

TREASONOUS REPERTOIRES

Performing Collaboration and Musical Life in

Japanese-Occupied Beijing, 1937–1945

L. Odila Schröder

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Laura Odila Schröder

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the musical culture of the “occupation state” in Japanese-occupied Beijing during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). While cultural production in support of resistance against the Japanese in wartime China is well explored and its memory propagated to boost the CCP’s legitimacy, music composed and performed in support of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied China has largely been disregarded or dismissed. This thesis thus lies at the hitherto uncharted intersection of several areas of research, including wartime “collaboration”, the cultural history of Japanese-occupied north China, the development of music in wartime China, and musical culture of occupation more broadly. What can we learn about the occupation state in north China through an analysis of the musical repertoires and performance practices it developed and appropriated, and how does accounting for the musical culture of the occupation state alter our understanding of musical culture in wartime China?

To address these questions, I draw on a broad range of sources, including musical scores, performance programmes and campaign reports published in the occupation state’s main news outlets, as well as archival material pertaining to the regime’s propaganda policies, music textbooks, a private collection of wartime concert programmes, musicians’ (auto)biographies and recordings.

The first three chapters offer an overview of the occupation state, as well as its organization, ideologies and main campaigns in north China. They also provide a critical view of the historiography of music in twentieth century China, explaining the significance of this thesis as an intervention into dominant narratives, and a detailed

account of the musical infrastructure in Japanese-occupied Beijing. The second part of the thesis offers a detailed musical analysis of the evolving musical repertoires and performance practices developed and appropriated by the regime with a particular focus on “new music”. I also consider how the regime employed collective and individual gendered voices and the spatial aspects of sound. I show how the song commission and mass singing activities initiated by the occupation state, as well as local musical elites’ concern for topical repertoire and voices, were surprisingly similar to musical developments in both pre-war China and in the non-occupied areas in wartime China. Such continuities and similarities draw into question long-standing narrative alignments between the aesthetic and moral judgement of musical culture in wartime China. I further show how musical repertoire and practice reflects changes and dissonances in the occupation state’s relationship with its citizens and reveals the regime’s attempts at mitigating the limitations of its territorial control, countering the normalization of the condition of occupation, and forging a distinctly local identity for itself through concert programme design.

This analysis of the musical culture of the occupation state in north China thus contributes not only to our understanding of the cultural history of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied north China, but to broader discussions of musical culture in twentieth-century China and the role of music in shaping military occupations more broadly.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BMCA Beijing Music Culture Association

CCP Chinese Communist Party

GEACPS Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

KMT Chinese Nationalist Party

NCAA North China Area Army

NCPC North China Political Council

PGROC Provisional Government of the Republic of China

PRC People's Republic of China

RGROC Reformed Government of the Republic of China

RNG Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China

US United States (of America)

YMCA Young Men's Christian Association, China Christian Youth Association

YSC Yao Siyuan Collection

COMMENT ON FORMATTING, LANGUAGES AND TRANSLITERATION

This thesis is written in British English. Bibliographical information follows the author date format as per the *Chicago Manual of Style* (ed. 17). Names of independently published song titles are italicized. Sub-publications, such as individual arias, are in quotation marks.

Chinese and Japanese names, institutions, publications, musical repertoire and terms can be found in the Glossary. Songs commissioned under the PGROC and RNG are listed in Appendix 1. Since this thesis focuses on the Republican era, I use traditional Chinese characters. I use *Hanyu pinyin* for transliteration of Chinese terms and follow standard *pinyin* orthography. Japanese is transcribed following the modified Hepburn romanization system. Where Chinese and Japanese pronunciations are given, I follow the format *Hanyu pinyin / modified Hepburn romanization*. Exceptions are made for a few commonly known proper names, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Tokyo. Bibliographical data is given in the original script.

Names and titles exclusively mentioned in the Appendices are not included in the Glossary. The Glossary contains, if known, the year of birth and death and alternative names of the mentioned personae as well as the year of release for films and songs. Year of birth and death of people and years of publication not included in the Glossary (e.g., European composers and pieces and those only mentioned in the Appendices) are given upon first mention within the text. European repertoire reached China through myriad ways and certainly changed in the process. Since this process is not the focus of this thesis, European language titles are indicated in English and/or the

language(s) the mentioned musical pieces were first published in, even if the repertoire reached China in a different language.

Any translations and transcriptions, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author.

Translations are documentary in style and aim to give a faithful impression of the original wording, rather than a literary impression of style or emotional content.

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Introduction

What was the significance of musical culture for the occupation state in Beijing during the Second Sino-Japanese War? What musical repertoires and performance practices did Chinese governments and their proxies develop and appropriate under Japanese occupation? And what can we learn about the occupation state through an analysis of these repertoires and musical practices? These are the key questions that this thesis aims to address.

Studying the musical culture of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied Beijing means venturing into the hitherto uncharted intersection between several areas of interrelated scholarly interests. This includes the history of “collaboration” during the Second Sino-Japanese War; the cultural history of the Japanese occupation of China; the musical and sound culture of occupation, war and conflict; and, finally, the development of music in twentieth-century China. This thesis is therefore part of a growing field of research which transcends disciplinary boundaries between history, regional studies and cultural studies and that Jeremy Taylor and Yang Zhiyi have recently called the “new cultural history” of Japanese-occupied China (Taylor and Yang 2020). In discussing the historiographical gaps in our understanding of the cultural history of wartime China, Taylor and Yang not only explain the background to a renewed interest in the cultural history of the Japanese occupation, but also argue for the need for more in-depth studies of the sort that is presented in this thesis. Studies of cultural production in Japanese-occupied China allow us to view established narratives from a different – often uncomfortable and challenging – angle. They draw

into question dismissive views of the aesthetic value of cultural production created under occupation – thereby scrutinizing long-held narratives, which to this day present resistance culture as one of the pillars of nationalism and thereby regime legitimacy, especially (though not exclusively) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Chang 2021). Taylor and Yang also highlight some of the characteristics of this new history of cultural expression in Japanese-occupied China, including its emphasis on the agency of Chinese cultural workers as well as audiences, its tendency to highlight relations and dialogue across the borders that supposedly separated different parts of wartime China, and a refusal to adhere to a simplistic collaboration/resistance dichotomy. All three of these characteristics will be evident throughout this thesis as well.

Despite scholarly advances in studies of wartime China over recent years, there are still a number of gaps even in the most recent “new cultural history” of Japanese-occupied China. This thesis aims to fill a number of these gaps. Firstly, by focusing on Beijing, I will be exploring details of the north Chinese occupation state – an entity that has often been overlooked in the past in favour of Manchukuo, occupied Shanghai or the Lower Yangzi Delta. This means that my thesis will provide a point of comparison for often generalizing claims that are made on the basis of studies of Manchukuo, or cities such as Shanghai, where evasion from Japanese directives was often possible due to a continued colonial presence (Gunn 1980, 21). Second, by choosing to focus on musical performance and repertoires, I will explore a type of cultural expression which is not only of immense cultural prestige and considered to be extraordinarily closely related to politics,¹ but also one which has rarely been

¹ For a discussion on the relation between music and the state, see Chapter 3.

explored in the context of the Japanese occupation. Furthermore, this focus on musical culture will allow me to incorporate a broad range of sources and media. Instead of highlighting the motivations of individuals under foreign occupation who are said to have “collaborated” with the Japanese, I will highlight the otherwise forgotten role of selected elite artists, as well as the interplay between private and public institutions, musical ensembles and individual musicians – all while rejecting an artificial, but often exclusive focus on the agency of musical elites or professionals (vs. amateurs).²

Methodologically, this thesis is interdisciplinary, drawing on history, cultural studies, sound studies and musicology, while maintaining a clear focus on one specific area of occupied China between 1937 and 1945. Below, I will return to these areas of scholarly inquiry outlined above, namely collaborationism, cultural history, sound studies and musicology, to explain some of the conceptual paradigms and parameters within which this thesis will operate. I will then elaborate on my methodology and sources, and provide a brief overview of the structure of this thesis.

Wartime Collaboration and the Occupation State in China

Differences to this day in the very nomenclature of the violent conflict during which Beijing was occupied by Japanese forces illustrate regional foci and the continued

² By “musical elites” I refer to individuals who were educated in formal institutions of tertiary music education, that is conservatories or universities with music institutes, individuals who were affiliated with or taught at these institutions, and individuals affiliated with professional musical ensembles (professional commercial opera troupes or professional orchestras, for example).

existence of conflict lines post-war. In the PRC, this war is still referred to as the “Anti-Japanese War of Resistance” or the “Japanese War of Aggression against China”, indicating the guilt of Japanese imperialism and emphasizing the contributions of resistance forces. In Japan, on the other hand, the war was referred to as the “China Incident” until 1941, denying the nature of the conflict (Awaya 1998, 223–24). The term “Second Sino-Japanese War”, which I will use throughout this thesis, offers a less morally-laden alternative. However, its regional focus veils the integration of the occupied territories into the wider Japanese empire and the international context of the Pacific War and emerging Second World War (or “Great Patriotic War”). The Second World War, in turn, is often defined with a focus on the war in Europe and its beginning dated to 1939, while the Pacific War is often only referred to as such with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the entrance of the United States (US) into the war against Japan in December 1941. Equally contentious and a matter of political intervention in history textbooks is the question of when the Second Sino-Japanese War began. While the beginning of the war is commonly dated to 1937, the CCP now dates the beginning of the “War of Resistance” to 1931, defining Manchuria as an integral part of China and extending the time of China’s “patriotic” struggle against Japanese imperialism (Chang 2021, 1152–60). While recognizing the increasing Japanese presence in north China between 1931 and 1937, this thesis is concerned with the occupation of Beijing and therefore focuses on the 1937–1945 period.

The Sino-Japanese War is one of the most studied periods in twentieth-century history. In Japan, the PRC and Taiwan, specialized journals publish on the period, and English-language scholarship on the period can be found in journals of military, political, economic and cultural history. A review article published in 2006 in *The Journal of Military History*, provides a well-crafted overview of the field (Gordon 2006).

Although much has happened in the field since the turn of the millennium – detailed studies of military history (Peattie, Drea and van de Ven 2011; Mitter 2013; van de Ven 2017) and studies with a focus on regional and social history (MacKinnon, Lary, and Vogel 2007; MacKinnon 2008; Schoppa 2011; Zhu 2015; Ma 2015; Wu 2017) for example – the field’s focus has remained largely on military, diplomatic and economic developments in wartime China, as well as memory of the conflict.

Despite tendencies to highlight the perspective of the Japanese empire and groups in China which resisted the Japanese invasion (such as the CCP and KMT), and despite continuing sensitivities both within and outside of China, the question of “collaboration” and the existence of “client regimes” in Japanese-occupied Asia has developed into a subfield of its own. Building on scholarship from the 1970s (Boyle 1972; Bunker 1972), scholars have, since the turn of the millennium, contributed to our understanding of the political and economic history of the occupation state, particularly in the Lower Yangzi Delta (Barrett and Shyu 2001; Coble 2003; Martin 2003; Brook 2005; Martin 2009). They have revealed more of the inner workings of these regimes, and complicated the very notion of collaboration (Wakeman 2000; Barrett and Shyu 2001; Brook 2007; 2000a; Zanasi 2008; Xia 2017).³

³ Studies of “client regimes” in other regions of the Japanese empire have proven especially encouraging and instrumental in exploring questions of “patriotic collaboration” and “collaborationist nationalism” (Yellen 2019; Kratoska 2018). Burmese and Filipino elites saw collaboration with imperialist Japan as a necessary step toward independence and part of an anti-colonial struggle. Jeremy Yellen, therefore, has coined the phrase “patriotic collaborators” (Yellen 2019, 137–40). Similar anti-colonial sentiments were propagated in occupied China. “Collaborationist nationalism” in turn has been coined by Timothy Brook to describe a rhetoric brought forth by former elites serving the Chinese occupation state, who were later persecuted as collaborators but claimed to have acted “patriotically”

Chinese-language scholarship that focuses on the occupied territories often operates within prescribed moral categories such as “traitors” (*hanjian*) or “fallen areas” (*lunxianqu*), and understands propaganda that was promoted under the Japanese as being little more than “enslavement education” (*nuhua jiaoyu*) (Ren 2019; Yang 2004b). While the title of this thesis – *Treasonous Repertoires* – invokes such moral categories, it is used here to reflect the ambiguous nature of cultural production under occupation. Within the occupied territories, “treason” was understood both in the conventional sense as “treason” against the ideal of a sovereign Chinese nation-state through collaboration with or contribution to the occupation state’s wartime effort, but also as “treason” against the interests of the Japanese occupiers and ideologies of Asianism through subversive cultural messaging. In this thesis, I adopt Timothy Brook’s understanding of the term “collaboration” as “a necessary part of occupation’s political repertoire [...that] is not coterminous with the structures and sanctions of the occupation regime [... This] shifts the fault lines in the moral landscape of occupation from a small set of bad guys, isolated and idealized as a type, to a broader and more intricate pattern of interaction and accommodation without condemning everyone” (Brook 2005, 13). I thus use the term to denote contributions to Japanese directives or the efforts of the occupation state – understanding that such contributions might be

and with the intention to defend land and people and use its economic resources for nation-building – that is to act in the interest of the Chinese nation by collaborating with the occupying force (Brook 2000a). According to this logic, the KMT treated “people and land as acceptable collateral damage and placed the state at the center of national defense” (Zanasi 2008, 739). As Margherita Zanasi has shown, such claims resonated internationally in the post-war trials of collaborators in both France and China, but were countered by evidence of the occupation state’s brutality, failure to protect its people, and continued collaboration after international military aid rendered the eventual defeat of Japanese troops highly likely (Zanasi 2008, 736–40).

regarded as morally unjustifiable – but also allowing for the acknowledgement of subversive potential even in the most politically and ideologically “conforming” (pro-Japanese or pro-Axis) actions.

Highlighting the agency of Chinese governments that were established under Japanese occupation, and understanding them as “an integral part of the *longue durée* of the Chinese state” (Serfass 2022a, 138) and as one among many Chinese states in the twentieth century has been an important step in providing a more nuanced picture of the wartime experience in China. To shed light on such agency, David Serfass has drawn on Timothy Brook’s terminology in speaking about these regimes “not in terms of a collaboration state, existing purely to collaborate with the occupier, but as an occupation state: a political regime installed to administer occupied territory in the interests of the occupying power” (Brook 2005, 12–13). Serfass uses the term occupation state “not as a synonym of the ‘collaborationist government’ but as a concept referring to an apparatus going beyond the collaboration regimes and including the Japanese military and civilian agencies as well as local governments in China” (Serfass 2022a, 139). This is the definition I will be following in this thesis. I differentiate between the Chinese local governments and the wider occupation state. In the context of north China, however, this is complicated by the fact that two successive governments operated in north China during the war: the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (PGROC, 1937–1940), established in north China with Beijing as its capital in December 1937; and, Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing-based Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China (RNG, 1940–1945), under which the North China Political Council (NCPC, 1940–1945) operated in Beijing and the surrounding area. The PGROC was subsumed by the Wang Jingwei regime on 30 March 1940 but continued to operate almost independently as the NCPC

through until the end of the war. Following Serfass, I understand other military and civilian agencies and proxies of these governments that operated in north China, as well as the Japanese military, as part of a wider occupation state. This applies primarily to these governments' most important civic organization and propaganda agency in north China – the Xinminhui (1937–1945).

The city of Beijing makes for a particularly relevant case as a major cultural centre which became the capital of the above-named PGROC and NCPC.⁴ By focusing on Beijing, we have an opportunity to counter the predominance in English-language scholarship on the occupation of Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Delta. This focus on Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Delta in the English-language scholarship can be contrasted with the Chinese-language scholarship. A recent survey of Chinese studies of the occupied territories by Gao Yingying confirms the predominance of military and economic histories (Gao 2015), but also highlights recent publications based on large-scale archival research, which cover the governments established in north China (Wang 2006; Liu 2007; Zhang 2012). I will draw extensively on these studies in Chapter 1, as they provide an important basis for this thesis' focus on the north Chinese regimes' musical culture. Important groundwork has also been laid by Akira Iriye's work on the regime's propaganda organization, the Xinminhui (Iriye 2014), while Sophia Lee's work on higher education, universities and research institutes in

⁴ I will refer to the capital of these north Chinese client regimes by its current name – Beijing (northern capital). The city had been referred to as Beiping (northern peace) since the move of the Republican capital to Nanjing in 1928. However, the Japanese and the PGROC referred to the city as Beijing from 1937 until the “return to the capital” (*huandu*) of Nanjing with the establishment of the Wang Jingwei regime in March 1940. Despite this shift, north Chinese officials and newspapers continued to refer to the city as Beijing (instead of the official “Beiping”) between 1940 and 1945.

occupied Beijing also provides important material (Lee 1983; 1996). Similarly, detailed studies of individual north China-based intellectuals have revealed subtle strategies of dealing with the moral dilemma posed by the occupation as I will explore in more detail below (Yuan 2020; Daruvala 2017).

Cultural History of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Despite repeated calls to take the occupation state seriously as a centre of cultural expression and propaganda (Kushner 2006, 119), the field of modern Chinese cultural history continues to struggle against the assumption “that it was only (or at least predominantly) those who resisted the Japanese who [...] produced songs, literature or visual cultures worth studying” (Taylor and Yang 2020, 195). Over recent decades, the cultural history of occupied China has often been approached in terms of filling a gap in the cultural history of twentieth-century China more broadly – highlighting wartime cultural elites’ position or contribution to overarching narratives such as that of modernism. In this vein, Edward Gunn’s *Unwelcome Muse* (1980), has laid the groundwork for much subsequent scholarship. In this highly influential work, Gunn observes a “resurgence of Chinese tradition” under Japanese occupation: The persistent use of “traditional” forms of literary expression, including stylized language, archetypical characters, themes and storylines from traditional Chinese opera, even in “modern” literary genres such as the essay and drama in occupied Shanghai and Beijing (Gunn 1980, 109–10). Such appreciation for traditionalism in Gunn’s view signifies a productive response to contemporary challenges that literary elites faced in wartime China (Gunn 1980, 110, 268).

In contrast, Poshek Fu's *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration* (1993) represents one of the earliest examples of scholarship which approaches the cultural history of the occupied territories not with a primary interest in cultural production, but with questions about the nature of the occupation state and its supporters. In his recent monograph on the visual culture of the RNG, Jeremy Taylor follows Fu's approach in arguing that cultural history is especially well suited to examining client regimes such as the RNG, which operated with limited sovereignty, but developed cultural policies and fostered unique types of cultural expression (Taylor 2021, 29–30). While Edward Gunn's and Poshek Fu's works represent pioneering efforts at venturing into the cultural history of the occupied territories (albeit from different angles), Jeremy Taylor's work builds on scholarly efforts in the fields of "collaboration" as well as new (visual) approaches to cultural history and can thus be regarded as an important step in the development of the aforementioned "new cultural history of Japanese-occupied China". Scholars have also aimed to approach the issue of (cultural) collaboration from a comparative perspective – drawing on literature on cases such as colonial and Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, the wider Japanese empire, Manchukuo,⁵ Nazi-occupied Europe and regions recently occupied by the United States in the Middle East (Huang 2005, 26–27; Taylor 2021, 12–14).

Despite efforts to enhance our understanding of cultural production in Japanese-occupied (north) China, particularly in fields such as literature (Gunn 1980; Fu 1993;

⁵ Due to its special position as a marginal and formerly economically underdeveloped space, Manchukuo was quite different from occupied north China. I will only reference Manchukuo in this thesis for theoretical insights into some early ideological developments, and as a precedent to some institutional configurations and types of propagandistic rituals established under Japanese supervision in north China.

Huang 2005; Daruvala 2017; Wang 2019), cinema (Fu 1997; 2003) and visual culture (Taylor 2021), there are some fields of cultural “collaboration” which remain largely untouched. Music is one such example. Music is important for any understanding of the Japanese occupation of China as it became, through everyday rituals, broadcasts and live performances, a ubiquitous part of the sound environment that shaped people’s lives.⁶ As Sarah Zalfen and Sven Oliver Müller have explained in their introduction to the edited volume on the “occupation force music” (*Besatzungsmacht Musik*) in Nazi-occupied Europe, music constructs, “on a communicative, praxeological and symbolic level those routines which maintain the state of occupation” (Zalfen and Müller 2012, 12). Considering the processual nature of occupation (the constant need for ideological legitimation and reinforcement of the structures that maintain the occupation state) and given the prominence of studies on sound and music in other cases of occupation, such as Nazi-occupied Europe and US-occupied Iraq (Fanning and Levi 2019; Daughtry 2015) this disregard for music in the context of the Japanese occupation of China is striking.

Music’s absence from the study of “cultural collaboration” is also surprising given the scholarly focus that music has attracted in the study of propaganda, nation-building and self-expression in various other subfields of modern Chinese history, including the history of anti-Japanese resistance during the war (Hung 1996; Howard 2015; Liu 2010, 168–74, 189–202; Tang 2020). In the context of the Second Sino-Japanese War, aural techniques, including radio broadcasting and cinema, have been identified as powerful technologies and tools in forging the Japanese empire (Yang 2010) and

⁶ For an exploration of why sound might be relevant to the study of the past, see Mark Smith’s essay “Sound – So What?” (Smith 2015) and Michele Hilmes much-cited essay “Is There a Field Called Sound Studies? And Does it Matter” (Hilmes 2005).

mobilizing the Chinese masses (Tang 2020). Considering the importance attached to music as a tool for nation-building in pre-war China (Mittler 1997, 46) and music's effective use by communist propagandists (Howard 2015), as well as the fact that Japanese propaganda theorists recognized music as an important tool in occupation,⁷ it is vital to understand the role of musical practice in the cultural politics of occupied China, and to analyze the musical repertoires that were mobilized in support of the occupation state. This is precisely what I aim to do in this thesis.

On the rare occasions that music has been featured in the broader cultural history of wartime China, the focus has often been on the “numbing” or “pacifying” effects of commercial mass culture: commercial musical drama and “yellow” or “pornographic” *shidaiqu* – a “hybrid genre of American Jazz, Hollywood film music, and Chinese folk music” (Jones 2001, 6) developed in the transcultural contact zones of Chinese port cities and performed by young and attractive female stars in Sino-Japanese cinematic co-productions and sung in the theatres of Shanghai (Yu 2006, 375, 403–4; Benson 2004; Jiang 2009; Liao 2015; Stephenson 2002; Chen 2005, 263–67). Song-writing activities and choral mobilization, which will be studied in detail in this thesis, are usually only mentioned alongside other Japanese-led propaganda measures, and are usually understood to be nothing more than part of the “enslavement education” paradigm (Ren 2019). Most surprising of all is the lack of acknowledgement in the existing scholarship of elite genres of music that were produced in occupied China for and/or by the occupation state. This gap in the literature can be attributed neither to the lack of such music in the occupied territories, nor to a lack of sources which detail

⁷ For example, Koyama Eizō, a renowned Japanese propaganda theorist, wrote a treatise on the role of music in propaganda (Kushner 2006, 33).

the wartime activities of musicians in Shanghai and Beijing. Indeed, some elite musical institutions and protagonists of musical life in occupied Beijing and Shanghai, such as Jiang Wenye, Ke Zhenghe, Lao Zhicheng and Li Weining, have been reintroduced into the history of higher musical education in China and the modernist discourse since the 1980s (Utz 2004, 200; Yang 2017; Han and Lin 1984; Hu 1985; Zhang 2002; Liu 2016; Han 1989a; Mang 2004). However, their contributions have usually been discussed with little or no attention given to the historical context of occupation.⁸ I offer a more detailed review of the available literature on wartime music in the occupied territories and Beijing in this thesis, specifically in Chapter 2 and 3.

In most of the thesis, I will focus on what is often referred to as “new music” (*xin yinyue*). The term “new music”, denoting a particular genre of music, was coined in 1936 and is still used in Chinese musicological discourse today (Liu 2010, 7–21). I follow musicologist Liu Ching-chi’s understanding of the term “new music” to refer to music that conforms to a European idea of composition – understood as individual authorship by a member of an elite, often academically institutionalized group of musicians and thus largely excluding the performance of “traditional” Chinese musical drama (*xiqu*) and instrumental music (Liu 2010, 9–12). I have chosen to focus mainly on “new music” (as opposed to, for example, *xiqu* or forms of “popular music” such as *shidaiqu*) because “new music” has long been associated in China with the modern state and state institutions – and thus the very genres that the occupation state in wartime Beijing most successfully co-opted and used predominantly in musical campaign events. My focus on “new music” also means I am able to move away from studies of other forms of music that have been discussed in studies of the Japanese

⁸ One of the few exceptions is David Der-wei Wang’s work on Jiang Wenye (Wang 2010; 2015).

occupation in the past, such as studies of various types of traditional Chinese and Taiwanese opera in Japanese-occupied Shanghai and Beijing (e.g., Jiang 2009; Fu 2015; Dan 2014; Qiu 2015; Hsieh 2010).

It is important, however, to acknowledge the diversity of musical life in Republican China when evaluating Japanese wartime efforts to conquer the minds of their newly acquired Chinese subjects through music. Performances, live and mediated,⁹ took place on streets and in the fields, at temples and in concert halls, in schools and private residences, in cinemas and dance clubs (Farrer and Field 2015, 16–38; Jones 2001, 30–31). They featured a multitude of genres: “traditional” instrumental music, various types of “traditional” Chinese musical drama and vocal practices, folk songs (*minge*), Buddhist and Islamic chants, Christian hymns, Confucian temple music, Western style symphonic works, chamber music, accompanied art songs, jazz and more (Jones 2001, 21–22). Music from Southeast Asia and Hawaii had made its way to the port cities of China, and musicians from various parts of Southeast Asia were recruited as instrumentalists and performers to serve in Western-style ensembles and in bands (Bickers 2001, 840–48). Film soundtracks and radio programmes featured popular Chinese *shidaiqu*. Brass bands accompanied official political and military engagements, weddings and funerals. This diverse range of musical practices transcended and challenged the distinction between “Chinese” and “foreign” genres, or between “popular” and “elite” art music.

As Pamela Potter observes in *Art of Suppression* (a historiography of visual and performing arts in Nazi Germany), historians’ understanding of the field of “cultural

⁹ Technologies like the radio, vinyl records played on gramophones and sound films allowed for the distribution of music in homes, on the street, in teahouses and in cinemas.

history” actually “served as a deterrent to reengaging with those more traditional objects of cultural history – namely art, architecture, theatre, dance and music” (Potter 2016, 37). Within musicology, similarly, the contributions that composers and musicians made to the propaganda efforts of the Chinese occupation state are usually silenced or left unmentioned in order to allow for the aesthetic appraisal of their less politically-tainted work (produced before or after the occupation period).¹⁰ In this thesis, however, I will demonstrate how an analysis of the works of modernist composers and an assessment of their contribution to the propaganda efforts of the occupation state will highlight issues of political and artistic agency, and induce a conversation between musicologists and scholars interested in wartime cultural production.

In addition, Beijing, despite being a major cultural and musical centre in its own right, as well as the capital of the PGROC and NCPC, has not received nearly as much scholarly attention as Shanghai in terms of music. Given the professional infrastructure and diverse communities contributing to musical life in the city at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1937, I will show how Beijing can serve as a prime example of cultural developments in occupied north China. Beijing allows us to highlight differences between collaborationist ideologies promoted in the Lower Yangzi Delta and north China. In contrast to cities with large foreign concessions (such as Shanghai), Beijing was under the full control of the occupation state. Indeed, the organs of the occupation state facilitated the institutionalization of musical life in

¹⁰ For example, the *Complete Edition* of Jiang Wenye’s works, published by one of the PRCs most prestigious music presses, the China Central Conservatory Press (Wang 2016), excluded the songs that Jiang has produced for the Xinminhui or the RNG. These songs are discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

the city (as I will show in Chapter 3). Moreover, in contrast to other major cultural centres in China such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan, much of Beijing did not experience open military engagement or shelling during the Japanese invasion, with the occupation marking (counterintuitively) a period of relative quietude and stability (Lary 2007, 7–8). This allowed musical elites who remained in the city to realize and institutionalize their own visions of musical life in the city, albeit under strict control and within the limits set by a belligerent occupant.

Key Concepts and Methodology

Let us return to the initial question that underlines the research conducted in this thesis. What is the significance of musical culture for the occupation state in Japanese-occupied Beijing? I will address this question in two ways: by examining musical repertoires and by assessing the performance practices developed and appropriated by the regimes in north China. The full title of this thesis – *Treasonous Repertoires: Performing Collaboration and Musical Life in Japanese-Occupied Beijing, 1937–1945* – hints at these two approaches. While the distinction between musical repertoire and performance may seem an arbitrary one, I will explain this choice in more detail below as I explore both concepts, and the limitations of my sources and interpretive focus.

Over the last few decades, history as a discipline has increasingly welcomed sound studies as a “‘habit’ of historical inquiry” (Smith 2016). At the same time, musicologists’ expertise in interpreting musical text and performance practices as acts of communication and music’s role in political, economic and social history has been recognized by historians (Müller and Osterhammel 2012). In many cases, the

incorporation of lines of questioning developed in sound studies and musicology has aided in “texturing, deepening, and complicating issues with which we are already familiar but that nevertheless require deeper interrogation and understanding” (Smith 2015, 134). Today, many subdisciplines, especially cultural history, media studies and the history of science and technology are particularly attentive to questions of aurality (Morat 2010; 2011).

Although this thesis is almost exclusively concerned with musical culture, the “essential ‘critical’ element” (Sterne 2012, 5) of sound studies – too often constructed in disciplinary opposition to music – will be reflected in the way textual evidence of musical practices and repertoires are interpreted within a broader context of constantly reinterpreted cultural symbols and signifiers.¹¹ I will explain the key concept of

¹¹ I have chosen in this thesis to refer to sound, sound culture and sound history, instead of aural culture, auditory culture, audio culture, sonic culture or historical acoustemology. Although these terms are used almost synonymously in the literature, “auditory culture”, similar to “listening culture” and “hearing culture”, often centres on listening experiences, whereas “sonic culture” tends to focus on the vibrational impact of sound (Kane 2015). Sound culture, however, has become an umbrella term, is now one of the most widely used terms, and is most broadly applicable. It also corresponds well to the German discourse around “*Klangkultur*” (sound culture) and “*Klanggeschichte*” (sound history). Many scholars have evaded this discussion simply by referring to the “sounds of” a certain period in history or the “soundscape” of a particular time and place (e.g., Morat 2016; Paul and Schock 2013). In her work on occupied Amsterdam, Annelies Jacobs has divided sound studies into three different perspectives, namely the “ecology of sounds”, “the semiotics of sounds” and the “politics of sounds”. While the first takes stock of possible sounds audible in a historical context, the second accounts for the meanings attached to those sounds under specific circumstances and by different audiences, while the latter investigates the role of sound in the negotiation of power relations (Jacobs 2016). Similarly, Jörg Echternkamp, in an introduction to music as an occupying force, differentiates between the

repertoire and my approach to the analysis of both repertoire and performance practices in more detail below.

Repertoire

In this thesis, the term repertoire serves both as a key concept as well as a framework of methodological approaches to the analysis of musical pieces and concert programming. In music and theatre, “repertoire” denotes a selection of roles, pieces and programmes, which an ensemble, orchestra, company, or individual musician can perform without much preparation. An opera house, for example, may list “repertory performances”, referring to stage productions of one specific operatic piece which are repeatedly performed over a long period of time and which instrumentalists, vocalists and the stage production team are familiar with and able to perform without additional preparation. Similarly, singers may list pieces as their “repertoire” if they are familiar with the pieces, have performed them before and the pieces fit their vocal specialization (*Stimmfach*). In declaring one’s repertoire, musicians also clearly mark their musical identity and interests.¹²

historiography of musical, emotional and political aspects of sound (Echternkamp 2012). My focus on repertoires might indicate a simple “ecology of sounds” approach. However, I am addressing the semiotics of sound by observing change in meaning through performance context and specific performance practices. I further observe the politics of sound in accounting for the role of musical repertoires and different aesthetics in the promotion of the occupation state’s ideologies.

¹² A soprano, for example, may very well be able to sing both dramatic and lyrical pieces, operatic pieces and Lieder, but might choose to only declare pieces of one *Stimmfach* or historical period as their repertoire – or purposefully declare a broad range – in order to attract certain bookings.

Many recent studies of sound history, in referring to “sounds of . . .” or “soundscapes”, have tacitly operated with a similar understanding of a sum or repertoire of sounds that characterize or even make up the identity of a particular era or historical agent: Daniel Morat’s *Sounds of Modern History* (2016) and the collection *Sound des Jahrhunderts* (sounds of the century), edited by Gerhard Paul and Ralph Schock (2014), for example, are edited to highlight representative sounds and musical repertoires of selected historical eras. Similarly, Carolyn Birdsall’s *Nazi Soundscapes* (Birdsall 2012) provides an overview of the sounds audible within Nazi Düsseldorf, while Martin Daughy’s *Listening to War* even includes an explicit taxonomy of sounds audible in occupied Iraq (2015, 33–75).

The term repertoire has proven useful not only in the context of music and sound studies, but in the study of conflict as well. Indeed, in this thesis, I draw specifically on Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s use of the term in their analysis of social movements. Tilly and Tarrow define “repertoires” as “arrays of performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors” or “inherited forms of collective action” (2015, 7, 14) and analyze how different forms of actions of discontent – be it demonstrations, petitions or strikes – through repeated performance, become (what they refer to as) “repertoires of protest”. Especially interesting, then, is how these similar forms of “protest-performances” are adopted or appropriated by different political actors. When applied to musical performances in wartime China, for example, we can observe the appropriation of certain musical repertoires and performances across enemy lines.

The strength of repertoire as a methodological or analytical framework can be found in its hermeneutic potential and in the multitude of approaches and levels of inquiry that it covers. In this thesis, repertoires are approached on three different levels: (i) the

musical analysis of individual pieces; (ii) the analysis of the changing meaning of musical pieces within specific performance contexts and concert programmes; and (iii) the analysis of changes to the repertoire of musical organizations over time. First, careful musical analysis of newly commissioned musical pieces and melodies offers a glimpse into the initial construction of meaning by commissioner, lyricist and composer. What makes the concept of repertoire interesting and fruitful in the wartime context, however, is the multi-layered and multi-directional way in which we can conceptualize the construction of meaning through connections between individual pieces and performance context. Therefore, I also seek to understand the meanings of individual musical pieces by referring to their performance context. The well-known musical piece '*O Sole Mio*, for example, may mobilize very different meanings when performed at an Italian operatic gala as opposed to a propaganda event celebrating the Axis powers. As Luis Velasco-Pufleau observes, musical propaganda can be understood as

the manipulation of a musical work's polysemy through specific political rituals and measures [and the] willingness of a particular power [...] to control the symbolic and emotional dimension of musical works. [...] This does not mean that music does not itself carry its own meanings according to its aesthetic characteristics, but rather that one can invest a piece of work with various – even contradictory – categories and discourses. (Velasco-Pufleau 2014)

This means that performance context and repeated performance under specific circumstances can effectively limit or even alter the potential meanings of a musical piece. Adolf Hitler's favour for particular pieces of music composed by Richard

Wagner, for example, still influences the reception of those pieces today (Spinola 2017; Burton-Hill 2014).

Analytically, we can account for changes in meaning by observing changes in performance repertoires. As Sarah Zalfen and Sven Oliver Müller have argued, such repetition then constitutes occupation itself: “music as an occupation force [...] shaped repetitive practices and rituals, that is those repetitions, that are paramount in the unstable state of occupation” (Zalfen and Müller 2012, 29). In my analysis of the repertoire performed in the context of political campaigns, I look to understand pieces within their specific performance contexts and the combination of multiple pieces within concert programmes. I also “zoom out” further to analyze changes in ensembles’ repertoires within the broader musical ecology of wartime Beijing. This means – as far as sources allow – assessing the full performance history of these ensembles, taking note of shifts in the repertoire of such ensembles and tracing similar repertoires in other musical communities. On this latter level, instead of referring to a “soundscape”, which includes ever-changing, ungraspable sound events fathomable only through the description of listening experiences, I postulate a symbolic integrity of the musical repertoire that I examine. I must assume such symbolic integrity due to the limitations of my sources, which identify musical pieces by name (and composer) notwithstanding potential (symbolically unsettling) differences in performance practice. I can, however, ground this assumption of symbolic integrity in my analysis of selected pieces, their potential meanings and their position within this ecology. Having analyzed propaganda songs and their performance contexts as well as selected concert programmes and the repertoire of individual institutions, I can then grasp the meaning of repertoire changes on a macroscopic level.

As touched upon above, the notion of repertoire is also helpful in speaking about identity formation and the development and promotion of distinct ideologies. We can define musical identity as the sum of musical pieces (here understood as cultural symbols) repeatedly performed by a musician, ensemble or even the occupation state itself. Analytically, such a definition of identity as the sum of relations to other “entities” (musical pieces) may allow us to detect similarities between repertoires. We may expect to find, for example, certain similarities between the musical repertoires performed by Japanese military brass bands and brass bands serving the occupation state in north China.

However, such an understanding can be problematic as soon as we speak about differing performance practices and the polysemy of music as a cultural symbol, as each performance of a musical piece can be – and sometimes has to be – considered an independent “entity” without connection to other performances based on the same “text”. For example, the French song *Frère Jacques*, performed as a children’s song, could be considered a different entity from the same melody serving as the Chinese national anthem in the late 1920s. At the same time, however, “mapping” and comparing repertoires of meaning is helpful in pointing out not only similarities in musical repertoires but detecting instances in which pieces connect otherwise distinct institutions. This may point to the coexistence of different interpretations of the same musical piece or “text”. The notion of repertoire therefore does not presume one unchanging, fixed identity, but instead allows me to focus on the persistent reiteration

and performance of identity and consider discrepancies in the interpretation of musical repertoires by different audiences.¹³

Additionally, it is important to consider layers of hierarchical association with the occupation state. I will consider the “repertoire” (and thereby musical identity) of the occupation state to be made up of (in the following hierarchical order): (i) those musical pieces and performances commissioned by the occupation state or developed under its guidance; (ii) those explicitly included in campaign events; (iii) those performed by ensembles institutionally affiliated with the regimes; and (iv) – under the pretext of otherwise fierce censorship – those simply tolerated and integrated into the musical life of the city.

Performance Practice: Voice and Space

In my analysis of performance practice in occupied Beijing, I will focus on two aspects that are integral to and unique aspects of musical culture: voice and space. I argue that both voice and space are particularly relevant in the context of foreign occupation. While voice can be comparable to individual style both in literature and in art, it also harbours connotations of power and representation – important aspects to consider in contexts of violent conflict and newly established governing bodies such as the

¹³ Martin Daughtry, for example, has developed a theory of specific modes of listening or zones of audition in the context of war and occupation (Daughtry 2015, 76–102), which, due to the very different circumstances and repertoires audible in Beijing, will not be applied in this thesis. Nevertheless, an awareness of the impact of power asymmetries on listening behaviour and the interpretation of sound and musical practice will be referred to throughout this thesis.

occupation state. The spatial aspect of musical performance, on the other hand, is immensely relevant in the context of occupation as a vibrational marker of power.

Voices (collective as well as individual) are often understood as the ultimate locus of political power and authenticity (Weidman 2015, 232–33). As Tang Xiaobing asserts in his recent study of “salvationist” (i.e., anti-Japanese) community singing and sound cinema, the “discovery of the capacity and reach of the human voice, raw or amplified” was integral to the “political history of producing an articulate and audible subject against the soundscape of modernity” in Republican China (2020, 6). Voices are considered the audible realization of political representation. Sound quality and vocal timbre offer clues about the intended emotional reaction expected from audiences. For a regime with limited military, economic and political power and autonomy (such as the occupation state in north China), the performance of political ideologies through authentic and topical voices was considered to be of the utmost importance. I will therefore detail the use of different voices, as well as cultural elites’ reflections on those voices, throughout this thesis.

Sound studies have long called us to take seriously the physical nature of sound and its interaction with space (Eisenberg 2015). In the context of occupation, the spatiality of musical practice proved an important resource for a regime with limited territorial control. Sound has the capacity to create spaces and broaden the regimes’ spatial presence – be it in live performance or in mediated listening experiences. I will therefore pay close attention to the spatial aspect of musical performances and mediation in my analysis of the regimes’ various campaigns. This includes analysis of the spatial configuration of performance venues, the rhetorical framing of campaign events with regard to space, as well as the interaction between different media in the promotion of particular ideologies.

Sources

While my analysis centres on repertoire commissioned and promoted in the occupation state's news outlets and performance practices developed and appropriated for musical campaign events, I rely on a range of sources to contextualize institutional affiliations, campaign events, performance practices and listening experiences. I thus consciously draw on a broad range of sources. My main sources are newspaper and journal articles, which include musical scores, concert programmes and campaign reports. I also draw on material from the Beijing Municipal Archive, including official notices, financing and campaign plans, statutes and police reports. In addition, I have consulted (auto)biographies, musical scores, song collections, music textbooks, a private collection of concert programmes and a number of recordings. I also draw on a small number of qualitative interviews that I conducted in China with scholars, as well as with time witnesses and their families.

I trace musical activity in occupied Beijing through the lens of the occupation states' main news outlets, such as the *Xinminbao*, *Huabei xinbao*, *Shibao* and *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* (*Huawen Daban meiri*). These publications frequently reported musical events taking place in the city, advertised ensembles and musical publications, issued song commissions and reprinted musical scores of commissioned propaganda songs. While some of these publications are available digitally, I was able to access print-versions during my field trips to Beijing and Stanford in 2018 and 2019. In order to trace musical activities, I manually searched through the full run of the *Xinminbao* and *Huabei xinbao* for mentions of keywords such as “music”, “concert”, “performance”, “gala”, “song”, “orchestra/band” and individual key events and musicians. These

findings were later complemented with findings from the *Shibao* and *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi*.

I am mindful of the fact that such collections offer a highly curated view of musical life in the occupied city. However, in order to better contextualize them, I have also drawn on privately published magazines, such as the *Guomin zazhi* and *Huabei yinghua*. Moreover, I have been able to obtain digital copies of a collection of concert programmes collected by music educator and time witness, Yao Siyuan, the Yao Siyuan Collection (YSC). This collection is now held at the History Museum of Beijing Capital Normal University. Furthermore, biographical accounts of individual composers such as Jiang Wenye and Lao Zhicheng, along with editions of their works, have been helpful in contextualizing their life in occupied China and their contribution to the occupation state's war effort (Mang 2004; Liu 2016; Zhang 2002). Meng Weiping's study of musical life in Beijing throughout the twentieth century has proven instructive in accounting for less well-known musicians (2018). I will also reference archival material obtained at the Beijing Municipal Archives, which highlight policy decisions relating to musical events, such as song commission activities, and document the establishment and funding of important musical institutions. I further draw on song collections published by the Xinminhui and the RNG's Propaganda Department which I obtained at the National Library of China and Stanford's East Asia Library. Music textbooks and repertoire collections published and reissued in Beijing during the war have been accessed through the National Library of China's digital collection. Recordings of some of the newly commissioned songs and repertoire performed in occupied Beijing have been digitized and are available through the Japanese National Diet Library, the National Taiwan University Library and the National Museum of Taiwan History's "Taiwan Audio in 100 Years" digital

exhibition, or as private uploads on commercial video-sharing platforms. They will be referenced as evidence of vocal technique, arrangement and instrumentation of songs, of which often only the melody has been preserved on paper. Not many time witnesses survive and could be interviewed for this thesis. However, two interviews – one with the scholars and time witness Yao Siyuan and one with anonymous family members of Jiang Wenye – have been extremely valuable in complementing textual accounts. Similarly, a few accounts published on community websites have been extremely valuable in complementing more formally published textual accounts, offering insights on audience perception and illustrating post-war judgements.

Relevant information from all of these sources have been translated into English. A list of over eighty propaganda songs that I compiled can be found in Appendix 1, and transcriptions accessed through the TreasonousRepertoires Zotero library.¹⁴ Deciphering concert programmes posed a particular challenge as names of foreign musical pieces and composers are not standardized and data is often incomplete. Hence, no comprehensive database is available. However, relevant evidence is cited in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. Access to the recordings of my interviews with time witnesses is restricted in order to protect interviewees' anonymity (in accordance with University of Nottingham ethics guidelines).

Contrary to a good deal of scholarship on auditory culture, my analysis is not mainly concerned with listening experiences. I do draw on some accounts of “ear-witnesses” to contextualize specific auditory events or give indications of the possible reception of the musical and performative repertoires developed by local governments under

¹⁴ Please visit <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires> to access the library and song collection.

occupation. However, this thesis is not an exploration of what interviews with ear-witnesses, diaries or fictional accounts of wartime experiences might tell us about the lived experience of the musical campaigns described therein. This is due to our lack of knowledge about most of the musical propaganda events accounted for in this thesis and the limited number of sources that would allow for a sufficient juxtaposition or analysis. Most importantly, however, I have found post-war recollections of listening experiences often tainted or amplified by clear-cut moral judgements rather than the ambiguity of wartime lived experience. While the discrepancies between wartime descriptions and post-war recollections could be an interesting study in of itself, it falls outside the scope of this thesis – but I provide some ground for such studies in the future.

In keeping with the approach of much of the “new cultural history” of Japanese-occupied China, I have also consciously limited my use of Japanese materials to foreground Chinese agency (Taylor and Yang 2020, 190–92). While I will occasionally point out similarities with Japanese initiatives or locate performance practices within propaganda campaigns initiated throughout the wider Japanese empire, my aim is to reintroduce occupied Beijing into a wider cultural history of wartime China and to explain the role played by Chinese composers, performers, audiences and officials in all of this. I do so by relying on Chinese-language materials which allow me to account for figures, institutions and listening communities who have been largely left out of earlier histories that foregrounded either Japanese directives or the agency of underground resistance cultural workers (e.g., Ren 2019; Chen 2005, 267–73).

In studying cultural production under occupation and focusing largely on cultural production in support of the occupation state, I rely on sources produced by the very

regime I am studying and will frequently refer to and analyze this regime's ideological standpoints and vocabulary. While I read these sources with a critical eye and juxtapose them with other sources and historical accounts, it remains difficult to gauge the extent to which (self-) censorship, disinformation, suppression and coercion remains hidden in the archive. Many acts of resistance, for example, may have never been committed to paper, but may have taken shape in subtle ways, such as changing the harmony of a setting to voice one's disagreement with the text¹⁵ – or by introducing small changes to the text whilst singing, which might only be audible to immediate bystanders. Such reactions can only be accounted for through individual testimonies, diary entries or marginal notes on music copies, which I was able to refer to in select places. Aware of the challenges my collection of sources poses, I have aimed to point out uncertainties and incongruencies where necessary.

Another challenge has been to differentiate between the ideological concepts and propaganda slogans of the occupation state – concepts such as “Sino-Japanese amity” (*Zhong-Ri qinshan*), “raising Asia” (*xing Ya* or, in Japanese, *kōa*)¹⁶ and the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere” (*Da Dongya gongrongquan / Daitōa Kyōeiken*) – from analytical categories. Acknowledging the trauma that such vocabulary still carries, I have aimed to maintain a critical distance by highlighting discrepancies between wartime vocabulary and the activities with which such vocabulary was associated. Focusing on the achievements of cultural workers in occupied China and

¹⁵ For example, the voice carrying the major third in a final major chord can easily be altered to a minor third, a musical cliché often signifying sadness or loss of hope, thus musically contradicting the lyrics.

¹⁶ I follow the translation used in Sven Saaler and Christopher Szpilman's *Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History* (2011), which also implies Asian “development”, “revival” or, when read in Chinese, “renaissance” or “reawakening”.

their contributions (voluntary or not) to the occupation state is also not meant to diminish the immense suffering, loss and oppression that people, including musicians and audiences, experienced during the Japanese occupation.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is made up of six main chapters. The structure of the first three chapters reflects the disciplinary divide between the two main disciplines that I engage with, namely the (cultural) history of collaboration under Japanese occupation and music in twentieth-century China. Chapter 1 offers an overview of the governments based in occupied north China, as well as their most important proxy institution in terms of cultural life and propaganda initiatives, the Xinminhui. Based mostly on textual evidence and Chinese-language secondary sources, I explore what we know about the north Chinese regimes' ideologies and activities between 1937 and 1945. This will allow us to contextualize the musical propaganda initiatives I analyze in later chapters and question how focusing on musical culture might challenge or complicate these established narratives.

The following two chapters focus on musical life in wartime China and occupied Beijing. Chapter 2 introduces existing literature on the musical culture of the occupation state in Beijing and places occupied China within several dominant narratives on music in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It explains how narratives focusing on modernist achievements of individual composers, the commercial recording industry and musical mass struggle, as well as the moral judgements associated with labels such as “modernist”, “revolutionary” or “Chinese”, continue to shape our understanding of music in wartime China. It thus deconstructs

such associations and tendencies to disregard developments in the occupied territories and makes a case for this thesis' focus on repertoires and performance practices developed by and under the occupation state in Beijing as an intervention into and call for a readjustment of such dominant narratives.

Chapter 3 moves into discussion of musical life in occupied Beijing. Since the musical repertoire of the occupation state is bound to the ensembles and individual musicians able to develop and perform them, I examine the musical infrastructure in occupied Beijing and account for the ways in which musical institutions and ensembles were incorporated into the occupation state's propaganda infrastructure. Accounting for the musical ensembles and institutions working for and co-opted by the local governments, and drawing a timeline of musical activities in the city allows us to question claims that deny community involvement in the occupation state's propaganda activities (Meng 2018, 66). It also enables us to question assumptions that musical life in the city declined after 1941 (Meng 2018, 30–31). Furthermore, Chapter 3 offers a brief overview of performance venues and insights into the spatial distribution and the venues and their connection to imperial legacy. Consideration of the spaces of performance will lay the groundwork for our understanding of the construction of symbolic power in the performance practices developed by the regime in subsequent chapters.

The next three chapters offer a detailed analysis of the musical repertoires and performance practices developed in occupied Beijing. In these chapters, I return to the key questions posed in this thesis: What musical culture did the occupation state forge for itself and their Chinese subjects through newly developed repertoire and performance practices? In other words, what types of pre-existing repertoires and performance practices did the occupation state and its proxies appropriate in support

of their message? Conversely, what can we learn about the occupation state through an analysis of its musical culture? And how did the repertoires developed under occupation interact with repertoires and performance practices developed prior to the occupation and in other wartime territories?

These three chapters follow a loose chronological order, with Chapter 4 focusing largely on developments in 1938 (i.e., the year in which the PGROC established its musical propaganda apparatus), Chapter 5 focusing on 1939–1941 and Chapter 6 on 1942–1945. These correspond to the different phases of propaganda activities and ideological development explored in Chapter 1. This adoption of a chronological order also allows us to notice changes in the regime's propaganda efforts and the types of repertoire and voices that were propagated by it. In keeping with my focus on repertoire and performance practices, each chapter covers different aspects of the musical repertoire, voices and the spatial character of sound employed by the occupation state. Regarding repertoire, each chapter also roughly corresponds to one layer of hierarchical association with the occupation state. Methodologically, I move from close readings of individual musical pieces to the analysis of campaign events and concert programmes and eventually to shifts in the musical repertoires of selected musical institutions in wartime Beijing.

Chapter 4 focuses on repertoires and performance practices developed under the direct supervision and as a musical representation of the PRGOC and the Xinminhui in 1938: newly commissioned propaganda songs, mass singing events and parades. I ask: What can we learn about the regimes' ideologies through a musical analysis of the repertoire most closely related to the regime? What cultural precedents did the occupation state draw upon? In terms of performance practice, I explore the significance of mass singing and parades as practices that highlight collective voicing and the symbolic

power of ritual spaces. As I will show, a deeper understanding of the musical and performative aesthetics employed by the occupation state allows us to place the contributions of musicians working to promote the regime's ideologies on a continuum of cultural development in twentieth-century China, and thus challenge narratives that have sought to dismiss such parallels by omission (see Chapter 2). We can also observe attempts to expand the spatial reach of the occupation state by accounting for the role of recording technologies and intermediality in the construction of a broader listening community.

In Chapter 5, I show how the newly developed repertoire analyzed in Chapter 4 was integrated into the wider musical culture of the regime, including popular music produced by the commercial entertainment industry and performed at leisurely summer gatherings promoted under the banner of political campaign events. Many elites in wartime China shared an explicit disdain for the genre of *shidaiqu*, referring to it as “pornographic” or “decadent” – I will use the term “musical pabulum”¹⁷ to denote such derogatory judgement. This reveals the dilemma that local elites faced, as the borders between “patriotic” music and musical entertainment became blurred. Of particular interest is the interaction between selected repertoires and discussions about individual as opposed to collective voices, female performers and vocal timbre. Such discussions allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning attributed to different repertoires and performance practices in wartime China more broadly. I also ask how the musical repertoires and performance practices employed by the

¹⁷ “Pabulum” is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “[t]hat which nourishes the mind or soul; spiritual sustenance, food for thought”. However, the word also carries a pejorative meaning of “[b]land intellectual fare [...] an insipid or undemanding diet of words, entertainment” (*Oxford English Dictionary Online*, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/135768>, accessed 17 February 2022).

occupation state interacted with those developed in other wartime territories. A close analysis of selected repertoires and performance practices reveals a convergence of wartime aesthetics and unexpected similarities between the aesthetics of the Chinese resistance and the occupation state. Taking such similarities seriously calls us to question long-held beliefs about the alignment between musical aesthetics and wartime political standing. Importantly, however, I point to the desire for an authentic alignment between repertoire choices and (vocal) performance, considered to be a determining factor in the popularity of selected repertoire.

Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on instrumental repertoires promoted in the latter years of the occupation. I ask to what extent repertoire developed by local musical elites was used by the regime, how the appropriation of most of Beijing's musical elite observed in Chapter 3 was reflected in campaign repertoire, and how community ensembles responded to shifts in the city's musical infrastructure. In this chapter, I highlight, first, the musical elite's contributions to the highly localized identity of the occupation state in north China. In a subsequent analysis of the musical repertoire of one important, large-scale campaign event, I note how the regime was able to draw on the resources available in Beijing and carefully design concert programmes to perform political affiliations, ideologies and local identity. Shifting our level of analysis to gain a structural view of the repeated performance of a limited set of musical repertoires helps us to trace subtler reconfigurations of meaning. I thus trace changes in the programmes of Beijing's most popular community ensemble, the Beijing Harmonica Society, which, depending on the perspective taken, reflected or contributed to the normalization of the condition of occupation. I show how musical repertoires reflected the increasing dissonances between the expansion of the Japanese empire and the regime's reach for "total war" and control over musical life on the one hand, and the

occupation state's aspirations for a localized identity and the normalization of the condition of occupation on the other hand.

In summary, what can we learn from this analysis of the repertoires and performance practices developed and appropriated by the occupation state in north China? First, I argue for the significance of musical culture for the occupation state. Chapter 3 illustrates the importance and political function attributed to music by political elites. The cadres and musical elites who worked for the PGROC and NCPC understood music as a source of discursive power and political legitimacy, a tool for the construction of community, a means of ideological messaging and an instrument of repression (*Xinminbao* 1938w). The regime actively shaped Beijing's musical infrastructure and integrated pre-existing ensembles into its propaganda apparatus. Not only well-known composers contributed to the collaborationist cause, but other musical elites and even amateur community ensembles in Beijing had unique opportunities in the occupied city and were able to realize and institutionalize their visions of musical life under the condition of occupation. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 then show what musical repertoires and performance practices tell us about the occupation state in north China. Chapter 4 shows how music was employed by the north China regime to claim sovereignty, define its relationship with the Japanese occupiers and other Chinese governments established under occupation, fashion a social movement in support of the occupation state's ideologies and redefine the role of individuals under the regime. Musical culture also reveals incongruencies between the PGROC and Xinminhui's ideologies and efforts to extend the spatial boundaries and reach of the regime, thereby mitigating the regime's limited territorial control. In Chapter 5, I show the anxieties of musical elites as boundaries between musical entertainment ("musical pabulum") and political messaging were blurred and attempts were made to

define appropriate aesthetics of collaborationist repertoire and recording practice. While Chapter 4 highlights continuities in the performance practice of mass singing and similarities with anti-Japanese salvationist singing campaigns, Chapter 5 reveals that musical elites in the occupied territories actively modelled repertoires and recording practices on “salvationist” predecessors. Chapter 6 shows how concert programming and musical repertoire was employed to normalize the condition of occupation, perform strength, and finally, perform affiliation with various international alliances while maintaining a localized identity. All these points add to our understanding of the occupation state in north China and its complex position within wartime China, but also the wider Japanese empire and international alliances. They illustrate continuities and positions hardly observable through textual sources alone.

Turning toward narratives of music in twentieth-century China, this thesis offers an important intervention into pervasive narratives of musical modernism and mass struggle in the historiography of China. While much of the repertoires and performance practices analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 may seem unsurprising in the wartime context, highlighting the role of newly commissioned repertoire and discussions among musical elites about the appropriate (collective and individual) voices representing the regime cuts directly against established narratives in modern Chinese and East Asian history. Tracing similarities between salvationist and collaborationist song repertoires and performance allows us to question narratives that have long sought to align aesthetic and moral judgements and locate particular repertoires and performance practices in the Nationalist areas, communist bases and

the occupied regions accordingly, or attribute political agency only when it seemed convenient.¹⁸

Music matters. Accounting for musical repertoires and trying to listen to archival sources teaches us important lessons about the occupation state in north China, cultural continuities and wartime shifts and life in an occupied city.

¹⁸ As I will show in more detail in Chapter 2, the few Chinese-language studies that cover music in the occupied territories often reiterate such alignments. Propaganda songs issued by the “collaborationist regimes” are exclusively attributed to the only two musicians officially identified as collaborators post-war (Chen 2005, 267). Their songs are deemed “hypocritical and insipid” (Liu 2010, 190), and simply understood as part of the regime’s efforts in “enslavement education” (Ren 2019; Wang 2013, 52–54).

