

**Understanding the Knight in the Age of the  
Crusades, c.1100-1204**

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## **Abstract**

Medieval military terminology in crusading sources from c.1100-1204 is the focus of this study. An interrogation of when knights developed into a coherent grouping is central to the thesis. Definitions of knights on a military, economic and social basis are explored. The approach exposes and emphasises often overlooked nuances of medieval military structure.

Due to the terminological basis of the thesis, it considers mainly written sources which focus on crusading expeditions. The methodology is based around the premise that the crusading movement was broadly representative of contemporary medieval society and armies from large swathes of western Christendom. This allows for the use of evidence from the selected sources to support conclusions about domestic structures. As such, the methodology provides a significant and fresh perspective.

The thesis makes clear that medieval military history is far more nuanced than has often been represented. It exposes further military categories than have previously been identified. It also opposes the popular misconception of knights as exclusively heavy, shock cavalry and works to dispel this myth. Rather it argues that knights were general-purpose elite soldiers.

The key contribution is that it both establishes and emphasises the difference between the knightly grouping and the knightly identity. The former -the knighthood- was a socially coherent grouping as early as 1120, while the latter formed the precursor to chivalry as a set of values. The dating of a coalesced knighthood also represents a departure from previous estimates in the final quarter of the twelfth century.

Finally, the adopted approach has wider application than the scope of the thesis. It could be used as a framework for further studies on other facets of the medieval period such as social structure, piety and religious rhetoric.

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Jack Beaman

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<b>Abbreviation List</b>	5
<b>Introduction</b>	6
<b>Chapter 1: Literature and Methodology</b>	11
<b>Chapter 2: The Sources and Terms Associated with Crusading Combatants</b>	36
<b>Chapter 3: The Cavalry Forces of the Crusading Expeditions</b>	70
<b>Chapter 4: The Infantry Forces of the Crusading Expeditions</b>	110
<b>Chapter 5: Paid Crusaders and Paid Knights</b>	128
<b>Chapter 6: The Crusades in the Formation of the Knighthood and Knightly Identity</b>	165
<b>Conclusion</b>	211
<b>Bibliography</b>	224

## Abbreviation List

### Primary Sources:

MGH SS – *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, 39 vols. (1826-2009)

MGH SRG – *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores Rerum Germanicum*, 78 vols. (1871-2007)

MGH SRGNS – *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores Rerum Germanicum Novae Series*, 24 vols. (1922-2009)

IPGRR - *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, Vol.I: Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1864)

Ambroise - Ambroise, *The History of the Holy War: Ambroise's Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, Vol.1, ed. M. Ailes, M. Barber (Woodbridge, 2003)

Howden - Roger of Howden, *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1868)

Coggeshall - Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicanum*, ed. J. Stevenson (London, 1875)

Devizes - Richard of Devizes, *The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes of the Time of King Richard the First*, ed. & tr. J.T. Appleby (London, 1963)

Clari - Robert of Clari, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. P. Noble (Edinburgh, 2005)

Villehardouin - Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. & trans. E. Faral (Paris, 1938)

HEF - *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, ed. A. Chroust, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum Nova Series, Tomus V* (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: Berlin, 1928), pp.1-115

Règle - Anonymous, *La Règle du Temple*, ed. Henri de Curzon (La Société de l'Histoire de France: Paris, 1886)

CGT - *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1192)*, ed. M.R. Morgan (Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1982)

## Introduction

“Much of the ‘Middle Ages’ is still seen through the distorting lenses of fifteenth century legend, which cast upon the whole world of ‘chivalry’ a golden and fictitious glamour, a sunset glow from a consciously disappearing society.”<sup>1</sup>

Michael Howard’s sentiment is especially applicable to the study of medieval warfare. Modern representations of medieval warfare are everywhere, both in scholarly works and popular culture. At the centre of many of these representations is the image of the knight, clad in shining armour, in a manifestation of what is perceived to be a key medieval ideal: Chivalry. The knight and the Crusades are two areas which perhaps characterise modern popular perception of the medieval period better than any other. Studies of these aspects of the era are therefore crucial not just in scholarly circles but impact further into public perceptions of medieval history at large. The aim of the thesis is to interrogate and challenge a range of assumptions regarding medieval warfare, using source material relating to the Crusades from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The goal is to properly locate the emergence of a knightly grouping far earlier in the twelfth century than has previously been argued, by redefining the grouping on a military basis.

Numerous scholarly traditions concerning medieval warfare exist, with many historians dividing medieval forces into what should be considered oversimplified categories cavalry and infantry. This literature will be outlined below. By comparison, the argument here will be that there were at least three functional ‘grades’ of cavalry alone, and a far wider variety of infantry than is often credited in modern historiography. In the context of the Crusades, there has been an emphasis on the dichotomy between ‘knights’ and ‘the rest’. While the shift away from the concept of a core of heavy cavalry surrounded by a swarm of infantry has started in wider military historiography, the main tactical differences have traditionally been identified as existing between heavy and light cavalry, or heavy and light infantry. These separate examinations of infantry and cavalry might as well be between defensive and offensive warfare respectively, with infantry being considered a purely defensive arm of medieval armies, while cavalry provided the

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<sup>1</sup> M. Howard, *War in European History* (Updated Edn.) (Oxford, 2009; originally 1976.), p.4.

means to attack. The Crusades provide invaluable insight here, as it has recently been argued that they paved the way for closer interaction between cavalry and infantry on the battlefield, leading to increasingly sophisticated tactics as the weaknesses of previously dominant cavalry were revealed.<sup>2</sup>

A study of the Crusades provides a fresh means of examining European military history, but also provides insights into contemporary social history. The expeditions of the early twelfth century are particularly significant for the course of their development and we can discern the impact of individual crusading events on social structures. The First and Second Crusade are noted for the diversity of participants. The nature of these expeditions – which necessitated travelling large distances by land- as well as the fervour with which they were pursued means that they represent a cross-section of contemporary Western Christian society on the move.<sup>3</sup> By contrast the transportation by sea of many Third and Fourth Crusade contingents meant that these later expeditions were necessarily more professionalised. Although not such a diverse representation of society, they undoubtedly offer valuable insights into how contemporary armies operated on extended campaigns. For this reason, the use of these sources providing a cross-sectional view of the armies of western Christendom drawn from geographically diverse regions has yielded new and fruitful perspectives in several areas. Therefore, the value of conclusions drawn from this source material is the ability to extrapolate them back to western Christendom.

The knightly grouping is of central concern to this thesis and the main debates herein addresses their social ascension and coalescence as a social group. The current consensus, drawn from consideration of ‘traditional’ sources from western Christendom, and with studies -discussed in greater detail below- often being conducted on a necessarily narrow scale, is that these events happened largely simultaneously, in the final quarter of the twelfth century. In contrast the argument here is that there were several strands to the development of the knightly grouping, with the social ascension and coalescence aspects occurring first. Later, in the final quarter of the twelfth century, a knightly identity

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<sup>2</sup> B.T. Carey, *Warfare in the Medieval World* (Barnsley, 2006), p.100.

<sup>3</sup> D. Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1: Byzantium, Europe and the Struggle for the Holy Land 1050-1300.AD* (London, 2007), p.20; C. Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (Leiden & Boston, 2008), pp.6-8.

developed as a manifestation of the growing elitism of the grouping. The central argument emphasises the distinction between the development of the knightly grouping and that of the knightly identity. For the purposes of this thesis, knightly identity is used to describe the collection of values and practices associated with being a knight.

Defining terms is one of the major issues in any era of military history.<sup>4</sup> Of primary importance to this thesis is the specific term 'the knighthood'. The term appears throughout modern secondary literature, but the most accurate application –and the way it will be used in this thesis- is to describe the socially coherent grouping of knights. The transition from knights as a plural term to the collective of 'the knighthood' is a focal point of study. Many modern studies of the knighthood also use the modern term 'class', which is contentious when applied to the medieval period. It was not used by contemporaries and has connotations which were perhaps not applicable to the knighthood or any other social group. Preferred for the purposes of this thesis is the more neutral term 'grouping', with the contemporary *ordo* -used as the description of a grouping- being of comparable use throughout the thesis.<sup>5</sup>

As a focal point of the methodology, the nature of the source base is significant. Mainly consisting of chronicle sources for the major Crusades composed in the twelfth century, they cover expeditions to theatres as diverse as Spain, the Baltic, Greece and the Holy Land. A wider source base, including some of the crusading *chansons de geste* has been considered in the final chapter.

The first chapter of thesis will provide a brief context to several of the more significant debates, focussing first on the significant trends in medieval warfare, before moving more into social history with a consideration of 'feudalism', chivalry and the relationship between the knighthood and nobility. It will also locate the original methodology within modern historiography. There are issues with areas of the current historiographical trend, specifically the improper

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<sup>4</sup> K. DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems,' in J. France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages, Proceedings of a Conference held at University of Wales, Swansea, 7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> July 2005* (Leiden & Boston, 2008), p.44.

<sup>5</sup> The term *ordo* has had varying usage in secondary literature, but more recently Kostick has characterized it as a specific social rank in: Kostick, *Social Structure*, pp.165-6. It is possible that knights were considered a separate *ordo* as early as 980 (see: A. Scaglione, *Knights at Court: Courtliness, Chivalry, & Courtesy From Ottonian Germany to The Italian Renaissance* (Oxford & Los Angeles, 1991), pp.17-19).



extrapolation from conclusions, and overgeneralisations based on the translation of one contemporary term are common. The second chapter will provide further context for the thesis. It will examine sources of the twelfth century and the use of case studies will illustrate the broad distinctions between them. Also included is a consideration of the various groupings studied in the thesis, as they appear in modern sources.

Chapters Three, Four and Five constitute the bulk of the research material and involve the analysis of various terms found in the crusading primary source material. Chapter Three examines the diversity of the cavalry forces of the twelfth-century crusading expeditions and challenges the usual categorisation as either heavy or light cavalry. The inclusion of a third category is proposed; second-rank cavalry will cover those who fought as *mêlée* cavalry but did not exist primarily as front-line, shock cavalry. Other groupings are also examined, with contributions made to the debates surrounding twelfth century mounted sergeants and squires. The argument of this thesis is that mounted sergeants were largely indistinguishable from their knightly counterparts based on equipment alone, and that sergeants were unlikely to be considered a military category. By contrast it is confirmed that those described as squires in the twelfth century were very different from the members of the gentry they would become in the late medieval period. Squires had no special connotations of social standing before the end of the twelfth century.

Chapter Four evaluates the relative merits of traditionalist and revisionist arguments regarding the efficacy of twelfth century infantry. It does this by examining its performance under the considerable duress of the crusading campaigns. The chapter looks at the numerous examples of those described as knights fighting on foot. Such individuals appear in various settings throughout the crusading expeditions of the twelfth century: in battles, siege and even naval warfare. The fact that knights may have chosen to fight on foot rather than acting out of necessity suggests a certain diversity of military function.

Chapter Five considers what exactly constituted a mercenary both in the medieval period generally and in the crusading context specifically, as well as how paid soldiers were perceived by contemporaries. The broad argument is that medieval mercenaries were defined as 'paid outsiders'. As part of this, the chapter

examines how crusading soldiers were remunerated for their efforts in various expeditions of the twelfth century, and perceptions of different types of payment. There are a few broad distinctions to be examined. Most common were ongoing payments in return for service obligations, which included money-fiefs. Far more varied were one-off payments, used to pay either for extraordinary service or for specific tasks or missions. In domestic conflicts this was most often in the form of extended service past the usual forty-days of the *servitia debitum*. In the crusading arena this was a concern given the extended nature of the campaigns, but there is also the possibility that participants were paid at the outset of the Crusade because of the immense cost of travelling, which would certainly qualify as extraordinary service.

The final chapter locates chronologically the inception of the knighthood and the development of knightly identity. It contains a discussion of the military, economic and social aspects of crusading knighthood in the twelfth century, and how these might have developed. Where prior chapters look at these areas in isolation, Chapter Six considers a more complete view. It demonstrates the relationship between distinguishable 'subsets' within the knightly grouping, militarily and socially. An argument is also made for the distinction between the social grouping of the knighthood, and the knightly identity. The conclusion emphasises this argument. The former can be located much earlier than has previously been assumed, in the early twelfth century, with the formation of the latter being placed significantly later in the final quarter of the century.

## Chapter 1 – Literature and Methodology

Many of the key debates relating to medieval warfare are important for the study of the evolution of contemporary soldiers. This historiography includes debates concerning the practice of warfare and specifically the development, supremacy and use of cavalry as opposed to infantry, as well as the more substantial discussion concerning the concept of chivalry. Most fundamental is the debate over social structure, and the construct of ‘feudalism’. Of perhaps equal significance however is the debate concerning the development of the stirrup. It is crucial as a foundation of arguments about the origins of shock cavalry and their battlefield efficacy, as well as having a significant bearing on the consideration of knights as heavy cavalry.<sup>1</sup> This chapter will consider the historiography concerning the stirrup. The evolution of the studies of both medieval strategy and tactics will be considered first. The issue of the supremacy of knightly heavy cavalry particularly, has been at the centre of medieval military historiography, with the stirrup debate playing a varied role through the progression of the discussion. Given its impact on the modern perception of knights, the stirrup debate has also had a significant, if indirect, influence on the construction of ‘feudalism’ as well as the numerous studies on chivalry and the relationship between nobles and knights. The chapter will therefore subsequently move onto a consideration of the historiography regarding how the development of warfare affected contemporary social and cultural history.

The debates concerning chivalry and feudalism intersect in the concepts of knighthood and nobility.<sup>2</sup> This last distinction provides much of the contextual basis for many of the conclusions reached by the end of the thesis. Key to many of these debates is a close study of terminology.

Loose definition of terms is a problem which plagues medieval historiography. ‘Feudalism’, ‘feudal society,’ ‘chivalry’ and even ‘knight’ have been defined in very different ways by various historians.<sup>3</sup> These must be considered as they appear in

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<sup>1</sup> Stated by J. Flori, ‘Knightly Society,’ in D. Luscombe, J. Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Vol.4: c.1024-c.1198, Part 1* (Cambridge, 2004), pp.170-2.

<sup>2</sup> Noted in both: G. Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. C. Postan (London, 1977), p.158; Flori, ‘Knightly Society’, p.162.

<sup>3</sup> For ‘feudalism’, or ‘feudal society’, see: S. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1994), pp.1-2, 55; E.A.R. Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism

modern historiography to establish a basis for primary source analysis. A lot has been made of the social and legal nature of the distinction between the nobility and the aristocracy, particularly by historians such as Reuter and Crouch.<sup>4</sup> Both agree that the nobility had its status legally defined, while the aristocracy was able to exercise power merely due to being socially well-born.

Another significant distinction to make is that between the knighthood and chivalry, something often overlooked since many of the works on both are originally in French, where the word *chevalerie* can mean both. A cautious and broad distinction would be that chivalry was the 'code', while the knighthood was the collective or 'order' which practised it. Even 'knighthood' must be used with care; using only connotations of social coherence. Unfortunately, it has appeared with obvious military connotations, born of the earlier iterations of knights as a more military category. The formal 'knighthood' must be viewed as a development of the twelfth century, so -as with applying the term 'class' to any pre-Marxist period- applying it to groupings which pre-date that should be used with extreme caution.

On a more fundamental level, using the same terms to describe knights before and after the social ascension and coalescence of the grouping represents generalisation, with the strong implication that the make-up of the grouping remained consistent throughout its evolution. In turn, this serves to undermine the fundamental nature of the change undergone by the grouping of knights. As such, there needs to be a clear distinction in the terminology used to describe knights before and after the social changes under investigation, with the 'knighthood' being a term more suited to the coherent grouping of the mid-late twelfth century rather than the nebulous one which existed previously. In general

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and Historians of Medieval Europe,' *The American Historical Review* 79:4, pp.1070-1, 1086. For chivalry, see: M. Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven & London, 1984), p.2; Scaglione, *Knights at Court*, p.6. For knights, see: J. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* (London & Ithaca, 1999), p.54; B.S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Military Historiography,' in M. Bentley (ed.), *Companion to Historiography* (London & New York, 1997), p.211; J.-P. Poly, E. Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation: 900-1200*, tr. C. Higgitt (New York & London, 1991), pp.97-9; M. Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' in M. Strickland (ed.), *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France* (Stamford, 1998), p.304; J. Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200* (Ithaca & London, 1971), p.247; J. Bumke, *The Concept of Knighthood in the Middle Ages*, tr. W.T.H. & E. Jackson (Woodbridge, 1984), p.128; R. Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry* (London, 1970), p.5.

<sup>4</sup> T. Reuter, 'The Medieval Nobility in Twentieth-Century Historiography,' in Bentley (ed.), *Companion to Historiography* (London & New York, 1997), p.179; D. Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France, 900-1300* (Harlow, 2005), pp.2-3

there is a sense of difference and variety in the ways in which terminology was used and interpreted by different writers, which will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Thus far, the social evolution of medieval soldiery (most often knights specifically) has been studied within numerous tightly localised studies, with Duby's examination of the Mâconnais, and Génicot's of the Namurois being perhaps the most well-known.<sup>5</sup> More recently, Evergates has looked in-depth at Champagne and Barthélemy has examined the Vendômois, to name but a few.<sup>6</sup> By contrast, little has been done on the distinctions between those soldiers considered militarily or socially lower than knights. There is a paucity of comparative source material, attesting to the usefulness of the present methodology. The sources detailed below (see Chapter Two) provide a cross-section of social and military views spanning Western Christendom in the twelfth century. The Crusades were not restricted to the military and social elite. Arguably, there is more information from crusading material on how members of the lower strata of society fought than from what might be termed 'domestic' sources; those dealing with specific localities of Western Christendom.

The original approach of this thesis will lie in the detailed examination of the terms which described the crusading combatants of the twelfth century. The methodological focus on Christian sources with an interest in crusading, as opposed to those strictly concerned with Western Christendom makes the study a particularly significant one. The crusading phenomenon transcended geographical boundaries, allowing for conclusions to be wider reaching than those drawn from a less diverse source base.

Studies on warfare generally comprise two main elements: strategy and tactics. Both have been the subject of considerable debate among medieval military historians, who broadly follow three schools of thought, which will each be considered below.

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<sup>5</sup> See: Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, pp.58, 94, 161. L. Génicot, *L'économie rurale namuroise au bas Moyen Age (1199-1429)*, 4 vols. (Louvain, 1943-1995)

<sup>6</sup> For Champagne, see: T. Evergates, *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne (1100-1300)*, (Philadelphia, 2007), for the Vendômois, see: D. Barthélemy, 'Castles, Barons and Vavassors in the Vendômois and Neighbouring Regions in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' in T.N. Bisson (ed.), *Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe* (Philadelphia, 1995), p.57. See also: T.N. Bisson, 'The Feudal Revolution,' *Past & Present* 142 (1994), pp.6-7.

## 1.1. Medieval Warfare: Traditionalist Approaches

The traditionalist model, which has survived into the modern era in Oman's work, is the popular focus on the so-called 'warrior aristocracy' and their roles in pitched battles.<sup>7</sup> This stems from Clausewitzian ideas of warfare, which argue that the sole role of a general was to seek out and destroy the enemy in battle. This focus was sustained through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, leading to numerous popular battle histories.<sup>8</sup> Such a trend continued up through the late 1950s, with medieval military history studied almost exclusively by retired military officers -most prolifically by Oman- who brought the ideas of Clausewitz into modern historiography.<sup>9</sup>

The role of the knight, most often characterised as 'heavy cavalry', has been strongly associated with social structure in the Middle Ages since Brunner's article. He argued that the battle of Poitiers in 732 was a crucial encounter between the Franks under Charles Martel and Muslim cavalry under Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi. It caused a shift in focus for the Frankish forces towards heavy cavalry, and this new requirement precipitated the entire feudal system as a means of supporting such forces.<sup>10</sup> Brunner's thesis is foundational and has been adopted and adapted by other notables such as Oman. The latter argued that the feudal system precipitated a dominance of heavy cavalry, though this 'thousand-year rule of the knight' potentially started as early as the battle of Adrianople in 378.<sup>11</sup> This idea has often been considered over-simplistic, due largely to its focus on pitched battles and lack of critical concern for other aspects of warfare, most significantly siege warfare.<sup>12</sup> As well as the central ideas described above, there are other aspects which must be considered.

For the traditionalist school, heavy cavalry reigned supreme, while infantry played virtually no role. The only reason they were included in medieval armies was to

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<sup>7</sup> Noted by J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, 1994), p.72

<sup>8</sup> Noted by J. France, 'Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300,' *The Journal of Military History* 65:2 (2001), p.447.

<sup>9</sup> Observed by B.S. Bachrach, D.S. Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453* (London & New York, 2017), pp.6-8; M. Bennett, et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World A.D.500-A.D.1500* (London, 2013), p.76.

<sup>10</sup> See K. DeVries, R.D. Smith, *Medieval Military Technology, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn.* (Ontario, 2012), p.101-2. For the original work, see: H. Brunner, 'Der Reiterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehnwesens,' *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung* 8 (1887), pp.1-38.

<sup>11</sup> Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' p.306.

<sup>12</sup> Whetham, *Just Wars and Moral Victories*, p.244.

make up numbers because they were easy and cheap to recruit, but even proponents of such an extreme view, such as Oman, concede that infantry never fully disappeared.<sup>13</sup> The terms used to describe infantry forces in the secondary material emphasise their untrained and untrustworthy nature, portraying them as helpless, only present to serve as a rallying point for the all-important cavalry.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, Delbrück marginalised their contribution during the twelfth century, citing their performance at Dorylaeum in 1097 as the height of their significance.<sup>15</sup> They are often characterised as being little more than ‘cannon fodder’ - used to soak up enemy fire before the heavy cavalry could make their charge.<sup>16</sup> This view has been prolonged by their characterisation in the works of social historians as little more than a ‘seething mass’.<sup>17</sup> Such a characterisation is found in contemporary sources but is by no means as prevalent as is perhaps suggested.<sup>18</sup> It is undeniable that they appeared socially inferior to their mounted counterparts, at least initially.<sup>19</sup>

### 1.1.1. Medieval Warfare: The Stirrup Debate

Traditionalist ideas did not remain unchallenged for long however, with Ross in 1951 placing the development of the stirrup sometime between 1050 and 1150, and therefore placing the start of the period of cavalry dominance significantly later than his predecessor.<sup>20</sup> It is this fixation on the ‘couched lance’ or shock charge tactics which has generated considerable debate regarding medieval warfare. Perhaps the most oft-cited contribution to the historiography of mounted shock combat is Lynn White Jr.’s 1962 *Medieval Technology and Social*

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<sup>13</sup> S. Morillo, ‘The “Age of Cavalry” Revisited,’ in D.J. Kagay, L.J.A. Villalon (eds.), *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History* (Woodbridge, 1999), p.46; C. Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol.1: 378-1278AD* (London, 1998), p.282.

<sup>14</sup> Oman, *A History of the Art of War, Vol.1*, p.296.

<sup>15</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.69; R.C. Finucaine, *Soldiers of the Faith: Crusaders and Moslems at War* (London & Melbourne, 1983), p.69; R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn* (Cambridge, 1995), p.117.

<sup>16</sup> As argued by Powicke in his review: M.R. Powicke, ‘Review: Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), by R.C. Smail,’ *The English Historical Review* 73:286 (1958), p.135.

<sup>17</sup> See Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.186.

