The Changing Nature of θυμός in Homer, Plato and Apollonius of Rhodes

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Abstract

Θυμός in early Greek literature is largely conceived in these three ways:

1) Part of the soul. Using Plato's *Republic* as the starting point, most analyses reference θυμός as part of broader works about the soul. Some scholars map back Plato's ideas, trying to find their origins in Homer.
2) Seat of emotions. The θυμός is discussed in relation to various emotions and is often agreed to be the "seat of emotions", a conclusion supported by examples from Homer and Plato.
3) A physical entity. Using select examples from Homer a physical definition of θυμός is postulated as "smoke" or "breath".

More recently Clarke examines θυμός alongside a "family" of other words including φρήν/φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, καρδίη, πραπίδες, and νόος. He does not discuss all aspects of the θυμός in Homer, or consider it independently of the other words. Caswell also skims over certain of its activities in Homer. The most comprehensive recent review of θυμός in Homer is provided by Cairns in his Oxford Classical Dictionary entry. Cairns' review, though, is necessarily a pit-stop tour of the Homeric θυμός. An analytically detailed review of all the various uses of θυμός in Homer is the first gap in the literature that this thesis addresses. New light is shed particularly on the range of influences on the θυμός, and on the categories of options that the θυμός is said to debate or ponder with different verbs used for different categories.

After examining the uses of θυμός in the Homeric epics, this thesis also compares them with Plato's use of θυμός, before looking forward in time to Apollonius of Rhodes' epic the *Argonautica* to determine the relative influences of Homer and/or Plato. This is the second gap in the literature to be addressed: There are, to my knowledge, no works that deal with θυμός in the *Argonautica*, except as a brief footnote in studies of Euripides' *Medea* where the analysis is restricted to the single character of Medea. In addition, three themes are followed through – heat and θυμός, anger and θυμός, and shame/courage and θυμός to illustrate the development of θυμός over time. It is in this section that Aristotle is added to Homer, Plato and Apollonius, as his works make a valuable contribution to the aspects of both heat and courage in connection with θυμός. The vast difference in the portrayal of θυμός by the various authors makes it possible to trace clear threads of thought, some that appear in Homer and Apollonius but not in the philosophers, some that are seen only in the philosophers, and some that while absent in Homer appear in both the philosophers and Apollonius. When later authors use θυμός in a way that is not prominent in Homer, this thesis looks back to ascertain whether it is truly absent. In doing so it discovers an aspect of θυμός that Apollonius makes much of, the family-oriented θυμός, and finds definite evidence of it in Homer that has been largely overlooked in previous academic discussions.

I conclude that while Apollonius consciously follows a Homeric pattern in his use of θυμός and does not follow the soul-centric description in Plato's *Republic*, he nevertheless embraces the physical description of θυμός seen in Plato's *Timaeus* and continued in other medical and philosophical literature.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Why a new consideration of θυμός is needed

In the *Cratylus,* Plato depicts a conversation between three men: Socrates, Cratylus and Hermogenes. They discuss the original meanings of words that have been changed over time. Regarding ἡμέρα, which Socrates says has been changed from either ἰμέρα or ἐμέρα, he states "Only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver, don't you know?".[1] Among the words that form his discussion he explains that "θυμός has its name from the raging (θύσις) and boiling (ζέσεως) of the soul".[2] If Plato's characters were unsure of the meanings of the very words they were speaking, it is hardly surprising that a modern scholar may have the same difficulties. Indeed Dedovic observes that any prior attempt to "clearly define or psychologically profile" θυμός has been seen as futile.[3] Yet while, or perhaps because, much has been written on θυμός, the problem persists.

Cairns and Caswell both address at length the wide-ranging functions of the θυμός.[4] On the other hand Jahn argues at greater length that it is "semantically void", a pleonasm.[5] It is, however, more common to see a writer argue at length for a brief translation, such as Onians' "breath-soul" and Clarke's "breath of thought", or Rohde's "seat of the emotions" and Snell's "organ of (e)motion".[6] A more troubling tendency is to simply provide a single-word translation in parenthesis and then move on. For example, Gay states "Aristotle himself suggests that there is a link between courage and *thumos* ['anger']" before going on to define the English word anger and continue his analysis of Aristotle on the basis of that definition.[7]

[1] Pl. *Cra.* 418c9-10.
[2] Pl. *Cra.* 419d8-e2.
[3] Dedovic, 2021, p.7.
[4] Cairns, 2019; Caswell, 1990.
[5] Jahn, 1987, pp.1-123, 247-298; Van Der Mije, 1991, p.440.
[6] Onians, 1951, pp.23-44; Clarke, 1999, p.84; Rohde, 1925, pp.50-51; Snell, 1982, p.9. (All of these sources are discussed at greater length, below).
[7] Gay, 1988, p.258.

Perhaps with similar preconceptions in mind, Koziak looks to Aristotle and seems surprised to find that θυμός is not simply anger but "the general capacity for emotion" which, she says, "constitutes an innovation over the formulations in the *Iliad* and the *Republic*".[8] The news that θυμός being associated with more emotions than only anger is an innovation over its use in the *Iliad* would certainly come as a surprise to Rohde and Snell. However, Koziak's book is a useful starting point for this thesis as it highlights one of the gaps in scholarship which I shall attempt to partly fill. She states that:

> One perplexity occasioned by the typical translations is this: it is especially odd that the translation of *thumos* should hover between the broad concept, spiritedness, and the narrow concept, anger. This perplexity should have led commentators to question what the relationship of the broader interpretation to the narrower one might be, to ask why anger should be the narrow concept, and to ascertain whether the word's meaning had ever fluctuated.[9]

It is the latter question, whether the word's meaning had ever fluctuated, that is addressed first here. Koziak's background of political philosophy meant that Aristotle was the natural starting place for her enquiry. I elected to go further back and begin with the first major works that feature θυμός – the Homeric epics – before moving on to Plato. Like Koziak, I am limited with regards to space and cannot fully consider all fluctuations in the meaning of θυμός throughout the long history of the usage of that word. However, by comparing only Homer and Plato, I clearly demonstrate that certainly between those authors the meaning of θυμός did indeed fluctuate hugely. To do justice to the argument, it is necessary to analyse both authors in some considerable depth, devoting a chapter to each. Having established the very different usage of θυμός between theses authors, I feel sure that Koziak would be interested to go further forward in time and ask whether it changed further, or changed back, with later authors. I begin to address that question here by asking which θυμός, the Homeric or the Platonic, appears to have had the most influence upon the next extant epic – the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes.

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[8] Koziak, 2000, p.34. Koziak approaches θυμός from a background of politics. The political θυμός is discussed briefly below.
[9] Koziak, 2000, pp.31-32.

Reading around θυμός – common threads in scholarship

One strand of work on θυμός has already been broached by referencing Koziak, above. That is, political θυμός. While Koziak has gone back to "grass-roots", as it were, by concentrating on Aristotle, the bulk of research into political θυμός looks further forward and examines the perspectives of, for example, Descartes, Adam Smith, Sartre and Hegel.[10] In these accounts θυμός almost always means ambition.[11] Mansfield, more recently, refers to θυμός as "the part of the soul that makes us want to insist on our own importance".[12] He goes on to sum it up as the drive which makes minority groups angry if they feel they are being denied benefits to which they feel they are entitled – it is not the benefits particularly that they want, according to Mansfield, merely the acknowledgement by the ruling classes that they are entitled to those benefits.[13] He ties θυμός expressly to anger, despite writing seven years after Koziak attempted to place θυμός on a more accurate footing within the field of politics. While these views are interesting in themselves, they do not shed further light on the Homeric or Platonic understandings of θυμός and so are not covered further here. They do, however, serve to illustrate the persistent misunderstanding of θυμός.

The next strand, also covered by Koziak, has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, that of gender studies and feminism. Historically in classical studies one woman has been particularly associated with θυμός – Euripides' Medea, who famously killed her children even though she knew it was evil because, as she said, "my θυμός is stronger".[14] Perhaps because θυμός in women is not discussed at very great length in Homer (although it is present), nor in Plato, Euripides' portrayal of Medea's out-of-control θυμός has been used to argue that in Greek literature θυμός is a) a masculine trait, and b) invariably dangerous when present in women.[15] By showing that θυμός in Aristotle is also

[10] Hassing, 2011; Hill, 2007; Ang, 2014.
[11] Eg. Smith, 1976 [1759], VII.ii.10.2-4
[12] Mansfield, 2007, pp.41-42.
[13] Mansfield, 2007, p.44.
[14] Euripides, *Med.* 1078-1079.
[15] For example, Foley, 1989, p.77, who sees Medea's monologue as an internal debate between the feminine (mother) side of Medea's character and the competing masculine (heroic) side with

concerned with other emotions besides the traditionally masculine anger Koziak sees what she calls Aristotle's "expansion of *thumos*" as "part of Aristotle's critique of traditional Greek masculinity".[16] Lest Aristotle be seen as a feminist (which Koziak argues against), Deslauriers, for example, uses Aristotle's understanding of θυμός in the *Politics* to explain his "exclusion of women from political authority, even in the context of the household".[17] In this thesis I do not make an extensive examination of the θυμός of women versus men. I do note, however, that in at least some of its Homeric aspects, the θυμός of women and men is not markedly different. Andromache's θυμός returns after a faint, which may be seen as a "feminine" response, but the identical phrase is used when Laertes also recovers from fainting.[18] Male warriors are prompted by their θυμός to fight, but so are goddesses.[19] The goddess Hera "loves" in her θυμός, but so does the man Achilles.[20] Medea's θυμός is remarkable, but as she is in every way a unique rather than a typical character, I do not use her θυμός to make generalisations about θυμός in women. At the same time, I acknowledge that normal women, rather than goddesses or queens, are grossly under-represented and a more focussed analysis of the θυμός in ordinary women in Greek literature, not just the Homeric works, may yet be worthwhile. Nevertheless, on the very few occasions where the θυμός of ordinary women is mentioned, it is consistent with the male-centric examples that are abundant in the Homeric works. For example, Odysseus plots how to take away the θυμός of Penelope's handmaidens, that is, kill them, in the same way that many male warriors have their θυμός taken away at death.[21] A hypothetical female servant is pained in her θυμός, an example that is discussed further in the section θυμός-paining and θυμός-pleasing.[22] She is limited in her response by both her gender and her frailty, but so far as she can act, her θυμός prompts her to do so, just as the θυμός of a warrior prompts him to act. The actions are different (wishing as opposed to fighting) but the will to act that comes from the θυμός is there in

"the hero and finally the divinity in Medea emerg[ing] to dominate, if not entirely obscure, the victimized woman".

[16] Koziak, 2000, p.154.
[17] Deslauriers, 2019, p.57 (abstract).
[18] Hom. *Il.* 22.475, *Od.* 24.349.
[19] Hom. *Il.* 7.74, 7.25.
[20] Hom. *Il.* 1.196, 9.343.
[21] Hom. *Od.* 22.462.
[22] Hom. *Od.* 20.118.

both cases. Penelope accuses her maidservants of "knowing" in their θυμός just as various men know in their θυμός, although the verb used (ἐπίστημι) is unique to their θυμός.[23] Thus in four aspects of the Homeric θυμός (leaving at death, being pained, motivating the agent to action, and having knowledge) the θυμός of ordinary, low status, mortal women is consistent with that of men. I repeat, though, that these are a tiny minority of examples and further analysis with that one question in mind – whether the θυμός of men and women is different – would be warranted.

Further back in time, the second half of the 20th Century saw a great deal of analysis of θυμός in connection with emotion, as already mentioned above. Chronologically this overlapped with the earliest modern analysis of θυμός which concentrated on explaining the soul, with a heavy reliance on Plato's *Republic*. Both of these aspects are touched on where relevant, below. However, from the point of view of emotions, it is sufficient to say again with Snell that θυμός can be translated as the "organ of (e)motion", while adding the necessary caveat that it has a number of other aspects or functions besides.[24]

The final strand appears occasionally throughout the modern history of work on θυμός and attempts to fit θυμός to a single word or concept, as cautioned against by Dedovic, quoted above. Some variation on "breath" is popular, with Onians making an early and extensive argument for all instances of θυμός to be explained by "breath-soul": breath, but with a richer meaning than our current understanding of "mere outer air received and expelled".[25] Gomperz and Bremmer, meanwhile, approach θυμός tangentially in their studies of soul and mind and find that θυμός is a "smoke-soul" (Gomperz) or an "ego soul" that contrasts with the "free soul", or ψυχή, (Bremmer).[26] These arguments are touched on in the relevant sections below, particularly in considering Homer's use of θυμός.

[23] Hom. *Od.* 4.730.
[24] Snell, 1982, p.9.
[25] Onians, 1951, pp.23-44, 46.
[26] Gomperz, 1901, p.249; Bremmer, 1983, p.54.

Current controversies/gaps in the literature and how to address them

Mirhady, reviewing Koziak's book, draws attention to another gap in the literature:

> We might wish for quite a bit more from her discussion of Homer. After all, with over seven hundred occurrences [of *thumos*], all of them singular (I noted), there seems a real possibility to put together a systematic taxonomy. In fact, we do not even get an index of passages.[27]

I should like to boast that I have put together a systematic taxonomy of all the occurrences of θυμός in Homer, and I agree with Mirhady that it would be a useful tool for scholars. While I cannot go that far, I have analysed most of the occurrences, including those in the *Odyssey* which, as regretted by Mirhady, were absent from Koziak's book. In an attempt to understand θυμός as Homer understood it, I approached the texts with the following conditions in mind: I assumed for the sake of the argument that we do not know what θυμός means, that Homer is our sole source, and that we do understand every other word that he used. Thus in each case I asked "what is θυμός doing here?". This functional approach, which may sound overly simplistic, has proved very rewarding and has shed new light in particular on Homer's understanding of θυμός in connection with its motivation(s), as well as in its role in debating where it becomes clear that different verbs are used according to the various categories of choice that the agent faces, a feature which has previously gone unmentioned in academic literature.

Leaving Homer behind, Mirhady also regrets that Koziak limits her analysis of Plato largely to the *Republic,* although that was an understandable choice as she was writing about political philosophy. If the question in this thesis was merely as Koziak asks "whether the word's meaning had ever fluctuated?" it would be possible to examine only the *Republic,* compare that with Homer, and answer with a loud "yes!" On the other hand, if, as I ask in the Plato chapter, the question is the broader "how is θυμός represented by Plato?", Koziak's choice of sources would yield only an incomplete and one-sided answer. Such a

[27] Mirhady, 2002, p.440.

limited approach to Plato is another problem that is rectified in this thesis. While the *Republic* is arguably the most influential of Plato's works dealing with θυμός, and certainly provides the most well-known and in-depth definition of θυμός, it is not the only work that treats of θυμός, nor even the only definition given by Plato. By examining other works of Plato it is shown that he presented at least two interpretations of θυμός, one psychical, the other physical. Plato's psychical θυμός is shown to be very different from Homer's. His physical description of the θυμός, on the other hand, while being more expansively described than Homer's, remains essentially compatible with the Homeric usage except in one notable regard: Plato associates the θυμός with heat, Homer does not. It is, however, this particular aspect that is taken up consistently in later works, including by Apollonius Rhodius.

Regarding Aristotle, the main focus of Koziak's argument, she states that she:

> … delineate[s] Aristotle's three diverse uses of *thumos*. The first and second, *thumos* as the emotion anger and as the aggressive martial *thumos*, do not differ from Plato's conception, as recent commentators have argued. His third use, however, *thumos* as the general capacity for emotion, constitutes an innovation over the formulations in the *Iliad* and the *Republic*.[28]

In this thesis I argue against Koziak's "first use", that θυμός is the emotion anger in Plato. While I acknowledge that the difference between θυμός and anger (ὀργή, in the *Republic*) is occasionally subtle, nevertheless there is a clear difference and if the question were "what is θυμός in Plato?", it would be remiss to answer simply "anger". A difference between θυμός and anger is far more prominent in Homer. Furthermore, while each of the authors shows a difference between θυμός and anger, in each case the difference varies. This will be discussed in detail in the chapter "Themes: Anger and θυμός", which as well as the three main authors under discussion (Homer, Plato and Apollonius), includes material from Aristotle.

[28] Koziak, 2000, p.34.

Moving on from anger, Koziak's claim that understanding "*thumos* as the general capacity for emotion constitutes an innovation over the formulations in the *Iliad* and the *Republic*" is particularly ripe for argument, but it is one that is not greatly taken up here. That θυμός is the general capacity for emotion is correct, up to a point. What is surprising is that this understanding could be called an innovation. Homer associates anger with the θυμός, but also other diverse emotions including desire and love, pleasure, fear, pity and shame.[29] As far back as 1946, Snell suggested translating "*thymos* as 'organ of (e)motion'".[30] Since Snell's time, it has been quite usual for scholars to approach θυμός through the lens of one emotion or another, including love, anger, shame, and pity, with analysis including but rarely restricted to Homer.[31] The depth of the available literature renders it unnecessary to revisit the question and confirm again that θυμός is indeed associated with emotion generally. However, to obtain a full understanding of θυμός, its many other aspects also need to be considered, and are considered in this thesis.

I do not suggest an English translation for θυμός. It is evident, especially from Homer, that θυμός is an extraordinarily wide-ranging concept and no one English word can be used to cover all instances. In this, I differ from, for example, Onians and Clarke and even to a certain extent Snell who all felt able to narrow the definition of θυμός to a single word or a single concept (as discussed in the relevant sections, below). The difficulty in attempting a word-for-word translation is, I believe, well-summarised by Dedovic:

> It must be noted that any prior attempt to clearly define or psychologically profile these terms [θυμός, along with others dealing with mental activity] consistently has been seen as futile. That is, these terms have no firm English equivalents. As a result, any single definition or usage pattern profile may be easily refuted by numerous counter-examples.[32]

[29] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 3.139, 1.196, *Od.* 10.362, *Il.* 8.138, 8.202, 15.561.
[30] Snell, 1946 (trans. 1982), p.9.
[31] Eg. Renaut, 2013; Braund and Most, 2003; Cairns, 1993; Liebert, 2013.
[32] Dedovic, 2021, p.7.

Outline of chapters and overview of important discoveries

My approach to θυμός in Homer has already been mentioned, above. It is difficult to read Homer, indeed any author, without carrying some preconception regarding θυμός being a part of the soul as described in Plato's *Republic.* It is a problem that is immediately compounded by one aspect of θυμός in Homer being that it leaves the body at death, as does the ψυχή, raising the possibility that to Homer the θυμός may indeed be another word for soul or be a type of soul.[33] Other questions that have been raised include whether θυμός might be synonymous with breath or life.[34] Collectively these are the first aspects of θυμός in Homer to be considered, in the section "Life, Death, Breath and θυμός". However, many other aspects of θυμός are also considered including the role of the θυμός in receiving information and using that knowledge to debate choices and make decisions, its ability to feel both pain and pleasure (an aspect which has previously attracted very little comment), and how the θυμός both motivates the agent to act, and also how it itself is motivated to action by internal and external influences. It is the latter which has shown a new understanding of the dual-facing role of θυμός in Homer. The function of θυμός in animals is also considered, along with the question of whether θυμός, apparently a laudable aspect of an agent's character, can nevertheless be overdone, as discussed in the section "Μεγάθυμος and Ὑπέρθυμος".

Moving on to Plato, the well-worn definition of θυμός being the one-third non-rational part of the soul in the *Republic* is summarised only briefly. Particular attention is given to the thumoedic class in the description of the city which describes the education of what may be termed an 'ideal' group of warrior-guardians, corresponding with the 'ideal' θυμός in the soul. This approach allows a comparison with other representations of a soul-centred θυμός in Plato, particularly the *Phaedrus,* but also with some of the real-life characters who feature in the *Republic,* for example Leontius and Thrasymachus. By means of this comparison it is shown that Plato (through Socrates) presented only one ideal θυμός - the hypothetical one. In the real-life examples, on the other hand,

[33] As per Gomperz (1901), Rohde (1925), and Bremmer (1983).
[34] Onians (1951), Caswell (1990), and Clarke (1999) all regard θυμός as being (in part, in Caswell's case) some variation on breath.

the θυμός is a great deal more problematic, much less controllable than Socrates suggested.

Far less commented on in modern scholarship is the definition of θυμός found in the *Timaeus* where Plato turns his back on the psychical model and instead presents a physical θυμός. I mentioned above that Plato's treatment of the physical θυμός was roughly compatible with Homer's, but I must add the caveat that Plato goes a great deal further than Homer and introduces some aspects that are novel: even when a retrospective search is made in Homer, such slight trace of them is found that they must be considered absent or at the very least unimportant in Homer's understanding of θυμός. One such aspect is explored in some depth in the section "Heat and θυμός". While largely absent in Homer, though, the physical characteristics as described by Plato do provide a gateway to other philosophical literature as well as medical texts which are discussed in this section.

With the Homeric and Platonic θυμός in mind, it is then possible to search for the influence of either or both in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica.* As a writer of epic, one may expect Apollonius to continue the heroic θυμός tradition of Homer. On the other hand, it would not be unreasonable to expect a well-read scholar such as Apollonius to have been influenced by more contemporary philosophy and as such it would not be surprising to see him incorporate a more Platonic θυμός into his work. However, certainly with regards to the psychical θυμός, the differences between Homer and Plato are so marked that Apollonius could not embrace them both without jarring inconsistencies in the *Argonautica*.

My approach to Apollonius was in the first place similar to my approach to Homer – to ask "what is the θυμός doing here?" From this approach, I found that Apollonius presents a particular aspect of the psychical θυμός to be of great importance – that of its family-oriented duties. Perhaps because of the nature of his writings, this facet is not prominent, in fact is largely absent, in Plato. However, going back to Homer and examining his works anew with Apollonius' family-oriented θυμός in mind, it was possible to discern that the same aspect is present in the Homeric θυμός, but well-hidden. It is particularly

noticeable in the motivations of the θυμός that are first discussed in the section of the Homer chapter "Rousing the θυμός with speech".

There follows a theme-by-theme analysis of θυμός in Apollonius, using the Homer chapter as a framework. It is discovered that in all cases, the Apollonian θυμός is modelled on the Homeric one. However, there are also, in most cases, differences where Apollonius has taken the Homeric θυμός and twisted it into something at once recognisably Homeric but also novel. It is not possible to argue any influence from Plato in this, rather Apollonius takes the Homeric model but then also pulls away from Homer. This is a technique that has been noted in other aspects of the *Argonautica,* but has not been examined from the point of view of θυμός before.[35]

As the most thumoedic character in the *Argonautica,* it is necessary to consider Medea at some length, including specific influences on her depiction by Apollonius. While his main inspiration is widely accepted to be Euripides' Medea, I find that she is also a traditionally Homeric character.[36] Her story shares some similarities with Homer's Nausicaa, but is twisted by Apollonius so that the innocent helper-maiden Nausicaa portrayed by Homer is in Medea a darkly powerful sorceress, but still a helper-maiden. However, she can also be directly compared with a far more traditional Homeric character – that of hero. A like-for-like comparison between Medea's internal debate in Book 3 of the *Argonautica* and Hector's monologue in Book 22 of the *Iliad* is particularly rewarding. Having established Apollonius' Medea as a literary descendant of Homer as well as Euripides, it is then possible to look at her θυμός with the original question in mind: whether her θυμός as portrayed by Apollonius owes more to Homer or to Plato. As with almost all other instances of θυμός in the *Argonautica,* Apollonius has taken the Homeric model and twisted it in various ways. However, here finally can be seen a non-Homeric influence: it is particularly with Medea's θυμός that Apollonius is seen to associate θυμός very strongly with heat.

[35] Eg. Beye (2006).
[36] Eg. Dyck (1989), Hunter (1989).

Finally, I look at particular aspects of the θυμός that have stood out especially in one or more authors and traced the development of those aspects over time. As mentioned above, heat and θυμός is one of those themes. The other theme I have chosen are courage/shame and θυμός, and anger and θυμός. These themes, more than any other examination, illustrate most clearly that the meaning of θυμός has indeed 'fluctuated' over time, as suspected by Koziak. In these sections it has been beneficial to draw on other authors besides Homer, Plato and Apollonius, with Aristotle particularly providing a useful contribution.

A note on the choice of texts and use of translations

To consider both the Homeric works and Plato is not unusual despite the difference in genre and the wide chronological gap between the two corpuses. Koziak has done the same, as has Cairns.[37] Braund and Most cover multiple genres including epic, philosophy, oratory and tragedy, and chronologically cover time periods from Homer to Vergil.[38] Likewise Homer and Apollonius are frequently considered together.[39] Nevertheless it is unusual to find an analysis that concerns both Plato and Apollonius. Marshall did so and called it "unchartered territory", a description which certainly appears to be justified by the previous choices made by scholars. Nevertheless, Marshall's decision was rewarded, and she has laid the foundation for more work to be done on the reception of philosophy in the *Argonautica.*[40] I have made a similar choice and likewise found that while largely "unchartered", the territory is most fruitful.

Throughout my consideration of all the ancient authors, I have made it clear which Greek word is under consideration at any point. Nevertheless I have also provided English translations in order that my work should be accessible to any and all who may wish to read it.

[37] Koziak (1999), (2000). Cairns (2014).
[38] Braund & Most (2003).
[39] Bär (2019), Burgess (2020), Danek (2009), Fantuzzi (2008), Knight (1995), to name a few.
[40] Marshall (2017).

Conclusions

Regarding the basic question "what is θυμός?", there is no all-encompassing answer that can be affixed to all authors, all times and all genres. Rather, to understand each author's use of the word, one must look to their writings and ask "what is θυμός doing here? What is affecting θυμός and how? What effect does θυμός have upon the agent?". However, the different usages provided by Homer and Plato are sufficiently comprehensive to provide a starting framework for other authors. Homeric θυμός is largely an aspect of what would later come to be called "the inner man", that is, it is inseparably linked to a person's character, feelings, thought processes and motivations. It is also, less prominently, a physical aspect which has an assigned proper place in the body (θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν). Plato presents two types of θυμός. One is the θυμός of the *Republic* which is a part of the soul, and while covering some of the functions of the Homeric character-θυμός it is greatly narrowed in scope from its usage in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Plato's second usage is as a physical organ, with its various attributes explored and explained in far greater depth than in Homer. Apollonius picks up on one physical aspect of the θυμός, its association with heat, and incorporates that into his depiction of the θυμός. However, that is his only possible 'nod' to Plato. He makes no attempt to depict the θυμός along the lines that Plato did in the *Republic.* Considering the Renaissance and post-Renaissance influence of Plato's *Republic,* it is interesting to see that aspect of θυμός being noticeably ignored by Apollonius. On the other hand, Apollonius clearly engages with the Homeric depiction of θυμός, but twists it subtly so that it is both recognisable to Homer's readers, but also something new.

Chapter 2: Homer

Section 1: Introduction to the use and meanings of θυμός in Homer

Overview of uses of θυμός in Homer

The word θυμός is used extensively in the Homeric works. Anyone who looks to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to discover the meaning of θυμός will quickly appreciate that it is a multifaceted concept. At the point of death, it can be said to leave the body or be taken, suggesting that it may be synonymous with life.[41] As it leaves the body it is sometimes said to be "breathed out", causing some to argue that it is a sort of breath.[42] It is sometimes said to return when a person recovers from a period of unconsciousness following an injury, suggesting that 'consciousness' may be a reasonable translation.[43] On occasion, if a person revives after a faint, it is said to be the ψυχή that leaves but the θυμός that returns, allowing the argument that the θυμός is a type of soul.[44]

Another prominent usage of θυμός relates to eating and drinking: "they ate and drank, neither was any man's θυμός denied a fair portion" occurs repeatedly in the *Iliad,* while the *Odyssey* tends more towards "they drank as their θυμός wished/was able".[45]

In the same way that the θυμός apparently enjoys food and drink, other external influences, as well as some internal ones, are said to be either θυμαλγής or θυμαρής – θυμός-paining or θυμός-pleasing.[46] Further instances relating to food and drink record men or horses drinking "as their θυμός commands", introducing another role of the θυμός in Homer – that of commander.[47] The θυμός is repeatedly said to "command" a person to some action or other, whether to eat and drink which presumably brings pleasure, or to deliver a

[41] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.470, 16.469.
[42] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.524, 16.468. Onians, 1951; Clarke, 1999.
[43] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.152, 15.240.
[44] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 22.466-475. Gomperz, 1901; Bremmer, 1983
[45] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 1.468, 1.602; *Od.* 3.342, 395.
[46] Eg. Hom. *Od.* 8.272, 17.199.
[47] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.263, 8.189.

speech which the speaker knows will be ill-received.[48] A common command of the θυμός is to fight bravely, although a hypothetical coward would flee from battle if his θυμός had its way and could not be restrained.[49] Further examination shows that it is rare to restrain one's θυμός and that it can only be done with difficulty. A range of emotions, from anger and rage, through fear and shame, to pleasure and love, are also associated with the θυμός.[50]

If from the above the θυμός in the Homeric works appears to be involved only in physical appetites and emotional states, it should also be mentioned that it is involved in rational thought and apparently takes part in internal debates, pondering two courses of action, and weighing the risks and the benefits and also the rights and wrongs of each course, suggesting an ethical as well as a rational faculty.[51] It can be roused to action by hearing a speech or by some other external influence, and be recalled to duty, hinting at a memorial faculty.[52] Nor is the θυμός restricted to gods and humans: animals as diverse as lions and sheep also have a θυμός.[53] Finally, it is used in epithets with both μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος being used to describe men and, on one occasion each, giants and beasts.[54]

With this dizzying variety of uses, it is hardly to be wondered at that no one word can be reliably used to translate every instance of θυμός, hence the Cambridge Greek Lexicon's offering of six main categories summarised here as:

1) Breath, breath of life, vital spirit, life, strength.
2) Mind or heart (as the seat of consciousness and the emotions, or as the object of self-address).
3) Strength of mind, spirit, courage, determination, arrogant attitude, pride.
4) Will, wish, inclination, desire.

[48] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 2.276, 19.102.
[49] Hom. *Il.* 13.279-283.
[50] Eg. Hom. *Od.* 2.138, 11.55; *Il.* 1.196, 1.217.
[51] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 11.407; *Od.* 4.117.
[52] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 2.142; *Od.* 20.9.
[53] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 5.135, 16.355.
[54] Eg. Hom. *Od.* 24.57, 14.209; *Od.* 7.59, *Il.* 16.488.

5) Strong emotion, passion.[55]
6) Anger, wrath, indignation, rage.[56]

Scholarship on Homeric θυμός – a brief overview

The vast majority of studies on Homeric θυμός have approached it tangentially, initially as part of the soul, later in relation to the various emotions with which it is linked in literature. Few studies that include θυμός have limited themselves to Homer.

A) The relationship of the θυμός to the soul

Plato's *Republic* defines θυμός as being part of the soul (ψυχή) and the oldest important strand of discussion regarding the θυμός in the Homeric works concerns its relationship to the soul.[57] Unfortunately there is no universal definition or understanding of soul, any more than there is of θυμός. Rather, 'soul' has different meanings to different cultures and its analysis is therefore fraught with difficulties. When used by European and non-indigenous North American writers, soul tends to refer to an immortal and immaterial part of a human or animal that broadly retains their personality when it survives the death of the body, as per mainstream Christianity. Gomperz, writing originally in 1881, sees in Homer clear evidence of a 'two-soul' theory, of which the θυμός is one 'soul':

> Psykhe's sole *raison d'être* would appear to be her separation from the body at death and her survival in the underworld. Not a single instance can be quoted in which she appears as the agent of human thought, will, or emotion.[58]

On the other hand, Gomperz says, the functions of thought, will and emotion:

> … actually belonged to a being of quite a different formation – to a perishable being which dissolved in air at the death of animals and men. To that extent it is even legitimate to speak of a two-soul theory in Homer, and this second mortal soul went by the name of Thymos.[59]

[55] CGL does not cite any Homeric examples of this definition.
[56] Cambridge Greek Lexicon, 2021, s.v. "θυμός".
[57] Pl. *Resp.* 440e6-441a4.
[58] Gomperz, 1901, p.249.
[59] Gomperz, 1901, p.249.

Gomperz goes on to explore the etymological origin of θυμός being "identical with the Latin *fumus*, or smoke" and consequently suggests the notion of a "smoke-soul", by which term he continues to differentiate between θυμός and the more usually understood immortal soul or ψυχή.[60]

Rohde likewise used the soul as his starting point. However, he took issue with Gomperz's reasoning that any form of 'soul' can be mortal. As the θυμός apparently *is* mortal in the Homeric works, Rohde argues that it consequently cannot be a 'soul', contending that:

> If by soul a "something" is meant – as it must be in popular psychology – which is added independently to the body and its faculties, something which lives separately in the body and after the death of the body (with which it is not indissolubly united) dissociates itself and goes off independently – then the θυμός of Homer cannot be called a "soul" or a double of the ψυχή. Again and again the θυμός is clearly referred to as a mental faculty of the living body.[61]

Rohde, like Gomperz, regarded his conclusion as obvious. He was not troubled by one instance in Homer of the θυμός "going down to Hades" which would indicate an existence of the θυμός beyond the living body as, he states, "this can only be an error or oversight".[62]

After Rohde, the 'mental faculty' of the θυμός became the prominent strand of discussion, as explored below, for some time. Bremmer, however, considerably later, returned to a two-soul theory for Homer, which he was able to do by using a more broad definition of soul than Rohde would have allowed. He takes a theory from early Indian philosophy and applies it to the Homeric works and, by doing so, is able to regard the ψυχή as being the equivalent of a "free soul" (borrowing the term from Sanskrit scholar Ernst Arbman). This free soul is inactive while the body is active and leaves the body to continue an independent existence after death (and during swoons and in dreams), but is nevertheless a

[60] Gomperz, 1901, p.249.
[61] Rohde, 1925, pp.50-51.
[62] Rohde, 1925, p.51.

"precondition for the continuation of life".[63] However, he acknowledges that the evidence base only from the Homeric works is tenuous and bolsters his argument by stating that "given the fact that the concept of the free soul seems to have existed at one time nearly everywhere for which we have evidence [Bremmer only quotes Arbman, so the identity of the rest of "nearly everywhere" is unclear] it is not unreasonable to infer that the Homeric *psychē* corresponds with the free soul."[64] The role of what Bremmer then called the "ego soul", which is active during consciousness, falls to θυμός along with νόος and μένος.[65]

B) The physical θυμός as breath or organ

A slightly more recent strand of research has been to try to explain the θυμός in entirely physical terms. Amongst the earliest to take this approach was Onians who did not abandon the soul as a point of reference, but sought to reconcile words that had previously only been considered as psychical concepts, θυμός amongst them, with physical organs. He stated:

> Rohde speaks of the 'untranslatable word θυμός', and says that it is not taken from any bodily organ and it shows already that it is thought of as an immaterial function, which, however does not explain its origin and, unfortunately, is not true; for Homer's language makes it clear that it is not a function but a thing.[66]

Having ascertained to his satisfaction that φρένες refers to the lungs, he therefore suggests that θυμός, which the *Iliad* refers to as ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός, is breath as it interacts with blood in the lungs – a "breath-soul".[67] The interaction of blood warming the breath is important to Onians' theory as he explains that "it is clear that θυμός expressed a much richer concept for the Homeric Greeks than our 'breath' or mere outer air received and expelled".[68] He goes on to explore the Homeric association of θυμός with emotion, consciousness and

[63] Bremmer, 1983, p.21.
[64] Bremmer, 1983, p.21.
[65] Bremmer, 1983, p.54.
[66] Onians, 1951 (1988), p.44.
[67] Onians, 1951, pp.23-43; Hom. *Il.* 8.202. Not all scholars accept Onians' assertion that the φρένες are the lungs (eg. Ireland, 1975, pp.187-188), which is a prerequisite to Onians' argument that the θυμός is breath within the φρένες/lungs.
[68] Onians, 1951, p.46.

thought, but always tying them back in to physical breath and explaining the mechanisms by which the θυμός uses breathing to think and experience emotions.[69] He then uses the same methodology to explain how as breath the θυμός also sees, hears, tastes and touches, linking it with cognition through sensory perception.[70] Onians uses other Greek sources than the Homeric works, for example Aeschylus and Pindar, but also non-Greek tradition, stating regarding his theory that "our incredulity, if not our wonder, may be diminished when we realize that the ancient Hindoos had similar beliefs. According to the Upanishads, speech, sight, hearing, and mind were known as breaths".[71] While some association with breath and θυμός is noted by many scholars (see below), Onians is alone in making a wholesale identification of θυμός with breath and nothing but breath. Onians notes the similarity of the ψυχή to the θυμός, but also cites the many passages that prevent them being understood as the same. He concludes that whereas the θυμός is sited in the lungs, the ψυχή is situated in the head.[72] His analysis then moves from θυμός and continues with ψυχή as a physical concept.

Caswell also associates θυμός with breath in certain instances, specifically those connected with death, but states that "it would be an oversimplification to equate θυμός with breath and have done with it".[73] Noting "the convergence of vocabulary with that of winds and storms", and drawing a parallel between the winds of Aiolos in the *Odyssey* which were disastrously uncontained and the θυμός which is often spoken of as being "contained" in the φρήν/φρένες, which Caswell accepts as being the lungs, she suggests that:

> θυμός is in fact the human counterpart of the winds, brought to animate the body by the winds as we see in the revival of Sarpedon, and carried away on the winds from the body once it has ceased to be able, for whatever reason, physically to continue breathing and to contain the θυμός within the φρήν/φρένες.[74]

[69] Onians, 1951, pp.49-50, 57, 59.
[70] Onians, 1951, pp.66-83.
[71] Onians, 1951, p.44.
[72] Onians, 1951, pp.93-96.
[73] Caswell, 1990, p.16.
[74] Caswell, 1990, p.62.

The θυμός would therefore be connected to breath, according to Caswell's interpretation, insofar as only the breathing body can contain the θυμός. When it does not, the breath leaves the body and is joined (perhaps re-joined) to the winds. Loss of θυμός would therefore be a consequence of loss of breath, and both conditions when permanent would indicate death. Unlike Onians, Caswell takes care to apply this interpretation only to the references of θυμός that concern death.

Clarke, looking at all the θυμός family of words which he regards collectively as the mental apparatus, also notes the prominence of breath associated with their actions. He is reluctant to view this imagery as "decoration", but rather suggests that it is "a serious reflection of Homer's conception of mental life".[75] Clarke feels able to associate θυμός with breath (but not just with simple breath) during the agents' lifetimes as well as at their deaths. He begins with the "minimum hypothesis that θυμός is breath inhaled deep into the lungs, and φρήν/φρένες are the lungs themselves. These basic identities are unmistakable."[76] He also, however, notes that a man "thinks in his θυμός", as well as in his φρένες and ἦτορ which in Clarke's view are interchangeable words.[77] Regarding the wind and sea imagery that is so prominent in the θυμός family, Clarke explains:

> Just as rushing wind moves over the face of the sea, so the inhaled breath rushes along towards the oozing stuff at the base of the lungs; and just as the dark flowing sea is churned up with the winds in the tempest, so this breath mingles with blood and the other ebbing and flowing liquids of the expanding chest; and once we add the point that in practice each of the nouns in the θυμός family can stand for the whole phenomenon, then Homer's psychological imagery will fall into a subtle and consistent pattern.[78]

Possibly with a critical backward glance at Onians, Clarke states that "it turns out that it is a little less than the whole truth to say baldly and bluntly that φρένες

[75] Clarke, 1999, p.83.
[76] Clarke, 1999, p.77.
[77] Clarke, 1999, p.74.
[78] Clarke, 1999, p.83.

are the lungs and θυμός is the air in them".[79] Rather (and I abbreviate Clarke's argument considerably here) θυμός is not just breath but "the breath of thought".[80] Clarke's rejection of the possibility that Homer may at least sometimes have been speaking metaphorically has attracted some criticism.[81]

Clarke, as noted above, refers to a "θυμος-family" of words that all essentially do the same thing. Jahn also looks at a group of words in Homer: ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη, πραπίδες and φρήν/φρένες are all considered alongside θυμός and are judged to be identical in meaning, or "semantically void" as summed up by Van Der Mije.[82] However, Jahn admits at once that θυμός is the outlier in this group as the above words are all used explicitly for physical organs, while θυμός can at best only be said to be used implicitly in that way, despite being the most widely used of all the words. Accepting the θυμός to be a physical entity, Jahn acknowledges that in that sense it is not identical to, for example, κῆρ, but that psychologically their function is the same. By Jahn's argument, different words from the group are chosen at different times to explain psychological phenomena purely for metrical convenience.[83] While praising Jahn's work, Van Der Mije points to instances where two or more of the words are used by Homer and are clearly not identical in meaning, for example θυμός and φρένες, and further doubts that six synonyms would be needed merely to provide metrical flexibility.[84] To Van Der Mije's argument I would add that imagining an author being forced to use one particular word because it is the only one that 'fits into the line' presupposes an almost complete line over which the author has no control beyond inserting the occasional noun. Jahn's work is, however, almost universally praised whether or not the reviewer has their reservations (Van Der Mije, Sullivan), or is firmly convinced (Long).[85]

[79] Clarke, 1999, p.106.
[80] Clarke, 1999, p.84.
[81] Eg. Cairns, 2003(a), pp.66-67.
[82] Van Der Mije, 1991, p.440.
[83] Jahn, 1987, pp.1-123, 247-298.
[84] Van Der Mije, 1991, p.444
[85] Van Der Mije, 1991. Sullivan, 1991. Long, 1992.

C) The emotional θυμός

Returning to Rohde, having argued vehemently that the θυμός could not be regarded as any form of soul, he goes on to explain that:

> … either thinking or willing or merely feeling is conducted by its means [the θυμός]. It is the seat of the emotions and belongs to the body of the living man, and is especially enclosed in the φρένες. In the face of this it is impossible to regard it as something independent of the body or as anything else than a special faculty of the same living body.[86]

Despite mentioning briefly that the θυμός is the seat of the emotions, Rohde did not go on to elaborate, being more concerned with the ψυχή than the θυμός.

Böhme, writing of "Die Seele", first notes the difficulty surrounding using 'soul' in translation. "A solution", he says, "to the basic problem for any investigation of Homer's position of the soul, the question of the relationship between the life-soul and the search for the ψυχή, is not possible as long as the concept of θυμός has not been clarified".[87] Then, concentrating for a while on the θυμός rather than ψυχή, Böhme noted the vast array of emotions and emotional states that are associated with the θυμός in the Homeric works. He listed these "feelings and affects" as: pleasure, favour (liking), love, benevolence, pity, forgiveness, pain/sorrow, worry, lament, marvel, honour, shame, cruelty, hate, desire/excitement of the will in general, association with μένος, courage, fearlessness, perseverance, anger, displeasure, illness, cowardice, fear, shyness, longing, prayer, hope, and pride.[88] Böhme concluded that "θυμός primarily refers to emotional states of excitement", and noted in addition that while other words were also used for the same concept, "the word θυμός is used much more frequently than κραδίη / κῆρ / ἦτορ in Homer to describe emotional life".[89]

[86] Rohde, 1925, pp.50-51.
[87] Böhme, 1929, p.19.
[88] Böhme, 1929, pp.69-71.
[89] Böhme, 1929, pp.19, 69.

Snell, perhaps most influentially, calls the θυμός the "organ of (e)motion", although he is not as categorical as Onians in awarding it a physical form.[90] Rather, he questions the need to distinguish, in the Homeric works, between 'concrete' and 'abstract' concepts. Thus, he says, a person may be called "'heartless', 'brainless' and ἄθυμος refer[ring] to the lack of a function", rather than suggesting that they are physically lacking a heart, a brain or a θυμός. In such cases, Snell says, the organ is named in place of the function of the organ.[91] Thus while Snell allows that the θυμός is a physical organ, not every mention of the θυμός in the Homeric works should be read as referring only to a physical organ. Snell's work is particularly useful to the Homeric scholar for his methodology of understanding Homer's words in "no terms but his own", claiming that "once the words are grasped with greater precision in their meaning and relevance, they will suddenly recover all their ancient splendour".[92] He reaches the clear conclusion that "*Thymos* in Homer is the generator of motion or agitation", and "if we translate *thymos* as 'organ of (e)motion', the matter becomes simple enough".[93] Snell's interest is in the intellect or the mind rather than the soul, but Homeric language forces him to also consider the ψυχή. He acknowledges the close similarity of ψυχή and θυμός but clearly favours regarding θυμός as primarily having to do with emotions and the motivating power of emotions.[94] Regarding the difference between θυμός and ψυχή, Snell picks up on passages where an animal's θυμός rather than its ψυχή is described as leaving at the moment of death. This leads him to the interesting conclusion that "evidently people were averse to ascribing the *psyche*, which a human being loses when he dies, also to an animal. They therefore invented the idea of a *thymos* which leaves the animal when it expires".[95] He does not go further and suggest why the vast majority of mentions of the θυμός then relate to humans, including those where the θυμός leaves at death. In addition he is quick to explain any inconsistencies as being

[90] Snell, 1982, p.9.
[91] Snell, 1982, pp.14-15.
[92] Snell, 1982, p.1.
[93] Snell, 1982, p.9.
[94] Snell, 1982, pp.10, 12, 15.
[95] Snell, 1982, pp.11-12.

due to "late" passages (not unlike Rohde) contributed by an author who "did not know the Homeric usage".[96]

From Snell's time, the majority of work on θυμός has been secondary to a consideration of one or other emotion, and rarely restricts analysis to the Homeric works.[97] Bremmer says "*Thymos* is, above all the source of emotions. Friendship and feelings of revenge, joy and grief, anger and fear – all spring from *thymos.*"[98] He also notes, however, that "the action of *thymos* is not always restricted to emotion" going on to cite the intellectual debates that, admittedly, always take place in an emotionally charged situation.[99] Caswell notes that θυμός is also involved in a number of non-emotional functions, but states "the fact that θυμός is the constant factor in passages describing a large number of emotions suggests that it itself is the neutral bearer of emotion".[100] The emotions she lists are "grief, fear, anxiety, hope, desire, love, anger, joy, delight and so on".[101]

D) The θυμός as mental faculty

A recent exception to considering θυμός in relation to emotion occurs when Clarke returns to Snell's "no terms but his own" methodology as he analyses the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in isolation as far as possible, letting, as he says, "the Homeric words speak for themselves".[102] There are two conclusions to Clarke's work, of which the first, that θυμός is "the breath of thought" is summarised above. Before reaching that conclusion, he sums up his argument by saying that "these things are manifestations in action of an indivisible human whole, a whole where the complexities of mental life make sense best if apprehended without trying to divide man into mind and body".[103] Thus an earlier step in his logic is that θυμός is associated with all mental activity. Clarke considers, among other words, ψυχή, and, as noted above, in view of the culturally and

[96] Snell, 1982, p.10-11.
[97] Eg. Renaut, 2013; Braund and Most, 2003; Cairns, 1993; Liebert, 2013.
[98] Bremmer, 1983, p.54.
[99] Bremmer, 1983, p.55.
[100] Caswell, 1990, p.50.
[101] Caswell, 1990, p.34.
[102] Clarke, 1999, p.47.
[103] Clarke, 1999, p.61.

religiously loaded understanding of the English word 'soul', he is right to be wary. As well as ψυχή, Clarke also considers the rest of what he calls "the θυμός family": θυμός, φρήν/φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη, πραπίδες, and νόος.[104] Further he regards all the words as being slightly fluid: "sometimes they think, sometimes man thinks in, by, with, or through them, and sometimes they stand for the resultant thought itself", reminiscent of Snell's views on abstract and concrete concepts.[105] Thus the θυμός, for example, thinks, and is the (possibly abstract) organ by which or within which the agent thinks, and it is the thought that comes out of either or both of those deliberations. Clarke's work, despite its heavy concentration on θυμός, considers the "θυμός family" as a whole and, as illustrated in his summary of agency and function, he does not make a distinction between θυμός and any other words in the "family".[106]

E) The multi-faceted θυμός

The final strand of research on θυμός is hinted at by Clarke's work, above, when he regards it as mental life and thus links it with all activities undertaken by a conscious agent. Naturally, dictionary entries also look at all instances of θυμός and tend, as with the Cambridge Lexicon, above, to give many definitions rather than one. The *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* lists extensively the various semantic functions of θυμός, as well as the grammatical functions. The grammatical functions are given because the *Lexikon* is concerned to group formulas together and are not considered here. Of the semantic functions, the following stand out as particularly relevant to Homer:

- Vital energy, which is awakened or dissolves/flies off when fainting, including when dying (B1).
- Form of psychological energy, with less emphasis on its purpose than μένος, either undifferentiated (B2) or qualified as a means of characterising a person's temperament or emotion (B3).
- Not specifically courage, but a courageous soul (B3a).
- Source of or site of desires that provoke the agent to act in a certain way (B4, 11-3), including for food and drink (B5).

[104] Clarke, 1999, p.53.
[105] Clarke, 1999, p.69.
[106] Clarke, 1999, p.69.

- Bearer (B7-8) or site (B9-13) of emotions, prominently including anger and joy.
- Vehicle for (B6) or site of (B12) intellectual processes of reflection including self-reflection, and self-persuasion, or thoughts with a strong emotional component.[107]

Caswell's comprehensive work on θυμός considers θυμός in its own right, and largely restricts itself to the Homeric works. She re-orders the above list into five more succinct categories: "1) loss of consciousness/death (in which the θυμός can be associated with breath and wind), 2) cognition or the function of the intellect, 3) the function of emotion, 4) the function of deliberation, and 5) the function of motivation".[108] Apart from associating θυμός with breath in relation to the loss of consciousness or death episodes (as opposed to in every occurrence of θυμός as per Onians), Caswell allows that it has multiple functions and does not attempt to translate it using a single word or phrase.

Cairns, most recently of all, makes a clear distinction between the various ancient authors, which makes the section in which he concentrates on the Homeric works less dependent on Plato's tripartite soul theory than many scholars' work. In the introduction he summarises that:

> In the Homeric poems, *thymos* is one of a family of terms associated with internal psychological process of thought, emotion, volition and motivation. Though the range of the term's applications in Homer is wide, that in itself gives us a sense of the unity of the cognitive, affective, and desiderative processes in Homeric psychology. No post-Homeric author can rival that range …[109]

Despite Cairns' dictionary entry being on *thymos,* he follows Clarke in stating that "we need to treat the 'psychic organs' [*phrēn,* for example] as a family rather than as independent variables", although he also notes that "*thymos* is by far the most common member of the group".[110] Cairns then goes on to provide

[107] LfgrE, 2010, s.v. θυμός.
[108] Caswell, 1990, p.11.
[109] Cairns, 2019, p.1.
[110] Cairns, 2019, p.3.

a comprehensive overview of the various functions of θυμός during life in the Homeric works. In brief, the "*thymos*-functions" for which Cairns gives an overview are:

1) Interiority: where something is said to take place "in θυμός", e.g. pity or rejoicing
2) Desire/motivation: where the θυμός wants something, or commands the agent to some particular course of action
3) Emotion: anger prominently, but also grief, sorrow, distress, worry, pity, fear and shame
4) Imagination/memory/belief: this is halfway to debating, where a person believes in their θυμός that a certain course of action is best
5) Planning/deliberation: when a person is said to be torn two ways by their θυμός
6) Deliberation/dialogue/agency: when two courses of action are debated, often involving a person "speaking" to their θυμός

The boundaries between items 4, 5, and 6 are somewhat subjective. In addition Cairns briefly lists the instances of θυμός leaving the body at death or during a swoon, although he does not analyse this usage in the same depth as the activities of the θυμός during life. With Caswell's and Cairns' category lists in mind, I propose the following framework for analysis:

1) "Loss of consciousness/death". Particular attention is given to those cases where loss of θυμός does not occur along with loss of consciousness or death. In addition, this section deals with the relationship between breath and θυμός.
2) The use of θυμός in the epithets μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος. While μεγάθυμος is always used approvingly, the various designations of ὑπέρθυμος show that θυμός can be overdone.
3) "Cognition or the function of the intellect" and "the function of deliberation". Caswell discussed these in two different categories, and Cairns in three, but they are difficult to separate from each other and are treated together here. In this section, the knowing θυμός is discussed first and a remarkable difference is discovered between the two verbs

used for "to know". Next the debating θυμός is discussed in particular detail with an examination of the passages containing the formulaic phrase "but why does my θυμός debate these things?". While the debating θυμός has been studied before, I find again significant differences in the nature of the debates according to the verbs used. With these new discoveries in mind, it is possible to answer the difficult question, "Why did Odysseus test and mock Laertes in Book 24 of the *Odyssey*?"

4) Θυμός-paining and θυμός-pleasing/desires. Cairns combined the desiring θυμός with the motivating θυμός, while Caswell did not discuss this aspect at all. It is not an especially prominent aspect of the θυμός in the Homeric works, but it does exist and is particularly relevant when considering Homeric influence on Apollonius.
5) Motivation. While Cairns combines this with desires, it is a large topic and should be discussed separately. Here it is considered from two perspectives: the role of the θυμός in motivating the agent to action, and also external influences that work on the θυμός to cause such an effect. The latter reveals that the Homeric θυμός in a warrior (examples of which necessarily predominate in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*) has both an outward public-facing role, and also an inward domestic-facing aspect with, again, different verbs used for each.

Cairns' category of emotion is largely allowed to stand, as it has been covered comprehensively in literature since the 1950s. However, as this work traces the development of the θυμός from the Homeric works through Plato to Apollonius, the involvement of some emotions, such as anger, shame and courage, are considered separately later.

Section 2: Life, Death, Breath and Θυμός

There are more than 80 instances in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* where, when a person dies, their θυμός is said to leave their body.[111] There are also, however, a few cases where the θυμός is gathered back to the body, and another one in

[111] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 5.317.

which death follows on from the θυμός leaving, rather than the two occurring simultaneously.[112] These few exceptions to loss of θυμός being exactly coincident with death prevent the possibility that θυμός can be straightforwardly translated 'life', with 'consciousness' or 'breath' being reasonable alternatives. There are also a small number of instances where θυμός and ψυχή appear to be used synonymously, that is, one leaves at the point of becoming unconscious, the other returns upon awakening.[113]

The connection between θυμός and breath has been well commented upon with Caswell noting a near-equivalency in a limited number of circumstances (those involving death), and Onians going much further and explaining at length that every instance of θυμός in Homer is intimately connected with breath.[114] However, I present an alternative argument: that θυμός, as used in the Homeric works, does not equal breath. It could, however, in these cases be understood as vitality.

Life/death and θυμός

There are many ways in which the θυμός can depart the body – being taken by a killer, exhaled by the victim, or simply leaving. In the vast majority of instances when the θυμός is said to be removed from or leave the body, the person dies. The exceptions are Menelaus, Sarpedon, Hector, Ares, Andromache, Odysseus and Laertes. Sarpedon's θυμός "gasped out" (κεκαφηότα θυμόν), but later he revives, while the θυμός of Hector is "overwhelmed" (ἐδάμνα) before returning some considerable time later.[115] Menelaus, Ares, Andromache, Odysseus and Laertes also all have their θυμός return to them (ἀγέρθη/ἐσαγείρετο) after an injury or a severe shock.[116] Of these cases, some (Sarpedon, Hector and Odysseus) were at real risk of death, whereas others (Menelaus, Ares, Andromache and Laertes) would be better described as faints.

[112] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.152; 16.828, 16.856.
[113] Hom. *Il.* 22.467, 475.
[114] Caswell, 1990, p.16; Onians, 1951, p.44.
[115] Hom. *Il.* 5.698, 14.439.
[116] Hom. *Il.* 4.152, 15.240, 21.417, *Od.* 5.458, 24.349.

To examine one of the fainting cases first, Menelaus was struck by an arrow, but not fatally.[117] It is not stated that his θυμός left him, nor did any other element leave except a quantity of "dark blood", sufficient to coat his leg from thigh to ankle.[118] On seeing the extent of the bleeding, Agamemnon "shuddered" (ῥίγησεν) fearing a severe injury.[119] The same verb is also applied to Menelaus.[120] Shortly afterwards Menelaus recovers and at that point "his θυμός was gathered back again in his breast" (ἄψορρόν οἱ θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀγέρθη).[121] This account therefore indicates that loss of θυμός is not automatically synonymous with loss of life.

Breath and θυμός

Kirk repeatedly refers to θυμός as 'breath-soul', and regarding Menelaus states "His θυμός had temporarily left his chest, it seems, and he was breathless with shock. … Now the breath-soul is 'gathered back again in his chest'".[122] Onians, who also uses the term "breath-soul" for θυμός, closely associates θυμός with consciousness and thought, while Clarke calls θυμός "the breath of thought".[123] However, I would argue that this experience of Menelaus indicates that θυμός is not a prerequisite for thought. Menelaus "shuddered", but it was when he "saw that the sinew and the barbs were outside the flesh" that his θυμός was gathered back into his breast.[124] Thus before his θυμός was regathered, Menelaus was capable of sight and sufficient thinking ability to reason on the potential seriousness or slightness of his injury. He was therefore not unconscious. Thus loss of θυμός, even temporary, does not demand loss of reasoning ability and in turn cannot be reconciled with the θυμός being either "breath-soul" connected to thought or the "breath of thought". We are left only with Kirk's apparent association of θυμός with simple breath, but again an example, this time of Patroclus, renders this understanding debatable.

[117] Hom. *Il.* 4.139-140.
[118] Hom. *Il.* 4.146-147.
[119] Hom. *Il.* 4.148, 171-182.
[120] Hom. *Il.* 4.148-150.
[121] Hom. *Il.* 4.151-152.
[122] Kirk, 1990, p.347.
[123] Onians, 1951, pp.49-59; Clarke, 1999, p.84.
[124] Hom. *Il.* 4.150-152.

Patroclus, already weakened by a spear injury, is found by Hector who takes the opportunity to strike again, driving his spear through his victim's abdomen.[125] Unsurprisingly, this injury was fatal, but only slowly so. The author describes how "Hector, Priam's son, [took Patroclus'] θυμός away".[126] This is not the end of the matter, though. Hector spends thirteen lines taunting Patroclus, and Patroclus, far from being either breathless or unconscious, manages an eleven line speech in return, following which he finally dies as "the end of death enfolded him; and his ψυχή fleeting from his limbs was gone to Hades".[127] In this account, the loss of θυμός apparently precedes the loss of the ψυχή by some time, and only when the ψυχή leaves does the "end of death" (τέλος θανάτοιο) occur. This calls into question the theory that θυμός equals either simple breath or the more complex "breath of thought", with Patroclus thinking and speaking (and so evidently breathing) after his θυμός has departed.

Vitality and θυμός

Caswell offers an alternative that may explain all the cases of loss of θυμός. She states "the importance of its [θυμός'] absence at death strongly suggests connection with the breath, but also it seems to be a vital part of the personality of the individual".[128] "Vital" in this sentence is no idle word, suggesting a fulness of life and energy. Menelaus was not dead, nor unconscious, but neither could he be called 'vital' in the immediate aftermath of his injury. Similarly, Ares' temporary loss of θυμός occurs when Athene strikes him on the neck with a rock.[129] We read that he could only "with difficulty" collect his θυμός (μόγις δ' ἐσαγείρετο θυμόν) as Aphrodite led him away.[130] Ares, unlike Menelaus, need not fear that his wound was mortal, being inflicted as it was upon an immortal, and he was certainly conscious at the time that his θυμός was "with difficulty" gathered and he was led (not carried) from the battlefield by Aphrodite while uttering "many a groan".[131] Again, therefore, it is seen from

[125] Hom. *Il.* 16.812-821.
[126] Hom. *Il.* 16.828.
[127] Hom. *Il.* 16.830-856.
[128] Caswell, 1990, p.16.
[129] Hom. *Il.* 21.403-406.
[130] Hom. *Il.* 21.416-417.
[131] Hom. *Il.* 21.417.

this example that loss of consciousness is not an invariable consequence of loss of θυμός. Ares was, however, sufficiently enfeebled to need help departing the field, fitting with a loss of vitality.

