Essays on the Political Economy of Protest Voting

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I hereby declare that this thesis is all my own work, except as indicated in the text

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to study the causal effect of socio-economic shocks on political attitudes and voting. The first chapter documents that the arrival of immigrants from Eastern European countries after the European enlargement caused an increase in Euroscepticism in Great Britain. The second chapter studies instead how a large wave of forced migration shaped both electoral outcomes and party strategy in 1960s France. In the third chapter, I consider instead the effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis and of the policies implemented by the Labour government on electoral outcomes. I show that areas that are likely to have benefited from the rescue package targeted at the financial sector increased their support for the Labour party.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since 2010 populist parties have been on the rise in almost all Western countries. The Brexit vote on 23 June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States represented two watershed moments, marking the start of a new political landscape characterised by the strong presence of populist/radical-right parties across the globe. Since then, there has been a flourishing of studies on the drivers of the vote for populist/radical-right parties. Several explanations have been proposed: financial crises, trade shocks and massive migration/refugee waves among many others.

While the first two explanations focus on economic shocks which affect income and employment, immigration can have both economic and socio-cultural implications, thus also providing an explanation for the rise of nativist attitudes among voters for populist/radical-right parties. Although many European countries have been historically associated with large waves of emigration, starting from the late 1970s, and even more from the new Millennium, many of those same countries have experienced subsequent waves of migrants and refugees arrivals. In many cases, inflows of foreign-born coincided with an increase in support for populist parties, leading both economists and political scientists to study the existence of a possible causal mechanism linking the two phenomena. Several studies, focusing on both historical and present settings and covering different countries have

documented that migration waves cause an increase in the popular vote for populist parties. Different channels have been suggested to explain the backlash of native citizens against the newly arrived immigrants: cultural threat, a perceived increase in criminal activity and also economic threat among others.

The aim of this PhD thesis is to study the causal effect of socio-economic shocks on political attitudes and voting. I focus in particular on important socio-economic shocks that can have long-lasting political effects: episodes of massive inflows of migrants and the 2008 Financial Crisis.

The first two chapters of this PhD thesis build on the Political Economy of Migration literature and study the impact of massive waves of immigrants' arrival on political attitudes and voting behaviours in both historical and contemporary settings. I also analyse how party strategies can be influenced by the arrival of immigrants in a particular setting in which immigrants had the right to vote in national elections and were associated with clear and salient political issues.

In the first chapter, I study how the arrival of immigrants from Eastern European countries in the UK in the aftermath of the 2004 EU enlargement affected British attitudes towards the European Union. After the enlargement, almost a million citizens from Eastern European countries settled in the UK in a few years. Using longitudinal survey data, I document that this massive migration wave caused an increase in Euroscepticism in those areas that, after the European enlargement, received more immigrants from Eastern European countries. I also show that one possible driver of this result is the increased threat of being affected by criminal activity which at the time was associated in the British media with the large number of incoming immigrants.

In the second chapter, I study the political impact of a large forced migration wave: the massive repatriation of French citizens from Algeria. When Al-

geria became independent in 1962, one million people left the country and repatriated to France. A unique feature of this migration wave is that repatriates were French citizens and could vote in French elections immediately after arrival. By looking at this episode I find that, similar to other studies in the literature, support for far-right parties increased in areas more exposed to the arrival of migrants. One key difference from these canonical studies is that, in the case of the French repatriates from Algeria, increased support for far-right parties is likely to be a direct consequence of the repatriates themselves voting for the far-right, and not necessarily a reaction by natives. I also show that the increased support for far-right parties persists even in the long run. Additionally, I analyse how this massive repatriation wave shaped the political strategy of French parties. I show that far-right parties tried to capture the new electorate by giving more prominence – in their political manifestos – to the issues which were salient for the repatriates. Far-right parties, in particular, were the first to propose an indemnification for the economic losses suffered by the repatriates when they were forced to leave Algeria. Mainstream parties also adopted a similar strategy – but only in subsequent elections. Hence, proposals initially advanced by the far-right became mainstream in the French political debate.

The third chapter focuses instead on a different topic: the effect of the financial crisis and of the policies implemented by the Labour government on electoral outcomes. The financial crisis caused serious damage to the UK's economy leading to a significant decrease in GDP, and a staggering increase in unemployment and public debt. As a response to the crisis, the Labour government introduced a series of measures to stabilise the financial system: it injected 1 trillion pounds into the economy and nationalised two banks. In this chapter, I show that, compared to its pre-crisis level, support for the Labour party increased in areas characterised by higher employment in the financial sector. Hence, the policies implemented by the Labour government

to bail out the banking system appeared to have secured greater support for the incumbent in areas that are likely to have benefited the most from the government's response to the crisis.

In this thesis, I studied the causal effect of socio-economic shocks on political attitudes and voting. I first showed that immigration can affect citizens' attitudes, voting behaviour and also parties' political strategy. Migration thus affects both political demand and political supply and can have an impact on several possible variables that can provide an explanation for the recent surge in populist/radical-right parties. Additionally, I showed that other substantial economic shocks, such as the 2008 Financial Crisis, can cause significant and long-lasting political consequences.

Chapter 2

I Want My Country Back! British Nationalist attitudes After the European Enlargement

Abstract

On 1 May 2004, ten Eastern European countries joined the European Union and unencumbered free mobility led to one million Eastern European citizens migrating to the United Kingdom in the aftermath of this expansion. In the same years, an increase in Eurosceptic attitudes has been documented in the UK. This study, using a shift-share instrumental variable strategy, causally assesses the impact of the Eastern European migration shock on British citizens' attitudes towards the EU. The results indicate that migration from Eastern Europe contributed to increasing the number of British citizens considering membership in the EU as non-beneficial. An immigrant-related crime threat is a likely driver of the observed increased Euroscepticism.

2.1 Introduction

Since the Brexit referendum in 2016, several studies have looked for an explanation of the referendum outcome. A stylized fact emerging from these studies is that Euroscepticism has been on the rise in the UK even before 2016 (Becker et al., 2018; Fieldhouse et al., 2019). In fact, UK Independence Party (UKIP) has fared consistently well in European elections since 2004. Still, causal evidence on the determinants of Eurosceptic attitudes before the Brexit referendum remains scant. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, individual-level studies documenting a causal mechanism explaining the rise of Euroscepticism before the Brexit referendum are lacking.

In this paper I employ a longitudinal survey dataset, the British Household Panel Survey, to study one possible driver of Euroscepticism: immigration. I exploit a quasi-experiment represented by the 2004 Eastern European enlargement, which led to the arrival in the UK of several hundred thousand immigrants from the Eastern European countries. To account for the potential endogeneity of the immigrants' spatial distribution, I instrument their location using a shift-share instrumental variable based on the Eastern Europeans' past settlement or, alternatively, on the past settlement of foreign-born individuals. I show that the arrival the Eastern European immigrants caused an increase in the Eurosceptic attitudes of the individuals living in the areas more exposed to the migration shock. I also find that, in the same period, it is also possible to observe an increase in nativist attitudes of the British people. One possible mechanism explaining the results is the perceived threat of being affected by crime, which increases in the areas more exposed to the arrival of Eastern European immigrants. The inclusion of Economic trends such as changes in local authorities' Gross Value Added, or in unemployment before 2004 does not alter my conclusion. Even accounting for the respondents working in sectors most affected by the China's trade shock leads to the same results.

This paper contributes to the literature on Brexit and UK Euroscepticism, and more generally to the body of work that has analysed the electoral consequences of immigration. Several studies highlighted possible explanatory variables which may have caused the Brexit referendum outcome. Becker et al. (2018) analysed the Brexit vote at the Local Authority District level. They found that exposure to trade or immigration seems to have little explanatory power. Instead, the employment structure, poverty and unemployment seem to be better predictors of the referendum outcome. Looking at individual-level data Alabrese et al. (2019) shows that being older, white, less educated (among other variables) strongly correlates with voting "Leave" at the referendum. Additionally, looking for causal explanations of the Brexit vote, Colantone and Stanig (2018) found that the "China Trade Shock" represents a plausible candidate. Other studies focused on Eurosceptic attitudes in the UK even before the Brexit referendum. Fetzer (2019) showed that the strong vote for UKIP, the main British Eurosceptic party, in the 2014 European elections can be explained by the "Austerity programme" introduced by the Cameron government in 2010. The vote for UKIP can also be considered an important proxy of the future "Leave" vote in the Brexit referendum.

The fast-growing literature on the electoral consequences of immigration has mainly focused on the effect of new immigrants on the political behaviour of native citizens. In recent years, attention has been directed to the association between far-right voting and migration waves and in several instances, it has been shown that the arrival of immigrants led to an increase in the vote for (radical) right parties. In an early contribution, Otto and Steinhardt (2014) found an increase in the vote for far-right parties in areas of Hamburg which experienced a higher inflow of immigrants and refugees. Barone et al. (2016), Halla et al. (2017) and Edo et al. (2019) looking respectively at the Italian, Austrian and French experiences uncovered similar results. Additionally,

Fieldhouse et al. (2019) argues that the increased saliency of immigration after the enlargement is positively associated with an increase in Euroscepticism and in UKIP's support in the UK. Mayda et al. (2022) studies the political impact of migration waves in the US by distinguishing between low and high skilled immigrants. The authors find that only the arrival of low-skilled immigrants increases the vote share of Republican candidates while the arrival of high-skilled immigrants decreases it. The association between (radical) right voting and immigration is not just a recent phenomenon. In fact, as shown by Tabellini (2020) the inflow of immigrants in the US during the "age of mass migration" (1910-1930), led to the election of more conservatives legislators and the introduction of more anti-immigrant legislation. These results were driven in particular by the arrival of immigrants from countries that were more culturally distant.

While several studies have documented the positive association between immigrant arrivals and support for (radical) right parties, some recent contributions have shown that these findings might be context-specific. For example, considering electoral results in Danish municipalities Dustmann et al. (2019) finds that the arrival of refugees increased the vote share for radical right parties only in rural municipalities. In large urban municipalities, the effect is smaller and in some cases, it turns even negative. A similar pattern has been uncovered by Steinmayr (2021), who finds that the arrival of refugees in Austria could even reduce the votes for far-right parties. This result could be explained by the "contact theory": more exposure to refugees in everyday life might decrease more negative attitudes towards them (Allport, 1954).

My study contributes to both strands of the literature by showing how a massive arrival of immigrants caused an increase in Euroscepticism in Great Britain before Brexit. Exploiting longitudinal survey data and within-individual variation I am able to show how the same individual living in

areas more exposed to the arrival of Eastern European immigrants became more Eurosceptic after the European enlargement. The time period considered in the analysis allows me to also rule out possible important confounders of an increase in Euroscepticism such as the financial crisis and the austerity programme introduced after 2010.

This paper proceeds as follows: in section 2.2 I discuss the historical background of the European enlargement, in section2.3 I present the main data sources and summary statistics, in section 2.4 I discuss the empirical strategy adopted to identify the causal effect of migration on Euroscepticism, in section 2.5 I present the main results and possible mechanisms, in section 2.6 I show that the results are robust to several tests, finally section 2.7 concludes this paper.

2.2 Historical background

On 1 May 2004 ten new countries[1] joined the European Union. This was the result of a long process that started immediately after the fall of the Communist bloc in the East. In order to be admitted into the European Union, new members had to accept a series of conditions. In particular, they had to be recognised as European States (Article 49 of the EU Treaty), they had to accept the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (Article 6 of the EU Treaty). They also had to fulfil the economic and political conditions known as the Copenhagen criteria (Union, 2007).

Given the significant gap in GDP per capita between the EU 15 and the Eastern European accession countries and the resulting concerns about excessive migration inflows, EU 15 member countries were allowed to temporarily restrict the free mobility of citizens from the accession countries for a period

[1]Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta

up to seven years (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2014). Germany and Austria took full advantage of this transition period, restricting access to their labour markets for the whole seven years period. Many other EU members restricted free entry for two years. The UK, along with Ireland and Sweden, decided not to impose any barriers against the Eastern European migrants. This decision was taken as a way to address labour market shortages in some specific booming sectors. Contemporary estimates used by the Labour government to justify its choice suggested that migration flows were likely to be modest "only around 5,000-13,000 Eastern European" (Dustmann et al., 2003), as long as other EU countries would have not restricted the free entry of people from the accession countries.[2] The only requirement for the immigrants arriving from the accession countries was to be registered in the Working Right Scheme, which allowed the UK government to monitor the inflow. The liberalisation of the UK labour market had a great effect on the post enlargement migration flows. In fact, differently from the past, when Germany and Austria were the main destinations of Eastern European migrants, the UK and Ireland took on that role, with a total increase of more than 1.2 million EU8 residents between 2004 and 2007 (Kahanec and Kurekova, 2011).

As figure 2.1 shows, the 2004 enlargement represents a change in immigration patterns to the UK, with a sharp increase in the number of migrants originating in the European Union. The newly arrived immigrants were younger than the British natives- 81% were between 18-34 years old - and worked in the Admin, Business & Management sector and in Hospitality & Catering. They settled across different UK regions with a slight prevalence in the East of England, the Midlands and London (border Report, 2009).

[2]The actual report was more cautious pointing out that: "The forecasts indicate that net immigration from the AC-10 to the UK after the current enlargement of the EU will be relatively small, at between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year up to 2010. However, these figures need to be interpreted with great caution due to the methodological problems pointed out at various stages in the report."



Figure 2.1: EU Immigration inflow. Source: Office for National Statistics (2014)

The enlargement and the arrival of thousands of immigrants from the accession countries were associated with political backlash in different European countries. In many cases, the stereotypical characterisation of the Eastern European immigrants as "Polish Plumbers" was used to trigger political reactions. As an example, in France, the threat represented by immigration from Poland was used, by right-wing politicians, to influence the 2005 referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe Houchard (2013). In the UK, talking about Eastern European migrants, the UKIP leader Nigel Farage pointed out: "That one issue had more impact on the political direction of the UK than any other political decision in recent years. No question about that."(Consterdine, 2016; Parker et al., 2021). As a consequence, the will to take back control over the border and immigration has been considered an important driver of the Brexit referendum outcome (Ashcroft, 2016). Despite newspaper articles and surveys that described how the arrival of the Eastern European immigrants influenced the vote in favour of Brexit, the real cause of the referendum outcome is still debated.

In the next sections, I will show that the arrival of the Eastern European immigrants in the immediate aftermath of the enlargement caused an increase in the Eurosceptic attitudes of British citizens.

2.3 Data

The main source of data for this study is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), an annual longitudinal survey initiated in 1991. The British Household Panel Survey contains observations on a total of approximately 10,000 individuals (5,500 households) located in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The longitudinal nature of this dataset allows researchers to study the evolution of the attitudes of the same UK citizen over time.[3]

In order to study the effect of the enlargement on British anti-European attitudes, my analysis is restricted only to England, Scotland and Wales.[4] The final dataset is represented by a balanced panel of around 8,000 individuals followed from 1999 to 2008 and located in 367 different local authority districts.[5]

The British Household Panel Survey asks several attitudinal questions. Starting from 1999 (and after that in 2002 and 2006) the BHPS asked questions regarding individual views towards the European Union and British membership in the EU. In this study, I use these questions as a proxy for the anti-European sentiments of the British citizens before and after the Eastern European enlargement. The first question considered in the analysis asks: "Generally speaking, do you think that Britain's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or is it neither good nor bad?". The answers have been recoded as an indicator variable taking a value of 1 for "Bad" and 0 for "Good" to simplify the interpretation of the results.[6] In

[3]The British Household Panel after 2008 changed its name to "Understanding society". After 2006 there are no further iterations of the questions used as a proxy for the Eurosceptic sentiments. My sample thus includes only the British Household Panel Survey.

[4]The respondents from Northern Ireland were included in the British Household Panel survey only starting from 2001. In order to perform the analysis for as many years as possible Northern Ireland has not been included in the study.

[5]In Great Britain there is a total of 380 local authority districts, the average population in 2001 was about 150,000 individuals.

[6]The answer "Neither good nor bad" has been recoded as a 0. In table A.2 I show that, even without this recoding of the variable the results obtained are similar.

the following sections this variable has been labelled “Anti Eu". The second question I will be using asks: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?”. The variable is coded such that a value of 1 represents the answer “Not benefited” while a value 0 represents the answer “Benefited". In the following sections, this variable will be defined as “Eu non beneficial”. The third question asks: “Do you think Britain’s long-term policy should be: to leave the European Union, to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers, to leave things as they are, to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers, to work for the formation of a single European government.” The variable has been recoded as an indicator taking a value of 1 for the first two answers and 0 for the other possible answers. In the following analysis, this variable has been labelled as “Less EU”. In an additional analysis, since these questions do not completely overlap, I combine them in a single outcome using Principal Component Analysis.



Figure 2.2: Eurosceptic attitudes

Figure 2.2 shows the change in the anti-European sentiments over time. Using all three different measures, it is possible to observe a substantial increase in Euroscepticism after 2004, the year of the European enlargement.

The percentage of respondents who think that Britain's membership in the EU is undesirable increased from 21.29% in 1999 to 29.08% in 2006; similarly, the respondents who think that Britain's membership in the EU has not been beneficial increased from 49.38% in 1999 to 57.3% in 2006 and those who think that EU power should be reduced or want to leave the European Union increased from 49.09% in 1999 to 63.07% in 2006. These indicators suggest a significant increase of Eurosceptic attitudes after the Eastern European enlargement.

These variables, used as proxies for Euroscepticism, also show a significant degree of geographical variation. At the local authority level, the three different proxies for anti-European sentiments show a significant degree of correlation but do not completely overlap.[7]



Figure 2.3: Euroscepticism across British local Authorities in 2006

The main hypothesis of this study is that the arrival of Eastern European immigrants after the enlargement caused an increase in Eurosceptic outcomes. To test this hypothesis I thus collect information on the number of

[7]The correlation between these three variables varies between .4 and .55

immigrants living in Great Britain from all census waves between 1991 and 2011. The main variable of interest will be the inflow of Eastern European immigrants between 2001 and 2011 as a share of the 2011 local Authority population.



Figure 2.4: Eurosceptic attitudes and exposure to Eastern European immigration

Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of Euroscepticism over time by the intensity of exposure to the Eastern European immigration. The first two measures of Euroscepticism increased more in areas above the median exposure to the arrival of Eastern European immigrants after the enlargement and point in favour of the causal effect of migrants on Euroscepticism.

To account for possible important confounders my dataset also comprises a set of additional demographic information collected from the censuses 1991-2011. I use information on the productive/employment structure of the different local authorities, as well as information on the price of houses all taken at their 2001 level, i.e. before the enlargement. In particular the controls used in throughout the papers are the employment shares in several

sectors such as: the employment in Agriculture, Fishing, Manufacturing, Retail, Hotels and Accommodation, Transportation, Finance, Real estate, Public Administration, Education and Health. Additionally, to account for other socio-economic differences among the British local authorities I also control for the Median House price, the unemployment rate, the Gross Value Added and the share of long-term ill people in each local authority in 2001. Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of these variables as well as the other variables used in this study.

