Free thinking for expressivists

Sinclair, Neil (2008) Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37 (2). pp. 263-287. ISSN 0556-8641

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This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Philosphical Papers © 2008, copyright Taylor & Francis; Philosophical Papers is available online at:
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
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Depositing User: Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2012 13:43
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 20:27

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