The same conclusion can be reached by examining other 'departing/returning θυμός' narratives with Hector and Odysseus both being severely enfeebled by injury and near-drowning respectively.[132] Similarly Odysseus' θυμός "returned again to his breast" (ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη) after a near drowning.[133] In particular, unconsciousness is not specified as part of Odysseus's loss of θυμός, but a severe weakening or loss of vitality is.

Thus from the examples considered above loss of θυμός does not automatically mean death or even unconsciousness or breathlessness and therefore θυμός is not synonymous with life or breath or consciousness. Loss of θυμός is, however, always accompanied by some loss of normal strength or function.

Conclusion:

The Homeric texts repeatedly present that loss of θυμός occurs at death. Rarely, as in the examples examined above, the θυμός can return, indicating that the person was not dead, nor even always unconscious, but in all cases severely weakened. An analysis of these instances show that θυμός is to an extent connected with life, consciousness and breath. Nevertheless, the θυμός cannot be judged to be exactly synonymous with any of these conditions or elements. Further, despite strong and popular arguments in favour of θυμός equating to 'mental life', I argue that mental life continues even when the θυμός is temporarily absent. Thus θυμός cannot by summed up as 'mental life'. However, while I have argued that in the departing/returning θυμός narratives, the θυμός is vitality rather than breath, life or consciousness, these remain the tiny minority of θυμός occurrences in the Homeric works. These death/near death episodes merely showcase one of many aspects of the multi-faceted θυμός that the author presents.

[132] Hom. *Il.* 14.419-420, 436-439. Hom. *Od.* 5.456-468.
[133] Hom. *Od.* 5.458.

Section 3: Μεγάθυμος and Ὑπέρθυμος

Μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος in epithets

The use of θυμός in epithets has not attracted much scholarly attention. What has been written on the subject (summarised below) asks whether the epithets are significant descriptors or merely formulas that happen to fit the meter. It is this neglected strand of research that answers an important question regarding θυμός: Is it possible to have too much of a good thing? The adjectives μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος (usually translated "great-hearted" and "high-spirited" respectively) are repeatedly used as epithets in the Homeric works. Scholarly opinion has concentrated on ὑπέρθυμος. Kirk regards some instances of ὑπέρθυμος as being used for "obvious metrical contrivance", but suggests regarding its application to Diomedes (*Il.* 5.376) that "it is especially appropriate to Diomedes here, at least if ὑπερ- is taken as implying excessive, rather than simply high, courage".[134] He therefore vacillates between it being a relevant descriptor of the character(s) in some cases, and only metrically convenient in others. Hainsworth is likewise in two minds: regarding the Trojans in the *Iliad* 9.233, he suggests that although "the Trojans have certainly got their tails up, as happens usually to be the case where this epithet is used, the epithet … cannot certainly be taken as a contextually significant reference".[135] Despite this, he still concludes that the epithets "special to the Trojans [including ὑπέρθυμοι], which may be shared with individual Achaeans, present them as high-spirited to excess".[136] Heath, with a critical glance at Hainsworth, notes that Hector calls his own Trojan men ὑπέρθυμοι, without apparently censuring them for any sort of excess. His conclusion is that "the pejorative sense of the word is not required, and in fact is inappropriate, in all six places where the poet himself uses it of the Trojans".[137] Pinsent examines all the epithets used to describe Trojans and concludes that while some are pejorative, ὑπέρθυμοι is merely formulaic.[138] On the other hand he allows that μεγάθυμοι when used as an Achaean epithet may refer to character.[139]

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[134] Kirk, 1990, pp. 62, 100.
[135] Hainsworth, 1993, p.95.
[136] Hainsworth, 1993, p.95.
[137] Heath, 2005, p.532.
[138] Pinsent, 1984, p.148.
[139] Pinsent, 1984, p.147.

In this section, I determine to what extent the two words essentially differ in meaning, judging from their usage in the Homeric epics. I am unable to concur with Pinsent that ὑπέρθυμος is only formulaic and not pejorative as in most cases it does indicate disapproval. I agree with him that μεγάθυμος does refer to character, in a positive way although Pinsent does not say so explicitly. There remain, however, two cases of Hector calling the Trojans ὑπέρθυμοι with no pejorative connotations attached, as noted by Heath. These prevent the argument that ὑπέρθυμος is always a criticism, although they represent a small minority of cases. Graziosi and Haubold asked a similar question regarding the words ἠνορέη and ἀγηνορίη ('manliness' and 'excessive manliness') and concluded that while ἠνορέη is expected and applauded in Iliadic heroes, ἀγηνορίη is problematic and indicative of a warrior who trusts too much himself.[140] Perhaps predictably my examination of μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος reaches a similar conclusion, and also shows exactly what it is that makes ὑπέρθυμος a usually pejorative term, shedding further light on what θυμός is and what it should be. There are not very many instances of the terms that are detailed enough to be profitably examined, but there are sufficient to allow the understanding that μεγάθυμος is an epithet indicating praise, whereas an individual or group described as ὑπέρθυμος tends to over-value themselves in some way, with only two exceptions.

In analysing the justification of the use of ὑπέρθυμος it is necessary to know the actions that led to the epithet, and only the following individuals who are described using ὑπέρθυμος and not μεγάθυμος have active roles in the epics to be usefully analysed:

- The henchmen of Penelope's suitors[141]
- Melanippus[142]
- Polypoetes and Leonteus[143]
- Zeus[144]

[140] Graziosi & Haubold, 2003, p.60.
[141] Hom. *Od.* 4.784, 16.326, 16.360.
[142] Hom. *Il.* 15.576.
[143] Hom. *Il.* 12.128.
[144] Hom. *Il.* 14.250.

In addition, the following characters are all described as both μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος at different times, which enables an analysis of what may have changed the author's or speaker's opinion of their character at the time when they changed from being called μεγάθυμος to ὑπέρθυμος. Any conclusions can in turn be taken back to the above list of ὑπέρθυμος people to see if they hold true:

- The Achaeans collectively[145]
- Achilles[146]
- Diomedes (also called καρτερόθυμος – strong-hearted/steadfast)[147]
- Nestor[148]
- The Trojans collectively[149]

Diomedes: From μεγάθυμος to ὑπέρθυμος

To take Diomedes as a case study: Diomedes is described as μεγάθυμος by Glaucus when they meet on the battlefield. Diomedes had first hailed Glaucus as "mighty one" and enquired after his lineage.[150] Glaucus, meanwhile, is already well aware of Diomedes' identity and lineage, addressing him as son of Tydeus.[151] His assessment of Diomedes as μεγάθυμος comes during a battle which starts in Book 5 of the *Iliad*. Diomedes rallies, with Athene's help, after being struck by an arrow.[152] His next five skirmishes, resulting in nine killings (the would-be tenth, Aeneas, spared only by the intervention of Aphrodite), are all against pairs of warriors at one time.[153] It is clear to Glaucus that Diomedes is an exceptional warrior and it is against this background that Glaucus identifies Diomedes as μεγάθυμος.[154]

[145] Hom. *Il.* 1.123, 1.135, 23.512, *Od.* 24.57.
[146] Hom. *Il.* 17.214, 18.226, 19.75, 20.498, 21.153, 23.168, 20.88, 20.333, *Od.* 3.189.
[147] Hom. *Il.* 6.145, 4.365, 5.376, 5.277.
[148] Hom. *Il.* 5.565, 13.400, 17.653, 23.541, 23.302, 23.596.
[149] Hom. *Il.* 5.27, 5.102, 8.155, 9.233, 10.205, 11.294, 11.459, 11.564, 13.456, 13.737, 14.15, 15.135, 17.276, 17.420, 20.366, 23.175, 23.181.
[150] Hom. *Il.* 6.119-123, 141.
[151] Hom. *Il.* 6.145.
[152] Hom. *Il.* 5.103.
[153] Hom. *Il.* 5.144, 148-151, 152-156, 159-160, 290-313.
[154] Hom. *Il.* 5.330-340, 855-859, 6.145.

This is a fairly typical use of μεγάθυμος. The adjective may be used to describe groups of people, such as the Achaeans or the Trojans, or individuals such as Achilles.[155] In just over half of cases, it is the author who assigns the adjective, but it is also quite common for another character within the narrative to do so, as Glaucus did, above. It is also not an epithet that is reserved only for one's own comrades: Achilles calls both the Achaeans and the Trojans μεγάθυμος.[156] Among warriors, it certainly appears to be an indication of respect: a warrior should be μεγάθυμος.

Can the same be said of ὑπέρθυμος? Diomedes is twice described as ὑπέρθυμος, once by the narrator and once by Aphrodite.[157] In the case of Aphrodite, the answer is quite clear-cut. Diomedes has attacked her in battle, in full knowledge that she is a goddess, and injured her hand with his spear.[158] As she retreats, Diomedes shouts after her:

> Keep away, daughter of Zeus, from war and fighting. Is it not enough that you deceived weakling women? But if into battle you will enter, I think you will surely shudder at the very word, even if you hear it from afar.[159]

Diomedes has thus offended the goddess's sensibilities on two counts: by knowingly inflicting physical injury on a god, and by gloating over his achievement. It is when Aphrodite recounts the scene to her mother, Dione, that she uses the word ὑπέρθυμος to describe Diomedes.[160] In Aphrodite's opinion, Diomedes has clearly crossed a boundary between honourable μεγάθυμος and hubristic ὑπέρθυμος. Kirk agrees with Aphrodite that ὑπέρθυμος "is especially appropriate to Diomedes here".[161] Heracles is similarly called ὑπέρθυμος by Hypnos when he and Hera are discussing Heracles.[162] They referred to a time that Heracles had sacked Troy and the two had banded together to punish him.[163]

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[155] Hom. *Il.* 1.123, 2.541, 5.27.
[156] Hom. *Il.* 1.123, 23.181.
[157] Hom. *Il.* 4.365, 5.376.
[158] Hom. *Il.* 5.335-340.
[159] Hom. *Il.* 5.348-351.
[160] Hom. *Il.* 5.376.
[161] Kirk, 1990, p.100.
[162] Hom. *Il.* 14.250.
[163] Hom. *Il.* 14.249-256.

From their point of view Heracles' actions would have been regarded as a step too far and so the adjective ὑπέρθυμος could again be viewed as a censure.

Other examples of ὑπέρθυμος

There are other instances of ὑπέρθυμος where the same conclusion can be drawn, but not with as much certainty. When Odysseus is trying to encourage Achilles to rejoin the battle, he describes the Trojans using ὑπέρθυμος.[164] Frequently described as μεγάθυμος, from Odysseus' point of view the Trojans have now gone too far in bringing the battle to the very ships of the Achaeans, and he reports also their boasting, particularly that of Hector whom Odysseus accuses of "respect[ing] neither men nor gods".[165] The behaviour of the Trojans is again censured when Zeus is guarding the corpse of Patroclus while the Trojans are determined to drag it away from the battlefield.[166] It is at this point, while the Trojans are resisting Zeus, that the author assigns them the epithet ὑπέρθυμος.[167] These are two of the instances that Pinsent cites as evidence that the author is not being 'anti-Trojan' and using ὑπέρθυμοι to suggest that they are taking θυμός to excess.[168] However, I believe as above that it is possible to explain the use of ὑπέρθυμοι in these cases as being critical of the Trojans for a degree of hubris, on the first occasion by boasting, and on the second by resisting Zeus. It is, however, less easy to assert that the two instances of Hector calling the Trojans ὑπέρθυμοι also contain a criticism. In Book 6, he encourages the Trojans to continue the fight while he apprises the Trojan elders of the situation.[169] He is not trying to insult them into action, which is a well-known tactic of Agamemnon, and the ensuing battle is not decisive so the armies are well-matched with neither side having more θυμός than their strength justifies. I thus agree with Pinsent that at least on this occasion ὑπέρθυμοι/ ὑπέρθυμος is not used pejoratively.

[164] Hom. *Il.* 9.233.
[165] Hom. *Il.* 9.232-239.
[166] Hom. *Il.* 17.266-277.
[167] Hom. *Il.* 17.276.
[168] Pinsent, 1984, p.148.
[169] Hom. *Il.* 6.111-115.

Despite the two exceptions above, there is still sufficient evidence of ὑπέρθυμος being used negatively to make it appropriate to consider when a character is described as ὑπέρθυμος, whether this may imply some sort of hubris or haughtiness on their part in the eyes of the speaker. Penelope's suitors are named by the author as ὑπέρθυμος.[170] There is nothing specific in their actions to justify reading it as a slur, but in the *Odyssey* the suitors are clearly cast as 'the baddies' and the partisan reader would be expected to accept that their henchmen are similarly haughty and over-reaching. In the *Iliad,* there is also the possibility that Melanippus has over-reached himself in some way when he is described as ὑπέρθυμος. There is nothing in his actions immediately before the epithet is applied to justify its use as a censure of his behaviour, but at the very moment that he is being identified as ὑπέρθυμος, he is struck by Antilochus' arrow and dies.[171] Without being himself at all dishonourable, Melanippus' skill as a warrior was not equal to the ambition of his θυμός and so he over-reached himself.

There is therefore evidence within the Homeric narrative to support the theory that ὑπέρθυμος is a somewhat mixed characteristic indicative of a too-high opinion of one's own abilities. However, a consideration of all the uses of ὑπέρθυμος shows that it is not automatically a safe assumption. Poseidon calls Achilles ὑπέρθυμος when he talks about him to Aeneas, but also makes it clear that Achilles is the better man.[172] Poseidon may regret that Achilles is ὑπέρθυμος, but he does not censure him for it. Nestor is also described as ὑπέρθυμος without any indication that he had acted hubristically.[173]

Conclusion:

Overall, it can be concluded that ὑπέρθυμος is a rarer attribute than μεγάθυμος and that it is normally, but not always, associated with an unjustifiable excess of θυμός. An individual who disrespects gods is described using ὑπέρθυμος, indicating that an ideal θυμός should be tempered by reverence. The censured

[170] Hom. *Od.* 4.784, 16.360.
[171] Hom. *Il.* 15.576-578.
[172] Hom. *Il.* 20.333.
[173] Hom. *Il.* 23.302.

gloating of Diomedes and Hector similarly indicates that a well-trained θυμός should not give in to excessive triumphing. Thus θυμός is heavily involved in a fighting spirit, but can, if not controlled and educated, give way to excessive pride which will bring reproach upon the agent.

Section 4: The Thinking Θυμός

A large number of passages in the Homeric texts speak of the θυμός as exhibiting powers of sense and thought to a greater or lesser degree. To place these in categories necessarily involves a certain amount of subjectivity, but as a starting point I would suggest they can be grouped into three broad categories of gradually increasing complexity:

- The θυμός as a receiver of information (listening or being spoken to)
- The θυμός retaining information (knowing and remembering), and using thinking ability to consider the likelihood of future events and consequences of current actions
- The θυμός exhibiting the most complex thinking processes of planning, pondering and debating

1) The θυμός as receiver of information

There are three verbs (ἀκούω, λέγω, μυθέομαι) describing the θυμός being the receiver of information. Evidently in the Homeric texts the θυμός could hear information and also be told it. This is one of the instances that would be covered by Jahn's 'pleonastic' theory whereby "to hear with one's θυμός" could be rendered simply "to hear". [174] However I believe it is worthwhile to take into account the nature of the things heard, may be significant to our understanding of the θυμός. In all cases the θυμός is said to hear or be told things that are particularly significant to the agent. The θυμός is never said to "hear" something inconsequential, such as birdsong, and with Penelope, for example, it is only accounts relevant to her husband and son that she is said to hear with her θυμός. This, and the other examples seen below, illuminate what is important to the θυμός.

[174] Van der Mije, 1991, p.440.

Telemachus advises his mother to "let your κραδίη καὶ θυμός endure to listen" to the minstrel's song of the Achaeans' return from Troy.[175] When this brief passage has been analysed, it has been from the point of view of the relationship of κραδίη and θυμός, or from the perspective of endurance.[176] However, for this discussion what is important is that the θυμός has, metaphorically, the sensory perception necessary to hear information. This is not radical information: there are many instances, discussed later, where a person "speaks" to their θυμός which by extension implies that the θυμός can hear. However in this case it is an outside agent to which the θυμός must listen. That it must 'endure' to listen indicates that it does so unwillingly: in fact Penelope decides not to listen, instead leaving the room after speaking with Telemachus. Penelope's agency in later storing up Telemachus' sayings in her θυμός indicates that it can also be a willing participant in hearing and actively retain the information.[177]

Onians theorised a mechanism by which the θυμός (breath, as per Onians) hears, according to the understanding of Homer:

> The sound, the breath, of which the words consist passes through the ears not to the brain but to the lungs. This, though it may seem foolish to us, is in fact a natural interpretation of the anatomy of the head, which shows an air passage direct from the outer air through the ear to the pharynx and so to the lungs.[178]

Snell, on the other hand, would see this as one of the instance of the organ (θυμός, in this case) being named in place of the function of the organ (hearing).[179] He also, however, regards the θυμός as the "generator of motion or agitation", which is the important distinction between his theory and that of Onians.[180] Onians makes no distinction between the sorts of things the θυμός may hear, important or irrelevant, whereas Snell shows that the θυμός hears

[175] Hom. *Od.* 1.353. 1.325-327.
[176] Eg. Caswell, 1990, p.39. Sullivan, 1995, p.13.
[177] Hom. *Od.* 1.360-361.
[178] Onians, 1951, p.69.
[179] Snell, 1982, pp.14-15.
[180] Snell, 1982, p.1.

what it particularly cares about. Its mention in this account of Penelope is therefore not necessarily merely pleonastic, but shows that in Penelope's case her θυμός cares about her husband and her son.

It is more common for the θυμός to be spoken to (εἶπε πρός) by its host person than an outside agent. Most of such cases constitute the beginning of a dialogue or debate between the agent and the θυμός and are considered later. The remaining three are also slightly more complex than a simple passage of information to the θυμός. In the *Iliad*, Achilles twice speaks to his θυμός (without opening a dialogue), and in both cases the introduction and first line of the speech follow the same formula:

> In agitation [Achilles] spoke to his proud θυμός: "Well, now!
> Surely a great marvel is this that my eyes look upon.[181]

He then goes on to recap what has just happened. In the first case, Aeneas vanishes from close combat, which Achilles rightly assumes to be due to divine intervention, and in the second he sees Lycaon, who Achilles had thought was far away in Lemnos.[182] After speaking to his θυμός, he then gathers his thoughts about him with the imperative "ἀλλ' ἄγε", before resuming battle, against "other Trojans" in the first case, and against Lycaon in the second.[183] Thus the speech does not merely give the θυμός information, but represents a pause in action.

Pelliccia notes that these speeches to the θυμός take place when "the speaker is physically removed from any potential outside audience, isolated either totally or temporarily and artificially".[184] In that case, the speech to the θυμός can be seen as a purely literary device in which information needs to be made available to the external audience, but there is no-one in the immediate vicinity of the speaker, no internal audience, to hear the speech. Thus the agent addresses his θυμός as a proxy for a 'real' listener so that the audience can learn the workings of his mind. In addition to Pelliccia's interpretation I would suggest that the

[181] Hom. *Il.* 20.343-344, 21.53-54.
[182] Hom. *Il.* 20.345-350, 21.55-59.
[183] Hom. *Il.* 20.351-352, 21.60-63.
[184] Pelliccia, 1995, p.139.

speech serves another purpose for the speaker as Achilles, in these examples, goes over what has just happened in order to come to terms with an unexpected event, and, having done that, is able to resume his interrupted activity of killing Trojans. Cairns suggests that in these cases "the *thumos* is a sounding-board for the agent's thoughts, expressed as direct speech".[185] Despite the relative complexity of the purpose of the speech, the θυμός itself is not spoken of as interpreting the speech in any way or making a response or giving an answer. Even so, the speech has served a purpose: the agent is no longer held in shock by the events but, having spoken to his θυμός by way of a recap of what has happened, putting into words the "great marvel" that he has seen, he is able to resume action. Again, what the agent tells to his θυμός is a matter of some importance.

Μυθέομαι is another word used to describe somebody addressing their θυμός, and the four examples share a common theme. They refer to the gods Zeus (in the *Iliad*) and Poseidon (in the *Odyssey*) and follow the same opening formula:

> κινήσας δὲ κάρη προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν.[186]

What follows, though, in three of the cases, is not an address to the god's θυμός, but the gods relating to themselves speeches in which they mentally address other parties. Zeus first 'addresses' Hector, saying "ah, poor wretch, not in your thoughts is death, that yet surely draws near you".[187] There follows a determination by Zeus that Hector will not return from the battle.[188] As with Penelope's θυμός that heard what was important to it, Hector's fame and death is a matter of some weight to Zeus who favoured the Trojans against the inclinations of his wife. He later sympathises with the immortal horses, originally his own gift, who are mourning the death of Patroclus, beginning "Ah, unhappy pair, why did we give you to kind Peleus, a mortal, while you are ageless and immortal?" and continuing with a plan for the horses to carry

[185] Cairns, 2019,
[186] Hom. *Il.* 17.200, 17.442; *Od.* 5.285, 5.376.
[187] Hom. *Il.* 17.201-202.
[188] Hom. *Il.* 17.207-208.

Automedon to glory.[189] In the *Odyssey*, Poseidon similarly mentally addresses Odysseus despite being said to be speaking to his own θυμός: "So now, after you have suffered many ills, go wandering over the sea, until you come among men fostered by Zeus. Yet even so, I think, you will not make light of your suffering."[190] Just as Zeus favoured the Trojans and Hector, Poseidon held a particular grudge against Odysseus, so again he had a vested interest in the outcome. In the other example, Poseidon does seem to address himself:

> Out on it! The gods have certainly changed their purpose regarding Odysseus, while I was among the Ethiopians. Here he is near to the land of the Phaeacians, where it is his fate to escape the trial of misery which has come upon him. Nevertheless, even yet, I think I shall give him his fill of evil.[191]

He is still very much against Odysseus, but now has added anger against the gods who he believes have behaved treacherously in his absence, furthering the importance of the matter and its relevance to his θυμός.

That it is only gods, not humans, who are said to speak to their θυμός using the verb μυθέομαι need not be significant in terms of the difference between a human and a divine θυμός. It is more simply explained by considering that μυθέομαι carries a slightly more formal connotation than λέγω. Other examples of μυθέομαι are, for example, oracles delivered by Calchas and Circe, or tales told of Troy's near-legendary wealth.[192] Martin discusses the performative differences of μῦθος-speeches and ἔπος-speeches and identifies μῦθος as being "a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a focus on full attention to every detail" while ἔπος by contrast is "an utterance, ideally short, accompanying a physical act, and focusing on the message … rather than on performance as enacted by the speaker".[193] Certainly the 'authoritative' quality of μῦθος speeches is apparent in the above examples of gods addressing (μυθέομαι) their θυμός, and all are accompanied by definite plans of action which are lacking in, for examples, Achilles' 'εἶπε πρός' speech

[189] Hom. *Il.* 17.443-455.
[190] Hom. *Od.* 5.376-379.
[191] Hom. *Od.* 5.286-290.
[192] Hom. *Il.* 1.74, *Od.* 12.155, *Il.* 18.289.
[193] Martin, 1989, p.12.

to his θυμός which only represents a pause in the action. On the other hand, Martin's explanation cannot be applied wholesale as the four μυθέομαι speeches above are not delivered in public, nor always at very great length. While De Jong also does not agree with all of Martin's conclusions, she does note that most μῦθος-speeches are delivered by gods, backing up Martin's 'authority' theory, with the authority figures of Nestor, Agamemnon, Odysseus and Achilles accounting for the human contributors.[194]

As far as the effect on the speaker is concerned, the four examples of μυθέομαι can be categorised alongside the εἶπε πρός speeches of Achilles and Odysseus in that they are sounding down information into the speakers' understanding. They also precede a definite plan of action (not merely a pause in action as in Achilles' case). Here again Martin's analysis could be helpful as he identifies one of the three categories of μῦθος speeches as being commands.[195] Extending this application to the speaking (μυθέομαι) to θυμός speeches, it is possible that μυθέομαι indicates a command to the θυμός, whereas εἶπε πρός is simply a statement. In all μυθέομαι cases, the order is carried out, that is, the speaker does what he says he will, although the role of the θυμός in the subsequent action is not described by the author. All cases are united by being important to the agent, hence the involvement of the θυμός instead of merely the ears.

In summary, it can be seen that the θυμός can, at least metaphorically, hear information either unwillingly or willingly, from its own agent or from another person. In most cases a plan of action results, which harks forward to the below discussion of the debating and pondering θυμός. In all cases what is said to be heard by the θυμός or spoken to the θυμός is a matter of considerable import to the listener, often playing particularly on emotions such as grief (Penelope), wonderment (Achilles), and anger (Poseidon). This indicates that the θυμός is not simply the agent; it hears only what is particularly important.

[194] De Jong, 1992, p.393. NB, both Martin and De Jong consider all μῦθος and ἔπος speeches, some of which are delivered by humans, whereas my analysis is restricted to those that are addressed to the θυμός, which are all delivered by gods.
[195] Martin, 1989, p.49.

2) The knowing θυμός – retaining information and using it

The next category involves not only receiving impressions but retaining them in some way so that the θυμός can be said to know, understand or remember information. It also uses its memorial faculty to hypothesize what might be expected to happen next. This has attracted little comment with analysis concentrating almost exclusively on the later 'debating θυμός' category. Cairns briefly notes that "since *thymos* can be associated in various ways with what later Greeks would call *phantasia,* it is no surprise that it is also associated with memory".[196] The categories considered below do not tend towards *phantasia,* but they do show the memorial capacity of the θυμός. They are all, as may be expected by now, describing important matters. However, there is a further distinction between what the θυμός in particular knows and what the agent in general may be said to know. The θυμός has knowledge that is not merely academic. It knows what it knows through experience and as such has an unshakeable belief in the knowledge. A distinction between the two verbs used (οἶδα and γιγνώσκω) is that with οἶδα the knowledge is pre-existing, whereas with γιγνώσκω we see the knowledge being learned in real time.

οἶδα

Characters in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* frequently say of themselves, or have it said of them, that they "know in their θυμός" or "their θυμός knows" using the verb οἶδα. The instances are summarised below:

Agent(s)	Context
Menelaus	Knows in θυμός how his brother was occupied (*Il.* 2.409)
Agamemnon, Hector	"I know this well in my φρήν and θυμός: the day will come when sacred Ilios will be laid low" (*Il.* 4.163, 6.447)
soothsayer	This is the way the soothsayer would interpret, one who in his mind had clear knowledge of omens (*Il.* 12.228-9)
Telemachus	"To you the suitors make answer thus, that you may know it in your θυμός" (*Od.* 2.111-2)
Athene	"I never doubted of this, but in my θυμός knew it well, that you would come home after losing all your comrades" (*Od.* 13.339)
Peisistratus	"Well I know this in φρήν and θυμός, so masterful is his spirit he will not let you go" (*Od.* 15.211)

[196] Cairns, 2019, p.8.

Two aspects of these examples separate the knowledge that the θυμός is said to have from the knowledge that it would gain from simply being told of a matter. The first is that the knowledge that the θυμός has would not be considered universal or uncontroversial. Both Agamemnon and Hector "know" in their mind (φρήν) and θυμός that Troy will be devastated, even though three-quarters of the *Iliad* is yet to be told and the advantage in battle will swing several times before the end, either of the *Iliad* or of Troy.[197] The soothsayer has clear knowledge of omens, a specialist knowledge not shared by many.[198] Athene knows in her θυμός that Odysseus would come home, which to every other character in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus included, was in serious doubt.[199] Telemachus anticipates that Nestor would wish to entertain him hospitably, but only Peisistratus knows with the absolute certainty that comes of experience that Nestor would insist upon it.[200] Perhaps the most interesting is the first account, where Agamemnon, seeking Zeus's favour, arranges a sacrifice. He sends a message to various chiefs of the army, but one person does not need such a request:

> And uncalled came to him Menelaus, good at the war cry, for he knew in his θυμός how his brother was occupied.[201]

In this example, as in all, it is clearly the knowledge of personal experience, of knowing a person intimately as only a sibling can. It is not the knowledge of a second-hand tale, however well-believed.

The second unifying factor is that these examples of knowledge are in no way doubted by the knower. Rather the agent has a firm belief that the knowledge held is unshakeably true, as indicated by the frequent use of "know well" in translation, as well as the emphasis implied by the use of ἐγώ in four of the examples. This interpretation is consistent with Kirk's analysis who notes regarding the *Iliad* 4.163:

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[197] Hom. *Il.* 4.163, 6.447.
[198] Hom. *Il.* 12.228.
[199] Hom. *Od.* 13.339.
[200] Hom. *Od.* 15.211.
[201] Hom. *Il.* 2.402-409.

> οἶδα as opening tends in any event to introduce a very personal declaration; εὖ … οἶδα is still more emphatic. … The addition of the formula κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν increases the sense of passionate conviction.[202]

In the *Republic*, Plato suggests that the guardian class in the city should be exposed from an early age to stories of good behaviour so that they would internalise these and know almost instinctively by recognition what is right or wrong in real life from those early examples.[203] The absolute certainty of the Homeric 'knowing in θυμός' is the quality of knowledge that one would expect from this sort of childhood inculcation. It is more a strongly held belief system, an unshakeable tenet about a matter of great importance, than a merely academic knowledge that would be gained from reading a textbook or being told a fact. The sharpest example of this is Menelaus' instinctive knowledge of his brother's need.

γιγνώσκω

The two examples of knowing in θυμός that use the verb γιγνώσκω tally with the οἶδα examples above in that they convey the impression of a knowledge that is more than merely academic. In one, we are told that Hector cut through the spear of Aias, such a remarkable feat that Aias knew in his θυμός that Zeus was backing Hector at that point.[204] This knowledge in θυμός also proves to be a stimulus to action as he wisely retreats from the missiles.[205] In the second example, Odysseus tells Medon that he has been spared "so that you may know in your θυμός, and tell also to another, how much better it is to do good deeds than evil."[206] This γιγνώσκω knowledge is similar to the οἶδα knowledge, above, in that the knowledge is gained through first-hand experience and that it is firmly believed. The difference is one of perspective. With γιγνώσκω, we see the knowledge being gained in real time, whereas in οἶδα examples the knowledge already existed. There are unfortunately only these two examples

[202] Kirk, 1985, p.348.
[203] Pl. *Resp.* 386a-389a.
[204] Hom. *Il.* 16.114-122.
[205] Hom. *Il.* 16.122-123.
[206] Hom. *Od.* 22.371-374.

of knowing (γιγνώσκω) in θυμός, which is too few to insist that the author intended such a difference to be apparent. However, it remains a possibility.

Using knowledge

In between retaining information and debating is a brief category where the agent believes or forebodes something in their θυμός or is told to 'consider' in their θυμός the consequences of their actions. This shows a more aware θυμός that can not only receive information and retain it, but analyse it to some useful purpose. Again, this category of the thinking θυμός has unfortunately attracted little scholarly interest. Also again, the things that the θυμός considers are seen to be things that are important.

Odysseus, on an incidental expedition to the land of the Cyclopes, decides to take with him an extra supply of wine, "for my proud θυμός had a foreboding (ὀίσατο) that presently a man would come to me clothed in great might, a savage man that knew nothing of justice or of law".[207] Penelope's foreboding in θυμός is similar when she says to the disguised Odysseus that she does not believe her husband will return: "in my θυμός I forebode (ὀΐεται) it, just as it shall be".[208] She has nine years' experience of not seeing his return since the end of the war, and credits her θυμός with the future knowledge based on that experience. The final οἴομαι instance returns to Odysseus, who anticipates in θυμός that Eurycleia will recognise him through his scar.[209] Odysseus was justified in both his assumptions. Penelope, it turned out, was mistaken. In all cases, the foreboding in θυμός prompted action: Odysseus took the wine, and prepared himself to silence Eurycleia, while Penelope guarded herself against believing probably false reports of Odysseus' return.

People and gods are also advised to actively consider consequences in their θυμός, and by implication to plan accordingly. Zeus sends a message to Poseidon to "cease from war and battle" and if he will not, to "consider

[207] Hom. *Od.* 9.212-215.
[208] Hom. *Od.* 19.312.
[209] Hom. *Od.* 19.390-391.

(φραζέσθω) then in φρένα and θυμόν" the consequences.[210] Eumaeus, less threateningly, advises Telemachus to let his θυμός beware (καὶ φράζεο θυμῷ) lest some evil occur at the hands of the plotting suitors.[211]

In all of these cases, the θυμός is spoken of as not only storing information, but processing it to work out what consequences are likely to occur as a result of current action and plan accordingly. These cases show that the θυμός is aware of the likely consequence of any particular circumstance. They serve as a stepping stone between the θυμός merely having knowledge and the section below in which the θυμός debates two courses of action and comes to a decision. Again, Jahn's pleonastic theory regarding θυμός could be considered here, where it would be as relevant to say either 'know' or 'consider' rather than 'know/consider in θυμός'. As with the hearing examples, though, they are all matters of some considerable weight and in view of the next step considered, in which the θυμός is shown to play an active role in debating, I would argue that θυμός is not just filling space in the line in these cases either.

3) The debating θυμός

In this section the θυμός goes one step further than receiving information and working out likely consequences. It takes information it has received and uses it to debate between two, or occasionally more, courses of action. Various verbs are used. Some are unique to one work or the other, for instance βουλεύω is used twice in the *Odyssey* and not at all in the *Iliad,* while the five occurrences of διαλέγω are all found in the *Iliad.* On the other hand, μερμηρίζω and ὁρμαίνω are quite evenly split between the two.

Plato would later categorise the θυμός as being separated from rational thought, and it has already been seen in the overview of scholarship on Homer, above, that the θυμός is widely accepted to be emotion-driven in Homer. With these points in mind, it may be expected that in debates the θυμός would put forward an emotional, even passionate, argument, and some other aspect than θυμός

[210] Hom. *Il.* 15.162-167.
[211] Hom. *Od.* 17.595-596.

would argue for cool-headedness and rationality. Barnouw seems to suggest as much when he defines θυμός as "impulse".[212] Sullivan suggests φρήν as a potential arguer with or against θυμός but also states that while "it may be tempting to associate *phrēn* more with intellect, and *thumos* more with emotion … its [θυμός] intellectual aspect may be as strong as that of *phrēn"*.[213] It will be seen that Sullivan's assessment is accurate: the θυμός does consider emotions, with fear predominating as may be expected in life or death situations, but the final decision is almost always the unemotional one, shaped by social expectations of what one should do rather than what one may want to do in the moment. This aspect of θυμός is especially highlighted in the first category of debates considered: those involving the verb διαλέγω.

διαλέγω

The five occurrences of διαλέγω show similarities with four of them following the same formula and the fifth differing only slightly. To take the account of Odysseus in Book 11 of the *Iliad* as an example, it begins with Odysseus in a state of agitation speaking to his θυμός as he finds himself alone on the battlefield:

> ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·[214]
> (In agitation he spoke to his proud [great-hearted] *thumos*)

The same line is used to describe Menelaus, with the same underlying cause of agitation.[215] Agenor and Hector also share the same line: Agenor is the only one of the Trojans not fleeing the scene of battle, and Hector is considering entering into single combat against Achilles.[216]

The scene then progresses with the protagonist outlining his choices. Again, to use Odysseus as the example:

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[212] Barnouw, 2004, p.27.
[213] Sullivan, 1988, p.83.
[214] Hom. *Il.* 11.403.
[215] Hom. *Il.* 17.90.
[216] Hom. *Il.* 21.552, 22.98.

> Ah me, what will become of me? Great evil if I flee seized with fear of the mass of men; but a worse thing if I am taken alone, for the rest of the Danaans has the son of Cronos scattered in flight.[217]

All four men begin with the brief exclamation of self-pity, justifiably so considering their options. Odysseus's options, at their most basic level, are between shameful flight and fatal death. He does not seem to consider at this point that if he stands and fights, he may yet be successful and live. He does at this point, while speaking to his θυμός, consider death to be "a worse thing".

The other three warriors face similar hopeless choices: Menelaus fears that if he abandons the body of Patroclus with its borrowed armour on the battlefield, then "many a Danaan may find fault with me". On the other hand, if due to that fear of shame he stayed to fight Hector and the Trojans alone, he fears "that perhaps they may surround me, many against one". Thus Menelaus' choice in essence is identical to Odysseus's - shame, or near-certain death.[218] Agenor's choices are very slightly different as both involve shame – if he flees from Achilles, "even so will he overtake me and butcher me in my cowardice", or else he may escape and eventually get safe back to Ilion, having failed to fight.[219] His choice is between shame and death, and shame and life, with the actual choice out of his hands: he only considers fleeing at that stage. Hector has more choices than anyone, outlining three: He can retreat inside the gate, in which case "Polydamas will be the first to reproach me".[220] This was never a realistic option for Hector who would be ashamed (αἰδέομαι) by the reproaches that he would then invite.[221] His second choice is to "meet Achilles man to man and slay him … or perish gloriously (ἐυκλειῶς) before the city".[222] His initial two choices are thus to choose either shame and life, or glory and possible death. A third option is that he can "lay down his arms and speak to Achilles", arguing rationally for an end to the war.[223] However, he quickly

[217] Hom. *Il.* 11.404-406.
[218] Hom. *Il.* 17.91-96.
[219] Hom. *Il.* 21.553-561.
[220] Hom. *Il.* 22.99.
[221] Hom. *Il.* 22.105.
[222] Hom. *Il.* 22.108-110.
[223] Hom. *Il.* 22.111-121.

realises that this option would bring both shame and death, considering it unlikely that Achilles, so recently bereaved of Patroclus, would refrain from killing Hector, so Hector would have the shame of being killed without the glory of having put up a fight.[224] Thus the choice for all the protagonists is ultimately between shame on the one hand and death on the other. Only Odysseus identified death as "a worse thing". Hector, by contrast, considers it would be "far better for me to meet Achilles" and either kill him or, more likely, die in the attempt.[225]

In the next step of the formula, the protagonist asks why the θυμός debates (διαλέγω) these things, and the wording is identical in all four cases:

> ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;[226]
> ("but why has my θυμός debated these things with me?")

This is immediately followed by resolution to follow the non-shameful course, and action to that end.

The role of θυμός in these dialogues has been analysed in some depth. Hainsworth notes the standard formula which "illustrates again the tendency of the epic to represent what goes on in the mind (as we should say) as a dialogue between the person and a personified entity".[227] This tends towards Jahn's "pleonastic" assessment of θυμός as being simply the agent: the agent is having a discussion with himself. However, Hainsworth also notes that the author at times portrays himself not as an omniscient being, but as an observer who must guess what is driving a particular action:

> As an observer he has a choice between two kinds of rhetorical language, both alien to later and modern thought. He can say, as at [*Iliad* 12:] 292, that a god impelled the man to act or, as at 307 and of the same event, that the man's θυμός impelled him to act. It is natural for an observer of Sarpedon's assault to say that he

[224] Hom. *Il.* 22.123-130.
[225] Hom. *Il.* 22.108-109.
[226] Hom. *Il.* 11.407, 17.97, 21.562, 22.122.
[227] Hainsworth, 1993, p.270.

> was inspired by a god (292); that describes and at the same time explains its impetuosity: it is also natural to say that he was inspired by his θυμός (307). There is no contradiction, nor even what some have called 'common-sense carelessness' in these descriptions. The common ground is that both figures of speech describe action in terms of an impulse emanating from outside, or at least distinct from, the man himself.[228]

Of the standard formula "In agitation he spoke to his proud [great-hearted] θυμός", Haimsowrth presents the agent as talking essentially to himself. When, however, the θυμός prompts an action, he states that the impulse appears to the observer to come from either outside or distinct from the agent. If it is possible to accept the author uses θυμός not as a mere pleonasm but as a distinct part of the agent, such a possible contradiction does not arise.

Collins suggests that the θυμός has "subvocally and/or subauditorily" been debating the various options and putting forth the various pros and cons of each course of action.[229] By this understanding the words spoken by the protagonist have been an echo of what the θυμός was telling him at any particular time. However, by this point in the decision-making process, the arguments of the θυμός are no longer helpful because the decision has already been made, hence the question in Collins' view is not "why has my θυμός debated?" but, as he heavily rephrases it, "why does my dear *thumos* continue to argue the relative merits of these options?".[230] This may suggest a relatively neutral θυμός that simply parrots the options so that the thinking head can decide what to do, rather than a θυμός that is actively arguing one way or the other. However Collins also suggests that perhaps the head, which has the power of speech, is not the judge in the debate, but rather the herald that simply pronounces the verdict of the θυμός.[231]

Sharples offers a different explanation for asking "why the θυμός has debated", whereby the agent uses it as an excuse for having considered, for a moment, a shameful course. He notes especially that the agent first addresses the θυμός,

[228] Hainsworth, 1993, p.349.
[229] Collins, 1996, p.78.
[230] Collins, 1996, p.78. (Collins' rephrasing is not justified by the source material).
[231] Collins, 1996, p.78.

but then changes position and asks why the θυμός debates, thus pushing the responsibility for the initial argument onto the θυμός. He regards this as a distancing technique by the agent:

> With hindsight, a character finds it difficult to regard certain actions as his own – either because he would not normally be capable of them, or because they now seem foolish; so he ascribes them to forces outside himself. Somewhat similarly, the description of what was *introduced* as a course of action contemplated by the character himself rather than as a course of action suggestion *to* him *by* his *thumos* can be seen as an expression of his repudiation of it.[232]

Sharples seems to portray a θυμός that is absolutely passive in the debate. The agent first addresses it and then blames it, while any action on the part of the θυμός is not stated. This explanation, though, does not harmonize with the θυμός of such μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος individuals discussed above where the martial spirit predominates throughout, even to excess. I therefore suggest an alternative understanding that gives the θυμός a more active role in the decision-making process than either blandly stating the options and likely consequences, or sitting passively while the agent chats to it. I suggest instead that the formulaic phrase "but why has my θυμός debated these things with me" does indeed close down the discussion, as Collins believes, but the reason is that the agent has come to realise that in truth there is only one possible action. Furthermore, the actions chosen show that the θυμός has had the deciding word. Cairns writes of the relationship between fear of shame and θυμός:

> The *thumos*, then, is intimately related to the ideal of oneself presupposed by the concept of *timē* [honour], and covers the desire for *timē*, the anger of one who has fallen below his own ideal of himself, and the resentment of one whose self-image has failed to find validation in the eyes of others.[233]

Bearing in mind the honour-loving, shame-fearing aspect of θυμός, it is likely that the θυμός, in a debate, would naturally opt for the action that is not shameful. The non-shameful action in all cases is to fight, which also coincides

[232] Sharples, 1998, p.166.
[233] Cairns, 1993, p.383.

with the μεγάθυμος individuals discussed above. I would suggest that if the agent realises that there is actually no choice, as he does in each of these cases, it is because the inclination of the θυμός has predominated in the debate. The immediate decisions made by three of the characters show that they are, indeed, acting in accord with this honour-loving, shame-fearing θυμός. Only Menelaus is for a time in doubt, although even he, while taking what he initially described as the blameworthy choice, eventually redeems himself by protecting the corpse of Patroclus.

For Odysseus the decision is:

> I know that cowards walk away from war, but whoever is pre-eminent in battle, for him surely there is great need to hold his ground boldly, whether he be struck, or strike another.[234]

Even as Odysseus makes his choice to stand and fight rather than flee, he also voices the slight hope that he may yet live ("whether he be struck, or strike another"). However, it is not the possibility of winning that motivates him to "hold his ground boldly", but the wish to be seen to be "pre-eminent in battle" rather than cowardly.

In all cases, then, the θυμός can only support one course of action: that of avoiding shame and pursuing honour. In this it has to compete against the agent's predominating emotion in the moment, that of fear. Thus in a crisis θυμός, despite being heavily associated with emotion, does not champion the emotional cause, but rather chooses what it believes to be the rational one based on a belief system centred on an heroic code of conduct inculcated since childhood.

In summary, it can be argued that in the four similar *διαλέγω* type scenes, the honour-loving θυμός predominates. It follows the formulaic structure:

- The agent opens the dialogue with the θυμός ("In agitation he spoke to his proud θυμός")

[234] Hom. *Il.* 11.408-410.

- The options are summarised – at least one option would involve shame
- The debate concludes ("But why has my θυμός debated these things with me?")
- The reasons for the decision are given, with avoidance of shame predominating
- The agent acts in a way that avoids shame indicating the active role of the θυμός in coming to the decision

It was noted that there are five uses of διαλέγω in relation to the θυμός in the *Iliad*, with only four following the formulaic structure laid out above. The fifth scene using διαλέγω leaves off steps 1 and 2. Immediately following Hector's death, Achilles begins to plan a further attack on Troy (taking the place of step 2 in the list above), before he stops himself with the formulaic step 3: "But why does my θυμός debate these things with me?"[235] His reason for closing the debate is that "there lies by the ships a dead man unwept, unburied – Patroclus".[236]

The decision facing Achilles is not shame versus death, yet still he asks why his θυμός has debated these things. When compared with the other four formulaic instances, this may indicate that his θυμός still allows only one course of action in the circumstances. It is natural that in the *Iliad*, with its heavy ratio of combat scenarios, the honour-loving, shame-fearing θυμός would frequently recommend 'stand and fight' as a course of action. However, this episode in Achilles' story suggests that the θυμός may have another aspect that motivates the agent to fulfil domestic responsibilities as well as to avoid the shame that would be attracted by being cowardly in battle. In the heat of the moment it seems likely that Achilles' companions would not consider it shameful to continue the battle against Troy, and indeed Achilles himself considered doing so. However, when his θυμός exerts its wish, it appears that Achilles is not being motivated by a fear of being judged wanting by an external audience, but rather he acts as his own judge: he must fulfil his duty to his dead comrade.

[235] Hom. *Il.* 22.385.
[236] Hom. *Il.* 22.386-387.

This episode is not unique in the *Iliad* in illustrating that family duty is an aspect of θυμός, but it shows the underlying thought process, including the θυμός-thought process, more clearly than any other. This 'family duty' aspect of the θυμός is not especially prominent in the *Iliad*, but it is a theme that will be revisited below in the section "Rousing the θυμός with speech".

At this point it is worth noting the role of θυμός as commander, discussed in more detail below. Once the θυμός has decided upon a course of action, there is no suggestion that the agent fails to act accordingly. In this way the θυμός appears to be a sort of internal imperative to the agent. Its dictates are not random, being the result of a moral grounding in what is acceptable and worthy, and they are, so far, always obeyed.

Compared with the five διαλέγω instances in the *Iliad*, the remainder of the debating verbs do not show such a strong stepwise formulaic pattern. Nevertheless, patterns do emerge.

μερμηρίζω

Of the ten instances where a person ponders in his θυμός (μερμήριξε κατὰ θυμόν) or where the θυμός ponders (θυμός ἐνί φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει), two appear in the *Iliad*, and eight in the *Odyssey*. In both works, φρήν is frequently mentioned as well, either as a party to the pondering, or as the location of the θυμός while it ponders.[237] Beyond the association of θυμός and φρήν, there is little of a formulaic pattern to these ten examples as there was in the case of διαλέγω. There are, however, similarities in the situations which are worth noting. A table format for direct comparison may be useful:

[237] Hom. *Il.* 5.671, 8.169. *Od.* 4.117, 10.50, 10.151, 16.73, 16.237, 20.10, 20.38, 24.235.

Line ref & character:	**Choices**
Il. 5.671 Odysseus	1) Pursue and kill Sarpedon 2) Remain and kill more Lycians
Il. 8.169 Diomedes	1) Turn and fight Hector face to face 2) Return to the ships
Od. 4.117 Menelaus	1) Tell Telemachus that he is recognised as Odysseus' son 2) Let Telemachus speak first
Od. 10.50 Odysseus	1) Jump ship and perish in the sea 2) Wait to see if the ship survives
Od. 10.151 Odysseus	1) Search for food himself 2) Return to the ship and send others to search for food
Od. 16.73 Penelope	1) Stay with Telemachus 2) Marry one of the suitors
Od. 16.237 Odysseus	1) Telemachus and Odysseus to kill the suitors alone 2) Seek out others to help
Od. 20.10 Odysseus	1) Kill the servant women today 2) Kill the servant women tomorrow
Od. 20.38 Odysseus	How to kill the suitors (exact choices not specified)
Od. 24.235 Odysseus	1) Embrace Laertes openly and tell all 2) Test Laertes out with questions

The table shows the breadth of choices that the θυμός is debating. It was seen in the διαλέγω section that the choices faced were often diametrically opposed, normally involving either shame and life on the one side, or honour and death on the other. In the case of μερμηρίζω, however, the choices tend to be far closer to each other: kill one or kill many, kill now or kill later. The basic decision, the endpoint of action, is already decided, and the θυμός only debates the means to that end. The killing options are the ones most obviously motivated by an honour-loving θυμός. The search for food is also the province of the Homeric θυμός, considering the number of times we read in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* that "they feasted, nor did any θυμός lack anything of the equal

feast".[238] Penelope's decision whether to remain with Telemachus or marry again is covered by the family-oriented θυμός hinted at above, and her choice is a difficult one – to remain the protectress, albeit less effectively as time goes on, of her existing child, or to pursue the option of having another family. Indeed, her options are the most diametrically opposed as she must decide which family to safeguard: her existing son, or her hypothetical future children. In all of these cases, either of the options would have been satisfactory to the honour-loving θυμός. The fact that there was an internal debate indicates that the θυμός is capable of weighing the pros and cons beyond the first question of whether this or that course is honourable. When there are two options, both honourable, some other consideration is needed. For Odysseus attacking the suitors, the extra consideration was apparently likelihood of success as he asks Telemachus for more details about the suitors and how many of them there are in order "that I may ponder in my noble θυμός".[239] This suggests a far more rational aspect to the θυμός than Plato would later credit it with.

Without comparison with the διαλέγω options, it would not be easy to see a pattern with these μερμηρίζω choices. However, as it is there is an apparent difference: when διαλέγω is used, the options are vastly conflicting. When μερμηρίζω is used in the examples discussed so far the ultimate action has already been decided on and only the finer details are left to be considered.

The two outliers in this pattern are Diomedes in the *Iliad,* and Odysseus' final pondering in the *Odyssey.*

Diomedes' example is easy to explain. At first sight his choice of fight or flight is more similar to the διαλέγω choices, of which only one would be clearly championed by the θυμός. However, Zeus had already given a clear sign that Diomedes should not fight Hector at that time, hurling down a flame of burning sulphur from heaven to turn back Diomedes' horses.[240] Nestor, reading the sign rightly, tries to assure Diomedes that neither the Trojans nor the Dardanians,

[238] Hom. *Il.* 1.468, for example.
[239] Hom. *Od.* 16.235-236.
[240] Hom. *Il.* 8.133-136.

and especially the many Trojan women made widows by Diomedes, will think him a coward.[241] Even so, Diomedes still considers fighting Hector: "Three times he wavered in mind and heart (μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν), and thrice from the mountains of Ida Zeus the counsellor thundered".[242] Essentially, therefore, Diomedes is not deciding whether to live shamefully or die gloriously, but whether to actively pursue honour in battle or heed a god's instructions, both reasonable courses of action for a well-trained θυμός. Kelly notes regarding the expression κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν that it only occurs "where the hero keenly feels the need to act aggressively, usually then doing so".[243] This would again underline the martial θυμός that is unable to countenance a shameful, if safer, option.

Odysseus' testing of Laertes is more complex. He faced two options:

> He debated in his mind and his θυμός whether to kiss and embrace his father, and tell him all, how he had returned and come to his native land, or whether he should first question him, and prove him in each thing.[244]

The first option is clearly a part of the family-oriented θυμός which would want to pay his respects to his father, and to cheer him with the news of his son's return and safety. Of the second option, one commentary states only that it "does not make a great deal of sense" as "it is not up to the new arrival (in xxiv, Odysseus), but to the 'host' to do the questioning".[245] Whatever the social hierarchy, Odysseus chooses the latter course and in doing so mocks Laertes' poor condition.[246] Sels notes that this is a troubling scene for scholars, even leading some to argue for omitting book 24 altogether.[247] Sels' own argument is that Odysseus is testing whether Laertes is strong enough to receive the

[241] Hom. *Il.* 8.151-156.
[242] Hom. *Il.* 8.167-171.
[243] Kelly, 2007, p.198.
[244] Hom. *Il.* 24.235-238.
[245] Russo, Fernandez-Galiano & Heubeck, 1992, p.388.
[246] Hom. *Od.* 24.244-257.
[247] Sels, 2013, p.190.

information that Odysseus has returned: thus far the only character to recognise Odysseus instantly is Argus, who died immediately afterwards.[248]

Sels' argument is compelling, however I offer an alternative – that what we are seeing in this scene is the culmination of an education process that the author shows us happening in real-time. When earlier examples of Odysseus debating in θυμός are called to mind, a clear pattern emerges. Earliest in his life story, he does what he thinks best – pursues Sarpedon – until Athene with her extra knowledge diverts him.[249] Later, after it seems best to his θυμός to send his comrades in search of food, he credits the arrival of a stag as being due to divine intervention which renders his choice unnecessary.[250] Perhaps his request of more information about the suitors from Telemachus, the next time he debates in θυμός, is a tacit acknowledgement that he has twice before acted without full knowledge, and this time he seeks to ensure that he is fully informed before his θυμός debates what action to take.[251] In the next example, when he debates when to kill the serving women, his heart was eager to act immediately, but he "rebuked" it into reluctant obedience.[252] The reason why he did so is that it would immediately alert the suitors to his intentions. In this case he did not hold back because of the need to gain new information, simply because it would be inexpedient to act at once. However, his next debate which follows hard on the heels of that one is how best to kill the suitors, and here Athene again intervenes with the final piece of information that he needs: that she is on his side and he cannot lose.[253] Had he been busy slaughtering women, Athene would not have had the opportunity to deliver that vital information, so Odysseus may have later reflected how fortunate it was that he had waited and not obeyed his first instinct. All of these lead down to Odysseus' final debate in θυμός when he confronts Laertes. This time, his θυμός itself acts in a way that will get Odysseus the final piece of information that he needs: whether Laertes has remained loyal to him. By mentioning Laertes' poor condition and

[248] Sels, 2013, pp.191-193.
[249] Hom. *Il.* 5.671-676.
[250] Hom. *Od.* 10.155-159.
[251] Hom. *Od.* 16.237.
[252] Hom. *Od.* 20.16-18.
[253] Hom. *Od.* 20.36-53.

asking what master he has that has neglected a hard-working slave so badly, Odysseus lays the groundwork for Laertes to blame his reduced state on his neglectful son.[254] Laertes, however, only praises Odysseus and begs the stranger, as he thinks, for information about him.[255] This was the final piece of information that Odysseus's θυμός needed to make a decision. Finally, when it was in possession of all the relevant information, Odysseus' θυμός was stirred to comfort his father.[256] I believe this series of events represents the only instance in the Homeric works where the training (or further training at least) of the θυμός can be followed in real time, as Odysseus first realises that he has acted without full knowledge and twice required the correction of the gods, and then gradually learns to gather all the information himself before his θυμός debates, until finally "it seems best" to the θυμός itself to ensure no fact has been missed.

To summarise, where there is a debate (μερμηρίζω) in θυμός, all of the options debated would be acceptable to the θυμός, and the options themselves illustrate the various things that the θυμός values. Most examples showcase the honour-loving θυμός that seeks to do glorious deeds in war or, equally honour-loving, avenge an insult. Less frequently, the θυμός is concerned with physical sustenance. Odysseus illustrates the family-oriented θυμός when he wants to comfort his father. Finally, and, it must be admitted, unusually, Odysseus shows a learning θυμός as he gradually comes to appreciate the value of gathering all the relevant information before acting.

βουλεύω

There are only two instances of βουλεύω – to plan or deliberate – in connection with the θυμός and, once again, by comparing with διαλέγω and μερμηρίζω a pattern can be divined, although not conclusively as there are only two examples. With διαλέγω, the agent was faced with opposing choices, only one of which could be countenanced by the θυμός. With most cases of μερμηρίζω, the θυμός would be able to countenance either choice with the end plan already

[254] Hom. *Od.* 24.249-257.
[255] Hom. *Od.* 24.280-290.
[256] Hom. *Od.* 24.318-320

made and only relatively minor details still to be worked out. With βουλεύω, the agent faces a choice that is no choice. In the first instance, Odysseus plans in his θυμός (βούλευσα κατὰ μεγαλήτορα θυμόν) to stab Polyphemus in the breast.[257] However, before acting, he says that "another θυμός checked me".[258] Polyphemus has trapped Odysseus and his men in a cave in such a way that they would not be able to escape if Polyphemus is dead. Until he is killed, however, Polyphemus is eating the men at the rate of two per meal. Thus Odysseus faces the choice of killing Polyphemus and starving to death, or not killing Polyphemus and being eaten himself. To kill now or kill later, as above, is an enviable choice compared with choosing to die quickly now or slowly later. The impossibility of the choice temporarily paralyzes Odysseus into inactivity as all he and his comrades can do is "with wailing, wait for the bright dawn."[259]

Odysseus later faces another such choice in Book 12, when he is told by Circe to "deliberate [the choice] in your θυμός" (αὐτὸς θυμῷ βουλεύειν).[260] The first option is either to sail through the clashing rocks, through which "not even winged things may pass", or face Scylla and Charybdis.[261] He then faces a further choice, assuming he does not opt for the certain death of the clashing rocks: to all be killed by Charybdis, or lose six of his men to Scylla. Once again, there is not really a choice. Circe claims that she does not know which way Odysseus's course lies, but she advises that "it is better by far to mourn six comrades in your ship than all together".[262] She knows that there is only one real option. Odysseus, on the other hand, has difficulty comprehending that

[257] Hom. *Od.* 9.299-302.
[258] Hom. *Od.* 9.302. This appears to be a unique circumstance in Homer. Ordinarily the θυμός allows only one plan and the agent, almost without exception, carries it out. As may be expected, the unique phrase ἕτερος θυμός has attracted some attention. Snell (1982, p.14) remarks that sometimes in Homer the name of the organ was used for the function of the organ. The example he gives is that "to look at a thing with different eyes" does not imply a second pair of eyes, but a different perspective or way of looking. If we then say that the function of the θυμός is an impulse, as Snell does in this context, the reading is simply that Odysseus first had one impulse, and then another. Alternative explanations have been proposed (e.g. Collins, 1996, p.80; Clarke, 1999, p.65; Barnouw, 2004, pp.3, 12; Schein, 2015, p.78), but I find Snell's explanation satisfactory.
[259] Hom. *Od.* 9.306.
[260] Hom. *Od.* 12.57-58.
[261] Hom. *Od.* 12.61-65.
[262] Hom. *Od.* 12.57, 12.109-110.

there is no possibility of fighting instead of simply hoping for the least number of deaths.[263]

Thus, in the two Homeric instances when the θυμός deliberates (βουλεύω) a course, it is not with a view to choosing between two possibilities, but rather to consider the hopelessness of the case and the impossibility of any apparent alternative. As noted above, there is a caveat – there are only two examples from which to judge. There are many more examples of βουλεύω in the Homer works, but none directly involving the θυμός. Those that do not involve the θυμός are not about hopeless choices, but simply involve two or more people deliberating a number of reasonable possible courses of action.[264] Similarly, outside of the Homeric texts it is rare to find βουλεύω in connection with the θυμός, unless it is quoting the *Odyssey*.[265] It is not possible, therefore, to insist that when the θυμός ponders (βουλεύω), the agent is always faced with a hopeless situation. Nevertheless, the two examples that we do have permit that reading.

