Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power

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Nosenzo, Daniele and Sefton, Martin (2014) Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power. In: Reward and punishment in social dilemmas. Series in human cooperation . Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 87-114. ISBN 9780199300730

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Abstract

Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (‘central monitors’). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation.

Item Type: Book Section
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/729060
Additional Information: This is a draft of an article that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book Reward and punishment in social dilemmas / edited by Paul A.M. Van Lange, Bettina Rockenbach, Toshio Yamagishi due for publication in 2014.
Keywords: Rewards; punishment; discretionary incentives; decentralized incentives; peer-to-peer incentives; centralized incentives; experiment.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
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http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199300747.doPublisher
Depositing User: Kesaite, Viktorija
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2015 15:02
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 16:48
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/29875

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