CHAPTER 1

The Occupation State in North China and its Ideologies, 1937–1945

Before we analyze the musical culture produced under Japanese occupation in north China and understand what it might teach us about the occupation state in turn, we have to examine what we already know about the occupation state – mainly from textual sources.¹ This chapter serves as an introduction to the nature, main ideologies and activities of the occupation state as institutionalized in the form of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (PGROC) and Reorganized National

¹ Produced within the first few years of the occupation, George Edward Taylor’s account of the “puppet regimes” in north China first introduced the main actors and activities to the English-speaking world (1940). Published in the late 1960s and 1970s, John Hunter Boyle’s study of the regimes includes a dense but helpful section on the north China regimes (1972), and Lincoln Li provides an account of economic and political control in north China (1975) – both drawing predominantly on Japanese sources. More recently, Akira Iriye’s introduction to the *Xinminhui* (2014), has become the main point of reference for many students of the regime and of “fascist” propaganda organizations in the occupied territories. In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, detailed Chinese-language accounts of the local governments in north China, such as the PGROC and NCPC have been published (Zeng 1992; Guo 2003; Wang 2006; Zhang, Feng and Guo 2007; Liu 2007; Zhang 2012). In this chapter, I draw heavily on these findings, while supplementing them with insight into the *Xinminhui*’s internal membership news (*Xinmin huibao*) and my own observations pertaining to campaign events mediated through the pages of *Xinminhui*-backed newspapers (*Xinminbao*, *Shibao* and *Huabei xinbao*).

Government of the Republic of China (RNG) and their proxies, including the North China Political Council (NCPC) and the most important propaganda organization operating in north China, the New People's Association or People's Renovation Society (Xinminhui).² Without understanding the international and domestic position of the regime, its socio-economic nature and the specific local perspective of the people who worked to promote the regime's ideologies, we cannot sufficiently explain the musical repertoires, performance practices and sometimes eclectic musical messaging produced under Japanese occupation in north China.

In this chapter, I first give a brief overview of the developments leading up to the war and occupation of north China, which will highlight some of the institutional and ideological continuities that shaped the occupation state in north China. I point out some of the local conditions that may have had an impact on the legitimacy and perception of the occupation state and may thus have produced differences with other parts of occupied China. Subsequently, I provide an account of the process of building governmental agencies that would maintain and legitimize the Japanese presence in north China. As I will show, local governments existed within the wider context of international relations and foreign policy, and the Chinese occupation state had to operate within a complex web of Japanese interests and local agents. The political legitimacy of any government not only rose and fell with Japanese military success, but also constantly reacted to the presence of opposing Chinese forces, including the KMT and CCP, as well as different local governments and their respective political and ideological developments.

² While many have simply translated the name as "New People's Association" I follow Akira Iriye's suggestion to translate *xin* not only as "new" but as "renew", or "renovate [the people]" (2014, 254).

The last three sections of this chapter will provide an overview of three phases of Xinminhui activities and ideological development. These phases were accompanied by structural changes, most notably those accompanying the establishment of Wang Jingwei's RNG in Nanjing and the growing size of the Japanese empire following the attack on Pearl Harbor. By providing a translation of and commentary on the corresponding versions of the *Xinminhui Principles* I examine some of the most important ideological adjustments made by the Xinminhui, as well as campaigns initiated by the occupation state in north China. While Akira Iriye's chapter on the Xinminhui provides important information on the initial conceptualization of ideologies in the occupied territories, including Miao Bin's promotion of *xinmin* ideology (Iriye 2014, 254–58), we know much less about changes to those ideologies throughout the occupation, especially in north China. Thus, apart from providing an overview and background for this thesis, this chapter makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Xinminhui ideologies and activities more broadly.

Developments Leading Up to the War

Scholarship on the Second Sino-Japanese War has long grappled with the question of what led to the occupation of north China, and the escalation into a full-blown war.³ I will not address questions of culpability here, but rather focus on north China and its place within complex political and socio-economic developments in 1930's East Asia. Japanese encroachment in Manchuria and north China had been a slow and contested process. The interests of three major powers (the Soviet Union, Japan and China), and

³ See David Gordon's review (2006) for an overview of the lines of questioning that have driven scholarship up until the early twenty-first century.

multiple armies, often following their own interests, converged in this territory.⁴ Japanese military involvement in the region dates back to the First Sino-Japanese War⁵ and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905,⁶ which secured Japan’s rights over the South Manchurian Railway (Matsusaka 2010). Following the Mukden Incident in 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria and established an occupation state there under the former Chinese emperor Pu Yi.⁷ The state of Manchukuo, established in 1932, and in particular Manchukuo’s “Concordia Society”, became models for other Chinese governments and propaganda organizations in other occupied areas (Iriye 2014, 258; Li 1975, 112).

International attempts to appease and accommodate Japan’s moves in the following years were tainted by its decision to leave the League of Nations in 1933 (Iriye 1986, 500–502). Despite continuing external threats from the Japanese and internal conflict with the CCP, the Chinese Republic had enjoyed a period of relative stability in east

⁴ Lincoln Li (1975) illustrates the independence with which different military troops and organs were able to function in north China and the multitude of factions operating in the area. He reveals the power struggle between political organs and military forces, which often operated without political approval or captured political interests. Li also recounts how factions within the military could be outstaffed or otherwise dispersed.

⁵ For a brief overview of the First Sino-Japanese War, see Elleman’s chapter *The Sino-Japanese War and the Partitioning of China* (2001, 94–115).

⁶ The developments leading up to the Russo-Japanese war are portrayed in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective* (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2005).

⁷ For an overview of military campaigns in the early twentieth century and the history of Manchuria, see: *The Making of Japanese Manchuria* (Matsusaka 2003) and *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Duus, Myers and Peattie 2014) For a shorter explanation of Japanese ambitions in Manchuria see Young (1999, 21–52).

China with its capital in Nanjing since 1927. With the occupation of Manchuria, however, north China became a much-needed buffer zone between Manchuria and the main territory under KMT control (Li 1975, 26). The Japanese military presence and encroachment through economic holdings did not halt at the Manchurian border. In February 1933, Rehe Province was occupied and integrated into Manchukuo. The subsequent Tanggu Truce established a demilitarized zone controlled by a newly formed Peace Preservation Corps, comprised of former warlord soldiers under Japanese control. The zone extended 100 kilometres beyond the Great Wall to Shunyi and Changping – less than a day’s march from Beijing.⁸ Additionally, the Japanese China Garrison Army had been stationed in Tianjin ever since 1901. In 1935, the He-Umezu Agreement was reached after continued skirmishes and conflict.⁹ The agreement expelled Nationalist political and military personnel from north China. The installation of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council in late 1935 made the two provinces effectively independent from Nanjing – an effort by the Japanese to split China and contain the conflict to its zone of interest (Boyle 1972, 41). Faced with the possibility of a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, the Soviet Union pressured CCP officials to pursue a united front against Japan with the KMT (van de Ven 2011, 171), which took shape after the Xi’an Incident in 1936. Appeasement initiatives by the civilian government

⁸ Both Shunyi and Changping are less than 40 kilometres from the Imperial Palace. They are almost integrated into modern day Beijing, which illustrates the immediate danger this demilitarized zone posed.

⁹ For a concise history of north China and regionalization between 1933 and 1937, see Dryburgh (2000).

in Tokyo proved futile due to its inability to fully control the military.¹⁰ On the night of 7–8 July 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,¹¹ staged by members of the Japanese China Garrison Army, marked the beginning of open war.¹²

It is important to note the lack of sovereignty and direct control the Nationalist government had exerted over north China even after the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and local warlord's acceptance of Chiang Kai-shek's authority. North China was regionalized with the growing influence of the Japanese long before the incident on 7 July 1937 (Dryburgh 2000, 208–10). One could therefore frame the subsequent occupation of Beijing by Japanese forces as just another military occupation in a long string of alien rule (including the dynastic rule of the Manchus) and warlord governments. While such arguments can aid our understanding of collaboration and the quiet acceptance of the Japanese occupation, however, they neglect the intensity of pre-war nation-building efforts and anti-Japanese movements prior to 1937 as well as the distinctly Chinese identities constructed under Japanese occupation (both of which I will detail in subsequent chapters). They further ignore that both resistance

¹⁰ Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro had only taken office one month before the Incident on the night of 7 July, elected to counterbalance military interests and better the relationship with China (Iriye 1986, 518).

¹¹ For a timeline of the conflict see *The Battle for China* (Peattie, Drea and van de Ven 2011, 7–26). The Tianjin Garrison Army seems to have timed its aggressive behaviour to coincide with the summer, when most students were out of town, which forestalled the occurrence of student protests (Li 1975, 98).

¹² For a discussion of the relevant actors involved at the very onset of the war, including the Japanese Navy and Chiang's decisions to resist Japanese expansionism, see Gordon 2006, 147. For an overview of intellectual streams and their relation to Marxism and modernism in the Showa era, see Yamazaki (1990).

forces and the Chinese occupation state under Japanese occupation relied on ideas of a unified Chinese nation-state. All this suggests that the Japanese invasion and occupation of China was perceived as qualitatively different from both alien rule during the Qing dynasty and changing warlord regimes. At the same time, reactions to occupation, especially those of eventual collaborators, need to be understood within the context of Beijing's previous experience of ambiguous sovereignty – and the lack of a singular legitimate and obvious alternative.

Building an Occupation State

The developments sketched above illustrate the presence of Japanese influence long before the formal occupation of north China by Japanese troops and the establishment of local governments. After a Japanese offensive on 26 July 1937, chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council General Song Zheyuan withdrew his troops from Beijing. The regiments left behind were given “police functions and militia status” to secure them from the Japanese (Li 1975, 45). Committees of Public Safety were installed in most occupied areas, including Beijing, where former Qing officials, merchants and former pro-Japanese members of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council allowed Japanese troops to enter Beijing on 8 August 1937 (Li 1975, 47–49).

The occupation of Beijing was exceptional, insofar as the Inner City of Beijing experienced no direct fighting. Citizens of most other major cities in China, including Tianjin, Shanghai and Nanjing, were witness to military action and extreme brutality in direct vicinity of their homes; other cities, like Chongqing, Wuhan, Guangzhou and Changsha suffered from air strikes and heavy fires (van de Ven and Drea 2011, 7–14). Such military action (from both sides) as well as the atrocities committed by the

Japanese during and after the capture of Nanjing, constituted the traumatic experience of many citizens. Beijing, in contrast, not only remained untouched, but even maintained civic control (Li 1975, 46–50). This is important as it impacted not only the perceived legitimacy of local governments and the credibility of potential claims to peace, but also, importantly, the perception of belliphonic sounds and militaristic repertoires.¹³

Transitory administrations were tolerated until instructions from Tokyo to allow self-administration led to the installation of a local Chinese government in December 1937 (Li 1975, 49–53). The PGROC was founded on 14 December 1937, under the supervision of the newly formed North China Area Army (NCAA) Special Services' Kita Seiichi.¹⁴ Kita also recruited Zhejiang native, former Qing official, businessman, banker and former finance minister Wang Kemin to serve as this government's figure head. Fellow Zhejiang native and Republican politician and diplomat Yu Jinhe became mayor of Beijing in 1938.¹⁵ Wang Kemin and most of the high officials of the PGROC had previously served in the Beiping Political Affairs Committee and the Hebei–Chahar Political Council (Dryburgh 2000, 47).

Beijing's Municipal Government was subsumed under the PGROC, and some personnel on high levels replaced (Lee 1996, 60). Ten days after the founding of the

¹³ I use the term “belliphonic” in reference to Martin Daughtry's work *Listening to War* in US-occupied Iraq, in which he refers to the specific spectrum of sounds produced in the context of violent conflict by fighting technologies as belliphonic sounds (2015, 3–5).

¹⁴ The Special Services established in Beijing, Tianjin and Tongzhou by the Tianjin Garrison were found to be too radical and therefore substituted with a newly formed Special Service Unit under NCAA supervision (Li 1975, 52).

¹⁵ Succeeding Jiang Chaozong, who held the post of provisional mayor between 1937 and 1938.

PGROC, on 24 December 1937, the so-called “New People’s Association” or “People’s Renovation Society” (Xinminhui) was established. In the following weeks and months, the Xinminhui and the PGROC became increasingly intertwined, resembling the organizational structure of a one-party-state, with the Xinminhui acting as an executive organ and administrating civic life in occupied north China. I will introduce both institutions in detail below.

The Provisional Government of the Republic of China (PGROC)

Prior to their establishment, there had been some controversy as to what structure the Chinese government and administration should take. While the Japanese War Ministry intended to forge local governments to be later centralized with Nanjing as the capital of occupied China, various army factions had interests in a federal structure (Serfass 2022b, 75–76). The Japanese Kwantung Army, having established a government in Inner Mongolia, was just as opposed to a centralized Chinese government with Beijing as centre as the NCAA was to a central regime in Nanjing. But centralization was essential, and Kita, knowing that only a centralized government would appeal to the masses, imagined a centralized government with Beijing at its centre. Thus, he pushed for the Beijing government to be established before the fall of Nanjing (Boyle 1972, 87–90). As we will see in Chapter 4, this had an impact on the musical culture and identity of the occupation state in north China.

The PGROC was inaugurated just one day after Japanese troops entered Nanjing (van de Ven and Drea 2011, 9). In Nanjing, the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (RGROC, 1938–1940), under Liang Hongzhi, was inaugurated on 28 March

1938 by Japan's Central China Expeditionary Army (Serfass 2022b, 75–76). In September 1938, a council was set up to coordinate between the governments in north China and Nanjing. But not even with the establishment of the RNG in March 1940 was full centralization achieved. This fragmented nature of the Chinese occupation state under the Japanese went along with the limited sovereignty local governments enjoyed, both territorially and politically.

Nominally, the PGROC controlled Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Shandong and the cities Beijing, Tianjin and Qingdao. Representatives of the PGROC were set up at the provincial level (in Hebei, Henan, Shandong and Shanxi) and in the cities of Beijing and Tianjin. Annual and spontaneous consultative conferences brought together representatives of these respective levels. However, local governments outside Beijing, Baoding and Tianjin were not fully under the control of the PGROC (Li 1975, 81–82). In fact, during later “Peace Keeping and Strengthening Movements”, regions were labelled according to the level of sovereignty the government enjoyed (Wang 2006, 96–97). As we will see in the following chapters, this constant discrepancy between claimed sovereignty and limited territorial control impacted the repertoires performed in Beijing.

Politically and economically, these local governments in occupied China were bound by Japanese interest. The Japanese exercised control over the local governments using different strategies: (i) They appointed advisors, who controlled political decision-making; (ii) they exercised control through contracts; (iii) they controlled the governments' personnel management; (iv) and they maintained control over executive decisions and policy-making (Liu 2007, 24–26). Institutionally, the PGROC's policy decisions were supervised by the Japanese Special Services (see figure 1), which, after the establishment of the East Asia Development Board in December 1938, operated

as the local North China Liaison Offices (Pei 2006, 133; Li 1975, 72). From November 1942 onwards, these tasks were taken over by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the China Department. Police and military personnel were educated under Japanese supervision, and civil servants were trained at the Xinmin College (Boyle 1972, 93).




Figure 1: Policy-making structure of the PGROC, original in Lincoln Li The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941 (1975, 72).

Institutionally, the PGROC was designed to be a republic. Thus, hopes for a Manchu renovation that had lingered throughout the Republican period and were used in Manchuria with the installation of the former Chinese emperor as figure head of a constitutional monarchy, were crushed. On paper, the PGROC adhered to a separation of powers as institutionalized in Republican China. In reality, however, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government overlapped in the PGROC (Wang 2006, 12), while the Control Yuan was abolished almost immediately and the

Examination Yuan became part of the Ministry of Education (Boyle 1972, 90).¹⁶ In order to prevent Chinese concentration of power, all organs were headed by a leadership collective which included personnel from formerly opposing political cliques: Wang Kemin from the Zhili Clique was opposed by Wang Yitang from the Anfu Clique.¹⁷ This pattern continued even after the establishment of the RNG in 1940. Much has been written about the negotiations between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese and the different collaboration governments' interests that led to a large time lag between Wang's defection in 1939 and the establishment of the RNG in March the following year (Boyle 1972, 194–255). Wang Jingwei was determined to establish a centralized state instead of the multi-polar “confederate” state structure as conceptualized by the Japanese (Serfass 2022b, 76). This was met with resistance from local actors. In north China, the Japanese Army maintained the special role it played as a resource to the Japanese war effort and prevented north China's integration into Wang's realm of power (Pei 2006, 131–32). Although the PGROC was nominally subsumed in the RNG, the NCPC retained almost complete autonomy from the RNG, while remaining under Japanese supervision (Wang 2006, 168). It is therefore crucial to treat north China as a discrete entity when studying occupied China and cultural production sponsored by the north Chinese government and Xinminhui. Nevertheless, it is also important to note the interactions between the local governments (Iriye 2014, 272) and the personal, ideological and institutional changes in north China that came

¹⁶ Responsible for education were Tang Erhe – and from December 1940 onwards the famous essayist and brother of the writer Lu Xun (Zhou Shuren), Zhou Zuoren (Zhang 2012, 437–38).

¹⁷ Liu Jingzhong offers a fascinating tale of the “two Wang's” struggles for power. He argues, that the Zhili Clique managed to maintain its position, and claims that Qi Xieyuan was in fact in power (2007, 29–32).

with the establishment of a new government in Nanjing. Wang Kemin continued to serve as head of the NCPC, but, after clashes with Wang Jingwei (Liu 2007, 10), was replaced by the less contentious Wang Yitang, who served until 8 February 1943. His replacement, Zhu Chen, died after only five months, after which Wang Kemin took office again, remaining there until his health made him unable to serve shortly before the war ended (after which he was replaced by Wang Yintai).¹⁸

Economic control was exerted through the newly established Federal Reserve Bank of China and development company, which monopolized Chinese business (Wang 2006, 18; Yuan 2007, 127). Initially, a new currency issued by the bank alleviated the government's financial burden (Boyle 1972, 97–98). However, excessive printing of the new currency led to extreme inflation. The lack of a stable north Chinese currency necessitated coexisting systems: the currencies used in north China were the Japanese *yen* and the KMT *fabi* (Boyle 1972, 97–98). The China Development Company (later North China Development Company) was the only entity allowed to commission resource development, which in turn was largely granted to Japanese companies (Boyle 1972, 102–3). In 1940, the China Development Company's sub-branches controlled the coal, steel, salt, cotton, electricity and transport trade in Beijing (Yuan 2007, 127). Furthermore, Japan brought the opium trade under state control with the Opium Prohibition Bureau, and relied heavily on the opium trade to subsidize its activities in north China (Boyle 1972, 99–100; Brook 2000b; Wakabayashi 2000; Eykholt 2000) – thereby undercutting the local government's legitimacy. The beginning of the Pacific War in 1941 only intensified the demand for resources, and additional problems with the transportation of goods put the Chinese economy under

¹⁸ Zhang Tongle (2012, 434–39) provides a list of officials.

extreme pressure. Food was rationed and became hardly affordable to most ordinary Chinese families. Death rates began to rise – with numbers as high as 300 daily deaths in Beijing during 1943 (Zhang and Yang 1999, 82). Significant numbers of women in particular died from hunger or the inability to afford medical treatment (Yuan 2007, 136–37). Such suffering was, of course, visible and audible – and had a clear impact on the regimes’ ideologies and messaging.

The most important pillars of social control the occupation state exerted (beside economic control) were censorship, control of education and the media, coercion through police and youth militias, and the reintroduction of the *baojia* system of collective surveillance and responsibility.¹⁹ Additional soft or structural forms of social control were maintained through the control of civic life and entertainment industries. Except for the executive power of the police, these measures were largely administered by the Xinminhui,²⁰ the north Chinese government’s civic organization for propaganda and social control.

The Xinminhui

The Xinminhui was established ten days after the PGROC on 24 December 1937. It was originally modelled on the Concordia Association that had been founded in Manchukuo and started out as an organization devoted to propaganda. However, it

¹⁹ Originally established as a mechanism of self-defence in imperial China, the *baojia* system was used to establish a hierarchical grid of mutual surveillance through which the state could control its citizens (Theobald 2016; Zhang, Feng, and Guo 2007, 464–68).

²⁰ See George Edward Taylor for a first-hand description of Xinminhui’s all-encompassing activities and spending (1940, 71).

soon exerted economic and political control to a degree that went far beyond the scope of its Manchurian counterpart (Wang 2006, 68). With their top-level cadres shared, the relationship between the social organization Xinminhui and civil government resembled the organizational structure of a one-party state.²¹ The Xinminhui became intertwined with the government's executive (Pei 2006, 133). In fact, the Xinminhui's budget was higher than that of the rest of the government (Pei 2006, 133).²²

Xinminhui branches exerted control over the media and educational institutions, offered relief work and economic support, and even controlled access to medical services. The Xinminhui also reached down into the household levels of rural villages and into societal and cultural matters. It co-opted cinemas, teahouses, cafés, reading rooms, dance halls and opera stages. It was simultaneously a tightly knit mass organization and an organ of mass control.²³

Top-level cadres in the Xinminhui usually also held important government positions, and the distribution of Chinese and Japanese within it followed the above-described model, with Chinese individuals as top-level, outward-facing representatives and Japanese deputies. However, some key differences can be seen. Many of the initial Chinese collaborators who became figure heads of the PGROC were elderly – so

²¹ This phenomenon is often coined “organization and government merged as one” in the Chinese literature (Wang 2006, 169).

²² The Xinminhui was financed through membership fees and subsidies from the Japanese and new money printed by the Federal Reserve Bank of China. For more on Xinminhui finances, see Zeng (1992, 612).

²³ Wang Qiang argues that the Xinminhui was an all-encompassing organization, used by the Japanese to run the entirety of the occupation-related tasks (2006, 169–71). Most Chinese authors adopt this categorization.

elderly, in fact, that many of them died between 1940 and 1945. Many PGROC cadres had also been educated within the dynastic civil service examination system, which emphasized traditional learning, and had started their careers during the Qing era (Liu 2007, 11–15).²⁴ In contrast, advisors, theorists and administrators who were recruited as leaders of the Xinminhui were younger and brought experience from Manchukuo.²⁵ These included former Director of the Concordia Society, Zhang Yanqing, Xinminhui ideologue Miao Bin,²⁶ and former Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, Hayakawa Saburo.²⁷ Song Jie, Chairman of the Xinminhui's Education Department, supervised

²⁴ This generational difference between political leaders in the KMT and CCP as opposed to the north China government allows Chinese scholars to claim that they were “relics of the past” (Wang 2006, 25), but such labels do not help us understand their involvement. Other characteristics of the occupation state's officials, like their affiliation with business rather than political circles and their educational background, have been discussed in the Chinese literature, but are not helpful in distinguishing those resisting from those who chose to collaborate.

²⁵ Wang Qiang provides us with a typology of Xinminhui members (2006, 68–72), which is interesting as it reflects the dominant strand of mainland historiography. Wang categorizes members as follows: Japanophiles; people with anti-KMT-sentiments (including the top tier of officials and cadres, often members of the Beiyang governments); opportunists; local thugs (including businessmen); returned students (although Wang admits that returned overseas students were part of every group during the war); and “ordinary people”.

²⁶ For a brief introduction to the enigmatic figure, see Wakeman's essay on “traitors” (2000, 323–24).

²⁷ Zhang Yanqing became vice president of the Xinminhui. In March 1938, Miao Bin and Hayakawa Saburo became president and deputy of the Xinminhui Central Guidance and Leadership Department, and Ozawa Kaisaku became head of the Xinminhui General Affairs Office. Andō Kisaburō had been recruited as advisor to the Xinminhui in September 1938. Zhang Yanqing was withdrawn in late 1939 to reduce the influence of the Manchurian Concordia Society and replaced with Wang Yitang, Andō Kisaburō and Miao Bin (Zeng 1992, 614). The position of president was not filled until late 1938, when

most educational and musical propaganda activities. Ke Zhenghe, whom we will re-encounter as the driving force behind many modernist musical propaganda activities, served in the Committee of the Xinminhui Central Guidance and Leadership Department (Wang 2006, 44).²⁸ This difference in age and education led to ideological incongruencies between the PGROC and the Xinminhui (Taylor 2016, 666–67), which helps to explain the sometimes eclectic or outright contradictory messages promoted by the occupation state (as we shall see in subsequent chapters).

The Xinminhui initially had three main departments responsible for general affairs (*zongwu*), welfare (*housheng*) and re-education (*jiaohua*) (Zeng 1992, 612). Within the Re-education Department there were offices responsible for propaganda (*xuanchuan*), organization (*zuzhi*) and social affairs (*shehui*). While these administrative units shifted over time, propaganda was mainly organized under the banner of propaganda and re-education, civic organization or so-called “motivational work” (*jingshen gongzuo*). Regional Xinminhui offices were established in over 100 localities throughout north China between 1937 and 1939 (Wang 2006, 45–50).

Civic society was organized around branch societies (*fenhui*), which were established in each administrative district or region. These included professional guild-like branches – including some professional music ensembles – as well as youth and gender-specific groups. Pre-existing religious organizations and secret societies were co-opted as external groups (*wai wei tuanti*). Membership was granted to two different degrees: full membership (*zheng huiyuan*) and associated membership (*xiezan*

Wang Kemin was made president. Subsequently, the presidency of the Xinminhui continued to lie in the hands of the PGROC/NCPC president.

²⁸ As a Taiwanese, Ke Zhenghe counted as one of three Japanese representatives.

huiyuan). Initially, the procedure for becoming a Xinminhui member was quite elaborate with the result that in December 1938, the Xinminhui could only claim 41,840 members. However, membership policies soon changed, and coercive measures were taken to “recruit” members, so that by 1941, the Xinminhui could boast some 674,057 members (Wang 2006, 91). Later in the war, membership became handled through sub-branches. This meant that everybody in a sub-branch (for example someone who registered as a member of a guild), automatically became a member of the Xinminhui. Children and youths aged between 12 and 22 (for girls/women) and from 12 to 28 (for boys/men) also automatically became members of the Xinminhui’s children’s and youth groups (Wang 2006, 107). As a result, by late 1942, the Xinminhui had 3.6 million members (Wang 2006, 99), and by May 1944 it had around 10 million (representing around 10 percent of north China’s population) (Wang 2006, 107). While impressive, these numbers are not necessarily indicative of the popular support that the Xinminhui might have enjoyed. They are indicative, rather, of the reach of the organization’s propaganda initiatives and activities.

The co-optation and coercion of local press organs and textbook revisions, both intended to further the propagation of the regimes’ main ideologies, were among the first tasks of the Xinminhui. Its main media outlet became the *Xinminbao*, a daily newspaper first published on 1 January 1938 (and running until 1 May 1944). This newspaper was established by co-opting the offices and about ninety percent of the journalists of pre-existing newspapers, the *Shijie ribao* and the *Shijie wanbao* (Wang 2006, 23–24; Guo 2003, 117). Up until 7 July 1941, the *Xinminbao* was accompanied by an evening edition, the *Xinminbao wankan*. In 1939, the daily newspaper *Xinminbao* had a run of 4,400 openly distributed copies (Wang 2006, 24). A fortnightly journal, the *Xinminbao banyuekan*, published longer theoretical articles.

Membership news and policies were distributed via a different publication called the *Xinmin huibao*. Also under strict supervision was the daily newspaper *Shibao* and the illustrated magazine *Shoudu huabao*, published between July 1938 and late 1939. In 1944, a number of state-run journals, including the *Xinminbao* and *Shibao*, were discontinued and substituted by the *Huabei xinbao*, published between 1944 and 1945 (Guo 2003, 117–18). The Xinminhui also published a variety of illustrated journals as well as educational and youth-oriented publications (Guo 2003; Shen 2008, 47). It controlled private publishing and broadcasting through a Propaganda League, and a number of associations, including the North China News Association and the North China Broadcasting Association (Guo 2003, 113). As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 3, the Xinminhui even co-opted a pre-existing music publishing house, the Xinmin Music Press.

Education and youth-oriented initiatives were central to the regime's propaganda activities: Japanese language classes as well as a new subject called "self-cultivation" (*xiushen*) became obligatory, offering essentially anti-communist propaganda and pro-imperialist teachings delivered through Confucian phrases (Yang 2004b, 46). Outside the classroom, students were expected to participate in youth organizations and further their ideological stance at Xinmin summer camps. The Xinminhui's youth re-education camps counted over 10,000 graduates by late 1939 while youth organizations claimed 19,000 members (Zeng 1992, 614). As we will see in subsequent chapters, activities for youth made up a large part of the Xinminhui's musical propaganda activities.

The Xinminhui also aimed to become an integral part of ordinary peoples' everyday lives, especially through culture and entertainment. Regular calisthenics and sport events were as much part of their re-education efforts as the management of tea houses

with reading rooms, where regular programmes of speeches and broadcasts would be maintained (Yang 2004b, 47). Propaganda was distributed through different media, including written publications such as pamphlets, posters, newspapers and journals, as well as radio, films, drawings, public speeches and rallies (Wang 2006, 82; Beijing Municipal Archive 1989, 18–24).

December 1937 to March 1940: Asianism and *Xinmin*-ism

The first version of the *Xinminhui Principles*, published in December 1937, emphasized state-building – both politically and economically. It also defined the ideological standing of the Xinminhui and its promotion of East Asian culture and morals, pacifism and Sino-Japanese amity under the motto of good neighbourly relations – all keywords clearly reflecting Japanese influence. As we can see, it also explicitly expressed anti-KMT, anti-CCP and implicitly anti-Western colonialist sentiment.

Xinminhui Principles, December 1937

- (i) Protect and sustain the new government to placate popular opinion.
- (ii) Develop the industry to appease the people's livelihoods.
- (iii) Develop East [Asian] culture and morals.
- (iv) Under the flag of exterminating the CCP and vanquishing the KMT, take part in the anti-communist front.

- (v) Promote the realization of an alliance with friendly neighbours to contribute to the peace of mankind.

(Beijing Municipal Archive 1989, 4; Anonymous 1938a)

Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, multiple terms for and various forms of Asianism existed (Weber 2018). Scholars of Asianism have emphasized the constant renegotiation of the concept throughout the war years. While Chinese Asianism emphasized the need for a “peaceful union [of strong Asian nations] based on equality” (Weber 2018, 37), the dominant Japanese wartime ideology was based on different strands of the Asianist discourse: expansionist “Meishuron (Japan-as-leader thesis) Pan-Asianism” (Hotta 2007, 30). This form of Asianism had developed much earlier from ideas of a shared Asian cultural and philosophical tradition to the idea of a weak Asia, which needed to grow strong in face of the Western imperial threat, and eventually taken on imperialistic and fascist tendencies and developed into a Japanese mission to “save” Asian nations from colonialization in order to forge a united Asian community able to overpower the West (Hotta 2007, 7–81; 2007, 30–37).²⁹ This set of ideas was rooted in an earlier construct of a culturally uniform Asia (Hotta 2007, 23), the need for the liberation of a similarly constructed Asian race,³⁰ ideas of Japanese superiority and the need to develop stronger Asian state structures under Japanese leadership, which would ultimately rival Western powers.

Of course, the idea of different regions and peoples on the Asian continent being unified and brought together through a shared culture was not new. And even as

²⁹ Hotta introduces these three strands of Asianism as Teaist, Sinic and Meishuron (Hotta 2007, 30–52).

³⁰ For more on the conceptualization of a “yellow race” in late imperial and Republican China, see Dikötter (1992).

nation-states evolved throughout Asia, Asianism had been promoted by prominent Chinese thinkers such as Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao (Brown 2011; Matten 2011). For conservatively-minded intellectuals, for whom neither the dominant faction of the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek nor the CCP offered an ideological alternative, the appropriation of an ideology that promised a strong, culturally conservative Asian region free of Western influence proved appealing, even under Japanese domination. Thus, Chinese ideologues could refer to Sun Yat-sen in promoting Sino-Japanese co-operation while maintaining Chinese nationalism through Sun's ideas of nationalism (Weber 2018, 279–86).

Such ideas were central to the ideology of the newly established north China government and Xinminhui in 1938. However, north Chinese ideologues such as Miao Bin had much less room for ideological negotiation in the context of the Japanese occupation. Instead, Miao argued for economic development and modernization. Japan, having the resources to develop north Chinese territory, should also have the legitimate right to occupy and develop it (Wang 2006, 38; Liu 2007, 145). Within the same vein, the regime argued for Social Darwinist survivalism: Chinese – as the same race – should listen to the Japanese, accept the “course of nature” and survive under Japanese leadership (Liu 2007, 141–42).

Miao Bin's full theoretical introduction of *Xinmin*-ism (*xinmin zhuyi*), literally “people's renovation ideology” or “new people's ideology”, was published in early January 1938 (Miao 1938). I use the neologism “*Xinmin*-ism” here as a direct translation of the term *xinmin zhuyi* (*xinmin* ideology or “people's renovation ideology”) and in parallel to the recently coined Wang Jingwei-ism (Smith 2021), understanding that *Xinmin*-ism, while presented as such, never formed a coherent ideology, but represented an amalgamation of Asianist ideas and Japanese concepts,

and changed continuously with the development and needs of the Japanese empire. *Xinmin*-ism was decisively modern and was, in fact, named to suggest its novelty. Its emphasis on newness, its goal to forge “new” men and women, and its appeal to youth resembled European fascist ideologies. At the same time, however, its calls for a “renovation” of the people and the “renaissance” of Asian culture were clearly derivative of (Chinese) May Fourth ideas, rectifying prior “flirtations” with the West and providing some sense of continuity (Iriye 2014, 259).

Continuity (or, rather, a return to Chinese ideological roots) within *Xinmin*-ism was further constructed through the deployment of traditional lexicon, mostly using terminology appropriated from Confucianist texts (Boyle 1972, 94–95). The application of the principles of *Xinmin*-ism, for example, was explained as being to study in order to acquire knowledge, to undertake self-cultivation, to maintain an orderly home, and to promote well-managed state affairs and peace – all central ideas in Confucian thought (Miao 1939, 1–13). Central to *Xinmin*-ism was an understanding of politics as the extension of an orderly family and societal relations and a “New People’s Historical Perspective”, which stressed co-operation with neighbours and the “creation of a harmonious international community” (Iriye 2014, 260). The adoption of Confucian phrases and educational and literary formats such as the *Three Character Classic* not only suggested the preservation or “renaissance” of traditional Chinese culture, but injected well-known phrases with new meaning (Liu 2007, 140–44).

Miao Bin also linked Confucianism to the concept of the Kingly Way (*wangdao* / *ōdō*) – “implying benevolent [paternalistic] rule” (Saaler and Szpilman 2011, 1:20) and constructed in contrast with (Western) militaristic or “despotic rule” of force and utilitarianism (*badao* / *hadō*). In 1924, Sun Yat-sen had provided theoretical grounds for the “morally superior” Kingly Way as a principle upon which imperial Chinese

relations with neighbouring countries had been founded (and which could serve as a model for future Asian relations and co-operation in a – likely forceful – defence of Asian independence) (Brown 2011).³¹

Xinminhui activities in the first phase of the war concentrated on building the organization and propaganda activities for the newly established government. The Xinminhui organized rallies, concerts, film viewings, exhibitions, sports events and competitions, and founded schools and education camps (*Xinminbao* 1940m; *Chenbao* 1940b; *Xinminbao* 1941j; Iriye 2014, 256, 263). Furthermore, rallies were held to congratulate Japanese victories as the Japanese offensive continued (*Xinminbao* 1938u). The occupation of Chinese cities was celebrated as examples of “national salvation” (*jiuguo*) – a term that had been used to denote anti-Japanese protests prior to the occupation, but which, in the new context of occupation, suggested support for the new regime. Next to such efforts of state- and community-building, the “extermination” of communists took priority (Zeng 1992, 612).³² The prevalence of anti-communism in Japanese propaganda can be explained geopolitically, with the Soviet Union as Japan’s longstanding and direct foe, but is harder to explain considering that many Japanese intellectuals were (sometimes extreme) leftist thinkers.

³¹ Brown (2007, 133–44) provides a brief historical overview of the concept of the Kingly Way and discussions on its difference with the Japanese concept of the “Imperial Way” (*huangdao / kōdō*).

³² At the inauguration of the PGROC, themes emphasized by Tang Erhe included: anti-KMT sentiment (i.e., blaming the KMT for the war and criticizing its corruption); anti-communism (i.e., scorning the KMT for co-operating with the CCP); and racial (Sino-Japanese) unity (Boyle 1972, 91).

These included later members of the Shōwa Research Association, which became the central institution developing Japan's wartime ideologies (Fletcher 1979, 42–43).³³

From the perspective of north Chinese collaborators, however, CCP forces were both geographically and ideologically the most immediate competitor. Attacks on communism were phrased as attacks on “materialism” or “corruption”, while the Xinminhui claimed that the communists' revolutionary ideas represented a “death sentence” for the Chinese people (Liu 2007, 146). In June 1938, the Xinminhui organized an “Exterminate the CCP and Vanquish the KMT Movement Week”, during which agitators were sent to different places to give public speeches, broadcast new songs and distribute anti-CCP/KMT pamphlets (*Xinminbao* 1938z; *Xinminbao wankan* 1938d). Between 1939 and March 1940, the PGROC and Xinminhui also launched an initiative to strengthen control in rural areas by undertaking military campaigns against CCP forces and tightening control through the *baojia* system and local police forces (Zhang, Feng, and Guo 2007, 247–52). Anti-communist campaigns intensified in a second phase of Xinminhui activities, as I will recount in more detail in the next section, focusing on the period from 1940 to 1942.

March 1940 to 1942: Accommodating Wang Jingwei

Wang Jingwei framed the establishment of the RNG in March 1940 as the “return” of the Nationalist government to its capital Nanjing, presenting the RNG as the true heir

³³ However, pragmatism seems to have made Japanese anti-communist rhetoric flexible: when Japan negotiated the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Matsuoka Yōsuke, explained that the Japanese were “moral communists”, which had been veiled by “Western” ideas (Slavinskiĭ 2004, 35).

of Sun Yat-sen's Republic (Taylor 2021, 20). Under the occupation, Wang promoted an orthodox version of Nationalist ideology that has recently been coined "Wang Jingwei-ism" (Smith 2021, 238), reinventing KMT tradition and referring to Sun Yat-sen's Asianist ideologies and Three People's Principles (*sanmin zhuyi*) – nationalism, democracy and welfare. This fashioning can be most superficially observed through the re-use of Nanjing decade-era Chinese symbols and iconography under Wang Jingwei's RNG in Nanjing (Taylor 2021, 19–27).

Since *Xinmin*-ism had explicitly opposed the KMT and Sun's Three People's Principles, adjustments needed to be made in late 1939 to accommodate the imminent advent of the RNG (Zeng 1992, 613–14; Wang 2006, 168).³⁴ A new version of the *Xinminhui Principles*, published in March 1940, offers insights into some of these ideological developments:

Xinminhui Principles, 1 March 1940

- (i) Develop the *xinmin* spirit as a manifestation of the Kingly Way.
- (ii) Implement anti-communism, revive culture, maintain peace.
- (iii) Promote industry, improve the people's livelihoods.
- (iv) Being a good neighbour and ally, construct a New Order in East Asia.

(Anonymous 1940)

³⁴ The rewording of anti-KMT slogans, however, should not (contrary to what Zeng suggests) be understood as reflecting the lessening of the KMT's war effort and the intensification of the CCP forces' contribution to the prosecution of the war (Zeng 1992, 618).

While the first version (published in 1937) had contained the phrase “exterminate the CCP and vanquish the KMT”, the second (1940) version deleted the second part of the phrase. Wang Jingwei’s influence is also apparent in the explicit mentioning of “peace” – a keyword central to Wang’s claims to legitimacy (Taylor 2021, 31–36). The 1940 *Xinminhui Principles* not only explicitly mention a “*xinmin* spirit”, but also link this spirit to the realization of the Kingly Way – an indicator of strong Japanese influence. While Wang Jingwei tried to link the Kingly Way to Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles, it here served as an antidote to nationalism and civic engagement with its emphasis on civic passivity (reliance on benevolent rule). The Japanese call to establish a “New Order” (*xin zhixu*) also first appears in this version. However, the notion of a “New Order” had been promoted before the publication of the 1940 *Xinminhui Principles* in north China. For example, an “Establish a New Order in East Asia Week” was launched in March 1939 – only a few months after the first mentioning of the goal to establish a “New Order in East Asia” by Japanese government officials (*Xinminbao* 1939c). The policy targeted regions already under Japanese occupation, including Manchukuo and other Chinese occupied territories, and demanded economic co-operation (contributions to the Japanese war effort) and a revival of cultural conservatism.

The phrase “revive culture” or “[induce the] renaissance of culture”, also included in the *Xinminhui Principles*, further suggested a lingering influence of the New Culture Movement in China, which had promoted the renewal and renaissance of Chinese culture in response to the increasing influence of Western thought (Iriye 2014, 259). And while the motto “raise Asia” (*xing Ya / kōa*) was not explicitly mentioned in these *Xinminhui Principles*, it was promoted in campaigns celebrating the anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 7 July (Anonymous 1939b). As we will

see in later chapters, campaigns designed around the call to “raise Asia” continued in north China until the very end of the war and were accompanied by calls for the “preservation” or “protection of Asia” (*baowei Dongya*) from 1941 onwards – a time when the eventual military defeat of the Japanese empire became palpable.

Xinminhui activities between 1940 and 1942 continued to focus on the suppression of CCP forces in north China. During the summer of 1940, celebrations of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (i.e., the Japanese invasion of China) included the seizure of communist materials and an anti-communist propaganda initiative. Three intensive Peace Keeping and Strengthening Movements were launched over the course of 1941, including propaganda activities, censorship and the capture of communist resistance fighters in rural areas. These were the most effective anti-CCP initiatives that the occupation state was able to launch. They began with a week of activities around the anniversary of the establishment of the RNG between 29 March and 3 April 1941; a second initiative was launched with the help of the Japanese Imperial Army in July of the same year (Zeng 1992, 615). Xinminhui military youth corps and groups were involved in this series of activities focusing on rural areas (Liu 2007, 138). Establishing tighter control through the *baojia* system became a major strategy of the government. The third series of activities was launched in November and December 1941, and focused on the economic isolation of communist base areas in north China and social control (Zeng 1992, 615). A fourth series of events took place between March and June 1942. Different measures were taken in these “pacification campaigns”, depending on the degree of acceptance for the occupation state (Wang 2006, 96–97). Such measures included everything from tightened social controls and intensified secret service activities and propaganda in favour of Japan’s “Greater East Asia” project to forced relocations, to out-right destructive measures of “killing,

burning and shooting”. The last period of Peace Keeping and Strengthening took place in early October 1942 (Wang 2006, 91–98). During this period, the Xinminhui forced recycling to save material for the war effort, launched further re-education activities, and strengthened *baojia* control and military youth groups in rural areas.

As these continuities in anti-communist activities indicate, the beginning of the third phase of Xinminhui ideological development and related activities is more difficult to pinpoint. Wang Qiang and Zeng Yeying point to the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 as the beginning of this third phase or, alternatively, to organizational changes taking place in May 1941 (Wang 2006, 32). However, the *Xinminhui Principles* were only changed in late October 1942. This coincides with the founding of the Greater East Asia Ministry in Tokyo on 1 November 1942, the implementation of a Japanese “New China Policy”, the completion of the last Peace Keeping and Strengthening Movement (Zeng 1992, 617), the establishment of a Xinminhui branch office in Nanjing (Iriye 2014, 272) and the first propaganda activities organized under the banner of the New Citizens’ Movement.

1942–1945: Greater East Asia during the “Total War”

The 1942 version of the *Xinminhui Principles* reflects the growing size of the Japanese empire and its corresponding ambitions.

Xinminhui Principles, 27 October 1942

- (i) Develop the *xinmin* spirit.
- (ii) Implement peace [through/and] anti-communism
- (iii) Complete civic organization.
- (iv) Unite the East Asian race.

(v) Construct a New World Order.

(Anonymous 1942)

Instead of a “New Order in East Asia”, the Xinminhui now called for a “New World Order” and unity of the “East Asian race” – accounting for Japanese’ military success in Southeast Asia. The “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (GEACPS) is not mentioned explicitly in this version of the *Xinminhui Principles* but was propagated throughout north China, replacing narrower references to East Asia that had existed in earlier Xinminhui documents. The GEACPS referred to the community of Asian countries that were supposedly profiting, at this stage, from Japanese hegemony (“benevolent rule”). Ideas about a GEACPS had been circulating in Japan (and occupied China) much earlier, but became national policy in Japan after Matsuoka Yōsuke’s 1941 book of the same title, and his speech to the Japanese Imperial Diet (Saaler 2011, 223–29). Its institutional realization came in 1943 with the installation of a new Greater East Asia Ministry in the Japanese government.

Apart from references to a growing Japanese empire, however, the 1942 *Xinminhui Principles* are most telling for their omissions.³⁵ While the “*xinmin* spirit” and “anti-communism” are retained, concepts such as the Kingly Way, cultural revival and peace are all omitted. Such changes were indicative of the increasing militarization of the occupation state in this period. Jeremy Taylor draws on Louise Young’s “fascist imperialism” in explaining this “seemingly counterintuitive militarization of the RNG”

³⁵ Comparing the three versions, we can also observe a development of language, from unpolished phrases to rhythmic slogans. One could argue that such stylistic changes led to some omissions, but I would argue that there seemed to be no hesitation about including certain aspects even if it meant an elongation.

in this same period (Taylor 2021, 34) – its display of anti-Western sentiment, increasing Chinese nativism and adoption of fascist aesthetics – as the RNG gained more autonomy from Japan.

While the persecution of communist resistance fighters in rural areas continued, the occupation state's attention shifted to new enemies in January 1943, when Wang Jingwei's RNG officially declared war on the Allies. Campaigns against "Western imperialism", embodied by the UK, had already taken place in June 1939, when the PGROC sealed off the English Concession in Tianjin following the assassination of the manager of the Federal Reserve Bank of north China (Swann 1998, 43). From 1943 onwards, former calls to "exterminate the CCP and vanquish the KMT" were rephrased into calls for victory over Britain and the US and the "liberation" of Asia from Western imperialism. Efforts to mobilize the people were organized under the banner of a New Citizens' Movement (Anonymous 1943, 4). The movement, announced by Wang Jingwei in January 1942, was not only modelled on previous Republican movements (Smith 2021, 239–40), but drew on experiences of the *Xinminhui* (Taylor 2021, 108) and was extensively promoted in both Nanjing and Beijing (*Xinminbao* 1943p).

The 1942 *Xinminhui Principles* are also devoid of any mention of industrial development or welfare – reflecting the dire socio-economic environment and significant food-shortages people in the occupied territories faced (Zhang and Yang 1999, 82). Instead, civic organization is emphasized. With the beginning of the Pacific War and the integration of the Chinese resistance against Japan into the international alliance against the Axis powers, the Japanese New China Policy identified the importance of Chinese collaboration in the occupied territories and China's economic contributions to the Japanese war effort (Zeng 1992, 616; Liu 2007, 139–40). The

Xinminhui became much involved in economic matters, trying to satisfy the appetite of Tokyo's increased war machine and growing territory. It rationed resources and food, promoted frugality, and "donated" metal to the Japanese military (Wang 2006, 105–6; Liu 2007, 22). As we will see in later chapters, these initiatives were accompanied by many propaganda events and performances organized under the banner of "increasing production" (*zengchan*) and "relief" or comfort (*wei'an*).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the most important political structures and agents, ideologies and activities of the occupation state in north China, providing the context for the investigation of the occupation state's musical culture in later chapters. I have shown how the policies and ideologies of local governments were shaped by pre-existing structures, changes in international alliances, the state of the Japanese war effort, and developments within China itself. I have noted continuities between wartime and pre-war political institutions, including north Chinese local governments and the legacy of warlord regimes. I have shown how revolutionary ideologies promoted with the establishment of the Chinese Republic and the ideological and performative repertoires of early twentieth-century campaigns and movements provided the groundwork for wartime reiterations and aspirations of an Asian revival. Experiences in other Japanese-occupied territories (most importantly, Manchukuo) shaped local governments in north China just as international developments did. While some antipathies – against communist resistance forces and ideologies, for example – remained prevalent throughout the war, other ideologies changed. Competition between local governments led to incongruencies, and with the

amalgamation of the PGROC into the RNG in March 1940, Wang Jingwei's ideas had to be accommodated. As the Japanese empire expanded and new enemies emerged, Asianist ideologies were broadened and old anti-imperial movements carefully reintroduced so as to target solely Western imperialism, while legitimizing Japanese expansionist activities. As the RNG gained more autonomy from Japan in 1943, we can also observe a militarization of cultural expression that went along with calls for a "liberation" from imperialist powers.

With this understanding of the north Chinese government, its position within the wider occupation state, socio-economic developments in north China and the specific ideologies developed and appropriated by the Xinminhui, we can endeavour to analyze the regime's musical culture. Subsequent chapters will show how scholarship relying largely on textual sources and written statements produced by occupation state officials as reviewed in this chapter and analysis of the musical culture of the regime can speak to each other. While many of the ideological developments observable through textual sources and outlined in this chapter are reflected in the musical culture of the regime, we can also attest to the ways in which musical practice contributed to the establishment of the new government and the mobilization of the occupied populace. I will argue even further that musical culture can help us to take note of continuities, ruptures and some of the underlying insecurities the regime faced.

CHAPTER 2

Deconstructing Narratives of Musical Culture in Japanese-Occupied China

Having outlined the political and ideological developments that shaped life in occupied north China, in this chapter I focus on the existing literature on musical production in Japanese-occupied Beijing. I ask: Can we understand music in the occupied territories as more than “merely an extension of the bitter fight between the two parties [Nationalists and Communists] on the literature and art fronts” (Liu 2010, 286)? And could an analysis of the music developed and appropriated by the occupation state in Japanese-occupied north China alter common narratives and paradigms that have shaped scholarship on music in wartime China?

As I will show in the first part of this chapter, literature that focuses specifically on the musical culture of the occupation state is scarce. This scarcity can be explained by the dominance of other narratives and paradigms which have shaped both Chinese- and English-language scholarship on musical developments in wartime China. These include narratives focusing on the life and musical production of individual modernist composers, narratives highlighting the role of commercial consumer culture and the commercial recording industry, and narratives of musical resistance against the Japanese.¹ I will discuss each of these narratives and trace the extent to which musical

¹ In his recent monograph on Nie Er, Joshua Howard understands these narratives as part of two dominant paradigms: “revolution and modernization/modernity”, the latter of which he claims “has

production in Japanese-occupied Beijing has been included therein. In sum, I will explain how this thesis not only provides an analysis of musical life in occupied Beijing, but also serves as an intervention into dominant narratives of musical modernism, the supposed “pacifying” effects of commercial musical entertainment and the musical aesthetics of anti-Japanese mass struggle.

As I will show, each of these dominant narratives is constructed around artificial and dichotomized categories (e.g., academic/commercial, elite/popular, modern/traditional, Chinese/Western, revolutionary/imperialist). Each of these categories are, in turn, associated with moral judgements about the behaviour of people during the Second Sino-Japanese War, depending on the narrative constructed around them. Additionally, the emergence of three distinct political arenas under which musical production after the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 took place (i.e., areas controlled by the Nationalists, by the communists and by Japanese forces) has led to a multitude of voices seeking to align narratives of wartime aesthetic developments with moral judgements about the political actors and political ideologies represented in each of the three respective areas. This complexity of narratives has been exacerbated by the continued coexistence of wartime parties post-war. Depending on the post-war perspective, musical developments in wartime China and

privileged the consumer culture of Shanghai and consciously sought to displace the previous historiography that focused on the Chinese revolutionary experience” (Howard 2020, 2). While I largely agree with Howard’s observation with regard to the English-language literature, works focusing on individual revolutionary composers have indeed highlighted their modernist contributions (e.g. Yang 2004a). I thus differentiate between three dominant narratives, which in turn can be aligned with the paradigms Howard has outlined.

the pinnacles of (Chinese) musical modernism and populism, for example, have thus been located in different political arenas.

Too often have aesthetic and moral appraisals been directly linked and attributed to corresponding political spheres, which has led to a disregard of musical production in the occupied territories – especially of music produced under the direct supervision and in support of the occupation state. For example, the standard narrative of music in wartime China as told in the PRC today (and often reiterated by scholars elsewhere), seeks to highlight leftist musicians' contributions to China's revolutionary anti-imperialist mass struggle, and to identify leftist composers as being at the forefront of modernist musical developments (e.g., Chen 2005, 79–262; Yu 2006, 327–74). This can be illustrated in two representative musical histories published in the PRC. Chen Zhi'ang's *History of Music during the War of Resistance* (2005), for example, devotes three chapters to the contributions of individual modernist composers and the pieces composed in the so-called “liberated areas” (i.e., those areas controlled by the CCP).² Similarly, Yu Jiafang's *History of Modern Music in China* devotes much space to the development of anti-Japanese repertoire in the communist base areas, while only highlighting the (supposedly apolitical) commercial and instrumental music that was produced by Chinese composers in the Japanese-occupied areas (Yu 2006, 374–83, 401–9).

Nonetheless, a handful of scholars have started to deviate from this standard PRC narrative. Hong Kong scholar Liu Ching-chi's *Critical History*, for example, has

² Out of eight chapters, six cover pre-war anti-Japanese singing movements and musical developments in the “liberated areas”, while only two chapters recount developments in the Nationalist-controlled and Japanese-occupied areas. The latter focus on commercial music and the contributions of composers in the occupied territories who wrote “apolitical” or anti-Japanese pieces.

highlighted the modernist achievements of the academic musical elite in the Nationalist capital of Chongqing and Japanese-occupied Shanghai and Beijing during the war (Liu 2010, 191–97, 221–49). A number of scholars based mainly in North America and Hong Kong have deconstructed the negative moral judgements associated with the commercial recording industry in the existing literature (Jones 2001, 113; Howard 2015, 40–41) and have questioned the effectiveness and populist aesthetics of resistance song writing in the communist base areas (Liu 2010, 202–3; Gong 2008, 61). This thesis builds on such efforts, emulating lines of enquiry developed in other realms of the “new cultural history” of Japanese-occupied China (Taylor and Yang 2020).

Studies of Musical Life in Occupied Beijing

Studies that touch upon musical life in Japanese-occupied Beijing have certainly been published. For instance, histories of musical life in twentieth-century China with a regional focus on Beijing often do cover the occupation era. One example is Yao Siyuan’s *Beijing Music Gazetteer* (2002), a historiographical account of musical life in Beijing throughout the twentieth century which includes information on wartime institutions, compositions and activities (which will be referenced in Chapter 3). Similarly, a study of music in Beijing compiled by Meng Weiping (2018) includes more information on the institutions and people who were active in occupied Beijing, most importantly at the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute. Due to limitations of space and a seeming reluctance to touch on collaborationist music, however, Meng’s account is limited and is defined by moral judgements about the work of composers and performers who contributed to the occupation state’s musical

campaign efforts. Both Yao and Meng were shaped by the missionary presence in Beijing, and their studies of musical life in occupied Beijing reflect this. Born in 1925, Yao was educated at missionary schools in occupied Beijing, and has collected concert programmes throughout his life. The Yao Siyuan Collection (YSC) thus provides a valuable insight into musical life in Beijing as experienced by a teenager who participated in and listened to the concerts of a distinct musical circle of Christian missionaries in the city (including during wartime). The geographical distribution of the concerts represented therein, however, indicates the limitations of this specific collection.³ Meng relies heavily on Yao's programme collection and thus provides a similarly limited view of musical life in the occupied city. For example, Meng does not cover the extent of musical activity in support of the Xinminhui, or mention the construction of the Beijing City Music Hall with Japanese funding in 1942. Instead, he creates a false dichotomy between collaborationist musical fundraising events for the Japanese military and "purely" artistic, religious and privately organized concert life during the occupation (Meng 2018, 66).

Despite the contributions of work by Yao and Meng, however, many aspects of musical life in occupied Beijing remain completely untouched in the scholarship. This is especially true for the uses of music as propaganda by the occupation state. In recent studies on the Xinminhui and "cultural encroachment" in occupied Beijing, respectively, Wang Qiang and Ren Chao mention songs commissioned by the regime between 1938 and 1942 (Wang 2006, 79, 82, 86, 98), but they summarily dismiss the artistic quality of such music:

³ A list of the collections' contents can be found in Meng Weiping's study of musical life in Beijing (Meng 2018, 282–87).

Enslavement education songs almost became the “mainstream music” of occupied Beiping. The Xinminhui commissioned song lyrics for prize money, commissioned specialists to arrange the songs and organized the masses and students to practise and sing them. One could say they exerted all their energy to promote imperialist thought. But the quality of these songs is not high, their artistic value is lacking. (Ren 2019, 18)

None of these studies centres on the sound culture of the occupation state more broadly or offers any in-depth analysis of the repertoires and performance practices developed under the Japanese occupation. Instead, they mention these songs simply as one more indication of the occupation state’s omniferous encroachment on cultural life.

Similar tendencies can be observed in the only full-length Chinese-language study on music promoted by the Xinminhui. This was a Master’s thesis written by Wang Yindan (under the supervision of musicologist Li Shuqin) at Beijing’s Central Conservatory of Music in 2013. Wang traces groups, performances, song production and wartime personae, mainly through a reading of the Xinminhui’s primary newspaper, the *Xinminbao*. The main part of her thesis is a chronological overview of performances in occupied Beijing, categorized in performances organized around the publication of songs commissioned by the Xinminhui, performances by Chinese musicians promoting the Xinminhui and celebrating Japanese victories and joint performances involving Japanese and Chinese artists (Wang 2013, 20–42). Though Wang presents a wealth of information, her analysis of the material is limited. She does not offer detailed analysis of the songs and repertoire commissioned and performed in wartime Beijing and is not concerned with performance practice. Nor does she explore how the events she lists fit into the specific propaganda initiatives of

the *Xinminhui* or how the musical culture of the occupation state relates to cultural production in other parts of wartime China.

As this review has illustrated, literature with a distinct focus on the musical culture of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied Beijing is sparse. This gap in the literature on musical culture in twentieth-century China can be explained by the dominance of a few pre-existing narratives. These include narratives that highlight individual composers' modernist accomplishments or contributions to the anti-imperial struggle; narratives that focus on the role of popular music and commercial music production; and narratives of Chinese musical resistance against Japanese imperialism. Such accounts often aim to place the works of individual composers, selected genres, repertoires and musical practices in broader paradigms of musical modernism, revolutionary mass struggle, or narratives of the appropriation of "Chinese" elements into the genre of (Western) "new music". They are thus constructed along such dichotomies as academic/commercial, elite/popular, modern/traditional, revolutionary/imperialist and Chinese/Western. Since characterizations such as "modernist" or "revolutionary Chinese" are in turn associated with claims of cultural "superiority" and political legitimacy, recognizing repertoires and performance practices developed in the occupied territories as part of these developments can be a sensitive issue (Liu 2010, 244). Thus, accounts of musical life in occupied Beijing often fall outside such established narratives. Below, I trace three of the dominant narratives listed above and the role musicians in the occupied territories have been allocated within these.