A summary of the verbs considered so far indicate the following patterns that are instructive as to the workings of the θυμός:

διαλέγω – faced with diametrically opposing options, the θυμός is only capable of championing one, but permits the agent to consider others before the agent comes to understand that there is no real option. It is not specified, but the agent's choice is presumably the effect of the strong honour-loving, shame-fearing θυμός.

μερμηρίζω – the objective having already been decided on by the θυμός, it debates two or more ways to achieve the objective. The end is not in doubt, only the means.

[263] Hom. *Od.* 12.111-114.
[264] For example, Hom. *Il.* 1.531, 2.114.
[265] For example, Eustathius. *Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam.* 2.8.5, or Plut. *Caius Marcius Coriolanus.* 32.6.34. The only example that I can find that does not quote the *Odyssey* is Plut. *Thes.* 24.5.5 where the Delphic oracle advises Theseus to "with spirit counsel only" ("ἀλλὰ σὺ μή τι λίην πεπονημένος ἔνδοθι θυμὸν βουλεύειν").

βουλεύω – faced with hopeless choices, the θυμός can only consider the hopelessness of the case, to the point of temporary paralysis.

ὁρμαίνω

The verb ὁρμαίνω (ponder) seems to link all of these threads, and indeed is used synonymously alongside some of them. There are ten instances of ὁρμαίνω being used in connection with the θυμός.[266] Regarding patterns to the use of ὁρμαίνω, nothing stands out clearly. Achilles ponders two diametrically opposed courses, "to kill the son of Atreus" [Agamemnon] or to "check his wrath and curb his spirit".[267] However this dichotomy is not repeated in enough cases to call it a pattern. For example, Menelaus is only considering whether to tell Telamachus that he has recognised the latter as the son of Odysseus, or wait for Telemachus to identify himself.[268] This latter example uses as ὁρμαίνω synonymously with μερμηρίζω, a verb which when used in connection θυμός is characterised by relatively unimportant choices. In the two instances noted above, the choices are specified, but again, this is not true of all the ὁρμαίνω episodes. The river Scamander is angered at being choked by corpses courtesy of Achilles, and ponders how to stop him.[269] He ends by simply asking Achilles to refrain from disposing of dead bodies in his waters.[270] In some other cases, third party intervention is used, for example Athene appearing to Achilles and telling him not to kill Agamemnon.[271] Divine intervention also twice stops the pondering of Odysseus, in both instances where his choice resembles the βουλεύω pattern of only a hopeless choice – to drown now or later.[272] In both cases the intervention takes the form of a huge wave sent by Poseidon. Both are unfriendly, the first shattering the raft that held Odysseus' slim hope, the second dashing him against the rugged shore.

In short, unlike other verbs, the ὁρμαίνω examples are not marked by any pattern at all, but are rather a hotch-potch of patterns that other verbs have teased

[266] Hom. *Il.* 1.193, 11.411, 17.106, 21.137, 24.680, *Od.* 2.156, 4.120, 5.365, 5.424, 6.118.
[267] Hom. *Il.* 1.190-192.
[268] Hom. *Od.* 4.116-122.
[269] Hom. *Il.* 21.136-138.
[270] Hom. *Il.* 21.214-226.
[271] Hom. *Il.* 1.206-214.
[272] Hom. *Od.* 5.360-367, 416-425.

out into distinct strands. They are interesting, but do not contribute any additional information to the workings and capabilities of the θυμός.

Conclusion

This section has shown θυμός to be involved in a wide range of activities that have to do with thought. It metaphorically sees and hears information, it retains information, processes it to consider likely consequences, and finally makes decisions based on both information received in real-time and existing knowledge that it has taken in through education, a sort of internal moral code. While the θυμός is strongly associated with emotions and is the metaphorical place where emotions are felt, the decisions it makes in a crisis tend to place greater weight on the more rational consideration of 'doing the right thing' rather than giving into immediate emotions such as fear. When Plato deals with θυμός he will deprive it of much of its debating ability, rather relegating it to being a 'soldier' who implements the cool-headed decisions made by rational thought. However in the Homeric works, rational thought is very much part of the remit of the θυμός

In this section new information has been discovered by paying careful attention to the verbs that are used in connection with the θυμός. There are two ways in which the θυμός "knows" information. In debates there are often clues to the nature of the debate in the verb used. This important pattern will recur later in the section "rousing the θυμός with speech".

Section 5: Θυμός-pleasing and Θυμός-paining

In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, some things are described as being painful to the θυμός (θυμαλγής) and some, although rather fewer, as pleasing to it (θυμαρής). This is an academically neglected topic but shows what sort of things please or pain the θυμός, and thus gives further insight into the nature and function of the θυμός. Some instances further relate the θυμός to vitality, as already discussed above. In other cases, it is the martial θυμός that is pleased, which aspect has also already been introduced. A new aspect of the θυμός that is brought to light here, though, is that it loves honour, which may of course have been inferred

from fearing shame which has already been noted. This honour-loving θυμός needs to be read into the θυμός-pleasing accounts, but it is blatant in the θυμός-paining ones.

θυμαρής / θυμήρης

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* identify three separate things that are described as θυμαρής or θυμήρης (fitting or pleasing the θυμός), and all are what one might term 'external' influences. Referring to Briseis, taken from him by Agamemnon, Achilles calls her ἄλοχον θυμαρέα.[273] The same phrase is used to refer to Penelope in relation to Odysseus.[274] Thus a bedfellow, whether lawful wife or concubine, is pleasing to the θυμός according to the Homeric works. Hainsworth analyses the phrase but only to ask whether Briseis should have been described as ἄλοχος, making no comment on θυμαρής.[275] The *Odyssey* also provides two other mentions of things that are pleasing/fitting to the θυμός. The first is water for a bath, hot and cold well-mixed, provided by Circe and her handmaidens.[276] Odysseus had complained to Circe that she had turned his companions into swine, but after she has sworn an oath not to harm him, he accepts her hospitality.[277] It is at this point, before she has returned his companions to their normal form, that Odysseus remarks on her having mixed water to be θυμήρες. The effect of the water is that "she took from my limbs soul-consuming (θυμοφθόρον) weariness".[278] Thus the effect of the θυμήρης object in this case is to refresh the θυμός, bringing it back from near-ruin, and relax the receiver. The final θυμαρής object is a staff, given to Odysseus by Eumaeus.[279] Odysseus had asked for a staff because "the way was treacherous", and its presence in the narrative is immediately justified when Odysseus ponders whether to use it to kill Melanthius.[280] This is not, like the well-mixed water, a relaxing asset, but its presence is nevertheless a comfort to the bearer. More examples of θυμός-pleasing items would be helpful in the understanding,

[273] Hom. *Il.* 9.336.
[274] Hom. *Od.* 23.232.
[275] Hainsworth, 1993, p.106.
[276] Hom. *Od.* 10.362.
[277] Hom. *Od.* 10.336-347.
[278] Hom. *Od.* 10.363.
[279] Hom. *Od.* 17.199.
[280] Hom. *Od.* 17.196, 17.236-7.

but from the three that are cited by the Homeric texts, it can be deduced that they share the characteristic of being a comfort to the receiver. The water would be revitalising to exhausted Odysseus. The staff, on the other hand, appeals specifically to the active martial θυμός. Thus two of the θυμός-pleasing objects assist in the identification of the θυμός as being connected with vitality and with martial prowess. The third, the companionship of Briseis, is explained below.

Pleasing the θυμός with food and drink

In addition to the instances where an object is described specifically as being θυμαρής, there are many other occasions where it can be inferred that a tangible object is pleasant to the θυμός. Perhaps the most prominent of these occasions are the ones that involve eating and drinking.[281] In addition to food and wine being specified as the source of satisfaction, one of these references also states that the θυμός was satisfied with the music of the lyre.[282] Thus it is not only physical sustenance that the θυμός enjoys, but also music.

Regarding enjoying and being satisfied, this can clearly be classed alongside the revitalising water that Odysseus enjoyed. Kirk does not comment on the effect of food and wine on the θυμός, or the mechanism by which it may partake or be satisfied. He does, however, regarding *Iliad* 4.263, raise another point about the context that can contribute to our understanding of the θυμός. Agamemnon speaks to Idomeneus who is excelling himself on the battlefield:

> "Idomeneus,
> beyond all the Danaans with swift steeds do I show honour
> to you both in war and in other tasks, and at the feast,
> when the chief men of the Argives mix in the bowl the
> ruddy wine of the elders. For though the other long-haired
> Achaeans drink an allotted portion, your cup stands always
> full, just as mine does, to drink whenever your θυμός
> commands".[283]

[281] Hom. *Od.* 3.342, 3.395, 5.95, 7.184, 7.228, 8.70, 8.98, 14.28, 14.46, 14.111, 16.479, 18.427, 19.425, 21.273, *Il.* 1.468, 1.602, 2.431, 4.263, 7.320, 8.189, 9.177, 23.56.
[282] Hom. *Od.* 8.98.
[283] Hom. *Il.* 4.257-263.

Kirk states regarding the allotted portions, "each of the ordinary guests thus has so many cups each, but the host and anyone specially honoured have as much wine as they wish".[284] He goes on to cite other instances of this special honour with Sarpedon, Glaukos and Diomedes all either having or being assumed to have "a seat of honour and meat and full cups".[285] This therefore introduces another aspect of the θυμός, one which is connected to military prowess and also explains why Briseis was θυμός-pleasing to Achilles. Achilles had won Briseis as a prize of honour, and when Agamemnon took her away Achilles complained that "he has done me dishonour; for he has taken away and holds my prize".[286] The θυμός that has earned a prize is therefore pleased by the prize, the proof of the honour that has been given in recognition of brave works. Without Briseis, there is no tangible evidence of the honour that he has earned. While the provision of food and drink may support the suggestion that the θυμός is pleased by the honour that is being conferred by the host, it is less easy to reconcile its enjoyment of the music of the lyre in the same way.

Looking forward to the Platonic θυμός, it is significant that in the Homeric works the author clearly and repeatedly indicates that pleasure in eating and drinking is associated with the θυμός. Plato, on the other hand, would later assign the desire for food and drink, along with other physical desires, to the part of the soul that he called the ἐπιθυμητικόν rather than the θυμός.[287]

θυμαλγής

There are thirteen instances of things being described as θυμαλγής in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, with seven different objects (six, if μῦθος and ἔπος are counted together). While some of these are physical objects, for example the θυμαλγέϊ δεσμῷ – the θυμός-paining bonds – of Melanthius, most are intangible entities such as χόλος or λώβη.[288] The three instances of χόλον θυμαλγέα in the *Iliad*

[284] Kirk, 1985, p.358.
[285] Hom. *Il.* 12.311, 8.161-2.
[286] Hom. *Il.* 1.355-356.
[287] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-8.
[288] Hom. *Od.* 22.189.

are all internal forces: it is the host of the θυμός that also experiences the χόλος.[289]

The cause of Achilles' χόλος in Book 4 is the insulting treatment that he received from Agamemnon, most specifically the removal of Briseis, Achilles' prize of honour.[290] This is consistent again with the honour-loving θυμός introduced above. Later, Phoenix relates to Achilles the parallel account of Meleager, whose χόλος had been triggered by his mother's actions in taking her brother's side against Meleager and praying for his death.[291]

The most frequently mentioned θυμάλγης force is λώβη. In the *Iliad,* it is the outrage or dishonour – the λώβη – that Achilles receives from Agamemnon that provokes his χόλος and decides his next course of action, which is to refrain from the battle.[292] In the *Odyssey,* it is the λώβης θυμαλγέος of the suitors that is repeatedly mentioned.[293] Odysseus' response is decisive, as he explains to Laertes: "The wooers I have slain in our halls, and have taken vengeance on their grievous insolence (λώβην θυμαλγέα) and their evil deeds".[294] Again, the honour-loving aspect of the θυμός is at the forefront here.

Another intangible object that is described as θυμαλγής is speech, not an insulting speech or one indicating outrageous behaviour on the part of the speaker, as in the case of the suitors, but merely an account of events. However, the recipient of the speech feels dishonoured by the account he receives.[295] The θυμαλγέα μῦθον is a second-hand account, sung by Demodocus: the story of Ares and Aphrodite and how Helios told Hephaestus of his wife's disloyalty. It is the account of Helios that is described as θυμαλγέα μῦθον to Hephaestus.[296] Later, we read of an ἔπος θυμαλγές when Penelope tests whether the man claiming to be Odysseus actually is her husband with an apparently throw-away

[289] Hom. *Il.* 4.513, 9.260, 9.565.
[290] Hom. *Il.* 1.318-325.
[291] Hom. *Il.* 9.565-571.
[292] Hom. *Il.* 9.387.
[293] Hom. *Od.* 18.347, 20.285, 24.326.
[294] Hom. *Od.* 24.326-326.
[295] Hom. *Od.* 8.272, 16.69, 23.183.
[296] Hom. *Od.* 8.266-272.

comment about their bed that Odysseus would know to be untrue.[297] He is predictably angry at her apparent forgetfulness and is provoked to describe, at some length, the origin, building and positioning of the bed, so that Penelope is absolutely convinced of his true identity.[298]

The other ἔπος θυμαλγές in the *Odyssey* occurs when Eumaeus tells Telemachus of his visitor and that the stranger presents himself as a suppliant to Telemachus.[299] Ordinarily Telemachus would not have found this speech an ἔπος θυμαλγές, but, as he explains to Eumaeus, he is unable to offer the stranger the usual hospitality of his house because of the presence of the suitors.[300] This example of θυμός-paining highlights again the domestic-facing aspect of the θυμός. Standing as host in his father's absence, Telemachus knew that he had certain duties to perform, and it pained his θυμός that he was prevented from doing so.

In summary, it can be seen that there are a number of influences that are described as θυμαλγής in Homer. In almost all cases when the θυμός is pained, it is because of some perceived dishonour so the honour-loving aspect of the θυμός is heavily foregrounded in these cases.

Section 6: Motivation and Θυμός

a) The θυμός as commander

It has already been noted that when the θυμός is mentioned in association with eating and drinking, it is spoken of as being filled or pleased by the sustenance, or else wishing for it. There are also three occasions where the word ἄνωγα is used in relation to drinking, indicating that the θυμός actively commands, or at least advises, its host to drink.[301] Three of the agents are humans – Idomeneus, Demodocus and Laertes.[302] The fourth is Hector's horses.[303] Besides these

[297] Hom. *Od.* 23.173-180.
[298] Hom. *Od.* 23.181-206.
[299] Hom. *Od.* 16.60-67.
[300] Hom. *Od.* 16.85-89.
[301] Hom. *Il.* 4.263, 8.189; *Od.* 8.70, 16.141.
[302] Hom. *Il.* 4.263; *Od.* 8.70, 16.141.
[303] Hom. *Il.* 8.189.

examples, there is a plethora of other instances where the θυμός acts as the commander of its host.[304]

On most occasions the θυμός commands what comes naturally to the agent. Warriors are told by their θυμός to fight, attack or spy.[305] The θυμός of tired, hungry or thirsty men commands them to sleep, eat or drink.[306] Warlike Athene is conveniently commanded by her θυμός to attend the war in person.[307] 'Thersites of the endless speech' speaks as his θυμός commands.[308] The singer Demodocus obeys his θυμός when it instructs him to sing.[309] Hecuba assumes that her pious son Hector will want to pray.[310]

This array of the θυμός prompting what the agent wants to do has led Shay to call θυμός "a synonym for the English word 'character'".[311] In these particular instances, 'character' may be an adequate translation, but in view of the facets of θυμός seen above, in particular where the θυμός leaves and returns, I would agree with Cairns that Shay goes "too far" in his assertion.[312] It will be seen later that Plato's definition of the θυμός shows some marked differences from the Homeric usage. However, in these cases Plato's definition tallies with Homer's usage: Plato argues at some length that the θυμός is an entity that must be trained according to what is most fit for the person.[313] A well-trained θυμός will then prompt, or command as per Homer, the agent to do what they should do.

In a small but significant minority of cases the agent 'blames' the θυμός, in the way in which Sharples, as noted above, suggested characters do when debating with the θυμός.[314] The agents appear to still agree with the commands of the

[304] A comprehensive list of the commands of the θυμός is provided in Appendix A.
[305] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 6.439, 10.220.
[306] Eg. Hom. *Il.* 4.253, 15.395.
[307] Hom. *Il.* 7.25.
[308] Hom. *Il.* 2.276.
[309] Hom. *Od.* 8.45.
[310] Hom. *Il.* 6.256.
[311] Shay, 2000, p.33.
[312] Cairns, 2019, p.5.
[313] Pl. *Resp.* 386a6-389a7, 441a2-442a3.
[314] Sharples, 1998, p.166.

θυμός, but they show an awareness that their actions will be unpopular and so distance themselves by saying "I must do as my θυμός commands me". This is most prominent in cases where the θυμός commands a person to speak.

When a character begins with "I must speak as my θυμός commands me," it is not always the case that the ensuing speech has the potential to be unpleasant to the hearers, but it is frequently so. For example, Hector challenges any of the Achaeans to single combat, or Odysseus disguised as a beggar has the audacity to challenge the high-born suitors.[315] There can be no question that the speakers know that their speech is likely to be controversial. Cairns, similarly to Sharples, suggests that in dialogues with the θυμός when the agent says "but why has my θυμός debated this?", one role of the θυμός is that of scapegoat with the agent ascribing to it a wish for a course of action that is shameful.[316] I argued against such a conclusion in the dialogue cases, but in these, where the speaker says "I must speak as my θυμός commands me", there is the hint of scapegoating the θυμός. The speakers appear to choose that particular turn of phrase to distance themselves from a potentially unpopular speech, blaming their θυμός instead of themselves. This would in turn suggest that the θυμός was considered a force by itself, possibly an abstract entity rather than a physical one, and while not capable of an existence independent of the body, it was still considered an active force that exercises power over the host, sometimes against the host's inclinations.

There are occasions where the θυμός "shrinks" from a course of action, where the same formula is used in each case: σεβάσσατο γὰρ τό γε θυμῷ.[317] These illustrate an additional facet of the θυμός that has already been seen in the use of the epithets μεγάθυμος and ὑπέρθυμος – that of reverence. In the first example, Proetus shrinks from killing the innocent and god-favoured Bellerophon.[318] In the second, Achilles "shrinks" from stripping the armour from Eëtion after he has killed him.[319] It was not some fear of man that caused

[315] Hom. *Il.* 7.68; *Od.* 21.276.
[316] Cairns, 2019, p.12.
[317] Hom. *Il.* 6.167, 6.417.
[318] Hom. *Il.* 6.155-167.
[319] Hom. *Il.* 6.411-419.

Achilles' θυμός to give up taking his rightful spoil from the corpse and instead to bury Eëtion honourably in his full armour. In both his case and that of Proetus, the hands-off inclination of the θυμός is more easily explained by the concept of what is honourable. Another possible example of a reverent θυμός is Priam's statement that his μένος καὶ θυμός command him to go to Achilles, after Iris instructs him to.[320] Richardson notes that "Priam's assertion that his desire to go to Akhilleus coincides with the divine command is an example of the familiar pattern of 'double-motivation'".[321] Another example cited by Richardson concerns it being said of Achilles that "hereafter he will fight when the θυμός in his breast commands him and a god rouses him".[322] Thus it is confirmed that the θυμός acts, in some cases, with reference to what is expected of the agent not only by fellow men but also by the gods. Again, this would be consistent with Plato's argument that the θυμός can be trained according to certain values.

b) Motivating the θυμός with speech

The section above considered what sorts of actions the θυμός motivates the agent to undertake. In this section another question is asked: What motivates the θυμός? The *Iliad* contains a number of speeches that are said to rouse or stir the θυμός of the hearer to action, or by which the θυμός is roused. In this section, I shall examine the speeches to ascertain what aspect of the θυμός is motivated by speech. In some cases, the intended purpose of the speech is to encourage the listeners to fight, or to undertake some other action that may be regarded as dangerous, and the response of the effectively roused θυμός is to undertake that action. In other cases, it appears that the speaker does not intend any particular effect, except to boast of his own prowess. Nevertheless, the speech still affects the θυμός of at least one hearer, which then motivates them to action. That the θυμός has a military aspect is well-known. Caswell, for example, says of Hector that when his θυμός does not bid him to shrink from battle (*Il.* 6.441-446) this is "a negative expression of motivation resulting from

[320] Hom. *Il.* 24.198-199.
[321] Richardson, 1993, p.294.
[322] Hom. *Il.* 9.702-704.

Hektor's education in the line of duty".[323] What has not been commented on before, except above in this thesis, is that the θυμός is also motivated by domestic considerations. However, in examining speeches that motivate the θυμός to action, I show that in almost half the cases, the resulting action is to fulfil a domestic duty. This in turn supports the theory that the domestic-facing θυμός that is not immediately obvious in epic until Apollonius Rhodius writes the *Argonautica* is, if sought, already present in the Homeric epics.

Two verbs are used to describe the effect of the speech upon the θυμός - ὀρίνω and ὀτρύνω. In the case of the ὀτρύνω speeches, there are ten in the *Iliad,* and also one in the *Odyssey.*[324] The ὀρίνω speeches occur entirely in the *Iliad.*[325] It is not difficult to trace a pattern in the two words. All of the speeches that result in ὄτρυνε … θυμόν are addressed to multiple people and it is the collective θυμός of all that is stirred. These are the speeches that are intended all along to have that effect. By contrast, all but one of the ὀρίνω speeches provoke the θυμός of just one individual. The exception is the speech of Agamemnon to the Argives in Book 2.[326] A careful inspection of the speeches and responses shows that the number of people addressed or that respond is not, however, the significant difference between the two verbs. Rather, if we consider instead what the nature of the action is that the θυμός is roused to take, Agamemnon's speech is no longer an exception. By using this approach, it can be shown that the θυμός has two main motivating factors that can be summed up as public and domestic.

The ὀρίνω speeches

The ὀρίνω speeches do not all follow the same formula. Only in six cases is repetition seen, with three cases each falling into one pattern:

> Ὣς φάτο, τῷ δ᾽ ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε·[327]
>
> (So he spoke, and roused the *thumos* in his breast)

[323] Caswell, 1990, p.22.
[324] Hom. *Il.* 5.470, 5.792, 6.72, 11.291, 13.155, 15.500, 15.514, 15.667, 16.210, 16.275, *Od.* 8.15.
[325] Hom. *Il.* 4.208, 9.595, 11.804, 13.418, 13.468, 14.459, 14.487, 17.123, 24.467, 24.568.
[326] Hom. *Il.* 2.109-143.
[327] Hom. *Il.* 4.208, 11.804, 13.467

And:

> Ὣς ἔφατ᾽, Ἀργείοισι δ᾽ ἄχος γένετ᾽ εὐξαμένοιο,
> Ἀντίλόχῳ/Αἴαντι/Πηνέλεῳ δὲ μάλιστα δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινε(ν).[328]
>
> So he spoke, and upon the Argives came sorrow at his exulting,
> And beyond all did he stir the *thumos* of war-minded Antilochus/Aias/Peneleos

A similar but abbreviated line can be added to this latter category:

> Ὣς ἔφατ᾽, Αἴαντι δὲ δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινε[329]
>
> So he spoke, and he stirred the *thumos* of war-minded Aias

The first example is noted by Janko as being a formula repeated three times, but he does not comment further on any similarities between the three occurrences.[330]

Of the three speeches involving μάλιστα δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινε(ν), one is addressed to a multitude, and the other two to no-one in particular, being boastful speeches celebrating a kill in the heat of battle. Each of those speeches does have a collective effect on the audience, as in each case we are told that "sorrow came upon the Argives", but their sorrow does not motivate the Argives as a whole to any particular action. That effect is reserved for the θυμός of a single hearer.[331] The remainder of the ὀρίνω speeches are addressed specifically to the one person whose θυμός is stirred.

The ten ὀρίνω speeches can be subdivided into categories in another way:

In the first category are the three speeches mentioned above where there is no particular addressee. Three warriors, Deïphobos, Polydamas, and Acamas, boast of their respective kills. The speeches themselves are not identical, but their effect is. There comes sorrow on the Argives, but one θυμός in particular

[328] Hom. *Il.* 13.417-418, 14.458-459, 14.486-487.
[329] Hom. *Il.* 17.123.
[330] Janko, 1992, p.107.
[331] Hom. *Il.* 13.418, 14.459, 14.487.

is roused to action in each case. In the first case, the θυμός which has been stirred prompts Antilochus to guard the body of Hypsenor until two more comrades arrive to carry it safely away from the battlefield.[332] In the latter two cases, the unlooked for (by the speaker) result is the death of a comrade. First Polydamas' boast prompts Aias to hurl his spear at Polydamas to avenge the death of Prothoënor, but Aias misses and kills Archelochus instead.[333] Very shortly afterwards Acamas similarly provokes Peneleos into aiming for Acamas in order to avenge Promachus, but Peneleos instead strikes Ilioneus.[334]

The reason given by the narrator for Aias in particular to avenge the death of Prothoënor is that he was closest to Prothoënor when he fell.[335] In the other two cases, the author does not specify any particular relationship between the dead man and his avenger, although Janko states that Peneleos and Promachus were kinsmen.[336] The theme of avenging, however, is also raised in two of the boastful speeches that initially prompt the individuals' θυμός to action. Deïphobos boasts:

> In truth not unavenged lies Asius; but I say that though he is going to the house of Hades, fastener of the gate, he will be glad at heart, since I have given him an escort.[337]

Polydamas does not specify vengeance in his speech, but his attack on Prothoënor occurred while Polydamas was protecting the body of his comrade Satnius, speared by Aias.[338] The direct reference to avenging occurs again in Acamas' speech, after a spate of tit-for-tat killings between the two sides:

> Consider how your Promachus sleeps, vanquished by my spear, so that the blood price of my brother will not be long unpaid. And for this reason a man prays that a kinsman be left him in his halls, to be a warder off of ruin.[339]

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[332] Hom. *Il.* 13.419-423.
[333] Hom. *Il.* 14.460-464.
[334] Hom. *Il.* 14.488-489.
[335] Hom. *Il.* 14.460.
[336] Janko, 1992, p.221.
[337] Hom. *Il.* 13.414-416.
[338] Hom. *Il.* 14.442-444.
[339] Hom. *Il.* 14.482-485.

In this speech Acamas gives the key to these three instances of the θυμός being motivated to action. Avenging a killing and reverently tending a dead body are the remit of kinsmen. Trypanis suggests that one reason for members of the same family to be found frequently fighting side by side in works of literature is so that this important task would not be neglected:

> I suggest that this was part of the early organization of the Achaean armies, based on the solemn duty of the blood relatives to protect, and, failing that, to avenge and to secure a proper burial for the killed kinsman. … It was for the family, not for the whole community, to deal with the shedder of blood, just as it was for the family to bury its members. Such great religious and moral duties could not be overlooked in wartime, so these members of the family that could carry arms (usually men of the same generation, brothers and cousins) set out together into battle, so as to ensure that retribution and burial would not be overlooked.[340]

Trypanis extends the ties of blood to include outcasts who have entered a household as suppliant such as Phoenix and, particularly relevant to the theme of vengeance in the *Iliad*, Patroclus.[341] However, although Trypanis suggests that such duties "could not be overlooked in wartime", difficulties would naturally arise particularly during a prolonged action such as that before the gates of Troy when, after the first few battles, no members even of an extended family might survive to fulfil the necessary duties to the next corpse.

It becomes necessary, then, to look further afield to other instances in which a non-household member takes care of this family duty. In the *Odyssey*, Elpenor requests Odysseus to attend to his funeral rites.[342] There is no evidence to suggest that Elpenor was a relative of Odysseus, or a member of his extended household. Nor does Homer describe him as having any particular ties of ξενία with Odysseus. Odysseus describes him only as one of "my men" – ἑταῖρος – and it is in this capacity that Odysseus and the rest of Elpenor's erstwhile comrades mourn him.[343] It may therefore be possible that ἑταῖροι would take

[340] Trypanis, 1963, p.290.
[341] Trypanis, 1963, pp.294, 295.
[342] Hom. *Od.* 11.71-78.
[343] Hom. *Od.* 10.551.

on next of kin duties, becoming 'brothers in arms' in such a close sense that appropriate rites for the dead would be included in their remit.

Esposito justifiably calls ἑταιρεία a "neglected subject".[344] As part of his mission to redress that balance, he lists all the actions of, to, for, or with ἑταῖροι in the *Iliad*.[345] Of the 76 occasions where ἑταῖροι are the agents of action, the action type is recorded as "protect" 32 times, and "lament" eight times. Two occasions are recorded where ἑταῖροι avenge (or fail to avenge) a death. The first is Patroclus avenging Epeigeus.[346] It may be argued that Patroclus was so motivated because both he and Epeigeus were suppliants in the household of Peleus and so tied that way. However, Patroclus had already left with Achilles when Epeigeus arrived to Peleus, who then sent him onward to Troy.[347] Thus that possible relationship is slightly weakened, and in addition Homer identifies him only as Patroclus' slain ἑταῖρος.[348] The second example is Hector who is bitterly reproached by Glaucus for leaving Sarpedon unavenged and unburied.[349] Glaucus identifies Sarpedon as being both ξεῖνον and ἑταῖρος to Hector.[350] Hector was not linked to Sarpedon by ties of blood, but it is evident that Glaucus considered him by virtue of both ξενία and ἑταιρεία to have been duty-bound to avenge Sarpedon's death and ensure his proper funeral rites.

Esposito is able to conclude from his extensive study that "in most cases, *hetairoi* give or receive protection, vengeance, and lament, almost always in a military context".[351] He cites Hector's funeral rites in Book 24 of the *Iliad*:

> And when they were assembled and met together, first they quenched with ruddy wine all the pyre, so far as the fire's might had spread, and then his brother and his comrades (κασίγνητοί θ'ἕταροί τε μυρὸμενοι) gathered up the white bones, mourning, and large tears flowed ever down their cheeks.[352]

[344] Esposito, 2015, p.3.
[345] Esposito, 2015, pp.308-313.
[346] Hom. *Il.* 16.580-581.
[347] Hom. *Il.* 16.569-576.
[348] Hom. *Il.* 16.581.
[349] Hom. *Il.* 17.140-153.
[350] Hom. *Il.* 17.150.
[351] Esposito, 2015, p.13.
[352] Hom. *Il.* 24.790-794.

It is therefore apparent that in the military context ἑταῖροι were true 'brothers in arms', acting as temporary family to their comrades. Thus the speeches noted above, where the θυμός of an individual was roused to avenge a fallen comrade, all relate to a family duty being performed by the agent. This theme of family duty recurs in other ὀρίνω cases where the θυμός is motivated to action.

It has already been seen that Antilochus guarded the body of Hypsenor because his θυμός was stirred.[353] Care of the fallen is also the common motif in the second subcategory of ὀρίνω speeches where the θυμός is stirred to action, but in this category the speeches which prompt the action include an imperative to that effect. The first is the direct appeal of Deïphobos to Aeneas:

> Aeneas, counsellor of the Trojans, now you must rescue your sister's husband, if any grief for your kin comes upon you. But come with me, let us rescue Alcathous, who, though he was only your sister's husband, reared you in the halls when you were still a little child; he, I tell you, has been slain by Idomeneus, famed for his spear.[354]

Antilochus' imperative duly rouses Aeneas' θυμός to action – τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε.[355] In this case, Aeneas actually is the kinsman, although only the brother-in-law, of the fallen man, so there was no need to look for a pseudo-brother among the other warriors. Later, Menelaus similarly appeals to Aias to fulfil the brotherly role of rescuing the corpse of Patroclus, which duty should by rights have fallen to his great friend Achilles, who is absent from the immediate field of battle.[356]

The strongest appeal referencing care of the fallen is that of Priam to Achilles towards the end of the *Iliad.* Kinship is a motif that occurs in two aspects of this exchange. Most obviously it is an appeal to permit Priam to fulfil his family duty in tending his son's corpse. However, before his attempt, Priam is counselled by Hermes to "entreat [Achilles] by his father and his fair-haired

[353] Hom. *Il.* 13.418.
[354] Hom. *Il.* 13.463-467.
[355] Hom. *Il.* 13.468.
[356] Hom. *Il.* 17.120-123.

mother and his child, so that you may stir his heart (ἵνα οἱ σὺν θυμὸν ὀρίνῃς)".[357] This technique of evoking Achilles' own family ties works almost too well as Achilles and Priam weep together: Priam for his already lost son, Achilles for both Patroclus and his own father, effectively already lost to him due to Achilles' own imminent death.[358] At the end of this mutual display of grief by the respective kinsmen, Achilles bids Priam to "stir my heart no more among my sorrows" (μή μοι μᾶλλον ἐν ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ὀρίνῃς).[359] Thus family ties and feelings are doubly the motif of this extraordinary exchange in which the θυμός is motivated to action.

Priam's appeal worked, despite Achilles' extreme rage at Hector. The suggestion that the appeal of a relative may succeed where others fail had already been made several times in the *Iliad,* and forms the third and final subcategory of ὀρίνω speeches. Phoenix, attempting to move Achilles to action, told him the story of Meleager who was also sitting out a battle. Meleager, Phoenix said, did not listen until his wife finally begged him, and then at last,

> … his θυμός was stirred, as he heard the evil tale, and he set out to go, and put on his body his gleaming armour.[360]

Nestor had also appealed to Patroclus to try what he could in the way of persuading Achilles, advising:

> Who knows but that with the aid of a god you might rouse his heart (θυμὸν ὀρίναις) with your persuading. A good thing is the persuasion of a comrade.[361]

Nestor's speech to Patroclus had the desired effect, that of rousing Patroclus to action (τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε), with Patroclus later repeating Nestor's words as he tells Eurypylus "I will hurry to Achilles so that I may urge him on to do battle. Who knows but that with the aid of a god I may rouse his

[357] Hom. *Il.* 24.465-467.
[358] Hom. *Il.* 24.507-512.
[359] Hom. *Il.* 24.568.
[360] Hom. *Il.* 9.590-596.
[361] Hom. *Il.* 11.792

θυμός with my persuading? A good thing is the persuasion of a comrade."[362] Unfortunately for Patroclus, while his own θυμός was motivated to action by Nestor's speech, Achilles still refused to fight at that time

The remaining ὀρίνω speech is, as already briefly noted above, unique in that category as Agamemnon stirs the collective θυμός of the Argives rather than working on an individual. On the other hand, all of the ὀτρύνω speeches act on the collective θυμός of one group or another, and so it might be reasoned that Agamemnon's speech in Book 2 belongs in that category. To reconcile this apparent anomaly and demonstrate that Agamemnon's speech in fact does properly belong with the ὀρίνω speeches, it is necessary to consider the ὀτρύνω speeches in some detail.

The ὀτρύνω speeches

The phrasing used in these speeches varies only very slightly in each case, and is:

> Ὣς εἰπὼν (or εἰποῦσ᾽) ὄτρυνε (or ὤτρυνε) μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου.[363]

Kirk notes that this formula occurs ten times in the *Iliad*, but he comments only that the phrase "must have been well-established in the oral tradition", he does not remark on any similarity in the situations described.[364]

The speeches that rouse (ὀτρύνω) the θυμός share a number of characteristics and it is not possible, nor necessary, to subdivide them into categories. The most common formula is to begin with either a reproach ("Shame on you!") or a vocative indicating approval or comradeship ("friends", or "warriors"), and to finish with an exhortation: "Be men!" is popular, and some variation on fighting/standing firm is almost universal, with or without reminders designed to evoke a response that concerns the warriors' sense of shame or honour. A brief summary is shown below in table form:

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[362] Hom. *Il.* 15.401-404.
[363] Hom. *Il.* 5.470, 5.792, 6.72, 11.291, 13.155, 15.500, 15.514, 15.667, 16.210, 16.275, *Od.* 8.15.
[364] Kirk, 1990, p.109.

Lines	**Speaker**	**Reproach/praise**	**Exhortation**
5.464-469	Ares	How long will you continue to allow your army to be slain by the Achaeans?	Out of the din of conflict let us save our noble comrade (Aeneas)
5.785-791	Hera	Shame! Objects of base reproach, fair in appearance only	*None specified*
6.67-71	Nestor	My friends, Danaan warriors, attendants of Ares	Let us slay men!
11.286-290	Hector	My friends	Be men. Take thought of furious valour. Drive your single-hoofed horses straight towards the valiant Danaans, so that you may win still greater glory.
13.150-154	Hector		Stand fast.
15.486-499	Hector	My friends	Be men. Fight at the ships in close throngs.
15.502-513	Aias	Shame on you	Either perish or find safety by thrusting back the peril from the ships.
15.661-666	Nestor	Friends	Be men. Be mindful of children and wife, of possessions and of parents. Stand firm, do not turn back in flight
16.200-209	Achilles	*Not a specific reproach, but tells the Myrmidons to remember the time when they spoke against Achilles for refusing to fight*	Remember your threats … Fight the Trojans with valiant heart.
16.269-274	Patroclus	My friends	Be men and take thought of furious valour.

It is more common to appeal to comradeship than rely on a reproach to motivate the listeners. While only Hera's and Aias's speech begin with "αἰδώ", suggestions that shame should be a motivating consideration are also found in other speeches. Ares, as already noted, implies behaviour that is lacking in

honour.[365] Nestor exhorts against "stay[ing] back in eager desire for spoil", rather encouraging the Danaan warriors to "slay men" first, and only then think of spoil.[366]

In a later speech, Nestor draws together most of the common motifs of the ὀτρύνω speeches. He advises the Achaeans:

> Friends, be men, and put in your heart a sense of shame (αἰδῶ) before other men, and be mindful, each man of you, of children and wife, of possessions and of parents, whether they are living or dead. For the sake of those who are distant I here beg you to stand firm, and not turn back in flight.[367]

He first establishes comradeship, addressing the men as "friends". He then exhorts the Achaeans to "be men" (ἀνέρες ἔστε), and evokes their children, wives, possessions and parents as encouragement. The role of shame is that they must put it into their θυμός, that is, they must ensure that the θυμός is aware that turning back in flight would be shameful. Then, acted upon by the sense of shame, the θυμός motivates them to fulfil a performative role "before other men" (ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων). Some ὀτρύνω speeches hold out the prospect of glory as their motivation, for example Hector to the Trojans and Lycians.[368] Here, though, Nestor shows that fear of appearing unmanly before a judgmental audience can be an equally motivating force. Cairns notes the similarity of effect of αἰδώς and θυμός in Hector's decision to fight despite the pleas of Andromache:

> It is clearly unbearable for him that others should consider him to be acting like a coward. But this is not his only reason for rejecting Andromache's appeal; he knows that there is something else which impels him to risk his life, something within himself not dependent on his fear of what the Trojans might say, and it is to this factor that he refers when he indicates that his *thumos* produces the same result as his *aidos*.[369]

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[365] Hom. *Il.* 5.464-465.
[366] Hom. *Il.* 6.67-71.
[367] Hom. *Il.* 15.661-666.
[368] Hom. *Il.* 11.286-290.
[369] Cairns, 1993, p.80.

The relationship between αἰδώς and θυμός seen here in the *Iliad,* is one of the most persistent attributes of θυμός throughout later literature and is considered at length in the section 'θυμός and courage/shame', below.

Four of the speeches under consideration, including Nestor's, share the exhortation to "be men". Graziosi and Haubold have noted that this phrase is employed exclusively in addresses to groups of warriors and is used to encourage them to stand firm and fight, leading them to the conclusion that "proper men should think about one another and offer support".[370] This consideration of comradeship in arms provides both the unifying factor of all the ὀτρύνω speeches, and also explains why Agamemnon's speech in Book 2, despite being addressed to a group of warriors, results in θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε πᾶσι rather than ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου.[371]

The exhortation to fight, characteristic of the ὀτρύνω speeches is an exhortation for men to perform a public duty that is part of their gendered role as men, specifically as warriors in battle. Their collective θυμός is then roused (ὀτρύνω) to fulfil that role. This interpretation is supported by the sole example of an ὀτρύνω speech in the *Odyssey,* where the Phaeacians are motivated by Athene to attend a formal assembly, another public duty of male citizens, at which Odysseus is introduced to them by Alcinous.[372] This encouragement to fulfil a public duty contrasts with the response of the θυμός in the ὀρίνω speeches where the motivation is to fulfil a family obligation, albeit sometimes in lieu of actual family being present. In those cases the individual θυμός is then stirred (ὀρίνω) to fulfil that domestic role.

Agamemnon's speech

If this analysis is applied to Agamemnon's speech in Book 2, it can be seen that although he was addressing a collective group of warriors and so might be appealing to the facet of their θυμός that can be roused (ὀτρύνω) to perform a public duty, he was not exhorting them to fight, but was appealing to the aspect

[370] Graziosi, Haubold. 2003. p.69
[371] Hom. *Il.* 2.142.
[372] Hom. *Od.* 8.11-15.

of the θυμός that is stirred (ὀρίνω) to deal with family responsibilities. Agamemnon's speech is by far the longest of those that is explicitly said to rouse or stir the θυμός, running to 31 lines. The speech is complicated by Agamemnon saying one thing and wanting another. He orders the men to do something that he says will be shameful, clearly hoping to provoke them into doing the opposite. He begins, formulaically, by addressing the Argives as "friends, Danaan warriors" and underlines their warrior status by following with "attendants of Ares".[373] He then explains why they must leave the battle, despite it being a shameful thing. It is abundantly clear that Agamemnon intends to rouse (ὀτρύνω) the warriors to fight by disingenuously remarking that to leave now would be regarded as shameful for generations to come.

> … but now he [Zeus] has planned cruel deceit, and tells me to return inglorious to Argos, when I have lost many men. Such, I suppose, must be the pleasure of Zeus, supreme in might, who has laid low the towers of many cities, and will lay low still more, for his power is very great. A shameful thing it is even for men in times to come to hear, that so noble and so great an army of the Achaeans so vainly warred a fruitless war, and fought with men fewer than they, and no end to it has yet been seen.[374]

However, he also, fatally for his purpose, evokes domestic responsibilities in his speech: "our wives, I imagine, and little ones sit in our halls awaiting us".[375] His final injunction is "let us flee with our ships to our dear native land", adding the appeal of their fatherland to the already mentioned wives and children.[376] To Agamemnon's distress, the Achaeans were only too willing to obey, and the narrator helpfully explains their motive:

> And they with loud shouting rushed towards the ships; and from beneath their feet the dust rose up and hung in the air. And they called to each other to lay hold of the ships and draw them into the bright sea, and they set about clearing the launching-ways, and their shouting went up to heaven, *so eager were they to return home;* and they began to take the props from beneath the ships.[377]

[373] Hom. *Il.* 2.110.
[374] Hom. *Il.* 2.119-122.
[375] Hom. *Il.* 2.136-137.
[376] Hom. *Il.* 2.140.
[377] Hom. *Il.* 2.149-154.

Cook notes that the Achaeans probably did not only have pleasure in mind when they wanted to return to their wives and children, but also had "concern that if they don't return soon they never will, and anxiety over the state of their households, in particular, their wives and children."[378] The resultant stirring of the collective θυμός was sufficiently powerful that Hera and Athene had to join forces together to undo the damage done by Agamemnon's speech.[379] Athene spoke to Odysseus instructing him to rally the men, and he in turn spoke to "whatever king or man of note he met".[380] It is interesting that none of these speeches of Odysseus, while they were obeyed, were said to act on the θυμός of any of the hearers. Rather, certainly in the case of Odysseus's exhortations, his staff was apparently more effective than his speech.[381] Returning to Agamemnon's speech, although he hoped to rouse (ὀτρύνω) the military shame-fearing aspect of the θυμός of the warriors, he was inadvertently more effective at rousing (ὀρίνω) the domestic facing aspect of their θυμός.

Conclusion

Thus by examining the speeches which motivate the θυμός it can be seen that the θυμός has two interests in view – the public good, by appealing to which the hearer's θυμός is roused (ὀτρύνω) to some public duty, usually to fight, and family duties (and pleasures) by which the θυμός is roused (ὀρίνω) to fulfil some more domestic responsibility. Agamemnon, testing the resolve of his warriors, attempted an appeal to both aspects of the θυμός by mixing the vocative "Danaan warriors, attendants of Ares" and the reference to "a shameful thing", with a reminder of wives, children and hereditary possessions. He got the balance wrong, for his own purposes, and the collective θυμός of the Achaeans responded more strongly to the domestic call than the public duty.

Section 7: Conclusion

It is clear that in the Homeric works θυμός is a wide-ranging concept. Loss of θυμός can be, but is not always, associated with loss of life. However, loss of

[378] Cook, 2003, p.169.
[379] Hom. *Il.* 2.155-165.
[380] Hom. *Il.* 2.182-188.
[381] Hom. *Il.* 2.199.

θυμός does not necessarily entail loss of consciousness and it is therefore not equal to life or mental faculty. It does, however, equate to loss of vitality, and is frequently associated with dysfunctional breathing. However, breathing can continue in the absence of the θυμός, so θυμός is not breath. It has also been shown that θυμός, while universal and largely a positive trait in the Homeric epics, can be overdone, at which point the individual over-reaches himself in some way, either acting against the gods, or overestimating his ability against a human opponent, and is described as ὑπέρθυμος. The θυμός also shows thinking ability being able to receive, retain and process information, and inform decision-making. It can be both pleased and pained: pleased with useful items or comforts, and pained by hearing bad news or feeling anger. The role of θυμός as commander is already seen in decision making and prompting to action, but when the "my θυμός commands me" speeches are included, it can be seen that this is one of the most prominent roles of the θυμός. The θυμός usually commands the host to do what would be naturally expected, hinting that it has been trained in what to value. The θυμός itself can also be roused to action, and again, there is no question that having been roused, the agent would work against the θυμός and not act, so the commanding element of the θυμός is seen in this regard also. The θυμός thus roused prompts the agent to one of two distinct types of action: a community responsibility (often fighting), or a domestic responsibility such as avenging or protecting.

Chapter 3: Plato

Section 1: An overview of θυμός in Plato

Plato uses θυμός and related words, for example θυμοειδής, ἄθυμος, πρόθυμος, ἐνθυμέομαι, throughout his extant corpus. To gain an understanding of θυμός as Plato understood it, arguably his most valuable work is the *Republic* Book IV in which Plato's Socrates determines what θυμός is and explains its place and function within the soul.[382] He does this by hypothetically constructing a city which he uses as a simile to explain the make-up of the soul, likening parts of the soul to different groups of citizens in the city. This chapter will begin with a consideration of Plato's analysis of θυμός in Book IV of the *Republic*, and then go on to examine the city-soul simile throughout the *Republic* to assess where it is useful in contributing additional information to Plato's understanding of θυμός.

Plato also wrote about the soul in other works, notably the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*, and used θυμός in other contexts than the city-soul simile. These are also examined and consideration given to how consistent Plato's representations of the θυμός are. In the *Phaedrus,* Plato describes a tripartite soul as he does in the *Republic.* It is not automatically assumed that the three 'parts' in each representation are the same, although there is often an underlying understanding that they are: Scott, for example, argues against assuming that the three parts of the *Republic* soul are also the three parts of the *Phaedrus* soul, yet he calls the noble horse of the *Phaedrus "*the θυμός at its very best", using language from the *Republic* that does not appear in the *Phaedrus.*[383] In this chapter I test the two representations of the soul and conclude that there are sufficient similarities in the two accounts and that the parts of the soul described in the *Phaedrus* do approximately correspond with those in the *Republic.* Nevertheless there are also differences that cannot be easily dismissed. I argue that these differences are explained by Plato constructing an ideal soul in the *Republic,* and presenting a more realistic one in the *Phaedrus.*

[382] It is noted that while Plato was the author of the *Republic*, the speaker is usually "Socrates", who may or may not be identified with Plato's tutor, the historical Socrates.
[383] Scott, 2020, p.279.

Moving on from the soul-centred descriptions of θυμός in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus,* I then turn to the *Timaeus* where Plato describes the θυμός in physical terms. Thus Plato presents three portrayals of θυμός: the physical θυμός in the *Timaeus,* the perfect or ideal psychical θυμός in the *Republic,* and the imperfect but ultimately more realistic psychical θυμός in the *Phaedrus.* All of these descriptions are given as part of conversations. During these conversations we are also introduced to characters who are themselves more or less thumoedic. Indeed one, Thrasymachus, has been claimed to be a human exemplar of θυμός.[384] I challenge this claim and suggest instead that Thrasymachus corresponds more closely to another example that Plato gave of an imperfect θυμός. Thrasymachus, as well as the other characters examined, all support the theory proposed in the *Phaedrus* section, that only the θυμός in the ideal soul of the *Republic* is a perfect one; the rest are flawed, human and realistic.

Section 2: θυμός in Plato's *Republic*

In Homer, the θυμός partakes in rational decision-making and is also involved in physical desires, as shown above. A major development in Plato's definition of the θυμός and the other soul-parts is the separation of such tasks, with thought and debate assigned to the rational part of the soul, and bodily desires to the non-rational part.[385] In terms of rationality the θυμός lies somewhere in between the entirely rational and the wholly non-rational parts. This has led to a great deal of scholarly debate on whether the θυμός itself is rational or non-rational.[386] Although many scholars have argued that the θυμός is wholly non-rational, some even using the stronger translation "irrational", in this chapter I note the special relationship that it has with the rational part of the soul that can be interpreted as the θυμός having a form of rationality itself.

[384] Wilson, 1995, p.58.
[385] Although Plato separates thought processes from the θυμός in the *Republic,* elsewhere in his extant corpus he uses ἐνθυμέομαι to refer to understanding, recalling and thinking of matters of some weight (e.g. *Gorgias* 499b5, *Meno* 94c1, *Hippias Major* 300d2, *Menexenus* 249c3, *Symposium* 182d5, 198b6, 208c4, 212a2). He does so when not particularly commenting on the θυμός, indicating that in everyday usage he understands the θυμός to retain some of the thinking ability that it exhibits in the Homeric works.
[386] E.g. Brennan, 2012; Renaut, 2018; Campeggiani, 2020 (all discussed later)

Background of the **Republic** *Book IV*

Book IV of Plato's *Republic* relates part of a conversation between Socrates, Adeimantus and Glaucon. They, and others who have left the discussion earlier than Book IV, want to know how to define justice in a man.[387] A lengthy and largely unsuccessful conversation follows, characterised by many false starts, culminating in Socrates' suggestion that as a man is a small thing, it would be easier to locate justice in a large thing – a city – first, and then to look for the same quality in a man.[388] Having theoretically defined the "best" city (Kallipolis) in Books II and III, Book IV provides the conclusion that a city has justice when each of the "three natural kinds of people in it were doing their own business individually".[389] The "natural kinds" of citizens are identified as artisans/wage-earners, guardian-soldiers, and guardian-rulers/judges.[390] To discover what constitutes justice in a man, they expect that on examining an individual they will find "these same qualities in his own soul (ψυχή)" which, as long as they keep within their allotted functions in the same way that the corresponding classes should in the city, will also constitute justice in a man.[391] The ensuing discussion of the soul includes a definition of θυμός, corresponding to the guardian-soldiers of the city, as well as of the other two parts of the soul, each corresponding with one of the citizen-classes in the city. The argument is only briefly recapped here.

Division of the soul into 'parts'

Having identified three classes in an ideal city, Socrates fully expects that "a just man will be no different from a just State in terms of the actual concept of justice, but similar in fact".[392] It is clear that Socrates is confident that he will find the same parts in the soul as were identified in the city as he asks "Is it not essential that we agree on this at least: that there are the same concepts and character in each of us as in the State?", to which Glaucon readily agrees.[393]

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[387] Pl. *Resp.* 331c1-5. Unless stated otherwise, Emlyn-Jones and Preddy's translations (LCL237 & 276) are used throughout.
[388] Pl. *Resp.* 368d1-369a4.
[389] Pl. *Resp.* 435b4-7.
[390] Pl. *Resp.* 434c7-10.
[391] Pl. *Resp.* 435b4-c3.
[392] Pl. *Resp.* 435b1-2.
[393] Pl. *Resp.* 435d9-e2; 436a4.

They ask first regarding the soul's parts whether "we use one to learn, another when we become inwardly angry, and again a third when we desire the pleasures of food and sex and all those things akin to these?".[394] The alternative that they first consider is the possibility that "we do each of these things one by one with the whole soul whenever we set about them."[395] They approach the question by appealing to a principle of opposites:

> It is clear that the same faculty cannot do opposite things nor experience them in the same respect and in relation to the same part all at the same time, so that if we find these things happening in them I think that we shall know that it was not the same thing, but several parts.[396]

The first "opposite things" that Socrates examines are illustrated by thirst. A thirsty person desires to drink. Whatever part of them that desires to drink, will not desire to abstain from drink when given the opportunity to drink. Therefore if they do not drink when given the opportunity, it must be some other part of the soul that holds them back, by Socrates' argument.[397] To illustrate his point Socrates gives the example of an archer who with one arm holds the bow firmly away from his body, and with the other arm draws the bowstring towards his body.[398] The archer's body cannot be both pushing and pulling the bow at the same time if it does not have at least two parts that can do different things at the same time as each other. Just as there is one archer with two arms that can pull in different directions yet still be a part of the whole body, there must, in the case of the thirsty man who does not drink when the opportunity arises, be one soul with at least two parts, one of which desires to drink, the other which does not, pulling the agent in different directions. In Socrates' view, and with Glaucon's agreement, this argument is settled and it only remains to clarify how many parts the soul may have, and to identify the nature of each.[399]

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[394] Pl. *Resp.* 436a8-b2.
[395] Pl. *Resp.* 436b2-4.
[396] Pl. *Resp.* 436b9-c2.
[397] Pl. *Resp.* 439a1-b6.
[398] Pl. *Resp.* 439b8-c1.
[399] The English word "parts" implies the ability to partition the soul into components, although there is no indication that Plato intended such an understanding, as noted by Stocks (1915, p.218). Various alternative translations are "functions" (Renaut, 2018, p.72), "entities" (Penner, 1971, pp.104-5), "qualities", "types", "elements" and "internal agents" (Cairns, 2014, pp.56,

Identifying different elements of the soul:

Having established that there is indeed more than one part to the soul, Socrates and Glaucon agree to call the element of the soul "where desires such as love, hunger, and thirst are found and which is aroused over other passions too, the irrational and appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν)".[400] They also determine that whatever prevents a thirsty person drinking must arise "out of reason (ἐκ λογισμοῦ)".[401] This element of the soul they call "the reasoning part/faculty" – the λογιστικόν.[402]

The first two elements of the soul – the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the λογιστικόν – having been identified, and identified as separate through a careful application of the principle of opposites, the question then arises:

> Is the faculty of passion (θυμοῦ) by which we grow angry (θυμούμεθα) a third one, or would it share its characteristics with one of the other two?[403]

The initial suggestion that the θυμός is like the appetitive element, the ἐπιθυμητικόν, is refuted by examples: first a specific example of a man, Leontius, whose desire to look at corpses, prompted by the ἐπιθυμητικόν, overpowered his disgust.[404] Socrates does not use the word θυμός in recounting the anecdote, but asks if this story shows "that passion (ὀργήν) sometimes does battle with our desires, as one thing against another", to which Glaucon wholeheartedly agrees.[405] Here translated "passion", ὀργή is more commonly rendered 'anger' and its close association with θυμός will be explored in detail later. Despite not using the word θυμός, the context makes it clear that Socrates and Glaucon consider θυμός to be the force that is opposing Leontius' ἐπιθυμητικόν. Socrates and Glaucon follow the example of Leontius with a

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68, 72, 73). I use the term 'elements' which is hopefully less ambiguous in meaning than "parts".

[400] Pl. *Resp.* 439d6-8.

[401] Pl. *Resp.* 439c10-d2.

[402] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5.

[403] Pl. *Resp.* 439e2-3.

[404] Pl. *Resp.* 439e5-440a4. Leontius is one of the "θυμός in action" cases that is discussed in detail below.

[405] Pl. *Resp.* 440a6-8.

general observation that often when the appetite opposes logic, a man "reviles himself and grows angry (θυμούμενον) with the violent force inside him".[406] In this struggle, θυμός is identified as the element that is allied to reason and opposes and grows angry at the ἐπιθυμητικόν.[407] It therefore follows, again by applying the principle of opposites, that the θυμός is distinct from the ἐπιθυμητικόν as they can oppose each other.

At this point in the dialogue, Socrates and Glaucon decide that to constitute a third part of the soul, θυμός must be proved to be separate from the λογιστικόν as well as from the ἐπιθυμητικόν. This time they do not refer to the principle of opposites. They had not at first determined that such a robust principle must be proved, but having used the technique twice, its absence is noticeable at this point in the dialogue. Glaucon quickly dismisses the issue with the observation that:

> You can be sure to find this in children because at birth they are immediately full of θυμός, but some seem to me never to have any share of reason (λογισμός), although most of them do sometime later.[408]

Socrates then steps in with two further arguments in support of separateness. His first bolsters Glaucon's opinion by noting that the same can be said of animals.[409] His second argument appeals more strongly to the principle of opposites by invoking Homer:

> In addition to all this and, as we said before, I think, Homer's line will bear witness:
> 'He struck his breast and rebuked his heart' [The *Odyssey* 20.17]
> for here Homer has clearly described the element which has calculated the better or worse course upbraiding the irrational passionate element, as one entity upbraiding another separate one.[410]

[406] Pl. *Resp.* 440a9-b2.
[407] Pl. *Resp.* 440b2-4.
[408] Pl. *Resp.* 441a7-b1.
[409] Pl. *Resp.* 441b2-3.
[410] Pl. *Resp.* 441b3-c2.

In the scene cited by Socrates, Odysseus had first pondered in his θυμός how best to punish Penelope's suitors, and then debated in his θυμός whether to kill the women servants immediately or on the following day.[411] Socrates interprets the line as proving an opposition between a calculating part of Odysseus and a non-rational passionate part (ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ). This reasoning adds a little to Glaucon's comment about children, but the argument lacks the robustness of the ἐπιθυμητικόν/λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν/θυμός arguments where the principle of opposites had been argued and proved.

Wilson agrees that the principle of opposites between the λογιστικόν and the θυμός is not convincingly proven in Book IV of the *Republic,* however he argues that it was unnecessary because the oppositeness had already been illustrated by example earlier in the work.[412] In Book I, Thrasymachus had been an interlocuter in the discussion and was ultimately defeated in conversation by Socrates.[413] Wilson regards Thrasymachus as being a personification of the θυμός.[414] If Socrates is in the same way accepted to be the personification of the λογιστικόν as Wilson assumes, then it can be concluded that the principle of opposites has already been demonstrated by the argument between the two characters in Book I, meaning that Socrates does not have to repeat the proof in Book IV.[415] However, Wilson does not explore the association of Socrates with the λογιστικόν upon which his argument depends. Vasiliou addresses this point when he compares the philosophers in the *Phaedo* with those in the *Republic.* He states that:

> .. .the *Republic* is more demanding than the *Phaedo* insofar as the former insists that it is not sufficient to be a philosopher merely to love or to seek wisdom in the right way, i.e. by acknowledging that one must know Forms via reason alone [which Socrates does]; one must actually attain it. Thus Socrates is *not* a philosopher in the *Republic's* sense, given his explicit disavowal of knowledge of the Form of the Good (505a), still less are any of his fellow interlocutors in the *Phaedo* or *Republic.*[416]

[411] Hom. *Od.* 20.5-13.
[412] Wilson, 1995, p.65.
[413] Pl. *Resp.* 336b1-354c3.
[414] Wilson, 1995, p.58.
[415] Wilson, 1995, pp.65-7. Wilson's argument is examined in detail later in "θυμος in action: Thrasymachus".
[416] Vasiliou, 2012, pp.11-12.

