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Jump to: Article | Book Section Number of items: 21. ArticleSinclair, Neil (2017) Reasons Internalism and the function of normative reasons. Dialectica, 71 (2). pp. 209-229. ISSN 1746-8361 Sinclair, Neil (2017) Conceptual role semantics and the reference of moral concepts. European Journal of Philosophy . ISSN 1468-0378 Sinclair, Neil (2016) On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19 (5). pp. 1211-1223. ISSN 1572-8447 Sinclair, Neil (2016) Reasons, inescapability and persuasion. Philosophical Studies . ISSN 1573-0883 Sinclair, Neil (2014) On standing one's ground. Analysis, 74 (3). pp. 422-431. ISSN 0003-2638 Sinclair, Neil (2012) The pretensions of moral realism. Analytic Philosophy, 53 (2). pp. 158-179. ISSN 2153-960X (Unpublished) Sinclair, Neil (2012) Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements. Biology and Philosophy . ISSN 0169-3867 Sinclair, Neil (2012) Expressivism and the value of truth. Philosophia, 40 (4). pp. 877-883. ISSN 1574-9274 Sinclair, Neil (2012) Expressivist explanations. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2). pp. 147-177. ISSN 1740-4681 Sinclair, Neil (2012) Promotionalism, motivationalism and reasons to perform physically impossible actions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice . ISSN 1386-2820 (In Press) Sinclair, Neil (2011) Moral expressivism and sentential negation. Philosophical Studies, 152 (3). pp. 385-411. ISSN 1573-0883 Sinclair, Neil (2011) The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1911-0820 Sinclair, Neil (2008) Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37 (2). pp. 263-287. ISSN 0556-8641 Sinclair, Neil (2007) Propositional clothing and belief. The Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (228). pp. 342-362. ISSN 1467-9213 Sinclair, Neil (2007) Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 41 (2-4). pp. 201-220. ISSN 0022-5363 Sinclair, Neil (2006) The moral belief problem. Ratio, 19 (2). pp. 249-260. ISSN 1467-9329 Sinclair, Neil (2006) Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9 (4). pp. 417-439. ISSN 1386-2820 Book SectionSinclair, Neil (2018) The naturalistic fallacy and the history of metaethics. In: The naturalistic fallacy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781316717578 Sinclair, Neil (2017) Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology. In: Oxford studies in metaethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (In Press) Leibowitz, Uri D. and Sinclair, Neil (2017) Evolution and the missing link (in debunking arguments). In: The Cambridge handbook of evolutionary ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 210-225. ISBN 9781107132955 Leibowitz, Uri D. and Sinclair, Neil Evolution and the missing link (in debunking arguments). In: Cambridge Handbook to Evolutionary Ethics. Cambridge University Press. (In Press) |