<sup>18</sup> Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.186; M. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. L.A. Manyon (London, 1961), p.291; L. Paterson, ‘The Concept of Knighthood in the Twelfth-Century Occitan Lyric,’ in P.S. Noble, L.M. Paterson (eds.) *Chrétien de Troyes and the Troubadours* (Cambridge, 1984), p.116

<sup>19</sup> Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.124; S. McGlynn, ‘The Myths of Medieval Warfare,’ *History Today* 44 (1994), p.29; P. Edbury, ‘Warfare in the Latin East,’ in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999), p.93; France, *Western Warfare*, p.5.

<sup>20</sup> See DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, pp.11-2.

*Change*.<sup>21</sup> White's thesis concerns the development and diffusion of the stirrup as the basis of the development of the 'couched lance' technique and therefore of mounted shock combat.<sup>22</sup> The main challenge he poses to Brunner is in respect of the chronology: White argues that the Muslim invasion culminating at the Battle of Poitiers in 732 did not constitute a crisis to the extent his predecessor suggested. White goes on to argue that Muslim cavalry usage in general only developed later, possibly even as a response to Frankish cavalry encountered at Poitiers in 732.<sup>23</sup> White's overall argument is that the diffusion of the stirrup in Europe generally occurred in the seventh and early-eighth centuries.<sup>24</sup> In terms of the Franks, White states that the focus on heavy cavalry was begun by Charles Martel, and then consolidated by his immediate descendants.<sup>25</sup> The argument is usually summarised as one of technological determinism: that the use of the stirrup had a significant effect on the shaping of the social structure of early medieval Europe due to its role in the pivotal mounted shock charge.

White's thesis almost immediately attracted direct criticism from Sawyer, who challenged the use of technology in determining social history.<sup>26</sup> He also challenged the significance of Charles Martel to the inception of heavy cavalry, before moving on to challenge most of White's evidence.<sup>27</sup> An alternate chronology was proposed by Buttin, who suggested that the mid-twelfth century was the crucial period in the development of the stirrup and heavy cavalry.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps the most damning criticism for White's thesis came five years later, from both Bullough and Bachrach.<sup>29</sup> Bachrach argued that there is little evidence for heavy cavalry having been present in the armies of Charles Martel, which

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<sup>21</sup> L. White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (Oxford, 1963), pp.1-38.

<sup>22</sup> J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340*, tr. S. Willard, S.C.M. Southern (Amsterdam & New York, 1977), p.5, A. Ayton 'Arms, Armour, and Horses,' in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare* (Oxford, 1999), p.188; M.A. Hoskin, 'Review: Medieval Technology and Social Change, by Lynn White,' *The English Historical Review* 79:310 (1964), p.139; DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.13; Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, pp.73-6.

<sup>23</sup> White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, pp.11-3.

<sup>24</sup> White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, pp.14-20.

<sup>25</sup> White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, pp.25-33.

<sup>26</sup> P.H. Sawyer, *The Age of Vikings* (London, 1962), p.90.

<sup>27</sup> Sawyer, *The Age of Vikings*, pp.90-5.

<sup>28</sup> F. Buttin, 'La lance et l'arrêt de cuirasse,' *Archaeologia* 99 (1965), pp.77-178; DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.13.

<sup>29</sup> D.A. Bullough, 'Europae Pater: Charlemagne and His Achievement in the Light of Recent Scholarship,' *English Historical Review* 85 (1970), p.85-90; B.S. Bachrach, 'Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stirrup, and Feudalism,' *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 7 (1970), pp.47-75.



together with his other arguments goes to show that even Brunner's thesis had very shaky foundations.<sup>30</sup> Bachrach also argues that a mid-eighth century location for the diffusion of the stirrup is inaccurate.<sup>31</sup> In 1977, Verbruggen argued that stirrups alone did not determine the effectiveness of mounted shock combat; a high-backed saddle was required to prevent the rider becoming dislodged upon impact.<sup>32</sup> This has become generally accepted, with Bachrach including it in his otherwise largely unchanged 1985 thesis.<sup>33</sup>

The dating of the diffusion of the stirrup has remained under consideration, though a later chronology is now suggested. In 1980, Nicolle located it in the early-twelfth century based on 'crusading sources', while in 1985 Cirlot used Catalan sources to place the spread c.1140.<sup>34</sup> Even more recently, one can find such arguments in Flori's chapter in *The New Medieval Cambridge History* in 2004, which also argues that this diffusion was unlikely to have taken place before the eleventh century but was likely widespread by the mid-twelfth century.<sup>35</sup> What is in no doubt is that White's 1962 thesis is now largely dead.<sup>36</sup> The overall debate is still foundational however, with larger implications for wider discussions concerning the development and conduct of medieval warfare in general. This thesis subscribes to the argument that the stirrup alone was not sufficient for the 'couched lance' charge. However, it also argues that such a tactic was not as pivotal as has been assumed, and this would therefore diminish the importance of the stirrup in general.<sup>37</sup> The development of heavily-armoured cavalry was far more important, but this was not necessarily tied to the 'couched lance' technique.

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<sup>30</sup> Bachrach, 'Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stirrup and Feudalism,' pp.53-4; DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.110.

<sup>31</sup> Bachrach, 'Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stirrup and Feudalism,' pp.58-62.

<sup>32</sup> Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, tr. Willard, Southern, p.5, 23.

<sup>33</sup> See: Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' p.308; Ayton 'Arms, Armour, and Horses,' p.188, DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.13, M. Aurell, 'Society,' in D. Power (ed.), *The Central Middle Ages: Europe, 950-1320* (Oxford, 2009), p.39. B.S. Bachrach, 'Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,' *Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo* 31 (1985), pp.707-51.

<sup>34</sup> DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.13.

<sup>35</sup> Flori, 'Knightly Society,' pp.170-2.

<sup>36</sup> DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.113.

<sup>37</sup> This is perhaps particularly true of the expeditions to the Holy Land. The Muslim cavalry faced by the early crusaders contained substantial Turkic steppe elements. This represented a significant departure from tactics they would have faced in western Christendom and would perhaps have changed the way in which they conducted warfare.

### 1.1.2. Knights on the Battlefield

While the advent of mounted shock combat and its causes remain obscured, there are aspects of cavalry warfare which are more clear-cut. The formations used by medieval heavy cavalry are now largely agreed upon. The traditionalist view was that knights were ill-disciplined, too proud to fight on foot, and adhered to only the most rudimentary tactics.<sup>38</sup> The basic consensus which has now been reached however is that the heavy cavalry would form up into 'squadrons' (in French: *eschielles* and later *conrois*; in Latin: *acies*, or *turmas* depending on the preference of the author).<sup>39</sup> They would then be screened from enemy missile fire by a combination of infantry troops until the commander deemed it to be the appropriate moment. The infantry would then make way for the heavy cavalry to charge. If the charge made contact, the battle would supposedly be won, though this was by no means certain. This cannot be broadly applied to all medieval warfare, and the tactics varied with the commander, as well as the circumstances of the battle, the make-up of the enemy, and any number of other considerations. What is important is that heavy cavalrymen were organised and disciplined, and that they had to be screened until engagement.

### 1.2. Medieval Warfare: The Revisionists

It is broadly agreed that cavalry troops were very effective on western European battlefields.<sup>40</sup> There are a few minor variations within this consensus however with Flori being careful to specify that it was only in pitched battles, as opposed to medieval warfare as a whole that heavy cavalry were considered effective.<sup>41</sup> The way in which pitched battles took centre stage in older literature has caused medieval battles and medieval warfare to be discussed interchangeably, leading to considerable imprecision. This centrality of pitched battles has come under considerable criticism by 'revisionist' historians of the 1980s and 1990s. It is

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<sup>38</sup> McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.29.

<sup>39</sup> Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.145; D. Nicolle, *Fighting for the Faith: The Many Fronts of Medieval Crusade and Jihad, 1000-1500 AD* (Barnsley, 2007), p.25; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.114; M. Bennett, 'La Règle du Temple as a Military Manual or How to Deliver a Cavalry Charge,' in J.M. Upton-Ward (tr.), *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templars* (Woodbridge, 1992), p.183; McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.30; C.J. Marshall, 'The Use of the Charge in Battles in the Latin East, 1192-1291,' *Historical Research* 63:152 (1990), p.222.

<sup>40</sup> DeVries, Smith, *Medieval Military Technology*, p.13; Ayton 'Arms, Armour, and Horses,' p.188; Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' p.304

<sup>41</sup> Flori, 'Knightly Society,' p.170.

argued that the potential for high casualties and capture or death of significant individuals -even in an indecisive battle- was too great a risk for most medieval commanders.<sup>42</sup>

These 'revisionists' have focused on a different aspect of warfare, largely through an increased consideration of Vegetius' *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, and a more positive perspective on medieval generalship. Vegetius' lack of emphasis on cavalry perhaps explains the degree of marginalisation it receives in revisionist arguments.<sup>43</sup> A by-product of this focus has been an increasing emphasis on 'ravaging' and 'raiding'. While the traditionalist school did consider this form of warfare, the revisionist tendency has been to assign far more importance to raiding. For example, Oman posited that raiding was the only means of supplying an army on the march due to the complete lack of logistical awareness of medieval generals.<sup>44</sup> By contrast, revisionist historians used Vegetius to argue that it was 'preferable to subdue an enemy by famine, raids and terror'.<sup>45</sup> Vegetius' work has often been taken as evidence for the proliferation of raiding in medieval warfare. However, this and the fact that it was likely integral to an army on the march in contested territory has -albeit in its simplest form- only helped to perpetuate Oman's views on logistics.<sup>46</sup>

The difference between the two approaches can be reconciled by the concept of controlled raiding: Oman argues that such activity was inevitable, and that medieval commanders could not have stopped it even had they wanted to. The revisionist consensus however, is that raiding was a conscious strategy and far more common than was acknowledged by their traditionalist counterparts.<sup>47</sup> Gillingham in particular argues that, in societies where wealth was widely dispersed, for instance the Celts and Saxons, raiding was virtually the only form of war, and that even in more urbanised societies, it was a staple of medieval

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<sup>42</sup> S. McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare* (London, 2008), p.81; J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340*, tr. S. Willard, S.C.M. Southern (Amsterdam & New York, 1977), p.300; Powicke, 'Review: Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), by R.C. Smail,' p.135; J. Gillingham, 'An Age of Expansion, c.1020-1204,' in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999), p.78.

<sup>43</sup> Bennett, 'La Règle du Temple as a Military Manual or How to Deliver a Cavalry Charge,' p.177.

<sup>44</sup> As noted in McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.29.

<sup>45</sup> F.R. Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, ed. and tr. N.P. Milner (Liverpool, 1993), p.108. For Vegetian influence, see: France, *Western Warfare*, pp.12-3.

<sup>46</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, pp.198-200.

<sup>47</sup> France, 'Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare' p.462.

strategy.<sup>48</sup> It is also more widely understood now that ravaging constituted a means of undermining the economic base required to hold fortifications, and for depriving an enemy of revenues.<sup>49</sup> This strategy caused diversions for enemy commanders who attempted to protect their material wealth, as well as provoking considerable terror and confusion.<sup>50</sup> The ease with which this type of strategy could be implemented meant that destruction of this kind was the staple form of war in medieval Europe, involving little more than armed men bullying unarmed men and destroying their livelihoods - often crops.<sup>51</sup> As well as being significantly easier than winning pitched battles or storming castles, successful ravaging was economically efficient, while simultaneously inflicting severe damage on the enemy.<sup>52</sup>

Although revisionists play down the role of cavalry, the mobility afforded by being mounted meant that cavalry was incredibly useful with regards to this type of warfare.<sup>53</sup> However, this aptitude for economic warfare did not mean they were the most significant type of soldier.<sup>54</sup> The suitability of cavalry for economic warfare is undisputed, but infantry did remain involved. Even before the great *chevauchées* of the Hundred Years War, they played a significant role in such strategies, with mercenaries in particular being strongly associated with ravaging activity.<sup>55</sup> The 'cruelty' of mercenaries is the subject of considerable debate, and will be discussed at length below.<sup>56</sup> Although it is clear that economic warfare was the most common strategy in the Middle Ages, arguably revisionists have focused on the *Epitoma Rei Militaris* too much and exaggerated its significance.<sup>57</sup>

The downplaying of the role of cavalry in the revisionist argument has simultaneously increased interest in infantry. Lyon, together with Bennett and

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<sup>48</sup> Gillingham, 'An Age of Expansion, c.1020-1204,' pp.67-8.

<sup>49</sup> McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.32; France, *Western Warfare*, pp.10-5; Gillingham, 'An Age of Expansion, c.1020-1204,' p.80.

<sup>50</sup> Edbury, 'Warfare in the Latin East,' p.98; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, pp.240-2.

<sup>51</sup> J. France, 'Warfare in the Mediterranean Region in the Age of the Crusades, 1095-1291: A Clash of Contrasts,' in C. Kostick (ed.), *The Crusades and the Near East* (London & New York, 2011), p.12.

<sup>52</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.242; France, *Western Warfare*, p.12.

<sup>53</sup> Edbury, 'Warfare in the Latin East,' p.98; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.85.

<sup>54</sup> J. France, 'Crusading Warfare,' in H.J. Nicholson (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in the Crusades* (New York, 2005), p.69.

<sup>55</sup> For *chevauchées*, see: McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, pp.196-8. For mercenaries, see: France, *Western Warfare*, pp.71-2.

<sup>56</sup> See Chapter 5.

<sup>57</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.239.

Gillingham have argued that, far from being masters of the battlefield, cavalry using the couched lance technique was useless against trained and disciplined infantry.<sup>58</sup> Lyon in particular has attracted vehement criticism from Verbruggen for what might be considered 'extreme' revisionist arguments.<sup>59</sup> The significance of infantry has been emphasised by referencing the later 'infantry revolution' in some revisionist arguments. This 'infantry revolution' is most noted in the fourteenth century and has often been linked to the development of missile weapons, whether the mass-production of crossbows, or the growing use of longbows.<sup>60</sup>

This strand of revisionism shares a striking similarity with its 'traditionalist' predecessor, the crucial difference being that it implies the supremacy of infantry and not cavalry on the medieval battlefield. The revisionist argument is also somewhat more qualified, in that it does not outright champion one arm of the medieval military as reigning supreme. While trained and disciplined infantry were effective in the face of heavy cavalry, it is unlikely that they were all-conquering, or indeed particularly common, especially in the twelfth century.

### 1.3. Medieval Warfare: Post-Revisionism

The greatest proponent of what McGlynn has described as post-revisionism is John France, who argues that the relegation of the role of cavalry has taken the argument too far in the other direction.<sup>61</sup> It is here that part of Flori's argument might also be useful, as he notes that the popularity of shock cavalry combat and the charge might have owed more to its perceived prestige than to its real military superiority.<sup>62</sup> Others like Kaeuper are simply content to argue that the dominance of heavy cavalry was 'much less total than initially thought.'<sup>63</sup> The supposed supremacy of heavy cavalry therefore appears most frequently with heavy qualification, such as Morillo's argument rather for the presence of poor-quality infantry than overly-dominant cavalry.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' p.316; Gillingham, 'An Age of Expansion, c.1020-1204,' p.76; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.60.

<sup>59</sup> J.F. Verbruggen, 'The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,' *Journal of Medieval Military History* 3 (2005), pp.46-8.

<sup>60</sup> Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.8.

<sup>61</sup> See France, *Western Warfare*, passim; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.85

<sup>62</sup> Flori, 'Knightly Society,' p.174

<sup>63</sup> R.W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 2001), p.172.

<sup>64</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.58.

Morillo has also argued that the couched lance charge in these 'squadrons' was not meant to be used as a physically destructive tactic, but rather as a psychological one. While accepting the views of Bennett and Gillingham – that a couched lance charge was all but useless against a determined block of infantry – such an argument suggests that by the time the charge struck home, the infantry would not be a determined block, but rather a frightened and potentially disjointed mass.<sup>65</sup> The aim of the charge was not to shatter an enemy formation – particularly of infantry – by sheer mass. It was the anticipation of such an act, combined with the sheer noise of a formation of galloping heavy cavalry, which served to disperse troops before contact was made. At such a point, cavalry proved very effective against scattered infantry in broken or disordered formation, and the battle would likely be won.<sup>66</sup>

### 1.3.1. Siege Warfare

The advent of post-revisionism has brought with it deeper consideration of another aspect of warfare: that concerned with attacking or defending fortifications. In works dealing specifically with siege warfare, an earlier focus was on architecture. For instance, Oman and Delbrück noted the importance of fortifications but provided only limited critical analysis of the specific strategies and tactics they represented, with greater emphasis placed on the more popular knights and pitched battles.<sup>67</sup> Others including Rogers, Bradbury and Purton have only recently made the first significant efforts to study the specifics of siege warfare and may be considered members of the post-revisionist school.

The focus on fortifications is unsurprising given the importance attributed to sieges by contemporary chroniclers, and the 'revisionism' of medieval military history focussing on examinations of Vegetius.<sup>68</sup> These examinations have led to a tight focus on armies in the field ravaging as opposed to fortifications, which seems odd given that six chapters of the *Epitoma Rei Militaris* are devoted to

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<sup>65</sup> Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.83; Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.50.

<sup>66</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.51.

<sup>67</sup> P.E. Chevedden, 'Fortifications and the Development of Defensive Planning in the Latin East,' in D.J. Kagay, L.J. Villalon (eds.), *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History* (Woodbridge, 1999), p.34; France, 'Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare,' p.457; McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.29.

<sup>68</sup> Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege*, p.72

sieges, both in attack and defence.<sup>69</sup> Siege warfare often determined the success or failure of a campaign, with the risk to reward ratio being considerably higher in comparison to the practice of raiding, particularly true in the Latin East.<sup>70</sup> Medieval strategy thus cannot be understood outside the context of siege warfare and the military role of the castle.<sup>71</sup>

More recent studies have considered a variety of siege tactics, including bombardment, mining, storming and blockade.<sup>72</sup> Bombardment is perhaps the most technical, given that it involved a range of artillery machines, designed in various ways to batter breaches in the walls of fortifications.<sup>73</sup> Mining was the most effective means of gaining entry to a fortified position, but also the most dangerous given the possibility of accidental collapse, or of counter-mining operations.<sup>74</sup> The bloodiest option however, involved the preparation of ladders and siege towers before attempting to take the position by storm. By necessity, this only involved infantry, and often proved very costly.<sup>75</sup> Blockade was the most time-consuming as it involved starving the enemy into submission. The conquest of fortified locations, whether through siege or storm, undeniably proved most decisive in medieval warfare.<sup>76</sup> The primary purpose of fortifications was to control the land around them, so conquest of the fortification therefore meant conquest of the land.

### 1.3.2. Post-Revisionist Synergy

The study of siege warfare has led to an increased appreciation of the cooperation between infantry and cavalry, with infantry providing obvious advantages for the assault and defence of fortifications. As a result of the

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<sup>69</sup> R.L.C. Jones, 'Fortifications and Sieges in Western Europe, c.800-1450,' in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999), p.183.

<sup>70</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, pp.141-50; Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.44; Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, p.300; France, 'Crusading Warfare,' p.7; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.9.

<sup>71</sup> McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.32

<sup>72</sup> France, 'Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare,' p.457, see: Rogers, R., *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, 1992); Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege*.

<sup>73</sup> For a good description of different types of artillery, see: Jones, 'Fortifications and Sieges in Western Europe,' p.171; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, pp.146-7; France, *Western Warfare*, pp.118-20.

<sup>74</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.148; France, *Western Warfare*, pp.116-7; Jones, 'Fortifications and Sieges in Western Europe,' p.171.

<sup>75</sup> France, 'Warfare in the Mediterranean,' p.17; Jones, 'Fortifications and Sieges in Western Europe,' p.171.

<sup>76</sup> France, 'Warfare in the Mediterranean,' p.10; Jones, 'Fortifications and Sieges in Western Europe,' p.163.

heightened mobility of cavalry forces, they were invaluable when attempting to enforce a blockade, particularly when it came to blocking sorties by garrison forces.<sup>77</sup> It was precisely this risk of garrisons sallying out that forced commanders to take castles and other fortifications rather than simply bypass them. Cavalry forces were heavily favoured for sortie actions, as their increased mobility afforded the opportunity to conduct 'lightning strike' attacks before retreating back inside the safety of their fortifications.

A certain degree of synergy between infantry and cavalry extends beyond siege warfare. Although the idea of the infantry being used primarily to screen heavy cavalry in pitched battles also remains prevalent, an argument focusing on the effective combination of horse and foot has begun to emerge, with the communal armies of Northern Italy cited as a possible origin.<sup>78</sup> However, Powicke argues that such a combination had not quite been achieved in the twelfth century.<sup>79</sup> Ravaging and siege warfare were more central to the strategy of medieval warfare, largely due to their common occurrence.<sup>80</sup> Emphasis has also been placed on the role infantry played in pitched battles, with the seminal works of Verbruggen and Smail focusing on armies in the field but simultaneously noting the importance of castles and their garrisons.<sup>81</sup>

All these perspectives can be located on a hypothetical spectrum ranging from the complete dominance of heavy cavalry to the complete dominance of infantry. This is overly simplistic, as very often engagements were not determined by the supremacy of infantry or cavalry alone, with many other variables influencing the outcome.

The contention of this thesis is that the debate needs to be reframed, moving away from generalisations and inaccuracy. Medieval warfare as defined by strategy and tactics was more complex than has been suggested by the absolute bipartite divisions between cavalry and infantry. Proper categorisation of soldiers on a military rather than social basis will illustrate this complexity in a poignant

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<sup>77</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.108.

<sup>78</sup> For the screen, see: Finucaine, *Soldiers of the Faith*, p.69; Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, tr. Willard, Southern, p.195; Nicolle, *Fighting for the Faith*, p.25. For the emerging synthesis, see: Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.4; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.10

<sup>79</sup> Powicke, 'Review: Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), by R.C. Smail,' p.135.

<sup>80</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, pp.51-9.

<sup>81</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.46; McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.29.



manner. This will be more useful than ranking different broad types of troops in order of effectiveness.

#### 1.4. Feudalism – ‘the remarkably ferocious intellectual hydra’.<sup>82</sup>

Debates over medieval warfare have been linked with social structure since Brunner’s thesis of 1887. The most common term used to describe medieval society is ‘feudal’, and the debate exists in two distinct periods: the older is when the phenomenon originated, and the far more recent is over the very suitability of such a construct. The concept of ‘feudalism’ originated in sixteenth century France with lawyers such as Du Moulin.<sup>83</sup> Gradually, the term assumed social and economic dimensions as well as legal ones, and it came to dominate as an historical construct from the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>84</sup> Though it did not go unchallenged, many historians simply utilised the framework with small alterations, such as replacing ‘feudalism’ with ‘feudal society’, and focusing on the social and political systems of obligations rather than the military connotations of the construct.<sup>85</sup>

Before considering the most vehement challenges to the construct of ‘feudalism’, it seems useful -given the methodology- to consider the judgments of historians upon what is called ‘crusader feudalism’. Though Duby dismisses such a notion as ‘a dream’, with little difference between the Crusader States of the Holy Land and the states of Western Christendom, he is in a decided minority.<sup>86</sup> Ganshof, Praver and Brooke have described ‘feudalism’ in the Latin East as being more ‘coherent’, more ‘feudal’, or simply ‘pure feudalism’, emphasising its colonial character within a strict military-political framework.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.261.

