The Mad Monk: Sir Keith Joseph, Thatcherism, and the Morphology of Conservatism

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Abstract

Via a morphological approach to the study of ideologies of the kind advocated by Michael Freeden, this thesis analyses the political thought of the British Conservative MP and leading Thatcherite, Sir Keith Joseph (1918-1994). It does so, as its title implies, in order to probe two interrelated issues - both Thatcherism as a form of conservatism and conservatism as an ideology. The four main chapters which comprise this document contend that, if Joseph was a Thatcherite, then Thatcherism is best considered as not a liberal ideology but a conservative one. Ideologies on this thesis' account are modular structures comprised of political concepts, and conservatism is an anti-rationalist ideology which prioritises two concepts in particular – those being organic change and the extra-human origins of any social order – and which emerges in response to the threats posed by such rationalist ideologies as socialism and liberalism to those two core concepts. Beside the latter pair, the concepts that any one conservative favours are simply those that are most expedient then and there to defending organic change and society's extra-human origins as that conservative perceives them. This thesis argues that this was true in Joseph's ideology of, for example, Sir Keith's epistemology, inequality, freedom, and the market, all of which Joseph defended as a means to shoring up that which was natural (extra-human) and the (organic) change which those extra-human origins provided for. Conservatism is thus dialectical in nature. In arguing as much, this thesis validates Freeden's description of conservatism. But the present author judges that this argument also has interesting implications for our comprehension of the 1970s as a political interregnum wherein new possibilities emerged. Thus this thesis emphasises the contingency of actually-existing Thatcherism and the gap between that practice and the political thought of a Thatcherite like Sir Keith Joseph.

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This research has also benefitted from those who in many cases have, to be frank, had very little intellectually to contribute to it. Friends are a blessing (especially so during a pandemic), and the company and good humour of faithful friends has had the added benefit of allowing me to return to this project rested and recuperated. As such, I would like to thank the following: the Wolfson gang - Sharon Walker, Marie Kent, and Charles and Ursula Wide; my C Floor comrades – David Civil, Jamie Smith, Tom Rose, Jonathan Roche, and David Robinson; also from Nottingham, and for our Trent Bridge/pub outings, Rod Howlett; and last but not least, from the motherland, also known as God's Own Country, James Homan and Will Fowers.

Though they rarely showed much interest in history or politics (being dogs), I am also thankful to Rolo and Dougie for their loyalty and companionship.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Andrew and Jacqui, for their love and support. To them I am, and forever shall be, grateful.

Contents

Introduction

London, 1996, and before an audience at Swiss Bank House Margaret Thatcher takes to the stage. Now six years out of office, she is dressed in black, as is befitting; she has come to praise the dead.[1] Over the following forty-five minutes or so, and in front of the logo – C.P.S. – of the free-market thinktank that this ex-Prime Minister, alongside the man in whose honour she is today prepared to speak, helped to create, Mrs. Thatcher delivers the inaugural Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture. Her friend and colleague was, she remarks, modest but timid, remote yet warm, and a great man whose integrity was the wellspring of his greatness.[2] Born in 1918, Keith Sinjohn Joseph, who died in 1994, served as the Conservative Member of Parliament for Leeds North East from 1956 to 1987, and in the Cabinets of four Prime Ministers, including Thatcher's, in such positions as Secretary of State for Education and Science, and Minister for Housing and Local Government. It is however for his role in what Margaret Thatcher in her 1996 lecture called 'the rethinking of Conservatism, which Keith inspired and led', that Joseph is best known.[3] Nicknamed the "Mad Monk" for his supposed zealotry, he lays claim to the reputation of Margaret Thatcher's John the Baptist, and of having been the godfather of what has come to be known as Thatcherism.[4] Following the fall of the Heath government (in which he had served) in 1974, Joseph embarked on an impassioned rhetorical campaign, in speeches and pamphlets, against inflation, incomes policy, and high public spending, and in favour of the principles after which the so-called Iron Lady titled her speech in remembrance of him – that is, of liberty and limited government. Doubtless he was one of Skinner's 'innovating ideologists'.[5] But quite how far Sir Keith's ideological innovations extended - that is what this thesis is dedicated to determining. In particular, this document seeks to understand to what degree if any Joseph's favouring of what in 1996 the then-Baroness Thatcher termed his and her "liberal" Conservatism – by which she 'mean[t] the liberalism of Mr Gladstone not of the latter day collectivists' – represented a significant departure from not only British

[1] 'Baroness Thatcher – 1996 CPS Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture', <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1VnupAxN80>, accessed 20/04/2021.
[2] M. Thatcher, 'Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture ("Liberty and Limited Government")' (11/01/1996), *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108353>, accessed 20/04/2021.
[3] M. Thatcher, 'Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture'.
[4] R. Colville, 'Tories still have much to learn from Keith Joseph' (17/01/2018), *The Times*, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tories-still-have-much-to-learn-from-keith-joseph-sfnwzj802>, accessed 23/04/2021.
[5] Q. Skinner, 'Moral principles and social change', in his *Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: Regarding Method* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 149-150.

Conservatism but from a particular form of what she also in that speech called conservatism.[6]

This is not a biography. It is not even an intellectual one. For a cradle-to-grave account of Joseph's life-story, readers can do no better than to settle down with Denham and Garnett's *Keith Joseph*, which, though not the first such biography - Halcrow published his slimmer volume in 1989, while Joseph was still alive – is by far the most insightful. Especially noteworthy is its authors' exploding of the common myth, perpetuated by Joseph as much as by anyone else, that Sir Keith underwent a damascene conversion in 1974 to what he deemed proper, free-market Conservatism. In tracing their titular subject's advocacy of free enterprise back to the 1960s, Denham and Garnett show how 'Joseph's account was a distortion of his own intellectual development'.[7] The only kind of conversion that Joseph could be said to have undergone, they maintain, was in his social outlook.[8] This thesis does not demur from the idea that, for the most part, post-1974, Joseph held the zeal of a convert without actually having been converted.[9] Its divergence from Denham and Garnett's account is interpretative. Without putting too fine a point on it for the moment, whereas Denham and Garnett identify Joseph with liberalism, this thesis argues that Sir Keith was a conservative, even if, admittedly, those authors' capitalisation of conservatism in their biography suggests that it is the traditional worldview and activities of the Conservative Party, and not conservatism as an ideology, that they see Joseph as having been out of kilter with.[10] More so than in *Keith Joseph*, the line of argument with which this analysis takes issue Denham and Garnett pursued in an article that they authored following the publication of their biography, the title of which speaks volumes. On Denham and Garnett's account in *Sir Keith Joseph and the undoing of conservatism*, 'the liberal ideologues who now controlled the Conservative Party were stimulated by the opportunity to try out their utopian ideas about the nature of British individuals', and Joseph in particular supposedly 'saw additional doses of classical liberalism as the most promising remedy' to what he deemed the country's social crisis.[11] Alongside such critics of the Thatcher governments

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[6] M. Thatcher, 'Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture'.
[7] A. Denham and M. Garnett, *Keith Joseph* (Chesham, 2001), p. 250.
[8] Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 264.
[9] Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 252.
[10] Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 251; That pair state how, '[e]ven if Joseph's economic thought was compatible with Conservatism, his outlook was not', because the Tory Party 'has seldom gone in for heresy-hunting' and 'is not a church or a branch of theology'.
[11] A. Denham and M. Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph and the undoing of British conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 7/1 (2002), p. 61, 71; Apparently, '[o]nly the fact that Joseph was a member of the Conservative Party could lure the unwary into associating

as Lord Gilmour, about whom more later, Denham and Garnett can be seen to form a part of what Bevir and Rhodes call the "liberal tradition" of interpreting 'Thatcherism as the revival of nineteenth-century liberalism'.[12]

Ultimately, it is that tradition of scholarship, and not any one book or article, which this thesis is principally concerned to rebut. Indeed, besides its foregoing a chronological structure, this thesis is not a biography due to the fact that it treats Joseph's political thought not as an end in itself, but as a stepping stone to the investigation of a number of broader issues, of which Thatcherism is one. To be honest, although the present author is certainly interested in Sir Keith Joseph as an individual in his own right, frankly, Joseph could be replaced in this analysis with another Thatcherite like Margaret Thatcher or Nigel Lawson, without this thesis' modus operandi necessarily suffering for it. This document's subject of analysis is like a pyramidal iceberg. Joseph's political thought is the visible apex, beneath which and under the water line is Thatcherism and, below that, the base, conservatism. First things first when it comes to Thatcherism however: there is no Thatcherism; there are only Thatcherisms – Thatcherism as statecraft, Thatcherism as political economy, and so on. Scholars of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher make of that -ism what they bring to it. A certain group of late-twentieth-century socialists read Thatcherism through what they perceived to be a crisis of British capitalism in the 1970s. For those whose scholarship Bevir and Rhodes bracket under the "socialist tradition", many of whom had an eye for the Thatcherites' political economy, Thatcherism represented what one of their number, the cultural theorist Stuart Hall, called 'the corresponding political bedfellow of a period of capitalist recession'.[13] For Hall, Thatcherism represented what he labelled an authoritarian populism - 'an exceptional form of the capitalist state'.[14] By way of its analysis of Sir Keith Joseph's political thought, this thesis attends to Thatcherism as ideology. In particular, it argues that Joseph's political thought, as an ideology and as a variant of Thatcherism, is, contra Denham and Garnett, a form of conservatism and not liberalism, and that there is therefore good reason to think of Thatcherism in the round as a conservative ideology, the implications of which will soon become apparent.

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the pronouncements of his early career with a distinctively conservative, rather than a liberal, framework of belief' (Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 63).

[12] M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance* (London, 2003), p. 111.

[13] S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', *Marxism Today* (Jan., 1979), p. 14; Bevir and Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance*, p. 116.

[14] S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', p. 15.

Ideology:

What are ideologies? Were they, with the rise of Tracey's 'science of ideas', discovered? Or are they inventions, born of the Enlightenment and the onset of modernity? Was liberalism, for instance, an already-existing phenomena, articulated in the writings of John Locke and other liberals, or was it created therein? These are crucial questions with which scholars have for generations grappled.[15] Unfortunately, if not perhaps unsurprisingly, unanimity has been there none. With at one count twenty-seven individual features to its name, it is little wonder that "ideology" has been described as 'ambivalent', 'elusive', and even 'promiscuous'.[16] One reason for their supposed elusiveness is that ideologies are all too often viewed in an instrumental rather than a constitutive sense. For Heywood, for instance, they 'act as a form of social cement'.[17] This is all well and good. But to rely only on those features is akin to defining the human person as an organism that eats, sleeps and procreates. We require an understanding not only of what an ideology does but of what it *is*. More often than not however, when that criterion is fulfilled, "ideology" is adopted as a synonym for a discrete set of ideas or worldview. According to Eatwell, Adams and O'Sullivan's respective studies, for example, an ideology must be self-consciously held and cohesive, incorporating a view of an ideal society, human nature and/or the political system that best embodies the values which flow from those perspectives.[18] There is some truth to this. Ideologies and belief systems are surely more akin than are ideologies and single concepts or principles. No one could plausibly label equality an ideology. The same is true of democracy. Though one might shape the other, at least in common parlance, an ideology is distinct from a political system. And yet if an ideology is to be equated with, say, a philosophy or doctrine, then why use the term at all? If it is simply a generalisation – a composite term for other categories – how is it distinct?

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[15] For a succinct breakdown of the main, differing ways in which ideology has been defined, see N. Abercrombie, S. Hill and B. S. Turner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology* (London, 5th Ed., [1984] 2006), pp. 191-192.

[16] M. Hamilton, 'The Elements of the Concept of Ideology', *Political Studies*, 35/1 (1987), pp. 18-38; R. Leach, *British Political Ideologies* (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, 2nd Ed., [1991] 1996), p. 2; D. McLellan, *Ideology* (Buckingham, 2nd Ed., [1987] 1995), p. 1; A. Vincent, 'Political Ideology and Political Theory: Reflections on an Awkward Relationship', in B. Jackson and M. Stears (Eds.), *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden* (Oxford, 2012), p. 159.

[17] A. Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London, 6th Ed., [1992] 2017), p. 3.

[18] R. Eatwell, 'Ideologies: Approaches and Trends', in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (Eds.), *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (London, 1983), p. 7; I. Adams, *Political Ideology Today* (Manchester, 2nd Ed., [1993] 2001), p. 3; N. O'Sullivan, *Conservatism* (London, 1976), p. 9.

This problem, of attempting to unearth a consensual definition of ideology, is compounded by many intellectuals' susceptibility towards severe bouts of what has been termed 'ideolophobia'.[19] A legacy in part of the French Revolution, ideologies have repeatedly been branded as doctrinaire, dogmatic and closed systems of thought, frequently upheld in the guise of emotional commitments, or else as social distortions alien to the general populace. Marx and Engels, for example, wrote of ideologies as 'phantoms formed in the human brain', while more recently the American sociologist Daniel Bell - representative in this regard of much in the way of the twentieth-century, Anglo-Saxon, empiricist tradition of political science and political philosophy - referred to ideology as a 'belief system that […] sought to convert ideas into social levers'.[20] Such assessments would not be nearly so injurious had they not pervaded the public consciousness. Under the weight of these and other such negative connotations, however, few would likely claim to be ideologists. Philosophy is typically thought to be a more respectable alternative to ideologising. Both in and out of academia, the product of the latter activity has become less a mere definition (insofar as such a thing exists) and more a pejorative value judgement. Ideologies are what other people have. According to the conceptualisation of ideology used in this thesis, however, everyone has an ideology, and it is the premises which lead to that conclusion that make a definition of ideologies as morphologies so very useful for our analysis of Sir Keith Joseph's political thought, Thatcherism and conservatism.

As presented in the morphological approach, ideologies constitute ideational constructs, born of the basic units of political thinking in the form of political concepts.[21] The individuality of an ideology such as liberalism or socialism thus derives principally from the specificity of its internal configurations – the conceptualisations it employs and the priority it accords to differing concepts. Naturally then, for the advocates of this method, like Michael Freeden, the analysis of such structural configurations is best undertaken by proceeding from the conceptual morphologies they display, of which more in a moment. To adopt this approach is not, of course, to prohibit other conceptions of ideology, any more than it precludes attending to ideological arrangements' additional roles. In no sense is this a comprehensive definition. By Freeden's own admission the semantic perspective advanced under the morphological approach is but one of three

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[19] M. Freeden, 'Ideologies as communal resources', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 4/3 (1999), p. 411.

[20] K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology, Part One* [Ed. C. J. Arthur] (New York, [1845] 1970), p. 47; D. Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties: with "The Resumption of History in the New Century"* (London, [1960] 2000), p. xi.

[21] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford, 1998), p. 2.

possible lines of enquiry, alongside a genetic and a functional interpretation.[22] Indeed, to dismiss an ideology's functions is a largely unfeasible expectation anyway, given the indefeasible link between ideologies' morphologies and their separate roles. In the case of the forthcoming analysis, however, certainly the most useful conception of ideology is to view that structure as a product of the interrelationships between its conceptual building blocks, the narratives, idioms and mythologies those formations utilise being layers built upon their elemental units of analysis. The basic role of the student of ideologies is thus that of "conceptologist": our task is to ascertain ideologies by way of their internal patterns (potentially limitless in their diversity) and the fields of meaning imbued therein.[23] This being the case, the fundamental purpose of the forthcoming chapters is to elicit via decoding the rhythms and patterns inherent within Sir Keith Joseph's political thought. We have in this respect three layers with which to contend: (i) the political concept, (ii) its own internal relations, and (iii) the particular combinations concepts create in the form of ideologies.

It is to our great advantage in analysing Joseph's writings and speeches that ideologies are not only ideational arrangements. Given that political concepts, though signifiers, are themselves signified by words, ideologies are also forms of linguistic expression. They lead two lives, one internal to and the other external to language. Hence the concept of justice, to take just one example, relates both to actions in which a conceptualisation of that concept is upheld (in court, for instance) and to the thought-events that diagnose those activities as constituting justice. Starting from the prima facie evidence that the concepts constitutive of ideologies are most readily discernible in the words and grammar via which they are expressed, Freeden begins his study of ideologies with an 'appreciation of the nature of political language'.[24] The result is a rebuttal of the inclination amongst normative political philosophers for linguistic precision and in its place an affirmation of the pliability and indeterminacy of language, the most conspicuous manifestation of which is Freeden's emphasising of essential contestability. First formally theorised by W. B. Gallie, essentially contested concepts are those where 'there is no one clearly definable general use of any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use'.[25] This characteristic is informed by two notable factors: by societies' inability to recognise a set hierarchy of values and by the impossibility of

[22] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 3.
[23] M. Freeden, 'What Should the 'Political' in Political Theory Explore?', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 13/2 (2005), p. 133.
[24] M. Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', in M. Freeden, L. Tower Sargent and M. Stears (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford, 2013), p. 116.
[25] W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1955-1956*, 56 (1955-1956), p. 168.

providing a definition of any concept inclusive of all of its significant features.[26] Take the second of these. It might be thought, as Joseph indeed thought, that absolute equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are irreconcilable. Nor can this phenomena be transcended. Essential contestability is inevitable: while concepts' surplus of meaning must be curtailed if the language in which they are made communicable is to be practical, the diversity innate to politics means that their polysemy persists.

Numerous conceptions may be suitable, but only one can prevail. And it is via decontestation that essential contestability is, for however short a time, muted. At least in part, distinctions between differing ideological configurations derive from the differing decontested meanings ideologies attach to particular concepts. Competing ideologies are hence fighting for a "correct" definition.[27] Victory in this contest in turn helps to legitimate a preferred political order. Ideologies, in sum, act to dampen, albeit temporarily, the pluralism of politics. Decontestation is the name bestowed on the decision-making process crucial to all ideologies and characteristic of all political thinking. It is the means by which we acquire the maps through which we navigate the seemingly open-ended world of politics. Its study is thus indispensable to political theory. To a large degree, our role as students of ideologies (in this case, of Joseph's ideology) must be to explore the nature of decontestive thinking, its various embodiments and the ways in which it operates. Freeden observes this closure in three forms: first and foremost, in exact definitions; in stipulative definitions; and finally in the pretence of decontestation, upheld via constructive ambiguity and imprecision.[28] We will witness the first and third of these in due course. When we do, we ought always to bear in mind their impermanence. Any decontestation is seated between, on the one hand, the practical necessity of closure and, on the other, the inability of any concept to remain decontested for a prolonged period due to all concepts' multiplicity of meanings and consequent indeterminacy. There are always alternate conceptions vying for their turn. While even when there is agreement as to a concept's essentials, the additional features attached will be sufficient to distinguish one ideology from another.

Nor for that matter can we equate a single successful decontestation with optimal influence – a status guaranteed just as much, if not more, by the successful propagation of an ideology throughout society, or by the success or failure of other attempted decontestations within the same ideology.[29] To repeat, total victory or defeat

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[26] M. Freeden, 'Thinking politically and thinking about politics: language, interpretation, and ideology', in D. Leopold and M. Stears (Eds.), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches* (Oxford, 2008), p. 212.
[27] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 117.
[28] Freeden, 'What Should the 'Political' in Political Theory Explore?', p. 121.
[29] M. Freeden, 'Editorial: What is special about ideologies?', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 6/1 (2001), p. 6.

is impossible, and conceptual success only ever temporary. A post-ideological age is a fantasy. In this respect, any consensus should be treated with suspicion. It will never be the manifestation of a natural order and will most likely be a consequence of linguistic and conceptual manipulation, or, as with the soon to be reviewed idea of a British post-war consensus, a result of (a not necessarily unreasonable) simplification on the analyst's part.[30] And this all in turn alights us to the fact that decontestation relates to judgement and not to description. It concerns not our external reality, but the interpretive means by which we make sense of that reality. The attentive reader may well at this point call a halt to proceedings. Are we not, they might ask, subject to an infinite regress? Though itself composed of concepts, is not the concept of ideology employed here also a decontested one? The short answer to that final question is "yes". As such, the plausibility of this approach must derive from its proficiency as an analytical tool. Indeed, it is in recognition of the polysemy intrinsic to all concepts and ideological morphologies that the present author aspires to decode, as opposed to the traditional Marxist objective of unmasking. Whereas the latter implies a uniform truth to be unveiled, decoding respects texts' plurality of possible interpretations.[31] The truthfulness of Joseph's ideology is thus irrelevant to the ambitions of this thesis, for meaning relates not to truth- or falsehood, but to a cultural context. Ours is a restrained relativism. Judgements of "better" or "worse", "good" or "bad" are relevant only in relation to an ideology's effectiveness, or to the propagator of any ideology's subjective standards of success.

Insofar as one cannot think politically without the use of decontested political concepts, ideologies can be seen to represent not so much elite or doctrinaire forms of political thought, nor still the epiphenomena of wider forces, but typical features of political activity evident at every level of social articulation.[32] They can never be an optional extra to politics; ideologies are essentially ubiquitous and never variable. Hence the great historian of Conservatism E. H. H. Green's observation that even supposedly disinterested, pragmatic and neutral political activity represents a specific expression of ideology.[33] The prophets of the end of ideology – the likes of Fukuyama, Bell and Aron – are thus destined for the wilderness, for while not synonymous, with the end of ideology

[30] Freeden, 'What Should the 'Political' in Political Theory Explore?', p. 125; Freeden, 'Thinking politically and thinking about politics', p. 201.
[31] M. Freeden, 'Editorial: Political ideology at century's end', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5/1 (2000), p. 9.
[32] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', p. 116.
[33] E. H. H. Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2002), p. 9.

comes the end of politics – an improbable eventuality for the foreseeable future.[34] This insight - that ideologies represent an ever-present feature of our political lives, held at numerous levels - distances this thesis from a certain academic consensus, of which the work of Sartori, who distinguishes between pragmatic and elite, ideological modes of thought, and Nisbet, for whom ideologies must relate to a power base, is illustrative.[35] For the sake of ecumenism within the political sciences and in avoidance of reductionism, though, it is important to note that while political thought is inevitably ideological, it is not invariably composed of that thought-product alone. Speech acts and texts may, for instance, hold ideological and philosophical dimensions concurrently.[36] Though to complicate matters further, the former will also be constitutive of the latter. But if this all seems like rather arduous terrain, then it need not be trodden blindly. We can still make out the trees from the endless woods of ideology. Mapping requires a map, which we are fortunate enough to have to hand.

According to Freeden's typology, ideologies comprise three attributes. The first of these, the "core", represents a cohort of durable concepts and is what gives ideological formations their primary objectives and stability.[37] Its content often take the form of ineliminable concepts, deduced from general principles. Liberty, for instance, is an ineliminable feature of liberalism's core, without which liberalism would be unrecognisable. This is not to say that core concepts cannot move position, any more than it is to deny that differing members of the same ideological family will not value one core idea more than another. Though determinate in their capacity as core concepts, being the product of social conventions – we cannot plausibly conceive of socialism without equality principally because discursive practices have made this so – these features are never mandatory. There is nothing essentialist about the core. Of secondary importance are an ideology's "adjacent" concepts, which provide ideological morphologies with a range of additional meanings.[38] Without the provision of a contingent subject, for example – in the case of one of socialism's core concepts, equality, between men and women, or of opportunity – any ideology will remain vacuous and abstract. And finally come two forms of "peripheral" concept. The first of these is the

[34] F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, [1992] 2006), p. 45; Bell, *The End of Ideology*, p. 393; R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1955] 2017), xxiii.
[35] G. Sartori, 'Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems', *The American Political Science Review*, 63/2 (Jun., 1969), p. 399; R. Nisbet, *Conservatism: Dream and Reality* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1986] 2017), p. 15.
[36] For further information on the difference between different kinds of thinking – ideological, political, and otherwise – see: M. Freeden, 'Editorial: Thinking politically and thinking ideologically', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13/1 (2008), pp. 1-10.
[37] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 84.
[38] M. Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', p. 125.

margin – a term used to refer to insubstantial concepts whose presence has little effect on the ideology's core.[39] The second denotes those concepts that allow ideologies to interact with their political surroundings and is known as the perimeter.[40] As exemplified in the form of party policy, the latter type of peripheral concept is testament to the historical and geographical – time- and space-bound – ecosystems ideologies occupy. It reminds the researcher, often submerged within the frequently abstract world of political theory, that ideologies exist within a concrete, tangible reality. Marginal concepts may also lie on the perimeter, while vice versa, some perimeter concepts might be closer to the ideological core. Hence even when there is agreement as to an ideology's core components, the additional features attached will be sufficient to distinguish, say, one variant of liberalism from another.

Distinguishing between an ideology's principal components in this fashion has a number of advantages over simpler, hierarchical models. One such benefit is an appreciation of ideologies as essentially fluid and permeable formations, all of them sharing concepts, overlapping and thus capable of adapting their meanings according to circumstances. To this extent, the traditional depiction of politics in post-war Britain as a contest between three distinct, self-contained ideological types (conservatism, liberalism, and socialism), each holding to partisan policies, is misplaced. Though ideologies can be bracketed under familial resemblances and maintain ineliminable core concepts, their complexity and interconnectedness allows for a variety of differing configurations, the implications of which are evident in the works of many contemporary scholars of post-war British politics, such as Jackson and Saunders, as well as Davies, Freeman and Pemberton, in their recognition of political parties as centres of continual ideological debate.[41] Another repercussion, then, is to divorce ideology from a purely spatial definition of that concept. The typical variant of that type of description, the Left-Right political spectrum, has an understandable appeal, especially in its capacity to act as both a continuum and a duality. But these gains are outweighed by the inability of any ideological spectrum to account for ideologies' constant dynamism. This is the case even for those visualisations which have sought to mitigate the aforementioned issues, like the use of a horse-shoe spectrum or of an X-Y axis. Ideologies' fields of meaning are anchored in both the temporal and the spatial - any approach that attends to one at the

[39] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 78.
[40] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 79.
[41] For example, see: B. Jackson and R. Saunders, 'Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism', in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (Eds.), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 1-22; A. Davies, J. Freeman and H. Pemberton, ''Everyman a Capitalist' or 'Free to Choose'? Exploring the Tensions within Thatcherite Individualism', *The Historical Journal*, 61/2 (2018), pp. 477-501.

expense of the other is unsuited to our purposes. Hence any mention of the Left or Right in this thesis is with reference to Joseph's or other scholars' use of those terms.

In spite of their pliability, underlined above, it is crucial for the purposes of this thesis to recall that ideologies exist at the macro-level. There is a conservatism in spite of there being differing conservatisms, and the same is true of liberalism and liberalisms, as well as of socialism and socialisms. Freeden uses the analogy of a room. Should different rooms share the same layout it is safe to assume that they are of the same type. If, for instance, numerous rooms contain a central table, chairs and a sideboard, rather than a shower and sink, it is safe to assume that they are dining rooms and not bathrooms. As with rooms, so too with ideologies, the appearance of similar patterns in differing configurations of concepts provides them with a shared profile in the form of Wittgensteinian familial resemblances.[42] Needless to say, this is simply the recognition of commonalities and in no sense a submission to essentialism. Just as one might query the categorical validity of a bedroom without, say, a bed, so too would one be justified in questioning any liberalism that lacked at its core the concept of liberty. To entertain such prefabricated categories as liberalism, socialism and conservatism is, of course, to subject ideologies to generalisations: it both obscures their internal arrangements' fluidity and exaggerates the rigidity of their boundaries. Yet this is undoubtedly a necessary form of compartmentalisation, without which we (both as scholars and citizens) would be lost amongst the complexities that ideologies exhibit. The most rewarding analysis must, therefore, engage with ideologies at differing levels of magnification – both the macro and the micro, the general and the specific. To use as an analogy the biological classification of the taxonomic rank, it is perfectly justifiable for a biologist to study a domain or kingdom, so long as she is also acquainted with the categories of genus and species.

The preceding pages have outlined what it means for this thesis to be interested in Sir Keith Joseph's ideology. What interests us is Sir Keith's ideological morphology, by which is meant not simply his general "worldview" but the collection of decontested concepts which Joseph sought to realise.[43] That concepts are assigned distinct positions in Freeden's typology does not entail that they are hermetically-sealed. They are all mutually defining; no concept is an island unto itself. Taken together, the network of conceptual interrelations that the three layers surveyed constitute informs the semantic fields of meaning ideologies impart. Just as an ideology's adjacent and peripheral concepts serve to cement, albeit often temporarily, any morphology's core features, so are the meanings induced by the latter, more permanent concepts both bolstered by

[42] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 86.
[43] Plamenatz records how ideologies have sometimes been defined as Weltanschauung. See: J. Plamenatz, *Ideology* (London, 1970), p. 17.

their neighbors at the adjacent and peripheral levels and imparted through and impact upon the wider morphology, such that ideologies form communities of meaning. We would do well to visualise three concentric circles, the core being the smallest and innermost, and the periphery the largest and outermost. From subjection to this typology and the accusation of ideologist there is no escape, and this is as true of Joseph and other conservatives as it is of anyone else. But if conservatism is an ideology, it is also a highly distinctive one, as the following section shows.

Conservatism as an ideology, Thatcherism as a conservatism:

In opposition to those who would deny it the status of an ideology, under the approach embraced here, in its presentation of a distinctive morphology, conservatism must necessarily be categorised as such.[44] Like any other ideological family, conservatives' political thought displays a unique structural configuration of concepts. According to Freeden, this entails four central features, two of which represent conservatism's substantive core concepts: (A) a resistance to purportedly inorganic change and (B) the attribution of acceptable, organic change to extra-human origins.[45] These (A and B) are underpinned by two additional characteristics. One of these is what Freeden labels a (C) 'substantive flexibility in the deployment of decontested concepts', and is designed to serve the conservative belief in the extra-human origins of the social order.[46] The other he terms a (D) 'swivel-mirror technique', whereby conservatism fashions adjacent concepts in reaction to its progressive opposition, the aim of which is to shield its core conception of organic change (A).[47] In Freeden's mind, an awareness of this feature serves to relieve the tension in British C/conservatism's so-called dual tradition, between the seemingly oppositional creeds of One Nation Toryism and Thatcherite neo-liberalism.[48] A morphological analysis, we are told, reveals the large degree to which these bodies of thought shared the same basic morphology and, in so doing, underlines the contingency of their respective collectivist and individualist

[44] Many have insisted that conservatism is not an ideology. One such author is the British conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott, who features prominently in the subsequent chapter. Another is the American conservative, Russell Kirk. See R. Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* (Washington D.C., 7th revised Ed., [1953] 2001), p. 490.
[45] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 334; See also E. Neill, *Conservatism (Key Concepts in Political Theory)* (Cambridge, 2021).
[46] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 345.
[47] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 336.
[48] This thesis uses 'Conservatism' to refer to the traditional philosophy/attitude of the British Conservative Party and 'conservatism' to refer to conservative ideologies.

orientations.[49] The conservative notion of change is thus decisive. It is that conception around which adjacent concepts rally and which affects the latter's potential polysemy. Beyond its core concepts, conservatism's morphology displays no consistency in the concepts it deploys. What is consistent is the routine by which it employs a diverse range of concepts to shore up its core. The commonality between differing conservatisms thus lies in their morphology as a whole – something not often evident during the heat of ideological battle.[50]

Freeden thereby deals a rebuke to traditional, prescriptive studies of conservatism, the authors of which have typically tended to highlight values central to progressive ideologies and then proceeded to search for their conservative equivalents. If, for instance, socialists are seen to hold dear to equality and liberals to individualism, what, many have asked, is the conservative attitude to those concepts.[51] But this, Freeden maintains, is beside the point, for progressive (mainly, socialism and liberalism) and conservative ideologies construct altogether different morphologies to one another. 'Liberal and socialist ideologies emphasise a coherent set of ideas that order human political experience in a purposive manner, and is designed to optimize the realization of certain desirable social values', whereas conservatives, in their embrace of the idea of organic change, 'intentionally […] avoid the search for fundamentally new rational solutions to social issues'.[52] By Freeden's reckoning, in its relation to any status quo, conservatism is concerned not so much with halting change as with mitigating its potentially harmful consequences. In Freeden's own words, conservativism as an ideology proffers a 'diachronic interpretation of the present, in which the structure rather than the contents of the diachrony requires protection […] Through it a specific version of historical continuity secures the presentation of social order per se'.[53] Practically-speaking, this translates into attempts on the part of conservatives to build specific (and, to their minds, organic) historical traditions as a means to rendering safe historical change.

Did Joseph identify as a conservative of the type described by Freeden? Would that it were so simple. Joseph's respect for what he called conservatism waxed and waned. Sir Keith thought the United Kingdom of 1975 conservative with a small 'c'. Which is to say that he did not think that it 'believe[d] in collective solutions'.[54] Instead,

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[49] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 349.
[50] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 382.
[51] For example, see Dorey's scholarship, which Chapter Two critiques: P. Dorey, *British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality* (London, 2010).
[52] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 335.
[53] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 333.
[54] 'Panorama – 23rd June 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 38, p. 8.

it was freedom-loving. Yet the same small c was employed in the exact same year as a pejorative to describe the socialist enemy. Tony Benn was the conservative. With his proposed National Enterprise Board, he was, Joseph said, like a museum-curator, dedicated to 'preserving the obsolete'. 'If Benn had been alive the hand-loom weavers – the thatchers and the fletchers – would be weaving and thatching the arrow-making still'.[55] He shared in this parochialism with the trade unions. In *Monetarism is Not Enough*, Joseph accused them of being 'deeply conservative – with a small 'c''. They 'had come increasingly to rationalise this conservatism by the use of heroic socialist phraseology'.[56] Their socialism was, therefore, a kind of cover - a view which was not shared across Joseph's speeches and writings, wherein Sir Keith largely took socialists at their word. Consistency is a wonderful thing, if you can find it. Alas, Sir Keith continued to chop and change in his opinion of conservatism. The episode of Panorama quoted from above was not a lone slip-up. *Monetarism is Not Enough* was published in 1976. Spool forward fifteen years and in another CPS publication, and seemingly speaking with himself in mind, Joseph wrote that '[n]o one, especially not a conservative, can expect a quick transformation'.[57] Despite his ambivalence towards what he called conservatism, however, this thesis argues that Joseph was indeed what Freeden labels a conservative.

By default, in being a conservative of the kind theorised by Freeden, Joseph was not a liberal. Even were Thatcherism to have been 'largely inspired by nineteenth-century liberalism', as Garnett and one of Thatcher's most high profile Tory critics, Lord Gilmour, assert, this would not entail that it was 'clearly incompatible with post-war British Conservatism'.[58] Now is not the time for a forensic dissection of liberalism, nineteenth-century or otherwise. In the space available, this thesis cannot pretend to be able to offer an extended definition of that ideology. Bell's survey is enough to convince anyone who is in need of convincing that any off-the-cuff definition of what the liberal believes is likely to raise as many questions as it answers.[59] For what it is worth, Freeden and Stear's list appears trustworthy: liberalism's core concepts seem to be

[55] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt Mp (Leeds NE) the Opposition Spokesman with overall responsibility for policy and research speaking at the Editors Dinner, Guild of British Newspapers, Council House, Birmingham on Friday 11 April 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 80, p. 5.
[56] The Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP, with a foreword by the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, *Monetarism is Not Enough* (London, 1976), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 106/8, p. 7.
[57] Lord Joseph, *The Importance of Parenting* (London, 1991), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 114/24, p. 8.
[58] M. Garnett and Lord Gilmour, 'Thatcherism and the Conservative Tradition', in M. Francis and I. Zweiniger-Burljielowska (Eds.), *The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990* (Cardiff, 1996), p. 89.
[59] D. Bell, 'What is Liberalism?', *Political Theory*, 42/6 (2014), pp. 682-715.

liberty, rationality, sociability, individuality, constrained power, progress, and the general interest.[60] For the purposes of this analysis, however, it will suffice to think of liberalism, like socialism, simply as a rationalist ideology. Whether liberalism tends to prioritise liberty over the general interest (or vice versa) is neither here nor there. What matters is that the liberal values such concepts because they tell her that they are valuable. They are to one degree or another valuable in liberalism in and of themselves. A belief at any one time in rationality, individuality, progress and the like, it ought by now to be clear therefore, doth not a liberal make. If it did, then Joseph would indeed be a liberal. But when Joseph argued for, for instance, liberty, he did so not because that concept was for him necessarily valuable but due to its happening to be a means to shoring up his core concepts. To Joseph, as a conservative, liberty was ultimately contingent. That concept was not for him inherently worthy, and so he was not a liberal (or socialist).

Judging the extent to which Sir Keith Joseph's political thought conforms to the definition of conservatism detailed above is this thesis' raison d'être. Freeden has given us a leg up in this respect; he has already gone some way towards outlining Thatcherism's morphology.[61] As a form of conservatism, Thatcherites' mirror-image technique was, Freeden says, directed at both a bureaucratic state and Soviet totalitarianism, in response to which Thatcherism appealed to self-confidence and self-reliance, and constitutionalism and individual liberties, respectively.[62] Far from representing the ends of Thatcherism, those concepts deemed by many scholars as central to that ideology are thus revealed to be merely adjacent: the authority of the state and individualism were for their advocates merely means to buttress the conservative core and thus be 'protective of what made Britain great in the past'.[63] As stated by Freeden, Thatcherism's adjacent concepts included, amongst others, security of private property (reinforced via its association with democracy), individual responsibility, incentives and nationhood.[64] Perimeter concepts such as privatisation and lower taxes supposedly secured the ideology's inner structure, being adaptable to cultural constraints and historical circumstances.[65] The former policy in particular is thought to have contributed substantially to shoring up Thatcherism's morphology, functioning as a means to economic freedom and consumer choice, as well as eliciting

[60] M. Freeden and M. Stears, 'Liberalism', in M. Freeden, L. Tower Sargent and M. Stears (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford, 2013), p. 341.
[61] Indeed, his 1996 magnum opus briefly makes mention of Sir Keith. See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 395.
[62] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 388, 397-398.
[63] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 388.
[64] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 391.
[65] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp. 393-394.

individual performance.[66] All of these concepts – both adjacent and peripheral - were subject to specific decontestations of course. The essential contestability of democracy, for instance, was minimised via its association with economic freedom and independence.[67] Rights, meanwhile, were decontested as traditional liberties under the rule of law, while their corresponding duties were grounded in a 'cultural constraint promoting the obligation not to burden others and, instead, to assume self-responsibility', thereby impeding any move towards a decontestation of rights under a system of social justice or welfarism.[68]

At bottom, this thesis is a case study. It puts *Ideologies and Political Theory* to the test. In doing so, its argument affirms the viability both of Freeden's interpretation of conservatism and of the idea of Thatcherism as a form of that kind of conservatism. Which is not to say that Freeden's understanding of Thatcherism in general, summarised in the previous paragraph, seamlessly accommodates Joseph, a specific Thatcherite. Ours is not an exercise in box-ticking. The forthcoming chapters accord with the essence of Freeden's interpretation while also significantly expanding upon it. A relatively minor example in this respect is chapters Three and Four's emphasising more than Freeden has the adjacent status of the rule of law and the free market within Thatcherism.[69] Those concepts were in Sir Keith's morphology, this thesis wishes to stress, only contingent articulations of Joseph's core concepts. More significantly perhaps, this thesis argues that, as a signifier, the wording 'the extra-human origins of the social order' signifies in Sir Keith's political thought that which Joseph deemed to be 'natural', including human nature.[70] Moreover, though this thesis cannot claim to be wholly original (given that it tallies with Freeden's interpretation of Thatcherism), that interpretation is itself hardly exotic, as a number of other scholars have reached similar conclusions independently. The subsequent chapter highlights the overlap between Freeden's and many others' interpretations of conservatism as anti-rationalist for example. No, the originality of this enterprise, such as it is, is that of synthesising Freeden's interpretation of conservatism – which ranges broadly from Burke to Thatcher – with post-war British politics and the issues pertaining therein, like embourgeoisement and the social market economy. The result of which is a history of Thatcherism as part of a continuum.

It will be noted that the decision at the heart of this thesis, to label Joseph a conservative rather than a liberal, is not based principally on an assessment of Sir Keith's policy prescriptions – of such issues as low taxation and privatisation, important

[66] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 394.
[67] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 392.
[68] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 389.
[69] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 391.
[70] Alternative extra-human origins might be the divine or biological laws.

though these were. Furthermore, inasmuch as this document concentrates on Joseph's core and adjacent concepts – that is, on the likes of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, liberty and inequality – instead of on his peripheral ones, it tells a story of continuity over change. Most histories of post-war Britain are, to one degree or another, histories of change (or lack thereof), and this is especially true of those of them that place their spotlight on what they call Thatcherism. Scholars have long debated whether the so-called Thatcher revolution was ever really that, a revolution. Kavanagh, for instance, has written of 'the abandonment of the consensus' between post-war Britain's political elites.[71] By contrast, according to Kerr and Marsh, the popular idea of the Thatcher governments as radical change-makers, in which Kavanagh is invested, is one example of what they call 'a strong tendency in the literature to adopt a simplistic conception of change in which the postwar period is simply bisected'.[72] For them, '[o]ver the postwar period […] change is usefully conceptualized in evolutionary terms'.[73] They might be right. Or perhaps Kavanagh is. Neither of their contentions preoccupies this thesis however, which engages with an altogether different level of analysis.

Whereas Kavanagh, Kerr and Marsh are concerned by and large with the largest concentric circle of any ideology's morphology, this thesis is attracted to the rings which that outermost one contains, as a means to determining the identity of the ideology that all of those layers constituted. There can be change in one respect and continuity in another. In effect, the forthcoming chapters argue that if indeed there was a fundamental change to Conservatives' policy prescriptions in the 1970s and 1980s (as might be exemplified by Conservatism's reorientation from Keynesianism to monetarism), then this did not damage the nature of the network of political concepts of which such policies were a part. The same is true of Conservative conservatives' adjacent concepts. Their changing would not have harmed Conservative conservatives' basic morphology. Now, it just so happens that Sir Keith Joseph was remarkably consistent in this regard. This thesis detects very little in the way of a change in his adjacent concepts, as will be made clear in its argument. It thereby aligns itself with Denham and Garnett's analysis in distrusting Sir Keith's self-declared conversion. Yet whether Joseph's adjacent or peripheral concepts did or did not change is irrelevant to the nature of his ideology. Whether Joseph was as he was, or whether he was more like

[71] D. Kavanagh, 'Whatever Happened to Consensus Politics?', *Political Studies*, 33/4 (1985), p. 541; See also: D. Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?* (Oxford, 1990).
[72] P. Kerr and D. Marsh, 'Explaining Thatcherism: Towards a Multidimensional Approach', in D. Marsh, J. Buller, C. Hay, J. Johnston, P. Kerr, S. McAnulla and M. Watson (Eds.), *Postwar British Politics in Perspective* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 211.
[73] Kerr and Marsh, 'Explaining Thatcherism', p. 214.

his colleague Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham, who features later) in changing course from a Middle Way Conservative position to a more Thatcherite one, it matters not, for what is ultimately at issue is not the contents but the structure of Joseph's political thought.[74] What matters is that he was a conservative and not that he was one particular species of conservative rather than another.

Crucially, this continuity allowed for change. This might seem paradoxical. But it in the end is why it matters historically that Joseph was a conservative and not a liberal.[75] It goes without saying that any ideologist in the round, liberals included, can change their mind. Again, ideologies' make-ups are not essentialist. It is not the ideology which controls its producer but the other way around. When we consider the kind of liberalism that Joseph and his fellow Thatcherites are often associated with however, those individuals were as liberals, according to those who label them as such, less open to changing their minds than they might have been. This comes across in the following chapter in particular, which observes the frequent portrayal of Thatcherism as a form of rationalism of the kind that deduces knowledge on the basis of reason. Thus the Thatcherite view of the market, pace Friedrich Hayek, has been thought to have been one of inviolability. In being a conservative, though, Joseph – and also, this thesis wishes to suggest, Thatcherism – was not only concerned with (organic) change but was himself open to change, largely because of conservatism's dialectical character, arising in opposition to a perceived progressive antagonist. Chapter Two arguably makes the most of this particular logic's historical implications, of all other concepts in the conservative's morphology being in thrall to conservatism's core ones. It contends that if the 1945-1979 post-war consensus detailed in Chapter One was a broadly egalitarian one, requiring greater levels of redistribution than the Joseph of the 1970s was entirely comfortable with, then Sir Keith, in spite of his wariness towards equality of outcomes (alongside egalitarianism) and material determinations aside, would possibly have permitted that settlement to endure in one form or another as long as it allowed for the flourishing of the organic change which, Joseph believed, the aforementioned consensus had via its undermining of the market come to frustrate.

[74] Middle Way Conservatism is best thought of as a conservatism supportive of managed capitalism: R. Eccleshall, *English Conservatism Since the Restoration: An Introduction and Anthology* (London, 1990), pp. 179-188.

[75] Historically, because history ultimately concerns contingencies. See R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of History and Other Writings in Philosophy of History* [Eds. W. H. Dray and J. Van der Dussen] (Oxford, 1999), and M. Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 86-168.

All of which furthers our understanding of what Peter Hall called the 1970's "marketplace of ideas".[76] This is the notion that, both inside Parliament and outside it, a crisis of legitimation caused by Keynesianism's demise allowed for the widening of the intellectual battlefield and the multiplication of those who fought upon it. A crisis occurred, to which Thatcherism was the most successful response. But it was not an organic one, and its component events were narrativised by the Thatcherites to produce not *the* story but *a* story. Thatcherism in turn was fundamentally contingent – the result of what Hilton and his co-authors have called 'a difficult decade, but one ripe with potential'.[77] It is this potential that concerns us. Many scholars have argued that there was nothing inevitable about the ascent to power of the New Right, globally let alone in the United Kingdom. Hay has spoken of the 'narrativity' of the British crisis, while Pemberton and Black have edited an entire collection which emphasises the 1970s as a decade of flux.[78] Though various such authors have shown how the "marketplace" in question had many more ideational traders than Hall's original and largely binary formulation lets on, their conception of political contestation, like Hall's, still relates mainly to policy paradigms. Little is said of the raw conceptual components that interest this study. This thesis goes some way towards filling that lacunae.

It supplements in particular the kind of nondeterministic analysis advanced by, to take one notable example, Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Thomlinson, who have together argued that what they term popular individualism in individuals' claiming of rights and asserting of identities 'did not lead inexorably to Thatcherism', which harnessed a preexisting popular individualism to its own ends.[79] There were alternative outlets for that individualism on what Robinson et al the call the political Left, with some in the 1970s (an increasingly individualistic decade, as the increase in births outside wedlock heralded) foreseeing individual agency as being best fulfilled collectively. Participatory politics and plans for workers' control in industry, as well as proposals for wider share ownership, all spoke to a 'desire for greater autonomy' and

[76] P. A. Hall, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, 25/3 (1993), pp. 275-296.
[77] M. Hilton, C. Moores and F. Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, *New Times* revisited: Britain in the 1980s, *Contemporary British History*, 31/2 (2017), p. 116.
[78] C. Hay, 'Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1/3 (1999), p. 320; C. Hay, 'Rethinking Crisis: Narratives of the new Right and Constructions of Crisis', *Rethinking Marxism*, 8/2 (1995), pp. 60-76; See in particular: D. Blackburn, 'Penguin Books and the 'marketplace of ideas'', in L. Black, H. Pemberton and P. Thane (Eds.), *Reassessing 1970s Britain* (Manchester, 2013), pp. 224-251.
[79] E. Robinson, C. Schofield, F. Sutcliffe-Braithwaite & N. Thomlinson, 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain: Popular Individualism and the 'Crisis' of the 1970s', *Twentieth Century British History*, 28/2 (2017), p. 268.

represented a means of pushing back against "Establishment" politics and corporatism.[80] It may well have been that popular individualism had various 'valences' (from middle class suburbia to anarchist punks), but what this thesis emphasises is not that social democracy (with for example its own understanding of popular individualism) might have won out over what has come to be called Thatcherism, but that this distinction between social democrats and Thatcherites is itself too binary by half, and that Thatcherism, being constituted by conservatives, was mutable.[81] Thatcherism was not preprogrammed. If 'popular individualism could in many ways point towards an expanded politics of equality', for instance, then a certain variant of that "left popular individualism" need not have waited for socialists and liberals to enact it.[82] It is for this reason that this thesis, unlike many scholars, avoids calling the post-war consensus a 'social democratic' one, because to do so would buy into Joseph's argument that post-1945 Conservatives had been in some sense unconservative, and would thus be to ignore the great extent to which that consensus was constituted by conservatives who were not unconservative for constituting it.[83]

This thesis thus privileges continuity over change as a means to highlighting the 1970s as a moment of flux between conjunctures, even if the tale it tells might not have been one that Joseph, a self-declared revolutionary, recognised.[84] In much the same way, nowhere can Joseph be found saying: "I came into politics to secure the extra-human origins of the social order and organic change". Chance would be a fine thing. What Sir Keith did say was that he 'only entered politics, however, because of a hatred of poverty'.[85] He had similarly claimed one year earlier, in 1974, that he went 'into

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[80] Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite & Thomlinson, 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain', p. 268, 272-273, 282.
[81] Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite & Thomlinson, 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain', p. 302.
[82] Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite & Thomlinson, 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain', p. 302.
[83] Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite & Thomlinson, 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain', p. 277; A. Gamble, 'Economic Growth and Political Dilemmas', in his *'After Brexit' and Other Essays* (Bristol, 2021), p. 134.
[84] According to Hall, the post-war consensus was one conjuncture and Thatcherite neo-liberalism another. '[H]istory moves from one conjuncture to another rather than being an evolutionary flow. And what drives it usually a crisis, when the contradictions that are always at play in any historical moment are condensed […] Crises are moments of political change, but the nature of their resolution is not given. It may be that society moves on to another version of the same thing […] or relations can be radically transformed' (S. Hall and D. Massey, 'Interpreting the Crisis', *Soundings*, 44 (2010), p. 57). For a classic example of a conjunctural analysis, see S. Hall, C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2nd Ed., [1978] 2013).
[85] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 6.

politics […] to help bridge the divisions in society' and 'saw the best way of doing so to be the twin policies of increasing national wealth and levelling up rather than down'. That forever had been and was still his 'prime concern'.[86] On these comments alone, Joseph could be put down as a socialist or liberal. And Joseph's concern for society's poorest may well have taken precedents over the abstract concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order in the forthcoming analysis were this thesis a contextualist reading of the kind advocated by the so-called Cambridge school of intellectual history. Yet it is part and parcel of interrogating any individual's ideology that we should venture beyond what they took themselves to be doing.

Ideologies contain what Ricoeur termed a 'surplus of meaning': they are sites of both intentional and *unintentional* cognition.[87] Furthermore, the former, in the guise of purposive speech-acts, are invariably fashioned by the latter in the shape of the unconscious cultural assumptions and implicit meanings incorporated into rational political thinking. Thinking and action are not mutually exclusive; the former is a genre of the latter. In particular, and though in no sense to assert a binary between thought and language or downplay the great extent to which the former is often embodied in the latter, in its tendency towards the unarticulated much political thought can be seen to represent what has been termed 'thought-behaviour'.[88] Grammar is a case in point, the nature of its structure and synchronicity being largely incomprehensible to all but the professional linguist. Individuals may be purposive. But they are never wholly so. In view of the multiple levels of possible interpretation held in any form of linguistic expression, should they seek to provide effective explanations, second order analyses of ideologies must decode and reconstruct via inference additional, unintended and unarticulated concepts and patterns of thought-behaviour meaningless to their respective authors. We must attend to the intertwining of signified and symbol – to the 'silent speech' intrinsic to linguistic expression.[89] In short, we cannot take Sir Keith Joseph's political thought at face value.

Culture and logic are two factors that circumscribe concepts' meanings, neither of which Joseph intended and yet both of which were, as Chapter Two contends, critical for his conservatism. Another such example, and one that has not passed Joseph's biographers by, is that of the emotions. Halcrow identifies 'plenty of what any psycho-

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[86] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, BT., Conservative Candidate for North East Leeds, Shadow Home Secretary, speaking at the Talbot C.F. School, East Moor Road, Leeds, on Thursday, 8th October 1974', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 4.

[87] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', p. 122; P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, 1976), p. 55.

[88] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 43.

[89] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 43.

analyst would identify as anger' in Joseph in 1974 – anger that was motivated by the Conservative Party's supposed ignorance of economics.[90] While very often, under Denham and Garnett's analysis, that politician's political thinking is pathologised. Joseph's committed resistance to alternative policy frameworks in the latter part of his career is thus read through the lens of his complex personality, with Denham and Garnett informing their reader as to how, '[h]aving decided to blame himself for inadequate 'moral courage' in his early ministerial life, he [Joseph] was easily persuaded by new allies such as [Alfred] Sherman that he could only compensate for this by plunging headlong into an ideological battle against 'socialism''.[91] Also testament to Joseph's psychology, apparently, was his jettisoning of the term "social market" in favour of "the market", following his discovery that the primary exemplar of the former model, West Germany, pursued levels of state intervention at odds with his free market principles.[92] These explanations may or may not be true. What is significant in the context of this venture is the great extent to which Denham and Garnett's focusing in their monograph on Joseph's psychology acts to crowd out the ideological, with the authors of *Keith Joseph* remarking as to how, in the mid-1970s, 'the change in Joseph had been more psychological than ideological'.[93]

Yet for our purposes, Sir Keith's emotional state and ideology ought not to be thought of as nearly so distinct. For just as ideologies straddle intentional and unintentional meaning, so too do they lie at the interface between the rational and irrational. What political philosophers might deem defective thinking is simply reflective of the tumult entailed in most first-order political thinking. While all belief systems must aspire to a certain level of logical consistency if they are to be communicable to their publics, the extent to which this is an overriding feature of ideologies' constitutions should not be overstated. Even the most sophisticated corpus of political thought will contain at least some degree of what Freeden calls 'extra-rational preferences'.[94] Unfortunately, there is not the space available to delve into the nature of Joseph's emotional convulsions. What we will come across however are plenty of instances where Joseph was inconsistent or illogical, many of which were most likely due to Sir Keith as a politician having to make his ideas, which in many cases amounted to political philosophy, accessible to a mass audience. This thesis might be interested in what can broadly be termed intellectual politics, but Joseph, as well as those other politicians who feature hereinafter and who thought extensively about politics, was expected to face the

[90] Halcrow, *Keith Joseph*, p. 63.
[91] Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 68.
[92] Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 69.
[93] Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 252
[94] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 30.

electorate every few years and to be comprehendible to Joe Public. Chapter Two demonstrates how Joseph, in spite of his concern being egalitarianism and not equality per se, still occasionally referred to equality as being the issue – a decision that Joseph presumably took because he thought that equality was the more recognisable term. But, as all of the forthcoming chapters bear witness, Joseph's rhetoric was coherent enough for us to be able to think of Sir Keith as having at any one time a singular political thought and, in turn, an ideology which this thesis calls conservative.

