INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOFT POWER IN NEWLY INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 2008-2018

Martha Flor Puebla Mora, BA, MA

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Abstract

Soft power is an ability developed by countries to make others do what otherwise they would not, using tools such as attraction, persuasion/influence and setting agendas according to their national goals. Developed and developing countries use different tools to build soft power capabilities in different ways. This thesis investigates how International Higher Education (IHE) produces soft power in Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), focusing on three case studies: Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. This is a multidisciplinary study where International Relations, Politics and Education fields of study collide to increase our understanding of soft power. This research argues that Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), research centres, associations of universities and other non-governmental actors become agents of soft power using diplomacy mechanisms, challenging the traditional soft power understandings.

This research studies inbound student mobility, outbound student mobility, internationalisation of research and international mobility of programmes and providers under the soft power paradigm. A three-variant model that explains how and why IHE produces soft power shows a new approach for soft power in NICs, where soft power is a motivation to foster IHE, a consequence of IHE initiatives, or an extension of the country's foreign policy.

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And to the people that will pick this thesis up and read it, I hope you find in it a fresh perspective on international higher education and soft power. And, if you are a PhD student, remember, resilience!

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
AMEXCID	Mexican International Cooperation for Development Agency
ANUIES	National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
BRICS	Brazil, Rusia, India, China and South Africa
CAPES	Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel
CENB	Centre of Japanese-Brazilian Studies
CFF	Crops For the Future
CGBU	Coimbra Group of Brazilian Universities
CIMMYT	*Centro International del Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo*
CNPq	Brazilian *Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico*
COLEF	*Colegio de la Frontera Norte*
CONACyT	Mexican National Council for Science and Tecnology
CONAHEC	Consortium for North American Higher Education Collaboration
CONAHEC	Consortium of North American Higher Education Collaboration
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
EMBRAPA	Brazilian Agency of Agricultural Research
EMGS	Education Malaysia Global Services
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAPESP	Sao Paulo Research Foundation
FICG	International Film Festival of Guadalajara
FIL	International Book Fair of Guadalajara
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
HEIs	Higher Education Institutions
IAU	International Association of Universities
ICD	International Cooperation for Development
ICDL	International Cooperation for Development Law
ICDP	Mexican International Cooperation for Development Programme
IHE	International Higher Education
IIE	Institute of International Education
IIUM	International Islamic University of Malaysia
IME	Institute of Mexicans Abroad
INCT	Brazilian National Institutes of Science and Technology Programme
INTI	*International University and Colleges*

IPD	Brazilian Innovation Diplomacy Programme
IPPM	International Programme and Provider Mobility
IR	International Relations
ISA	Internal Security Act
ITESM	*Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey*
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KLEC	Kuala Lumpur Education City
KSP	Knowledge Sharing Programme
LDB	Education Guidelines and Bases Act
LDB	Brazilians Education Guidelines and Bases Act
LMMC	Likeminded Megadiverse Countries
MCTIC	Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications
MEC	Brazilian *Ministério da Educação*
MERCOSUR	*Mercado Común del Sur*
MFI	More Food International
MIKTA	Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia
MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHE	Ministy of Higher Education
MoSTI	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTCP	Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme
NACCD	North American Centre for Collaborative Development
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NHESP 2	Malaysian National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2
NICs	Newly Industrialised Countries
NPSTI	Malaysian National Policy on Science, Tecnology and Innovation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OBHOE	Observatory of Borderless Higher Education
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PECiTI	National Special Programme for Science, Technology and Innovation
PELD	Brazilian Programme of Ecological Research of Long Duration
PROANTAR	Brazilian Antartic Programme
R&D	Research and Development
R&D&C	Research, Development and Commercialisation
SATREPS	Japanese Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development Programme
SDGs	UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030
SEP	Mexican *Secretaría de Educación Pública*

SICyT	*Secretary of Innovation, Science and Technology*
SRE	Mexican *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*
SWB	Science Without Borders
TNE	Transnational Education
UDEM	*Universidad de Monterrey*
UDG	*Universidad de Guadalajara*
UERJ	*Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*
UFCSPA	*Universidde Federal de Ciencias de Saúde de Porto Alegre*
UFMT	*Universidde Federal do Mato Grosso*
UFPA	*Universidade Federal do Pará*
UFPR	*Universidde Federal do Paraná*
UFRGS	*Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul*
UFSC	*Universidade Federal de Santa Catalina*
UFV	*Universidde Federal de Visçosa*
UiTM	*Universiti Teknologi MARA*
UK	United Kingdom
UKM	*Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia*
UM	*Universiti Malaya*
UN	United Nations
UNAM	*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*
UnB	*Universidade de Brasilia*
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNESP	*Universidde Estadual Paulista*
UNICAMP	*Universidde Estadual de Campinas*
UNIFESP	*Universidade Federal de Sao Paulo*
UniKL	*Universiti Kuala Lumpur*
UNILAB	*Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira*
UNMC	*University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus*
UNSC	UN's Security Council
US	United States
USP	*Universidade de Sao Paulo*
UTM	*Universiti Teknologi Malaysia*
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Chapter 1: Introduction

International higher education (IHE) and soft power are not usually studied together as part of the foreign affairs of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). International Relations (IR) scholars analyse soft power as a means for states to obtain foreign policy objectives while IHE is a vehicle to transform countries into knowledge economies.

NICs are a group of countries that political scientists and economists identify as having significant economic growth and democratization; they are also known as middle-income countries.[1] NICs are still considered as developing nations, but their macroeconomic indicators reveal a higher level of development than their counterparts. Besides economic growth, these countries have political structures, urbanisation and investment in knowledge, science and technology.

In NICs, governments pursue the development of knowledge societies to achieve economic and social development, shaping higher education and research agendas. Also, global capital increasingly invests in knowledge industries worldwide, including higher education, supporting the emergence of knowledge societies. In turn, many nations have become dependent on knowledge products and highly educated personnel for economic growth.[2]

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[1] Patrick O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 6th edn (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).

[2] Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, 'The Internationalization of Higher Education: Motivations and Realities', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 11.3–4 (2007), 290–305.

There are many assumptions regarding higher education and knowledge societies in the IR field of studies. The World Bank suggests that the more developed a country is, the more sophisticated its higher education system ought to be.[3] The organisation points that the creation of a knowledge society is desirable in developing countries, and should be built upon knowledge transfer, innovation and research. Following these reasonings, one might wonder about the implications for the foreign affairs agenda when developing a knowledge society and economy. IR scholars usually address this question through development studies or global political economy.

Nonetheless, when examining the role of higher education in the foreign affairs agenda, specifically of IHE, the question of 'power' also becomes evident. Hence, researchers need to explore the relationship between power and higher education. The dynamics of power and higher education point to a complexity that deserves the attention of multidisciplinary research.

In turn, the Education field of studies has been increasingly concerned with global trends in higher education, creating the sub-field of IHE. In the last two decades, higher education stakeholders have placed their attention to academic cooperation beyond the typical student exchanges that governments initially fostered as a way to bring nations closer (i.e. during the Cold War).[4] Instead, new and evolving forms

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[3] See for exampple The World Bank, *Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tiertiary Education* (Washington: IBRD, The World Bank, 2002).

[4] See John K Hudzik and Michael Stohl, 'Comprehensive and Strategic Internationalization of US Higher Education', in *The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education*, ed. by Darla Deardorff and others (London, 2012), pp. 61–80; Altbach and Knight; Axel Didriksson, 'Visión Panorámica de La Internacionalización', XXVIII (2006), 3–12.

of academic cooperation have become recent trends of global and regional IHE, with effects such as the establishment of education hubs, branch campuses and multi-national, multi-institutional and multi-funding research clusters.[5] Since then, new terminology has been developed, such as transnational education and comprehensive internationalisation, that go beyond traditional views of international higher education such as language instruction and student exchanges.

IHE scholars have been paying more attention to the development of cognitive skills of students through student mobility, organisational characteristics of *internationalisation*, and ways for explaining the new models and trends of academic cooperation around the globe, to name a few.[6] However, there has been little concern about the ways these features of IHE impact in the foreign policy of NICs.

Furthermore, recent attempts to reconcile both fields of studies acknowledge the use of the tools of diplomacy for higher education and research purposes. Such are the cases of science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy, where scholars from Education suggest a shift of paradigm moving away from the framework of 'power'.[7] As a consequence, the use of

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[5] Mohd Ismail Abd Aziz and Doria Abdullah, 'Malaysia : Becoming an Education Hub to Serve National Development', in *International Education Hubs*, ed. by Jane Knight (Springer International Publishing, 2014), pp. 101–19; Jane Knight, 'Education Hubs: A Fad, a Brand, an Innovation?', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 15.3 (2011), 221–40.

[6] See for example the work on Ulrich Teichler, 'The Changing Debate on Internationalisation of Higher Education', *Higher Education*, 48.1 (2004), 5–26; Fernanda Geremias Leal, Rafaela Ribeiro Céspedes, and Luciane Stallivieri, 'The Profile of the International Cooperation University Manager in Brazil', *Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais*, 12.2 (2017), 1–16; Bill Hunter, George White, and Galen Godbey, 'What Does It Mean to Be Globally Competent?', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 10.3 (2006), 267–85.

[7] Some examples of the work of Education scholars discussing diplomacy include Luc Vinet, 'Universities and Knowledge Diplomacy', *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 41*, 2.5 (2010), 6772–76; Jane Knight, 'Knowledge Diplomacy in Action', 2019; Fernando Quevedo, 'The Importance of International Research Institutions for Science Diplomacy', *Science and Diplomacy*, 2.3 (2013).

different terminology and the attempt to export concepts from one field to another has brought confusion between the academy, practitioners, decision-makers and politicians. Therefore, we need to study IHE and power with an understanding of both fields of study, to clarify the terminology but also the mechanisms, relationship between the actors, agency and the implications of IHE policies within the soft power paradigm.

This research is an interdisciplinary study that focuses on three NICs: Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. It aims to understand the relationship between both fields of studies on the same phenomenon. It attempts to bring IR and IHE fields closer and to clarify the boundaries between both on the same subject. The aim is to generate a theoretical perspective through which we can analyse the role of IHE in soft power.

Soft power is an analytical concept that has been defined by Joseph Nye as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies'.[8] Its use by practitioners and scholars has opened the space to link IR and education fields with *power*.[9] In this research, soft power is the analytical concept we use to understand how foreign policy and IHE interact.

There are several gaps in the literature on soft power that makes us question its scope, depth and adaptability. For instance, current soft power literature focuses mostly on

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[8] Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (USA: Public Affairs. Perseus Books Group., 2004), p. x.

[9] Education, according to Joseph Nye, is a high-culture component, and a soft power source.

developed countries. The conceptualisation of soft power itself began with Nye's analysis of the foreign policy of the United States (US).[10] Since then, several authors have applied soft power approaches in other developed countries, such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, to name a few.[11] More recent studies on soft power and IHE have also focused on developing countries, such as China.[12] However, we need to consider that China has unique power resources and ambitions in the international system that the rest of the NICs do not share.

There are few researchers that have written about the soft power of NICs. Those that have done so, tend to focus on sources other than IHE.[13] The lack of studies on IHE and soft power in NICs suggests that the findings of this kind of research could unravel patterns and models not studied before, generating new knowledge. Therefore, more in-depth

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[10] Joseph Nye, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), 153–71.

[11] Some of this work includes Jonathan McClory, 'A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017', *The Soft Power 30*, 2017, 120; James Pamment, 'Soft Power', in *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* (Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 187–229; Iain Watson, 'South Korea's State-Led Soft Power Strategies: Limits on Inter-Korean Relations', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 20.3 (2012), 304–25; Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet, 'Introduction', in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet (London: Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 2010), pp. 1–3.

[12] Few of these studies are Ying Zhou and Sabrina Luk, 'Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Promoting China's Soft Power?', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25.100 (2016), 628–42; Falk Hartig, 'Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 17.1 (2012), 53–76; Covina Y W Kwan, 'Cultural Diplomacy and Internationalization of Higher Education: The Experience of Three Confucius Institutes in Canada', *Frontiers of Education in China*, 9.1 (2013), 110–26; Lan He and Stephen Wilkins, 'The Return of China's Soft Power in South East Asia: An Analysis of the International Branch Campuses Established by Three Chinese Universities', *Higher Education Policy*, 2018, 1–17; Oluwaseun Tella, 'Wielding Soft Power in Strategic Regions: An Analysis of China's Power of Attraction in Africa and the Middle East', *Africa Review*, 8.2 (2016), 133–44.

[13] Examples of such researches include C. Wagner, 'India's Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations', *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 66.4 (2010), 333–42; Mathilde Chatin and Giulio M. Gallarotti, 'The BRICS and Soft Power: An Introduction', *Journal of Political Power*, 9.3 (2016), 335–52; Hanafi Hussin, 'Gastronomy, Tourism, and the Soft Power of Malaysia', *SAGE Open*, 8.4 (2018); Daniel Flemes, 'O Brasil Na Iniciativa BRIC: Soft Balancing Numa Ordem Global Em Mudança?', *Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional*, 53.1 (2010), 141–56.

studies on soft power as an outcome of IHE policies need to be developed.

The literature on the subject does not provide an in-depth understanding of the relationship between IHE and public, cultural, science and knowledge diplomacy. IR is the main field of studies that analyses diplomacy mechanisms. Hence, there is little understanding of how IHE stakeholders use diplomacy for soft power purposes.

Other governmental and non-governmental bodies (such as the British Council) have produced reports on the *internationalisation of higher education* in various countries, including the three under study here.[14] However, their findings do not discuss an in-depth relationship between international higher education and soft power. Additionally, these reports contrast developed with developing countries, arguably disregarding data that is valuable for this research.[15]

This research aims to fill the gaps identified in the literature, providing a framework for analysis. This thesis proposes to rethink soft power as an analytical concept, considering the factors that are unique to NICs, and to study them in the light of higher education and international relations fields of studies, adopting a multidisciplinary approach.

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[14] For example, the British Council reports. See Janet Ilieva and Michael Peak, *The Shape of Global Higher Education: National Policies Framework for International Engagement*, 2016.

[15] Comparisons of Brazil and Mexico with the US and Canada highlight the differences and the gap in between 'poor' and 'rich' countries, instead of framing the similarities in between the developing countries and point towards policy suggestions within the capabilities of the same-level-of-development countries.

1.1 Research question

The main question that guides this research is *how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs?* We aim to answer it by examining three case studies: Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. The purpose is to identify a model that fits NICs realities, providing original contributions to soft power and the role of international higher education. Furthermore, it intends to generate a set of ideas around IHE and soft power that can be applied to other NICs.

This thesis contributes to the discussions of soft power by providing a framework to identify the agency of governments, higher education institutions (HEIs), research centres and other higher education stakeholders in generating soft power projection and gains through IHE. At the same time, it offers a more coherent approach to the use of diplomatic tools by diverse actors through IHE. The goal is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the subject and to develop policy recommendations for different actors that can take part in the soft power of NICs through IHE.

1.2 Theory

From the findings of the three case studies, this research proposes a theory to answer the question that guides this study. The theory identifies the actors and their processes to turn their higher education resources to produce soft power outcomes, and why governments in NICs enable such actors to become soft power agents. This way, the theory addresses some of the gaps identified in the literature.

This theory is empirical and seeks to establish a relationship between IHE and soft power. It is also inductive as it arrives at

conclusions through the observation of known facts.[16] Analytic induction was used to make a general statement rooted in the data and involving the process of defining a problem, developing a hypothesis, examination of a case to test the theory and hypothesis, reformulation of the theory against the data, analysis and further data collection.[17]

The analytical concept of soft power is a departing point for the development of the theory. Soft power conceives education as part of the high culture of a country. At the same time, culture has been proposed by Joseph Nye to be one of the three sources of soft power.[18] It is assumed, then, that higher education is part of the cultural source of soft power. However, there is a lack of explanation in the current literature on how this works in NICs.

IHE is the sub-field of studies that analyses global trends in higher education. It seeks to rationalise the international aspects of higher education. Hence, it involves as many areas as international activities HEIs have. This research focuses on four particular areas of IHE. Here, they are named *components of IHE* and were used to construct the framework of analysis.[19] This framework was developed to explain how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs. The four components are inbound student mobility, outbound student

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[16] Todd Landman and Edzia Carvalho, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. An Introduction*, Fourth (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 19.

[17] John Brewer, 'Induction', in *The A-Z of Social Research*, ed. by Robert L Miller and John Brewer (London: SAGE, 2011), pp. 155–56 (p. 156); Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornwell University Press, 1997), p. 22.

[18] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 11.

[19] The term framework of analysis is used to indicate that there is a classification frame that distinguishes international higher education activities from one another. This framework follows the logic of the three pillars of higher education institutions (teaching/learning, research and extension/cultural dissemination) identified in the cases.

mobility, internationalisation of research and international programme and provider mobility. The argument is that these four components produce soft power in the form of attraction, persuasion/influence, and the creation of narratives to set agendas. However, NICs have a unique understanding of soft power which allows them to transform IHE resources to soft power assets. Hence, for IHE to produce soft power, the governments and non-state actors need to develop soft power conversion abilities.[20]

In the context of this research, soft power conversion ability means the capability of actors to transform and mobilise IHE resources into soft power assets. Countries develop this ability through the use of diplomatic tools, such as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, science diplomacy, and international cooperation for development.

At this point, some terminology needs to be clarified. By soft power outcomes, we mean the consequences obtained once soft power was exercised. By contrast, soft power gains are those attitudes and behaviour gained that adds to the image and soft power of the country. Soft power projection is understood here as the way the country is intended to be perceived by those towards whom soft power is being projected (that is, the soft power subjects).

Soft power agents are those that wield soft power; hence they are involved in a behavioural relationship. In this way, actors other than national governments and its apparatus are able to become soft power agents by transforming their resources into

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[20] This being one of the most contested aspects of soft power, as is discussed in chapter 2.

soft power assets. In the case of higher education, universities, research institutes, scientist and academic community in general become soft power agents by representing and acting on behalf of the country while engaging in relationships with other HEIs. This research takes a closer look at the roles of universities and HEIs in general, and the ways in which they become soft power agents.

Governments are the primary actors able to transform resources into soft power assets. In the developing world, the implementation of policies, programmes and strategies that foster IHE reflect the soft power conversion ability of countries.

Five levels of governmental agents play a role in the development and implementation of such policies, programmes and strategies:

a) President / Prime Minister.
b) Ministries of foreign affairs, of education (higher education), and science, innovation and technology.
c) Governmental agencies for higher education, research and innovation.
d) Local secretaries of higher education, research and innovation (such as state and municipal levels).
e) Funding bodies of all levels (i. e. federal, state and municipal).

Given that the policies, programmes and strategies set by the governments of developing countries lack the necessary resources (budget, infrastructure) and a strategic approach on soft power, other actors shape country's ability to wield soft

power through IHE.[21] These actors mobilise and allocate their resources and implement actions which affect the IHE landscape of a state. When these make use of diplomatic tools to mobilise their resources and implement IHE plans, then they acquire soft power conversion abilities, hence becoming soft power agents.

The second type of actors are national, and they can either belong to the higher education or non-governmental sectors:

a) Higher education, research and innovation institutions: research institutes, higher education institutions (public and private), research clusters, associations of universities and university networks.

b) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): national NGOs, academies of sciences, think-tanks.

The third type of actors that are involved in shaping the country's ability to obtain soft power are international, and can belong to the higher education, governmental or non-governmental sectors:

a) Higher education, research and innovation institutions: foreign higher education institutions (public and private), foreign research institutes, regional and international networks and associations, international research clusters.

b) Governmental: regional and international organisations, United Nations (UN) agencies, foreign

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[21] Other constrains include an uneven understanding of the soft power concept and outcomes by the different ministries involved in international higher education, the lack of inter-sectorial planning of strategies, and the top-to-bottom approach that does not consider the agency of other actors in the soft power configuration.

government's agencies, institutes and bodies for the *internationalisation of higher education* and research.

c) Non-governmental: international NGOs, international associations of academies of sciences.

Their use of diplomatic tools intensifies the mobilisation of resources and implementation of actions of non-state actors through each one of the four components of IHE. These actors mobilise their assets and implement IHE through the means described above, which are also known as instruments to wield soft power. All of them are governmental tools that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) use. Still, in the developing world and within NICs, there is an increased tendency of non-traditional actors to use them as well.[22]

However, the appearance of other agents that impact the soft power conversion of a country implies that there could be different ways by which IHE causes soft power. There could be cases where governments are the most vital agents of soft power, where governmental policies and programmes guide the *internationalisation of higher education*. In this case, other actors are only reactive to the government's schemes. On the other hand, there could be cases where other agents impact directly on the soft power conversion of the country. This means that soft power (through IHE) is mostly obtained through the allocation of resources and mobilisation of assets and actions from non-governmental actors, filling the gaps that governments leave in wielding soft power.

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[22] See chapter 3.

Finally, soft power is a means to shape the preferences of others, those towards which countries direct their efforts. The subjects of soft power are essential for the foreign affairs of a state. Hence, the selection of those whose preferences are being shaped is not random. The subjects of soft power respond to the foreign policy context; they are part of the historical context and foreign policy objectives of a country. Therefore, there is a relationship between the foreign policy context of a country, the agents/actors and the subjects of soft power. This relationship is not static and shifts through time and space. Also, there is a relationship between the agents themselves: between the government, national and international actors, which furthermore explains why non-traditional actors can use diplomatic tools and transform their resources into soft power assets.

As noted above, most scholars have addressed the concept of soft power from the perspective of developed countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and France.[23] However, these studies do not easily translate to the range of countries that this thesis intends to approach. Nor do they provide a categorisation of the different components of IHE or an explanation of how they produce soft power. This thesis proposes a more in-depth study on each of the four components of IHE explained here, how they relate to soft power, how different actors intervene in wielding soft power

[23]Some examples include Jan Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', in *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. by Jan Melissen (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 246; Cox and Inderjeet; Joseph Nye, 'Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts', in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet (London: Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 2010), pp. 215–27; Melissa Nisbett, 'The Art of Attraction: Soft Power and the UK's Role in the World', *Cultural Trends*, 24.2 (2015), 183–85.

through the use of diplomatic tools, and the agency between the actors, the subjects and the foreign policy contexts.

The three cases analysed do not emulate the soft power models of developed countries as they lack the necessary infrastructure and budget and have different historical contexts with particular higher education systems. We should consider that NICs have specific characteristics that make them distinctive from developed countries, making them more approachable to the Global South. Hence, their soft power capabilities would be inevitable different than those displayed by the developed nations, and various actors would intervene in the soft power conversion ability of the country in different ways.

1.3 Case selection

The cases selected to construct this theory have specific characteristics that are necessary conditions for its application. The following are their shared characteristics.

1. They are Newly Industrialised Countries.
2. The World Bank catalogues them as upper-middle-income economies.[24]
3. Have a regional weight in regional organisations.
4. They are middle-power countries that belong to international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G20, etc.

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[24] World Bank, 'World Development Indicators. Upper Middle-Inconme Economies.', 2017 <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> [accessed 13 November 2017].

5. They are former colonies and now are liberal democracies.
6. They possess assets such as global common goods that would allow them to gain a voice within the international system. (The countries selected are megadiverse countries, for example).
7. They have sophisticated higher education systems (including higher education, research and innovation).
8. They are aspiring to become a knowledge economy as a development strategy.

These are the similar conditions the three countries selected for this study share, even if the values on the components of IHE are different. These characteristics are not unique to these three countries. Other countries were considered to be part of this study that share such features, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey. However, the contrast between these three countries would make the theory stronger, and more findings would surface.

The reason for basing our research around the cases of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico is that, as explained before, the current literature has been extensive in developed countries, but not in developing countries and particularly NICs. Also, this thesis argues that there are several differences in the ways that NICs acquire soft power conversion abilities. More inferences can surface if we analyse these countries as a population, rather than making assumptions employing observations from the developed nations.

In NICs, governments can increase the soft power of the country through the implementation of policies, programmes

and strategies that target IHE. The use of diplomatic tools develops the soft power conversion capabilities of the actors involved. This would enable the IHE landscape of a country to become a soft power source. Hence, the resources of governments and national actors can become soft power assets, if they wield soft power strategically.

The agents need to direct their soft power efforts to specific subjects, according to the foreign policy of the country. In the case of NICs, the countries make use of diplomacy tools along with other soft power tools beyond those commonly recognised in the current literature. This leads us to rethink the role of higher education in harnessing soft power.

If governments fail to transform their resources into soft power assets, two scenarios could arise. First, non-state national actors could be achieving soft power gains through IHE without government guidance. However, these gains could be diluted and lack significance. In this case, governments would need explicit policies and strategies to maximize the potentialities of IHE for soft power purposes. Second, soft power could be a remote non-intended consequence of IHE. In this case, governments should reframe the policies, programmes and strategies (with it the budget and resources allocated to IHE) to include soft power in the discourse and practice to achieve significant results.

1.4 Methodology

Case study methods was the methodology we selected for its utility in the selection of the cases, the development of the

theory and the collection of the data.[25] A case study is an empirical enquiry that deeply investigates a contemporary phenomenon on its real-life context, in particular when the context and the phenomenon boundaries are not evident. Case study methods employ many variables and multiple sources of evidence, providing a basis for data triangulation. [26] Since this methodology aims to develop a theoretical proposition to guide data collection, it was the most appropriate to apply in this research.

This methodology also helped to define the topic, identifying the outcomes, and selecting the cases that offered relevant information on the variables.[27] Case studies serve several primary purposes: the creation and test of theories, the identification of antecedent conditions and the explanation of cases of intrinsic importance.[28] Therefore, case studies helped to identify the importance of foreign policy and diplomacy in IHE, and how the particularities of NICs would evidence a shift in our understanding of soft power.

In this methodology, to achieve validity represents a challenge, due to the size of the sample.[29] Validity was constructed through the use of multiple sources and establishing evidence chains. Explanation building, the use of rival explanations, and a replication logic addressed the possible validity issues, ensuring the analysis did not overlook

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[25] A big thank you to Professor Nicole Janz, for her invaluable contributions in the development of the methodological section of thesis.

[26] Robert Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, Fourth (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2009), p. 18.

[27] John Gerring, *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 41.

[28] Van Evera, pp. 67–68.

[29] Gerring, p. 43.

other variables and that the theory would be valid for other countries that match the characteristics previously described.

The development and use of a case study protocol addressed the reliability of the research. The case study protocol included a questionnaire for the semi-structured interviews; the identification of crucial interviewees of each country; a data collection mechanism and mapping of the actors, sources and resources for each case and under each of the four components of IHE; the research proposal; field procedures; an identification of the main characteristics of each of the countries and their development indicators; and preliminary identification of the soft power subjects. This protocol guided the data collection in the three cases.[30]

An initial proposition guided the selection of the three case studies: Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. The rationale used to select the cases was that the three of them had different values on the four explanatory variables (the components of IHE). This provided a contrast between the cases and the variables so that more information surfaced.

The first observations pointed to the selection of Brazil as the country has high values on outbound student mobility and internationalisation of research. However, it has low values on the international programme and provider mobility. In turn, Malaysia has high values on inbound student mobility and international programme and provider mobility, but lower values on internationalisation of research. Lastly, Mexico has high values on internationalisation of research and a different

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[30] See Appendix II, where the sample of the Semi-structured interviews' questionnaire is provided.

approach to international programme and provider mobility, but lower values on student mobility. The strengths and weaknesses observed in each of the variables provided the basis to answer the question of how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs.

This thesis followed an explanation-building process. First, an initial theoretical statement/proposition was made, followed by the literature review and identification of literature gaps. Then, after the first field research trip (Malaysia), the preliminary findings were compared against the first theoretical statement, making the necessary adjustments. After this revision, the second case was introduced (Mexico) following the same steps and adjusting the statement. Then, the third case study was introduced (Brazil), and the theory was finally developed. The final stage included the collection of more data and classification of the information gathered. The resulting analysis led to inferences and answered the research questions.[31]

Besides case study methods, this research also used process tracing to analyse the evidence and explain the different steps actors take to transform their resources into soft power assets. The narrative element of process tracing is essential in this research. It aids in confirming the thesis and uncovering the relationship between the evidence and the explanation power of the theory.[32] Process tracing aids in tracing the

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[31] The cities visited to collect the data include Belem, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, Guadalajara and Mexico City.

[32] Sharon Crasnow, 'Process Tracing in Political Science: What's the Story?', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 62 (2017), 6–13 (p. 7).

mechanism from the cause to the effect, so it provides this research with supporting evidence.

Semi-structured interviews with key actors in each country were vital to collect data and conduct the analysis.[33] The interviews revealed valuable data and increased reliability. They were accumulative sources of information, and the data provided by the interviewees was corroborated with data from other sources. The comparison of the answers and information provided by the different informants with documents and other data provided reliability and trustworthiness. Semi-structured interviews also allowed for the identification of common opinions or attitudes as leads to search for more information and making the inferences reliable.

The selection of informants was made by first identifying and classifying the kinds of actors. Governmental actors included the ministries involved in foreign policy, higher education, research, and science and technology of each country, including their agencies. As for the national actors, the selection included mainly the international relations offices of the most relevant public and private universities and research centres as well as other organisations such as associations of universities. Appendix I comprises the list of interviewees.

The elites from governmental and education sectors were the subjects of the semi-structured interviews. These elites are 'those with close proximity to power or policymaking'.[34]

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[33] See Appendix II.

[34] Darren G. Lilleker, 'Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield', *Politics*, 23.3 (2003), 207–14 (p. 207).

The personal insight I have on international higher education was an essential part not only on the selection of interviewees, but also on the questions prepared in the questionnaire and the elaboration of the protocols followed. I have over 17 years of experience in working in the higher education sector, and more than 10 year in the international higher education field. All the experience accumulated in those years, along with my qualifications in the IR field of studies, led me to realise that international higher education and international relations were interconnected. During those years, I was able to attend international higher education conferences such as NAFTA, EAIE, HACU, IAUP and CONAHEC, representing both my home university and my country. It was through conversations with field experts and some government representatives from different countries that elements of soft power surfaced and led me to rethink the role of higher education in soft power studies.

The interviews conducted were possible thanks to the information I already had gathered on the field. Each interview was thought to obtain the information needed to conduct this research, but also was set in different scenarios that helped me to gain a broader perspective and harness vast information. One of the most valuable things was that I was able to travel to the three countries and conduct the interviews in the places of work of the interviewees. This gained me a particular perspective. For instance, in Brazil the International Officers were very welcoming, even attempted to talk to me in Spanish. I prepared ahead for the trip to Brazil and learned some Portuguese. This helped me to break some language barriers and the interviews ended up being conducted in 'Portuñol', a mixture of both languages. I found

in the Brazilian interviews that universities and governmental officers were willing to talk more when I made the effort to speak Portuguese. In the interviews conducted during the FAUBAI conference, I found that the universities were more open to describe their opinions and positive and negative points of programmes such as SWB and CAPES PrInt. The insight I got from universities was invaluable as some of the presentations in the conference were also about evaluating the programmes set by the government from the universities' perspective. Since not all of them got space to become speakers, they were more willing to provide me with the information needed to fill in the blanks.

In the case of Malaysia, I found that the governmental offices I visited were less willing to share more insightful information. The interviews were done from a very governmental perspective, all of the interviewees providing me with the same information that felt rehearsed and followed the perspective from the Higher Education Blueprint. In the case of universities, it was easier to get richer information. I found that speaking to them from my 17 years' experience in higher education and presenting myself as a PhD student from the University of Nottingham, gained me their trust and made them open up with me, answering my questions in a more honest way. As for the branch campuses in Malaysia, it was fundamental for me to visit the campuses and particularly Johor Bahru. The field experience does not compare to what can be read in articles or books. The insight of visiting those places gained me a unique perspective and voice on what I call 'the bi-directionality of soft power'.

In the case of Mexico, I was able to get access to Rectors of universities and practitioners also due to the trajectory I have

in higher education in Mexico. I was able to get first-hand information from universities, the government and the association of universities ANUIES. I visited their offices in Mexico City, which allowed me to get a sense of the centrality of the government and their disconnection with universities as well. I have a distinctive insight on cultural diplomacy as for several years I have been working with the International Book Fair of Guadalajara and the International Film Festival of UDG. The information gathered in those years is also reflected in chapter 9.

The interviews in the three countries helped me better understand the role of international higher education and soft power. Through the answers I got, I was able to identify the importance the higher education sector gave to soft power (if any), and at the same time I was able to hear from the government their relationship with the higher education sector in harnessing soft power, and to compare the level of importance they gave to this sector when considering soft power. Brazil was the country that I found has placed more importance to soft power and how to harness it from international higher education. Malaysia seems to understand it but only from 2011 onwards, before it seems that their policies targeted only higher education and not soft power. In the case of Mexico, the autonomy of universities places soft power in the hands of universities and, through some targeted strategies, of the government.

My ability with languages (Spanish, English and Portuguese) was key to conduct the interviews, along with my experience as practitioner in international higher education. The research design reflects that these assets made me the appropriate person to conduct this study. The visits to the different

institutions and places of works of the interviewees was nor random but selected, identifying the three ministries important for this research and their agencies (MoHE, MoFA and MoSTI), the public and private universities that are more important for the country and have experience in international higher education and those that do not, and the research centres and other bodies such as associations of universities that are central to the higher education landscape of the county and that play a part in its relationship to soft power. I was able to identify all these kind of actors thanks to the insight I already had on international higher education. Also, to interview the different actors from the different sectors made me able to uncover more information, getting a variety of perspectives that enriched the study presented here.

Different sources complemented the information the interviewees provided. These sources include:

1. Books and literature on soft power, international higher education, foreign policy, diplomacy and those that discuss these issues in the three case studies.
2. Reports, either governmental or done by specialised agencies, national or international.
3. News and articles from mass media.
4. Magazines, journals and book collections of the foreign affairs ministries edited by the governments of the countries under research, and which often contain the government's views on international affairs and foreign policy.
5. Official documents which include datasets, statistical yearbooks and annual reports of governments and higher education institutions.

6. Official websites of the different actors, which include their data, plans, programs and objectives. Such websites also contain video material, official postures and discourses.

7. Academic journal articles that cover both IHE and soft power.

8. Statistic records and datasets from international organisations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the World Bank.

9. Statistics and reports from other stakeholders such as ranking organisations and specialised think tanks.

10. Governmental programmes and their calls for participation which often include the aims and goals of the programmes, policies, and the results of the programmes implemented.

11. Websites of multilateral organizations (to which the countries are members) which contain its objectives, resources, actors involved and sometimes expected outcomes.

12. Legal and normative documents such as laws, decrees and policies.

13. Blueprints and official documents containing objectives and strategies, such as the national development plan, higher education blueprint, and foreign policy strategy.

This researcher used direct observation as a way to retrieve information while on-site and in the UK. The activities conducted included workshops, conferences, presentations given at conferences with key audiences in different countries

(Brazil, Germany, UK), personal conversations with professors of IR, consultations with experts on IHE and diplomacy, networking events, visits to government bodies, university campuses, museums, public and university libraries, specialised libraries, workplaces of the informants, and participation in cultural activities of the cities visited. These activities provided an essential insight into the culture and the country, its higher education and its diversity.

This research focuses on the period from 2008 to 2018. In the three countries, three different administrations occurred. Nevertheless, in the case of Malaysia and Mexico, the newest administrations only include a few months of 2018, for which the focus is on the two previous administrations. Table 1 shows the timeline and exposes the names of the Presidents/Prime Ministers that were active during this period. The three countries had elections in 2018, and in the three cases, the opposition won, leading to a decisive break in politics of the countries. Hence, 2018 was the year selected as the endpoint of this research.

Table 1 Administrations of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico 2008-2018

President/ Prime Minister	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Brazil											
Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva	01/01/03	x	31/12/10								
Dilma Rousseff				01/01/11	x	x	x	x	12/05/16		
Michel Temer									12/05/16	x	31/12/18
Malaysia											
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	31/10/03	03/04/09									
Najib Razak		03/04/09	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	10/05/18
Mahathir Mohamad											10/05/18
Mexico											
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	01/12/06	x	x	x	30/11/12						
Enrique Peña Nieto					01/12/12	x	x	x	x	x	30/11/18
Andrés Manuel López Obrador											01/12/18

Source: Own creation.

Datasets were used in this study for the three case studies. Mainly the student mobility components used datasets as evidence. Since this research focuses on a period of 10 years, the datasets cover the period from 2008 to 2018, where available. This data provides quantitative evidence that supports the theory.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The argument is built up in ten chapters. Chapter 1 covers the introduction, research design, the theory and methodology. Chapter 2 discusses soft power as an analytical concept and provides the literature review on soft power studies and its

connection to higher education, pointing out the gaps in the literature and central issues. Chapter 3 includes clarification of definitions such as foreign policy, diplomacy and diplomatic tools. Chapter 4 discusses IHE, clarifying some of the most common terminologies and constructing the framework of analysis.

The next chapters of the thesis expose the framework of analysis applied in the four components of IHE and the key findings. Chapter 5 discusses the foreign policy context of each of the three cases studied here. The next four chapters analyse of each of the four components of IHE in the three countries. In this way, chapter 6 focuses on inbound student mobility, chapter 7 on outbound student mobility, chapter 8 on internationalisation of research, and chapter 9 on the international mobility of programmes and providers.

The final section proposes a reassessment of soft power in NICs in the context of IHE. Chapter 10 discusses the findings and provides an explanation of the three-variant model found. It also challenges us to rethink the concept of soft power as an analytical tool in light of the findings. Finally, it provides general conclusions on the lessons learned from this study.

Chapter 2: Soft Power Prospects: from Developed to Newly Industrialised Countries

Joseph Nye first used the term of *soft power* in 1990, in his book *Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power*, where he analyses the American sources of power and other powerful countries in the context of the end of the Cold War. This use of soft power in American foreign policy ignited a debate within IR studies. Politicians and country leaders diffused the concept by using his terminology, although not always conveying the meaning as intended by Nye.[35] His subsequent works addressed these misconceptions, making the author to revisit the term in several articles and publications through the 1990s.

In 2004, Nye expanded the definition in his book *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. In it, he defined soft power as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas, and policies.'[36] Since then, soft power has been a recurring topic for politicians, academics, public audiences and media interested in low politics. The interest on the subject is not exclusive to politics and IR scholars; cultural, communications and media studies also explore the scope of soft power in an

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[35] Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos, 'From Hegemony to Soft Power', in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet (Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 2010), pp. 12–31 (p. 14).

[36] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. X.

attempt to explain reactions and interactions between governments and publics.

To understand soft power, it is essential to clarify the meaning of power. It is a contested concept among IR and politics scholars, and a single definition is challenging to produce as it could not be adequate to all cases.[37] However, this research provides a definition that helps us to understand its scope.

Within IR field of studies, realist scholars tend to define power according to the material capacities that a state owes. For them, **power** is defined **in terms of resources**. These are the 'specific assets or material resources available to a state'.[38] To realists, there are two kinds of power: latent and military. Latent power relates to the socio-economic resources that help to build military power, such as wealth, technology, population, and raw potential to win wars. Military power, on the other hand, is based on the size and strength of a state's defence and military forces and how they are compared to the military forces of other rival countries.[39] Ultimately, these scholars define power as 'the ability of one state to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would not do'.[40]

Although Nye advocates for a broader definition of power, he recognizes that resources are essential since the possession of

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[37] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1–32 (p. 2).

[38] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2nd edn (New York: Norton & Company, 2014), p. 57.

[39] Mearsheimer, pp. 55–56.

[40] Barnett and Duvall, 'Power Glob. Gov.', p. 2.

capabilities or resources can influence outcomes.[41] Through this lens, power is always 'concrete, measurable and predictable'.[42] However, the extent of a county's resources (population, territory, natural resources, army, economy and social stability) do not guarantee the attainment of the desired outcome.

Liberal, neoliberal, institutionalist and constructivist scholars propose another way to define power. **Power in terms of behaviour** is 'the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants.'[43] Nye considers that power resources are the tangible and intangible raw materials that trigger power relationships, but the accomplishment of the preferred outcomes depend on the behaviour in context. A complete definition of power should include resources, but these must provide the grounds to modify the behaviour of others.

Behavioural scholars judge power by the outcomes obtained when wielding power. [44] In contrast, most policymakers and diplomats define power in terms of resources that can produce results. They are on a constant search of outcome predictions that can guide policy and decision-making. The paradox is that, sometimes, owning the best resources does not

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[41] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 3.

[42] Joseph Nye, 'Hard, Soft and Smart Power', in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 559–74 (p. 560).

[43] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 2.

[44] See for example Kenneth E. Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990); Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization*, 59.1 (2005), 39–75.

guarantee the outcomes one wants.[45] This is why countries must develop strategic planning to achieve targeted results.

This research adopts the concept of power in terms of behaviour. Resources beyond the military and economic spheres, which often are intangible, play an essential function in increasing a country's power, particularly in NICs. These resources are used to change behaviours and to obtain strategic outcomes from targeted subjects.

Nye further developed his understanding of power in *The Future of Power*, published in 2011. In his work, he differentiates between the scope of power (who is involved in the power relationship) and the domain of power (what are the topics involved). Furthermore, he recognizes that power can be policy-oriented and depend on specific contexts, responding to the question of *who* gets *what, how, where* and *when.*[46] This is an important contribution as the identification of the subjects of soft power (*who*), the mechanisms (*how*), the scope of the soft power outcomes (*what*) and the context where it is wielded (*where* and *when*) provide a complete approach to its analysis.

The discussion on power has led scholars to differentiate between two types of power: hard and soft. Some countries have sufficient resources to wield power in a hard way. This hard power is usually wielded through resources such as military force, economic sanctions, inducements and threats. [47] On the other hand, countries that cannot rely on hard power,

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[45] Nye, 'Hard, Soft and Smart Power', p. 560.

[46] Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs. Perseus Books Group., 2011), p. 7.

[47] Cox and Inderjeet, p. 1.

such as NICs, resort to soft power to obtain the outcomes they want. They use attraction, persuasion, co-option and other means to wield power. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others. Scholars and politicians associate it to attractiveness, culture, political values, institutions and policies, which are intangible resources.[48]

Soft power seen in terms of behaviour is the ability to shape the preferences of others to achieve the goals one wants through attraction, persuasion/influence and setting agendas. At the same time, soft power assets are the resources used to influence that outcome.

In this distinction between hard and soft power, it is crucial to recognize two characteristics of power discussed earlier: command power and co-optive power. Command power relates to the ability to change preferences and outcomes through coercion or inducement. Hard power can be seen as command power. In comparison, soft power is the ability to change preferences and outcomes, attracting others to one's culture and values and manipulating the agenda with or without the awareness of others. For this reason, soft power is also regarded as co-optive power.[49]

Soft and hard power are two different sides of the same coin. They are both aspects of the capability to achieve a state's goal by affecting the behaviour of others. Still, if not used

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[48] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 6.

[49] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 7.

properly, they can obstruct the success of the strategies employed.[50]

In defining soft power, Nye discusses power conversion as a challenge for states to transform their resources to attain certain behaviours from others.[51] Power conversion involves the ability to identify the owned resources and maximizing them to achieve behavioural outcomes. Countries can accomplish power conversion through skilful leadership, assessing the environment and strategies to provide the best basis for power behaviour in a particular context.[52]

For this research, soft power is an ability, possessed by states and non-state actors, to influence the behaviour of others (states, governments, non-state actors and publics) to obtain the preferred outcomes. To wield soft power, countries use 'the co-optive means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction'.[53] This definition recognises a variety of actors as well as three mechanisms to exercise soft power. These mechanisms, also known as soft power behaviours, are Nye's interpretations of the three faces of power.[54]

The first face of power is **persuasion**. It follows the concept of power as depicted by Robert Dahl, who understands power in terms of relations among people, as well as the ability of A to get B doing something that B would not do otherwise. Nye

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[50] Joseph Nye, 'Soft Power and Higher Education', *The Internet and the University, Forum 2004*, 2004, 33–60 (p. 39).

[51] Nye, 'Soft Power', p. 159.

[52] Nye, 'Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts', p. 218; Joseph Nye, 'Power and Foreign Policy', *Journal of Political Power*, 4.1 (2011), 9–24 (pp. 10, 99).

[53] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 16.

[54] Various authors have also made contributions to the interpretation of the three faces of power. See for example the work of Boulding; Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioural Science*, 2.3 (1957), 201–15; Cox and Inderjeet.

takes Dahl's interpretation of power and includes it in his soft power definition as persuasion (also referred to as influence). Countries use persuasions as a means to induce others to do what they would not do otherwise. It contains the arguments (that appeal to facts, beliefs and normative premises, mixed with attractiveness and emotional appeals) to influence the thoughts and actions of others, and might involve manipulation to some extent.[55]

Dahl considers that a wide range of actors such as individuals, groups, governments, nation-states, etc., might exercise power using their resources.[56] Nye agrees on the identification of other actors as possessors of soft power.[57] However, when explaining their role and assessing their ability to increase a country's soft power, Nye focuses on the diffusion of soft power, making unclear the sources, means, amount and scope of soft power that these non-traditional actors can exercise.

The second face of power behaviour is **framing and setting agendas.** The theories developed by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz serve as the basis for this face. Nye argues that narratives and framing agendas are closely related to persuasion as for an argument to be legitimate in the eyes of the counterpart it needs to be persuasive. However, soft power actors use persuasion and influence indirectly, and the public rather than the elite mediate them. Nye explains that indirect persuasion often involves efforts to attract third parties with emotional appeals and narratives rather than pure

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[55] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 93.

[56] Dahl, p. 203.

[57] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. 90–97; Nye, 'Soft Power and Higher Education', p. 49; Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 101.

logic. Narratives frame issues in compelling ways, so that some facts or topics become more important than others, and this contributes to the setting of agendas.[58]

The third face of power behaviour is the shaping of others' preferences through **attraction**. This face can be traced back to the works of Steven Lukes in 1974, in his book *Power, a Radical View*, which was revisited and expanded in his 2005 edition.[59] Attraction means bringing attention – positive or negative – or to create positive or captivating magnetic effects.[60] Psychologically, attraction means that we like those that are similar or familiar to us, or with whom we share group membership, characteristics and attitudes. To understand it, Nye explores the three clusters of qualities that were expressed by Alexander Vuving: benignity (creating trust, sympathy and credibility), competence (or brilliance that produces admiration, respect and emulation), and beauty (or charisma, producing inspiration and adherence). These three clusters of qualities are crucial for converting sources – such as culture, values and policies – into power behaviour.[61]

In this research, the faces of power are the essential instruments used by governments and non-state actors to change the behaviours of others. Hence, attraction, persuasion/influence and creating narratives to set agendas are the tools that agents use to wield power. Since these three

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[58] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 94.

[59] See Steven Lukes, *Power, a Radical View*, Second (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[60] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 92.

[61] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 94.

are the tools most commonly found in the literature, they are identified as *established soft power tools*.

This thesis proposes to define soft power as the ability of governments and non-state actors (agents) to develop their capabilities and enable national environments to change, alter and influencing the behaviours and preferences of others (states, governments, non-state actors and public). Attraction, persuasion, influence and creating narratives to set agendas are the established tools soft power agents use in the attempt to obtain the outcomes pursued. To wield it, the agents need to develop soft power conversion abilities, have clarity of the soft power subjects and their preferences, the soft power assets, the targets, and the possible and preferred outcomes. For soft power to succeed, the soft power agents need to have plans and strategies, as well as mechanisms to measure its success.

Nye distinguishes three sources of soft power, namely culture, domestic values and policies, and foreign policies. For Nye, culture creates the meaning of society through values and practices by different means. Nye distinguishes between two levels of culture, high culture being the level for literature, art and education that appeals to elites. The second level is popular culture, which focuses on broader publics and includes mass entertainment. [62] According to Nye, high culture produces significant soft power since it is vital in transmitting values and ideas. A way to achieve the latter is through personal contacts, visits and exchanges, involving IHE

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[62] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 11; Joseph Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616.1 (2008), 94–109 (p. 98).

practices. Foreign visiting professors and exchange students return to their home country with a better acceptance and understanding of the other culture. Many of them follow career paths where they can affect policy outcomes. Additionally, world leaders educated in other country have a greater appreciation of the host county's values and institutions.

Domestic values and policies are Nye's second source of soft power. These, he argues, can become powerful sources of attraction beyond broadcasting. Governments should promote their values and ideologies without losing legitimacy.[63]

Finally, Nye discusses foreign policy as the third soft power source. National interest is at the core of foreign policy. If soft power is about reaching one's goals through attraction, the way countries frame these goals is the reflection of the foreign policy's initiatives. Policies are more likely to be attractive when countries share their values with other actors and societies.[64] Within this in mind, Nye introduces the idea of public goods; that is, something that everyone enjoys from or consume without diminishing its accessibility to the rest. A country can increase its soft power when its foreign policy adds to the preservation of that public good, and it would seem as legitimate for those that enjoy it.

2.1 *Mind the gap:* rethinking soft power

It became evident in researching this thesis that the traditional/current understanding of the concept of soft power did not fit with how NICs operated in the higher educational

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[63] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 55.

[64] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 61.

space. The three established soft power tools – attraction, persuasion/influence and setting agendas – are not the only ways governments and non-state actors in NICs have been able to change and influence the behaviours of others.

We need to consider that Nye conceptualised soft power by analysing the American foreign policy and its role as the hegemon in the international system. The resources of the US and other powerful countries that Nye explores in his works respond to certain realities not shared with the rest of the countries, such as democracy, Western values and Ivy League HEIs.

When we extrapolate the soft power understandings of developed countries to countries such as NICs, it becomes evident that the resources to leverage soft power are different than those used in the Developed World. The uniqueness of NICs' foreign policy and geopolitics, where the international system and structures define their bilateral and multilateral relations, show that the current conceptualisation of soft power does not entirely fit their realities. NICs do not seek to change the international system instantly but do aspire to become a significant weight within their regions of influence. The impact they pursue shapes their foreign policy and higher education agendas, as well as their selection of soft power subjects and the expected outcomes.

This thesis challenges soft power as exposed in the current literature. When examining NICs through soft power, we can see that there is something missing in it. NICs seem to have a different understanding of the scope of soft power and how to wield it when considering IHE. Their position as middle powers, their regional and global aspirations, their complex

higher education systems and foreign policy postures point towards a new understanding of soft power unique to these countries. These characteristics make it inevitable for us to rethink soft power.

Soft power as an analytical concept has been contested before by several scholars. Some of the debates surrounding soft power include its lightness and originality, as it is very close to other IR approaches such as institutionalism and democratic peace theory.[65] Other scholars consider soft power a simplistic view of the foreign policy decision-making process.[66] Some other problems with the concept include its rigour, its problematic use and uncertainty in its application.[67] Nye's explanation of the term fails to address in detail who are the agents that hold soft power, their qualifications, and differences between actors, institutions, large corporations, civil society entities, movements or individuals.[68]

When Nye identifies the three sources of soft power, the level of state control imposed is hard to locate. Nye's framework does not explain the linkage between the soft power sources of civil society and different states.[69] There is also a pre-conception that non-state actors create soft power of their own, and at the same time, they can strengthen or weaken the soft power of a different state or non-state agents.[70] This is a recurrent issue in the literature, but Nye's definition of soft

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[65] Christopher Layne, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power', in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet (Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 2010), pp. 51–82 (p. 54).

[66] Layne, p. 56.

[67] Zahran and Ramos, p. 16.

[68] Zahran and Ramos, p. 19.

[69] Zahran and Ramos, p. 19.

[70] Zahran and Ramos, p. 20.

power states that it is a capability owned by governments. Hence, it is still not clear whether non-state actors can hold soft power, or if governments can transform the latter into soft power resources. Moreover, the literature needs to clarify if the soft power wielded by non-state actors such as HEIs is the result of state policies, hence becoming instruments of soft power, rather than wielding soft power themselves.

States cannot fully control its soft power resources. At most, they can influence them through several policies.[71] For this reason, when exploring non-state actors as soft power agents, we must study the policies that affect them. In these policies, countries establish their soft power aspirations. Still, we need to clarify if soft power is an intentional outcome or an unintended consequence of policy implementation.

Other problems with the conceptualisation of soft power include the debate between the agents and subjects. Nye tends to overlook the role of the soft power subject and gives more importance to the agent that wields soft power. The problem is that there is an oversimplified understanding of the power relation and soft power itself. Nye tends to describe soft power as something that is being possessed by an agent, implying that it is a resource rather than a feature of a relationship.[72] Nye suggests that soft power could be something almost tangible, and that could be enhanced, produced or curtailed. However, this understanding of soft

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[71] Zahran and Ramos, p. 19.

[72] Edward Lock, 'Soft Power and Strategy', in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michel Cox and Parmar Inderjeet (Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 2010), pp. 32–50 (p. 36).

power could signify that power is described in terms of resources, rather than behaviours.

As this chapter demonstrates, there are many contributions that Nye and other authors have made attempting to theorising soft power, and to solve some of the complications that arise when comprehending it as an analytical concept. The current literature has inevitable gaps that fail to respond to the questions outlined when thinking of the role of non-state actors, specifically higher education institutions, as agents, sources or resources of soft power. There is some confusion in the use of the terminology, and when it is applied to NICs, the current understanding of soft power does not entirely fit in their realities. Hence, the critiques to soft power suggest that, as an analytical concept, it needs revision. Particularly when considering NICs and IHE.

2.2 Soft power and the role of higher education

After considering the sources of soft power as described by Nye, it would be useful to expand the analysis of the role of higher education within them. As we have seen before, Nye places higher education as part of the first source of soft power: culture, reducing and diluting its role within soft power literature. Higher education does not only involve culture or student exchanges, it also promotes understanding between people, transfer of technology and innovation to solve the most pressing problems of humanity, all of which links higher education to foreign policy, the third source of soft power.

We need to recognise the difficulties implied in placing education as part of the first soft power source. When

considering education, Nye does not recognize the distinction between education at primary and secondary levels and higher education. Higher education entitles education as well as research, and this dual character derives into *triple helix* collaboration between HEIs, government and the private sector. HEIs have a distinctive role in society, which opens a door for the discussion of the ways that HEIs can become soft power agents while being the basis for governments' legitimacy.

The current literature has reduced the role of higher education to the implications of exchange programmes and international students or leaders (elites) educated abroad, making them the only soft power subjects.[73] This view of education as part of the high culture source of soft power disregards the vast international activities that HEIs carry out as part of their internationalisation strategies, and which potentially makes them active actors in the development of the soft power of a country.

Higher education could also be analysed through the second and third sources of power, and not only through culture, as Nye implies. In domestic values and policies, the second source of soft power, higher education plays an important role too. HEIs influence national leaders and politicians to set national higher education policies. HEIs also reflect the values of the country abroad. Universities are portrayers of the

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[73] See for example the works of Aidarbek Amirbek and Kanat Ydyrys, 'Education as a Soft Power Instrument of Foreign Policy', *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 143 (2014), 501–3; Nye, 'Soft Power and Higher Education'; Giles Polglase, 'Higher Education as Soft Power in the Eastern Partnership: The Case of Belarus', *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, 4.2 (2013), 111–21; Anna Wojciuk, Maciej Michałek, and Marta Stormowska, 'Education As a Source and Tool of Soft Power in International Relations', *European Political Science*, 14.3 (2015), 298–317.

values and ideologies of the country, and when they move abroad, they represent such values as well. Furthermore, when they receive international students and faculty, they represent the values and ideologies of the country, building a bridge between the societies of both countries.

In the third source of soft power, foreign policy, higher education plays a more prominent role. A country that shapes its national interest to reflect knowledge as a public good in its foreign policy is more likely to be attractive. However, there is little work on how knowledge and higher education increase the attractiveness of a country through research and concerning global common goods. This thesis contributes to this area.

The current literature has misconceived the scope of higher education and the role of higher education stakeholders within soft power studies. Universities are the reflection of the country's values abroad, either when on diplomatic missions, when having campuses abroad, through their IR, or the exchanges of students, faculty, personnel, or while becoming subjects of international funding for research. In foreign policy, higher education is at the core of the national interest. If countries place higher education as part of their foreign policy agenda, then the latter could reinforce the role of HEIs in the country's soft power aspirations. Furthermore, the HEIs and research centres that make use of knowledge and research to protect global common goods could increase the soft power capabilities of their countries.

Nye addressed higher education in his 2004 paper, making a connection between HE and soft power. However, Nye continues to rely on a traditional approach, dissolving HEI's

contribution to a list of personal contacts, visits, exchanges and providing formative experiences for the world's elite. He concedes that '… universities … and other non-governmental groups develop soft power on their own that may reinforce or be at odds with official foreign policy goals' but fails to explain how to achieve this.[74]

Nye's work discusses primary resources that can be converted into soft power using skilful conversion strategies. These resources include culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a thriving economy and a competent militia. Governments could shape these as national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programmes, assistance programmes, training programmes, and various other measures.[75] Even if Nye identifies the conversion of resources to soft power assets, he does not explain how other diplomatic tools such as science and knowledge diplomacy are used as instruments to wield soft power. Additionally, Nye dilutes the role of other non-state actors in soft power conversion, and how or why they can use such tools for the same purposes. Hence, he fails to explain how HEIs and other higher education stakeholders use them to wield soft power.