<sup>83</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.261; C. Brooke, *Europe in the Central Middle Ages 962-1154*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. (Harlow, 2000), p.96; C.B. Bouchard, “*Strong of Body, Brave and Noble*”: *Chivalry and Society in Medieval France* (Ithaca & London, 1998), pp.36-8; S. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1994), p.4.

<sup>84</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.262; Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct,’ p.1065.

<sup>85</sup> For challenges, see: Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct,’ pp.1063-5. For ‘feudal society’ see: T.H. Marshall, ‘Review: Feudal Society, by M. Bloch, tr. L.A. Manyon,’ *The British Journal of Sociology* 13:2 (1962), p.173; F.L. Ganshof, *Feudalism*, tr. P. Grierson (Toronto & London, 1964), p.xvi. For the political focus, see: Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct,’ p.1071.

<sup>86</sup> G. Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, tr. A. Goldhammer (Chicago & London, 1978), p.200.

<sup>87</sup> Ganshof, *Feudalism*, tr. Grierson, p.65; Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct,’ p.1077; J. Praver, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford & New York, 1980), pp.11-2.

Many of those noted above have been content to accept 'feudalism' as a concept for its facilitative nature: it makes medieval social and political structure easier to comprehend as a modern observer.<sup>88</sup> Significant challenges began as early as 1963 however, though it was not until more recently that such challenges began to gain more traction with the article of E.A.R. Brown in 1974, and the well-known *Fiefs and Vassals*, by Reynolds in 1994.<sup>89</sup>

Few scholars still retain the idea of 'feudalism', but most historians of the pre-Crusade period focus on the relative effectiveness of governmental authority rather than the dissolution and privatisation of power into more localised centres. The broad dismissal of the 'feudal' construct has allowed for a re-evaluation of narrative sources throughout the medieval period. The focus on centralised, governmental power has also caused a move away from the perception of medieval warfare as being conducted by small 'war-bands'.<sup>90</sup> Condemnation of 'feudalism' is widespread due to its anachronistic nature, and this thesis will therefore use the term sparingly to avoid inaccuracy.<sup>91</sup>

### 1.5. Chivalry

The concept of 'chivalry' is also important in the study of medieval warfare, as it has sometimes been represented as the hard-and-fast laws which governed its practice.<sup>92</sup> Unlike 'feudalism', chivalry is not a construct of historians; it appears as a concept in the medieval period.<sup>93</sup> Although the knighthood and chivalry are inter-related, there are important differences. Chivalry and its evolution are more difficult to pin down than the knighthood.<sup>94</sup> An example of this is Scaglione, writing in 1991, who describes three very diverse types of chivalry: ranging from 'a Christian knighthood, centred in northern France, and reaching its consciousness in 1050-1100,' through general 'courtly knighthood' and to 'a culture of courtly love'. Scaglione's loose definitions may have had their roots in

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<sup>88</sup> Brown, 'The Tyranny of a Construct,' pp.1067-9.

<sup>89</sup> Brown, 'The Tyranny of a Construct,' pp.1066, 1078; Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, p.5; Brooke, *Europe in the Central Middle Ages*, p.97.

<sup>90</sup> Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe*, pp.117-8

<sup>91</sup> Bouchard, "Strong of Body, Brave and Noble", p.36.

<sup>92</sup> Howard, *War in European History*, pp.4-6. See also Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe*, p.21

<sup>93</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.7.

<sup>94</sup> Keen, *Chivalry*, pp.1-2.

Erdmann's 1935 thesis, with an apparent endorsement coming later from E.R. Curtius.<sup>95</sup>

Although the crusading movement has been recognised in modern historiography for its specific importance and contribution to the development of chivalry, it has not been investigated fully. This system of values and beliefs and their development were central to the establishment of the knightly identity. The study of chivalry may broadly be divided into two periods, the first dating roughly from the 1620s up to the First World War; characterised by didactic and polemic writing. The works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries encompassed two opposing viewpoints, either that chivalry was the complete reality or that it was a myth, with early medieval government being warlike and unstable.<sup>96</sup> By the 1730s-1740s, it was agreed by all that chivalry was a dead cultural phenomenon.<sup>97</sup> The stirrings of the 'modern' discussions began with Bloch, under the influence of Gautier's 1884 work in his consideration of chivalry. Gautier argued that chivalry came from the grouping of knights, who rose to become noble, thereby infecting the nobility.<sup>98</sup>

Following this argument, Bloch attributed the causes of these changes to the church.<sup>99</sup> Such a view was immediately challenged by the likes of Sidney Painter, who criticised the argument at its roots, stating that Gautier was concerned only with 'religious chivalry', while he was more concerned with secular aspects of chivalry, and the way in which they acted as restraints on an otherwise violent and unrestrained medieval society.<sup>100</sup> Discussions in the 1980s were led by the Dutch historian Huizinga, under the influence of William James, and were initially dismissive of the value of the study of chivalry.<sup>101</sup> Chivalry was considered no more than a myth, and such a view has found support in the works of Auerbach, Köhler, Bumke and Curtius.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Scaglione, *Knights at Court*, p.6.

<sup>96</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.8-10

<sup>97</sup> For an in-depth summary of this first period of study, see: Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.7-14.

<sup>98</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.12.

<sup>99</sup> Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, pp.315-7; Crouch, *Birth of Nobility*, pp.15-6.

<sup>100</sup> S. Painter, *French Chivalry: Chivalric Idea and Practices in Medieval France* (Baltimore, 1940), pp.28-9; Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.15-6.

<sup>101</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.15; Keen, *Chivalry*, p.3.

<sup>102</sup> C.S. Jaeger, 'Courtliness and Social Change,' in T.N. Bisson (ed.), *Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe* (Philadelphia, 1995), p.289.

The social historian George Duby also held views not too distant from those of Gautier. Duby's argument was more sophisticated, with a clear separation of nobility and knightliness accompanying an emphasis on the works of Chrétien de Troyes.<sup>103</sup> The focus on secular chivalry gained support in 1984 in the work of Maurice Keen, which utilised a thorough synthesis between literary and historical sources, something later echoed by the likes of Kaeuper.<sup>104</sup> A new approach was devised by the largely Francophone scholar Jean Flori, who primarily used semantic arguments in his 1986 analysis of chivalry, with particular emphasis on the ritualization of dubbing.<sup>105</sup> For Flori, a student of Duby, chivalry originated in Germany c.1100 before spreading across Europe, and was born out of the struggle for social hegemony in a world of clashing classes and social ideologies where the nascent knightly class struggled to define itself between merchant groupings and professional mercenaries.<sup>106</sup>

Jaeger's 1987 study caused a shift in focus, placing the origin of chivalry in tenth century Ottonian Germany. He argued that clerical culture affected lay culture, but that knights were completely detached from the former.<sup>107</sup> He also emphasised that the ideal of the chivalric courtly knight found in the *chansons de geste* and Arthurian romances of Chrétien de Troyes influenced the creation of a similar social ideal.<sup>108</sup> Jaeger began to explore the upbringing of the ideal courtly knight, positing that literate and culturally ambitious noblemen had also been evidenced in French society as early as the eleventh century, though they were not then common. By the latter half of the twelfth however, they were no longer so uncommon, with both noblemen and knights with ambitions to be considered paragons seeking fame as composers or vernacular poets as well as on the battlefield.<sup>109</sup>

His radical shift in chronology has been challenged. Gillingham and Strickland both reject Ottonian Germany as the origin of chivalry, arguing that it was a self-generated, internal aristocratic code. Gillingham has focused on the pragmatic

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<sup>103</sup> Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.161; Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.17; Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.299.

<sup>104</sup> R.W. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia, 2009), *passim*; Keen, *Chivalry*, pp.5-6; Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.18-21, 25-6.

<sup>105</sup> Flori, *L'essor de la chevalerie*, pp.45, 83-4.

<sup>106</sup> Flori, *L'essor de la chevalerie*, pp.267-71; Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.17-9.

<sup>107</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.23-6.

<sup>108</sup> Jaeger, 'Courtliness and Social Change,' p.288.

<sup>109</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.85.

and non-ideological aspects of the code, while Strickland similarly looks at the secular, military aspects of chivalry.<sup>110</sup> Both represent a departure from Jaeger's focus on courtliness. What remains common to all three however, is the clear difference between their arguments and those of Vale which unequivocally argue that chivalry was merely a set of ideals, and completely out of touch with reality.<sup>111</sup> While the significance of chivalric literature has long been recognised by the likes of Kohler and Wentzlaff-Eggebert, in recent historiography it has come into sharper focus.<sup>112</sup> In his 2009 *Holy Warriors* Kaeuper focused on the religious aspects of the mid-fourteenth century chivalry, through the examination of two contemporary treatises on the subject. His argument followed the lines developed by Keen, Flori and Crouch, using both literature and *chansons* to establish the picture.<sup>113</sup>

### 1.5.1. The Ideal of the Literate Knight

There has been a growing focus on what has been referred to as the ideal of the thoughtful or literate knight.<sup>114</sup> The idea of the literate knight, collectively known by the Latin *militēs literati*, has been thoroughly examined in recent historiography, by both Anglophone and Francophone scholars. Aurell has been among the most vocal Francophone scholars, arguing that William de Mandeville and Ranulf de Glanville were both members of this group, defined by their knowledge of Latin being 'a step beyond average'.<sup>115</sup> Aurell contends that the term *illiteratus*, or illiterate, should not be understood in its modern sense, but according to its medieval definition, which he argues encompassed all those who were unable to read philosophical and theological scholarly treatises. Being *illiteratus* did not mean that one had no Latin whatsoever; it was impossible to administrate without any Latin. As an example, Walter Map described Waleran d'Ivry as a *miles illiteratus*, even though he could compose French verse.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.26-7.

<sup>111</sup> See Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' p.305.

<sup>112</sup> Bumke, *The Concept of Knighthood in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jackson, p.4.

<sup>113</sup> R.W. Kaeuper, 'Literature as Essential Evidence for Understanding Chivalry,' *Journal of Medieval Military History* 5 (2007) pp.1-2.

<sup>114</sup> C. Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade: Reason and Religious War in the Middle Ages* (St Ives, 2015), p.20.

<sup>115</sup> M. Aurell, *The Plantagenet Empire, 1154-1224*, tr. D. Crouch (Harlow, 2007), p.52.

<sup>116</sup> Aurell, *The Plantagenet Empire*, tr. Crouch, pp.72-3.

Similarly Ralph Turner argues that the learned knight was nothing less than an ideal social type widespread at the Plantagenet court within the middle-ranking nobility, where education assisted in getting careers in royal service.<sup>117</sup> More recently, David Crouch has pointed out the correlation that chivalry emerged as a self-defined code of conduct in the generation that the aristocracy became noticeably literate.<sup>118</sup> A discussion of the literate knight is important when considering the formation of knightly identity. The distinction between the knightly identity and the knightly grouping is a crucial one which underpins this thesis and will be examined in more detail in Chapter Six. No consensus has yet been reached regarding the origin and diffusion of 'chivalry', and the subject's treatment has grown ever more nuanced. It is here that a gap in the historiography may be detected. The potential for wider-reaching conclusions is greater with the consideration of the geographically and socially diverse crusading movement than those based on strictly domestic sources.

## 1.6. Nobles and Knights

A focus of this thesis is on distinguishing different military categories. It would be impossible to conduct a thorough study of knights, the emerging knighthood and knightly identity without considering fundamental social and cultural changes which occurred through the twelfth century. Knights have held such a high profile in debates on medieval warfare that a significant argument concerns the rise in the social status of those referred to as 'knights' to the nobility. All aspects of this rise in social status are debated, starting with whether it even took place, through locating it in the period and finally into how it occurred. The consensus is that it certainly did happen, though this idea is not unchallenged. A whole spectrum of debate exists: at one end is the idea that the nobility of the twelfth century was made up entirely of the risen *milites* of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The other extreme is that the social rise of the collective knighthood was a result of the higher echelons of society adopting and reforming the warrior ideal which came to be known as chivalry.

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<sup>117</sup> R.V. Turner, 'The *Miles Literatus* in Twelfth- and Thirteenth- Century England: How Rare a Phenomenon?' *The American Historical Review* 83:4 (1978), pp.941-5.

<sup>118</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.86.

The idea of *militēs* rising wholesale to form the nobility of the twelfth century was considered an ‘Old Idea’ by Van Winter thirty years ago, with a convergence between the two being more widely accepted.<sup>119</sup> Historians emphasized the sharing of ideas between the ‘old’ nobility and the professional group of knights. These included those of hereditary land ownership, as argued originally -and much earlier- by Bloch, or of the similar set of virtues which came to be identified as chivalry, as argued by Duby.<sup>120</sup> Chivalry and its rudimentary predecessors have been studied extensively in related albeit distinct historiographical debates. Somewhat related is the use of legitimate violence as a means of distinction between nobles and non-nobles, which has been particularly emphasized by Crouch.<sup>121</sup> The ritual importance of chivalry has also been tied with entry to the grouping of knights as they became reliant on the practice of dubbing.<sup>122</sup>

There is considerable disagreement over when exactly this social ascent occurred; dates anywhere between the tenth and early-thirteenth centuries have been suggested. A degree of cross-over has been present between the two debates - concerning chivalry and social ascent- due to similar and linked chronologies. Reuter placed this process of social ascent in the late tenth century, focusing on the term *miles* and its usage in relation to nobles.<sup>123</sup> Duby used his study of the Mâconnais in a similar fashion to argue that it occurred slightly later in the 1030s.<sup>124</sup> Flori asserted that the coalescence of knights into a grouping, and the social ascent of the same happened almost simultaneously, around the date 1180, as noted above.<sup>125</sup>

The most crucial of the many issues which exist however lies in the geographic diversity of western Christendom. For example Flori argues that there was a

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<sup>119</sup> For the ‘Old Idea’, see: J.M. Van Winter, ‘Knighthood and Nobility in the Netherlands,’ in M. Jones (ed.), *Gentry and Lesser Nobility in Late Medieval Europe* (Gloucester, 1986), p.81. For arguments for a degree of convergence between the professional warrior grouping and the socially elite group of nobles, see Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, p.321; Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.294.

<sup>120</sup> Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, p.321; Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.294.

<sup>121</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.19

<sup>122</sup> Duby, *The Three Orders*, p.296; Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, p.312.

<sup>123</sup> See Reuter, ‘The Medieval Nobility in Twentieth-Century Historiography,’ p.192.

<sup>124</sup> Reuter, ‘The Medieval Nobility in Twentieth-Century Historiography,’ p.192; Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.168.

<sup>125</sup> For Flori, see: J. Flori, ‘La notion de chevalerie dans les chanson de geste du XIIIe siècle,’ *Le Moyen Age: Revue d’Histoire et de Philologie* 81 (1975), pp.408-45

general, if diversified, rise in the social status of *milites*, stating that it happened at different times in various locations.<sup>126</sup> Part of the problem is the sheer volume of source material available for a survey of Christendom, and this has led many to focus on more localised areas.<sup>127</sup> It is here that the crusading material from around the turn of the century will be particularly valuable. The strength of such source material is that it represents a variety of authors describing the same events from across Christendom.

Another significant problem is one involving both primary and secondary literature. Vast variation exists in the medieval usage of the term *miles*.<sup>128</sup> The term has been used extensively as part of the widely-applied and imprecise rhetoric of *milites Christi*. Often used as a more abstract idea, the phrase was in use prior to the First Crusade, but gained prestige and prominence with the advent of the movement. *Miles* has been translated as anything from its Classical meaning of the generic 'soldier', all the way to 'knight', which is more prevalent in the period under consideration in the thesis. The lack of clear chronological distinction between the two ends of the spectrum confuses historiography even before considering the varied usage of *miles* in more modern debates. Perhaps the most frustrating problem is the significant diversity in the manner that modern historians employ terms such as 'knight' and 'noble'.<sup>129</sup> It is accepted that even when the former coalesced into a collective, it was a very broad group, as evidenced by the distinction between superior and inferior knights.<sup>130</sup>

### **1.7. Sources and Terminology: The Way Forward<sup>131</sup>**

The centrality of knights in medieval warfare and society has been challenged in recent historiography. However, they remain crucial in the consideration of military, social and cultural aspects of the medieval period. Many modern studies on medieval warfare have covered whether infantry or cavalry were the most

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<sup>126</sup> J. Flori, *L'essor de la chevalerie, XIe-XIIIe siècles* (Geneva, 1986), pp.223-30.

<sup>127</sup> For example, Van Winter, 'Knighthood and Nobility in the Netherlands,' p.81. See also Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe*, p.142.

<sup>128</sup> Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe*, p.141

<sup>129</sup> Praver, *Crusader Institutions*, p.26.

<sup>130</sup> For more details, see: Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.18; France, *Western Warfare*, p.31; DUBY, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.294.

<sup>131</sup> I have become aware of S. Tibble, *The Crusader Armies, 1099-1187* (New Haven & London, 2018). Some of the conclusions in Chapters 5 and 6 in particular (pp.99-154) are similar to those expressed throughout this thesis as original content. My methodological focus on terminology and the way in which I have reached my conclusions remains different, however.



effective. This has been approached in several ways (considering numerous strategic and tactical variations), but little effort has been made to identify functional categories of medieval soldiers within contemporary terminology. Terminology generally is an area which has been largely marginalised, with only limited critical analysis devoted to a tight collection of terms. *Miles* stands out as a term which has received a great deal of attention, while terms describing 'lower' social strata have received only a passing interest.

The key focus of the thesis is on the military sphere. Its wider aim may be summarised as an attempt to determine whether terms existed which primarily designated military function, and whether this function was influenced by considerations including social or economic standing. This study will provide a deeper examination of the terms describing those who fought as non-noble cavalrymen, infantrymen and mercenaries. The objective will be to explore such terms and their applications across the various cultural boundaries present in the Western Christendom of the twelfth century. This will facilitate tracking how authors viewed and described the different military categories present in the crusader armies across the century.

Furthermore the thesis will seek to highlight the distinction between the knightly grouping and the knightly identity. While the former -in its socially coherent form at least- will be described as the knighthood, the latter came about largely in line with the codification of the ideals known as chivalry. Crucially, it will be argued that the two did not develop simultaneously. With this in mind, other areas require clarification with regards to the framing of the wider thesis. The term 'feudalism' and variations thereof will be used sparingly to avoid the application of anachronistic values to this study. Similarly, the term 'class' will not be employed in favour of the more neutral 'grouping' or more contemporary *ordo*.

The focus on the listed sources rather than those concerned only with Western Christendom is a valuable one. The Crusades encompassed numerous distinct geographical regions, with the First Crusade alone drawing recruits from large swathes of the north and south of modern France, as well as Flanders, Germany, Italy, and England. The Second Crusade, with the expansion of crusading, saw contingents from all the above, as well as Spain and Scandinavia take up the cross, with subsequent efforts continuing to draw recruits from across the length

and breadth of Western Christendom. This diversity contrasts sharply with previous efforts, which have relied on a selection of sources which remain geographically narrow. The Third Crusade again drew recruits from the length and breadth of western Christendom, encompassing modern England, France, Germany and Italy. The Fourth Crusade was among the most restricted geographically but still drew elements from France, England, Germany and Italy to participate throughout the campaign. The sources under consideration are geographically narrower than the participants of the twelfth century expeditions. It is important to emphasise this distinction, so as not to misrepresent the breadth of the thesis. Although the sources for the twelfth century Crusades are not fully representative of their participants, they represent a far wider cross-section of western Christendom than domestic sources would, meaning the methodology of the thesis remains valuable.

How the sources are used is also different to most Crusades studies. Much of the secondary literature has been concerned with tracking the expeditions to their conclusion, or examining what the crusaders took East, or more generally the cross-cultural experiences between Christendom and Islam. Efforts have been made to study the military history of the crusades. The foundational work of R.C. Smail has aged surprisingly well in the seven decades since its original publication.<sup>132</sup> There have been other works published on individual campaigns or crusaders, but the authors of the Crusades represent a veritable mine of information on a large cross-section of European regions. Comparatively, these sources provide significant evidence to draw upon, as well as being both geographically and chronologically diverse. The evidence provided is not only more prolific, but it is more valuable for wider ranging analysis of the lower strata of society due to the geographical diversity noted above.

Undoubtedly, there remain difficulties associated with relying upon crusading material. Primarily the Crusades represented an exceptional phenomenon in the history of the Middle Ages. Many sources record the events of the Crusades with layers of religious rhetoric added, which makes the military terminology used somewhat unreliable. A particular example would be the terms such as *milites Christi*, or *milites crucis Christi* – both appear frequently throughout sources, but it

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<sup>132</sup> Smail, *Crusading Warfare*.

is unlikely that on every occasion they refer to the grouping known as 'knights'. Far more likely, *milites Christi* was meant as 'soldiers of Christ' in a more Classical sense, placed in opposition to non-Christians, whether Muslim or Greek. Despite the difficulties it throws up in the military sphere, the usage of such rhetoric was important in the development of the knightly grouping, and this will be examined in more detail below.<sup>133</sup> It is conceivable that the evidence provided by the sources examined represents a divergence from the reality of European military structure. While the First Crusade can be said to have represented a microcosm of Western society in general, the later crusades represented more specialised military expeditions, and therefore reflected Western armies only, rather than society.<sup>134</sup> This thesis represents both a new perspective on the conduct of warfare in Western Europe and an innovative use of the relevant source material by a close examination of military terminology.

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<sup>133</sup> See Chapter 6.

<sup>134</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.20.

## Chapter 2: The Sources and Terms Associated with Crusading Combatants

Thus far, the methodology has been described simply as using ‘crusade sources’, due to the aforementioned multi-regional nature of the expeditions, in contrast with the more tightly-focused efforts of Duby and Evergates among others. The aim is to use every major crusade source to examine primarily non-noble soldiers in the twelfth century. The definition of ‘crusade source’ would constitute one that has been traditionally used for the history of the Crusades, as such sources offer a profile of European society and military structure on the move. This coalescence of soldiers of different ranks from all over Western Christendom provides unique challenges for narrators, and it is these challenges which provide considerable insight.

### 2.1. The Source Base

The sources for the Second Crusade include the various works of Otto of Freising, Odo of Deuil’s *De Profectione Ludovici*, Helmold of Bosau’s *Chronica Slavorum* and the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, the collection known as the ‘Lisbon Letter’, and Saxo Grammaticus’ *Historia Danorum*.<sup>1</sup> The majority of these were likely completed in the 1160s, nearly fifteen years after the events they describe.