Contributions of Individual Modernist Composers

Accounts of the life and works of individual composers active during the Second Sino-Japanese War have assessed the contributions of such composers to musical modernism, the development of a national (Chinese) musical language within the constraints of (Western) “new music”, and their contributions to the so-called “Anti-Japanese War of Resistance”. These accounts have mainly focused on composers active in the communist base areas and the Nationalist realm, such as Xian Xinghai (e.g. Yang 2004a; 2019), Lü Ji (e.g. Li 2001), Ma Sicong (e.g., Ma Sicong yanjiuhui 1997) and He Lüting (e.g. Shi 2017). These composers were based at the two most important academic musical institutions in these areas – the relocated branches of Shanghai Conservatory in the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing and the Lu Xun Arts Academy in the communist base of Yan’an. Individual composers who remained at the Shanghai Conservatory in occupied Shanghai (i.e., those sections of this institution which remained in the city after the Japanese invasion) have also been included in narratives of modernist developments in wartime China (Utz 2004; Mao and Zhao 1983; Cheong 2017; Liu 2010, 221–31). In contrast, the stories of individual composers who worked for and with the Japanese have often been left untouched. For example, Li Weining, who managed the Shanghai Conservatory between 1940 and 1945 under Japanese supervision, and who is often named as the only true collaborator at the institution, is still largely unexplored (Kouwenhoven and Schimmelpenninck 1993, 69–70; Yu 2006, 380).⁴ Such tendencies are symptomatic of a field that

⁴ The only study of Li Weining I could locate was a Master’s thesis from China Central Conservatory (Li 2012). In light of the sheer number of unfiled boxes that make up Li’s materials at the Shanghai Conservatory when I visited in 2018, there is much to be discovered.

continues to avoid tracing modernist developments in the musical culture of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied China (e.g. Yu 2006, 374–83, 401–9; Chen 2005, 267–72).

While we can find biographies and brief accounts of composers and musicians active in Japanese-occupied Beijing (Mang 2004; Han 1989a), most of these accounts also illustrate the power of post-war moral judgements. A biography of Beijing-based pianist Lao Zhicheng by Mang Kerong, for example, following the narrative of musical resistance, painstakingly recounts Lao's detention during the war (ostensibly due to his sympathies for the communists) but fails to mention his participation in many occupation state-led campaign events (Mang 2004, 85–124). The only notable exception to such disregard for composers in occupied Beijing are works focusing on a composer now recognized as one of the most technically accomplished Chinese modernist composers of the time – Jiang Wenye.

Jiang Wenye was born in 1910 in (Japanese colonial) Taiwan. He was educated in Xiamen (China) from 1917 and in Ueda (Japan) from 1923. He later studied electrical engineering in Tokyo.⁵ In the early 1930s, he became a professional singer for Columbia Records and started studying composition with Yamada Kōsaku. Between 1934 and 1938 he travelled throughout Taiwan and mainland China, winning several composition prizes, among them an honourable mention for his *Formosan Dance* at the 1936 Berlin Olympics.⁶ In 1938, Jiang moved to north China and became a lecturer at the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute. Jiang experienced his most creative period in Japanese-occupied Beijing. It was in this period that he composed

⁵ For a chronological overview of Jiang's life, see Jiang's *Complete Edition* (Wang and Zhao 2016).

⁶ For an account of the politics behind the composition prize at the Olympics in 1936 see Heinze 2005.

several song cycles, choruses and pieces for solo piano, one theatrical piece, two ballets, two symphonies and a few symphonic poems.⁷ Some of these were written for competitions in Japan, which allowed Jiang to conduct and record his works there.⁸ Unfortunately, a number of these pieces are lost.⁹ Those which do remain, however, reveal Jiang's enormous productivity during the war.

Today, Jiang is acknowledged as a pioneer of "genuine" Chinese new music (Wang 2010) and has been granted a major role in the narrative of Chinese musical modernism. Indeed, quite apart from his activities during the war, Jiang is considered one of the most important figures in Chinese music in the twentieth century (Liu 2010, 231–44). However, because of his contributions to the occupation state in north China (which will be explored at length in Chapters 4, 5 and 6), Jiang was initially scorned in post-war China (Liu 2010, 236–38, 243). Only in the early 1980s did musicologists reintroduce Jiang into the modernist narrative as one of the first composers to have used elements of Chinese elite culture as inspiration for sophisticated modernist symphonic works (Hu 1985; Han and Lin 1984; Wu 1991; Wang 1984; Su 1986). Three conferences held in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Shanghai in the early 1990s, and the first publication of Jiang's manuscripts in the same period, were pivotal in reintroducing him to the field and to wider audiences (Zhang 1992; Liu 1992; Liang and Jiang 2000; Jiang 1992). Multiple biographies have appeared since then (Zhang

⁷ For a lists of Jiang Wenye's compositions see Wu Lingyi and Liu Ching-chi's compilations (Wu 1992; Liu 2010, 696–98), where lost pieces are marked.

⁸ Jiang often returned to Tokyo during summer holidays to be with his Japanese family (Kung 2002, 63).

⁹ According to Jiang's Chinese relatives, Jiang's Japanese family may still hold some of his compositions and materials.

2002; Liu 2016). Jiang's pieces for orchestra and piano have been the subject of a number of studies, both in the field of musicology as well as in cultural history (Kung 2002; Wang 2010). Today, Jiang's works are performed and recorded internationally (Moskow Conservatory Orchestra and Nikolayev 2009; NHK Symphony Orchestra and Chen 2009) and a new edition of his complete works has been published in the PRC (Wang 2016).

However, the connection between Jiang's oeuvre and the occupation state's policies in north China has been downplayed in an effort to rehabilitate Jiang personally and reintroduce his works into the history of modernist music in China (Liu 2010, 236). And despite explicitly focusing on Jiang's life and works between 1938 and 1949 (Su 1990; Liou 2005) and referencing the reason for Jiang's former exclusion from the musical narrative (Liu 2010, 236, 244, 561–62), the sensitivity of the topic of collaboration has led scholars to analyze Jiang's oeuvre without fully exploring the political context in which Jiang worked. One rare exception to this is the work of David Wang, who has noted how Jiang's symphonic pieces, including his *Song for the Myth of the Century* and *Symphonia Universalis*, can be "interpreted as promoting racial harmony and solidarity among East Asian countries, and to that effect they resonated with the emerging discourse of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'" (Wang 2015, 215).

While this thesis does not focus exclusively on Jiang's repertoire, it does highlight his contributions to the cultural capital of and the ideological battle fought by the occupation state in north China. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, Jiang's role in composing and even performing the "treasonous repertoires" of the occupation state in north China was central to the musical culture of the regime, shaped people's everyday lives and their interaction with the occupation state. Equally, an

understanding of the cultural context of occupation in wartime Beijing is central to any understanding of Jiang and his place in Chinese musical history.

Condemnations of *Shidaiqu*

Another dominant field of research in the history of musical production during the Second Sino-Japanese War focuses on the commercial recording industry and popular music – mainly the genre of *shidaiqu* (Benson 2004; Wang 2012; Raine 2018). In this case, it is not a failure of scholars to recognize the popularity of this genre – which first developed in the port cities of China during the 1920s and 1930s as musicians fused Chinese melodies sung by young female performers with jazz accompaniment – in the occupied territories. On the contrary, the wartime development of *shidaiqu* is often exclusively associated with the occupied territories (e.g. Chen 2005, 263–67). Indeed, Li Xianglan – a widely successful Manchurian-based Japanese singer of *shidaiqu* who “passed” as Chinese – has become a symbol for wartime musical collaboration (Stephenson 2002; Xia 2013, 116), helping to associate this genre with the political “treason” that Li Xianglan is often seen to embody.

Two aspects of the current literature on *shidaiqu* in occupied China are particularly problematic. Firstly, a number of scholars have assumed that Chinese musical elites working for the occupation state’s musical propaganda apparatus welcomed *shidaiqu* and its “pacifying effect” without hesitation (e.g., Chen 2014; 2005, 263–67). Secondly, there has often been an association between *shidaiqu* and female agency and thus the tendency to attribute collaborative agency only to malleable young female musicians. I expand on both of these tendencies below.

At the time of its development and especially leading up to the Japanese invasion in 1937, the genre of *shidaiqu* was scorned by the leftist cultural elite in China as decadent, “pornographic”, light and unpatriotic (Liu 2010, 165–66; Howard 2015, 4). It was seen as unfit for the important work of nation-building and decolonization. It is only recently that such critiques have been relativized in post-modern appraisals of the genre by scholars of popular music, such as Andrew Jones, Andreas Steen and Andrew Field (Jones 2001; Field 1999; Steen 2006). However, most important accounts of this genre focus on its development prior to the Japanese invasion of 1937 (Jones 2001, 6; Steen 2006). Thus, prejudices against the entertainment industry, sown by the academic establishment and young communist composers leading up to the war (Gong 2008, 65), continue to shape the academic discourse on its role in wartime China (Chen 2005, 263–67; 2014). In other words, musical life in the occupied territories is still overwhelmingly associated with the *shidaiqu* songs that were supposedly not just tolerated but welcomed by “puppet regimes” in order to keep the population in Japanese-occupied China entertained and passive (Benson 2004; Chen 2014). As I show in Chapter 5, however, musical elites in occupied Beijing shared such condemnatory views of the genre as well as wider anxieties around its potential to distract from ideology and pressing political issues, even while supporting the occupation state. In other words, as I will show, the assumption that *shidaiqu* was universally favoured by the occupation state is not supported by the evidence.

Moral judgements about *shidaiqu* were (and still are) also rooted in the anxieties of musical elites in Republican China around the public display and popularity of female voices (Jones 2001, 113). This is important in understanding the second issue in the dominant narrative of the role of *shidaiqu* and the commercial recording industry in Japanese-occupied China, i.e., the emphasis on female agency which an exclusive

focus on this genre entails. Studies have shown that female writers, artists and film stars in the occupied territories indeed experienced unprecedented popularity and positions within the cultural realm (Huang 2005, 53–54, 62–64; Jiang 2009; Wang 2012). All-female Yue opera, for example, overtook Peking opera as the most popular form of theatre in wartime Shanghai (Jiang 2009, 126). Indeed, the topic of gender and female agency and archetypes seems to have become a safe space which has allowed scholars to approach the cultural history of the occupied territories and north China in particular (Smith 2006; Ma 2015; Taylor 2016). Notwithstanding the importance of such studies and their contribution to the cultural history of the occupation state, I consider such heightened interest in female agency symptomatic for a field that seems to struggle to acknowledge male collaborationist agency.¹⁰

In sum, I claim that the almost exclusive association of music in the occupied territories with “musical pabulum” and the genre of *shidaiqu* in particular, has served to delineate music in the occupied territories from “salvationist” resistance culture and thus reflects a pre-war prejudice against commercial musical repertoire and female voices. I will address both issues in more detail in Chapter 5. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that the rather gendered approach in many existing histories of occupied Beijing, in which female-sung *shidaiqu* songs are assumed to represent the “sound” of the occupation state, are far from accurate. Indeed, the overview of wartime Beijing’s musical infrastructure I present in Chapter 3 will illustrate the predominant presence and agency of male musical elites.

¹⁰ Scholars such as Yun Xia have now started to make an effort to explore the gendered nature of anti-“*hanjian*” discourse, assessing the gendered vocabulary associated with collaboration, the role of post-war judgement of female literary figures such as Su Qing and Zhang Ailing, and feminizing portrayals of male collaborators (Xia 2013).

Salvationist Singing and the “Folk Turn”

The third and most pervasive narrative I aim to deconstruct here is the narrative of musicians’ contributions to the anti-Japanese resistance and anti-imperial struggle (e.g., Howard 2015). This narrative offers an interesting parallel to my focus on the musical culture produced in support of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied China, as it accounts for similarly politicized, though ideologically diametrically opposed, musical production.

Anti-Japanese “salvationist” song repertoire and mass singing activities are widely recognized as an essential part of popular culture in the broader cultural histories of wartime China (Li 2015, 239–44, 189–221; Hung 1994, 13) and as constitutive of Chinese nationalism (Ho and Ho 2012; Gong 2008, 66–68). In particular, repertoire developed and popularized during the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Singing Movement, which reached its peak in the lead up to the Japanese invasion between 1935 and 1937, is often invoked to illustrate the efforts that musicians made in order to capture the hearts of the masses, and the importance of mass singing for the cause of the resistance (Chen 2005, 39–43; Howard 2015; Tang 2020). This has allowed scholars to include wartime singing in histories of organized mass struggle, drawing a line from nation-building through school songs (*xuetang ge*) in the early twentieth century to early communist mass singing, and from voiced resistance against imperialism during the Second Sino-Japanese War to “class struggle” through revolutionary songs widely popular during the Cultural Revolution in post-war China (Wong 1984). With the undiminished popularity of “red songs”, compilations of anti-Japanese wartime songs continue to be published decades after the war (Tuohy 2001, 120–21).

In this narrative of anti-Japanese mass struggle, musicians in the Japanese-occupied territories only play a role as brave contributors to underground resistance activities. The song *Without the Communist Party There Is No New China* written by Cao Huoxing in 1943 in the outskirts of Japanese-occupied Beijing, for example, is still invoked today as Beijing's musical contribution to the communist war effort (Meng 2018, 162, 268). Tracing resistance in the occupied territories certainly has its merits. However, it is the lack of recognition for aesthetically similar musical developments in the musical culture of the occupation state that I deem problematic. Specifically, I question claims that point to the use of Chinese folk tunes and mass singing as uniquely effective characteristics of resistance repertoire and performance practice (e.g. Howard 2015).

The musical characteristics of resistance songs have been analyzed by Isabel Wong and Joshua Howard (Howard 2015, 247–49, 254–55, 263–64; Wong 1984, 122–27). While Wong and Howard agree that these songs are not the most sophisticated musical creations, they explain their efficacy as grounded in certain musical properties. These include colloquial lyrics, syllabic lines, a limited vocal range, rhythmic repetitions and a lack of modulations, dotted and syncopated rhythms, sequencing and repetitions. Howard and Wong also emphasize the use of pentatonic modes and elements of certain types of Chinese folk music to render songs familiar and emphasize cultural identity. Indeed, displaced musicians based at the Lu Xun Arts Academy in the communist wartime centre of Yan'an established a Folk Music Research Society which collected folk songs (Yang 2004a, 26–27; Hung 1996, 907–12), and composers in these areas started to incorporate elements of Chinese folk music into their works (Tuohy 2001, 115–16; Holm 1984). This interest in folk music was part of a larger effort that

dominated the literary and artistic scene in the communist base areas during the war.¹¹ Thus, the use of folk elements in resistance songs and the authentic manipulation of people's voices are understood as the essential aesthetic achievement and a cornerstone of the success of anti-Japanese mass singing in most of the existing literature (Hung 1996, 908–12, 925–29).

Accompanying the development of anti-Japanese repertoire were new forms of performance practices, most importantly mass singing activities organized in major cities throughout China, including Beijing (Howard 2015, 250–71; Tang 2020, 18–23; Ho and Ho 2012, 200–201; Meng 2018, 65). Leftist intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s understood mass singing as one of the most important tools in the battle and a reason for the eventual victory of resistance forces (Howard 2015, 238–39; Tang 2020, 23). Scholars today reiterate such sentiments as they credit mass singing and its reflection in cinema and radio broadcasting as a “powerful new medium in social organization and mobilization” (Tang 2020, 22) and emphasize its role in “China’s emergence as a singing nation” (6).

As I show throughout this thesis, however, none of this was unique to the resistance. We can find continuities and similarities between not only anti-Japanese song repertoire and songs commissioned by the occupation state, but also with occupation-state mass singing and recording practices as well. I thus argue that while narratives praising the aesthetics and innovations in performance practice of resistance culture are entirely valid, their partial reliance on a poorly constructed opposition to *shidaiqu*

¹¹ The impact of Mao Zedong’s call for national cultural forms in his 1942 “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” is well researched. For a recent exploration of folk art in Yan’an, see Chapter 7 of Lufkin (2016, 159–87).

as “collaborationist” musicking hinders scholarly appreciation and deeper understanding of music produced in support of the occupation state.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed existing literature on the musical culture of Japanese-occupied north China. I have outlined three dominant types of narratives which have framed existing understanding of musical life in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. One focuses on individual composers, the second focuses on the role of *shidaiqu* produced by the commercial recording industry and the third highlights musicians’ contribution to nation-building, the anti-imperial mass struggle and resistance against the Japanese. Each of these narratives are constructed along paradigmatic dichotomies such as academic/commercial, elite/popular, modern/traditional, revolutionary/imperialist and Chinese/Western. These are in turn associated with moral judgements and developments in corresponding wartime territories. Narratives of individual composers often follow a teleological understanding of musical modernism and appraise individual composer’s modernist achievements – especially those of the academic musical elite in the Nationalist realm and those communist composers who drew on elite forms of “Western” art music in developing distinctly “Chinese” pieces in support of the anti-imperialist struggle (Yang 2004a). Narratives of commercial music, though highly contested in the 1920s and 1930s, often associate *shidaiqu* during the war with imperialist influences (both Western and Japanese), moral reprehensibility and thus the occupied territories (Chen 2014; 2005, 263–67; Yu 2006, 379–83; Benson 2004). But moral judgements are most obvious in narratives of musicians’ contribution to the “revolutionary” anti-imperialist

struggle, judged as morally superior to “musical collaboration”, and commonly associated with populist mass singing activities and the turn toward distinctly Chinese folk tunes in the communist base areas (e.g. Hung 1996; Howard 2015).

Assessing the blind spots that these narratives have created, I argue that this thesis’ analysis of music produced in support of the occupation state offers an important counterpoint. Studying the repertoires and performance practices developed in Japanese-occupied north China will not only close a historiographical gap but shed new light on our judgement of musical developments in wartime China more broadly. Throughout this chapter, I have pointed toward some of the ways in which existing narratives might shift. While musicologists have included individual Beijing-based composers such as Jiang Wenye in the history of musical modernism in China, we need to explore their role in the occupation state’s campaigns and provide an account of the conditions in Japanese-occupied Beijing that allowed for such modernist developments. I also argue that we need to move beyond the often-exclusive association of the occupied territories with commercial “musical pabulum”. This means reassessing the role of commercial music and gendered voices in the musical culture of the occupation state and examining how musical elites working for the regime viewed the genre. Analyzing the newly developed repertoire of the occupation state will challenge assumptions about the uniqueness of resistance songs and draw into question claims about the reason for their effectiveness and continued popularity. With this study of musical culture in Japanese-occupied north China I aim to deconstruct alignments between aesthetic and moral judgement and the placement of musical development in corresponding wartime territories.

CHAPTER 3

The Infrastructure of Musical Life in Japanese-Occupied Beijing

Having sketched out the internal structure and basic ideologies of the PGROC, the NCPC and the Xinminhui, as well as three dominant narratives of musical culture in wartime China that this thesis challenges, this chapter (and the following chapters) will focus on music in wartime Beijing and the role of music in the occupation state's cultural policies and propaganda efforts. This chapter aims to introduce the infrastructure of Beijing's musical world and the main institutions through which the regime operated in terms of music. I have organized my analysis in a manner that moves through different levels of institutional association with the occupation state. I will thus examine institutions that were directly linked to the occupation state, such as the radio, music publishing and military, police and railway brass bands. I will then move on to institutions funded by the occupation state, such as music institutes and state-funded colleges. Following this, I will look at those institutions that were simply tolerated by the regime, including private and commercial ensembles. And, finally, I will consider those institutions which maintained some degree of independence from the occupation state, such as missionary institutions. By doing this, we will be able to observe the process of co-optation of pre-existing musical institutions into the regime's propaganda infrastructure, and the development of new institutions created by the occupation state. We will also begin to understand the intricacies of institutional

affiliations which complicate what seems like a simple spectrum of association with the occupation state. In keeping with my emphasis on performance practices, I will also focus on the spatial aspects of sound production in occupied Beijing and provide an account of the spaces and venues which hosted the musical culture of the occupation state.

Throughout this chapter, we will observe how the mechanisms of control and mobilization employed by the occupation state paralleled those used by autocratic regimes in other realms. Musicians were subject to violent and nonviolent coercion, discursive constraints, structural repression and co-optation. The occupation state inherited the main institutions necessary for a functioning musical propaganda infrastructure but also reorganized the majority of these, at least nominally, in the process of establishing social control over cultural life. It further relied on the co-optation of elites by offering them career advancement and opportunities unavailable otherwise, or simply by offering them a comfortable life within state-funded institutions. But it also resorted to coercion and repression, silencing resistance voices and forcing people to display loyalty.

This overview will also show, however, that we need to further complicate the spectrum of private versus state-sanctioned expression. Much scholarship on cultural production in wartime China has assessed such activity assuming a relatively clear divide between private and state-sanctioned expression and categorized or placed it on a complementary moral spectrum of resistance – (passivity) – collaboration (Gunn 1980, 21–56; Fu 1993, xiv–xvii). As Nicole Huang has noted in her work on other regions of Japanese-occupied China, the term passivity in particular is “so vague that it works to eclipse much more complex personal choices that could be both politically and culturally subversive” (Huang 2005, 32). Instead, this chapter will illustrate the

structural complexities of musical life in wartime Beijing and thus take a first step toward a multidimensional understanding of musical activity under occupation.

Furthermore, I will argue that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the subsequent entry of the Allies into the war against Japan, and halt of American and British missionaries' musical activities did not, in fact, lead to a decline in musical activity in occupied Beijing after 1941. A periodization that assumes such a decline and emphasizes a clear divide between pre-1941 and post-1941 activities, I claim, is based on limited data focused on missionary institutions (e.g., Meng 2018, 25, 30, 66). While possibly applicable to cities with a larger international community such as Shanghai and Tianjin, in the case of Beijing, it is countered by a surge of state-funded and privately organized musical activity in 1942 and 1943. Throughout this chapter, I lay out the reasons for the increased activity after 1941. These include the establishment of new institutions hosting musical activities and funding for guest performances; the maintenance and appropriation of pre-existing institutions and inclusion of such institutions into campaign events; and an increased leniency toward and encouragement of musical entertainment.

As we begin to examine occupied Beijing's musical infrastructure, we also need to bear in mind continuities between musical life in the city before the war and during the occupation. As I shall demonstrate, the musician and Xinminhui official Ke Zhenghe is representative of such continuities on a personal level. But continuities can also be observed in the way in which occupation state officials viewed music, the political functions they ascribed to musical performance and the measures they deemed appropriate to further musical education and performance. This explains the occupation state's motivation to control, invest in and even micromanage musical production within its territory.

Continuities and the Political Function of Music

The most important link between musical life in Beijing prior to the war and during the occupation is one person: Ke Zhenghe. Though often overlooked in favour of his more prominent colleagues (e.g., Liu Tianhua and Jiang Wenye), Ke was a constant presence behind the scenes and a key figure in both the management of musical activities and in music publishing during the occupation. Ke was born in Taiwan in 1889 and moved to Beijing in 1923 after having established a musical career in colonial Taiwan and pursuing further education in Japan (Guo 2008, 3–9). In the 1920s, Ke worked alongside Xiao Youmei and belonged to the prominent group of musicians eager to establish a conservatory in Republican Beijing. He was particularly interested in jazz and recording technologies (Jones 2001, 192). When the staff of the Peking University Institute of Music relocated from Beijing to Shanghai in 1927, Ke Zhenghe stayed in Beijing. Thus, Ke and Liu Tianhua became the centre of Beijing's network of musical elites from the late 1920s onwards. Liu founded the Chinese Music Reform Society in 1927, which published the *Music Magazine* between 1927 and 1934. In 1927, Ke Zhenghe and Liu Tianhua also joined former members of the Western Music Society in founding the Amateur Music Society which published the journal *Xinyue chao* (Li 2003, 37–42). When this journal stopped publication in 1929, a new society based at Ke's alma mater was formed: The National Normal University Music Study Group. After Liu Tianhua's death in 1932, Ke Zhenghe founded the Chinese Musical Education Promotion Society in 1935 (Li 2003, 42).

In 1938, following the Japanese invasion, Ke Zhenghe joined the ranks of Xinminhui officials and became heavily involved in the occupation state's cultural policies.¹ Ke composed several Xinminhui songs and organized performances to further their distribution (Wang 2013, 16, 38–40, 48). We will repeatedly encounter Ke as the “hidden hand” in Xinminhui musical activities in the following chapters.² Most prominently, Ke represents continuous efforts to institutionalize musical learning and performance in the city (both before and during the occupation), as well as continuities in the ways in which music and its political functions were understood in wartime China.

In Republican China, sound and music were understood to be intimately connected to political power. This is especially true with regard to Western-style music, which was seen as an essential tool for nation-building and the forging and management of state subjects (Mittler 1997, 46; Liu 2010, 29–32; Tuohy 2001, 107, 111–13). The occupation state's officials shared and built on these beliefs and ambitions. Officials commonly referred to music as being indicative of a country's rise and fall, citing from the Confucian classic *Record of Music (Yueji)* (Legge 1885; Feng 1941). This causal relationship between music and the “health” of the state (the direction of which remained deliberately unclear) was commonly invoked to justify calls for music education during the occupation (Ke 1940, 14). While we might question the sincerity of such invocations of classical wisdom, officials certainly seemed to believe that

¹ Ke was responsible for re-education as a member of the Central Guidance and Leadership Department from January 1938. He became vice president of the Xinminhui's Capital Guidance Department in 1939 (Anonymous 1941e; 1938b).

² Ke was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and reportedly died in Ningxia in 1979 (Han 1989, 185).

music was a highly effective medium to promote political messages. Their assumptions about the emotional immediacy of music, as well as the universality of music, led to wide-ranging theories about music as a highly potent political tool. Zhou Dawen, head of the Central Broadcasting Station in occupied Beijing, for example, strongly believed in the power of songs:

Broadcasting songs, we can use their property to touch and move people, to let them spread widely among the people and achieve a change in their manners and alter their customs! Humans are emotional animals, it is difficult to force them [to do something], but easy to move them (Zhou 1942).

The emotional immediacy ascribed to music contributed to the belief that music might subtly circumvent pre-existing political ideals. Ke Zhenghe, responsible for much of the Xinminhui's musical propaganda efforts, explicated the appeal of music as a propaganda tool for the illiterate classes and saw traditional opera houses as "a venue of civic education" (Ke 1941). Music was understood as a source of legitimacy, as a tool for the construction of community, but also as a tool of manipulative communication, a pacifier and instrument of repression. Music was clearly identified as a source of discursive power and the occupation state was willing to exert such control. To this end, they implemented structural changes to incorporate Beijing's musical establishment into the occupation state's propaganda apparatus.

Musical elites in occupied China had a relatively uniform and clear vision of the need for a vibrant musical scene, and understood the need for institutions to help build it. However, this was not a view that had started with the Japanese occupation. Rather, their vision was a direct continuation of early Republican Chinese academic music elites' efforts, and emphasized government involvement and educational measures

rather than commercial enterprise. The tasks listed by musical elites during the occupation in various articles include:

- (i) Supporting the institutionalization of musical life.³
- (ii) Reconstructing and developing Chinese musical tradition, folk music, musical drama and fostering Chinese new music.⁴
- (iii) Strengthening general music education by
 - a. making music an obligatory class at schools, normal universities and vocational schools,
 - b. organizing music teacher's training and evaluation, reviewing music textbooks and song collections,
 - c. organizing public concerts, lectures and educational radio programs and
 - d. designing music museums.⁵
- (iv) Strengthening specialized and professional music practice, education and research by
 - a. establishing a conservatory and improving the social status of musicians,
 - b. organizing annual conferences and competitions,

³ This was supposed to be achieved by appointing music inspectors at the provincial and municipal level, organizing musical ensembles, and establishing music research, lecture, leisure and publishing associations, as well as Xinminhui branch societies (Ke 1940).

⁴ Traditional Chinese music could be reconstructed from oral traditions, fragments and through traditions surviving in Japan and Korea. Theorists (acousticians) and craftsmen were supposed to collaborate in the development of sonically stronger traditional instruments. Composers were encouraged to transcribe, rearrange, and harmonize traditional music, to use Chinese modes to write new music. Their livelihoods should be strengthened by protecting copyright (Ke 1940; Kage 1941).

⁵ And further introducing "music appreciation" classes, a trend facilitated by recording companies, and equipping universities with instruments (Ke 1939b; 1939c).

c. translating, publishing and rewarding theoretical works and establishing specialized journals, and

d. editing a music encyclopaedia to unify terminologies

(Ke 1940; Kage 1941; Gao 1942; Chen 1941; Dong 1943; Ke 1939a).

Some of the measures outlined above had already been or were immediately put into practice by the Xinminhui and pre-existing musical groups, while others were aspirations. But many of these tasks finally found an institutional home in occupied north China with the founding of the Beijing Music Culture Association (BMCA) in 1942, which explicitly listed such aims in its statutes (Beijing Municipal Archive 1943, 13–14).

The BMCA was established on the initiative of Ke Zhenghe after an organization of the same name had been established in Japan only a few months earlier.⁶ Comprised of five choirs,⁷ the North China Transportation and Railway Company Brass Bands, the Harmonica Society,⁸ and the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, the BMCA represented the completion of a long process of incorporating musical ensembles into the Xinminhui's branch system structure. The BMCA immediately became Beijing's most important organizer of concert life. Its mission was to "promote the development of the musical profession in north China, complete the construction of Chinese 'new

⁶ The Japanese Music Culture Association was founded in November 1941 (Tonoshita n.d.; 2008).

⁷ Initial members included the Beijing Shenghua Choir, the Beijing Choral Music Association, the Beijing Japanese YMCA Choir, the Shuangye Choir and the Beijing Mixed Choir. The Japanese Shuangye and Beijing Mixed Choir had previously been members of the Sino-Japanese Music Research Society, founded in November 1941 (*Xinminbao* 1941r).

⁸ The Harmonica Society and the North China Railway Brass Band must have joined before May 1943 (Dong 1943).

music' and develop Chinese traditional [pre-existing] music to merge them" (Beijing Municipal Archive 1943, 12). It set itself the task to:

- (i) commission timely songs that will rectify the people's moral and thoughts,
- (ii) publish a music journal, books and sheet music,
- (iii) hold music competitions of different types,
- (iv) hold various concerts,
- (v) hold music lectures,
- (vi) hold music conferences,
- (vii) organize choirs, brass bands and string orchestras,
- (viii) research Chinese traditional music to advance the construction of Chinese music,
- (ix) collect Chinese and foreign sheet music and instruments,
- (x) found a museum for music and Chinese opera,
- (xi) better the design of musical education,
- (xii) hold other musical events

(Beijing Municipal Archive 1943, 12–13).

The BMCA organized commemorative events and relief concerts. It held several meetings of the Music Research Society as well as organizing performances by brass bands, choirs, concert evenings with Japanese soloists and record-listening sessions (Beijing Municipal Archive 1943, 10–11). The Association's concerts were free to enter, which meant that concerts funded by the organization were more likely to be attended by Beijing's less affluent residents.

Comparing the BMCA's list of tasks with musical elites' vision shows how much of the actual work of elites found an institutional home in the BMCA. Though not all these objectives were ultimately achieved, the BMCA's founding marked a great change in wartime musical life that was recognized even by relatively critical publications at the time (Shang 1942a).

Acknowledging the role of Ke Zhenghe and the BMCA in Beijing touches on three aspects highlighted in the introduction of this chapter. Firstly, it means recognizing continuities in the pursuit of musical education and the institutionalization thereof in China throughout the twentieth century, and including steps taken in the occupied territories in this longer narrative. And while the BMCA's founding in 1942 confirms narratives that highlight increased control over musical expression after 1941, it also indicates increased funding and activity after the "1941 divide" (i.e., assumptions that Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor led to a decline in musical activity in occupied Beijing). Additionally, the fact that the BMCA included not only state-funded brass bands, but also privately established choirs and the Beijing Symphony Orchestra illustrates the structural complexity of wartime Beijing's musical life and the challenges involved in making a clear distinction between private and state-affiliated elites and institutions.

Music Publishing, Radio and the Film and Recording Industry

Similar continuities can be observed in the field of music publishing, and in the occupation state's control of radio stations and the film and recording industries. Beginning in 1928, Ke Zhenghe ran his own music publishing house and shop for

instruments and recordings. This was known as the China Music Society. Under this umbrella, Ke edited many volumes, including basic music theory textbooks and repertoire collections for school choirs, as well as for violin, piano and harmonica (Han 1989a, 187–88). Following the Japanese invasion, Ke’s publishing house became the “Xinmin Music Press” in 1938 (Han 1989a, 187). As curricula were reviewed, Ke Zhenghe’s school song collections were reissued by the Xinmin Music Press and sanctioned as teaching materials in occupied Beijing (*Xinminbao* 1938c). The Xinmin Music Press also reissued selections for a range of musical instruments, with reprints of *How to Play the Harmonica* (Ke 1935b) indicating this instrument’s popularity in Beijing. By editing these volumes, Ke was single-handedly responsible for the majority of the repertoire that was taught at schools and played by amateur societies – both prior to the war *and* during the occupation of Beijing.

The radio was one of the main tools of propaganda in occupied China (Zhao 1987; 2015; Kushner 2006, 54–58, 147). Japanese engineers repaired radio stations directly after the occupation of major cities and used particularly strong signals to distort radio broadcasts from other sources.⁹ Beijing’s Central Radio was formally established at the same time as the founding of the PGROC in December 1937. From February 1938, it controlled all broadcasting in north China (Zhong guang yanweihui Tangshan keti zu 2005). The regime also tried to keep track and register radio receivers in north China, registering 26,000 receivers in 1940 – what they estimated to be half of all existing receivers (*Xinminbao* 1940d). After such investigations, the regime further invested in radio by moving into a new, larger studio in February 1941, supplying

⁹ A report published by the communists’ Culture Education Research Association details the set-up of radio stations in occupied China (Wenhua jiaoyu yanjiuhui 1941, 169–74).

radio receivers and offering consultations on existing devices (*Xinminbao* 1941a). The regime also tried to limit the reception of alternative programming by sealing short wave radios with wax (Sitsky 2015, 189).

Radio North China commonly aired traditional Chinese music, traditional forms of storytelling, popular songs, speeches, and news reports. It also broadcast almost every major campaign event. Despite commercial radio receivers being affordable only for affluent families, communal listening practices in teahouses, shops and official “radio listening sessions” in public parks made the programming available to the wider public and ensured control over which station was being listened to (a topic that we shall return to in Chapter 5). The radio also became a source of income for recording artists it employed as well as a means to gain publicity. Radio North China featured many of Beijing’s semi-professional musical ensembles and choirs. In November 1942, it became home to Beijing’s most professional choir, the North China Radio Choir under the direction of Takarai Shin’ichi, lecturer at Beijing Normal College (*Xinminbao* 1943r; *Xinminbao* 1943s). A North China Radio Associations’ Children’s Choir was then established in August 1943 (*Xinminbao* 1943l).¹⁰

While the radio was controlled and the contents of broadcasts monitored, film and newsreel production was overseen very closely and used to promote pro-Japanese and Pan-Asianist ideologies. In 1938, the film industry was reorganized under the control of the Xinminhui as the Xinmin Film Association (Ren 2019, 17). This was again reorganized with investment by the Manchukuo Film Association Corporation and Japanese film companies, the PGROC and the Japanese East Asia Development Board

¹⁰ A Japanese Beijing Children’s Broadcasting Choir had apparently existed beforehand (*Xinminbao* 1941w).

in December 1939 to form North China Film Ltd (*Shibao* 1939b). In 1942, this same company installed a nominally Chinese-run Yanjing Film Company, which produced traditional opera films. Other film companies active in Beijing included the Raise Asia Film Institute, established in February 1938 by the North China Area Army (NCAA), which produced propaganda shorts (Ren 2019, 17).

Films were used to promote all aspects of collaboration, including news of smaller political campaigns. The occupation state also aimed to control the repertoire of films shown in commercial movie theatres by imposing a quota of Japanese films and prohibiting the public screening of British and American films after 1941. Much has been written on the film industry and individual films in occupied north China (e.g., Taylor 2016). With regard to musical life in occupied Beijing, however, we have to note the role of the film industry in Beijing's music world. The radio, film and recording studios were an important part of the musical infrastructure in Beijing as they provided performance opportunities and income not only to singing actresses and stars such as Li Xianglan and Bai Guang, but also to young local singers like Chi Yuanyuan, recording artists such as Huang Shiping and composers, including Jiang Wenye, as well as the instrumentalists and choirs that were featured. Films were screened at campaign events in public parks and thus made visible (and, just as importantly, audible) to a larger audience. Films usually featured a few songs which were released simultaneously by commercial record companies and played on the radio, while scores were printed in commercial magazines such as *Huabei yinghua*. The radio and record labels, such as the Victor, Columbia, Pathé and China Records in turn co-funded musical activities as promotional events for recording releases (YSC

1944c) and supported commissions of propaganda songs (*Xinminbao* 1940a).¹¹ We therefore have to consider the music publishing, radio, film and recording industries as an interconnected network of cultural elites. We have to consider the different repertoires explored in the following chapters as products of this infrastructure. That means we have to analyze musical performances within a multimedia world and consider the effect of this intermediality on performance practices and audience perception (as I do in Chapter 5).

Below, I will introduce the institutions, musical ensembles and individuals shaping wartime Beijing's musical culture in more detail. As mentioned above, I will move from institutions directly affiliated and immediately employed in musical campaign events to institutions that were only later incorporated into the occupation state's propaganda infrastructure (or that aimed to maintain independence from the state despite the realities of the occupation). Please refer to figure 2 for a map of Beijing's most important musical institutions.

¹¹ For a history of these labels in early Republican China, see Steen (2006).




Figure 2: Map of musical venues in wartime Beijing. Halls (yellow, Roman numerals): I – Huarentang; II – Hall of Supreme Harmony; III – Zhongshan Park with Xinmin Hall and Beijing Music Hall. Schools and universities (green, Arabic numerals): 1 – Furen University; 2 – Art Department of National Beijing Normal College; 3 – National Beijing Women’s Normal College (Aula); 4 – National Beijing Normal College; 5 – Private Jinhua Art School (from 1941); 6 – Yuying School; 7 – Bridgeman Girls’ School; 8 – YMCA; 9 – Peking Union Medical College; 10 – Huiwen School and Muzhen Girl’s School. Churches (red, minuscule): a – Church of Our Lady of Mount Carmel; b – Xishiku Catholic Church; c

– Xuanwumen Catholic Church; d – Wangfujing Catholic Church; e – St Michael’s Church; f – Dengshikou Congregational Church; g – China Christian Church; h – Asbury Church. *Theatres* (dark blue, majuscule): A – Chang’an Theatre; B – Xinxin Theatre; C – Zhenguang Film Theatre; D – Beijing Hotel. Original map produced in 1938, reproduced in the US in 1948, available through the Library of Congress digital map collection (<https://www.loc.gov/item/2006626862/>, accessed 10 September 2019), venues added. For a larger version, visit the TreasonousRepertoires Zotero library at <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires>.

Institutions of Musical Practice and Learning

Military and Railway Companies

Among the ensembles first employed to support the occupation state were those most closely affiliated with military occupation and the regime’s physical power apparatus. These were the brass bands of the Beijing City Police, the North China Transportation Company and the NCAA. The Beijing City Police Band, in particular, was employed in the early months of the occupation, before other private ensembles had been successfully co-opted (*Xinminbao* 1938e). The Xinminhui Capital Guidance Department’s [Brass] Band Branch Society celebrated its establishment with a march through the city in May 1939 (*Xinminbao* 1939i; *Xinminbao* 1940i). Similarly, the NCAA Military Band played a vital role in 1938, performing a series of school concerts in Beijing, although it was later only employed on special occasions, such as the grand finale of political campaign concerts (*Xinminbao* 1938o; Wang 2013, 34–35). Both bands continued to perform regularly at victory parades, festivals, opening

ceremonies and song releases.¹² The North China Transportation Company also had choirs participate in the occupation state's festivities (Dong 1943). As this shows (and as we shall see in later chapters), the military, police and railways remained an important part of occupied Beijing's musical infrastructure. But while common narratives might suggest an increase in control throughout the years, the opposite seems to be the case here. While military and police bands played a role in establishing the occupation state, they ceased to be mobilized in the same way after the successful incorporation of privately established ensembles.

Music Institutes

Next on our spectrum of institutions affiliated with the occupation state are institutions of higher learning. The Music Institutes at National Beijing Normal College and National Beijing Women's Normal College became Beijing's most important educational institutions for professional musicians during the occupation. Since the colleges were funded by the occupation state, they also became the regimes' primary recruitment ground for musical propaganda activities¹³ – with staff and students ensembles becoming the regimes' most important and reliable musical supporters. Students of the National Beijing Normal Colleges did participate in both missionary

¹² Please refer to the TreasonousRepertoires Zotero library for sources on military brass band activities in Japanese-occupied Beijing: <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires>.

¹³ Meng Weiping concludes that most people at the institution studied quietly during the occupation and even resisted the Japanese – Lao Zhicheng, who was imprisoned twice (in 1941 and 1944) for anti-Japanese activities, is his prime example (Meng 2018, 17; Mang 2004, 89–124). While personal memories might support such an evaluation, data on participants in the Xinminhui's propaganda performances does not.

musical circles and in musical propaganda activities of the occupation state.¹⁴ Students of the Music Institute and the Beijing Normal College Choir were regularly recruited to perform during political campaigns. They also recorded propaganda songs and performed on Beijing Central Radio.¹⁵ The choirs of the Associated Elementary and Middle Schools of Beijing Normal College were among the choirs that successfully participated in singing competitions organized by the Xinminhui (*Xinminbao* 1938y). The directors of the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute were Ke Zhenghe and Zhang Xiushan¹⁶ who, alongside Ke, became heavily involved in the Xinminhui's musical activities. Other staff included renowned composer Jiang Wenye, whom we have already encountered in Chapter 2, as well as the pianists Piotr Kupka¹⁷ and Tanaka Toshio, the above mentioned conductor Takarai Shin'ichi and a Russian violinist (Meng 2018, 16; Mang 2004, 103). The National Beijing Women's Normal College Music Institute was headed by Li Enke.¹⁸ Other staff included the pianist Lao Zhicheng and the violinist Zhao Niankui, who became the first concert master of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra (*Xinminbao* 1941e), as well as the violinist Zhang Weizhi, the Japanese soprano Suzuki Fumiko and the tenor Wang Dunfang – all

¹⁴ For lists of students studying at National Beijing Normal Colleges refer to Meng's monograph (2018, 15–17). Admissions lists were printed newspapers such as the *Shibao* and *Chenbao* (*Shibao* 1939a; *Shibao* 1940c; *Chenbao* 1941b).

¹⁵ For a list of choir and orchestra members, see *Xinminbao* 1941g.

¹⁶ Zhang Xiushan, a tenor from Hebei, emigrated to Taiwan in 1949 (Meng 2018, 15).

¹⁷ Piotr Kupka, born in 1879, was either German or Czech, and a graduate of the Vienna Conservatory. He had taught in Beijing at Tsinghua University and the National Beijing Normal College in the 1930s (Meng 2018, 145).

¹⁸ Li Enke, born in 1894 in Tianjin, had studied in the United States, and started teaching at the National Beijing Women's Normal College in 1938 (Meng 2018, 16).

requested soloists – and a Russian pianist (Meng 2018, 15). We will encounter all these figures in subsequent chapters.

I briefly introduced Jiang Wenye's role in the narrative of musical modernism in China in Chapter 2, as well as his fall from grace due to his involvement with the occupation state. The extent to which Jiang's appointment as a lecturer at the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute was tied to his involvement in propaganda activities remains unclear, but it was announced concurrently with Jiang promoting the film *Road to Peace in the Orient* and the release of his *Xinmin Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938h). Jiang's relationship with the occupation state can be viewed in a number of different ways. Interestingly, Jiang never formally joined the Xinminhui. Nevertheless, he composed some of the organization's early propaganda anthems (some of which we shall examine in Chapter 4). These songs are usually cited as the reason for his post-war persecution (Liu 2010, 236). However, there are more extensive connections between Jiang's works and Japanese propaganda efforts. Jiang composed music for a number of Japanese propaganda films, including two war documentaries, *Beijing* (Kamei 1938) and *Nanjing* (Matsuzaki 1938), produced by the Japanese company Tōhō in 1938.¹⁹ He recycled some of this material in his later symphonic works and published several pieces through Ke's Xinmin Music Press (Wang 2016, 5.2: 35–79). Several of his orchestral pieces have been described as sympathetic to the idea of a “co-prosperity sphere” by some theorists (e.g., Wang 2010, 172). Some argue that Jiang was by no means a light-hearted collaborationist and tried to avoid involvement

¹⁹ For the most comprehensive list of films, see Liou 2010, 17.

in Japanese initiatives (Su 1990, 39–40).²⁰ But while Jiang certainly fell victim to his own prominence, he did not sacrifice his relatively comfortable life, or actively avoid publicity, during the occupation period.

Jiang Wenye's post-war fate can be juxtaposed with the now less well-known but nonetheless prominent wartime pianist Lao Zhicheng, who not only taught at the Women's College, but also became head of the Private Jinghua Art School in occupied Beijing in 1937 (Meng 2018, 22). Lao was born in Guangdong in 1911 and moved to Beijing during his childhood, studying at Beijing Normal College from 1925 to 1931 and becoming a teacher there upon graduation. During the occupation and after the war, Lao was a prolific pianist and music educator. Apart from his engagements as a soloist, Lao was Japanese-occupied Beijing's most requested accompanist – the breadth of his activity in chamber music ensembles is noteworthy (*Xinminbao* 1942c; *Xinminbao* 1942b; *Xinminbao wankan* 1941a). However, his relationship with the Japanese is particularly complex. Lao was interned and violently questioned upon suspicion of affiliation with the communists in 1941 and 1944 (Mang 2004, 46–54, 89–101, 111–24). However, such coercion, and his affiliation with Beijing Normal College, seems to have made it impossible to avoid involvement with the occupation state's propaganda machine. As I have mentioned in my brief analysis of Lao's biography in Chapter 2 (and will show in more detail in later chapters), Lao's internment seems to have been used by scholars to veil his involvement in Xinminhui propaganda campaigns both as a performer and possibly even as a composer.

²⁰ Similarly, Kong Hsiao-Yun suggests minimal involvement based on her interviews with Wu Yunzhen in her thesis (2002). As I will show in subsequent chapters, Jiang was involved in Xinminhui activities until at least 1942.

My intention in exploring both Jiang's and Lao's stories and their contributions to the regime is not to denigrate their musical accomplishments or to denounce them as collaborators. Instead, accepting the "grey" areas of life under occupation as reflected in individual biographies can help us to understand the ramifications of institutional affiliations with a musical infrastructure overtaken by a belligerent occupier.

After the unification of the National Beijing Normal College and National Beijing Women's Normal College in 1942, Takarai Shin'ichi was made head of the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute, and Zhang Xiushan and Li Enke became his deputies (Meng 2018, 16). Staff of both institutions continued to teach during the occupation. New staff included the Japanese-educated Chinese composer Lei Zhenbang;²¹ one of the few teachers of traditional instruments at the institution who also regularly performed at official events, Jiang Fengzhi;²² and, significantly, two non-Chinese and non-Japanese musicians, the pianist Vladimir A. Garts,²³ and an unnamed Hungarian violinist (Meng 2018, 15–16, 103). As had been the case with Jiang Wenye, Lei Zhenbang's appointment at Beijing Normal College coincided with the composition of several propaganda songs (*Huabei xinbao* 1944f; *Huabei xinbao* 1944g).

²¹ Lei Zhenbang, who was born in 1916 in Beijing, studied in Japan from 1939, and returned to Beijing in 1943 to teach at the National Beijing Women's Normal College (Meng 2018, 117–18).

²² Jiang Fengzhi, born in 1908 in Jiangsu, was an *erhu* and traditional stringed instruments performer. He studied at the Shanghai Conservatory from 1928 and transferred to Peking University in 1929 to study with Liu Tianhua. He taught at the Jinghua Art Vocational School from 1932 (Meng 2018, 122–23).

²³ Vladimir A. Garts, was a pianist and teacher at the Peking University Institute of Music, National Beijing Women's Normal College and National Beijing University (Meng 2018, 141; Gong 2008, 47).

A few other professional musicians belonged to this network of professional music elites and became involved in Xinminhui musical activities, but were not formally associated with any of the institutions I have listed. These include Wang Tizhi, Li Yiming and Chen Ruyi. Chen, for example, came to Beijing in July 1941 after six years of studying piano, music theory and composition at the Musashino Academia Musicae in Tokyo. These individuals greatly enriched musical life both in theory and practice after their arrival.²⁴

The complexities of institutional affiliations can be further illustrated with institutional overlap. Some of the staff of the National Beijing Women's Normal College, for example, also taught at the Music Institute of Beijing's Private Jinghua Art School. This school was founded in 1925 and a music institute within it established by Li Baochen in 1930 (Meng 2018, 21).²⁵ Teachers at this institute included Zhang Weizhi, Jiang Fengzhi and Lao Zhicheng. Such double affiliations make it difficult to differentiate between state-funded and private or commercial musical expression.

Private and Commercial Activities

Western-style professional musicians and ensembles were often part of state-funded institutions, such as the army, police, schools and universities. They were therefore

²⁴ Chen's article "How to Develop China's Music" (1941) was credited as having a major impact in the musical world during the occupation (*Shibao* 1941a).

²⁵ Li Baochen, born in 1907 in Baoding, graduated from Yanjing University in 1930 and became a music teacher and choral conductor at Beijing's missionary schools. He studied at Oberlin College between 1935 and 1937 and returned to Beijing before moving to Chongqing to teach at the Music Conservatory (Meng 2018, 122).

accessible to the occupation state without additional incorporation into the Xinminhui. However, the occupation state also aimed to extend its control over commercial and community-based groups and private ensembles and thereby diversify its musical repertoire (so that it could appeal to different audiences). Thus, many ensembles were formally registered as Xinminhui branch societies – initially often with little effect on their performance practice. Commercial and private ensembles also received ad hoc funding through government proxies. The central sources of funding for cultural production and concert life in wartime Beijing were the Xinminhui Guidance and Propaganda Departments, member organizations of the Propaganda League,²⁶ and the Raise Asian Culture Association. However, the comprehensive co-optation of commercial and community-based groups and private initiatives was only completed in 1942 with the founding of the above-mentioned BMCA. Only then were private music groups incorporated systematically into the propaganda apparatus and easily employed for political campaigns. Similarly, initiatives to provide relief through music were only consolidated in 1943 with the establishment of the China Life and Culture Association²⁷ and the China New Culture Construction Association.²⁸ Below, I will focus on: (i) the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, Beijing's most prestigious professional ensemble established during the occupation; (ii) community ensembles incorporated

²⁶ This includes newspaper publishers, most prominently the *Xinminbao* and the *Dongya xinbao*, as well as the Central Radio and China Broadcasting Association. Nominal oversight over propaganda activities was undertaken by the East Asia Development Board Culture Department, which is only very rarely explicitly mentioned.

²⁷ The China Life and Culture Association was founded on 16 June 1943 (*Shibao* 1943k), its mission being relief fundraising and enriching musical life in Beijing under the motto “reform life, create culture” (*Shibao* 1943n).

²⁸ The New Culture Construction Association was established on 27 June 1943 (*Xinminbao* 1943j).

into the regime's musical infrastructure; and (iii) professional guest performers who contributed to the regime's cultural capital.



Figure 3: *Beijing Symphony Orchestra and Children's Choir (Huabei xinbao 1944a).*

The Beijing Symphony Orchestra (see figure 3) was established in late 1940 and gave three performances in 1941. Its members were predominantly lecturers and students at Beijing's universities and colleges, and hailed from China, Japan, Russia, Italy and the Philippines (*Xinminbao* 1941e). Because of its international membership, it was also colloquially referred to as the "International Symphony Orchestra" or "Eight Nation's Alliance Orchestra" (Meng 2018, 66). The National Beijing Women's Normal College's violin lecturer Zhao Niankui served as concert master, while Inoue Tadashini served as the conductor (*Xinminbao* 1941f). In contrast to the orchestras at Yanjing and Furen Universities, which only rehearsed in preparation for specific projects, this orchestra met on a weekly basis.²⁹ The orchestra was paid after each rehearsal, but the exact source of funding is unclear, though it almost certainly

²⁹ Meng Weiping cites Xu Guanghan, who attests to rehearsals taking place every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday (Meng 2018, 66). Yao Siyuan claims there was only one rehearsal a week (Personal interview with Yao Siyuan, 11 November 2018).

stemmed from Japanese proxy organizations.³⁰ Some have suggested that the orchestra performed regularly at cinemas, which also would have provided a steady revenue stream (Mang 2004, 105).

The Beijing Symphony Orchestra's repertoire included symphonies for smaller orchestras by Joseph Haydn (1732–1809) and Schubert (1797–1828) as well as piano concertos by Franz Liszt (1811–1886) and Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827), which Lao Zhicheng performed as the soloist (*Xinminbao wankan* 1941a; *Chenbao* 1941a; *Xinminbao* 1941e; *Xinminbao* 1942c). This suggests some consistency with repertoire performed by orchestras and ensembles in Beijing prior to the war (Meng 2018, 5–6, 63).³¹ We know that many of the orchestra's foreign members left Beijing in 1941 (i.e., shortly before and immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) (*Xinminbao* 1941f). While the exodus and replacement of a considerable number of instrumentalists would have likely entailed at least a temporary decline in quality of the orchestra's musical practice, it is important to note that the orchestra continued its activities after that date. With the orchestra's integration into the BMCA in 1942, the proportion of Chinese members increased drastically (*Huabei xinbao* 1944b). We could, therefore, also interpret the years after 1941, in the eyes of the occupation state itself, as a first "liberation" from (British and American) colonial and missionary influences. The orchestra continued to perform on its own accord in the post-1941 period (*Xinminbao* 1941e; *Xinminbao* 1942d; Shang 1942b, 82), with performances on 14 March 1942 at Zhenguang Film Theatre (*Xinminbao* 1942d; *Xinminbao* 1942c)

³⁰ Yao Siyuan suggests they were payed one *yuan datou* and speculates that it came from the Japanese Embassy in Beijing (Personal interview with Yao Siyuan, 11 November 2018).

³¹ Meng and Yao date the establishment of the orchestra to 1942 (Meng 2018, 16; Yao 2002, 107), but I can clearly trace the history of the orchestra back to late 1940.

and on 18 June 1942 at Beijing Hotel (Shang 1942b, 82). It again featured Lao Zhicheng playing Beethoven's *Piano Concerto No. 3* (1804) in the autumn of 1943 (Mang 2004, 104). Importantly, however, these three concerts were explicitly supported by the BMCA, the Japanese *Tōa shinpō* and the *Xinminbao*. The orchestra was also co-opted to accompany Japanese soloists and was increasingly used as an asset for political campaign purposes. It accompanied Japanese guest soloists (*Xinminbao* 1943o), performed at the opening of the Beijing City Music Hall in November 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1942p; *Shibao* 1942a), and even at fundraisers for the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (*Xinminbao* 1943t).

Significantly, the orchestra's repertoire changed with changes to its political standing. The first programme announced after it was co-opted into the occupation state's propaganda apparatus featured some of the pieces favoured by military brass bands, including Joseph Haydn's "*Military*" *Symphony No. 100* (1794), Gioachino Rossini's (1792–1868) overture to *Il Barbiere di Seville* (1816) and Beethoven's *Symphony No. 1* (1800) (*Xinminbao* 1942d; *Xinminbao* 1942c). The last reported performance of the orchestra in 1944 was an entire programme of Japanese contemporary music, accompanied by a statement asking for the financial support necessary to grant the orchestra's survival as a model of Sino-Japanese cultural exchange (*Huabei xinbao* 1944b).

Of course, the notion of orchestras as cultural assets in wartime is well established in the academic literature. In Nazi-occupied Europe, for example, orchestras were regarded as cultural assets and travelled as ambassadors of the "cultural superiority" of the Third Reich, but also to "sway host audiences into believing that the occupiers shared the same cultural values as those of the occupied and that expertly performed concerts could serve not only to nurture peaceful coexistence but also to enhance

active collaboration” (Fanning and Levi 2019, 2). However, before we dismiss the Beijing Symphony Orchestra as merely a vehicle of cultural imperialism we have to consider that public campaign events of the sort it was involved in made Western-style orchestral repertoire accessible to audiences that would otherwise not have been confronted with such musical performances.

The existence of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra has not been acknowledged in the historiography. Not many full standard complement orchestras (with doubled wind and brass sections) existed in Republican China. While the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra has received some attention in English-language literature (Yang 2017; Bickers 2001), the existence of the China Symphony Orchestra under Ma Sicong in Chongqing is also known, but less studied (Liu 2010, 244–45).³² Acknowledging the fact that Beijing’s first “proper” orchestra, staffed predominantly by Chinese musicians, took shape under Japanese occupation and serving the occupation state may be uncomfortable but also needs to be acknowledged.

In addition to the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, community ensembles were also an important part of the musical landscape in occupied Beijing. Incorporating community brass bands, choirs and instrumental groups in campaign events meant that the occupation state could diversify its propaganda activities and try to appeal to different audiences.

³² Three other orchestras are mentioned in the sources: the Ha’erbin Symphony Orchestra (*Xinminbao* 1942g); the Beijing Symphony String Orchestra (*Xinminbao* 1939e; *Xinminbao* 1939f; *Xinminbao* 1939g), which was possibly a predecessor of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra; and Zhang Xiaohu’s Amateur String Orchestra, which included some players from the missionary circles, but was likely based in Tianjin (*Shibao* 1943m).

Unique in its popularity and apparent willingness to participate in the occupation state's activities was the Beijing Branch of the China Harmonica Society, which had been established by in May 1936 (Wang 2013, 10; Lin 2005, 13; Beijing Municipal Archive 1936). This society thrived during the occupation,³³ continuing classes and organizing small- and large-scale ensembles.³⁴ The harmonica, as a Western-style instrument with roots in China,³⁵ had long appealed to the Chinese people as an instrument that was both modern, nativist and non-elite, while also being easy to learn, relatively cheap and portable. While reference to the harmonica may seem obscure, the Harmonica Society's various community branches and ensembles in Beijing, along with its founder, Wang Qingxun,³⁶ were the single most active community group at propaganda events in Beijing during the occupation. The association was integrated into the BMCA in 1942/3 (Dong 1943).