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs	Min.	Max.
Individual Variables					
Anti EU	0.24	0.43	21155	0.00	1.00
Less EU	0.55	0.50	20048	0.00	1.00
EU non beneficial	0.52	0.50	17995	0.00	1.00
Trust	0.45	0.50	37997	0.00	1.00
Close to Conservatives	0.31	0.46	47335	0.00	1.00
Close to Labour	0.46	0.50	47335	0.00	1.00
Close to Libdem	0.13	0.34	47335	0.00	1.00
Close to Others	0.01	0.11	47335	0.00	1.00
Britain the Best	0.74	0.44	30534	0.00	1.00
Crime	0.53	0.50	15354	0.00	1.00
Life Satisfaction	0.77	0.42	69118	0.00	1.00
Employed in Manufacturing	0.01	0.12	79120	0.00	1.00
Local Authority Variables					
Eastern European inflow 2001-11	0.02	0.01	79120	0.00	0.12
Predicted East Eu inflow 2001-11	0.01	0.02	79120	0.00	0.18
Median House price	73812.10	31257.60	79120	33500.00	350000.00
Unemployment share	0.03	0.01	79120	0.01	0.07
GVA per capita	0.02	0.01	79120	0.01	0.15
Share of long-term ill	0.00	0.00	79120	0.00	0.00
Employment in Manufacturing	0.16	0.05	79120	0.00	0.34
Employment in Retail	0.16	0.02	79120	0.00	0.24
Employment in Hotels	0.05	0.01	79120	0.00	0.14
Employment in Transportation	0.06	0.01	79120	0.00	0.21
Employment in Finance	0.04	0.02	79120	0.00	0.17
Employment in Realestate	0.11	0.04	79120	0.00	0.29
Employment in Public Administration	0.06	0.02	79120	0.00	0.25
Employment in Education	0.08	0.01	79120	0.00	0.20
Employment in Health	0.11	0.02	79120	0.00	0.17
Employment in Agriculture	0.02	0.02	79120	0.00	0.11
Employment in Fishing	0.00	0.00	79120	0.00	0.03
Unemployment share 1999-2003	0.01	0.00	77138	−0.00	0.02
GVA Manufacturing 2001	475.21	386.49	79120	13.00	2657.00
GVA Manufacturing 1999-2003	−0.05	0.13	79120	−0.44	0.44
GVA 1999-2003	0.19	0.07	79120	0.01	0.39

2.4 Empirical Strategy

2.4.1 OLS

My analysis will be carried out using a difference-in-difference methodology. The main hypothesis is that the arrival of Eastern European immigrants, after the 2004 enlargement, caused a change in Eurosceptic attitudes. I expect this change to be larger the stronger is the exposure of a local authority district to the arrival of the Eastern European immigrants after the enlargement. To assess this hypothesis I estimate the following model:

$$Y_{ijrt} = \beta_1 I_{jr2001-11} \times \tau_t + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{jr2001} + \gamma_i + \tau_t * \delta_r + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{2.1}$$

Where i represents the individual respondent, j the local authorities, r the regions and t the different time periods. Y_{ijrt} are different measures of Euroscepticism, $I_{jr2001-11}$ is the inflow of Eastern European immigrants who arrived between 2001 and 2011 as a share of the 2001 local authority population and $\mathbf{X}_{jr2001}$ is a vector of socio-demographic controls fixed at 2001. Longitudinal studies such as the British Household Panel contain repeated observations of the same individual i, who is followed in different waves. This feature of the dataset allows me to use individual fixed effects (γ_i) which capture any individual time-invariant characteristic. Additionally, I capture region-specific trends using region by year fixed effects ($\tau_t * \delta_r$). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level throughout the analysis. The coefficient of interest is β_1 and captures the within-individual change in Euroscepticism that is caused by living in areas more exposed to the arrival of Eastern European immigrants after the enlargement.



Figure 2.5: Eastern European inflow and Euroscepticism

Figure 2.5 plots β_1 over time.[8] With the exception of the "Less EU" outcome, greater exposure to post-enlargement immigration had a positive and significant effect on Eurosceptic attitudes after 2004. The plots also show no sign of a significant pre-trend in the outcome variables. This result is confirmed by the analysis carried out in the last plot where I consider an index for Euroscepticism obtained by combining together the previous three measures using Principal Component Analysis. Post-enlargement immigration had a sizeable effect: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of Eastern European immigrants who arrived in a local authority between 2001 and 2011 increased the likelihood of manifesting Eurosceptic attitudes by between 1 and 4 percentage points.

One possible concern may arise in the context of a massive wave of arrival of migrants. Migrants can in fact sort into areas according to both observable and unobservable characteristics thus generating a bias in the OLS estimates. As an example, immigrants could potentially avoid settling in areas where anti-immigrant or Eurosceptic attitudes are more widespread, as they might

[8] Table A.3 shows the table of the coefficients.

feel less likely to be welcomed in those areas. In this case, the OLS estimates presented previously would be biased downward.

To address this concern in the next section I use an instrumental variable strategy to account for the endogenous distribution of immigrants across space.

2.4.2 Instrumental variable

In this section I use an instrumental variable approach, based on a standard shift-share design (Card, 2001), to study the relation between Eastern European migrants and Euroscepticism. The power of this instrument rests on the hypothesis that there is persistence in the location choice of the immigrants over time. Immigrants from similar origin countries tend to locate in similar areas to previous immigrants from the same origin countries. Hence, it is possible to predict the distribution of the new-coming immigrants according to the pre-existing distribution of immigrants from the same countries of origin.

I construct the shift-share as:

$$Z_{jr2001-11} = \alpha_{jr} I_{2001-11} \tag{2.2}$$

Where α_{jr} represents the share of Eastern European immigrants in 2001, while $I_{2001-11}$ represents the Inflow of Eastern European immigrants between 2001 and 2011.

The new estimation equation now becomes:

$$Y_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \widehat{I_{jr2001-11}} \times \tau_t + \beta_2 X_{jr2001} + \gamma_i + \delta_r * \tau_t + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{2.3}$$

$\widehat{I_{jr2001-11}}$ is the instrumented inflow of Eastern European migrants and τ_t represents this time an indicator variable that takes value 0 before the enlargement and 1 after.

Figure 2.6 shows the scatter plot of the first-stage regression. The predicted inflow, using the shift-share, is positively and significantly correlated with the actual inflow of Eastern European immigrants.



Figure 2.6: Actual and predicted Eastern European inflow 2001-11.

The instrument is thus relevant in explaining the distribution of the inflow of Eastern European immigrants. In the following tables and throughout the paper, I will always report the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistic for both the Eastern European inflow and the interaction with the time dummy. This statistic is always greater than 10 thus showing that the instrument is not weak.

The key identifying assumption requires that the instrument should influence Euroscepticism only through the inflow of Eastern European immigrants. This assumption can be violated if areas with a higher share of Eastern European immigrants before the European enlargement were already on different trends in terms of Eurosceptic attitudes. In this case, the previous share of Eastern European immigrants would have an impact

on Euroscepticism other than the one of the subsequent immigration wave. Alternatively, another possible violation of the exclusion restriction could arise if local authority characteristics correlated with the instrument could affect Euroscepticism.

Following Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) I address these concerns in two ways: first in Table B.1 of the Appendix B I show that both the initial share of Eastern European immigrants and the predicted inflow of Eastern European immigrants, do not significantly predict any change in Euroscepticism before the European enlargement; second in Table B.2 I augment my specification by interacting my control variables, fixed in 2001, with year dummies. I show that the results obtained with this specification do not alter my previous conclusions. I also replicate the same robustness exercises for the alternative version of the shift-share (see Tables B.3 and B.4) and my results are unaffected.

2.5 Results

Table 2.2 shows the impact of the arrival of Eastern European immigrants on the different measures of Euroscepticism using the shift-share instrument described above.

The coefficients are the result of 2SLS regressions and I thus report the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistic for both the inflow and the inflow interacted by the time dummy.

Table 2.2: Euroscepticism and Eastern European immigrants. IV: Eastern European in 2001

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.524**	4.092***	2.304*	11.080***
	(1.102)	(1.212)	(1.343)	(3.384)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	510	404	430	379
SW stat Inflow	150	100	115	100

Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

The arrival of Eastern European immigrants increases the probability of becoming Eurosceptic after the enlargement. A 1% increase in the share of Eastern European immigrants who arrived between 2001 and 2011 increases: the probability of seeing the European Union as a bad thing by around 2.5%, it also increases the probability of seeing the British membership in the EU as non-beneficial by around 4%. The third measure of Euroscepticism is also significant but to a smaller extent. Similar to the OLS case, The variable created using Principal Component Analysis is still positive and significant. This result means that, despite some differences in the proxies for the Eurosceptic sentiment, it is possible to conclude that the inflow of Eastern European immigrants caused an increase in Eurosceptic attitudes after the enlargement.

Comparing these results with the one in table A.4 of the Appendix A I observe that, with respect to the OLS, the IV estimates are larger in magnitude. This result suggests the existence of a downward bias in the OLS estimates, which is likely to be explained by the fact that migrants may have avoided areas with stronger Eurosceptic attitudes.

2.5.1 Mechanisms

I now turn to investigate possible mechanisms that could explain the causal effect of the arrival of Eastern European migrants on the rise of Euroscepticism. In particular, I consider the possible effects triggered by the arrival of Eastern European immigrants, focusing on their political and social impact. I start by considering in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.3 the effect of immigrant inflows on respondents' political preference for the main political parties (Conservative, Labour and LibDem) and an aggregate describing all other political groups[9]. The results indicate that the immigration wave did not have any significant political effect. In fact, in the areas of larger exposure to the migration wave, I cannot observe any change in the likelihood of being closer to the conservative or labour party after the enlargement.

The arrival of immigrants from Eastern European countries can potentially affects respondents' sense of security and trust towards other people. Hence, in columns (5)-(8) I study if the arrival of migrants from Eastern European countries affected several other variables such as life satisfaction, trust, crime and nationalism.[10] Variable "Britain Best" is a variable which takes value 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement: 'I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world" and 0 otherwise. Variable "Life Satisfaction" takes value 1 if people are not satisfied with their life overall and 0 otherwise. Variable "Trust" takes value 1 if the respondents believe that "Most people can be trusted". Finally, the variable "Crime" takes value 1 if respondents answer positively to the question: "Do you ever worry about the possibility that you, or anyone else who lives with you, might be the victim of crime?".

Table 2.3 shows no effect of migrants' arrival on life satisfaction or general

[9]the British Household Panel Survey asks respondents to name the parties they feel the closest to. The list of possible options includes the main parties in the UK parliament plus a category "other" that contains all other parties named by the respondents that are not in the parliament (E.G. UKIP)

[10]Table A.1 in the Appendix A reports all the main BHPS variable used in this study and how they have been recoded.

trust of the respondents. Differently, I do find that the exposure to the inflow of Eastern European immigrants increases the probability of agreeing with the statement "I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world". This result further points in favour of an increased nativist sentiment that happened after the Eastern European enlargement which is in line with the increased Eurosceptic sentiment showed in previous results. In the last column I study if the arrival of Eastern European migrants after the enlargement made the respondents more likely to to be worried about being affected by crime. It is important to notice that Bell et al. (2013) ruled out a significant increase in crime rates in the areas more exposed to the inflow of Eastern European migrants. Still, despite any evidence that show that migrants caused more crimes the general sentiment of the time seems to have been one of concern. There were in fact several articles by important national newspapers that argued in favour of this supposed link between the accession countries' immigrants and the increase in criminal activity.[11] Using the BHPS data I find that the arrival of Eastern European immigrants causes an increase in the likelihood that a respondent worries about being affected by crime. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the inflow of migrants causes an increase in the probability of being worried about crime of around 3.2% points. This result can thus provide a piece of evidence that highlights the mechanism that connects the arrival of migrants to the increase in Eurosceptic attitudes. The increased number of migrants could have caused an increased sense of threat and security concerns which may have then triggered a Eurosceptic reaction.

[11] During the period 2004-2011 newspapers such as The Daily Telegraph, The Sun, or the Daily Mail reported increase in crimes attributing it to the newly arrived immigrants.

Table 2.3: Attitudes and Eastern European immigrants.

	(1) Conservatives	(2) Labour	(3) Libdem	(4) Others	(5) Britain Best	(6) Trust	(7) Life satisfatction	(8) Crime
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	0.014	−0.515	0.239	0.157	2.080**	0.458	−0.292	3.233**
	(0.482)	(0.524)	(0.434)	(0.164)	(0.943)	(0.757)	(0.647)	(1.507)
Observations	46545	46545	46545	46545	30384	37770	68720	14838
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	335	335	335	335	552	566	602	484
SW stat Inflow	178	178	178	178	230	337	263	122

Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

How to explain this sentiment about crime in areas of larger exposure to the arrival of migrants if immigrants themselves did not cause a spark in crimes? One possible explanation is that continuous media exposure, especially from news sources that emphasised the link between migration and crime, may have influenced the public opinion on the topic. Similarly, public speeches by important politicians could be also linked to these perceptions. Unfortunately the BHPS does not contain further questions that can be used to test these hypothesis.

2.6 Robustness

In this section, I provide evidence that the main findings of this paper are robust by showing the results of several additional tests.

Identifying assumption In Appendix B I provide evidence in favour of the validity of the exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable as suggested by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020). Table B.1 shows that the instrument does not predict changes in Euroscepticism before the enlargement. Table B.2 shows that even allowing for the evolution of local authority characteristics over time, my results are replicated.

Alternative instrument and inflow In Appendix C, I show that the causal relationship between the arrival of Eastern European migrants after the enlargement and the rise of Euroscepticism is confirmed even when I use an alternative shift-share instrument or when I use, as measure of inflow, the predicted share of immigrants arrived until 2006. The massive arrival of Eastern European migrants in the UK has been quite a break from past decades when they tended to settle in other European countries. Thus, instead of using the share of Eastern European migrants in 2001 as initial shares, I use the share of foreign-born in 1991. One possible explanation

for the persistence of the location choice between the foreign-born and the subsequent inflow of Eastern European migrants can be related to the fact that immigrants tend to locate in areas with more job opportunities, more services and more diversity in their demographic characteristics. Using this alternative version of a shift-share instrumental variable does not deliver different results with respect to the more canonical shift-share design. Table A.5 also shows the result of a reduced form regression where the measure of inflow of the Eastern European migrants is the predicted inflow of Eastern Europeans arrived until 2006. Also in this case the results are in line with the main findings.

Placebo Between 2001 and 2011, along with the massive increase in the number of migrants from Eastern European countries, the UK also experimented a significant increase in the number of migrants from South Asia. Hence, the arrival of migrants from South Asia may be seen as an additional confounder to the arrival of migrants from Eastern European, especially if respondents do not make distinctions about source countries. In this case, an increase in Euroscepticism would signal a more general backlash against immigration per se rather than a specific change of attitude towards the European Union after the enlargement. In tables C.9 and C.10 in the appendix, I show that the inflow of immigrants from South Asia does not cause an increase in Euroscepticism. This result further increases the likelihood that the spark in Euroscepticism is caused by a backlash of British citizens against the European Union as well as against the UK's decision to allow the free entry of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the accession countries.

Geographical and attrition bias I then show that the main findings are not driven by influential observations or by specific geographical patterns. In table C.1 I show the results of a winsorisation of the inflow of migrants from Eastern European countries by 10% (top and bottom 5%). The results

hold the same, thus showing that the results are not driven by influential observations. Additionally, in the same table I also show that even excluding, at turn, Wales, Scotland and Inner London the results are all robust, thus showing that the results are not likely to be driven by a specific geographic pattern but instead are the expression of a more general condition. Furthermore, in table C.5, I include the latitude and longitude of the different local authorities as additional controls. The result obtained are unchanged with respect to the main findings showing that even accounting for spatial correlation does not affect my results. Finally, in table C.2 I also show that keeping individuals who answer all three main Eurosceptic questions gives me the same results. This means that the previous results does not seem to be driven by selection on the specific question the respondents decide to answer to.

Additional controls I then proceed by adding some other possible control variables to reduce the concern that the main results may suffer from an omitted variable bias represented by different economic dynamics at the local level. I thus show that even controlling for the economic trends of the different local authorities before the enlargement the results continue to hold. In table C.3 I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of variable capturing the change in the share of Job Seeking allowance between 1999 and 2003. Additionally, the results are robust even when I interact this variable with an indicator variable after the enlargement. In table C.4 I replicate the previous robustness checks using, instead of the change in the share of Job Seeking allowance, the growth rate of the Gross Value Added between 1999 and 2003.

De-industrialisation Given the time span of the dataset, the main contending explanation for the increase in Eurosceptic attitudes in the period is represented by the process of de-industrialisation experimented in particular by

some local areas in the UK. Hence, in table C.6, I include as controls a series of variables used as proxies for the China trade-shock/de-industrialisation effect on the manufacturing sector. The inclusion of variables such as the employment, the Gross Value Added, or the change in the Gross Value Added of the manufacturing sectors, do not alter my results, meaning that, the arrival of Eastern European immigrants represents a significant causal explanation of the increased Eurosceptic sentiment in Great Britain after the European enlargement.

2.7 Conclusion

This study documented a causal link between the arrival of Eastern European migrants and the increase in Euroscepticism after the European enlargement. I showed that individuals living in areas more exposed to the arrival of Eastern European migrants were more likely to consider the UK membership in the EU as negative and non-beneficial after the enlargement. Furthermore, they were also more likely to express nationalistic sentiments. A possible mechanism explaining the rise of Euroscepticism can be found in the concerns related to public and personal safety. Individuals living in areas more exposed to the arrival of migrants were in fact also more likely to be worried about being affected by crime. The massive arrival of migrants after the European enlargement may have caused an increased sense of insecurity and turned the British citizens towards more Eurosceptic opinions.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Descriptive statistics, plots and OLS tables

A.1 Descriptive



Figure A.1: Main source countries

Table A.1: British Household Panel Survey, variables description

Variable name	**original name**	**Description**	**Code**
Anti eu	opeur1	Generally speaking, do you think that Britain's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or is it neither good nor bad?	1 bad, 0 good and neither good nor bad
Eu non benef	opeur2	Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?	1 not benefited, 0 benefited
less Eu	opeur3	Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be: To leave the European Union, To stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU's powers, To leave things as they are, To stay in the EU and try and increase the EU's powers , or To work for the formation, Don't know,	1 To leave the European Union, To stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU's powers, 0 all the other options
Labour, etc	vote4	If there were to be a General Election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support? Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, Green Party, Other party	different dummies for the parties have been created
Trust	trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1 Most people can be trusted 2 Can't be too careful 3 Other/depends	1 Most people can be trusted , 0 other options
Life satisfaction	lfsato	Using the same scale how dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall? 1 Not Satisfied at all, 5 completely satisfied	life satisfaction, 1 equal answers 1 and 2, 0 all the others
Crime	crwora	Now I have some questions about crime. Do you ever worry about the possibility that you, or anyone else who lives with you, might be the victim of crime?	1 Yes, 0 No
Unemployed	jbstat	Self employed, In paid employment, Unemployed, Retired from paid, On maternity leave, Looking after family or home, Full-time student/at school, Long term sick or disabled,On a government training scheme ,Something else	1 Unemployed, 0 others
Britain best	opnatab	Would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world 1 strongly agree-5 strongly disagree	1 equals answers 1 and 2, 0 all the others
Empl. Manufacturing	jbsic92	What does the firm/organisation you work for actually make or do (at the place where you work)?	1 from 1500 to 3600, 0 all the other sectors

Table A.2: Euroscepticism, different definitiopns of dependent variables

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Leave	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	4.021**	4.088***	0.747	9.460***
	(1.809)	(1.212)	(0.994)	(3.232)
Observations	20622	17920	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	510		430	379
SW stat Inflow	150		115	100

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. "Anti eu" represents the question "Generally speaking, do you think that Britain's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or is it neither good nor bad?". The answers have been ordered from positive to negative (1-3). "Eu non Benef" represents the question "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?". The variable is coded such that value 1 represents the answer "Not benefited" while value 0 represents the answer "Benefited". "Less EU" represents the question "Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be: to leave the European Union, to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU's powers, to leave things as they are, to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU's powers, to work for the formation of a single European government." The variable has been recoded as a dummy with value 1 for the first answer and 0 for the other possible answers. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

A.1.1 OLS tables

in this section, I report the OLS tables referred in the paper.[1]

[1]The number of observations in the OLS case differs from the IV one because IV drops singleton observations.

Table A.3: Euroscepticism OLS event study

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA_OLS
2002 × Eastern European inflow 2001-11	0.175	0.085	−0.401	−0.457
	(0.490)	(0.625)	(0.669)	(1.583)
2006 × Eastern European inflow 2001-11	1.285**	1.643**	0.230	4.073**
	(0.548)	(0.648)	(0.662)	(1.705)
Observations	21065	17920	19965	16721
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table A.4: Euroscepticism OLS pre and post

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11*Post	1.196**	1.592***	0.447	4.309***
	(0.475)	(0.565)	(0.579)	(1.515)
Observations	21065	17920	19965	16721
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

A.2 Predicted Inflow Eastern European at 2006

Table A.5: Euroscepticism and Eastern European immigrants. Using the predicted inflow at 2006.

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11×post	6.984**	11.422***	6.343*	30.830***
	(3.045)	(3.363)	(3.697)	(9.506)
Observations	21065	17920	19965	16721
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. "Anti eu" represents the question "Generally speaking, do you think that Britain's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or is it neither good nor bad?". The answers have been recoded as a dummy with value 1 for "Bad" and 0 for "Good" "Eu non Benef" represents the question "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?". The variable is coded such that value 1 represents the answer "Not benefited" while value 0 represents the answer "Benefited". "Less EU" represents the question "Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be: to leave the European Union, to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU's powers, to leave things as they are, to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU's powers, to work for the formation of a single European government." The variable has been recoded as a dummy with value 1 for the first two answers and 0 for the other possible answers.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Appendix B

Instrumental variable

In this section, I provide evidence in favour of the exclusion restriction assumption for the instrumental variable used in the paper.

