Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh Diplomacy: 927-1154

James Smith

Doctor of Philosophy, History, School of Humanities
University of Nottingham
Dr Claire Taylor and Dr Gwilym Dodd
September 2022

Abstract

Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in 927-1154 has been underrepresented in dedicated studies of medieval diplomacy, receiving most of its scholarly attention from more general works of English, Scottish and Welsh history, with each national approach often contradicting the interpretations of the others. In response, this study provides in-depth analysis of diplomacy with the goal of illuminating kings' social relationships, foreign policies and political aims. It has two primary focuses: comparing Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, and determining the extent to which relations shifted from the Anglo-Saxon period to the Anglo-Norman one. Using an interdisciplinary and comparative framework, five significant themes of diplomatic practice are analysed: meeting places, objects, marriages, diplomats and exiles. Overall, Anglo-Welsh relations were characterised by frequent Welsh submissions to kings of England, whereas Anglo-Scottish relations were more variable, involving both English dominance and relative Anglo-Scottish equality. Furthermore, diplomacy does reveal some changes to relationships post-Norman Conquest. However, these broad conclusions are not the whole story, with exceptions and nuances highlighted throughout. In addition, this study has wider implications, since the conclusions drawn here not only relate to other medieval diplomatic relationships, but also to diplomacy in the modern world, which, with the rise of non-state diplomatic actors, increasingly resembles pre-state interactions.

Contents

Abbreviations

AC	*Annales Cambriae: B and C in Parallel, from A.D. 924 to A.D. 1189*, ed. Henry W. Lough-Cooper (Welsh Chronicles Research Group, 2017).
Althoff, *Family*	Althoff, Gerd, *Family, Friends and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Early Medieval Europe*, trans. Christopher Carroll (Cambridge, 2004).
ANS	*Anglo-Norman Studies*, ed. R. Allen Brown (1979–89), M. Chibnall (1990–94), C. Harper-Bill (1995–99), J. Gillingham (2000–04), C. P. Lewis (2005-11), David Bates (2012-14), Elisabeth van Houts (2014-18), S.D. Church (2019-).
Anselmi	*S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh, 1946-51).
Armes	'*Armes Prydein Vawr*,' in *The Battle of Brunanburh: A Casebook*, ed. Michael Livingston (Exeter, 2011), pp. 28-37.
ASC	'*Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*,' in *English Historical Documents: c. 500-1042*, ed. Dorothy Whitelock (London, 1955), years up to 1042 and '*Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*,' in *English Historical Documents: c. 1042-1189*, ed. David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway (London, 1953), years up to 1154; Old English from *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition*, ed. various, vols. 1, 3-8, 10, 17 (Cambridge, 1983-2002). Identified by year and manuscript (A-H).
ASP	Bradley, S. A. J., ed., *Anglo-Saxon Poetry* (London, 1982).
ASR	Stones, E. L. G., ed. and trans., *Anglo-Scottish Relations: 1174-1328* (London and Edinburgh, 1965).
AU	*Annals of Ulster*, ed. and trans., Seán Mac Airt and Gearóid Mac Niocaill (Dublin, 1983).
Bede	Bede, *The Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, ed. Judith McClure and Roger Collins (Oxford, 1969).
Bradbury, *SM*	Bradbury, Jim, *Stephen and Matilda: The Civil War of 1139-53* (Stroud, 1998).
Bredehoft, *Textual*	Bredehoft, Thomas, *Textual Histories: Readings of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (London, 2001).
Brenhinedd	*Brenhinedd Y Saesson*, ed. Thomas Jones (Cardiff, 1971).
Brut	*Brut Y Tywysogyon or The Chronicle of The Princes: Red Book of Hergest Version*, ed. Thomas Jones (Cardiff, 1973).
Campbell, *AS*	Campbell, James, ed., *The Anglo-Saxons* (London, 1991).
Carpenter, *Britain*	Carpenter, David A., *The Struggle for Mastery: Britain 1066-1284* (London, 2004).
Davies, *Conquest*	R. R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest: Wales, 1063-1415* (Oxford, 2000).

DB	*Domesday Book*, ed. Ann Williams and G. H. Martin (London, 2002).
Duncan, *Kingship*	Duncan, Archibald Alexander McBeth, *The Kingship of the Scots, 842-1292* (Edinburgh, 2002).
Dunsæte	'*The Ordinance Concerning the Dunsæte',* in Frank Noble, *Offa's Dyke Reviewed*, ed. Margaret Gelling (Oxford, 1983), pp. 104-09.
Encomium	*Encomium Emmae Reginae*, ed. and trans. Alistair Campbell, and introduction by Simon Keynes (Cambridge, 1998).
EHD I	Whitelock, Dorothy, ed., *English Historical Documents: c. 500-1042* (London, 1955).
EHD II	Douglas, David C., and George W. Greenaway, ed., *English Historical Documents: c. 1042-1189* (London, 1953).
EHR	*The English Historical Review*
EMA	Napran, Laura, and Elisabeth M. C. van Houts, ed., *Exile in the Middle Ages* (Turnhout, 2004).
EME	*Early Medieval Europe*
ES	*Electronic Sawyer*, https://esawyer.lib.cam.ac.uk/about/index.html. An online expanded version of Peter H. Sawyer, *Anglo-Saxon charters: an annotated list and bibliography* (London, 1968). Identified by Sawyer number.
ESC	Archibald Campbell Lawrie, ed., *Early Scottish Charters, prior to A.D. 1153* (Glasgow, 1905). Identified by charter number.
Foot, *Æthelstan*	Foot, Sarah, *Æthelstan: The First King of England* (London, 2011).
Frontiers in Question	Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, ed., *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700* (Basingstoke, 1999).
Glaber	Ralph Glaber, '*The Five Books of the Histories*', in *Rodulfus Glaber Opera*, ed. and trans. by John France (Oxford, 1989).
GND	William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of Torigni, *The Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, ed. and trans. Elisabeth M. C. van Houts (Oxford, 1995).
Green, *Henry I*	Green, Judith A, *Henry I: King of England and Dukes of Normandy* (Cambridge, 2009)
GS	*The Deeds of Stephen*, ed. and trans. Kenneth Reginald Potter (London, 1955).
GT	Gregory of Tours, *The History of the Franks*, trans. Lewis Thorpe (Harmondsworth, 1974).
HDE	Simeon of Durham, '*Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiae*,' in *Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (London, 1882-85), 1.
HH	Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon, *Historian Anglorum*, ed. and trans. Diana Greenaway (Oxford, 1996).
Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking'	Holdsworth, Christopher, 'R. Allen Brown Memorial Lecture: Peacemaking in the Twelfth Century', in *Anglo-Norman Studies XIX*, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 1-17.

Howden, *Gesta*	(Roger of Howden), *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, ed. William Stubbs, 2 vols. (London, 1867), (ascribed in this edition to Benedict of Peterborough).
Howden, *Chronica*	Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. William Stubbs, 4 vols. (London, 1868-71).
HR	Simeon of Durham, '*Historia Regum*,' in *Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (London, 1882-85), 2.
HSC	'*Historia de Sancto Cuthberto*', in *Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (London, 1882-85), 1, pp. 196-214.
HSJ	*The Haskins Society Journal*
Huneycutt, *Matilda*	Lois L. Huneycutt, *Matilda of Scotland: A Study in Medieval Queenship* (Woodbridge, 2003).
ILE	Jenny Benham, *International Law in Europe: 700-1200* (Manchester, 2022), supplied with a pre-publication edition.
JH	John of Hexham, '*Historia XXV: Annorum*,' in *Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (London, 1182-85), 2, pp. 284-332.
JMEMS	*Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*
JMH	*Journal of Medieval History*
JW	*Chronicle of John of Worcester*, ed. Reginald R. Darlington and Peter McGurk, trans. Jennifer Bray and Peter McGurk, vols. 2-3 (Oxford, 1995-8).
Kosto, *Hostages*	Adam J. Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2012).
LGC	*Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan*, ed. and trans. Paul Russell (Cardiff, 2005).
LKE	*The Life of King Edward who Rests at Westminster*, ed. and trans. Frank Barlow (Oxford, 1992).
Lloyd, *Wales*	Lloyd, John Edward, *A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest*, 2 vols. (London, 1939).
McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*	McCann, Kathrin, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship and Political Power:* Rex Gratia Dei (Cardiff, 2018).
NDH	New Diplomatic History
ODNB	*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004-): https://www-oxforddnb-com.ezproxy.nottingham.ac.uk/. Accessed 14 December 2020.
Oram, *Domination*	Oram, Richard D., *Domination and Lordship: Scotland, 1070-1230* (Edinburgh, 2006).
OV	Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History*, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1969-80).
PMA	Jenny Benham, *Peacemaking in the Middle Ages* (Manchester, 2011).
PW	Jennifer Carpenter and Sally-Beth MacLean, ed., *Power of the Weak: Studies on Medieval Women* (Champaign, 1995).

RFA	'*Royal Frankish Annals*,' in *Carolingian Chronicles*, ed. Bernhard Walter Scholz with Barbara Rogers (Ann Arbor, MI., 1970), pp. 35-126.
Roach, *Kingship*	Levi Roach, *Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978: Assemblies and the State in the Early Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2013).
RRAN	*Regesta Regum Anglorum-Normannorum 1066-1154*, ed. H. A. Cronne *et al.,* 3 vols. (Oxford, 1913-68), 1-3: Identified by charter number.
RW	Rogeri de Wendover, *Flores Historiarum*, ed. Henry O. Coxe, 4 vols. (London, 1841-44).
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*
VSM	'*Vita S. Margaretae Scotorum Reginae, Turgoto Monacho Dunelmensi Adscripta*,' in *Symeon Dunelmensis Opera et Collectanea*, ed. J. Hodgson Hinde (London, 1868), pp. 234-54.
Watkins, *NDH*	Watkins, John, 'Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38 (2008), pp. 1-14.
Watkins, *Lavinia*	Watkins, John, *After Lavinia: A Literary History of Premodern Marriage Diplomacy* (Cornell, 2017).
WHR	*The Welsh History Review*
WM	William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum Anglorum, The History of the English Kings*, ed. and trans. R. A. B. Mynors, completed by R. M. Thomson and M. Winterbottom, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1998-99), 1.
WN	William of Newburgh, *The History of English Affairs*, ed. and trans. Patrick Gerard Walsh and M. J. Kennedy, 2 vols. (Warminster, 1988-2007).
Woolf, *Pictland*	Woolf, Alex, *From Pictland to Alba: 789-1070* (Edinburgh, 2007).
WPAMH	France, John, and Philip De Souza ed., *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History* (Cambridge, 2008).

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Terminology

The term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ has been criticised recently due to its connection to racist groups and views.[1] Unfortunately, no appropriate term has yet emerged to directly replace it as a descriptor. Generally, I employ ‘English’ as an adjective for nouns related to England. However, I do use ‘Anglo-Saxon’ to differentiate the period before the Norman Conquest from the one that came after, which is referred to as the ‘Anglo-Norman’ period. I also use the terms as adjectives for other nouns related to the pre- and post-Conquest periods, in the interest of differentiating them, for example, ‘Anglo-Saxon diplomacy’.

For simplicity, I use Anglicised names.

[1] Michael Wood, ‘As a racism row rumbles on, is it time to retire the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’?’, *History Extra*, 04 November 2019: https://www.historyextra.com/period/anglo-saxon/professor-michael-wood-anglo-saxon-name-debate-is-term-racist/. Accessed 08 October 2020.

Introduction

1. Diplomacy and Relations: New and Old

On June 12th 2018, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un met US President Donald Trump in Singapore: the first ever meeting between a North Korean leader and a US President.[1] The crucial moment was supposedly the signing of a joint agreement by both Kim and Trump. Intriguingly though, commentators devoted a lot of ink to interpreting the pair's other behaviours and interactions, and what they might reveal about the summit's significance, including the leaders' attitudes to one another and their underlying relationship. Articles mused on the importance of where they met, their punctuality, their handshakes, and how much eye contact they shared, to name a few subjects.[2]

Medieval kings likewise interacted with one another through a wide range of practices, rituals and behaviours, which can provide insight into their foreign relations and strategies. For example, according to the chronicler John of Worcester, in 973 King Edgar of England travelled to Chester. Once there, 'Eight underkings, namely Kenneth, king of Scots, Malcolm, king of Cumbrians [Strathclyde], Maccus, king of many islands, and five others, Dufnal, Siferth, Hywel, Iacob and Iuchil went to meet him, as he had commanded, and swore that they would be loyal to and co-operate with him by land and sea.'[3] Next, they all boarded a boat and, with Edgar at the helm, the subkings rowed him down the River Dee. Hammering home the point, Edgar remarked to his nobles at the end of the summit, 'that each of his successors would be able to boast that he was king of the English, and would enjoy the pomp of such honour, with so many kings at his command.'[4] William of Malmesbury, another chronicler, wrote a near identical account, adding that the five kings that John did not identify with specific kingdoms came from Wales.[5]

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[1] 'Trump Kim summit: US president hails deal after historic talks', *BBC News*, 12 June 2018: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44450739. Accessed 9 October 2020.

[2] Donald Kirk, 'US-North Korea talks have many obstacles to overcome – starting with where to meet', *South China Morning Post*, 10 April 2018: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2141030/us-north-korea-talks-have-many-obstacles-overcome-starting. Accessed 09 October 2020; Louise Moon, 'Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un's body language was a complex display of power, politeness and clash of cultures', *Politico*, 12 June 2018: https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/12/donald-trump-and-kim-jong-un-body-language-615628. Accessed 09 October 2020; Karol Ward, 'I'm a body language expert – this is what Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un were really thinking in Singapore', *Independent*, 12 June 2018: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-singapore-summit-world-peace-nuclear-a8395126.html. Accessed 09 October 2020.

[3] JW, 2, pp. 422-23, '*Cui subregulus eius .viii., Kynath scilicet rex Scottorum, Malcolm rex Cumbrorum, Maccus plurimarum rex insularum, et alii. .v., Dufnal, Siferth, Huuual, Iacob, Iuchil, ut mandarat, occurrerunt et quod sibi fideles et terra et mari cooperatores esse uellent, iurauerunt*.'

[4] Ibid, pp. 424-25, '*Quod dum intraret optimatibus fertur dixisse tunc demum quemque suorum successorum se gloriari posse regem Anglorum fore, cum tot regibus sibi obsequentibus potiretur pompa talium honorum*.'

[5] WM, pp. 238-39.

Historians have analysed this conference, which has become known as Chester's earliest "regatta", and the practices that took place there, with a view to understanding King Edgar's relationships with Scottish and Welsh rulers. Several, such as Nicholas Higham and Martin Ryan, Eric John, Georges Molyneaux and Frank Stenton, view the meeting as demonstrating Edgar's dominance over his neighbours.[6] Others consider it to have been less one sided. Figures like Alan O. Anderson, Andrew Barrell, Julia Barrow and David Walker depict the conference as principally about creating alliances, negotiating, establishing equal relations or the performance of loose submissions to English influence, respectively.[7]

This thesis takes analysing the significance of diplomatic practice further. Rather than focusing on a single example of medieval diplomacy, it assesses Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy from 927 to 1154, in order to understand the nature of relationships between kings of England and their Welsh and Scottish counterparts. It explores, for instance, the extent to which relations were hierarchical, as well as ruler's foreign policies and strategies. Of central focus is how relationships changed over time and the difference between Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. Through this exploration, this thesis paves the way for future studies on both medieval and modern diplomacy, whilst responding to disputes and absences within the current historiography.

2. Historiography

As noted, my project interacts with existing research on medieval diplomacy, including work on Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in 927-1154. It seeks to address absences within the literature, whilst also building on and furthering existing scholarly trends. There are six relevant and distinct categories of scholarship which this thesis interacts with. However, the approaches are not necessarily exclusive, with some overlaps existing.

A. Modernist Approach

Advocated by figures like Garrett Mattingly and Donald Queller, this approach is principally concerned with uncovering the origins of "modern diplomacy" in the medieval period.[8] It takes a particular interest

[6] Nicholas J. Higham and Martin J. Ryan, *The Anglo-Saxon World* (London, 2013), p. 305; Eric John, 'The End of Anglo-Saxon England', Campbell, *AS*, p. 173; George Molyneaux, 'Why Were Some Tenth-Century English Kings Presented as Rulers of Britain', *TRHS*, 21 (2011), p. 68; Stenton, Frank Merry, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 369-70.

[7] Alan O. Anderson, 'Anglo-Scottish Relations from Constantine II to William', *Scottish Historical Review*, 42 (1963), p. 5; Andrew D. M. Barrell, *Medieval Scotland* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 69; Julia Barrow, 'Chester's Earliest Regatta? Edgar's Dee-Rowing Revisited', *EME*, 10 (2001), pp. 84-87, 92-93; David Walker, *Medieval Wales* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 16.

[8] Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 9-10; Donald E. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J., 1967), pp. vii, 228.

in the office of resident ambassador, a major element of the modern diplomatic system.[9] Rather than *ad hoc* diplomats, these figures remained permanently stationed in their host country, continually representing their principal and feeding back information. Scholars examine the invention of this system during the fifteenth century in northern Italian city states, such as Venice, Florence and Milan, before following its subsequent spread across Europe.[10]

This approach is problematic because it is unrepresentative of medieval diplomacy. Firstly, it overly focuses on a small number of Italian city states. Due to their small size and relatively high number of educated subjects, the Italian city states were ably administrated, resulting in continuous and well-structured foreign policies.[11] This was not possible for all polities in the medieval period and should not colour how we understand medieval diplomacy in its entirety. Secondly, it is a far too teleological interpretation. Echoing modernisation theory, which judges how "modern" historical societies were, this approach values diplomatic practices in the medieval period by how far they have evolved towards practices that exist in the modern world.[12] Consequently, "medieval diplomacy" is not understood on its own terms. Rather a false binary is constructed between the nature of medieval and modern practices.[13] In *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Mattingly claims the establishment of resident ambassadors was 'a revolutionary change in practice which finally forced so complete a shift in theory that the medieval law of diplomacy was almost forgotten.'[14] He describes medieval diplomacy as 'formless' and 'absurd', and based on the belief that Western Europe was a single Christian community before a growth in secularism during the Renaissance created "modern" diplomatic practices.[15] Queller likewise sharply divides diplomacy into irrational and disorganised medieval diplomacy, and rational and regular modern diplomacy, emphasising that the resident ambassador's emergence reflected 'sweeping changes in the fabric of a society in the process of transformation from *feudal* to *modern*.'[16]

Though neither Mattingly nor Queller's studies are recent, their approach can be seen elsewhere. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne have described medieval diplomacy as 'relatively infrequent, inevitably slow and subject to little, if any organic development', whilst emphasising the period's 'primitive state of administration' and reliance on Christian unity.[17] Contrasting the earlier stagnancy, 'the rise of the resident ambassador during the fifteenth century began a major

[9] Watkins, *NDH*, p. 2; Robert Wolfe, 'Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 9 (1998), pp. 23-54.
[10] Mathew Smith Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919* (Abingdon, 1993), pp. 5-9.
[11] Ibid, pp. 3-4.
[12] John Harvey, 'History and the Social Sciences', in *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, ed. Stefan Berger *et al*. (London, 2010), pp. 99-100.
[13] Watkins, *NDH*, pp. 1-3; see Isabella Lazzarini, 'Renaissance diplomacy', in *The Italian Renaissance State*, ed. Andrea Lamberini and Isabella Lazzarini (Cambridge, 2012), p. 425.
[14] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 51.
[15] Ibid, pp. 17, 25, 51; Watkins, *NDH*, p. 2.
[16] Queller, *Ambassador*, pp. 225, 228, quote on p. 225 with my emphasis.
[17] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne*, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolutions, Theory and Administration* (London, 2011), pp. 31-32.

revolution'.[18] Mathew Smith Anderson's *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* similarly takes an interest in the fifteenth century Italian system and its use of resident ambassadors, declaring it the 'direct ancestor of the one which exists today', unlike the 'underdeveloped' structure that came before.[19] Later in his first chapter, he describes how the Reformation and Counter-Reformation undermined diplomacy between states, highlighting the fact that England had no ambassador to Spain from 1568 and over the next two decades had just one ambassador at a Catholic court. However, this was not a permanent development, as English ambassadors reappeared at Catholic courts in the seventeenth century following Philip II of Spain's death. After revealing this great reversal, Anderson declares that 'the forces of *modernity*, which in a limited but genuine way the new diplomatic machinery typified, had proved strong enough to resist the disruptive powers of religious antagonism'.[20] In these works, medieval diplomacy is frequently relegated to the status of obstacle: something completely contrary to modern practices that needed to be overcome. A more nuanced approach is needed, that does not simply *other* medieval diplomatic practice, but approaches it on its own terms and accounts for the situation outside Italy.

B. Medieval Institutional Approach

Concurrently, others have done exactly this, seeking to understand how medieval diplomacy functioned without tying it to the modernisation narrative. For medieval English diplomacy the central figure is Pierre Chaplais and his *English Diplomatic Practice*. As the book states, it is a 'manual on English diplomatic practice', serving as 'an exposition of how these relations were conducted, and how their format and procedures evolved across about a thousand years.'[21] G. P. Cuttino has also considered English diplomacy in this manner, though restricted to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[22] Elsewhere, François Louis Ganshof has investigated diplomatic practices across much of medieval Europe, including in Byzantium, Germany, Spain, England and Sicily.[23] Barbara Bombi and D. N. R. Zutschi have taken this approach to fourteenth-century Anglo-Papal diplomacy, whereas Isabella Lazzarini has explored Italian diplomacy in 1350-1520.[24]

[18] Ibid, pp. 33.
[19] Anderson, *Modern Diplomacy*, p. 3.
[20] Ibid p. 11, my emphasis.
[21] Pierre Chaplais, *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages* (London, 2003), p. vii.
[22] G. P. Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration: 1259-1339* (Oxford, 1971).
[23] François L. Ganshof, *The Middle Ages: A History of International Relations*, trans. Rémy Inglis Hall (London, 1971), p. vii.
[24] Barbara Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy* (Oxford, 2019), p. 1; D. N. R. Zutschi, 'The Letters of the Avignon Popes (1305-1378): A Source for the Study of Anglo-Papal Relations and English Ecclesiastical History', in *England and her neighbours, 1066-1453: essays in honour of Pierre Chaplais*, ed. Michael Jones and Malcolm Vale (London, 1989), p. 259; Isabella Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict : Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350-1520* (Oxford, 2015).

What unites these scholars is their interest in the *how* of medieval diplomacy. Administration is a particularly recurrent theme.[25] They consider the types of messages sent, whether written or oral for instance, and the phraseology needed for different letters. Also investigated is the recording of diplomacy, such as the copying of letters and production of reports and treaties, including how the latter could be authenticated. The composition of missions abroad, for example the status of envoys, is another area of interest, as is how medieval diplomacy dealt with practical challenges, like language, baggage and confidentiality. As claimed in Chaplais' book, they establish manuals for how medieval diplomacy functioned in their given period.

Other methodological aspects unite these historians, including their frequent employment of comparisons. Bombi and Zutschi compare diplomatic administration in England and at the Papal court, whilst Chaplais looks to continental evidence to interpret English epistolary practice.[26] Further, they often have an evolutionary focus, looking at how practices changed over time. This is most obvious with Ganshof and, as already highlighted, Chaplais, who discuss diplomacy over a thousand years in a roughly chronological order.[27] Though more limited in scope, Bombi, Lazzarini, Zutschi all consider how major events, like The Hundred Years War, altered diplomatic practice.[28]

Although these works aid understanding of medieval diplomacy, they are not without limits. Just as Mattingly was interested in the resident ambassador office, these historians largely focus on the institution of medieval diplomacy itself: how it operated and evolved. Neglected, are the actors who employed medieval diplomacy. We do not fully appreciate the role it played in specific rulers' foreign policies or particular social networks and relationships. As is made clear in Chaplais' book 'this is not an account of England's foreign relations in the Middle Ages'.[29] Put simply, we come away with good knowledge of how diplomacy functioned, but not of what diplomacy can tell us about the political motives and geopolitical realities for why rulers utilised it.

C. Social Diplomacy

The social approach to diplomacy responds to the drawbacks of more institutional interpretations. As Joseph P. Huffman, the social approach's clearest advocate, claims, often 'one reads more about the *office* of the ambassador than about the movement of an ambassador within an actual sociopolitical network that linked regions and kingdoms.'[30] He addressed this with a methodology that 'places less emphasis on the institutions and levers of power and more on the social groups that pull the levers

[25] Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations*, p. 75, 202; Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. 35, 39-44, 76-91; Cuttino, *Diplomatic Administration*, pp. 132, 140; Ganshof, *The Middle Ages*, pp. 130, 132-36, 138; Lazzarini, *Communication*, p. 7; Zutschi, 'Avignon Popes', pp. 262-63, 267-71.
[26] Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations*, p. 5; Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 30; Zutschi, 'Avignon Popes', p. 259
[27] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. vii-viii; Ganshof, *The Middle Ages*, pp. vii-viii.
[28] Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations*, p. 5; Lazzarini, *Communication*, pp. 5-6; Zutschi, 'Avignon Popes', p. 265.
[29] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. vii.
[30] Joseph P. Huffman, *The Social Politics of Medieval Diplomacy: Anglo-German Relations (1066-1307)* (Ann Arbour, MI, 2000), p. 9.

and run the institutions.'[31] Huffman applied this social framework to Anglo-German relations in 1066-1307, with a focus on Cologne, revealing the policy motives and foreign connections that lay behind diplomacy. He concluded that English and German rulers pursued close relations with one another for dynastic, economic and diplomatic reasons that served domestic needs, 'rather than the needs of imperial foreign adventures.'[32]

A more social approach is detectable in many studies of medieval diplomacy. John Gillingham has explored Anglo-French diplomacy in the twelfth-century, focusing on what the act of homage can reveal about the rulers who employed it. He notes that Henry II and John of England both performed homage to the French king to strengthen their position in light of their respective weakness.[33] Fernando Luis Corral considers Alfonso VIII of Castile's decision to take part in a mediation in 1177, led by Henry II of England, regarding his conflict with Sancho VI of Navarre. Corral argues it was an attempt by the Castilian king to postpone conflict with Navarre, whilst he dealt with an attack from the Almohad Caliphate.[34] Likewise, Thomas M. Andersson has deeply analysed King Æthelred of England's confirmation of the Viking raider Olaf Tryggvason, arguing it improved their relationship and guarded the English king's flank.[35] Thus, diplomacy can inform us about relations between the individuals who took part in it, their motives for said relations, and their power to act.

For these reasons, considerable research on medieval diplomacy has been produced that contains elements of a social approach.[36] Some, such as Michael R. Davidson and Corral's articles, focus exclusively on one example of diplomacy, such as a particular conference. Others are broader, as with Gillingham's study of homage, which compares English rulers across the twelfth century.

A certain degree of overlap between social diplomacy and the medieval institutional approach is apparent. Whilst discussing the role of marriages in twelfth-century diplomacy, Ganshof muses on the marriages Henry II of England arranged for his daughters to the kings of Castille and Sicily, suggesting they demonstrate his ambitions for a 'southern policy'.[37] When discussing diplomatic practice across one-thousand years, understanding of individual rulers themselves is bound to bleed through at times. Beyond this, Jenny Benham's *Peacemaking in the Middle Ages* is seemingly a

[31] Ibid, p. 3.
[32] Ibid, pp. 14, 318, 320.
[33] John Gillingham, 'Doing Homage to the King of France', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (Woodbridge, 2007), p. 83.
[34] Fernando Luis Corral, 'Alfonso VIII of Castile's Territorial Litigation at Henry II of England's Court: An Effective Valid Arbitration?', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 50 (2006), p. 38.
[35] Thomas M. Andersson, 'The Viking Policy of Ethelred the Unready', *Scandinavian Studies*, 59 (1987), pp. 292-94.
[36] Richard Abels, 'Paying the Danegeld: Anglo-Saxon Peacemaking with Vikings', *WPAMH*, pp. 173-92; Jenny Benham, 'Anglo-French Peace Conferences in the Twelfth Century', *ANS*, 27 pp. 52-67; Katherine Bullimore, 'Unpicking the Web: The Divorce of Ecgfrith and Æthelthryth', *European Review of History*, 16 (2009), pp. 835-54; Michael R. Davidson, 'The (Non)submission of the Northern Kings in 920,' in *Edward the Elder: 899-924*, ed. N. J. Higham and D. H. Hill (London, 2000), pp. 200-11; Klaus van Eickels, '*Homagium* and *Amicita*: Rituals of Peace and their Significance in the Anglo-French Negotiations of the Twelfth-Century', *Francia*, 24 (1997), pp. 133-40; Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', pp. 1-17; Roach, *Kingship*, p. 48; Michelle R. Warren, 'Roger of Howden Strikes Back: Investing Arthur of Britany with the Anglo-Norman Future', *ANS*, 21, pp.261-271.
[37] Ganshof, *The Middle Ages*, pp. 137-38.

hybrid study. On one hand, it has an institutional focus, exploring the 'generally understood principles of how to negotiate peace', such as the role of treaties, terminology and the written word.[38] As with Chaplais, comparison is used to understand the instruments of diplomacy. Benham compares England and Denmark in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, whilst also considering trends across Europe. However, she is also invested in understanding the figures who conducted diplomacy. Benham's introduction emphasises the importance of diplomatic actors and their identities to her study, asking about the difference between victor and vanquished, Christians and non-Christians. Using analysis of diplomatic practice, she concludes that Welsh rulers negotiated with English kings around c.1200 as inferiors.[39] Although her envoy chapter devotes several pages to the legal power of different diplomat types, it also flags up King John's use of household officers as envoys, suggesting it was indicative of the rancour between John on his barons.[40] To borrow Huffman's metaphor, she is interest in both the levers and those pulling them. The line between social and institutional approaches can be blurry, and is mostly a question of focus.

D. Symbolic Diplomacy

A subcategory of scholarship deserving of discussion is symbolic diplomacy, which analyses the symbolism of rituals conducted by medieval rulers. As Gerd Althoff, a historian of rituals in the early medieval period, writes 'Ceremonies, rituals and gestures were used not just to strengthen relationships: they were also used to establish the position and status of strangers so that they might be treated in an appropriate manner.'[41] Consequently, historians of the social approach have been inclined to interpret the rituals employed in diplomacy as a way to understand how rulers' communicated their relationships with one another. We have already seen how Gillingham and Andersson approached inter-ruler relations by investigating the rituals of homage and confirmation. Symbolism attached to where rulers met is another focus of analysis, appearing in Benham and Davidson's studies, as well as in several others that we will meet in later chapters. Evidence of rituals, ceremonies and other symbolic diplomatic acts are clearly seen as key to our knowledge of social ties between rulers.

[38] *PMA*, pp. 11-12.
[39] Ibid, p. 49.
[40] Ibid, pp. 117-22, 135-37.
[41] Althoff, *Family*, p. 136; For demonstrative behaviour, see Julia Barrow, 'Demonstrative Behaviour and Political Communication in Later Anglo-Saxon England', *ASE*, 36 (2007), pp. 127-150; Geoffrey Koziol, *Begging Pardon and Favour* (London, 1992); Geoffrey Koziol, 'Review Article: The Dangers of Polemic: Is Ritual Still an Interesting Topic of Historical Study', *EME*, 11 (2002), pp. 367-88; Karl Leyser, *Communications and Power in Medieval Europe*, ed. Timothy Reuter (London, 1994).

E. New Diplomatic History

Another category of scholarship that relates to the use of evidence is New Diplomatic History (NDH). In his introduction to a special edition of the *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* on diplomacy, John Watkins wrote a call to arms for historians: 'The time has come for a multidisciplinary re-evaluation of one of the oldest, and traditionally one of the most conservative, subfields in the modern discipline of history: the study of pre-modern diplomacy.'[42] Watkins argued the discipline has been far too closed off and insular, reliant too heavily on the approaches of a select few scholars. In particular, he targeted the aforementioned works of Mattingly, Queller and Anderson.[43] His solution to the previously discussed limits imposed by their modernisation approach was his proposed 'multidisciplinary re-evaluation': a *New* Diplomatic History. At its core is the assertion that diplomacy is not a closed practice, but an open one, interacting with and reflecting other elements. To understand it, we must go beyond pure diplomatic examples and embrace sources related to internal politics, as well as social and cultural history. Additionally, historians can gather more evidence by, as Watkins demanded, embracing interdisciplinarity, with modern international relations, art history, literature, women's and gender studies, modern languages, technology and philosophy identified as potential sources of information. 'One story cannot be told fully without reference to the others.'[44] Through NDH, historians can multiply the number of sources and approaches available for interpreting diplomatic interactions.

Watkins's critique of existing scholarship is largely targeted at the modernisation approach, with its telescoped geographic focus and teleological narrative. We could, however, level it to a degree at those who have approached medieval diplomacy from the institutional angle. Their restricted focus on the instruments of diplomacy, at the expense of the agents who used them, could be seen as arbitrarily closing their research off from other aspects of history. The emphasis on purely diplomatic sources, such as letters and treaties, similarly does not align with his expanded evidence base. Though he may have appreciated their use of comparisons, such as Chaplais' utilisation of continental evidence for his study of England, as a means of expanding the source base and incorporating multiple "stories" into their research. As for other approaches, Watkins did not specifically cite Huffman's emphasis on social relations, but given his reference to incorporating social history into analysis of diplomacy he would presumably consider Huffman's work within the broad NDH canon.

The direct success of Watkin's demand can be seen in several works. Citing Watkins' rallying cry, Lindsay Diggelmann took a multidisciplinary approach to exploring a late-twelfth-century summit between Henry II of England and Philip Augustus of France held at an elm tree between Gisors and Trie, utilising the discipline of emotionology.[45] Alternatively, Manuel Duran referenced Watkins and

[42] Watkins, *NDH*, p. 1.
[43] Ibid, pp. 1-3.
[44] Ibid, pp. 1, 5-6, quote on p. 6.
[45] Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Hewing the Ancient Elm: Anger, Arboricide, and Medieval Kingship', *JMEMS*, 40 (2010), pp. 249-56, 260-61.

NDH methods, whilst researching medieval envoys. He defied periodisation and expanded his evidence base by comparing diplomacy pursued by modern sub-state governments, such as the government of Flanders, with the behaviour of medieval diplomats. Duran argues for strong similarities between them, such as how they both lack the firm distinguishing legal powers enjoyed by ambassadors representing modern states, so instead rely on *ad-hoc* interactions with foreign groups to establish networks, both formal and informal, which help them achieve their policy goals.[46]

Marriage diplomacy has been a fruitful outlet for NDH approaches, perhaps because the marriage ritual was not isolated to the diplomatic or even political worlds, providing a wealth of interdisciplinary evidence. Watkins himself produced *After Lavinia: A Literary History of Premodern Marriage Diplomacy*. He used literary examples of diplomatic marriage from the ancient, medieval and early modern periods to explain how the ideology of marriage diplomacy and its cultural significance changed over time. From a medieval historian's perspective, Watkins executes his plan well, providing ample consideration of medieval marriage diplomacy, including its role amongst early medieval groups like the Franks and Anglo-Saxons.[47] Likewise, Diggelmann redeployed the discipline of emotionology in a more recent study that highlighted people's use of enmity as a response to medieval diplomatic marriages.[48] NDH is steadily becoming a tried and tested methodology for understanding the medieval world.

Before advancing, it must be noted that Watkin's pre-modern interest is only a fragment of a broader, trans-period, NDH front. This has been advanced and recorded by the *Network for New Diplomatic History*. Established in 2011, the *Network* echoes Watkins, seeking to rediscover historical diplomacy by bringing the discipline in line with trends from cultural studies and social sciences. The project's open and social considerations are apparent by the fact that rather than purely international relations, the group's focus is the individuals and groups, whether state or non-state, who performed diplomacy. By studying their practices, symbols and languages using interdisciplinary methods, the *Network* can 'reassert professional diplomats and other diplomatic actors as important subjects of historical study while paving the way for further innovations in the understanding of international society.'[49]

However, medieval diplomacy is underrepresented in both the *Network*'s own outputs and its record of NDH scholarship.[50] Most likely, this simply reflects a general lack of research on medieval diplomacy, as noted by Benham and Diane Wolfthal, when compared to the amount written on modern peacemaking and medieval war.[51] The modern popular image of the medieval world involves

[46] Manuel Duran, 'Regional Diplomacy: A Piece in the Neo-Medieval Puzzle', *Belgeo*, 2 (2019), pp. 1-14.
[47] Watkins, *Lavinia*, pp. 11-12, 51.
[48] Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity in the Twelfth Century', *Common Knowledge*, 22 (2016), pp. 237-255.
[49] 'About', *New Diplomatic History*: https://newdiplomatichistory.org/about/. Accessed 8 January 2020.
[50] 'About', 'Conferences', 'Journal', 'Readings', *New Diplomatic History*: https://newdiplomatichistory.org/. Accessed 31 August 2020.
[51] *PMA*, p. 1; Diane Wolfthal, 'Introduction', in *Peace and Negotiations: Strategies for Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Diane Wolfthal (Turnout, 2000), pp. xii.

violence, brutality and barbarism. Marcus Bull has outlined this using works of fiction, citing the casual and sudden violence with which characters are killed in the Michael Crichton novel *Timeline*, set in fourteenth-century France.[52] Elsewhere, we can see it in western interpretations of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). As then presidential candidate Donald Trump put it during a debate in 2016, 'you know, when we have a world where you have ISIS chopping off heads […] where you have wars and horrible, horrible sights all over, where you have so many bad things happening, this is like medieval times.'[53] The medieval world is imagined as a nightmarish mirror of our own, legitimising modernity and delegitimising contemporary behaviours contrary to our sensibilities.[54] We have already seen this to an extent, with the simplistic binary divide between modern and medieval diplomacy in the modernisation approach. If taken at face value then, one would not expect diplomacy or peacemaking to exist in such an excessively violent period. Whilst Crichton and Trump are not historians, it seems likely the popular image of the medieval world has filtered into academia, explaining the relative absence of medieval NDH literature when compared to modern diplomacy.[55] Regardless, more medieval research is needed if NDH wishes to be a truly trans-period school.

F. Existing Research on Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh Diplomacy in 927-1154

Despite the wide-ranging approaches to medieval diplomacy, research looking at Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries is conspicuously absent. In Chaplais' case, whilst his scope is English diplomacy throughout the Middle Ages, his detailed approach does not begin until the late twelfth century. By contrast, the years c.500-1154 are summarised in the opening forty-four pages. Moreover, his interest lay largely with diplomacy between England and the continent, not within Britain.[56] When it comes to scholars of medieval English diplomacy these two preferences, for post-1154 English diplomacy, and for diplomacy between English kings and non-British rulers, are wide reaching.[57] A quick survey of the literature

[52] Marcus Bull, *Thinking Medieval: An Introduction to the Study of the Middle Ages* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 12-13.
[53] David M. Perry, 'This not the Crusades: There's nothing medieval about ISIS', *CNN*, 16 October 2016: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/16/opinions/nothing-medieval-about-isis-perry/index.html. Accessed 07 January 2019.
[54] John Dagenais and Margaret R. Greer, 'Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction', *JMEMS*, 30 (2000), pp. 431-36; John Dagenais, 'The Postcolonial Laura', *Modern Language Quarterly*, 65 (2004), pp. 373-74.
[55] Bull, *Thinking Medieval*, p. 2.
[56] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. 1-44.
[57] For studies of medieval English diplomacy with continental figures in this era, see Abels, 'Paying the Danegeld', pp. 173-92; Andersson, 'Viking Policy', pp. 284-95; Jenny Benham, 'Anglo-French Peace Conferences', pp. 52-67; Jenny Benham, 'The Earliest Arbitration Treaty? A Re-Assessment of the Anglo-Norman Treaty of 991', *Historical Research*, 20 (2020), pp. 189-204; van Eickels, '*Homagium* and *Amicita*', pp. 133-40; Gillingham, 'Homage', pp. 63-85; John Gillingham, 'The Meetings of the Kings of France and England, 1066-1204', in *Normandy and its Neighbours, 900-1250: Essays for David Bates*, ed. David Crouch and Kathleen Thompson (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 237-70; Huffman, *Anglo-German Relations*; Peter Sawyer, 'Ethelred II, Olaf Tryggvason, and the Conversion of Norway', *Scandinavian Studies*, 59 (1987), pp. 299-307; For examples looking at Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy post-1154, see *PMA*; Bjorn Weiler, 'Knighting, Homage, and the Meaning of Ritual: The Kings of England and their Neighbours in the Thirteenth Century', *Viator,* 37

reveals that Anglo-French and Anglo-Viking/Scandinavian diplomacy is often favoured. The predominant reason for this is the source base, or lack thereof, which is discussed later. For now, what matters is that with few exceptions,[58] scholars dedicated to understanding medieval diplomacy have neglected Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish examples from 927 to 1154.

Instead, these have been largely left to those without a specifically diplomatic focus. Principally national historians writing accounts of Welsh, Scottish and English histories. Within their works they encounter Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, and consequently provide interpretations of it. For instance, this was the case with several of the historians discussed in relation to the Chester conference at the start of this chapter. Higham and Ryan, John and Stenton all touched on it as part of general works on the Anglo-Saxon period. Meanwhile, Barrell and Walker, as well as others like Alan Macquerrie, Alex Woolf, Wendy Davies and David Moore, investigated Chester in studies of medieval Scotland and Wales.[59]

Their approach is understandably flawed. The focus and experience of national historians is obviously not dedicated to analysing diplomacy, leading to limited analysis. Further, their conclusions are fractured and divided, with each historian approaching diplomacy from the perspective of the national history they are presenting.[60] Writers of English history, such as John, are more inclined to present diplomatic events like Chester as indicative of English supremacy over their neighbours. By contrast, Welsh and Scottish national histories generally downplay the extent of English dominance when discussing diplomacy, often depicting Welsh and Scottish rulers as allies, simply engaging in peacemaking, or at least less overt inferiors during meetings with kings of England. The sentiment and expectation of nationality has no doubt played a role.[61] To understand Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations, and therefore resolve disputes within the existing historiography, it is necessary to employ a more holistic method that does not approach diplomacy from one national perspective. Rather it must both understanding medieval diplomatic practices themselves and the positions of the various contemporary historical agents involved. A more social diplomatic approach could prove insightful.

(2006), pp. 275-99; For examples demonstrating both preferences, see Corral, 'Alfonso VIII', pp. 22-42; Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Marriages as Tactical Response: Henry II and the Royal Wedding of 1160', *EHR*, 119 (2004), pp. 954-64; Diggelmann, 'Hewing the Ancient Elm', pp. 249-72; Warren, 'Roger of Howden Strikes Back', pp.261-271.

[58] Paul Dalton, 'Sites and Occasions of Peacemaking in England and Normandy, c. 900-c.1150', *HSJ*, 16, ed. Stephen Morillo, with Diane Korngiebel (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 12-26; Kevin Halloran, 'Welsh Kings at the English Court, 928-956', *WHR*, 25 (2011), pp. 297-313; Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', pp. 1-17; Simon Keynes, 'Welsh Kings at Anglo-Saxon Royal Assemblies (928-55)', *HSJ*, 26, ed. Laura L. Gathagan and William North (Suffolk, 2015), pp. 69-122; Henry Loyn, 'Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of the Athelstan Charters', *WHR*, 10 (1980), pp. 283-301.

[59] Alan MacQuarrie, *Medieval Scotland: Kingship and Nation* (Stroud, 2004), p. 83; Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 207-08; Wendy Davies, *Wales in the Early Middle Ages* (Leicester, 1982), p. 114; David Moore, *The Welsh Wars of Independence c.410 - c.1415* (Stroud, 2013), p. 31.

[60] Huffman, *Anglo-German Relations*, pp. 4, 9.

[61] *PMA,* p. 51.

3. Methodology and Approach

This thesis responds to the existing historiography, aiming to answer unresolved questions, whilst learning lessons from work that has come before. To begin with, it rejects the modernisation approach, which fails to appreciate diplomacy in the medieval world on its own terms. Fundamentally, this project can be seen as within the social school, seeking to understand relations between kings of England and their Welsh and Scottish neighbours in 927-1154, by analysing their diplomacy. Such an approach not only counteracts the dearth of research on this period from diplomatic historians, but contributes to resolving the existing divides between the English, Scottish and Welsh national historians.

Diplomacy is understood from a *realist* perspective, reflecting underlying relationships between rulers.[62] Most obviously, it reflects the relative power of the sovereigns involved. As argued by Geoffrey Berridge, scholar of modern diplomacy, 'the balance of power' is something that diplomacy 'both reflects and reinforces'.[63] The discussion of the Chester conference 973, as well as Gillingham's understanding of twelfth-century homage and Benham's interpretation of Anglo-Welsh interactions, have already shown that what diplomacy tells us about rulers' power and position within a hierarchical network is of central concern for historians. Although this is of interest, it is not all we can learn from diplomacy. As Paul Sharpe argues, diplomacy is not just a simple reflection of power, but also slightly detached from it. It may be viewed as a multiplier: 'It can enhance a good policy and even […] rescue a bad one. In other words, good diplomacy and good diplomats can be seen, not just as elements of power.'[64] This separateness means diplomacy does not merely demonstrate the balance of power, but how rulers responded to it, revealing a multiplicity of different strategies and attitudes. For example, if there are two identical rulers, both victims of successful foreign invasions, but one submits and the other does not, diplomatic action is revealing two different approaches to foreign policy. We can discover what rulers did in light of the balance of power. Maintain it, emphasise it, or push for change? Ensure peace or encourage hostility? Build a close relationship or pursue distance? Through diplomacy, we can learn not just the power differential between rulers, but their policies, attitudes and motives towards one another. A three-dimensional view of the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relationships can be constructed.

My goal is to understand relations across the period, from 927 to 1154. Given the challenge and scope of this project, two research questions anchor my analysis. Firstly, how did Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations differ from one another? Secondly, to what extent was there a significant shift from relations in the Anglo-Saxon period to relations in the Anglo-Norman one? Though my focus differs from theirs, like Chaplais, Ganshof and Bombi, by employing comparisons between polities and considering changes over time, I aim to better understand the significance of the diplomacy that I analyse.

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[62] Paul Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 54-56.
[63] Geoff R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 1.
[64] Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, p. 56.

Despite this overlap, my interest is fundamentally non-institutional. There is no intention to provide a guide to how diplomacy itself practically functioned in tenth, eleventh and early twelfth-century Britain, nor to consider the genesis of the institution and its evolution during this period, as Chaplais has already done. Though the reader can glean information about these topics from this essay, it is not my goal. This is a social interpretation, which treats diplomacy as a mean for analysing Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations.

To do this, we must define what medieval diplomacy was. A simple and traditional definition of diplomacy in the modern world is provided by Ronald Peter Barston: 'Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors.'[65] He goes on to outline the peacefulness traditionally attributed to diplomacy.[66] Non-violent interactions and a focus on external, rather than domestic, relations can easily be applied to a definition of medieval diplomacy. The problem is the weight placed on the *state* in modern conceptualisations. Medieval kingdoms lacked the territorial bounds of modern states, with rulers governing people not territory.[67] King Æthelstan, for example, called himself 'King of the English (*Rex Anglorum*)'.[68] Nor was their sovereignty supreme in the manner of a state's. Kingdoms were polycentric, with authority pooled around a diverse group of figures, including frontier and local aristocrats, ecclesiastical groups and individuals such as monasteries and bishops, and even trans-kingdom entities, like the papal court and overlords.[69] They all possessed the power to influence foreign affairs. The difficulty of defining medieval diplomacy is indicated by how rarely it is done, with scholars like Phillip De Souza and John France, Christopher Holdsworth and Ryan Lavelle preferring to proclaim an interest in peacemaking.[70] Of course, diplomacy in the modern world is not just about making peace, and we should not likewise restrict it in the medieval period.

However, the idea of tightly restricting diplomacy to state action is outdated. In the contemporary world, there has been a recognised declined in the territorially defined nation state, with a growth in non-state political actors.[71] Consequently, modern international relations involve, among others, supranational institutions (EU), sub-state governments (Quebec, Scotland, and Flanders) and

[65] Ronald Peter Barston, *Modern Diplomacy* (Harlow, 2006), p. 1.
[66] For other modern definitions, see Peter Barber, *Diplomacy* (London, 1979), p. 6; Berridge, *Diplomacy*, p. 1; Robert F. Tragger, 'The Diplomacy of War and Peace', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19 (2016), p. 206.
[67] Jenny Benham, 'Law or Treaty? Defining the edge of legal studies in the early and high medieval periods', *Historical Research*, 86 (2013), p. 488.
[68] *ES* 400.
[69] *ILE*, pp. 16-19; Jakub Grygiel, 'The Primacy of Premodern History', *Security Studies*, 22 (2013), pp. 20-24; For examples, Janet L. Nelson, 'Kingship and Empire in the Carolingian World', in *Carolingian Culture: Emulation and Innovation*, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 52-57, 65-66; Esther Pascau, 'South of the Pyrenees: Kings, Magnates and Political Bargaining in Twelfth-Century Spain', *JMH*, 27 (2001), pp. 103-04.
[70] Phillip de Souza and John France, 'Introduction', *WPAMH*, p. 1; Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', pp. 2-3; Ryan Lavelle, 'Towards a Political Contextualization of Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in Anglo-Saxon England', in *Peace and Negotiations: Strategies for Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Diane Wolfthal (Turnout, 2000), p. 40.
[71] Grygiel, 'Premodern History', pp. 20-24; Watkins, *NDH*, p.5.

even rogue agents, such as terrorist networks, insurgencies and rebels.[72] Diplomatic scholars have subsequently accepted an understanding of diplomacy that accounts for a multifaceted approach. As the introduction to The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy declares, if diplomacy was limited to acts conducted by representatives of sovereign states 'then much of what is called diplomacy today and is presented as such in this collection will appear mislabelled.'[73] Instead, that work opted for a 'relaxed' categorisation, which features diplomacy conducted by cities, business groups and indigenous people.[74] Barston, likewise, states the traditional definition of diplomacy must be revised due to the involvement of a growing number of non-state actors.[75]

With this in mind, there is no theoretical obstacle to exploring diplomacy in a period without states. Rather than states, this thesis investigates inter-ruler relations. It views relevant diplomacy as non-violent interactions and communication that shaped relations and policies between the kings of England on one hand, and the rulers of Scotland and the native Welsh rulers on the other. Benham has employed the inter-ruler focus in her recent study of medieval treaties, noting they were usually agreed by rulers, testifying to the significance of their relations. When other figures, such as aristocrats living in a march, agreed treaties, these were often local affairs and subject to the king's approval.[76]

The primacy of inter-ruler relations is clear in tenth, eleventh and early twelfth-century Britain too. For what it is worth, the one surviving Anglo-Welsh written treaty we have from the period follows Benham's model. It was agreed by English and Welsh border communities on the river Wye to govern local concerns, such as cattle theft. It also cited the English king's dominance in Anglo-Welsh relations, stating that the border community cannot take hostages from the neighbouring Welsh realm of Gwent without the king of England's permission.[77] His position in such foreign affairs was evidently supreme. Our sources stress the significance of inter-ruler relations by recording numerous personal interactions between English rulers and their Scottish and Welsh counterparts, including summits and conferences like Chester in 973.[78] Of course, due to practicality and the polycentric nature of authority in kingdoms, not all peaceful interactions that shaped inter-ruler relations involved rulers themselves meeting. Rather we must account for the envoys sent between kings, the third-party mediators who resolved their conflicts, and the influence of their relatives, who were often connected to multiple kings

[72] James A. Caporaso, 'Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty', *International Studies Review*, 2 (2000), p.22-23; Christopher Clapham, 'Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35 (1998), p. 194; Duran, 'Regional Diplomacy', pp. 1-14, especially pp. 1-4; Grygiel, 'Premodern History', p. 20; Virginie Marmadouh and Herman van der Wusten, 'The Paradiplomacy of Cities and Regions: Transnational Relations between Sub-State Political Entities', in *Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives*, ed. Jason Dittmer and Fiona McConnell (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 135-42; Edward Newman, 'The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed', *Security Dialogue*, 35 (2004), pp. 175-76.
[73] Costas M. Constantinou *et al*, 'Introduction: Understanding Diplomatic Practice', in *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, ed. Costas M. Constantinou *et al*. (Los Angeles, CA, 2016), pp. 3-5, quote on p. 4.
[74] See Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, pp. 1-3.
[75] Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 1, 10.
[76] *ILE*, pp. 17-18.
[77] *Dunsæte*, p. 105-09.
[78] Appendix 2.

by kinship. Even the diplomacy of rogue elements, like exiles, was part of inter-ruler relations. Exiles frequently made contact and found sanctuary with foreign rulers, which would incite a response from their host against the ruler of their homeland or *vice versa*. Though these people were individuals with their own motivations, as long as their peaceful interactions with "foreign" figures shaped Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh inter-ruler relations it is applicable here. Further restrictions on the scope of this study are provided later, during the chapter summary.

Diplomacy is considered through both its immediate and long-term impact. For instance, in the case of diplomatic marriages, I investigate both the wedding's instant consequences, as well as later implications for inter-ruler relations, such as the bride's child or other descendant allying with her brother in a war (it should be noted that whilst diplomacy itself is peaceful, it is usually conflict adjacent: ending wars, securing allies for wars, and even starting wars).[79]

My approach is fundamentally comparative. Influenced by John Watkins and NDH, evaluation of different medieval diplomatic practices is provided by expanding the evidence base beyond accounts of specific diplomatic events. Evidence from across and beyond my period, including from different disciplines is employed. The exact nature of the various sources is discussed in the upcoming section dedicated to the source base. Presently, the seminal point is that by broadening the evidence base we can learn more about the significance of diplomatic practices, helping us understand Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations in 927-1154, answering my research questions.

4. Sources

The methodology of this thesis, as well as the historiographical motives and influences around it, are shaped by the sources, or lack thereof. Firstly, there are several source types common to studies of diplomacy that this topic lacks. Most obviously, surviving written treaties, arguably the most diplomatic of sources, are almost entirely absent from Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations in 927-1154. Many likely existed, given the previously mentioned example governing Anglo-Welsh border relations, known as the *Ordinance concerning the Dunsæte*. Unfortunately, it is the only extant written treaty we have and it is a very difficult source in itself, providing no composition date, nor a reference to the kings who were ruling when it was agreed.[80] Letters are another trans-kingdom source, allowing figures separated by geography to directly appeal to one another. However, none sent between the rulers discussed here have survived. Again, it seems probable letters were used, given their involvement in English diplomacy can be traced back to the eighth-century, whilst Pope Paschal II exchanged letter with Henry I in the early twelfth century.[81] Their loss is a significant impediment.

[79] Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, p. 1.
[80] *Dunsæte*, pp. 105-09; Appendix 2, no. 1
[81] '*Letter of Charles the Good to Offa, king of Mercia'*, *EHD I*, pp. 848-49; '*Ad Henricum Regem Anglorum*: 424', *Anselmi*, 5, pp. 369-70; Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. 28-30.

Finally, there are no contemporary guides produced by diplomats to explain their role, such as the one written by the fifteenth-century envoy Bernard du Rossier, which Mattingly extensive used.[82]

The sources for Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in 927-1154 can be divided into two categories: narrative and documentary. The narrative category is largely made up of chronicles, of which arguably the most important is the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (*ASC*).[83] It provides an entry narrating incidents of high politics for almost every year of this study until 1154, its final addition. However, the composition of this document is relatively complicated. Rather than a single source, it survives unevenly in seven manuscripts (each assigned a letter from A to G) and a fragment containing two annals of an eighth (H). First produced at the court of King Alfred of Wessex in the 890s, the *ASC*'s corpus and surviving manuscripts were added to, copied and altered by different people at different times.[84] For instance, the annals for 934-40 that survive in the ABCD manuscripts, seem to have originally been composed in 940, after King Æthelstan of England's death.[85] Alternatively, the C manuscript's entries for the years up to the 1040s were written up in one go, after which there are a large number of contemporary entries for the years that followed.[86] The manuscripts mostly agree with one another despite the complexities of the source, reflecting their common root. When there are contradictions, the ramifications are discussed. The spread of its entries across the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, which crucially preserves tenth-century accounts of diplomacy, makes it essential for this study.

There is a plethora of Anglo-Norman chroniclers from the twelfth century's first half who provide accounts of English history, including William of Malmesbury, John of Worcester, Orderic Vitalis and Henry of Huntingdon.[87] Later chroniclers of English history, such as William of Newburgh and Roger of Wendover can be instructive too.[88] There are also chronicles containing native Welsh accounts from this period, like the *Annales Cambriae* and *Brut Y Tywysogyon*.[89] Some narrative sources are dedicated to the life of a particular individual, for instance the *Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan*,

[82] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 22, 27-29.
[83] Bredehoft, *Textual*; Nicholas Brooks, 'Why is the "Anglo-Saxon Chronicle" About Kings?', *ASE*, 39 (2011), pp. 43-70; Alice Jorgensen, 'Introduction: Reading the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', *Reading the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: Language, Literature, History*, ed. Alice Jorgensen (Turnhout, 2010), pp. 1-28; Pauline Stafford, 'The Making of Chronicles and the Making of England: The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles After Alfred: Prothero Lecture', *TRHS*, 27 (2017), pp. 65-86; Jacqueline Stodnick, 'Second-rate Stories? Changing Approaches to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*', *Literature Compass*, 3 (2006), pp. 1253-65.
[84] Jorgensen, 'Introduction', p. 11.
[85] Brooks, 'Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', p. 50.
[86] Bredehoft, *Textual*, p. 5.
[87] John Allen Giles, 'The Translator's Preface', in his edition of William of Malmesbury, *Chronicle of the Kings of England* (London, 1866), pp. vi-vii; Paul McGurk, 'Introduction', JW, 2, pp. xvii-xx; Marjorie Chibnall, 'Introduction', OV, 4, pp. xvii-xxvii; Diana Greenaway, 'Introduction', HH, pp. lvii-lxv.
[88] Patrick Gerard Walsh and M. J. Kennedy, 'Introduction', WN, 1, pp. 1-18; Dorothy Whitelock, 'Notes', *EHD I*, p. 255.
[89] David N. Dumville, 'Review: Kathleen Hughes, *The Welsh Latin Chronicles: '*Annales Cambriae *and Related Texts*,' *Studia Celtica*, 12 (1977), pp. 461-67; Owain Wyn Jones, *Historical Writing in Medieval Wales* (PhD Dissertation: Bangor University, 2013), pp. 184-286; Jones, 'Introduction', *Brut*, pp. xi-lxii; David Stephenson, *Medieval Powys* (Woodbridge, 2016), p. 224.

twelfth-century ruler of the Welsh realm of Gwynedd, and *The Life of King Edward*.[90] Finally, there is the Welsh poem *Armes Prydein Vawr*, a tenth-century exhortation for the Welsh to attack the English.[91] As for documentary evidence, this thesis utilises charters, the written records of land and privileges granted by kings.[92] Further evidence is taken from *Domesday Book,* a survey of land within England ordered by William the Conqueror at Christmas 1085.[93]

Within this source base there are further challenges around distribution, both temporal and geographic. There is a notable absence of evidence for Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in the late tenth and eleventh centuries. The primary reason for this is King Æthelred of England's reign (978-1013/1014-16). It featured numerous Viking incursions before eventually Cnut, the Danish leader of one such invasion, conquered England and became its king. The main account for Æthelred's reign, recorded in the *ASC*'s D manuscript, was composed after Cnut's succession, and thus Æthelred's failure to defeat the Viking threat.[94] Consequently, the author's narrative is downbeat, emphasising everything that Æthelred did wrong in regards to the now ruling Scandinavian invaders, with no reason to offer support to a king that had died and a dynasty that had ended. As Simon Keynes put it, 'he was like a dead man conducting his own post mortem.'[95] Any relationships Æthelred may have had with the Welsh or Scots were not relevant to this author, so went unaddressed.

Furthermore, in contrast to Wales and England, there is a lack of surviving chronicles from Scotland. The diminutive *Chronicle of the Kings of Alba*, the single native Scottish chronicle in this period, only records up to the 970s.[96] Historians of Scotland often plug this gap using Irish chronicles.[97] From the perspective of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, these frugal accounts do not provide any information that is not already found in the English and Welsh chronicles.[98]

This truncated pool of evidence likely accounts for this period's neglect amongst historians of diplomacy. It is no coincidence that there is, as discussed, increased scholarly interest in English diplomatic history after the succession of the Angevin rulers in the second half of the twelfth century.

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[90] C. P. Lewis, 'Gruffudd ap Cynan and the Reality and Reputation of Exile', *EMA*, pp. 43-46, 50; Paul Russell, 'Introduction', *LGC*, pp. 46-47: Frank Barlow, 'Introduction', *LKE*, pp. xvii-lxxxi.
[91] See pp. 63-64.
[92] Simon Keynes, 'Charters and Writs', in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Anglo-Saxon England*, ed. Michael Lapidge *et al.* (Chichester, 2014), pp. 192-94; Dauvit Broun, 'Introduction', in *The Reality Behind the Charter Diplomatic in Anglo-Norman Britain*, ed. Dauvit Broun (Glasgow, 2011), pp. xi-xvi.
[93] *ASC E*, 1085; Stephen Baxter, 'How and Why Wad Domesday Made', *EHR*, 135 (2020), pp. 1085-1131.
[94] *ASC D*, 975-1016.
[95] Simon Keynes, 'A Tale of Two Kings', *TRHS*, 36 (1986), p. 201.
[96] '*The Scottish Chronicle: Translation*', in Benjamin T. Hudson, 'The Scottish Chronicle', *Scottish Historical Review*, 77 (1998), pp. 152-61.
[97] Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 357-58; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 17, 34.
[98] *The Annals of the Four Masters*, trans. John O'Donovan, ed. Emma Ryan (Cork, 2002); *The Annals of Tigernarch*, trans. Gearóid Mac Niocaill, ed. Emer Purcell and Donnchadh Ó Corráin (Cork, 2010); *AU*; *Chronicon Scottorum*, trans. William H. Hennessy and Gearóid Mac Niocaill, ed. Beatrix Farber and Ruth Murphy (Cork, 2010).

Under these kings, particularly during King John's reign (1199-1216), record keeping and bureaucracy rapidly increased, resulting in a greater number of administrative documents surviving from this period.[99] Surviving written treaties governing King Alfred of Wessex and King Æthelred's respective relations with Scandinavian figures have aided analysis of Anglo-Scandinavian diplomacy.[100] Those interested in epistolary diplomacy, like Elena Woodacre, have had to look elsewhere for case studies.[101] The efficient administration of Italian city states not only makes them unrepresentative, but favoured by historians due to their extensive source production.[102] Sources and historiographical interest are thoroughly entwined.

As for the content, specific source issues and how they related to depictions of diplomacy will be discussed throughout. However, it is worth flagging up a few recurrent themes. None of these, apart from perhaps *Armes*, are specifically dedicated to explaining relations between rulers, limiting the amount of information they provide. The central concern of charters is not to describe diplomacy, but to archive the granting of land. It is only when we look at the witness lists of English charters, for instance, and discover the names of Welsh and Scottish rulers, do we realise that the charter must have been issued whilst these foreign rulers were attending the English court. The narrative accounts do provide more descriptive information, though it can be minimal at times. The *ASC*'s claim that in 946 'The Scots gave oaths to him [King Eadred of England] that they would agree to all that he wanted' leaves much to the imagination.[103] Chroniclers were not reporters, intent on providing accurate first-hand accounts of diplomacy. William of Malmesbury writes that the purpose of history is moral instruction, 'spurring the reader by the accumulation of examples to follow the good and shun the bad.'[104] These are moralising and pedagogical works, produced by Christian writers to provide educational models that readers can learn from and imitate.[105] Whilst this does not guarantee inaccuracy, exact blow-by-blow commentary is not their overriding goal, explaining the at times limited information.

Secondly, they were often produced in alignment with a particular ruler or dynasty, whether for patronage or geographic reasons. The *ASC* was originally a centrally produced legitimising tool for King Alfred, and continued to serve as propaganda for his successors and descendants who ruled

[99] *PMA*, pp. 7, 181; Nicholas Vincent, 'Why 1199? Bureaucracy and Enrolment under John and his Contemporaries', in *English Government in the Thirteenth Century*, ed. Adrian Jobson (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 17-48.
[100] '*Treaty between Alfred and Guthrum*,' *EHD I*, pp. 380-81; '*King Æthelred's Treaty with the Viking Army*', *EHD I*, pp. 401-02.
[101] Elena Woodacre, 'Cousins and Queens: Familial Ties, Political Ambitions and Epistolary Diplomacy in Renaissance Europe', in *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 30-41.
[102] Lazzarini, 'Renaissance diplomacy', pp. 426-27.
[103] *ASC C*, 946.
[104] WM, pp. 150-51, '*Ad bona sequenda uel mala cauenda legentes exemplis irritat*.'
[105] Chris Given-Wilson, *Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England* (London, 2004), pp. 2-3; For examples, Maesha L. Dutton, 'Introduction: Aelred's Hisotrical Works: A Mirror for Twelfth-Century England', in *Aelred of Rievaulx: The Historical Works*, trans. Jane Patricia Freeland, ed. Maesha L. Dutton (Kalmazoo, M.I., 2005), pp. 8; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 13.

England, including the Norman kings.[106] That it was used as a source for twelfth-century writers, like John of Worcester, further bedded in pro-monarchy sentiment.[107] The *Brut*'s detailed 1100-27 entries seem to have been written by the early twelfth-century figure Daniel ap Sulien, who was based at a church in Llanbadarn Fawr in the Welsh realm of Powys. Consequently, pro-Powys sympathy can be detected.[108] The *Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* was produced at the behest of the titular ruler's sons, whereas a clerk in King Stephen's service wrote *The Deeds of Stephen*.[109] Charters were written up in the name of kings, with the involvement of priests in the king's service at a central royal chancery.[110] In terms of diplomacy, this leads to sources presenting their preferred ruler in a favourable light when interacting with foreign rulers. To take one such example, The *Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* describes Henry I of England and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd's 1114 treaty following Henry's invasion of Wales as 'an agreement on a form of peace'.[111] Conversely, the *ASC* and the *Brut*, with their preferences for the monarchs of England and Powys, present Gruffudd in a more submissive manner, becoming an English vassal and paying tribute.[112] This creates a problem when we cannot crosscheck events with multiple accounts.