The regime found more collaborators with the revival of several semi-professional subgroups of Beijing's Chinese Opera Learned Society: the Kunqu Research Society, the Music Research Society and the Peking Opera Research Society, established in 1938, 1940 and early 1941, respectively. These societies offered lessons and performance opportunities for traditional Chinese instrumental groups and opera

³³ The China Harmonica Society had 15,000 paying members in 1939, and over 120,000 in 1946, with over 2,000 members in Beijing alone by 1939 (Lin 2005, 17; Anonymous 1939a).

³⁴ The Beijing Branch also published its own special issue of the Shanghai-based magazine *China Harmonica World* in May 1943 (Meng 2018, 249).

³⁵ That the development of the harmonica was potentially inspired by Joseph-Marie Amiot's (1718–1793) descriptions of the Chinese reed instrument known as the *sheng* was recounted in *China Harmonica World* (Bao 1940) and reported in occupied north China (Peng 1944).

³⁶ Wang Qingxun, who was born in 1905 in Taiwan, studied in Xiamen and Shanghai, and moved to Beijing in 1936 (Lin 2005).

ensembles and regularly participated in Central Radio broadcasts and entertained guests at official meetings and galas (*Xinminbao* 1940c; *Xinminbao* 1940h; *Xinminbao* 1943k).³⁷

Other community groups were more hesitant to participate. The cities' brass bands were reorganized in March 1943, forming the Beijing [Brass] Band Association, which included over forty representatives of Beijing's state and private brass bands (*Xinminbao* 1943e). And many of Beijing's amateur choirs, such as the Beijing Shenghua Choir, were only incorporated into the Xinminhui's propaganda infrastructure in 1942. Despite the regime's efforts to incorporate commercial and community ensembles into their propaganda infrastructure, people managed to continue private concert life, though such activities were made more difficult by the requirement of performance and travel permits (Wiant 2003, 95–97, 200). However, recitals continued to be organized and musical activity continued in private residences (YSC 1942a; 1944c; Mang 2004, 88–89).

Increased state mandate and funding had a direct impact on musicians living in and repertoires performed in Beijing. For example, the BMCA invited several Japanese soloists to perform in Beijing, among them the composer Yamada Kōsaku and the violinist Tsuji Hisako (*Xinminbao* 1942t; *Xinminbao* 1943o; *Huabei xinbao* 1944k). This young violinist performed concertos and sonatas by Wolfgang A. Mozart (1756–

³⁷ Due to the focus of this thesis on official campaign events, Chinese musical drama (*xiqu*) will feature in only a limited way. From a quantitative perspective, however, the incorporation and employment of Chinese traditional musical drama in the regimes' propaganda apparatus was far more important than that of new, Western-style music ensembles. Indeed, Beijing's Chinese opera professionals were among the first commercial ensembles to be incorporated into the Xinminhui branch society system with the Chinese Opera Professionals' Branch Society being established in August 1938 (*Xinminbao* 1938ae).

1791), Beethoven and Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1809–1847) as well as Édouard Lalo's (1823–1892) *Symphonie espagnole* (1875) (*Xinminbao* 1943n; *Xinminbao* 1943m). Musicians from Manchukuo as well as Shanghai and Nanjing also made their way to Beijing and Tianjin to perform, and brought repertoire from the Shanghai Conservatory with them. One particularly welcome temporary resident was Lang Yuxiu, who came to Beijing in late November 1942 (YSC 1942b; *Shibao* 1942c).³⁸ Guest performers included not only Japanese and Chinese performers, but also members of the white Russian diaspora in China, who performed classics by Liszt, Sergej Rachmaninov (1873–1943), Frédéric Chopin (1810–1949) and Beethoven, and also shaped the repertoires of their Chinese students (Shang 1942b, 81–82; YSC 1942a). Most prominently, Li Xianglan and the Ha'erbin Symphony Orchestra visited Beijing and Tianjin in the summer of 1942 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the state of Manchukuo (*Xinminbao* 1942j; *Xinminbao* 1942g). Apart from Li Xianglan's celebrated film and popular songs, the orchestra brought a repertoire of Beethoven's *Symphony No. 5* (1808), the *Leonora Overture No. 3* (1805) and the *Egmont Overture* (1810), as well as Russian repertoire, including Pjotr Tchaikovsky's (1840–1893)

³⁸ Lang Yuxiu, daughter of the successful photographer Lang Jingshan, was a graduate of Shanghai Conservatory and a Pathé recording artist. She returned from her studies at the Royal Conservatory Brussels in 1941. She later moved to Xi'an and Chengdu. Her performances have been lauded as an exceptional case in Beijing's wartime history by Meng Weiping (Meng 2018, 268), because they included pieces by He Lüting, whom Meng associates with the avant-garde – and the resistance. However, a closer look at the programme performed by Lang (YSC 1942b) shows that He Lüting was included alongside pieces by Huang Zi and Li Weining – the two presidents of Shanghai Conservatory during the Japanese occupation. I would therefore argue that Lang's performance, while it may have been of exceptional quality and included some pieces not frequently heard in Beijing due to their virtuosity, does not represent a political anomaly or unusual example of resistance.

Symphony No. 5 (1888), excerpts from *Swan Lake* (1877), *Marche Slave* (1876), and Nikolai A. Rimsky-Korsakov's (1844–1908) *Capriccio Espagnole* (1887), *Scheherazade* (1888) and *Russian Easter Festival Overture* (1888). Most of these pieces required an extraordinarily large symphonic orchestra and were therefore rarely performed in Beijing and Tianjin.

Of course, the presence of guest performers from other parts of the Japanese empire, along with performances by “local representatives” in celebration of various military and political achievements, was meant to convey a sense of “racial harmony and amity”. The establishment of the Second Philippine Republic, for example, was celebrated with a broadcast by the Tianjin Filipino String Orchestra (*Xinminbao* 1943q). And joint performances were praised as an opportunity of mutual understanding – for both the musicians who were performing and for the audiences listening and watching.

However, not all of these performers were particularly welcome or praised. There was particular distaste about some Shanghai-based performers in Beijing amongst the city's musical elites (Ming 1943). We can detect such distaste in the publication of lengthy concert announcements and reviews.³⁹ Magazines and newspapers, such as

³⁹ One might question if such increased reporting does, in fact, generate the impression of prosperity and increased activity, while previously musical life might not have been covered in official newspapers in the same way. This is not the case – or at least only partly. My focus on the official narrative and “musical culture of the occupation state” naturally includes institutions later during the war, that were only appropriated in 1941 or later. However, knowing the landscape prior to 1941, even events that would have been held privately and were not reported on in state-owned media continued to be held, albeit under difficult circumstances. Acknowledging that private activity did not cease, despite the departure of some foreigners, is important.

the *Guomin zazhi* and in the *Shibao*, published surprisingly detailed reports on selected events throughout 1942 and 1943 (e.g., Dong 1943; Shang 1942a; 1942c).

Despite the contributions of guest performers, the increased activity and variety in musical repertoires in 1942 and 1943 can be mostly attributed to local elites. Beijing's small circle of musicians had gained a few active participants with recent college graduates⁴⁰ and returnees from Japanese universities and conservatories started to leave their mark on both concert life and public discussions. Additionally, lecturers at the National Beijing Normal College seemed less hesitant about (or were possibly coerced into) organizing concerts and participating in BMCA events. At the institution's inaugural public performances in February and June 1942, Beijing's musical elite performed Japanese and Italian folk songs, arias, romantic Lieder and classics of violin and Russian piano repertoire (*Xinminbao* 1942b; Shang 1942b, 80–81).⁴¹ At such events, Japanese and Chinese musicians performed alongside each other in a display of Sino-Japanese co-operation and amity.

Apart from the successful founding and appropriation of civic groups by 1942, the *Xinminhui* and other propaganda organizations also became less selective in the types of concerts they reported on and claimed as part of their campaigns and relief efforts, making the regime's cumulative repertoire seem quite eclectic, but maintaining the impression of lasting prosperity. Music was promoted as an acceptable recreational activity that did not hamper the collection of resources for the war effort (*Huabei*

⁴⁰ Among them were violinist Li Yiming, tenors Wang Tizhi and Lü Peisheng, and sopranos Li Mengmei, Chi Yuanyuan and Mao Aili, as well as a few Japanese performers (*Shibao* 1943m; *Shibao* 1942d; *Shibao* 1943b).

⁴¹ This was not the first official Sino-Japanese performance. The first official co-operative concert between Chinese and Japanese musicians took place on 26 June 1938 (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938e).

xinbao 1944d). Given the socio-economic struggles Beijing faced at this time, exasperation became palpable in 1944, with almost all musical events being framed in official newspapers as “relief” (*wei’an*) performances to “re-enliven the spirit for victory” – while claiming some state contribution. A Christmas performance by the choir of Furen University, for example, was covered in the *Huabei xinbao* with the remark that the concert had been held with support of the Beijing police (*Huabei xinbao* 1944m). Such statements are misleading and must have seemed like a cynical joke to participants and organizers, who did not engage with the police voluntarily, but were obliged to gain permission and accept police oversight (Wiant 2003, 95–97, 200). However, as this example indicates, even missionary initiatives were increasingly incorporated and claimed as part of this regime’s musical culture.

Missionary Institutions

Most independent from the occupation state, but nevertheless part of Beijing’s wartime musical world and not entirely isolated, were missionary institutions (i.e., schools, colleges and churches in the city that had been established by foreign Christian orders and organizations). The individuals and ensembles covered here will not feature prominently in later chapters. Nonetheless, they were an important part of musical life in the city and their presence reminds us of alternative possibilities even within the narrow geographical boundaries of the city walls of occupied Beijing. Their existence also reminds us of the complexities of the networks of musical elites, who – when affiliated with multiple institutions – cannot easily be categorized in the occupation context.

Beijing's wartime missionary institutions included American and British protestant Christian churches and the schools associated with them; French and German Roman Catholic parishes; and two major Christian-run universities, i.e., Furen University and Yanjing University. Yanjing University has been described as the "lonely island" of occupied Beijing (Lee 1996, 22), and as such, musical activities at Yanjing were among the few commonly known and reported in literature on music in wartime Beijing. Under the direction of Ruth Stahl, Helen Gunderson and Bliss Mitchel Wiant (1895–1975) the school had introduced a music course in 1925. Responsible for the school's strong vocal course and a large university chorus were Wiant and his wife Mildred Wiant.⁴² The Yanjing University Choir followed a standard Anglican repertoire and calendar, performing Georg F. Handel's (1685–1759) *Messiah* (1741) every year around Christmas and in the early spring, and Haydn's *Creation* (1798) in early summer. This choir was strong enough to expand its repertoire to include Mendelssohn's *Hymn of Praise* (1840) and *Elijah* (1846), Johannes Brahms' (1833–1897) *Requiem* (1869) (YSC 1939), as well as Johann S. Bach's (1685–1750) *Ascension Oratorio* (1735) and *Easter Oratorio* (1725) (Wiant 2003; Meng 2018, 30).⁴³ With Yanjing University's closure in 1941, however, university staff returned to the US or were imprisoned in internment camps (Geng 2022).

Despite its closure, Yanjing University's former students continued to uphold the school's musical legacy at Beijing's protestant parishes: Asbury Church, Dengshikou Congregational Church and China Christian Church. These three churches and their

⁴² See Gong Hong-yu's (2008, 50–53) and Han Kuo-Huang's essay on the Wiants (1989b, 161–71) as well as their memoir (Wiant 2003).

⁴³ Yanjing University had a Hammond organ, which Bliss Mitchel Wiant played alongside a "Chinese doctor from the PUMC [Peking Union Medical College]" (Wiant 2003, 198).

associated schools were the home of missionary musical life in wartime Beijing. The Methodist Asbury Church, located near Chongwenmen, became one of the most popular concert venues in the city – not only for missionary choirs, but for solo recitals and guest performers (YSC 1944a; 1943a; 1944b). The Calvinist Dengshikou Congregational Church was sponsored by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. It too served as a venue of choral concerts and musical “adoration” services under occupation (YSC 1943c). China Christian Church was located just one block south of Dengshikou. It was run by the London Missionary Society, which also funded Jefferson Academy in Tongzhou and Beijing’s YMCA (China Christian Youth Association). Peking Union Medical College, jointly funded by British and American missions, was also in close vicinity. The YMCA and the college’s aulias frequently served as concert halls (Meng 2018, 90–94).

Missionary schools were not entirely sheltered from the propaganda initiatives of the occupation state. They seem to have been unable to resist participation in the citywide propaganda song releases and school singing competitions, for example – even before 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1938w; *Xinminbao* 1938y). The schools associated with Asbury Church, Huiwen School and Muzhen Girls’ School, as well as the Dengshikou Congregational Churches’ Yuying School and Bridgeman Girls’ School, for example, were among the most successful in singing competitions prior to *and* during the war.

The vast majority of conductors and soloists at these protestant churches were former Yanjing University students.⁴⁴ Asbury and Dengshikou Churches had their own choirs,

⁴⁴ Soloists at oratorio performances almost exclusively featured students and graduates of Yanjing University. The small circle of soloist included sopranos Wang Fusheng (Miss Flora Wang), tenor Wang Dunfang and basses Yang Rongdong and Zheng Rugang (YSC 1942c; 1943b; 1944a; 1944e; 1944f).

namely the Asbury Church Oratorio Choir under the direction of pastor Zheng Rugang and the Dengshikou Mission Oratorio Choir under the direction of various Yanjing graduates (YSC 1942c; 1943c; 1944f). Yang Rondong directed both the Joint YMCA Choir and the Beijing Joint Oratorio Choir.⁴⁵ The lists of choir members on concert programmes suggest that each of these choirs was between fifty to 100 people strong, with many singers participating in multiple choirs.

Relatively little is known about musical life in Beijing's five large Catholic churches, with the notable exception of choirs and orchestras based at Furen University. Furen University Choir was over 100 people strong, with mostly Chinese singers. It was led by Rev. Jos[eph] Graisy, an Austrian pastor, who established several musical societies at Furen after his arrival in late 1937 (Meng 2018, 145; Fabel 2017, 398; YSC 1944d; 1945). Soloists were almost exclusively Chinese and again featured Yanjing graduates. The orchestra on the other hand was made up of some Chinese instrumentalists, as well as members of Furen's overwhelmingly German staff. The repertoire of Furen University resembled that of Yanjing University, with regular performances of Handel's *Messiah* and Haydn's *Creation* (YSC 1944d; 1945).

The musical elite at missionary institutions functioned almost independently from the music scene participating in performances organized by the Xinminhui and other ensembles associated with the occupation state. Only a handful of instrumentalists and accomplished soloists such as Lao Zhicheng, Wang Dunfang and Flora Wang seem to have, however rarely, stepped out of the boundaries of their respective circles. There

⁴⁵ Yang Rondong, 1902–1991, studied at Yanjing from 1924 onwards. Yang is lauded for his engagement in music education and the missionary music scene. He has been deemed a “patriot” for his refusal to perform Sino-Japanese goodwill songs (Meng 2018, 119).

was also little overlap between performers at these Christian churches and students and staff of Beijing Normal College. Some notable exceptions are, again, Lao Zhicheng, who accompanied performances of Haydn's *Creation* and Handel's *Messiah* (YSC 1943b; 1944a, 4–5), and his colleagues Zhang Weizhi, Zhao Niankui and Wang Dunfang (YSC 1943b; 1944e). Barring these exceptions, most conductors, instrumentalists and vocalists seem to have been institutionally bound. Many soloists did, however, perform at relief concerts organized in the context of political campaigns to strengthen morale after 1942. And Yanjing graduates actively participated in the occupation state's musical endeavours. Young singers such as Chi Yuanyuan, for example, were attractive and willing recruits for the occupation state's propaganda organizations (*Huabei xinbao* 1944c).

This overview can serve as a guide in navigating wartime Beijing's musical world. However, I have highlighted some key aspects and developments, including: (i) the continued presence of state-funded, professional, commercial and private institutions, and their incorporation into the regime's propaganda infrastructure, and continued efforts to institutionalize musical learning; (ii) the ability of the occupation state to attract talented musicians such as Jiang Wenye, Lei Zhenbang and Chen Ruyi, as well as guest performers, to the city during the occupation; (iii) the effect of the regime's incorporation of professional and community ensembles on the accessibility of musical performances; (iv) the willingness of community ensembles such as the Harmonica Society to propagate the ideologies of the Xinminhui and local governments; and (iv) the regime's increased leniency toward musical performances under the guise of "relief work" during the latter stages of the occupation

Spaces and Venues

Thinking about Beijing as a space of musical performance also highlights the city's history as a space of imperial ritual. The Inner City's raster layout, with the Forbidden City at its heart, had the potential to enrich performances with symbolic power. Former imperial leisure spaces, opened to the public during the Republican era, continued to be used for public entertainment. Beijing's main streets and avenues, circling the centre of power, became a convenient stage of sonic ritual. The *Xinminhui* frequently made use of Beijing's imperial architecture. Representative halls in the city centre and the open spaces and parks surrounding them were convenient spaces for large assemblies and were used for public announcements and celebrations, including musical performances (see figure 2 for a map of musical venues in wartime Beijing).

The most prominent of these halls, the Hall of Supreme Harmony, is the largest hall in the heart of the Forbidden City. Geographically located at the very centre of Beijing, the hall also served as the symbolic centre of power. Performing state rituals there meant joining the ranks of dynastic emperors (Zhu 1994, 51–56). Of similar symbolic power was Zhongshan Park, located on the south-western edge of the Forbidden City, surrounding the imperial Altar of Soil and Grain (*Shejitan*). The park had been opened to the public in 1914 (Dong 2003, 82–84). It was referred to as Central Park throughout the war. Its central hall, today's Zhongshantang, was renamed Xinmin Hall in 1938 (Zhongshantang guanlichu 2018). The space had previously served as the site of imperial soil and grain rituals, important markers of sovereignty (Naquin 2000, 134). The occupation government made use of such connotations and commonly referred to the space as “Grain Park”, especially during campaigns designed to “increase

production” (*zengchan*) in 1943.⁴⁶ The third important hall in central Beijing was Huarentang, located in Zhongnanhai to the west of the Forbidden City, which had been the geographical centre of late Qing and Republican political life (Strand 1989, 8–9). These three halls were similar in their layout, with wide open spaces for large standing audiences, raised steps, which could easily accommodate multiple rows of people (a choir for example), and spectacular hall-fronts. These former temples were often used by the Xinminhui and local governments as stages of political ritual and symbolically laden entertainment venues (*Xinminbao* 1941c; *Xinminbao* 1938ae).

Apart from re-using existing venues, Beijing’s local government also invested in the construction of new venues for musical performance. The most important of these was the Beijing City Music Hall. Prior to 1942, Beijing had only a few theatres and concerts venues with the capacity for a symphony orchestra and an audience of several hundred people (Shang 1942c, 94). Until 1942, most musical events and concerts were held at three theatres commonly used for film screenings and traditional musical drama performances: the Xinxin Grand Theatre, the Chang’an Grand Theatre and the Zhenguang Film Theatre. The Zhenguang Film Theatre was opened in 1921 by Luo Mingyou and served as the centre of his North China Film Company between 1927 and 1937 (Meng 2018, 87–88; Pang 2002, 24). Both the Chang’an and the Xinxin Grand Theatre had been opened in early 1937, before the Japanese invasion. Each of these theatres had a capacity of 800–1000 people. Many solo recitals and evening galas took place at the Grand Hôtel de Pékin (Beijing Hotel), which could accommodate an audience of around 700 people. This hotel, founded in 1900, underwent reconstruction in 1915 and reopened as Beijing’s most luxurious hotel in 1917. Japanese investors

⁴⁶ A simple keyword search across digitized newspapers and journals confirms this trend.

acquired over half of its shares in 1940 and subsequently took over management (Liu 2017b). The Beijing Hotel's ballroom had a Bösendorfer concert piano and was equipped to record performances for the radio through a telephone connection (Meng 2018, 86; Wiant 2003, 200).

Despite the existence of these venues in Beijing, none had been built specifically for concert performances, and all were considered less than ideal acoustically (Shang 1942c, 94). The lack of appropriate venues was recognized and remedied in 1942 with the construction of Beijing City Music Hall – Beijing's first open-air concert hall which could accommodate a symphony orchestra of 100 players or a choir of up to 200 people (Shang 1942c, 94).

The Beijing City Music Hall (see figures 4, 5 and 6) was a rounded V-shaped structure with backstage rooms, a roofed stage and an amphitheatre-style open-air seating area with a capacity of up to 5,000 people.⁴⁷ It was built with Japanese funding (Beijing Municipal Archive 1942) and opened in November 1942 with a week of celebratory performances (*Xinminbao* 1942q).

⁴⁷ Concert reviews in the *Xinminbao* often cite 5,000 people in attendance. However, a report in the *Guomin zazhi* states that there were 2,000 seats (Shang 1942c, 94). The venue was remodelled three times and turned into indoor venue which still exists today and has functioned as a concert hall since 1999 – the Forbidden City Concert Hall (Gao 2019).



Figure 4: Beijing City Music Hall in Zhongshan Park, 1945; aerial photograph by the USA Air Force (Liu 2017a), highlight added.




Figure 5: Beijing City Music Hall under construction in Zhongshan Park, October 1942 (Xinminbao 1942o).




Figure 6: Opening of Beijing City Music Hall, November 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1942q).

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. Firstly, it provides an overview of musical life in wartime Beijing and the infrastructure that the occupation state built for musical propaganda purposes. Secondly, I have detailed the process of appropriation of pre-existing structures, forced incorporation and co-optation of musical institutions, and the genesis of new institutions constructed by the occupation state (while also demonstrating how such changes contradict commonly held assumptions about the periodization of cultural production in occupied Beijing). And, finally, I have explained the multiple layers of institutional affiliation which complicated the multidimensional space of musical “collaboration” in occupied Beijing.

By 1942, the regime had co-opted most private cultural organizations, among them the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, and organized public entertainment through proxies

such as the BMCA. Even privately-organized concerts were increasingly and explicitly framed as part of war or relief effort. With a fully reorganized musical elite, the occupation state was able to incorporate a broad range of performers in its musical campaigns. From early 1942 and throughout 1943, increased funding from Japan made available through proxy organizations such as the BMCA meant a realization of many musical elites' visions of the institutional framework for a lively cultural scene. The years 1942 and 1943 seem to have represented the liveliest years of musical life in occupied Beijing, with over forty elaborate musical galas, concerts and private recitals taking place annually and being promoted in the pages of official newspapers.

As I have shown, the occupation state's musical infrastructure reached full maturity with the establishment of the BMCA, the co-optation of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra and the opening of the Beijing City Music Hall in 1942. It has been assumed that musical life after 1941 was less vibrant, both because of the exodus of foreigners and because of the increasing difficulties involved in simply surviving in wartime Beijing. And while the exodus of foreign musicians in 1941 and continuously worsening economic conditions did certainly hamper musical life in Beijing, other factors led to its vibrancy in 1942 and 1943. These included the establishment of centralized and well-funded institutions organizing and hosting regular musical activities; exchanges with musicians from Japan, Shanghai and Tianjin, and the presence of musicians having returned from their studies in Japan, enriching concert life; and the inclusion of classical music in campaign galas, making such performances more visible and accessible. The regime's increased propaganda effort after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as its policy to provide "relief" during political campaigns, also meant increased leniency toward privately organized musical activities as part of wider efforts to emphasize prosperity under occupation.

I have argued that we need to rethink the existing periodization of musical life in occupied Beijing, which often assumes a collapse of musical life after 1941. A more accurate periodization would emphasize reorganization and heightened activity in 1938, and again in 1942–1943, and would take into account the structural changes that occurred in the period in between these two eras. The decline of musical activity in 1944–1945 should be understood as a process induced by a lack of funding and disintegration, against which the regime fought until the end of the war. What might seem like a simple question of periodization represents, therefore, an important step in reassessing the role of the occupation state in the history of musical life in occupied Beijing. So far, the role of the occupation state has largely been reduced to an inhibiting force in the wider historiography. As this chapter has shown, however, the occupation state (and the Xinminhui in particular) not only exercised control but provided performance opportunities and funding, and played an active part in shaping musical life in the city. Rather than impose a monolithic musical scene on Japanese-occupied Beijing, the occupation state oversaw a complex spectrum of musical institutions, repertoires and musical practices, which I will further analyze in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 4

Fashioning a New Social Movement Through Song

One of the first tasks the occupation state in Beijing needed to accomplish in the 1937–1938 period was to foster a sense of collective identification with the newly established polity. As I have shown in Chapter 3, occupation state officials understood music as a highly potent political and social tool. Music thus became an important part of the regime’s initial effort to attain legitimacy. In this chapter, I ask: What can we learn about the newly established PGROC and Xinminhui through an analysis of the occupation state’s musical culture, including the musical repertoires it drew on and developed, and the performance practices it appropriated in 1938? What continuities and similarities with prior singing campaigns and the musical culture of other wartime regimes can we identify? What significance was attributed to mass singing as a practice of collective voicing? How was the spatial aspect of sound and the potential of recording and broadcasting technology used in promoting the regime beyond the confines of Beijing’s city walls? As I will show, the repertoires and performance practices employed by the PGROC and Xinminhui can be understood as a continuation of cultural developments in twentieth-century China and often resemble developments in other wartime areas of China (i.e., those beyond the control of the Japanese). We can thus challenge common narratives that dismissed such parallels and continuities in the past (and which I examined in Chapter 2).

In the first part of this chapter, I offer an analysis of the occupation state's first major musical campaign effort which was staged between December 1937 and June 1938. In my analysis of the repertoire promoted in this phase, I focus on the regime's choice of national anthem and the Xinminhui's first major song commission, both of which reveal some ambiguities in the regime's ideological messaging. Musical analysis of a small collection of songs published by the Xinminhui in 1938 shows how the regime categorized and imagined its new subjects and the roles it envisioned for them within the collaborationist movement. I further argue that the songs commissioned by the Xinminhui can be understood as a continuation of musical developments begun prior to the war and share many of the characteristics of anti-Japanese salvationist song repertoire. This observation is important because it counters narratives that clearly delineate salvationist mass singing in pre-war Shanghai and wartime resistance culture from commercial music promoted by the occupation state without referring to the state-funded development of musical repertoires in the occupied territories (Chen 2005, 39–43, 263–67; 2014; Howard 2015; Tang 2020).

With regard to performance practice, I focus on mass singing events and parades staged to promote this newly developed repertoire. I show that the Xinminhui – referring to such practices in Nazi Germany – understood mass singing events and collective voicing as a tool to promote the collective identification with the occupation state's ideologies. A brief analysis of the spatial aspects of the Xinminhui's performance practices shows how the PGROC used (mediated) sound to assert its territorial claim. Live performances in ritual spaces, parades, and sound recording and broadcasting all contributed to the symbolic power and geographic reach of the regime. I will demonstrate how music was used to mitigate the regime's perceived inadequate territorial control.

The second part of this chapter will explore how the occupation state continued to develop new repertoire throughout the war and how it tried to ensure the retention of propaganda messages. An analysis of song commission activities in 1940 and 1941 reveals the impact of empire-wide propaganda initiatives and the changing relationship between the various governments in occupied China following the establishment of the Wang Jingwei regime (RNG). In this chapter, I will show how local governments retained agency when it came to the realization of Japanese propaganda directives. Initiatives to centralize propaganda were mitigated by continued local activity. I also highlight the particular role of north Chinese agents, a fact that contradicts some of the dominant narratives about the predominance of Shanghainese entertainment culture that I discussed in Chapter 2.

Finally, focusing on the Xinminhui's attempts to promote the retention of newly developed repertoire allows us to understand how the sheer ubiquity of these songs shaped peoples' daily lives, as well as their relationship with and understanding of the occupation state. Musical culture thus offers a unique view at everyday life under occupation and a brief glimpse at the reception of such intense and ubiquitous messaging.

Fashioning a Social Movement

Repertoire

Today, the basic audible symbol and sonic equivalent of a national flag or emblem of any country, state or nation is its anthem. In the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century, many newly established states officially adopted national anthems.

Oftentimes, these anthems were products of war, revolution or violent conflict (Mecking 2018). In China, various songs had been used as national anthems since the last years of the Qing dynasty and officially adopted throughout the first years of the Chinese Republic. Between 1921 and 1928, prior to Chiang Kai-shek's instalment as Chairman of the Nationalist government, Xiao Youmei's *Song to the Auspicious Cloud* served as the Republican anthem. This was a slow-paced, peaceful and solemn song in E major and in common time with a sixteen bar A(A')BB' structure set to lyrics from the *Commentary on the Shangshu*.

The PGROC announced its decision to adopt Xiao Youmei's *Song to the Auspicious Cloud* as its official anthem in April 1938, at the same time as the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (RGROC, 1938–1940) was officially established in Shanghai (Beijing Municipal Archive 1938; Xiao 1938). With this step, the PGROC staked its claim to be the successor of the Republican government associated with Sun Yat-sen. At the same time, however, this step contradicted the PGROC's general opposition to the KMT (Boyle 1972, 89–92). It might also suggest that textual sources have overemphasized this opposition, failing to take note of continuities in the regime's musical culture. However, with its decision to adopt pre-existing national symbols, the PGROC also left room for other governmental agencies to define distinct and new aspects of the occupation state's cultural identity. In other words, what the PGROC lacked in distinctive repertoire had to be substituted by the Xinminhui. Instead of demanding identification with an administrative or governmental body, north Chinese elites could argue that collaboration was part of an organized civic movement concurrently promoting the "renovation" of the people (Iriye 2014, 257–58). As such, the Xinminhui commissioned several songs to establish

an independent repertoire: a set of songs portraying different societal groups and their role within this newly established polity.

The *Xinmin Song* became the first of nine songs published in 1938. Its lyrics were commissioned publicly throughout January 1938 by the *Xinminbao* – appearing on page one of both the morning and evening issues of the *Xinminbao* in early January (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938a; *Xinminbao* 1938a; *Xinminbao* 1938f). Substantial monetary rewards were offered to winners. Public commissions for so-called “national folk songs” (*guomin ge / kokuminka*) and “patriotic songs” (*aiguo ge / aikokuka*) had been very successfully established in Japan not long before this with the commission of the *Patriotic March* in December 1937 (Strasser 2011, 125–27). And while public song commissions were not unheard of in China (Liu 2010, 270), this was not a common technique in pre-war China, suggesting that the strategy was directly imported from Japan.

The *Xinminbao* reported regularly on the commission process and number of submissions, which it claimed indicated “the enthusiastic support for the new Government of the Republic of China” (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938b). The six winners were introduced in a special issue of the *Xinminbao* in March. Four of these lived in Beijing, and two in Tangshan (a small city located ca. 170 kilometres east of Beijing in occupied north China). Most of the winners, among them two women, worked as educators. Their submissions were published along with photographs of the authors, short biographies and a letter from the first prize winner detailing his feelings of luck, fortune (*jiaoxing*) and humility upon learning of his victory (*Xinminbao* 1938b) (see figure 7).

with a large portrait photograph, a short biographical note and a report on his work composing the *Xinmin Song* and recording the song in Tokyo before his departure for Beijing (*Xinminbao* 1938d). In this report, Jiang Wenye is cited as a supporter of the ideologies of the Xinminhui. At the same time, however, Jiang seems to distance himself from the Xinminhui as a political organization:

This song is not some Association's anthem, nor is it some organization's anthem. I used a melody that could be easily sung by the general public, by everybody, as the melody for the *Xinmin Song*. The first half of the song represents the Chinese people's love of peace. The second half, from "investigating things, extending knowledge" onwards, represents the emergent Chinese nation/race's [*Zhongguo minzu*] will and spirit [*qigai*] (*Xinminbao* 1938d).²

Jiang's melody for the *Xinmin Song* (see figures 8 and 9), though in common time, is set in the anhemiotic pentatonic *yu*-mode, a mode akin to natural minor, suggesting a peaceful nature. The mode is also distinctly Chinese and not one of the pentatonic modes in use in Japan at this time.³ The song's basic twenty-four bar AA'B structure with B as the refrain adheres to a structure known as the bar form, a term developed in the nineteenth century to denote medieval German strophic songs of this structure. The same structure is known from Lutheran chorales and nineteenth century song compositions in Europe. It was known in China not least through the work of European

² After the war, Jiang claimed that he did not know at the time of these song's political implications (Su 1990, 40), and that he had received large amounts of money to compose them (Kung 2002, 65).

³ Hemiotic scales are typical of Japanese music, but anhemiotic scales, such as the *ryo*- and *ritsu*-scales, were used in Japanese Buddhist chants as well.

missionaries, German military advisors and early Chinese composers of Western-style songs, written in support of the emerging Chinese nation state. The verses (AA') feature an aba'b' substructure with two semi-quaver melismata in the second half of a and a'. The first four syllables of the refrain, "investigating things, extending knowledge", are intensified by accents. However, the remaining six bars of the refrain resemble the movement of the verses (typical for a type of Bar form called the Rundkanzone). This recapitulation counteracts the contrast of the two parts but adds to the song's cohesiveness and peaceful nature. The lyrics, while in the vernacular, are not colloquial, nor stirring, but easy to remember. The verses propagate some of the new ideas that, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, were being formulated under the Xinminhui at this time. These include ideas about "harmony in Asia", *Xinmin*-ism, the Kingly Way and opposition to the KMT and CCP. The refrain is made up of the main concepts of the Confucian Classic *The Great Learning*, describing the proper way to peace through good governance – the same concepts used by the Xinminhui ideologue Miao Bin in his outline of *Xinmin*-ism (explored in Chapter 1) (Miao 1938, 5).

In sum, the *Xinmin Song*'s lyrics draw on classical Confucian phrases, highlighting its conservative ideological framing. Adherence to the bar form's AAB structure points to the regimes' modern state structure. Finally, the use of the Chinese pentatonic *yu*-mode along with typical Chinese melismatic elements suggest that the song was conceptualized as distinctly Chinese (rather than Japanese). I thus understand the *Xinmin Song* as the Xinminhui's attempt at generating a genuinely autonomous identity as a culturally conservative but structurally modern Chinese state under Japanese occupation.

流傳雅韻深入民間

新民之歌膺選作品 發獎演奏大會

今日下午二時隆重舉行 中繼放送選遺均可收聽

本報於今年春初，懸賞徵求「新民之歌」，宗旨在闡揚新民主主義，糾正人民思想，而使全國人民俱為更生中國之新民，狼吞海內讀者，踴躍應徵，其徵國人對此種可喜之熱忱，本報於感戴之餘，惟有更盡厥職，而別國人之渴望，應徵之件，為數逾三千餘封，本報先作初選，選出名詞家作最後鑑定，結果，唐李君賢賢先生之作品，名列前茅。蓋李君先生之作品，詞句通俗，而含蓄深奧，無論老幼婦孺，一經傳授，均能心會口誦，洵佳構焉。比之在本報徵求世界名作曲家江文也先生擔任製譜，江先生之國際間之作曲聲譽與地位，本報已屢次介紹，江先生此次為「新民之歌」製譜，製譜可謂珠聯璧合，相得益彰者矣。江先生並親來中國，實地教授「新民之歌」為時一月，例如北京市警察局警隊，暨多數中小學生，均參加本報「新民之歌」發獎演奏大會，於今（二十四）日下午二時參加本報「新民之歌」發獎演奏大會，屆時之盛況，概可想見。北京中日各機關長官，各團體領袖均準備屆時蒞會指導。應徵「新民之歌」分別奉函，奉邀出席中央公園新民堂之已派人布置諸事，當即登報「新民之歌」為「新民之歌」之徵求，於今（二十四）日下午二時，在中央公園，遊客比較以往任何集會，更見擁擠也。茲將「新民之歌」發獎演奏大會程序「新民之歌」歌譜分誌於次。



江文也先生



江文也先生



江文也先生

發獎演奏大會程序
（全體起立）；四、中國國歌演奏（全體起立）；五、報告經過；六、

發獎：七、來賓祝詞；（一）根本大佐，（二）川口大佐，（三）湯爾和總長，（四）張燕卿副會長，八、新民之歌唱片演奏；九、作曲者演說；十、獨唱（江文也先生）；十一、合唱（第一組女學生，第二組男學生）；十二、攝影；十三、閉會。



江文也先生之曲市「歌之民新」

新民之歌

Andante per mezzosoprano

首都農民分會
設立園行支會
市當局擬修葺
重修堤壩

中央電話局保
用戶通話

是以搬出而便交通，特於上月十日，派員局工程隊，前往修理，已於日前全部竣工，並將修葺完竣，現由本市公用局撥款，現工程，計分三段，第一段，長一公尺，高一公尺，第二段，長一公尺，高一公尺，第三段，長一公尺，高一公尺，共計全長三公尺，九公分，（一）

Figure 8: Announcement for the Xinmin Song Award Ceremony, with report of the commission process, large portrait of Jiang Wenye and song manuscript (Xinminbao 1938g).

新民之歌

Xinmin zhi ge - Xinmin Song

Li Jianxian 李薦賢

Jiang Wenye 江文也

Andantino, poco maestoso

旭 日 照 東 亞
Xu ri zhao Dong ya
The rising sun reflects on East Asia

全 亞 協 和 為 一 家
quan Ya xie he wei yi jia
all of Asia in harmony as one family

學 宗 孔 孟 興 王 道
xue zong kong meng xing wang dao
learning the ancients Confucius and Mencius raising the King-ly Way

人 作 新 民 在 中 華
ren zuo xin min zai Zhong hua
people become renewed citizens in Chi-na

格 物 致 知 正 心 誠 意
ge wu zhi zhi zheng xin cheng yi
investigating things, extending know-ledge, rectifying the heart, sin- cere thoughts

修 身 齊 家 治 國 平 天 下
xiu shen qi jia zhi guo ping tian xia
cultivating oneself, orderly family, well-governed country, peace in All-under-Heaven

Figure 9: Xinmin Song, transcribed and translated according to the manuscript (*Xinminbao* 1938g).

The Xinminhui was also keen to prescribe idealized roles for its “renewed citizens” through songs. This meant developing distinct repertoires for different parts of society. Beginning in May until October 1938, Miao Bin wrote a series of lyrics for new songs, whose titles largely corresponded to the main Xinminhui branch societies that I explored in Chapter 1. Miao Bin’s lyrics were then set to music by Jiang Wenye (see Appendix 1). The three main categories that prescribe affiliation with these groups –

gender, age and the rural/urban divide – were clearly reflected in the musical realization of these songs.

Take, for example, the *Xinminhui Anthem* (*Xinminbao* 1938ab) and the *Xinminhui Flag Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938ac). Both of these songs rely heavily on repetition and both prominently feature octave or sixth leaps and dotted rhythms. Depending on how the *Anthem* is performed, its syncopated rhythm and quaver-pauses could render it both light and joyous, or emphasize its martial character. Both songs are distinctly different in this regard from the relatively subdued *Xinmin Song*.

Two other unmistakably militaristic marching songs represented the urban male population. One of these was the *Xinminhui Youth Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938r; Jiang and Miao 1938a),⁴ which is highly repetitive and has an extremely restricted vocal range (only once exceeding a sixth). Indeed, this song seems to have been written to be bellowed rather than sung. This song's marking "vivo. marziale" and initial syncopated motif with an upward fourth characterize the youth as the frontline of ideological battle. Another example is the *Xinmin Children's Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938ah) which was similar in mode and structure, but with a broader vocal range and

⁴ Upon its publication, the song was set to an unattributed melody. I assume that a pre-existing melody was used because the melody does not complement the tonal movement and stirring character of the text. It is set in G major – in contrast to Jiang Wenye's settings, which exclusively use pentatonic modes. A later version of the song composed by Jiang Wenye (*Xinmin changgeji* 1941, 23–24) uses the same lyrics by Miao Bin, but an entirely different melody. This suggests that plans for additional *Xinminhui* songs only took shape after the success of the *Xinmin Song*. It further suggests that Jiang Wenye agreed to collaborate with Miao Bin and composed the following songs only after his arrival in Beijing. The initial rush to publish a *Youth Song* might have been due to the annual school singing competition scheduled for late June 1938, which featured both the *Xinmin Song* and the *Xinmin Youth Song*.

more playful initial motif. The marching character of both these songs reveals how the Xinminhui's musical characterization of its male citizens contradicted the PGROC's claim for peaceful coexistence. Indeed, this clear distinction between the *Song to the Auspicious Cloud* and *Xinmin Song* and the Xinminhui songs written in this early phase paralleled the inherent contradictions in the occupation state that I explored in Chapter 1. Despite claims of unity, the occupation state included an elderly and more socially conservative PGROC leadership, and a young, idealistic and "modern" Xinminhui.

In contrast to these marching-style songs that were used predominantly at assemblies of the Xinminhui organizations for urban men, there were other songs written to appeal to girls and women. Both the *Women's Song* and the *Girls' Song* are lyrical, playful and more traditional in their musical gestures (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938f; *Xinminbao* 1938ai). The *Xinmin Women's Song* is arguably the least "exciting" of all the newly released songs. Its lyrical character is emphasized by pentatonic quaver arpeggi in the piano accompaniment (Wang 2013, 47). More interestingly, the *Xinmin Girls Song's* introductory interjection and quaver triplet melismata seem to imitate melodic lines commonly found in local forms of Chinese opera. Along with the consistent upbeat and upward movement this lends the song a forward movement without creating any resemblance to the marching songs (that had been written for boys and men). The consistent avoidance of the downbeat further renders the song playful and light. The clearly gendered nature of these songs reiterates the occupation state's highly gendered views about Chinese society at this time (Taylor 2016, 674–82).

Also revealing are the songs that were composed in this period specifically for the rural population and working class, the *Xinmin Love the Homeland Song* and *Xinmin Workers' Song*. While folk elements are especially pronounced in both of these songs,

their lyrics are distinctly unspecific with regards to age or gender. The *Xinmin Love the Homeland Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938af) is a highly contrastive song. The quick-paced dotted melody of the first section, introducing the countryside as the singer's home, is juxtaposed with a lyrical line serenading rural life. The *Xinmin Workers' Song* (*Xinminbao* 1938ag), on the other hand, is characterized by onomatopoeic exclamations and interjections, as well as phrases imitating rural worker's songs. The song was clearly designed to appeal to an idealized notion of what north Chinese rural workers' songs should sound like. The song's lyrics define the peasant as optimistically hard-working and focused on agricultural production rather than political activism. The lyrics of the verse are extremely limited and colloquial, and the distinctly north Chinese dialectic rhotacization (*erhua yin*) of elongated syllable finals marks them as a local composition.⁵ Furthermore, the rhotacization brings the tongue into a position akin to the retroflex used in certain forms of overtone singing, which may lead to a comparable acoustic effect. While the *Xinmin Workers' Song* is not a faithful reproduction of folk music, authorities may have believed that it could pass as an "authentic" manipulation of the "people's voices" – a technique composers in the communist base areas were equally skilled at (Hung 1996, 908–10, 928).

We might wonder about the lack of differentiation between various parts of rural society apparent in the *Xinmin Love the Homeland Song* and *Xinmin Workers' Song*. This was no accident, however. A separate commission for a *Xinmin Folk Song* in 1939 specified that lyrics ought to be in "common", everyday language (*tongsu*), and also that they should not be gender-specific, class-specific or age-specific (*Xinminbao*

⁵ The rhotacization of syllable finals is only commonly found in north Chinese and especially in the Beijing dialect (Norman 1988, 144–45). It is musically emphasized in the *Xinmin Workers' Song* with elongated notes on the rhotacized syllable at the end of the first line.

1939l; *Xinminbao* 1939p). We might further question if the Xinminhui sufficiently considered the level of musical literacy and stylistic preferences in rural areas. While some lyrics explicitly targeted the rural population, the musical genre chosen – Western-style patriotic songs and marches – suggests that Xinminhui did not differentiate between rural and urban communities (*Xinminbao* 1941l; *Xinminbao* 1941q; *Xinminbao* 1941n; *Chenbao* 1941c), at least at this early stage of the occupation. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it was only in 1942 that lyrics of songs that had been commissioned earlier in the war were reprinted with instructions to perform them to well-known folk tunes such as *The Shepherd Su Wu* and *Lady Meng Jiang* (*Xinminbao* 1941k), and vernacular forms of musical drama and storytelling were only used by the occupation state in north China as tools of ideological battle during the second half of the occupation.⁶

Jiang Wenye's consistent use of pentatonic modes throughout all of the songs published in 1938 and analyzed above shows his commitment to producing distinctly Chinese “new music” – that is using Chinese pentatonic modes and introducing Chinese elements into the musical form of European-style songs. Of course, expressions of Chinese musical identity cannot purely rely on the choice of mode – after all, the musics of many cultures rely on pentatonic scales. But at this early stage of the development of Chinese new music, Jiang's choice must be interpreted as his

⁶ In 1941, the North China Performing Arts Association was designed to provide oversight over “civic education” in the form of such popular genres as *pingju* opera (Ke 1941). It was only in late 1944 when vernacular types of storytelling materialized in the form of song and story booklets, was discovered as a potential medium of propaganda. These forms were widely circulated and very popular, especially for the semi-literate, as they used a phonetic script (*yunwen*) using simplified Chinese characters (*Huabei xinbao* 1944j).

answer to discussions over how to introduce Chinese elements into the Western musical idiom he was educated in (as per debates I discussed in earlier chapters).⁷ While Chinese musical elites had discussed methods of writing distinctly Chinese new music since the early twentieth century, efforts to collect folk songs and incorporate folk elements into new compositions only started in the 1920s and only became widely practised during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Wong 1984).

Interestingly, the popularity of resistance songs in rural areas during the Second Sino-Japanese War has often been ascribed to the efficient use of folk elements in these songs (Hung 1996, 927). However, resistance songs did not reproduce folk melodies faithfully. As Chang-tai Hung rightly remarks: “In the case of Communist propaganda songs, the rewritten pieces were no more than elitist views in the guise of a popular folk format. The people’s voice had to be recast and manipulated to serve the rulers’ ends” (Hung 1996, 928). What is interesting here is that such claims could also be made for the “collaborationist” songs that were being written by Jiang Wenye at the same time, and which incorporated folk elements. In other words, despite being on diametrically opposite sides of the conflict in occupied China, musical elites working for the resistance and composers such as Jiang Wenye were both part of attempts to develop a musical language of Chinese nationalism during the war.

In a vein typical of many scholars who focus on the Chinese songs of anti-Japanese resistance, Joshua Howard has further suggested that the popularity of resistance songs

⁷ There had been a lot of discussion around the choice of modes in Chinese “new music”, with detailed discussions of pentatonic and heptatonic scales, tuning systems, and modal music in both Europe and China. Pentatonic modes were favoured and strongly associated with traditional Chinese music. Slight changes in tuning were seen as necessary progress toward the commensurability/coalescence of European and Chinese music (Kage 1941, 21; *Xinminbao* 1940g).

during the Second Sino-Japanese War might be due to their composers' lack of formal training: "Unhindered by any inferiority complex vis-à-vis the European musical tradition, wartime musicians were open to experimentation in using folk music and melding lyrical and martial songs" (Howard 2015, 243). Yet, as Jiang's efforts to incorporate folk elements into Xinminhui anthems in 1938 and even collect folk songs in 1944 (Kung 2002, 66) suggests, such experimentation was just as true for composers in the occupied territories (such as Jiang Wenye) – and despite their extensive training in the European musical tradition.

Performance Practices

With this new repertoire came specific performance practices which the Xinminhui unashamedly appropriated from earlier (pre-war) social movements. The *Xinmin Song* Award Ceremony took place on 24 April 1938 – the same day on which the students of many of Beijing's colleges were moving into their accommodation to restart their studies after a long break since the summer of 1937 (*Xinminbao* 1938j). Beijing's universities had been the starting point of important civic movements throughout the Republican period, most prominently the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and for this reason, the anti-Japanese sentiment of university students in Beijing prior to the war was well-known (Li 1975, 98). Organizing a performance of loyalty to the occupation state on the day of the students' return, and appropriating performative rituals of earlier social movements that had involved radical student protestors, could thus not have been mere coincidence.

The award ceremony took place at Xinmin Hall in Beijing Central Park, a place introduced in Chapter 3 as an important marker of state sovereignty by virtue of its

E調 新 民 之 歌 ♩

6	1	2	3	23	23 21	6
旭		日		照	東	亞
撒	得	下	清	小	康	種
博	3	河	2	與	人	壽
12	53			6	21	2
全	亞	協	和	爲	一	家
必	切	開	惡	大	同	花
一	61	罪	5	絕	根	芽
6	23			61	61 65	3
學	宗	孔	孟	行	王	道
鐘	家	除	度	各	匪	黨
大	32	共	21	太	平	日
5		3		6	21	3 20
人	作	新	民	在	中	華
人		人		防	赤	化
幸	3	福		永	無	涯
3		6	12	35	65	3
格	物	致	知	正	誠	意
23	5	61	65	35	65	6
修	身	齊	治	平	天	下
		家	國			

Figure 11: Xinmin Song in cipher notation, published in the Xinminbao's children's column (Xinminbao 1938am).



Figure 12: Great Xinmin Choral Singing Event, 4 June 1938, with Jiang Wenye conducting (bottom right) (Anonymous 1938c).

At the *Xinmin Song* Award Ceremony, the pre-produced recording of the song was played. Jiang Wenye and several school choirs and the Police Band then performed it live. The event was then re-enacted and scenes filmed as a newsreel (*Xinminbao* 1938g; *Xinminbao* 1938i). According to an official report, 30,000 people attended the event, among them Mayor Yu Jinhe, Education Minister Song Jie and Chief of the Central Radio Station Zhou Dawen.⁸ Images of this and similar events later featured in photo spreads published in the occupation printed media (*Xinminbao* 1938k; *Xinminbao* 1938l) (see figure 12). The recording of the song was played regularly on the Central Radio from May onwards (*Xinminbao* 1938s). Before I elaborate on the effect of this multimedia campaign, however, let us focus on live events and the role of collective voicing.

Xinminhui officials explicitly appreciated the psychological and physiological impact of collective singing as a coordinated, simultaneous physical action. And in this regard, the Xinminhui explicitly tried to incorporate elements of youth singing events in Nazi Germany in their own events in 1938 (*Xinminbao* 1938w). In preparation for a mass singing event promoting the *Xinmin Song* in June 1938, for example, Propaganda Minister Fan Youshi explained the benefits of mass singing events and claimed it would allow students to experience the abstract notion of the “mass” (*qunti*):⁹ “We cannot only fantasize about an abstract mass; we must get to know the real body of the mass. [...] In Germany, youth events all use this kind of mass organization” (*Xinminbao* 1938w). Similarly, Education Minister Song Jie praised the event as a model in “mass education” (*qunyu*) – a term coined in parallel to intellectual (*zhiyu*),

⁸ Beijing had around 1.2 million inhabitants at this time (Yuan 2003, 79).

⁹ This notion of the “mass” (*qunti*) differs from the CCP notion of the “mass” (*qunzhong*) (Li 2018).

moral (*deyu*) and physical education (*tiyu*) – which would instil a national spirit in students (*Xinminbao* 1938x). Advocates of musical education would commonly categorize musical education as part of aesthetic education (*meiyu*), which in turn would aid moral decision-making (Ke 1939a, 22). However, by inventing a new category immediately relevant to the occupation context, Song makes a strong case for music and mass singing.

While the mass singing activities promoted by the occupation state in Beijing thus can be associated with the musical culture of the Axis powers, they were entirely in keeping with pre-war uses of mass singing by Chinese regimes and groups. In early June 1938, over 10,000 guests attended the Great *Xinmin* Choral Singing Event at the Hall of Supreme Harmony in Beijing's Forbidden City (*Xinminbao* 1938q; *Xinminbao* 1938w). This was the same place where, in May 1935, a salvationist singing movement organized by Li Baochen had seen over 500 students perform anti-Japanese songs in front of an audience of 3,000 people (Meng 2018, 65). In 1938, journals reported how Li Baochen was flanked by Ke Zhenghe and Jiang Wenye, who led 700 to 800 students, accompanied by the Beijing City Police Band, in a joint performance of collaborationist propaganda songs and marches. Li himself later mentioned having been invited to “come and promote the sort of large-scale choral events I used to arrange [...] as a sign that the people were content and the country at peace” (Liu 2010, 685) – neither confirming nor denying his participation in the event itself. Significantly, and despite his possible involvement in these *Xinminhui* activities, Li Baochen left Beijing in the autumn of 1938 to support the resistance and became an industrious organizer and editor of resistance songs in Chongqing (Dai 2001, 63–65). All of this demonstrates that the *Xinminhui* unashamedly appropriated performance rituals from their pre-war (and anti-Japanese) predecessors and closely modelled mass

singing events on events in Japanese-occupied Beijing organized during the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Singing Movement prior to the Japanese invasion. This parallels strategies that have been observed by Edward Gunn in other forms of performance under occupation such as spoken drama. As Gunn notes: “the Japanese were not slow to recognize the popularity of Chinese theater and its role in society. The Japanese coaxed the actors into performing a resistance play they had staged prior to the fall of the city, and studied the themes and techniques of resistance drama” (1980, 12).

In a recent study on community singing in Shanghai during the mid-1930s, Tang Xiaobing notes how the understanding of singing as a “weapon” in the War of Resistance “[...] expresses a deep appreciation of the affective as well as motivating power of music, or simply collective voicing, in asserting human subjectivity and will” (2020, 22). He further explores how singing as a new auditory mass culture produced an articulate and audible national subject in Republican China (2020, 4–6). Tang is not alone in attributing leftist mass singing a significant role in mobilizing nationalism (Ho and Ho 2012, 197–202; Tuohy 2001, 109).

But harnessing mass singing to foster a sense of community and patriotism was by no means a uniquely leftist, or anti-Japanese strategy; nor was it uniquely Chinese. In Vichy France, mass singing and “musical events held before large crowds, preferably outdoors” (Riding 2011, 129), were promoted as a tool to affirm group unity and identification (Lloyd 2017, 154).¹⁰ And mass singing festivals in Estonia have been understood as sites of both collaboration and resistance and performances affirming patriotism during the Soviet occupation of that country (Brüggemann and Kasekamp

¹⁰ See Dompnier (1996) for more on hymns, singing and the repertoires of the Vichy regime.

2014, 260). It is this context of occupation and the need to not only build a community but connect amicably with members of an occupying power that highlights the reconciliatory power attributed to music.

Propaganda Minister Fan Youshi also explicitly recognized the emotional potential of mass singing as a shared experience. He invoked the ancient Chinese notion of a “true friend” (*zhiyin*)¹¹ as someone who listens to and understands your sound to explain the effect and elation he hoped students would experience in resounding with the 20,000 people at occupation-era events:

The hardest thing in life is finding people that share one’s mode/sound [*tongdiao*]. The ancients were already sighing “I pity myself having no true friend / one who understands my sound [*zhiyin*]”. On the other hand, there is nothing happier than resounding together [*gongming*]. [...] People who sing together naturally resound together, people who listen together also resound together (*Xinminbao* 1938w).

In speaking about friendship, Fan may have been alluding to the divisive nature of the occupation, without referring directly to the Japanese presence. Yet many Xinminhui officials also believed in the supposedly conciliatory potential of music to raise sympathies for the Japanese:

Music is the call of the soul. [...] Music is one method [to establish sympathies between Japanese and Chinese], as it originates in true

¹¹ The Chinese term “*zhiyin*” refers to someone who shares the speaker’s understanding of sound and alludes to a story from the *Lü shi chunqiu* about two learned men communicating via the zither.

feeling. If it is not performed with true feeling, it will turn into a theatrical clown and will make people “laugh it off” (Feng 1941).¹²

As the above quote suggests, however, occupation officials also understood that, when performed insincerely (without “true feeling”), music could be ineffective. If effective, however, real music was thought to convey true feelings or instil those feelings and thoughts in the performing body. The circular reasoning built into this understanding of “music as beauty” achieved exclusively through truthful expression meant that any deception would reveal itself through sound. Consequently, even an inner or hidden resistance to *xinmin* ideology would easily be revealed. By the same token, however, it also meant that even inadvertent production of beauty could testify to the momentary internalization of a political message in the subject. Propaganda Minister Fan Youshi explicitly framed singing as a chance for students to express their true feelings – be those anxiety or happiness (*Xinminbao* 1938w). Fascinatingly, this suggests that singing was framed by the Xinminhui as not merely a tool through which loyalty could be expressed, but also as a mechanism to channel people’s grievances and to offer them an emotional and physical outlet.

Both the release of the *Xinmin Song* in April 1938 and the Great *Xinmin* Choral Singing Event in June 1938 took place in spaces in the heart of Beijing’s Inner City, more specifically in ceremonial halls that had long been associated with imperial state ritual. These spaces, through their imperial legacy, were important markers of sovereignty and territorial occupation, and thus enriched performances with symbolic power. The occupation state thus sonically demarcated its hold on the geographical and symbolic centre of power in Beijing and performed the reach of territorial

¹² For similar sentiments, see Gao Tianxi (1942, 23).

occupation by filling spaces with (mediated) sound. By physically filling space with music and sound, the occupation state aimed to realize territorial occupation – first in the city of Beijing and, later, beyond its walls. Sound waves naturally connect bodies and space, both in live and in mediated performance. Sound waves occupy space and raise awareness in the listening subject for the space through which they reverberate. In writing about songs “spreading widely among the people” (*Xinminbao* 1938e) and “reverberating through the whole country” (*Xinminbao* 1943c), Xinminhui officials rhetorically linked sonic to territorial occupation.

The most tangible ritual of territorial demarcation, however, was performed in victory parades circling the ancient city (see figure 13). After the occupation of Xuzhou by the Japanese Imperial Army in May 1938, the occupation state in Beijing celebrated the “fall of Xuzhou” with multiple parades (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938c). Military and police brass bands performed the *Xinmin Song* in symbolic spaces around the city and automobile cavalcades broadcast the song along their route. Parades circled the entire ancient city, performing rituals of sonic and spatial occupation. News outlets celebrated the audio-visual presence of governmental symbols in the occupied space, equating the presence of PGROC symbols with PGROC sounds: “The five-coloured flag flutters throughout the city,¹³ the *Xinmin Song* fills the streets” (*Xinminbao wankan* 1938c).

¹³ This refers to the “five-coloured” flag used by the PGROC and the links between the “five colours” of this flag and the Japanese concept of the “harmony of the five races” (Shepherdson-Scott 2016, 188–90).