If Socrates can no longer be said to personify the philosopher-kings of the *Republic*, the city equivalent of the soul's λογιστικόν, then the separateness of θυμός and λογιστικόν is not proven by his argument with Thrasymachus, however well Thrasymachus may illustrate a thumoedic man.

Nevertheless, in Socrates' opinion, as well as that of Glaucon, they have determined that the θυμός and the λογιστικόν are separate, and the discussion moves on.

Summary of the division of the soul

In summary, therefore, Book IV of Plato's *Republic* suggests a tripartite soul formed of rational thought (the λογιστικόν), appetites and desires (the ἐπιθυμητικόν), and spirit (the θυμός). To understand fully the role of each, it is helpful to see how Plato's speakers describe each one, in addition to the succinct definitions given above, and to examine them in the context of the city-soul simile throughout Book IV.

Ἐπιθυμητικόν

The basic definition of the ἐπιθυμητικόν is the element of the soul "where desires such as love, hunger, and thirst are found and which is aroused over other passions too, the irrational (ἀλόγιστον) and appetitive, related to certain gratifications and pleasures."[417] The word ἀλόγιστον would be better translated "non-rational" than "irrational". It is later added that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is "where the largest element of the soul is situated in each individual and is naturally most greedy for material things."[418] Socrates says that there are different kinds of desires (ἐπιθυμίας), the greatest assortment and worst of which will be found in "children, women and slaves, and even in many inferior types among those so-called free men."[419] On the other hand, some desires are of "the moderate and temperate kinds, which are led with sense and with regard to correct belief, and you will come across them in a few people who are

[417] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-8.
[418] Pl. *Resp.* 442a6-7.
[419] Pl. *Resp.* 431b9-c3.

naturally very good or have been well taught."[420] Therefore Socrates envisaged that even the very best of people would have some ἐπιθυμητικόν in their soul, but there is an implication that the desires that it experiences would be milder in some people than others.

The ἐπιθυμητικόν is linked in the city-soul simile to the largest part of the city that was hypothetically constructed in Books II and III of the *Republic:* the farmers, craftsmen, hired labourers, tradesmen, merchants and money-makers.[421] In the city simile, the ἐπιθυμητικόν class had come first in forming the city; without that class there would be no city, no citizens for the judges to rule, nor for the soldiers to defend. However, in discussing the soul, beyond the above definition that it is the seat of desires, the ἐπιθμητικόν is only mentioned in terms of its relations with the λογιστικόν and the θυμός. Very little training or education is recommended for the ἐπιθυμητικόν class in the city, especially in comparison with the other two classes.[422] It may be inferred from this absence of information that the ἐπιθμητικόν element of the soul cannot be developed or trained, only controlled to a greater or lesser degree, and that it is of a different order of being entirely from λογιστικόν or θυμός. The two latter, Socrates says, will take control of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, and

> … will watch in case, by being filled with so-called physical pleasures and becoming large and strong, it won't perform its proper functions and will attempt to enslave and rule the things that this very class should not, and altogether turn everyone's whole life upside down.[423]

Taken as a whole, the ἐπιθυμητικόν is presented as being a necessary element of the soul, as the corresponding people-group is a necessary part of the city. The desires of which it is the seat are common to all people to a greater or lesser degree, but it appears to be a troublesome and recalcitrant element of the soul.

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[420] Pl. *Resp.* 431c5-7.
[421] Pl. *Resp.* 369d7-9; 370d9-10, 370e12-371a2.
[422] Pl. *Resp.* 376-412 outlines the education required for the λογιστιλόν and the θυμός. Only Pl. *Resp.* 390 is aimed at the ἐπιθυμητικόν class.
[423] Pl. *Resp.* 442a4-b3.

Λογιστικόν

The λογιστικόν is "that part of the soul which does the calculating (λογίζεται)".[424] As it is separate from the "irrational and appetitive [element], relating to certain gratifications and pleasures", it may be inferred that appetites, gratifications and pleasures do not form part of the λογιστικόν.[425] However, in Book IX, when Socrates sums up the three elements of the soul again, each of the three elements is shown to have a particular love of something. The ἐπιθυμητικόν with its pursuit of money that can buy pleasure is summarised as being "money-loving and profit-loving".[426] The θυμός has its own loves: success and a high reputation.[427] The λογιστικόν also has a love, being described as a lover of learning and of wisdom.[428] These three loves (φιλοχρήματον/φιλοκερδές, φιλόνικον/φιλότιμον, and φιλομαθές/φιλόσοφον) are described by Socrates as three kinds "of pleasures" (ἡδονῶν), showing that the λογιστικόν in fact does experience, and presumably desires, pleasure.[429] Indeed, the pleasure of the λογιστικόν is held to be the only true one, with those of the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμός being untrue to varying degrees.[430]

As part of the city simile, the λογιστικόν is said to be able to lead desires "with sense and with regard to correct belief" as a result of which "the passion in those many inferior people is under control there as a result of the passions and prudence of the fair-minded minority".[431] If applied to the soul, this suggests that although the λογιστικόν does not itself have appetites beyond the pursuit of wisdom and learning, it does recognise other appetites and their importance to one or both of the other elements of the soul, and it attempts to lead or guide them rather than trying to quash them entirely or ignore them. That the λογιστικόν is not always able to direct the desires of the ἐπιθυμητικόν is reinforced by the question asked by Socrates:

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[424] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-6.
[425] Pl. *Resp.* 439d7-8.
[426] Pl. *Resp.* 581a6-7.
[427] Pl. *Resp.* 581b3.
[428] Pl. *Resp.* 581b10.
[429] Pl. *Resp.* 581c7.
[430] Pl. *Resp.* 587b15-16.
[431] Pl. *Resp.* 431c5-d2.

> Doesn't the force which prevents such things [not drinking when thirsty] come into play, *when it does,* as the result of reason (ἐκ λογισμοῦ). The pulling and pushing are additional forces which arise through afflictions and illness?[432]

The relative weakness of the λογιστικόν if it must act alone is hinted at by the repeated assertion that it needs the θυμός to back it up: the θυμός "is far more likely to take up arms on the side of reason", and the θυμός is "naturally auxiliary to the rational".[433] Even with the θυμός coming to the aid of the λογιστικόν, desires can on occasion "force someone to do things contrary to reason".[434]

In the case of the λογιστικόν, and also the θυμός, some training is required. The λογιστικόν must be strengthened "with fine literature and learning".[435] Such education having been achieved, it is "fitting for the rational to govern, as it is wise and has forethought for the whole of the soul, and for the passions to be subject to and an ally of it."[436] The education required to nurture the best λογιστικόν is not discussed in Book IV, but appears during the hypothetical construction of the city in Book II. Socrates' main criteria is that the stories told to children, regardless of whether they are true or false, should be morally upbuilding so that they do not let "into their souls opinions which are for the most part the opposite of those which we think they ought to have when they're grown up."[437] Examples follow: descriptions of family differences amongst the gods are to be avoided at all costs, most especially those where children kill or punish their parents.[438] The battles of the gods must be removed from Homer's verse, along with any suggestion that the gods might harm a man unfairly.[439] A final stroke against Homer is a prohibition on stories that tell of the gods changing form or of sending false dreams to humans.[440]

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[432] Pl. *Resp.* 439c10-d2.
[433] Pl. *Resp.* 440e3-4; 441a2-3.
[434] Pl. *Resp.* 440b1-2.
[435] Pl. *Resp.* 441e8-442a1.
[436] Pl. *Resp.* 441e3-5.
[437] Pl. *Resp.* 377b4-8.
[438] Pl. *Resp.* 377e6-378a1; 378d2-3.
[439] Pl. *Resp.* 378d4-5; 380a8-c4.
[440] Pl. *Resp.* 381c6-e6; 383a7-c5.

In summary, the λογιστικόν is the thinking element of the soul. Ideally it makes the decisions concerning what the agent should do, but its commands can be defeated by the strength of physical desires if, even bolstered by the θυμός, it is too weak to overpower the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

Θυμός/Θυμοειδές

The θυμός is perhaps the most complicated of the three elements of the soul as defined by Plato's speakers.[441] The citizen class that corresponds to the θυμός is the army, or auxiliaries, who "must be amenable toward their own people, but intractable against their enemies".[442] Within the soul, the θυμός is defined as the "the faculty of passion by which we get angry (θυμούμεθα)".[443] It is generally loyal, ideally exclusively so, to the λογιστικόν rather than to the appetites: "if there are two parties wrangling, such a person's θυμός becomes an ally of his reason".[444] Socrates affirms that for θυμός to ally itself with desires when reason forbids is unthinkable: "I think you would say that you deny such a thing ever having arisen inside yourself and I think you would say it had never happened to anyone else".[445] Furthermore the θυμός seems either to have within itself a degree of reasonableness, or at least to be particularly susceptible to the arguments of the λογιστικόν, as we read:

> Is it not a fact that the more high-minded he is the less he is able to become angry, even if he is suffering from hunger and cold and anything else of this kind at the hands of that man who he may think is doing these things rightly and, as I have been saying, won't his θυμός not want to get aroused against him?
> ...
> But what of when a person thinks he is being wronged? Does his spirit not seethe inside him, rage and ally itself with what he believes to be right? Doesn't it suffer because of hunger and cold and all such things, and, by enduring, overcome them without ceasing from noble acts until it achieves its end, or dies, or like the dog called to heel by the shepherd, calms down and is brought back to itself by reason and so is pacified?[446]

[441] In the following quotes, "spirit" is the most commonly used translation of θυμός.
[442] Pl. *Resp.* 375c1-2.
[443] Pl. *Resp.* 439e2-3.
[444] Pl. *Resp.* 440b2-4.
[445] Pl. *Resp.* 440b4-7.
[446] Pl. *Resp.* 440b9-d3.

The above passage also serves to further highlight the dissociation between the θυμός and the appetites that Socrates and his companions had already noted, as the appetites would certainly not willingly endure "hunger and cold and all such things". Ideally, the θυμός should always be guided by the λογιστικόν: "through pain and pleasure the spirited part of him (θυμοειδές) keeps firmly to what he has been taught he must fear and what not, by the dictates of reason".[447] This suggests that the θυμός does feel and can be susceptible to pains and pleasures, but that it also respects the rational arguments of the λογιστικόν. Socrates and Glaucon conclude that the θυμός is far from being "something appetitive", although they do not explicitly state that it has the faculty of reason within itself, only that "it is far more likely to take up arms on the side of the λογιστικόν".[448]

The education of the θυμός is extensive. Present "at birth", and at that point uncontrolled by a functioning λογιστικόν, it needs to be made "harmonious" through "fine literature and learning, relaxing, encouraging" and to be made civilised with "harmony and rhythm".[449] To this civilising is added the education discussed in the city simile in Book III. A courageous person needs to hear all the same stories as a wise person, but Socrates goes further and asks if they must be told stories "which make them least afraid of death?"[450] Therefore, life in Hades (death) must not appear in any way terrible, but should be depicted as to be greatly preferred over a life of slavery.[451] Even the fear-inspiring names associated with the underworld, such as "Styx", must be struck out.[452] Homer's works suffer again as all scenes of mourning and lamentation, especially on the part of Achilles, son of a goddess, must no longer be represented.[453] A final education for θυμός is moderation in all things; neither gods nor heroes should be depicted as being immoderately happy, any more than immoderately sad.[454]

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[447] Pl. *Resp.* 442b10-c3.
[448] Pl. *Resp.* 440e1-4.
[449] Pl. *Resp.* 441a9; 442a1-3
[450] Pl. *Resp.* 386a6-b1
[451] Pl. *Resp.* 386c3-387b7
[452] Pl. *Resp.* 387c1
[453] Pl. *Resp.* 388a5-10
[454] Pl. *Resp.* 388e4-389a7

Socrates specifically warns that the θυμός can be "corrupted by a bad upbringing".[455] The consequences of potential corruption are presumably that it would result in too strong a θυμός that no longer respects the dictates of the λογιστικόν, or a θυμός so weak that it cannot control the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Personified examples of such corruption in both soul and city are given later in the *Republic* and will be discussed along with other examples of θυμός in action. When well-educated, however, the θυμός and the λογιστικόν act in harmony because both "the ruling part and the two subject to it agree together that the rational must be the ruler."[456]

As noted above, just as the λογιστικόν has its own pleasures, derived from the pursuit of learning and wisdom, so too the θυμός has its pleasures, being described as a lover of victory (νίκη) and honour (τιμή).[457] It is this love of honour that causes Brennan to link the θυμός to the honour system as a whole.[458] He argues that the soul without a body would not need either appetites or the θυμός, but once the soul became embodied it assigned a part of itself to deal with bodily needs, thus effectively creating the ἐπιθυμητικόν.[459] The appetites quickly got out of control, as illustrated by the "fevered city" of the *Republic,* and so the θυμός became necessary to control them.[460] In order to argue that the θυμός was a response to the ἐπιθυμητικόν, which itself was a response to the soul being embodied, Brennan relies to a great degree on the chronology of the *Republic* where the "city of pigs" (a healthy city) gave way to the fevered city. However, in the *Republic,* the last of all categories to come into being was the λογιστικόν. Brennan, however, states that "the true soul is the rational soul, which is immortal and not associated with a body", thus in Brennan's argument the λογιστικόν, the rational part of the soul, already existed in isolation in the unembodied soul.[461]

[455] Pl. *Resp.* 441a2 (trans. Horan)
[456] Pl. *Resp.* 442d1
[457] Pl. *Resp.* 581b10; 581b3.
[458] Brennan, 2012, p.105.
[459] Brennan, 2012, p.103.
[460] Brennan, 2012, p.103. Pl. *Resp.* 372e8.
[461] Brennan, 2012, p.103.

Rationality, non-rationality, and the special relationship between the λογιστικόν and the θυμός

In the city part of the Plato's city/soul simile, the guardian-governors are to be taken from amongst the older guardian-soldiers who have been observed through a series of testing situations in their early lives and who proved themselves to always act for the benefit of the state.[462] These are given the name of perfect guardians, or guardians in the fullest sense, and these are the ones who correspond to the λογιστικόν in the soul.[463] The city and the soul are similar in the *Republic*, but not completely analogous, that is, they do not need to be read as having point-to-point correspondence in all aspects. In the soul, the θυμός is described as being present from birth (along with desires), and reason follows later. Yet it is not necessary to go further and, using a comparison with the city where the guardian-rulers are chosen from among the guardian-soldiers, state that the λογιστικόν is θυμός perfected. However, their similarity is noted in both parts of the simile. In the city, the λογιστικόν and the θυμός are the same in origin. In the soul, they are natural allies. The identifying characteristic of the λογιστικόν is its rationality so the question of whether the θυμός also has some rationality should be addressed.

Socrates said that the θυμός could be, "like the dog called to heel by the shepherd", calmed down and pacified.[464] Aristotle later assigned θυμός to the non-rational part of the soul, along with desires and appetites, and said of this non-rational part that it "seems … to participate in rational principle; at least in the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle – and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in harmony with principle".[465] He illustrated the pseudo-rationality of θυμός by likening it, as Plato had, to a servant or a watchdog:

> Now it appears that θυμός does to some extent hear λόγος, but hears it wrong, just as hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are saying, and so mistake your order, and as watch-dogs bark at a mere sound, without

[462] Pl. *Resp.* 412d9-e2.
[463] Pl. *Resp.* 414b1-2.
[464] Pl. *Resp.* 440d1-3.
[465] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1102b30-31. (here and future: LCL73, trans.: Rackham)

> waiting to see if it is a friend. Similarly θυμός, owing to the heat and swiftness of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given and rushes off to take vengeance.[466]

A great deal more can be said about Aristotle's own view of θυμός and rationality, but for the current purpose – to elucidate Socrates' argument in the *Republic* – the above illustration is sufficient. Aristotle describes a θυμός that has sufficient cognitive ability to read a situation and expect that an order from the λογιστικόν will be forthcoming. The θυμός also assumes, rightly or wrongly, that the order will be for action and attack. This requires a certain degree of knowledge or opinion, the first indication that rationality may be involved.

Campeggiani states that there are two types of knowledge, according to whether the knowledge is held by the rational or the non-rational part of the soul.[467] The rational part of the soul has true knowledge as a result of a cognitive approach based on calculating, measuring, and weighing (knowing that a stick half in/half out of water is straight), while the non-rational part has only perceptual knowledge, based on what it can see and feel (the stick appears to be bent where it enters the water).[468] By this argument, the θυμός would have knowledge, but based only on what its host sees. It need not follow that it has the ability to consider whether what is seen may be misleading. Thus θυμός remains non-rational by Campeggiani's argument.

Renaut assigns to the θυμός another form of knowledge, one that combines the impressions it receives through the senses with memories gained earlier in life. He explains that the θυμός holds opinions or beliefs (δόξα) in the form of an "internalised judgment" that it has acquired through its λογιστικόν-prescribed education.[469] During a time of crisis, the θυμός will then assign a relative value to its previously held δόξα, similarly assign a value to the desire of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, and commit the agent to a course of action according to the

[466] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1149a25-32.
[467] Campeggiani, 2020, pp.41-44.
[468] Campeggiani, 2020, pp.44, 47-8.
[469] Renaut, 2018, pp.73-4.

relative values that it assigns; if the λογιστικόν was successful in the education, then the "internalised judgment" will be sufficiently strong, and the ἐπιθυμητικόν will be defeated.[470] This reading presents the image of a θυμός that is all-powerful in times of crisis when instant decision is needed, but in repose, before it is called upon to evaluate, it can be educated by the λογιστικόν as recommended in the *Republic*. In this way, the θυμός can be said to be responsive to rationality, or to partake in rationality, as it is the rational part of the soul that has instructed it what to believe and value. Nevertheless, in assigning a value, the θυμός has the potential to favour the non-rational desires of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, or even some other internalised judgment of its own that the λογιστικόν would judge to be inferior, and so remains non-rational itself.

Brennan also considers the "memories" of the θυμός, but uses them to explain why the θυμός class of guardians is "gentle" to the ἐπιθυμητικόν class of citizens. He notes that the *oikeion* – the group of familiar fellow-citizens – existed (although were not named) prior to the existence of the θυμός class. From this, he argues that "the spirited part loves the things it was raised with, purely and simply because it was raised with them."[471] The familiar ἐπιθυμητικόν class then becomes as much a part of the education of the θυμός as the heroic stories that are carefully inculcated from youth. The former inspires love for the familiar, the latter a yearning for the honour earned by heroism. Regarding rationality, though, Brennan concludes that "it is also important that spirit, with its strong sense of the *oikeion,* has severe cognitive limitations".[472] The reason that θυμός not only is, but *must be*, non-rational is that it must not think to ask whether the familiar is good or bad, right or wrong, and draw a conclusion. "The considerations that spirit can bring forward – 'it's what our kind of people do', 'it's traditional', and so on – are fatally insensitive to the actual goodness and badness of the customs in question".[473] Thus Brennan concludes that non-rationality is not just a passing characteristic of the θυμός, but one that is absolutely essential if it is to be any use to the soul.

[470] Renaut, 2018, p.74.
[471] Brennan, 2012, pp.114-115. Pl. *Resp.* 375c.
[472] Brennan, 2012, p.116.
[473] Brennan, 2012, p.116

The explanations as to why the θυμός is non-rational vary a little, but it can be seen that there is largely a consensus that θυμός is indeed non-rational. This is perhaps the way in which Plato's θυμός differs the most from the Homeric usage. There was little question in Homer of whether the θυμός was rational or non-rational, but, as shown above, it was concerned in such activities as debating, planning and pondering (very much the remit of the rational λογιστικόν in Plato), as well as fighting, eating and drinking, and sex, which Plato would variously assign to the θυμός and the ἐπιθυμητικόν. The question of the rationality or non-rationality of the θυμός only arises because Plato presents a soul that has been split into elements and explains the function of the resulting elements. In doing so he has presented a greatly expanded theory of the make-up of the soul, but has diminished the responsibility of the θυμός narrowing its focus to only non-rational considerations, and not even all of those.

Section 3: The *Phaedrus*

In the last section, Plato's *Republic* was examined to determine how Plato portrayed the θυμός, in that work. This section expands the source material to consider another of Plato's presentations of a tripartite soul, in the *Phaedrus.* Despite the obvious similarity of both works presenting a soul comprising three elements, there are also significant differences which have led scholars to be cautious about claiming they represent the same three elements of the soul.[474] After briefly summarising the tripartite soul of the *Phaedrus,* I test whether the three parts of the *Phaedrus* soul do, at a basic level, correspond with the three parts of the *Republic* soul, and find that it is a reasonable assumption. I then examine the differences and make the argument that Plato in the *Phaedrus* describes a different quality of soul. The soul in the *Republic* is a hypothetical and ideally constructed soul. The *Phaedrus*, on the other hand, describes a more realistic, flawed, human soul.

[474] Eg. Buccioni, 2002, p.337; Scott, 2020, p.276.

The soul in Plato's **Phaedrus**

In the *Phaedrus,* Plato's Socrates describes a ten thousand year cycle of reincarnation during which time the soul is incorporated into various bodies, at first determined by what has immediately preceded the ten thousand year period, and subsequently, after the first embodiment of the cycle, as it chooses.[475] He also describes the activities of the immortal soul during its time between reincarnation cycles. He gives the caveat that any description will be deficient to some extent:

> As for its form we have to put it as follows. To explain what kind of thing it is would require an entirely superhuman and lengthy explanation, but what it is like needs a shorter one, and within the bounds of human ability.[476]

The soul, he says, can be likened to "the combined power of a winged yoke of horses and their charioteer."[477] Socrates notes that the gods also have this composite soul, but while in their case the charioteer and the horses are all good, in other races, including humans, the three are less well-balanced.[478] The human soul, for example, is said to drive a 'mixed' pair of horses, one is "good and noble and is from stock of this kind", the other "is from the opposite kind and is the opposite".[479] This mismatched pair means that "driving a chariot in our case has to be difficult and troublesome".[480]

Whilst it is unincorporated in a body, the soul flies about in the universe unless and until it sheds its wings, at which point it "settles and takes on an earthly body".[481] Socrates explains how the wings come to be shed: The gods lead a procession of high-flying souls to the "apex of the arch under the heaven" where they all can "gaze on what is outside the heavens".[482] The soul that reaches such heights:

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[475] Pl. *Phdr.* 248e5-249b7. Translations are by Emlyn-Jones & Preddy (LCL166) unless stated otherwise.
[476] Pl. *Phdr.* 246a3-6.
[477] Pl. *Phdr.* 246a6-7.
[478] Pl. *Phdr.* 246a7-b1.
[479] Pl. *Phdr.* 246b1-3.
[480] Pl. *Phdr.* 246b4-6.
[481] Pl. *Phdr.* 246c2-4.
[482] Pl. *Phdr.* 246e4-247c2.

> … sees reality and is both well content and in contemplating the truth it is fed and made happy until the circuit carries it round in a circle and brings it back to the same place. And in the course of revolution it sees actual justice, it sees temperance, it sees knowledge, not that to which coming into being belongs, nor even that which is somehow different in different circumstances – knowledge of what we now call realities, but that in which there is real knowledge of real being. And similarly having observed and feasted on the rest of what really exists, and having sunk back into what is inside the universe, it comes home.[483]

It is this absolute knowledge and gazing upon truth by which the intelligence of every soul is nurtured "to the extent that it is concerned to receive its proper nourishment", while the wings themselves are nourished specifically by "the divine; the divine being beautiful, wise, good and everything that is of this kind".[484] Sadly, few souls are able to attain the necessary height and so most leave "without managing to get a view of reality, and away they go and feed on what they imagine nourishes them."[485] The soul that has not been able to partake of sufficient nourishment "sheds its wings and falls to the ground", where it is conjoined with a body appropriate to its experience, the one that had the closest view of reality to a philosopher, and then through deteriorating degrees down to the very worst which is conjoined with a tyrant.[486]

Similarities between the tripartite souls in the Republic *and the* Phaedrus

The image of the soul that Socrates gives in the *Phaedrus* immediately calls to mind a similarity with the one that he presented in the *Republic*, but also some differences. In terms of similarity, there is a recurrence of the image of the tripartite soul, in the *Republic* consisting of three elements of the soul roughly analogous to three groups of people in a state, and in the *Phaedrus* a chariot team of charioteer and two winged horses.[487] It remains to be established to what extent the three parts of the soul in the *Phaedrus* are analogous to those in the *Republic.*

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[483] Pl. *Phdr.* 247d3–e4.
[484] Pl. *Phdr.* 247d1-3, 246d8-e2.
[485] Pl. *Phdr.* 248a6-b5.
[486] Pl. *Phdr.* 248c7-e3.
[487] Pl. *Resp.* 441c4-6.

Scott warns against assuming that the two images of the soul in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* are identical, stating that "although there are many similarities between the tripartite models of the psyche that Plato uses in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, we should be careful not to assume they are the same".[488] His caution is especially valid in view of the fact that Plato does not use the words λογιστικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν, or θυμός in the *Phaedrus.* Buccioni notes that while there are surface similarities, there are also a number of discrepancies that render cross-identification doubtful (she does not say "impossible").[489] It therefore seems reasonable to test whether the parts of the soul in the *Phaedrus* can be understood as being equivalent to the three elements of the soul in the *Republic* which have been labelled there as λογιστικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμός.[490]

A cautionary note about metaphors/similes/analogies

In the following section, I rely heavily on mapping elements of the *Republic* city description onto elements of the *Phaedrus* chariot representation. I believe that approach is justified by the results: the *Republic* soul alone is only loosely compatible with the *Phaedrus* chariot. With the additional helpful information provided by utilising the *Republic* city description the argument for equivalency is much stronger. I acknowledge, however, that my approach may be criticised. Murphy, for example, suggests that our understanding of the city-soul comparison (and I assume he would include the *Phaedrus* chariot-soul simile as well) should be limited to illustrating only a tripartite structure, stating that "to assert any further type or kind of resemblance would go beyond what the analogy of structure warrants."[491] On the one hand, Murphy's solution could make research much easier: by applying his suggestion, any explanation of inconsistencies between the two presentations would be unnecessary. However, I am reluctant to dismiss the many finer details of both the city and the chariot representations where they can possibly illumine Plato's description of the soul.

[488] Scott, 2020, p.276
[489] Buccioni, 2002, p.337.
[490] Pl. *Resp.* 441c4-6.
[491] Murphy, 1951, p.70.

As noted by Cairns, "if we take metaphor away from Plato's talk about the ψυχή, we are left with nothing".[492]

Equivalency of tripartite souls in the Republic *and the* Phaedrus

Of the three parts of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, there are two horses and one charioteer. As the driver responsible for controlling the horses, the charioteer should correspond to the λογιστικόν of the *Republic,* and he will be the first part of the *Phaedrus* soul to be considered.

The charioteer

In the chariot simile of the *Phaedrus,* the charioteer manages, or attempts to manage, a pair of horses.[493] Despite his importance in the incorporeal state, once embodied there are very few references to the charioteer in isolation, rather he is defined almost exclusively by his relationship with the horses. One example illustrates the relationship well: Socrates speaks of a time when "the charioteer, seeing the light of his love [a young man], having sent warmth through his whole soul and through his perception, is filled with a tickling and the goads of longing".[494] At this point, one of the horses "constrained then as ever by its sense of respect, holds itself in check from leaping on the loved one", while the other, against the reprimands of the charioteer, "leaping, surges violently ahead, and giving its yoke fellow and the charioteer every kind of difficulty, forces them to go toward his loved one and give a reminder of the pleasure of sex".[495] A long and repeated struggle ensues, until finally the unruly horse "stops being violent and now humbly follows the foresight of the charioteer".[496]

Leaving to one side for the moment the identities of the two horses, the end result of this exchange is that both horses acknowledge and follow the wisdom of the charioteer, one by natural inclination, the other persuaded by fear of pain. This eventual obedience to the charioteer is reminiscent of the three parts of the

[492] Cairns, 2014, p.54.
[493] Pl. *Phdr.* 246b1-2.
[494] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5-254a1.
[495] Pl. *Phdr.* 254a1-3.
[496] Pl. *Phdr.* 254e5-8.

soul in the *Republic* who, in a well-balanced soul, "agree together that the rational [the λογιστικόν] must be the ruler, and they [the ἐπιθμητικόν and the θυμός] do not argue with it."[497] The difference is that in the *Phaedrus,* the 'agreement' is hard won.

By this argument, the charioteer of the *Phaedrus* would indeed correspond to the λογιστικόν of the *Republic.* In support of this interpretation is that the charioteer is also linked with "the mind" (ὁ νοῦς) when Socrates states that certain things beyond the realm of heavens are "visible only to the mind, the governor of soul".[498] A counter-argument may be that in the *Phaedrus* example it is the charioteer who first beholds "the light of his love", indicating that the charioteer has desires that might more naturally be expected to be found in the ἐπιθυμητικόν.[499] Indeed this overlap of roles is the first of Buccioni's six arguments against cross-identification.[500] However, balanced against this argument is that it is also the charioteer who then remembers the true "nature of beauty" and that it "[stands] with temperance on a sacred pedestal".[501] He then calculates that an uncontrolled assault on the beloved would be wrong, and orders the horses accordingly.[502] Thus, because of his ability to calculate, including to weigh his own desires against his known standards of right and wrong, the charioteer of the *Phaedrus* would still correspond to the λογιστικόν of the *Republic,* "the part of the soul with which it calculates".[503]

There is more to be said about the nature of the communication between the parts, and the ability of the λογιστικόν to desire, but for now the analysis can move on to the two horses.

The unruly horse

To begin with the "bad" horse, Socrates describes this "other" horse as being:

[497] Pl. *Resp.* 442d1-2.
[498] Pl. *Phdr.* 247c7-8.
[499] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5.
[500] Buccioni, 2002, p.338.
[501] Pl. *Phdr.* 254b5-7.
[502] Pl. *Phdr.* 254b8-c3.
[503] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-6.

> Crooked, massive, put together in a ramshackle way, with a short, strong neck, snub-nosed, black-skinned, gray-eyed, bloodshot, a companion of excess and imposture, shaggy round the ears, deaf, barely yielding to the whip and goad together.[504]

While in most circumstances this horse will obey, although "barely", it becomes uncontrollable, as quoted above, when the charioteer looks upon the object of his love and the whole soul is warmed.[505] It may have been the charioteer who first noticed the beloved, but it is the unruly horse who immediately forgets every consideration other than sex.

If there is a correspondence to the elements of the soul in the *Republic*, this horse with its single-minded preoccupation with the fulfilment of physical desire must equate to the ἐπιθυμητικόν "where desires such as love, hunger, and thirst are found and which is aroused over other passions too, the irrational and appetitive, related to certain gratifications and pleasures."[506] An additional argument is that, like the ἐπιθυμητικόν of Leontius in the *Republic*, this horse can at times get the upper hand over the other two parts of the *Phaedrus* soul who at first "resist, irritated because they are being forced to make terrible and improper moves", but when at last they see that "there is no end to their trouble, they move forward under its lead, yield and agree to do what it orders".[507] The struggle does not end there; the charioteer and the noble horse reassert their combined will and eventually prevail, but at first they are forced to yield to the power of the ill-favoured horse.[508]

Despite these similarities between the unruly horse of the *Phaedrus* and the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the *Republic*, though, one difference is immediately apparent. In the city of the *Republic*, the ἐπιθυμητικόν class were treated gently; it is specifically noted that the guardian soldiers had as one of their two most basic requirements that they "must be amenable toward their own people".[509] Even in the case of Leontius, where the ἐπιθυμητικόν overpowered the combined

[504] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e1-5.
[505] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5.
[506] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-8.
[507] Pl. *Resp.* 439e5-440a4, Pl. *Phdr.* 254b1-3.
[508] Pl. *Phdr.* 254b5-c4.
[509] Pl. *Resp.* 375c1-2.

forces of the λογιστικόν and the θυμός, the frustration of the latter against the unruly ἐπιθυμητικόν was expressed in angry words only.[510] By contrast, the bad horse in the *Phaedrus* is controlled ordinarily by "the whip and goad together".[511] At the crisis mentioned, when the unruly horse lurches forward a second time, the charioteer ends by:

> … pulling the bit back even more forcibly from the teeth of the violent horse, covers its abusive tongue and jaws with blood and by pushing both its legs and haunches to the ground, gives it over to pain.[512]

After much repetition, the horse is finally obedient "and when it sees the beautiful boy, it is frightened to death".[513] The result is obedience to "the foresight of the charioteer", but there is no indication in the *Republic* that such harsh measures would be used on the ἐπιθυμητικόν to persuade both it and the θυμός to "agree together that the rational must be the ruler, and [not to] argue with it."[514] Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the treatment described in the *Phaedrus* could result in the "friendship and harmony" described among the three elements of the soul in the *Republic*.[515] Further differences in the education of the soul between the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* are discussed below.

The noble horse

The only part of the chariot-team left to be matched is the noble horse, which by process of elimination should equate to the θυμός, the spirited part of the soul described in the *Republic*. Indeed, Scott, who argued against assuming the three elements of the *Republic* soul to be identical to those in the *Phaedrus*, does not hesitate to say of the noble horse that "this is the θυμός at its very best".[516] In assessing whether the noble horse does indeed correspond to the θυμός, two characteristics are suggestive.

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[510] Pl. *Resp.* 439e5-440a4.
[511] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e4-5.
[512] Pl. *Phdr.* 254d6-e5.
[513] Pl. *Phdr.* 254e5-8.
[514] Pl. *Resp.* 442d1-2.
[515] Pl. *Resp.* 442c9-d1.
[516] Scott, 2020, p.279

Firstly, this noble horse of the *Phaedrus* is described as being "a lover of honour" (τιμῆς ἐραστής), as is the guardian-warrior of the *Republic* (φιλότιμος).[517] The second telling characteristic is that this noble horse is "guided by the word of command alone".[518] When faced with the same test that caused the other horse to become uncontrollable, this horse is "constrained then as ever by its sense of respect [αἰδώς – more often translated "shame"] and holds itself in check from leaping on the loved one."[519] Shame is considered at length by Cairns who notes that in the *Republic*, "Plato does not locate the emotion specifically in any one of the psychic 'parts'".[520] Nevertheless Cairns interprets the self-reproach of Leontius, voiced by the θυμός, as being rooted in shame and representing "the anger of one who has fallen below his own ideal of himself".[521] Considering also that the θυμός is an honour-lover, Cairns is able to conclude that αἰδώς "belongs clearly with the functions which are situated, in a collocation that is coherent and plausible, in the *thumos*".[522] If Cairns' association of αἰδώς with the θυμός in the *Republic* is accepted, and it is a convincing argument, then the noble horse of the Phaedrus who is motivated by αἰδως in the tripartite soul of the *Phaedrus* has its equivalent in the θυμός in the tripartite soul of the *Republic.*

An additional consideration is the relationship between the fine horse and the charioteer. As noted above, the noble horse cannot at first prevail over the other horse, despite both it and the charioteer resisting.[523] Even when the charioteer violently forces both horses back, this good horse falls back "willingly because it offers no resistance".[524] This obedience of the fine horse to the charioteer recalls the special relationship between the λογιστικόν and the θυμός described in the *Republic* where the θυμός is described as being "natural auxiliary to the rational element".[525] Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between strength of the fine horse of the *Phaedrus* and the θυμός of the *Republic.* The

[517] Pl. *Phdr.* 253d6, Pl. *Resp.* 583a8.
[518] Pl. *Phdr.* 253d7-e1.
[519] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5-254a3.
[520] Cairns, 1993, p.382.
[521] Cairns, 1993, p.383.
[522] Cairns, 1993, p.385.
[523] Pl. *Phdr.* 254a8-b1.
[524] Pl. *Phdr.* 254c2-3.
[525] Pl. *Resp.* 441a2-3, Pl. *Phdr.* 256a5-6.

fine horse plays relatively little part in the struggle between the charioteer and the unruly horse. He seems consistently to side with the charioteer, but to be ineffective. It is the charioteer who forces both horses back when the team is being controlled by the unruly horse, and the fine horse is forced to partake, albeit "willingly", of the punishment merely because it is yoked to the unruly horse.[526] This apparent weakness of the noble horse of the *Phaedrus* causes Buccioni to doubt that it can be associated with the θυμός of the *Republic.*[527] However, the apparent powerlessness of the white horse reflects only its weakness in this case. It still resists and supports the charioteer against the unruly horse, so its motives and actions (although ineffective) can still be identified with the honour-loving, authority-siding θυμός of the *Republic.* The apparent weakness of the noble horse in the *Phaedrus* does, however, contrast strongly with the role played by θυμός in the *Republic,* in which at times the θυμός can be the ruling element in the soul.[528] I maintain, however, that the difference is one of the strength of the θυμός, not its inclination: the noble horse of the *Phaedrus* is physically weak while the θυμός in the *Republic* is strong, but they still represent the same element in the tripartite soul.

Summary

To summarise, although the fit is not perfect, the three members of the chariot team of the *Phaedrus* do broadly correspond to the three elements of the soul in the *Republic* with the charioteer corresponding to the λογιστικόν, and the good and bad horses to the θυμός and the ἐπιθυμητικόν respectively. Some inconsistencies can be explained easily by considering that in the *Republic,* Socrates and his companions had drawn their image of the soul using the simile of an ideal city and so had described an ideal, perfectly balanced soul. In the *Phaedrus,* however, the only perfect souls are those of the gods, whereas the others are those of humans, and the one that is described at length is that of a man who is afflicted by love for a beautiful youth.[529] Thus the difference between the souls in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* is the difference between

[526] Pl. *Phdr.* 354b8-c3.
[527] Buccioni, 2002, 337-338.
[528] Pl. *Resp.* 550b7-9
[529] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5-6.

an ideally balanced soul and a realistically flawed one. Other inconsistencies, however, are not so easily explained and these should be noted, as below.

Differences between the souls in the Republic *and the* Phaedrus

Chronology

When constructing the hypothetical city in the *Republic*, the first citizens were the ἐπιθυμητικόν class, with the class corresponding to the θυμός coming next, and finally the λογιστικόν class.[530] Additionally, in the description of the soul in the *Republic*, Socrates and Glaucon were quite clear that the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμός are present from birth, with rational thought (the λογιστικόν) developing later.[531] In the *Phaedrus*, however, a soul, even the soul of a god, is tripartite before incorporation into a body, and indeed has the potential to never be embodied:

> Whichever soul has become a follower of a god and perceives something of what is true, remains without sorrow until the next circuit, and if it is always able to do this, is to remain unharmed always; but whenever it cannot see because it is unable to keep up, and experiencing some misfortune it is weighed down, filled with forgetfulness and incapacity, and in being weighed down it sheds its wings and falls to the ground: then the law is that this soul shall not be implanted in any wild creature in its first incarnation, but the one that has seen most shall be implanted in the seed which will become a man who loves wisdom …[532]

Socrates could have explained that the description of the disembodied soul in the *Phaedrus* applied only to human souls after a corporeal existence, in which case the two horses, the non-λογιστικόν elements of the soul, may have been a residual characteristic of embodiment, but he did not. Nevertheless, this is Guthrie's explanation for the presence of "the lower parts of the soul".[533] He argues that Plato's description only applies to souls who are in between reincarnation cycles and so the soul, having "given itself over to bodily desires and pleasures while in the body is, when it leaves it, still permeated by the

[530] Pl. *Resp.* 369d6-371e6, 373e10-374a2, 413c5-414b5.
[531] Pl. *Resp.* 441a7-b1.
[532] Pl. *Phdr.* 248c3-d3.
[533] Guthrie, 1971, p.237.

corporeal".[534] However, Guthrie is not able to explain why souls who have not yet been embodied at all, in that or any other cycle of reincarnation, would already be tainted with the presence of the 'mixed' pair of horses, whose presence in turn condemns the soul to embodiment. Thus any difficulty in understanding the chronology of the parts of the soul raised by the *Republic* are only compounded by the *Phaedrus.* There are attempts, as made by Brennan and Guthrie, above, to explain that the 'true soul' is pure reason, but Plato's own writings do not unequivocally confirm that view.

Separateness of the elements of the soul

In the *Republic,* the λογιστικόν is described as being separate from the "the irrational and appetitive [element], related to certain gratifications and pleasures".[535] However, in the *Phaedrus,* it is the charioteer/λογιστικόν, not the unruly horse/ἐπιθυμητικόν, who first sees "the light of his love" and through him that the whole soul is warmed by the sight.[536] The memory of the charioteer is triggered and he recalls the true beauty that he briefly glimpsed in the heavens, and he remembers that true beauty stands with soundness of mind.[537] He then becomes afraid and awestruck.[538] In the *Republic* there are no mentions of either memory or fear in connection with λογιστικόν. The *Phaedrus* therefore presents a charioteer that is more responsive to stimuli (the sight of the beloved, memory, fear) than the λογιστικόν of the *Republic* which was described as being separate from the "irrational, appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures".[539] In addition, Buccioni notes that the unruly horse "also exhibits the anger which ought to be the prerogative of spirit-cum-white horse", another usurpation of the tasks of the separate elements in the *Republic* that ought, if they are truly separate, to be impossible.[540]

[534] Guthrie, 1971, p.237.
[535] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-8.
[536] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5-6.
[537] Pl. *Phdr.* 254b5-7.
[538] Pl. *Phdr.* 254b7-8.
[539] Pl. *Resp.* 439d5-8.
[540] Buccioni, 2002, p.338.

In their dialogue in the *Republic,* Socrates and his friends insisted on the separateness of the elements of the soul.[541] It is the bringing forward of this idea of separateness that makes the concept of the λογιστικόν-charioteer having desires problematic. However, even within the *Republic,* there is a hint that the separateness described in the soul part of the simile may not be absolute, if it is compared with the city description. In the city each class is made up of a number of individual humans, each one having a soul with, presumably, three elements within it. Thus when discussing, for example, the ἐπιθυμητικόν element of the soul, it is likened to the craftsmen/money-maker group of citizens which itself consists of hundreds, maybe thousands, of souls each of which contains not only an ἐπιθυμητικόν of its own but also a λογιστικόν and a θυμός, even if the latter two are less prominent than the ἐπιθυμητικόν in the souls of that class of citizen. Socrates directly addresses the presence of something other than ἐπιθυμητικόν in the money-making class when he says:

> And for the general population the main thing about self-control is that while they are to be the subjects of those who govern them, *they themselves are to be in control* of the pleasures derived from drink, sex and food.[542]

This requires each member of the citizen-class corresponding to the ἐπιθυμητικόν in the soul to have at least some degree of their own λογιστικόν to tell them that what they may desire is not proper, as well as at least a little of their own θυμός to give them the strength to resist their desires to behave immoderately. If the exactness of the simile is insisted upon, then when this conclusion is applied to the soul, the three elements are no longer distinct. Thus by considering the existence of the three more "mixed" classes in the city, rather than only the strictly separate elements of the soul, it is possible to argue that the desire-feeling charioteer of the *Phaedrus* does not preclude the charioteer's association with the λογιστικόν of the *Republic,* nor the anger-displaying unruly horse with the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

[541] Pl. *Resp.* 439d4-8, 440e6-441e6.
[542] Pl. *Resp.* 389d9-e2.

The *Republic* city is considered 'just' when all the people in it do their own work and do not interfere in that of others, and this criteria is applied to the soul as well.[543] The description in the *Republic* is, however, an ideal and does not in fact exist. In the *Phaedrus,* the soul described is real rather than perfect. The λογιστικόν-charioteer feels the desires that the unruly horse should feel. In turn the ἐπιθυμητικόν-horse takes upon itself the decision-making prerogative that ideally would be the remit of the λογιστικόν-charioteer, and the anger that should be the part of the θυμός-horse. The difference between the separate elements of the *Republic* city-soul and the more mixed elements of the *Phaedrus* chariot team-soul can thus be read not as illustrating a different and irreconcilable doctrine regarding the soul, but once again simply the difference between an unrealistic ideal soul and a realistic flawed one.

Differences in the education of the soul

The difference in the treatment of the ἐπιθυμητικόν class of the *Republic* and the bad horse of the *Phaedrus* has already been noted above, with the control of the bad horse in the *Phaedrus* being largely accomplished by the use of whip and spurs.[544] By contrast, in the *Republic*, the ἐπιθυμητικόν class is educated from childhood, albeit they receive much less education than the λογιστικόν and θυμός classes.[545] In the *Phaedrus,* the soul's "education", that is to say the vision of truth and true beauty on which the soul feeds, is "visible only to the mind, the governor of the soul".[546] Sadly, in the case of the human soul, even the charioteer is imperfectly educated and "sees some things, but not others".[547] Therefore the early education in the *Republic* is extensive for the λογιστικόν and θυμός classes, and present if sparse for the ἐπιθυμητικόν class, whilst in the *Phaedrus* it is barely present for even the charioteer.

Another difference is also apparent regarding education. In the *Republic,* the education has two definite characteristics. Firstly, it is an education by example, most prominently by being fed fine examples of fine deeds by fine men,

[543] Pl. *Resp.* 433a8-b2.
[544] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e4-5.
[545] Pl. *Resp.* 390, 376-412.
[546] Pl. *Phdr.* 247c7-8.
[547] Pl. *Phdr.* 248a5-6.

although admittedly very few of the traditional stories are permitted.[548] Murphy calls this manner of education "a training of character rather than of intellect".[549] Secondly, education is a communal effort, from the mothers or nurses who must be careful which fables they tell to their infants, to the craftsmen who must make nothing ugly for the guardians to look upon.[550] Shorey comments on the collaborative effort of education when he says, using the *Republic* as his example, that "the ordinary virtues of habit and opinion may fairly be said to be taught when they are systematically inculcated by superior wisdom enlisting all the forces of society in its service".[551] The result is, as commented by Andersson, that each person is "utterly dependant on the social and cultural environment".[552] The education of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, by contrast, is a very personal affair. Even if the soul's charioteer catches a brief glimpse of beautiful, absolute, unchanging truth – "what really exists" – for ever after, or at least until its next ten thousand year reincarnation cycle, only the soul of the philosopher can remember parts of that education.[553] If, which is more likely, he fails to catch a glimpse, that is due to his own skill as pilot. The sight of absolute truth is there as a passive teacher for anyone to see who is able, but the active role in the education is reserved for the student/charioteer who must have the skill to see the lesson. Any resultant deficit on the part of the unruly horse is therefore blamed upon the charioteer. As stated by Shorey, "wrongdoing is involuntary … because the conditions that shape conduct lie far more in heredity, *education*, and environment than in our conscious wills".[554] With only the narrow education available to the *Phaedrus* soul, the natural consequence is an unruly horse and a difficult journey through the lifetime of the embodied soul. The example in the *Phaedrus* is thus the example and the natural consequence of a faulty education system.

The reconciling explanation given above regarding the differences of separateness between the souls of the *Republic* and that of the *Phaedrus* can

[548] Pl. *Resp.* 376-412.
[549] Murphy, 1951, p.25
[550] Pl. *Resp.* 377a1-c6, 401b1-c2.
[551] Shorey, 1971, pp.8-9.
[552] Andersson, 1971, p.228
[553] Pl. *Phdr.* 247e1-2, 249c4-6.
[554] Shorey, 1971, pp.7-8.

here be repeated. The ideal education of the soul, while very different in the two works, is still present in the *Phaedrus*, but only the gods are able to partake of it. The lesser souls are, obviously, more human and more realistic. The difference is once again that of ideal and real.

Summary

In the *Phaedrus*¸ as in the *Republic,* Plato's Socrates uses a simile to present an image of a tripartite soul. The two portrayals, the chariot team of the *Phaedrus* and the city of the *Republic,* are broadly similar in that they represent the same three elements of the soul. Some inconsistencies are noted, that could be easily disregarded by saying that Plato only wished to state that the soul has three elements. However, this explanation, while convenient, dismisses the wealth of detail that Socrates includes in his descriptions of the city and the chariot team that can shed light on Plato's understanding of the soul, and particularly of the θυμός. On the other hand, parts of the similes do not work if applied too closely and it is not possible to reconcile, for example, the chronology of the 'parts'. Nevertheless, if we are willing to work between the two extremes of ignoring all details on the one hand and insisting on a point to point comparison on the other, the inconsistencies can largely be viewed as the difference between a perfectly modelled soul in the *Republic* and an imperfect but realistic example in the *Phaedrus.*

Section 4: Plato's use of θυμός elsewhere

The *Republic* is undoubtedly Plato's most studied work that deals with the θυμός. There he considers θυμός almost entirely from a psychical point of view, and the *Phaedrus* broadly follows the same lines. These are not his only works to deal with θυμός, but the prominence of the *Republic* has pushed the others out of the limelight. Consequently we have a one-sided report of Plato's representation of the θυμός, which I hope to redress here by considering in particular the physical, not psychical, description of the θυμός that Plato gives us in the *Timaeus.* This introduces an exciting new aspect of the θυμός – that of heat – which persists in later literature. The *Cratylus,* the *Protagoras* and

the *Laws* are also briefly considered where they can add extra information to our understanding of the θυμός.

The Cratylus

Mention of θυμός in the *Cratylus* is very brief, but deals with the etymology of the word and so must hold a place of importance in any consideration of θυμός. "θυμός has its name from the raging [θύσις] and boiling of the soul".[555] "Raging" may be a suitable epithet for one half of the θυμός mentioned in the *Republic,* which must be both strongly spirited and also gentle in nature, but certainly the etymology as given by Socrates does not address the "gentle" side of θυμός.[556] Boiling (ζέσεως) is an interesting addition to the Platonic understanding of θυμός. In the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus,* the θυμός has been analysed from a psychical perspective and the definitions and descriptions there have understandably not included many physical characteristics. However, in the *Timaeus,* the physical aspect of the θυμός is discussed and the concept of the θυμός being associated with heat is taken up. Thus this etymology that Plato mentions in the *Cratylus* is compatible with the physical discussion of θυμός in the *Timaeus*. Interestingly Socrates says of the etymology of ἐπιθυμία that it is so called because it is "the power that goes into the θυμός" (τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα).[557] This relationship between θυμός and ἐπιθυμία is a new idea when compared with the *Republic* in which the θυμός and the ἐπιθυμητικόν are described as being fundamentally different.[558] However, an alternative translation could be "the power that opposes the θυμός", which corresponds more nearly with the descriptions given in both the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* where the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμός tend to be at loggerheads with each other, although in both of those works ἐπιθυμία opposes the λογιστικόν as well as, and possibly more than, it does the θυμός.

[555] Pl. *Cra.* 419e2-3. Translations are by Fowler (LCL 167).
[556] Pl. *Resp.* 375c
[557] Pl. *Cra.* 419d8-e2.
[558] Pl. *Resp.* 440e.

The Protagoras

Three references to θυμός are clustered together in the *Protagoras* and are highlighted here as they may shed some light on the relationship between Leontius and his θυμός in the *Republic.* We are asked to consider in what situations a person should become angry (θυμοῦνται) with a neighbour:

> In all cases of evils which men deem to have befallen their neighbours by nature or fortune, nobody is wroth with them (θυμοῦνται) or reproves or lectures or punishes them, when so afflicted, with a view to their being other than they are; one merely pities them. … But as to all the good things that people are supposed to get by application and practice and teaching, where these are lacking in anyone and only their opposite evils are found, here surely are the occasions for θυμός and punishment and reproof. One of them is injustice, and impiety, and in short all that is opposed to civic virtue; in such case anyone will be wroth (θυμοῦνται) with his neighbour and reprove him, clearly because the virtue is to be acquired by application and learning.[559]

If applied to Leontius and his own θυμός being angry at the desire of his eyes, the suggestion is that the root cause of Leontius' misdemeanour was a lack of the "application and practice and teaching" that he should have made his business throughout his life. This also harks back to the education of the θυμός in the *Republic* that must be taught what to value. The *Protagoras*, however, extends to the θυμός a judgmental faculty: if a man sees that his neighbour's thumoedic education has been deficient and resulted in harm, his own θυμός is roused to "reprove" him.

The Timaeus

The exact chronology of the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* is debated. Taylor, for example, argues for the *Timaeus* being written after the *Republic* as it apparently references the *Republic*.[560] While Owen argues for an earlier date for the *Timaeus* than "the last stage of Plato's writings" that was generally accepted at his time of writing, he still regards it as referencing the *Republic* and so post-

[559] Pl. *Protag.* 323d1-324a4
[560] Taylor, 1962, p.3.

dating that work.[561] Ryle on the other hand believes the *Timaeus* to predate the *Republic*, arguing that the reference is not to the *Republic* but rather to a lost earlier work: the *Ideal State*, or *Proto-Republic*.[562] While the argument regarding chronology is acknowledged, it is relatively unimportant as far as an understanding of θυμός is concerned. Plato, through his character Timaeus, still presents a tripartite view of the soul, of which θυμός is one element.

Timaeus asserts that the ideal city as defined "yesterday" by Socrates is in fact ancient Athens and the previously imaginary citizens are their own ancestors.[563] He proposes to recount the history of that ancient city, beginning with "the origin of the Cosmos".[564] The relevant part of the *Timaeus* is presented as a monologue, which gives the impression that the speaker is giving a well-thought out conclusion rather than the tentative enquiry through dialogue that characterises the *Republic.* However, the speaker is not Socrates, who despite his frequent disavowal of true knowledge, is the undoubted authority figure in the Socratic dialogues.

As he starts with "the origin of the Cosmos", it takes Timaeus some time to reach the creation of souls where θυμός is considered in its turn. What follows is not a psychical definition of the various soul elements as was given in the *Republic*, but a description of their physical locations in the body. The more physical descriptions in the *Timaeus* do not contradict the soul-centric descriptions of the *Republic.* They do, however, make it much easier to visualise the relationships between the three elements which are now given assigned physical locations, as well as anatomical lines of communication, including the means of persuading the still problematic desiring element of the soul. Thus the *Timaeus* provides a great deal of complementary information to the previous discussion.

The mortal soul, we are told, contains:

[561] Owen, 1953, pp.79, 94.
[562] Ryle, 1966, p.230-231.
[563] Pl. *Ti.* 26c-d. (Translations are by Bury, LCL 234).
[564] Pl. *Ti.* 27a5-6.

> Firstly … pleasure, a most mighty lure to evil; next, pains, which put good to rout; and besides these, rashness and fear, foolish counsellors both; and θυμός, hard to dissuade; and hope, ready to seduce. And blending these with irrational sensation and with all-daring lust, they [the gods] thus compounded in necessary fashion the mortal kind of soul.[565]

This passage only describes the irrational aspects of the soul, "reason" being dealt with separately. From this passage which refers to pleasures, pains, rashness and fear, θυμός, and hope, it may be thought that the tripartite model of the soul has been abandoned, but in fact the various aspects mentioned above are ultimately grouped into two basic divisions corresponding to the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμός of the *Republic*. The "worse" elements (pleasures, pains, rashness and fears) are housed below the midriff, and the "better" elements (θυμός and hope) between the midriff and the neck.[566]

This passage demonstrates the persistence of the soul-centric *Republic* definition, in that the pleasures (corresponding to the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the *Republic*) are considered "worse" in kind than the θυμός. The discussion in the *Timaeus* foregrounds the body, and from the body's point of view, the desires for food and drink are more likely to result in longevity than the ambition of the θυμός for renown and honour achieved largely in battle, yet the desiring part is still spoken of derisively. The ἐπιθυμητικόν (named as such in the *Timaeus* as well as the *Republic*) is described as being like "a creature which, though savage, they must necessarily keep joined to the rest and feed, if the mortal stock were to exist at all".[567] It is housed below the midriff, "as far away as possible from the counselling part [residing in the head], and creating the least possible turmoil and din".[568] The intelligence (in the *Timaeus* named διάνοια, not λόγος or λογιστικόν), which is the third aspect of the soul not mentioned as part of the "mortal" soul above, communicates with the ἐπιθυμητικόν by means of the liver, punishing the ἐπιθυμητικόν by suffusing the liver with bitterness causing

[565] Pl. *Ti.* 69d1-5.
[566] Pl. *Ti.* 69e-70a.
[567] Pl. *Ti.* 70e4-5.
[568] Pl. *Ti.* 70e5-7.

pain and nausea, or allowing it to rest "cheerful and serene" by maximising the liver's own inherent sweetness.[569]

In between the head and the midriff is placed "that part of the soul which partakes of courage and spirit (θυμός)".[570] As with the liver below the midriff, the internal organs in the chest are considered in the positioning of this "better" part:

> The heart, which is the junction of the veins and the fount of the blood which circulates vigorously through all the limbs, they appointed to be the chamber of the bodyguard (δορυφορικήν), to the end that when the heat of the passion (θυμοῦ) boils up, as soon as reason (λόγου) passes the word round that some unjust action is being done which affects them, either from without or possibly even from the interior desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν), every organ of sense in the body might quickly perceive through all the channels both the injunctions and the threats and in all ways obey and follow them, thus allowing their best part to bet the leader of them all".[571]

In the *Republic*, Plato identified the θυμός as a guardian-soldier. This would indicate that what is called in this *Timaeus* passage "the bodyguard" is also the θυμός, and the heart is the appointed "chamber" of the θυμός.[572] It also describes that the circulatory system is used for communication between the λόγος and the θυμός, as well other organs in the body, with the θυμός utilising its position near the heart to make that organ beat faster and disseminate the message more quickly through the body. Finally, the λόγος is described as the best part and leader of the all the others, mirroring the λογιστικόν in the *Republic*.

The *Republic* repeatedly identifies θυμός as taking arms on the side of λογιστικόν.[573] The *Timaeus* generally uses different terminology for "mind", "thought" and "reason", using λογιστικόν only once, when describing the

[569] Pl. *Ti.* 71a7-d2.
[570] Pl. *Ti.* 70a2-3.
[571] Pl. *Ti.* 70a7-c1.
[572] Pl. *Resp.* 440e-441a.
[573] Pl. *Resp.* 440e4; 441a3

perfect soul of the universe rather than the flawed souls of men.[574] Therefore, the identification of the mind with what is named λογιστικόν in the *Republic* must be assumed, supported by the passage above in which reason is described as sending out instructions, being the "best part" and acknowledged leader. If that assumption is allowed, the physical location of θυμός between the head and the midriff as described in the *Timaeus* confirms the alliance between θυμός and λογιστικόν. The θυμός was placed there "in order that it might hearken to the reason, and, in conjunction therewith, might forcibly subdue the tribe of the desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν) whensoever they should utterly refuse to yield willing obedience to the word of command from the citadel of reason".[575]

In considering the make-up of the soul as described in the *Republic*, Renaut called the θυμός both an intermediate and a mediator, and both of these roles are apparent in the *Timaeus* description.[576] Renaut considers the θυμός to be an intermediate because it is covers "a variety of ambivalent passions: being angry or ashamed, resisting desires or fighting for some values, etc., all of them being best described as in-between reason and desire".[577] The abstract in-betweenness of the nature of θυμός was described in the *Republic,* while here in the *Timaeus* it is physically placed in between reason and the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Renaut's second role of θυμός is as mediator, which he describes as its "key role".[578] This role entails θυμός "transcrib[ing] reason's recommendation in the whole agent". In other words, *thumos* "'mediates' reason's rule in a positive way".[579] Again, this role is described in the *Timaeus* with the θυμός "hearkening" to reason, and passing on the instructions to ensure (by force, if necessary) that the agent obeys.

Thus, the *Timaeus* reinforces the notion of a struggle between λογιστικόν and θυμός on the one hand, and a potentially disobedient ἐπιθυμητικόν on the other. However, unlike the *Republic,* it provides a physical framework for the

[574] Pl. *Ti.* 34c1
[575] Pl. *Ti.* 70a2-b1.
[576] Renaut, 2018, pp72-73.
[577] Renaut, 2018, p.73.
[578] Renaut, 2018, p.72.
[579] Renaut, 2018, p.73.

relationship between the three aspects of the soul, one that can be easily visualised and understood.