For the Third Crusade, there are fourteen sources, which may be divided according to which king they focus on. King Richard, as perhaps the main protagonist, attracted the most attention, with one source in Old French – Ambroise’s *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* – and six in Latin, including the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*, and the chronicles of Richard of Devizes, William of Newburgh, Ralph of Diceto, Ralph of Coggeshall, and Roger of Howden.<sup>2</sup> Philip II Augustus of France is the subject of three Latin sources, including the

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<sup>1</sup> Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris*, ed. G. Waitz in MGH SRG 46, translated in Otto of Freising, *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, tr. C.C. Mierow (New York, 1953), Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem: The Journey of Louis VII to the East*, ed. & tr. V.G. Berry (New York, 1948), Helmold of Bosau, *Chronica Slavorum*, ed. & tr. H. Stob (Darmstadt, 1963), *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. & tr. C.W. David (New York, 2001), Edgington, S., ‘The Lisbon Letter of the Second Crusade,’ *Historical Research* 69:170 (1996), pp.328-39, Saxo Grammaticus, *Gesta Danorum: The History of the Danes, 2 vols.*, ed. K. Friis-Jensen, tr. P. Fisher (Oxford, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> Ambroise, IPGRR, Devizes, William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, ed. R. Howlett, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I* (London, 1884), Ralph of Diceto, *Opera Historica, Vol.2*, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1876), Coggeshall, Howden.

chronicle of William the Breton, his later *Philippide* and Rigord's *Gesta Philippi Augusti*.<sup>3</sup> The last, abortive branch of the Third Crusade set out under the famous Frederick Barbarossa and is covered by the Latin sources the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris*, the *Historia Peregrinorum*, the *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, and the Chronicle of Otto of St Blasien.<sup>4</sup>

The sources being examined for the Fourth Crusade include the Old French Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, and the Latin Hugh of Saint-Pol, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Anonymous of Soissons, Gunther of Pairis, as well as the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* and the *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium*.<sup>5</sup>

Alongside these sources for the specific events of the numbered Crusades, there are numerous other works describing the innumerable smaller contingents which made the journey to the Holy Land in amongst the larger, more 'official' expeditions, as well as several supplementary texts. Among these are those relating to the inception of the military orders, such as the Old French Rule of the Temple, and Bernard of Clairvaux's *De Laude Novae Militiae* and those sources originating in the Holy Land, most famous of which are the works of William of Tyre and their continuations.<sup>6</sup> Unsurprisingly these span the century. The Rule of the Temple was the subject of several additions, with the base document dating from the 1160s and subsequent sections appearing well into the thirteenth century. Bernard of Clairvaux's treatise may be dated somewhere between the inception of the Knights Templars (c.1120) and the death of Hugh of Payens (c.1136).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Rigord, *Gesta Philippi Augusti* and William the Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, both in H.F. Delaborde (ed.), *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton: Historiens de Philippe-Auguste, Tome Premier: Chroniques de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton* (La Société de l'histoire de France: Paris, 1882), William the Breton, *Philippide*, in H.F. Delaborde (ed.), *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton: Historiens de Philippe-Auguste, Tome Second: Philippide de Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882),

<sup>4</sup> HEF, *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17.

<sup>5</sup> Villehardouin, Clari, Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, Albrichi monachi Triumfontium, *Chronicon* ed. P. Scheffer-Boichorst in MGH SS 23, Anonymi Suessionensis, *De Terra Iherosolimitana et quomodo ab urbe Constantinopolitana ad hanc ecclesiam allate sunt reliquie*, ed. P. Riant in *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae* (Geneva, 1877), Gunther von Pairis, *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, ed. P. Orth (Hildesheim & Zurich, 1994), 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in *Annales Herbipolenses*, ed. Pertz in MGH SS 16, *Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium*, ed. L. Weiland, MGH SS 23.

<sup>6</sup> Règle, Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, in JP. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, v.182, William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum Chronique*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout, 1986), CGT.

<sup>7</sup> Bennett, 'La Règle du Temple as a Military Manual or How to Deliver a Cavalry Charge', p.175; Flori, 'Knighthly Society,' p.180.

### 2.1.1. Source Limitations: The Second Crusade

For the Second Crusade, Otto of Freising's work covered c.1075-1156, with only the events described in the second half of the source occurring during his lifetime. The section authored by Otto was completed prior to his death in 1158. He accompanied Conrad on the expedition and was a highly-placed eyewitness for the duration of the Crusade.<sup>8</sup> Odo of Deuil may perhaps be considered Otto's French counterpart, due to several similarities. Odo was chaplain to Louis VII and accompanied the king on his expedition, finishing his account before 1162. Therefore Odo of Deuil was also a highly-placed eyewitness, though in a different army. Like Otto, Odo's knowledge was therefore centred on official matters similar to the later Fourth Crusade account of Geoffrey of Villehardouin.<sup>9</sup> The *De Profectione Ludovici VII* was written as an epistolary letter to Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis. It covered from 1145 to the arrival of the French remnants at Antioch in 1148. There was a strong theme of remembrance of the First Crusade, probably influenced by Odo's reading of the *Gesta Francorum* and the work of Raymond d'Aguilers.<sup>10</sup> The general consensus is that while Odo was factually accurate, he lacked objective judgement.<sup>11</sup> His main aims were to praise the King of France and to guide subsequent crusading efforts, and these must be taken into account when examining evidence from the source.

The Second Crusade is also noted for the opening of further theatres in the crusading movement. Helmold of Bosau wrote his *Chronica Slavorum* as a record of events in the Baltic, with the first two sections probably finished between 1167-1172, and followed Adam of Bremen's earlier work extensively. The Second Crusade is merely a feature in Helmold's work rather than a focus. This coupled with the period of time between the date of the work and the timing of the initial crusading activity undermines the value of this source regarding specific events.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Otto of Freising, *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, tr. C.C. Mierow (New York, 1953), pp.3-5

<sup>9</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. V.G. Berry, pp.xv-xix

<sup>10</sup> See: J. Phillips, 'Odo of Deuil's *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* as a source for the Second Crusade,' in M. Bull, N. Housley (eds.), *The Experience of Crusading vol.1* (Cambridge, 2003), pp.83-5.

<sup>11</sup> G. Constable, 'The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries,' *Traditio* 9(1953), p.217; H. Mayr-Harting, 'Odo of Deuil, the Second Crusade and the Monastery of Saint-Denis,' in M.A. Meyer (ed.), *The Culture of Christendom: Essays in Medieval History in Memory of Denis L.T. Bethell* (London, 1993), pp.255-61.

<sup>12</sup> Helmold of Bosau, *The Chronicle of the Slavs*, tr. F.J. Tschan (New York, 1935), pp.25-8

Of the two significant sources for the Iberian Peninsula, the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* is the more extensive, and the better-known. Extant in a sole manuscript from the 1160s-1170s, it is possible that the work represents a second edition, being a reworking of a diary or report written at the capture itself. The author, thought to have been one 'Raol', is described as a well-educated man who produced a sophisticated, homogeneous work.<sup>13</sup> The shorter source, known as the 'Lisbon Letter' is more obscure, with no extant copies from before the sixteenth century. In addition the original source can only be dated to the 'twelfth century'. From the information given it is likely that the author was an eyewitness, making the 'Letter' a valuable source.<sup>14</sup>

### 2.1.2. Source Limitations: The Third Crusade

The sources for the Third Crusade may be best divided according to the kingdoms from which they originated. By far the most numerous come from the Angevin realms, with the majority being written in Latin. An exception is Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, a verse written in Old French. Originally thought to have been an Anglo-Norman jongleur, Ailes has more recently noted the possibility that Ambroise was in fact a cleric.<sup>15</sup> It has long been argued that Ambroise and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* were linked, due to their similar -and in some places identical- content. More recently it has been specifically argued that the later *Itinerarium* (probably composed between 1217-22) was substantially based on Ambroise's work, written between 1194-9.<sup>16</sup> The *Itinerarium* is thought to have been compiled by Richard de Templo, an unverified eyewitness to the events of the expedition.<sup>17</sup> Both sources provide extensive evidence on military matters in the context of the Third Crusade, but Ambroise's work presents a particular problem. As a verse source making extensive use of rhyming couplets, there are potential instances where words are used to achieve a rhyme, at the cost of accuracy. Ambroise and the *Itinerarium* represent the only

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<sup>13</sup> For a brief discussion of the authorship of the *De Expugnatione*, see: J. Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (New Haven & London, 2007), pp.136-7. Phillips also notes the challenges of Constable and David to the established authorship.

<sup>14</sup> Edgington, 'The Lisbon Letter,' pp.329-31

<sup>15</sup> M. Ailes, (tr.), *The History of the Holy War: Ambroise's Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* (Woodbridge, 2011), pp.1-3. Also supported by M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England* (Oxford, 2017), pp.144-5.

<sup>16</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, pp.13-14, p.129, Ailes (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, p.13

<sup>17</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, p.216, p.236.

eyewitness Angevin sources for the duration of the Third Crusade, with others being present for only portions of the campaign.

Roger of Howden was an author and an eyewitness to events between embarkation at Marseilles and the conclusion of the siege of Acre.<sup>18</sup> While the authors of the *Estoire* and *Itinerarium* were clearly biased in favour of Richard I's leadership, Roger was arguably a more independent record of events who wrote contemporaneously, finishing shortly after returning home in 1192. Together with the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and Ambroise, Roger of Howden likely wrote for the edification of the Angevin court.<sup>19</sup> His account was in a national chronicle format, filled with contemporary documents including letters, charters, treaties and assizes.<sup>20</sup> Finally, there are four more Angevin writers who were reliant on the accounts of others to write their descriptions of the Third Crusade. The works of William of Newburgh, Ralph of Diceto, Ralph of Coggeshall and Richard of Devizes collated information from several first-hand sources, posing the problem that another degree of separation was present.<sup>21</sup> William of Newburgh has been praised extensively in modern historiography. He offers a Cistercian perspective on the events of the Third Crusade and is heavily based on the work of Roger of Howden, though rewritten and reinterpreted.<sup>22</sup> Ralph of Diceto is another whose work is written in a national chronicle format, and much like Howden includes significant use of documents.<sup>23</sup> A key difference is that Diceto's work is generally more ecclesiastical in character, and was designed to be more accessible than other accounts.<sup>24</sup> Richard of Devizes will be examined in far more detail below as a case study of a secondary if well-informed chronicler.<sup>25</sup>

The weight of material for the Third Crusade certainly falls in favour of the Angevin sources, though there were a few authors more concerned with the

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<sup>18</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, p.216

<sup>19</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, p.56, Ailes (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, p.14; *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: A Translation of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. & tr. H.J. Nicholson (Aldershot, 1997), p.2.

<sup>20</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, p.3, p.11.

<sup>21</sup> Ailes (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, pp.14-5; *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: A Translation of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. & tr. H.J. Nicholson (Aldershot, 1997), p.2. For more information on William of Newburgh specifically: K. Norgate, 'The Date of Composition of William of Newburgh's History,' *The English Historical Review* 19:74 (1904), pp.289-97.

<sup>22</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, pp.84-6, p.217.

<sup>23</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, p.3, p.11.

<sup>24</sup> Staunton, *Historians*, pp.67-75

<sup>25</sup> *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: A Translation of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. & tr. Nicholson, p.2; S.J. Allen, E. Amt (eds.), *The Crusades: A Reader*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. (Toronto, 2010), p.169



other monarchs who led contingents east. The sources concerned with the French and German monarchs have been considered in less detail largely because Phillip II and Frederick Barbarossa were not as involved in events. Phillip II returned home after the successful conclusion of the siege of Acre, and Frederick Barbarossa famously died during his passage across Anatolia. The sources for the French expedition include those written by Rigord and the later William the Breton.<sup>26</sup> Neither author participated in the expedition, and both wrote some time after the event: Rigord in the first quarter of the thirteenth century and William the Breton even later.<sup>27</sup> Both authors had significant ties to the French royal line and were therefore writing for the edification of their patrons, with a courtly audience in mind.

The corresponding German sources were far more contemporary with the Third Crusade, with the most extensive being the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*. The author was probably an eyewitness to the earlier events of the Crusade, but it is thought that he relied on the now-lost diary of Tageno for the final section of his record. Though the actual identity of the author is problematic due to variance between manuscripts, the original work was completed by c.1200 at the latest, within a decade of the events it describes.<sup>28</sup> The *Historia Peregrinorum* and *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* are both significantly shorter, but still relevant.<sup>29</sup> Both are contemporary, with the former being completed before c.1200, and drawing on the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* extensively. The *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* also draws on the diary of Tageno extensively, with the insertions comprising Magnus' coverage of the Third Crusade. The *Chronicon* was composed before Magnus' death in 1195. Together with the *Historia Peregrinorum*, the *Chronicon* had the same potential drawback of not being an eyewitness source.<sup>30</sup> One of the significant advantages of non-eyewitness primary sources is the opportunity to collate material, and the converse is equally valid. Although the original source was a diary -not necessarily intended for widespread consumption- the *Historia de*

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<sup>26</sup> Rigord, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, William the Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, William the Breton, *Philippide*.

<sup>27</sup> Ailes (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, p.16; Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.18

<sup>28</sup> G.A Loud (tr.), *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick and Related Texts* (Farnham, 2010), pp.1-2

<sup>29</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17

<sup>30</sup> Loud (tr.), *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa*, pp.1-8

*Expeditione Friderici* was likely for the Imperial Court, while the *Historia Peregrinorum* and Magnus' *Chronicon* were both written for their local, religious communities (i.e. their institution or those in the geographical vicinity of the author).

### 2.1.3. Source Contexts: The Fourth Crusade

The range of sources under consideration is therefore vast, with each presenting their own perspectives and challenges. Geoffrey of Villehardouin likely completed his Old French account of the Fourth Crusade between 1206-7 and is widely regarded as the most significant source for the expedition.<sup>31</sup> As *mareschaus* of Champagne, Villehardouin was a highly-placed eyewitness to the Crusade, and able to draw on several significant documents, most notably the Treaty of Venice. This contrasts with his countryman Robert of Clari, whose Old French account seems to have been written in two parts, in 1205 and 1216. Robert is characterised by modern historians as a 'poor knight', who held a small fief in Picardy. He took part in the expedition as part of the retinue of Pierre d'Amiens, who was a cousin of Hugh of St-Pol.<sup>32</sup> Although Robert did not enjoy the same position as Villehardouin, he is considered significant for his characterization of an under-represented group, while simultaneously providing a useful counterbalance to his countryman.<sup>33</sup> In terms of readership, Villehardouin's was almost certainly wider, given his position within the Crusade, and his later title of Marshal of Romania with the Latin Empire. In contrast, Robert of Clari's text survives only in a single manuscript, which suggests limited circulation.<sup>34</sup> The third and final secular source for the Fourth Crusade was written in Latin by Hugh of St-Pol. With the focus on terminology, this is a significant contrast as it provides a means of direct comparison between Latin and Old French terms describing the same events. Written in 1203 before the final capture of Constantinople, Hugh's account did not draw any real conclusions about the

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<sup>31</sup> See Villehardouin, N. Housley, *The Crusaders*, (Stroud, 2002), p.67; Andrea, 'Essay on Primary Sources', p.299.

<sup>32</sup> See Clari, Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' pp.13-14.

<sup>33</sup> Clari, p.xxvii; Andrea, 'Essay on Primary Sources', p.302.

<sup>34</sup> M. Angold, *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* (Harlow, 2003), p.13.

Fourth Crusade overall, though his very high rank -he was fourth in line for command- means that he was likely at least as well-informed as Villehardouin.<sup>35</sup>

The clerical sources for the Fourth Crusade may be broadly grouped together since they share certain traits in terms of context. All authors were writing for the aggrandisement of specific churchmen, though at risk of making generalisations, some broad similarities may be identified. First and foremost, all were writing based on the experiences of others, with other members of the community the target audience. Gunther of Pairis wrote about Abbot Martin, and his work was probably completed before the end of 1205, with additions made in the following few years.<sup>36</sup> The account of the Anonymous of Soissons was similarly written between 1205-7, but instead centered around the the experiences of Nivelon of Chérisy.<sup>37</sup> The author of the *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium* wrote about the crusading involvement of Conrad of Krosigk, and the relevant section was likely completed around 1208.<sup>38</sup> Significantly none of these authors were eyewitnesses, in contrast to their secular counterparts who all took part in many of the engagements they describe. Indeed, the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* is unique among the clerical sources for its eyewitness status, though written anonymously. It was also likely written in 1215, making it one of the further removed sources in terms of time passed, which would potentially throw up questions over memory but for the fact that the short source seems to have been constructed from official documents.<sup>39</sup>

## 2.2. General Source Limitations

Aside from the sources directly related to the expeditions of the twelfth century, there are others which provide valuable context regarding the contemporary crusading movement. The Old French Rule is invaluable with regards to the pragmatic ideals of knighthood.<sup>40</sup> The Templar Order was received by Hugh de

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<sup>35</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.16.

<sup>36</sup> Gunther von Pairis, ed. Orth, Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.30; Andrea, 'Essay on Primary Sources,' p.304.

<sup>37</sup> Anonymi Suessionensis, *De Terra Iherosolimitana*, A.J. Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade* (Leiden & Boston, 2000), pp.223-4

<sup>38</sup> *Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium*, in MGH SS 23, Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.31.

<sup>39</sup> 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in MGH SS 16, Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.24

<sup>40</sup> Règle.

Payens at the Council of Troyes in 1128, with the first section of the Rule - known as the 'Primitive Rule'- being codified shortly after.<sup>41</sup> The full French Rule evolved over a long period, with numerous additions being made throughout the twelfth century. For instance, the Hierarchical Statutes were dated around 1165.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately the source exists in a series of manuscripts from the thirteenth century, providing scope for transcription errors, wilful or otherwise.<sup>43</sup> Another crucial document -also related to the Templars- is Bernard of Clairvaux's treatise *De Laude Novae Militiae*, or 'In Praise of the New Knighthood', written sometime between 1129 and 1136.<sup>44</sup> It is one of the earlier sources under consideration and therefore provides a significant contrast with the latest sources for the Fourth Crusade. Although the treatise was addressed to Hugh of Payens, the first Master of the Templars, it is likely that the source was later communicated widely due to Bernard's stature – a result of his subsequent Second Crusade preaching.<sup>45</sup>

The variety in the source-base poses numerous challenges. Most obviously, the volume alone might seem to be a limitation, given that various authors attached different meanings to certain words. Due to the geographical diversity which gives this study value, the specific terms under consideration lack a coherent meaning even across the primary sources. To minimise the impact of such a problem, it would therefore seem prudent to conduct a comparison of authors and their terms. Part of the methodology involves examining the extent to which the sources allow one to compare how authors used terms. It remains important to be cognisant of the manner in which individual authors employed the various terms, and how this varied from source to source. As a result one must question the extent to which the sources allow for comparison between authors and how they viewed military groupings and the terms used to describe them. One must accept that such comparison is only possible on a very generalised level, and that questions will always remain.

An associated, significant -and inevitable- difficulty is the tendency to take a retrospective view of history. The meanings of certain words have evolved, and

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<sup>41</sup> P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones (Oxford, 1984), p.74.

<sup>42</sup> *Règle*, pp.11-3

<sup>43</sup> C.B. Paris, 'Review: The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of Knights Templars: Studies in the History of Medieval Religion 4, by J.M. Upton-Ward,' *Church History* 64:2 (1995), p.340.

<sup>44</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*.

<sup>45</sup> *Règle*, ed. de Curzon, p.4

this has clouded the view of earlier understanding. Of central importance to this thesis are the words 'knight' and 'squire', whose definitions changed considerably in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The problem with taking a 'hindsight view' of such changes is that there is the temptation to take the more recent definitions of, for example, the words 'knight' and 'squire', and work backwards from there. This is misleading, as it gives an undue impression of causality; connections are drawn between changes and significant moments when there ought to be no link. One way to address such a problem is to start with the original terminology, as used in the language of the primary sources. Only once the source has been examined fully can meanings be assigned to the author's terminology accurately, thereby reducing a significant proportion of misleading connotations, to allow for a purer analysis.

Before commencing such an examination, there are other limitations to consider, including whether authors used different terms for soldiers from diverse geographical areas; whether the type of soldier in action varied geographically, or it simply displayed prejudice on the part of the author, such as that displayed by certain pro-Richard authors on the Third Crusade.<sup>46</sup> There is also the challenge of different languages used in the sources, with a tendency to see certain terms as equivalent – could *chevalier* be considered directly equivalent to *miles*? The validity of the methodology is reinforced, as it seems likely that many authors used terms differently, not least *milites*. The best way to assess these differences is to evaluate each source individually, to determine which words each author favoured, and how extensive their military vocabulary was, and therefore how general a meaning they attributed to the words used.

How much weight to assign evidence is crucial to such an evaluation. The provenance of sources is key, including the purpose of the source, and contextual information about the author. Some important general trends can be detected throughout the sources examined. One must consider the focus of contemporary authors. The emphasis of most of the authors under consideration was more likely to reflect the nature of crusading. Indeed, a central component of authors' considerations were the spiritual and pious facets of the expeditions. As a result, there was potentially an element of disinterested imprecision regarding financial

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<sup>46</sup> IPGRR, 5:20.

loot and treasure, or military concerns. Intertwined with this spiritual focus is what might broadly be described as the 'legacy of the First Crusade'.

The impact of the First Crusade upon the literary works of the twelfth century cannot be understated.<sup>47</sup> As an event it was crucial for the interpretation of events by later historians, with strong themes of memory and obligations to uphold ancestral accomplishments. The tangible manifestation of this centred on reverence and the imitation of forebears and is particularly detectable in the preaching of the Second Crusade and the letters of Innocent III.<sup>48</sup> The full impact of the First Crusade on its successor expeditions -not to mention literature- is vast and nuanced. This should certainly be kept in mind when considering the contexts of the sources under consideration.

Each source must be considered on an individual basis for their value, with provenance and context being of central concern. Gilbert of Mons and Robert of Clari are near-contemporary, and provide useful case studies of particularly valuable sources, though for very different reasons.

### **2.2.1. Case Study: Gilbert of Mons**

Although not necessarily focusing on the crusades, Gilbert of Mons provides a useful case study against which to measure the value of source material. The Latin of Gilbert of Mons is used frequently with regards to military history, and as a record of the history of north-western Europe.<sup>49</sup> This is in large part due to his recognized reliability, due to his position as chancellor of Hainaut (1178-95), and chancellor of Namur (1192-5).<sup>50</sup> He had access to numerous official documents, as shown when his descriptions slip into the more official language of charters.<sup>51</sup> Of significance is his background as chancellor, as he had access to the administration of the Counties of Hainaut and Flanders. While Gilbert notes himself that he made extensive use of other sources, the *Chronicle of Hainaut*, is an

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<sup>47</sup> D. Roach, 'Orderic Vitalis and the First Crusade,' *Journal of Medieval History* 42:2 (2016), pp.179-80, 200.

<sup>48</sup> See: N.L. Paul, *To Follow in Their Footsteps: The Crusades and Family Memory in the High Middle Ages* (Ithaca & London, 2012), p.2. The wider work goes into considerable detail on the topic.

<sup>49</sup> Gislebert de Mons, *La Chronique*, ed. L. Vanderkindere (Bruxelles, 1904) remains the most useful edition of the Latin, despite its age. The modern translation by L. Napran is based on the Vanderkindere edition: Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. L. Napran (Woodbridge, 2005).

<sup>50</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, p.xxvii.

<sup>51</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, p.xxxii.

entirely original work.<sup>52</sup> He shows some obvious interest in military matters and uses extensive military terminology. This suggests that he was writing for the edification of the Counts of Flanders and Hainaut, who were likely interested in military affairs.<sup>53</sup> His purpose in writing, combined with his high-level access to official documents therefore means that overall, his assessments of social status, but also of troop types may be trusted.

His work's value would seem indisputable, though there are other concerns about his reliability. His status as a clerical source may weaken his standing, but his interest in military history, and that he was an eyewitness serve as an effective counter to this accusation.<sup>54</sup> Despite being an eyewitness to many of the events he reported, he is open to criticism that he was partisan, through his background and his purpose in writing. Given his noted relationship with the Counts of Flanders and Hainaut, he was more than likely to skew evidence in their favour. This bias manifests itself, either by downplaying the numbers and disposition of friendly armies, or by exaggerating those of the enemy.<sup>55</sup> Overall, the benefits of the evidence provided by Gilbert, with his specific knowledge and well-documented evidence outweigh the limited bias displayed through the *Chronicle*. It may therefore be considered a useful source on military structure.