Figure 14: Parade celebrating the fall of Xuzhou, 21 May 1938 (*Xinminbao* 1938t).

Images of the parades highlight the sonic aspects of the event, showing brass bands marching and performing, and people listening to performances of the *Xinmin Song* at Tian'anmen Square (*Xinminbao* 1938u; *Xinminbao* 1938t) (see also figure 14). Similar

parades took place after the occupation of Wuhan at the end of October 1938 and the Philippines in 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1938aj; *Xinminbao* 1938ak; *Xinminbao* 1942e). According to foreign observers, however, Chinese audiences were less enthusiastic about such displays. Bliss Mitchel Wiant, lecturer at Yanjing University, noted in his diary: “The Japs are certainly rattle-brained and stupid when it comes to their propaganda. To think that Chinese would want to celebrate the sufferings, deaths and humiliations of their own countrymen is a sample of it” (Wiant 2003, 91–92).

The sonic reach of the regime was further extended by mediated sound. As I have shown above in detailing the *Xinmin Song* Award Ceremony, a mix of mediated and live performances created a mediated connection between the live audience and a wider community of people living in the occupied territories. Having songs recorded in Japan, and those recordings shipped to north China and then distributed in Beijing and surrounding cities identified Japan clearly as the source of sonic power, and north China as a proxy of Japanese geographical claims. With sound waves emanating directly from Beijing’s Central Radio Station and songs being recorded in Beijing later during the war (*Xinminbao* 1942f), the north Chinese occupation state eventually put itself at the centre, claiming sonic autonomy and independence from Japan.

If we look beyond 1938, we can note how the interplay of mediated sound and live performance was used to create an imagined occupied space, expand the imagined realm of collaboration and create a sense of physical presence in a contested territory. Multisensorial events and the multimedia infrastructure that facilitated them helped to establish collective listening practices. Pre-recorded repertoire was played publicly alongside radio broadcasts and public film exhibitions (*Xinminbao* 1939q; *Xinminbao* 1940m; *Xinminbao* 1944d). Audiences collectively listened to recordings of live events that had taken place only a few months earlier in close proximity (*Xinminbao*

1939f; *Xinminbao* 1939o). Facilitated by the scores provided to them via newspapers, audiences were invited to sing along with pre-recorded material and then watch a film that featured the same song (*Xinminbao* 1939q).

The importance of such intermediality has been noted in adjacent contexts. For example, Tang Xiaobing (2020) has shown how the cinema became a facilitator of community singing and anti-Japanese salvationist singing campaigns in mid-1930s Shanghai. Tang notes how songs were introduced to audiences with the advent of sound cinema, emotionally charged through the film's political messages and then performed live at large gatherings organized by central figures in China's salvationist singing campaigns. Despite the very different political context, similar processes were at play in occupied Beijing. The Xinminhui took advantage of the interplay between different media not only to maximize exposure to propagandistic material, but also to foster a sense of a community beyond the geographical and temporal boundaries of the immediate performance.

The myriad events held in public parks sonically marked these spaces as sites of leisure activities, communal gathering and ideological conformity. Similarly, teahouses, theatres and cinemas became sites of politically conformist auditory messaging and were used to forge a sense of a local community. As sounds from other occupied spaces, mediated through the radio or speakers, filled such social gatherings and communal spaces, they also became sites for the performance of a wider occupied community. In particular, broadcasting and "collective listening sessions" expanded

the regimes' potential presence beyond its physical borders and meant a momentary and simultaneous realization of spatial occupation through sound.¹⁴

Concurrently, songs being performed and broadcast in rural areas and other cities were cited as evidence of the reach of the regime and the realization of state power in remote areas beyond Beijing (*Xinminbao* 1941d; *Xinminbao wankan* 1941b). This was, of course, in stark contrast with the limitations of the Japanese military's territorial control of rural areas of north China at this very time, as well as the limits of the occupation state's administrative reach in such areas. In the case of occupied north China, where actual military control over claimed territory and public approval of the regimes' ideological foundations amongst the occupied community was limited, making territorial occupation palpable through sound and music, and creating a multisensorial impression of occupied space, seems to have been of the utmost importance. One might even interpret the regime's aspirations for a sonic presence as a strategy to overcome – at least in rhetoric and through mediated sound – the inadequacies and limitations of the occupation state's actual power. The (imagined) sonic presence throughout the occupation state's territory thus became a substitute for actual dominion over spaces that the regime nominally claimed to control.

In summary, the PGROC and Xinminhui drew on pre-existing performance practices and generated new musical repertoire to assert identification with the new polity, perform Sino-Japanese co-operation and used sound, in particular musical performance, to demarcate sovereignty over occupied space. The regime

¹⁴ Much has been said about the reproducibility of sound, the medium of radio and its contribution to the formation of imagined communities of nationhood in the context of the Japanese empire (Yang 2010; Daniels 1982) as well as the Third Reich (Birdsall 2012, 103–39).

commissioned lyrics and songs as symbols of the new polity and aimed to elevate popular consciousness for the community by organizing mass singing events. In doing so, the Xinminhui aimed to fashion a collaborationist social movement through song – modelling it on leftist and anti-Japanese singing movements while also invoking fascist ideas of collective voicing from Europe. Finally, filling symbolic spaces with new state-sanctioned repertoire emphasized the “movement’s” alignment with the centre of power. Emphasis on the regime’s sonic reach into remote areas was supposed to mitigate the limitations of the occupation state’s territorial control and popularity.

Continued Repertoire Development

Having established their basic auditory identities in 1938, the Xinminhui continued to develop new musical repertoire and used propaganda songs as part of its musical messaging and ideological battles (see Appendix 1). Indeed, the Xinminhui commissioned lyrics for propaganda songs annually between 1938 and 1940 and even biannually between 1941 and 1944. After the PGROC’s nominal amalgamation into the RNG in 1940, commissions were issued by the NCPC, sometimes in co-operation with the Intelligence Bureau, the Xinminhui Guidance and Leadership, Propaganda or Education Departments, and the Central Radio Station (see Appendix 1). Other commissions hailed from the North China News Association (*Xinminbao* 1944a), the North China Writers Association, the Raise Asian Culture Association (*Shibao* 1941b) and North China Transportation Company (*Xinminbao* 1943a). Commissions were supported by the Japanese Special Services, other government agencies and seven different newspapers, which often simultaneously printed the calls and subsequent

results. Recordings were produced in collaboration with Japanese-owned recording labels such as Columbia (Nipponophone) and the Victor Company of Japan.

Commissions usually ran for about a month, offered financial incentives to participate and (according to the occupation press) often yielded several thousand submissions. Song lyrics, and sometimes musical scores, were typically released after a selection and composing process of one to three months. Winners of the lyric commissions included people of all ages, from recent high-school graduates and university students to middle-aged teachers. They also included members of the educated rural elite and established writers, and hailed from all parts of north China.¹⁵ Data from later song commissions shows that participants had direct relations with the occupation state and its civil and economic institutions. This may well suggest that pressure to answer such calls (and possibly other forms of coercion) were put on participants by their employers, schools or universities (*Huabei xinbao* 1945a). Significantly, very few professional lyricists seem to have contributed unsolicited texts to the collaborationist cause, with Wang Jingwei's most industrious musical supporter, Gao Tianxi, being the most prominent exception.¹⁶ Selection committees usually consisted of both Chinese and Japanese officials, with some musical elites, such as Ke Zhenghe and Li Yiming, and representatives of newspapers, record companies and radio (Anonymous 1941b; 1941d; *Xinminbao* 1942a; *Xinminbao* 1942l; *Xinminbao* 1943b). Commission winners and song lyrics were usually announced before the final song was published,

¹⁵ For examples of winner's portraits see some of the announcements of lyric commissions (*Xinminbao* 1938b; *Xinminbao* 1939n; Feng 1941; *Huabei xinbao* 1945a).

¹⁶ Gao Tianxi composed several songs celebrating the establishment of Wang Jingwei's RNG in early 1940. He continued to contribute to song collections providing repertoire for schools and ensembles performing in official functions under occupation. He was also an established film composer (Wu 2010).

while sometimes separate small-scale award ceremonies were held for lyricists (*Xinminbao* 1940f). Melodies were then composed by professional musicians after the lyrics were chosen. Jiang Wenye continued to compose the melodies and arrangements for most annual song commissions through until 1942, as well as the *Beijing City Anthem* in 1944/1945 (*Huabei xinbao* 1945b). Jiang was not the only composer involved in such work, however. The *Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Song* and *New Beijing Melody*, both commissioned in 1943, appear to have been composed by Lao Zhicheng.¹⁷ Songs in 1944 were composed by Lei Zhenbang, who had just returned to China from his studies in Japan.

As with many propaganda slogans circulating in north China, and having appropriated the practice of “national folk song” commissions from Japan, is it evident that the initiative for most of the Xinminhui’s song commissions likely came from Japan. However, Japanese propaganda initiatives were implemented by local governments and the Xinminhui (Beijing Municipal Archive 1938; 1940), meaning that the ways in which songs were commissioned and eventually chosen represented specific elements of the north China regime. In other words, as with the Xinminhui songs published in 1938, songs were produced by Chinese agents in China rather than simply being imposed on occupied north China by Japanese agents or composers. Even if Japanese directives might have put some constraints on the message and main phrases used in song lyrics, local agents negotiated and determined the content and musical form of the final propaganda songs that were produced, recorded and performed. Lyrics may

¹⁷ I was unable to find an explicit attribution, but the handwritten score printed in the newspaper has the same handwriting as later songs published and attributed to Lao Zhicheng (even after the war) (*Xinminbao* 1942m; *Xinminbao* 1942n; Lao 1944b). Of course, the scores could have been copied by someone, but Jiang’s songs were also printed in his handwriting (*Xinminbao* 1938g).

have prescribed certain musical tropes, but what musical shape such directives took was up to the individual composers and varied accordingly.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that these song commission activities were not restricted to occupied north China. Instead, this strategy was applied throughout the Japanese empire and was appropriated by Wang Jingwei's RNG after its establishment in 1940. Focusing on two song commissions promoted in 1940 and 1941 allows us to better understand this relationship between Japanese directives and local implementation, as well as the interactions between Chinese local governments and changes to their relationship in 1940/1941.

In 1940, multiple *Raise Asia* songs and marches were simultaneously commissioned in different parts of Japanese-occupied Asia. The Japanese version of a *Raise Asia March* was commissioned by the newspaper *Asahi shinbun* between March and April 1940.¹⁸ The arrangement for the Victor Company of Japan, composed by Hashimoto Kunihiko, is an upbeat marching song with a well-produced instrumental arrangement (Japanese Imperial Army Band and Ōnuma 1940). Other recordings of the same Japanese song were published in Taiwan at the same time (Sid wang 2013). Local Chinese administrations (i.e., the RGROC/RNG and the NCPC) commissioned their own versions of the song in early 1940, suggesting an attempt to emulate but also Sinicise these wider Japanese efforts. In the Lower Yangzi Delta, Gao Tianxi wrote Chinese lyrics to the *Raise Asia March* and *Raise Asia Song*.¹⁹ The text was set to music by Li Jinguang (who operated under the pseudonym Jin Yugu) – the brother of

¹⁸ The lyrics chosen were written by the female writer Imazawa Fukiko. The composer Fukui Fumihiko wrote the melody.

¹⁹ This version can be accessed through the National Taiwan University Library online collection (*Xing Ya jinxingqu* 1940).

the “father of *shidaiqu*”, Li Jinhui, and a prominent figure in Shanghai’s commercial music scene. This version resembled the Japanese version in style – simultaneously militaristic by virtue of its beat, rhythm and brass section, but also resembling upbeat vaudeville music.

In addition, the NCPG in Beijing commissioned its own version of this song at the beginning of 1940 and released the lyrics in late March (*Xinminbao* 1939b; *Xinminbao* 1939d). Possibly due to the overlapping timelines of two propaganda initiatives (songs for the newly established Wang Jingwei regime were commissioned in Tianjin in March (*Xinminbao* 1940e)), the musical score of the north China version of the *Raise Asia March* was only published in late November (*Xinminbao* 1940n), and the official release was scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the Xinminhui on 24 December 1940 (*Xinminbao* 1940p). The ideological uncertainty that came to north China with the establishment of the RNG in Nanjing was reflected in the lyrics (see figure 15). Even by the standards of earlier north Chinese propaganda songs, the lyrics were written in an unusually classical style. Powerful natural imagery is used to invoke a beautiful Asian continent and calls for peace and co-operation between the whole of China and Japan. With the exception of a reference to the promotion of Sino-Japanese co-operation, no specific enemies or occupation state slogans are mentioned in the lyrics. Just as interestingly, the musical realization, in its very simplicity and use of a pure pentatonic melody, shows just how independent north Chinese propaganda initiatives had become from direct Japanese and Lower Yangzi Delta influence. Nevertheless, or possibly because of such broad applicability, the *Raise Asia March(es)* were among the most regularly played repertoire in occupied Beijing through until the end of the war.

興亞進行曲

Xing Ya jinxingqu - Raise Asia March

賈吉 Jia Ji

江文也 Jiang Wenye

旭 日 升 耀 光 茫 揚 子 江 上 金 龍 驤
 Xu ri sheng cui guang-mang Yang - zi-jiang shang jin - long xiang

5
 皎 月 照 互 天 長 富 士 山 嶺 彩 風 翔
 jiao yue zhao gen tian zhang Fu - shi shan - ling cai feng xiang

9
 江 山 相 映 雄 秀 輝 煌 亞 洲 基 業 興 國 禎 祥
 jiangshan xiang - ying xiong-xiu hui - huang Ya - zhou ji - ye xing guo zhen - xiang

13
 前 程 萬 裏 大 風 泱 泱 神 明 華 胃 齊 發 揚
 qian - chengwan - li da feng yang-yang shen - minghua wei qi fa - yang

Figure 15: Raise Asia March, transcribed according to the manuscript (*Xinminbao* 1940n).

The musical realization of these songs shows how north Chinese propaganda initiatives had become relatively independent of Japanese and RNG influence by 1940, just as the north China occupation state, re-constituted as the NCPC after the founding of the RNG, maintained almost complete administrative and ideological independence from Wang Jingwei's supposedly "pan-Chinese" collaborationist regime, headquartered in Nanjing. In other words, local Chinese groups, though operating within the bounds of Japanese directives, displayed remarkable levels of local agency. These groups did not simply circulate Japanese songs. Instead, local writers were recruited through public commissions, local composers were tasked with writing songs and local performers were tasked with performing or recording them. Moreover, while Japanese slogans were used in the lyrics of each *Raise Asia March*, their musical

realization bears witness to the differences of personal musical style and mass culture in Beijing as opposed to the RNG heartland of the Lower Yangzi Delta. Despite efforts on the part of the newly-founded RNG government to unify propaganda activities throughout occupied China after 1940, this localized character of musical propaganda was largely maintained through until the end of the war.

With the nominal amalgamation of the north Chinese government under Wang Jingwei's RNG in March 1940, attempts to commission propaganda songs throughout China went one step further, with a joint song commission of two songs in 1941. The songs *Preserve East Asia* and the *East Asian Nations' March* were commissioned jointly by the *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi*, the *Shanghai Zhonghua ribao* and the *Tōkyō nichichi shinbun* (Anonymous 1941b). Two texts were selected: one written by a 21-old Chinese student from Hebei studying in Japan called Yang Shoudan; the other written by the above-mentioned lyricist, filmmaker and composer Gao Tianxi. The lyrics were then set to music by Ke Zhenghe, Yamada Kōsaku and Jiang Wenye (Ke, Gao and Yamada 1941; Jiang and Yang 1941).

Pairing Gao's lyrics for *Preserve East Asia* with a melody by Ke Zhenghe and an arrangement by Yamada Kōsaku served as a model example of intra-Chinese and Japanese collaboration (Wang, Yuan and Chen 1941). Having Jiang Wenye compose a setting of the exchange student's lyrics for the *East Asia Nations' March* would show that the younger generation was starting to embody complex transnational attachments. The two songs were first performed in Nanjing at celebrations for the first anniversary of the RNG's "return to the capital" (*huandu*) on 30 March 1941. They were then brought to Shanghai, Wuhan, Beijing, Tokyo, Osaka and the Manchukuo capital of Xinjing (Changchun). The *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* dedicated an entire special issue to the songs in April 1941 (Anonymous 1941a). Photo spreads of song release events in

Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan continued to be published in the same journal throughout May and June (see figure 16).



Figure 16: Release events for the Preserve East Asia Song in Nanjing (top), Shanghai (left) and Hankou (right), 1941 (Anonymous 1941f; 1941g; 1941h).

These commission activities in 1940 and 1941 show how propaganda strategies were incrementally adopted in various parts of Japanese-occupied China. Similar appropriations and patterns of contact have been noted for propaganda strategies and questions of ideology between Manchukuo, north China and the Lower Yangzi Delta – most notably with the modelling of the Xinminhui and later Daminhui on the Concordia Association of Manchukuo. It is therefore not surprising to see propaganda strategies that had been tried and tested in north China earlier in the war being employed in the Lower Yangzi Delta. However, the literature which stresses the common narrative of the dominance of the commercial music scene in Shanghai (Chen 2005, 263–67; Yu 2006, 379–83) has so far not recognized the outward movement of musical propaganda initiatives from north to south in Japanese-occupied China. Nor has the existing scholarship acknowledged the interaction of musical elites in the Lower Yangzi Delta with their counterparts in occupied north China. If anything, the commission process in 1941 suggests that Japanese advisors placed a significant amount of trust in (the Taiwanese-born) composers Ke Zhenghe and Jiang Wenye as independent cultural agents and ambassadors of collaboration. However, the process also shows a level of both competition and co-operation between different centres of Chinese “collaborationist” power – be those in Beijing, Nanjing or elsewhere.

Ensuring Retention

In Beijing, each major song commission was celebrated with a large award ceremony and performance, taking place either at the Xinmin Hall (*Xinminbao* 1938g; *Xinminbao* 1939p), the Chang’an Grand Theatre (*Xinminbao* 1940p; *Xinminbao* 1941u; *Xinminbao* 1941v; *Xinminbao* 1942i) or the Beijing City Music Hall

(*Xinminbao* 1943h; *Huabei xinbao* 1944i). These events maintained a standard procedure, following the model established in 1938. Speeches by Xinminhui representatives were framed by repetitive performances of the commissioned song by various groups, including the Beijing City Police Band, several school choirs and well-known soloists such as Jiang Wenye, Wang Tizhi or the previous winners of singing contests (*Xinminbao* 1939o; *Xinminbao* 1941i; *Xinminbao* 1941v). These soloists would then lead a singing tutorial for the audience. Some relief from the monotonous repetition was offered by brass bands present and pieces performed by individual choirs (*Xinminbao* 1938w). Interestingly, choirs performed with sheet music at hand.²⁰ This certainly made a difference in their retention and possibly had a negative effect on audience reception of the performance (Kopiez, Wolf and Platz 2017). Reciting a musical piece from material that is physically separated from the performing body means maintaining a distance between the performer and the musical work and text and creates a visual barrier between the singer and the audience. It may lessen the performers' own as well as the perceived identification with the musical message and the intensity of the performance.

Audiences at these events were expected to behave in a disciplined manner. Indeed, instructions published in 1941 advised arriving on time, carrying a five-coloured flag, remaining at one's appointed place, listening quietly to speeches, bowing when asked to do so, and joining in with enthusiasm when shouting slogans (*Xinminbao* 1940l). The very existence of such directives suggests problems had earlier existed with unruly audiences, late arrivals, walkouts during speeches and a lack of enthusiasm or

²⁰ Performance practice has changed over the centuries. Since much of Chinese musical tradition relied on improvisation, the use of sheet music here could also have been meant to mark the formal and modern characteristics of the performance.

respect for rituals. While this may therefore be taken as evidence of resistance, it could also be understood as indicative of the unfamiliarity of Beijing's audiences with what the Japanese considered normal and proper audience behaviour. Unfortunately, we do not have direct evidence that would allow us to differentiate between the two.

Following their initial propagation, the occupation state went to great lengths to ensure that its subjects knew these songs. The songs were not only made obligatory in school curricula and taught at Xinminhui summer camps and workshops in 1938 (*Xinminbao* 1938ad), but became part of the standard ritual at morning assemblies, Xinminhui group meetings, political campaigns, student singing competitions, mass rallies, parades and other celebratory events. They were published in the internal Xinminhui members' news *Xinmin huibao* (Jiang and Miao 1938a; 1938b) and strategically placed alongside articles on related topics in other journals (Jiang and Miao 1938c; 1938d). Score leaflets and recordings were sent to various institutions around the city (Beijing Municipal Archive 1938).

Most songs were recorded prior to the actual song release event by varying record companies in Japan and shipped to Beijing (*Xinminbao* 1938d; *Xinminbao* 1939h; Anonymous 1941c). Singers included actresses, performers and celebrities such as Bai Guang, Huang Shiping and Li Xianglan (Anonymous 1941c; *Huabei xinbao* 1944f; *Huabei xinbao* 1944g), perhaps as a means of making them appeal to a populace who would associate such performers with entertainment and glamour. Songs were broadcast throughout the empire and featured in newsreels. And song lyrics were even painted on walls so that pedestrians would pass them on a regular basis.²¹ These

²¹ This can be seen in images such as "People Gazing at a Wang Jingwei Song on the Street" (Guangzhou, 1941) found in the Asahi News Image Database, image ID: 0000044160.

measures made sure people were exposed to the songs on a regular basis and in specific contexts and would associate them with specific spaces.²²

Especially important as an educational tool in both parts of the RNG were annual school singing contests – a tradition appropriated from pre-war Chinese political traditions. Choral singing competitions ensured the retention of new repertoire, as specific songs could be set as obligatory repertoire and would be rehearsed intensively in preparation for each contest.²³ Prizes were offered for every participating school, and scores and recordings made available for preparation (*Xinminbao* 1941b). The judging panel at these competitions was usually composed of lecturers from both Beijing Normal Colleges' Music Institutes. Finalists usually performed at the Central Radio Station (*Xinminbao* 1938v; *Xinminbao* 1938y; *Xinminbao* 1938aa).

These singing competitions were commonly set to coincide with commemorative or political campaign events. These included a citywide “Exterminate the CCP and Vanquish the KMT Movement Week” in June 1938,²⁴ the “Raise Asia Movement Weeks” commemorating the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in early July 1940 and 1941

²² Sue Tuohy has noted a similar multimedia and repetitive approach in her study of national music in the PRC (Tuohy 2001, 117).

²³ The quality of general music education in Beijing's state-funded schools was questionable. A review published two weeks after the 1939 contest provided some harsh but constructive criticism: voice parts were not equally loud, conductors confused up- and downbeats, and groups sang in unison rather than harmony and misread basic rhythmic patterns (*Xinminbao* 1940b). However, the purpose of these competitions was not to nurture elite singing groups, but to enforce the retention of political messages through repetition and mass experience.

²⁴ This week took place from 13 June to 19 June. A separate *Exterminate the CCP and Vanquish the KMT Song* had been commissioned (composed by Ke Zhenghe), and was published for the occasion, but was not performed at this event.

(*Xinminbao* 1940k; *Xinminbao* 1941i; *Xinminbao* 1941s); the first anniversary of the establishment of the RNG in March 1941 (*Xinminbao* 1941c); and the commemoration of the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor held in 1944 (*Huabei xinbao* 1944n; *Huabei xinbao* 1944o). A competition in 1941 was even organized as a regional event and featured six elementary and six middle school choirs and six solo representatives from different cities and regions across north China (*Xinminbao* 1941c). The last singing competition to take place during the occupation was in July 1945 (*Huabei xinbao* 1945c), only weeks before the Japanese surrender.

Repertoire prescribed for each competition revealed a tightening of controls as the war progressed. Initially, schools were asked to perform two songs: one obligatory song and one song of their choice. As for the obligatory song, the 1938 competition required the *Xinmin Song* exclusively. In 1939 different pieces were assigned to each participating section, including several Xinminhui songs and *Under the Five-Coloured Flag* (*Xinminbao* 1939y; *Xinminbao* 1940b). As for the free song choice, though many schools chose a piece included in Ke Zhenghe's textbooks, a handful of schools chose a similarly political second piece. Some schools even performed songs in English. Choices were restricted in later years, however. In 1940, for example, each choir was asked to perform two out of five prescribed songs, including the newly commissioned *East Asia March* (*Chenbao* 1940b). In 1942, the twenty-two participating schools had to perform their choice of a song in Japanese along with the new *Greater East Asia General Advance Song* (*Xinminbao* 1942k). And in December 1944, each school had to pick a song by an "East Asian composer" (*Huabei xinbao* 1944i; *Huabei xinbao* 1944o).

Despite such intense promotion and control, the regime's efforts to popularize many of the songs met with little enthusiasm. Instead of inspiring a pro-Japanese,

collaborationist movement, the songs were often met with skepticism and disdain. Time witness Yao Siyuan, for example, recalls how teachers in occupied north China only taught the melodies of songs to their students, but not the lyrics.²⁵ Yao's claim is credible – it is common practice to teach songs without lyrics first or use solmization techniques to learn the melody. Music teachers could thus avoid compliance without facing much risk. Another eyewitness recalls: “While singing the [Japanese national] anthem students used to substitute some rude Russian words that sounded like the Japanese” (Sitsky 2015, 157). This suggests that twisting lyrics became a method to express resistance or humour to peers and bystanders without being discovered by audiences or facing retaliation from superiors.

Tellingly, an internal investigation by the Xinminhui and Beijing police a year after the first performance in 1938 revealed that few people even knew the national or city anthems (Beijing Municipal Archive 1939). While this can be partly attributed to low levels of musical literacy and a lack of musical education even prior to the war, it warranted increased popularization efforts by the occupation state. Consequently, the government again sent out leaflets with songs in cipher notation to all government departments, schools, corporations and civic groups in June 1939, ordering them to designate time to practise the songs. They were given two months to learn the national anthem, the *Beijing City Anthem* and the *Xinminhui Anthem*. The police, for example, implemented a rotating system in response to such calls, sending a few officers from each battalion to rehearse the songs three times a week and practising the anthems at their morning assemblies.²⁶ Later reports attest to the occupation state's persistent (but

²⁵ Personal interview with Yao Siyuan, 11 November 2018.

²⁶ Several reports of the police's implementation of this system can be found in the BMA files (Beijing Municipal Archive 1939; *Xinminbao wankan* 1939).

often futile) attempts at ensuring that its subjects knew the anthems. In June 1941, for example, each regional office, branch society, advisory office and external group had to send one representative to learn the national anthem, the *Xinmin Song*, the *Yellow Race Song* and the *Raise Asia March* (*Xinminbao* 1941h). Teachers were recruited from Japanese residents' groups, the Women's League and, in rural areas, military groups (*Xinminbao* 1940o). While this suggests that the songs had limited public appeal and their dissemination had to be enforced, it did not impede the effect their presence (and even ubiquity) in occupied Beijing had on citizens.

The Xinminhui ensured that people were constantly confronted with the songs and remembered them, however reluctantly. The scarcity of evidence about the reception of such efforts might tell us more about the subject's sensitivity and risks of being labelled a traitor in post-war China than about the actual effectiveness of the occupation state's musical propaganda. A short essay published on an online community forum in 2015 by an elderly person who attended elementary school in occupied Beijing offers a different perspective, however. This person recounts participating in one of the singing competition broadcasting sessions at the time:

The Xinminhui [...] made elementary school students perform the winning song at the radio station for broadcast. Because our music teacher made us rehearse them repeatedly, I have remembered most of the lyrics. [...] the Japanese national anthem and *Sakura* were broadcast non-stop on the radio and through megaphones. Listening to them every day through those machines, students could almost all hum them. [...] Newly commissioned Chinese songs highlighted the core of Japanese ideologies. Because the melodies were simple and easy to sing, the children learned them fast (Hua 2015)

This account goes on to cite the *Greater East Asia General Advance Song*, the *Raise Asia March*, the *East Asia March* and the *Yellow Race Youth Song* from memory with only a few slight changes to the text. This suggests that people who were not primed against and receptive to repetitive messaging could be successfully targeted by the occupation state's musical messaging.

Figure 17 perfectly illustrates the expected behaviour of the occupation state's singing subjects. It includes a depiction of the peoples of Japan, the Lower Yangzi Delta (i.e., RGROC), north China (i.e., PGROC/Xinminhui) and Manchukuo, represented by their flag-carriers, and celebrating the first anniversary of the founding of the Xinminhui. They are marching from Beijing's Qianmen Gate through a gateway (*paifang*) with the Xinminhui symbol, singing the *Xinminhui Anthem* (with lyrics printed above). However, I would argue that the image also illustrates the dissonance between expectation and reality. If we "listened" to this image, we would hear a Japanese airplane (and leaflet-bomber) flying overhead alongside the sound of celebrating people. For Chinese residents of occupied Beijing, the sound of Japanese planes would have potentially been associated with traumatic experiences or images of destruction and bodily harm. Here, residents are pictured rejoicing to this sound and joining in with it through song. This image therefore shows the discrepancy between the listening experiences of Chinese residents (part of the intended readership of this leaflet) and the "Japanese fondness for picturing bombers in flight over China" (Taylor 2021, 120). This depiction of sounds of violence, in other words, reveals the asymmetry in power relations between occupier and occupied (Daughtry 2015, 128–58).




Figure 17: Leaflet with lyrics of the Xinminhui Anthem, Hoover Institute, Chinese Subject Collections, Box 13.

While many of the techniques we have explored in this chapter may seem relatively harmless, we should take them seriously in their long-lasting effect as psychological manipulation. Having subjects not only listen to but actively perform political messages they might not agree with creates a cognitive dissonance between the corporal euphoria of singing and the mental discomfort of acting against one's ideological integrity. This dissonance is potentially traumatic and can be mitigated by the singer in various ways: open resistance and refusing participation; non-compliance with the political message by changing lyrics during the performance; emotional retreat from engagement with the political message; or simply non retention of the message. We have seen some of these coping mechanisms at play in time witness accounts. In each case, resentment against the coercive power that led to such inner conflicts would be expected. Assuming no retaliation from this level of abuse and subjugation speaks to the confidence – or naivety – of the Japanese occupiers and groups such as the Xinminhui.

Conclusion

While part one of this chapter focused on the repertoire and performance practices developed and appropriated in 1938, I have shown how these continued to be employed and promoted throughout the occupation in north China. I have approached my initial question regarding the significance of musical culture for the occupation state through two main avenues: a focus on and detailed analysis of musical repertoire, mainly individual newly commissioned songs, and their institutionalized creation and second, performance practices such as mass singing events, singing competitions and parades, as well as recording and broadcasting practices.

I have shown how the PGROC used musical repertoire to stake its claim as the legitimate government under Japanese occupation. I have also highlighted the gendered nature of Xinminhui songs and lack of differentiation across the rural-urban divide. Musical analysis has further revealed the regimes' effort to represent itself as a distinctly Chinese entity. Jiang Wenye's use of Chinese modes and folk elements puts these songs in line with musical developments begun prior to the war but also in line with resistance song composition.

A closer look at performance practices organized directly by the Xinminhui again highlights continuities with pre-war musical performance. Xinminhui officials consciously appropriated performance practices from pre-war social movements and used song commissions and mass singing events to foster a sense of community among the subjects of the occupation state. Such material demonstrates that mass singing was not an exclusively anti-Japanese resistance activity. On the contrary, mass singing must be understood as an integral part of the occupation state's propaganda efforts. While this may seem unsurprising in the context of Axis propaganda, it is counter-intuitive if we consider the "positive" effects of community-building and mobilization that are commonly attributed to mass singing in the scholarship on twentieth-century China.

I have also considered how the Xinminhui used sound and musical performance to demarcate its power. Live performances in symbolically laden ritual spaces and sonic demarcations of power with parades around Beijing's city centre along with measures promoting the mediated presence of newly commissioned repertoire were employed to perform territorial occupation and state sovereignty.

In the second part of the chapter, I moved beyond 1938 to consider how the occupation state continued to generate and promote new repertoire throughout the war. I showed

how local governments in occupied China tried to maintain independent agency when it came to the way they presented shifting ideologies and Japanese propaganda initiatives. In observing the joint song commission initiative in 1941, we have to acknowledge the important role of north Chinese elites in establishing propaganda strategies throughout occupied China. Finally, difficulties the Xinminhui faced in their propagation of collaborationist messages have been illustrated through repeated measures taken to ensure their retention. While we cannot make claims regarding their popularity, we can attest to their ubiquity and impact on people's everyday lives. Anecdotal evidence from time witnesses has also illustrated both resistance against and the success of the Xinminhui's initiatives.

The following chapter will continue to explore the repertoires developed after 1938. It will illustrate the occupation state's increased management of musical repertoires and its turn toward public entertainment, rather than mass participation. I will also analyze the changing aesthetics of the repertoire commissioned by local governments in occupied China between 1939 and 1945 and its interaction with commercial repertoire in more detail.

CHAPTER 5

Voicing Collaboration: Ambiguous Entertainment and the Convergence of Wartime Aesthetics

As initial efforts to establish the occupation government drew to a close in late 1938, musical propaganda was more seamlessly integrated into the regime's propaganda efforts. In this chapter, I continue to focus on song repertoire developed by the occupation state. Instead of focusing on one specific song collection, however, I ask: how were newly commissioned pieces integrated into the wider repertoire of the occupation state's propaganda campaigns? What significance did they have amidst other music produced by the commercial recording and film industry? How did performance practices change following the initial effort to establish the occupation state in occupied north China? And what kind of voices were deemed appropriate to perform newly commissioned songs and what do these discussions and choices reveal about the occupation state and its standing?

To trace how newly commissioned pieces were integrated into the regime's propaganda effort, I examine the repertoire performed at three "Raise Asia Movement Weeks" held in the summer of 1939, 1940 and 1941, respectively. I juxtapose this with discussions among musical elites in occupied China about repertoire development and the aesthetic choices deemed appropriate at the time. These reveal the frustration and dismay that musical elites felt as the distinction between "musical pabulum" and

newly commissioned songs with ideological messaging became increasingly blurred. I subsequently approach this dilemma from two angles: (i) discussions around the aesthetic choices in the creation of musical repertoire that elites considered befitting in the context of occupation; and (ii) the types of voices and singing styles deemed appropriate and chosen to represent the occupation state's ideologies.

It would be naïve to deny the significance of commercial repertoire produced by record and film companies under Japanese supervision and distributed in occupied Beijing. By continuing to focus on local collaborationist discourse, however, I will offer an alternative view of cultural production in occupied north China. As I will show, musical elites only deemed specific musical genres suitable for reconfiguring the affective state of listening bodies/minds and their attitude toward topical issues. I will show just how similar some of ideas about the musical realization of patriotism were in both the occupied *and* non-occupied territories of wartime China. I will suggest, therefore, that the aesthetics of collaboration and resistance converged in a more general aesthetic of wartime crisis (i.e., one that was common across wartime China). I will further show that musical exchanges between the occupied and non-occupied regions occurred, and that pieces written in support of collaboration drew directly on salvationist (i.e., resistance) repertoire. This has far-reaching implications for the historiography of wartime music and auditory propaganda in occupied China. While the circulation of resistance songs in the occupied territories is known, no evidence of the occupation state actively appropriating similar repertoire has been produced in the literature before.¹

¹ In the past, anti-Japanese salvationist songs in China have been lauded for their effectiveness and musical quality. Even a critical scholar such as Liu Ching-chi – who notes the artistic superiority of

At the heart of government officials' worries about the appropriate way to represent the occupation state and its ideologies was the question of gender. I will therefore also shift my focus in this chapter from repertoires to voices, and in particular the female voices who represented the regime both in commercial recordings, "national policy films" (*kokusaku eiga*) and in newly commissioned repertoire. While I will detail changes in performance and recording practices, I will also show that the regime was represented mainly by professional singers.

I end this chapter with a call to consider the interplay between repertoire and performance practice. Only when we consider how changing wartime aesthetics in composition were performed and if, indeed, performances reflected theorists' and composers' call for more "topical" voices, can we gain an understanding of the dilemma that musical elites in occupied China faced. A misalignment between newly developed repertoire and performances thereof, I argue, was considered detrimental to much of the ambiguous entertainment developed by the occupation state.

Ambiguous Entertainment

The most elaborate displays of public entertainment between 1939 and 1941 were arguably the so-called "Raise Asia Movement Weeks". These events commemorated the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 in early July each year. These political movement weeks were celebrated as sonic campaigns in north China with daily live performances, concerts, galas and other forms of audio-visual entertainment. They

pre-war salvationist songs over the extremely politicized songs that were produced quickly and en masse in Yan'an (Liu 2010, 201–3) and is familiar with the artistic achievements of Jiang Wenye – condemns the songs of the occupation state as "hypocritical and insipid" (Liu 2010, 190).

were also timed to coincide with the release of newly commissioned songs or the annual choral singing contests (*Xinminbao* 1939n; *Xinminbao* 1940j; *Xinminbao* 1940k; *Xinminbao* 1941l). In 1939, for example, the newly commissioned *Xinmin Folk Song* was performed by the Beijing City Police Band and two school choirs (*Xinminbao* 1939n; *Xinminbao* 1939a), and in 1941, the jointly commissioned *Preserve East Asia Song* was promoted with a school choir competition (*Xinminbao* 1941l). Beginning in early July 1939, the Japanese Imperial Army Band played its standard repertoire – a mix of brass band adaptations of European operetta repertoire, Japanese marches and Chinese songs – at four Sino-Japanese Goodwill Music and Film Events on consecutive Saturdays.² “Raise Asia Day” on 7 July 1940 illustrated the breadth of soloists and ensembles mobilized by the Xinminhui (*Chenbao* 1940c). It featured performances by an instrumental trio and a traditional music ensemble, a girls’ middle school choir singing two of Jiang Wenye’s propaganda songs, a dance performance, and performances by popular singers and soloists on piano, violin, *nanhu*, *guqin* and *pipa*. The event concluded with a theatre performance and the showing of three newsreels (*Xinminbao* 1940j; *Shibao* 1940b).

Concerts and record listening sessions organized under the pretext of “Asian revival” continued throughout Beijing’s hot summer months, when outdoor events allowed for larger audiences and spontaneous gatherings in public parks. These sessions wove musical entertainment together with more overtly propagandistic messaging delivered through speeches and films. In 1939, summer record listening sessions were organized four times a week between early July and September in Beijing’s Central Park.

² These events were held between early July and early August (*Xinminbao* 1939o; *Xinminbao* 1939t; *Xinminbao* 1939u; *Xinminbao* 1939s; *Xinminbao* 1939v; *Xinminbao* 1939w)

Alongside film viewings and live performances recorded for radio broadcasts, these sessions featured recordings provided by China Records with a wide range of genres, including Peking opera, music from Guangdong, drumming performances, and commercial song recordings by female film stars and recording artists,³ most prominently the Beijing-based starlets Li Mengmei, Wen Li and Wang Tizhi (*Xinminbao* 1939o). In 1940, musical performances were held alongside sports events and a photography and cartoon exhibition (*Chenbao* 1940a; *Chenbao* 1940b). At so-called “leisurely summer events” (*xiao xia dahui*) in 1941, films and speeches on “pacification” (*zhi'an*) were accompanied by record listening sessions and live concerts on weekends (*Xinminbao* 1941m; *Xinminbao* 1941p). These featured an eclectic collection of genres, including popular songs, crosstalk (*xiangsheng*), opera, and harmonica and brass band performances.

“Raise Asia Week” ceased to be celebrated on the same scale after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Nonetheless, such entertainment and relief performances continued after 1941 despite ideological tightening, and alongside anti-communist Peace Keeping and Strengthening Movements, despite the lack of resources and even after Wang Jingwei’s declaration of war on the Allies in January 1943. I will explore some of the performance highlights of this latter phase of the war in Chapter 6.

While musical entertainment had been part of the occupation state’s propaganda efforts even at the start of the war, the regime became less selective in the events they promoted and appropriated as part of their political messaging. Music was increasingly

³ Films promoted in the pages of the north Chinese journal *Huabei yinghua* included *All-Encompassing Love* (1942), *Eternity* (1943), *Fairy Ninbo* (1943), *Three Flowers* (1943), *Red Beans Grow in the Southern Lands* (1944) and *Phoenix Flies* (1944). These starred, among others, Bai Guang, Li Xianglan, Zhou Xuan and Gong Qiuxia.

used for relief work (and pacification), rather than for active mobilization. Thus, public entertainment with a mix of live performances and record listening sessions at “leisurely summer events” became a staple of occupied north China’s musical culture. After Wang Jingwei’s declaration of war on the Allies in January 1943, music was re-conceptualized as a way to ease the hardships that the war had inflicted on the people of the so-called hinterland (*houfang*) and laud their production efforts behind the front line (*Shibao* 1943n; *Huabei xinbao* 1944d). This development parallels trends in both Germany and Vichy France where people were catered to with light entertainment programmes to maintain morale and create a sense of normalcy – a fact that is easily ignored in narratives of the uninterrupted propagation of the “total war” (Kater 2019, 179–80; Riding 2011, 50–57).

The musical repertoire presented at these events was not carefully curated but grew out of the individual repertoires of the performing artists, ensembles and record companies invited to take part in them. Hence, much of the musical repertoire played at the “Raise Asia” listening sessions did not explicitly express support for the occupation state and its ideologies. Militaristic pieces and marches performed by police and military bands were certainly meant to intimidate and convey power, but they could easily have been listened to as familiar parts of a pre-war repertoire. Popular love songs, such as the classic *When Will You Return?* (1937),⁴ were performed in and associated with many different political territories and ideologies (Ho 2006, 441). Some popular songs used during campaign events even originated in pre-war left-wing creations. Among the songs performed in 1940, for example, were *The Wandering*

⁴ *When Will You Return?* is an extremely popular song first performed in 1937 by Zhou Xuan (Zhou 1937) and covered in 1939 and 1940 by Li Xianglan and Bai Guang (Bai 1940) (Steen 1999–2000).

Songstress and *Song of Four Seasons* – two widely popular songs from the pre-war left-wing Shanghai film *Street Angels* (1937)⁵ and composed by He Lüting (Zhou, and Pathé Orchestra 1937). By 1940, He Lüting had become a prominent supporter of the resistance, active in Chongqing and later in Yan'an. Despite his close association with resistance, however, his songs remained popular in occupied China where they were transformed from symbols of patriotism into ballads of submission and passivity.⁶ The theme song from *Song of the Fishermen* (1934), performed in 1941, similarly originated in a pre-war leftist film.⁷ Its composer, Ren Guang, joined the resistance in Southeast Asia and later the East China base area. Despite its leftist message, *Song of the Fishermen* was a known commercial success, promoted as such and shown to Chinese audiences in Japanese-occupied countries even outside China itself (Taylor 2013, 1606). The films' theme song was covered by the young Japanese-educated and Beijing-based Bai Guang in 1940 (*Xinminbao* 1941o).⁸ All this goes to show that

⁵ For an introduction to the film see Rea (2021).

⁶ Most prominently they were used in the film *Lust, Caution* (Li 2007) in a performance by the female protagonist to seduce her collaborationist lover/adversary.

⁷ For a brief synopsis of *Song of the Fishermen* see Voci 1998. For an analysis of the music in both *Street Angels* and *Song of the Fishermen*, see Yeh 2002.

⁸ Bai Guang worked a member of a song and dance team in Japan during her studies there (Raine 2018, 173), and became a recording artist with Pathé. She starred in one of the earliest Sino-Japanese joint film productions, *Road to Peace in the Orient* (1938). Bai Guang was active as a recording artist following her return to China, but only rose to stardom in China with her performance in *Peach and Plum Blooming in Spring* (1943). The theme song of the 1943 film, composed by Chen Gexin, is a stereotypical Shanghainese commercial song with its profession of and intoxication with love, jazz-band accompaniment (featuring piano and clarinet), and relaxed but ornate singing style. Bai Guang's characteristic deeper voice is particularly well featured in the songs featured in *Red Beans Grow in the Southern Lands* (1944).

repeatedly performing pieces in heightened political contexts as part of political campaign events meant that individual musical pieces and performers, ensembles and entire genres gained new political meaning by association. Similar processes around the reinterpretation and appropriation of musical repertoire for political purposes have been observed with regard to the widely popular wartime song *Lili Marleen* or in the context of American political campaigns (Walter 2012; Mackey-Kallis and McDermott 1992).

At the same time, the occupation state's emphasis on relief and entertainment meant that repertoires produced by the commercial recording industry far outnumbered the pieces painstakingly commissioned and produced by the occupation state itself (such as the songs that I examined in detail in Chapter 4). Even if such pieces were played as the grand finale at such events and recorded by the same actresses that lent their voices to the film industry, their effect was diminished by the popularity of commercial repertoire. The sheer ubiquity of music performed and recorded by female singers thus created a dilemma for intellectuals in the occupied territories. Could listeners differentiate between mere entertainment – “musical pabulum” – and propaganda songs when the same singers performed both? How could the same singer perform potentially submissive love songs, while also performing songs meant to convey strength and patriotism? Below, I explore the effect of this dilemma on the aesthetic choices made by local musical elites.

Converging Wartime Aesthetics

As newly commissioned propaganda songs were performed alongside popular film songs and *shidaiqu* at large campaign events and sung by the same performers known

for their love songs, the lines between propaganda and “musical pabulum” ceased to be drawn clearly.⁹ While the PGROC and RNG did not hesitate to employ popular music to entertain or even mobilize people, they were less enthusiastic about being directly identified with these “decadent” popular songs (*liuxing ge / ryūkōka*) and were adamant about the need for “patriotic” and “topical” (*shidai xing*) national folk songs (*guomin ge / kokuminka*) (Gao 1942, 20; Zhou 1942; *Xinminbao* 1941i). Thus, the need to delineate between musical entertainment and “patriotic music” grew. Programmes printed in newspapers for the Raise Asia campaigns clearly differentiated between popular songs on the one hand, and national folk songs and patriotic songs (*aiguo ge / aikokuka*) on the other.

In 1943, the Beijing-based performing art historian and literary critic Jin Shoushen wrote an essay on “The Development of Songs Over the Last Forty Years”. His essay included this striking observation which is indicative of the ways in which musical elites in occupied China viewed the place of popular music in the occupation context:

On great streets and small lanes, we could hear *Drizzle* and *Darling*, *I Love You* being sung. Song and Dance Societies were springing up like bamboo shoots after spring rain. This went on until about 1931 [...] In these last few years, with the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, composers are hustling and writing

⁹ The difference between popular and “national”, “patriotic” or “salvationist” songs was an artificial distinction which often relied on lyrics rather than musical differences. In fact, it was the experience in the entertainment industry of many musicians involved in the National Salvation Singing Movement that contributed to the success of the movement (Howard 2015, 238–44; Jones 2001, 102–11; Gong 2008, 64–65).

many strong and winding [*weiwan*] songs to change customs and manners and to correct people's hearts and minds (Jin 1943).

Ironically, the harshest critics of popular songs in occupied China were also directly involved in the creation and distribution of musical entertainment. For example, Zhou Dawen, head of the Central Radio in Beijing, claimed: "we need to condemn those who write obscene songs more clearly" (Zhou 1942). And Gao Tianxi, Wang Jingwei's "court composer", condemned what he referred to as "decadent sounds" (*mimi zhi yin*) and as "harmful food for the soul" (Gao 1942, 20). In an editorial promoting the *Preserve East Asia Song* Song Contest, published on the first page of the *Xinminbao* in June 1941, the author condemned popular songs in the harshest terms, warning of the effect they could have on people's behaviour. Musical taste became subject to public scrutiny. Prejudices against the "lower classes" and young women, in particular, were mobilized to illustrate the corrosive effect of popular music on public morale:

Apart from the people who like Peking opera [*jingju*], there is a larger group of people, especially female students, who are very interested in popular songs [*liuxing gequ*]. But, unapologetically, frankly and subjectively speaking, these songs are extremely worthless, their lyrics are coarse and crude, their meaning is vulgar. And they have such a big influence on the bodies and minds of the youth! For example, even the rickshaw pullers can sing the phrase "In life, there are not many opportunities to get intoxicated" from

When Will You Return?.¹⁰ Consequently, many people believe in the sentence “drink today while drink you may” and look for opportunities to get drunk!¹¹ No wonder there are people who call for the overthrow of popular songs! [...] The songs we need are well-knit and meaningful, true-to-life, uplifting and lively; surely not some decadent sounds, mean and vulgar melodies. (*Xinminbao* 1941i)

We might take such statements as simply hypocritical. Nonetheless, they reflect the elites’ realization that listeners may not have internalized the same categories of popular music and propaganda songs, or simply did not listen to lyrics in the same manner. Thus, these statements can be understood as attempts to adjust listening practices in a time of crisis by drawing more attention to lyrics – the main differentiator between popular and “patriotic” songs.

As Edgar Pope has shown, similar sentiment was expressed by Japanese elites, who, while praising the “healthier” pioneering *Patriotic March*, “lamented the continued popularity of *ryukoka* (popular songs), including exotic *tairiku* songs such as ‘Shina no Yoru’” (Pope 2003, 179).¹² It might therefore be tempting to dismiss such calls by Chinese elites as simple reiterations of Japanese discourse. However, Japanese elites seemed to accept Chinese audiences’ preference for entertainment (Fu 1997, 72–74). These continuities thus suggest that we can also understand these discussions as

¹⁰ This line was apparently only popular in the north Chinese version of the song (Steen 1999–2000, 133).

¹¹ Citing: *Self Consolation* by Luo Yin.

¹² *Shina no Yoru* (*China Nights*) is the title song of a film of the same name starring Li Xianglan (1940).

Chinese elites' efforts to express patriotic sentiment and strength in the face of an increased popularity of commercial songs.

What properly “patriotic songs” should sound like, and what genres and voices should be employed in them, was a matter of constant discussion in occupied China. With regard to genre, both Chinese traditional opera and folk songs were dismissed on the grounds of their inability to convey contemporary life and capture the spirit of the “peoples of East Asia”: “Today’s songs ought to become topical [*shidaihua*]. [...] China’s old operatic dramas [*guju*] may be beautiful, but the majority have lost their topical character [*shidaixing*]. Therefore, when people watch them, they feel no connection with life” (*Xinminbao* 1941i). Chinese folk songs were subjected to the same critique: “If we look at the folk songs in China’s rural society, the majority have also lost their topical character. They can only serve to study the state of the society in ancient times and to examine the manners and customs of ancient times, nothing more” (*Xinminbao* 1941i). This dismissal of both Chinese musical drama (i.e., *xiqu*) and folk songs seems to be indicative of difficulties to reconcile the modernist aesthetic of the Xinminhui with the elitist vision of cultural revival embodied by the PGROC/NCPC (as discussed in Chapter 4) and implicit in the Xinminhui’s ideological framing.

While alternative musical aesthetics, especially those closely associated with Western-style nation-building, were welcomed, pre-war salvationist songs were dismissed on the basis of their anti-Japanese lyrics (rather than their musical characteristics). Gao Tianxi’s critique of wartime resistance songs, for example, relied on their disregard for ancient Chinese tonal rhyme patterns (Gao 1942, 21). This critique may seem elitist and weak, but it is also one of the few instances when such songs were explicitly discussed in state-sanctioned journals.

It is no surprise then, that the music produced under the pretext of “topicality” resembled that produced in other wartime realms. The occupation state increasingly employed noticeably similar aesthetics and composing techniques as their peers in the Chinese resistance were doing. Composers in the occupied territories were very aware of pre-war salvationist repertoire and the success of their counterpart’s efforts as resistance songs circulated across the various fronts in the war. This is evident in the re-use of melodies such as the French folk song *Frère Jacques*.¹³ But similarities were not limited to the re-use of song material.

Other examples of increasingly militaristic repertoire include the *Greater East Asia General Advance Song*, commissioned in 1942. This song features an intricate structure of repetitions which aids memorization. With its fanfare-like beginning, syllabic nature, dotted rhythms and upward movement, it is written to be enticing and to excite listeners. Similar songs include the *Leap Forward Asia March*, with its tonal repetitions on dotted rhythms, and the *East Asian Nations’ March*, with its octave leaps and effective use of quaver pauses. Lei Zhenbang’s 1944 *Greater East Asia Song* is also memorable given its contrasting ABCBC’ structure and marked exclamations of the word “look!”. (See Appendix 1 for transcriptions of all of these songs.)

Crucially, however, if we compare the musical characteristics of a collection of over thirty propaganda songs found in PGROC and NCPC newspapers and magazines to “salvationist” songs of the resistance as analyzed by Isabel Wong and Joshua Howard (Wong 1984, 122–27; Howard 2015, 247–49, 254–55, 263–64) we find many

¹³ Various versions of this song circulated in Republican China, and the occupation state added at least two new variants on the lyrics to the collection: the 1939 *National Salvation and Raise Asia Song* and the 1943 *War Declaration Song* (see Appendix 1).

commonalities. All have a limited vocal range, rhythmic repetitions and a lack of modulations which make them easy to learn. Dotted and syncopated rhythms, sequencing, repetitions and recapitulations render all such songs easy to remember. The use of pentatonic modes and elements of folk tunes make the songs familiar and emphasize notions of an essentialized national or cultural identity. Occupation and resistance composers also shared a tendency to contrast energetic or militaristic rhythms with lyrical sections and traditional musical gestures (such as specific melismatic ornamentations and grace notes). A close fit between the tonal characteristics of the lyrics and melodic direction kept the songs close to the spoken word and aided memorization. Collaborationist songs featured less colloquial lyrics, often adhering to traditional poetic genres, regular verse lengths and rhyme patterns. Nonetheless, they may well have appealed to an educated urban elite and older generations while proving less popular than colloquial free forms. Uplifting modern Chinese marching songs with colloquial lyrics gained much acclaim in both communist and collaborationist realms. The *Xinminhui Anthem* and the *East Asian Nations' March*, for example, were favoured by musical elites in the occupied territories over their more subdued, traditional counterparts, the *Xinmin Song* and the *Preserve East Asia Song* (Liu 1942, 19).

Such similarities between repertoire produced in different wartime realms in China have been disregarded or even denied by scholars in the past (Ren 2019, 18; Liu 2010, 190). But a direct comparison between these two bodies of songs makes the comparison striking. Moreover, similar aesthetic parallels have been observed in Europe. In 2005, Pamela Potter asked: “What is Nazi Music?” Stripping away the layers of historical narrative that have been constructed around music in Nazi Germany, she recounts how musicologists have struggled to define a distinct Nazi

aesthetic. Even restricting the focus, as I have done in this chapter, to the song literature of the political organizations involved, has not led to satisfying results. As Potter argues: “Even then, one should not expect to unlock any clues about the musical peculiarities of a Nazi aesthetic by examining the repertoire, as the songs, unique only in their graphic texts, relied on borrowed melodies or militaristic styles virtually indistinguishable from the song literature of the left wing” (Potter 2005, 448). Although the psychological effects of musical patterns are not sufficiently understood, we can assume that rhythmic structures and melodic movements can have strong psychological and physiological effects on people. Despite such emotional responses being culturally mediated and learned, it should therefore not be surprising that certain musical tropes were (and still are) used across cultures and the political spectrum to entice people for a diverse range of ideologies.

In wartime China, similarities between resistance and collaborationist songs became more pronounced as composers in the occupied territories gained awareness of the supposed success of their counterpart’s efforts in the unoccupied regions. Composers in the occupied territories increasingly imitated composing techniques commonly used in resistance songs. In late 1942, for example, an article by Guangzhou-based composer Liu Bangxing in the *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* even gave clear instructions and examples of how to write effective songs. Liu advocated joyous, fast-paced marching songs with simple syllabic lyrics and shouted interjections of army mottos:

The Direction of Mass Singing in China

- (i) Enthusiastic, brave, joyous songs and tunes (national folk songs should take “marching forward”, “inciting”, “encouraging” and “rousing to action” as principle),

- (ii) Powerful, wholesome, resolute melodies and rhythms (marching songs are most suitable, this is the reason for people favouring the *East Asian Nations' March* over the *Preserve East Asia Song*),
- (iii) Short, commonly understandable, and memorable lyrics (not exceeding 120 characters),
- (iv) New and curious, stimulating motto calls (such as the *Preserve East Asia Song's* “arise!” or the same song’s “march on!”, or other character pairs that are extremely easy to sing or shout together),
- (v) Fast paced marches are best in moving forward mass groups, or army, police and student divisions (this will be more clearly understood when experienced under a [band] leader),
- (vi) Syllabic songs are easier to sing [...],
- (vii) Dynamics and accents are not easily followed in China’s mass singing [...],
- (viii) In songs that promote the meaning of the holy East Asia War and enthusiasm for the liberation of East Asia, army marching mottos are most powerful

(Liu 1942, 19).

Liu also included three representative songs to exemplify his demands (all of which are strikingly similar to resistance songs). Among them, the *East Asian Nations' Liberation March* closely resembles the *March of the Volunteers* – the national anthem of today's PRC – both with regards to lyrics and melody. Rather than assuming plagiarism or the intention to subvert the lyric's message of Pan-Asian liberation, I suggest that we take this song as an indication of the circulation and effectiveness of musical tropes commonly associated with the resistance (Please refer to figure 18 accompanying the following comparison).

The *March of the Volunteers* was composed by Nie Er in 1935 for the film *Children of Troubled Times* and was widely popularized through community and mass singing activities. Like the *March of the Volunteers* – and *The Internationale*, as Joshua Howard has observed (Howard 2020, 134) – the *East Asian Nations' Liberation March* relies heavily on the ascending forth. This is first seen at the beginning of phrases, which are set to the same text as their “salvationist” counterpart: “Arise!” The *East Asian Nations' Liberation March* also directly imitates the phrasing and structure of its salvationist counterpart. The first line of both songs follows a similar melodic and rhythmic pattern as the lyrics urge the masses to “arise”. The line “East Asian nations liberate!” in the *East Asian Nations' Liberation March* is set to an inverted melody of the *March of the Volunteers'* “China's nations face [the most perilous times]” with four straight, accented crotchets unmistakably identifiable by anyone familiar with the *March of the Volunteers*. The following “complete our great era's new mission” echoes the *March of the Volunteers'* line “let's build our new Great Wall”, set to a similar dotted rhythm. Even the beginning of the last phrase parallels the *March of the Volunteers* both in text and in musical realization: “We join forces constructing a co-existing co-prosperous Greater East Asia” echoes “We millions with

one heart, brave the enemies' fire, [march on!]". Instead of ending on the call to "march on" on an ascending fourth, however, the *East Asian Nations' Liberation March* exemplifies the use of shouted interjections on the two syllables. Other similarities, like the rare use of the triplet in the prelude and more distant variations of the original melody and rhythm, only add to the resemblance between the two songs. The *East Asian Nations' Liberation March*, therefore, offers a valuable insight into the connections and similarities between songs that were written in support of both the occupation *and* the resistance.