B.1 Using Share East EU 2001

Table B.1: Euroscepticism robustness, pre trends. IV: Eastern Europeans in 2001

	Anti EU		EU non beneficial		Less Eu		PCA	
	(1) Shift-share	(2) immgrants share	(3) Shift-share	(4) immgrants share	(5) Shift-share	(6) immgrants share	(7) Shift-share	(8) immgrants share
2002 × Predicted inflow	−0.767		−0.354		−0.229		−2.349	
	(0.490)		(0.586)		(0.668)		(1.482)	
2002 × Share East EU 2001		−7.552		−3.486		−2.260		−23.141
		(4.831)		(5.772)		(6.577)		(14.600)
Observations	14016	14016	11809	11809	13119	13119	10919	10919
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table B.2: Euroscepticism robustness, controls-interacted dummies. IV: Eastern Europeans in 2001

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	4.367***	5.298***	3.496*	16.704***
	(1.626)	(1.764)	(1.956)	(5.061)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

B.2 Using share of immigrants in 1991

B.2.1 Instrument validity



Figure B.1: Binscatter of actual and predicted Eastern European inflow 2001-11. IV: Immigrants share 1991



Figure B.2: Map of actual and predicted Eastern European inflow 2001-11. IV: Immigrants share 1991

B.2.2 Identifying assumption

Table B.3: Euroscepticism robustness, pre trends. IV: Immigrants in 1991

	Anti EU		EU non beneficial		Less Eu		PCA	
	(1) Shift-share	(2) immgrants share	(3) Shift-share	(4) immgrants share	(5) Shift-share	(6) immgrants share	(7) Shift-share	(8) immgrants share
2002 × Predicted inflow	−0.123		0.521		−0.463		0.603	
	(0.649)		(0.794)		(0.877)		(1.994)	
2002 × Share Immigrants 1991		−0.039		0.163		−0.145		0.189
		(0.203)		(0.249)		(0.275)		(0.625)
Observations	14016	14016	11809	11809	13119	13119	10919	10919
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table B.4: Euroscepticism robustness, dummies. IV: Immigrants in 1991

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	3.201**	4.385***	2.449*	13.300***
	(1.297)	(1.486)	(1.463)	(4.056)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Appendix C

Robustness

In this section, I show that the main results of the paper are robust to several tests.

C.1 Using a shift-share instrument based on the Eastern European immigrants in 2001

Table C.1: Euroscepticism robustness, removing parts of the dataset

	Anti EU				EU non beneficial				Less Eu			
	(1) No Wales	(2) No Scotland	(3) No Inner London	(4) Winsorised	(5) No Wales	(6) No Scotland	(7) No Inner London	(8) Winsorised	(9) No Wales	(10) No Scotland	(11) No Inner London	(12) Winsorised
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.494**	2.721**	2.347**	8.388**	3.930***	4.414***	3.660***	13.340***	2.359*	2.900**	2.933**	7.329*
	(1.098)	(1.155)	(1.066)	(3.717)	(1.201)	(1.275)	(1.141)	(4.018)	(1.338)	(1.411)	(1.243)	(4.330)
Observations	16705	16476	20299	20622	13660	13431	16610	16870	15601	15371	19007	19315
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	500	466	958	353	400	377	829	297	422	394	934	342
SW stat Inflow	147	145	200	136	101	84	117	96	113	108	144	107

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.2: Euroscepticism robustness, keeping only non-missing to all questions

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.607**	4.123***	2.472*
	(1.318)	(1.263)	(1.470)
Observations	15531	15531	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	379	379	379
SW stat Inflow	100	100	100

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.3: Euroscepticism robustness, controlling for the change in unemployment 1999-2003

	Anti EU		EU non beneficial		Less Eu		PCA	
	(1) Unem.	(2) Unem. x T	(3) Unem.	(4) Unem. x T	(5) Unem.	(6) Unem. x T	(7) Unem.	(8) Unem. x T
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.514**	2.468**	3.990***	3.980***	2.352*	2.253*	10.944***	10.663***
	(1.098)	(1.089)	(1.205)	(1.195)	(1.339)	(1.327)	(3.367)	(3.338)
Observations	20104	20104	16420	16420	18815	18815	15122	15122
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	510	526	409	423	432	446	382	396
SW stat Inflow	149	148	106	106	114	114	107	106

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.4: Euroscepticism robustness, controlling for the change in GVA 1999-2003

	Anti EU		EU non beneficial		Less Eu		PCA	
	(1) GVA	(2) GVA x T	(3) GVA	(4) GVA x T	(5) GVA	(6) GVA x T	(7) GVA	(8) GVA x T
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.524**	2.525**	4.071***	4.074***	2.312*	2.314*	11.077***	11.201***
	(1.102)	(1.103)	(1.210)	(1.209)	(1.345)	(1.347)	(3.385)	(3.406)
Observations	20622	20622	16870	16870	19315	19315	15531	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	510	522	407	418	430	440	380	387
SW stat Inflow	150	151	104	104	117	117	104	104

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.5: Euroscepticism robustness, controlling for latitude and longitude

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.524**	4.019***	2.301*	10.935***
	(1.103)	(1.209)	(1.345)	(3.382)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	509	406	429	379
SW stat Inflow	148	102	113	101

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

C.1.1 China shock/De-industrialisation

In this section, I show that the main results are robust even controlling for individual or local authority characteristics which proxy for a decline in the manufacturing sector. I use the individual/local authority employment in the manufacturing sector in 2001 or alternatively the Gross Value Added or a change in Gross Value Added (1999-2003), interacted with a time indicator dummy, to proxy for the effect of changes in the manufacturing sector. In this way, I account for the possible effects that the China trade-shock or de-industrialisation had on individuals/areas more reliant on the manufacturing sector. I show that even accounting for those events, my results are unaltered.

Table C.6: Euroscepticism robustness, controlling for manufacturing trends

	Anti EU	EU non beneficial	Less Eu	PCA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual level				
Controlling for individual employment in manufacturing 2001				
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.528**	4.090***	2.305*	11.082***
	(1.102)	(1.212)	(1.343)	(3.384)
LAD level				
Controlling for LAD employment share in manufacturing 2001				
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.744**	4.431***	2.436*	11.961***
	(1.127)	(1.242)	(1.376)	(3.467)
Controlling for LAD GVA in manufacturing 2001				
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.409**	4.050***	2.739*	11.223***
	(1.152)	(1.261)	(1.403)	(3.523)
Controlling for Δ LAD GVA in manufacturing 1999-2003				
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.528**	4.054***	2.148	10.812***
	(1.096)	(1.208)	(1.342)	(3.370)
Observations	21065	17920	19965	16721
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

C.2 Using a shift-share instrument based on the immigrants in 1991

Table C.7: Euroscepticism and Eastern European immigrants. IV: Immigrants in 1991

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	1.983**	3.184***	1.709	8.838***
	(0.976)	(1.172)	(1.141)	(3.082)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	754	584	684	581
SW stat Inflow	334	203	295	202

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.8: Euroscepticism robustness, removing parts of the dataset. IV: Immigrants in 1991

	Anti EU				EU non beneficial				Less Eu			
	(1) No Wales	(2) No Scotland	(3) No Inner London	(4) Winsorised	(5) No Wales	(6) No Scotland	(7) No Inner London	(8) Winsorised	(9) No Wales	(10) No Scotland	(11) No Inner London	(12) Winsorised
Eastern European inflow 2001-11 * Post	2.226**	2.491**	1.880**	5.901**	3.580***	3.873***	2.906**	9.476***	1.989*	2.330*	2.124*	4.973
	(0.991)	(1.121)	(0.952)	(2.925)	(1.190)	(1.352)	(1.132)	(3.581)	(1.161)	(1.315)	(1.100)	(3.319)
Observations	16705	16476	20299	20622	13660	13431	16610	16870	15601	15371	19007	19315
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region $\times$ year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	702	604	1225	568	550	473	923	438	637	542	1133	539
SW stat Inflow	331	203	388	271	206	119	277	177	286	175	323	241

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

C.3 South Asians Placebo analysis

Table C.9: Placebo Euroscepticism using South asians inflow-OLS

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
2002 × Inflow S.Asians 2001-11	−0.017	−0.077	−0.919	−1.328
	(0.514)	(0.704)	(0.664)	(1.761)
2006 × Inflow S.Asians 2001-11	−0.654	0.461	−1.215	−0.333
	(0.631)	(0.677)	(0.763)	(1.928)
Observations	21065	17920	19965	16721
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Table C.10: Placebo Euroscepticism using South asians inflow-IV

	(1) Anti EU	(2) EU non beneficial	(3) Less EU	(4) PCA
Inflow S.Asians 2001-11 * Post	−0.219	0.766	0.076	1.431
	(0.712)	(0.823)	(0.828)	(2.319)
Observations	20622	16870	19315	15531
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region × year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW stat Inflow * post	347	215	322	191
SW stat Inflow	1055	750	841	681

Standard errors clustered by constituencies in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The controls included are: Median house price, Unemployment share, GVA per capita, share of long-term illness, employment in manufacturing, employment in wholesale and retail trade, employment in hotels and restaurants, employment in transportation, storage and communication, employment in financial sector, employment in real estate, employment in public administration, employment in education, employment health and social work, employment in agriculture hunting forestry and employment in fishing. Individual and region by year fixed effects are also included.

Chapter 3

The Political Consequences of Mass Repatriation

Abstract

What happens when the electorate of a country is suddenly increased by hundreds of thousands of new potential voters? How do parties adjust their strategies in response to such an event? To address these questions I exploit a quasi-experiment represented by the arrival in France of about 1 million repatriates from Algeria, the so-called *pieds noirs*, which happened in 1962. To study the causal impact of the *pieds noirs* on voting, I instrument their location choice based on the average temperature by department. I find that the arrival of the *pieds noirs* increased turnout and the vote share of far-right parties while it decreased the vote share of center-right parties in both legislative and presidential elections between 1962 and 1974. I then analyse how this shock affected the political strategies of the different French parties by looking at more than 10,000 political manifestos issued by candidates in the legislative elections during the same period. I show that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur and started to discuss issues associated with the *pieds noirs* already in 1962. The other parties subsequently adapted their manifestos using the same words of the far-right. These findings shed light on how radical parties can affect mainstream ones by pushing new issues in their agenda.

3.1 Introduction

What happens when the electorate of a country is suddenly increased by hundreds of thousands of new potential voters? How do parties adjust their strategies in response to such an event? Several studies investigate how shocks to the electorate of a country impact a political system focusing, for example on the effect of the extension of the franchise [1]. The extension of the franchise is often the final outcome of decades of political activism in favour of voting rights by the excluded population. Parties thus often already have a historical position on the issues associated with the new electorate and they may also have time to adjust their political strategy to the new political landscape.

In this paper, I leverage a different mechanism that allows me to overcome some of these limitations. I exploit a quasi-experiment represented by the arrival in France of almost 1 million repatriates from Algeria. These people were not born in France but were French citizens and were entitled to vote in the French elections. Hence, their arrival in France represents an exogenous and unexpected increase in the size of the electorate which can be used to answer several questions. In this paper, I show how the electoral outcomes and party strategy were affected by the arrival of this new group of voters. I find an increase in turnout and in the vote share of far-right parties but also a decrease in the share of center-right parties in the areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates. I also observe that far-right parties were the first ones to include issues associated with the repatriates, the other parties were then forced to adopt a similar strategy in later elections.

The arrival of the French repatriates from Algeria, which started in the aftermath of the 1962 French Évian Accords referendum, marks an important event in the history of France. The relevance of the event is evident by looking at the growth rate of the French population, as shown in figure 3.1.

[1] For an overview, see Berlinski and Dewan (2011).

The spike immediately after 1961, when the population growth hits almost 2.5%, shows the increase of the population in the aftermath of the repatriates exodus. Between March 1962 and January 1968 around 1 million people left Algeria to move to France.



Figure 3.1: French population growth rate 1951-2012.

Several studies have analysed how the arrival of the repatriates affected economic outcomes.[2] To the best of my knowledge no study has instead looked at the causal impact of the *pieds noirs* on political outcomes.

Since the majority of the repatriates were French citizens, they could immediately vote and manifest their grievances to the French political system. In particular, two important political issues were associated with the repatriates: compensation for the property they lost when they left Algeria and the amnesty for the crimes committed during the Algerian War of Independence. Given the significant numbers of repatriates with common interests, the question arises of whether their arrivals had a direct effect on relevant political outcomes.

Historians and social scientists (Cohen (1980, 2003), Davies (2002), Shields

[2]In her pioneering paper, Hunt (1992) looked at the repatriates impact on labour market outcomes at the department level, showing that it led to a 0.3% increase in the unemployment rate and to a decrease in the annual salaries (in 1967) of around 1.3%, at most. The results were then confirmed by Clemens and Hunt (2019). Similarly, but using variation at the regional level, Edo (2019) finds a temporary decrease in the native population's wages between 1962 and 1968, with full recovery taking up to 15 years.

(2007) and Veugelers (2019)), have long claimed that the repatriates manifested an ideological bias in favour of far-right parties already during the Algerian War of Independence and that on French soil they helped to shape the political geography of France. The areas more affected by their arrival started, in fact, to vote in favour of far-right parties in the '60s and are still more likely to support the Front-National nowadays. Despite these historical accounts, there is still no systematic causal evidence on this question. Hence, the aim of this paper is to fill this gap and show how the arrival of the repatriates from Algeria influenced French political life.

In the first part of the paper, I study the political consequences of the arrival of the repatriates focusing on the electoral results. To causally isolate the effect of the repatriates' arrival, in line with many of the studies in the Political Economy of migration, I instrument the repatriates' location. Repatriates, similar to immigrants, can, in fact, distribute in a way to willingly avoid settling in areas with specific political ideas. Or, more generally, according to unobservable characteristics which may affect the voting outcome. In other words, the distribution of the repatriates is endogenous to voting and thus requires an instrumental variable strategy to minimise the sources of bias. To account for the endogenous distribution of the repatriates I exploit an instrumental variable, which has already been used in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019). In particular, Hunt (1992) shows that the distribution of the repatriates from Algeria was strongly correlated with the weather conditions of the different French departments. The repatriates in fact settled massively in the south of France where the climate was similar to the Algerian one. As in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019) I thus use the average temperature by department as an instrument for the endogenous distribution of the repatriates across departments.

To show how the arrival of the repatriates affected voting, I focus on the first round of both legislative and presidential elections held between 1962

and 1974. First, I show evidence in favour of the direct participation of the repatriates in the electoral process. In particular, I find that a 1% increase in the share of repatriates, causes an increase in the turnout of 0.58% in legislative elections and of 0.55% in presidential elections. I show that this result is likely to be driven by the electoral participation of the repatriates rather than by a mobilisation effect of native citizens. Second, analysing the pattern of votes for political parties, I find that the same inflow of repatriates also causes an increase in the vote share for the far-right of around 0.3% in legislative elections and around 0.7% in the presidential elections. Additionally, I find a decrease in the vote share for center-right parties of around 1.8% in legislative elections and 1.3% in presidential elections in the same period. These results are in line with the historians' accounts of the repatriates mindset. The repatriates had in fact an established political link with the far-right movements that started already during the Algerian War of independence. They also never forgave De Gaulle for his decision to abandon Algeria in 1962.

In the second part of the paper, I shift my focus to the political strategies of the different parties by looking at how the arrival of the repatriates affected the political behaviour in electoral campaigns. I use text analysis on 10,745 individual candidates' political manifestos issued in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. I find that far-right parties devote, on average, a larger proportion of their political manifestos to the issues associated with the repatriates. This happens immediately with the first election after their arrival. After the 1962 election, the other parties also started to increase the space of their manifestos devoted to the repatriates, mimicking in this way the strategy adopted by the far-right. Far-right parties thus behave similarly to a *political entrepreneur* who knows before the others the preferences of the electorate and exploits the informational advantage for her own political goal. The other parties are then forced to move to the right and use a language

similar to that deployed in the far-right manifestos as a way to appeal to the same new electorate. This mechanism is similar to the one highlighted in more recent elections when far-right parties in Europe exploited the issues related to the arrival of immigrants and forced the other parties to move to the right and show more anti-immigrant stances. Additionally, I also show that, in the areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates, parties, independently from their own political ideology, tend to devote a larger space of their manifestos to the issues associated with them. Hence, while shedding light on the consequences of an important historical event, this paper also provides evidence of a more general mechanism at play. An exogenous increase in the voting population and the increased salience of the issues related to this new electorate causes parties to adjust their political strategy. Some parties can exploit these issues before all others. The other parties could then be forced to mimic this behaviour. In the end, issues associated with niche parties can become mainstream.

The arrival of the repatriates from Algeria presents some similarities with the inflow of immigrants from other countries. This paper thus contributes to the growing literature in Political Economy that studies how the arrival of immigrants in a country affects voting. Many of these studies tend to find a causal effect of immigration on voting for radical-right parties. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) shows that the arrival of immigrants and asylum seekers in Hamburg led to an increase in far-right parties' vote share in the local elections. Similarly Barone et al. (2016) finds that Italian municipalities more exposed to immigration saw an increase in the vote share of center-right coalition parties in the national elections. Halla et al. (2017) shows that the arrival of immigrants in Austria increased the vote share of the far-right movement FPO. Edo et al. (2019) finds that the increase in immigration from Northern African countries caused an increase in Le Pen's vote share in the French Presidential elections between 1988 and 2012. Also, using

historical data, Tabellini (2020) shows that, during the age of mass migration in the US, the increased number of immigrants caused the election of more anti-immigrant and conservative legislators and higher support for anti-immigration legislation.

Although the number of studies finding a causal link between immigration and far-right voting is constantly growing, other studies find that the effect of immigrants and asylum seekers on radical-right voting is heterogeneous and depends on several factors. Mayda et al. (2022), looking at US election outcomes at the county level, shows that an increase in low-skilled immigration causes an increase in the vote share of the Republican party, while an increase in the high-skilled immigration decreases it. Dustmann et al. (2019) finds that an increase in the exogenous allocation of refugees in Danish municipalities led to an increase, in all but the most urban municipalities, of the vote share of anti-immigrant parties. In addition, some studies even find an opposite effect of immigration on radical right parties. As an example, Steinmayr (2021), studying the Austrian case, finds mixed results: The arrival of refugees passing the borders increased the vote-share for far-right parties, while sustained contact between refugees and native citizens reduced it. As argued by Alesina and Tabellini (2021), studies that find a negative effect of immigration on the vote for radical-right parties usually require a long exposure and interaction between immigrants and natives citizens, and are in line with the theoretical predictions of the "Contact theory" by Allport (1954).

Despite the similarities with the arrival of immigrants in a country, there is a fundamental feature of this study that distinguishes it from the canonical studies of the political economy of migration. In fact, all these studies tend to observe that the effect on political outcomes is not a direct cause of the newly arrived individuals but crucially depends on the backlash of native citizens who react against the increased level of immigration. As an example,

the increase in the vote share for far-right parties can be explained by the backlash of native citizens against immigrants, but cannot be a direct effect of the newly arrived immigrants themselves since they don't have the right to vote. Mayda et al. (2022), for example, finds that the effect of non-naturalized immigrants on the vote for the Republican party dominates the effect of naturalized immigrants, meaning that the political effect of immigration on voting is indirect.

This study instead, leverages a different mechanism. In the specific case of the repatriates from Algeria, the electoral effect is likely to be also driven by the repatriates themselves, who are in fact eligible voters already when they arrived on French soil, and vote in accordance with their ideology and interests. Hence, this study shares similarities with the literature that looks at the effects of the extension of the franchise.

Several studies, such as Husted and Kenny (1997), Lott and Kenny (1999), Aidt et al. (2006), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Miller (2008) and Cascio and Washington (2013) among others, looked at how the extension of the franchise affected public spending, finding that the latter increased in the areas more strongly affected by the franchise extension. After the extension of the franchise vote-seeking parties are thus more likely to implement policies in such a way to appeal to the new electorate to gain an electoral advantage. The literature on the effect of the franchise extension on electoral outcomes is instead scanter. Berlinski and Dewan (2011) and Larcinese (2011) studied how the extension of the franchise affected voting and party competition respectively in the United Kingdom and Italy. One important identification challenge in isolating the effect of a new group of voters on political outcomes is that the franchise is often the final outcome of decades of political activism in favour of voting rights by the excluded population. In the case of the repatriates from Algeria instead, the change in the electorate is due to an unexpected inflow of migrants who are entitled to vote. Hence, by ex-

ploiting a unique natural experiment, my work builds a bridge between the literature on the extension of the franchise and that on the political effects of migration, while providing causal evidence on an important historical event with long-lasting political consequences.

3.2 Historical background and hypotheses

In this section, I describe the main historical events that characterised the French dominion of Algeria whose legacy will be important to understand the political institutions in France and the electoral behaviour of the repatriates. In particular, I focus on the colonial relationship between France and Algeria and the consequences of the civil war on the French political system.