Speaking of the general public, mentioned above, it is largely Joseph's public speeches and writings that this thesis plunges, and not Sir Keith's private correspondences or contributions to private meetings. This is on two counts. Firstly, because this thesis places Joseph's more abstract concepts in the limelight, and those concepts feature far less in Joseph's contributions to, say, parliamentary debates and committees than do the ideas, like monetarism and education vouchers, which such concepts helped to animate. And, second of all, because ideologies are public-oriented: rarely are they ever devised solely for their creators' personal satisfaction, but are instead intended to spur a community to action, whether that be to vote one way rather than another, or to accept an ideology as the natural order of things. As such, the source base for the forthcoming analysis centres around the pamphlets and books that Joseph authored or co-authored, such as *Equality* and *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, as well as Sir Keith's public speeches in the Conservative Party Archive. Although many of these speeches are full transcripts, some are titled as extracts (which are still to all intents and purposes contiguous in content) and others as summaries. This thesis uses these rather than the speeches of Joseph's housed in the collection of his private papers at the Bodleian Library not only because the latter, according to the Conservative Party Archive at least, relate only to the period from 1969 to the mid-1970s – whereas Sir Keith's speeches in the broader archive, which this thesis does use, date from 1959 to 1990 - but also due to the fact that those private papers cannot be photographed and, not knowing what the argument of this thesis was going to be before it was written, it was important to have Joseph's political thought readily available as a point of reference.[95]

The subsequent chapters drill down into Sir Keith Joseph's political thought so as to understand Thatcherism as an ideology (which Joseph is typically taken to be an advocate for) and, given that this thesis argues that Thatcherism was a conservative ideology, to better comprehend both the nature of conservatism and the politics of the 1970s. But if Joseph has the starring role from here on out, that does not mean that this thesis is a one-man show, as a number of Sir Keith's contemporaries have walk-on

[95] When full speeches of Joseph's have been unavailable, the present author availed himself of the resources of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation online.

parts, including Anthony Crosland and Roger Scruton. In a study of conservatism, such a comparative element as this is not so much a luxury as it is a necessity, in view of conservatisms' nature in deriving their meanings via the mirror-image technique in reaction against other ideologies, as well as the necessity, referenced earlier, of toggling between the macro and the micro, so that we appreciate both any individual conservatism's distinctiveness and the ideological umbrella beneath which any conservative's political thought sits. This thesis proceeds as follows. The subsequent chapter analyses Sir Keith's epistemology and maintains that what Joseph thought to be knowable depended on his core ontological beliefs. Chapter Two attends to equality and argues that Joseph's problem was less with that concept and far more with a rationalist egalitarianism. It also shows how Joseph only favoured inequality insofar as that concept was a byproduct of human nature. Freedom is the domain of this thesis' third chapter: Chapter Three contends that freedom in Joseph's ideological morphology deviated from a negative definition of that concept, which Sir Keith espoused, to a positive one, in order that organic change be maximised, and is thus best considered republican in nature. The final chapter of this thesis, number four, examines the market in Joseph's ideology. That concept features heavily in the preceding analysis, thanks to its prominence in Joseph's political thought. What Chapter Four focuses on in particular though is the market's status for Joseph as a tributary of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. The sum total of these chapters is to argue that their namesakes – Joseph's epistemology, equality, freedom, and the market – were in Sir Keith's political thought subordinate to the conservative core, that Joseph was therefore a conservative and Thatcherism a form of conservatism, and hence that, conservatism being an anti-rationalist and reactive ideology, the 1970s was with respect to political ideas opportunity-laden, with the Conclusion using this argument to argue in turn for what it deems the 'logic of conservatism'.

Chapter One: Epistemology

Ideologies are like rooms. Their layouts betray their profiles. But rooms have walls and foundations, and those for ideologies are perhaps best thought of as being their accompanying epistemologies, which concern the nature of knowledge. Episteme refers to "knowledge", and ology to "study" or "logos". Needless to say, this chapter is unconcerned with epistemologists and epistemologies as such. We are not philosophising. As a second-order activity, this thesis cares little for the actual nature of and criteria for knowledge. Our task is to understand what Joseph though to be knowable. Blackburn, of whom more later, has in his survey of contemporary ideology studies highlighted this kind of consideration of the epistemological makeup of any individual's political thought as one amongst a number of pertinent outlets for future research, for '[a]s yet […] historians of twentieth-century Britain have not uncovered these kinds of belief'.[1] In their contestation of political concepts, politicians cannot but help be informed by epistemological beliefs of one form or another however. The imbuing of concepts with value and the recommendation of their fulfilment in the form of particular policies is of necessity symbiotic with determining what is knowable about the past and, perhaps most importantly, the present and future. None but the lunatic or the professional polemicist would propose a prescription in the knowledge that it could not be actualised. Through Freeden's typology, we now know, ideologies are ubiquitious. Yet while all forms of political thinking are ideological, they may differ in their epistemologies. An analysis not only of the conceptual architecture of Joseph's political thought, but its epistemological layout also, will assist in determining the extent to which Joseph – and, to a large degree, Thatcherism – wholly diverged from the post-war consensus which that politician so frequently derided. Underlining the contours shared between ideologies in spite of their differing conceptual arrangements invites us to deconstruct or at the very least realign the traditional conception of post-war British politics. That is an invitation which this chapter gladly takes up.

This is no easy task. Save to admire any wallpaper or paint colour, we rarely take note of the walls of a room, and still less the foundations on which they stand. If ideologies are most readily visible through policy proposals, and then at a further level removed via the raw concepts that give rise to those programmes, the grounds of knowledge without which neither tier is possible, it is reasonable to presume, are rarely

[1] D. Blackburn, 'Still the stranger at the feast? Ideology and the study of twentieth century British politics', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 22/2 (2017), p. 124; Analyses of epistemologies in the context of everyday politics are sadly few and far between. For an exception that proves the rule, see Q. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political* (Oxford, 2019).

if ever stated explicitly. If not universally true, these suspicions are at least confirmed in the case of Joseph's rhetoric, in which Sir Keith's epistemology is only ever implicit. This is a caveat, not an excuse, and excavating Joseph's epistemology remains a worthwhile endeavor, not least thanks to the inroads made by Denham and Garnett, for whom Sir Keith represents what the philosopher Michael Oakeshott termed a rationalist in politics. As depicted by Oakeshott, the rationalist 'is the *enemy* of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or habitual', and seeks to throw out that which cannot be avowed by reason, which in turn is based in 'rules, principles, directions [and] maxims'.[2] The latter, technical knowledge can be 'learned from a book […] learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically', and was juxtaposed by Oakeshott with the practical knowledge that 'exists only in practice', and can be 'only imparted and acquired' rather than learned or taught.[3]

Joseph was one such technician. Or so Denham and Garnett would have us believe. For those authors, Sir Keith conveyed his rationalism most openly in his commitment to what they call a 'de-contextualised form of economic determinism'.[4] A significant outlet for this form of thinking, we are told, was Joseph's tendency towards ''Utopian' speculations', a principal example of which was Sir Keith's conception of what he termed embourgeoisement – of, to quote Joseph, 'a state in society where most people own and earn enough to have choice and scope and where everyone has the attitudes and time-horizons to make use of them'.[5] The forthcoming analysis rejects Denham and Garnett's depiction of embourgeoisement in Joseph's political thought. That stance is however only one iteration of this study's broader opposition to the portrayal of Sir Keith as a rationalist. The then-Member of Parliament for Leeds North East was no more a rationalist than, say, his Middle Way Conservative colleagues. To argue this is not merely to disagree with Denham and Garnett. Our issue is not so much with two biographers as it is with the wider strand of historiography which their thinking

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[2] M. Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in politics', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 5, 14; It was not simply for its epistemological naivety that Oakeshott opposed rationalism, but for its dismissal of the plurality of historical experience in modern Europe too, for Oakeshott attached significance to those traditions which have endured, amongst which modern individualism, having grown in the Medieval period, ranked highly.

[3] Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in politics', p. 15; This does not mean that one ideology is any less ideological than another. If anything, a distinction between rationalist and non-rationalist ideologies keeps intact, albeit in a different guise, the instinctive contrast in the popular imagination between supposedly ideological political thought, like Nazism and Communism, and those ideologies often deemed to be non-ideological.

[4] Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 71.

[5] Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 69; Joseph quoted in Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 413.

represents. For in attributing a specifically rationalist epistemology to Sir Keith Joseph's political thought, Denham and Garnett are by no means lonely warriors. They stand alongside a league of scholars for whom Thatcherism represents a rationalist departure from the post-war Conservative Party's epistemological norms.[6] Gray maintains that the Conservatives under Thatcher attempted to 'yoke Conservatism, perhaps for the first time in its history, to an Enlightenment utopia'.[7] On that view, traditional institutions and a form of Tory statecraft which governed via evolutionary adaptation were in the minds of those bourgeois modernisers out, and radical individualism and submission to market forces, both animated by an Enlightenment rationalism, decidedly in.

Oakeshott's is not the only rationalism however. In distinction to the rationalist as pure political technician, the twentieth-century philosopher Karl Popper, who described himself as a 'rationalist of sorts', posed the rationalist as falsifier.[8] As laid out in, amongst other texts, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, those Popper described as critical rationalists criticise claims to knowledge and seek not to verify but to falsify them. To be falsifiable is to be empirical and therefore to be embraced as scientific. Knowledge is thus unjustified untrue belief; it is not justified true belief. Critical rationalism is not a form of justificationism; the opposite is true - it is a kind of non-justificationism. While not necessarily a relativist, the critical rationalist does not believe that knowledge, rationality or reason are foundational or infallible. She views rationality as the provisional acceptance of those theories which have withstood extended criticism. Hence the best scientific hypotheses are conjectural. As Gray writes: on Popper's account, 'every identification of a natural law is tentative and permanently liable to overthrow'.[9] To be rational for Popper is to prefer the best-tested theory, and only if we have a better one are we justified (and rational) in rejecting that theory. Yet while Popper was a philosopher of science, critical rationalism is not limited to the occupants of laboratories. It has a 'practical consequence for science, for ethics, and even for politics'.[10] Indeed, Popper conceded that as far as critical rationalism in the social and natural sciences is concerned, 'the methods in the two fields are fundamentally the same', and that 'the existence of sociological laws or hypotheses which are analogous to the laws or hypothesis of the natural sciences is one

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[6] See also Gamble's comment that 'many aspects of Thatcherism were rationalist': A. Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism* (Basingstoke, 2nd Ed., [1988] 1994), p. 159.
[7] J. Gray, 'The Undoing of Conservatism', in his *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and culture at the close of the modern age* (Abingdon, Oxon, 2007), p. 152
[8] K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London, [1963] 2002), p. 8.
[9] J. Gray, *Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy* (London, 1990), p. 16.
[10] Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 5.

thing that unites the two'.[11] Popper thus finds an analogy for tradition in the form of scientific theories. Both for him create 'a certain order or something like a social structure' and provide 'something upon which we can operate; something that we can criticize and change'.[12] As befits his type of rationalism, Popper argued for 'a critical attitude, which may result either in acceptance of rejection, or perhaps in a compromise'.[13] Thus he thought both possible and worthwhile small-scale 'social experiments', examples of which could be as banal as 'a new kind of life-insurance, of a new kind of taxation, of a new penal reform'.[14] In taking this view and despite their similarities, Popper parted company with Hayek – for whom the social order is improvable only at the level of the abstract rules that govern its workings – and Oakeshott, the latter of whom, though united with Popper in favouring practical knowledge, disavowed the idea of politics as an activity in 'solving problems' – an outlook in the second instance totally removed from Popper's belief that to be 'in search of a better world' is an applaudable pursuit, and one alien also from his trusting in individual reason and its capacity to improve society.[15]

Joseph was not a critical rationalist per se. It would be absurd to pin dualistic interactionism to his mast, and not only for that term's appeal to philosophical jargon.[16] Caldwell has written of how the critical rationalist's purpose 'is to keep the critical process going, to build an ecology of critical inquiry, an environment in which the optimal amount of criticism is able to flourish'.[17] Sir Keith did not meet those standards. He did not believe that any prospectus, conjecture or theory ought to be subjected to constant and maximum scrutiny. Joseph was a politician with a job to do. What matters for our purposes is that his political thought lay far nearer to critical rationalism than to any other epistemology. That view relies on a certain generalisation of course. But then so too does Denham and Garnett's invoking of rationalism and singling out of Joseph. Strict adherence to Oakeshott's philosophy would have us call the vast majority of Britain's post-war political class rationalists. While Oakeshott believed that the history of all modern Europe bears the scars of rationalist surgery, he had an eye on post-war

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[11] K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1957] 2002), p. 120, 56.
[12] Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 176.
[13] Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 164.
[14] K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1945] 2011), p. 152.
[15] Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in politics', p. 9; K. Popper, *In Search of a Better World: Lectures and essays from thirty years* [Trans. L. J. Bennett, K. Popper & M. Mew] (London, [1994] 1996), p. 28.
[16] C. Herrmann-Pillath, 'The Brain, Its Sensory Order, and the Evolutionary Concept of Mind: On Hayek's Contribution to Evolutionary Epistemology', *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 15/2 (1992), p. 148.
[17] B. J. Caldwell, 'Clarifying Popper', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 29/1 (Mar., 1991), p. 25.

British governments when he warned of the ongoing construction of a managed society in place of the partnership of the generations. Even *The Case for Conservatism*, authored by a veritable apostle of consensual Middle Way Conservatism, Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham), and frequently deemed to be a bible of the One Nation cause, proved too rationalist for Oakeshott's taste.[18] Hayek fared no better: Oakeshott lamented that 'a plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite but it belongs to the same style of politics'.[19] In spite of which, Denham and Garnett are not unreasonable, even if they are wrong, in calling on Oakeshott as a point of reference. Broad brush strokes of a kind need not be a mark against anyone, the current author included.

In contending that Joseph was closest to being an anti-rationalist critical rationalist, this chapter's argument is dialectical. Its thesis, that Joseph inclined towards Popper's preferred rationalism, meets the antithesis of Oakeshott's anti-rationalism, and the resulting synthesis is to say that Joseph was a conservative whose core concepts, by delimiting his epistemology, were what allowed Sir Keith to be nearly one kind of rationalist and not another. Joseph's epistemology was and had to be in sync with his core. The next section bar one analyses Joseph's understanding of monetarism and argues that Joseph prescribed that medicine in order that he might see organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order restored to health. It shows how, though Joseph believed that monetarism was commonsensical and therefore empirical, the extra-human ends that Sir Keith thought that monetarism was designed to serve were insusceptible to wholesale empirical evaluation. What this precludes was the possibility of there having been for Joseph what Popper called 'social wholes'.[20] Popper linked such holism to what he termed historicism, by which he meant the false and teleological belief that history progresses towards a set destination, with human action animated by impersonal forces – 'the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history' - beyond the reach of individuals to comprehend or direct.[21] Wholesale social engineers' position, that a priori, theoretical ideals could be enforced upon society, was for Popper an impossibility, as knowledge has in critical rationalism little in the way of a firm basis and is advanced on critical rationalists'

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[18] M. Oakeshott, '*Contemporary British Politics*. Review of J. Parker, *Labour Marches On*, and Q. Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism* (1947)', in his *The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926-51* [Ed. L. O'Sullivan] (Exeter, 2007), pp. 203-219; For a sense of the highly contested nature of One Nation Conservatism, compare D. Seawright, 'One Nation', in K. Hickson (Ed.), *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 69-90 and R. Hayton, 'The demise of the One Nation tradition', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, 5/1 (2014), pp. 92-95.

[19] Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in Politics', p. 26.

[20] See Popper's criticism of holism in K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, pp. 70-75.

[21] K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 3.

accounts via gradual accumulation, trial and error. It was for this reason that while 'a better world' might be the end, in place of 'Utopian' approaches, the means for Popper had to be 'piecemeal'.[22] The same was broadly true in Joseph's thought, and the second section of this chapter demonstrates that there was in a complex social realm the origins of which were extra-human no knowledge of a causative ground zero from which to gain foresight of some forthcoming teleology. Section three develops this position and argues that what Joseph labelled progress, encompassing of embourgeoisement, was for him undetermined. This chapter's first section details those subsequent sections' theoretical and historical contexts, noting how this chapter's argument acts to both revise Blackburn's proposal for an epistemological post-war consensus and refute O'Hara's case that conservatism is first and foremost epistemological.

Anti-rationalism:

Sir Keith was not a rationalist. But he was closest to being a critical one. This, part of the argument of the present chapter, is a counterintuitive proposal. Margaret Thatcher stands astride the popular imagination as a crusader who baulked at compromise and embraced certainty. As with many stereotypes, there is a germ of truth to that image. T.I.N.A. – 'there is no alternative' - was one of her mantras. In a speech to a Conservative rally in Cardiff in 1979, that Prime Minister to-be gave the following oft-cited rallying cry: '[t]he Old Testament prophets didn't go out into the highways saying, 'Brothers, I want consensus.' They said, 'This is my faith and my vision.' This is what I passionately believe.' And they preached it. We have a message. Go out, preach it, practice it, fight for it – and the day will be ours'.[23] Considering that partisan exhortation, what is remarkable about Sir Keith, another senior Thatcherite, is the charity he offered his opponents. His writings and speeches evince an open and considered attempt on the part of their author to ask questions and not preempt the answers, to gain greater understanding and adapt according to circumstances. '[T]he truth', Sir Keith avowed in 1975, 'always emerges the stronger from questioning and dialogue'.[24] He wanted not simply to preach, but sought a measure of consensus. Speaking in 1979 on the need for a new legal framework to reign in alleged union

[22] K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 45, 63.
[23] M. Thatcher, 'Speech to Conservative Rally in Cardiff' (16/04/1979), *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104011>, accessed 12/02/2020, p. 8.
[24] 'Speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP (Leeds NE) Opposition Spokesman Responsible for Policy and Research to the National Viewers and Listeners Convention at the Midland Hotel, Birmingham on Saturday 22 February 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 79, p. 6.

misbehavior, for example, Joseph maintained that '[t]he first step in that direction is public debate to ensure that we all understand the problem, recognise that it must be tackled and find the best means of doing so', a 'crucially important' component of which was '[o]ur own debating style': '[w]e can make no progress if we refuse to understand the viewpoints of those who disagree with us. We must not over-simplfiy the problems'.[25] This chapter contends that this, his searching for truth and understanding, derived in part from Joseph's broadly Popperian epistemology.

That epistemology, according to which, as in Popper's conception of scientific method, knowledge is indeterminate and certain knowledge impossible, comes across in Sir Keith's (and Jonathan Sumption's) remark in 1979 as to how '[s]hared assumptions are intrinsically unsafe. Being shared they are not challenged, not tested and quite commonly not right'.[26] That statement was likely a byproduct at least partly of Joseph's view, as he argued five years earlier, that 'it [wa]s the current intellectual fashions which ha[d] wrought so much havoc'.[27] The best course of action for the Conservatives was thus not to follow fashion for fashion's sake, but to 'rest more confidently on traditional wisdom while picking our way through circumstances, events, ideas and intellectual fashions' – a prospectus which strikes a chord with Popper's understanding of tradition as something that can be criticised and changed.[28] Indeed, Joseph was in the aftermath of his self-diagnosed conversion highly self—critical, confessing four months after the Conservative defeat in the February 1974 General Election how, 'I must take my share of the blame for following too many of the fashions'.[29] As with fashion, so too with utopianism, Joseph judged himself during his previous ministerial career to have fallen for the habits of the day. He had himself been, he said, one of the utopians. Thus he told

[25] 'Text of a talk given by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., MP., (Leeds, North-East), Opposition Spokesman on Industry, in Committee Room 6, House of Commons, to members of the Bow Group, on Monday, 5th February, 1979, at 7.30 pm – 'Solving the union problem is the key to Britain's recovery'', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 104/2, pp. 11-12.
[26] K. Joseph and J. Sumption, *Equality* (London, 1979), p. 2.
[27] 'Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP (Leeds NE) Conservative Spokesman on Home Affairs, speaking at the Grand Hotel, Birmingham on Saturday 19 October 1974', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 78, p. 1.
[28] 'Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP (Leeds NE) Conservative Spokesman for Home Affairs speaking at a CPC Conference at the Royal Festival Hall (Purcell Room) on Saturday 26 January 1975 – Freedom Under the Law', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 79, p. 15.
[29] 'Text of a speech made by the Rt. Hon. Sir keith Joseph Bt. Leeds NE, Opposition spokesman for Home Affairs, Upminster on Saturday 22 June 1974', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 76, p. 3.

of how 'it was not long ago that we thought utopia was within reach'.[30] Indeed, there is about Joseph's rhetoric in the latter half of the 1970s and beyond the sense of a sinner doing penance. How better to explain Sir Keith's seemingly excusatory and preemptive rejection "post-conversion" of any allegation that he was, to use his own words, 'being Utopian'.[31] Despite which, Joseph was too hard on himself. Proof of which is Sir Keith's confession in 1967, in the midst of his supposed submission to fashion and utopianism, to 'a private nightmare', which arose 'from the tendency of today's fashion to be tomorrow's heresy' and which marks out once more Joseph's inclination towards a kind of fallibilism:

> Just suppose a widespread network of Family Advice Centres is set up. Suppose they pour out to eager clients a torrent of well-meant advice – and suppose it is all later shown to have been wrong! Well, we lurch in our pursuit of truth from approximation. But a Family Advice Centre sounds so confident and authoritative – and I hope a seemly humility will survive. We know so little.[32]

Joseph seemed to recognise that earlier, supposedly pre-conversion self-doubt in a 1974 speech, in which he claimed that he was well-aware while the Minister for the Social Services over the previous four years that attempts 'to take short cuts to Utopia' had 'generated more problems than we have solved'.[33]

This was easy talk of course. Joseph's appeals to bipartisanship and truth-telling might well have been empty perorations. What follows argues that they were not, and for the playing out in Joseph's political thought of what the current author takes to be a genuinely-held conception of knowledge which, like critical rationalism, was built upon an essentially evolutionary epistemology, where knowledge-accumulation occurs via a process of error-elimination in a method analogous to evolution by natural selection. This has implications for our understanding of both the Conservatives and the -ism to which that party's name bears allegiance. One knock-on effect is on the story we tell ourselves about post-war British politics. Spearheaded by Addison, the traditional post-war consensus thesis views the Conservative and Labour parties as having coalesced

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[30] 'Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Spokesman for Home Affairs and Conservative Candidate for Leeds NE speaking at Fairley Hill, Luton on Thursday 3rd October 1974', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 2.
[31] Joseph, *The Importance of Parenting*, p. 6.
[32] 'Text of a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), Opposition Spokesman on Trade, to the Conference of Children's Officers at Brighton, on Wednesday, 11th October, 1967 – "The context of the local authority personal services"', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 151, p. 10.
[33] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 5.

from approximately 1945 until 1979 around a set of shared policy prescriptions, including Keynesian demand management, the nationalisation of major industries, a mixed economy, and a welfare state.[34] As developed in academic monographs and articles, not every post-war consensus is identical. Kavanagh and Morris, for example, define that settlement as constituting both a specific group of policies pursued by post-war British governments and a corporatist style of government in which the Executive was in consultation with intermediary institutions such as trade unions.[35] Variations upon that theme nevertheless constitute the spine for a great many histories of post-war Britain. Despite which, the belief in the existence in the decades immediately after the Second World War of significant points of convergence is not a statement of fact; it is an interpretation of the facts.

Pimlott was correct to argue that what we call the post-war consensus is a result of historians' prioritising of certain categories and ideas over others.[36] Alongside Pimlott, who objected to the notion of a post-war consensus in his argument that few at the time thought they were living in consensual times and that both main parties were staunchly adversarial, Kerr is notable for having flipped the traditional idea of a post-war consensus on its head. Kerr proffers an 'alternative storyline' to that offered up by the likes of Addison who, he maintains, indulged in a form of 'myth-making' in their construction of a false binary between the period from 1945 to 1979 and that of 1979 onwards.[37] Unlike those scholars, in attempting to trace the evolution of the post-1945 British state and the dialectic between agency and structure in the development of institutional change, Kerr privileges comparisons over contrasts, and what this amounts to is a role reversal.[38] The "post-war consensus" was no such thing. It was its successor period, the United Kingdom of the 1980s and 1990s, which experienced a relative level of agreement over matters political and economic. The nation thus moved not from consensus to conflict but, if anything, vice versa.[39] For all that his argument is not ours,

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[34] P. Addison, *The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War* (London, 1975).

[35] D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, 'Commentary Two', in B. Pimlott, D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, 'Is the 'postwar consensus' a myth?', *Contemporary Record*, 2/6 (1989), pp. 14-15.

[36] B. Pimlott, 'Commentary One', in B. Pimlott, D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, 'Is the 'postwar consensus' a myth?', *Contemporary Record*, 2/6 (1989), pp. 12-14.

[37] P. Kerr, *Postwar British Politics: From conflict to consensus* (London, 2001), p. 7, 1.

[38] Kerr, *Postwar British Politics*, p. 29.

[39] Kerr, *Postwar British Politics*, p. 15; Thatcherism, Kerr rightly reminds us, did not emerge ex nihilo. It had a significant ancestry in its predecessor, the epoch to which it was opposed, and emerged from a context riven with discontinuities. Pulled between expansion and retraction, the British state evolved such as to permit aspects of what would turn out to be the Thatcherite strategy, like a persistent desire for fiscal rectitude

Kerr provides a crucial tonic in confirming that we dare imagine a different past. In this he is, however, exemplary, and not uniquely qualified. There is another – one whose addendum to the traditional idea of the post-war consensus, by bringing together the subject of late-twentieth-century British politics with matters epistemological, provides a springboard for this chapter to show, as it shortly will, that in being much more so a rationalist of the critical variety than the kind Oakeshott described, Joseph was far more in keeping with post-war Britain's purveyors of consensus than we might initially expect.

The post-war consensus of Blackburn's imagining is Popperian.[40] The United Kingdom's governing class was until the 1980s broadly united in their rejection of universalist solutions and utopian attempts to tailor the social order to abstract ideals and fixed ends, in their espousal of empirical enquiry, and in their preference for evolutionary and organic change – measured on the basis of present realities – as opposed to radical transformation. Rationalist modifications to society of the kind Oakeshott warned against were thus out of the question, and Middle Way Conservatives and revisionist social democrats took from Popper's writings the idea that appropriate political activity ought to be piecemeal and determined on the basis of sensory experience, since the outcomes of their actions could never be wholly foreseen. Blackburn cites Gilmour's quoting of Popper's remark as to how 'nothing ever comes off exactly as intended', in addition to which we can count one politician not mentioned by him (doubtless there are others), Denis Healey, who spoke of his own 'eclectic pragmatism' and voiced his indebtedness to Popper.[41] If there was a post-war consensus, therefore, it was rooted above all in a set of starting- rather than end-points. In saying all of this, Blackburn's intention is modest. Blackburn does not give an opinion as to the validity or otherwise of the idea of a post-war consensus as traditionally understood. His wish is simply to say 'that if such a consensus did exist, it may have had an epistemological foundation'.[42] None of which is to diminish the conceptual differences between Labour and Conservative parliamentarians of whatever shade of red or blue in

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and to act in the interests of the currency and finance - themselves at that stage a brake upon post-war governments' ability to fashion a stable state settlement or corporatist consensus - to lie dormant within it, and not only in political parties but in the Bank of England and the Treasury also. While even those features which typified the supposed post-war consensus, such as Keynesianism, were largely discursive, often customised and sometimes simply discarded, as the Labour Party's frequent turn to deflation underlines.

[40] D. Blackburn, 'Reassessing Britain's "Post-War Consensus": The Politics of Reason, 1945-1979', *British Politics*, 13 (2018), pp. 201-202.

[41] Blackburn, 'Reassessing Britain's "Post-war consensus"', p. 202; Healey quoted in N. Thompson, *Political Economy and the Labour Party* (London, 1996), p. 239; See also B. Magee, *The New Radicalism* (London, 1962), p, 14, 30, 73.

[42] Blackburn, 'Reassessing Britain's "Post-war consensus"', p. 199.

post-war Britain. It is simply to note that both sides shared the same platform from which they reached for their differing conclusions.

1979 remains the watershed. The parameters of the epistemological post-war consensus are according to Blackburn the same as those of the purported post-1945 policy consensus. That author agrees with Denham, Garnett and Gray in viewing Thatcherism as a rationalist juncture. He does not say as much, but what Blackburn describes as occurring under the Thatcherites is akin to what Thomas Kuhn called a paradigm shift, whereby a prevailing set of concepts, interpretative practices and frameworks – 'the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given community' - alter in response to their incompatibility with new findings and thus give way to a fresh paradigm.[43] There was however no such rupture in the epistemological assumptions of Britain's post-war politicians.[44] That most fundamental of consensuses held. Where Blackburn sees a divergence, the present author finds continuity. If he compares one of the Labour Party's ideological factions and one of the Conservative's in the form of revisionist social democrats and Middle Way Conservatives respectively, this thesis adds the Conservative Party's Thatcherite wing as another point of comparison, the result of which is not in any sense to undermine the idea of an epistemological post-war consensus. Rather, it is to adapt it: if Blackburn is correct and if there was such a consensus immediately after the Second World War – the view of the current author is that he is and that there was – then that consensus was one which endured in the Conservative Party in spite of that party's embrace of Thatcherism. Of what has been said of Middle Way Conservatives in relation to Labour Revisionists, much the same can be said of both of those groups in their relation to Thatcherite Conservatives. He may well have advocated divergent policy prescriptions to those proposed by the likes of Harold Macmillan and Anthony Crosland, but Sir Keith Joseph had his engagement with political concepts mediated by the same basic comprehension of the ability of individual agents to make change. Just as Popper pleaded for his readers 'to remember that all religious wars were wars of ideas, and that all revolutions were revolutions of ideas', so too, if post-war British politicians' policy prescriptions relied partly upon epistemological beliefs, those Britons' ideological conflicts would end up being less conflictual than we might first suspect.[45]

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[43] T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 2nd Ed., [1962] 1970), p. 175.

[44] Were there to have been, then the latter half of the 1970s and 1980s would likely have been tantamount for the Thatcherites to what Althusser called an 'epistemological break': L. Althusser, *For Marx* [Trans. B. Brewster] (London, [1965] 2005), pp. 33-34, 249.

[45] Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 501.

That is the Conservatives. But what of conservatism? Unless the old adage is true and conservatism is as conservatives do, we are theoretically none the wiser when it comes to identifying a conservative epistemology. It just so happens that, in the case of the British Conservative Party after 1945, conservatism was indeed what they did, epistemology and all. There was a natural confluence between that ideology and the anti-rationalist politics of the supporters of the post-war settlement. Anti-rationalism is conservatism's epistemological golden thread. Oakeshott, who is best considered a conservative, and for whom, unsurprisingly, conservatism is anti-rationalist, is not alone as a conservative in placing out of bounds any notion that politics might provide a route to individual human flourishing. Another British conservative philosopher, Anthony Quinton, who similarly defended conservatism as being about what he termed the politics of imperfection, referred to three principles of conservatism, the third of which 'is that of political scepticism, the belief that political wisdom, the kind of knowledge that is needed for the successful management of human affairs, is not to be found in theoretical speculation of isolated thinkers but in the historically accumulated social experience of the community as a whole.[46] Those ostensibly non-rationalist factors are available in Allison's definition of conservatism as 'anti-intellectual' (conservatives 'do not respect or value theories, preferring instead doctrine, experience and intuition'), as well as in the conservative Roger Scruton's opposition to the reforming zeal of liberals and socialists, 'who, acting always in a spirit of improvement finds reason to change whatever he cannot find reason to retain'.[47] Believing it to have emerged in the eighteenth century in opposition to a certain kind of bourgeois ideology, Mannheim lends credence to the aforementioned conceptions of conservatism via a historical interpretation which is itself buoyed by the exhortation of that most troubled occupant of the 'age of reason', the supposed founding father of modern conservatism, Edmund Burke, that '[t]he nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity; and

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[46] A. Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection: The religious and secular traditions of conservative thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott* (London, 1978), pp. 16-17; Quinton's three conservative principles cut to the heart of conservatism as theorised by Freeden. The third principle of political scepticism is on a Freedenite view motivated by conservatives' investment in the extra-human origins of the social order. The second such principle, 'that of organicism, which takes a society to be a unitary, natural growth, an organized, living whole, not a mechanical aggregate', equates to conservatism's defence of organic change. While '[t]he first of these specific principles […] traditionalism, expressed in the conservative's attachment to, or reverence for, established customs and institutions' represent the 'specific version of historical continuity' about which Freeden speaks (Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 333).

[47] L. Allison, *Right Principles: A Conservative Philosophy of Politics* (Oxford, 1984), p. 8; R. Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1980), p. 13.

therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature, or the quality of his affairs', less than a century after the issuing of which, another famed practitioner of C/conservatism in high politics, Disraeli, bemoaned in a like manner of the 'war on the manners and customs of the people of the country under the pretext of Progress'.[48]

Few such groupings are exempt from exemptions. Some who have been called or described themselves as conservatives appear to buck the anti-rationalist trend. W. H. Mallock was in his espousal of a "scientific" conservatism seemingly an odd man out.[49] He is not in a minority of one though. There is said to be an odd woman, too. In addition to the Thatcherites who followed her and Joseph's ideological lead, Margaret Thatcher is purported to have disavowed through her support for "correct" theoretical formulae the large-C philosophy which gives her party its name.[50] If it was not already so, it ought by now to be clear however that it is not simply with Conservatism but with conservatism that she and they have by way of their supposed rationalism been thought to have parted company. Extending the end date of the epistemological post-war consensus described by Blackburn beyond the moment Margaret Thatcher assumed the office of Prime Minister for the first time thereby defends not only the nigh-on-Popperian epistemology of the Conservative Party under her leadership, but the compliance of that attitude to knowledge, both in Thatcherism and Middle Way Conservatism, with conservatism. If and when the Conservatives ceased to have a conservative (though not exclusively so) epistemology is difficult to discern. Albeit that has not stopped one distinguished theorist of conservatism from believing himself to have detected that denouement as occurring near the end of the second Thatcher government's tenure. Attending to his conception of conservatism, both in theory and as it supposedly played out in practice in the Conservative Party of the 1970s and 1980s, provides a springboard for this chapter to argue, as the next section will, that conservatism is, when it comes

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[48] K. Mannheim, ''Conservative Thought', in K. H. Wolff (Ed.), *From Karl Mannheim* (Abingdon, Oxon, 2017), pp. 260-350; R. Eccleshall, 'Conservatism', in R. Eccleshall, V. Geoghegan, R. Jay, M. Kenny, I. Mackenzie and R. Wilford (Eds.), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London, 2nd Ed., [1984] 1994), p. 64; E. Burke, 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', in E. Hampsher-Monk (Ed.), *Revolutionary Writings: 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' and the first 'Letter on a Regicide Peace'* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 62; B. Disraeli, 'Conservative and Liberal Principles – Speech at Crystal Palace, June 24, 1872', in T. E. Kebbel (Ed.), *Selected Speeches of the Late Right Honourable the Earl of Beaconsfield (Volume 2)* (London, 1882), p. 524.

[49] W. H. Mallock, *The Limits of Pure Democracy* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1918] 2017), pp. 286-287.

[50] See much of the academic commentary on the Thatcherites' approach to monetarism, featured in the subsequent section.

down to it, ontological first and epistemological second, and that conservatism's core composes conservatives' anti-rationalism.

O'Hara's definition of conservatism is fundamentally epistemological. '[C]onservatism is a statement about risk' and, by extension, about uncertainty and change.[51] In particular, it equates for O'Hara to the combination of what he calls the knowledge principle (kp) and the change principle (cp), the first of which maintains that, 'because society and the mediating institutions are highly complex and dynamic with natures that are constantly evolving as they are co-constituted with the individuals who are their members, both data and theories about society are highly uncertain'.[52] The second of those principles, relating to change, asserts that, 'because the current state of society is typically undervalued, and because the effects of social innovations cannot be known fully in advance, then social change (a) must always risk destroying beneficial institutions and norms and (b) cannot be guaranteed to achieve the aims for which it was implemented', an adjunct to which is 'that societies should be risk averse with respect to social change, and the burden of proof placed on the innovator'. Any future change thus ought to be incremental, potentially reversible and 'rigorously evaluated before the next potential step'.[53] The net effect of these two parts is that the conservative is not, then, against all change. She is not after a wholly static society. What matters for conservatives is change's associated risks. The skill is in discriminating between positive and negative change. A conservative can accept the risk of change if they judge that risk to outweigh the risk inherent in the status quo.[54]

All of which is, of course, subjective.[55] 'Whatever happens will be for the worse, and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible'.[56] That view, put forward by the Victorian Prime Minister Robert Cecil (Lord Salisbury), lies at one extreme. A rather more moderate stance is that of the majority of the Conservative Party in the late 1970s, who O'Hara and this thesis are in agreement in thinking embraced a new course of action, the repercussions of which were not fully known,

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[51] K. O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic of Margaret Thatcher's First Term', in B. W. Hart and R. Carr (Eds.), *The Foundations of the British Conservative Party: Essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron* (London, 2013), p. 48.
[52] K. O'Hara, *Conservatism* (London, 2011), pp. 49-50.
[53] O'Hara, *Conservatism*, p. 88.
[54] Likewise, according to Freeden, the default position of mainstream conservatism 'is a low-urgency stance aimed at eschewing sustained political activity unless externally induced social change becomes unacceptably disruptive': M. Freeden, 'Editorial: Fundaments and foundations in ideologies', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10/1 (2005), p. 8.
[55] This too is in keeping with Freeden's view, which is that the conservative 'postulates a specific diachronic reading' of the past: Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 333.
[56] Quoted in A. Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London, 1999), p. 435.

because it appeared less perilous than the alternative in the form of the known and, to many of them, indisputably hazardous present set of policies. Sound money, for instance, was according to O'Hara 'a vital risk management tool'. As too he says was a balanced budget.[57] This approach was perhaps easier for some than it was for others however, and O'Hara suggests that the most precise conceptualisation of the late-twentieth-century Conservative Party's internecine conflict is of a defeat of risk-averse conservatives at the hands of free-market liberals in 1986, with the rationalist rot having set in some time around 1983, for 'while some policies chimed with a conservative agenda (especially union reform) other advances had purely theoretical backing' from Thatcher's second term onward.[58] The 1986 Big Bang, when the London Stock Exchange was deregulated, eventually exploded the Conservative Party's uneasy coalition between conservatives and liberals.[59] The following section uses this account, and O'Hara's account of differing Conservative stances towards monetarism in particular, as a matrix, to argue that Joseph was on Freeden's terms, if not O'Hara's (the remainder of this section explains why), a conservative rather than a liberal. What remains of this section lays the seedbed for that analysis by articulating why O'Hara is right to think of conservatives as anti-rationalist for the wrong reasons.

To believe both that conservatism is anti-rationalist and that there existed an anti-rationalist cross-party epistemological consensus does not require us to think that Labour politicians as much as Conservatives were conservative. It might, were conservatism defined above all by its epistemology, rather than ontologically, via the value that conservatives place in their core concepts. Unlike socialism, conservative ideologies centre upon organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. Freeden speaks of how what follows from this is that the conservative is inclined to be wary of risk and seeks to 'render it safe'.[60] Which marks a difference in emphasis from Oakeshott, for whom conservatism was not an ideology but a 'disposition' – a 'propensity to use and to enjoy what is available rather than to wish for or to look for something else'.[61] That ideology (for that is what it is) has little to do with principles and doctrines. Indeed, it is not 'necessarily connected with any particular beliefs about the universe,

[57] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 54.
[58] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 61; O'Hara thus finds himself in agreement with Kerr, mentioned earlier, and Hay, in believing that what the latter two scholars both call 'radical Thatcherism' arose only in Thatcher's final term, from 1987. See: Kerr, *Postwar British Politics*, p. 176; and C. Hay, *Re-Stating Social and Political Change* (Buckingham, 1996), p. 147.
[59] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 60.
[60] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 332.
[61] M. Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 408.

about the world in general or about human conduct in general. What it is tied to is certain beliefs about the activity of governing and the instruments of government'.[62] Yet while it would be wrong to characterise Oakeshott's preference for practical knowledge over its technical counterpart as implying an endorsement of tradition for tradition's sake - tradition was for him not monolithic, and the options opened up by it were he thought best decided upon via 'conversation' - it is also true to say that, in preferring 'the familiar to the unknown', Oakeshott's view leaves little room for the taking of risks that are both radical and conservative – the kind of risks, that is, that the Thatcherites took.[63]

The reason for this is Oakeshott's failure to articulate as best he might conservatism's commitment to a social ontology of one kind or another. For the conservative will value something. Even anti-rationalism requires a rationale. However cruel an irony it might seem, there needs surely to be a reason as to why conservatives seek to provide, to quote Scruton, 'reasons for not having reasons'.[64] There must in Oakeshott's particular case, for instance, be an explanation as to why conservatives prefer the 'familiar to the unknown'. If O'Hara's maxim is accurate, then we have a right to ask what for example it is about the social order that makes it difficult to understand. If the status quo is 'typically undervalued', meanwhile, then what would it mean for it to be valued? The long and the short of it is that the conservative must make substantive claims about the nature of social reality – value judgements which are independent of kp + cp, a formula which is not self-justifying. (Indeed, O'Hara inserts value judgements of this sort when he says that the conservative values stability.)[65] This thesis maintains that conservatives are anti-rationalists, mistrusting an excessive use of reason, due largely to their holding to the core concept of the *extra-human* origins of the social order. Contra O'Hara, then, conservatism is not – nay, cannot be – first and foremost epistemological.[66] Were the opposite true, then there would be numerous circumstances

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[62] M. Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', p. 423.
[63] M. Oakeshott, 'Political education', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 58. See also M. Oakeshott, 'The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 488-541; Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', p. 408.
[64] 'What Conservatism Really Means – Roger Scruton in Conversation with Hamza Yusuf', <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iawSzFZg-vw>, accessed 09/08/2018.
[65] K. O'Hara, 'Conservatism, Epistemology, and Value', *The Monist*, 99/4 (Oct., 2016), pp. 433-434.
[66] Blackburn suggests that such theories about the world as the social order's extra-human origins, which need not accord with the knowledge principle, undercut that principle, because, presuming that those theories are firmly held, it could not then be said that our worldviews are uncertain: D. Blackburn, 'In the Shadows: Conservative Epistemology and Ideological Value', *Political Studies Review*, (2021), p. 4. The following

in which, even were nobody inclined to be ideologically conservative, no one could be. Would there be conservatives in Plato's guardian-ruling, largely changeless republic? In other words, would there be conservatives to conform to O'Hara's knowledge principle in a society that is not 'highly complex and dynamic'? The answer is surely 'no'. What follows places empirical meat on these theoretical bones. The next section argues that, while monetarism as a form of commonsense is testament to Joseph's empiricism, Sir Keith's proposed monetary policy was a handmaiden to his core concepts, which he could not fully know. To a great extent then, Joseph's epistemology followed in the wake of his ontology, of his value judgements.

Monetarism:

The Big Bang was the moment of liberal rise and conservative fall. The war for the Conservative Party was won in 1986. If we accept that story (of O'Hara's), then there was well before financial deregulation a considerable amount of skirmishing, a manifestation of which was the Wets' critique of monetarism.[67] Also known as the quantity theory of money, the target of those Conservatives' appraisal was the idea that there is a systematic connection between the money supply and the price level. After the hubris of monetary laxity was said by monetarists to come inflationary nemesis. Too much money chasing too few goods was the issue: an increase in the amount of money and credit in circulation while production is the same equals increased prices. Hence Milton Friedman, who emphasised the importance of price stability, famously remarked as to how 'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon'.[68] The so-called "money illusion" was therefore just that.[69] There was little substance for monetarists to the idea that inflation-backed increases in nominal incomes could compensate for real

chapters will show how Joseph managed to reconcile that tension by believing that human nature was itself subject to change. It is doubtful whether his can be called a single theory of human nature.

[67] As opposed to the Thatcherite "Dries", O'Hara lists Sir Ian Gilmour, James Prior, Norman St John-Stevas and Francis Pym amongst the most prominent "Wets": O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 45.

[68] M. Friedman, 'The Counter-revolution in Monetary Theory' (1970), *Collected Works of Milton Friedman Project records*, Hoover Institution Library and Archives (Stanford, CA), <https://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/internal/media/dispatcher/214480/full>, accessed 01/03/2020, p. 11.

[69] Freidman and Schwartz held 'that economic actors are concerned with real variables and do not consistently err in their estimations of real variables because of purely monetary changes': M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, *Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975* (London, 1982), p. 413.

wage cuts; consumers would not remain ignorant of, let alone dismiss, the paucity of their pay packets. That did not cut it with many conservative Conservatives though. The knowledge principle was in their eyes violated by monetarism's 'faith in theory', O'Hara says.[70] That creed was too good and, in particular, too precise to be true. To which was added the offence it paid to the change principle in the belief that monetarism amounted to a potential threat to social stability. The observation of these two sins combined made, therefore, for 'a genuinely conservative critique'.[71] Echoes of which can be found in scholarly non-conservative commentaries. O'Gorman commented that the Thatcherites' 'almost biblical commitment to monetarism sits a little oddly on a party which has normally distanced itself from magical cures and remedies'.[72] Green believed monetarism to have provided 'scientific/technical certainties'.[73] While Clarke remarked as to how '[i]t is tempting to think of the monetarist critique as a mirror image of the post-war consensus which it subverted: a rival panacea asserted with the same cocksure triumphalism of which Keynesians had been guilty a generation previously'.[74]

Any such temptation should be resisted. Monetarism was for Joseph a backstop. It represented in his mind the sine qua non for the possibility of any kind of economic progress. Unlike the "inflationeers'" promotion of greater demand, and in contrast with others' suppositions, Sir Keith was not 'offering monetary restraint as a cure-all'. 'Nothing', he said in 1975, 'could be further from the truth'.[75] Joseph described that characterisation one year earlier as a caricature – one that implied 'that if we get the flow of money spending right, everything will be right. This is not – repeat, *not* – my belief'. There was no 'magic cure', monetary or otherwise.[76] They do not come much clearer than Joseph's prognosis in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*: '[i]n economics

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[70] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 44.
[71] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 46.
[72] F. O'Gorman, *British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher* (London, 1986), p. 58.
[73] E. H. H. Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 288.
[74] P. Clarke, 'The Keynesian Consensus and its Enemies: The Argument over Macroeconomic Policy in Britain since the Second World War', in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (Eds.), *The Ideas that Shaped Post-war Britain* (London, 1996), p. 86; Denham and Garnett believe that monetarism appealed to Sir Keith because of its moral force. It 'provided him with the certainty he had always craved': Denham & Garnett, *Keith Joseph*, p. 432.
[75] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North-East), Opposition Spokesman for Policy and Research, speaking at the Preston Stadium, Acre Gate, Preston on Wednesday, 24th September 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 83, p. 3.
[76] Sir Keith Joseph, 'Speech at Preston ("Inflation is Caused by Governments")' (05/09/1974), *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110607>, accessed 10/08/2018, p. 13.

there is not and cannot be one cure. Economics is a matter of balance. You must simply deal with one obstacle from another. If the money supply is right, we still have all the other problems to deal with. But if you have too much demand, or too little, nothing else will come right'.[77] Indeed, by Joseph's reckoning, and as stated to a Birmingham audience in 1975, the actual monetarists - the real magicians and panacea-mongers - were the so-called Keynesians who had so dominated the direction of economic policy in post-war Britain and who believed that money 'can conjure up goods where there are none and create jobs where there is no productive work to be done'.[78] Theirs were 'the attitudes which have gotten us into the mess'.[79]

If Joseph's political thought is any kind of measure, monetarism was for the Thatcherites what a stable currency was for Oakeshott – an example of governmental best practice, with rules taking precedent over outcomes. The Rule of Law is another example of the 'adverbial conditions' that Oakeshott so respected, in that it states not what we ought to do but only how, should we wish to do anything, we ought to go about doing it.[80] In contrast with which is the society organised as what Oakeshott called an enterprise, which was for that philosopher one placed in a single, purposive direction.[81] That kind of association is a model of rationalism in politics. The labelling of Thatcherism a "project", as it is so often called, hints at the rationalism with which the Thatcherites are often associated and, relatedly, at the common view of the Thatcher governments as having attempted to erect such an enterprise.[82] Politics by contradistinction is best considered 'the pursuit of intimations' and 'the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together', and the

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[77] Sir Keith Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground? Reflections on Circumstances and Policies* (London, 1976), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 106/9, p. 11.

[78] Joseph's references to 'so-called Keynesians' (see Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 5 and Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 39) and 'vulgar Keynesianism (see 'Extract from a speech by Sir Keith JOSEPH Bt., M.P. (Leeds N.E.) Shadow Spokesman on Home Affairs, to the Economic Research Council at St. Ermins Hotel, London, S.W.1. on Wednesday, 15th January, 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 78, p. 12) spoke to a broader Thatcherite scepticism towards post-war Keynesians' pedigree. For example, the monetarist economists Tim Congdon writes as to how 'the Keynesians […] had freedom to propound their own views as those of Keynes. This freedom amounted to a license to counterfeit his intellectual coinage'. See T. Congdon, *Keynes, the Keynesians and Monetarism* (Cheltenham, 2007), p. 33.

[79] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 7.

[80] M. Oakeshott, 'The Rule of Law', in his '*On History' and Other Essays* (Indianapolis, 1999), p. 136.

[81] M. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 112-114.

[82] See: Hay, *Re-Stating Social and Political Change*, p. 130; A. Gamble, 'Privatization, Thatcherism, and the British State', *Journal of Law and Society*, 16/1 (Spring, 1988), p. 16; and Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, pp. 178-179.

correct mode of government ought, Oakeshott felt, to be dedicated to the avoidance of the 'collision' between freely choosing individuals.[83] Simply put, politics was about the continuity of a certain form of social existence and, in particular, the maintenance of procedures within which individuals can pursue their own ends, the role of the politician in those circumstances being simply to hold the circle. In politics, Oakeshott remarked, 'men sail on a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel'.[84] But if that is what (non-rationalist) politics properly understood is analogous to, then the apparent Thatcherite enterprise state was not so much an attempt to sail to a particular port as a bid to wrestle the wheel off of those who, in their search for safe harbour, risked breaking the vessel apart on the rocks of corporatism and much else besides.[85]

What others labelled monetarism, Joseph declared simply to be 'common sense' – a phrase that Sir Keith called on the support of throughout his political career, and which is a further clue as to the practical, non-rationalist nature of monetarism for him.[86] Socialist proposals to subsidise interest rates were said in 1964 to 'offend common sense', while eleven years later Joseph encouraged his Conservative colleagues to 'fight the battle of ideas now, expose the fallacies in the siege economy, put forward our own recipe, not a wonder cure but a long-term perspective based on economic commensense, cutting our coat to suit our cloth, looking forward to retrenchment, recovery, steady growth'.[87] The acceptance by a community of an idea as commonsense is to bestow upon it one of the greatest decontestatory privileges imaginable.[88] It is to permit it to levitate above the fray of everyday conceptual battle. Many accounts of

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[83] Oakeshott, 'Political education', p. 58, 44; Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', p. 428.
[84] Oakeshott, 'Political education', p. 60.
[85] Of which a point of criticism might be to state that the means undermined the ends. Consider Oakeshott's opinion of Hayek.
[86] Joseph, 'Inflation is Caused by Governments' (Preston, 05/09/1974), p. 13.
[87] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North-East) Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs, at his Adoption Meeting, St. Martin's Institute, Chapel Town Road, Leeds, on Thursday, 17th September, 1964', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 007/1, p. 1; 'Speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP (Leeds NE) the Opposition Spokesman for Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research speaking to the Eastern Area Young Conservatives Conference in Eastbourne on Saturday 12 April 1975 – A siege economy would mean back to 1945 for good', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 80, p. 6.
[88] Hall equated 'the ideological' in large part with 'the taken-for-grantedness of 'the real''. See S. Hall, 'The rediscovery of 'ideology': return of the repressed in media studies', in M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woollacott (Eds.), *Culture, Society and the Media* (London, 1982), p. 65.

Thatcherism, such as those Hall and Gamble – the first of which refers to 'a populist common sense', and the second to a 'discourse hegemony' – put that ideology's success down at least in part to the success of the Thatcherites in convincing the British people of the existence of a New Right 'common sense'.[89] Whether that commonsense was wholly theirs is a moot point. For Kerr and Marsh, the 'discursive strategies' of Thatcher and her ilk did not so much forge a new commonsense as build upon an old one.[90] Whatever its origins, the commonsense to which Thatcherism appealed supposedly made the Thatcherites' solutions appear partly "anti-political" – the sweet spot of ideological success. In tandem with the media, the Conservative Party of the late 1970s is said to have constructed the Winter of Discontent, and to have presented that event as the logical culmination of a social-democratic crisis.[91] If true, this was an unoriginal gambit (though it was none the less potent for being so), and Toye, for example, has described the deployment of the idea of a post-war consensus by those who subscribed to it as an appeal to 'a wide and established national community of common sense'.[92]

Something of the constructedness of commonsense can be inferred from Joseph's hope, voiced in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, for monetarism's erasure from the political lexicon – an aspiration which stemmed from Sir Keith's opinion that, in an apparent reworking of Friedman's remark a decade earlier that '[w]e are all Keynesians now', '[w]e are all monetarists now, except for a few die-hard inflationers who cannot learn from experience or admit mistakes'.[93] As a monetarist himself, all Joseph sought, he said, was to relate the money in circulation directly to the number of purchasable

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[89] Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', p. 17; A. Gamble, 'Neo-liberalism and fiscal conservatism', in V. A. Schmidt and M. Thatcher (Eds.), *Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Political Economy* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 53; Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 182.

[90] Kerr and Marsh, 'Explaining Thatcherism', pp. 173-174.

[91] C. Hay, 'Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the 'Winter of Discontent'', *Sociology*, 30/2 (1996), pp. 253-277; In addition to which, a number of scholars have argued that it was under Thatcher that a new, seemingly classness 'ordinariness' arose. See for example A. Edwards, ''Financial Consumerism': citizenship, consumerism and capital ownership in the 1980s', *Contemporary British History*, 31/2 (2017), pp. 211. Atkins and Finlayson have also noted how, '[t]hroughout the 1980s and 1990s, the explicit articulation of the congruity of party ideology and policy with the interests and the common sense of something called 'ordinary people' became an ever more extensive feature of conference speeches'. See J. Atkins and A. Finlayson, ''… A 40-Year Old Black Man Made the Point to Me': Everyday Knowledge and the Performance of Leadership in Contemporary British Politics', *Political Studies*, 60 (2013), p. 173.

[92] R. Toye, 'From 'Consensus' to 'Common Ground': The Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48/1 (2012), p. 7.

[93] M. Friedman, 'Letter: 'Friedman and Keynes'' (04/02/1966), *Time*, <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,898916-2,00.html>, accessed 05/05/2020; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 17.

goods, which he thought to be impossible unless governments controlled their deficits. This, he insisted, did not entail any kind of 'philosophy; it [wa]s just a demand that we should return to a sense of what the function of money is'.[94] But then, if that outlook was in the context of the 1970s a partisan one, must every definition, even that of commonsense, be part of an 'agonistic struggle'?[95] Does essential contestability consign us to conceptual relativism? Clarke thought so: for her, '[i]t is possible to make sense of the notion of an essentially contestable concept, but only at the cost of introducing a radical relativism into all discourse using such disputable concepts'.[96] Were that true however, it need not tarnish politics more broadly, one reason being that, as Clarke implies, not every discourse uses such disputable concepts as essentially contested ones. As Ball notes, contestation is contingent. To think otherwise 'is to take a timeless and ahistorical view of the character and function of political concepts'.[97] The present author prefers to think, as Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu do, 'that the application of Gallie's definition and his framework should be governed by whether they yield useful insight into the concept at hand'.[98] What is significant for Joseph as a conservative is that, even were monetarism contestable (as it was, if not essentially so), in arguing for it via appeals to commonsense Joseph genuinely believed that it was not.

