Corruption and bicameral reforms

Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2016) Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare . pp. 1-25. ISSN 1432-217X

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Abstract

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9.
Keywords: Bicameralism, corruption, lobbying
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355UNSPECIFIED
Depositing User: Facchini, Giovanni
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2016 08:08
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2016 15:31
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/33776

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