### 2.2.2. Case Study: Robert of Clari

The Old French work of Robert of Clari contrasts with the *Chronicle* of Gilbert of Mons for several reasons. Gilbert was a secular cleric whose source focused on events in western Christendom, while Robert of Clari was a knight who participated in the Fourth Crusade. Robert's status as a *povre chevalier* (poor knight) is a stark contrast to Gilbert's high office as chancellor.<sup>56</sup> Robert's account of the leaders' activities is representative of the general perspective of the average participant.<sup>57</sup> In comparison with his contemporary, Villehardouin, he is usually considered unreliable. Further criticism of his reliability arises as he was only

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<sup>52</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, p.xxxiv

<sup>53</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, pp.xxxiv-xxxvii.

<sup>54</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, p.xxxiii; L. Napran, 'Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,' in J. France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages* (Leiden & Boston, 2008), p.287.

<sup>55</sup> Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, tr. Napran, p.xxxiv.

<sup>56</sup> Clari, p.xxvii; D.E. Queller, T.F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople* (Philadelphia, 2000), p.302.

<sup>57</sup> *The Conquest of Constantinople of Robert of Clari*, tr. E.H. McNeal (London, 1966), p.15.

present for the events between 1202-1205, and his account of the Treaty of Venice is very different to that of the eyewitness Villehardouin.<sup>58</sup> Robert's focus on the military events in which he participated, for which he paints a vivid and reliable picture, and his articulation of the views of the poor knights are perfectly valid for the purposes of this thesis.

Much has been made of the contrasting statuses of Robert of Clari and Villehardouin in particular, but a careful distinction is necessary. They represent two ends of the knighthood rather than wider society. As a commander, Villehardouin had a wider, perhaps more politically-conscious view: while he was knowledgeable, accurate military reporting was not necessarily his only concern. Robert identified himself as a *chevalier* and therefore placed himself socially above commoners, but his account has been considered an inferior one by modern historians due to his perceived low standing.<sup>59</sup> Although a self-described *chevalier*, his implicit identification with *poivres chevaliers* has led to his description as a 'simple' knight, which has been accompanied by criticism of his account for being unsophisticated and naïve, in content, style and diction.<sup>60</sup> Even if this were true, simplicity of style and diction is not necessarily a negative. Robert's very straightforwardness enhances his credibility when it comes to the structure of the army.<sup>61</sup> Instead of naïve therefore, the account might be viewed as uninformed; Robert was unaware of the political affairs of the upper echelons of society.

Robert's lack of insight with respect to high politics is often over-simplified to the expression 'no axe to grind'.<sup>62</sup> Arguably, unlike Villehardouin, Robert had no concern to justify the actions of the expedition leaders despite Pierre d'Amiens, being the cousin of Hugh of Saint-Pol.<sup>63</sup> Unfortunately, the original manuscript does not survive, and the text is only extant in an early fourteenth century copy, thus raising the issues associated with copying as a process of composition,

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<sup>58</sup> *The Conquest of Constantinople of Robert of Clari*, tr. E.H. McNeal, p.13.

<sup>59</sup> Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.13; *The Conquest of Constantinople of Robert of Clari*, tr. McNeal, pp.11-5.

<sup>60</sup> Clari, §120; see also: Clari, p.xxiv; P. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204-1500* (London & New York, 1995), p.19.

<sup>61</sup> F.H. Marshall, 'Review: The Conquest of Constantinople of Robert of Clari, by E.H. McNeal,' *The Modern Language Review* 32:2 (1937), p.305.

<sup>62</sup> Housley, *The Crusaders*, (Stroud, 2002), p.68.

<sup>63</sup> Clari, p.xxiii; Bradford, *The Great Betrayal*, p.203; Housley, *The Crusaders*, p.68; J.L. La Monte, 'Review: The Conquest of Constantinople of Robert of Clari, by E.H. McNeal,' *Speculum* 11:3 (1936), p.419.



including rewriting, restructuring, omission and elaboration.<sup>64</sup> Given the frequency with which he mentions *poires chevaliers*, Robert was probably writing with this group in mind.<sup>65</sup> This is unconvincing however, and it is highly likely that his purpose was to authenticate the relics he returned with, to elevate his local monastery, Corbie.<sup>66</sup>

Sources like these are valuable since they were both experts in the field, and were eyewitnesses, however the combination of these qualities is somewhat uncommon. These authors were better-informed about military terminology. This was by no means universal but if for example the authors were themselves soldiers - as Villehardouin and Robert both were - they would have been inherently more qualified on account of their extensive relevant experience. The evidence found within sources like these is considerably more technically-accurate than that of certain counterparts. A benefit of -particularly eyewitness sources is the degree of proximity to events, lacking in second- or even third-hand sources. However, the latter must not be disregarded, as they remain useful, in that the authors were able to collect and amalgamate numerous accounts, as in the work of Alberic of Trois-Fontaines.<sup>67</sup>

### 2.2.3. Case Study: Richard of Devizes

Other sources should not be dismissed however; there are significant reasons why they warrant as much detailed consideration as their more informed counterparts. Primarily, it is their lack of military knowledge which is useful. Ignorance of the correct terminology for troops would have led to eyewitness authors describing soldiers as they saw them, or by social standing. This provides evidence in several areas: whether they were mounted or on foot; their equipment; and their perceived social standing.

The first such case study examined is the *Cronicon* of Richard of Devizes.<sup>68</sup>

Richard was a monk of St. Swithun's at Winchester.<sup>69</sup> He was perhaps unlikely to

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<sup>64</sup> Clari, pp.xxviii-xxix.

<sup>65</sup> Clari, see §80, 81, 93.

<sup>66</sup> Angold, *The Fourth Crusade*, p.13.

<sup>67</sup> *Albrichi monachi Triumfontium Chronicon*, in MGH SS 23.

<sup>68</sup> The best edition, complete with translation on the *recto* pages remains: Richard of Devizes, *The Chronicle of the Time of King Richard the First*, ed. J.T. Appleby (London & New York, 1963). Previous editions include those by Stevenson in 1838, and Richard Howlett in 1886).

<sup>69</sup> Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*; N.F. Partner, *Serious Entertainments: The Writing of History in Twelfth-Century England* (Chicago & London, 1977), p.5; Devizes, p.xi

possess extensive military knowledge due to this position. This is arguably reinforced by his strong prejudices; Anglophile, pro-local -Winchester- and pro-monastic all.<sup>70</sup> Richard's position meant that his standing did not rely on the king's good-will, in the same way that of a royal chaplain may have. The *Cronicon* was therefore not sycophantic puffery, making his obvious admiration of the king as the embodiment of crusading knightly virtue all the more significant.<sup>71</sup>

Although a monastic source, the style resembles that of a secular clerk, displaying aspects of the romance literary tradition, as well as an affinity with the court satirist Walter Map.<sup>72</sup> This tendency is also evidenced by the distinctly aristocratic flavour of the text, which displays little sympathy for the general populace.<sup>73</sup>

As a chronicle, the purpose of the text was at least in part to record events.<sup>74</sup> It is not such a useful source for the Third Crusade, with a more domestic focus.<sup>75</sup> He used an amalgamation of sources -as many as three- to construct his Third Crusade narrative. The first was the most detailed, describing events from France to Cyprus. The accounts of the conquests of Cyprus and Acre are both brief. There is a gap of almost a year after August 1191, with no mention of the crusaders, and no account of the central battle of Arsuf.<sup>76</sup> It is possible that the chronicle was written purely as a record of events. However, its limited circulation suggests that it was primarily intended to be a private work written for a friend's entertainment, rather than for a court.<sup>77</sup> The factual inaccuracies, the obvious lack of concern for military matters and the Third Crusade in general mean that one must place strict limits on the weight assigned to Richard of Devizes' *Cronicon*.

#### **2.2.4. Case Study: *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium***

The *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium* was authored in 1209 by a member of the minor German contingent of the Fourth Crusade.<sup>78</sup> Written by another anonymous yet clearly well-educated cleric, the account is considered significant

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<sup>70</sup> Devizes, p.xv; Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, p.247.

<sup>71</sup> Devizes, pp.xvi-xvii; Staunton, *Historians*, p.128

<sup>72</sup> Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, pp.248-51

<sup>73</sup> Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, p.249.

<sup>74</sup> Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, p.252.

<sup>75</sup> Devizes, pp.xi-xiv.

<sup>76</sup> Devizes, p.xvii; Partner, *Serious Entertainments*, p.144.

<sup>77</sup> Devizes, p.xiv; Partner, *Serious Entertainments*, p.143.

<sup>78</sup> *Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium*, in MGH SS 23.

and largely trustworthy.<sup>79</sup> As with the contemporary *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, however, the source should be utilised with caution.<sup>80</sup> While the author was not an eyewitness, he did receive his information, perhaps under dictation, from Conrad of Krosigk, a participant in the Fourth Crusade.<sup>81</sup> The purpose of the source, or at least the relevant section of the *Gesta*, was as an *apologia* for Bishop Conrad.<sup>82</sup> The most extensive terminology covered the deeds and piety of Conrad himself, and less so military or political matters. While Conrad himself might have been knowledgeable regarding military matters, the unnamed author was probably not as acquainted with the same nuances and took liberties in composition. As a monk who did not take part in the Fourth Crusade, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Anonymous lacked military experience.

### 2.3. Survey of Terms

The various authors documenting crusading activity in the twelfth century used multiple terms to describe the military composition of expeditions. Latin is the language used most often, so the starting point is an examination of the numerous terms used. To illustrate the issue of variance between authors and their usage of words, the terms will be grouped together based on how they appear in the secondary literature. Significant confusion has arisen because of this secondary literature, as each historian has established their own criteria for classification, not to mention their study foci. This phenomenon is more pronounced in primary sources however, with confusion arising even at the highest levels of society. These levels were best-documented since it was the nobility who most-often patronised the authors. Although the highest social strata are not the focus of this thesis, they are included for the sake of completeness, and to provide an indication of what terms might indicate the social hierarchy of knights.

#### 2.3.1. The Nobility

Some of the more generic terms surveyed in the secondary literature include *proceres*, *nobiles*, *principes* and *dominus* in Latin and *mesires*, *monseignor*, *prodome* and *balz*

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<sup>79</sup> Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, pp.239-42.

<sup>80</sup> 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in MGH SS 16.

<sup>81</sup> Queller, Katele, 'Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,' p.31.

<sup>82</sup> Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, p.240.

*homes* in Old French. *Proceres* is used frequently to describe the noble grouping in general and is one of the more common terms pervading the secondary literature.<sup>83</sup> It is used as an encompassing term, and its uses in the Fourth Crusade source the Anonymous of Soissons would support this. It is used once as part of a tripartite division with *equites* and *pedites*, and again listing the participants of the Third Crusade: ‘*cum maxima procerum, militum, episcoporum, clericorum et etiam plebis innumerabilis multitudine...*’<sup>84</sup> *Nobiles* is perhaps the only term used more often in the secondary sources, again as a general term for the ‘noble class’.<sup>85</sup> There is however contention over the usage of the term, with Bouchard pointing out that strictly speaking, it should be used more as an adjective than as a noun.<sup>86</sup> Both *proceres* and *nobiles* have been used as general terms for the grouping variously described as the noble class, the nobility or the aristocracy. These classifications are contentious, with historians often distinguishing between the nobility and the aristocracy, as well as directly challenging or modifying the concepts. Although the focus of the thesis is on the primary sources, it is beneficial to establish context by considering where terms have appeared in secondary literature.

For instance, Bouchard determines that knights were an aristocratic grouping when they emerged in the tenth or eleventh century. Following this is an immediate rejection of them being considered noble, however aristocratic they were.<sup>87</sup> Bouchard is not alone in making clear the distinction, with both Reuter and more recently Crouch defining aristocracy on a legal basis, and nobility being associated with social standing.<sup>88</sup> The roughly equivalent Old French terms (*haut/balz homes*) are more general than their Latin counterparts. Literally meaning ‘high men’, the term was used in a variety of contexts, either as part of a bipartite

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<sup>83</sup> See: Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.155; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.37; T. Evergates, ‘Nobles and Knights in Twelfth-Century France,’ in T.N. Bisson (ed.), *Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe* (Philadelphia, 1995), p.15; Poly, Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation*, tr. Higgitt, p.94.

<sup>84</sup> ‘with great nobles, ‘knights’, bishops, clerics, and also a multitude of innumerable people...’ in Anonymi Suessionensis, *De Terra Iherosolimitana*, p.4. The placement of *militum* here, in a clearly hierarchical list is curious, as it would seem to place them above *episcoporum* (bishops).

<sup>85</sup> See: Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.94; M. Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis: Norman Monks and Norman Knights* (Woodbridge, 1984), p.141; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.31; Aurell, ‘Society’, p.34; Evergates, ‘Nobles and Knights in Twelfth-Century France,’ p.15; Scaglione, *Knights at Court*, p.17

<sup>86</sup> See: Bouchard, “*Strong of Body, Brave and Noble*”, pp.1-2

<sup>87</sup> Bouchard, “*Strong of Body, Brave and Noble*”, p.3

<sup>88</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of the Nobility*, pp.2-3; Reuter, ‘The Medieval Nobility in Twentieth-Century Historiography,’ p.179.

division, as is the case throughout the works of Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, or as part of a social spectrum encompassing those considered ‘nobles’.<sup>89</sup>

More contentious is the Old French *prodome*. With various spellings found in the primary sources, *prodome* is considered a shortening of *prudhomme*, literally ‘valorous man’. There is arguably a relationship between *prudhomme* and *preux* (also with various spellings), and with the ‘d’ introduced for ease of pronunciation. The meaning of the word *preux*, more a description of character than social standing, implies that initially the word *prudhomme* was a description of character, and over time it came to mean nobleman in the commonly-known sense.<sup>90</sup>

The Latin *principes* is another term used extensively in primary and secondary sources, both as a generic term and as a specific title.<sup>91</sup> For example, the Principality of Antioch was ruled by a specific Prince. Much has been made of the early link between the group referred to as *principes*, and the *pugnatores* of the famous ‘Three Orders’ promulgated primarily in the works of Duby. The argument is that the *pugnatores* represented the rulers in the tripartite division, and the rest of ‘those who fought’ simply constituted their entourages.<sup>92</sup> The final term of significant interest is the Latin *dominus*. Meaning ‘master’ in Classical Latin, by the Middle Ages it had come to mean ‘lord’ and was often used as an honorific, rather than necessarily to denote rank. Authors frequently referred to ‘my lord X’, a salutation usually used when denoting an individual with a higher standing than themselves, someone to whom they held social, political or economic ties. Such a phenomenon is even more pronounced in Old French, with the pronoun being amalgamated into the word itself. *Mesires* and *monseignor* were common as an honorific, particularly in Ambroise’s *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> See Villehardouin, §54, 73, 78, 145, 171, 248, 263, 273, 319, 335, 369, 382, 402, 403. See also Clari, where the strongest example is §80-1.

<sup>90</sup> Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, p.306. For a full discussion of the term, see Crouch, *The Birth of the Nobility*, pp.30-46.

<sup>91</sup> Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.155; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.37; Poly, Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation*, tr. Higgitt, p.94

<sup>92</sup> Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, pp.29-53.

<sup>93</sup> Ambroise, ll.4715, 4990, 9296, 9926, 9931, 12100.

The definition of words generally used to describe those below the 'high nobility' is more difficult. The Latin *baronus* and Old French *baron* are often translated as 'baron' for etymological reasons, though arguably it was a more general term used to denote nobility.<sup>94</sup> These lower nobles acted as the middle classification in what was often a tripartite division among the nobility, with the layer above being the 'high nobility' and that below being the 'lower knights'.<sup>95</sup> As such, it is possible that the terms were used to stress the notion of vassalage.<sup>96</sup> This is particularly convincing given the relationship between the Old French *baron* and *vavassour*, with the latter most often being translated as literally a 'vassal of vassals'.<sup>97</sup> The *baron* was considered a step up from the *vavassour*, and the two were contrasted against each other, particularly in the Vendômois.<sup>98</sup> *Vavassores* have often been likened to knights in general in that they were prone to the same sins. Having said that, a distinction is often drawn between the vavasours and the enfeoffed knights, with it seeming likely that the latter acted with more independence.<sup>99</sup>

Related to these terms is the *castellanus*, or Old French *châtelain*. Traditionally translated as 'castellan', much has been made of this tier of the noble grouping, especially as part of wider debates on so-called 'feudal structure'.<sup>100</sup> Their origins arguably lie with the ninth century *vassi dominici* described by Duby, however he also argues a little less convincingly that they became barons in the twelfth century.<sup>101</sup> His assertions regarding their more humble origins are far more convincing. However, in earlier periods the *castellanus* was grouped with the *miles* and the *caballarius* in the armies of the *nobiles*.<sup>102</sup> Further scope for confusion

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<sup>94</sup> J. Prawer, 'Social Classes in the Latin Kingdom: The Franks,' in N.P. Zacour, H.W. Hazard (eds.), *A History of the Crusades, Vol.V: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East* (Madison, 1985), p.126.

<sup>95</sup> A.J. Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades: Society, Landscape and Art in the Holy City under Frankish Rule* (London & New York, 2001), p.36; Prawer, 'Social Classes in the Latin Kingdom: the Franks,' pp.125-6.

<sup>96</sup> Prawer, 'Social Classes in the Latin Kingdom: the Franks,' p.126.

<sup>97</sup> Bouchard, *Strong of Body, Brave and Noble*, p.45; Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. Manyon, pp.332-4.

<sup>98</sup> Barthélemy, 'Castles, Barons, and Vavassors in the Vendômois and Neighbouring Regions in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' p.60.

<sup>99</sup> Barthélemy, 'Castles, Barons, and Vavassors in the Vendômois and Neighbouring Regions in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' pp.60-2; T. Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' in W.H. Jackson (ed.), *Knighthood in Medieval Literature* (Bury St. Edmunds, 1981), p.10

<sup>100</sup> See. Bisson, 'The Feudal Revolution,' pp.6-42.

<sup>101</sup> Duby. *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.105.

<sup>102</sup> Aurell, 'Society', p.34.

emerges when castellans began to use the title of *miles* as early as the eleventh century in France at least.<sup>103</sup> The source may simply have been misread – castellans may have been unfairly grouped with *milites* when they simply took the title for themselves. It must be stressed that there is a difference between the word *miles* when used as a title, and the term *miles* used to describe a group of heavy cavalry soldiers. The usage of *miles* as a title suggests a degree of relative elevation, however used in a military sense it appears to have had no social connotation.

Castellans have frequently been associated and sometimes equated with knights in secondary literature, particularly with regards to the use of violence as a means of exercising power, something symptomatic of a collective thirst for social status. Bisson has emphasised the link between violence and lordship with regards to castellans, arguing for a marginalisation of their political and administrative character. He argues that only lords could be noble, and only nobles could govern.<sup>104</sup> This has been challenged by for instance Barthélemy, who argues that castellan lords possessed an authority akin to royal and comital counterparts. The main point of contention however is that Bisson focuses too much on violence, making it the salient feature of castellan lordship of the eleventh century.<sup>105</sup>

At the beginning of the twelfth century -the period under study- castellans began to be recognised after the king, counts and bishops in hierarchical lists, acting as a local representative of the count or bishop above them, and commanding the garrison of their assigned castle.<sup>106</sup> By the twelfth century, castellan lordship was not just exercised through military pressure, and was more a means of co-ordinating the power of local knightly domination.<sup>107</sup> Castellans have been characterised as lesser lords, with just enough power to retain their own military households as garrisons.<sup>108</sup> It is important to note that until the end of the twelfth century, castellans were distinguished as *domini* possessing the right to levy

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<sup>103</sup> Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.160

<sup>104</sup> Bisson, 'The Feudal Revolution,' p.18

<sup>105</sup> D. Barthélemy, S.D. White, 'The "Feudal Revolution",' *Past & Present* 152 (1996), p.201.

<sup>106</sup> Barthélemy, White, 'The "Feudal Revolution",' p.203; Poly, Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation*, tr. Higgitt, p.28.

<sup>107</sup> Barthélemy, White, 'The "Feudal Revolution",' p.203.

<sup>108</sup> Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis*, p.132; Flori, 'Knightly Society,' p.169; J. France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge, 1994), p.40; Bouchard, "Strong of Body, Brave and Noble", p.26.

soldiers (the *ban*), as opposed to the simple knights who still arguably represented little more than armed retainers. Knights supposedly served castellans both in court and on the battlefield throughout the century.<sup>109</sup>

This characterisation of castellans confuses the picture further regarding those described as *baronus* above. If they were both considered 'lesser nobles', then what distinguished them? Simplification is difficult; not all barons were also castellans, but there were some castellans who were barons. Some who were both *castellanus* and *baronus* had vassals, who themselves were both *castellanus* and *baronus*. The precise qualities that made one a *castellanus* or a *baronus* are somewhat unclear. Barthélemy argues that for one to be considered *baronus*, one had to have a *curia*, or court.<sup>110</sup> One was considered *castellanus* merely if one lived in a *castellum* (castle or fortified residence), as opposed to the non-castellan noble who possessed allodial estates, perhaps a fief or two and lived in a manor house.<sup>111</sup>

Related to *castellanus* is the lesser-studied *vicecomes* or *viceconsul*. The most obvious modern translation for these terms is 'viscount', however it also grew to denote 'sheriff' in post-Conquest England, given the strong likeness between the pre-Conquest English sheriff and the Norman *vicomte*.<sup>112</sup> The origins of the role were in the Merovingian and Carolingian periods, with comparisons being drawn with the Carolingian *missi* in particular.<sup>113</sup> What is generally agreed is that *vicecomites* formed the centre of local administration, with a strong royal connection also being emphasised by older historians such as Malcolm and Morris.<sup>114</sup> The most often mentioned role of the *vicecomes* is the dispensation of local justice, with Crouch more recently describing the early *vicomté* as 'part of the apparatus of local control'.<sup>115</sup> While the emphasis was undoubtedly on administration and the dispensation of justice, there was a military dimension as well, with the *vicecomes*

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<sup>109</sup> Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' pp.3-4.

<sup>110</sup> Barthélemy, 'Castles, Barons, and Vavassors in the Vendômois and Neighbouring Regions in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' pp.60-1.

<sup>111</sup> Evergates, 'Nobles and Knights in Twelfth-Century France,' p.16.

<sup>112</sup> W.A. Morris, 'The Office of Sheriff in the Early Norman Period,' *The English Historical Review* 33:130 (1918), p.145

<sup>113</sup> C.A. Malcolm, 'The Office of Sheriff in Scotland: Its Origin and Early Development,' *The Scottish Historical Review* 20:78 (1923), pp.129-30.

<sup>114</sup> Morris, 'The Office of Sheriff,' p.152; Malcolm, 'The Office of Sheriff,' p.131.

<sup>115</sup> D. Crouch, *The English Aristocracy, 1070-1272: A Social Transformation* (New Haven & London, 2011), p.135



most likely leading the local levy forces, for which he was responsible during peacetime too.<sup>116</sup>

Aside from these ranks, there were numerous titles assigned based on function. The principal administrative offices, particularly in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, were those of the Seneschal, Constable, Marshal, Chamberlain and the Chancellor, each fulfilling very different roles.<sup>117</sup> Most relevant militarily are those of the Constable and Marshal, though debate exists over their relationship. The role of a Constable, in Latin *constabularius* and in Old French *connetable*, is difficult to define. In the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Constable, sometimes referred to as *regni constabularius*, was the head of the army and possibly responsible for the royal household's security. His position as the commander of the royal army de facto raised him above the Seneschal.<sup>118</sup> Looking at specific examples of Constables in England, the term appears more limited, commanding a group of ten. However, as with many contemporary military institutions, England was an anomaly, due to the unique circumstances of the Norman Conquest of 1066.<sup>119</sup> What resulted was an amalgamation of two different systems, with elements of the Anglo-Saxon socio-military structure remaining untouched, overlaid by French influence.

