Executive Compensation and Firm Financial Performance in ChinaTools Zhang, Xichen (2022) Executive Compensation and Firm Financial Performance in China. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)]
AbstractExecutive compensation has long been seen as the solution key to the agency problem between shareholders and managers in terms of corporate governance. Specifically, an efficient remuneration system could effectively motivate executives and reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers. On the other hand, if the remuneration system is not properly designed, it may lead to a lack of incentive for management, which could exacerbate the dispute between shareholders and management in turn. The topic of "exorbitant remuneration" for senior executives of listed companies has caused great concern in China in recent years. Some have begun to question whether the rise in executive remuneration reflects the increase in wealth creation for the company and if the corporate governance incentive scheme is logical and efficient. China is currently undergoing an economic transition to a more market-based economy. Furthermore, Confucianism, which emphasizes the equal distribution of wealth, has had a significant influence on China. Therefore, it is interesting and important to study the relationship between executive compensation and company financial performance in China.
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