Corrections requested by the examiners in their Joint Report

School/Dept: Politics & International Relations

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Title of thesis: The Quality of Democracy Revisited: Exploring the Effects of Government Alternation and Presidential Power in Latin America

Programme of Study: PhD Politics

Name of Internal Examiner: Dr Simon Toubeau

Name of External Examiner: Prof. Richard S. Katz

Requested by the examiners	Answer to these points	Pages of the thesis where the corrections were implemented
1) Conceptual components of QoD: **1a) Accountability:** at the moment this paper is set-up as a paper that discusses the electoral component of accountability, namely the potential reward/punishment models of retrospective voting. But this is not ultimately analysed in the paper, which instead measures turnout and VDEM accountability. The examiners request that the chapter be re-drafted so as to remove the reward/punishment theory at the start of the chapter and to focus instead on electoral procedures (VDEM	The chapter has been redrafted to focus on the procedures and mechanisms that allow vertical accountability as captured by the Vertical Accountability Index of V-Dem and its different components. As requested, the focus on reward/punishment related to retrospective voting has been removed. The analysis of vertical accountability has been redrafted to focus on the measurement of the Vertical Accountability Index of V-Dem as the single dependent variable, and removing Voter Turnout from the statistical analyses. However, the references in the literature review that mention	These changes to remove the ideas of punishment/rewards in favour of the potential for vertical accountability are reflected in the (**Introduction chapter** (p.20) in **Chapter 2**, particularly, in section **2.1 Introduction**, (pp. 43-44) and section **2.2**

accountability) that measures 'contestability' or the 'potential for' accountability. The examiners request that the analysis be re-run on this dependent variable.	Turnout as a proxy measurement of vertical accountability are retained solely for illustrative purposes of the different possible operationalisations that have been tested before by other authors, particularly to test the effects of presidential power.	**Theory and Conceptualisation** (pp. 44-47). The changes regarding the statistical analyses using the V-Dem variable, can be found in section **2.5. Analysis and Results** (p. 62)
1b) Competition: the examiners request the analysis be conducted again with two other dependent variables (competitiveness and volatility) and that the phrasing of the chapter refers more clearly to competitiveness of elections rather than competition.	As requested by the examiners, I redrafted the focus of the analysis and substituted the measurements of the Effective Number of Parties in the dependent variable, to include a measurement of electoral volatility with data from Mainwaring, S. et al. (2021) and a measurement of electoral competitiveness with data from Cruz, Keefer & Scartascini (2021). Mentions of the Effective number of parties or fragmentation are retained for illustrative purposes in the literature review.	The statistical results and interpretation of the new dependent variables can be found in section **3.4 Analysis and Results** (pp. 90-93).
1c) Responsiveness: the examiners request that the analysis be re-run with a combination of satisfaction with democracy and turnout as two potential indicators of 'diffuse regime support or legitimacy' rather than 'responsiveness'; the chapter should accordingly be re-	As requested by the examiners, this chapter has been redrafted to focus on regime diffuse support instead of responsiveness. This reflects my acknowledgement of the reservations expressed by the examiners on the limitations of using *support for democracy* and *satisfaction with democracy* as the operationalisation of responsiveness, given that these measurements do not capture the changes	The changes that redraft the chapter to focus on diffuse regime support are reflected in the entirety of **Chapter 4. Diffuse Regime Support: An**

drafted to include literature on diffuse regime support/legitimacy.	to policies from governments that match specific preferences expressed by voters/citizens. However, given that the literature that studies the "results dimension" of QoD tends to rely on responsiveness as the way to measure this, I have chosen to acknowledge this literature and the role of the concept in the discussion, instead of completely removing every reference to responsiveness. This includes the literature review that addresses the possible effects of government alternation and presidential power on the dimension of results but uses responsiveness as the main operationalisation to discuss this. Moreover, given that the objective of this thesis is to test the effects of government alternation and presidential power on QoD via different dimensions (procedural and results), substituting responsiveness with diffuse regime support without offering a convincing justification would contradict and "derail" the structure and logic of this work. Therefore, I propose the following approach to conciliate the requested corrections with the structure and objective of my thesis. I use the concept of "diffuse regime support" and its literature as a possible way to capture QoD as "results/outcomes", and an alternative to responsiveness.	**Alternative Dimension of Result (p. 96.)** In particular, the discussion and justification can be found in sections **4.1 Introduction** (pp. 96-97) and section **4.2.2 Diffuse Regime Support** (pp. 101-102). This adjustemnt is also reflected at the end of section **1.1.3 Quality of Democracy**, when selecting and justifying dimensions to study in the thesis (p. 20). The new statistical analysis with satisfaction with democracy and turnout as measurements of diffuse regime support can be found in section