This research addresses these gaps in the literature, arguing that actors such as HEIs can shape their resources (such as internationalisation plans and strategies) into soft power assets. They do so through IHE and implementing diplomatic mechanisms. Thus, not only exchange programmes become

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[74] Nye, 'Soft Power and Higher Education', p. 49.

[75] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 99.

soft power resources but also do other internationalisation strategies of HEIs. These include transnational and international education activities, joint publications and collaborative research, strategic partnerships with other HEIs in targeted key countries, cultural fairs and festivals, to name a few. Likewise, governments would have to shape their primary resources (policies, values, higher education system, budget allocations for research and economic system) to enable HEIs to shape their internationalisation strategies into soft power resources. This involves the acquisition of soft power conversion abilities to modify behaviour; hence, we should see policies as vehicles to enable HEIs to become soft power agents.

Nye presents us with a model of direct and indirect effects of soft power.[76] In the first model of direct effects, the benignity, competence or charisma of leaders might attract other leaders, for which elite relations and networks often play an essential role. Here, the exercise of soft power is direct. Nye claims that international students that return home they do so with a more positive view of the host country.[77]

In the second model, the targets of influence are publics and third parties which, in turn, affect their leaders, creating an enabling/disabling environment for decisions. Here, the soft power exercise is indirect.

According to this model, there are three conditions necessary for successful soft power projection: effective communication

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[76] Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 94–95.

[77] Joseph Nye, 'Soft Power and Higher Education', *The Internet and the University*, 2004, 33–60 (p. 42).

with publics, persuasion to change their attitudes to political issues and to ensure that all of this makes an influence in political outcomes.[78]

In terms of higher education, student exchanges and training the elites are part of the first model as described by Nye, making a direct effect on policymakers without conferring first with public opinion. However, Nye overlooked other indirect consequences that cause a domino effect. Upon their return home, students share their experiences and the new learned values and knowledge of the learned culture and values with their University, family and close social circle, also causing unintended consequences.

In NICs, other IHE activities fit in the second model, which Nye's interpretation of soft power does not include. Furthermore, the rest of international activities of HEIs in NICs, such as double degrees, joint research, internationalisation of the curricula, international education programmes, among others, do not fit in this two-sided model. This suggests that NICs could have a soft power model of their own.

In sum, we need greater clarity on soft power and the role of IHE. Although the advances and contributions made to the conceptualisation of soft power help us to understand its relevance in world politics, the theorising of soft power falls short in including higher education and HEIs as actors or agents of soft power.

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[78] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 95.

Nye developed soft power as an analytical concept thinking of the US and other powerful countries. The current literature on soft power has helped us to understand the term and to differentiate it from other forms of power. Furthermore, it has provided us with a set of tools that countries can apply to wield it. However, the current literature fails to provide a deeper understanding of the role of higher education in soft power, to identify the variety of agents and their tools, and to clarify how and why countries such as NICs can wield soft power. Soft power studies have overlooked the role of international higher education and whether we should consider it as a source or resource of soft power. This research intends to contribute to knowledge on soft power, filling these gaps in the literature.

Soft power is directly associated with foreign policy. The foreign policy contains the national interest; it also identifies the objectives and targets of the country. The foreign policy targets are also the subjects of soft power.

Diplomacy, on the other hand, is the way governments and other actors act to achieve foreign policy goals. At the same time, diplomacy, in particular public diplomacy, has also been regarded as a way to wield soft power. To clarify the role of diplomacy in wielding soft power, we need to look at public, cultural, knowledge and science diplomacy and International Cooperation for Development.

Higher education stakeholders use diplomatic tools while they deploy their internationalisation strategies, empowering them to wield soft power. The next chapter unravels the central understandings of foreign policy, diplomacy and its instruments under examination in this research.

Chapter 3: Foreign policy and the tools of diplomacy

Foreign policy involves the national interest and the strategic relations a country pursues to find its place in the international system. It strategically guides a country's relationship to others and with the international structures. Moreover, it is the outcome of a country's particular history, its geographical disposition and its domestic political environment.

This chapter introduces a brief review of foreign policy as a way to understand the context of the countries' regions of influence and strategic alliances. An overview of diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy follows it, signalling the characteristics of the diplomatic tools that concern this research.

3.1 Foreign policy

Policy, to put it simply, could be referred to as the 'tools that the states use to get what they want'.[79] This description of policy is correlated to the definition of power as reviewed in the last chapter. Policies are tools while power is an ability, but both focus on getting the outcomes desired by states in a given time. In this respect, it becomes evident that foreign policy is related to the attainment of power objectives, including soft power gains.

Politics scholars refer to policies as an ultimate objective, a guiding principle or specific actions countries take to reach a

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[79] Glenn Palmer and Clifton T. Morgan, *Theory of Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 14.

goal. It could also indicate the principles and priorities adopted in particular issues (sometimes as rhetoric rather than practice) and governments could direct them to produce change or assure continuity.[80] A policy implies 'conscious intentions and coordination'.[81] Their implementation should follow rationality, where the objectives, timings and instruments are explicit.[82] The decisions made to develop policies include the achievement of outputs and, ultimately, the shaping of behaviours.[83]

In IR, countries establish foreign policies to set strategies and reach goals. Foreign policy is a way to make sense of the actions of national governments and other stakeholders when engaging with other international actors. It stands in between the internal and external dimensions of a state. The environments in which it operates are complicated as it has to consider the domestics and international contexts. In other words, 'foreign policy is at the hinge of domestic politics and IR'.[84]

A broad conceptualisation of foreign policy recognises the diversity of actors involved in it. The definition of foreign policy adopted is 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually, a state) in IR'.[85] Foreign policy

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[80] Richard Wilson, 'Policy Analysis as Policy Advice', in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, ed. by Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 983 (p. 53).

[81] Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 4.

[82] Hill, p. 5.

[83] Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, 'Introduction', in *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, Third (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 564 (p. 3).

[84] Hill, p. 23.

[85] Hill, p. 3.

actors include governments, international organisations, regional governments, and other non-state actors, which affect a country's foreign policy.[86] Usually, the foreign policy consists of the action, statements and values of a country, where actors influence it to achieve its objectives and to give form to the external structures (such as the international system).[87] On this broader vision of foreign policy, HEIs and other higher education stakeholders can conduct external relations on behalf of the country, directly influencing its foreign policy.

Foreign policy involves agent behaviour; it has to have intentionality and countries must direct it towards a specific goal.[88] Intentionality means that there should be a conscious decision-making process, designed to reach a particular objective. To examine the foreign policy of a country we need to acknowledge not only the actors that intervene in foreign policy, but also the targets, the expected outcomes or goals, and the processes involved in taking such actions.

States create foreign policy portfolios, which consist of foreign policy behaviours and individual policies that a country adopts while considering the existing constraints.[89] The foreign policy portfolio is dynamic and changes in time according to the leader's preferences and the international and national contexts.

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[86] Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, pp. 2–3.

[87] Hill, p. 4.

[88] Trine Flockhart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', in *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, Third (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 564 (p. 90).

[89] Palmer and Morgan, p. 16.

Foreign policy is the context in which IHE takes form. The interviews conducted in this research included decision-makers in both foreign policy and IHE to identify where IHE and foreign policy collide. This thesis does not focus on the underlying causes of foreign policy decision making, as this is not the objective of this thesis. Hence, foreign policy analysis is not employed. Instead, chapter 5 describes specific foreign policies as part of the context of each of the case studies.

Foreign policy implementation requires de use of instruments available to different actors and selected to translate the intentions into actions. These mechanisms depend on the resources and capabilities of the countries. Resources can be advantages a country has as a result of climate, position, geography, population size, education, tradition and level of development.[90] They are a critical factor in determining foreign policy. To possess a resource is not enough, as argued in chapter 2. A country must also have the capacity to mobilise them to advance its interests and achieve its goals.

On the other hand, capabilities are 'resources made operational but not yet translated into specific instruments'.[91] Culture and education are the soft power sources subject of this research. These are also foreign policy resources, made operational through the implementation of policies, programmes and strategies. The argument is that these resources are mobilised by governments and higher education

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[90] Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill, 'Implementation and Behaviour', in *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, Third (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 564 (p. 162).

[91] Brighi and Hill, p. 162.

and research actors (national and international) through diplomacy mechanisms.

This research identifies the main diplomacy mechanisms used in IHE. The literature also refers to them as soft power tools. However, this research labels them as diplomatic tools, diplomacy tools and diplomacy mechanisms to differentiate them from another set of soft power tools (such as attraction, influence and persuasion). Next sections briefly revise them.

3.2 The tools of diplomacy

Traditional scholars argue that diplomacy is a particular activity of the states, where governments use diplomacy to manage and influence the external environment, using official government-to-government channels.[92] They define it as 'a state-based institution involving professional accredited diplomats from foreign ministries and embassies, who follow the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)'.[93]

Diplomacy is essential to achieve foreign policy objectives without the use of force, propaganda or law.[94] The main features of diplomacy are to represent, negotiate and communicate the national interests with diplomats from other states to advance the state's interests.

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[92] Caitlin Byrne, 'Public Diplomacy', in *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, Third (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 564 (p. 169).

[93] Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, 'Introduction', in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World. Theories and Practices*, ed. by Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 406 (p. 4).

[94] G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy. Theory and Practice*, 5th Ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 1.

Some diplomacy scholars challenge this conventional view of diplomacy, arguing that other actors can use diplomacy to achieve foreign policy goals. A broader notion of diplomacy argues that traditional diplomacy is part of a 'national diplomatic system', in which other actors (non-governmental and governmental) can use the same diplomatic channels or new ones, representing, negotiating and communicating the national interest through own means. Self-styled 'new diplomacy' scholars consider that diplomacy is not an exclusive activity of the states anymore, as other actors also lead the processes of representation, negotiation and communication.[95] There is a current debate within practitioners and scholars, questioning the scope of diplomacy and the field of action of the actors involved in new diplomacy. Some interrogations have surfaced, such as: Who are the actors able to use diplomacy? Are they, in fact, diplomats? What can we consider as diplomacy?

This thesis recognises that not only the obvious governmental actors use diplomacy mechanisms to advance the state's interests. Other governmental actors are also engaged in diplomatic activities, such as the Ministries of Education (MoE), Ministries of Higher Education (MoHE), the Ministries of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI), and local governments.[96] The third kind of actors that engage in what is commonly called track two diplomacy includes HEIs, universities, research centres and associations of universities.

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[95] Kerr and Wiseman, p. 4; Geoffrey Allen Pigman, 'Debates about Contemporary and Future Diplomacy', in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World. Theories and Practices*, ed. by Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 406 (pp. 70–73).

[96] Through *paradiplomacy,* non-central governments increase their presence abroad using diplomacy tactics.

This research adopts a broader approach to diplomacy that describes it as 'the practical art of representing the sovereign and conducting negotiations on his or her behalf'.[97]

Three elements of diplomacy are essential to understand what constitutes diplomacy: negotiation, representation and communication. Negotiation is a feature that originates in 'track one' diplomacy – the official governmental diplomacy that follows official channels. However, other actors and pressure groups such as NGOs made of negotiation an instrument widely used. Higher education stakeholders use negotiation when there is leverage, such as fully funded projects to foster the mobility of students or faculty. Still, their success depends on skills, strategies and resources. This research takes a closer look at how and why non-state actors are part of or use negotiations to advance the countries' interests.

Representation and communication are the other two features of diplomacy, where non-governmental actors also intervene. Representation of the state's interests while engaging with international actors and foreign societies requires the mobilisation of resources. Communication is, hence, inseparable from representation, as communication is a feature that occurs when this engagement happens. Communication is a core function of diplomacy where actors can achieve the foreign policy objectives while modifying the behaviours, interests and sometimes the identity of the actors involved.[98] In the context of globalisation and with the rise of

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[97] Pigman, p. 70.

[98] Pigman, p. 72.

information technology, communication with foreign audiences has become a challenge to diplomacy. It is precisely this context that the communication, engagement and interaction with foreign audiences have been fostering the appearance of track two diplomacy.

The theory developed in this thesis argues that soft power agents use the tools of diplomacy to mobilise their resources, turning them into soft power assets. Diplomacy is how agents acquire soft power conversion abilities. Next sections discuss each of the diplomatic tools identified for this study.

3.2.1 Public diplomacy

US Foreign Diplomacy officer Edmund Gullion coined the term public diplomacy in 1965.[99] Countries direct public diplomacy to influence the societies of a foreign country, affecting other governments indirectly. Diplomacy scholars identify over 150 definitions of public diplomacy. Fields of studies such as IR, communications and media studies have different understandings of the same term.[100]

Here, public diplomacy is a process governments follow to communicate with foreign audiences, intending to make them understand their national ideas and ideals, institutions, culture, national goals and policies.[101] Some scholars identify public diplomacy as white propaganda, meaning that it involves the manipulation of publics through mass media for

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[99] Berridge, p. 200; Tom Fletcher, 'Public Diplomacy and Its Offshoots', in *Statow's Diplomatic Practice*, ed. by Ivor Roberts, Seventh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 747 (p. 555).

[100] Jan Melissen, 'Public Diplomacy', in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World. Theories and Practices*, ed. by Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 406 (p. 193).

[101] Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', p. 12.

political purposes, to achieve long term changes in public opinion.[102]

According to Nye, public diplomacy is a tool that governments use to mobilize and communicate with foreign publics and attract societies and communities of other countries.[103] Public diplomacy involves the strategies the governments use to succeed in attracting by broadcasting culture. Nye identifies three dimensions of public diplomacy: through daily communications, strategic communication, and the development of lasting relations with key individuals, such as world leaders.[104] Governments achieve the latter by implementing scholarship programmes, students and faculty exchanges, grants for attendance to conferences and seminars, training programmes, and providing access to media channels.

Nye discussion focusses mainly in the mobilisation of governmental resources to reach, engage and communicate with foreign audiences. The author understands public diplomacy as a process mostly used by governments, narrowing the strategies to the state's capabilities and capacities. However, other actors also use public diplomacy. Non-state actors, such as HEIs and research centres, use public diplomacy to engage with other societies abroad. Hence, scholars have provided a revised concept of public diplomacy.

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[102] Berridge, p. 198.

[103] Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', p. 95.

[104] Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', pp. 101–2.

Bryne provides a broader definition of public diplomacy, which portrays it as a process to engage with people in another country through 'the pursuit of direct relations with ordinary people at home and abroad to advance the interest and values of those being represented'.[105] Melissen defines it as an instrument that states, associations of countries and some sub-state and non-state actors use to 'understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; build and manage relationships, and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values'.[106]

Scholars catalogue this broader definition as 'new public diplomacy'. It includes non-state actors that engage with foreign publics, advancing the country's national interests. It moves away from the traditional public diplomacy, which is more concerned with information flow and feeding information to foreign publics. Instead, new public diplomacy is concerned with dialogue and engagement, creating long term relationships with other societies. In doing so, these societies could influence their governments to align with the interests of the country using public diplomacy. This process is more complicated than delivering messages or broadcasting internationally.

It is essential to recognise non-state actors in public diplomacy, as they can legitimise the institutions, values and policies of their governments. These actors also legitimise the foreign policies and aid in nation branding and building the reputation of the country abroad. While developing long term

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[105] Byrne, p. 169.

[106] Melissen, 'Public Diplomacy', p. 193.

relationships with foreign societies, non-state actors portray the country's values and culture, gaining a good reputation for the nation abroad.

Public diplomacy is a way to communicate the national interest abroad, promoting the image of the country for political purposes: to attract, influence, persuade and create narratives to set agendas. It differs from nation branding as the latter is considered a marketing strategy that involves strategies such as commercialisation, setting campaigns, and worldwide broadcasting.[107] This communication of the national image abroad by actors other than the government is crucial in increasing the reputation of a country abroad. Non-state actors would have more legitimisation than the government's attempts to do so.

3.2.2 Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy shares many characteristics with public diplomacy. Both seek to engage with foreign audiences, to build long-lasting relationships and to avoid the broadcasting of propaganda.[108] Also, both aim to build trust and legitimize the policy and decision making of their governments. To some scholars, cultural diplomacy is a subset of public diplomacy.[109]

Cultural diplomacy is 'the managed export of culture (or other cultural intervention) to service foreign policy ends'.[110] It implies the use of a country's culture for diplomatic purposes.

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[107] Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', p. 19.

[108] Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', pp. 16–17.

[109] Naren Chitty, 'Soft Power, Civic Virtue and World Politics', in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. by Naren Chitty and others (Routledge, 2017), pp. 9–33 (p. 19).

[110] Byrne, p. 181.

Cultural diplomacy involves 'the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding'.[111] Art, language and education are arguably the most significant cultural expressions used to promote that understanding and respect among countries.[112] Hence, it is crucial to analyse how IHE includes cultural diplomacy in its practices.

Governments and HEIs use cultural diplomacy when they promote the exchange of students, cultural exchanges, language and culture teaching to foreign audiences, and the showcase of artistic expressions abroad. This thesis argues that there is a need to deepen our understanding of how IHE produces soft power when actors use cultural diplomacy to achieve foreign policy goals. HEIs engage in cultural diplomacy in NICs through their internationalisation plans, which include practices beyond student exchanges, such as the opening of international institutes and offices abroad. This way, HEIs maximise the cultural assets of the country, engaging with strategic foreign audiences while using cultural diplomacy.

3.2.3 Knowledge diplomacy and science diplomacy

Knowledge diplomacy is a term that this researcher proposes to identify a broader scope of diplomacy activities deployed by non-traditional actors such as HEIs and research centres. However, knowledge diplomacy is not a new term. In recent years, scholars and practitioners have debated its use, aiming

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[111] Milton C. Cummings, 'Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey', *Center for Arts and Culture*, 2003, p. 1.

[112] Patricia M. Goff, 'Cultural Diplomacy', in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 953 (p. 420).

to identify the elements to describe knowledge diplomacy and its differences with science diplomacy.

Science diplomacy is a term used to explain the role of science in foreign policy. In 2010, the Royal Society of the UK and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) hosted a meeting with 200 delegates from around the world to discuss the new frontiers in science diplomacy. The meeting resulted in a document, which summarises science diplomacy. According to it, science diplomacy is a concept used to describe the role of science, technology and innovation in three dimensions of policy:

- Science in diplomacy, which implies delivering information through science for the formulation of foreign policy objectives.
- Diplomacy for science, which can be understood as the use of diplomacy to facilitate international science cooperation, either bilaterally or through global structures.
- Science for diplomacy, which involves the use of scientific cooperation to improve the relations between countries.[113]

Science diplomacy recognises the value of science in advancing relations between countries, but the boundaries between science cooperation and science diplomacy are thin. One of the most acknowledged definitions of science diplomacy depicts it as 'the use of scientific interactions among nations to address the common problems facing

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[113] AAAS and The Royal Society, *New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy* (London, 2010), pp. 7–8.

humanity and to build constructive, knowledge based international partnerships.'[114] Countries and scientists have made use of science diplomacy for more than a decade. Still, a broader term needs to fill some gaps in the literature. For this reason, several scholars have been exploring alternative frameworks, such as knowledge diplomacy.

Definitions of knowledge diplomacy explain the interactions of HEIs and other stakeholders in diplomatic activities. For instance, Vinet identifies that universities are increasingly playing diplomatic roles, as HEIs are involved in the flow of people, knowledge and rapports between nations. For the author, the development of networks, partnerships with foreign institutions and the development of strategic alliances have opened the space for HEIs to conduct their diplomacy, complementary to that of states.[115]

In 2018, the British Council commissioned the Canadian scholar Jane Knight to develop a concept around knowledge diplomacy that was more accurate to the present times and the diversity of activities HEIs engage with while internationalising higher education. A working paper was the result of it. The British Council dedicated its flag-ship annual conference, Going Global in 2019, to a discussion of Knight's conception of knowledge diplomacy. Knight's interpretation of knowledge diplomacy argues the need for an alternative framework from the power paradigm, which leads her to propose a new model breaking apart from soft power.[116] Her

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[114] AAAS and The Royal Society, p. 2.

[115] Vinet, p. 6774.

[116] Jane Knight, 'Moving from Soft Power to Knowledge Diplomacy', *International Higher Education*, 80 (2015), 8–9.

main critique on soft power is that it refers to tactics and concepts attached to dominance, authority, command and control. In contrast, higher education conceives knowledge as a way to offer solutions to worldwide challenges. In this spirit, Knight believes that when HEIs are seen as instruments of soft power, the power imbalances within countries favour a few, so the alternative use of collaboration and mediation strategies (as diplomacy does) would bring a different paradigm to IHE.[117]

Knight's views of the *internationalisation of higher education* helped her to propose a change of paradigm within knowledge diplomacy, arguing that there is no current theoretical framework that studies both IHE and IR. While Knight recognises that recent analysis of higher education within soft power literature are out-dated, she proposes a new paradigm that does not consider the government-HEIs dynamics and agency, particularly within the realities of NICs. Knight continues to focus in HEIs as separate actors with their internationalisation agendas, yet with a common focus: knowledge production and dissemination. Even if this is a reasonable attempt to increase the literature on knowledge diplomacy, and to address higher education in IR' paradigm, Knight's views fall short in discussing the benefits for both governments and HEIs. Knights new definition of knowledge diplomacy also fails to clarify the differences and similarities with public, cultural and science diplomacy.

Due to the absence of a more in-depth description of what knowledge diplomacy entails, this thesis proposes a definition

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[117] Interview 96 University of Toronto.

rooted in diplomacy as a way to achieve soft power objectives. Knowledge diplomacy is an analytical concept that can be used to capture the international activities through which higher education stakeholders engage with foreign partners in the sharing, transfer and pursuit of knowledge while representing the state they pertain to, negotiating on their behalf and communicating the national interest.[118] It is worth noting that not all the international activities of stakeholders count as knowledge diplomacy. The activities that HEIs and research centres pursue that target or follow the national interest as well as the institution's objectives, regardless of the intentionality behind, and that comply with representation, negotiation and communication, are the ones that should be considered as knowledge diplomacy activities.

This definition recognises a variety of actors beyond the governmental sphere, involving mainly institutions, associations and organisations that engage with knowledge sharing, transfer and creation. We understand the sharing, transfer or pursue of knowledge as follows: sharing of knowledge involves cooperation between partners to make knowledge available for both parties. Transfer of knowledge consists of the transmission of knowledge from the partner that holds it to the partner that lacks the knowledge or infrastructure. The pursuit of knowledge involves cooperation between the parties to make new theories, discoveries or innovation, constructing new knowledge that derives from the inputs of all the parties involved.

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[118] Stakeholders include HEIs, research centres, associations of universities, scientific associations, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks, researchers and other research and higher education bodies.

Representation, negotiation and communication of the national interest are the three elements that define diplomacy. To be labelled as diplomacy, the activities should include at least one of these three elements. Without them, it would rather be the case of international academic cooperation. Hence, because it is a form of diplomacy, the national interest is a motivation or rationale behind the internationalisation strategies of the stakeholders. Here is where we can explain the link between foreign policy objectives and knowledge diplomacy.

Engaging with knowledge diplomacy has an outcome that is close to public diplomacy. Such is the creation of research networks that can build meaningful relationships through long-term collaboration between researchers. This feature is an intrinsic part of academic cooperation, which allows for different cultures to search for global solutions to local problems, especially in terms of cooperation between the Global South and with the developed countries.

3.2.4 International Cooperation for Development

International Cooperation for Development, or ICD, is a diplomacy tool that governments use to achieve their foreign policy goals.[119] It has distinctive implications for developing economies. Providing a single definition of ICD is challenging since, within IR, diverse theoretical approaches have developed different understandings of cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation itself has evolved throughout history.

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[119] See UN, 'International Cooperation for Development', 2020 <https://www.unsystem.org/content/international-cooperation-development> [accessed 26 October 2020].

Before analysing ICD, we must understand the meaning of cooperation.[120] Maass Moreno and Carvajal Cortés define it as a 'set of plans and actions carried out between societies of different nations, to achieve shared benefits in different areas using or not governmental mechanisms, through the application of economic, human or technological resources'.[121]

The authors suggest that, when the term cooperation appears in international treaties, agreements, national policies or regional strategies, it has political implications. Cooperation then should be efficient, making the other to act in a particular way or adopt specific attitudes.[122] This acknowledgement of cooperation as a way to change behaviours brings the term within the realm of soft power, as the objective of the latter is also to change behaviours, postures and attitudes of others towards own goals.

Gómez Galán and Sanahuja provide a far-reaching understanding of ICD. They define it as a set of actions that aim to promote the economic and social progress of the Global South.[123] Public and private actors from countries of different income levels carry out those actions, mainly through governmental platforms.

ICD responds to some criteria such as co-responsibility, solidarity, respect, protection of human rights, and the search for better conditions and more resources for human wellbeing

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[120] The definition of cooperation and ICD this research adopts has Latin American origins, adopting a non-western view of ICD.

[121] Margarita Maass Moreno and Rocio Carvajal Cortés, *Cultura, Desarrollo y Cooperación Internacional: Una Aproximación Desde La Perspectiva Sistémica* (Ciudad de México: Instituto Mora, Universidad Iberoamericana, 2012), p. 122.

[122] Maass Moreno and Carvajal Cortés, p. 45.

[123] Manuel Gómez Galán and José Antorio Sanahuja, *El Sistema Internacional de Cooperación Al Desarrollo. Una Aproximación a Sus Actores e Instrumentos* (Madrid: Cideal, 1999), p. 17.

and dignity. It acknowledges public and private actors, with common priorities, goals and strategies. ICD strives for clear and constant dialogue between the parties involved, respecting the domestic and foreign policies of the receptor country.[124]

Ángel Martínez Meléndez has systematized the different kinds of existing ICD. He explains that we could identify the actors according to their nature. Actors could be governmental (being either centralized or decentralized) or non-governmental. They could also be classified according to their role, identifying three kinds of cooperation: North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation.[125] Following these categories, we can locate ICD as bilateral or multilateral, according to the number of actors involved.

ICD can also be classified by the nature of the resources – financial or technical, and by the degree of concession – refundable or non-refundable. ICD also involves political factors, which respond to their conditionality – tied or untied. Finally, ICD can be organised according to themes, prioritising the advancement of development areas, such as economic, scientific and technological, educational, and cultural.[126]

This research looks at ICD in the three case studies in terms of governmental, non-governmental, North-South, South-South

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[124] Lisbeth Katherine Duarte Herrera and Carlos Hernán González Parias, 'Origen y Evolución de La Cooperación Internacional Para El Desarrollo', *Panorama*, 8.15 (2014), 117–31 (p. 118).

[125] South countries are referred to as a group of countries that are not totally developed, they have been colonized, and have less, few or non-economic, political or military power in respect to the countries of the North. These conditions prevent them to dictate 'the rules of the game' globally. See Ángel Martínez Meléndez, *Causas de La Instauración de La Ley Mexicana Para La Cooperación Internacional Para El Desarrollo. Análisis Histórico-Sistémico* (Ciudad de México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2018), pp. 54–55.

[126] Martínez Meléndez, p. 52.

and triangular cooperation. Table 2 presents a summary of the main characteristics of the types of cooperation subject to this research.

Table 2 Description of selected types of cooperation under ICD

Type	Description
Governmental	The government directly intervenes through the chancellery or ministry of foreign affairs or its agencies to strengthen their foreign policy objectives. The local governments and international and regional organization also participate in decentralized cooperation.
Non-governmental	This cooperation is done by international actors that do not represent officially their government, such as associations, companies, social movements, as well as research centres and institutes.
North-South	Also referred to as vertical cooperation, developing countries receive it from developed countries.
South-South	Cooperation between countries that share a shared reality and position in the international arena, generally in development disadvantage from the countries of the North.
Triangular	Cooperation between three parties, two offerors and one receiver. One of the offerors is usually a developed country

	or international organization; the other one is a developing country. The receiver is a country with lesser development. Usually, the high-income country provides the economic resources, the middle-income country provides technical knowledge, and both benefit the low-income country.

Source: Martínez Meléndez (2018) pp. 53-60.

This thesis argues that Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico possess an ability to engage in South-South and triangular cooperation without posing a threat to less developed countries. ICD allows NICs to approach and create meaningful understandings with developing countries with which they share roots, colonizing history or culture (such as language and religion), without intimidating them but instead influencing them to favour their foreign policy postures. Additionally, South-South cooperation helps with the image of the country abroad, making it more attractive. Through triangular cooperation, NICs also become interlocutors between the North and the South. This gains a distinctive and unique voice for this kind of countries globally. Hence, this thesis considers ICD as a diplomacy mechanism that NICs use to achieve soft power goals.

This thesis also shows that the diplomatic tools presented in this chapter are the ways governments and non-state higher education stakeholders in NICs wield soft power. In particular, we should recognise HEIs and research centres as diplomats that engage in track two diplomacy when they use the instruments of diplomacy while deploying their internationalisation strategies. As these actors use such

diplomacy mechanisms, consequently obtaining soft power, they also become soft power agents.

3.3 Soft power and its relation to foreign policy goals

Soft power objectives and foreign policy goals are closely connected. While foreign policy contains the national interest, it also depicts the priorities of countries to assure its place in the international system. As reviewed in this chapter, the tools of diplomacy are used to mobilise the assets of a country to achieve the desired outcomes. At the same time, these tools are also used to mobilise soft power assets, hence not only governments but also other national actors can achieve foreign policy goals.

Both soft power and foreign policy recognise the diversity of actors that are involved in shaping behaviours of other publics and nations to acquire de desired goals. The involvement of these wider kind of actors in foreign policy is done through the tools of diplomacy. In the literature, public diplomacy has been the tool most studied where contribution of other actors is more evident in the attainment of foreign policy goals. As seen before, public diplomacy can be seen as both a soft power tool and a foreign policy instrument.

There is a recognised interdependent connection between public diplomacy and soft power, both pointing to an 'understanding of world politics beyond interstate relations by accentuating the role of publics as well as non-military means

to achieve desirable results'.[127] In addition, IR scholars claim that to study public diplomacy is to gain a deeper understanding on how soft power operates to influence, inform and manage foreign publics.[128] Therefore, we can conclude that public diplomacy is a hinge practitioners use to achieve foreign policy goals and soft power objectives.

Since all countries have different foreign policy goals, public diplomacy in practice has taken many forms and shapes. In the countries analysed here, it is argued that national actors other than governments are active in the foreign policy configuration of the country, particularly universities. The HEIs of these countries have found a place in the political arena to engage in public diplomacy practices, hence deploying their own means to shape behaviours of others in favour of the national interest. Furthermore, not only public diplomacy has become a natural tool for HEIs, as has been observed in this chapter. Cultural diplomacy has also played a significant difference when HEIs engage with foreign audiences, as is exposed in chapter 9.

HEIs of the countries analysed here have been exponentially engaging in other kinds of practices beyond public diplomacy that also have a direct impact in obtaining foreign policy goals as well as soft power objectives. HEIs and other national actors of the higher education sector have used knowledge and science as a means to represent their country, communicate the national interest and negotiate on behalf of

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[127] Efe Sevin, 'Understanding Soft Power through Public Diplomacy in Contrasting Polities', in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. by Naren Chitty and others (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 62–71 (p. 62).

[128] See Craig Hayden, *The Rethoric of Soft Power. Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Maryland, 2012); Sevin.

those they represent. Therefore, they use knowledge diplomacy and science diplomacy, where they become soft power agents in their own right and targeting the foreign policy goals inherent to their country of origin and regardless of the government in turn. The three cases exposed in this research shed more light on the processes these actors follow while using the tools of diplomacy.

In conclusion, to study the foreign policy context of NICs is essential in understanding their relationships with their neighbours and regions of interest. At the same time, the foreign policy postures and objectives are a guide to uncover the soft power subjects. The foreign policy also aids in defining the national interest and how higher education stakeholders intervene in attaining foreign policy objectives. Both the foreign policy contexts and the diplomacy mechanisms exposed here aid to explain how IHE produces soft power in NICs.

Before analysing the foreign policy of the three case studies, we need first to examine some of the basics of IHE. In the following chapter we explain the differences between IHE and *internationalisation of higher education*. We also present the framework of analysis proposed in the developed theory.

Chapter 4: International higher education

The creation of knowledge societies and the attainment of high levels of development in NICs is associated to their investment in higher education. Rapid changes in the global system have pushed countries to transform their higher education systems, making them fundamental to attract foreign direct investment, participate in transfer technology and promote innovation. In this context, IHE in NICs has been a cornerstone for the development of the higher education sector. IHE is an instrument to foster intercultural competence in the students, mutual understanding among societies and appreciation of cultural diversity. Also, in terms of research and development, universities and research centres have become fundamental to achieve sustainable development.

The purpose of this chapter is to help us to comprehend IHE, differentiating it with the practices that are particular to HEIs. We intend to provide a common ground by examining the motivations behind *internationalisation*, and the differences between governments and HEIs logics to internationalise. The objective is to also to understand the main concepts that will help us to construct a comprehensive framework of analysis that guides this study.

We begin by conceptualising IHE, differentiating it from the *internationalisation of higher education*. A discussion of the relationship between IR and international education follows. The next section analyses the national and institutional rationales for internationalisation, highlighting the governments and HEIs motivations to pursue internationalisation of higher education. Finally, this chapter

presents the elements of the framework of analysis for IHE and soft power.

4.1 Conceptualising IHE

The study of IHE is essential to understand how NICs wield soft power. A clarification of terminologies such as IHE, the *internationalisation of higher education*, cross-border or transnational education, and the newest concept International Programme and Provider Mobility (IPPM) is important if we are to grasp how the fields of IR and Education interact.

Education scholars describe international education as the study of higher education in its international and global context.[129] Globalisation intensifies the relations between the local and the international, allowing for new dynamics and increasing the interconnectedness between states, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, civil society and individuals.[130] Furthermore, globalisation gives way to economic interdependence and new communication technologies that revolutionised the way societies communicate around the globe. Globalisation also challenges the state boundaries, fostering the relations between social actors that take part in the international arena.[131] As a result, globalisation has increased the flow of people, culture, ideas, values, knowledge, technology and

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[129] Hans de Wit and Fiona Hunter, 'Un Momento Decisivo Para La Educación Superior International y El Proceso de Internacionalización', *International Higher Education*, 2014, 2–3 (p. 2). Theoretical education approaches label the study of higher education as a global phenomenon as international education. However, in this thesis international education will hereon be referred to as international higher education, for the purpose of distinguishing it from other levels of education.

[130] Kerr and Wiseman, p. 5.

[131] Bertrand Badie, 'Transnationalising Diplomacy and Global Governance', in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World. Theories and Practices2*, ed. by Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 406 (p. 86).

economy across borders, playing a crucial role in transferring higher education from a national and local concern to an issue of international analysis.[132] This context made higher education become a subject of global trends, with internal and external factors that influence the way IHE develops in different countries.

IHE is an Education sub-field of study that analyses the international developments in higher education at a systemic level. By contrast, *internationalisation of higher education* (henceforth referred to as *internationalisation*) and cross-border education are sub-categories of international education.[133] IHE is, thus, the study of the trends and features of higher education in the international arena. In comparison, *internationalisation* involves the planning, strategies, activities and outcomes of the global practices of HEIs. It is 'an intentional process undertaken by HEIs but its implications go beyond the domain of higher education and affect society at large'.[134]

We can trace the origins of IHE to the period before World War I. The creation of agencies and institutions such as the Institute of International Education (IIE) in 1919 in the US, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in 1925 and the British Council in 1934 detonated a global attention to international cooperation. Before World War I, institutions focused more on faculty exchange, shifting in the period

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[132] Jane Knight, 'Cross Border Tiertiary Education. An Introduction', in *Cross Border Tiertiary Education: A Way towards Capacity Development*, ed. by Stéphan Vincent-Lancrin (OECD and IBRD/The World Bank, 2007), pp. 21–46 (p. 23).

[133] de Wit and Hunter, p. 2.

[134] Giorgio Marinoni, *IAU 5th Global Survey -Internationalization of Higher Education: An Evolving Landscape Locally and Globally*, 2019, p. 22.

between wars to follow 'political rationales of peace and mutual understanding'.[135] After World War II, IHE had a slow growth as reconstruction in Europe decelerated the international exchanges and cooperation.

The early efforts of IHE focused on Europe, but the aftermath of the World War II drastically changed IHE. Peace and mutual understanding were still rationales for *internationalisation*, however 'national security and foreign policy were the real forces behind its expansion, and with it came government funding and regulations'.[136]

During the Cold War, the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States fostered the investment in science and technology, and with it the academic exchanges. In this period, developing countries were an important region to which developed countries could expand their economic and political power. Hence, these countries used development aid programmes for universities to engage with their regions of influence.[137]

More recently, the relations between countries have facilitated transactions that occur in the IHE environment. Through their foreign policy, countries interact with each other in different sectors such as politics, economics, culture and education. Instruments of foreign policy such as international treaties and conventions have had an impact on the way international

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[135] Hans de Wit and Gilbert Merkx, 'The History of Internationalization of Higher Education', in *The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education*, ed. by Darla Deardorff and others (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), pp. 43–60 (p. 47).

[136] de Wit and Merkx, p. 49.

[137] de Wit and Merkx, p. 51.

education has evolved. At the same time, the rationales have shifted from political to economic ones.

An example of this is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a treaty promoted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), addresses the education sector as one of the twelve services it regulates, setting the rules for the transnational delivery of higher education. The impact of GATS in higher education is significant. It defines four ways in which countries can trade a service. This is also known as 'modes of supply'. These include cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural persons, and each one of them has an impact on IHE. For instance, we can link cross-border supply to distance education and virtual universities; consumption abroad to students that pursue a degree in a country different than their nationality; commercial presence to branch campuses, twinning partnerships and franchising agreements with local institutions; and presence of natural persons to the mobility of faculty.[138]

Cooperation and diplomacy were some of the first drivers for international education. They served as the foundations of IHE. They dominated its agenda by setting the motivations for approaching strategic countries through education and cultural exchanges, to promote the national interest, culture and values. During the cold war, this strategy was seen as part of the propaganda of a country, to promote its values within foreign publics of Western/Soviet blocs. With the rapid

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[138] Jane Knight, 'Trade in Higher Education Services: The Implications of GATS', *The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, UK*, 2002, 1–25 (p. 5).

expansion of globalisation, the appearance of new actors and the technological advances, IHE evolved in such a way that currently the IHE agenda is no longer dominated by governments alone.

The direction that IHE took in developed countries differs from that in developing countries. In developed countries, the main objectives that IHE pursued were the expansion of their cultural imperialism, the provision of foreign aid to improve their image, and the recruitment of self-financed international students. By contrast, developing countries see IHE as a means to attract development aid, to foster the development of human capital through international scholarships, and attract self-financed international students.[139]

Since the end of the Cold War, the motivations behind countries embracing IHE have evolved. Developing countries do not emulate developed counties but respond to their contexts. Foreign policy and diplomacy play a more significant role in contemporary IHE. They have also evolved in NICs and play a significant role in their *internationalisation* strategies, especially when considering soft power.

This research argues that the foreign policy contexts of NICs, along with an understanding of their higher education systems, are factors that shape their IHE landscape. Without these two, the study of IHE and soft power of any country would lack the in-depth approach required to link motivations to outcomes.

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[139] Emmanuel Jean Francois, *Building Global Education with a Local Perspective. An Introduction to Glocal Higher Education* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 31–32.

Not only foreign policy and diplomacy have a crucial role in IHE, but they have a direct impact on the foreign relations of a country. International education brings a series of complex issues and implications for the foreign affairs agenda. IHE activities occurs almost organically with countries where there is an existing interaction. It is a tool commonly used to establish diplomatic relations, demonstrating good faith. Furthermore, bilateral or multilateral treaties that concern higher education are signed government-to-government in higher education and research areas, which facilitate *internationalisation* in the form of degree recognition, credit transfer, or scientific cooperation.

In the cultural sphere, governments use IHE to promote understanding between societies and mutual respect between people and civilisations. This is achieved when people have access to other cultures, and higher education provides the platform for that to occur. The foreign policy then becomes a framework for cultural exchange, facilitating collaboration in *internationalisation* activities. It allows students to acquire intercultural competencies where students move beyond their comfort zones and develop a new perspective of the world through self-reflection.[140]

IHE contributes to the changes in the higher education system at a national level. Countries can change their higher education system by introducing IHE policies, such as the ones conceived to increase the delivery of transnational and cross-

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[140] Jean Francois, pp. 20–21.

border education in the form of twinning programmes or branch campuses.

In domestic policy, IHE also has several implications since an increase of international students is also a matter of visas and immigration. The role of HEIs is evident here as they can influence the migration processes of a country. They are responsible for recruiting international students and act as counsellors and mediators for the migration processes or in the event of conflicting migration policies. Furthermore, since the international recruitment of faculty and students affects the immigration policies, HEIs have become key actors for governments in policy configuration, implementation and decision-making, acting as non-state actors sharing control of student migration.[141] Recruitment of international students and faculty as a feature of HEIs can create synergies with government immigration policies. Still, if these are not consistent and go in different directions, they can obstruct or de-accelerate the *internationalisation* process.

The practice of and openness towards IHE has a direct effect on the national society and culture. Higher education operates in a national education system, within a structure, functions and principles. This system guides higher education and implements the processes and practices of education outlined by the government. Since education is part of the culture of a society, it involves and affects society as a whole. Consequently, the governmental structures have a responsibility to set the orientation of education according to

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[141] Lucie Cerna, 'The Internationalisation of Higher Education: Three European Universities in Comparative Perspective', *Compas*, 2014, 1–26 (p. 6).

society's needs. Governmental and non-governmental structures manage the direction and goal of education, translating them into policies and implementing them through programmes and curricula.[142]

The national governments decide the aims and objectives of education. However, there are substructures for policy implementation in the territorial divisions of a country or local government. This scenario makes the landscape for the development of IHE more complicated. However, it also opens the discussion for the "glocality" of higher education, where international strategies of HEIs make a local impact, and local funding stimulates international activities on localised issues. Hence, the local also becomes an essential sphere for IHE.

4.2 *Internationalisation of higher education*

After this general discussion of IHE, a closer look at *internationalisation* is now pertinent. Although scholars of the Education field of studies have different understandings of the meaning of IHE and what it involves, there are more studies and literature that helps us to understand *internationalisation*. This feature of IHE is generally understood as positive and essential in the development of higher education. Scholars associate it with success in terms of 'research funding, international staff and student recruitment, and co-authorship with international research partners, which help to determine

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[142] Jean Francois, p. 5.

the position of HE institutions in influential global university rankings'.[143]

The firsts definitions appeared in the early 1990s and focused on the international activities conducted by HEIs. As follows, the globalisation and the rapid responses of HEIs made the term evolve. In 1994, Jane Knight introduced the most commonly used definition that described it as a process, where HEIs integrate the international and intercultural dimensions to the substantive functions of the institutions.[144] As this definition concerned mostly institutions rather than other actors that appeared in the *internationalisation* landscape, a broader definition was needed to include the national and sector levels, recognising the agency between governments and HEIs. The revised definition provided by Knight in 2008 is the following:

> Internationalisation at the national/sector/institutional levels is the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of higher education at the institutional and national levels.[145]

This definition implies that the practice of internationalising higher education is a matter of both governments and HEIs, evidencing the agency between both in constructing the IHE landscape of a country. In NICs and developing countries,

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[143] Monne Wihlborg and Sue Robson, 'Internationalisation of Higher Education:Drivers, Rationales, Priorities, Values and Impacts', *European Journal of Higher Education*, 8.1 (2018), 8–18 (p. 8).

[144] Jane Knight, 'Trade in Higher Education Services: The Implications of GATS', p. 3.

[145] Jane Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2008), p. 21.

governments assist in the *internationalisation* processes of HEIs as much as HEIs help in the attainment of the national goals portrayed in the foreign affairs agenda, as will be demonstrated in the case studies.

Some of the most common *internationalisation* practices of HEIs include internationalisation of the curriculum, of research, of teaching/learning and of services. Internationalisation of the curriculum involves the insertion of these dimensions into the curricular content of the degree programmes and courses, as well as in its learning outcomes, assessment, tasks, teaching methods and support services.[146] Internationalisation of research refers to the academic collaboration between researchers from different countries, which include the sharing or co-creation of knowledge and products such as joint publications. Internationalisation of teaching/learning involves the strategies in the teaching-learning process that include a multicultural vision and instructional strategies for collaborative learning between classrooms in different countries, commonly using virtual learning environments. Finally, the internationalisation of services refers to the inclusion of foreign faculty, staff and students, providing inclusive services that respond to the multiculturality of the campus.[147]

In addition to these, there is also another commonly used term: internationalisation at home. This kind of *internationalisation* emphasises the activities and strategies developed on campus to bring the international dimension to

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[146] Betty Leask, 'Internationalizing the Curriculum in the Disciplines-Imagining New Possibilities', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 17.2 (2013), 103–18 (p. 106).
[147] Jean Francois, p. 53.

those that are unable to move to other countries. Some ways to achieve internationalisation at home are through the integration of intercultural and international dimensions in the teaching/learning process adopting foreign models, such as Adaptative Learning Platforms, extracurricular activities, integration of foreign professors into campus and life activities, inbound student mobility, internationalisation of the curriculum, decolonisation of the curriculum, multilingualism, comparative research and liaison with the local community with an international scope.[148] Some of these internationalisation at home initiatives collide with the previously defined strategy. This is due to the research advancements by Education scholars.

Recent developments in the study of *internationalisation* have brought new terminology based on the strategies that HEIs follow, which have become trends in IHE. The term *comprehensive internationalisation* is one of them. In 2011, John Hudzik coined the term *comprehensive internationalisation*, which refers to the ways HEIs respond to the complex expectations of global connectedness in every sense for a better service to its students, stakeholders and society in general.[149] In short, *comprehensive internationalisation* aims to grant access to all institutional actors to the international, comparative and global content and perspective. HEIs expect that all the people, in their different levels and activities within the institution, will take

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[148] Jane Knight, 'Concepts, Rationales and Interpretive Frameworks in the Internationalization of Higher Education', in *The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education*, ed. by Darla Deardorff and others (London: SAGE, 2012), pp. 27–42 (p. 34); CBIE, *A World of Learning. Canada's Performance and Potential in International Education*, 2016, p. 24.

[149] John K Hudzik, *Comprehensive Internationalization* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 1.

part in the internationalisation efforts. The main goal is for *internationalisation* to become part of the ethos, values and missions of the institution. Hudzik's definition of *comprehensive internationalisation* is the following:

> Comprehensive internationalisation is a commitment, confirmed through action, to infuse international and comparative perspectives throughout the teaching, research, and service missions of higher education. It shapes institutional ethos and values and touches the entire higher education enterprise. Institutional leadership, governance, faculty, students, and all academic service and support units must embrace it. It is an institutional imperative, not just a desirable possibility.
>
> Comprehensive internationalisation not only impacts all of campus life but the institution's external frames of reference, partnerships and relations. The global reconfiguration of economies, systems of trade, research, and communication, and the impact of global forces on local life, dramatically expand the need for comprehensive internationalisation and the motivations and purposes driving it.[150]

In the first part of the definition, the focus is the HEIs, their communities and resources. More than a planning strategy, it has to become a reality by tangible actions. The second part of this definition opens the door to a discussion of the interplay between HEIs and their international, national and local

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[150] John K Hudzik, *Comprehensive Internationalization: From Concept to Action*, *NAFSA E-Publications*, 2011, p. 6.

contexts. It suggests that global and national environments are factors that influence *internationalisation*. From the Education field of study, the attention is on the *internationalisation* practices within the HEIs, and how these trends impact at a systemic level. However, the interest of this research is also on the policies, programmes and strategies set by official government bodies to enable HEIs and other actors to transform the IHE landscape, impacting in the soft power of the country.

Finally, cross-border, Transnational Education (TNE) and IPPM are the last concepts to explore within the IHE umbrella. Previously defined as transnational education, cross-border education is a term used for naming some activities that HEIs have adopted. The most recognised form is in the branch and international campuses that HEIs open abroad. In 2009, the Observatory of Borderless Higher Education (OBHOE) defined the concept of international campus as the activity of HEIs in foreign countries, where a partner institution or joint venture manages the campus. These venues grant its students with the degree of the foreign institution upon completion of the course requisites.

Nonetheless, cross-border education is more expansive than just international campuses. Cross-border education implies the movement of people, programmes, providers, curricula, projects, research and services through countries. It is a sub-section of *internationalisation* and part of the initiatives from the government or education sector.[151] This definition emphasises *cross-border education* as policy and legislation

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151 Jane Knight, 'Cross Border Tiertiary Education. An Introduction', p. 24.

need to be adjusted to allow or enable practices that trespass the geographical limits of countries. This feature was not apparent when using the term TNE. Cross-border education takes many different forms, such as joint and double degrees, twinning, franchise programmes and distance learning.[152]

In the year 2017, the British Council launched a report with the DAAD that included the clarification of terminology under transnational education, through which the term IPPM was introduced, arguably aiming to replace the cross-border and TNE terminologies. IPPM consists of both programme and providers that move across national borders to 'deliver higher education programmes and credentials to students in their home or neighbouring country instead of students moving to the country of the foreign higher education institution/provider for the full academic programme'.[153] This term is useful for this research since inbound and outbound student mobility, and internationalisation of research are both analysed as separate phenomena from the mobility of programmes and providers. Hence, the IPPM constitutes the fourth component of the framework of analysis.

This section has provided a general discussion on the relationship between IHE and IR, as well as a better understanding of the main concepts concerning IHE and internationalisation. The next section of this chapter explores the national and institutional rationales for *internationalisation*.

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[152] Rowan Bayne, Ian Horton, and John Radford, 'The Higher Education Context', in *The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education*, ed. by Darla Deardorff and others (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), pp. 1–25 (p. 11).

[153] Jane Knight and John McNamara, *Transnational Education: A Classification Framework and Data Collection Guidelines for International Programme and Provider Mobility (IPPM)* (British Council, DAAD, 2017), p. 1.

4.3 Rationales for *internationalisation*

Rationales are the motivations, drivers, logics and reasons behind *internationalisation* as promoted by nations and institutions and, when clearly articulated, they become the reasoning behind the decision-making process and investment in IHE. The policies, programmes and strategies implemented by governments and institutions eventually reflect such rationales. Rationales articulate the benefits or outcomes the stakeholders expect from the implementation of *internationalisation* strategies. Along with a clear rationale, there should be a set of objectives or policy statements, a plan and a system of monitoring or evaluation.[154]

There have been several studies that reveal the main rationales for *internationalisation* in different parts of the world. For instance, in 2003 the International Association of Universities (IAU) conducted its first Global Survey among its members, enquiring about HEIs *internationalisation* efforts. The report showed that the main rationales for *internationalisation* included the mobility of students and faculty, teaching and research collaboration, academic standards and quality, research projects, cooperation and development assistance, curriculum development, international and intercultural understanding, promotion of the institution, regional issues and integration, international student recruitment and diversification of income generation, among others.[155]

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[154] Jane Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization*, p. 25.

[155] Jane Knight, *Internationalization of Higher Education Practices and Priorities: 2003 IAU Survey Report* (Paris: IAU, 2003), p. 8.

The *internationalisation* rationales have changed since the first IAU survey. In its 5th Global Survey of 2019, the IAU found that enhancing international cooperation and capacity building, improving the quality of teaching and learning, and increasing awareness of global issues among students were the main benefits of *internationalisation*. Furthermore, the main internal drivers for internationalisation were institutional leadership and the empowering of the international office, while the external drivers were business and industry demand, demand for higher education institutions and government policy.[156]

Rationales have evolved according to push and pull factors inherent to higher education and the demands of a globalised world. As Knight observes, 'as internationalisation becomes more widespread and complex, a more nuanced set of motives is necessary'.[157]

In 2006, Naidoo argued that the main rationales that drive the mobility of students, programmes and institutions include 'the mutual understanding approaches which view student mobility as a means to enhance political, cultural and economic ties'.[158] For him, other rationales included skilled migration to benefit from brain gain, the increase of capacity building through *internationalisation* and cross-border education, and revenue generation as international students bring capital to the

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[156] Marinoni, pp. 25–26.

[157] Jane Knight, 'Concepts, Rationales and Interpretive Frameworks in the Internationalization of Higher Education', p. 32.

[158] Vikash Naidoo, 'International Education: A Tertiary-Level Industry Update', *Journal of Research in International Education*, 5.3 (2006), 323–45 (p. 3).

country. These rationales were observed in countries such as Germany, Malaysia and Australia.[159]

In 2008, Knight recognised the emerging importance of rationales at a national and institutional levels. At a national level, human resources development, strategic alliances, income generation and commercial trade, nation and institution building, social and cultural development and mutual understanding are the main rationales that follow the national interest. On the institutional level, the international branding and profile, quality enhancement and international standards, income generation, student and staff development, strategic alliances, and research and knowledge production are the rationales behind the *internationalisation* of HEIs.[160] In her research, Knight concluded that, regardless of the complexity of the rationales, it is essential that the governments and institutions clearly articulate their motivations for *internationalisation* and link their plans and strategies to the rationales.[161]

In the Netherlands, the agency Nuffic developed in 2009 an instrument in cooperation with national HEIs called MINT, to map the *internationalisation* efforts of the universities. The tool MINT has as objective to help HEIs to set up their *internationalisation* agendas. MINT observes seven objectives to internationalise higher education, including the development of international and intercultural competencies of students, development of general competencies, improvement

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[159] Naidoo, p. 333.

[160] Jane Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization*, p. 25.

[161] Jane Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization*, p. 29.

of the quality of education, continuity, maintaining an educational programme and funding, public service and reputation building.[162]

By 2012, Gacel-Ávila presented us with a summary of the main rationales for internationalising universities in Latin America, claiming that the main rationales include to improve student skills to live in a globalised world, to internationalise the curriculum and improve quality, and to strengthen research and knowledge capacity.[163]

A 2016 study performed in 400 European HEIs found that the institutions that participate in global rankings use *internationalisation* as a way to achieve prestige, for which the latter becomes a core rationale for internationanlising HEIs. Furthermore, the study showed that private for-profit HEIs are more likely to follow an economic rationale, and that HEIs that invest in research and knowledge production have a strongest view of the benefits of internationalisation of research.[164] The study concludes that 'the national contexts do not greatly affect HEIs' rationales, and the amount of resources is less important than the competition for resources'.[165]

Another analysis of 2016 situated soft power as a policy rationale for international education in the UK. The study focused on policy discourses from 1999 to 2013, particularly

[162] Adinda van Gaalen, 'Developing a Tool for Mapping Internationalisation: A Case Study', in *Measuring Success in the Internationalisation of Higher Education*, ed. by Hans de Wit (EAIE, 2009), pp. 77–91 (p. 84).

[163] Jocelyne Gacel-Ávila, 'Comprehensive Internationalisation in Latin America', *Higher Education Policy*, 25.4 (2012), 493–510 (p. 500).

[164] Marco Seeber and others, 'Why Do Higher Education Institutions Internationalize? An Investigation of the Multilevel Determinants of Internationalization Rationales', *Higher Education*, 72.5 (2016), 685–702 (pp. 695–98).

[165] Seeber and others, p. 685.

following the argument that international students are a global political soft power resource for the country. Using soft power as a rationale the analysis departs from the assumption that attracting a significant number of international students is beneficial for the UK as this increases its influence in global diplomacy because graduates appreciate more 'British values'. This way, they contribute to the UK's influence around the world. [166]The study concludes that the role of international graduates in the UK's soft power projection is rooted in assumptions that originated in America, just after the Cold War. Even if soft power is a government intended rationale to promote international higher education, to demonstrate the influence of international alumni is 'next to impossible to empirically prove'.[167] However, the study argues that the UK 'gains soft power through networks of influence and cultural attraction in a landscape of changing relationships between global powers, using its identity and reputation as a tool for public diplomacy'.[168]

To conclude, rationales could be articulated bottom-up or top-down, depending on the country's structure and internal and external factors.[169] In some cases, governments guide the path towards *internationalisation* following the national interest and rationales. In other instances, the IHE landscape of a country is the result of HEIs objectives and needs. Hence, HEIs lead the *internationalisation* processes. However, in most

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[166] Sylvie Lomer, 'Soft Power as a Policy Rationale for International Education in the UK: A Critical Analysis', *Higher Education*, 74.4 (2017), 581–98 (pp. 581–82).

[167] Lomer, p. 595.

[168] Lomer, p. 595.

[169] Jane Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization*, p. 27.

of the cases, there is a hybrid of rationales that drive the IHE of a country. Therefore, to associate the national with the institutional rationales could aid us to holistically look at the agency of governments and HEIs while they produce soft power through IHE.

4.4 Constructing the framework of analysis

As the theory of this thesis exposes, there are a variety of actors involved in IHE. Hence, we must acknowledge that, without the inclusion of actors other than governments, the analysis would be incomplete. The three types of actors (governmental, national – which includes HEIs –, and international) are responsible in different degrees for the soft power that is produced through IHE.

This section includes the participation of different actors in the four components that are part of IHE. These components are part of the framework for analysis. The framework was designed to uncover the ways NICs, and specifically, Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, transform their resources into soft power assets. At the same time, this framework serves to identify the elements of IHE that have been overlooked by current soft power literature.