The description of the lungs also playing a part in the positioning of the θυμός underlines the other new aspect of θυμός that Plato had introduced in the *Cratylus*, above – that of heat. In the *Timaeus* lungs are said to be useful in cooling the heat of the θυμός to prevent undue damage to the heart:

> As a means of relief for the leaping of the heart, in times when dangers are expected and θυμός is excited – since they knew that all such swelling of the passionate parts (θυμουμένων) would arise from the action of fire, - they contrived and implanted the form of the lungs … so that it might have a cooling effect and furnish relief and comfort in the burning heat. To this end they drew the channels of the windpipe to the lungs, and placed the lungs as a kind of padding around the heart, in order that, when the θυμός therein should be at its height, by leaping upon a yielding substance and becoming cool, the heart might suffer less and thereby be enabled the more to be subservient to the reason in times of passion.[580]

Heat is not strongly associated with θυμός in the Homeric works.[581] Thus Plato's strong association between heat and θυμός seen in the *Timaeus* marks both a difference from the Homeric tradition as well as from his own description in the *Republic*.

The **Laws**

Turning from the *Timaeus,* the other work of Plato's which mentions θυμός extensively is the *Laws.* However, it does not add a great deal to our understanding of the θυμός. One interesting detail is the culpability and responsibility of the θυμός. Two types of killing involving the θυμός of the killer are described. The first occurs when a man lashes out to some physical assault on the spur of the moment and, without prior intention, kills, with repentance immediately following.[582] In the second type, the reaction is

[580] Pl. *Ti.* 70c1-d6.
[581] For an in-depth discussion of the association between heat and θυμός in the literature under consideration, see the later section 'Heat and θυμός".
[582] Pl. *Leg.* 866d7-e2. (Translated by Bury, LCL 187).

separated by time from the original insult or assault. This time the murderer intends and plans to kill, and is not repentant.[583] The legal recrimination is that both "shall suffer such other penalties as it is proper for the man to suffer who has slain without θυμός", but a period of exile is also added; three years for the man who intended to kill, two years for the one who did not.[584] During the exile, the killer should "chastise his own θυμός", and it is specifically stated that the deliberate killer has a longer period of exile "because of the greatness of his θυμός".[585] A possible interpretation is that the θυμός that reacted immediately had no time to ask of λογιστικόν what should be done, whereas that which planned to murder either ignored or persuaded the λογιστικόν, overstepping its proper place within the soul. That the λογιστικόν might disapprove of planned murder is indicated by an earlier passage stating that "it is permissible to show pity to the man that has evils that are remediable, and to abate one's θυμόν and treat him gently".[586] It is not clarified within the *Laws* whether the period of exile is for the purposes of retribution or rehabilitation. If retribution, the punishment is greater for the uncontrolled θυμός. If rehabilitation, the stronger θυμός presumably will take longer to be brought under sufficient control for the agent to be allowed back into the city.

Summary:

As far as the make-up of the soul goes, Plato's coverage of θυμός outside of the two main works of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* adds only a little to our understanding of the Platonic θυμός. It was already established that while the *Republic* showcases an ideal θυμός subject to careful education and upbringing, it also, along with the *Phaedrus,* indicates that in practice the θυμός is unlikely to be so well-managed. The result is a θυμός that is either too strong or too weak, and a person whose overall character is correspondingly flawed. The *Laws* in particular follows along the same lines, indicating the various penalties that may be needed, either for rehabilitation or punishment, for a person whose θυμός has led them to violence.

[583] Pl. *Leg.* 866e2-6.
[584] Pl. *Leg.* 867c4-d3.
[585] Pl. *Leg.* 867c8, d3.
[586] Pl. *Leg.* 731c8-d2.

To a certain extent the *Timaeus* also addresses the same theme, continuing the "guard-dog" illustration that first appeared in the *Republic* where the θυμός is well-meaning but overly impulsive and needs constantly calling to heel by the λογιστικόν. It also, however, along with the *Cratylus*, introduces the concept that the θυμός is strongly associated with heat – that it becomes hot when active, and can be soothed by cooling. This is not a characteristic of θυμός that was seen in Homer. It will be seen later that this association of heat and θυμός was taken up and built upon by later authors including Aristotle and Apollonius Rhodius. Thus a second major characteristic of θυμός has been introduced by Plato.

Section 5: The θυμός in action in Plato's *Republic*

In this section, examples of "θυμός in action" will be examined and compared with the definition of θυμός that Plato's Socrates gives in the *Republic* Book IV. In considering examples from the *Republic*, Andersson comments that "Socrates was told to explain the matter by use of extremes and polarization; by taking extremes one does not aim to catch the features of the man in the street".[587] In line with Andersson's observation, the theory has already been tendered, above, that the soul, and with it the θυμός, that Plato describes in the *Republic* is ideal, perfect, and therefore unrealistic. In contrast, the soul in the *Phaedrus* is flawed and human and the θυμός-horse is correspondingly weak and ineffective. Both descriptions are also united by being presented largely in simile, with all the attendant questions regarding how far the corresponding imagery can be accepted or dismissed. Helpfully, though, Plato clearly signposts four descriptions of θυμός in action in the *Republic*. Three are hypothetical and closely related, and the fourth example is a named man, Leontius. In addition, Wilson has argued that Thrasymachus, a participant in the conversation of the *Republic*, is an example of a heavily θυμός-dominant character, so he will also be considered.[588] It is these examples that we can look to for a realistic middle-ground, Andersson's "man in the street". It will be

[587] Andersson, 1971, p.226.
[588] Wilson, 1995, p.58.

shown by these examples that the *Republic* soul with its perfectly balanced and agreeing elements is indeed unrealistic. When considered in realistic and lifelike examples, the θυμός is problematic, either too strong or too weak, and does not match up with Plato's ideal.

Souls corresponding to constitutions

The three hypothetical descriptions occur in Book VIII of the *Republic.* They are considered here first because, although hypothetical, they provided a useful framework within which to discuss the real examples of Leontius and Thrasymachus.

After Socrates defines three elements of a soul, he enlarges the simile once again to ask what sort of constitution a city would have if the government within it corresponded to a man in whose soul one of the three elements took undue precedence over the other two.[589] Descriptions of different constitutions follow, after which the speakers refocus their analysis onto individuals to explain how the corresponding man could have come to have one aspect of his soul pre-eminent over the other two. The finest constitution, aristocracy, quite literally "rule by the best", is not considered at length as the speakers agree immediately that such a constitution correlates to the best type of man, one in whom the three aspects of the soul are in perfect balance, which has already been discussed.[590]

Four other types of constitution are given at first: kingship (timocracy), oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny ("the ultimate disorder in the state").[591]

Timocracy and the θυμός-dominant man

Elsewhere in Plato's works we have seen that while he defined a perfectly balanced, perfectly educated and ideal soul in the *Republic,* the reality is somewhat different. Equally, the perfectly educated and balanced ideal Kallipolis is not a realistic city, even by Plato's own account. He takes up this theme of ideal versus real in Book VIII of the *Republic* where he describes the

[589] Pl. *Resp.* 544a2-8.
[590] Pl. *Resp.* 544e6-7.
[591] Pl. *Resp.* 544c1-7.

natural deterioration through a series of more realistic societies than the hypothetical Kallipolis.

Kingship, soon renamed "timocracy", is defined as being "the constitution based on love of honour".[592] In the city, the degeneration from aristocracy to timocracy will occur, Socrates explains, when the leaders of the state unwittingly breed at the wrong time and bring forth inferior offspring.[593] The rulers will neglect the arts and philosophy and so be less wise, thereby decreasing the relative strength of the λογιστικόν element in the city and increasing the influence of the spirited element (θυμοειδεῖς).[594] The over-riding characteristic of this constitution is the dominance of the spirited element, as a result of which "one thing only stands out in it most clearly: φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι (love of victory and love of honour)".[595]

Socrates goes on to describe the corresponding man in depth. As in the city-parallel, this man will have been under-educated in the arts, including in stories of worthy acts.[596] Consequently, whereas he should have been gentle to all familiar fellow-citizens, he treats people in three different ways. He is "harsh on slaves", "civil to free men", and "very respectful to those in authority".[597] He wants to be like the men in authority and wants to earn the honour that he sees being given to them. At first he pursues this through "prowess in war".[598] As time goes on, he sees that honour follows status and so "being pulled by both sides" (anthropomorphised as an honour-loving father and a status-seeking mother), he at last "reaches a compromise and hands control of himself to the ambitious and passionate coterie and becomes arrogant and glory-seeking".[599] The ideal θυμός had no ambition to rule, acknowledging that the ruling role was better given to the λογιστικόν. This realistic θυμός desires not just the honour that it would deservedly earn through fine deeds, but also the honour that is

[592] Pl. *Resp.* 545b5-8.
[593] Pl. *Resp.* 546a7-b4, c8-d3.
[594] Pl. *Resp.* 546d5-7.
[595] Pl. *Resp.* 548c5-7. (Emlyn-Jones and Preddy's translation is "contentiousness and ambition").
[596] Pl. *Resp.* 548e4-549a1.
[597] Pl. *Resp.* 549a1-3.
[598] Pl. *Resp.* 549a3-7.
[599] Pl. *Resp.* 550b4-7.

given to the ruling class regardless of why it is given. Specifically, it wants to rule.

The defining characteristic of the θυμός in this example is that it cares what others think. As noted by Wilberding, "the timocrat, instead of trying to be good, focus[es] his or her efforts on trying to appear good to others".[600] In an ideal situation, the 'good' that the θυμός tries to be would be the same in its own opinion and in others. In this more realistic situation, though, the θυμός develops alternative ideas of what is worth having.

Timocracy is listed as the next best government to aristocracy, or the least-worse in comparison with what follows. It may therefore be surmised that the imbalanced soul with the θυμός as the leading element in the soul is inferior to the ideal soul in which "the ruler and the ruled believe in common that the rational part should rule", but that it is not as bad as any other imbalanced combination.[601] Wilberding endorses this hierarchy of worth, suggesting that although "Plato would have us pity the timocrat for his or her vain concern with appearances, we should also appreciate that it is how things appear *to others* that he or she is so concerned about. And surely being concerned with what others think is better than having no concern for what others think."[602] Thus in Wilberding's view, the timocracy-man is better than what follows because he is not collecting trinkets for his own gratification, but in order to gain the good opinion of others. Motive is still the key, and the basic motivation of this thumoedic timocracy-man is still honour.

Oligarchy and the ἐπιθυμητικόν-dominant man

The next constitution to be examined is oligarchy, defined by Plato's speakers as "the constitution which derives from one's property in which the rich rule, [and] the poor have no share in government."[603] The change from timocracy in the city is easily explained: any share in civic life requires money so the

[600] Wilberding, 2009, pp.373-4.
[601] Pl. *Resp.* 442d1-2.
[602] Wilberding, 2009, p374.
[603] Pl. *Resp.* 550c11-12.

moneymaking tendency must have pre-eminence, and in consequence "the more respectable they think this is, the more dishonourable they consider virtue to be."[604] The λογιστικόν that was already somewhat weakened in the timocracy does not recover. Without the tempering hand of wise rulers, the warrior-guardians will also develop a passion for material wealth. When summarising the classes of citizens in Book IV of the *Republic*, Socrates had called the ἐπιθυμητικόν class of citizens "the moneymaking" class (χρηματιστικόν). Therefore this new passion for material wealth in the warrior-guardians indicates that they are developing the traits of the ἐπιθυμητικόν class.[605] The result is that money now overtakes honour as the prime motivator of the citizens, increasing the sway of the ἐπιθυμητικόν to the detriment of the θυμός.

Socrates' theory of how the corresponding man may be formed is that the man in whom the θυμός was the most powerful element has a son in his turn who sees his father being maliciously prosecuted in the law courts by career-prosecutors.[606] His father, on losing the case, is either executed, exiled or disenfranchised.[607] The natural result is that the son is no longer ambitious for power through honour, as his father had been, but understands only the value of money which alone can safeguard against poverty.[608] Having "enthroned" the money-making principle,

> … then, I suppose, with reason and passion (λογιστικόν καὶ θυμοειδές) enslaved sitting on the ground on either side beneath the throne, he allows neither the one to reason and investigate, other than how less money can be increased into more, nor the other to admire and respect anything but wealth and the wealthy and to be ambitious for anything other than the accumulation of money and anything else that contributes to it.[609]

This sad picture shows a man whose λογιστικόν, overpowered by his ἐπιθυμητικόν, is not permitted to exercise itself with thoughts of wisdom, and whose θυμός is perverted from its natural pursuit of honour into pursuit of

[604] Pl. *Resp.* 550d8-e6.
[605] Pl. *Resp.* 548a5-b2.
[606] Pl. *Resp.* 553a9-b4.
[607] Pl. *Resp.* 553b4-5.
[608] Pl. *Resp.* 553b7-c7.
[609] Pl. *Resp.* 553d1-7.

money. Adeimantus believes the change that Socrates describes to be a very natural one: "there's no other change so swift and certain as from an ambitious young man to a moneygrubber".[610] Once the soul is deficient in the soothing education of the arts, the θυμός naturally becomes predominant, and then the ἐπιθυμητικόν just as naturally takes over. Faulty education remains the root cause of the problem.

Democracy and the immoderate man

The next constitution discussed is democracy. Just as the oligarchic constitution was the natural heir to the timocratic one, democracy as a constitution is the natural heir to oligarchy. The oligarchy had created a two-part state, "that of the poor, that of the rich, living in the same place continually plotting against each other".[611] The poor, always the majority, eventually become such a majority that by sheer numbers they become more powerful than the rulers: "A democracy emerges when the poor are victorious and put some of their opponents to death and exile others and give those left an equal share of the state and its government".[612]

Both Socrates and Adeimantus seem unenthusiastic about democracy, as may be expected of the constitution that is almost as far removed from aristocracy as possible. Socrates comments that the state abounds in "freedom and freedom of speech" because of which it may be judged to be the finest.[613] Unfortunately for the city, the freedom includes being able either to take part in government or not, no matter whether one is ill-suited or competent.[614] Ultimately the reason for democracy as a constitution falling so far short of the ideal state is again to do with education, specifically a "complete failure to concern itself with detail and its contempt for those things we were talking about in solemn terms when we were founding our state".[615]

[610] Pl. *Resp.* 553d8-e1.
[611] Pl. *Resp.* 551d5-7.
[612] Pl. *Resp.* 557a2-5.
[613] Pl. *Resp.* 557b4-7, c4-9.
[614] Pl. *Resp.* 557e1-558a2.
[615] Pl. *Resp.* 558a10-b2.

The man corresponding to democracy descends from the man corresponding to oligarchy, who had in turn descended from the human equivalent of timocracy, who himself was descended from the best man (aristocracy).[616] In this descendant's case, there has been an absolute lack of education and even more external influence than that which caused the aristocrat's son to become a timocrat. Through all these influences "a young man changes from his upbringing based on desires for what is basically essential, to licentiousness and indulgence in unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures".[617]

The balance of the elements of this man's soul may be supposed to be very heavily in favour of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, an exaggerated oligarchy-man, but in fact the fault is that two of the three elements enjoy absolute equality, while only the λογιστικόν is truly exiled. This young man

> … lives and enjoys the desire that each day happens to bring along, sometimes indulging in wine to the sound of the flute, and at others drinking water and pining away. Again there are times when he takes exercise, but there are times when he's idle and neglects everything, while at others he's apparently engrossed in philosophy. He frequently takes part in politics and leaps up and says and does whatever occurs to him. If he can ever admire some military men, that's the side he inclines towards; or if businessmen, then again he inclines that way; and there is no order or necessity in his life, but he calls this existence truly pleasant and free and blessed and applies himself to it throughout the whole of his life.[618]

The man equivalent to democracy, then, will sometimes pursue honour, when his θυμός has the upper hand, but at other times pleasure, when the ἐπιθυμητικόν is in control. He may even pursue philosophy, hinting at some slight residual λογιστικόν, but without any degree of constancy. According to Renaut, the function of the θυμός in the *Republic* is that it "values", that is, it assigns "importance to principles or objects and leads the agent to commit himself in what he finds good, beautiful and just because that's what he values most".[619]

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[616] Pl. *Resp.* 558c10-d2.
[617] Pl. *Resp.* 561a1-4.
[618] Pl. *Resp.* 561c6-d8.
[619] Renaut, 2018, p.74.

The fault of the θυμός in democracy-man would therefore be that it is randomly assigning importance to desires which a healthy θυμός would balance more carefully. Once again, the original fault lies in education. The θυμός has not been exercised into the strength that would allow it to control the ἐπιθυμητικόν, nor soothed so that it will obey the dictates of the λογιστικόν, which is so weakened as to be all but absent in any case. There is equality of ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμός, but no moderation in either case: this man will either "indulge" in wine, or "pine away" on water.

Tyranny man

The final and worst constitution is tyranny, and the corresponding man is, of course, a tyrant. This soul no longer has the θυμός but rather madness (μανία) as its bodyguard and therefore does not illustrate θυμός in action.[620]

Summary

These three descriptions of θυμός in action in the *Republic* all represent a difference from the ideal θυμός of book IV. However, the difference is, once again, explained by reality: in theory the θυμός, and indeed the other aspects of the soul, can be perfectly educated and balanced with each other. In practice, however, errors creep in, and a slight fault in the education results in a slight imbalance between the parts of the soul, which then cannot help but grow in future generations.

Leontius

The non-hypothetical account of the θυμός in action in the *Republic* is the case of Leontius. Glaucon and Socrates are discussing whether the θυμός is a third part of the soul or is related to, and part of, the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Socrates says:

> I once heard a story, and I believe it, that Aglaion's son Leontius was coming up from Piraeus along the foot of the northern wall on the outside and he noticed some corpses lying beside the executioner. He felt the desire (ἐπιθυμοῖ) to look at them one moment and turned away in disgust at the next. For a time he struggled and covered his face; then, overcome by his desire he

[620] Pl. *Resp.* 573b1-2.

> opened his eyes wide and ran towards the corpses. "Look for yourself, you wretches," he shouted, "and fill yourselves with an image of the beautiful."[621]

Glaucon agrees that he has heard the story too and it is quickly clarified that it is the θυμός that prompts the anger and opposes the ἐπιθυμίαις in this case:

> Don't we see this in many places elsewhere, when desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) force someone to do things contrary to reason (λογισμὸν), he reviles himself and grows angry (θυμούμενον) with the violent force inside him and, as if there are two parties wrangling, such a person's θυμός becomes an ally of his reason?[622]

This is arguably the most comprehensive account that Plato gives of a θυμός in action, hence the importance of understanding its function in this case. It is first necessary to ascertain what is motivating both Leontius' ἐπιθυμίαι and his θυμός.

The θυμός opposing inappropriate sexual desire

The editors Emlyn-Jones and Preddy provide the footnote that Leontius is "possibly to be identified with a character in a fragment of the comic poet Theopompus, who was notorious for his love of boys 'as pale as corpses'".[623] The later Hackett edition removes the word "possibly" and states definitely that "Leontius' desire to look at corpses is sexual in nature, for a fragment of contemporary comedy tells us that Leontius was known for his love of boys as pale as corpses".[624] In that case the explanation would be that Leontius, with his predilection for "pale" boys, wanted with his ἐπιθυμητικόν to look at the corpses, but his θυμός, presumably allying itself to the λογιστικόν, told him that looking at corpses for sexual pleasure was wrong and became angry at his recalcitrant ἐπιθυμητικόν. It is a neat explanation that covers why the θυμός would be angry at the necrophiliac tendencies of the ἐπιθυμητικόν. If the

[621] Pl. *Resp.* 439e5-440a5.
[622] Pl. *Resp.* 440a6-b8.
[623] Emlyn-Jones & Preddy, 2013, 421 n.
[624] Grube & Reeve 1992, 115 n.

explanation is based on a faulty premise, however, then it cannot be so easily accepted, no matter how convenient it would be.

The definite association of Plato's Leontius with the Leontinus (maybe 'of Leontium') referenced by Theopompus seems tenuous. Ferrari notes that "the grounds are very insecure", and it is easy to see why he comes to that conclusion.[625] The full Theopompus fragment, derived from the scholia on Aristophanes' *Birds* 1406, reads:

> Λεωτροφίδης ὁ τρίμετρος ὡς † λεόντινος †
> εὔχρως † τε φάναι † καὶ χαρίεις ὥσπερ νεκρός.[626]

The many gaps in the text are immediately an issue, and the footnote to the fragment states:

> The text of the first line is corrupt and numerous attempts have been made to make sense of *trimetros* and *leontinos*. At *Republic* 439e Plato tells of a Leontius who was attracted by the sight of dead bodies.[627]

The conclusions drawn about Leontius/Leontinus' sexual desire for corpses seem to rest heavily on conjecture. The only facts are that Plato mentions a man called Leontius, son of Aglaion, who on one occasion wanted to look at corpses, and that Theopompus says (possibly, noting the difficulties of translation) "Leotrophides the triple-measure just as a fresh-looking and lovely corpse for Leontinus to look at".[628] The use of εὔχρως καὶ χαρίεις (fresh-looking and lovely) would appear to be sarcastic, although it is still possible that Leontinus was literally attracted to corpses.

It is difficult to justify Leontius' "notoriety" from only two references that are not definitely related to each other. If we take away the identification with the

[625] Ferrari, 2007, p.182.
[626] Theopompus fr.25.
[627] Storey (Ed.) 2011 p.331fn.
[628] Theopompus, fr.25. (my translation: τρίμετρος is assumed to be an epithet or nickname of Leotrophides. As the play is called "Barmaids", I suggest that Leotrophides-Triple-Measure is at this point passed out drunk. Athenaeus' quote that Dionysus' "third krater is dedicated to sleep" (*Deipnosophists*, 36b7-c1) may support this suggestion)

Leontinus of the Theopompus fragment, the accepted motivation of Leontius' ἐπιθυμητικόν must be open to question. His λογιστικόν would still be of the opinion that it is wrong to look at corpses for sexual gratification, but if the desire had not been for that in the first place, it would no longer explain the consequent anger of the θυμός.

It is therefore reasonable to return to Socrates' story to seek other possible explanations for why Leontius wanted to look at corpses, and why that caused a civil war in his soul.

The θυμός opposing inappropriate grief

Liebert argues against a sexual interpretation of Leontius' desire: Socrates, she notes, is trying to convince Glaucon of a "*universal* psychic division" between appetite and anger; the example of Leontius proves that such a division is possible, but to have to resort to an example containing something so perverse as necrophilia harms the universality of the conclusion.[629] A counter-argument, however, is that Socrates was not trying to prove a universal psychic division, but only to show that such a division was possible in certain limited and highly specific circumstances. In that case, it would not matter that the example was extreme.

Allen also offers an alternative to a sexual connotation, proposing that the viewing of corpses, especially the lawfully executed corpses of criminals that Leontius was viewing, would not, and indeed should not, be shocking to an Athenian audience.[630] She notes that while friends would be expected to pity the corpses, to an Athenian:

> The corpses were a visible product of the Athenian regime … they symbolized Athenian power. To look at the corpses without being too discomfited was to accept the forms of power, the penal practices, and the ideologies that not only culminated in but also validated their presence in the landscape.[631]

[629] Liebert, 2013, p.181.
[630] Allen, 2000, p.136.
[631] Allen, 2000, p.137.

She supports this statement by giving an example from the *Iliad* in which Achilles attempts to mutilate Hector's body. Allen notes that while "the Trojans mourn the sight of Hector being dragged round the city", "the Greek soldiers", on the other hand, "stand over the body, consider its former beauty, and take turns stabbing it (*Il.* 22.395-515)", highlighting the very different responses of friends and enemies.[632] Purely from Allen's interpretation, we now have the problem that, far from being wrong, Leontius *should* have a desire to view the corpses, as part of his Athenian identity. Of course, there remains the question of how far Homeric examples should be taken as "normal". The most famous mistreatment of Hector's corpse was Achilles' attempt to disfigure it by dragging it with his chariot, and this account has been specifically removed from the education of the young guardians in the ideal city due to its unwholesome content.[633] Allen cites other examples where Greeks enjoy seeing their enemies brought low, but these are personal not state enemies, for example Creon and Oedipus.[634] Allen does not absolutely convince in arguing that it was Leontius' patriotic duty to view the corpses and delight in their fate, but it is difficult to argue against her conclusion that at the very least "an ordinary Athenian could have looked at the corpses without cursing himself".[635]

Building on Allen's argument, Liebert agrees that Leontius' desire to look at the corpses would not be wrong in itself, but she argues that his motive may be reprehensible if his desire was to grieve for lawfully executed criminals rather than rejoice over such a manifestation of Athenian power.[636] The "disgust" that Leontius experiences alongside his desire is expressed by δυσχεραίνοι, which Liebert notes is the same verb involved in the education of the θυμός in book 3 of the *Republic*:

> Then we would be right to remove the lamentations of men of good standing, and allocate them to women, although not even then if they are virtuous, as well as to men of bad character in order that those whom we saw we are bringing up to guard our

[632] Allen, 2000, p.136fn.
[633] Hom. *Il.* 24.14-18; Pl. *Resp.* 391b5-c6.
[634] Allen, 2000, p.136.
[635] Allen, 2000, p.136.
[636] Liebert, 2013, p.182.

> country may scorn (δυσχεραίνωσιν) to do similar things to these men.[637]

Liebert comments that "in both cases, disgust is an expression of the θυμός, and in both cases the target of thumoedic aggression involves death and the improper response to death".[638] Regarding grief, Socrates suggests a bereaved relative would not allow the full extent of his grief to be seen in public.[639] Crucially what prevents any overflow of grief in public is "reason and convention" – λόγος καὶ νόμος.[640] Liebert therefore concludes that "Socrates thus conceives of the desire to grieve as a lawless appetite" (translating νόμος as "law").[641]

Liebert does not say so, but equally supportive to her argument that what was wrong with Leontius' appetite was his desire to grieve for the corpses is that inappropriate grief is also presented by Socrates as contrary to reason, emphasizing again the part of rational calculation in determining right and wrong behaviour.

Allen's and Liebert's conclusion that Leontius' specific desire was inappropriate grief is overall more satisfactory and stands up to scrutiny better than the suggestion favoured by earlier commentators that inappropriate sexual appetite was Leontius' motivation. It does not, however, explain why Leontius cursed his eyes specifically, telling them to "take their fill".

Right reaction, wrong place

Ferrari's explanation for Leontius' anger is entirely based on other passages in the *Republic*, which immediately puts it on safer ground than relying on outside sources, especially one so obscure as the Theopompus fragment. He refers back to the "decent man", the same referenced by Allen, above.[642] In the *Republic,*

[637] Pl. *Resp.* 387e9-388a3.
[638] Liebert, 2013, p.191.
[639] Pl. *Resp.* 604a1-7.
[640] Pl. *Resp.* 604a9-10.
[641] Liebert, 2013, p.194.
[642] Ferrari, 2007, p.179.

Plato speaks of a "decent man" whose θυμός allows him to display more grief for his dead son in private than in public:

> When he is alone I think he'll dare to come out with a great deal that he'd be ashamed to do if anyone were to hear him, and would do a great deal he wouldn't allow anyone to see him doing.[643]

Ferrari remarks that the consequence of not grieving in public makes it more likely that the man will lose control in private; he is "starving" himself in public, risking causing an over-indulgence in private.[644] Ferrari's argument is then furthered by considering another "decent man" of the *Republic* (or possibly the same one, although the cases appear to be purely hypothetical). This man, Ferrari says, basing his argument on *Republic* 605c-606a, is able to go to a dramatic performance of tragedy and grieve for the characters far more than he would permit himself to grieve for a personal tragedy. Equally, he could go to a comic performance and laugh at jokes that he would be ashamed to make. Ferrari concludes that "for once, our respectable man can allow himself to have a good cry and not feel bad about it".[645] At first Ferrari's use of these passages of Plato appears misplaced: Socrates and his companions agree that this is what happens at the theatre, but their point is that by indulging in such "feeding" of a natural tendency to weep, the tendency will be made strong and consequently more difficult to control in real life.[646] However, they agree that this is what happens in Athens, although it would not be permitted in Kallipolis. Ferrari justifies the use of this passage by showing that this is exactly what has happened to Leontius, although he does not assign grief or pity as basis of Leontius' desire to view the corpses. He suggests that when Leontius saw the corpses, he was delighted at the opportunity of viewing close-up the gory spectacle. Ferrari notes that while violence takes place off-scene in Greek tragedy, the descriptions are often intensely lurid. He suggests that Leontius in the theatre had thrilled at the graphic descriptions of mutilations and killings, and wished to gawk immoderately at the real-life example before him in

[643] Pl. *Resp.* 604a5-7.
[644] Ferrari, 2007, p.180.
[645] Ferrari, 2007, pp.179-180.
[646] Pl. *Resp.* 606b7-8.

public.[647] Leontius' behaviour was censurable because he should not have permitted his eyes to indulge their bloodthirsty wish outside of the theatre. In doing so, to bring the theatrical motif full circle, he became a spectacle himself. His "histrionics" include a "a too polished a piece of cursing to count as an involuntary outburst", as described by Ferrari, suggesting the rehearsed quality that would more appropriately be seen on stage.[648]

Ferrari's explanation is complex, but overall satisfactory, and, as noted above, it relies only on the *Republic* which makes a counterargument difficult. However, while he assigns the eyes' thirst for gore as Leontius' motive, his argument that Leontius' scandalous public behaviour would not have been censured in a theatre would apply equally well to Liebert's suggestion of immoderate grief.

Summary

Overall, it is not possible to absolutely dismiss the suggestion that Leontius' desire was sexual in nature, although it is almost entirely without basis. Liebert's and Ferrari's explanations both have merit, and unfortunately it is impossible to be certain what Leontius' motive truly was. The result, however, in his case was that the ἐπιθυμητικόν defeated the θυμός which was ultimately powerless to do anything other than curse Leontius' eyes.[649] Thus this actual rather than hypothetical example of θυμός in action in the *Republic* illustrates one of the potential problems caused by an imbalance of the λογιστικόν, the θυμός and the ἐπιθυμητικόν. It also demonstrates that the θυμός in reality may not be as strong as Socrates suggested in the "ideal" case, so once again the difference is between ideal and real.

Thrasymachus

Thrasymachus is one of the participants in the discussion that forms the *Republic*. In Book 1, he takes the part of the main speaker against Socrates, and disagrees with him vociferously. Wilson argues that Thrasymachus is intended

[647] Ferrari, 2007, p.181.
[648] Ferrari, 2007, p.181, 182.
[649] Pl. *Resp.* 440a4-5.

to represent θυμός in the *Republic.* He refers to an earlier work by Reeve in which the association between Thrasymachus and θυμός was noted.[650] Reeve briefly examines the main interlocutors in the *Republic* and concludes that "Cephalus and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, and Glaucon and Adeimantus are, in some respects at least, our introduction to the money-lovers, honour-lovers, and wisdom lovers – the producers, guardians, and philosopher-kings – who are the true, if submerged, *dramatis personae* of the *Republic.*"[651] Despite naming five characters, however, his argument then centres only on the similarity between Thrasymachus and the honour-loving guardian class of the state. An initial problem to his argument, that Thrasymachus admires "the appetitive tyrant, rather than the successful honour-lover, as we might expect" is explained as being "because, since [Thrasymachus] has not been brought up in the Kallipolis, his interests are pathological".[652]

Wilson takes up Reeve's argument that Thrasymachus is to be likened to the honour-loving guardians of the *Republic* and furthers it by extending the similarity also to the θυμός aspect of the soul. His argument contains the following strands:

- First, images used in relation to Thrasymachus are also used in relation to the θυμός.
- Secondly, the temper that Thrasymachus displays and his argumentative impulse and style are characteristic of θυμός in its pathological aspect.
- Thirdly, Thrasymachus interprets Socrates' motives as if these too sprang from the θυμός.
- Fourthly, the substance of what he says – his account of justice and the view of the human reality which underlies it – is infused with thumoedic features.[653]

I shall examine each of these arguments in turn.

[650] Wilson, 1995, p.58.
[651] Reeve, 1988, p.35.
[652] Reeve, 1988, p.41.
[653] Wilson, 1995, pp.58-9.

Imagery

Wilson gives examples where wild animals were used in describing both Thrasymachus and the θυμός.[654] Socrates says of Thrasymachus that during a pause in the discussion, "he could no longer keep quiet, but, gathering himself up like a wild beast, he sprang on us as if he wanted to tear us to pieces".[655] Later, Socrates likens Thrasymachus' behaviour to a lion when he asks "do you imagine that I would be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion and defraud Thrasymachus?"[656] Wilson weighs these quotes against the result of an imperfectly educated θυμός in a person: "In discussion he no longer uses any kind of persuasion, but carries out all his business with brute force like a wild animal and lives in ignorance and is clumsy without elegance or grace."[657] This wildness is the product of a θυμός that is trained only in gymnastics, and not soothed with music to produce a tempering gentleness to counter the brute nature.

In order for Wilson's imagery argument to be convincing, it is necessary that no other character in the *Republic* is described in similar terms, and this test is easily passed. The wild beast simile is applied uniquely to Thrasymachus and the unsoothed θυμός.

However, while wild beast imagery is restricted in the *Republic*, it appeared to a far greater extent, and often in direct connection with the θυμός, in the Homeric works. In similes illustrating the fierceness of attack, lions are particularly popular with four separate examples.[658] I consider it unlikely that Plato made use of lion and wild beast similes in relation to Thrasymachus without being aware of the Homeric tradition. In the *Republic,* Homer's works had suffered especially badly in the education chapter, almost all the forbidden examples being works of his. It is interesting now to see Plato using a simile that is so reminiscent of Homer.

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[654] Wilson, 1995, pp.59-60.
[655] Pl. *Resp.* 336b4-6.
[656] Pl. *Resp.* 341c2-3.
[657] Pl. *Resp.* 411d7-e2.
[658] Hom. *Il.* 5.135, 12.300, 17.664, 24.42.

Character

The first part of Wilson's character argument centres again around Thrasymachus' wild nature, his outbursts of anger, and that "he goes about the business of argument with force and savageness".[659] This is closely linked to the wild beast imagery already noted above. Another more telling aspect of his character that Wilson quotes is Thrasymachus' motives in arguing.[660] Socrates reports: "It was clear that Thrasymachus was keen to speak in order to gain credit, since he believed he had a brilliant answer; but he went on pretending to be keen for me to be the one to answer the questions."[661] Wilson judges that Thrasymachus' desire to speak to gain credit or esteem is commensurate with the thumoedic love of victory.[662] He does not, however, explain why, in that case, Thrasymachus appears to want Socrates to answer the questions, which presumably would earn Socrates greater esteem that Thrasymachus.

Socrates' motives

Wilson notes that Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of questioning but never answering because he, Socrates, is an honour lover.[663] "Do not", he instructs Socrates, "just ask questions, or show off by refuting anyone who answers you".[664] The word here translated "show off" is φιλοτιμοῦ, hence Thrasymachus is accusing Socrates of using his habit of only asking questions, not answering them, to pursue honour. Thrasymachus ascribes to Socrates the same thumoedic motives that he himself has, unable to imagine any other. As summarised by Wilson, Thrasymachus "gives evidence of a cast of mind which can only see human encounters in antagonistic terms, and has difficulty even comprehending the idea of a joint search for truth".[665] The use of φιλότιμος is suggestive, but again, we are left with the question of why Thrasymachus apparently wanted Socrates to answer the questions, gaining the honour that might otherwise have gone to Thrasymachus.

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[659] Wilson, 1995, p.61.
[660] Wilson, 1995, p.61.
[661] Pl. *Resp.* 338a5-b1.
[662] Wilson, 1995, p.61.
[663] Wilson, 1995, p.61.
[664] Pl. *Resp.* 336c3-5.
[665] Wilson, 1995, pp.61-2.

Opinion of justice

Wilson's final argument for associating Thrasymachus with θυμός is his opinion of justice, that justice is "the advantage of the stronger".[666] In this argument, Wilson moves away from the θυμός as it was described via the auxiliaries in the Kallipolis or in its own guise in the soul, and instead looks to the example of the timocratic man described in Book VIII.[667] This is the man in whom the θυμός has become too strong to the detriment of the λογιστικόν so that while he is motivated by love of honour, he now believes that he, rather than the philosopher, has the right to rule "because of his prowess in war and his success as a military man".[668]

Thus Wilson's arguments for associating Thrasymachus with the θυμός are valid, but only to an extent. However, in the final strand, concerning justice, he moves from arguing that Thrasymachus is θυμός personified to likening Thrasymachus to the timocracy-man already discussed above. I believe his argument would have been considerably strengthened by comparing Thrasymachus with the timocracy-man.

Thrasymachus compared with timocracy-man

In addition to Wilson arguing for Thrasymachus representing θυμός in the *Republic,* Reeve suggests that Thrasymachus serves as a living precursor to the honour-loving auxiliaries in Kallipolis. Wilson's argument is strongest when he also, briefly, uses evidence from the timocratic man immoderately ruled by the θυμός in Book VIII. Wilberding argues that the two, the Kallipolis auxiliary and the timocrat, are not identical.[669] The important difference that he notes is that the soul corresponding to timocracy contains all three elements, "but in such a way that the spirited part dominates".[670] That is, the θυμός is the ruling element of the timocracy man. In the auxiliary, by contrast, all three elements of the soul are kept in proper order; his θυμός is strong, both cultivated and

[666] Pl. *Resp.* 338c2-3.
[667] Wilson, 1995, p.62.
[668] Pl. *Resp.* 549a3-7.
[669] Wilberding, 2009, p.354.
[670] Wilberding, 2009, p.354.

soothed to the proper extent, which results not in being "ruled" by the θυμός, but harmoniously by the λογιστικόν.[671]

Socrates himself notes certain characteristics of timocracy-man, and they match well with Thrasymachus' nature as it has been presented in the *Republic.* Socrates begins, "he has to be more willful", which Thrasymachus has shown himself to be in Book I.[672] In addition, Socrates highlights that such a man would be ambitious to rule, but would consider the qualifications for rulership to be "prowess in war and success as a military man", which coincides with Thrasymachus' stated viewpoint that justice is "the advantage of the stronger".[673]

Less immediately associated with Thrasymachus is Socrates' suggestion that the man corresponding to timocracy would be "fond of the arts and listening to discourse, but by no means a rhetorician".[674] In the *Phaedrus*, the question of whether or not Thrasymachus is a rhetorician is discussed. Socrates is not entirely satisfied that Thrasymachus can be called a rhetorician, and Phaedrus tends to agree. Socrates asks "what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this [dialectic] that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?"[675] Phaedrus agrees that dialectic, and not rhetoric, is the right name for the art.[676] A similar opinion is proffered later when Socrates states regarding the art of rhetoric, "so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus".[677] Thus despite his reputation as a teacher of rhetoric, from Socrates' opinion in the *Phaedrus*, it is quite feasible that Plato regarded him as "by no means a rhetorician" and therefore consistent with timocracy-man.

[671] Wilberding, 2009, pp.354-5.
[672] Pl. *Resp.* 548e4.
[673] Pl. *Resp.* 549a4-6, 338c2-3.
[674] Pl. *Resp.* 548e4-549a2.
[675] Pl. *Phdr.* 266c1-5.
[676] Pl. *Phdr.* 266c6-9.
[677] Pl. *Phdr.* 269d6-8.

Conclusion

In summary, the sole part of Wilson's argument that links Thrasymachus specifically to the θυμός, not to the timocracy-man, is the description of an untamed θυμός being like a wild beast. Socrates' description of the θυμός-class of guardians contains many other facets that are not seen in Thrasymachus. I is therefore do not find it possible to wholly agree with Wilson that Thrasymachus represents the θυμός. However, Socrates also described the θυμός as it could become through lack of careful education, as exemplified in the timocracy-man. Thrasymachus shares many characteristics with this example, and I would suggest that it is that person with whom Thrasymachus should more accurately be identified rather than with the θυμός as a stand-alone element of the soul. Once again, the example given of the θυμός in action illustrates the result of a flawed, imperfect, but ultimately realistic, θυμός.

Summary

At first in the *Republic*, Plato defines an ideal θυμός and describes its perfect education which results in it fulfilling its responsibilities within a well-ordered and healthily balanced soul. The descriptions of the θυμός in action, however, do not start from a perfect education, and are not presented as part of an ideally balanced soul. Indeed, the very existence of the different hypothetical constitution-men is dependent on an imbalanced soul. Yet, Socrates' interlocutors have no difficulty accepting the realistic figures that he describes. Similarly, Leontius' education is deficient when compared with the ideal laid down in the *Republic*, and his soul is accordingly imbalanced with a too-headstrong ἐπιθυμητικόν and a too-weakened although still-functioning θυμός. These θυμός-in-action examples are also reminiscent of the chariot-team simile in the *Phaedrus*, which again shows not a perfect soul, but a realistically flawed one. Thus there is not any internal inconsistency in Plato's description of the θυμός, despite the differences in θυμός in action and the ideal θυμός of the early *Republic*. Rather the examples given underline the message from the *Laws* and the *Timaeus* that the θυμός is a necessary but difficult aspect of the soul, and what may seem like an unnecessarily detailed education that Socrates

recommended in its training is apparently justified by the untrained examples which Plato gives.

Section 6: Conclusion

In this section I have argued that Plato's description of the θυμός in the *Republic,* while the most well-known, is unique in his work in describing a perfect, ideally educated θυμός. The ideal standard is not repeated anywhere else, and most certainly not in the examples of θυμός in action that are examined above. It is also shown that Plato departed from the Homeric understanding of θυμός, greatly restricting its role to that of the strength used by rational thought to keep desires (the ἐπιθυμητικόν) in check. Plato also describes the θυμός in physical terms, so we now have four types of θυμός to look out for when we examine possible influences on Apollonius Rhodius' depiction of θυμός: the wide-ranging Homeric, the perfect Platonic psychical, the imperfect Platonic psychical, and the Platonic physical.

Chapter 4: Apollonius of Rhodes

Section 1: Approaching θυμός in the *Argonautica*

It has been shown above that the Homeric θυμός is in many ways a far richer concept than the Platonic θυμός. Whereas Plato assigned various activities and desires to three distinct elements of the soul – the λογιστικόν (rational thought), the ἐπιθυμητικόν (physical appetites) and the θυμός (broadly, the desire for honour) – in Homer the θυμός was involved in all such activities and desires. On the other hand, Plato discusses the physical θυμός as well as the psychical one, and in doing so introduces concepts that are not found in Homer, most especially an association between θυμός and heat. Turning now to Apollonius, two questions are raised: Firstly, how does Apollonius portray the θυμός? Secondly, in what ways does he differ from or agree with Homer and/or Plato? The difference, especially in the psychical θυμός, is so marked between Homer and Plato that it would not be possible for Apollonius to fully embrace both traditions. However, there is a caveat to that statement. Plato introduced an aspect of the θυμός, heat, that was not present in Homer, but neither did Homer associate θυμός with cold, or in any other way engage with the idea at all. So while heat can be said to be a non-Homeric aspect of θυμός, it is not anti-Homeric. Homer simply did not comment one way or the other.

I shall begin by examining the Lemnian episode.[678] This is the closest thing that Apollonius gives to a definition of θυμός, although it has not previously been utilised by scholars to that end. It shows that to Apollonius the family-facing aspect of the θυμός, present but subtle in the *Iliad*, is heavily foregrounded. I then follow with a theme by theme analysis of θυμός in the *Argonautica* using the themes that have already been discovered in Homer, above, as a framework. The presence in the *Argonautica* of all of Homer's major aspects of the θυμός indicates a very conscious imitation of Homer. Apollonius does not take up Plato's portrayal of the psychical θυμός of the *Republic* and/or the *Phaedrus* at all. I finally examine the unique character of Medea, which has always been

[678] Unless stated otherwise, the translation used is Seaton, 1967, LCL1.

supposed to owe a great debt to Euripides' heroine.[679] I demonstrate that her θυμός is, in keeping with the Lemnian episode, heavily family-oriented, which in view of her later filicide is a theory not normally propounded.

Two things particularly stand out in my analysis. The first is Apollonius' conscious imitation of Homer. He does not just use θυμός in a way that is consistent with Homer's usage, he covers every aspect of θυμός that is seen in Homer. He also tends to use distinctly Homeric phrases to introduce the scenes in a way that heralds the upcoming reference to the Homeric source material. The second stand-out point is that he has not only consciously imitated Homer, but also that he has frequently changed the representation of θυμός slightly so that it is both undeniably Homeric but also something new.[680] For example, the injuries that precede a θυμός being "gathered back" are love-wounds, not battle wounds. Jason's θυμός commands him to talk, not fight, which in the *Iliad* always preceded a speech that would be unpleasant to the hearer, but his was welcome to Medea. This observation of subtle differences in Apollonius' writing builds on the work of Beye, Knight, and others mentioned below, but goes much further. Beye mentions such overarching themes as ring composition, book divisions and the narrator's relationship with his characters and the muses.[681] By looking at a single word I find that Beye's conclusions hold true. I do not know yet whether Apollonius engages with other Homeric terms and reworks them with the same thoroughness: an exciting piece of research that must surely be undertaken at some point.

A brief overview of Homeric influence on the *Argonautica*

Throughout scholarship there is a long-standing assumption that Apollonius was consciously imitating Homer. Clauss refers to Apollonius' "ubiquitous allusion to other writers, especially Homer".[682] Knight, in addition, states "One reason why Apollonius' creativity in using Homer was for a long time

[679] Hunter, 1989, pp.18-19. The various competing influences on Apollonius's portrayal of Medea are examined in Appendix B where it is shown that Euripides' portrayal is in itself Homeric, therefore Apollonius's portrayal of Medea is indirectly Homeric as well.
[680] All of the following examples are discussed in greater detail below.
[681] Beye, 2006, pp192-7, 207.
[682] Clauss, 1993, p.5.

unrecognised was that his reliance on his predecessor was taken for granted, since echoes of Homer pervade all later Greek literature, especially epic".[683] Knight herself tests the assumption that Apollonius was influenced by Homer by comparing motifs such as 'recurrent scenes', battle scenes, gods, and the wanderings described in the *Odyssey* and the *Argonautica* generally, and finds the assumption of Homeric influence justified.[684]

Nevertheless, a simple 'model and imitation' relationship has been called into question. Beye suggests that "Apollonius is far from imitating Homer, as anyone who reads the poem sympathetically can quickly see".[685] This does not mean that Beye denies any influence, he acknowledges the Homeric influence when he speaks of "the narrator's habit of playing off the Homeric originals".[686] It is only direct imitation that he argues against. He expands his theory later, suggesting that while Apollonius (and other Alexandrian writers) would have looked to previous works:

> Rather than through slavish imitation, however, these entirely original poets imitated through distancing, looked to the past by rereading the past, and in their reading – that is, their wilful misreading, their deliberate perversion and parody of what had come before – they recreated the past by demanding that their readers notice the difference between their models and what they made in seeming imitation.[687]

Hunter (who describes the *Argonautica* as a "creative reworking of Homer") gives a number of examples that would back up both his and Beye's opinion.[688] One such is the palace architecture described in Book 3 which Hunter calls "a mixture of the fabulous, the Homeric, and the Hellenistic".[689] A Homeric precedent was available in the description of Alcinous' palace in the *Odyssey,* but Apollonius chose to innovate. Certainly at first glance the heroes of the *Argonautica* are far more nuanced than those of the *Iliad.* Glei provides an

[683] Knight, 1995, p.2.
[684] Note, Knight did not consider θυμός as part of her remit.
[685] Beye, 2006, p.192.
[686] Beye, 2006, p.192.
[687] Beye, 2006, p.195.
[688] Hunter, 1993, p.xxiv.
[689] Hunter, 1993, p.xxiv fn28.

excellent summary of the various "unheroic" stages of Jason as he has been analysed in modern scholarship, from Carspecken (1952) showing that "the ideals of the Homeric hero do not apply to Apollonius' heroes", through the "love-hero" representation propounded by Beye (1969), to Williams' suggestion that Jason is actually a Stoic and instead it is Aeëtes who represents the traditional Homeric hero (1996).[690] If the hero Jason is so difficult to equate to the traditional Homeric hero, it would not be surprising to see one of the most prominent aspects of the Homeric hero, the θυμός, to also be changed. Possibilities are that it could be less prominent in the *Argonautica,* or altered in some way, including to a more Platonic rendering.

Since Knight's analysis in 1995 other authors have examined particular aspects of Homeric influence on the *Argonautica*.[691] However, analysis specifically of θυμός in the *Argonautica* has centred almost entirely on Medea. As a result of Euripides' very obvious influence on Apollonius, there has been little if anything written on a possible Homeric influence on Apollonius' portrayal of θυμός, and even less on his depiction of θυμός apart from Medea.

A brief overview of Platonic influence on the *Argonautica*

While Homer's general influence on Apollonius has been widely examined, a great deal less has been written about possible influence from Plato. Plato's works appear to have been familiar to another Alexandrian poet, Callimachus, who Stephens believes engages with the *Republic*.[692] Further, there is a biographical tradition that Callimachus was Apollonius' teacher, a relationship regarded as "not impossible" by Hunter.[693] Whatever their exact relationship, Hunter does, however, note "numerous and striking" parallels between Callimachus' fragmentary *Aitia* and the *Argonautica*.[694] Accepting that Callimachus was familiar with Plato's works, and accepting that Callimachus and Apollonius were at least acquaintances, whether rivals or comrades, it is

[690] Glei, 2008, pp.6-12.
[691] Eg. Danek, 2009 (Space and Time); Fantuzzi, 2008 (Homeric formularity); Bär, 2019 (Heracles).
[692] Stephens, 2015, p.122
[693] Hunter, 1989, p.6.
[694] Hunter, 1989, P.7.

very likely that Apollonius was also familiar with Plato's works even though he does not directly quote from them.

One notable exception among scholars who have not asked whether or not there may be any Platonic influence on the *Argonautica* is Marshall who rightly calls the question of reception of philosophy in the *Argonautica* "uncharted territory". She analyses the *Argonautica* for influence from various philosophical authors including Plato and concludes that:

> Although there are good reasons for considering Plato's works as a source of interest for Apollonius, Apollonius does not use Plato's work in the same significant ways that he uses Empedocles' and Parmenides' works. Instead, Apollonius' project as a poet-scholar contradicts many of the views on poetry, inspiration and skill that Plato's Socrates develops in the *Ion.*[695]

One of Marshall's lines of enquiry was to look at words used by the various philosophers that she examines compared with Apollonius. In doing so, she finds that Apollonius was influenced by Empedocles in his description of Medea's burning pain from Eros's arrow. Had she looked instead at Plato's physical description of θυμός, as I do in the section "Heat and θυμός", she may have come to a different conclusion regarding Plato's lack of influence. However, Marshall remains, as far as I can see, the only researcher to look seriously at Plato's possible influence on the depiction of characters in the *Argonautica* and she could not be expected to utilise every possible approach.

Section 2: The Presentation of θυμός in the *Argonautica*

For most examples of θυμός in the *Argonautica,* it is profitable to look at them on a theme-by-theme basis, similar to the examination of the Homeric examples, above. This allows a direct comparison or contrast with Homer, and gives a framework to search for influence from Plato as well. However, two episodes in the *Argonautica* are particularly important for assessing Apollonius' use of θυμός: the Lemnian episode in Book I, and Medea's story in Books III-

[695] Marshall, 2017, p.ii.

IV. I shall leave Medea until the end. She is not a typical person and it seems better to establish what θυμός does in 'normal' people in the *Argonautica* before looking at a woman who is the exception to almost every rule. The Lemnian episode describes what happens when a θυμός is corrupted, and from that we can work back to ascertain what is expected of a normal, healthy θυμός. I shall present that 'definition' first.

The Lemnian Episode and the ekphrasis of the Cloak

The Lemnian Episode

In the *Republic,* Plato provided a definition of his understanding of θυμός with examples and similes that assist in interpretation.[696] As part of a philosophical dialogue, such an exhaustive discussion was a natural thing to include. The same cannot be expected of epic poetry. However, close analysis of θυμός in the Lemnian episode of the *Argonautica* does provide sufficient information about the function of θυμός as presented by Apollonius that a definition can be tentatively formed to test against other instances of θυμός in the *Argonautica.*

Hypsipyle and the Lemnian women need to plausibly explain to Jason why there are no men in the area, without admitting that they were all killed by the women. The truth, the women fear, would be "in nowise to their liking, should they learn it".[697] The word rendered here "to their liking" is θυμηδές, compounded from θυμός plus ἦδος (delight, pleasure). On its own this is not especially helpful. There are many, many reasons why the θυμός of the Argonauts may not find it pleasant to hear that the Lemnian women had killed all their menfolk, not least of all the possibility that it could grow to be a habit. However, it does show that Hypsipyle fears the spirited part of the men's θυμός - had she credited the Argonauts with a merely desiring θυμός, a city populated exclusively by women need not be feared to be an unattractive proposition. Ultimately the account that Hypsipyle presents and the offer of hospitality in the city for the Argonauts are θυμός-pleasant to the Argonauts as Jason responds "Hypsipyle, very dear to our hearts (θυμηδέος) is the help we shall meet with".[698]

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[696] Pl. *Resp.* 439-441.
[697] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.662-3.
[698] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.836.

It is Hypsipyle's account of the Lemnian men which is most useful in defining θυμός. Hypsipyle explains that the men had been accustomed to plundering the nearby Thracians and bringing home goods and, the start of the troubles, female prisoners.[699] She goes on:

> But the counsel of the baneful goddess Cypris was working out its accomplishment, who brought upon them soul-destroying infatuation.[700]

"Soul-destroying" is translated from θυμοφθόρος: θυμός plus φθείρω, a Homeric word as noted by Fränkel.[701] Hypsipyle goes on to list the symptoms of this θυμός-destroying ailment, from which we can work back to understand what a non-destroyed, fully-functioning θυμός should do in certain situations, and by extension what it values and what motivates it to action.

> For they hated their lawful wives, and, yielding to their own mad folly, drove them from their homes; and they took to their beds the captives of their spear, cruel ones. … And the lawful children were being dishonoured in their halls, and a bastard race was rising. And thus unmarried maidens and widowed mothers too wandered uncared for through the city; no father heeded his daughter ever so little even though he should see her done to death before his eyes at the hands of an insolent step-dame, nor did sons, as before, defend their mother against unseemly outrage; nor did brothers care at heart for their sister. But in their homes, in the dance, in the assembly and the banquet all their thought was only for their captive maidens.[702]

All the accusations that Hypsipyle levels against the Lemnian men are basically the same, it is only the relationships between the two parties that are different in each case. Husbands do not care for their wives, fathers for daughters, sons for mothers, or brothers for sisters. In all cases the menfolk are not taking proper care of the women for whom they are responsible. The role of θυμός is particularly highlighted in the accusation of brothers not caring at heart (θυμῷ)

[699] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.798-802.
[700] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.802-3. Note, scholia has alternative lines in the "first edition", as per Mooney, 1964, p.407, which removes mention of θυμοφθόρος.
[701] Fränkel, 1968, pp.108-109.
[702] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.804-819.

for their sisters.[703] Not only does this confirm that brothers are meant to care for their sisters, but the seat of that care is, or should be, the θυμός. Custom dictates the responsibilities of the (male) heads of households, but it is their own θυμός that personally motivates them to action. Thus in the Lemnian episode the θυμός is a predominantly family-facing concept.[704]

There are several potential pitfalls to be aware of when using Hypsipyle's speech as source material. An immediate problem is that we know she was being highly selective in her account to favour the behaviour of the women. Nevertheless, although she hid the true nature and extent of the women's behaviour, she need not have been lying about the actions of the men that provoked it, although admittedly that remains a possibility. Therefore it is still possible to use Hypsipyle's description of the consequences of a diseased θυμός and work back from it to ascertain the workings of a healthy θυμός. A second factor to consider is that she may have been entirely lying; the murdered men cannot give their side of the story to balance against Hypsipyle's version. Hypsipyle also states that the behaviour of the men was due to a divinely sent affliction. This may be part of Hypsipyle's cunning as she presents herself to Jason as a loyal woman distancing the men themselves from their fault and rather diverting blame for their actions onto the goddess. There is also the undeniable fact that the Lemnian women are extraordinary. I have already stated that Medea cannot be used as an example of a normal woman, and the same can be said of the Lemnian women. They are functioning so far outside of the acceptable social norms that neither their behaviour nor Hypsipyle's speech can be given as an example. However, these problems need not impact on our understanding of θυμός as gleaned from Hypsipyle's account. Her motive was to account for the absence of the men in a way that would be believable enough for Jason to accept it. She apparently succeeded. Jason certainly considered her explanation plausible; he does not quiz her about the role of the θυμός, launching into an argument that a destroyed θυμός would not

[703] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.817.

[704] The θυμός is also strongly connected with honour, as noted by Saenz (2017), and the domestic facing θυμός of a male head of household may well value the honour of being seen take care of his female and minor charges. Likewise, the θυμός of the Lemnian women would undoubtedly be hurt at the dishonour of being replaced by foreign women.

act in such a way. Rather he accepts the proffered Lemnian hospitality without question.[705] Hypsipyle's account may have been partly or wholly false, but her description of a destroyed θυμός was plausible to Jason.

Hypsipyle's speech, does not, however, provide a full definition of every working or non-working θυμός. Because Hypsipyle is talking about the men of the city, the examples she gives are male-centric. Nor can any female example be gleaned from the women's response (as given by Hypsipyle). She says that "some god put desperate courage in us", but neither the courage itself nor the location of the courage (looking for a Homeric 'θυμός as container of emotions') is stated to be the θυμός.[706] It is interesting that the Lemnian women's dismissal of the menfolk (Hypsipyle says only that they told the men to leave, not that they killed them), is not put down to θυμός, especially when compared with the later very active θυμός of Medea. She similarly betrayed her family duties in mentally dismissing her parents when she aided Jason against her father, and, even more similar to the actual Lemnian episode rather than Hypsipyle's sanitised account of it, killed her brother. Yet the Lemnian women do have a θυμός: just as they hoped that their hospitality would be θυμηδές to the Argonauts, so they presented their offer as being θυμηδές to themselves.[707] The long-term purpose of inviting the Argonauts into the city was to secure the next generation of Lemnians. The provision of children is a large part of the family responsibility of women and if the concept of a family-facing θυμός is applied to women, we should see the θυμός motivating the women to that end. Therefore it is plausible that if the Lemnian women's description of the Argonauts' company being θυμός-pleasing to them is accurate, this would be consistent with the family-facing θυμός that in men is characterised by husbands, fathers, brothers and sons taking appropriate care of their dependent female family members. This latter point is, however, speculation. Apollonius does not analyse their movies in the necessary depth to insist on the above interpretation.

[705] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.836-7.
[706] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.820-3.
[707] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.705.

In summary, from the only near-definition of θυμός in the *Argonautica*, we can see that it is, or can be, a very domestic facet. It is the part of a person's soul or character that motivates them to fulfil their family responsibilities. Within the Lemnian episode, this definition may now provide a more specific rationale for Hypsipyle's fear that the truth of the murder of the Lemnian men would not be θυμηδές to the Argonauts. Women are not supposed to kill their husbands or their fathers or their brothers or their sons. In doing so, each woman betrayed her own existing family responsibilities, and prevented the formation of future family ties for every other Lemnian woman. As the Lemnian men were not related to the Argonauts, the latter may not necessarily have felt obliged in or by their θυμός to take vengeance on behalf of men generally (looking to the Homeric θυμός which cared about such duties in the *Iliad*), but they certainly would not have wanted to associate with women whose actions were so far removed from social norms. In turn, upon realising that their murderous policy had been short-sighted, the women's attempt to remediate the now-apparent consequences could possibly have been motivated by their own family-feeling θυμός, although Apollonius does not state that categorically.