The role of the Constable is more contentious however, with considerable confusion over the respective duties of the Marshal and Constable. These offices differed from region to region or were in some cases simply absent. The Marshal sometimes was noted as the lieutenant of the Constable, with a potentially more intimate relationship with the king (in the cases of England and Jerusalem). What is also possible, and more reconcilable with other evidence, is that the Marshal was responsible for the army's recruitment and supply.<sup>120</sup>

This argument is difficult when faced with the overwhelming counter-evidence of Villehardouin. He was the *mareschaus* of Champagne and referred to himself as such in his work.<sup>121</sup> In secondary literature, he is considered the Count of

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<sup>116</sup> Malcolm, 'The Office of Sheriff,' p.131; Morris, 'The Office of Sheriff,' pp.161-2.

<sup>117</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, pp.22-3.

<sup>118</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, pp.22-3; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.31.

<sup>119</sup> A.L. Poole, *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries: The Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford in Michaelmas Term 1944* (Oxford, 1946), pp.49-50.

<sup>120</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, pp.22-3; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.31.

<sup>121</sup> Villehardouin, §5, 120.

Champagne's military deputy, perhaps in an effort to inflate the significance of the source, or at least certain aspects of his reliability.<sup>122</sup> If accurate, it poses questions over the difference between the Marshal of a county and that of a full kingdom. It is possible there was no need for both a Marshal and Constable with smaller forces. The role of Marshal probably varied regionally. As noted above, the Marshal's most common role was the army's recruitment and supply, while the Constable commanded forces in battle - in the absence of the King or lord. It therefore seems possible that the position of Constable was assigned on a campaign-by-campaign basis when required.

The Seneschal, usually *senescalcus* in Latin or *seneschaus* in Old French, was largely responsible for the administration of his lord's domain, and sometimes dealt with judicial matters. In the Kingdom of Jerusalem in particular, the Royal Seneschal was sometimes also referred to as *dapifer regis* (lit. 'steward of the king'), who held the power to change garrisons, if not their castellans.<sup>123</sup> Below the Seneschal on the administrative side, was the Chamberlain, in Latin *camerarius* or in Old French *chamberlens*, who organised the personal finances of his lord (in many cases the King).<sup>124</sup> Parallel to this secular office was that of the Chancellor, an ecclesiastic.<sup>125</sup> Appearing most commonly as *cancellarius* in the records of the *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* compiled by Röhrich, they were responsible for the execution of charters through the chancery.<sup>126</sup>

In addition to these military and administrative offices, there is the more symbolic *pincerna* in Latin, or *buteillier* in Old French. These have often been translated as 'butler', though this belies the honour seen in holding such a position.<sup>127</sup> One anecdote of the Third Crusade entails the 'Butler' of Senlis being kidnapped, along with some companions.<sup>128</sup> The 'Butler' in question, Guy III of Senlis was one of the hereditary cup-bearers of the King of France. Stubbs, in his

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<sup>122</sup> M.R.B. Shaw (tr.), *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades*, (London, 1976), p.10; Andrea, 'Essay on Primary Sources,' p.299; C. Smith (tr.), *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades* (London & New York, 2008), p.xxiv.

<sup>123</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.31

<sup>124</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, pp.22-3.

<sup>125</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, pp.22-3.

<sup>126</sup> See: H.E. Mayer (ed.), *Die Urkunden der Lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Diplomata Regum Latinorum Hierosolymitanum, pars.1-4 (Hannover, 2010), *passim*. The term *cancellarius* appears a total of 155 times in the 800 charters for the period 1099-1204.

<sup>127</sup> Boas, *Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades*, p.23.

<sup>128</sup> Ralph of Diceto, *Opera Historica, Vol.2*, ed. Stubbs, p.86; Ambroise, l.4155; IPGRR, 1:63. Also mentioned in Devizes, pp.47-8.

edition of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* translates *pincerna* as ‘cup-bearer’ rather than the ‘butler’, used by Nicholson in her translation.<sup>129</sup> The connotations of ‘cup-bearer’ as opposed to ‘butler’ are vastly different, with the former perhaps better-conveying the inherent trust of the position.

### 2.3.2. Knights

Although it is contextually useful to consider the higher social strata, those beneath them are of more interest to this thesis. The twelfth century included great social upheaval, particularly for those who became known as ‘knights’. At the beginning of the period under consideration here, *milites* and *equites* were -in a battlefield context at least- synonymous. The concepts of knight and horseman appear to have been largely interchangeable in Western Christendom, and Kostick’s work on the First Crusade has determined that at the time of the expedition, non-noble cavalry did not exist.<sup>130</sup> When compared to the Fourth Crusade sources, where Hugh of Saint-Pol describes ‘*milites et totidem equites*’, a significant change in the intervening century is clear.<sup>131</sup> The Latin terms present certain problems, born of their Classical meanings, where *milites* meant soldier, and *militia* campaign or war. These are far less specific than their translations during the Middle Ages. Controversy has arisen over when the definition changed.

The Old French words for ‘knight’ and the ‘kighthood’ are generally taken as *chevalier* and *chevalerie* respectively. The former is less controversial, with *chevalerie* most commonly appearing as the collective term for a group of *chevaliers* - to mean ‘the kighthood’.<sup>132</sup> However, the phrase *flur de chevalerie* also appears in Ambroise’s *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* to mean ‘flower of chivalry’. This suggests a more common usage as a collective noun to encompass the kighthood, perhaps as an *ordo*.<sup>133</sup> There are also occasions when *chevalerie* has been used to mean ‘deeds/acts of kighthood’, particularly in the more dramatic sources of the Third Crusade.<sup>134</sup> Care must be taken when comparing to Latin terms, as *chevalier*

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<sup>129</sup> IPGRR, 1:63. For the translation, see: *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, ed. & tr. Nicholson, p.122.

<sup>130</sup> Kostick, *Social Structure*, p.186.

<sup>131</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.814.

<sup>132</sup> For some further discussion of *chevalier* and *chevalerie*, see: Paterson, ‘Concept of Knighthood’, pp.112-4

<sup>133</sup> Ambroise, l.6341.

<sup>134</sup> For the latter use, see: Ambroise, ll.1612, 3040, 5621, 11616

and *chevalerie* are not direct translations of *milites* and *militia*. The latter terms have a far more appreciable and complex history of traditions – something which led to very different connotations. Part of this is due to the prolific nature of Latin crusading texts through the twelfth century. The earliest vernacular texts appeared only after the 1190s, with Ambroise’s record of the Third Crusade, followed by those of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari after the Fourth Crusade.<sup>135</sup>

Of interest are the myriad qualifying terms around *milites* usually used most strikingly to differentiate the relative poverty of some within the grouping. Though they all had broadly similar connotations denoting lower status, each had different meanings, with varying nuances. Perhaps the most socially explicit of the early twelfth century was *milites ignobiles*, usually translated literally as ‘non-noble knight’.<sup>136</sup> Similarly, the broadly contemporary *milites rustici* is translated as ‘peasant knights’, conveying social standing, and simultaneously being somewhat derogatory.<sup>137</sup> The most general term, *milites gregarii* literally translates as ‘common knights’, providing very little specific insight.<sup>138</sup> This is the only qualifying adjective to appear in the Latin sources of the Third Crusade, describing some of the crusaders who sallied from the siege camp outside Acre in 1190.<sup>139</sup> *Milites plebei*, or poor knight, is the most overtly economic in nature, with perhaps the most direct translation into Old French, used extensively by Robert of Clari in particular: *povres chevaliers*.<sup>140</sup>

Aside from these, there were a few other subsets with varied vocabulary. Firstly is that of household knights, characterised as the armed retainers who surrounded lords. Most of the time in the sources they take the form of simple ‘companions’,

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<sup>135</sup> Ambroise, Villehardouin, Clari.

<sup>136</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.54.

<sup>137</sup> Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis*, p.142; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68.

<sup>138</sup> Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis*, pp.141-2; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.242; Hunt, ‘The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,’ p.10; Aurell, ‘Society,’ p.34; Flori, ‘Knightly Society,’ p.175. It also appears as “of the common sort” see: C.T. Lewis, C. Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1879), and “belonging to the rank and file”, see: R. Ashdowne, D. Howlett, R. Latham, *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources*, (3 vols.)(Oxford, 2018).

<sup>139</sup> IPGRR, 1:40.

<sup>140</sup> For *milites plebei*, see: Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis*, p.142; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68; France, *Victory in the East*, p.125; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.242; Finucaine, *Soldiers of the Faith*, p.79. For *povres chevaliers*, see: Clari, §80, 81, 93.

as either *comitates* or *socii* in Latin or *compaignons* in Old French.<sup>141</sup> One issue with such generalities is that they did not always refer to knights specifically.<sup>142</sup> When the companions are individually named and placed in the retinue of a lord or king, they were clearly knights in most cases. Those in the retinue of a lord or king were not necessarily all knights, but a specific example is found in Ambroise's *Estoire*, where the author frequently refers to the *chevaliers de Préaux*, also described as *compaignons reials*.<sup>143</sup> Even more vague is when a socially superior individual is described as acting *cum suis*, literally meaning 'with his', an ambiguous description. The safest translation is usually 'with his men'. This masks the possibility of particular types of soldiers. Contextual analysis helps to determine the meaning, though the specific identity of these 'men' remains obscured nevertheless.

The most precise terms used to describe these household knights are both Latin, and both appear in the *Itinerarium*. The most literal is *milites sociis*.<sup>144</sup> The fact that both the Earl (*comes*) of Leicester and Andrew of Chauvigny (himself described as a *miles*) are described as being accompanied by *milites sociis*, reinforces the argument for a range of means and standing within the knightly grouping.<sup>145</sup> *Commilitones* is a somewhat different term and is used in more specifically. Traditionally translated as 'fellow-knight', the implication is that they were knights of the household.<sup>146</sup> Used several times in the *Itinerarium*, the most dramatic use of the term applies to those knights following Richard in his landing assault at Jaffa, despite the whole group being on foot.<sup>147</sup> Of related interest are those terms used to encompass paid or wage-earning knights. Often, household knights were paid rather than enfeoffed, suggesting an overlap between those described as 'household' knights and 'paid' knights. The most widespread terminology regarding paid knights is the Latin *stipendiarii milites*. This is a

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<sup>141</sup> For Latin *sociis*, see: IPGRR, *passim*. For Latin *comitates* (various spellings), see: IPGRR, 3:1, 3:4, 3:6. For Old French *compaignons* (various spellings), see: Ambroise, ll.1535, 2081, 2112, 2994, 7267, 9177.

<sup>142</sup> See Ambroise, ll.4327-8. Or for the same event in Latin, see IPGRR, 1:75.

<sup>143</sup> Described as *chevalers* in Ambroise, ll.5416, 7110, 7545. Described as *compaignons reials* in Ambroise, ll.4724, 10970. For the Latin, where they are referred to as *sociis regis* and *miles* both, see IPGRR, 4:28, 6:14.

<sup>144</sup> IPGRR, 4:30.

<sup>145</sup> IPGRR, 4:30, 4:33.

<sup>146</sup> Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, tr. Willard, Southern, p.69.

<sup>147</sup> IPGRR, 6:15. For further uses, see 1:2 (in reference to Templars), 1:29, and 6:21.

contentious term, and it appears to have been used to mean anything including wage-earning knights, professional household soldiers, and mere mercenaries.<sup>148</sup> More specific is *conducti milites*, described only as wage-earning knights.<sup>149</sup>

A further subset of this grouping known as 'knights' are those referred to as *juvenes* in Latin or *bachelor* or *jeune* in Old French, which translates broadly as 'youths'. They have been written on extensively by Duby, and more recently Kostick.<sup>150</sup> Usually characterised as a turbulent, aggressive and unstable group, 'youths' possibly comprised large portions of the crusading knights.<sup>151</sup> Central to the definition of 'youth', is the notion of being unmarried, with Barber eloquently describing them as men 'between knighthood and marriage.'<sup>152</sup> These terms appear infrequently in the considered sources, though they suggest recklessness in the mould of the 'knights errant' of later *chansons de geste*.

### 2.3.3. The Lower Strata

Among the numerous terms describing the complexity of ranks in the upper strata of society, there are common threads. Within the lower echelons of society definitions remain unclear, and they are frequently considered of limited importance, compared with their socially superior counterparts. There were many reasons for this. Many authors were related to members of the upper strata, who formed a large part of the target audience for many sources in the twelfth century and provided funding. A range of vocabulary was used across the diverse source-base under consideration.

Of the terminology used to describe the range of mounted soldiers which began to emerge in the twelfth century, the Old French for 'mounted sergeant', *serjans à cheval* is the least contested, and it is primarily with the Latin terms that difficulties begin to arise.<sup>153</sup> The most common term for these same cavalrymen is *servientes*,

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<sup>148</sup> For wage-earning knights, see Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.39. For professional household soldiers, see: Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' p.10. *Stipendiarii* is generally considered the most common term used to describe mercenaries.

<sup>149</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.39.

<sup>150</sup> C. Kostick, 'Juvenes and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?' *The Journal of Military History* 73 (2009), pp.177-208.

<sup>151</sup> Poly, Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation*, tr. Higgitt, p.111; Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' p.5.

<sup>152</sup> For the quote, see: Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, p.31; Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' p.6 Duby. *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.112-3.

<sup>153</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.25; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.107.

translated based on appearances in western European sources such as Gislebert of Mons and the *Prisia Servientum* of Philip Augustus.<sup>154</sup> *Servientes* is a common label for the non-noble cavalry grouping generally identified as ‘sergeants’. Contamine is careful to use the modern French term *cavalier* rather than *sergent* in his modern French study, *La Guerre au Moyen Age*. Although he uses *cavalier*, he still encompasses all the qualifications and variations used to describe the grouping, including *servientes loricati* (mailed sergeants), *servientes equites*, *famuli*, *scutiferi*, *satellites equestres*, *clientes*, *servientes armati ut milites*.<sup>155</sup> This perhaps illustrates the problem of translating medieval terms into any modern language. So little is known about sergeants that older scholars following the example of Bloch have likened *servientes* (or French *serjans*) to a type of *ministerialis* (unfree knight).<sup>156</sup> The Latin *servientes* has been translated into Old French as both *serjans* and *escuier*, considered subsets of *armigeri* in Latin or *gens d’armes* in Old French, which loosely translates as ‘men-at-arms’ based on the works of Orderic Vitalis among others.<sup>157</sup>

Alongside these ‘mounted sergeants’ is a group traditionally referred to as squires. Unlike the wealth of terms listed above for sergeants, squires have generally been restricted to *escuier* or *écuyer* in Old French, and *scutifer* or *armiger* in Latin.<sup>158</sup> Their later rise in status to ‘knights-in-training’ and landholders in their own right has

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<sup>154</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.58; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.91; M. Bennett, ‘The Status of the Squire: the Northern Evidence,’ in C. Harper-Bill, R. Harvey (eds.), *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood: Papers from the first and second Strawberry Hill conferences* (Woodbridge, 1986), p.2; Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, tr. Willard, Southern, p.8.

<sup>155</sup> For *servientes loricati*, see: Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis*, p.141; P. Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1980), p.163; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.107. For *scutiferi*, see: Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age*, p.163; Bennett, ‘The Status of the Squire,’ p.2. For *servientes equites*, *famuli*, *satellites equestres*, *clientes* and *servientes armati ut milites*, see: Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age*, p.163.

<sup>156</sup> M. Bloch, *La Société Féodale: Les Classes et le Gouvernement des Hommes* (Paris, 1940), p.87; Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.225.

<sup>157</sup> H. Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe: 300-1500* (Basingstoke, 2004), p.55. For *armigeri* as ‘men-at-arms’: C. Harper-Bill, R. Harvey (eds.), *The Ideals and Practice of Knighthood: Papers from the first and second Strawberry Hill conferences* (Woodbridge, 1986), p.xi, Bennett, ‘The Status of the Squire,’ p.2.

<sup>158</sup> For *écuyer*, see: France, *Western Warfare*, p.59; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.108-9; Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.55; Bennett, ‘The Status of the Squire,’ p.2. For *escudier*, see: L.M. Paterson, ‘The Occitan Squire in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,’ in C. Harper-Bill, R. Harvey (eds.), *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood: Papers from the first and second Strawberry Hill conferences* (Woodbridge, 1986), p.133.

For *armiger*, *scutifer*, see: Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.294; France, *Western Warfare*, p.59; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68 Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.55; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.108; Bennett, ‘The Status of the Squire,’ p.2; Paterson, ‘The Occitan Squire in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,’ p.133.

led to a lack of clarity.<sup>159</sup> Symptomatic is Contamine's association of the terms for other auxiliaries with squires. Alongside the given 'squire', these include the 'valet' (Latin: *valletus*; German: *knecht*) and 'boy' (Latin: *garcio, puer*; German: *knabe, knappe*; Old French: *garçon*).<sup>160</sup>

The final grouping of mounted soldiers may be broadly described as 'light cavalry', which varied in terms of strategy, tactics and equipment. Specific to crusading and the Latin East were the 'turcoples'.<sup>161</sup> There are debates over the precise connotations of the Latin *turcopolos* and Old French *turcoples*. Currently, the debate centres around whether 'turcople' denoted an ethnic grouping or a military one, with a third school of thought arguing that it was both.<sup>162</sup> The general consensus is that they acted as general light cavalry, fulfilling skirmishing/harassing roles, with most citing William of Tyre as the most explicit evidence, where they are described as *equites levis armaturae*.<sup>163</sup> Often, they are also characterised as mercenaries, with historians such as Nicolle pointing to their involvement with the military orders in the Holy Land as evidence.<sup>164</sup>

Perhaps a response to -or taking inspiration from- the Muslim horse archers encountered in the Holy Land, mounted crossbowmen began to emerge in western Christendom towards the end of the period under study. Appearing as *balistarii equites* in the armies of Philip II Augustus of France, and John Lackland of England, they became more common into the thirteenth century.<sup>165</sup> They appear only rarely in the sources under consideration however, mentioned explicitly as *arbalestiers à cheval* just once in the aftermath of the sack of Constantinople by Villehardouin.<sup>166</sup> The brevity of their inclusion makes it unclear whether they used crossbows from horseback, or acted more as mounted infantry; using horses in a strategic rather than tactical capacity. This problem is

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<sup>159</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.59. Warned against in Harper-Bill, Harvey (eds.), *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood*, p.xi, Bennett, 'The Status of the Squire,' p.1.

<sup>160</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68; see also: Bennett, 'The Status of the Squire', p.3-9.

<sup>161</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.70.

<sup>162</sup> See Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, pp.13-4. For a full summation of the debate to 1997, see: Y. Harari, 'The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples: A Reassessment,' *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12:1 (1997), pp.75-116.

<sup>163</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones p.70; Nicolle, *Fighting for the Faith*, p.22; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.72.

<sup>164</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.33; A.T. Hatto, 'Archery and Chivalry: A Noble Prejudice,' *The Modern Language Review* 35:1 (1940), p.43.

<sup>165</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.71; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.30.

<sup>166</sup> Villehardouin, §438.



not restricted to Villehardouin, with many mentions being imprecise.<sup>167</sup> Even the pairing of mounted crossbowmen with turcoples is not as illuminating as it might appear.<sup>168</sup> The assertion that turcoples as a group fought from horseback could lead to the assumption that mounted crossbowmen did too. It is more likely that the crossbowmen were mounted only to keep up with the turcoples to the site of engagement, before dismounting and fighting on foot.

Predictably, there is less clarity when considering foot-soldiers, with less effort made to describe them.<sup>169</sup> Most significant is the fact that they were not the patrons, relatives or intended audience of the authors. Where they do appear in sources, they were often far more numerous than their mounted counterparts, with ratios of foot to horse as high as ten to one.<sup>170</sup> This did not stop Richard of Devizes dismissing 'simple' foot-soldiers as useless to the point that Richard I of England apparently rejected them.<sup>171</sup> The Latin *pedites* is the most prolific term used to describe this nebulous group.<sup>172</sup> Though it is generally assumed to be a word carrying social connotations as much as military, the term's meaning varies by historian.<sup>173</sup> For example, Nicolle contests the social connotations of the word, describing *pedites* as 'those on foot, including of non-servile origins,' whose usual role was what might best be described as 'grunt work' – the heavy lifting the army might require, such as building fortifications, digging latrines, setting up camp and the like.<sup>174</sup>

The most equivalent term, *gent de pié*, or *gent à pié* (often shortened to *à pié*) in Old French literally translates as 'people on foot'.<sup>175</sup> Of similar imprecision is the Old French *peoniers*. Translating as 'pedestrian' or 'foot-soldier', it is used on two occasions by Ambroise, once to describe the 7,000 infantry who accompanied King Guy to the siege of Acre in 1189, and once later to describe a part of

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<sup>167</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.74.

<sup>168</sup> Ambroise, ll.10378; Villehardouin, §438.

<sup>169</sup> Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.124.

<sup>170</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.49; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.32; Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.57

<sup>171</sup> Devizes, p.81.

<sup>172</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.49; N. Housley, 'Recent Scholarship on Crusading and Medieval Warfare, 1095-1291: Convergence and Divergence,' in C. Given-Wilson, A. Kettle, L. Scales (eds.), *War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, c.1150-1500* (Woodbridge, 2008), p.204

<sup>173</sup> J. Bradbury, *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare* (London & New York, 2004), p.276.

<sup>174</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.23

<sup>175</sup> Ambroise, ll.10772, 11211

Richard's forces on the march.<sup>176</sup> Though there is no explicit mention of them being foot-soldiers, those described using the terms above are often marching into battle, or fighting on foot, so the assumption, barring further contextual evidence, would be that they were soldiers.

The generality of the terms shows a degree of homogenisation when describing infantry, resulting from a possible tendency of tenth- to twelfth-century Latin writers to describe entire armies with the terms *milites peditesque*.<sup>177</sup> This is arguably a relic of an earlier time when all cavalry were *milites* and all *milites* were cavalry. The term *pedites* was often encompassed a great deal of variation, from the poorest infantryman to those who were well-equipped.<sup>178</sup> To further complicate this situation, there are examples of 'foot-knights', described most explicitly in Villehardouin as a 200-strong division made up of *chevaliers a pié*.<sup>179</sup>

Despite the considerable confusion surrounding *pedites* and *gent de pié*, a few distinctions are commonly made in both Latin and Old French sources. Those usually rendered as sergeants are found particularly frequently as *serjanx à pié* in the Old French of Ambroise and Villehardouin, though they do also appear in numerous Latin sources.<sup>180</sup> The Latin terms are somewhat more varied, with *satellites*, *servientes* and *sariantes* all being used -sometimes interchangeably- to describe sergeants.<sup>181</sup> The grouping known as sergeants has proven contentious, with this thesis contending that it probably constituted a socio-economic position rather than a military one.<sup>182</sup> There is a contrasting consideration of sergeants in a purely military setting, with the implication that sergeants were considered more 'professional' infantry and above the masses of regular infantry forming the general levy.<sup>183</sup>

Other significant terms applied to specific subsets of foot-soldiers include bowmen and crossbowmen. Towards the end of the twelfth century particularly, the two are often paired because of the role they performed, but the existence of

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<sup>176</sup> Ambroise, ll.2749, 5868.