The four components of IHE were selected considering, firstly, the three pillars of higher education, namely teaching and learning, research, and extension/cultural dissemination. Besides, these components are part of the framework for their role within the *internationalisation* landscape in NICs, as these are the most recurring in the three countries examined. The components of IHE are inbound student mobility, outbound

student mobility, internationalisation of research and international programme and provider mobility.

4.4.1 Inbound and outbound student mobility

International student mobility implies the movement of students across borders for academic purposes. The movement of students and faculty is one of the most important aspects of *internationalisation*. This phenomenon is particularly complex when considering the global level.[170]

The duration of student mobility can vary. Short term student mobility involves students enrolled as regular students in one HEI and travel to another institution located in a different country. The students from the sending institution are labelled by their home HEI as outbound students, while the international students enrolled at a host institution for one or more terms are known as inbound students. The purpose of this movement is two-folded: to conduct part of their studies abroad, seeking to obtain credits, or to make an academic visit where credit transfer is not involved, such as volunteer work, research stays and internships.

Usually, the short-term student mobility that seeks credit transfer materialises through an academic agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which most of the time involves a reciprocity clause that requires the sending institution also to receive students for the same amount of time and purpose. This is also known as student exchange. Additionally, the mobility programmes could be bilateral or multilateral, where more than two institutions are part of a

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[170] Bayne, Horton, and Radford, p. 7.

consortium. The primary purpose of this kind of student mobility is to conduct part of their studies at the host institution, receiving at the end a transcript for credit transfer. After completion of their studies, their home institution grants their degree. The length of this kind of mobility is short-term, meaning that usually, the maximum period of studies is one academic year. The other type of short-term student mobility involves participation in programmes such as language courses, summer programmes, or academic stays to conduct research.

Long term student mobility is a different category of movement of people. Here, individuals whose nationality is other than the county where they seek to conduct their studies enrol in a full time or part-time academic programme, seeking to obtain a degree. Such a degree could be granted by one or two institutions, this is known as joint or double degree programmes.

Through the examination of inbound and outbound flows of students, it is possible to identify national trends of student mobility. These flows help to identify the countries that are most attracted to the national higher education system. They are useful data upon which to make inferences on governmental policies, strategies and programmes. The examination of student flows and the foreign policy objectives uncovers the countries and regions of interest for IHE. However, to gather accurate data is challenging. Students are counted in different countries through different criteria; sometimes citizenship differentiate national from international students, and in some other cases international students are

only counted if they are enrolled in long-term mobility programmes.[171]

For the purpose of this research, student mobility, as a component of IHE, has been divided into two chapters. The purpose is to identify the governmental policies, programmes and strategies that target student mobility to and from strategic countries, identifying the mobility flows per country. At the same time, mobility flows can reveal the intervention of actors other than governments. Another aim of this component is to identify the connection between IHE and foreign policy, hence uncovering the relationship between IHE and soft power.

4.4.2 Internationalisation of research

Internationalisation of research refers to the international dimension of research, innovation and knowledge production. Hence, in this component of IHE, research, innovation and knowledge production are connected to foreign policy and soft power. Two diplomatic tools have become of importance in the past few years, where the connection between governments and HEIs is more evident. These are science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy. These two are particularly important in this component, and the use of them by national actors other than the government is more evident in their production of soft power. This thesis shows that the use of these diplomatic tools contributes to the soft power conversion abilities of the country. Also, ICD is a diplomacy tool worth looking at in this

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[171] Bayne, Horton, and Radford, p. 7.

component, as NICs seem to have a unique use of this tool of diplomacy to obtain the desired soft power objectives.

Through this component, it is showed that governments invest in research and development, science, technology, innovation and knowledge transfer through different policies, programmes and strategies. This component aims to identify the actors that intervene in the internationalisation of research and their use of diplomatic tools to transform their research resources into soft power assets.

4.4.3 International Programme and Provider Mobility (IPPM)

IPPM is a recently used term used by higher education scholars to study the mobility of national actors (such as HEIs) and their resources (such as programmes) across borders. As discussed above, IPPM includes franchise programmes, international branch campus, self-study distance education, partnership programmes, joint universities/colleges, and distance education with a local academic partner. The first three are independent activities, while the latter three are collaborative actions between HEIs/Providers.[172]

There are other two characteristics inherent to the movement of providers that the original British Council and DAAD classification of IPPM overlooked, both of which are found in NICs; international offices and international institutes opened by HEIs abroad.

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172 Knight and McNamara, p. 2.

The objective of this component is to identify how governments support the mobility of programmes and providers, and the responses from HEIs. If the governments lack these, the intervention of other actors will surface, showing in which ways other actors acquire soft power conversion abilities through IPPM, making use of the diplomatic tools. With this exercise, also the rationales for IPPM would be uncovered and related to the foreign policy objectives.

This research argues that there are governmental and non-governmental actors that become soft power agents through their use of diplomatic tools. If we are able to identify the tools they use to acquire soft power conversion abilities, then we can frame the scope of their soft power leverage. Also, the analysis of their resource allocation and actions in each the four components of IHE provide clarification on the scope of their participation in acquiring soft power gains in NICs.

This chapter analysed the main issues surrounding IHE. The latter includes the sub-division labelled as the *internationalisation of higher education*. Through *internationalisation*, Education scholars explain the outcomes of interactions among higher education actors and the motivations behind the governmental and institutional decision-making processes. This thesis argues that four components of IHE produce soft power in NICs, filling some of the gaps located in current soft power literature. A framework of analysis that includes the four components help us to deepen our understanding of how IHE becomes a soft power source in NICs. This framework includes inbound and outbound study mobility, internationalisation of research and

IPPM. However, other *internationalisation* strategies could also produce soft power, such as internationalisation at home.

The governmental and institutional rationales behind the *internationalisation* processes show that governments, HEIs or both can guide the international higher education agenda. The latter is specific to the higher education landscape of each country. In NICs, the rationales for international higher education can be driven top-down, bottom-up or horizontally between government and higher education stakeholders. This diversity of the decision-making process has different soft power implications, as is shown in chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.

The IHE landscape of NICs is responsive to domestic factors, such as the historical roots of the higher education system, the political organisation, ideologies and the administrative structures that support the system. Also, the foreign policy of countries helps us to identify the soft power subjects and to clarify the mechanisms by which IHE can become a soft power source. Next chapter explores the foreign policy of the three case studies as a way to understand the context and historical roots that explain the differences and similarities between each of the cases.

Chapter 5: Foreign policy contexts of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico

The previous chapters discussed the central understandings of soft power and IHE. However, it is also essential to understand the foreign policy of a country to identify the subjects of soft power, the agents that intervene and the ways the latter transform their resources into soft power assets. This chapter identifies the key elements of the foreign policy of each of the three states explored in the thesis. The aim is to make a brief review of their foreign policy from 2008-2018 to get a deeper understanding of the internal and external factors that guide their foreign policy and how these become central for their soft power aspirations.

The foreign policy objectives, postures and strategies exposed are central to their foreign policy agenda and its connections with student mobility, internationalisation of research and IPPM. Hence, this chapter intends to explain the foreign policy of each country as the basic scenario for the next four chapters.

This chapter discusses similar elements of foreign policy within the three case studies. By contrasting these elements, we can obtain more in-depth explanations of why IHE produces soft power in NICs. First, this chapter presents the foreign policy principles in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. This is followed by a discussion of the regional dynamics for each country, highlighting the importance these countries give to their regions of interest. Next, strategic bilateral relations are outlined, categorising them in two parts: with developing countries and with developed nations. The subsequent section

outlines the importance these countries place on multilateral relations. The last section presents a cross-case analysis, discussing the differences and similarities in the foreign policy contexts of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico.

5.1 Foreign policy principles and postures

Brazil's foreign policy is conceived as a public policy, which goal is to 'meet the needs of the population and target national interests, in addition to being inclusive, democratic and participatory'.[173] Brazil guides its foreign policy observing the ten principles expressed in Article 4 of the Constitution: national independence, the prevalence of human rights, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality between states, defence of peace, peaceful settlement of disputes, repudiation to terrorism and racism, cooperation between peoples for the progress of humanity, and concession of political asylum.[174] In addition to the foreign policy principles, the Constitution observes a unique paragraph which instructs the President to seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, in the quest to integrate a Latin American community of nations. With this prevision, Latin America becomes the central region for Brazil's foreign affairs.

Since the leadership of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010), Brazil has aspired to present itself as a country leader of the developing world as a way to gain significant weight in multilateral forums. This aspiration is connected to the political

[173] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Itamaraty', 2018 <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en> [accessed 3 January 2018].

[174] Senado Federal, *Constituição Da República Federal Do Brasil* (Brasilia: Coordenação de Edições Técnicas, 2016), p. 11.

sphere through the exercise of power, and the economic one by playing a significant role in the geography of international commerce.[175] The Brazilian government aspires to become the voice of the Global South, particularly in South America and Lusophone Africa, for which Lula's administration directed the foreign policy initiatives to these specific regions.

Socioeconomic development and the pursuit of peace are two of the interests located in Brazil's foreign policy.[176] Peace in the South American region detonated diverse integration mechanisms promoted by Brazil. The peaceful resolution of controversies with the neighbouring countries and the social and economic development became a defining strategy for its international relations. Subsequently, the social, economic and environmental development has been in the core of the Brazilian diplomatic discourse, making of Brazil a relevant actor in the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and a leading voice in the international arena concerning sustainable development.[177]

Malaysia's foreign policy is shaped by three factors; its strategic location in Southeast Asia, its attributes as a trading nation, and its multicultural demography.[178] The foreign policy is dictated in the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 of the MoFA. It delineates the foreign policy principles, such as respect for

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[175] Paulo Roberto De Almeida, 'A Diplomacia Regional Brasileira: Visão Histórica Das Últimas Décadas', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: IPEA, 2018), pp. 211–33 (p. 225).

[176] Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio and Kassius Diniz da Silva Pontes, 'A Estratégia de Inserção Internacional Do Brasil', in *Brasil e China: 40 Anos de Relações Diplomáticas*, ed. by Sergio Eduardo Moreira Lima (Brasília: FUNAG, 2016), pp. 125–42 (p. 133).

[177] Carvalho Lyrio and da Silva Pontes, pp. 135–36.

[178] Elina Noor and T. N. Qistina, 'Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Malaysian Foreign Policy', *Asian Security*, 13.3 (2017), 200–219 (p. 212).

independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit in relations.

These principles guide the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, ensuring continuity through time. The Strategic Plan also positions Malaysia as a bridge between races, nations and cultures. Furthermore, it conceives Malaysia in between the East and the West, the developed and the developing world, Islam and other religions. [179]

The Strategic Plan 2016-2020 outlines six strategic objectives: bilateral diplomacy, the strengthening of multilateral diplomacy, the strengthening of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the development of effective and efficient services to the MoFA's stakeholders and clients, the promotion of Malaysia abroad, the dissemination of information through public diplomacy, the strengthening of the institution and improvement of human capital.[180] Other main postures that have been preserved historically in Malaysia's foreign policy include the preservation of common goods, the development of the country into a knowledge economy (this is the Vision 2020), the advocacy for third world causes and sustainable development, and the relationship with the Muslim world.[181]

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[179] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2016-2020*, 2015, p. 8.

[180] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2016-2020*, p. 32.

[181] Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy. The First Fifty Years. Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 193.

Neutrality and non-interference have been historically significant in Malaysia's foreign policy.[182] These two postures are part of the country's relations with powerful countries, especially the US, the UK and China. The relationship with the UK is worthy of attention, as that country was a former coloniser of Malaysia. The UK keeps proximity with its former colonies through the Commonwealth, of which Malaysia is part. In addition to the Commonwealth, the bilateral relations with the UK regarding higher education have been closer than with any other country, as Malaysia has invited five UK universities to establish branch campuses in the country as part of Malaysia's attempt to become an education hub.

Finally, Mexico's foreign policy is guided by the country's privileged location, which might also be considered as burdensome. On the North, it shares its borders with the US, while the southern border connects Mexico with Central and Latin America. This geopolitical position makes of Mexico a country that strives to gain its place in the international system, making its foreign policy both active and reactive to the national and global contexts.

The Constitution of the country contains the principles by which the government must guide its foreign policy. These are the self-determination of peoples; non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries; peaceful settlement of disputes; the prohibition of threat or use of force in international relations; the legal equality of states; international cooperation for development; respect, protection and promotion of human rights, and the fight for global peace

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[182] Saravanamuttu, p. 93.

and security.[183] It is the role of the President of the country to guide the foreign policy observing these principles, and its executive arm to conduct the foreign policy is the Mexican *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores* (SRE).[184] Nevertheless, the appearance of other actors in the conduction of the foreign affairs has challenged the SRE to modify its role from executor to a coordinator one, especially in issues involving ICD.[185]

The Constitution elevates ICD as a foreign policy principle, giving it a prominent role within the foreign affairs of the country. ICD was added to the Constitution in 1988, its origins can be traced to the country's independence in 1821.[186] Since then, Mexico has both received and provided ICD, having a dual role.

The Constitution, the National Development Plan and the International Cooperation for Development Law (ICDL) are the foundations of the Foreign Policy Strategic Plan developed by the SRE. This normative framework allows for some continuity in the foreign policy, despite the political differences between the administrations of President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) and President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). Calderón belonged to a far-right party, while Peña Nieto's political party was centre-left. However, the main foreign policy objectives that appear in both documents include: to expand and strengthen the presence of Mexico abroad; to promote

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[183] Congreso de la Unión, *Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, *Diario Oficial de La Federación*, 2017, p. 296 (p. 83).

[184] In Mexico, the political organization of the country names the Ministries as *Secretariats*, but in order to provide clarity in this research the term Ministry was adopted. Hence, for the three countries examined here the same terminology of 'ministry' is used, when not using the Spanish acronym (SRE for the MoFA and SEP for the MoE).

[185] Gabriela Rodríguez Huerta, *México En El Mundo. Constitución y Política Exterior* (Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2017), p. 30.

[186] Rodríguez Huerta, p. 32.

Mexico's values in the world through the dissemination of its culture, tourism and economy; to reaffirm the country's commitment with democracy and free trade, capital mobility and productivity; and to protect the interests of Mexicans abroad and the rights of foreigners in the country.[187]

Additionally, the Strategic Plan 2013-2018 prioritises the prosperity of the country, the promotion of Mexico as an attractive destiny for visitors and investment and showcasing the values and culture of Mexico to gain the respect from other nations. It highlights the importance of 'the promotion of an inclusive and sustainable development, where cooperation, education and mobility of people and exchange of knowledge that contribute to increasing the quality of life of our society'.[188] Finally, it advocates for the strengthening of peace and security in the country and international system, as Mexico considers itself as an actor with global responsibility. Here, the political dialogue in bilateral and multilateral forums and the protection of the rights of Mexicans abroad are a requirement to reach foreign policy goals.

The three countries guide their foreign policy according to normative frameworks that respond to their historical contexts. The next sections briefly discuss some of the particularities of their foreign policy.

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[187] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 'Programa Sectorial de Relaciones Exteriores 2007-2012', *Diario Oficial de La Federación*, Primera Se.23 de enero de 2008 (2008), 26 (pp. 3–10); Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 'Programa Sectorial de Relaciones Exteriores 2013-2018', *Diario Oficial de La Federación*, Primera Se.13 de diciembre de 2013 (2013), 41 (pp. 9–11).

[188] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 'Programa Sectorial de Relaciones Exteriores 2013-2018', p. 10.

5.2 Regional dynamics

South America is Brazil's region of influence. In contrast, Central America and the Caribbean are under the sphere of influence of the US. [189] For this reason, South America is the platform Brazil uses to insert itself in the global economy and is the primary region for its external projection. Brazil's foreign policy postures incline the country to promote regional integration in South America. This has made Brazil establish itself as the leader of the *Mercado Común del Sur* (MERCOSUR), and the *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*.[190]

The Central American and Caribbean countries, although not of primary importance for Brazil, have gradually gained relevance for the country in the past ten years. Of particular importance is Haiti, which has a presence of Brazilian blue helmets at the UN since 2004 to preserve the security, political stability and promotion of the development of that country.[191]

At the same time, the Pacific Alliance, formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru has also acquired significance for Brazil as these countries are robust economies of the region and, more importantly, are not included in MERCOSUR. Brazil aspires to bring together MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance to form a cohesive and integrated project of South America.[192] Furthermore, the synergy between both organisations pursued during the administration of Michael Temer (2016-2018) responded to the country's ambition to expand its trade

[189] Almeida, p. 211.

[190] Carvalho Lyrio and da Silva Pontes, p. 128.

[191] Celso Amorim, *A Grande Estratégia Do Brasil: Discursos, Artigos e Entrevistas Da Gestão No Ministério Da Defesa (2011-2014)* (Brasília: FUNAG-UNESP, 2016), p. 176.

[192] Amorim, p. 176.

agreements to those countries, particularly Mexico, Peru and Colombia. These are strategic countries for Brazil for being three of the major economies in Latin America, with significant complementarity to Brazil.[193]

In the context of regional dynamics that the foreign policy of Malaysia pursues, the bilateral and multilateral relations with other East Asian countries is of primary importance to the country. During the 1980s, the government of Mahathir implemented the Look East policy to focus on the relations with the East instead of the West. The policy implied that Malaysia should emulate the newly industrialised economies of the East to achieve its development, as the Western way of development was exploitative and imperialistic. [194] The Look East policy included propaganda about the 'Japanese miracle', which was thought as the best model to emulate for its work attitude, ethics and skills.[195]

The Look East policy fostered the relations with the rest of the region, displacing the relationships with the West, including the UK. This strategy promoted the relations with neighbouring countries and the strengthening of ASEAN. Hence Asia, but especially the South-East of Asia, became priorities of Malaysia's foreign policy.

The regional relations that characterise the foreign policy of the country are with the immediate neighbouring countries. The relationship with Singapore, the southern neighbour of

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[193] Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, 'Palestra Magna - A Política Externa Brasileira', in *V Conferência Sobre Relações Exteriores. O Brasil e as Tendências Do Cenário Internacional*, ed. by Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima and Auguso W.M. Teixeira Júnior (Brasília: FUNAG, 2018), pp. 11–28 (p. 17).
[194] Saravanamuttu, p. 187.
[195] Saravanamuttu, p. 188.

Malaysia and a developed economy, has been fundamental in Malaysia's foreign policy. In recent years, the country has pursued the development of its southern regions, known as Iskandar Economic Region, or Iskandar Malaysia. The area comprises the city of Johor Bahru, which is a cross border town and is separated from Singapore by sea. In 2007, the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia signed a bilateral agreement to develop the area further, starting with the Nusajaya area, which hosts an industrial park, theme parks, a medical park, residences and an educational city. [196] The latter one is known as EduCity, and its construction was feasible because of this economic strategy, as Iskandar was due to attract investment from Singapore. The structure of EduCity envisioned hosting several foreign universities, starting with UK's Newcastle University. The bilateral relations with Singapore improved and had a significant economic impact, specifically the border town Johor Bahru. The Iskandar region is essential for attracting foreign capital, especially Chinese investment.[197]

The relationship with Indonesia is also vital to Malaysia as the neighbouring country is its second-largest foreign investor. The oil industry, plantations and banking are the sectors where Indonesia invests the most.[198] The two countries share a common culture, values, language and religion. These

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[196] Saravanamuttu, p. 249.

[197] Karminder S. Dhillon, 'Foreign Policy Priorities', in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia*, ed. by Meredith L. Weiss (New York, 2015), pp. 379–90 (p. 384).

[198] Khadijah Khalid, 'Malaysia's Foreign Policy under Najib. A Comparison with Mahathir', *Asian Survey*, 51.3 (2011), 429–52 (p. 445).

features make their bilateral relation complex in issues such as territory, leadership roles in the region, and immigration.[199]

Like Malaysia, Mexico also considers its neighbours of vital importance for its foreign policy. Economically, Mexico is more integrated with the Northern countries of the American continent, while the culture and Hispanic heritage connect it to the Latin American community. For this, Mexico distinguishes its foreign policy between bilateral relations and regional relations by geographical area, designing its foreign policy according to its interests and connections that are particular for each region in the continent, but as well with the rest of the world.

Integration with the Northern neighbours is the primary importance of Mexican foreign policy, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides the basis for economic integration and the creation of a region of knowledge. With the southern neighbours, Central America and Latin America and the Caribbean are of priority in the Mexican foreign affairs agenda. The countries of these regions have been the leading receivers of the ICD offered by Mexico. The ICDL gives particular relevance to the relationships with both regions, to the extent that it places them as the priority in the implementation of the International Cooperation for Development Programme (ICDP).[200]

The Strategic Plan 2013-2018 confers Central America, Latin America and the Caribbean a prominent place in the foreign

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[199] Dhillon, p. 383.

[200] Congreso de la Unión, *Ley de Cooperación Internacional Para El Desarrollo*, *Diario Oficial de La Federación* (Mexico, 2011), Pᴿᴵᴹᴱᴿᴬ Sᴇ, 29–37 (p. 34).

affairs agenda, elevating the relations with Central America as strategic ones. [201] This recognition given by both the ICDL and the Strategic Plan to Central America, Latin America and the Caribbean is traduced to targeted programs and strategies set by the Mexican International Cooperation for Development Agency (AMEXCID), particularly for the 2013-2018 period, under the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto.[202]

Furthermore, with Latin America and the Caribbean, the AMEXCID pursues higher education initiatives to strengthen its relations with the region. AMEXCID finances projects that enhance their institutional capacities in higher education, innovative education, and bilingual and intercultural education, to name a few.[203] AMEXCID coordinates its efforts with the *Secretaría de Educación Pública* (SEP), the Ministry of Culture and other HEIs.[204] The country has several educational and cultural cooperation projects with different countries in the area, holding several bilateral reunions to create or evaluate cooperation programmes in education and culture through AMEXCID.[205]

5.3 Bilateral relations: The Global South and South-South cooperation

Brazil frames under South-South cooperation its engagement with developing countries, which we can trace back to the

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[201] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 'Programa Sectorial de Relaciones Exteriores 2013-2018', p. 16.

[202] AMEXCID is the executing arm of the SRE, and the agency that wields the country's soft power.

[203] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2017* (Ciudad de México, 2017), p. 33.

[204] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2017*, p. 34.

[205] AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018* (Ciudad de México, 2018), p. 35.

1960s. The government has made strategic use of South-South cooperation to advance its economic and political interests and the country's soft power. This was evident in the foreign policy of President Lula (2003-2010) where foreign policy promoted economic development while reduced the vulnerabilities from abroad.[206] Brazil announced South-South cooperation in Latin America to counterbalance North-South postures, but as well to establish a 'consensual hegemony' to regain the support of the region for Brazilian's international initiatives.[207] Furthermore, the leadership of Brazil in South America, even if only an aspiration, was tied to the strategy to compromise national resources to technical assistance without reciprocity.[208]

Brazil considers both South America and Africa as priorities for its South-South cooperation activities, particularly in areas of agriculture, health and social programs. This has made those countries frequent allies of Brazil in diverse debates in multilateral forums.[209]

The relationship with African countries acquired the status of priority and a state's policy during the administration of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and continued by Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018). [210] The relationship with Lusophone countries and those African countries that

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[206] Robert Muggah and Eduarda Passarelli Hamann, 'Brazil ' s Generous Diplomacy : Friendly Dragon or Paper Tiger ?', *International Development Policy | Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement*, 2012, 1–10 (pp. 2–3).

[207] Muggah and Passarelli Hamann, p. 3.

[208] Almeida, p. 228.

[209] Carvalho Lyrio and da Silva Pontes, p. 137.

[210] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, *Cooperaçao Brasileira Para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: Levantamento 2014-2016* (Brasília, 2018), p. 107.

share their historical roots with Brazil are priorities of ICD and South-South cooperation. Mainly as the Portuguese empire transported Africans slaves to Brazil. Hence, these countries share history and heritage. For these reasons, Africa is a strategic region for Brazil, as the identity of the country cannot be conceived without the African roots its population shares.

During Lula's administration, the relationship with Africa was more proactive than the one conducted under the previous administration. Lula visited twenty-three African countries, and his minister of foreign affairs visited thirty-four.[211] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty*), framed the relationship with African countries under solidarity and identity, as some Brazilians are African descendants.[212] Furthermore, through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) financial allocations were increased continuously, going from US$ 524,000 in 2003 to US$20 million in 2010.[213] With it, the number of cooperation projects and the African partners increased, especially in the areas of agriculture, biotechnology and public health.[214]

Overall, South-South cooperation with Africa was sought for national motives (shared African roots which evoked sentimentalism, identity and solidarity among Brazilians) but also for a particular aspiration of Lula's administration. The first one was to enhance Brazil's bargaining power in international negotiations through bandwagon strategies. The

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[211] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 83.

[212] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 103.

[213] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 84.

[214] Mauro Vieira, 'Apresentação', in *Quarenta Anos Das Relações Brasil-Angola: Documentos e Depoimentos*, ed. by Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Luna and Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos (Brasília: FUNAG, 2015), pp. 9–11 (p. 10).

second one was the reform of the international order, namely the UN's Security Council (UNSC), of which Brazil seeks a permanent seat.[215] The new South-South linkages propelled the country's ambition to have a more robust international role.

A 'new agenda´ implemented by Lula included a strong relationship with Africa. This new agenda sought South-South solidarity in the cooperation with African countries. In addition, the new agenda allowed Brazil to provide technical assistance to African countries, contributing to their development. Africa was considered a priority, as the strategic partnership with African countries would make them an ally in international negotiations.[216]

Of the African countries, Angola has particular importance to Brazil as the latter was the first country in the world to recognise Angola's independence in 1975. Furthermore, Angola played a cornerstone for the formulation and success of Brazil's foreign policy on the African continent.[217] The history, language and culture that strengthen the bilateral relationship are accompanied by the development aspirations and challenges faced by both countries. In economic matters, Brazilian companies have established themselves in Angola, and vice versa. The bilateral relation also evolves in themes such as defence, government, social development, health and education.[218]

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[215] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 83.

[216] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 110.

[217] Vieira, p. 9.

[218] Vieira, p. 10.

In the case of Malaysia, South-South cooperation is a strategic objective of the country's foreign policy, and multilateral relations also have relevance as the government has pursued an active role in the UN and other international conferences. South-South cooperation is mainly envisioned in the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP), whose goal is to increase the country's global reputation.[219] This programme is designed to 'share its development experiences and expertise with other developing countries'.[220] The MTCP is part of a strategy to promote and project the national ethos and image of the country abroad and to stimulate Malaysia's political economic and strategic interest through a coherent plan of action.[221] As opposed to Brazil, Malaysia provides South-South cooperation through a list of projects publicised on its website, not by demand. Under training, Malaysia offers more than 50 programmes in 10 areas of expertise.

Malaysia does not have an agency dedicated to international cooperation for development. Instead, through the MTCP Malaysia promotes technical collaboration among developing countries. In such a programme, the government of Malaysia engages with HEIs as the MTCP offers training programmes provided by universities and research centres in Islamic issues. For instance, the Malaysian International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance offers a course on Fintech and Data Science for Islamic Finance through the MTPC.[222] In this

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[219] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2016-2020*, p. 9.

[220] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Malaysia Technical Cooperation Program', 2019 <http://mtcp.kln.gov.my/> [accessed 6 March 2019].

[221] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2016-2020*, pp. 36–38.

[222] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Malaysia Technical Cooperation Program'.

way, the government of Malaysia fosters the engagement of universities in foreign affairs and in issues that are of national interest. The recognition of Malaysia as a country where training in Islamic finances is offered as a part of a South-South cooperation programme gains it a voice within other Islamic developing countries.

Additionally, up to 2018, the MTCP offered scholarships for masters and doctoral degrees to selected countries. The MTCP programmes have a list of 144 priority countries, beginning with ASEAN countries, then West Asia, South Asia and the Pacific Islands. However, MTCP opens the programmes to third world countries around the world. Up to 2018, Malaysia had more than 50 programmes and ten areas of expertise where HEIs took part.[223] This way, the government of Malaysia opens the space for HEIs to participate in South-South cooperation. As opposed to Brazil and Mexico, research is not involved in ICD in Malaysia. The absence of an ICD agency suggests that Malaysia has a different understanding of how ICD produces soft power, and of the role of IHE in it.

Mexico is a particular case in the international system in terms of ICD, as the country is both a recipient and a donor, with a Law (ICDL), a Programme (ICDP) and an executing body (AMEXCID).[224] South-South cooperation, horizontal cooperation and triangular cooperation are three of the most important aspects of the Mexican ICDP that AMEXCID coordinates. In the three, the higher education sector is actively involved. South-South and horizontal cooperation

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[223] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Malaysia Technical Cooperation Program'.

[224] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016* (Ciudad de México, 2016), p. 33.

include scholarships, privileging Central American, Latin American and Caribbean students. Triangular cooperation strengthens the ties of Mexico with other powerful nations and strategic partners. Through triangular cooperation, Mexican HEIs get involved in knowledge transfer and training of developing countries jointly with other developed countries. AMEXCID maintains strategic alliances with three particular countries which have collaborated in the strengthening of the AMEXCID itself and the country's capacities for ICD. These are the US through its cooperation for development agency USAID, Germany through GIZ, and Japan through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

AMEXCID coordinates the Mexican ICD, where other actors such as HEIs and research centres provide their expertise in specific projects. Some of the flag programmes of AMEXCID are presented in more detail in the next chapters.

5.4 Bilateral relations: the developed countries

Even if South America, Latin America and Africa are the priority regions for Brazil, the country has also pursued a relationship with developed countries, such as the European countries, the US and Japan. This diversification of the Brazilian relations widens its cooperation horizons and reinforces its dialogue capabilities in defence of its interests.[225]

Since 2008, with the government of Lula da Silva, Brazil pursued a strategic partnership with the European Union (EU),

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[225] Carvalho Lyrio and da Silva Pontes, p. 137.

which involves a series of strategies including commerce, climate change and human rights. This relationship was part of an initiative of new activism of Brazil in the international arena, albeit it was a slow process of building a bilateral agenda.[226] This strategic partnership envisioned further proximity in the fields of academic cooperation, science and technology.

The bilateral relations with Portugal are also crucial for the country, as the latter was its former colonial power. The relationship with other developed countries, such as the US and those in Western Europe, also is essential for Brazil. Notably, the partnership with those countries in areas of education, science, technology, and innovation are considered as relevant to impulse the competitivity of the Brazilian economy.[227]

The bilateral relationship with the US is also relevant in the foreign policy portfolio of Brazil, albeit it is one of the most controversial ones in the different administrations analysed here. For the administration of Lula (2003-2010), which was framed in the discourse of alleviation of poverty, sustainability and approaching to the third world through South-South cooperation, the relationship with the US was tense and divided the public opinion between pro-Americans and anti-Americans.[228] A change in the posture of the US due to the

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[226] Miriam Gomes Saraiva, 'As Relações Com a União Europeia (2008-2015)', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: IPEA, 2018), pp. 273–98 (p. 294).

[227] Moreira Lima, p. 20.

[228] Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo, 'As Relações Com Os Estados Unidos (2008-2015)', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: FUNAG, 2018), pp. 301–31 (pp. 302–5).

emergence of the group BRICS (Bazil, Rusia, India, China and Suth Africa), from engaging to criticising them, also shifted Brazil's posture towards the US. Also, the US, under the administration of Obama in 2011, did not recognise the emergent economies as a bloc, labelling the BRICS as propaganda.[229]

The bilateral relations with Japan have their roots in the massive immigration of Japanese people to Brazilian territory after World War II. However, Japanese immigration to Brazil has more than 100 years of history. In Brazil, the cultural identity of the country is built on the fusion of 'three races', the union of the Back, White and Indian. Since Japanese migrants do not pertain to any of those races, they are excluded from the traditional Brazilian image.[230] Nippon-descendants are often called Japanese or Japanese of Brazil, even if they feel Brazilian.[231] The third generation of the Japanese diaspora is the most numerous one, corresponding to 41% of Nippon-Brazilians. [232]

The relationship between Japan and Brazil has also been developing through ICD, where the JICA has set strategies in the areas of formation of human resources, research in agriculture and industry, and triangular cooperation specifically with African countries. Through ICD research institutions of both Japan and Brazil develop joint research to promote the resolution of global problems through science and

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[229] Soreanu Pecequilo, p. 311.

[230] Candice Sakamoto Souza, 'Um Japão No Brasil: Heranças de 100 Anos de História', in *Ensaios Sobre a Herança Cultural Japonesa Incorporada à Sociedade Brasileira* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2008), p. 260 (p. 49). Since Italians are considered White, the Italians that immigrated after World War II were more easily included in the Brazilian imaginary.

[231] Interview 18 USP.

[232] Sakamoto Souza, p. 50.

technology, mainly focusing on environment, food and health areas.[233]

The relationship of Malaysia with the developed world is different than that of Brazil. Malaysia's foreign policy has a strong posture of neutrality not only for the country but as well for the South East of Asia, and there was a decisive call to exclude the foreign powers from the region.[234] Despite pursuing a strong relationship with Asia, the government has managed to establish relations with the US that would favour the country to turn to a developed nation. However, these relations with the US balance the relationships with China for its investment and trade.[235] During Najib's administration (2009-2018), the foreign policy seemed to give some preference to the relationship with China rather than the rest of Asia.

Furthermore, even though Japan was of high importance to the first period of Mahathir's administration, who saw in Japan an example of economic development, Najib turned to China for the financial investing and did not pursue a strong relationship with Japan. The Look East policy that preferred Japan over other nations on Mahathir's era did not seem to find an echo in Najib's policies. Although Najib pursued a closer relationship with China, Korea became the model of development that Najib was more attracted to, as opposed to Japan. Korea was attractive to Najib because of its foreign

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[233] JICA, *50 Anos de Cooperação Brasil-Japão* (Brasilia, 2009), p. 8.

[234] Saravanamuttu, p. 119.

[235] Noor and Qistina, p. 203.

investment, technology transfer, smart nuclear technology and renewable energy.[236]

Malaysia, under Najib's rule (2009-2018), pursued a strong relationship with China that was economical in principle. However, Malaysia also seeks balance in its relationships with great powers. With this in mind, Malaysia also pursued a relationship with the US. The US-Malaysia relations have been historically complicated regarding the Islam issues and the US support for Israel. Despite this, it has been argued that Najib and Obama wanted to work on deepening and broadening the bilateral relation and strategic cooperation, which was crystallised on the several cabinet visits both governments had, as well as Obama's visit to Malaysia in 2014.[237] In more recent years, the US has involved itself in the investigation of the corruption scandal of 1MDB and supported the release of Anwar Ibrahim, which was considered by Malaysians as direct interference for domestic affairs.[238] These issues have made tense the bilateral relation.

Mexico's relations with the developed world begin with the proximity with the US and Canada. This privileged geographical position also influences Mexico's relationship with other developed countries. Mexico has its main commercial partners in the US and Canada; hence the relationship with them is fundamental for the prosperity of the country. The economic integration with both countries through the NAFTA is essential for the attainment of Mexico's foreign policy objectives. Mexico's exports to the US are 80% of the total

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[236] Khalid, p. 448.

[237] Noor and Qistina, p. 206.

[238] Noor and Qistina, p. 201.

and buys about 50% of its imports from that country.[239] This makes Mexico's interdependence with the US a vulnerability in its foreign affairs agenda. This interdependence is not only in the commercial balance. Still, it is also reflected in issues such as foreign debt, oil and energy, foreign direct investment, entwined with other issues such as security, environment and migration.

In particular, migration is an essential element of the bilateral foreign affairs agenda with the US. The mapping of the relations with the US would not be complete without acknowledging this issue. The US is the place of residence for many Mexicans, and Canada is the second country with most quantities of Mexicans abroad.[240] This places the US and Canada as strategic partners of Mexico.

The bilateral relations with other developed countries are also crucial as the government attempts to diversify its relations and strives not to be as dependent of the US, mainly since Trump took the presidency of the US in January 2017. The EU and the bilateral relations with many of its members such as the UK, Spain, Germany and France are important for Mexico's foreign affairs. The language and culture inherited from Spain characterise the Mexico-Spain relationship, as the latter was its coloniser. In particular, the relations with Germany, France and the UK are strengthened by cooperation in education and knowledge exchange. The countries and organisms within the

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[239] Miguel Ángel Corona Jiménez, 'Hacia Una Relación Equitativa, Sustentable y Estratégica Entre México y Los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica', in *Las Relaciones México-Estados Unidos En La Coyuntura Actual*, ed. by Mario Miguel Carrillo Huerta (Puebla: Instituto de Ciencias de Gobierno y Desarrollo Estratégico, BUAP. Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, 2017), pp. 21–32 (p. 25).

[240] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 'Programa Sectorial de Relaciones Exteriores 2013-2018', p. 14.

EU are for Mexico a strategic space of action, particularly the economic bloc of the EU that represents the second commercial partner of Mexico.[241]

Furthermore, the SRE and AMEXCID have systematised the participation of the higher education sector in the foreign policy through the initiative Dual Years. These are celebrated between Mexico and a strategic country for Mexico, creating strategic alliances. In 2015, the government of Peña Nieto installed the first Dual Year Mexico-UK. Throughout the year, the governments of both countries created an ambitious programme of 110 activities in three sectors. The sectors involved were arts and creative industries; commerce, investment and tourism; and education, science and innovation, attracting audiences of the UK from cities such as London, Oxford, Cardiff, Manchester, Liverpool and Edinburgh.[242] The celebration of the Dual Year Mexico-UK had a vital element of soft power that included culture and higher education as instruments to attract foreign audiences, in particular the public of the UK and its higher education system. This is the first systematised effort of the SRE and, in particular of AMEXCID, to bring together the culture, education and economic sectors to wield Mexican soft power with a targeted country.

The government launched a second dual year in 2016 with Germany. The Dual Year Mexico-Germany 2016-2017 had as purpose the strengthening of the bilateral relation of the two countries through the political dialogue and the celebration of

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[241] SRE, *2do Informe de Labores 2013-2014* (Ciudad de México, 2014), p. 64.

[242] Gobierno de la República, *Programa de Cooperación Internacional Para El Desarrollo 2014-2018. Logros 2015* (Ciudad de México, 2015), p. 32.

cultural projects and events as well as those scientific and academic.[243] The governments hosted 523 activities in the sectors of commerce, investment and tourism; education, science and innovation, and art and creative industries.[244] The dual years as a Mexican strategy evidence the presence of the higher education sectors in the foreign policy agenda.

5.5 Multilateral relations

Brazil's multilateral relations have as priority MERCOSUR. Created in 1990, MERCOSUR is the most relevant initiative of Brazil for its insertion in the global markets. Commerce flows between the member countries characterised the first decade of MERCOSUR, representing up to 17% of the total of the Brazilian exports. MERCOSUR entered in crisis in 1999, following the crisis in Argentina and Brazil.[245] President Lula da Silva was the most enthusiastic advocate of MERCOSUR and proposed its reform to transform it into a zone of common policies regarding industries, agriculture, commerce, but most importantly of science, technology, education and culture.[246] Nevertheless, the process of regional integration lost its momentum, and by 2018 it represented less than 10% of Brazilian exports due to the industrial protectionism of Brazil and Argentina.[247]

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[243] AMEXCID, 'Año Dual México-Alemania', 2016
<https://www.gob.mx/amexcid/articulos/alemania-se-vale-enamorarse-de-mexico> [accessed 14 August 2018].

[244] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2017*, p. 37.

[245] Almeida, p. 215.

[246] Almeida, p. 219.

[247] Sergio Augusto De Abreu e Lima and Edison Da Silva Filho, 'A Agenda Da Política Externa Brasileira No Período Pós-Crise: Uma Análise Crítica', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: IPEA, 2018), pp. 25–38 (p. 37).

The BRICS is another multilateral forum of importance in Brazilian foreign policy. In 2006, Jim O'Neil created the acronym BRIC to denominate a group of countries that appear to have development potential in the decades to come. They had a vast population, extensive geography, and high rates of net income. The group initially had Brazil, Russia, India and China as members. South Africa was included in 2010 to what now is known as BRICS. In 2016, the BRICS accounted for 25% of the global economy, and almost half of the population of the planet. In the future, most of the global youth will live in a megacity located in a BRICS country.[248]

From its creation, Brazil introduced the BRICS in the core of its foreign policy strategy.[249] The most evident connection between the BRICS and higher education is reflected in the inclusion of academic cooperation education, and cooperation in science, technology and innovation in diverse topics such as energy and agriculture in the agenda of the BRICS summits, celebrated since 2009.[250]

The participation of Brazil in BRICS gained the country international recognition for its development. It also gained Brazil recognition as a middle power within the region and beyond. The development of the country and the earned international reputation is deeply rooted in the country's investment in science, technology and innovation.

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[248] Anna Jaguaribe, 'Brasil e China: Novos Desafíos e Dinñamicas de Cooperação Em Ciência e Tecnologia', in *Brasil e China: 40 Anos de Relações Diplomáticas*, ed. by Sergio Eduardo Moreira Lima (Brasília: FUNAG, 2016), pp. 103–24 (p. 107).

[249] Rogério de Souza Farias, 'O Brasil e a OMC (2008-2015)', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: IPEA, 2018), pp. 103–33 (p. 108).

[250] Renato Baumann, 'O BRICS: Desafios Para o Brasil', in *Politica Externa Brasileira Em Debate. Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção International No Pós-Crise de 2008*, ed. by Walter Antonio Desiderá Neto and others (Brasília: IPEA, 2018), pp. 167–87 (pp. 170–74).

Furthermore, BRICS was created with the fundamental objective to influence global governance, including in its agenda summits with the Ministries of Science and Technology, Agriculture, Environment, and Culture.[251] This demonstrates that BRICS in the foreign policy agenda of Brazil gives relevance to 'soft' topics such as IHE and research, rather than only including commerce and finance.[252] The summit of the Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation of BRICS in 2015 created the '*Universiade em Rede*' (University Network), which is seen as a possible major contributor to the *internationalisation* of Brazilian Universities.[253]

Another multilateral organisation of vital importance for Brazil is the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). The CPLP was created in 1996, and its current members are Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Timor-Leste. From 2016 to 2018, Brazil held the presidency of the CPLP. During this term, the theme selected by the country was 'CPLP and the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development', discussing the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDGs) and approaching the CPLP to the global agenda.[254] This overlap between the Agenda 2030 of the UN and the agenda of CPLP is coherent as well with the

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[251] Baumann, p. 176.

[252] This shows the government's intentionality to use R&D, science and technology as part of the multilateral agenda with the BRICS. However, Brazilian scientific collaboration is not necessarily shaped to follow the rest of the BRICS.

[253] Kenneth Felix Haczynski, 'BRICS: De Fortaleza a Goa', *Cuadernos de Política Exterior*, 11–4.2 (2016), 29–55 (p. 41).

[254] Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, 'A Presidência Brasileira Da CPLP (2016-2018)', in *A Presidência Brasileira Da CPLP (2016-2018)*, ed. by Luís Henrique Sobreira Lopes, Fernando Figueira de Mello, and Maria Lima Kallás (Brasília: FUNAG, 2018), pp. 17–64 (p. 17).

foreign policy objectives of Brazil, and the role of the country as an advocate for sustainable development.

Finally, Brazil has been an active member of the UN. It was a founder member of the organisation, and participant of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the UNSC. In San Francisco, the great powers of the time considered Brazil as a possible permanent member of the UNSC. Since then, Brazil has been elected as a non-permanent member ten times, surpassed only by Japan who has been elected eleven.[255] During the military government from 1969-1987, Brazil limited its participation in the UNSC.[256] Brazil's role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC and the active involvement that the country has had in the UN reflects the success of Brazilian multilateral diplomacy in the system, for which its prolonged diplomacy tradition has gained the country international reputation and a voice within the developing countries.

Brazil has further aspirations in the UNSC and has tried to gain a permanent seat. The country has grouped with Germany, Japan and India in the G4 to promote its image abroad, as each country shares the same aspirations. Critical approaches consider that Brazil needs to gain strength within developing countries, particularly in Latin America, as well as the permanent members, to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC.[257]

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[255] Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, *O Brasil e as Nações Unidas* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2013), p. 91.

[256] Sardenberg, p. 95.

[257] NATO, 'Brazil's Permanent Seat on the UNSC', 2015 <http://natoassociation.ca/brazils-permanent-seat-on-the-united-nations-security-council/> [accessed 23 November 2019].

For Malaysia, ASEAN is the leading organisation through which it conducts its multilateral relations. However, Malaysia also places particular importance to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Islamism is an essential element of Malaysia's multicultural society, and at the same time is a flagship of its foreign policy. After the terrorist attacks to New York's Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, Malaysia subscribed initially to the counterterrorism policy of the United States. Still, the global war against terrorism was an issue of foreign policy not only for Malaysia but for other Islamic states. The definition of the concept of terrorism was a problematic one. Under the auspices of the OIC, the 2002 conference was organised in Kuala Lumpur. On such meeting, the members did not agree on the Western definition of terrorism, nor did they agree on the issue of 'suicide bombing'.

Additionally, some of the detentions that occurred under Malaysia's Internal Security Act (ISA) were said by the US government to have a connection with the authors of the 9/11 attacks. As a consequence, the US issued travel warnings making Malaysia one of the Islamic countries for tourists to avoid.[258] However, Mahathir urged the US government not to seek retaliation, and invited Westerners to explore Malaysia as a 'model Islamic state'.[259] The ISA and the adherence of the war on terrorism done by the Mahathir's government were criticised domestically for the cooperation showed by the government with the United States, which was distant from the anti-hegemonic pro-South foreign policy posture of the

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[258] Saravanamuttu, p. 225.

[259] Andrew Humphreys, 'Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy: Winning "hearts and Minds" or Legitimising the Political Status Quo?', *Kajian Malaysia*, 28.1 (2010), 21–52 (p. 29).

past.[260] Despite these facts, Malaysia's foreign policy since 2001 included the promotion of Islamism in the world. The adherence to the OIC helped Malaysia to build a positive reputation among the Islamic world.[261]

In short, in the aftermath of 9/11, Malaysia focused on becoming a leader of the Muslim world, making statements to disassociate Islam from terrorism, and promoting a moderate Islamic state as an antidote to extremism.[262] The version of a moderate Islamic state was conceived as *Islam Hadhari* or 'civilisation Islam'. This posture was also in tune with the position of Malaysia as leader of the OIC and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in a world that was marked by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

In more recent years, Islamism is still is an integral part of Malaysia's foreign policy, although other issues have risen to be relevant for the country. This was due, in part, to the changing national political landscape, as well as the electoral attitudes.[263] The toning down of the Islamic discourse responded to domestic electoral issues rather than a change in the international context.

The multilateral relationships with other Muslim states were also crucial for Najib as trade and investment from countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates towards Malaysia kept growing. Najib was also aware of the importance of increasing the image of the country within the Middle East.

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[260] Saravanamuttu, p. 226.

[261] Khalid, p. 435; Humphreys, p. 23.

[262] Humphreys, p. 35.

[263] Khalid, p. 435.

Malaysia had a growing reputation as a *Halal hub*, Islamic finances were also of importance since the Badawi period, and Malaysia was becoming an Islamic financial centre, as well as an investment destination (especially in infrastructure in Iskandar Malaysia).[264] Through Malaysia's participation in multilateral forums, the country pursued to become a country recognised for being non-aligned, with interest to become a leader of the Islamic world and being recognised as a moderate Islamic state, a leader within the South East and Asian regions, and a fighter for the Global South's causes.[265]

For Mexico, not only the bilateral relations with developed countries and its neighbouring region are essential for the country. Mexico has a historical diplomatic tradition that characterises it for its fight for autonomy from other powerful nations, the commitment of the government with the multilateralism and its endeavours for the more universal causes and values.[266]

Multilateral relations with Latin American countries are in the core of Mexican foreign policy. The Pacific Alliance (created to counterbalance MERCOSUR) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) are particularly crucial for the country, and both have a vital higher education element.[267]

As for the UN, Mexico has had an influential voice within the organisation, is one of the founding members and a vital contributor to its budget. It has been a non-permanent

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[264] Khalid, p. 451.

[265] Humphreys, p. 46.

[266] César Villanueva Rivas, 'Construyendo El Poder Suave de México', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, Septiembre.111 (2017), 5–19 (p. 13).

[267] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*, p. 61.

member of the Security Council in five occasions, including the one of 2020. Also, in multilateral forums of the UN Mexico has taken historically common positions with other nations, like the decolonisation, disarmament, maritime law, ICD, sustainable development, preservation of the environment, fight against narcotraffic, international migration and solidarity with Latin America.[268] Other memberships that the country has that are important in its foreign relations and to which higher education also plays a part is the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), for which ICD was vital to gain the country a main seat within the organisation.

Additionally, Mexico belongs to other groups of NICs such as MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia). The country also has promoted the creation of the Group of Likeminded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC), created in 2002. Brazil and Malaysia are also members of LMMC. The participation of Mexico in these organisations gives the country recognition as an emerging economy and regional power. It provides the country with opportunities to diversify its relations and to enhance its reputation abroad.

This chapter briefly reviewed the foreign policy contexts of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, and highlighted some similarities and differences that appeared in the categories selected for examination. This foreign policy context is key in understanding the scope of the soft power obtained through the IHE components, which are analysed in the next chapters.

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[268] Villanueva Rivas, 'Construyendo El Poder Suave de México', p. 14.

Chapter 6: Inbound student mobility

Student mobility involves the movement of students to other countries in two primary modalities: short- and long-term. In both cases, a student crosses the border to enrol in a foreign HEI to pursue part of their degree as an exchange student, obtain a degree, or carry out academic stays without transferring credits.

In this thesis, two chapters elaborate on student mobility. This chapter studies inbound student mobility and the next one the outbound feature of student mobility. This division is necessary since the soft power implications are different in each modality. While one country could be more active in attracting international students (such as Malaysia), another one could be more inclined to send students abroad to strategic countries (like Brazil), following different rationales.

This chapter discusses how inbound student mobility produces soft power in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. The argument that this research follows is that, in NICs, inbound student mobility has intended and unintended soft power consequences, primarily in terms of attracting international students, influencing students from target countries, and creating strategic alliances with priority states. Each country has different soft power outcomes in this component of IHE, which is also intrinsically linked to the ability of governments to establish policies. Where there are no policies in place, other non-state actors transform their resources in favour of inbound student mobility and following the foreign policy agenda, becoming soft power agents.

Inbound student mobility implies the movement of international students to a host country for short or long-term academic stays. International students enrol in national HEIs or branch campuses located in the host country to pursue part of their studies or to obtain a degree.

International students who enrol in HEIs as an exchange or short-term mobility students often use the structures created between two or more partner institutions (foreign and domestic). Typically, mechanisms such as general agreements, specific agreements, letters of intent or MoUs consolidate these partnerships. These documents specify the recognition and transfer of credits, tuition fees and the number of exchange students per academic year. In general, HEIs are the main actors seeking these alliances, placing educational interest at the core. However, governments can become involved in the selection of strategic partners by creating dynamics (such as programmes within multilateral or regional forums) to encourage national HEIs to seek for partnerships in countries and areas of government interest.

International students who enrol in a public or private HEI in another country to pursue a degree are also part of this modality. These students are foreign nationals seeking to obtain a bachelor's or postgraduate degree, diploma or specialisation in the host country. Unlike short-term mobility, HEIs and governments are the main actors here seeking to attract international students through various mechanisms. The level of involvement of HEIs and governments in attracting international students pursuing a degree or qualification is different in each country. In addition to HEIs and governments, other national actors have their programmes and resources to attract international students.

These organisations have a lobbying role and serve as a channel of communication and collaboration between the government and HEIs.

Inbound student mobility is connected to soft power primarily through the tool of attraction. The attraction of international students is the result of IHE policies, programmes and strategies of three types of actors: governments, HEIs and national organisations of universities.

This chapter first charts global trends to identify the countries that are most attracted to the cases studied here. Then, it examines the policies and programmes that the governments implemented, focusing on Malaysian policies and Brazil and Mexico's programmes. We place particular interest in strategic countries or groups of countries and how the government inserts inbound student mobility into bilateral and multilateral agendas. The last section presents the main findings, as well as the implications of inbound student mobility for soft power gains and projection.

6.1 Inbound student mobility trends

Global inbound student mobility indicators provide the basis to identify the regions and countries most attracted to the case studies. These trends help to map the attractiveness of the country but should be taken only as guidance.

The inbound mobility trends denote to the total number of international students per year enrolled in HEIs in the host country. In the cases of Brazil and Malaysia, this research drew on inbound mobility data from the UNESCO Education Dataset. At the same time, the National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions (ANUIES)

provided the data for the case of Mexico. As Mexico has another source of information, first the analysis is centred in the cases of Brazil and Malaysia.

Of the three cases analysed, Malaysia is the country with the highest number of inbound student mobility.[269] As can be seen in figure 1, the number of international students in Malaysia is considerably higher than those of Brazil.

Figure 1 Inbound mobility trends in Brazil and Malaysia, 2009-2018

Source: UNESCO Education Dataset.[270]

In the case of Malaysia, there is a significant increase in international student mobility. The overall growth was of 115%, going from 57,048 in 2009 to 122,823 in 2018. In Brazil, although the data reflects a growing trend, the number

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[269] The data was extracted through UNESCO's dataset, covering the period from 2009 to 2018 in the case of Malaysia and 2009-2017 in the case of Brazil. The year 2013 did not have any data available, for which that year has been omitted from the graphics, so that the lack of information would not interfere with the interpretation of the data.

[270] UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 'UNESCO Education Dataset', 2019 <http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT_DS> [accessed 30 October 2019].

of international students was not as high as in Malaysia. The global increase in Brazil was of 70%, going from 12,111 to 20,546.

In the case of Mexico, a global account of inbound student mobility is not possible to make, as there is no organisation within the government, or external to it, that gathers the data from all the HEIs of the country. This lack of data shows the reduced role of the Ministry of Education (SEP) in areas of IHE. Internationalisation of higher education in the country is considered an issue of international cooperation for development, for which AMEXCID is the agency through which the government coordinates most of the inbound mobility programmes. However, up to 2018, AMEXCID has not developed an instrument to measure student mobility.

6.1.1 Top regions and countries

As argued in chapter 5, both Africa and South America are the most important regions of interest of Brazilian foreign policy. This is also reflected in the inbound mobility trends, as from 2009-2017, 65% of inbound student mobility was from Africa and South America.[271] Figure 2 shows the total of student mobility per year during that period from both regions. South America shows an increase of 93% of student mobility, while mobility from Africa has remained somewhat constant, showing a 19% growth.

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[271] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Figure 2 Inbound student mobility from Africa and South America to Brazil, 2009-2017

Source: UNESCO Education Dataset. [272]

The top 5 countries that sent most students to Brazil are Angola, Guinea Bissau (both also Lusophone countries), Argentina, Colombia and Peru. Figure 3 shows the mobility trends of these five countries. In this period, Angola is the country that sent the most students to Brazil. This country has a strong bilateral relationship with Brazil, which is reflected in the number of inbound students, albeit in the last two years it decreased. According to the UNESCO Education Dataset, Brazil is the second country of preference for Angolan students, just behind Portugal. South Africa and the US are the third and fourth preferred countries for Angolan students. This reflects

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[272] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

that students are more attracted to study in Brazil than in countries in their region or with a higher reputation.[273]

The cases of Colombia and Peru are also notable. Figure 3 shows the inbound student mobility from both countries. In the case of Colombia, the increase of inbound student mobility was of 350%, while in Peru it was 126%. Even if there was a significant growth of students from both countries, Brazil is not among the top 5 countries of preference for Colombian or Peruvian students. For Colombia, Brazil is the ninth destination country, while for Peru, it is the seventh. Students from both countries preferred to go to Brazil than to Canada, Argentina or Mexico, which are on the same continent. They also chose to go to Spain, France, the US and, in the case of Colombia, the UK. This could mean that both countries implemented strategies to send students abroad, and Brazil is one of those countries that attracted such students.

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[273] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Figure 3 Top 5 countries of origin of international students in Brazil, 2009-2017

Source: UNESCO Education Dataset. [274]

As for Malaysia, Asia is an important region for its foreign policy, particularly Southeast Asia, as well as Asian countries that are also Muslim. Furthermore, the Muslim countries of Africa and the Middle East are also within its foreign policy interests. This is reflected in the inbound mobility figures, as Asia and Africa are the regions that send the most students to Malaysia. According to the UNESCO Education Dataset, 75% of the inbound mobility came from Asian countries, 23% came from African countries, and only 2% of came from the rest of the world.[275] Figure 4 shows the inbound student mobility trend by year from Asia and Africa. In the case of Asia, there was a 196% increase in students, while in Africa it increased by 265%.

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[274] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

[275] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Figure 4 Inbound student mobility from Asia and Africa to Malaysia, 2009-2017


Source: UNESCO Education Dataset.[276]

The top five countries of origin for international students in Malaysia are Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran and Nigeria. As can be seen in figure 5, as of 2014, Bangladesh is the country that sends the highest number of students to Malaysia. The inbound student mobility from Bangladesh increased by 132%. According to interviews with the MoHE, the increase of student movility in one year responds to particular programmes that that year were launched between the two governments to strengthen their bilateral relationship.[277] The officer of the World Bank interviewed suggested that, in 2014, the country was given advice to

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[276] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

[277] Interview 52 MoHE.

increase the expenditure in education, including student mobility.[278] Therefore, it would appear that the sudden increase of Bangladeshi students sent to Malaysia responds to internal and external factors, that were driven by both the support of international organisations and the bilateral relation with Malaysia in those years.