These challenges are what makes this topic ripe for the incorporation of new evidence. Influenced by NDH, this thesis utilises a wide array of comparative evidence to analyse the significance of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomatic incidents in 927-1154. Often this involves comparing different examples of diplomacy within my time period. However, I go further, incorporating evidence of domestic politics, as well as evidence from other periods and regions that are not my primary focus, including sources for Roman, Byzantine and Frankish governance and diplomacy, and evidence from pre-927 and post-1154 Britain. This allows access to diplomatic sources that are non-extant in 927-1154 Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations, like treaties and letters. Interdisciplinary evidence, drawn from anthropology, literature, geography and international relations theory is utilised as well. The wider context that surrounds diplomatic events, such as succession crises or relations with third parties, is considered too.

All this additional evidence is brought to bear on our source base for Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in 927-1154 to understand the character of these relationships. It allows us to re-examine the significance of these events, particularly ones where limited descriptive information is provided within the sources. Additional evidence also helps us test source interpretations of diplomacy, providing supplementary ammunition for determining the accuracy of these depictions. Understandably, there are limits to this approach. The lack of relevant diplomatic examples for Æthelred means he will always remain hard to analyse. But a refreshed interpretation of the period as a whole could at least offer additional insight into those decades. Overall, primary accounts of Anglo-

[106] Bredehoft, *Textual*, pp. 61, 67, 71, 144.
[107] McGurk, 'Introduction', JW, 2, pp. xix.
[108] Jones, *Medieval Wales*, pp. 248-253; Stephenson, *Powys,* p. 224.
[109] Russell, 'Introduction', *LGC*, pp. 46-47; Kenneth Reginald Potter, 'Introduction', *GS*, pp. xxx.
[110] Simon Keynes, 'Chancery, Royal', in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Anglo-Saxon England*, ed. Michael Lapidge *et al.* (Chichester, 2014), pp. 184-87.
[111] *LGC,* pp. 86-87, '*In pacis formam est consensum*'.
[112] *ASC H*, 1114; *Brut*, pp. 80-81.

Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, combined with a comparative approach to evidence, paves a route to answering this project's research questions.

5. Political background

It is not necessary to include a comprehensive political history of England, Wales and Scotland in the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries here. Information about kingdoms' domestic politics is incorporated throughout to better understand rulers' relations with one another. Further, the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the changing political position of rulers across the period, in the field of inter-ruler relations. However, a brief discussion of medieval Britain's broad political structure can serve as an aid to a reader unfamiliar with the period. Furthermore, it offers an opportunity to underline the suitability of the time period and inter-ruler relationships being investigated.

Unlike the kingdom of England, which was unified in 927, the composition of medieval Wales and Scotland was very different to their modern counterparts. Wales was notable for its political divisions.[113] Whilst there was a sense of Welsh identity, built on unifying laws, language and culture, the Welsh were split into multiple political units. This thesis mostly considers relations between kings of England and the rulers of the three principal Welsh realms: Gwynedd, centred on Anglesey and Snowdonia in North West Wales; Powys, on the eastern side of the central Anglo-Welsh border; Deheubarth in South West Wales. Some of the less significant polities, such as Gwent and Breicheiniog, are briefly encountered.

'Scotland' in this period meant something different to today.[114] This thesis looks at diplomacy involving the kings of the Gaelic kingdom referred to as 'Alba' in Irish sources, and 'Scotland' in English sources, who descended from the mid-ninth-century ruler, Kenneth MacAlpin (843-58), considered Scotland's first king. Their realm did not control Scandinavian areas, such as the earldom of Orkney, which included Caithness and Shetland, and owed nominal overlordship to the Norwegian kings. Likewise, the Western Isles, Argyll and Galloway were largely beyond the Scottish king's control. Further south was the kingdom of Strathclyde. Culturally Welsh, little is known of Strathclyde from contemporary sources. Roughly, in the tenth century it corresponded with the modern counties of Lanarkshire, Dunbartonshire, Stirlingshire, Renfrewshire, Peeblesshire, west and mid-Lothian, eastern Dumfriesshire and Cumberland.[115] Therefore, the polity known by some contemporaries as "Scotland", which is the focus of this thesis, was far smaller than the Scotland of today. Though modern Scotland is about 30,405 square miles, the tenth-century realm was roughly a third of the

[113] Lloyd, *Wales* provides a good overview of Medieval Wales. See also David Walker, *Medieval Wales* and Davies, *Conquest*.

[114] Woolf, *Pictland* and Oram, *Domination* are good introductions to medieval Scotland. See also Barrell, *Scotland*; Duncan, *Kingship*; G. W. S. Barrow, *The Kingdom of the Scots* (London, 1973).

[115] Alan MacQuarrie, 'The Kings of Strathclyde, c. 400-1018', in *Medieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and Community: Essays Presented to G. W. S. Barrow*, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1993), pp. 1-19; Fiona Edmonds, 'The Expansion of the Kingdom of Strathclyde', *EME*, 23 (2015), pp. 43-66.

size, slightly larger than modern Wales. Based on the itineraries of kings, it was centred on the Tay Basin, with Dunkeld, Scone, St. Andrews, Abernethy and Clunie the most significant sites.

It would of course be interesting to investigate diplomacy between English rulers and all the groups that inhabited Britain in this period, and perhaps even relations between England and Ireland. However, aside from restrictions imposed by time and space, references to cases of diplomacy involving other groups are rare and inconsistent, in contrast to Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in 927-1154, which was relatively regular. Irregular relations are unhelpful for a study committed to exploring how relations evolved over a long timeframe. Further, the Welsh and Scots shared land borders with the kingdom of England, providing an additional control on measuring their interactions, which other relationships, like the Anglo-Irish one, lack.[116]

As already hinted, the seminal year for my study is 1066. That year, Duke William of Normandy became king of England, having killed and defeated Harold Godwinson, the last Anglo-Saxon king, at the Battle of Hastings.[117] The event unquestionably caused a shift in the historic trajectory of Britain, bringing a new foreign dynasty to the English throne and a new foreign aristocracy to the kingdom. Consequently, the year has been recognised by historians as the conclusion of the Anglo-Saxon period and the dawn of the Anglo-Norman one.[118] Thus, if one is to compare and contrast diplomacy across the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries, it is logical to divide it into and pre- and post-1066 diplomacy. The choice of the years 927 and 1154 as the respective start and endpoints aids this investigation, providing pools of evidence on either side of the Norman Conquest, which can be used to understand the similarities and differences in Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman inter-ruler relations.

Aside from the historiographical neglect of diplomacy in these years, 927 and 1154 serve as rational bookends. As mentioned, 927 was when England was unified under King Æthelstan. Contemporaries recognised this as a turning point. Reflecting the unification, in 928 Æthelstan's court abandoned the royal style 'King of the Anglo-Saxons', previously used by him, his father and grandfather, and began calling him 'King of the English'.[119] This remained the case for his successors.[120] From 927 we can thenceforth talk of true English diplomacy. Though parts of the kingdom seceded again in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, their efforts were short lived.[121] As for 1154, King Stephen of England's death that year saw a new dynastic house succeed to the

[116] For interactions across the Irish Sea, see Caitlin Ellis, 'A Plausible Eleventh-Century Welsh-Orcadian Alliance', *Notes and Queries*, 67 (2020), pp. 336-38; Robin Frame, 'England and Ireland, 1171-1399', in *England and her neighbours, 1066-1453*, ed. Michael C. E. Jones and Malcolm Graham Allan Vale (London, 1989), pp. 139-55.
[117] *ASC D*, 1066.
[118] Carpenter, *Britain*, pp. 78-97 for post-1066 changes; For historiography, see Marjorie Chibnall, *The Debate on the Norman Conquest* (Manchester, 1999).
[119] *ES* 347, 360, 396, 400; see Foot, *Æthelstan*, pp. 10, 25-27; Alfred P. Smythe, 'The Making of English Identity, 700-1000', in *Medieval Europeans: Studies in Ethnic Identity and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 24-52; Ian W. Walker, *Mercia and the making of England* (Stroud, 2000), especially p. 148.
[120] *ES* 460, 517a, 660, 691.
[121] *ASC C*, 957; *D* 940, 946, 947, 1016; *E* 949, 1035.

English throne: the Angevins.[122] King David I of Scotland died the year before, adding to the sense that the mid-1150s saw a changing of the guard, justifying drawing my study to a close.[123]

There were other significant political developments in England, Scotland and Wales during 927-1154 that we must remain aware of. Though not long-lasting movements, kings of England had to respond to the abovementioned succession attempts, along with challenges posed by powerful earls and other aristocrats. 1066 was of course not the only the successful foreign invasion of England, with Cnut's attack in 1016 leading to both himself and his sons ruling until 1042.[124] A further period of significance in English history was Stephen's reign (1135-54). Often referred to as 'the Anarchy,' Stephen spent his reign engrossed in a civil war with his cousin, the Empress Matilda, for control of the English throne. Consequently, the Anarchy offers insight into how extended civil wars affect rulers' relations. In order to fully appreciate this, I consider the diplomacy of both Stephen and Matilda.[125]

As for Wales, though it was often divided, some Welsh rulers did manage to exert influence over other Welsh realms. Hywel Dda (942-48) and Maredudd ab Owain (986-99) were both native Deheubarth rulers who managed to take control of North Wales, whilst Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Gwynedd also ruled Powys and Deheubarth between 1055 and 1063.[126] Though none of these hegemonies survived the death of the kings, they were important developments at the time. Post-1066, the biggest change was increased English intervention in Wales.[127] Though the infiltration varied across Wales, a few overarching points emerge. It began with the installation of Norman lords on the border, such as Hugh d'Avranches in Chester and William Fitz Osbern in Hereford. They quickly constructed castles along the Anglo-Welsh frontier, before they built lines of forts into Wales that they gave to their loyal supports. By 1094 Hugh d'Avranches had castles in North Wales as far west as Anglesey. In the south, Gwent was quickly taken over, whilst King Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth (1078-93) was killed by Norman forces during the reign of William Rufus, paving the way for further advancement. These changes were not irreversible. During the Anarchy, influential Norman figures were killed in 1136-37, whilst Deheubarth, Powys and Gwynedd reasserted themselves and expanded.[128] Politics in the west certainly saw some changes.

The situation in Scotland was similarly fluid. The kingdom's influence steadily spread southwards. Edinburgh and the wider Lothian area were absorbed in the tenth and eleventh centuries.[129] There is evidence for increased control over Strathclyde in the early eleventh century, with that kingdom seemingly annexed by the 1060s.[130] During Stephen's reign, King David of Scotland expanded his rule into parts of northern England, whilst exerting more influence over

[122] *ASC E*, 1154.
[123] JH, p. 330.
[124] Michael Kenneth Lawson, *Cnut: England's Viking King* (Stroud, 2004).
[125] See H. A. Cronne, *The Reign of Stephen, 1135-54* (Worcester, 1970); Bradbury, *SM*; David Crouch, *The Reign of King Stephen, 1135-1154* (Harlow, 2000).
[126] Lloyd, *Wales*, pp. 343-46, 361-71; *Brut*, pp. 13, 17-19, 23-27.
[127] Davies, *Conquest*, pp. 24-45; *Brut*, pp. 27-113.
[128] Davies, *Conquest*, pp. 45-62; *Brut*, pp. 113-15.
[129] Barrell, *Scotland*, p. 8; Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 263-64; RW, 1, pp. 416-17,
[130] Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 270-71; *HR*, p. 191.

Galloway and the west.[131] This expansion made David I a particularly significant ruler. The same could be said for his father, Malcolm III, who led numerous attacks on England.[132] Perhaps even more pivotal were the violent transitions of power that characterised Scottish politics. To take just one ruler, Malcolm III assumed power by killing his predecessor Lulach, whilst his death was followed by a civil war between his sons and brother for the throne.[133]

Many of these events are returned to and expanded on throughout this thesis. Crucially, they are considered regarding the difference between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman relations, and whether this truly was the seminal shift. Or perhaps changes either side of 1066, such as from one ruler's reign to his successor, were more ground-breaking.

6. Chapters

Each of my five chapters analyses a single diplomatic theme, through which inter-ruler relations are understood. Chapter One explores diplomatic meeting places, investigating where kings held their summits. Chapter Two looks at examples of material items being exchanged between kings, principally highlighting the gifts and tributes that rulers gave to one another. The third chapter focuses on the impact of diplomatic marriages between the ruling families, shedding light on the role of wives and queens in diplomacy. Chapter Four considers the diplomats who travelled between kings for the purpose of negotiation and peacemaking, including escorts, envoys, third-party mediators and other proxies. The final chapter looks at the significance of diplomacy conducted by exiles, mainly meaning individuals who fled from one king and were taken in by another.

These themes were selected for two reasons. Firstly, their prevalence. Generally speaking, examples of these themes can be found throughout the entire period and in both the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relationships, making them instructive for analysing changes across the tenth, eleventh and the early twelfth-century. Though there are occasional absences, these still provide instructive contrasts.

Secondly, for historiographical reasons. Some of these diplomatic themes have already received reasonable scholarly attention, notably meeting places, gifts, envoys, and, in recent years, marriages.[134] Several of these are ritualised behaviours that fall into the category of symbolic diplomacy, helping to explain the historiographical interest in them. Consequently, this work is utilised and built on to better understand my chosen themes. Alternatively, other themes have been neglected. In particular, there is limited discussion on the role of tribute and exiles in medieval diplomacy. By shining a light on less understood diplomatic practices, my research aims to develop

[131] Oram, *Domination*, pp. 74-108; Aelred, Abbot of Rievaulx, 'The *Relatio de Standardo*,' in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I*., ed. Richard Howlett, 4 vols. (London, 1884-89), 3, pp. 181-202.
[132] Duncan, *Kingship*, p. 43; Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 269; *HR*, 191-92; *ASC E*, 1079, 1091, 1093.
[133] Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 263-64; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 38-45; *AU*, p. 495; *ASC E*, 1093, 1097.
[134] Pp. 26-29, 56-57, 82-85, 103, 110-13, 137-41, 143 for the historiography of the individual practices.

novel interpretations of them, which not only shed light on Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, but may prove instructive for those wishing to understand medieval diplomacy in general.

It should be noted that whilst some of these themes have been neglected by historians of diplomacy, this does not mean there is no relevant research on them. In line with NDH's call to open up diplomacy, none of these themes are exclusively diplomatic. Studying diplomatic meeting places necessitates engaging with scholarship and evidence on both domestic meeting places and work on spatiality. Gifts, tributes and marriages are not solely diplomatic behaviours, and must be considered in relation to their domestic equivalents. The same is true for exiles and diplomats. The former engages with the practice of outlawry and domestic exiles. Further, diplomats and exiles often had relationships with foreign rulers that were not exclusively diplomatic, such as family ties and bonds created by the knighting ritual. To fully appreciate these diplomatic themes, non-diplomatic evidence and research must be considered.

7. Preliminary Conclusions

Across these chapters, analysis of diplomatic practice allows me to respond to my research questions about the nature of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh inter-ruler relations. Firstly, there were differences between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman relations. The practices discussed in this thesis were used differently by Anglo-Norman rulers compared to their Anglo-Saxon predecessors. There is also evidence that Welsh and Scottish attitudes to the English kings changed after 1066. Although there were multiple reasons for these changes, the principal cause was the Anglo-Norman kings' dual roles as kings of England and dukes of Normandy. Concerns for their continental lands impacted their relationships with their British neighbours. However, the picture is multifaceted. There is some evidence of consistency, with some Anglo-Saxon approaches to diplomacy surviving the Conquest. Additionally, the extent to which 1066 was the key dividing point is challenged by numerous other shifts in relations, such as shifts precipitated by civil conflict and changes in leader. Secondly, Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy differed considerably. The Anglo-Scottish relationship was variable, with periods of both English dominance and relative Anglo-Scottish equality. The Anglo-Welsh relationship was more hierarchical, characterised by consistent Welsh submissions to English power. However, despite frequent illustrations of their weakness, diplomacy also highlights evidence of Welsh agency and attempts by rulers to improve their position.

Though my main intention is to interpret Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations, it is hoped this thesis has other benefits as well. The general historiography of medieval diplomacy is helped through my illumination of a period, relationships and diplomatic practices that have been neglected. It further serves as a model for the inclusion of NDH elements into a wide-ranging medieval study.

Perhaps most crucial are the advantages it might offer studies of modern diplomacy. As we have seen, the concept of diplomacy in the contemporary world has become quite open. Barston, Sharpe and Constantinou have noted that modern international relations are no longer the preserve of

state action, but influenced by numerous heterogeneous non-state actors. There is some debate over the process, with Edward Newman arguing that rather than a decline in state power and a proliferation of non-state actors, such as insurgency groups, NGOs and mercenaries, this has been the situation over the past century.[135] Regardless, it is a common interpretation of the world today. Consequently, figures like Watkins and Jakub Grygiel have suggested investigating pre-state diplomacy, due its own multifaceted and multi-layered roster of non-state diplomatic agents, in order to better understand the practice in the world around us. To quote Watkins, 'in short, diplomatic discourse before the advent of the bourgeois nation-state has acquired a peculiar relevance.'[136] Having investigated the impact on Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations of many such diplomatic agents, like exiles and brides, I use my conclusion to reflect on the similarities between them and modern examples, paving the way for further research. Such a discussion reveals that in many ways the practice of medieval diplomacy remains alive today.

[135] Newman, 'New Wars', pp. 179.
[136] Grygiel, 'Premodern History', p. 2; Watkins, *NDH*, p. 5.

Chapter 1: Diplomatic Meeting Places

1. Introduction

A key topic of discussion for scholars of medieval diplomacy is the *diplomatic meeting place*, meaning where rulers held their summits. In *Peacemaking in the Middle Ages*, Jenny Benham dedicates her first two chapters to analysing where rulers met during the High Middle-Ages.[1] Similarly, Paul Dalton surveyed the location of summits in England and Normandy between c. 900 and 1150, with a particular interest in rivers.[2] When looking at the 63 Anglo-French summits that occurred in the Angevin kings' reigns, John Gillingham divides them into those that took place on the border and those within English and French territory.[3] Even when it is not a study's focus, references to diplomatic meeting places often seep in. Christopher Holdsworth's exploration of peacemaking during Henry I and Henry II of England's reigns is broad in scope, highlighting many of the practices through which treaties were made, such as hostages and oaths. Within this, he explicitly flags up that a meeting between Henry I and Pope Callixtus II was hosted at a church near Gisors.[4]

The premise for this interest centres on the idea that meeting places mattered to contemporaries, so are an entry point for understanding interactions between medieval rulers. As Dalton argues, his study of meeting places 'has much to say about peacemaking, and the complex range of influences and ideas that helped shape and determine […] actions'.[5] Holdsworth shows how this works in practice. Regarding Henry and Callixtus' meeting, which was intended to resolve an Anglo-French conflict, he points out that the decision to meet 'midway between castles held by two warring sides, was surely made to try and find as neutral a site as possible.'[6] Thus, the location indicates the parties' desire to meet on neutral ground. These historians are taking what human geographers call a social constructivist perspective. As highlighted by Tim Cresswell, Charles Withers and Sarah de Nardi, this approach links social practices and places: 'Whenever we think about the power or knowledge gained by interpreting a place, it is helpful to identify practices and behaviours deemed appropriate or unsuitable to places.'[7] A social practice can be in, or out of place, and

[1] *PMA*, 19-68.
[2] Paul Dalton, 'Sites and Occasions of Peacemaking in England and Normandy, c. 900-c.1150', *HSJ*, 16, ed. Stephen Morillo, assisted by Diane Korngiebel (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 12-17.
[3] John Gillingham, 'The Meetings of the Kings of France and England, 1066-1204', in *Normandy and its Neighbours, 900-1250: Essays for David Bates*, ed. David Crouch and Kathleen Thompson (Turnhout, 2011), p. 25.
[4] Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', p. 6.
[5] Dalton, 'Sites', p. 13.
[6] Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', p. 6.
[7] Sarah de Nardi, *Visualising Place, Memory and the Imagined* (London, 2018), loc. 80; Charles W. J. Withers, 'Place and the "Spatial Turn" in Geography and in History', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 70 (2009) p. 644; Tim Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2004), p. 29.

investigating why this is the case can reveal information about underlying values and beliefs.[8] In a medieval diplomatic context, meeting places are suitable for certain diplomatic practices and not others. By analysing a meeting place historians can determine the sorts of interactions that occurred there, and by extension the participants' underlying relationships and strategies. Such an approach is a crucial boon, since, as Benham points out, sources often say more about a summit's location than what actually happened.[9]

There certainly is evidence that rulers conducting diplomacy in Britain during the tenth, eleventh and early-twelfth centuries were concerned with meeting places. In an account of Malcolm III of Scotland's meeting with William Rufus of England at Gloucester in 1093, recorded by the twelfth-century English chronicler John of Worcester. Malcolm was not granted a warm reception, with William refusing to speak to him:

What's more, he [William] wanted to force him to do homage to him at his court, according to the judgement of only his barons, but Malcolm wanted not at all to do it, except upon the border of their kingdoms, where kings of Scots were accustomed to do homage to kings of the English, and according to the judgement of the chief men of both realms.[10]

Unhappy with Rufus' demands, Malcolm returned to Scotland and launched an invasion of northern England. The event speaks to the meeting place's supreme importance in the medieval mind. Malcolm did not oppose providing homage. Rather, it was the homage's location, whether on the Anglo-Scottish border or at the English court, that mattered to him. Following in the footsteps of the abovementioned scholars, I begin this study with analysis of where Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh summits were held, considering both border and court meetings, as well as those in a defeated ruler's territory. Lastly, I return to the Gloucester summit, which does not fit neatly into these categories due to its disputed nature. Through this analysis of summit locations, we discover the character of relationships between rulers, noting key divisions between Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, as well as differences between pre- and post-Conquest relations. The picture is multifaceted though, with the evidence also pointing towards some continuity, in addition to other shifts, which occurred within the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman periods.

2. Border Meetings

From the perspective of scholarship on medieval diplomacy, it is significant that Malcolm III demanded a border meeting, as there is both good evidence for such meetings across the premodern period and considerable historiographical interest in them. Border meetings can be traced back at

[8] Tim Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression* (Minneapolis, Min, 1996), p. 4.
[9] *PMA,* p. 21.
[10] JW, 3, pp. 64-67, quote on pp. 64-65, '*Insuper etiam illum ut, secundum iudicium tantum suorum baronum, in curia sua rectitudinem ei faceret, constringere uoluit, sed id agere, nisi in regnorum suorum confiniis, ubi reges Scottorum errant soliti rectitudinem facere regibus Anglorum, et secundum iudicium primatum utriusque regni, nullo modo Malcolmus uoluit*'; Paul McGurk, 'Introduction', JW, 2, pp. xvii-xx.

least as far as the Romans. In 1 A.D., Gaius Caesar, the grandson and designated heir of Emperor Augustus, met the Parthian king for a summit on the Euphrates River, the supposed division between Roman and Parthian influence.[11] Such meetings remained in vogue during the early medieval period. King Clovis I, the late fifth and early sixth century ruler of the Franks, met Alaric II of the Visigoths 'on an island in the Loire', which ran through the frontier of their respective kingdoms.[12] Similarly, a letter written by Bishop of Wealdhere of London from 704-05 describes a summit between the rulers of Wessex and Essex that took placed at Brentford near the Thames, at that time the border.[13] The practice is perhaps best illustrated by an example that occurred during the time period that this thesis focuses on. The eleventh-century Burgundian chronicler Ralph Glaber records Robert the Pious of France and Henry II of the Germans taking part in a summit in 1023: 'At one time, they had met with each other for a conference upon the River Meuse, which is the boundary between both kingdoms.'[14]

Historians argue that border summits were for meetings between kings of equal status. Having surveyed English and Danish diplomacy in late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Benham believed the evidence makes 'it obvious that […] participants of peacemaking conferred with each other as equals on border sites.'[15] Gillingham came to a similar conclusion, contrasting the frequent Anglo-French border meetings and their connection to equality with more hierarchical summit types.[16] Glaber's account of Henry II and Robert the Pious seconds these conclusions. He emphasises the connection between borders and equality, mentioning that 'many from both factions muttered that it would be unbecoming for one of these so undoubtedly great kings to humiliate oneself by going over to the other, as if to aid him.'[17] He calls both rulers 'great' kings, suggesting he regarded them as equals, but if one of them travelled to the other their status would be undermined.[18] Subsequently they compromised, and both journeyed to the border, a neutral venue far from their respective powerbases. Though John of Worcester's account is less explicit, it does point to borders being places of equality. Malcolm III's walkout could suggest a disagreement over whether he held the same status as Rufus. Further he claims the border was where *both* the chief men of England and Scotland held authority, rather than one side dominating. This interpretation of border meetings as indicating equality is substantiated by primary evidence.

[11] Marcus Velleius Paterculus, *Historia Romana*, ed. Thomas Newcomb (London, 1724), pp. 208-09; Brian Campbell, 'Diplomacy in the Roman World (c. 500BC- AD 235)', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12 (2001), p. 14.
[12] GT, p. 150; Patrick J. Geary, *Before France and Germany* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 114-15.
[13] 'Letter of Wealdhere, Bishop of London, to Brihtwold, Archbishop of Canterbury,' *EHD I*, pp. 729-30; Pierre Chaplais, *Essays in Medieval Diplomacy and Administration* (London, 1981), essay xiv, pp. 3-24.
[14] *Glaber*, pp. 108-09, '*Nam cum aliquando ad inuicem colloquendem super Mosam fluuium, qui limes est utriusque regni, conuenissent*'.
[15] *PMA*, p. 60.
[16] Gillingham, 'Meetings', pp. 27, 31.
[17] *Glaber*, pp. 108-09, '*Pluresque ex ambobus partibus musitarent indecens esse ut quis illorum, tantorum scilicet regum, semet humilians quasi in alterius transiret auxilium*'.
[18] See Jenny Benham, 'Walter Map and Ralph Glaber: Intertextuality and the Construction of Memories of Peacemaking', in *Citation, Intertextuality and Memory in the Middle Ages and Rennaissance. Volume 2: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Medieval Culture*, ed. G. Di Bacco and Y. Plumley (Exeter, 2013), p. 6, 11, 16.

This model's success is shown by the fact it has transitioned beyond studies dedicated to discovering how medieval diplomacy functioned, and has instead been used as evidence in its own right to interpret (or re-interpret) social relations between rulers. R. Michael Davidson employed it to analyse King Edward of the Anglo-Saxons' meeting with several northern rulers in 920. Traditionally seen as a submission to Edward, Davidson argues that since the summit occurred on a border 'the idea that the meeting represented a 'submission' […] does however seem unlikely.'[19] Julia Barrow similarly uses it to analyse the Chester Conference 973, which I shall return to later, whilst Levi Roach employs it within a broader chapter on English royal assemblies in the tenth century to explain the relatively few that were attended by foreign rulers.[20] The road is clear for me to take this model even further. Rather than the relatively limited scope of the short studies by Barrow and Davidson, I apply it to Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh border summits over more than 200 years.

There is a problem though with identifying them. Historians often treat border summits as self-evident, as when Roach writes that 'they tend to be held near borders and when not they generally symbolise a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved'.[21] However, he never explains where the borders were, or how we determine that a meeting occurred on one. Most sources for this period tell us little more than the settlement or region where the Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish summits happened, with only John of Worcester's account of 1093 ever explicitly talking about summits taking place on borders. Mapping the meetings onto known borders presents problems too. Very few sources describe the Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish borders in the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries.[22] This uncertainty around borders aligns with conclusions in the field of *frontier studies*. Historians traditionally described medieval kingdoms as possessing definitive linear borders, akin to modern states, as Geoffrey Barrow did in his 1989 essay on the medieval Anglo-Scottish border. He claimed that in the tenth-century it followed the Westmoreland Fells in the west, whilst in the east it originally tracked the river Tees, then the Tyne, and eventually the Tweed, which formed the border between the English and Scots for the next few centuries.[23] Conversely, *frontier studies* question the idea of clear linear borders in the medieval period. Rather, medieval borders consisted of vague and ill-defined zones, which were heavily connected to the polities they sat between. This created a broad and illusive area of fusion and transition.[24] When defined linear borders were

[19] Michael R. Davidson, 'The (Non)submission of the Northern Kings in 920', *Edward the Elder: 899-924*, ed. N. J. Higham and D. H. Hill (London, 2000), p. 209.
[20] Julia Barrow, 'Chester's Earliest Regatta? Edgar's Dee-Rowing Revisited', *EME*, 10 (2001), pp. 81-93; Roach, *Kingship*, pp. 48-53.
[21] Roach, *Kingship*, p. 48.
[22] WM, pp. 217. King Æthelstan of England supposedly fixed the Anglo-Welsh border on the River Wye; *GS*, p. 35, in the twelfth century, England and Scotland were apparently divided by a river.
[23] Geoffrey Barrow, 'Frontier and Settlement: Which Influenced Which? England and Scotland, 1100-1300', in *Medieval Frontier and Societies*, ed. Robert Bartlett and Angus Mackay (Oxford, 1989), pp. 3-4, 10, 20; See G. W. S. Barrow, *The Kingdom of the Scots* (London 1973), pp. 139-156; for an example related to France, W. Gordon East, *An Historical Geography of Europe* (London, 1955), p. 231.
[24] Patrick J. Duffy, 'The Nature of the Medieval Frontier in Ireland', *Studia Hibernica*, 22/23 (1982/1983), p. 21; Ronnie Ellenblum, 'Were there Borders and Borderlines in the Middle Ages? The Example of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', in *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, ed. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (London, 2016), pp. 108-12; Judith Green, 'King Henry I and Northern England', *TRHS*, 17 (2007), p. 40; Daniel J. Power,

mentioned, these historians argue that such statements reflect political aspirations, not the complex underlying reality.[25] We can see this shift in recent works, such as Lindy Brady's *Writing the Welsh Borderlands in Anglo-Saxon England*. Like Barrow, she analyses a political frontier in medieval Britain, but unlike him she rejects the idea of an obvious linear border. Instead, she describes the Anglo-Welsh frontier as a 'zone of mutual influence in which Anglo-Saxon and Welsh peoples lived', and includes a map depicting the border as shaded area rather than a line.[26] It is beyond this thesis' scope to completely diagnose the nature of borders in the Middle Ages. My interest purely relates to medieval diplomacy. But, a framework for identifying the sorts of border meetings that chroniclers like John of Worcester and Ralph Glaber mention must account for research that questions the notion that there were identifiable borders for rulers to meet on. Furthermore, increasing our understanding of the link between borders and summits will provide further insight into the latter's significance.

Benham is one of the few scholars to consider how the nature of political borders interacted with diplomatic summits. Ultimately, she rejects the line versus zone division when it comes to diplomacy, instead arguing that rulers met at specific border places: 'the place of meeting, and only the place of meeting was the agreed border.'[27] Benham's view centres on the idea that as long as the participants mutually recognised the place as appropriate for border summits, then it could function as such. This is a more flexible approach, that belays the need for clear linear borders. Whilst welcome, it is not a flawless solution. Given the dearth of sources available that actually mention border meetings, how do we know that the rulers identified a meeting as taking place on a border, versus another justification or rationale? In fact, Benham's emphasis on mutual recognition means her approach lacks objective measures for classifying summits as border meetings. A model that instead relies on external evidence is necessary for historians to approach summits through.

The solution can be found in John of Worcester's account of the 1093 meeting. John sharply distinguished between meetings at the English court and the Anglo-Scottish border, seemingly identifying them as contrary to one another. The human geographer Yi-fu Tuan believes places obtain their identity by being contrasted with rival or alternative places: principally, by people identifying what they are not.[28] In contrast to the border, which could host the nobility of both realms, making it a place of shared sovereignty, the English court was a place of exclusively English authority, attended exclusively by English nobles. The royal court was where a king's political power manifested. It was there that kings enacted legislation, granted land, ruled on disputes, appointed officials and planned invasions. Essentially, courts were the location of all-important political actions that impacted the state

'What Did the Frontier of Angevin Normandy Compromise', *ANS*, 17, p. 184; Daniel Power, 'Introduction: A. Frontiers: Terms, Concepts and the Historian of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', *Frontiers in Question*, p. 5; Daniel Power, 'French and Norman Frontiers in the Central Middle Ages', *Frontiers in Question*, pp. 111-12.

[25] Power, 'Angevin Normandy', p. 201; Power, 'French and Norman Frontiers', p. 118; Naomi Standen, 'Re(constructing) the Frontiers of Tenth-Century North China', *Frontiers in Question*, p. 63.

[26] Lindy Brady, *Writing the Welsh Borderlands in Anglo-Saxon England* (Manchester, 2017), p. 9-10.

[27] Jenny Benham, 'Anglo-French Peace Conferences in the Twelfth Century', *ANS*, 27, pp. 61-62, quote on p. 61; See *PMA*, pp. 23-28.

[28] Yi-fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis, Min, 1979), p. 171.

of realm.[29] Historians such as Thomas Charles-Edwards, Ronnie Ellenblum and David Rollason have investigated how authority functioned in medieval kingdoms, arguing that they were divided into zones, within which rulers held different levels of influence.[30] A king's power spread from places where authority was demonstrated, becoming diluted as it went, creating areas of greater, lesser and uncertain sovereignty. With this in mind, John's distinction between courts and borders suggests that a border summit was somewhere far enough away from both rulers' centres of power that they held similar influence at the location, making it a place of equality and neutrality. The location could be, and generally was, between both kingdoms' centres of power, within the border zone, and I strongly suspect that this is the sort of meeting that John of Worcester envisioned. Although it need not. In line with Benham's focus on mutual recognition, if both rulers agreed that the meeting site was far enough from their respective centres of power, whether it sat in an ill-defined border zone or not, it could be a border meeting. Going forward, a primary indicator that an Anglo-Welsh or Anglo-Scottish summit was a border meeting, and thus indicative of equality between the English king and his opposite number, is whether it was far from the location of domestic English courts.

This approach reveals seven border meetings. Five of these took place in the northern English frontier zone and were attended by English and Scottish rulers, meaning these were likely the sorts of meetings that Malcolm III was claiming there was precedence for in 1093: King Æthelstan of England and Constantine II of Scotland's meeting at Eamont in 927, which was also attended by Owain of Strathclyde and possibly Ealdred of Bamburgh;[31] King Edmund of England and Malcolm I of Scotland's 945 summit in Cumbria;[32] King Eadred of England and Malcolm I's 946 summit in the vicinity of Northumbria;[33] the 1091 summit between King William Rufus of England and Malcolm III of Scotland in Lothian;[34] King Stephen's meeting with David I of Scotland near Durham in 1136.[35] All these English kings were based in and around the former Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Wessex, holding courts in southern England.[36] Conversely, these summits were held north of the Humber, a place English kings only visited on extraordinary occasions, such as when Æthelstan invaded Scotland in 934.[37] Given these visits' rarity, these northern meeting places were not places of English authority, but seemingly border meetings that implied equality.

Border summits were not restricted to the north though. For instance, there is evidence of an Anglo-Welsh border meeting taking place in the west. During King Edward the Confessor's reign, a

[29] Timothy Reuter, 'Assembly Politics in Western Europe from the Eighth Century to the Twelfth Century', in *The Medieval World*, ed. Peter Linehan and Janet L. Nelson (London, 2001), pp. 615; Roach, *Kingship*, pp. 77, 107, 122, 149, 155-59

[30] Thomas Charles-Edwards, 'Early Medieval Kingships in the British Isles', in *The Origins of Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms* ed. Steven Bassett (Leicester, 1989), pp. 28-31; Ellenblum, 'Borders', pp. 109-112; David Rollason, *Northumbria, 500-1100: Creation and Destruction of a Kingdom* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 20-54, esp. 20-24.

[31] *ASC D*, 927; WM, pp. 214-15; Appendix 2, no.2.

[32] *ASC C*, 945.

[33] Ibid, 946.

[34] *ASC*, E 1091; JW, 3, pp. 60-61; OV, 4, pp. 268-69.

[35] HH, pp. 706-07.

[36] Appendix 1, Maps 1-2, 7, 9.

[37] *ASC C*, 934; Appendix 1, Map 1.

meeting was held involving King Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales and Earl Harold Godwinson of Wessex at Billingsley (1055).[38] This was far from the centre of English royal power.[39] Edward never held a domestic court there, as like other English kings he was based in southern England, with Gloucester the furthest he ventured north-west. Thus, our model would suggest Billingsley was a border summit, and the Anglo-Welsh equivalent of places such as Eamont and Lothian. The obvious caveat here is that the 1055 meeting was not a true royal summit, since Gruffydd met Earl Harold, not King Edward. Aside from the earlier discussion about the polycentric nature of medieval diplomacy, there are some contextual factors to consider too.[40] Firstly, Harold was commanding an army of 'all England', making him a worthy representative of English power. Meanwhile, Edward was relatively inactive in this period, not directly taking part in campaigns against Welsh and Scots.[41] He was not entirely absent from English foreign policy though, hosting Malcolm III of Scotland at his court in 1059.[42] Evidently, despite Edward's inactivity, he could still host foreign rulers at his court. That he did not in 1055, but instead had a follower meet Gruffydd on the border is certainly indicative of the underlying Anglo-Welsh relationship. This border meeting is certainly worthy of analysis here.

The seventh is the famous Chester Conference in 973. It is perhaps the most peculiar, involving English, Scottish *and* Welsh rulers, and not taking place between two kingdoms' centres in the supposed frontier zone. The earliest record of the conference is in the *ASC*, in a minimal extract composed towards the tenth century's close. It merely states that King Edgar of England went to Chester and 'there six kings came to him and all gave him pledges that they would be co-workers on sea and land.'[43] The clerical writer Ælfric reveals the identity of two of the other kings in attendance. His *Life of St. Swithun*, produced between 995 and 1002, states that eight kings, including the kings of Scotland and Strathclyde, submitted to Edgar on a single day.[44] Ælfric was clearly describing Chester, meaning King Kenneth II of Scotland was there. The twelfth-century English writers John of Worcester and William of Malmesbury expanded on the conference in a number of ways, creating the accounts this thesis opened with.[45] For example, they claimed that the conference was also attended by King Maccus of the Isles and several Welsh rulers, including Iago ab Idwal of Gwynedd. Given the frequency of Anglo-Welsh summits in the tenth-century, with numerous examples between 927 and 973, the reference to Welsh attendance has good historical grounding.[46] The twelfth-century sources also aggrandise the conference, depicting it is as more symbolic of English dominance through the claim that Edgar manned the helm of a boat, and was rowed down the Dee by the other kings. This

[38] *ASC C*, 1055.
[39] Appendix 1, Map 5.
[40] See pp. 13-15.
[41] *ASC CDE*, 1042-1066.
[42] *HR*, p. 124.
[43] *ASC D*, 973, '*Þær him comon ongean .vi. Cyningas, 7 ealle wið hine getreowsodon þæt hi woldon efenwyrhtan beon on sae 7 on lande*'; Simon Keynes, 'Edgar, *Rex Admirabilis*', in *Edgar, King of the English 959-975: New Interpretations*, ed. Donald Scragg (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 50.
[44] Ælfric, '*Life of St. Swithun*', *EHD I*, p. 853; G. I. Needham, 'Introduction', in his version of Ælfric, *Lives of Three English Saints* (London, 1966), p. 12.
[45] JW, 2, pp. 422-25; WM, pp. 238-39.
[46] Appendix 2, no. 3-10, 12-14, 17-19.

strikingly contrasts the terse, relatively neutral, account in the *ASC*. The historicity of such additions will be discussed later. For now, I accept that Welsh and Scottish rulers met King Edgar for a conference, and I focus on an aspect that both the later and earlier sources agree on: that Chester hosted the conference.

Chester certainly possessed border-like qualities. It was far from Edgar's sphere of influence, since he was largely based in the south, holding almost all his courts there.[47] There were only a few exceptions, one of which occurred during the two-year period when he ruled only Mercia.[48] Roach has criticised interpreting Chester as hosting a border meeting, since it was far from the kingdoms of Scotland and Strathclyde.[49] However, as discussed, border meetings need not take place in the actual frontier zones between kingdoms. Rather, they simply had to be far enough away from the participants' centres of power that they could meet as equals. This Chester was, both from the perspective of Edgar and the kings, such as Kenneth, that he met there. Further, Roach's conclusions do not acknowledge the context. Yes, Chester is further south than we might expect an English king to meet the kings of Scotland and Strathclyde. However, this was not a conference between just Edgar and the northern kings. The attendance of Welsh rulers and the king of the Isles, who ruled over Man among others, presumably meant their centres of power had to be accommodated, pulling any neutral location towards the south and the west.

When closely inspected together, these seven meetings reveal patterns that further demonstrate both that they were border summits, and that such meetings are indicative of equality. Firstly, though the sources do not describe meeting places in detail, saying nothing about whether they took place inside for instance, the language chroniclers used is insightful. The *ASC* introduced the 927 summit with the phrase 'at that place (*stowe*) which is called Eamont'.[50] William of Malmesbury used the same sentence construction in his account of Eamont, again referring to it as just a 'place' (*locum* in Latin).[51] Likewise, John of Worcester states the 1055 meeting was 'convened in the place (*loco*), which is called Billingsley.'[52] This vagueness, and the lack of adjective besides 'place', implies they were not important English settlements, but rather places of dubious sovereignty. The way the chroniclers introduced the names of meeting places even suggests they did not expect their audience to be familiar with them, further speaking to their lack of domestic significance. Likewise, the Durham summit in 1136 was said to have occurred '*circa Dunelmiam*' (near Durham).[53] This suggests David and Stephen did not meet within the English city, which would have symbolised a greater degree of English authority, but outside of it, perhaps somewhere on route to Newcastle, where David is said to have been before the summit. Thus, the limited descriptors the sources provide point to the summits being border meetings.

[47] Appendix 1, Map 3.
[48] *ES* 667.
[49] Roach, *Kingship*, pp. 52-53.
[50] *ASC D*, 927, '*On þære stowe þe genemned is æt Eamotum*'.
[51] WM, pp. 214-15.
[52] JW, 2, pp. 578-79.
[53] HH, pp. 706-07; JH, p. 287.

Secondly, external evidence suggests that these were places where none of the participating kings held supreme authority. For instance, there were a large number of Brittonic place names not far from Eamont, concentrated around the nearby Ullswater.[54] This implies the meeting place was in the English frontier zone, where English influence declined and mingled with the authority of the British kingdom of Strathclyde. Æthelstan had only just absorbed Northumbria, the formerly independent Anglo-Saxon kingdom that Eamont was nominally a part of, prior to the summit.[55] Determining the demographic topography of the area prior to his conquest is challenging, since aside from one spurious grant by King Ecgfrith of Northumbria, no charters for pre-tenth Northumbria survive.[56] However, the plentiful narrative sources for eighth-century Northumbria, notably Bede's work, do reveal some insight into where the kings were based. The location of royal estates suggests the Northumbrian centres of power were east of the Pennines, in places like York, Bamburgh, and Tyne and Weir: all far from Eamont.[57] As the effective successor to their throne, we would expect Æthelstan's relationship to the region to be similar. We can draw parallel conclusions about Lothian. Whilst Northumbrian kings historically possessed influence north of the Firth of Forth, with Northumbrian style sculpture being found there, Pictish placenames can be found to the south in Lothian too.[58] Though the thirteenth-century chronicler Roger of Wendover tells us the region became part of Scotland, this had only occurred in the late-tenth century, when King Edgar of England granted it to King Kenneth II of Scotland.[59] Returning briefly to the language used, it is notable that both the *ASC* and John of Worcester claim Malcolm III travelled to Lothian in 1091 from Scotland, suggesting it was not considered Scotland proper.[60] Therefore, whilst the evidence is not overt, it does demonstrate that these places were not the firm and exclusive possession of one kingdom. Rather they were places where multiple kingdoms' influence blended into one another, suiting a border meeting.

The border nature of these summits is also shown by the proximity of rivers. In Orderic Vitalis' account of Malcolm III and William Rufus' meeting at Lothian, he claims they met at 'the great river (*magnum flumen*) called 'Scots' Water.''[61] Eamont sits on both the River Eamont and the River Lowther. In fact, the rivers almost meet at Eamont, before drifting apart again and eventually joining together further downstream, creating the effect of a faux island.[62] Similarly, Billingsley is near the River Severn, where the meeting may have actually taken place.[63] This corresponds with the comparative examples of border summits that I discussed earlier: the Euphrates, Loire, Thames and Meuse all played host to diplomatic summits. The traditional explanation is that rivers demarcated kingdom's linear borders, as Barrow illustrated by aligning the Anglo-Scottish border with the Tees,

[54] Fiona Edmonds, 'The Expansion of the Kingdom of Strathclyde', *EME*, 23 (2015), p. 64; Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 154-55.
[55] *ASC*, D 927.
[56] Rollason, *Northumbria,* pp. 11-12; *ES* 66.
[57] Rollason, *Northumbria,* pp. 45-52.
[58] Ibid, pp. 32-34.
[59] RW, 1, pp. 416-17.
[60] *ASC E*, 1091; JW, 3, pp. 60-61.
[61] OV, 4, pp. 268-69, '*Et usque ad magnum flumen quod Scotte Watra dicitur perduxit*'.
[62] Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 152.
[63] Appendix 2, no. 24.

Tyne and Tweed. This of course does not correspond with the ambiguous nature of medieval borders. Instead, Benham argues that rivers were used for border meetings as they served as landmarks for identifying a border meeting place. A particular point on a waterway was well suited to this role, because rivers were permanent and recognisable features, so could easily be used and reused for diplomacy.[64] The other activities that rivers were used for suggests they possessed symbolic elements that made them ideal for border meetings. Thietmar of Merseburg's eleventh-century *Chronicon* records a judicial duel taking place on an island in a river.[65] Likewise, the *Mabinogion*, a medieval Welsh poem, describes two kings meeting in a river for a duel.[66] The poet expands on the fight, declaring 'this confrontation is between the two kings, and between their two persons alone', emphasising their isolation.[67] The in-between nature of rivers encouraged medieval people to see them as places of neutrality, disconnected from the "mainland's" influence.[68] This was ideal for men that wanted to take part in a fair duel, or for rulers who wanted to meet as equals. The kings at these summits seemingly saw the river as asserting the fact that neither controlled the meeting place: ideal for a border meeting.

This raises questions about the River Dee's possible role in 973. As mentioned, twelfth-century chroniclers claimed that the other rulers rowed King Edgar down the Dee.[69] Based on comparisons such as those made above, Julia Barrow argues the involvement of a river in the conference points to equality between the participants.[70] As already highlighted though, the earliest sources reference neither the rowing or the Dee. Elsewhere in her article, Barrow suggests the rowing may have been added by Benedictine monks looking to celebrate the king responsible for the Benedictine reforms. Unfortunately for them, the evidence for Edgar's reign is sparse, possibly reflecting a general lack of achievements. The monks' solution was to take the conference and, inspired by the title of 'helmsman (*gubernator*)' that he used in his charters, glorify it with the rowing incident.[71] *Gubernator* was a common Anglo-Saxon royal title, so probably did not relate to a specific incident involving Edgar.[72] Given this, I do not think the evidence of the Dee's involvement is strong enough to analyse the conference through it.

More significantly, Chester was a port, indicated by the fact Edgar sailed there.[73] Ports were favoured when it was not possible to meet in the space between the parties' centres of power. Henry of Huntingdon claims that in 1154, King Stephen 'made for Dover to speak with the Count of

[64] Benham, 'Anglo-French Peace', p. 58.
[65] Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, ed. and trans. David A. Warner (Manchester, 2001), pp. 133-34.
[66] Andrew Breeze, 'The Dates of the Four Branches of the Mabinogi', *Studia Celtica Posnaniensia*, 3 (2018), pp. 47-62, particularly pp. 59-60: The poem's relevant sections are dated to 1120-30.
[67] *Mabinogion*, trans. and ed. Sioned Davies (Oxford, 2007), pp. 47-48, quote on p. 48; See *ILE*, pp. 167-69 for judicial combat.
[68] Karl Leyser, *Communications and Power in Medieval Europe*, ed. Timothy Reuter (London, 1994), p. 210.
[69] JW, 2, pp. 422-25; WM, pp. 238-39.
[70] J. Barrow, 'Chester', pp. 84-87, 92-93.
[71] Ibid, pp. 89-90, 92.
[72] McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, pp. 170-74; *ES* 498, 882.
[73] *ASC D*, 973.

Flanders.'[74] Since the sea divided their polities, a port on the very brink of English influence was the best option for a border meeting.[75] The situation was similar in 973, when the meeting involved a large number of rulers whose realms were spread over a wide and disparate area. Because Anglo-Flemish meetings took place in England, Benham suggests that the king of England was the more powerful ruler, but not a dominant one.[76] Chester could similarly mean that Edgar held more authority than his counterparts, but was by no means dominant over them all, necessitating a meeting as relative equals.

Beyond analysis of the meeting place itself, the sources do include elements showing that the rulers met as equals, although nothing as explicit as Ralph Glaber's account. Whilst the writers often claimed the purpose of these meetings was a submission to the English king, the context around them points to more equal relationships. Not a single one of these summits was immediately preceded by a successful English invasion of Wales or Scotland. Rather, they often followed significant English military setbacks. Prior to the Billingsley summit, Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, who was in a strong position having recently asserted control over all of Wales, allied with the English dissident Earl Ælfgar and attacked Hereford, pillaging its minster.[77] The Chester, Lothian and Durham meetings followed successful attacks on northern England by Scottish kings.[78] In 1091, William Rufus led both a land and a naval force north in response to the attack in an effort to invade Scotland, as his father did effectively in 1072.[79] However, Rufus suffered a setback when his navy sank during the journey, and he was only able to square off with Malcolm's forces before ultimately having to negotiate. Evidently, these meetings did not take place in the context of English dominance, but during periods when kings of England were suffering foreign policy hindrances at the hands of their neighbours. The underlying power relations meant they could only conduct diplomacy with the Welsh and Scots as relative equals.

If then, these summits were all border meetings, so indicative of equality, that raises a new question: what were their purposes? Historians have often simply followed the interpretation of the chroniclers, and categorised them as submissions to the king of England. Regarding Eamont, Eric John wrote 'the kings of Scotland and Strathclyde […] became his [Æthelstan's] men.'[80] In her study of Æthelstan's reign, Sarah Foot claims the meeting established Æthelstan's 'overlordship' over the northern rulers and was a step towards his goal of becoming over-king of all Britain.'[81] Not only is this challenged by analysis of the meeting places, it must be appreciated that we are almost exclusively reliant on English chroniclers for accounts of border meeting. For instance, the *ASC*, with its interest in legitimising the English monarchy, depicts the meetings in 927, 945, 946 and 1091 as submissions

[74] HH, pp. 774-75, '*Doroberniam peciit cum consule Flandrensi locuturus*'.
[75] *PMA*, pp. 60-61.
[76] Ibid, pp. 60-61.
[77] *ASC C*, 1055.
[78] '*The Scottish Chronicle: Translation*', in Benjamin T. Hudson, 'The Scottish Chronicle', *Scottish Historical Review*, 77 (1998), p. 161; *ASC E*, 1091; HH, pp. 706-07.
[79] *ASC E,* 1072.
[80] Eric John, 'The Age of Edgar', Campbell, *AS*, p. 164.
[81] Foot, *Æthelstan*, p. 20.

to kings of England.[82] We have already seen in this chapter how the desire to celebrate King Edgar led to twelfth-century chronicler's depicting the Chester conference as more indicative of the English king's dominance than earlier accounts. Crucially, we do have one insular account of a border meeting not from the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Norman realms. The *Annales Cambriae*, a chronicle produced at St. Davids in South-West Wales between 800 and 1200 presents a neutral description of 973, simply stating 'There was an association of ships in Chester with King Edgar of England.'[83] It further highlights the issue of author allegiance discussed in the introduction, and whether other sources from Wales and Scotland would have provided more neutral interpretations of border summits, had they survived.[84]

If the summits were not submissions, one obvious explanation for them is that these meeting places were used for peacemaking. The Chester, Billingsley, Lothian and Durham meetings all took place after either Anglo-Scottish or Anglo-Welsh conflicts, necessitating peace negotiations. Following recent English military failures, and the inability of any of the belligerents to emerge as dominant, the most suitable meeting place was a location that symbolised relative equality between the attendees.

As for the meetings in 927, 945 and 946, these were all precipitated by a need for recognition. All three meetings came in the wake of territorial change in the north. Before Eamont, Æthelstan subsumed Northumbria into his realm. After Æthelstan's death in 939, Northumbria seceded from the English kingdom, briefly becoming an independent realm under the authority of culturally Scandinavian monarchs once more.[85] It was reconquered in 944 by King Edmund of England, who followed this up with another military campaign in the north and a diplomatic summit.[86] The *ASC* states that in 945 'King Edmund ravaged all Cumberland and *let* it all to Malcolm, King of Scots.'[87] The next year Edmund died and was succeeded by his brother Eadred, who quickly 'reduced all Northumbria under his rule', before meeting with Malcolm.[88] These examples point to a correlation between territorial change and diplomatic meetings, suggesting their purpose related to the unique problems caused by a realm's recent expansion.

Subsequently, kings likely pursued such meetings to obtain foreign recognition of recent conquests. As discussed, these Anglo-Saxon kings were largely based far to the south of Northumbria in Wessex. To ensure their distant northern territories were not infringed on by Scottish kings, Æthelstan, Edmund and Eadred needed peace treaties with the Scots recognising their expansions. Though no written text survives, that they were successful in this endeavour is indicated by the meeting place. In 918-19, King Edward of the Anglo-Saxons, Æthelstan's father, subjugated all of Mercia, adding it to his existing realm, which included Wessex, East Anglia and parts of southern

[82] See p. 16.
[83] *AC*, p.2, '*Congregacio nauium in urbe legionum a rege Saxonum eadgar*'; David N. Dumville, '"*Annales Cambriae*" and Easter', *The Medieval Chronicle*, 3 (2004), p. 41.
[84] See pp. 18-19.
[85] *ASC*, D 940.
[86] Ibid, 944.
[87] Ibid, 945; Appendix 2, no. 15 for discussion of 'let'.
[88] Ibid, 946.

Mercia. Like his successors he held a summit following the conquest, with the respective leaders of Scotland, Strathclyde, Northumbria and Bamburgh, at Bakewell in 920 (the subject of Davidson's work), presumably in a similar effort to secure his new conquests.[89] In meeting Æthelstan at Eamont, considerably further north than Bakewell, Constantine and the other northern figures were acknowledging that he had extended English power north through the annexation of Northumbria. The same is presumably true of Edmund and Eadred's meetings, after their own reconquests of Northumbria.

Foreign recognition was needed for internal peace within the English kingdom. Æthelstan was the first member of the West Saxon dynasty to incorporate Northumbria into their realm, whilst Edmund and Eadred were reincorporating it by force. It is safe to assume their rule incurred local animosity.[90] However, these summits were perfect opportunities to strengthen their respective holds on the north. Defining status is the goal of diplomatic rituals, and meetings between rulers had a significant role in this. Based on twelfth-century evidence, Esther Pascau argues that by treating one another as equals kings confirmed each other's social position. These events set some men apart as individuals with a right to the throne that was recognised by other ruling kings, undermining their opponents.[91] Word of a Scottish king acknowledging their English counterpart as ruler of Northumbria would have filtered down into the formerly independent kingdom, improving the English ruler's claim.

Border meetings were a significant feature of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy, which provides insight into the nature of inter-ruler relations. Firstly, they were a relatively prevalent feature of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, with six examples, including Chester, drawn from the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries. By contrast, there are only two border meetings related to Anglo-Welsh diplomacy, both with qualifying factors: Billingsley was not a royal summit, whilst Chester was not an exclusively Anglo-Welsh one. Thus, equality between rulers was a more common feature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship than the Anglo-Welsh one. As for how relations evolved, the frequency of border meetings in the early decades of the Anglo-Saxon part of my period relates to the recentness of English unification, and the need to use methods that helped protect and guarantee expansions. Conversely, the meetings during the reigns of the Anglo-Norman kings related to peacemaking, and were responses to direct hostile action against England by neighbouring rulers. A simple Anglo-Norman versus Anglo-Saxon binary must be resisted though, since conflict precipitated both the Billingsley and Chester summits. The other types of meeting places will now be used to further develop these findings.

[89] *ASC A*, 920.
[90] David N. Dumville, *Wessex and England from Alfred to Edgar* (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 142-170; Rollason, *Northumbria,* pp. 252-74.
[91] Esther Pascau, 'Peace Among Equals: War and Treaties in Twelfth-Century Europe', *WPAMH*, pp. 193, 196.

3. Court Meetings

John of Worcester also refers to diplomatic summits taking place at kings' courts. Like border meetings, the practice of travelling to another ruler's political centre for diplomacy has a long history. Having been defeated by the Roman army, King Tiridates I of Armenia travelled to Rome, where he met Emperor Nero in A.D. 66.[92] Michael Whitby argues that Byzantine Emperors were ill disposed towards conducting diplomacy on borders, preferring to host foreign dignitaries in Constantinople, with *The Book of Ceremonies* outlining how these visitors should be treated whilst there in the tenth century.[93] Of the c.40 Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh meetings between 927 and 1154 investigated here, the majority occurred at the English court.[94] This data set is buttressed by English charters, which as discussed occasionally list Scottish and Welsh rulers in their witness lists, particularly during the reigns of Æthelstan, Eadred and Eadwig.

As with border meetings, historians ascribe a particular relationship type to rulers that met at courts. In his investigation of Anglo-French diplomacy, Gillingham writes that for one king 'to celebrate Easter, or any of the other great feasts, at another king's court would have been a sign of client status.'[95] Benham came to similar conclusions when looking at Anglo-Welsh summits in the Angevin period: 'the fact that the Welsh came to the English king seeking peace in the twelfth century, as well as the early thirteenth century, immediately tells the historian that these were meetings […] between superiors and inferiors.'[96] Likewise, J. R. Mandicott argues there are 'overtones of submission implicit in one [ruler] visiting the other's territory.'[97] Evidently, the historiographical consensus points to these summits possessing a hierarchical character, with the host ruler dominant over the traveller.

Evidence from 927-1154 seconds these conclusions. The negativity associated with a meeting at a foreign court is shown by Malcolm III's walkout in 1093, due to his preference for a border meeting.[98] The inferiority of the travellers is made apparent by the titles given to the Welsh and Scottish rulers attending the English court in those aforementioned charters. One issued at Exeter in 928 by King Æthelstan records Hywel Dda, the ruler of Deheubarth, and Idwal Foel, ruler of Gwynedd in the witness list. Both the Welsh rulers were referred to as '*subregulus* (subking)', in contrast to Æthelstan who held the full status of '*Rex Anglorum* (King of the English)'.[99] This distinction between

[92] Suetonius, *The Twelve Caesars*, trans. Robert Graves, ed. Michael Grant (London, 2003), p. 220.
[93] Michael Whitby, 'From Frontier to Palace', in *Byzantine Diplomacy*, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1993), p. 300; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *The Book of Ceremonies*, ed. Ann Moffat and Maxeme Tall (Canberra, 2012), pp. 393-410.
[94] Appendix 2, no. 3-10, 12-14, 17-19, 21, 28, 44, 46-49, 51, 53-55, 58, 59, 69.
[95] Gillingham, 'Meetings', p. 27.
[96] *PMA*, p. 49.
[97] J. R. Mandicoot, 'Edward the Confessor's Return', *EHR*, 119 (2004), p. 662; Also George Molyneaux, 'Why Were Some Tenth-Century English Kings Presented as Rulers of Britain', *TRHS*, 21 (2011), pp. 65-68; Pauline Stafford, *Unification and Conquest: a political and social history of England in the tenth and eleventh centuries* (London, 1989), p. 127.
[98] JW, 3, pp. 64-67.
[99] *ES* 400.

the greater authority of the English king and the lesser authority of the visiting rulers is repeated in all but one these charters, though the ones issued by Eadred and Eadwig prefer '*regulus* (petty king)' for the foreign leaders.[100]

Again, the context of the summits provides insight into their significance. In 935, King Constantine was recorded in attendance at Æthelstan's court at Cirencester, attesting a charter as '*Ego Constantine subregulus* (I, Constantine, subking).'[101] The peace that Æthelstan and Constantine established at Eamont in 927 had broken down during the previous year. The *ASC* states that in 934 'King Æthelstan went into Scotland with both a land force and a naval force, and ravaged.'[102] John of Worcester adds that following the invasion, the two kings met, and 'having been compelled with force, King Constantine gave his son with worthy gifts to him, and, peace having been restored, the King [Æthelstan] returned to Wessex.'[103] Giving hostages was a general expression of defeat and submission.[104] Something similar precipitated a court summit in 1114-15. In 1114 Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd were in conflict with the Anglo-Norman marcher lords.[105] Consequently, 'King Henry moved an army into Wales and, having made peace, returned home', according to the *Annales Cambriae*.[106] An expanded account in the *Brut Y Tywysogyon* records how when faced with Henry's army both rulers negotiated submissions with the English king. It then adds the caveat that following his surrender, Owain travelled with Henry to Normandy. Both returned to England in 1115, with Owain soon journeying home to Wales.[107] Though this source lists no specific court sites, based on charters and John of Worcester, Owain must have accompanied Henry to Winchester, Westbourne and Portsmouth prior to their trip across the Channel, as well as at other unrecorded locations in Normandy during his stay there.[108] Constantine and Owain's trips show a correlation between a recent military defeat and spending time at the victor's court. Such meeting places seemingly suited hierarchical relationships.

This is logical, as unlike borders, courts were places where only one king, the host, held authority. As discussed, kings exercised their power at courts.[109] The traveller was in a far weaker position, as Iorwerth ap Bleddyn of Powys's trip to Henry I's court shows. In 1103, Iorwerth journeyed to Shrewsbury, purportedly to answer to the king's council concerning complaints made against him. However, according to the *Brut*, the English court turned against him, and 'in the end he was adjured

[100] *ES* 544, 633.
[101] *ES* 1792.
[102] *ASC C*, 934.
[103] JW, 2, pp. 390-91, '*Vnde ui compulsus rex constantinus filium suum obsidem cum dignis muneribus illi dedit, paceque redintegrata, rex in wessaxoniam rediit*.'
[104] See pp. 82-83; *PMA*, pp. 158-59; Adam J. Kosto, 'Hostages in the Carolingian World (714-840)', *EME*, 11 (2002), p. 138; Ryan Lavelle, 'The Use and Abuse of Hostages in Later Anglo-Saxon England', *EME*, 14 (2006), pp. 270-71.
[105] *Brut*, pp. 79-83.
[106] *AC*, p. 14, '*Henricus rex mouit exercitum in kambriam et pacificus domum rediit.'*
[107] *Brut*, p. 83.
[108] *RRAN,* 2, 1056, 1070; JW, 3, pp. 134-35.
[109] See pp. 71-72.

to the king's prison, not according to law but according to power.'[110] Travelling monarchs certainly risked danger. Within another rulers' sphere of influence and isolated from their own, the traveller was vulnerable. Regardless of the law, Iorwerth simply did not have enough power at the English court to resist incarceration. Though an exceptional example, this vulnerability must have played on the minds of rulers throughout this period, and certainly indicates inferiority.

Descriptions are once more informative, illustrating English control at court meeting places. Many are said to have taken place in a 'city (*urbem/civitate*)', like the meeting at Hereford in 927 between Æthelstan and a group of unnamed Welsh rulers, as well the frequently referenced 1093 Gloucester summit.[111] These cities were well known and integral parts of the English kingdom, where we would expect English kings to display authority. Some charters emphasised how eminent these meeting places were within the kingdom, referring to them as 'the most famous (*noblissima*)' villa or city.[112] Other sources specifically highlight the existence of royal authority at the location of court meetings, such as the charter recording Æthelstan's aforementioned 928 summit at Exeter, which calls it a 'royal fortress (*arce regia*)'.[113] Whilst there is some variation in convention, these terms are distinct from the vague and unclear descriptors used for border meetings, where sovereignty was blurred. Instead, the language surrounding court meetings shows that these places were firmly within England and under royal authority.

Symbolically, through their appearance at court meetings, the travellers were behaving like the host kings' followers. King Alfred, the ninth-century ruler of Wessex, mused on medieval views of spatiality in his Old English translation of Augustine's *Soliloquies*: 'It is likewise with the estates of every king: some men are in the chamber, some in the hall, some on the threshing floor, some in prison, and yet all live through the lord's favour'.[114] Similarly, the *ASC* states that in 1086 William the Conqueror of England went to Salisbury, where 'his councillors came to him, and all the people occupying land who were of any account over all England, whosoever's vassals they might be; and they submitted to him and became his vassals.'[115] Simply put, travelling to a king and spending time at his place of power is characteristic of a follower. Whereas two kings meeting at the border confirmed one another's independent kingship, a court meeting did the opposite, symbolically eroding the traveller's status as a sovereign monarch.