Voicing Collaboration

Arguably even more important than aesthetic changes in the development of musical repertoire were the choices made regarding performance practice in occupied China, particularly when it came to the voices recruited to perform political messages. Of course, this dilemma was not something that the occupation state was unique in facing. Sue Tuohy has described how it also shaped pre-war musical practices in China:

When musical activists searched for the people's voice, they found vocal diversity; no one voice represented the nation as a whole, let alone met their goals for a national future. Because defining the voice of the people is tantamount to defining the nation, the activists had different opinions as to what such a voice should sound like. [...]

Some advocated maintaining a Chinese "essence" from the past, only to be countered by those arguing China needed a new, stronger voice to meet both nationalist and popular demand (Tuohy 2001, 115).

Interestingly, the perceived success of songs propagated by China's wartime regimes depended not solely on the aesthetic choices made by composers in the development of musical repertoire, nor the availability of professional singers and recording equipment. Rather, the combination of and alignment between compositions and voices was deemed significant. Composing enticing marching songs is one step, but finding authentic voices and singing styles to perform those marching songs was another.

One recording that manages to achieve such an alignment between lyrics, musical style and vocal performance is the vastly popular *Quit Opium Song* by Liang Leyin (Li 1943).¹⁴ Written for the film *Eternity* (1943),¹⁵ the song disguises a strong socio-political message as a love song, in which the female singer tries to convince the male addict to “leave” his other lover – opium (personified). Carrying a message that every Chinese regime (both collaborationist and resistance) would have agreed with,¹⁶ it also implied a critique of the Western powers that had brought the drug to China.

In the recording, strings first play a constant romantic tremolo over a melancholic clarinet introduction and then accompany the vocal line. Li Xianglan's vocal timbre is light and her extensive use of glissandi suggests an overly romantic sound that fits with what Michael Raine has called an *ersatz*-Hollywood style of entertainment

¹⁴ Liang Leyin was a child of complex national identities. With parents from Guangzhou, Liang was born in 1910 in Tokyo and studied in Tianjin, before returning to Japan. He worked as a film composer in Shanghai during the war (Yamaguchi and Fujiwara 2015, 332).

¹⁵ For a brief analysis of the film, see Fu (1997, 74–75).

¹⁶ For more on the controversies around opium in occupied China, see Martin (2003, 386–94).

produced for Chinese cinema audiences at the time (Raine 2018, 189).¹⁷ A piano provides harmonic arpeggi and the woodwinds provide melancholic interludes. Crotales (antique cymbals or Chinese crotales – sounding much like a single bell) highlight phrases with high end notes. Many of these techniques resemble late romantic orchestrations. The *Quit Opium Song* is not only a beautiful song, but also a good example of a song that works musically, irrespective of its political message. Along with the other song featured in the same movie, the *Candy Peddling Song*, it represents the very aesthetic attacked by intellectuals for its capacity to normalize the occupation and “seduce” the occupied people (despite being featured in a film that was integral to a pro-occupation message).

Finding voices that would reflect what elites even in the occupied territories considered a more appropriate, timely and “topical” sound would mean developing a patriotic singing style that differed sufficiently from peace-time commercial productions. Understanding this challenge, the communist composer Nie Er had rejected the commercial music composed by his teachers and peers as bourgeois, and developed a style that Andrew Jones has coined “phonographic realism” instead (Jones 2001, 105–11). This aesthetic entailed a different, more open-throated, bel canto-inspired singing style often performed collectively (Jones 2001, 126–27). Nie Er’s compositions and those of his peers composing salvationist songs were sung by large masses of soldiers and amateurs prior to the war, as well as in preparation for combat. This included both male and female singers (Howard 2015, 270–72). During the war, these songs were performed in rural spaces beyond Japanese control with little

¹⁷ In contrast to later singers, such as Teresa Teng, these female singers were still allowing their vocal folds to fully close, avoiding the breathy timbre that made performers of the 1960s and 1970s famous (Jones 2020, 169–95).

or unsophisticated equipment. This not only forged a sense of the collective in participants, but the diverse, untrained and asynchronous voices of lay choirs may have even added to the perceived authenticity of the performance.

In contrast, the occupation state, while apparently rejecting Shanghai's "decadence", built on the institutional remnants of Shanghai's commercial recording industry. The occupied territories and Japan had, despite the initial loss of infrastructure, the means and access to high-quality recording and production technologies (Taylor 2021, 53). While school, university and community choirs continued to be mobilized to perform propaganda songs at song release galas under occupation, the Xinminhui's success in co-opting an existing musical elite led to a decrease in the necessity to rely on active public participation. Instead, professionally-trained voices could be recruited to record and perform occupation state propaganda songs.

It may seem counterintuitive that professional voices could be deemed by musical elites in occupied China to hamper the success of propaganda initiatives. But in this time of crisis, allowing listeners to immerse themselves in the sound of professional singing voices may have had the potential to convey a sense of confidence in the supposed prosperity that occupation had brought to Beijing. However, it was also believed that such voices were unsuitable for mobilizing people as a newly imagined collective for the "patriotic" mission of collaboration that was being promoted (Gao 1942). What has hitherto not been recognized in scholarship focusing on commercial music in occupied China (e.g., Benson 2004; Jiang 2009) are the efforts of musical elites in occupied China who recognized this disconnect between the newly developed repertoire and existing recording practices and (particularly female) voices.

Occupation state officials were aware of the persistent association in China between female singers with sex work (Field 2010, 100–110). Nevertheless, the occupation

state harnessed the female talent that was present in the city. Thus, Beijing saw a new generation of female singers, all of whom were born around 1920, emerge as performing and recording artists during the occupation. These included the sopranos Chi Yuanyuan, Mao Aili, Wen Li, Flora Wang and Li Mengmei.¹⁸ These young women grew up in north China, and many had trained with Mrs. Wiant at Yanjing University. While many of these singers went on to enjoy successful post-war careers, their careers actually started in occupied Beijing, as they were recruited as entertainers for and representative bodies of the occupation state. Moreover, the occupation state ensured that prominent female soloists such as these were present at most high-level campaign events and elaborate movement weeks, often selecting them as the focal points of visual media and reports on such campaigns (*Xinminbao* 1942g; *Xinminbao* 1942r; *Xinminbao* 1942s). This may be understood as part of a wider effort to feminize occupied north China, i.e., to make China itself appear feminine in the face of a masculine Japan (Taylor 2016).

As Cui Shuqin ascertains, nation and gender “are mutually constitutive locations of social construction” (Cui 2003, xii). The visual depiction of gender is an immediate marker of asymmetric power relations (De Matos and Ward 2012, 6).¹⁹ As with the female body more generally, the Chinese nation had become a victim of desire, of sexual assault, and penetration during the occupation. As Andrew Jones suggests: “In a discursive climate in which the nation was consistently figured as a woman, and prostitution deployed as a figure for national humiliation at the hands of Japan and the West, these accusations inevitably painted yellow music [the music performed by

¹⁸ For some of their concerts see: *Xinminbao* 1939g; *Shibao* 1943i; *Shibao* 1943a; *Xinminbao* 1941m.

¹⁹ The topic of gender and occupation has been widely explored both theoretically and in many case studies (e.g., De Matos and Ward 2012; Koikari 2015).

these female singers, labelled “yellow” due to its overly romantic or “pornographic” nature] as a betrayal of nationalistic ideals” (Jones 2001, 113). Even today, the sound most associated with the Japanese occupation of China are the “seductive” voices of attractive female stars such as Li Xianglan, Bai Guang and Zhou Xuan that allegedly kept the population entertained and passive (Chen 2014; Yu 2006, 381–83; Chen 2005, 263–67). Indeed, the singing female actress has been one of the more thoroughly explored subjects of gendered cultural expression in occupied China – mainly due to the fame of individual performers such as Li Xianglan (Kirsch 2019; Stephenson 2002), but also in broader studies of Chinese cinema (Zhang 1999; Cui 2003; Freiberg 1992; Raine 2018).

Instead of feminizing occupied China, however, north Chinese occupation elites tried to find a balance between the effeminate voices of the “musical pabulum” that was being hummed by rickshaw men and “virile” performances expected for Xinminhui anthems. This fact has been disregarded because the scholarly focus on the female singer – while serving narratives of submission and the contribution of cultural elites to the normalization of occupation – has veiled the Xinminhui and Chinese elites’ agency in the occupation state’s musical propaganda strategies. I would argue that if we step away from the visual sources, such as the film posters, newspapers and pictorials that have been used so thoroughly in much of the literature on Japanese-occupied China (e.g., Taylor 2021), we will understand that the focus on the female singer was created through the lens itself, i.e., by the visual medium.

As performances at the “Raise Asia Movement Weeks” show, ensembles often performed for an audience of corresponding age and status – schoolchildren performed for their peers, community ensembles for the adult population, and professional musicians for high-status listeners and officials. However, like other fascist

organizations and client regimes,²⁰ the Xinminhui was preoccupied not only with the notion of the renewal of its citizens, but also with the youth (Iriye 2014, 265–67). Innocent, but easy to manipulate, children's voices were often deemed appropriate to represent the state and carry messages of patriotism and revival. It is therefore not surprising that children's voices and school choirs were chosen to represent the most overtly propagandistic songs in this regimes' repertoire at live events (*Xinminbao* 1940j; *Shibao* 1940b; *Xinminbao* 1941x).

However, when it came to the recording of their headlining propaganda songs (as well as in later live performances), officials seem to have aimed for equal representation of male and female performers. Recordings of propaganda songs commissioned directly by the Xinminhui after 1941 usually featured one female and one male singer (see Appendix 1). Male performers also became the subject of physical description, emphasizing health and fitness and thus the site of a gendered nationalistic imagination (*Xinminbao* 1942f; Anonymous 1941c). In other words, the occupation state seems to have aimed for a compromise between the unwavering popularity of young female singers and their own notions of a patriotic (masculine) voice for occupied north China. However, female voices continued to represent different parts of the empire and the (non-sexualized, non-martial) friendship between them. Sino-Japanese-Manchurian amity, for example, was displayed musically in the 1940 Japanese song *Three Girls of Asian Development* (Raine 2018, 171) written by Satō Hachirō, composed by Koga Masao and performed by Li Xianglan, Bai Guang and Okuyama Saiko (Okuyama, Li, and Bai 1940). Here each woman represented one part of the Japanese empire:

²⁰ There is, of course, a great deal of research on youth culture in the Third Reich (Harvey 2006) and Vichy France (Lespinaud 2001).

Manchukuo, China and Japan – again, employing long-tested strategies of the representation of racial and political harmony (Shepherdson-Scott 2016, 188–92). Similar choices were made for live performances (*Xinminbao* 1943f).

Listening beyond the gendered representation of the occupation state, we can trace different singing styles and timbres that were used to represent different political messages and identities. We can thus account for vocal archetypes that parallel those observed in the visual culture of the occupation state in north China (Taylor 2016): while the “modern girl” would perform love songs, children and the desexualized/maternal “new women” or collective voices were deemed appropriate for the performance of national folk songs. In the context of live performance, visual markers such as costume changes could have indicated switches of persona (even when the performer remained the same).²¹

Indeed, singers did adapt their singing styles to fit more explicitly political lyrics. One of the few recordings of non-film propaganda songs available to us through the collection of the National Museum of Taiwan History, for instance, is Huang Shiping and Bai Guang’s performances of *Preserve East Asia* and the *East Asian Nations’ March* (Huang, Bai, and Nippon Columbia Orchestra 1941) – the two songs jointly commissioned in 1941 by newspapers in the realms of Japan, the RNG and NCPC. The recording sounds like what we might term a compromise between Shanghainese “musical pabulum” and a Xinminhui-style martial character prescribed by the lyrics and composition. While the nasal timbre of Bai Guang’s famous voice would have been immediately associated with her film songs, she does adopt a slightly less ornate singing style in these songs. Nonetheless, the use of glissandi, though relatively

²¹ Costume changes are sometimes indicated in reports on live performances (Raine 2018, 172).

minimal, would certainly not have passed as “patriotic”. Huang Shiping, on the other hand, delivers a relatively straight call, maintaining a vocal timbre close to speech, despite his training as a vocalist.

We can even find recordings of occupation state songs which emulate the collective aesthetics pioneered by leftist activists prior to the war. One such example is the *All-Encompassing Love Song* composed by Liang Leyin and first recorded as part of a film of the same name – *All-Encompassing Love* in 1942 (Tang, Liang and Li 2013). A classic marching song, it starts with a brass fanfare and drum roll which leads into a brass-heavy accompaniment to a strophic song. The arrangement and harmonic structure is extremely simple, but fanfare interludes and the contrasting AAB structure with successively shortening phrases keep the listener alert. The melody was recorded by a large group of male and female singers – employees of China United Productions. Each verse was performed collectively, though short instances offer alternations between male and female voices. And even though the individual voices sound just like the ones that were normally heard on recordings of commercial love songs, they are performed in an entirely different style, without vocal ornamentations, simply delivering a straight political message of unity.

Neither of these songs can be considered an authentic, raw call to action. Rather, they represent a compromise between the Chinese elite’s call for “topical” songs and voices and the habits and techniques of the commercial recording industry. Thus, no authentic alignment between the newly developed repertoire and performance practice could be established. This lack of supposed authenticity, combined with the overt and decidedly unsubtle political messaging, may well have hampered the success of this repertoire. These attempts show, however, that musical and intellectual elites in occupied China indeed called for “patriotic” and “topical” aesthetics resembling those promoted by

their supposed enemies amongst the resistance in Chongqing and Yan'an, and tried to implement their ideas about the compositions and voices appropriate and needed at this time.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the newly developed repertoire introduced in Chapter 4 was integrated into the wider musical repertoire and performance practices in occupied Beijing as such overtly political messages were integrated into efforts to provide relief through entertainment. Due to the diverse repertoires and voices used in the regimes' propaganda initiatives we cannot identify musical characteristics that could be taken as *uniquely* coinciding with the regimes' ideological messaging. However, we can trace how elites reacted to this ambiguity. I have noted the frustration caused amongst occupation state theorists and propagandists as the distinction between entertainment and political messaging began to be blurred. I have also traced the responses to this dilemma with regard to both repertoire development and performance practice.

By analyzing a range of songs composed and promoted after 1938, I have found that musical elites tried to develop songs that aptly reflected a sense of crisis. In doing this, they employed a range of musical tropes – many of which were surprisingly similar to those promoted in the non-occupied areas. This suggests a convergence of wartime musical aesthetics in the occupied and non-occupied territories. This is significant, as it shifts our narrative away from simple dichotomies that align political standing and aesthetic expression in different parts of wartime China. By disregarding the (unpopular but ubiquitous) newly developed song repertoire in the occupied territories,

scholars of wartime singing have chosen to perpetuate a narrative of submission to Japanese interests and have ignored Chinese agency in the propaganda efforts of the occupation state (see Chapter 2).

This observation runs in parallel to points I have made in Chapter 4 regarding the practice of collective mass singing in occupied China. In this chapter, I have traced discussions around the individual voices deemed apt to perform messages of political conformity (often promoted as patriotism). I have thus analyzed the employment of individual gendered voices and the use of different singing styles in the musical culture of the occupation state. While this regime certainly drew on the female talent that was present in occupied Beijing, I have argued that Chinese elites nonetheless strove for the presence of both female *and* male voices in the recordings of newly commissioned repertoire. This reflects wider efforts on the part of the Chinese elites to highlight not only voices associated with musical entertainment, submission and pacification, but also associated with “healthy” energy and patriotism.

As I have shown, it is therefore important to consider both repertoire and performance practice in relation to one another. This has implications for our assessment of both the propaganda strategies of the occupation state as well as the effect of aesthetic choices made in occupied *and* non-occupied parts of China. Importantly, we have to consider the interplay of repertoire and performance practice, as the authentic alignment between repertoire choice and performance style and avoiding ambiguous messaging was key to the perceived success in both occupied *and* non-occupied territories.

As briefly mentioned in this chapter, pre-war political associations were not set in stone, and did not hold up against repetitive use in other contexts. Selected songs associated with the pre-war left were immensely popular under occupation – and this

popularity was not always due to their leftist messaging. They were not shown and listened to in an effort to subvert collaborationist ideologies, but as highly popular commercial musical products. They were adapted, covered and gained association with the collaborationist war effort. Similar processes can be observed when we shift our focus to instrumental repertoire, as I shall do in the following and final chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Performing the Total War

The title of this chapter may be read as an oxymoron: is the mere performance of total war even possible? Wouldn't "total war" leave no room for alternate interpretations of the repertoire being performed or for performative agency? In this chapter, I explore the implication of "total war", that is Japan's aspirations for total mobilization after its attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, for musical production in occupied north China in this latter half of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

In her work on Japanese-occupied Manchukuo, Louise Young has defined the Japanese "total empire" in parallel to the "total war" fought by the Japanese, noting that both "entailed the mass and multidimensional mobilization of domestic society: cultural, military, political, and economic" (1999, 13).¹ In Chapter 3, I laid out the structural changes that led to increased musical activity after Japan's attack on Pearl

¹ While the concept of "total war" is still a matter of scholarly discussion (Mulligan 2008; Uchiyama 2019, 5–8), it might best be described as an "ideal type", a "model that features a number of salient characteristic, elements, or ingredients" (Chickering et al. 2005, 2), which "represent real historical phenomena that gestated over more than a century [rather than a] discrete historical phenomenon that was confined to the first half of the twentieth century" (Chickering et al. 2005, 13). Central aspects of the notion of "total war" include economic exploitation for the war effort, total mobilization of the population and total control that extends to everyday life and cultural expression, as well as "the systematic erasure of basic distinctions between soldiers and civilians" (Chickering et al. 2005, 2).

Harbor in north China. And while the occupation state in north China never attained “total” control over cultural production, it did certainly support the Japanese empire’s aspirations for total war in the post-1941 era, extracting resources, mobilizing civilians and framing cultural expression as part of the wider war effort.

Viewing cultural production that was promoted by the occupation state in north China through the lens of total war is important, because it highlights the dissonance between intensifying propaganda efforts and the normalization of the condition of occupation – especially in north China. It also highlights the dissonance between the height of the Japanese’s empire’s expansion, and efforts “on the ground” in Beijing to emphasize the local identity of the occupation state. In this chapter, I therefore explore how the repertoire of both professional musicians and community ensembles, working for and under the occupation state reflected and shaped the occupation state’s contributions to total war.

In contrast to earlier chapters, the focus in this chapter lies primarily on instrumental repertoire and events that took place between 1942 and 1945. I ask: How did individual modernist composers respond to the conditions of the occupation in this late-war period, and how were their works promoted by the occupation state? How did the regime’s mobilization for total war – including the occupation state’s increased control over cultural production and framing of almost all public concert performances under the umbrella of political campaigns – shape concert life and musical repertoires in north China? And what can we learn from an analysis of musical repertoire about the identity the occupation state in north China constructed for itself?

Firstly, I will show how local composers worked to (re)appropriate traditional Chinese forms of elite culture and celebrated local sounds that were unique or specific to Beijing. I will then consider to what extent this repertoire was performed in north

China and used as an asset by the occupation state. As I will show, most campaigns in this period did not build on newly produced repertoire, but drew on repertoires already “ripe with meaning”, harbouring the potential to be reinterpreted or gain meaning through association. This polysemic potential of music made the curation of concert programmes especially interesting and worthy of detailed analysis.

As I argued in Chapter 3, concert life in Beijing was particularly lively in 1942 and 1943. Musical campaign highlights included celebrations of the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941 (*Xinminbao* 1941x); the tenth anniversary of the founding of Manchukuo in the summer of 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1942g; *Xinminbao* 1942j); the opening of the newly constructed Beijing City Music Hall in November 1942 (*Xinminbao* 1942q); the “Attack and Destroy Great Britain and the US for/to (As)Certain Victory” and “New Citizen’s” Movement Weeks organized in the summer of 1943 (*Xinminbao* 1943h; *Shibao* 1943l; *Xinminbao* 1943p); and concerts held in the context of the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo in 1943 (*Shibao* 1943o). Guest concerts continued and multiple concerts were organized by the BMCA each month – often coinciding with the monthly commemoration of the attack on Pearl Harbor (“Preserve East Asia Commemoration Day”) and the declaration of war on the Allies by Wang Jingwei (“Declaration of War Commemoration Day”) (Beijing Municipal Archive 1943, 10–11; *Xinminbao* 1942b; *Xinminbao* 1942j; *Shibao* 1943n; Shang 1942a; 1942b; 1942d; YSC 1942b). In this chapter, I offer an analysis of one of the most elaborate and well-documented of these concerts – one which can be understood as representing the height of the regime’s reach for control over musical expression. This concert was played as the grand finale of an “Attack and Destroy Britain and the US to/for (As)Certain Victory Movement Week” in June 1943. By considering such high-level campaign performances, we can observe the active shaping of well-known

repertoire and the re-signification of such repertoire through changes in performance context and deliberate programme design. I will argue that this concert in particular was carefully designed to simultaneously perform Sino-Japanese amity, north China's imagined alliance with the Axis powers, and local (i.e., north Chinese) identity. I will explain how alignments of different scale were possible even within the limits of one concert programme, but also how the dissonances inherent in the relationship between the Japanese empire's expansion and localization efforts in occupied China were reflected in this same musical event.

Subtler changes can be observed in the repertoire played by Beijing's most popular community ensemble, the Harmonica Society. I will show how this ensemble became enmeshed in a network of repertoires commonly performed by military brass bands late in the war, appropriating these repertoires for specific purposes. Such appropriation of militaristic sounds might be interpreted as a contribution to what I refer to as the "normalization of the condition of occupation", and celebrated as the ultimate erasure of distinction between civic and military repertoire (and hence the successful realization of "total war" in the musical sense).

Local Talent

In terms of musical innovation and creative output, modernist composers such as Jiang Wenye, Lao Zhicheng and Lei Zhenbang represented some of the occupation state's most important musical assets.² The propaganda songs that Jiang and his colleagues

² How much cultural prestige was attached to avant-garde compositions can be seen through the promotion of compositions by lesser-known composers such as Lao Zhicheng and Li Yiming (Shang 1942d; *Shibao* 1942b; Lao 1944a; 1944b; 1944c).

composed for the Xinminhui have been analyzed in previous chapters, and their connection to the regimes' propaganda efforts are obvious. Apart from their direct involvement in this capacity, however, most of these composers and musicians maintained a low profile during the war, investing much of their time in composing modernist music, teaching, writing about music, and undertaking private performances, rather than writing propaganda songs or regularly performing them. Since Jiang Wenye was the most productive modernist composer in Beijing, this section will focus mainly on his activities, and particularly his contributions to the PGROC (and, after 1940 the NCPC) and Xinminhui's propaganda initiatives.

As I will demonstrate, however, the occupation state seems to have only made limited use of the musical talent that was available for it in the city, even after 1942. Most notably, the work Jiang Wenye is now most revered for, namely his orchestral music, was never performed live in Beijing during the war. This can partly be attributed to a lack of resources. However, we can also note a delay in the intensive promotion of other pieces, which cannot be explained by a lack of information about Jiang's activities,³ suggesting that there were other reasons behind this apparent contradiction.

Between 1938 and 1946 alone, Jiang Wenye composed around 200 art songs. Over 140 of these are known and documented in the (almost) *Complete Edition* published by the Beijing Central Conservatory Press (Wang 2016). Throughout the war, Jiang systematically worked his way through the corpus of Chinese poetry and wrote song cycles to poems from the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, as well as from the Republican period – amassing an anthology of classic and modern Chinese poetry

³ Jiang was Ke Zhenghe's colleague at the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute. Ke, in turn, was responsible for the musical activities of the Xinminhui and the editor of the Xinmin Music Press.

(Liu 2010, 697). Jiang, who was a baritone and poet as well as a composer, seems to have set himself this task in order to reconnect to and reinterpret through the medium of song what he may have conceived as a cornerstone of Chinese cultural heritage. His song cycles seem like an exercise not in language acquisition but in the (re-)acquisition of musical tradition. Most of them were published with the Xinmin Music Press and thus contributed to the cultural capital of the Xinminhui itself (Wang 2016, 5.2: 35–79).

While these songs *were* promoted by the regime, such promotion was remarkably muted and limited. In June and July 1939, Jiang took to the stage alongside the Normal College Choir to perform a number of his choral pieces and songs from his *Collection of Famous Chinese Songs* as well as other “international folk songs” on Central Radio (*Xinminbao* 1939m; *Xinminbao* 1939r). Tracing Jiang’s repertoire, we find that a few of Jiang’s choral pieces, including *Fishermen’s Delight*⁴ and *Ode to Beijing*, were performed by both professional and school choirs in Beijing during the occupation (*Xinminbao* 1939m; *Huabei xinbao* 1944a). However, if we consider the debates about “topical” songs and voices that raged in occupied Beijing (and which I discussed in detail in Chapter 5), we might wonder why these art songs were only promoted to such a limited extent by the occupation state. Despite their musical simplicity, these art songs were less accessible than the songs Jiang composed in direct support of the regime. However, stylistically, they could have been cited as models and offered an alternative to modern marching tunes.

⁴ The piece was performed even before its publication in 1939, namely as part of a Xinminhui rally on 4 June 1938 (*Xinminbao* 1938w).

Similarly, the promotion of artistic highlights, such as Beijing's First Arts Festival, held in June 1940, was minimal. This "festival" seems to have been organized to highlight Jiang's pieces. For example, excerpts from Jiang's piano suite *16 Bagatelles* were performed by Jiang's colleague Lao Zhicheng alongside a few of Jiang's art songs and four-part choruses Jiang composed in 1939 (*Shibao* 1940a). Tellingly, we only find traces of this event in the pages of the *Shibao*. No images or prior announcements seem to have been made.

Most famous for its use of traditional Chinese elements is Jiang's 1940 orchestral work in six movements, *The Music of the Confucian Temple*, an attempt to reconstruct a Confucian memorial rite (Wang 2015, 208–11). With this piece, Jiang tried to achieve a new modernist sound by adhering to reconstructed Confucian musical simplicity. Due to the lack of a professional orchestra in Beijing and Jiang's close connections to Japan, Jiang's orchestral pieces such as this were not performed in Beijing. The premiere of *The Music of the Confucian Temple* in fact took place in Tokyo in March 1940, and the piece was only publicized in north China after 1942. Jiang published a lengthy treatise in Japanese explicating his reconstruction of Confucian temple music in 1942 (Wang 2016, 6: 68–169). And a discussion of the piece appeared in the *North China Writer's Monthly* in June 1943 (Jiang 1943).⁵ The piece was first performed live in China in February 1944 in Shanghai by the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra. Prior to its China premier, Jiang gave two "Release Recitals for *The Music of the Confucius Temple*" in Beijing and Tianjin in February 1944. Both occasions were

⁵ The piece is included in Jiang's *Complete Edition*, albeit without a note on its publication in the *North China Writer's Monthly* (Wang 2016, 6: 170–175).

covered at some length in Beijing's daily news outlets, which celebrated Jiang's music as the realization of Buddhist concepts of true joy (*Shibao* 1944; *Xinminbao* 1944b).

Jiang Wenye's performance activities continued to be covered in newspapers, especially after 1943, when financial hardships may well have forced him to revert to such ad hoc work as a means of earning an income. Jiang gave several recitals at Asbury Church (YSC 1944b; Kung 2002, 64) – among them a programme of “Axis” poetry, featuring Johann W. von Goethe, Li Bai, Su Shi and the modern Japanese writer Shimazaki Tōson (*Xinminbao* 1944c) – and a performance of his own art songs at a “Reignite the Citizens' Spirit” Summer Evening Concert in August 1944 at Beijing City Music Hall (*Huabei xinbao* 1944e; *Huabei xinbao* 1944f). During the final months of the war, Jiang also seems to have earned money by writing popular songs for the Victor Company of Japan. A concert programme from late September 1944 includes an advert for two recordings by Chi Yuanyuan and Wang Jialu, which feature some hitherto unknown pieces by Jiang (YSC 1944c).⁶

Beginning in 1942, the regime also actively publicized and appropriated selected activities of Beijing's musical elite. Composers who chose to settle or stay in Beijing could hardly escape the grasp of the regime, which sought to use even musical activities of low quality if it saw a benefit in doing so. Li Yiming, for example, composed a violin sonata in 1942, performing it at Beijing Hotel in October that year. The performance and piece received a remarkably scathing review in the *Guomin zazhi* (Shang 1942d, 75). Nevertheless, the extent to which the concert was featured in official newspapers (*Shibao* 1942b) shows how much cultural prestige was attached

⁶ These songs are not included in any lists of Jiang's works, and Jiang's family members seemed unaware of them.

to the première of a newly composed violin sonata. The regime also publicized newly composed art songs by lesser-known composers, especially those set to classical Chinese poetry. Three of Lao Zhicheng's songs – *Children's Verse* (Li Bai), *Spring Dawn* (Meng Haoran) and *Picking Lotus Flowers* (Wang Changling) – along with violinist Li Yiming's art song set to Li Bai's popular *Yearning* were printed in the art section of the *Huabei xinbao* throughout the summer of 1944, for example (Lao 1944a; 1944b; 1944c; Li 1944). Publicizing such compositions and including images of song manuscripts in a newspaper at a time when paper was scarce and space limited,⁷ shows the prestige attached to modernist composition and the regime's need to associate itself with such cultural capital in these latter stages of the war. The selection of poems featured with these songs also suggests that the occupation state favoured and thereby may even have encouraged interpretations of classical Chinese poetry (instead of modernist literature or folk songs).⁸

By composing pieces that aimed to revive Chinese tradition, including Confucianism, certain aspects of Buddhism and classical Chinese poetry, Jiang Wenye and his colleagues found a way to celebrate traditional elite forms and local sounds – an approach worthy of the praise it has received within the narrative of musical modernism (Liu 2010, 231–44). The extent to which these can be understood as an intellectual response to wartime occupation or a direct response to the PGROC and

⁷ In 1938, multiple papers funded by the regime published lengthy daily news. The *Xinminbao*, for example, published eight pages of morning news and four pages of evening news. By 1945, not only had publication of many major newspapers ceased and been amalgamated into the *Huabei xinbao*, but even the *Huabei xinbao* shrank to two pages a day.

⁸ As Yang Zhiyi has shown, classical poetry was indeed an important tool of self-expression for many political elites of the occupation state (2020, 246, 263).

Xinminhui's tendencies to frame their ideologies in Confucian terminology is questionable. The re-use of traditional Chinese elements in modernist Chinese music was an artistic tendency that both predated the war and continued after 1945. At the same time, such activities parallel literary developments, namely a "resurgence of tradition" (i.e., the use of traditional forms and tropes within modern literary genres) which Edward Gunn has observed in occupied Beijing and Shanghai (Gunn 1980, 109–10).⁹ We could also understand the reach for elite forms such as Tang poetry (rather than reimagined folk tradition) as indicative of wartime hopes of stability and orientation, as I have argued elsewhere (Schröder 2021).

As the above summary has shown and many scholars of Jiang's work and life have emphasized (Su 1990, 40; Liu 2010, 236; Wang 2015, 208), Jiang was not as actively involved in the regime's direct promotion as his prominence might suggest. This is all the more puzzling when we consider not only how some of Jiang's pieces coincided with Japanese wartime ideologies, but also Jiang's contribution to the aestheticization of Beijing as a "soundscape".

Jiang's fascination with the actual sounds of Beijing is reflected in many of his works. Indeed, it appears that one of the reasons for Jiang's move to Beijing in 1938 was his fascination with this ancient city, which had already inspired parts of his *16 Bagatelles* (Su 1990, 39). Partly composed during a brief visit to the mainland in 1936, the *Bagatelles* for piano include pieces such as *Beijing Zhengyangmen* (Kung 2002, 127; Wang 2016, 4: 85–86). Yet another piece that Jiang had written prior to his move was the score for the propaganda film *Beijing* (Kamei 1938).

⁹ David Wang also negates the categorization of Jiang's work as "reactionary reform" – a term coined by Stephen Owens (Wang 2015, 210–11).

Jiang continued his musical engagement with the city after moving there. He re-used parts of the *Beijing* score in his second symphony and actually dedicated the symphony to the city itself (Liu 2010, 696). In 1938, Jiang wrote a set of pieces for piano inspired by some of Beijing's most prominent historical sites, including *The Gate of Heavenly Peace, In the Forbidden City, a Night Scene at the Alter of Land and Grain* and *Lama Temple* (Wang 2016, 4: 145–59). In 1939, Jiang also wrote the symphonic piece *Sketches of the Old Capital*. Though this piece only premiered in Japan in 1944 (Wang 2016, 1: 151), it clearly reflects Jiang's love for energetic and playful music as well as his talent in instrumentation. But above all, it is a love letter to the sounds of Beijing, its bustling small lanes, historic and religious sites and urban energy (NHK Symphony Orchestra and Chen 2009).

In 1941, Jiang finished writing a collection of poetry entitled *Inscriptions of Beijing*, which includes personal reflections and snapshots of everyday life as well as historic and religious sites of the city (Wang 2016, 6: 290–302). But the everyday life in Beijing's small "alleyways" (*hutong*) and the city's local customs seem to have been a source for inspiration not only of poetry. The title of one of Jiang's lost pieces composed in 1943 suggests Jiang's continued fascination with the city: *Pigeon Flutes Resounding in the Blue Sky* (Liu 2010, 696). The title of this piece invokes the ancient practice of attaching small gourds or bamboo flutes to the tail feathers of pigeons and training them to fly in circles. While practised in many local communities in China (and in other parts of Asia such as Java), this practice is strongly associated with Beijing, where pigeon enthusiasts have practised the art of pigeon whistles for centuries. As a musical instrument without a human instrumentalist to play it and

without any score to abide by, but nevertheless highly artistic, it seems to have fascinated Jiang Wenye.¹⁰

We can provide some context on the intellectual source of Jiang's interest in capturing Beijing's sounds and sights, which was certainly driven by broader discussions of the incorporation of everyday sounds within modernist music,¹¹ but we can only speculate on the connection between Jiang's obsession with Beijing and the condition of occupation. As studies of the visual culture of Japanese imperialism have shown, the depiction and mapping of occupied landscape contributed to Japan's imperial imagination (Taylor-Jones 2013, 43; Taylor 2021, 117–20). Translating the occupation of a landscape through depictions, compositions and writing speaks to the fascination with a captured landscape, as well as the privilege of the occupier in doing so. It is not possible to say whether Jiang purposefully tried to “capture” the “soundscape” of Beijing in this way to serve the occupation state. However, Jiang's own perspective as someone who was ethnically Chinese but enjoyed the privileges of Japanese colonial citizenship (by virtue of being Taiwanese),¹² allowed him to view

¹⁰ The practice was certainly known about and practised during the war, as a 1938 lecture at the California College of Chinese Studies in Beijing attests (Hoose 1938). For further information on pigeon whistles in Beijing, see Wang Shixiang's monograph on the practice (2000).

¹¹ Allusions to everyday sounds, noise, and acoustic phenomena, such as the echo, were certainly not new within art music. And even the more literal incorporation of everyday sounds and industrial noise predates Jiang's interest. However, Jiang certainly was one of the first Chinese composers, who reflected on the use of everyday sounds in his writing, referencing Alexander W. Mossolow's (1900–1973) *Iron Foundry* (1926) and Arthur Honegger's (1892–1955) *Pacific 231* (1924) (Jiang 1940).

¹² Taiwanese citizens enjoyed the privilege of Japanese citizenship in wartime China (Wang 2015, 207–8; Hsieh 2010, 273; Lary 2010, 46; Brooks 2017).

Beijing not only as a vessel of inspiration and relic of traditional Chinese culture, but also as a space that he could “capture” and celebrate in his compositions.

At the same time, Jiang’s focus to local specificities resonates with a literary trend observed by Susan Daruvala in her work on the modernist aesthetics developed by the Beijing-based writer Zhou Zuoren, who, she claims, “constructed his alternative response to modernity in three interrelated ways [one of which is] by the importance he ascribed to locality in a writer’s identity and self-representation” (Daruvala 2000, 11–12) Through locality –vivid descriptions of local geography, the material culture of everyday life and local customs – writers were “best able to realize the demands of the [Neo-Confucian] aesthetics of flavor [*quwei*]” (Daruvala 2000, 12) and thereby “sidestep the notion of an inherited *national* character” (Daruvala 2000, 63) and the importance attributed to race (Daruvala 2000, 64) by the Japanese. For Jiang, himself struggling with ambiguous national identities, the focus on local, everyday sounds may have offered a similar escape from essentializing views of nationality carried to their extremes during the war. This dissonance between a clear essentialization of nationalities within the expanding Japanese empire and an aspiration for local (in this case Beijing) identification can also be observed in the programme design of campaign concerts, as I will show below.

Polysemic Repertoires

The occupation state harnessed the nationalities of performing musicians, the polysemy of musical repertoires and the often ambiguous national identities of their creators to simultaneously perform racial harmony, Sino-Japanese amity, alliance with the Axis powers, militarism and, above all, local identity. While some of these

constructs and alignments might seem mutually exclusive, they were realized on different levels in concert. I will demonstrate this strategy with a close analysis of the repertoire performed at a concert during the “Attack and Destroy Britain and the US to/for (As)Certain Victory Movement Week” in June 1943.

This Movement Week followed the RNG’s official declaration of war on the Allies in January 1943. It can also be understood as part of a larger “anti-imperialist” campaign organized around the centenary of the end of the first Opium War, in which Japan aimed to display itself as a force of “anti-imperial” liberation.¹³ Ke Zhenghe’s speech held before the final concert reminded the audience of the purpose of the event:

Although we are in the hinterland, our responsibility remains very large. Therefore, is it unusually important that we increase our effort for the war, for example when it comes to motivational work, we must firmly grasp the belief in victory and strengthen the moral to participate in the war. [...] Attacking and Destroying Great Britain and the United States is not Japan’s responsibility alone. All we East Asian people should struggle for it! (*Xinminbao* 1943i)

The Movement Week started with the release of two songs that had been specially commissioned by the Xinminhui for the occasion,¹⁴ and a “sing-off” between three

¹³ Several films about the Opium War were released in 1943, including *The Opium War* by Makino Masahiro (Desser 1995) and *Eternity* (Fu 1997, 74–75).

¹⁴ The NCPC had commissioned the *Attack and Destroy Britain and the United States* song and the *North China Increase Production Song* in January and February 1943 (*Shibao* 1943c). Winners were announced on 8 March 1943. The completion of the song composition was announced the end of the same month (*Xinminbao* 1943d; *Xinminbao* 1943b). The song was released and performed two months later during the corresponding Movement Week (*Shibao* 1943d).

famous female singers representing Manchukuo, north China and Japan: Li Xianglan, Wu Suqiu – a successful Peking opera actress – and Takamine Mieko, a Japanese popular singer (all accompanied by the Beijing Symphony Orchestra) (*Shibao* 1943d; *Xinminbao* 1943f). The following days were filled with a spectacular display of the diversity of cultural life in Beijing, including a dragon boat race, fireworks, Peking opera, theatre and martial arts performances, film screenings, and a visual arts exhibition (*Shibao* 1943e; *Shibao* 1943h; *Shibao* 1943f; *Xinminbao* 1943g; *Shibao* 1943j; *Shibao* 1943i). Finally, on 12 June, Beijing’s musical elite and a predominantly male Chinese and Japanese middle-class audience came together for a carefully designed concert celebrating the Axis powers (*Xinminbao* 1943h; *Xinminbao* 1943i; *Shibao* 1943g), which will be analyzed in more detail below. Please refer to Appendix 2 and figure 19 throughout this chapter for the concert programme.

日二十月六年二十三國民華中

【四】

擊滅英美音樂大會

今晚在稷園舉行

昨廣播之夕觀衆踴躍

擊滅英美必勝運動旬間，昨（十一日）為第六日廣播之夕，於下午七時半起，在中央公園音樂堂展開各項節目，觀衆仍如以前各日踴躍，有增無減，今日（十二日）為音樂大會，集中外音樂名家演奏分合唱，獨奏，獨唱等項，節目繁瑣，極為精彩，下午八時起，在音樂堂開始演奏，茲誌其演奏項目如次：

第一部

一，混聲合唱，華北廣播合唱團（中，日），指揮：蓋井真一，1，聖體，莫查特作曲，2，春風，吳泰次郎作曲，3，我的家，山田耕作曲，4，哈利路亞，亨德爾作曲。

二，鋼琴獨奏，關仲暨，協奏曲（第一樂章）莫查特作曲 A 長調 鋼琴伴奏，老志誠。

三，高音獨唱，馬濤庭，1，安眠之君，德伯特作曲，鋼琴伴奏，老志誠，2，自由射手，韋柏作曲。

四，鋼琴獨奏，田中利夫，1，愛之夢，利斯特作曲，2，塔蘭台拉，黑拉作曲，（休息）

第二部

一，次中音獨唱，王柘方，鋼琴伴奏，老志誠：1，西班牙舞曲，法利亞作曲，2，舊愛，奧地利奧作曲，3，春夜洛城聞笛，老志誠作曲，4，春曉，老志誠作曲

二，南胡獨奏，蔣風之，光明行，劉天華。

三，高音獨唱，鈴木富美子，鋼琴伴奏，田中利夫，1，母的苦，佐伯自助作曲，2，心的故鄉，江口夜詩作曲，3，得勝歸來吧，衛路第作曲，歌劇「愛達」。

四，吹奏樂，華北交通吹奏樂團指揮：山口豐作，1，進行曲「空軍之威力」（江口夜詩作曲），2，思想曲（爆發樂）（江口夜詩作曲），3，接續曲（聖戰軍歌）（辻井市太郎作曲），4，理想曲，（攻擊）（陸軍軍樂隊作曲）

又十五日展覽會表演藝術業經決定為名坤伶家今晚之花田八繪云

喚起學生

師大昨舉

國立北京師範大學當局為藉此熱烈勸共時期，並起青年學生熱烈，發揮總力起見，特於昨日（十一日）上午十一時，在和平門外該院舉行勸共講演大會，邀請新民會北京市總務處胡漢翔事務部長，蒞校講演，應邀勸共之意義與推進方針，極為詳盡，除該校各院全體學生參加聆聽，泰世衛校長，馮陰慶訓導長及教職員等，亦全場出席，演歷歷兩小時，聲意深長，聆聽學生極為踴躍

會，她起身告辭，李小姐的歷史大家都知道很詳細，用不着再來介紹，以上所寫的，前面已然說明，是她的「近況」。

她的特長，也可以說擅長，是一口流利的日語，據有力的批評說「她日本話比中國話還好」，可

Figure 19: Concert Programme for the “Attack and Destroy Britain and the US for/to (As) Certain Victory Movement Week”, 12 June 1943 (*Xinminbao* 1943h).

I argue that the concert programme was designed to do three things. Firstly, it was designed to perform racial harmony and Sino-Japanese collaboration through the bodies of the performing musicians on stage. Secondly, it represented the Axis powers through nationalistic showpieces. Finally, it reflected local identity and an exclusive identification with the city of Beijing in representing the (north) Chinese occupation state. This was achieved on multiple levels, by joint performance, repertoire choice and, most importantly, through the structure of the programme, which served to re-signify the otherwise well-known and sometimes ambivalent pieces. I argue that the sonic representation of the Axis powers, as well as the way in which the north Chinese occupation state positioned itself as an ally of the Axis powers, can be understood as marking a subtle move in performing the regime's autonomy from the Japanese occupiers.¹⁵

A glance at the programme and the musicians performing alongside each other reveals the first layer of alliances. Four Japanese and five Chinese performers' solo performances were framed by two mixed groups, i.e., the Radio Choir and the North China Transportation Company Brass Band. Joint performance was used as a means to portray Sino-Japanese co-operation and amity. This is not surprising. In fact, it is consistent with the regimes' strategy of employing representatives of different nationalities and political regimes in joint performances to perform Sino-Japanese amity, pan-Asian ideals, mutual respect and collaboration. While mass singing events in the late 1930s created new collective identities for the participating masses (as I

¹⁵ The RNG had been quite keen to gain diplomatic recognition from the Axis powers (Taylor 2021, 32). Photographs that show Wang Jingwei with the Hungarian ambassador in Stanford's Wang Jingwei and Lin Baisheng Photo Collection 1940–1944 (<https://purl.stanford.edu/gx191nw2235>, accessed 9 March 2022) illustrate the RNG's interest in such diplomatic connections.

demonstrated in Chapter 4), these late-war events used individual representatives to stage an imagined and idealized co-operation between the Japanese and north Chinese collaborators.

Joint performances were designed to create a physical and emotional connection between performers that would be perceived by the audience through sound. In doing so, the regime relied heavily on ethnicity and nationality as embodied by musical performers. For the Xinminhui, the physical or mediated presence of Japanese musicians, as well as musicians from other occupied areas in China and the wider Japanese empire, meant the auditory realization of an imagined “East Asian” community. In joint performances, musicians became physical and sonic manifestations of Asian co-prosperity (*Xinminbao* 1942b). Institutions like the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, the North China Radio Choir, or the Transportation Company Brass Band were framed as staging co-operation between international members of the ensemble and the Japanese conductor or guest soloist (*Xinminbao wankan* 1941a; *Xinminbao* 1943f). The specific co-dependent but hierarchical relationships that characterized nineteenth century-style (symphonic) ensembles allows for even more poignant analogies. The orchestra serves as a sonic realization of the ideal configuration between Japan (the conductor) and its empire (both soloists and tutti players) as imagined by Japanese leaders. Thus, the persistent reiteration of simplistic national characterizations of individual performers rendered the pure participation of musicians a political act – no matter how apolitical the musical pieces they performed might appear to be.

However, the mere concept of racial harmony as it was performed relied on the fortification of the very borders that allowed for a simplistic construct of separation of ethnic and national identities. In making such constructs legible or performable, any

complexity around ethnic or national belonging had to be reduced. Any transcultural movement or ambiguous identities were negated by the very concept of racial harmony – a disservice to any musical elites who could have served as actual “ambassadors of transculturality”, of whom Li Xianglan is only one prominent example.¹⁶ Kari Shepherdson-Scott makes a similar observation in her analysis of depictions of the “harmony of the five races” (Japanese, Chinese, Manchurian, Mongol, Korean, alternatively including White-Russian) in the Manchukuo print media (Shepherdson-Scott 2016, 188–92). She claims the “visual language of multiculturalism and racial diversification relied on maintaining the image of cultural difference” (Shepherdson-Scott 2016, 192). In joint performance, hierarchical relations and the fortification of ethnic and political borders was just as obvious.

It is only one small step from the representation of racial harmony through performing artists to the representation of national and regional alliances implicit in repertoire choice – especially when many composers of the selected repertoire explicitly characterized themselves and their music as representative of one distinct nationality within the context of musical nationalism. But designing concert programmes with the composers’ nationalities in mind and treating their pieces, irrespective of musical content, as national signifiers, offered the occupation state a slightly subtler avenue through which to express cultural identity and political standing.

A closer look at the musical repertoire performed on 12 June 1943 (see Appendix 2) reveals the intricate nature of the programme design. Most of the musical repertoire presented at this occasion was not new to Beijing audiences. Instead, pieces that had

¹⁶ Li Xianglan’s nationality has famously been treated as a matter of secrecy and deceit and has been the topic of many scholarly discussions (Stephenson 2002, 4–10; Kirsch 2019, 1, 6; Wang 2012, 152).

long been appropriated were re-signified for this specific occasion with otherwise potentially forgotten nationalistic meanings. Indeed, the way in which the programme was structured was carefully designed to represent the Axis powers, their allies and their “friends” (*Xinminbao* 1943h).¹⁷ The programme was hierarchically structured, with German, Japanese and Italian pieces at the beginning and end, framing Hungarian, Spanish and Chinese in the middle (I refer to these not with the historical name of the political entity at the time of performance, but deliberately with the indistinct national label that would encompass both their historical and projected identification).

The programme started with lyrical pieces by the Austro-German composers Wolfgang A. Mozart, Franz Schubert and Carl M. von Weber (1786–1826), as well as two settings by the Japanese composers Gō Taijirō and Yamada Kōsaku. It closed with four pieces by the Japanese composers Eguchi Yoshi and Tsujii Ichitarō, which were designed to leave the audience with an impression of Japan as a sonically powerful empire. All in all, the programme featured five of the most prolific Japanese composers of the time.

Within the first bloc, the Radio Choir also performed the “Hallelujah” chorus from Handel’s *Messiah*. This may seem counterintuitive given the anti-British context, but Georg F. Handel can also be understood as a German, not British, composer – and the connection of the “Hallelujah” chorus to Christianity and British royalty may well

¹⁷ This programme is not the only programme which seems to represent the Axis powers in this way. We can find similar repertoire choices in performances of “Axis” poetry (*Xinminbao* 1944c) and celebrations of the Anti-Comintern Pact (*Xinminbao* 1941t).

have been disregarded.¹⁸ Here, the chorus was probably selected out of convenience. Handel's *Messiah* had been performed regularly by Beijing's missionary choirs, and the tradition was maintained by Chinese university alumni and their church choirs even after the departure of many foreign missionaries in 1941 (YSC 1942c; 1943a; 1944e). Now, the Xinminhui seems to have claimed this catchy, monumental, but easy-to-rehearse piece as part of its own repertoire, aiming to decouple it from its missionary associations and re-signifying it with new meaning.

Italy is present through Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901) and placed toward the end of the programme – mirroring Germany. Despite the popularity of Italian repertoire prior to 1943, this programme only features one Italian aria. Considering, that the US' military was about to land in Sicily in June 1943, the title “Ritorna, vincitor!” (return, victor) seems almost too fitting.

The two pieces for piano solo performed by Tanaka Toshio before the interval represent Hungary, the fourth member of the Axis, having signed the Tripartite pact in 1940. While Franz Liszt is well-known, Stephen Heller (1813–1888) has sunken into obscurity. Nonetheless, they share many important commonalities. Both were born in Hungary, studied in Vienna and eventually settled in Paris. During the wave of musical nationalism, Liszt had identified himself as a Hungarian composer.¹⁹ Probably owing more to his monumental musical style than his German-speaking ancestry, Liszt became a favourite of the Nazi regime – his Victory Fanfares from *Les*

¹⁸ Similar discussions were had after the chorus had been used in Nazi Germany at the opening of the Olympic Games 1936. At the time there was an effort to explain its inclusion in these festivities in Nazi journals (Schlüssel 2001, 291–94).

¹⁹ Liszt was also identified as “Hungarian” in music histories published in China during the occupation (e.g., Yu 1939, 70).

Préludes were regularly used to accompany German newsreels and were even used as the “breaking news fanfare” on German radio from June 1941 onwards (Helms 2014, 248–49).

Spain was represented by a “Spanish dance” by Manuel de Falla (1876–1946) – most likely the first “Spanish Dance” from *La Vida Breve* (1913), which can be performed in many versions, here possibly in an arrangement for piano solo. The second piece is a chanson by the Mexican composer Alfonso E. Oteo (1894–1950), a widely popular song composed in the early 1920s which had apparently made its way to China via the recording industry. The fact that Mexico had declared war on the Axis powers in May 1942 suggests that Oteo’s piece may well have been mistakenly regarded as Spanish by the occupation state.²⁰

China is included alongside the nominally neutral but fascist and Axis-friendly Spain. Since Wang Jingwei had declared war on the allies in January of 1943, representing the RNG as allies of the Axis powers made sense. But it further suggests what Jeremy Taylor has deemed the “Axis turn” of the RNG – the use of fascist visual tropes to perform sovereignty and independence from Japanese occupiers after 1941 (Taylor 2021, 73–80). However, if we focus more closely on the repertoire chosen to represent China, we can see that occupied China was represented by local Beijing musicians playing pieces by Beijing composers. Beijing’s wartime star pianist Lao Zhicheng and

²⁰ This can be interpreted as lack of attention to detail but is also indicative of the difficulties of essentializing the often-complex biographies of musical elites. Similarly problematic attributions of national identity can be found in Yu Jifan’s 1939 *Brief History of Western Music*, where Michael Balfe, who was born in Ireland is categorized as “English/American” and the Italian-born Nicolo Paganini (1782–1840) and Galtano Donizetti (1797–1848) are categorized as French romantics (Yu 1939, 97, 69).

the tenor Wang Qifang performed Lao's modern renditions of two poems by Li Bai and Meng Haoran, while their colleague Jiang Fengzhi performed a piece for *erhu* (the Chinese two-stringed fiddle) by Liu Tianhua. As in the Xinminhui's promotion of Lao's compositions explored above, two songs with decidedly traditional lyrics by poets from the Tang dynasty were chosen for the event. In conjunction with Liu Tianhua's *March Toward Brightness*, which was composed in 1931 as an attempt to express patriotic nationalism through traditional instrumental music, these pieces reflected the ambivalent nature of the occupation state's ideologies. Presenting contemporary pieces with such traditional and well-known lyrics and contemporary instrumental music composed for what is regarded as a traditional Chinese instrument speaks to the regimes' constant struggle between, on the one hand, modernist aspirations (promoted especially by the Xinminhui) and, on the other, its conservative ideological framing (promoted by sections of the PGROC/NCPC elite). The selected pieces also illustrated the localized nature of both the occupation state and the musical circles operating therein.

For a highly educated audience, understanding the national references I have outlined above may have been possible. It is more likely, however, that people simply listened to the classical and romantic pieces as "Western/European", or as the standard repertoire of a Chinese ensemble they were familiar with, rather than specifically German, Italian, Spanish or Hungarian. In the announcement of the repertoire, only the pieces and their composers were named (and not the composers' national origins). While this veils some problematic choices, it also hid the message of such intricately designed programming.

Should we consider such programmes as the height of the musical realization of total war – the absorption of individual agency and successful limitation of the meaning of

musical repertoire to one single end? Certainly, the programme shows how the Xinminhui successfully drew on the musical resources that it had access to in the city and associated known repertoires with new meaning. Even some odd continuities might be understood as the occupation state's attempts at harnessing familiarity and salvaging well-known pieces' sonic effect. At the same time, the extremely localized repertoire chosen to represent north China shows the agency of local musical elites in determining musical programmes. The polysemy of musical repertoire, therefore, does not only represent a challenge to researchers trying to decipher the meaning of concert repertoire. It also offered the occupation state and the musical elites operating therein the opportunity to adhere to Japanese propaganda guidelines while still leaving sufficient room for the representation of Chinese agency.

Normalizing the Sound of War and Occupation

While the occupation state had the means to plan and control musical repertoires at the highest level, we might question how far such changes in musical repertoires and semantic alterations took hold. Below, I will show how the repertoire of Beijing's most popular community ensemble, the Beijing Harmonica Society, changed due to the shifting musical culture of the occupation state under which it operated. I am especially interested in the dissonance between intensified propaganda efforts – including the narrowing of permissible repertoire – and the normalization of the state of crisis that intensified with the advent of “total war”.

I introduced the Beijing Branch of the China Harmonica Society in Chapter 3 as one of the few non-elite music groups that readily collaborated with the occupation state. The harmonica was a vastly popular, easy to learn and affordable instrument and

despite its acoustic and harmonic limitations an instrument that its players and audiences enjoyed. Thousands of members played the repertoires presented to them through collections, textbooks and the Shanghai-based *China Harmonica World* magazine.²¹ Propagandists appreciated the harmonica not only because of its popularity, but because of its truly transcultural history (Peng 1944; see also figure 20). The early history of the instrument still is a matter of debate, but its modern form was traced back to small workshops in early nineteenth-century Germany. Instruments produced in a workshop founded by Matthias Hohner (1833–1902) made their way to Japan and China (Bao 1940). And Bao Mingshan, one of the most active harmonica players and arrangers in Shanghai, argued that the harmonica was a result of European experimentation with the Chinese *sheng* (mouth organ) (Bao 1940).²²

The cultural prestige or specific associations with instruments, such as middle-class aspirations, or gendered associations, are well established (Kraus 1989; Tanur and Zervoudakes 1994). In the case of the harmonica, the instrument was regarded as both Western and Chinese, both modern and nativist. The instrument thus seemed to capture the ideologies of the Xinminhui (with its modernist fascist tendencies), but also the regimes' nativist rhetoric, which aimed to legitimize the occupation state's opposition to foreign influence in China.

²¹ The Beijing Branch published its own special issue of the *China Harmonica World* in May 1943 (Meng 2018, 249).

²² Both the *sheng* and the harmonica are free reed aerophones.

A list of contents from the *Collection of Pieces for Harmonica Ensemble*, published by Ke Zhenghe (1935a), can be taken as an indication of the repertoire that the Harmonica Society in Beijing performed shortly before the Japanese invasion:

O Sole Mio, Eduardo di Capua (1865–1917), 1898

Santa Lucia, Neapolitan Song, Teodoro Cottrau (1825–1879), 1849

[excerpts from] *La Traviata*, Giuseppe Verdi, 1853

Guillaume Tell Overture, Gioacchino Rossini, 1829

[excerpts from] *Carmen*, Georges Bizet (1838–1875), 1875

“Cio-Cio-san Aria” from *Madame Butterfly*, Giacomo Puccini (1858–1924), 1904

Karavan, Abe Olman (1887–1984), 1919

Song of the Volga Boatmen, collected by Mily A. Balakirev (1837–1910), 1866

La Paloma, Sebastián Yradier (1809–1865), 1850

Barcelona, Tolchard Evans (1901–1978), 1926

Aloha 'Oe, Queen Lili'uokalani (1838–1919), 1878

Honolulu Moon, Fred Lawrence (1887–1946), 1926

Am Bache, Gustav Lange (1811–1887), 1870

Der lustige Landmann, Robert Schumann (1810–1856), 1848

Serenata op. 6.I, Enrico Toselli (1883–1926), 1900

Sérénade, Charles Gounod (1818–1893), ca. 1857

Under the Double Eagle, Franz J. Wagner (1856–1908), 1893

Light Cavalry, Franz von Suppé (1819–1895), 1866

This list appears as a “best of”. It includes many pieces which, by this time, would have already been nineteenth-century *schlager* – performed and re-performed, re-arranged and recorded, recognizable even if performed in groups of beginner harmonica players. This textbook also offers a glimpse into the travel routes and infrastructure of the international recording industry that shaped musical repertoires in China (Jones 2001, 59–61; Steen 2006, 111–32, 313–21). The collection includes Italian repertoire from the early days of operatic recordings, alongside more traditional operatic repertoire. Some pieces seem to have been chosen for their supposedly “Asian” theme: Puccini’s “Cio-Cio-san Aria”, for example. Other pieces were chosen for their pentatonic appeal, such as Abe Olman’s *Karavan*. Russian folk melodies, including the *Song of the Volga Boatmen*, presumably made their way to China through the recordings of famed performers as Feodor Chaliapin (1873–1938), published first in 1922 and again in 1936. The piece had been adapted and recorded on the harmonica by Satō Hideo in 1934 (Satō 1934),²³ who had visited Beijing in November 1938, performing this and other pieces (*Xinminbao* 1938a). Saloon and dance music was featured alongside simple pieces that might have been found in piano textbooks (Schumann and Lange specifically). Franz Joseph Wagner’s *Under the Double Eagle* and Franz von Suppé’s *Light Cavalry* may be indicative of the influence of German military advisors (Gong 2008, 42–48).