Commonsense can refer to a tactic. It might be the means to the naturalisation of an ideology. If it was so for Sir Keith Joseph, who never fleshed out what he meant for something to be commonsensical, it need not only have been that. Commonsense can be thought to reveal something not just circumstantial but integral about the political thought of those who lay claim to it. To employ commonsense is not necessarily to be engaged in developing a hegemonic culture, and to think, as Finlayson does, that ideologies 'invent' commonsense is not to say that there are no truly commonsensical

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[94] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers (11/04/1975)', p. 7; Thatcher echoed this idea. Though she rarely mentioned monetarism, her reference to 'honest' or 'sound' money, noted by Saunders, reflected her belief that monetarism was not really any kind of theory or –ism at all but was 'as fundamental as the law of gravity, and you cannot avoid it'. See R. Saunders, ''Crisis? What crisis?' Thatcherism and the seventies', in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (Eds.), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 29.
[95] R. Abbey, 'Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?', *New Political Science*, 27/4 (2005), p. 480.
[96] B. Clarke, 'Eccentrically contested concepts', *British Journal of Political Science*, 9/1 (1979), pp. 125-126.
[97] T. Ball, 'Political Theory and Conceptual Change', in A. Vincent (Ed.), *Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 36. Thus Ball notes that, unlike fierce and ongoing arguments over the meaning of democracy, debates as to how best to define republicanism are now largely the preserve of academics. He therefore refers to a 'contingent contestability thesis'.
[98] D. Collier, F. D. Hidalgo & A. O. Maciuceanu, 'Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11/3 (2006), p. 215.

aspects to political life.[99] Hence that concept has been bracketed under the header "public reason", which is the idea that citizens partaking in public political discussion ought in the justification of their beliefs and actions to make reference to language and standards that are publicly accepted. There is a certain irony to the fact that, alongside Habermas, one of the most prominent proponents of that mode of reasoning was John Rawls, who Joseph took against and who features prominently in the following chapter.[100] Rawls was a liberal, and Sir Keith, even were he to have been a liberal, would not have been of the same species of that ideology as the author of *A Theory of Justice*, who, alongside the likes of Dworkin, has been cast as being amongst the praetorian guard of what scholars have called variously 'high' or 'deontological' liberalism.[101] Joseph was a conservative and, if O'Hara is to be believed, it is his appeal to commonsense that helps attest to this, for according to O'Hara in his theorising of conservatism, commonsense, in addition to rules of inference and science-inspired reasoning, is a kind of public reason, which, being '[t]he use of arguments that appeal beyond selfish interests to a common mode of reasoning', is supposedly central to the conservative's epistemology and, especially for O'Hara, given that his definition of conservatism is at heart epistemological, to conservatism as a whole.[102] Thus O'Hara argues that conservatives will introduce into political debate such reasons as will have broad backing, in the belief that the shared framework provided by public reason is a prerequisite for those parties in democracies which wish to provide for moderate and/or legitimate government and which aspire to gain political support.[103]

A simple dictionary definition defines commonsense as 'good practical understanding', and while, essential contestability being what it is, we would do well not to think of such seamless translations as being unfailingly true, broadly speaking that is what commonsense meant for Joseph – a non-specialist, sound practical judgement, which can be called public reason precisely because what it describes is intelligible to all with, to repeat a line of Joseph's, 'eyes to see'.[104] Sir Keith gave the game away that this

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[99] A. Finlayson, 'Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies', *Political Studies*, 60/4 (2012), p. 763.
[100] J. Habermas, *Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* [Trans. W. Rehg] (Cambridge, 1997).
[101] R. North, 'Political realism: Introduction', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9/4 (2010), p. 381; D. Mill and R. Dagger, 'Utilitarianism and beyond: contemporary analytical political theory', in T. Ball and R. Bellamy (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 466.
[102] O'Hara, *Conservatism*, p. 18.
[103] O'Hara, *Conservatism*, p. 19.
[104] G. Breslin, L. Gilmour and P. Weber (Eds.), *Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language* (Glasgow, 5th Ed., [2000] 2011), p. 200; 'Joseph, Talbot C.F. School, Leeds (08/10/1974)', p. 4.

was true for him through his aligning of commonsense and empiricism, in his contention that the idea of a monetarist 'as a man who thinks that there is one simple, rational solution to all our economic problems, in short a "panacea-monger"', was in his opinion 'very offensive to the commonsense, empirical tradition in British politics'.[105] In *Freedom and Order* also, Joseph states as to how 'the truth […] is attested by experience and common sense'.[106] Thus Sir Keith hoped that his audience would consent to monetarism on the basis of their senses. Which is not to say that such public reasoning is, as O'Hara contends, central to conservatism. For if conservatisms exist to service their core concepts then public reason will never be one of the last few concepts standing therein. What remains of this section argues that Joseph backed commonsense in the form of monetarism not simply due to its being a kind of public reason, but because he valued that which monetarism catered for, the free market, which he favoured not only because it provided growth but thanks to its embodying of the extra-human origins of the social order and organic change, core conservative concepts which, unlike monetarism, were not amenable to empirical dissection.

We can intuit that commonsense pertained for Joseph to the empirically observable from Sir Keith's understanding of causation. There are, *Monetarism is Not Enough* claims, 'no ultimate causes, only proximate causes'.[107] Every cause has an effect, and every effect is eventually a cause. It was for this reason, Joseph elsewhere implied, that there was no universal salve for unemployment.[108] Varied unemployment required varied responses. Intriguingly, however, that relation between cause and effect was untrue of state intervention. The elusiveness of causes' relation to symptoms ceased when government was the cause. Thus Joseph could speak in 1967 of how 'the overwhelming need now is to move from a symptom-oriented to a person- or family – or client-oritented system' – that is, to a cause-oriented as opposed to a symptom-oriented system - in the social services.[109] Hence also he was able to argue in 1974 that 'the cause of inflation was not full employment but the means devised to define, measure and achieve it'.[110] The connection between cause and effect in those instances could be effectively traced. In particular, it was in Sir Keith's mind due to the fact that inflation

[105] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers (11/04/1975)', p. 7.
[106] Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP, in Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph BT MP, Angus Maude MP and Ian Percival QC MP, *Freedom and Order* (London, 1975), p. 23.
[107] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 18.
[108] Joseph, 'Inflation is Caused by Governments' (Preston, 05/09/1974), p. 7.
[109] 'Joseph, Conference of Children's Officers at Brighton (11/10/1967)', p. 6.
[110] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, BT. M.P. (Leeds North East), Opposition Spokesman on Home Affairs, speaking to the Leeds North East Conservative Association, 205 Roundhay Road, Leeds, on Saturday, 14th December 1974 – Inflation and Growth', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 78, p. 3.

was principally the fault of government that Joseph believed that he could 'be clear as to its nature and causes'. 'To do so is not doctrinaire', Joseph said, 'but sound common sense'.[111] Monetarism was commonsense according to Joseph because, like the problem it was intended to cure, inflation, the link between the printing of money and its effects was obvious, due to it having been the government or human volition, and not the diffuse and partly inexplicable workings of the market, that was doing the printing. Albeit, as the following few pages show, the lag Joseph perceived between the initial (government) input and eventual (social/economic) outputs complicates this idea and was such that, even if its remedies were commonsense, the relationship between inflation and its causes was far from a wholly linear one. The cumulative nature and opaque origins of inflation and other such post-war British travails thus further grounded Sir Keith's epistemology in uncertainty.

Since the Second World War, Sir Keith thought, Britain had suffered a plague on its houses.[112] The reason for this Joseph believed was that, at the outset at least, war had been elided with peace. That government had effectively mobilised resources to the furtherance of death and destruction led many to believe that the same could be achieved to the public's benefit once the shooting stopped.[113] Sir Keith held that a climate of full employment, expanded government and a sense of national purpose, as witnessed in the Second World War, was especially conducive to what he termed 'the socialist-Keynesian theses'.[114] Thus 'it came to be believed that government could do almost everything for everybody without infringing freedom or opportunity'.[115] In spite of which, the Second World War and its immediate aftermath was for Joseph more one of many inciting incidents than it was an absolute juncture. To think otherwise, or to go in search of a single historic jumping-off point as inspiration for Sir Keith's conservatism, is to pass over Joseph's broadly (d)evolutionary conception of the nation's recent past. Joseph likened the effects of inflation on the nation to 'a house being eaten away by

[111] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 1.
[112] Politicians had increased inflation and undercut savings; unemployment had surged; those who enjoyed greater leisure and affluence had neglected to understand the origins of those benefits; governments had become enamoured with demand management; capital had been misallocated; standards and self-discipline had slipped; governments had made risk-taking less worthwhile; and, it almost goes without saying, there had been 'too much Socialism' ('Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 2).
[113] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 51.
[114] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 8.
[115] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, Bt, MP (Leeds NE), Conservative Spokesman with overall responsibility for policy and research, speaking at the Oxford Union on Saturday 6 December, 1975 – The Quest for Common Ground', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 84, p. 1.

termites: one moment it looks as it has always done, the next it has collapsed'.[116] This is an apt metaphor for his broader understanding of national decline. Like the inflation of the 1950s and 1960s, which Sir Keith described in retrospect as having been 'at relatively low but cumulatively drastic levels', many of Britain's other ailments were in Joseph's political thought cumulative.[117] Joseph said as much in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* and in his 1975 speech on the quest for common ground, a couple of lines from both of which are especially noteworthy in the context of this discussion: 'I think it should be clear to most of us that these evils and shortcomings did not begin last year, or in 1970, or even ten years ago. No, the process began further back, but has become increasingly visible because its effects are cumulative'.[118] In a letter to his constituency chairman also, Joseph described how high interest rates, controls, high taxation, and inflation had what he called a 'cumulative effect'.[119] Taking these statements into account, it is unreasonable to think of Joseph as having pinned the blame principally on the Second World War, let alone on any other specific past moment. Decline for him was not so much a single sudden drop as it was a series of downwards steps on a path cloaked in mist. Thus Joseph described how Labour would take the country 'one more step on the road to national pauperisation'.[120]

Joseph's position on the First World War illustrates this point. Although consistent in seeming to date the onset of the nation's various malaises to the Second World War or, at the very least, to the end of that conflict, Sir Keith did not think the Great War blameless.[121] In 1976, in both *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* and his speech on

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[116] Sir Keith Joseph, 'Speech at Leith ("Inflation is Decapitalising British Industry")' (08/08/1974), *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110606>, accessed 17/08/2018, p. 8.
[117] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, B.T., M.P. (Leeds North East), The Opposition Spokesman with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking at the Opening Dinner of the Annual Conference of the Institute of Personnel Management at Harrogate, on Thursday, 21st October, 1976 – Dismounting from the Tiger: Wage Bargaining in the Post-Inflation Era', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 89/1, p. 1.
[118] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 20; 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 2.
[119] 'Text of a letter from the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt, MP (Leeds North-East), with overall responsibility for policy and research and the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, to his constituency chairman, Donald Bradley – "Jim Callaghan the Job-Killer"' (04/09/1978), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.
[120] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP (Leeds NE) Shadow Spokesman with overall responsibility for policy and research, speaking in Streatham, London SW on Thursday 24 April 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 80, p. 3.
[121] 'Joseph, Panorama (23/06/1975)', p. 4, 2; Joseph, 'Inflation is Caused by Governments' (Preston, 05/09/1974), p. 9; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p.

"Recovery without Inflation", Joseph blamed the two world wars for having, in the words of both documents, 'impelled society towards interventionism and socialism'.[122] Another 1976 text of Joseph's, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, accused the First World War of having 'struck a far stronger blow against the economic and socio-psychological basis of the British capitalist democracy than was appreciated at the time, or for that matter now. The second world war continued this process, in several ways'.[123] A few pages later in the same document, Sir Keith reverted to type in pointing the accusatory finger squarely at 1939-1945: controls, rationalisation and cartelisation born of the Second World War scuppered the gains in business vitality that had been made after the First World War. They had 'diminished what zest for enterprise and risk-taking we had as compared with businessmen in other advanced countries'.[124] There is no denying that the aftermath of the Second World War marked in Sir Keith's mind a turn for the worse. At the 1979 Conservative Party Conference, Joseph harked back to the end of that world war, when the average standard of living in the UK was approximately the third highest in the world (he said), as almost a lost idyll. Since the mid-1940s, he bemoaned, '[w]e have been overtaken and leapfrogged by many countries'.[125] Nonetheless, there is a clear sense in which the crisis of late-twentieth-century Britain was the result of a process analogous to compound interest, the origins of which were ultimately indeterminable.

Like much else that was "human", his commonsense and empirically-substantiated monetarist means were thus less important to Joseph than were the mysterious and unquantifiable ends of the extra-human origins of the social order (exemplified by a society the heredity of which was unclear) and organic change which monetarism served. Evidence to the contrary ought not to be overstated. The division in Joseph's mind between, on the one hand, the 'mechanistic' view of economy and society inculcated by what Sir Keith took to be inappropriate government intervention and, on

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39; *Why Britain needs a social market economy, with a foreword by Sir Keith Joseph* (London, 1975), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 106/1, p. 15, 5; Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP, *Conditions for Fuller Employment* (London, 1978), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 106/19, p. 2; 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 11; 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 4; 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 2.

[122] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 51; 'Full text of the speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. M.P. (Leeds North-East) speaking at the International Monetary Conference held by the American Bankers Association at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, on Thursday, 17th June 1976 – "Recovery Without Inflation"', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 88/1, p. 6.

[123] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 8.

[124] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 11.

[125] Joseph, 'Conservative Party Conference – Free Enterprise and Industry (11/10/79)', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.

the other, the proper appreciation of those realms of activity as 'organic, complex, and largely spontaneous' – that is, the distinction between human volition and that which Joseph defended, the extra-human - Sir Keith believed to be true in spite of that politician's complaint in 1974 that '[s]uccessive governments sought to foster growth, without explaining what it really means, what causes it, what inhibits it'.[126] Joseph did not mean to imply that the cause of growth could be pinned down, and went on to argue in the same speech that: 'the truth is that growth should occur, and has normally occurred, spontaneously. We do not really know the secret of economic growth or how to generate it, though we have accumulated much experience of what frustrates it. We think we know some of the fundamental ingredients. We know that it is a by-product of much else'.[127] Joseph suggested on another occasion in 1974 that growth was perhaps 'a by-product of other policies' and ought not therefore to be a primary aim of government policy.[128] The causes of growth did not in his view constitute commonsense, then. This was because the market via which growth occurred was a reservoir for the extra-human origins of the social order. The latter concept thus led Joseph's epistemology by the hand, as it were. That epistemology, a falsifiable standard of evaluation, Joseph made known in his thinking, quoted above, that he only knew what prevented growth. As regards monetarism, Sir Keith thought that course of action viable because it was commonsense. But that was not why he was a monetarist; Joseph was one because he valued the free market. And he endorsed that concept because the market embodied his core concepts.

This section has argued that Joseph's use of 'commonsense' substantiates the argument for Sir Keith having had a Popperian and empiricist epistemology, but also - seeing as Joseph employed a supposedly commonsense monetarism, a peripheral concept, to argue for the market, an adjacent concept unamenable to commonsense - that such public reason was present in Joseph's political thought at the behest of Sir Keith's core concepts, given in particular that the market in Joseph's ideology was a vent for the social order's unquantifiable extra-human origins. The next and final one attends to the latter concept's brother-in-arms in conservatism, organic change, to argue that Joseph's prioritising of that core concept entailed future uncertainty. Progress is a watch-word in this respect, being as it is suggestive of certain assumptions about the past, present and future.[129] Progressivism, Robinson argues in her study of the language of that type of politics, implies inevitability. It is the ongoing "forwards march", and of

[126] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 5.
[127] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 5.
[128] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 6.
[129] E. Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics in Modern Britain* (London, 2017), p. 1.

immense rhetorical use to individuals in making their principles appear both 'self-evident' and yet, in so far as they are future-oriented, not ultimately amenable to empirical proof.[130] Robinson accuses New Labour, for instance, of having engaged in a form of 'temporal blackmail' in their insistence that the Labour Party modernise.[131] A result of that kind of progressive positioning is that political action is perceived as a matter of keeping up with the times, and struggles over the decontestation of progress thus blend the heat of ideological combat with the fashion parade.[132] In effect, then, to be convinced of political progress, more so perhaps than with 'commonsense', is to submit to a form of ideological naturalisation. Such a valuable prize as this has encouraged collectivists and individualists, liberals, socialists, and conservatives, to tussle for ownership over the term "progressive".[133]

Whereas traditionally, C/conservative thought has been seen to be primed in response to progress' forward march, Robinson notes, crucially for our purposes, how the opposite of progress is not conservative but regress.[134] Progressive and conservative are 'co-constituting' therefore; conservatives have actively adopted the language of progressivism.[135] Kowol implies much the same thing in identifying three political groupings within the wartime Conservative movement – the Individualists, the Constructive Imperialists, and the Tory Progressives – all of whom made use of the language of progressive politics, with Tory Progressives, for example, advancing paternalism and organicism beneath the rhetorical cloak of modernity and progress.[136] Like O'Hara with commonsense however, Robinson emphasises that the conservative invocation of progress has been and can be more than simply a tactical appropriation: it also 'reveals the great extent to which conservatism is structured around an idea of gradual, benevolent change' – change which the following section contends was organic and which kept Joseph's epistemology fallible.[137]

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[130] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, pp. 14-15, 3.
[131] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 7.
[132] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, pp. 6-7.
[133] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 91.
[134] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 5; Though this is not always true in practice, as reactionaries, themselves residents of modernity, submit to that epoch's linear conceptions of time, as opposed to some of pre-modernity's cyclical ones. See Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 26.
[135] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 12, 25; Relatedly, and on the subject of social evolution, Nisbet wrote that 'Marxists and other radicals, liberals old and new, and even conservatives must be counted among the adherents to this current manifestation of the philosophy of progress'. See R. Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1980] 2017), p. 308.
[136] K. Kowol, 'The Conservative Movement and Dreams of Britain's Post-war Future', *The Historical Journal*, 62/2 (2018), p. 4, 13, 5.
[137] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 43.

Progress:

According to Robinson, it was at the very moment that socialist and liberal teleologies like, respectively, Marxism and Keynesianism were failing to prove their empirical worth that progressive politics and the Left became almost synonymous.[138] The Thatcherites and the broader New Right of which they were a part aided and abetted this merger in spite of the unpropitious circumstances for the Left just mentioned: unwilling to swallow the counter-cultural ideals of individual liberty that developed in the late 1960s, they uncoupled economic freedom from moral liberalism, and criticised the latter for being progressive, while also rejecting outright the link between progress and collectivism, in reaction against which they embraced a moral conservatism.[139] And in distancing themselves from the term "progressive", they ceded it to their opponents.[140] In contrast with which, it was those Conservatives who accepted the post-war policy consensus who were most successful in burnishing their progressive credentials.[141] Such an account might well be true. But, were it to be, all its telling would prove is that most Thatcherites rejected a specific decontestation of progress. In keeping with Robinson's account, Joseph barely ever used the term 'progressive'. What he did refer to however was the idea of progress, of which there were in his political thought two varieties – the economic and the social.

For Joseph a notable source of progress was the market. Profits increased investment, the output of labour resultingly grew, and thus earnings rose and costs decreased. Such was the nature of '[e]conomic progress' granted by workers' cooperation with management.[142] This was Joseph's assessment in 1978's *Conditions for Fuller Employment*. But in his contribution to *Freedom and Order* three years earlier, Sir Keith similarly remarked how, by disciplining competition, the market economy 'turn[ed] it into an engine of progress'.[143] And this progress we are elsewhere led to believe was perpetual. Though imperfect, the market order was, Joseph commented in 1976 in both *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* and his speech on the moral and material benefits of

[138] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 221; Robinson observes how the natural parity in the popular imagination between progressive and Left politics has meant that a number of figures, such as William Morris, are incorporated into the former category in spite of their distance from linear notions of time. See Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 26.
[139] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 221, 40.
[140] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 225.
[141] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 41.
[142] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 11.
[143] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 9.

the market order, 'a self-improving system'. It bore 'within itself the source of constant improvement'.[144] Minimum standards would for example, the second of the 1976 documents just quoted from noted, keep on rising as a result of it.[145] Two years earlier, Sir Keith likewise remarked how economic growth 'continually expand[ed] the range of natural resources'.[146] And yet while growth within the market was exponential, that growth was not assured, for nor was the market. Unlike such liberals as Hayek and von Mises, for whom there was no better alternative then or ever to the free market or Great Society, for Joseph, as a conservative with his core concepts, some other, as-yet-undefined alternative was possible.[147]

The free market was not for Joseph the product of universal verities. Sir Keith's support for such an economy was historicist in nature. *Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy*, for which Joseph wrote the foreword, makes repeated reference to 'experience' as justification for embracing the market economy and expanding the private sector of the economy, while a 1970 speech by Joseph speaks of competition being the only 'reliable' route to uncovering new needs and methods of production.[148] Sir Keith's trust in *Freedom and Order* in the ability of the market to, for example, 'balance its inputs and outputs, allocate resources and ensure that labour goes to where it is needed, and relate efforts to spur' was moreover based to a great extent on the fact, as Joseph saw it, that those features have 'been observed and described by generations of economists from Adam Smith onwards'.[149] Though this was not what Oakeshott, in his criticism of rationalism, called 'the politics of the book'.[150] Theory for Joseph followed practice. Smith reappears in his speech to the Students' Union at Oxford, wherein its author argued that 'Adam Smith did not invent capitalism; he did not tell people what to

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[144] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 64; 'Summary of a Talk by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, BT, M.P. (Leeds North East), Opposition Spokesman with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking to the Bow Group at Norwich on Saturday, 10th July 1976 – The moral and material benefits of the market order', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 88/2, p. 15.

[145] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 10.

[146] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 4.

[147] A. Gamble, *Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Key Contemporary Thinkers)* (London, 1996), p. 70.

[148] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 3; 'Text of a speech by the Rt. Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P. (Leeds N.E.), Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Technology and Trade at a Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting, Assembly Hall, Conservative Central Office, 32 Smith Square, London, S.W.1. on Saturday 24th January 1970 – Government and Industry or Conditions Essential to Industrial Success', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 65/2, p. 10.

[149] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 18.

[150] Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in politics', p. 27.

do: he merely showed what was happening and its rationale'.[151] Like the author of the *Wealth of Nations* and *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, both of which feature on the reading list that Sir Keith distributed to civil servants, Joseph maintained that his '[c]omprehension of the market […] followed its realisation'.[152] Competition, for instance, he characterised in the previously cited speech to a Greater London area trade union advisory committee meeting as 'not text-book and perfect, but workable and creative'.[153]

What followed from this was a respect on Joseph's part for the contingency of contemporary circumstances, the fallibility of current knowledge, and future uncertainty. The free market was thus not a necessarily permanent feature of the social order. It was in Sir Keith's mind 'the best way *yet* [current author's emphasis] invented towards full employment and rising standards of living', as well as liberty, the logical adjunct to which was Joseph's striking admission four years prior to the conference speech from which the previous quotation is taken, that '[i]n the long run the market economy may or may not be superseded'.[154] This was, he suspected, 'a very long run indeed'.[155] Speaking and writing in the latter half of the twentieth century, what mattered was that 'its [the market's] potentialities did not yet look to be exhausted'.[156] Furthermore, not everything was possible, and Joseph warned in 1976 against the pursuit of 'a Utopia that doesn't exist – and will never exist'.[157] Still, that he was open to a market-less future speaks volumes for the contingency of that concept in his morphology and the fallibilism of his epistemology. As for Oakeshott, so too for Sir Keith Joseph therefore, politics was, as the philosopher amongst them put it, 'not the science of setting up a permanently impregnable society'.[158] The free market was for Joseph potentially pregnable.

Apparent contradictions to this evidence are misrepresentative. 'There is no other way' is a refrain that Joseph repeated in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, in a speech in Hertfordshire, and in another in Harrogate, in support of his argument that, in order '[t]o

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[151] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt. MP. (Leeds North East), Opposition Spokesman for Policy and Research, speaking to the National Association of Conservative Graduates at the Gladstone Room, Students Union, Oxford on Friday 14 March [1975]', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 80, p. 3.
[152] See N. Bosanquet, 'Sir Keith's Reading List', *Political Quarterly*, 52/3 (July., 1981), pp. 324-341; Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p 19.
[153] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 2.
[154] 'Conservative Party Conference – Free Enterprise and Industry (11/10/79)', p. 2; Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 22.
[155] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 22.
[156] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 22.
[157] Joseph*, Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 65.
[158] M. Oakeshott, 'The political economy of freedom', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 406.

halt the slide' (as the last of those speeches put it), cuts in both government spending and subsidies were required.[159] "Only" is a signal word in this regard: the 'only way' in which to compete and provide more jobs was to accept relatively lower pay and a lower pound, and 'only from the increasing efficiency of the free enterprise system' could higher wages be paid out, higher earnings garnered, and greater benefits provided.[160] These excerpts do not speak for themselves though. Such seeming certainty, if only superficial, is part and parcel of the trade of politicians, most of whom are likely conscious that those among their number who treat politics as a Socratic dialogue are, it is not unreasonable to suspect, unlikely to emerge victorious in an electoral contest, let alone sustain a parliamentary career. Joseph was when he spoke of the market as the only possible option speaking to present concerns. In 1992, he wrote as to how '[a] free market society is the basis of an almost unlimited number of opportunities […] which no other kind of society can provide', and of how '[i]n so far as markets are free they are the best way to satisfy the wants of the society in which they operate'.[161] Definite article notwithstanding, there is little reason to suppose that Joseph closed off in those instances the possibility of the market's future replacement. What he appears to have meant by 'best way', for example, is that the market process was the best *available* or, as he put it in 1974, 'practicable' means to fulfil consumer demand.[162] Hence Joseph could go on in the same Centre for Policy Studies document to state that '[w]hat I do claim is that free enterprise capitalism is the least bad system *yet evolved* [current author's emphasis] for achieving the goals of most societies' – a comment which certainly leaves room for the emergence of some as yet unknown, future mode of distribution.[163]

"Evolve" is key here. Purposeful attempts to replace the market with 'administrative discretion' could not help but foster 'political totalitarianism and corruption'. Such was 'the evidence': increased sectionalism, class conflict, direct action,

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[159] Joseph*, Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 46; 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), Opposition spokesman with Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking at a Businessmen's Meeting at Sarrat, Hertfordshire on Thursday, 3rd June 1976 – 'THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT'', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 88/1, p. 3; 'Joseph, Institute of Personnel Management, Harrogate (21/10/1976)', p. 11.
[160] 'Free Enterprise and Industry – Replying to the debate, Sir Keith Joseph (12th October 1979)', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 4; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 62.
[161] Lord Joseph, *The Social Market: Containing some lessons from Germany* (London, 1992), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PUB 112/3, pp. 10-11.
[162] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 11.
[163] Joseph, *The Social Market*, p. 16.

and the breakdown of social cohesion.[164] The stark choice presented in, to take just one example, *Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy* (for which Joseph wrote the foreword), between free markets and bureaucracy, was thus a child of historical necessity.[165] And yet the idea of evolution speaks not only to Joseph's particular empiricist epistemology, as the preceding few sentences and their references to evidence also allude, but to the conservative concept of organic change and to that core concept's precedence over said epistemology.[166] The extra-human origins of the social order were in Joseph's morphology resident within the market – hence Sir Keith's resistance to a "human" administrative discretion. By extension, the market was a site of organic change, as Chapter Four analyses in greater detail. But what Joseph's invocation of evolution presupposes is that such change was for Sir Keith not synonymous with the market, which was but one outlet for organic change – change which, should it evolve to produce one, might find an alternate outlet for its workings. Thus there was nothing teleological or deterministic about economic progress as Joseph understood it; his core concepts and their accompanying epistemology made that so. Furthermore, the same basic triangulation in Joseph's political thought, between the extra-human origins of the social order, organic change, and what Sir Keith thought knowable, played out similarly when Joseph took to thinking about social progress, with significant implications for our understanding of the Thatcherite appeal to so-called 'Victorian values'.[167]

Important though economic progress was for Joseph, as befits a man who, as Chapter Four shows, believed that the social ought to take priority over the economic, he also thought that '[t]he measure of progress is social even more than economic'.[168] Social progress Sir Keith believed relied on such issues as health, housing, education, 'and all the services that increasingly prosperous and educated people expect in life'.[169] He elsewhere maintained 'that the test of social progress should surely be that the

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[164] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 14.
[165] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 10.
[166] See also Joseph and Sumption's contention that '[o]ne cannot provide collectively for innovation. One cannot plan administratively for things the possibility of which is unknown. We do not know what the demands of the future will be because our horizons are necessarily limited by what is available now': Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 123-124.
[167] R. Samuel, 'Mrs. Thatcher's Return to Victorian Values', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 78 (1992), pp. 9-29; See also Letwin's analysis of Thatcherism's 'vigorous virtues': S. R. Letwin, *Anatomy of Thatcherism* (London, 1992), pp. 33-34.
[168] 'Text of a speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds N.E.), Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Technology and Trade at the West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Abbey Hotel, Malvern, on Saturday, 21st February 1970 – The Social Purpose and Framework of Conservative Industrial Policy', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 65/1, p. 1.
[169] 'Joseph, West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Malvern (21/02/1970)', p. 1.

virtues and benefits of the existing stage of society are retained and enhanced in the newer form'.[170] Then, Joseph 'argue[d] that the kind of society we inherited from the Victorians has the potential for great progress, advances in well being, and expansion of rights for the less fortunate without adversely affecting existing rights of their fellows'. He did so, Sir Keith himself said, '[i]n the light of experience'.[171] The above-quoted reference of Joseph's to the 'newer form' of benefits and virtues that awaited in the future speaks just as much to Sir Keith's conservatism as do his references to experience and the need for those benefits and virtues to be preexisting, for, in valuing organic change of one form or another, the conservative advocates for a continuum that can stretch not only out of the past into the present, but thence into what many conservatives, Joseph included, would deem an unknown if still acceptable future, too.

Nowhere is this sentiment more transparent than in Joseph's account of '[t]he objective for our life time', embourgeoisement, about which he was most fluent in his 1975 speech to the Economic Research Council, where Sir Keith described that process – 'the gradual spread of middle class values throughout society' - as 'the greatest measure of progress towards' what he called 'The Good Life'.[172] Such values Joseph said

> were based on economic independence, shared by self-employed craftsmen, shopkeeper, farmer and free professional as well as businessman large and small. The working class movement in its early years was motivated by these shared aspirations, reflected in the Trade Unions, friendly societies, cooperative societies. Engels complained that the workers and aristocracy in this country were becoming bourgeois, Lenin denounced trade union consciousness as bourgeois.[173]

Embourgeoisement was a series of 'life-styles, behaviour patterns and value-structures', entailing 'a common value system'. Significantly however, according to Joseph, these ends would not provide for, to repeat a line of Oakeshott's, a 'permanently impregnable society', '[f]or The Good Life is not a plateau to be reached but an infinite series of peaks. Each generation's striving for The Good Life is part of its good life'. Comprising part of what Joseph in another appeal to an extra-human naturalism referred to as 'our social evolution', embourgeoisement was therefore a form of (perpetual) organic change, since Joseph had been confident that '[f]rom the mid-Victorian era till a few years ago […] our society was moving under its own momentum', as opposed to the dictates of

[170] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 14.
[171] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 15.
[172] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', pp. 1-2.
[173] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 1.

politicians.[174] It was the latter, originating in human volition, that had stalled late-twentieth-century Britain's progress towards The Good Life. Joseph asserted that inflation (which he thought was caused by governments) and 'deliberate manipulation' had sent embourgeoisement into reverse.[175] He later also bemoaned 'the bureaucratisation of society'.[176] Much of what Joseph advocated for, though born of human volition, was about putting society back on the right track, in much the same way in which human beings might (or might not, as the case may be) reduce carbon emissions so as to protect the natural environment, without themselves manipulating the birth and growth of these plants or those animals. His 'job', Joseph said, 'is not to dictate general values, least of all when we speak as economists. As politicians and economists, our task is to re-create conditions under which the values we value can form the cement of our society. Our job is to re-create the conditions which will again permit the forward march of embourgeoisement'.[177] Like monetarism as analysed in the previous section for example, national solvency was for Joseph what he termed 'not so much an objective as conditio sine qua non, for the attainment of any objectives', including embourgeoisement.[178]

It is not even as though we can take refuge in stereotype, then. It might be thought that the best that can be said is that, regardless of when he believed decline to have set in (whether or not that be the Second World War), Joseph sought to return Britain to its Victorian past. But this resort too is closed to us. In 1970, Joseph disclosed that no twentieth-century government, Labour or Conservative, had provided the proper environment for efficiency in industry.[179] Four years later, Sir Keith praised the country's talent by saying that it was 'the same kind of talent that made Britain great and prosperous a hundred years ago, the envy of the world'.[180] The nineteenth century was accordingly for Joseph a benchmark of sorts. Yet there is no inkling in his rhetoric of Joseph having wished to return there. There is no sense in which it was for him what the political theorist James Alexander, whom the Conclusion contends with, calls a 'constitutive event'. As this thesis has shown already, much of what Britain had inherited from the Victorians was in Joseph's mind's eye a work in progress. '[E]mbourgeoisement […] went so far in Victorian times', Sir Keith said in 1975. But it could have gone further, as it had done 'even in the much maligned 'thirties', when home-ownership took such

[174] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 2.
[175] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 1.
[176] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 9.
[177] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 4.
[178] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 2.
[179] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 2.
[180] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 2.

strides'.[181] In *Monetarism is Not Enough*, Joseph commended that decade as a time during which, 'by and large, Britain was on its way forward again'.[182] There was never any crystalline state of Victorian glory to retreat to therefore. Were there to have been in Sir Keith's political thought, then Joseph might well have been a reactionary and not a conservative. And yet, speaking in 1975 on the subject of what might be called Victorian values, Joseph observed that '[w]hat may seem to the impatient as obstacles to progress can equally be barriers against regression'.[183] These values were thus just as much a means of *preventing* society from going backwards as they were of taking society forwards, the reality of which in Joseph's mind speaks to Sir Keith's both sense of time as progressive and privileging of organic change.

What goes up must, it is said, come down; what went forward could, Joseph believed, alas go back. Degeneration was for him just as much a possibility as progress. The former, not the latter, was he said at Birmingham's Grand Hotel '[t]he worship of instinct, of spontaneity, the rejection of self-discipline'.[184] Speaking in his constituency in May 1979, a few days before that year's General Election, Joseph spelt out how the voters had one of two choices. Either they could move forwards and choose to live in an economy and a society (Joseph again distinguished between the two) within which there was personal liberty and individual responsibility, and which would lead to a kind of progress thanks to the 'modest but steady and sustainable growth' it would provide for. Or, alternatively, the electors could plump for more equality and a larger state. Two 'direction[s]' were on offer. One was beneficial, while the other Joseph believed 'would […] guarantee that for the first time this century society would be put into reverse down a sharp incline of social, economic and political debilitation, leading to individual and collective impoverishment'.[185] And yet it was not only change's origins and direction – for instance, whether it had extra-human or human origins, or went forwards or back - that was at issue. So too in Joseph's eyes was its speed, as the reference cited above to 'steady' growth hints. Sir Keith observed in *Freedom and Order* that 'change can also be for the worse, both in itself, and because the rate of change itself can affect social behavior adversely'.[186] '[T]here [wa]s', he advised, 'a limit to society's ability to accommodate the side-effects of change and growth':

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[181] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 4.
[182] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 8.
[183] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 5.
[184] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 12.
[185] 'Extract from a speech by The Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Leeds, north East, and Conservative Spokesman on Industry with responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking in his Constituency, on May 1st, 1979', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 3.
[186] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 8.

> What does it profit a nation to increase the growth rate by one or two per cent of the GNP – no mean achievement – if this entails or causes an increase in unproductive overheads as great or greater, while adversely affecting the quality of life? And the quality of life includes the freedom, great and small, personal security, personal relationships, honesty in politics, stability, predictability, rewards and sanctions.[187]

Much more could be said about speed and time-horizons in Joseph's ideology. For now, it need only be said that Joseph's concern for the speed of change relates, like Sir Keith's conception of progress, to conservatism possibly being an invitation to work with, and not necessarily a kowtowing to, an extra-human-led organic change. This is especially germane to the following chapter, which notes that Joseph was open to increased equality via government intervention if the alternative was the social order's imperilment.

Thus there is little evidence to support the idea that Joseph conformed to a utopian determinism of the kind that Denham and Garnett posit. As this section has shown by analysing Sir Keith's comprehension of progress, that process, whether economic or social, Joseph did not "decontextualise". Its workings were both contingent and uncertain. With respect to the economic, this chapter has argued that the seeming determinism of Joseph's view of the free market and its potential for continued growth was undercut by Sir Keith holding out the possibility of the market's displacement. While with regard to social progress, this section has made the case for Joseph having thought of embourgeoisement as entailing not a series of static goods but an evolving inheritance. Joseph regretted that embourgeoisement might soon be utopian, but only if by 'utopia' is meant its literal translation, 'no place'. Sir Keith questioned 'whether life-styles which emerged in one set of circumstances can survive another'. He did so because of what he perceived as the middle classes' increasing emulation of the working class in their 'militancy, solidarity, [and attitude of] put your claim in and spend what you have while you have it'.[188] But not only for that reason. Joseph also wondered whether middle class values, which he thought had moulded the values of salary and

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[187] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 8.

[188] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p 4; Indeed, Joseph's concern for the health of embourgeoisement reflects a broader concern in the 1970s over increased 'proletarianisation'. Similar accounts include P. Hutber, *The Decline and Fall of The Middle Class and How It Can Fight Back* (Harmondsworth, 1977) and P. Johnson, *Enemies of Society* (London, 1977). A conservative and former social democrat, Johnson wrote that 'the health of the middle class is probably the best index of the health of society as a whole': Johnson, *Enemies of Society*, p. 258.

wage earners (especially when there was mobility, greater economic security and rising incomes), would 'survive almost universal proletarisation – or salarisation […] as the self-employed are driven out of their modest castles and forced to seek paid employment, increasingly in the public sector dominated by the political machine'. Dashing Joseph's expectations, growing prosperity and 'the substantial change in the pattern of income distribution' looked to have failed in spreading middle-class values and life-styles in an 'age of inflation, spend-what-you-have-because-it-is-not-worth-saving, and of pop culture'.[189] '[I]n some sense', Joseph feared, 'the opposite has been taking place'.[190] It was in that perceived context that Joseph argued for embourgeoisement, an undetermined form of social progress, with regard to which he confessed that 'we shall be happy if we can hold the line' – a comment which speaks to Joseph's both despondency and sense of embourgeoisement (should it last) as an ongoing process.[191]

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There exist rooms without furniture, which itself can be found outside of rooms, as in many gardens. As far as the comparison of ideologies to rooms goes though, furniture must be room-bound, for ideologies are both ontological and epistemological, their core concepts helping to delineate the known from the unknown. This chapter has argued that Joseph's epistemology chimed with Karl Popper's critical rationalism in being fallibilist and making for uncertain knowledge because Sir Keith's core concepts were organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, and that it was these concepts that made Joseph and other conservatives anti-rationalist. The third section argued that Joseph's understanding of progress, both social and economic (embourgeoisement and growth respectively), was suffused with uncertainty for this very reason. It showed for example how embourgeoisement was at risk of collapse and, even when that value-system was operational, that it was evolutionary. Prior to which, the second section of this chapter contended that, though Joseph advocated for monetarism via a reasoning which was public because it was empiricist, he did so because he valued organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, the workings of which were not susceptible to commonsense judgements. Thus, what Joseph thought knowable was caught in the tractor beam of his core concepts.

By way of its analysis, this chapter has countered O'Hara's argument that conservatism is at root epistemological. Moreover, in much the same way in which scholars of Thatcherism have tended to take the rhetoric of the so-called Iron Lady and

[189] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', pp. 3-4.
[190] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 3.
[191] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 4.

her retinue at face value, this chapter has argued effectively that, likewise, O'Hara accepts unduly the consternation of those he makes out to be the Conservative Party's true conservatives. The points raised in those Conservatives' critiques of monetarism can be thought of as having been conservative. What is unwarranted is to think that the Conservatives who raised them were the sole executors of conservatism within the British Conservative Party. O'Hara is wrong to refer to conservatives and monetarists as though they were opposites.[192] Monetarism was not a rationalist solution for Joseph, a conservative. Had it been, it would indeed have circumvented the knowledge and change principles, for in their allegiance to that pair 'the conservative challenges the epistemological ground on which rationalist ideologues stand'.[193] Instead of or as well as a division simply between liberals and conservatives, it is perhaps best to theorise a split in the Conservative Party between two groups of conservatives over their acceptance of differing levels of risk. All were cautious. But some were more cautious than others. Joseph was not as incautious as he might have been, it seems, because he judged the benefit of securing his core concepts to outweigh any possible cost to doing so.

In spite of the end to the post-war policy consensus which that judgement helped to bring about, this chapter's argument has extended the duration of the epistemological post-war consensus described by Blackburn and outlined in the first section of this chapter. Despite their conceptual differences, in sharing a broadly fallibilist, anti-utopian epistemology, Joseph and many of his adversaries had more in common than first meets the eye. One of those opponents, the Revisionist Labour MP Anthony Crosland, enters the frame in the following chapter, which analyses equality and inequality in Joseph's political thought to argue that, much like Sir Keith's epistemology, those concepts were in Joseph's ideology contingent upon conservatism's core concepts. Chapter Two contends that, when it came to those politicians' disagreements however, Joseph's epistemological limitations were in the context of the turbulence of the 1970s not nearly as much of a hindrance to the fulfillment of his ideology as were those of Crosland, whose preference of equality, unlike what Joseph perceived to be the naturality of inequality, was not materially-grounded and could therefore be taken by Croslandism's consumers to be excessive. Thus we turn now from epistemological consensus to conceptual conflict.

[192] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', pp. 49-50.
[193] O'Hara, 'The Conservative Dialectic', p. 40.

Chapter Two: Equality

When Margaret Thatcher departed Downing Street in 1990, she left inequality in her wake. Gauged via the Gini coefficient, which measures income or wealth distribution among a population on a scale of 0 (0%, or absolute equality) to 1 (100%, or perfect inequality), inequality rose rapidly from 0.25 when Mrs. Thatcher was first elected as Prime Minister to 0.34 the year after her ousting from office.[1] Many have thus perceived the Thatcherites as proponents for socio-economic inequality. Hickson for example has recommended that, '[r]ather than seeing the Conservative Party as being about statecraft, it would be better to see it as marked by an underlying commitment to inequality'.[2] For him, 'the New Right sought to articulate a clear intellectual argument in favour of greater inequality', with Joseph in particular having apparently made 'the case for greater inequality'.[3] For all of Joseph's reputation as an opponent of equality, he dedicated relatively little time to the subject of either equality or its antithesis. There is an obvious reason for this: at over one hundred pages in length, the 1979 monograph that Sir Keith co-authored with the then-academic Jonathan Sumption, *Equality*, provides an extensive elucidation of Joseph's thoughts on its namesake.[4] Of all of his public speeches, meanwhile, only one – given at the London School of economics in 1978 - was devoted specifically to the issue of equality and inequality. Besides those texts - which were published within a year of one another in the late 1970s – and a number of newspaper articles from around the same period, Joseph's thoughts as regards equality were by and large elsewhere only implicitly stated – as in, for instance, Sir Keith's remarks on the market economy. As such, when scholars have sought Joseph's opinion on the matter, in the majority of cases it has been to *Equality* that they have appealed. And rarely have they delighted in what they have found. One initial review was excoriating. '[W]hen historians come to write of the decades in which the miracle of Joseph and Margaret [Thatcher] was enacted', it predicted, 'they will have much fun at our expense for mistaking a tap-room philosopher for an intellectual guru. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that Sir Keith Joseph protests so vigorously that he

[1] J. Cribb, 'Income inequality in the UK', <https://ifs.org.uk/docs/ER_JC_2013.pdf>, accessed 1/11/2019, p. 1.
[2] K. Hickson, 'Inequality', in K. Hickson (Ed.), *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2005), p. 183; See also R. Eccleshall, 'The doing of conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5/3 (2005), pp. 275-287.
[3] Hickson, 'Inequality', pp. 188-190.
[4] Going forwards, this thesis often refers to Joseph alone as the author of *Equality* not because it discounts Sumption's contribution to that text but simply because its focus is Sir Keith.

does not believe in equality, it would be tempting to accuse him of trying to drag everyone down to his level'.[5]

Such critics have a point. *Equality*'s analysis can seem confused. Joseph and Sumption appear to move the goal posts. Redistribution is interpreted in their book as at one and the same time necessary and immoral. Yet any inconsistencies should not be treated, as some have viewed them, as an invitation to spar. Though such perhaps are the perils of contemporary history. We must resist the temptation to don boxing gloves and retain firm in hand the magnifying glass. First-order combat must be differentiated from second-order analysis. Indeed, what is interesting about Sir Keith Joseph's political thought is precisely its irreconciled tensions. At the end of the day, ours is not to prescribe. Rather, it is to analyse. And analyse we shall: this chapter challenges the predominant characterisation of Thatcherite attitudes to equality and inequality – a characterisation that has been attached to Joseph. Having inspired the writing of a monograph, Dorey's interpretation is as good a foil as any. As the subtitle of *British Conservatism* makes plain, the ideological tradition to which that title makes reference is for its author one centered upon *[t]he Politics and Philosophy of Inequality*. Dorey looks on inequality as the 'common characteristic permeating' every Conservative's political thought: the latter ideologies are dedicated above all to the defence and advocacy of socio-economic inequality, in the belief that the wealth of a minority benefits the majority and/or that inequality represents a pre-ordained fact of life.[6] '[A]ll Conservatives are emphatic that inequality per se is both desirable and necessary', inevitable and natural. It follows that as far as equality is concerned, Dorey maintains, that concept is in practice 'undesirable and unattainable', and that for those who seek it, the cost of their doing so can only ever be human suffering.[7]

The ideology Dorey ascribes to Sir Keith Joseph is in his mind's eye the distillation of Conservatism – the 'pure[st]' and 'more literal' manifestation of its precepts and principles.[8] Dorey's use of the word 'neo-liberalism' to describe that phenomenon is, to say the very least, anachronistic.[9] A precise definition of that -ism is reserved for Chapter Four, which considers Joseph's understanding of the free market. Whatever else they might be, however, neo-liberals are not simply, to quote Dorey, 'free-market fundamentalists'. Neither A. V. Dicey nor Ernest Benn are best thought of as neo-liberals, in spite of Dorey's contentions to the contrary.[10] The second of those

[5] G. Pearson, 'Reviews: Equality Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption London, John Murray, 1979, pp. 130, £4.95 hardback', *Critical Social Policy*, 1/1 (June 1981), p. 120.
[6] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 1.
[7] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 5.
[8] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 111, 163.
[9] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 111.
[10] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 119.

individuals, though, Dorey links to Joseph through both theirs references to the author of *Self-Help*, Samuel Smiles.[11] According to the author of *British Conservatism*, for such advocates of neo-liberalism, the market was the 'only viable or feasible means of wealth creation and resource allocation'.[12] The neo-liberal market was, moreover, a perfect one, the failures of which its advocates blamed on undue government interference. Those early Thatcherites (like Joseph) who emerged in reaction to the failures of the 1970-1974 government and Heath's abandonment of the Selsdon programme acted, we are assured, to 'restate the case for a purer, unadulterated, mode of capitalism' in which the market reigned.[13] Under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher, Dorey argues, the Conservative Party engaged not merely in the defence of inequality but in its 'deliberate promotion'; 'unlike One Nation Conservatives, Conservative neo-liberals do not believe that there is a point beyond which inequality becomes excessive, indefensible or reprehensible, nor do they believe that the rich should feel any moral obligation to the poor'.[14]

The purpose of this chapter is to refute by way of an analysis of Joseph's understanding of equality and inequality the thesis for which Dorey is the most conspicuous and articulate spokesman.[15] To all intents and purposes, in the language of Freeden's typology, inequality was for Joseph, according to Dorey, a core component of that politician's ideology. The forthcoming pages argue that no such thing was true. Inequality's status was within Joseph's ideological morphology ultimately contingent, by reason of the fact that it was desirable therein only in so far as it was perceived to be required to protect the conservative core and deemed to be compatible with the primary outlet for the extra-human origins of the social order and organic change, the free market. As noted in the Introduction, such extra-human origins can take many forms. They might be divine in nature.[16] For Joseph, they included not only the market but, as the following chapter argues, the rule of law, too. Thus, insofar as the free market provided extra-human legitimation, as the previous chapter intimated, it was for Joseph not synonymous with the extra-volitional. It was an adjunct of it. The market was simply the best placed means to fulfilling individuals' wants and needs – that is, to providing for organic change - and was not sacrosanct. Like inequality, it was an adjacent concept.

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[11] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 121.
[12] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 111.
[13] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 137.
[14] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 117, 164.
[15] This chapter takes inspiration from D. Blackburn, ''For We Shall Prejudice Nothing': Middle Way Conservatism and the Defence of Inequality, 1945-1979', *Political Studies*, 64/1 (2016), pp. 156-172.
[16] As they looked to be for one forerunner of Thatcherism, Lord Coleraine: R. Law, *Return from Utopia* (London, 1950), pp. 194-200;

Hence both concepts lacked any intrinsic value, had no independent status, and their removal would not have damaged the essential meaning of Joseph's political thought.

And if inequality was in Joseph's political thought neither stable nor ineliminable, it stands to reason that the same was true of that concept's antonym. The Thatcherites advocated inequality and by extension opposed outright equality – so runs the standard account, and so much so that is seems for some scholars to have become an article of faith. That presupposition is understandable. But a presupposition it remains – and, in the case of Sir Keith Joseph at least, a false one at that, for Joseph had on the whole no problem with equality in and of itself. Indeed, there were moments when he thought greater equality permissible, as when the social order and, in turn, the conservative core was imperiled. What he opposed was the pursuit of that concept. That it was egalitarianism and not equality that Joseph rejected will be revealed in the third and final section of this chapter. It is first to a comparison between Sir Keith and one of the premier advocates of increased equality in post-war Britain, the Labour politician Anthony Crosland, that this chapter applies itself, in its first and second sections. Students of conservatism cannot do without an appreciation for that which conservatives oppose. This is because conservatism is reactive. Inequality was conspicuous in Joseph's political thought due largely to the perceived threat posed by egalitarianism to Sir Keith's core concepts. Conservatism's adjacent commitments represent a blockade, prompted by an external threat and dictated by the exigencies of the conservative core.[17] A comparison between Sir Keith and the author of *The Future of Socialism* is especially relevant given that, alongside Tony Benn and Harold Wilson, Crosland was one of the few opposition MPs whom Joseph called out in his public speeches, which typically cited (more often than not, accused) socialists in general. Sir Keith quoted another English socialist, George Orwell, in one assault on the then-Secretary of State for the Environment, in support of his belief that '[w]hen there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink', just as, he contended, Crosland did.[18]

Comprehending Joseph's opinion of Crosland, the second section of this chapter bridges this chapter and the previous one, by arguing that, in spite of both that opinion

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[17] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 344; Albeit the meanings of conservatism are conferred not so much by its adversaries as by what conservatives take those adversaries to stand for. Misinterpretation, either mistaken or calculated, is a distinct possibility. See Blackburn, *Still the stranger at the feast?*, p. 121, and Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 378.

[18] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. M.P. (Leeds North East) speaking at the Paddington Conservative Association, 92 Bishops Bridge Road WC on 16th December 1975 at 15:00 hours', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 85/1, p. 11.

and their differences, Sir Keith and Crosland helped via their promotion of a series of consensual and democratic conceptualisations to sustain the epistemological post-war consensus which the previous chapter argued for. Despite which, that section then goes on to argue that Joseph had an advantage over Crosland in sounding the death knell of the traditional post-war policy consensus, because he rooted a great many of his decontestations, including of not only inequality but justice, in material reality, and thus defined them as in some sense factual, truthful, and/or, in a sign of those concepts' adjacent status, natural. In contrast with those conceptualisations, Crosland did not argue for one of the concepts at Croslandism's core, equality, on the basis of its factuality, and was therefore liable to be found ideologically wanting when, as happened in the 1970s, the political economy on which his understanding of equality depended ran into trouble. Indeed, what Nuttall has said of moral and intellectual improvement in Crosland's political thought this chapter relates to equality specifically, in that all of those concerns were for Crosland 'post-material' in nature.[19] *The Future of Socialism* argued that 'material standards are rising to the point where we can spare more energy, and more resources, for beauty and culture'.[20] Equality, like that belief in the improvement of minds, followed material improvement, and it was for this reason that Croslandite revisionism was oriented towards reforming structures and not to 'changing minds' – whether the latter be to persuade the public to favour equality or to engage with aesthetics – and, this chapter suggests, that Crosland's conception of equality was left stranded when the material tide turned.[21] In dealing with both inequality and equality, the middle section of this chapter thus acts as a segue between the final section, which (as stated above) concerns almost exclusively Joseph's attitude towards equality, and the first one, which deals principally with Joseph's comprehension of inequality and argues that that concept, in being for Sir Keith a natural consequence of organic change, was for him an adjacent one. Our entry-point into the following analysis are Crosland and Joseph's differing views of the liberal political philosopher, John Rawls, whose 'veil of ignorance' Sir Keith rejected due to what he took to be that ideal's denial of both man's natural condition and, one result of that condition, a natural inequality.

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[19] J. Nuttall, 'The Labour Party and the Improvement of Minds: The Case of Tony Crosland', *The Historical Journal*, 46/1 (Mar., 2003), p. 149; Like Nuttall, Black notes how '[f]or Tony Crosland […] affluence afforded a post-materialist focus in which the Webbs and Fabian emphasis on efficiency would yield to a more relaxed pluralism of full enjoyment': L. Black, *Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-70* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2010), p. 18.

[20] A. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London, [1956] 2006), p. 408.

[21] Nuttall, 'The Labour Party and the Improvement of Minds', p. 138.

Inequality:

Anthony Crosland was a socialist. For him, socialism concerned ends.[22] It was fundamentally ethical and values-based. Above all, it concerned equality. But not only of opportunity. That type of equality was 'not enough'.[23] A just and prosperous society could only be secured via equality on various fronts. In particular, Crosland aspired to what he called democratic equality in the form of a combination of more equal outcomes and equality of opportunity, with positive liberty being a result. Though cooperation and fellowship were important, social equality was 'the most characteristic feature of socialist thought'.[24] That view was in place of the traditional concern of the Attlee administrations of 1945-51, cemented by Clause IV, with state ownership – a concern which by the 1950s had been exhausted, and in the context of which The *Future of Socialism*'s heterodoxy promoted a reconsideration of Labour's purpose and a fresh sense of direction for a party which seemed to many, Crosland included, intellectually vacuous. The Labour Party could not go on being 'the Party for defending 1945-51 and little more'.[25] Consolidation was no longer enough, and the nationalisation to be consolidated simply one means among many. Public ownerships applicability ought to be judged on a case by case basis. *The Conservative Enemy* thought that policy all well and good once upon a time.[26] Writing in *The Future of Socialism*, however, Crosland argued that '[t]here is little reason to expect nationalisation to produce an automatic change for the better'.[27] That form of ownership was unlikely to 'alter the existing institutional framework in such a way as to give more outlet for *existing* social motives'.[28] Indeed, Crosland said, the economy was by the middle of the twentieth century improved less by the style of ownership (whether private or public) of this or that industry and far more by the quality of management. Public ownership was by the late 1950s thus 'wholly irrelevant to socialism as defined in' *The Future of Socialism*.[29] Such was the Croslandite, and indeed Revisionist, strategy.[30] What mattered were the ends. The means were circumstantial.

