Presentism as dynamic existence

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Langsdale, Kerry (2024) Presentism as dynamic existence. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.

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Abstract

This thesis proposes and defends a novel version of presentism called Dynamic Existence Presentism (DEP). DEP is founded on two main principles: there are no (discrete) times and temporal existence is fundamentally dynamic. Rejecting the notion of time as a series of static slices, DEP builds on Merricks' (2007) and Tallant's (2014) arguments that presence equates to existence, thereby dissolving the need for a distinct present moment. DEP further distinguishes between the passage of time and temporal dynamism, accepting the latter as an irreducible aspect of reality. The mechanism of DEP's dynamism is rooted in a Neo-Aristotelian powers ontology, positing that all properties are dynamic and process-like. According to DEP, objects are bundles of powerful properties, intrinsically dynamic and inseparable from their properties.

Item Type: Thesis (University of Nottingham only) (PhD)
Supervisors: Tallant, Jonathan
Jansson, Lina
Keywords: Presentism, dynamism, time, temporal existence, temporal dynamism.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative philosophy
Faculties/Schools: UK Campuses > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities
Item ID: 78602
Depositing User: Langsdale, Kerry
Date Deposited: 10 Dec 2024 04:40
Last Modified: 10 Dec 2024 04:40
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/78602

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