Comparison with Homer and Plato

The domestic-facing θυμός described in the Lemnian episode is not a prominent feature in the Homeric works, which is to be expected as the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* are largely set away from home and family. However, it is there. In the section 'Rousing the θυμός with Speech' it was established that the θυμός was the motivation behind various heroes fulfilling what would otherwise have been a family responsibility for their dead brothers-in-arms – avenging deaths and reverently tending to corpses. Amidst all the adventure, warfare and foreign travel featured in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, though, this domestic-facing θυμός is only a tiny facet, well-hidden among the killing, honour-seeking, and feasting aspects of the warrior θυμός. In the *Argonautica*, and particularly in the domestic lives of the women of Lemnos, the subtle family aspect of θυμός that could be easily overlooked in the *Iliad* becomes the predominant concern.

Like Homer, Plato also does not describe a normal domestic setting in which to seek a family-facing θυμός.[708] Had he done so, I have no doubt he would have constructed an ideal family, just as the Kallipolis of the *Republic* is an ideal city and the corresponding perfectly balanced soul also describes an ideal that is not seen in Plato's real life examples. Without such a useful description it is difficult to find family-facing examples of θυμός in Plato. One argument that could be considered (which to the best of my knowledge no-one has suggested) comes from the θυμός class of warrior guardians who must be carefully educated to "be amenable toward their own people, but intractable against their enemies".[709] However, this did not refer to their own families, or even to their own class, but to the entire city. A slightly stronger argument could be made from Plato's arrangement of eugenics described in Book 5 where only the best of the guardians are permitted to cohabit and conceive children in temporary rigged marriages, and none may have a permanent spouse or know who is their own child or parent.[710] Zach notes that "the traditional interpretation" of this section is "that Plato advocated the dissolution of the family in the *Republic*", which would argue firmly against any connection between θυμός and a particular focus on the family.[711] Against that "traditional interpretation", however, Samaras argues that "strictly speaking, it might be more accurate to say not that he dissolves the *oikos*, but rather that he expands it to the point that it becomes co-extensive with the two higher classes".[712] In other words, every person in the θυμός class (and also, incidentally, the λογιστικόν class) is united in a single οἶκος and regards their entire class as their family. This may be likened to the 'brothers in arms' of the *Iliad* who took upon themselves the next-of-kin responsibilities of avenging murders and reverently tending corpses. However, Plato does not go on to say who would stand individually as next of kin in the situations that arose in the *Iliad* – his programme only allows for well-ordered births, not violent deaths. It is not therefore possible to stretch the point and argue that Plato definitely did or did not associate θυμός with the same

[708] The description of the guardian class family in Book 5 of the *Republic* (460-461) is not a "normal" domestic setting.
[709] Pl. *Resp.* 375c1-2.
[710] Pl. *Resp.* 460a8-d5, 461c6-e3.
[711] Zach, 1997, p.45. Note, Zach goes on to argue against that interpretation along the lines of Samaras, below.
[712] Samaras, 2020, p.41.

strong sense of family responsibility that motivated Iliadic warriors to take on next of kin duties. There is simply an absence of evidence to argue firmly on either side: he did not cover the situations that would show his opinion one way or the other.

In summary, thanks to Apollonius' heavy emphasis on the family-oriented θυμός in the Lemnian episode, it becomes possible to find compelling evidence of a similar aspect of the Homeric θυμός in the *Iliad.* However, that ability does not extend to Plato. There is a hint of it in the extended οἶκος of the *Republic*, but it is a hint only. To argue definitely that Plato considered θυμός to have any family-oriented aspect is difficult; to argue that he considered it a major aspect is impossible.

As Plato has failed to describe any family-θυμός that could have influenced Apollonius, and as Homer's family-θυμός is so subtle as to be easily missed, it is worth looking at authors to see whether they display the same heavily family-oriented θυμός as described by Apollonius in the Lemnian episode. When considering the *Argonautica* it is almost impossible to miss one great influence on Apollonius: his portrayal of Medea owes a great debt to Euripides' play of the same name.[713] I therefore turn to Euripides to see whether his use of θυμός tallies with the family-centric θυμός of the Lemnian episode. An initial caveat, though, is that at this early stage I again purposely disregard Medea's θυμός. I am searching for the typical, which Medea is not.

Euripides mentions θυμός 45 times (including extant fragments). In six of these, a family aspect is seen to a greater or lesser degree. Medea tells Creon that "you married your daughter to whom your θυμός told you", indicating that Creon's θυμός considered (perhaps not carefully enough) who would make the best son-in-law.[714] In the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, an old servant asks if Achilles' θυμός will swell up if he loses his supposed bride.[715] Later in the same play, Clytemnestra appeals for Achilles' help and appeals to the reported engagement between

[713] This connection is examined at greater length in Appendix B.
[714] Eur. *Med.* 309-310.
[715] Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 124-125,

himself and Iphigenia, and even though he had no part in the deception he responds that "my θυμός is stirred to action" as a result of which he tells Clytemnestra "your daughter shall never be slaughtered by her father since she was called mine".[716] These two instances are particularly reminiscent of the Lemnian θυμός which should have had care of lawful wives as one of its priorities. The eponymous hero of the *Electra* says that "my θυμός is not aflutter, my friends, at feasts", but rather "in tears my nights are spent".[717] In her next speech she identifies the reason that her θυμός has no joy: her murdered father, her missing brother, and her adulterous mother.[718] In restricting her action to tears Electra stands in stark contrast to the active vengeance of the Lemnian women, but a θυμός that is, or at least should be, responsive to family concerns is a motif that she has in common with the Hypsipyle's description of a destroyed θυμός. Later in the same play when an old man points out the marks on a 'stranger' that identify Electra's brother, she credits her θυμός with being convinced by the signs, before embracing Orestes.[719] Finally in the *Andromache,* Peleus' "prophetic θυμός bodes disaster", which is immediately justified when he hears of the death of his grandson.[720] These instances of a family-facing θυμός in Euripides appear not to have attracted any scholarly attention. However, it is possible to argue that for Euripides the θυμός did involve family feeling, alongside the more expected aspects of anger and spiritedness that have not been considered here. Nevertheless, I cannot argue from these few instances that Apollonius was certainly influenced by Euripides in his portrayal of the θυμός. Rather I would suggest that θυμός had always been known to have a family aspect but that whereas it is only slightly present in the *Iliad* due to the battle setting, it is more prominent in Euripides who writes of family affairs, and finally unmistakable in Apollonius. Apollonius was not inventing a new aspect of θυμός, he was only foregrounding what had always been there.

[716] Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 919, 935-936. It is noted that this speech of Achilles is credited to a Revisor and possibly replaces original lines (LCL495, Kovacs (Ed. & Trans.), p.269).
[717] Eur. *El.* 175-176.
[718] Eur. *El.* 200, 206, 211-212.
[719] Eur. *El.* 577-579.
[720] Eur. *Androm.* 1072-1075.

The ekphrasis of Jason's cloak and its relationship to θυμός and the Lemnian episode

Returning to the *Argonautica*, constantly lurking in the background of the Lemnian episode is the murder of the Lemnian men by their wives, daughters, mothers and sisters. While Hypsipyle spoke only of the men's dereliction of duty being due to their destroyed θυμός, if the θυμός is the motivating force behind maintaining family ties, then it follows that the Lemnian women also suffered from corruption of their θυμός when they murdered their menfolk. With this in mind, the *ekphrasis* of Jason's cloak which he wears to meet Hypsipyle becomes relevant as it presages all the corrupted family relationships of which the Lemnian men are about to be accused.

In the first scene the Cyclopes, hated and hidden away by their father, are fashioning a thunderbolt for Zeus, which he will use to kill his own grandson Asclepius, whose father Apollo in turn murdered the Cyclopes in vengeance.[721] The second scene follows the theme of family betrayal with the brothers Amphion and Zethos building Thebes.[722] Twin sons of Zeus by Antiope, a catalogue of family misadventures surrounds these brothers: Antiope's father first threatened her and then killed himself, her uncle imprisoned her and exposed the infant children, and the children, when grown, avenged their mother by brutally killing their aunt.[723] The third scene shows Cytherea, or Aphrodite, holding the shield of Ares, the lover with whom she had betrayed her husband Hephaestus, the maker of Ares' shield.[724] This is the least violent of the myths presented on the cloak, but while Ares and Hephaestus, the lover and the husband, are physically absent, both are symbolically present in the shield, emphasizing Cytherea's adultery. Θυμός is particularly called to mind in this scene due to its use in Homer's account of Hephaestus' discovery: the story told to Hephaestus by Helios is said to be θυμαλγέα, not surprisingly, and at the end Hephaestus reproaches Aphrodite with being "fair, but not self-controlled (ἐχέθυμος)".[725]

[721] Hes. *Theog.* 139-82, Eur. *Alc.* 107.
[722] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 735-41.
[723] Hom. *Od.* 11.260-5, Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.5.5.
[724] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.742-6; Hom. *Od.* 8.266-70.
[725] Hom. *Od.* 8.272, 320.

A return to the frankly violent is seen in the fourth scene where the Teleboans and the sons of Electryon, cousins, fight until "the dewy meadow was drenched with their blood", only one fighter on each side remaining alive.[726] An additional link to the Lemnian episode in which the men cared more for their captive women than their lawful wives is that the only son of Electryon to survive was his illegitimate son Licymnius,[727] Again, therefore, familial violence is highlighted, with the addition of legitimate offspring coming off worst. Looking forward to Book III and Medea's assistance to Jason against Aeëtes, the fifth scene shows Hippodamia helping her lover, Pelops, to defeat her father, Oenomaus, who in turn was trying to kill Pelops.[728] As an unmarried woman, Hippodamia's loyalty should have been to her father, but he in turn was attempting to prevent the marriage of his daughter, depriving her of her own household and family.[729] There is therefore a double family betrayal in this account. The sixth scene is the final unequivocally violent one and shows the ultimate in corrupted family relationships as Phoebus Apollo is forced into adelphicide, shooting his half-brother Tityos who was attempting to rape Apollo's mother, who as one of his father Zeus's lovers, should have been off-limits to Tityos.[730]

Finally of all on the cloak, there is a representation of Phrixus listening to the golden-fleeced ram.[731] This picture is jarringly peaceful considering all that has gone before, but again there is an oblique reference to violence and family betrayal: Phrixus' stepmother plotted his death, reminiscent of the cruel treatment of the legitimate Lemnian daughters at the hands of their stepmothers, and his father was driven to madness by Zeus and murdered another son.[732] Of course, this scene also serves to bring the mythological past into the heroic present, as it is the fleece of this same ram that the Argonauts are seeking.

[726] Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.5-6; Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.747-1750-1.
[727] Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.5.
[728] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.152-8.
[729] Pind. *Ol.* 1.79-81.
[730] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.759-62.
[731] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 763-7.
[732] Hyg. *Fab.* 2-3.

Shapiro describes this as the only "proper" *ekphrasis* in the *Argonautica*, and as such it has attracted attention.[733] Apollonius does not, in his description of the cloak, use the word θυμός. Nevertheless, in considering the effects of the θυμός-destroying infatuation from which the Lemnian men suffered, I have argued for a definition of θυμός that links it to care of family responsibilities, and that the destroyed θυμός of the Lemnian men consequently resulted in family betrayal and violence. With this in mind, it becomes possible to read the *ekphrasis* of the cloak as a series of vignettes of the ultimate examples of destroyed θυμός, by either directly illustrating family violence and betrayal, or indirectly referencing it.

Shapiro prefers to view the cloak as a work of art, rather than "a purely literary construct, fraught with symbolism and deeper meaning".[734] Using this analysis, he suggests that Apollonius "incorporated an artistic perspective and aesthetic standards reflecting the major concerns and interests of Late Classical and Early Hellenistic painters and sculptors".[735] He does not entirely dismiss any allegorical value, but does argue that "most of [the scenes] were chosen not primarily for any symbolic meaning concealed in the myth, but because they illustrated especially well one or another of these [aesthetic] principles".[736] The perspectives and standards are, in summary:

1) The realistic rendering of human (and animal) figures which seem to be alive (Phrixus [and the ram]);
2) A fascination with bright and reflected light (the Cyclopes, Aphrodite);
3) The capturing of violent movement arrested on a static two-dimensional surface (Tityos, Pelops' race); and,
4) The illusionistic rendering of non-visual sense perceptions and supernatural phenomena in a conventional artistic medium (Amphion and Zethos, Taphian Pirates, Phrixus).[737]

[733] Shapiro, 1980, p.264.
[734] Shapiro, 1980, p.266.
[735] Shapiro, 1980, pp.271-2.
[736] Shapiro, 1980, p.286.
[737] Shapiro, 1980, p.286.

Shapiro's explanation, which I have necessarily only briefly summarised here, is interesting, but just as he felt that by looking at the cloak purely as a work of art "we may gain something", I feel that by looking *only* at the aesthetics of the cloak and not considering any "symbolism and deeper meaning", we risk losing something.[738]

Hunter, far from seeing the scenes as "random" as Shapiro did, favours a chronological approach.[739] He links the *ekphrasis* of the cloak in the *Argonautica* with the Homeric shield in Book 18 of the *Iliad*, citing that both "move from cosmological phenomena to the world of cities".[740] The determination of the scenes with the Cyclopes crafting Zeus's thunderbolts as cosmological is made by linking this first scene on the cloak with the last lines of Orpheus's earlier song, with Hunter noting that the cloak picks up where the song left off.[741] The conclusion of Orpheus's song had left Zeus still as a child: "the earthborn Cyclopes had not yet armed him with the bolt, with thunder and lightning".[742] The chronological approach of the cloak then continues with "the creation of cities and the civilising role of poets such as Amphion; after that comes love, war and deceit".[743] Hunter's explanation of Jason's cloak acting as a sequel to Orpheus' song is appealing in view of the close association between the end of the latter and the first scene on the cloak. Hunter himself does not discuss the significance of the chosen scenes beyond their chronological value, but he does acknowledge that "it is no surprise (or scandal) that modern critics are far from agreed on how to read the cloak".[744]

Merriam regards the scenes to be mythologically significant to the message of the *Argonautica*. She reads the Taphian scene, the most bloody, as "illustrat[ing] a particular, Iliadic mode of action, that of violence and frontal attack".[745] She suggests that the remaining scenes can be regarded as being

[738] Shapiro, 1980, p.266.
[739] Shapiro, 1980, p.276. Hunter, 2004, p.53.
[740] Hunter, 2004, p.53.
[741] Hunter, 2004, p.53-4.
[742] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.508-11.
[743] Hunter, 2004, p.54.
[744] Hunter, 2004, p.57.
[745] Merriam, 1993, p.69.

instructive to the cloak's immediate audience, saying that "all of these scenes illustrate the alternatives to heroic violent action which will bring success to Jason and his crew". The main "message" of the garment, to Merriam, is that "to succeed, strength must always be allied with some other attribute".[746] The central panel, the Taphian raiders, is to be read as illustrating "the disastrous results, for both perpetrator and victim, of action undertaken solely by frontal assault and physical force – that is, Iliadic action in this Argonautic world".[747] The remaining scenes then can be read as demonstrating 'strength plus …'. The first scene shows strength plus skill as Zeus' strength as a ruler depends on the thunderbolts, themselves made by the skill of the Cyclops. The second scene illustrates strength plus charm with both being needed to build Thebes, and in the third scene Aphrodite reflected in Ares' shield shows strength plus love.[748] The chariot race illustrates strength plus cunning and treachery, with the dubious 'virtue' of treachery being "justified in both cases [Hippodameia and Medea] by the bad faith of the kings against whom the heroes are working".[749] The sixth scene, Apollo killing Tityos, does not fit in to Merriam's argument so neatly as it illustrates not 'strength plus …' but merely the "brute force and frontal assault" so typical of Iliadic heroes. Merriam's justification for its inclusion in the scheme as a whole is that Tityos with his Iliadic attack cannot succeed and is defeated by Apollo.[750] The final scene is back on track, showing strength plus wisdom as Phrixus takes advice from the ram.[751] The effect that Merriam hopes the cloak will have is that "the Argonauts are theoretically able to eschew violent and offensive action on the way to their final goals of success and survival".[752] Her 'strength plus …' explanation is thought-provoking, but it is slightly unconvincing by having two exceptions in the Taphian raiders and Apollo/Tityos scenes.

All of these interpretations, and others that I have not covered here, have merit. However, I believe that my explanation of the cloak illustrating family betrayals

[746] Merriam, 1993, p.72-73.
[747] Merriam, 1993, p.73.
[748] Merriam, 1993, p.74-76.
[749] Merriam, 1993, pp.77-8.
[750] Merriam, 1993, p.78.
[751] Merriam, 1993, pp.79-80.
[752] Merriam, 1993, p.80.

due to a defective θυμός can stand among them as it satisfactorily unites all the scenes into one theme, a theme that moreover is central to the *Argonautica* as a whole. It also explains the appearance of the cloak at this particular point in the narrative: the Lemnian episode is a human example of a destroyed θυμός, the cloak shows seven divine/heroic examples of the same theme. The Lemnian men's dereliction of family duties was consequent upon the θυμός-destroying infatuation visited on them by Cypris. This in turn provoked even greater violence from the Lemnian women when they murdered their husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons. Thus family betrayal and violence is an integral theme of the Lemnian episode as a whole, as well as being symptomatic of a sickened θυμός. Each scene on Jason's cloak, which is introduced directly before the Lemnian episode and which he wears to visit Lemnos, either directly represents or obliquely refers to family betrayal *par excellence*, and can therefore be read as a guidebook of the dreadful consequences that can arise from a non-functioning θυμός.

In conclusion, the Lemnian episode and the *ekphrasis* of the cloak have highlighted one major aspect of the θυμός in the *Argonautica* – that of the family-facing θυμός which had already been noted, although to a lesser degree, in Homer. However, despite the importance of this aspect for the *Argonautica*, there remain many other aspects of the θυμός which are also relevant to a discussion of relative influence upon Apollonius. There are analysed on a theme-by-theme basis, below.

Theme by theme analysis of θυμός in the Argonautica

In this section I shall take the themes that were discussed in the Homer chapter and look for correspondence in the *Argonautica.* All of the major Homeric themes are repeated, demonstrating that Apollonius was indeed engaging with the Homeric portrayal of the θυμός. However, almost all are altered consistent with what Beye called a "Willful misreading, deliberate perversion and parody of what had come before."[753] Apollonius broadly imitates Homer, but introduces differences in situation. Only in the use of similes is it possible to

[753] Beye, 2006, p.195.

argue any influence from Plato using this theme by theme approach. I have stated above that the differences between the Homeric θυμός and the Platonic are so great that Apollonius could not imitate both, and for the most part he appears very consciously to imitate Homer.

Life, death, breath and θυμός

In Homer, a person's death was frequently described using some variation of his θυμός leaving the body. Deaths are not so plentiful in the *Argonautica* as in the *Iliad,* but they do occur, and two follow the Homeric pattern. With a skull-shattering blow, Amycus fell to his knees in pain, and his "θυμός was poured forth all at once".[754] Apsyrtus too, struck by Jason's sword like an animal sacrifice, sank to his knees and "breath[ed] out his θυμός".[755] These deaths are both entirely consistent with the Homeric usage.

Two more examples may be added to the category of life/consciousness and θυμός. These are both when Medea searches for some drug that first she says will destroy her θυμός and that she later describes as θυμοφθόρος – θυμός-destroying.[756] The same word appears in the *Odyssey,* also to describe deadly drugs.[757] Medea's intention was suicide, and in the *Odyssey* Telemachus' supposed intention was murder, so in both cases the aim of the θυμός-destroying drugs was to destroy life. However, θυμοφθόρος is also used in both the *Argonautica* and the *Odyssey* without immediate death being the objective. In the *Odyssey,* Penelope's grief on hearing of Telemachus' departure, Odysseus' weariness cured by Circe's θυμῆρες bath, and grief again which Penelope warns against anybody inflicting upon the disguised Odysseus, are all described as θυμοφθόρος.[758] In the *Argonautica,* a Cypris-sent infatuation was described as θυμοφθόρος, and while the afflicted Lemnian men did ultimately die, that did not occur when their θυμός was destroyed, but only as a consequence of their later actions.[759] Therefore in both the *Argonautica* and the Homeric works

[754] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.95-97.
[755] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.468-472.
[756] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.790, 807.
[757] Hom. *Od.* 2.329.
[758] Hom. *Od.* 4.716, 10.362-3, 19.323.
[759] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.803.

θυμοφθόρος can be used to describe something that will be immediately fatal, but it can also describe something that is only wearying or temporarily disabling. In both cases, Apollonius appears to have been influenced by Homer.

In Homer, the θυμός could also be gathered back, which signalled a return to consciousness or strength after an incapacitating injury or faint. This usage is also seen in two situations in the *Argonautica*, but the incapacity in each case is not as dire as those described in the Homeric works. The first is an unnamed nymph whose heart Cypris set racing when she saw Hylas, which caused a state of helplessness (ἀμηχανία). Only with difficulty could she gather back (συναγείρω) her θυμός.[760] Medea had similar difficulty gathering back (ἐσαγείρω) her θυμός when she awoke in a state of fear after a nightmare.[761] In using the same phrase for Medea as Homer had for Ares (μόλις δ'ἐσαγείρατο θυμόν), Apollonius gives a clear nod to Homer. However, his choice of 'injuries' that require the θυμός to be returned are distinctly non-Homeric, being the effects of love rather than injuries gained in battle. Beye tendered the theory that Apollonius chose to "acknowledge Homer by distorting him".[762] This use of needing to regather the θυμός after a love-wound rather than a battle-wound is one such distortion.

In summary, as far as θυμός being associated with life, death and breath goes, we have in Apollonius evidence of some strong influence from Homer where loss of θυμός occurs synchronously with loss of life, and similarly strong evidence that an incapacitated person needs to "gather back" their θυμός before they can return to full ability, albeit from a very different class of injury than the Homeric warriors suffered.

The thinking θυμός

Unlike the Homeric works, there are no instances in the *Argonautica* where the agent speaks to their θυμός. As the 'monologue to θυμός' motif featured so frequently in Homer, its absence in Apollonius is a little surprising (the debating

[760] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1232-1233.
[761] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.632-634.
[762] Beye, 1969, p.34.

θυμός, however, is present, specifically in Medea's monologue of Book 3, discussed below). Of the other Homeric ways that the θυμός takes in information, there is one example in the *Argonautica*. Arete "stores up in her θυμός" the words of Alcinous.[763] In Homer, when the θυμός is said to hear information, the agent is always motivated to some sort of action. This pattern is also seen in the example of Arete: she sends her herald to Jason and advises him to wed Medea immediately.[764]

In the *Iliad*, the agent often 'knew' something in their θυμός. The first similar example in the *Argonautica* is Mopsus, the seer, specialising in bird omens, who accurately interprets a bird omen as indicating that the Argonauts' return would be achieved with the help of Aphrodite. He says, "as my θυμός within me foresees according to this omen, so may it prove".[765] While the vocabulary is different (προτιόσσεται instead of the οἶδα of the Iliad), Mopsus' belief is as strong as the hypothetical soothsayer of the Iliad who had in his θυμός "clear knowledge of omens".[766] In describing the cloak, woven by Athene, that Jason wears in Book 1, Apollonius says that one scene in particular is so realistically rendered that the viewer would cheat their θυμός with the hope of hearing the woven characters speak.[767] Like the Homeric examples of the hearing θυμός, the agent would be motivated to action – to "long gaze with the hope" of hearing the conversation.[768] This "knowledge", however, was false.

Debating

There are two examples in the Argonautica where the θυμός debates or is the seat of a debate. One of the examples is Medea who "pondered much in her θυμός".[769] As this scene is so key to Medea's character, it is considered in depth separately in the Medea section, below. Here, I only draw attention to the typically Homeric verb used by Apollonius: he chooses to use ὁρμαίνω, which was also used ten times by Homer when the agent debated in θυμός.

[763] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1111.
[764] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1114-1120.
[765] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.551-552.
[766] Hom. *Il.* 12.228-229.
[767] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.765-767.
[768] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.767.
[769] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.451-452.

The other example from Apollonius is Medea's father, Aeëtes, who considers how he should deal with the Argonauts:

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> The king's θυμός brooded a twofold purpose within him, whether he should attack and slay them on the spot or should make trial of their might. And this, as he pondered (φραζομένῳ), seemed the better way.[770]

Hunter calls this "a reworking of a standard Homeric description of making a decision".[771] The 'trial' that Aeëtes is considering involves Jason's almost certain death as he attempts firstly to yoke the fire-breathing oxen and then fight the earth-born warriors. Apollonius describes Aeëtes' choices as διχθαδίην … μενοινήν. Μενοινήν indicates that Aeëtes' desire was for both choices, but ultimately he had to decide one way or the other. He finally 'pondered' (φράζομαι) that testing Jason would be the better option. The use of φράζομαι has not been commented upon in the standard commentaries. In Homer, φράζω is used when the agent is advised to "consider carefully" in his θυμός what the consequences of an action might be and it is possible to make the same application in this case. Aeëtes' grandson, Argus, has informed him of the divine ancestry of many of the Argonauts, and also hinted strongly that the quest for the fleece is backed by Zeus, whose wrath the success of the mission will avert, and Athene, who fashioned the Argo.[772] Thus Aeëtes, if he kills Jason outright, risks working against the gods, including Zeus. In the *Iliad*, Zeus himself advised Poseidon to consider (φράζω) the consequences of such an action.[773] There is no doubt that Aeëtes wants to see Jason dead, but he also does not want to kill someone who is actively favoured by the gods. While he doubts the legitimacy of Jason's claim, by opting to make Jason face a trial of might Aeëtes gives ample opportunity for the gods to interfere on Jason's behalf and so avoid the wrath that would come upon him by working openly against them. He has, in short, considered very carefully in his θυμός the potential consequences, as Zeus advised Poseidon to do.

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[770] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.396-400.
[771] Hunter, 1989, p.142.
[772] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.320-342.
[773] Hom. *Il.* 15.162-167.

In summary, with the debating θυμός speeches we are back firmly on Homeric ground. The vocabulary used is mostly, if not entirely, reminiscent of Homer. Aeëtes' careful consideration of potential consequences is also Homeric, and it is this latter aspect that in addition shows a snub to the Platonic soul of the *Republic*. In that work, the θυμός is quick to react without waiting to consider whether the action is rational. That could have been shown by Aeëtes immediately killing Jason. However, having considered his options in θυμός, he makes a rational (if still violent) choice, one that had the potential to go against the will of the θυμός, which wanted absolutely to ensure Jason's certain death. Thus in this aspect, Apollonius firmly embraces the Homeric tradition while turning his back on the Platonic portrayal of θυμός. I consider, with Hunter, that it is unlikely Aeëtes believed Jason would survive the trial.[774] Therefore I do not make the argument that the two wishes that Aeëtes had in his θυμός were both for Jason to die immediately and for Jason to succeed in the trial and live. Had that been the case, his two desires in θυμός would have been in direct opposition to each other which would have bolstered the argument against a Platonic influence. However, as stated above, I do not believe Aeëtes thought Jason likely to live. He certainly did not want him to do so.

Θυμός-paining and θυμός-pleasing

There is only one instance of θυμαλγής in the Argonautica. Argus tells Aeëtes that Jason's countrymen will not escape Zeus's θυμαλγέα μῆνιν καὶ χόλον if the fleece does not return to Hellas. [775] The phrase χόλον θυμαλγέα was seen three times in the *Iliad*, twice applied directly to Achilles, and once indirectly when Phoenix likened his actions to those of Meleager.[776] Apollonius merges this usage with another Homeric phrase – χόλος καὶ μῆνις – used in relation to the gods.[777] For Achilles, the θυμαλγὴς χόλος resulted in his withdrawal from battle as he sulked, causing massive harm to the Achaeans who had to fight without him. Argus suggests that the effect of Zeus's θυμαλγὴς χόλος is the opposite – far from withdrawing, he actively inflicts an "unbearable curse" that will not

[774] Hunter, 1989, p.143.
[775] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.337-338.
[776] Hom. *Il.* 4.513, 9.260, 9.565.
[777] Hom. *Il.* 15.122.

stop unless Jason succeeds in returning with the fleece.[778] Therefore once again there is a definite influence from Homer in Apollonius' choice of words, but with a subtle change of emphasis.

A similar conclusion can be drawn about θυμαρής: Apollonius is using a Homeric word, but with minor changes. The three θυμαρής examples in Homer were of tangible things that brought comfort to the receiver: a bedfellow, soothing and refreshing bath-water, and a staff.[779] In the *Argonautica* it is still an external influence that is described as θυμαρής, but it takes the form of words. Hypsipyle sends a message to the Argonauts that she says is θυμός-pleasing to her people.[780] The message she sends is to enter the city, if they wish. It may be expected that such an invitation would be θυμαρής to the Argonauts, but Apollonius applies it instead to the Lemnian women. Currently living in a city without men, they hope that the Argonauts will ensure the next generation of Lemnians. As argued above, one aspect of the θυμός, relatively hidden in Homer but very prominent in Apollonius, is that it is particularly responsive to the needs of the family. Thus it is easy to see why this speech would be θυμαρής to the Lemnian women. While the *Argonautica* does not follow a Homeric pattern in calling a speech θυμαρής, speeches in Homer are frequently said to affect the θυμός of the hearer, but in the opposite way, being described as θυμαλγής.[781] Thus this ἔπος θυμῆρες of Hypsipyle shows an amalgamation of Homeric usage, in the word θυμαρής, and in the concept of a speech having an effect upon the θυμός, albeit a positive effect in the *Argonautica* where it was negative in Homer.

To the above examples we can add θυμηδής, another word to describe things that are θυμός-pleasing. The only complex example occurs during the Lemnian episode where the Lemnian women fear that a true account of their recent history will be "in no way θυμηδές" to the Argonauts, and is discussed above.[782]

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[778] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.338-339.
[779] Hom. *Il.* 9.336, *Od.* 23.232, 10.362, 17.199.
[780] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.705, 714. The Loeb Classical Library has "ἔπος θυμῆρες" in line 705 and "ἔπος θυμηδές" in line 714. Fraenkel's Oxford text has "ἔπος θυμηδές" in both lines 705 and 714, with which Vian agrees.
[781] Hom. *Od.* 8.272, 16.69, 23.183.
[782] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.663.

All of the other examples are straightforward in indicating a wish that a person feels in their θυμός, and collectively they indicate what is valuable to the θυμός. As the heroes leave on their quest, the women pray that the gods grant the heroes the homecoming that would be pleasing to their θυμός: "εὐχόμεναι νόστοιο τέλος θυμηδὲς ὀπάσσαι".[783] Almost at the end of the epic, the cycle is completed with similar words (καὶ νόστοιο τέλος θυμηδὲς ὄπαζε) when the Argonauts also pray to the gods for the homecoming that would be θυμός-pleasing to them.[784] Earlier in Book IV, Medea had intuited that a νόστος was also the θυμός-pleasing wish of Jason when she asks whether he "will win the θυμηδέα νόστον".[785] The theme of νόστος, particularly failed νόστος, is prominent in the *Odyssey*. Therefore although Homer's apparent preference is for θυμαρής, I believe this emphasis on νόστος linking the beginning and the end of the *Argonautica* still argues for a Homeric influence in the θυμηδές examples.

The other θυμηδής items in the *Argonautica* are more mundane than a hero's homecoming, but still serve to showcase what may reasonably be supposed to be pleasing to the θυμός. While Medea was in turmoil, at one point she remembered the θυμός-pleasing cares of life, which Apollonius then lists as "the delightful things that are among the living", her companions, and even the sunlight.[786] Zeus tells Thetis that he arranged a marriage that was pleasing to her θυμός.[787] Additionally Jason says that Hypsipyle's offer of help to the Argonauts is very θυμός-pleasing.[788] This included food, drink, sex, and for Jason kingship, although he declined the latter. The first three of these hark back to the Homeric θυμός which was pleased by the same things, and contradict the Platonic soul where all such considerations are placed in the ἐπιθυμητικόν, separate to the θυμός.[789]

[783] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.249.
[784] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1600.
[785] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.381.
[786] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.811-816.
[787] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.806.
[788] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.836.
[789] Pl. *Resp.* 440b1-8.

In conclusion, the things that Apollonius describes as being θυμός-pleasing are clearly Homeric. They are not consistent with Plato's tripartite soul theory of the *Republic*.

Eating and Drinking

There were many instances in the Homeric works where the θυμός was said to be involved in eating and drinking, as discussed above.[790] Therefore to read in the *Argonautica* that Phineus "delighted his θυμός" with a feast and that Chalkiope's sons "pleased their θυμός with meat and drink" recalls the Homeric works.[791] Apollonius does not use Homer's standard formulaic phrases, although Campbell notes regarding "θυμὸν ἄεσσαν (Arg. 3.301) that ἤραρε θυμὸν ἐδωδῇ (Od. 5.95, 14.111) is obviously relevant … and also the Homeric θυμαρής/θυμηδής".[792] Therefore although the wording is not identical to that used by Homer, the idea of eating and drinking being related to the θυμός is Homeric, and again is not consistent with Plato's *Republic* where eating and drinking are not within the remit of the θυμός.

As in Homer, the θυμός in the *Argonautica* can also be positively affected by a small miscellany of other considerations. Medea and her companions satisfy their θυμός with song, while Aeëtes wants to satisfy his with vengeance.[793] Medea supposes that Jason's θυμός will want to go home when she says may he go "where his θυμός desires".[794] Collectively the Argonauts delighted their θυμός with conversation.[795] The effect of the same conversation on Lycus was said to "charm" (θέλγετ') his θυμός, apparently moving him to build a temple and dedicate land to Castor and Pollux, and offer his son as a poor replacement for Heracles who had been left behind by the Argonauts.[796] This indicates also the motivational power of the θυμός, another feature seen extensively in Homer. A similar motivational effect is seen when the sirens' song affects Butes' θυμός detrimentally so that he leapt into the sea to certain death, but for the

[790] Chapter 2. Section 5.
[791] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.306, 3.301.
[792] Campbell, 1994, p.276.
[793] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.897, 4.233-234.
[794] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.787.
[795] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.761.
[796] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.771-810.

intervention of Cypris, while the Argonauts collective θυμός was "warmed" at the sight of a propitious sign.[797]

Emotions

In the Homer chapter, I did not give a comprehensive list of all emotions felt by the θυμός as they have been covered at length in existing scholarship. However, the *Argonautica* has not attracted the same amount of 'emotional' research so it is worth noting here the range of emotions with which the θυμός is involved according to Apollonius:

Emotion	Line ref.
Anger	4.8, 4.1088
Anxiety/Dread/Fear	2.561, 2.1219, 3.612, 3.688, 3.695, 4.54
Grief	1.299
Hopelessness	1.1288-89, 2.863
Delight/Joy/Rejoicing	2.878, 3.724, 3.1141, 4.1126, 4.1628
Shame	4.1047
Sibling affection	1.817

These emotions are also seen in Homer, but unlike the eating and drinking examples which are clearly inconsistent with Plato's definition of θυμός in the *Republic*, Apollonius' description of emotions being associated with the θυμός does not run counter to Plato. Anger is the most prominent emotion associated with the θυμός in Plato, and Cairns also makes a very strong argument for shame to be associated with the Platonic θυμός.[798] This is nevertheless a very short list of emotions associated with the θυμός in Plato. In contrast the many examples of a wide range of emotions associated with θυμός in the *Argonautica* indicate that this was a prominent aspect of θυμός in Apollonius' understanding, and is again more reminiscent of the Homeric θυμός than the Platonic.

[797] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.913-919, 4.1591-1592. In both these cases, the θυμός is said to melt (ἰαίνω), which is discussed further in 'Heat and θυμός', below.
[798] Cairns, 1993.

Motivation

Θυμός as Commander

In Homer, the θυμός frequently commanded the agent to some course of action, with ἄνωγα and κελεύω/κέλομαι being the most common verbs used.[799] The only time that either of these verbs are used in connection with the θυμός in the *Argonautica* is when Medea asks Jason to tell him about his homeland, his journey, and even her own distant relative, Ariadne.[800] Jason is glad to oblige saying that "indeed my own θυμός bids me do this" (μάλα γάρ με καὶ αὐτὸν θυμὸς ἀνώγει).[801] While in Homer the most common command of the θυμός was to fight, Jason is rather commanded here by his θυμός to talk. Beye, while calling Jason "a hero with a difference" remarks that "how often Jason does the talking" is a mark of his status as hero of the *Argonautica*.[802] Certainly the Homeric heroes did their fair share of talking as well. Martin summarises the genres of speech for "heroic performers" as "prayer, lament, supplication, commanding, insulting, and narrating from memory".[803] By contrast Jason refers to his own talk as "empty things", another mark of his difference from the Homeric heroes whose words, while varied, were never empty.[804] We thus again have a Homeric word applied to a situation that is slightly distorted from Homer's representations of typical heroes.

Other examples of a commanding θυμός in the *Argonautica* include Amycus whose "θυμός stirred within him all eager to dash the lifeblood from [Polydeuces'] breast".[805] This is a typical Homeric example of the θυμός commanding what comes naturally to the agent. The same is shown by Telamon and other Argonauts. In response to Aeëtes' hate-filled speech against Argus, Telamon's "θυμός within longed to speak a deadly word in defiance".[806] Afterwards, back at the Argo when Jason explained to the heroes the deadly task that Aeëtes had set before them, Telamon was the first whose θυμός was

[799] Chapter 2, section 6.
[800] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1071-1076,
[801] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1084.
[802] Beye, 1969, pp.38-39
[803] Martin, 1989, p.44.
[804] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1096.
[805] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.50.
[806] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.383.

stirred (θυμὸς ὀρίνθη) to volunteer for the task, followed quickly by Idas, Polydeuces, Castor, and Meleager.[807] The others, however, "gave way to these in silence".[808] Thus we have five firmly Homeric heroes whose θυμός motivates them, using ὀρίνω – a word that occurred ten times in relation to θυμός in the *Iliad* – to face monstrous odds in the pursuit of honour. In the *Iliad*, ὀρίνω only occurred when the agent was motivated to fulfil a family responsibility, rather than displaying a noble θυμός by fighting in company. Apollonius therefore here takes over a Homeric formula, although without observing the distinction of usage that I discussed in the Homer chapter. Nevertheless this omission does not detract from the clear Homeric influence.

The other three instances in the *Argonautica* where the θυμός is connected with motivation are firstly Eros whose warning to his mother she reports when she says "he has threatened that if I shall not keep my hands off him while he still masters his θυμός, I shall have cause to blame myself afterwards".[809] The use of "still" (ἔτι) hints that Eros knows he will not continue to master his θυμός, and is reminiscent of the Homeric θυμός that was so difficult to restrain, taking the combined appeal of two goddesses in Achilles' case.[810] The second example is Medea whose θυμός could not be distracted with song or play from its overwhelming concern regarding Jason, again indicating a θυμός that is difficult to restrain.[811] Thirdly, and finally, Apollonius himself pleads with his θυμός not to force him to tell the details of Medea's sacrifice to Hecate, which no man should know.[812] To Apollonius' relief, and future scholars' frustration, his θυμός apparently acquiesced to his request and the mysteries of Hecate remain a mystery.

Epithets and similes

None of the heroes in the *Argonautica*, nor any other character, is explicitly described as being thumoedic, or given the epithets ὑπέρθυμος or μεγάθυμος,

[807] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.515-520.
[808] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.521.
[809] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.98-99.
[810] Hom. *Il.* 1.216-218.
[811] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.948.
[812] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.249.

as they had been in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The closest candidate would be Polyphemus whose thumoedic nature is highlighted when it is said in the catalogue of heroes: "now his limbs were grown heavy with age, but his martial spirit (θυμὸς ἀρήιος) still remained, even as of old."[813] It is therefore worth looking further at Polyphemus' actions in the *Argonautica* to see how he manifests this martial θυμός. Unfortunately, he was left behind by the crew at the same time as Heracles, so the evidence amounts to a single event: the search for Hylas. Hylas has gone alone to search for water and as he is taken by a nymph he cries out with a shout that is heard only by Polyphemus.[814] His reaction is described in simile by Apollonius:

> And he rushed after the cry, near Pegae, like some beast of the wild wood whom the bleating of sheep has reached from afar, and burning with hunger he follows, but does not fall in with the flocks; for the shepherds beforehand have penned them in the fold, but he groans and roars vehemently until he is weary. Thus vehemently at that time did the son of Eilatus groan and wandered shouting around the spot; and his voice rang piteous. Then quickly drawing his great sword he started in pursuit, in fear lest the boy should be the prey of wild beasts, or men should have lain in ambush for him faring all alone, and be carrying him off, an easy prey.[815]

The simile of a beast hungry for food is familiar from the *Iliad*, where Diomedes, Sarpedon, Menelaos and Achilles are all likened to lions unstoppable in their search for food.[816] The exact wording θὴρ ἄγριος, though, is not Homeric, nor can it be easily attributed to any other likely source.[817] However, Apollonius' simile is similar to the four Homeric lion similes in that the heroes in each case are hungry for battle, and it is specifically their hunger that is likened to the hypothetical lions' hunger for sheep. It is not only a Homeric influence that can be traced in the Polyphemus simile, though. Plato used θήρ when speaking about Thrasymachus, seen (as discussed above) as a singularly thumoedic character in the *Republic*. Thrasymachus is likened to a wild beast

[813] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.43-44.
[814] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1240-1242.
[815] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1243-1252.
[816] Hom. *Il.* 5.134-143, 12.298-308, 17.656-664, 24.41-43.
[817] Θήρ occurs in Homer, e.g. *Iliad* 15.324, but never in combination with ἄγριος

(θηρίον) in his eagerness to enter the argument.[818] Later, Socrates describes a man who is entirely thumoedic, without the soothing influence of music, as being like a wild beast (θηρίον) who achieves all his ends by violence and savagery (ἀγριότητι and διαπράττεται).[819] Therefore while Apollonius' choice of words for his Polyphemus simile are reminiscent of Homer's warrior/lion similes, Plato's descriptive wild beast similes relating to Thrasymachus are also called to mind.

Immediately following the Polyphemus scene, we see the reaction of Heracles as he is told of the disappearance of Hylas. With the possible Platonic influence so recent, it becomes noticeable that although Heracles' reaction does not mention θυμός directly, one of the first descriptions given is that his blood boiled: ζέεν αἷμα.[820] In the *Cratylus*, Plato had pointed out that "θυμός has its name from the raging (θύσεως) and boiling (ζέσεως) of the soul".[821] This was the start of Plato's association of θυμός with heat which was taken up in the *Timaeus*. Aristotle also connected the two, along with blood, when he said that the fibrous blood of some animals caused them to become more heated when the θυμός was active.[822] One of the thumoedic animals specified by Aristotle was a bull, and it is to a bull that Apollonius next likens Heracles: "As when a bull stung by a gadfly tears along".[823] There is more to be said about heat and θυμός in similes, but that discussion is reserved for the section 'Heat and θυμός', below. For now, it is sufficient to note that in his use of similes Apollonius seems to be as much influenced by Plato (and Aristotle) with their association of heat and θυμός as he does by Homer who applies lion similes to the θυμός of some of his heroes.

Another passage of Apollonius redolent with similes is the boxing match between Amycus and Polydeuces. Amycus' θυμός "surged within him" in eager anticipation of the fight, and although Polydeuces' θυμός is not

[818] Pl. *Resp.* 336b5.
[819] Pl. *Resp.* 411c8-e3
[820] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1262.
[821] Pl. *Crat.* 419e2-3.
[822] Arist. *Part. An.* 650b33-651a3.
[823] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1265-1266.

specifically referenced by Apollonius, he too comes in for his share of thumoedic similes.[824] To start with Polydeuces, we are told that his "might and fury waxed like a wild beast's (θηρός)".[825] Amycus, meanwhile, is likened to a "lion struck by a javelin" who has no thought but of revenge against the one who has struck him – a single-minded Homeric simile, although in Homer the single-mindedness of the lion was always for food.[826] The animal similes then give way briefly to imagery of the sea for both combatants:

> Even as a fierce wave of the sea rises in a crest against a swift ship, but she by the skill of the crafty pilot just escapes the shock when the billow is eager to break over the bulwark – so he followed up the son of Tyndareus, trying to daunt him, and gave him no respite.[827]

This passage is heavily reminiscent of Homer's description of Hector:

> Just as beneath the clouds a violent wave, swollen by the winds, falls on a swift ship …[828]

Apollonius then returns to a bull simile, likening both fighters to "two bulls fight[ing] in furious rivalry for a grazing heifer", evoking once again the Aristotelian thumoedic bull.[829] Homer had also used bulls in similes, although not as often as lions. In his works, though, the bull tended to be weakened in some way, either having been tied by farmers, or in the act of being sacrificed, rather than fighting like a lion.[830] Indeed in one Homeric simile, the bull is being killed by a lion.[831] The end of the single combat is marked by Amycus' violent death, when his θυμός "was poured forth all at once".[832]

Because of the clear reference to Hector, this Amycus/Polydeuces scene appears to owe a conscious debt to Homer. However themes common to both Plato and

[824] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.50.
[825] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.44-45.
[826] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.26-29.
[827] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.70-75.
[828] Hom. *Il.* 15.624-625.
[829] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.88-89.
[830] Hom. *Il.* 13.671-676, 20.482-488.
[831] Hom. *Il.* 16.563-572.
[832] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.97.

Aristotle are still there and it would seem that in his use of similes, Apollonius has taken on the mantle of both the epic and philosophical traditions. In particular the 'fighting bull' simile used by Apollonius is far more reminiscent of Aristotle's thumoedic bull than the relatively passive Homeric victims.

Summary

In summary, a theme by theme analysis of the workings of the θυμός in the *Argonautica* shows an almost certainly conscious imitation of Homer. All of the broad Homeric themes are represented in the *Argonautica,* and while there are differences, or distortions as Beye would describe them, they remain distinctly Homeric. In view of the fact that all the Homeric aspects of θυμός are covered by Apollonius, and that almost all show a slight difference from the Homeric usage, I believe Apollonius was well aware of Homer's depiction of the θυμός and was consciously working to both incorporate the Homeric θυμός into the *Argonautica* but also to manipulate it as Beye and Hunter noted that he did with other Homeric motifs.

Section 3: Homeric influences on Medea in the *Argonautica*

In this section I look specifically for influence on Apollonius' depiction of Medea in the *Argonautica.* This is justified because she is the most thumoedic character in the *Argonautica* with more θυμός-words being applied to her than to any other character or group of characters. I find that Medea in the *Argonautica* is recognisably Homeric in ways that have not been widely accepted before.[833]

Homer's "Medea": The Helper Maiden and the Hero

Homer does not mention Medea. He does, however, provide examples of two people-types into which Medea could fit. The first is the helper-maiden Nausicaa, the second is the Homeric hero. Clauss concludes that Medea is a helper-maiden, not a hero.[834] I put forward an argument that she is both.

[833] For a brief discussion of Euripides' influence on Medea's portrayal in the *Argonautica,* see Appendix B, below.
[834] Clauss, 1997, pp.160-173.

Medea as the helper-maiden

Child-killer and witch are Medea's most famous attributes, but in the *Argonautica* she is also a helper-maiden, a role that in the *Odyssey* was filled by Nausicaa. Even in Euripides' *Medea*, when Jason is quite out of love with Medea, he acknowledges that she did save his life, although he gives all the credit to Aphrodite.[835] The suggestion that Medea may be modelled on Nausicaa is not a new one. Hunter remarks that "The scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa are an obviously crucial model for A[pollonius], although there is nothing in the *Odyssey* which corresponds to the lengthy descriptions of Medea's private suffering; once Nausicaa has seen Odysseus safely on his way to the city, she disappears from the poem but for a brief scene of farewell". He goes on to suggest that rather than Nausicaa it is Calypso whose bitterness in the *Odyssey* "certainly looks forward to Medea's suffering."[836] Hunter is correct that Apollonius gives Medea a far greater role in the *Argonautica* than Nausicaa's in the *Odyssey,* but his comment does not seem to address how greatly Apollonius twisted the Nausicaa story when he applied it to Medea, and yet even by doing so referenced the *Odyssey*. Clauss explores the helper-maiden motif in some depth, but concentrates more on the differences between the two characters than their similarities, for example that Nausicaa never acted in a 'shameful' way, while Medea did.[837] I find it advantageous to consider both the similarities and the differences.

Clauss notes that both girls' stories begin with a dream, but then he notes the differences: that Nausicaa dreams of getting a husband, while Medea dreams of winning a heroic contest.[838] However, by comparing not the dreams in isolation but the wider introductions to the respective characters, the similarities become much more evident than the differences. Nausicaa is sleeping when introduced to the audience, and Athena appears to her in a dream, the first in a chain of events that ends with her meeting and helping Odysseus.[839] Athena refers to Nausicaa's upcoming marriage, and tells her that she must be in

[835] Eur. *Med.* 522-35.
[836] Hunter, 1989, p.26.
[837] Clauss, 1997, pp.160-173.
[838] Clauss, 1997, p.160.
[839] Hom. *Od.* 6.24.

readiness for that event by washing clothes.[840] Thus two immediate similarities between Nausicaa and Medea are seen. First, the intervention of a goddess – Athena in Nausicaa's case, Cypris in Medea's – and the emphasis on each girl's upcoming marriage. Then the two paths diverge, and Apollonius' portrayal of Medea becomes a travesty of Nausicaa rather than a reflection. Nausicaa's first action on waking and remembering her dream is that she "went through the house, so as to give the word to her parents, to her dear father and her mother".[841] By contrast, Medea's immediate concern on being hit by Eros's arrow and becoming afflicted with love for Jason was to shun all company, retreat to her own chamber, and keep her own counsel so that no-one should discover her affliction.[842] Of all people, she especially had no wish to confide in her father. Even when she approached Chalkiope, she pretended that all her concern was for her nephews, not for Jason.[843] Far from ever trusting to approach her father with her cares, Medea betrays his interests, although she does have the grace to be ashamed of plotting to help Jason to win against Aeëtes.[844] Another obvious difference between the two is that when Medea was struck with love, leading her to hopes of marriage, the specific object of her love was already in sight. For Nausicaa, it is merely the abstract idea of marriage. Nevertheless, she is still afflicted by shame, as Medea was, but in Nausicaa's case it is maidenly embarrassment at talking of marriage with her father, rather than guilt at plotting against him.[845]

The next part of the journey of both girls involves a trip away from the family home. Again Clauss highlights the differences, shame again, and also that Odysseus ends by saying that he will pray to Nausicaa as a god in thanks, while Jason tells Medea that the gods will thank her for her part in the success of his quest.[846] Again, though, the similarities are more prominent than the differences. While on their journeys, the girls are shown not as relatively junior members of their parents' households, but as leaders of their companions, their

[840] Hom. *Od.* 6.25-33.
[841] Hom. *Od.* 6.48-51.
[842] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.451-2.
[843] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.688-9.
[844] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.741-3.
[845] Hom. *Od.* 6.66-7.
[846] Clauss, 1997, p.168.

own temporary "households" in a way. Both Nausicaa and Medea are likened to goddesses surrounded by nymphs.[847] Nausicaa "shone amongst her handmaidens", by Homer's description, while Medea is especially marked by "the people giving way, shunning the eyes of the royal maiden".[848] Having reached their destination, the actions of the two girls are starkly contrasted. Nausicaa conscientiously completes her domestic tasks before engaging in harmless play with her companions.[849] Medea, on the other hand, immediately dismisses her duty as priestess to Hecate, and inveigles her companions to join, unwittingly, in her treachery against Aeëtes.[850]

Perhaps Apollonius' strongest parody-mockery of Nausicaa's helper-maiden role is his perversion of the immediate aid that was rendered to Odysseus. This pair of situations is not discussed by Clauss, despite the embarrassment of riches they offer. Nausicaa, through her companions, provides for Odysseus "a mantle and tunic", and gives to him "limpid olive oil in a golden oil flask and told him he could bathe himself in the stream of the river".[851] All of these motifs are darkly twisted in Medea's helper-maiden role. Odysseus' bathing in the stream to make himself presentable becomes in Jason the prelude to dark sacrificial rites to propitiate Hecate.[852] The mantle and tunic that Nausicaa provides for Odysseus have an immediate equivalent in the golden fleece that Medea delivers to Jason through her charms.[853] The olive oil to anoint and soothe Odysseus' skin becomes the prepared charm by means of which Jason is given temporary strength and invulnerability.[854] While Clauss only compares this young Medea with Nausicaa, the latter two motifs are also picked up in Euripides' *Medea* when the older Medea sends to Jason's new bride a "fine-spun robe" and "golden diadem" which she has previously anointed, not with Nausicaa's healing olive oil, but with her own deadly, flesh-eating poison.[855] Apollonius has taken the motifs of Nausicaa's helper-maiden role and twisted them into a

[847] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.875-81, Hom. *Od.* 6.102-8.
[848] Hom. *Od.* 6.108, Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.885-6.
[849] Hom. *Od.* 6.85-101.
[850] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.891-911.
[851] Hom. *Od.* 6.211-6.
[852] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1030-6.
[853] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.162-6.
[854] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1042-5.
[855] Eur. *Med.* 949, 1125-6, 1188-9.

more uncanny force in this young Medea, prior to them maturing into the sinister destructive power that his readers already know Medea will display later in her life story.[856]

Despite these differences, Apollonius' Medea does help Jason, saving his life and ensuring the successful outcome of his quest, and so she is, by definition, a "helper-maiden" as identified by Clauss. She is also undeniably modelled on Homer's Nausicaa, but again we see the same sort of manipulations that Beye highlighted in Apollonius' portrayal of Jason.

Medea the Homeric hero – a comparison with Hector

The observation that Medea fulfills certain of the criteria of Greek heroes is not a new suggestion, although that conclusion largely considers only Euripides' heroine.[857] At this point it is worth taking up Hunter's comment that Calypso's bitterness in the *Odyssey* is the predecessor of Apollonius' descriptions of Medea's suffering. I suggest an alternative argument in which Medea's suffering is an aspect of her heroic portrayal, still Homeric in origin, but from a different character-type than Calypso. By comparing Medea's internal debate in the *Argonautica* with that of Hector in the *Iliad,* clear parallels can be drawn that I use to argue for a specific Homeric influence on Apollonius's portrayal of Medea.

Before his internal debate, Hector's parents, Priam and Hecuba, plead with him to "come inside the walls, my child".[858] Medea's parents do not plead with her as they do not know her predicament, but nor do they need to: she is well aware that "the home of my parents" should be her concern, and she is already inside the walls, in this case her own room in her father's palace.[859]

Hector's next step is to consider his options, and the omniscient narrator has helpfully reconstructed his concerns. He begins by fearing the reproach of

[856] Hunter, 1989, p.18.
[857] Foley, 1989, p73; Bongie, 1977, pp.29-30.
[858] Hom. *Il.* 22.56, 84-85.
[859] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.640.

Polydamas in particular, who had advised him against fighting Achilles.[860] This quickly turns to self-reproach: "I did not listen – surely it would have been better", which leads him in turn to feel shame (αἰδέομαι).[861] He finally returns to the first point, but this time it is a widespread reproach that he fears to hear from "Trojans and the Trojans' wives", leading him to decide that ultimately it would be better to face Achilles and either live or die than to hear their justified reproach.[862]

Shame (αἰδώς) also features in Medea's debate. In her case it is αἰδώς that keeps her from leaving her room to consult Chalkiope; the first step towards helping Jason and betraying her father.[863] Apollonius likens her to a widowed bride, and here he brings fear of mockery into the account as well as he describes Medea weeping like the bride "in fear lest the women should mock and revile her".[864] For both Hector and Medea, shame and fear of mockery win out at this early stage. Hector is kept from the safety of the city walls, with his sense of shame bolstering his thumoedic instinct to fight, while Medea remains within her room, the wish of her θυμός overcome, temporarily, by her sense of shame. Both quickly consider alternatives.

Medea, it turns out, did not need to go to Chalkiope who instead goes herself to her troubled sister. With shame now overcome, Medea's θυμός is again in the ascendancy and she refers Chalkiope to a "ghastly dream" that she had had about her sons.[865] In doing so she twice enters a fantasy world: the "ghastly dream" had not involved Chalkiope's sons. It had, however, contained a number of counterfactual scenarios. Firstly Jason, in her dream, had come to Colchis in order to be married to Medea, secondly Medea herself accomplished Aeëtes' task, and thirdly Medea was granted the power of choice by her parents.[866] Hector too enters a fantasy world when trying to think of honourable options, one where he will promise Achilles to return not only Helen but all the

[860] Hom. *Il.* 22.99-102.
[861] Hom. *Il.* 22.103-105.
[862] Hom. *Il.* 22.105-110.
[863] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.653.
[864] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.663.
[865] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.688-692.
[866] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.619-629.

treasures that Alexander brought with her, imagining that he has the power to dispose of his still-living brother's wife and fortune.[867] Further, he will make the Trojans, his still-living father's subjects, take an oath that they will divide honestly all the treasure of Troy into two, half for Troy, half for the Achaeans.[868] He eventually comes to the realisation that there is no way he will be able to talk to Achilles.[869] Murray notes the "grim contrast between the real and the imagined situation", although both Hector and Murray seem to be referring only to the likelihood of successfully conversing with Achilles, not to the feasibility of Hector being able to usurp his father's and brother's relative positions.[870]

Hector closes down the first part of his internal debate with the decisive "why does my θυμός debate these things?" and returns to his previous αἰδώς and θυμός-driven resolve to fight, either to death or glory.[871] Medea, having manipulated Chalkiope to persuade her to act, also brings this first debate to a close, at which her own "θυμός bounded with joy" and she swore to Chalkiope to help her sons.[872]

Both Medea and Hector are almost immediately faced with the reality and consequences of their choices. On seeing Achilles, "trembling seized Hector, and he dared no longer remain where he was, but left the gates behind him and fled in fear (φοβηθείς)", and later is described as having "fled in terror (τρέσε)".[873] Fear has always been a factor in Hector's decision making, but fear of mockery has now turned to the more immediate fear at facing Achilles. Mockery and θυμός are both forgotten as he runs three times around the walls of Troy trying to escape Achilles.[874] On the fourth circuit, Athene appears to him in the form of his brother Deïphobos encouraging him, at which he stands and faces Achilles telling him that "now again my θυμός impels me to stand and face you, whether I slay or be slain", indicating that θυμός has overcome fear.[875]

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[867] Hom. *Il.* 22.114-117.
[868] Hom. *Il.* 22.117-121.
[869] Hom. *Il.* 22.126-128.
[870] Murray, 1925, p.461 fn1.
[871] Hom. *Il.* 22.122, 129-130.
[872] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.724-739.
[873] Hom. *Il.* 22.136-137, 143-144.
[874] Hom. *Il.* 22.165.
[875] Hom. *Il.* 22.252-253.

Hector's flight signalled the last time that his θυμός would be overcome by fear. Even on realising that he is doomed he declares "not without a struggle let me die, nor ingloriously, but having done some great deed for men yet to be born to hear".[876]

In Medea's case, as delighted as her θυμός had been by her decision to help Jason, she was immediately seized again by fear and shame. For her it was not fear of death, in fact she welcomed that as the only way of avoiding the shame of her parents knowing what she had done. At that point, though, fear of mockery again returned as she imagines Colchian women reviling her corpse as "the maid who disgraced her home and her parents, yielding to a mad passion".[877] Her fear of mockery temporarily overcomes even her θυμός, as keen as it is to help Jason, and she reaches for the drugs that will kill her immediately.[878] At this point with her θυμός overcome, just as Hector's had been when Athene maliciously encouraged him, the prompting of Hera causes Medea to change her mind. Like Hector, this resolve was final as we are told that from that time on "no more did she waver in purpose".[879]

Even the characters involved in the two scenarios bear a strong resemblance to each other: both works evoke the protagonist's parents, goddesses play a role with Athene persuading Hector while Apollonius credits Hera for prompting Medea, and siblings feature in both with Hector's brother apparently appearing to embolden him while Medea's sister takes that role in the *Argonautica*. A consideration of Medea's conflict in the *Argonautica* compared against Hector's in the *Iliad* leads me to the conclusion that Apollonius was directly influenced in this by Homer. Thus Medea is twice Homeric: both helper maiden and hero.