When considering Anglo-Welsh summits at the English court in the 900s, Kevin Halloran states that 'little consideration has been given to the purpose behind them besides a general assumption that they represented an acknowledgement of Welsh subordination to the West Saxon kings.'[116] Whilst it is not hard to see what the English gained from gestures of submission, it is worth

[110] *Brut*, p. 49.
[111] WM, pp. 214-17; JW 2, pp. 64-65; Also, *ES* 407, 418a, 425, 1792.
[112] *ES* 417, 425.
[113] *ES* 400.
[114] Alfred, 'Soliloquies,' in *Alfred the Great: Asser's Life of King Alfred and Other Contemporary Sources*, ed. Simon Keynes and Michael Lapidge (London, 1983), p. 144.
[115] *ASC E*, 1086.
[116] Kevin Halloran, 'Welsh Kings at the English Court, 928-956', *WHR*, 25 (2011), p. 297.

considering how travelling kings benefited from these journeys to England. For example, attendance at the English court was a way to gain recognition. Sarah Hamilton argues that paradoxically rulers humiliated themselves through penance in an effort to improve their positions. Humbling themselves before God, and subsequently being forgiven, demonstrated they had a connection with God that elevated them above their contemporaries.[117] The purpose of rebellious magnates submitting to kings, according to Paul R. Hyams, was to normalise relations and provide closure. The rebels acknowledged that they were wrong to challenge their lord's authority and demonstrated their lower status in society in return for acceptance back into it.[118] The pursuit of recognition does concur with what we know about these meetings. Whilst being described as a *subregulus* meant the travelling ruler held less authority than the English king, it acknowledged them as a legitimate royal ruler within the broad English political spectrum.[119] These kings often appeared near the top of the witness lists, only behind the king and the archbishops in Æthelstan's reign, asserting their relatively high status *vis-à-vis* members of the English nobility. This recognition could then be capitalised on for domestic benefit, as it identified the kings that visited England, and them alone, as the ones with *subregulus* status in the eyes of the English kings. This raised them above other Welsh magnates, strengthening their domestic position. It is indicative that a year after Hywel Dda was granted 'subking' status by Æthelstan at Exeter in 928, he felt secure enough to go on a pilgrimage to Rome.[120]

One key variation between the court meetings, which helps explain the travelling kings' motives, is whether they followed conflicts. We have seen how Constantine II of Scotland and Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys attended the English court after being the victims of Æthelstan and Henry I's respective invasions. They would obviously be keen to recoup some English acknowledgement of their status and that the conflict was over. Conversely, other court meetings happened during periods of apparent peace, meaning there was no conflict to atone for, as was the situation surrounding the Anglo-Welsh summits during Æthelstan's reign. These meetings may have been pre-emptive submissions, which acknowledged the English king's dominance in exchange for him accepting the sovereignty of the Welsh kings to a certain degree. This would have forestalled any attack on Wales by an English kingdom that, with the acquisition of Northumbria, has just grown in power. Hywel Dda had behaved similarly in 918, submitting to King Edward immediately after Mercia was subsumed into Edward's realm.[121] Moreover, William of Malmesbury's claim that the Welsh came to the Hereford summit (927) after some reluctance implies that despite opposition to the submission, they felt that acknowledging English dominance was better than contesting it.[122] Meetings persisted beyond 927 and into subsequent reigns to ensure this *quid pro quo* persisted.

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[117] Sarah Hamilton, *The Practice of Penance* (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 175, 181.
[118] Paul R. Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England* (London, 2003), pp. 11-13; p. 16 for demonstrative behaviour.
[119] Keynes, 'Welsh Kings', p. 105; For subkings, McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, pp. 25, 51.
[120] *Brenhinedd*, p. 31; Henry Loyn, 'Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of the Athelstan Charters', *WHR*, 10 (1980), p. 299; Rebecca Thomas, 'Three Welsh Kings and Rome: Royal Pilgrimage, Overlordship, and Anglo-Welsh Relations in the Early Middle Ages', *EME,* 28 (2020), pp. 569-73, 590.
[121] *ASC A*, 918.
[122] WM, pp. 214-17

Sometimes the perks of acknowledging English supremacy were more tangible. Prior to his imprisonment at Henry I's court, when Iorwerth ap Bleddyn of Powys first travelled to Henry in 1102, he was promised Powys, Ceredigion and half of Dyfed for turning against the rebellious magnate Robert of Bellême, Earl of Shrewsbury.[123] Owain ap Cadwgan journeyed around the Anglo-Norman realm with Henry in 1114-15 in return for promised rewards, including that the king of England would knight him.[124] Events repeated themselves later in 1115 and in 1116. According to the *Brut*, in 1115, Gruffydd ap Rhys, son of Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth, was 'accused before the king' of an unspecified charge. Henry first responded to this apparent threat by summoning Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd to him, where he offered the visitor rewards if he killed or captured the errant Gruffydd ap Rhys. When this failed, Henry summoned Owain ap Cadwgan in 1116, and promised Owain rewards in return for leading an army against Gruffydd ap Rhys, who by now had attacked several Anglo-Norman castles.[125] A pattern is obvious. These Welsh rulers sought rewards in return for travelling to the English court and acknowledging Henry's dominance.

The practice was seemingly not unique to Anglo-Welsh diplomacy. Roger of Wendover wrote that in 975 King Kenneth II of Scotland travelled to King Edgar's court, where as discussed, he received Lothian. This came with the condition that he would continue visiting the English court, and he was also given residences in England to help with his journeys, which 'remained in the power of the kings of Scotland up to the times of King Henry II.'[126] Some caution must be exercised. Roger was writing in the thirteenth century, with the reference to Henry II indicating that he applied understanding of more recent events to older ones.[127] Whilst William Malmesbury, writing in the twelfth century, mentions Kenneth attending Edgar's court, nothing like this account is even hinted at in the earlier sources.[128] It certainly contrasts the border meetings that generally featured in the tenth-century Anglo-Scottish relationship, minus Cirencester. That meeting though followed English military victory over the Scots, with no comparable invasion occurring under Edgar. Perhaps though, the promise of Lothian convinced Kenneth to come south and acknowledge English dominance. Even if we exercise some caution, Roger's direct correlation between Kenneth's attendance at Edgar's court and the granting of Lothian supports the idea that there were benefits to travelling to a foreign court. Whether they earnt a tangible reward, such as territory, recognition, or merely the absence of future conflict, Welsh and Scottish kings had much to motivate trips to England.

Having surveyed the court meetings, we can once more employ conclusions about their nature to answer this study's key research questions. These responses largely correspond with what we learnt from border meetings. The majority of summits that took place at the English court were Anglo-Welsh affairs.[129] This, combined with the almost complete absence of Anglo-Welsh border

[123] *Brut*, pp. 42-45.
[124] Ibid, p. 83.
[125] Ibid, pp. 83-97, quote on p. 83.
[126] RW, 1, pp. 416-17, '*Quae usque in tempora regis Henrici secundi in potestate regum Scotiae remanserunt*'.
[127] Dorothy Whitelock, *EHD I*, p. 255.
[128] WM, pp. 254-57; Duncan, *Kingship*, p. 25.
[129] Appendix 2, no. 3-10, 12-14, 17-19, 47-49, 53-55.

meetings, points to Welsh rulers being in consistently weak positions when meeting with kings of England, frequently humbling themselves by travelling to the English court. By contrast, we see greater variety in the Anglo-Scottish relationship, illustrating a less hierarchical connection. Just as border meetings played a role in diplomacy between kings of England and Scotland during the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries, so did summits at the English court. This diversity of meeting places can even be seen during relatively short periods of time: Constantine II, Kenneth II and David I of Scotland all met their English counterparts both within England and at the border. Power dynamics shifting between equality and English dominance was seemingly the norm in Anglo-Scottish relations. At times though the shift was long lasting, with a noted rise in Anglo-Scottish court meetings taking place after c. 1100. This was highly entwined with the disputed Gloucester summit (1093), so will be investigated when we later return to that event.

Although court meetings always indicate hierarchy, courts are not identical, conveying different forms of dominance and thus further shifts in inter-ruler relations. One pattern that emerges in tenth-century Anglo-Saxon diplomacy is the frequent use of Roman towns for court meetings, like Exeter, Winchester, Dorchester and Cirencester.[130] The charter recording the Cirencester Summit 935 explicitly makes this link, stating it took place 'in the city at one time built by the Romans that is called Cirencester'.[131] Alex Woolf speculates that surviving Roman architecture, like amphitheatres, could have been incorporated into this summit.[132] Old English poetry shows Anglo-Saxons revering Roman heritage.[133] *The Ruin*, which is believed to describe the remains of Bath, states 'Wondrously ornate is the stone of this wall, shattered by fate: the precincts of the city have crumbled and the work of the giants is rotting away.'[134] In using Roman spaces for political events English kings were connecting their own authority to that of the Roman Empire, enhancing their charisma. Such a strategy was not unknown for medieval rulers, with Charlemagne famously turning the Roman site of Aachen into his realm's political centre.[135]

Anglo-Saxon rulers certainly had imperial pretensions. Most obviously, Æthelstan, Eadred, Eadwig, Edgar and Æthelred were all labelled 'emperor (*imperator*)', the term employed by Roman emperors.[136] It was often included in charters that relate to kings ruling over multiple peoples, suggesting it was understood as being connected to the idea of empire. For example, *imperator* was used for Eadwig in a charter recording a court held at Cirencester that was attended by Welsh rulers. The charter also described Eadwig as ruling over 'Anglo-Saxons (*Angulsæxna*)', 'Northumbrians (*Northanhumbrorum*)', 'pagans (*paganorum*)' and 'Britons (*Breotonum*)'.[137] *Basileus*, the Byzantine

[130] *ES* 400, 425, 436.
[131] *ES* 1792, '*In civitate a Romanis olim constructa quæ Cirnecester dicitur*',
[132] Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 167.
[133] McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 138; See Barbara Yorke, 'The Burial of Kings in Anglo-Saxon England', Gale R. Owen-Crocker and Brian W. Schneider, ed. *Kingship and Legislation and Power in Anglo-Saxon England* (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 1-14.
[134] 'The Ruin', *ASP*, pp. 402; See 'The Wanderer', *EHD I*, pp. 801-03.
[135] McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 138; Yorke, 'Burial', p. 240.
[136] *ES* 392, 544, 633, 775, 903; McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 56.
[137] *ES* 633.

emperor's title was occasionally used in charters too, though not in any recording subking attendance, further suggesting it was the western Roman imperium, not the eastern, that was being emulated at the summits.[138] The idea of a British polity is frequently alluded to in the charters, with Æthelstan being referred to as 'ruling king of flourishing Britain.'[139] Additionally, it can be no coincidence that Æthelstan's most imperial conference, the one occasion when the Welsh rulers and the Scottish king attended his court simultaneously, not only took place at Cirencester, but was explicitly connected to the Romans by the source recording it. Nor is it coincidental that many of these meetings are only recorded in English charters composed by a scribe known as Æthelstan A.[140] Little is known of the scribe's life, besides an apparent associated with Bishop Ælfwine of Lichfield.[141] During the 940/50s there is another concentration of charters featuring Welsh rulers in their witnesses lists.[142] These references all come from a body of evidence known as the Alliterative charters, linked to Bishop Koenwald of Worcester.[143] Alongside their mentions of foreign rulers, both types of charter have other exceptional stylistic elements, including exhaustive witness lists and an ornate linguistic style, distinct from the more workmanlike documents they replaced. These abrupt transformations to the charter formula were attempts to revolutionise the presentation of Anglo-Saxon rule. As Simon Keynes puts it, having unified England and asserted dominance over its neighbours, the English monarchy was going through a successful period, so began 'developing the pretensions commensurate with its actual achievements and clothing itself in the trappings of a new political order.'[144] Therefore, the decision to record these attendees at Roman places speaks to the conscious importance of these events to the Anglo-Saxon ruling ideology, particularly for how they viewed their Scottish and Welsh rulers.[145]

There seems to have been a shift in the sorts of places used for court meetings during the Anglo-Norman period. Though caution is needed, as the sources do not always record exactly where kings met, evidence for the reuse of Anglo-Saxon meetings places after the Conquest is limited. None of the sources explicitly reference a meeting place's Roman or even Anglo-Saxon history. Rather, the Norman rulers adapted their diplomacy to their situation. This is most evident in the Anglo-Welsh relationship. For example, Henry I hosting Owain ap Cadwgan in Normandy. Adaptation can also be

[138] *ES* 406; McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 58.
[139] *ES* 416, '*Florentis Brytaniæ monarchia præditus rex*'.
[140] *ES* 400, 407, 413, 417, 418a, 425, 427, 1792.
[141] Foot, *Æthelstan*, p. 98; D. A. Woodman, ''Æthelstan A' and the rhetoric of rule', *ASE*, 42 (2013), p. 224; Snook, Ben, *The Anglo-Saxon Chancery* (Woodbridge, 2015), pp. 86-124.
[142] *ES* 544, 550, 566.
[143] Simon Keynes, 'Chancery, Royal', in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Anglo-Saxon England*, ed. Michael Lapidge *et al.* (Chichester, 2014), p. 186
[144] Simon Keynes, 'England, c.900-1016', *New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume 3* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 470.
[145] Molyneaux argues Edgar selected Chester (973) to connect his influence over his neighbours with Roman imperial control, as Æthelstan used Cirencester (Molyneaux, 'Rulers of Britain', p. 68). Edgar had been ceremonially crowned at Bath immediately prior to the conference, another Roman place (*ASC C*, 973). Unlike the accounts of the Bath coronation and the Cirencester conference though, the *ASC* does not reference Chester's Roman history. Evidently, the writer did not view, or wish to promote, Chester as a Roman place, undermining any role its "Romanness" and any imperial connotations may have played. Moreover, if Edgar had wanted a Roman place, he could have summoned the kings to Bath to watch his coronation.

seen during the Anarchy, when Empress Matilda allied with Welsh leaders. There were Welsh troops in the army of her brother, Robert of Gloucester, at the Battle of Lincoln in 1141, likely led by Madog ap Maredudd of Powys and Owain of Gwynedd's brother Cadwaladr.[146] This alliance was possibly established at an earlier meeting. Orderic Vitalis states that just after Matilda's arrival in England in 1139, 'Robert of Caen [Gloucester] hosted her under his roof: He called the Welsh to his help, and badness multiplied everywhere and far.'[147] This 'roof' was Bristol, where Matilda spent time with Robert after leaving Arundel Castle, the site of her initial landing in England.[148] Although Bristol was not a major court site during earlier reigns, Matilda's charters and itinerary show that her powerbase was in South-West England (Map Ten). She evidently felt she had authority at Bristol, imprisoning Stephen there after his capture at the Battle of Lincoln (1141).[149] Like earlier English rulers, Matilda met Welsh rulers at a place under her power to symbolise their alignment with her party. But it was a novel place, corresponding with her circumstances and not those of the rulers who came before. The balance of evidence points to Anglo-Norman rulers on the whole not re-establishing the diplomatic relationships that existed in the Anglo-Saxon period, but pursuing new ones. This conclusion will be reinforced by analysis of our third type of meeting: summits within a defeated party's territory.

4. Invasion Meetings

In outlining his model of two diametrically opposed types of meetings between rulers, John of Worcester failed to acknowledge a third option: submissions in a defeated party's kingdom in the aftermath of an invasion. This lack of discussion in the medieval sources is mirrored by the historiography. Whilst Gillingham and Roach have shown interest in meetings at courts and on borders, there is an absence of interest in these post-invasion meetings. Benham is an exception again. She contrasts the submission of William the Lion of Scotland to King John of England with Duke Bogiszlav of the Pomeranians' submission to Cnut IV of Denmark, arguing that whilst both William and Bogiszlav were supplicants, the former was less inferior on the grounds that 'although the king of Scots was negotiating deep within English territory, he had not suffered conquest' immediately prior to the submission.[150] The historiographical dearth is likely precipitated by these incidents not appearing to require much comment. The power relations are obvious, with the submitter having suffered an invasion. Yet, these meetings had an important role in diplomacy and were not uncommon, meriting discussion.

There are six examples of invasions involving submissions in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in 927-1154, as well as a few close comparisons: the aforementioned meeting in Scotland between Æthelstan and Constantine in 934;[151] Cnut's 1027 invasion of Scotland that

[146] HH, pp. 726-27; OV, 6, pp. 542-43; Bradbury, *SM*, p. 96.
[147] OV, 6, p. 537, '*Rodbertus de Cadomo sororem suam Mathildem* […] *in suis mappaliis hospitatus est; et Gualis ad auxilium sui ascites nimia malicia passim multiplicata est*.'
[148] HH, pp. 722-23.
[149] Ibid, pp. 738-39.
[150] *PME*, p. 99.
[151] JW, 2, pp. 388-89.

involved a meeting with three Scottish rulers;[152] William the Conqueror's attack on Scotland in 1072 that culminated in a summit with Malcolm III;[153] William the Conqueror's meeting with Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth in 1081 following a campaign in south Wales;[154] the previously discussed 1114 encounter between the Welsh rulers Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd on one hand, and Henry I on the other;[155] and Henry I's meeting with the rulers of Powys in 1121, in the aftermath of another invasion.[156]

The only example where there might be some doubt over whether a meeting actually occurred is the 1081 summit, as no sources specifically say that William and Rhys met. The *ASC* simply states that William led an army into Wales that year.[157] Conversely, the *Brut* presents the trip in a different light claiming that 'William the Bastard, King of the Saxons and the French and the Britons, came on a pilgrimage to Menevia [St. Davids].'[158] This optimistic reinterpretation of the invasion as a pilgrimage was likely caused by the source being produced in Wales, though there is no reason to doubt that William visited St. Davids.[159] Whilst neither source mentions Rhys ap Tewdwr, ruler of South Wales until his death in 1093, he was linked to St. Davids. In *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan*, Gruffudd was recorded travelling to St. Davids at an earlier point in 1081, where he found Rhys taking refuge from his rival Caradog ap Gruffydd, who briefly took control of Deheubarth.[160] This implies that St. Davids was a place under Rhys' authority, where he could find sanctuary even at his weakest moment. Further, Rhys and William seemingly had some sort of relationship. *Domesday Book* records that "Rhys of Wales" paid King William forty pounds, presumably a reference to Rhys ap Tewdwr.[161] A desire to establish this tributary relationship provides William with a motive for leading an army into Wales. Consequently, Robert S. Badcock argues that William's journey involved a summit with Rhys.[162] Certainly, the event's inclusion with other meetings that followed invasions is well founded.

The dominance of the invader is made apparent by their military success. When John of Worcester writes that in 1072 'King William of the English, with a ship and cavalry force […] advanced to Scotland, in order to subjugate it to his dominion: to whom [William] King Malcolm of Scots, in the location called Abernethy, appeared, and become his man', we are left in little doubt over who is superior.[163] Likewise, in 1114, we are told of Henry I's overwhelming force, which featured troops under the command of marcher lords and the king of Scotland.[164] The diplomatic practices further

[152] *ASC E*, 1031.
[153] *ASC E*, 1072.
[154] See below, notes 158-63.
[155] *Brut*, pp. 79-83.
[156] *Brut*, 104-09.
[157] *ASC E*, 1081.
[158] *Brut*, p. 31.
[159] Davies, *Conquest*, p. 33; Jones, Thomas, 'Introduction', *Brut*, pp. xii-xiii; Lloyd, *Wales*, p. 392.
[160] *LGC*, pp. 68-71; Appendix 2, no. 39.
[161] *DB*, fol. 179.
[162] Robert S. Badcock, 'Rhys ap Tewdwr, King of Deheubarth', *ANS*, 16, p. 21.
[163] JW, 2, pp. 20-21, '*Rex anglorum willelmus* […] *cum nauali et equestri exercitu scottiam profectus est, ut eam sue diconi subiugerat; cui rex scottorum malcolmus, in loco qui dicitur abernithici, occurit, et homo suus deuenit*'.
[164] *Brut*, p. 79.

show the success of the invaders. The 934, 1072 and 1121 meetings all involved the defeated party handing over hostages, which as discussed indicates defeat. Additionally, in 934, 1081, 1114 and 1121 the invaders took tribute, another practice associated with dominance.[165]

However, we should not underestimate the meeting place's importance for communicating dominance on these occasions. The specific location of these post-invasion summits is not always revealed, but when they are, they generally occurred at places where the defeated king held authority. For instance, John of Worcester does not record where exactly Æthelstan met Constantine, though saying he immediately returned to Wessex afterwards implies the summit was in Scotland at the campaign's climax. Thankfully the *Historia Regum*, a chronicle produced in the early twelfth century and ascribed to Symeon of Durham, provides more detail.[166] Symeon wrote that Æthelstan's land force ravaged as far as Dunnottar and *Wertermorum*, whilst his ships went up to Caithness.[167] *Wertermorum* cannot be identified, and Caithness was probably outside Constantine's sphere of influence.[168] Fortunately, Dunnottar is identifiable, and was likely a fortified location under Constantine's control.[169] It sits slightly to the northeast of the medieval Scottish political heartland.[170] Whether this was the northern extreme of the English attack and the submission occurred further south, or Dunnottar itself was used, it clearly took place within the Scottish area of influence. It was the same in 1072, when according to John of Worcester Malcolm submitted at Abernethy, a place at the centre of the Scottish sphere of influence.[171] Likewise, we have already seen how much authority Rhys held at St. Davids, given that he was able to find refuge there. Although, one of the reasons for these meetings was surely practicality, as the invading king was already in the submitting king's realm, we must not undervalue the symbolism of a ruler submitting within their own kingdom. A place where the king traditionally exercised domestic authority instead hosted an event where his power was constrained by a foreign king. This diplomatic role reversal sent the powerful message that defeated figures like Constantine, Malcolm and Rhys were no longer in sole control of their polities.

The significance of these invasion meetings is also shown by the fact they were sometimes paired with court meetings. Æthelstan and Constantine's meeting in Scotland was followed by the latter's trip to Cirencester a year later. We have seen how after accepting Owain ap Cadwgan's surrender in Wales, Henry I took him on a tour of his Anglo-Norman realm. At the most basic level, the need to combine court and invasion meetings implies that although both were hierarchical, they played different roles. The propaganda value of these meeting places is again evident. Constantine and Owain's visits projected English dominance to Æthelstan and Henry's own subjects. Conversely, submissions within Scotland and Wales communicate that relationship to Scottish and Welsh audiences. This would further embed English dominance in their consciousness and prevent calls for

[165] See pp. 63-70.
[166] Bernard Meehan, 'Symeon of Durham', *ODNB*, 23 September 2004.
[167] *HR*, p. 124.
[168] Dorothy Whitelock, *EHD I*, p. 252, note 9; Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 165-66.
[169] Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 165.
[170] Appendix 1, Map 1; see pp. 20-21.
[171] JW, 3, pp. 20-21.

future challenges to English authority. Evidently, medieval rulers were conscious of wider public opinion, and sought to display their diplomatic success to their own and foreign subjects. Regardless, these meetings all show that as well as at their own courts, kings also accepted submissions in foreign realms following successful invasions.

Though a relatively sparse evidence base, these meetings are significant resources for analysing the evolution of diplomatic relations. Invasions were important events that chroniclers would be expected to record, meaning our record is likely extant. Further, when cross referenced with other meeting places, trends become apparent. Again, there is a pre- and post-Conquest divide, as the majority of these meetings occurred after 1066. A close reading of the context surrounding these submissions shows how the Norman invasion accelerated this trend. Prior to his 1081 campaign in South Wales, William had spent much of the late 1070s abroad, principally to defend the duchy of Normandy from his eldest son, Robert Curthose.[172] The situation was similar in 1114, when Henry I had been abroad defending his continental land during the preceding years, only returning to Britain immediately prior to the invasion.[173] These absences provided Welsh and Scottish rulers with opportunities to oppose or challenge Anglo-Norman supremacy, as the *Brut* hints at with its references to disputes between the marcher lords and the Welsh leaders in the lead up to Henry's 1114 invasion. Two other Anglo-Scottish incidents confirm this pattern. Whilst William the Conqueror was abroad in the late 1070s, Malcolm III raided northern England in 1079.[174] After reconciling with his son, the Conqueror sent Robert with an army into Scotland in 1080, where William of Malmesbury implies some sort of summit was held.[175] Similarly, William Rufus' border meeting with Malcolm in 1091 was precipitated by another attack by the Scottish king on England, which again took place whilst the Anglo-Norman king of England was in Normandy quelling opposition from Robert Curthose, Rufus' brother.[176] Had his navy not sunk, Rufus would likely have invaded Scotland and met with Malcolm there, rather than at the border. Having lost some authority within Britain during their periods abroad, the Anglo-Norman kings were forced to march armies into their neighbours' realms and secure submissions in Wales and Scotland.

Conversely, these invasion meetings were less common in the Anglo-Saxon period, and completely absent from the pre-Conquest Anglo-Welsh relationship. As we saw, Anglo-Saxon kings exercised authority over Welsh rulers by hosting them at their courts, not by invading. Unlike their Anglo-Norman successors, Anglo-Saxon kings generally did not have continental lands that necessitated them leaving Britain. Instead, they were based in southern England, not far from Wales, meaning the Welsh were not only vulnerable to Anglo-Saxon royal power, but opportunities to challenge it were less apparent. The Welsh instead responded to the threat through pre-emptive submissions at the English court. This division is significant, challenging historiographical perceptions of this relationship. R. R. Davies argues that the Anglo-Norman kings inherited the Anglo-Saxon claim

[172] *ASC E*, 1076-79; Bates, *William* the *Conqueror*, (Stroud, 2004), pp. 397-405, 409.
[173] *ASC E*, 1111-14; JW, 3, p. 135.
[174] *ASC E*, 1079; Bates, *William*, pp. 397-405, 409.
[175] *HR*, p. 211; WM, pp. 704-05; See pp. 104-05.
[176] *ASC E*, 1091.

to overlordship over the Welsh.[177] However, the post-1066 situation was different and so diplomatic relations changed as well. Welsh rulers like Rhys ap Tewdwr were not content to continue pre-emptively submitting, but rejected Anglo-Norman dominance at times, necessitating invasions in response.

As for examples from the earlier Anglo-Scottish relationship, post-invasion meetings are another factor that speaks to its variety. That Æthelstan and Constantine met at the border, at the English court, and within Scotland following an invasion shows how their relationship and the context surrounding varied. None of the sources provide an explanation for the 934 invasion. The only context drawn from the *ASC*'s extraordinary terse annals is a reference to Æthelstan's brother Edwin, who drowned in 933.[178] William of Malmesbury later claim Æthelstan was behind this death, thus it has been suggested Æthelstan was responding to a threat posed by Edwin.[179] Having dealt with this opposition, he would have been in a stronger position than in 927, and thus better able to establish a hierarchical relationship with the Constantine.[180] The king of Scotland presumably did not agree, necessitating an invasion to enforce the submission.

Cnut's 1027 meeting bucks the trend though, demonstrating a post-Conquest continuation of an earlier diplomatic practice by mirroring later Anglo-Norman approaches to the Scots.[181] Cnut had recently been abroad, visiting Rome and quelling opposition in his Scandinavian territories. Like William the Conqueror, William Rufus and Henry I, he followed his time away from Britain with a military campaign against a neighbouring British realm and a subsequent summit. The probable explanation for Cnut's behaviour then was a Scottish attack on England or English authority during his absence, necessitating a show of force and a meeting to establish a hierarchical peace. Alas, the evidence is not exhaustive, but consideration of other meeting place examples and their contexts does illuminate Cnut's summit. Given that he was one of the only rulers of England during the Anglo-Saxon period to also rule continental polities, it is unsurprising that his diplomacy draws parallels with the post-Conquest kings who ruled over Normandy.

5. A Disputed Meeting Place

The 1093 Gloucester summit does not easily fit into the categories discussed above, as there were conflicting interpretations of its significance. As explained, Malcolm III and William Rufus met at Gloucester, where the two rulers fell out, leading to Malcolm's subsequent invasion. The idea that the rulers had different attitudes to the meeting place, and that these played a role in their dispute is supported by human geographers. As Cresswell argues, a place's identity is not just made and

[177] Davies, *Conquest,* p. 27.
[178] *ASC E*, 933.
[179] WM, pp. 226-27; Kevin Halloran, *The invasion of Scotland, 934*, Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/1650991/The_invasion_of_Scotland_934?email_work_card=interaction_paper. Accessed 22 January 2020, pp. 3-5.
[180] Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 163.
[181] *ASC E*, 1031; Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 25, 244-48.

maintained, but contested, leading to conflict. A homeless person might view a street as a place to sleep, whereas a local resident might believe the street should be an attractive place and solicit for the removal of homeless people.[182] Understanding Malcolm and Rufus' different interpretations of Gloucester will not only help explain their dispute, but also Anglo-Scottish relations in the years preceding and proceeding 1093.

From a pro-English perspective, Gloucester was a place of English dominance. It regularly hosted the English court, with William of Malmesbury writing that William the Conqueror held 'extravagant and splendid feasts on the preeminent festivals: Christmas at Gloucester, Easter at Winchester, Whitsun at Westminster in the years which he was allowed to linger in England,' adding that William Rufus maintained this custom.[183] Analysis of both theirs and King Edward the Confessor's itineraries confirm its frequent use.[184] Its prominence within the English political landscape is further shown by how it was described as a *civitate*. Evidently, it was a well-established centre of English royal power. The last locatable Anglo-Scottish summit in this region was at Cirencester in 935, less than twenty miles away, and in the aftermath of Æthelstan's victory over Constantine. Despite Rufus' best efforts, the situation was very different in the early 1090s. As we have seen, Rufus had been unable to enforce a submission on Malcolm in 1091 after his fleet sank, and he instead met the Scottish king as an equal. Regarding Anglo-French diplomacy, Lindsay Diggelmann argues that rulers reused meeting places to remind each other of earlier meetings, promoting memories of compromise and negotiation.[185] In selecting a court site not far from Cirencester, perhaps William Rufus was trying to undo the failure of 1091 and to resurrect an earlier Anglo-Scottish relationship, characterised by hierarchy and English dominance.

Alternatively, Malcolm could view Gloucester as a place of equality, in line with the Lothian summit, thanks to the hostages the English king sent him. The *ASC* claims that 'King William summoned him [Malcolm] to Gloucester and sent him hostages (*gislas*) to Scotland.'[186] The ninth-century Frankish chronicler Nithard explained how hostages interacted with summit locations, with reference to the ninth-century Frankish Civil Wars. The two parties, Lothair of Middle Frankia on one side, Charles the Bald of West Frankia and Louis the German of East Frankia on the other, had agreed that their ambassadors would meet at Metz to negotiate peace on their behalf. However, Lothair based himself far closer to Metz than Charles and Louis. Concerned about his ambassadors' safety, Charles sent Lothair a message proposing different arrangements. Either the meeting place or the courts could be relocated so both parties were equidistant from the summit. Alternatively, one court could hold the meeting, with the host sending hostages to the travelling ambassadors' king as

[182] Cresswell, *In Place*, p. 5.
[183] WM, pp. 508-09, '*Conuiuia in precipuis festiuitatibus sumptuosa et magnifica inibat, Natale Domini apud Gloecestram, Pascha apud Wintoniam, Pentecosten apud Westmonasterium agens quotannis quibus in Anglia morari liceret*'.
[184] Martin Biddle, 'Seasonal Festivals and Residence: Winchester, Westminster and Gloucester in the Tenth to Twelfth Centuries', *ANS*, 8, pp. 64, 67; Appendix 1, Maps 5-7.
[185] Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Hewing the Ancient Elm: Anger, Arboricide, and Medieval Kingship', *JMEMS*, 40 (2010), pp. 257-58.
[186] *ASC E,* 1093.

guarantees of safe conduct.[187] The first thing to note is that Nithard's view that border meetings were held far from both sides' spheres of influence aligns with John of Worcester's. Moreover, Charles' request suggests that border meetings were interchangeable with travelling to another ruler's court in return for receiving hostages. Both forms of meeting symbolised neutrality and equality. This was because the hostage effectively altered the nature of the host ruler's court. If a host had previously given hostages to his guest, he no longer held complete authority at his own court since the risk to the hostages constrained his actions. Despite its connection to English authority, Malcolm could view Gloucester as invoking equality.

This is more in line with Malcolm's recent policies and actions. Whilst he had travelled to Edward the Confessor's court, Malcolm had consistently rejected English royal power throughout the Anglo-Norman period. He had invaded in 1070, 1079 and 1091, and would do so again immediately after the summit.[188] Although, he had previously submitted to William the Conqueror, this was imposed by military intervention. Further, in 1091, he was able to conduct relations with William Rufus as equals. From Malcolm's perspective, the Gloucester meeting was a continuation of these policies. Though in England, it was not fully under English control, so indicative of equality.

Unfortunately, this dissonance could not be maintained. William Rufus refused to speak to Malcolm, and demanded a ritual homage that the Scottish king did not want to give. Evidently the hostages had failed, and Gloucester remained a place of English authority where the Scottish king was at the mercy of English actions. Malcolm's disgust is palpable from his decision to walk out and launch an invasion, during which he was killed.[189] In response to his failure in 1091, Rufus seems to have tricked the Scot into attending a summit that demonstrated English dominance. Malcolm would either have to acknowledge this or be shamed for coming so close to doing so.

1093 was a watershed moment in Anglo-Scottish relations. Contrasting Malcolm's rejection of Anglo-Norman dominance, his sons seemingly embraced it. After Malcolm's death William Rufus asserted English control over the Scots, supporting the claims of Malcolm's sons to the Scottish throne. He backed Duncan in 1093, who was killed the following year by Malcolm's brother Donald, and then helped Edgar take the throne in 1097.[190] Following this English backing, the meeting places over the next forty years suggest Scottish acknowledgement of English overlordship. Malcolm's three sons, Edgar (1097-1107), Alexander (1107-24) and David (1124-53) all travelled to rulers of England whilst ruling Scotland.[191] Even during the Anarchy, whilst David broke the pattern by meeting Stephen at the border, he journeyed to the Empress Matilda and stayed with her court for a period.[192] With the support of sources claiming the Scottish king owed his crown to the English king, even historians of

[187] Nithard, '*Histories*', in *Carolingian Chronicles*, ed. Bernhard Walter Scholz and Barbara Rogers (Ann Arbour, M.I., 1972), pp. 170-71.
[188] *HR*, p. 190; *ASC E*, 1079, 1091, 1093.
[189] *ASC E*, 1093.
[190] *ASC E*, 1093, 1097.
[191] '*Annales de Wintonia*', in *Annales Monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols. (London, 1864-69), 2, p. 40; *Brut*, p. 79; *ASC E*, 1126-27; *RRAN* 2, 601, 1451, 1466, 1639, 1659.
[192] *GS*, p. 79.

Scotland accept the post-Malcolm years saw English dominance.[193] The simplest explanation is that Malcolm's sons were obligated to kings of England due to the English aid that helped them obtain their throne, corresponding with the benefits for submission model discussed earlier. Additionally, as the following chapters show, Henry I reinforced this obligation through practices such as gift giving. Further, the breakdown of the Gloucester summit itself may have informed Malcolm's sons' behaviour. Malcolm's policies brought him into conflict with the Anglo-Norman kings, rulers who were seemingly bent on securing Scottish submission. These conflicting goals led to the Gloucester summit and Malcolm's ultimate death. As Oram puts it, 'Twenty-five years of opportunism, brinkmanship and calculated violence in Anglo-Scottish relations had been brought to a bloody climax.'[194] In light of his failure, Malcolm's sons may have preferred to pre-emptively submit to the rulers of England, travelling south and thereby preventing conflict. Whilst 1066 matters, 1093 was another seminal year for Anglo-Scottish relations.

6. Conclusion

Investigation of diplomatic meeting places provides a good framework for interpreting Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations in the period 927-1154. Using examples of summits from these and other relationships, as well as literary evidence and concepts concerning the nature of medieval kingdoms, I identified three meeting place types used for diplomacy in medieval Britain and determined what they symbolised. Border meetings meant equality, whereas travelling to another ruler's court demonstrated the host's superiority. Rulers also submitted in their own territories in the aftermath of an invasion by a foreign ruler. Over the course of the chapter these conclusions were developed further. A place's history, its geographic features and amenities, as well as preparatory behaviours, like sending hostages, could all impact its significance. These conclusions, though significant here, will also contribute to the flourishing historiography that surrounds them. In particular, my approach to identifying the much-discussed border meetings could prove useful for other historians, whose own source bases do not clearly identify border summits.

When applied to Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish summits across my entire period, the rules concerning meeting sites indicate trends. The Anglo-Welsh relationship was consistently one sided. Baring the unusual Billingsley and Chester Conferences, Welsh rulers met kings of England at places that demonstrated their inferiority in return for a form of recognition. The Anglo-Scottish relationship was far more variable, with considerable evidence for both equality and hierarchy. During periods of English strength, or when inducements were offered to the Scottish rulers, the kings met at locations that indicate hierarchy. Conversely, when the English rulers suffered setbacks and especially during the tenth-century, Anglo-Scottish summits were held on the border, demonstrating equality. Such

[193] *ESC*, 15; G. W. S. Barrow, *Scotland and its Neighbours in the Middle Ages* (London, 1992), p. 24; Duncan, *Kingship*, p. 56; Alan MacQuarrie, *Medieval Scotland: Kingship and Nation* (Stroud, 2004), p. 94; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 47, 51, 73.
[194] Oram, *Domination*, p. 37.

variability was evidently a product of a far smaller power differential when compared to Anglo-Welsh relations.

Certainly, pre- and post-Conquest relation were distinct. During the Anglo-Saxon period, court meetings were the more common form of hierarchical meeting place, with submission within a defeated kingdom completely absent from the Anglo-Welsh relationship. Anglo-Saxon kings made use of border meetings in order to obtain diplomatic recognition of their fledgling kingdom, and often met foreign rulers at court locations with Roman pasts, thus depicting themselves as possessing authority over their neighbours in a manner akin to a Roman emperor. The Anglo-Norman period saw several shifts, indicating different relationships. With unification no longer a pressing political issue, border summits were exclusively for peacemaking, not recognition. Aside from Gloucester in 1093, there is little evidence for the reuse of Anglo-Saxon meeting places post-1066, with the Anglo-Norman kings adapting to their own situation, even hosting Owain ap Cadwgan in Normandy. Most crucially there was an increase in the number of submissions to kings of England in a defeated party's kingdom. Anglo-Norman kings' trips abroad encouraged neighbouring rulers to challenge their authority, rather than acknowledge it pre-emptively. Consequently, invasions and subsequent submissions were necessary to reimpose control.

The 1066 divide is not universal. For an example of continuity, Cnut's meeting with the Scottish leaders after his return from the continent resembles several meetings during the Anglo-Norman period. Further, peacemaking motivated some border meetings in the Anglo-Saxon period too. Other shifts also occurred, particularly in the variable Anglo-Scottish relationship. Within the space of eight years, Æthelstan met Constantine at all three types of meeting places discussed, reflecting a fluctuating geopolitical landscape. Although, some changes were long-live. Most notably, from meeting places indicating equality with Anglo-Norman kings and opposition to their control during Malcolm III's reign, to the court meetings during the reigns of his sons, suggesting far greater Scottish acceptance of English suzerainty.

Perhaps the most important point about meeting places is that, due to their prevalence, they provide an outline of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations during this period, which will be built upon in the following chapters.

Chapter 2: Diplomatic Objects: Gifts and Tributes

1. Introduction

Whilst diplomatic meeting places mattered, rulers expressed and developed their relationships through other practices too. Material items were frequently passed between kings, both in person and via intermediaries. This chapter explores what gifts and tributes tell us about the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relationships, including how they differ, and how they changed over time. Following Lars Kjær's approach, the focus here is movable wealth, such as cups, gold, silver, cows and dogs.[1] The granting of land itself is not considered, though I discuss cases that interact with movable wealth. Furthermore, the giving of land as part of a marriage agreements is discussed in a subsequent chapter.[2] I begin by exploring King Henry I of England's gift of a "magic cup" to King David I of Scotland. I utilise Marcel Mauss' anthropological theory of reciprocity to argue that Henry gave this gift to bind the Scot to him.[3] Although some historians have criticised using anthropology for interpreting medieval behaviour, I demonstrate the applicability of Mauss' theory to diplomacy in medieval Britain.[4] I also go further, developing my interpretation in line with evidence and arguments drawn from the medieval context. Secondly, I investigate the Anglo-Welsh relationship, focusing mostly on tribute payments, but with some discussion of gift giving. Notwithstanding one article by Timothy Reuter, consideration of the taking of tribute in medieval diplomacy is very limited.[5] This chapter addresses these deficits, investigating the character of tribute and how it relates to other examples of object exchange, notably gift giving. Welsh tribute payments to the English, combined with some English gifts, reveal numerous instances of Welsh subordination. However, these acts of dominance were employed in different ways, reflecting various forms of hierarchy. Finally, I explore Constantine II of Scotland's payment of tribute to Æthelstan of England in 934. It was the sole Scottish payment of tribute in this period, so provides insight into how their Anglo-Scottish relationship differed to their successors'. Overall, these examples of gifts and tributes show Scottish and Welsh subordination to the English. However, as with meeting places, considerable variation and nuance is evident. English dominance over the Welsh differed from their authority over the Scots, and the use of tributes and gifts illustrates the evolution of relations on either side of the conquest, not to mention during other

[1] Lars Kjær, *The Medieval Gift and the Classical Tradition: Ideas and the Practice of Generosity in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 2019), p. 3.
[2] See p. 96.
[3] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. W. D. Halls (London, 2002).
[4] Philippe Buc, *The Dangers of Ritual* (Princeton, 2001), p. 2; Anthony Cutler, 'Significant Gifts: Patterns of Exchange in Late Antiquity, Byzantine, and Early Islamic Diplomacy', *JMEMS*, pp. 81, 87-90; Kjær, *Gift*, pp. 1-7; Janet L. Nelson, 'Introduction', in *The Languages of Gift in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 1, 3.
[5] Timothy Reuter, 'Plunder and Tribute in the Carolingian Empire', *TRHS*, 35 (1985), pp. 75-94.

significant periods, such as in the years following Malcolm III's death. Further, the subordinate parties in these interactions benefited as well.

2. Henry I's Gift to David I

In the late twelfth century, William of Newburgh produced a chronicle of English history.[6] Within it was a section on 'wonderful and unnatural' events, which included the story of a man, who, whilst walking home heard singing from a hill. Upon further inspection he discovered a door into the hill that led to a raucous feast, full of men, women and servants. He quickly left, taking with him a cup. According to William, 'this cup of unknown matter, unusual colour and extraordinary shape was offered to the older King Henry of the English as a great gift, and next to the brother of the queen, that is to say King David I of the Scots, and was kept for many years among the treasures of Scotland; and several years ago, as we learnt from a truthful report, Henry II [of England] desired to examine that cup, and it was surrendered by King William the Lion of the Scots.'[7] The cup's diplomatic life had three phases: Henry I's initial gifting of the cup to David I; David's keeping of the cup for numerous years; its eventual return to England during the reigns of Henry II and William the Lion. I will focus on the first two phases and their implications for Anglo-Scottish relations, since William and Henry II's reigns are beyond my scope.[8] Detailed accounts of gifts between rulers in this period are not especially common, making this a fascinating source for exploring the character of Henry I and David I's connection. Though William of Newburgh does not explicitly date these events, by determining their significance I can then connect them to datable interactions between Henry and David.

Firstly, by giving David the cup, Henry was seemingly obligating the Scottish king to support him in return for diplomatic recognition. The starting point for understanding this act is Marcel Mauss. In *The Gift*, Mauss investigated gift giving in Polynesia, Melanesia and the American northwest, in what he called 'backward' and 'archaic' societies. He argued that within these societies a total system of exchange exists, whereby gifts are not free, but impose hierarchical obligations on recipients. Put simply, the gift receiver becomes indebted to the gift giver, and must repay the gift in some form. Gifts are thus inalienable. Though possession is transferred, the item remains attached to the giver, creating the duty to reciprocate. Consequently, gift giving is a competitive behaviour, with people attempting to outbid one another to gain support and status.[9]

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[6] David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, *EHD II*, p. 322.

[7] WN, 1, pp. 118-21, quote at pp. 120-21: '*Denique hoc poculum materiae incognitae, coloris insoliti, et formae inusitatae henrico seniori anglorum regi pro magno munere oblatum est, ac deinde fatri reginae, david scilicet regi scottorum, contraditum annnis plurimis in thesauris scotiae servatum est; et ante annos aliquot, sicut veraci relatione cognovimus, henrico secundo illus aspiicere cupienti a rege scottorum willelmo resignatum est*'.

[8] Appendix 2, no. 58.

[9] Mauss, *Gift*, pp. 3-8; Also, Annette B. Weiner, 'Inalienable Wealth', *America Ethnologist*, 12 (1985), pp. 210-212.

Several historians have utilised Mauss' theory to analyse medieval gift giving.[10] Florin Curta and Georges Duby referenced Mauss in their studies, stating that leaders gave gifts to their followers as a means of creating an obligation to reciprocate, generating a network of debt and alliances that held the existing social structure together.[11] Historians have also applied Mauss' ideas to medieval diplomacy. Jenny Benham and Michelle R. Warren have looked at gifts exchanged between Richard I of England and Tancred of Sicily. According to Roger of Howden, during a visit to Sicily in 1191, Richard gave Tancred Caliburn, King Arthur's legendary sword. Tancred offered the king of England a wide array of gifts in return, including gold, silver, horses and silken cloth, though Richard only accepted a ring.[12] Both Benham and Warren see power relations at this episode's core, arguing that a mutual exchange of gifts demonstrates equality between kings, whilst unilateral giving subordinates the receiver to the giver, since the gift must be returned in some form. Where they differ is on the eventual outcome. Benham believed the ring and sword cancelled one another out, whereas Warren judged the sword to be more valuable than the ring, subordinating Tancred to Richard.[13] Being unilateral, Henry's gift to David is more straightforward. The cup would create a hierarchical relationship that obliged the Scottish king to support his English counterpart in return for the gift.

Mauss' model has been considerably critiqued. Alan Testart queried it from an anthropological perspective, arguing gift giving is too diverse to be encapsulated by Mauss' theory, and that reciprocation is not truly obligatory.[14] The theory's role in medieval history has also been debated, perhaps due to the influence of Philippe Buc, who called into question the relevance of modern anthropological and social scientific models for the study of medieval rituals.[15] Thus, historians such as Anthony Cutler, Bernard Jussen, Kjær and Janet Nelson have criticised those who have uncritically applied Mauss' conclusions to medieval texts without consideration for the medieval context, such as the contemporary social and political situation.[16]

However, this is not a reason to throw Mauss out. Rather, this sentiment is a call to think critically when analysing medieval gifts, and not to stay yoked to Mauss regardless of the evidence. This does not mean that Mauss' idea cannot correspond with medieval evidence by default, simply because his model was not developed for the medieval period. In fact, many accounts explicitly align with it. The most famous of these is the depiction of kingship in the Old English poem *Beowulf*.

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[10] For the material turn, see Patrick Joyce and Tony Bennett, 'Introduction', in *Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn*, ed. Patrick Joyce and Tony Bennett (Abingdon, 2010), pp. 21-64.
[11] Florin Curta, 'Merovingian and Carolingian Gift Giving', *Speculum*, 81 (2006), pp. 671, 676-78; Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh and the Twelfth Century*, trans. B. Clarke (London, 1974), pp. 48-50.
[12] Howden, *Gesta*, 2, p. 159.
[13] *PMA*, pp. 74-78; Michelle R. Warren, 'Roger of Howden Strikes Back: Investing Arthur of Britany with the Anglo-Norman Future', *ANS*, 21, pp.263-64, 267-68.
[14] Alan Testart, 'Uncertainties of the "Obligation to Reciprocate": A Critique of Mauss', in *Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute*, ed. Wendy James and N. J. Allen (Oxford, 1998), pp. 98-100, 103-04.
[15] Buc, *Dangers*, p. 2.
[16] Cutler, 'Gifts', pp. 81, 87-90; Bernhard Jussen, 'Religious Discourse of the Gift in the Middle Ages: Semantic Evidence (Second to Twelfth Centuries)', in *Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange*, ed. Gazi Algazi *et al* (Gottingen, 2003), pp. 173-174; Kjær, *Gift*, pp. 1-9, see pp. 8, 160-61 for references to Buc; Nelson, 'Introduction', pp. 1, 3.

Although its original composition date is extensively debated, with proposed dates ranging from the seventh to eleventh century, the poem's manuscript has been confidently dated to the early eleventh century.[17] Even if it was initially composed much earlier, the narrative definitely interested people in the period this thesis looks at, suggesting it corresponds with their attitudes to a degree. In *Beowulf*, King Hrothgar of the Danes is labelled the 'giver of treasure', who rewards loyal followers with jewels and rings at feasts. The interaction between service and gifts is made more explicit when Hrothgar rewards Beowulf with several items, including a sword, a helmet, and a banner in return for killing the monster Grendel.[18] Historical rulers behaved similarly in relatively contemporary sources. In c.1070, the Norman monk William of Jumièges completed an addition to his account of the Norman dukes, the *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, which focused on William the Conqueror's invasion of England in 1066. He states that prior to the Conquest, William gave Earl Harold Godwinson gifts in return for swearing an oath of fealty.[19] The same event is depicted in the *Bayeux Tapestry*, produced in the eleventh century's second half.[20] These examples draw a clear link between gift giving and the obligation to reciprocate in some form, demonstrating the Maussian gift giving model.

There are even accounts of a diplomatic incident in Britain, involving Henry I, which make this relationship explicit. According to John of Worcester, when Robert of Bellême rebelled against Henry in 1102, Robert 'encouraged his Welsh followers with honours, lands, horses and arms, and he [Robert] liberally gave to them various gifts, so that they would be more willing, and more faithful, and be better prepared to complete what he wanted.' Next, Robert led those Welsh followers on a raid into Staffordshire, successfully capturing both cattle and men. In response, Henry 'easily tempted the Welsh, in whom Robert had possessed great confidence, with small gifts, so that they made void the oaths they [the Welsh] had sworn to Robert, and withdrew from him, and rose against him.'[21] Orderic Vitalis' account of events supports John's. Robert is recorded allying with the Welsh rulers Iorwerth and Cadwgan, who he mistakenly calls the 'sons of Rhys'. Later, Henry summoned the Welsh rulers, where 'softening with offered gifts and promises he cautiously stole them from the enemy.'[22] The *Brut y Tywysogyon* provides a Welsh version that broadly supports the other accounts, clarifying that it was the rulers of Powys, the three brothers Iorwerth, Cadwgan and Maredudd ap Bleddyn, who supported Robert in return for wealth and gifts, before Iorwerth eventually joined Henry.[23] Regardless, the events of 1102 seemingly follow Mauss' model. Robert gave gifts to the Welsh, which indebted them to him, and hence they were required to support his rebellion. Likewise, once Iorwerth received

[17] Roberta Frank, 'A Scandal in Toronto: *The Dating of "Beowulf"* a Quarter Century On,' *Speculum,* 82 (2007), pp. 843-64 especially pp. 846-848.
[18] 'Beowulf', *ASP*, pp. 413, 438.
[19] *GND*, 2, pp. 160-61; Elisabeth M. C. Van Houts, 'Introduction', *GND*, 1, pp. xx, xlvii, xlix.
[20] 'The Bayeux Tapestry,' *EHD II*, pp. 251-52; 'Bayeux Tapestry', *Britannica Academic*: https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Bayeux-Tapestry/13875. Accessed 16 March 2020.
[21] JW, 3, pp. 100-01, '*Walanos eitam suos homines, ut promptiores sibique fideliores ac paratiores essent ad id perficiendum quod uolebat, honoribus, terris, equis, armis incitauit, uariissque donis largiter donauit* [...] *Interim walanos, in quibus fiduciam magnam rotbertus habuerat, ut iuramenta que illi iurauerant irrita fierent, et ab illo penitus deficerent, in illumque consugerent, donis modicis facile corrupit*'.
[22] OV, 6, pp. 22-23, 26-27, quote at p. 26, '*Eosque datis muneribus et promissis demulcens hosti caute surripuit*'.
[23] *Brut*, p. 43.

gifts from Henry he became obligated to reciprocate, so turned against Robert in favour of the English king.

The narrative of all these events, drawn from several different sources, certainly aligns with Mauss' outlook. In eleventh and twelfth-century Britain, particularly in terms of secular politics, including diplomacy, people seemingly saw some gifts as creating an obligation, or perhaps an expectation, for the receiver to repay the giver in some form, such as through support. Even if this interpretation is not applicable to all gifts, using it to explore Henry's gift to David is justifiable. Doing so suggests the cup was an attempt by Henry to obtain his Scottish counterpart's support.

Retaining Mauss does not mean dismissing other approaches to medieval gift giving. Cutler, for example, called for medieval historians to move away from Maussian reciprocity and instead focus on what objects were given.[24] Considering the cup in its medieval context actually corroborates the view that Henry gifted it to gain David's support, whilst also helping to date the event. Items used for drinking were a relatively common diplomatic gift. In a letter to his English subjects in 1027, King Cnut recounts his meeting with the German Emperor Conrad II, stating he received many presents from the emperor, including gold and silver vessels.[25] Likewise, the German Emperor Henry II gave Robert the Pious of France 'a pair of gold vessels' at their early eleventh-century meeting on the River Meuse.[26] This prominence may relate to the concept of hospitality, particularly feasting and consumption. Sociologically speaking, the sharing of food is a social act which creates bonds of association between participants.[27] It could impose obligations for instance, such as between a king or a lord and his followers. According to William of Malmesbury, during major festivals William the Conqueror would host grand and costly feasts that he would summon all of his followers to.[28] Providing food and drink was a type of gift giving, which like material gifts indebted those receiving the hospitality to the one providing.[29] Joanna Bellis has highlighted literary sources that make this relationship explicit.[30] Returning to *Beowulf*, after arriving at King Hrothgar's hall and speaking to the king, the titular character joined the ongoing feast. There Wealhtheow, Hrothgar's queen, presented Beowulf with a cup of beer. Having received it, Beowulf instantly promised to defeat the monster Grendel for Hrothgar.[31] A similar episode occurs in *The Battle of Maldon*, a near contemporary poem describing the titular battle (991). The character Ælfwine exhorted his comrades to avenge their lord, Ealdorman

[24] Cutler, 'Gifts', pp. 81-82.
[25] WM, pp. 326-27, '*Maxime autem ab imperatore donis uariis et muneribus pretiosis honoratus sum, tam in uasis aureis et argenteis quam in palliis et uestibus ualde pretiosis*'; '*Cnut's Letter of 1027*' *EHD I*, pp. 417.
[26] *Glaber*, pp. 110-11, '*Rex quoque pares tantum naues auri ex illo sumpsit*'.
[27] Michael Dietler, 'Feasts and Commensal Politics in the Political Economy: Food, Power and Status in Prehistoric Europe', in *Food and the Status Quest: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, ed. Polly Wiessner and Wulf Schiefenhövel (Oxford, 1996), p. 91.
[28] WM, pp. 508-09.
[29] Dietler, 'Feasts', p. 90; Mark Hagger, 'Lordship and Lunching: Interpretations of Eating and Food in the Anglo-Norman World, 1050-1200 with Reference to the Bayeux Tapestry', *The English and Their Legacy, 900-1200: Essays in Honour of Anne Williams*, ed. David Roffe (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 230-32.
[30] Joanna Bellis, 'The Dregs of Trembling, the Draughts of Salvation: The Dual Symbolism of the Cup in Medieval Literature', *JMH*, 37 (2011), pp. 49-53.
[31] 'Beowulf', *ASP*, p. 428.

Byrhtnoth of Essex, by recalling the hospitality he showed them: 'Remember the words that we uttered many a time over the mead, when on the bench, heroes in hall, we made our boast about hard strife.'[32] In both these examples the link between obligation and hospitality is clear. After accepting Hrothgar and Byrhtnoth's hospitality, these men were now obliged to return it, and provide their support.[33]

The idea that the cup David received from Henry would have been associated with feasting and hospitality is not farfetched: it did supposedly come from a feast, whilst my other examples also relate to hospitality. Cnut claims that Conrad II received him and other nobles for Easter celebrations, which likely involved feasting akin to William's celebrations.[34] Robert received his vessels after eating breakfast in Henry II's camp.[35] Humans consciously invest gifts with value based on their interaction with cultural norms.[36] Thus David received a gift related to hospitality, and by extension the obligation that hospitality imposed on guests. Consequently, it further emphasised Henry's reasoning for giving the gift: to bind David to the English king in a manner that would require him to support Henry. It was not unheard of for rulers to utilise gift items that reinforced the connection between giver and receiver. For example, during the 930s Æthelstan gave numerous gifts to the community of St Cuthbert.[37] These included a now destroyed gospel book and a copy of Bede's *Lives of St Cuthbert*.[38] Both manuscripts featured images of the king alongside the saint, with the gospel book also containing an inscription describing it as a gift from the king to the community. When the monks saw these manuscripts, they would have seen visual proof of the relationship with Æthelstan which he was seeking to cement with them. Similarly, by giving David a cup, Henry ensured the gift would communicate to the Scottish king the obligation he owed to the king of England.

For these reasons, I date what William of Newburgh describes to 1126-27. According to the *ASC*, after Michaelmas 1126, David visited Henry's court, spending the rest of the year in England. That Christmas, David, along with members of the English nobility, swore to support the claim of Henry's daughter, the Empress Matilda, to the English throne after her father's death.[39] This was a crucial moment, when more than ever Henry needed to guarantee David's support. Giving David the cup obliged him to uphold his oath and help Matilda. It also aligns with the fact that David had just spent time at the English court receiving hospitality, further indebting himself. Finally, as *Beowulf* and *The Battle of Maldon* poem show, drinking from a cup at a lord's feast was associated with making a promise or pledge of support. Thus, the cup may have been a clever way to communicate that the

[32] '*The Battle of Maldon*', *EHD I*, p. 296; Whitelock, *EHD I*, p. 293.
[33] Bellis, 'Dregs', pp. 50, 52.
[34] 'Cnut's Letter', *EHD I*, pp. 417.
[35] *Glaber*, pp. 110-11.
[36] Janet L. Nelson, 'The Setting of the Gift in the Reign of Charlemagne', in *The Languages of Gift in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (Cambridge, 2010), p. 117; Joyce and Bennett, 'Introduction', p. 28.
[37] *HSC*, pp. 211-12.
[38] Foot, *Æthelstan*, pp. 120-23.
[39] *ASC E*, 1126-27.

help David owed Henry specifically related to the pledge David himself made whilst receiving Henry's hospitality in 1126: the oath he swore to support Matilda.

Furthermore, the cup would have helped David secure his rule in Scotland, which was weak during the early years of his reign. As Richard D. Oram contests, whilst the later years of David's reign were characterised by strong and capable royal power, he was much more vulnerable during the early years.[40] There's no evidence his succession was prearranged, especially since it was immediately followed in 1124 by a rebellion led by his bastard nephew Malcolm Macbeth according to Orderic Vitalis. David was victorious, but his nephew survived, and was involved in another rebellion in 1130.[41] As discussed, at the core of Maussian thinking is that gifts are inalienable, remaining attached in some form to the giver. Whilst accepting the gift made David Henry's subordinate, it also visibly established a bond with a powerful foreign king. Thus, it was another form of diplomatic recognition that singled David out from his domestic opponents, raising his standing. The purpose then of gifting the cup was to provide English recognition of David's rule, in return for Scottish support.

` The second phase of the cup's diplomatic life was its time spent with the treasures of Scotland. By keeping the cup, David was likely demonstrating that the relationship the act of gift giving established was still alive. Cutler highlights a lack of scholarly investigation into what medieval rulers did with the gifts they received.[42] Unfortunately, gift items often vanish from the sources once given. Neither Cnut nor Glaber tell us what happened to the gifts they refer to. Here though is an exception. Newburgh clearly states that the cup spent 'many years among the treasures of Scotland.'[43] The early twelfth-century *Life of St. Margaret* describes the Scottish court towards the end of the eleventh century as full of gold and silver ornaments, and it is tempting to imagine the cup alongside these.[44] Regardless, what matters is that David kept the cup, and that this keeping was well known. Although not an exact comparison, since it did not involve two ruling kings, similarities exist with an episode involving David's father, King Malcolm III of Scotland. In 1074 Malcolm gifted a wide selection of items to Edgar the Ætheling, the claimant to the English throne, before the latter left Scotland. However, Edgar's ship sunk with all his presents, and he was forced to return to Scotland. He soon left again, but not before Malcolm replaced the gifts previously lost at sea.[45] Evidently, the earlier act of gifting was no longer enough to bind Edgar to Malcolm.[46] The items themselves had power, and needed to remain in the receiver's possession.

Gift keeping then is a way to preserve and display the relationship established by the gift-giving event. Cases where gifts were not kept can help confirm this, since the receivers in these examples were attempting to stop any obligation to the giver developing. In his study of the obligation gift giving imposes on people, James Laidlaw considers Jain monks, known as Renouncers. These

[40] Oram, *Domination*, p. 64; Also, Richard Oram, *David I: King of Scots, 1124-1154* (Edinburgh, 2020), pp. 47-54.
[41] OV, 4, pp. 276-79; Oram, *David*, pp 47-48, pp. 52-53,
[42] Cutler, 'Gifts', p. 91.
[43] WN, 1, pp. 120-21.
[44] *VSM*, p. 234; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 11.
[45] *ASC D*, 1074.
[46] See pp. 148-50.

monks cannot hold property and live off food provided by others, which they believe does not create an obligation to reciprocate, but is a free gift. Their behaviour reflects this attitude. The food is never called a gift, it is mixed with other donations so it cannot be identified, and it is eaten behind closed doors, meaning the outcome of the donation is never witnessed by the giver.[47] Essentially these acts obscure and de-publicise the gift items, denying them their gift identity, and allowing the Jain Renouncers to believe they owe their benefactors nothing in return (although Laidlaw questions whether this procedure completely undermines the Maussian understanding of gifts, since those who donate the food still feel reciprocated through spiritual rewards, either in this life or the next).[48] This is the complete opposite of David's behaviour. A gift acknowledged and kept in its original state works to collapse space and time.[49] It becomes a permanent reminder, to those who see and hear about it, of the occasion when the gift was given, thus the relationship the episode established, and the hierarchical obligations it placed on the receiver. Keeping the cup could suggest that David was happy to remind himself and others of the support he owed Henry I and the Empress Matilda. He clearly believed that relationship still existed.

David's behaviour over the following years supports these conclusions. As touched on, David's adherence to Matilda is illustrated by his journey to Matilda's court in 1141, and his decision to attack England whilst it was under Stephen's rule, which contemporary chroniclers believed was precipitated by the oath he swore to recognise Matilda as queen of England after her father's death.[50]

Gifts are important to diplomacy because of their permanence. The problem with succession is that the incumbent king's death means he cannot help his chosen successor. Henry, however, used the cup, a physical object that could outlast him, to remind David of the support and oath he owed to Matilda. Likewise, David's domestic opposition would not disappear overnight, especially since Malcolm Macbeth was still alive in 1126. He continuously needed to prove his relationship with Henry, which, displayed at the Scottish court, the cup did. A further problem was his absence from the kingdom. As well as the time he spent at Henry's court in 1126-27 and with Matilda in 1141, he was in England in 1130. Travelling to another ruler's kingdom was a sign of inferiority, partly because it left the traveller's realm open to opposition. It is not coincidental that Malcolm Macbeth and Earl Angus of Moray attempted to conquer Scotland whilst David was abroad in 1130.[51] The cup was a surrogate for the absent king: a visible assertion to those left in Scotland that Henry had recognised David as king of Scotland, ideally discouraging native opposition. Obviously, it did not prevent all opposition, given the 1130 uprising. Yet David was not abandoned, and his constable marshalled an army, which fought off Malcolm Macbeth and Angus.[52] The cup may have helped generate the support that was needed to successfully defend David's rule.

[47] James Laidlaw, 'A Free Gift Makes No Friends', in *The Questions of the Gift*, ed. Mark Osteen (London, 2002), pp. 46-53.
[48] Laidlaw, 'A Free Gift', pp. 53-54, 63.
[49] Weiner, 'Inalienable Wealth', p. 210.
[50] OV, 6, p. 519; *GS*, pp. 35-37; JH, p. 287; Oram, *David*, pp. 76-87.
[51] OV, 4, pp. 276-77; Oram, *David*, p. 52.
[52] OV, 4, pp. 276-77.

The “magic cup” David received from Henry is a very useful case study for exploring medieval diplomacy and Anglo-Scottish relations. Firstly, it implies David was subordinate to Henry, in line with analysis of their diplomatic meeting sites. This again contrasts David’s father, Malcolm III, who pursued Anglo-Scottish equality. Another difference between father and son is the permanence of the relationship. Malcolm attacked England on multiple occasions, defying English attempts to create peace through submission, such as in 1072 and 1093. Conversely, David accepted a long-term relationship with the English king, which required him to support Henry and his daughter in return for diplomatic recognition. David’s military engagements during the Anarchy clearly show that he supported the relationship after Henry’s death, and that the cup was not removed until the reign of David’s grandson William could mean he respected it until his own demise in 1153. The Anglo-Scottish relationship evidently saw a profound change post-Malcolm’s death, further demonstrating that we must be cautious of a simple Anglo-Saxon versus Anglo-Norman divide. Additionally, long-term Scottish acceptance and alignment with English royal power during the earlier part of the twelfth century is a theme I will return to in. Beyond Henry and David’s relationship, the episode offers useful lessons on diplomacy. Principally, the idea that gifts create permanent, hierarchical relationships, that obligate the receiver to repay the gift in some form. Most significantly for the study of medieval diplomacy as a whole, it describes what happened to a diplomatic gift once it was given, a rarity for this period. William of Newburgh’s suggestion that receivers kept gifts can now be applied to other episodes, helping to explain why items were given and received in the first place.

3. Welsh Tribute Payments During the Reign of King Æthelstan

In comparison to gifts, tribute has attracted minimal historiographical interest. Timothy Reuter’s investigation of tribute in the Carolingian Empire is one of the only in-depth explorations of the practice, though it considers tribute alongside plunder.[53] Given this research dearth and the potential overlap with other forms of wealth exchange, particularly gift giving, it is worth devoting some time to explicitly defining tribute and its role. The tribute King Æthelstan took from the Welsh kings at Hereford in 927 is the perfect case study, as it is well attested, appearing in multiple relatively detailed accounts. This close read further improves our understanding Anglo-Welsh relations during the early part of my period.

According to William of Malmesbury, at the Hereford summit (927) Æthelstan demanded tribute from the Welsh: ‘they paid to him as annual tax twenty pounds of gold and three hundred of silver’, as well as 25,000 cows, hunting dogs and birds of prey.[54] Welsh sources confirm this event, with the *Brenhinedd Y Seasson* repeating the claim that Æthelstan took gold, silver and cows from the Welsh, though without referencing the dogs or birds.[55] Linked to these accounts is the Welsh poem,

[53] Reuter, ‘Plunder’, pp. 75-94.
[54] WM, pp. 216-217, ‘*Ut ei nomine uectigalis annuatim uiginti libras auri, trecentas argenti penderent, boues uiginti quinque milia annumerarent, preterea quot liberet canes qui odorisequo nare spelea et diuerticula ferarum deprehenderent, uolucres quae aliarum auium predam per inane uenari nossent*’.
[55] *Brenhinedd*, pp. 28-31.