If we take this repertoire as representative of what was performed by the Harmonica Society in Beijing prior to the war, we can trace how this repertoire changed with the occupation. I do so by comparing the pre-war repertoire with a handful of wartime

²³ *The Song of the Volga Boatmen* also topped the US charts in 1941 with a recording by Glenn Miller.

performance programmes that were published in Beijing's newspapers and the *China Harmonica World* magazine.²⁴

Traces of the pre-war repertoire can be found in performances given by the Harmonica Society in late 1938 and 1939. The *Song of the Volga Boatmen*, *Under the Double-Eagle* and *Karavan*, for example, were included in wartime programmes (*Xinminbao* 1938al; *Xinminbao* 1939k; *Xinminbao* 1939x). However, repertoires changed throughout the years. Despite the scarcity of material and limited evidence, we can see that the repertoires of the Harmonica Society increasingly resembled those played by military marching bands in occupied Beijing.

Pieces that became the new standard repertoire under occupation were largely adopted from Austro-German operetta pieces and military marches (these categories occasionally overlap, with overtures featuring marches and gallops). These included Franz von Suppé's *Overture to Dichter und Bauer* (*Poet and Peasant*, 1846), Johann Strauss II' (1825–1899) *Donauwalzer* (*The Blue Danube*, 1866), Richard Eisenberg's (1848–1927) *Schmiede im Walde* (1885) and the *Toy Symphony* (ca. 1765), attributed here to Joseph Haydn. However, there were also French patriotic marches such as Louis-Gaston Ganne's (1862–1923) *Le Père de la Victoire* (ca. 1888) and Japanese songs such as the *Warship March* and *The Moon over the Ruined Castle* (*Xinminbao* 1939j; *Xinminbao* 1939q; *Shibao* 1940a; Shang 1942c; *Huabei xinbao* 1944h).²⁵ A

²⁴ Please refer to my Zotero library at <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires> for a collection of newspaper articles that mention performances by the Beijing Harmonica Society.

²⁵ We can also find scores of some of this repertoire printed in the journal *Harmonica World* published in Shanghai 1937–1941. The repertoire included in the magazine suggests a relative distance from the occupation state, even including such pieces as John P. Sousa's (1854–1932) *Stars and Stripes Forever*

programme played at Beijing Hotel for the sixth anniversary of the China Harmonica Society in June 1942 illustrates the extent to which these changes had taken hold by the time of “total war”. The 1942 programme included almost exclusively pieces that had been popularized by marching bands and the Japanese operetta craze, such as the *Warship March*, *Umi Yukaba*, Liszt’s *Hungarian Rhapsody No. 2* (1874/75), Rossini’s *Overture to Guillaume Tell* (1829) and Johann Strauss II’ *The Blue Danube* and *Rosen aus dem Süden* (1880) (Shang 1942c; *Xinminbao* 1942h). This performance was not part of any propaganda campaign, indicating that members of the Harmonica Society appropriated such nationalistic and militaristic repertoire as their own.

We could, of course, try to evaluate each piece for its potential “militaristic” or “violent” content, or identify potential musical gestures or timbres which might seem particularly closely associated with occupation or military conflict. However, in doing so we might also struggle to differentiate between pre-war repertoires and those performed during the war. And even repertoire that might not seem militaristic in of itself gained meaning by association and repeated performance in heightened campaign concerts or as the standard repertoire of ensembles closely associated with the occupying force. So how did this repertoire come to be performed by the Harmonica Society?

Tracing repertoire performed in occupied Beijing has allowed me to reconstruct the networks of repertoires performed by various ensembles in the city. Through such a broader analysis of repertoire, we can find striking similarities between the Harmonica

(1896) in 1938. However, in 1941, pieces such as arrangements by Tōhō Miyata of the *Overture to Guillaume Tell* and *Le Père de la Victoire* were included in its pages (Rossini and Miyata 1941; Ganne and Miyata 1941).

Society's new repertoire and repertoire performed by Japanese and Chinese (para)-military brass bands at official events in Beijing. A few of the most repeated pieces include:

Umi Yukaba, Nobutoki Kiyoshi, 1937

Warship March, Setoguchi Tōkichi, 1896

Die Schmiede im Walde, Richard Eilenberg (1848–1927), 1885

The Blue Danube, Johann Strauss II, 1866

Guillaume Tell Overture, Gioachino Rossini, 1829

Poet and Peasant Overture, Franz von Suppé, 1846

Toy Symphony, here attributed to Joseph Haydn, 176?

Hungarian Rhapsody No. 2, Franz Liszt, 1874/75

Military March, Franz Schubert, 1826(?)

Orpheus in the Underworld Overture, Carl Binder (1816–1860), 1860

Swanee River, George Gershwin (1898–1937), 1919

Gold and Silver Waltz, Franz Lehár (1870–1948), 1902

Il Barbiere di Seville Overture, Gioachino Rossini, 1816

Semiramide, Gioachino Rossini, 1823

Capriccio Espagnol, Nikolai A. Rimsky-Korsakov, 1887

Most importantly, military brass bands played a variety of Japanese *gunka* (war songs) and marches, only a few of which are included here. Stylistically similar repertoires were used in Japanese newsreels accompanying the description of military

accomplishments (and exhibited to audiences in occupied Beijing, of course).²⁶ Such marches were routinely included in programmes and performed alongside new Chinese and Japanese compositions and Western classical and romantic pieces, most prominently overtures. This list is indicative of the influence of military advisors from Germany in both Japan and China (Mehl 2013, 217–18), as well as the popularity of Parisian and Viennese operetta in Tokyo’s theatres following the First World War (Takenaka 2015, 204). Many of the pieces and composers listed here were also by key representatives of European musical nationalism, such as Lehár, Strauss and Liszt. The inclusion of Russian composers like Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov might seem surprising but may well represent the musical tradition of folklore and (Tsarist) nationalism rather than Stalin’s Soviet Union. At school concerts, Japanese military brass bands performed operetta, dance and even American popular songs for entertainment purposes. The bands’ repertoire also included arrangements of more “serious” symphonic literature, such as arrangements and excerpts from Franz Schubert’s *Unfinished Symphony*, Beethoven’s *Symphony No. 5* and *Egmont Overture* and the second movement of Dvořák’s *Symphony No. 9*.²⁷ Again, the performance of Dvořák’s *Symphony No. 9 “From the New World”* may seem counterintuitive given its connection to America, but may well be understood as a celebration of the concept of a New World (Order) under Japanese leadership. Similar reinterpretations of the

²⁶ Sakaromoto provides us with an overview of the songs and marches used in Japanese newsreels. He does not, however, account for any Western repertoires that may have been included, especially prior to 1941 (Sakuramoto 2005, 39–48).

²⁷ All of these pieces are listed in performance programmes – a selection of which is available at <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires>.

piece have been found in performances by German orchestras in occupied Prague (Pestel 2021).

What is performed here is first and foremost modern state- and nationhood,²⁸ military might through the sheer volume and sonic power as well as state organization through intricate rhythmic organization, harmony and polyphony. But while these bands operated as representatives of an imperialistic sonic power, they also paid attention to entertainment value and operated with limited resources. They chose joyous, lively and catchy pieces with high recognizability, that strongly, but not exclusively, evoke militaristic characteristics. Repertoires were designed not just to move or educate, but to impress, to affect or entertain, and perhaps to raise consciousness for a collective power. The repertoire of military and police brass bands did not change much throughout the war but was continuously expanded upon with the newest propaganda songs and Japanese marches.

The Harmonica Society performed alongside military bands not only in concert settings, but also during film viewings in public parks, as well as for radio broadcasts. Its various ensembles performed pieces adopted from military brass bands before screenings of propaganda short films or newsreels, which contained similar, if not the same, musical repertoire (*Xinminbao* 1944d). Additionally, some of the Japanese pieces listed above were used in Japanese newsreels accompanying the description of military accomplishments and even used to prepare kamikaze pilots for their missions. Through such perpetual performance of a quite limited set of musical repertoires, a network of repertoires associated with military conquest and occupation was created.

²⁸ Repertoire at soloist's recitals was less militaristic and often featured more Japanese and Chinese repertoires (*Xinminbao* 1943o).

The fact that community ensembles such as the Harmonica Society actively contributed to the normalization of such sounds of occupation and violence is significant. However, considering the effect of constant mobilization and normalization of the condition of occupation, such developments can also be understood as the appropriation of repertoires of power by community groups longing for the expression of strength, and possibly even nationalism – as an act of self-empowerment. In a cultural environment of total war, where specific musical repertoire is prominently associated with the dominant force, such appropriation illustrates how different meanings of the same repertoire can coexist even in a space with such clear discursive hierarchies.

Conclusion

With the material presented in this chapter, I could have told a few very different stories. One of these might be the story of the successful appropriation of Beijing's cultural assets, including local composers, for the promotion of mobilization for total war. Focusing on repertoire, one could also tell the story of how Jiang Wenye and his colleagues contributed to the cultural capital of the occupation state by answering the call for a “revival” of Chinese culture and reframing the sounds of the occupied city. There is also the story of the subtle integration of community ensembles into the propaganda apparatus with the normalization of repertoire associated with the occupying force.

Instead, however, I have chosen to tell a more complicated story. My account considers some of the fissures in the Japanese “total empire” and credits local elites and even amateur Chinese musicians with some degree of agency. I have highlighted

two dissonances that emerged in this last phase of the war in occupied Beijing. First, there was a dissonance between the continued expansion of the Japanese empire and the distinctly local identification of the regime in north China. Secondly, there was dissonance between continued mobilization of musical culture for the total war and the normalization of the occupation.

Modernist composers in Beijing, while contributing to the Xinminhui's propaganda efforts, continued to compose art songs, as well as instrumental and orchestral pieces. These were removed from the immediate ideologies of the occupation state. Many of Jiang Wenye's pieces explored the Chinese traditional literary canon or are dedicated to the sights and sounds of Beijing. At one level, this reflected Jiang's identity as a Taiwanese colonial subject who had been educated in a Western musical idiom in Japan, and was trying to reconstruct the musical tradition of an occupied Chinese "homeland". Yet Jiang's focus on local north China culture resonated not only with cultural developments in the city, but also coincided with the localized identification of the political regime in north China.

I have also shown how musical elites in occupied Beijing made use of the polysemy of musical repertoire. Pre-existing and well-known repertoire was given new meaning through programme design. By performing selected pieces together and arranging them in a specific order, musicians were able to perform often overlapping or contradictory affiliations and identities. The performance of Sino-Japanese amity through joint performance was certainly in line with Japanese propaganda policies. Repertoire, however, seems to have offered cultural elites a subtle way to perform autonomy as they placed China alongside the Axis powers and highlighted the local identity of the occupation state.

While we recognize events such as the concert during the “Attack and Destroy Britain and the US to/for (As)Certain Victory Movement Week” in June 1943 as highlights of the regime’s musical propaganda effort, they also attest to the agency of local elites, who were able to determine the details of such programmes and use familiar repertoire to speak to local audiences. Performers may have understood the event not as a mere performance of Sino-Japanese alliance or the Axis powers, but as an opportunity to come together as a local community and perform repertoire long rooted in musical practice in the city. For audiences, in turn, such events may have simply been a rare opportunity to witness a live performance of orchestral repertoire. Yao Siyuan, for example, recalled his immense joy at having overheard the Beijing Symphony Orchestra’s rehearsal for a performance of Beethoven’s *Symphony No. 5*.²⁹ Campaign events made such repertoire accessible to a different audience than closed concert settings.

Finally, my analysis of the Harmonica Society in this chapter not only counters common scholarly narratives that categorically deny largescale community involvement in the collaborationist war effort (Meng 2018, 66) but shows how community groups contributed to propaganda efforts – not only by providing relief or distraction, but by normalizing sounds of war and occupation through musical performance. The Harmonica Society, performing on the radio and during film viewings in public parks, was entangled in a multimedia system of highly repetitive repertoires of violence. As I have described in Chapter 5, the “normalization” of occupation has often been attributed to popular “musical pabulum” sung by female voices that many critics believe distracted the masses from their potential to resist the

²⁹ Personal Interview with Yao Siyuan, 11 November 2018.

Japanese occupation. Yet civic societies such as the Harmonica Society became a vehicle not of distraction but of active acceptance and enthusiasm for repertoires associated with the occupier's military institutions. At the same time, the prolonged state of occupation certainly altered perceptions of repertoire repeatedly performed by military brass bands. Considering these circumstances, we can also understand this process of appropriation of militaristic repertoire as the emancipation from such auditory violence and the reframing or reclamation of such repertoire as empowerment. Thus, analyzing the repertoires developed and performed during the latter years of the war in occupied Beijing attests simultaneously to the intensified control and reach of the regime, but also to the normalization of the condition of occupation.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have set out to explain the significance of musical culture for the occupation state in Japanese-occupied north China. I have asked what we can learn from an analysis of the repertoires and performance practices that the occupation state developed and appropriated between 1937 and 1945. This thesis thus builds on the emerging “new cultural history of Japanese-occupied China”, which seeks to analyze the cultural production of the occupation state to better understand Chinese “collaborationist” agency, the ideologies and campaigns of the occupation state, continuities with pre-war developments and similarities with cultural production in other wartime territories in China and beyond (Taylor and Yang 2020). Through my analysis of musical culture, I have provided a more nuanced view of the occupation state in north China, as well as its ideologies and its relationships (with cultural elites working in north China, with citizens, with its neighbours, and with the Japanese empire). I have also re-examined some of the narratives of musical culture in wartime China that have dominated the literature thus far.

In this thesis, I have introduced the PGROC, the NCPC and the Xinminhui as largely autonomous governmental entities in north China and analyzed developments in the Xinminhui’s ideologies and campaign efforts throughout the war (Chapter 1). I have reviewed dominant narratives of musical culture in wartime China and assessed how these might continue to shift with increased recognition of musical culture in the occupied territories (Chapter 2). I have provided an overview of Japanese-occupied Beijing’s musical infrastructure and the extent to which musical elites and community

ensembles were integrated into the occupation state's propaganda apparatus. I have also analyzed the political function attributed to music by musical and political elites in north China (Chapter 3). I have further analyzed the newly developed song repertoire and mass singing events held in ritual spaces and organized in support of the recently established PGROC and Xinminhui in 1938. I have shown how this local development of song repertoire continued throughout the war, and I have detailed the measures that the regime took to ensure its retention (Chapter 4). I have shown how propaganda strategies shifted after 1938 toward public entertainment, causing anxieties for musical elites in north China, who worried about the pacifying effect of *shidaiqu* and the role of professional female voices in the wartime context. I have shown how blurring the lines between politicized propaganda songs and musical entertainment was countered with the composition of increasingly militaristic songs and a less "decadent" singing style – leading to an unexpected convergence of wartime aesthetics, whereby music produced and performed in the name of resistance and occupation began to look and sound extraordinarily similar (Chapter 5). This dissonance between the normalization of the condition of occupation and intensifying propaganda efforts reached its pinnacle during the mobilization efforts of 1942 and 1943, which were explored in Chapter 6. I have illustrated this with an analysis of the shifting performance repertoires of local community ensembles. I have also shown how instrumental repertoire composed by local elites and performances at carefully planned campaign concerts were used to maintain Beijing's identity as the centre of a strong, nominally independent local regime amidst a constantly expanding "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Chapter 6).

In this Conclusion, I will highlight the implications of the findings of this thesis for two distinct bodies of academic literature. The first of these is the field of

“collaborationist” studies and the occupation state in Japanese-occupied China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The second is the study of the development of “new music” in wartime China. I will also reflect on the main themes and concepts that run throughout through this thesis. These include (i) the localized nature of the occupation state in north China; (ii) the shifting meanings in the musical repertoires developed and appropriated by the regime; (iii) the role of collective and individual voices as representatives of the regime; (iv) the spatial capacity of (mediated) sound and music; (v) the continuities between pre-war musical culture and the musical culture of the occupation state; and (vi) similarities between the repertoire and performance practices developed in different wartime territories. In tracing these themes, I have illustrated the significance of the “treasonous repertoires” and performance practices appropriated and developed in Japanese-occupied north China. Musical repertoire defined the occupation state’s political identity and its role as an important agent in the “thought war” fought during the Second Sino-Japanese War. I have also shown how an analysis of the occupation state’s musical culture and attention to changing voices and spatial configurations of musical performance can help us gain a more nuanced understanding of musical culture in wartime China.

Listening to the Occupation State in North China

As David Serfass has noted in a recent article on collaboration and state-making in occupied China, the occupation state grew out of “constant negotiations over political power between contending agents. Despite successive efforts to integrate this [state] apparatus, its lack of cohesion was more pronounced than in a ‘regular’ state because of the coexistence of Chinese and Japanese components within it and because of the

contradictions they contained” (2022b, 73). While Serfass grounds his notion of the occupation state mainly in an analysis of the state structures of the RNG in the Lower Yangzi Delta, his approach is also useful for understanding the complex governmental structure that existed in occupied north China.

The occupation state in north China was not a monolithic entity. Rather, it was shaped by multiple, overlapping governmental agencies and elites. Structurally, it resembled a one-party state with a weak governmental structure and a strong party-like organ – the Xinminhui. Despite the presence of the Japanese, Chinese elites working for the occupation state in north China were not simply “puppets”, but worked to realize their own vision(s) of statehood – albeit within the boundaries set by a belligerent occupier. As I have shown in this thesis, this included musical elites such as Ke Zhenghe, who took on official roles within the regime’s propaganda apparatus. Ke, a lecturer at the National Beijing Normal College Music Institute and main organizer of musical life in Beijing since 1927, became a member of the Xinminhui and was responsible for re-education from 1938 onwards. He organized many of the mass singing events, song contests and campaign concerts that I have detailed throughout this thesis.

Contrary to the common scholarly narratives that emphasize the displacement of Chinese musical elites after the Japanese invasion, and their contributions to the resistance (Chen 2005, 79–80; Howard 2015, 40), many Chinese musicians stayed in Beijing after 1937, and Japanese supervisors relied on local musical elites to shape the musical culture of the occupation state. The occupation state also offered unusual career opportunities to young, often female, performers and individuals with ambiguous national identities and transnational cultural roots. Similar observations have been made in other cultural realms in occupied Shanghai. Jeremy Taylor, for example, has shown that the vacuum created by the exodus of established cartoonists

in the Lower Yangzi Delta allowed new artists to establish themselves under the RGROC and RNG: “For many of the artists who provided content for such [newly established collaborationist] publications, the war appears to have represented one of their first opportunities to produce cartoons” (Taylor 2015, 410). Even more importantly, Nicole Huang has shown how the occupation allowed a group of young women writers to emerge as new cultural icons, dominate the cultural scene in Shanghai, and help “shape a culture of reading and writing that was a direct response to the war and occupation” (Huang 2005, 18–19). Instead of suggesting that their success was simply due to the suppression or exodus of resistance voices (Huang 2005, 20) Huang argues, that we can interpret such developments as a continuation of pre-existing textual traditions, and credits women with “manipulat[ing] textual strategies in order to compose wartime narratives in the guise of domestic and personal narratives” (Huang 2005, 19). One significant difference between Shanghai and Beijing, however, seems to have been the ability of the occupation state in north China to draw on local elites, who had established names for themselves well prior to the Japanese invasion. Judging these individuals as “opportunists” or “traitors”, however, fails to capture the complexity of the relationship between the occupation state in north China and the musical elite working in Beijing.

In the tradition of Edward Gunn, tracing personal motivation to collaborate or the “moral dilemmas of intellectuals” (Gunn 1980, 1) has not been one of the objectives of this thesis. While the biographical accounts of Beijing-based musicians that I have drawn on in this thesis have provided some insights, I have sought to avoid being distracted by them from a deeper understanding of the actual cultural production that constituted the occupation state’s musical culture. Nevertheless, individual musicians’ contributions to the regime have provided some important insight into questions of

“collaborative agency”. They have also highlighted the complexity of affiliations with the occupation state. Doing justice to such complexity requires us to draw a multidimensional space of collaboration, one which considers not only institutional affiliations and direct (versus indirect) contributions to the regime’s propaganda efforts, but also continuities and ruptures in musical repertoires and performance practices as well.

As I have shown in Chapter 3, musicians at military and state-funded institutions such as military brass bands and the Beijing Normal College were employed to promote the regime relatively soon after the founding of the PGROC. But it was not until 1942 that commercial and community ensembles became fully integrated into the regime’s propaganda apparatus and were employed at campaign events. At the same time, institutional affiliation did not always correlate with participation in the regime’s campaigns, nor did institutional affiliation necessarily mean a change in musical repertoire or performance practice. For instance, some semi-professional branches of the Chinese Opera Learned Society readily promoted the occupation state, while some professional musicians at state-funded institutions managed to largely evade participation in propaganda activities. Similarly, the integration of former missionary choirs into the Xinminhui branch society structure, and the expulsion of foreign missionaries in late 1941, did not halt the regular performance of Christmas and Easter oratorios. However, prestigious but privately established ensembles, such as the Beijing Symphony Orchestra, were quickly incorporated into the occupation state’s propaganda apparatus, employed in campaign contexts and their repertoires adjusted accordingly. Such examples demonstrate the often complex affiliations that emerged in the complex context of the occupation and the need for detailed analysis of the musical practice of various groups.

Any attempt at tracing “collaborative agency” is further complicated by continuities between pre-war and wartime musical culture. Since local elites shaped the occupation state’s musical culture, local elites also continued to realize goals that had been set well before the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The BMCA, for example, can be understood not as an entity unique to the wartime context, but also as the realization of Ke Zhenghe’s pre-war vision of a group that would promote musical life and education in Beijing. Similarly, the founding of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra and the construction of Beijing City Music Hall both represented an important step in the long-term (and pre-war) promotion of musical life in the city by musical elites. Counterintuitively, it was the Japanese occupation and the autonomy of north China from the RNG that made the realization of north Chinese elites’ aims possible. As we have seen in Chapter 4, such continuities also led to interesting similarities between pre-war practices such as anti-Japanese mass singing and similar performances in support of the occupation state in 1938. These developments cannot be explained through the application of a simple resistance/collaboration dichotomy.

It was not only professional musicians who became musical representatives of the regime. As I have shown, community involvement in the collaborationist propaganda effort cannot be denied. Some community engagement can certainly be attributed to coercion. School and university students were not given a choice as to whether or not they wanted to participate in pro-regime musical events, for example. However, ensembles such as the Harmonica Society and communal choirs actively participated in the regime’s musical propaganda as early as 1938. Even if we assume that community leaders were pressured to participate in such events, membership in these ensembles remained voluntary and potential pressure to participate in such events did not result in the disintegration of these ensembles. To the contrary, membership

numbers of the Harmonica Society grew over the course of the occupation. These findings undermine existing studies that have sought to downplay community involvement in the musical life of the occupation state, or which claim that community activities were of a purely artistic nature (Meng 2018, 66).

Active citizen participation in the regime's musical propaganda effort was encouraged throughout the occupation period, but especially as the governmental structures of the occupation state took shape. The occupation state valued music as an important tool to mobilize citizens in support of collaboration. This can be observed both through the propaganda praxis and through statements made by elites working for the regime's propaganda apparatus. As I have shown in Chapter 4, song commission activities illustrated the regime's trust in music to effectively promote the newly established government and propagate ideological developments throughout the war. Mass singing was assumed to forge a sense of community and garner sympathies for the Japanese. As my analysis of a collection of Xinminhui songs published in 1938 has shown, the Xinminhui used music to prescribe roles and identities for different sections of society. Music was used to shape not only the perceived legitimacy of the new government but also citizens' roles as "renewed people" in support of Sino-Japanese alliance. However, songs also drew on distinctly Chinese – and, in the case of the *Xinmin Workers' Song*, even north Chinese – musical elements, thus defining the people as citizens of a distinctly local regime. In other words, support for the occupation state was imagined and musically composed as a distinctly Chinese and even Beijing-specific sentiment.

The musical culture of the occupation state reflects both changes in the musical infrastructure available to the regime and shifts in the regime's relationship with its citizens and propaganda strategies. Between 1939 and 1941, the regime continued to

propagate newly commissioned song repertoires and aimed to ensure their retention, but public campaign events such as the “Raise Asia Movement Weeks” mainly focused on providing relief and entertainment for an increasingly war-weary society. The regime thus moved away from active public mobilization and collective voicing to professional voices being recruited as representatives of the regime. This went along with popular demand, as Edward Gunn has explained in his work on literature in occupied Shanghai: “But by the outbreak of the Pacific War in late 1941, the public had largely decided in favor of works less directly concerned with the immediacies of a stagnating war” (Gunn 1980, 6). As I have shown in Chapter 5, however, and in contrast to studies that emphasize the “escapist”, “nostalgic” or “passive” nature of cultural production in occupied China (e.g., Fu 1993, 51, 120), musical elites in occupied north China pushed back against the prevalence of the resulting “musical pabulum”, and emphasized the need for topical repertoires as well as for what they considered appropriate (male) voices to perform them. This led to a convergence in wartime aesthetics, with propaganda songs composed in the occupied territories increasingly resembling resistance song repertoire and recording practices.

Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, increased funding, the presence of guest performers and the incorporation of much of Beijing’s musical elite allowed the regime to organize more high-profile concerts and performances and carefully design campaign performance repertoires. The participation of community choirs and ensembles ensured citizen involvement and may even have broadened audience engagement. However, the regime’s aspiration for “total war” meant that performers and musical repertoires alike were reduced to national representatives in displays of political affiliation and local identity, as I have shown in my analysis of selected movement week repertoire in Chapter 6. I have also observed an apparent

normalization of the condition of war and occupation as community ensembles in Beijing appropriated militaristic repertoires late in the war.

We can thus observe three phases of citizen mobilization through music: (i) initial mobilization in 1938; (ii) “pacification” in the 1939 to 1941 period; and, finally, (iii) a tension between the continued normalization of occupation and renewed mobilization efforts which created an interesting juncture in the musical culture of the occupation state. However, rather than suggesting a sequential development of propaganda strategies, I argue that these shifts in the regime’s musical culture reflect the multitude of voices and ever-changing nature of wartime ideologies, propaganda policies and shifting power relations which the occupation state had to negotiate. This, in turn, was reflected in the often ambivalent messaging of the occupation state, as well as the misalignment between the local elites’ desire for continued mobilization and sense of crisis versus the promotion of “musical pabulum” and relief efforts that were welcomed by audiences. This observation of ambivalence or incoherence and wavering between the promotion of “peace” and mobilization or militarization is in line with recent work on the RNG’s visual culture (Taylor 2021, 149–54).

Music shaped not only the occupation state’s relationship with its citizens, but also its relationships with other groups in Japanese-occupied China as well. As I have shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the PGROC used music to assert its sovereignty and even stake its claim to be the true successor of the pre-war Republican Chinese regime (against its rivals in the Lower Yangzi Delta, such the RGROC) by adopting a pre-war Nationalist anthem. When the PGROC was subsumed into Wang Jingwei’s RNG, joint song commission activities were initiated to centralize cultural production across occupied China. After this, the Xinminhui reverted to local musical realizations of ideological developments. And while the signified community of identification – the

“we” – in song lyrics shifted with the expanding Japanese empire (from “Sino-Japanese” to “East Asian” and eventually to “Greater East Asian”), the musical realization continued to highlight local (i.e., north Chinese) musical culture rather than imperial Japanese musical culture.

The occupation state also drew on music to counter its most immediate rival in north China – the communists. Anti-communist songs were only one pillar of the regime’s strategy. Campaigns also drew on music to mitigate anxieties about the limitations of the regime’s territorial control beyond Beijing by performing in important ritual spaces denoting state sovereignty, circling the city, promoting regional participation in singing competitions, and using broadcasting techniques to spread its ideological messaging sonically. At the same time, the aesthetic choices we can observe in music written in support of the occupation state also reflect the musical elites’ awareness of the success of song repertoire developed by resistance forces.

Finally, the regime’s position within the wider Japanese empire, as well as its standing vis-à-vis Japan, was negotiated through musical performance. As I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6, musicians served as national and local representatives and repertoires were used to perform political affiliations. However, performances conceptualized to promote “Sino-Japanese amity” and “Asian co-prosperity” often relied on contrasting individual performers’ national identities and employing them as national representatives instead of promoting the performance or celebration of transcultural identities. Thus, national identities were artificially simplified and ossified. Additionally, such performances often reiterated hierarchical relationships between the governments represented (with Japanese soloists being accompanied by Chinese pianists, and Japanese conductors leading local Chinese orchestras). Modernist composition and the design of concert repertoire thus provided the

opportunity to portray more complex identities or subversive relations. It is notable, for example, that even during the extensive textual promotion of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, and despite his personal connection to Taiwan, Jiang Wenye continued to focus on local Beijing sounds in his modernist compositions. This went hand in hand with the regime’s emphasis on local identification. As I have further argued in Chapter 6, the inclusion of local north Chinese repertoire alongside pieces identified as Hungarian and Spanish in a performance of Axis power music illustrated the regime’s attempt to perform independence from Japanese supervision and highlight its local identity. This is similar to what Jeremy Taylor has called the “Axis turn” in the RNG’s visual culture (Taylor 2021, 72–82) – an effort by Chinese “collaborators” to “emulate the aesthetics of the Axis powers or to rebrand China as a GEACPS [Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere] state” (Taylor 2021, 148) in order to assert a sense of symbolic independence from the Japanese.

As my analysis has shown, cultural production in the Japanese-occupied territories cannot be sufficiently understood in terms of a dichotomy between collaboration and resistance, nor can they be placed into a one-dimensional spectrum of collaboration. Instead, I have drawn a multidimensional space which considers institutional affiliation, repertoire and performance practice, and recognizes continuities between pre-war and wartime developments. Only by doing this can we do justice to the complex choices that cultural elites were faced with in occupied Beijing.

I have further argued for the governmental structures established in occupied China to be taken seriously as state entities with distinctly local Chinese agency. Indeed, my analysis of the musical culture of the occupation state in north China strengthens claims in the literature around collaboration that have sought to emphasize local agency and include the occupation state in broader narratives of state-building in

twentieth century China (Brook 2007; Serfass 2022b). While the occupation state in north China was shaped by many institutions with often conflicting interests (resulting in often ambiguous ideological messaging), the musical repertoire developed and appropriated in occupied Beijing consistently constructed north China as an autonomous entity. Taking the occupation state seriously and treating the occupation period not as an aberration but as an important part of modern China's history (including its musical history), as many scholars of wartime political and cultural history have encouraged us to do (Gunn 1980; Brook 2005; Huang 2005; Taylor 2021), also entails an attempt to understand the musical culture of the occupation state as part of the musical history of twentieth-century and wartime China. This, in turn, can help to facilitate an understanding of the repertoires and performance practices developed and appropriated by the occupation state within established narratives, thereby enabling us to highlight continuities with pre-war developments and recognize similarities with musical culture in other parts of wartime China.

Treasonous Repertoires

As I have argued in Chapter 2, I understand this thesis as an intervention into multiple scholarly narratives that have shaped our understanding of music in occupied China. I have questioned narrative alignments between specific musical repertoires and performance practices, aesthetic judgements, moral judgements, and the political realms with which they are associated. Providing a more nuanced view of musical culture in occupied north China can, I argue, help us to test assumptions about the role of musical elites, specific musical genres, and musical repertoire and performance practices in modern China more generally.

But before I reiterate these interventions into these dominant scholarly discourses, I turn to the three main concepts that have guided my analysis throughout this thesis. These are repertoire, voice and space. In the thesis Introduction, I have explained the multi-layered approach to musical repertoire which has enabled me to offer both detailed musical analysis of individual pieces and songs and observe shifts in meaning as pieces were integrated into concert programmes and repeatedly performed and thereby associated with particular cultural or political institutions. I have chosen this approach to make the most of the available and rich collection of campaign performance programmes and musical scores of newly commissioned repertoire – mitigating the limitations in sources with regard to performance practice and audience perception.

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I have chosen to move through different layers of analysis of musical repertoire. I have thus been able to ground our understanding of the occupation state's musical culture in a detailed musical analysis of the regime's newly commissioned song repertoire, following the example of established discourses and musical analysis of musical repertoire in other areas of Republican and wartime China (e.g., Wong 1984; Tuohy 2001; Howard 2015). This has widened our view of the occupation state's musical repertoire and its interaction with the repertoire of other areas of wartime China. I have subsequently analyzed both individual concert programmes and the performance repertoires of selected ensembles, observing shifting meanings as performance contexts were manipulated and repertoire was repeatedly performed and thereby associated and given new meaning(s).

I have also examined performance practices with the information available through campaign performance announcements, reviews, visual materials and a few time witness' accounts. Additional rare recordings have allowed me to analyze the shifting

vocal techniques used to represent the occupation state. Focusing on voice and the spatial aspects of sound has proven particularly productive in the context of occupation. Issues of voicing were a matter of intense negotiation and debate for musical elites in occupied China. Thus, analysis of these discourses and the different voices employed by the regime have also helped me to better understand and unveil otherwise hidden nuances in the regime's relationship with its citizens.

Focusing on the spatial aspects of sound and musical performance has proven particularly instructive in our understanding of performances staged in ritual spaces throughout occupied Beijing and have helped me to appreciate the role of (mediated) sound in mitigating limitations in the regime's territorial control. Analyzing the repertoires and performance practices developed and appropriated by the occupation state in north China in this manner has revealed important cultural continuities and similarities which would otherwise be left unexplored. In other words, my tripartite attention to musical repertoire, voice and the spatial aspects of musical performance has been vital in coming to terms with the cultural history of occupied Beijing and in questioning dominant narratives of musical history in Japanese-occupied China.

My main concerns in this thesis have been musical repertoires and performances that were developed and appropriated in the context (and in support) of the occupation state's various political campaigns. Such contributions to the musical culture of the occupation state took many forms – from propaganda song commissions to mass singing events, and from professional recordings to public listening sessions. While the occupation state aimed to develop its own musical repertoire, it drew on the local musical elite, pre-existing repertoires and performance practices, and was shaped by pre-war musical discourse and aesthetics of war and mobilization. As I have shown, it is this focus on continuities and similarities which challenge scholarship that has

disregarded cultural production in the occupied territories or deemed “collaborationist” music unworthy of further analysis (Chen 2005; Yu 2006; Liu 2010, 190).

Similarities between pre-war musical culture and the musical culture of the occupation state are most notable in my analysis of the Xinminhui’s newly commissioned song repertoire and mass singing events organized to mobilize citizens in support of the occupation state. While public commissions can be attributed to Japanese initiatives, the musical genres and realization of Xinminhui anthems emulated the aesthetics of songs written by Chinese composers in the early twentieth century in support of nation- and community-building. Songs composed by Jiang Wenye are technically sophisticated and can be regarded as a continuation of efforts to develop a Chinese musical idiom. The mass singing events organized for their promotion are direct reproductions of pre-war anti-Japanese mass singing activities during the 1935–1937 National Salvation Singing Movement. Yet such repertoire and performance have largely been left out of narratives of musical developments in wartime China, almost all of which have associated mass singing (and the use of pentatonic melodies and folk elements) exclusively with the anti-Japanese resistance. By placing mass singing in Japanese-occupied Beijing back into a wider story of wartime musical culture we can adjust narratives of musical nationalism in twentieth-century China and re-examine moral judgements (positive and negative) associated with mass singing.

Continuities can also be observed in the musical elite’s anxieties about the vastly popular genre of *shidaiqu*. While many of the cinematic productions (co)funded by the occupation state certainly did feature such repertoire, Chinese musical elites in occupied north China deemed *shidaiqu* inappropriate to represent the regime and its ideologies. Just as their counterparts in other wartime territories did, local elites propagated a martial aesthetic that would reflect their sense of crisis and aimed for

equal representation of female and male voices as well as (what they referred to as) a more “patriotic” singing style in the recording of such repertoire. We have also seen that the preference for such a martial aesthetic was likely due to exchanges between wartime territories and the occupation state’s awareness of the success of communist singing performed in the name of resistance. In fact, direct written references to anti-Japanese repertoire and the modelling of occupation-state songs on well-known resistance songs attests to this (Gao 1942; Liu 1942). The exclusive association of the occupied territories with young female voices performing in the genre of *shidaiqu* (a trope that has dominated many PRC-published accounts of musical culture in wartime China) thus overlooks the complexity of Chinese agency in the musical culture of the occupation state, distracts from the dominance of male collaborationist agency, and reinforces narratives of pacification and passivity that have only a partial basis in fact. Many of the musicians I have discussed in this thesis are commonly featured in the main academic literature on the development of Chinese “new music”. Jiang Wenye, for example, has been credited as a technically accomplished modernist composer and a champion of twentieth-century modernist music in China. Ke Zhenghe is widely acknowledged for his early interest in recording technologies and contributions to musical education. And Lao Zhicheng is celebrated for his pioneering performances as a concert pianist. However, the contributions of such individuals to the musical culture of the occupation state, while detrimental to their legacy, have usually not been considered as part of the history of musical modernism and performance in twentieth-century China. As I hope this thesis has demonstrated, just as songs written by prolific modernist composers in support of anti-Japanese resistance can be considered a valid part of the story of nation-building in China through song, songs written to support the establishment of a new collaborationist polity must equally be included in narratives

of the political use of Western-style repertoire in twentieth-century China. Recitals and concerts – even if performed in the context of pro-Axis events – introduced new repertoires to a broader Chinese audience and can thus be regarded as part of a broader history of “new music” in modern China.

Nevertheless, the performance of Western concert repertoire, often excused as an “apolitical” act, should be understood in its performance context. As I have shown in Chapter 6, concert repertoire, even if made up of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century pieces, was laden with meaning, carefully employed, and shaped through repeated performance. Beyond our simple understanding of specific performance contexts, we need to recognize when such repertoire has gained meaning by association. Any performance of it can be regarded as a political act – of reiteration, but also of resistance or reappropriation. In my analysis of shifts in the repertoire of the Harmonica Society, for example, I have suggested that we might understand the performance of repertoire associated with military power by a community ensemble in an occupied city as both a symptom of the normalization of the condition of occupation *and* as an act of self-empowerment.

I therefore hope that my analysis of the musical culture of the occupation state in Japanese-occupied China serves not only as an intervention into narratives of wartime musical culture, but will also help us to better understand the contested memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the musical culture of collaboration beyond the Japanese empire, and musical developments in modern China since 1945.

There are, of course, some areas of research that this thesis has touched upon, but that, due to limits of space, I have been unable to fully explore. One obvious point of interest is the question of the public reception of musical campaigns. While I was able to draw on anecdotal evidence to provide some sense of the impact of such activities, a broader

study of oral histories, diaries and personal collections that is further removed from lingering post-war moral judgements about “collaboration” might bring to light a more nuanced picture. In the same vein, an auditory history of the Sino-Japanese War, which takes theories of affect seriously and includes analysis not only of musical production but also draws on frameworks such as those developed by Martin Daughtry (Daughtry 2015) on “belliphonic” sounds and listening cultures might also contribute to our understanding of the period. My analysis of selected propaganda initiatives has also indicated that similar campaigns were conducted throughout other parts of the Japanese empire. A “transnational history” of such campaigns, which draws on Japanese directives and traces their implementation in occupied territories throughout East and Southeast Asia, could offer new comparative perspectives that would highlight the links between north China and other parts of the Japanese wartime empire.¹ The increasing digitization of archival sources and new methods in the digital humanities may also enable researchers to pursue questions of shifting musical repertoires on a larger scale than I have done in my analysis of concert life in wartime Beijing.

Echoes of Collaboration

Despite the intense musical propaganda effort spearheaded by the Xinminhui in Japanese-occupied Beijing, we might doubt the impact of such efforts given post-war censorship and the widespread attempts to erase public memory of the Xinminhui in China after the Japanese surrender. However, during my visit to their Beijing home

¹ Both Ethan Mark (2018) and Jeremy Yellen (2019) have illustrated the merits of such a transnational approach in the political and economic histories of the broader Japanese wartime empire.

when conducting research for this thesis, one of Jiang Wenye's family members shared a handwritten note with me. The person in question had obtained this note from a former professor at the Central Conservatory of Music in Beijing. As a student at the Composition Department, the professor had been part of a folk song collecting expedition to Yongnian County in southern Hebei in 1955. There, he had apparently found that one of Jiang Wenye's propaganda songs (written during the war years in support of the Xinminhui) was still being sung by villagers, albeit with different, revolutionary lyrics. How he was able to attribute the song to Jiang Wenye is unclear. He might have been familiar with Jiang's compositions, or his colleagues at the conservatory (and possibly even Jiang himself) may have recognized it. The villagers themselves might even have provided the information. The score in cipher notation does not indicate any lyrics, and Jiang's family members were not able to identify which one of Jiang's songs this was. Having transcribed the score, however, I was able to identify the song as Jiang's *Raise Asia March*. There are a few very slight differences in the rhythm to the original version, and the transcription is in 2/4 time rather than 4/4 time, but this only underlines the authenticity of the oral transmission. We do not know if the melody was already used in communist base areas before 1945, nor do we know if the song made its way to the south of Hebei in its original version. This leaves us with two possibilities. Either the song was remembered as a wartime song having possibly made its way to Yongnian County in its original version during the war (which speaks for the efficacy of the occupation state's propaganda efforts). Or perhaps the melody had been appropriated by other groups during or after the war and was tolerated and used despite its association with the occupation state. In either case, this case illustrates the continued use and legacy of the musical repertoire developed by the occupation state in north China. Music developed by the occupation

state, despite all efforts to suppress memories of collaboration, continued to linger in post-war China.

While wartime resistance songs are still nostalgically performed in public spaces in the PRC today, the same repertoire has now also become a vehicle of domination and even oppression. In 2019, for example, a blockbuster Sino-Kazakh cinematic co-production – part of cultural co-operation in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative – featured the wartime life of the communist composer Xian Xinghai (Yakov 2019). Xian Xinghai was not only stylized as a communist wartime icon (Yang 2004a), but as a pioneer of Sino-Kazakh friendship as the PRC's influence throughout Asia expands. The song *Without the Communist Party There Is No New China* – famously composed in the outskirts of Japanese-occupied Beijing in 1943 (Meng 2018, 162, 268) – is now sung by Uyghur detainees as the PRC commits cultural genocide in their homeland (Harris 2020, 208–9). There is no doubt that music composed during the Second Sino-Japanese War continues to resonate and that its meanings continue to change as it shapes new conflicts.

At the same time, the repertoires explored in this thesis gain new relevance (albeit at a smaller scale). As the last people who experienced the Japanese occupation of Beijing share their memories of wartime singing through blog-posts (Hua 2015), a younger generation of collectors is sharing rare recordings of collaborationist RNG songs on social video platforms (Zuikaku no umiwashi 2020; Tang, Liang and Li 2013). For instance, since the product of the first RNG-NCPC joint song commission in 1941, Jiang Wenye's widely successful *East Asian Nations' March*, was first

uploaded on YouTube in 2020, it has been shared by many different accounts.² Responses have varied from admiration for this rare find to unabashed support for the message of East Asian revival and unification. One comment on the *East Asian Nations' March* even reads: “Enthusiastically celebrating the establishment of the RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership]” (Yadav Singh Khan 2022).³ Responses to the collaborationist *All-Encompassing Love Song* (Tang, Liang and Li 2013), shared without reference to the historical context of its creation, include: “Imagine at the Olympic medal ceremony blasting this song to the world. Make it our national anthem for all the lands across the strait” (Lee 2020). As the PRC is expanding its influence internationally, and claiming to build “a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind [...] benefiting all peoples” (Wang 2022), lyrics of these wartime Pan-Asianist “occupation state” songs seem to hit a nerve. And while songs produced by the PGROC and Xinminhui are still largely confined to libraries and archives, the musical repertoires developed and appropriated by the occupation state in north China may also continue to resonate in new and unexpected ways in the future.

² A complete version was uploaded a few months later by an account called Historical Music Archive (2021), for example.

³ The RCEP is a free trade agreement signed in 2020 between fifteen countries in the Asia-Pacific region (including the PRC) and effective since January 2022.

Appendix 1: Songs Commissioned under the PGROC and RNG, 1937–1945

This list does not include songs composed as film songs. It only includes those songs that were publicly commissioned, written or composed for the occupation state's campaign events. This list cannot claim complete coverage but includes all songs of this nature that I was able to find in north Chinese news outlets and archives. This includes some songs written for the RNG. All songs, with publication reference, copy of the original source, lyric transcription and (if available) score transcription can be found in the TreasonousRepertoires Zotero library at <https://www.zotero.org/groups/4554024/treasonousrepertoires>.

Song Title	Lyricist	Composer	Commission and/or Publication Details	Recording
1938				
<i>Xinmin Song: Xinmin zhi ge</i> 新民之歌	Li Jianxian 李薦 賢	Jiang Wenye	Xinmin News Agency, 3 January 1938; lyrics published 11 November 1938; score published 24 April 1938	recorded in Japan, Jiang Wenye

<i>Collaboration Song: hezuo ge</i> 合作歌	Chen Guofu 陳果 夫	Fu Yanchang 傅 彥長	first published in 1936, recycled February 1938	
<i>Hardworking Farmer's Collaboration Song: Qin nongmin hezuo ge</i> 勤農民合作歌			February 1938, lyrics only	
<i>Xinmin Youth Song: Xinmin qingnian ge</i> 新民 青年歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	14 April 1938	
<i>Yellow Race Youth Song: Huangzu qingnian ge</i> 黃族青年歌			9 June 1938, recycled melody	
<i>Xinminhui Anthem: Xinminhui ge</i> 新民會歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	20 June 1938	
<i>Xinminhui Flag Song: Xinminhui huiqi ge</i> 新 民會[會]旗歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	24 June 1938	
<i>Xinmin Women's Song: Xinmin funü ge</i> 新民 婦女歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	28 June 1938	

<i>Xinmin Love the Homeland Song: Xinmin ai xiang ge</i> 新民愛鄉歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	27 September 1938	
<i>Xinmin Workers' Song: Xinmin laodong ge</i> 新民勞動歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	13 October 1938	
<i>Xinmin Children's Song: Xinmin shaonian ge</i> 新民少年歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	14 October 1938	
<i>Xinmin Girls' Song: Xinmin shaonü ge</i> 新民少女歌	Miao Bin	Jiang Wenye	19 October 1938	
<i>Exterminate the CCP and Vanquish the KMT Song: Jiao Gong mie Dang ge</i> 剿共滅黨歌	Ke Zhenghe		first mentioned 10 March 1938; published 17 June 1938	
1939				

<i>Beijing City Anthem: Beijing shi shige</i> 北京市市歌	Chen Zhonghu 陳仲篋	Jiang Wenye	Xinminhui Beijing City Offices, 19 December 1938; published 20 January 1939	
<i>Xinmin Folk Song: Xinmin minyao</i> 新人民謠	Wang Guozhang 王國章	Iida Nobuo 飯田 信夫	Xinmin News Agency, 7 January 1939; published 15 May 1939	Victor Records, Liang Suxin 梁素馨
<i>East Asia March / Establish a New Order in East Asia March: Dongya jinxingqu / Jianshe Dongya xin zhixu xingjinqu</i> 東亞進行曲 / 建設東亞新秩序進行曲			lyrics published 10 March 1939; score published 2 July 1939	Wen Li
<i>Boye County Anthem: Boye xian xiange</i> 博野縣縣歌			Xinminhui Boye County Offices; published 22 April 1939	

<i>Militarism: Jian jun zhuyi</i> 建軍主義		same melody	12 June 1939	
<i>Sino-Japanese Co-Operation: Zhong-Ri tixie</i> 中日提携				
<i>National Salvation and Raise Asia Song:</i> <i>Jiuguo yu xing Ya</i> 救國興亞歌		Recycled melody: <i>Frère</i> <i>Jacques</i>	17 June 1939	
<i>Song of Dawn: Liming zhi ge</i> 黎明之歌	Lin Huo 林火	Jiang Wenye, Di Ping 迪平	21 June 1939	
<i>Anti-British Song: Pai Ying ge / Fan Ying ge</i> 排英歌 / 反英歌	Chen Guang 陳 光	Lin Xifeng 林西 峰	1 September 1939	
<i>Under the Five-Coloured Flag: Wuse qi zhi xia</i> 五色旗之下			mentioned 24 November 1939	

<i>Asia's Little Angel: Yaxiya de xiao tianshi</i> 亞細亞的小天使	Takahashi Akira 高橋淘汰朗	Abe Takeo 阿部 武雄	1939, published in <i>Xinmin Song Collection</i> in 1941	
<i>Love the Railway Song: Ai lug e</i> 愛路歌			first mentioned as part of Li Mengmei's repertoire in 1939	Li Mengmei
1940				
<i>Police Song: Jingcha ge</i> 警察歌			PGROC Peacekeeping Department; published 5 January 1940	
<i>Raise Asia March: Xing Ya jinxingqu</i> 興亞進行曲	Tang Jiaji 湯家 驥 (賈吉 Jia Ji)	Jiang Wenye	Xinmin Capital Guidance Department and others, 14 January 1940; published 25 November 1940	
1941				
<i>Ode to Master Confucius: Kong sheng zange</i> 孔聖頌贊			15 January 1941	

<i>Xinmin Ode to Confucius: Xinmin Kongzi zange</i> 新民孔子贊歌	Zhou Wensheng 周文生	Narita Fujiki 成 田藤己	<i>Xinmin Song Collection</i> , 1941	
<i>Preserve East Asia Song: Baowei Dongya zhi ge</i> 保衛東亞[之歌]	Gao Tianxi	Ke Zhenge, Yamada Kōsaku	<i>Shanghai Zhonghua ribao, Kabun Ōsaka mainichi, Tōkyō nichichi shinbun</i> , 1 December 1940;	Pathé Records, Bai Guang and Huang Shiping
<i>East Asian Nations' March: Dongya minzu jinxingqu</i> 東亞民族進行曲	Yang Shoudan	Jiang Wenye	published 1 April 1941 in a special issue of the <i>Kabun Ōsaka mainichi</i> , 6 (7)	
<i>Baojia Song: Baojia zhi ge</i> 保甲之歌			3 August 1941, lyrics only	
<i>Ode to the Anniversary of Establishing Sino-Japanese-Manchurian Diplomatic Relations: Zhong-Ri-Man sanguo guojiao chenli zhounian jinian zhuhe ge</i> 中日滿三國國交成立周年紀念祝賀歌			27 November 1941, lyrics only	

<i>Leap Forward Asia: Yuejin Yaxiya</i> 躍進亞細亞			2 December 1941	
<i>National Peking University Anthem: Guoli Beijing daxuexiao xiaoge</i> 國立北京大學校歌	Tang General Supervisor 湯總監督	Lao Zhicheng	December 1941	
<i>Quit Opium Song: Jie yan ge</i> 戒烟歌	Gao Tianxi		1940/1941 part of the <i>Preserve East Asia Song Collection</i>	
<i>Peace Song: Heping ge</i> 和平歌	Xue Feng 薛豐	Gao Tianxi	<i>Preserve East Asia Song Collection</i> , 1941	
<i>A Ray of Peace has Emerged: Heping shuguang toulu le</i> 和平曙光透露了	Gao Tianxi			
<i>Commemorating the Father of the Nation Sun Yatsen's Death Song: Guofu shishi jinian ge</i> 國父逝世紀念歌	Gao Tianxi			

<i>Implement Constitutionalism Song: Shishi</i> <i>xianzheng ge</i> 實施憲政歌	Gao Tianxi		
<i>Commemorate One Week of the Return to the Capital Song: Guofu huandu yi zhou jinian ge</i> 國府還都一週紀念歌	Gao Tianxi		
<i>Commemorate the Day of the Nation: Guoqing jiniange</i> 國慶紀念歌	Gao Tianxi		
<i>I love China: Wo ai Zhonghua</i> 我愛中華	recycled		
<i>Song for the Birthday of the President: Zongli danchen ge</i> 總理誕辰歌	Gao Tianxi	mentioned in biographical note on Gao Tianxi in the <i>Kabun Ōsaka</i>	-
<i>Celebrating New Year Song: Qingzhu yuandan ge</i> 慶祝元旦歌	Gao Tianxi	<i>mainichi</i> , 6 (7): 8.	-

<i>The Nationalist Government Reorganized and Returns to the Capital Song: Guomin zhengfu gaizu huandu ge</i> 國民政府改組還都歌	Gao Tianxi		<i>Preserve East Asia Song Collection,</i> 1941	
1942				
<i>Raise Asia Sports Youth Song: Xing Ya tiyu qingnian ge</i> 興亞體育青年歌	Fang Lian 方廉	Ōnishi Shun'ichi 大西俊一	Raise Asia Association, 28 October 1941; published 1 January 1942	Columbia Records
<i>Greater East Asia General Advance Song: Da Donya zong jinjun zhi ge</i> 大東亞總進軍之歌	Du Yu 杜宇	Jiang Wenye	Xinminhui, NCPC, Radio Station 1 January 1942; lyrics published 22 February 1942; score published 20 May 1942 and 20 June 1942	Victor Records
<i>Collaboration Song: Hezuo zhi ge</i> 合作之歌	C.		March 1942	
<i>Greater East Asia Liberation Song: Da Dongya jiefang ge</i> 大東亞解放歌	Gao Tianxi	Lu Zhongren 陸 仲任	1 May 1942	

<p><i>East Asian Nations' Liberation March:</i> <i>Dongya minzu jiefang jinxingqu</i> 東亞民族解放進行曲</p>	Liu Bangxing		1 May 1942	
<p><i>Pacific March: Taipingyang jinxingqu</i> 太平洋進行曲</p>	Liu Bangxing		Original commissioned by the <i>Daimai tonichi</i> newspaper, lyrics added by Liu, published 1 May 1942	
<p><i>Xinmin Calisthenics Accompaniment: Xinmin ticao banzouqu</i> 新民體操伴奏曲</p>		Nishina Shūichi 仁科秀一	published in the <i>Xinmin Song Collection</i> ; new version announced 19 May 1942	
<p><i>Liberate East Asia: Dongya jiefang</i> 東亞解放</p>	Tian Lai 天籟		Xinminhui General Office, 7 April 1942; winner announced 5 July 1942	
<p><i>Peace Keeping and Strengthening Song:</i> <i>Zhi'an qianghua ge</i> 治安強化歌</p>	Zhu Lin 朱林		North China Radio Association; lyrics published 17 May 1942; live performance 15 June 1942	

<p><i>Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Song: Da Dongya gongrong ge</i> 大東亞共榮歌</p>	<p>Chen Zhifan (Baoyi) 陳之藩 (抱一)</p>	<p>Lao Zhicheng (?)</p>	<p>Beijing City Music Hall Construction Committee (Xinminhui), 6 June 1942; lyrics published 1 September 1942; score published 8 October 1942</p>	
<p><i>New Beijing Melody: Xin Beijing qu</i> 新北京曲</p>	<p>Yang Xiaocang 楊孝蒼</p>			
<p><i>Establishing the Real Gulf of Hebei Song: Jianshe Zhenbo zhi ge</i> 建設真渤之歌</p>			<p>Shandong Province, De County, Zhenbo Special Zone, 31 August 1942</p>	
<p><i>Neighbourhood Organization Song: Linzu ge</i> 鄰組歌</p>	<p>Mei Qing 梅青</p>		<p>Xinminhui Propaganda Office, August 1942; winner announced 1 October 1942</p>	
<p><i>Republic of China Xinmin Youth Group Anthem: Zhonghua minguo xinmin</i></p>	<p>Yu Xijie 喻熙杰 (Head of the</p>	<p>1942: Ke Zhenghe</p>	<p>Ke Zhenghe's version published 06 December 1942; new version announced 28 February 1943</p>	

<i>qingshaoniantuan tuange</i> 中華民國新民青少年團團歌	Xinminhui Affaires Office)	1943: Jiang Wenye		
1943				
<i>War Declaration Song, Canzhan ge</i> 參戰歌		(Frère Jacques)	RNG Propaganda Ministry; 10 January 1943, lyrics only	
<i>Greater East Asia Decisive Battle Song: Da Dongya juezhan ge</i> 大東亞決戰歌			17 January 1943, lyrics only	
<i>Love and Protect the Railway Song: Tielu aihu ge</i> 鐵路愛護歌	Zhang Wenge 張 文閣		North China Transportation Company, October 1942; lyrics published 3 February 1943	
<i>Love the Railway Folk Song: Ailu minyao</i> 愛路 民謠	Liu Chengming 柳承銘			

<p><i>Xinmin Love the Railway Youth Group Song:</i> <i>Xinmin ailu qingshaonian tuange</i> 新民愛路青 少年團歌</p>	Liu Chengming		North China Transportation Company; title published October 1942	
<p><i>Xinmin Love the Railway Womens' Group</i> <i>Song: Xinmin ailu funü tuange</i> 新民愛路婦女 團歌</p>	Liu Chengming			
<p><i>Counteroffensive March: Fan gong jinxingqu</i> 反攻進行曲</p>	Fang Yin 方殷		25 March 1943, lyrics only	
<p><i>Attack and Destroy Britain and the United</i> <i>States: Ji mie Ying Mei</i> 擊滅英美</p>	Zhu Fengping 朱 鳳平		NCPC, Intelligence Bureau, 25 January 1943; lyrics published 8	Pathé Records,
<p><i>North China Increase Production Song:</i> <i>Huabei zengchan ge</i> 華北增產歌</p>	Ding Yao 丁曜		March 1943; decision on score announced 27 March 1943	Huang Shiping

<i>Raising the National Flag: Guoqi shengyang</i> 國旗升陽			Commissioned for children by the North China Radio Association and Victor Records, 9 May 1943	
<i>Summer Holliday: Shujia 暑假</i>				
<i>New Citizens' Movement Song: Xin Guomin yundong ge 新國民運動歌</i>	Chen Zhifan (Baoyi)		Xinminhui, June 1943; published 20 October 1943	
<i>Beautify Life Song: Shenghuo meihua zhi ge 生活美化之歌</i>			mentioned in the <i>Xinminbao</i> , 21 August 1943	
1944				
<i>Greater East Asia Youth Song: Da Dongya qingshaonian ge 大東亞青少年歌</i>			Beijing Youth Group, 15 January 1944	
<i>Greater East Asia Victory Song: Da Dongya shengli zhi ge 大東亞勝利之歌</i>	Li Hongzhu 李鴻 翥	Ke Zhenghe	North China News Association, 29 December 1943; lyrics published 29 March 1944	

<i>Greater East Asia Song: Da Dongya ge</i> 大東亞歌	Lei Sheng 雷聲	Lei Zhenbang	North China Writers Association, Intelligence Bureau, <i>Wudebao</i> , <i>Huabei xinbao</i> ; published 18 August 1944	Pathé Records, Li Xianglan and Huang Shiping (?)
<i>Sino-Japanese Alliance Song: Zhong-Ri tongmeng ge</i> 中日同盟歌	Guo Qingping 郭青萍	Lei Zhenbang		
<i>Post Song: You ge</i> 郵歌			BMA file, August 1944	
1945				
<i>Beijing City Anthem: Beijing shi shige</i> 北京市市歌			Beijing City, Xinminhui, 16 July 1944; published 24 February 1945	
<i>China Declares War Song: Zhongguo canzhan ge</i> 中國參戰歌	Li Zhonglin 李中霖		North China Transportation Company, October 1944; lyrics published 14 February 1945	

Appendix 2: Concert Programme, 12 June 1943

Concert for the “Attack and Destroy Britain and the US for/to (As)Certain Victory Movement Week”, 12 June 1943 (*Xinminbao* 1943h; *Shibao* 1943g) (see figure 19)

1. The North China Radio Choir, Takarai Shin'ichi (conductor)
 - a. *Ave Verum Corpus* (Wolfgang A. Mozart)
 - b. *Spring* (*Haru* 春, 1937) (Gō Taijirō)
 - c. *My Home* (*Watashi no uchi* 我的家) (Yamada Kōsaku)
 - d. “Hallelujah” chorus from *Messiah* (Georg F. Handel)
2. Guan Zhongxian 關仲賢 (violin), Lao Zhicheng (piano)
 - a. *Violin Concerto in A Major*, first movement (Wolfgang A. Mozart)
3. Ma Zeting 馬澤庭 (voice), Lao Zhicheng (piano)
 - a. *Du bist die Ruh* (Franz Schubert)
 - b. Aria from *Freischütz* (Carl Maria von Weber)
4. Tanaka Toshio (piano)
 - a. *Liebestraum* (Franz Liszt)
 - b. *Tarantella* (Stephen Heller)

Interval

5. Wang Qifang (voice), Lao Zhicheng (piano)
 - a. “Spanish Dance”, possibly from *La Vida Breve* (Manuel de Falla)
 - b. *Un viejo amor* (Alfonso E. Oteo)
 - c. *Listening to the Flute on a Spring Night in Luoyang* (*Chunye Luoyang wen di* 春夜洛城闻笛, 1943) (Lao Zhicheng)
 - d. *Spring Dawn* (Lao Zhicheng)
6. Jiang Fengzhi (*erhu*)
 - a. *March Toward Brightness* (Liu Tianhua)
7. Suzuki Fumiko (voice), Tanaka Toshio (piano)
 - a. *Mother’s Darling* (*Haha no se wa* 母の背は, 1940) (Saeki Jijo 佐伯自助)
 - b. *Home of the Heart* (*Kokoro no furusato* 心のふるさと, 1936) (Eguchi Yoshi)
 - c. “Ritorna vincitor” from *Aida* (Giuseppe Verdi)
8. North China Transportation Company Brass Band, Yamaguchi Hōsaku 山口豊作 (conductor)
 - a. *The Power of the Air Force* (*Kūgun no iryoku* 空軍の威力, 1937) (Eguchi Yoshi)
 - b. *Bomber* (*Bakugeki ki* 爆撃機) (Eguchi Yoshi)
 - c. *Victorious Army Song* (*Senshō gunka* 戦勝軍歌) (Tsuji Ichitarō)
 - d. *Attack* (*Kōgeki* 攻撃) (Japanese Imperial Army Band)

GLOSSARY

PERSONAL NAMES

Andō Kisaburō 安藤紀三朗 (1879–1954)

Bai Guang 白光 (1919–1999)

Bao Mingshan 鮑明珊 (1914–?)