Even if in 2016 the mobility decreased, Bangladesh remains the country most attracted to Malaysia, reaching 20,811 students in 2018. According to the UNESCO Education Dataset, Malaysia is the first preferred country for Bangladeshi students. Malaysia receives four times more students from that country than the UK or the US.[279]

China is another country that has an increasing trend of sending students to Malaysia. From 2008 to 2018, the growth of Chinese students to Malaysia was of 184%. This growth is the result of China's internal policies to increase the number of students studying abroad, and Malaysia's multicultural society, which includes a vast Chinese population. Malaysia is the tenth preferred destination country for Chinese students abroad. However, Chinese student mobility to Malaysia accounted for only 1.43% of China's overall student mobility in the period analysed. This suggests that although Malaysia attracts Chinese students, it is not particularly representative of China's overall mobility. Still, Malaysia is not only among the top 10 destination countries for Chinese students, it is also the only developing country on the list.

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[278] Interview 86 The World Bank.

[279] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Regarding the mobility of Indonesian students, figure 5 shows there were several fluctuations. According to the UNESCO Education Database, Malaysia ranks second in preference among Indonesian students, just after Australia. Student mobility from Indonesia to Malaysia constituted 22% of the country's total mobility.[280]

As for the case of Iran, figure 5 also shows that in the first years of the period, there was an increase in inbound student mobility, but it decreased after 2011. The overall decrease from 2011 to 2018 was of 66%. Still, according to the UNESCO Education Dataset, Malaysia was the second destination country for Iranian students of the period, just after the US. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are also Muslim countries and education hubs, receive less Iranian students than Malaysia.[281]

Malaysia's attractiveness as an education hub is also reflected in countries outside of Asia, but which are also Muslim states. Such is the case of Nigeria. As figure 5 shows, Nigeria has increased the number of its students in Malaysia by 662% in the same period, which is the most significant increase of them all.

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[280] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

[281] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Figure 5 Top 5 countries of origin of international students in Malaysia, 2008-2018

Source: UNESCO Education Dataset.[282]

As specified at the beginning of this section, there are no global statistics on student mobility flows in Mexico. There is no governmental body that collects all the information from all the HEIs in the country. At the same time, international organisations such as UNESCO or the OECD do not have any student mobility for Mexico in their databases. For this reason, the analysis of student mobility in Mexico is carried out differently from that done for Brazil and Malaysia. The research done in the country pointed to other sources of information that helped to make a first approximation of the student mobility flows in Mexico, such as ANUIES' national survey reported in *Patlani*.

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[282] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

The results of such a survey are a starting point that helps to identify the main countries that Mexico attracts. However, the *Patlani* survey has significant limitations. First, since the survey is not compulsory for the HEIs to complete, the information collected is representative only of those institutions that responded. Each year the number of respondent institutions vary. The *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM), the most important public university in the country and the one that attracts the largest number of international students, did not participate in the survey until 2017, which makes comparisons with previous editions misleading, and makes it impossible to identify trustworthy trends reliably. For this reason, this thesis reviews only the 2017 edition. This edition reports the surveys for the years 2014/2015 and 2015/2016. Second, *Patlani* only shows the mobility of students enrolled in HEIs who responded to the questionnaire, which for the 2017 edition represented 39% of the total HEIs in the country. We should consider that ANUIES represents only 34% of Mexican universities (197 HEIs), however, these are the HEIs most interested and invested in internacionalisation. For this reason, we take this data only as a sample that serves to explore student mobility trends.

Table 3 shows the top countries attracted to Mexico, as reported by *Patlani* in 2017. Six of these countries are from South America, three from Asia, three from Europe, and two from North America. The country that sends most students Mexican HEIs is the US, followed by Colombia, France, Germany and Spain.

Table 3 Inbound student mobility to Mexico, 2014-2016

	Patlani 2014-2015	**Patlani 2015-2016**
Argentina	454	498
Brazil	334	N.A.
Canada	253	297
China	N.A.	591
Colombia	1953	2805
Ecuador	406	N.A.
France	1700	1864
Germany	1127	1282
Japan	N.A.	563
Peru	N.A.	563
Republic of Korea	329	527
Spain	992	1231
US	3428	4213
Venezuela	395	N.A.

Source: *Patlani* survey, ANUIES.[283]

Inbound and outbound student mobility to and from the US also appears in the Open Doors report. The IIE collects the data and publishes it annually. This data includes some figures that could serve the purpose of this chapter. Figure 6 shows

[283] Alma Maldonado Maldonado, *Patlani. Encuesta Mexicana de Movilidad Internacional Estudiantil. 2014/2015 y 2015/2016*, ed. by Alma Maldonado Maldonado (Mexico: ANUIES, 2017).

the fluctuation of US students enrolled in Mexican HEIs from 2007 to 2017, according to the cited source.

Figure 6 Inbound student mobility from the US to Mexico, 2007/2008 – 2016/2017

Source: Own elaboration with data from the Institute of International Education.[284]

As shown in figure 6, student mobility constantly declined from 2007 to 2013. According to IIE, Mexico has positioned itself in the top 12 destination countries for US students during

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[284] IIE, *Open Doors 2009 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2009); IIE, *Open Doors 2010 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2010); IIE, *Open Doors 2019 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2019); IIE, *Open Doors 2008 "Fast Facts"* (Washington, 2008); IIE, *Open Doors 2017 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2017); IIE, *Open Doors 2018 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2018); IIE, *Open Doors 2015 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2015); IIE, *Open Doors 2016 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2016); IIE, *Open Doors 2013 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2013); IIE, *Open Doors 2011 'Fast Facts'* (Washington, 2011).

the last three years.[285] Considering that Mexico is the US'
next-door neighbour, being in twelfth place as a destination
for American students is significant. The US Department of
State issues travels warnings to Mexico, which affect its
attractiveness. American students are most attracted to the
UK, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Ireland, Australia and
Japan. This is consistent with global mobility trends, as these
countries are known for the quality of their higher education
systems and their power to attract international students.
However, considering that there is no long-term government
policy in Mexico to attract international students actively, it is
significant that Mexico is in the twelfth position for three
consecutive years. This is a reflection of the work carried out
by HEIs and higher education organisations to cooperate with
their North American counterparts, as despite the absence of
Mexican mobility policies, Mexico figures in the top of the
preferences for American students.

As the interest of this research is in IHE and its relation to soft
power in NICs, we need to examine the origins of the inbound
student mobility trends in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. The
following sections therefore discuss their policies, programmes
and strategies towards inbound student mobility, and the
connections to the foreign policy objectives.

6.2 Government policies and programmes

Government policies and programmes that promote inbound
student mobility have two main characteristics. Government
policies are the result of a particular official document that

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[285] IIE, *Open Doors 2017 'Fast Facts'*; IIE, *Open Doors 2018 'Fast Facts'*; IIE, *Open Doors 2019 'Fast Facts'*.

specifies a set of assumptions, ideas, objectives or the action plan concerning the mobility of international students to the country. Government policies tend to have a long-term vision and are widely accepted in the country. Inbound student mobility programmes are promoted by governments, bilaterally or multilaterally, to achieve specific objectives. Governments allocate resources to those programmes for their success. Government policies may contain specific mobility programmes, but not all mobility programmes are supported by explicit policies, as they might have a short-term duration.

In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, there are no government policies that promote inbound student mobility with goals and an action plan to implement. However, they have long-term programmes to attract international students, but the numbers are low compared to the overall inbound student mobility presented in the last section. The case of Malaysia differs from the other two countries, as Malaysia has a series of policies that foster inbound student mobility.

6.2.1 Inbound student mobility in Malaysian policies

Malaysia's internationalisation policy, which contains a large component of inbound student mobility, dates back to the 1980s when the demand for higher education increased, and there was not enough public HEIs in the country. This allowed the establishment of private HEIs, which partnered with foreign HEIs to provide twinning and franchised programmes, as they were not allowed to award degrees. This attracted international students from the region. The government of Mahathir (1981-2003) developed the Vision 2020 Plan in 1991, which proposed the development of Malaysia's economy and society to become a developed country by 2020. In the

light of this Plan, the government implemented the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act in 1996, which allowed private HEIs to award degrees instead of the twinning and franchised programmes, liberalising the higher education sector.[286] In 2003, the government amended the Act to enable the establishment of branch campuses of foreign HEIs in the country. This was the starting point for Malaysia to become an education hub.

The Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 elaborated on Malaysia's ambition and sought to increase the number of international students to 100,000 by 2010.[287] The Tenth Malaysia Plan 2011-2015 and the New Economic Model adopted by the country in 2010 comprised the vision of higher education as a generation of export revenue.[288] This emphasises the economic rationale behind the internationalisation strategy of the country.

The government articulated Malaysia's determination to become an international and regional education hub through two particular documents: the National Education Strategic Plan launched in 2007 and the National Higher Education Action Plan 2007-2010. The former contained four strategies to achieve IHE goals, including enhancing global higher education networks and collaborative international academic activities. It also envisioned to expand strategic programmes

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[286] Mohd Ismail Abd Aziz and Doria Abdullah, 'Finding the next "Wave" in Internationalisation of Higher Education: Focus on Malaysia', *Asia Pacific Education Review*, 15.3 (2014), 493–502 (p. 495).

[287] Dale Down, 'Malaysia: Future Hub of International Education?', *University World News*, 2009, p. 1 <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20090903203756838> [accessed 8 January 2019].

[288] Siew Yean Tham, 'From the Movement of Itinerant Scholars to a Strategic Process', in *Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia. Understanding, Practices and Challenges*, ed. by Siew Yean Tham (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), pp. 1–17 (pp. 6–7).

and to increase the inflow of international students by promoting and marketing Malaysia as international hub for higher education, rebranding the HEIs and increasing its international profile. [289]

The National Higher Education Action Plan was launched in 2007, detailing the actions necessary 'to strengthen and enhance the competitiveness of the higher education system at a global level, through increased prominence of its academic research and teaching'.[290] Furthermore, it aimed to become a hub of higher education excellence by 2020.[291] In terms of inbound mobility, the action plan aimed to attract 100,000 international students by 2010. This objective was increased in the Economic Transformation Plan and the 2011 MoHE Internationalisation Policy, targeting to attract 150,000 international students by 2015. These revised targets indicate that the construction of Malaysia's regional and international education hub focuses on inbound student mobility.[292]

The Eleventh Malaysia Plan 2016-2020 also emphasized Malaysia's global prominence as an education hub. Furthermore, it established Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia as the strategic markets. The Eleventh Malaysia Plan develops four strategies to reach those markets and attract international students from these regions: to intensify the promotion and marketing of HEIs, to increase the number of quality international students, to strengthen global

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[289] Tham, 'From the Movement of Itinerant Scholars to a Strategic Process', p. 7.

[290] Tham, 'From the Movement of Itinerant Scholars to a Strategic Process', p. 7.

[291] Abd Aziz and Abdullah, 'Finding the next "Wave" in Internationalisation of Higher Education: Focus on Malaysia', p. 496.

[292] Siew Yean Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 17.5 (2013), 648–62 (p. 651).

networking and to achieve international recognition in areas of expertise.[293]

A closer examination of the UNESCO Education Dataset revealed that, of the top 10 Asian countries that are attracted to Malaysia's higher education system, seven of them are members of the OIC. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Maldives, Pakistan and Yemen are all Muslim countries and feature at the top of the list of countries that Malaysia attracts the most. The inbound student mobility of OIC members from 2008 to 2018 accounted for 60.26% of the overall inbound mobility. This is important since, as shown in previous chapters, Malaysia gives the OIC a primary role in its multilateral relations in the foreign policy agenda. Besides, the ambition to become the leader of the OIC frames the attraction of international students from these countries. Furthermore, Malaysia's image as a moderate Muslim country, which is at the centre of the foreign policy, is closely linked to inbound student mobility, as most of the students attracted are from Muslim countries.

In addition to the Eleventh Malaysia Plan, the Malaysia Education Blueprint (Higher Education) 2015-2025 makes a substantial contribution to the IHE of the country. The document introduced '10 shifts' in Malaysian higher education. On the eighth shift: global performance, the Blueprint emphasises three themes of the higher education system. First, it recognised the higher education system as a

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[293] Economic Planning Unit, *Eleventh Malaysia Plan 2016-2020. Anchoring Growth on People* (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad, 2015).

significant source of income, which confirms the income generation rationale for pursuing IHE in the country.

Second, the Blueprint envisioned Malaysia as a renowned international education hub that is relevant globally and recognised for its quality, affordability, good quality of life, and rich and cultural experiences. Malaysia considered these to be the assets by which the country can attract international students, and even more so, it targets to reach 200,000 international students by 2020 and 250,000 international students by 2025, increasing the targets set on previous documents. Finally, this policy envisioned Malaysia as a globally connected higher education player, recognised for niche areas such as Islamic Banking and Finance, and tropic-related issues with an emphasis on science and technology.[294]

The Malaysia Education Blueprint prioritises two groups of countries: Asia as high priority market (particularly ASEAN) and Muslim countries. According to the document, Malaysia is a preferred destination for Muslim students, as it provides a friendly environment due to its multiculturalism, where Islamic values and practices are understood, shared and respected by the society.[295] Finally, the document also referred to the soft power consequences of becoming an education hub, positioning higher education as a means to wield soft power through education diplomacy, capturing the 'hearts and minds' of local and international students.[296]

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[294] Ministry of Education Malaysia, 'Malaysia Education Blueprint 2015-2025 (Higher Education)', *Ministry of Education Malaysia*, 2025 (2015), 40 (p. E-15).

[295] Ministry of Education Malaysia, p. 190.

[296] Chapter 9 builds more on soft power and Malaysia's policies to become an education hub.

In addition to the Malaysia Education Blueprint, the MoHE created the Education Malaysia Global Service (EMGS) as its education marketing division; its mission is to promote the country as a centre of higher education excellence. The EMGS facilitates information to prospective students about universities, programmes, health insurance, accommodation, transportation and living costs. The EMGS website enlists eight reasons to study in Malaysia, namely: world-class universities, affordability, English as a widely spoken language in the country, highlighting the country as modern and progressive, with a multicultural society and food heaven, a dynamic lifestyle, strategically located in the 'heart of Asia', and its status as the third most peaceful country in Asia.[297]

Some studies about the higher education sub-field of studies have shown that five factors influence international students to choose Malaysia as their study destination. These are the international recognition of qualifications, the competitiveness of the programme fees, the opportunity to make global connections, the quality of education found in Malaysia, the chance to experience different cultures in a multicultural environment, and the use of English as a medium of instruction.[298] These findings have a direct correlation to the role of the EMGS and the way it promotes the higher education system of the country, showing that the EMGS has a vital role in influencing student preferences.

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[297] EMGS, '8 Reasons to Study in Malaysia', 2020 <https://educationmalaysia.gov.my/why-malaysia/> [accessed 9 April 2020].

[298] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', p. 656; Siew Yean Tham, Nik K.N. Mahmod, and Rokiah Alavi, 'Assessing Policies for Attracting International Students: Case of Malaysia', *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, 33.1 (2013), 112–26 (p. 114).

The EMGS has been able to systematise the processes so that the inbound student mobility becomes a reality and not a rhetoric of the Malaysia Education Blueprint. Furthermore, a survey conducted in 2010 showed that international students are attracted to Malaysia because the government facilitates student visa applications.[299] Nonetheless, there have been some issues in the past with visa procedures. In 2013-2014, Malaysia's MoHE, MoFA and the Immigration Department had to change their visa granting strategy, as foreigners were taking advantage of the system and applied for student visas, disappearing after they entered the country. This ignited a stricter visa control process and mechanisms within HEIs to verify the status of the students, which resulted in the slowdown of admission processes. [300] A 2007 study suggested that greater coordination was needed between HEIs, MoHE and immigration authorities to improve the processing time for student visas and extension visas for international students.[301]

Some scholars have discussed the effectiveness of the policies implemented by the Malaysian government in favour of IHE. These studies show that domestic policies are pulling factors that attract international students.[302] Additionally, other regional, bilateral and international agreements and commitments are also sources of international recognition of qualifications and reputation, quality and accreditation, and

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[299] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University 's Response', p. 656.

[300] Interviews 45 IIUM, 57 UKM, 60 UniKL and 62 UiTM.

[301] Tham, Mahmod, and Alavi, p. 123.

[302] Tham, Mahmod, and Alavi, pp. 117–18.

competitive programme fees, which add to the attractiveness of the country.[303]

The case of Iran better illustrates the latter. Malaysia is an ideal destination for Iranians because of its multicultural social structure and the Islamic background and relative freedoms. These factors have attracted a total of 70,000 Iranians, with about 100 academic staff living in Malaysia.[304] A study conducted in 2018 found that Iranian students look to Malaysia as a destination country for the sense of political, socio-cultural and religious freedom; the low tuition fees and living costs and high-advanced educational technologies; the existence of high-ranking universities; the international cooperation which influenced Iranian students to migrate to that country, and the simplicity of the visa regulations to enter the country to study and work.[305] This study confirms the success of the attraction strategies set by the MoHE and the EMGS in Iranian students, as their responses of preference to study in Malaysia correspond to what the government promotes.

Having examined Malaysia's higher education policies, as well as the inbound student mobility figures, we are now in a position to draw connections to soft power. Inbound student mobility represents for Malaysia the systematic and targeted attraction of international students, particularly from Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. As expressed in the previous section, the statistics from the

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[303] Tham, Mahmod, and Alavi, p. 120.

[304] Ali Kazemi and others, 'Contributing Factors to Migration Growth Among Iranian Students: Drivers of Migration to Malaysia', *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 19.3 (2018), 757–70 (p. 761).

[305] Kazemi and others, pp. 764–65.

UNESCO dataset confirms that these regions are indeed the most attracted to Malaysia. The attraction of students from these countries has two foreign policy implications: first, they demonstrate the country's interest in Southeast Asia and Asia as a continent, and the recognition of the Asian region as a place to deploy regional dynamics in favour of Malaysia's foreign policy through IHE. Second, the attraction of Muslim students has a direct connection to the foreign policy, particularly in two ways: Malaysia's aspiration to be recognised as a moderate Islamic country and the closeness that Malaysia wants to achieve with other Muslim countries (particularly with other members of the OIC) and its leadership aspirations within the Muslim community.[306] The policies implemented by the government since Mahathir in the 1990s have increased the competitiveness of the higher education sector, making the country attractive and building its international reputation as an education hub.

6.2.2 Inbound student mobility programmes of Brazil and Mexico

Since there are no particular policies for international inbound student mobility, the governments of Brazil and Mexico have implemented different programmes and therefore resorted to other mechanisms to foster IHE within their higher education systems. These programmes aid in consolidating national foreign policy objectives by attracting students from targeted regions and countries. This is demonstrated in three kinds of programmes: scholarships for foreigners, multilateral

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[306] Interview 53 MoHE.

programmes, and those programmes that pursue strategic alliances.

6.2.2.1 Scholarships for foreigners (long-term inbound student mobility)

The government of Brazil pursues the recruitment of international students through two primary programmes: PEC-G and PEC-PG. PEC is a programme for international students to enrol in graduate (PEC-G) or postgraduate (PEC-PG) programmes of Brazilian HEIs, and it is open to 60 countries with which Brazil has an agreement. Last year's statistics confirmed that 46% of the students came from non-Lusophone African countries, 25% from Lusophone African countries, 15% from North and South America, 11% from Central America, and 3% from Asia.[307] A total of 115 HEIs of Brazil participate as hosts of these students. These HEIs are from federal, private, state and municipal levels. Although the programmes do not specifically target African or Lusophone countries, Africa is the region that sends most students to Brazil through these programmes. In total, there are 2,000 active students under PEC, and they receive 400 students each year. In comparison to the statistics presented in the past section, PEC represents less than 1% of the overall inbound student mobility of Brazil.

The PEC started in 1964 and has continuity through the different administrations and governments. Under the programme, the HEIs of Brazil offer tuition-free admission, but the students have to find their own sponsors within the

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[307] Interview 8 *Itamaraty*.

university. The other inbound mobility programme that is sponsored by the government is the one managed through the OAS, which is a bigger programme than PEC. For instance, in 2018, the programme offered more than 500 scholarship opportunities.

In general, these governmental programmes create long-lasting relationships with students from strategic countries. For instance, Brazil supports the inbound mobility of students from Mozambique through various programmes such as PEC-G and PEC-PG. About 20% of Mozambique alumni now have ministerial positions. Because they studied in Brazil, they are more aware of how Brazil understands the world and its place in the international system. Some other alumni from Mozambique are in the private sector, particularly agriculture. This benefits the country as they engage in long-term relationships with Mozambique's elite.[308] This engagement falls into the category of public diplomacy, and the HEIs where Mozambique students attended also become public diplomacy actors.

These programmes are considered beneficial for both Brazil and the partner country in terms of internationalisation of higher education. The government perceives attracted international students as practical as they bring different perspectives and languages, and national students get to collaborate with international students. When the latter go back to their countries, they bring a positive image of Brazil. The government is also aware of the importance of internationalisation of higher education for global rankings,

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[308] Interview 8 *Itamaraty.*

and through programmes such as PEC-G, PEC-PG and PEC-OAS the government seeks to increase the inbound student mobility and target the indicators of such rankings.[309] These are some of the government rationales for internationalisation of higher education.

As part of the inbound mobility strategies of Mexico, the country also offers scholarships to students from developing countries, which is consistent with the foreign policy as presented in the previous chapter. These scholarships are for students from developing countries from Africa, Asia-Pacific, South America, Central America and the Caribbean in its majority. The governmental bodies that offer these scholarships are the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACyT), AMEXCID, the Ministry of Defence, the Maritime Ministry, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Health. In 2015, the Mexican government granted 3,675 scholarships, in 2016 3,659 and in 2017 3,883.[310] The government considers these scholarships as part of the ICD.[311] AMEXCID coordinates the other agencies and bodies while also offers the majority of the scholarships as part of the ICDP. The several governmental bodies and agencies that offer the scholarships report their annual statistics to the SRE, and then they are labelled as joint ICD efforts. This makes the scholarship programmes a straightforward extension of the foreign policy of the country.

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[309] Interviews 6 MEC and 8 *Itamaraty*.

[310] AMEXCID, 'Cuantificación de La Cooperación Internacional Para El Desarrollo de México', 2019 <https://infoamexcid.sre.gob.mx/amexcid/ccid2013/home.html> [accessed 4 January 2020].

[311] Interview 84 AMEXCID.

Furthermore, these scholarships have the goal of offering aid to developing countries, while building upon the image of Mexico as a country committed to the development of less developed countries. For instance, after the natural disasters that occurred in Haiti, the government implemented through AMEXCID a programme of 300 scholarships for Haiti, being at the time the only programme in the world that involved an issue of education in the aid programme launched after the hurricane hit the island. The programme gave 100 scholarships each year from 2013-2015. The students had first to complete a 6-month Spanish Language course that contained a Mexican culture induction section. Then the students were enrolled in Technological and Polytechnic Universities. AMEXCID coordinated its efforts with SEP for its success.[312] This programme is significant, as universities were selected carefully in the centre and southern parts of the country so that students would not use the programme to cross the border illegally to the US.[313]

Even if inbound student mobility is used as an extension of the foreign policy agenda, the government is aware of further consequences that the implementation of these kinds of programmes could have in the image of Mexico abroad. Particularly in its relations to both the US and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, and the strategic geopolitical aspirations of the country.

Other regions are also in the national interest of Mexico, particularly with countries where AMEXCID can coordinate the ICD and internationalisation of higher education. Such is the

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[312] Interview 84 AMEXCID.

[313] Interview 84 AMEXCID.

case of Japan, Korea and China in Asia, where the long-lasting relationships created through inbound mobility programmes have a secondary ICD element.

The government's inbound student mobility programmes are a soft power resource, where attraction, influence and strategic alliances are actively being pursued. This is particularly true after the creation of the ICDL in 2011 and the establishment of AMEXCID under the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018).

As can be observed, both countries developed long-term programmes that have been operational since their implementation, regardless of the government in turn. Both countries are also aware of the soft power implication of these programmes, as they consider that these scholarships create long-lasting relations with bright individuals from other countries which, to some extent, could become members of the elite of their own countries, which links to public diplomacy. There is coordination between the governmental agencies in the case of both countries to operate these programmes. Nevertheless, the number of scholarships is not significant in relation to the overall inbound student mobility. This suggests that the HEIs are more relevant actors to attract international students and that, while pursuing internationalisation strategies such as inbound student mobility, they are also becoming soft power agents.

In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, HEIs are not necessarily enabled by the government through policies as in the case of Malaysia, but rather HEIs can establish their own mechanisms following institutional interests and rationales. This is not to say that they are not obtaining soft power gains. But that they are becoming soft power agents in their own rights by

attracting international students without governmental policies, investing their resources and deploying public diplomacy tactics for the attraction of students, engaging with them and creating long-lasting bonds, and this is reflected in the figures presented in the inbound student mobility trends section.

6.2.2.2 Multilateral programmes (short-term inbound student mobility)

Even if there are not governmental policies, multilateral programmes for inbound student mobility is another way these governments are guiding the student mobility trends from strategic regions. In the case of Brazil, a multilateral organisation that is the most important for the country is MERCOSUR, as analysed in the previous chapter. MERCOSUR has its own mobility programme called MARCA, implemented by the Educational Sector of MERCOSUR. This programme focuses on student mobility between the members of MERCOSUR, and the participants are students enrolled in a degree accredited by the System of Regional Accreditation of University Courses of MERCOSUR.

The foreign policy objectives of Brazil towards Latin America consist of two main initiatives: the regional integration pursued through MERCOSUR and the building of closer ties of collaboration between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance. The Brazilian government strongly supported these two initiatives through different administrations, and they involved education, science and technology in the agenda. In particular, student mobility is the reflection of those foreign policy objectives and was a cornerstone for the collaboration between both blocs.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the members of the Pacific Alliance acquired particular relevance during the administration of Michael Temer (2016-2018) and the approximation to these countries was imperative since Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia are not part of MERCOSUR but are strategically important to Brazil. The strategy to get closer to the Pacific Alliance has an economic rationale, but higher education, science, technology and innovation are part of the foreign policy agenda.

For Mexico's multilateral relations, the Pacific Alliance is of the primary importance of the foreign affairs agenda. The members of the Pacific Alliance strengthen their connections through higher education, mainly through inbound student mobility. Since 2014, Mexico offers 100 scholarships to students from members of the Pacific Alliance, and each country replicates this strategy. According to AMEXCID, one of the pillars of the Pacific Alliance is the technical, scientific and educational cooperation to promote the regional integration, for which the organisation developed the Platform of Academic and Student Mobility. Such a mechanism has registered, up to 2018, a total of 1,840 scholarships from all the country members of the Alliance. Of these, 1,490 are undergraduate, and 350 are doctoral postgraduates and researchers.[314]

These initiatives follow the foreign policy postures and principles, as discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, in the case of Mexico, these scholarships are framed under the ICD, which states that the priority geographic areas for Mexico are Latin America and the Caribbean. In both Brazil and

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[314] AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*, p. 23.

Mexico, the mobility programmes are part of the multilateral agenda. In both the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR, the governments consider higher education as a way to achieve foreign policy objectives, becoming those strategies an extension of the foreign policy agenda.

In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, other national actors such as organisations of universities also have their own mobility programmes. In Brazil, the Coimbra Group of Brazilian Universities (CGBU) and in Mexico the ANUIES have own rationales for creating programmes for inbound student mobility. They follow the collective needs of the HEIs members of the organisation, as well as the governmental objectives pursued through foreign policy. Nonetheless, these organisations have gained a voice in their own right within the configuration of the national higher education system and serve as a voice for the sector in the international arena. Inbound mobility programmes are launched by these national actors, turning their resources into, for example, bursaries to attract international students from key countries. In this way, these organisations contribute to the foreign policy of the country by creating strategic alliances with other organisations of universities, other international organisations and even other governments, engaging in public diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy practices.

6.2.2.3 Strategic partnerships

The third category of programmes is the strategic partnerships with critical countries with which governments pursue long-lasting relationships. In the case of Brazil, the analysis is done in Lusophone countries, while in the case of Mexico, the bilateral relationship with the US is highlighted.

Besides South America, the relationship between Brazil and the Lusophone countries is an essential part of the bilateral and multilateral foreign policy agenda of the country. Angola and Guinea-Bissau are the countries most attracted to Brazil, as can be observed in figure 7. By contrast, Equatorial Guinea is the country with the lowest number of student mobility.

Figure 7 Inbound student mobility from Lusophone countries to Brazil, 2009-2017

Source: UNESCO Education Dataset.[315]

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[315] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Two strategies pursued by the country members of the CPLP could explain the number of inbound student mobility from Lusophone countries to Brazil. First, the CPLP created a network of universities called '*Rede de Instituções Públicas de Educação Superior'*, created in 2012, to strengthen the cooperation and integration of the countries pertaining to the CPLP.[316] The second initiative was the creation of the *Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira* (UNILAB). This institution was created in Brazil in 2008 under the principles of solidarity and cooperation between the country members of CPLP. Up to 2019, UNILAB students were 78.71% from Brazil, 12.61% from Guinea-Bissau, 5.42% from Angola, 1.22% from Cape Verde, 1.1% from Saõ Tomé and Príncipe, 0.70% from Mozambique, and 0.22% from Timor Leste.[317] These initiatives demonstrate that the government seeks to engage with students from CPLP countries, targeting the national interest while making use of higher education to attract students.

In particular, the CPLP has a sub-division of Education, Higher Education, Science and Technology. Within this division, the Ministries of Education and Science and Technology of the CPLP countries gather periodically. The objective pursued is to have concrete actions that benefit all members in the areas mentioned above. A significant contribution to soft power is the objective to 'translate "intellectual power" into competitive advantages of CPLP and CPLP member states in the

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[316] Nunes Ferreira, p. 58.

[317] UNILAB, 'UNILAB', 2019 <http://www.unilab.edu.br/sobre-a-unilab/> [accessed 18 December 2019].

international scientific and technological context'.[318] Moreover, through this objective, this sub-division intends to contribute to academic cooperation in higher education and science and technology as a direct response to the article 4 of the CPLP Statutes. The collective efforts to transform the country's intellectual power into competitive advantages of the institution itself and the members of the CPLP give higher education and science and technology a preponderant role within the organization. The CPLP has been able to use science diplomacy to bring together the scientific communities of the member states and to demonstrate their strength in certain areas. Concrete actions pursued through this sub-division is the exchange of scientific knowledge, student mobility, mobility of faculty and researchers, and the creation of research networks, among others.

The relationship between Mexico and the US is a complex one. But in terms of student mobility, the FOBESII bilateral forum attempted to create a stronger bond between both countries. In 2013, presidents Obama and Peña Nieto announced the establishment of FOBESII as a bilateral forum to achieve economic development and social wellness between both countries through the formation of human resources, research and innovation. The shared objective was the transformation of North America as a region of knowledge.[319] The mission of FOBESII was to encourage mutual understanding and foster bilateral cooperation between Mexico and the US through

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[318] CPLP, 'CPLP Ensino Superior,Ciência e Technologia', 2020 <https://www.cplp.org/id-4627.aspx> [accessed 10 March 2020].

[319] Scientific and Technological Consultative Forum, *Proyecta 100,000. Towards a Region of Knowledge. Proposal of the Mexican Consultation Group of the Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation and Research (Fobesii)* (Mexico City: SRE, SEP, CONACyT, 2013), p. 5.

student mobility and academic exchange, to foster bilateral research on common issues and areas of mutual interest and innovation. The objective is to benefit a large number of students, researchers, teachers, companies and clusters, and to create economic development in the region, encouraging the training of competent human resources and achieve social inclusion, environmental protection and preservation, cultural integration and citizen security.[320] As can be observed, the higher education sector, through the initiative FOBESII, became an essential element of the bilateral relationship with the US. The forum resulted in the promotion of student mobility between both countries. According to the Mexico Institute of the Wilson Centre, FOBESII increased the student mobility between Mexico and the US since 2014.[321]

Following the encounter of both presidents, the SRE, SEP and CONACyT invited several universities, organisations, institutions and other Ministries to create the Mexican Consultation Group of the FOBESII. This consultation group put together a proposal called *Proyecta 100,000*, which envisions the different initiatives through which FOBESII could succeed. This proposal envisages a joint Mexico-US action plan on education, research and innovation policies, through which the academic mobility and exchange programmes would create synergies for the generation of knowledge on common issues.[322] *Proyecta 100,000* specifies the main goals of FOBESII, which include the increase of undergraduate and graduate student mobility; of scholarships for undergraduate

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[320] Scientific and Technological Consultative Forum, p. 11.

[321] Angela Robertson and Duncan Wood, *Building on Early Success : Next Steps in US-Mexico Educational Cooperation* (Washington, 2017), p. 3.

[322] Scientific and Technological Consultative Forum, p. 10.

stays, graduate studies, post-doctorates and internships; the creation of knowledge networks; the growth of joint research and innovation projects, among others.

FOBESII intended to increase the bilateral mobility from 13,893 Mexican students in 2013 studying in the US, and 4,167 US students participating in exchange programmes in Mexico, to an overall of 150,000 students and professors in mobility programmes by 2018, which was accomplished. In particular, 100,000 students and faculty of Mexico and 50,000 US students were set to participate in the programme.[323] This number is ambitious, for which the Mexican government had to find alliances with universities and associations such as ANUIES to reach the targets.

According to the *Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG), the AMEXCID pursued an alliance with the institution while at a meeting with the President of the University of California Janet Napolitano and the Rector of the UDG Tonatiuh Bravo Padilla. There, the director of AMEXCID asked for the active engagement of the UDG to meet the FOBESII goals.[324] The response was positive, and during the administration of Tonatiuh Bravo, there was a unique project created called FOBESII, through which the university invested their resources and managed to mobilise 1,507 students from 2014 to 2018 through scholarships, approximately 1% of the overall goal of FOBESII. For the first time at UDG, the institution created a mobility programme that targeted the strategic alliance with the US. The programme included summer scholarships, short

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[323] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2014* (Ciudad de México, 2014), p. 31.

[324] Interview 87 UDG.

academic stays at Boston University and the MIT, and stronger ties were created with the Arizona State University (ASU) to the extent that the UDG signed in 2018 an agreement to create an office within the grounds of the ASU.[325] All these efforts responded to the invitation made from AMEXCID to engage with US institutions, where the UDG had not particularly targeted that country in its internationalisation aspirations.

Regarding FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000*, it is essential to note that the government included the higher education sector, particularly the universities, inviting them to be part of the project and to invest their resources to achieve a foreign policy goal. This can be understood as a joint effort between the government and universities to achieve the target to bring closer the communities of Mexico and the US through higher education. In the interviews with AMEXCID and ANUIES, it became evident that the efforts were coordinated among the universities, the higher education organisation ANUIES as intermediate, and the government represented by AMEXCID, to create the synergies needed to work together.[326] Both ANUIES and AMEXCID were aware of the soft power projection to be achieved through the FOBESII, particularly through student mobility between both countries.[327] This initiative also became an extension of the foreign policy objectives in the bilateral relation Mexico-US, and the HEIs played a primary role in closing the bridge between both countries.

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[325] Interview 88 UDG.

[326] Interview 71 and 72 ANUIES.

[327] Interview 71 ANUIES and 84 AMEXCID.

FOBESII can be understood as a way to influence US society, particularly students, faculty and decision-makers in the higher education sector, using public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. The consultation group paid particular importance to issues that are on the national interest for both countries such as immigration, human rights and security, and these framed the whole *Proyecta 100,000* strategy. Through the interviews, it was clear that not only the government was aware of the implications of expanding the bilateral agenda through higher education. Also, the HEIs and ANUIES seized the value of this government-led effort.[328] In the interview conducted with the former rector of UNAM, it became noticeable that also UNAM, the most prestigious HEI of the country, collaborated with AMEXCID and ANUIES in issues regarding FOBESII and *Projecta 100,000*. UNAM and UDG, the two most prominent public HEIs of Mexico, were collaborators of the consultation group of *Proyecta 100,000*. Other prestigious institutions of Mexico also participated in the group, such as the CIDE, IPN, Autonomous University of Baja California, Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez, the Autonomous University of the State of Hidalgo, the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosí, the Metropolitan Autonomous University, and the Mexican Academy of Sciences, to name a few. In the end, for FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000* to be successful, the voluntary involvement of ANUIES and HEIs was needed. This was an outstanding achievement, considering that in Mexico, the autonomy of universities deters the government to impose the higher education agenda, and universities can refuse to cooperate

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[328] Interview 72 ANUIES.

with the government.[329] Particularly if it involves following governmental strategies compromising own resources.

In general, in the case of the bilateral relationship with the US, higher education and student mobility have a prominent role in the agenda. FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000* were initiatives that brought together different actors to achieve a common goal: to increase the academic collaboration between both countries. Furthermore, not only the efforts were coordinated, but also this was the first attempt from AMEXCID to yield the space to different actors to transform their resources into soft power assets. In this respects, HEIs, ANUIES and the federal and local governments turned their resources to attract students from the US and to send Mexican students to US HEIs, making them soft power agents. In sum, the soft power gains of FOBESII can be linked to the attraction of students from the US, the use of public diplomacy to create long-lasting bonds, the use of science diplomacy as research was also involved in FOBESII and the strengthening of the strategic alliance.

Other organisations also involved in bilateral student mobility are the Consortium for North American Higher Education Collaboration (CONAHEC) and the NAFSA Association of International Educators. CONAHEC has a particular student mobility programme for US and Mexican students, while it is a forum in which HEIs of both countries interact for academic collaboration. Moreover, in 2014 the AMEXCID placed a Mexico pavilion at the NAFSA annual fair and invited 28 Mexican HEIs and 93 administrators of the education area of Mexico to

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[329] Interview 83 SRE/UNAM.

participate. As a result, the country got visibility, and the participants reported 4,060 actions with foreign HEIs. Among these actions are the negotiation of 72 collaboration agreements, the establishment of 106 new networks of cooperation, 262 specific encounters with American HEIs, and 567 student mobility agreements.[330] All of these efforts were framed under FOBESII.

In both cases, Brazil and Mexico, the governments have not been able to develop a national policy to increase the number of international students, as there is in Malaysia. In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, public universities have as one of their objectives the aim to develop their local societies, hence their first objective is to serve their localities and solve local problems rather than increase their intake of international students. Therefore, a national policy to increase the number of international students is politically challenging for both countries.[331] Nevertheless, the programmes developed by both countries and the interviews conducted suggest that both governments have a clear understanding of the soft power gains and projection that inbound student mobility could bring to the country. Still, they have not developed yet a clear, long-lasting policy or strategy to increase the attraction of international students.

The lack of policies for inbound student mobility has led to the implementation of programmes that attract international students by non-state actors. For instance, in Brazil, the CGBU has created mobility programmes to attract students from

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[330] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2014*, p. 26.

[331] Interviews 16 UnB, 25 UNICAMP, 74 UDG and 93 UNAM.

Europe, Africa and Latin America. In contrast, ANUIES from Mexico has developed programmes with North America, Latin America and Europe mainly. These organisations also create strategic alliances with their counterparts in other countries (such as CREPUQ in Canada) and with other governmental agencies (such as the DAAD of Germany). By using their resources to create the programmes that attract international students, these national actors acquire soft power conversion abilities, becoming hence soft power agents in their own right.

6.3 Key findings

The evidence traced in this chapter demonstrates that inbound student mobility produces soft power in three main areas: attraction of international students, the influence that is achieved by creating long-lasting bonds with students, and the creation of strategic alliances with countries that are of priority in the foreign policy agenda of the country. We will address each finding in turn.

6.3.1 Attraction

The governments can harness soft power out of inbound student mobility by attracting international students with clear policies. Without policies, governments resort to a mechanism such as the implementation of programmes, inviting other non-state actors to become soft power agents.

In the case of Brazil, the global inbound mobility trends show that Africa and South America are the regions most attracted to Brazil. Students from Angola and Guinea Bissau (both Lusophone countries) are within the most attracted, which is a reflection of the foreign policy of the government and the efforts placed through organisations such as CLPL and the

creation of UNILAB. The other three countries most attracted to Brazil are Argentina, Colombia and Peru, which also is in line with the foreign policy aspirations of the country.

The countries that are most attracted to Malaysia's higher education system are Muslim states in Asia and Africa. The constant increase of students from both regions reflects the policies towards IHE as established by the Malaysia Education Blueprint. The MoHE targets the attraction of international students and created policies to achieve those targets. The aspiration to become an education hub has soft power projection and soft power gains, as the strategic countries for Malaysia's IHE also correspond to the strategic countries found in the foreign policy. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran and Nigeria are all Muslim countries attracted to Malaysia's higher education system. This is a soft power gain of Malaysia as with the attraction of international students from Muslim countries the foreign policy objectives are achieved. Some of these objectives are to be recognised as a moderate Muslim nation, to become a voice for the Third World causes, and the aspiration to become a recognised developed country by 2020. The government attempts to meet these targets through the implementation of IHE policies.

In the case of Mexico, European and North American countries are the most attracted to the higher education system of Mexico. The US, being the northern neighbour of Mexico, is the country that sends most students to the country. Nevertheless, Mexico is not the first country of preference for US students. Strategies such as FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000* had to be introduced by the government of Mexico to increase the inbound mobility from the US, while at the same time targeting foreign policy objectives to strengthen the

bilateral relationship with the country. In this case, the attraction of US students to Mexico becomes an extension of the foreign policy, where other national actors such as HEIs, ANUIES and CONAHEC are involved in achieving the targets set by the government.

6.3.2 Influence

In Brazil, the programmes PEC-G, PEC-PG and PEC OAS were intended to create long-lasting bonds with students, being African countries the ones more attracted to these programmes and, hence, building on the influence Brazil could project in the region. Non-state actors also intervene in attracting those students, becoming agents of soft power and employing public diplomacy to engage with targeted international students. The example of Mozambique was offered as evidence of how the government aims to gain influence through inbound student mobility.

In Malaysia, through the attraction of international students from Asia and Muslim countries, foreign policy objectives are targeted. Through these connections, the government seeks to influence the nationals of these two regions, creating long-lasting relationships with students, consolidating strategic alliances with those countries, and building a reputation of the country through inbound student mobility. In this respect, IHE (on its inbound student mobility component) produces soft power gains in terms of influence.

Influence of students in the case of Mexico is a result of inbound student mobility of countries in North America, Europe and Latin America. Students from these nations are attracted to Mexico. Still, the creation of long-lasting bonds with students is also a consequence of the foreign policy of the

county and its historical relations with them. Furthermore, the scholarships for foreigners offered by the Mexican government aid in influencing these students to change their possible future behaviours in favour of the country, such as the case of the 300 scholarship programmes for Haiti.

6.3.3 Strategic alliances

Attraction leads to further soft power gains, as the attraction of students from targeted countries serves for the projection of soft power towards strategic countries, creating strategic alliances. In Brazil, the government has implemented programmes for the attraction of students of key countries, such as members of the CPLP, while strengthening the strategic alliances with Lusophone countries. Since in Brazil there is a lack of a policy to promote the inbound student mobility with strategic countries, other than the foreign policy, we can assume that non-governmental actors also intervene in attracting the students from these targeted countries. These actors achieve internationalisation targets while attaining foreign policy objectives. Some of these targeted objectives are to become a voice within Lusophone countries, represent third world countries in the international arena, and to strengthen the alliances with South American countries, particularly within MERCOSUR and with countries of the Pacific Alliance. Since the alliances are created not only by the government but also by non-state actors, the latter become soft power agents, attracting students from the regions of interest and investing their resources through inbound mobility programmes. The same phenomenon was observed in the case of Mexico.

In Malaysia, the strengthening of alliances through inbound student mobility is directed and coordinated by the MoHE. The Malaysia Education Blueprint identifies the targets in terms of numbers but also places relevance to two niche areas: Islamic Banking and Islamic Finance. Such instrument presents as priority markets ASEAN and Muslim countries, and the EMGS plays its part by advertising the country as a preferred destination for being a *halal heaven* and moderate Muslim country. This evidences that foreign policy and IHE for Malaysia are closely related. Furthermore, inbound student mobility aids for the soft power projection of the country by strengthening the bilateral and multilateral relations of the country with the targeted countries.

The strengthening of strategic alliances through inbound student mobility programmes can be seen in Mexico with the implementation of the scholarships between the Pacific Alliance members. The mechanisms that the government has negotiated with the Pacific Alliance for the fostering of multilateral student mobility between the country members evidence the importance of student mobility in strengthening the alliance. In this way, inbound student mobility becomes an extension of foreign policy, obtaining soft power gains in terms of strengthening strategic alliances. Another programme that fosters the bilateral strategic alliance with the US is FOBESII. The soft power projection of the country through this initiative includes the programme *Proyecta 100,000*, which needed the participation of non-state actors to turn their resources into soft power assets to achieve the targets suggested by the government. In this way, HEIs and ANUIES become soft power agents, acquiring soft power conversion capabilities.

Moreover, other organisations in the higher education sectors have also become agents of soft power. This chapter explored the role of other international actors such as CONAHEC and NAFSA. These organisations become participants of the soft power projection through the fostering of inbound mobility programmes.

The three countries show that inbound student mobility is a resource to attract international students from targeted regions. Foreign policy provides not merely the context but also is a rationale for mobility programmes that attract, influence and build or strengthen strategic alliances. IHE produces soft power in the three countries as these three elements were found through the evidence prodived. Even if Malaysia has policies and Brazil and Mexico implement programmes, the goal is the same: to produce soft power out of inbound student mobility.

Chapter 7: Outbound student mobility

Outbound student mobility is the second component of the IHE object of this research. The previous chapter discussed inbound student mobility and its soft power implications for the three case studies. This chapter focuses on outbound student mobility, and explores how soft power is pursued through programmes, policies and strategies in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico.

The goal of this chapter is to uncover the NIC's efforts in promoting outbound student mobility, and in which ways these efforts are materialised into short- and long-term programmes. The chapter connects the outbound student mobility to foreign policy objectives as a way to identify the soft power that this component produces. We argue that through outbound mobility programmes Brazil and Mexico allocate resources to incentivate outbound mobility, while pursuing soft power goals. We demonstrate that collaboration and partnership with other non-state actors are key to the success of outbound student mobility programmes.[332]

Outbound student mobility refers to national students enrolling in foreign HEIs outside of the country of origin, including study cetres and other providers of academic programmes. It entails the physical movement of students from one country to another. Hence, virtual environments, online studies and courses online are not part of this study as those involved do

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[332] In the case of Malaysia, there was no intentional soft power gain observed in this component, for which this country is not thoroughly analysed here.

not move to another country to obtain their degree or qualification.

Outbound students move to another country to enrol at a foreign HEI in short- or long-term modalities. National students that pursue short-term courses in foreign HEIs can do so by taking part in exchange programmes (where a reciprocity clause may or may not be included), summer/winter programmes, internships and volunteering work, language courses, innovation and entrepreneurial programmes, research stays or other forms of for-credit or non-for-credit programmes.

To promote short-term outbound mobility, HEIs establish partnerships with foreign institutions and mechanisms for the management of their programmes. However, governments encourage universities to promote outbound student mobility as a part of their internationalisation strategy or to pursue foreign policy objectives. Since each university has its mechanisms for outbound student mobility, the focus is on government strategies that stimulate outbound student mobility through specific programmes or as part of the foreign policy agenda.

This is not a unique feature of NICs. Many developed countries have study abroad programmes. Governments promote them for the benefits they bring in the acquisition of employability skills and to improve the quality of higher education. Some of these countries have clear soft power expectations when implementing studying abroad programmes. Even if developed countries recognise that there are inherent soft power benefits derived from outbound student mobility, there is also a recognition that 'the government should work with universities

to increase the number of students who are studying in other countries'.[333] The key difference with NICs is, as the cases of Brazil and Mexico will show, that the programmes more clearly target the soft power gains.

Long-term outbound student mobility includes the enrolment of national students in foreign HEIs abroad. These students are usually pursuing degree qualifications, such as bachelor, master's or doctoral degrees, a post-doctoral stay, a specialisation or a technical qualification. Although some HEIs have bursaries for their professors or alumni to study a postgraduate degree at a foreign HEI, it is mainly the governments who provide grants to their national citizens to study abroad.

Other international actors also offer forms of scholarships and services to facilitate the mobility of students. Education USA, the DAAD or Chevening Scholarships provide programmes to attract young talent to their country, forming long-lasting bonds and, hence, obtaining soft power gains. The analysis of this section centres on the governmental efforts made by Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico,and not on the soft power gains that foreign governments acquire through their own programmes. However, some conclusions are drown regarding this issue, as we recognise the bi-directionality of soft power.[334] In this section, the long-term outbound student mobility is addressed through the programmes established by Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) in Brazil and CONACyT in

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[333] Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Persuasion and Power in the Modern World*, 2014, p. 30.
[334] See chapter 10.1.5 The bi-directionality of soft power.

Mexico, as those agencies are the executing arm of these governments to send students abroad in postgraduate programmes and specialisations.

The agency between governments and HEIs in the case of outbound student mobility has two aspects. On the one hand, the governments can create dynamics with HEIs that would increase the outbound student mobility with strategically important countries, encouraging them to transform their resources into soft power assets. On the other hand, governments can indicate the priority countries, and even of particular HEIs, not only guiding the agenda but preasuring HEIs to pursue the governmen's interests, rather than their own. This is more clearly seen in the different programmes that this chapter analyses.

Outbound student mobility is connected to soft power through attraction, influence, the creation of strategic alliances and gaining international visibility and reputation building. The first two are part of the established understandings of soft power, while the latter two are part of the new elements of soft power that have been observed through this research and that are further discussed in chapter 10.

This chapter begins with the identification of the outbound student mobility trends. The second section discusses the short-term outbound mobility programmes set by the governments of Brazil and Mexico, focusing on two programmes of Brazil and two of Mexico. This is followed by an analysis of the long-term outbound student mobility programmes of the three countries. One of the most significant implications of outbound student mobility is also discussed: brain drain. Finally, the last section summarises the

main findings and the soft power implications of outbound student mobility.

7.1 Outbound student mobility trends

The three countries subject of this research have shown an overall increase in outbound student mobility. As figure 8 shows, the country where outbound student mobility has grown the most is Brazil, which showed a 108% increase from 2008 to 2017, followed by Mexico with 31.2% and Malaysia with 12.59%. Brazil is the only one of the three countries to exceed the global average of 60% growth in outbound mobility.[335] The increase observed in Brazil is more significant in 2014, which is when the government launched Science Without Borders (SWB), one of its landmark mobility programmes.

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[335] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Figure 8 Outbound student mobility trends in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, 2008-2017

Source: Own elaboration, with data from the UNESCO Education Dataset.[336]

The data demonstrates that Brazilian students showed a strong preference for European destinations. The outbound student mobility to Europe accounted for 49% of the total, while North America attracted 35%. In contrast to inbound mobility, discussed in the last chapter, Africa and Latin America are not attractive destinations for Brazilian students.[337]

The preferences for Malaysian students are more diverse than those of their Brazilian and Mexican counterparts. Even if 35% of students preferred to do an academic stay in European

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[336] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

[337] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

institutions, 34% travelled to HEIs in Australia. It is important to note that Asian countries have a low number of students from Malaysia, with only 14% of students selecting institutions in their same continent.[338]

The majority of Mexican students prefer to move to North American HEIs, as 59% of the total enrolled in Canadian and US HEIs. Europe is the second region of preference for Mexican students, with 33% of students going to countries such as France, Germany, Spain and the UK.[339]

We can conclude that Brazilian, Malay and Mexican students are more attracted to institutions in countries where the quality of higher education is widely recognised. This differs from the inbound student mobility trends explored in the previous chapter, as outbound student mobility trends expose the countries that attract national students, rather than the attraction exercised. In other words, Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico are being subjects of the soft power of developed countries. In contrast, countries with the same level of development or less are the subjects of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico's soft power.

7.2 Short-term government programmes of Brazil and Mexico

There are several programmes launched by Brazil and Mexico that are designed to foster the outbound student mobility.

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[338] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

[339] UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

Those programmes are national strategies that aim to promote student mobility as part of the internationalisation agenda of academic programmes and have a rationale for producing highly qualified human resources. The focus of this section is in four particular programmes where soft power was identified. Two programmes of Brazil are analysed: SWB, which was created in 2011 but ran from 2014 to 2016, and CAPES PrInt, which was launched in 2017 and has had, up to 2018, only one call for participation. In the case of Mexico, a particular strategy is discussed: FOBESII and its programme *Proyecta 100,000*, created in 2013 in partnership with the US, as well as its mirror programme with Canada.

7.2.1 Science Without Borders (SWB)

Student mobility in Brazil has seen significant development since 2014, due to governmental initiatives, notably the SWB Programme. To achieve its objectives, the programme envisioned the partnership with several institutions and foreign governmental agencies for the mobility of students and faculty. The government launched the initiative in 2011 through a presidential decree, and the first grants were executed in 2014. The programme ended in the first semester of 2016.

The administration of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) created the the SWB programme through the presidential decree 7642 of 13 December 2011. However, the programme was inspired by the vision of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010). SWB was a governmental-led initiative that promoted the internationalisation of science, technology and innovation in the country, mainly through outbound mobility. The programme had two main objectives. The first focused on

outbound mobility and aimed to increase the development of human resources through 'the formation and training of people with high qualifications in universities, institutions of professional and technological education, and foreign research centres of excellence'.[340] The second objective focused on the internationalisation of research, as a goal was to attract young talent and highly qualified foreign researchers, targeting inbound mobility of faculty. In this chapter, the focus is placed on the outbound student mobility component of the programme.

The decree by which the programme was created appointed a Committee of Support and Advice of SWB. The members of the committee included a representative of the Presidency; one representative of the *Ministério da Educação* (MEC), MoSTI, MoFA, plus the ministries of Development, Industry and Foreign Commerce, Treasury and Planning, and four representatives of private institutions that act as sponsors of the programme. Also, the decree created an Executive Committee, which included a representative of the Presidency, MEC, MoSTI, MoFA, *Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Científico e Tecnológico* (CNPq) and CAPES. The inclusion of several sectors suggests that, although the programme was primarily an IHE strategy, the expected outcomes extended to other areas beyond education and science, technology and innovation. This also shows the agency between the different governmental levels for the creation of the programme. Its scope was broader than IHE, involving foreign policy, development, industry and trading. We can assume that SWB

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[340] Presidência da República, *Decreto N° 7642 Institui o Programa Ciência Sem Fronteiras* (Brazil, 2011), p. 7 (p. 1).

envisioned a mobility strategy that would target the development of human resources with more significant implications for internationalisation of higher education, foreign policy and development. In this programme, students were also 'ambassadors' of Brazil, and the outcomes expected by the government included greater visibility of Brazil's research and to showcase its advances in science and technology.[341]

In January 2013, the government established the priority areas of the programme, these being engineering and other technological areas; pure and natural sciences; health and biomedical sciences; information and communication technologies; aerospace; pharmaceuticals; sustainable agricultural production; oil, gas and coal; renewable energy; biotechnology; nanotechnology and new materials; technology for the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters; biodiversity and bioprospection; marine sciences; creative industry; new technologies for constructive engineering, and formation of technical personnel.[342] This shows that through SWB the government placed the importance on strategic areas for economic development, but also areas in which the country was already strong and internationally recognised, which aids in the reputation building of the country (this being soft power projection).

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[341] Interviews 5 MEC, 6 MEC, 7 CAPES, 8 *Itamaraty* and 13 CNPq.

[342] Ministério da Educaçaõ, 'Portaria Interministerial No. 1, de 9 de Janeiro de 2013', *Diário Oficial Da União*, Seção 1 (2013), 24.

SWB granted a total of 92,880 bursaries between 2014 and 2016.[343] These were distributed in different modalities, prioritising the temporal mobility of Brazilian students, with 80% of the bursaries in this modality (over 70,000 scholarships).

The government selected the partner countries on the basis of the perceived quality of their HEIs and research centres, allocating the bursaries according to the selected countries as established in the programme. Europe received the majority of the students, with 52%, followed by America with 39%. The programme allocated only 9% of the grants to countries in other regions.[344]

SWB had its foundations on the political views of President Lula da Silva. However, the nature of the creation of the programme was the competition between China and Brazil. SWB began as a challenge between President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and President Obama (2009-2017), as the latter announced that China was sending 100,000 students to the US. This declaration triggered a response by Rousseff, who informed that Brazil was sending 101,000 students to the US to increase the collaboration in education, science and technology with that country and to be ahead of China's targets.[345] Officials in Brazil's CAPES soon realised, however, that the US was not able to absorb such large numbers of Brazilian students and that the partnerships Brazil already had with US institutions were not sufficient for the success of the

[343] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras, 'Science Without Borders', 2016 <http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf/painel-de-controle> [accessed 16 December 2019].