3.2.1 The colonial past

The French invasion of Algeria, at the time part of the Ottoman empire, started in 1830 as a consequence of a diplomatic incident between the two countries. The increased Algerian financial needs during the 1820s led, as a consequence, to the official request to France to repay the debt contracted during the Napoleonic Wars. The negative answer by the French government led to a diplomatic clash. The initial French response was the establishment of a blockade against Algeria and then, in 1830, the final act was the invasion and the complete conquest of the territory.

From 1830 until the Evian's agreement, in 1962, Algeria will be an integral part of the French empire and will even be integrated into the administrative structure of the French republic in 1881. The colonisation process and the strong demographic growth of the native population led to an enduring imbalance in Algeria's political life. Though the settlers were a small fraction of the total population the key administrative positions, and the rights

accorded by the law, were all in favour of the settlers. Only a small fraction[3] of the population was able to vote for the elections. The Muslim population was in fact disproportionately under-represented in the Algerian political system. The institutional design adopted in Algeria was thus the driver of the creation of a very strongly segregated society. The increased segregation of the Algerian society, even after the demographic boom of the Muslim population, and the emergence of an Algerian National sentiment, were the main triggers of the Algerian Civil War which started in 1954 and ended in 1962.

3.2.2 Civil War

The Algerian Civil war started in November 1954 with the coordinated attacks against French targets by an Algerian armed force called *Front de Libèration National* (FLN). In the same year, France had already lost Indochina, and the other North-African colonies were pushing to get independence. The French government, unwilling to accept any other defeat, decided to act to maintain the colonial possession in Algeria. As Francois Mitterand, the French Ministry of Interior at the time said: "Algeria is France. And who amongst you, mesdames and messieurs, would hesitate to employ all methods to preserve France?" Evans (2011, p. 124). After the "Philippeville Massacre" (20 August 1955), when the FLN killed more than 100 European citizens, the French government decided to recall the reservists and started a war in Algeria. The failure of the French government[4] in dealing with the Algerian war and the increasing military spending without results led to a political crisis. Scared by a possible coup[5] by the French army the figure of

[3] This included: the French settlers; the Jewish population after the Cremieux's Law in 1870; and also the Foreign settlers from 1889.

[4] After the 1956 elections the new Prime minister of the French government was Guy Mollet, his government, the longest-lasting government of the fourth republic, will last only 14 months.

[5] Some generals of the French army, Massau and Salan among others, threatened the French government with a possible coup in order to install De Gaulle as prime minister.

general De Gaulle emerged as the man of order and on 1st of June 1958 his government was installed.

One of the first moves by De Gaulle was to travel to Algeria on the 4 of June. The first words of his speech to the crowd were: "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you), words that were read by the French settlers in Algeria as a clear expression of support for the existence and preservation of the "Algerie Francaise".[6] In order to stabilise the French political system, and increase the government power, De Gaulle announced a series of reforms to the French constitution to be voted in a referendum on the 28 September. The referendum was won with 66% of the votes in France and with an overwhelming 96% in Algeria. With this reform, France adopted a semi-presidential system and entered the political period called the "French Fifth Republic".

One of the first acts of the new government was to announce the "Constantine Plan", a development plan for Algeria designed with the aim to provide financial help and education to the Muslim population. The European population of Algeria did not support the plan, which they considered to be a major gift to the population with whom they were fighting a civil war. In addition to the plan, on 16 September 1959, in a speech to the French people, De Gaulle opened to the possibility of the self-determination of Algeria. After this speech, members of the French army in Algeria, and the European settlers, felt betrayed and gave birth to an insurrectionary group called *French National Front* (FNF), whose symbol was the Celtic cross, the same symbol of the French far-right group *Jeune Nation*.[7] In order to manifest their opposition to De Gaulle's policy the FNF occupied the university of

[6]The correct interpretation of De Gaulle's words in that circumstance is still debated. De Gaulle seemed to suggest that Algeria with its 10 million people was still an integral part of France but in his speech, he never used any expression that could be easily associated with the term "Algerie Francaise".

[7]Jeune Nation was "The most prominent French neo-fascist movement of the 1950s" Shields (2007, p. 124). This group wanted to exploit the Algerian crisis to suppress elections and political parties in France.

Algiers on the 23 of January by creating barricades. The day after they were joined by thousands of supporters who created a series of barricades in the streets.[8] When the *gendarmerie* was sent to dismantle the barricades, the clash with the crowd resulted in many victims on both sides. After this event, De Gaulle reacted with a speech to the nation attacking the members of the FNF and asking for the support of the French people. The day after the speech, the barricades were dismantled and the FNF dissolved.

Given the still strong support for the FNL by the Algerian people, the increasing cost of the war with thousands of French troops on Algerian soil, and the mounting pressure from international institutions, the only solution left to De Gaulle was to accept the self-determination of Algeria. Hence, On the 8 of January 1961, the French people were asked to express their opinion on the self-determination of Algeria in a referendum. The 76% voted in favour of De Gaulle's proposal thus giving to the Algerian people the possibility to vote for their independence. A group of supporters of the *Algerie Francaise*, unable to accept the outcome of the referendum, decided to create the *Organisation de l'Armee Secrete* (OAS), a terrorist organisation with the specific goal of stopping any possible negotiations in favour of the Algerian independence. On 21 April 1961 French paratroopers linked to the OAS announced to have taken control of Algiers to protect French Algeria. The streets of Algiers became crowded with European settlers who manifested in favour of the putsch. General De Gaulle reacted on 23 April with a strong speech to the nation: "In the name of France, I order that all methods, I say all methods, are used to block the path of these men." Evans (2011, p. 297). Given the weak support by the French army, and the lack of any plan on how to support their military operation, the putsch failed. The OAS then tried again to stop the negotiations with a killing attempt against De Gaulle, who was able to safely escape from a bombing. The bombings by OAS members

[8]The week from the 23 January to the 1 of February when these events took place is called the "Week of the Barricades".

continued in Paris and targeted the politicians and intellectuals who were manifestly against French Algeria. In a climate of terror on the 18 of March De Gaulle announced to have found an agreement with the provisional government of Algeria on how to organize the process of self-determination of the Algerian people.[9] Despite the terrorist attacks by the OAS and the protest of the European settlers, on the 8 of April Evian agreements were ratified with a referendum that saw a victory for independence. The independence won with 90.8% of the votes in France and then, on the 1 of July, with the 99.7% of the votes in Algeria. On the 5 of July Algeria declared its official independence from France.

3.2.3 Pieds-noirs' Exodus

After the April referendum the European settlers, which during the Algerian war started to define themselves as *pieds noirs* (black foot), started to leave Algeria mainly by boat, some of them by flight. The *pieds noirs* were allowed to bring with them only the objects that could fit two suitcases per person, they had to leave all the rest in Algeria. The mass repatriation was an unexpected event for both the *pieds noirs* and the government. Before April the government had, in fact, only one liner to move the *pieds noirs* to France Evans (2011, p. 320). In addition, the Evian agreements were regulating the rights of French citizens in Algeria and the French government was thus convinced that the majority of the *pieds noirs* would have stayed in Algeria. The government predicted a maximum inflow of 100,000 people per year to move to France in the first years (Cohen, 1980; Horne, 2011; Shepard, 2008). Despite the government predictions, around 700,000 *pieds noirs* arrived in France from April to December 1962. The number of arrivals decreased already from 1963 and then stopped in 1968 when the total number of repa-

[9]The round of discussions between the French Government and the Algerian provisional government took place in the city of Evian, the documents that allowed Algeria self-determination are therefore named the Evian agreements.

triates who settled in France had touched almost 1 million. The wave of *pieds noirs* represented an increase of the French population of almost 2% in less than 7 years. The spatial distribution of repatriates across different French departments was very heterogeneous. The majority of them disproportionately settled in the southern departments of France because the climate was mild and Mediterranean, similar to the Algerian one Horne (2011, p. 631). As a pieds noir recalled in a newspaper interview: "We were told: "Come to Provence, there is the same climate" (Sallon, 2012). By looking at figure 3.2, the average temperature by department seems indeed to be a good predictor of the location choices of the repatriates.



Figure 3.2: Distribution of *pieds noirs* and average temperature by department

Given the high number of repatriates, especially in some areas, it is not surprising that they represented an important electoral force in the areas where they settled. Two important issues started to be associated with the *pieds noirs* after their arrival: the compensation for the property they lost in Algeria and the amnesty for the crimes committed during the Algerian Civil War. The government was in fact unprepared to compensate such a huge and unexpected number of people Cohen (1980). The far-right, in particular,

tried to exploit the unresolved grievances of the Algerian independence and the sense of loss that the repatriates experienced during the '60s. The relationship between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right did not come as a surprise given the *pieds noirs*' rejection of the Evian's agreement and their support for some of the OAS actions back in Algeria. In the next section I thus briefly discuss the relationship between the repatriates and the far-right parties in France.

3.2.4 Pieds noirs and the far-right

The Algerian war marked a very important step for the development of the far-right ideology. It gave the far-right an important theme to exploit in a moment when, after the second world war, the fascist ideology was out of fashion. For the far-right French Algeria represented a crusade against the Muslim people ("*les Arabs*"), it represented the fight between the western Christian civilization and the Muslims (Shields, 2007). It gave the far-right new vigour. It led to the creation of movements and associations fighting to maintain the *Algerie Francaise* such as Jeune Nation, the OAS, student associations like *Federation of National Students* (FEN) and *Front National pour l'Algerie Francaise* (FNAF) founded by Jean Marie Le Pen, the future leader of the Front National, and by Jean Tixier-Vignancour who will be the presidential candidate for the far-right in the 1965 presidential election. This election, in particular, represented the best hope for the far-right before the success of Le Pen in the '80s. Against these hopes, Tixier-Vignancour was able to win only the 5.2% of the votes at the national level, well distant from his predictions of 25% in the first round of the elections. The poor result at the national level does hide the spatial distribution of the votes for Tixier-Vignancour, who was able to gain as much as the 15% of the vote in some of the Southern departments most affected by the *pieds noirs*' arrival. The arrival of the repatriates marked an important event in the electoral geog-

raphy of France since the areas more willing to vote for the far-right were different from the ones that voted in favour of the Poujadist party[10] in the 1958 election.

The Southern departments from this moment on will be associated with the vote for the far-right and will be the stronghold of Jean Marie Le Pen from the second half of the '80s on. The relationship between Jean Marie Le Pen and the *pieds noirs* has been documented by Veugelers et al. (2015) and by Veugelers (2019) who interviewed *pieds noirs* communities in Toulon but also by Fourquet and Pratviel (2012) according to whom, those who identify themselves as *pieds noir*, are 8.5% points more likely to vote for the Front National. Though many years have passed from the end of the Algerian war and the Algerian independence, the legacy of the *pieds noirs* and the *Algerie Francaise* is still an important topic. This can be is illustrated by several monuments [11] erected to remember the *Algerie Francaise.* But also by the 2005 French law on colonialism[12] which stated in the article 4: "The schools programs should acknowledge and recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa, and should give the right historical place to the fighters of the French army issued in that place".[13] The Law was then repealed in 2006 and article 4 completely changed under the pressure of international institutions, historians and civil associations.

[10]The Poujadist party took its name from its leader Pierre Poujade. It was a populist party in favour of the small property and against the political elites of the time, see Goodliffe (2012).

[11]Histoire coloniale et postcoloniale (2011) shows a (partial) list of monuments devoted to the *pieds noirs* with their specific inauguration year and locations.

[12]Loi n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés

[13]"Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord et accordent à l'histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l'armée française issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit".

3.2.5 Testable hypotheses

From the historical facts presented in the previous sections it is thus possible to draw some testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Areas more exposed to the arrival of the pieds noirs experience an increase in turnout.*

The *pieds noirs*, being eligible voters, could use the elections as a way to publicly manifest their grievances and to push in favour of their interests. I thus expect to observe an increase in the turnout in the areas of higher *pieds noirs*' concentration.

Hypothesis 2: *Far-right parties show a higher vote share in the areas more exposed to the arrival of the pieds noirs.*

Since the connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs* was already established during the Algerian war[14], I expect to observe a higher vote share for far-right parties in the areas where the *pieds noirs* settled.

Hypothesis 3: *There is a decline in the vote share of center-right parties in areas of higher exposure to the pieds noirs' arrival.*

Since the *pieds noirs* were forced to leave Algeria because of De Gaulle's decision and because they considered him a traitor, I expect them not to cast votes for center-right parties. This means that, given the increase in the electorate without an increase in the number of votes for center-right parties, their vote share is likely to decrease.

3.3 Data description

In order to identify the political impact of the *pieds noirs* I exploit two main data sources: the record of the elections of the French Fifth Republic that is provided by the French Ministry of the interior and all the French censuses

[14] Davies (2002) argues that the *pieds noirs* and the far-right shared similar goals and similar attitudes. Veugelers (2019) defines "Elective Affinity" the mutual attraction between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right.

between 1962 and 2012.

Elections. From 1958, when De Gaulle won the constitutional referendum, the French political system has been characterised by a system of government defined as "semi-presidentialism" (Duverger, 1980). This system combines a President of the Republic who is elected by universal suffrage with a prime minister who is able to stay in office if the parliament is not opposed to it. In France, there are two important elections that characterize the political system: presidential and legislative elections. Before the year 2000, the candidate winning the presidential election was elected for 7 years.[15]. The presidential election is a two-round system. The candidate who is able to win the absolute majority in the first round wins, otherwise, the two candidates with the higher vote shares go to the second round. In this case, the president is the candidate who gets more votes than the other. The prime minister is appointed by the president and usually requires the confidence of the national assembly. The national assembly is composed of 577 MPs, elected through a two-round system. Each MP is elected by a single constituency (*Circonscription*) if she has the absolute majority of votes and at least the vote of a quarter of the registered electorate after the first round. Otherwise, all the candidates that are voted by at least one-eighth of the eligible voters are admitted to the second round. In the second round, the candidate who gets more votes is elected to the National Assembly.

The Ministry of interior provides information on all the legislative and presidential elections between 1958 and 2012 at the electoral district level. My analysis focuses in particular on the first wave of elections when the effect of the *pieds noirs* should be supposedly stronger. I thus examine all national elections (presidential or legislative) that took place between 1962 and 1974.

[15]The constitutional reform in 2000 reduced the years of mandate of the president from 7 to 5 years. This was a way to reduce the risk of cohabitation, a particular condition under which the president and prime minister belong to two different opposite parties. The only example of cohabitation happened in 1997 when the French president, the socialist Mitterand, had to govern with Jacques Chirac who, despite being a member of the largest center-right party, had been nominated Prime minister.

I then look at possible long-run effects by examining the election outcomes between 1986 and 2012. In order to match the geographical level of the census, I aggregate the information at a higher geographical level: the department *Departement*. The French departments were created in 1790 during the period of the French Revolution with the intent to give France stronger institutional stability.[16] Despite new territorial acquisitions and reforms the French departments remained almost the same over the past two centuries. After excluding Corse from the dataset and aggregating the new departments created in 1968 I have a total of 88 departments that are consistent over time.[17] France is also divided into higher geographical units called regions. France comprised 21 regions when the Pieds Noirs arrived and settled in France.

Pieds noirs. In order to construct a measure of exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival I exploit the rich set of information provided by the French Census in 1968, the first census which allows collecting information on the number of repatriates who entered the country after the Algerian Independence. [18]. I consider being a repatriate any individual who was resident in Algeria on January 1st 1962 and entered France between March 1962 and December 1968.[19] I then consider among these individuals only those who are French citizens (excluding the French Muslims) and then exploit the year of entry to construct a time-varying measure of the *pieds noirs*' arrival in France between 1962 and 1968. I then divide the number of *pieds noirs* arrived in each different year in the different French departments by the 1962 department population.

[16] Maier (2016)

[17] The departments of Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val-d'Oise and Yvellines have been aggregated with the department of Paris in order to have a consistent geographical unit over time.

[18] The 1968 census covers a fourth of the French population, around 12.5 million individuals.

[19] I start to include the repatriates from March 1962, excluding the ones entered between January and February, because from that date on they are more likely to move because of the Algerian independence and not for other possible reasons such as better economic conditions. In the Appendix C table C.4 I show that even including the *pieds noirs* arrived between February and March 1962 the results are unaltered.

The measure is thus defined as:

$$pieds\ noirs_{jrs} = \frac{\text{N } pieds\ noirs_{jrs}}{\text{Population}_{jr1962}}$$

where j represents the French departments, r represents the French regions and s varies between March 1962 to December 1968.

The *pieds noirs* identified from the census represent around 950,000 individuals. The vast majority of them (nearly 70%) arrived in 1962 after the referendum on the Algerian independence. Their distribution shows a large spatial variation which ranges from around 0.3% of the 1962 population in Cotes-d'Armor department to almost 10% in the Var. Around 70% of *pieds noirs* were born in Algeria and represent the heirs of the original French settlers who moved from France to Algeria after it was colonised in 1830. Almost half of them work in the public sector. They are disproportionally concentrated in the public administration and the army. They are also, on average, better educated than the general French population.[20]

Socio-economic characteristics. In order to adjust for possible confounders that can affect both the distribution of the *pieds noirs* and the voting outcomes I exploit the 1962 census to obtain information on the pre-arrival department characteristics.[21] In particular, I collect information on the 1962 employment share in different sectors. [22] I also include the Education level in 1962, measured as the share of the population in the department with the high school diploma (*Baccalaureat*), and the share of the non-French population in 1962, which proxies for the pre-existing exposure to immigration.

I also exploit the 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2011 censuses to collect information on immigrants, from different source countries, who arrived in France at different points in time. This information is used as an alternative

[20] See figure A.3 and figure A.4 in the Appendix A.

[21] The 1962 census data were collected in March 1962 so it can be used as the last census before the arrival of the repatriates.

[22] the sectors are: tertiary, construction, transportation, public, agriculture, industry and commerce sector

explanation for the long-run effect of the *pieds noirs* on the far-right parties' vote share.

Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics for the variables used in this paper.

Table 3.1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs	Min.	Max.
Elections					
Right share-Legislative elections	0.34	0.13	1057	0.00	0.76
Far-right voteshare-Legislative elections	0.06	0.07	1057	0.00	0.30
Turnout-Legislative elections	0.73	0.08	1056	0.52	0.88
Right voteshare-Presidential elections	0.33	0.11	792	0.15	0.70
Far-right voteshare-Presidential elections	0.12	0.07	616	0.00	0.30
Turnout-Presidential elections	0.82	0.04	792	0.68	0.90
Census					
Pieds Noirs share 1962-1968	0.02	0.02	1496	0.00	0.09
Education	0.04	0.01	1496	0.02	0.09
Employed in agriculture 1962	0.30	0.14	1496	0.01	0.64
Employed in industry 1962	0.24	0.10	1496	0.08	0.53
Employed in transportation 1962	0.03	0.02	1496	0.01	0.11
Employed in construction 1962	0.09	0.02	1496	0.06	0.19
Employed in banking 1962	0.13	0.03	1496	0.08	0.25
Employed in tertiary 1962	0.09	0.02	1496	0.05	0.16
Employed in public sector 1962	0.10	0.03	1496	0.06	0.21
Foreign born population 1962	0.05	0.04	1496	0.00	0.20
Average temperature	11.32	1.36	1496	9.30	15.20
Immigrant population Maghreb 1962-1968 (share)	0.0002	0.0005	1496	0	0.003
Immigrant population from Maghreb 1962 (share)	0.01	0.01	1496	0	0.03
Immigrants inflow (1982-2012) Immigrants inflow	0.000	0.007	440	−0.03	0.02
Manifestos					
Word Algerie share	0.00054	0.00096	1490	0	0.00984
Word Rapatrie share	0.00048	0.00086	1490	0	0.00929
Word Indemnisation share	0.00034	0.00070	1490	0	0.00523
Word Amnistie share	0.00029	0.00072	1490	0	0.00616
Word Algerie share 1958	0.00274	0.00212	1548	0	0.01208
Word Rapatrie share 1958	0.00008	0.00034	1548	0	0.00350
Word Amnistie share 1958	0.00005	0.00028	1548	0	0.00256
Word Indemnisation share 1958	0.00007	0.00035	1548	0	0.00417

Summary statistics. Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum and Observations showed in the table

3.4 Identification strategy

To study the political impact of the *pieds noirs* between 1962 and 1974 I estimate the following model:

$$\text{Voteshare}_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \sum_{s=1962}^{1968} \text{pieds noirs}_{jrs} + \beta_2 \text{Voteshare}_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{3.1}$$

The outcome variable $Voteshare_{ijrt}$ captures the share of votes for the different parties i (or overall elections turnout), in each department j, located

in a region r, at time t. t ranges from 1962, the first election after the first wave of arrival of the *pieds noirs*, to 1974. As the different parties considered are not constant for the whole period, instead of looking at the vote share for every single party, I recode them according to their prevalent political ideology. Hence, my main outcome variable represents the vote share for center-right, far-right, as well as the election turnout.[23] The elections considered are the legislative elections of 1962, 1967, 1968 and 1973, while the presidential elections are the ones of 1965, 1969 and 1974.