[876] Hom. *Il.* 22.304-305.
[877] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.796-797.
[878] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.798-807.
[879] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.818-819.

Section 4: Medea's θυμός in the *Argonautica*

It has already been established that to a great extent Apollonius covered the same aspects of θυμός as Homer did. Medea's θυμός is mentioned more often than that of any other single character in the *Argonautica,* and, as may be expected, some of the references are entirely consistent with Homeric usage. It is not necessary to go into these in great detail, but as an overview they include the life/breath/consciousness aspect with Medea gathering her θυμός or selecting poisonous drugs that will destroy her θυμός, that is, kill her.[880] Her θυμός is delighted or satisfied with various pastimes, or at other times wrung with fear or anxiety.[881] Her θυμός was also concerned in planning and debating.[882] As with the general usage of θυμός in the *Argonautica,* they are marked by Homeric words and phrases, but with subtle differences so that they consciously recall Homer without slavishly imitating him. All of these are typical of Apollonius' reworking of the Homeric θυμός as already analysed in other characters and need not be explored further here.

There are, however, further references to θυμός and Medea that do bear closer examination. The first is Apollonius' equivalent to Euripides' famous monologue. This not only shows the great similarities between the two accounts, but more importantly showcases Medea's remarkable, I might say unique, θυμός. The second point of examination is the various effects upon Medea's θυμός when she is hit by Eros's arrow. The first effect is "speechless amazement" (ἀμφασίη). Such speechlessness is frequently seen in Homer, but despite arguing that Medea is a traditional Homeric hero, as above, I do not believe that this particular instance can be used in support of that argument.[883] The second effect is seen in Apollonius' further descriptions as he follows with a host of "heat" words, recalling Plato's association of heat and θυμός. These are only slightly considered here, being considered in depth in the section "Heat and θυμός", below. The third effect is easily overlooked, at first sight being related to the heat association. However, on examination this relationship is

[880] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.634, 3.790, 3.807.
[881] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.812, 3.897, 4.54, 4.1061.
[882] Ap. Rhod. *Arg*. 3.451.
[883] This and the following examples are explored in detail below.

due almost entirely to an unfortunate translation choice. If in line 3.290 κατείβω is translated "melt", as Seaton gives it, then heat is implied. This apparently minor detail becomes important when considering that κατείβω is also used by Homer and, if heat is indeed implied, it could be argued that an association between heat and θυμός is also Homeric. Adjacent to the question of how κατείβω should be translated is the question of whether κατείβω implies a strengthening or a weakening of the θυμός. A weakening is certainly implied by the translation "melted", and not contradicted by the more usual "flowing down" frequently used to translate κατείβω in Homer. However, I argue that certainly in Medea's case her θυμός is extraordinarily strengthened at the times when any sort of liquid simile is used.

Finally, from other uses of θυμός in the *Argonautica,* I have suggested that θυμός has a particularly family-centric aspect when Apollonius uses it. The final consideration of Medea's θυμός is to ask whether or not it is consistent with this understanding. As she plots against her father and kills her brother, the most obvious answer is a vehement "no". However, the two can be reconciled, and in doing so a slightly Platonic motif is introduced by Apollonius. Plato defined the ideal soul and θυμός, but then failed to present any examples of it in action that were not flawed to some extent. Apollonius has done the same. He defines a healthy θυμός by describing the opposite in the Lemnian men. Their θυμός was weak. Medea's by contrast is immensely strong. What can be seen from the *Argonautica* is that a θυμός either too weak or too strong is equally unhealthy.

The function of the θυμός in Medea's 'monologue'

In Euripides' *Medea,* Medea engages in a monologue in which her θυμός clearly champions one course of action – that of killing her children to take vengeance on her husband. In the equivalent scene in Book 3 of the *Argonautica,* Medea again debates two courses of action, to either follow her heart and help Jason in his task, or be a loyal daughter to Aeëtes and withhold any help from Jason. She decides to help Jason, at which her "θυμός fluttered with joy".[884]

[884] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.724.

The response of Medea's θυμός makes it clear that, as in Euripides' *Medea,* her θυμός actively wanted one course of action more than the other. It is therefore reasonable to argue that Medea's θυμός was motivating her to choose that course of action. Apollonius names the two motivators in the debate as "shame" (αἰδώς) and "desire" (ἵμερος) saying that "as often as she went straight on, shame held her within the chamber, and though held back by shame, bold desire kept urging her on".[885] In view of the fact that Medea's θυμός later "bounded with joy" at her desires winning through, it seems that her θυμός had taken the side of desire in this debate, with shame as the counteracting force. This, of course, would contrast strongly with Plato's representation of θυμός in the *Republic* where the θυμός and the seat of desires are not only separate but normally in opposition to each other.

Motif: Speechlessness

When Medea is first struck by Eros's arrow, Apollonius tells us that "speechless amazement" seized her θυμός.[886] Green and Hunter both note that Eros's shooting of Medea is closely modelled on Pandarus' shooting of Menelaus in the *Iliad* 4.110-126.[887] In that case the arrow also affected Menelaus' θυμός, forming one of the "gathering back the θυμός" examples, although speechlessness was not an effect specified by Homer.[888] Once Menelaus had gathered back his θυμός he was able to converse apparently easily with Agamemnon.[889] Lennox, while arguing that Homer's Pandarus was the model for Apollonius' Eros, also notes the contrast between the two injuries:

> The arrow of Pandarus merely grazes Menelaus; he shuddered at first as he saw the blood flowing from the wound but, when he perceived that it was only a flesh-wound, ἄψορρον οἱ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀγέρθη. Not so for Medea; Eros' dart penetrates deep, burning beneath the maiden's breast καί οἱ ἄηντο /στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτῳ φρένες.[890]

[885] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.652-3.
[886] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.284.
[887] Hunter, 1989, p.129; Green, 2008, p.250.
[888] Hom. *Il.* 4.148-152.
[889] Hom. *Il.* 4.183-187.
[890] Lennox, 1980, p.67.

Regarding the speechless affect, ἀμφασίη, upon Medea's θυμός, the same afflicts other characters at various times in the *Argonautica* without being specifically related to their θυμός. Jason, his mother, and Aeëtes all suffer speechless amazement at various points.[891] In most cases, speech is very quickly resumed. Similarly in Homer ἀμφασίη affects Antilochus and Penelope, in both cases after receiving dreadful news.[892] However, ἀμφασίη directly affecting the θυμός specifically is not borrowed from Homer and cannot be used to supplement the argument that Medea is a Homeric hero. Nevertheless, following the Homeric model, the use of ἀμφασίη in Medea's case could indicate that something dreadful has happened to her, which Medea herself is unaware of yet. In the *Iliad,* Antilochus' speechlessness was caused by hearing of Patroclus' death and the stripping of Achilles' armour from his corpse, along with the knowledge that he was the one who had to impart those tidings to Achilles.[893] This is a pivotal point in the *Iliad,* with Antilochus' ἀμφασίη marking a brief period of silence between Achilles' inaction and his return to the fight and a consequent change in the fortunes of the Achaeans. Medea's ἀμφασίη may therefore signal to the alert listener both a direct influence of Homer in the word ἀμφασίη and also a pivotal point in the *Argonautica*, in which they are not disappointed.

Medea's "melting" θυμός

When she is hit by Eros's arrow, Apollonius remarks that Medea's θυμός "melted" (κατείβω).[894] The same phenomenon occurs later when Jason has declared his love for Medea.[895] Seaton's choice of "melted" in both cases evokes the connection between heat and θυμός which appears in Plato's and Aristotle's writings. However, in Homer's works, κατείβω is often translated "flowing down", once referring to tears flowing down a cheek, but most frequently speaking of waters: the practically uncrossable River Styx, and later an irrigation channel that sweeps all the pebbles along with the water are both

[891] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.409, 1.262, 3.1372.
[892] Hom. *Il.* 17.695, *Od.* 4.704.
[893] Hom. *Il.* 17.685-693.
[894] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.290 (Trans. Seaton).
[895] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1131.

described that way.[896] In view of Apollonius writing in the epic tradition, it is worth considering the difference it would make to an understanding of the θυμός as Apollonius wrote it if the more usual Homeric translation of "flowing down" was used instead of Seaton's "melted".

A melting of the θυμός might imply a corruption of it into a state of ineffectiveness or uselessness, which would have been an apt description in the case of the Lemnian men who no longer cared in their θυμός about family responsibilities.[897] The simile of a flowing river, however, could imply quite the opposite – a θυμός so formidable as to be irresistible, so far from being destroyed and ineffective itself that it rather moves along inexorably. This suggestion is strengthened by considering the next simile that Apollonius uses to describe Medea:

> And as a poor woman heaps dry twigs round a blazing brand – a daughter of toil, whose task is the spinning of wool, that she may kindle a blaze at night beneath her roof, when she has waked very early – and the flame waxing wondrous great from the small brand consumes all the twigs together; so, coiling round her heart, burnt secretly Love the destroyer.[898]

If we read that Medea's θυμός "melted with the sweet pain", implying weakness, then in the succeeding passage the θυμός would be represented by the twigs that are detrimentally affected by fire. If, however, we apply the alternative understanding that her θυμός flowed like the waters of a river, then the strongly-flowing θυμός equates to the flame "waxing wondrous great" which, starting from the heart (the "small brand"), consumes and destroys all other considerations ("all the twigs"). Green suggests that the fire simile "suggest[s] an emotion that is unstable, fragile, and liable to die out as easily as it flares up".[899] I should like to tender an alternative understanding. Apollonius does not speak of the flame/θυμός dying out or being fragile. It may be inferred that having consumed everything, the flame would eventually die out, as

[896] Hom. *Od.* 21.86, *Il.* 15.37, 21.261.
[897] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.811-7.
[898] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.291-7.
[899] Green, 2008, p.250.

Medea's love for Jason finally does in Euripides' *Medea*, but Apollonius concentrates only on its immediate effect of being all-consuming. Campbell would seem to agree that the fire represents love, which in Medea's case is clearly being championed by the θυμός. He states:

> Medea, whose body and mind are feeding the flame, does not know what is happening to her, and is in no position to control it, any more than the working-woman who fuels a brand to keep herself going can anticipate that a modest flame will result in a conflagration that wipes out precious resources, all in one fell swoop".[900]

This also indicates an unstoppably strong, rather than a weak, θυμός. While it is not always necessary to insist on an exact analogy for all aspects of a simile, neither is it necessary to ignore any aspects where, as in this case, there is a good fit. The "flowing down" translation of κατείβω evoking the unstoppable strength of a powerful river works better than "melted" suggesting weakness.[901]

Later in Book 3, κατείβω is again used in connection with Medea's θυμός, immediately following Jason's declaration of love and his intention to marry Medea. This time, no simile is given that would elucidate the nature of the verb, but a strong rather than a weak θυμός is still implied:

> And her θυμός melted [κατείβετο] within her to hear his words; nevertheless she shuddered to behold the deeds of destruction to come.[902]

In this instance, at first sight "melted" may be a reasonable translation in the first clause, when compared with the with "shuddered" (ῥιγέω) in the second clause implying coolness, contrasted with each other as the two clauses are by the use of "nevertheless". However, if we accept the translation "melted", then again the θυμός is weakened, which would make the use of "nevertheless" implying a contrast unnecessary. On the contrary, with a weakened θυμός, it is entirely natural that she would shudder at such a foreboding. If, however, the

[900] Campbell, 1994, p.265.
[901] Again, this fiery simile is discussed further in the section 'Heat and θυμός'
[902] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1131-2.

θυμός is understood to be unstoppably flowing like the waters of a river on hearing Jason's words, this short passage is not only internally harmonious in its two clauses, but also becomes highly evocative of Medea's conclusion to her monologue in Euripides' *Medea.* In that passage she states that "I know the evils I am about to do, but my θυμός is stronger".[903] In the *Medea,* Medea "knows" that her future deeds, including the killing of her own children, are evil, and it is clearly specified that she is able to contemplate doing them only because of the extraordinary strength of her θυμός. In the *Argonautica,* the same two conditions are repeated: she has knowledge through beholding, or foreseeing, the future "deeds of destruction" that must follow on the heels of her current course of action, and also her θυμός is sufficiently strong that she will face those deeds, although shuddering at the thought. A weakened, "melted" θυμός would not impart such strength. A powerfully flowing one would. To conclude, when κατείβω is used in relation to the θυμός, translating it as "melted" has the unfortunate consequence of introducing a potential misunderstanding as it can be seen as a heat simile rather than a liquid one. "Flowing down" allows a more coherent understanding of the workings of the θυμός at such times.

There is another instance in Book 3 of the *Argonautica* in which Medea's θυμός is given a liquid simile. This occurs at the beginning of Jason's pretty speech when he begs her help and showers her with compliments, at which "her θυμός melted (ἐχύθη) within her, uplifted by his praise".[904] A flowing is still implied, but where Apollonius uses χέω elsewhere, he tends to refer either to tears or the pouring of a libation, rather than the relentless flowing of a river.[905] The result of the flowing θυμός in this case is that Medea's apparent bashfulness is overcome and she hands over the necessary charm to Jason and gives him clear instructions on its use.[906] This may not require such extraordinary strength of θυμός as overcoming her scruples at the "deeds of destruction to come", but it still requires a strong rather than a weak θυμός. Thus in all cases where Medea's

[903] Eur. *Med.* 1078-9.
[904] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1009-10.
[905] Eg. Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 1.1067, 1075.
[906] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.1013-25.

θυμός is said to be melted or flowing (depending on the translator's choice), I would suggest that the θυμός is strong, not weak.

Medea's family-centric θυμός?

From the Lemnian episode, a possible working definition of θυμός had been formed, namely that a healthy θυμός is that part of a soul which motivates a person to fulfil their family responsibilities. Comparing Medea's θυμός with that definition presents an apparent paradox. Medea's family responsibility was loyalty to her father, Aeëtes, yet her θυμός "bounded with joy" at her decision to help Jason defeat Aeëtes.[907] Counterarguments may be proposed that allow the reading that Medea was still fulfilling her family responsibilities: the lives of Chalkiope's sons, Medea's nephews, were threatened by Aeëtes. Medea had to make a choice, and ultimately the decision was between family and family. It may also be argued that Medea was acting in the interests of an as yet non-existent family – her own children with Jason. However, a simpler explanation would be that Medea's θυμός at this time, while not "destroyed" like that of the Lemnian men, was also not healthy, having been unnaturally strengthened by Eros's arrow. If the θυμός may be likened to an immune system that is equally harmful to the body when too strong as it is when too weak, the Lemnian definition can stand with only a minor amendment: a *healthy* θυμός is that part of the soul which cares for family responsibilities, but an unhealthy θυμός, either weak/destroyed, or too strong, does not.

This indication of an unhealthy (or too strong) θυμός corresponds neatly with Plato's analysis in the *Republic* that the θυμός needs to be soothed by music to prevent it taking undue prominence over other parts of the soul to the detriment of the unity of the whole.[908] Other aspects of Medea's monologue, however, do not fit so neatly with the Platonic θυμός, as discussed above. Specifically the θυμός championing the desires of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, as Plato would classify them, would be impossible to reconcile with Plato's separate elements of the soul. Thus while the portrayal of an unhealthy θυμός is a technique used

[907] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.724.
[908] Pl. *Resp.* 441a9, 442a1-3, 550a7-b7.

extensively by Plato, I cannot conclude that Apollonius was consciously following him in this regard. He showcased an unhealthy θυμός, but he failed to include other aspects that would indicate Platonic influence. Overall I believe that Apollonius has consciously followed the Homeric works throughout in his depiction of the θυμός, in both 'ordinary' people and in the extraordinary character of Medea.

Chapter 5: Themes: θυμός and […]

As has already been seen from the overview of θυμός in Homer, Plato and Apollonius Rhodius, θυμός is a wide-ranging concept that has resulted in an embarrassment of riches for the translator who can choose from words as diverse as breath, soul, passion, anger, and many more, to render it in English. Plato has perhaps the narrowest portrayal, but even he describes θυμός in both psychological and physical terms. The Homeric θυμός is the widest-ranging covering everything from eating and drinking to complex decision-making. This chapter attempts to show the evolution of the authors' understanding of θυμός, by examining it in conjunction with three separate concepts and analysing the development through all three authors' works. It is helpful at this point to also consider other authors, most prominently Aristotle who with two of the chosen themes, courage/shame, and heat, adds a great deal of valuable information. This approach shows clearly the dynamic nature of the word θυμός and illustrates the hazards of taking one well-known definition, for example that of Plato in the *Republic*, and assuming that the meaning of θυμός is fixed. While this is probably not a surprise to translators, the changeable nature of θυμός is quite remarkable. The themes have been chosen for the richness of the supporting evidence, and partly because of the strength of some misconceptions.

The first theme is Anger and θυμός. Koziak, writing from a background of political philosophy, is pleased to discover that in Homer θυμός is not simply anger. She does not state the source of that initial misconception stating only that "recent theorists have understood *thumos* as the angry and manly defense of one's own honor, family, and country".[909] She then comes to the conclusion that "*thumos* is not entirely or simply anger, but harbors other emotions".[910] While I agree with Koziak's findings, adding the important proviso that θυμός is not *only* concerned with emotions, I was surprised to find that anyone reading Homer should consider θυμός to be "entirely or simply anger".

[909] Koziak, 1999, p.1068.
[910] Koziak, 1999, p.1070.

Courage, shame and θυμός has been chosen for the richness of secondary source material with Cairns writing particularly on the association between θυμός and αἰδώς.[911] However, Cairns' analysis is largely (and understandably) limited to Homer and Plato where αἰδώς and θυμός work in concert with each other: the θυμός pulling a person to a noble course of action, fear of αἰδώς pushing them away from the opposite shameful course. In Apollonius, however, the two work on opposite sides in Medea's case with αἰδώς pulling her one way, θυμός another.

Finally heat and θυμός has been chosen for the opposite reason: the extreme paucity of academic research that the association between the two has attracted. Yet it is this theme that shows most clearly a development in the understanding of θυμός. The first two themes show a waxing and waning picture with obvious references in the depth of the Homeric θυμός, before a diminishing in the limited Platonic θυμός, and finally a re-emergence when Apollonius adopts the Homeric tradition. In the case of heat and θυμός, however, the development is more linear. Not mentioned at all by Homer, the association between the two appears to be introduced by Plato, advanced by Aristotle and others, and fully embraced by Apollonius.

Overall the picture is fascinating for the lack of influence from Plato's *Republic*, despite that being the best-known surviving work on θυμός.

Section 1: Anger and θυμός

Anger is often associated with θυμός, to the extent that it has been argued, as explored below, that θυμός is anger. This argument has been made in relation to both Homer and Plato. The assumption is not safe in either case. Snell famously called θυμός the "organ of (e)motion".[912] By examining the account of Achilles in Book 1 of the *Iliad,* it is possible to explain and largely endorse Snell's theory (as far as it pertains to emotion; there are still other facets of the θυμός that are not covered by it), but also, I would suggest, to modify it very

[911] Cairns, 1993.
[912] Snell, 1982, p.9.

slightly. Allen contends that Plato replaces the word ὀργή with θυμός, simply making a linguistic choice.[913] I believe an alternative argument is possible, by instead taking up a brief comment by Allen and exploring it in greater detail. The results suggest that in the *Republic*, θυμός and ὀργή are experienced by different classes of people/animals with ὀργή being a sort of inferior version of θυμός. This is a marked difference from the Homeric θυμός which is a facet of gods, humans and animals alike.

Anger and θυμός in Homer

It is perhaps unsurprising, given the opening lines of the *Iliad*, that anger features heavily in the epic, hence the large role that the *Iliad* plays in scholarship on ancient anger.[914] The character whose anger is most examined is Achilles, and as such it is not necessary to do more than briefly recap the accounts of his anger here, highlighting where it is relevant to the θυμός.[915]

In Achilles and others a wide range of emotions as diverse as grief and joy, love and hate, pleasure and pain, are mentioned alongside the θυμός by Homer. Anger, though, is perhaps the most frequent emotion that is mentioned in connection with the θυμός. Χόλος affects a range of humans and gods and goddesses (no human women, but as they are under-represented in the *Iliad*, that need not be significant). In some cases the effect, or the anticipated effect, is that the agent refrains from his natural activity, as when warriors refrain from fighting.[916] In other cases, being angry in θυμός causes the agent to redouble their fighting efforts.[917] The example of Achilles reluctantly obeying Athene's command not to fight shows that his natural response to Agamemnon's slight would have been to act, had Athene not persuaded him otherwise, as he says to her "one must observe the words of you two [Athene and Hera], no matter how angry he may be θυμῷ".[918]

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[913] Allen, 2003, p.96.
[914] Eg. Braund & Most, 2003; Renaut, 2016.
[915] While the goddess is requested to sing of the μῆνις of Achilles, that word is not used often, and never in connection with the θυμός of the agent. As χόλος, though, anger is seen to be associated with the θυμός.
[916] Hom. *Il.* 6.326, 9.436, 9.675, 14.50, 16.206.
[917] Hom. *Il.* 4.494, 13.660.
[918] Hom. *Il.* 1.216-217.

For a more detailed study of the effect of θυμός plus χόλος, we can look to Achilles in Book 1 of the *Iliad* as a case study.

Achilles, χόλος and θυμός

The first major passage show-casing Achilles' θυμός in relation to χόλος has already been alluded to, above. In the passage immediately preceding, Agamemnon has threatened to deprive Achilles of his prize of honour, Briseïs, in compensation for the loss of his own prize, the daughter of Chryses.[919] Achilles' immediate response is grief followed by anger:

> So [Agamemnon] spoke, and grief came upon the son of Peleus, and within his shaggy breast his heart was divided in counsel, whether he should draw his sharp sword from his side and break up the assembly, and kill the son of Atreus, or whether he should check his wrath (χόλον) and curb his spirit (θυμόν). While he pondered this in his mind and heart (κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν), and was drawing his great sword from its sheath, Athene came from heaven, sent by the goddess, white-armed Hera, for in her heart (θυμῷ) she loved them both alike and cared for them.[920]

Achilles ultimately respects Athene's wishes, although reluctantly, saying:

> Goddess, one must observe the words of you two, no matter how angry he may be at heart (περ θυμῷ κεχολωμένον), for it is better so.[921]

In the first passage, curbing the θυμός is paired with checking the χόλος, indicating that both would be accomplished simultaneously or perhaps that one would follow the other. This raises the possibility that χόλος and θυμός may be identical, and this assumption is often made. Frere, for example, frequently translates θυμός simply as "ardente colère" or fiery anger.[922] Caswell also argues that occasionally the θυμός *is* anger. She calls the θυμός, "the neutral bearer of emotions", while noting it is involved in a number of non-emotional

[919] Hom, *Il.* 1.182-185.
[920] Hom. *Il.* 1.188-196.
[921] Hom. *Il.* 1.216-217.
[922] Frere, 2004, p.148.

functions as well.[923] The "neutral" status of the θυμός is, in Caswell's argument, conditional on the θυμός being contained within the φρήν. When the θυμός itself is not contained in the φρήν, the emotions can no longer be restrained in or by the θυμός and at that point "θυμός seems to be in the process of becoming no longer the neutral bearer of emotions but emotion itself".[924] By Caswell's argument, then, the θυμός would, at certain times, be χολός. However, I am not able to fully agree with Caswell in this regard.. In the case of Achilles, we are not told whether the θυμός was ἐνὶ φρεσί or not either when he wanted to give way to anger or when he refrained from doing so. Therefore no argument can be made from that section. However, in Book 21, it is specified that the gods' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμός was blown in different directions causing them to fight amongst themselves without restraint.[925] By Caswell's argument, such lack of restraint should only occur when the θυμός was not contained within the φρήν, which is not explicitly the case here. I would also query Caswell's description of the "neutrality" of the θυμός. From the examples of both Achilles' χόλος and of Hera loving him in θυμός, it would appear that the θυμός cannot help, or can only hardly help, acting on whichever emotion it is bearing at the time. It is therefore decidedly aligned with the emotion.

Snell argues that "*thymos* in Homer is the generator of motion or agitation" and suggests translating θυμός as "organ of (e)motion", also later stating that θυμός is the "mental organ which causes (e)motion".[926] Snell's argument is slightly clouded by means of his repeated use of "(e)motion" rather than dealing with emotion and motion separately. However, by applying it to Achilles, it is possible to both explain Snell's meaning and to agree with him. In this passage when Achilles was debating whether to act or not, he "pondered this in mind (φρένα) and θυμός".[927] The role of the θυμός in pondering and debating is discussed above where it is argued that the θυμός, although described as pondering or debating two potential choices, could actually only approve one of

[923] Caswell, 1990, p.50.
[924] Caswell, 1990, p.44.
[925] Hom. *Il.* 21.385-386.
[926] Snell, 1982, p.9, 12. Frere (2004, p.8) uses a similar play on words, calling the θυμός the "substrate of everything that is affectivity or activity".
[927] Hom. *Il.* 1.193.

the options – that of action, in this case the action of killing Agamemnon as revenge for the insult. The early activity of the θυμός towards this end can be seen in Achilles' performative act of "drawing his great sword from its sheath" even while he was still ostensibly undecided.[928] When Athene then tells Achilles that she has come to put a stop to his anger, he responds "one must observe the words of you two, no matter how angry he may be at heart (περ θυμῷ κεχολωμένον), for it is better so".[929] This spoken decision goes against the natural inclination of Achilles' θυμός, and is accompanied by the performative action of "check[ing] his heavy hand on the silver hilt, and back into its sheath thrust[ing] the great sword".[930]

This illustrates well the 'motion' part of the θυμός that Snell repeatedly mentions. The result of Achilles not venting his anger but keeping it in his θυμός was inactivity, or lack of 'motion', as he withdrew from the battle and refused to fight, nursing his χόλον θυμαλγέα.[931] This introduces a somewhat abstract concept by which emotion, if not released through the 'motion' of action, remains in the θυμός and becomes painful to it. Having felt an emotion (in this case anger), the θυμός converts it into action, and by the motion of action, the emotion is released. If the emotion is not released by being acted upon, it festers and the θυμός is frustrated and pained, as in the case of Achilles harmfully nursing his anger rather than releasing it. I would therefore suggest amending Snell's definition slightly and referring to the θυμός in relation to emotions as "the converter of emotion into motion".

From this scene in Book 1, then, a number of details about the θυμός can be gleaned. As noted above, the θυμός, even while described as still "debating" or "pondering", in fact inclines so strongly towards only one potential course of action (to kill, in this case), that the agent is already performing that action, illustrated in Achilles' case by the unsheathing of his sword. Secondly, Achilles is finally able to curb his θυμός, and by extension to check his χόλος, when he

[928] Hom. *Il.* 1.194.
[929] Hom. *Il.* 1.216-217.
[930] Hom. *Il.* 1.219-220.
[931] Hom. *Il.* 9.260.

overcomes, albeit only with difficulty and divine intervention, his natural inclination to vent his anger by killing Agamemnon. It is rare to read of a θυμός being overcome or restrained by its own agent, but clearly it can be done with effort. Finally, the input of some other concern besides θυμός is seen to be present in Achilles' decision-making, in this case the appeal of two goddesses.

Summary

The initial suggestion, that because "checking χόλος" and "curbing θυμός" occur apparently simultaneously the two may be regarded as identical, is clearly incorrect. Anger and θυμός are not the same in Homer. The θυμός feels anger and converts it, normally, into the action that will release the anger. If not released, the anger negatively affects the θυμός.

Anger and θυμός in Plato

Looking now to Plato, and particularly the *Republic*, it would appear that Plato represents anger as having a different relationship with the θυμός than Homer did. In fact, it is not unusual to hear the suggestion that Plato, or at least Plato's Socrates, presents anger and θυμός as being virtually identical.[932]

Plato does not use the word χόλος, rather favouring ὀργή. Nevertheless, he does not even use ὀργή with great frequency. Allen asserts that "[Plato's] Socrates rejects the word ὀργή itself as a term of analysis and replaces the fourth-century passional vocabulary that turned around it with his invented vocabulary of spiritedness (e.g. θυμοειδής)".[933] In support of Allen's hypothesis, that Plato simply "replaced" ὀργή with spiritedness, ὀργή is not a well-used word in Plato's *Republic*, appearing only four times compared to the combined total of 41 instances of θυμός and θυμοειδής. However, this need not indicate a simple like-for-like replacement of words. Another possible explanation is raised, but not explored, by Allen herself. In a footnote she observes that when ὀργή is used it appears once in connection with the corpse-viewer Leontius, once about a "beast", once about the "masses", and once to describe uncontrolled anger.[934]

[932] Wilburn, 2021, p.29.
[933] Allen, 2003, p.96.
[934] Allen, 2003, p.96.

While Allen does not comment on any possible connection between these instances, they raise the possibility that θυμός is a facet of noble people (the guardians) while ὀργή is its equivalent in less noble (in Socrates' view) humans, or even animals. If so, this would still mean that θυμός is different from anger in Plato's works, but the difference is the character of the agent feeling the anger/θυμός.

The first instance in which ὀργή is used is the case of Leontius who became angry with himself because of the strength of his own desire to view corpses.[935] Socrates' conclusion from this account is that "ὀργή sometimes does battle with our desires, as one thing against another".[936] As Socrates was using this incident to prove a difference between the part of the soul that deals with desires and the θυμός, the use of ὀργή instead of θυμός would indeed support Allen's hypothesis that the two words are essentially interchangeable. However, Leontius, the notorious viewer of corpses, is not cited as an example of excellence to be emulated, or even as a "normal" man.

Analysis of the other three instances of ὀργή in the *Republic* support more conclusively my alternative theory that ὀργή is experienced by people who are deemed to be in some way inferior to those who excel in θυμός. The first instance refers to the anger of "some huge strong creature", an animal rather than a human.[937] Another speaks of "many people of various sorts", later making it clear that these are the people Socrates has in mind when he says that it is "impossible for most people to be philosophers", therefore speaking of a less mentally capable people than the philosophers who are to make up the rulers of the fine city.[938] The third example contrasts a man who gets angry with one who has "soothed his passionate spirit" by means of the prescribed healthful and temperate education fitting for a guardian rather than a money-maker, so that again ὀργή is ascribed to a less noble class of citizen.[939] Similarly Plato contrasts the angry (ὀργίλος) man with the one who is θυμοειδής explaining that

[935] For an analysis of Leontius's possible motivation see Chapter 3, section 5, above.
[936] Pl. *Resp.* 440a6-7.
[937] Pl. *Resp,* 493a10.
[938] Pl. *Resp,* 493d1; 494a3.
[939] Pl. *Resp.* 572a3-5.

the latter has had the right amount of exposure to the soothing effects of the musical arts, whereas the former has overindulged in them.[940]

There is therefore in Plato a strong similarity between anger and θυμός with anger being an attribute of beings who are unequal to those guardian-soldiers in whom θυμός has been adequately nurtured into temperance. Ὀργή and θυμός are different, but the difference comes from the quality of the agent, not the ὀργή or the θυμός itself.

Homer, as seen above, had also regarded anger and θυμός as being different from each other. However, he described them both being present in one person when he describes Achilles' anger being felt by the θυμός and the θυμός in turn responding to anger. An additional difference is that for the θυμός to be restrained in the *Iliad*, the intervention of two goddesses was required. The Platonic θυμός, however, is not "restrained", but is both soothed and strengthened into the right course of action before the fact by a carefully managed education.

Anger and θυμός in Aristotle

Aristotle, like Plato, does not tend to use χόλος but rather ὀργή. One aspect of θυμός that Aristotle explores to some extent is the nature of its association with anger (ὀργή). Again, as in Plato, anger and θυμός are sufficiently connected that Cairns suggests that in later Classical Greek "the main terms for anger are ὀργή and θυμός".[941] Konstan says regarding one instance of θυμός in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that it is "analogous to anger".[942] Harris, meanwhile, argues against ὀργή and θυμός being identical noting that "these two terms were quite often interchangeable but never synonymous, since θυμός for most of its history meant 'the seat or agency of anger and zeal within the person'".[943] This interpretation would seem to agree with Cairns' footnote that θυμός "can also function as an emotional force" by means of a conceptual metaphor in which

[940] Pl. *Resp.* 411a5-c2.
[941] Cairns, 2003, p.21.
[942] Konstan, 2003, p.120(fn).
[943] Harris, 2003, p. 123; Simon (1998) 82, cited at Harris (2003) 123).

θυμός is understood to be a "container" of certain emotions.[944] Harris's statement, as well as Cairns' footnote, returns anger to its Homeric relationship with θυμός, as something that is felt by or contained within the θυμός. Nevertheless, in view of the suggestion that θυμός and ὀργή may be identical or at least practically interchangeable, it is worth considering, as with Plato, whether this is what Aristotle meant. Despite the suggestion of similarity, it will be shown that Aristotle demonstrates that the two are not absolutely identical. However, he follows, not the Platonic pattern of ὀργή being experienced by a non-thumoedic or at least imperfectly thumoedic person, but rather the Homeric pattern of the θυμός being particularly susceptible to anger.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle spends some time showing that in such things as ambition, for example, a man should pursue the mean: "We blame a man as ambitious if he seeks honour more than is right, or from wrong sources; we blame him as unambitious if he does not care about receiving honour even on noble grounds."[945] A similar middle ground is recommended with regards to anger, but while there is only one "defect" caused by lack of anger, there are two possible outcomes caused by an excess. The defect is blameworthy on the grounds that:

> Those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry, he will not stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one's friends to be insulted.[946]

An excess of anger is also blameworthy, slightly more so than the inappropriate lack of anger, as "the harsh-tempered are worse to live with."[947] Excess is apparent in two ways, and again, one is more blameworthy than the other. The first possible result of excess is the better (or the least worse) because it is, in a manner of speaking, its own cure. These are the people who:

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[944] Cairns, 2003, p.21(fn).
[945] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1125b8-11.
[946] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a4-8.
[947] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a31.

> … get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things and too violently, but whose anger is soon over. This last is the best point in their character, and it is due to the fact that they do not keep their anger in (οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν), but being quick-tempered display it openly by retaliating and then have done with it.[948]

The harsh-tempered, or bitter, people, on the other hand are "implacable (πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται) because they keep their θυμός in".[949] Doing so, they:

> … continue to labour under a sense of resentment – for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them either, and it takes a long time to digest one's wrath within one. Bitterness is the most troublesome form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends.[950]

Almost throughout these passages all words that Rackham has translated "anger", as well as "spirit" and "passion", have as their root ὀργή. The first mention of θυμός is the quote above, where the bitter people "keep their θυμός in".[951] A possible alternative translation would be "because they restrain (or withhold) their θυμός".

From the above, it can immediately be seen that ὀργή is experienced by all people, not only those who are imperfectly thumoedic as suggested by Plato's *Republic*. Regarding the relationship between ὀργή and θυμός, this section of Aristotle can be used to argue two ways. On the one hand, the similar wording is noted between the quick-tempered who do not restrain their anger (οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν) and the bitter who do restrain their θυμός (κατέχουσι τὸν θυμόν). This could perhaps be used to argue that ὀργή and θυμός are synonymous and identical. However, Aristotle had earlier quoted Homer speaking of "bitter μένος swelling through the nostrils" and commented that this, along with "the blood boiling", was a *sign* of an excited or aroused θυμός.[952] Thus a more plausible reading is that ὀργή, like μένος, is a physical

[948] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a13-18.
[949] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a20-21.
[950] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a23-26.
[951] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a20-21.
[952] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b27-30.

manifestation of an aroused θυμός rather than being identical with θυμός itself. This would explain why the quick-tempered man is spoken of as not restraining his ὀργή which, being released, can be seen as a visible sign to other people, whereas the bitter man who restrains his θυμός gives no outward sign. That is to say, the unrestrained θυμός releases anger which becomes a visible sign of its agitation, whereas the restrained θυμός does not release any sign of agitation. Thus θυμός here, like in the *Iliad,* is where anger is felt, rather than being anger itself.

This suggestion is supported and expanded upon by a passage in the *Art of Rhetoric* which also tends to the conclusion that the θυμός is a part of the soul which feels anger or by the existence of which anger can be felt. Aristotle here follows a similar pattern to the *Nicomachean Ethics* quote above whereby ὀργή is used extensively before he offers a summary which mentioned θυμός. Firstly, Aristotle identifies anger as being one of the emotions, and emotions in turn are described as "those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain".[953] Aristotle then continues:

> Let anger, then, be defined as a desire, accompanied by pain, for [an apparent] revenge, due to an apparent slight affecting a man himself or one of his friends, by persons who ought not to slight him. … Lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come.[954]

Again, throughout the above passage the word translated "anger" is always ὀργή until Aristotle adds the extra information that

> Wherefore it has been well said of anger (περὶ θυμοῦ) that:
> 'Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat
> it spreads in men's hearts.'[955]

While the translator has chosen to render both ὀργή and θυμός as "anger", it is interesting that Aristotle, having used ὀργή initially and repeatedly, then

[953] Arist. *Rh.* 1378a19-22.
[954] Arist. *Rh.* 1378a22-1378b2.
[955] Arist. *Rh.* 1378b4-6.

introduces a quote in support of his treatment of ὀργή that uses, not ὀργή, but θυμός. It is further interesting that Aristotle slightly misquotes Homer as in the *Iliad* it is said there that it is χολός, not θυμός, that "sweeter far than trickling honey, increases like smoke in the breasts of men".[956] However, Aristotle's (mis)quote does tally with the suggestion that θυμός is the seat of anger. When speaking of the sweetness of the spreading χολός, Achilles is referring to the rage that he felt at the insult of Agamemnon and, presumably, the anticipated sweetness of revenge.[957] He then states that "these things" (both the insult and the revenge against Agamemnon) "will we let be as past and done, for all our pain, curbing the θυμός within our breasts because we must".[958] Thus in the same way that Aristotle had spoken of restraining the agitated θυμός instead of releasing ὀργή which would then effect a cure of the θυμός, Homer shows Achilles painfully curbing his θυμός rather than sweetly giving rein to his χολός.

Overall Aristotle's treatment of θυμός and ὀργή in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Art of Rhetoric* is supportive of Simon's assessment that the θυμός is the "seat of anger" rather than being synonymous with anger. It is understandable, due to the very close association between the two words, that they have occasionally been regarded as virtually synonymous for practical purposes. Aristotle's usage, although using a different word for "anger", is markedly similar to Homer's as seen from the analysis of Achilles' χόλος, above. It is equally markedly different from Plato's slightly limited use of ὀργή in the *Republic.*

With these working definitions in mind, we turn next to Apollonius Rhodius and his use of anger and θυμός. It could be assumed that Apollonius, following the epic tradition, would write in conscious imitation of Homer, while noting that in doing so he would also, perhaps inadvertently, include an Aristotelian concept of anger and θυμός. On the other hand, it would be equally reasonable to expect to see traces of Platonic philosophy in Apollonius' works, writing as he did around a century after Plato.

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[956] Hom. *Il.* 18.108-110.
[957] Hom. *Il.* 18.111.
[958] Hom. *Il.* 18.112-113.

Anger and θυμός in Apollonius Rhodius

Apollonius does not use ὀργή in the *Argonautica*. He uses the more Homeric terms χόλος (most frequently), μῆνις and κότος. Thus the *Argonautica* immediately demonstrates a return to Homeric language. In order to determine whether Apollonius' portrayal of anger and θυμός likewise returns to Homer, it is necessary to look for a character who is both angry and thumoedic, as Achilles was in the *Iliad.* More than any other character in the *Argonautica,* Medea is repeatedly spoken of with regards to her θυμός, but she is not portrayed as generally angry. Burgess, however, notes that "two characters each in their own way are case studies of the negativity of anger, Idas and King Aeëtes", with Aeëtes being "by far the angriest character".[959] Idas does not fulfil the "thumoedic" criteria, but Aeëtes does. Many characters in the *Argonautica* are mentioned with regards to their θυμός, often in connection with some other emotion. However, Aeëtes' θυμός is most consistently associated with anger.

The first time Aeëtes' θυμός is mentioned is when his "θυμός brooded a twofold purpose within him, whether he should attack and slay them [Jason and his men] on the spot or should make trial of their might".[960] While anger is not linked to θυμός in that sentence, Aeëtes has immediately beforehand been established as an extremely angry character. Having been told of Jason's quest he was motivated by his χόλος to direct an impassioned speech against the Argonauts who are only saved from having their tongues and hands cut off by their status as guests.[961] Having made his anger clearly manifest, Aeëtes' θυμός then starts debating, as above. When Achilles had similarly pondered such a decision in his θυμός, whether to kill Agamemnon or not, it was clear that his θυμός was inclined to kill but he was held back by the intervention of Athene. In Aeëtes' case, he has already shown that he is not kindly inclined to the strangers and wants to kill them. Like Achilles, though, he is held back, according to his own speech, by the possibility of angering gods. Argus had taken care to list the

[959] Burgess, 2020, par.25, 26.
[960] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.396-399.
[961] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.372-381.

divine lineage of some of the Argonauts when he introduced them to Aeëtes.[962] It is this that stops Aeëtes' immediate plan of killing the Argonauts, as he says:

> If truly you and your men are descendants of gods or have come in other respects not a bit inferior to me to gain the possessions of another, I shall give you the golden fleece to take, if you wish, after you have undergone a test, for when it comes to noble men, I do not begrudge anything.[963]

This background of a decision being pondered in θυμός forms a link with Achilles in the *Iliad.* The representation of the gods opposing the natural wish of the θυμός in both cases underlines the connection. In the *Iliad,* the action then shifted from Achilles until Book 9. Similarly in the *Argonautica,* the action shifts from Aeëtes until Jason's task is accomplished. We rejoin both Aeëtes' θυμός and his anger in Book 4.

> Aeëtes spent the entire night in his palace with the leading men of his people, plotting an inescapable trap for the heroes, violently angry in his heart at the appalling contest (στυγερῷ ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἀέθλῳ Αἰήτης ἄμοτον κεχολωμένος).[964]

Unlike Achilles, Aeëtes no longer has any intention of restraining his anger to the detriment of his θυμός. Spurred on by the added knowledge that his daughter Medea had betrayed him, he pursues both her and Jason so that "he might satisfy (ἐνιπλήσει) his θυμός with vengeance for all those deeds, that they would learn with their lives what it was to receive the full measure of his wrath (χόλον)".[965] In Achilles' case, not releasing his anger by killing Agamemnon led to his θυμός being pained. Aeëtes' case shows the other side of the coin, that releasing his anger by killing Jason and Medea would, as he puts it, "satisfy" his θυμός. This is not an entirely new concept with regards to the θυμός, although it has not been seen so far in Homer, Plato or Aristotle directly in relation to anger and θυμός. However, in the *Odyssey*¸ Homer speaks twice in similar terms: Eumaeus "having satisfied his θυμός with meat and drink" (πλησάμενος δ'ἄρα θυμόν), and Odysseus' crew being given food and drink "in

[962] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.356-366.
[963] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.402-405.
[964] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.6-9.
[965] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.233-235.

order that their θυμός might be satisfied" (ἵνα πλησαίατο θυμόν).[966] To Aeëtes, therefore, revenge is as much a necessity for his θυμός as food and drink is to most men. The θυμός being pleased with or wishing for food and drink in Homer is a common motif. By using one of the same verbs in relation to θυμός and anger, Apollonius allows us to extend the concept and read back to Achilles' case that his θυμός was effectively starved by his anger being unnaturally restrained.

The final reference to Aeëtes' θυμός and anger comes in Book 4 where Arete speaks to about him to Alcinous. She warns Alcinous not to let Aeëtes "with angry θυμός (θυμῷ κεκοτηότι) work some intolerable harm" upon Medea.[967] Aristotle had spoken of a "median" θυμός that felt just the right amount of anger at just the right time, neither too much nor too little. The examples that Arete cites do not fall into this median range, as she reminds Alcinous of Nycteus, Acrisius, and Echetus.[968] It is not possible to state whether Apollonius was deliberately showcasing one of the extremes that Aristotle warned against, but had he wished to do so, he could hardly have given better examples than the ones chosen by Arete.

In Homer, and Plato and Aristotle, there were sufficient details about θυμός and anger to determine with reasonable clarity their relationship to each other showing that they were never considered identical. There are not enough mentions of anger and θυμός in combination in the *Argonautica* to state conclusively what relationship Apollonius envisaged them as having. Overall, though, his usage is sufficiently reminiscent of anger and θυμός in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to suggest that he was following the Homeric pattern. Regarding restraining the θυμός, Apollonius shows only an unrestrained θυμός in relation to anger.[969] However, Aeëtes disingenuously suggests that consideration for the gods would make him act differently, which forms a link with Achilles' plight in the *Iliad.* Nevertheless, it is not only a Homeric influence that can be

[966] Hom. *Od.* 17.603, 19.198 .
[967] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1087-1089.
[968] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1090-1095.
[969] Medea attempted to restrain her θυμός, as discussed elsewhere, but it was love or shame that was acting on it at the time, not anger.

discerned in Aeëtes' character. His personality overall is so angry that it also evokes Aristotle's man of bitterness. Thus both Homer and Aristotle could be argued to have had some influence on Apollonius' portrayal of Aeëtes' anger and θυμός.

Summary

Considering the combination of anger and θυμός from Homer, through Plato and Aristotle, to Apollonius, it is established that there are differences and that the authors' portrayal of the relationship between the two evolved over time. In Homer, anger is felt within or experienced by the θυμός, and if the θυμός does not allow the anger its natural outlet of action, it itself becomes pained. Plato, in the *Republic,* then follows a different notion by which anger and θυμός are rarely seen in the same person, rather where a well-disciplined agent is motivated by his θυμός, a less disciplined person, or an animal, experiences only anger. Aristotle returns to speaking of anger and θυμός in connection with each other showing that the θυμός is susceptible to feeling anger, and adds that the agent is responsible for the extent to which his θυμός responds to anger. Apollonius then returns entirely to the Homeric model in his treatment of Aeëtes' anger and its effect on and relationship to his θυμός. He also, however, possibly gives a nod to Aristotle's warning against extremes of anger by giving an example of one such character.

Section 2: Courage, Shame and θυμός

In this section I shall depart from my usual chronological approach of considering Homer first and begin instead with Aristotle. This is because Aristotle considers courage at length, not perhaps to the same extent as Plato defines θυμός in the *Republic,* but in sufficient detail to provide a useful framework for comparison. Furthermore, he does so with reference to θυμός. It will also quickly be appreciated that courage, by Aristotle's reckoning, can be bolstered by a sense of shame which encourages the agent to the same action as courage, so shame is considered alongside courage. In the following quotes, unless noted otherwise, 'courage' is translated from ἀνδρεία, and 'shame' from αἰδώς. Cairns additionally notes the adjective αἰσχρός used by Homer to

indicate something shameful, for example describing the failure of the Achaeans to win a war against an enemy with fewer men.[970] Particularly helpful is that Aristotle uses the same word in his description of courage. The opposite of a courageous man is a cowardly one, translated from the adjective δειλός. All of these terms are relevant in considering examples of courage, cowardice, shame and θυμός.

Aristotle calls courage a virtue or excellence, and there is no doubt that in Homer and Plato courage is also considered a positive character trait.[971] That is a view that has lately been called into question, with some modern scholarship highlighting that "doing the right thing" can be personally harmful. For example, Otteson states:

> It appears in many cases that doing the right thing can sometimes harm us. Integrity, for instance, may require us to repay our debts, even if we could otherwise use the money to go on a vacation. Duties for beneficence or generosity might also siphon resources to projects that help others instead of ourselves. In the case of courage, we may even be forced to risk our own lives to save other people.[972]

If integrity and courage are no longer considered virtues worth having, one can only imagine what the reaction would be at learning of the Homeric heroes who risked their lives not to save other people, but to avoid being thought cowardly. It is the ends that courage pursues that Rorty also considers problematic:

> Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable.[973]

I agree that these ends in themselves are questionable. The obstacles must be worth opposing, the dangerous actions worth completing, and that is where opinions can vary over time. Aristotle asked "What form of death then is a test

[970] Cairns, 1993, p.58. Hom. *Il.* 2.119-122.
[971] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1114b26.
[972] Otteson, 2022, p.1.
[973] Rorty, 1986, p.151.

of courage? Presumably that which is the noblest. Now the noblest form of death is death in battle".[974] He does not make a distinction according to whether the battle is being fought for a noble cause or a poor one. However, despite all that has been written afterwards, Aristotle regarded courage as a good thing, while the Homeric heroes showed by their actions that they too regarded death in battle to be the noblest. Later views too can be accommodated by considering that it is only the values assigned to the ends that change. If it is accepted that the ends are considered by the agent to be worthwhile, then the courage that drives them to pursue those ends must regarded as a positive character trait. As summarised by an unnamed 9-year old child:

> Courage is when you believe in something, you really do, so you go ahead and try to do what your beliefs tell you to do, and if you're in danger, that way – well, you're not thinking "I'm in danger". You're thinking, "this is right, this is important, and I'm going to go ahead, and that is that".[975]

Courage, shame and θυμός in Aristotle

Aristotle shows that there are different types of courage, of which one is associated with θυμός. He does not call this "true courage", but the θυμός-courageous man may be thought to be truly courageous because true courage and θυμός-courage both motivate him to the same course of action. Aristotle also shows the relationship between courage and fear of shame with courage pursuing honour and shunning shame.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle has discussed virtues and vices, whether they are voluntary or involuntary, and shown that virtues are a disposition, and the observation of the "mean".[976] The first individual virtue that he discusses is courage.[977] As explained by Aristotle:

> Courage is the observance of the mean in relation to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances stated; and it is

[974] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1115a33-35.
[975] Coles, 1998, pp.118-119.
[976] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1114b26-31.
[977] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1115a6.

> confident and endures because it is noble to do so or base (αἰσχρός) not to do so.[978]

Immediately there is an association between courage and shame with a sense of what is shameful bolstering courage's resilience. Courage itself is the observance of the mean, but it endures because it is shored up by the knowledge of what is noble and what is shameful. This alone, the observance of the mean, is what Aristotle calls courage, but he also notes that the name 'courage' is also applied to five other "types of character" which he goes on to describe.[979]

The first, "citizen's courage" (πολιτική), is the most like true courage because it is "prompted by a virtue, namely the sense of shame (αἰδώς), and by the desire of something noble, namely honour, and the wish to avoid reproach, which would be shameful (αἰσχρός)."[980] In this type of courage the pursuit of what is noble and fear of shame have together taken the place of the observance of the mean in true courage. As examples of this sort of courage Aristotle quotes the Homeric heroes Hector and Diomedes who through this "citizen's courage" fought although the odds were against them.[981] A sort of 'part two' of this definition of courage is "the courage of troops forced into battle by their officers".[982] It is inferior to the courage prompted by what is either noble or αἰσχρός because its motivation is fear of the captain rather than the troops' own sense of shame if they do not fight, but it is still laudable as the result (fighting) is the same.[983] Thus in this first courage-like condition shame is again linked with courage as fear of shame remains the motivation of citizen-courage. No mention of θυμός is made in relation to this type of courage.

The second type of courage is courage through knowledge, where a soldier's experience on the battlefield makes him brave against a lesser enemy.[984] Aristotle invokes Plato as he explains that this is why Socrates argued that

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[978] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a10-12.
[979] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a16-18.
[980] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a27-30.
[981] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a23-26.
[982] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a30-32.
[983] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a30-35.
[984] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b3-16.

courage is knowledge.[985] There is no mention of θυμός in this type of courage either, nor of αἰδώς.

Aristotle introduces the third type of courage with the statement "θυμός is also classed with Courage", because of which it is worth quoting at length:

> θυμός is also classed with Courage. Men emboldened by θυμός, like wild beasts which rush upon the hunter that has wounded them, are supposed to be courageous, because the courageous are also θυμοειδεῖς; for θυμός is very impetuous in encountering danger. Hence Homer writes, 'he put strength in their θυμός', and 'roused up their might and their θυμός', and 'bitter wrath up through his nostrils swelled', and 'his blood boiled'; for all such symptoms seem to indicate an excitement and impulse of the θυμός. Thus the real motive of courageous men is the nobility of courage, although θυμός operates in them as well.[986]

Three points in this paragraph are helpful in our understanding of Aristotle's understanding of θυμός. Firstly, Aristotle had stated that these five "types of character", of which θυμός-courage is the third, are not true courage in his opinion but are widely regarded as courage.[987] This distinction is subtle but shows that the world in general, or at least the communities with which Aristotle was familiar, might hold a slightly different view of the meaning of courage, and therefore the meaning of θυμός, than that held by Aristotle the philosopher. The acceptance of Aristotle's views by his contemporaries is impossible to determine; whether all or most philosophers, or rulers, or educated men, or playwrights agreed with him can only be guessed at, although their works, where extant, could do much to inform an accurate guess (an approach which is tested with regards to Homer and Apollonius Rhodius throughout this thesis).

Secondly, Aristotle states that "the courageous (οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι) also are θυμοειδεῖς".[988] Therefore while Aristotle believes, as noted above, that true courage is not equal to θυμός-courage, he does hold that courageous people are

[985] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b4-6, referencing Plato's *Laches.*
[986] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b23-32
[987] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a10-18
[988] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b26

also θυμοειδεῖς. He does not state that the θυμοειδεῖς are also ἀνδρεῖοι, which may imply that he regarded ἀνδρεῖος to be a subset of θυμοειδής.

Thirdly, of the four Homeric quotes that Aristotle gives regarding θυμός, only two mention θυμός. Aristotle justifies the inclusion of the other two ("bitter wrath up through his nostrils swelled", and "his blood boiled") by explaining that these symptoms "indicate an excitement and impulse of θυμός".[989] It is therefore explained that θυμός can be strengthened and roused, and that one possible symptom of that state is "bitter wrath". "His blood boiled" is another symptom of a roused θυμός, and is one instance of a recurring motif of heat in relation to θυμός which is explored at length in the section 'heat and θυμός'.

Strikingly absent from Aristotle's analysis of θυμός-courage is any mention of αἰδώς or τό αἰσχρόν. Elsewhere Aristotle classified both αἰδώς and θυμός as πάθη – sensations or emotions – along with fear and desire.[990] I would suggest that Aristotle does not mention αἰδώς in this case because it is an emotion that pushes a person away from one course of action (shamefully shirking from fighting) which is not necessary when the agent is already being motivated towards the opposite course of action (fighting) by the θυμός. In cases of θυμός-courage, θυμός pushes the agent towards the non-shameful act (fighting), and the strength of θυμός motivating the agent to that end means it is unnecessary to ask himself whether not fighting would be αἰσχρός.

The fourth type of courage Aristotle mentions is a sanguine temperament.[991] It is similar to knowledge-courage in that it is born of experience of previous victories.[992] However, unlike the well-judged courage of type two, there is a possibility that this confidence is misplaced as Aristotle goes on to explain "when, however, things do not turn out as they expect, the merely sanguine run away, whereas the mark of the courageous man, as we have seen, is to endure things that are terrible to a human being and that seem so to him, because it is

[989] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b27-30.
[990] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1220b12-13.
[991] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a9-10.
[992] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a10-12.

noble to do so and base not to do so".[993] If a sanguine man is mistaken in the situation, he will run away because he knows he cannot win. A truly courageous man, on the other hand, will stay and fight because it is either noble to do so or αἰσχρός not to do so. Aristotle's contrast here between sanguine courage and true courage serves to highlight the similarity of the motivations behind both citizen courage and true courage. The description of sanguine courage does not mention θυμός. It only mentions αἰδώς/αἰσχρός in the negative – as something that affects a truly courageous person but that is not present in a sanguine-courageous person.

The fifth and final type of character also does not feature θυμός. This is courage through ignorance and is described only very briefly by Aristotle. "Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous".[994] Unlike sanguine courage, though, where the sanguine "stand firm for a time", "those who have been deceived as to the danger, if they learn or suspect the true state of affairs, take to flight" immediately.[995] Again, there is no mention of shame or θυμός playing any role in ignorance-courage.

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle again gives courage as the midway point, stating that it is "the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring", falling appropriately between being too fearful and too confident.[996] As in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he posits five 'pseudo-courages'. He says these are "kinds of courage so called by analogy, because brave men of these kinds endure the same things as the really courageous, but not for the same reasons".[997] Aristotle's descriptions in the *Eudemian Ethics* are far briefer than they are in the *Nicomachean Ethics:*

> One is civic courage; this is courage due to a sense of shame (αἰδώς). Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said [Pl. *Protagoras* 360] but of ways of encountering what is formidable.

[993] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a15-18.
[994] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a22-23.
[995] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a22-26.
[996] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1228a37-8.
[997] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1229a12-13.

> Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that makes children and madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine. Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or θυμός. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the man who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and θυμός, for θυμός is a thing that makes him beside himself.[998]

These five kinds of courage are reproduced in the table below, alongside those of the *Nicomachean Ethics* for comparison. After the first two categories, Aristotle varies the order of the types of courage:

Nicomachean Ethics		***Eudemian Ethics***	
Type of "courage"	**Motivation/cause**	**Type of "courage"**	**Motivation/cause**
a) Citizens' courage b) Military courage	Desire of honour/ Sense of shame Fear of commanding officer	Civic courage	Sense of shame (αἰδώς)
Knowledge courage	Experience allows accurate assessment of danger	Military courage	Experience/knowledge
θυμός-courage	Excitement of θυμος causing impetuosity	Inexperience courage	Ignorance of danger, as in madness
Sanguine courage	Confidence in victory	Hopeful courage	Previous good fortune or present intoxication
Ignorant courage	Ignorance of danger	Emotional courage	Love or θυμός

On the whole, there is a strong similarity between the two lists of five lesser types of courage. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle lists the types of courage in order of laudability, and states that θυμός-courage "seems to be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be true courage".[999] He therefore appears to regard it as a useful, even

[998] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1229a13-25.
[999] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117a2-6.

praiseworthy, type of pseudo-courage, similar to the higher types of courage, and in contrast to the lower ones. Although in the *Eudemian Ethics* courage motivated by θυμός is listed last, Aristotle again notes that it is both "natural" and "useful":

> But nevertheless the courage of θυμός is in the highest degree natural; θυμός is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are the best fighters. Civic courage is due to law. But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful for encouragement in dangers.[1000]

Although he had earlier stated that emotional courage could be motivated by *either* "love or θυμός". He is careful to single out θυμός as being "in the highest degree natural"; he does not include courage motivated by ἔρως in that description.

There is a slight difference between the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* in the role that Aristotle assigns to αἰδώς. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* both true courage and civic-courage were motivated by the avoidance of αἰδώς as well as its complement, the pursuit of what is noble, although that was only a secondary consideration in true courage while it was the primary one in civic-courage. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, on the other hand, true courage is concerned only with what is noble, while civic courage is prompted only by αἰδώς. As the resulting actions are the same, though, there is still a connection between courage and αἰδώς. This leaves the connection between θυμός and αἰδώς to be explored. Aristotle describes them as being no more connected than as serving the same end, both resulting in one of the states of near-courage. The connection is seen far more clearly in Homer.