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[22] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, pp. 74-77.
[23] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 191.
[24] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 87.
[25] Quoted in S. Crosland, *Tony Crosland* (London, 1982), p. 68.
[26] A. Crosland, *The Conservative Enemy: A programme of radical reform for the 1960s* (London, 1962), pp. 41-42.
[27] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 288.
[28] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 83.
[29] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 385.
[30] B. Jackson, *Equality and the British Left: A study in progressive political thought, 1900-64* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 155-160.

Joseph and Crosland were ideologically not as one. Besides the fact that one was a socialist and the other a conservative, another noteworthy fissure between the two was their differing views of the American liberal mentioned in the previous chapter, John Rawls. The people who inhabit perhaps the most famous of that political philosopher's intellectual schemas in *A Theory of Justice* exist behind a veil of ignorance. They know the basic facts of life but are unaware of their social positions, individual tastes or talents.[31] Under those conditions, Rawls thought that individuals would choose two options.[32] First, they would wish for the maximum liberty for themselves that does not infringe upon the liberties of others. This would leave them with the essential freedoms familiar to the citizens of liberal democracies, like freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the freedom to vote. Second of all, Rawls believed that those ignorant of their positions would seek equality and, upon seeing that certain inequalities could work to the benefit of the least well-off, would view as equitable those inequalities which assist the poorest and which were not the preserve of a restricted cadre, such as the disparities in income that resulted from the preservation of incentives as a means to increased production. In giving precedence to justice therefore, Rawls' conception of that concept was of justice as impartiality and not of it as mutual advantage, and it is for his belief in the availability of a uniform and unifying conception of justice, as well as of liberty, that Rawls has been called a Kantian, given that he allowed for such concepts to be moulded so as not to conflict.[33]

Crosland made an essentially Rawlsian point when in *The Future of Socialism* he stated 'that no one deserves either so generous a reward or so severe a penalty for a quality implanted from outside, for which he himself can claim only a limited responsibility'.[34] Having read Rawls in the meantime, he later made a similar remark in *Socialism Now*, where he commented explicitly as to how, '[b]y equality, we meant more than meritocratic society of equal opportunities in which the greatest rewards would go to those with the most fortunate genetic endowment and family background; we adopted the 'strong' definition of equality - what Rawls has subsequently called the 'democratic' as opposed to the 'liberal' conception'.[35] In his contention that '[w]e do not want complete equality of incomes; since extra responsibility and exceptional talent require and deserve a differential rewards', Crosland had an affinity for what Rawls called the

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[31] J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (London, [1971] 2005), pp. 136-142.
[32] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 61
[33] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 251; For example, Gray sees Rawls as having attempted to circumvent the issue of value-incommensurability identified by Berlin by defining such principles as liberty and justice as regulative ones of right. See J. Gray, *Isaiah Berlin: An Interpretation of His Thought* (Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 1996), pp. 146-147.
[34] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 189.
[35] A. Crosland, *Socialism Now and other essays* (London, [1974] 1975), p. 15.

"difference principle", according to which 'the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the most attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate'.[36] When he referred to 'genuine' equality of opportunity therefore, read "strong": Crosland could not rest easy with the 'social waste' which be believed emanated from a highly stratified British class system and via which the most talented only within a certain hereditary pool reaped the rewards, favouring instead an equality of opportunity, exemplified in his support for comprehensive education, which could benefit all citizens and not just the privileged.[37]

As much as Rawls gave succour to Crosland, he antagonised others.[38] Many have taken his work to be emblematic of a post-war attempt on the part of certain political philosophers to subsume the political under the moral.[39] Rawls' writings stand accused of scouring politics from the public realm.[40] So runs the standard critique: Rawls is systematic, ahistorical and deductive, and overly so in all of the above. History and the particularities of actually-existing human beings seem to have little bearing on principles which Rawls held in a kind of suspended animation. Individuals as painted by that philosopher are for example when placed behind the veil of ignorance – just one of the philosophical mechanisms used to emphasise the consensual – individuals in name only. Being hollow and homogenous in equal measure, they appear almost pre-social, seeming to exist prior to the societies which people do in fact inhabit. Coincidentally, some of Rawls' fiercest critics are philosophical realists, with whom this thesis is in many ways aligned (see the Introduction and its distancing of this thesis from philosophy), and who find Rawls' ideal of justice to be so demanding as to be impractical.[41] Bernard Williams,

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[36] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 168; Crosland did not, he said, wish to see 'the Queen riding a bicycle' (Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 168); Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 75 (for further detail, see pp. 75-80); Lord Plant thinks that, for Crosland, inequalities were permissible 'if, and only if, differential rewards work to the benefit of the community as a whole and we can assume that access to jobs which command differential rewards would be on the basis of a genuine equality of opportunity'. See Lord Plant, 'Democratic Socialism and Equality', in H. Fawcett & R. Lowe, *Welfare Policy in Britain: The Road from 1945* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 1999), p. 101.

[37] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 166.

[38] And not only Crosland: D. Owen, *A Future That Will Work* (London, 1984), p. 108.

[39] Geuss refers, and not as a compliment, as to how 'the "original position" was supposed to be disjoined from real politics': R. Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2008) pp. 72-73.

[40] Waldon pithily distinguishes what he calls the 'circumstances of politics' from Rawls' 'circumstances of justice': J. Waldron, *Law and Disagreement* (Oxford, 1999), p. 160.

[41] See W. A. Galston, 'Realism in political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9/4 (2010), pp. 385-411.

for instance, disavowed the structural model of the kind that Rawls upheld, as well as the role played by a certain kind of morality in both that and the enactment model of utilitarianism.[42] This author is not competent to judge the veracity of these allegations. He wishes only to note the great extent to which they chime with Joseph's critique of Rawls and his 'large assumptions about human nature'.[43]

Joseph's analysis of *A Theory of Justice* in *Equality* sits comfortably alongside that of a philosopher like Michael Sandel, who took against what he saw as being the unencumbered self imagined by Rawls.[44] Sir Keith argued that:

> it seems reasonable to suppose that Rawls' men in the original position would in fact consult not only their own material advantage but their moral principles before deciding what is in their 'interest'. Some of them might well express a moral preference for equality, but the variety of other opinions would be as great as the variety of men asserting them. The idea is absurd that out of such an unusual colloquy there would emerge some unanimous consensus.[45]

Especially striking in Joseph's opinion was the fact that those who inhabit what Sir Keith called Rawls' 'rhetorical device', the veil of ignorance, 'do not gamble on their ability' and 'are very cautious', in contrast with which, Joseph maintained that reality was such that '[m]en organise their own world. And when they make political decisions what matters is not how they seem to some objective intelligence surveying them from an Olympian height'.[46] It was thus in the same vein as the critiques featured in the previous paragraph that Sir Keith rejected Rawls' philosophy for its both determinacy and dismissal of the contingency of any consensus. Albeit *Equality* might not have passed peer review. Sir Keith appears to have partially misrepresented Rawls, stating how, '[i]f Rawls is right, then it may be that we should indeed look upon equality as the natural state of mankind', in spite of the fact that Rawls never contended that equality was natural, only that it was preferable.[47] That remark most likely represents an attempt on the part of Joseph to crowbar Rawls into his broader argument against the idea that

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[42] B. Williams, *Essays and Reviews, 1959-2002* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 82-86.
[43] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 89; For an understanding of how liberal egalitarianism developed in response to challenges from the New Right, see K. Forrester, *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy* (Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2019), pp. 204-238.
[44] M. J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge, 2nd Ed., [1982] 1998).
[45] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 90; Rawls' position was not so distant from Joseph's as Sir Keith liked to think. See S. M. Amadae, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (London, 2003), p. 271.
[46] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 92, 89, 119.
[47] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 89.

equality was a natural state of affairs, the crux of which is stated below, and which is in its invocation of the naturalness of *inequality* indicative of Joseph's conservatism, its content and form.

Joseph held inequality to be a perennial feature of any advanced society. It is equality of outcome and not inequality that is 'not natural'.[48] In large part, Joseph claimed, this is due to the incompatibility of equality's differing aspects, such that '[t]rying to achieve equality in one respect will necessarily produce inequality in other respects'.[49] To impose equality of food intake, for instance, would result in inequality of nutrition, given individuals' differing requirements. And thanks to the need for what Joseph perceived as excessive government intervention in order to do so, to impose equality of result more generally would, Joseph also claimed in his speech to the LSE, require inequality of power between the state and the citizenry.[50] Hence *Equality* spoke of how '[t]he emergence of new inequalities in place of the old is an enduring feature of humanity in all but the most primitive unstructured societies'.[51] "Equal at dawn; unequal at dusk/noon" was a refrain Joseph repeated in his 1976 work, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, as well as in his LSE lecture two years later.[52] The only inequality of incomes was to be found in the graveyard.[53] The likes of the nineteenth-century cultural critic Matthew Arnold were wrong therefore: inequality was not the result of a 'system', nor the consequence of 'a contrivance, a fraud deliberately worked by powerful men in their own interests'.[54] The means by which egalitarians attempted to achieve equality proved that to be true, Joseph stated; that state intervention and a command economy were required to try and make people equal goes to show that inequality was a natural state of affairs 'which results when the natural aptitudes of men are allowed to manifest themselves in natural differences'.[55] Reorganising social life was no good, and only the unlikely event of 'a change in the human material' that comprises it could, Joseph maintained, secure the egalitarian dream.[56] The onus was on those who believed otherwise to provide evidence that inequalities 'which would not naturally exist are

[48] 'Text of a Lecture Given at the London School of Economics by The Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt, MP, (Leeds North East) Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research and the Opposition Spokesman for Industry, on Thursday, 8th June, 1978 – Equality and Inequality', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 10.
[49] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 1.
[50] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 7.
[51] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 46.
[52] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 76; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 8.
[53] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 76.
[54] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 84.
[55] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 51.
[56] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 40.

artificially brought into being', with regards to which it was not enough, Joseph insisted, simply to propose a system which would, if it could, abolish inequality.[57]

Inequality thus bears all the hallmarks of an adjacent concept. Not only, as the previous paragraph testifies, was it natural. It also relied on conservatism's mirror-image technique. That strategy, of securing at the adjacent level concepts antithetical to the ones posed by the conservative's foe, is intended to protect the core conservative concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, however those are defined.[58] The challenger concept is isolated, and refutations to it are provided by shoring up the target of the assault.[59] Successfully undertaken, the culmination of this process is, seemingly, to de-politicise and shield from debate particular decontestations. All else being equal, when change in the conservative imagination runs smoothly, conservatism is disengaged from the fray. Only when its core concepts are again threatened and the mirror-image mechanism springs into action does it acquire once more "principles".[60] Unlike such rationalist ideologies as liberalism and socialism therefore, conservatism prizes structural complexity above a distinct set of purposively-oriented concepts like, say, liberty, equality and fraternity. *Equality* in particular offers a remarkably transparent breakdown of the mirror-image technique as it relates in Joseph's political thought to the concept of inequality. First comes the threat – egalitarians, or 'celestial chefs', who menace the extra-human origins of the social order and organic change.[61] Then the mirror-image technique activates, buttressing those concepts which egalitarianism works to expel (chiefly, inequality) and which insulate the conservative core. The result is to shore up by way of a promotion of inequality (via another adjacent concept, the market) a conception of change legitimated by that which resides beyond individuals' arbitrary discretion (namely, the "natural").

This process makes sense of Joseph's argument for the immateriality of what Sir Keith called 'the material circumstances of a man's upbringing'.[62] In view of the fact that egalitarian resentment was given succour in the main by the supposedly privileged ability of some rather than others to gain wealth via free enterprise, Joseph thought, the egalitarian case was grounded by the insignificance of any individual's initial material circumstances. The poor can ascend to wealth, while the rich can descend to poverty. John D. Rockefeller's fortune, we are reminded, was produced in spite of its owner's harsh childhood.[63] In "Equality and Inequality", as elsewhere, Joseph asserted that

[57] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 51.
[58] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 343.
[59] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 344.
[60] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 337.
[61] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 44.
[62] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 33.
[63] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 11.

'institutional factors have no appreciable effect on outcome' (a conclusion apparently confirmed by academic studies and 'commonsense' alike).[64] Differences in ability were not a consequence of institutions and existed independently of structural factors. It was for this reason that 'the brave new experiments in manufacturing equality by educational manipulation […] produce[d] little or no effect'. More significant was luck, the individual's innate talents and their motivation, the 'intensity' of the third of which Joseph did not believe had any discernible link to 'the material advantages of a prosperous background' (if anything, he claimed, the opposite was true).[65] This argument, for the centrality of motivation, luck and talent (rather than institutional factors) to individual achievement and thus to inequality, is indicative of a belief in a social realm sanctified by extra-human forces. How, if outcomes depended on a 'system' of the kind that Joseph ascribed to Arnold, and if the social order was entrenched in observable social structures, could such an order be extra-human in its origins?[66] The extra-human origins of the social order (outposts of which were luck, talent, etcetera) would be negated were education, for instance, able to provide against inequality.[67] Joseph thus served up inequality in defence of what he took to be natural (talent, luck, etcetera) and the organic change which those extra-human origins of the social order provided for. Nowhere is this better exemplified, however, than in Joseph's support for individual competitiveness, a cause of another adjacent concept, inequality, and, like inequality, an outpost of the conservative core.

The most competitive were the trend-setters. The 'speed of any society's advance' was thus 'the speed of its fastest members, and a society in which no one may advance an inch before another will remain immobile'.[68] That the rich might spend some of their incomes frivorously is, Joseph tells us, beside the point. The enjoyment by those on lower incomes of those same benefits is thanks to the fact that they were once produced for a minority.[69] Defined as 'the desire to excel over others and be seen to be doing so', what Joseph in *Equality* termed the 'competitive spirit' is, the co-author of that text admitted, double-edged.[70] It could improve standards and it could corrupt.[71] Far better to run the risk of the second of those eventualities, though, than to frustrate man's 'competitive nature', which *Equality* declared to be nothing short of a

[64] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 11.
[65] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 34.
[66] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 84.
[67] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 34.
[68] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 61.
[69] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 61-62.
[70] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 55.
[71] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 14.

'revolutionary endeavor'.[72] Above all, Joseph thought the latter pursuit pointless, for '[m]en do not become less ambitious when their ambitions are frustrated; they change methods rather than their objectives. This is strikingly illustrated by every attempt to make the State the agent of distribution instead of the free market'.[73] Man's competitiveness could not be abolished, Joseph felt. Rather than for the benefit of the consumer, under an egalitarian government 'men will instead compete for the favour of the State'.[74] The same impulse would simply be funneled into a different domain, except this time without regard for the interests of others. In those circumstances, '[s]heer strength is the only determinant of success and the winner is the participant who can cause maximum inconvenience to his fellow man'.[75] The competitive spirit was thus all-pervasive, and so much so, Joseph believed, that alongside basic materialism it was just as much at the heart of egalitarianism as it was a cause of inequality.[76] Again, Joseph insisted, the obstacle to the egalitarian Eden is not an economic system. It is 'human nature itself'.[77]

Change induced by man's competitive spirit was thus natural, whereas equality of outcome, in having human design intrude on the extra-human origins of the social order to produce discontinuous change, was 'not natural'.[78] Hence Joseph's reference, quoted in the previous paragraph, to society's (organic) advance under the auspices of man's competitive nature, one result of which was inequality. Inequality was, therefore, an adjacent concept. Joseph called upon that concept in reaction against egalitarians and in defence of his core concepts. But, importantly, he also singled out inequality because of the context in which he placed himself. Joseph's political thought was not universalist, and the social order the extra-human origins of which concerned Sir Keith was British. Joseph's concepts, in other words, were nationally-prescribed. According to Sir Keith therefore, not every conservative need have called upon inequality, even were they, like Joseph in the 1970s, faced with egalitarians, because not every conservative lived in a society in which organic change required unequal outcomes. In this respect, as in many others, Joseph failed to conform to type. Invoking Holmes' remark to Watson, Dorey thinks that Conservatives, amongst whom he numbers Joseph, view inequality as 'the one fixed point in a changing age'.[79] Not so of conservatives, Sir Keith implied. Take for example his dismissal of the supposedly common analogy used in favour of greater

[72] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 46-47.
[73] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 39.
[74] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 39.
[75] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 39.
[76] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 40.
[77] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 41.
[78] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 10.
[79] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 37.

equality in the comparison of the redistribution of wealth and the sharing of cakes. That analogy could only be feasible, Joseph thought, if wealth was never created, or if it was produced by society at large and then distributed to its individual members – a state of affairs that he thought to be 'perfectly correct in the case of the mother and her five children', but which was not reflective of the reality of individuals in a 'modern industrial society', for ultimately, as Joseph argued the previous year also, '[w]ealth is created not by society but by the members of society, as individuals or teams, according to their capacities'.[80] Call to mind also Joseph's statement as to how '[t]he emergence of new inequalities in place of the old is an enduring feature of humanity in all but the most primitive unstructured societies'.[81] What these excerpts leave open is the possibility of there having been at some stage in the pre-modern past a broadly egalitarian form of organic change which a conservative could have got behind. This, on top of the nature of inequality in Joseph's political thought as a conservative antithesis to socialists' egalitarian thesis, speaks to inequality's expendability under conservatism.

This section has argued that inequality was for Joseph an adjacent concept. The next one picks up where in a sense we left off, with Crosland, to contend that, although he and Joseph jointly contributed via their consensual definitions of such political concepts as justice and equality towards the epistemological post-war consensus featured in the previous chapter, Joseph's decontestations of justice and inequality in particular were, in their "naturalness", of those concepts as akin to facts, unlike Crosland's decontestation of equality, which, being both a personal value and 'post-material', was by contrast found ultimately in the context of the 1970s to be expendable.[82] The downfall of the traditional post-war consensus – the one supposedly baptised in 1945 and buried in 1979 – can therefore be explained at least in part with reference to these differing conceptualisations. The buck need not have stopped with ideas, important thought they were, and this thesis does not wish to intervene in the debate over which were (and are) more influential, ideas or institutions.[83] Taking Joseph and Crosland as points of reference however, the following section offers ammunition for those who do.

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[80] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 85; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 10.
[81] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 46.
[82] The first section of this chapter has argued, in effect, that inequality was for Joseph in the latter half of the twentieth century a Sachwang or 'factual constraint residing in the nature of things that leaves you no choice': W. Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End?: Essays on a Failing System* (London, 2017), p. 22.
[83] M. Blyth, 'Review: "Any More bright Ideas?" The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy', *Comparative Politics*, 29/2 (Jan., 1997), p. 236.

Inequality versus Equality:

Revisionism's means did not in practice last. By the 1970s the Revisionists' dream was over and their optimism at an end. The basis on which Crosland's political economy had relied collapsed. Distribution and production fell out of alignment. With the United Kingdom imperiled from without and within by, in the first instance, global finance, which threatened nationally-bounded macro-economic Keynesianism – a factor presaged by the failure of the 1967 devaluation – and, in the second, the non-English nationalisms which sought to undermine the very unity of the British state, Croslandism ran aground on the industrial strife, increasing political polarisation and economic stagnation which had taken the place of the stability and growth promised by Britain's post-war consensus, and which *The Future of Socialism* had taken so much for granted.[84] If the Croslandite prospectus of reducing inequalities was fueled by economic growth, with the proceeds of that expansion distributed in favour of greater levels of state welfare, by the 1970s the engine had run dry and the revisionist strategy which rested upon it stalled. In light of which, Crosland would perhaps have done well not to have both dismissed so readily the Fabians' emphasis on efficiency and taken for granted growth and production in his focus on redistribution. With 'economic politics' now superseding 'social politics' (the opposite of what Crosland had expected), it was no longer sociologists that Labour needed.[85]

Not that Crosland was unaware of this. How to allocate the dividends of growth between personal consumption and state spending; a belief that the goals of reducing poverty and providing for a more equal distribution of wealth were 'not within sight of attainment'; as well as an awareness of the importance of environmental politics and of the need for stricter competition policy to 'halt' increasing multinational concentration – these were all issues raised by Crosland in *Socialism Now*.[86] In addition to attending once more, as he had done in his 1956 magnum opus, to the future of socialism, however, Crosland in the 1970s looked to the preceding post-war decades with a sense of regret. He believed that in 'generat[ing] the loudest demands', such as for extra resources for their local schools and subsidies for their rail travel, the middle classes had

[84] The politics of the 1970s meant that 'more pleasure-gardens on the Battersea model, more murals and pictures in public places, better designs for furniture and pottery and women's clothes, statues in the centre of new housing-estates, better-designed street-lamps and telephone kiosks, and so on' would have to wait: Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 403.
[85] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 148.
[86] Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 72, 151-189, 34.

reaped most of the rewards from the 1964-1970 Wilson administrations.[87] Alongside which, economic growth had not been as expected ('lamentable' was how Crosland described it), having been sacrificed to the balance of payments.[88] 'Looking back with hindsight', therefore, Crosland asserted that 'the early revisionist writings were too complacent in tone; they proposed the right reforms, but under-rated the difficulty of achieving them in a British context'.[89] Continued poverty, inequalities and inflation, he said, 'belie[d] the relative optimism of *The Future of Socialism*'.[90] What Crosland did not admit was that there was about the Croslandism of the *Future of Socialism* something almost teleological.[91] The Attlee governments had changed the country, and they had done so, so Crosland appeared to believe, at least for the foreseeable future. '[T]he contemporary mixed economy [wa]s characterised by high levels both of employment and productivity and by a reasonable degree of stability', and that, it seemed, was that.[92] Reviewing *The Conservative Enemy* in *The New York Review of Books*, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote that Crosland's 'essential plea in the end is to his own party, and his essential argument is that, if socialism is to survive in the modern world, it must undergo a process of modernization'.[93] Only that Crosland had long given the impression that modernisation was an event and not a process.

Crosland's means suffered. But so crucially did his ends. It was not only Keynesian demand management, in appearing to produce inflation and not employment, that was by the 1970s compromised, but Crosland's understanding of equality also, for the latter was in Croslandism in practice dependent on the former. This was because Crosland thought of equality as simply his personal preference and never went to any great lengths in providing a philosophical justification for that concept. 'Crosland was',

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[87] A. Crosland, *Social democracy in Europe (Fabian Tract 438)* (London, 1975), <https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:fuj246zew?id=lse%3Afuj246zew#page/1/mode/2up>, accessed 10/02/2020, pp. 8-9.
[88] Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 18.
[89] Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 44.
[90] Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 26.
[91] In his contribution to *New Fabian Essays*, originally published in 1952, Crosland commented as to how capitalism was 'passing to statism': C. A. R. Crosland, 'The Transition from Capitalism' in R. H. S. Crossman (Ed.), *New Fabian Essays* (London, 3rd Ed. [1952] 1970), p. 46. Four years later, he regretted the use of 'statism', but nonetheless insisted that 'our present society is sufficiently defined, and distinct from classical capitalism, to require a different name: Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 38. Tellingly, little is said of 'statism' in *Socialism Now* however.
[92] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 79.
[93] A. Schlesinger Jr., 'Crosland's Socialism', *The New York Review* (June 1st, 1963), <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1963/06/01/croslands-socialism/>, accessed 10/12/2021.

Diamond has argued, 'a pragmatic thinker'.[94] His was 'not […] a rigid doctrine of equality' and, most importantly, *The Future of Socialism* provided 'no explicit moral theory of why equality matters to the Left'.[95] Ellison is likewise correct to say that, for Crosland, '[i]ndividuals ultimately had to choose equality rather than have it imposed upon them' – a view borne out by Crosland's proposals for improvements in industrial relations, which relied not on the collective but on the individual and their free choice.[96] Make no mistake, it was still 'equality and higher public expenditure' that 'divide[d] […Labour] from the Tories'.[97] But being based on 'ethical judgements of a non-economic character', equality was not necessarily and obviously the right choice.[98] *The Future of Socialism*, for instance, excused itself by stating how 'what constitutes a 'just' distribution of privileges and rewards' depended on the 'moral predilations of the reader' – an outlook which speaks to Crosland's alleged positivism and, in particular, to his view, stated in *Socialism Now*, of 'a coherent egalitarian strategy instead of a muddle of bits and pieces' as being 'closely related to the needs and aspirations of ordinary people'.[99]

In a sign of Joseph and Crosland's joint participation in an epistemological post-war consensus of the kind detailed in the previous chapter, Crosland's belief that egalitarianism needed to relate to a common conception of political ends bears a striking resemblance to what Sir Keith called the common ground. Sir Keith's distinction between that concept and the middle ground is one of Joseph's enduring intellectual legacies. There is a reason why the title of Joseph's 1976 CPS publication referred to 'stranded' and not, say, 'resident'. Being mere opportunism, the middle ground was to be avoided. It 'was simply the lowest common denominator obtained from calculus of assumed electoral expediency, defined not by reference to popular feeling but by splitting the difference between Labour's position and the Conservatives'.[100] This was false moderation – what Sir Keith called a 'rake's progress' and, repeatedly, 'a will-o'-the-wisp'.[101] Indeed, that which the middle ground purported to provide, it produced the

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[94] P. Diamond, *The Crosland Legacy: The Future of British Social Democracy* (Bristol, 2016), p. 87.
[95] Diamond, *The Crosland Legacy*, p. 86.
[96] N. Ellison, *Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions* (London, 1994), p. 105.
[97] Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 58
[98] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 144.
[99] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 159; E. Neill, 'The Impact of Positivism: Academic Political Thought in Britain, c. 1945-1970', *History of European Ideas*, 39/1 (2013), p. 51, 55; Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 58.
[100] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 21; 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 2.
[101] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', pp. 7-8; Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p 24; 'Joseph, Panorama (23/06/1975)', p. 5.

opposite of – extremism in place of moderation, and the Left instead of the middle - because of what Joseph, citing the president of the Mont Pelerin Society Arthur Shenfield, called the ratchet effect, which skewed the middle to the Left, due to the fact that 'Labour's position […] [wa]s itself arrived at by splitting the difference between their left and the centre'.[102] Furthermore, 'the left-wing' would never rest content. Theirs would be a constant advance, driven by a 'natural momentum'.[103] The middle ground in practice was consequently what Joseph in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* and his 1975 speech at Oxford, in a remark reminiscent of Hayek's argument in *The Road to Serfdom*, called 'a slippery slope to socialism and state control', and what in one 1975 speech he deemed a road to 'a nation of dependents, a servile nation'.[104]

The common ground was the opposite of the middle ground. It was 'what can be shared by politicians with the people'.[105] Joseph believed that by 1974, for example, 'the depth of the crisis ha[d] become common ground'.[106] He claimed that politicians and the public alike recognised the severity of Britain's political and economic circumstances. Significantly, Sir Keith described in his 1975 speech "The Quest for Common Ground" how the common ground was inclusive of 'values and aspirations', as well as 'understanding and policies', by which we can understand him to mean adjacent concepts, in addition to peripheral ones.[107] Presaging his verbal assault on Rawls' theory of justice four years later, Joseph thus complained in 1975 of 'Mr. Crosland's exhausted idioms' – "social", "equality", and "class" – and declared the need to 'work out effective policies on the fundamental ideas of justice and liberty that make up the common

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[102] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 24; 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 8; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 21.
[103] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 21, 63.
[104] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 20; 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 2; 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 8; Hayek argued that socialism led to totalitarianism. He contended that '[i]t may indeed be said that it is the paradox of all collectivist doctrine […] that they necessarily lead to the demand that the mind of some individual should rule supreme'. See F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1944] 2001), pp. 169-170.
[105] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 11.
[106] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 15.
[107] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 11; In 1978's *Conditions for Fuller Employment* Joseph differentiated 'common ground' from 'a common objective', the implication of which might be that the common ground concerned mainly values rather than policies: Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 1. Yet if Joseph in fact meant to make it, that distinction proved short-lived. A year after the publication of *Conditions*, Sir Keith cited a policy, monetary discipline, as an example of 'welcome common ground between the parties': 'Joseph, House of Commons, to members of the Bow Group (05/02/1979)', p. 4. More often than not, then, the common ground encompassed all those issues about which the public and politicians concurred.

ground which all the British people recognise as sensible and right'.[108] One possible interpretation of that statement is to say simply that Joseph was being a democrat. Democratic governments were distinguished from authoritarian ones in Sir Keith's mind by their willingness in 'enabling the values, aspirations and purposes of the people to be implemented'.[109] Which made Britain's post-war middle ground politics, in seeing politicians impose their goals and values, border on the authoritarian.[110] What the aforementioned distinction did not necessitate, however, was that politicians be wholly acquiescent in the face of public opinion. Joseph wished to 'educate public opinion in the need for' a sensible monetary framework, and was not by his own standards an authoritarian for doing so.[111] That people's beliefs were according to Sir Keith 'the bedrock of our policies' need not have stopped politicians from convincing the public of their beliefs.[112] 'The constraints set by public opinion' were not shackles. Indeed, the whole purpose of the Centre for Policy Studies was to, as Joseph went on to say in 1974, 'open […] the public's eyes to what is practicable'.[113]

Hence, when it came to liberty and justice, Sir Keith could have both offered the British public a democratic choice *and* insisted that there were rationalist/correct definitions of those concepts. That he did not, and instead attempted to ground his stance in a consensual comprehension of, as we shall soon see, justice in particular, has him parallel Crosland. Joseph's description in 1975 and 1976 of 'the search for common ground as the elaboration of a mental map we can honestly share', abstract concepts and all it seems, epitomises this outlook, and is highly similar to Crosland's view, quoted earlier, of an egalitarian strategy as 'closely related to the needs and aspirations of ordinary people'.[114] To repeat, their consenting to what they took to be popular conceptions of political concepts does not mean that Joseph and Crosland agreed on what constituted what one called common ground and the other people's needs and aspirations. Evidently, Joseph did not believe that a Rawlsian-infused ideal of equality was common ground. For Sir Keith, a yet more significant difference between the two was that, whereas Crosland's political thinking was idealised, his was altogether more concrete.

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[108] 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 13.
[109] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, pp. 32-33; 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 15.
[110] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, pp. 32-33.
[111] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 6.
[112] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 33.
[113] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 11.
[114] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 14; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 31; Crosland, *Socialism Now*, p. 58.

Joseph and Sumption's assessment in *Equality* of the concept to which *A Theory of Justice*'s title makes reference is as follows: 'Man has fallen. Original sin exists. The question is not what is perfect justice it is what is the most perfect justice which men are capable who do not in fact live behind the 'veil of ignorance' but are aware of their capabilities'.[115] No idea was according to Sir Keith 'intrinsically just'.[116] Justice was results-based. '[A]bstract ideas of justice', considered apart from their practical implications, were off the conceptual menu.[117] That judgement was a rebuttal of Rawls. It represented an attempt to tear down the veil of ignorance and to reveal its theoretical draper as the truly ignorant one. But it was not only that. Joseph's rejoinder was also one iteration of a broader comprehension of political concepts as "factual". Four years prior to the publication of *Equality*, Sir Keith warned the Economic Research Council that 'when false ideas are allowed to dominate the facts they create their own momentum', the implication of that excerpt being that ideas properly defined (true ones) were for Joseph in some sense quantifiable – an interpretation nourished by Joseph's discomfort with the "national interest", "social contract", "moderation", "profiteering" and "fair shares", which were for him some of the 'undefinable and unmeasurable concepts' that resulted from popular attempts to subjectively interpret economic phenomena.[118] Their meaninglessness was not the only issue, mind. In a 1975 speech at the Royal Festival Hall, Joseph argued that the problem with "the general will", "social justice" (which Hayek also opposed) and the "collective good" was that when they as 'collective goods[s…] transcends individual rights […] we move towards despotism'.[119] The subsequent chapter argues that such rights were for Joseph extra-human in nature, and that their overriding thus represented an assault on his ideological core. What matters in the context both of the present argument and of the 1970's marketplace of ideas, though, is that, in spite of their sharing the same basic epistemology, the materially-grounded nature of his adjacent concepts, including not only justice but inequality, arguably gave Joseph the upper-hand over Crosland in the battle of ideas.

Joseph would have us believe that his comprehension of political concepts differed fundamentally from Crosland's. One's conceptualisations were empirically-derived and the other's not at all - so we are made to think. Recollect Sir Keith's characterisation of

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[115] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 99.
[116] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 42.
[117] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 43.
[118] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 7; 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 7.
[119] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 4; For Hayek's opinion of social justice, see F. A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1973] 2013), pp. 226-266.

Crosland as the rhetorical equivalent of an aquatic ink-spurter. 'Mr. Crosland's exhausted idioms' were "social", "equality", and "class". Crosland was in this respect supposedly representative of his ideological kin. One of the problems with socialists generally, Sir Keith remarked, was that they try 'to preempt an idea, so as to make everyone use it their way'.[120] Joseph thus disagreed with the idea, which he accused socialists of holding to, that people belong only to one class, when in reality 'every human being belongs to an infinitely large number of classes'.[121] The notion that concepts can be "preempted", and that individuals belong to as many classes as the facts of their individual circumstances determine, points again to the prospect that concepts were for Joseph materially-grounded. In contrast with which, even if his various 'idioms' were not 'empty', there is nonetheless a kernel of truth to Joseph's assessment of Crosland, who, as this chapter earlier suggested, struggled to maintain the edge over the Thatcherites in large part, if not exclusively, because of his holding to an understanding of equality which, though also supposedly consensual, proved disposable under the weight of an economic downturn.[122] As with Sir Keith's references to commonsense however, what this divergence between Joseph and Crosland speaks to is not only tactical success or failure, but the very nature of their ideological morphologies as forms of conservatism and socialism respectively. Unlike Crosland, who argued, based on what he perceived as a consensual basis, for what ought to have been the case (for a particular conception of equality for example), Joseph argued in traditionally conservative fashion for what he believed was naturally-occurring. But such was the prominence of organic change in Sir Keith's morphology that what Joseph took to be natural was itself subject to change.

Take the concept of justice for example. Joseph's remark in 1976 as to how the rule of law 'entails predictable laws which are in general accord with *prevailing concepts of natural justice* [present author's emphasis]' and, in a like manner, Sir Keith's 1978 comment that the rule of law 'in accord[ance] with a natural justice', not *the* natural justice, was 'necessary to freedom and to democracy, but not enough', point to the reliance of justice on subjective standards, as well as to its role in Joseph's political thought as incorporating extra-volitional forces.[123] And what this signals is the role of a

[120] As well as socialists, this was true of the Left more broadly, and Joseph stated in his speech in Birmingham in October 1974 how 'Left-wing ideology' 'requires little knowledge and less analytical thought, just a compendium of all-purpose phraseology': 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 7.

[121] 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 7.

[122] Crosland remarked in *The Future of Socialism* how 'Raymond Aron has correctly observed that 'Socialism has ceased in the West to be a myth because it has become a part of reality'': Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 73. But that reality was perhaps not as real as the nature to which Joseph appealed.

[123] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 4; 'Extract from a lunchtime talk given by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., MP., (Leeds North East), the

kind of social consensus, akin to the common ground, in helping to constitute what counted as natural, in which the social order had its origins. We thus have cause once more to underscore the indeterminacy of Joseph's conservatism. To follow Sir Keith's train of thought is to think that what counts as natural justice one hundred years hence might well differ from what is today considered natural justice. All conservatives can shuffle their adjacent concepts in response to this or that enemy. But Joseph, a conservative, could also allow what counted as natural, which conservatism's adjacent concepts corroborate, to change. That which was natural was not fixed. This was not true across the board of course. Inequality was for Joseph natural whether or not a public majority believed otherwise. Nevertheless, that Sir Keith took his conceptual cue from the social world (albeit on the basis of what he valued), rather than dictating to it, can help to explain conservatism's past traction and underlines its potential mutability. In attending to the concept of equality, the subsequent and final section of this chapter takes this one step further, to underscore further still conservatism's pliability and to argue that, in allowing for greater equality and in spite of the argument thus far unfolded, Joseph's political thinking left the door open for a Thatcherism not nearly as distant from Crosland's thought as British conservatism in the 1980s evolved to be.

Equality:

First, a caveat. Joseph obviously did not oppose equality, defined in its most abstract sense. Sir Keith did not think that two things could and ought never to be equal. Due to what he considered to be the conflict between differing forms of equality, however, Joseph believed that one had to choose between equalities. This necessitated a hierarchy. Again, individuals could not be equal in their food consumption and nutrition. Only there was no pre-ordained answer – 'no ground in nature, no irrefutable principle' - to the question "which equality?".[124] In 1978, Joseph advised that '[a]ll serious and practical discussion of equality must begin from the question: what aspects of equality are relevant? When someone says that he believes in equality, he owes it to us to explain which aspects of equality he aims at'.[125] His preference at various stages throughout his political career was for a few forms of equality: equality of opportunity, which the following chapter breaks down; equality before the law; equality of dignity;

Opposition Spokesman on Industry, speaking from the Pulpit of the Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark, SE1, on Wednesday, 21st June, 1978 – Limits of Freedom in Democracy', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.

[124] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 1.

[125] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 1.

and equality of respect.[126] The last of those terms Joseph used as shorthand to say 'that all men should be treated as ends in themselves, not as means to be dispensed of by others as if they were instruments', the corollaries of which were for that politician equality before the law and equality of opportunity.[127] Esteem for what equality of respect denoted was a recurrent feature of Sir Keith rhetoric throughout his political career. Almost two decades prior to the publication of *Equality*, in France in 1961, Joseph referred to 'the brotherhood and equality of mankind which are the mainspring of European civilisation'.[128]

What Joseph supposedly eschewed, and what historians like Hickson and Dorey appear to take to be his target when they speak simply of how Conservatives oppose(d) equality, was that which Sir Keith variously called economic equality, equality of result, equality of income and economic equality, those being forms of correspondence that in Joseph's mind contradicted both equality of opportunity and equality before the law, and which were not required for the advancement of equality of dignity.[129] As Joseph explained to his audience at the LSE, 'equality before the law means that some will be guilty of breaches of the law and their outcome will differ from that of those who are not guilty'.[130] Unlike equality of outcome, which he believed necessitated selective discrimination by the state, equality before the law Joseph defined to mean that 'the way in which individuals are treated by the government should be decided by impersonal rules which apply to everyone: rule which are decided upon in an authorised manner, rules which are not changed at will by anyone who happens to dislike the outcome'.[131] Briefly, and for the record: there does not appear to be any substantive difference in Joseph's rhetoric between the names used for equality of outcome, in spite of the specificity of equality of income in contrast to the generality of equality of outcome, equality of result and economic equality. *Equality* references equality of income, economic equality and equality of result, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* makes use of the first of those titles and not the second or third, while Joseph spoke at the LSE of equality of outcome and economic equality.[132] All of those labels were as one in the

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[126] The following chapter argues that Joseph promoted equality of opportunity because he thought of that concept as an enabler for organic change.
[127] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 1, 3.
[128] 'Extract from speech by the Minister of State, Board of Trade, Sir Keith Joseph, M.P. at the Grand Hotel, Roubaix, N.E. France, on Friday afternoon, November 24th, 1961 – Britain and Europe' Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 239/1, p. 2.
[129] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 40.
[130] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.
[131] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 2.
[132] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 60, 28-29; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 70; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 4.

effects they described, the most damaging of which appears ostensibly to be the threat posed by equality – as this thesis will from now on simply call it – to freedom.

Whether they knew it or not, egalitarians were despots in waiting. This was due to the nature of equality as what Joseph in *Equality* called an 'absolute concept': '[t]wo individuals are not more equal simply because they are less different; they are either equal or unequal. Whoever asserts that we have as much equality as we want will therefore forthwith be contradicted by some more enthusiastic egalitarian zealot who will point to further inequalities remaining to be advocated'. If one favours equality and believes it to be 'intrinsically and manifestly right', Joseph thought, then why stop at differences in income alone.[133] The egalitarian campaign could only end once it had abolished the various inequalities of satisfaction – Joseph believed that 'legal ownership of wealth [i]s [not] synonymous with beneficial enjoyment' - 'interest, status and power' that accompanies those incomes.[134] No disparity could be left untouched. And that way totalitarianism lay, as logic would inevitably compel egalitarians towards the creation of the kind of repressive regime in which the state coercively removes any inequality, and a 'society in which the choices fundamental to human existence are determined by coercion is not a free society'.[135] In order to prevent the creation of new inequalities, the market system, for example, would need to be abolished and its functions transferred to public bodies.[136] '[T]he regimentation and despotism would have to be unceasing'.[137] *Equality* is exemplary for arguing as much. But while exceptional in its length and for the ferocity of its argument, that text did not mark a break for Joseph as far as his attitude toward what he perceived to be egalitarianism's despotic implications is concerned. In *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, Sir Keith enquired as to whether, if 'incomes were equalised […] that [would] satisfy the egalitarians?' His answer was unequivocal: '[n]o'. 'The zeal for levelling would shift from economic to other targets'.[138] That the pursuit of equality of income would transform the country into a 'totalitarian slum' is a line voiced in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* and repeated in Joseph's 1979 speech in Penistone.[139] And yet, survey the quotations relating to Joseph's opinion on what the current author admittedly rather duplicitously referred to previously as simply equality's

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[133] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 45.
[134] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 114, 25.
[135] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 47.
[136] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 65.
[137] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 8.
[138] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 78.
[139] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 79; 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Leeds North-East, and Conservative Spokesman on Industry with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking in Penistone, on Friday 20th April 1979', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.

relation to freedom, and the references to, for example, the pursuit of equality take on greater significance. The inclusion of such verbs as "pursue" and "enforce" is not additive but substantive.

Equality is one thing, and egalitarianism another. Scholars have tended to focus on the former at the expense of the latter. Indeed, *Equality*'s title, suggesting as it does that Joseph and Sumption's principal concern was with equality pure and simple, appears to have lulled many scholars into a false sense of security. In spite of its name, however, the focus of that 1979 text is not equality per se. Far rather, it is 'the belief that the State not only has a duty to supervise the distribution of wealth but should in doing so lean in favour of equality'.[140] Sir Keith similarly defined egalitarianism one year earlier in his speech at the LSE, where he cast that doctrine as 'the insistence on enforcing equality of outcome'.[141] In particular, and as relayed in *Equality*, Joseph identified that ideal as something akin to a religious belief – one impervious in the eyes of the faithful to 'reasoned analysis' and, so those followers are supposed to have thought, 'not […] a doctrine at all, but a direct revelation of truth'.[142] One of the earliest egalitarians in *Equality*'s narration of that creed's ascent, Marx, in his claims to 'direct revelation', apparently resisted 'reasoned argument', in the belief that radical institutional transformation would do his revolutionary work for him.[143] Unlike the Marxian variant, which as Joseph saw it was focused above all on the equality of classes rather than of individuals, and which at least had the benefit of internal coherence, the egalitarianism of the late-twentieth-century Englishman was a doctrine transcendent of any such political philosophy (whether Marxism or socialism). 'Rousseau's gentle, muddled, romantic and humane egalitarianism is closer to their view than that of any other abstract theorist', Sir Keith observed.[144] The problem with the Rousseauian type the authors of *Equality* thought was the willing submission of those most likely to resist the egalitarian threat to its siren call. For Joseph, 'this [wa]s a depressing truth'.[145] In his hostility to egalitarianism, therefore, what Joseph opposed was what he variously called a 'doctrine', a prejudice, a set of '[s]hared assumptions' or 'methodological principles', the setting up of equality 'as a desirable goal' and, most revealingly, the belief that that concept ought to be 'the point of reference from which any existing distribution of resources must be measured'.[146] That it was the use of a specific criterion and not equality in and of itself that Joseph resisted is not an insignificant observation. It

[140] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 1
[141] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 15.
[142] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 4.
[143] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 7.
[144] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 8.
[145] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 18.
[146] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 4, 96, 2, 46, 85.

is one that can be most clearly understood via Joseph's references to the pursuit of equality.

There is a difference between equality and that concept's pursuit, and a crucial one at that. Admittedly, it is not one that many scholars have, in spite of their acknowledgement of it, deemed to take seriously. Dorey, for instance, states that those he calls Conservative neo-liberals 'sought to illustrate how the post-war pursuit of equality was itself a partial cause of Britain's socio-economic problems'.[147] Yet such a remark does not induce its author to disaggregate between means and ends in the rhetoric of the Thatcherites, nor in his own mind dilute Dorey's central claim that Conservatives (Joseph included), the political thought of whom he is committed to surveying, were concerned with equality in and of itself. Suppose that for one reason or another a future society were to develop in such a way that increased equality of outcomes was a result. On account of his published writings, it is not unreasonable to suspect that Joseph would have had no query with that state of affairs. For one, Joseph never presented any moral case against simply what he called equality of outcome, result or income. He resented it because, in order to pursue it, 'it is necessary to embark on a continual process of mutual inspection and assessment, to give institutional form to every mean resentment, to require every man to justify those respects in which he is happier than his fellows'.[148] It was 'the *pursuit* [current author's emphasis] of equality' that 'has in practice led to inequality and tyranny', the same text elsewhere alleged.[149] Nor again was *Equality* exceptional in this regard. In 1976 the same basic view held firm, as when Joseph stated how 'the pursuit of equality will destroy the chance of more by damaging the spring of wealth-creation'.[150]

Granted, Joseph appeared to waver from that position. Two days prior to the 1979 General Election, in a speech in his constituency, Sir Keith advised the electors against 'opt[ing] for more equality, a bigger, more expensive and more powerful State with more central planning and controls and more Quangos'.[151] And in the previous year, at the LSE, he stated how 'economic equality, equality of outcome […] can […] be achieved'. It was just that equality before the law and equality of opportunity would have to be sacrificed in order to achieve it.[152] Yet elsewhere, we now know, Joseph maintained that 'more equality' was impossible and that what was pernicious was the pursuit of that concept as an end-state. Talk of the dangers of equality full stop is in the

[147] Dorey, *British Conservatism*, p. 137.
[148] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 121.
[149] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 47.
[150] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 79; Indeed, this view is common amongst conservatives. See D. Willetts, *Modern Conservatism* (London, 1992), p. 145.
[151] 'Joseph, speaking in his Constituency (01/05/1979)', p. 3.
[152] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 4.

grand scheme of things anomalous however. It does not dilute the current author's contention that it was by and large his opponents' pursuit of equality and not equality itself that Joseph found disconcerting. Much in the way of Sir Keith's inconsistencies can be put down to unclear language. In 1970, for instance, Joseph spoke of how 'Socialists [being egalitarians] are levelers down – the levelers down breed neither prosperity nor freedom nor the resources for compassion'.[153] One would expect those individuals described as, for example, swimmers to engage regularly in the activity of swimming. That noun would not typically be attributed to an individual who, say, goes to the pool but does not get in. When Joseph spoke of levelers, however, what he appeared to be describing was the intentions of his adversaries and not their actions. In *Equality*, for example, the ambiguity of Joseph's comment as to how, while '[t]he aspiration to equality may be elevated […] the reality of equality is grubby and unpleasant' is undercut by the subsequent sentence, which speaks of 'an ideal which promises what it cannot give'.[154] Equality's 'reality' was the pursuit of equality. The same seems to be true of 'more equality'.[155]

As to why that should be so, truth be told, it is hard to tell. An obvious reason for Joseph's linguistic fluctuations, noted above, does present itself though, and it is one that also explains why Joseph began speaking on the subject of equality in the late 1970s in the first place. It is that Sir Keith might in the context of the political tumult and industrial strife of the late 1970s have expected a general election sooner rather than later. It is not improbable that Joseph thought that the best means of ousting Callaghan's Labour Party from government after five years of Conservative opposition was to exaggerate the effects of equality pure and simple. Perhaps Sir Keith thought that talk of equality rather than of that concept's pursuit would be more resonant with the public, whom he may well not have trusted to understand the distinction between the two. Remember that ideologies are not devised for their own sake. They are action-oriented consumer products that must be understandable to a general audience, and simplification via sloganising and the use of symbols is an invaluable marketing strategy in their calls to arms. In the process, when complexity is a downside, philosophical niceties fall by the way side. In any case, more important for our purposes than "why?" is "what?". What matters is that what Joseph took issue with was not equality per se, but, in part at least, the policy initiatives which he thought that the pursuit of that

[153] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., Conservative Candidate for Leeds North-East and Spokesman on Technology and Trade at Roundhay Parochial Hall, Fitzroy Drive, Leeds 8, on Wednesday 17th June, 1970', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 20/2, p. 1.
[154] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 121.
[155] 'Joseph, Leeds (01/05/1979)', p. 3.

concept inevitably entailed. Socialism as enacted in the United Kingdom of 1979, Joseph told an audience in Penistone in that year, 'would turn th[e] country into a totalitarian slum not because of equality of outcome', but due to what he called 'the pursuit of economic equality' and, in particular, the 'means' by which such a pursuit would necessarily be undertaken. The latter included nationalisation, high levels of taxation, and controls on profits, income and dividends.[156] The first two of those, in addition to 'excessive State spending, […] politicised trade unions, [… the] wholesale subsidisation of industry, […] an all-pervasive anti-enterprise culture' and, most important of all in the context of this chapter, 'the pursuit of equality', were, Sir Keith contended to an audience at Harehills in 1979, the 'six evils' of the age.[157]

Even then, we need to tread carefully. Joseph was never against redistribution as such. It would be absurd to expect anything else of a mainstream politician in late-twentieth-century Britain. What was true in Joseph's opinion of the abstract fed through in Sir Keith's mind to the tangible. Redistribution just as much as equality was not intrinsically unacceptable. As Sir Keith stated in 1976, he did not believe 'that there was no scope for some redistribution'. 'To pay for government spending and to help those who need help', he went on to say, 'the better-off should contribute more than those with lower incomes'.[158] In the same way, *Equality* conceded the need for some redistribution should the circumstances warrant it. Returning to his cake analogy, Joseph declared that:

> [t]he question is whether, if each of these five people has provided his own flour and baked his own cake, and if one of them baked a larger cake than the others, that person ought to be made to give a slice to them. In answer to that question most civilised societies have said that there may be certain circumstances in which he ought to do so. If the most basic needs of the poorest, measured by some absolute and not relative standard, cannot be satisfied by the amount of wealth which they have, then it would probably be generally agreed that the richest should help them out.[159]

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[156] 'Joseph, Penistone (20/04/1979)', p. 1.
[157] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt., Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Leeds North East, and Conservative Spokesman on Industry with overall Responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking at a meeting in his constituency at Harehills on Wednesday, 18th April 1979 – Our Six Deadly Evils', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1; Joseph grouped 'nationalisation and whole subsidisation of industry' as one evil.
[158] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 76.
[159] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 85-86.

'[I]t [wa]s a long way from that to an a priori assumption that all cakes, large and small, should be confiscated, placed in a central store, and then handed out without regard to the different contribution of individuals to their manufacture'.[160] Again, the difference was between equality and egalitarianism, between a concept and the dogmatic pursuit of it via redistribution. Joseph's support for redistribution should not be overstated of course. Sir Keith upheld a firm distinction in 1978 between the redistribution of income and the maintenance of a safety net. It 'is a logical fallacy to suppose that the safety net and redistribution have any necessary connection', he declared.[161] Joseph sought 'minimum standards', and not equality or even 'welfare'.[162]

Oakeshott provides a useful point of comparison in this regard. What reason and rationalism were for him, equality and egalitarianism were for Joseph. What Oakeshott found problematic was the eliding of reason and premeditated technique; what troubled him was rationalism as the application of a misplaced understanding of reason. The mirroring of Oakeshott's discrimination between rationalism and reason in Joseph's distinction between egalitarianism and equality is all the more resonant when we consider that, for Oakeshott, conservatism in practice is in large part about governmental best practice, in that politics for conservatives concerns the avoidance if at all possible of 'collision[s]' between autonomous individuals' self-chosen activities.[163] Oakeshott opposed the idea of the 'common good'.[164] Civil association was his ideal, and morality, in the Oakeshottian sense of the word, 'is the art of mutual accommodation'.[165] A similar kind of thinking is on show in Sir Keith's political thought. One -ism led to another. Part of the problem with egalitarianism as Joseph saw it was that it was sectionalism under another name. The outcomes egalitarians sought favoured 'the pecuniary interests of a particular class rather than the general interest of a society as a whole'.[166] In *Equality*, for instance, Joseph complained that egalitarianism 'has traditionally been used to justify redistribution not in favour of the poor but in favour of the rich and powerful'.[167] In his Penistone speech in the same year that privileged group was either replaced by or particularised as 'Socialist Ministers'.[168] Egalitarianism thus

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[160] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 86.
[161] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 13.
[162] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 32.
[163] M. Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', p. 429.
[164] Oakeshott distinguished '[t]he morality of the common good' from 'the morality of communal ties' and 'the morality of individuality'. See M. Oakeshott, 'The moral life in the writings of Thomas Hobbes', in his *'Rationalism in politics' and other essays* (Indianapolis, 1991), pp. 296-297.
[165] Oakeshott, 'The moral life in the writings of Thomas Hobbes', p. 297.
[166] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 65.
[167] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 1.
[168] 'Joseph, Penistone (20/04/1979)', p. 1.

represented the imposition of one element of the population's principles upon another's, and that, rather than the nature of its beneficiaries, appeared to be the problem.

Joseph's enmity for that process ought to be seen in part as a product of Sir Keith's broader aversion to what might best be called the tyranny of the majority, the implications of which the following chapter explores. For the time being, what can be said outright is that that outlook was on show in Sir Keith's conceptualisation of the state, the defining role of which as detailed in *Equality* was to be 'the delegate of all citizens equally', and which in turn was a major motivating factor in Joseph's resistance to egalitarianism.[169] The state was 'precluded from using its powers to favour some citizens against others', had to 'take its subject as it f[ound] them', and could not 'advance any social arrangement […] as being the mould in which society should be shaped', for '[i]t [wa]s no business of the State to decide in advance what kind of society it ought to be governing and then to manipulate or frustrate known desires in such a way as to bring such a society into being'.[170] The job of government was to provide the means by which free citizens could fulfill their own ends.[171] It was not to impose either its own ends or those of a certain interest group. That Joseph perceived equality to be one such sectional objective should come as no surprise. His doing so bolsters the similarities between himself and Oakeshott. Both men thus rejected the idea that there were, to quote Sir Keith's criticism of the egalitarian's rationalist conception of equality, 'intrinsically and manifestly right solutions' in politics, and the two of them likewise eschewed the factionalism that for Oakeshott was representative of an essentially unconservative understanding of political conduct.

Yet while there would in a Venn diagram of egalitarianism and rationalism in Sir Keith Joseph's political thought be little symmetric difference, as Joseph's support for redistribution heavily implies, the same cannot be said of rationalism and equality therein. What does 'deserve respect', *Equality* argued, is the argument 'that equality will confer some real benefit on the whole community and not just on that part of it which would be better off in consequence'. Equating redistribution and equality, Joseph continued: 'there may be some beneficial public purpose to be served, some reason for redistribution independent of the satisfaction given to the beneficiaries. If both the beneficiaries and the victims of redistribution share a common social purpose which redistribution advances, then there is the justification of it'.[172] One such reason suggested by Joseph was that of political stability: 'it may be that the rich recognise that their interests are served by political stability and that political stability can only be had

[169] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 29.
[170] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 29, 67.
[171] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 67.
[172] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 20.

if the differences between rich and poor are kept within bounds. If so, then redistribution is justified to the limited extent that it is necessary for the purpose of achieving that object. But its justification goes not one inch further'.[173] Only if there was a natural right to equality, which, Joseph was confident, there was not, could further redistribution be allowed. It is interesting to note that Sir Keith did not concede the possibility that in voting for a particular government, some or all of the individuals subject to the subsequent taxation might acquiesce in the redistribution of their wealth for the purposes of a more equal society. Greater equality was admissible only as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself. Gritted teeth notwithstanding, that it was admissible, combined with it being in the main the pursuit of equality that Joseph opposed, deals a further blow to Dorey's thesis.