In each single regression, I always control for the vote share for the same ideology i in the 1958 election, the first election of the French Fifth Republic and the last one before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The share of votes in the 1958 election captures the pre-existing political preference in the different areas.

The main variable of interest which captures the shock in each department j, region r, at time s is *pieds noirs*$_{jrs}$. I sum this variable in order to have, for each election, the share of *pieds noirs* who have settled in the area at the time of the election. In the Appendix C I also use two alternative measures of the shock: I restrict the measure only to the *pieds noirs* arrived between March to December 1962, or I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived between March 1962 to December 1968 who are in their legal voting age (at least 21) at the time of the elections.

In order to adjust for possible confounders, I include a set of controls that captures the socio-economic characteristics of the different areas (X_{jr62}). The impact of the repatriates on the different socio-economic characteristics of the departments can be a source of concern. Hence, the controls are fixed at their 1962 value, their pre-treatment levels. To capture time-specific trends and time-invariant characteristics at the regional level I also include a set

[23] The French ministry of interior provides a label that helps to identify the different parties according to their specific political ideology. The codification of every single party and president according to the ideology is shown in the Appendix E.

of year dummies δ_t and a set of region fixed effects θ_r. Standard errors are clustered at the department level, the main geographical unit of analysis. The parameter of interest (β_1) thus captures the average additional vote share, compared to that obtained in 1958, which can be causally attributed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs*.

3.4.1 Instrumental variable

The arrival of the *pieds noirs* is conceptually similar to the arrival of immigrants in a country. Hence, the main source of concern for identification is the potentially endogenous distribution of the repatriates across space. In particular, unobserved characteristics of the different departments could affect both the distribution of the *pieds noirs* as well as voting outcomes. In order to address this concern, I use an instrumental variable approach. Since the *pieds noirs* settled in the south of France where the climate is similar to the one they were used back in Algeria, I can use the average temperature by department as an instrumental variable. This is not a novel instrument since it has been already used in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019) to study the economic impact of the arrival of the repatriates. Figure 3.2 represents the distribution of *pieds noirs* and average temperature by department. The two maps show a significant degree of correlation, thus corroborating the relevance of the instrument.



Figure 3.3: predicted *pieds noirs* and share of *pieds noirs*

Additionally, figure 3.3 illustrates the relation between the predicted and the actual share of *pieds noirs*. The two measures are strongly correlated.

Table 3.2: First stage regression

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.009***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616	616	616	616
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 and year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Also, Table 3.2 shows the first stage regression which captures the effect of the average temperature on the *pieds noirs*' distribution during the period 1962-1974. The first column is the simple correlation between temperature and the share of *pieds noirs*. In Column 2 I add different socio-economic controls, in column 3 I add year fixed effects and in the last column, I also

add region fixed effects.

The coefficient is always statistically significant and positive, meaning that an increase in the average temperature in an area is associated with an increase in the share of the *pieds noirs* in the same area. The first stage thus shows that the instrument is relevant. In the following tables, I will always report the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for weak instruments to show the validity of the instrument.

3.4.2 Identifying assumption

The key identifying assumption behind the instrument is that average temperature should influence the vote share only through the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. This means that departments with a higher average temperature should not show significant differences in terms of political outcomes. This can happen if average temperature affects the voting outcomes or if, department-specific characteristics associated with average temperature affect the election outcomes after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The exclusion restriction assumption cannot be tested. Nonetheless, I try to bring some pieces of evidence to support the validity of this assumption.

First, in Appendix B table B.1, I show that average temperature is not associated with the political outcomes of interest in several elections before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. This means that warmer areas do not show higher turnout or higher vote-shares for center-right, far-right in the 1951, 1956 and 1958 legislative elections. To show that the average temperature is not associated with the pre-arrival political outcomes may not be enough since it may still be that warmer areas were already on different trends before the arrival of the repatriates. Hence, in Appendix B table B.2, I show that average temperature is also not associated with the change in political outcomes between the 1951, 1956 and 1958 elections.[24] These two pieces of

[24] A note of caution should be made on the possibility of using elections before 1958 since previous elections used a different electoral system. Only from 1958, France will undergo a

evidence suggests that average temperature did not directly affect the voting outcomes.

Second, in appendix B tables B.3 and B.4, I augment my specification by interacting controls, possibly correlated with average temperature, with year dummies, thus allowing for their evolution over time. This exercise is used to check if departments characteristics can have persistent effects on political outcomes. The results of this exercise leave the effect of the *pieds noirs* unaffected, suggesting that these characteristics were less likely to play a role in shaping the electoral outcomes after the arrival of the repatriates. These exercises reduce possible concerns over indirect links between average temperature and voting outcomes.

3.5 Results

In this section, I present the results of the analysis of the political impact of the *pieds noirs*. In order to minimize the concern over strategic voting by the electorate, I study the effect of the *pieds noirs*' arrival on the first round of both presidential and legislative elections. The first round should provide a more truthful representation of the preferences of the electorate. I first look at the short-run effect of the *pieds noirs*' arrival (1962-1974) and then move to the persistence of political voting (1986-2012).

3.5.1 Short-run

In this section, I test the empirical hypothesis stated in section 3.2.5. I look at legislative and presidential elections separately. This is because the two elections have different purposes. With legislative elections, the electorate elects a single MP to the national assembly. Differently, in presidential elections, each candidate is voted in a single different electoral district.

constitutional reform and the start of the French "Fifth Republic".

Table 3.3: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and *pieds noirs*.

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.103	0.586**	−1.204*	−1.844**	0.238***	0.292***
	(0.184)	(0.251)	(0.628)	(0.719)	(0.056)	(0.101)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		46.3		46.6		44.8

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 3.3 presents estimates of the causal impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. For each different ideology, the first column shows the results of the OLS regression while the second presents the result of the 2SLS regression. The first outcome of interest is the turnout. If the *pieds noirs'* voted in the elections I should observe an increase in turnout with respect to the 1958 election. Looking at the 2SLS result, A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* causes an increase in the turnout by around 0.58%. This result points in favour of the direct electoral participation of the *pieds noirs*. If the *pieds noirs* voted is likely that they also had noticeable effects in terms of vote shares for different parties.

Consistent with the hypothesis that the *pieds noirs* will not vote in favour of center-right/Gaullists candidates I observe that a 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* causes a decrease of the vote shares of 1.808%. I then look at the effect on far-right candidates. A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* leads to an increase in the far-right vote share by around 0.3%. In all cases the F-stat is high, thus showing that the instrument is relevant.

Table 3.4 shows the causal impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the presidential

elections held between 1965 and 1974. The results are in line with the ones found for the legislative elections: A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* increases the turnout by around 0.56%, it also decreases the vote shares of center-right presidential candidates by 1.3%, and increases the far-right vote share by around 0.7%.

Table 3.4: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and *pieds noirs*

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.232	0.562**	−0.470	−1.301**	0.509***	0.735***
	(0.166)	(0.247)	(0.451)	(0.659)	(0.083)	(0.092)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		44.1		44.3		39.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Both tables show OLS coefficients relative to center-right parties and turnout that are strongly downward biased. One possible explanation for this downward bias can be specifically related to the location choice of the repatriates. The repatriates likely settled in areas where they felt more welcomed and where people shared some of their beliefs on the Algerian issue. Those areas could be areas more dissatisfied with the government's decision to concede independence to Algeria.

The empirical analysis provides support for the hypothesis. The areas which were more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* saw: an increase in turnout, a decrease in the vote share for center-right parties, and an increase in the vote share for far-right parties.

Before studying the persistence of political preferences, one issue needs

further discussion. It is possible that the French government's decision to concede independence to Algeria led to mounting dissatisfaction against the government in some areas of France. This dissatisfaction could have led to a potential mobilisation of native citizens against the government, and in favour of the far-right, already before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. Does this possible mobilisation effect rule out any causal effect of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the political outcomes? It is not possible to answer unequivocally this question, given the non-availability of enough detailed opinion surveys and because the individual vote cannot be observed. Notwithstanding, I bring some pieces of evidence in favour of the political impact of the *pieds noirs*. The first thing to notice is that the electoral participation of the *pieds noirs* has been claimed by historians and has been documented in newspaper articles of the time (Palacio, 1965). Additionally, the analysis of the political manifestos in the second part of this paper shows a political manifesto of a candidate of an association of repatriates ("*Le Rassemblement National des Francais Rapatries*") directly running in the 1962 legislative election in a coalition with a far-right party (the Pojuadist party). These anecdotal examples point in the direction of the political participation of the *pieds noirs*.

To the previous anecdotal examples, I also add a quantitative one. I perform a falsification test to verify if turnout was already increasing before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. In particular, I use the referendum on the Algerian independence (8 April 1962) to observe the possible mobilisation effects of native citizens on that issue. This referendum was held immediately before the arrival of the *pieds noirs* and should thus capture natives' mobilisation on the Algerian issue, net of the *pieds noirs'* effect. In Appendix C table C.1 I show that the areas which will be more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* did not see an increase in votes and turnout between the 1958 legislative election and the 8 April 1962 referendum on the Algerian independence. At the same time, as I have shown in this section, the arrival of the *pieds noirs*

did cause an increase in turnout in the elections 1962-1974. These two results combined point in favour of the participation of the *pieds noirs* in the electoral process and thus in favour of the direct political effect of the *pieds noirs* on the electoral outcomes. It is still important to notice that this does not rule out possible spillover/contagion effects of the *pieds noirs* who could potentially have influenced the electoral behaviour of the natives in favour of the Far-right. In this case the electoral results I observe in the areas more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* would be a function of both the direct vote of the *pieds noirs* and of the natives.

3.5.2 Long-Run

The previous section showed the immediate impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the French elections. In this section, I look at the possible persistence of political voting. The long-run persistence of the vote for the far-right in the areas most affected by the arrival of the *pieds noirs* is not a completely new topic of discussion. In fact, Veugelers et al. (2015) and Veugelers (2019) showed that in the city of Toulon the *Front National* enjoyed the disproportionate support of the repatriates' communities in both presidential and legislative elections between 2002 and 2012. Similarly, Fourquet and Pratviel (2012), found that the *pieds noirs*, and their descendants (around 3 million potential voters), were significantly more likely to vote for the 2012 far-right presidential candidate. The monuments to the repatriates and to the Algerian war built in the 1980s also testify the saliency of the issue of the repatriates in the south of France decades after their arrival.

In order to study the long-run effect of the *pieds noirs'* arrival, I deploy the same strategy used to estimate the short-run effect. This time I use it for the elections held between 1982 and 2012. The main concern that arises, in this case, is represented by the presence of an omitted variable bias. In fact, as Edo (2019) showed, the arrival of (non-French) immigrants in France from

the '80s causally explains the increase in the vote share of far-right parties. Therefore, in order to claim that the *pieds noirs* had a persistent effect on the voting behaviour, I have to show that this effect is robust to the inclusion of a variable capturing the inflow of immigrants from other source countries starting from the '80s. Hence, I use all the censuses between 1982 and 2011 to construct a measure of the immigrant population[25] as the share of the overall department population in each census wave. I then calculate the immigration inflow as the change in the share of immigrants between two consecutive census waves and match each election with a census wave. In this way, I have, for each election, a measure of the inflow of immigrants at the time. Since the inflow of immigrants could generate endogeneity concerns, along the lines of Edo (2019), I construct a shift-share instrumental variable for the inflow of immigrants.[26] I use this measure in all the following regressions as an additional control.

In the following tables, for each different party, the first column shows the result of the OLS analysis if I control for the share of *pieds noirs'* and the inflow of immigrants. In the second column, the share of repatriates is instrumented using the average temperature and, in the third one, I also instrument the inflow of immigrants using a shift-share instrumental variable. In the third column, I always report the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics for each individual instrument.

[25] I consider as immigrants individuals who are not French. In this way, I am able to exclude the *pieds noirs* from this measure.

[26] In the Appendix C, sectionsC.11 I provide the details on how I constructed the dataset and the instrumental variable

Table 3.5: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs (standardized)	−0.064**	−0.025	−0.037	−0.039	−0.187	−0.189	0.457***	0.456***	0.422***
	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Immigrants inflow	0.013	0.017	−0.018	0.003	−0.015	−0.019	−0.006	−0.006	−0.110
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.072)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		43.7			38.9			41.3	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			49.8			37.8			39.9
SW F-stat immigrants			49.0			51.5			50.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, inflow of immigrants, year fixed effects and region fixed effects. The coefficients are standardized.

Table 3.6: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs (standardized)	−0.034	0.016	0.041	0.052	0.016	0.051	0.364***	0.216**	0.198*
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.102)
Immigrants inflow	0.036*	0.042**	0.111*	0.015	0.010	0.109	−0.037	−0.056**	−0.109
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.069)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.085)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
KP F-stat		42.6			37.6			40.2	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			62.7			48.3			50.7
SW F-stat immigrants			76.9			79.4			77.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, inflow of immigrants, year fixed effects and region fixed effects. The coefficients are standardized.

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that, in the long-run, there is a persistent effect of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share of far-right parties, even after controlling for the predicted inflow of immigrants. In particular, one standard deviation in the share of *pieds noirs* is associated with an increase in the vote share of far-right parties by around 0.4% in the legislative elections and by 0.197% in the presidential elections, though this result is less significant. The other results found in the short-run (higher turnout and lower vote share for the center-right parties) are not persistent.

A possible channel explaining the persistence of far-right voting in the areas historically more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* can be offered by Fourquet and Pratviel (2012). According to this study there 1.2 million electors in 2012 who still consider themsleves *pieds noirs* and more importantly a total of 3.2 million potential voters who have *pieds noirs* heritage and are more likely to vote for the Far-right.

This section showed the impact of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share of the different parties both in the short and the long run. In the next sections, I look at how the arrival of the *pieds noirs* influenced political strategies in the short-run. In particular, I show that, in areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates, parties devote a larger share of their political manifestos to the issues associated with the *pieds noirs*.

3.6 Party strategy and Pieds Noirs

Spatial models of elections as developed by Downs (1957) predict that parties adjust their political strategies and electoral programmes in response to shifts in public opinion as well as to successful shifts in their competitor's strategies.

Many studies have analysed how party strategy and policy is affected by shocks to the electorate. For example, the political science literature Adams et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2006) show how and when parties respond to changes in public opinion with a change in their strategy.[27] Adopting the same spatial framework of party competition also allowed authors to study how party strategy changes in response to changes in the strategy of their competitors. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), by looking at the comparative manifesto data for twenty-five countries, shows that parties tend to shift their policy positions in the same direction in which their opponents had shifted in the previous election. A related study, Han (2015) shows how the electoral positions of the radical right parties influenced the right-wing parties' position on multiculturalism.

One limitation of standard spatial models of party competition is that they tend to assume that parties compete over an exogenous set of fixed issues (Meguid, 2005). Differently, Carmines and Stimson (1986), Petrocik (1996), De Vries and Hobolt (2020); De Vries and Hobolt (2012), Aragonès et al. (2015) and Hobolt and De Vries (2015) among others, start from the assumption that issues are not always exogenous but their saliency can be manipulated by parties to gain electoral advantage. Political parties can behave as *political entrepreneurs*[28] pushing in the public debate political issues on which they

[27] Adams (2012) provides a survey of studies both theoretical and empirical that look at the same topic.

[28] According to Hobolt and De Vries (2015): "Issue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream status quo."

can capitalise. One possible consequence of issue entrepreneurship is that the other parties will be forced to respond to this strategy by adopting similar political stances (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Meguid, 2008). Examples of this behaviour can be found in Abou-Chadi (2016) and Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018) who show how the success of radical right positions on immigration affected the policy positions of the other parties. They show that radical right parties behaved as political entrepreneurs exploiting the ignored issue of immigration to gain electoral advantage. As a consequence of this strategy, the mainstream parties were then forced to develop more anti-immigrant stances as shown by their political manifestos.

These studies, which use parties' political manifestos to analyse party strategy, can help to shed light on a possible mechanism that is triggered by the arrival of the *pieds noirs* on French soil. The *pieds noirs* arrive in 1962 and constitute a new group of potential voters. This generates a shift in the political preferences of the electorate. I should then expect an adjustment in the strategy by the different parties in order to win the votes of the newly arrived electorate. If the connection between far-right parties and the *pieds noirs* was already active during the Algerian War, I should also expect the far-right to know better than other parties the *pieds noirs*' grievances. Far-right parties thus have an informational advantage to exploit. It is thus rational for the far-right to adopt a strategy that takes into account the needs of the *pieds noirs* and exploits this topic for political advantage in advance of other parties. The far-right thus behaves as a political entrepreneur. Hence, I expect far-right parties to devote more space to the topic in their political manifestos than their competitors, especially in the first years after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The increased salience of the issue and its national importance of it could potentially lead to convergence on this issue by the dominant parties who could mimic the strategy of the far-right, trying in this way to take advantage of the new electorate. It is also important to emphasize that

since a change in the political strategy does not go without cost, it is also reasonable to expect that the parties will react to the new strategy of the far-right in a heterogeneous way. They will try to exploit the issues related to the *pieds noirs* where they can maximize their votes. As a consequence, it is more likely that the increase in the space of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* will be larger in the areas of larger exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival.

From the above-stated mechanism three hypotheses arise:

Hypothesis 4: *Far-right parties devote more space of their political manifestos than other parties to the pieds noirs, especially in 1962.*

Given the existence of a connection between far-right parties and the *pieds noirs*, they may be more aware of the *pieds noirs*' grievances. I expect then to observe a larger share of the political manifestos of far-right parties devoted to the *pieds noirs*, especially in 1962, the first election after the first wave of arrival of the *pieds noirs*. Far-right parties behave as a political entrepreneur by exploiting, before other parties, the issues linked to the *pieds noirs*.

Hypothesis 5: *The other parties mimic the strategy of the far-right and thus start to devote more space in the political manifestos to the pieds noirs in later elections.*

Since the far-right is able to gain from the arrival of the *pieds noirs*, the other parties have to adjust their political strategy in order to exploit the issue. As a consequence, their political manifestos must see an increase in the space devoted to the *pieds noirs*. This implies that, over time, the difference in the space devoted to the *pieds noirs*, between the far-right and the other parties, tend to decrease.

Hypothesis 6: *The arrival of pieds noirs causes a shift in the strategy of the different parties. This shift is stronger, the larger the share of pieds noirs in the area.*

Since political manifestos have limited space, any word included in a manifesto is costly. As a consequence, it is rational to use more frequently the words linked with the *pieds noirs*' grievances in the areas where the issue

is more salient. It is thus rational to expect a higher usage of these words in the areas where it is possible to observe a more significant presence of the repatriates. Hence, the inflow of the repatriates forces parties to adopt a strategy that is a function of the exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival.

To test these hypotheses I look at the content of the political manifestos of the period. It is standard in the literature to look at party positions by studying the manifestos' scores on different issues as provided by the Manifesto Project Database (CMP/MARPOR).[29] Since there is no detailed information on the *pieds noirs*' issue I have to opt for an alternative solution. Hence, I directly extract data from the text of the original manifestos. Examples of this process can be found in Laver et al. (2003), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2019), Enke (2020) among others.[30] One study, in particular, has already applied text mining techniques to the French political manifestos: Le Pennec-Çaldichoury (2020) used text analysis to show how candidates' campaign communication changes between the first and second round of the French legislative elections.

In the next section, I describe the dataset I use and the process used to extract data from the French Political manifestos.

3.6.1 Data

My analysis focuses on the manifestos issued by each different political candidate in the first round of the legislative elections between 1958 and 1973. Each candidate for the National Assembly issued a manifesto before the elections that showed her political intent. Manifestos are usually two pages long and contain a description of the candidate's political platform. They contain both national and local policy proposals and thus represent a fundamental source to study any shift in party strategy. Manifestos were

[29] Volkens et al. (2019)

[30] Gentzkow et al. (2019) offers an overview of the statistical methods used and the different applications of text analysis.

collected by the Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF) and are freely available in a digitalized form from the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF*[31] (Gaultier-Voituriez, 2015, 2016).[32] The dataset contains a total of 10,745 single manifestos and covers almost all the manifestos issued by candidates to the legislative elections in the considered period.[33] For each single document I remove French stop-words, special characters as well as numbers. In this way, I obtain a dataset with tokens represented by single words in each document. I then apply a stemming algorithm to obtain the final dataset.[34]

For each single document I then compute the term frequency defined as:

$$\omega = \frac{\text{N word}}{\text{N non-stop words}}$$

In order to match the level of the analysis (the department), I need to aggregate the results. Hence, I take the average of ω for each single party i by *circonscription*[35] in a department j and I thus obtain ω_{ijrt}, which represents the term frequency for each single party i, in each single department j, in a region r, at the time of the election t. This measure captures how parties used their political manifestos to accommodate for the *pieds noirs*' needs, and represent a proxy for the different electoral strategies.