[344] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

[345] Interviews 6 MEC and 7 CAPES.

ambitious plan. Language proficiency was also a problem, since few Brazilian students were fluent in English. Students preferred to study in Portugal and at the beginning of the programme, that country was the most popular destination for Brazilian students. This raised concerns within the MEC, so the Ministry inaugurated another programme to improve the language proficiency of students: Language Without Borders.[346]

The MEC then changed the tone of the programme to include Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) areas, health sciences and creative industries. It also opened SWB to other countries (mainly developed countries) and expanded it to undergraduate students and short- and long-term mobility. The Presidency entrusted CAPES and CNPq with the execution of the programme. However, President Dilma interfered in the process and in how it was supposed to work. CAPES and CNPq gave ideas on the procedures, but the Presidency cut off most of them.[347] This process reveals that the government conceived and executed the programme from top-down, where ministries were reduced as secondary actors rather than decision-makers, and where the government did not involve the majority of the other higher education stakeholders.

The programme distributed the bursaries to several developed countries or countries with the same level of development that are important for the foreign affairs agenda of the country. The bursaries allocated to students that had the US as a

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[346] Interviews 6 MEC.

[347] Interview 7 CAPES.

destination country were 30%, followed by the UK with 14%, and Canada, France and Australia with 8% each. Portugal only received 4% of the total of bursaries available.[348] Figure 9 shows the mapping of the distribution of the bursaries. The priority regions were Europe, North America and Australia, and only a few countries with similar development were included, such as China, Chile, Mexico and South Africa.

Figure 9 Distribution of SWB bursaries, 2014-2016

Source: Own elaboration, with data from Science Without Borders Programme.[349]

The programme aims to magnify the participation of students in international mobility, which previously was a concern of the HEIs with little interference of the government. Up to 2018, there was no IHE national policy in Brazil. However, the quality assurance of the postgraduate degrees promoted

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[348] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

[349] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

mobility as a way to grant higher scores in CNPq's evaluations, so student mobility was already a common practice in Brazil, albeit not a coordinated national effort.

Before SWB, only a few universities in Brazil developed coherent internationalisation strategies, choosing their partners and setting their mechanisms and budget for the promotion of student mobility. Furthermore, internationalisation was not compulsory to all HEIs, for which every institution had the decision on whether to invest in it or to choose which programmes would benefit from it. This led to disparities as some institutions advanced more rapidly in their internationalisation strategies than others, depending on the interest of the institution's senior management and the support obtained from local and federal governments.[350]

SWB also had the objective to contribute to the process of internationalisation of higher education of Brazilian HEIs and research centres. The government, through the Executive Committee, had the task of administering the scholarships. The first step was searching for strategic alliances with priority countries. The government selected the countries and partners according to priority areas of studies, priority countries, and the excellence of the institutions abroad. Second, the government made national calls that were distributed to the HEIs and research centres for their promotion.[351] Hence, HEIs were not active actors or participants of the programme at any level other than in advertising the opportunities to their students and faculty.[352] Finally, the government selected the

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[350] Interviews 28 UFSC and 37 *Universidade La Salle*.

[351] Interview 7 CAPES.

[352] Interviews 20 USP, 24 UERJ, 25 UNICAMP and 29 UNIFESP.

students as beneficiaries and received the bursary directly from the government, so HEIs did not get the resources.[353] This process suggests that, even if one of the aims was to internationalise the HEIs, the latter had little involvement in the management or intentionality of the programme.

Figure 10 shows the top 20 institutions of origin of Brazilian students. The institutions that had the most significant number of participants were the University of Sao Paulo, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and the University of Brasilia. The state with the most institutions in the top 20 was São Paulo.[354] Even though the programme distributed bursaries across the country, it is noticeable that the institutions with the most beneficiaries were the ones that were already recognised for their internationalisation strategies before the SWB programme. This suggests that the universities that already had internationalisation aspirations were able to send most students abroad through the programme.

Other institutions that were not familiar with student mobility were nevertheless able to participate in the programme, albeit in fewer numbers. We can conclude that the programme aided the visibility of the HEIs that sent most students abroad. Even if the programme was intended to reach a large number of institutions across the country, in the end, the institutions that already invested their resources to internationalisation benefited the most. The beneficiary institutions had the foundations to support large numbers of student mobility as

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[353] Interview 20 USP.

[354] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

they already were directing their resources to foster outbound student mobility, and internationalisation was embedded within the academic culture of the institution.

Figure 10 Top 20 HEIs of origin of Brazilian students in the SWB Programme 2014-2016

Source: Own elaboration, with data from Science Without Borders Programme.[355]

Staff in both CAPES and CNPq acknowledge the power of attraction that SWB brought to Brazilian higher education. Since this programme involved the allocation of federal resources for mobility, many international actors such as governmental agencies (i.e. DAAD, British Council) and foreign HEIs became interested in Brazilian higher education.[356] The

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[355] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

[356] Interviews 6 MEC, 7 CAPES and 8 *Itamaraty*.

government also saw the programme as a platform to gain international visibility for the academic and scientific research of the country.[357] SWB was intended to open the higher education system of Brazil internationally, acquiring global visibility. The soft power consequences of the implementation of the programme included the attraction of foreign universities and governmental agencies, agenda-setting as specific areas of knowledge were the priorities of the programme, influence as the students sent abroad were also regarded as ambassadors of the country, and reputation building since the programme aimed to attain recognition of Brazil as a country that is 'fertile soil' for science and technology, with strong HEIs and talented students.

Before 2012, few Brazilian universities had a cohesive internationalisation strategy or academic cooperation agreements with foreign HEIs. After SWB, many universities started to build on their internationalisation aspirations. To some extent, this was a response of the HEIs as they were side-lined in the SWB process. The internationalisation strategies of the Brazilian HEIs were either created or consolidated through their participation on a second programme launched by CAPES called CAPES PrInt.

7.2.2 CAPES PrInt

CAPES PrInt is the second initiative of this period implemented by the government with the aim of internationalising the Brazilian higher education sector. Even if CAPES PrInt has components of inbound and outbound student mobility and

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[357] Presidência da República, p. 2.

internationalisation of research, it is discussed in this section as it was the successor of SWB, and because outbound student mobility is an integral part of it.

The government of Michael Temer (2016-2018) launched CAPES PrInt on the 3rd of November 2017 and had 36 HEIs as beneficiaries. The programme intended to strengthen the internationalisation policy of HEIs and research centres of the country, with postgraduate degrees as the primary focus. Additionally, CAPES PrInt aimed to establish and consolidate the country's areas of excellence in terms of scientific and technological production. The main differences between the two programmes were that, while SWB focused on student mobility in undergraduate degrees, CAPES PrInt had a more comprehensive approach, adding on the internationalisation of research and mobility in postgraduate degrees.

There were five main areas promoted in the programme. First, CAPES wanted to transform the experience of SWB into a more cohesive strategy, for which CAPES PrInt urged HEIs to develop, implement and consolidate their strategic internationalisation programmes. The programme intended HEIs to take ownership of their internationalisation paths, investing their resources and developing capabilities according to their own projections. Second, the programme promoted the creation of international research networks as part of the internationalisation strategies of the HEIs with the aspiration to increase the quality of academic production linked to postgraduate degrees. Third, the programme supported the internationalisation of postgraduate degrees with foreign institutions of selected countries, announced by CAPES. Fourth, doctoral and postdoctoral degree students were particularly encouraged to participate in mobility programmes.

Finally, CAPES PrInt encouraged HEIs and research centres to adopt international environments and to incorporate other internationalisation strategies sponsored by CAPES.[358]

CAPES PrInt had pre-requisites for HEIs and research centres to participate in the programme. The institutions needed to have at least four postgraduate degrees of high quality, of which two at least were doctoral degrees. Also, HEIs were required to develop an Institutional Internationalisation Plan (in a document). These pre-requisites had positive and negative effects in the higher education sector.

The HEIs that did not have internationalisation plans held a series of meetings within the institution and different areas were involved in developing their strategies, focusing on the countries that CAPES indicated as priorities. This allowed institutions to build their internationalisation capabilities, which became IHE resources.[359] The HEIs that already had Institutional Internationalisation Plans moved to a second phase, which included the creation of internal committees for CAPES PrInt, the selection of areas of knowledge and international partners according to CAPES recommendations, and the internal mechanisms for the implementation of the plan and the operational structure.[360] In both cases, CAPES was able to guide the efforts of the institutions and to make them think in a more inclusive and comprehensive approach to internationalisation, and that also served the purposes pursued by the government.

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[358] Ministério da Educaçaõ, 'CAPES PrInt', *Diário Oficial Da União*, ISSN 1677-.No. 214 (2017), 20.

[359] Interviews 17 UNIFOR, 20 USP, 26 UNESP, 27 UFCSPA, 31 UFV and 33 UFPA.

[360] Interviews 20 USP, 24 UERJ, 25 UNICAMP and 26 UNESP.

On the downside, the HEIs interviewed commented on some of the adverse outcomes of CAPES PrInt. Some institutions commented on the absence of a level playing field, as some HEIs were already more advanced in their internationalisation strategies. For this group of HEIs, their lack of experience prevented them from integrating a more comprehensive approach that included all the pre-requisites of CAPES, so they were not successful in the call, and were left with plans but no funding to execute them.

The unsuccessful applicants also stated that in the past, due to SWB, they had an increase of student mobility and funding but, since the programme ended, they were not able to support the mobility of their students anymore. The HEIs perceived this as a setback for their internationalisation plans.

There were also negative comments on CAPES' list of countries deemed to be strategic partners. According to CAPES PrInt, HEIs had to allocate 70% of the resources to academic cooperation with the following twenty-four countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. As can be observed, 18 were developed countries, 4 were BRICS countries, and two were from Latin America, with similar levels of development. CAPES added Mexico to the list at a later stage thanks to the recommendations of the bilateral commission of education.[361] This demonstrates that cultural

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[361] Interview 76 Embassy of Mexico in Brasilia.

diplomacy between governments includes higher education as a resource to get foreign policy goals.

The preference for developed countries and BRICS accords with some of the foreign policy objectives of the country. Furthermore, the MoFA considers CAPES to be a guiding figure for internationalisation of higher education. At the same time, MoFA provides the platform of diplomats and education attachés to approach strategic countries and supports CAPES in the decision-making process, according to the national interest towards those particular countries.[362] This collaboration between the ministries provides the platform to achieve the crossover between IHE and foreign policy.

CAPES PrInt allowed the remainder of the resources (30%) to be allocated to partnerships with foreign institutions, according to the priorities of the HEI's Institutional Internationalisation Plan. This regulation on the allocation of the resources was significant for the HEIs. The HEIs identified that they already made several of their academic collaborations with countries in the Global South. In particular with Latin American and African countries that were excluded from CAPES PrInt. This is an indication of the control the government exercises through the allocation of resources to Brazilian HEIs and research centres, ensuring the alignment of HEIs' internationalisation with the government's foreign policy goals. The autonomy of the universities implies that they have the freedom to allocate resources to the strategies as they see fit. But with CAPES PrInt, the government has a way to re-direct the universities' partnerships to the strategic alliances the government wants

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[362] Interview 8 *Itamaraty*.

to strengthen, and this follows from a soft power motivation.[363]

In terms of the selection of strategic countries, the interviews yielded two approaches. First, the HEIs that already had Institutional Internationalisation Plans re-directed their regular budgets on internationalisation to continue with the strategies with the other countries that were not part of the CAPES PrInt call. In this way, they could create new alliances, consolidate others and maintain the ones that traditionally these institutions had. Second, both HEIs with Institutional Internationalisation Plans and the ones that just made one, thought of ways in which academic collaboration with the countries on the list would benefit the programmes and how they could include some of the partners they already had in the Global South. This way, HEIs would complement CAPES PrInt resources with their own or with resources of those partners that were not on the list. Hence, HEIs triangulated CAPES resources.

CAPES PrInt has several implications on the soft power of the country. The programme is a way for the government to re-direct the academic collaboration of universities to create or consolidate strategic alliances that are on the foreign affairs agenda as a priority, such as the BRICS. This is relevant since the beneficiary institutions included those with longstanding traditions in internationalisation, with a high international reputation for their research, and a culture of academic

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[363] The soft power as a motivation of internationalisation of higher education was confirmed by CAPES and CNPq during the interviews conducted.

collaborations in accordance to academic interests, regardless of the government interests at the time.

The ability to guide the internationalisation plans of universities such as USP, UnB, UNESP and UNICAMP through CAPES PrInt allows the government to transform their resources into soft power assets, and this brings soft power consequences that otherwise would not be achieved. In the particular case of outbound student mobility in postgraduate degrees, it serves as a way to strengthen, consolidate or initiate strategic partnerships, and to increase the visibility of the country in targeted countries. Furthermore, through governmental initiatives, the latter has enabled HEIs to become actors of knowledge diplomacy. With government resources, HEIs and research centres engage with foreign audiences through the creation of research networks, student and faculty mobility. They do so on behalf of the country, representing Brazil's interests abroad as specified by the CAPES programme.

CAPES PrInt allocates financial resources, by which HEIs and research centres can leverage their funding with the funding of the partner institutions, giving them the ability to negotiate the terms of the academic collaboration. Finally, the institutions can communicate the national interest as the Institutional Internationalisation Plan is directed to target the countries CAPES selected, and these countries are already part of the foreign affairs agenda. For instance, the resulting projects with BRICS could be added to the foreign policy portfolio of the country with the block, gaining influence within the group.

7.2.3 FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000*

Similar to Brazil, Mexico has launched strategies and programmes that aid in fostering the internationalisation of higher education of the country. However, the Mexican initiatives differ from those of Brazil as the approach is not global, but each programme targeted a different country. Two relevant governmental initiatives are analysed next.

FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000* had as objective to increase the number of Mexican student mobility to the US up to 100,000 by 2018. According to the SRE, the country reached the goal, as by 2017 a total of 125,999 student and academic mobilities were achieved through the efforts of AMEXCID, local governments, HEIs and other national organisations.[364] Figure 11 shows the evolution of those mobilities from 2014 to 2017. It is important to note that the mobilities include staff as well as students; still, this information is included in this chapter as it is assumed that student mobility was considerably higher than that of scholars.

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[364] SRE, *6to Informe de Labores 2017-2018* (Ciudad de México, 2018), p. 175.

Figure 11 Evolution of student and faculty mobility of Proyecta 100,000, 2014-2017

Source: Own elaboration, with data from AMEXCID.[365]

The SRE's reports state that AMEXCID managed 14,656 mobilities of *Proyecta 100,000*.[366] This means that the target was reached and surpassed through the agency of the federal government (SEP/AMEXCID), local state governments, SEP, ANUIES and HEIs of all over the country. AMEXCID negotiated and accomplished 11.63% of the target, while the other actors managed 88.37%, which shows that the government needed the participation of other higher education stakeholders to achieve its targets. As discussed in the previous chapter, the government sought the support of HEIs such as UDG and UNAM to succeed. Since this initiative is a soft power effort of the government to strengthen the bilateral relations with the US, we can conclude that the government involved several

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[365] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*; AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*.

[366] SRE, *6to Informe de Labores 2017-2018*, p. 176.

HEIs and ANUIES in this initiative, integrating them into the foreign policy of the country and, more importantly, transforming them into soft power agents. As these actors compromised their resources transforming them into soft power assets (in the form of mobility scholarships and negotiating with their peers and other organisations in the US), we can argue that the government enabled these actors to increase the country's soft power capabilities.

As follows, it becomes essential to highlight the significance of initiatives such as *Proyecta 100,000* for the soft power of the country. After the instauration of the programme, which was promoted by AMEXCID with several HEIs and other organisations such as ANUIES, AMEXCID negotiated with HEIs of the US several places for Mexican students. For instance, in 2015 AMEXCID allocated 7,500 Mexican students in 142 American institutions, and aided in the expedition of 7,500 visas and passports for Mexican students.[367] In 2017, AMEXCID negotiated spaces for 758 mobile students in 65 universities of the US.[368] To achieve these results, AMEXCID had direct contact with the US higher education sector, mobilising resources to do so, and negotiating directly with the US government over the issuing of visas for the Mexican students.

Also, HEIs negotiated on behalf of the country obtaining student visas from the US. For example, the UDG had direct contact with the US Consulate in Guadalajara to facilitate the issuing of visas for its students.[369] These collaborations from

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[367] AMEXCID, *Informe 2015* (Ciudad de México, 2015), p. 30.
[368] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*, p. 33.
[369] Interview 88 UDG.

both AMEXCID and HEIs to send large numbers of students to US HEIs set a precedent for the influence aspect of soft power through knowledge diplomacy. Through these direct connections with the US government and American HEIs, new channels for further collaboration in higher education, research and innovation were established.[370] In the end, the goal of soft power is to obtain the will of others. By influencing officials of the government and American HEIs, the Mexican government built on its reputation as a country where higher education, science, technology and innovation is strong enough to generate large numbers of outbound students, while at the same time strengthening the internationalisation strategies of Mexican HEIs.

It is important to note that, for the US, the Mexican effort of outbound mobility is translated into its soft power, as the US regards these efforts as attracting Mexican students to its own higher education system. We must remember that this is a bilateral initiative, having soft power consequences for both parties.[371] Making these connections about inbound and outbound student mobility, and the rationales of both governments to pursue student mobility as part of their foreign policy agenda closes the circle between the subject of soft power and the portrayer of soft power through IHE. And as seen in the cases of Brazil and Malaysia, the three countries are obtaining soft power gains out of student mobility, but also are subject of the soft power of more developed countries.

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[370] Interview 87 UDG.

[371] This has been identified in this thesis as the bi directionality of soft power.

The Mexican government created another project similar to *Proyecta 100,000* in 2015, but this time with Canada: *Proyecta 10,000*. This initiative was also created by the SRE through AMEXCID and aimed to send 10,000 Mexicans to Canada by the year 2018. It had the participation of other actors in the higher education sector such as HEIs, ANUIES and local governments. In total, the number of mobilities registered in *Proyecta 10,000* by 2017 was 22,661, doubling the target. [372] Although the programmes were similar, and both reached the targets, FOBESII framed in a better way the collaboration with the US.

In sum, the governments of Brazil and Mexico used short-term outbound mobility programmes to wield soft power. By sending students abroad to specific countries, both Brazil and Mexico sought to attract other higher education sectors and governments. Furthermore, they intended to gain visibility of the country, engage with targeted countries and gain influence through massively sending students to these selected countries. Short-term outbound mobility programmes in both countries pursued foreign policy objectives, as by sending students to these countries, the governments sought to strengthen their bilateral relations. All this also aided in the reputation building of the country abroad, as talented students acted as 'ambassadors', and these countries seek to gain in turn reputation as nations strong in science, innovation and technology, with competent, qualified human resources.

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[372] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*; AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*.

7.3 Long-term government programmes of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico

Long-term outbound student mobility programmes focus on sending students abroad to complete a degree or qualification. They are also crucial for the development of qualified human resources and have had continuity through different administrations. A review of some of the long-term programmes that are most significant for this research is done for Brazil and Mexico, pointing out the soft power gains identified.

7.3.1 CAPES scholarships

In Brazil, CAPES is the governmental agency that allocates the bursaries under scholarship programmes for Brazilian students to study at graduate and post-graduate levels in HEIs abroad. From 2008 to 2018, CAPES distributed 26,668 scholarships under these programmes. Figure 12 shows the number of long-term outbound student mobility scholarships allocated by CAPES. As can be observed, the years with most long-term outbound mobility were 2014 and 2015. Afterwards, the numbers declined.

Figure 12 Long-term outbound student mobility in CAPES programmes, 2008-2018

Source: Own elaboration, with data from CAPES.[373]

Concerning the outbound mobility as analysed in the first section of this chapter, it is possible to identify that this kind of mobility through CAPES programmes is not significant for the overall mobility of the country. The outbound mobility through CAPES programmes in 2014 only represented 9.72% of the total outbound mobility of the country, while in 2015, the year with the highest mobility through CAPES, it represented only 8.86% of the total.

Figure 13 shows the top 10 destinations for Brazilian students pursuing a degree or qualification through CAPES programmes. CAPES has several programmes that are run

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[373] CAPES, 'Bolsas CAPES', 2020 <https://dadosabertos.capes.gov.br/organization/bolsas-e-auxilios?q=bolsas&sort=> [accessed 25 April 2020].

either entirely by CAPES or in collaboration with other national ministries and foreign institutions and organisations. For instance, with the US, the government installed 38 bursary programmes in partnership with different organisations, such as Fulbright, LASPAU, University of Harvard, and Texas A&M University. Similarly, CAPES concluded an agreement with the DAAD to send students to Germany. While in the cases of Portugal and the UK, the programme that sent most students was the *Doutorado Pleno No Exterior* (DPE). The DPE accounts for 58.59% of the total of the long-term programmes administered by CAPES.

Figure 13 Top 10 countries of destination for Brazilian students through CAPES long-term programmes, 2008-2018

Source: Own elaboration, with data from CAPES.[374]

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[374] CAPES, 'Bolsas CAPES'.

The destinations of long-term outbound student mobility programmes of CAPES correspond to those mentioned in the previous section as the preferred countries for outbound mobility for Brazilian students. The US is the first country of choice, followed by Portugal. European countries such as UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands follow the logic of the foreign policy but as well of the rationales exposed before. However, the case of Mozambique is particular as it is not expected to find a developing country on the list. Mozambique is in this list because of a specific government initiative with UNILAB, and the *Universidade Aberta do Brasil*. The programme envisions the mobility of Brazilian students to Mozambique as a way to build capacities in that country to teach in higher education in Lusophone countries. Outbound mobility serves to materialise foreign policy objectives directed towards Lusophone countries. This, in turn, brings soft power projection in the form of reputation building and the strengthening of strategic alliances, while targeting foreign policy objectives.

With this information, we can arrive at two conclusions. First, although the numbers are not highly representative of the overall mobility, the countries of destination show the priorities the government has for students to obtain a degree in a foreign country. The aim is for students to enrol in HEIs of developed countries, particularly of Europe and North America, with a clear preference to the US. Second, the rationale behind these programmes is to obtain a critical mass of highly qualified human resources. However, in the case of Mozambique, there is a second rationale that responds to soft power logics. Foreign policy objectives are pursued through outbound student mobility, such as the strengthening of the

relationship with a Lusophone country through higher education.

7.3.2 CONACyT scholarships

In Mexico, CONACyT is the governmental agency for science and technology reporting directly to the presidency. It has under its auspices the national budget for science and technology, from which the allocation and execution of scholarships abroad follows. The government created the CONACyT Scholarships Abroad Programme over 45 years ago. Its objective is to offer grants for the development of highly skilled human resources abroad, covering tuition fees and expenses for students enrolled in masters and doctoral degrees and specialisations. Figure 14 shows the evolution of the programme from 2014 to 2018. This is the programme through which the government allocates most of the resources for long-term outbound student mobility in the country.

Figure 14 Evolution of CONACyT Scholarships Abroad Programme, 2014-2018

Source: Own elaboration, with data from CONACyT.[375]

During the administration of Peña Nieto (2012-2018), the CONACyT Scholarships Abroad programme was aligned to the National Special Programme for Science, Technology and Innovation (PECiTI). The latter centres on the strategies the country should follow to advance its interests on innovation, science and technology. The PECiTI identified and selected the geographic regions and countries that are strategic to increase the science and technology interests of Mexico. These countries are Canada, the US, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Spain, the UK, China, India,

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[375] CONACyT, *Programa Institucional Del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 2014-2018. Avance y Resultados 2018*, 2018; CONACyT, *Programa Institucional Del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 2014-2018. Avance y Resultados 2017*, 2017; CONACyT, *Programa Institucional Del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 2014-2018. Avance y Resultados 2016*, 2016; CONACyT, *Programa Institucional Del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 2014-2018. Avance y Resultados 2015*, 2015; CONACyT, *Programa Institucional Del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 2014-2018. Avance y Resultados 2014*, 2014.

Israel, Japan and Korea. The selection of these countries responds to the quality of research done in these countries and to strategic reasons in geographic and economic terms.[376] Importantly, these countries also correspond to the foreign policy objectives as depicted in chapter 5.

Although the calls of the CONACyT Scholarships Abroad Programme allow for students to apply for grants of any country as long as the academic programme is internationally recognised for its quality, CONACyT has a list of countries and institutions of preference with which the agency has agreements. The list of priority countries for the programme includes in its majority the mentioned countries in the PECiTI, and countries with recognised higher education institutions and that have international quality programmes. The only country on the list that is not a developed country but has similar development as Mexico is Brazil. This reveals the recognition by CONACyT that Brazil has high-quality postgraduate programmes, which also speaks of the soft power of Brazil by attracting the Mexican government through higher education.

Figure 15 shows the top 6 countries of destination of the programme from 2012 to 2017. The US and the UK were the two top host countries of this programme. In 2015, the UK surpassed the US in the number of Mexican students enrolled in HEIs. This is due to the Dual Year Mexico-UK, as is explored in the next section. Spain is a natural country sought after for

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[376] CONACyT, *Programa Especial de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2014-2018* (Mexico City, 2014), p. 39.

Mexican students due to the language of instruction of the academic programmes, and the Spanish cultural heritage.

Figure 15 Top 6 countries of destination of CONACyT Scholarships Abroad Programme, 2012-2018

Source: Own elaboration, with data from CONACyT.[377]

The governments of France and Germany have their strategies to attract Mexican students. The partnership between CONACyT with the DAAD and the French Government-Campus France facilitate the outbound mobility of Mexicans to both countries. Up to 2019, the US and France had 19 agreements signed with CONACyT, while the UK had 27, being the later the country with most HEIs in the list of priorities of CONACyT. This is also evidence of the dual side of soft power. These countries have developed their soft power tools to attract developing countries; in this case, it applies to Mexico as well.

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[377] CONACyT, 'Scholarships Abroad Statistics', 2020
<http://www.siicyt.gob.mx/index.php/estadisticas/indicadores> [accessed 27 April 2020].

Mexico also targets these countries through their foreign policy, wielding soft power through higher education in both ways.

The PECiTI also has a list of the priority areas of knowledge and themes and, accordingly, CONACyT aligns its grants to programmes reflecting these priorities. These themes include the most pressing problems of humanity and global concerns, including environmental studies, sustainable development, renewable energies, food security, and fight against poverty.

There are three main rationales behind the CONACyT Scholarships Abroad Programme. The first one follows the logic of the development of qualified human resources abroad in countries already recognised for the quality of their higher education, research and innovation, and which are strategic for the future of science and technology of the country. In soft power terms, this rationale is linked to the consolidation of strategic alliances with countries that are of the importance of the foreign policy and the higher education and science and technology agenda of the country.

The second rationale is the construction of a critical mass of scientists that would aid in the development of Mexico and the construction of a knowledge economy. This rationale is linked to soft power in terms of influence, as having this critical mass of highly qualified human resources helps influence the countries where they were educated, and the international community of scientists in case of their success abroad.[378] The third rationale has to do with the image of the country abroad.

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[378] Interview 75 CONACyT.

For CONACyT, the programme contributes to creating a picture of a country where science, technology and innovation are the motors for the development of the country. This aids in building a reputation of a country that engages with science and technology, but also that is concerned in solving global problems.

7.4 Brain drain, brain gain and engagement with the diasporas

Migration to other countries is often initiated through outbound student mobility. In NICs, governments send students abroad for a set period. Still, suppose they can find jobs in the host country. In that case, the result is a loss of skilled individuals who move or stay abroad looking for more favourable countries in terms of income, professional development or better geographic conditions. This phenomenon is usually known as 'human capital flight' or 'brain drain'.[379] There are both push and pull factors that incite brain drain, push factors being those that encourage migration from the home country due to threat of violence, financial security, living costs, among others. Pull factors are those attractive qualities of a country, which are appealing to migrants. This research primarily focuses on the pull factors and the governmental efforts to attract talented individuals but, at the same time, there is an underlying understanding that push factors are also crucial in the individual decision to immigrate to a foreign country.

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[379] Kazemi and others, p. 759.

Governments of NICs try to stop the brain drain through several strategies. In the case of Brazil, the programme SWB prevented brain drain by enforcing a policy where the students would have to come back to the country or face prosecution.[380] Nevertheless, a common theme evident in the interviews conducted with senior officials of HEIs and academic experts was that Brazil must learn to harness the power of the diaspora. In the case of Malaysia, the outbound mobility programmes financed by the MoHE also stipulate that students must return to serve the government for at least seven years. This is a governmental initiative to face the brain drain issue. Both countries are keen to bring back the students that went abroad, and regulations are set in place to corroborate that students come back to the country.

In the case of Mexico, the government requires that students come back to the country for only six months after completing their studies, and they have set in place other programmes for the repatriation of Mexicans that studied abroad. Nevertheless, CONACyT is aware that there is more gained in taking advantages of the connections that students made while being abroad, so they encourage them to keep those connections. CONACyT regards Mexican students as 'ambassadors' of the country, and sometimes it is beneficial for the country if the students do not come back as they would continue to have ties both in Mexico and in the host country.[381]

In contrast to Mexico, Malaysia launched in 2011 the agency TalentCorp, dedicated to facilitating the return of the

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[380] Interview 38 UoN.

[381] Interview 75 CONACyT.

Malaysian diaspora to the country. The agency engages with Malaysians abroad and pairs them with local employers to make them aware of the available employment opportunities in the country. The goal is to make possible the return of highly qualified diaspora to the country.[382]

We can conclude tht there are really diametrically opposite policieis here. The Mexican government thinks there is much to gain from having people abroad with connections; the others want their talent home. This reflects different attitudes towards their diasporas. It seems that Mexico understands differently the ways the diaspora contributes to the soft power of the country. At least under the administration of Peña Nieto, CONACyT believed that there is a need to shift the paradigm. Students abroad could generate international scientific research networks beyond the governmental scope. This suggests that the government understands that the qualified diaspora is a source of soft power, and the way they harness that power is done by not losing connection with them.[383] For this, Mexico has created the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME). The institute is under the Sub-Secretary of North America of the SRE, as the US and Canada are hosts of the largest Mexican diaspora. According to the IME, about 11.9 million Mexicans are living abroad, of which 97.79% live in the US.[384] The IME has several regional chapters around the world, with the largest located in the US.

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382 Graeme Atherton and others, *The Shape of Global Higher Education: Understanding the ASEAN Region*, 2018, III, p. 43.

383 Interview 77 Embassy of Mexico in London.

384 IME, 'Instituto de Los Mexicanos En El Exterior', 2018 <https://www.gob.mx/ime> [accessed 29 January 2018].

The engagement with the highly qualified diaspora through the IME responds to the longstanding experience of having large diaspora communities in the US. This is a particular feature of Mexico that Brazil and Malaysia do not have, as their diaspora is not as localised as the Mexican one.

Although migration is a global phenomenon, the case of migration in Mexico is a particular one as the border was the one that moved, hence the first Mexican migrants in the US were not migrants. In the southern territories of the US that were populated by Mexicans, the population had suddenly to adopt an American identity. This changed the culture in these states, as well as the physiognomy of the Mexican migration to the US.[385] This first wave of migration did not stop there. Since then, Mexicans from all over the country migrate legally and illegally to the US, looking for better opportunities. Mexico boasts the third largest diaspora in the world, after China and India.[386] Mexico seems to understand that engagement with the highly qualified diaspora is a way to turn the brain drain discourse into soft power assets. We need to consider that many of these Mexicans go to the US searching for better living conditions, and those second and third generations of Mexicans living abroad lose their cultural ties and identity along the way. Higher education plays a crucial role in engaging with the diaspora through public diplomacy. Chapter 9 further explores this issue.

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[385] Carlos García de Alba, 'La Diáspora Mexicana: De La Indiferencia a Reerente International. Antecedentes y Retos', in *La Política Exterior de México*, ed. by Salvador Cassian Santos and Manuel Martínez del Sobral (Zapopan: El Colegio de Jalisco, 2018), pp. 73–85 (p. 77).

[386] García de Alba, p. 78.

This thesis suggests that governments should consider shifting the brain drain issue towards a soft power strategy, where students educated abroad could become soft power agents, being a vehicle to harness the soft power of the diasporas. Through their engagement with other scientific and academic communities abroad, they can continue with the long-term links created throughout their studies. This critical mass of skilled scientists abroad can become soft power agents through knowledge diplomacy, engaging with foreign audiences, representing their country abroad and at home through their insertion in academic circles and the private sector. To harness the soft power from the diasporas, Brazil and Malaysia could implement initiatives like IME. Better recognition and follow up on these individuals could aid in identifying the scope of their involvement in representing the national interest abroad. What is required is to engage with the diasporas in a better way, recognising their potential in terms of persuasion, influence, image building and global advocacy.

7.5 Key findings

This chapter discussed several short- and long-term governmental outbound mobility programmes, identifying their soft power implications. There are four soft power gains found in the three case studies. First, attraction is a consequence of outbound student mobility programmes. Second, countries seek to obtain influence by sending students abroad. Third, strategic alliances are created or strengthen with key countries, following foreign policy logics. Finally, outbound student mobility serves to obtain international visibility and gain a positive reputation abroad.

7.5.1 Attraction

Outbound student mobility programmes attract foreign governments and HEIs to the higher education system of the country. This is achieved to a greater extent when there is funding for this kind of mobility. The case of SWB better exemplifies the attraction of other international actors to the Brazilian higher education system. Before SWB, the higher education system did not have such visibility. There were economic gains for the receiving countries, as tuition fees for international students are usually high, and there is also an economic spillover from student mobility. *Proyecta 100,000* also attracted US HEIs to receive students from Mexico, and the involvement of other actors was vital for the success of the programme.

Since this research recognises that soft power has a two-way direction, governments should be able to harness the attraction of other countries in favour of their ambitions. Governments should develop an ability to transform that attraction into positive outcomes, such as the creation of a critical mass of human resources educated abroad in institutions with high reputation and empower the diasporas to become soft power agents.

The downside would mean that the sending country becomes attracted to the receiving country, merely becoming a target of that country which will have economic and soft power gains without leaving anything in return to the sending country. To avoid this trap, developing countries that have outbound mobility programmes should implement IHE long-term policies to pursue clear objectives for higher education but that are also linked and enclaved into the foreign affairs agenda. This

policy should clarify the soft power gains of the internationalisation processes, and the mechanisms to harness the soft power potential of the country through higher education.

7.5.2 Influence

Another soft power gain found is the influence that outbound students could exercise when sent abroad, serving as ambassadors of their home country. Once the governments transform the brain drain discourse into a brain gain one and implement policies for the engagement with the highly educated diaspora, they can work towards the implementation of strategies such as the IME in Mexico. This strengthens the soft power of the country abroad through the alumni and students that were beneficiaries of governmental scholarship programmes, such as the ones run by CONACyT.

HEIs can also gain influence through outbound student mobility programmes. HEIs create alliances with foreign HEIs for outbound student mobility purposes. Suppose they do this under umbrella initiatives such as FOBESII. In that case, these non-state actors are empowered by the government to represent and negotiate on behalf of the country, targeting foreign policy objectives while influencing their foreign partners to enrol Mexican students in their institutions, using knowledge diplomacy. They influence foreign governments and partner HEIs transforming academic cooperation into soft power assets.

7.5.3 Strategic alliances

In NICs, outbound student mobility programmes strengthen or create new strategic alliances. Governments allocate resources

to send students abroad, reinforcing the bilateral or multilateral relations of the country through outbound student mobility.

The government of Brazil promotes the creation or strengthening of strategic alliances in all its outbound mobility programmes, appointing CAPES and CNPq as executing bodies. The participation of several ministries such as MoFA and MEC makes it possible for Brazil to link the foreign policy with the higher education agenda. The agency between the different government actors allows the creation, management and launching of outbound mobility programmes with intended soft power consequences for the country. The list of priority countries features in all the programmes evidencing the intersection between foreign policy and IHE.

As for Mexico, the creation of strategic alliances with key countries through outbound mobility is a resource the government uses to expand its foreign policy agenda. This is especially true in the strategies directed towards particular countries, such as the US, Canada and the UK, since outbound mobility programmes promoted by the government become an extension of the bilateral foreign affairs agenda. There is a clear link between foreign policy and IHE, mainly because AMEXCID coordinates the latter from the SRE headquarters, rather than within the ministry of education. Hence, the foreign policy objectives are in the core of the programmes and are part of the rationale of strengthening strategic alliances.

7.5.4 International visibility and reputation building

Governments and other higher education stakeholders are participants of the international visibility the country when

showcasing the higher education system and their science and technology strengths through outbound student mobility. This, in turn, increases the reputation of the country abroad.

The Brazilian government pursues the creation of a critical mass of scientists educated abroad through outbound mobility programmes. The latter have intended soft power consequences, as the goal is also to build a reputation abroad as a country that has talented individuals, where the quality of higher education is such that produces large numbers of individuals able to study overseas. These students are seen as an investment since student mobility brings the possibilities to create networks and academic cooperation with developed countries and HEIs of high reputation. SWB and CAPES PrInt are clear examples of this intended soft power consequence. However, reality differed from the expectations of the government, as at the beginning of SWB students lacked the qualifications expected, such as language proficiency.

Even so, both government programmes aided in building the reputation of Brazil abroad and gained international visibility to the country. Furthermore, Brazil is keen on promoting its most robust capacities, such as environmental studies, sustainability, renewable energy, and other technological and engineering areas, building an image abroad that gravitates towards the mastery of those subjects.

In the case of Mexico, AMEXCID intentionally pursues the soft power projection that outbound student mobility programmes bring to the country, especially when considering its reputation and visibility abroad. The outbound mobility programmes that the government promotes denote a strategy to build a reputation abroad as a country that invests in science and

technology. AMEXCID announced the alliance with the US through FOBESII and *Proyecta 100,000*, intending to increase its reputation within the American higher education sector. The government repeated this pattern in other initiatives, such as *Proyecta 10,000* and the Dual Year Mexico-UK, where the government integrated IHE as part of the bilateral agendas to showcase the country abroad for its capabilities in the higher education sector. AMEXCID is the wielding arm of the country's soft power, which denotes the intentionality of the soft power outcomes achieved through these kinds of programmes.

In sum, as the governments send students to key countries, they are also sending bright individuals that build an image of the country as one with talented and brilliant human resources. The governments consider these students as their ambassadors abroad.[387] Furthermore, their successful performance in the HEIs where they are enrolled bring a positive reputation to the country, and by having high numbers of students enrolled at any HEI abroad, the country gains international visibility as one where science and technology are pursued.

As discussed throughout this thesis, the bi-directionality of soft power impacts on the outcomes for both countries involved in soft power relations. Bright students are attracted to institutions of the Ivy League or Russell Group. They are subjects of the soft power of the host country, while at the same time they perform as representatives of their countries of origin. These individuals are also meeting the other

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[387] Interviews 5 MEC, 6 MEC, 7 CAPES, 8 *Itamaraty*, 13 CNPq and 75 CONACyT

country's students and faculty and are being impressed accordingly. Hence, soft power as an outcome of IHE and, specifically of outbound student mobility, should consider the involvement of the different actors and the subjects of soft power as much as the foreign policy contexts.

Chapter 8: Internationalisation of research

The three NICs studied here have one common objective: to build knowledge societies as a way to foster economic development. Consequently, governments invest in science, technology and innovation to achieve this purpose. Knowledge societies are an outcome of globalisation. Research and innovation in goods and services nowadays determine the competitiveness of economies, breaking the frontiers that historically divided the manufacturing and services sectors. Hence, research and education are crucial to becoming a knowledge society.[388]

Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, invest in research to develop the national science and knowledge production, of which HEIs and research centres are vital actors. This chapter examines a particular element of research – internationalisation of research. It also focuses on the agency between governments and national actors such as HEIs, research centres and other stakeholders, while demonstrating that internationalisation of research has intended soft power consequences.

In NICs, the expansion of research infrastructure targets the development of new knowledge. Governments and HEIs invest resources to achieve this goal. Thus, these actors use internationalisation of research as a way to increase the research capacities of the countries, instead of relying on importing technology to achieve development.

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[388] Philip G Altbach, 'Research and Higher Education in Newly Industrialized Countries', *Higher Education Policy*, 2.3 (1989), 44–45 (p. 44).

Different stakeholders constantly challenge the research agenda of NICs. Local governments, national agencies, academies of sciences, HEIs and research centres, to name a few, attempt to influence the research agenda of their country. In Brazil and Mexico, the autonomy of universities provides the academic and scientific community with leverage to set the research agenda. Therefore, governments have to adjust and implement programmes and strategies while re-directing the research activities and observing the autonomy of universities.[389]

In the case of Malaysia, universities have less autonomy than Brazilian and Mexican HEIs. For example, universities are not able to decide how to allocate funds and research grants. They need to follow the financial procedures imposed by the Ministry of Finance and Treasury. Besides, the Vice-Chancellor is not able to travel abroad for official duties without the consent of the Board of Directors and the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Higher Education.[390] Moreover, the government of Malaysia can set the research agenda through policies, focusing on specific areas and selected research universities and institutes.[391]

In sum, the autonomy of the universities is a domestic factor that affects the implementation of policies, programmes and strategies towards research. Thus, the universities' autonomy is a crucial internal factor in how NICs wield soft power through the internationalisation of research.

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[389] Interviews 13 CNPq, 74 CONACyT.

[390] Chang-Da Wan, *The History of University Autonomy in Malaysia*, *Policy IDEAS*, 2017, XL, p. 17.

[391] Interview 40 IDEAS.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify how internationalisation of research as a component of IHE produces soft power in NICs. We can link soft power to the internationalisation of research in terms of building strategic alliances, gaining international visibility and reputation in science and technology, setting the global agenda through advocacy for the protection of global common goods, and gaining influence of the international community. The discussion of this chapter centres on the role of the governments of Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, and the agency of other stakeholders, in the process of internationalising their research, while linking it to the foreign policy agenda.

Internationalisation of research refers to the inclusion of the international element to research, innovation and knowledge production. Research in science, technology and innovation benefit from the addition of the international dimension as, through partnerships with institutions abroad, Research and Developmnet (R&D) can focus on frontier scientific research, aiming to resolve humanity's greatest challenges. In NICs, research institutions, clusters, research universities, public and private HEIs and other state and non-state actors engage in science and knowledge diplomacy 'to propel their countries to the frontiers of scientific development, to link basic research in these sciences'.[392]

In this chapter, we argue that by including an international dimension to research in global common goods (also known as global public goods), governments intentionally seek soft power gains. Global common goods are those commodities

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[392] Altbach.

that benefit humanity and are by nature available to all. There are two criteria for them. First, their benefits are marked by nonrivalry in consumption – 'the consumption of one individual does not detract from that of another' and non-excludability – 'it is difficult if not impossible to exclude an individual from enjoying the good'.[393] Second, the benefits are quasi-universal, so countries, people and generations can benefit from them.[394] In sum, global common goods are outcomes or intermediate products that tend to be universal, beneficial for all countries, population and generations without discrimination.

This chapter consists of four sections. It begins with a brief introduction of the international research landscapes to identify actors and the particularities of each country. Then, we recognise the different programmes where the government promotes research in selected geographic and knowledge areas. An analysis on ICD follows, focusing in Brazil and Mexico and how the governments pursue the cooperation of HEIs and research centres for soft power gains. Finally, we explore research networks of Brazil and Mexico, paying particular attention to the ways the governments engage with HEIs in strategies such as clusters, innovation diplomacy, and international research networks.

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[393] Joseph Stiglitz, 'Knowledge as a Global Public Good', in *Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, ed. by Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1999), pp. 308–25 (p. 308).

[394] Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, 'Defining Global Public Goods', in *Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, ed. by Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1999), pp. 2–19 (pp. 2–3).

8.1 International research landscape

Different characteristics of the three countries analysed here mark their research landscapes and consequent soft power projection and gains. In Brazil, few public universities engage in research activities. Generally, those are the ones that get to participate for governmental grants.[395] Local universities have to respond to the local needs; hence, the research done in these HEIs has a local focus.[396]

The Brazilian Education Guidelines and Bases Act (LDB) of 1996 is the foundation of the county's research. It articulates that higher education must be comprehensive, concerned with the cultural, scientific and technical production of knowledge. The LDB also states that the purpose of higher education should be to stimulate artistic creation and development of scientific spirit and reflective thinking, to promote the education of professionals in the diverse areas of knowledge, to encourage research for the development of science and technology, and the creation and promotion of culture, developing an understanding of man and its environment.[397] This law puts teaching, research and culture as equal in the higher education of the country.

In terms of research, the LDB prescribes two other purposes to higher education. HEIs should stimulate knowledge to answer the world's most pressing problems, making an emphasis on the solution of national and regional ones. This

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[395] Interview 29 UNIFESP.

[396] Interview 32 UFMT.

[397] Senado Federal, *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases Da Educaçao* (Brasília: Civil House, 1996), p. Law 9,394 (p. 20).

opens the possibility for Brazilian's HEIs to engage in research on global common goods, mainly through links with other HEIs of the continent. It also signals the need to promote and disseminate the achievements and benefits resulting from the research and knowledge production of cultural, scientific and technological research that Brazilian institutions generate.[398]

The Constitution grants the autonomy of Brazilian universities. Agreements and MoUs for the creation of strategic alliances go through the central bodies of the universities, without the MEC's interference. However, the MEC and CNPq allocate resources to programmes to foster research in particular geographic areas of interest for the country. To some extent, autonomy is not total or as broad as in Mexico. There are some frameworks that the MEC still defines.[399]

Different from Brazil, a small group of HEIs of Malaysia engage in research activities. The government of Mahathir (1981-2003) transformed the higher education landscape pursuing the targets of the National Education Strategic Plan. These targets had consequences for the visibility and reputation building of the country (soft power projection) through internationalisation of research. First, in 2006 the government selected four public universities to be the research universities of the country: UM, UPM, USM and UKM. This increased the *internationalisation* processes of these four HEIs and allowed the government to invest in research, priming those HEIs to compete internationally.

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[398] Senado Federal, *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases Da Educaçao*, p. 21.
[399] Interview 13 CNPq.

The goal of the National Higher Education Action Plan: 2007-2010 was to have two HEIs in the top 100 universities at the world rankings, as well as to develop ten prominent R&D centres of excellence. Furthermore, the plan aimed to have three HEIs in the top 100 by 2020 and two HEIs in the top 50 by 2057.[400] By 2016, the research universities were increased to five (UTM being the latest addition), all of which were listed in the top 100 QS University Rankings: Asia.[401] The government gives additional research funding to the research universities, committing resources to fulfil objectives.

One of the six objectives of the MoHE is to strengthen the rankings of public universities. At large, public universities have poorly performed in the world rankings, with only the UM meeting the expectations of MoHE.[402] Malaysian scholars have expressed several concerns around university rankings and the pressure to meet the government's key performance indicators. For instance, there are concerns on the weight the rankings give to high impact publications in natural sciences and medicine, without considering the contributions of social science education and institutional outcomes in national contexts.[403] Other concerns are on the lines of 'westernisation' and homogenisation of higher education while ignoring the social and economic development contributions of HEIs within the local realities and societies they have the mandate to

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[400] Tham, 'From the Movement of Itinerant Scholars to a Strategic Process', p. 8.

[401] Study Malaysia, 'Malaysian Research Universities in Top 100 of QS University Rankings: Asia 2016', 2016 <https://studymalaysia.com/education/top-stories/all-five-malaysian-research-universities-in-top-100-of-qs-university-rankings> [accessed 9 April 2020].

[402] Yao Sua Tan and Soo Khoon Goh, 'International Students, Academic Publications and World University Rankings: The Impact of Globalisation and Responses of a Malaysian Public University', *Higher Education*, 68.4 (2014), 489–502 (p. 490).

[403] Yang Farina, Koo Yew Lie, and Yazrina Yahya, *Internationalisation of Higher Education. Insights from Malaysian Higher Education Institutions* (Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sains Malaysia Press, 2015), p. 11.

serve.[404] For this reason, universities such as the USM have rejected the world university rankings as a benchmark for academic excellence.[405]

Malaysia differs from Brazilian and Mexican higher education and research landscapes as the former has an authoritarian system, where 'the state authority has absolute primacy (…) politicians and the state predominate in the fashioning and dissemination of policy'.[406] This translates in the massive interference of governmental bodies in shaping the R&D of the country, usually through policies, allowing little contribution from other national actors, as well as little university autonomy.

A study conducted by the British Council in 2017, identified that Malaysia had developed units to strengthen the collaborations of the country with other ASEAN members. Nevertheless, research collaborations between members of the ASEAN tend to be guided by particular HEIs that have the infrastructure to do so.[407]

The National Policy on Science, Technology and Innovation (NPSTI) guides the R&D of Malaysia. This policy places particular importance to international strategic alliances, as global collaborations and partnerships are seen as essential to advance the R&D of the country.[408]

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[404] Interview 59 UKM and 87 UDG.

[405] Tan and Goh, pp. 490–91.

[406] Sean Matthews, *Autonomy and Accountability in Higher Education: Lessons from Ghana and Mexico*, *Policy IDEAS* (Kuala Lumpur, 2017), p. 4.

[407] Atherton and others, III, p. 25.

[408] MoSTI, *National Policy on Science, Technology & Innovation (NPSTI) 2013-2020* (Malaysia, 2013), p. 25.

Out of the three of them, Malaysia is the only country that has a national policy to guide the internationalisation of research. In Brazil, sectorial and regional policies drive the internationalisation of research, without a federal project.[409] By contrast, Mexico has a law that allows for the implementation of programmes (such as PECiTI), but no internationalisation of research policy.

In Mexico, the international research landscape differs from that of Malaysia as research is done in a more autonomous framework. Juan Ramón de la Fuente, the former rector of UNAM, articulates that 'without autonomy, there can be no academic freedom'.[410] The solutions that free academia and research can provide to a country's problems not always match the political interests of the elite. The independence of mind offers credibility to the university's advances.[411] It is in these lines of autonomy that universities and research centres become actors of soft power through international research in their own right.

There are three main areas within the autonomy of Mexican public universities. HEIs have autonomy of designation, meaning that universities have autonomy in hiring, promoting and the dismissal of faculty, authorities and administrative staff. They also have financial freedom, for which universities have the control of enrolment and fees, and they control and execute their budgets. More importantly, academic autonomy means that universities are free to decide the procedures for

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[409] Academia Brasileira de Ciências, *Ciência, Tecnologia, Economia E Qualidade De Vida Para O Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 2018), p. 5.

[410] Juan Ramón De la Fuente, *La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (Ciudad de México: Nostra Ediciones, 2010), p. 50.

[411] De la Fuente, p. 51.

admitting students, design the curricula, the requirements to obtain academic degrees, and determine the scope and extent of academic freedom.[412] Autonomy also means that researchers and universities have the freedom to select the topic of research that responds to the local and national realities without the interference of the government, even if the majority of the budget allocated to research comes from federal or state's sources. In sum, Mexico's public universities have very high degrees of institutional autonomy, which is accompanied by 'a strong, established principle of higher education as a public good'.[413]

Autonomy grants universities the right to decide the international partners, geographic areas and areas of knowledge they see fit to involve in their internationalisation of research strategies. In this way, they become actors that can lead the national and international research agenda. In turn, the government attempts to gain control of the research agenda of the country through different bodies and the allocation of resources. In Mexico, CONACyT is the governmental agency entrusted with the R&D, technology transfer and the national research strategy. In 2002, CONACyT proclaimed the Law of Science and Technology. Its long-term goals include to achieve, by 2025, a governmental investment of more than 2% of the GNP in R&D activities, and the world's recognition of Mexico as one of the top 20 countries more developed in science and technology, this also

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[412] Armando Alcántara, 'Autonomía de La Universidad Pública En Una Era de Globalización: El Caso de La UNAM', *EccoS Revista Científica*, 5.1 (2003), 77–94 (p. 83).

[413] Matthews, pp. 9–10.

being a soft power objective.[414] The Law of Science and Technology also postulates the conditions for the creation of the Special Programme of Science, Technology and Innovation (PECiTI) of 2014.

There are significant differences between the three countries analysed here. Brazilian and Mexican universities have autonomy, for which government bodies have to act as catalysts of international research through different mechanisms, such as strategies and programmes, both at a national and local level. In turn, universities and research centres gain their right as actors that guide the research agenda of the country, becoming soft power agents in the process. By contrast, Malaysia has a more centralised system; the government makes decisions on international research top-to-bottom. National laws and policies empower the government to guide the R&D. However, this approach is controversial as policies can be rhetorical, emphasising the discourse and with no implementation or follow up measures. Overall, the three countries have different research landscapes, for which the internationalisation of research has distinctive impacts on the soft power of these nations.

8.2 Research programmes: geographic and knowledge areas

Brazil has, for decades, invested in R&D through different programmes and strategies. This investment has allowed for the creation of a critical mass of scientists that can respond to the demands and the tremendous national challenges. Brazil

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[414] CONACyT, 'Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología', 2018
<http://www.conacyt.gob.mx/> [accessed 2 February 2018].

stands out in this component due to the intensity of research done in the country. The country first built its reputation on science and technology, before opening up its higher education system to *internationalisation*. This reputation attracts potential partners from around the world.[415]

According to the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, despite lacking a national policy or plan on science and technological innovation, the investment in R&D has produced significant advances. Among them are the oil exploration in the ocean, the increase in the tropical agricultural productivity, the expansion of renewable energy production, advances in Brazilian medicine on issues such as Zika, the emergence of high-tech companies with global insertion, the international role of Brazilian science and the evolution of an aerospace industry with a strong international presence.[416]

Brazilian resources provide international recognition of its scientific development. The country hosts approximately 20% of the world's biodiversity. Its sustainable use results in the development of new medicine, new materials, and have the potential to increase food production with minimum use of land, water and fertilisers. The presence of water resources is abundant; almost 12% of the total in the world. This is useful for food production and energy. Finally, the country has a climate that allows for the exploitation of solar and wind energy and mineral resources that are fundamental to the development of the industry sector.[417]

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[415] Interview 1 Brazilian Academy of Sciences.
[416] Academia Brasileira de Ciências, p. 5.
[417] Academia Brasileira de Ciências, pp. 5–6.

Brazil's internationalisation of research has been directed by the government through CNPq, to three specific geographic areas: Europe, Africa and America. The rationales behind internationalisation of research prioritise collaboration with Africa and South America, following the foreign policy.

The relationship with developed countries is different than that pursued with the Global South. While Brazil has aspirations to be included in leading international organisations and have a profile as a middle power in international politics, it also aspires to become a voice for the third-world causes. For this, Brazil needs to strengthen its ties to both the North and the South. Different programmes reflect this strategy, where the government promoted the internationalisation of research within these two groups of countries.

The relationship of Brazil with the EU was an essential part of the foreign policy portfolio of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Science and technology played its role in the agenda, as the government installed new cooperation schemes between Brazil and the EU. The government was particularly interested in consolidating that bond so that in 2010 it announced to establish an Institute of European Studies by a group of Brazilian universities. From this moment on, the EU financed several technical cooperation projects. A joint action plan between Brazil and the EU resulted in 37 actions along with 11 sectorial dialogues during Lula's administration.[418] Unfortunately, the Institute of European Studies closed after its first period, having a low impact in European studies on Brazil. However, it encouraged the mobility of students and

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[418] Gomes Saraiva, p. 284.

faculty from European institutions.[419] It also established the beginning of a fruitful relationship with the EU. Still, the main foreign policy objectives of Brazil focused on the regional dynamics with South America and Lusophone countries.

The administration of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) also emphasized the aspiration to become closer to developed counties, as it promoted academic and technological cooperation with European countries and North America. An example of this was the programme SWB, which favoured the collaboration with HEIs in these geographic areas. SWB had as primary goal Brazilian students' outbound mobility. However, it had as a secondary goal the attraction of young talent and top researchers. Hence, internationalisation of research is an element of SWB, albeit in a less robust way.

SWB allocated a total of 1,276 bursaries to attract foreign researchers and young talent. Of these, 60.66% were visiting researchers, and 39.34% young talent.[420] These bursaries represent only 1.38% of the total grants. The importance of SWB is not the small budget allocated to attract foreign researchers, but that this milestone programme deliberately pursued the attraction of talented scientists to strengthen Brazil's soft power through IHE. In this case, not only through outbound student mobility, but also through technical-scientific cooperation, joint research, and providing a platform for the visibility of academic and scientific research of Brazil.[421] SWB demonstrated the 'use of soft power for the strengthening of [Brazil's] international relations and of

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[419] Gomes Saraiva, p. 292.

[420] Ciencia Sem Fronteiras.

[421] Presidência da República, pp. 1–2.

national prestige'.[422] Brazilian science diplomacy was strengthened through SWB, as in the programme science strengthened cooperation with strategic allies and important economic partners.

Some other projects that serve to the projection of Brazil within international science and technology include its participation in the CERN laboratory, the biggest laboratory of particle physics in the world; the Programme of Ecological Research of Long Duration (PELD) in partnership with the UK, and the Sea Science Programme and the Atlantic Forest Programme in collaboration with Germany.

CNPq showcases these programmes as the country's most prominent international cooperation projects with developed countries. The soft power implications found are the growth of the international profile of research and researchers, as well as of the reputation of the country, building upon the image of Brazil as a country capable of contending in science and knowledge production with developed countries. HEIs and researchers engage in science diplomacy because the government is empowering them. The thematic areas where the government pursues international cooperation are global common goods or great challenges to humanity. At the same time, these areas of knowledge also are natural strengths and high-profile resources of the country. Hence, we can read the benefits of investing in research on these areas in terms of soft power gains.

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[422] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 141.