Equally, that that is true should not constrain us in underlining the discrepancies in Joseph's political thought, and those that pertain especially to Sir Keith's acceptance of some degree of equality. The inclination to iron out Joseph's conceptual and/or logical slippages must be resisted at all cost. On the one hand, recall that *Equality* characterises its namesake as an 'absolute concept'. All that egalitarianism's opponents had to rely on was the goodwill and 'the mild and decent instincts' of their foe – and that was no assurance at all.[174] Kind hearts could not compensate for the extremes to which equality would take those who actively sought it. Indeed, Joseph in *Equality* declared, 'when egalitarians profess to abhor those results we may legitimately look back and remember what became of those who expressed similarly 'moderate' views at the origin of almost every tyranny which has been erected in the name of equality'.[175] In this respect, equality was in Joseph's political thought uniquely constituted, for no other concept in Sir Keith's ideational lexicon was similarly unconditional. Had Sir Keith been consistent and applied universally the logic by way of which he defined equality, we would expect to see in his speeches and writings a decidedly extreme decontestation of freedom as in the mould of some libertarians. The following chapter underscores the great extent to which he did not, and how freedom was in Joseph's conceptual armoury bounded by conservatism's core concepts. At the same time that tyranny and inequality were 'the direct result of contradictions which are inherent in the very concept of equality' however, as the above analysis has demonstrated, Joseph implicitly dismissed that decontestation of equality, in that he believed that individuals could be relied upon not to overstep the mark and follow equality as far as despotism if they confined the aim of greater equality to a specific and mutually beneficial goal like political stability. Those who chose greater equality both could and could not be trusted.

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[173] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 102.
[174] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 45.
[175] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 46.

The two views just described do not to the present author's mind cancel each other out. Joseph's concession to equality stands, and that it does so is perhaps best explained through an interpretation of conservatism as holding at its core support for organic change. Two particular interpretations are feasible here. One is to say that, whereas egalitarianism as the dedicated pursuit of equality was fundamentally functional, distinctly human (being a concerted effort on the part of its advocates) and therefore thoroughly inorganic, a desire for greater equality was permissible insofar as it was subservient to a naturally-evolved public will, determined via a democratic vote at the ballot box and not conscripted in a 'campaign for equality'.[176] The present author's preference is to think organic change irrelevant in Joseph's political thought to the means to equality. In the context of *Equality* at least, it was not so much that Joseph permitted increased equality insofar as it resulted from organic change, but that Sir Keith allowed individuals to choose greater equality so long as it provided for continued and *stable* organic change. What Joseph left open therefore was precisely the kind of broadly egalitarian and welfarist politics that the supporters of the post-war consensus partook in. Commenting in 1976 on the change in circumstances since the immediate post-war period, Lord Hailsham, justifying his pivot from a Middle Way to a more Thatcherite Conservatism, remarked how '[t]hen we were concerned to provide a safety net of social security adequate to prevent a recurrence of pre-war unemployment and poverty. Today we are concerned to secure adequate rewards and investment to make any kind of plural society possible. The enemy then was insecurity. The enemy today is uniformity, which has grown to the extent of becoming altogether incompatible with freedom'.[177] As the 'enemy' changed, so too via the conservative mirror-image technique did Hogg's conservatism. What Joseph teased was a potential retracing of Hogg's steps, and thus a possible rekindling of Britain's post-war consensus, should his core concepts have warranted it.

Which brings us back almost full circle, to Crosland, his relation to Joseph, and both their attitudes to equality. The first of those individuals was what the latter called an egalitarian. He, to use Sir Keith's phrase, pursued equality. Yet epistemologically-speaking his political thought does not conform to Joseph's characterisation of egalitarianism. Crosland did not believe that equality was 'intrinsically and manifestly right', that it was 'a direct revelation of truth', or that it was justified on the basis of some 'irrefutable principle'. Joseph thus misread Crosland, the effect of which is to obscure their commonalities, as the previous section of this chapter made clear. What his hypothetical acceptance of equality points to however is the immense capacity of

[176] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 46.
[177] The Rt. Hon. Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, 'Foreword', in Lord Blake and J. Patten (Eds.), *The Conservative Opportunity* (London, 1976), p. vii.

Joseph and Crosland, taken as standard-bearers for C/conservatism and Labour revisionism respectively, for mutual consensus. Many might think this line of argument futile. Richard J. Evans has justifiably admonished the popular fetishising of counter-factual history.[178] Though admirable in emphasising the chance nature of historical events and seeking to free the occupants of the past from determinism, so-called "what-ifs" often amount to little more than a kind of futile speculation, which would be inconsequential were it not for their depiction of individual agents as unfettered by structural forces. Furthermore, it can be said that everyone has the potential for anything. The Duke of Wellington could have fought for the French, and the present author could dance for the Bolshoi Ballet. Those eventualities were/are possible, if not probable. But what is meant by possibility in this context is equivalent to the Thomistic idea of potentiality.[179] Our concern is not with the spurious notion that Joseph and Crosland could have forged a consensus had the first of them become a socialist and the second of them turned to Thatcherism. It is instead with, for want of a better word, adjacencies, of which culture and logic are the two primary manifestations.

Logic provides form and culture provides meaning. Each constrain the choices ideologists make in the decontestation of a given field of meaning. The limits that they set on agents' thought-practices means that indeterminacy is preloaded with certain limitations and stretches only so far. Cultural adjacency in particular exists in two forms, the first of which circumscribes the extremity of a concept's logical conclusions and prompts the political thinker to choose one path over another.[180] This first form of cultural brake thus makes practicable political concepts that would otherwise be internally contradictory or functionally absurd. A second type of cultural adjacency are those historical contingencies which are not the logical product of an ideology's ineliminable core but which are granted legitimacy by past usage.[181] These either act within logical frameworks or override them altogether. For example, the fact that one concept is culturally associated with another within a given political (say national) context may intercede between logical dominoes and prevent one from toppling the other (rarer is the overriding of cultural adjacencies by logical ones, which Freeden believes typically results from more reflective individuals' attempts to follow rational ends).[182] The Western link between liberty and democracy is a case in point. Noteworthy

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[178] R. J. Evans, "'What if' is a waste of time', <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/13/counterfactual-history-what-if-waste-of-time>, accessed 17/05/2020; see also R. J. Evans, *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (London, 2014).
[179] See E. Feser, *Five Proofs of the Existence of God* (San Francisco, 2017), pp. 18-19.
[180] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp. 70-71.
[181] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp. 71-73.
[182] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 72.

is how neither kind of cultural adjacency intervened to prevent Joseph from accepting some measure of equality. One could well have done. The conservative commitment to organic change need not amount to fatalism. Otherwise every revolution would be sanctioned and there would be little conservative in conservatism. Given Sir Keith's privileging of freedom over equality, it is perfectly feasible for the first of those concepts to have acted as a cultural impediment in Joseph's political thought to Sir Keith's permitting of equality. That neither it nor any other concept did so goes to show the overwhelming influence of Sir Keith's core concepts, and has implications for our understanding of the breakdown of the United Kingdom's post-war consensus.

Crisis for some was opportunity for others. Seemingly impotent in the face of rising unemployment and inflation, Keynesian demand management created a vacuum into which Joseph and his ilk stepped. Had Crosland not died in 1977 and lived into the following decade he would doubtless have engaged seriously with Thatcherism. As it happened, he did neither of those things. And as such, when it came to the New Right more broadly, Crosland was generally dismissive. In 1956 he described how 'no one of any standing now believes the once-popular Hayek thesis that any interference with the market mechanism must start us down the slippery slope that leads to totalitarianism', which, he thought, 'has been thoroughly discredited now that we have experienced a decade of varying degrees of government control, with no sign of weakening of our democratic fibre'.[183] Nothing in his subsequent twenty-one years seemed to convince Crosland that this was not still the case, or to treat what would come to be known as Thatcherism as the threat it surely was. This was in spite even of the then-Labour leader James Callaghan's statement as to how, 'while we used to think you could spend your way out of a recession […] I tell you in all candour that this option no longer exists'.[184] Policies relating to the control of the money supply thus feature little in Crosland's writings. In the end of course, whether Thatcherism saw the return to the United Kingdom of what Crosland described as '[t]he traditional capitalist ruthlessness' is a debate for another time.[185] What it did subject Britons to, though, was a political economy which, in absconding from the aim of full employment in particular, Crosland had throughout the post-war consensus thought largely unthinkable.[186]

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[183] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 390.
[184] J. Callaghan, 'Leader's Speech, Blackpool 1976', *British Political Speech*, <http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=174>, accessed 12/06/2020.
[185] Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 73.
[186] Crosland described in the past tense as to how '[c]apitalism was historically associated with an explicit, assertive, and, in the perspective of history, unusual ideology. Its essential features were, first, the veneration of individualism and competition: secondly, an insistence on the absolute and unconditional rights of private

But it need not have been entirely thus. And, concept-wise, relatively easily so. It is in order to appreciate this that an understanding of adjacencies is worthwhile. At the risk of mixing metaphors, alongside the concentric circles of the morphological approach, another useful representation as far as logical and cultural adjacencies are concerned is Moksha Patam, alternatively known as the boardgame Snakes and Ladders. Joseph and Crosland's respective positions on the board were far-removed, just as Sir Keith and Crosland were ideologically distant – one being a Thatcherite (conservative) and the other a revisionist social democrat (socialist). Yet if Joseph was positioned at the bottom of the board and Crosland at the top, then the idea of organic change was the ladder that could in one movement take the first of those politicians closer to the second. Not the whole way, certainly. The core conservative concept under consideration could not have made Joseph a socialist, otherwise it would not have been a core concept. If this is perhaps a rather laboured analogy, it nonetheless serves to highlight how, with few to no culturally adjacent concepts impeding Joseph's acceptance of equality, there was less of a leap between the post-war consensus and the Thatcherite settlement than first meets the eye. Such an observation is not intended as a balm for those who hark after a different past. Its purpose is rather to underscore one of the central themes of this thesis – that of the fluidity of ideologies and their potential for considerable overlap. Its consequence, meanwhile, is to provide another revision to the idea of a British post-war consensus. The first such revision is the epistemological post-war consensus which the previous chapter extended to incorporate Thatcherism. The second is to the traditional policy settlement described by Addison et al which, we are now in a position to see, was less path-dependent than it might have been.

Were ideological disputes strictly binary, then the tale just told, of revisionism's collapse, would definitively and necessarily be the end of the story. If an equalitarian order depended solely on socialists, against selfish and inegalitarian conservatives, then the burden was absolutely Crosland's and not Joseph's. But it did not, and indeed never does. The logic of Sir Keith's ideological morphology, and of conservatism generally, means that Joseph could have helped keep alive something broadly similar to the high taxation, interventionist political economy that endured up until the 1980s. This is especially true given that Joseph, as quotations provided earlier in this chapter bear witness, equated increased equality with more redistribution. None of this is to imply that Sir Keith was likely to have endorsed greater equality, any more than it is to suggest that the post-war consensus would have necessarily endured had Joseph and his fellow Thatcherites accepted more equality. There were too many variables at play for

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property: thirdly, an intellectual belief that the unfettered exercise of private rights must, by 'the invisible hand' of economic competition, maximise the welfare of the community': Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, p. 35.

either of those eventualities to have been guaranteed, just as there were too many causal factors in the downfall of the post-war consensus to hold Crosland's conception of equality solely accountable for that event. But to deny altogether the plausibility of a Thatcherite turn to increased equality is only possible if Thatcherism designates certain policies, rather than a particular temporal manifestation of conservatism within the British Conservative Party. If Bismarck was right therefore in thinking of politics as the art of the possible, and if one of the purposes of studying ideological entrepreneurs is to discern the limitations to the possible set by ideologies, then, in the context of post-war Britain at least, far more was possible than historical fatalists – those who lapse almost into what Popper, surveyed in the previous chapter, called historicism – let on.[187]

* * *

This chapter has taken head on Dorey's thesis, an exemplar of a certain interpretation of Thatcherism's relationship with inequality. Dorey may be correct in a number of statements of fact, but he is in the round incorrect in arguing, in effect, that inequality was a core constituent of post-war Conservatives' political ideologies. The first part of this chapter examined *British Conservatism*'s primary subject of analysis. It argued that inequality was indeed for one C/conservative, Sir Keith Joseph, a feature of the natural order for example – one that was a byproduct of man's competitive spirit. Dorey is correct; inequality was important. But that it was contingent upon a host of other concepts is a distinction with a major difference. If, as Dorey essentially contends it to have been, inequality was a core component of Joseph's political thought, we would be able to foresee instances where Joseph valued that concept as in some sense virtuous in and of itself. That he did not speaks volumes, and is amplified by the analysis of the final section of this chapter, which addressed the concept of equality in Joseph's ideology. Two points therein rebut Dorey's thesis: firstly, that it was egalitarianism and the 'pursuit of equality' that offended Sir Keith and, second of all, that Joseph was (if begrudgingly) willing to accept equality should organic change and/or the extra-human origins of the social order require it. The second of these meant that the door was left if not open then at least unlocked (though whether other factors blocked said door is another matter) for the reemergence of a more egalitarian settlement.

No such order emerged of course. Thatcherism could have been more redistributive, but was not. The second section of this chapter helped to explain why, of

[187] J. Steinberg, *Bismarck: A Life* (Oxford, 2011), p. 8; Popper maintained that: the growth of our scientific knowledge is unpredictable; the growth of such human knowledge influences human history; we cannot therefore predict the human future. See K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*.

the ideologies on offer in the 1970s, Joseph's was likely more resilient than Crosland's, and did so by contrasting Joseph's defense of a given inequality with Crosland's support for an expendable equality. Without discounting other factors (like the inflationary spiral predicted by Kalecki in 1943), that section's admittedly partial account argued that Joseph's ideology benefited from many of its features appearing natural and/or fixed, as exemplified by inequality and in contrast with Crosland's revisionist offering.[188] While it is certainly true to say that economics was less of a priority for Crosland than the social, this was only because the author of *The Future of Socialism* maintained that Britain's post-war elite had a handle on the management of the economy. The irony is that it's being 'post-material' made equality highly susceptible to material outcomes. In the absence of any good reason to think of that concept as intrinsically worthwhile, equality could be easily abandoned. As set out in *Socialism Now*, socialism was for Crosland very much still about equality. 'There [wa]s, at least', Crosland remarked, 'no need for revisionists to revise [thei]r *definition* of socialism'.[189] There were 'plenty of harsh, specific and unmerited inequalities to combat in the next ten years', and what was required of socialists was 'a sharper delineation of fundamental objectives, a greater clarity about egalitarian priorities and a stronger determination to achieve them'.[190] Nothing much changed in Crosland's decontesting of equality between the publications of *The Future of Socialism* in the 1950s and *Socialism Now* in the 1970s, and this, in combination with the crisis of the latter decade (constructed or not), handed such Thatcherite changemakers as Joseph an advantage.

The following chapter contemplates a concept with which equality is so often entangled, freedom (or liberty; this thesis treats them synonymously). For a socialist like R. H. Tawney in *Equality*, that book's namesake and liberty needed each other.[191] As stated in his and Sumption's identically-titled 1979 text, for Joseph, a conservative, the opposite was true: Sir Keith believed that equality (or rather, the pursuit of that concept) undermined freedom. The next chapter argues that, in spite of *Equality*'s support for negative liberty (or 'freedom from') and rejection of positive liberty (or 'freedom to'), Joseph's decontestation of freedom both in *Equality* and on various other occasions was such that freedom for Sir Keith entailed positive as well as negative liberty. Chapter Three describes Joseph's definition of freedom as neo-roman for its proximity to individual self-government and independence. This is not an exercise in semantics however, and the point of the aforementioned argument, that of the following

[188] See M. Kalecki, 'Political Aspects of Full Employment', *The Political Quarterly*, 14/4 (Oct., 1943), pp. 322-330.
[189] Crosland, 'Socialism Now', p. 15.
[190] Crosland, 'Socialism Now', p. 17, 44.
[191] R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London, 1931).

chapter, is to say that, like equality and inequality as examined in the present chapter, freedom was in Joseph's morphology contingent upon the core conservative concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. It was in order to maximise the potential for the first of those two core concepts, the subsequent chapter maintains, that Joseph allowed for a kind of positive liberty. Chapter by chapter therefore, this thesis consolidates the case for thinking of Joseph's ideology as a form of conservatism, and Sir Keith's conservatism as accepting of a far broader range of concepts than those that the Thatcher governments in the 1980s actualised.

Chapter Three: Freedom

In his 1958 inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, the liberal political philosopher Isaiah Berlin distinguished between two concepts of liberty. One he called negative liberty and 'consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men', while the other, which he termed positive liberty, 'consists in being one's own master'. The first is 'freedom from' (external interference or obstacles) and the second 'freedom to' (typically self-mastery and control).[1] Berlin's distinction is reflective of two established intellectual traditions and was prefigured in the work of the Marxist psychologist and philosopher, Erich Fromm, who also referred to 'freedom to' and 'freedom from'.[2] Put simply, the individual who is free in the negative sense is sovereign, while he who lives under positive freedom has the capacity to act on his free will. Berlin cites Hobbes, Bentham and J. S. Mill as advocates of the former freedom, and Spinoza and Hegel as some of the latter freedom's most notable supporters.[3] Negative freedom is frequently allied to the defence of free speech and freedom of both movement and religion, whereas positive freedom is regularly associated with forms of redistribution and welfare states that assist people in fulfilling their basic desires. Hence the two are commonly taken to be incompatible: some query how it is possible to be free from external interference and free to act, when the types of outside intervention which positive freedom might require can preclude negative freedom.[4] Sir Keith Joseph held just such a view and, if his remarks in *Equality* are anything to go by, he had no doubts as to which camp he stood in.

'Freedom', Joseph and Sumption remarked, 'consists in the absence of external coercion and no man is unfree unless other people intentionally use coercion to prevent him from doing something which he is able and willing to do and which could be done without encroaching on the freedoms of others'.[5] One 'coercive force' in the Britain of the

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[1] I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, 1969), p. 131.

[2] E. Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (Abingdon, Oxon, [1942] 2001), p. 26.

[3] Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', pp. 123-124; Mill famously maintained that 'the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs'. See J. S. Mill, 'On Liberty', in S. Collini (Ed.), *'On Liberty' and other writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 16.

[4] Berlin himself described how 'the 'positive' and 'negative' notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions not always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other': Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 132.

[5] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 49; Joseph used 'freedom' and 'liberty' interchangeably, and so too does this thesis.

1970s, Joseph elsewhere said, were the trade unions, which could coerce members and non-members, consumers and producers.[6] Another – indeed, the coercer in chief - was government, to whom every power arrogated meant a fresh restriction on individuals and corporations.[7] Heavy taxation, for example, Joseph believed entailed a curtailment of 'the citizen's freedom to spend his own money'.[8] The purpose of civil liberty, then, was to protect from coercion and not to provide against equality or poverty.[9] Joseph and Sumption characterised the common argument against their position in *Equality*, and indeed against the same basic definition of freedom which Joseph voiced elsewhere, as being that 'there is no point in telling us that we are all free to run newspapers or lunch at the Ritz if only a millionaire can afford to do either'. Those opposed to them supposedly believed that '[l]iberty has no meaning except in relation to an individual's opportunity to make use of it'.[10] Joseph thought that the idea of what he and Sumption called 'freedom to' made little sense however.[11] They directly cited Berlin in saying as much. What mattered was the reason why someone could not do something. If it was because of coercion, then he was not free. But if it was due to an inability to do it in the first place – to, for example, make money in business or write a poem in Latin hexameters – then he was not unfree. 'Poverty is one kind of personal incapacity. But it is not coercion'.[12]

On the face of it, Joseph's was a highly rigorous and distinctly negative decontestation of freedom – one that both defined the concept under consideration and neutered its most prominent rival. Joseph conceptualised freedom in a binary, in opposition to equality and a command economy, or so it seems. What this chapter will argue, however, is that, beyond the bedrock provided by a lack of external coercion, Joseph also conceived of freedom as entailing independence and even affluence. His segregation of negative from positive freedom was less strict than he supposed therefore. That delineation was not so much an iron curtain as a picket fence, over which Joseph could, as he often did, covertly vault. Moreover, though Joseph disaggregated freedom from power, the mutual proximity of those concepts in his political thought was

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[6] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 9.
[7] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 7.
[8] 'Joseph, Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark (21/06/1978)', p. 2.
[9] 'Summary of a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, Bt, M.P. (Leeds N.E.), the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, debating with the Rt. Hon. Tony BENN, M.P. (Bristol S.E.), on "Socialism and Civil Liberty", speaking at the Commonwealth Hall, Northumberland Avenue, WC2, on Saturday, December 10th, 1977, to mark the 1977 Cobden Trust Human Rights Day', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 6.
[10] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 47.
[11] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 48.
[12] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 48.

such that to be free was not simply to preclude the intrusion of external barriers to individual self-government, but was to have the power and resources to fulfil one's potential also. Freedom thus veered towards the self-determination through which the positive version of that concept is in large part defined. The ripple effect of which was felt across Joseph's wider morphology, most notably in Sir Keith's attitude towards government, which could promote individuals' independence and capacities (and, by implication, their freedom), as well as, it is true, act as a barrier to individual freedom. The reason for Joseph's adhering to a dichotomous duality of positive and negative liberty in spite of all of this, this chapter elaborates, lies in Sir Keith's nature as a conservative, spurred into politics in reaction against rationalists who, in the case of freedom and in the context of late-twentieth-century Britain, threatened negative liberty chiefly.

In arguing as much, this thesis annexes Gamble's interpretation of Thatcherism as a Conservative hegemonic project realised in the form of the free economy and the strong state. By limiting the role of the state to that of upholding the free economy via, for example, the defence of property rights and prevention of private coercion, Gamble says, the advocates for that essentially restorative regime hoped to bolster the state's authority and competence, as well as to revive an efficient, competitive market economy, by dint of all of which the Conservative Party could reclaim its (so its leaders thought) rightful position at the heart of British politics.[13] Confrontations by the state with those embedded bastions of resistance which undermined the functions from which the state's legitimacy derived - the 'bullies' of Joseph's reckoning - such as the trade unions, Gamble contends, were thus relished.[14] Conversely, unalloyed laissez-faire could not but erode the legitimacy of the state.[15] All that this chapter wishes to suggest is that, if Joseph's political thought is anything to go by, on the level of intellectual politics at least, in defining Thatcherism, we might include the "free society" alongside the free economy and the strong state. For the organic change which Joseph prized related to both the economic and the social, the free economy as well as the free society, as the final section of Chapter One noted and as the following chapter also details. Thus, though this thesis in many ways coopts Gamble's interpretation of Thatcherism, in thinking of Joseph as a conservative and of conservatism as a dialectical ideology with the potential for change, this chapter distances this thesis from Gamble's interpretation

[13] Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 4.
[14] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 9.
[15] Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 42.

of the free economy and the strong state as a return on the part of the New Right, conservatives included, to classical liberalism.[16]

A work of reader-response theory this is not. It is inclined towards ideologies' producers, not their consumers. Its central concern is Joseph, not his audiences. This orientation notwithstanding, there is no escaping the fact that reading is transactional.[17] In much the same way in which Crosland, in having a reader like Joseph, could not pin down his ideology's meaning, nor could Joseph with his. His readership also played a part, for readers are not passive, but are agents whose confrontations with that which they read breeds new meanings. This chapter will consider two such "audience" members who were hostile to the Thatcherites' recommendations, one of whom, Roy Hattersley, was a social democrat, and the other, Roger Scruton, a conservative. Comparing Joseph's political thought with what those individuals imparted from Thatcherism, this thesis will further the point made in the previous chapter, in suggesting that much in the way of post-war British political discourse was a product of ideologists arguing past one another (not that Joseph is exempt in this respect, as the previous chapter demonstrated), and that beneath rhetorical tumult often lay a greater degree of ideological kinship than first meets the eye. Scruton features in the final section of this chapter, which argues that, for Joseph, freedom was tied to order. Joseph did not hanker after a state of nature in which, prior to state expansion, individuals enjoyed unalloyed liberty. Furthermore, an unjust or unstable society was impermissible, lest freedom be imperiled. And the process by which the likes of justice and order were sustained was not limited to the state, but extended to the individual, who, it will be shown, could aid freedom by moderating their expectations. Relatedly, this last third or so also argues that, by both associating freedom with a subjective status and seeing that concept as embedded in an extra-human (and, Sir Keith hoped, constitutionally-assured) rule of law, Joseph inclined towards a republican conception of freedom – an argument which, in thinking of Joseph as subscribing exclusively to neither one of Berlin's two concepts, the previous section foregrounds.

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[16] Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 5; One of Thatcherism's three central objectives was 'to revive market liberalism as the dominant public philosophy'. The other two objective are thought to be to secure the Conservative Party as a party of government and to reaffirm a limited (though authoritative) state by way of which to provide for a free economy (pp. 4-5).

[17] The literary scholar Wolfgang Iser compared the act of reading to that of looking at the stars: 'two people gazing at the night sky may both be looking at the same collection of stars, but one will see the image of a plough, and the other will make out a dipper. The "stars" in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are variable'. See W. Iser, 'The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach', *New Literary History*, 3/2 (1972), p. 287.

The second section of this chapter deals with the aforementioned chink in Joseph's decontestative armour – with his permitting of a kind of positive liberty - and it is here where Hattersley makes his entrance: this part contends that Joseph allowed positive freedom entry into his ideological morphology so as to enlarge the potential for organic change. The present author transposes Freeden's political theory as it relates to conservatism onto Green's history of British Conservatism, to argue for the state as one preserver of that freedom, and to show how the Conservative enthusiasm for the state as described by Green – as ebbing and flowing with the health of civil society – maps onto the morphology of conservatism, the conservative core substituting for civil society. Section two thus demonstrates that what was true for Joseph as one conservative likely was and is the case for conservatism as an ideology: like the concept of freedom in Joseph's political thought, all concepts in conservatism, the state included, are downstream of that ideology's core ones. First, though, this chapter attends to ground zero in Joseph's definition of freedom, negative freedom. In particular, the following half-dozen pages or so analyse Sir Keith's thinking with respect to equality of opportunity and individual rights, both of which were closely intertwined with negative freedom in Joseph's political thought, the first as a corollary of that freedom and the second as an entry-point to it. The sum of these parts is an image of freedom as a proxy for Joseph's core concepts, organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order.

Negative freedom:

'Equality of opportunity', Joseph and Sumption said, 'is the corollary of the liberty of the individual'.[18] Joseph believed that 'equality of opportunity in taking jobs […] mean[t] the freedom to choose where and when we work', by which he meant not the right to any job, but a situation in which 'the state does not force anyone to change his job or prevent anyone from attempting to change his jobs'.[19] Equality of opportunity thus pertained to negative rather than positive liberty. It necessitated freedom from coercive interference, instead of the freedom to acquire this or that position. As Joseph variously put it, equality of opportunity '[wa]s one manifestation of leaving the individual free to manage his own life within the law', meant 'not being barred […] by any arbitrary rules, imposed by government or by private associations', and, as he stated in conjunction with Sumption, 'require[d] that no external barrier shall prevent an individual from exploiting his talents'.[20] It would however be a mistake to infer from all

[18] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 31.
[19] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 12.
[20] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 2; 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 4; Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 29.

of this the conclusion that, for Joseph, equality of opportunity necessitated the absence of any and all state intervention. Joseph expected the government of the day, in 1975, to perform a number of tasks, including the breaking up of monopolies, ensuring competition, providing public services, legislating against pollution and noise, as well as 'be[ing] active to seek to secure equality of opportunity for all, and to seek to limit concentrations of power'.[21] Government thus had a role to play in ensuring negative liberty – that individuals were free from coercion - in order that they might take up opportunities. As it related to freedom, theirs was a fine balancing act, between providing for equality of opportunity and ensuring that, as a potential coercer itself, the state did not encumber the individual and, thereby, damage negative liberty. We will return shortly to the role of the state as a guarantor of freedom, after having first explored equality of opportunity's role in Joseph's political thought as a facilitator for organic change.

What mattered to Joseph was not only that opportunities existed, but that they be taken. He enumerated a few ways in which we might identify equality of opportunity. First, he said, there may be 'few laws or quasi-logical practices that exclude people from one form of another of work for arbitrary and indefensible reasons'. But, Sir Keith also maintained that, '[a]lternatively, we could look at the general outcome. The absence of equality of opportunity would be suggested by the existence of a caste system, such that no person could achieve a position different from that of his parents or fall below that occupied by his parents. The presence of equality of opportunity would be suggested by the pervasiveness of snakes and ladders'.[22] Joseph indicated that his preference was for the latter. His concern was for end- as well as starting-points, whatever the former ended up being. Hence he so often referred to social mobility when he spoke of equality of opportunity. For example, in his 1978 speech on equality and inequality, in which he sketched out the two understandings of equality of opportunity just noted, Joseph commented as to '[o]ur society is, and for centuries has been, intensely mobile, up ladders and down snakes'. He praised the British establishment for being 'very permeable', with technicians or manual workers supposedly comprising '40% of men in the top occupational classes'.[23] Moreover, the alleged neutrality of this process – of what we would do well to think of as organic change - is indicative of its extra-human origins. Joseph and Sumption called equality of opportunity 'a neutral concept', in that '[i]t does not set up any particular social arrangement as a desirable goal but merely requires the absence of artificial constraints on individual achievement'.[24] For neutral, read natural,

[21] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 8.
[22] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 3.
[23] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 3.
[24] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 29.

and that which was natural, as we now well-know, signified for Joseph the extra-human origins of the social order. Equality of opportunity Joseph stated in 1978 'means that the laws may not prevent any person from developing and exercising his talents – of course within the general framework of law – as he chooses'.[25] But, as he and Sumption said the following year with regards to a particular job, 'to confine it to those with *natural* [current author's emphasis] endowments or talent' was not a privilege.[26] In effect, then, to permit equality of opportunity was to respect the extra-human origins of the social order and the change it wrought.

Equality of opportunity was thus an adjacent concept, summoned in defence of the conservative core and in defiance of equality of results, for if, as Sir Keith remarked, to offend against equality of opportunity was to offend against liberty, then equality of results of the sort that socialists and egalitarians pursued offended liberty, it being typified by '[d]iscrimination between different kinds of citizen, absence of which is the essence of equality of opportunity'.[27] Equality of opportunity and equality of results/outcome were 'mutually inconsistent' and 'incompatible'.[28] One was 'the enemy' of the other.[29] Indeed, in a sign of those concepts' essentially dialectical relationship, rarely if ever did Joseph refer to equality of opportunity except in the context of it and equality of result's mutual exclusivity. Now, equality of opportunity was not liberty. Hence Joseph distinguished between the two. He 'd[id] not accept that relative poverty or even poverty destroys either freedom or equality of opportunity'.[30] And yet, intimate as they were in Joseph's morphology, what the origins of equality of opportunity therein intimates is that, like that concept, freedom was for Joseph similarly not the be all and end all. Another adjacent concept, it was likewise not a good in and of itself, and Joseph conceded that it was ultimately expendable. 'It would be quite fair (although irrelevant in modern Britain) to say that liberty is not in all circumstances the highest good and that in some conditions of extreme starvation and squalor one might reasonably prefer to be fed and housed than to be free', he and Sumption said.[31] Building off of the preceding analysis, what this thesis proposes next to show is not only that Joseph set limits to the freedom of the individual but that those boundaries began where the extra-human origins of the social order ended.

We owe a debt of gratitude to a Mr. Reid, whose questions to Joseph on Radio Four in 1971 did much to tease out the limits of freedom in Sir Keith's political thought.

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[25] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 2.
[26] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 29.
[27] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 31.
[28] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 28; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.
[29] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 28.
[30] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 11.
[31] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 52.

Mr. Reid began by querying whether 'to prohibit smoking would be a great breach of the people's freedom of choice of matters affecting their health'.[32] In answer to what was a rather leading question, Joseph concurred: 'it would certainly be that, it's a free country'.[33] Next, laced with a certain mischief, came what Mr. Reid called his 'punch question': 'what I want to ask now is will Mr. Keith Joseph's Department stop all pressure on local health authorities to force people to ingest fluorides through the public water supply'.[34] Joseph's response was to say: 'I don't happen to think that it's the same order of things at all'.[35] But what distinguished one order of things from another? Digging down into his public remarks, it soon becomes clear that, as his responses to Mr. Reid suggest, freedom for Sir Keith did not mean the absence of any and all coercion - Joseph freely acknowledged that 'no society can exist without some apparatus of coercion' - and that there were therefore certain respects in which individuals ought not to be free.[36] The authors of *Why Britain needs a social market economy* said that they advocated for the market economy because they believed in freedom of personal choice, of which the idea 'that adult members of society should, over very wide areas of choice, be regarded as best qualified to judge what is in their own interests and act accordingly' was a part.[37] Four years later, Joseph and Sumption commented as to how '[a] society in which the choices fundamental to human existence are determined by coercion is not a free society'.[38] How wide the areas of choice ought to be, and what did and did not constitute "fundamental", are the preserve of this section of this chapter. A good starting place is with Joseph's understanding of individual rights.

Rights provided 'access to […] freedoms' – freedoms that were in turn negative.[39] The numerous rights that Joseph outlined entailed an absence of coercion. There was a right to free speech.[40] Parents had a right to choose their child's education, and to spend their own money on their offspring's schooling if they chose to.[41] Contra Benn, Joseph

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[32] '"It's your line", Radio 4, 2nd November 1971 – Guest: Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 69/2, p. 3/2.
[33] '"It's your line"', p. 3/2.
[34] '"It's your line"', p. 3/2.
[35] '"It's your line"', p. 3/3.
[36] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 9.
[37] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 12.
[38] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 47.
[39] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 4.
[40] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., Conservative Candidate for Leeds North East and Conservative Spokesman on Technology and Trade, speaking at Chapeltown, Leeds on Thursday, 4th June, 1970 – Permissive is not the same as civilised', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 20/2, p. 1.
[41] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham' (19/10/1974)', p. 3.

believed that workers did not have a right to their job.[42] The right to join a union and the right not to join a union were natural corollaries.[43] And so forth and so on: rights were rights to negative liberty. Joseph made this point explicitly with regard to what he called civil liberty. 'Civil liberty means that the individual has rights with which the state should not interfere. It means that the state is the servant of the individual, not the other way around'.[44] 'It is practicable and proper', Joseph continued, 'to look to civil liberty for protection against coercion: that is, restraint and constraint' and 'not […] for the power to cause things to be done for your benefit'. There was, then, no positive right to an end to poverty or to a guarantee of work, which were 'by-products of a healthy economic system'.[45] Thus, just as increased government intervention (or rather, as we shall later see, certain forms of government intervention) curtailed the individual's freedom, so too did it infringe the individual's rights. Hence Joseph's complaint that '[w]e have ceased during my lifetimes to regard it as axiomatic that the expansion of government economic power would always be at the expense of individual and corporate rights'.[46] If not necessarily of an economic kind, government power expanded, damaging liberties and rights, when government distributed rights. 'Rights decreed by government and distributed so freely must be made good by order, every right entails corresponding duties, every material right is given at someone else's expense. Every new power to government is a new restriction on individuals and corporations'.[47] Joseph therefore conceived of at least two types of right – one of which, in providing for individuals' freedoms, he approved of, while the other, by restricting such freedoms, he disapproved of. Whereas the latter was artificial, the former was natural.

Joseph and Sumption envisaged a natural right to equal opportunity, which was not undermined by other individuals accruing wealth via such a right. What there was not such a pre-existing right to was equality, because 'there cannot be a natural right to the fruits of other men's talents'.[48] By implication, Joseph and Sumption suggested that individuals had a right to their talent – a right that the pursuers of equality denied.[49] That they thought that the greatest possible tyranny was 'denying to individuals the

[42] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 7.
[43] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. M.P. (Leeds NE), the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, to the Chelmsford Constituency Conservative Association at the House of Commons on Monday 20th June 1977', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 93/2, p. 2.
[44] 'Joseph, "Socialism and Civil Liberty" (10/12/1977)', p. 3.
[45] 'Joseph, "Socialism and Civil Liberty" (10/12/1977)', p. 6.
[46] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 6.
[47] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 7.
[48] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 102.
[49] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 86.

disposal of their talents' is salutary in this respect.[50] In the absence of a natural right to it, equality could only be permitted as a discrete political end if, as the previous chapter explained, there was a set of 'criteria which both groups recognise as valid', like political stability.[51] We were earlier acquainted with equality of opportunity's role as a facilitator for the conservative core, it being neutral/natural. The concept of competitiveness held in *Equality* a similar position, as natural or part of human nature. The authors of that text asserted that '[m]en have a natural right to their ambitions because it was not for the purpose of abolishing competitiveness that they have submitted to government'.[52] To be ambitious was to be competitive, and there was a right to ambition because competition was in Joseph's thinking natural.[53] Ambition/competitiveness, equality of opportunity, and talent – these were for Sir Keith all natural therefore. Moreover, that which was natural, including the rights of individuals (to, for example, equal opportunity, their talents, and ambition), was pre-social, because human nature did not depend on the individuals whose nature it was coming together to form societies. Hence Joseph and Sumption claimed that 'individuals are prior to societies and have rights independent of them'.[54]

What this all suggests is that Joseph valued freedom to the extent that that concept allowed for the flourishing of his core concepts. Joseph believed that freedom was important insofar as it was a product of a series of rights - which, being natural, were expressions of the extra-human origins of the social order - and inasmuch as equality of opportunity, which Sir Keith deduced from freedom and to which the individual had a right, allowed for change which was organic because it resulted from individuals' natural rights. This amounted to negative freedom; the borders of freedom were demarcated by coercion's breadth, and Joseph defined coercion with reference to the extra-human origins of the social order. The following two sections of this chapter argue that this was only one aspect of Joseph's understanding of freedom however. Joseph's conception of freedom was nested. At its heart was freedom as freedom from coercion. But atop those foundations Joseph layered what will henceforth be called freedom as independence and ordered freedom. Freedom as non-interference, with which we have just dealt, was the freedom that individuals had whether or not they lived in societies or under government, as Joseph said. Yet Joseph was not speaking to individuals who were not under government and/or not part of societies, but the

[50] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 125.
[51] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 102.
[52] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 100.
[53] Albeit Chapter Four notes how *Equality* placed more emphasis on competitiveness as natural than did Joseph's other speeches and writings.
[54] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 100.

opposite. In late-twentieth-century Britain (constituting a society subject to government) freedom was more than a lack of constraints. The final section of this chapter shows how and explains why Joseph linked freedom to order. First, though, this chapter proposes that Joseph permitted freedom to drift away from a purely negative definition (by, for example, allowing the state to be conscripted to the end of individual self-determination) in order that there could be as much organic change as possible. Joseph might well have accentuated the negative. But he did not eliminate the positive. It is the latter, or its closest equivalent in Joseph's ideology, which the next section contends with.

Positive freedom:

The freedom that Joseph backed was not altogether negative. In *Freedom and Order*, Joseph described the absence of particular constraints as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for freedom, which also required what he called 'the availability of material means'.[55] In the same year, in his speech on the subject of freedom under the law at the Royal Festival Hall, Sir Keith remarked how, for example, '[f]reedom of speech means access to communications media; freedom of the press is possible only where people have the resources to start up publications and solicit support and subscriptions as best they can'.[56] To which we might retort: but what is this if not a freedom to? Undeniably, not all "freedoms to" were or need be positive freedoms. What Joseph called the 'freedom to own and dispose of property and to keep and dispose of one's own income' was a negative one; it described a lack of coercion.[57] As too was the freedom, praised by Joseph, of American entrepreneurs to innovate in the telecommunications sector.[58] Sir Keith even referred to 'the basic freedom of people to spend their incomes in any peaceful way they like' as a matter of being '[l]eft free'.[59] Such examples notwithstanding, there is in Joseph's political thought nonetheless a clear sense in which individuals' material security secured their freedom. In line with Berlin's description of '[t]he 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' [as] deriv[ing] from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master', freedom and indeed human achievement required what *Equality* termed 'men of independent means'.[60] One such man, Marx, could criticise the British government because of Engels' wealth.[61] Joseph seemed

[55] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, 10.
[56] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 4.
[57] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 9.
[58] 'Telecommunications Monopoly, July 21st 1980 [statement by Joseph to Parliament]', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/7, p. 1.
[59] 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 10.
[60] Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 131; Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 57.
[61] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.

thankful however that the privileged freedom that the author of *Das Kapital* enjoyed in the nineteenth century had by the mid-twentieth-century become commonplace. Resonances of this idea are evident in 1975's *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, whose authors commented as to how, '[s]ince the war, rising prosperity and increased leisure have enabled the mass of the British people to enjoy their individual freedoms on a scale never previously realised', and that 'personal liberty [wa]s beginning to characterise the life-style of a whole generation'.[62] An implication of which is that the Victorian Briton who was as free from undue coercion as the New Elizabethan one might still have been less free because of their precarious material circumstances. One factor that elevated freedom beyond mere lack of coercion and which was materially constituted was the freedom to choose.

Joseph inferred choice from freedom. He said that 'freedom ensures that we and not some other person will choose between the range of alternatives', and, alongside Sumption, that '[l]iberty means that we, not others, choose between these alternatives'.[63] As is to be expected then, like the freedom that he valued more broadly, freedom of choice was not for Sir Keith pre-social. It relied on a set of material circumstances. Hence we find Joseph seeking 'a minimum level of income so high that all have choice and plenty', and, in 1967, referring to how choice could be increased and poverty relieved by having the country grow richer.[64] One facilitator of choice, unsurprisingly, was the free market. The free enterprise sector Joseph thought sustained people's freedoms.[65] It offered people choices, as a result of which they were 'freer to do their own thing than in any other form of society'.[66] That the state too had a role to play in this respect will comes as less of a surprise, should it come as one at all, by the end of this thesis, when, having read Chapter Four in particular, the reader will be in a position to know that, for Joseph, government had an important part to play in fostering the market, itself a giver of choice. Government had for example to ensure as best it could neither prolonged boom nor slump, in order that there could be numerous employers and, in turn, choice for the individual as to how, when and where to work.[67]

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[62] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 5.
[63] 'Joseph, "Socialism and Civil Liberty" (10/12/1977)', p. 5; Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 49.
[64] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 11; 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Trade and Power, at the North-East Bristol Conservative Association Rally at Elmles School, Bristol, on Saturday 8th July, 1967 – For Richer, For Poorer – And It May Be For Poorer', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 151, p. 3.
[65] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 14.
[66] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 65.
[67] Joseph, *The Social Market*, p. 6.

An area in which Joseph hoped government might provide far greater choice was education, wherein Joseph believed that a voucher scheme could not only improve standards but help extend choice to all. Under that scheme, the state would offer parents either a free education for their children at a state school or a voucher to be spent by parents at an independent school of their choosing.[68] Dissatisfied parents would be able to up and leave for another school.[69] Joseph conceded however that '[t]here are very great difficulties in making a voucher deliver, in a way that would commend itself to us, more choice than the 1980 Act will deliver', and, in the end, such a scheme never got off the ground.[70] Now, no doubt about it, part of the reason why the governments of 1980s Britain were able to offer people choice was because previous governments had denied them those choices in the first place. Joseph conceded in 1975 that the government could not 'denationalise great industries overnight', but promised that 'we shall try to find ways to offer people more choice'.[71] In other words, had previous governments not nationalised industries, the then government would not have been in a position to offer choice by promising to denationalise them. Whether or not at the practical level Joseph and the Thatcher governments did in fact offer greater choice, and whatever the extent of that choice, that Sir Keith thought of that concept, wedded as it was to freedom, as rising and falling with the extent of prosperity and social provision only adds to our comprehension of that politician as devoted to a conception of freedom that was an admixture of negative and positive liberty as defined by Berlin.

The previous chapter foreshadowed this argument.[72] Recall that, being what he called an absolute concept, equality Joseph judged to be incompatible with liberty, for '[t]here can never be a condition of perfect equilibrium in which we can rest satisfied with as great a measure of equality as can be had without unacceptable infringements of our liberty'.[73] Egalitarians faced a simple choice therefore: one or the other, equality or

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[68] 'Replying to the debate on Education, Sir Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Education and Science – Education, Tuesday October 5th, 1982', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 115/3, p. 7.
[69] 'Joseph, Replying to the debate on Education (05/10/1982)', p. 3.
[70] 'Education [Joseph, replying to a debate, 05/01/1982]', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/7, p. 12.
[71] 'Joseph, Panorama (23/06/1975)', p. 9.
[72] As indeed did the previous section of this chapter, which argued that it was important to Joseph not only that opportunities be available but that they be exercised, the relevance of which to positive liberty is notable when we consider the philosopher Charles Taylor's distinction between negative and positive liberty as being that between an 'opportunity concept' and an 'exercise concept'. See C. Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Philosophical Papers Volume 2)* (Cambridge 1985), p. 213. Complying with Berlin's definition of positive liberty, this was the free individual as 'a doer': Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 131.
[73] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 45.

liberty?[74] A clue to their answer lay in their name: all too predictably, the egalitarians had chosen poorly. Hence Sir Keith feared in 1975 that socialists, having prioritised equality at liberty's expense, might soon introduce 'movement permits'.[75] Even moderate Labour MPs – the likes of Dennis Howell and Shirley Williams – he accused of being enablers of 'red fascism'.[76] In spite of which, we are also well aware, by virtue again of the previous chapter, that this conflict between liberty and equality was not always as 'fundamental' as Sir Keith (and his colleagues) often let on.[77] In *Equality*, Joseph and Sumption gave two reasons for redistribution, for greater equality. The first was a 'technical consideration': it was that taxes needed to be collectable.[78] In the context of the present discussion, the second is more interesting, and was that '[t]here is a level of subsistence below which no society should allow its poorest members to fall because a free society cannot afford to permit a substantial number of citizens to sink to a condition in which they would prefer well-fed slavery to indignant freedom'.[79] Here, as elsewhere, Joseph thought of freedom as requiring sociological agency. In keeping with which, Joseph on his ownsome proclaimed in his 1978 speech on equality and inequality that 'there is no reason whatever – I repeat, no reason whatever – why a society committed to maintaining freedom cannot decide to devote part of its resources to maintaining a safety-net'.[80] Equality and freedom were not nearly so foreign to one another as Joseph seems frequently to have wanted his audience to believe therefore.

The primary reason for this, as argued in Chapter Two, is that Joseph's issue was ultimately not with equality but with egalitarianism as the pursuit of equality as a good in and of itself. Thus Joseph said that, alongside culture, living standards and equality both of opportunity and before the law, freedom was 'destroyed by *insisting* [current author's emphasis] on equality of outcome'.[81] In addition to which, *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, to which Joseph pegged his name, remarked how, 'beyond a *certain degree* [current author's emphasis], equality can only be enforced at the cost of sacrificing individual freedoms', and that '[a] capitalist market economy and the personal

[74] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 47.
[75] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. MP (Leeds NE) Shadow Home Secretary, Speaking at the Camping and Outdoor Life Exhibitions and Motor Caravan Show, Olympia Empire Hall, London on Wednesday 1 January 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 78, p. 3.
[76] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph M.P. (Leeds NE), at a Lunch at Doncaster Racecourse Restaurant on Friday 24th June 1977', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 93/2, p. 2.
[77] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 13.
[78] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 27.
[79] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 27.
[80] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 13.
[81] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.

liberties it safeguards are not compatible with an *extreme* [present author's emphasis] egalitarian society'.[82] His concession in *Equality* to greater redistribution may well appear an 'attempt to achieve and maintain equality' of the kind that he disapproved of, but was not, because Sir Keith's hypothetical was a last resort and not the egalitarian's first port of call, the pursuit of equality for its own sake.[83] All of the concepts in Joseph's ideology bar his core ones, freedom and equality amongst them, were satellites in orbit around organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, and it was due to and not in spite of this dynamic that, in much the same way in which he and Crosland might have found consensus (see Chapter Two), Joseph could have reached a degree of accord with another socialist, whose vision of liberty via equality, it will be noted, bears a resemblance to Joseph's conception of freedom as analysed in this section, despite the outright hostility of the socialist in question to Joseph and all that he was seen to stand for.

Be they miners, communists or the Argentine junta, enemies were not hard to come by in the eleven years of Margaret Thatcher's "reign". A veritable brigadier in the Labour Party's intellectual war of words with the Thatcherites was Roy Hattersley, whose 1987 book *Choose Freedom* represents a rhetorical blitzkrieg against (purported) New Right propositions. Hattersley's was in many ways a re-statement of basic revisionist principles. The apprentice took after the master: like Crosland, in tribute to whose 1956 magnum opus he subtitled the product of his own intellectual labours just over three decades later *The Future for Democratic Socialism*, Hattersley sought to reaffirm a distinction between ends and means as essential to socialism.[84] In a show of his revisionist colours, he cautioned against over-indulgence in state ownership. While natural monopolies should be subject to public ownership, in the majority of the economy, on evidence, the market was the best solution.[85] In other ways, though, *Choose Freedom* was very much a product of its time. Hattersley's intention in writing that text was in large part to save freedom from what Hattersley viewed as being its perversion at the hands of the New Right.[86] In this respect, Hattersley kept in ideological

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[82] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 13.
[83] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.
[84] K. Jeffreys, 'The Old Right', in R. Plant, M. Beech and K. Hickson (Eds.), *The Struggle for Labour's Soul: Understanding Labour's political thought since 1945* (London, 2004), p. 81.
[85] R. Hattersley, *Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism* (London, 1987), p. 171.
[86] Beech and Hickson describe how 'Hattersley's contribution can be seen […] as the most significant attempt by a senior Labour Party politician after the 1983 General Election defeat to modernise democratic socialism/social democracy in response to the intellectual challenge of the New Right': M. Beech and K. Hickson, *Labour's Thinkers:*

step with those Revisionists in leadership roles in Labour throughout the decade of Thatcherism's supremacy, who emphasised freedom more so than their intra-party rivals in the New Left.[87] 'The true object of socialism', in Hattersley's view, 'is the creation of a genuinely free society in which the protection and extension of individual liberty is the primary duty of the state'.[88] Yet liberty was not an island. Freedom and equality were 'indivisible', and only together could provide for 'the full flowering of the individual human spirit'.[89] In order to fulfil the command issued by the title of Hattersley's 1987 work therefore, one must also choose equality. The equal distribution of power and thus the provision of resources and opportunities to all was the main path by way of which theoretical rights could be actualised.[90] Unless they were to be quashed by the rich and the strong, it was required that the individual rights of the majority be shielded and extended by collective and, in particular, state power.[91] To provide that defence was, thought Hattersley, the socialist's main duty.[92]

Hattersley's antagonist is a compound. It is 'the libertarian right', including something by the name of 'Hayek-Friedman theories'.[93] Joseph is mentioned.[94] As too are Hayek, Berlin, and the American philosopher Robert Nozick.[95] Compared to genuine freedom – what Hattersley, paraphrasing Keynes, called effective freedom – that offered by the New Right was a 'cruel joke'.[96] Only that social democrats had fallen for the punch line. In their belief that freedom was purely negative, 'amount[ing] to no more than the removal of restraints', Hattersley's comrades had proved all too willing 'to argue about liberty in the language of [… their] opponents'.[97] Tested against Joseph's political thought, however, Hattersley's characterisation is largely inapplicable. Joseph's view of freedom was not, as Hattersley made out of the New Right generally, a liberating, emancipatory doctrine (as the next section of this chapter demonstrates in

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The Intellectual Roots of Labour from Tawney to Gordon Brown (London, 2007), pp. 219-220.

[87] M. Wickham-Jones, 'The New Left', in R. Plant, M. Beech and K. Hickson (Eds.), *The Struggle for Labour's Soul: Understanding Labour's political thought since 1945* (London, 2004), p. 32.

[88] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. xv.

[89] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 105, 101.

[90] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. xv.

[91] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. xvi.

[92] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. xv.

[93] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 45, 66.

[94] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 54.

[95] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 83.

[96] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 22, xvi; See also R. Hattersley, in R. Hattersley, E. Heffer, N. Kinnock and P. Shore, *Labour's Choices (Fabian Tract 489)* (London, 1983), p. 3.

[97] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 23.

particular). Freedom was thus not 'no more than the removal of restraints'. Nor still was Joseph in the habit of promoting a 'generalised liberty'.[98] This section has shown how, for him, freedom was to a great extent materially-constituted, requiring specific provisions such as access to communications media. Though he erred on the side of positive liberty – of freedom as the 'freedom to work, freedom to be well housed and educated', and the like - the author of *Choose Freedom* readily admitted that freedom in what he called the negative sense was the starting point for a proper understanding of liberty, and that the state could both extend and stifle freedom.[99] Except that liberty could not be left there. An additional layer in the form of primary goods and the fulfillment of basic needs was also required.[100] With Tawney as his guide, and in a forthright rejection of the binary supposedly sought by Joseph and his ilk, Hattersley recognised the linkage between what he called 'freedom to' and 'freedom from'.[101] The right to act was all well and good, but it was worthless without the agency to make use of it.[102] As his concessions to equality allude however, and as the following pages argue, Joseph was in his references to capacities and power not a million miles away from that position himself.

Joseph held in two 1974 speeches, one in Luton and the other in Birmingham, 'that men and women are born with a capacity for good and evil, to make the best use of their talents or to waste them'.[103] He elsewhere put these differing capacities down to luck – an adjacent concept which, significantly and as the following chapter demonstrates, stands alongside self-interest in having been rolled out by Joseph in defence of his conservative core.[104] Both luck and self-interest represented that which was natural or, to use Freeden's turn of phrase, extra-human. That Sir Keith used the example of individuals' varying capacities, themselves down to luck, to excuse inequality makes sense therefore, given that, as the previous chapter argued, Joseph only defended inequality insofar as it too was natural. If people 'differ[ed] in their capacity to retain that which they ha[d]', Joseph remarked in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, then equality of income was impossible.[105] People did not have what Joseph and Sumption in 1979 termed 'the same economic capacity'.[106] And yet Joseph also sought 'a safety net

[98] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 78.
[99] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 79, 83 & 86.
[100] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 85.
[101] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 79.
[102] Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. 85.
[103] 'Joseph, Fairley Hill, Luton (03/10/1974)', p. 3; 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 4.
[104] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 10.
[105] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 76.
[106] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 64.

that will promote rather than diminish peoples' capacity to live as they individually choose: an aid to self-reliance rather than invitation to apathy'.[107] This remark of his goes to show not only that government could for Sir Keith nurture freedom (insofar as freedom manifested in choice), but that Joseph's defence of both organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order represented just that – a defence – and in no sense a fatalistic submission to those concepts. What mattered to Joseph was that his core concepts were not trammelled over, not that they could or should never be exploited to the public good.