Cao Huoxing 曹火星 (1924–1999)

Chen Gexin 陳歌辛 (1914–1961)

Chen Ruyi 陳汝翼

Chi Yuanyuan 池元元 (1920–?)

Eguchi Yoshi 江口夜詩 (1903–1978)

Fan Youshi 樊友實

Flora Wang, Wang Fusheng 王復生

Fukui Fumihiko 福井文彦 (1909–1976)

Gao Tianxi 高天栖

Gō Taijirō 吳泰次郎 (1907–1971)

Gong Qiuxia 龔秋霞 (1918–2004)

Hashimoto Kunihiko 橋本國彦 (1904–1949)

Hayakawa Saburo 早川三郎 (1888–1973)

He Lüting 賀綠汀 (1903–1999)

Huang Shiping 黃世平

Huang Zi 黃自 (1904–1938)

Imazawa Fukiko 今沢ふきこ

Inoue Tadashini 井上直二

Jiang Chaozong 江朝宗 (1861–1943)

Jiang Fengzhi 蔣風之 (1908–1986)

Jiang Wenye 江文也 (1910–1983), born: Jiang Wenbin 江文彬, also: Chiang

Wenyeh, Kō Bunya, Bunya Koh

Jin Shoushen 金受申 (1906–1968)

Kawakita Nagamasa 川喜多長政 (1903–1981)

Ke Zhenghe 柯政和 (1889–1979), born: Ke Dingchou 柯丁丑

Kita Seiichi 喜多誠一 (1886–1947)

Koga Masao 故賀政男 (1904–1978)

Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1899–1983)

Koyama Eizō 小山榮三 (1899–1983)

Kupka, Piotr (1879–195?), also: Kupuke 苦普克

Lang Jingshan 郎静山 (1892–1995)

Lang Yuxiu 郎毓秀 (1918–2012)

Lao Zhicheng 老志誠 (1910–2006)

Lei Zhenbang 雷振邦 (1916–1997)

Li Bai 李白 (701–762)

Li Baochen 李抱枕 (1907–1979)

Li Dazhao 李大釗 (1889–1927)

Li Enke 李恩科 (1894–1950)

Li Jinguang 黎錦光 (1907–1993), also: Jin Yugu 金玉谷

Li Jinhui 黎錦暉 (1891–1961)

Li Mengmei 李夢梅

Li Weining 李惟宁 (1910–1984)

Li Xianglan 李香蘭 (1920–2014), also: Ri Kōran, Yamaguchi Yoshiko 山口淑子,

Shirley Yamaguchi

Li Yiming 李一鳴

Liang Leyin 梁樂音 (1910–1989), also: Lok-Yam Leung

Liu Bangxing 劉邦興

Liu Tianhua 劉天華 (1895–1932)

Lü Ji 呂驥 (1909–2002)

Lü Peisheng 呂培生

Luo Mingyou 羅明佑 (1900–1967)

Luo Yin 羅隱 (833–919)

Ma Sicong 馬思聰 (1912–1987)

Makino Masahiro マキノ 雅弘 (1908–1993), also: Makino Masatada 牧野正唯

Mao Aili 茅愛立 (1920–2019)

Matsuoka Yōsuke 松岡洋右 (1880–1946)

Meng Haoran 孟浩然 (689–740)

Miao Bin 繆斌 (1899–1946)

Nie Er 聶耳 (1912–1935)

Nobutoki Kiyoshi 信時潔 (1887–1965)

Ozawa Kaisaku 小澤开策

Pu Yi 溥儀 (1906–1967), also: Aisin Gioro Puyi

Qi Xieyuan 齊燮元 (1885–1946)

Ren Guang 任光 (1900–1941)

Satō Hachirō サトウ ハテロー (1903–1973)

Satō Hideo 佐藤秀朗 (1925–?)

Setoguchi Tōkichi 瀬戸口藤吉 (1868–1941)

Shimazaki Tōson 島崎藤村 (1872–1943)

Song Jie 宋傑 (1893–?)

Song Zheyuan 宋哲元 (1885–1940)

Su Qing 蘇青 (1914–1982)

Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), also: Sun Wen 孫文, Sun Yixian 孫逸仙

Suzuki Fumiko 鈴木富美子

Suzuki Shigeyoshi 鈴木重吉 (1900–1976)

Takamine Mieko 高峯三枝子 (1918–1990)

Takarai Shin'ichi 寶井真一

Tanaka Toshio 田中利夫

Tang Erhe 湯爾和 (1878–1940)

Teresa Teng (1953–1995), also: Deng Lijun 鄧麗君

Tōhō Miyata 東方宮田 (1898–1986)

Tsuji Hisako 辻久子 (1926–2021)

Tsujii Ichitarō 辻井市太郎 (1910–1986)

Wang Changling 王昌齡 (ca. 698–757)

Wang Dunfang 王鈍方

Wang Jialu 汪葭露

Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883–1944), born: Wang Zhaoming 汪兆銘

Wang Kemin 王克敏 (1876–1945)

Wang Qifang 王杞芳

Wang Qingxun 王慶勛 (1906–?)

Wang Tizhi 王悌之

Wang Yintai 王荫泰 (1886–1961)

Wang Yitang 王揖唐 (1878–1948)

Wen Li 文麗

Wu Suqiu 吳素秋 (1922–2016)

Xian Xinghai 冼星海 (1905–1945)

Xiao Youmei 蕭友梅 (1884–1940)

Xu Guanghan 徐光漢

Yamada Kōsaku 山田耕筰 (1886–1965)

Yang Rondong 楊榮東 (1902–1991)

Yang Shoudan 楊壽聃

Yu Jinhe 余晉穌 (1887–?)

Yu Xijie 喻熙杰

Zhang Ailing 張愛玲 (1920–1995), also: Eileen Chang

Zhang Weizhi 張維之

Zhang Xiaohu 張肖虎 (1914–1997)

Zhang Xiushan 張秀山

Zhang Yanqing 張燕卿 (1898–1951)

Zhao Niankui 趙年魁

Zheng Rugang 鄭如崗

Zhou Dawen 周大文 (1895–1971)

Zhou Fohai 周佛海 (1897–1948)

Zhou Xuan 周璇 (1918–1957)

Zhu Chen 朱琛 (1879–1943)

INSTITUTIONS, PLACES

Altar of Soil and Grain: Shejitan 社稷壇

Amateur Music Society: Ai meiyue she 愛美樂社

Amateur String Orchestra: Yeyu guanxian yuedui 業餘管弦樂隊

Anfu Clique: Anfu xi 安福系, also: Anhui Clique (Wan xi junfa 皖系軍閥)

Asbury Church Oratorio Choir: Yasilitang shengyuetuan 亞斯立堂聖樂團

Asbury Church: Yasilitang 亞斯立堂

Beijing [Brass] Band Association: Beijing tebieshi yuedui xiehui 北京特別市樂隊
協會

Beijing Branch of the China Harmonica Society: Zhonghua kouqinhui Beijing fenhui
中華口琴會北京分會

Beijing Choral Music Association: Beijing hechang yinyue xiehui 北京合唱音樂協
會

Beijing City Music Hall: Beijing shi yinyuetang 北京市音樂堂, also: Beijing Music
Hall (Beijing yinyuetang 北京音樂堂)

Beijing City Police Band: Beijing shi jingcha yuedui 北京市警察樂隊

Beijing Committee for Public Safety: Beijing difang zhi'an weichihui 北京地方治安
維持會

Beijing Hotel: Beijing fandian 北京飯店, also: Grand Hôtel de Pékin

Beijing Japanese YMCA Choir: Beijing Riben jidujiao qingnianhui hechangtuan 北京日本基督教青年會合唱團

Beijing Joint Oratorio Choir: Beijing lianhe shengyue hechangtuan 北京聯合聖樂合唱團

Beijing Mixed Choir: Beijing hunsheng hechangtuan 北京混聲合唱團

Beijing Municipal Archive: Beijing dang'anguan 北京檔案館

Beijing Music Culture Association (BMCA): Beijing yinyue wenhua xiehui 北京音樂文化協會

Beijing Shenghua Choir: Beijing shenghua hechangtuan 北京聲華合唱團

Beijing Symphony Orchestra: Beijing jiaoxiang yuetuan 北京交響樂團, also:

International Symphony Orchestra (Guoji jiaoxiang yuetuan 國際交響樂團),

Eight Nation's Alliance Orchestra (Bago lianjun yuedui 八國聯軍樂隊)

Beijing Symphony String Orchestra: Beijing xinheni guanxian yuetuan 北京新荷尼管絃樂團

Beiping Political Affairs Committee: Beiping zhengwu zhengli weiyuanhui 北平政務整理委員會

Bridgeman Girls' School: Beiman nüxiao 貝滿女校

Central China Expeditionary Army: Naka Shina hakengun 中支那派遣軍

Central Conservatory of Music: Zhongyang yinyue xueyuan 中央音樂學院

Central Park: Zhongyang gongyuan 中央公園, also: Zhongshan Park (Zhongshan gongyuan 中山公園), Grain Park (Jiyuan 稷園)

Central Radio: Zhongyang guangbotai 中央廣播臺

Chang'an Grand Theatre: Chang'an da xiuyan 長安大戲院

China Christian Church, also: London Missionary Society Church (Lundunhui mishi jiaotang 倫敦會米市教堂)

China Christian Youth Association (YMCA): Zhonghua jidujiao qingnianhui 中華基督教青年會

China Garrison Army: Zhina zhutunjun / Shina chūtongun 支那駐屯軍

China Harmonica Society: Zhonghua kouqinhui 中華口琴會

China Life and Culture Association: Zhongguo shenghuo wenhua xiehui 中國生活文化協會

China Music Society: Zhonghua yueshe 中華樂社

China New Culture Construction Association: Zhongguo xin wenhua jianshe xiehui 中國新文化建設協會

China Records: Guoyue changpian gongsi 國樂唱片公司, also: Corona

China Symphony Orchestra: Zhonghua jiaoxiang yuetuan 中華交響樂團

China United Productions: Zhonghua lianhe zhipian gufen gongsi 中華聯合製片股份有限公司

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Zhongguo gongchandang 中國共產黨

Chinese Music Reform Society: Guoyue gaijin she 國樂改進社

Chinese Musical Education Promotion Society: Zhongguo jiaoyu yinyue cujinhui 中國教育音樂促進會

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT): Zhongguo guomindang 中國國民黨, also:
Kuomintang

Chinese Opera Learned Society: Guoju xuehui 國劇學會

Chinese Opera Professionals' Branch Society: Guoju zhiye fenhui 國劇職業分會

Concordia Society: Xiehehui / Kyōwakai 協和會

Daminhui 大民會

Dengshikou Congregational Church: Gonglihui Dengshikou jiaotang 公理會燈市口
教堂

Dengshikou Mission Oratorio Choir: Dengshikou jiaohui shengyuetuan 燈市口教會
聖樂團

East Asia Development Board Culture Department: Kōain bunkabu 興亞院文化部

East Asia Development Board North China Liaison Offices: Xing Ya yuan huabei
lianluobu / Kōain kahoku renrakubu 興亞院華北聯絡部

East Asia Development Board: Kōain 興亞院, also: China Affairs Board

Federal Reserve Bank of China: Zhongguo lianhe zhunbei yinhang 中國聯合準備銀
行

Folk Music Research Society: Zhongguo minjian yinyue yanjiuhui 中國民間音樂研究會

Forbidden City: Zijingcheng 紫荊城

Furen University: Furen daxue 輔仁大學

Greater East Asia Ministry: Daitōashō 大東亞省

Ha'erbin Symphony Orchestra: Ha'erbin jiaoxiang yuetuan 哈爾濱交響樂團

Hall of Supreme Harmony: Taihedian 太和殿

Harmonica Society, see: Beijing Branch of the China Harmonica Society

Hebei-Chahar Political Council: Ji-Cha zhengwu weiyuanhui 冀察政務委員會

Huarentang 懷仁堂

Huiwen School: Huiwen xuexiao 匯文學校

Intelligence Bureau: Qingbaoju 情報局

Japanese Beijing Children's Broadcasting Choir: Riben Beijing ertong fangsong

hechangtuan / Nihon Pekin jidō hōsō gasshōdan 日本北京兒童放送合唱團

Japanese Embassy in Beijing: Riben zhu Beijing lingshiguan / Nihon chū Pekin

ryōjikan 日本駐北京領事館

Japanese Imperial Army Band: Lujun junyuedui / Rikugun gungakutai 陸軍軍樂隊

Jefferson Academy: Luhe zhongxue 潞河中學

Joint YMCA Choir: Qingnianhui lianhe shengyue hechangtuan 青年會聯合聲樂合唱團

Kunqu Research Society: Kunqu yanjiuhui 昆曲研究會

Kwantung Army: Guandong jun / Kantōgun 關東軍

Lu Xun Arts Academy: Lu Xun yishu xueyuan 魯迅藝術學院

Manchukuo Film Association Corporation: Kabushiki kaisha Manshū eiga kyōkai 株式會社滿洲映畫協會, also: Man'ei 滿映

Manchukuo: Manzhouguo / Manshūkoku 滿洲國

Musashino Academia Musicae: Musashino Ongaku Gakuin 武蔵野音樂學院

Music Research Society: Yinyue yanjiuhui 音樂研究會

Muzhen Girls' School: Muzhen nūxiao 慕貞女校

National Beijing Normal College Music Institute: Guoli Beijing shifan xueyuan yinyuexi 國立北京師範學院音樂系

National Beijing Women's Normal College Music Institute: Guoli Beijing nūzi shifan xueyuan yinyuexi 國立北京女子師範學院音樂系

National Normal University Music Study Group: Guoli shifan daxue yinyue xuehui 國立師範大學音樂學會

North China Area Army (NCAA): Kita Shina hōmengun 北支那方面軍

North China Area Army Military Band (NCAA Military Band): Huabei lujun junyuedui / Kahoku rikugun gungakutai 華北陸軍軍樂隊

North China Broadcasting Association: Huabei guangbo xiehui 華北廣播協會

North China Development Company: Kita Shina kaiwatsu kabushiki kaisha 北支那開發株式會社, also: China Development Company

North China Film Company: Huabei dianying youxian gongsi 華北電影有限公司

North China Film Ltd: Huabei dianying gongsi 華北電影公司

North China News Association: Huabei xinwen xiehui 華北新聞協會

North China Performing Arts Association: Huabei yanyi xiehui 華北演藝協會

North China Political Council (NCPC): Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui 華北政務委員會

North China Radio Associations' Children's Choir: Huabei guangbo xiehui ertong hechangtuan 華北廣播協會兒童合唱團

North China Radio Choir: Huabei guangbo hechangtuan 華北廣播合唱團

North China Transportation Company Brass Band: Huabei yunshu chuizou yuetuan 華北運輸吹奏樂團

North China Transportation Company: Kahoku kōtsū kabushiki kaisha 華北交通株式會社, also: North China Railway (Huabei yunshu 華北運輸)

North China Writers Association: Huabei zuojia xiehui 華北作家協會

Opium Prohibition Bureau: Yopian jinzhi ju 鴉片禁止局

Pathé Records: Baidai changpian 白代唱片

Peking Opera Research Society: Jingju yanjiuhui 京劇研究會

Peking Union Medical College: Zhongguo xiehe yiyuan 中國協和醫院

Peking University Institute of Music: Beijing daxue yinyue chuanxisuo 北京大學音樂傳習所

Peking University: Beijing daxue 北京大學

Private Jinhua Art School: Sili jinhua meishu xueyuan 私立京華美術學院, also:
Jinhua Art Vocational School (Jinhua meishu zhuanke xuexiao 京華美術專科學校)

Propaganda League: Xuanchuan lianmeng 宣傳聯盟

Provisional Government of the Republic of China (PGROC): Zhonghua minguo
linshi zhengfu 中華民國臨時政府

Qianmen 前門

Raise Asia Film Institute: Xing Ya yingpian zhizaosuo 興亞影片製作所

Raise Asian Culture Association: Xing Ya wenhua xiehui 興亞文化協會

Reformed Government of the Republic of China (RGROC), Zhonghua minguo
weixin zhengfu 中華民國維新政府

Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China (RNG), Zhonghua
minguo guomin zhengfu 中華民國國民政府, also: Wang Jingwei regime

Shanghai Conservatory: Shanghai yinyue xueyuan 上海音樂學院

Shanghai Municipal Orchestra: Shanghai gongbujue yuedui 上海工部局樂隊

Shōwa Research Association: Shōwa kenkyūkai 昭和研究所

Shuangye Choir: Shuangye hechangtuan 雙葉合唱團

Special Service: Tewu jiguan / Tokumu kikan 特務機關, also: Secret Service

Tianjin Filipino String Orchestra: Tianjin Feilübin guanxian yuetuan 天津菲律賓管
弦樂團

Tōhō Ltd: Tōhō kabushiki kaisha 東寶株式會社

Victor Records: Shengli changpian 勝利唱片

Western Music Society: Xiyue she 西樂社

Xinmin College: Xinmin xueyuan 新民學院

Xinmin Film Association: Xinmin yinghua xiehui 新民映畫協會

Xinmin Hall: Xinmintang 新民堂, also: Zhongshantang 中山堂

Xinmin Music Press: Xinmin yinyue shuju 新民音樂書局

Xinminhui Capital Guidance Department: Xinminhui shoudu zhidaobu 新民會首都
指導部

Xinminhui Capital Guidance Department's [Brass] Band Branch Society: Xinminhui
shoudu zhidaobu yuedui fenhui 新民會首都指導部樂隊分會

Xinminhui General Affairs Department: Xinminhui zongwubu 新民會總務部

Xinminhui Office for Social Affairs: Xinminhui shehuike 新民會社會科

Xinminhui Organization Office: Xinminhui zuzhike 新民會組織科

Xinminhui Propaganda Office: Xinminhui xuanchuanke 新民會宣傳科

Xinminhui Re-education Department: Xinminhui jiaohuabu 新民會教化部

Xinminhui Welfare Department: Xinminhui houshengbu 新民會厚生部

Xinminhui 新民會, also: New People's Association, People's Renovation Society

Xinxin Grand Theatre: Xinxin da xiyuan 新新大戲院, also: Xinxin Theatre

Yanjing Film Company: Yanjing yingpian gongsi 燕京影片公司

Yanjing University: Yanjing daxue 燕京大學

Yongnian County: Yongnian xian 永年縣

Yuying School: Yuying xuexiao 育英學校

Zhenguang Film Theatre: Zhenguang dianyingyuan 真光電影院

Zhili Clique: Zhili xi junfa 直隸系軍閥

Zhongnanhai 中南海

SONGS, FILMS, PUBLICATIONS

16 Bagatelles (1935–1936): *Jūroku no Bagateru* 16 のバガテル

All-Encompassing Love (1942): *Bo'ai* 博愛

All-Encompassing Love Song (1942): *Bo'ai ge* 博愛歌

Anti-Communist March (1943): *Fan gong jinxingqu* 反攻進行曲

Asahi shinbun 朝日新聞 (1879–today)

Beijing Zhengyangmen (1936): 北京正陽門

Candy Peddling Song (1943): *Mai tang ge* 賣糖歌

Children of Troubled Times (1935): *Fengyun ernü* 風雲兒女, also: *A Poem of the Great Wall*

Children's Verse (1943): *Shaonian hang* 少年行

China Harmonica World (1935–1941): *Zhonghua kouqinjie* 中華口琴界

China Nights (1940): *Shina no yoru* 支那の夜

Collection of Famous Chinese Songs (1939): *Zhongguo minggeji* 中國名歌集

Commentary on the Shangshu: Shangshu da zhuan 尚書大傳

Darling, I Love You (1929): *Meimei, wo ai ni* 妹妹我愛你

Drizzle (1927): *Mao mao yu* 毛毛雨

Eternity (1943): *Wan shi liu fang* 萬世流芳

Fairy Ninbo (1943): *Lingbo xianzi* 凌波仙子

Fishermen's Delight (1939): *Yu weng le* 漁翁樂

Formosan Dance (1934): *Taiwan wuqu* 台灣舞曲

Great Leaning: Daxue 大學

Guomin zazhi 國民雜誌 (1941–1944)

Huabei xinbao 華北新報 (1944–1945)

Huabei yinghua 華北映畫 (1941–1945)

In the Forbidden City (1938): *Zijingcheng xia* 紫禁城下

Kabun Ōsaka mainichi 華文大阪每日 (1938–1945), also: *Huawen Daban meiri*

Lady Meng Jiang: Meng Jiang nü 孟姜女

Lama Temple (1938): *Zai Lama miao* 在喇嘛廟

Liyan huakan 立言畫刊 (1938–1945)

Lü shi chunqiu 呂氏春秋

March of the Volunteers (1935): *Yiyongjun jinxingqu* 義勇軍進行曲

March Toward Brightness (1931): *Guangming xing* 光明行

Music Magazine (1927–1934): *Yinyue zazhi* 音樂雜誌

Night Scene at the Alter of Land and Grain (1938): *Ziye, zai Shejitan shang* 子夜，

在社稷壇上

Ode to Beijing (1939?): *Beijing zange* 北京贊歌

Patriotic March (1940): *Aikoku kōshinkyoku* 愛國行進曲

Peach and Plum Blooming in Spring (1943): *Taoli zheng chun* 桃李爭春

Phoenix Flies (1944): *Fenghuang yu fei* 鳳凰于飛

Picking Lotus Flower (1943): *Cai lian qu* 採蓮曲

Pigeon Flutes Resounding in the Blue Sky (1943): *Bikong zhong mingxiang de gedi*

碧空中鳴響的鴿笛

Quit Opium Song (1943): *Jie yan ge* 戒烟歌

Record of Music: Yueji 樂記

Red Beans Grow in the Southern Lands (1944): *Hongdou sheng nanguo* 紅豆生南

國, also: *Yearning*

Road to Peace in the Orient (1938): *Dongyang heping zhi dao* 東洋和平之道 / *Tōyō*

heiwa no michi 東洋平和の道

Sakura Sakura さくら さくら

Self Consolation: Zi qian 自遣

Shanghai Zhonghua Ribao 上海中華日報 (1928–1945)

Shibao 實報 (1928–1944)

Shijie ribao 世界日報 (1924–1937)

Shijie wanbao 世界晚報 (1924–1937)

Shoudu huabao 首都畫報 (1938–1939)

Sketches of the Old Capital (1939): *Gu du soumiao* 故都素描

Song for the Myth of the Century (1942): *Seiki no shinwa ni yoru shōka* 世紀の神話

による頌歌

Song of Four Seasons (1937): *Siji ge* 四季歌

Song of the Fishermen (1934): *Yu guang qu* 漁光曲

Song to the Auspicious Cloud (1921): *Qing yun ge* 卿云歌

Spring Dawn (1943): *Chun xiao* 春曉

Street Angels (1937): *Malu tianshi* 馬路天使

Symphonia Universalis: Yi yu tongguang 一字同光

The Gate of Heavenly Peace (1938): *Tian'anmen* 天安門

The Moon over the Ruined Castle (1901): *Kōjō no tsuki* 荒城の月

The Music of the Confucian Temple (1940): *Kongmiao dacheng yuezhang* 孔廟大成

樂章

The Opium War (1943): *Ahen sensō* 阿片戰爭

The Sheperd Su Wu: Su Wu muyang 蘇武牧羊

The Wandering Songstress (1937): *Tianya genü* 天涯歌女

Three Character Classic: San zi jing 三字经

Three Flowers (1943): *San duo hua* 三朵花, also: *Test of Love*

Three Girls of Asian Development (1940): *Xing Ya san ren niang* 興亞三人娘

Tōa shinpō 東亞新報 (1939–1945)

Tōkyō nichī nichī shinbun 東京日日新聞 (1872–1943)

Umi Yukaba (1937): 海行かば

Warship March (1896): *Gunkan kōshinkyoku* 軍艦行進曲

When Will You Return? (1937): *Heri jun zai lai* 何日君再來

Without the Communist Party There Is No New China (1943): *Mei you*

Gongchandang jiu mei you xin Zhongguo 沒有共產黨就沒有新中國

Xinmin huibao 新民會報 (1938–1945)

Xinminbao banyuekan 新民報半月刊 (1939–1944)

Xinminbao wankan 新民報晚刊 (1938–1941)

Xinminbao 新民報 (1938–1944)

Xinyue chao 新樂潮 (1927–1929)

Yearning (1944): *Jing ye si* 靜夜思

EVENTS, MOVEMENTS, IDEOLOGIES, OTHER TERMS

aesthetic education: *meiyu* 美育

alleyways: *hutong* 胡同

Anti-Japanese National Salvation Singing Movement (ca. 1935–1937): *Kang-Ri*

jiuwang geyong yundong 抗日救亡歌詠運動

Anti-Japanese War of Resistance (1931/1937–1945): *Kang-Ri zhanzheng* 抗日戰爭

Asianism: *Yazhou zhuyi* 亞洲主義 / *Ajia shugi* アジア主義, also: *Yaxiya zhuyi* 亞細

亞主義, Pan-Asianism: *Fan Ya zhuyi*, 泛亞主意

associated member: *xiezan huiyuan* 協贊會員

Attack and Destroy Britain and the US to/for (As)Certain Victory Movement Week

(1943): *Ji mie Ying Mei bi sheng yundong zhou* 擊滅英美必勝運動周

baojia system: *baojia zhidu* 保甲制度

branch society: *fenhui* 分會

Chinese musical drama: *xiqu* 戲曲

Chinese nation/race: *Zhongguo minzu* 中國民族

common, everyday: *tongsu* 通俗

crosstalk: *xiangsheng* 相聲

decadent sounds: *mimi zhi yin* 靡靡之音

Declaration of War Commemoration Day: *Canzhan jinian ri* 參戰紀念日

despotic rule: *badao / hadō* 霸道

enslavement education: *nuhua jiaoyu* 奴化教育

erhu 二胡, also: Chinese two-stringed fiddle

Exterminate the CCP and Vanquish the KMT Movement Week (1938): *Jiao Gong*

mie Dang yundong zhou 剿共滅黨運動周

external groups: *wai wei tuanti* 外圍團體

fabi 法幣 (currency)

fallen areas: *lunxianqu* 淪陷區

folk song: *minge* 民歌

fortune: *jiaoxing* 僥倖

full member: *zheng huiyuan* 正會員

gateway: *paifang* 牌坊

gongche notation: *gongche pu* 工尺譜

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS): *Da Dongya gongrongquan /*

Daitōa kyōeiken 大東亞共榮圈

hinterland: *houfang* 後方

Imperial Way: *huangdao / kōdō* 皇道

increase production: *zengchan* 增產

intellectual education: *zhiyu* 智育

Japanese War of Aggression against China (1931/1937–1945): *Riben qin Hua*

zhanzheng 日本侵華戰爭

Kingly Way: *wangdao / odō* 王道

leisurely summer events: *xiao xia dahui* 消夏大會

Marco Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937), also: Lugou Bridge Incident (*Lugouqiao*

shibian 盧溝橋事變), July Seventh Incident (*Qi qi shibian* 七七事變)

mass education: *qunyu* 群育

mass: *qunti* 群体

mass: *qunzhong* 群众

moral education: *deyu* 德育

motivational work: *jingshen gongzuo* 精神工作

national folk song: *guomin ge / kokuminka* 國民歌

national policy film: *kokusaku eiga* 國策映畫

national salvation: *jiuguo* 救國

New Citizens' Movement (1942–1943): *Xin guomin yundong* 新國民運動

New Culture Movement (1910s-1920s): *Xin wenhua yundong* 新文化運動

new music: *xin yinyue* 新音樂

New Order: *xin zhixu* 新秩序

old operatic dramas: *guju* 古劇

pacification: *zhi'an* 治安

patriotic song: *aiguo ge* / *aikokuka* 愛國歌

Peace Keeping and Strengthening Movements (1941–1942): *Zhi'an qianghua yundong* 治安強化運動

Peking opera: *jingju* 京劇

people that share one's mode/sound: *tongdiao* 同調

phonetic script: *yunwen* 韻文

physical education: *tiyu* 體育

pingju (opera) 評劇

popular song: *liuxing gequ* 流行歌曲 / *ryūkōka* 流行歌

Preserve East Asia Commemoration Day: *Baowei Dongya jinian ri* 保衛東亞紀念日

preserve East Asia: *baowei Dongya* 保衛東亞

raise Asia: *xing Ya* / *kōa* 興亞

Raise Asia Movement Weeks: *Xing Ya yundong zhou* 興亞運動周

relief / comfort: *wei'an* 慰安

resounding together: *gongming* 共鳴

return to the capital: *huandu* 還都

rhotacization: *erhua yin* 兒化音

ritsu-scale: *ritsu onkai* 律音階

ryo-scale: ryo onkai 呂音階

school song: *xuetang ge* 學堂歌

self-cultivation: *xiushen* 修身

sheng 笙, also: mouth organ

shidaiqu 時代曲

Sino-Japanese amity: *Zhong-Ri qinshan* 中日親善, *Ri-Hua qinshan* 日華親善

Three People's Principles: *sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義

topical character: *shidaixing* 時代性

topical: *shidaihua* 時代化

traitor (to the Han Chinese people): *hanjian* 漢奸

true friend: *zhiyin* 知音

will and spirit: *qigai* 氣概

winding: *weiwan* 委婉

Xinmin-ism: xinmin zhuyi 新民主義

yuan datou 袁大頭 (currency)

yu-mode: yu diao 羽調

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Xinmin huibao 1 (April): 2.
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Xinmin huibao 2 (April): 1.
- . 1938c. ‘Quanshi xuesheng xinmin hechang dahui’ 全市學生新民合唱大會
[Citywide Student Xinmin Great Choral Singing Event]. *Shoudu huabao* 3
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大會的意義和感想 [Meaning and Experience of the Raise Asia Movement
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Xinminbao banyuekan 1 (3): 30.
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發表 [‘Preserve East Asia’ Song Release]. *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* 6 (7): 2.

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- . 1941d. ‘Geci pingxuan jue ding jingguo’ 歌詞評選決定經過 [Song Lyrics Selection Process]. *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* 6 (7): 6.
- . 1941e. ‘Pucheng xuanlü de liang wei zuoqujia’ 譜成旋律的兩位作曲家 [The Two Composers Who Wrote the Melodies]. *Kabun Ōsaka mainichi* 6 (7): 8.
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- . 1938h. ‘Ming zhiqujia Jiang Wenye Beijing shifan xueyuan nipin qing wei jiangshi’ 名製曲家江文也北京師範學院擬聘請為講師 [Renowned Composer Jiang Wenye Appointed as Lecturer at Beijing Normal College], 25 April 1938.
- . 1938i. ‘Mingge yanzou’ 名歌演奏 [Famous Song Performance], 25 April 1938.
- . 1938j. ‘Xinmin zhi ge fajiang yanzou dahui’ 新民之歌發獎演奏大會 [Xinmin Song Award Performance], 25 April 1938.
- . 1938k. ‘Xinmin zhi ge yanzou dahui’ 新民之歌演奏大會 [Xinmin Song Performance], 27 April 1938.
- . 1938l. ‘Xinmin zhi ge yanzou dahui (er)’ 新民之歌演奏大會（二） [Xinmin Song Performance (2)], 28 April 1938.
- . 1938m. ‘Zhong-Ri yingtian hezuo di yi bu ju pian Dongya heping zhi lu’ 中日影壇合作第一步鉅片 東亞和平之路 [First Sino-Japanese Film Co-Operation Road to Peace in the Orient], 3 May 1938.
- . 1938n. ‘Dongya heping zhi lu zhuyan mingxing dengtai changge’ 東亞和平之路主演明星登臺唱歌 [Road to Peace in the Orient Main Stars Climb the Stage to Sing], 5 May 1938.
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- . 1938p. “‘Xinmin zhi ge’ zhongyue qupu’ 「新民之歌」中樂曲譜 [‘Xinmin Song’ Chinese Musical Score], 13 May 1938.
- . 1938q. ‘Xinmin qingnian yunweihui zhuban xinmin hechang dahui’ 新民青年運委會主辦新民合唱大會 [Xinmin Youth Movement Department Organizes Xinmin Choral Singing Event], 14 May 1938.
- . 1938r. ‘Xinmin qingnian ge gepu’ 新民青年歌歌譜 [Xinmin Youth Song Score], 14 May 1938.
- . 1938s. ‘Xinmin zhi ge changpian’ 新民之歌唱片 [Xinmin Song Recording], 16 May 1938.
- . 1938t. ‘Ben bao zhuban zhi quanshi yuedui qingzhu Xuzhou xianluo da youxing’ 本報主辦之全市樂隊慶祝徐州陷落大游行 [Citywide Brass Band Celebratory Parades for the Fall of Xuzhou Organized by This Newspaper], 22 May 1938.
- . 1938u. ‘Qinghe Xuzhou xianluo dahui’ 慶賀徐州陷落大會 [Celebrations for the Fall of Xuzhou], 23 May 1938.
- . 1938v. ‘Ben bao zhuban zhongdeng xuexiao tuanti xinmin changge bisaihui’ 本報主辦中等學校團體新民唱歌比賽會 [This Newspaper Organizes Middle- and High School Xinmin Singing Contest], 24 May 1938.
- . 1938w. ‘Gesheng yangyi Taihemen xinmin hechang dahui jinri xiawu zhengshi juxing’ 歌聲洋溢太和門新民合唱大會今日下午正式舉行 [Song Fills the Hall of Supreme Harmony, Great Xinmin Choral Singing Event Held Formally This Afternoon], 4 June 1938.

- . 1938x. ‘Xinmin hechang dahui zuori zhengshi juxing’ 新民合唱大會昨日正式舉行 [Great Xinmin Choral Singing Event Held Yesterday], 5 June 1938.
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- . 1938ab. ‘Xinminhui ge’ 新民會歌 [Xinminhui Anthem], 20 June 1938.
- . 1938ac. ‘Xinminhui huiqi ge’ 新民會會旗歌 [Xinminhui Flag Song], 24 June 1938.
- . 1938ad. ‘Xinminhui shuqi qingniantuan shenxin zhi xunlian’ 新民會暑期青年團身心之訓練 [Xinminhui Summer Youth Group Physical and Mental Training], 5 August 1938.
- . 1938ae. ‘Guoju fenhui zhangcheng’ 國劇分會章程 [Chinese Opera Branch Society Statute], 16 August 1938.
- . 1938af. ‘Xinmin ai xiang ge’ 新民愛鄉歌 [Xinmin Love the Homeland Song], 27 September 1938.
- . 1938ag. ‘Xinmin laodong ge’ 新民勞動歌 [Xinmin Workers’ Song], 13 October 1938.

- . 1938ah. ‘Xinmin shaonian ge’ 新民少年歌 [Xinmin Children’s Song], 14 October 1938.
- . 1938ai. ‘Xinmin shaonü ge’ 新民少女歌 [Xinmin Girls’ Song], 19 October 1938.
- . 1938aj. ‘Xinminhui jinri juxing Wuhan xianluo qingzhu dahui’ 新民會今日舉行武漢陷落慶祝大會 [Xinminhui Celebrates the Fall of Wuhan Today], 29 October 1938.
- . 1938ak. ‘Jinri Taihedian qian juxing qingzhu dahui’ 今日太和殿前舉行慶祝大會 [Celebrations Held Today at Taihedian], 30 October 1938.
- . 1938al. ‘Shijie de kouqin mingshou Zuoteng Xiulang shi yanzou ji’ 世界的口琴名手佐藤秀朗氏演奏記 [World Famous Harmonica Player Mr. Satō Hideo Performance Report], 8 November 1938.
- . 1938am. ‘Xinmin zhi ge’ 新民之歌 [Xinmin Song], 11 December 1938.
- . 1939a. ‘Zhengqiu “Xinmin minyao”’ 徵求「新國民謠」 [“Xinmin Folk Song” Commission], 7 January 1939.
- . 1939b. ‘Zhengji “Xing Ya jinxingqu”’ geci jihuashu’ 徵集「興亞進行曲」歌詞計劃書 [‘Raise Asia March’ Lyrics Commission Plan], 14 January 1939.
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- . 1939d. ‘Shoudu zonghui zhengji zhi Xing Ya jinxingqu qulu qi ming zuori jixiao’ 首都總會徵集之興亞進行曲取錄七名昨日揭曉 [Seven Winners of

- the Capital General Affairs Office's Commission for the Raise Asia March Revealed Yesterday], 20 March 1939.
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- . 1939f. 'Li Mengmei xiaojie duchang zhi xi' 李夢梅小姐獨唱之夕 [Miss Li Mengmei Evening Recital], 15 April 1939.
- . 1939g. 'Li Mengmei xiaojie zuo wan yi cheng zhu hou' 李夢梅小姐昨晚一逞珠喉 [Miss Li Mengmei Showed off Her Talent Yesterday Evening], 16 April 1939.
- . 1939h. 'Xinmin minyao zhicheng qupu' 新國民謠製成曲譜 [Xinmin Folk Song Score Completed], 15 May 1939.
- . 1939i. 'Yuedui Niu-yang-tuo liang fenhui zuo tong kai chengli dahui' 樂隊牛羊駝兩分會昨同開成立大會 [The Brass Band and Cattle Sheep and Camel Branch Societies Both Celebrated Their Establishment Yesterday], 23 May 1939.
- . 1939j. 'Zhonghua Kouqinhui zhuban kouqin yanzou dahui' 中華口琴會主辦口琴演奏大會 [The China Harmonica Society Organizes Harmonica Performance], 28 May 1939.
- . 1939k. 'Kouqin yanzou ling qu ji' 口琴演奏聆曲記 [Harmonica Performance Critique], 6 June 1939.
- . 1939l. 'Jixu zhengqiu Xinmin minyao' 繼續徵求新國民謠 [Continued Commission of the Xinmin Folk Song], 24 June 1939.

- . 1939m. ‘Zhongguo mingge zhi xi’ 中國名歌之夕 [Evening with Famous Chinese Songs], 28 June 1939.
- . 1939n. ‘Ben bao zhengqiu Xinmin minyao jinri zai Xinmintang juxing fabiao dahui’ 本報徵求之新國民謠今日在新民堂舉行發表大會 [Release Event for the Xinmin Folk Song Commissioned by This Newspaper to Be Held This Evening at Xinmin Hall], 2 July 1939.
- . 1939o. ‘Ben bao zhuban zhi xiaji yanyi dahui mingri qi zai gongyuan kaimu’ 本報主辦之夏季演藝大會明日起在公園開幕 [Summer Show Organized by This Newspaper to Open in the Park Tomorrow], 2 July 1939.
- . 1939p. ‘Xinmin minyao pucheng gequ zuo Xinmintang yanzou ji’ 新國民謠譜成歌曲昨新民堂演奏記 [Xinmin Folk Song Score Completed, Record of Yesterday’s Performance at Xinmin Hall], 3 July 1939.
- . 1939q. ‘Ben bao zhuban dianying yu yinyue zhi xi’ 本報主辦電影與音樂之夕 [This Newspaper Organizes Film and Music Evening], 8 July 1939.
- . 1939r. ‘Zhongyang diantai jinri ershi shi shijie ming gequ’ 中央電臺今日廿時世界名歌曲 [Central Radio Plays Famous Songs from the World Today at Eight], 12 July 1939.
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- . 1939t. ‘Ben baoshe zhuban zhi wei’an youyi dahui’ 本報社主辦之慰安游藝大會 [Relief Performances Organized by This Newspaper], 24 July 1939.

- . 1939u. ‘Ri-Hua qinshan yinyue yinghua dahui’ 日華親善音樂映畫大會 [Sino-Japanese Goodwill Music and Film Event], 29 July 1939.
- . 1939v. ‘Ri-Hua qinshan yinyue yinghua dahui mingri jixu juxing’ 日華親善音樂映畫大會明日繼續舉行 [Sino-Japanese Goodwill Music and Film Event Continuing Tomorrow], 4 August 1939.
- . 1939w. ‘Ri-Hua qinshan yinyue yinghua dahui zuo wan Jiyuan shengkuang kongqian’ 日華親善音樂映畫大會昨晚稷園盛況空前 [Sino-Japanese Goodwill Music and Film Event Held Yesterday at Grain Park With Unprecedented Success], 6 August 1939.
- . 1939x. ‘Zhen zai kouqin yanzou’ 振災口琴演奏 [Disaster Relief Harmonica Performance], 26 September 1939.
- . 1939y. ‘Changge bisai dahui’ 唱歌比賽大會 [Singing Contest], 24 November 1939.
- . 1940a. ‘Zhengji “Xing Ya jinxingqu” geci jihuashu’ 徵集「興亞進行曲」歌詞計劃書 [‘Raise Asia March’ Lyrics Commission Plan], 14 January 1940.
- . 1940b. ‘Shoudu zhong xiao xuexiao changge bisai zong piping’ 首都中小學校唱歌比賽總批評 [Capital Elementary and Middle School Singing Contest Critique], 16 January 1940.
- . 1940c. ‘Guoju xuehui zengshe yinyue yanjiuhui’ 國劇學會增設音樂研究會 [The Chinese Opera Learned Society Establishes Music Research Society], 9 March 1940.

- . 1940d. ‘Zai tan shouyinji dengji’ 再談收音機登記 [More on Radio Registration], 16 March 1940.
- . 1940e. ‘Xinminhui Jin shiwuju xuanshang zhengji geyao yi zhu zhengfu chengli wei ti’ 新民會津事務局懸賞徵集歌謠以祝政府成立爲題 [Xinminhui Tianjin Bureau Offers Reward on Song Commissioned to Congratulate the Establishment of the Government], 24 March 1940.
- . 1940f. ‘Yingxuan Xing Ya jinxingqu geci zuori juxing fabiao jiangshi’ 膺選興亞進行曲歌詞昨日舉行發表獎式 [Choosing the Raise Asia March Lyrics, Winners Gala Held Yesterday], 21 April 1940.
- . 1940g. ‘Yue bu fen jin gu’ 樂不分今古 [Music Cannot Be Categorized as Modern or Old], 24 April 1940.
- . 1940h. ‘Yinyue yanjiuhui jixu zhengqiu huiyuan’ 音樂研究會繼續徵求會員 [Music Research Society Continues to Recruit Members], 30 April 1940.
- . 1940i. ‘Jing shi yuedui fenhui qingzhu chengli zhou nian’ 京市樂隊分會昨慶祝成立周年 [Beijing City Brass Band Branch Society Celebrates Its Anniversary], 23 May 1940.
- . 1940j. ‘Qingzhu xing Ya jie yinyuehui’ 慶祝興亞節音樂會 [Celebrating the Raise Asia Festival Concert], 6 July 1940.
- . 1940k. ‘Ertong hechang dahui’ 兒童合唱大會 [Children’s Choral Singing Event], 6 July 1940.

- . 1940l. ‘Xing Ya shimin qingzhu dahui jinri relie juxing’ 興亞市民慶祝大會今日熱烈舉行 [Raise Asia Citizens’ Ceremony to Be Held Today], 7 July 1940.
- . 1940m. ‘Tiyu yinyue yinghua zhi xi zuo wan shengda juxing’ 體育音樂映畫之夕昨晚盛大舉行 [Sports, Music and Film Evening Held Yesterday], 20 July 1940.
- . 1940n. ‘Xing Ya jinxingqu’ 興亞進行曲 [Raise Asia March], 26 November 1940.
- . 1940o. ‘Xing Ya jinxingqu zhunbeihui zuori shangwu juxing’ 興亞進行曲準備會昨日上午舉行 [Raise Asia March Preparation Session Held Yesterday Morning], 4 December 1940.
- . 1940p. ‘Xing Ya jinxingqu fabiao dahui’ 興亞進行曲發表大會 [Raise Asia March Release Event], 25 December 1940.
- . 1941a. ‘Huabei chuanbo diantai shouyinji peigeisuo’ 華北傳播電臺收音機配給所 [North China Broadcasting Station Radio Receiver Distribution Office], 18 January 1941.
- . 1941b. ‘Jiaoyuju fen ling ge xiao lianxi Xing Ya jinxingqu’ 教育局分令各校練習興亞進行曲 [Education Office Orders Every School to Rehearse the Raise Asia March], 20 February 1941.
- . 1941c. ‘Xing Ya jinqingqu huabei juesheng bisai dahui’ 興亞進行曲華北決勝比賽大會 [Raise Asia March North China Contest Final], 15 March 1941.

- . 1941d. ‘Rijun yuedui shenru minjian’ 日軍樂隊深入民間 [Japanese Military Band Amongst the People], 21 April 1941.
- . 1941e. ‘Guoji jiaoxiang yuetuan yanzouhui cangan ji’ 國際交響樂團演奏會參觀記 [On Visiting the International Symphony Orchestra’s Concert], 12 May 1941.
- . 1941f. ‘Jing shi guoji guanxian yuetuan’ 京市國際管弦樂團 [Beijing City International String Orchestra], 16 May 1941.
- . 1941g. ‘Shiyuan yinyue yanzouhui’ 師院音樂演奏會 [Beijing Normal College Concert], 30 May 1941.
- . 1941h. ‘Shi zonghui tichang xinmin gequ zuo juban hechang dahui’ 市總會提倡新民歌曲昨舉辦合唱大會 [The General City Office Promotes Xinmin Songs, Great Choral Singing Event Held Yesterday], 8 June 1941.
- . 1941i. “‘Baowei Dongya zhi ge’ bisai dahui’ 「保衛東亞之歌」比賽大會 [‘Preserve East Asia Song’ Contest], 26 June 1941.
- . 1941j. ‘Xing Ya zhanlan hui’ 興亞展覽會 [Raise Asia Exhibition], 5 July 1941.
- . 1941k. ‘Xing Ya mie gong gesheng han tiandi’ 興亞滅共歌聲憾天地 [The Raise Asia and Exterminate the Communists Songs Shake Heaven and Earth], 22 July 1941.
- . 1941l. “‘Baowei Dongya zhi ge’ zhi xi’ 「保衛東亞之歌」之夕 [‘Preserve East Asia Song’ Evening], 27 July 1941.

- . 1941m. ‘Xiao xia dahui changpian zhi xi’ 消夏大會唱片之夕 [Leisurely Summer Event and Evening with Recordings], 30 July 1941.
- . 1941n. ‘Baojia zhi ge ji Baojia shi xun’ 保甲之歌及保甲十訓 [Baojia Song and Ten Baojia Commandments], 3 August 1941.
- . 1941o. ‘Xiao xia dahui ben zhoumo you-jun zuo yue’ 消夏大會本周末友軍奏樂 [Leisurely Summer Event This Weekend, Japanese Army Plays Music], 14 August 1941.
- . 1941p. ‘Xiao xia dahui weisheng’ 消夏大會尾聲 [Leisurely Summer Events Resonate], 20 August 1941.
- . 1941q. ‘Yi ticao yu gequ fahui zhiqiang jingshen’ 以體操與歌曲發揮治強精神 [Using Calisthenics and Songs to Elevate the Spirit of Peace Keeping and Strengthening], 28 October 1941.
- . 1941r. ‘Zhong-Ri yinyue yanjiushe juxing shou ci yanzouhui’ 中日音樂研究社舉行首次演奏會 [Sino-Japanese Music Research Society Holds Inaugural Concert], 1 November 1941.
- . 1941s. ‘Baowei Dongya zhi ge bisai zuori lingxuan junshi’ 保衛東亞之歌比賽昨日領選竣事 [Preserve East Asia Song Contest Winner Selection Event Held Yesterday], 7 November 1941.
- . 1941t. ‘Jinian Ri-De-Yi fang gong xieding’ 紀念日德義防共協定 [Commemorating the Anti-Comintern Pact], 10 November 1941.

- . 1941u. ‘Huabei guangbo xie zhuban xing Ya fabiao yanzouhui’ 華北廣播協主辦興亞發表演奏會 [North China Radio Association Organizes Raise Asia Release Performance], 27 November 1941.
- . 1941v. ‘Huabei guangbo xie zhuban Xing Ya xingjinqi Yuejin Yaxiya jinri juxing fabiaohui’ 華北廣播協主辦興亞行進曲躍進亞細亞今日舉行發表會 [North China Radio Association Organizes Raise Asia March and Advance Asia Release Performance Today], 2 December 1941.
- . 1941w. ‘Qingzhu Xianggang xianluo Zhong Ri xuesheng juxing yinyue dahui’ 慶祝香港陷落中日學生今日舉行音樂大會 [Chinese and Japanese Students Hold Concert in Celebration of the Fall of Hong Kong], 28 December 1941.
- . 1941x. ‘Zhong Ri xuesheng qingzhu Xianggang xianluo’ 中日學生慶祝香港陷落 [Chinese and Japanese Students Celebrate the Fall of Hong Kong], 29 December 1941.
- . 1942a. ‘Da Dongya zongjinjun zhi ge zhengjian jiezhi’ 大東亞總進軍之歌徵件截止 [Greater East Asia General Advance Song Commission Ends], 31 January 1942.
- . 1942b. ‘Beijing yinyue wenhua xiehui zhuban qinshan yanzou dahui’ 北京音樂文化協會主辦親善演奏大會 [The BMCA Organizes Goodwill Performance], 25 February 1942.
- . 1942c. ‘Zhuming zhi Beijing jiaoxiang yuetuan jiang juxing si ci yanzou’ 著名之北京交響樂團將舉行四次演奏 [Famous Beijing Symphony Orchestra to Hold Fourth Concert], 8 March 1942.

- . 1942d. ‘Beijing jiaoxiang yuetuan di si ci yanzou dahui’ 北京交響樂團第四次演奏大會 [Fourth Concert of the Beijing Symphony Orchestra], 13 March 1942.
- . 1942e. ‘Feidao quanmian kanding’ 菲島全面戡定 [The Philippines Are Fully Occupied], 9 May 1942.
- . 1942f. ‘Da Dongya zongjinjun zhi ge guanyin sheng ju zuo gao wancheng’ 大東亞總進軍之歌灌音盛舉昨告完成 [The Greater East Asia General Advance Song Recording Accomplished and Completed Yesterday], 19 May 1942.
- . 1942g. ‘Qingzhu Manzhouguo jianguo shi guo nian jinian’ 慶祝滿洲國建國十週年紀念 [Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of Manchukuo], 17 June 1942.
- . 1942h. ‘Zhonghua kouqinhui qingzhu liu zhou nian’ 中華口琴會慶祝六周年 [The China Harmonica Society Celebrates Its Sixth Anniversary], 18 June 1942.
- . 1942i. ‘Da Dongya zong jinjun zhi ge jinri juxing fabiao dahui’ 大東亞總進軍之歌今日舉行發表大會 [Greater East Asia General Advance Song Release Performance to Be Held Today], 20 June 1942.
- . 1942j. ‘Qingzhu Manzhouguo jianguo shi guo nian jinian’ 慶祝滿洲國建國十週年紀念 [Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of Manchukuo], 24 June 1942.

- . 1942k. ‘Da Dongya zong jinjun zhi ge bisai dahui zuo juxing yuxuan dahui’ 大東亞總進軍之歌比賽大會昨舉行預選大會 [Greater East Asia General Advance Song Contest Preselection Event Held Yesterday], 21 September 1942.
- . 1942l. ‘Jing shi zonghui zhengmu linzu geci’ 京市總會徵募鄰組歌詞 [Beijing City General Affairs Office Commissions Neighbourhood Organization Song Lyrics], 1 October 1942.
- . 1942m. ‘Dongya gongrong ge’ 東亞共榮歌 [East Asia Co-Prosperity Song], 8 October 1942.
- . 1942n. ‘Xin Beijing qu’ 新北京曲 [New Beijing Melody], 8 October 1942.
- . 1942o. ‘Yinyuetang jiang juxing jungong shi’ 音樂堂將舉行竣工式 [Music Hall to Hold Completion Ceremony], 13 October 1942.
- . 1942p. ‘Yinyuetang jungong jinian’ 音樂堂竣工紀念 [Celebrating the Completion of the Music Hall], 8 November 1942.
- . 1942q. ‘Jing Yinyuetang jianzhu wancheng’ 京音樂堂建築完成 [Construction on Beijing Music Hall Completed], 10 November 1942.
- . 1942r. ‘Yinyuetang xuetong yinyue dahui’ 音樂堂學童音樂大會 [Music Hall School Children Concert], 11 November 1942.
- . 1942s. ‘Yinyue dahui yuanman bimou’ 音樂大會圓滿閉幕 [Concert Closes Perfectly], 14 November 1942.

- . 1942t. ‘Shantian shi yinyue yanzou zuo wu zai Shida juxing’ 山田氏音樂演奏昨午在師大舉行 [Concert with Mr. Kōsaku Held Yesterday at Lunchtime at Beijing Normal College], 30 November 1942.
- . 1943a. ‘Huajiao qianghua ailu gongzuo xuanshang zhengge jiazuo fabiao’ 華交強化愛路工作懸賞徵歌佳作發表 [North China Transportation Company Strengthens Railway Appreciation Work, Commissions Songs to Be Published], 3 February 1943.
- . 1943b. ‘Ji mie Ying Mei Huabei zengchan liang ge zhongxuan mingdan fabiao’ 擊滅英美華北增產兩歌仲選名單發表 [Winners’ List for the Attack and Destroy Britain and the US and Increase Production Songs Published], 8 March 1943.
- . 1943c. ‘Da Dongya zongjinjun zhi ge jiang ge pian Zhongguo quantu’ 大東亞總進軍之歌將歌篇中國全土 [The Greater East Asia General Advance Song Reverberates through the Whole of China], 27 March 1943.
- . 1943d. ‘Ji mie Ying Mei Huabei zengchan gepu zuo yi shencha jue ding’ 擊滅英美華北增產歌譜昨已審查決定 [The Scores for the Attack and Destroy Britain and the US and Increase Production Songs Have Been Approved Yesterday], 27 March 1943.
- . 1943e. ‘Yuedui xiehui zhengshi jiecheng’ 樂隊協會正式結成 [Brass Band Association Formally Established], 28 March 1943.
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