We can conclude that international cooperation through research with developed countries enhances the image of Brazil abroad, showcasing the competitive advantages of the country gaining international visibility and recognition. This aids in strengthening the strategic alliances of the country for soft power gains, particularly with developed countries and in topics in which Brazil is strong in R&D.

In the case of developing countries, CNPq places importance in two regions that have prominence in Brazilian foreign policy: Africa and Latin America. PROAFRICA, an international cooperation programme that frames cooperation with African countries, was established in 2004 to elevate the scientific and technological capacities of African countries. For this, the government finances the academic mobility of researchers, with an emphasis in strategic areas.[423] In 2011, the programme went into a phase of restructuration, and most of the international research done with Africa is now under the auspice of the ABC and framed under ICD.

Through the Brazilian Antarctic Programme (PROANTAR) the government leverages its soft power in the form of international visibility and reputation building. The objective is to produce scientific knowledge on Antarctica and its relations with the global climate system, including the biosphere, oceans and atmosphere.[424] CNPq acts as coordinator of the different actors that intervene in PROANTAR, including the universities and research institutes that conduct scientific

[423] CNPq, 'International Cooperation CNPq - PROAFRICA', 2020 <http://www.cnpq.br/web/guest/proafrica> [accessed 27 May 2020].
[424] CNPq, 'International Cooperation CNPq - PROANTAR', 2020 <http://www.cnpq.br/web/guest/apresentacao-proantar/> [accessed 6 June 2020].

activities in Brazil's Antarctic station, promoting partnerships with other Latin American countries that have stations in Antarctica. PROANTAR propels the image of Brazil as a protector of global common goods while strengthening cooperation with other Latin American countries, acquiring recognition for knowledge production, science and technology. These are soft power gains for the country attained through internationalisation of research, making use of science diplomacy.

The Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (MCTIC) has a series of strategies that involve international cooperation under the soft power and science diplomacy umbrellas. Those include the support of research projects developed by the MCTIC, HEIs and research centres, knowledge generation involving techniques and technologies, support to national researchers in their participation in international multilateral experiments, contributions to international scientific institutions, and scientific advising to decision-making in foreign policy.[425] Thus, it becomes clear that IHE (in its internationalisation of research component) has become a source of soft power for the country. Furthermore, these strategies prove the existing link between higher education and international relations, as well as the agency between the government and the higher education sector, evidencing that the government expects soft power outcomes out of academic collaboration.

At the local level, other actors intervene in the creation of research centres that target some of the foreign policy

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[425] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 143.

objectives of the country. Such is the case of the Centre of Japanese-Brazilian Studies (CENB), funded at a local level by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). This is an example of how other national actors in Brazil are also fundamental for the internationalisation of research and wielding soft power. The CENB is an independent institution whose main objective is to reach an understanding of the history of Japanese migration to Brazil and the lives of the immigrants and their descendants.[426] Founded in 1946 in the state of Sao Paulo, it promotes research on issues concerning the Japanese-Brazilian population. The Centre also has several calls to fund research projects, some of which are supported by FAPESP, bringing together an independent research centre with a governmental agency. We can argue that, by funding those projects, the local government endorses the research done in bilateral issues, making a foreign policy issue such as the bilateral relation of Brazil and Japan a matter of concern of local governments and researchers in the country.

Another example of research centres that foster internationalisation of research while engaging in the foreign policy agenda is the Brazilian Agency of Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA). In Brazil, agriculture is incredibly strong due to the vast natural resources it possesses. Specialised governmental research centres such as EMBRAPA focus on research to improve the local society. In the technology area, the cultural question is essential and robust in Brazil. Local customs are rigid, especially the cultural products of the Northeast region. CNPq had to find a way to introduce

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[426] CENB, 'Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros', 2019.

scientific information with initiatives that adapt to the local realities. In CNPq's view, more technology equals more accelerated growth, for which CNPq and EMBRAPA collaborate in bringing technology to remote parts of the country in agricultural issues while respecting the local realities. In the international front, the government of Brazil has taken advantage of that mode of introduction of technology with a focus on global realities, as the model is transferrable to cooperation with Africa and other countries in Latin America.[427] The agricultural advances achieved through EMBRAPA serve as an example to other countries in those two regions of interest for the country. When EMBRAPA engages in international collaborations with Africa and Latin America, representing the national interest and disseminating knowledge in these two regions, the agency participates in knowledge diplomacy, becoming a soft power agent.

For Brazil, it is crucial to gain a reputation as an international actor with developed research capabilities. The country's investment in research, knowledge production and science and technology has created a positive image globally, with both HEIs and the government contributing to this gained reputation through IHE. This has made developed countries to show interest in Brazilian research capabilities. For instance, by 2019, 46 UK institutions had joint activities with Brazilian institutions, becoming the second-largest research partner, just after the US.[428] Furthermore, from 2015 to 2018, the co-authored publications between the UK and Brazilian HEIs

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[427] Interview 13 CNPq.

[428] Universities UK International, *The State of the Relationship: Mapping UK Higher Education Engagement with Brazil*, 2019, p. 32.

increased by 31.5%, reaching over 13,000. Medicine, physics, astronomy, biochemistry, genetics and molecular biology are the subjects that dominate the collaborative research output. This way, 'Brazil leads the South American region in terms of research collaboration with the UK'.[429]

For CNPq, international research has also gained the country a voice in international forums such as the FAO, particularly regarding agriculture and the Amazon. However, the Amazon is also a political subject. Deforestation has taken place to favour cattle breeding and agriculture of soybeans. A new law has been put in place to stop deforestation, but the environmental damage had already taken place. Here is where universities, researchers and the Brazilian Academy of Sciences come into the defence of the Amazon. They become advocates for the biodiversity of all what the Amazon contains, including aborigines and its cultures.[430] HEIs become actors of public and knowledge diplomacy by placing a focus on the protection of the Amazon globally, where a local problem becomes a matter of global common goods.

We can conclude that the government of Brazil has particular programmes that include international research in critical geographic areas, that at the same time pursue foreign policy objectives. Also, several governmental and non-state actors intervene in R&D, and the inclusion of the international dimension to research has made these actors participants of the country's soft power gains. These gains include the strengthening of strategic alliances; building an image abroad

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[429] Universities UK International, p. 5.
[430] Interview 13 CNPq.

of Brazil as a country rich in natural resources and in science, technology and innovation; and becoming an advocate for the protection of global common goods by investing in resources and concerns that are of the importance of all humanity.

In the case of Malaysia, the five research universities have become the focus of the research activities of the country. These universities have developed specialised research centres, dedicated to issues that are of national interest. For instance, the UM created the Centre of Research for Power Electronics, Drives, Automation and Control; the UKM invested in the Medical Molecular Biology Institute; and the USM created the Institute for Research in Molecular Medicine, to name a few. These research centres are increasingly developing international research along with the mobility of faculty and researchers, visiting fellowships and the invitation of Nobel Laureates as visiting professors.[431]

The government targets to increase the number of academic outputs (publications) and the inclusion of international staff. Both goals are also a concern of the global rankings. Hence, the rationale to reach these goals is embedded in the government's ambition to increase the country's position in the top 200 in such classifications.[432] This shows that internationalisation of research in Malaysia follows economic rationales but also pursues prestige and reputation.

The case of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) deserves special consideration for its contribution to

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[431] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University 's Response', p. 658.

[432] Nooraini Mohamad Sheriff and Noordini Abdullaj, 'Research Universities in Malaysia: What Beholds?', *Asian Journal of University Education*, 13.2 (2017), 35–50 (p. 41).

international research and soft power. The government has identified this public HEI as a fundamental institution for its research in two particular themes: Islamic finance and Theology studies.[433] In the former, the IIUM has established an International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance, which attracts international students from the Muslim world. From 1983-1990, the government of Malaysia provided scholarships to study in the IIUM to international students from Muslim nations that were in conflict. Although the scholarships were no longer available since 2005, and the student fees are high for international students, the reputation of the IIUM in those two topics attract international students as well as researchers and visiting professors from the Muslim world.[434] Furthermore, Islamic Banking and Theology studies are high among the QS ranking by subjects, in great part due to their research, publications and number of international faculty, which aids in the attraction of the targeted nations.[435]

The NPSTI, which guides the research strategy of the country, gives special consideration to the enhancement of strategic alliances. On its sixth component, the NPSTI highlights the multilateral organisations it belongs to, such as ASEAN, APEC, NAM, OIC, UNESCO, WHO and WTO, and the need to strengthen the collaboration with these organisations through research, technology transfer and trade opportunities.[436] There are two soft power consequences imprinted in the policy: the

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[433] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University 's Response', p. 653.

[434] Interview 45 IIUM.

[435] See chapter 9 for more on internationalisation of research and attraction through Islam studies.

[436] MoSTI, p. 21.

strengthening of strategic alliances following the priorities set by both the foreign policy and the research policy, and the attraction of global partners to improve the R&D ecosystem.

In the case of Mexico, CONACyT promotes public policies and the development of technical and scientific research, becoming a primary actor for the foundation of Mexico's knowledge society.[437] The Mexican Academy of Sciences points out that a significant challenge for CONACyT is to strengthen the global engagement of Mexican science. Mexico needs to develop a strategic international cooperation plan to coordinate the areas, programmes and actors better. The US is the country with which Mexico conducts most of its international cooperation in terms of research and knowledge exchange. Therefore, there is an evident need for diversification, particularly to other nations in Latin America.[438]

In terms of internationalisation of research, the PECiTI includes two strategic points that guide the funding of academic and research activities through CONACyT. First is the geographic areas that are strategic for the country.[439] These are either developed countries or nations with similar levels of development. Second is the selection of priority areas of knowledge that the government would benefit from, in an attempt to guide the research agenda of the country. These include the environment, understanding of the universe, sustainable development, technological development, energy,

[437] CONACyT, *Informe General Del Estado de La Ciencia, La Tecnología y La Innovación 2017* (Ciudad de México, 2017), p. 119.

[438] Alejandra Monsiváis Molina, 'Fortalecer La Vinculación Internacional de La Ciencia Mexicana, Reto Para El CONACyT', *Boletín Informativo de La Academia Mexicana de Ciencias*, Noviembre.19 (2013), 11–12 (p. 11).

[439] Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Spain, the UK and the US.

health and society.[440] As can be observed, the majority of those areas are related to the protection of global common goods, as in the case of Brazil. Unfortunately, PECiTI had a four-year validity. It finished in 2018, with the change of administration. The lack of continuity in these kinds of programmes jeopardizes the benefits obtained, such as the identification of priority areas and soft power outcomes. This thesis suggests that the country should focus on the continuity of programmes and policies to harness the soft power benefits that come with the internationalisation of research.

The research done in the US-Mexico border is essential in the research agenda of the country. The bilateral relationship with the US is of primary importance in foreign policy. The national interest is to maintain a positive relationship with the neighbouring country, and the bilateral research conducted between US and Mexican HEIs is vital for mutual understanding. HEIs and research centres of Mexico are active participants in the maintenance of bilateral diplomatic relations through internationalisation of research. For instance, the *Colegio de la Frontera Norte* (COLEF) is a Mexican research centre that has eight venues across the northern border, and that enquires the different issues surrounding the bilateral relation, migration and even the impact of COVID19 in migrants and border towns.[441] Institutions of the sort become agents of soft power when they engage in knowledge diplomacy. The COLEF examines subjects vital for the survival of the country, representing it when engaging with other

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[440] CONACyT, *Programa Especial de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2014-2018*, p. 51.

[441] COLEF, 'El Colegio de La Frontera Norte', 2020 <https://www.colef.mx/> [accessed 20 June 2020].

researchers from the US and communicating the national interest through their publications.[442]

Mexico requires an IHE policy that articulates the participation of different actors, emphasising the benefits of the internationalisation of research. Mexico attracts other researchers in selected issues, such as history, cultural assets, ethnicity, culture, archaeology, and cultural and colonial heritage. UNAM, for example, recognises that research teams traditionally seek to engage with the institution in these areas of knowledge.[443] Still, there is another Mexico, where modern research in areas of scientific development is making its way to the international focus. Incubators are an excellent example of it.

In sum, CONACyT and AMEXCID are the central government bodies that promote collaborative international research in Mexico. However, other national actors such as HEIs and research centres have a decisive participation in establishing the research agenda of the country. North America and Latin America continue to be the prioritized geographic areas, following the foreign policy. Still, collaboration with European HEIs is strong. Even if the PECiTI attempted to guide international cooperation in terms of research, the strategy only lasted four years, and there is no policy for the internationalisation of research. In these circumstances, other actors such as HEIs and research centres can push the research agenda as to where and in which areas of knowledge

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[442] We must not confuse the national interest with the interest of the government. In fact, the autonomy of universities gives them academic freedom to publish findings that are of interest for the nation, not the government in turn.

[443] Interview 83 SRE/UNAM.

research advances in the country. They select their strategic alliances and bring visibility to the research done in the country, engaging in knowledge diplomacy and becoming soft power agents.

8.3 International Cooperation for Development in Brazil and Mexico

Brazilian and Mexican governments have been able to harness soft power by engaging the higher education sector with ICD to target foreign policy objectives. In this section, Malaysia is not exhaustively examined as no soft power gains were identified at the same level as those found in Brazil and Mexico.

Brazil's increasing participation in the international scene and the aspiration of becoming a voice to developing countries are the two leading platforms through which Brazil wields its soft power, for which South-South cooperation becomes key in its foreign affairs.[444] The ABC is the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, which provides ICD through technical cooperation, educational cooperation and sports cooperation. Particularly in technical cooperation, the government of Brazil concedes widening participation of the academic community in ICD actions.[445]

Brazil has engaged with developing countries through over 7,000 projects over the last 20 years, which have focused primarily on Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. The main areas of interest with greater volumes of exchange are

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[444] Sandra H. Bry, 'Brazil's Soft-Power Strategy: The Political Aspirations of South–South Development Cooperation', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13 (2017), 297–316 (p. 298).
[445] Interview 10 ABC.

agriculture, health, education, environment and public administration.[446]

There is no general law for international cooperation for development, like in Mexico. However, the government of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) influenced ABC to produce soft power outcomes through ICD in defined sectors and targets.[447] Since then, the ICD in Brazil has been an instrument to engage with the Global South and a platform for Brazil to give 'a voice to developing countries by reinforcing alliances and cooperation between Southern countries'.[448]

Under the administration of Temer (2016-2018), the ABC followed the Mexican model and developed the first draft of an ICD law, adapted to Brazilian realities. However, it is the ABC's opinion that there are not yet the necessary conditions to evolve into the structure that Mexico has.[449]

The ABC is not the only participant of Brazilian ICD. The government has a list of Brazilian partner institutions, which includes 37 HEIs and research centres, among which are the UnB, USP and UFMG. Therefore, universities act as the institution of Brazilian cooperation. There is not a list or catalogue of researchers in universities to contact; this instead operates as a case-by-case scenario. When contacted by ABC, there is an understanding that researchers do not participate as individuals but as representatives of institutions.[450]

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[446] Interview 10 ABC.
[447] Bry, p. 297.
[448] Bry, p. 298.
[449] Interview 10 ABC.
[450] Interview 10 ABC.

In short, HEIs and research centres engage in ICD upon request of the ABC and become agents of soft power by turning their resources (researchers, laboratories, etc.) into soft power assets. They do this through science diplomacy, engaging in projects dedicated to bringing development to other countries. The government enables them to engage in ICD and, at the same time, they fill the void of governmental soft power resources. Ultimately, the soft power obtained through ICD highlights the strategic alliances with other developing nations, influencing and persuading them through research and cooperation, gaining an international reputation and a voice for the country in international organisations.

A strong link between South-South cooperation and soft power was evident during the interview with ABC. Brazil is a food export country, for which there is not an economic interest in expanding or transferring their knowledge on agriculture to African countries. However, one of the most popular areas in South-South cooperation with Africa is in the field of agriculture, helping them to develop their capabilities so they can produce their food rather than buying from abroad. Because the rationale is not an economic one, the ABC suggested that it is a soft power one. Therefore, the projection of soft power to African countries through South-South cooperation acquires more relevance than trade, empowering African counterparts in the process.[451]

Africa is the region that receives most of the Brazilian aid, accounting for 64.3% of the budget for ICD, distributed in 437

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[451] Interview 10 ABC.

projects, of which 412 are in Sub-Saharan Africa.[452] Even if 40 out of 53 African countries receive Brazilian aid, the government allocates the resources in five states, all of which are CPLP members: Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Angola. These countries receive 83.4% of the total of the aid for Africa.[453] This distribution of ICD to African countries follow foreign policy logics. The ICD serves for strengthening the strategic alliances of the country, in particular the Lusophone ones.

Moreover, More Food International (MFI) was a programme designed to promote the export of agricultural machinery to African smallholder family farmers.[454] Installed under the administration of Lula da Silva (203-2010), the programme consists of the offering of subsidized credit to family farmers to support modernization, acquiring agricultural machinery and improving productivity.[455] This case and, in general, cooperation in agriculture, are clear examples of the influence that Brazil has harnessed through internationalisation of research and ICD. Brazil attracts African countries for its agricultural expertise that is compatible with the realities of African countries, instead of importing technologies of the North.

EMBRAPA is also a key partner in the implementation of the ICD of the country. This agency, jointly with the *Universidade Federal de Lavras*, leads five programmes with African

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[452] Javier Abellán and José Antonio Alonso, *The Role of Brazil as a New Donor of Development Aid in Africa*, *Africa, New Powers, Old Powers* (Bologna, 2017), p. 7.

[453] Abellán and Alonso, p. 8.

[454] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 85.

[455] Lídia Cabral and others, 'Brazil's Agricultural Politics in Africa: More Food International and the Disputed Meanings of "Family Farming"', *World Development*, 81 (2016), 47–60 (p. 49).

countries in areas of cotton agriculture, which include collaboration with Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, Senegal and Zimbabwe, among others. From 2014-2016, fifteen countries have benefited from the programme, training 1,638 professionals.[456] Among the benefits of these initiatives are the development of agriculture in African countries, technology transfer adapted to the agricultural and socio-economic conditions of these countries, training of researchers and producers, technological dissemination, and contribution to their infrastructure.[457]

The ICD that Brazil provides to African nations also produces benefits for the country in terms of soft power. Brazil has a long-term strategy that uses *solidarity* instead of hard power resources to build an international image and achieve its interests. Brazil stresses that the receiving countries are not only 'recipients' of cooperation, but the government is applying a different model from the developed countries because its motivation is solidarity, adding legitimacy to its relations with the Global South.[458]

Brazilian aid is an alternative to traditional development donors.[459] The country has been able to strengthen its relations with Africa while promoting South-South relations. This has helped the country to gain positions within international organisations. An example of this is the appointment of the Brazilian José Graziano da Silva as

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[456] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 29.

[457] Instituto de Pesqusa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, p. 30.

[458] Bry, p. 302.

[459] Cabral and others, p. 49.

Director-General of the FAO in 2011, which Brazil achieved due to the support of African nations in the election process.[460]

Triangular cooperation has also served Brazil to find its place as a middle power. Brazil's historical roots and closeness to Africa allow for the country to become a bridge between the North and the Global South. Through triangular cooperation, the state gains international visibility and reputation. An example of this is its engagement with the Japanese agency JICA. Launched in 2008, the Japanese Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS) programme comprises a series of projects recognised as triangular cooperation and that involve HEIs of Brazil and Japan. One of such is 'Training for Third Countries', in which the UCAMPINAS and JICA offered an international course on infections with HIV/AIDS patients in 2009.[461]

SATREPS aims to target global problems of humanity, such as global warming, bio-resources, natural disasters, and infectious diseases.[462] Japan has seen this strategy as 'science and technology diplomacy'. Through SATRESPS, Japan develops strategic partnerships with developing countries, aligning the research to the SDGs and linking new knowledge and technology with local needs.[463] SATREPS is a projection of Japan's soft power, using triangular cooperation, science and knowledge diplomacy to engage with the Global South.

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[460] Interview 13, CNPq.

[461] JICA, *50 Anos de Cooperação Brasil-Japão*, p. 9.

[462] JICA, *Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development Program*, 2017, p. 3.

[463] JICA, *Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development Program*, p. 3.

Brazil is subject of the soft power projection of Japan, wielded through the SATREPS programme. However, Brazil also projects its soft power by influencing other developing countries involved, providing them with technical assistance funded by developed countries. This has a two-folded consequence. It consolidates the relationships with the countries in need while gaining a reputation as a voice for the Global South causes.

In the case of SATREPS, the country also gains a reputation as a country concerned with the UN SDGs and that partner with developed countries to achieve them. Hence, even if Brazil is subject to soft power projections of a developed country, it also leverages its soft power to both developing and developed countries, IHE becoming a gateway to achieve this.

Mexico shares similarities with the Brazilian model, as HEIs and research centres are also involved in key thematic areas, particularly in the protection of global common goods. In the case of Mexico, AMEXCID is the agency that coordinates ICD.

An example of the agency between AMEXCID and HEIs to attain foreign policy goals and harness soft power through South-South cooperation and international research are the food and agricultural projects with African countries. AMEXCID launched a strategy to strengthen the agricultural sector, particularly for the production and handling of corn for consumption with African nations such as Kenia, Tanzania and Malawi. The project is called *Nixtamalización del Maíz para África.*[464] In 2016 and 2018, AMEXCID, the *Centro*

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[464] See AMEXCID, *2º Informe Semestral 2013* (Ciudad de México, 2013), p. 13.

International del Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT) and UNAM donated corn mills to Kenia and Ghana, training their counterparts on their use and installing laboratories in partner universities.[465] Similarly, UDG, UAEM and the *Universidad de Morelia* have collaborated with AMEXCID in the introduction of the *nopal* cactus in other African countries, such as Ethiopia.[466]

The participation of HEIs and research centres of Mexico in South-South cooperation in Africa in issues regarding *nopal* cactus and corn, endemic to Mexico, aids in building the reputation of the country in multilateral organisations, and this is actively pursued by the government of Mexico as soft power projection.[467] Even if the priorities of the ICDL are Central America and Latin America, South-South cooperation with Africa in terms of food and agriculture is important as this collaboration has gained prestige and a positive image to Mexico. At the same time, these projects have gained Mexico a reputation within the UN system, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP measures poorness of countries, for which Mexico took the formula that PNUD applies and improved it. The organisation is collaborating with AMEXCID to implement the new procedure to other countries, as it targets multidimensional poverty, and Mexico is placed as an example in multilateral forums in this issue.[468] This can be read as a soft power gain in terms of influence, as the ICD programmes where HEIs have involved gain reputation to the country in the international arena.

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[465] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*; AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*.

[466] AMEXCID, *Informe 2015*, p. 23; AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*, p. 53.

[467] Interview 84 AMEXCID and 85 AMEXCID.

[468] Interview 85 AMEXCID.

Even if there is a clear tendency to link the research and higher education sector in ICD, the majority of the aid that AMEXCID provides is in terms of technical cooperation. Scientific research requires more engagement, the payment of airfares for researchers and costs associated with it, but the resources are not enough to cover many of these actions.[469] This lack of resources has implied that HEIs of Mexico have been able to engage in joint research with other countries using their resources. For example, the UDG continues with the study and collaboration on *nopal* with African nations, investing own resources. This means that the HEIs and research centres become agents of soft power, acquiring conversion abilities using tools such as knowledge diplomacy.

Despite the similarities in terms of ICD between Brazil and Mexico, the ICD works differently in Mexico, as the government is more able to guide the ICD and include the participation of HEIs and research institutes. In Mexico, there are calls and direct invitations to other countries as an offering party, while in Brazil the aid is done per request. AMEXCID defines the priority areas, attending to the political situation of the country. Then, AMEXCID organises and agrees upon the terms and conditions for the aid and asks institutions to present the projects to get involved in ICD.[470] Even if the soft power gains are similar, the ICDL empowers AMEXCID by allowing it to coordinate both the ICD and the *internationalisation of higher education*. This provides

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[469] Interview 85 AMEXCID.

[470] Interview 85 AMEXCID.

AMEXCID with the role of an executing body with more ability to harness soft power through IHE.

8.4 Research networks

There were two features identified for the case of Brazil, where the government and other national actors have been pursuing international research networks that provide soft power gains for the country. First is the creation of clusters for research in a triple and quadruple helix models, followed by the government's development of innovation diplomacy.

In the case of Mexico, AMEXCID has been guiding the creation of research networks in the country through specific strategies at a federal level. At the same time, other non-state actors participate in the creation of research networks, strengthening the strategic alliances and building an image of the country through internationalisation of research. We explore here three of these networks. We begin with the Consortium of North American Higher Education Collaboration (CONAHEC). Then, we present the Visiting Chair Mexico-UK as a governmental strategy to create networks. Finally, we expose how collaboration with Japan and Korea strengthen the soft power of the country through the internationalisation of research.

8.4.1 Brazilian clusters and internationalisation of research

In 2008, Brazil created the National Institutes of Science and Technology Programme (INCT), as an attempt to foster the investment in R&D, introducing new technologies in regionally themed clusters through a quadruple helix model. CNPq coordinates this programme with other partners. These include

CAPES, the Ministry of Health, and the Research Support Foundations of the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Amazonas, Bahia, Pará, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Norte, Piauí and Santa Catarina. The research the clusters produce is at the frontiers of science and technology; their purpose is to generate knowledge and innovation with a local focus, articulating and mobilising researchers and developing collaboration between the HEIs and research centres of the country in selected topics. One of the main objectives is to boost the research of the country to be internationally competitive.[471]

The partnership between universities and research centres with the governmental bodies through the INCT has brought international visibility to the country. The clusters focus on scientific fields such as engineering, biotechnology, nanotechnology, energy, climate and environment, information and communication technologies, medicine, public health, archaeology, astrophysics, earth sciences, photonics, mathematics, agricultural sciences and the humanities and social sciences.[472] By 2013, there were 126 INCT in the country, classified in agricultural sciences (12), energy (10) engineering and information technology (12), hard and natural sciences (11), humanities and social sciences (10), ecology and environment (22), nanotechnology (10), and health (39). These areas of knowledge are intrinsically linked to the national interest and the protection of global common goods,

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[471] CNPq, 'INCT Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia' (Brasília: Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovaçao, 2013), p. 288 (p. 3) <http://inct.cnpq.br/> [accessed 20 May 2020].

[472] CNPq, 'INCT Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia', p. 5.

as exposed before. Table 4 contains the areas of expertise and institutes where international collaboration is present.

Table 4 Countries of origin of foreign institutions partners of Brazilian research clusters, 2013

Scientific area and Institute	Country of origin of partner institutions	Number of partner institutions
Agricultural Sciences: National Institute of Science and Technology for the Control of Intoxication by Plants – INCT CIP	Australia USA	1 1
Energy: National Institute of Science and Technology of Energy, Environment and Biodiversity – INCT CEAB	Israel Japan Malaysia USA	1 1 1 4
Engineering and Information Technology: National Institute of Science and Technology for Software Engineering – INCT INES	Germany Norway	1 1

Humanities and Social Sciences: National Institute of Science and Technology on Behaviour, Cognition and Teaching – INCT ECCE	USA	1
Humanities and Social Sciences: National Institute of Science and Technology of Comparative Studies in Institutional Conflict Administration – INCT InEAC	Argentina	2
Ecology and Environment: National Institute of Science and Technology of Biodiversity and Land Use in the Amazon region	UK	2
Ecology and environment: National Institute	Argentina Australia Canada	1 1 1

of Science and Technology Centre for Studies of Adaptations of Aquatic Biota of the Amazon – INCT ADAPTA	Colombia Germany Spain USA	1 1 1 4
Ecology and Environment: National Institute of Science and Technology for Climate Change – INCT MC	Netherlands USA	1 3
Ecology and Environment: National Institute of Science and Technology of the Cryosphere – INCT Criosfera	Australia Chile Germany	1 1 1
Ecology and Environment: National Institute of Science and Technology for Integrated Studies of Biodiversity in the Amazon – INCT CENBAM	Japan UK USA	1 1 3

Ecology and Environment: Institute of Science and Technology in Wet Areas – INCT INAU	Germany	2
	France	1
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology of Biomedicine of the Brazilian SemiArid – INCT IBISAB	Australia	1
	UK	1
	USA	1
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology of Molecular Medicine – INCT MM	UK	1
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology in Oncogenomics – INCT INCiTO	Argentina	1
	Canada	1
	UN – WHO	1
	Uruguay	1
	USA	2
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology for Policies on Alcohol and other Drugs – INCT IPAD	UK	1
	USA	1
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology in	Argentina	1
	India	1
	USA	1

Tuberculosis – INCT TB		
Health: National Institute of Science and Technology of Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers – INCT FHV	USA	4
	Argentina	1
	Germany	1
	Ireland	1
	UK	1

Source: *Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia,* CNPq 2013.[473]

The *internationalisation* activities of the clusters bring visibility to the country in cutting edge research and innovation. The INCT attract international capital to invest in the development of human resources, employing them after graduation and helping the local economy and environment. Such is the case of INCT CEAB, which attracts many multinational companies to the Manaus Industrial Zone. Up to 2013, the zone lacked front line technology due to a lack of qualified labour force, for which the cluster created a particular undergraduate course to develop a highly-skilled workforce, turning the region attractive to foreign capital.[474] Another example is the INCT Acqua, which specialises in mineral resources, water and biodiversity. This cluster attracted private funding from companies in the USA, Canada and Australia.[475] The political instability of the country has led the INCT to plea for other financing resources, taking on board municipalities and loans

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[473] CNPq, 'INCT Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia'. Complemented with information available at http://inct.cnpq.br,

[474] CNPq, 'INCT Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia', p. 172.

[475] CNPq, 'INCT Institutos Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia', p. 231.

from international banks. Clusters then become actors that engage with other international actors.

Even if the HEIs are active members of the clusters, engaging in the creation of international networks, the internationalisation of research in Brazil is still developing. There is a tendency of 'passive *internationalisation*' in the HEIs, visible in the low attraction of international faculty.[476] For this reason, it is crucial to identify the IHE activities that become sources of soft power, such as the creation of research networks, highlighting the different agents that intervene in the process. In the case of Brazil, the government ignites the role of clusters to create research networks. Still, it is the *internationalisation* processes of the HEIs within the clusters that transform the resources into soft power assets, harnessing soft power gains such as strategic alliances and international visibility.

8.4.2 Innovation Diplomacy Programme of Brazil

In recent years, the Brazilian government has been advancing in the implementation of a foreign policy of innovation. SWB and CAPES Print are an effort in priming the Brazilian scientific and technological capabilities with the more advanced poles of knowledge. These initiatives were cornerstones for the development of the Innovation Diplomacy Programme (IDP), launched in 2017 by the Department of Scientific and Technological Themes. The IDP is the first coordinated effort to implement innovation diplomacy at the MoFA. The aim is to promote the transfer of knowledge, faculty mobility, strategic

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[476] CAPES, *A Internacionalização Na Universidade Brasileira: Resultados Do Questionário Aplicado Pela Capes.* (Brasília: CAPES, Ministério da Educação, 2017), pp. 44–45.

alliances with foreign partners, and other initiatives where science, technology and R&D of Brazil serve to engage globally, fostering innovation locally.[477]

The objectives of the IDP point to the 'break down stereotypes surrounding the image of Brazil abroad'.[478] The intention is for Brazil to build an image of a country where knowledge production is at the scientific frontier and has the potential to be a reference in the world in selected areas of knowledge. This is directly related to soft power in two senses: image and reputation building and global advocacy for the protection of global common goods.

Since 2017, the government has deployed 14 posts of IDP around the world, with activities such as networking events for Brazilian entrepreneurs that live in innovation poles, activities to disseminate the national system of innovation, and missions of directors of technology parks to visit world centres of excellence.[479] The IDP is an evidence of the steps Brazil is taking to harness the soft power that comes from R&D of the country. This is a relatively new programme, which pursues the attainment of soft power through international research. More evaluations on the impact of this programme in terms of soft power are yet to be explored.

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[477] Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva, 'Fundamentos Teóricos e Práticos Para Uma Diplomacia Da Inovação', *Cuadernos de Política Exterior*, IV–7.1 Semestre (2018), 307–30 (p. 324).

[478] Itamaraty, 'Innnovation Diplomacy Programme', 2020 <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/ciencia-tecnologia-e-inovacao/6508-innovation-diplomacy-program> [accessed 16 June 2020].

[479] Ferraz da Silva, p. 324.

8.4.3 Mexican government-university international networks

As discussed in previous chapters, the Mexican proximity to the US and Canada and the complexity of the historical bilateral and trilateral relations makes them a priority of the Mexican foreign policy. Several strategies have been implemented in the higher education sector, bringing together the three countries. In this section, we highlight the role of the CONAHEC. This organisation is a network of 180 HEIs of the three countries and recently has included selected institutions from other countries.[480]

CONAHEC has many activities that benefit the *internationalisation* of the member institutions, but of particular importance is the support it brings to international research through networking. CONAHEC promotes and keeps track of the research networks created through the North American Academic Partnerships Database. Such instrument reports 576 research partnerships in diverse fields of studies.[481] Also, in 2016 CONAHEC and the governments of Canada, the US and Mexico supported the creation of the North American Centre for Collaborative Development (NACCD). The NACCD is a space for the exchange of ideas and research, focusing on the challenges North America faces. It welcomes different disciplines and facilitates joint research, publications and research networks in three priority areas:

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[480] CONAHEC, 'Consortium for North American Higher Education Collaboration', 2020 <https://conahec.org/about-conahec> [accessed 20 June 2020].
[481] CONAHEC.

indigenous communities, energy and climate, and regional competitiveness.[482]

CONAHEC is an independent body, but also a place where governments and non-state actors promote international research through tri- and bi-lateral networks. Furthermore, through CONAHEC, HEIs and research centres enter in direct dialogue with their peers but also with the governments of the three countries. This demonstrates the international agency between the members and governments, making use of knowledge diplomacy. Research is done in critical areas of knowledge for the three countries, stressing the issues that are regional and global problems. Mexico gains international visibility and reputation by being part of CONAHEC. The HEIs that are members of the consortia become soft power agents in their own right by engaging in international research through this consortia.

Another way where research networks bring soft power gains that is more related to the government's initiatives is the Dual Years.[483] The Dual Year Mexico-UK comprised a section of culture, education, science and innovation. The Visiting Chair Mexico-UK, as part of the Dual Year initiative, involved innovatively the participation of Mexican HEIs, which was fundamental for its success. The creation of the chair included the signing of a MoU between 12 HEIs of Mexico and 12 HEIs of the UK, to strengthen the academic cooperation in benefit

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[482] CONAHEC.

[483] See chapter 5.

of both nations in areas of science, technology, engineering, mathematics, humanities and social sciences.[484]

Through this initiative, AMEXCID created a new way of research cooperation in which Mexican HEIs fully collaborated in the strategy, engaging their resources for its success.[485] The visiting chair provided a fruitful space for Mexican HEIs to cooperate with high ranked universities in the UK through academic collaboration, which started with the mobility of senior faculty recognised locally and nationally in their academic fields. The Visiting Chair Mexico-UK is a successful case in which the agency between AMEXCID, ANUIES, the British Council and HEIs of both countries were able to engage through research networks.[486] This initiative is a soft power projection of the country in terms of internationalisation of research. The soft power gains found include the strengthening of strategic alliances and increase the reputation and international visibility of the country.

AMEXCID, in collaboration with ANUIES, has also been promoting bilateral networks with Japan and Korea. An example of this is the several summits that Japan and Mexico organised between their higher education sectors, generating opportunities for engagement in five strategic areas: cooperation between the industry and academy, development of innovation systems, training of human resources, understanding of the cultural diversity, and the strengthening of languages linked to student mobility.[487] This is an important

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[484] Gobierno de la República, p. 32.

[485] Interview 84 AMEXCID.

[486] Interview 84 AMEXCID.

[487] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2014*, p. 26.

action in the development of the country, as Japan is an important investor in Mexico. Several Japanese companies have settled in the centre-west region of the country, creating a manufacturing corridor in the automotive sector. The government creates links between Mexican HEIs, foreign HEIs and the private sector, creating a triple helix model where foreign direct investment, research and higher education meet the development needs of the country. The cooperation of the three sectors is fundamental to face the new global challenges and continue with innovation in science and technology.[488]

It is important to note that the government is actively pursuing the triple helix model at the federal level and the state and municipal levels. Guadalajara and Monterrey are two primary examples of the collaboration between academy, industry and local governments, where IHE is vital for their success. This triple helix model evolves to soft power consequences as strategic alliances get strengthened, and the country gains international visibility and reputation.

In the case of the partnership with Korea, AMEXCID and the cited country launched the Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) in 2013. The KSP strengthens the mechanic and automotive sector of Mexico, but also the system of dual education. The objective is to innovate on public policies for technological development, research and education.[489] Moreover, in 2014, Mexico and Korea created a strategic alliance based in the knowledge exchange and the strengthening of the higher education and industry sectors and

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[488] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2017*, p. 35.

[489] AMEXCID, *2º Informe Semestral 2013*, p. 44.

technology parks in Chihuahua, Colima, Hidalgo, México, and Querétaro.[490] In 2016, the government inaugurated the first Academy-Industry Cooperation Centre in the State of Mexico, in partnership with Korea.[491] In the next two years, KSP sponsored the creation of the Technology Park of Colima.[492] These initiatives place the internationalisation of research and development in the core of the bilateral relations with Korea, following the national interest and with the aid of developed countries, strengthening the creation of a knowledge society. These kinds of collaborations position Mexico as receiver of cooperation for development while supporting the *internationalisation* of its HEIs and producing soft power.

These initiatives are evidence of the platform that AMEXCID offers to the higher education sector to create networks and strategic alliances with partners that are of the importance of the foreign policy of Mexico. IHE hence becomes an extension of the foreign policy agenda of the country. Moreover, AMEXCID, the wielding arm of Mexican soft power, enables HEIs and research centres to become soft power agents.

Even if the efforts by AMEXCID and ANUIES to bring up Mexico's soft power through higher education include a range of initiatives, the reality is that these are *ad hoc*. The strategies lack continuity and are not rooted in an *internationalisation* policy that is cohesive and adaptive to the Mexican environment. Initiatives such as FOBESII seem to be a one-time occurrence, as the budget decreased considerably

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[490] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2014*, p. 34.
[491] AMEXCID, *Informe Anual 2016*, p. 56.
[492] AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*, p. 22.

less than a year and a half after its implementation and ended when Peña Nieto finished his mandate.[493]

Domestic issues deter the success of IHE. Years ago, the image of Mexico was one of prosperity, the country of tequila and mariachi. Today, it is the country of narcotraffic and violence.[494] It seems that cultural and public diplomacy could be the vehicles to improve the image of the country abroad, and HEIs have started to become soft power agents in their dissemination of Mexican culture activities, as is explored in next chapter.

8.6 Key findings

Development and the creation of a knowledge society are the principal rationales that drive R&D and innovation in NICs. The international strategic partners are key in the internationalisation of research efforts of these countries. The share and transfer of knowledge are also instrumental in relations with both developed countries and the Global South. This highlights the need to scientifically advance the country's science and technology to achieve development and gain an international reputation. Also, governments and HEIs benefit from the internationalisation of research, increasing their research capabilities instead of importing technology.

NICs use internationalisation of research as a tool to extend the foreign policy agenda, involving HEIs in ICD projects. For this reason, soft power is a consequence of the internationalisation of research in four ways. First, the

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[493] Interview 86 The World Bank.
[494] Interview 86 The World Bank.

countries build upon and strengthen their strategic alliances through internationalisation of research. Second, they gain international visibility and reputation in science and technology. Third, the governments attempt to set the global agenda through advocacy for the protection of global common goods and by addressing the great challenges for humanity through international research. Finally, they can influence the global scientific community through science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy, gaining a voice within the international community.

8.6.1 Strategic alliances

Brazil pursues strategic alliances with developed and developing countries through the internationalisation of research. The government has established several programmes with Northern countries (US, Europe and Japan) which makes Brazil engage in science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy. At the same time, the state engages with South-South cooperation through ICD, being African countries a particular objective.

Directing academic collaboration in terms of research to both Northern countries and the Global South makes Brazil strengthen its strategic alliances, while at the same time placing the country in a position where no developed country can be. Brazil acts as a *solidarity* partner to African nations, posing no threat to them in terms of colonization. This allows for soft power gains, particularly in the areas of knowledge where Brazil is strong. Furthermore, the country has been able to participate in triangular ICD, which also provides it with a privileged position as it can interact between developed and developing countries, gaining a voice in the international arena

and a place as a middle power. It also helps to increase its reputation in R&D and ICD.

Opposite to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the government directs the internationalisation of research agenda of Malaysia. There are five research universities selected by the government that receive a research budget. Still, other universities such as the IIUM also excel in research in key thematic areas. The strategic alliances that internationalisation of research targets in the case of Malaysia are the Muslim countries and ASEAN, which is consistent with the foreign policy.

The government of Mexico intends to guide the R&D of the country by selecting strategic geographic and thematic areas of knowledge. For this, the government instated the PECiTI, followed by other initiatives where CONACyT and AMEXCID are the main actors. The programmes analysed are an attempt by the government to direct the funding to key geographic areas and areas of knowledge-generating strategic alliances. Due to the autonomy of universities, the HEIs of the country have gained their right to create the strategic partnerships they consider fit. For this, the government had to develop strategies to engage the HEIs and their international research in strategic areas for the government. The programmes exposed identified Canada, Japan, Korea, the UK and the US as some of the countries of particular importance for the country, as well as Latin America, were international research backs the regional dynamics. The government uses internationalisation of research, ICD and research networks to create synergies with these countries, gaining soft power in return. Africa is a particular case, where also ICD is deployed for soft power projection purposes. HEIs and researchers are

involved in this strategy, aiding in the diversification of the foreign affairs agenda of the country.

8.6.2 International visibility and reputation building

Gaining international visibility and a reputation as a country that develops science and technology through internationalisation of research is a significant target of the government of Brazil. The CNPq targets this outcome in the different programmes explored in this chapter. Particularly the programmes where it involves strategic countries, and key thematic areas of knowledge gain the country this international reputation. Also, the clusters that are guided by CNPq have become soft power actors in their own right, bringing global visibility for the country's R&D.

The government of Malaysia identifies the soft power gains obtained through IHE, particularly of internationalisation of research. Also, R&D in Malaysia is linked to another element: commercialisation. The goal of the government is to engage in R&D&C. Internationalisation of research plays an integral part as a step to becoming an education hub. The inclusion of branch campuses in the Malaysian higher education landscape had as a target to gain international visibility for the country, but also to aid in the internationalisation of public universities, particularly the five research universities. The government expects collaboration between branch campuses and local universities, and this also brings soft power gains to the country. Even if in this chapter this issue is only briefly explored, next chapter engages deeper in this discussion.

The Mexican government also obtains international visibility and reputation to the country through internationalisation of research. First, the ICD of the country and the predominant

role that AMEXCID has in coordinating both the ICD and IHE confirms the position of AMEXCID as the executing arm of the soft power of the government. In terms of internationalisation of research, it is this double feature of AMEXCID the key to making the government able to use the resources of the HEIs and research centres for ICD, acquiring international recognition and visibility while increasing the country's reputation. Notable projects with Africa exposed here are evidence of this. Also, AMEXCID funds other programmes, including the mobility of researchers, which brings internationalisation of research and at the same time, soft power gains to the country. The second is the research networks that AMEXCID and ANUIES have been able to establish through different strategies. The triple helix model with Japan and Korea strengthens the alliances with both countries and is used to develop the R&D of country, gain visibility to the corridors and clusters attracting the industry and international capital to these sectors. All of these are soft power consequences of internationalisation of research. Furthermore, in this way, the internationalisation of research becomes an extension of the foreign policy agenda.

8.6.3 Worldwide advocacy for global common goods and setting agendas

Brazil is a country rich in natural resources, and there is a clear intention to showcase the strengths of the country by including the international dimension to research. The advocacy for the protection of global common goods and the search for strategic international partners in the clusters of the country is evidence of the ways Brazil attempts to dictate the research agenda. The ICD also aids Brazil in setting the global agenda as its involvement in ICD with African countries in key

thematic areas such as food and agriculture has gained the country a voice within the international community. Furthermore, the government enables HEIs and research centres to become soft power agents by engaging them in ICD. In this way, HEIs turn their resources into soft power assets, generating soft power gains on behalf of the government.

Also, the use of science diplomacy through strategic programmes such as PROANTAR and CERN aid the country's reputation as protector of global common goods. Brazil has understood that participating in these kinds of global collaborations increases the country's international visibility and profile, acquiring a voice in the international arena and, hence, soft power projection.

In Mexico, a variety of actors contribute to the research agenda of the country. The government attempts to guide the research agenda through programmes such as PECiTI and the creation of networks. Nevertheless, the autonomy of universities provides HEIs and research centres with the ability to dictate the research agenda of the country. Through internationalisation of research, the HEIs obtain soft power gains for the country on their own right when engaging in knowledge diplomacy, representing the country, acting on behalf of the national interest and communicating the national interest through internationalisation of research. We can see this more clearly in issues such as international research in key thematic areas (i.e. research on US-Mexico border, migration, environment, water, energy, anthropology, etc.). In the case of Mexico, the involvement of non-state actors in setting the research agenda transforms them into soft power agents, turning their resources into soft power assets.

8.6.4 Influence

Brazil makes use of science diplomacy, innovation diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy both at a national level and a local level. Other actors intervene in this configuration of the soft power through internationalisation of research. Still, the government intervenes in an attempt to set the research agenda of the country and showcasing it internationally. This way, the government of Brazil attempts to influence the global scientific community, primarily through the ID programme, gaining a voice within the international community.

For Mexico, the Law of Science and Technology and the autonomy of universities enables the HEIs and research centres to set the tone of the research agenda of the country and to become soft power agents. Mexican HEIs have been able to influence the global scientific community through science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy. Some pieces of evidence are the cases of CONAHEC and the COLEF. However, there are other examples where HEIs guide the research agenda in issues that are at the core of the national interest, like the bilateral relationship with the US. By creating the research networks in selected topics with HEIs of North America, Mexican HEIs can influence the bilateral and trilateral relations, becoming soft power agents and gaining an international reputation for the country's R&D.

Chapter 9: International Programme and Provider Mobility

International Programme and Provider Mobility (IPPM) is the fourth component of IHE analysed in this study. As presented in chapter 4, IPPM is a concept newly introduced by the British Council and the DAAD in 2017. The term refers to the transnational movement of HEIs and their academic offer. Through IPPM, HEIs deliver programmes and degrees to international students in their own country, without the need to move.[495]

The TNE classification framework of the British Council and DAAD identifies six features of IPPM:

1. Franchise programmes/arrangements: programmes primarily exported by a sending country.
2. Partnership programmes: programmes based on collaboration between host and sending country. It includes double and joint degrees.
3. International branch campus: satellite campus in a country abroad.
4. Joint university: HEI co-founded and co-developed by the sending and host country.
5. Self-study distance education programmes: programmes provided by a foreign sending HEI/provider and has no teaching or learning support provided locally.
6. Distance education with a local academic partner: programmes provided by a foreign sending

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[495] Knight and McNamara, p. 1.

HEI/provider that has teaching or learning support provided locally.[496]

The IPPM does not include two additional features that are happening in NICs. These features are particular forms of providers' mobility found in the countries analysed here:

1. Language and culture teaching institutes: Establishments located abroad that could be entirely supported by the national HEI or sponsored by a national HEI and hosted by a partner institution abroad. Some are also co-funded by the government. The activities of such institutes include the promotion of joint research, language learning and culture dissemination of the sending country, representing the national interest.

2. International offices: spaces located abroad that act as liaison offices of HEIs. These link the administrative officers, researchers and students with the HEI at the country of origin, without providing academic programmes.

Even though these two categories do not involve the delivery of academic programmes (for credit) or qualifications, they are IHE activities that involve the mobility of providers in NICs and have considerable soft power potential. Although they are not part of the TNE classification framework of the British Council and DAAD, they should be part of IPPM.

In addition to the classification framework, this research identified two functions of IPPM: inbound IPPM, where

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[496] Knight and McNamara, p. 2.

countries host foreign providers, and outbound IPPM, where HEIs establish themselves in foreign countries. Consequently, this chapter is divided into those two functions.

This chapter aims to uncover how NICs engage in IPPM, and why IHE in its IPPM component produces soft power. This section argues that the mobility of providers to and from NICs results in soft power in its inbound and outbound functions. As a host country, governments can set policies to attract students, researchers and providers, set research agendas, gain international visibility and good reputation abroad through IHE. Comparably, as a sending country NICs provide another role to HEIs, which can engage in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, acquiring soft power conversion abilities and becoming soft power agents in their own right.

In NICs, countries do not need to have branch campuses abroad to obtain the soft power produced by the mobility of providers. Strategies such as becoming an education hub or opening international institutes for the teaching of language and culture allow NICs to harness or project their country's soft power abroad. As these countries do not have the equivalent of the British Council, the DAAD, the Alliance Française or Cervantes Institute, other strategies are emerging to promote their own culture, involving the higher education sector along the way. As Malaysia and Mexico are more active in this component of IHE than Brazil, the latter as a case study is not discussed in depth here.[497]

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[497] Brazil is host of international offices from foreign universities, particularly from the US. There are no branch campuses as such in the country. Instead, agencies such as the DAAD have a strong presence in the country, fostering collaboration with German HEIs. Brazilian HEIs do not have branch campuses abroad.

The first section of this chapter analyses inbound IPPM and looks at Malaysia as a host country for programmes and providers. We explore one feature of the IPPM classification: the international branch campuses established in Malaysia, with a focus on the creation of an education hub. The second section explores outbound IPPM, focusing on the Mexican HEIs that have been opening institutes for the teaching of language and culture as well as international offices abroad, projecting the country's soft power in strategic settings. Finally, the last section postulates the main findings and reviews the soft power gains and projection found through IPPM.

9.1 Inbound IPPM: Malaysia's education hub

An education hub is a term that countries have adopted in an attempt to become an exceptional centre for excellence in higher education, developing the conditions for a critical mass of foreign and local actors to interact and engage in education, training, knowledge production and innovation initiatives.[498] The transformation of a country into an education hub involves the implementation of policies and strategies to build an education landscape where diverse actors and stakeholders are key to strengthening the education system and its reputation abroad. It also needs a natural constituency and target region. For Knight, an education hub is 'a country's plan and efforts to position itself within the region and beyond as a reputed centre for higher education and research'.[499] The author proposed a typology of education hubs: the student hub, the skilled workforce hub, and the knowledge/innovation

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[498] J. Knight, 'Education Hubs: A Fad, a Brand, an Innovation?', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 15.3 (2011), 221–40 (p. 221).
[499] J. Knight, p. 223.

hub, and identified Malaysia as a student hub transitioning towards a knowledge/innovation hub. Knight also argues that Malaysia is one of six countries that claim to be an education hub, along with Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Hong Kong. As the author recognised, there is a need to explore other issues related to education hubs and the diversity of roles of higher education actors, including macro and theoretical issues such as soft power. This is where this research makes its contribution.

Malaysia's ambition to become an education hub was first unveiled under the Badawi administration in 2006, at the *Globalising Higher Education in Malaysia* conference. Its origins are also in the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010), which introduced the idea of increasing the country's capacity for knowledge and innovation.[500] As discussed in chapter 6, the implementation of policies and laws that facilitated the establishment of branch campuses paved the road towards becoming an education hub. The following documents articulate such policies:

- Vision 2020 (1991).
- The Private Higher Educational Institutions Act (1996) and its amendment of 2003.
- The Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010).
- The National Education Strategic Plan (2007).
- The National Higher Education Action Plan (2007-2010).
- The Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015).
- The Internationalisation Policy of the MoHE (2011).

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[500] Down, p. 1.

- The National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2 (2011).
- The Malaysia Education Blueprint (Higher Education) (2015-2025).
- The Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016-2020).[501]

Of particular importance was the introduction of the Private Higher Education Institutions Act of 1996 and its amendment of 2003, which allowed for the establishment of branch campuses and liberalised the sector.[502] Foreign HEIs can enter the country only at the invitation of the government.[503] The first branch campuses invited to Malaysia were Monash University (1998), the Curtin University of Technology in Sarawak (1999), the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (2000) and the Swinburne University of Technology in Sarawak (2004).[504] These institutions offer a different range of programmes, are multidisciplinary and are teaching-oriented, with limited collaboration with Malaysian HEIs and joint research.[505]

In 2006, under Badawi's administration, the Prime Minister's Department endorsed the Kuala Lumpur Education City (KLEC) development, incorporated to a commercial and residential

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[501] Chapter 6 provides a deeper explanation of most of these policies and their impact on IHE and soft power.

[502] See chapter 6.

[503] Siew Yean Tham, 'Private Higher Education Institutions. Development and Internationalization', in *Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia. Understanding, Practices and Challenges*, ed. by Siew Yean Tham (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), pp. 66–86 (p. 81).

[504] Najib was the Minister of Education from 1995 to 1999, and a graduate of the University of Nottingham. He invited his former university to be among the first branch campuses to establish themselves in Malaysia, and the first UK university in the country.

[505] Jane Knight and Sirat Morshidi, 'The Complexities and Challenges of Regional Education Hubs : Focus on Malaysia', *Journal of Higher Education*, 62 (2011), 593–606 (p. 604); Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', p. 650.

project south of Kuala Lumpur. The government granted KLEC the status of a high-impact educational project.[506] With the support of the MoHE, the KLEC intends to provide the platform for world-class universities to open branch campuses and offer academic programmes in the country. Through KLEC, Malaysia seeks to attract students and talents from India, China and Indonesia, while positioning Malaysia as a regional centre of excellence and creating networks among stakeholders such as HEIs, companies and service providers.

There are economic and social rationales for the creation of KLEC. The economic rationales respond to the country's need to create a knowledge economy. In contrast, the social rationales include 'to showcase Malaysia as an environment-friendly, energy-efficient, and networked knowledge-based regional centre'.[507]

The government launched in 2006 a second initiative to create an education hub: EduCity Iskandar Malaysia. The city of Johor Bahru, an economic free zone on the border with Singapore, hosts EduCity. The project includes industries, residential areas, port facilities, a medical park and tourist attractions. The developer of the EduCity project is Iskandar Investment Bhd, which is backed up by the government's National Kazanah Bhd.[508] EduCity is in itself a fully integrated education hub, with nine local and international partners: University of Southampton Malaysia Campus, Multimedia University, University of Reading Malaysia, Newcastle

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[506] Mahkota Foundation, 'Kuala Lumpur Education City (KLEC)', 2020 <https://mahkotafoundation.wordpress.com/activities/education/kuala-lumpur-education-city/> [accessed 27 July 2020].

[507] J. Knight, p. 228.

[508] Knight and Morshidi, p. 599.

University Medicine Malaysia, Netherlands Maritime Institute of Technology, Management Development Institute of Singapore, Raffles University Iskandar, Marlborough College Malaysia and Raffles American School.[509]

One of the main characteristics of EduCity is that the government invited each branch campus to carry out teaching and research within a specialised area of knowledge, sharing infrastructure and facilities with other industrial stakeholders under a concept of 'multivarsity education centre'. The goal is to foster collaboration between academia and industry, expanding the economic region located in Johor Bahru.[510] Nonetheless, the scope of success as an education hub that attracts international students has yet to be measured. For instance, Malaysia advertises EduCity as a milestone for the education hub the country desires to become. The government expected that the location of EduCity and the relocation of UiTM from Kuala Lumpur would attract more international students to that region. However, from 2015 to 2018, Johor was the second Malaysian state with less international students enrolled in private HEIs, including branch campuses. From 2015 to 2018 only 0.37% of the total of international students were registered at a private HEI located in Johor. The majority of students in that period enrolled at private HEIs located in Selangor (63.32%) and Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area (23.64%).[511]

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[509] IIB, 'EduCity', 2020 <https://iskandarinvestment.com/educity/> [accessed 30 July 2020].

[510] Abd Aziz and Abdullah, 'Finding the next "Wave" in Internationalisation of Higher Education: Focus on Malaysia', p. 497.

[511] MoHE, 'Statistics Ministry of Higher Education', 2020 <https://www.moe.gov.my/en/muat-turun/laporan-dan-statistik/pendidikan-tinggi/buku-perangkaan> [accessed 28 August 2020].

EduCity still has a long way to rise as an education hub the size of its competitors. The massive investment and development envisioned in the state of Johor are not finished yet. Branch campuses are being pressured to meet the government's targets in terms of international students but have not been able to reach them.[512] The UTM, a Malaysian public HEI, was moved from Kuala Lumpur to Johor Bahru in 1985 to increase the education in the zone and then the investment. In 2010 it was made one of the five research universities so that they would be able to collaborate with the branch campuses at EduCity. Nevertheless, the collaboration is not as complete as expected, so internationalisation of research through academic partnership with branch campuses in Iskandar is more a desire than concrete reality.[513]

The latest foreign branch campus established in Malaysia was Xiamen University Malaysia Campus. This Chinese university was invited by Najib, which, as explained in chapter 5, had a particular foreign policy that showed preference towards that country. Malaysia has been actively supporting the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative, and Malaysian companies have invested USD 7.72 bn in China, far more than the Chinese investment in Malaysia.[514] The opening of the branch campus contributes to the commercial relationship between Malaysia and China. Hence, we can conclude that higher education

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[512] Interviews 55 NUMed, 66 UNMC and 69 University of Southampton Malaysia.

