REINSURANCE IN MEXICO, MORAL HAZARD AND ASIMETRIC INFORMATION

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Cassab, Eduardo (2005) REINSURANCE IN MEXICO, MORAL HAZARD AND ASIMETRIC INFORMATION. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper attempts to investigate Moral Hazard and Asymmetric Information between Insurance and Reinsurance Companies in the Mexican Insurance Industry. Empirical results revealed by the analysis of information asymmetries that occur in the Mexican Insurance Market, describe how these information asymmetries can lead to adverse selection problems.

Item Type: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Depositing User: EP, Services
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2006
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2018 07:32
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/20016

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