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Çetinkaya, Janset Özün (2023) Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians: Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.

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Abstract

This thesis offers three novel accounts on three different topics that fall under Aristotle’s account of happiness and flourishing.

In Part I, I reinterpret the function argument (NE I 7) to provide an answer to the long-standing question: why does Aristotle identify happiness with only theoretical and practical wisdom? I claim that Aristotle constructs his function argument, whereby he establishes what is good for humans, with his metaphysics in mind. I argue that two metaphysical notions (human essence, human propria) enter the function argument implicitly and that for Aristotle, there is a metaphysically-ordered relation (metaphysical grounding) between four items in the function argument: human essence, human function, human propria, and human good. Building on these claims, I explain the grounds on which Aristotle restricts the human good to theoretical and practical wisdom despite identifying the human function with rational activities in general.

In Part II, I reinterpret three types of friendship (NE VIII-IX) by inquiring into two new topics which have not been addressed in the literature, nor explicitly raised by Aristotle in his writings: could it be the case that for Aristotle, particular agent-based qualities figure prominently in all types of friendships, and if so, how can two parties become philoi and form philia? I claim that there is a common structural similarity between all types of friendship in virtue of being subsumed under the phenomenon of philia. I argue that in all types of friendship, particular agent-based qualities explain some features related to these common characteristics. Building on this, I develop the view that friends focus on each other’s particular agent-based qualities in a certain way to become philos and form philia.

In Part III, I explicate the relation between self-knowledge and character friendship (NE IX 4, 9; MM II 15; EE VII 12) discussion of which has recently gained popularity among scholars. I claim that the relation can be best captured by a non-standard account of self-knowledge which is implicit in Aristotle. I argue that virtuous people already have self-knowledge and they employ it in attributing themselves prohairetic agency by making and acting on their prohairetic choices. I further argue that character friends contribute to their existing level of self-knowledge by making each other aware of their skills and qualities that constitute their particular virtue. I claim that in this way, they become aware of a new layer of their prohairetic agency by realising a new aspect of their disposition that will be manifest in a different circumstance.

Item Type:	Thesis (University of Nottingham only) (PhD)
Supervisors:	Duncombe, Matthew Sinclair, Neil
Faculties/Schools:	UK Campuses > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities
Item ID:	72166
Depositing User:	Cetinkaya, Ozun
Date Deposited:	23 Sep 2024 09:18
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2024 12:57
URI:	https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/72166

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