<sup>177</sup> Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.106.

<sup>178</sup> Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p.115; Bouchard, "Strong of Body, Brave and Noble", p.13; Housley, 'Recent Scholarship on Crusading and Medieval Warfare, 1095-1291,' p.204; France, *Western Warfare*, p.25.

<sup>179</sup> Villehardouin, §178. See also: Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.69.

<sup>180</sup> See: Ambroise, *passim*; Villehardouin, *passim*.

<sup>181</sup> Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, p.225.

<sup>182</sup> Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' p.9

<sup>183</sup> Nicolle, *Fighting for the Faith*, p.21.

separate terms marks a sharp distinction between them. Bowmen are referred to in Latin as *sagittarii* and in Old French as *archiers*, while crossbowmen are *balistarii* or *arbelastiers* respectively.

Most often used in rhetoric-heavy portions of text or when referring to non-Latin enemies, soldiers are sometimes reduced to a mass of ‘armed men’; translated from *genz armées* in Old French. There are several broadly equivalent terms in Latin, each of which translates differently. *Bellatores* is traditionally translated as ‘warriors’, as are the equally common *armatores* and *pugnatores*. Given the suggestive components of the latter two, they are better translated as ‘armed men’ and ‘fighters’ respectively. While the distinction might seem pedantic, there are different connotations underpinning each modern word. Using different translations for each of the Latin words should therefore alert one to the possibility of equally different connotations. Alongside these, with their obvious military association, the primary sources often refer to the masses of ‘poor’ or ‘commoners’ using words like *populus universus*, *populus infinitus*, or more explicitly as *pauperes*, *plebs* or *mediocres* (Latin) or *povres* or *quemun* (Old French).<sup>184</sup> It seems safe to assume that those described were also on foot due to their description in economic terms. Due to this same description of economic means, it is unclear what proportion of this mass took part in combat.

Mercenaries are often heavily-linked with infantry forces. Due to their later effectiveness, they have most often been characterised as professional infantry, even as early as the twelfth century, with Nicolle stating that of the 17,000 infantry at the battle of Hattin in 1187, ‘most’ were professional mercenaries.<sup>185</sup> Even before turning to medieval terms, there is considerable debate over what exactly constitutes a ‘mercenary’.<sup>186</sup> It is tempting to label all soldiers who fought for pay as mercenaries, but this is oversimplistic.<sup>187</sup> As Bradbury states: ‘The problem in the Middle Ages is to define the rewards received. Feudal [by which Bradbury appears to mean those raised through levy obligations] troops could receive pay for support and additional service. Allies and household men were often paid.’<sup>188</sup> Most often, medieval writers use the more neutral *stipendiarii* as

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<sup>184</sup> For the Latin terms, see Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, pp.170-1.

<sup>185</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.9

<sup>186</sup> For a good summation of the debate, see: DeVries, ‘Medieval Mercenaries,’ pp.43-60.

<sup>187</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.132.

<sup>188</sup> Bradbury, *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare*, p.277.

opposed to the explicit *mercenarii* to describe mercenaries, though both terms are also used to describe paid troops.<sup>189</sup> For example, those described as *militēs stipendiarii* might be honourable unenfeoffed household troops, or just recipients of ‘money-fiefs’, as was often the case particularly in the Latin East.<sup>190</sup> While *stipendiarii* is the most common, and *mercenarii* the most explicit, numerous other terms were used to describe mercenaries and paid soldiers specifically, such as *rutharii*, *routiers*, *conducticii*, *coterelles*, and *palearii*, as well as *solidarii*.<sup>191</sup>

#### **2.4. Conclusion: The basis upon which definitions may be assigned**

Having surveyed the terms and presented the current state of confusion surrounding many of them, it remains to establish the basis upon which definitions and translations may be assigned. The most prudent way to assign definitions is on a source-by-source basis; establishing a translation based on its use in a particular source. While not a new approach, it explains why each grouping has so many Latin and/or Old French terms attached to it in the secondary literature. Contributing to this problem is the sheer geographical and temporal differences between the source materials, with significant variation in language and terminology.

This problem needs addressing. The temporal diversity is of central importance to the study, with its purpose to track the changing meanings of certain words across the twelfth century. The collation of the numerous extant definitions is a useful first step, as it allows for the identification of any correlations in meaning, either temporal or geographical. It also eases the process of tracking changes across the period, testing if words used to describe certain groupings changed. Geographical diversity may be accounted for using the context of sources and comparing how authors of different origins recorded the same event. While to a certain degree this is possible with the sources of western Christendom, there is greater scope to adopt the methodology above, with the literature of the geographically diverse Crusades. A good example is the Fourth Crusade, with its

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<sup>189</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.132; Evergates, ‘Nobles and Knights in Twelfth-Century France,’ p.13; J. France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages* (Leiden & Boston, 2008), pp.6-7.

<sup>190</sup> H. Vollrath, A. Hoverkamp (eds.), *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages* (London, 1996), p.19.

<sup>191</sup> For *solidarii* specifically, see Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.291; France, *Western Warfare*, p.73; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.90. For the rest of the terms, see: France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp.6-7.

nine main sources comprising five French sources spread across north-eastern France, three German sources spread from modern-day France as far as the Elbe river.

There are potentially ways to eliminate or reduce the confusion of terms. Perhaps the best is the tracking of frequency of usage across the sources under consideration. The first military groupings under scrutiny in the next chapter are those which fought on horseback. An examination of the descriptive terms used for cavalry will emphasise the significance of temporal diversity, with *milites* and *equites* being near-synonymous at the beginning of the period before the latter term diversified in meaning with the emergence of non-noble cavalry.

Despite this, it must be emphasised that it is near-impossible to compare Latin and Old French terms. For example, the consensus is that the social ascent of knights had already broadly occurred when *chevalier* first appeared in crusading texts in the 1190s.<sup>192</sup> *Chevalier* therefore represents a tighter term from inception in the sources under consideration, suggesting that the upper levels of society were perhaps more coherently presented in the Old French sources. In contrast, there remains considerable debate over the term *milites* – indeed it has become one central to the historiography of the Middle Ages; not just in the period in question, but throughout.<sup>193</sup> The examination of similar linguistic comparisons constitutes a central concern during the following research chapters.

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<sup>192</sup>Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, p.293; Flori, 'Knightly Society,' p.163

<sup>193</sup> See Chapter 1.

### Chapter 3 – The Cavalry Forces of the Crusading Expeditions

The consensus noted in Chapter One would suggest that the make-up of western cavalry contingents diversified significantly across the twelfth century. This is an over-simplification, however. The breadth of terminology applied to cavalry forces c.1200 is wider and indicates that an intense diversification took place over the course of the century. It has previously been assumed that the earlier paucity of terms represented a functionally-narrow grouping of cavalry soldiers. The argument here is that the terms were actually so unspecific they could be widely applicable.

Kostick has interpreted both *milites* and *equites* as referring to the grouping of professional mounted soldiers often labelled knights, and modern historiography has taken this as an equivalence of the two Latin terms.<sup>1</sup> While it might be that the two terms were broadly equivalent, it should be noted that not all cavalry forces of the time -frequently described as *equites* as opposed to *pedites*- were knights. The distinctions made within an army at the end of the eleventh century were usually restricted to the bipartite divisions of *milites et pedites* or *equites et pedites*, and the nebulous usage of both *milites* and *equites* persisted through the period. For example, the authors of the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* both make use of such distinctions, as does the expert eyewitness for the Fourth Crusade Hugh of St Pol.<sup>2</sup> In the *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* the distinction most often made when describing the German host is between *equites* and *pedites*, with the terms being favoured throughout the source.<sup>3</sup> Although the divisions do persist down to c.1200, further terms emerge to clarify -or perhaps complicate- the picture, and these are of most interest.

The emerging diversification of terms is undoubted. The main distinction tactically has remained between heavy and light cavalry. With the breadth of terms evident by the end of the twelfth century, this bipartite division is inadequate. Rather this thesis proposes the concept of a tri-partite division. This presents the possibility of acknowledging the enormous collection of mounted

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<sup>1</sup> Kostick, *Social Structure*, p.186.

<sup>2</sup> HEF, p.79, p.82; IPGRR, 5:23; Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in in MGH SS 17, p.813; 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in MGH SS 16, pp.9-12.

<sup>3</sup> *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.513.

soldiers found between the two tactical extremes of 'heavy' and 'light' cavalry as distinct groupings. Many would have gone mounted but been unable to afford the full harness of a higher status knight, particularly towards the end of the period. This is evidenced by the appearance of such qualifications as *militēs rustici* or *gregarii*.<sup>4</sup> As such the contention is that this central category was made up of 'medium cavalry'. The intent behind such a description is to connote 'second-rank' cavalry, in contrast to the front-line nature of the heavy cavalry. Despite the broad similarities between mounted sergeants and knights on the battlefield noted above, nuances did exist. What seems most likely is that this 'second-rank' cavalry, while able to perform as replacements for knights in times of desperation, were primarily employed to add mass to charges. They formed the second and subsequent ranks of a formation fronted by predominantly knightly heavy cavalry. What follows constitutes evidence both in favour of and against such a model.

### 3.1. The General Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare

Cavalry forces performed both strategically and tactically in siege warfare, raiding and pitched battles. Although poorly suited for static defence, there were cavalry components in the garrisons of many fortified positions.<sup>5</sup> Their good mobility made them a far more natural offensive arm than their infantry counterparts, making them far more useful in conducting sorties.<sup>6</sup> The use of cavalry in ravaging the countryside is also well-documented. A striking example is that of Peter of Bracieux, shortly after the conclusion of the Fourth Crusade, leading one-hundred-and-forty knights against Theodore Lascaris, against whom 'they made war...with great vigour and ferociousness, doing great damage in his lands.'<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the best-studied use of cavalry -or perhaps more specifically those known as 'knights'- has been their role on the medieval battlefield, where the shock charge has been described as an essential element. Such a charge involved a close formation of *eschielles* supposedly breaking through enemy lines.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.47; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.68

<sup>5</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.142.

<sup>6</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" revisited,' p.49.

<sup>7</sup> Villehardouin, §453-4: *Et cil comen cierent la guerre contre Toldre l'Ascre mult grant et mult fiere, et fisent grant damage en sa terre.*

<sup>8</sup> Villehardouin, §231; Marshall, 'The Use of the Charge in Battles in the Latin East, 1192-1291,' p.222.

The significance of the physical impact of the charge has been challenged however, particularly by the likes of Morillo, who implies that a shock cavalry charge was useless against a solid infantry formation. For him, the emphasis therefore should be placed on the psychological impact of the charge, and the intimidation of the poor, lighter-armoured infantry.<sup>9</sup> Several examples appear to contradict this, with a passage in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* stating: ‘the *milites* knocked them [the Saracens] down and the *pedites* beheaded them.’<sup>10</sup> A later example in the same source describes *armigeri* performing the same task; killing those knocked down by the initial charge.<sup>11</sup> In the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, a *miles* is described as knocking down a Turkish emir.<sup>12</sup> These examples do not disprove the psychological argument because there is little evidence concerning the quality of the enemy soldiers. The enemy troops were possibly wavering when the charge struck home, or perhaps the sheer force of the charge broke a solid and disciplined infantry formation.

Cavalry performed another, often understated role, but one that has proved significant in the sources considered. In contrast with many other theatres, what might be termed ‘amphibious assaults’ were common in the eastern Mediterranean. Whether it be Angevin *milites* assaulting the beach at Limassol on their way to the Third Crusade, or French and Flemish *chevaliers* assaulting the beaches outside Constantinople, a mounted assault directly from specialised landing craft was possible.<sup>13</sup> The evidence for the former example is somewhat more controversial, with archers and crossbowmen described as preceding the knights with volleys of bolts and arrows from ‘snekas’ or ‘skiffs’. While the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* does not specify whether the *milites* remained mounted or were on foot, Roger of Howden describing the same event states that the king and his people were on foot.<sup>14</sup> The example from the Fourth Crusade is far more overt however, with the reliable eyewitness Villehardouin stating that: ‘all the *chevaliers* came out of the *uisiers*, with their warhorses and all fully-armed, each

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<sup>9</sup> Morillo, ‘The “Age of Cavalry” Revisited,’ p.50, see also: Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.83.

<sup>10</sup> IPGRR, 4:19: ...*ipsos enim a militibus prostratos decollaverunt pedites nostril.*

<sup>11</sup> IPGRR, 6:4

<sup>12</sup> HEF, p.81

<sup>13</sup> IPGRR, 2:30-32; Howden, 3:107; Villehardouin, §155

<sup>14</sup> IPGRR, 2:30-32; Howden, 3:107



with his helm laced, and his horse covered and saddled,...'<sup>15</sup> By the start of the thirteenth century therefore, it was possible to launch a mounted charge directly from specialist landing craft.

Cavalry clearly performed a variety of functions -both strategic and tactical- in medieval warfare, but the precise breadth is not necessarily the focus of this study. Significant difficulties arise in attempting to discern which types of cavalry performed which strategic and/or tactical functions, though it might be noted that the latter is found far more in narrative sources in particular. 'Strategic function' denotes the use of cavalry in over-arching strategies, for example in campaigns including raiding or siege warfare. This is opposed to tactical function, which constitutes their specific battle tactics – as *mêlée* or ranged cavalry. The assessment of cavalry can be approached in several ways, with the consideration of arms and armour and explicit descriptions of the tactics executed. One cannot rely on these areas alone however, and military terminology remains of central importance in the accurate identification of both equipment and tactics. The primary aims are to determine whether or not there were terms which remained purely military designations, and whether or not military function was at all determined by social or economic standing. Integral to this latter association are considerations of the relative levels and cost of the military equipment available to combatants of the twelfth century.

A clearer explanation requires the example of light cavalry. Were they lightly equipped because they were light cavalry, and because they wanted to be as good at their specific function as possible? Or were they lightly equipped because they could afford no better, and because of this, they naturally acted as light cavalry? One way to seek answers to these questions, as well as their counterparts surrounding other groupings lies in the careful consideration of the wide range of terminology, which appears in the source material. The breadth of terms used to describe each group is problematic, and only by considering the contexts in which they appear can we begin to identify the specific functions the various groupings fulfilled in medieval warfare.

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<sup>15</sup> Villehardouin, §155: *Li chevalier furent es uissiers tuit, avec lor destriers et furent tuit armé, les helmes lacies et li cheval covert et ensellé...*

### 3.1.1. *Milites* and Mounted Soldiers on Crusade

There are several reasons why both the terms *milites* and *equites* might have had vague and wide-ranging application through the twelfth century. The first, and easiest argument, is for a simple lack of precision, whether through ignorance or merely lack of concern with military affairs, something which manifests as well with the frequent usage of words such as *armatores*, *bellatores* and *pugnatores*. The best sources which illustrate this are the works of Gunther of Pairis and Ralph of Coggeshall.<sup>16</sup> Also something which appears particularly frequently is the attitude with which the Latin *milites* is employed in many sources throughout the period, something which is particularly obvious in the later sources.<sup>17</sup> The idea of *milites Christi* (or *milites crucis Christi*) is prevalent especially in some of the more rhetoric-heavy sources; those focused more on the spiritual aspects of the movement. In these and other sources, authors have shown a willingness to refer to all crusaders who fought against the infidel as *milites Christi*, and this has made an accurate appraisal of the functions and standing of ‘true’ *milites* significantly more difficult.<sup>18</sup>

*Milites Christi* had very different connotations and was applied to knights and non-knights alike. This presents difficulties when considering other uses of the term *milites*. For example, some authors perhaps used *milites* as shorthand for *milites Christi* rather than in its more technical socio-military sense. This perhaps supports the first point. If sources were more concerned with the construction of sophisticated pro-Christian or anti-Muslim rhetoric, as was common particularly within the corpus of crusading material, authors probably lacked the parchment space or inclination to describe the military exploits of the expeditions in detail, and therefore preferred to focus on the religious and spiritual aspects of the crusading movement. Naturally, this means that such sources were less

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<sup>16</sup> For such terms being applied to the non-Christian forces, opposing *milites Christi*, see: Gunther von Pairis, ed. Orth, 12:19-28. For their application to Christian forces, see: Gunther von Pairis, ed. Orth, 3:39; 3:50-1; Coggeshall, 46-8

<sup>17</sup> *Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium*, in MGH SS 23; Gunther von Pairis, ed. P. Orth; William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, ed. Howlett.

<sup>18</sup> Gunther von Pairis, ed. P. Orth, 6:40; HEF, p.99. Other variations include: *milites sancti Sepulchri*, see: Otto of St. Blasien, *Chronica*, ed. A. Hofmeister in MGH SRG 47, 32

concerned with accurately reporting military activity than were secular crusaders such as Villehardouin or Hugh of Saint-Pol.<sup>19</sup>

The passage in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* of the Third Crusade best summarises the ease with which the term *milites* could be applied to those who were certainly not knights in the traditional sense:

*Men of the cloister took the cross with the rest. The attraction of this expedition spread everywhere. A great number went from the cloister to the camp, threw off their cowls, donned mail-shirts, and became milites in a new sense, replacing alms with arms.*<sup>20</sup>

This exemplifies a problem which needs to be accounted for. In what sense did these ‘men of the cloister’ become *milites*? Did they only take on certain traits of what it meant to be a *miles*: that they were turning from protecting Christendom against spiritual threat to a more temporal one? Does it illustrate that *milites* had military connotations and nothing further, and that only when they were described as *milites Christi* did the term take on new meanings?

Here the author implies that in his view, being a knight simply meant wearing a mail shirt and bearing arms. The specific passage is heavy on imagery, so it is entirely possible it was included solely to convey crusading fervour. Even if they did not actually ‘become knights’, it is useful to investigate the sense in which the author meant that they became knights, and what he meant by the term. These questions illustrate the difficulties caused by the usage of *milites Christi* in contemporary sources. They emphasise the need for contextual analysis of each appearance of *milites*.

Towards the end of the period, the term *equites* was employed increasingly to describe a wide range of cavalry, while *milites* was used to mean knights, either in a specific military sense or as part of the sophisticated and developing crusade rhetoric. Later in the twelfth century, Turkish cavalry forces were described almost exclusively as *equites*, with the combination of *equites* and *pedites* appearing

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<sup>19</sup> Andrea, ‘Essay on Primary Sources,’ p.299; Queller, Katele, ‘Attitudes Towards the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade,’ p.16.

<sup>20</sup> IPGRR, 1:17: *Claustales cum caeteris crucizantur. Hac militandi Gloria vagante licentius, de claustris quamplures migrabant ad castra, et abjectis cucullis, loricas induti, jam vere Christi milites, non armariis studere gaudebant sed armis.*

frequently to describe the armies of the various enemies of the crusades.<sup>21</sup> That being said, Turkish *milites* do appear, with instances where the author wished to convey praise for an honourable enemy, with the most famous example being the supposed girding of Saladin's brother Saphadin by Richard during the conclusion of the Third Crusade.<sup>22</sup> During the Third Crusade, Turks also appear described as part of an 'equestrian order', which suggests that the term *milites* did not necessarily have an overtly Frankish connotation and that there was recognition - however grudging- of similar values present among the enemy.<sup>23</sup> An easy argument to make would be that *milites* had social connotations, thus making *equites* an implicitly derogatory term to be applied freely to those opposing the Christians and social inferiors with equal disregard. It is possible however, that this was not the case, and that the term *equites* was rather used as an encompassing term by Latin authors who were either not able to or concerned with the accurate identification of the enemy soldiers, except where it served a literary purpose – so as to increase Christian achievement by exaggerating the size of the enemy they defeated.<sup>24</sup>

This tendency translates into the Old French sources as well, with Turks being described as *a cheval* in the work of Ambroise.<sup>25</sup> The Greek opponents of the Fourth Crusade are referred to similarly vaguely as *hommes a cheval* in the Old French of Robert of Clari.<sup>26</sup> Few sources apply the supposedly more distinguished terms *milites* and *chevaliers* to non-Christian forces, and they reference both Turks and Greeks. While there is scope for a significant amount of research in this direction alone, a satisfying proposal is that it was done largely to honour the opposition, or again as a way building the sense of Christian

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<sup>21</sup> HEF, p.76 (...*nam Turci equites et pedites...*), p.79 (*Nam ut ex relatione postmodum ipsorum hostium didicimus, quatuor milia et centum septuaginta quatuor viri de equitibus...*); IPGRR, 6:3: ...*cum iis prius caravanis deducendis deputabantur, duo millia equitum aestimabantur exceptis peditibus plurimis.*

<sup>22</sup> IPGRR, 5:12: *Dominica Palmarum, rex Ricardus apud Achon filium Saphadini, ad hoc transmissum, insignivit magnifice cingulo militia.*

<sup>23</sup> Coggeshall, 50

<sup>24</sup> IPGRR, 4:29; 4:30; 4:33; 6:3; 6:5; 6:10; 6:12; 6:15; 6:22; *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.117, p.168; *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.513; *Epistola de morte Friderici Imperatoris*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.176; *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.183, p.185.

<sup>25</sup> Ambroise, ll.10299 (...*deus mile a cheval...*); 10533 (...*ot bien mort mil Turs a cheval...*); 10707 (...*Turs a cheval e bien armé...*); 10768 (...*Turs a cheval plus de .xx. mile...*); 11050 (...*vin[ren]t a pié e a cheval...*).

<sup>26</sup> See Clari, §44: *[E]n ches .xviij. batailles esmoit on bien pres de .c.m. hommes a cheval.*

achievements.<sup>27</sup> Even if definitions for both *milites* and *equites* remained vague, other types of cavalry had clearly emerged by the end of the twelfth century. The most consistent evidence can be found in the Old French works, particularly those for the Fourth Crusade. Both Robert of Clari and Geoffrey of Villehardouin's eyewitness accounts of the Fourth Crusade frequently referenced both *chevaliers* and *serjanz à cheval*, with the most obvious translation for the latter being 'mounted sergeant'.<sup>28</sup> It should be emphasised here that the Old French terms were not by any means equivalent to what have often been considered their Latin counterparts. In an earlier period, *equites* by definition meant 'horsemen', while *milites* was the much more general 'soldier'. By the start of the twelfth century this was clearly not the case, with the two arguably being considered synonymous. As noted above, the consensus is that they both meant 'knight' in its earlier iteration.<sup>29</sup> The argument here is that both terms had incredibly vague definitions rather than similarly semi-specific ones. Rather than 'knight' therefore -an incredibly problematic term- the sense one gets is that both *milites* and *equites* were meant as general terms denoting mounted status.

That being said, the distinction is not just restricted to the Old French sources. There is clear evidence to suggest that 'cavalry' could comprise both *milites* and mounted sergeants.<sup>30</sup> Ralph of Diceto, describing the infamous kidnapping of Guy of Senlis, claimed that he was taken along with seventeen *milites* and fifteen *servientes equites*.<sup>31</sup> The *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* details the payment received by the individual members of the Fourth Crusade, stating that *milites* were given twenty marks in payment, while *servientes equites* received just ten.<sup>32</sup> Introducing another term, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes the same grouping as *satellites*, frequently contrasting them with *milites*.<sup>33</sup> Clearly, both *milites* and mounted

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<sup>27</sup> For Turkish *milites*, see: *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.514. For Greek *milites*, see: Gunther von Paris, ed. Orth, 16:V10; Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in in MGH SS 17, p.814. For Greek *chevaliers*, see Villehardouin, §139

<sup>28</sup> Villehardouin, *passim.*, Clari, *passim.*

<sup>29</sup> Kostick, *Social Structure*, p.186.