Armes Prydein Vawr. It describes an incredibly tense Anglo-Welsh relationship, characterised by English domination, which the poet prophesised the Welsh would overthrow through violence. Within the poem are several references to the paying of tribute, such as 'the agents will collect their taxes; in the treasuries of the Cymry was nothing they would pay', and 'the agents of Cirencester will bitterly comment […] the taxes they will collect - affliction.'[56] The reference to Cirencester, a place associated English domination during Æthelstan's reign, makes it clear that these payments were going to England.[57]

Although the poem does not provide a composition date, internal evidence suggests it was created during Æthelstan's reign. The poet calls for the Welsh to ally with other groups based in and around the British Isles, including the Scots, the Hiberno-Norse and the men of Strathclyde.[58] This seemingly is a direct reference to the *Brunanburh* campaign of 937, which saw Olaf Guthfrithson of Dublin, Constantine II of Scotland, and Owen of Strathclyde band together for an unsuccessful invasion of Æthelstan's England.[59] It is unlikely that the poet would urge joining a failed alliance, so probably composed his poem pre-937. Mention of an alliance between Mercians and West Saxons mirrored recent political developments.[60] They had only unified into a single kingdom in 918, and had to be reunited in 924 after they briefly split over who should succeed King Edward.[61] Moreover, it called the English ruler a 'great king (*mechtëyrn*)'.[62] John K. Bollard and Margred Haycock believe this was an ironic comment on Æthelstan's extravagant royal styles, such as 'I Æthelstan, king of the English, through the right hand of the almighty raised to the throne of the whole kingdom of Britain.'[63] Some historians propose less precise composition dates. David Dumville casts a wide net, suggesting 935-980, whilst Rebecca Thomas and David Callander simply calling it 'an early tenth-century product'.[64] Alternatively, Andrew Breeze argues for 940, believing King Edmund of England's surrender of northern territory to Olaf Guthfrithson provoked the poet into calling for an anti-English coalition. However, given that Edmund only succeeded in 940, the poet's deep resentment of English tribute demands would presumably relate more to Æthelstan than his successor.[65] The overlap between Æthelstan's reign and the poem's content means 927-37 is the most likely period of composition, and thus the tribute payments mentioned relate to the Hereford summit. If doubts

[56] *Armes*, pp. 28-35.
[57] See pp. 44-45.
[58] *Armes*, pp. 28-29.
[59] *ASC C*, 937; *HDE*, p. 76; Michael Livingston, 'The Roads to Brunanburh', in *The Battle of Brunanburh: A Casebook*, ed. Michael Livingston (Exeter, 2011), pp. 1-26.
[60] *Armes*, pp. 32-33.
[61] *ASC Mercian Register*, 924.
[62] *Armes*, pp. 28-29.
[63] John K. Bollard and Margred Haycock, 'The Welsh Sources Pertaining to the Battle', in *The Battle of Brunanburh: A Casebook*, ed. Michael Livingston (Exeter, 2011), pp. 251-53; *ES* 418a, '*Ego Æˇelstanus rex Anglorum.per omnipotentis dexteram totius Brittanie regni*'.
[64] David N. Dumville, 'Brittany and *Armes Prydein Vawr*', *Études Celtiques*, 20 (1983), pp. 150-51; Rebecca Thomas and David Callander, 'Reading Asser in Early Medieval Wales: The Evidence of *Armes Prydein Vawr*', *ASE*, 46 (2017), p. 118.
[65] Andrew Breeze, 'Durham, Caithness, and *Armes Prydein*', *Northern History*, 48 (2011), p. 147.

persist, then *Armes* still suggests how tribute payments were perceived, including the one that William of Malmesbury and the *Brenhinedd* mention.

Firstly, the language around tribute reveals a power differential that starkly contrasts gift giving. Curta argues that tributes involve coercion by the receiver.[66] William of Malmesbury used *coegit*, meaning Æthelstan compelled or forced the Welsh to Hereford, adding that they performed some form of surrender (*deditionem*). Similarly, the transferred materials are not a gift but a tax (*vectigalis*). This language depicts Æthelstan, the receiver, as controlling the Welsh kings in attendance. They seemingly had no choice but to concede to his demand, or at least could not reject it without risking retributive action by a more powerful party. Whilst tribute does ensure peace, it is a hierarchical peace. In fact, tribute seemingly signifies a far more hierarchical peace than gift giving, as the tribute taker is in such an ascendant position that they could flip the connection between gift giving and power on its head, with the receiving side now the superior party and the giving one the inferior. Presumably the power politics of the situation were so apparent that the tribute taker need not worry about the event being misconstrued as sign of submission.

Tribute also relates to warfare, particularly the taking of plunder. Sources from medieval England suggest that defeating enemies and taking their wealth were inseparable aspects of warfare, as is the case in the Old English version of *Judith*, dated to the tenth century.[67] Having defeated the Assyrians, the Hebrews had the opportunity 'to seize from the most odious foes, their old dead enemies, bloodied booty, resplendent accoutrements, shield and broad sword, burnished helmets, costly treasures', which they brought back to Bethulia, their city.[68] Though a biblical story, the poet deviated from the version of the story found in the fourth-century Vulgate Bible, stripping out many of the complexities and placing it within a Germanic setting, with motifs reminiscent of *Beowulf*, in order to make it recognisable for his audience.[69] The behaviours that characters exhibit then, such as their treatment of defeated enemies, were likely familiar to a tenth-century English audience, so provide insight into tenth-century attitudes and beliefs. It certainly corresponds with contemporary wars involving the English. *The Life of King Edward* records Earl Harold of Wessex and Earl Tostig of Northumbria's successful English invasion of Wales in 1063. 'The enemy's house was ruined, garlanded furniture robbed, royal pomp vulnerable to loot.'[70] Similarly, the *Encomium of Queen Emma* describes the aftermath of the Danish victory over the English at The Battle of Assandun (1016): 'The English, truly not ignorant of the location, quickly escaped from the hands of the enemies, abandoning the spoils to them.' The Danes spent the following morning stripping loot off the dead English soldiers.[71] Simply put, victorious armies took plunder from defeated ones, supporting Karl Leyser's

[66] Curta, 'Gift Giving', pp. 693-94.
[67] *ASP*, pp. 495-96.
[68] '*Judith*,' *ASP*, p. 503.
[69] Jackson J. Campbell, 'Schematic Techniques in Judith', *English Literary History*, 38 (1971), pp. 155-59, 165; Stephen Greenblatt, ed. *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, 2 vols. (London, 2012), 1, pp. 109-10.
[70] *LKE*, pp. 86-87, '*Diruitur inimical domus, redimita suppelex diripitur, prede regia pompa patet*'.
[71] *Encomium*, pp. 26-29, '*Angli vero loci non inscii cito a minibus hostium sunt elapse, eos relinquantes ad spoila*'.

view that early medieval wars were principally a quest for wealth.[72] Victory and the seizing of material wealth were thus synonymous.

By extension, tribute taking mirrors military victory. Reuter states that 'tribute was in practice institutionalised plunder.'[73] From a peacekeeping perspective, offering tribute ends wars by providing the attacker with the material wealth they had sought to gain through invading. It is in effect a substitute for conflict. Asser's account of a Viking force that set up camp on Thanet in 865 makes this point explicitly. Initially the people of Kent paid them tribute in return for peace, but before long the Vikings covertly attacked eastern Kent 'for they knew they could get more money by stolen plunder than by peace.'[74] The tribute payment needed to accurately reflect what the attackers felt they could gain from plunder or it would not deter an attack, as the inhabitants of Kent learnt to their cost. Furthermore, the overlap between tribute and plunder implies that the parties involved would have seen tributes, such as those Æthelstan received, as akin to military victories. This association suggests a particularly vertical relationship, far more one sided than the relationship between David I and Henry I, which was built on gift giving.

The reference to cows seemingly confirms the link to military dominance. Lists of items given as tribute are a rarity in records of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in this period. The sources are often vague, using varying terms for the payment including money (*pecunia*) or, as we have seen, tax (*dreth* in Welsh).[75] The itemised list William of Malmesbury provides for 927 is what makes his account so insightful, particularly the mention of cows. Cattle seems to have been a common means of paying tribute. Following Henry I's invasion of Wales in 1121 he met with Maredudd ap Bleddyn of Powys, who 'offering ten thousand cows, made peace with him [Henry].[76] Likewise, King John of England's invasion of Gwynedd in 1211 was brought to a close when Llywelyn the Great paid a tribute to the invader, which included twenty-thousand cows.[77] Crucially, cows were a common form of plunder. The *ASC* records seven cattle raids by English, Viking and Scottish forces.[78] It is similarly notable that the *Ordinance concerning the Dunsæte*, the treaty designed to govern frontier relations between English and Welsh, features numerous provisions dedicated to inter-community cattle theft.[79] Whether tribute or plunder, cows were perfect for this mode of wealth transfer. The wealth was coming from another realm, so the best way to bring it home was, as

[72] Karl Leyser, 'Early Medieval Warfare', in *The Battle of Maldon: Fiction and Fact*, ed. Janet Cooper (London, 1993), p. 91.
[73] Reuter, 'Plunder', pp. 87; Also, Duby, *Economy*, p. 49; D. M. Metcalf, 'Large Danegelds in Relation to War and Kingship', in *Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England*, ed. Sonia Chadwick Hawkes (Oxford, 1989), p. 183.
[74] Asser, *Life of King Alfred*, ed. William Henry Stevenson (Oxford, 1998), p. 18, '*Sciebant enim maiorem pecuniam se furtiva praeda quam pace adepturos*.' Erroneously dated to 864; see *EHD I*, p. 176, note 2.
[75] *Brut*, pp. 80-81; WM 1, pp. 728-29.
[76] *AC*, p. 15, '*datis x milibus pecorum cum eo pacificati sunt*'.
[77] *Brut*, p. 192-93.
[78] *ASC A*, 894, 917; *C* 1010; *D* 1077; *E* 1052, 1065, 1092.
[79] *Dunsæte*, pp. 104-07.

Thomas Charles-Edwards argues, 'to make the food travel on its hoofs.'[80] The parallels between what was taken as plunder and what was offered as tribute further supports the view that the practices had similar roles in relations between rulers.

Once in the tribute receiver's realm, it would have played a key role in domestic politics. *Armes* provides some information on the logistics of tribute. Æthelstan's agents travelled to Aber Peryddon, identified as near Monmouth on the Wye's western side, to collect taxes from the Welsh.[81] The poem does not say where the tribute was taken, but a comparison drawn from Frankia provides insight. In the ninth-century *Annals of St. Bertin*, Hincmar of Rheims states that in 864 'Charles [The Bald, King of West Frankia] held a great assembly at which he received the annual gifts, but also tribute from Brittany, directed to him by Duke Salomon of the Bretons in the custom of his ancestors, namely fifty pounds of silver.'[82] Æthelstan's 'grand assemblies', as recorded in the charters of 'Æthelstan A', were attended by his most important magnates, notably bishops, ealdormen and earls, thegns, and members of the royal family.[83] Likely, the gold, silver, cows, dogs and birds that Æthelstan demanded from the Welsh were also presented at his domestic assemblies.

Bringing the tribute to an assembly had two significant domestic outcomes. Firstly, receiving the Welsh tribute in front of his magnates showcased Æthelstan's diplomatic practice and his relationship with the Welsh kingdoms, displaying it as something akin to a military conquest. Secondly, the court was also ideal for redistributing the tribute. Æthelstan probably gave out what he received from the Welsh to his own followers. In an early English context, there are a few recorded examples of wealth redistribution. Again, the most famous practitioner is King Hrothgar, who gifted Beowulf and his followers many items during a feast at the royal hall.[84] A passage in the *Encomium of Queen Emma* also implies that wealth recently acquired from enemies was normally shared out. After the Battle of Assandun, the author states that the Danes 'did not however, divide the spoil in the night', instead regrouping into a defensive position.[85] This was evidently unusual enough to necessitate a comment, with the immediate sharing out of the spoil straight after victory presumably the norm. Early Frankish sources are more explicit. According to the *Royal Frankish Annals*, in 796 the Franks plundered the Avars and brought what they seized back to Charlemagne at Aachen. Part of this he sent to Rome, but he shared the rest out amongst his magnates and followers, both secular

[80] Thomas Charles-Edwards, 'Early Medieval Kingship in the British Isles', in *The Origins of Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms*, ed. Steven Bassett (Leicester, 1989), p. 30; see Thomas Charles-Edwards, *Wales and the Britons 300-1064* (Oxford, 2013), p. 287.
[81] *Armes*, pp. 28-31; Andrew Breeze, 'Sorrowful Tribute in *Armes Prydein* and *The Battle of Maldon*', *Notes and Queries*, 47 (2000), p. 13; Toby D. Griffen, 'Aber Perydon: River of Death', *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium*, 15 (1995), p. 38.
[82] *Annales de Saint-Bertin*, ed. Felix Grat *et al.* (Paris, 1964), '*Karolus* […] *generale placitum habet, in quo annua dona, sed et censum de Brittannia a Salomone Brittanorum duce sibi directum more praedecessorum suorum, quinquaginta scilicet libras argenti, recipit*'; Janet L. Nelson, 'Introduction', in her version of *The Annals of St. Bertin* (Manchester, 1991), pp. 6-11.
[83] Roach, *Kingship*, pp. 29, 32-33; *ES* 425.
[84] 'Beowulf', *ASP*, pp. 437-39.
[85] *Encomium*, pp. 28-29, '*Non autem in nocte spolia dirimunt*'.

and ecclesiastical.[86] Gregory of Tours describes a similar behaviour among the Franks during King Clovis I's reign (481-511). After his troops had plundered numerous churches, Clovis was asked by a bishop to return an ewer. Clovis invited the bishop to Soissons, where all the plunder would be distributed amongst the king and his men. Clovis first promised the bishop that he would return the ewer if he received it as part of his share of the plunder, and went on to ask his men if he could take the ewer, in addition to his usual share. Most agreed, saying Clovis had a right to all the plunder, although one declared the king was only entitled to a fair share.[87] Reuter suggests the event might be legendary, and evidently there was some disagreement over proper practice.[88] Whether Clovis actually behaved like this or not, Gregory's description seemingly supports the idea, as in the above accounts, that plunder was supposed to be distributed to followers after successful attacks. The king had some influence over how this was done, but his control was not unlimited. Tribute's similarity to plunder means it was probably redistributed the same way. As discussed earlier, gift giving was an important function of kingship. From a Maussian perspective, the gifts that kings gave to their followers needed reciprocation. Thus, gift giving was seemingly a way for kings to earn domestic support, securing their own position. To do this they needed to acquire wealth, which tribute taking would facilitate.[89] A royal court, attended by the great and the good, was the perfect place for a king to redistribute a tribute to his followers. This domestic use presumably made tribute taking a far more desirable diplomatic practice than gift giving, at least from the dominant party's perspective. Whilst the latter meant giving wealth away to another polity, the former resulted in acquiring more, meaning additional redistributable resources. The best explanation for why dominant rulers turned to gift giving instead of tribute taking when dealing with inferior rulers is that they lacked the necessary power differential to enforce the demands. This was a necessary consideration given, as we shall see, the responses tribute payments could elicit from the realms footing the bills.

Naturally, the tribute paid to Æthelstan was unpopular in Wales. Commenting on the tribute collectors Æthelstan sent, *Armes Prydein* states 'the taxes they will collect - affliction'. The tribute payment and the 'agents' collecting it are returned to throughout the poem. For example, 'The agents, as *payment* for their deceit, will wallow in their blood.' The poet promises that when the agents next come to collect tribute, nine hundred attackers will massacre them, whilst only four English envoys will escape: 'As an end to their taxes, they will know death […] For ever and ever they will not [be able to] round up their taxes.' The poem culminates in the grand Welsh led alliance defeating the English and forcing them out of Britain.[90] Overall, the poem depicts this tribute as a humiliation that needed avenging.

Some historians have put a positive spin on offering tribute. Ryan Lavelle notes that Bede did not criticise King Oswiu of Northumbria's decision to offer King Penda of Mercia tribute prior to the

[86] *RFA*, p. 74.
[87] GT, pp. 139-40.
[88] Reuter, 'Plunder', p. 79.
[89] Althoff, *Family*, pp. 111-14; Duby, *Economy*, pp. 50-51.
[90] *Armes*, pp. 28-37, quotes at pp. 31, 33, my italics.

Battle of the Winwaed.[91] Richard Abels offers a reappraisal of the Anglo-Saxon policy of paying off Viking raiders. Firstly, tribute benefited the giver since it was less costly than plunder and less risky than battle. Secondly, Abels attempts to justify Æthelred of England's tributes to the Vikings, which famously did not stop attacks. He claims the Anglo-Saxons failed to appreciate that Scandinavian culture viewed those who paid tribute as weak and shameful. This created contempt for the payer, encouraging more Viking raids.[92] Tribute in itself was not bad then. Rather, giving it to this group specifically was erroneous.

There are some problems with this interpretation. In the case of Oswiu, the Northumbrian defeated and killed Penda not long after the tribute offer.[93] His eventual military success against the pagan king shielded Oswiu from any criticism of his tribute proposal. Abels is right to acknowledge that tribute had benefits, but this does not cancel out the negative feelings it evoked, and their consequences. Whilst Abels equates these feelings with Viking culture, comparisons suggest they were cross-cultural. As well as the rage against the Welsh paying tribute in *Armes*, similar emotions are evident in *The Battle of Maldon* poem. Before the battle between Ealdorman Byrhtnoth's retinue and a Viking army, a messenger from the Vikings told the English 'In return for gold we are ready to make a truce with you.' Byrhtnoth responded angrily: 'For tribute we will give you spears poisoned point and ancient sword.'[94] As Breeze notes, the response echoes *Armes*, suggesting that paying tribute was wrong, and instead the potential payer should reject the demand and fight.[95] The ninth-century *Annals of Fulda* displays similar attitudes on the continent.[96] The source bemoans the Frankish Emperor Charles III's response to Viking attacks in 882: 'What was still more of a crime, he did not blush to pay tribute to a man from whom he ought to have taken hostages and exacted tribute.' In total, he gave the Vikings 2,412lbs of gold and silver to leave his realm.[97] Together these accounts confirm *Armes*' assertion that giving tribute was viewed negatively. The Welsh rulers that offered tribute to Æthelstan enacted an unpopular policy, weakening their own position whilst Æthelstan strengthened his. The composition of *Armes* itself testifies to how much the Welsh disliked their rulers' actions.

No sources explain how Æthelstan's demands were met, though comparative evidence suggests that Welsh subjects would have contributed in some form. Charles III raised his payment by taking it from both churches and his soldiers.[98] A charter from 872 records Bishop Wærferth of Worcester leasing out land for 20 *mancuses* of gold, in order to pay his contribution to a tribute a

[91] Bede, p. 150; Ryan Lavelle, 'Towards a Political Contextualization of Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in Anglo-Saxon England', in *Peace and Negotiations: Strategies for Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Diane Wolfthal (Turnout, 2000), p. 47.
[92] Richard Abels, 'Paying the Danegeld: Anglo-Saxon Peacemaking with Vikings', *WPAMH*, pp. 182-83.
[93] Bede, p. 150
[94] '*The Battle of Maldon*', *EHD I*, pp. 293-94, quotes on p. 294.
[95] Andrew Breeze, 'Sorrowful Tribute', pp. 11, 13-14.
[96] Timothy Reuter, 'Introduction', in his version of *The Annals of Fulda* (Manchester, 1992), pp. 4-5, 8-9.
[97] *The Annals of Fulda*, ed. and trans. Timothy Reuter (Manchester, 1992), p. 93; *Annales Fuldenses*, ed. Georg Heinrich Pertz, MGH SS rer. Germ 7, (Hannover, 1891), p. 99, '*Et quod maioris est criminis, a quo obsides accipere et tributa exigere debuit* […] *tributa solver non erubuit*'.
[98] *Fulda*, Reuter, p. 93.

Viking army levied on the Mercians.[99] If the burden similarly fell on the Welsh kings' followers in 927, then it would easily explain their disgruntlement.

The domestic impact of tribute made it an unstable peacemaking practice. Its unpopularity pressured the tribute-giving ruler to abandon the policy, and instead fight the tribute-taking king. *Armes*' bombastic call to massacre Æthelstan's tribute collectors and a subsequent grand alliance against the English is the epitome of this. Likewise, the tribute taking ruler would continue to need wealth that could be provided to followers in return for loyalty, leading to more tribute demands.[100] William of Malmesbury called Æthelstan's demand an 'annual tax', meaning the tribute had to be repeated yearly. Each payment meant more discontent in the giver's kingdom, increasing the likelihood that the payments would cease. The erstwhile tribute receiver would then be motivated to use their overriding power to acquire the wealth by force, in the form of plunder. Moreover, in contrast to David I of Scotland's cup, which spent years at the Scottish court reminding him of what he owed Henry I, Æthelstan's tribute would have been given out to his followers. Thus, it would have impacted his thinking far less. Whilst tribute could avert war, it created a tenuous peace that encouraged its own demise.

Analysis of Æthelstan's 927 tribute provides key insight into the practice of tribute taking. Like gift giving, the practice is hierarchical, but with the wealth receiver now the superior party. In fact, taking tribute was akin to a military victory, further asserting its hierarchical nature. Tribute had domestic significance, demonstrating victory and helping the ruler in loyalty in the receiving kingdom, whilst fermenting discontent in the polity that provided the tribute. The domestic consequences of tribute came together to ensure any peace established by have a degree of insecurity.

These conclusions interact with what we have already learnt about the Anglo-Welsh relationship in this period. Both evidence of tribute taking and diplomatic meeting places point to a hierarchical relationship built around English dominance. Tribute payments were another component of the Welsh rulers' strategy of pre-emptive submission. Although these payments symbolised their subordination to Æthelstan whilst improving his position, they also discouraged him from invading Wales. Adherence to this policy is powerfully symbolised by the fact that despite its unpopularity, Welsh rulers did not join the alliance that fought Æthelstan at *Brunanburh*. The frequent visits by Welsh rulers to England may have been attempts to counterbalance the weakness of a peace built on tribute payments. Numerous visible displays of submission at Æthelstan's court were reciprocated through clear recognition of their status, albeit an inferior status than Æthelstan's. However, those visits also speak to the underlying instability of the Anglo-Welsh relationship in this period. Like how they had to keep paying tribute, Welsh rulers seemingly had to keep visiting Æthelstan to ensure their relationship with him persisted.

[99] *ES* 1278; '*Lease by Wærferth, bishop of Worcester, of Nuthurst, Warwickshire, in order to obtain money to pay tribute to the Danes*', *EHD I*, p. 490.
[100] Althoff, *Family*, p. 116; Reuter, 'Plunder', pp. 84, 92-93.

4. Tributes and Gifts in Anglo-Welsh Diplomacy: After Æthelstan

Towards the end of the Anglo-Saxon period tribute demands were part of King Edward the Confessor's relationship with the Welsh rulers Bleddyn ap Cynfyn of Gwynedd and Rhiwallon ap Cynfyn of Powys. As touched on, by the mid-1050s Gruffydd ap Llywelyn had consolidated his power over all of Wales, allowing him to increasingly influence English affairs. As well as the attack he led on Hereford with Earl Ælfgar (1055), he repelled an English invasion force (1056) and campaigned against the English kingdom with Ælfgar for a second time (1058).[101] Of course, the English establishment acknowledged his growth in power and their relative lack of influence over him at the Billingsley summit in 1055, sharply contrasting Anglo-Welsh relations during the rest of my period.[102] Gruffydd's influence came to an end in 1063, when Tostig and Harold successfully invaded Wales. Faced with this English force, Gruffydd's followers turned on him and killed him. In the aftermath, the *ASC* says, 'And King Edward entrusted that country to his [Gruffydd's] two brothers Bleddyn and Rhiwallon, and they swore oaths and gave hostages to the king and that Earl Harold, promising that they would be in all things faithful, make ready everywhere on water and on land, and likewise *pay such dues* from that country such as men did before to other kings.'[103]

Based on my earlier conclusions, paying tribute to Edward and the English indicated Bleddyn and Rhiwallon's weakness and submission. The context around the tribute supports this. Gruffydd was not only defeated, but his realm was split between multiple kings. As well as Powys and Gwynedd being divided, former dynasties returned to the thrones of Deheubarth, Morgannwg, and Gwynllwg.[104] The peace agreement with Edward and Harold required Bleddyn and Rhiwallon to swear oaths of obedience to the English. Contextually, the *dues* the Welsh paid were part of a policy of English domination, akin to Æthelstan's Anglo-Welsh relationship.

Where Edward's and Æthelstan's approaches differ is in the use of hostages, a subject touched on previously. The matter of hostages can shed light on the role of tribute, particularly as both were often taken simultaneously. The *Annals of Fulda* derided Charles III for not taking hostages *and* tribute from the Vikings, whilst Llywelyn the Great gave King John hostages as well as cattle in 1211.[105] Consequently, historians have noted the recurrent interaction between these practices, though without extensive discussion.[106]

Firstly, the relationship between the offering of hostages and the giving of tribute confirms the latter's connection to subordination. As mentioned, hostages were frequently demanded from defeated and submitting parties. Following his victory at the Battle of Hastings in 1066, William the Conqueror took an oath of obedience and hostages from the surviving Anglo-Saxon nobility.[107] King

[101] *ASC C*, 1055-56; *D* 1058.
[102] See pp. 31-32.
[103] *ASC D*, 1065.
[104] Lloyd, *Wales*, 2, p. 372.
[105] *Fulda*, Reuter, p. 93; *Brut*, p. 193.
[106] *PMA*, pp. 158-59; Kosto, *Hostages*, p. 70.
[107] *ASC D*, 1066.

William the Lion of Scotland was captured by forces loyal to Henry II of England during his invasion of northern England in 1174. The subsequent peace treaty, the *Treaty of Falaise*, states 'King William of Scots has become the liegeman of the Lord King [Henry II] against all men', and delivered hostages for the agreement.[108] Principally, these hostages guaranteed the submission agreement, preventing the giver from going back on it without risking the hostage's safety.[109] Hostage taking did have its flaws. With reference to the Saxons, who gave hostages to Charlemagne as part of submission agreements in the late eighth century, Adam Kosto notes that groups often broke these agreements. Yet, dominant rulers continued to demand them. Kosto suggests this was because hostages symbolised control, even if they did not always enforce it. Thus, rulers like Charlemagne demanded them from foreign realms to demonstrate their own influence.[110] The symbolism of hostages is apparent in English sources too.[111] Asser celebrates the Viking's submission to Alfred by declaring 'they asked for peace on this condition, that the king receive however many hostages he wanted from them and he gave none to them. Nevertheless, in that way they had agreed peace as they had never agreed with anyone before.'[112] By contrast, King Ceolwulf of Mercia, who gave hostages to the Vikings to guarantee his obedience, is called 'a certain foolish king's thegn.'[113] Giving and taking hostages simply became shorthand for defeat and victory. That Edward took hostages then, further confirms that the tribute was symbolic of English dominance over Bleddyn and Rhiwallon.

Secondly, hostages encouraged the payment of tribute. Even if they did not always succeed, medieval people evidently saw hostages as guaranteeing promises. When Asser says the Vikings placed Ceolwulf in charge of Mercia on the terms 'that on whatever day they wanted to have it again, he would peacefully give it over to them. He gave hostages on this agreement and vowed […] obedience in all things', there is no ambiguity over the hostages' purpose.[114] Edward's hostage demand was a practical response to the negative connotations of paying tribute. In theory, Bleddyn and Rhiwallon would be less inclined to default on their payments, as this would risk reprisal against their hostages.

The 1063 tribute also differs from the 927 example with its timing. Whereas the Welsh gave Æthelstan tribute to prevent war, Bleddyn and Rhiwallon gave theirs in the *postbellum* period. That this tribute literally followed an armed conflicted further asserts the practice's connection to military victory and extreme dominance. But there is another way that recent hostilities influenced the imposition of the tribute. In response to Gruffydd's military successes, English sources express vulnerability. The *ASC* provides a pretty bleak summary of the English losses suffered during their

[108] '*Treaty "of Falaise"*', *ASR*, pp. 1, 3-4, '*Willelmus rex Scotorum devenit homo ligius domini regis contra omnem*'.
[109] Kosto, *Hostages*, pp. 24-25, 78.
[110] *RFA*, pp. 48-49, 51, 53, 55-56, 58, 73-76; Kosto, *Hostages*, pp. 53-55.
[111] Ryan Lavelle, 'The Use and Abuse of Hostages in Later Anglo-Saxon England', *EME*, 14 (2006), pp. 269-70.
[112] Asser, p. 46, '*Pacem ea condicione petierunt, ut rex nominatos obsides, quantos vellet, ab eis acciperet, et ille nullum eis daret, ita tamen qualiter nunquam cum aliquot pace ante pepigerant*'.
[113] Ibid, p. 35, '*Cuidam insipienti ministro (regis)*'.
[114] Ibid, p. 35, '*Ut qualicunque die illus vellent habere iterum, pacifice illis assignaret. Quibus eadem condicione obsides dedit et iuravit* […] *oboediens in omnibus*'.

campaign against Gruffydd in 1056: 'it is hard to describe the oppression and all the expedition and campaigning and the labours and the loss of men and horse that all the army of England suffered.'[115] Meanwhile, a poem in *The Life of King Edward* indicates that Gruffydd was perceived as a major threat:

A people crafted in Caucasian rock,

too untamed and strong with Gruffydd ruling,

not content anymore with western lands?

But he bore a war of evil beyond the Severn,

and the English kingdom suffered his assault.[116]

The 1063 tribute was not just about expressing English dominance and securing wealth. Having spent years feeling vulnerable to the expanded influence of Gruffydd and the Welsh, taking tribute was a way for the English to redefine their position. Whilst the earlier Billingsley summit had recognised the growth of Welsh power, the tribute re-established a hierarchical Anglo-Welsh relationship more akin to the situation during Æthelstan's reign. The *ASC*'s author was seemingly aware that the tribute mirrored earlier English foreign policies, stating that the Welsh would 'likewise pay such dues from that country such as men did *before to other kings*.'[117] Consequently, Bleddyn and Rhiwallon's tribute assured Edward's subjects that the Welsh threat was over, and the old policy of English dominance and Welsh submission was back. As with meeting places, the evidence of tributes points to Gruffydd's reign being an unusual and significant period for Anglo-Welsh relations.

The Anglo-Norman monarchs also extracted tribute payments from the Welsh. *Domesday Book* states "Rhys of Wales" paid William the Conqueror forty pounds.[118] As discussed in the preceding chapter, due to the *Brut*'s claim that William the Conqueror visited St. Davids in 1081 and the *ASC*'s statement that he led an army into Wales that year, this payment is generally attached to Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth.[119] When combined, these extracts suggest an example closer to the tribute paid to Edward the Confessor, than the one given to Æthelstan. Rather than a pre-emptive tribute, Rhys only paid William after a demand was enforced by military means. Akin to Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, Rhys must have somehow incited this English invasion. Although indicative of Rhys' weakness in relation to William, the tribute did establish peace between them. William never returned,

[115] *ASC C*, 1056.
[116] *LKE*, pp. 86-87, '*Gentem Caucaseis rupibus ingenitam, indomitam fortemque nimis regnante Griphino, nec iam contentam finibus occiduis? Vltra sed sceleris cursum tulit arma Syuerne, uimque eius regnum pertulit Angligenum*'.
[117] *ASC D*, 1063.
[118] *DB*, fol. 179.
[119] *Brut*, p. 31; *ASC E*, 1081.

nor did any other Anglo-Norman magnates trouble Rhys during the rest of William's reign.[120] Seemingly happy with the wealth he received from Rhys and submission it expressed, Robert S. Badcock argues that William respected Rhys's territorial integrity.[121] Although the tribute was initially forced from Rhys and clearly hierarchical, it did discourage another war.

Broadly, the tribute demands Henry I imposed on Cadwgan ap Bleddyn of Powys, Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd and the rulers of Powys under Maredudd ap Bleddyn's leadership in 1109, 1114 and 1121 respectively, all followed the same pattern. These three Welsh rulers were in militarily weak positions. As discussed in Chapter One, Henry led invasions of Wales prior to meeting with his Welsh opposite numbers in 1114 and 1121, and subsequently demanding tribute.[122] Gruffudd's position was particularly exposed, since by the time he met with Henry his own ally, Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys, had already abandoned him and made peace with the king of England. In 1109, Cadwgan was suffering from attacks due to the actions of Owain, his son. Owain had rebelled against Norman influence, having previously abducted Nest, wife of Gerald of Windsor, castellan of Pembroke. The Normans retaliated by ordering native Welsh magnates to expel both Owain and his father.[123] In response, Cadwgan travelled to the English court. Next, the *Brut* says 'Cadwgan had made peace with the king, he obtained his territory, that is Ceredigion, after it had been redeemed from the king for a hundred pounds.'[124] Contextually, these three were all in vulnerable positions in relation to the king of England, a fact that is further confirmed by the hostages Maredudd handed over in 1121.[125] Consequently, like Rhys ap Tewdwr before them, they resorted to paying tribute to Henry I, effectively plundering themselves in order to bring to a close the campaigns against them, whilst also underlining their own inferiority.

What makes Gruffudd ap Cynan's tribute agreement in 1114 significant is what happened next. As we know, Rhys ap Tewdwr's son, Gruffydd ap Rhys, was accused of a crime by Henry I's court in 1115.[126] 'When Gruffydd heard those tidings', the *Brut* says, 'he planned to go to Gruffudd ap Cynan to seek to protect his life along with him.' Having received messages, Gruffudd ap Cynan promised to harbour Gruffydd ap Rhys.[127] The peace the tribute had created was clearly not strong, as Gruffudd ap Cynan almost immediately went against Henry's interests and harboured an opponent of his. The probable explanation for this is the negative feelings associated with giving tribute. *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* makes no reference to the tribute payment in its account of Henry's invasion.[128] Seemingly his sons, the text's patrons, felt the tribute was not something to shout about, but rather something to be ignored in the interest of celebrating the former king. Gruffudd likely faced criticism similar to *Armes*, motivating him to harbour one of Henry's opponents, effectively challenging

[120] *Brut*, p. 31.
[121] Robert S. Badcock, 'Rhys ap Tewdwr, King of Deheubarth', *ANS*, 16, pp. 26-27.
[122] *Brut*, pp. 79-83, 108-09; *AC*, p. 15.
[123] Ibid, pp. 57-65.
[124] Ibid, p. 63.
[125] WM, pp. 728-29.
[126] See p. 43.
[127] *Brut*, pp. 81-83, quote on p. 83.
[128] Paul Russell, 'Introduction', *LGC*, pp. 46-47; *LGC*, pp. 86-87.

the tribute payment and the peace it established. On this occasion the tribute payment was not simply unpopular, but self-defeating in regards to ensuring peace.

Henry then changed tack. As discussed in Chapter One, he summoned Gruffudd ap Cynan to court and 'promised him much if he undertook to capture Gruffydd ap Rhys […] and if he could not capture him to kill him.'[129] We do not know what was promised. Further, Gruffydd ap Rhys managed to evade Gruffudd ap Cynan's clutches, raising questions about whether Henry actually rewarded him. Regardless, following Gruffudd ap Cynan's dissidence, Henry abandoned his failed strategy of imposing peace through tribute, and instead tried to establish a gift giving relationship, or something akin to it: whether Gruffudd was offered gift items, land, or perhaps a knighthood, he was now being offered benefits in return for helping Henry. Crucially, Gruffudd's relationship with Henry subsequently improved. When Henry moved an army against Powys in 1121. Maredudd ap Bleddyn and other rulers of Powys asked for Gruffudd's help, but the *Brut* says 'He, keeping peace with the king, said that, if they fled to the bounds of his territory, he would have them despoiled and plundered and that he would oppose them.'[130] This suggests that Gruffudd was given a reward for his earlier efforts, and consequently paid it back by maintaining peace with Henry, and supporting this English invasion. If Gruffudd did receive gift items, as opposed to another form of reward, this interaction would again speak to gift giving's permanence. In stark contrast to the tribute Henry previously demanded, the gifts he possibly gave secured Gruffudd's support for an extended period of time. Relations could be fluid, changing not just following a king's death or after the Norman Conquest, but within a single ruler's reign.

When all the examples of tribute are considered, much like meeting places they reveal periods of English dominance over the Welsh, both before and after 1066. However, our understanding should be more nuanced than this. From a Welsh perspective, acts of submission, in particular the payment of tribute, were about stopping or preventing English invasions, the risks of which were huge. Harold and Tostig's attack in 1063 precipitated Gruffydd ap Llywelyn's death at the hands of his own men, who then sent his decapitated head on to the English.[131] His realm was quickly broken up and handed over to new rulers. By paying tribute, figures like Rhys ap Tewdwr avoided the same fate. They remained alive and in power, and could then seek opportunities to improve their position, as Gruffudd ap Cynan did.

Though English superiority was common, examples of tribute illustrate that Anglo-Welsh relations were not static. Most starkly, the 1063 tribute was a counter attack against the recent development of a more equal Anglo-Welsh relationship, which attempted to redefine the connection as more akin to the situation during Æthelstan's reign. Henry I altered his interactions with Gruffudd ap Cynan, after his earlier approach led to an ongoing hostile relationship.

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[129] *Brut*, p. 85.
[130] Ibid, p. 105; see David Moore, 'Gruffudd ap Cynan and the Medieval Welsh Polity', in *Gruffudd ap Cynan: A Collaborative Biography*, ed. K. L. Maund (Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 3, 33, 39-44.
[131] *ASC D*, 1063.

Whilst other shifts in the relationship occurred, a change in how English dominance was expressed either side of the conquest is again evident. The Anglo-Saxon kings levied tribute on multiple native Welsh realms at once. William of Malmesbury says that Æthelstan took tribute from the 'north Welsh Kings' in 927, meaning the Welsh of Wales as opposed to the Cornish, whilst the *Brenhinedd* says 'all the kings of Wales' paid tribute.[132] *Armes* clearly saw the payment as a pan-Welsh issue which all Welshmen should oppose.[133] The fact that five different Welsh rulers attended his courts, often at the same time, proves that Æthelstan wanted to exert influence over multiple Welsh realms at once.[134] Jumping forward to Edward the Confessor's reign, he took tribute from both Powys and Gwynedd simultaneously.[135]

Conversely, the Anglo-Norman kings often demanded tribute from one Welsh realm or ruler at a time. Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth was the only native Welsh leader that paid William the Conqueror tribute in 1081. Likewise, it was only Cadwgan ap Bleddyn, Gruffudd ap Cynan and the Powysians under Maredudd ap Bleddyn's leadership, who paid tribute to Henry I in 1109, 1114, and 1121 respectively. There was seemingly no attempt to demand payment from multiple native kingdoms at once. The examples of gift giving follow a similar pattern. Returning to 1102 and Robert of Bellême's rebellion, the brothers Cadwgan, Iorwerth, and Maredudd ap Bleddyn of Powys all supported the rebellious magnate.[136] Henry responded by giving gifts to Iorwerth alone. Here, he was not simply dealing with realms on an individual level, but established a distinct relationship with a single member of a kingdom's royal family. Also, in 1114, rather than taking tribute from Gruffudd and his ally Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys, Henry promised the latter rewards, such as a knighthood, an offer we might view as creating another "gift giving-like" Anglo-Welsh relationship: built on the king of England offering benefits, not taking tribute.[137]

This policy of treating individual Welsh rulers and realms differently may have been part of a divide and rule strategy, designed to undermine opposition by encouraging Welsh magnates to turn against and abandon one another.[138] Henry's behaviour in 1114 best demonstrates this policy and its desired outcomes. The *Brut* spells out that taking tribute from Gruffudd ap Cynan, whilst taking Owain ap Cadwgan to Normandy and offering him rewards, led to Henry possessing different types of relationship with each Welsh ruler. Owain was told he could win Henry's 'friendship' by negotiating, whilst Henry 'received him [Owain] gladly with great love and honour.' Conversely, emotional language is absent from the description of Gruffudd and Henry's meeting.[139] The *Brut* suggests that Henry's intention was to sow division between the belligerent Welsh rulers, claiming he assured

[132] *Brenhinedd*, pp. 28-29; WM, pp. 216-217.
[133] *Armes*, pp. 28-29.
[134] *ES* 400; Appendix 2, no. 4-10, 12-14.
[135] *ASC D*, 1063.
[136] *Brut*, p. 43; OV, 6, pp. 24-25.
[137] *Brut*, pp. 79-83.
[138] R. R. Davies, 'Henry I and Wales', in *Studies in Medieval History: Presented to R. H. C. Davies*, ed. Robert Ian Moore and Henry Mayr-Harting (London, 1985), p. 139 for Henry I's exploitation of fissions.
[139] *Brut*, p. 81.

Owain that, due to the rewards he would receive, 'every one of thy kin shall be envious of thee.'[140] If so, the strategy worked. When Gruffudd moved against Henry the following year, he did so without his erstwhile ally's support. Owain ap Cadwgan stayed clear, and is next heard of in 1116, campaigning against Gruffydd ap Rhys on Henry's behalf.[141] Not only did the different peace agreements likely encourage envy, as the *Brut* suggests, they also provoked different responses and attitudes. Whilst paying tribute made Gruffudd ap Cynan resent Henry, Owain had no such opposition, with the rewards he received seemingly keeping him loyal. Therefore, lacking a common relationship to Henry, the pair were less inclined to resurrect their alliance against him.

Anglo-Norman kings broke up, or pre-empted the formation of, other Welsh alliances too. As discussed, all three brothers and leaders of Powys initially supported Robert of Bellême in 1102, but Henry only courted Iorwerth ap Bleddyn with gifts. Thus, Iorwerth alone became aligned with Henry, causing him to abandon his alliance with Robert and turn on his own brother, Maredudd.[142] Although, Henry's behaviour in 1102 and 1114 are the best documented examples of this divide and rule strategy, it may help explain the general Anglo-Norman approach to gifts and tribute in Anglo-Welsh diplomacy. Taking tribute from, or giving gifts to, one Welsh ruler or realm at a time meant that they had a different relationship with the English king than their Welsh peers. As shown above, different relationships led to jealously and diverging interests, encouraging intra-Welsh division at the expense of mutual cooperation.

On the other hand, by taking tribute from all the Welsh kings, Æthelstan precipitated a desire for a general uprising. Arguably, it was even worse, since *Armes* suggests the Welsh were looking for help from Æthelstan's other opponents, such as the Scots. Though this came to nought, the same cannot be said for Edward's tribute. Demanding tribute from both Bleddyn of Gwynedd and Rhiwallon of Powys effectively equalised their relationship with the English kingdom. Since they already had a *positive* relationship, as brothers, this would only further encourage a potential alliance. In 1067 this came to pass. John of Worcester reports that Bleddyn and Rhiwallon joined a rebellion against William the Conqueror, led by a west midland noble called Eadric the Wild.[143] Clearly there was no division between the Welsh rulers that could have undermined their relationship, as Anglo-Norman diplomacy aimed to create. Of course, Edward was no longer king in 1067. There is some indication that the policy came back to bite him during his own reign though. The Northumbrians rebelled in 1065, demanding the appointment of Morcar, the earl of Mercia's brother, as their earl. According to the *ASC* 'his brother Edwin [earl of Mercia] came to meet him with the men that were in his earldom, and also many Welsh came with him.'[144] Due to their preceding and proceeding connections to England, it is likely these Welsh were Bleddyn and Rhiwallon, as Stephen Baxter proposes.[145]

[140] Ibid, p. 81
[141] Ibid, p. 97.
[142] Ibid, p. 47; *AC*, p. 12.
[143] JW, 3, pp. 5-6.
[144] *ASC D*, 1065.
[145] Stephen Baxter, *The Earls of Mercia* (Oxford, 2007), p. 286.

Different ideologies and political realities precipitated alternative approaches. Tenth-century Anglo-Saxon kings presented themselves as rulers of Britain. The notion that Britain was a single unit went back to at least the eighth century, with Bede regarding it as a distinct and separate island, inhabited by four different peoples.[146] King Æthelbald of Mercia similarly referred to himself as 'King of Britain' in a charter from 736.[147] As for the tenth century, Sarah Foot argues Æthelstan 'laid stake to the hegemony over the entire island and all the lesser kings and princes therein.'[148] I previously highlighted Æthelstan and his successors' depiction of themselves as emperors of Britain.[149] King Edgar, for instance, titled himself 'Edgar, king by divine pleasure of all Britain', and leant into the British characterisation with his burial at Glastonbury, a site connected with Celtic saints, such as Gildas, Patrick, David and Aidan.[150] The Anglo-Saxon kings clearly embraced a British identity and kingship. Æthelstan's tribute policy performed this ideology. Taking wealth from as many different Welsh rulers as possible proved he truly was ruling over Britain and its lesser kings. Summoning multiple Welsh rulers to court at the same time had a similar effect.

There is debate over when the English belief in a British identity and political unit ended. Georges Molyneaux argues for an early endpoint, suggesting it began to die out at the end of the tenth century. Administrative structures became much stronger within England. Edgar's coinage reforms and the taxes Æthelred raised to pay the extortionate tribute demands made by Viking armies indicate a complex and bureaucratic polity.[151] The power English kings exercised over other kings in Britain looked comparatively weak, undermining the idea that Britain was a single unit. This caused English kings to stop presenting themselves as kings of all Britain.[152] Alternatively, John Gillingham argues for a twelfth-century split between the English and British identities. He believes the English developed a civilising narrative, which saw their neighbours as uncivilised barbarians. This was caused by economic and cultural differences between the groups, as well as the Norman Conquest. A belief in Celtic *otherness* became central to uniting the Anglo-Saxons and Normans together into a single English people.[153]

Regardless, during Æthelstan's reign there was a concept of a British polity, motivating his diplomatic behaviour, which declined over the following years. This perhaps explains why later kings, like Henry I, did not take tribute from multiple Welsh rulers at one time. If we take Molyneaux's earlier

[146] Bede, p. 10.
[147] *ES* 89.
[148] Foot, *Æthelstan*, pp. 212-16, quote at p. 215; *ES* 416.
[149] See pp. 44-45; *ES* 416; Elina Screen, *Sylloge of coins of the British Isles 65: Norwegian Collection part 1: Anglo-Saxon Coins to 1016* (Oxford, 2003), p. 72, plate 3.
[150] JW, 2, pp. 424-25; *ES* 773, '*Eadgar divina collubescente gratia totius Albionis rex*'; John Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National Identity, and Political Values* (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 9-10.
[151] James Campbell, 'The United Kingdom of England: The Anglo-Saxon Achievement', in *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History*, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (London, 1995), pp. 31-47.
[152] George Molyneaux, 'Why Were Some Tenth-Century English Kings Presented as Rulers of Britain', *TRHS*, 21 (2011), pp. 59-91, particularly pp, 80-91.
[153] John Gillingham, 'Foundations of a Disunited Kingdom', in *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History*, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (London, 1995), pp. 52-56, 59-64; Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 4-5, 8, 12-18.

date, this explanation does not clarify the tribute taken from both Powys and Gwynedd in Edward the Confessor's reign. However, the *ASC* suggests this tribute was the same 'as men did before to other kings', evoking past Anglo-Welsh relationships like Æthelstan's.[154] Likely, the same kingship ideology and the idea of a single British king was also being emphasised. Perhaps Molyneaux's interpretation exaggerates how quickly this concept died out.

Furthermore, the shift reflected new circumstances. As discussed regarding meeting places, Anglo-Norman kings of England frequently travelled abroad to defend their continental land, reducing their ability to respond to Welsh opposition.[155] It made sense then to only levy tribute and give gifts to one Welsh ruler at a time, since this prevented alliances between multiple rulers and even turned them against one another. Conversely, Æthelstan could take tribute from multiple Welsh rulers safe in the knowledge that if they revolted, he would be in southern England, ready to oppose them.

5. The Anglo-Scottish Tribute, 934

There is one recorded Scottish tribute payment to the English king in this period. Following Æthelstan's invasion of Scotland in 934, John of Worcester alone says 'Whence, having been compelled by force, King Constantine gave his son as hostage with worthy gifts to him [Æthelstan], and peace having been restored, the king returned to Wessex.'[156] The first question is whether Constantine II of Scotland did actually offer Æthelstan tribute. John did not list what items Constantine handed to Æthelstan, nor did he even call this wealth transfer a tribute, instead using the term *munus*, which can mean gift. Other factors though make it clear that the items given were a form of tribute. 'Compelled (*Compulsus*)' makes the event sound like a submission, as does the context. The tribute was paid following a clear military defeat in return for the invading force leaving and re-establishing peace. Giving his son as a hostage further confirms Constantine's inferiority. Finally, the year after Constantine attended the English court at Cirencester.[157] We know from William of Malmesbury and *Armes* that the Welsh rulers who attended were paying tribute to Æthelstan. It makes sense that Constantine was doing the same, and *munus* can be added to the list of terms used to describe tributes.

Constantine's tribute is a fascinating example that not only helps understand the peculiarities of the Anglo-Scottish relationship during his reign, but also the relationship in general. Most broadly, as the only Anglo-Scottish tribute, this event suggests that the Scots were far more powerful *vis-à-vis* the English than their Welsh counterparts, who paid it more frequently. Further, it points to 934 being the height of English power over the Scots. Whilst other rulers, such as William the Conqueror and Cnut invaded Scotland and took submissions, none of them enforced tribute payments like Æthelstan.

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[154] *ASC D*, 1063.
[155] See pp. 49-50.
[156] JW, 2, pp. 388-89, '*Vnde ui compulsus rex constantinus filium suum obsidem cum dignis muneribus illi dedit, paceque redintegrata, rex in wessaxoniam rediit*'.
[157] *ES* 1792.

Henry I could only dominate the Scots through giving wealth rather than taking it. As discussed, having dispatched internal opponents Æthelstan was at the peak of his power in 934, and capable of creating a hierarchical Anglo-Scottish relationship that could not be matched by any of his successors.[158] This is additional evidence that diplomacy in this period cannot simply be categorised as pre- and post-Conquest, with other distinct periods existing.

Nevertheless, despite his apparent superiority, Æthelstan's diplomacy did not successfully establish long-term peace. Unlike the Welsh, Constantine did fight Æthelstan at the Battle of *Brunanburh*, allied with Olaf Guthfrithson, son of the ruler of independent Northumbria that Æthelstan displaced in 927.[159] There is no Scottish *Armes* to explain the Scottish response to the tribute payment, but given what we have learnt from comparative sources, they likely opposed it. This pushed Constantine into aligning with another group that opposed Æthelstan in order to jointly fight against his dominance. The greater power of the Scots evidently meant Æthelstan could not expect the same outcome as his Welsh tribute policy. Taking tribute can look like a great move: it established a hierarchical relationship, whilst supplying the king and his followers with material gain at another ruler's expense. Alternatively, gift giving involves giving up material in return for a submission and support. Nonetheless, Æthelstan got just three years before he fought the Scots again, whilst Henry I's gift earnt him David I's support for the rest of his own reign and beyond. The sustainability of the relationship that emerged from the latter approach suggests it was more applicable to Anglo-Scottish relations.

6. Conclusion

The giving, taking and receiving of objects were key aspects of diplomacy in this period. Analysis of such exchanges informs us about the nature of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, including how they differed from one another and how they changed over time. As with meeting places, I used examples of diplomacy within Britain, as well as comparisons and existing historiographical work to determine the significance of gifts and tributes. With reference to Henry I's gift of a cup to David I, I utilised and correlated Marcel Mauss' approach to gift giving. The gift created a hierarchical relationship, which obligated David to return it in some form whilst recognising his rule. Influenced by scholars such as Cutler, I went beyond Mauss, to consider the item given and its time at the Scottish court after David received it. These factors emphasised the obligation David owed and the permanence of their relationship.

Conclusions about gift giving are crucial to understanding how the practice differed from tribute taking. Utilising the tribute Æthelstan took from the Welsh, I explored the general significance of this practice, rectifying a historiographical absence. The wealth receiver is the dominant party in the relationship, equivalent to a military victor, and possessing such authority that they can overturn the gift giving model. Further, the practice had domestic importance, with the taker earning his subjects'

[158] See p. 50.
[159] *ASC C,* 937.

loyalty by redistributing the wealth, whereas the giver's subjects would pressure him into opposing the payment due to its unpopularity. These conflicting considerations made tribute an unstable peacemaking practice, lacking gift giving's permanence.

Overall, this chapter has revealed multiple instances of English supremacy over the Scots and the Welsh. However, this does not mean the inferior parties did not benefit from gifts and tributes. Gifts meant recognition, and tribute paying, though not positive, did stop you ending up like Gruffydd ap Llywelyn. Further, these examples of dominance also reveal variations. Corresponding with the previous chapter, the more numerous examples of tribute taking in the Anglo-Welsh relationship than in the Anglo-Scottish one suggests the English had more power over the Welsh than the Scots. When Henry I sought to dominate the Scots, he could only do so via gift giving, not tribute taking. Again, there is a distinction between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman diplomacy. The Anglo-Normans used gifts and tributes to divide the Welsh rulers, whereas the Anglo-Saxon tribute policy pushed them into alignment. The later rulers were motivated to sow division, as their frequent trips abroad meant their power over their British neighbours was weaker. This was not a problem for Anglo-Saxon kings, whose mass tribute taking helped depict them as the supreme rulers of Britain. This post-Conquest shift was not the only change that occurred though. We see further evidence of the post-Malcolm III transformation in Anglo-Scottish relations. Instead of challenging Henry's supremacy, the cup incident shows David accepting his inferiority and obligation to the king of England in return for other benefits. The object exchanges during Edward the Confessor and Henry I's reigns also illustrate evolution in Anglo-Welsh relations, with Gruffydd ap Llywelyn's reign once more coming across as a period of Welsh rejection of English control. Likewise, Æthelstan's ability to take tribute from the Scots, the only English king to do, suggests he was a particularly powerful ruler.

These conclusions, both about the practices of gift giving and tribute taking, and Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations will be redeployed in later chapters to understand other diplomatic practices, such as marriages and the treatment of exiles.

Chapter 3: Diplomatic Marriages

1. Introduction

In his interdisciplinary study, *After Lavinia: A Literary History of Premodern Marriage Diplomacy*, John Watkins contests that historians 'rarely comment on the practice of marriage diplomacy, which they treat as a perennial feature of the political experience.'[1] Whilst they engage with examples of medieval diplomatic marriages, historians rarely conceptualise clear theories and schools of thought around the practice itself. Marriage diplomacy is only considered in relation to specific case studies, or integrated into wider discussions about queenship.[2]

This absence is not universal. Alongside Watkins' work, Lindsay Diggelmann has produced two insightful studies: 'Marriage, peace and enmity in the twelfth century' and the earlier article 'Marriage as tactical response: Henry II and the royal wedding of 1160'.[3] Taken together these essays establish two overlapping categories of diplomatic marriage. The first is 'peaceful' marriages, used as tools for ensuring peace and improving relations between the two parties directly involved. As Diggelmann states in his later article, marriage could operate as 'a standard and widely accepted method of premodern peacemaking'.[4] These peaceful marriages build on an idea mentioned in 'Marriage as tactical response'. Diggelmann states that some marriages are strategic, meaning they are part of 'a deliberate plan, often lengthy in preparation and negotiation, which produced a definite and predictable advantage for both parties to the marital alliance'.[5] A guarantee of peace between the bride and groom's families can certainly be considered a definite advantage for both. Alternatively, Diggelmann identifies 'inimical' marriages that were chiefly designed to undermine third parties. His first article introduced the idea that marriages could be obstructive or confrontational in nature. He subsequently expanded this idea in 'Marriage, peace and enmity', employing more examples to argue that 'a union between the children of two powerful ruling families could serve as a deliberate snub, insult, or provocation to a third party.'[6] Thus, whilst peaceful marriages primarily establish peace, inimical marriages are confrontational, targeted at rivals outside the immediate agreement.

[1] Watkins, *Lavinia*, p. 4.
[2] Examples include George Conklin, 'Ingeborg of Denmark, Queen of France, 1193-1223', in *Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe*, ed. Anne J. Duggan (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 39-52; Georges Duby, *Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth Century France*, trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore, 1978), p. 49.
[3] Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Marriages as Tactical Response: Henry II and the Royal Wedding of 1160', *EHR*, 119 (2004), pp. 954-64, particularly pp. 954-55, 962-63; Lindsay Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity in the Twelfth Century', *Common Knowledge*, 22 (2016), pp. 237-55, particularly pp. 237-41.
[4] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity' p. 244.
[5] Diggelmann, 'Marriages as Tactical Response', pp. 954-55.
[6] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity' p. 241.

Diggelmann claimed the two categories are not mutually exclusive, intersecting considerably.[7] This chapter confirms this assertion, exploring the peaceful and inimical implications of the five diplomatic marriages that took place in this period. For a diplomatic marriage to be considered within this chapter it must align with one of the two following definitions. Either, a marriage between a member of the ruling English royal family and someone from a ruling Scottish or Welsh royal family. Or a marriage between a member of the ruling English royal family and a subject from a Welsh realm

Figure 2: Select Scottish Royal Dynasty



Figure 3: Select Norman Royal Dynasty



[7] Ibid, p. 242

or from the Scottish kingdom, or *vice versa*. In the latter scenario, the subject's ruler must have been involved in arranging the marriage. Based on this, I focus on five examples: the marriage of Matilda of Scots, daughter of Malcolm III of Scotland, to Henry I of England (1100);[8] the marriage of Sybilla of Normandy, Henry I's bastard daughter, to Alexander I of Scotland (c.1114);[9] the marriage of Maud, countess of Huntingdon and Henry I's relative, to David I of Scotland (1114);[10] the marriage of Matilda of Boulogne, granddaughter of Malcolm III, to King Stephen (1125);[11] and the marriage of Ada de Warenne, sister of Earl William of Surrey, to Henry of Scotland, David I's son (1139).[12] To help distinguish the "Matildas", Henry I's daughter is referred to as *The Empress Matilda*, or simply *The Empress*. Meanwhile, *Queen Matilda of Boulogne* means Stephen's wife, whilst *Queen Matilda of Scots* applies to Henry I's wife. Please refer to the family trees for additional details.[13]

Upon close inspection, these five Anglo-Scottish marriages align with Diggelmann, with major peaceful and inimical outcomes. After illustrating this, I explore what these outcomes meant for the nature and evolution of inter-ruler relations. The marriages contributed to a comparatively peaceful Anglo-Scottish relationship, whilst also serving as vehicles to strengthen Anglo-Norman kings versus third parties within and outside of Britain. Intriguingly there were no Anglo-Welsh diplomatic marriages in 927-1154, nor any Anglo-Scottish ones involving the Anglo-Saxon rulers under discussion in this thesis. Although this evidence dearth presents a challenge, understanding what a diplomatic marriage meant for a relationship allows me to consider what their absence means too. As with other themes, marriage diplomacy highlights a divide between Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy, and between pre- and post-Conquest diplomacy. Overlaps exist though, and once again there is a marked shift in Anglo-Scottish relations after the death of Malcolm III and Henry I's succession.

2. Peaceful Marriages

Diggelmann's peaceful marriages, encompassing those chiefly intended to establish and maintain good relations between the parties, is a more traditional interpretation of diplomatic marriages, broadly aligning with numerous other studies. In Diggelmann's words, 'The truism that arranged marriages were the fruits of peace and alliance is generally valid'.[14] For instance, Louise J. Wilkinson asserts this point during an assessment of Princess Isabella of England's marriage to Frederick II, the Holy Roman Emperor, in 1235, stating definitively that 'there was no better way of cementing a political alliance than through a personal dynastic bond.'[15] Likewise, when discussing the marriage

[8] *ASC E*, 1100.
[9] WM, *GR*, 1, pp. 724-25; Appendix 2, no. 50.
[10] *ASC H*, 1114.
[11] OV, 5, pp. 272-75; Appendix 2, no. 57.
[12] JH, p. 300.
[13] See p. 83.
[14] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity', p. 241, my italics.
[15] Louise J. Wilkinson, 'The Imperial Marriage of Isabella of England, Henry III's Sister', in *The Rituals and Rhetoric of Queenship: Medieval to Early Modern*, ed. Liz Oakley-Brown and Louise J. Wilkinson (Dublin, 2009), p. 21.

between Emma of Normandy and Cnut the Great after the latter's conquest of England, Pauline Stafford writes that sources depict Emma 'in one of the most traditional female images as a woman whose marriage brings peace.'[16] Outside of a purely diplomatic context, Georges Duby claims in his detailed study of aristocratic marriages in twelfth-century northern France that 'marriages implied peace' and were often used to create alliance networks.[17] Evidently, the concept of peaceful marriages is widely accepted in the historiography.

These Anglo-Scottish marriages maintained and contributed to good relations between the kingdoms in two ways: due to the actions of the wives and thanks to the wider mutual ties the marriages created between members of the royal families. I begin with analysis of wives' actions, before discussing the broader mutual ties, after which I summarise the consequences for the nature of inter-ruler relations.

A. Peacemaking Wives

Wives significantly encouraged peacemaking through their ability to intercede with their husbands on behalf of their blood relatives, for instance. This behaviour is best illustrated by Queen Matilda of Boulogne, King Stephen's wife, in 1138. That year David I of Scotland led an invasion of northern England that culminated in his defeat at the Battle of the Standard, near Northallerton.[18] John of Hexham states that during the Christmas after the battle, an English council was held at Westminster. There the Papal Legate Alberic of Ostia petitioned Stephen to make peace with the Scots. Crucially, Matilda was not just queen of England, but also David's niece. Consequently, she seems to have desired improved Anglo-Scottish relations, as we are told Alberic's entreaties with Stephen were aided by the 'private perseverance of Matilda, queen of England'.[19] She succeeded, and peace was soon re-established with the sealing of the *Second Treaty of Durham* (1139).[20]

The counsellor queen, who influences her husband, is a firmly established trope in literature on queenship. Queens supposedly lacked demarcated and separate sovereignty. As Miriam Shadis summarised, 'Queenly influence on government was only possibly through a queen's personal relations with her husband'.[21] Jennifer Carpenter and Sally-Beth MacLean have highlighted the same restriction in a study on women's power in the Middle Ages, claiming 'the real influence women exercised was precarious and fragile, and was often dependent on their family', with the marriage tie highlighted as a significant family relation.[22] However, this model of power has positives. Though a

[16] Pauline Stafford, 'The Portrayal of Royal Women in England, Mid-Tenth to Mid-Twelfth Centuries', in *Medieval Queenship,* ed. John Carmi Parsons (Stroud, 1993), p. 163.
[17] Duby, *Marriage*, p. 92; Also, McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 89.
[18] Richard of Hexham, '*Account of the Battle of Standard*', *EHD II*, p. 319; HH, pp. 718-19; See Bradbury, *SM*, pp. 33-37 for The Standard campaign.
[19] JH, p. 299, '*Domestica instantia Matildis regina Anglorum*'.
[20] Ibid, p. 300.
[21] Miriam Shadis, 'Blanche of Castile and Facinger's "Medieval Queenship": Reassessing the Argument', in *Capetian Women*, ed. Kathleen Nolan (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 137.
[22] Jennifer Carpenter and Sally-Beth MacLean, 'Introduction', *PW*, pp. xvi-xvii.

queen lacked an individual powerbase, the relationship with her husband provided a route to intercede with him, which consequently could be used to exercise agency and respond to her concerns. The queenly counsel model is often associated with mercy. Looking at petitions to the king for help, John Carmi Parsons notes how the 'queen was expected to soften the king's heart'.[23] Such an expectation was a useful model that allowed a queen to lessen her husband's appetite for conflict and rancour with her relatives. We should not assume all examples of queenly influence were principally about mercy though. Looking at royal women in England and France during the thirteenth century, Margaret Howell notes the significance of mercy and tempering justice in the rhetoric of intercession. However, she also suggests that 'the intention of intercession was often overtly political' and 'some [queens] no doubt relished a sense of power.'[24] We must be open to numerous contexts and reasons for queenly influence, including the importance of self and familial interest.

There are suggestions that queenly power shifted over time. Marion Facinger purports that French queens went from full partners in government in the tenth century, to fully reliant on their personal ties to the king in the thirteenth.[25] Parsons has similarly argued that between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries intercession increasingly became the central pillar of queenly agency.[26] It is not this study's intention to chart changes to queenship across the medieval period. What is apparent though is that numerous historians have viewed intercession as a component of the office throughout the Middle Ages and across Europe. From the sixth to the fourteenth century, from France to Hungary, counsellor queens existed.[27] Significant for this study is the work of Pauline Stafford and Louis Huneycutt, who have identified intercessor queens in eleventh and early twelfth-century Britain, with the latter specifically tying the role to Queen Matilda of Scots, a subject of this chapter.[28]

Huneycutt argues that queens in this period mirrored the behaviour of the biblical Queen Esther.[29] The Persian king, Ahasuerus, took Esther as his queen, unaware that she was Jewish, a fact she kept hidden. Later, Ahasuerus's advisor, Haman, manipulated the king into passing an edict ordering a massacre of the Jews. Upon learning of this, Esther went to the king and convinced him to

[23] John Carmi Parsons, 'The Queen's Intercession in Thirteenth-Century England', *PW*, p. 162.
[24] Margaret Howell, 'The Royal Women of England and France in the Mid-Thirteenth Century: A Gendered Perspective', in *England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216-1272),* ed. Bjorn K. U. Weiler and Ifor W. Rowland (Aldershot, 2002), p. 171, quotes on p. 172 and p. 178.
[25] Marion F. Facinger, 'A Study in Medieval Queenship: Capetian France, 987-1237', *Studies in Renaissance History*, 5 (1968), p. 4; Shadis, 'Blanche', p. 138.
[26] Parsons, 'Intercession', pp. 149-50; Also, Howell, 'Royal Women', p. 170.
[27] Janos M. Bak, 'Queens as Scapegoats in Medieval Hungary', in *Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe*, ed. Anne J. Duggan (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 223-33; Howell, 'Royal Women', pp. 163-82; Stacy S. Klein, *Ruling Women: Queenship and Gender in Anglo-Saxon Literature* (Notre Dame, Ind, 2006), p. 53; McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, pp. 87-95; Janet L. Nelson, 'Early Medieval Rites of Queen-Making and the Shaping of Medieval Queenship', in *Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe*, ed. Anne J. Duggan (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 301-17; Watkins, *Lavinia*, pp. 55-65.
[28] Lois L. Huneycutt, 'Intercession and the High-Medieval Queen: The Esther Topos', *PW*, pp. 126-47; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, pp. 32-33; Huneycutt, 'Public Lives, Private Ties: Royal Mothers in England and Scotland, 1070-1204', in *Medieval Mothering*, ed. John Carmi Parsons, and Bonnie Wheeler (London, 1996), pp. 295-312; Pauline Stafford, 'Emma: The Power of the Queen in the Eleventh Century', in *Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe*, ed. Anne J. Duggan (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 3-26.
[29] Huneycutt, 'Esther', p. 127; *Vulgate Esther*, 2:1-8:17.

attend a feast, where she solicited a promise from him that he would do whatever she requested. Esther then revealed her Jewish identity, pleaded for the lives of her and her people, and accused Haman of wickedness. Ahasuerus responded by ordering Haman's death and consenting to a new edict, which voided his previous one and ordered the Jews to destroy their enemies. Her role as an intercessor between the king on one hand, and other interests and peoples on the other hand, became a model for how queens could influence their husbands.