This openness of Joseph to mobilising the extra-human origins of the social order serves to further augment our understanding of his opposition towards positive liberty, according to which freedom is not power.[108] Sir Keith believed that a poor man could be free or unfree.[109] But in 1982 and speaking on the subject of education, he stated his wish to give parents 'the power and the sense of responsibility that is properly theirs'.[110] At London's St. Ermins Hotel in 1975, Joseph remarked how these concepts, responsibility and power, implied certain capacities. He said that 'our powers and pretensions have been so much greater than those of British politicians at any time, since the Commonwealth at least, that our responsibilities must be correspondingly greater. We need to reassess with hindsight and humility the powers and responsibilities we have arrogated and the capacities they imply. We need to take a broader and deeper view, while giving back what we can to the spontaneous processes of society and economy'.[111] For the state or politicians to repatriate power(s) back to the individual was thus to restore her natural capacities. But, as the previous paragraph argued, individuals' respective capacities were extra-human and due to such natural qualities as luck and talent. One might not have been synonymous with the others therefore, but what Joseph called freedom was impossible without powers and the capacities those powers implied, because, broadly speaking and as the previous section contended, the freedom that Joseph valued (one corollary of which was equality of opportunity) was coterminous with the extra-human origins of the social order. Though not everyone could, to paraphrase one of Joseph's favourite, oft-repeated lines, be "free to lunch at the Ritz", they could still be afforded the opportunity to afford a lunch, by having the state grant back those powers and capacities which it had expropriated.

Perhaps Joseph had two different conceptions of individual power – two concepts under one word. What the present author thinks more likely is that Joseph's distancing

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[107] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 78.
[108] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 11.
[109] Joseph, *The Social Market*, p. 15.
[110] 'Joseph, Replying to the debate on Education (05/10/1982)', p. 3.
[111] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', pp. 4-5.

of freedom from power was not nearly so strident a position as Sir Keith might have liked his audience to think. Power in Joseph's morphology, as well as the concepts of capacities, choice and independence therein, was implicated with freedom, and carried Joseph's conceptualisation of that concept away from a solely negative definition. It is not even as though Joseph radically changed opinion from one year and public statement to the next. It is in *Equality* that Joseph's commitment to negative liberty over its positive counterpart is most obvious, and in that text of all places where Joseph refers to the importance of men of independent means. A probable explanation for his clinging to the dualism of positive versus negative liberty is the context in which Joseph found himself. It seems to have been because he placed himself in opposition to socialists who he thought wished to trample over individual (extra-human) rights that Sir Keith placed such emphasis on the negative freedom that sprang from those rights. One of Joseph's concerns in the mid-1970s was that, '[w]henever the rights of the individual are over-ridden for the sake of some ostensibly higher aim, some collective good which transcends individual rights, we move towards despotism, in which the rights of all individuals are sacrificed to the interests and political fashions of the ruling hierarchy'. Sir Keith listed as examples of such higher aims 'social justice', the 'collective good', and 'the general will'.[112] If untrue of all socialisms however, in comparison with one socialist, Roy Hattersley, Joseph's understanding of freedom overlaps with (a) socialism. Theirs was not unanimity, and Joseph's contention that, even if private wealth 'can itself be a kind of power', '[t]he power conferred by private wealth is not a power to coerce others' (because it was muted by 'social and moral pressures' and 'diluted by competition') would not have passed muster with Hattersley.[113] In spite of which, both men shared an understanding of freedom as reliant on individual agency – an agency exemplified for Joseph by capacities and powers, and instantiated with government support.

On a strictly negative view of freedom, the state was for Joseph liable to be more a hindrance than a help.[114] Though it had a role to play in ensuring security of property and equality of opportunity, being itself a coercive force, its potential for intruding on the freedom of the individual was immense, and therefore its scope Joseph believed needed to be strictly limited. This was Sir Keith as an advocate for negative liberty. Yet in thinking of freedom as not only freedom from coercion but as entailing a certain kind of independence, Joseph, as we have seen, allowed for a far greater role for government.

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[112] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p 4.
[113] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 53; As a socialist, Hattersley also differed from Joseph in desiring 'a more equal distribution of wealth and power': Hattersley, *Choose Freedom*, p. xvii.
[114] The state, Joseph said, 'means politicians and bureaucrats' ('Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p 4). When Joseph referred to 'the state' therefore, he meant 'government'.

As with Joseph's view of choice, so too with his stance towards capacities and powers, it could well be said that Sir Keith only permitted expansive state activity insofar as he thought that it was the government's role to return to the individual that which was rightfully theirs – their freedom of choice, power and capacities - after which the state would return to a minimalist, nightwatchman function.[115] Any such conjecture is however exploded by Sir Keith's having gone above and beyond the mere repatriation of powers and the like, to ensure instead in many instances that individuals could perform to the best of their abilities, or should that be capacities. Thus Joseph asserted in 1978 that '[t]he invention of sheltered housing has been a real mercy, giving years of *extra independence* [present author's italics] and fulfilment to thousands of elderly people who would probably have lost their vitality had they gone into a home for the Elderly'.[116] But even if the sheltered housing Joseph had in mind was private, we also know that Joseph sought 'a safety net that will promote rather than diminish peoples' capacity to live as they individually choose: an aid to self-reliance rather than invitation to apathy', of which tax credits was one example.[117] This role, of the state in effectively shoring up freedom, should not be exaggerated of course. Joseph's priority in this domain was still very much the market. If not a sufficient condition, free enterprise was nevertheless a necessary one for freedom, as '[f]reedom depends on being able at any time, to criticise the Government and mobilise opinion against it', which was impossible when government had a monopoly over society's employment and communications.[118] Government intervention in the areas of welfare and housing, by contrast, Joseph never to the best of the present author's knowledge described as necessary to the preservation of freedom. That Joseph could allow the state a role at all in the defence of his core concepts is however revealing of the conservative attitude to the state more broadly.

There is no one conservative view of government. Collectivism or statism is not unconservative. This is not to say that there is not 'a traditional Conservative orientation to government' of the kind that Gamble perceives Thatcher as holding to.[119] There could

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[115] This would simply be providing for negative liberty: Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 122.

[116] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph MP (Leeds North East), Overall responsibility for Policy and Research, and the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, at the opening of Jubilee Court Sheltered Housing, Alcester, Warwickshire, on Friday, 15th December 1978', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.

[117] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 78.

[118] 'Joseph, Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark (21/06/1978)', p. 2.

[119] Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 161; An obvious candidate for a Conservative orientation to government is the Tory statecraft theorised by Bulpitt. See J. Bulpitt, 'The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft', *Political Studies*, 34/1 (1986), pp. 19-39.

also be a traditional conservative orientation to government. What there cannot be is an essentially conservative one. Green states as to how '[a]t no point in 'the Conservative century' [the twentieth one] was there a definitive Conservative theory of the state'.[120] The state's size and role was according to him determined for Conservatives by the efficacy of the agencies of civil society. When civil society was healthy, then the state was restrained, and when civil society was failing, then the state was interventionist.[121] This issue, as to the competency of the agencies of civil society, Green believes was at the heart of much in the way of twentieth-century Conservatives' deliberations over social policy. It was relatively easy for the Conservative Party's differing factions to agree upon the need for trade union reform, Green says, because of their shared understanding of trade unions as agencies of civil society, and their concurring that the unions had strayed out of the social and into the political, with legislation therefore being required so as to return them to their rightful abode.[122] The proposed (most notably by Greenleaf) intra-Tory Party dynamic of libertarians versus paternalists thus dissolves once it is appreciated that it is the effectiveness of the agencies of civil society that leads the way when it comes to Conservatives' views of the state.[123] Conservatives can be seen to occupy both camps.[124] They were and can be paternalist on some issues and libertarian on others.[125]

Though disinclined to name its progenitor explicitly except for in his footnotes, Green takes issue with Freeden's conception of conservatism as it applies to late-twentieth-century Conservatives. Individualism was not for Thatcher, he suggests, an adjacent concept.[126] The individual, her rights and duties were for the Conservative essential.[127] Despite Green's implied placing of individualism at the Conservative core

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[120] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 240.
[121] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 279.
[122] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 272.
[123] W. H. Greenleaf, *The British Political Tradition, Volume Two: The Ideological Heritage* (London, 1983).
[124] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 260; Other scholars apart from Green have tracked changing Conservative approaches to the state. Francis has observed that the Conservative Party was less collectivist in the late 1940s than it was in the 1930s. The extent to which Tories capitulated to collectivists in the years immediately after the Second World War is, he says, easily overstated: contrast the creation in the 1930s of marketing boards and public corporations with Churchill's warning in the following decade that the NHS would lead to a Gestapo – a remark not at all out of keeping with Conservative opinion from 1945-1951. See M. Francis, ''Set The People Free'? Conservatives and the State, 1920-1960', in M. Francis and I. Zweiniger-Bargielowski (Eds.), '*The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990* (Cardiff, 1996), pp. 59-61.
[125] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 241.
[126] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 257.
[127] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 258.

(albeit not necessarily the conservative one) and disavowal of the idea of conservatism as attendant above all else to organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, there is available to us a discernibly Freedenite reading of the interpretation of Green's summarised in the previous paragraph. Indeed, Green gestures towards the compatibility of his and Freeden's interpretations in his comment as to how '[t]he organicist conception of society served to provide Conservatives with a distinctive social philosophy that differentiated it in crucial ways from Classical Liberalism and Socialism'.[128] For 'organicist conception of society' read "organic change", and for 'distinctive' in Conservatism think "ineliminable" in conservatism. If, as Green maintains, 'Thatcherism can be viewed as perhaps the ultimate expression of Conservative belief in agencies of civil society as the fulcrum of social life', we might also add that that Conservative belief can be thought of as an expression of the conservative core as theorised by Freeden.[129] Civil society was worth preserving by means of the state inasmuch as it was a fissure for organic change and the social order's extra-human origins. In addition to Green's example of trade unions, for Sir Keith, another, non-institutional agent in civil society was the individual who comprised such institutions as unions, churches, and the like. One of the benefits of a free society according to Joseph was that it best allowed *people* to 'do their own thing', remember, and there was room aplenty for the state in ensuring that individuals could do just that.[130] And, more to the point as far as conservatism is concerned, there might well be more in future.

Recall that Joseph thought of civil liberty as equating to 'restraint and constraint', and as meaning that individuals had rights with which the state should not interfere. The previous section argued that such rights were fundamentally extra-human and that the consequences of the freedom which those rights allowed for amounted to organic change. What Joseph himself called limited government was thus necessitated on deontological, rights-based grounds.[131] But Joseph also stated that 'independence is the <u>real</u> meaning of civil liberty'.[132] And independence was not finite. To follow the logic of Joseph's understanding of freedom as analysed in this section, there need not for the conservative be a final stage at which one is maximally independent. Call to mind Sir Keith's praising of the 'extra independence' offered by sheltered housing. It is thus worth considering (and indeed doubting) whether there is a stage at which 'peoples' capacity to live as they individually choose', to reiterate a line of Joseph's cited earlier, can under

[128] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 287.
[129] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, p. 278.
[130] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 65.
[131] 'Joseph, Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark (21/06/1978)', p. 1; A. Gamble, 'Economic Libertarianism', in M. Freeden, L. Tower Sargent and M. Stears, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford, 2013), p. 414.
[132] 'Joseph, "Socialism and Civil Liberty" (10/12/1977)', p. 2.

conservatism be promoted no further.[133] Might not the Keith Joseph of two hundred years' time, a conservative still, allow for innovative forms of state intervention, were it to mean the continuing fruition of his core concepts? One index of this is conservative support for universal basic income, and it is telling that when in 1966 Milton Friedman argued for a negative income tax, part of his case rested on the idea that '[i]t would be far better to give the indigent money and let them spend it according to their values' than have the taxpayer 'see to it that the money is spent for designated purposes', with the hope being that 'at least some [of the beneficiaries] would grow in the course of making their own decisions, and would develop habits of independence and self-reliance'.[134] We will return in the Conclusion to what this thesis deems the logic of conservatism and the unknown horizons to which that logic can point. As for Joseph's conservatism, this section has argued that Joseph's decontestation of freedom is best thought of as fractal. Civil liberty was non-coercion and independence, and so too was freedom. The next and final section of this chapter considers one more significant aspect of Joseph's understanding of freedom, its reliance on social order.

Freedom & Order:

Joseph defined a free society in *Freedom and Order* as 'one which is able to reconcile conflicting groups and individual objectives without recourse to substantial coercion', and thought that '[t]his […] is possible only where people's demands are realistic, and where people are prepared to settle for less that they would have hoped to gain rather than carry their struggle beyond a certain limit'.[135] There are two main takeaways from these excerpts, both of which speak to the nature of freedom in Joseph's political thought. The first, a familiar one, is that a free society was absent of unnecessary coercion. The one that will preoccupy us for the time being however is Joseph's belief that free societies required negative liberty in combination with a certain

[133] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 78.
[134] M. Friedman, 'The Case for the Negative Income Tax: A View from the Right', *Proceedings of the National Symposium on Guaranteed Income, December 9, 1966* (1966), <https://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/internal/media/dispatcher/271085/full>, accessed 14/06/2021, pp. 5-6. More recently, in a remark not all that far-removed from Joseph's support for the state provision of greater choice and freedom, the prominent American policy analyst Yuval Levin praised the former Republican Speaker of the U.S. House of Representative Paul Ryan's proposal for a government "opportunity grant" for attempting 'to give people more resources and authority and greater freedom to find new and more effective ways up from poverty'. See Y. Levin, 'The Ryan Mobility Agenda', *National Review*, <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/ryan-mobility-agenda-yuval-levin/>, accessed 17/07/2021.
[135] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 9.

restraint on the part of the citizenry. Sir Keith intimated much the same belief in 1974 when he complained that, '[w]hile the freedom of ordinary families has been eroded in housing, and is threatened – to the extent that it exists – in education, we have been asked to take comfort in the belief, taught be Mr. Roy Jenkins, that a permissive is a civilised society'; one possible implication being that freedom plus the opposite of permissiveness – what we might call self-restraint – made for a civilised society.[136] The importance to Joseph of what he himself called self-restraint and self-discipline, whether in connection with freedom or not, was a consistent theme in his speeches and writings throughout the 1970s, and the way in which he spoke of those concepts more generally therein can teach us a great deal about Sir Keith's framing of freedom in relation to them. For instance, that Joseph invested heavily in the idea of self-restraint goes a long way towards explaining his fascination with such social issues as the notorious cycle of deprivation, with Sir Keith in 1979 blaming a rapid rise in juvenile crime – in, for example, robbery, mugging and hooliganism – on the fashion for self-expression over self-restraint.[137] Note also his contention five years earlier that:

> [a] child needs, we believe, a consistent combination of love and firmness from preferably two, but if necessary, one parent or stable substitute, if he or she is to mature into a person to whom self-restraint is natural and strong, with a sense of social duty, able to receive and ready to give love, respect and trust. This is to a large extent in the parents' gift. Social behaviour is learned.[138]

Where the 1974 speech from which that passage derives becomes interesting for freedom, though, is when, later on, Joseph referred to thrift, family strength and self-discipline as 'the cement of society'.[139] But in the same year, at Birmingham's Grand

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[136] 'Joseph, Fairley Hill, Luton (03/10/1974)', p. 5; Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1967 to 1970, Roy Jenkins spearheaded a range of reforms in the 1960s, including laws liberalising divorce, homosexuality and abortion. As such, and as one of Jenkins' biographers notes, Jenkins was 'demonised by conservatives as the godfather of the permissive society'. See J. Campbell, *Roy Jenkins* (London, 2015), p. 2. The speech to which Joseph was referring is most probably Jenkins' July 1969 speech in Abingdon, in which Jenkins stated that a better term than "permissive society" was "civilised society".
[137] 'Extract from a Speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Leeds North East, and Conservative Spokesman on Industry with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking at Middleton and Prestwich at a public meeting on Tuesday, 17th April 1979 at 7.30pm – Keep the law or be punished', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 1.
[138] 'Joseph, Fairley Hill, Luton (03/10/1974)', p. 6.
[139] 'Joseph, Fairley Hill, Luton (03/10/1974)', p. 10.

Hotel, Sir Keith spoke of how freedom 'begins with self-discipline'.[140] Presuming only the slightest consistency between these two speeches (both given in the same year), we can say that if, then, freedom began with self-discipline, which was in turn society's cement, we have reason to think of freedom as inextricably rooted in the social order. The drunkenness, vagrancy and vandalism that those who railed against an "unjust society" or "authority" promoted was, Joseph at the Grand Hotel said, 'the very opposite of freedom', while in seeking to end parental choice in education and healthcare, socialists Joseph insisted had set out to erode 'self-discipline and real freedoms'.[141] Little wonder therefore that Joseph believed that 'the Communist societies ha[d] failed to generate freedom'.[142] Freedom in the United Kingdom just as much as in Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China was for Joseph something to be nurtured and sustained. It was thoroughly social and not a given. Which would have likely come as news to some.

One need only acknowledge the writings and speeches of Ian Gilmour or Harold Macmillan to recognise that resistance to Thatcherism was not the preserve of that ideology's social democratic adversaries. While the categories of "Wets" and "Dries" were created by members of the second of those groupings, many of the individuals allocated to the former camp, by way of their public statements, lent credence to the trench which they were allocated and the no-man's-land that supposedly lay between them and the Thatcherites. Of what has been said of Hattersley however, much the same can be said of some of the Thatcherites' self-declared conservative critics. Step forward Roger Scruton, whose 1980 *The Meaning of Conservatism* launched a potent philosophical salvo at what its author identified as the betrayal by the free marketeers of traditional Tory values. Among a number of targets, that text takes aim at what its author believed to be a naïve view of liberty, behind which Scruton's Conservative contemporaries had thrown their weight. The party of which Joseph was a member, Scruton maintained, had taken on the mantle of the defender of freedom against the state, as a result of which it had adopted 'the principal enemy of conservatism, the philosophy of liberalism with all its attendant trappings of individual autonomy and the 'natural' rights of man'.[143] Theirs was a wholly abstract, negative conception, in opposition to which was conjured a totalitarian menace. As set down by Scruton, for the conservative, who yearns above all to be governed, freedom is the product of man's social condition. It is unfeasible except in relation to the institutions which make it possible. Those institutions, as well as the history and culture to which man is subordinate, are thus the precondition of his

[140] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 7.
[141] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', pp. 7-8.
[142] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 12.
[143] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 16.

liberty.[144] But, as we have just seen, this view of freedom is not all that distant from Joseph's. What Scruton castigated was akin to what Joseph at Birmingham and Luton in 1974 deemed a 'facile rhetoric' of what in the former speech he called 'absolute liberty' and in the latter 'total liberty'.[145] Conversely, both men conceived of freedom as grounded in the social order.

As depicted in *The Meaning of Conservatism*, unlike the liberal nemesis, the true conservative does not value freedom for its own sake. This chapter has argued that the same was true of Joseph, who invested in freedom because of the return it provided in the form of organic change. It is unclear how freedom relates to the conservative core – assuming that, as a committed conservative, its author had one - in the works of Scruton, for whom the import of freedom (in *The Meaning* at least) is found in its subjection to authoritative government.[146] More important than freedom, let alone the abstract conception after which the liberal strives, was for Scruton the authority of settled institutions and ways of being.[147] Government is not a means to the extension of freedom, as it could be for Joseph (in helping to extend choice and maximise individuals' independence and capacities). It is an end in and of itself. Real freedom is thus to be found in allegiance, as exemplified by the individual's immersion in the corporate life of the family.[148] The autonomous, idealised and ahistorical individual of the liberal imagination is no real individual at all.[149] Devoid of a philosophy of human nature, the free man for the liberal is according to Scruton a mere individualistic chooser.[150] He is a utility maximiser who values nothing and whose apparent autonomy is thereby meaningless.[151] 'Anarchy (which is freedom from the sense of a public realm) is not the gain of individuality, but its loss'.[152] Scruton thus comes across as more change-averse than Joseph, who, as we will shortly see, favoured sweeping institutional change. Their differences notwithstanding though, that Scruton could share common ground with Joseph, and yet not recognise it, serves nonetheless to narrow the chasm that he determined as lying between them, as well as to underscore the great extent to which, for conservatives like them, having an essentially reactionary and non-rationalist

[144] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 19.
[145] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 7; 'Joseph, Fairley Hill, Luton (03/10/1974)', p. 5.
[146] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 19.
[147] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, pp. 18-19.
[148] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 35.
[149] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 73.
[150] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 120.
[151] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, pp. 72-73.
[152] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, p. 73.

ideology, much in the way of their contributions to politics was and is still liable to be based on misreadings of that which they were reacting against.

Conforming to a stereotypically Burkean mould, Joseph thus believed in what we might call ordered liberty.[153] Indeed, in both his 1975 speech on the quest for common ground and *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, he referred to freedom and order as 'not antagonistic' but 'complementary'.[154] In a similar vein, in his contribution to *Freedom and Order* in the same year, Sir Keith called social stability 'the secure basis of freedom', and something that had been too readily dismissed.[155] Joseph, it ought here to be recognised, was throughout the 1970s preoccupied with the need for order, whether in relation to freedom or otherwise. For example, speaking at the annual Conservative education conference in 1975, he counterposed the '[i]llegal disruption of ordered life', prosecuted by strikers, with the imperative in his own mind for 'the re-establishment of sane economic order'.[156] But however prominent its position in Joseph's political thought, and no matter how great its pull on freedom, order and its place in Joseph's ideological morphology must not distract from freedom's other liaisons therein. Order was far from freedom's only neighbour, as Joseph went on to emphasise in *Freedom and Order* when he said that:

> freedom cannot stand alone. Freedom is not secure while many feel that their society is not just, that effort and talent do not win their proper reward, that rights are not respected, that not everyone has a fair chance – or a second chance where needs be. A sense of justice is an essential ingredient in social solidarity and order. I shall argue that we have gone dangerously far in undermining this at both ends.[157]

What is so striking about this passage is not so much the fact that Joseph believed that freedom, justice, and the like were interdependent (circumstances

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[153] Burke wrote that liberty absent of virtue was 'the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness, without tuition or restraint': Burke, 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', p. 247. For a more recent argument for ordered liberty, see S. Gregg, *On Ordered Liberty: A Treatise on the Free Society* (Oxford, 2003), which argues for an 'integral liberty' (p. 9).

[154] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 16; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 33.

[155] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 8.

[156] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH Bt MP (LEEDS NE) Conservative Spokesman for Policy and Research speaking at the Annual Conservative Education Conference at Conservative Central Office, London SW1 on Saturday 21 June 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 82, p. 4.

[157] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 8.

allowing, Joseph might also have included equality on his list), but his thinking that their fruition relied on people's sense of or feeling for those concepts having been actualised. And this looks to have been part of a wider pattern. Recall from the previous chapter Joseph's belief that the rule of law 'in accord[ance] with *a* [current author's emphasis] natural justice' was 'necessary to freedom and to democracy'.[158] To return specifically to freedom, Joseph's belief that that concept relied on a particular social order formed partly of a series of sentiments is suggestive of not only the pliant nature of Sir Keith's wider morphology, but also, taken alongside the evidence marshalled in the previous section, indicates the broadly republican nature of freedom in Joseph's political thought, for as one of republicanism's most prominent advocates, Pettit, remarks, '[t]he association of freedom with subjective and often intersubjective status – the association of freedom with a feeling of independence and immunity – goes back a long way in the republican tradition' – a tradition supposedly indigenous to modern Britain.[159]

Foote argues that, after 1956 and in response to a corporatist post-war consensus, there re-emerged on the Left and Right in Britain 'a near-dormant republican tradition', a tradition which had been overrun by politicians' concern for the social issues of economics and class.[160] He says that republicanism's 'mother principle' is 'to be found in […] active political participation, which is not necessarily democratic [in the sense of universal adult suffrage]', but which did 'constitute […] republican liberty, in the sense of self-government'.[161] Republicanism thus provided for active, self-governing citizens participating in a communitarian polity, in the style of the Athenian assembly and the Florentine republic.[162] This participation in the political nation was the condition for liberty and turned subjects into citizens. '[I]t was an indispensable condition of civic virtue, in which the citizen could act to his full capacity in the political life of the community for the common good', and stood in contrast 'to the liberal conception of individual autonomy from public affairs'.[163] Foote cites the conservatives Maurice Cowling, Diane Spearman and Angus Maude as republican political thinkers of this kind, the first of whom struck out against Hayek's supposedly rationalist, "book-learnt" conception of liberty.[164] If the essence of republicanism is '[p]articipation in government

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[158] 'Joseph, Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark (21/06/1978)', p. 1.
[159] P. Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford, 1997), p. 71.
[160] G. Foote, *The Republican Transformation of Modern British Politics* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 1-2.
[161] Foote, *The Republican Transformation*, p. 5.
[162] Foote, *The Republican Transformation*, p. 6.
[163] Foote, *The Republican Transformation*, p. 7.
[164] Despite what Cowling might have thought, intriguingly, Gamble has written as to how, '[t]o be fully effective, a Hayekian market order has to be more than just a system

through active citizenship', though, then Joseph was not a republican of the sort Foote describes.[165] Foote's is however only one of two major interpretations of republicanism. It is republicanism as civic humanism, which one of its principal interpreters, Pocock, thinks 'denotes a style of thought […] in which it is contended that the development of the individual towards self-fulfillment is possible only when the individual acts as a citizen, that is as a conscious and autonomous participant in an autonomous decision-taking political community, the polis or republic'.[166] On this interpretation, civic virtue and political participation are good in and of themselves.

But there is another, so-called 'neo-roman' interpretation of republicanism, according to which virtue and participation, though important, are ultimately instrumental to liberty, and in which Joseph sits rather more comfortably. As described by Pettit, to be free in this mould of republicanism is 'to be in a position where no one can interfere arbitrarily in your affairs'.[167] Freedom is therefore non-domination.[168] More significantly, like Joseph's understanding of freedom, it:

> fits on neither side of the now established positive-negative dichotomy. This conception is negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others, not necessarily the presence of self-mastery, whatever that is thought to involve. The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something more than the absence of interference, in particular against interference on an arbitrary basis.[169]

If Joseph did not think that citizens need exist in a community of action (a community central to Foote's interpretation of British republicanism), he can nonetheless

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of voluntary exchange. It has also to be a political order, a *republic* [current author's emphasis], which requires the education of its citizens in the necessity and desirability of a market order so they will maintain and cherish it and refrain from actions and policies that might damage or weaken it': A. Gamble, 'Hayek and Liberty', *Critical Review*, 2013 25/3-4, p. 354. 'Only if the right kind of state and the right kind of citizens could be created and sustained was there hope for a stable order of liberty' (p. 344).

[165] Foote, *The Republican Transformation*, p. 7.

[166] J. G. A. Pocock, 'Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought', in his *Politics, Language, and Time* (London, 1989), p. 85.

[167] Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 107.

[168] Pettit gives the example of Nora in Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, who is in her marriage to Torval – the master of the house, and in possession of legal prerogatives - unfree, even though her husband is (initially) well-meaning: P. Pettit, *Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World* (London, 2014), pp. xv-xvi. Torval is a 'doorkeeper' to Nora's choices, and has the arbitrary power to close the door to his wife's choices if he so wishes (p. 42).

[169] Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 51.

be seen to have adhered to a republican (neo-roman) conception of liberty according to which that concept entails a (felt) structural independence. His thinking on liberty entailed, as Joseph said, not only freedom from external restraints, but men of independent means. This was broadly what Pettit has called 'an idiom of freedom in which enslavement and subjection are the great ills, independence and status the supreme goods'.[170] Thus Joseph and Sumption declared that '[l]iberty is liberty, not something else. And the slave is a slave; you do not set him free by feeding him'.[171] This motif, of freedom in contradistinction with slavery, recurs in many of Joseph's public speeches and writings, such as Sir Keith's 1992 pamphlet on the social market, in which its author asserted that 'when we speak of prosperity and full employment we do not mean the prosperity and employment of slaves. We mean the prosperity of free men'.[172] For Joseph as for those in the classical republican canon, this freedom does not necessitate total security of the sort that Joseph rejected when he rebuffed the idea of a right to a job. States, nations and individuals, Skinner argues, remain in the republican sense 'free if and only if they are similarly unconstrained from using their powers according to their own wills in pursuit of their desired ands. Free states, like free persons, are thus defined by their capacity for self-government'.[173] Individuals should thus be able to make the most of their capacities, no more and no less.

Like Sir Keith's liberalism (that is, Joseph's support for a free market and free society), Joseph's republicanism was a subsidiary of his conservatism. Joseph was a conservative first, and a liberal and republican second. Republicanism in Joseph's political thought pertains to one concept, freedom, and not to the broader ideological structure in which that concept was housed. It does so in two main ways. We have already touched on the first, which is Sir Keith's decontesting of freedom itself. Joseph belongs in a republican tradition inasmuch as freedom for him approximated to independence and a subjective status. The second way in which Joseph can be labelled a republican, however, lies in the routes he proposed to that conceptualisation of freedom. One of the means to that end, for Joseph as for classical republican thinkers, was via the state. On Pettit's account, republican government 'bears […] on what it is necessary for

[170] Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 132; A slave with a benevolent master is still a slave, and therefore still unfree (Pettit, *Just Freedom*, p. 28). True, Berlin asserts that positive liberty can mean that 'I am slave to no man' (Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 132), but the point of this analysis in many ways is to say that republican liberty captures Joseph's thinking on freedom more succinctly than does the idea of Sir Keith as sitting somewhere in the middle of a spectrum with negative liberty at one end and positive liberty at the other.

[171] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 52.

[172] Joseph, *The Social Market*, p. 6.

[173] Q. Skinner, *Liberty Before Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 25-26.

the state to do in fostering the independence – the socioeconomic independence – of each individual person. To be independent in the intended sense is to have the wherewithal to operate normally and properly in our society without having to beg or borrow from others, and without having to depend on their beneficence. It is […] to have the basic capabilities that are required for functioning in the local culture'.[174] What Pettit calls capabilities are analogous to what Joseph termed capacities – capacities which, as the previous section of this chapter argued, Sir Keith thought the state had a role in assuring.[175] Besides the state, political virtues and a mixed constitution have also traditionally been thought of in the republican canon as safeguards of liberty. The remainder of this section argues that Joseph, as is natural for a conservative, promoted the rule of law (a tributary for the extra-volitional, including an extra-human natural justice) in response to rationalist incursions, and that hence, in its relation to the law, freedom for him was once again conceived so as to be a handmaiden to the conservative core. In so doing, what remains of this chapter also uncovers Joseph's plans for a constitution revised to protect the rule of law and, in turn, freedom, aligning Sir Keith with a republicanism which 'requires not just the absence of arbitrary interference but the absence of capacities for arbitrary interference'.[176] This final leg thus buttresses the case for seeing freedom in Joseph's ideology as both an adjacent concept and republican.

Like the concept of the market covered in the following chapter, the rule of law in Sir Keith's political thought resembles a fleshing out of the otherwise abstract idea of the extra-human origins of the social order – that is, broadly speaking, of "the natural" - to which, crucially, freedom was subordinate. Thus Joseph emphasised 'the rule of law as it grew up in preceding centuries' and, in the same 1975 speech, described the same concept as a 'birthright'.[177] In contrast with which, it is surely significant that Sir Keith described those 'who regard[ed] the rule of law as dispensable' as being involved in the supremely volitional act of 'social engineering', and likewise that he resisted 'the law […] becoming a party-political football'.[178] As was his wont, Joseph couched the rule of law in methodological individualism, as when he said that 'the rule of law begins with the

[174] Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 158.
[175] Pettit nods towards the potential for a range of government intervention, of the kind that Joseph left room for in his reference to 'extra independence': '[a]s society has become more complex, and as the demands of successful social living have multiplied, so the standard necessary for assured access to a decent quality of life – the standard necessary for socioeconomic independence – has risen too'. See Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 158.
[176] Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 276.
[177] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 5, 3.
[178] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 2, 11.

individual, because individuals are real, whereas society is an abstraction'.[179] But whatever Joseph meant by 'begins with', there can be little doubt in view of the previously-cited statements of his that he did not mean that the rule of law was devised by individuals. With respect to the focal point of this chapter, and with the rule of law's extra-human underpinnings in mind, it is telling that Joseph described not freedom but freedom under the law as the 'most basic element of political life', and that he thought it 'indispensable for freedom […] that the rule of law should prevail'.[180] This, let it be said, was freedom in the negative sense, as freedom from coercion. At Doncaster racecourse in 1977, Joseph said that people had 'the right […] to go about their lawful business *free from intimidation* [current author's italics]', and this, he implied, was what the rule of law entailed – a sentiment that Joseph reiterated in his 1978 speech on equality and inequality, when he commented how '[a] system of law is essential to all members of society for their own protection'.[181] If organic change occurred via individuals' free choices therefore, then alongside the market and individuals' rights, the rule of law was another mediator that made such change organic.

This understanding, of the extra-human as a denizen of the rule of law, can be inferred from Joseph's Hayekian distinction between law and legislation.[182] The latter was volitional and to be restrained, while the former was extra-volitional and to be fostered. Thus Joseph in 1975 cried: '[m]ore will mean worse. Cut down legislation and save the law'.[183] It was no good hoping that politicians might observe self-restraint however; the problem, Joseph thought, required systemic change. MPs could not keep at

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[179] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 4.
[180] 'Westminster – BBC2 – Week Review/Year Review Intro – 1/8/75', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 38, p. 2; 'Joseph, Cathedral Church of St. Saviour, Southwark (21/06/1978)', p. 1.
[181] 'Joseph, Doncaster Racecourse Restaurant (24/06/1977)', p. 3; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 9.
[182] Hayek distinguished law as 'nomos' from legislation as 'thesis' (Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, p. 121). Law is not invented, and provides for impersonal and abstract general rules which, unlike specific commands, are not ends-oriented. Absent the rule of law, government would no longer be limited or 'determined by pre-established rules' (Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 86). Hayek wrote that '[t]he Rule of Law […] implies limits to the scope of legislation: it restricts it to the kind of general rules known as formal law, and excludes legislation either directly aimed at particular people, or at enabling anybody to use the coercive power of the state for the purpose of such discrimination' (Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 87). The difference between law and legislation was thus that between signposts and commands as to where to drive (Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 78). Hence the Rule of Law Hayek thought preserved equality before the law ('the opposite of arbitrary government'), the both of which were 'incompatible […] with any activity of the government deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of different people' (Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 82).
[183] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 10.

bay a 'flood of legislation' that was different in degree and kind to that which previous generations had faced.[184] Indeed, it was because he thought that Parliament had evolved to become a 'legislative factory', and had abnegated its role as '"a High Court"' and guardian of the rule of law, that Joseph, speaking to the Society of Conservative Lawyers in 1975, sought constitutional change in order to amend what he himself called '[t]he doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty', by which was meant the idea, supreme since 1688, 'that Parliament can lawfully do whatever it is physically practicable to do', and which equated in effect, Joseph said, to the sovereignty of the Executive.[185] One of a number of constitutional innovations that Joseph advanced in the mid-to-late 1970s, alongside support for 'a constitutional limit on taxation' (on income and property, so as to protect individual rights), his proposed 'Bill of Rights would provide a self-imposed restraint on Parliament. It would subject Parliament to the rule of law'.[186] Joseph advocated for such a charter in two of his 1975 public speeches especially, at the Royal Festival Hall and the Waldorf Hotel respectively, and found allies for his proposals in such luminaries as the Lord Chief Justice Hewart, Lord Justice Scarman, and Lord Hailsham.[187] He suggested that this declaration might require different majorities for different parliamentary functions. Significant change he believed 'would surely need parliamentary majorities reflecting a majority of the nation'.[188] In addition to which, the courts could be allowed to strike down those statutes that they held to be invalid, with a new constitutional court amounting to 'a supreme court of the United Kingdom charged with the duty of protecting the Constitution' determining whether or not legislation accorded with the Bill of Rights.[189] The division of powers would thus be laid out.[190]

Initially, such constitutional innovations as these look for all the world like feats of the rationalist imagination. They were in the context of 1970s Britain, on the Oakeshottian view of things, possible but not actual, and unknown instead of familiar. Joseph's view was to have out with the old and in with what Sir Keith himself called an altogether 'new constitutional settlement' – a far cry from the immemorial and

[184] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 10.
[185] 'Extract from a speech by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt M.P. (Leeds NE) the Opposition Spokesman for Policy and Research speaking to the Society of Conservative Lawyers at the Waldorf Hotel, London on Monday 17 March 1975', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 80, p. 6, 3-4.
[186] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 10, 12.
[187] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 9; See Q. Hogg, *New Charter* (London, 1969).
[188] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 12.
[189] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 6, 12.
[190] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 11.

customary constitution of Burke's.[191] Sir Keith's citing in particular of the French 'system of administrative law, under which the executive is not allowed to be judged in its own cause' as inspiration for what he hoped might be the courts' new role cannot help but put one in mind of the abstract blueprints that conservatives supposedly disavow.[192] In spite of all of which, Joseph's proposals can only be thought of as un-conservative if conservatism is seen to be the defence of status quos (see the Conclusion, which attends to the work of Samuel P. Huntington and to positional theories of conservatism), or if, for the conservative, all change need be organic. If though conservative ideology concerns the defence, as it did for Joseph, of that which is deemed "natural" and the change which nature allows for, then a new-fangled Bill of Rights would be permissible if its purpose was, as it was for Joseph, to secure the extra-human origins of the social order and/or organic change. At the Royal Festival Hall in 1975, Joseph remarked how, '[t]o maintain a just society, we must preserve the rule of law', and this he believed could be achieved via 'a new settlement […] to replace that of 1689'.[193] Here again we can see Freeden's typology come into its own: a radical change in policy (a constitutional innovation) at the periphery is proposed in order to bolster an adjacent concept (the rule of law), which is in turn rolled out in defence of the core. The use of 'just' in this instance is remarkable, because we already know that Joseph believed that the rule of law ought to accord with prevailing conceptions of natural justice. Sir Keith's belief that a Bill of Rights would ensure that 'a bare majority in Parliament' could not assault individual rights is similarly noteworthy, as we saw earlier how, having its basis in the extra-human, for Joseph, a certain kind of right worked to promote organic change, and people were free to do this or that insofar as they had the right to do so.[194]

Joseph acknowledged that there were faults with a written constitution, like 'a perpetual temptation to litigation', as in the United States.[195] By contrast with which, as in 1940, the sovereignty of Parliament allowed for mass mobilisation at short notice.[196] Now more than then, Joseph thought, emergency powers might well be required, 'and it is not really conceivable that judges should be burdened with the duty of deciding whether the political circumstances in any given case justify the use of such powers'.[197] More relevant to this thesis, Joseph conceded that codified rights had the potential to frustrate change. He claimed that 'those who try to lay down fundamental rights for ever

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[191] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 12; J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 367.
[192] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 13.
[193] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 12.
[194] 'Joseph, CPC Conference, Royal Festival Hall (26/01/1975)', p. 12.
[195] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 7.
[196] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 8.
[197] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 8.

are guilty of the presumption of trying to legislate for posterity'.[198] Bearing in mind the overlap identified in the following chapter between conservatism as theorised by Freeden and what Joseph called Conservatism, it is telling that Sir Keith referred to how the architects of declarations of rights 'ignore the essentially Conservative truth that it is necessary to adapt principles and institutions to changing circumstances'.[199] In one sense of course, Joseph was via his proposal for a Bill of Rights abiding by the Conservative truth just detailed, in that he was advocating for an adaptation to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and to the relations between two institutions, namely Parliament and the courts. In another, and as he conceded, future change would be hamstrung by "legislating for posterity". Thus Joseph remarked at the Waldorf 'that the efficacy of law depends upon the willingness to obey it: if some constitutional Declaration of Rights sets out a perfect system which in fact proves an obstruction to the aspirations of the people, the people will overthrow it'.[200] He described how, alongside the (organic) change that people's aspirations facilitated, '[o]ur peace and stability is derived largely from the fact that we have not put our legislators in any such shackles'.[201]

Sir Keith faced a dilemma therefore. He could prioritise the extra-human origins of the social order (as exemplified in the rule of law) at the expense of organic change, or else leave the first of those concepts to suffer under 'an almost indefinite extension of public power' and the 'monstrous oppressions' that afflicted the British people.[202] In promoting a British Bill of Rights, Joseph chose the former option – to secure the extra-human origins of the social order, even if doing so meant hampering the potential for organic change. There is however a case for saying that securing the rule of law (and thereby also the extra-human origins of the social order) via a Bill of Rights would on Joseph's own terms and up to a point have benefited organic change. In addition to those rights which derived from man's nature, there was another, statutory series of rights, which likewise helped to demarcate liberty from licence. Joseph observed in 1975 that: '[i]n every civilised country some freedoms of individuals, are rightly limited by law. For generations the common law has given neighbours the right to demand that a nuisance be abated. On this concept of nuisance, a wide range of statutory duties and rights have been erected'.[203] These rights were not the natural ones that we attended to earlier, for the latter existed prior to society, whereas we have every reason to believe

[198] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 6.
[199] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 6.
[200] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 6.
[201] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 6.
[202] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 2 & 3-4.
[203] 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 11.

that the common law, on which such rights as the right to end a nuisance depended, was thoroughly social. Nor were they the rights that Joseph rejected outright, the ones doled out by politicians. Cognisant as we are that the (rule of) law (as opposed to legislation) was for Joseph an adjacent concept and therefore a substantiation of his core, it is not too far of a stretch to think that the protection of the rule of law by way of a charter of rights might also have permitted a form of organic change insofar as it would allow for the emergence of new rights like those which prohibited nuisance-making out of the common law. This, however, was not on Joseph's radar.

* * *

To recognise positive and negative liberty is not to endorse an apartheid. On Berlin's own admission, each of these two concepts asks a different question. While negative liberty asks '[w]hat is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by others', its positive counterpart enquires as to '[w]hat, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?'[204] According to Berlin, who Joseph invoked in support of his rebuke to 'freedom to', 'the two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap'.[205] Unlike Joseph, for the author of *Two Concepts of Liberty*, neither investigation requires an either-or response. Both variants of freedom are legitimate and necessary to a free society. Far from being mutually exclusive, the two are subject to 'haggling', an outlook Berlin articulated when he affirmed that: '[m]en are largely interdependent, and no man's activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. 'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'; the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others. 'Freedom for an Oxford don', others have been known to add, 'is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant''.[206] Berlin's preference was for negative liberty. Provided that it was not manifested in a normative, rationalist schema imposed upon a collectivity and instead represented a route to individual self-mastery, though, positive liberty for him was a 'valid universal goal'.[207]

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[204] Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', pp. 121-122.
[205] Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 122.
[206] Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 124.
[207] I. Berlin, 'Introduction', in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, 1969), p. xlvii; Berlin's fear was that positive liberty had been and could again be elided with rational action derived from rational knowledge, a possible cover for totalitarianism. Positive liberty was reasonable, however, so long as it had nothing to do with what people ought "rationally" to want. See Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', pp. 132-134.

This chapter has argued that Joseph was a haggler. Having begun by noting his professed devotion to negative liberty and rejection of positive liberty, the first section of this chapter analysed Joseph's understanding of freedom as it related to the negative side of the aisle. At base, freedom for Joseph was indeed non-coercion, an upshot of which was equality of opportunity, an adjacent concept, an embodiment of the core conservative concept of organic change, and organic because of its neutrality. Next, and in the same section, this chapter argued that what held liberty in check and stopped it from sliding into license were the natural (extra-human) rights of the individual, including their right to equality of opportunity. Hence freedom was of service insofar as it furnished Joseph's core concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. But non-constraint was not freedom's only contribution, and the second section of this chapter unearthed Joseph's conception of freedom as necessitating independence, an idea which, for Sir Keith, was grounded in material means. The free market was crucial in this respect. Yet this chapter also contended that government had an important role to play in, for example, extending the availability of choice and maximising people's natural capacities. It noted how the binary that Joseph erected of negative versus positive freedom begins to erode once we appreciate that for him, even if they were not synonymous, freedom seemed to rely on the individual's powers. This in turn led to a consideration of conservative approaches to government. What Joseph's attitude towards freedom and the capacities and powers on which that concept relied indicates is that for Sir Keith, as a conservative Conservative, the state's size and role depended on the perceived vitality of civil society and, at one remove, on the health of the organic change and extra-human origins of the social order via which civil society found form, in much the same way in which Green describes Conservatism's attitude to the state.

The first two sections of this chapter thus broke down Joseph's proposed dichotomy, to reveal Sir Keith as holding to a conception of freedom that conformed neither wholly to negative nor to positive liberty as defined by Berlin. Negative freedom provided the groundwork for organic change. But Joseph was willing to countenance government intervention so as to maximise individuals' natural (extra-human) capacities, the present author supposed, in order that there could be as much organic change as possible. Off the back of which, the third and final section of this chapter (re)emphasised the great extent to which freedom existed in a state of mutual dependence alongside other concepts, including not only the natural rights examined earlier, but order and a natural justice too. In its reliance on not only those concepts, but on the citizen's sense of their realisation, freedom in Joseph's ideological morphology was both an outpouring of an immensely pliable conservative core and went a long way towards transcending the continuum of positive and negative liberty altogether,

amounting to a third way in the form of a republican liberty, of freedom as non-domination. Moreover, by examining Joseph's plans for a revised constitution (by way of which Joseph hoped to save the rule of law, the natural justice on which the rule of law depended, freedom, which he couched in the extra-human rule of law, and by extension his core), the latter half of the third section of this chapter emphasised Joseph's republican bent, as well as the great extent to which conservatives can be dedicated to their core concepts rather than their peripheral ones, at the possible expense of even long-established traditions. The sum of these parts has been to show that freedom for Joseph was not an end in and of itself, but was a retainer to his core concepts, organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. The following chapter goes one step further and demonstrates how the free market, crucial as it was to freedom, held a similar position for Joseph.

Chapter Four: The Market

The conservatism of what Joseph labelled his and the Conservative Party's Conservatism is attested by Sir Keith having described the Conservatives as 'a party of change'. 'We accept that human institutions must evolve', Joseph said in 1975. Having itself been changing for three hundred years, his party believed in understanding and 'working with change', a task that necessitated 'patience, intellectual humility, ability to understand the wisdom of events'.[1] That he elsewhere described what he called '[t]he traditional Tory approach' as 'more organic' than socialists' rejection of the market and laissez-faire liberals' worshipping of it represents a conservative correlate to the Conservative acceptance of change just described.[2] That approach was in evidence in Leeds in 1974 when Sir Keith recommended that governments should 'find organic ways of facilitating growth of working with the grain in the economy'. 'We need', he said, 'to understand where the resources are being misused, why they are being misused, and how they can be freed for uses which generate higher economic potential'.[3] Such was the prominence of this way of thinking in Joseph's politics that, as the previous chapter showed, it gave Sir Keith pause for thought when he looked to be going off the conservative piste. It was an 'essentially Conservative truth that it is necessary to adapt principles and institutions to changing circumstances', Joseph remarked, in a rebuttal of his own position of disregarding the sovereignty of Parliament in favour of a British Declaration of Rights. That 'those who try to lay down fundamental rights for ever are guilty of the presumption of trying to legislate for posterity' was he conceded one argument against his own position.[4] All of this - Sir Keith's understanding, voiced consistently over a number of years, of the Conservative Party's role in fostering what we might be so bold as to call organic change - touches on the centrality of that conception of change in Joseph's political thought.

Sir Keith thought that the Tories were a party of change in large part because change was for him as a Tory pivotal to his politics. Everything was change and, it does not seem too much to say that, for Joseph, change was everything. By which is meant that change was conceptually central to Sir Keith's ideology and as a matter of fact, according to Joseph, all-pervasive. A font of endless change in Joseph's political thought was this chapter's focal point. In *Conditions for Fuller Employment* the market economy

[1] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 2.
[2] 'Extract from an article by Sir Keith JOSEPH Bt MP (Leeds NE) Conservative Spokesman for Home Affairs, for the London University Conservative Association Magazine (11 February 1975) – Tories and the Market Economy', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 79, p. 1.
[3] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 16.
[4] 'Joseph, Waldorf Hotel, London (17/03/1975)', p. 6.

was said to be a site of 'endless change and adaptation'.[5] Sir Keith assures the reader of that text that producers could not afford to rest on their laurels due to the fact that '[c]onsumers change their demands because of changing income, fashion, awareness, taste, invention, innovation, advertising and cannot be prevented from changing except by the coercion practiced in socialist societies'.[6] It was this change in consumption, as well as in supply and demand more broadly, which meant that some unemployment was inevitable.[7] Unsurprisingly therefore, Sir Keith remarked in 1978 at the Royal Commonwealth Society how human adaptability was required in order that the labour market work effectively. Such adaptation might entail 'new skills, different hours, moving house, new responsibilities, new jobs, perhaps starting a business'.[8] Thus change begat change.

Joseph deferred to the market as a source of change and was a custodian of said change. It is this which makes Sir Keith's decontestation of the market such a worthy testing-ground for the argument, developed throughout the course of this thesis, that Joseph was a conservative, and that his favoured, superficially liberal concepts (such as negative freedom and indeed the free market) rode in the slipstream of his and conservatism's core concepts, the extra-human origins of the social order and a particular kind of change. In spite of his declaration to the effect that 'the prevention of change, the attempt to freeze employment and population distribution in patterns generated in the past, make things worse not better', Sir Keith did not approve of every and all change.[9] He often spoke of one thing or another, as he put it in 1975, 'moving under its own momentum'.[10] This was not always a positive description, even if it often could be, as when Joseph spoke positively about how British society since the Victorian age had progressed under its own momentum.[11] Thus Sir Keith insisted that, 'when false ideas are allowed to dominate the facts, they create their own momentum'.[12] A year

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[5] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 8.
[6] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 5.
[7] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 11.
[8] 'Summary and Extract from a speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), the Opposition Spokesman for Industry, speaking to the Bow Group at the Royal Commonwealth Society, Northumberland Avenue, WC2, on Thursday, 24th August 1978 – Conditions for Fuller Employment', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 3.
[9] 'Extract from a Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph BT MP (Leeds NE) Opposition Spokesman with Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research for Policy and Research speaking to the Cathcart Conservative Association at the Albany Hotel, Glasgow on Wednesday 7th May [1975] – Job Saving – An Optical Illusion', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 81, p. 2.
[10] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 2.
[11] See Chapter One.
[12] 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', p. 7.

later and with regard to the nationalised industries, Joseph similarly referred to what he believed would be 'a self-perpetuating change, unless we step in to reverse it. For the burden is so heavy that the process would continue by its own momentum even were it not accelerated by further nationalisation measures which turn profitable firms into losers'.[13] It was because he believed that there was no state of rest in either of these cases (that of false ideas or of the nationalised industries) that Sir Keith advocated radical intervention, stating in 1975 as to how the Establishment "Left's" critics on the supposed "Right" believed in 'a radical programme for reducing the activity of the State, not just stopping its expansion, for it has reached the point at which it has acquired a self-propelling force'.[14] This was clearly felt to mark a different approach to the one previously undertaken by the Conservatives, which had been subject to the very process that its proposed successor was devised to prevent: whereas socialist governments had moved the ratchet forward as quickly as was politic, by contrast, the Conservatives, Joseph complained, had allowed things to 'move on under their own momentum'.[15]

The changes described in the previous paragraph were for the worse. This might be an issue, were one of conservatism's core concepts mere change, rather than organic change. Bourke describes Freeden's definition of conservatism as 'involv[ing] an intellectual commitment to the prudent management of change'. It may well be true that 'this criterion applies to reforming liberalism and socialism', too.[16] But Freeden's and this thesis' argument is not that the prudent management of change is the exclusive preserve of conservatives.[17] It is that *organic* change is an *ineliminable* aspect of conservatism, without which that ideology would be unrecognisable. That the critic in question makes reference to their reforming varieties, rather than to socialism and liberalism in the round, makes all the difference. We can only presume therefore that the change Joseph opposed, surveyed in the previous paragraph, was for him inorganic. But why might this be so? The answer to that question lies in Sir Keith's understanding of the extra-human. Off the back of the preceding introductory analysis, this chapter will first look to organic change's companion in conservatism, those extra-human origins of the social order, to reaffirm how change was made organic in Joseph's eyes by it having

[13] Extract from the Stockton Lecture by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH Bt, MP., (Leeds NE), Conservative Spokesman with overall responsibility for policy and research, speaking at the London Graduate School of Business Studies, Sussex Place, Regents Park on Thursday 15 January 1976', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 8.
[14] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 4.
[15] Joseph*, Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 21.
[16] R. Bourke, 'What is conservatism? History, ideology and party', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 17/4 (2018), p. 454.
[17] See Chapter One's argument for an epistemological post-war consensus.

originated in the extra-volitional – that is, in the "natural" and, in the case of the market in particular, in human nature, which was manifested in the adjacent concept of, most notably, self-interest. This first section thereby demonstrates how, for Joseph, the market was an effusion of his core concepts, but also that the particular market *system* that Joseph took up ideological arms in defense of relied on regulation. After which, the second section of this chapter lasers in on that which the extra-human was the origins of, the social order: it argues that Joseph conceived of the economic, including the market, as subordinate to society and social ends. And after that, section number three will bring both of conservatism's core concepts together in a study of Joseph's conception of the entrepreneur who, operating in the extra-human market, spurred on organic change. Broadly construed therefore, the first section of this chapter attends to Joseph's core, the second to (some of) Joseph's adjacent concepts, and the third one to Joseph's periphery. What these sections amount to is an argument that Joseph was in his view of the market a conservative, as opposed to the most plausible alternative, a neo-liberal.

Studies of neo-liberalism are frequently overshadowed by rather dreary debates as to what the subject of analysis actually is, as though neo-liberalism, like a pebble or a planet, were a natural kind, and not, as it surely ought to be thought, a word to define a concept. A number of those who use the term, most commonly in popular parlance, seem to take it upon themselves to be in the business of searching for something almost mythical – the conceptual equivalent of Big Foot.[18] In truth, our task, however short it may be for the purposes of the present analysis, is to pin down what neo-liberalism best refers to. This does not entail our having carte blanche, and ordinary language philosophy has a role to play in our comprehension of the concept. Clearly, neo-liberalism is best interpreted as having something to do with free markets, and it is for this reason that it is frequently lumped in alongside libertarianism, classical liberalism, and free market liberalism.[19] But there, or there abouts, consensus typically ends. Hence neo-liberalism has become an omnibus. It straddles the radical economic reforms advanced by the Chicago Boys in Pinochet's Chile, the broader revival of free market doctrines in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the original definition of neo-liberalism as the liberalism of the German Frieberg School.[20] Indeed, the scale of the definitional inexactitude surrounding the term is revealed in the finding that 69% of

[18] E. Conway, 'Sky Views: What is neoliberalism and why is it an insult?', *Sky News*, <https://news.sky.com/story/sky-views-what-is-neoliberalism-and-why-is-it-an-insult-11373031>, accessed 07/06/2018; W. Davies, 'The difficulty of 'neoliberalism'', *Political Economy Research Centre*, <https://www.perc.org.uk/project_posts/the-difficulty-of-neoliberalism/>, accessed 19/03/2019.
[19] Gamble, 'Economic Libertarianism', p. 405.
[20] Gamble, 'Neo-liberalism and fiscal conservatism', p. 57.

academic articles surveyed provided no definition of neo-liberalism whatsoever.[21] Though to be fair to the authors of those papers, had they attempted to do so, their provision of a stable definition would have been not nearly so difficult were it not for neo-liberalism's normativity and, in particular, use as a marker of hostility.[22] Neo-liberalism had by the final few decades of the twentieth century become imbued with distinctly negative connotations, especially in Latin America, where it described a kind of market fundamentalism - a transformation that can be dated to the experience of Pinochet's Chile following the 1973 coup.[23] The resulting definition is the one popularised by such writers as Naomi Klein and Noam Chomsky, the first of whom praised the American Senator and candidate in 2016 and 2020 for the Democratic Party nomination for the U.S. presidency, Bernie Sanders, for having 'broke[n] the spell' of neo-liberalism.[24] Alas therefore, this kind of first-order intervention is often as true of scholars as it is of activists. Hence writers in academic journals can advise that 'the left should abandon the concept of neoliberalism'.[25] Compounded by the input of those with overtly political agendas, the combined effect of neo-liberalism's differing definitions has been to make that -ism something close to an empty signifier. Neo-liberalism describes in a certain remit almost everything.