In particular, my focus is on the words that are directly linked with the *pieds noirs*. The first set of words captures geographical origin and status. I thus focus on the use of the words "*Algerie*" and "*Rapatrie*" or "*Refugie*". These words capture the extent to which the arrival of the repatriates from Algeria is a salient issue in the political debate. I then look at two other words that are directly linked with the *pieds noirs*' grievances: "*Indemnisation*" and

[31] https://archive.org/details/archiveselectoralesducevipof/

[32] See Appendix D for a more detailed description of the dataset

[33] Unfortunately the majority of the political manifestos for the UNR-UDT, De Gaulle's party in 1962, are missing.

[34] In this way words with the same root are grouped together. E.G. the words *Algerie* and *Algerienne* become the single word *Alger*.

[35] The *circonscription* (electoral district) were 465 from 1958 to 1967, when, after the reform of the Paris region, became 473. Each department comprises on average 5 electoral districts.

"*Amnistie*". Since the *pieds noirs* left all their possession in Algeria they started to pretend the compensation for their losses as soon as they arrived in France. The word "*Indemnisation*" thus captures the extent to which the different parties try to exploit this issue by promising compensation for the *pieds noirs*' losses. The word "*Amnistie*" is related to the *pieds noirs*' activity during the war. Since many *pieds noirs* were members of the army and were involved in the Algerian war, one of their requests was the amnesty for the possible crimes committed during the war.

In the next section, I show how far-right parties used the terms linked with the *pieds noirs* with higher frequency than the other parties. This highlights, once again, the existence of a connection between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right. I also show that the other parties, after 1962, the first election after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*, mimic the strategy of far-right parties and start to use the same terms used by the far-right more frequently.

3.6.2 Political entrepreneurship

In the previous sections I have assumed the existence of a connection between the *pieds noirs* and far-right parties and I then showed that this connection manifests its effect in the elections' outcome. A possible way to visualize the existence of this connection is represented by the share of the manifestos that each party devoted to the *pieds noirs* in 1962. If this connection is real I should expect the far-right to know better than other parties the issues linked with the *pieds noirs*. Hence, I should also expect to see these issues more frequently mentioned in the manifestos of far-right parties.



Figure 3.4: Words in political manifestos 1962, by party.

By looking at figure 3.4 it is clear that far-right parties devoted more space (than the majority of the competitors) of their political manifestos to the *pieds noirs'* issue in 1962. This evidence points again in favour of the previously stated connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs*.

What is also interesting to observe is the dynamics of party strategy. The existence of a connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs* gives an informational advantage to the far-right. This means that far-right parties can exploit this advantage to gain votes at the expense of others. If the far-right acts as a political entrepreneur I should observe the far-right to be the party that exploits the issues associated with the repatriates before other parties. Given the saliency and the importance of the issue, this can then potentially lead to a convergence of the other parties in later elections. I should then observe the other parties catch up and increase the space of their manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* in later elections.



Figure 3.5: Words by parties in the political manifestos 1958-1973.

Figure 3.5 points in this direction with an increase of the space of the manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* that increases in 1962[36] for the far-right and a catch up by the other parties in 1967. One noticeable exception is the word "Algerie" which follows a decreasing pattern. This behaviour can be easily explained by the fact that the Algerian war was an already important topic in the 1958 election when the French army was fighting the war. After the independence in 1962, the destiny of the Algerian nation was not as interesting for the French politicians as the French citizens who arrived after the end of the war.

A simple way to show that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur is to estimate:

[36]The word 'Amnistie" seems to follow the same pattern but with a lag of one period. This probably can be explained by the fact that the issue became salient with a delay. The first law in favour of the amnesty was voted in 1964 and then in 1966. Then in June 1968 a law specifically targeted the crimes committed in Algeria (*Loi n°68-697 du 31 juillet 1968 Portant amnistie Algerie)*) was passed. This explains the descending trend after 1967 and the loss of interest in this topic after 1968.

$$\omega_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \text{Far-Right}_{ijt} \times \delta_t + \theta_j + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{3.2}$$

Far-Right represents a dummy that takes a value of 1 for the manifestos of far-right parties. δ_t represents election fixed effects and θ_j represents department fixed effects. β_1 is the coefficient of interest and captures the differential behaviour of far-right parties with respect to the other parties within the same departments. I expect the coefficient to be significant and positive in 1962. This implies that far-right parties are the first ones to devote more space to the issue related to the *pieds noirs*. I then expect the coefficient to be reduced in magnitude and significance if the other parties mimic the strategy of the far-right and increase, in this way, the space of their political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs*.



Figure 3.6: Use of words by far-right parties vs others. Political manifestos 1958-1973.

Plot 3.6 points in this direction with the coefficient that is significant in 1962 and then decreases in the following elections. According to these results,

hypotheses 4 and 5 are vindicated by the data. Far-right were the first parties to exploit the issue related to the *pieds noirs*, thus behaving as a political entrepreneur. The other parties, made aware of the topical new issues brought by the repatriates, mimicked the strategy of the far-right in order to appeal to the new electorate.

3.6.3 *Pieds noirs'* exposure and political manifestos

In the previous section, I looked at the strategy of the different parties over time without looking at the causal effect of the exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival. It is thus rational to ask if parties devoted a larger space of their manifestos, especially in areas where more *pieds noirs* have settled. According to hypothesis 6, I should observe a larger space of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* in areas with a higher share of *pieds noirs*.



Figure 3.7: Inflow of *pieds noirs* and words in the political manifestos 1962-1973.

Figure 3.7 suggests that all parties tend to use the words more frequently

in areas with higher exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival[37]. To study more in detail this relation I adapt the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share. This time I also include a set of party fixed effects Ω_i to capture ideology specific characteristics that do not vary over time. I thus estimate:

$$\omega_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \sum_{t=1962}^{1968} \widehat{\text{pieds noirs}}_{jrs} + \beta_2 \omega_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \Omega_i + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{3.3}$$

The coefficient of interest is β_1, which captures the differential use of the words related to the *pieds noirs* as a function of the exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival. I expect the coefficient to be significant and positive, meaning that, increasing the share of *pieds noirs* also increases the space of the political manifestos devoted to the issue linked with the *pieds noirs*. For each word, the first column presents the OLS results while the second column shows the result of the 2SLS. In both regressions, I always include the set of controls used throughout the paper and I also add year, region and party fixed effects. In table 3.7, the coefficient of interest is always significant and positive. Looking at the 2SLS estimates, a 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* increases the term frequency by 0.011% for the word "Algerie", by 0.013% for the word "Rapatrie", by 0.019% for the word "Indemnisation" and by 0.015% for the word "Amnistie".

[37] "Low" means below the median while "high" above the median exposure to the share of *pieds noirs*.

Table 3.7: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and *pieds noirs*

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Pieds noirs	0.010***	0.009**	0.014***	0.010**	0.019***	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.2		44.7		45.6		45.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

As expected, the arrival of the *pieds noirs* causes a shift in the strategy of the different parties. Hence, parties adopt a strategy that depends on the magnitude of the exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival. Since the space of a manifesto and also the attention of a reader is limited, any word used in a political manifesto is costly. Hence, It is rational to target the electorate depending on the issue that can maximize the number of votes at the local level. This means that it is rational to use more frequently the words linked with the *pieds noirs* in the areas where the issue is more salient, the areas with a larger *pieds noirs'* concentration.

3.7 Robustness tests

In the Appendix C I show that the results are unaltered if I look at different definitions of the shock. In particular, I show that results do not significantly change if I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived only in 1962 (section C.2), if I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived between February 1962 to December 1968 (section C.4) or, if I look only at the *pieds noirs* who are older than the voting age in each election (section C.3).

Since in the same years of the *pieds noirs'* arrival also other Northern African countries became independent from France, I perform a placebo analysis exploiting this event (section C.7). In light of the recent literature on the political impact of immigrants on the vote for the far-right, instead of looking at the arrival of *pieds noirs*, I look at the arrival of immigrants from Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) between 1962 and 1975. In order to avoid overlapping with the *pieds noirs*, I only consider immigrants from Algeria that are not French citizens. To account for endogeneity concerns over the distribution of immigrants I look at both the actual and the predicted share of immigrants from the Maghreb. I thus instrument the share of immigrants from the Maghreb using a shift-share instrumental variable. In both presidential and legislative elections, the arrival of immigrants from the

Maghreb cannot explain any of the results obtained by looking at the *pieds noirs*. The 2SLS does not show any significant relation between the arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb and the increase in both the far-right vote share and turnout. I do find evidence of an effect on the decrease of vote share for center-right parties. As an additional robustness test, I thus look at the effect of the *pieds noirs'* arrival controlling for both the actual and predicted arrival of immigrants from Maghreb (section C.8). Even controlling for the predicted arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb the share of *pieds noirs* delivers the same effects found in section 3.5.1.

Since distance can affect the location choice of the pieds noirs and also outcomes, as an additional test, I control for the distance between the capital of each French department to Algiers (the capital of Algeria). The results are unaltered (section C.6). Additionally, since labour market considerations can influence voting I control for the unemployment share in 1962. The results are still robust. In order to rule out that the results are driven by influential observations, I replicate the analysis of section 3.5.1 with a winsorised version of the shock. The results hold the same. In section C.1 of the Appendix C I show that, in the areas of larger exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival, both the number of votes and turnout did not increase between the 1958 legislative elections and the 1962 referendum on the Algerian independence. At the same time, I show that turnout and the number of votes increased in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973, thus pointing in favour of the direct participation of the *pieds noirs* in the electoral process. Additionally, I use Conley standard errors (Conley, 1999) to account for possible spatial correlation (section C.10).

I then look at the robustness of the persistence effects. I show that the results presented in section 3.5.2 are unaltered if I use the distribution of the *pieds noirs* constructed from the 1975 census (section C.13) and if I use a winsorised version of the shock (section C.12). Additionally, since persistence could be

driven by spatial instead of temporal persistence, as argued by Kelly (2019), as a robustness check I follow Kelly (2020) and I add the departments' latitude and longitude as additional controls (section C.14). I also winsorise both *pieds noirs* and the immigrants' inflow in order to show that the results are not driven by influential observations. In both cases the results are robust, indicating that temporal persistence, instead of spatial correlation, seems to be a more likely explanation of the results.

In the Appendix D, I perform several robustness tests on the analysis of the manifestos. I replicate the analysis of section 3.6.3 using the *pieds noirs* older than the voting age in each elections (section D.5) or a winsorised version of the shock (section D.3). Additionally, I perform the same placebo test used for the electoral outcomes on the manifestos. The actual or predicted share of immigrants from the Maghreb does not explain any of the manifestos' outcomes.

3.8 Conclusion

This article studied the impact of an exogenous change in the voting population on election outcomes and on the strategies pursued by parties to mobilize voters. I exploited the exogenous variation in the arrival of about 1 million French repatriates from Algeria in 1962 (the so-called *pieds noirs*). I find that the arrival of the *pieds noirs* increased the elections turnout and the vote share of far-right parties while it decreased the vote share of the center-right parties in both legislative and presidential elections between 1962 and 1974. I also analysed how this shock affected the political strategies of different parties by examining more than 10,000 political manifestos issued in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. I documented that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur and started to devote space of their political manifestos to the issues historically associated with the *pieds noirs* already from 1962. The other parties were then forced to adopt

the same strategy in the following elections. I also showed that the larger the exposure to the repatriates' arrival, the larger the share of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs*. These findings, and the mechanism highlighted in this paper, could still be relevant in explaining current parties' behaviour. As in the case of the *pieds noirs*, ignored issues may still be captured by radical parties and used in electoral competition to gain votes. As a consequence, the mainstream parties could be dragged towards more radical positions.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Descriptive statistics and historical background

A.1 Descriptive statistics

Figure A.1: Pieds noirs departing from Algeria after the Algerian independence (Month of August 1962). Source: Evans (2011)



Figure A.2: Pieds noirs' arrival, in thousands. Source: French Census 1968



Figure A.3: Economic activities and pieds noirs. Source: French Census 1968

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

Figure A.4: Education level. Source: French Census 1968

Appendix B

IV identifying assumptions

B.1 Effect on pre-treatment outcome variables, level and change

Table B.1: Vote share in legislative elections 1958 and average temperature

	Turnout			Right			Far Right	
	(1) 1958	(2) 1956	(3) 1951	(4) 1958	(5) 1956	(6) 1951	(7) 1958	(8) 1956
temp	0.002	0.004	0.003	−0.020	−0.022	−0.011	0.003	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Observations	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table B.2: Change in vote share in legislative elections 1951-1958 and average temperature

	Turnout		Right		Far Right
	(1) 1956-58	(2) 1951-56	(3) 1956-58	(4) 1951-56	(5) 1956-58
temp	−0.003	0.002	0.002	−0.011	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.008)
Observations	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

B.2 Using controls interacted with year dummies

Table B.3: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs, controls interacted

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pieds noirs	0.586**	−1.844**	0.292***
	(0.251)	(0.719)	(0.101)
Observations	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	41.9	42.2	40.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table B.4: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs, controls interacted

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pieds noirs	0.562**	−1.301**	0.735***
	(0.247)	(0.659)	(0.092)
Observations	264	264	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	40.3	40.4	37.2

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table B.5: Use of words in manifesto and pieds noirs. Controls interacted

	ALgerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) IV	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) IV	(6) IV	(7) IV	(8) IV
Pieds noirs	0.009**	0.009**	0.010**	0.010**	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	45.2	45.2	44.7	44.8	45.6	45.8	45.1	45.3

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.

Appendix C

Robustness

In this section, I perform different robustness checks in order to show that, even looking at a modified version of the shock the results do not change in a significant way. The empirical strategy used in the paper is replicated in this section with the only difference that I use a different version of the shock or I winsorised the shock in order to get rid of potential issues related to the influence of the outliers. I also perform a placebo test to show that immigration from other source countries does not explain the results obtained with the pieds noirs. Whenever I change the variable of interest (the measure of the shock) I always report also the first stage regression to show that, even changing the measure the instrument is still valid.

C.1 Change in votes/turnout 1958-1962 referendum

In this section, I perform a falsification test to show that the change in votes/turnout between the 1958 election and the 1962 referendum on the Algerian independence is uncorrelated with the arrival of the pieds noirs. This means that before the arrival of the pieds noirs votes/turnout in these areas was not increasing.

Table C.1: Change in turnout 1958-1962 referendum and pieds noirs

	(1) OLS	(2) IV
Pieds noirs	0.356	−0.385
	(0.387)	(0.535)
Observations	88	88
Controls	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes
KP F-stat		
Fstat		34.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains region fixed effects



Change in the number of votes 1958-1962 referendum. Votes 1962-1973 controlling for 1958 results.

C.2 Using pieds noirs in 1962

In this section, I construct the variable that captures the shock of pieds noirs arrival by looking only at the pieds noirs who arrived in France between March 1962 to December 1962. In this way, I am increasing the likelihood that the pieds noirs in the sample are repatriates and immigrants who moved to France for other reasons other than the end of the Algerian War and the Algerian independence. The variable of interest is thus:

$$\text{pieds noirs}_{jr1962} = \frac{\text{N pieds noirs}_{jr1962}}{\text{Population}_{jr1962}}$$

Table C.2: First-stage results, pieds noirs share in 1962 and average temperature

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.006***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616.0	616.0	616.0	616.0
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department

Table C.3: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.144	0.808**	−1.488*	−2.541**	0.378***	0.404***
	(0.277)	(0.343)	(0.865)	(0.988)	(0.074)	(0.138)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		48.7		50.3		47.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.4: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.307	0.831**	−0.726	−1.921**	0.904***	1.078***
	(0.245)	(0.359)	(0.651)	(0.956)	(0.106)	(0.131)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		47.2		48.7		42.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.3 Using pieds noirs able to vote

In this section, I construct the variable that captures the shock of pieds noirs' arrival by looking only at the pieds noirs who arrived in France between March 1962 to December 1968 and are 21 in the different years of the elections. Since I am including only the pieds noirs who are eligible voters at the moment of the elections I am, in this way, looking at the direct effect of the pieds noirs on the voting pattern. The variable of interest is thus:

$$\text{pieds noirs}_{jrs} = \frac{\text{N pieds noirs}_{jrs} >= 21 \text{years old}}{\text{Population}_{jr1962}}$$

Table C.5: First-stage results, eligible voters pieds noirs share and average temperature

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.005***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616	616	616	616
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department

Table C.6: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and eligible voters pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.100	0.959**	−1.961*	−2.997**	0.403***	0.476***
	(0.321)	(0.419)	(1.043)	(1.164)	(0.090)	(0.164)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.9		47.9		45.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.7: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and eligible voters pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.288	0.918**	−0.766	−2.110**	0.953***	1.190***
	(0.283)	(0.411)	(0.751)	(1.076)	(0.120)	(0.155)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		43.6		45.4		40.6

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.4 Using also pieds noirs February-March 1962

Table C.8: First stage results, pieds noirs in 1962 share and average temperature

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.009***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616	616	616	616
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department

Table C.9: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.105	0.580**	−1.182*	−1.823**	0.235***	0.289***
	(0.181)	(0.248)	(0.624)	(0.711)	(0.055)	(0.100)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		47.4		47.9		45.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.10: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.232	0.556**	−0.462	−1.287**	0.506***	0.727***
	(0.164)	(0.244)	(0.446)	(0.651)	(0.082)	(0.091)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.1		45.4		40.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.5 Using pieds noirs time varying

$$\text{Voteshare}_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \text{pieds noirs}_{jrs} + \beta_2 \text{Voteshare}_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{C.1}$$

Table C.11: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.001	0.014**	0.001	−0.053**	0.001	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Observations	264	264	264	264	264	264
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		47.4		48.1		45.6

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The variable pieds noirs has been standardised. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.

Table C.12: Vote share in presidential elections 1965 and pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.013**	0.021***	−0.020	−0.047**	0.031***	0.037***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	88	88	88	88	88	88
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		24.7		24.1		24.6

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The variable pieds noirs has been standardised. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.6 Controlling for the distance from Algiers and unemployment

Table C.13: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs

	Turnout				Right				Far Right			
	(1) Distance	(2) Distance X year	(3) Unemployed	(4) Unemployed X year	(5) Distance	(6) Distance X year	(7) Unemployed	(8) Unemployed X year	(9) Distance	(10) Distance X year	(11) Unemployed	(12) Unemployed X year
Pieds noirs	1.154***	1.154***	0.576*	0.576*	−3.072***	−3.072***	−2.152**	−2.152**	0.363**	0.363**	0.350***	0.350***
	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(1.054)	(1.054)	(0.912)	(0.912)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	33.5	33.2	46.4	45.9	33.6	33.3	48.5	48.0	32.1	31.8	43.5	43.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.14: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs

	Turnout				Right				Far Right			
	(1) Distance	(2) Distance X year	(3) Unemployed	(4) Unemployed X year	(5) Distance	(6) Distance X year	(7) Unemployed	(8) Unemployed X year	(9) Distance	(10) Distance X year	(11) Unemployed	(12) Unemployed X year
Pieds noirs	1.095***	1.095***	0.666**	0.666**	−1.941**	−1.941**	−1.342*	−1.342*	0.732***	0.732***	0.756***	0.756***
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.917)	(0.917)	(0.743)	(0.743)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Observations	264	264	264	264	264	264	264	264	176	176	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	32.5	32.2	44.1	43.7	32.6	32.3	46.1	45.7	29.0	28.8	38.6	38.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.7 Placebo Maghreb immigrants

In this section, I perform a placebo test. instead of looking at the arrival of the pieds noirs, I look at immigrants who arrived from Maghreb countries which were previous colonies of France and became independent in the same year as Algeria. I thus look at immigrants from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. I construct the measure of the shock as:

$$\text{Maghreb Immigrants}_{jrs} = \frac{\text{N immi from Algeria+ N imm from Tunisia + N immi from Morocco }_{jrt}}{\text{Population}_{jr1962}}$$

In order to avoid any possible overlapping of this measure with the one used for the pieds noirs, I consider only the immigrants from Algeria without French citizenship thus increasing the likelihood that the people included in the measure are just immigrants and not repatriates. The estimation equation is exactly the same used in the paper for the political effect of the pieds noirs. Since the average temperature by department is only weakly correlated with the spatial distribution of the arrival of the migrants from Maghreb I have to instrument *Maghreb Immigrants* using the spatial distribution of immigrants from the same source countries on 1st January 1962.

$$\text{Voteshare}_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \text{Maghreb Immigrants}_{jrt} + \beta_2 \text{Voteshare}_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{C.2}$$

Table C.15: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Inflow Maghreb	0.050	−0.101	−1.893***	−2.446***	0.059	0.107
	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.576)	(0.587)	(0.081)	(0.097)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		159.3		160.9		157.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.16: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Inflow Maghreb	−0.132	−0.359*	0.199	0.362	−0.779***	−0.986***
	(0.135)	(0.214)	(0.361)	(0.536)	(0.268)	(0.320)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		65.1		72.5		82.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.8 Pieds noirs plus controlling for Maghreb immigrants

Table C.17: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds Noirs	0.102	0.597**	−0.999	−1.674**	0.235***	0.286***
	(0.184)	(0.253)	(0.637)	(0.723)	(0.059)	(0.100)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW F-stat pieds noirs		62.7		66.3		61.4
SW F-stat immigrants		162.2		160.7		162.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.18: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds Noirs	0.270	0.627**	−0.532	−1.367**	0.652***	0.878***
	(0.170)	(0.247)	(0.461)	(0.651)	(0.094)	(0.108)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW F-stat pieds noirs		54.9		56.4		50.2
SW F-stat immigrants		118.4		112.7		122.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.9 Tables-pieds noirs winsorization

In this section, I winsorized the share of pieds noirs by department by assigning to the top and bottom 5% the least extreme values before that interval. In this way, I am able to reduce the influence of the outliers on my regression without losing observations.