The model held currency among medieval thinkers. Sedulius Scottus, a ninth-century Irish monk based in Frankia, produced *On Christian Rulers,* a mirror for princes that provided Christian behavioural examples for rulers to emulate. Within it, he discusses a queen's role, stating 'piety, prudence and sacred authority should adorn her, just as gracious Esther shone.'[30] She must be the 'inventress of prudent counsel', which will bring benefits to the king. Another mirror, the ninth-century Irish text *The Instructions of King Cormac Mac Airt*, presents a contrary view, cautioning kings against taking women's advice.[31] Read against the grain, this suggests kings were accustom to taking such advice, and certainly there is additional evidence supporting Sedulius and his attitude to Esther. Also in the ninth century, Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims produced liturgical rites for the consecration of Judith, daughter of King Charles the Bald of West Frankia, when she married King Æthelwulf of Wessex in 856. This contains a prayer recalling Old Testament queens, including Esther.[32] Ælfric of Eynsham translated Esther's story into Old English in 1002-05, modifying it to further emphasise her intercession and play down the violence.[33] It has been suggested he produced the translation to influence Emma of Normandy, as she had married King Æthelred of England in 1002 and Ælfric was known to target contemporary politics with his works.[34] Both Hincmar and Ælfric's works related to foreign queens: Judith from Frankia and Emma from Normandy. Seemingly Esther was considered particularly instructive for foreign wives.

We must be cautious when ascribing this behavioural model to explain queenly behaviour. These sources, as well as others encountered across this chapter, were all written by ecclesiastic men. They are not windows into the minds of women like Matilda of Boulogne. However, these women would have been aware of such expectations and therefore were in a prime position to capitalise. For instance, both Hincmar and Ælfric both produced works for ruling queens. We shall later see, in regards to Matilda of Scotland, evidence of queens directly interacting with literature that emphasised a wife's intercessory role. This was largely a masculine and ecclesiastical world.[35] Being

[30] Sedulius Scottus, '*On Christian Rulers*', in *Sedulius Scottus, On Christian Rulers and the Poems*, ed. Edward Gerard Doyle (New York, 1983), pp. 59-61; Edward Gerrard Doyle, 'Introduction', in his *Sedulius Scottus, On Christian Rulers and the Poems* (New York, 1983), pp. 9-10, 18-19.
[31] *The Instructions of King Cormac Mac Airt*, trans. Kuno Meyer, ed. Beatrix Ferber (Cork, 2010), pp. 29, 35; Meyer, Kuno, 'Preface', in *The Instructions of King Cormac Mac Airt*, trans. Kuno Meyer (Cork, 2010), p. xi.
[32] Hincmar of Rheims, *Coronation Iudithae Karoli II filiae*, ed. A. Boetius, MGH Capitularies, 2 (Hannover, 1883), pp. 425-27; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 35.
[33] 'Esther', in *Ælfric's Homilies on Judith, Esther, and the Maccabees*, ed. Stuart D. Lee (1999). https://users.ox.ac.uk/~stuart/kings/main.htm. Accessed 25 April, 2022.
[34] Mary Clayton, '*Ælfric: Esther: A Speculum Reginae*', in *Text and Gloss: Studies in Insular Learning and Literature* ed. Helen Conrad O'Brian *et al.* (Dublin, 1999), p. 99.
[35] McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 90; Parsons, 'Intercession', p. 147.

provided with a route to power by the church, even if via her husband, helped strengthen and secure a queen's agency. Although a restricted model for influence, queens would have known about it and would have exploited it.

Returning to twelfth-century Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and Matilda of Boulogne, who serves as the paragon example of a peacemaking queen in this period, it seems clear that she employed the accepted intercessor model to influence her husband into making peace with her ancestral homeland. Notably, Matilda is not depicted as averting warfare simply for merciful or pacifist reasons. Rather John of Hexham connects it to her family bonds, highlighting that David I of Scotland was her uncle, before describing in detail their shared lineage.[36] Family bonds imposed mutual rights and obligations on those they tied together. In his study of political behaviour, Gerd Althoff argues that medieval people were required to help their relatives in whatever way they could. This included providing military support, favourable appointments, standing as a witness, exacting revenge and offering prayers.[37] There is extensive historiographical debate about how family relations changed over the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. Scholars like Georges Duby argued that families evolved from wide, horizontal, and diffuse units to small, vertical groups that emphasised patrilineal relations.[38] Others, like Constance Brittain Bouchard, have queried the extent of this change.[39] Overall, there is an acceptance that close family connections remained important: siblings, parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles. Although inheritance was limited to a small group, principally from father to son, more distant relatives were still expected to aid one another.[40] In line with these expectations, Matilda supported her uncle, David, at the English court. Put simply, this meant encouraging Stephen to make peace with the Scots.

A key part of John Hexham's account in regards to the counselling queen model is the suggestion that Matilda implored King Stephen in private. Such meetings were risky. As Julia Barrow points out, being in a secluded and confined location leaves you vulnerable to attack.[41] It is no coincidence that the *ASC*'s account of Eadric Streona's murder of Sigeferth and Morcar in 1015 states 'he enticed them into his chamber, and they were basely killed inside it.'[42] Alternatively, Orderic Vitalis suggests a less lethal reason why it was not advisable to meet someone privately. In 1102, Henry I was attempting to put down Robert of Bellême's rebellion. His lords preferred a negotiated

[36] JH, p. 299.
[37] Althoff, *Family*, p. 59.
[38] Georges Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, trans. Cynthia Postan (London, 1977), pp. 147-48.
[39] Constance Brittain Bouchard, *Those of My Blood: Constructing Families in Medieval Francia* (Philadelphia, P.A., 2001), pp. 60, 67-69, 72.
[40] David Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France: 900-1300* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 99-122, (and 121-22 for wider relations); Mark Hagger, 'Kinship and Identity in Eleventh-Century Normandy: The Case of Hugh de Grandmesnil, c. 1040-98', *JMH*, 32 (2006), pp. 212-30; Elisabeth van Houts, 'Family, Marriage, Kinship', in *A Social History of England, 900-1200*, ed. Julia Crick and Elisabeth van Houts (Cambridge, 2011), p. 134; Bruce O'Brien, 'Authority and Community', in *A Social History of England, 900-1200*, ed. Julia Crick and Elisabeth van Houts (Cambridge, 2011), p. 90.
[41] Julia Barrow, 'Demonstrative Behaviour and Political Communication in Later Anglo-Saxon England', *ASE*, 36 (2007), pp. 142-43.
[42] *ASC D*, 1015.

peace, fearing that if Henry defeated Robert and disinherited him, this might empower the king to treat them harshly too. They met him in a field in front of 3,000 soldiers, and tried to dissuade him from continuing the campaign. Aware of their motives, the soldiers called out that Henry was being deceived, and encouraged him to attack Robert.[43] Had Henry met the lords in private there would have been no audience to hold them to account. Due to these concerns, people only privately consulted with those they firmly trusted, such as family members.[44]

Notwithstanding these reservations, private meetings had benefits too. Open discussion was dangerous, since it could easily lead to public arguments, insults, dishonour, and ultimately no negotiated agreement, as occurred when Henry met his lords in the open. A private meeting allowed a frank discussion of the issues without the risk of public shaming.[45] Arguments could be more convincing and minds more readily changed. Through her ability to access Stephen in a private setting, Matilda was able to offer him forthright counsel, helping her influence him to make peace.

Furthermore, Matilda of Boulogne shows that a wife's peacemaking role involved maintaining peace too. She safeguarded Anglo-Scottish peace, after it was re-established with the *Second Treaty of Durham*. In 1140, Henry of Scotland, David's son and Matilda's cousin, visited King Stephen, testifying to the peace treaty's early success. Unfortunately, during the trip he endured Earl Ralph IV of Chester's wrath. Ralph was unhappy because the Durham treaties had granted Henry Carlisle and Cumberland, previously held by Ralph's father, Earl Ralph III, until 1120.[46] Ralph IV subsequently opposed Stephen giving away land that he claimed. John of Hexham says that during Henry's visit, 'Earl Ralph of Chester rose up against him in hostility because of Carlisle and Cumberland […] He wanted to overwhelm him on the return with an armed band.' However, after being 'reminded by the entreaties of the queen', Stephen helped Henry get home safely.[47] Matilda was continuing to apply pressure on Stephen to protect members of the Scottish royal family, and by extension protect the peace. Perhaps she remembered Henry's visit to England in 1136. On that occasion, Ralph insulted Henry, presumably because the Scot had been granted Carlisle earlier that year.[48] This clearly damaged Anglo-Scottish relations, since David refused to allow Henry to return to England, and, as we have seen, later invaded again. Matilda was essentially a guarantor of peace: not simply responsible for re-establishing it after a period of conflict between her husband and her uncle, but its protector over the following years.

Matilda's activities exemplify the actions queens took at their husbands' courts to promote and maintain peace with their relatives. Diggelmann has claimed that a marriage 'was not simply

[43] OV, 6, pp. 26-27.
[44] Althoff, *Family*, pp. 61-62.
[45] Ibid, p. 62.
[46] Green, *Henry I*, p. 173.
[47] JH, p. 306, '*Insurrexit in inimicitias in eum Ranulfus comes Cestriae propter Karlel et Cumberland* […] *voluit eum in reditu cum armata manu involvere. Rex vero, reginae precibus commonitus, ab intentato periculo tutatum eum patri et patriae resituit, transpositaque est indignatio haec in insidias regiae salutis*'.
[48] Ibid, p. 287.

symbolic of, or connected to peace; it was in itself the peace agreement.'[49] In line with this, Matilda's marriage to Stephen did not merely suggest good relations between the English and Scots. Rather she was an active agent in improving relations, using her position and an influential behaviour model to do so. Without her presence events may have preceded very differently. Before using her experience as evidence for how the other women under discussion here worked to ensure Anglo-Scottish peace, it is worth highlighting where she is distinct. There is considerably more evidence for Matilda's peacemaking than any other diplomatic brides. This partly reflects the fact that her reign coincided with the outbreak of an Anglo-Scottish war, an event that lacks clear parallels between 1100-36. However, given this comparison and the ecclesiastical justification for counsellor queens, it seems likely that the other brides would have all been able to employ this model to influence their husbands' actions. Additionally, as Matilda's intercession in 1140 shows, a diplomatic bride's role involved maintaining peace, not just ending war. Whilst the evidence is less apparent, a closer look at the other wives suggests they were similarly influential in improving Anglo-Scottish relations.

Ada de Warenne was certainly a peacemaking wife, whose marriage was intended to contribute to peace between England and Scotland. Her marriage to Henry of Scotland took place in the immediate aftermath of the *Second Treaty of Durham*, suggesting it related to peace between the realms.[50] That she could have actively encouraged her husband to pursue good relations with Stephen is suggested by Orderic Vitalis' relatively in-depth account. Referring to the *Second Durham Treaty*, he wrote that 'Accordingly Henry the son of King David of Scotland endorsed an agreement of such a type, as he loved Ada, daughter of Earl William of Surrey, he requested her marriage to himself. Bound with such a relationship, he was wholeheartedly in favour of a Norman and English friendship.'[51] Orderic connects Anglo-Scottish peace with this marriage, and specifically the love Henry felt for Ada. Love and affection were expectations in twelfth-century aristocratic marriages.[52] Both William of Malmesbury and Orderic Vitalis depicted King Henry of England as desiring Queen Matilda of Scots, with the former commenting that 'to love her his mind had long been persuaded'.[53]

Importantly, love could be a tool for wielding influence over one's spouse. Orderic claims after all that it was love that made Henry of Scotland favour the marriage and thus peace. We can apply this explanation to the period following the wedding. An insightful comparison comes from the *Life of St. Margare*t, a hagiographical account of a former queen of Scotland (1070-93), written within 10 years of her death.[54] The source claims Margaret influenced her husband regarding the laws of the kingdom: 'What she rejected, he at the same time also rejected, and what she loved, he loved, for the love of her love.'[55] As with other saints lives this a didactic source, intended to teach a queen how to

[49] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity', p. 245.
[50] JH, p. 300.
[51] OV, 6, pp. 524-25, '*Henricus itaque filius Dauid regis Scotiae amiciam huiuscemodi approbauit, ac Adelinam Guillelmi Suthregiae comitis filiam adamauit, et in coniugium sibi requisiuit. Necessitudine tali constrictus amiciciae Normannorum et Anglorum medullitus ahesit*'.
[52] John Gillingham, *Richard Coeur De Lion* (London, 1994), p. 244; Watkins, *Lavinia*, p. 107.
[53] WM, pp. 714-15, '*Amori iam pridem animum impulerat*'; OV, 5, pp. 300-01.
[54] *VSM*, p. 234; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 11.
[55] Ibid, p. 241, '*Quae ipsa respuerat, eadem et ipse respuere; et quae amaverat, amore amoris illius amare*'.

behave through an exemplary life.[56] Like Margaret, Ada could have used her husband's love for her as a way to influence him. Said influence likely included encouraging a more harmonious relationship between her husband's kingdom and her native one, in line with Queen Matilda of Boulogne's actions the previous year and Orderic's explanation. Both he and John of Hexham further illustrate the importance of Ada's family ties by outlining her immediate blood relatives in their accounts.[57] Love then provided Ada with a means to actively secure peace.

Although there are no obvious examples of Matilda of Scots behaving exactly like Matilda of Boulogne, there are indications that she altered Henry I's behaviour. Huneycutt claims 'Matilda was also perceived to have a good deal of unofficial influence over Henry', suggesting she would have been able to solicit him on behalf of her Scottish family, alleviating conflict and dispute.[58] We have already discussed the love Henry I felt for her, providing a route to influence. Aelred of Rievaulx, a former member of King David's court, wrote about Matilda of Scots in 1150s, calling her 'another Esther in our time'.[59] We see this influence over Henry in a charter from March 1103 that permitted the nuns of Malling to host a market, which Henry supposedly granted at Queen Matilda's request.[60] Such an example is likely the tip of the iceberg for two reasons. Firstly, she was fully aware of a queen's ability to influence her husband's actions. If we briefly return to the *Life of St. Margaret*, the source was actually commissioned by Matilda, Queen Margaret's daughter.[61] Given its focus on her mother, another foreign queen, having fled England after the Norman Conquest, we should expect that Matilda was not only aware of hagiography's didactic message on queenly influence, but embraced it. Secondly, others perceived Matilda as having influence over Henry. When Henry rejected an appeal from a group of priests to undo a recent tax rise in 1105, Eadmer states 'they went to the queen and solicited her to intervene.'[62] Belief in her influence can be seen in the letters sent to her during the dispute between Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury and Henry. Anselm opposed the English king's historic right to select, invest, and receive homage from, bishops, precipitating his exile from England (1103-07).[63] Pope Paschal II attempted to reconcile the pair by appealing to Matilda's influence over her husband. He exhorted her to 'Remember what the Apostle says: the unfaithful man will be saved through the faithful wife. Assert, beseech, chide, so that he takes back the prefaced bishop in his see.'[64] Anselm himself wrote to her about this matter.[65] Whether these requests were

[56] Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 13.
[57] JH, p. 300.
[58] Huneycutt, 'Intercession', p. 133.
[59] Aelred of Rievaulx, '*The Genealogy of the Kings of the English*', in *Aelred of Rievaulx: The Historical Works*, trans. Jane Patricia Freeland, ed. Maesha L. Dutton (Kalmazoo, M.I., 2005), p. 119.
[60] *RRAN* 2, 634; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 30. See also *RRAN* 2, 668.
[61] Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 11.
[62] Eadmeri, *Historia Novorum in Anglia*, ed. Martin Rule (London, 1884), p. 173, '*Qui, confusion super confusionem induti, reginam adeunt et interventricem flagitant*'.
[63] R. W. Southern, 'Anselm [St. Anselm]', *ODNB*, 08 October 2009.
[64] '*Eiusdem ad Mathildem reginam Anglorum*: 352', *Anselmi*, 5, p. 292, '*Memento quod dicit apostolus: salvabitur vir infidelis per mulierem fidelem: Argue, obsecra, increpa: ut et praefalum episcopum in sede sua recipiat*'.
[65] '*Ad Mathildem reginam Anglorum*: 321', *Anselmi*, 5, pp. 250-51; Huneycutt, 'Intercession and the High-Medieval Queen', p. 136.

based on the appellants knowledge of other intercessions that Matilda had performed, or theological justifications for queenly counsel, they point to a belief that Matilda could alter Henry's actions.

Whilst none of these intercessions relate specifically to Anglo-Scottish relations, it seems likely Matilda turned her counsel towards Scottish interests. Aelred's reference to Esther implies she advocated on behalf of her ancestral people. Further, we know she maintained a connection with her Scottish family, particularly her brother David. He spent time at Henry's court in his sister's company. According to Aelred, David visited his sister chambers on at least one occasion, finding her washing the feet of lepers.[66] Although the account obviously contains hagiographical elements in line with Aelred's desire to present virtuous models for his readers to imitate, the suggestion that the siblings remained linked seems reasonable.[67] When David witnessed one of Henry's charters in 1103, he was identified as the queen's brother, implying a connection between the pair.[68] Finally, we must once more return to the *Life of St. Margaret*, which described Margaret liberating 'people of the English,' who had been taken captive, showing that she maintained an interest in her native kingdom.[69] This taught Matilda to remember her origins, and to use her power to help her former home. After her marriage the new queen of England evidently remained aware of her Scottish dynastic roots, meaning she likely used her influence over Henry to promote Scottish interests, advocating peace and other concerns that dissuaded war.

A final piece of evidence that points to queens actively promoting peace at their husbands' courts is what occurred in their absence. Seemingly, the kings of England and Scotland came close to war in 1122. That year Henry I built a castle in Carlisle and held a large council at York, perhaps in response to a perceived threat from Alexander I of Scotland.[70] Notably, Sybilla, Alexander's wife and Henry's bastard daughter, had died earlier that year, whilst Henry I's wife Matilda of Scots had died in 1118.[71] Thus, this build up in tensions happened when neither the queen of Scotland was a member of the English royal family, nor the queen of England a member of the Scottish royal family, a situation that had not been the case since 1100, and was soon rectified with David's succession to the Scottish throne in 1124.[72] Belligerence increased without a diplomatic bride at court to advocate for peace with the neighbouring realm.

Intercession was not limited to marital relations, with diplomatic brides also drawing on other family relations to influence relatives on behalf of their husbands. As Stafford states in relation to Emma of Normandy 'A wife was always some other man's daughter or sister.'[73] Carpenter, MacLean,

[66] Aelred of Rievaulx, '*The Genealogy of the Kings of the English*', pp. 119-20.
[67] Maesha L. Dutton, 'Introduction: Aelred's Hisotrical Works: A Mirror for Twelfth-Century England', in *Aelred of Rievaulx: The Historical Works*, trans. Jane Patricia Freeland, ed. Maesha L. Dutton (Kalmazoo, M.I., 2005), pp. 8, 15.
[68] *RRAN* 2, 32.
[69] *VSM*, p. 247, '*Gente Anglorum*'.
[70] *HR*, p. 267, pp. 605-06; Oram, *Domination*, p. 63.
[71] *HR*, pp. 252, 265.
[72] JW, 3, pp. 154-55.
[73] Stafford, 'Emma', p. 18.

and Parsons also emphasise the importance of other family ties for a wife's position and actions.[74] Again Matilda of Boulogne is the prime example, reaching out to her Scottish relatives as part of a peacemaking initiative. John of Hexham states that the *Second Treaty of Durham*, 'was confirmed through the queen and Henry, son of the king of Scotland, at Durham on the 9th of April [1139)'.[75] Next, Matilda led her cousin Henry to Nottingham, so that he could meet with King Stephen and marry Ada de Warenne.[76] Here Matilda served as an English envoy to the Scots, as well as Henry of Scotland's escort. She was not the only wife to act this way. According to the *Brut Y Tywysogyon*, when King John of England led an army against Llywelyn the Great of Gwynedd in 1211, Llywelyn 'sent to the king his wife, who was daughter to the king, to make peace between him and the king and whatsoever terms she could.'[77] Here the author highlighted that Llywelyn's wife was related to King John, suggesting that she was selected for this diplomatic mission due to her family tie. This again relates to the aforementioned power of kinship and womanly intercession. The influence drawn from kinship did not flow one way, and diplomatic brides could also intercede with their blood relatives to make peace with their husbands. Negotiating with his cousin, rather than another member of the English nobility, would likely soften Henry of Scotland's heart and make him more inclined to concede some English requests. Matilda may have even been able to negotiate with him privately, encouraging more productive discussion. Her involvement was certainly a boon for Stephen.

Though Matilda of Boulogne is once again the most obvious example, the other diplomatic brides likely performed similar roles. For instance, Ada de Warenne joined Henry of Scotland on his visit to King Stephen in 1140.[78] Given the conflict that arose between Henry and members of the English aristocracy during his 1136 visit, she may have hoped her connections to the English court would soften any opposition to her new husband, preventing a breakdown in relations. We do not see Matilda of Scots acting so openly on behalf of her husband, but given the relationship she maintained with David, and that both King Edgar and King Alexander visited England during her time as queen, the opportunity would have existed.[79]

Therefore, in line with Stafford's comment, diplomatic brides were truly liminal people, with close connections in both polities and thus an interest in ensuring peace. In war a bride was a guaranteed loser, since victory for her husband meant defeat for her other relatives, and *vice versa*. Fortunately for these women, their actions were not the sole guarantee of peace.

[74] Carpenter and MacLean, 'Introduction', p. xvi; John Carmi Parsons, 'Family, Sex and Power: The Rhythms of Medieval Queenship', in his *Medieval Queenship* (Stroud, 1993), p. 163.
[75] JH, p. 300, '*Confirmata est haec concordia per reginam et Henricum filium regis Scotiae apud Dunelmum, v. Idus Aprilis*'.
[76] Ibid, p. 300.
[77] *Brut*, pp. 190-93.
[78] JH, p. 306.
[79] *RRAN*, 2, 601; *Brut*, pp. 78-83.

B. Wider Connections

The ties created by these marriages did not stop at the brides. Rather, they penetrated further into the English and Scottish royal families, improving relations between their kingdoms along the peaceful marriage model. Evidence of positive connections between families can be seen before the marriage took place, during the initial negotiation and betrothal. As Duby claims, marriage is founded on agreement, therefore it 'also implied peace, because the institution of marriage was the very opposite of abduction'.[80] The clearest explanations of how marriages were arranged in this period comes from an Old English law code dated to the dawn of the eleventh century, known as *Concerning the betrothal of Women*.[81] It emphasises the betrothal preceding the marriage itself and the role of the bride's wider kinsmen. The groom had to pledge his desire to marry the prospective bride and receive the consent of her family. This includes agreeing the dowry and providing the principal kinsman responsible for the betrothal with a surety. The role of a bride's family is shown in Henry I's *Coronation Charter*, stating that 'if any of my barons or tenants shall wish to give in marriage his daughter or his sister or his niece or his cousin, he shall consult me.' Whilst his permission was needed, Henry promised to never refuse it, unless the noble was trying to arrange a marriage with one of Henry's enemies.[82] Evidently the male head of the family was principally responsible for his kinswomen's marriage prospects and would be heavily involved in agreeing the nuptials with the prospective husband. Narrative sources occasionally reference this pre-negotiation and agreement. William of Malmesbury mentions that Henry the Fowler of East Francia requested that Æthelstan send one of his sisters to the continent for a marriage to Henry's son Otto (later Otto the Great, the eventual Holy Roman Emperor).[83] Regarding Matilda of Scots, prior to her marriage and her father's death, she spent time at Romsey Abbey, where she was forced to wear a veil. According to Eadmer, Matilda later said that 'when my father by chance saw me veiled, inflamed with rage he snatched the veil by hand […] protesting he would rather me to be wife to Count Alan than destined to the company of nuns.'[84] There are questions over whether this was a real or ironic proposal,[85] but evidently at the time Malcolm III controlled his daughter's marriage prospects and would be involved in negotiating with any potential suitors.

Therefore, our Anglo-Scottish marriages would have required the husbands to establish an agreement with their brides' families and social network, illustrating a good relationship between them. Unfortunately, we have next to no evidence for such agreements. Other scholars who have investigated marriage agreements have utilised epistolography evidence. Wilkinson notes that the marriage between Emperor Frederick II and Isabella of England was first discussed in a letter sent by

[80] Duby, *Marriage*, p. 92.
[81] '*Concerning the Betrothal of Women*', *EHD I*, p. 431.
[82] '*The "Coronation Charter" of Henry I*', *EHD II*, p. 401.
[83] WM, p. 171.
[84] Eadmeri, p. 122, '*Pater meus cum me quemadmodum dixi velatum forte vidisset, furore succensus injecta manu velum arripuit* […] *contestans se comiti Alano me potius in uxorem, quam in contubernium sanctimonalium praedestinasse*'.
[85] Huneycutt, *Matilda*, pp. 23-24.

the emperor on November 15th 1234.[86] Though no such letters exist for these Anglo-Scottish marriages, the chronicles do hint at the agreements that lay behind them. William of Malmesbury wrote that 'Henry bound his [Edgar's] successor Alexander by ties of relationship, *giving* him his own illegitimate daughter in marriage.'[87] William describes David I's marriage to Maud of Huntingdon similarly, recording that David was 'Whom the king had made an earl and had bestowed with the marriage of a highborn woman.'[88] Henry is depicted as the key player in the marriage agreements, offering these women to the Scottish figures. Unlike Sybilla, Maud was not Henry's daughter, but he was her most senior relative, as she lacked a living father or brother. Also, his *Coronation Charter* demonstrates that Henry had the authority to arrange marriages for widows, which Maud was following the death of Simon de Senlis, her former husband.[89] Whilst Orderic Vitalis depicts Ada de Warenne and Henry of Scotland's marriage as closer to a love match, the wider involvement of Stephen and Matilda of Boulogne is clear. It occurred at Stephen's court in Nottingham following the treaty negotiated by the queen earlier that year at Durham. Both Orderic and John of Hexham mention Ada's family relatives, such as her brothers, the earls of Leicester and Surrey.[90] The marriage evidently involved an agreement between Henry on one hand, and the king, queen and possibly Ada's brothers on the other. The practice was never singular, resting only on the bride. At its conception it required her prospective husband to come to an agreement with her family and others she possessed personal ties to: a good basis for peace.

The ties between the groom and bride's families created mutual rights and obligations that were conducive for a more peaceful Anglo-Scottish relationship. For instance, the right to counsel was not restricted to queens, but could be utilised by other relatives to influence a ruler. During King David of Scotland's visit to England in 1126, the *ASC* states that Henry moved Robert Curthose from Bishop Roger of Salisbury's custody to Earl Robert of Gloucester's: 'This was all done on the advice of his daughter, and through the king of Scots, David, her uncle.'[91] Like his sister, David could influence the English king. The best explanation for this is his family connection to the English royal family, especially since the source specifically flags up that he was Matilda's uncle.

David's ability to counsel members of the English royal family was not restricted to Henry, but continued on to the next generation, as fifteen years later David attempted to advise a relative again. According to *The Deeds of King Stephen,* whilst campaigning with the Empress Matilda in 1141, David approached her in the company of the bishop of Winchester and the earl of Gloucester, Matilda's brother:

They came before her on bended knee to request something, when they bowed before her, she did not rise respectfully, as is proper, nor agree to the request, but frequently sending them away from

[86] Wilkinson, 'Imperial Marriage', p. 23; Also, Duby, *Marriagel*, p. 25.
[87] WM, pp. 724-25, '*Alexandrum successorem Henricus affinitate detinuit, data ei in coniugium filia notha*', my emphasis.
[88] Ibid, pp. 726-27, '*Conubio insignis feminae donauerat*'.
[89] '"*Coronation Charter*"', *EHD II*, p. 401.
[90] JH, p. 300; OV, 6, pp. 524-25.
[91] *ASC E*, 1126.

her, dishonoured with arrogant reply, and not heeded: and now she was not supported by their advice, as is proper, and as she had promised, but to govern everything by her provision and the presumption of her management.[92]

Although unsuccessful on this occasion, it still seems likely David had the right to influence his niece. The source, as product of one of Stephen's clerks, supported his claim.[93] The author's aim then was to depict Matilda in an unfavourable light that would damage her reputation, benefiting Stephen. Whether the event occurred as described or not, the criticism of Matilda would not have landed if there was no expectation that David could advise her. Of course, neither of David's counsels specifically related to Anglo-Scottish relations. But there is no indication that David could not use his influence on such matters. Both known counsels regard highly important matters: the custody of a rival to Henry's throne and presumably, given the context, Matilda's efforts to secure the throne. Likely, David could solicit his relatives to pursue good relations with his own kingdom or to pursue policies that were favourable to him, allaying reasons for conflict or dispute.

The connections created by marriages conferred other advantages on family members. One benefit for the Scottish side came about in 1114, when according to the *ASC* Henry 'gave the earldom of Huntingdon to David, who was the queen's brother.'[94] Of course, this earldom came in the form of his marriage to Maud, the heiress of Huntingdon. Crucially, Maud was also the daughter of the former earl of Northumbria, Waltheof, providing influence in that region too.[95] Regardless of what the marriage itself meant for Anglo-Scottish relations, it was the result of the earlier marriage between Henry I and Matilda of Scots. A later source claims Matilda petitioned Henry to arrange David's marriage to Maud.[96] This may be true, since she had the power to petition. At the very least though, the source justifies the granting of Huntingdon to David by pointing out that he was 'the queen's brother'. As discussed, family connections lead to better treatment, with the award of earldom via a marriage certainly evidence of this. Henry's marriage seems to have obliged him to establish good relations with his brother-in-law.

Likewise, the English rulers benefited from the military support of Scottish kings due to diplomatic marriages. Military support was a key expectation placed on those bound by family ties.[97] The most obvious example of this is David's support for the Empress Matilda, his niece. Having sworn to back her claim to the throne in 1126, David made good on his oath and invaded England on

[92] *GS,* pp. 79-80, '*Pro quolibet supplicaturi poplitibus ante ipsam flexis accesserant, non ipsis ante se inclinantibus reverenter ut decuit assurgere, nec in postulatis assentiri, sed inexauditos quamsaepe, tumidaque responsione obbuccatos a se inhonore dimittere; jamjamque non illorum consiliis, ut decebat et ut eis promiserat, inniti, sed suo quaeque provisu, suae et dispositionis praesumptu, cunctu ordinare. Haec vero cum episcopus Wintoniensis sine suo assensu, sed et alia nonnulla sine suo consilio agi conspiceret*'.
[93] Kenneth Reginald Potter, 'Introduction', *GS*, pp. xxx.
[94] *ASC H*, 1114.
[95] G. W. S. Barrow, 'David I', *ODNB*, 05 January 2006; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 128-29.
[96] Green, *Henry I*, p. 128; Waldevi Comitis, *Chroniques Anglo-Normandes*, ed. Francisque Michel (Rouen, 1836), 2, p. 126.
[97] Althoff, *Family*, p. 59.

numerous occasions after Stephen became king.[98] Some historians are cynical about his intervention, suggesting the attacks were opportunistic attempts to expand his realm during a period of English weakness.'[99] Chroniclers in this period saw it differently. Orderic states that David attacked 'on account of the oath, which by King Henry's commanding, he made to his niece.'[100] John of Hexham writes that 'Also David, King of Scotland, uncle of the same empress, not heedless of the oath, which he […] had sworn to King Henry concerning his succession, immediately invaded the kingdom of England.'[101] Both chroniclers justified David's oath and support for Matilda through reference to their family relationship. Other writers, such as William of Malmesbury, William of Newburgh and Henry of Huntingdon, all flag up that David was the Empress Matilda's uncle when referencing his support for her claim.[102] We will never know David's exact motivations for these attacks, but since twelfth-century interpretations suggest family ties influenced his behaviour, it seems likely that these, along with the cup he received from Henry, were important factors behind his decision.[103] Likewise, King Alexander I of Scotland joined Henry, his brother-in-law, on campaign against the Welsh in 1114.[104] No familial link is mentioned as a justification, yet they must have weighed on Alexander as they supposedly did on David. Especially if the marriage took place in 1114, suggested by some scholars, as this would draw a direction link between marriage and military support.[105] It should not be neglected that this is the first known instance of the king of Scotland campaigning with the king of England. That it occurred at a time when Henry was married to Alexander's sister and Alexander to Henry's daughter is certainly significant. The marriages clearly brought several members of the different dynasties closer, resulting in them providing each other with aid. The continued access to the other kingdom's resources and help would of course further discourage any breakdown in relations. Scottish military support is only definitively shown during two periods of crisis, the war in Wales and the Anarchy, but presumably Henry could have utilised this resource on other occasions if necessary. Reliance on such benefits certainly made peace more desirable and the punishment for an Anglo-Scottish war far graver.

Additionally, relationships were forged between individual family members following weddings, as a diplomatic bride could bring other relatives with her to her husband's court. We have already discussed David's meeting with his sister, Queen Matilda of Scots, at the English court. This is slightly complicated by the fact David first fled to England with his siblings in 1093, in the aftermath of their father's death.[106] Although his arrival in England was not caused by his sister's marriage, their ongoing relationship and the fact he was identified in the aforementioned charter as the queen's

[98] *ASC E*, 1126-27.
[99] Oram, *Domination*, p. 90; Also H. A. Cronne, *The Reign of Stephen, 1135-54* (Worcester, 1970), p. 176.
[100] OV, 6, pp. 518-19, '*Propter iusiruandum quod iubente Henrico rege iam nepti suae fecerat*'.
[101] JH, p. 287, '*David quoque rex Scotiae, avunculus eiusdem imperatricis, non immemor sacramenti quod ipse* […] *Henrico regi super successione eius juraverat, continuo insurrexit in regnum Angliae*'.
[102] William of Malmesbury, *The Historia Novella*, ed. and trans. K. R. Potter (London, 1955), p. 4; WN, 1, p. 63; HH, pp. 740-41.
[103] See pp. 56-63.
[104] *Brut*, pp. 79-81; *LGC,* pp. 86-87.
[105] Appendix 2, no. 50.
[106] OV, 4, pp. 274-75; *ASC E*, 1093.

brother suggests his position was secured by Matilda's position. In two 1120s charters of King Alexander I of Scotland, a William is mentioned in the witness list, identified as the queen's brother.[107] Though no other specific individuals are mentioned accompanying the other wives under discussion here, the arrival of a foreign queen generally brought additional newcomers from her homeland. Ralph Glaber complained that when Robert II of France married Constance of Provence in 1004/05, she was soon joined by others from Provence, bringing with them their own strange customs.[108] In contrast to Glaber's negativity, the *Life of St. Margaret* mentions that the queen stimulated traded, bringing foreign merchants into Scotland.[109] For good or bad, a foreign bride meant more foreigners, including relatives, making their way to her new home. Thus, we should expect something similar took place following all five marriages highlighted here.

The accompaniment of a wife's relatives provided additional routes for connections to form between them and her husband. It has been speculated that Sybilla's brother was made constable of Scotland.[110] David's positive relationship with Henry I did not begin after the former's succession, but during his time at Henry's court. Consequently, Orderic Vitalis tells us, David 'Grew up among the boys of the royal household, and earned the close friendship of a wise and powerful king [Henry]'.[111] This close relationship presumably contributed to David receiving benefits from Henry, including a knighthood, gifts and of course the marriage to Maud of Huntingdon. The underlying reasons for these benefits and David's position itself at Henry's court was his sister's marriage, and thus the ties it created. Yet his very proximity to Henry must have played a role in their especially close relationship. As I will discuss later, David seemed to benefit far more from Henry than his brother Alexander, who was comparatively absent from England. Bonds then were formed between a wife's visiting or accompanying relatives and her husband, bringing the families closer and creating more advocates for good relations.

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C. Marriages (or lack thereof) and Peaceful Consequences for Inter-ruler Relations

The actions of these diplomatic brides and the ties between English and Scottish royal families that their marriages initiated combined to promote Anglo-Scottish peace, in line with Diggelmann's peaceful marriage model. It should not be ignored how conflict ridden the relationship was in the decades preceding these marriages. As we have seen, Malcolm III had a 'tempestuous relationship with the king of England,' invading England five times during his 35-year reign.[112] Meanwhile, the

[107] *ESC*, 36, 49; Chris Given-Wilson and Alice Curteis, *The Royal Bastards of Medieval England* (London, 1984), p. 64.
[108] *Glaber*, pp. 166-67; Robert Bartlett, *Blood Royal: Dynastic Politics in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 2020), p. 30.
[109] *VSM*, p. 241.
[110] Given-Wilson and Curteis, *Bastards*, p. 64.
[111] OV, 4, pp. 274-75, '*Domesticos educatus pueros creuit, regisque sapientis et potentis familiarem amiciciam promeruit*.'
[112] Duncan, *Kingship*, p. 43; Woolf, *Pictland*, p. 269; *HR*, pp. 174-75, 190; *ASC E*, 1079, 1091, 1093.

English campaigned against Scotland in 1072, 1080 and 1091, not to mention when William Rufus provided Malcolm III's sons, Duncan and Edgar, with English support for their invasions of Scotland in 1093 and 1097.[113] Conversely, after the first of these marriages in 1100, there was not another Scottish invasion until 1136.[114] Even this had mitigating factors, as this invasion was part of an English civil war and an attempt to support Henry I's daughter against a third-party, King Stephen. The importance of third-party relations will be discussed in more detail in the following section on inimical marriages. Regarding specifically two-party relations, it is significant that the Scottish attacks in the late 1130s were mitigated and briefly resolved by the marriage ties between David and Stephen, and the arrangement of a new marriage between Henry of Scotland and Ada de Warenne. As for English attacks, besides the aforementioned build up in tensions in 1122, there are hints of English involvement in a dispute between King Alexander I and his brother David. In his account of the Battle of the Standard (1138), written in the mid-1150s, Aelred of Rievaulx put a speech into the mouth of Robert de Brus, who had come as envoy to David, now king of Scotland, from the English army.[115] Robert lists all the ways that the Anglo-Normans helped David, including forcing Alexander to concede to David areas in southern Scotland that their older brother, King Edgar, had granted to David, an event generally dated to 1113.[116] A Gaelic poem also hints at a dispute between the brothers over land.[117] This was another civil conflict though, involving an intra-Scotland quarrel and some English involvement. It is unclear whether there was any proper fighting, nor is it apparent that Henry was directly involved. Even including this dispute, Anglo-Scottish relations were far more peaceful in the years following these marriages than during those that came before. The power of marriage ties and brides helped enforce this, and then reinforce it when necessary.

The permanence of marriages ties makes them an especially effective tool for facilitating peace. David I makes this explicitly clear. His connection to the English monarchy ultimately rested on a marriage in 1100 between his sister and King Henry. This link survived both his sister and brother-in-law, resulting in David providing military support and counsel to the Empress Matilda in the 1130s and 1140s. A similar permanence is evident with Queen Matilda of Boulogne. Almost forty years after her mother's marriage to the Count of Boulogne (1102),[118] and fourteen years after her own marriage to Stephen, Matilda still had affinity for other descendants of Malcolm III. Her Scottish family members remained important, provoking her into ensuring good relations between her husband on one hand and her uncle and cousin on the other.

[113] *ASC E*, 1072, 1093, 1097; *HR*, p. 211.
[114] HH, pp. 706-07.
[115] John R. E. Bliese, 'Aelred of Rievaulx's Rhetoric and Morale at the Battle of the Standard, 1138', *Albion*, 20 (1988), p. 548.
[116] Aelred, Abbot of Rievaulx, 'The *Relatio de Standardo*', in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I*., ed. Richard Howlett, 4 vols. (London, 1884-89), 3, pp. 192-93; Green, *Henry I*, p. 129; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 57-58.
[117] '*A Verse on David son Mael Coluim*', in *The Triumph Tree: Scotland's Earliest Poetry, 550-1350*, ed. Thomas Owen Clancy, trans. Gilbert Markus (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 184.
[118] JW, 3, pp. 102-03.

The rise in marriage diplomacy can party be explained by the previously discussed alteration in Anglo-Scottish relations which followed the death of Malcolm III and Henry I's succession. As with the gift he gave David, the marriages of Matilda of Scots, Sybilla of Normandy and Maud of Huntingdon bound Scottish monarchs into a close and peaceful relationship with Henry, which obliged them to aid him and his descendants. From the perspective of kings Edgar, Alexander and David the marriages ensured peace, preventing the sorts of Anglo-Scottish conflicts that doomed their father, whilst providing advantages, such as their sister advocating their interests at Henry's court and the granting of Huntingdon.

However, these marriages provide insight into more than Henry I's diplomacy with the Scots. Afterall, King Stephen also arranged a diplomatic marriage with the Scottish monarchy. What is so striking about both Henry and Stephen's diplomacy is how extensively it contrasts Anglo-Norman relations with the Welsh, and Anglo-Saxon relations with both the Welsh and Scots post-927, as these relationships saw zero diplomatic marriages. Investigating the absence of a historic event is challenging. But having considered the peaceful impact of the twelfth-century Anglo-Scottish marriages, this insight can reveal the significance of the conspicuous absence of diplomatic marriages from a relationship. Such conclusions will be further built on later, once the inimical outcomes of marriages are considered.

Most obviously, due to the lack of diplomatic marriages, Henry I did not enjoy peace with the Welsh. Like his father and elder brother, he invaded Wales, doing so in 1114 and 1121.[119] Based on what we have seen, it is more likely that peace would have been maintained if Henry had created marriage ties with the rulers of Gwynedd and Powys.

A peace built on marriage ties would have been undesirable though, since it would work against what we know about the approach of Anglo-Norman kings, particularly Henry I, to the Welsh. More than any other diplomatic practice, marriages created long-lasting positive relationships. Henry valued flexibility and reactivity in his dealings with the Welsh. He changed his approach to Iorwerth ap Bleddyn of Powys, first allying with him before turning against him, and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd, who was offered a more advantageous relationship after their original treaty caused further disputes.[120] Conversely, diplomatic marriages would have firmly bound him and his descendants to one Welsh magnate, reducing their capacity to adapt. Further, it was a product of power relations. As discussed throughout, the Welsh rulers were weaker than the English king, as well as their Scottish counterpart. Marriage was clearly a diplomatic practice that created mutual rights and obligations between the parties. Since the power differential between the groups was so great, English rulers often did not have to offer the Welsh benefits to ensure peace. Instead, they coerced the Welsh into making peace, often through tribute demands. Marriages were not needed.

Whilst not exactly a marriage, Henry may have utilised another type of sexual union to improve Anglo-Welsh relations. Gerald of Wales states his aunt Nest had a son by Henry I, also

[119] *ASC E*, 1114, 1121.
[120] See pp. 40-43, 75.

called Henry, suggesting an affair.[121] The *Annales Cambriae* contains an overlapping remark, describing Nest's son as 'Henry the son of Gerald, as others would wish the son of King Henry.'[122] Though the writer was evidently raising doubts over Nest's son's paternity, the comment shows an awareness of a liaison between Nest and the king. Beyond this, we know little about any affair, including when it took place. David Crouch argues it occurred in 1114 during Henry's campaigns in Wales, whilst Kari Maund proposes pre-1100, when most of Henry's bastards were born.[123] Any date prior to Henry's coronation would undermine the notion that the affair was part of the king's foreign policy, as he was simply William the Conqueror's third son at this point and unlikely to become king of England.[124] Further, the question over Nest's son's paternity implies a brief dalliance, rather than an indisputable long-term relationship. This meant limited interaction with the king and less opportunities to act as an intercessor between him and her family. There would also be no formalised marriage agreement, which encouraged and displayed good relations between the parties.

This does not mean Nest had no impact on relations. She was an important figure in Welsh politics, as the daughter of the former king of Deheubarth, Rhys ap Tewdwr, a relative of the Powysian royal family, and the wife of the castellan of Pembroke, Gerald of Wales. In 1109 she played an almost intercessory role in a conflict between the Welsh and Anglo-Normans. Her cousin, Owain ap Cadwgan attacked the castle where she and her husband were staying. Nest advised Gerald to escape through a latrine, before speaking with the attackers. After being abducted alongside her children, she was later able to negotiate their release.[125] She was protecting her husband and children's interests, meaning Norman concerns, in a conflict with one of her relatives, reaching out and attempting to effectively counsel Owain. In a way she paralleled Matilda of Boulogne, when she parlayed with her Scottish relatives on behalf of her husband. To the extent this reflected any connection to Henry is near impossible to say. The affair certainly created some long-lasting connections, as their son would later serve Henry II, Henry I's grandson, attacking the king of Gwynedd at Anglesey in 1158 on Henry II's behalf. Perhaps this is just one way this bastard helped secure Anglo-Norman interests in Wales, and Henry I had long hoped the affair would aid Anglo-Welsh peace, just as Sybilla did with the Scots. If so, it corresponds with what else we have seen of Henry's Anglo-Welsh policy. This affair may have improved relations, but in a way that created far weaker connections than an Anglo-Welsh marriage, aligning with the Anglo-Welsh power differential and Henry I's desire for flexibility.

Overlapping, though not identical, reasons are behind the lack of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomatic marriages in the Anglo-Saxon period.[126] It is worth mentioning that pre-Conquest

[121] *The Autobiography of Gerald of Wales*, ed. C. H. Willian (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 83.
[122] *AC*, p. 23, '*Henricus filius Geraldi occisus est alii uolunt filius fuit henrici regis*'.
[123] David Crouch, 'Nest', *ODNB*, 23 September 2004; Kari Maund, *Princess Nest of Wales: Seductress of the English* (Stroud, 2012), p. 246; Susan M. John, *Gender, Nation and Conquest in the High Middle Ages: Nest of Deheubarth* (Manchester, 2013), p. 70.
[124] Maund, *Nest*, p 244.
[125] *Brut*, pp. 54-57.
[126] Simon MacLean, 'Making a Difference in Tenth-Century Politics', *Frankland*, ed. Paul Fouracre and David Ganz (Manchester, 2008), p. 171; Shelia Sharp, 'The West Saxon Tradition of Dynastic Marriage: With Special

kings were not dogmatically opposed to diplomatic marriages. Æthelred of England married Emma of Normandy, obstructing an alliance between Duke Robert of Normandy and Æthelred's Viking enemies.[127] Cnut married his daughter Gunhilda to Henry III of Germany.[128] Æthelstan was a serial practitioner of marriage diplomacy, marrying off several of his sisters to foreign magnates, including Duke Hugh the Great of the Franks, King Sihtric of Northumbria prior to the unification of England, the future Emperor Otto the Great, and Louis, brother of King Rudolph II of Burgundy.[129] Why did Æthelstan not marry one of his sisters to a Scottish or Welsh ruler, especially given his numerous diplomatic interactions and conflicts with them? Like Henry I with the Welsh, Æthelstan pursued diplomatic practices that did not correspond with marriages. He established peace by taking tribute from neighbouring realms, so probably felt he did not need to employ a practice that would have tied him to them through bonds of mutual obligation. He was proven wrong in regards to Constantine II of Scotland, who attacked in the years following his payment of tribute to Æthelstan in 934. Perhaps a marriage alliance would have prevented this war. Æthelstan's successors probably also considered themselves too strong to need diplomatic marriages with Welsh rulers, who visited English courts and paid tribute during the reigns of Eadred, Eadwig and Edward the Confessor for instance. Notwithstanding Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, these strategies kept the Welsh in check.

Furthermore, there were others who Anglo-Saxon kings needed to establish strong peace ties with: their own magnates. *The Life of King Edward* records Edward's marriage to Edith, daughter of Earl Godwin of Wessex, in 1045. It states he did this because 'he knew that with the advice and help of that Godwin he would have a firmer hold on his hereditary rights in England.'[130] This sounds like a diplomatic marriage, which provided Edward with the support of Edith's family, the only substantive difference being that it was not inter-ruler. Given the secessionist movements Anglo-Saxon kings faced in the tenth century, and the numerous noble led rebellions that occurred in the eleventh, political marriages were probably seen principally as tools for domestic peacemaking. Notably, the tenth century kings Edmund, Eadwig and Edgar all married women from north of the Thames. The family ties these women brought their husbands surely aided unification.[131] Only when a king was particularly powerful (Æthelstan), or faced a challenging continental threat (Æthelred), were marriage ties with foreign rulers employed. As for Cnut, his marriage strategy will be reconsidered in the following section. Whilst there has been limited investigation into the strategies behind diplomatic marriages, Russell Martin uncovered a similar trend in early-modern Muscovy (in the edition of *The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* that Watkins promoted NDH in). During the sixteenth century it became more common for the grand prince to take domestic rather than foreign brides.

Reference to Edward the Elder', *Edward the Elder*, ed. N. J. Higham and D. H. Hill (London, 2001), p. 86; Bartlett, *Blood Royal*, p. 12

[127] *ASC D*, 1002.

[128] *LKE*, pp. 64-65; Michael Kenneth Lawson, *Cnut: England's Viking King* (Stroud, 2004), p. 104.

[129] WM, 1, pp. 170-71, 198-201.

[130] *LKE*, pp. 24-25, '*Sciebat ipsius Godwini consilio et auxilio ius suum hereditarium in Anglia securius possidere*'; *ASC E*, 1045.

[131] *ASC D*, 957; WM, p. 261; *ES* 744; Pauline Stafford, *Queen Emma and Queen Edith: Queenship and Women's Power in Eleventh-Century England* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 134-35.

These marriages were still used to make allies, it is just that the allies were native magnates, not foreign kings. As Martin puts it 'The grand prince needed allies at court, and he made them using marriages […] the boundary between foreign policy and domestic or court politics then, is a flimsy one in Muscovy.'[132] Martin encouraged comparing this approach to the marriage strategies employed by other European rulers in the early modern period.[133] Perhaps his conclusions go beyond early-modern Europe, corresponding with the activities of Anglo-Saxon kings. To fully understand why this trend was bucked in the Anglo-Norman period, we must also explore the inimical motives behind these marriages.

3. Inimical Marriages

Unlike peaceful marriages, Diggelmann's inimical marriages were primarily about opposing a party outside of the direct marriage agreement.[134] As an example, he proposes the marriage that Henry I arranged between his son William Adelin and daughter of Count Fulk of Anjou in 1119.[135] This alliance counterbalanced Henry's rival, Louis VI of France, which Diggelmann argues contributed to the king of England's success when he fought his French counterpart at the Battle of Brémule that same year. Other historians have alluded to the inimical marriage model, though without explicit reference to it. In Wilkinson's aforementioned work on a thirteenth century Anglo-German diplomatic marriage, she suggests both Emperor Frederick II and Henry III were motived by enmity with third parties.[136] Frederick sought to pull the English kingdom away from his rebelling son, who Henry III had previously treated with. Much like his namesake, Henry III wanted an ally against the king of France. Kathrin McCann likewise highlighted the role that rivalries with third parties played in the formation of Anglo-Saxon royal marriage agreements, listing 'to gain support against adversaries' as one of the main motivations.[137] Historians have seen enmity fuelling marriage agreements over much of the medieval period.

We have already seen two examples of the inimical consequences of marriage diplomacy: Alexander I of Scotland campaigning with Henry I versus the Welsh, and David I of Scotland fighting King Stephen on behalf of his niece, the Empress Matilda. If Alexander and Sybilla's marriage did take place around the time of the attack on Wales, as has been suggested, it might partly be explained by Henry's desire to secure an ally versus the Welsh. This corresponds with his other actions in Wales, such as using gifts and rewards to secure the aid of one Welsh magnate against another. David's military intervention in the Anarchy could not have been a direct aim of Henry's marriage to David's sister, given the events are separated by thirty-six years. Still, both marriages

[132] Russell E. Martin, 'Gifts for the Bride: Dowries, Diplomacy and Marriage Politics in Muscovy', *JMEMS*, 28 (2008), pp. 120, 129, 138-40, quote at p. 139.
[133] Ibid, pp. 139-40.
[134] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity' p. 241.
[135] Ibid p. 243-44.
[136] Wilkinson, 'Imperial Marriage', pp. 23-24.
[137] McCann, *Anglo-Saxon Kingship*, p. 94; Also, Katherine Bullimore, 'Unpicking the Web: The Divorce of Ecgfrith and Æthelthryth', *European Review of History*, 16 (2009), pp. 845-46.

indicate that matrimony could have unwelcome outcomes for those outside the agreement, and that these potential results could play a role in the decision to pursue a diplomatic marriage.

The marriage of Henry and Matilda of Scots was intended to secure Scottish support, or at least Scottish non-participation, regarding a succession dispute with another claimant: Robert Curthose. R. W. Southern argues that Henry was primarily worried about Robert attacking England's southern coast from the mainland Europe, so 'a marriage with the sister of the king of Scotland probably offered the best means of protecting his rear.'[138] Certainly the wedding, taking place on November 11th 1100, occurred amidst tensions between Henry and his brother Robert. Henry had only been crowned on August 5th of that year.[139] Then Robert, who had been recognised as William Rufus' heir, returned to Normandy from the Holy Land in the autumn and launched a campaign to take the English throne with the backing of some of the Anglo-Norman realm's richest landholders. Meanwhile, Henry's supporters were deserting him in favour of his brother. Robert landed at Portsmouth in July 1101. Rather than fight the brothers reconciled, negotiating an agreement known as the *Treaty of Alton*: Henry kept England, whilst Robert got Normandy and a yearly pension from his brother.[140] Contextually, the marriage must have related to Henry's efforts to ward off Robert, the central political issue when it occurred.

Unnoticed by Southern, Henry had another reason to fear the Scots playing a decisive role in the succession dispute. Robert Curthose had ties to the Scottish royal family. He helped mediate peace between Malcolm III and William Rufus during their summit in 1091.[141] The link went back to 1080, when Robert led an invasion of Scotland at his father's behest.[142] Symeon claims he achieved nothing, but William of Malmesbury implies that the attack led to Robert conducting diplomacy with the Scottish royal family. He states that Robert was Matilda's godfather.[143] William does not date the ceremony that established this relationship, but it likely happened during Robert's visit in 1080, and presumably required interactions with other members of the royal family. The relationship was still active in the early twelfth century. In 1103, Robert cancelled the 3,000-mark annual payment that Henry owed him under the terms of the *Treaty of Alton*. Malmesbury states he did this because Matilda was his goddaughter, and 'he understood that the queen so wished it from her silent pleading.'[144] The Scots then were natural allies of Robert, whom he could ask to support his campaign against Henry. By marrying Matilda, Henry was blocking this potential alliance. Bound to both sides in this Anglo-Norman civil war, King Edgar and the Scots responded by not becoming involved with

[138] R. W. Southern, *Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-c.1130* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 188; Appendix 2 no. 45.
[139] Ibid, pp. 176-77; WM, pp. 716-19; OV, 5, pp. 318-19; C. Warren Hollister, 'The Anglo-Norman Civil War: 1101', *EHR*, 88 (1973), pp. 315-34.
[140] Ibid, p. 176.
[141] *ASC E*, 1091.
[142] *HR*, p. 211.
[143] WM, pp. 704-05.
[144] Ibid, pp. 704-05, '*Sola uoluntate reginae tacite postulantis comperta*'.

either, sitting out the conflict. This was a significant shift in the balance of power between the brothers, and likely contributed to Henry remaining king of England.

The marriage of Ada de Warenne may have played a similar role. As well as directly smoothing out Anglo-Scottish relations after the Battle of the Standard, this wedding took place in the context of the ongoing conflict between Stephen and the Empress Matilda, which is what originally motivated David's invasion. Like Henry I in 1100, Stephen needed to break the connection between the Scottish king and his dynastic rival to strengthen his hand in a civil war. It is notable that he also used a familial tie between his own court and the Scottish one as part of his diplomacy. Since the Empress was already joined to David by her father's marriage, the only way to cancel it out was through another marriage, this time involving David's son. Without doubt, isolating the Empress formed part of Stephen's calculations on 1139.

Diplomatic marriages did not only relate to Anglo-Norman dynastic rivalries. The marriages Henry I arranged for Alexander and David were partly intended to turn the Scottish brothers against each other. For starters, the brides involved were not of equal status, and this asymmetricity had big consequences. Orderic describes two features that enhanced Maud of Huntingdon's status: her relation to the Norman royal family, and her attachment to both Huntingdon and Northumbria. Obtaining the earldom of Huntingdon was obviously helpful, as it gave David a powerbase in England. Moreover, as the daughter of a former earl of Northumbria, Maud gave David and his future descendants a claim on it. This would have provided the heir presumptive and future king of Scotland with a route to expanding the Scottish realm southward.

Sybilla brought Alexander no earldom, nor any claim to English territory. William of Malmesbury goes further, suggesting that Sybilla was in some way deficient. He wrote that 'nor, she [Sybilla] having died before him, did he [Alexander] sigh a lot, for she was lacking, as it is reported, in modesty of manners or in refinement of person.'[145] There is some discussion about whether Sybilla was actually criticised by Alexander and other contemporaries, and how this related to her bastard status. Kathleen Thompson argues that whereas lower status individuals might appreciate a marriage to the king's bastard, since it provided a link to Henry, 'there can be no such comfort factor for Alexander of Scotland, however, whose royal blood, […] stretched for generations.'[146] Conversely, Jessica Nelson suggests that William's attack on Sybilla was a politically motivated slur aimed at earning the support of Alexander's brother David.[147] Chris Given-Wilson and Alice Curteis also effectively disregard Malmesbury's comment, stating that 'there is no evidence the match caused any astonishment amongst contemporaries. Royal blood was royal blood', and adding that the political relationships and dowries that came with marriages were all that mattered.[148]

[145] Ibid, pp. 724-25, '*Nec ante se mortuam multum suspirauit; defuerat enim feminae, ut fertur, quod desideraretur uel in morum modestia uel in corporis elegantia*'.
[146] Kathleen Thompson, 'Affairs of State: The Illegitimate Children of Henry I', *JMH*, 29 (2003), p. 139.
[147] Nelson, 'Sybilla'.
[148] Given-Wilson and Curteis, *Bastards*, p. 64.

I favour Thompson's argument. Malmesbury was not opposed to Alexander, writing in regards to him and his brothers Edgar and David, that 'History can show no parallel to these brothers, each a king and each so holy, breathing the fragrance of their mother's life', before extolling their other virtues.[149] It seems unlikely that William would construct the Sybilla story to deride Alexander. Probably, it reflects his and others' actual view on Alexander's marriage to Henry's bastard. Given-Wilson and Curteis' attitude might be true in the abstract, but Alexander surely compared his illegitimate wife, who brought him no land or titles, to the heiress his brother married. William seemingly made this point. Having flagged up how unworthy the bastard Sybilla was, he wrote in the following sentence that David 'was bestowed with the marriage of a highborn woman.'[150] He certainly perceived Maud as a far better bride than Sybilla.

Setting aside Sybilla's bastard status, Alexander probably would not have appreciated Maud of Huntingdon marrying his brother. Noble families generally restricted marriages. Sheila Sharp argues that Anglo-Saxon royal heirs did not often marry before succeeding, as kings would not want to create and finance a rival faction's household.[151] Duby suggests that families only aimed to marry off one of their sons, protecting their land by reducing the number of claimants to it. The one exception was when the second son married an heiress, providing him with land of his own.[152] Though Maud was an heiress, David's marriage was still a possible threat to Alexander and his line. It gave his rival a political base to challenge him from, something Alexander had explicitly tried to stop by attempting to prevent David from inheriting land in southern Scotland. The marriage also provided David with the opportunity to produce descendants with claims to the Scottish throne and Northumbria, an area that given its close proximity to Scotland Alexander may have coveted. Eventually Alexander died without a legitimate heir and David became king, but such an outcome was not foreseeable in 1114, and definitely undesirable from Alexander's perspective.

Alexander and David's marriages were about more than Anglo-Scottish peace, stoking division between the brothers to Henry's advantage. This resembles his divide and rule approach towards Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd and Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys in 1114. Again, Henry successfully established links with two foreign magnates, Alexander and David, who themselves had a pre-existing relationship. However, the connections were not identical, with David's bride seemingly far better than Alexander's. This would have made David more supportive of Henry than Alexander, and encouraged jealousy between them, decreasing the chance they would ally against the English king. Other interactions between Henry and the Scottish brothers correspond with this approach. Whilst Alexander reportedly only visited Henry once, during the Welsh campaign of 1114, we know from Orderic Vitalis that David spent an extended period at Henry's court prior to becoming king of

[149] WM, pp. 726-27, '*Neque uero umquam in act historiarum relatum est tantae sanctitatis tres fuisse pariter reges et fratres, maternae pietatis nectar*'.
[150] Ibid, 1, pp. 726-27, '*Conubio insignis feminae donauerat*'.
[151] Sharp, 'Dynastic Marriage', p. 80.
[152] Duby, *Marriage*, p. 11.

Scotland, receiving the aforementioned gifts and a knighthood.[153] It is possibly significant that David is not mentioned in any of the accounts of the 1114 invasion of Wales.

From what we know of it, the brothers' relationship was fraught. As well as the conflict over David's claim to Tweeddale, Teviotdale and part of Cumbria, David held no formal role in Alexander's government.[154] A rift evidently existed between them, which prevented the formation of a united front against Henry. The extent to which the marriages and Henry's other diplomatic actions increased this tension is difficult to know, but it seems likely this strategy contributed to David and Alexander's ire towards one another, further strengthening Henry's position. As Green claims regarding a potential internal Scottish dispute, 'from Henry's perspective, such a complication was no bad thing.'[155]

These marriages had inimical consequences, confronting and damping the threat posed by third parties. Yet, as we saw earlier, they also had also peaceful outcomes. This furthers the argument made by Diggelmann, who accepted that his categories would overlap, stating 'Both motivations (peaceful and inimical) could be apparent within a single marriage.'[156] In fact it seems likely they always would be to a degree. Even if a marriage was mostly about confronting a third party, it still enshrined a good relationship with a second party. Given the potential permanence of these ties, it would be unwise to not consider them when agreeing to a marriage. The ultimate paradox of marriage, is that it could bring both war and peace. It was really a question of gradation, with both motives mattering, but one more so. Due to the Scottish invasions that immediately preceded it, Ada de Warenne's marriage was probably more centred on re-establishing Anglo-Scottish peace. Alexander and Sybilla's marriage on the other hand seems to have immediately led to his role in attacking Henry's Welsh enemies, whilst also promoting hostility with David, suggesting inimical motives dominated Henry I's strategic thinking.

Having diagnosed inimicality in marriages, we can use this theme to further dissect the sudden rise in diplomatic marriages in the Anglo-Norman period. Once again, they were distinct from the majority of Anglo-Saxon kings in possessing continental land. This meant Anglo-Norman kings' focus was often southward towards continental threats. It also led to frequent trips abroad, which, as discussed, left England ripe for attacks from Scotland during Malcolm III's reign. Thus Anglo-Scottish marriages were partly used to firmly guarantee peace at one end of the Anglo-Norman realm, so that its kings could turn their attention to the opposite end. As Southern noted, Henry's marriage to Matilda of Scots was needed to protect his northern frontier whilst facing off against a continental threat, in the form of his brother. The marriages Henry I arranged for Alexander and David occurred during a period when he was frequently abroad defending his continental land.[157] The former not only helped secure the north, but earned Henry an ally against a threat that had rebelled in his absence. Correspondingly, the divide and rule strategy behind these marriages sowed discord between the brothers, weakening

[153] OV, 4, pp. 274-75.
[154] Green, *Henry I*, pp. 128-29; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 57-59.
[155] Green, *Henry I*, p. 129.
[156] Diggelmann, 'Marriage, Peace, and Enmity' p. 241.
[157] *ASC E*, 1111-14; JW, 3, p. 135; Judith, *Henry I*, pp. 118-37.

potential Scottish opposition. Stephen also faced significant continental challenges. Count Geoffrey of Anjou, the Empress' husband, had attacked Normandy in 1136 and 1137. Stephen was unable to fully defeat Geoffrey at this time, only able to secure a short-term truce by paying the count off.[158] Further, he had spent much of 1138 putting down rebellions in southwestern England, launched at the instigation of the Empress' bastard half-brother, Robert of Gloucester, who had renounced his homage to Stephen.[159] At the time of Ada and Henry of Scotland's marriage, Robert and the Empress were on the other side of the English Channel. Stephen likely anticipated their eventual crossing, in September 1139, having ordered all the harbours to be guarded.[160] Peace on one front meant leave to pursue war on another. In line with this, one of the only rulers in the Anglo-Saxon period to pursue diplomatic marriages was Cnut, who of course also held continental possessions. His daughter married the King of Germany, allaying the chance of conflict between the Germans and Cnut's nearby Danish realm.[161] Like the Anglo-Norman kings, he wanted one of his many disparate frontiers secure, so turned to marriage diplomacy.

