Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the LiarTools Jago, Mark (2016) Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76 (3). pp. 278-283. ISSN 1467-8284 Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/278
AbstractStephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances.
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