Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar

Jago, Mark (2016) Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76 (3). pp. 278-283. ISSN 1467-8284

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Abstract

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances.

Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of us who aim to find a solution without logical revisionism. As it stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Mark Jago "Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar" Analysis 2016 76: 278-283 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/278.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 30 Nov 2016 12:14
Last Modified: 02 Dec 2016 17:04
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/39078

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