4. Conclusion

Without question, marriages played a significant role in the diplomatic landscape of medieval Britain. Following Diggelmann, I investigated how they established peaceful relations between a groom and brides' kingdoms. Wives like Matilda of Scotland and Matilda of Boulogne used the model of Queen Esther to influence their husbands, whilst also reaching out on his behalf to their other relatives, significantly improving relations. The marriages also led to other members of both the Scottish and English royal family becoming more closely aligned. The arrangement of the marriage itself, time spent at the other family's court and the mutual benefits they provided each other, such as military support and the right to give counsel, all created family connections that stretched far beyond the bride and groom, to their siblings and descendants. That later point is key. The power of marriage is its permanence, establishing long-lasting positive connections that last across generations, assisting an enduring move from war to peace.

Influenced by Diggelmann, I also showed that marriages also had inimical consequences, targeted at third parties. Through marriages, the Anglo-Norman kings gained Scottish allies against third party threats, as was the case with the aid Alexander provided against the Welsh. They also blocked, or attempted to stop, Scottish leaders allying with third parties. Henry I hoped that his marriage to Matilda of Scots, for instance, would stop any alliance between Robert Curthose and the Scots. These marriages shifted the balance of power, strengthening the ruler of England.

In terms of the evolution of relations, as with other diplomatic practices, marriages played a role in transforming the Anglo-Scottish relationship around the beginning of Henry I's reign. In contrast

[158] HH, p. 709; OV, 6, pp. 480-87; Bradbury, *SM*, pp. 37-42.
[159] HH, p. 713; Malmesbury, *Novella*, p. 23; Bradbury, *SM*, pp. 23-25.
[160] *GS*, pp. 57-58.
[161] Lawson, *Cnut*, p. 104.

to the preceding decades, they helped generate, maintain and re-establish a positive relationship between the kingdoms. The family ties created connections and offered benefits, whilst sowing a degree of intra-Scottish division, that encouraged a shift away from Anglo-Scottish conflict. When tensions rose, it was partly due to the physical absence of a diplomatic bride. Further, after David's invasions in the late 1130s, it was diplomatic brides, Matilda of Boulogne and Ada de Warenne, who played major roles in reforging peace.

However, the change is broader than that. Rather than simply reflecting the situation post-1100, the shift was the result of considerable differences between the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman political situations. As rulers of Normandy, the later kings used marriages to secure their position within Britain, in particular their Scottish front, allowing them to turn their attention southwards towards continental military threats. This was not a concern for Anglo-Saxon kings. They generally only employed marriages to improve relations with their own magnates, a bigger issue given recent unification. An interesting parallel is Cnut, who like the Anglo-Norman kings used marriage diplomacy due to considerations around continental land.

The lack of Anglo-Welsh marriages post-1100 has several ramifications which point to differences between English relations with their Scottish and Welsh neighbours. Not only did it lead to Anglo-Welsh conflict, but it illustrates the incompatibility between marriages and the Anglo-Welsh relationship. The weakness of the Welsh, combined with the flexible diplomatic approach of figures like Henry I, meant marriages did not align with this sort of relationship. Henry I's affair with Nest may have worked to improve Anglo-Welsh relations, though without the benefits and position that came with marriage, she could never have influenced events as much as a true diplomatic queen.

Beyond this, the chapter supports and promotes the use of Diggelmann's peaceful and inimical marriage models. It provides a route to expanding on the multifaceted and overlapping outcomes brought about by diplomatic marriages. It is already implicit within the work of other scholars, such as Wilkinson and Stafford, so deserves recognition as a successful method for approaching these marriages through.

Chapter 4: Diplomats: Envoys, Escorts, Mediators and Proxies

1. Introduction

When King Malcolm III of Scotland and King William Rufus of England met for their disastrous summit at Gloucester in 1093, they had arrived there thanks to numerous diplomats: 'the king of Scotland sent and asked for the fulfilment of the terms that had been promised him, and King William summoned him to Gloucester and sent him hostages to Scotland, and Prince Edgar afterwards.'[1] Envoys from both sides had played an important role in arranging this event, as probably was the case for every summit mentioned in this study. NDH scholars have argued for the importance of researching such diplomats and their behaviours, claiming that diplomats are significant historical agents, who can shed light on broader international relations.[2] Karen Gram-Skjoldager, for instance, has claimed that diplomats are 'important creatures in international history', and called for fresh investigations into how European unification altered their position.[3] Though these scholars have privileged the twentieth century, their approach is perhaps even more applicable to medieval diplomacy due to the polycentric nature of kingdoms.[4] Kings could not be everywhere. By necessity relations with their neighbours involved other diplomatic agents. We have already seen this, with queens appearing as quasi-diplomats, interceding on behalf of a blood relatives at their husband's court. Due to the absence of modern communication technology and high-speed transport, medieval leaders were less able to directly interact with each other than their modern counterparts, further increasing the importance of diplomats in Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations between 927 and 1154.

When scholarship of medieval diplomacy has moved away from kings to consider the other diplomats involved in relations, it often centres on two types of envoys: *nuncii* (or *nuntii*) and *procuratores*. This approach is demonstrated by Donald Queller in 'Thirteenth Century Diplomatic Envoys'. Fundamentally, *nuncii* were envoys with limited powers. There is some evidence for the position's existence in Britain between 927 and 1154. For example, Orderic Vitalis claims that following a dispute between William the Conqueror and Malcolm III of Scotland, in 1068 the Scottish king 'gladly sent back his messengers (*nuncios*) with the bishop of Durham through whom he faithfully swore obedience to King William.'[5] According to Queller, a *nuncius* was 'merely a messenger':

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[1] *ASC E*, 1093.
[2] 'About,' *The Network for New Diplomatic History*: https://newdiplomatichistory.org/about/. Accessed 14 July 2020.
[3] Karen Gram-Skjoldager, 'Bringing the Diplomat Back In: Elements of a New Historical Research Agenda', *IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEC* (2011), pp. 1-21, quote on p. 2; See also Karen Gram-Skjoldager, 'Never Talk to Strangers? On Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of Diplomacy in European Community/Union', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 22 (2011), pp. 696-714.
[4] *ILE*, p.19.
[5] OV, 2, p. 219, '*Cum praesule dunelmi nuncios suos ouanter remisit per quos guillelmo regi fidele obsequium iurauit*'.

anything a letter could achieved, a *nuncius* could also do. As well as carrying messages, they paid debts and, as in 1068, swore oaths on their principal's behalf. Although, they could only conclude terms if their principal had already agreed to them. Consequently, a *nuncii* had the power to negotiate an agreement, or conclude one, but never both. Their position was secured by a letter of credence from the principal, which asked the recipient to believe that the *nuncius* spoke on the sender's behalf.[6] Rather than a product of medieval secular or ecclesiastical innovation, this envoy type was developed in the ancient world.[7] For instance, Julius Caesar sent messengers with letters of credence during the Gallic Wars, instructing the Lingones to not aid the Helvetii.[8] It is best to think of *nuncii* as simple instruments of medieval diplomacy, which rulers sent to complete specific tasks.

Procuratores had more power. The best example of how they functioned is the *Treaty of Venice* (1201), negotiated in the context of the Fourth Crusade. The Crusaders assembled in 1200 at Compiegne, and then sent six envoys 'with full powers' to conclude an agreement with a port to build ships. These envoys were supplied with 'valid charters, with seals attached, to the effect that they would undertake to maintain to carry out whatever conventions and agreements the envoys might enter into, in all sea ports, and whithersoever else the envoys might fare.' The envoys decided to travel to Venice, where they negotiated an agreement to pay the Venetians 85,000 marks in return for the ships they needed. They then ratified the treaty, loaned money to make an initial payment on the ships, and then took word of the agreement back to their principals.[9] These *procuratores* were entrusted with the power to make decisions at meetings that their leaders could have made if they were there, and anything the *procuratores* negotiated was respected as if their principals had actually agreed it. Like *nuncii*, their power was granted by official documents from the principal. The office developed in the thirteenth century, streamlining diplomacy by permitting the negotiation and conclusion of agreements at the same time, meaning rulers could now create treaties without a face-to-face meeting, or numerous back and forth missions.[10]

These two offices have dominated discussion of medieval diplomats, particularly in works interested in institutional evolution. Investigating the changing nature of diplomacy, Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne made the *nuncius* versus *procurator* distinction the main subject of their brief section on medieval diplomacy prior to the emergence of resident ambassadors[11] In the context of diplomatic documents in English foreign policy, Chaplais highlights the post-1200 growth in letters granting powers of procuration, in contrast to the preceding years when envoys were only granted the

[6] Donald E. Queller, 'Thirteenth Century Diplomatic Envoys: *Nuncii and Procuratores*', *Speculum*, 35 (1960), pp. 199-202, quote on p. 199.
[7] Kriston R. Rennie, *The Foundations of Medieval Papal Legation* (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 67.
[8] Caesar, *The Gallic Wars*, trans. Carolyn Hammond (Oxford, 1996), p. 17.
[9] Geoffroi de Villehardouin, *Memoirs or Chronicle of the Fourth Crusade and The Conquest of Constantinople*, trans. Frank T. Murzials (London, 1908), pp. 4-9, quotes on p. 4.
[10] Queller, 'Diplomatic Envoys', pp. 203-04, 213.
[11] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolutions, Theory and Administration* (London, 2011), pp. 31-36, quote on p.33.

power to be *nuncii*.[12] G.P. Cuttino and Garrett Mattingly see the two offices as central to diplomacy in the Middle Ages. They do reference another secular envoy type though: *legatus*. In terms of power to negotiate and conclude, this office performed a similar function to a *nuncius*, but its holders were of higher status, thus symbolising the principle's dignity to a greater degree. As Cuttino put it, the difference was between 'sending a note' and 'making a diplomatic representation'.[13] This corresponds with Queller's brief explanation that *legatus* and *porturs des lectres* (letter bearers) were just *nuncii* by other names.[14] Whilst a welcome addition, it is not a major alteration to the *nuncius-procurator* model.

Unfortunately, analysing envoys by asking how much power they possessed in negotiations and thus whether they were a *nuncius* or a *procurator*, has its drawbacks. Jenny Benham argues the *nuncius-procurator* distinction, like many interpretations of medieval diplomacy, largely relates to Italy and the thirteenth century onwards.[15] This makes the model ill equipped for a study of diplomatic agents in Britain prior to c.1200, when the *procurator* office had yet to be developed. We would consequently expect every envoy featured in this study to be some form of *nuncius*, and certainly we possess no evidence this was not the case. However, even if it was not, or we consider other envoy offices like *legatus*, our sources are not a direct route to understanding the power envoys possessed. Queller utilised 'diplomatic sources', such as the letters of credence envoys carried as evidence of their remit.[16] As working legal documents, they accurately described an envoy's real status. Instead, the chronicles this study relies on are far more disconnected from the envoys they record. The *ASC*'s author likely did not know exactly what leeway Edgar the Ætheling was granted in dealing with Malcolm III, nor did he need to, as his chronicle was not intended to prove the envoy's powers. Due to this, we should be cautious about drawing too much meaning from the terms chroniclers, like Orderic Vitalis, used for envoys, since they lack the legalistic rigour that applied to Queller's sources. Further, envoy terms are not common. As in the case of the *ASC*'s account of 1093, which does not include any envoy titles. The same is true in the source's description of the Englishmen who treated with Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales in 1056: 'Earl Leofric came there, and Earl Harold and Bishop Ealdred, and made an agreement between them according to which Gruffydd swore oaths that he would be a loyal and faithful under-king to King Edward.'[17] Likewise, when Henry of Scotland met with Queen Matilda of England to agree the *Second Treaty of Durham* (1139), he was simply called the 'son of the king of Scotland'.[18] The absence of any sort reference to a diplomatic office in these sources could

[12] Pierre Chaplais, 'English Diplomatic Documents to the end of Edward III's Reign', in *The Study of Medieval Records: Essays in Honour of Kathleen Major*, ed. Donald A. Bullough and R. L. Storey (Oxford, 1971), pp. 25, 39.
[13] G. P. Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration: 1259-1339* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 127-30, quote on p. 130; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 29-30.
[14] Queller, 'Diplomatic Envoys', p. 199, n. 6-7.
[15] *PMA*, pp. 117-19.
[16] Queller, 'Diplomatic Envoys', p. 200, 202; Expanded on further in Donald Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J., 1967), pp. viii.
[17] *ASC C*, 1056; See JW, 2, pp. 580-81.
[18] JH, p. 300, '*Henricum filium regis Scotiae*'.

suggest that as far as the chroniclers were concerned this was not an important factor compared to other aspects of envoys' identities.

Benham concluded her section on *nuncii* and *procuratores* with the statement, 'When looking at diplomatic personnel in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, a more subtle approach is needed than simply distinguishing between *nuncii* and *procuratores*.'[19] As my above conclusions show, this less constrained argument can be applied to other periods as well. Benham put this into practice, highlighting the recurrent employment of chancellors, like Thomas Becket, as envoys from the English king.[20] Other scholars have looked at envoy behaviour aside from their negotiating power. Both Nicholas Droucourt and Ecatarina Lung have investigated envoys to and from Byzantium, discovering that one of their primary roles was to gather information.[21] In 714, the Byzantine Emperor sent Daniel Sinopites to the Umayyad Caliph with instructions to learn about the caliphate's military strengths.[22]

Correspondingly, this chapter develops understanding of envoys in a more nuanced way than the *nuncii-procuratores* method permits. Analysing the patterns of envoy behaviour and identity apparent in the primary sources, with reference to context and comparisons, reveals three forms of diplomatic agent to explore Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations during this period through. Firstly, linked diplomats, who possessed some form of connection to the rulers they were sent to treat with. This connection usually manifested itself in one of two ways; through family ties or geographic proximity. Secondly, third-party mediators, for which the papal legate Alberic of Ostia is the sole example. Thirdly, proxies, meaning envoys who submitted to a king on another's behalf. These categories are not exclusive, with a degree of overlap between the first and third types.

The list is not exhaustive either. The sources generally focus on high-status envoys, obscuring many unnamed low-status individuals who were presumably involved in minor issues. We cannot identify the envoys that brought Malcolm III's initial demands to William Rufus in 1093, for instance. Similarly, as trans-kingdom individuals, foreign merchants must have frequently impacted and been impacted by diplomatic relations. Notably, the surviving written treaties that King Alfred of Wessex and King Æthelred of England agreed with Scandinavian figures in the ninth and tenth centuries, respectively, extensively discuss foreign trade.[23] Yet the narrative sources we largely rely on here make no reference to a direct connection between merchants and diplomacy, presumably again due to their low status. Whilst such issues cannot be entirely overcome, where possible unnamed individuals are considered. Beyond being distinct and identifiable in my sources, the three

[19] *PMA*, p. 122.
[20] Ibid, pp. 124-25; William Fitzstephen, '*Life of St. Thomas*', in *The lives of Thomas Becket*, ed. and trans. Michael Staunton (Manchester, 2001), pp. 55-56.
[21] Nicholas Drocourt, 'Passing on Political Information between Major Powers; The Key Role of Ambassadors between Byzantium and some its Neighbours', *Al-Masaq*, 24 (2021), pp. 91-112; Ecaterina Lung, 'Barbarian Envoys at Byzantium in the 6th Century', *Revista Hiperborea*, 2 (2015), pp. 42-43.
[22] *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor*, ed. Cyril Mango and Roger Scott (Oxford, 1997), p. 534.
[23] '*Treaty between Alfred and Guthrum (886-890)*', *EHD I*, pp. 380-81; '*King Æthelred's treaty with the viking army*', *EHD I*, pp. 401-02.

types of diplomats discussed can also be seen in primary and secondary evidence related to other periods and locations. Thus, they can be built on through comparison and historiographical debate. Additionally, they are all tied to inter-ruler relations. The vast majority were clearly chosen by a king to serve as a diplomat, or were in his service. As a third-party, Alberic of Ostia was a notable exception. However, as we shall see, the kings involved in his mediation accepted his intervention, making him an approved agent within their diplomatic policies.

As this chapter reflects on at its close, the selection, identity and behaviour of these diplomats provides insight into the differences between Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations. Furthermore, diplomats reveal a degree of pre- and post-Conquest continuity, with Anglo-Norman rulers utilising figures who played a role in Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. Once again, the character of inter-ruler relationships was more nuanced than this though, as diplomats do indicate that the Norman Conquest and other events did precipitate some changes in relations.

2. Linked Diplomats

Kings often sent diplomats to treat with other rulers, who had a positive connection to the receiving king. This was a clever tactical decision, as the diplomat could use their connection to influence their host, leading to effective peacemaking and the advancement of their principal's goals. Though the concept of linked envoys and escorts has not been codified in the historiography to the extent of *nuncii and procuratores*, it has been acknowledged. Benham herself pointed out that when King John of England sent a mission to King William the Lion of Scotland, he included William's brother David in its composition.[24] Other links were less personal, with Chaplais arguing that knowledge of the destination, including linguistic skills, were important considerations for a ruler when selecting envoys: 'A person of lower rank, familiar with the country to which he was sent and able to speak the native tongue of its people, was likely to be a better asset than a bishop or an earl without those qualifications.'[25]

The origin of linked envoys can be traced all the way back to the classical world. When communicating with the Persians, Sparta sent two envoys whose fathers had previously travelled to Persia.[26] The Greek city states would often manage diplomatic relations between themselves with *proxenos*, citizens of one city who would work on behalf of another. *Proxenos* would provide assistance, advice and hospitality to any other envoys that arrived from the foreign city that they worked for.[27] Links between diplomats and their recipients can be seen in Roman diplomacy too. When Crassus was campaigning against the Parthians, the opposing general sent a Latin speaking

[24] *PMA,* p. 132.
[25] Chaplais. 'English Diplomatic Documents', p. 34.
[26] Edward Rung, 'War, Peace and Diplomacy in Graeco-Persian Relations from the Sixth to the Fourth Century B.C.', *WPAMH*, p. 4; Herodotus, *The Histories*, ed. Aubrey de Selincourt (London, 2003), p. 460.
[27] Hamilton and Langhorne, *Diplomacy*, pp.10-11.

envoy to the Roman army.[28] As Chaplais suggests, knowledge of the recipients' language seems to have been generally useful. Likewise, Emperor Constantius sent a mission to the Persian ruler Shapur II in 358 that compromised the military officers Lucillianius and Prosper. Both had knowledge of their destination, as Lucillianius had commanded troops against the Persians, whilst Prosper had been stationed on the Romano-Persian border.[29]

In tenth, eleventh, and early twelfth-century Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, two identifiable, subcategories of linked envoys and escorts can be discerned: family diplomats, who were related to the king they were sent to treat with; border diplomats, who were from part of their own kingdom adjacent to a foreign realm, and consequently were utilised to conduct relations with said foreign realm. I shall outline the categories in order, before highlighting what linked diplomats can tell us about the wider Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relationships.

A. Family Diplomats

Having spent the preceding year abroad responding to disputes related to his continental realm, Henry I returned to Britain in the summer of 1114 and invaded Wales.[30] As discussed before, the attack was provoked by a dispute between the Anglo-Norman lords based in Wales and two native Welsh rulers, Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd, which ultimately resulted in the peace agreement that saw Owain accompany Henry to Normandy with the promise of a knighthood, whilst Gruffudd paid Henry tribute.[31] According to the *Brut*'s detailed account, this outcome came about thanks to Henry's clever use of an envoy with a family tie to Owain.[32] There was a stand-off in the Welsh mountains between the native Welsh force and Henry's army, which included King Alexander I of Scotland and Earl Richard of Chester. The breakthrough occurred when Henry 'planned to send messengers to Owain, along with Maredudd [ap Bleddyn], his uncle' who was also in Henry's coalition. Maredudd warned Owain, saying 'see that thou be not late coming to the king lest others forestall winning the king's friendship.' Following Maredudd's advice, Owain made peace with Henry, receiving his knighthood in return, as well as an exemption from any tribute. As discussed, family members often counselled one another. Their mutual trust gave them access to private spaces, where they could have frank discussions without risking reprisals in the future.[33] The increased level of influence that family members possessed over one another made Maredudd a perfect envoy to Owain, able to gain access to his nephew and make a compelling argument for negotiation. Whether or not he said the exact words the *Brut* records, by explicitly pointing out that Maredudd was Owain's uncle, the source suggests his relation provided him with influence over Owain.

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[28] Plutarch, '*Crassus*', in *Fall of the Roman Empire: Six Lives of Plutarch*, trans. Rex Warner, introduction Robin Seager (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 149.
[29] Andrew Gillett, *Envoys and Political Communication in the Late Antique West, 411-533* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 21.
[30] *ASC H*, 1114; JW, 3, p. 135.
[31] See p. 40.
[32] *Brut*, pp. 78-83, all quotes on p. 81.
[33] Althoff, *Family*, p. 62.

The other envoys involved in this conflict demonstrate the effectiveness of using family members as envoys, and particularly the importance of trust. Previously, Alexander and Earl Richard had 'sent messengers to Gruffudd ap Cynan to ask him to come to the king's peace, and they promised him much and they lured him into agreeing with them.'[34] Later, the source states that the envoys had 'promised him that he should have his land free, without tribute or payment for it.'[35] As we know, when Gruffudd met Henry, after Owain's meeting with the English king, he was required to give tribute in return for peace. The implication is that Gruffudd was wrong to believe the unknown envoys' promise. Whether they were lying to Gruffudd, mistaken, or something else went wrong, these unlinked individuals were untrustworthy diplomats.

The earlier envoys who treated with Owain illustrate the same point. Prior to the meeting with Maredudd, 'the king sent messengers to Owain to ask him to come to his peace'.[36] When Owain initially refused, one of the envoys said '"Be careful and do wisely that which thou doest. Behold, Gruffudd and Owain, his son, have accepted peace from the son of Malcolm and the earl after they had promised him that he should have his land free, without either tribute or payment for it, so long as the king might live." But still Owain did not agree.'[37] Like Maredudd these envoys made a convincing argument as to why Owain should surrender. Though not explicitly said, it seems likely Owain did not trust these envoys, with whom he had no relationship. Conversely, when his uncle made a similar argument, the *Brut* states 'he believed that, and he came to the king.'[38] Evidently envoys who lacked a familial relationship with the recipient were less likely to be believed, or should not have been. Henry's decision to send Maredudd was a smart move that brought Owain to negotiations, stimulating a peace agreement. Having ended this Welsh threat through smart use of envoys, tributes and meeting sites, Henry returned to Normandy on September 21st and resumed his attempts to assert authority over his continental land.[39]

Another envoy with a family connection to the realm and the king whom he was sent to is Robert Curthose. 1091 saw the meeting between Malcolm III of Scotland and William Rufus in the vicinity of Lothian, after Rufus led a military force towards Scotland in response to an attack Malcolm led on England, at Edgar the Ætheling's instigation. Rufus' campaign stalled when his fleet sunk, leaving the two kings' armies squaring off, when, according to John of Worcester, 'Duke Robert observing this, summoned to him Edgar the Ætheling, whom the king had expelled from Normandy, and then was spending time with the king of Scots. With whose help he made peace between the kings.'[40] Orderic Vitalis provides a more expansive account. He wrote that 'The king of Scotland […] sent envoys with the following message to the king of England: "I owe you nothing, King William [Rufus], unless it be battle if you inflict any injuries on me. But if I could see King William [the

[34] *Brut*, p. 81.
[35] Ibid, p. 81.
[36] Ibid, p. 81.
[37] Ibid, p. 81.
[38] Ibid, p. 81.
[39] *ASC E*, 1114.
[40] JW, 3, pp. 60-61, '*Quod uidens comes rotbertus, clitonem Eadgarum quem rex de Normannia expulerat, et tunc cum rege scottorum degebart, ad se accersiuit; cuiu auxilio fretus, pacem inter reges fecit*'.

Conqueror]'s eldest son, Robert, I would be ready to offer him whatever I owe"'.[41] Robert went to Malcolm and spent three days with him, after which he said '"So now, great king, do as I ask you and come with me to my brother; you will find him kind and bountiful." […] The credulous king [Malcolm] was won over by promises of this kind, and after holding conference with King William made peace with him.'[42]

Robert's familial ties to Scotland dated back to 1080, when he led an army there and seemingly interacted with Malcolm, becoming godfather to the Scottish king's daughter, Matilda.[43] This facilitated a connection between Malcolm and Robert, and created a ritual kinship bond, in this case godparenthood, between Robert and the Scottish royal family, which he could use to influence the Scots.[44] Orderic's account indicates how this was done, even if there are questions about its accuracy. Whilst other sources state that Malcolm did not visit England until 1093, and was killed during an attack on northern England later that year, Orderic claims he went south immediately after the 1091 meeting and was killed on his way home.[45] However, even if the event did not occur exactly as he claims, Orderic explicitly states that Malcolm trusted in Robert's promises, reiterating the view of the *Brut* that leaders more readily agreed with envoys they had a relationship with. Thus, Robert's link to Malcolm and his family is likely why he was selected as an envoy to the Scottish king, and was ultimately successful.

Other family diplomats were involved in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy too, such as Edgar the Ætheling, whose diplomatic mission to Malcolm III in 1093 was mentioned at the top of this chapter.[46] Malcolm was married to Edgar's sister Margaret.[47] Further, Edgar spent much of 1068-74 in Scotland as an exile and returned again 1091, not only demonstrating the family tie but further opportunities for it to be developed.[48] These events will be revisited in more detail later in the thesis.[49] For now, it is enough to say that Edgar had a familial relationship with Malcolm. Henry of Scotland, Malcolm III's grandson, was also employed as a family diplomat by King David I of Scotland. Following David and Stephen's conflict and subsequent peace conference near Durham in 1136, Henry travelled to York, where Stephen granted him Doncaster, Carlisle and Huntingdon, and then onto London for an Easter feast.[50] Needless to say, Henry's diplomatic travels were not over. He agreed the *Second Treaty of*

[41] OV, 4, pp. 268-69, '*Rex autem Scottorum* […] *reqique Anglorum per internuncios ista mandauit, "Tibi rex Guillelme nichil debeo: nisi conflictum si a te iniuriis lacessitus fuero. Verum si Robertum primogenitum Guillelmi regis filium uidero: illi exhibere paratus sum quicquid debeo"*'.
[42] Ibid, pp. 270-71, '*Nunc igitur inclite rex adquiesce michi, et mecum ad fratrem meum ueni: inueniesque apud eum dulcedinem bonique affluentiam* […] *His itaque promissis rex credulous effectus est: et peractis colloquiis cum rege pacificatus est*'.
[43] *HR*, p. 211; WM, pp. 704-05; See pp. 104-05.
[44] Ruth Macrides, 'Dynastic Marriages and Political Kinship', in *Byzantine Diplomacy*, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1993), p. 263.
[45] OV, 4, p. 271; *ASC E*, 1093.
[46] *ASC E*, 1093.
[47] Ibid, 1067.
[48] JW, 3, pp. 6-9; *ASC D,* 1067-69, 1074; *E*, 1091; *HR*, pp. 191-92.
[49] See pp. 143-55.
[50] JH, pp. 287; HH, pp. 706-07.

Durham with Queen Matilda in 1139, obtaining the earldom of Northumberland. [51] He went on to meet Stephen himself at Nottingham that year, and travelled south again in 1140 for another meeting with the king and queen.[52] This thesis has already touched on how Henry's marriage to Ada de Warenne was a route through which King Stephen's influence travelled into Scotland, as well as Henry's interactions with Queen Matilda, his cousin, from her perspective. From David's standpoint, his selection of Henry for this diplomatic role must have rested on his son's family ties. Henry after all, like his father, was a blood relation of Queen Matilda, so linked by family ties to the King of England. John of Hexham and Henry of Huntingdon emphasise Henry's familial status, as David's son, in accounts of his 1136 and 1139 missions, with John's reference coming immediately after his detailed genealogical description of the ties between the queen and the Scottish royal family. Just like William Rufus 1091 and Henry I in 1114, David I must have seen such a connection as an instrument for influencing a foreign king to his own advantage. That Henry secured peace and territorial concessions on both occasions speaks to that tactic's success.

Another potential family diplomat, who at the very least had a positive connection to the king he was treating with, was Earl Leofric of Mercia. Following the Anglo-Welsh summit at Billingsley in 1055, relations soon broke down the following year, with a battle taking place between King Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales and English forces led by Bishop Leofgar of Hereford.[53] The outcome was an English defeat and another summit with Gruffydd was soon arranged, with the English delegation consisting of Earl Leofric of Mercia, as well as Earl Harold of Wessex and Bishop Ealdred of Worcester.[54] Crucially, Leofric was father of Ælfgar, who in 1055 had allied with Gruffydd in an attack on Hereford. That alliance was close: not only was it reused in 1058, but Gruffydd married Ælfgar's daughter. Orderic Vitalis, our source for the marriage does not date it, though it is associated with 1057, when Ælfgar succeeded to the earldom of Mercia.[55] We cannot rule out it having occurred by 1056, or at least marriage negotiations having begun. It is certainly possible Leofric had a family connection to Gruffydd in 1056 via his granddaughter's marriage. Even if not, the relationship between Gruffydd and Leofric's son did exist in 1056, providing the earl of Mercia with a positive social connection, akin to a familial link, to the Welsh ruler.

The frequency with which family diplomats were used, combined with descriptions of their influence over foreign rulers, suggests they were effective diplomats, who played significant roles in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. Their importance will be discussed further after the other diplomat types have been considered.

[51] Ibid, p. 300.
[52] Ibid, pp. 300, 306.
[53] *ASC C*, 1055
[54] Ibid, 1055.
[55] OV, 2, pp. 138-39; K.L Maund, 'Ealdgyth [Aldgyth]', *ODNB*, 23 September 2004.

B. Border Diplomats

Though not widely conceptualised in the historiography of diplomacy yet, another diplomat type prominent within Britain were border diplomats. Based around realms' extremities, these diplomats' proximity to foreign kingdoms encouraged close links with those neighbouring polities, whether political, cultural, social or linguistic. Their own kings could then exploit these existing relationships by sending border diplomats as envoys or escorts to the foreign rulers they were linked to, furthering inter-ruler relations.

Whilst the secondary literature has not acknowledged the concept of border diplomats, historians have highlighted examples that fall within it. Edward Rung explored Graeco-Persian relations between the sixth and fourth century B.C., discovering that Persian Satraps based in Asia Minor were frequently involved, often escorting Greek diplomats to the Persian court.[56] Likewise, Robyn Dora Radway found that border fortresses were responsible for Habsburg-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth century. They oversaw communication, hosted embassies, organised logistics for said embassies, sent letters into the foreign realm, whilst reporting to their own governments.[57]

As for research on diplomacy in the period under discussion here, the best example is Rhys Sais, who Frederick C. Suppe believes was Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales' diplomat to England in the late Anglo-Saxon period.[58] His epithet, 'Sais', was Welsh for Englishman, though it was often applied to Welsh individuals who simply possessed a connection to England.[59] He was related to Gruffydd, with his grandfather being the Welsh ruler's half-brother, helping explain how he came to serve Gruffydd.[60] His descendants were linked to England too: his great grandson, Roger of Powys, served Henry II, whilst Roger's grandson, Wronnic (a corrupted version of Goronwy) acted as King John's messenger to Wales. Seemingly Roger and Wronnic inherited and developed their ancestor's link to the English nobility, aiding the foreign policies of English monarchs towards the Welsh, rather than the other way around.[61] Crucially for this section, we know from *Domesday Book* that Rhys possessed a manor at Erbistock, located on the Welsh side of the River Dee, adjacent to north-west Shropshire, and under Gruffydd's control in the 1050s.[62] Domesday also states Erbistock had a *radman*, a horse rider who performed services including the delivery of messages. Based on this evidence, Suppe argues that 'if Rhys Sais owned Erbistock, conveniently situated just across the river from England and replete with […] a riding man, he could have been the ideal intermediary for Gruffydd ap

[56] Rung, 'War', pp. 45-46.
[57] Robyn Dora Radway, *Vernacular Diplomacy in Central Europe: Statesmen and Soldiers Between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, 1543-1593* (PhD Dissertation: Princeton University, 2017), pp. 189, 195-96, 201-06.
[58] Frederick C. Suppe, 'Who was Rhys Sais? Some Comments in Anglo-Welsh Relations before 1066', *HSJ*, ed. C. P. Lewis with Emma Courie, (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 63-72.
[59] *Brut*, p. 31.
[60] Peter Bartrum, *A Welsh Classical Dictionary* (Aberystwyth, 1993), p. 622.
[61] *The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Fifth Year of the Reign of King Henry the Second, A.D. 1158-1159*, The Pipe Roll Society (London, 1884), p.62; *Book of Fees*, ed. H. C. Maxwell Lyte, 3 vols (London, 1920-31), 1, p. 348; Frederick Suppe, 'Roger of Powys, Henry II's Anglo-Welsh Middleman and his Lineage', *WHR*, 21 (2007), pp. 1-23.
[62] *DB*, fol. 267v.

Llywelyn.'[63] Suppe focused on Gruffydd's relationship with the rebellious Ælfgar.[64] Yet Gruffydd also attended summits with King Edward's supporters and suffered two invasions at their hands. He certainly had cause for conducting diplomacy with the English king and his followers too, making him a suitable example for this study. Further, combined with Rung and Radway's studies, Suppe's shows border diplomats to be a wide-reaching concept, providing a useful lens for approaching historic diplomacy.

As a comparison, Suppe overlooked perhaps the most obvious border diplomats in medieval Britain: the bishops of Durham, key players in Anglo-Scottish relations. Though not specifically diplomatic, historians have previously seen a connection between the Durham bishopric and the Scottish kingdom. G.W.S Barrow has explored mutual ties between them, whilst Paul Dalton has discussed Scottish influence on Durham.[65] The manifestation of these ties in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy is best evidenced during Æthelwine's time as bishop. According to Symeon of Durham, in the year 1059, 'Cynsige, archbishop of York, and Æthelwine, bishop of Durham, Tostig, earl of York, conducted King Malcolm to King Edward.'[66] Orderic Vitalis states that Æthelwine also played a role in Anglo-Scottish relations in 1068. After the Battle of Hastings, William the Conqueror faced native opposition over the following five years. As we have seen, Malcolm III became involved in this dispute in 1068, taking in Edgar the Ætheling, a claimant to the English throne, and preparing a force to assist the Anglo-Saxon rebels.[67] That year, after a successful campaign against the rebels in northern England, William met Bishop Æthelwine. Orderic writes that, 'the bishop of Durham returned to the grace of the king [William], and became mediator of peace (*pacis mediator*) with Malcolm king of Scots.' Æthelwine travelled to Malcolm's court and convinced him to promise not to support the English rebels, and to send back messengers with the bishop to William, who swore obedience on Malcolm's behalf.[68]

This involvement in Anglo-Scottish relations was not restricted to Æthelwine, but was seemingly attached to the office of bishop of Durham. In a late-twelfth-century written treaty, concerning Scottish kings' visits to England, King Richard I of England guaranteed that the bishop of Durham, accompanied by the city's sheriff and the barons of Northumberland, would meet the Scottish king on the frontier of his realm and escort him south.[69] The chronicler Roger of Howden backs this up in his record of the Anglo-Scottish summit at Lincoln in 1200. Then, King John of England sent numerous escorts to bring King William the Lion to Lincoln, including Bishop Philip of

[63] Suppe, 'Rhys', p. 70.
[64] See pp.71, 142-43.
[65] See *Anglo-Norman Durham 1093-1193*, ed. David Rollason *et al* (Woodbridge, 1994), especially G. W. S. Barrow, 'The Kings of Scotland and Durham' pp. 311-24; Paul Dalton, 'Scottish Influence on Durham 1066-1214', pp. 339-52.
[66] Bernard Meehan, 'Symeon of Durham', *ODNB*, 23 September 2004; *HR*, p. 174, '*Kinsi Eboracensis archiepiscopus, et Egelwinus Dunelmensis episcopus, et Tosti comes Eboraci deduxerunt regem Malcolmum ad-regem Eadwaradum*.'
[67] JW, 3, pp. 6-7; OV, 2, pp. 217-18.
[68] OV, 2, pp. 217-18, '*Praesul quoque Dunelmi regis in gratiam accessit et pro malcomo rege scotorum pacis mediator interuent*'.
[69] '*Provisions concerning the visits of the kings of Scots to England*', *ASR*, p. 10.

Durham.[70] Richard's treaty also states that the bishop of Durham traditionally escorted Scottish kings, suggesting Richard was simply recognising a pre-existing condition, which went back to Æthelwine.[71] It may have even predated him. Roger of Wendover wrote that in 975 'Bishop Ælfsige [of St. Cuthbert, which became the see of Durham] and Earl Eadwulf [of Bamburgh] brought Kenneth, king of Scots, to King Edgar.'[72] The sources in no way imply that Æthelwine's ambassadorial role was novel. Again, caution must be exercised with Roger, who possessed extensive knowledge of northern England, and may have used a now lost northern source, but he was still a thirteenth-century chronicler describing events in the tenth.[73] Nevertheless, the bishop of Durham seemingly had become the quasi-official English envoy to Scotland by the mid-eleventh century at the latest, an arrangement that persisted into King John's reign. Returning to the question of unnamed envoys, the bishop was likely utilised in this way in 1093. Symeon of Durham claims that during his journey to Gloucester, Malcolm joined Bishop William of Durham to witness the laying of the new Durham Cathedral's foundation stone.[74] Given the comparative evidence, Bishop William probably continued south with Malcolm, becoming one of the unidentified 'people' who were recorded escorting the king of Scotland.[75] This is just one of the possibly numerous examples of the bishop of Durham escorting the Scottish king that our extant source base obscures.

Just as the diplomats discussed earlier were linked to the kings they conducted relations with by family ties, the bishops of Durham were tied to Scottish rulers by geography. The other individuals described in these escort missions are often northern figures: the archbishop of York, the sheriff of Durham, and the earl of Bamburgh. This is the same in the Roger of Howden example, which included Robert fitzRoger, sheriff of Northumberland.[76] These comparisons point to the bishops' location being the underlying reason for their use as diplomats, not their ecclesiastical position. The lack of distance between the Scottish kingdom and the bishopric of Durham stimulated a relationship that went beyond Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, as highlighted by G.W.S Barrow amongst others. As well as Malcolm's visit to see the laying of the foundation stone, his son King Alexander I travelled there to witness the inspection of St. Cuthbert's body.[77] King Edgar of Scotland granted land to the monks of Durham in 1095, whilst prior Turgot of Durham, who was also with King Malcolm III in 1093, spent considerable time in Scotland as an advisor to Queen Margaret of Scots, before writing her hagiography, and even being elected bishop of St. Andrews.[78] The bishop of Durham and the king of

[70] Howden, *Chronica*, 4, p. 141.
[71] 'Provisions', *ASR*, p. 10.
[72] RW, 1, p. 416.
[73] Dorothy Whitelock, 'Notes', *EHD I*, p. 255.
[74] *HR*, p. 220.
[75] *ASC E*, 1093.
[76] Howden, *Chronica*, 4, p. 141.
[77] OV, 3, p. 67.
[78] *ESC*, 15; *VSM*, p. 234.

Scotland also collaborated in constructing a bridge over the Tweed at Berwick in the twelfth century's second half.[79] A Scoto-Durham connection is evident.

In using the bishops of Durham as ambassadors, English kings utilised this connection in service of their foreign policies. Like the family diplomats, they possessed a pre-existing connection to the recipient, providing social leverage the envoy could use to make the recipient more amenable to the sender, improving relations. 1068 exemplifies this best, with Æthelwine's existing relationship with Malcolm III likely helping him influence the Scot into making a peace agreement. But the bishops probably played a role in softening Scottish attitudes to the English kingdom on all their frequent ambassadorial missions.

Positive connections were important for escort missions too, as travelling to another ruler's court was both humbling and dangerous.[80] Sending a diplomat with a good pre-existing relationship with the Scottish king tactfully counteracted this negativity, ensuring a smooth journey, and creating the perfect foundation for a summit. The smoothness was aided by the bishops of Durham's access to stopovers that linked the English kingdom's periphery and its political centre, serving as convenient waystations on a journey from the border to the English king. As Julia Barrow has argued, medieval bishops were itinerant individuals. They travelled around their diocese, to church councils, on missions abroad and to the royal courts previously discussed. Consequently, they developed a network of stopovers to aid their travels.[81] The bishop of Durham was no exception, and though the evidence is not abundant, accounts of these layovers do creep into our sources. After being consecrated, Bishop Edmund of Durham (1021-1040) returned to his bishopric via Peterborough.[82] Peterborough likely remained a rest stop in the years following Edmund's death, as his successors, Æthelric and the Æthelwine, were both from there, with the former even retiring there.[83] Looking to the seventh century, when the Durham community was based at Lindisfarne, King Ecgfrith of Northumbria and Archbishop Theodore of Canterbury granted to Bishop Cuthbert of Lindisfarne 'the estate which is called Crayke […] so that he should have a halting place whenever he should go to the city of York, or whenever he should return from there', according to the *Historia de Sancto Cuthberto*.[84] Eric Cambridge goes further, highlighting other properties belonging to, or linked to, the bishop of Lindisfarne that would have also served as convenient stopping points on the way to and from York.[85] These may have remained in use during the period under study here, and even if not they still demonstrate the existence of bishop waystations. Thus, bishops were ideal escorts for foreign rulers, as they possessed existing rest stop networks that they could use to host their charges during the

[79] G. Barrow, 'Scotland and Durham', p. 320; See also William. M. Aird, 'St Cuthbert, The Scots and The Normans', *ANS*, 16, pp. 16-19.
[80] See pp. 48-55.
[81] Julia Barrow, 'Way-Stations on English Episcopal Itineraries, 700-1300', *EHR*, 127 (2012), pp. 549-565.
[82] *HDE*, p. 86.
[83] JW, 2, p. 581.
[84] *HSC*, p. 199.
[85] Eric Cambridge, 'Why did the Community of St Cuthbert Settle at Chester-Le-Street', in *St Cuthbert, his cult and his community to AD 1200*, ed. Gerald Bonner *et al* (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 380-84; *HSC*, pp. 201, 208; Bede, pp. 262-63.

journey to the summit. Unlike a southern bishop, the bishop of Durham's network included northern waystations adjacent to Scotland, as the abovementioned examples attest, and presumably stretched all the way to the traditional West Saxon heartlands, where royal courts were so often based.[86] Such stopping places were perfect for escorting a Scottish king to a summit in southern England.

Equivalent figures in Anglo-Welsh relations were the priests of Archenfield. *Domesday Book* states that the king had three churches there, and that the priests from them led his embassies into Wales.[87] Although not as high status as the bishop of Durham, these priests were connected to the polities they were sent to. Archenfield bordered Wales, much as Durham was near Scotland. This could similarly allow the development of personal ties between those from Archenfield and Welsh rulers. Furthermore, Archenfield was culturally linked to Wales. It has been suggested that King Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales ruled this area in the 1050s and early 1060s before the English took it back following Earl Harold Godwinson's invasion in 1063.[88] Welsh people certainly lived there, as *Domesday Book* references specific laws for Welsh criminals.[89] Whether Welsh or not, they would have a good understanding of Welsh culture as a consequence of their geographic location.

Access to Welsh people and Welsh culture, raises the possibility that the Archenfield priests knew the Welsh language. Anglo-Norman rulers were conscious of linguistic differences within Britain and sought to mitigate the challenges this presented for governance. Orderic Vitalis claims the French speaking William the Conqueror attempted to learn English in order to improve his rulership.[90] Richard Sharpe has analysed the charters of William and his successors, arguing that they illustrate understanding of linguistic pluralism within Britain. Many of their charters are addressed to their English and French subjects. Sharpe believes this meant English and French *speaking* subjects, with *Francii* being a simplified way of referring to all the different French speakers, such as Normans, Bretons and Flemish people, that William brought to Britain. Similarly, charters that related to Wales referenced Welsh speakers.[91] In response, these French speaking kings made use of interpreters to ensure successful governance. *Domesday Book* records several figures as *interpres* or *latimer* (interpreter). For example, 'Angsot the interpreter holds of the king Coomb.'[92] It is believed that these figures translated at shire courts and assisted in the compilation of *Domesday Book* itself. The scholarly work in this area, such as Sharpe's and H. Tsurushima's 'Domesday Interpreters', has largely focused on what we might think of as *internal translation*, between the kings of England and the subjects they directly ruled over.[93] But the Archenfield priests were possibly an extension of this communication policy to Wales. Certainly, there is some overlap between the priests of Archenfield

[86] Appendix 1.
[87] *DB*, fol. 179.
[88] David Walker, 'A Note on Gruffydd ap Llywelyn (1039-63)', *WHR*, 1 (1960), p. 91, n.3; *ASC D*, 1063.
[89] *DB*, fol. 179.
[90] OV, 2, pp. 256-57.
[91] Richard Sharpe, 'Peoples and languages in eleventh- and twelfth-century Britain and Ireland; reading the charter evidence', in *The Reality Behind the Charter Diplomatic in Anglo-Norman Britain*, ed. Dauvit Broun (Glasgow, 2011), pp. 4-10, 25, 28-33, 104; *RRAN*, 1, 31; *RRAN*, 3, 394.
[92] *DB*, fol. 36v; See also fol. 50v, 73v, 83v, 99v, 168v.
[93] Sharpe, 'Peoples', pp. 1-119, H. Tsurushima, 'Domesday Interpretations', *ANS*, 18, pp. 201-22, esp. p. 201.

and these interpreters. Besides both being recorded in *Domesday Book*, the majority of the translators, such as Angsot, held land from the king, meaning they were directly in his service, much as the priests who served at his churches in Archenfield were. Many were also relatively small landholders, who presumably aided higher status figures at local courts. The priests were similarly low status and expected to assist with missions into Wales, not *be* the missions themselves, which presumably consisted of higher status individuals. Just as translators like Angsot helped communicate royal power to subjects of the Anglo-Norman kings of England, the Archenfield priests would have communicated it to Welsh polities. Their peripheral geographic position provided them personal, cultural and linguistic understanding of Wales, making them effective tools for advancing English foreign policy goals.

It is worth briefly reflecting on other evidence for diplomats employing linguistic knowledge. Though the *Brut* implies that Maredudd ap Bleddyn was primarily chosen as an envoy for his family connection, as a native Welshman his knowledge of Welsh would have been another advantage. Although a later example, Wronnic, King John's messenger is called a *latimer* in an early-thirteenth century charter, suggesting his role included translating the king's commands.[94] As for Scotland, the role of language in diplomacy is less apparent. Constance Bullock-Davies states 'One feels that there ought to have been a king's Latimer for the North of England and the Scots border as well, but so far no direct proof is forthcoming.'[95] He notes the existence of a le Latimer family in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, which included William le Latimer, leader of an embassy from Henry III to the Scottish court in 1260.[96] Unfortunately, there is no evidence for them prior to the thirteenth century, and thus we can only speculate as to whether they played a role in Anglo-Scottish relations during my period. Post-Conquest, translation would have been less needed. Malcolm III understood English, translating for his English wife at the Scottish court.[97] His children all spent time in England and at the Anglo-Norman court itself, so presumably understood the envoys they received from their southern neighbours.[98] Although, the charter containing Edgar's grant to the church of Durham acknowledged Gaelic speakers in the region.[99] Possibly the bishops of Durham augmented their entourages with Gaelic speakers both when travelling to Scotland and when escorting Scottish kings south, help proceedings run smoother. This would certainly be another contributing factor as to why these bishops in particular were utilised.

C. Linked Diplomats Summary

There was evidently a pattern of individuals with existing connections to foreign rulers being used as diplomats in relations with said foreign rulers. Common to Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy

[94] *Book of Fees*, 1, p. 348.
[95] Constance Bullock-Davies, 'Professional Interpreters and the Matter of Britain (Cardiff, 1966), p. 19.
[96] Bullock-Davies, 'Interpreters', p. 19.
[97] *VSM*¸ 243.
[98] *ASC E*, 1093, 1097.
[99] *ESC*, 15.

in this period were connections resting on family ties and geographic locations. These linked diplomats were valuable agents for kings, shown by their frequent use, as well as the more detailed accounts of their actions, demonstrating their ability to access, influence and better accommodate the rulers they treated with. This made them skilled at advancing their principal's objectives, whether by helping to establish peace, securing concessions, ensuring a smooth journey to a summit, or providing clear translations. On the whole, we may view family diplomats as more influential diplomats. They were often used for making peace between two belligerent rulers, as was the case during Maredudd ap Bleddyn, Robert Curthose, Henry of Scotland and Earl Leofric of Mercia's stints as envoys. This further confirms the power of family ties. Alternatively, border diplomats appear more routine, with their involvements not often directly linked to an ongoing crisis. The clause in *Domesday Book* codifying the Archenfield priests' role and the recurrent diplomatic missions of the bishops of Durham suggests their involvement was a normal part of diplomacy, not necessarily related to specific conflicts. Of course, the maintenance of peaceful relations could benefit from influential figures too, which border diplomats certainly were, thanks to the resources, linguistic abilities and connections they possessed. The distinction is not binary either. Bishop Æthelwine of Durham helped stop Malcolm III invading England in 1068, whilst Edgar the Ætheling went as envoy to Malcolm III in 1093 when the English and Scottish rulers were ostensibly at peace following Robert Curthose's intervention. Although both types were impactful, on balance the surrounding context points to family diplomats being more influential in one-on-one interactions with rulers.

The employment of linked diplomats certainly comes across as smart diplomacy, characteristic of a ruler using tools at their disposal to advance their foreign policy goals. Alternatively, it could be seen as indicative of weakness on the sending ruler's side. Kings such as William Rufus and Henry I were unable to enforce their demands freely on foreign rulers. Instead, when communicating with said rulers they were reliant on middlemen with greater sway in this matter. We especially see the limits of their personal control over proceedings when kings resorted to using highly influential family diplomats to restore peace. What these conclusions illustrate about broader evolution and consistency within Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations will be considered after discussing third-party mediators and proxies.

3. Third-Party Mediators

Third-party mediators were another form of medieval diplomat. As argued by Christopher Holdsworth in his overview of twelfth-century peacemaking, independent mediators were often drawn from the papacy, coming in the form of papal legates.[100] In a letter dated to 1077, Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) claimed the purpose of these legates was to resolve problems that the pope himself could not be present to resolve.[101] Fundamentally, they were representatives of the pope, treated the same as he

[100] Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', p. 11.
[101] '*To the Christians of Narbonne Gascony and Spain*', in *The Epistolae Vagantes of Pope Gregory VII*, ed. H. E. J. Cowdrey (Oxford, 1972), pp. 56-59.

would be if he were present.[102] They attended councils away from Rome, where they would enforce papal degrees, preside over bishops and even enforce disciplinary action. Overall, the office served a way for papal authority to advance out of Rome and into the provinces of Latin Christian Europe.[103] Through this process, they often become involved in mediating inter-ruler disputes.

Consequently, a papal legate mediated Anglo-Scottish peace following the English victory at the Battle of The Standard in August 1138.[104] John of Hexham records the papal legate, Alberic of Ostia, meeting King David I of Scotland, as well as the Scottish nobles and bishops, at Carlisle in autumn. There he chastised David for the damage his invasion had caused to northern England. He made the Scots return all the prisoners they had captured, promise to not attack churches, women, children or old men, and finally 'prostrated at the knees of the same king [David], he compelled him to hold back from hostility up to the feast of St. Martin.'[105] Next, Alberic convened a council at London, where 'he solicited the king of England regarding reforming peace with the king of Scotland with many entreaties.'[106] At his wife's instigation, Stephen granted this request, and an Anglo-Scottish peace was soon agreed by Queen Matilda and David's son in 1139.[107]

To understand Alberic's meaning for Anglo-Scottish relations, we must understand how papal mediation worked. The papal court was a quasi-medieval international court of justice that drew its power from Christian doctrine. As the Apostolic Successors to St. Peter, on whom Jesus had conferred responsibility for all Christians, the medieval popes had authority to legislate over all faithful Christians.[108] Since western European kings were Catholic Christians, the pope had power over them. As Pope Gregory VII contested, their intervention in the affairs of secular rulers included the right to their obedience, to depose them, and to release their subjects from oaths of fidelity.[109] Consequently, popes could intervene in disputes between kings, with their legates' decisions equivalent to international law.[110] Benham recently explored the *Treaty of Rouen* (991) between Æthelred of England and Duke Richard I of Normandy, achieved through the involvement of the papal legate Leo of Trier.[111] William of Malmesbury claims 'The Apostolic seat having not allowed two Christians to fight, sent into England Bishop Leo of Trier in order arrange peace.'[112] The conflict between Æthelred

[102] Rennie, *Papal*, p. 1.
[103] Uta-Renate Blumenthal, 'The Papacy, 1042-1122', in *New Cambridge Hisotry IV, c. 1042-c. 1198*, ed. David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley Smith (Cambridge, 2004), pp, 11-12, 26, 29.
[104] HH, pp. 712-19.
[105] JH, pp. 297-98, quote on p. 298, '*Ipsius etiam regis genibus provolutus ab hostilitate eum usque ad festum Sancti Martini cessare compulit*'.
[106] Ibid, p. 299, '*Regem quoque Angliae super reformanda pace cum rege Scotiae plurima prece sollicitavit*'.
[107] For Alberic, see Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (London, 2017), pp. 41-42.
[108] Rennie, *Papal*, pp. 23-24.
[109] '*Twenty-Seven Propositions about Papal Authority*', in *The Register of Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085*, ed. H. E. J. Cowdrey (Oxford, 2002), pp. 149-50.
[110] Walter Ullmann, *The Papacy and Political Ideas in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976), pp. 357-60.
[111] Jenny Benham, 'The Earliest Arbitration Treaty? A Re-Assessment of the Anglo-Norman Treaty of 991', *Historical Research*, 20 (2020), pp. 189-204; '*Letter of Pope John XV to all the Faithful, Concerning the Reconciliation of Æthelred, King of England, and Richard, Duke of Normandy*', in *EHD I*, pp. 823-24.
[112] WM, 1 pp. 276-77, '*Non passa sedes apostolica duos Christianos digladiari, misit in Angliam Leonem Treuerensem episcopum ut pacem componeret*'.

and Richard possibly stemmed from the Normans harbouring English exiles, but Benham argues the papacy became involved due to Norman attacks on English travellers, specifically pilgrims. She argues the papacy often concerned itself with peacemaking when 'unchristian' acts were being committed, such as the destruction of church property, and the killing or enslaving of Christians, principally non-combatants.[113] This explains Alberic's role in 1138, since David's army reportedly committed many of these horrific acts, not to mention that Alberic chastised the Scots for these behaviours at Carlisle.[114]

Like modern institutions that rule on international disputes, the papal court enforced its decisions with sanctions. Brenda Bolton investigated how Pope Innocent III employed sanctions to reconcile Philip Augustus of France and King John of England in the early thirteenth century. Justifying his involvement because Christian sins were being committed, he imposed interdict on England in 1208 and went on to excommunicate John in 1209.[115] Nevertheless, Ullmann argues these measures were tertiary, and that papal decisions largely derived power from popular opinion. Defying the papacy opened kings up to opposition from their Christian subjects, who had faith in the pope's position as the head of Catholic Christianity, undermining the rulers' power. The ability to intervene in international disputes caused Ullmann to conclude 'papal judicial judgements were nothing but decisions made on a supra-regal, supra-tribal and supranational plan.'[116]

There has been considerable academic investigation into mediation's role in modern diplomacy, with scholars considering what factors contribute to successful mediation. Their research can also help explain the success of medieval mediators. For example, Jacob Bercovitch analysed all examples of mediation in international disputes in 1954-84, totalling 44 out of 72 conflicts.[117] He noted numerous factors that contributed to successful mediation, but concluded that a mediators' main job is persuading parties to make peace, and that 'persuasion is best achieved […] when he possesses resources which either or both parties value.' Superpowers are thus effective mediators, as they have the raw military and economic power to persuade.[118] Crocker *et al*. likewise argue mediators need influence within a dispute, such as a mandate for involvement, as well as leverage over the parties. Otherwise, the mediation will be seen as illegitimate, and the belligerents will not trust that the mediator can follow through with their promises.[119] Thus the 'mediator readiness […] is critical to helping the parties craft a sustainable peace.'[120] Papal legates like Alberic of Ostia fit this bill. The papacy's authority over Christians, combined with the aforementioned real and social sanctions, gave

[113] Benham, 'Arbitration' pp. 198-99, 203.
[114] Richard of Hexham, '*Standard*', pp. 314-17; HH, p. 711.
[115] Brenda M. Bolton, 'Phillip Augustus and John: Two Sons in Innocent III's Vineyard', *Studies in Church History*, 9 (1987), pp. 114, 117, 120-24.
[116] Ullmann, *Papacy*, pp. 362-363, quote on p. 363.
[117] Jacob Bercovitch, 'International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 21 (1986), pp. 155, 158-59.
[118] Ibid, p. 164.
[119] Chester A. Crocker *et al*, 'Ready for Prime Time: The When, Who, and Why of International Mediation', *Negotiation Journal*, 19 (2003), pp. 154-55.
[120] Ibid, p. 164.

legates legitimacy and leverage in disputes between Christian kings, and the ability to re-establish peace.

The need to involve a papal mediator suggests the English and Scots were locked in a stalemate after the Battle of the Standard. Whether the parties are ready for mediation is a major focus of modern mediation theorists. I. William Zartman developed the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) concept, which is a pre-requisite for mediation. MHS occurs when neither warring party can achieve victory, and the current deadlock is damaging to them both. A cost benefit analysis of the situation precipitates a search for a way out, such as a mediated peace. Zartman states it is 'a moment when the upper hand slips and the lower hand rises, both parties moving toward equality, with both movements carrying pain for the parties.'[121] Numerous scholars have tested MHS theory, such as Barry Steiner, who concluded that a MHS existed in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), since the Russians were shocked by the Japanese military's success and feared a greater defeat. Meanwhile the Japanese knew they had reached the limit of their own military capacity, so could not sustain their achievements. Consequently, both accepted US mediation.[122] Whilst Johan Hellman cautions against uncritical applying MHSs, arguing human behaviour can be illogical, it provides a model for understanding relations during third-party mediation, so long as it is informed by contextual evidence.[123]

One of the few scholarly investigations of third-party involvement in medieval conflict resolution reached a similar conclusion. Fernando Luis Corral explored Henry II of England's arbitration of a dispute between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Sancho VI of Navarre in 1177. After a protracted conflict between the kingdoms for numerous years, Alfonso eventually pushed for Henry's involvement after an attack on Castile by the Almohad Caliphate. This attack weakened Alfonso's position *vis-à-vis* Sancho, leading him to pursue arbitration. When the Almohad threat was over and the power differential was much more in Castile's favour, Alfonso broke the peace Henry had helped establish. Corral concluded Alfonso's acceptance of arbitration was 'merely a political manoeuvre with a view to postponing a conflict.'[124] It made sense during a MHS, but when the circumstances changed, the third-party peacemaking was no longer respected.[125]

MHS proponents would assert that one must have existed between the English and Scots for them to accept papal mediation, which contextual evidence supports. From David's perspective, The Standard was a major blow to his war effort. He suffered a heavy defeat, with both Richard of

[121] I. William, Zartman, 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond', in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 228-29, quote at p. 228.
[122] Barry H. Steiner, 'Diplomatic Mediation as an Independent Variable', International Negotiation, 14 (2009), pp. 13-14.
[123] Johan Hellman, 'The Occurrence of Mediation: A Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate', *International Studies Review*, 14 (2012), pp. 591-603.
[124] Fernando Luis Corral, 'Alfonso VIII of Castile's Territorial Litigation at Henry II of England's Court: An Effective and Valid Arbitration', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 50 (2006), pp. 22-26, 36-39, quote at p. 38.
[125] See also Benham on third-party arbitration, *ILE*, p. 184, 'All arbitrations seem to have been a last option, after the failure of protracted conflict, negotiation and truce'.

Hexham and Henry of Huntingdon suggesting 10,000-11,000 Scots were killed.[126] Zartman argues catastrophes can cause parties to feel they are in a MHS, and a military defeat of this scale would qualify.[127] Stephen was not in the ascendancy either. Though victorious, the English army did not force the Scots outs of northern England, and quickly disbanded.[128] Perhaps more importantly, at that time the threats to Stephen's rule were multifaceted. As discussed previously, by 1138 Stephen was facing dissidents in southwestern England, attacks on Normandy by Count Geoffrey of Anjou, and presumably the spectre of the Empress' upcoming arrival in England.[129] In a tough position, facing opposition on several fronts, Stephen was open to a solution that would bring peace to one of them. As Zartman might put it, The Standard was a moment when the Scottish hand fell and the English hand rose, so that neither side saw outright victory as likely, and feared continued conflict.[130] Therefore, Alberic of Ostia's papal mediation, with its connection to universal Christian authority, was an effective way to aid the re-establishment of Anglo-Scottish peace. That it reached this point indicates there was an Anglo-Scottish stalemate, which was open to mediation.

The papacy's third-party mediation could also serve as a tool for legitimisation, with Alberic legitimising David's control over Carlisle. The Scottish king met the legate there in 1138. The city had seemingly been disputed for around fifty years. William Rufus refortified it in 1092, likely contributing to the frosty Gloucester summit between him and Malcolm the following year.[131] It was geopolitically and economically crucial. Not only did it guard the route west of the Pennines that a Scottish army would take into England, but it was also located near silver mines.[132] David made capturing it a goal for his war on Stephen, doing so in 1136, and subsequently receiving it from the English as part of the *First Treaty of Durham*.[133] Yet the Carlisle question remained open. Ralph IV of Chester continued to claim the city, precipitating his insults towards Henry of Scotland at the 1136 Easter festival, whilst David's subsequent attacks on England presumably undermined the treaty.[134]

As we know, diplomatic meeting places matter.[135] Papal legates generally seem to have met kings in places of royal authority, with Alberic meeting Stephen in London.[136] London was firmly under Stephen's control, as the English king held assemblies there at Christmas 1135, Easter 1136 and Christmas 1138.[137] Though papal legations to Britain were rare, this seems like common meeting place etiquette. The papal legates of Pope John XV that mediated between King Æthelred of England

[126] Richard of Hexham, '*Standard*', p. 319; HH, pp. 718-19; See Bradbury, *SM*, pp. 33-37 for a summary of The Standard campaign.
[127] Zartman, 'Ripeness', p. 228.
[128] Richard of Hexham, 'Standard', p. 321.
[129] See pp. 107-08.
[130] Oram, *Domination*, p. 94.
[131] *ASC E*, 1092.
[132] Geoffrey Barrow, 'Frontier and Settlement: Which Influenced Which? England and Scotland, 1100-1300', in *Medieval Frontier and Societies*, ed. Robert Bartlett and Angus Mackay (Oxford, 1989), p. 10; Oram, *Domination*, p. 97.
[133] HH, pp. 707.
[134] See p. 89.
[135] Chapter 1.
[136] JH, p. 299.
[137] HH, pp. 703, 707, 719.

and Duke Richard of Normandy in 991 went to an assembly of King Æthelred and then Rouen.[138] Rouen was the political centre of Normandy, and though we do not know exactly where they met Æthelred, the implication is that the legates went to a standard political assembly, presumably at a regular site.[139] In meeting David at Carlisle, Alberic was treating the disputed city as place of Scottish royal authority. The papal court that Alberic represented, as well as universal Christendom, which the pope had authority over, were recognising Carlisle as David's.

Alberic's intervention in Britain in 1138 was an important event that illustrated a stalemate in the Anglo-Scottish relationship and legitimised Scottish expansion. Still, to fully understand the nature of relations in 1138, the Anarchy and how they differed from other periods, we must compare his mediation with the other diplomats used during King Stephen's reign, such as our next subject: proxies.

4. Proxies

The final type of diplomat explored here are envoys who submitted on behalf of kings, referred to here as proxies. This category is not exclusive. A diplomat with a family tie to foreign ruler could also perform a submission to said ruler on behalf of their principal. The potential importance of an envoy performing a dual role will be considered later. Rather, the focus here is what the significance of an act of submission itself, performed via proxy, was for inter-ruler relations. On the subject of submissions, Levi Roach has argued that 'we should treat homage as a flexible rite, whose meaning was contextual, and might change and adapt over time and space.'[140] Much as how a submission's location can alter its meaning, so can whether a king himself performed the ritual or he delegated it to another. Correspondingly, when investigating medieval Anglo-French relations, John Gillingham argues the decision to employ a proxy or not reflected power within an inter-ruler relationship.'[141]

There are two recorded proxies in this period, who submitted on behalf of kings, both in Anglo-Scottish relations. Firstly, following Bishop Æthelwine of Durham's intervention in 1068, Orderic Vitalis says Malcolm 'gladly sent back his messengers (*nuncios*) with the bishop of Durham through whom he faithfully swore obedience to King William [the Conqueror].'[142] Secondly, as mentioned, King David I of Scotland concluded the First and Second Treaties of Durham in 1136 and 1139 through his son Henry. As part of the first agreement, Henry of Huntingdon tells us that David refused to do

[138] '*Pope John XV*', *EHD I*, pp. 823-24.
[139] David Bates, *Normandy before 1066* (London, 1982), pp. 2-43; Dudo of St. Quentin, '*Gesta Normannorum*', ed. Felice Lifshitz, in *International Medieval Sourcebook* (Fordham University, 2019): https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/dudu-stquentin-gesta-trans-lifshitz.asp. Accessed 30 November 2020, Chapter 14, 15, 17, 55 for examples of Rouen as a political centre.
[140] Levi Roach, 'Submission and Homage: Feudo-Vassalic Bonds and the Settlement of Disputes in Ottonian Germany', *History*, 97 (2012), p. 367.
[141] John Gillingham, 'Doing Homage to the King of France', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 63-85.
[142] OV, 2, p. 219, '*Cum praesule dunelmi nuncios suos ouanter remisit per quos guillelmo regi fidele obsequium iurauit*'.

homage to Stephen himself because of his existing ties to the Empress Matilda, and instead 'Henry was made King Stephen's man' in return for English land.[143] Though John of Hexham does not specifically say Henry did homage for the earldom of Northumberland in 1139, he mentions that the Scots gave hostages to guarantee the agreement, and that Stephen gave Henry gifts later that year, making it clear that a hierarchical relationship was agreed between the English king and the Scottish heir.[144] This submission was clearly a continuation of the homage Henry previously performed in 1136.