Ours is an unenviable position. Or it would be, were this thesis seeking to justify Joseph as a neo-liberal. While many of those who disparage marketisation revel in their use of "neo-liberalism", most of those who laud free markets ignore the term, and scholars of all stripes are left to scramble amongst a sea of conflicting definitions. Whether this in the long-term is a sustainable state of affairs is debatable.[26] Fortunately,

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[21] T. C. Boas and J. Gans-Morse, 'Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44 (2009), p. 142.
[22] J. McDonnell, 'Caught at a crossroads: it's time to build an alternative to neoliberalism', *New Statesman*, <https://www.newstatesman.com/business/economics/2016/11/caught-crossroads-its-time-build-alternative-neoliberalism>, accessed 04/05/2018; G. Monbiot, 'Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot>, accessed 12/10/2018.
[23] N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine* (London, 2007).
[24] 'Sanders "Broke the Spell" of Neoliberalism as Trump Pushes Covid-19 Capitalism', *Truthout*, <https://truthout.org/video/sanders-broke-the-spell-of-neoliberalism-as-trump-pushes-covid-19-capitalism/>, accessed 01/02/2021; N. Chomsky, *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and the Global Order* (London, 1999); The Adam Smith Institute is peculiar for having embraced the term 'neo-liberal': 'Coming Out as Neoliberals', *Adam Smith Institute*, <https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/coming-out-as-neoliberals>, accessed 16/03/2018.
[25] B. Dunn, 'Against neoliberalism as a concept', *Capital and Class*, 41/3 (2017), p. 435.
[26] T. Flew, 'Six theories of neoliberalism', *Thesis Eleven*, 122/1 (2014), p. 51.

this thesis' time-horizon is the short-term. As it relates to neo-liberalism, this chapter's argument is purely defensive. It surmises simply that if Joseph as much as Thatcher, Hayek and Friedman must be considered a neo-liberal, then neo-liberalism is best thought of as a set of discourses. It is not the first to do so. Apeldoorn and Overbeek think that what they call the neo-liberal project was 'characterized by a mix of liberal pro-market and supply-side discourses (laissez-faire, privatization, liberalization, deregulation, competitiveness)'.[27] A similar analysis is that of Jackson, who distinguishes neo-liberals like Lippmann from the network of neo-liberals – of Thatcherites and Hayekians, Reaganites and Friedmanites - that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, and whose 'doctrine' was more 'systematic' in its critique of the post-war Keynesian welfare state.[28] What Jackson calls 'left neo-liberalism' favoured not only the market but distributive justice and a broadly positive conception of freedom. That author thus speaks of how a plurality of indigenous political ideologies adopted neo-liberalism, such that 'there was never simply one current of neo-liberalism in British politics', the result of his showing of which is to complicate the idea of a simple New Right neo-liberal conquest over social democrats and One Nation conservatives.[29] This approach represents a satisfying middle ground between a definition of neo-liberalism as a distinct ideology and one that, as is sometimes the case on the rare occasion when neo-liberalism lacks an overtly negative valence, simply describes the capitalist status quo.

Readers would be forgiven for thinking of the above as little but semantics. Forgiven, but not vindicated, for the idea that Joseph was a neo-liberal conservative, as opposed to a neo-liberal, has a significant bearing on our comprehension of Sir Keith's political thought. The same is of course true of conservatism and liberalism, and this document would be a monument to folly if this were untrue. Indeed, this analysis is in a sense simply an extension of this thesis' broader argument: whereas this thesis argues in general against the idea that Joseph was a liberal, this chapter argues in particular against the idea that Sir Keith was a neo-liberal plain and simple. It is however because of the nature of the logic of neo-liberalism in accounts of neo-liberalism as a singular

[27] B. van Apeldoorn and H. Overbeek, 'Introduction: The Life Course of the Neoliberal Project and the Global Crisis', in their (Eds.) *Neoliberalism in Crisis* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2012), p. 5; The idea of neo-liberalism as constituting a distinct political project is a popular one. Harvey refers to how '[t]he neoliberal project is to disembed capital from [… such] constraints' as state ownership and planning, while Slobodian similarly refers to 'neoliberal globalism as an institution-building project'. See D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford, 2007), p. 11 and Q. Slobodian, *Globalists* (London, 2018), p. 283 respectively.

[28] B. Jackson, 'Currents of Neo-Liberalism: British Political Ideologies and the New Right, c.1955-1979', *The English Historical Review*, 131/551 (Aug., 2016), p. 824.

[29] Jackson, 'Currents of Neo-Liberalism', p. 849, 826.

ideology in its own right that a rescue mission in aid of Sir Keith Joseph is required.[30] The aforementioned logic is intimated in the neat encapsulation by Davies of neo-liberalism as 'the disenchantment of politics by economics', and is more heavily implied in that author's analysis of what he calls 'the logic of competition', according to which neo-liberalism takes competition to be society's supreme normative rationality and, as such, extends it beyond the confines of the traditional market sphere to, for example and as the rise of league tables and auditing at universities bears testament, educational reform.[31] Neo-liberalism is on this account exclusionary of conservatism. The neo-liberal cannot be a conservative as defined by this thesis. If Joseph were a neo-liberal of the kind described by Davies we would perhaps expect Sir Keith to promote the market both as a good in and of itself and at the expense of other concepts. There would at his core be no room for the organic change or the extra-human origins of the social order which this chapter argues, as this thesis has argued, were pivotal to Joseph's ideology.

The Extra-human Origins of the Social Order:

That which Joseph described as natural was characteristic of his core conservative concept of the extra-human origins of the social order, and Sir Keith construed change as organic when it was the product of those extra-human forces. The previous chapter argued that: what Joseph called natural rights were extra-human (unlike the rights distributed by governments); individuals had a natural right to, for example, equality of opportunity; equality of opportunity therefore provided for organic change. Like equality of opportunity, the free market in Joseph's political thought operated under the auspices of the social order's extra-human origins. Hence Joseph analogised the economic to the

[30] Stedman Jones includes Joseph as one of a number of '[n]eoliberal political symbols': D. Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2014), p. 17.
[31] W. Davies, *The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition* (London, 2014), p. 4; See also W. Davies, 'Populism and the Limits of Neoliberalism', *LSE*, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/30/essay-populism-and-the-limits-of-neoliberalism-by-william-davies/>, accessed 23/10/2017. Davies defines neo-liberalism more as an anti-political style of technocracy than the promotion of free markets; Other accounts bar Davies' argue that neo-liberalism prioritised liberty and/or the economic assertiveness of the free individual to the detriment of other "liberal" concepts. Jackson taps into the same idea in his remark as to how what he calls the neo-liberal think-tank archipelago 'diagnosed the fundamental problem as an excess of politics – by which they meant democratically authorised state coercion – over economics – by which they meant the use of the price mechanism to coordinate commercial activity in a non-coercive and maximally productive fashion'. See B. Jackson, 'The think-tank archipelago: Thatcherism and neo-liberalism', in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (Eds.), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 51.

natural. The decline of old jobs and the emergence of new ones he thought akin to 'the balance of nature, when death no less than regeneration is part of the life-cycle'.[32] In the same vein and the same year, this time in *Freedom and Order*, Joseph compared the laws of the market to those of physics, gravity and mechanics.[33] In much the same way in which governments had destroyed the balance of nature, Sir Keith added elsewhere in 1975, they had 'ha[d] destroyed the balance of the economy by crude intervention'.[34] The rise of some products and interests and the decline of others, moreover, was he said four years later a 'process of natural selection'.[35] Banking these examples, this section begins by focusing on one concept in particular which anchored the market in the natural in Joseph's political thought, and which features prominently in *Equality*. Joseph and Sumption defined what they termed the natural condition of mankind – that is, 'the social condition departures from which ought, in a political society, to be explained and justified' – as '[a] society of autonomous individuals'.[36] For them, "natural" referred to the characteristics that individuals have 'whether they live under governments or not', one of which was *self-interest*.[37]

Self-interest was natural. Joseph in 1975 called it one aspect of 'the drive for survival and self-perpetuation' which '[m]ankind brought with it from the state of nature'.[38] Four years later, he and Sumption wrote of how '[m]en are so constituted that it is natural to them to pursue private rather than public ends. This is a simple matter of observation'. More than that even: it was for them an 'immutable fact about human nature'.[39] Self-interest, *Equality* maintained, 'will be found in any society which man can devise'.[40] The reason given for this in that 1979 text is that:

> [n]o man can regard himself objectively. He cannot treat himself as the equal of every other man. He cannot put his own desires, which he experienced at first hand, after those of others which he observes at second or thirdhand. He cannot subordinate his own interests to those of others. If one allows for a handful of saints and ascetics, men have always put themselves first.[41]

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[32] 'Joseph, Cathcart Conservative Association, Glasgow (07/05/1975)', p. 2.
[33] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 20.
[34] 'Joseph, Annual Conservative Education Conference, London (21/06/1975)', p. 7.
[35] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 61.
[36] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 99-100.
[37] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 100.
[38] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 13.
[39] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 100.
[40] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 120-121.
[41] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 119; This of course ties into *Equality*'s argument against Rawls, covered in Chapter Two.

If self-interest was natural, though, it also cut both ways. It could lead to altruism as well as to selfishness. As regards the former, Joseph's definition of self-interest often bordered on the tautological, as when the authors of *Equality* remarked how '[e]very man who sacrifices his own material interest for that of the family, friends and fellow-men, is doing so for his own interest'.[42] Similarly, at the Oxford Union in 1975, Joseph maintained that '[l]eisure, esteem, freedom, security, convenience, self-betterment are no less foci for self-interest' than materialism.[43] Adam Smith was a touchstone in this respect. On the subject of individuals' striving for self-betterment, Joseph quoted the author of *The Wealth of Nations* approvingly in 1976: '[l]ike the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor'.[44] He also sang the Sage of Kirkcaldy's praises the following month, when Sir Keith quoted Smith's comment to the effect that we receive our daily bread thanks to the self-interest of the baker and not his benevolence.[45]

Like the market, and as part of human nature, self-interest was one of many adjacent concept which Joseph promoted in defence of his conservative core. Joseph intimated as much when he stated in 1975 that '[s]elf-interest is one of humanities' motors, which we ignore at our peril. It is complex'.[46] He described self-interest in the same year as being just one aspect of 'the drive for survival and self-perpetuation' that mankind held on to during its transition from the state of nature.[47] In *Equality*, Sir Keith and Sumption appeared to upgrade self-interest to the status of 'man's most fundamental trait'.[48] We have reason to believe that this had long been Joseph's view however. As far back as 1967, well before his supposed conversion and while serving as Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Trade and Power, Sir Keith stated as to how 'given only a recognition of human nature by our Government there is no trade rival whom we need fear'. In particular, he said that what the Wilson government needed to recognise was that '[t]he skills and enterprise latent in this country can be harnessed by self-interest within a framework of law and compassion and competition to give us the growing resources which we need for so many reasons'.[49] But in seeming to equate human nature and self-interest alone, this 1967 speech, as a window into Joseph's

[42] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 120.
[43] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 4.
[44] 'Joseph, International Monetary Conference, San Francisco (17/06/1976)', p. 12; By referencing 'animal life', this extract is also telling in gesturing towards the organic.
[45] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 7.
[46] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 4.
[47] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 13.
[48] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 120.
[49] 'Joseph, North-East Bristol Conservative Association Rally, Bristol (08/07/1967)', p. 6.

political thinking, provides only a partial view. *Equality* namechecks a whole host of traits as being due to human nature. One of which was envy. Human nature meant that people were less likely to consider the entrepreneur's benefits to the public good than they were the entrepreneur's benefits to the entrepreneur himself.[50] It also 'finds it hard to envy another for a way of life that the envier could never conceivably have had', and it was for this reason that the Queen was not envied.[51]

What self-interest was to the extra-human origins of the social order, luck was too. They were symptomatic of those origins, and hence Joseph consistently called them, alongside the concept of equality of opportunity featured in the previous chapter, "natural" or "neutral". Testament to their adjacent status, and to the swivel-mirror technique that made them thus, Joseph had luck and self-interest reflect his rationalist foe's assault. They were the conservative white to the rationalist black. For example, Sir Keith and Sumption called luck 'a neutral factor which cannot be either meritorious or objectionable. It is not a reason for political intervention in either direction. It is an irrelevance'.[52] But they seemingly only called luck an irrelevance because egalitarians, in seeking 'positive intervention […] to deprive them [people] of advantages which they owe to luck', sought to make it relevant.[53] More broadly, it was due to the fact, as *Equality*'s authors saw it, that egalitarians' 'quarrel [wa]s not with an economic system but with human nature itself' that Joseph and Sumption flagged up human nature, which self-interest in particular was characteristic of.[54] That pair thus went on to lament the 'egalitarian's constant advance against the grain of human nature'.[55] Joseph and Sumption thought of egalitarianism as '[l]evying war on humanity' and as constituting a 'systematic assault on human nature'.[56] One reason for this, as Joseph stated on his ownsome, was that '[e]quality of outcome is not natural'.[57] In contrast with which and as Chapter Two has shown, he and Sumption charged that '[i]nequality […] results when the natural aptitudes of men are allowed to manifest themselves in natural differences'.[58] Nor was this strategy unique to either egalitarianism or *Equality*. Joseph's advertising the concept of self-interest when confronted in 1967 with what he considered to be the socialist Mr. Wilson's failure to recognise human nature, cited above, speaks to the same basic procedure. And thus Joseph in 1975 charged not egalitarians in particular but

[50] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 16.
[51] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 15.
[52] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 95.
[53] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 95.
[54] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 41.
[55] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 46.
[56] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 42, 123.
[57] 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 10.
[58] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 51.

socialists in general with a 'naïve and unscientific view of human nature'.[59] Sir Keith's core concepts were not luck and self-interest, better known as the extra-human origins of the social order, and organic change therefore. They were the extra-human origins of the social order (in the form of the natural, including human nature) and organic change, in defence of which Joseph rolled out, to take just two examples, self-interest and luck.

But if self-interest was a fact of life, that did not mean that it could not be tamed. Laissez-faire was not an option. Joseph argued in *Freedom and Order* that 'we have to live with self-interest, contain it, harness it, discipline it'.[60] If it is allowed to be, he telegraphed in the same document, self-interest could be 'a great creative force'.[61] It was on that basis that, at Upminster, Sir Keith invited people 'to transmute it [self-interest] into enlightened self interest'.[62] He did this because he believed that he was 'dealing with real people with their own views, habits and prejudices'.[63] This need, to, as Joseph put it in 1967, 'harness the self-interest' of individuals – in that instance, of landlords and tenants – was, as that example attests, a consistent theme in Joseph's political thought.[64] Elsewhere in 1967, Sir Keith complained that in 'far too many parts of our national life the combined effects of taxation and tariffs and nationalisation and bungling legislation has been to divorce self-interest from service to the public'.[65] Key to harnessing self-interest was competition, which Joseph believed in 1976 'ensures that profit can only be made by serving the consumer efficiently'.[66] The relation between competition and self-interest, and both their contributions to the workings of the market in Sir Keith's political thought, is our next port of call.

Equality conjoined competition and self-interest. Joseph and Sumption defined what can almost be thought of as a synonym for self-interest, the 'competitive spirit', as 'the desire to excel over others and be seen to be doing so'. That spirit was 'capable of corrupting men's character' and 'also of inducing them to make the best possible of their talents, and in the process to improve the standards of the society in which they live'.[67]

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[59] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 4.
[60] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 14.
[61] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 15.
[62] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 8.
[63] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 8.
[64] K. Joseph, *Changing Housing* (London, 1967) p. 6.
[65] 'Joseph, North-East Bristol Conservative Association Rally, Bristol (08/07/1967)', p. 2.
[66] 'Summary of a talk by Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt, M.P. (Leeds North East), the Opposition Spokesman with Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research, to the Free Enterprise Conference organised by the Federation of Conservative Students at the Collegiate Theatre, Gordon Street, London at 11:00 hours on Saturday, 30th October, 1976 – The Job Creators: The Missing Dimension in our Economic Thinking', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 89/1, p. 10.
[67] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 55.

We have seen these characteristics before, in Sir Keith's descriptions at other times and in other places of self-interest. According to *Equality* therefore, to be self-interested was basically to be competitive. Indeed, that text even refers to 'competitive self-interest'.[68] What Joseph seemed to be referring to in these extracts however was competitiveness, a characteristic. Distinct from which is our current concern, competition as a condition. In *Freedom and Order*, for example, Sir Keith wrote that 'competition disciplines self-interest'.[69] Those concepts were there, as elsewhere, made so as to be distinct, if still interrelated. In 1970, Joseph similarly spoke of how competition 'makes managements the servants of the public'.[70] In 1967, too, Joseph commented as to how 'private enterprise will never be at its best subject to too much interference, too much taxation and, in some areas, too little competition'.[71] Competition was in these instances a guard-rail, pointing self-interest in the direction of the public good.

Its authors thought of self-interest as inherently competitive. But this was not the only way in which *Equality* veers away from Sir Keith's more general understanding of self-interest. That text is in its approach to self-interest both descriptive and uniquely normative. It is descriptive in the sense that, as we have already seen, it describes self-interest as a matter of fact which politicians could either take (that is, harness, as Joseph advised) or leave (which is to say, stifle, as socialists supposedly had). But it was also normative, in that it describes self-interest as 'the first duty which a man owes to his community, so that he supports himself and does not depend on others'.[72] Relieved of Sumption's influence, Joseph's attitude to self-interest was descriptive in the sense just described. Conspicuous by its absence in Joseph's other speeches and writings was any kind of normative valence of the sort cited above. It is hard to find in Sir Keith's public statements outside of *Equality* a reference to self-interest as valuable regardless of it being natural. But this makes sense for Joseph as a conservative. To promote self-interest as a good in and of itself is to step on to the slippery slope to rationalism. Whereas to advocate for that concept on the basis of its naturalness is simply to work with what is available. It is not to judge one way or the other. On the whole therefore, *Equality* is in its attitude to self-interest slightly out of kilter with Joseph's oeuvre. It is

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[68] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 53.
[69] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 16.
[70] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 2.
[71] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), Opposition Front Bench Spokesmen on Trade and Power, at the close of the Scottish Young Conservatives' Annual Conference, in Glasgow, on Saturday, 29th April, 1967', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 150, p. 2.
[72] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 121.

with an eye to the latter that this analysis of Sir Keith's understanding of self-interest and competition proceeds.

Comprehending Joseph's view of competition (as opposed to competitiveness) and of its relation to self-interest allows for a greater understanding of what Sir Keith did and did not mean by the market. As stated previously, the market was in Joseph's ideological morphology a part of the social order. Hylomorphism is an apt analogy: if the extra-human origins of the social order was matter, the free market was form. Hence the former was in Sir Keith's ideological morphology a core concept, while the latter was not. More apposite however is the fact that, in being for him an adjacent concept, Joseph also conceived of the market he favoured as something of a construct. It was what he repeatedly called 'the system'. To ignore self-interest, as in a controlled economy, Sir Keith said in 1976 was to risk having 'would-be entrepreneurs […] divert their talents to areas of economic life which lie outside the "system" – to "fiddles" or to the "black market"'.[73] In the same year, Joseph stated the following: '[t]he pressure of competition keeps the entrepreneur serving the public because he can only survive by serving it as well as or better than his rivals. So the system won't work without competition, without entrepreneurs, without rewards and sanctions'.[74] The market 'system' was not, then, a part of the natural order of things. Unalloyed self-interest was. As too was a concept like luck. The market system relied on the precondition of competition, which has been shown to have been in virtually all of Joseph's output bar *Equality* not extra-human but human-led. This insight has interesting implications, one of which is that socialist countries like the Soviet Union which rejected the market and were thereby more likely to produce "black markets" and "fiddles" can on the basis of Joseph's political thought be thought of as having been more exposed to the core conservative concept of the extra-human origins of the social order than were countries with market systems, given that such nations as Switzerland and West Germany had diluted self-interest by harnessing it via competition to human ends.[75]

How else to convey the workings of any market except via figure of speech? Joseph frequently spoke of the market and/or private enterprise as what in two speeches from 1970 he called a 'self-correcting mechanism'.[76] In 1976 he described the workings

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[73] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 6.
[74] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 9.
[75] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 16.
[76] 'Text of a speech by the Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds N.E.), Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Technology and Trade, to the A.G.M. of the Young Conservative National Advisory Committee, Royal Overseas League, London, on Saturday, 7th March, 1970 – Conservative Industrial Policy', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 65/1, p. 3; 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 20.

of this machine, remarking how 'a signal is sent down thousands of networks of communication, indicating what the customer had chosen and what he has not'.[77] In the same year, however, Joseph admitted to what he perceived as being the perversity of his and his colleagues' references to the "price" and "market" mechanisms and the "signalling system", in that '[t]his talk has obscured the fundamental assumption about human beings on which the defence of a free economy rests', which is 'that men are not machines, not instruments or mechanisms serving ends outside themselves'. By his own admission, Sir Keith had acquiesced to the language of the socialist, for whom men were 'instruments of [an inorganic] social engineering'.[78] And yet he excused himself thus: '[i]f we sometimes fall into the language of mechanics, we are using language such as metaphors'.[79] This shows, as in Joseph's rejection of what he called Crosland's 'grim determinist world in which people are 'programmed' to succeed, fail, be good or bad'.[80] Such a remark exemplifies precisely the 'refus[al] to reduce men to machines' that Sir Keith would later advance in *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*.[81] Moreover, in his speech to the Federation of Conservative Students in 1976, Joseph placed the "system" in scare quotes, and two years on from then, at a dinner of the Oxford Tory Reform Club, he warned that the idea that growth could result from monetary demand was 'far too mechanistic a view of economics'.[82]

We need not entertain false binaries therefore. The market system was not the extra-human origins of the social order. But nor was it an artifice, a 'mechanism' strictly-speaking. It was nature on a leash, and broadly equivalent to what Sir Keith famously called the social market. This he deemed in *Freedom and Order* 'our natural tenet'.[83] Joseph defined his social market philosophy for his audience at the Royal Overseas League in 1970 as pertaining to 'free enterprise in a civilised context', off the back of which he referred to the Conservatives' dedication to 'civilised capitalism, based on

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[77] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 7.
[78] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 69.
[79] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, pp. 69-70.
[80] 'Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 4.
[81] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 69.
[82] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 6; 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt, MP. (Leeds North East), the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, the Oxford Tory Reform Club's Dinner, at Queen's College, Oxford, on Saturday, 11th February 1978 – "Think Hard Mr Healey"', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 97/2, p. 2; With respect to the argument made in Chapter Two that it was not equality but the pursuit of equality in the form of egalitarianism with which Joseph took issue, it is interesting to note that Joseph referred to 'mechanical equality', which he felt would damage incentives ('Joseph, Paddington Conservative Association (16/12/1975)', p. 5).
[83] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 24.

competitive free enterprise in a context of humane laws and institutions'.[84] In its reference to competition, the latter description, of the social market economy, could very nearly tack onto Joseph's conception of the market system. These two markets were not in their particulars identical of course. What Joseph called the market system had he thought evolved; it had not been invented, even if government-induced competition was required to sustain it.[85] In contrast with which, Sir Keith termed his social market philosophy 'a revolutionary idea'.[86] As its title suggests, that philosophy was an approach (as Joseph had it, a "tenet"), whereas the market system was something to be approached. Thus, when Joseph spoke of how '[t]here must be a framework of laws and taxes and services within which the market system can do its work of raising living standards', he appeared to be appealing to the market system approached by way of his social market philosophy.[87] But even if the social market and the market system were not the same idea under differing names, we would be well-advised to think of them as differing permutations of the same basic idea – the market come to heel.

Here then we come to the crux of a crucial if fine-grain distinction between what the market system and the social market economy generally referred to and, on the other side of the conceptual aisle, that which the market and economics denoted. At the risk of repletion to the point of nuisance, none of these concepts were in Sir Keith's morphology themselves the extra-human origins of the social order. That concept was, as all core concepts are, abstract. It was "the natural" or "human nature". Hence Joseph had he said a 'position on the market economy, without metaphysics, without ideology, not as the embodiment of eternal verities or the acme of perfection, but as a workable product of history and national character which must be judged empirically'.[88] But if the various markets to which Joseph referred were adjacent concepts, then the market pure and simple/economics lay closer to his ideological core than did the social market economy and the market system. Economics Joseph said in 1975 represented 'an extension of human nature'.[89] There can be no more significant a statement in this regard than Sir Keith's admission in the same year that 'the market means human nature in its interaction with the material environment, each individual exercising the

[84] 'Joseph, A.G.M. of the Young Conservative National Advisory Committee, Royal Overseas League, London (07/03/1970)', p. 1.
[85] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 8; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground*, p. 60.
[86] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 5.
[87] 'Joseph, Bow Group, Norwich (10/07/1976)', p. 11.
[88] 'Joseph, London University Conservative Association Magazine (11/02/1975)', p. 3.
[89] 'Joseph, Cathcart Conservative Association, Glasgow (07/05/1975)', p. 2.

multiple functions of producer and consumer; saver, investor, spender'.[90] There are no ifs or buts, on paper at least. Call to mind the fact that, according to Joseph's thinking, even those countries which did not have market systems could still have had markets (albeit "black" ones), presumably because such nations were inhabited by humans whose nature was the same as that of the citizens of any other territory. Russians and Chinese just as much as Britons and Americans were liable to be self-interested. What neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China had however was the kind of market system and/or social market which Joseph wished to sustain/advocated for.

This difference, between the market as a blunt instrument and the social market/market system as the refinement of that instrument into a tool for human ends, is perhaps most clearly spelt out in *Freedom and Order*, in which Joseph remarked that:

> [i]n a sense, the market is a state of nature, with empirically observable laws, like the laws of nature. Indeed, inasmuch as economics is a social science, it studies laws of human nature. Now just as we gain greater control over our material environment through understanding the laws of physical nature, and working with and through them to achieve desired objectives, so we can enhance our control over our economic environment, by better understanding of the laws of the market, thereby working with and through them to attain desired ends.[91]

Sir Keith thought that the laws of the market could be worked with and through via social market policies, which, he went on in *Freedom and Order* to say, were ones that operated 'within a broad pattern of economic understanding'.[92] Testament to the benefits of our having focused on self-interest as a channel for human nature, Sir Keith hammered home the previous point in his remark in the same text as to how '[t]he role of social market policies in relation to self-interest has two dimensions. At the economic level, it is to ensure that work, talent, thrift and enterprise can make their potential contributions to economic life'.[93] Yet if Joseph thought that self-interest as manifested in the market could be mobilised to human advantage via the social market, then the mutual dependence of his core concepts entailed that this domestication at the adjacent level of one of them, the extra-human origins of the social order (i.e – the natural, which a natural self-interest was wheeled out in defence of), had a knock-on effect on the other, organic change, which, as the following few pages show, Sir Keith correspondingly wished to make tractable.

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[90] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 1.
[91] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 19.
[92] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 22.
[93] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 12.

The waves of change were unceasing. But Joseph did not think that the nation need be mere flotsam upon them. If organic change was a river, and if socialists were the dam-builders who sought to block its progress, then the Conservative Party ought to be considered as being in Sir Keith's political thought like a lock-keeper, allowing both the river's waters to continue flowing and for human navigation. This difference, between the lock-keeper and the dam-builder, was 'the difference between evolution and impatience; between working positively with the grain on the one hand and, on the other, imposing preconceptions onto a functioning society, thereby impairings its workings, and then using this impairement as an excuse for destroying it'.[94] With respect to this chapter's titular concept, Joseph said in *Freedom and Order* that what he meant by the social market were policies that assisted the workings of the market 'while ensuring that individuals and localities do not bear the brunt of the necessary change'.[95] Sir Keith expressed the same basic attitude when he did not refer to his social market philosophy. Twice in 1975 he voiced his belief in, as he put it both times, 'working with the market, co-operating with necessity, cushioning the sharp edges of change, predicting and preparing for the inevitable'.[96] The means to doing so Sir Keith believed lay ultimately in a greater understanding of what he called the laws of economics and the laws of the market. Joseph hoped to 'work with them [the aforementioned laws] to forsee change, adjust to it, smooth its rough edges, see that people are not ground down, ensure too that we neither invest vast resources in resisting change, in trying to frustrate the structural changes which are essential in response to world change, on the one hand, nor allow change to operate blindly at the expense of people and localities'.[97] Just such a philosophy looks to have been in operation five years earlier when Joseph proposed that an agricultural age had previously given way to the industrial age, which, he assured his Malvern audience, was in the process of evolving into a service age. Sir Keith asserted on the basis of that foresight that '[t]o-day it is industry's turn to release resources for the non-commercial and the commercial services'.[98] In saying as much, he likely thought himself to have been keeping alight the flame of civilisation. For at the Oxford Union in March 1975 Joseph stated that:

> [t]he history of civilisation from its origins has been bound up with man's efforts to understand the laws of nature in order to work through them to control his

[94] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 2.
[95] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 22.
[96] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 11; 'Joseph, London University Conservative Association Magazine (11/02/1975)', p. 3.
[97] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 20.
[98] 'Joseph, West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Malvern (21/02/1970)', p. 3.

> destiny. So far men have been conspicuously more successful in harnessing the laws of physical nature than those of human nature – despite the insights of artists and philosophers of genius. But we have made some progress in mastering our own human environment, too. The great teacher have spelt out for us the lessons of human conduct: we can learn from the past.[99]

Managing change was moreover a necessity. In Leeds in 1974 Sir Keith described it - the need for governments 'to cushion change, to ensure that individuals or communities are not called on to pay the price of change to others' benefit' – as a 'duty'.[100] He gave no reason for this obligation. One possible explanation though was for stability's sake. Stability Sir Keith warned in the following two years could be achieved 'only by riding the waves, not by drifting with them'.[101] This, Joseph suggested, required that the Conservatives stick to their ideas, instincts and better judgement. Otherwise stability would lose out to mere convenience.[102] In Joseph's political thought, organic change did not mean stable change, then, and it is perfectly feasible to imagine the same Sir Keith, a conservative, also being accepting of radical, painful and seismic ruptures – a counterfactual which plainly contradicts O'Hara's argument, featured in Chapter One, that conservatism's ideal is incremental change. Joseph was a self-described radical of a kind. He remarked that if 'the Right is thought of as the defender of the establishment against sudden and extensive political change', then the Left traditionally-defined was at his time of speaking the Right, and the Right the Left.[103] But such a statement has little to do with organic change. The change it describes was not organic because it was not legitimated by the extra-human origins of the social order. It was, as Joseph himself said, political in nature. The Thatcherite means of radical change were designed to ensure stable organic change. Seeing as Sir Keith valued stability in the context of the non-agentic, furthermore, and that he did not think that stability was likely were organic change left to its own devices, we cannot understand Joseph's conservatism by simply resorting to the conservative core concepts. As Chapter Two noted and as the Conclusion also explores, though conservatisms share the same logic, their differences owe not only to their differing conceptualisations but to the cultural baggage that conservatives bring to their ideologies. Thus the 'social order per se' that Joseph as a conservative aspired to maintain was not simply the natural and the change

[99] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 2.
[100] 'Joseph, Inflation and Growth (14/12/1974)', p. 7.
[101] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 8; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 25.
[102] 'Joseph, The Quest for Common Ground (06/12/1975)', p. 8; Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 25.
[103] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 3.

it provided for but those factors as arbitrated by a particular culture, namely what Joseph called civilisation.[104]

Taking stock, we can say that the market was for Joseph an extension of human nature. Human nature was also present in his political thought in the form of, for instance, self-interest. Hence the market embraced self-interest, as exemplified in Sir Keith's belief that bakers baked for their customers not out of charity but for their own good. All of these concepts bar human nature were adjacent ones. The market, self-interest and, to give another example, luck represented simultaneously both a rampart in defence of and the contingent fleshing out of the conservative core concept of the extra-human origins of the social order in the form of that which was natural, including human nature. Thus organic change occurred when it was regulated by that which was extra-volitional. For example, change was organic when it went under the mantle of the market. Left at this stage, Sir Keith's political thought would have remained conservative. What made Joseph's ideology more than a fatalistic submission to this or that organic change is where Sir Keith took it next. He wished to mediate organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. Hence his arguments for the market system (via the imposition of competition) and the social market economy (through a civilised framework of institutions, laws and services). Despite their differences, these markets were the market made fit for late twentieth century human habitation. What they amounted to Joseph thought was the furtherance of civilisation. Having just explored the social order's extra-human origins (amongst other topics), the next section of this chapter, a relatively short one, digs down into the social order itself and, in particular, the explicitly social character of both Joseph's conservatism and the market therein.

The Social Order:

An adjacent concept, the market Joseph thought was ultimately expendable, as Chapter One argued. But nor was the extra-human, manifested in the market, valuable by itself. It was significant for Sir Keith as the origins of a certain social order. One of his two core concepts was not the extra-human but the extra-human origins of the social order. This is an important point of emphasis, and is one that played itself out in Joseph's understanding of the origins of the market economy. That institution was not a brute fact. Although a product of human nature, it had not existed for as long as human beings had. Joseph provided a history of the market economy in his remarks to the Oxford Student Union in 1975, where he described how, 'with occasional exceptions, the

[104] Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 333.

market economy, that is to say a society in which a large part of economic behavior was related to the market, is a development of post-feudal society'.[105] In the selfsame speech, Joseph referred to a 'market-oriented society' operating 'within the framework of a market economy and a political democracy'.[106] We are thus provided with a picture of the economic as emerging out of the social. This stands to reason if, as it was for Sir Keith, the market was adjacent to the core concept of the extra-human origins of the social order. The latter, ineliminable conservative concept was not, after all, the extra-human origins of the economic order. As such, and as the following analysis details, Joseph prioritised the social over the economic.

Sir Keith claimed in 1975 to 'have argued that [… an] obsession with economic policy, not just the primacy of instant economic promises in our political campaigning but also in our policy considerations, is one of the causes of the worsening of our economic situation and the condition of our society as well'.[107] Indeed, that he had. At the Grand Hotel in Birmingham, a year before the publication of his, Maude and Percival's collection, Joseph contended that it was 'an economic-first' approach that had wrought so much social and economic havoc in the preceding few years. An auction instigated by the nation's political class had raised the public's expectations to such extremes that it had 'aggravated unhappiness and social conflict, as well as over-straining the whole economic system to a point where it [wa]s beginning to seize up'.[108] A discordant note in this argument of Joseph's is the fact that, in spite of his portrayal of the British people as insatiable bidders, Sir Keith then goes on in the same speech to invoke something akin to the common ground, posing to his audience a purely rhetoric question: '[w]ould it not now be better to approach the public, who know that economics is not everything, as whole men rather than economic men?'.[109] A consensus held that matters economical were not the be-all and end-all. Yet still the British people kept on bidding. Such tensions notwithstanding, there is little reason to doubt Joseph's antipathy towards what he termed 'an exclusive diet of economics'.[110] Thus Sir Keith put the Conservative's failure in the October 1974 election down to discussion having been fixed 'almost exclusively on economics' (he felt that '[t]his was the kind of auction in which Labour was bound to outbid us').[111] His was no mere pragmatism though, and as early

[105] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 2.
[106] 'Joseph, National Association of Conservative Graduates, Oxford (14/03/1975)', p. 3.
[107] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 5.
[108] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 2.
[109] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 2.
[110] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 1.
[111] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 1.

as 1970 Joseph commented as to how competition was not 'a fetish to which society is subordinate'.[112]

Only four months prior to his Birmingham speech, however, in the summer of 1974, Joseph remarked how, by attempting 'to buy social peace at the expense of economic efficiency […] we have got the worst of all worlds, inefficiency, hence poor performance and hence social discontents'.[113] In this instance, it appears at first glance not to have been an economic-first approach that was the issue but, for want of a better phrase, a social-first one. Inconsistency or a change of heart? This apparent inversion of the cause of the problem on Sir Keith's part comes to look less like either, once it is understood that, for Joseph, what he termed on one occasion the social framework and economic activity enjoyed in his mind a symbiotic relationship.[114] The path from the economic to the social was not a one-way street; one shaped the other, and vice versa. Thus Joseph held that '[t]he British economy means the British people going about their business, and the way people and government earn and spend *reflects and affects* [current author's emphasis] their general behavior and values'.[115] Hence Joseph could claim that 'truly social considerations can never be anti-economic, and what is anti-economic, that is wasted resources, can never be truly social' (to prop up an unproductive British mining industry was for Joseph the peak of anti-social behaviour).[116] It was seemingly for this reason that Sir Keith rejected the idea of a capitalist society in favour of that of a market-oriented one, because, so he thought, of the nature of capitalism as a concept in focusing, no thanks to Marx, on the private ownership of capital at the expense of the broader and, in Joseph's mind, more significant features of such a society, including 'the market, choice, democracy'.[117] This all being the case, Joseph likely believed that his fellow politicians had attempted to buy social peace via an economics-first approach.

We need be in no doubt as to what bracketed what though. Economics Sir Keith claimed in 1974 was 'one aspect of politics, important but never really the main thing'.[118] The main thing was the social framework within which economics operated. Chapter One

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[112] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 12.
[113] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 7.
[114] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 5.
[115] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 5.
[116] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 21.
[117] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 16; Though by contrast, published in the same year, *Why Britain needs a social market economy* comments as to how the connection between economics and politics is 'intimate', due to the fact that '[c]apitalism is the elemental economic component of a free society': *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 14.
[118] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 1.

underlined Joseph's belief that '[t]he measure of progress is social even more than economic' and that social progress relied on the state of the country's healthcare, housing and education.[119] The title of the speech from which the preceding quotation derives speaks volumes in this regard. The Conservative Party's industrial policy was not merely a framework for social action. It had a social purpose. From which we may extrapolate that so too did economic policy more broadly. Indeed, Joseph implied as much and more five years later when he stated how 'the purpose of economic activity always lies outside of economics, it relates to the individual, the family, the nation', with the use of "always" in this context suggesting that it was not the application of any social market philosophy that linked the economic to the social, the both of which were already interrelated.[120] Were further proof needed of Joseph's couching of the economic in the social, Sir Keith, giving a talk on the implications of Tony Benn, spoke of how the level of demand in the economy was significant for 'the economy and to society as a whole', a not-unreasonable interpretation of which is that the economic was for him one part of a social whole.[121] Debates over economic policy Sir Keith therefore thought meaningless if civilised values and the family – what Sir Keith called in 1974 'the foundation on which the nation is built' – were eroded. The United Kingdom could be 'utterly ruined' by such values being undercut.[122] The economic was in Joseph's political thought then a subaltern to the social.

Freeden provides a guide as to what to expect were the opposite the case. His is a more thorough explication at the conceptual level of the idea of neo-liberalism as a discrete ideology. Like Davies, Freeden defines that "liberalism" (though one in name only, he says) as having the economic trump the social, cultural and political.[123] It is for him a perversion of - and an ideology that cannot be recognised as part of - the mainstream twentieth-century liberal tradition. Freeden goes so far as to speak of how, under neo-liberalism, 'the complex morphology of liberalism is shattered and becomes barely recognizable'.[124] Neo-liberalism's inflation of the market and its attendant liberties, manifested in personal advancement, is thought to stifle most other liberal values, like individual development, the promotion of human well-being, and the state, that liberals, and welfare ones especially, have typically taken account of.[125] Neo-liberals jettison natural sociability. Their state is the strong one, used to shore up the market and with little concern for human wellbeing. This market is in turn 'unfettered', and the

[119] 'Joseph, West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Malvern (21/02/1970)', p. 1.
[120] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 8.
[121] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 5.
[122] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974)', p. 3.
[123] M. Freeden, *Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2015), p. 109.
[124] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 111.
[125] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 116, 2; Freeden & Stears, 'Liberalism', p. 341.

traditional liberal idea of accountable power undercut by it.[126] Political institutions, meanwhile, are in neo-liberalism, according to Freeden, oriented in favour of the private sector, its prosperity and efficiency. Neo-liberal globalism thus overwhelms liberal universalism.[127] Alongside what he deems another 'rival ideological offshoot' of liberalism, libertarianism, neo-liberalism Freeden thinks disassociates human welfare and economic liberty, and hence sees rationality as 'the calculated attainment of ends through the most cost-efficient means'.[128]

There are two main takeaways from the preceding analysis. The first is an insight that cuts off at the knees any argument aspiring to shepherd Joseph into a pen labelled "neo-liberal", if neo-liberalism is taken to represent the subordination of the extra-economic to the economic, as described by Freeden in the previous paragraph: Sir Keith couched the economic in the social. As opposed to Thatcher, for Joseph, there very much was such a thing as society.[129] The second of the aforementioned takeaways is Joseph's emphasising the 'social' in the second core conservative concept, the extra-human origins of the social order. The social order is as a point of emphasis in conservatism at the macro level superfluous. It is in excess of what is minimally required in conservatism. In terms of core concepts, conservatives need only prioritise organic change and the extra-human origins of any social order, or whatever those are made to mean. Joseph could very well have remained a conservative and not emphasised the social order nearly as much as he in fact did. That he articulated a conservatism which *did* give priority to the social order speaks to the stereotypically Burkean nature of Joseph's ideology, which the previous chapter also noted in underscoring how Joseph expressed the need for an ordered freedom. Change was for Joseph made organic by its being determined by the extra-human origins of the social order in the guise of, for example, self-interest. Another adjacent concept, the market, was an extension of self-interest. The following section is a case study. It shows how the entrepreneur helped to realise organic change in Sir Keith's political thought and, by extension, how both conservative core concepts made their presence known throughout all of the concentric circles of Joseph's ideological morphology, from the core to the periphery, from abstract concepts to tangible individuals.

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[126] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 109.
[127] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 110.
[128] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 56, 60; Freeden portrays libertarianism as similarly out of keeping with liberalism. See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 276.
[129] M. Thatcher, 'Interview for *Woman's Own*' (23/09/1987), *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689>, accessed 12/06/2021, pp. 29-30.

The Entrepreneur:

Why Britain needs a social market economy comments as to how '[n]o human mind or bureaucracy can comprehend all the knowledge which guides the actions of society; hence the need for impersonal processes […] The market economy incorporates these processes'.[130] This remark helps to draw out the distinction in Sir Keith and the Thatcherites' political thought between the 'impersonal forces' which the term "the extra-human origins of the social order" (a core concept) connotes and the market (an adjacent concept) which was a receptacle for those forces. But insofar as the market incorporated impersonal process, it was in its day-to-day operation nonetheless personal. Joseph asserted in 1974 that '[h]istory is not made by abstract forces, or classes. It is made by people'.[131] He similarly emphasised people power in *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, wherein he described how, regarding the market economy in particular, '[t]he market creates the framework: but it is people who act within it'.[132] Resources, Joseph said, do not organise themselves. Hence he and Sumption could speak of televisions, Rembrandt paintings and, oddly enough, potatoes, 'all of which owed their unexpected arrival in Western societies to the initiative of individuals'.[133] Mind you, the individuals who acted in the market were not the only ones who mattered to Sir Keith. In *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* he made mention of the inventor, the critic, the reformer, the writer, and the artist. But if they were 'the yeast and the stimulus of a civilised community', then the fermentation of the market system relied in Joseph's political thought upon the manager and the entrepreneur in particular.[134] Our next step is to examine what Joseph took their roles to be and what this says about his politics. In taking it, this thesis bolsters the case for seeing the market in Joseph's political thought as an adjacent concept, and for thinking of Sir Keith's conservatism as having developed over the course of the 1970s to assert that concept by means of a renewed emphasis on entrepreneurialism, in line with the decline of the professional ideal and the rise to venerable status of the entrepreneur.[135]

The founder of Laker Airways, Freddie Laker, Joseph thought emblematic. Laker was 'the epitome of a brilliant, abrasive, energetic entrepreneur'.[136] So much so that Sir Keith named after him one of the two kingdoms and its ruler in his 1979 allegory on the

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[130] *Why Britain needs a social market economy*, p. 8.
[131] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, Birmingham (19/10/1974) [Thatcher Archive]', p. 9.
[132] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 6.
[133] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, pp. 123-124.
[134] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 63.
[135] D. Blackburn, *Penguin Books and Political Change: Britain's Meritocratic Moment, 1937-1988* (Manchester, 2020).
[136] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 8.

benefits of the free market. A Tale of Two Kingdoms tells of how, in Lakeland, 'the barrel of gold which King Laker received each week did not come to him from the people as taxpayers but was only paid by those of the people who liked and valued what King Laker did'. His entrepreneurial Majesty was a market-oriented monarch. He 'had to please the people enough to deserve their payments if he wished to go on living in his palace'.[137] In a thinly-veiled reference to the National Economic Development Council (otherwise known as Neddy), the National Enterprise Board, and to quangos, the kingdom neighbouring Lakeland was called Neddyland and was ruled by King Neb and his allies the Quangeroos, who simply extracted gold from the people in order to pay for what they wanted, the result of which was that the people of Neddyland 'felt so over-taxed that it was quite common in the Neddylands to hear people from many different backgrounds using a phrase which started as a mutter, then became a chorus and grew finally into a National Anthem. This phrase was used whenever there was a need for more effort or more risk or more work, and loosely translated it meant "it's not worth while"'.[138] Thus King Neb's subjects became poorer. By contrast, the citizens of Lakeland were motivated to be enterprising risk-takers who could pay King Laker and raise all boats.[139]

Allegory can convey via narrative and in relatively simple terms what might otherwise be complex messages. When Joseph said of the story of King Laker and King Neb that 'of course this was a long time ago' he of course meant "this is Britain here and now".[140] And yet Joseph's 1979 fable is at risk of confusing rather than clarifying. We can let slide the fact that, were A Tale of Two Kingdoms truly reflective of Sir Keith's thinking, King Laker would have to compete for his throne with other presumptive monarchs; in Joseph's story, he is a monopolist. More pertinently, in being presented with a Lakeland populated by masses of people who 'took risks and showed enterprise', the reader of A Tale of Two Kingdoms would be forgiven for thinking that Sir Keith hankered after a nation bristling with entrepreneurs.[141] Joseph told of how in Neddyland 'only a few hundred people tried very hard to make the right decision to enable all the people to satisfy the customers at home and abroad: but in Lakeland it was not just a

[137] 'Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Leeds North-East, and Conservatice Spokesman on Industry with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking in Leeds, on Saturday, 21st April 1979 – A Tale of Two Kingdoms', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/7, p. 2.
[138] 'Joseph, Leeds, A Tale of Two Kingdoms (21/04/1979)', p. 1.
[139] 'Joseph, Leeds, A Tale of Two Kingdoms (21/04/1979)', p. 2.
[140] 'Joseph, Leeds, A Tale of Two Kingdoms (21/04/1979)', p. 2.
[141] 'Joseph, Leeds, A Tale of Two Kingdoms (21/04/1979)', p. 2.

few hundred people but many millions – nearly the whole population'.[142] Despite what this remark might lead us to believe, as will soon become clear, its author thought that entrepreneurs were something of an elite and, as the following pages also demonstrate, that such individuals were not made but, in a sign of Joseph's loyalty to the impersonal and organic forces at his ideological core, simply to be found. As in the case of monetarism discussed in Chapter One – which required the drawing back of government intervention in the form of money-printing so as to unleash the otherwise naturally-occurring potential of the market for growth, progress and, indeed, what this thesis calls organic change – so too regarding the entrepreneur did Joseph believe that government needed to reorient itself, providing simply the right climate for entrepreneurs to make themselves known of their own accord.

In the space of nine years, Joseph went from 'want[ing] as many men and women as possible to have fulfilment and independence that comes from building a small or medium-sized business' – '[s]talwart, thrifty, often creative people running their own businesses […] like the yeoman of the past' were his archetype - to calling entrepreneurs in *Equality* 'glittering individuals', the implication being that in the Sir Keith of 1979's opinion not everyone did or could glitter.[143] What changed and when, if at all? Joseph's attitude in 1975 seemed still to be that politicians ought to, as Sir Keith put it in *Freedom and Order*, 'maximise the number of independent decision-makers, resource centres, controllers of funds', in order in particular to optimise security and freedom.[144] In the following year, however, Sir Keith asserted that 'the degree to which business is or is not esteemed in a country has an effect on the number of the most able who make it their career'.[145] The pool of potential businessmen had thus in Joseph's mind apparently shrunk over the course of the 1970s from the maximum number (to paraphrase *Freedom and Order*) to a minority in the form of those 'glittering' few, the most able. And yet looks can be deceiving. It would be a mistake to think that Joseph was in the first five years or so of the 1970s necessarily advocating for the creation of a nation of entrepreneurs, managers and the like. *Equality* maintained that '[t]he number of people able and willing to take the risk of perceiving and satisfying the market demand is […] very small'.[146] It was unequivocal. Joseph's earlier statements on the same subject are rather more ambiguous, though by no means in contradiction with the remark of Joseph and Sumption's just quoted. When Sir Keith said that he wished to

[142] 'Joseph, Leeds, A Tale of Two Kingdoms (21/04/1979)', p. 2.
[143] 'Joseph, West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Malvern (21/02/1970)', p. 7; Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 16.
[144] Joseph, *Freedom and Order*, p. 16.
[145] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 13.
[146] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 75.

'maximise the number of independent decision-makers', he surely meant that he wished to increase their number as much as possible – a sentiment that is in line with another of his speeches cited above, in which Joseph said that he 'want[ed] as many men and women as possible' to create businesses. Some might have thought it possible for everyone to have been an entrepreneur, and others only a small minority. In Joseph's case, it is not unreasonable to suspect that his opinions in 1970 and in 1979 were virtually the same: entrepreneurship was, Sir Keith thought, 'a skill, a talent […] Not everyone has it'.[147] Entrepreneurs represented for him 'a relatively small minority of bold, adventurous individuals'.[148]

On government's relation to this minority, Joseph quoted Swift in saying that '[h]e who enables two blades of grass to grow where one grew before is worth more than the whole tribe of politicians'.[149] Such references as this, to "enable" and, as Sir Keith also remarked in his speech on "The Job Creators", to 'recognising' and 'acknowledg[ing]' entrepreneurs rather than 'exclud[ing]' or 'banish[ing]' them, all of these are telling.[150] They speak to the idea that there was little need to create entrepreneurs, who were pre-existing, if also stifled. The entrepreneur Joseph believed was like Gulliver, tied down by so many Westminster Lilliputians.[151] Sir Keith's problem (one of many) in the 1960s and 1970s was not therefore that there were no entrepreneurs to be found, but that governments had failed to create the right climate or, as Sir Keith had it in 1976, 'scope' for actually-existing entrepreneurs who, Joseph said the following year, 'would renew industry once the climate was improved', which it could never be so long as governments backed lame-ducks and discouraged expanding industries.[152] With regard to that most energetic, abrasive and brilliant of entrepreneurs, for instance, Sir Keith held at the 1977 Conservative Party Conference that '[t]here are lots of Freddie Lakers; we need today their effort for themselves and their families and the country, if only we could create the climate that will encourage them'.[153] References

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[147] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 6.
[148] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 14.
[149] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 15.
[150] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', pp. 14-15.
[151] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 1.
[152] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 6; 'Statement by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith JOSEPH, Bt, MP, (Leeds North East), the Opposition Spokesman with overall responsibility for Policy and Research, on Monday, 31st January 1977 [undisclosed location] – Spitting in the Wind', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 91/2, p. 2.
[153] Joseph, 'Conservative Party Conference ('77) – Industry and Free Enterprise' (October 1977), Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 3; Joseph was similarly concerned with the climate for business "pre-conversion". In his 1970 speech on the subject of Conservative industrial policy, for example, Sir Keith

of this kind, to entrepreneurs both in the present tense and as being motivated by self-interest, are not inconsequential: they are indicative of the role of the entrepreneur, like the market in which she served, as a frontier of the extra-human origins of the social order. Were Joseph to have endeavoured to make people be enterprising, by contrast, this would have called his conservatism into question, given the volitional nature of such an exercise.[154] In pointing individuals towards preconceived goals, that activity would be the opposite of the purposelessness that Oakeshott as a conservative believed helps make civil society tick.[155] By contrasting Sir Keith's respective understandings of the entrepreneur and the manager, the ensuing analysis expands on this interpretation – that is, on the idea of entrepreneurs as a token at Joseph's periphery of the extra-human origins of the social order at his core - to show how, in having changed to set more store by the entrepreneur than by the manager in the late 1970s, Joseph can be thought of as having entrenched the market in his conservatism as an outlet for organic change in the latter half of that decade.

We need first to set our definitional house in order. The role of management was in Joseph's opinion in 1978 'to win co-operation from the workforce by convincing them of the facts of economic life', a view that was likewise Sir Keith's in 1970, before his supposed conversion.[156] By contrast, the entrepreneur's task he believed in 1976 lay in 'the identification and the satisfaction, competitively and without waste, of what the consumers want at home and abroad'.[157] What Joseph called managerialisation he defined as pertaining not to ownership but, obviously enough, to management, and as being more likely the older and larger a business was, unlike entrepreneurial businesses, which he thought were generally newer and smaller.[158] Whereas the manager managed, then, the entrepreneur married supply and demand. This distinction was not always appreciable, and in 1970 Sir Keith appeared to equate entrepreneurs with managers: '[i]t is they [entrepreneurs]', he remarked, 'who organise inventors, investors and

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referred to the need 'to galvanise top management in particular' ('Joseph, A.G.M. of the Young Conservative National Advisory Committee, Royal Overseas League, London (07/03/1970)', p. 6) and 'induce' outstanding managers via tax reform ('Joseph, A.G.M. of the Young Conservative National Advisory Committee, Royal Overseas League, London (07/03/1970)', p. 12).

[154] Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, p. 42.

[155] N. P. Barry, *The New Right* (London, 1987), p. 96.

[156] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 11; 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 17.

[157] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 7.

