Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism

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Mackie, Penelope (2014) Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism. Analysis, 74 (4). pp. 593-603. ISSN 1467-8284

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Abstract

Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/994300
Additional Information: This is an author-produced post-print version of an article published in Analysis. It is the final version of the manuscript accepted for publication, but does not include modifications following copyediting and proof correction. For the published version, see: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593
Keywords: free will, causal powers, compatibilism, determinism, causation
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu088
Depositing User: Mackie, Dr Penelope
Date Deposited: 14 Jul 2016 08:58
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 20:13
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/34975

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