In a medieval diplomatic context, there is nothing unusual about a *nuncio* or a son submitting in place of their king. Queller claims *nuncios* could swear to agreements on their principal's behalf, including homage. [145] As for sons, there is plenty of evidence for this in the aforementioned Anglo-French relationship, after the Norman Conquest. Since English Kings ruled land in France, the French kings were the *de jure* overlords for their continental possessions, so could legally demand homage from them. Instead, their sons often did this on their behalf. Henry I of England's son William Adelin and Stephen's son Eustace performed homage for Normandy in 1120 and 1137 respectively.[146] Likewise, 1169 saw Henry II of England's son Henry do homage to the French king for Anjou and Maine, whilst his other son Richard did the same for Poitou.[147]

As with third-party mediators, by turning to the wider context around the proxies we can confirm the significance of this diplomatic practice. Firstly, such events illustrate the strength of the proxy's principal in contrast to the king receiving the homage. The recipient was evidently not overwhelmingly strong, and could not force the other king to perform homage in person. As Gillingham claims, 'the kings of England persuaded the kings of France to accept the homage of their sons – and they were able to do so […] because they were strong.'[148] Ruling England evidently made them powerful enough to resist demands for them to perform this hierarchical ritual. Returning to Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, as mentioned regarding Æthelwine, in 1068 William the Conqueror was still facing domestic opposition following his victory at Hastings. In 1067, Eadric 'The Wild,' an Anglo-Saxon magnate from the west midlands, attacked Herefordshire in alliance with Bleddyn ap Cynfyn of Gwynedd and Rhiwallon ap Cynfyn of Powys. The following year Exeter rebelled in support of Harold Godwinson's mother, whilst Earls Edwin of Mercia and Morcar of Northumbria rose up, again with Bleddyn's support. It was at this point that Malcolm began harbouring Edgar and his family. Things then turned against the rebel alliance. William marched north in 1068, first building a castle at Warwick, where the earls surrendered. He built more castles at Nottingham and York, with the rebelling citizens of the latter ritually submitting, and ordered more to be constructed at Lincoln, Huntingdon and Cambridge.[149] However, his war for control of England was not over. 1069-70 saw

[143] HH, pp. 705-06, '*Henricus, homo regis Stephani effectus est*'; JH, p. 287.
[144] Ibid, p. 300.
[145] Queller, 'Diplomatic Envoys', p. 200.
[146] WM, p. 235; HH, p. 709.
[147] John of Salisbury, '*To Bartholomew, Bishop of Exeter*', in *Letters of John of Salisbury*, ed. W. J. Millor and C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford, 1979), p. 639.
[148] Gillingham, 'Homage', p. 83.
[149] OV, 2, pp. 211-19; JW, 3, pp. 5-9.

the Anglo-Saxon nobles, Edgar, and King Sweyn of Denmark band together for some unsuccessful rebellions, and Earls Edwin and Morcar moved against him in 1071 for one final time.[150] Only after their defeat does David Carpenter conclude 'The Conquest itself was over.'[151] Outright victory was far from secure in 1068, and there remained a risk that Malcolm might lead Scottish troops into England in support of the rebels, as the Welsh had done. Regarding Henry of Scotland, we have already seen evidence of the MHS that blighted Anglo-Scottish relations prior to him concluding the *Second Treaty of Durham*. Similarly, the *First Treaty of Durham* followed a successful Scottish military attack on northern England.[152] In these contexts, it is unsurprising that these rulers of England could only obtain Scottish subordination via proxies.

Secondly, having avoided performing the submission in person, the ruler on the giving side was less closely tied to the receiver, meaning they were seemingly freer to break or simply ignore the obligations submission imposed. Malcolm went on to not only attack England in 1070, but to offer sanctuary to Edgar again in 1069, after the Anglo-Saxon claimant's involvement in one of the failed uprisings against William.[153] Seemingly, the submission via proxy left Malcolm feeling limited obligation towards William. As for Henry of Scotland, his submissions were seemingly a way for the Scottish kingdom to establish a connection to Stephen without undermining David's link to Matilda. This is supported not just by Henry of Huntingdon's account of 1136, but by David and Henry's diplomacy. Whilst Henry met Stephen in 1136, 1139 and 1140, David had a strong link to Matilda from prior to civil war, notably swearing to support her claim.[154] This obviously persisted into the conflict, since not only did David attack northern England on Matilda's behalf, but after Stephen's capture at Lincoln in 1141 David joined her forces, serving as her advisor.[155] David and Stephen's meeting at Durham in 1136 was the one occasion when this division, with David and Matilda on one side, and Henry and Stephen on the other, was not respected. This was just a preliminary meeting though, before Henry concluded the full agreement at York, so should not be seen as a major bond between them. Had it been David who submitted, rather than his son, this David-Matilda relationship would have undermined.

Submissions via proxy are significant. They indicate a less hierarchical submission than if the king himself performed the ritual and apparently imposed less stringent obligations on him. Having looked at several different diplomat types, it is time now to consider what they can tell us about the nature of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations and ruler's foreign policies across the period.

[150] *ASC D*, 1067-71.
[151] Carpenter, *Britain*, p. 78.
[152] HH, pp. 706-07.
[153] *HR*, 191-92; *ASC D*, 1068; Nicholas Hooper, 'Edgar the Ætheling: Anglo-Saxon Prince, Rebel and Crusader', *ASE*, 14 (1985), pp. 204-05.
[154] JH, pp. 287, 300, 306; *ASC E*, 1127.
[155] *GS*, pp. 79-80, 84, 89.

5. Diplomats and Inter-ruler Relations

When all the diplomats are considered together, they paint a multifaceted picture of relations between the king of England and his neighbours. To begin with, we see evidence of consistency in relations either side of the Norman Conquest. Linked diplomats, whether bound by family ties or geography were employed in diplomatic relations in both Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman diplomacy. This consistency is most apparent in regards to the bishops of Durham. In 1068, William lacked a connection to the Scottish king that he could use to influence him. Consequently, he turned to an existing Anglo-Saxon diplomatic institution and used the bishop of Durham to create peace between England and Scotland. The bishops' connections to Scotland made them an incredibly valuable diplomatic resource that rulers of England re-utilised throughout this study's time period and beyond. Such a continuity, as with the general persistence of linked diplomats, suggests the Norman Conquest was not a wholesale watershed moment for inter-ruler relations within Britain.

This does not mean this dynastic change had zero implications for the role of diplomats and their interactions. As discussed, Henry I's 1114 invasion of Wales occurred during a period when he was frequently abroad, asserting his claim to continental land. The use of Maredudd ap Bleddyn as a linked envoy to the initially reticent Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys effectively helped secure peace on the Welsh front, allowing Henry to resume confronting threats outside of Britain. The MHS and Alberic of Ostia's subsequent mediation were partly consequences of the danger posed to Normandy. Just like in the other chapters, possession of land across the channel impacted Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomatic relations.

Diplomats reveal more information about relations, such as a degree of Welsh agency. Much of this study has highlighted the weakness of the Welsh, with their meeting places and tribute payments demonstrating their submission to English authority. The prevalence of linked diplomats, including the Archenfield priests as well as highly influential family diplomats like Maredudd and Ælfgar, reveal that Welsh rulers could not simply be forced into one-sided arrangements by English kings. Instead, they had to be wooed into making agreements through the clever employment of influential diplomats. That a linked diplomat was used for diplomacy with Gruffydd ap Llywelyn is particularly interesting, since alongside the meeting place he met English nobles at and the tribute that followed his death, it is further evidence of the threat he posed to the English kingdom and the diplomatic methods needed to mitigate this.

Of course, the prevalence of linked diplomats alone is simply proof that the receiving party had some capacity to resist, rather than that they were in an especially strong position. Owain ap Cadwgan after all did submit to Henry I. Given the invasions Gruffydd suffered from Leofgar and Harold Godwinson, the latter ultimately successful, he had cause to improve his relationship with England through Rhys Sais, even if he was powerful by the standards of Welsh rulers. Welsh weakness, particularly during the reign of Æthelstan, is confirmed by the fact they faced a corrupted form of linked diplomat: someone with a negative association with the receiving king. According to the poem *Armes Prydein Vawr*, English envoys were tasked with collecting the Welsh tribute during

Æthelstan's reign. 'The agents will collect their taxes; in the treasuries of the Cymry was nothing they would pay', 'the agents of Cirencester will bitterly lament […] the taxes they will collect – affliction.'[156] As the public face of Æthelstan's tribute demands, the negative feelings the Welsh felt towards the tribute were transplanted onto the tribute collectors. When they next came to Wales 'Nine score men will attack. Great mockery! Except for four, they will not return. A tale of strife they will tell to their wives.'[157] Although the nature of their role made it difficult for these envoys to form a positive relationship with the Welsh, Æthelstan leant into this in choosing Cirencester as the tribute collector's base. Chapter One demonstrated that the Cirencester conference represented English dominance over other British rulers.[158] Sending envoys from there reminded the Welsh of that event and the English superiority, reinforcing the supremacy implicit in tribute taking. Evidently, this Anglo-Welsh power differential meant Æthelstan did not need linked envoys to convince the Welsh to give tribute, but instead could send agents symbolic of that differential. Whilst the evidence for linked diplomats outlines a degree of Welsh diplomatic agency within 927-1154, it had limits, especially in the 930s.

The diplomats provide insight into Anglo-Scottish relations too. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Anglo-Scottish relationship was more variable than the Anglo-Welsh one, shifting between English dominance and relative equality, seemingly reflecting a narrower power differential. In line with this, we find examples of linked diplomats being sent to Scottish rulers in order to improve Anglo-Scottish relations, such as the Bishops of Durham. What is more, the appearance of a third-party mediator, indicative of an MHS, and Scottish submissions via proxy, further demonstrate periods when the English lacked authority over the kings of Scotland. These forms of diplomat are notably absent from Anglo-Welsh relations, whilst the Scots never treated with envoys possessing explicitly negative connections, like the Cirencester tribute collectors. Diplomats therefore provide supplementary evidence that Scottish relations with the English were less one sided than Anglo-Welsh relations.

They also re-emphasise shifts within the Anglo-Scottish relationship discussed elsewhere, such as Malcolm III's hostility to English kings' authority and its consequences. Broadly, he received multiple linked diplomats: bishops of Durham, Edgar the Ætheling and Robert Curthose. This points to a need to be influenced into making certain agreements. However, diplomats expressly demonstrate his hostility in 1068 and 1091. He of course sent a proxy to submit to William the Conqueror in 1068, less firmly tying him to the king of England, facilitating his later invasion. Likewise, in 1091 he insisted on conducting peace talks with Robert Curthose. This is significant not just because of his own link to Robert, but due to Robert and William Rufus' poor relationship. Kings traditionally selected loyal individuals to serve as their envoys, such as Maredudd ap Bleddyn, who had previously sought 'friendship of the king'.[159] Chaplais writes that the choice of envoy was primarily 'determined by the trust which the king placed in them rather than their social rank.'[160] "Loyalty" and "trust" do not characterise Robert and Rufus' relationship. Robert challenged William Rufus' rule over England in

[156] *Armes*, pp. 29, 31, 33.
[157] Ibid, p. 31.
[158] See pp. 44-45.
[159] *Brut*, p. 79.
[160] Chaplais, 'English Diplomatic Documents', p. 27.

1088-91, which was akin to his rebellion against Henry in 1100-01. The pair had only just reconciled when Malcolm III invaded England in 1091, and they soon fell out again at Christmas that same year, illustrating the reunion's limit.[161] Following Orderic's account, Malcolm was effectively challenging Rufus' authority, undermining him by demanding a disloyal diplomat and implying that it was Robert who had the legitimacy to treat with the Scots, so was in a better position to be king. On both occasions, these diplomats reflected English domestic weakness: the Conqueror was facing rebellions, whilst Rufus was dealing with the fallout from his sunken fleet. Both kings had no choice but to accept less than ideal diplomats in order to bring about some form of Anglo-Scottish peace.

Of course, 1091 precipitated the 1093 Gloucester summit, when William Rufus attempted to enforce a submission on Malcolm III, which ultimately led to the Scots' death and shepherded in a more cordial and hierarchical Anglo-Scottish relationship. The call for Robert to serve as an envoy might, along with Malcolm's desire for border meeting places, have been considered hostile actions that pushed Rufus into seeking a new type of relationship.

Scottish acceptance of English dominance characterised relations during Henry I's reign, as discussed in the preceding chapters. But through diplomats we see a shift towards greater equality and competition during Stephen's reign. Alberic of Ostia's mediation in 1138 and the MHS it reveals indicates the absence of a power differential. When combined with the evidence of meeting places, it seems David's relationship with Stephen was far less hierarchical than what came before. Furthermore, David used diplomats as part of a foreign policy that sought to strengthen the Scottish kingdom's position, often at English expense. Sending Henry of Scotland as a diplomat to England had two crucial consequences. The influence drawn from his family link to English monarchy seemingly encouraged cordial relations, including the ceding of English territory to the Scots, such as the earldom of Northumberland and Carlisle. Secondly, serving as a proxy for his father allowed David to remain bonded to Matilda. This ensured a two-pronged strategy: Henry connected to Stephen and David allied with Matilda. Whoever won the Anarchy the Scottish monarchy would emerge with a connection to them, discouraging retributory actions or uncertainty that might damage the Scottish realm, including recent expansions. Henry's duality, both sufficiently connected to the English monarchy to influence it, whilst distinct from David, allowing his father to remain aligned with Matilda, made him an especially effective agent for David to employ. Additionally, the hosting of Alberic at Carlisle served as papal recognition of David's control over the settlement, legitimising this recent acquisition. Diplomacy not just reveals a relative increase in Scottish power, but also how David pursued action that encouraged and safeguarded this advancement.

6. Conclusion

This chapter further stepped away from kings, focusing on the diplomats who contributed to Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. The common approach to medieval diplomats, utilised by Queller

[161] *ASC E*, 1091; Judith A. Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', *ANS*, 12, p. 110.

amongst others, focuses on two sorts: *nuncii* and *procuratores*. This is unsuitable for studying diplomacy in tenth, eleventh and early twelfth-century Britain due to the sources and time period. Instead, by analysing the behaviour and identity of diplomats in the primary sources, I identified three common, non-exhaustive categories: linked diplomats, such as the bishops of Durham, who can be subdivided into family and border diplomats; the third-party mediator Alberic of Ostia; proxy diplomats, like Henry of Scotland. They were all significant within inter-ruler relations, advancing peacemaking and foreign policies. For instance, linked diplomats used their ties to influence the king they were treating with to make peace or concessions to their principal. This can be seen as evidence of the side sending the diplomat's limits, as they could not negotiate without assistance, or a good diplomatic tactic. Third party-mediators and proxy diplomats also revealed power differentials, or lack thereof, as well as other policies, such as efforts to gain legitimacy or reduce allegiance.

Consequently, diplomats advance our knowledge of the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relationships' nature and evolution. Linked diplomats, like Earl Leofric, point to Welsh agency, a factor occasionally obscured by their submissions, since they had to be influenced into making peace on occasions. Still, linked diplomats were not ubiquitous in Anglo-Welsh relations, and the absence of third-party mediators and proxy diplomats, in contrast to the more changeable Anglo-Scottish relationship, once more shows the Welsh to be in an inferior position than their Scottish counterparts. Furthermore, the plethora of linked diplomats, particularly the bishops of Durham, who played a role in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy throughout the period, points to consistency in Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman inter-ruler relations. But the picture is multifaceted. The possession of continental territory seemingly influenced Henry I's selection of a diplomat. Varying policies and relations between different kings also emerge. We again see the growth in Welsh power under Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, Malcolm III's hostility to English authority and the relative equality between David I and Stephen during the Anarchy.

Regarding the study of diplomacy in general, this chapter illustrates a more flexible approach to diplomats, which eschews the traditional *nuncii-procuratores* paradigm. Through this, I conceptualised border diplomats, a wide-reaching post that not only existed in medieval Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, but in ancient and early-modern interactions too. It has the potential to improve our understanding of a wide variety of relationships, both medieval and beyond.

Chapter 5: Diplomacy and Exiles

1. Introduction

As the preceding chapters have shown, medieval diplomacy was not the preserve of kings, with queens, envoys and third-party mediators all playing roles in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. This chapter explores another type of diplomatic actor: the exile. These figures were frequently involved in inter-ruler relations, often being subjects of relevance for interactions between rulers, whilst also conducting their own diplomacy with foreign kings. Such observations are key for interpreting the significance of medieval diplomacy. As historians like John Watkins have argued, the medieval period's scholarly resonance relates to the plethora of heterogenous individuals involved in its diplomacy, neatly paralleling the contemporary nation state's declining influence over international relations and its replacement by a various sub-state, NGO, and supranational entities in the field of diplomacy.[1] Exiles then, serve as further examples of the multiparty nature of medieval diplomacy, who possessed a motive distinct from the diplomats discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas those figures sought to advance their own king's policies, exiles opposed the kings they fled from, and consequently engaged in diplomacy that directly challenged the ruler of their homeland.

Historians have spilled much ink defining exiles. They commonly utilise a broad definition. Paul Taberi exemplifies this in his analysis of Carolingian exiles in 750-900, stating that 'An exile is a person who is compelled to leave his homeland – though the forces that send him on his way may be political, economic, or purely psychological.'[2] Similarly Laura Napran has employed a wide conception, calling exile enforced exclusion, permanent or temporary, from a region, ideology or other social group.[3] Whilst investigating Gruffudd ap Cynan, a late-twelfth century Welsh exile, C. P. Lewis touches on the broadness of this exclusion, noting that it could be 'with or without actual or threatened coercion' and that 'some exiles left of their volition', "choosing" absence in response to general hostility in their homeland, not a clear instruction to leave.[4] What matters is that exiles were individuals forced from their own community against their will. Obviously, variations exist within this definition, and will be considered later to better understand the exiles under discussion.

Taking a broad interpretation permits consideration of a wide range of exiles who played roles in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. This chapter largely investigates community members who were forced from the kingdom of England and obtained sanctuary with Scottish or Welsh rulers, or *visa-versa*. For instance, Edgar the Ætheling, a surviving member of the Anglo-Saxon royal

[1] Watkins, *NDH*, p. 5.
[2] Steven Stofferahn, 'Banished Worlds: The Political Cultures of Carolingian Exile, 750-900 (Unpublished thesis: Purdue University, 2003), p. 9.
[3] Laura Napran, 'Introduction: Exile in Context', *EMA*, p. 1.
[4] C. P. Lewis, 'Gruffudd ap Cynan and the Reality and Reputation of Exile', *EMA*, p. 39.

dynasty, who fled to King Malcolm III during both William the Conqueror and William Rufus' reigns.[5] Young Henry of Anjou (the future Henry II of England) is not often thought of as an exile, safely spending much of his early life within his father's continental possessions. But during King Stephen's reign he was effectively denied access to England, which he had a claim on through his mother. His first campaign there in 1147 ended in abject failure, and left him with no choice but to flee back to Normandy.[6] Like many of the others discussed here, unwelcome in England he visited Scotland, finding safety there in 1149, justifying his inclusion.[7]

Another unconventional exile is Duncan II of Scotland, who initially travelled to England as a hostage. Duncan was handed over to William the Conqueror by his father, King Malcolm III, when the Scottish king submitted at Abernethy in 1072.[8] Hostages and exiles had similar experiences: both were individuals taken from their homeland. In his study of hostages in the Middle Ages, Adam Kosto suggests that hostage taking was not separate from other behaviours, informing his analysis with reference to oblation, fostering, and sponsorship.[9] In a similar vein, we may connect exiles and hostages. Beyond this, there is evidence that Malcolm opposed his son returning to Scotland, making Duncan an exile. If we accept that he was released in 1087, when William the Conqueror ordered all his captives to be freed, why did Duncan not return home then?[10] William of Malmesbury called him a bastard (*nothus*).[11] Tradition dictates that he was not a bastard, but Malcolm's son by first wife, Ingibiorg of Orkney.[12] Still, this reflects awareness that Duncan was not related to Malcolm's influential second wife, Margaret of Scots. Presumably she wanted one of her children to succeed Malcolm, and there is some evidence they overtook Duncan in the line of succession. Edward, Malcolm and Margaret's eldest son, was described in the *ASC*'s account of his death in 1093 as the son 'who should have been king after him [Malcolm].'[13] Based on this, Malcolm and Margaret would not want Duncan in Scotland after his release, effectively exiling him.

Furthermore, I also consider instances when individuals became exiles due to diplomatic agreements between English rulers and their Scottish and Welsh neighbours, since this can inform us about said rulers' foreign policies. For example, an agreement following Owain ap Cadwgan's abduction of Nest, wife of Gerald of Windsor, in 1109. This motivated English instigated retaliation against Owain and his father, Cadwgan ap Bleddyn of Powys.[14] Owain fled to Ireland, but Cadwgan opted to make peace with Henry. As well as agreeing to pay Henry tribute in return for permission to rule over Ceredigion, the *Brut y Tywysogyon* claims Cadwgan was banned from associating with his

[5] JW, 3, pp. 6-9; *ASC D,* 1067-69, 1074; *E*, 1091; *HR*, pp. 191-92; Nicholas Hooper, 'Edgar the Ætheling: Anglo-Saxon Prince, Rebel and Crusader,' *ASE*, 14 (1985), pp. 197-214.
[6] *GS*, pp. 135-37.
[7] HH, pp. 754-55; JH, pp. 322-23; *GS*, p. 142; WN, 1, pp. 98-101.
[8] *ASC E*, 1072, 1093.
[9] Kosto, *Hostages*, pp. 71-77.
[10] *ASC E*, 1087.
[11] WM, 1, pp. 214-15.
[12] Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 265-69.
[13] *ASC E*, 1093.
[14] See p. 74.

son. He was specifically told not to allow Owain into his land, nor provide him with counsel, advice, or help, exiling him from Cadwgan's realm.[15]

These parameters provide eleven individual exiles or distinct groups of exiles. That some were exiled on multiple occasions expands our source base further. Additionally, exiles often interacted with their harbourers both before and after their displacement, providing more evidence to interpret their role in inter-ruler relations through. The prominent ones, like the aforementioned Edgar the Ætheling and Henry of Anjou, have obviously received historiographical interest, but said attention has often underappreciated their time in exile. When investigating Edgar, Emily Joan Ward largely focused on his role in the Norman Conquest.[16] John T. Appleby, H. A. Crone and W. L. Warren have approached Henry of Anjou's period at the Scottish court as merely a preliminary to a subsequent military campaign.[17] Deeply analysing these individuals as exiles then will majorly contribute to our understanding of them.

The impact exiles had on inter-ruler Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations is of course most evident after they had become exiles, through their own interactions with foreign rulers, and the effect said interactions could have on the relationship between a king an exile had fled to and a king an exile had fled from. Both aspects will be investigated later in this chapter. However, to do so effectively we must first consider in greater detail the underlying reasons why these exiles were forced out. This is central, since what a person did in exile and how rulers responded to them is shaped by their pre-exile life. Together, these three themes help illustrate the nature of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, especially how they evolved across the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries, not just from the Anglo-Saxon to the Anglo-Norman period.

2. Types of Exiles

Within their broad exile definition, historians have identified two significant sub-categories: judicial and political. Judicial exiles were alleged criminals, leading to their involvement in a legal process, which ultimately sentenced them to exile as a form of punishment. As William Chester Jordan puts it whilst investigating English exiles in France, this category applies to 'those sent as exiles because of their association with serious criminal activities'.[18] Accepting that 'Exile had multiple meanings', Lewis claims 'sometimes it implied formal judicial banishment.'[19] Elisabeth Van Houts is principally interested in judicial exiles in the North Sea world around c.1000, focusing on kings' laws and connecting them to outlawry, when an individual was ruled to have lost the protection of the community as a punishment for committing the most heinous crimes, subsequently leading to their

[15] *Brut*, pp. 55-63, quote on p. 63.
[16] Hooper, 'Edgar', pp. 197-214.
[17] John T. Appleby, *The Troubled Reign of King Stephen* (London, 1969), pp. 172-73; Cronne, *The Reign of Stephen*, (Worcester, 1970), p. 61; W. L. Warren, *Henry II* (London, 1973), p. 36.
[18] William Chester Jordan, *From England to France: Felony and Exile in the High Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2015), p. 3.
[19] Lewis, 'Gruffudd', *EMA*, p. 39.

flight abroad.[20] Likewise, Patrick Wormald makes the distinction when investigating exiles and outlaws in Anglo-Saxon England, only considering exiles where clear judicial process, such as rulings in court, is evident.[21]

On the other hand, there are political exiles. Their displacement was not principally a product of jurisprudence. Rather, these exiles were forced abroad due to political reasons, such as a conflict or dispute within their homeland that made remaining undesirable. Jordan claims a typical political exile was a magnate, who left during periods of political danger, like a revolt or following 'the confiscation of their property by a hostile government.'[22] In contrast to the legal exiles he hinted at above, Lewis notes 'other individuals who went into exile had clearly not gone through a legal procedure', giving the example of those that left 'due to overriding difficulties at home.'[23] Though much of Van Houts' work focuses on exiles in legal texts, she hints at the political reasons behind exile, remarking 'The king could also outlaw his enemies' and reflecting on how the two eleventh-century foreign conquests of England might have increased the number of exiles fleeing the kingdom.[24] Wormald's focus on judicial exiles similarly demonstrates awareness of political exiles who fall outside his interest: 'To assume that *ira regis* necessarily adopted judicial form would entail the inclusion of an almost extendable number of casualties of Anglo-Saxon politics'.[25]

The exiles discussed here were seemingly the political sort. Many were claimants to the kingdom, or part of the kingdom, they were exiled from, like the aforementioned Edgar the Ætheling, Henry of Anjou and Duncan II. Duncan's half-siblings Edgar, Alexander and David, the children of Malcolm III's second wife Margaret, were similarly forced to flee from Scotland to England when their uncle Donald III seized the Scottish throne following their father's death in 1093.[26] Another example is Guthfrith the brother of Sihtric, the previous ruler of independent Northumbria, who fled to Constantine II of Scotland after Æthelstan's annexation of Northumbria (927).[27]

Others became exiles due to another form of dispute with a king, or with other powerful figures within his kingdom. As we have seen, prior to Henry I and Cadwgan ap Bleddyn agreeing that Owain ap Cadwgan must be exiled from Cadwgan's land, Owain had earnt Anglo-Norman ire by attacking Gerald of Windsor.[28] Many of the exiles during Edward the Confessor's reign fled due to intra-noble rivalries involving the earls, the king and his continental allies. When Edward's former brother-in-law Eustace of Boulogne was attacked by the citizens of Dover in 1051, the king ordered Earl Godwin of Wessex to retaliate, which he refused to do. This ultimately led to Edward forcing Godwin and his family into exile in Ireland and Flanders, with the support of French figures at the

[20] Elisabeth van Houts, 'The Vocabulary of Exile and Outlawry in the North Sea Area around the First Millenium', *EMA*, pp. 13-14.
[21] Patrick Wormald, 'An Handlist of Anglo-Saxon Lawsuits', *ASE*, 17 (1988), pp. 253-54.
[22] Chester Jordan, *Felony*, p. 3.
[23] Lewis, 'Gruffudd', *EMA*, p. 39.
[24] van Houts, 'Exile', *EMA*, pp. 23-24.
[25] Wormald, 'Lawsuits', p. 253.
[26] *ASC E*, 1093; JW, 3, pp. 84-85; Richard Oram, *David I: King of Scots, 1124-1154* (Edinburgh, 2020), pp. 23-24.
[27] WM, 1, pp. 214-15; Foot, *Æthelstan*, p. 19.
[28] *Brut*, p. 57.

English court and Earl Siward of Northumbria and Earl Leofric of Mercia. Under pressure from a retaliatory attack Godwin led on England in 1052, Edward both reinstated him and his family members to their former positions, and agreed to exile the majority of his French allies in England, with some ending up in Scotland.[29] Before becoming an exile at King Malcolm III's court in 1066, Earl Tostig of Northumbria was deprived of his position when the Northumbrians rebelled against him in 1065, preferring Morcar, brother of Earl Edwin of Mercia, as their earl. King Edward and Earl Harold of Wessex, Tostig's brother and evident rival, gave into their demands, precipitating Tostig's flight.[30] Whether it was a claim on a king's throne or different form of dispute with him or another significant magnate, the people discussed here sought safety in neighbouring kingdoms due to political rivalry.

Contrary to the neat division between judicial and political exiles, Jenny Benham and Ewan Johnson have seen considerable interplay, though they come to slightly different conclusions. Discussing treaties in 700-1200, Benham writes that 'it is not entirely clear such a distinction is necessary'.[31] She points out that political exiles also committed legal wrongs within their political disputes, like treachery and fleeing justice, meaning they fell under the judicial exile clarification. This is confirmed by the treaties she analyses, which 'nearly always refer to those [exiles] of a 'criminal' kind'.[32] Exploring exiles from the duchy of Normandy, Johnson also sees overlap: 'there is indeed no distinction between those whose departure was specifically demanded by authority, and who might therefore have some specific legal status as exile, and those forced to leave Normandy due to political losses'.[33] Unlike Benham who expanded the judicial category to include political exiles, Johnson sees all exiles as political, arguing they were forced out primarily due to ducal policy and the realities of realpolitik. Regardless, both undermine the traditional judicial and political division.

The exiles discussed here do suggest a degree of overlap between judicial and political exile, though this provides a limited analytical framework. We obviously lack the sorts of treaties Benham's study relies on. Yet it is notable that the closest comparison we do have defines exiles in a criminal sense. The *Treaty of Falaise* (1174) between Henry II of England and William the Lion of Scotland, the earliest surviving Anglo-Scottish written treaty, states that 'the king of Scotland and his men will henceforth harbour no fugitives, for the sake of *felony*, from the territory of the lord king [Henry] in Scotland or his other territories'.[34] Furthermore, there is some evidence that our exiles' displacement followed legal procedure, as in the case of Ælfgar, earl of East Anglia at the time and son of Earl Leofric of Mercia, who first fled to King Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales in 1055. According to the *ASC*'S E version, 'Earl Ælfgar was outlawed because he was charged with being a traitor to the king

[29] *ASC*, *CDE*, 1051-52; JW, 2, pp. 572-73; Richard Mortimer, 'Edward the Confessor: The Man and the Legend', in *Edward the Confessor: The Man the Legend*, ed. Richard Mortimer (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 9-12; Eric John, 'The End of Anglo-Saxon England', Campbell, *AS*, p. 225; Barlow, *The Godwins: The Rise and Dall of a Noble Dynasty* (Oxon, 2013), pp. 56-64.
[30] *ASC D*, 1065; JW, 2, pp. 600-03; See Frank Barlow, 'Introduction', in *LKE*, p. xxiii for Tostig and Harold.
[31] *ILE*, p. 51.
[32] Ibid, p. 51.
[33] Ewan Johnson, 'The Process of Norman Exile into Southern Italy', *EMA*, pp. 32-35, quote on p. 32.
[34] *'Treaty of "Falaise"'*, *ASR*, pp. 2-3, '*Preterea rex Scottorum et homines sui nullum amodo fugitivum de terra domini regis pro felonia, receptabunt in Scocia vel in alia terra sua*', my emphasis.

and all the people of the country'.[35] John of Worcester adds that this occurred at a royal court.[36] This seemingly points to Ælfgar being found guilty of treason at a trial and sentenced to outlawry, causing him to flee. He can be seen as a judicial exile, raising the possibility that other exiles may have been similarly sentenced prior to flight.

However, we must not discount the significance of the political reasons, which truly motivated these individuals' displacement. This is definitively clear with Ælfgar. Whilst the *ASC*'s E text, regarded as the pro-Godwinson version, shows Ælfgar as guilty beyond reproach, the other versions present different perspectives. The anti-Godwinson C text claims 'Earl Ælfgar was outlawed without any guilt' and the more neutral D version states 'Earl Ælfgar was outlawed having committed hardly any crime'.[37] Contemporary perspective on Ælfgar depended on alignment with a political faction, implying that politics rather than legality could motivate an outlawry ruling. The trigger for Ælfgar's exile must have been the appointment of Tostig in 1055, one of Godwin's sons, as earl of Northumbria.[38] Whilst Stephen Baxter argues that Ælfgar desired Northumbria himself, I believe he would have seen the selection of a Godwinson as the earl of a territory he had no connection to as proof that his own chances of inheriting Mercia were under threat.[39] Either way, this would have drawn him into conflict with the Godwin family. They were in a dominant and influential position following their return in 1052, shown by Tostig's appointment, and likely supported the outlawing of Ælfgar, the son of a man who had opposed them in 1051.[40] Here, as with the other exiles discussed, political conflict is what ultimately caused the displacement. Although they may have been involved in an outlawry trial and considered criminals in legal documents like treaties, akin to judicial exiles, politics is what pushed them out. If we are to understand what they did next and how they were treated we must fully appreciate their origins.

That the core reason exiles fled was conflict in the sphere of domestic high politics has multiple consequences for our understanding of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations. Firstly, it informs us about exiles' identity. They were all important political figures: earls, magnates and claimants. They could draw support and legitimacy in the kingdom they fled from. In the aftermath of King Harold's death at the Battle of Hastings, Edgar garnered the support of Archbishop Ealdred of York, the citizens of London, Earl Edwin of Mercia and Earl Morcar of Northumbria, before the Conqueror's army convinced them to change tact.[41] That other exiled claimants, like Henry of Anjou, ultimately became kings speaks to their support.[42] Moreover, the reason for their exile demonstrates that they were opponents of the king they fled from, or other significant figures within his kingdom. These two factors made them major threats to their home kingdom, and possibly useful allies for

[35] *ASC E*, 1055.
[36] JW, 2, pp. 576-77.
[37] *ASC*, *CD*, 1055; Eric John, 'The End of Anglo-Saxon England', Campbell, *AS*, pp. 221-22.
[38] *ASC D*, 1055.
[39] Stephen Baxter, *The Earls of Mercia* (Oxford, 2007), p. 46.
[40] Barlow, *Godwins*, pp. 74; Nicholas J. Higham and Martin J. Ryan, *The Anglo-Saxon World* (London, 2013), pp. 395-96.
[41] *ASC D*, 1066.
[42] HH, pp. 774-75.

someone looking to challenge said kingdom. As we shall see, this shaped how they were treated during their time in exile.

Secondly, it provides major insight into how Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations evolved. Changes were partly governed by domestic conflicts, which caused individuals to travel to foreign courts and subsequently impact relations between rulers, the focus of the next two sections. For instance, William the Conqueror's invasion led to Edgar's flight to Malcolm III. The same is true with other domestic disputes: English unification conflicts, the intra-earl rivalries that blighted Edward the Confessor's reign, the Scottish succession in the 1090s and the Anarchy. Rather than an Anglo-Saxon versus Anglo-Norman divide, exiles, like previously discussed themes, point to multiple shifts.

3. Exiles and Harbouring Kings

Once safe in a foreign realm, what sort of relationships did exiles have with the kings that hosted them? Crucially, from an inter-ruler perspective, what was the real or desired impact of these diplomatic interactions on the kingdom the exile fled from? A central theme of the historiography of medieval exiles is what life was like in exile. Johnson argues that Norman exiles in Italy identified with their homeland, using Norman toponymic names and seeking wealth that could help facilitate a return to the duchy.[43] Having devoted his early chapters to defining exiles and discussing sentencing, Jordan turns his attention to both the journey to France and the exiles' time there.[44] The exiles under observation here had close, mutually beneficial, relationships with their harbourers. Some of these bonds had long histories, whilst others were forged during the individual's period in exile or immediately prior. Two frequent and overlapping types of relationships can be discerned; those resting on family ties and those connected to kingmaking rituals. Both benefited the exile and the harbouring king, with the former considered first.

A. Family Ties

Exiles were frequently linked to their harbourers by family ties, often travelling to rulers who they were related to by blood. The most obvious example is Henry of Anjou, seeking sanctuary in 1149 with David, his great uncle. That the family relationship played a role in Henry's decision to journey to Scotland is evident from the sources' interest in it. As William of Newburgh writes, 'Henry, his grandnephew, joined him [David], having been sent by his mother'.[45] Henry of Huntingdon twice refers to Henry as David's nephew.[46] Though the *Deeds of Stephen* is less explicit, its claim that David was

[43] Johnson, 'Exile', p. 37.
[44] Chester Jordan, *Felony*.
[45] WN, 1, pp. 98, '*A quem Henricus ex nepte ejus* […] *a metre missus jame pubes accessit*'.
[46] HH pp. 754-55.

Henry's 'intimate and special friend' points towards the importance of an existing relationship, like a family tie.[47]

Henry was certainly not the first exile to seek out a family member for sanctuary. Cadwgan ap Bleddyn's agreement with Henry I that he would not harbour his son Owain hints at an expectation that people took in exiled relatives, which Henry was guarding against.[48] Outside of directly relevant Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish agreements and exiles, there are comparisons that support this conclusion. After his subjects abandoned him in favour of Sweyn Forkbeard of Denmark in 1013, King Æthelred fled to Duke Richard II of Normandy, his brother-in-law, who was already harbouring his wife and sons.[49] The boys, Edward and Alfred, went on to spend Cnut's entire reign in Normandy, in the company of their mother's family.[50] Similarly, when Earl Godwin of Wessex fled England in 1051, he found sanctuary with Count Baldwin V of Flanders, whose daughter Judith was married to Godwin's son Tostig.[51]

Elsewhere in this thesis we have seen the power of family ties and the mutual obligations they imposed, such as the provision of military support.[52] Seemingly harbouring was another obligation imposed by family ties. Interestingly, B's *Life of St. Dunstan* provides an account of the titular saint's exile during King Eadwig's reign (955-59), in which we are told that Dunstan travelling to a magnate in Frankia where the lord 'guarded him with the fatherly affection of love during the time of his exile.'[53] There is no suggestion that Dunstan was actually related to his host, implying the act of harbouring itself was heavily entwined with family relations in the author's and presumably others' minds. Whilst Henry I's marriage to David I's sister in 1100 was not intended to secure his grandson's sanctuary forty-nine years later, he might have reasonably assumed that a right to refuge in Scotland would be one of the possible advantages it brought his kin.

The link between harbouring and family ties is made more explicit by the individuals who established family relationships in and around the time of their exile. Most obviously, Edgar the Ætheling, who first fled to Malcolm III of Scotland with his siblings in 1068.[54] He is recorded in Scotland during 1069 and 1070, in the aftermath of two failed campaigns against William the Conqueror, before leaving at some point before 1074, when he is located in Flanders prior to another trip to Scotland.[55] During this period his sister Margaret married Malcolm. It is unclear exactly when, as the *ASC*'s confused timeline links it to Edgar's first visit to Scotland, meaning 1068, whereas Symeon of Durham suggests it occurred in 1070.[56] Regardless, it took place around the time of

[47] *GS*, p. 142, '*Familari sibi et praecipuo amico*'.
[48] *Brut*, pp. 55-63, quote on p. 63.
[49] *ASC D*, 1013.
[50] *Encomium*, p. 35; *ASC C*, 1036; *E*, 1041.
[51] *LKE*, pp. 38-39; *ASC E*, 1051.
[52] See pp. 96-97.
[53] B, '*Vita S. Dunstani*,' in *The Early Lives of St. Dunstan*, ed. Michael Winterbottom and Michael Lapidge (Oxford, 2012), pp. 72-73, '*Qui eum paterno caritatis affectu subexilii sui tempore custoduit*'.
[54] JW, 3, pp. 6-7; Hooper, 'Edgar', p. 204.
[55] *ASC D,* 1067-69, 1074; *HR*, p. 192; Hooper, 'Edgar', pp. 204-05.
[56] *ASC D*, 1067; *HR,* p. 192.

Edgar's initial trip to Scotland, entwining the two events. There is also Earl Ælfgar, who as discussed earlier was harboured by Gruffydd ap Llywelyn in 1055, and ultimately readmitted into England curtesy of the Welsh king's support. The *ASC* suggests that this event was repeated in 1058, stating that 'in this year Ælfgar was banished but got back by violence forthwith with Gruffydd's help.'[57] Presumably political rivalry was once again the cause, with the only detectable difference from 1055 coming from the *Brut*, which claims that Gruffydd's 1058 attack was aided by a Viking force.[58] A further difference was their family relationship, since Orderic Vitalis claims Ælfgar had a daughter called Edith, who 'had previously been the wife of Gruffydd, the strongest king of the Welsh,' a marriage usually dated to 1057, when Ælfgar succeeded his father as earl of Mercia.[59] Thus, marriage and exile appear entangled.

These exiles seem to have much in common with Gruffudd ap Cynan and his father Cynan ab Iago. Elsewhere in this thesis we have discussed Gruffudd's rule over Gwynedd during the early twelfth-century, but he also spent much of his youth exiled from Gwynedd, after his father, the son of the previous ruler, was forced abroad when Gruffydd ap Llywelyn assumed control of the realm in 1039.[60] They do not form a central part of this chapter because they were not harboured by an English king whilst in exile, nor did an Anglo-Welsh treaty displace them, meaning their direct relevance to the diplomacy discussed here is limited. Yet, they prove useful comparisons, particularly because there is twelfth-century account of Gruffudd's life. We learn from it that Cynan fled to Dublin, where he married Ragnell, daughter of King Olaf Sihtric of Dublin. Gruffudd was evidently safe in Dublin, being born there and later soliciting another ruler of Dublin, Muirchertach, for help with his first attempts to retake Gwynedd in 1075, furthering illustrating the interplay between marriage and exile.[61]

The marriage between Margaret and Malcolm III has been criticised, seemingly based on the *ASC*'s statement that 'he [Edgar] and his men opposed it for a long time.'[62] Nicholas Hooper writes that 'any advantage which the match brought Edgar was not apparent in the shorter term.'[63] However, given what we have learnt from this and other comparisons, it seems likely that Edgar, as well as Ælfgar, were using marriage to obtain the sort of family relationship Henry of Anjou had with David I, securing their much needed sanctuary in Malcolm and Gruffydd ap Llywelyn's respective kingdoms. Obviously Ælfgar's daughter had not wed Gruffydd during his first time in exile in 1055, if we accept 1057 as the marriage's date. It might have already been negotiated earlier, via Gruffydd's middleman Rhys Sais.[64] Alternatively, having been reinstated thanks to Gruffydd's help one time, Ælfgar locked

[57] *ASC D*, 1058; JW, 2, pp. 584-85.
[58] *Brut*, p. 27.
[59] OV, 2, pp. 138-39, '*Quae prius Gritfridi fortissimi regis Gualorum coniunx fuerat: eique Blidenem regni successorem et filiam nomine Nest pepererat*'; K.L Maund, 'Ealdgyth [Aldgyth]', *ODNB*, 23 September 2004.
[60] *LGC*, p. 53; *Brut*, p. 23.
[61] *LGC*, p. 59.
[62] *ASC D*, 1067.
[63] Hooper, 'Edgar', p. 205.
[64] See pp. 119-20.

the relationship down with a marriage tie, ensuring he would have sanctuary in Wales should he be exiled again, as in 1058.

Tostig of Northumbria, who fled to Malcolm III in 1066 following a failed attack on England, after being exiled the previous year, also had a familial relationship with his harbourer, but of a different type.[65] Symeon of Durham tells us that in 1061 'King Malcolm of Scots insolently ravaged the earldom of his *oath brother*, that is to say of Earl Tostig.'[66] This oath brotherhood was a form of ritual kinship. There has been some research on this phenomenon, including an extended discussion introduced by Elizabeth A. R. Brown. She claims it occurred when, through some form of ritual, 'two biologically unrelated people are transformed into spiritual siblings.'[67] In Tostig and Malcolm's case, as with other examples, the brotherhood was seemingly created by the participants swearing an oath, presumably during their first recorded meeting in 1059, when Tostig escorted Malcolm to Edward's court.[68] Principally, Brown argues, the relationship required them to treat one another as siblings, by maintaining peace and protecting one another's interests and dependents.[69] Comparisons from eleventh-century Britain seemingly confirm this. One is recorded in *De Obsessione Dunelmi*, an account of an eleventh-century Northumbrian feud written towards the end of that century. [70] Two members of the feuding families, Carl and Ealdred, briefly resolved their differences, with the source claiming 'they were both so greatly in love that the sworn brothers reached for Rome together.'[71] The practice was also used in 1016, after King Edmund Ironside of England made peace with the Danish invader, and future king of England, Cnut. The two leaders met at Alney, where they agreed to divide England between themselves. John of Worcester states that as part of this agreement 'peace, friendship, and brotherhood was confirmed and agreed by oath.'[72] William of Malmesbury does not mention the initial oath, but calls Edmund Cnut's brother in passages following the 1016 meeting.[73]

When compared, these accounts point to ritual kinships playing a similar role to other kinship ties, like marriage. They created positive connections, such as love and friendship, as well as a willingness to collaborate on matters, like a trip abroad or a kingdom's division. The upside of these bonds was a good and peaceful relationship, built on mutual obligations. Likely, as with other forms of

[65] *ASC C*, 1066.
[66] *HR*, pp. 174-75, '*Interim rex Scottorum Malcolmus sui conjurati fratris, scilicet comitis Tostii, comitatum ferociter-depopulatus est*', my emphasis.
[67] Elizabeth R. Brown, 'Introduction: Ritual Brotherhood in Ancient and Medieval Europe: A Syposium', *Traditio*, 52 (1997), pp. 261-83, quote on p. 270; See also Elizabeth R. Brown, 'Ritual Brotherhood in Western Medieval Europe', *Traditio*, 52 (1997), pp. 357-81; Klaus Oschema, 'Blood-brothers: a ritual of friendship and the construction of the imagined barbarian in the middle ages', *JMH*, 32 (2006), pp 275-301; Peter Parkes, 'Celtic Fosterage: Adoptive Kinship and Clientage in Northwest Europe', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 48 (2006), pp. 359-95.
[68] *HR*, pp. 174-75.
[69] Brown, 'Introduction', pp. 270-71.
[70] Christopher J. Morris, *Marriage and Murder in Eleventh-Century Northumbria: A Study of the* De Obsessione Dunelmi (York, 1992), pp. 7-8.
[71] '*De Obsessione Dunelmi*', in *Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (London, 1882-85), 1, p. 219, '*Atque adeo in amorem alterutrum sunt adunati, ut fratres adjurati Romam simul tenderent*'.
[72] JW, 2, pp. 492-93, '*Ubi pace, amicitias fraternitate, et pacto et sacramentis confirmata*'.
[73] WM, pp. 320-21, 330-32.

kinship ties, this one obliged the relatives to harbour one another, securing Tostig's sanctuary at Malcolm III's court. It evidently survived Malcolm III's attack on Northumbria in 1061, presumably because, from Tostig's perspective, it was about securing external help against English rivals, as was needed in 1066. Although they became oath brothers several years before Tostig needed the bond, he was perhaps inspired into seeking it in 1059 by Ælfgar's relationship with Gruffydd ap Llywelyn.

Family ties, of course, brought more than a safe haven, as exiles could use them to obtain military support from their host. Edgar the Ætheling fled to Malcolm III for the final time in 1091, after William Rufus deprived him of his English lands. Malcolm took retaliatory action on behalf of his brother-in-law, ravaging Northumberland.[74] Likewise, Ælfgar was re-instated in 1058 courtesy of military aid from Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, his son-in-law.[75] After spending time at his great-uncle's court in 1149, Henry of Anjou was joined by King David I for a joint, but ultimately fruitless, invasion of northern England.[76] As we saw in the marriage chapter, with Alexander I and David I of Scotland's respective support for Henry I's campaign in Wales and the Empress Matilda in the Anarchy, family members were obliged to provide one another with military aid.[77] Evidently, exiles had access to the same support from relatives that harboured them.

Additionally, what made a family connection to a harbourer particularly beneficial was that it created a long-term relationship. Henry of Anjou's sanctuary in Scotland was a consequence of his grandfather's marriage to David I's sister forty-nine years prior.[78] Following his sister's marriage to Malcolm III, Edgar found safety with Malcolm in 1074 and 1091, speaking again to the permanence of the relationships created by marriage.[79] In Edgar's case, the *ASC* hints that Margaret actively facilitated his repeated access to Scotland. As well as claiming that Edgar travelled to Scotland in 1091 to see both the king and the queen, the source's 1074 extract mentions how 'King Malcolm and Edgar's sister, Margaret, received him with great honour.' During that visit he received gifts, which the source describes as having come from both Malcolm and Margaret. In line with her *Vita*, which makes clear that Margaret influenced her husband's views and behaviours, she was actively involved in her husband and brother's relationship, likely using her position to counsel the former to shelter the latter.[80] Possibly, Ælfgar's daughter Edith played a similar role during her father's visit in 1058, and might have gone onto on more occasions had Ælfgar not died in 1062 and Edith herself not married Harold Godwinson after her husband's death in 1063.[81] Regardless, familial connections ensured that the exiles benefitted from their harbourer's support for an extended period.

By utilising family ties, these exiles behaved as proactive diplomatic agents looking to improve their position. They ensured they could perennially flee to neighbouring realms during

[74] *ASC E*, 1091; JW, 3, pp. 58-59; Hooper, 'Edgar', pp. 206-07.
[75] *ASC D*, 1058; JW, 2, pp. 584-85.
[76] HH, pp. 754-55; JH, pp. 322-23; *GS*, p. 142; WN, 1, pp. 98-101.
[77] See pp. 88, 96-97; Also, Althoff, *Family*, p. 59.
[78] *ASC E*, 1100.
[79] *ASC D*, 1074; *E*, 1091.
[80] *VSM*, p. 234; See pp. 90-91.
[81] OV, 2, pp. 138-39.

domestic conflicts, then gather support and launch a counterattack in order to resecure their rightful position. Ælfgar's exile in 1058 was a very successful execution of this plan, with his son-in-law providing first sanctuary in Wales and then military support, forcing the English court to permit Ælfgar's return. Seemingly, it was so successful in that his domestic opponents stopped forcing him out, with Ælfgar remaining in England as the earl of Mercia until his death in 1062.[82] Although Edgar never became king, his ties to Malcolm III were beneficial. We are told by John of Worcester that in the 1091 peace agreement between Malcolm and William Rufus, following Edgar's time at the Scottish court and Malcolm's attack on England, 'Prince Edgar also was brought into agreement with the king'.[83] Under pressure from the Scots, Rufus seemingly backed down and returned Edgar's land. Henry of Anjou and Tostig Godwinson were decisively less successful: both followed their time in Scotland with ultimately unsuccessful attacks on England, with Tostig dying in his.[84] But their family ties to Scottish kings gave them a place of safety within Britain and the opportunity to return to England.

B. Kingmaking Rituals

Harbouring kings also interacted with exiles who possessed a claim to the kingdom they had fled from through rituals that legitimised the exiles supposed kingship, an obvious boon for royal claimants. This occurred between William Rufus of England and Edgar, Malcolm III of Scotland's son and the future king of Scotland, during Edgar's exile in England (1093-97). In a charter confirming grants that Edgar made to the church of Durham, Rufus refers to the Scottish claimant as 'King Edgar', effectively recognising his kingship.[85] The recognition seems to have taken place by 1095, the date of Edgar's original charter recording his grant. In this document Edgar not only referred to himself as king, but points to Rufus' involvement by claiming he held the title 'by gift of King William my lord'.[86] Rufus had evidently recognised the exiled Scottish claimant he was hosting at his court as the rightful king of Scotland. Richard Oram speculates he might have done this through an investiture ritual, like the bestowal of crown[87] This seems likely based on the other examples that are considered in this section. Whilst the exact nature of any kingmaking ritual is open to debate, what matters is that Rufus evidently did recognise the exiled Edgar in some form, as the charters prove.

Though other kingmaking rituals between harbourers and exiles lack the same clarifying documentary evidence, through analysis their intention becomes clear. For instance, the gifts Edgar the Ætheling received during his visit to Scotland in 1074. According to the *ASC*'s D manuscript, 'King Malcolm and Edgar's sister, Margaret, gave him and his men many treasures.' These included skins

[82] K. L. Maund, 'The Welsh Alliances of Earl Ælfgar of Mercia and His Family in the Mid-Eleventh Century', *ANS*, 11, p. 188.
[83] *ASC E*, 1091.
[84] HH, pp. 754-55; *ASC C*, 1066.
[85] *ESC*, 16 '*Eadgarus Rex*'.
[86] *ESC*, 15, '*Dono domini mei Willelmi*'.
[87] Oram, *Domination*, p. 45.

with purple cloth, robes of marten's skin, grey fur, ermine, costly robes, golden vessels, and silver.[88] As in Chapter Two, the value attached to the gift items can help explain their significance.[89] Of particular interest are the skins with purple cloth. Purple is often associated with kingship, monarchy and political power, a legacy of the Roman period when purple was symbolic of high status and eventually imperial rule.[90] When Harold Godwinson became king in 1066, Orderic Vitalis describes him as having 'stealthily snatched the honour of the crown and the [royal] purple.'[91] This could explain why purple items were given to kings. *The Life of King Edward* reports a similar situation between Earl Godwin of Wessex and King Edward the Confessor. Earl Godwin gave Edward a ship, which the source says 'patrician purple pranks the hanging sail.'[92] Edward had only recently become king; hence his position was not particularly secure, especially since he had spent his life as an exile in Normandy.[93] Godwin is depicted in the source as his major backer, convincing others to follow suit.[94] In giving Edward a ship with visual connections to kingship, Godwin emphasised the new monarch's position to onlookers, further securing it. Malcolm's gifts evidently formed part of another kingmaking ritual. In giving Edgar purple cloth, an item associated with kingship, he was recognising Edgar's right to rule England.

That this was desired effect is confirmed by the *ASC*'s E manuscript, which includes a far briefer account of Edgar's 1074 visit, making no reference to the gifts.[95] D and E approached the Norman Conquest differently. D seemingly continued to view the West Saxon dynasty as England's rightful royal family. Its 1067 entry extensively highlights both Edgar and his sister Margaret, providing a genealogy for the latter that traced her lineage back to King Edgar of England, emphasising their position as members of England's legitimate dynasty, despite William's successful invasion.[96] In a similar manner, it has been argued that the D manuscript ultimately stopped in 1079 because it had become clear that a return to West Saxon rule was impossible.[97] With hope for its preferred dynasty now lost, Thomas A. Bredehoft claims that 'The D Chronicle almost certainly lost its reason for continuing.'[98] Conversely, E was more accepting of Norman rule. For starters, its entries continued until 1154, longer than any other manuscript.[99] As in 1074, it gave less attention to Edgar and his relatives in 1067, with no legitimising poem.[100] Rather, in its 1087 entry, E commemorated William the Conqueror's death with a poem celebrating his rule.[101] Poems are uncommon in the *ASC* but are occasionally included to mark the deaths of kings of England. King Edward the Confessor and King

[88] *ASC D*, 1074.
[89] See pp. 59-60.
[90] Mark Bradley, *Colour and Meaning in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 192-93, 198-201, 206-07.
[91] OV, 2, pp. 137-39, '*Furtim praeripuit diadematis et purpurae decus*'.
[92] *LKE*, pp. 20-21, '*Nobilis appensum preciatur purpura uelum*'.
[93] For Edward's life, see Mortimer, 'Edward', pp. 1-40.
[94] *LKE*, pp. 14-15.
[95] *ASC E*, 1074.
[96] *ASC D*, 1067; Bredehoft, *Textual*, pp. 142-43.
[97] Ibid, 1079.
[98] Bredehoft, *Textual*, p. 143.
[99] *ASC E*, 1154.
[100] Ibid, 1067.
[101] Ibid, 1087.

Edgar, two members of the West Saxon dynasty, both received them, but not King Cnut, who like William was a foreign invader who ruled through right of conquest.[102] This poem suggests that from E's perspective William was the legitimate king, rather than any surviving members of the West Saxon royal family.[103] Returning to Edgar's gifts, D and E's differing accounts make sense if we consider the manuscripts' political views and my interpretation of the gifts. To E, Edgar and his family members were no longer the legitimate rulers of England. So, if the purple gift was an acknowledgment of Edgar's rightful claim to the English throne, then it makes sense for E to ignore it. Conversely, D chose to describe the gift in detail in order to advocate Edgar's claim.

Another way to acknowledge an exile's claim was through knighting. William of Malmesbury states that William Rufus 'made Duncan, bastard son of Malcolm, a knight and established as king of Scots, his father having died.'[104] The knighting is undated, but William connects it to Rufus' support for Duncan's 1093 invasion of Scotland. Likewise, when Henry of Anjou went to David I of Scotland in 1149, he was knighted by his great-uncle. Depictions of knighting suggest it was a form of coming-of-age ritual. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon is William of Poiters description of William the Conqueror's knighting: 'Our duke, more adult in intelligence of honourable things and in strength of body, than in age, obtained knightly arms.'[105] Having demonstrated both mental and physical maturity, the knighting recognised his transition to adulthood. Though not as explicit, we can see elements of this in the sources for Henry of Anjou's knighting. He was sixteen in 1149, around the age of maturity, and subsequently called a 'youth' by William of Newburgh.[106] Additionally, in Henry of Huntingdon's account of the knighting, he states that David 'bequeathed to his nephew Henry *manly arms*', suggesting the ceremony played a role in confirming Henry's transition from youth to man. [107]

Crucially for the exiles discussed here, for politically significant individuals this rite of passage was linked to assuming office. To put it simply, it helped prove that an heir or claimant was ready to be king. Henry III of England's knighting in 1216, as recorded in the *History of William Marshal*, is a comparison that shows this explicitly. The magnates decided that William Marshal should dub Henry a knight before he was crowned. The connection between the events is made clear by the fact that after this, he was immediately carried to Gloucester Cathedral for his coronation. Further, the magnates told the Marshall 'You have dubbed your lord a knight, to your great honour, for through you he wears

[102] *ASC C*, 975, 1035, 1066; *D*, 975.
[103] Bredehoft, *Textual*, p. 144.
[104] WM, 1, pp. 214-15, '*Siquidem ille Dunecanum, filium Malcolmi nothum, et militem fecit et regem Scottorum mortuo patre constituit*'.
[105] William of Poiters, *The Gesta Guillelmi*, ed. and trans. R. H. C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1998), pp. 6-7, '*Dux noster, plus intelligentia rerum honestarum et ui corporis quam aetate adultus, arma militaria sumit*'.
[106] WN, 1, p. 98, '*A quem Henricus ex nepte ejus, id est Matilde olim imperatrice, Andegavensis comitis fillius et angliae rex futurus, a metre missus jame pubes accessit*'; Emily Joan Ward, 'Child Kings and the Norman Conquest: Representations of Association and Succession', in *Conquests in Eleventh-Century England: 1016, 1066*, ed. Laura Ashe and Emily Joan Ward (Woodbridge, 2020), pp. 27-28.
[107] HH pp. 754-55, '*Henrico nepoti suo Dauid rex Scotorum uirilia tradidit arma*'.

the crown.'[108] Since knighting increased an individual's status, confirming their adulthood, it was a way to recognise a claimant's right to kingship. As Björn Weiler puts it, 'The boy's knighting symbolised his readiness to perform the functions and duties of his offices.'[109] This is particularly pertinent, since Henry III's succession faced challenges. Not only did Louis VIII of France also claim the English throne, but Henry was only nine years old. Thus, the knighting raised his status, emphasising maturity in contrast to his youth.

The knighting of Duncan and Henry of Anjou performed similar roles to Edgar's purple gift. William Rufus and David I were effectively recognising their kingships, acknowledging that they had transitioned into manhood and had the capacity to assume their rightful offices. This is supported by evidence surrounding these events. It cannot be a coincidence that Eustace, Stephen's son, 'received manly arms' the same year that Henry did, nor that Henry of Huntingdon placed these two events back-to-back in his narrative.[110] Seemingly, David and Henry of Anjou were responding to Stephen recognising his son as his heir apparent by performing a ritual that asserted Henry's own right to the throne. As for Duncan, William of Malmesbury immediately follows the knighting by describing him being 'established as king of Scots' by Rufus.[111] Though the *ASC* does not mention the knighting, it says that in the supposed year of Duncan's knighting 'he came to the king [Rufus] and did such homage [for Scotland] as the king wished to have from him'.[112] Further, immediately after receiving their knighthoods, both Henry and Duncan joined military campaigns to secure their desired thrones.[113] Clearly, close textual and temporal links existed between being knighted and assumption of (or attempted assumption of) office. The former then, served as prerequisite recognition of an individual's capacity to perform the latter.

Regarding how all these rituals secured legitimacy, it is perhaps crucial that they all involved objects and materials. Edgar the Ætheling's gifts and the charters recording Edgar of Scotland's recognition have of course already been mentioned. Additionally, knighting was another form of object exchange. As well as Henry of Huntingdon's claim that David bequeathed arms to Henry, John of Hexham writes that 'he gave him a belt of military service,' and William of Newburgh claims 'he [Henry] received a martial belt.'[114] Lieberman speculates that knighting even evolved from an earlier arm giving ritual, employed in Germanic and later Carolingian politics.[115] Together, these items were all physical manifestations of these claimant's "kingworthiness", in turn promoting it. Edgar the Ætheling wearing the purple cloak over the following years, for instance, would remind people that

[108] *History of William Marshal*, ed. and trans. A.J. Holden, 2 vols. (London, 2002-2004), 2, 266-67, 270-71, quote at p. 271.
[109] Bjorn Weiler, 'Knighting, Homage, and the Meaning of Ritual: The Kings of England and their Neighbours in the Thirteenth Century', *Viator,* 37 (2006), p. 279.
[110] HH, pp. 754-55, '*Et ipse eodem anno uirilia sumpserat arma*'.
[111] See p. 150, note 104.
[112] *ASC E*, 1093.
[113] Ibid, 1093; HH, pp. 754-55.
[114] HH, pp. 754-55; JH, pp. 322-23, '*Militiae enim cingulo donavit eum*'; WN, 1, pp. 98, '*Cingulum militare accepit*'.
[115] Max Lieberman, 'A New Approach to the Knighting Ritual', *Speculum*, 90 (2015), p. 412.

Malcolm III had recognised his kingship, earning him more support. Seeing the charter confirming Edgar of Scotland's status would have had a similar effect.

These kingmaking rituals would have been incredibly important for our exiles. Perhaps the best insight into how important comes from *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan*. Though Gruffudd was an exile for many years, Lewis argues that the source does not present him as such. He is never referred to as an exile, and the descriptions of his journeys away from Wales following failed attempts to secure his throne are decidedly neutral and mundane, without much reflection. None of the biblical figures he is compared to were exiles. Rather the author chose comparisons like David and Maccabeus, who engaged in insurrection campaigns against oppressors in their homelands. The source was produced at his sons' behest during their reigns.[116] Presumably, they did not want their position undermined by their father being depicted as an exile, raising questions about who the rightful ruler was. Intriguingly, the source also included a kingmaking ritual. During his first attempt to re-take Gwynedd, the source claims Gruffudd was presented with a shirt which once belonged to Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, the former king of Gwynedd who actually drove out Gruffudd ap Cynan's father.[117] This is clearly a kingmaking ritual, which legitimises Gruffudd ap Cynan's rule by connecting him to a previous ruler. Whether it happened or not, his sons likely appreciated its inclusion as further recognition of their father's right to throne, undermining the notion he was an exile.

Similarly, the claimants this study considers had good reason to actively counteract the notion they were exiles through diplomacy. Forced from their homelands by rival rulers, they were in particularly weak positions. Legitimacy was needed, and this is exactly what kingmaking rituals performed by their hosts could provide. Having been recognised as the legitimate rulers by neighbouring kings, they would now have increased support in their homeland, improving their chances of returning home and securing their rightful position. This is a significant difference from non-royal claimants, like Earl Tostig and Earl Ælfgar, who seemingly did not seek ritualised legitimisation. Of course, both types, claimants and non-claimants, desired the benefits of family ties, as overlapping examples like Edgar the Ætheling show.

C. Harbourer Perspective

However, exiles were not the only actors here. Kings provided sanctuary and support in order to extract some sort of benefit from the exile, which strengthened their position in relation to the exile's homeland. The most obvious example of this occurred during Henry of Anjou's time at David I's court in 1149. William of Newburgh claims that Henry 'first pledged himself not at any time to despoil David's heir of any part of the lands which had passed from English control into that of King David', referring to the territory in northern England that David secured thanks to his invasions and Stephen's

[116] Lewis, 'Gruffudd', *EMA*, pp. 43-46, 50; Paul Russell, 'Introduction', *LGC*, pp. 46-47.
[117] *LGC*, p. 60-61.

concessions.[118] Seemingly, David was helping Henry in return for a promise that his recent expansions would not be reversed once Henry became king of England. William's claim can appear anachronistic, since he was writing towards the end of the twelfth century, long after this summit, and long after Henry broke his promise, seizing the contested territory from David's grandson, Malcolm IV, in 1157.[119] The doomed promise almost fits too well, implying that William may have fabricated it in light of later events. Analysis of the diplomatic meeting place seconds William's argument though. All accounts agree David met Henry at Carlisle, a part of northern England that he had captured during his invasion and been ceded by Stephen.[120] We have already seen how he attempted to secure recognition of his control over Carlisle by entertaining Alberic of Ostia there.[121] Henry's visit was an extension of this policy. In agreeing to be received by David at Carlisle, this prospective king of England was treating it as the location of the Scottish court, and thus as a territory under David's control. This was likely seen as an acknowledgement of all David's acquisitions in northern England. Furthermore, although John of Hexham does not mention Henry's promise in his account, he does state that Ranulf IV of Chester, who was also in attendance, agreed to abandon his own claim on Carlisle.[122] Thus, another source does confirm that this event did involve an agreement that Carlisle would remain in David's hands, presumably a *quid pro quo* for the aid he was providing Henry.

