Corruption and bicameral reforms

Tools

Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2016) Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare . pp. 1-25. ISSN 1432-217X

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0969-9

Abstract

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Item Type:	Article
RIS ID:	https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/788343
Additional Information:	The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9.
Keywords:	Bicameralism, corruption, lobbying
Schools/Departments:	University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number:	10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9
Related URLs:	URL URL Type http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355 UNSPECIFIED
Depositing User:	Facchini, Giovanni
Date Deposited:	06 Jun 2016 08:08
Last Modified:	04 May 2020 17:49
URI:	https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/33776

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View

LoginAdmin