Table C.19: First-stage results, pieds noirs share and average temperature, winsorised

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616.0	616.0	616.0	616.0
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department

Table C.20: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs, winsorised

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.573**	1.100***	−2.459**	−3.502**	0.212*	0.559***
	(0.227)	(0.379)	(1.059)	(1.511)	(0.120)	(0.210)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		30.2		27.8		25.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.21: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs, winsorised

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.866***	1.125***	−2.506***	−2.637**	0.963***	1.479***
	(0.219)	(0.388)	(0.573)	(1.089)	(0.118)	(0.275)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		24.8		22.9		20.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.10 Conley Spatial Correlation

Table C.22: Legislative elections-Conley corrected standard errors

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV	IV	IV
Pieds noirs	0.586***	−1.844*	0.292**
	(0.186)	(1.062)	(0.132)
Observations	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.23: Presidential elections-Conley corrected standard errors

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV	IV	IV
Pieds noirs	0.562***	−1.301**	0.735***
	(0.204)	(0.541)	(0.255)
Observations	264	264	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.11 long-run: Shift-share

In order to minimize possible concerns regarding the presence of an omitted variable bias, in the long-run analysis, I always control for the inflow of immigrants in each census wave between 1982 and 2011. I exploit the censuses in 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2011 to construct a measure of the inflow of immigrants, calculated as the share of the previous census population. I consider immigrants the citizens in each French department without French citizenship. I do not exploit information on the country of birth since the *pieds noirs* were born in Algeria and I don't want these two variables to overlap. I match each single census wave with the different elections in order to have one election per census wave: the 1982 census is used for the 1986 legislative election and 1988 presidential election; the 1990 election is used for the 1993 and 1997 legislative elections and the 1995 presidential elections; the 1999 census is used for the 2002 legislative and presidential elections; the 2006 census is used for the 2007 legislative and presidential elections and the 2011 census is used for the 2012 legislative and presidential elections.

Similarly to Edo (2019)[1], in order to instrument for the inflow of immigrants arriving in France at each census wave I use a shift-share instrumental variable. I use immigrants with citizenship from the following countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Romania, Finland, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and the rest of the world. I then divide immigrants from these countries in 4 groups: Europe (Germany, Finland, Poland, Romania), Latin (Spain, Italy, Portugal), Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and the rest of the world (all the other countries excluding the forehead mentioned). I start by constructing the instrument for each k country-group and then summing across k:

[1] Edo (2019) also uses the variable "Other African countries" to create the variable. Another difference is that I am not using the information on the different skill-level of the immigrants.

$$\Delta\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} = \sum_{k=1}^{k} \frac{N_{jk1968}}{N_{k1968}} * (\text{immi}_{kt} - \text{immi}_{kt-1}),$$

I then calculate the predicted immigration in location j at time t:

$$\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} = \text{immi}_{jt-1} + \Delta\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt},$$

I follow the same strategy to calculate the predicted share of French citizens in location j at time t:

$$\Delta\widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt} = \frac{N_{j1968}}{N_{1968}} * (\text{Natives}_{t} - \text{Natives}_{t-1}),$$

$$\widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt} = \text{Natives}_{jt-1} + \Delta\widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt},$$

I then calculate the predicted population in location j at time t:

$$\widehat{\text{Population}}_{jt} = \widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} + \widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt},$$

and so I obtain:

$$\widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt} = \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt}},$$

and then take the first-difference with lagged value in order to calculate the inflow, as a share of the population, for each location j and period t.
The variable that controls for the inflow of immigrants at each point in time is, therefore:

$$\widehat{\text{immigrants inflow}}_{jt} = \widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt} - \widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt-1} = \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt}} - \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt-1}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt-1}},$$

C.12 Long-run winsorised

In this section, I winsorised both the inflow of pieds noirs and immigrants in order to reduce to show that the results are not driven by influential observations.

Table C.24: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs*, winsorised

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.044	−0.056	−0.076	−0.166	−0.365	−0.393*	0.777***	0.918***	0.883***
	(0.056)	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.143)	(0.222)	(0.238)	(0.101)	(0.172)	(0.192)
Immigrants inflow	0.015	0.014	−0.035	0.020	0.009	−0.058	−0.040	−0.032	−0.120
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.144)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.126)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		29.6			26.1			23.9	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			28.4			23.1			22.2
SW F-stat immigrants			31.9			33.0			33.2

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.

Table C.25: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs*, winsorised

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	0.033	0.018	0.111	−0.150	0.049	0.136	0.625***	0.426**	0.391*
	(0.053)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.096)	(0.222)	(0.266)	(0.117)	(0.176)	(0.207)
Immigrants inflow	0.033	0.032	0.232*	0.038	0.051	0.227	−0.097**	−0.110***	−0.186
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.136)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.149)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.176)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		28.7			25.2			23.1	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			36.8			28.5			28.5
SW F-stat immigrants			22.7			23.4			23.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.13 Long-run using pieds noirs in 1975

In this section, instead of using the share of pieds noirs who arrived between March 1962 to December 1968, I look at long-run effects by using the distribution of pieds noirs in 1975 In order to construct this measure, I look at the 1975 census and I consider as pieds noirs the citizens who were born in Algeria but have French citizenship.

$$\text{pieds noirs}_{jr75} = \frac{\text{N pieds noirs}_{jr75}}{\text{Population}_{jr1968}}$$

This measure is not ideal since I cannot exclude Algerian Immigrants who were able to obtain French citizenship between 1968 and 1975. Still the correlation between this measure and one used in the paper is extremely high, increasing the confidence that it captures the actual share of pieds noirs in 1975.



Figure C.1: pieds noirs 1975 and pieds noirs 1968 (shares)

The estimation equation thus becomes:

$$\text{Voteshare}_{ijrt} = \beta_1 * \text{pieds noirs}_{jr75} + \beta_2 \text{immi inflow}_{jrt} + \beta_3 \text{Voteshare}_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \quad \text{(C.3)}$$

Table C.26: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs 75	−0.078***	−0.027	−0.039	−0.029	−0.200	−0.199	0.491***	0.484***	0.444***
	(0.027)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.100)
Immigrants inflow	0.011	0.017	−0.018	0.004	−0.016	−0.015	−0.003	−0.004	−0.119*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.083)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.070)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		48.0			43.1			44.9	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			54.0			41.8			44.6
SW F-stat immigrants			49.6			52.5			51.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table C.27: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs 75	−0.048	0.017	0.043	0.078	0.017	0.053	0.390***	0.228**	0.206*
	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.100)	(0.106)
Immigrants inflow	0.034	0.042**	0.110*	0.018	0.010	0.108	−0.035	−0.055*	−0.115
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.083)
Observations	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		46.5			41.5			43.4	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			63.1			50.5			54.6
SW F-stat immigrants			77.9			80.7			79.3

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.14 Long-run controlling for latitude and longitude

Table C.28: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.064*	−0.043	−0.054	−0.003	−0.198	−0.199	0.535***	0.623***	0.592***
	(0.033)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.087)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.116)
Immigrants inflow	0.010	0.011	−0.027	0.001	−0.013	−0.015	−0.010	−0.004	−0.129*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.083)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.068)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		27.4			22.5			22.8	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			27.5			20.6			20.9
SW F-stat immigrants			47.2			49.1			47.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects. I also add latitude and longitude as additional controls.

Table C.29: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.046	−0.003	0.018	0.013	−0.054	−0.024	0.461***	0.407***	0.388***
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.107)
Immigrants inflow	0.036*	0.038*	0.112*	0.020	0.015	0.131*	−0.040	−0.044*	−0.122
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.075)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.081)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		26.7			21.9			22.3	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			32.2			23.0			23.2
SW F-stat immigrants			76.5			77.0			73.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.I also add latitude and longitude as additional controls.

Appendix D

Manifesto

The electoral manifestos (*professions de foi*) of the considered period are collected by the CEVIPOF and Sciences PO and are available at the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF*[1]. Manifestos are, for the vast majority, documents of two pages that contains the candidates' political stances. Their size is regulated by the electoral law (R29) which states that they cannot weight more then 70 grams per square metre and cannot be bigger then 210 mm X 297 mm[2]

The main issue with the electoral manifestos in the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF* is that the pdf and txt file both contain the manifesto for all the different candidates in a *circonscription*. This means that it is not possible to immediately obtain information on the manifesto of single candidates. The only way to get information by candidates is to split the text in different parts and manually link them to each single specific candidate. Once this is done then it is possible to obtain the manifestos of all the candidates to the legislative elections in the different *circonscription*. This gives me a dataset of 10,745 single manifestos that is ready to be used. In order to extract information from the manifestos, I perform different pre-processing steps.

[1]https://archive.org/details/archiveselectoralesducevipof/

[2]Chaque candidat, binôme de candidats ou liste de candidats ne peut faire adresser à chaque électeur, par la commission de propagande, qu'une seule circulaire d'un grammage de 70 grammes au mètre carré et d'un format de 210 mm x 297 mm..

For each single document, I remove French stop-words, special characters as well as numbers. In this way, I obtain a dataset with tokens represented by single words in each document. I then apply a stemming algorithm to get the final dataset. The final dataset is composed of tokens (single words) for each specific document. In this way, I have all the single words used in each candidate's manifesto. This enables me to compute the term frequency for each single word in a document, calculated as:

$$\omega = \frac{\text{N word}}{\text{N non-stop words}}$$

Since the level of analysis is not the electoral district but the department I aggregate the results by taking the average of the term frequency for the different *circonscription* in a department. I then take the average of the obtained term frequency for all the parties that I have coded as Right, Far-right, Left, Far-left and Centrists. In this way for each single department, for each single party and for each single election I have the respective term frequency.

D.1 Example



Elections Législatives de Novembre 1962

DEPARTEMENT DES PYRENEES-ORIENTALES

Première Circonscription

Candidat du Front National Uni

présenté par

le Rassemblement National des Français Rapatriés

d'Afrique du Nord et d'Outre Mer

et les Amis d'Union et Fraternité Française (UFF)

ainsi que de Nombreuses Personnalités Régionales...

Electrices, Electeurs,

C'est en dehors de toute passion politique que nous présentons notre candidature aux élections législatives. Plus que quiconque, nous n'avons que mépris pour les méthodes anciennes appliquées par les partis, de l'U.N.R. aux Communistes, qui ont fait preuve de sectarisme, d'impuissance et de désordre.

RIEN NE CHANGERA TANT QUE VOUS NE CHANGEREZ PAS LES HOMMES EN PLACE COMPLICES D'UN GOUVERNEMENT BRADEUR DU PATRIMOINE NATIONAL.

DEPUIS QUATRE ANS QUE DES PROMESSES ONT ETE FAITES :

Les Paysans ont-ils obtenu quelque chose de sérieux et de durable ?
Les ouvriers et employés des secteurs privé et public ont-ils augmenté leurs pouvoirs d'achat ?
Les commerçants sont-ils à l'abri d'une fiscalité trop lourde ?
Les artisans sont-ils assurés du lendemain ?
Les réfugiés sont-ils indemnisés et reclassés dans la Communauté Nationale ?
Les professions libérales ne perdent-elles pas leurs libertés ?
Les contribuables de toutes catégories payent-ils moins d'impôts ?
Les vieux ne sont-ils pas restés des économiquement faibles ?
La stabilité monétaire et l'expansion économique sont-elles une réalité ?

DRAME DU PAYS ET COMEDIE DES ELUS

Des régions entières se dépeuplent, dépérissent économiquement. De part et d'autre d'une ligne BREST-GRENOBLE, s'opposent deux Frances, la France du Nord riche et prospère, la France du Sud qui devient un désert. Dans une Nation comme la nôtre, il ne saurait y avoir de parents pauvres.

Les hommes en place, malgré leurs beaux discours, leurs serments électoraux n'ont strictement rien fait pour remédier à cet état de choses bien mieux ils l'ont envenimé par leur coupable carence.

Ces hommes, sauf quelques rares exceptions, doivent être écartés.

Des hommes nouveaux doivent apparaître. Nous vous les présentons.

Ils sont dignes de votre confiance. Nous répondons d'eux.

Nos candidats ne vous promettent pas de faire des miracles. Ils jurent simplement de résister par tous les moyens à l'emprise de l'Etat, de l'autoritarisme, des oligarchies financières, de faire pièce au pouvoir quel qu'il soit, pour défendre vos intérêts économiques financiers et sociaux.

Figure D.1: Maifesto Poujadist candidate Pyrenees-Orientales 1962.

D.2 Graphical analysis



Figure D.2: Manifesto words by exposure intensity.



Figure D.3: Manifesto words by exposure intensity. Binscatter

D.3 Manifesto Winsorized

Table D.1: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and pieds noirs. Winsorised

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Pieds noirs	0.011**	0.020**	0.018***	0.022**	0.019***	0.031***	0.016***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		19.0		18.7		18.6		18.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

D.4 Manifesto Placebo

Table D.2: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and Immigrants from Maghreb

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Inflow Maghreb	−0.004	−0.007*	0.001	−0.003	0.000	−0.001	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1043	1043	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		182.2		180.8		181.5		180.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

D.5 Manifesto using eligible pieds noirs

Table D.3: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and eligible pieds noirs

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Pieds noirs 21	0.017***	0.015**	0.022***	0.016**	0.031***	0.023***	0.023***	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.1		44.5		45.4		44.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

Appendix E

Elections and parties

Table E.1: Elections included in the dataset

Year	Election type	First round	Second round
1958	Legislative	23 November	30 November
1962	Legislative	18 November	25 November
1965	Presidential	5 December	19 December
1967	Legislative	5 March	12 March
1968	Legislative	23 June	30 June
1969	Presidential	1 June	15 June
1973	Legislative	4 March	11 March
1974	Presidential	5 May	19 May
1978	Legislative	12 March	19 March
1981	Legislative	14 June	21 June
	Presidential	26 April	10 May
1986	Legislative	16 March	

In 1986 only the first round of the legislative elections was held. In 1962 the departments of Lot, Manche and Meuse did not vote in the second round; in 1967 the department of Lozere did not vote in the second round; in 1968 Cantal, Lozere, Marne, Heute-Marne, Meuse, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Deux Sevres and Vosges did not vote in the second round; in 1978 Cantal, Haute-Loire and Lozere did not vote in the second round; in 1981 the departments of Aude, Gers, Haute-Loire, Lot, Lozere, Maine-et-Loire, Mayenne and Deux Sevres did not vote in the second round of the legislative elections.

Table E.2: right and far-right parties by election

year	right	far-right
1958	Union pour la Nouvelle Republique-UNR	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Centre Reformateur Republicain-CRR	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Centre National des Independants-CNI	
1962	Union pour la nouvelle République-Union démocratique du travail-UNRUDT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-INDVREP	
	Centre National des Independants-CNI	
1967	Radicaux de droite-RADDROIT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union des Democrates pour la V Republique-UD5	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Alliance republicaine-ALLREP	
1968	Radicaux de droite-RADDROIT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union de Defense de la Republique-UDR	Alliance republicaine-EXD
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Republicains Independants - Union de Defense de la Republique-RIUDR	
1973	Divers droite-DVD	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union Des Democrates pour la V Republique-Union des Republicains de Progres-UDRURP	
	Republicains Independants-Union des Republicains de Progres-RIURP	
	Divers Union des Republicains de Progres-DIVURP	
	Centre Democrate-Union des Republicains de Progres-CDPURP	
	Union de Defense de la Republique-UDR	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
1978	Gaullistes d'opposition-GAULOPP	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	
	Divers droite-DVD	
1981	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-Rassemblement Pour la Republique-UDFRPR	Front National-FRN
	Divers droite-DVD	
1986	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	Front National-FRN
	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-Rassemblement Pour la Republique-UDFRPR	
	Divers droite-DVD	

List of parties coded as right wing and far right parties by legislative elections.

Table E.3: lef and far-left parties by election

year	left	far-left
1958	Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriare-SFIO	Parti communiste-COM
	Union des Forces Democratiques-UFD	
	Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC	
	Radicaux Union des Forces Democratiques-RADUFD	
	Union Democratique et Socialiste de la Resistance-minoritaires-UDSRMIN	
1962	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU	Parti communiste-COM
	Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC	Divers extreme gauche-EXG
	Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriare-SFIO	
1967	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU	Parti communiste-COM
	Divers extreme gauche-EXG	Parti communiste-apparentes-COM
	Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste-FGDS	
	Divers gauche-DVG	
1968	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU	Parti communiste-COM
	Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste-FGDS	Parti communiste-apparentes-COM
	Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC	
1973	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU	Parti communiste-COM
	Parti Socialiste-SOC	Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire-LCR
	Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-MRG	Lutte Ouvriere-LO
	Divers gauche-DVG	Organisation Communiste Revolutionaire-OCI
1978	Parti Socialiste-Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-PSMRG	Parti communiste-COM
	Divers gauche-DVG	Divers extreme gauche-EXG
		Front Autogestionnaire-EXG
1981	Parti Socialiste-SOC	Parti communiste-COM
	Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-MRG	extreme gauche-EXG
	Divers gauche-DVG	
1986	Parti Socialiste-SOC	Parti communiste-COM
	Divers gauche-DVG	extreme gauche-EXG

List of parties coded as left wing and far left parties by legislative elections.

Table E.4: centrists and other parties by election

year	centrists	others
1958	Radicaux centristes-RADCENT	Poujadistes-POUJ
	Mouvement Republicain Populaire-MRP	Divers-DIV
	Moderats-MOD	
1962	Radicaux centristes-RADCENT	Poujadistes-POUJ
	Mouvement reppublicain Populaire, V Republique-MRPVREP	
	Mouvement Republicain Populaire-MRP	Divers-DIV
	Moderats-MOD	
1967	Centristes rallies-RALLIE	Divers-DIV
	Moderats-MOD	
	Centre Democrate-CENTDEM	
1968	Moderats-MOD	
	Centre Progressiste et democratie moderne-CPDM	Divers-DIV
		Technique et democratie-DIV
		Mouvement pour la reforme-DIV
1973	Divers Radicaux reformateurs-DIVREF	
	Radicaux reformateurs-REFRAD	
	Centre Democratie et Progres-CDP	
1978	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Ecologistes-ECO
1981	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Regionalistes-DIV
		Ecologistes-ECO
1986	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Regionalistes-DIV
		Ecologistes-ECO

List of parties coded as centrists and other parties by legislative elections.