[513] Interview 61 UTM.

[514] E. Met Yeat and Jenny Ngu, 'Najib Invites Xi to Launch China ' s Xiamen University Branch in Malaysia', *Asia News Network*, 2016 <https://annx.asianews.network/content/najib-invites-xi-launch-chinas-xiamen-university-branch-malaysia-32080> [accessed 9 August 2020].

solidifies the strategic alliance with China as a strategic partner under the administration of Najib.

In total, there are ten foreign branch campuses established in Malaysia. Table 5 summarises them. There are five branch campuses from the UK, which highlights the relationship of Malaysia with that country, being the country's former colonizer. This has raised questions about the colonisation of knowledge and universities.

Table 5 Foreign University Branch Campuses in Malaysia, 2019

Name	Year established	Location in Malaysia	Country of origin
Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland and University College Dublin Malaysia Campus, Founded as Penang Medical College	1996	Penang	Ireland
Monash University Malaysia	1998	Selangor	Australia
Curtin University, Sarawak Malaysia	1999	Sarawak	Australia
The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus	2000	Kuala Lumpur/ Selangor	United Kingdom

Swinburne University of Technology, Sarawak Campus	2004	Sarawak	Australia
Newcastle University Medicine Malaysia	2007	Johor	United Kingdom
University of Southampton, Malaysia Campus	2011	Johor	United Kingdom
Heriot-Watt University Malaysia	2012	Putrajaya	United Kingdom
University of Reading Malaysia	2013	Johor	United Kingdom
Xiamen University Malaysia Campus	2015	Sepang, Selangor	China

Source: Education Malaysia Global Services.[515]

Malaysia introduced soft power into the higher education policies of the country until 2011. The National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2 (NHESP 2): Malaysia's global reach: a new direction, advocates for the inclusion of soft power within the higher education sector, equipping its stakeholders with the ability and intent to capture the hearts and minds of

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[515] EMGS, 'Foreign University Branch Campuses in Malaysia', 2019 <https://educationmalaysia.gov.my/why-malaysia/#universities> [accessed 12 November 2019].

local and international stakeholders. The goal is to collectively embrace learning values, ideologies and cultures for the benefit of the community [516].

The NHESP 2 proposes that IHE can manifest the soft power of the country and, more importantly, links the strategy of becoming an education hub with the implementation of a soft power framework by stating that institutions of higher education in Malaysia should be the anchor of soft power. The definition of soft power, as described by the MoHE, is based under the assumption that soft power (*tambatan hati*) is the ability to achieve desired results through selection and attraction using persuasive power. Other behaviours also influence that ability to achieve results without significant coercion or reward.[517]

NHESP 2 includes soft power in the fundamentals of becoming an education hub. The document introduces four soft power principles that each HEI should observe: sustainability, ownership, availability and accessibility. The principles highlight the importance of making affordable, inclusive and available all programmes offered, paying attention to cultural sensitivity and local values.[518]

The MoHE refers to the principles and the role of HEIs in Malaysia's education hub as follows:

[516] MoHE, *National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2. Malaysia's Global Reach: A New Dimension* (Putrajaya: Ministry of Higher Education, 2011), p. 18.

[517] MoHE, *National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2. Malaysia's Global Reach: A New Dimension*, p. 65.

[518] MoHE, *National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2. Malaysia's Global Reach: A New Dimension*, p. 18.

It is these principles that will determine the extent to which value-added strategies in the second phase of PSPTN can help Malaysia institutions of higher education achieve the goal of becoming a relevant, admired and referenced institution. This means it must be ensured that the programs implemented and that will be introduced taking into account the principles of soft power to ensure that the program is in line with the goal of making Malaysia a hub of higher education excellence. Encouragement of contextual wisdom, such as the use of local knowledge through strong links with global concern is essential to gaining regional and international attention and reputation. Thus, Malaysia should encourage an inside-out strategy, which is local knowledge applied to facing global needs and challenges.[519]

There are two significant contributions from the NHESP 2 to solidify Malaysia's vision of becoming an education hub through the inclusion of soft power. First, the document identifies that the Muslim countries and its closest neighbours in ASEAN recognise Malaysia as a country with a good reputation. Furthermore, the document highlights the need for Malaysian HEIs to engage in knowledge sharing and global engagement, which could create long-term loyalty, brand equity and a positive reputation for Malaysian higher education.[520] This places Malaysia in a strong position to lead

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[519] MoHE, *National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2. Malaysia's Global Reach: A New Dimension*, p. 19.

[520] MoHE, *National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2. Malaysia's Global Reach: A New Dimension*, p. 26.

global engagement to harness soft power projection, reflecting the image of a country with a good reputation.

Second, the NHESP 2 provides a list of preferred partner countries, including Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran and Bangladesh, which are the countries with the highest inbound student mobility.[521] Muslim, ASEAN and Asian countries have a preference. This clearly shows that the strategy of soft power through IHE aims at foreign policy objectives. There are two soft power gains included here: attraction and strategic alliances. The benefits gained from this inclusion of soft power in the NHESP 2 are tangible and intangible. The former are gains such as the attraction of international students and research-based activities. The latter are reputation building and projecting more significant geopolitical influence with partner countries within the region and beyond, finding allies to advance common development goals.[522]

Farina, Yew Lie and Yahya argue that 'the country positions higher education as a public diplomacy tool, encouraging its higher education institutions to play a greater role in enhancing the well-being of global communities'.[523] At the same time, the MoHE recognises the country's aspiration to become an education hub and a centre of knowledge like Qatar and Singapore. The ministry seeks international recognition and growth through the attraction of less powerful countries.[524] It wants to establish Malaysia's higher education

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[521] See chapter 6.

[522] Abd Aziz and Abdullah, 'Finding the next "Wave" in Internationalisation of Higher Education: Focus on Malaysia', p. 498; Farina, Yew Lie, and Yahya, p. 17.

[523] Farina, Yew Lie, and Yahya, p. 23.

[524] Interviews 50 and 52 MoHE.

brand globally, and the movement of programmes and providers helps the government to strengthen its education hub brand and, with it, its reputation abroad. However, the interviews showed that there is a disconnection between policy and practice. The interviewees also pointed out the lack of communication between the ministries, perhaps due to the country's hierarchical system.[525]

As explored in other chapters, there is a dual characteristic of soft power that we should observe. Inviting branch campuses to Malaysia has soft power consequences in favour of both the host and sending countries. In the case of UK institutions, their government uses this platform to deploy its soft power in the region through their branch campuses.[526]

There is a danger in not recognising this double characteristic of soft power, as the country in question could be only a subject of soft power and not take advantage of the soft power benefits that result from engaging in IHE practices. Suppose branch campuses do not engage with national actors in terms of joint research, academic cooperation, or even sharing knowledge and facilities. In that case, local HEIs cannot become agents of soft power. Indeed, the NHESP 2 is not clear on this issue and is not specified in the participation of national HEIs with branch campuses. The government should weight the value of HEIs and help them transform their resources into soft power assets. For this, we should not portrait soft power in only the plans and policies, but also in the grants and scholarships distributed by the government and

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[525] Interview 67 UNMC.

[526] Interview 39 British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur.

the budget allocated to international research, for example, avoiding the rhetorical trap.

9.1.1 *Internationalisation* and research

The internationalisation of HEIs is a controversial issue in Malaysia, with the language being one of the main problems faced by these institutions. The language of instruction for bachelor's degrees at public universities is Bahasa Malay, while programmes at private institutions are taught in English, producing graduates who are proficient in that language. This generates large divisions, mainly related to ethnicity since the majority of *bumiputra* students are in public institutions. In contrast, the majority of students from other ethnicity enrol in private HEIs, due to affirmative action measures and the quota system imposed by the government.[527]

As noted in chapter 8, there are five research universities in Malaysia: UM, UPM, USM, UKM and UTM, to which the government allocates additional research funds. Research universities focus primarily on the domestic market, with a 5% limit for international students enrolled in undergraduate programmes. Therefore, international students are recruited mainly for postgraduate programmes, although there is excessive demand from domestic students.[528] To achieve internationalisation goals and attract international students, public universities have resorted to offering short programmes

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[527] Azizah Kassim, 'Public Universities. Development and Internationalization', in *Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia. Understanding, Practices and Challenges*, ed. by Siew Yean Tham (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), pp. 41–65 (p. 47).

[528] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', pp. 656–57.

with strategic partners, such as summer courses, education visits and short-term mobility programmes.[529]

Only seven public HEIs (the five research universities plus UUM and IIUM) attract the majority of international students in the public higher education sector. For the period 2009-2018, these seven institutions attracted 223,821 international students, which represents 84.24% of the total of international students enrolled in public HEIs. The institution that attracted most students was IIUM (20%), perhaps for its nature of being an Islamic international university, followed by UM, UPM and UTM (with 12% each).[530] The five research HEIs have better *internationalisation* capabilities. Therefore, the rest of the HEIs need more help in the design, implementation and monitoring of internationalisation strategies.

Considering the ratio of enrolment of international and local students in the three higher education sectors (public, private and branch campuses) we can note that the percentage of enrolment of international students was more elevated in foreign branch campuses than in Malay institutions. From 2009 to 2018, the enrolment of international students in branch campuses represented 22.65% of the total of students in the sector. By contrast, 17.61% of students in private HEIs were international, while in public HEIs international students represented 5% of the total of the students.[531] This means that branch campuses attract more international students than national students when considering their population and that

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[529] Farina, Yew Lie, and Yahya, p. 20; Kassim, p. 49.

[530] MoHE, 'Statistics Ministry of Higher Education'.

[531] MoHE, 'Statistics Ministry of Higher Education'. It excludes the years 2012 and 2013, as this data was not available in the MoHE statistics.

Malay universities, particularly public HEIs, are committed to the teaching of locals rather than international students.

However, looking at the net number of international students, private HEIs with university status attract more international students than public HEIs or branch campuses. From 2009-2018, private HEIs enrolled a total of 361,523 (59.65%) international students, while for the same period public HEIs enrolled 210,623 (34.75%) and branch campuses only 33,836 (5.6%).[532] This means that private HEIs attract more international students than the public HEIs and that branch campuses attract a low number of international students.

In terms of soft power, particularly the element of attraction (which is a tangible and measurable gain), private HEIs seem to be more attractive than branch campuses. However, the rationale to open the higher education sector to branch campuses followed a logic of bringing international visibility and reputation to the higher education sector. Additionally, the five research universities, the UUM and IIUM, are more successful in attracting international students in the public higher education sector. In contrast, branch campuses attract a limited number of international students.

The data observed can be translated into the role that HEIs in Malaysia have in attracting international students. The private HEIs, and to a lesser extent, the public HEIs invest their resources in attracting international students. Private HEIs do so as they need the fees from overseas students to be viable and operational, and public HEIs do so to meet the

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[532] MoHE, 'Statistics Ministry of Higher Education'. It excludes the years 2012 and 2013, as this data was not available in the MoHE statistics.

requirements set by the government and the targets of global rankings. At the same time, these institutions become agents of soft power through the attraction of international students from preferred countries, identified in the policies set by the Malay government, particularly the NHESP 2. With this policy framework, and the promotion of EMGS (as described in chapter 6), Malay HEIs bring international visibility to the country attracting international students and strengthening the alliances set by the government.

In the case of foreign branch campuses, the several policy documents analysed seem to provide foreign branch campuses with the role of agents that increase the reputation of the country's higher education. They are entrusted with providing quality education to Malays and international students and are a way to strengthen alliances with strategic countries such as the UK and China. In such a way, branch campuses contribute to the reputation and attraction of the country, becoming soft power agents.[533] According to the MoHE, they invited good institutions to open branch campuses to train not only Malaysians but also international students.[534] However, in terms of net numbers of international students, the strategies and capabilities of private HEIs and the seven public HEIs seem to be more successful.

In terms of research, some branch campuses are not only dedicated to teaching but also operate research centres. Funds are available for some branch campuses in areas that are of

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[533] However, their main role is as higher education provider, rather than a soft power agent. In any case, branch campuses are primarily soft power agents of their own countries, but the host countries can benefit from their IHE activities in soft power terms.

[534] Interview 50 MoHE.

particular interest to the government. Crops For the Future (CFF), a research centre developed between the government and the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, received funding for RM 113 million for capital and operating costs over seven years. The government established the grant to support, design, construct, and maintenance of the research centre.[535]

CFF was an idea that Najib supported as Prime Minister. This is a foreign project in which several HEIs competed to host it, being the University of Nottingham the selected institution. In Malaysia, there are a total of 15 research centres, including CFF.[536] In 2017 they collectively requested USD 1 bn to the government for operations, and only received USD 175 million.[537] Interviewees expressed that having a research centre like CFF has more to do with the reputation the country seeks in terms of international recognition for global issues such as food security than with actual discoveries and solving of global problems. Here, soft power is about building the image of the country, with several questions about tangible results.

One of the rationales for bringing branch campuses to Malaysia was to collaborate with public HEIs in terms of research, thus increasing their international profiles. The MoHE encourages collaboration between these institutions. Public and private HEIs can participate jointly with branch campuses to obtain funding from the MoHE. In this way, the branch

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[535] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', p. 656.

[536] Monash University also hosts international research centres, such as the South East Asia Community Observatory.

[537] Interview 40 CFF.

campuses help to raise the quality of the country's research, which is attractive for some of them to establish themselves in the country.[538]

Some branch campuses also attract researchers in endemic areas of the country, such as palm oil, wildlife and biodiversity. For example, Prof. Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz, UNMC researcher from Spain, does research on the preservation of elephants, an endangered species. He decided to move from Singapore to Malaysia as the country began to invest in research on the conservation of wildlife, as the issue with elephants became a national concern. Malaysia attracted Prof. Ahimsa because of the country's natural resources and the government's discourse on the protection of animal wildlife, which contribute to the success of his research. However, he faced bureaucracy difficulties and problems with communication with the wildlife department, as well as issues with gaining the trust of the government.[539]

The government guides the internationalisation of research in public HEIs through the MoHE. Since 2004, the MoHE has tried to coordinate the *internationalisation* efforts of public universities, but it was not until 2011 that written guidance was made available.[540] This has produced shared *internationalisation* elements among public HEIs, but with disparities and disadvantages.

Even if there is a recognition of agency among governmental actors and HEIs in terms of attraction (a soft power gain), the

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[538] Interview 50 MoHE.

[539] Interview 64 UNMC.

[540] Kassim, p. 49.

importance of the MoHE in the Malaysian higher education landscape is evident. The MoHE is heavily involved in teaching and research activities of public HEIs, where the government exerts intense pressure to meet the needs of companies. The government has decreed HEIs engagement with the industry as mandatory, for which the former had to adapt their research to the business and industry's needs.[541] Ultimately, the research agenda is set by the government, which guides it towards commercial objectives and interests, compromising the academic freedom of universities.[542] The autonomy of universities is one of the most significant challenges the government of Malaysia faces. With greater autonomy, universities could engage in the soft power projection of the country proactively becoming agents instead of tools, and their activities could be more legitimised than those pushed by the government.

There are some challenges that Malaysia should overcome for a successful projection of its soft power. For example, the government measures the success of higher education against the international rankings. However, to compete internationally, HEIs must strengthen their research capacity, which requires increased investment and research grants.[543] Better coordination between stakeholders, including between HEIs and government, as well as internal coordination between ministries, could help to resolve situations such as career opportunities for international students and

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[541] Sirat Morshidi, Ahmad Abdul Razak, and Yew Lie Koo, 'Trade in Services and Its Policy Implications: The Case of Cross-Border/ Transnational Higher Education in Malaysia', *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 15.3 (2011), 241–60 (p. 257).

[542] Wan, XL, pp. 11–13.

[543] Abd Aziz and Abdullah, 'Finding the next "Wave" in Internationalisation of Higher Education: Focus on Malaysia', p. 499.

scholarships for international students to attract talent.[544] It is also necessary to include national and international actors in the formulation and implementation of policy initiatives, including the realities of the sector.

Public and research universities face the challenge of attracting international students to meet government key performance indicators and qualify for the university rankings.[545] For private institutions, the challenge of attracting international students is also a matter of survival. Student visas also represent a significant challenge, and both HEIs and the government must take steps to ensure that international students do not abuse their visas by staying longer or using them as a means of seeking employment.[546] Furthermore, international students engage in crime and other illicit activities, generating a negative perception in society.[547] A reform in the higher education sector could be the path towards the autonomy of universities, legitimisation and soft power projection beyond the attraction of international students, placing research and academic freedom in the centre of the transformations.

9.1.2 Islam, culture and the power of attraction

From a geographical and philosophical point of view, Malaysia has an ideal location to become an education hub, particularly in Islamic education.[548] The government has well used its

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[544] Interview 59 UKM.

[545] Interviews 46 Malaysian Parliament and 53 MoHE.

[546] Interview 62 UiTM and 61 UTM.

[547] Abdul Rahman Embong, 'Micro Perspectives. Ideas, Practices and Challenges', in *Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia. Understanding, Practices and Challenges*, ed. by Siew Yean Tham (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), pp. 113–31 (pp. 122–23).

[548] Down, p. 3.

privileged location and recognition as a moderate Islamic country. Still, the implementation of policies that facilitated its transition to an education hub, in addition to the foreign policy agenda, were vital in achieving its ambitions.

Islam, as a field of study, has attracted other Muslim nations to Malaysia. As of 2018, 11 private HEIs, two branch campuses and 15 public HEIs offered a total of 74 higher education programmes in Islamic studies. Bachelor, Master and Doctoral degrees cover various knowledge areas with a focus on Islam, such as Islamic Finance, Islamic Studies, Islamic Education, Islamic Banking, Islamic Management, Islamic Literature, Islamic Defence and Security, Islamic Knowledge and Heritage, Islamic Science, Islamic Political Science and Islamic Astronomy, among others.[549] Additionally, several research centres within HEIs focus on Islamism. For example, the IIUM established the Centre for Islamic Economics in 1983; the UM has the Centre of Qur'anic Research, the first of its kind in Malaysia; the USM has the Centre of Islamic Development and Management Studies, and the UKM has the Institute of Islam *Hadhari*, established in 2007 and considered a reference centre on Islamic civilisation at an international level.[550]

It is important to note that of the 20 public HEIs, 15 offer degrees in Islamic studies in one form or another. Also, not only the research universities have research centres with a focus on Islamism. Taylor's University College, Universiti

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[549] Study Malaysia, 'Higher Education Malaysia', 2018
<https://www.studymalaysia.com/education/higher-education-in-malaysia/malaysias-higher-education-achievements-2017> [accessed 20 January 2018].

[550] UKM, 'Islam Hadhari Centre', 2020.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, New Era College and Southern College also host such research centres.[551] Private HEIs, beyond branch campuses, are essential in the Malaysian higher education landscape, particularly Muslim HEIs, for their role in attracting Muslim international students. The Private Higher Education Institutions Act of 1996 allowed the proliferation of private institutions, resulting in Malaysia having a large number of providers and programmes, unusual for a relatively small domestic market. This creates a competitive environment for private HEIs, which must seek student enrolment abroad. Hence, private HEIs have developed different strategies to attract students, including international marketing strategies, rebranding, partnering with local institutions abroad, targeting companies for staff training, use of recruitment agents and establishment of international offices.[552] Also, to offer degrees with a focus in Islam makes these HEIs more attractive to Muslim international students.

Through Islam, the public and private HEIs represent the country, its national interest and communicate to foreign audiences, promoting cultural understanding. In short, through studies and research on Islam, Malaysian HEIs engage in knowledge diplomacy and contribute to the country's ambition to position itself as the leader of the Muslim world.

Furthermore, Malaysian public HEIs are vectors of the Islamic culture, religion and heritage. Museums entrusted to HEIs are evidence of this. The USM has the Museum and Gallery

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[551] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', p. 656.
[552] Tham, 'Internationalizing Higher Education in Malaysia : Government Policies and University ' s Response', p. 655.

Tuanku Fauziah, the country's first university museum, while the UPM houses the Malay Heritage Museum. Both display traditional fine arts, living Malaysian traditions, manuscripts, costumes and textiles. The UM Museum of Asian Art represents the three characteristic civilizations Malaysia's multicultural society: Indian, Chinese and Islamic (Malay culture).[553] Malaysian universities also host mosques, which attract other Muslim students. For example, the USM attracts Indonesian students as both countries share similar cultural roots and language. Islam is also the dominant religion in Indonesia, for which students can observe religious practices without inconveniences as there is a mosque on the university campus.[554]

In short, universities make use of public and cultural diplomacy to attract foreign audiences. Through museums and mosques, HEIs use cultural diplomacy to showcase the culture of the country, attracting its visitors and influencing them to admire the culture and heritage, thus advancing the country's interests.

These factors point to the consolidation of Malaysia as an education hub and recognition of Malaysia as a hub for Islamic studies and relevant to Asian cultures. Furthermore, Malaysia's HEIs serve to attract, influence and interact with foreign audiences through teaching, research and dissemination of culture. In sum, their use of diplomacy tools such as knowledge diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, applied to Islam and Asian cultures as a source for

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[553] UM, 'Museum of Asian Art', 2020 <https://museum.um.edu.my/> [accessed 1 August 2020].
[554] Tan and Goh, p. 495.

the engagement and communication with foreign audiences, results in soft power gains and soft power projection of the country.

Some academics argue that the attraction of Muslim students may not be a deliberate action by the Malaysian government. Lee and Morshidi claim that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had an impact on the admission of Middle Eastern students to the US. The authors see this a push factor that caused these students to go to more hospitable countries. However, the government had already paved the way towards an education hub. Both push factors (such as the aftermath of 9/11) and pull factors (such as policies intended to IHE rather than soft power) demonstrate that Malaysia's soft power is a consequence of IHE and not a motivation to establish an education hub. In other words, soft power was sought by the government only as a secondary issue, after the impact of international student mobility and the inclusion of research universities in global rankings for the reputation of the country became known.

9.2 Outbound IPPM: Mexican universities as vectors of public and cultural diplomacy [555]

Dissemination of culture constitutes, in some NICs, the third pillar of the university, in addition to teaching/learning and research. In these countries, nations entrust HEIs to promote and disseminate the culture and values of the country through

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[555] Extracts of this section have been used to author the publication: Puebla Mora, M. F. (2020) 'Universities as vectors of cultural diplomacy: the case of Mexico', in Ahmed, I., Colombo, E., and Muir, R. (eds) *The Politics of Culture: An Interrogation of Popular Culture*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 21–40

policies and higher education laws. Hence, this pillar is at the same level as teaching and research.

In NICs, the mission statement of universities usually contains a form of extension or engagement to fulfil their purpose of becoming a fundamental part of social development. In countries like Brazil and Mexico, culture dissemination also has a component of science and technology, which is known as extension. Simply put, extension refers to the university's mission to engage with the general public and to make teaching, science and innovation accessible to their societies.

In Brazil, the Constitution instructs universities to make teaching, research and extension inseparable from each other.[556] In Mexico, the Law for the Coordination of Higher Education entrusts universities with three functions: teaching, research and dissemination of culture.[557] The aim of dissemination of culture and extension is for universities to engage with their local societies and the nation. We argue that both dissemination of culture and extension are part of the *internationalisation* strategies of some HEIs while pursuing foreign policy objectives.

The Mexican case is relevant here since its cultural assets have positioned the country in the eye of foreign publics. Its rich history that dates back to the Aztecs, Mayas and other civilizations and its attraction is not only in terms of tourism but also for research. Besides, its colonial heritage, the Spanish language and the collective identity of the country

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[556] Senado Federal, *Constituição Da República Federal Do Brasil*, p. 123.

[557] Congreso de la Unión, *Ley Para La Coordinación de La Educación Superior*, *Diario Oficial de La Federación* (Mexico, 1978), pp. 1–6 (p. 1).

build a distinctive national profile, which is appealing to foreigners.[558]

The government and the academia recognise the relevance of Mexican cultural assets in the construction of the country's soft power. The Executive Director of AMEXCID highlights the role of Mexican culture and foreign policy in the soft power configuration of the country. He claims that 'to the extent that its political values, the legitimacy of its foreign policy, and its culture are attractive to other countries, Mexico's soft power will continue to be effective'.[559] Similarly, diplomacy scholars argue that Mexican culture should be a source of cultural diplomacy and essential in the construction of the soft power of Mexico.[560]

The role of HEIs in building the country's soft power has two recognised foundations: their participation in ICD and the dissemination of Mexican culture. The country's cultural assets are an intrinsic part of the universities, which is why the latter have become platforms to make Mexican culture known, achieving foreign policy objectives.[561] The role of HEIs as agents of soft power in Mexico is evident when analysing culture, as they mobilise their resources through cultural diplomacy.

The General Law of Culture and Cultural Rights articulate the agency between the government and HEIs for the exhibition

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[558] Interview 83 UNAM/SRE

[559] Agustín García-López Loaeza, 'La Cooperación Mexicana Para El Desarrollo: El Poder Suave de La Política Exterior', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 111.Septiembre-Diciembre (2017), 23–39 (p. 26).

[560] Villanueva Rivas, 'Construyendo El Poder Suave de México', pp. 15–16.

[561] Villanueva Rivas, 'Construyendo El Poder Suave de México', p. 16.

and preservation of Mexican culture. This law entrusts the Ministry of Culture with the national cultural policy and empowers it to establish the mechanisms for linking the culture and education sectors. Additionally, this law establishes the bases for the international dissemination of Mexican culture, recognizing the public and private sectors' role as organisers of festivals, fairs, and cultural expressions in other countries.[562] In short, the Ministry of Culture is related to the higher education sector in terms of showcasing the country's artistic expressions abroad and collaborates in the coordination of cultural events of internationally recognised HEIs. Both the Ministry of Culture and AMEXCID are relevant in this task, but the former also assigns a budget to HEIs for holding events such as international book fairs and film festivals.

Mexican HEIs understand that the cultural expressions of the country, both material and non-material, are part of the identity of the people and the community.[563] Some of them are an essential part of their internationalisation strategy, as the three examples of Mexican HEIs demonstrate. The UNAM, the UDG and the ITESM make use of cultural and public diplomacy to approach the foreign public, obtaining in return soft power gains. These activities are part of their internationalisation agendas, which, at the same time, are oriented towards foreign policy objectives. HEIs divide them

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[562] Congreso de la Unión, *Ley General de Cultura y Derechos Culturales*, *Diario Oficial de La Federación* (Mexico, 2017), pp. 1–10 (p. 2).

[563] According to the Mexican General Law of Culture and Cultural Rights, these are past and present expressions such as art, tradition, practices and knowledge that identify groups, people and communities of Mexico Congreso de la Unión, *Ley General de Cultura y Derechos Culturales*, p. 2..

into two categories, following the IPPM framework: language and culture teaching institutes and international offices.

9.2.1 Institutes for teaching Spanish language and Mexican culture

The three HEIs analysed have institutes dedicated to the teaching of Spanish for foreigners and Mexican culture. The UNAM and the UDG have opened these establishments abroad, particularly in the US and Canada. These activities add to the country's soft power projection since both HEIs interact with foreign audiences in two of the most important counties for Mexican foreign policy.

The UNAM, being the most prestigious university in the country, is a benchmark for the internationalisation of higher education in Mexico. The institution's IHE policy allows it to connect its teaching, research, extension and cultural dissemination purposes with the *internationalisation* plan. These policies include goals such as to consolidate UNAM's international prestige, to be a reference for the teaching of the Spanish language; to expand and strengthen strategic alliances with prestigious institutions abroad; to increase the mobility of teachers and students and to attract international students and researchers in academic and cultural dissemination activities.[564]

UNAM's *internationalisation* policy is a vehicle for the opening of international teaching institutes. The first one was in the US, with cultural and extension courses taught at the University of San Antonio in 1944. The goal was 'to help the

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[564] UNAM, *Internacionalización UNAM* (Ciudad de México, 2017), p. 5.

diaspora to be able to maintain a bond with Mexico for their kids, so they would not lose the language and for Americans not to lose their Spanish proficiency' (Juan Ramón de La Fuente, former Rector of UNAM).[565] In 1995 the institution opened another school in Canada as a result of the academic and education chapter of NAFTA, linking higher education and foreign policy.[566] The institution established two more in Chicago in 2002 and Los Angeles in 2005. With the inauguration of the Centre for Mexican Studies at the Beijing University of Foreign Studies in 2012, UNAM consolidated its international venues.

In 2018, the institution had 14 international locations in the US (6), Canada, Costa Rica, Spain, France, Germany, UK, China and South Africa [567]. At its international institutes, UNAM teaches Spanish language, history, literature and art, these being cultural diplomacy activities. Some countries, such as Canada, request UNAM to offer tailored courses in Mexican and Latin American culture for their diplomats. Through the teaching of language and culture in their international institutes, UNAM aims to attract and influence foreigners, acquiring international visibility but also soft power gains for the country through the engagement with foreign audiences.

An essential element for all the international venues is the dissemination of Mexican culture through a series of

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[565] Interview 83 SRE/UNAM.

[566] Interview 93 UNAM.

[567] UNAM, p. 4. The UDG has also opened two international venues in the US: UDGLA in Los Angeles and UDG Chicago. Although both offer academic activities, their most important functions are related to the dissemination of cultural programs aimed at local communities. These programs are intended to engage with the Mexican diaspora and the foreign public and communities through cultural and artistic expressions of Mexican heritage and contemporary Mexico.

exhibitions, presentations and other cultural expressions organised in the host country, many of which require the liaison with governmental offices. We can classify these activities as cultural and public diplomacy since through them the UNAM communicates the national image abroad, represents the country and exposes the Mexican culture to foreign audiences, engaging with the host country's societies and influencing them to appreciate the Mexican culture. These outcomes are more difficult to achieve by the government, as the public might see them as propaganda. Since universities are showcasing the Mexican culture, there is more legitimacy and acceptance from foreign publics.[568]

The UNAM also has two Study Centres for Foreigners located in Mexico. In 2017, both institutes organised 530 academic and cultural activities, which were attended by 21,523 visitors. In the same year, the international venues of the institution organised 868 educational and cultural activities, registering an attendance of 61,807 people. [569] This means that 74% of the target audience was overseas, showing that the institution attracts more foreigners through its programmes abroad than those located in Mexico City, demonstrating attractiveness. These activities have three folded objectives inscribed in the *internationalisation* strategy of UNAM that illustrate the intention of obtaining soft power gains. They concern the bilateral relationship of Mexico with the host country, they provide support to the Mexican diaspora resident abroad, and

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[568] Interview 93 UNAM.

[569] UNAM, pp. 14–15.

advocate for the identification of Mexican talent and UNAM alumni to continue the university's bond with them.[570]

Mexican HEIs are interested in promoting their activities abroad through their institutes, mainly following an institutional rationale to promote their image abroad, but also to build strategic alliances and contribute to the foreign policy objectives.[571] However, the government has also started a path to open its institutes to engage with foreign audiences. The beginning of the Peña Nieto Presidency prompted the creation of *Mexico Institutes* throughout the world.[572] These institutes had the objective of disseminating Mexican culture among foreign publics. The Wilson Institute in Washington has a *Mexico Institute* dedicated to research and the bilateral relation. Also, in 2015 the UNAM inaugurated an institute called *Casa México* in the UK, under Mexican government auspices, linking the faculty and students of both universities and promoting Mexico in the country.[573]

In general, the initiative *Mexico Institutes* that was envisioned by Peña Nieto did not work due to the lack of budget and infrastructure. However, AMEXCID recognises the role that the UNAM has in the dissemination of culture abroad, and how independently from the government, UNAM teaches Spanish as a foreign language in the world, representing the country and communicating the national interest to foreign audiences in a systematic way.[574] In 2018, AMEXCID promoted

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[570] UNAM, p. 15.

[571] Interview 74 Chamber of Deputies/UDG and 83 SRE/UNAM.

[572] Olga Pellicer, 'La Política Exterior de México Bajo Un Nuevo Presidente', *CIDOB Anuario Internacional*, 2014, 341–48 (p. 341).

[573] AMEXCID, *Informe 2015*, p. 27.

[574] Interview 93 UNAM.

collaboration between SRE, the Ministry of Culture, UNAM and the Cervantes Institute of Spain for promotion of the Spanish Language.[575] The idea is to encourage the teaching of Spanish and provide certification of language proficiency together with the government of Spain. The opinions of the interviewees towards this initiative were that UNAM took the initiative of teaching Spanish globally for over 70 years, for which Mexico does not need the collaboration with the Cervantes Institute as UNAM could develop its own Spanish language certification and open its own institutes.[576]

In short, the government has been attempting to open spaces of its own for the promotion of Spanish language and Mexican culture. Nonetheless, the lack of organisation, infrastructure and budget has led the government of Mexico to seek the help of HEIs, particularly the UNAM. This allows universities to become soft power agents. The government's efforts are insufficient, and greater clarity on the soft power objectives could shed light on a project such as the *Mexico Institutes*.

It is also clear that more coordination is needed and that HEIs could play a more significant role in harnessing soft power through their initiatives. Still, continuity is required if they are to be successful, as the plans and programmes in Mexico change every six years, with the change of president and his cabinet. Furthermore, considering that Mexico does not have the equivalent to DAAD, British Council or Cervantes Institute, HEIs are a platform that the government should empower in its attempts to bring a better image of the country. The

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[575] AMEXCID, *Informe Semestral 2018*, p. 36.
[576] Interview 93 UNAM.

country could achieve this if they install policies directed towards IHE that empower all the sector, not only a few HEIs, with strategic planning to attain soft power gains and fulfil the national interest in the long term. The presence of AMEXCID is not sufficient to perform such a task. Only 10% of AMEXCID's total budget is allocated to its various programmes, since agency uses the rest as operating expenses and paying fees to international organisations, which forces the agency to innovate through interactions with different actors, such as HEIs.[577]

9.2.2 International offices of Mexican HEIs

The ITESM has 12 international offices located in Vancouver, Montreal, New Haven, Boston, California, Buenos Aires, Berlin, Freiburg, London, Barcelona, Madrid and Shanghai. ITESM's international offices have particular tasks, ranging from representing ITESM abroad in other organisations, universities and institutions; seeking new academic opportunities for students and professors; promoting ITESM's educational programmes, and serving as a liaison office.[578]

As a private institution, the ITESM views its international offices primarily as a vehicle for interacting with foreign audiences through academic activities such as student exchange and faculty mobility, or international research, rather than intentionally serving as a carrier of Mexican culture abroad. However, international offices become vectors of cultural diplomacy in different settings. For example, the

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[577] García-López Loaeza, p. 32.

[578] ITESM, 'International Offices', 2018 <https://tec.mx/es/internacionalizacion#scroll-element3> [accessed 23 July 2018].

director of the international office in London participates in more activities than are within the range provided above. This particular officer has been working with the Mexican Embassy in London and AMEXCID, attending to various cultural and academic events that the Mexican government is unable to participate in or lacks adequate personnel to represent the higher education sector in Mexico.[579] This shows that, even though ITESM is a private university, the Mexican government involves the institution in diplomatic missions, representing the country abroad. In sum, the staff of the ITESM's international offices represent the government when resources are scarce, making use of cultural and public diplomacy and becoming soft power agents.

The international offices of Mexican HEIs in the US are of particular importance in demonstrating how Mexico pursues soft power gains through IPPM. The three HEIs have 11 institutes and offices in the US, combined. Los Angeles is where all three HEIs have venues. This is of significance since Los Angeles is the city with most Mexican inhabitants (13%). The second most important location is Chicago, as this is the second city with the highest concentration of Mexicans in the US (7%).[580]

One of the foreign audiences targeted by HEIs is the Mexican diaspora and the demographic group considered as Mexican American, born in the US with Mexican ancestry. The objective of disseminating the Mexican culture in this scenario is to

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[579] Interview 80 ITESM.

[580] 24/7 Wallstreet, 'US Cities with the Most Mexican Immigrants', 2020 <https://247wallst.com/economy/2017/01/27/us-cities-with-the-most-mexican-immigrants/> [accessed 14 August 2020].

make these communities feel culturally closer to Mexico, to bring them nearer to their heritage, which as a result will help in the formation of long-term relationships with Mexico, an objective of public diplomacy. [581] Indeed, these are some of the goals articulated in UNAM's internationalisation strategy.

Influence leveraged through the cultural and academic programmes and representation of Mexican HEIs in the US has the potential to translate into soft power gains, as foreign audiences of Mexican origin could become a strong vector in the bilateral relations agenda. In the US, the Latino vote is increasing and helping these communities not to forget their Mexican roots and strengthen their Mexican identity could advance Mexico's interests in that country. As Nye points out in an interview with Villanueva Rivas, the Latino community in the US is difficult to ignore, particularly the Mexican one. Nye suggests that Latin American countries should make more use of soft power to achieve real influence on issues of their interest within the US.[582] Following this idea, Baños Rivas argues that it is imperative to increase the positive image of Mexico in the states that voted for Trump. Mexico must use cultural and public diplomacy to refute the negative connotations that Trump made of Mexicans, using soft power to influence not only the Mexicans in the US but also American citizens and politicians that have a partial and unbalanced image of the country.[583]

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[581] Interviews 80 ITESM, 83 UNAM/SRE, 87 UDG and 89 UDG.

[582] César Villanueva Rivas, 'El Poder En El Siglo XXI. Entrevista Con Joseph S. Nye', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 111.Septiembre-Diciembre (2017), 165–79 (p. 178).

[583] Luz Elena Baños Rivas, 'Poder Suave e Imagen País En La Era de Trump. Desafíos y Oportunidades Para México', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 111.Septiembre-Diciembre (2017), 43–64 (p. 44).

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the target audience of the international institutes of HEIs is first, second or higher generation of Mexicans residing in the US. They are sons and daughters of immigrants who, in most cases, have never visited the country. They no longer speak Spanish or are not fully aware of their Mexican heritage. Influencing this foreign public through cultural and public diplomacy strategies could lead to soft power gains, since HEIs could influence them to advocate in favour of Mexico, thus contributing to the Mexican foreign policy objectives in the context of an already complicated bilateral relationship.[584] Therefore, we can conclude that HEIs help to strengthen Mexico's ability to leverage the influence of its citizens abroad.

9.2.3 Cultural industries and cultural diplomacy

Cultural industries have been essential for the showcase of the cultural and artistic expressions in Mexico. Through them, HEIs interact with government agencies of other countries and foreign audiences. The cultural diplomacy that the UDG and UNAM deploy through their international book fairs and international film festivals are two unique cases where these institutions make use of cultural diplomacy, obtaining soft power in return. This section overviews cultural industries and the use of cultural diplomacy by the UDG.

The UDG hosts the International Book Fair of Guadalajara (FIL), which is the most important publishing meeting in Iberian and Latin America, just after the Frankfurt Book Fair.

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[584] Martha Flor Puebla Mora, 'Universities as Vectors of Cultural Diplomacy: The Case of Mexico', in *The Politics of Culture: An Interrogation of Popular Culture*, ed. by Ibtisam Ahmed, Elena Colombo, and Robyn Muir (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020), pp. 21–40 (p. 37).

It is a cultural festival that brings together key stakeholders in the publishing world. For nine days, the book industry from around the world gathers in Guadalajara to do business, but also to celebrate the literature, culture and artistic expressions of Mexico and the world. FIL is a platform that has gained relevance in the cultural and literary spheres across the globe, gaining prestige and recognition for the country and the institution. For example, in October 2020, FIL got the *Prince of Asturias* Award from the hands of the Princess of Spain. This award recognises the achievements in sciences, humanities and public affairs of individuals and organisations from around the world.

FIL's organising team collaborates with the governmental bodies of both countries to organise the guest's participation in FIL. The phenomenon of FIL is significant for the conduct of the international relations of the country. The FIL becomes an extension of the country's diplomatic activities through cultural diplomacy. Through its activities, the UDG engages with governments but also with foreign audiences such as the book industry of the guest countries, professors, researchers, and literacy elite from both countries, as well as other relevant cultural actors.[585] This same effort is replicated by the UDGLA office, in the creation of LeaLA, the International Book Fair of Guadalajara in Los Angeles.

The phenomena that FIL Guadalajara and LeaLA are for Mexico's cultural diplomacy is unique. FIL has become a space for artistic expressions but also political dialogue. From the 2014 talk with José Mujica, former President of Uruguay, to

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[585] Interviews 87, 88, 89 and 90 UDG.

the conference of the President of Israel and Nobel Peace Prize Shimon Peres in 2013, when Israel was the guest of honour. FIL has connected foreign and national audiences, while the UDG has been exercising cultural diplomacy and becoming an actor of the international relations of Mexico.

Regarding the film industry, the International Film Festival of Guadalajara (FICG) has been considered one of the most important for the appreciation, promotion and distribution of Mexican, Iberian and Latin American cinema [586]. It is an effort to bring together the film industry from around the world, especially from Iberian America, showing the potential of Mexican cinema. Mexican cinema, as a cultural expression finds in the FICG a possibility to be exhibited in the world. The FICG shows that the UDG uses cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy to engage with foreign audiences and bring soft power projection to the country. Through the film festivals of Guadalajara and Los Angeles, Mexico gets recognition in Latin America, Iberic-America and the world as a pioneer in cinema as a cultural industry promoted by a university. In the end, cultural and public diplomacy are useful tools to improve the image of the country abroad.[587]

Other Mexican universities also have their festivals and book fairs. However, this is the exception, not the norm. Other HEIs could replicate the UDG's strategy of engaging with foreign publics through cultural diplomacy. The implementation of policies, better coordination between the ministries of culture, education and AMEXCID, and more significant investment in

[586] UdeG, 'FICG', 2018 <https://www.ficg.mx/34/index.php/en/the-festival/what-is-ficg> [accessed 22 July 2018].
[587] Baños Rivas, p. 56.

these types of activities could result in more extensive participation of HEIs in the dissemination of Mexican culture abroad. Also, a better understanding of the soft power projection and soft power gains, but more importantly, clarity in the expected soft power outcomes, could shed light on the flourishing of projects to showcase the Mexican culture in the world through HEIs.

9.3 Key findings

In this chapter, we discussed IPPM and its implications for soft power in NICs, focusing on Malaysia for inbound IPPM and Mexico for outbound IPPM. The soft power gains found in the implementation of IPPM were, in the first instance, the traditional ones: attraction, influence and creating narratives to set agendas. Also, there are two other elements of soft power in IPPM: the creation of strategic alliances and gaining international visibility and reputation building.

For Malaysia, soft power was not an intended consequence of IHE policies. It was until 2011 that the government officially included soft power in policies: the NHESP 2. Therefore, we can conclude that IHE policies (pull factors) and the international environment (push factors) attracted international students and promoted the development of the higher education sector, including the establishment of an education hub. Soft power, hence, is a consequence of IHE policies established to pave the way towards becoming an education hub.

For Mexico, the country's laws grant HEIs with another role besides teaching/learning and research. The law has elevated dissemination of culture as a University mission. The culture laws and policies provide the necessary fundaments to make

HEIs cultural diplomacy actors. Furthermore, scarce government resources allowed HEIs to become agents of soft power, making use of diplomacy tools such as public and cultural diplomacy to achieve foreign policy objectives. Soft power in Mexico is an intended consequence of IPPM. The legal framework grants AMEXCID and the Ministry of Culture the roles of coordinators, and although the government has an important role to play, resources are limited, so HEIs are empowered to become soft power agents, using their resources to establish their presence abroad. We discuss the soft power implications of IPPM next.

9.3.1 Attraction and influence

In the case of Malaysia, the country has understood the power of attraction of Islam and uses higher education and Islamic culture to make itself attractive to other Muslim nations. At the same time, the ambition to become an education hub serves for the country's attraction, and this helps to build Malaysia's soft power towards targeted countries: Muslim, ASEAN and Asian countries. This attraction that Malaysia pursues is closely tied to influence, as by establishing itself as an education hub, the government seeks to educate not only Malaysians but also other Muslim students and international students from the region.

As seen in this chapter, Mexican culture is an essential point of attraction in the country. HEIs not only attract foreign audiences through their international venues but also interact with them through public diplomacy, teaching Spanish language and Mexican culture. This leads to influencing the societies of other countries, particularly the Mexican diaspora, targeting foreign policy objectives and acquiring soft power

conversion abilities by investing their resources to promote the Mexican culture abroad.

Cultural industries, in particular, have shown to be central to cultural and public diplomacy. Through their international venues, Mexican universities have been able to engage with foreign audiences and to influence and persuade them in ways the government could not. This is mainly because the government lacks infrastructure. However, other factors intervene, such as legitimacy as sometimes it is counterproductive for the government to engage in direct activities with foreign societies, as these might seem not legitimate. This way, national actors such as HEIs can influence and persuade other publics more smoothly than the government, exerting soft power.

9.3.2 Setting agendas and strategic alliances

For Malaysia, the policies that paved the road towards becoming an education hub provided the government with the ability to set the higher education agenda. The narratives created followed the economic rationale, but the aftermath of 9/11 provided the country with the ability to develop a description of Malaysia as a moderate Islamic country (*Islam Hadari*). This complemented the foreign policy goal of becoming the leader of the Muslim world. The inclusion of soft power in higher education policies to become an education hub strengthened the country's vision of global engagement and knowledge sharing, harnessing soft power through strategic alliances. Malaysia had already attracted the countries listed in the NHESP 2. International inbound student mobility figures can confirm that Malaysia attracted these countries. Therefore, the policies implemented to become an education hub targeted

to increase the number of students from these countries. In short, the subjects of Malaysia's soft power are Muslim, ASEAN and Asian countries. NHESP 2 significantly contributed to identifying these soft power subjects by finally enlisting the importance of the partnership with these countries, by the level of preference. This aligns the IHE with the foreign policy, obtaining soft power projection in targeted countries through strategic alliances.

In Mexico, the use of cultural diplomacy has allowed HEIs to engage with foreign publics. Furthermore, HEIs have strategically established their international offices and institutes for the teaching of language and culture throughout the world. The mobility of Mexican HEIs has allowed them to create the narratives and set the agendas, particularly in their engagement with the Mexican diaspora in the US. The examples of cultural and public diplomacy analysed are evidence of the role of Mexican HEIs in the international relations of the country. Their dissemination of culture abroad through the use of diplomacy tools helps to strengthen the bilateral relationship, mainly by winning the hearts and minds of American citizens.

9.3.3 International visibility and reputation building

Malaysia's education hub pursues the goal of gaining a reputation abroad and international visibility. Being at the top of the global university rankings has become a way for the government to measure the importance and international visibility of its HEIs. The invitation to foreign universities to open branch campuses in the country also adds to the government's aspiration to have an excellent international

reputation. International visibility and reputation are soft power aspirations pursued through the establishment of an education hub. However, this soft power projection is limited to the region and Muslim countries, as those are the subject countries of Malaysia's soft power. HEIs face several challenges, such as immigration policies and caps that prevent them from attracting more international students, the language of instruction, funding, and lack of greater autonomy. This means that even if the government promotes its education hub, the policies could be rhetoric rather than guidance for soft power success.

Finally, in the case of Mexico, the bilateral relationship with the US has had different difficult moments in time. The image of Mexico as a country with violence and narcotraffic, plus the malicious campaign of US politicians against the state, means that for Mexico, soft power is necessary to enhance its image abroad. HEIs, as demonstrated in this chapter, are key to building the country's reputation, and the use of HEIs cultural diplomacy is one of the critical strategies Mexico should increase. The softness of the involvement of HEIs in foreign policy matters and the national interest legitimises the activities carried out to engage with foreign audiences, and the governments should consider this on their way to pursuing soft power.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

This research evidences the need to rethink the role of IHE in soft power studies. Current literature has overlooked how IHE can influence the behaviour of other governments and their societies to reach the desired outcomes. Furthermore, the evidence collected here suggests that NICs have a unique understanding of soft power and of how IHE produces soft power outcomes.

Soft power is defined here in terms of behaviours. We define it as an ability of governments and non-state actors to shape the preferences of others to achieve the goals desired. The evidence found in this research suggests that NICs use soft power to boost capabilities and create 'enabling environments' to change, alter and influence the behaviours and preferences of others to obtain wanted outcomes.[588]

In NICs, the higher education sector plays a crucial role in achieving soft power objectives. Even though NICs have different contexts, the analysis points to this same conclusion in the three cases. On the one hand, the autonomy of universities in Brazil and Mexico provide a distinct role to HEIs, research centres, clusters and associations of universities. In these cases, the non-state actors become soft power agents by allocating their resources and those received from the government to programmes and strategies that target foreign policy objectives. In turn, the governments create environments that enable the national higher education stakeholders to use diplomatic mechanisms to change, alter

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[588] See chapter 2.

and influence the behaviours of the selected soft power targets.[589]

On the other hand, Malaysia's centralised system has provided the government with the ability to establish policies and allocate resources to foster IHE, which results in soft power outcomes. The public and private HEIs of Malaysia become soft power agents because the government's strategies put pressure on them to reach targets and goals. This is explained by their dependency on the government for resources, particularly for *internationalisation*. Hence, they are required to develop capabilities to attract, influence and persuade targeted countries, in favour of the foreign policy objectives of the country.

The three countries examined here had different ways to approach IHE; however, their understanding of soft power point to a model that challenges its current conceptualisation in the literature. The soft power projection of these countries directly corresponds to their foreign policy contexts and their higher education systems. National policies, laws, leaders, resources and ideological standings are all internal factors that determine the soft power assets of the country. In the same way, the international context such as the geographic position, international organisations and international events that change paradigms shape the scope of the soft power of countries.

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[589] See chapter 3.

10.1 Rethinking the role of IHE within the soft power analytical framework: a view from the experiences of NICs

Throughout this research, the role of the five levels of governmental agents have been uncovered in the three cases analysed. In countries such as Malaysia and Brazil the President/Prime Minister designs and provides the guidelines through policies and programmes that target international higher education but also involve soft power outcomes that are expected to be achieved by the higher education sector. Even if these policies and programmes are directly mandated by the highest authority of the country, there is a pronounced involvement of other governmental agencies beyond the ministries of higher education. In Brazil, the involvement of the MoFA and MoSTI provide evidence of the intentionality to obtain soft power through international higher education at all governmental levels, including the funding bodies at the state level (EMBRAPA). For Malaysia, this intentionality was observed directly from the MoHE, and the role of the five research universities, rather than the involvement of other ministries. In the case of Mexico, the government is less involved in policies and relies on strategies and programmes to target foreign policy objectives, hence bringing together HEIs and their resources more sporadically to deploy soft power to very focused targets.

The role of the higher education, research and innovation institutions in obtaining soft power for the country through international higher education, on the other hand, is more evident in the countries studied here. In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, this research identified that the governments

lacked the resources and, to some extent, a strategic approach to obtain soft power from international higher education. Even if Brazil had a deeper understanding of the relationship between soft power and IHE, the government is missing the strategic approach to give continuity to its programmes, and the impact they should have on both HEIs and international higher education. In the case of Mexico, the government has a more coherent vision through ICD, however there is no policy and the resources are limited. These factors, along with the autonomy of universities, have formed a viable space for universities, research centres, clusters and higher education institutions to become soft power actors in their own right. These institutions seem to understand that by internationalising their institutions, they also take part of the image of the country abroad. Moreover, these actors recognise the importance of representation, negotiation and communication of the national interest with other international actors, using knowledge diplomacy to deploy their internationalisation efforts.

The use of tools such as public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy by HEIs deserve special attention. In the three countries, this research found that public and cultural diplomacy are embedded in the internationalisation and the four international higher education components analysed here. Public diplomacy serves as a conduct for HEIs to engage with foreign audiences, creating long lasting bonds. This was evident in the interviews, as the rationales behind internationalisation of universities were to attract foreign students and create in them a positive image of the country abroad. Furthermore, strategic communication, a feature of public diplomacy, is a pillar for universities in Mexico, to the

extent that they have developed their own radio and television channels to broadcast culture as well as the news, national and international, reaching to publics beyond their borders. This also has gained them a voice that serves as a counterpart to the governmental official channels.

In this research, chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated that there is more than the scholarship programmes and faculty exchanges that the government fosters to increase the internationalisation of higher education of the country. As the evidence suggests, the universities in the three countries actively engage in inbound and outbound mobility, beyond the governmental programmes. In the case of Malaysia, the government places targets of both the number of students and the places the mobility students should come from. This is different than in Brazil and Mexico, where it is evident that the universities invest their resources to promote student mobility, beyond the governmental guidelines. However, in the three countries was found the ability of the HEIs to transform their resources to reach soft power objectives, becoming hence soft power assets. This transformation of resources is achieved through public diplomacy. HEIs follow a process to be able to foster student mobility. This process involves contacting other universities in other countries through shared interest. They meet at international conferences (such as EAIE, IAUP, NAFSA, etc.) and create bonds between their peers. Usually, this is done through the internationalisation offices. This act of engaging with other HEIs around the globe has a prominent component of public diplomacy. HEIs pursue relationships with other foreign HEIs to advance their interests and those of the country they represent, regardless of the government in turn. They create these channels to understand the other cultures,

build relationships, influence their peers, investing their resources to create these bonds. At this point, the target is not only to foster student and faculty mobility, or even internationalisation of research, but also to create a reputation of the institution abroad, as well as to become attractive and gain influence through public diplomacy, hence obtaining soft power for the country.

Furthermore, as universities in the three countries analysed here engaged in public diplomacy, they were also found to legitimise the strategies and policies of the country. A clear example was exposed in the case of Mexico, where the University of Guadalajara served the purposes of the government through FOBESII, and particularly during the meeting held at the University of California. Examples like these suggest that the relationship between government and HEIs gets strengthen when HEIs are given an active role as soft power actors through public diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy has also given a relevant role to HEIs in soft power projection, as was observed in chapter 9. Malaysian and Mexican universities have become an essential actor to showcase the local and national culture. They again transform their resources into soft power assets through cultural diplomacy. In the case of Malaysia, English language as a medium of instruction has attracted many international students, but also Bahasa Malay as a medium of instruction in the undergraduate level has served to create a bond with Indonesian students, population that shares the language with Malaysia. In both languages, Malaysian HEIs have been able to attract and engage with far larger numbers of international students than Brazil and Mexico, which suggest that language remains an important topic in both IHE and soft power. In the

case of Brazil, language has as well served as a bridge between Brazil and Africa. It is not only about sharing the historical roots, but also to be able to engage and communicate with Lusophone countries to the extent that long lasting bonds are created, projecting the image of Brazil among third world countries and helping it to achieve its purposes in the international scenario. In this case, we can evidence that language is a strong component of the cultural diplomacy exercised by Brazil in its quest to gain a leadership role among Lusophone countries, to create a platform for Brazil to gain international visibility and soft power projection. The case of Mexico involves not only language, but also strategic approaches to cultural diplomacy that have gained Mexican HEIs international visibility and reputation, particularly among the diaspora and Latin American communities in the US. Cultural diplomacy, for Mexican HEIs, has become a tool for soft power. It is through the mobility of the universities to other latitudes to teach Spanish language and culture that they have become ambassadors of the country, portraying the national interest and representing the values and identity of the country abroad. The engagement with the diasporas abroad, particularly in the US, serve to create long lasting bonds with American society, to gain a voice and influence those living in the US in their own territory, with the aim of persuade the society which in turn could persuade its government. Universities such as UNAM and UDG invest their own resources and transform them to become soft power assets using culture, language and diplomacy to foster mutual understanding.

Other national actors also have a voice in the soft power configuration of the country. It seems that the academies of

sciences in the three countries have found a unique voice and a more global understanding of science diplomacy. In the cases of Brazil and Mexico the academies of sciences are very critical bodies that leverage the governmental voice and efforts at a national and international level. Those academies, as well as university organisations such as FAUBAI and CGBU in Brazil, and ANUIES in Mexico, seem to understand that scientific collaboration goes beyond borders and beyond the political intervention of the government in science and technology. The three dimensions of policy in which these actors have a role: science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science and science for diplomacy, not only serve as a leverage to the government's rationales, but also showcase the capabilities of the county in terms of science and promote development and a country image that serves to obtain international recognition, attraction to the scientific community of the country, and influence through the creation of alliances that are strategic to both the country and the mentioned national actors.

The three case studies suggest that NICs obtain soft power from IHE in ways that go beyond the traditional mechanisms identified in the current literature. The evidence indicates that NICs have different understandings of soft power than the developed world. As middle powers with unique cultures, natural resources and shared historical roots with other countries, NICs have a way to wield soft power in their own ways. Their strategic approach to soft power through IHE makes us rethink soft power as an analytical concept. This has implications in the way NICs conceive soft power, but also in its bi-directionality. Evidence suggests that NICs need to be strategic in their soft power projection, acknowledging their

role in between the North and the Global South. The next points explain these findings in more detail.