In other examples the sources do not spell out what exiles promised in return for support to the same extent, but we can discern what was agreed. Just as Gruffydd ap Llywelyn continued supporting Ælfgar, the former exile seemingly promised to maintain an alliance with the Welsh ruler. As discussed, Ælfgar seemingly died in 1062. It cannot be coincidence that Harold Godwinson invaded Wales and brought about Gruffydd's death just one year later.[123] The pair maintained an alliance that raised Gruffydd into an ascendant position, which English authority could not overcome. Edgar the Ætheling likewise aided the family of his harbourer, Malcolm III, following his time in Scotland. John of Worcester states that in 1097 'he [William Rufus] sent Edgar the Ætheling to Scotland with an army in order to establish his cousin, Edgar […] as king after expelling his uncle Donald.'[124] Given this, Edgar the Ætheling had likely agreed to help his harbourer in the future. Had he become king of England, this would have been incredibly beneficial for Malcolm. Following on, though there are many reasons for this phenomenon, such as marriage ties and gift giving, the three Scottish kings, Edgar, Alexander and David, who all spent time as exiles at Rufus' court, maintained a peaceful and submissive relationship with English rulers in 1097-1135.[125] This connection was seemingly agreed during their time in England, since in the 1095 charter that contained Edgar's claim

[118] WN, 1, pp. 100-01, '*Prius ut dicitur cautione quod nulla parte terrarum quae in ejusdem regis ex anglia ditionem transissent, ejus ullo tempore mutilaret heredes'.*
[119] Ibid, 2, pp. 20-21; David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, *EHD II*, p. 322.
[120] JH, pp. 287, 300, 322-23; HH, pp. 754-55; *GS*, p. 142; WN, 1, pp. 98-101.
[121] See pp. 129-30.
[122] JH, p. 323, '*Cooperantibus sibi Henrico filio suo et Ranulfo comite Cestriae. Remisit autem idem Ranulfus indignationem qua Karleol sub patrimoniali jure resposcere consueverat, fecitque homagium eidem regi David*'.
[123] *ASC D*, 1063.
[124] JW, 3, pp. 84-85, '*Post hec clitonem eagarum ad scottiam cum exercitu misit, ut in ea consobrinum suum eadgarum, malcolmi regis filium patruo sui dufenaldo, qui regnum inuaserat, expulso, regem constitueret*'.
[125] See pp. 56-63, 98-99.

to the Scottish throne, he also acknowledged William Rufus' supremacy.[126] In exile, these politically influential claimants and nobles were at their lowest point, needing considerable support. Nearby kings came to the rescue, providing aid designed to help the exiles return to their homeland and regain their rightful position. In return the harbourers hoped to secure important allies in neighbouring kingdoms, who would subsequently provide concessions and support upon their return.

The interactions employed between these individuals specifically helped harbourers obtain these concessions. Kingmaking rituals frequently involved the transfer of wealth in the form of gifts, such as Edgar's purple cloak and arms given in the knighting ritual. Returning to concepts discussed earlier, one way to explore gift giving is through the ideas of Marcel Mauss.[127] His conclusions suggest that the gifts established a hierarchical relationship, indebting the exiles to their hosts, and requiring them to repay the gifts with support in some form. Correspondingly, the man who dubbed a knight gained influence and authority over him. After praising William Marshal for knighting Henry, the magnates immediately demanded that Marshall become the young king's regent.[128] Having knighted the king, the Marshal was seen as the natural candidate to have official authority and responsibility over him. Orderic Vitalis' account of Edward the Confessor's knighting of Robert of RhuddIan, who came to England as a young boy to serve the English king, followed a similar pattern. In the aftermath of the ritual, Robert had to seek the expressed permission of King Edward to leave England and visit his parents.[129] Knighting certainly subordinated the knight to the man dubbing him.[130] It is no coincidence that, as in the case of Duncan II of Scotland, being knighted was often associated with doing homage.[131] Weiler puts it best when he says, 'Whoever administered the dubbing gained responsibility for and authority over his fellow knight, not expressed so much in terms of direct legal or political power, as in an imprecise and amorphous, but nonetheless recognised, language of standing and precedence.'[132] With their authority over the exiles confirmed through hierarchical rituals like gift giving and knighting, the harbouring kings would expect deference and reimbursement to characterise their ongoing relationships.

Family ties secured the repayment of support too. As discussed, the bonds they created were mutual, imposing obligations in both directions. John of Worcester calls Edgar of Scotland the 'cousin' of Edgar the Ætheling in his account of their 1097 campaign against Donald III.[133] The *ASC* similarly refers to Malcolm III's son as the 'kinsman' of the Ætheling.[134] Though John's claim is slightly inaccurate (they were uncle and nephew), clearly familial relations explained Edgar's involvement in 1097, and likely other instances of exiles aiding those who had taken them in.

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[126] *ESC*, 15.
[127] See pp. 56.
[128] *William Marshal*, 2, p. 271.
[129] OV, 4, pp. 138-39.
[130] Peter Coss, *The Knight in Medieval England 1000-1400* (Stroud, 1993), p. 17; Maurice H. Keen, *Chivalry* (London, 2005), p. 66.
[131] Weiler, 'Knighting,' pp. 276, 280, 286, 290.
[132] Ibid, p. 282.
[133] JW, 3, pp. 84-85.
[134] *ASC E*, 1097.

Familial connections to exiles could also be used to secure a beneficial relationship with a neighbouring realm in a way that bypassed said exile. Malcolm III's marriage to Margaret allowed him to father children with claims on the English throne. That he gave his sons names that had belonged to earlier Anglo-Saxon kings (Edward, Edmund, Æthelred, Edgar), all but confirms this was his intention.[135] Theoretically, Malcolm could then work to put them on the throne and secure an advantageous Anglo-Scottish relationship that way, rather than through Edgar the Ætheling. This was presumably why Edgar had initially opposed his sister's marriage, before ultimately relenting.

Crucially for harbourers, the relationships they established were long-term. As discussed, relations built on family ties were especially long lasting.[136] Edgar the Ætheling's support for Malcolm III effectively passed down a generation, leading to him helping Malcolm's son c.30 years after their connection was cemented by his sister's marriage. Likewise, the physical objects involved in gift giving effectively memorialised the ritual, and therefore the relationship it established.[137] Malcolm III's gifts in 1074 were given just before Edgar left Scotland to join the French king, further suggesting they were about maintaining their relationship during an absence from one another. The same is true for any objects given when Henry of Anjou and Duncan were knighted, as these immediately preceded military campaigns intended to instal them in the kingdoms the claimed. Sadly for Edgar, all his gifts were lost when his ship sank and he was forced to return to Scotland. As mentioned, Malcolm replaced the gifts before Edgar left again, this time for England, indicating the items' significance in maintaining their relationship.[138] They would remind the former exile of their time being harboured and the debts they owed. Harbourers were gambling on exiles, providing support in return for benefits that were not in the exiles' immediate power to return. They needed to ensure their support was not forgotten once the exile was home and back in a position of influence, which these sorts of bonds did.

Through their connections to exiles, harbouring kings sought to significantly impact inter-ruler relations, seeking an advantageous position in regards to the exiles' homeland. Theoretically, having helped the exile regain their position, due to family ties and kingmaking rituals, they would gain a powerful ally in the neighbouring kingdom or even an alliance with the neighbouring king, bringing concessions and benefits. This could also be done by going beyond the exile, by developing a relationship with his descendants, as was possibly Malcolm III's goal when he married Edgar the Ætheling's sister, much to the exile's chagrin. Whilst it was obviously a partnership between exile and host, this points to the latter being the dominant actor in the short term, something we shall return to. Long-term, repayment was not always forthcoming. Most obviously, Henry II reengaged on his promise and took back land from David's descendants. However, a ruler's intentions and efforts to secure them through an exile would impact relations, regardless of outcome. Significantly, they would affect the attitude of the king the exile had fled from to their harbourer, which we shall investigate next. After that, we will once more return to the question of how inter-ruler relations evolved.

[135] Oram, *Domination*, p. 16; *ASC E*, 1093, 1097; WM, pp. 174.
[136] See p. 99.
[137] See p. 62.
[138] *ASC D*, 1074.

4. The Harbouring King and the King being fled from

The historiographical focus on the life of the exile (their sentence, departure, time away and return) has resulted in limited discussion of how their harbouring could alter relationships that they were not directly a part of. The impact of exiles on relations between rulers has rarely been a subject of interest for scholars of medieval diplomacy. Benham, a notable exception, emphasises exiles' importance in this sphere: 'While expulsion was intended to ensure law and order on a domestic level, it could result in becoming a threat to peace and security on an international level.'[139] She goes on to explore how exiles related to both diplomatic treaties and inter-ruler hostility.[140] In line with this, how a ruler treated an exile fleeing from another ruler played a decisive role in determining whether those two kings were in a peaceful or belligerent relationship.

Firstly, taking in an exile was a hostile act against the king the exile had fled from. This is definitively shown by the fact it frequently led to an invasion, or a threatened invasion, in response. William of Malmesbury states that once Guthfrith, the claimant to Northumbria, arrived in Scotland, having fled from Æthelstan, the king of England responded forcefully: 'Royal messages followed instantly to King Constantine of Scotland and King Owain of Cumbria [Strathclyde] with another declaration of war.'[141] Seemingly, taking the exile in served as *casus belli* from Æthelstan's perspective. Constantine II avoided an invasion by meeting with Æthelstan, but the same cannot be said for King Macbeth of Scotland. He took in two Normans, Osbern and Hugo, who were exiled from England upon Earl Godwin's return in 1052.[142] Just two years later, Earl Siward of Northumbria invaded Scotland with Edward the Confessor's support. Seemingly harbouring the Normans solicited English retaliation, as John of Worcester implies, remarking that 'many thousands of the Scots and all of the Normans, whom we mentioned above, had been killed', entwining the two events.[143] Furthermore, having taken Edgar the Ætheling in during 1068-70, Malcolm III was a victim of William the Conqueror's 1072 invasion of Scotland, which culminated in Malcolm's submission at Abernethy. None of the sources provide a motive for the attack, besides John of Worcester's vague claim that William wanted 'to subjugate it [Scotland] to his dominion.'[144] Given Malcolm III's persistent harbouring of Edgar over the preceding years, it seems reasonable to assume the invasion was partly a response to this. Evidently, harbouring was considered a gravely antagonistic act against the king the exile had fled from, justifying a serious military response.

These attacks and malicious feelings against the harbourers were justified. As we have seen, harbourers were not benign humanitarians. Rather their support for a king's powerful enemy could

[139] *ILE*, p. 46.
[140] Ibid, pp. 43-71.
[141] WM, pp. 214-15, '*Subsecuti sunt e uestigio regales missi ad constantium regem scottorum et eugenium regem cumbrorum transfugam cum denuntiatione belli repetente*'.
[142] JW, 2 pp. 572-73.
[143] Ibid, 2, pp. 574-75, '*Multis milibus Scottorum et Normannis omnibys, quorum supra fecimus mentionem, occisis, illum fugaui*t.'
[144] Ibid, 3, p. 20-21, '*Ut eam sue diconi subiugerat*'; *ASC D*, 1072; *Brenhinedd*, p. 79; *AU*, p. 509.

strike a blow against him, either by ensuring the readmittance of said enemy or, in the case of claimants, by aiding the usurpation of his crown. This was obviously undesirable for ruling kings, and thus they would employ invasions, both threatened and real, to stop neighbouring rulers harbouring exiles. This is especially obvious in the case of Siward's 1054 invasion, supported by Edward the Confessor. Not only did he stop Macbeth's immediate relationship with Hugo and Osbern, by killing the exiles, but it aimed to establish a more permanent solution. John of Worcester concluded his account of the invasion by stating that Siward established Malcolm, son of the king of Cumbrians (not to be confused with Malcolm III), as ruler of Scotland.[145] Installing a more amenable king would hopefully stop exiles finding sanctuary north of the border. As we shall see, replacement was not the only way to stop harbouring. But as a general conclusion, taking in an exile was considered a grave threat against the ruler of his homeland, which is exemplified by the strength of the retaliatory action it courted.

Secondly, not taking in an exile from another kingdom was indicative of a cordial relationship with that realm's ruler. This is widely reflected in peace treaties, which frequently prohibited harbouring. In the *Treaty of Devol* (1108), Bohemond I of Antioch promised the Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos that he would reject and oppose anyone who rebelled against the emperor and then fled to him.[146] The same was true in diplomacy involving British rulers. Returning to the *Treaty of Falaise* between Henry II of England and William the Lion of Scotland, both rulers agreed to not harbour the other's exiles, and to even extradite them.[147] Henry likewise made a treaty with the king of France in 1187, in which they both agreed not to take the other's enemies in.[148] Such terms can be traced much further back and into the Anglo-Saxon period. In a letter written in 704-05, Bishop Wealdhere of London describes previous summits between the rulers of Wessex and Essex, where they 'made a treaty that we were to drive out exiles.'[149] The *Treaty of Alfred of Wessex and Guthrum of East Anglia* (886-890) has a similar provision, outlawing the harbouring of freemen or slaves from the other side.[150] The *Treaty of Rouen* (991) between Æthelred of England and Richard I of Normandy, mediated by Pope John XV's legate, states that 'Richard should receive none of the men of the king, or of his enemies, nor the king his, without their seal.'[151] Benham argues that this clause applied to domestic enemies, like exiles, pointing to a surplus of such figures.[152]

The view that peace between two parties involved neither side taking in the other's domestic opponents was wide-reaching. Some caution must be exercised, since none of these treaties were

[145] JW, 2, pp. 574-75.
[146] Anna Komnena, *The Alexiad*, trans. E. R. A. Sewter, ed. Peter Frankopan (London, 2009), pp. 387-88.
[147] '"*Falaise*"', pp. 2-3.
[148] Geraldus, '*On the instruction of Princes*', in *The Church Historians of England*, ed. and trans. Joseph Stevenson, 5 vols. (Seeleys, 1853-58), 5, p. 144.
[149] '*Letter of Wealdhere, Bishop of London, to Brihtwold, Archbishop of Canterbury*', *EHD I*, p. 729.
[150] '*Treaty between Alfred and Guthrum (886-890)*', *EHD I*, pp. 380-81.
[151] WM, pp. 278-79, '*Et de hominibus regis uel inimicis suis nolum Ricardus recipiat, nec rex de suis, sine sigallo eorum*'.
[152] Jenny Benham, 'The Earliest Arbitration Treaty? A Re-Assessment of the Anglo-Norman Treaty of 991', *Historical Research*, 20 (2020), pp. 5-6, 15; See *ASC C*, 985.

involved in Anglo-Welsh or Anglo-Scottish relations between 927 and 1154, but it seems likely this rule would have applied to these relationships too. There is not only a surplus of exile clauses, but these comparisons include examples from medieval Britain and are temporally close. Further, we can read the examples of harbouring which precipitated conflict against the grain, to suggest that refusing to harbour would lead to the opposite outcome, meaning peace.

Cases of not harbouring in our narrative sources are rare, presumably because they helped maintain peace rather than dramatically precipitate war. However, there are some instances that support this confusion. Though there is limited information about Malcolm III's 1072 submission to William the Conqueror, beyond a general submission, what happened next suggests the Scottish king agreed to no longer harbour Edgar the Ætheling. As mentioned, Edgar returned to Scotland in 1074. It is unclear whether his trip to Flanders directly related to William's invasion, but it seems a reasonable assumption. Rather than retain Edgar, Malcolm of course assisted the exile with his onward journey, first to France and then, after his boat sunk, to King William himself, where the *ASC* claims the king of England 'received him with great honour and stayed there at court and received such dues as were appointed him.'[153] Malcolm's change of behaviour suggests that following the peace imposed at Abernethy he had an agreement with William to no longer harbour Edgar and to even extradite him, corresponding with the other peace treaties. Not wishing to violate his submission agreement and undermine peace between the kingdoms, Malcolm sent the young claimant away.

He did harbour Edgar again, in 1091, but this only further proves the extradition agreement. Edgar only returned to Scotland after his lands were confiscated by William Rufus, which Hooper argues Rufus demanded in order to prevent an alliance between Edgar and Robert Curthose.[154] His land was presumably part of the 'dues' Edgar received immediately on his return to England. It is possible Malcolm was guaranteed at Abernethy that Edgar would be welcome in England and provided with property, increasing his willingness to comply with the extradition. Only once this agreement was broken in 1091, did he again provide sanctuary, leading to conflict.

Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in Henry I's reign also points to the connection between cordiality and not harbouring. When Henry I and Cadwgan ap Bleddyn of Powys made peace in 1109, they agreed that Cadwgan's exiled son Owain would not be allowed back into his father's land.[155] Likewise, in 1121, whilst Henry I was preparing a military campaign against Powys, its rulers, including Maredudd ap Bleddyn, reached out to the former exile Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd for support. The *Brut* records his response: 'He [Gruffudd], *keeping peace with the king*, said that, if they fled to the bounds of his territory, he would have them despoiled and plundered and that he would oppose them.'[156] As the source suggests, Gruffudd's refusal to provide sanctuary to anyone fleeing Henry was due to an

[153] *ASC D*, 1074.
[154] Hooper, 'Edgar', pp. 206-07.
[155] *Brut*, p. 63.
[156] Ibid, p. 105.

ongoing peace agreement with Henry I, which dated back to 1115.[157] The entwinement between peaceful relations and not harbouring exiles seems clear.

Furthermore, refusal to harbour did not just reflect a good relationship, but could encourage improved relations. Prior to 1115, Henry I and Gruffudd ap Cynan were not in a cordial relationship. Henry had campaigned against Gruffudd in 1114 and though peace was agreed, it was in a relatively unpalatable antagonistic form from Gruffudd's perspective, based on paying tribute.[158] Evidently unhappy with the king of England, in 1115 Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd harboured Gruffydd ap Rhys, son of the former ruler of Deheubarth, who was charged by Henry's court with an unspecified crime. As previously mentioned, Gruffudd ap Cynan's act of defiance was cut short when Henry invited him to court and promised him rewards in return for bringing him Gruffydd ap Rhys, dead or alive. Fortunately for Gruffydd ap Rhys, he was able to evade his host, going on to lead many attacks in Wales over the following years.[159] Turning on his guest seemingly earnt Gruffudd ap Cynan a far more positive relationship with the king of England, shown by the rewards he was offered, contrasting the tribute he previously had to pay, and his unwillingness to oppose Henry in 1121. Betraying an exile could certainly pay.

To conclude this section, how a king treated exiles who arrived at his court could lead to different relationships with the ruler the exile had fled from. Harbouring was considered a hostile act against the other king, which invited military retaliation designed to end the harbouring and its intended consequences. Alternatively, not harbouring the exile indicated a cordial relationship and could be a means of improving a relationship. Before going any further, it is worth reflecting on how relations between rulers informed interactions between the exile and his harbourer. The harbourer's dominance in the partnership is again shown. The exile was at the mercy of his host, who might decide to send him home to improve his own position or simply to avoid retaliation. A close relationship between exile and harbourer, built on connections like family ties, helped guarantee the exile's security, wherever that may be. Although Malcolm III sent his brother-in-law to William the Conqueror in 1074, he re-asserted his commitment to Edgar's claim with gifts and had seemingly only done so in the knowledge that Edgar would be safe there, provide with land. When this was no longer the case, he once again harboured Edgar in 1091. Now, we can turn to considering what diplomacy related to exiles tells us about how relations evolved across my period.

5. Exiles and Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh Relations

We do not see an extraordinary sharp division between Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish relations, and pre- and post-Conquest relations when it comes to diplomacy related to exiles, unlike say marriage diplomacy. They were taken in and extradited by English, Scottish and Welsh rulers during the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries. They were too valuable to ignore, with many potential

[157] Ibid, pp. 83-85.
[158] See pp. 74-75.
[159] *Brut,* pp. 83-85.

benefits on the table. However, more nuanced differences between Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations existed, as well as other forms of evolution. This aligns with conclusions from earlier in this chapter, with numerous periods of domestic conflict, like the Anarchy and factional rivalry in Edward the Confessor's reign, fuelling the creation of exiles and their significant involvement in inter-kingdom relations.

As with tribute taking and travelling to courts, this chapter further proves Welsh acquiescence to English demands and authority in return for peaceful relations. Figures like Cadwgan ap Bleddyn of Powys and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd promised to not host the English king's enemies to maintain peace with him. Had they not, his wrath would have come for them. Whilst this could be seen as Welsh weakness, it also shows agency. Gruffudd ap Cynan's decision to harbour and then betray Gruffydd ap Rhys was a tactical action that secured a better relationship between him and Henry I. Furthermore, Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales' reign again significantly bucks the trend. His persistent harbouring of Earl Ælfgar symbolised outright hostility to English power. It also materially improved his position versus that power, securing Ælfgar's reinstatement and consequently an ally within England, which ultimately made him untouchable until his ally's untimely demise.

Variety has been a theme of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, which often seesawed between rejection of English dominance and acceptance of said power. Constantine II and Macbeth's willingness to harbour Guthfrith, Osbern and Hugo, speaks to the former point. English rulers responded on these occasions with threatened and real force, seeking to end this harbour and assert their dominance, leading to a more cordial relationship.

From Malcolm III's reign onwards, the treatment of exiles in Anglo-Scottish relations reveals decisive shifts in policies. Malcolm has frequently come across as the chief opponent of English power, and his treatment of exiles confirms this. He provided sanctuary and support to the dissident Earl Tostig and the royal claimant Edgar the Ætheling. Through family ties and kingmaking rituals, he hoped to aid their return to England and in the process secure an influential and beholden ally abroad. Though no clear benefit from Tostig is forthcoming and Edgar never became king, the latter remained committed to Malcolm III's family, helping his son Edgar of Scotland become king. His opposition to incumbent English rulers was evidently not Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Norman exclusive, with exiles either side of the Conquest receiving his aid. Contrasting this, is his decision to return Edgar the Ætheling to England in 1074, upholding the peace agreed in 1072 and not seeking to incite William the Conqueror's wrath. However, Malcolm III remained in a favourable position in 1074, regarding Edgar and beyond. Edgar was still bound to him by family ties and the gifts he had received prior to his 1074 departure, which would further legitimise his claim to the English throne. Even if the relationship with Edgar came to nought, his marriage to Edgar's sister meant Malcolm could always push his own sons' claims in order to secure a more pliable neighbouring king.

Looking to end Anglo-Scottish hostility, William Rufus harboured Malcolm III's sons, before adding their returns and ultimate successions. This secured Scottish agreement to a peaceful and hierarchical relationship with Kings of England, which is not just demonstrated by the absence of

Scottish invasions between 1097-1135. Cordiality between the kingdoms is further confirmed by the complete absence of recorded English exiles finding sanctuary in Scotland and *vice versa*. This situation was partly a product of the close ties between Henry I and his Scottish counterparts, resting on gift giving and particularly marriage.[160] Benham highlights the case of Cnut I of Sweden, who captured and imprisoned Erling, a claimant to the Norwegian throne, who had fled to Sweden. He did this at the behest of his brother-in-law Sverre, the current ruler of Norway.[161] Just as family ties ensured an exile's safety at a foreign court, familial relationships between rulers precluded harbouring one another's enemies, explaining their absence during a period when the kings of Scotland and England were related.

Further shifts occurred during the Anarchy. Anglo-Scottish peace was of course shattered by David I's support for the Empress Matilda in her conflict with King Stephen. His opposition to Stephen was immediately confirmed by his decision to harbour English exiles. According to *The Deeds of Stephen*, in the summer of 1136 Stephen put down a rebellion led by Robert of Bampton. After receiving their surrender, Stephen exiled Robert's garrison, which fled to Scotland.[162] In reference to events in 1138, the source later states that 'The king [David] had with him […] the son of Robert of Bampton and his kinsmen, who had been exiled from England […] and had fled to him in hope of regaining their homeland.'[163] Though Robert's rebellion was tangential to the Anarchy, resting on an initial dispute with Glastonbury Abbey, David's decision to take in opponents of Stephen instantly illustrated his new attitude to England. *Détente* was over, and it was back to the hostility of Malcolm III's reign.

His decision to later harbour and knight Henry of Anjou, his relative and claimant to the English throne, appears to be a continuation of this approach. A further change can be detected though. We have seen how the Scottish royal family employed a two-pronged approach to the Anarchy. David had a strong relationship with the Empress, whilst Henry of Scotland was connected to Stephen. By playing the field, the Scots ensured they would be on the winning side, whereas Stephen hoped his interactions with Henry might help improve his general relationship with the Scottish royal family.[164] Yet, John of Hexham writes that in 1149 'he [David] gave him [Henry of Anjou] a belt of military service, with his son *Henry* and Ralph of Chester helping him.'[165] In assisting with this ritual Henry of Scotland was acknowledging the Empress Matilda's son's right to rule, breaking with Stephen. The dual approach was now over, with both the king of the Scotland and his heir backing Henry of Anjou.

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[160] See pp. 56-63, 98-99.
[161] *ILE*, pp. 66-67.
[162] *GS,* pp. 18-20; Bradbury, *SM*, p. 27.
[163] Ibid, p. 36, '*Habebat rex secum, qui eum crebro admonitionis calcare ad turbationem concitandam stimulabant, hinc filium Roberti de Bathentona, ejusque collaterales, qui ex Anglia, ut dictum est, exulati, sub spe recuperande patriae ad illium confugerant*'.
[164] See pp. 135-36.
[165] JH, pp. 322-23, '*Militiae enim cingulo donavit eum, cooperantibus sibi Henrico filio suo et Ranulfo comite Cestriae*'.

6. Conclusion

Exiles made a massive contribution to Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations in this period. Though they might have existed within a wider framework with judicial exiles, the individuals discussed here were largely political exiles, opponents and rivals of kings and courts, who were forced out as a result of domestic conflicts. They had strong relationships with the rulers who took them in, built on by family ties and kingmaking rituals, such as knighting and gift giving. These helped the exile's campaign to return home and claim their rightful position by guaranteeing them sanctuary, military support and increased legitimacy. In providing this support, harbouring kings hoped for repayment or another form of benefit, usually once their aid had helped the exile returned to their homeland. However, harbouring majorly impacted relations with the king the exile was fleeing. Supporting his opponent was considered a hostile act and could even solicit a military response. Alternatively, refusing to harbour an exile, or turning him over, was indicative of a peaceful relationship, and could even serve to create a more cordial and advantageous relationship between the two kings.

When these lessons are applied to Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations, their character and development is illustrated. A neat division between the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman relations it not overly evident. Rather, there are multiple shifts, partly governed by domestic crises. English unification, the inter-earl rivalries during Edward the Confessor's reign, the Norman Conquest, succession following Malcolm III's death and the Anarchy were all moments of domestic conflict, which created political losers, who subsequently fled to foreign realms and became involved in inter-kingdom relations.

Elsewhere, patterns in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations that we have seen in earlier chapters again re-emerge. Welsh agreement to not harbour the English king's opponents to maintain peace are further evidence of Welsh acceptance of English power. Conversely, through his harbouring of Earl Ælfgar, Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales once again comes across as an outlier, who was a hostile and powerful threat to the kingdom of England. Malcolm III's general support for English exiles re-confirms his hostility to English rulers and desire to not be dominated by his neighbours. However, the lack of English exiles finding sanctuary in Scotland, or Scottish exiles in England, from 1097 to 1135 is further evidence of peaceful Anglo-Scottish relations during that period, partly due to future Scottish rulers recognising English authority during the time they spent as exiles at the English court. Although the interactions between exiles and their harbourers also buck trends. On the face of it, David I's support for Henry of Anjou is a continuation of his opposition to King Stephen. Conversely, the involvement of his son illustrates that the two-pronged approach to England was over, with Henry of Scotland now backing Henry of Anjou, not Stephen. Malcolm III's decision to send Edgar the Ætheling to William the Conqueror shows that in 1074, he wanted to uphold peace with his English counterpart, a change from his abovementioned hostility.

More broadly, this chapter further confirms that kings were not the sole arbiters of inter-ruler relations, with exiles joining brides and diplomats as significant actors in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations. They conducted diplomacy with foreign kings, strengthening their own positions and impacting said kings' foreign policies. This aligns with the demand from scholars, including Watkins, to consider the multi-layered nature of medieval diplomacy and the numerous individuals involved in it, in the interest of better understanding diplomacy in the contemporary world.

Conclusion

Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy between 927 and 1154 has been an under-researched aspect of British history. Where it has been addressed, it has usually been through the paradigm of national of histories. Historians of diplomacy have looked elsewhere for case studies, and have often produced work interested in either the origins of modern diplomacy, or the institution of medieval diplomacy itself. These approaches, respectively, fail to appreciate the medieval period on its own terms and the significance of the historic actors who utilised diplomatic practice in their socio-political networks. Instead, I employed a social approach, investigating diplomacy between the kings of England and neighbouring Scottish and Welsh rulers in 927-1154 to understand their underlying relationships. This involved determining, amongst other aspects, rulers' status relative to one another, as well their foreign policies and political motives. Aside from a few wider goals, discussed later, this process focused on answering two research questions: How did Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh relations differ from one another? To what extent was there a significant shift from relations in the Anglo-Saxon period to relations in the Anglo-Norman one?

Each chapter explored one of five different aspects associated with medieval diplomatic practice: meeting places, objects, marriages, diplomats, and exiles. Inspired by NDH, I analysed these themes' importance for inter-ruler relations by broadening my source base, incorporating comparative and interdisciplinary evidence to better understand individual diplomatic interactions. Focusing on the diplomatic marriage chapter, at the simplistic end of the spectrum my approach involved comparing different examples of Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in 927-1154, with Queen Matilda of Boulogne's frequent participation in Anglo-Scottish peacemaking making her a useful paradigm for shedding light on other diplomatic brides. Comparisons from other inter-ruler relationships and time periods were also employed. Examples like Queen Matilda of Scots' role in an Anglo-Papal dispute, as well as the significance of Judith of Flanders and Emma of Normandy for ninth and eleventh-century relations between England and the continent, all demonstrated the importance of queenly counsel, which in turn was used to analyse the significance of Anglo-Scottish marriages. Looking elsewhere also allowed access to diplomatic sources that are non-extant in Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Welsh diplomacy in this period, such as letters like the one sent by Pope Paschal II to Matilda of Scots, beseeching her to influence Henry I. Furthermore, since marriage is not an exclusively diplomatic institution, we cannot stick solely to diplomatic comparisons. The wider historiography of marriages and queenship, including the work of Georges Duby, Marion Facinger and Jennifer Carpenter, as well as sources regulating domestic marriages, like *Concerning the betrothal of Women* and Henry I's *Coronation Charter*, all contributed to my analysis. A degree of interdisciplinary was incorporated through the use of non-historical evidence, such as sources for the biblical Queen Esther. Similar approaches were employed in other chapters. Conclusions produced in the fields of geography, anthropology and international relations theory were all utilised in the meeting places, objects and diplomats chapters respectively. Additionally, treaty evidence drawn from other inter-ruler

relationships was used to supplement understanding of exiles in tenth, eleventh and early-twelfth-century Britain. This expansion of evidence, of which the above is only a small sample, certainly facilitated improved knowledge of my chosen medieval diplomatic themes, aiding analysis of the relationships they were involved in. Given the relative dearth of direct evidence on Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in 927-1154, such a study would not be possible without incorporating evidence from elsewhere.

Anglo-Scottish relations across the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries were variable. Border summits, such as those at Eamont (927), Cumbria (945) and Lothian (1091), and the need for a third-party mediator, in the form of Alberic of Ostia, to help resolve a Mutually Hurting Stalemate in 1138 demonstrate relative equality between the rulers. Scottish resistance to English authority is likewise shown by the willingness of Constantine II, Macbeth, Malcolm III and David I to harbour exiles fleeing English kings. Consequently, Scottish rulers often pursued actions that would strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* England. Malcolm hoped that by harbouring the claimant Edgar the Ætheling, he would eventually gain a powerful ally in England, from whom he could obtain support and concessions. David actually did secure territorial concessions from King Stephen of England by sending his son, Henry of Scotland, as an envoy, exploiting the obligations imposed on Stephen and Queen Matilda by their family tie to Henry. David also strengthened his hold on recently acquired English territory by meeting Alberic within it, effectively securing papal recognition of his occupation.

At other times, kings of Scotland submitted to English power. Constantine II, Kenneth II, Malcolm III, Edgar, Alexander I and David I all travelled to England for summits, communicating their inferiority to the English rulers they met. They also submitted within Scotland following successful English invasions, such as Malcolm's submissions at Abernethy (1072) after William the Conqueror's campaign. Malcolm's subsequent refusal to harbour Edgar the Ætheling again in 1074 indicates he somewhat adhered to that submission agreement. English rulers often offered their Scottish counterparts tangible benefits in return for submission. Most obviously, Kenneth was granted Lothian, whilst David was the beneficiary of gift giving, receiving a cup from Henry I that strengthened his position domestically. Cordial Scottish deference to English power in the early twelfth-century was partly a reciprocation for William Rufus helping Malcolm's sons secure their father's throne. Conversely, tribute payments, a particularly hierarchical submission type with negative connotations for the giver, were largely absent, with the notable exception of the demand Æthelstan made on Constantine in 934.

Unlike the variability of Scottish diplomacy, Welsh rulers' relationships with English kings were characterised by consistent submissions. Welsh rulers frequently travelled to the English court, or submitted in Wales following successful English invasions. They often paid tribute either to stop or pre-empt English attacks, and sometimes accepted gifts and other incentives which bound them to the authority of English rulers. Although evidently weaker than kings of England, Welsh rulers were not passive victims of English domination. When Henry I invaded Wales in 1114, Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys and Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd both held out. Henry could only convince Owain to stand down by sending Owain's uncle to influence him, and by offering incentives. Gruffudd ap Cynan

displayed agency the following year, briefly harbouring and then betraying an opponent of Henry to secure a better relationship with the king of England. Furthermore, Gruffydd ap Llywelyn did not simply demonstrate agency or resistance to English dominance, but, having assumed control of all Wales, actively challenged the neighbouring realm. He formed a strong alliance with Earl Ælfgar of Mercia, which led to successful wars with the English, and essentially secured both his and Ælfgar's positions until the latter's death. He did not pay tribute and linked envoys were needed to pacify him. In 1055, Gruffydd even held a border summit with members of the English nobility. Although Edward the Confessor did not attend, the meeting suggests that Gruffydd was recognised as possessing far more authority than other Welsh rulers. However, Gruffydd was an anomaly, who was killed due to an English invasion. Most Welsh rulers, like Hywel Dda, Rhys ap Tewdwr and Maredudd ap Bleddyn, recognised the limits of their rule and submitted to stop English kings bringing an end to it. Though it had its drawbacks, this diplomatic strategy prevented them ending up like Gruffydd ap Llywelyn.

Evidently, the Anglo-Welsh relationship was not only more consistent than the Anglo-Scottish one, but more hierarchical. The higher frequency of border meetings in the Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, contrasted with the more frequent use of court summits and tribute payments in Anglo-Welsh diplomacy is good evidence for this. Though linked envoys were common to both, only Anglo-Scottish relations were ever stuck in such a stalemate that peace was secured via a third-party papal mediator, whilst only the Welsh had to deal with diplomats designed to emphasis their subordination to English power: the Agents of Cirencester. Significant too is the complete absence of Anglo-Welsh marriages. Not only did this mean the early twelfth century Anglo-Welsh relationship was more conflict ridden than its Anglo-Scottish equivalent, but it highlights Welsh weakness. Due to the mutual and permanent obligations imposed by marriages, English rulers viewed the Welsh as too weak to be worth establishing marriage ties with, to ensure peace. More hierarchical diplomatic practices, like tribute taking, sufficed.

As for the extent to which there was a significant shift from Anglo-Saxon and to Anglo-Norman relations, whilst the picture is multifaceted, some changes certainly occurred. Marriage diplomacy again illustrates the biggest difference, since only Anglo-Norman kings employed it, arranging five marriages with members of the Scottish royal family. Moreover, Anglo-Norman kings more commonly invaded neighbouring realms and enforced submissions there, whilst in the Anglo-Saxon period submissions at the English court, particularly by Welsh rulers, were more normal. As part of submissions, Anglo-Saxon kings would levy tribute on multiple Welsh rulers at once, whereas Anglo-Norman rulers preferred to take it from one king or realm at a time, or even demand tribute from one king whilst offering a more favourable agreement to another.

Different political situations and goals caused the divide. Anglo-Norman kings held a dual role, as kings of England *and* dukes of Normandy. Marriages with the Scottish royal family secured the northern frontier, creating ties with the Scots whilst sowing division amongst them, allowing Anglo-Norman kings to focus on continental threats to the south, frequently travelling across the English Channel to do so. These absences seemingly made their British neighbours inclined to throw off Anglo-Norman authority. Thus invasions, and at times the employment of linked envoys, were needed

to secure submissions and reimpose control. Treating Welsh rulers differently cemented division between them, preventing anti-English alliances forming, another major threat to kings who were often abroad. Anglo-Saxon kings were more focused on Britain. They preferred to use marriages to secure alliances with English nobles, perhaps reflecting secessionist pressures within their recently unified kingdom. This factor motivated another division, with Anglo-Saxon kings using border meetings to secure foreign recognition of their recently expanded realm. This was not a concern for Anglo-Norman rulers, who exclusively used these meetings for peacemaking. Finally, simultaneous tribute demands helped Anglo-Saxon kings present themselves as rulers of all Britain, a common ambition of theirs.

Change was not universal, with some continuity and overlap. For instance, peacemaking was also an Anglo-Saxon concern, precipitating border meetings like Billingsley (1055) and Chester (973). Broad continuity can be seen in the fact that diplomacy involving exiles and linked diplomats were a staple of inter-ruler relations both pre- and post-1066. For a more specific example of continuity, we need only turn to the bishops of Durham and their role as border diplomats. They served Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman kings, improving relations with Scottish rulers, including the belligerent Malcolm III, from as early as the tenth century probably right up to 1154. An additional post-Conquest continuity is the use of Gloucester for Malcolm III and Rufus' summit in 1093, which may have harked back to the 935 meeting between Constantine II and Æthelstan, located at nearby Cirencester. Rufus seemingly envisioned a return to a historic Anglo-Scottish relationship that was notably more beneficial for the English than the one he faced at the time. This was exceptional, with little evidence of Anglo-Norman kings reusing Anglo-Saxon meeting places. Perhaps the best evidence of continuity comes from the reign of Cnut, who, in 1027, met Scottish rulers following a successful invasion of Scotland, having just returned from his continental lands. This was a precursor to summits in the Anglo-Norman period that similarly followed kings' trips abroad to their duchy. Cnut was also one of the few pre-1066 kings to utilise marriage diplomacy, though admittedly with a German ruler, not the Scots or the Welsh. Regrettably, the sources for Cnut's reign are poor. But as a king of England who also ruled continental land, his foreign policy likely had much in common with kings who ruled England after the Conquest.

Furthermore, viewing the Conquest as *the* seminal divide is slightly too crude, with other significant shifts taking place across the tenth, eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Different kings employed different foreign policies at different times. An outlier is Æthelstan, who seemingly held an incredible amount of authority over Britain, not just dominating the Welsh but taking tribute from the Scottish king too, the only king of England to do so. The Conquest impacted Anglo-Welsh relations, but another big change occurred during Gruffydd ap Llywelyn's reign, when he extensively rejected English authority. The variability of Anglo-Scottish relations meant numerous shifts. As mentioned, Malcolm III was generally hostile to English kings' efforts to subordinate him, indicated by his approach to meeting places, envoys and exiles. This dispute came to ahead at the Gloucester summit, when Malcolm walked out in protest against William Rufus' attempt to obtain a submission, leading to his death and a revolution in Anglo-Scottish relations. Malcolm's sons were more willing to

submit to English power and maintain peace, reflecting their father's failed approach, the support they had received from William Rufus as exiles, and Henry I's efforts to bind them to him using gift giving and marriage. The latter further helped secure his position by sowing division within the Scottish royal family. This *détente* collapsed with the Anarchy and David I's rejection of Stephen's authority, preferring to support the Empress Matilda, who he was bound to by Henry's diplomacy. Diplomats, meeting places and marriages were employed by both sides to improve their positions, with the Scots using a two-pronged approach that involved David's son, Henry of Scotland, aligning with Stephen. A final shift occurred in 1149, when this strategy was abandoned and both David and Henry began supporting the Empress Matilda's son, Henry of Anjou. As this alteration to Scottish policy shows, changes did not merely happen between reigns but within them. In a similar vein, though he was clearly dominant over Constantine in 934, Æthelstan first the met the Scottish king as an equal, signalling another intra-reign fluctuation. Furthermore, alterations often had more do with domestic circumstances than a king's foreign policy. Periods of civil conflict, like the one related to inter-earl rivalries during Edward the Confessor's reign, caused the proliferation of exiles, who in turn reached out to neighbouring kings, leading to interactions that majorly impacted inter-ruler relations. Evidently, alongside Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman divisions and continuities, 927-1154 featured other important fluctuations, with the divide between relations in Malcolm's reign and the decades that followed his death especially significant. A multidimensional picture has emerged.

Regarding this thesis' wider goals, it certainly contributes to the general understanding and awareness of medieval diplomacy, providing insight into underdiscussed themes, in underdiscussed relationships, within a relatively underdiscussed topic. Having previously highlighted the benefits of incorporating NDH elements, it is hoped that future scholars will both consider the methodology used here and the conclusions drawn about diplomatic practice. Since these have been developed using an extensively comparative source base, they potentially possess wide-reaching applicability. The next step should be to interpret another underdiscussed medieval case study through the concepts explored here, such as border diplomats, the distinction between border and court summits and the difference between gifts and tributes. A possible candidate for this approach is English diplomacy before unification. Whilst writers like Asser and Bede were utilised here as comparisons, analysing their works through my categorisations of diplomatic behaviours would provide insight into relations between independent Anglo-Saxon kingdoms.

Moreover, my thesis also engages with recent interest in the parallels between medieval and modern diplomacy, highlighted by John Watkins. Just as diplomacy in the contemporary world has been progressively seen as less state-centric, often conducted by NGOs, supernational institutions, substate governments, and political dissidents, this thesis has highlighted diplomacy conducted by various pre-state figures. Though there has been considerable focus on interactions between kings, inter-ruler relations were the product of numerous agents. To take one such example, the *Second Treaty of Durham* (1139) between Stephen of England and David I of Scotland involved the papal legate Alberic of Ostia, Queen Matilda of Boulogne, and Henry of Scotland all advancing varying goals: the prevention of violence against innocents; peace between family members; territorial

concessions. Without them, this agreement and its consequences for Stephen and David's relationship would not have happened. A reader looking for antecedents of multi-party contemporary diplomacy should not be disappointed.

There are certain areas where the similarity is especially apparent, and thus ripe for further exploration. Modern paradiplomacy, meaning diplomacy involving substate entities, such as regional or city governments, is a worthy candidate.[166] This often involves a substate government pursuing a policy that challenges or counters the government of the state that the substate is within. In recent years the Scottish government under the Scottish National Party (SNP) has increasingly conducted diplomacy with foreign states, in order to secure overseas support for Scotland's secession from the UK.[167] Secession need not be the goal though. The Government of Quebec has pursued paradiplomacy regardless of whether a secessionist party is in charge.[168] It has often been concerned with the lack of Francophone representation and interest in the Canadian Foreign Ministry. Thus, it has sought to establish its own diplomatic relations with French-speaking countries, signing an agreement on education with France for instance.[169] Actions like these draw comparisons with earls, like Ælfgar and Tostig. These subordinate figures also formed their own foreign ties, through which they strengthened their position in relation to the king ruling their homeland and other domestic opponents. Likewise, Henry I did not restrict himself to dealing with King Alexander, but formed a relationship with the Scottish king's brother and heir David, another subordinate individual. This encouraged discord between the brothers, undermining Alexander's position. A comparative study of the diplomacy of subordinate individuals and institutions may reveal many resemblances.

Comparisons could be made with the diplomacy of modern governments in exile. Such groups lack legitimacy, having been forced from the state they claim to represent.[170] They counter this illegitimacy by behaving like a sovereign government. One way to do this is by conducting diplomacy, a practice traditionally seen as falling under the remit of a state's government. In 1960, the Dalai Lama established the Tibetan Government-in-exile. Based in northern India, his goal was to free Tibet from Chinese control and to help Tibetan refugees. To increase its legitimacy, this government-in-exile took part in numerous diplomatic practices, establishing unofficial embassies in eleven cities and arranging pseudo-summits with foreign leaders.[171] Their behaviour resembles that of exiled medieval

[166] Virginie Marmadouh and Herman van der Wusten, 'The Paradiplomacy of Cities and Regions: Transnational Relations between Sub-State Political Entities', in *Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives*, ed. Jason Dittmer and Fiona McConnell (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 135-42
[167] Jamie Maxwell, 'Scotland's long game', *Politico*, 06 November 2019: https://www.politico.eu/article/scotland-long-game-brexit-general-election-nicola-sturgeon-snp-second-scottish-independence-referendum/. Accessed 21 August 2020; Also, Colin Alexander, 'Sub-State Public Diplomacy in Africa: The Case of the Scottish Government's Engagement with Malawi', *Public Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 10 (2014), pp. 70-86.
[168] Stéphane Paquin, 'Identity Paradiplomacy in Québec', *Québec Studies*, 66 (2018), p. 36.
[169] Ibid, pp. 19-21.
[170] Pavol Jakubec, 'Together and Alone in Allied London: Czechoslovak, Norwegian and Polish Governments-in-Exile, 1940-1945', *The International History Review*, 42 (2020), p. 468.
[171] Fiona McConnell *et al*. 'Mimicking State Diplomacy: The Legitimizing Strategy of Unofficial Diplomacies', *Geoforum*, 43 (2012), pp. 806-08.

claimants, like Edgar the Ætheling. Receiving the purple cloth, with its kingship connotations, from Malcolm III, was also a diplomatic behaviour that mimicked political rule. Edgar hoped this would legitimise his position as rightful king of England, much as the Tibetan Government-in-exile hopes that taking part in summits will legitimise it as the rightful government of Tibet. Just as William the Conqueror opposed Malcolm's support for Edgar, the Chinese government has not appreciated those who have conducted diplomacy with Tibet. After British Prime Minister David Cameron met with the Dalai Lama in 2012, the Chinese government responded with outrage. A government spokesman declared, 'We ask the British side to take the Chinese side's solemn stance seriously' and to 'stop indulging and supporting "Tibet independence" anti-China forces.'[172]

Future studies should further explore these parallels, combining analysis of modern and medieval diplomacy to inform understanding of contemporary international relations. The Britain of 927-1154 could certainly aid analysis of its twenty-first-century counterpart, where alongside the Scottish government, there are additional devolved governments and other NGOs, including football teams like Manchester United, conducting their own diplomacy.[173] The current prominence of non-state diplomatic actors means similarities with the pre-state period will not only continue to occur, but will provide insight into the world around us.

[172] 'David Cameron's Dalai Lama meeting sparks Chinese protest', *BBC*, 16 May 2012: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18084223. Accessed 24 September 2020.
[173] Simon J. Rofe, 'It is a Squad Game: Manchester United as a Diplomatic Non-state Actor in International Affairs', *Sport in Society*, 17 (2014), pp. 1136-54; Elin Rogles, 'Substate Diplomacy, Culture and Wales: Investigating a Historical Approach', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 46 (2016), pp. 224-47.

Appendix 1: Maps of English Royal Itineraries

On the following pages are maps depicting the itineraries of rulers of England who are known to have held summits with Scottish and Welsh rulers. In general, only locations within Britain are highlighted. Corresponding with Chapter One, the maps distinguish between places kings visited which were exclusively used for diplomacy, places that played host to diplomatic and domestic political events, such as royal courts, and places that were never used for relevant diplomatic interactions.

The maps are based on existing itineraries, which have been built on through the investigation of primary sources. See below for my main sources:

Barlow, Frank, *William Rufus* (London, 2000), pp. 449-52.

Hill, David, *An Atlas of Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 87-94.

Regesta Regum Anglorum-Normannorum 1066-1154, ed. H. A. Cronne *et al*., 3 vols. (Oxford, 1913-68), 2, pp. xxix-xxxi, 3, pp. xxxix-xliv.

Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum: the Acta of William I, 1066-87, ed. David Bates (Oxford, 1998), pp. 75-84.

P.T.O.

Map One: King Æthelstan of England's Itinerary

Map Two: Itineraries of King Edmund, King Eadred, and King Eadwig of England

Map Three: King Edgar of England's Itinerary

Map Four: King Cnut of England's Itinerary

Map Five: King Edward the Confessor of England's Itinerary

Map Six: King William I (the Conqueror) of England's Itinerary



Map Seven: King William II (Rufus) of England's Itinerary

Map Eight: King Henry I of England's Itinerary



Map Nine: King Stephen of England's Itinerary



Map Ten: The Empress Matilda's Itinerary

Appendix 2: Table of Dateable Diplomatic Events

Year	Entry no.	Summary	Sources used	Notes
c.900-c.1000	1	An agreement was made between Welsh and English border communities near the River Wye. The king of England held ultimate authority over the agreement, and took tribute from Gwent.	*Dunsæte*.	For date of composition, see Lindy Brady, *Writing the Welsh Borderlands in Anglo-Saxon England* (Manchester, 2017), pp. 1-4; Michael Fordham, 'The Midlands History Prize Essay 2006: Peacekeeping and Order on the Anglo-Welsh Frontier', *Midlands History*, 32 (2007), pp. 1-18; George Molyneaux, 'The Ordinance Concerning the *Dunsæte* and the Anglo-Welsh Frontier in the Late Tenth and Eleventh Centuries', *ASE*, 40 (2011), pp. 249-72.
927	2	Æthelstan of England met Constantine II of Scotland at Eamont, along with Owain of Strathclyde and Ealdred of Bamburgh.	*ASC D;* WM, pp. 214-15; JW, 2, pp. 386-87.	The *ASC* records Welsh rulers, such as Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, in attendance at Eamont. However, William of Malmesbury records two conferences in 927: one with Constantine and Owain of Strathclyde at Eamont, and another with Welsh rulers at Hereford. The *ASC*'s account is brief and seemingly confused, listing Owain of Gwent in attendance rather than Owain of Strathclyde. I therefore believe its author combined the two summits and mislabelled the attendees. Further, given the geographic locations, Malmesbury's interpretation seems more likely.

	3	Æthelstan met unnamed Welsh rulers at Hereford, extracting tribute.	WM, pp. 214-17; *Armes*; *Brenhinedd*, pp. 28-31.	
928	4	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Idwal Foel of Gwynedd and an unknown figure called Gwriad at Exeter.	*ES* 400.	
931	5	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Ideal Foel of Gwynedd at Worthy, along with Owain of Strathclyde.	*ES* 413.	
	6	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth and Ideal Foel of Gwynedd at Lifton.	*ES* 416	
932	7	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Ideal Foel of Gwynedd and an unknown figure called Gwriad at Milton.	*ES* 417	
	8	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth and Idwal Foel of Gwynedd at Exeter.	*ES* 418a	
934	9	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Idwal Foel of Gwynedd and Tewdwr of Brycheiniog at Winchester.	*ES* 425	
	10	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth and Idwal Foel of Gwynedd at Nottingham.	*ES* 407	
	11	Following Æthelstan's invasion of Scotland, Constantine II submitted to him, paying tribute and handing over his son as a hostage.	JW, 2, pp. 388-89; *HR*, p. 124.	
	12	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda of Deheubarth at Frome	*ES* 427	
935	13	Æthelstan met Constantine II, Hywel Dda and Idwal Foel at Cirencester, along with Owain of Strathclyde.	*ES* 1792	

937	14	Æthelstan met Hywel Dda and Idwal Foel at Dorchester, along with Owain of Strathclyde.	*ES* 436	
945	15	King Edmund of England 'let' Cumbria to Malcolm I of Scotland.	*ASC C*; JW, 2, pp. 398-99.	It is unclear whether *let* means abandoned or leased (Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 183-84).
946	16	King Eadred of England met Malcolm I.	*ASC C*; JW, 2, pp. 400-01.	
949	17	Eadred met Hywel Dda and Morgan ab Owain of Gwent at an English court.	*ES* 550	
	18	Eadred met Hywel Dda and Morgan ab Owain at an English court.	*ES* 544	
955	19	Eadred met Morgan ab Owain, Owain ap Hywel of Deheubarth, Iago ab Idwal of Gwynedd and unknown figure called Syferth at an English court.	*ES* 566	
973	20	King Edgar of England met up to eight rulers, including Kenneth II of Scotland and several Welsh rulers at Chester. Allegedly, the other rulers rowed Edgar down the River Dee.	*ASC D*; Ælfric, '*Life of St. Swithun*', *EHD I*, p. 853; WM, pp. 238-39; JW, 2, pp. 422-25; *AC*, p. 2.	See pp. 32-36.
975	21	Kenneth II was escort to King Edgar's court by Bishop Ælfsige of St. Cuthbert and Earl Eadwulf of Bamburgh. The Scottish ruler was granted gifts, Lothian and residences in England, on condition that he and his successors continued to visit the English court.	RW, 1, p. 416; WM, pp. 254-57.	Largely based on a thirteenth-century account, raising questions about its accuracy.
1027	22	King Cnut of England invaded Scotland and met King Malcolm II of Scotland, alongside other northern figures.	*ASC E* (1031).	The source claims it took place in 1031, but external evidence suggests 1027, the same year that Cnut visited Rome. The two other

				attendees are believed to be Echmarcach son of Ragnall and Macbeth, later Mormaer of Moray and king of Scotland (1040-57). For the date and the attendees, see Woolf, *Pictland*, pp. 244-48 and Benjamin T. Hudson, 'Cnut and the Scottish Kings', *EHR*, 107 (1992), pp. 350-60.
1052	23	Osbern Pentecost and Hugo were exiled from King Edward the Confessor of England's realm to King Macbeth of Scotland.	JW, 2, pp. 572-73.	
1055	24	Having been exiled from England and gathered troops from Ireland, Earl Ælfgar of East Anglia went to King Gruffydd ap Llywelyn of Wales. They then led a successful attack on Hereford. Afterwards a summit was held at Billingsley between the attackers and Earl Harold of Wessex, which led to Ælfgar's reinstatement as an earl.	*ASC CDE*; JW, 2, pp. 578-79.	Chroniclers often located summits in relative terms, only recording the name of the nearest settlement (Jenny Benham, 'Anglo-French Peace Conferences in the Twelfth Century', *ANS*, 27 p. 54). Billingsley may have been the nearest named location to the place on the Severn that hosted the meeting.
1056	25	After an English attack on Gruffydd's realm, a peace conference was held between the Welsh ruler and three members of the English aristocracy; Harold, Bishop Ealdred of Worcester and Earl Leofric.	*ASC C*, 1056; JW, 2, pp. 580-81.	
1057	26	Ælfgar's daughter Edith married Gruffydd.	OV, 2, pp. 138-39	For the date, see p. 118.
1058	27	Ælfgar was exiled again. Once more he went to Gruffydd, who provided military support that helped Ælfgar resecure his position.	*ASC D*, 1058; JW, 2, pp. 584-85.	
1059	28	King Malcolm III of Scotland was escorted to Edward's court by Archbishop Cynesige of York,	*HR*, pp. 174-75.	

		Bishop Æthelwine of Durham and Earl Tostig of Northumbria. During the journey, Tostig and Malcolm became sworn brothers.		
1063	29	Edward the Confessor granted Gwynedd to Bleddyn ap Cynfyn and Powys to Rhiwallon ap Cynfyn in return for oaths, hostages and tribute.	*ASC D*; JW. 2, pp. 596-97.	
1066	30	After a failed attack on England, Tostig fled to Malcolm III's court.	*ASC C*; JW, 2, pp. 600-03.	
1068	31	Edgar the Ætheling fled to Malcolm's court, accompanied by his mother, Agatha, and his sisters, Margaret and Christina, as well as other supporters.	*ASC D*, (1067); JW, 3, pp. 6-7.	
	32	King William the Conqueror of England sent to Malcolm III Bishop Æthelwine of Durham to prevent Scottish intervention. Malcolm sent back envoys to swear obedience to the king of England.	OV, 2, p. 219.	
	33	Malcolm III married Margaret, Edgar the Ætheling's sister.	*ASC DE,* (1067); *HR,* p. 192.	See pp. 144-45
1069	34	After joining a failed rebellion against William the Conqueror, Edgar the Ætheling returned to Scotland.	*ASC D*, (1068).	
1070	35	After joining King Swein Estrithson of Denmark's unsuccessful attack on England, Edgar the Ætheling returned to Scotland.	*ASC D*, (1069); *HR*, p. 192.	
1072	36	After invading Scotland, William the Conqueror received Malcolm III's submission at Abernethy, taking Malcolm's son Duncan as a hostage.	*ASC E*; *AU*, p. 509; *Brenhinedd*, p. 79; JW, 3, pp. 20-21.	

1074	37	Edgar the Ætheling came to Malcolm III from Flanders. He received numerous gifts from Malcolm and Queen Margaret of Scotland, his sister, before attempting to travel to France. When his ship sunk he returned to Malcolm. The Scottish king replaced the gifts and advised Edgar to go to England. He did so, and was readmitted to the English court by William the Conqueror.	*ASC D*; JW, 3, pp. 22-23.	
1080	38	Robert Curthose invaded Scotland. Whilst there, he met with Malcolm III and became godfather to the Scottish king's daughter, Edith (later Queen Matilda of Scots).	*HR*, p. 211; WM, pp. 704-05.	See p. 104-05.
1081	39	William the Conqueror led an invasion force to St. Davids, where Rhys ap Tewdwr of Deheubarth agreed to pay him tribute.	*ASC* E; *DB*, fol. 179; *Brut*, p. 31.	Rhys ap Tewdwr overcame Caradog ap Gruffydd prior to William's trip (*Brut*, p. 31). No sources link the events.
1091	40	Edgar the Ætheling fled to Malcolm III of Scotland, after William Rufus of England deprived him of his land. Malcolm subsequently led an attack on northern England. In response, Rufus led a military force north, though his fleet sunk during the journey. There was a standoff at Lothian, but through the efforts of Robert Curthose, a treaty was agreed, and Edgar was permitted to return.	*ASC E*; JW, 3, pp. 60-61; OV, 4, pp. 268-71.	
1093	41	William Rufus of England and Malcolm III of Scotland met at Gloucester. Prior to the meeting, Rufus sent messengers, hostages and Edgar the Ætheling to the Scottish king, who was escorted south by the Bishop of Durham. Malcolm refused Rufus' request	*ASC E*; JW, 64-65; OV, 4, 270-71.	Orderic Vitalis incorrectly dates this to 1091.

		to perform homage, and walked out.		
	42	William Rufus of England knighted Duncan II of Scotland and backed his attempt to secure the Scottish throne.	*ASC E*; JW, 3, pp. 46-49; WM, pp. 724-25.	John of Worcester claims Robert Curthose knighted Duncan in 1087. However, given the connection between knighting and assuming office, it seems more likely it occurred when Duncan performed homage in 1093. Further, Robert's close ties to Malcolm and his children by Margaret (p. 104-05), mean it is unlikely he would have provided support for a rival of theirs (p. 138).
1095	43	William Rufus of England recognised the exiled Edgar of Scotland as the rightful ruler of Scotland.	*ESC*, 15-16.	
1099	44	Edgar of Scotland attended William Rufus' court.	*Annales de Wintonia*, in *Annales Monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols. (London, 1864-69), 2, p. 40.	
1100	45	Henry I married Matilda of Scots.	*ASC E*; JW, 3, pp. 96-97; OV, 4, pp. 272-73; WM pp. 714-17.	Many historians approach this marriage from a domestic standpoint: Green, *Henry I*, pp. 54-55; Huneycutt, *Matilda*, p. 27; Oram, *Domination*, pp. 51-52; Watkins, *Lavinia*, p. 86.
1101	46	King Edgar of Scotland visited Henry I's court.	*RRAN*, 2, 601.	
1102	47	The rulers of Powys allied with Earl Robert Bellême of Shrewsbury against Henry I, who tempted Iorwerth ap Bleddyn of	*Brut*, p. 43; JW, 3, pp. 100-01; OV,	

		Powys into turning against Robert with gifts and rewards.	6, pp. 22-23, 26-27.	
1103	48	Iorwerth ap Bleddyn travelled to the English court at Shrewsbury, where he was imprisoned.	*Brut*, p. 49.	
1109	49	Cadwgan ap Bleddyn of Powys went to Henry I and made a treaty, agreeing to pay tribute and to not harbour his son Owain ap Cadwgan. This stopped retaliatory action being taken against him, due to Owain abducting Nest, wife of Gerald of Windsor and one-time mistress of Henry.	*Brut*, pp. 57-65.	
1114	50	King Alexander I of Scotland married Sybilla of Normandy, bastard daughter of Henry I.	OV, 4, 274-75; WM, pp. 724-27.	Associated with Alexander's visit to England in 1114: Jessica Nelson, 'Sybilla', *ODNB*, 04 October 2008; Oram, *Domination*, p. 57.
	51	Henry I invaded Wales, with Alexander I in his army. Maredudd ap Bleddyn served as an envoy to Owain ap Cadwgan, convincing him to make peace with Henry in return for rewards, including a knighthood. Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd submitted, agreeing to pay Henry tribute.	*AC*, p. 14; *ASC H*; *Brut*, pp. 79-83; *LGC*, pp. 86-87.	
	52	Henry I arranged a marriage between Maud of Huntingdon and David I of Scotland.	*ASC H*; WM, pp. 726-27.	Dated to 1114, when David was granted the earldom of Huntingdon, which Maud was the heiress of.
1115	53	Owain ap Cadwgan travelled with Henry I to Normandy.	*Brut*, pp. 82-83	
	54	Gruffudd ap Cynan planned to harbour Gruffydd ap Rhys of Deheubarth. Henry I summoned Gruffudd ap Cynan to him, and promised rewards in return for capturing or killing Gruffydd ap Rhys. He was unsuccessful, with Gruffydd ap Rhys escaping.	*Brut*, pp. 96-99.	

1116	55	Henry I summoned Owain ap Cadwgan of Powys, and promised rewards in return for leading a force against Gruffydd ap Rhys.	*Brut*, pp. 96-99.	
1121	56	Henry I attacked Powys. Its rulers submitted, handing over 10,000 cows as tribute, and hostages.	*AC*, p. 15; *ASC E*; *Brut*, 108-09; WM, pp. 728-29.	
1125	57	Matilda of Boulogne, Malcolm III's granddaughter, married Stephen, later king of England.	OV, 5, pp. 272-75.	Henry I did not intend for this marriage to impact Anglo-Scottish relations when he arranged it. For example, it was partly about securing the important Channel port of Wissant, in the county of Boulogne, by placing his nephew in control of it, easing Channel crossings. See Edmund King, *King Stephen* (London, 2012), pp. 20-21.
1126	58	David I of Scotland spent a year in England. Whilst there he advised Henry regarding Robert Curthose's captivity, swore an oath to support the Empress Matilda's claim to the English throne and was gifted a cup, which remained at the Scottish court for the remainder of his reign and beyond.	*ASC E*, 1126-27; *GS*, p. 35; OV, 6, pp. 518-19; *RRAN*, 2, 1451, 1466; William of Malmesbury, *The Historia Novella*, ed. and trans. K. R. Potter (London, 1955), p. 4; WN, 1, pp. 118-21.	The cup was likely returned during the 1170s, when William the Lion invaded England. The attack failed, William was captured, and forced to perform a particularly punitive submission, known as the *Treaty of Falaise* (1174). The close and positive relationship between Henry I and David I's family that the cup indicated was decidedly over, so the cup was removed to symbolise this. See '*Treaty "of Falaise*,"' *ASR*, pp. 1-5; WN, 2, pp. 154-57; Carpenter, *Britain*, p. 226.
1130	59	David I visited Henry I's court.	*RRAN*, 2, 1639, 1654, 1659.	
1136	60	Robert of Bampton's son and garrison fled to David I, after a failed rebellion against King Stephen of England	*GS*, pp. 18-20	

	61	Near Durham, a peace treaty was agreed between David I and King Stephen.	*ASC E*; HH, pp. 706-07; JH, p. 287.	
	62	Henry of Scotland, David I's son, did homage to Stephen at York, receiving land in northern England, including Carlisle, and Huntingdon. He then travelled on to London with Stephen, where he was insulted by Archbishop William de Corbeil of Canterbury and Earl Ralph IV of Chester.	HH, pp. 706-07; JH, p. 287.	
1138	63	Having failed to negotiate peace with David I prior to the Battle of the Standard, Robert de Bruce and Bernard de Baliol absolved their homage.	JH, p. 293.	
	64	At Carlisle, the papal legate Alberic of Ostia convinced David to make a truce with King Stephen.	JH, pp. 297-98.	
	65	At London, with Queen Matilda of Boulogne's assistance, Alberic of Ostia solicited King Stephen to make peace with David I.	JH, p. 299.	
1139	66	An Anglo-Scottish peace treaty was greed at Durham by Henry of Scotland and Queen Matilda of Boulogne, with Henry receiving the earldom of Northumberland. They then met King Stephen at Nottingham, where Henry married Ada de Warenne.	JH, p. 300; OV, 6, pp. 522-23.	
1140	67	Henry of Scotland and Ada de Warenne visited King Stephen. On the way back Henry came under threat from Ralph IV of Chester, but he was protected by Stephen, due to a request from Queen Matilda of Boulogne.		
1141	68	Madog ap Maredudd of Powys and Owain of Gwynedd's brother Cadwaladr attended the Empress	OV, 6, pp. 536-37	See accounts of the Battle of Lincoln 1141 for the

		Matilda and Earl Robert of Gloucester at Bristol.		attendees: OV, 6, pp. 542-43; HH, pp. 726-27.
	69	David I joined the Empress Matilda's court in England.	*GS*, pp. 35-37.	
1149	70	Henry of Anjou met David I at Carlisle, where David knighted him, with Henry of Scotland's support.	*GS*, p. 142; HH, pp. 754-55; JH, pp. 322-23; WN, 1, pp. 98-101.	

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