[158] 'Summary of a speech by Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P. (Leeds North East), Opposition spokesman with Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research, speaking at Queen's Hotel, Aberdeen on Friday, 7th May 1976. Full text attached – Conservative and Business Leaders', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 87, p. 8.

workers within the law to serve the public'.[159] Later in the same decade, however, Joseph explicitly disassociated the activities of the entrepreneur from mere management when he said that '[t]he function of the entrepreneur is not the management of established processes of output and marketing – crucially important though these are. The entrepreneur's capacity is to be judged like that of the economy as a whole, by success in identifying and satisfying demand'.[160] Sir Keith's 1979 reference to 'our wealth-creators and our managers' is also noteworthy in suggesting that Sir Keith did not believe managers to be wealth-creators.[161] Joseph intimated much the same thing nigh on a decade earlier when he professed to 'believe that management performance should be exposed to appraisal by the market', as if it was not already.[162] He would continue to occasionally align aspects of the entrepreneur's job with that of the manager, as in his comment as to how the entrepreneur 'organises people-as producers to serve people-as-consumers'.[163] In the main, though, Joseph defined the entrepreneur as one who, as a means to profit and via the coordination of materials and machinery, money and skills, under competition and within the law, went in search of demand in order to fulfil it.[164]

In the early 1970s Joseph emphasised management and managers just as much as, if not more than, entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. In 1970, it was in his mind, as he put it in one speech, management that was 'key to industrial vitality', and, as he stated in another, good management that was 'the key to prosperity'.[165] Joseph therefore regretted in the same year that the Conservative Party had not devised a good enough framework for management.[166] By 1976, however, entrepreneurialism was very

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[159] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 5.
[160] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 2.
[161] 'Free Enterprise and Industry – Replying to the debate, Sir Keith Joseph (12/10/1979)', p. 4.
[162] 'Joseph, A.G.M. of the Young Conservative National Advisory Committee, Royal Overseas League, London (07/03/1970)', p. 12.
[163] 'Extract from a Lecture given by The Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph, Bt, MP, (Leeds North East) Overall Responsibility for Policy and Research and the Opposition Spokesman on Industry, speaking to the Associated Weavers' Seminar held at the Polytechnic, Huddersfield, on Thursday, 30th November, 1978', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 176/6, p. 2.
[164] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 60.
[165] 'Text of a speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P., (Leeds North East), Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Technology and Trade, to Esher Constituency Half-day Conference, Oxshott Village Centre, Oxshott, Surrey, on Saturday, 7th February, 1970', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 65/1, p. 3; 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 1.
[166] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 8.

much "in" in Joseph's political thought, while management was, if not "out", then certainly part way there. Which is not to say of course that the entrepreneur was at this stage newly-arrived on Joseph's conceptual scene. As far back as 1967 Joseph was insisting that entrepreneurs as well as managers required rewards for their effort.[167] A decade or so later, though, and Sir Keith was making entrepreneurs out to be not just important but central. They were now 'the principal agents of transformation', the 'engines of our economy', and the ones who would 'make the difference between national wealth and national poverty'.[168] In the same year – that is, in 1976 – and speaking on the subject of "the system", Sir Keith elsewhere said that it would 'not work without competition, without entrepreneurs, without rewards and sanctions'.[169] He did not say that it would not work without managers. Again, this marked a change from 1970 - a year in which Sir Keith referred to entrepreneurs and management equally as 'the wealth creators' who were crucial for industrial progress.[170] Both then '[we]re at the very heart of the free enterprise system'.[171] Though Joseph denied in both *Conditions for Fuller Employment* and his 1976 speech "The Job Creators" that entrepreneurs were heroes - he wished simply to explain their function, Sir Keith said, and not to adulate them – there can be little doubt that, by the end of the 1970s, Joseph had prioritised one above the other.[172]

By the late 1970s, entrepreneurs had taken precedent over managers in Joseph's political thinking. But this was not simply a changing of the (market-protecting) guard, as Sir Keith's references to an entrepreneurial mentality portend.[173] When Joseph said in his 1970 speech on "Conditions Essential for Industrial Success" that '[g]ood management is the magic that serves all interests simultaneously', he described management in much the same way in which he would later characterise entrepreneurs.[174] In spite of which, Sir Keith's detailing in 1970 of how it was 'better management […] and better co-operation between management and workers' that added extra value was a conceptual world away from Joseph's assessment in 1978 that

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[167] Joseph, *Changing Housing*, p. 11.
[168] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 14, 5, 4.
[169] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?*, p. 61.
[170] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 1.
[171] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 5.
[172] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 6; 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 9.
[173] Sir Keith contrasted a 'business-enterprise mentality' with a 'managerial mentality'. See 'Joseph, Queen's Hotel, Aberdeen (07/05/1976)', p. 8.
[174] 'Joseph, Greater London Area Trade Union Advisory Committee Meeting (24/01/1970)', p. 1.

'[r]ewards in a free society reflect not effort or time or skill or merit but simply the value put on the service concerned by the person who pays'.[175] Value in the first instance was intrinsic, and in the second extrinsic. This is one example of the broader conceptual significance of Sir Keith's turn to the entrepreneur. Additionally, however, Joseph's stressing in the late 1970s of the entrepreneur's role can be seen to represent a renewed emphasis upon the conservative core concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order. This is because the entrepreneur was an agent of organic change, 'constantly challenging existing patterns of production and consumption', as well as 'redistributing resources and ensuring that ownership remains widely spread'.[176] He was 'the man who envisages possibilities, who innovates'.[177] Entrepreneurs ensured not only wealth and employment but 'the ever-expanding variety and range of the decentralised structure of a free society', too.[178] Describing their function in 1979, Sir Keith emphasised 'the production of new goods and services'.[179]

Such quotations as these, on the role of the entrepreneur in unsettling the status quo, foreseeing possibilities, seeking out potentialities, advancing constant variety and innovating, suggest that the entrepreneur was in Joseph's political thinking a fulcrum of organic change. This was more true of the entrepreneur than it was of the manager because the former had a greater propensity than the latter for what Joseph called the entrepreneurial mindset. Recall that '[t]he function of the entrepreneur is not the management of established processes of output and marketing […] The entrepreneur's capacity is to be judged like that of the economy as a whole, by success in identifying and satisfying demand'.[180] But recall also from earlier in this chapter that the economy was a site of organic change. If the role of the entrepreneur was analogous to that of the economy therefore, and if the economy embodied organic change, then so too did the entrepreneur. Furthermore, change we can presume was organic when fomented by the entrepreneur (a peripheral concept) - and indeed by the manager - because the first of those individual's entrepreneurialism was motivated at least in part by human nature (a core concept) in the form of self-interest (an adjacent concept). None of this is to suggest that the entrepreneur (or the entrepreneurial manager for that matter) was the sole emissary of Joseph's conservative core. In embodying the conservative core concepts of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, she was however the most obvious. This argument acts to qualify Denham and Garnett's myth-

[175] 'Joseph, West Midlands Young Conservative Conference, Malvern (21/02/1970)', p. 4; 'Joseph, LSE (08/06/1978)', p. 5.
[176] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 5.
[177] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 4.
[178] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 5.
[179] 'Joseph, Penistone (20/4/1979)', p. 1.
[180] 'Joseph, Free Enterprise Conference, London (30/10/1976)', p. 2.

busting. There are no two ways about it: Sir Keith was a "free-marketeer" both before and after the Heath government's demise. He was moreover a conservative prior to and after that event. His self-confessed conversion is not all that it is cracked up to be, no question. But what this section in its analysis of Joseph's comprehension of the entrepreneur suggests is that the market gained an elevated position in Sir Keith's conservatism in the mid-to-late 1970s.

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One of Britain's problems according to Sir Keith was Britons' opposition to change. As far back as 1962, Joseph alleged that the Labour Party was guilty of 'thinking of the past – refusing to accept that times change and that organisations must change too'.[181] Twelve years on, in 1974, and this time those at fault were British workers and shop stewards, about whom Sir Keith complained that they 'tend[ed] to be more resistant to change' compared to their counterparts in North West Europe.[182] Especially guilty in this respect in the 1970s, though, were the trade unions, which, Joseph asserted in 1977, 'want[ed] the fruits of change without change'.[183] What was true in Sir Keith's mind of unions' attitude to change was also true therein of the unions' approach to the progress that change could provide for (covered in Chapter One), with Joseph contending in 1976 that a weak economy and a weak currency were the natural consequences of not only ill-judged government activity but unions 'obstruct[ing] economic progress while demanding its fruits in advance'.[184] Not only unions, but Government, industries and advisers - all ultimately had 'tried to thwart change rather than smooth a path for it' and failed 'to adjust to new realities' by way of competition and modernisation, instead seeking refuge in rationalisation, cartels and oligopolies.[185] On *Conditions for Fuller Employment*'s account, such obstruction was ultimately counterproductive, for '[i]f change is not allowed to take place by degrees, it will force itself by convulsion'.[186] The resolution of economic problems and the buoyancy of the labour market was thus said to rely on the adaptability of individuals to change. Joseph explained that: '[i]n a competitive world changes in the pattern of our industry and services are bound to come. What counts is the quality of our response: the responses of workers, of managers, and entrepreneurs. Preparedness to meet change – by new skills,

[181] 'Text of a Party Political Broadcast on behalf of the Conservative and Unionist Party, on the B.B.C. and Independent television networks on Wednesday, 14th November, 1962', Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Conservative Party Archive, PPB 005/2, p. 7.
[182] 'Joseph, Upminster (22/06/1974)', p. 8.
[183] 'Joseph, Spitting in the Wind (31/01/1977)', p. 1.
[184] 'Joseph, Businessmen's Meeting, Sarrat, Hertfordshire (03/06/1976)', p. 1.
[185] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, p. 7.
[186] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 5

different hours, moving house, new responsibilities, new jobs, revising plans and ambitions, perhaps starting a business – is essential'.[187]

Joseph did not meet change; he embraced it. As the preceding paragraph details, and as this chapter has argued, much of the change to be met in late-twentieth-century Britain Sir Keith believed manifested in the free market, and this thesis has argued that it was for this reason that Joseph was a tribune of said market. The first and longest section of this chapter reiterated that Joseph rode to the rescue of that change which was extra-human in origin, and that what was extra-human for him was that which was natural, including human nature. The latter concept for instance found form in the adjacent concept of self-interest, which in turn was a motivating force behind another adjacent concept, the free market, a dynamo for change which was organic because it was motivated by such extra-human impulses as self-interest and luck. The markets that Joseph advocated for however – the 'market system' or the 'social market' – were the market domesticated. Sir Keith's was not a passive acceptance of this or that organic change therefore. This chapter's second section showed how, one concentric ring out from that change and the extra-human origins which secreted it, Joseph subordinated the economic to the social. Both the economic and the social had extra-human origins. As has just been noted, section number one argued that the market (the economic) originated in such extra-human factors as self-interest. But the latter also looked to represent the origins of a central aspect of the social, the family for example. 'Every man who sacrifices his own material interest for that of the family, friends and fellow-men, is doing so for his own interest', Joseph said.[188] The economic being couched in Sir Keith's ideology in the social, section number two thus demonstrated the great extent to which one of Joseph's two core concepts was indeed the extra-human origins of the social order. And finally in the third section of this chapter we met the individuals, the likes of Freddie Laker, who in Joseph's thinking acted upon such intangible concepts as self-interest. The entrepreneur was the centrepiece of that section, which argued that Joseph's emphasising in the mid-to-late 1970s of the entrepreneur, in place of Sir Keith's deference towards that figure as well as the manager, represented Joseph's emphasising from approximately the middle of the 1970s onwards of the market as a wellspring for organic change.

An analysis of this sort, of a Thatcherite's approach towards and understanding of the free market, could not reasonably fail to mention neo-liberalism. Much as this chapter has grappled with that -ism however, it has been a witness for the defense. The pervasiveness of characterisations of neo-liberalism as the servility of the political or

[187] Joseph, *Conditions for Fuller Employment*, p. 8.
[188] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 120.

social to the economic warranted Joseph's deliverance from a neo-liberal reputation. Sir Keith having believed that the free market was valuable only in consideration of other factors minimises the possibility of Joseph having been a neo-liberal along the lines described by Davies, Freeden and Jackson. Chapter One observed how Joseph was willing to accept society's evolution away from the market, while the previous chapter expended with the idea of him as endorsing a licentious liberty. This one delivered the final blow and cut off at the pass any association between Joseph and, for example, a neo-liberal interpretation of rationality as the maximisation of economic advantage.[189] This chapter took the fight to scholars of neo-liberalisms' door in arguing for the centrality in Joseph's political thought of organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order, concepts that happened to find their joint fulfilment in Sir Keith's ideological morphology most obviously in the form of the market and in the activities of the entrepreneur. Just as there is not one invariant conservatism, then, nor is there a single neo-liberalism – at least, that is what this chapter has suggested.[190] Neo-liberalism is perhaps best considered similar to anarchism, which Freeden describes as an 'umbrella term that covers a cluster of concepts whose totality can be made to pull in entirely different ideological directions: towards an individualist or a socialist mode'.[191] We can therefore have a conservative neo-liberalism and a socialist neo-liberalism, without the designation of "neo-liberal" undermining the extent to which socialists are socialists and conservatives conservatives.[192] In thinking as much, the present author has in the course of this chapter's analysis rejected the idea that Joseph's was the logic of neo-liberalism or, to quote Davies, 'of competition'. What the Conclusion scrutinises, and what Joseph's political thought vouches for, is the logic not of neo-liberalism but of conservatism.

[189] Freeden, *Liberalism*, p. 109.
[190] See also M. Bevir, *New Labour: A Critique* (Abingdon, Oxon, 2005), p. 29.
[191] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 311.
[192] Should anyone call Joseph a neo-liberal, their doing so would on this definition of neo-liberalism not necessarily be to say that there is no difference between Joseph and a Middle Way Conservative like Ian Gilmour, just as, in arguing for the fundamental ideological continuity between Thatcherism and the Conservative tradition that it succeeded, this thesis does not dismiss the significance of 1975 as a moment of critical change. There is discontinuity as well as continuity, and the discursive cannot but help bleed into the conceptual and, by extension, the ideological. Ultimately, though, the difference between Joseph and his Middle Way colleagues is in degree and not in kind.

Conclusion

Sir Keith Joseph died in December 1994. The former Conservative MP David Willetts recounts how, when at a dinner following Labour's landslide election victory three years later, in 1997, he asked Denis Thatcher what the Conservatives needed to do in order to regain power, Mr. Thatcher responded: '[w]e must get back to basic conservative principles – but don't ask me what they are'.[1] But there is a reason why Thatcher struggled, and why anyone else might struggle still, to pin down conservative principles; what this thesis has suggested, and what this conclusion will underscore, is that there are no such thing, and that there is in the long run in conservatism no going backwards, only forwards. Ideological thinking of the kind with which this study has been concerned is the most tangible manifestation of the political, being consumed and produced by individuals and social groups, all in observable morphologies. As such, the study of ideological morphologies affords the most direct access to the political heartbeat of any collectivity, and the price of admission to the study of politics must, therefore, be an appreciation of and respect for the pivotal role of ideologies within its subject of analysis, as a result of which we might begin both to further entrench ideology studies within scholarly practice and recognise its subject matter as a crucial and indeed archetypal genre of political thought. Chapter One argued that Joseph had a broadly Popperian/falsifiable epistemology, Chapter Two that he opposed an a priori (inorganic) egalitarianism and not equality per se, and chapters Three and Four that he favoured, respectively, freedom and the market only in so far as they, like equality and inequality covered in the second chapter, were simpatico with his core concepts. The topics after which the preceding chapters are named were thus all contingent in Joseph's ideology upon organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order.

By studying the ideological morphology of a leading Thatcherite this thesis has provided a means therefore of understanding not only Thatcherism as a form of conservatism (rather than a liberalism) in keeping with its previously-predominant Middle Way cousin (exemplified by the rhetoric of Quintin Hogg, Ian Gilmour, and Harold Macmillan) but, equally, the 1970s as an interregnum in which, thanks in large part to the nature of conservatism, a number of political pathways opened up for one collectivity in particular, the late-twentieth-century United Kingdom. Via its argument that conservatism is a reactionary ideology best defined more by its structure than by its content – in the invocation by the conservative of adjacent concepts like inequality, freedom, and the market in reaction against her rationalist opponent(s) and in defence

[1] D. Willetts, 'Conservatism: the longest view', *Prospect*, <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/conservative-party-david-willetts-edmund-fawcett-book-review>, accessed 24/05/2021.

of her core concepts - it has emphasised the great extent to which what we call Thatcherism was contingent and not predestined to employ the concepts that it employed and enact the policies which it did in fact enact. On the basis of Joseph's political thought at least, a more egalitarian Thatcherism (see Chapter Two) endorsing freedom with a more 'positive' inflection (see Chapter Three) was foreseeable. If Joseph is best thought of as a Thatcherite, then latent within Thatcherism was a far more interventionist and what many would call "social democratic" kind of conservatism than that which actually-existing Thatcherism entailed. That there was a gulf between these two – between the potential and the actual - only underlines the contingency of the decade in question, the 1970s, in which class, the dynamics of capital, and the influence of ideological entrepreneurs like Joseph were all variables.

This argument has its parallels elsewhere. Gamble has spoken of the possibility of '[a] Hayekian social democracy'.[2] He contends that Hayek might have been more concerned with creating a fairer society and empowering citizens as alternate routes to economic liberty, if only his intellectual development had not taken place in opposition to socialism.[3] In much the same way, others have referred to a synthesis of Hayek and Rawls' political thought in the form of "Rawlsekianism" as a means of achieving Rawlsian ends via Hayekian (market-based) means.[4] Talk along the same lines of, for example, "Thatchlandism" – an admixture of Thatcherism and Croslandism – may be too clever for its own good, but still the point, made in Chapter Two in particular, stands: if we think of conservatism as being defined more by its general form than via its particular content, and if we also consider Joseph to have been first and foremost a conservative and only then a specific type of conservative, a Thatcherite, with all of the policy prescriptions that Thatcherism typically implies, then it stands to reason that Joseph could have advanced different, perhaps more egalitarian concepts in defence of his core. Many of those concepts, namely his adjacent ones, would have depended for their character to a large degree on the concepts of those ideologies Sir Keith chose to oppose, to be sure. But this would not have required that Joseph stop opposing socialists, as Macmillan and Gilmour, "Wets" the pair of them, had no problem in resisting both rationalists and Thatcherites.

That is the past. What this conclusion grapples with is conservatism as an ideology whose history (if at one time uncertain) we might think we know, yet whose

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[2] A. Gamble, 'Hayek and Liberty', *Critical Review*, 25/3-4 (2013), p. 360; See also H. Wainwright, *Arguments for a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right* (Oxford, 1994).
[3] After all, Gamble notes, it has long been a liberal goal to equalise power relations so as to reduce the potential for coercion. See Gamble, 'Hayek and Liberty', p. 360.
[4] W. Wilkinson, 'Is Rawlsekianism the Future?', <https://www.cato.org/blog/rawlsekianism-future>, accessed 20/05/2021.

futures, thanks to conservatism's dedication to organic change, we cannot possibly foresee. In order perhaps to stave off revolutionary discontent of the kind that risks overturning the organically-evolving traditions they cherish, conservatives two hundred years hence might find themselves endorsing an egalitarian regime of widescale redistribution. And/or maybe those traditions, whatever they end up being, will demand of them, or of some other conservatives, a radical individualism. In contrast with such radical uncertainty, there is little doubt that, should they continue to hold to what today we call socialism, socialists will continue to promote an equality and/or fraternity of some description. In spite of conservatism's inherent instability at the adjacent and peripheral levels however, this conclusion contends that the nature of conservatism is suggestive of one of two trajectories, "fight" or "flight". These final half-dozen pages or so confront these respective flightpaths, which this thesis brackets under the header 'the logic of conservatism'. Scholars regularly resort to analyses of the supposed internal logics of ideologies in order to explain their effects, with Laclau, for instance, having written on populism's 'discursive logic'.[5] Introduced in the previous chapter, Davies' conception of the 'logic of competition' under neo-liberalism is a similar sort of analysis.[6] With regard to conservatives' political thought, Robinson, who featured in Chapter One, observes how '[t]he very logic of conservativism implies an acceptance of progressive time', and how Conservatives have posed 'as a necessary counterpart to progressivism', as the popular nineteenth century metaphor of a (conservative) coach and (progressive) horses attests.[7] It is this logic and what conservatives can make of it with which the final pages of this thesis is concerned.

What Kirk called the conservative mind, Robin terms the reactionary one.[8] In what room is left though, this conclusion will demonstrate how the argument made in the preceding chapters highlights the importance of distinguishing conservatism from mere reaction. This thesis has implicitly rejected Robin's definition of conservatism, which is a worldview of the sort that the Introduction, in coming to a definition of

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[5] E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London, 2018); see also D. Hancock, The *Countercultural Logic of Neoliberalism* (Abingdon, Oxon, 2020), as well as C. J. Bickerton and C. I. Accetti, *Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics* (Oxford, 2021).
[6] W. Davies, *The Limits of Neoliberalism*.
[7] Robinson, *The Language of Progressive Politics*, p. 36; Though it is Robinson's understanding of the logic of conservatism as tapping into a progressive conception of time that concerns us here, it is worth noting that other scholars have made use of the idea of a logic of conservatism. For example, O'Neill argues that there was a conservative logic linking Burke's both opposition to the French Revolution and defense of empire: D. O'Neill, *Edmund Burke and the Conservative Logic of Empire* (Oakland, California, 2016).
[8] C. Robin, *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin* (Oxford, 2011).

ideology, dispelled with.[9] It has emphasised that, if Joseph's political thought is anything to go by, conservatives, though their ideologies result from reaction, are not themselves reactionaries - the conservative's is the reactionary mind only insofar as it is reactive – and that if indeed those ideologists do wish to go back, it must, as in Joseph's case, be as a means of going forwards, for their core concepts forbid conservatives from living in an eternal present. As this thesis has repeatedly underscored, once spawned, conservatisms are capable via their preference for organic change of incorporating a number of differing, often stereotypically unconservative concepts, so long as those concepts are seen by the conservative to be in keeping with the ongoing traditions that she values. The logic of conservatism, as for Joseph's political thought, is thus to be actively predisposed towards the future.

The following section argues as much by way of an analysis of what Alexander calls the contradictions of conservatism. What to Alexander is a contradiction is to the present author a tragedy. Conservatism is tragic, this conclusion maintains, insofar as its logic demands the renunciation of rationalist ideals whilst also seeking to have done with politics and withdraw from the ideological fray – an ideal if ever there was one, in lieu of the ubiquity of ideologies (including rationalist ideologies, against which conservatives react). This, then, is flight. The alternative to which is to fight. Conservatives' second option is to accept ideological combat. Hence the existence of not only self-declared conservatives but 'conservative commentators' and 'conservative principles'. And yet the risk here is that by sanctifying its non-core concepts conservatism moves towards a form of rationalism, and that conservatives take for granted the ineliminable concepts which their adjacent and peripheral ones typically defend. An example of this phenomena, which the final and largest part of this conclusion critiques, is that of positional conservatism as articulated by Samuel P. Huntington. Via that analysis, this conclusion underlines the tension between conservatism as this thesis has defined that ideology and

[9] *The Reactionary Mind* argues that conservatives exist in 'opposition to the liberation of men and women from the fetters of their superiors, particularly in the private sphere' (Robin, *The Reactionary Mind*, p. 16). Conservatism, Robin maintains, 'provides the most consistent and profound argument as to why the lower orders should not be allowed to exercise their independent will, why they should not be allowed to govern themselves or the polity' (Robin, *The Reactionary Mind*, p. 7). Which is not to say that Robin does not think that conservatives are incapable of being change-makers; they are, when it is in their interest, in order to reaffirm hierarchies. Unsurprisingly, Oakeshott, whose writings very much lack the dedication to 'pagan conflict' that the conservative – in his race against time, in opposition to decline – is supposed to prioritise over 'peace and prosperity', Robin ejects from the conservative bandwagon that he has assembled, on which are seated the likes of Hobbes and Burke (Robin, *The Reactionary Mind*, p. 183, 240, 21, 47).

Conservatism as a series of party-political (in the British context, Tory) principles. Conservatism remaining conservative this thesis maintains is thus a high-wire act.

The logic of conservatism is double-headed therefore.[10] Which is not to ignore the mediating role of culture. This thesis has gotten around any undue essentialism by thinking of ideologies as connected by family resemblances.[11] These resemblances are what Wittgenstein termed 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing'.[12] A famous example in the *Philosophical Investigations* of one such family is that of games. '[M]any common features drop out, and others appear': the child who throws their ball against a wall is unconcerned with winning and losing, unlike competitors in ball games, who are not.[13] What unites these games, card-games, board-games, Olympic games, and games such as ring-a-ring-a-roses? Only their 'similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that'.[14] As with games, so too with ideological families. Conservatives have in common mainly their "conservativeness". Being signifiers, the multiplicity of forms that organic change and the extra-human origins of the social order can take up forestalls conservatism's sliding towards essentialism. To say as much is of course to make a choice. It is not a statement of fact. What this conclusion will reiterate in the course of its analysis, however, is that it is a decision well worth making, in that there are features of Joseph's political thought that are best squared by thinking of him as a conservative whose morphology is as this thesis has described rather than, for the sake of argument, a positional conservative whose raison d'être is the defence of an established political order. These final few pages thereby reaffirm three themes in particular: conservatism's progressive logic; the inadequacy of essentialist accounts of ideologies; and the risk that conservatives might sanctify their eliminable concepts at the expense of their openness to change.

[10] These two logical paths often appear to meet in a synthesis in the political thought of a great many conservatives, who are reticent towards politics ("flight") and hence define conservatism as a mere 'disposition', and yet who self-describe as (and make careers as intellectuals out of their being) conservatives in opposition to meddling rationalists ("fight"). See for example R. Kirk, 'The Essence of Conservatism', *The Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal*, <https://kirkcenter.org/politics-and-social-order/essence-1957/>, accessed 19/11/2021. There, Kirk states that '[a] conservatism of instinct must be reinforced by a conservatism of thought and imagination'.

[11] Recall the analogy presented in the Introduction, of ideologies as equivalent to rooms.

[12] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* [Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe] (New York, 1953), §66.

[13] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §66.

[14] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §66.

The Logic of Conservatism:

Alexander's argument is contrarian and intriguing in equal measure. It states that 'a complete definition of conservatism is necessarily a contradictory one'.[15] This contradiction is to be found in conservatism's acquiescence to the order that follows from the revolution of which it disapproves.[16] Though progressives and conservatives occupy the same concrete world, liberals, socialists and the like have their principles speak to them from a realm of ideals, of which the conservative disapproves.[17] It is for this reason that conservatives appeal to what Alexander terms "shadow ideals". These are what Freeden would call adjacent concepts, and 'are intended to point back to the actuality which the rational, or argued, ideals [of socialists and liberals] will damage or destroy'.[18] Alexander cites inequality as one such conservative ideal. 'It is an abstraction, this 'inequality', which is meant to point to the actual world in which inequalities are inevitable'.[19] Thus the conservative claims that the world is concrete and not abstract. But, crucially, what Alexander calls 'a conservatism in itself' is, that author contends, opposed to that which it in fact seeks – abstraction, without history, situatedness or specificity.[20] Alexander holds that this 'is inadequate'.[21] Adequacy requires that the conservative have a criterion for change. More than that even: conservatism is incomplete without an image of perfection.[22] Lacking this, the conservative, Alexander insists, is adrift, in the implausible belief that the status quo is a suitable criterion.[23] The conservative must therefore defend two traditions according to Alexander. The first of these, such as concessionary politics, is consciously invoked. The second, though, are 'the traditions he does not have' and the truth that those traditions were dedicated to preserving.[24] Alexander argues that the historical institution conservatives seek above all others to conserve or restore is that of sacral monarchy.[25] When a revolution of the 1789 variety occurs and change is discontinuity, then the conservative is in the position of accepting that which he rejects.[26] Hence conservatism is contradictory. Having submitted

[15] J. Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', *Government and Opposition*, 48/4 (2013), p. 595.
[16] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 596.
[17] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 601.
[18] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 604.
[19] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 604.
[20] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 600.
[21] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 601.
[22] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 609.
[23] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 610.
[24] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', pp. 608-609.
[25] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 609.
[26] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 606.

to the post-revolutionary order, it is at one and the same time an acceptance of the loss of certain traditions, and also, in recognising that it cannot approve the subsequent order, a potentially radical yearning for the restoration of either that tradition or 'the truth served by that tradition' in the form of sacral monarchy.[27]

Alexander draws us back to the question which the Introduction briefly touched on. Were ideologies invented? To expand on that: did conservatism, let alone any other ideology, exist prior to the mobilisation of general publics and the emergence of mass communication?[28] Mannheim thought of conservatism as a conscious worldview – a Weltanschauung – and a 'counter-movement', born, like socialism and liberalism, of the French Revolution and, unlike those two other ideologies, of a defence of the Restoration.[29] He claimed that it was with Romanticism that conservatism flourished, and that this was especially so in Germany, where there was a turning away from bourgeois culture and natural law principles.[30] Burke was though, according to Mannheim, 'the initiator of modern anti-revolutionary conservatism'.[31] Oakeshott by contrast cuts a relatively isolated figure in having disassociated reaction and conservatism. He defined conservatism as involving 'a disposition exclusively appropriate in a large and significant field of human activity'. That -ism was 'disclosed [… but] not as prejudiced hostility to a ''progressive'' attitude'.[32] Oakeshott's conservatism is thus for the most part strikingly ahistorical in origin. Burke is not so much the founding father of conservatism therein as perhaps a role-model for a perennial way of thinking. Not that Oakeshott is unique. Cecil distinguished conservatism as a 'natural disposition' of the type that the author of *Rationalism in Politics* affirmed from 'modern Conservatism' – a view which again makes a nonsense of the notion that Burke, Richard Hooker or the Marquess of Halifax was the former -ism's author.[33] Those figures could be conservatism's patrons or benefactors but would in no sense be its originator.

Alexander's thesis hinges on the veracity of these two interpretations. Conservatism may indeed be contradictory if its origins lie in the eighteenth century, due to it being incapable of approving of its origins. But Alexander is surely wrong if conservatism has no 'constitutive event'.[34] Whichever of these origin stories is true, the analysis offered by Alexander is in toto ill-suited to the current enterprise, an exercise in

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[27] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 611.
[28] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp. 141-142.
[29] K. Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* [Ed. P. Kecskemeti] (London, 1953), p. 100, 82, 98-99.
[30] Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, p. 82, 89-90.
[31] Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, p. 134.
[32] Oakeshott, 'On being conservative', p. 415.
[33] H. Cecil, *Conservatism* (London, 1927) p. 8, 39.
[34] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 606.

ideology studies. According to him, 'it is because a revolution is an historical event that this contradiction [in conservatism] cannot be understood only in philosophical terms'.[35] But Alexander is in spite of his strivings too philosophical by half for our purposes. He describes as 'inadequate' conservatism's avowal of abstractions of the kind that it formally rejects. That it might be. But that will have to do. Man cannot live by logic alone (see below), and conservatives do not live as so many philosophers prescribe. Not that Alexander would necessarily take issue with such a contention. He posits that '[c]onservatism appears to be a very different thing when it is seen as a disposition, when it seen as one ideology among others in modern politics, and when it seen as the legacy of a conviction that modern politics is founded on an error'.[36] His conservatism is the third, and ours the second. The two are not mutually exclusive.

Sir Keith Joseph, sacral monarchist? Perhaps not. Yet if Alexander's conclusion is extraneous, one of his premises is highly pertinent. His argument provides an entry-point to an appreciation of the logic of conservatism. The conservative's consciousness of having an -ism comes when he alights upon the misunderstandings of his progressive foe. Alexander is correct. The conservative is in politics against his better judgement.[37] Purely logically, his preference as an ideologist is to crawl back into the historical womb from which he came. Conservatism's ultimate intent is murder-suicide. It wishes to see off its progressive foe and to be surplus to requirement. Bear in mind that Joseph's defence of inequality was motivated principally by egalitarians' pursuit of greater equality. Such ideals were indeed shadow ones. For conservatives, the answer to Hamlet's formulation - '[t]o be, or not to be, that is the question' - is obvious therefore. Their ideal is simply to be. But the conservative himself asserts that ours is not a world of pure ideals. Conservatism viewed as a single ideology is thus not so much contradictory as it is tragic. We have in this evaluation an ideological equivalent to Alexander's philosophical critique. What at one level in conservatism is contradiction is at another tragedy. Where Alexander's analysis and this one part company is thus over our understanding of what follows from conservatism's nature as the anti-ism -ism. Alexander, like so many before him, takes the Storming of the Bastille, the trial of Louis XVI, and the Reign of Terror as the birth pangs of conservatism. He may well be right to do so. What however of a Korean conservative in the here and now? Or indeed any conservative in our present who, knowing nothing of the French Revolution, is historically illiterate? Were ideologies to have specific historical and/or geographical origins, this would not require conservatism as an ideology at the micro level – Joseph's

[35] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 596.
[36] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 611.
[37] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 602.

conservatism as distinct from Burke's - to reach back to that time or place, the late eighteenth century, sacral monarchy or otherwise.

This is because particular conservatisms (Joseph's, Scruton's, etcetera) represent a general logic curtailed by a specific culture (see Chapter Two). By contrast, at the macro level, as a general reactivity and as depicted in essentialist accounts, the logic of conservatism is fated to either abstraction or absurdity. If logicality rather culture is the name of the game, we might suppose there to be a set of circumstances to which the logic of conservatism leads that are as much as possible trans-cultural. This thesis wishes to suggest, tongue firmly in cheek, that this state of affairs is that of the preadult.[38] If anything, and *on the basis of logic alone*, the conservative aspires to be Peter Pan and remain forever a child, 'before', as John Betjeman poetically put it, 'the dark hour of reason grows'.[39] Reason leads to critical analysis and thence on to such rationalist ideologies as liberalism and socialism, against which the conservative would feel the need, begrudgingly, to react. Call this a thought experiment. But it points to the importance in distinguishing between conservatism at the macro and micro levels respectively. The practical absurdity of the idea of conservatives as aspiring children highlights the significance of the micro and the difficulty in providing a definition of conservatism as a single coherent worldview. As the start of this conclusion implied, the present author prefers to extrapolate from the micro to the macro. In other words: "there exist individual conservatives, and this – conservatism – is what they have in common". Ideological existence thus precedes not so much ideological essence as familial resemblance.

This thesis has highlighted the centrality not of mere reaction but of (organic) change to conservatism, and thus the potential of that ideology to be just as much future- as past-oriented, for although Alexander is right to think that conservatism 'becomes what we call an ideology' by way of its reacting, he is wrong to imagine that 'conservatism is reaction'.[40] We can say that while the logic of conservatism at the level of the family resemblance might direct conservatives towards both the renunciation of their -ism and political innocence (similar to that of the child), or else perhaps to a kind of fatalism in the face of a culturally uncircumscribed organic change, such logic at the level of the family members from which the aforementioned resemblance is drawn – that is, at the level of specific conservatisms, including Joseph's, rather than the conservatism that Burke and Joseph held in common - can equally lead in other directions, towards, say, an indulgence in politics and, hence, a promotion of progress

[38] Another option is a cat: J. Gray, *Feline Philosophy: Cats and the Meaning of Life* (London, 2020).
[39] J. Betjeman, *Summoned by Bells* (Boston, Mass, 1960), p. 33.
[40] Alexander, 'The Contradictions of Conservatism', p. 602.

under the auspices of organic change for example, all with a convert's zeal, and thanks to conservatism at that micro level being a product of a logic (a certain "conservative-y" form) circumscribed by a culture (which provides a specific meaning).[41] Sadly, many political theorists, and not only Alexander, focus on the former at the expense of the latter. In *Why Liberalism Failed*, Patrick Deneen claims that '[l]iberalism's logic seeks to eliminate not only borders as we normally consider them – through political and economic globalization – but also the "boundaries" that exist in nature'.[42] The liberalism that he lambasts is like a driverless truck on a hill without a hand-break. But what this picture ignores is that all trucks have drivers; most logic is curtailed to one degree or another by a culture of some form or another. The flaw in Deneen's thinking is to imagine that liberalism or any other ideology is an essential type the features of which are reductive, as opposed to a hermeneutical understanding of ideologies as series of meanings.[43] The remainder of this conclusion deals with the logic of conservatism as attenuated by the culture that Deneen largely ignores. It addresses in particular one of the pitfalls entailed by the conservative fight – namely, what we might call the concretisation of conservatism.

The Cultures of Conservatism:

The political theorist Kenneth Minogue saw an analogy for liberalism in the tale of St. George and the dragon:

> After many centuries of hopelessness and superstition, St. George, in the guise of Rationality, appeared in the world somewhere about the sixteenth century. The first dragons upon whom he turned his lance were those of despotic kingship and religious intolerance. These battles won, he rested for a time, until such questions as slavery, or prison conditions, or the state of the poor, began to command his attention. During the nineteenth century, his lance was never still, prodding this way and that against the inert scaliness of privilege, vested interest, or patrician insolence. But, unlike St. George, he did not know when to retire. The more he succeeded, the more he became bewitched with the thought of a world free of dragons, and the less capable he became of ever returning to private life. He

[41] For example, it was because culture intervened in his political thought that Joseph did not take pop culture, about which he complained, to be an acceptable form of organic change: 'Joseph, Economic Research Council, London (15/01/1975)', pp. 3-4.
[42] P. Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed* (London, 2019), p. xix.
[43] For a critique of this kind of 'developmental historical logic', see M. Bevir and J. Blakey, *Interpretive Social Science: An Anti-Naturalist Approach* (Oxford, 2018), p. 144.

> needed his dragons. He could only live by fighting for causes - the people, the poor, the exploited, the colonially oppressed, the underprivileged and the underdeveloped.[44]

Is conservatism at the macro level so very different? Or, rather, can it be? Surely not, for as long as there exist rationalist ideologies to oppose, encompassing not only liberalisms but socialisms, individual conservatisms as defined by this thesis will continue to arise and persist in the defence of what they take to be organic change and the social order's extra-human origins. It can be no other way. The conservative may wish to retire, and well he might. But there will always be one of his ideological comrades, swivel-mirror in proverbial hand, ready to enter or wishing to remain in the ring. Egalitarianism had 'a short history', remember.[45] *Equality* maintained that one consequence of that -ism, 'the evil traditionally associated with a rigid class system […] had never been a feature of British society until we began to introduce it in our own lifetime'.[46] This dates the onset of the aforementioned evils to Jonathan Sumption's birthyear, 1948, at the earliest. There is however reason to think that egalitarianism had arisen and society been immobilised far later than that date, since Joseph and Sumption wrote of how the English middle class lurched left in the early 1970s.[47] Not only with respect to 'slumpflation', then, but more broadly, a picture builds up of the 1970s as being in many ways what Joseph, speaking with regard to that combination of a slump and inflation - a departure from stagnation and inflation (stagflation) – called 'a quantitatively new stage, not just an intensification of the previous stage'.[48] Thus, were Joseph to have felled "pseudo-Keynesianism" in the 1960s, there would still have been egalitarianism to counteract in the 1970s and, presumably, other rationalisms to contend with thereafter. And yet the danger in this course of action, of fighting the conservative fight, is that conservatisms become enamoured with what would ordinarily be eliminable concepts, and that, as exemplified by positional conservatism, cultural constraints become cultural icons.

The Anglo-American positional conservative closes in by default on nominally liberal territory. That this should be the case in the United States is relatively unremarkable. America has long been home to liberals, like Louis Hartz and John Dewey,

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[44] K. Minogue, *The Liberal Mind* (Indianapolis, 2001), p. 1.
[45] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 4.
[46] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 36; See also J. Blakely, *We Built Reality: How Social Science Infiltrated Culture, Politics, and Power* (Oxford, 2020).
[47] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 17.
[48] Joseph, *Monetarism is Not Enough*, pp. 10-11.

who equate the political culture of the U.S.A. with liberalism.[49] Many Americans claimed that their country was able to resist fascism due to its being fundamentally liberal, and many American liberals have therefore appeared and indeed do still seem conservative, because of their predisposition to defend the established order.[50] A notable exponent of the positional position, Samuel P. Huntington defined conservatism as 'the ideological justification of actual social and political institutions' – institutions that were in the context of his homeland, America, at his time of writing, in 1957, ostensibly liberal.[51] 'In preserving the achievements of American liberalism, American liberals ha[d] no recourse but to turn to conservatism', Huntington said.[52] When situational (synonymous with positional) theories of conservatism are not laid out in so many words as Huntington's, the gravitation in modern Anglo-America towards a liberal heritage of that which so many of them theorise is none the less noticeable for that. Denham and Garnett allude to a positional conservatism in one of their accounts of Sir Keith's political thought, only to stop at the last post and align Joseph with classical liberalism instead. They contend that, '[s]ince the institutions which he wished to preserve were characteristic of a bourgeois social order, a more plausible argument [than the one that says that Sir Keith was liberal in his economics and conservative with respect to social issues] would be that Joseph's thinking was in all respects consistent with classical liberalism'.[53] Their premise is suggestive of Huntington's definition of conservatism, while their conclusion affirms a form of liberalism.

Ought we to have gone the whole hog? Does the idea of Sir Keith Joseph as a positional conservative, rather than one with a morphology of the kind theorised by Freeden, make more sense of that politician's political thought? There are good reasons for thinking that it does – even though this thesis has argued otherwise - one of which is Joseph's own reflections. Had Joseph and his ideological comrades lived in nineteenth-century Britain, they would have been acknowledged as members of 'the liberal and radical tradition'.[54] That, at least, was the Sir Keith of 1975's impression. Liberals he and

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[49] L. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York, 1955); J. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York, [1939] 1989).

[50] For example, see the remark of the American neoconservative journalist and commentator, Bill Kristol: 'Conservatives should "rebrand" as liberals. Seriously. We're for liberal democracy, liberal world order, liberal economy, liberal education', <https://mobile.twitter.com/BillKristol/status/893889000045502464>, accessed 18/05/2021.

[51] S. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', *The American Political Science Review*, 51/2 (Jun., 1957), p. 459.

[52] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 473.

[53] Denham & Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph', p. 68.

[54] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 5.

Jonathan Sumption defined four years later as 'those who sanctify individual enterprise'. It was only because the word had been twisted 'into a byword for any collectivism which falls short of authoritarian socialism', they believed, that people thought otherwise.[55] Nor was this simply Sumption speaking. Four years prior to the publication of *Equality*, again in Birmingham in 1975, Joseph remarked how those collectivists who sought to increase the power of the establishment were wrong to regard themselves 'as the heirs of a liberal and radical tradition'.[56] That collectivists were not liberals does not mean that Joseph was a liberal rather than a conservative, or indeed that he thought of himself as such. His forays into semiotics need not be thought of as him staking a claim to liberalism as a discrete ideology. Certainly, in self-defence, Sir Keith was wont to summon up the ghosts of Victorian Liberals, of which Gladstone is the most striking example. The last Prime Minister under whom he served did much the same in her 1996 tribute of course. Thatcher we know from the Introduction referred to Joseph's liberal Conservatism as relating to 'the liberalism of Mr Gladstone not of the latter day collectivists'.[57] But which Mr. Gladstone, and his liberalism, really? Strikingly, Joseph invoked in February 1975 not the Liberal Prime Minister but the 'Tory reformer'.[58] Thus he questioned in the same year, and in the same speech in which he associated himself with the liberal and radical tradition, whether he might not in fact be a liberal-conservative or a radical-conservative, since he argued both for levelling up and for the benefits of free enterprise.[59]

Positional conservatism is a tempting framework. Defining Joseph as a positional conservative would confirm his status as a conservative (in the sense simply of one who seeks to conserve) while also recognising far more than this thesis has done the stereotypically liberal nature of his political thought, as exemplified in the latter instance by his 1961 appeal for '[a] liberal outward-looking policy' with regard to trade. Conservatives and socialists could 'make world trade liberal' without themselves becoming advocates of liberalism.[60] To be liberal on this understanding was to favour progress and reform, regardless of ideological affiliations. Despite his ambiguous attitude towards conservatism (covered in the Introduction), there is, as the previous paragraph shows, evidence to back the idea of Joseph as a positional conservative, in his defining himself both in relation to what he called the liberal/radical tradition and as a liberal-conservative. But then there is much which such an image misses out. A major sticking

[55] Joseph & Sumption, *Equality*, p. 28.
[56] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 6.
[57] M. Thatcher, 'Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture'.
[58] 'Joseph, Midland Hotel, Birmingham (22/02/1975)', p. 6.
[59] 'Joseph, Guild of British Newspapers, Birmingham (11/04/1975)', p. 6.
[60] 'Joseph, Grand Hotel, France (24/11/1961)', p. 3.

point for anyone who wishes to argue that Joseph was a conservative of the kind theorised by Huntington is how to make sense of Joseph's openness, evidenced throughout this thesis, towards changes to the values (see Chapter One) and, in particular, to the institutions (see Chapter Three) which a positional conservative would strive to preserve. Were he to have been that type of conservative, Sir Keith would surely not have been so open, as he in fact was, to the radical reform of Britain's traditional constitution. That he could accept such changes speaks to the centrality in his political thought of the concept of organic change and, by extension, to the utility of the description which Freeden provides of conservatives' ideological morphologies.

Overlaying this thesis' interpretation of Sir Keith Joseph's political thought atop positional conservatism thus sets in relief the benefits of the previous chapters' having thought of Joseph as a conservative with a morphology of the kind detailed by Freeden, and the poverty of one of the more plausible alternative approaches to studying his ideology. Above all, what positional conservatism leaves out, and what the morphological approach places front and centre, is an appreciation of the centrality of change in conservatism. But this is more than a second-order difference of interpretation. It also has first-order repercussions, given that, far more so than the understanding of ideologies as morphologies, many theories of conservatism as positional represent distinctly political interventions on the part of their authors. Huntington's is a case in point. It references 'America today' no less than five times.[61] In having an eye to the contemporary, Huntington's analysis was thus not only descriptive but prescriptive. 'Until the challenge of communism and the Soviet Union is eliminated or neutralized', its author argued, 'a major aim of American liberals must be to preserve what they have created. This is a limited goal but a necessary one'.[62] Huntington advised that 'American liberals […] lay aside their liberal ideology and […] accept the values of conservatism'.[63] His was thus an argument for conservatism's contemporary 'relevan[ce]' to 'the situation in which American liberalism f[ound] itself'.[64]

Indeed we have cause to think of Huntington as having shared with Joseph the same basic conservative morphology. Any conclusion, let alone this one, is hardly the time to map his morphology. Still, it pays to note that conservatism for Huntington arose out of reaction. Thus he wrote that '[t]he only threat extensive and deep enough to elicit a conservative response today is the challenge of communism and the Soviet Union to American society as a whole'.[65] Moreover, it is no good thinking with regard to

[61] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 454, 470, 472, 473.
[62] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 473.
[63] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', pp. 472-473.
[64] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 473.
[65] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 472.

Huntington's conservatism, as Huntington did of conservatism, that whereas progressives' ideologies are 'ideational' the conservative one is 'institutional'.[66] Conservatism for Huntington was comprised at least in part of concepts. That scholar listed six 'major components of the conservative creed' according to the supporters of all three of the definitions of conservatism – the aristocratic, the autonomous, and situational theories - that he surveyed, many of which relate in some way or another to substantive value judgements. Points (3) and (6) – respectively, that '[p]rudence, prejudice, experience, and habit are better guides than reason, logic, abstractions, and metaphysics', and that '[e]fforts to remedy existing evils usually result in even greater ones' – are epistemological.[67] But others track core conservative concepts. We might call point (1), that '[a] divine sanction infuses the existing, legitimate, social order', the extra-human origins of the social order.[68] While we can read point (2), that '[s]ociety is the natural, organic product of slow historical growth', as organic change.[69] Were 'conservatism […] the intellectual rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of human existence', then evidently, those prerequisites would be not simply 'intellectual'; they would be ideational.[70]

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[66] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 456; Huntington's is a false binary, for conservatism is neither 'transcendent' nor 'immanent'. Huntington can only have thought that conservatism 'lacks what might be termed a substantive ideal' because he thought of ideologies as having essences. But the reason that it would have been impossible to tell whether in the mid-twentieth century Portugal, Great Britain or the United States had the more conservative institutions was due to conservatisms' holding to family resemblances. And while it is true that '[n]o political philosopher has ever described a conservative utopia', substantive ideals do not necessitate utopias. Huntington elides 'substantive' with 'rationalist'. He ought to have extended to conservatism the courtesy that he gave to what he calls nonconservative ideologies, the ideals of which, though they 'change[d] from thinker to thinker and generation to generation […] their fundamental characteristic remain[ed] the same'. See Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', pp. 457-458.

[67] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 456.

[68] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 456.

[69] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 456; Huntington also noted how, as part of conservatism's third historic manifestation in the form of the mid-nineteenth century response by Europe's governing classes to the lower classes' demands for greater political participation, '[i]n Germany, where a major upheaval had not destroyed the structure of society, Stahl, Ranke, Savigny, and Ludwig von Gerlach articulated a more broadly conceived conservatism emphasising the *organic* [present author's emphasis] growth of society'. See Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 466.

[70] Huntington's seventh footnote is eye-catching. In it, Huntington asserts the near-impossibility of 'a conservative defense of sheer chaos', notes that Nazi Germany was 'chaos', and therefore asserts the impossibility of 'a conservative defense of such a society'. But, in the main body of his argument, Huntington states that '[t]he essence of conservatism is the passionate affirmation of the value of existing institutions'. Here

But if Huntington was a conservative, then his thinking of himself as a positional one goes to show one of the risks for conservatism as theorised in this thesis. A risk for those who launch into the ideological fight and carve out careers as conservatives – in the belief that conservatism, to quote Huntington, 'has a high and necessary function' - is that, in emphasising a particular situation or position in the form of their peripheral concepts, they overlook both the wider network of concepts in which those peripheral ones reside and, in particular, the core concepts which conservatives' eliminable ones typically defend. They thus begin to make of conservatism an ideology less open to change.[71] Hence in Huntington's hands conservatism became 'not just the absence of change [… but] the articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change', in spite of Huntington's concessions to core conservative concepts.[72] This is ultimately because that particular ideology worked backwards, from a prioritised periphery to an inebriated core, without much care for the adjacent concepts that would traditionally mediate between the two. Conservatism for Huntington exists simply to 'remind men of the institutional prerequisites of social order', and '[t]he characteristic elements of conservative thought', including most notably for our purposes 'the organic conception of society' (organic change), merely 'serve the overriding purpose of justifying the established order'.[73] On Freeden's synoptic account however, and as Joseph's political thought attests, it is not typically the case that 'conservatism is the rationalization of existing institutions in terms of history, God, nature, and man'; as the conservative's political thought pertains to the extra-human – in Huntington's case, to God and nature – and organic change, it is more often the other way around.[74]

Huntington's conservatism was therefore 'thinned' out. Its aspirations were limited and its morphology, unlike those of such 'thick' ideologies as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism as this thesis understands it, was impotent at supplying the coherent and practical programmes which politics requires of all successful ideologies.[75]

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again he concedes to the ideational. See Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 459.

[71] Conservatism is open to change because it too, like nonconservative ideologies, attends to 'existing institutions with an "ought demand" that the institutions be reshaped to embody the values of the ideology' (Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 458). It is just that in any conservative's case, the bar is far lower: institutions will likely have passed so long as they do not obstruct organic change or the workings of the extra-human origins of the social order.

[72] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 461.

[73] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 473, 457.

[74] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 457.

[75] If not true of the word "conservatism", differing conservatisms, like the words "liberalism", "communism", "democracy" and "fascism" on Huntington's account, do 'convey an intimation as to what should be the distribution of power and other values in

Huntington's conservatism did not so much replace or remove concepts, in the way Freeden has described thin-centered ideologies, as it did obfuscate and neglect them, as in the case of its core ones. The result was much the same however: 'a structural inability to offer complex ranges of argument, because many chains of ideas one would normally expect to find stretching from the general and abstract to the concrete and practical, from the core to the periphery, as well as in the reverse direction' were ignored.[76] This "conservatism" looks more like nationalism or populism, the latter of which according to Muller can '[a]s a thin-centred ideology […] be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism'.[77] And indeed, in believing that 'the liberals must be the conservatives in America today' in order to enable 'not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as the successful defense of those which already exist', conservatives are according to Huntington little more than liberalism's placeholder.[78] But conservatisms, though it is true to say that they arise out of reaction, do not exist at the behest of other ideologies' social ontologies and normative demands. While he was right to argue that '[t]he conservative ideology […] appears only when the challengers to the established institutions reject the fundamentals of the ideational theory in terms of which those institutions have been molded and created', Huntington was wrong to then say that, '[i]f the challengers do not question the basic values of the prevailing philosophy, the controversy between those for and against institutional change is carried on with reference to the commonly accepted ideational philosophy'.[79] In reality, conservatisms will in those circumstances frequently persist, reacting as they go, in defense of their core concepts.

To adapt Weber, we might call the phenomena described above the iron cage of conservatism.[80] That ideology can become bureaucratic and thereby rigid and inflexible

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society'. They do 'posit some vision as to how political society should be organized'. See Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 457.

[76] M. Freeden, 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?', *Political Studies*, 46/4 (1998), p. 750.

[77] C. Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39/4 (Autumn 2004), p. 544; See also B. Stanley, 'The thin ideology of populism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13/1 (2008), p. 99.

[78] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 472; Tellingly, Huntington implies that, were then-present circumstances not to demand conservatism, he would have been a liberal: '[t]he articulate exposition of a liberal ideology was necessary to convert others to liberal ideas and to reform existing institutions continuously along liberal lines'. See Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 472.

[79] Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', p. 458.

[80] M. Weber, 'The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism', in his '*The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism' and Other Writings* [Eds. and Trans. P. Baehr and G. C. Wells] (London, 2002), pp. 1-202.

beneath the weight of self-made rules and boundaries. Such conservatives are within their iron cages competent in routine situations but incapable of the ideational flexibility at which conservatisms are so often adept. If inadvertently, the Conservative MP Peter Lilley, who served in the Thatcher and Major governments, diagnosed the same essential problem in his 1999 RAB Butler Memorial Lecture, in which he critiqued what he took to be the widely-held Conservative belief 'that the primary or even only role of Conservatism is the application and extension of the free market paradigm'.[81] The reason why the free market should not have been extended any further into the public services, Lilley believed, '[wa]s that we have obligations to others […] [a]nd, of its very nature, fulfilling an obligation involves a transfer from those who have to those who have not; whereas the market is about mutually beneficial exchanges between self reliant individuals'.[82] But the kind of self-petrifying conservatism that Lilley criticised when he complained of how 'we must stop behaving as if we are only true to ourselves when we are applying the free market paradigm to anything or everything' looks in 2022 like an invasive species.[83] Thus we read debates as to how the contemporary Conservative Party has betrayed Thatcherism, and as to how there are such things as 'conservative policies' to be betrayed in the first place.[84] True enough, Sir Keith Joseph might have found himself in a similar position. Perhaps in time his conservatism may have regressed into the kind of dogma that Lilley denounced. Having described himself, as this conclusion has shown, as a liberal-conservative, Joseph's liberalism could well have overwhelmed his conservatism. What this thesis has proposed however is that, in spite of Sir Keith's reputation as the Mad Monk, Joseph's political thought represents in many ways a model alternative - a form of conservatism dedicated to a certain kind of change and itself open to change.

[81] P. Lilley, 'Transcript of the RAB Butler memorial lecture on the Welfare State given by the Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP', *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1999/apr/20/conservatives?CMP=share_btn_tw>, accessed 17/03/2021.

[82] Lilley, 'RAB Butler memorial lecture'.

[83] Lilley, 'RAB Butler memorial lecture'.

[84] D. Gauke, 'The Brexit project is betraying everything Margaret Thatcher stood for', *The New Statesman*, <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2021/11/the-brexit-project-is-betraying-everything-margaret-thatcher-stood-for>, accessed 02/12/2021; S. Baker, 'We should be using our 80-seat majority to implement conservative policies, not policies that wouldn't look out of place in Labour's manifesto', <https://twitter.com/SteveBakerHW/status/1488874770770939908?cxt=HHwWiMC-rebtxakpAAAA>, accessed 05/02/2022.

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