10.1.1. NICs challenge traditional models of soft power.

This research found that NICs do not entirely emulate the soft power models of developed countries. Three factors explain this phenomenon. First, their position in world politics impacts on their ability to leverage the power of other countries, in an attempt to level the field by using *soft* resources to modify behaivours in targeted countries. NICs understand their limitations in power resources such as military or defence, hence they stress the importance of using other assets. NICs direct their soft power efforts to countries of similar or lesser levels of development, primarily using IHE to achieve their objectives. This also means that NICs understand power in terms of behaviours, not in terms of resources.[590]

Second, being a middle power also implies a position that places them between the developed and developing countries. This provides NICs with certain legitimacy in the eyes of developing countries, as they are not seen as threat, particularly in terms of exploitation or taking advantage of their natural resources. This facilitates ICD and other diplomacy mechanisms used where the higher education sector plays a crucial role.[591] At the same time, being a middle power helps NICs to leverage their soft power capabilities

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[590] See chapter 2.
[591] See chapter 8.

among developed countries, who help them pursue their objectives in the developing world.[592]

Third, the lack of resources and infrastructure has made these countries apply innovative strategies and programmes to wield soft power, making use of one of the softest tools they have at hand: higher education.[593] Because resources are scarce and the strategies are not the same in NICs as in developed countries, NICs' governments have not developed structures such as the British Council or the DAAD to wield soft power. Instead, they have resorted to empowering their higher education system to achieve soft power objectives and, along the way, have made use of three specific soft power tools not commonly discussed in the current literature: strategic alliances, worldwide advocacy for global common goods, and international visibility and reputation building. This challenges the traditional understandings of soft power.

Finally, internal factors, such as the autonomy of universities, have created a distinctive landscape in these countries. It has allowed deeper participation of the higher education sector in achieving soft power objectives, making them soft power agents. The legal frameworks the governments set in place are steps towards giving a more substantial role to higher education in soft power. Still, supplementary and more substantial strategies are needed to ensure the achievement of soft power gains in the long-term.

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[592] See chapters 8 and 9.

[593] See chapters 6 to 9.

10.1.2. A soft power model fit for the NICs.

Soft power is an analytical concept created through the observation of American foreign policy. Since its appereance in the 1990s, many politicians, journalists and scholars of different disciplines adopt the term to refer to 'winning the hearts and minds' of publics abroad. NICs challenge the views of soft power as referred to by western countries. NICs are more concerned with local development, the reinforcement of native civilisations and producing global knowledge honouring local traditions and customs. This in turn suggests that these countries have also acquired different approaches to globalisation and internationalisation.

The rules of world politics apply to them, particularly the soft power ones. But instead of limiting themselves to become subjects of the soft power of developed countries, NICs seem to find a way to leverage their soft power limitations through IHE. Especially in the cases of internationalisation of research and ICD.

NICs undertand soft power not only as a way to get the desired outcomes through co-option. To them, soft power is also is a means of maximising other resources, securing their place in a world preponderantly ruled by western and developed countries, and a vehicle for becoming knowledge societies that nurture their local assets and cultural resources in a highly globalised world. What we can perceive as western, these countries have adapted to their understandings and capabilities. For example, Mexico values its own HEIs to the extent that it gives them a role to harness soft power through cultural diplomacy in a way that Brazil and Malaysia do not. At the same time, Malaysia has learned to exploit its Islamic

credentials and use it to gain the country a voice within the Muslim world through IHE.[594]

On the other hand, up until 2014, Brazil focused on developing its research institutions, addressing local social and environmental problems. The first objective was to bring higher education, research and development to all parts of the country, before opening the country to massive internationalisation efforts with the SWB programme.[595] At the same time, the country developed since its independence a sophisticated understanding of soft power, which permeated to other areas and ministries. It was only later that the country found a way to use its higher education system and developed capacities to connect IHE to its soft power ambitions.

These three cases explain how NICs move away from western frameworks, adapting to their realities following their position in the world. Furthermore, NICs seem comfortable to entrust their higher education stakeholders with diplomacy mechanisms. IHE produces soft power in NICs because governments empower these actors to become soft power agents and diplomats. They do so through the use of public and cultural diplomacy to engage with foreign audiences, and knowledge diplomacy and science diplomacy to build a good reputation for their countries and strengthen their strategic alliances

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[594] See chapter 9.
[595] See chapter 7.

10.1.3. Natural assets and historical background as sources of legitimation

The worldwide advocacy for global common goods is a feature shared with developed countries. However, NICs use this soft power tool to become the voice of third-world causes, which developed countries cannot do. Being middle powers with vast natural resources and shared problematics inherent of the third world, they have a more legitimate voice in world politics.

Their historical backgrounds also aid NICs to connect with other developing countries.[596] Their natural allies are those countries that share their colonial past. The shared language, culture and even religion have become soft power resources used by IHE.

The research on their natural resources and problems that are endemic to these countries has gained them a voice and recognition globally. This is more clearly reflected in the support they have gained in multilateral organisations, such as the seats they occupy in the UN system.

10.1.4. Rethinking sources and resources.

Internationalisation of higher education is a soft power resource in NICs. Academic collaboration in R&D and international initiatives, bilateral or multilateral programmes in science, technology and innovation, academic exchange, knowledge transfer, international institutes and other internationalisation strategies of universities and research

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[596] See chapter 5.

centres become soft power resources as the mobilisation of these target foreign policy objectives, becoming soft power assets. The higher education stakeholders mobilise their resources to transform them into soft power assets when they use diplomacy mechanisms. On their part, governments enable them to become soft power agents, allowing or even causing this transformation of higher education resources into soft power assets by setting laws, policies, programmes, strategies and allocating budget to this end. This mechanism that converts higher education resources into soft power assets makes us question the current belief that soft power has only three soft power sources: culture, foreign policy and domestic values and policies.[597]

The evidence presented in this thesis shows that IHE in NICs is a source of soft power in itself and should not be subordinated to the culture source. When it comes to cultural diplomacy, IHE makes use of culture to produce soft power, for which resources from culture and IHE interact to create soft power. Hence, soft power agents, governmental and non-governmental, mobilise their IHE resources, among them programmes and budget, at the same time that they use resources of culture, such as language and religion, to achieve soft power objectives.

Placing IHE as a source of soft power, at the same level as culture, makes it easier to identify the actors, the diplomatic tools, the resources and the mechanisms and motivations (the *how* and *why*). Additionally, this re-identification of IHE within soft power allows us also to identify the subjects of soft power

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[597] See chapter 2.

(the *who*) and the context (the *where* and *when*), particularly when analysing it along the lines of foreign policy.[598]

Nye considers foreign policy as the third source of soft power. However, this thesis has demonstrated that, in NICs, when IHE targets foreign policy objectives, the outcomes are soft power gains and projection. In the similar vein, IHE is guided by foreign policy postures and goals, which indicate the strategic countries and the national interest. Hence, if we consider both IHE and foreign policy at the same level as sources of soft power, we can see that both interact to fulfil mutual objectives.

IHE in NICs serves the purposes of foreign policy. Furthermore, the tools of diplomacy that foreign policy uses to reach its goals are also the instruments IHE uses to achieve soft power outcomes. Also, governments in NICs recognise the role of higher education stakeholders to accomplish foreign policy objectives, for which there is a more prominent role of these actors in wielding soft power and becoming track-two diplomats through representation, negotiation and communication.

This use of diplomacy by non-state actors allows them to engage with foreign audiences in a more credible and authentic way than governmental bodies can. The "softness" of higher education, the academic and research work of universities, and even the autonomy of universities make IHE more legitimate in the eyes of foreign publics, and less threatening than the governmental initiatives deployed by

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[598] See chapter 2 on how current literature fails to address the *who, why, where* and *when.*

developed countries (such as the British Council or the
Confucius Institutes).

10.1.5. The bi-directionality of soft power.

As Lukes pointed out, when it comes to soft power, we need to
focus on both agents and subjects, and enquire how agents
succeed in "winning the hearts and minds" of the subjects.
There are two possible scenarios, by wielding power over them
or by contributing to their empowerment.[599] The evidence
suggests that, concerning IHE, NICs take the second approach
to soft power. They contribute to the empowerment of less
developed countries and those with similar development
through joint research and ICD. This includes implementing
triangular cooperation and South-South cooperation
strategies; making quality higher education accessible to them
through branch campuses and own institutions in the top of
the global rankings; setting strategic alliances through
multilateral organisations that foster the mobility of students,
allowing them to gain global competences; bringing cultural
understanding closer between individuals of different societies
that share the language, historical roots or religion; and
becoming advocates of third world causes as well as global
common goods.

NICs not only intend to use soft power to shape the
preferences of strategic subjects. They themselves are also
the subject of other developed countries' soft power
projection. Therefore, NICs use their soft power resources to

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[599] Steven Lukes, 'Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds. On the Bluntness of Soft
Power', in *Power in World Politics*, ed. by Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (Oxon:
Routledge, 2007), pp. 83–97 (p. 97).

leverage the soft power that developed countries directed to them. They make use of their assets, such as culture, research capabilities and higher education reputation, to attract, persuade, influence and engage with foreign audiences the way the cannot do by using hard power. But they intendenly do so by engaging with the Global South, while at the same time creating connections and ties with the developed world. They take advantage of the resources that developed countries offer, creating partnerships and networks that are beneficial for both, and even for the Global South.[600] The evidence shows that NICs understand this bi-directionality of soft power.

In order to be successful, we make few recommendations. In terms of maximising their own soft power and its bi-directionality, NICs need a better implementation of policies, programmes and strategies, as well as more empowerment of national actors to become soft power agents in their own right. The successful implementation of these mechanisms in NICs is subject to internal and external factors, coordination between agents, intentionality and accountability of the outcomes, and the continuity of their implementation, regardless of the administration in turn. In NICs, the latter is perhaps the most challenging task to achieve.

Governments should be able to harness the soft power gains of partner countries in support of their ambitions. Otherwise, they become only soft power subjects. To avoid this trap, we suggest that these governments implement long-term policies that recognise IHE as a source of soft power. Such policies

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[600] See chapter 8.

should be embedded in the foreign policy agenda, with clear soft power expectations, well-defined roles of the soft power agents, and mechanisms to measure success.

Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the governments of Brazil and Malaysia might benefit from creating clear mechanisms and bodies to wield soft power more effectively, as Mexico has done with the ICDL and AMEXCID.[601] Brazil must assure the continuity of programmes and analyse the success of programmes such as SWB in the light of the soft power achievements before investing as many resources. For this, a policy that guides IHE and soft power is needed. Malaysia would benefit if government and HEIs explore the benefits that internationalisation of research and ICD could bring to the soft power of the country. The government could greatly benefit from more autonomy from HEIs and, in turn, public and private HEIs that are granted more autonomy could to invest more in research than targeting inbound student mobility.[602] This needs a shift of paradigm in their understanding of IHE. In turn, Mexico should advance in its soft power ambitions by investing more on IHE, from budget to infrastructure. AMEXCID needs to do better in coordinating the IHE of the country, as this is a mandate of the ICDL, instead of only focusing on ICD. An instrument to measure the inbound and outbound mobility of the country and the array of programmes and results could be the first step to know the soft power resources the country possesses and how to wield soft power from IHE.

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[601] See chapters 7 and 8.

[602] See chapter 8.

10.2 The three-variant model

This research uses the findings of the three countries analysed to make broader generalisations about soft power in NICs and to explain how and why IHE produces soft power in such countries. A pattern of how IHE causes soft power surfaces when applying the theory developed here to NICs. This is the result of the variation of the relationships between the agents and their soft power conversion abilities on the four IHE components. The value of each of the components also varies according to resources, foreign policy and the importance the higher education system places on IHE. Hence, there would be variances on the soft power outcomes as a consequence of IHE over time and space.

The analysis of the three cases has led to the construction of a pattern with three variants. This pattern pointed to a three-variant model, summarised in diagram 1.

Diagram 1 The three variant-model

Variant 1:

Soft power is a catalyst for international higher education. Countries intentionally pursue soft power objectives when implementing international higher education programmes and strategies. However, higher education policies are still needed to produce soft power outcomes strategically.

IHE ⟵ SP

Variant 2:

International higher education is a vehicle to achieve development, and soft power is a consequence shaped by internal and external factors, including international higher education.

IHE ⟶ SP

Variant 3:

International higher education is an extension of the foreign policy of a country. Governments create frameworks to achieve soft power goals, but internal or external factors prevent their success. Hence, they enable international higher education stakeholders to become soft power agents.

IHE ⇆ SP

Source: Own creation.

The three-variant model explains how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs. In the first variant, IHE delivers soft power because the latter is the driving force behind the implementation of IHE programmes and strategies. Brazil and Mexico both have these rationales behind their IHE activities, but it is more evident in the case of Brazil. Still, both countries need to develop policies to obtain soft power in the components studied here strategically.

The second variant explains that countries conceive IHE as a means to establish knowledge societies and achieve development. Soft power is a consequence of IHE, meaning that the latter was a driver before the government acts on wielding soft power through higher education. Furthermore, both internal and external factors shape the IHE landscape of the country, and hence its soft power gains. This variant applies to the case of Malaysia, where the government first directed its policies to the development of an education hub, following economic rationales and those of human resources development. Internal factors such as the need to strengthen the higher education sector due to the demand of national students and external factors such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks shaped the IHE of the country. It was until 2011 that

the government recognised the soft power of IHE through education policies, demonstrating that this was an unintended consequence at first.

The third variant exposes that IHE is an extension of a foreign policy of a country when it pursues soft power goals. This statement is showed in the three countries analysed here; however, the case of Mexico explains this phenomenon in a better way. Furthermore, the variant explains that countries have developed frameworks to increase their soft power. However, internal factors, such as lack of budget or infrastructure, jeopardise their success. In this scenario, countries empower HEIs to become soft power agents, also becoming foreign policy actors.

This variant explains the case of Mexico mainly. In the past few years, the government has set several legal instruments to wield soft power, taking advantage of the assets the country possesses. The ICDL, the General Law of Culture and Cultural Rights and the PECiTI are all part of a robust framework that shows that Mexico has a sophisticated understanding of soft power. Furthermore, AMEXCID coordinates not only ICD activities but also the IHE of the country. As part of the foreign affairs ministry, AMEXCID can coordinate the IHE efforts to make them follow foreign policy objectives. However, the lack of budget and infrastructure limits the governmental apparatus, which has made the country seek alliances with national HEIs, empowering them to become soft power agents. This is done in skilful ways, as the autonomy of universities allows HEIs to direct their resources the way they see fit.

Brazil and Malaysia do not have as developed a legal framework as Mexico, and both lack an agency with the characteristics of AMEXCID. In the case of Brazil, IHE is an extension of the foreign policy of the country as the coordination between the ministries allows the MoFA to coordinate higher education with the foreign affairs agenda when implementing programmes such as SWB. In the case of Malaysia, decisions are made top-down. Hence, evidence suggests that the Prime Minister and his cabinet direct the foreign policy agenda, and IHE is a tool to achieve its objectives.

This thesis proposes a taxonomy to explain how and why IHE causes soft power in the NICs analysed here. Furthermore, this taxonomy answers the question that drives this study: how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs?

In the case of Brazil, IHE causes soft power because the latter is a **motivation** to foster student mobility and internationalisation of research. The government explicitly identifies higher education as a means to and a mechanism to wield soft power, so the soft power gains that IHE produces are intentional. However, there is no legal framework to support it. Both government and national actors lead the rationales driving the IHE of the country, guiding the internationalisation strategies both at a national and institutional level. This makes the IHE of Brazil active and reactive to foreign policy objectives. This also means that, by obtaining soft power through IHE, both kinds of actors participate in the creation of foreign policy objectives, and by following the foreign policy objectives, they react to them as well.

In the case of Malaysia, IHE causes soft power because the government widely enables the former through student mobility and IPPM. Hence, soft power is a **consequence** of the internationalisation strategies implemented, such as IHE policies and the establishment of an education hub. The government did target soft power when implementing IHE strategies, but only from 2011 onwards. Hence, the soft power gains and projection were not the first rationale for IHE strategies but were a consequence (albeit unintended at first). At the same time, the government pursues foreign policy objectives through IHE, which make national actors reactive to foreign policy objectives, rather than active.

Finally, in the case of Mexico, IHE causes soft power because the government fosters student mobility, internationalisation of research and international programme and provider mobility as an **extension** of the soft power capabilities of the government. The government explicitly pursues to obtain soft power gains through IHE. However, internal factors such as the autonomy of the universities and lack of resources and infrastructure limit the government's soft power conversion abilities. Soft power gains are intentional, and the government has created a normative framework for it. Due to these characteristics of the country (the autonomy of universities and the normative framework created by the government), both government and national actors lead the rationales driving the IHE of the country, making them active and reactive to the foreign policy objectives.

Four conditioning factors explain the differences in the three-variant model:

1. The political and regional environments are different; therefore, foreign policy agendas are different.
2. The nature of the higher education sector is diverse. The autonomy of universities provides the HEIs with different capabilities, and the historical roots of higher education in the national configuration has made an impact on their role in both IHE and soft power.
3. Policy choices and ideology of the countries makes them pursue strategic alliances according to the nature of their values.
4. Countries use different soft power tools according to their capabilities but also their goals. It is the nature of their power, their resources, their understandings of soft power and of IHE that make them use different soft power tools.

With this in mind, a question surfaces: how can these countries change their landscape to obtain more enhanced soft power outcomes? That will depend on domestic and external factors. For instance, in 2018, the three countries had elections and radically changed their national political system as the opposition parties won. In the case of Malaysia, this change affected the higher education system as the MoHE was merged with the Ministry of Education. This strategy diminished the emphasis given by the previous administrations to IHE. In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the governments decreased expenditure on higher education and research, including reducing the budget to agencies such as CNPq and CONACyT and did not replicate previous strategies such as FOBESII and SWB.

Globally, the WHO declared coronavirus a pandemic the 11 of March 2020. This pandemic has presented other kind of

challenges to IHE worldwide. This phenomenon has made governments create programmes to incentivise research in particular areas of knowledge, such as medicine and others related to health. It also has seen a retrenchment of programmes in liberal arts and humanities. Some countries have been able to make use of their best resources, and universities are re-designing programmes, curricula, and even teaching methods to be on top of the demands of this new world. This is a different landscape that can change how countries understand and obtain soft power through IHE.

The three-variant model also shows some implications for the relationship between the government and the higher education sector. In the case of Mexico, the government cannot be a direct influence in HEIs. The autonomy of universities is a decisive determinant of the higher education landscape, which sometimes even serves as a counterweight of the decisions taken by the government, even in foreign policy affairs. Hence, universities have developed their negotiation tools, and in exceptional occasions (particularly during the administration of Peña Nieto) the government has empowered them to represent the country and communicate the national interest while attracting, persuading and influencing the societies of strategic partners.

The case of Malaysia is a sharp contrast when analysing it through the three-variant model. While the Mexican government has a more subtle relationship with universities, Malaysia dictates how universities serve the national interest. The governmental apparatus dominates the higher education sector. The MoHE sets the targets and monitors the progress, allocates the budget for IHE, and even has a presence at the heart of public universities, having a representative as part of

the board. The policies are formulated from top-down, and even though there are foreign universities in the higher education landscape, institutions also have to respond to targets as set by the government. This process means that the government directs soft power as a consequence of IHE.

Brazil has taken a different approach, where governmental programmes and strategies are more *ad hoc*. The government involves the higher education sector in its decision-making process. The association of universities such as CGBU and FAUBAII serve as interlocutors between the higher education sector and the government. This also is a feature of the Mexican university-government relations. Furthermore, there is coordination between the ministries of education, foreign affairs and science, technology and innovation, and the agencies CAPES and CNPq, which allow for more strategic planning of the IHE and the harnessing of its soft power outcomes.

The three variant-model and the newfound role of IHE in soft power studies show that NICs have a different understanding of soft power than what so far the literature has discussed. Taking into account the findings of this research, we propose a new model of soft power that applies to NICs, labelling it as Soft Power 2.0.

10.3 Soft power 2.0

The findings of this research force us to transition from the current perception of soft power towards a more inclusive concept that responds accordingly to NICs' realities. This research advocates for a broader interpretation of the analytical concept that recognises IHE as a soft power source.

This new interpretation of soft power is proposed here as **Soft Power 2.0**.

This research departed from the conceptualisations of soft power as provided by Nye. The author has defined soft power as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies'.[603] Nye also defined it as 'the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction.'[604] Additionally, he claims that 'in behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft-power resources are the assets that produce such attraction'.[605]

From this understanding of soft power, this research proposed to define soft power as *the ability of governments and non-state actors (agents) to develop the capabilities and enable environments to change, alter and influence the behaviours and preferences of others (states, governments, non-state actors and public).*[606]

This definition recognises that soft power is an ability not only owned by states, but also by other non-state actors. It also recognises the diversity of agents that can wield soft power. It identifies the subjects of soft power, that is, the entities towards which soft power is directed. The soft power subjects include governments, at the local and national level, and other

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[603] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. x.
[604] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 16.
[605] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 6.
[606] See chapter 2.

non-state actors as well as societies. When we incorporate this diversity of subjects, we can conceive soft power in more strategic terms.

The current literature proposes that soft power has three sources: culture, domestic and political values and foreign policy. However, Soft Power 2.0 recommends elevating IHE as a source of soft power. Consequently, internationalisation of higher education would become a soft power resource, as explained in previous sections.

So far, the definition of soft power has rested on three forms of co-option means *attraction, persuasion/influence and creating narratives to set agendas.* Those are the established tools that soft power agents use while wielding soft power. This research demonstrated that HEIs use these tools to exert soft power through IHE, albeit imprinting in them their uniqueness according to their capabilities and resources.

Even if NICs also use the established soft power tools, this research also found that NICs use a new soft power tool kit to achieve soft power outcomes. This new kit includes strategic alliances, worldwide advocacy for global common goods and international visibility and reputation building.

10.3.1 The new soft power tool kit

The new soft power tool kit proposes to include those instruments that countries such as NICs use to exercise soft power. These are different from the ones used in developed countries, and both internal and external factors influence them in particular ways. This is important as exogenous variables such as environment and context sometimes are structural obstacles to NICs' ability to leverage soft power. In

turn, internal policies and ideologies are the cornerstones to wield soft power.

This new soft power tool kit originates in their natural resources, their geographical positions, their cultural heritage and their position in the international system. Both internal and external factors can influence them. These particular soft power tools were observed by examining IHE, for which these are explained from such soft power source.

The first one concerns strategic alliances. In NICs, IHE is closely linked to their foreign policy and their national interest, albeit it is not always observable at first sight. The evidence presented here suggests that NICs make use of IHE to reach foreign policy objectives while aiming to change the preferences and behaviour of targeted countries. The different policies and programmes enlist strategic countries towards which governmental and non-governmental actors should direct the efforts. These efforts are a confirmation of the intentionality to strengthen strategic alliances with countries that are within their regions of influence, obtaining soft power gains or projecting their soft power.

The several programmes discussed in the course of chapters 7 to 9 suggest that not only the governments wield soft power through IHE. HEIs have become soft power agents by transforming their resources to engage with the societies of those targeted countries, making use of public diplomacy, science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy. The inbound student mobility trends demonstrate that the mobility inserted in government programmes is low compared to the overall mobility in the period analysed here. However, over the years, students from targeted countries have continued to study in

these host countries. This suggests that HEIs are not only attracting students from the regions of influence through student mobility. They are also engaging in other practices such as research networks, joint research and academic collaboration, strengthening the bilateral or multilateral relations that result in student mobility. The higher education landscape of the countries presented here, along with the political administration of the country, are domestic factors that empower HEIs, research centres, associations of universities, and other higher education stakeholders to become soft power agents, transforming their resources to soft power assets.

In the case of the three NICs analysed here, the strategic alliances are critical to the foreign policy agenda, particularly in the relations with their regions of influence. Contrarily, developed countries such as the US and the UK target global outreach rather than regional. This suggests that NICs do think strategically about their soft power projection, recognising their role as middle-power countries, where countries with less or similar development would easier become their strategic allies through inbound student mobility, internationalisation of research and ICD. For NICs, more bridges can be built with the developed world through outbound student mobility, triangular cooperation and internationalisation of research, using knowledge diplomacy and science diplomacy. However, without strategic planning, the alliances with developed countries could turn them into soft power subjects, preventing them from obtaining soft power in return.

Of the three characteristic soft power tools found in the three cases, worldwide advocacy for global common goods stands

out as being distinctive to NICs. Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico make use of their natural resources and use science diplomacy and knowledge diplomacy to engage with other countries in research aimed at solving global problems and the preservation of global common goods. Brazil and Mexico in particular make use of ICD to cooperate with less developed countries, giving particular importance to issues that are of significance for them, such as famine and agriculture. In both countries, their interest in specific topics has made them invest more in the internationalisation of research, allowing them to bring global attention to issues that are also part of the national interest.

Albeit the resources invested by the government to the internationalisation of research are not at the level seen in developed countries, other agents intervene by transforming their resources for soft power gains. Such agents are funding organisations, local governments, HEIs, research centres and the academies of sciences, which convert their resources to address problems of humanity, the protection of global common goods or even to participate in the UN's SDGs.

In cases such as pandemics, global diseases such as Zika, global common goods such as the Amazon, and global phenomena such as migration, famine and poverty, Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico have been pushing their agendas through research. They strengthen their capabilities through international collaboration while seeking to become the voice of third-world causes. Nonetheless, the recent focus that the UN has placed on SDGs has encouraged countries in the developed world to include these issues in their agendas for their own gains. The desire to measure the performance of universities in relation to the SDGs has made The Times

Higher Education to publish its Impact Rankings 2020. On it, the organisation assesses the universities against the UN's SDGs in three areas: research, outreach and stewardship.[607] On its 2020 edition, it ranked Australian, North American and European institutions in its top 10. However, the Brazilian USP is ranked in 14th place, Mexican UNAM in place 62 and the Malaysian USM in place 65.[608] Overall, several universities from the three countries appear in the ranking, suggesting that these institutions are commited to the UN's SDGs in similar levels as other universities from the developed world.

The agenda that is being pushed by the UN could have diluted the impact of NICs' advocacy. Even so, the research centres, academies of sciences and researchers are now more involved in pursuing the SDGs. It is a question of whether governments in NICs will develop the ability to harness the soft power benefits that derive from HEIs developing research that targets the SDGs. The NIC's could gain a voice and recognition within the international system if the governments support HEIs, research centres and academies of sciences as soft power agents, empowering them and increasing their investment in international research with clear soft power objectives in mind.

The ultimate goal to achieve through IHE in NICs is not only related to foreign policy principles and objectives. They mainly seek to obtain international visibility and build a reputation as countries that have sophisticated higher education systems, where science, technology, innovation and research are

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[607] The Times Higher Education, 'THE Impact Rankings 2020', 2021 <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/impactrankings> [accessed 10 March 2021].
[608] The Times Higher Education.

driving the social and economic development and are cornerstones in their ambition to become knowledge societies. At least that was the agenda up to 2018.

Through the four components of IHE, we can observe that the policies and programmes of these countries have an essential element of international visibility and reputation building. From scholarship programmes to research in global common goods or ICD, Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico have been making use of their assets to project soft power. Such assets are not only natural resources but also their human capital and their capabilities in research and innovation. Malaysia also links its international reputation to the global rankings and the targets the MoHE has to have the five research HEIs in the highest positions of the world university rankings.

The autonomy of universities fundamentally determines the differences between Brazilian, Mexican and Malay institutions. Brazilian and Mexican HEIs have more academic freedom, and their autonomy as granted by the constitution allows them to implement their own benchmarking and quality assurance, focusing on their mission as universities rather than complying with the world rankings. As long as the objective of the Malaysian government continues to be in the positions the universities get in the rankings, public and private HEIs will continue to struggle financially and with their research activities. International visibility and reputation building, as the cases of Brazil and Mexico demonstrate, could be achieved by empowering the higher education sector, granting autonomy and investing in research and academic collaboration, rather than targeting the inflow of international students.

NICs also seek to gain recognition from powerful countries by engaging in triangular cooperation. This way, countries desire to become intermediates between the developing world and the developed countries. This increases the reputation of NICs, so not only advocacy for their causes and global common goods help them in setting the international agenda. They also get an international reputation. NICs carry certain legitimacy that is unique to these countries, as they have already the sympathy of the developing world. Their use of diplomacy tools such as ICD and knowledge diplomacy gains them the support of likeminded developing countries that are within their region of influence. In this way, their reputation increases within the powerful nations as well, gaining them seats in international organisations such as the UN, as the cases of Brazil and Mexico demonstrate.

The new soft power tool kit demonstrates that the analytical concept, when it includes the experiences from the developing world, has the potential to re-define the scope of power relations between countries. Through soft power, NICs have been able to find their place and their voice in the international system. The characteristics that are particular to them help us to understand the importance of IHE, and the need to place it at the same level as the other sources of soft power.

10.3.2 A strategic approach to Soft Power 2.0

Finally, Soft Power 2.0 includes a strategic view on *how* and *why* the sources produce soft power. First, agents need to develop soft power conversion abilities. Diplomacy mechanisms such as public and cultural diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, science diplomacy and ICD are a way to achieve

this. Second, agents and countries should have clear soft power objectives, knowing the preferences of the soft power subjects and acknowledging the preferences they are trying to change. This requires strategic planning and the involvement of different agents. Third, countries should recognise the resources, including IHE resources, and assess their potential to transform them into soft power assets. Finally, agents should know the possible and the preferred outcomes to maximise resources and to avoid misappropriated investments.

For Soft Power 2.0 to succeed, countries should put in place long-term policies and laws that recognise the four sources of soft power (including IHE). Such policies should be the foundations for plans and strategies that guide the efforts of the diverse agents that intervene in soft power. Equally important, mechanisms to measure soft power success should be in place, as well as coordination between the governmental and non-governmental actors. This strategic approach to soft power also needs the recognition of the mechanisms other countries and agents wield to extract soft power gains. In recognising the bi-directionality of soft power, countries can better understand their strengths and how to leverage them, influencing others to gain their rightful position in the world of politics.

10.4 Final considerations

The three countries presented here have had variable success in their efforts to obtain soft power from IHE. Not just policies, but the context of the HEI sector itself, such as autonomy in Mexico as opposed to Malaysia's hierarchical system, show the differences in how and why IHE produces soft power in NICs.

As Nye reminds us, skilful leadership, a clear recognition of policies and soft power subjects, intended outcomes and measurement mechanisms are required for soft power success.[609] However, empowerment of higher education stakeholders has demonstrated to be vital in influencing the behaviour of others and changing their preferences, obtaining soft power in return.

To conclude, the study on Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico confirms the theory constructed here. In NICs, IHE causes soft power. A three-variant model was presented, which explains how and why IHE produces soft power. Soft power can be a motivation or an unintended consequence of IHE; or an extension of the foreign policy of a country when pursuing soft power outcomes. NICs have a unique understanding of soft power, which makes us rethink the role of IHE in soft power studies.

This research found the need to propose a particular definition of soft power, recognising other actors and explaining how and why it works the way it does in NICs. It also proposes Soft Power 2.0 as a way to re-define the sources of soft power, and it considers the need to elevate IHE to a source and to identify the variety of agents that intervene. Soft Power 2.0 intends to explain the role of diplomatic tools to wield soft power and develops a new approach along with a new soft power tool kit that challenges the traditional views on the subject.

Further research would increase our knowledge of soft power in NICs, particularly regarding IHE. Suggestions of research lines are studies that evidence the preference of international

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[609] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 2.

students in inbound and outbound student mobility, and research that compares countries with similar characteristics, such as those with autonomous sectors like Mexico or centralised systems like Malaysia. These kind of studies could help in testing whether this criteria is as significant as it would appear to be when set against the cases analysed here. These other lines of research could also aid in creating instruments to measure soft power. Other studies could also be developed in the lines of discourse analysis, contrasting the findings of this research and the changes the governments have faced in the lines of the coronavirus pandemic. The theory could also be tested in another set of countries, for example contrasted to developing countries that do not share the characteristics of the countries analysed here. Finally, other soft power studies can include corporations and international business, sports and religion, which might help us to uncover different ways NICs achieve soft power.

The observation of a phenomenon that is present in two fields of study, international relations and higher education, guided this research. It is hoped that scholars and practitioners of both fields would find value in reading this research and acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of how soft power and IHE intersect in NICs. It also aims that the general public that reads it gets interested in how the international activities of universities, research centres, institutions, organisations and governments can attract and influence foreign governments and societies to change or alter their preferences and behaviours.

This research generates new knowledge within soft power studies. It provides a framework to understand the ways IHE produces soft power in NICs. The readers of this thesis are

provided with a different perspective of how soft power works in developing countries, adding new considerations that derive from observing NICs and from elevating IHE to a soft power source. It challenges current understandings of soft power and is intended to demonstrate that NICs can be game-changing players in the international system through IHE as a soft power source.

Finally, we need to recognise the importance of states countinuing to embrace 'soft' forms of power in their relations, rather than hard power. A more articulate use of soft power by NICs could be the key in salvaging soft power for international politics, or at least give it a new direction. The gobal challenges of today make it imperative to collaborate in the search of global solutions to common threats, and higher education has proven to be a key player in reaching common objectives for humanity. The collective endeavour can bring a better world, and soft power gives NICs a distinctive edge at a time when the Great Powers teeter on a return to Great Power Politics.

Appendix I

List of Interviewees

Interview number	Country	Name	Institution	Position
1	Brazil	Marcos Cortesao Barnsley Scheuenstuhl	*Academia Brasileira de Ciencias* (ABC)	Executive Director of International Relations
2	Brazil	Rossana Valéria de Souza e Silva	Coimbra Group of Brazilian Universities (CGBU)	Executive Director
3	Brazil	Carlota de Azevedo Bezerra Vitor Ramos	Embassy of Brazil in London	Academic Cooperation, Science, Technology and Innovation
4	Brazil	Norma Brandao	*Fundação Oswaldo Cruz* (FIOCRUZ)	Responsible of CAPES PrInt
5	Brazil	Gabriel Dizner	Ministry of Education (MEC)	Europe Coordinator, International Affairs

6	Brazil	Noraí Romeu Rocco	Ministry of Education (MEC)	General Coordinator of Higher Education International Affairs
7	Brazil	Patricio Pereira Marinho	*Ministry of Education: Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* (CAPES)	Coordinator of Strategic Partnerships in the Global North and Oceania
8	Brazil	Francisco Figueiredo de Souza	Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Itamaraty*	Department and division of Educational Issues
9	Brazil	Roberto Goidanich	Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Itamaraty*	President of Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation
10	Brazil	Marcio Correa	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)	Coordinator of Technical Cooperation received from abroad with international organizations

11	Brazil	Bruno de Lacerda Cerrilho	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Instituto Rio Branco*	Adjoint General Director
12	Brazil	Gisela Maria Figueireido Padovan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Instituto Rio Branco*	General Director
13	Brazil	Leilo Fellows Filho	Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications: *Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Científico e Tecnológico* (CNPq)	General Coordinator of International Cooperation
14	Brazil	Jane K. Aparecido	The Ohio State University	Director Brazil Gateway
15	Brazil	Ana Flávia Granja e Barros	*Universidade de Brasilia* (UnB)	Coordinator of Postgraduate Program in International Relations

16	Brazil	Leonardo Freitas de Souza	*Universidade de Brasilia* (UnB)	Assistant Director, International Affairs Adviser's Office
17	Brazil	Andrelina Sena	*Universidade de Fortaleza* (UNIFOR)	Head of International Office
18	Brazil	Celi Matsumaru	*Universidade de Sao Paulo* (USP)	Head of International Office, Institute of International Relations
19	Brazil	Marcio Lobo Netto	*Universidade de Sao Paulo* (USP)	Associate Director for Mobility
20	Brazil	Paulo Vitor Gomez	*Universidade de Sao Paulo* (USP)	Head of CAPES PrINT, Pro-Rectory of Postgraduation
21	Brazil	Thaise Desirree Braga Lucenada Silva	*Universidade de Sao Paulo* (USP)	International Relations Office, School of Communications and Arts
22	Brazil	Vanesa de Lima Carvalho	*Universidade de Sao Paulo* (USP)	Secretary CCInt Faculty of Education

23	Brazil	Andreia Batista Vieira	*Universidade Do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (UERJ)	Assessoria
24	Brazil	Cristina Russi Guimaraes Furtado	*Universidade Do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (UERJ)	Director International Cooperation Office
25	Brazil	Elena Brugioni	*Universidade Estadual de Campinas* (UNICAMP)	Assessor of the International Relations Office
26	Brazil	José Celso Freire Junior	*Universidade Estadual Paulista* (UNESP)	Associate Provost for International Affairs
27	Brazil	Isabela B. Esperadio	*Universidade Federal de Ciencias de Saúde de Porto Alegre* (UFCSPA)	Executive Secretary, International Office
28	Brazil	Luciane Stallivieri	*Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina* (UFSC)	Post-Doctoral researcher in Internationalization of Higher Education and Knowledge Management

29	Brazil	Gabriela de Brelaz	*Universidade Federal de Sao Paulo* (UNIFESP)	Adviser to the Rector - International Affairs
30	Brazil	Vera Raquel Aburesi Salvadori	*Universidade Federal de Sao Paulo* (UNIFESP)	Consultant of International Affairs
31	Brazil	Vladimir Oliveira di Lorio	*Universidade Federal de Viçosa* (UFV)	Director of International Relations
32	Brazil	Victor Landeiro	*Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso* (UFMT)	Graduate Coordinator
33	Brazil	João Marcelo Brazão Protázio	*Universidade Federal do Pará* (UFPA)	Coordinator of the Department of Mathematics and Statistics Postgraduate Program
34	Brazil	Andre de Macedo Duarte	*Universidade Federal do Paraná* (UFPR)	Director of International Relations
35	Brazil	Fabiano Aguilar	*Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul* (UFRGS)	International Mobility Director

36	Brazil	Nicolas Maillard	*Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul* (UFRGS)	Secretary of International Relations
37	Brazil	Jose Alberto Antunes de Miranda	*Universidade La Salle*	Adviser International Affairs Office
38	Brazil	Maria Arruda	University of Nottingham	Brazilian researcher, School of Life Sciences
39	Malaysia	Paul Rennie Obe	British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur	Deputy High Commissioner
40	Malaysia	Sayed Azam-Ali	Crops For the Future CFF	CEO
41	Malaysia	Aira Azhari	IDEAS Institute	Researcher
42	Malaysia	Ali Salman	IDEAS Institute	Researcher
43	Malaysia	Wan Ya Shin	IDEAS Institute	Researcher
44	Malaysia	Guy Perring	iGraduate	Regional Director Asia

45	Malaysia	Amir Akramin Shafie	International Islamic University Malaysia IIUM	Director Office of International Affairs
46	Malaysia	Kian Ming Ong	Malaysian Parliament	Member of the Malaysian Parliament for Bangi
47	Malaysia	Azri Mat Yacob	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Under-Secretary for Communication and Public Diplomacy
48	Malaysia	Mohamad Sadik Kethergany	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations IDFR	Head Director
49	Malaysia	Raja Saifful Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations IDFR	Deputy Director Special Project Division
50	Malaysia	Azman Hassan	Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Deputy Director General of Higher Education

51	Malaysia	Nor Afzan Buyadi	Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Principal Assistant Director IPTS Governance Division
52	Malaysia	Rahana Abdul Rahim	Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Director of institutions of higher education excellence, Department of Higher Education
53	Malaysia	Roszana Tapsir	Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Program Lead, Program Management Office
54	Malaysia	Siti Hamisah Tapsir	Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Director of the Department of Higher Education
55	Malaysia	Roger Barton	Newcastle University Medicine Malaysia NUMed	Provost and CEO
56	Malaysia	Will Sanchez	Times Higher Education	Regional Director Latin America and Africa
57	Malaysia	Nik Hasif	*Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* (UKM)	Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Malaysian and

				International Studies
58	Malaysia	Tham Siew Yean	*Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* (UKM)	Researcher on Internationalisation of Higher Education
59	Malaysia	Yazrina Yahya	*Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* (UKM)	Director International Relations Centre UKM Global
60	Malaysia	Nor Zunaini Abd Kadir	*Universiti Kuala Lumpur* (UniKL)	International Office Chancellery
61	Malaysia	Mohd Ismid Md Said	*Universiti Teknologi Malaysia* (UTM)	Associate Director Global Strategy and Engagement
62	Malaysia	Hajah Zainab Mohd Noor	*Universiti Teknologi MARA* (UiTM)	Director Office of International Affairs
63	Malaysia	Young Zulina Zubairi	*Universiti Malaya* (UM)	Director International Relations Office
64	Malaysia	Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz	University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC)	Principal Investigator Management and Ecology of

				Malaysian Elephants
65	Malaysia	Ashley Ng Yoon	University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC)	Researcher, working on Education Blueprint with Tony Bush
66	Malaysia	Graham Kendall	University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC)	CEO Provost
67	Malaysia	Lucy Baily	University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC)	Assistant Professor in Education
68	Malaysia	Samantha Weston	University of Reading Malaysia	Interim Vice Provost and Academic Director
69	Malaysia	Rebecca Taylor	University of Southampton Malaysia	Pro Vice-Chancellor and CEO
70	Malaysia	Roberto Calleja	International University and Colleges (INTI)	Researcher and head of the Mass Communication Programme

71	Mexico	Brenda Galaviz Aragon	*Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior* (ANUIES)	Director of International Relations
72	Mexico	Sergio Martinez Cruz	*Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior* (ANUIES)	Director of Interinstitutional Engagement, *Proyecta 100,000* and *Patlani*
73	Mexico	Rodrigo Bueno	British Council Mexico	Chief of Higher Education Mexico
74	Mexico	Tonatiuh Bravo Padilla	Chamber of Deputies	President of Deputies for *Movimiento Ciudadano* Party, Former Rector of the University of Guadalajara
75	Mexico	Pablo Rojo Calzada	*Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technología* (CONACyT)	Director of Scholarships of the Adjoint Directorship of

				Postgraduate and Scholarships
76	Mexico	Patricia Elena Pérez Figueroa	Embassy of México in Brasilia	Attaché for Cultural and Cooperation Affairs
77	Mexico	Stephanie Black	Embassy of Mexico in London	Attaché for Cultural and Education Affairs
78	Mexico	Amb. Carlos Felix	Embassy of Mexico in Kuala Lumpur	Ambassador
79	Mexico	Patricia Vázquez Marín	Embassy of Mexico in Kuala Lumpur	Attaché for culture and economy
80	Mexico	Roberto Palacios Rodríguez	*Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey* (ITESM)	Director of International Office in London
81	Mexico	Sylvia Schmelkes	Mexican National Institute of Educational Evaluation	Counsellor of the Government Board
82	Mexico	Ivan Omar Zapata de Santiago	Ministry of Education (SEP)	Director of International Cooperation of the Sub-Direction of

				International Cooperation, General Coordination of Polytechnic and Technological Universities
83	Mexico	Juan Ramón de la Fuente	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE)	Ambassador of Mexico to the UN and former Rector of UNAM
84	Mexico	Abril Peña	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (AMEXCID)	Director of Academic Exchange of the Adjoint Direction for Academic Cooperation
85	Mexico	Roberto Mohar	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (AMEXCID)	Director of South-South Cooperation and Alliance of the Pacific

86	Mexico	Francisco Marmolejo	The World Bank	Lead Tertiary Education Specialist
87	Mexico	Carlos Iván Moreno Arellano	*Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG)	Vice-Chancellor
88	Mexico	José Antonio Aguilar Zarate	*Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG)	Coordinator of International Relations
89	Mexico	Karla Planter	*Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG)	Administrative Secretary of the Social Sciences Campus
90	Mexico	Miguel Ángel Navarro Navarro	*Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG)	Rector
91	Mexico	Ruth Padilla Muñoz	*Universidad de Guadalajara* (UDG)	Rector of the Sciences and Engineering Campus
92	Mexico	Thomas Buntru	*Universidad de Monterrey* (UDEM)	Director of International Programmes

93	Mexico	Federico Fernandez Christhieb	*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM)	Director of International Cooperation
94	Mexico	Maryon Lloyd	*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM)	Researcher School of Education
95	Mexico	María José Castelazo André	Secretary of Innovation, Science and Tecnology of the State of Jalisco (SICyT)	Coordinator of International Affairs and Engagement
96	Canada	Jane Knight	University of Toronto	Researcher

Appendix II

Semi-structured interviews questionnaire

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
Student mobility			
What are the strategies that the MoHE follows in order to attract students to enrole in national HEIs?	What are the strategies that the MoFA follows in order to attract international students?	Do postgraduate degrees at a national level follow an internationalisation strategy from the government?	What strategies the HEI follows to attract international students?
What kind of programs the MoHE promotes within the HEIs in order to increase the student mobility?	What are the expected outcomes of cultural and education exchange programs lounched from the MoFA?	Are there any specific programmes to foster outbound student mobility in the postgraduate level?	Are those strategies part of a national agenda?
For which purposes the MoHE attracts foreign students?	What are the purposes the MoFA has for the attraction of foreign students? Are they foreign policy oriented?	Why does the MoSTI intervenes in student mobility at a national level?	Is there any close collaboration witht the government regarding recruitment of international students?
With these programs, is the MoHE looking to develop long term relations with individuals?	With these programs, is the MoFA looking to develop long term relations with individuals?	With these programs, is the MoFA looking to develop long term relations with individuals?	Is outbound student mobility linked to an internationalisation strategy of the institution?
Is there expected any form of soft power gained as a resoult of these programs? Is this outcome pursued?	Is there any form of soft power expected as a resoult of these programs?	Are there any soft power ourtcomes expected from student mobility at the postgraduate level?	Does the student mobility respond to the rationales of the institution, of the government or both?
Does the MoHE have a mapping of student mobility?	Does the MoFA colaborates with other international or regional organizations (such as UNESCO, Pacific Alliance or ASEAN) for the exchange of students?	Does the MoFA colaborates with other international or regional organizations (such as UNESCO, Pacific Alliance or ASEAN) for the exchange of students?	Are there any soft power outcomes expected from outbound and inbound student mobility?
Are there any strategies that the government lounches to increment student mobility in specific areas of knowledge or geographical areas?	Are there any strategies that the government lounches to increment student mobility in specific areas of knowledge or geographical areas?	Are there any strategies that the government lounches to increment student mobility in specific areas of knowledge or geographical areas?	Are there any preferences in areas of knowledge or geographical areas? If so, are these linked to governmental objectives?
What are the objectives of those strategies?	Is there any coordination with the MoHE for the implementation of those strategies?	Do the different ministries coordinate in lounching internationalisation of higher education?	Is there a coordination between government and HEIs through strategies or programmes for IHE?

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
Internationalisation of Research and Knowledge Exchange			
Does the MoHE support the movility of researchers and professors through programs or strategies? Which are they?	Does the MoFA have any mechanisms, programs or strategies to foster the exchange of knowledge or facilitate research cooperation with other countries? Is it part of its foreign policy?	Does the MoFA have any mechanisms, programs or strategies to foster the exchange of knowledge or facilitate the cooperation on research with other countries?	Does your institution promote the internationalisation of research? Is there any strategy, policy or programme at your institution that foster internationalisation of research and knowledge ekchange?
Is the internationalisation of research considered by the MoHE as a factor to attract foreign founds for research purposes?	Does the MoFA intervene in the attraction of foreign founds for research purposes?	Does the MoHE support the mobility of researchers and faculty through programs or strategies? Which are they?	Does the your institution support the mobility of researchers and faculty through programs or strategies? Which are they? Are they linked to a national strategy?
Does the MoHE promotes the internationalisation of research within Universities?	What is the relationship of MoFA with HE institutions? Do they participate in the foreign policy-making? Or is it from the top to bottom?	Does the MoSTI intervene in the attraction of foreign founds for research purposes?	Does your institution attracts foreign founds for research purposes?
If so, what are the expected outcomes for it?	What kind of colaboration is done between the HEIs and the MoFA?	Does the MoSTI promote the intetnationalisation of research within HEIs?	Does your institute promote the intetnationalisation of research using governmental programmes and strategies?
Does the MoHE considers that the international research conducted through HEIs as a way to fulfil national objectives other than the transit to a knowledge society?	Does the MoFA consider that the international research conducted through HEIs as a way to fulfil national objectives other than the transit to a knowledge society?	What is the relation of MoSTI with HE institutions? Do they participate in the policy-making of science and technology programs? Or is it from the top to bottom?	What is the relationship of your institution with other governmental areas, regarding internationalisation of research?
Does the MoHE promote the knowledge exchange within HEIs to key developing or developed countries?	Does the MoFA promote knowledge exchange within HEIs to key developing or developed countries? Does this strategy respond to the foreigin policy objectives?	What kind of colaboration is done between the HEIs and the MoSTI?	What kind of colaboration is done between the HEIs and the MoSTI?
Does the MoHE promotes the participation of HEIs in south-south and north-south cooperation? Is there any soft power outcome expected?	Does the MoFA promotes the participation of HEIs in south-south and north-south cooperation? Is there any soft power outcome expected?	Does the MoSTI considers that the international research conducted through HEIs as a way to fulfil national objectives other than the transit to a knowledge society?	Does your institution consider that through internationalisation of research it is adding to the national objectives?

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
Strategic partnerships			
Does the MoHE encourages the HEIs to partner with strategic countries?	Are there any strategies that the MoFA promotes between HEIs for the selection of academic partnerships?	Are there any strategies that the MoSTI promotes between HEIs for the selection of academic partnerships?	What are the strategies pursued for internationalisation of higher education?
Which are the countries the MoHE considers as priorities in terms of mobility, research and international education?	Are there any regional or international priorities the MoFA supports for the creation of HEI's academic colaboration?	Are there any regional or international priorities, as well as tematic priorities that the MoSTI supports for the creation of HEI's academic colaboration?	Are particular strategic partnerships pursued?
What is the involvement of national HEIs in regional affairs?	How are the HEIs encouraged to engage with these priority countries/regions?	How are the HEIs encouraged to engage with these priority countries/regions and themes?	Are those partnerships aligned to foreign policy objectives?
Are the HEIs encouraged to form any partnership with strategic institutions to achieve foreign policy goals?	What is the involvement of national HEIs in the foreign policy agenda?	What is the involvement of national HEIs in the development of science and technology within the region?	Does the government have a voice in the choice and selection of strategic partners?
Are there any mechanisms or programs set in place from the MoHE for HEIs to develop partnerships with African-South American-Islamic--Asian-North American-Latin American countries? (depending of the country interviewed)	Are the HEIs encouraged to form any partnership with foreign targeted institutions for foreign policy goals?	Are the HEIs encouraged to form any partnership with targeted countries for research and development goals? Developing countries? Rest of the world?	Are strategic partners clearly outlined in your policies and programmes of IHE?
What are the objectives and expected outcomes of each? Do these outcomes have a soft power component?	Are there any mechanisms or programs set in place from the MoHE for national HEIs to develop partnerships with targeted countries? What are the objectives and expected soft power outcomes of each?	Are there any mechanisms or programs set in place from the MoSTI to develop partnerships with strategic countries? What are the objectives and expected soft power outcomes of each?	What are the mechanisms your institution follows to select strategic parners?
What regions are considered of interest for international academic cooperation? And for which purposes?	What regions are considered of interest for international academic cooperation? And for which purposes?	What regions are considered of interest for international academic cooperation? And for which purposes?	What are the targeted regions and for what pupuses?

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
Science diplomacy			
Does the MoHE have any science diplomacy program in place? What are its objectives?	Does the MoFA have any science diplomacy program in place? What are its objectives?	Does the MoSTI have any science diplomacy program in place? What are its objectives?	Does your institution follow governmental science diplomacy programmes?
Are HEIs part of a science diplomacy program from the government?	Are HEIs part of a science diplomacy program from the government?	Are HEIs part of a science diplomacy program from the government?	Are HEIs part of a science diplomacy program from the government?
Are there any global issues or global problems the HEIs are encouraged to tackle through international partnerships?	Are there any global issues or global problems the HEIs are encouraged to tackle through international partnerships? Is that part of the foreign policy?	Are there any global issues or global problems the HEIs are encouraged to tackle through international partnerships? Is that part of the foreign policy?	Are there any global issues or global problems the HEIs are encouraged to tackle through international partnerships? Is that part of the foreign policy?
What are those and which institutions intervene? What is the objective of having those from the MoHE point of view?	What are those and which institutions intervene? What is the objective of having those from the MoFA point of view?	What are those and which institutions intervene? What is the objective of having those from the MoSTI point of view?	What is the relationship of your institution with other governmental areas, regarding science diplomacy?
Does the MoHE keep record of these strategies?	Does the MoFA keep record of these strategies?	Does the MoSTI keep record of these strategies?	How do you keep record of science diplomacy strategies?
Does the MoHE encourage the partnerships between HEIs and institutions such as the British Council, the Newton Foundation, or other of the sort?	Does the MoFA encourage the partnerships between HEIs and institutions such as the British Council, the Newton Foundation, or other of the sort?	Does the MoSTI encourage the partnerships between HEIs and institutions such as the British Council, the Newton Foundation, or other of the sort?	Are your faculty members aware of the science diplomacy efforts of your institution?
Which other institutions of which countries the MoHE has ties with that develop into science diplomacy?	Which other institutions of which countries the MoFA has ties with that develop into science diplomacy?	Which other institutions of which countries the MoSTI has ties with that develop into science diplomacy?	Is science diplomacy pursued by your institution?

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
International higher education strategies			
Do the international higher education strategies originate within the governmen?	Are there any strategies that the MoFA follows for the establishment international higher education policies?	To which extent does the MoSTI collaborates in the formulation of international higher education strategies within the government?	Does your institution participate in the elaboratio of the national international higher education strategy?
What are national international education strategies that the government pursues and through which mechanisms these are triggered?	Does the MoFA colaborates with the MoHE in the internationalisation of HE?	Does the MoSTI take a leading role in the international higher education strategies outlined by the government for the postgraduate and research spheres?	If so, what is the role your institution plays?
Are the HEIs participant actors of the formulation of national IHE strategies and programmes?	Do national IHE policies, programmes and strategies follow the foreign policy rationales?	What are the policies, programmes and strategies that MoSTI follows regarding international higher education?	Is your institution part of any national consortium of universities?
Does the MoHE encourages the double and joint degrees between national HEIs and foreign institutions?	Does the MoFA collaborate with HEIs in the formulation of its own programmes that target higher education?	What is MoSTI's role in the programmes that target science, research, development and technology for development in the country?	Do you consider that the participation of your institution in the consortium places preasure on the government towars international higher education policies?
If so, what are the goals they pursue through those strategies? Are those goals connected to soft power?	Is there any interconnection between IHE and foreign policy objectives or soft power?	Do the goals of these programmes have any interconnection with the foreign policy or soft power?	Do you have any strategic alliances or pursue other specific objectives that target soft power, while developing international higher education strategies?
What are the goals the government pursue through the creation of the education hub? (Malaysia)	What is the role the MoFA has in the establishment of the education hub? (Malaysia)	Does the MoSTI intervenes in the creation of the education hub? (Malaysia)	Does the government intervene in your international higher education strategies?
Does the MoHE encourages the formation of branch campuses of Malaysian HEIs abroad? If so toward which countries and purposes?	Is international higher education considered a source of soft power by the MoFA? For example regarding the attractio of branch campuses to the country….	Is international higher education considered as a soft power source by the MoSTI?	Do you have a close relationship with other ministries regarding international higher education?

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI)	Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other National Actors
Internatonalisation of HE			
What is the role HEIs have in the formulation of national policies towards the internationalisation of higher education?	Are there any strategies that the MoFA pursue for the purpose of internationalising HEIs in the country?	Are there any strategies that the MoSTI pursue for the purpose of internationalising HEIs in the country?	Does your institution have an internationalisation of higher education strategy?
Are there any mechanisms that the MoHE applies to ensure the intrnationalisation of higher education in Universities?	What is the role HEIs have in the formulation of foreign policies that affect the internationalisation of higher education?	Does the MoSTI intervene in the internationalisation of higher educarion?	Do the government intervenes or colaborates in the definition of such strategy?
Does the MoHE see in the internationalisation of HE as a mechanism to make universities more attractive to foreign students?	Are there any mechanisms that the MoFA applies to ensure the intrnationalisation of HE in HEIs?	Are there any mechanisms that the MoSTI applies to ensure the intrnationalisation of HE in HEIs?	What do you consider the main rationales behind your institution's internationalisation strategies?
Is the attraction of foreign students a national goal that fulfill soft power purposes?	Does the MoFA see in the internationalisation of HE a mechanism to make uiversities more attractive to foreign students?	How is the MoSTI involved in the internationalisation of HE of the country?	Does the internationalisation of your institution distinguishes between the different strategic countries and the different components of internationalisation?
How does the internationalisation of higher education of HEIs make an impact on the foreign policy?	Is the attraction of foreign students a national goal that fulfill soft power purposes?	Does the MoSTI have any programmes or strategies to attract foreign students at the postgraduate level, or faculty?	Does your institution have a prefence in any of the internationalisation components?
Is foreign policy driven by internationalisation of HE of HEIs or the other way around?	How does the internationalisation of higher education of HEIs make an impact on foreign policy?	Does MoSTI intervene in the foreign policy of the country?	Is this preference dictated by the government or is it your own?
Does the MoHE have a measuring instrument of the development of the internationalization of HE?	Is foreign policy driven by internationalisation of HE of HEIs or the other way around?	Does the MoSTI have a measuring instrument of the development of the internationalization of HE?	What is the relationship with the different ministries of the government regarding internationalisation of HE?
What does it meassure and are any results?	What does it meassure and are any results?	What does it meassure and are any results?	Do you meassure internationalisation efforts?

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