	As established by the literature on the subject (see Easton, 1965, 1975 and Linde & Peters, 2020), diffuse regime support can be captured by expressions of the citizens towards supporting a system, what it represents and its results, expressing their Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Democracy and going to vote in elections. In turn, these expressions accumulate in a "reservoir of goodwill" from citizens towards future regime results/outcomes that might be unpopular. Accordingly, to the requested corrections, the statistical analyses have been re-run with Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout as measurements of diffuse regime support.	**4.5 Analysis and Results** (pp.115-118)
2) Data-set: **2a)** The examiners request that the candidate revise each chapter to present national means for each of the measures used to measure the component of QoD in that chapter.	I have added the national means for each of the measures of QoD. In the case of Chapter 2 "Vertical Accountability", a single measurement was used as requested by **point 1a (Vertical Accountability Index by V-Dem).** In the case of Chapter 2 "Party Competitiveness", a measurement for Electoral volatility and a measurement of legislative electoral competitiveness	In the case of Chapter 2 "Vertical Accountability", the means of the single component used are reported in Figure 2.1, p. 61. In the case of Chapter 3 "Party Competitiveness", the means of both measures, electoral

		volatility and electoral competitiveness, are reported in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, p. 89. In the case of Chapter 4 "Diffuse Regime Support", the means for satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout can be found in p.113.
2b) We recommend that the analysis aim to control for nationally-specific effects and that the results of this robustness test be presented in an appendix.	The multi-group analysis of the selected models in each chapter is acknowledged at the end of each analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and then reported in Appendix 3.	This analysis can be found in A.3. Nationally Specific Effects (p.148).
3) Analysis: **3a)** The examiners request that the analysis in the three papers be conducted again with a more valid uni-dimensional measure of government alternation (a continuous measure ranging from non-alternation to wholesale alternation)	To address the corrections requested by the examiners, I have opted to use the Index of Government Alternation proposed by Casal Bértoa & Enyedi (2016), which goes from 0 (non-alternation), to 100 (wholesale alternation), being 50 perfect partial alternation. This measurement excludes collapsing wholesale alternation and non-alternation as both being represented by a score of 100. Additionally, the new scores for each country were updated in the Appendix 4.	These changes can be found first in section **1.3.2 Methodology and Variables** (pp. 37-38) and subsequently reflected in the operationalisation of government alternation in each of the chapters. For new scores of government alternation

		from 0 to 100, consult Appendix 4. (p. 152).
3b) We recommend that the models in the three papers include a binary variable capturing term limits focusing on whether the election is witnessing the re-election of an incumbent (1) or the election of two new candidates (0).	As requested, a binary variable that captures if an incumbent is running for reelection (1) or if the election has two new candidates (0) was incorporated into the models and analysis of every chapter.	This can be found in the respective sections of control variables of each chapter, in the models (pp. 63, 91, and 115) and in the results (pp. 66, 93 and 117).
4) Presentation of SEM results. The examiners request that the candidate: **4a)** Identify the computer program used to do the calculations	The computer software used to compile the data was IBM SPSS Statistics version 29 and the software to do the calculations was IBM SPSS AMOS Graphics version 29.	This clarification can be found in section **1.3.2 Methodology and Variables** (p. 35).
4b) Present the structural equations.	I consider that presenting the written structural equations does not contribute anything to the dissertation, its analyses and results. Moreover, the graphical representations of the SEM models that were estimated, and which can be found in each chapter, contain all this information already (there were no constraints added or other analytical aspects of the main estimated models that are not reflected in these diagrams).	Graphical models are in pp. 63, 91, and 115.
4c) Present the results of a factor analysis between the observed indicators and the latent DV	The models for which this might be relevant are SEM models in which a factor-analytic part is combined with a path-analytic part. However, with the presentation of these models, both of these aspects (the factor analysis bit and the path analysis bit) are already reported. I consider that,	

	methodologically, it does not make sense to report a separate model that contains only the factor analysis aspect without the path analytical aspect. That is why I chose to present models in which both aspects are integrated.	
4d) Present the strengths of the results (especially for government alternation which had weak results) in light of the measures of model success (Chi2/df).	Given that Chi2/df on its own is not the only nor the most insightful way to display model fit on its own, I consider that a better approach is to also consider other model fit indices, such as Chi2, CFI, RMSA and PClose, as shown in the analyses of each chapter. The latter has been decided to consider other aspects of the model that can show that the data fits.	
4e) When variables are added to produce "nested" models, present the statistical significance of the improvement of model fit, and not just the significance of the individual models	This point has been addressed at the end of the analyses in each chapter, showing the significance of the improvement between the base models and the selected/desirable models. This is done with a P-Value from Chi-Square Calculator, which can be found at https://www.socscistatistics.com/pvalues/chidistribution.aspx	For **Chapter 2**, this can be found in p.65. For **Chapter 3**, this can be found in p. 92. For **Chapter 4**, this can be found in p. 118.
5) Citations from the literature: **5a)** The examiners request that the author re-drafts the parts of the literature review mentioned above to ensure that the attribution of ideas to authors (and interpretations thereof) are accurate.	This observation has been addressed and corrected to avoid any misinterpretation, as indicated in the report. In particular, regarding to references previously made of Arter 2004; Mair 2008; Bergman and Strom, 2011.	These changes are reflected in section **2.3.1 Government Alternation and Vertical Accountability** (pp. 48-51).
6) Contribution of the thesis: **6a)** The examiners request that the author identifies more clearly the generalizability (or not) of the findings to	Some observations about the potential to reproduce a similar analysis in other regions of the world are suggested in the conclusions section. However, I express some reservations about the generalisability of the results of this dissertation in other contexts like Sub-Saharan Africa, given the potential	These ideas are reflected in section **5.4 Some Recommendations**

| other contexts including Sub-Saharan Africa. | unobserved characteristics of Latin American regimes and their presidencies. Therefore, in order to generalise these results, | **and Replicability,** p. 127. |