Table E.5: Presidents by ideology and presidential election (1st round)

year	right	far-right	left	far-left	centrists	others
1965	De Gaulle-Unr	Tixier-Vignancour-Exd	Mitterrand-Cir		Lecanuet-Mrp	Barbu-Div Marcilhacy-Dvd
1969	Pompidou-Udr		Rocard-Psu Defferre-Sfio	Krivine-Lcr Duclos-Pcf	Poher-Cd	Ducatel-Div
1974	Giscard-D'Estaing-Ri Chaban-Delmas-Udr Royer-Dvd	Le Pen-Fn	Mitterrand-Ps Muller-Mdsr Crepeau-Mrg	Laguiller-Lo Krivine-Lcr		Dumont-Eco Renouvin-Nar Heraud-Div Sebag-Div
1981	Chirac-Rpr Debre-Dvd Garaud-Dvd		Bouchardeau-Psu Mitterrand-Ps	Laguiller-Lo Marchais-Pcf	Giscard-D'Estaing-Udf	Lalonde-Eco

List of presidents by ideology and presidential elections

Table E.6: Presidents by ideology and presidential election (2nd round)

year	right	far-right	left	far-left	centrists	others
1965	De Gaulle-Unr		Mitterrand-Cir			
1969	Pompidou-Udr				Poher-Cd	
1974	Giscard-D'Estaing-Ri		Mitterrand-Ps			
1981			Mitterrand-Ps		Giscard-D'Estaing-Udf	

List of presidents by ideology and presidential elections

Chapter 4

The Political Consequences of Labour's Bailout Programme[1]

Abstract

Several studies argue that financial crises can have substantial political effects. Still, there is limited evidence on how the 2008 financial crisis affected support for the incumbent. This paper analyses the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on support for the Labour party in UK national elections. We employ a difference-in-difference strategy to investigate how areas with larger initial employment in the financial sector reacted to the shock and to the Labour government programmes to stabilise the financial system. Our main results indicate that after the crisis support for the Labour party increased in areas characterized by larger employment in the financial sector.

[1]This chapter is based on the joint work with Professor Giovanni Facchini and Professor Cecilia Testa

4.1 Introduction

Several studies argue that financial crises can have substantial political effects. Still, there is limited evidence on how the 2008 financial crisis affected support for the incumbent. This paper analyses the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on support for the Labour party in UK national elections. We employ a difference-in-differences strategy to study the different dynamics that the shock and the subsequent government interventions to bail out financial institutions had on the Labour vote share. We find that in the aftermath of the crisis, areas with larger employment in the financial sector observed an increase in the vote share for the incumbent. Our preferred interpretation is that government interventions in favour of the financial sector during the crisis are likely to be the main drivers of this result.

Historically, financial and economic crises have increased support for extreme political parties. Doerr et al. (2021) shows that the banking crisis in Germany in 1931 caused an increase in the vote for the Nazis and anti-Semitism. Focusing on China, Braggion et al. (2020) show that the credit contraction and the banking crisis experienced by the country in the 1930s caused an increase in social unrest and an increased penetration of the Communist Party among Chinese workers. More generally, De Bromhead et al. (2013) shows that the Great Depression led to an increase in support for extremist parties on both the right and left of the political spectrum in several countries. Taking a longer-term perspective, Funke et al. (2016) construct a dataset covering 200 countries over the period 1870–2014 and find that in the aftermath of financial crises extreme-right parties experience a 30% increase in their vote share.

Several recent studies have documented the effect of more recent financial shocks on support for both extremist parties and the incumbent government. Gyongyosi and Verner (2019) and Ahlquist et al. (2020) analyze how the 2015 surprise revaluation of the Swiss franc affected the political landscape in two

Eastern European countries. Focusing on Hungary, Gyongyosi and Verner (2019) shows that the exposure to foreign currency debt caused an increase in the vote for far-right parties in that country. Using a pre-electoral survey and an experiment carried out in Poland in 2015, Ahlquist et al. (2020) show instead that individuals exposed to the shock were more likely to demand government intervention and to also vote against the incumbent party. The anti-incumbent vote has also been documented in Antoniades and Calomiris (2020) who shows that, in the 2008 US presidential election, the republican party suffered important electoral losses in counties more exposed to the contraction of mortgage credit.

In the UK, the financial crisis is believed to have induced an electoral shock and to have reshaped British politics by introducing new issues in the debate such as the need for austerity as a way to set the public deficit under control, and by also undermining the incumbent's reputation for economic soundness. For example, Fieldhouse et al. (2019) argues that the 2008 financial crisis can be seen as a "competence shock" for the incumbent – a shock that in particular called into question Labour's competence in handling the British economy. At the same time, it helped the Conservative party win the 2010 election by blaming the incumbent for the significant increase in the stock of public debt that followed the crisis. This increase in public debt was also used as a matter of fact by the conservative party to construct a narrative in favour of the introduction of austerity measures, which became the party's main policy proposal for the 2010 election.

Despite this aggregate evidence, little is known about whether the main policies put in place by the Labour government to limit the adverse effects of the shock on the financial sector were met by voters' support. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by exploiting variation at the local level in initial exposure to the financial sector. Our results indicate that in 2010 electoral support for the Labour party increased in areas more exposed to the

shock compared to areas less exposed to it. Importantly, this effect persists over time, and can still be detected in the 2015 and 2017 national elections. Gethin et al. (2021) has argued that 2010 is an important year in the Western political landscape since it establishes a strong political re-alignment for both left and right parties. This paper provides causal evidence in favour of this idea, by showing the key role played by the Labour government policies to support the financial industry.

4.2 Historical background: financial crisis

The first financial crisis of the new millennium is usually associated with the date of 15 September 2008, when the investment bank Lehman Brothers declared its default, starting a period of financial turmoil. In the UK the banking sector started to experience difficulties even earlier. The crisis began, in fact, when the financial situation of Northern Rock was made public on 14 September 2007, triggering a bank run. On September 17 the UK government had to step in and announce the complete guarantee of all existing deposits. Northern Rock first received an emergency loan of 25 billion pounds and was then nationalised in February 2008. After the failure of Lehman Brothers several other UK financial institutions found themselves in financial distress and started a series of mergers and consolidations: Lloyds TSB bought HBOS on 18 September 2008 and, on 29 September Santander bought branches and deposits of the Yorkshire bank Bradford & Bingley which in the meantime had been nationalised by the UK government. In the first week of October, the Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS were both rescued by the Bank of England (Bank of England, 2018). On 8 October the UK government announced a series of measures to support financial institutions with the aim to provide liquidity and stabilise the financial system (Edmonds, 2010).

4.2.1 Labour's response to the financial crisis

Between 2007 and 2009 the Labour government introduced a package of interventions to stabilise the financial system and support the banking sector through a series of loans and nationalisations. The government injected a total of 137 billion pounds to help the financial sector and in addition, a total of 1 trillion pounds in cash guarantees were given to several UK financial institutions Mor (2018). Half of this sum was used to recapitalise the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. The first received a total of 256 billion in cash support while the second received 276 billion. As a result, the UK government's reached a peak ownership share of 43% in Lloyds Banking Group and of 84% in Royal Bank of Scotland. By 2017, Lloyds was completely back in private ownership, whereas as of March 28, 2022, the UK government still owns almost 50% of the Royal Bank of Scotland, currently renamed Natwest. Given the impossibility to find buyers, a different approach was followed for Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. The two banks were nationalised and their assets were then sold over time to other buyers. The remainder of the funds made available by the UK government was used for other support mechanisms such as the Credit guarantee scheme, the special liquidity scheme and the asset protection scheme. In 2018 the estimated cost of the intervention was a net loss of 23 billion for the UK public.

4.2.2 Economic crisis

Despite the government interventions to sustain the financial system, the financial crisis still propagated to the economy leading to a recession lasting two years. As Figure 4.1 shows, in 2008 unemployment rate jumped to almost 8% while GDP fell by 4%. The recession and the bailout programme introduced by the government pushed the annual public deficit consistently over 5% for several years, increasing the ratio of public debt over GDP from 40% to 80% over a short time span.



Figure 4.1: UK economic indicators 2000-2015. Source: Office for National Statistics

The financial crisis had a heterogeneous impact on the UK economy: sectors such as Education, Health, Agriculture & Fishing and Electricity did not experiment a decrease in employment during the crisis, while sectors such as Accommodation, Real-Estate and Communications saw an initial decrease in employment but they recovered after some years. Employment in the public sector also did not decline during the crisis but experienced a sharp decrease after 2010 when the Conservative government introduced the Austerity programme. Differently, sectors like the Construction, Retail and Financial Services, which enjoyed a sustained expansion before 2008 were strongly hit by the crisis and did not recover to their pre-crisis employment levels. Finally, Manufacturing, which was already declining before the crisis, experienced a fall in employment of almost 10% in a single year (2008).



Figure 4.2: Employment by sector



Figure 4.3: Employment by sector

After the financial crisis and the period of economic distress, the Labour government saw a substantial decrease in its support, losing the 2010 elections. No party emerged as a clear winner and the result was the establishment of a coalition between the Conservative party and the Liberal-Democratic

Party. On this occasion, the reform of the banking system was an important topic that found a place in the political manifestos of all the main UK parties. The Labour party in particular, in their pre-electoral manifesto "A fair future for all" emphasized the significance of the economic measures introduced to stabilise the financial system and the results obtained.

4.3 Data

To explore the effect of the financial crisis on UK electoral results, we build a dataset that consists of electoral data and other socio-economic characteristics for all constituencies in England and Wales.

Elections We use the information on all the main parties in the UK political landscape between 1997 and 2017. Our dataset focuses on the result of the national elections in England and Wales. We thus have a total of 569 constituencies that are consistently defined over the period.[2] The main focus is on the electoral performance of the Labour party.



Figure 4.4: UK parties in UK general elections 1997-2017.

[2]The number of UK constituencies changed from the 2010 UK General elections following the proposals of the "Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster constituencies", which increased the total number of constituencies from 646 to 650. After the 2010 reform, some constituencies were changed and boundaries were redrawn. We describe in the Appendix A the process we used to infer the election results after 2010, keeping constant the boundaries of the constituency according to the pre-reform period.

Figure 4.4 shows the electoral results for different UK parties over time. The Labour party's vote peaked in 1997 and reached its minimum in 2010. After that, it started to increase and reduced its gap against the conservative party. Differently, the Conservative Party, after years of stable electoral performance was able to adjudicate the relative majority of votes after the crisis and continued to increase even in subsequent years. The 2010 election represented a turning point also for the LibDem Party, which reached its maximum in 2010 and showed a strong decline in subsequent elections.

Constituency characteristics We use the 2001 Census to collect information on several socio-economic characteristics at the constituency level. Our main variable of interest is the employment share in the financial sector in 2001. Workers in the financial sectors were affected by both the financial crisis and the rescue packages introduced by the Labour party, which helped financial institutions with several bailout programmes.



Figure 4.5: Employment in Financial Sector 2001

As the map shows, the employment in the financial sector in 2001 was concentrated in London and other southern constituencies in the outer London area. There were also areas of high employment in finance in Manchester and in several constituencies in East Anglia.

We then collect information on several other characteristics which capture differences in the socio-economic structure of the different constituencies that are summarized in Table 4.1. In particular, we use information on the employment shares in different sectors, the unemployment rate, the population density, the share of immigrants, the median income and the Union density as additional controls.

Table 4.1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs	Min.	Max.
Dependent Variable					
Labour vote share	0.39	0.18	3414	0.0	0.9
Employment					
Finance	0.05	0.03	3414	0.0	0.2
Agriculture	0.02	0.02	3414	0.0	0.1
Fishing	0.00	0.00	3414	0.0	0.0
Mining	0.00	0.00	3414	0.0	0.0
Manufacturing	0.15	0.06	3414	0.1	0.3
Electricity	0.01	0.00	3414	0.0	0.0
Construction	0.07	0.01	3414	0.0	0.1
Retail	0.17	0.02	3414	0.1	0.2
Hotels	0.05	0.01	3414	0.0	0.1
Transport	0.07	0.02	3414	0.0	0.2
Real Estate	0.13	0.05	3414	0.1	0.3
Public Sector	0.06	0.02	3414	0.0	0.2
Education	0.08	0.02	3414	0.0	0.2
Health	0.11	0.02	3414	0.1	0.2
Socio-economic					
Immigrants	0.09	0.09	3414	0.0	0.5
Population density	19.46	22.83	3414	0.2	130.9
Unemployed	0.03	0.01	3414	0.0	0.1
Union Membership	0.26	0.01	3414	0.2	0.3
Median income	16096.60	2957.12	3234	7128.0	29334.0

Summary statistics. Mean, Standard Deviation, number of observation, Minimum and Maximum values are displayed.

4.4 Empirical strategy

In our analysis, we posit that the effect of the financial crisis and of the subsequent government rescue package varies depending on pre-existing exposure to the financial crisis, captured by the employment in the financial sector before the crisis. Figure 4.6, plotting the binned bivariate relation between the change in Labour vote share between 2005 and 2015 and the employment share in the financial sector in 2001, provides prima-facie evidence on the relationship between electoral outcomes and pre-existing exposure to the crisis. As we can see, larger employment in the financial sector is associated with a positive change in Labour vote share with respect to the pre-financial crisis level.



Figure 4.6: Change in vote for the Labour party 2005-2015 and employment in financial sector.

To study the impact of the financial crisis and of the government's rescue package we next deploy a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits the pre-determined employment in the financial sector before the crisis:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{t \neq 2005} \beta_t(\text{Employment Share Finance}_{i2001} \times \delta_t) + \beta_2 X_{i2001} \times \delta_t + \theta_i + \epsilon_{it}. \tag{4.1}$$

Where Y_{it} is the vote share for the Labour party in each constituency i and election t. The main variable of interest is the share of individuals employed in the financial sector in each different constituency in 2001 interacted with a set of election-year dummies.

X_{i2001} is a vector of additional socio-economic controls interacted with year dummies. δ_t are election-year fixed-effects while θ_i are constituency fixed-effects. The standard errors are clustered at the constituency level.

The main parameters of interest are β_t which capture the within-constituency differential effect of the employment in the financial sector on the Labour vote share in each election t. Our hypothesis is that areas with larger pre-financial crisis employment in the financial sector will turn to be more in favour of the Labour party after the 2008 financial crisis, once the rescue packages have been introduced by the Labour government. The key identifying assumption in this specific context requires that employment in the financial sector should not be associated with an increase in the vote share for the Labour party before the financial crisis. We thus show that there are no pre-trends in voting for the Labour party in areas with a larger employment in the financial sector.

4.5 Results

Fieldhouse et al. (2019) argues that the 2008 financial crisis led to an important electoral shock by undermining voters' perception of the economic competence of the Labour party. The increase in the public debt, in particular, was used by the conservative party to blame the Labour's response to the financial crisis and to argue in favour of a programme based on austerity measures. This loss of reputation manifested its implications in the 2010 election and persisted even afterwards. "Competence shocks" can thus have long-lasting effects which could continue even after the economy has recovered. Although the financial crisis did cause damage to the reputation

of the Labour party, the policies implemented by the party as a response to the crisis could also cause positive and long-lasting effects in areas which benefited the most from these policies.

In Table 4.2 we show the effect of the constituency-level employment share in the financial sector over the vote for the Labour party in each election between 1997 and 2017. The reference year is 2005, the last election before the 2008 financial crisis. In column 1 no controls other than fixed effects are added; in column 2 I add employment shares in sectors plus other demographic controls such as population density, unemployment rate and the share of immigrants by constituency; in column 3 I add a variable that captures the share of workers who are unionised; lastly in column 4 I add as additional control the median income by constituency.

Table 4.2: Vote for the Labour party 1997-2017 and employment share in financial sector.

	(1) Baseline	(2) Demographics	(3) unions	(4) Income
year=1997 × Share Employment Finance	−0.024	−0.838**	−0.968***	−1.081***
	(0.096)	(0.343)	(0.365)	(0.370)
year=2001 × Share Employment Finance	0.215***	−0.022	−0.140	−0.204
	(0.075)	(0.250)	(0.261)	(0.265)
year=2010 × Share Employment Finance	0.296***	0.682***	0.840***	0.862***
	(0.092)	(0.259)	(0.256)	(0.265)
year=2015 × Share Employment Finance	0.559***	1.489***	1.570***	1.494***
	(0.140)	(0.342)	(0.359)	(0.357)
year=2017 × Share Employment Finance	0.814***	1.514***	1.382***	1.323***
	(0.155)	(0.388)	(0.401)	(0.403)
Observations	3414	3414	3414	3234
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Employment in the financial sector is negatively associated with the vote for the Labour party in 1997, the coefficient then becomes insignificant in 2001. This means that in 2001 the vote for the Labour party was not significantly different from the vote 2005 in the areas with a larger share of employment in the financial sector. After the financial crisis the coefficient turns positive and significant for all the elections between 2010 and 2017. A 1% increase

in the employment share in manufacturing increases the vote share for the Labour party by 0.862% in 2010, by 1.494% in 2015 and by 1.323% in 2017. This implies that constituencies with larger employment in the financial sector moved in favour of the Labour party after the financial crisis and Labour's response to the crisis. This change appears to be persistent also after the financial crisis and a full economic recovery. This result thus points in favour of a possible re-alignment of political preference started after the financial crisis and triggered by a policy shift of the Labour party to sustain the financial sector.

One note of caution should be made for the results found after the 2010 elections and especially for the 2017 election. In 2016 the UK voted to leave the European Union and the 2017 election is thus the first election after Brexit. Brexit introduced new issues in British Politics and change the political platforms of the entire political system in the UK. How Brexit affected the vote for the Labour party is not the focus of this study. It is still important to acknowledge that the positive and significant coefficient obtained for the 2017 election may be biased by the effect of Brexit.

4.6 Conclusion

In this paper, we study the political consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the Labour bailout programme on the vote for the political incumbent in the UK. The financial crisis has been associated to a negative "competence shock" for the Labour party, whose policies after the crisis were blamed for the increase in public debt.

In this paper, we showed instead a different and unexplored side of Labour's economic response to the financial crisis. Despite the negative effect of the financial crisis on employment in the financial sector, areas with larger pre-existing employment in the financial sector turned in favour of the Labour party after the financial crisis. This result can help to explain the ongoing

political re/alignment in British politics.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Elections imputed using 2005 constituencies

What would have been the result of 2010 general elections if the constituencies' boundaries had not changed with respect to 2005?

A way to answer this question is to reconstruct the vote for the different parties in 2010 using the boundaries of the constituencies in 2005. As a way to reconstruct the same boundaries, one possible solution is to use the different LSOAs that are contained in the constituencies in the different elections. The idea is to attribute to each LSOA a certain amount of votes that contributes to the total vote in a constituency in 2010, and then simply aggregate the LSOAs according to the boundaries in 2005.

Assumption 1: There is no substantial difference in political preferences across LSOA in each single constituency in 2010. This means that each LSOA votes parties in the same proportion as the constituency in which they are located.

Assumption 2: There is no substantial difference in the ratio electorate/population in each LSOA in a constituency. This means that in each LSOA there is a constant share of eligible voters with respect to the total LSOA population (older than 18). This assumption is needed since we don't know the electorate by

LSOA but only the residents by age.

1. Calculate the weights for each LSOA. Each LSOA (i) contributes to the total electorate of the constituency (j) with a weight proportional to the LSOA's electorate.

$$\omega_j = \frac{\text{Electorate}_{j2010}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{Pop}_{ij2010}} \omega_{ij2010} = \frac{\text{Pop}_{ij2010} * \omega_j}{\text{Electorate}_{j2010}}$$

   ω_j ensures that the sum of the LSOAs' population (older than 18) will be equal to the electorate in each constituency in 2010.

   E.G. If the electorate in a constituency is 900 and the population (older than 18) is 1000, ω_j will be equal to 0.9. Thus multiplying the LSOA's population by 0.9 we will get the electorate in the LSOA.

   ω_{ij2010} represents the contribution of each LSOA to the electorate in each constituency in 2010.

2. calculate the number of votes for each party in each LSOA. This is done by allocating the vote for each party in the constituencies to the underlying LSOAs. To do this we need to assume no difference in voting pattern between the LSOAs in the same constituency.

$$\text{Vote}_{pij2010} = \omega_{ij2010} * \text{Vote}_{pj2010}$$

   $\text{Vote}_{pij2010}$ represents the number of votes, for party p, in each LSOA in 2010.

   E.G. suppose that a LSOA i represents the 10% of the electorate of a constituency j ($\omega_{ij2010} = 0.1$). Suppose that the conservatives got 1000 votes in the constituency. This means that we can calculate the number of votes for the Conservatives in the LSOA: $\text{Vote}_{pij2010} = 100$.

3. Reaggregate the LSOAs according to the 2005 boundaries of the constituencies.

$$\text{Vote}_{pj2010|2005} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{Vote}_{pij2010}$$

$\text{Vote}_{pj2010|2005}$ is the imputed vote in 2010 according to the 2005 boundaries of the constituencies. This means that we will allocate the 100 votes for the conservatives to the constituency in which the LSOA was located in 2005.