Corruption and bicameral reforms

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Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2016) Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare . pp. 1-25. ISSN 1432-217X

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Official URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0969-9

Abstract

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Item Type:

Article

RIS ID:

https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/788343

Additional Information:

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9.

Keywords:

Bicameralism, corruption, lobbying

Schools/Departments:

University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics

Identification Number:

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9