Courage, shame and θυμός in Homer

The strong association between courage and θυμός is also seen in Homer. The examples he gives do not allow a judgment of whether the warriors are exhibiting true courage or θυμός-courage according to Aristotle's definitions,

[1000] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1229a28-32.

but that is unimportant. The same motivations are apparent: the θυμός motivates the agent to pursue the honourable course and shun the shameful one. If anything, fear of shame appears to be a stronger motivator than pursuit of honour.

To examine courage, αἰδώς and θυμός in Homer, and how that compares with Aristotle, it seems logical to begin with the two examples that Aristotle himself gave from the *Iliad*: Hector, starting at 22.100, and Diomedes, starting at 8.148. Both of these episodes are analysed in depth above with regards to the motivating and deliberating aspects of θυμός, so it is not necessary to quote them at length here.

The incident involving Diomedes occurs when Nestor advises Diomedes not to engage Hector as it is evident that Zeus is favouring the latter on that day. Diomedes recognises the truth of Nestor's words, but he responds that "dread grief comes upon my heart and θυμός, for Hector will one day say, as he speaks in the assembly of the Trojans: 'Tydeus' son, driven in flight before me, reached the ships'. So he will one day boast – on that day let the wide earth gape for me".[1001] Aristotle gave this as an example of a person experiencing fear of αἰδώς although neither αἰδώς nor any other word associated with shame is used by Homer. In his seminal work on αἰδώς, Cairns made the following proviso:

> I treat the concept of *aidōs* as a whole, and I have no qualms about using instances of the various cognate terms as evidence for the significance of the central concept to which they refer. … *aidōs* is used as shorthand for the concept under investigation, and while this usually, though not always indicates that some term belonging to the *aidōs*-group occurs in the passages under discussion, it should not be assumed that the reader will necessarily find the noun itself in the text.[1002]

Cairns' own justification for this approach is entirely adequate, and it now appears that Aristotle was using a similar tactic. With two such excellent precedents, I have no hesitation in doing the same.

[1001] Hom. *Il.* 8.147-9.
[1002] Cairns, 1993, p.1.

To continue with Diomedes, allowing that his fear of Hector's boasting is based in fear of αἰδώς, two points are salient here. First, his fear, "this dread grief", is felt in his θυμός. This would cause difficulties for Aristotle who regards both fear and θυμός to be emotions, which would lead to the conceptual problem of understanding that one emotion is being felt within another emotion. However, Homer was not constrained by later usage of θυμός and to feel an emotion in θυμός is entirely consistent with the Homeric usage of that word. Thus θυμός and αἰδώς are connected in this account, and both are pushing or pulling Diomedes to the same end: to fight Hector. Secondly, what Diomedes fears is the consequences of an action that he regards as shameful (not fighting): the opinion of other people. Diomedes himself knows, as indicated by acknowledging the wisdom of Nestor's advice, that he is not a coward. Nevertheless, Nestor does not try to persuade him using the argument that the report would be false, but rather that not even the Trojans would believe it, no matter what spin Hector attempted to put on his flight.[1003] However, even though the report would be false, and made not to his own people but to the Trojans at some future time, and disbelieved by the hearers, still Diomedes would rather die than know such a report was ever going to be made. This demonstrates both the strength of Diomedes' αἰδώς, and the susceptibility of his θυμός to evaluate the fear of αἰδώς above love of life. Adkins uses Nestor's argument and Diomedes' response to suggest that regardless of what the hero himself knows to be true, all that he values is the opinion of others: "The Homeric hero cannot fall back upon his own opinion of himself, for his self only has the value which other people put upon it".[1004] Cairns argues against Adkins' proposal that Diomedes has no sense of self-worth, but rather has a co-existent anxiousness that other people will share his own high opinion of himself.[1005] Cairns does not appeal to Plato's authority, but Socrates' argument in the *Republic* that a person's θυμός will not be roused against suffering if he believes his treatment to be deserved would also argue for Diomedes' sense of self-worth.[1006] Had Diomedes believed Hector's hypothetical speech to be justified,

[1003] Hom. *Il.* 8.151-156.
[1004] Adkins, 1960, p.49.
[1005] Cairns, 1993, p.73.
[1006] Pl. *Resp.* 440c1-4.

he would be less likely to object to it, and Cairns is right to assign to him a sense of self-worth alongside his perhaps excessive concern for the opinion of others.

Moving on to Aristotle's other example, Hector, this takes place at the beginning of Hector's long debate in θυμός of whether to pursue safety, albeit a slim chance, or glory in death. Again, the role of θυμός in the debate has already been analysed at length. In Hector's initial speech to his θυμός, we do see the 'shame-words' that were lacking in the account of Diomedes, vindicating Aristotle's and Cairns' inclusion of Diomedes:

> Ah, me, if I go inside the gates and the walls, Polydamas will be the first to put reproach on me, since he told me to lead the Trojans to the city during that fatal night when noble Achilles rose up. But I did not listen – surely it would have been far better! But now, since I have brought the army to ruin through my blind folly, I feel shame (αἰδέομαι) before the Trojans, and the Trojans' wives with trailing robes, lest perhaps some other, baser than I, may say: 'Hector, trusting in his own might, brought ruin on the army.'[1007]

The similarity between Hector's account and that of Diomedes is that both have the choice of fighting gloriously or retreating shamefully. In both cases, the θυμός pulls them to fight, while αἰδώς pushes them not to retreat. This same choice, and the same result, can be seen again and again in all of the debates in θυμός that have already been discussed. Together they confirm the relationship between θυμός and αἰδώς with both always being on the same side of the debate and leading together to the same end – to fight.

Courage, shame and θυμός in Plato

In the *Republic*, our main source of a definition of θυμός by Plato, courage is clearly associated with θυμός. The education of the warrior-guardians, the thumoedic class, is carefully designed to make them courageous (ἀνδρεῖοι) and not fear death as something terrible so that they "will be unafraid of death and will prefer death in battle rather than defeat and slavery".[1008] Furthermore, they

[1007] Hom. *Il.* 22.99-107.
[1008] Pl. *Resp.* 386a6, b3-4

must be exposed to no stories of gods or heroes weeping or grieving immoderately, otherwise they themselves may "sing many dirges and laments at the least sufferings without shame (αἰσχυνόμενος) or restraint".[1009] Again, therefore, courage as well as fear of shame are associated with θυμός in Plato's *Republic.* Cairns sees the example of Leontius as underlining the association between the thumoedic class and shame with Leontius' desire being shame-worthy and his θυμός becoming accordingly angry.[1010] An even stronger association of θυμός and αἰδώς is seen in the *Phaedrus,* where the "noble horse", which as demonstrated above is associated with the part of the soul that in the *Republic* Plato called the θυμός, fights against the sexual desire of the other horse because of αἰδώς.[1011]

Throughout Plato's examples or discussions of αἰδώς, the same relationship between that and θυμός can be seen as the one established in Homer. The two work on the same side pulling an agent to a courageous course of action and pushing them away from a shameful one.

Courage, shame and θυμός in Apollonius Rhodius

In the *Argonautica,* θυμός is mentioned in connection with Medea more than any other character. It has already been shown that Apollonius tends to take a Homeric tradition and twist it subtly into something new. There is nothing subtle, though, in his treatment of θυμός, courage and shame in Medea's case. The strong relationship between θυμός and courage is still there, but the motivating role of pursuit of honour and fear of shame is changed entirely so that the θυμός champions a course that is dishonourable. Even Medea's intense fear of shame cannot overpower the dictates of her courageous θυμός.

In Book 3 of the *Argonautica,* Medea debates two courses of action: to either follow her heart, corrupted as it is by Eros's arrow, and help Jason in his task, or to be a loyal daughter to Aeëtes and withhold any help from Jason. Medea's choice is not clear-cut as regards courage. The Homeric heroes had clear

[1009] Pl. *Resp.* 388d6-7
[1010] Cairns, 1993, p.383.
[1011] Pl. *Phdr.* 253e5-254a3.

standards to follow living in a world where courage is demonstrated by fighting even against the odds, and honour is won by the same means. For Medea, courage would still be demonstrated by fighting against the odds, but that would not be the honourable course. Medea's courageous 'fight' was against her father and social norms. Honour, by the standards of acceptable behaviour of her time, would only be won by meekly withdrawing from the scene and abandoning Jason to his fate. This complicates courage's relationship with honour, but θυμός and αἰδώς are still very much present.

The end of the debate (which is discussed separately at length in the section 'Medea and θυμός'), is that Medea makes the decision to follow her heart and help Jason, at which point her "θυμός bounded with joy".[1012] This debate also contains almost half of the instances of αἰδώς in the *Argonautica,* indicating that θυμός and αἰδώς are both strongly present in the single character of Medea, just as they are in the heroes of Homer. However, the pattern seen so far in both Homer and Plato, where θυμός and αἰδώς work in concert to motivate the agent towards one particular action and away from its opposite, is not repeated by Apollonius.

The response of Medea's θυμός makes it clear that her θυμός championed one course of action over the other. In Homeric debates, the θυμός always inclined to the heroic action of fighting, with αἰδώς additionally pushing the hero away from the shameful act of retreating from battle. In Medea's case, Apollonius identifies the two competing motivators as "shame" (αἰδώς) and "desire" (ἵμερος) saying that "as often as she went straight on, shame held her within the chamber, and though held back by shame, bold desire kept urging her on".[1013] In view of the fact that Medea's θυμός later "bounded with joy" at her desires winning through, it is clear that her θυμός had taken the side of desire in this debate, with shame as a counteracting force. Apollonius sets desire and shame in opposition to each other elsewhere in the *Argonautica,* but without the additional presence of θυμός: nymphs desired to touch the golden fleece but

[1012] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.724.
[1013] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.652-3.

αἰδώς, in this case indicating respect for the fleece rather than shame at touching it, held them back.[1014] The opposition of θυμός and αἰδώς in Medea's story is illustrated again later when Medea has decided on her course of action, θυμός having won out over αἰδώς. She is driven onwards until, having left Chalkiope, "again shame and hateful fear (αἰδώς τε στυγερόν δέος) seize Medea thus left alone, that she should devise such deeds for a man in her father's despite".[1015]

In summary, then, Apollonius takes the special relationship between θυμός and αἰδώς and turns it on its head. No longer do they support each other in motivating the agent to the same end. On the contrary, in the most thumoedic character in the *Argonautica* they fight against each other in strong contrast to the examples in Homer and the analysis by Aristotle. In another way, though, this opposition of θυμός and αἰδώς in the *Argonautica* shows Apollonius returning θυμός to a Homeric, pre-Platonic status. In Homer the dictates of the θυμός were very nearly impossible to resist. In Plato, by contrast, when a real as opposed to an ideal θυμός was shown, it was relatively weak when the agent was pulled in two ways. Apollonius returns θυμός in Medea's case to its Homeric irresistible strength.

Conclusion

Throughout the literature considered θυμός and courage are strongly connected, and that does not change. Aristotle showed that courageous people are thumoedic, although not necessarily vice versa. Plato has the ideal θυμός carefully educated to value courage and fear shame, although in the real-life examples that he gives it often falls short. Apollonius also showed his most thumoedic character, Medea, demonstrating courage as she chose the fighting course.

What changes is the relationship between courage and shame. The two work in concert until we get to the *Argonautica.* The desire for honour pulls the agent to one course of action, always the courageous one. The fear of shame, of

[1014] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1147-8.
[1015] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.741-3.

appearing cowardly, pushes them away from the opposite course of action. Therefore the θυμός does not have to choose whether to value courage more highly than fear of shame or not, as they tend towards the same action in any case. There have already been many examples of Apollonius taking a Homeric concept and twisting it subtly, but in this case the change is not subtle. Courage and fear of shame no longer work towards the same end but are diametrically opposed as Medea chooses the course that is courageous yet shameful. She still fears shame as shown in her internal debates, but her θυμός wins out and she takes the courageous course.

Section 3: Heat and θυμός

While assessing θυμός in each of the three authors that have been examined in depth, some features are immediately striking as being a constant presence. Anger and θυμός are never far apart although the exact relationship varies, as seen above. Emotions in general are frequently mentioned in close proximity to, and even in, the θυμός, along with a strong motivational aspect. If these and other features can be called the 'constants' of θυμός, there are other aspects that are not immediately noticeable in all authors, but that are very prominent in one or two. The relationship between heat and θυμός first comes to prominence in Plato's *Timaeus,* but it is worth looking more deeply to see if the same aspect, more subtly presented, has been overlooked in Homer. In addition other texts are examined, in particular Aristotle, as well as medical texts which shed additional light on the subject.

Heat and θυμός in Homer

Finding references to heat and θυμός in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is challenging. Any possible references are tangential and speculative. To find them at all it is necessary to approach the material with the idea already fixed in mind that θυμός is associated with heat and that a very active θυμός is a heated θυμός. Even then, the references are ultimately discovered not to associate heat and θυμός.

One potential line of enquiry is the use of ῥιγέω in *Iliad* 4.150 and 16.119, and *Odyssey* 23.216. Translated 'shudder' by Murray, in the *Iliad* Book 4 Menelaus "shuddered" when he was severely injured in the time before his θυμός was gathered back into his breast.[1016] Etymologically ῥιγέω can be connected to ῥῖγος – frost, or cold. It is therefore possible that Menelaus shivered through cold because of the absence of θυμός, proving in turn that θυμός is a warming element that, if present, would have prevented the shivering. However, Menelaus' shuddering is easily explained as a consequence of his injury and the apprehension of the possibly dire consequences of the same. It is not necessary to explain the presence of ῥιγέω in the narrative by any more complicated reasoning than that. Moving forward to *Iliad* 16.119, any possible association between θυμός and heat that might have been argued from the above is refuted entirely. Telamonian Aias, on witnessing the intervention of Zeus on Hector's side, "recognised in his incomparable θυμός and shuddered (ῥίγησεν) at the deeds of the gods".[1017] Here we have the agent shuddering while the θυμός is not only present but active in one of its Homeric aspects, that of taking in information and working out consequences. Thus it cannot be an absence of θυμός that causes Aias to shudder. Similarly, in the *Odyssey*, Penelope's θυμός "shuddered" at the thought that she may be deceived.[1018] Again, the shuddering and the θυμός are both present simultaneously, this time the shuddering/shivering takes place within the θυμός. To argue that her θυμός, if heavily connected with heat in the mind of the author, "shivered with cold" instead of the more logical "shuddered with dread" would involve even more complex reasoning than the Menelaus example. Therefore despite the etymology of ῥιγέω it is not possible to use it to argue for θυμός being connected with heat in the Homeric works.

A potentially more profitable example occurs in the *Odyssey* when "the θυμός in the breasts of all were cheered (ἰάνθη)" at seeing what they took to be an encouraging bird omen.[1019] ἰάνθη is from ἰαίνω – warm/heat, as well as

[1016] Hom. *Il.* 4.150-2.
[1017] Hom. *Il.* 16.119-120.
[1018] Hom. *Od.* 23.215-216.
[1019] Hom. *Od.* 15.165. Cambridge Greek Lexicon, 2021, s.v. "ἰαίνω".

gladden/placate.[1020] If the θυμός is connected with heat, then to have it further warmed could suggest a strengthening of the θυμός. However, turning to another example complicates that reading. In the *Iliad,* Antilochus beats Menelaus in a race. Menelaus, "grieved at θυμός", is furious: "Antilochus, once wise, what a thing you have done! You have put my skill to shame and have thwarted my horses, thrusting to the front your own that were far lesser."[1021] Antilochus apologises for his victory and offers up his prize to Menelaus. It is in describing Menelaus' reaction that Homer again uses θυμὸς ἰάνθη, this time with a helpful simile to consolidate the meaning:

> And his heart was warmed (τοῖο δὲ θυμὸς ἰάνθη) like the grain when it grows ripe with the dew on the ears, when the fields are bristling. Even so, Menelaus, was your heart warmed in your breast (φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἰάνθη). Then he spoke winged words to Antilochus, saying: "Antilochus, now I of myself cease from my anger (χωόμενος) against you".[1022]

Anger and θυμός are associated in Homer, as explored above. When Achilles was angry, his natural thumoedic reaction was to draw his sword and kill Agamemnon.[1023] By not venting his anger in violence, it festered within him to the detriment of his θυμός.[1024] Turning now to Menelaus we again see anger and θυμός, but in this case Menelaus's anger ceases, not by being violently released, but simply by him letting it go as something that is no longer important. Crucially, this happens when his θυμός is warmed. Therefore if from this passage we can argue an association between heat and θυμός in Homer, then in Homer a heated θυμός is not a 'raging' or 'boiling' θυμός as Aristotle would later have it, but one that is softened into gentleness. Ideas do change over time, but in such a case as this it is worth asking whether there may be an alternative explanation that does not require a complete about-face between Homer and later authors.

[1020] Eg. Hom. *Od*. 8.426: ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ πυρὶ χαλκὸν **ἰήνατε** (heat a cauldron on the fire).
[1021] Hom. *Od.* 23.570-572.
[1022] Hom. *Il.* 23.597-603.
[1023] Hom. *Il.* 1.188-196.
[1024] Hom. *Il.* 9.260.

Clarke addresses the question of whether ἰαίνω implies heat in relation to what he calls the "θυμός family" of words. As he had observed that ψυχή is etymologically associated with coldness, and as he regards ψυχή as being the cold departing final breath as opposed to θυμός which is associated with the warm breath of vigorous life, it may be expected that he would make much of any association between θυμός and heat that would bolster his argument.[1025] However, he reads this Menelaus passage as indicating that the mental apparatus (by Clarke's argument the collective meaning of the θυμός family of words) becomes liquified, emphasizing malleability rather than relative heat. He develops this theory by including examples where Hector's κραδίη (one of Clarke's θυμός family) is likened to an axe in *Iliad* 3.60-3, where the θυμός, κραδίη or ἦτορ is described as a thing of iron (*Iliad* 22.357, 24.205, *Odyssey* 4.293, 5.191, 23.172), and where Telemachus accuses his mother of having a κραδίη of stone (*Odyssey* 23.103). Thus Clarke concludes that "when [Menelaus] yields to placation … his mental apparatus melts and is liquified", on the other hand a stonelike or ironlike θυμός would be stern and implacable.[1026] Clarke's intention was always to let "the Homeric words speak for themselves" and by sticking to that remit he is very well able to account for Homer's use of ἰαίνω by showing that it indicates the malleable composition of the θυμός at that moment rather than its raging temperature.[1027] Thus even from this initially quite promising sentence, it is not possible to argue that Homer considered the θυμός to be intimately connected with heat.

Heat and θυμός in Plato

In the *Cratylus,* Socrates and Hermogenes discuss words which, according to Socrates, have had their spellings altered over time and consequently have had their original meanings obscured. Regarding day (ἡμέρα), for example, Socrates asks "don't you know that only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver?", and regarding obligation (δέον) he states "the ancient word, which is more likely to be right than the present one …".[1028] It is when

[1025] Clarke, 1999, pp.144-147.
[1026] Clarke, 1999, p.99-100.
[1027] Clarke, 1999, p.47.
[1028] Pl. *Cra.* 418c9-10, 418e10-419a1.

Hermogenes asks "What of ἡδονή (pleasure) and λύπη (pain) and ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates?" that Socrates speaks of θυμός.[1029] He explains ἐπιθυμία and then states "And θυμός has its name from the raging (θύσις) and boiling (ζέσεως) of the soul (ψυχή)".[1030] The conversation quickly moves on from θυμός so this brief reference to heat is all that we can learn of it from the *Cratylus*. It is, however, fascinating to read that in Plato's time two thinkers were already depicted as having a complex conversation regarding the difficulties of understanding the full meaning of the very words they were speaking.

The *Timaeus* has already been discussed at length, above, so it is only necessary in this section to be reminded that the physical θυμός as described by the interlocuters is connected with heat. This passage is key:

> As a means of relief for the leaping of the heart (καρδίας), in times when dangers are expected and passion (θυμοῦ) is excited – since they knew that all such swelling of the passionate parts (θυμουμένων) would arise from the action of fire - they contrived and implanted the form of the lungs. This is, in the first place, soft and bloodless; and, moreover, it contains within it perforated cavities like those of a sponge, so that, when it receives the breath and the drink, it might have a cooling effect and furnish relief and comfort in the burning heat. To this end they drew the channels of the windpipe to the lungs, and placed the lungs as a kind of padding around the heart (καρδίαν), in order that, when the passion (θυμός) therein should be at its height, by leaping upon a yielding substance and becoming cool, it might suffer less and thereby be enabled the more to be subservient to the reason in times of passion (θυμοῦ).[1031]

We are given here a picture of a θυμός becoming physically heated as if by fire when it is excited and swelling as a result, potentially causing damage to the heart, and needing to be physically cooled by the spongy, bloodless lungs. Interestingly the θυμός is excited when dangers are expected, a detail which in passing would explain why the θυμός features so often in the *Iliad.* After the physical description of the θυμός, the discussion goes on to other organs and

[1029] Pl. *Cra.* 419b5-6.
[1030] Pl. *Cra.* 419d8-e2.
[1031] Pl. *Ti.* 70c1-d6.

then to the immortality or otherwise of various parts of the soul, so there is no other mention of heat in connection with θυμός.

Heat and θυμός in Aristotle

When speaking of θυμός in psychical terms in the *Republic,* Plato had not associated it with heat. However when he addressed its physical properties in the *Timaeus,* he did. This is largely the pattern that continues in Aristotle.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* where Aristotle considers the make-up of the soul, he does not frequently use words associated with heat and fire as of a physical entity when speaking of θυμός. He does liken θυμός to a watchdog saying that "anger (θυμός), owing to the heat (θερμότητα) and swiftness of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given and rushes off to take vengeance".[1032] The watchdog's θυμός hears that there is an order, but does not hear what the order is, only presuming that the order would be to attack and acting accordingly. The reason for its impetuosity, according to Aristotle, is twofold: both its swiftness, and the heat of its nature. Despite the above reference making an obvious association between heat and θυμός, however, such references are not an especially prominent feature of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

It is when Aristotle moves away from examining the make-up of the soul that he more clearly associates θυμός with heat, both as a generator of heat and as responsive to heat. In the *Parts of Animals* he shows a cause and effect relationship in that θυμός first produces heat, and then certain animals, due to the fibrous nature of the their blood, store the heat and exaggerate it:

> On the other side, there are the animals that have especially plentiful and thick fibres in their blood; these are of an earthier nature, and are of a passionate (θυμώδη) temperament and liable to outbursts of passion (θυμόν). Passion (θυμός) produces heat (θερμότητος); and solids, when they have been heated, give off more heat than fluids. So the fibres, which are solid and earthy, become as it were embers inside the blood and cause it to boil up (ζέσιν) when the fits of passion (θυμοῖς) come on. That is why

[1032] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1149a29-32.

> bulls and boars are so liable to these fits of passion (θυμώδεις).[1033]

Aristotle does not suggest that the thumoedic nature caused the thick fibres in the blood, only that the thick fibres which happen to be present in certain animals cause the animal to become more heated in response to θυμός. In this case it could be argued that the thick fibres in the blood correlate to the 'disposition' of the soul that Aristotle spoke of in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which makes a person more likely to respond strongly to anger.[1034] Freudenthal, discussing the importance of what Aristotle called "vital heat", agrees that from the above section of the *Parts of Animals* "it would thus seem that the material constitution of the blood provides a physiological basis for what Aristotle calls the 'faculties' of soul" in *Nicomachean Ethics*."[1035] On the other hand, in the *Parts of Animals* Aristotle is speaking of an entirely physical explanation of animals and does not attempt any analysis of soul, so any possible analogy must be drawn with caution.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle again sketches an association with heat and θυμός, but here he no longer considers that the internal heat is caused first by the θυμός and then stored by particularly fibrous blood. Rather, in what he sees as a justification of natural slavery, he suggests that the climate, necessarily shared by large groups of people, induces national characteristics. One such characteristic is θυμός, another is intelligence:

> The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit (θυμοῦ) but somewhat deficient in intelligence (διανοία) and skill (τέχνη), so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbours. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skilful in temperament (διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν), but lack spirit (ἄθυμα), so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent (ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν); hence it continues to be free and to

[1033] Arist. *Part. An.* 650b33-651a3.
[1034] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1105b23-25.
[1035] Freudenthal, 1999, p.50.

> have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity.[1036]

Aristotle does not specifically mention the heat of Asia causing a lack of θυμός, but the contrast with what he describes as "the cold places and those of Europe" in which the inhabitants are "full of spirit" allows the assumption that heat is a relevant factor. Plato had also, in the *Republic*, suggested that certain races are naturally more spirited than others, and although he does not ascribe any influence from the climate, they too happen to be from the cooler, northern regions:

> It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit.[1037]

It would appear, therefore, that while internal heat is conducive to a thumoedic nature, external heat is not. As explained by Heath,

> The implication is that environmental conditions that deviate from the norm produce compensatory internal deviations: an excessively cold climate must be offset by excessive internal heat (requiring a hot, and therefore spirited, nature); an excessively hot climate suppresses internal heat (producing a cold, and therefore fearful, nature). Thus *Probl*. 14.15, 910a28-b8.[1038]

Heath's explanation of the two different types of heat affecting θυμός differently is rational – in a cold climate, one can exercise to warm up, whereas in excessive heat, it is more common to suffer a lack of energy. Nevertheless, it is only, as he admits, an "implication". It is possible, however, to consider this passage in the *Politics* alongside the *Parts of Animals* and come to the same conclusion. The key to the comparison is not θυμός, but the intelligence that Aristotle states is relatively lacking in the cold climate/thumoedic nature and a prominent part of the hot climate/athumoedic nature.

[1036] Arist. *Pol.* 1327b23-33.
[1037] Pl. *Resp.* 435e4-436a1.
[1038] Heath, 2008, p.254(fn).

Returning to Aristotle's consideration of fibrous blood, it will be remembered that fibrous blood contributes to a thumoedic nature by storing and increasing the heat produced by the θυμός. Another consequence of the quantity and thickness of the fibres in the blood is the intelligence of the animal: "The thicker and warmer the blood is, the more it makes for strength; if it tends to be thin and cold, it is conducive to sensation and intelligence".[1039] Interestingly, Aristotle even considers that some animals have no blood at all, which accounts for the extraordinary intelligence of, for example, bees:

> The same difference holds good with the counterpart of blood in other creatures: and thus we can explain why bees and other similar creatures are of a more intelligent nature than many animals that have blood in them; and among the latter class, why some are more intelligent than others.[1040]

Regarding climate, in between the two extremes of cold Europe and hot Asia, there is a possible perfect middle-ground in temperate Greece. There is a similar middle ground in temperament where intelligence and strength are in ideal balance: "Best of all are those animals whose blood is hot and also thin and clear; they stand well both for courage and for intelligence".[1041] Aristotle here appears to associate the heat of the blood with courage, while its thickness, or rather thinness, accounts for intelligence. Thus the relationship between the thinness of the blood and intelligence, and likewise the thickness and with it the heat of the blood and θυμός, is established. However, in these examples, Aristotle is discussing the various natures of different species of animals which, although they are different species, inhabit the same climate. There remains to be definitely explained by Aristotle the mechanism by which external heat or cold contributes to either the trapping or the dissipation of the internal heat.

The "Problem" that Heath references above, 14.15, attempts an explanation of the courage and intelligence of inhabitants of cold and hot climates respectively. It is noted that the authorship of the *Problems*, while attributed to Aristotle at

[1039] Arist. *Part. An.* 648a2-4.
[1040] Arist. *Part. An.* 648a4-8.
[1041] Arist. *Part. An.* 648a9-11.

various points in history, is in considerable doubt.[1042] Nevertheless, as a collection they shed some light on contemporary thought, and regarding the dissipation of internal heat we read that:

> Of course, it happens that those living in hot regions are cooled (for as their bodies are porous, the heat escapes to the outside), but those living in cold regions have been heated naturally, because the flesh is thickened by the external cold, and when it has thickened the heat is collected within.[1043]

While noting again the spurious authorship, this mechanism would explain the supposed effect of climate upon the θυμός, when taken in conjunction with the *Politics* quote, above.

A final comment on Aristotle's *Politics* is to note that there are two main types of nature discussed (apart from the perfectly balanced Greeks). The thumoedic race characterised by strength and courage, and their opposites who are characterised by both their intelligence and skill (τεχνικὰ). It is interesting that all three classes of Plato's *Republic* are represented in the two natures in the *Politics*, but while the thumoedic class stands alone, the artisans (forming part of the ἐπιθυμητικόν class in the *Republic*) and the thinkers (the λογιστικόν class) are, in the *Politics*, the same race. In the *Republic* they were far apart, with the λογιστικόν and thumoedic classes instead sharing a common origin.

Pseudo-Aristotle and other literature

Problems

Having introduced the *Problems*, it is worth looking to them for contemporary or near-contemporary views on heat and θυμός. They show that, again, there is a strong connection. The structure of the *Problems* is unusual when compared with works that are unambiguously attributed to Aristotle. Ordinarily one looks to Aristotle to answer questions. In the case of the *Problems*, however, very few answers are given. The individual problems tend to take the form of "Why [question]? Is it because [theory/theories]? +/- For [justification of theory]".

[1042] Mayhew, 2011, pp.xvi-xxi.
[1043] [Arist.] *Pr.* XIV.16 (910b3-8).

Thus questions are raised and theories are put forward, but no absolute conclusion is reached. Nevertheless the theories and, when they occur, the justification of the theories can shed light on current thought amongst Aristotle's contemporaries. The "Problems" that mention θυμός, with the exception of two (X.45 (895b24-896a11) and XXX.12 (956b34-37)), also mention temperature. The first to be considered here also illustrates the typical structure as outlined above:

> [Question:] Why do those who are angry not shiver (ῥιγῶσιν)?
> [Theory:] Is it because anger and spiritedness (θυμός) are the opposite of cowardice?
> [Justification:] Now anger (ὀργὴ) is from fire, for it is by retaining a great deal of fire that they grow warm within. This is observable most of all in children. For men are distressed (when angry), but children first draw in deep breaths, and then grow red; for the quantity of heat (θερμὸν) within being great and causing liquefaction makes them grow red, since if one were to pour a lot of cold water over them they would cease being angry, for their heat (θερμόν) would be extinguished.[1044]

This passage links θυμός and anger and also heat and anger, which due to the stated link between θυμός and anger (discussed at length in the section Anger and θυμός, above), gives also a link between θυμός and heat. However, unlike Aristotle's fibrous blood and climate discussions, this passage suggests that an external application of cold (cold water thrown over an angry child) will quench the internal heat.

A more definite link between θυμός and heat is given in Problem 26 of Book 2:

> Why do those who are anxious sweat in the feet, but not in the face? … Is it also because anxiety is not a transference of heat from the upper regions to the lower, as in the case of fear (and this is why the bowels are loosened in those who are afraid), but an increase of heat (θερμοῦ), as in the case of anger (ἐν τῷ θυμῷ)? Indeed, anger (θυμός) is a boiling (ζέσις) of the heat (θερμοῦ) around the heart; and the one who is anxious is affected not by fear or by cold, but by what is going to happen.[1045]

[1044] [Arist.] *Pr.* VIII.20 889a15-25.
[1045] [Arist.] *Pr.* II.26 868b34-869a7. *Pr.* XXVII.3 947b23-4 essentially repeats the above question, theory and justification, but adds the notes that "this is why with respect to spirit [τὸν θυμόν] people say—not erroneously, but fittingly – 'boil up', 'stir', 'be roused', and other such expressions."

Despite the translator's use of 'anger' for θυμός, this passage indicates a physiological explanation for θυμός defining it as "a boiling of the heat around the heart". It is interesting to compare the two physical explanations of anxiety and θυμός. It seems that there is a certain amount of heat within the body to begin with, and that in a case of anxiety the heat transfers from the heart area, its proper place, to the lower. On the other hand, θυμός takes all the existing heat and causes an increase in it, so that the "upper regions" become more heated rather than less as in the case of the downward transference of heat that occurs with anxiety. Again this passage is reminiscent of Plato's physical treatment of θυμός in the *Timaeus*, quoted above, where the θυμός is positioned by the demiurge so as to be close by the heart and higher than the ἐπιθυμητικόν, and perhaps adds a reason why the ἐπιθυμητικόν needs to be firmly controlled: an excess of heat in that area causes only incontinence.

The final bodily connection between heat and θυμός in the *Problems* is reminiscent of the section of the *Parts of Animals* discussed above, but the physical effect of hot blood is taken further to explain that hard bodies are indicative of courage and θυμός:

> Why are birds and humans and the courageous animals the hardest? Is it because spirit (θυμός) involves heat (θερμότητος)? For fear is a process of cooling. Therefore, those whose blood is hot (ἔνθερμον) are courageous and spirited (ἀνδρεῖα καὶ θυμοειδῆ); indeed, blood is [their] nourishment.[1046]

The final Problem to be considered indicates that it is not only the existing "vital heat" of the heart that can affect θυμός. It does not, however, resort to the climate to explain the effect. Rather, in wartime, when θυμός and courage are most highly prized, care must be taken that a person's diet does not contain any cooling element:

> Why is it said: "Neither eat nor plant mint in wartime"? Is it because mint cools bodies? Now its corruption of seed proves this. And this is contrary to courage and spirit (θυμόν), being the same in kind.[1047]

[1046] [Arist.] *Pr.* X.60 898a4-8.
[1047] [Arist.] *Pr.* XX.2 923a9-12.

Thus we finally have the added consideration that the body's internal heat can be cooled by the ingestion of a cooling element, such as mint. While Aristotle himself, at least in his extant works, does not discuss the effect of diet on θυμός, the potential internally-cooling effect of diet is compatible with his explanations of the general association between heat and θυμός. The only Problem that is not consistent with Aristotle's internal/external heat effect on θυμός is the angry child that is said to be calmed by sudden application of cold water.

Airs, Waters, Places

Another source that may shed light on contemporary thinking is Hippocrates' *Airs, Waters, Places*. The author approaches the subject of health and diseases from an environmental point of view, explaining that certain waters are harmful and some healthful, likewise winds, and pronounced changes in the weather which force the inhabitants to change accordingly. He concludes that the climate of Asia affects the θυμός of the inhabitants, but the chief reason he cites is the unchanging nature of the weather rather than specifically the heat.

> With regard to the lack of spirit (ἀθυμίης) and bravery of the people, the main reason why Asiatics are so unwarlike in comparison to Europeans, and more gentle in character, is the seasons, which bring no great changes toward heat or cold, but are always much the same. Thus there are no mental shocks or radical alterations of the body, from which anger is likely to be provoked, with a greater share of cruelty and hot temper, than being in a monotonous sameness would. For it is changes of all things that perpetually rouse the temper of a person and do not leave him in peace.[1048]

Hippocrates does note the heat of Asia elsewhere, along with the humidity, but his emphasis on the responsibility of the lack of variety in climate raises the possibility that he believes a constantly cold climate would produce a similarly athumoedic characteristic. In addition, he gives another contributory cause: being governed by kings takes away any incentive to fight:

> Subjects are likely to be forced to undergo military service, fatigue and death, in order to benefit their masters … all their

[1048] Hipp. *AWP* 16.1-9.

> worthy, brave deeds, merely serve to aggrandize and raise up their lords, while the harvest they themselves reap is danger and death.[1049]

Although Hippocrates gives this as a contributory cause rather than a chief one, the effect of the institutions of the country is so great that he states "even if a naturally brave and spirited man is born, his temper is changed by their custom".[1050] It is still possible to read a connection between θυμός and climatic heat in Hippocrates, but he does not place so great an emphasis upon it as Aristotle does. If Aristotle's quote from the *Politics* is considered in isolation, it would argue for heat being the only factor to affect the θυμός. Hippocrates' slightly broader view gives a more balanced picture – the contribution of heat is not dismissed, but other factors are shown to be at play as well.

Summary

Only once in connection with θυμός and the soul does Aristotle mention heat. However, when he turns to the physical as opposed to the psychical θυμός, the association between heat and θυμός that Plato introduced in the *Timaeus* is continued by Aristotle. Aristotle develops the explanation of cause and effect, highlighting how the physical nature of a creature's blood (or a human's) can affect the bodily heat and with it the θυμός. Wider reading shows that some association between heat and θυμός was a fairly common thought by Aristotle's time.

Heat and θυμός in Apollonius Rhodius

As with Homer, there is at first a false start when it comes to finding associations between heat and θυμός in Apollonius. Harking back to Homer and Menelaus, ἰαίνω is again used to describe an effect upon the θυμός. When Butes hears the song of the sirens he is unable to resist. We are told that he leapt into the sea, "his soul melted (θυμὸν ἰανθείς) by the clear ringing voice of the sirens".[1051] While ἰαίνω is not commonly used by Apollonius in relation to θυμός, other words that indicate melting are plentiful. Medea's θυμός melted (κατείβετο

[1049] Hipp. *AWP* 16.15-20.
[1050] Hipp. *AWP* 16.21-23.
[1051] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.914.

θυμός) within her when Jason spoke (discussed further below).[1052] On seeing the clashing rocks, another feature imported from the *Odyssey*, the Argonauts' θυμός melted (χύτο, from χέω, used almost exclusively of liquids) within them.[1053] Therefore it is logical to conclude that the θυμὸν ἰανθείς of Butes refers to a softening into weakness of something that should be hard, rather than a heating that boils into intensified activity.

Hunter translates the phrase θυμὸν ἰανθείς as "warmed in his heart" and adds that the cause of the warmth was erotic longing.[1054] He goes on to say that Butes' melting θυμός "is a very different kind of 'warming' than occurs in the Homeric episode (*Od.* 12.175)".[1055] In saying this, he implies that Butes' θυμός was roused by heat and strengthened into action. However, the Homeric episode that Hunter cites is when Odysseus used melted or softened wax to stop the ears of his companions against the sirens' song. This was a useful warming that made the wax malleable. That of Butes, on the other hand, was a detrimental warming – a softening of the θυμός at a time when Butes desperately needed it to be strengthened instead.[1056]

There is a subtle difference, however, between the Homeric examples and this one. When Menelaus' θυμός "melted" the result was that he let go of his unreasonable anger, resulting in peace between himself and Antilochus, hence the secondary suggestion of "gladden" or "placate" for translation. The result for Butes, on the other hand, was very nearly disastrous. At this point, Butes very much needed a fully functioning and active θυμός to resist the Siren song and preserve his life. If it became softened or placated, he would almost certainly die, and indeed without divine intervention that would have been the end of the matter and of Butes.[1057] Thus while softening the θυμός in Homer simply returns it to a neutral setting, by contrast in the *Argonautica,* Butes' θυμός becomes harmfully inactive, switched off rather than only relaxing.

[1052] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.290, 3.1131.
[1053] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.561.
[1054] Hunter, 2015, p.209.
[1055] Hunter, 2015, p.209.
[1056] Hom. *Il.* 23.597.
[1057] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.916-919.

This idea of a harmfully inactive θυμός does not, however, recur in Medea's case where her θυμός is described as "melted" (κατείβετο θυμόν). As discussed above, when Medea's θυμός is melted it is not weakened into inactivity, but flows with unstoppable force like a flooding river. I argue that this was still a corrupted θυμός as she acted outside of the social norms expected of her, but at no point can it be argued that her θυμός was weakened to the extent that Butes' had been.

Medea is, however, helpful in finally finding an unarguable association between θυμός and heat. There is a particular concentration of heat words in association with θυμός in Book 3 when she is hit by Eros's arrow:

> He laid the arrow-notch on the cord in the centre, and drawing wide apart with both hands he shot at Medea; and speechless amazement seized her θυμός. But the god himself flashed back again from the high-roofed hall, laughing loud; and the bolt burnt (ἐνεδαίετο) deep down in the maiden's heart (κραδίῃ), like a flame (φλογί). And ever she kept darting bright glances straight up at Aeson's son, and within her breast her heart (φρένες) panted fast, all remembrance left her, and her soul melted (κατείβετο θυμὸν) with the sweet pain. And as a poor woman heaps dry twigs round a blazing brand (δαλῷ) – a daughter of toil, whose task is the spinning of wool, that she may kindle a blaze (σέλας) at night beneath her roof, when she has waked very early – and the flame waxing wondrous great from the small brand consumes all the twigs together; so coiling round her heart (κραδίῃ), burnt (αἴθετο) secretly Love the destroyer, and the hue of her soft cheeks went and came, now pale, now red, in her soul's (νόος) distraction.[1058]

The use of κατείβω for "melted" has already been discussed in the Medea section above and is not a reference to heat. Likewise the "bright glances" (ἀμαρύγματα) need not have too much read into them – as a grandchild of Helios, Medea's eyes naturally flashed whether or not any heat was associated with the brightness.[1059] We are left, however, with the unarguably hot and fiery words "burnt" (x2) and "flame", complemented by the illustrative simile including a "blazing brand" and a "flame waxing wondrous great". As

[1058] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.281-298.
[1059] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.727-729.

discussed above in the Medea section, it is Medea's θυμός that in the fire simile "waxes wondrous great" and destroys all other considerations.

Sanders attributes these words to the effect of Eros's arrow causing an emotional state of ἔρος in Medea rather than specifically to her θυμός.[1060] However, one of the constants that has been seen in the understanding of θυμός from Homer's time onwards is that it feels emotions, responds to them, and translates them into action. With that in mind, while Sanders is not wrong in saying that ἔρος caused Medea's physiological response, it is also justifiable to ascribe the physiological and indeed psychological responses to her θυμός.

These clearly 'hot' words in association with the effect of Eros's arrow on Medea's θυμός are novel when compared to the Homeric θυμός with which heat is not noticeably connected. Therefore this passage may be read as non-Homeric and more reminiscent of the Platonic θυμός of the *Timaeus* which risks destroying the heart with its heat.[1061] However, Effe notes that in fact this passage is also influenced by Homer through the simile of the poor woman (γυνὴ χερνήτις) who also appeared in the *Iliad.*[1062] In the *Iliad,* the γυνὴ χερνήτις conscientiously weighs her wool in a double-scale to provide sustenance for her children.[1063] Here, she illustrates Medea and particularly her heated θυμός which, like the poor woman's fire that she conscientiously kindles, can be, as Effe notes, "in one instance the means to a useful end, in the other a destructive force".[1064] Accepting Effe's assertion that this simile deliberately borrows the γυνὴ χερνήτις from the *Iliad,* this passage therefore shows Homer's influence on Apollonius through the use of the evocative Homeric simile, but also the notion, not Homeric, that θυμός is strongly associated with heat as exemplified in Plato's *Timaeus* and several of Aristotle's works. The former, Effe argues, is what Apollonius intends: by evoking Homer's conscientious poor woman providing for her family, Apollonius "casts a compassionate light on the victim of Eros", while at the same time hinting prophetically at the

[1060] Sanders, 2021, p.48.
[1061] Pl. *Tim.* 70d4-6.
[1062] Effe, 2001, p.154.
[1063] Hom. *Il.* 12.433-435.
[1064] Effe, 2001, p.154-155.

destructive potential energy of Medea's fiery θυμός.[1065] The presence of heat, however, is not commented on by Effe as a Homeric motif.

Thus it can be seen that Apollonius does associate heat with θυμός. He does so at the time that Medea's θυμός is extraordinarily active, having been unnaturally heated by Eros's arrow. He does not go further into the physiological condition of, for example, Medea's blood which would show a clearly Aristotelian influence. However, what he does say is consistent with the notion introduced in the *Timaeus* by Plato and expanded on considerably by Aristotle that an active θυμός is associated with heat. What is lacking is any sort of 'ceremony' or obvious reference to either Plato or Aristotle. When he references Homer, Apollonius does so obviously by using the same distinctive phraseology as Homer, for example taking the γυνὴ χερνήτις from Homer's simile and putting her into one involving Medea. When he speaks of heat and θυμός, however, it is done without apparently referencing any well-known literary precedent. I recorded above how widespread the association was between heat and θυμός among Aristotle's near contemporaries. The lack of a clear literary reference when Apollonius associates heat and θυμός leads me to believe that by his time it was no longer a theory to be debated, but simply accepted fact. His writing is consistent with the *Timaeus* and with Aristotle and his contemporaries, but does not show the sort of distinctive imitation that would argue for a definite influence from any one author to the exclusion of others.

[1065] Effe, 2001, p.155.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Summary

I started my research because I wanted to understand what ancient authors meant by θυμός. It quickly became apparent that there was no "one size fits all" definition and in particular that Plato's famous definition from the *Republic* was clearly at odds with the Homeric usage. Koziak highlighted the first gap in scholarship that needed to be filled: "To ascertain whether the word's meaning had ever fluctuated". A simple but resounding "yes" would have been very easy, but unsatisfying. To answer the spirit of the question I undertook to understand fully what Homer meant when he used θυμός and then what Plato meant. The differences between those authors then prompted the next question: Which one, if either, had most influence on later writers. I chose Apollonius Rhodius as the focus of this question: as a writer of epic there was ample opportunity for him to write in the Homeric tradition, but he would also, for reasons that were discussed in the thesis, be likely to be familiar with the philosophical works as well.

The brief overview of existing scholarship on θυμός served only to emphasize that further work needed to be done. Excellent scholars have long written on θυμός as part of the soul with a heavy emphasis on emotions, or as part of a 'family' of words, or attempting to tie it to an entirely physical concept. Most, I subjectively feel, approached θυμός already heavily prejudiced by Plato's soul-centric account in the *Republic*. A few had undertaken to understand θυμός in its own right with Caswell and Cairns outstanding in their field, but limiting their analysis almost entirely to Homer, while Koziak's own exploration of the Platonic θυμός considered only the *Republic.*

I opted for a functional approach to θυμός in Homer asking in each case "what is the θυμός doing here?" This apparently simplistic approach paid great dividends and in several cases yielded surprising results. The breadth of θυμός, as noted by Cairns, was confirmed, but it was also shown that there were previously unnoticed correlations between the verb with which θυμός was associated and the aspect of θυμός being foregrounded, as well as the situations

the θυμός was facing. This was most prominent regarding the two motivations of θυμός, highlighting that it has an outward civic-facing motivation to fulfil one's role in the community, either in war or political life, but also an inward family-facing aspect, to fulfil next of kin responsibilities and to protect one's family. While this was the most startling discovery related to verbs, some difference in the 'debating' verbs was also noted. This leads to my first suggestion for further research: do verbs associated with other words than θυμός show the same pattern? A sensible beginning would be to look at, for example, the other words in Clarke's "θυμός-family" of words. This might justify Clarke's decision to look at θυμός only as part of that family of words, or it might bring to light a legitimate criticism of that method.

Moving on to Plato, the vast amount of literature already written on the *Republic* was noted, although it was still possible to add to that. In the *Republic*, Plato had narrowed the concept of θυμός compared to its usage in Homer. He presented it as being a part of the soul, and awarded some of Homer's other functions of the θυμός to other parts of the soul, separating the parts entirely one from the other. A new and rewarding strand of inquiry was to look at θυμός in action in such characters as Leontius and Thrasymachus, and the hypothetical "constitution-men" in the *Republic*. This, along with the chariot-simile in the *Phaedrus*, showed that while Plato's definition of θυμός in the *Republic* is the most famous and influential, it is actually unique in showing an ideal θυμός. The working examples are without exception problematic and demonstrate a θυμός that is either too weak or too strong. The second strand of θυμός in Plato was the physical θυμός, a topic that has been badly neglected by academia in favour of the soul-centric definition of the *Republic*. This showed an association of θυμός with heat which had not been seen in Homer.

Having established what θυμός meant to these earlier authors, it was then possible to look for the same or different in Apollonius. The first surprise was in Apollonius' own "definition" of θυμός, which was gleaned by taking a description of a diseased θυμός and working back to discover what a healthy one might be. This showed that one of the main identifiers of Apollonian θυμός in this episode was its family-centric aspect. It was with this discovery in mind

that I went back to Homer. Even reading the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* with, I hope, an open mind, I had not seen evidence of a domestic family-facing θυμός until I actively looked for it with Apollonius in mind. Then it became unmistakeable.

It was not a surprise, indeed it was one of only two possibilities, to find that Apollonius revisited the Homeric θυμός to a great extent. The taxonomy of Homeric usage was repeated by Apollonius. However, another feature of his treatment of θυμός also became apparent. While Apollonius was giving a clear nod to Homer in his use of θυμός, he also, in many cases, changed it slightly. He would do this by using an entirely Homeric phrase, but giving it a different context. For example he used the same "recovery" phrase for Ares and Medea. Ares had sustained a physical injury in battle that to a mortal would have been life-threatening, Medea had been overcome with love. Future work might involve examining other authors and genres to see if the same, or other, changes in θυμός can be found; I suspect that Josephus with his character-driven accounts of wars and politics would be very likely to repay the effort. Another interesting line of enquiry would involve the New Testament with its frequent use of θυμός-derived words such as πρόθυμον. In the course of these enquiries other aspects of θυμός might be found, as I found in Apollonius, and earlier authors then re-examined for evidence of more subtle facets of θυμός which are currently being overlooked.

Medea required special analysis in her own right. It has long been argued by scholars that Apollonius' Medea was heavily influenced by Euripides, and I agree.[1066] Medea's similarities to Homer's Nausicaa have also been previously noted, and while I expanded on those arguments, I contended that she is also fashioned after the typical Homeric hero, with a particular contribution from one of Hector's Homeric scenes.[1067] Medea is a well-researched character, but further work is possible. I note her similarities to Hector, but she would bear comparison to other of the Homeric heroes as well.

[1066] Eg. Dyck, 1989, p.455.
[1067] Eg. Hunter, 1989, pp.18-19.

Finally, three specific themes were followed through. The first was suggested by Koziak's assumption that θυμός was anger. I found that θυμός was always closely associated with anger, along with other emotions, but the closest to it actually being anger was in Plato's *Republic.* In that work there is a good argument for anger being the equivalent of θυμός in inferior characters including wild animals who, if they were better educated, might have had a θυμός instead. In all cases, though, θυμός was not anger, but was associated with anger along with a range of other emotions. The range was widest in Homer and Apollonius, but still present in Plato.

The association between courage and shame and anger was likewise found to be a constant with the courageous pursuit of noble deeds pulling the agent to one course of action, the urgent desire to avoid shameful cowardice pushing them away from the opposite course. In Homer the predominant factor was fear of shame, but as the two work in concert it is not an important distinction. It became important only in the character of Medea. For the Homeric and Apollonian heroes, and for the courageous man in Aristotle's examples, the courageous and thumoedic course of action was the opposite of the shameful, dishonourable course of action. Medea, on the other hand, thumoedically and courageously pursued a dishonourable course despite her profound fear of shame. This is the greatest of Apollonius' changes to the Homeric θυμός.

The final theme was heat and θυμός, inspired by Plato's and Aristotle's descriptions of the physical aspect of θυμός. Even when searching for a connection between heat and θυμός in Homer, I was unable to find one. However, in Apollonius it was frequently mentioned, but without the ceremony with which he introduced the distinctly Homeric references to θυμός. This led me to the conclusion that by the time Apollonius was writing, Aristotle's and Plato's connection between heat and θυμός was accepted fact, supported by various extant medical texts. While Apollonius consciously incorporated the Homeric θυμός into his work, the heated θυμός slipped in without comment. Further research, particularly into medical texts, could be undertaken regarding this more physical aspect of θυμός.

The initial question is therefore answered. The meaning of θυμός did indeed fluctuate over time. Perhaps most strikingly, previously unnoticed aspects of θυμός were found in Homer. The second question of whether Homer or Plato had the most influence on Apollonius is also answered, but with the surprising finding that there are in fact two answers: where he chose, Apollonius chose Homer. He also, though, clearly subscribed to the more physical descriptions of θυμός that are found in Plato, Aristotle and elsewhere that claim a strong association between θυμός and heat. Taken all together, these findings show the advantages of a cross-genre analysis which can be developed in future research.

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Appendix A:

Instances of the θυμός commanding the agent to a course of action in the Homeric epics

Agent	**Command of θυμός**
Alkinous (*Od.* 9.12)	Ask Odysseus his story
Achaians (*Il.* 6.439), Hector (*Il.* 8.322), a lion (*Il.* 12.300), Sarpedon (*Il.* 12.307), Poseidon (*Il.* 15.43), Achilles (*Il.* 18.282)	Attack
Athene (*Il.* 7.25)	Attend the war in person
Hector (*Il.* 18.176)	Behead Patroclus'corpse
"any man" (*Od.* 8.204)	Challenge Odysseus
Idomeneus (*Il.* 4.253), horses (*Il.* 8.189), Demodocus (*Od.* 8.70)	Drink
Laertes (*Od.* 16.141)	Eat and drink
Penelope (*Od.* 17.554)	Enquire about Odysseus
Achaeans (*Il.* 7.74), Menelaus (*Il.* 7.152), Meleager (*Il.* 9.598), Achilles (*Il.* 9.703, 20.174), Hector (*Il.* 13.784, 22.252), Patroclus (*Il.* 16.382), Aeneas (*Il.* 20.179), Odysseus (*Od.* 18.61)	Fight
Achilles (*Il.* 1.173)	Flee (if his heart is set on it)
Aphrodite (*Il.* 14.195), Hephaestus (*Il.* 18.426), Kalypso (*Od.* 5.89)	Fulfil Hera's/Thetis's/ Hermes' wish
Priam (*Il.* 24.198, 24.288)	Go to Achilles
Agamemnon (*Il.* 9.42)	Go home
Poseidon (*Il.* 15.43)	Harm the Trojans/Hector
Odysseus (*Od.* 11.206)	Embrace his mother
Achilles (*Il.* 18.90, 20.77, 22.36)	Kill Hector
Penelope (*Od.* 1.275)	Marry
Hector (*Il.* 6.444)	Not fight
Hector (*Il.* 6.256)	Pray (Hecuba's assumption)
Athene (as Mentes) (*Od.* 1.200), Helen (*Od.* 15.172)	Prophesy
Eumaeus (*Od.* 16.466)	Return to his guest
Odysseus's crew (*Od.* 9.139)	Sail
a falcon (*Il.* 22.142)	Seize a dove
Athene (*Il.* 21.395)	Set the gods to fight
Proetus (*Il.* 6.167), Achilles (*Il.* 6.417)	Shrink from an action
Demodocus (*Od.* 8.45)	Sing
"any man" (*Od.* 15.395)	Sleep
Polyphemos (*Od.* 9.278)	Spare Odysseus
Thersites (*Il.* 2.276), Hector (*Il.* 7.68), Antenor (*Il.* 7.349), Priam (*Il.* 7.369), Zeus (*Il.* 8.6, 19.102), "any man", (*Il.* 9.101),	Speak

Nestor (*Il.* 10.534), Helen (*Od.* 4.140), Alkinous (*Od.* 7.187, 8.27), Odysseus (*Od.* 17.469, 21.194, 21.276), Eurymachus (*Od.* 18.352)	
Diomedes (*Il.* 10.220), Dolon (*Il.* 10.319, 10.389)	Spy
Agamemnon (*Il.* 19.187)	Swear an oath
Telemachus (*Od.* 4.713), Odysseus (*Od.* 14.246, 14.517, 15.339, 16.81, 21.342)	Travel

Appendix B: Euripides' influence on Apollonius's portrayal of Medea

Background:

There is a heavy concentration of θυμός and associated words in Book III of the *Argonautica.*[1068] Thirteen of these, almost half, are connected with Medea.[1069] In Euripides' tragedy *Medea*, Euripides gives Medea a long speech in which she considers the necessity, as she sees it, of murdering her own sons.[1070] She ends this speech with "I know the evils I am about to do, but my θυμός is stronger".[1071] In modern scholarship these two lines have made Medea almost synonymous with θυμός, and it is generally accepted that Apollonius' portrayal of Medea was influenced heavily by Euripides' *Medea.* Dyck, for example, states that "what Apollonius was striving to do – and that he, in fact, achieved – was not to integrate the two 'halves' of Medea's personality [ingenue and witch], but to adumbrate her tragedy at Corinth" as explored in Euripides' *Medea*.[1072] There are many arguments in support of this theory which I shall not present here in depth. However, there is one issue that needs addressing: whether Medea's monologue and its famous final two lines were in fact written by Euripides. It is not possible to answer that question conclusively, but I acknowledge the debate and argue that actually it is unimportant when considering influence upon Apollonius.

Euripides' Medea

Medea's monologue ending in the infamous "my θυμός is stronger" line in Euripides is considered by some to be spurious. A neutral summary of the debate is given by Mastronarde in which he outlines the various arguments and refutations that lines 1056-80 are an interpolation, originally written by either Euripides (as per Bergk) or inserted by some actor or director (Jachmann's theory) for dramatic effect.[1073] Mastronarde, while not expressing a definite

[1068] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.22, 98, 284, 290, 301, 337, 383, 396, 451, 511, 515, 520, 551, 612, 534, 688, 695, 724, 787, 790, 807, 812, 866, 897, 948, 1009, 1131, 1141.
[1069] Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.284, 290, 451, 634, 688, 724, 790, 807, 812, 897, 948, 1009, 1131, 1141
[1070] Eur. *Med.* 1021-1077.
[1071] Eur. *Med.* 1078-79.
[1072] Dyck, 1989, p.455.
[1073] Mastronarde, 2002, p.388-389.

opinion, leaves the lines in the text. Diggle, on the other hand chooses to parenthesize them, for which Kovacs praises him for having "the courage of his convictions".[1074] It is, however, Diggle's courage that Kovacs praises, calling the action itself a "large-scale amputation" which he implies was unnecessary.[1075] The amputation motif was then taken up by Seidensticker who provides perhaps the best refutation of all arguments for deleting the passage.[1076] Lines 1078-1080 have been caught up in this controversy. Mossman notes that the lines were quoted by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (c.280-c.204BC), suggesting that if they were an interpolation by actors, it must have been a very early one.[1077] However, she is far from convinced and does not entirely dismiss the possibility that the lines were written by Chrysippus himself, albeit she calls that a "remote possibility".[1078] Ultimately she argues for the removal of lines 1078-80 stating that "Chrysippus' favourites are good lines; but they do not belong here".[1079]

I have only briefly outlined the controversy around the inclusion of lines 1056-1080 for two reasons. Firstly, if we accept their deletion, then two mentions of θυμός in relation to Medea are lost. Euripides mentions θυμός nine times in the *Medea* (seven, if we delete the two references in 1056-1080).[1080] Of those nine times, six relate to Medea herself and in a seventh the chorus appeals for their θυμός not to be smitten as Medea's was, making that also a reference to Medea's θυμός. Therefore although two references to Medea's θυμός would be lost by the deletion, four or five remain. This is more than any other character in the whole of Euripides' extant corpus so θυμός is still a very Medean trait, even without reliance on lines 1056-80. The second reason is hinted at by Mossman, above: the addition, if they were an addition, particularly of lines 1078-80 was certainly very early, even though it cannot be pinned down to an exact date. I am looking for evidence of influence from Euripides on Apollonius. Kovacs noted that the lines were "famous in antiquity", referring to their use by

[1074] Diggle, 1984, pp.138-139; Kovacs, 1986, p.343.
[1075] Kovacs, 1986, p.343.
[1076] Seidensticker, 1990, pp.89-99.
[1077] Mossman, 2011, p.317.
[1078] Mossman, 2011, p.331.
[1079] Mossman, 2011, p.318.
[1080] Eur. *Med.* 8, 108, 310, 640, 865, 879, 1056, 1079, 1052.

Chrysippus.[1081] Apollonius and Chrysippus were near-contemporaries. While conclusive evidence is lacking, it would be very difficult to argue that a line so well-remembered by Chrysippus would have been unavailable to Apollonius. It therefore becomes irrelevant whether lines 1078-80 were written by Euripides or added, possibly by an actor, some few years later. It is very likely that they were read by Apollonius and so had the ability to influence his own portrayal of Medea.

Further consideration of Euripides' influence on Apollonius is helpfully summarised by Hunter and not repeated here.[1082]

[1081] Kovacs, 1986, p.346.
[1082] Hunter, 1989, pp.18-19.