<sup>30</sup> Villehardouin, §54, §78, §171; Howden, 4:56; Bennett, et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.151; W.H. Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility in Gislebert of Mons's *Chronicon Hanoniense* and in Twelfth-Century German Literature,' *The Modern Language Review* 75:4 (1980), p.801.

<sup>31</sup> Ralph of Diceto, *Opera Historica*, ed. Stubbs, 2:86: ...cum decem et vii. aliis militibus et xv. servientibus equitibus...

<sup>32</sup> 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in MGH SS 16, p.11

<sup>33</sup> IPGRR, 1:61 (...nam et milites ducenti et trecenti satellites, viri sancti stipendiis pugnaturi sequuntur.); 2:23 (refers at length to *milites*, "peditibus quippe et inferioris fortunae satellitibus..."); 3:5 (...tot milites electos, quot nunquam ibi visi fuisse aestimantur; tot satellites magnae probitatis et audaciae...); 4:10 See also *passim.*

sergeants were included in the cavalry arm of Western medieval armies, though numerous other terms are used in relation to cavalry forces outside of these two groups.

Perhaps the best evidence comes from the short account of the Fourth Crusade by Hugh of Saint Pol, who describes the entire army as five hundred *milites et totidem equites*, along with some foot-soldiers.<sup>34</sup> The phrasing shows with striking clarity that by the time of the Fourth Crusade, the words *milites* and *equites* could no longer be considered interchangeable for the vast majority of authors. While this might seem a bold statement, one must consider Hugh's background. A veteran of the Third Crusade and one of the highest-ranking commanders on the Fourth, his knowledge with regards to military matters was second to none.<sup>35</sup> Similarly the *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam* distinguishes between *equites*, *pedites*, and *milites religiosi* when describing the army of the King of Portugal. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the use of two different words illustrates a perceived distinction.<sup>36</sup> The military orders were known for their heavy cavalry, so the *milites* were probably knights, and the qualification *religiosi* implies that the former was used in a military sense, with *equites* being used in its least specific sense, as encompassing the secular cavalry forces of the army. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* also describes a squadron of *equites armatores* being led out of the German camp.<sup>37</sup> This could be translated as 'armoured knights' due to the common association of *milites* and *equites* noted above, but 'mounted warriors' might be a better translation. The author of the *Historia* used a wider variety of terms than many of his contemporaries, and his later usage of the phrase *milites armati* means that one can legitimately assume that his use of *equites armatores* was intentionally different, and that they therefore meant different things.<sup>38</sup> Of course it is possible that the author simply considered the terms *milites* and *equites* interchangeable. However it does not seem unreasonable that the author chose his terminology with care.

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<sup>34</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.814.

<sup>35</sup> Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, pp.177-81

<sup>36</sup> *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.191: ...*exercitus autem regis multus erat equitum peditem et gaolitorum et errant cum eo milites religiosi de tribus sectis, Templarii, Iherosolimitani milites...*

<sup>37</sup> HEF, p.38

<sup>38</sup> HEF, p.85

Past these overt distinctions between the terms *milites* and *equites*, there is further implicit evidence for a diverse range of cavalry appearing in medieval armies. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, in one of the sections more reminiscent of a *chanson de geste*, describes *milites electos*, and *satellites magnae probitatis et audaciae* in the same passage, together with a broadly similar list of equipment including *loricae*, *galeas* and *nobiles equos*.<sup>39</sup> The implication is that the ‘elite knights’ and the ‘sergeants of great prowess and boldness’ were both armoured and mounted, further supporting the existence of mounted soldiers other than those considered ‘knights’. When the same source described Richard moving to attack a caravan towards the end of the Third Crusade, the implication is that all the forces he led were mounted, given the emphasis on speed. His forces included both *milites* and *expeditissimos servientes*. In the description of the attack itself, the author described *expeditos* crossbowmen and archers, as well as *armigeri*.<sup>40</sup> The *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* meanwhile frequently uses the term *loricis*, which has often been used to mean knights, but from their usage in the crusade sources [so far], it is unclear why.<sup>41</sup> Given the etymology of the term, ‘armoured cavalymen’ again seems more appropriate, which has fewer of the connotations of the modern terms.

### 3.2. Mounted Sergeants: Military Function and Distinction from other Cavalry

*Serjans à cheval* is perhaps the least contested Old French term for the non-noble cavalry known as mounted sergeants.<sup>42</sup> The Latin terms are more diverse, with *servientes equites*, *sariantes* and *satellites* all appearing in the source material.<sup>43</sup>

Questions surrounding the term *ministeriales* also concern mounted sergeants. Did the term ‘mounted sergeant’ denote a particular functional military grouping, or were its connotations more social? The mere presence of such terms combined with the evidence above clearly illustrates the existence of non-knightly cavalry.

<sup>39</sup> IPGRR, 3:5. IPGRR must be used with caution for the primary reason that it is heavily mapped on the work of Ambroise.

<sup>40</sup> IPGRR, 6:4: *...rex statim praemisit balistarios et sagittarios expeditos, quatenus Turcos ad faciendam moram Itineris...* See also in the same paragraph: *Quotquot autem milites nostril assecutos dejecerunt ab equis, peremerunt armigeri.*

<sup>41</sup> *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.509

<sup>42</sup> See Clari, *passim*; Villehardouin, *passim*.

<sup>43</sup> *Servientes equites* appears in ‘Devastatio Constantinopolitana’, in MGH SS 16, p.11; *sariantes* appears in Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi* in MGH SS 17 only, while *satellites* appears throughout IPGRR.

Were they non-knightly in the sense that they were not traditional heavy cavalry, or were they non-knightly in a social sense?

Under primary consideration is the existence of functional military differences between this grouping of non-knightly cavalry and their knightly counterparts, something ascertained from their respective descriptions in the sources.

Fortunately, these are particularly numerous in the source material. Evidence exists that mounted sergeants were not the same as knights in a purely military context, with frequent allusions made to the prowess of knights, to the detriment of all other types of soldiers. For example, Villehardouin occasionally disparaged any troops which were not *chevaliers*, stating they were ‘not much help in battle’, and ‘there were men in our battalions who were not *chevaliers* and were not skilled in arms...’<sup>44</sup> He implied that *serjans à cheval* were somewhat flightier than their knightly counterparts, describing how a contingent of two thousand fled from Apros overland, having offered only token resistance.<sup>45</sup> This all suggests that mounted sergeants were less-skilled than knights, which seemingly confirms that they differed on a functional basis. This evidence can be challenged, however. None of the descriptions are precise, and by no means are mounted sergeants the only troops described retreating in Villehardouin’s account, with the Venetians appearing in the very same passage falling back to their ships as a result of the same engagement.<sup>46</sup>

Far more convincing is the evidence for mounted sergeants, if not performing on the same level as knights, providing an acceptable substitution. Villehardouin’s later statement that the Christians ‘did not have more than one hundred and forty *chevaliers*, not counting the sergeants’ would suggest that it was not beyond the realms of possibility for sergeants to be included in the total number of *chevaliers*, suggesting that the term was sometimes used in a general sense.<sup>47</sup> This first seems unlikely given the existence and widespread usage of the term *serjans à cheval*, and the argument that these sergeants had broadly the same equipment as the *chevaliers*. However, further evidence can be found in Robert of Clari’s

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<sup>44</sup> For the first, see Villehardouin, §155 (...*qui n’avoient mie si grant mestier en bataille furent...*), for the second see Villehardouin, §359 (*Et li orent bataille d’autre gent que de chevaliers, qui ne savoient mie assez d’armes*).

<sup>45</sup> Villehardouin, §415

<sup>46</sup> Villehardouin, §415

<sup>47</sup> Villehardouin, §319: ...*n’avoient mie plus de sept vins chevaliers, sans les serjanz...*



description of seven battalions of 700 *chevaliers* each, which he went on to describe in the more general terms *batailles a cheval*.<sup>48</sup> The first usage would suggest an unusual proportion of knights -nearly five thousand, in a host which likely numbered no more than ten- while the change in terminology suggests that these battalions were made up of more than just knights.

*La Règle du Temple* supports this level of integration, stating that heavily-armed sergeant-brothers should behave just like their knight-brothers, and that even those who were not should form up to support the main charge.<sup>49</sup> Villehardouin also provides ample evidence for the integration of *chevaliers* and *serjans à cheval*. He frequently described contingents made up solely of the two. These companies appear primarily after the second fall of Constantinople, with the consolidation of the nascent Latin Empire.<sup>50</sup> This integration appears so often that it surely attests to the widespread substitution of non-noble cavalry for their knightly counterparts when required. Further evidence for this is the obvious capacity of mounted sergeants for independent activity, with Villehardouin occasionally having referenced *rotes* ('units') of mounted sergeants, one of which was some two thousand strong.<sup>51</sup>

The theme of integration continues in the Latin materials. Hugh of Saint Pol described *militēs et sariantis armatus* in the retinue of Peter of Braielcuel, another knight.<sup>52</sup> Although the distinction was made, they were described as performing the same military function.<sup>53</sup> On a separate occasion he also used the phrase *militēs armati*, which suggests that, for Hugh at least, the term *armatus* was more descriptive of heavy equipment than the distinction between *militēs* and *sariantes*. This is an isolated example however, and might be considered an anomaly, but Hugh's background must be considered. He was an expert soldier, with accurate knowledge of troop types. Somewhat more circumstantial evidence appears in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* in a very dramatic passage which describes a *militia* as including *juventutes* and *satellites*.<sup>54</sup> The seeming explanation would be that the

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<sup>48</sup> Clari, §44-45.

<sup>49</sup> Règle, §172: *Les freres sergens qui sont armés de fer se doivent contenir as armes si come il est devise des freres chevaliers...se le Mareschau ou les freres poignant, il doivent mener les sergens serrés et rengiés après.*

<sup>50</sup> Villehardouin, §273, §319, 328, 369, 382, 402, 403.

<sup>51</sup> Villehardouin, §351, 415, 418

<sup>52</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.813.

<sup>53</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.813

<sup>54</sup> IPGRR, 4:10: *O quam decenter accuratam ibi videres militiam; juventutem eximiam cui similis reperiretur difficile; ibi gentem videres electam, satellites multae probitatis et audaciae...*

author did not use *militia* to mean a band of knights, but rather more as a general contingent of soldiers. *Juventutes* was probably used to describe the group of young, as yet unestablished knights examined in great detail by Duby and Kostick among others.<sup>55</sup> Further than simply placing the two together in the *militia*, the author equated the two, suggesting that here at least *satellites* described mounted soldiers. The usage suggests that the two were perhaps functionally similar, given they were described as being ‘of much prowess and boldness, most becoming armour, so many pennants with fluttering flags and banners of many different shapes, so many white-tipped spears, gleaming mail shirts and helmets.’<sup>56</sup> Given the connotations of youth and errantry associated with *juventutes* and the lack of the same with *satellites*, the two terms likely did describe two different groupings. With this in mind, it should be noted that the *satellites* are described equipped with spears, mail and helms – a collection which constituted a heavily-armed sergeant in *La Règle du Temple*.<sup>57</sup>

Another way to examine the integration between better-armed sergeants and knights is to look at their respective equipment: what differences there were, and why these might have been. The passage of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* referenced above would seem to give an obvious list to use, but there are a few problems. The extract is quite a dramatic one, with plenty of scope for exaggeration or imprecise terminology. Even if the evidence is taken at face value, the exceptionality of these *satellites* is unclear. How widespread were heavily-armed sergeants, and to what extent is it true that ‘mounted sergeants were mounted, but knights were more fully-equipped’?<sup>58</sup> In short, the evidence is sparse, although *La Règle du Temple* provides a valuable insight with regards to the latter, stating that mounted sergeants were allowed everything that knight-brothers had, with the exception of the horses’ equipment.<sup>59</sup> They were allowed a *hauberjon* and hose without feet. This means that they were marginally less heavily-equipped than their knightly counterparts, but the fact remains that they were still largely covered in mail armour. What is crucial however is the list of weapons: both

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<sup>55</sup> Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. Postan, p.112-3; Kostick, ‘*Juvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99)’, pp.177-208

<sup>56</sup> IPGRR, 4:10: ...*multae probitatis et audaciae, decentissimas armaturas, tot penuncellos cum signis micantibus et multiformibus baneriis, tot bastilla albicanti cuspede, loricas lucentes et galeas.*

<sup>57</sup> See below, and *Règle*, §141

<sup>58</sup> Jackson, ‘Knighthood and Nobility,’ p.801.

<sup>59</sup> *Règle*, §141

knights and sergeants were to be equipped with a sword, shield, Turkish mace and most significantly a lance.<sup>60</sup> The inclusion of a lance suggests that both groups performed the same offensive function, and where the evidence of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* is perhaps refutable, *La Règle du Temple* was very much a manual, with much less of the dramatic flair and rhetoric one would expect to find in a crusading chronicle.

This would suggest that mounted sergeants equipped comparably to knights, but the fact remains that there was a difference between knights and mounted sergeants, with consistent evidence for the latter being significantly cheaper to recruit. Robert of Clari states that *serjanx à cheval* had to pay two marks each for passage on the Fourth Crusade, while *chevaliers* paid four, as well as an additional four per horse.<sup>61</sup> Both Villehardouin and the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* state that *chevaliers* and *militēs* received twice the payment that *serjanx à cheval* or *servientes equites* did.<sup>62</sup> These examples all illustrate that there was a common valuation, particularly by the time of the Fourth Crusade, and they all suggest that mounted sergeants were significantly cheaper to recruit. If, as has been examined above, their equipment was not all that different, why then were they valued so much less?

The amount of pay each participant generally received was perhaps determined by the average number of dependents they were expected to have.<sup>63</sup> While this may well be true in the majority of cases, especially when considering the payment of wages, the direct nature of the payment described by both Villehardouin and the *Devastatio* to all areas of the army suggests that those distributing the payment simply ‘cut out the middle-man’ as it were, thereby removing the need for the payment to filter down the ranks of the army. This would make the payment gradations potentially reflective of social differences between military groupings. The payments and gifts given would reinforce these differences. Other considerations must therefore be examined to determine precisely why this disparity was present. It seems likely that this gulf was in the quality of mount that each grouping rode. Due to the rarity of the trained destrier

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<sup>60</sup> *Règle*, §141

<sup>61</sup> Clari, §11

<sup>62</sup> ‘*Devastatio Constantinopolitana*’, in MGH SS 16, p.11; Villehardouin, §254.

<sup>63</sup> This was suggested by John France in an IMC Leeds 2017 Paper.

at the end of the twelfth century, they probably represented the most expensive single component of a knight's equipment.<sup>64</sup> Mounted sergeants likely did not ride into battle on fully-trained combat mounts, which therefore made them significantly less expensive to recruit. The size of this disparity is evidenced by the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, which describes Richard distributing gifts after the attack on the caravan towards the end of the Third Crusade. The *milites* received camels described as 'the best ever seen', while the *servientes* only received donkeys.<sup>65</sup>

Further evidence for cheaper recruitment comes from the unclear numbers in which mounted sergeants were present, and it makes instances of specificity all the more significant. Robert of Clari describes ten knights and sixty sergeants in the contingent led by Pierre d'Amiens in an attack on Constantinople.<sup>66</sup> When compared with consistent evidence from Villehardouin, mounted sergeants were clearly far more common than their knightly counterparts, and this was likely due to their cheaper cost. Villehardouin did report specific numbers on a few occasions, describing forty *chevaliers* and one hundred *serjans à cheval*, one hundred *chevaliers* and 140 *serjans à cheval*, and one hundred *chevaliers* and five hundred *serjans à cheval*. Such relative numbers are not unique to the Fourth Crusade however.<sup>67</sup> The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* also describes two hundred *milites* and three hundred *satellites* fighting under the Archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>68</sup> Although specific numbers appear throughout Villehardouin, there are many more unspecific examples. On numerous occasions, he gives a specific number of *chevaliers* - usually between one hundred and 140- but only describes 'a good number' (*grant part*) of sergeants.<sup>69</sup> These descriptions perhaps further support the argument that mounted sergeants were on poorer quality mounts, suggesting that status as a 'mounted' sergeant was subject to change depending on how many mounts were available. This would make their numbers difficult to keep track of.

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<sup>64</sup> R.H.C. Davis, *The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment* (London, 1989), p.11; M. Prestwich, 'Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War,' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5 (1995), pp.210-2

<sup>65</sup> IPGRR, 6:6: ...*quibus nunquam visi sunt aptiores...*

<sup>66</sup> Clari, §75, 76.

<sup>67</sup> Villehardouin, §273; 369; 382.

<sup>68</sup> IPGRR, 1:61

<sup>69</sup> Villehardouin, §319; 328; 402; 403

Previously, little has been made of this disparity in mounts, with Poole and Norman arguing that mounted sergeants were more cheaply-recruited than knights due to their lower 'class' and their less elaborate equipment, with the resulting assumption being that they were lightly-armed horsemen used primarily for reconnaissance.<sup>70</sup> The evidence above clearly illustrates that many of these conceptions are inaccurate. They were cheaper to recruit, and it might well be that Nicolle's characterisation of mounted sergeants as 'non-noble bourgeois cavalry' is accurate, as it seems mounted sergeants, particularly in the Holy Land were recruited from the urban burghess or merchant class.<sup>71</sup> Sergeants did not necessarily make careers out of military prowess -though this may have occurred- as the sense is that their recruitment was more on the basis of a levy, and that service was more of a responsibility of the urban elite. What is clear is that categorization by reference to military equipment does not fully explain the semantic distinction between *milites* and *servientes*, *sariantes* or *satellites*, due to the fact that some sergeants were as well-equipped as knights.<sup>72</sup> The 'lighter equipment' of sergeants was purely down to disparity of mounts. Rather than reflecting the diverse requirements of medieval warfare, it limited their efficacy as front-line soldiers.

The distinctions between types of cavalry in the medieval period were clearly far more complicated than just relating to noble and non-noble cavalry. It is possible that relative quality of equipment was of concern, but the crucial point is that that they performed in battle using broadly the same tactics. Given the examples above and their supposed limited efficacy, a description of mounted sergeants as 'heavy cavalry' would be generous, however 'light cavalry' is also misleading given many of the common perceptions surrounding the phrase. It is here therefore that the concept of 'medium' cavalry comes in, in accordance with the model proposed above in the introduction.

### **3.3. Squires: Military Function in the Twelfth Century**

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<sup>70</sup> Poole, *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries*, p.52; V. Norman, *The Medieval Soldier* (London, 1971), p.117; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare*, Vol.1, p.16. All these histories include use of the modern term 'class'.

<sup>71</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare*, Vol.1, p.16.

<sup>72</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare*, Vol.1, p.24; see also Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility,' p.801.

The appearance of squires as distinct from mounted sergeants is curious. Their role is unclear, as is whether they could even be counted a group of mounted soldiers. A large degree of the definition of the grouping clearly came from their relationship to those described as knights. There are frequent mentions of knights being accompanied by their squires, with the emphasis usually being placed on the possessive term. Séguin Barrez and his *armiger* Ospiard are described in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* as being the first over the walls of Darum, while Manessier de L'Isle and a group of non-comital nobles took a great many *armigeri* with them on a scouting expedition.<sup>73</sup> The implication tied to the usage of possessive terms such as 'his' and 'their', the description of the *pueri militum* in the *Historia de expeditione Friderici*, and a further example from the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* proves that squires were subservient to knights, at least in a military setting, with one *armiger* being forced to give up his horse (and losing his life as a result) when Baldwin of Carew was unhorsed.<sup>74</sup> Alongside the *pueri militum*, the *Historia de expeditione Friderici* describes *scutiferi* and *domnorum suorum*.<sup>75</sup> Past this obvious and seemingly personal relationship between squires and knights, their specific role is difficult to pin down. By the end of the thirteenth century, *armigeri* at least, if not squires in general were well-paid and -armoured cavalymen of lower status than knights.<sup>76</sup> By contrast, in the early twelfth century, Nicolle describes the group as pillagers and foragers who also fought. They were not intended to fight in open battle, he argues, though they did develop into the second line cavalry of the thirteenth century.<sup>77</sup>

Given the difficulties of translation noted in Chapter Two, the best way to approach the complicated grouping of squires is to divide the sources by language. Within the sources written in the vernacular Old French, the terminology for the grouping has been largely restricted to *escuier*, though other terms of interest do appear, in both *La Règle du Temple* and the work of Robert of Clari. To begin with *escuier* however: it constitutes a problematic term. As noted above in the consideration of modern literature, the term 'squire' probably applied to a relatively wide group at the end of the twelfth century. It is therefore

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<sup>73</sup> IPGRR, 5:39; 5:52

<sup>74</sup> IPGRR, 5:52; HEF, p.55, p.72.

<sup>75</sup> *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* in MGH SRGNS 5, p.90

<sup>76</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare*, Vol.1, p.30.

<sup>77</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare*, Vol.1, pp.60-1.

impossible to rely on terminology alone for a description of functionality, and one must consider context as well.

The uses of *escuier* in *La Règle du Temple*, or 'The French Rule of the Temple' represent among the earliest, particularly in a military setting. At first glance, the primary association of *escuiers* is with horses. The number of squires a brother-knight had was directly linked to how many horses he had: three horses and one squire was a minimum, but a fourth and second respectively was allowed at the discretion of the Master.<sup>78</sup> In an even earlier section of *La Règle*, called the 'Primitive Rule', there is even a chapter entitled 'On animals and squires', which clearly illustrates the link between the two.<sup>79</sup> In keeping with the traditional military view of twelfth century squires, later sections of *La Règle* do see *escuiers* more explicitly associated with equipment.<sup>80</sup> What is also striking is that in battle, and indeed at most times, the squires of the Order were under the command of the Standard Bearer, or if he was absent, the Under-Marshal, both of whom, while 'officers', were sergeants.

With all this considered in conjunction with another section of the Hierarchical Statutes -representing the subsequent additions to the Primitive Rule of the Temple- the combat role of *escuiers* can be clarified: "The Standard Bearer should form the *escuiers* into a squadron. And if the Marshal and the brothers charge, the *escuiers* who lead the destriers should ride hard behind their lords, and the others should take the mules which their lords ride and should remain with Standard Bearer."<sup>81</sup> Several of these words are contentious, and different interpretations of them imply incredibly varied functions for *escuiers*. The word *poindre*, used to describe the *escuiers* moving up behind their lords has been translated as 'charge' in Upton-Ward's edition, where 'ride hard' might be more appropriate, due to its less aggressive connotations. The word used for the charge of the other Templars is different: *poigner*. *Escuiers* were seemingly not intended to be combat troops therefore, though they may have been forced to fight in an emergency. Due to the nature of the source, anecdotal evidence in *La Règle* is somewhat lacking.

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<sup>78</sup> *Règle*, §138.

<sup>79</sup> *Règle*, §51.

<sup>80</sup> *Règle*, §283, 305.

<sup>81</sup> *Règle*, §179: *le Confanonier doit faire aler les escuiers en eschiele. Et se le Maresbau et les freres poignent, les escuiers qui menent les chavaus en destre doivent poindre après lor seignor, et les autres doivent prendre les mules ou lor seignor chevauchent, et doivent remainer o le Confanonier.*

While the source is otherwise incredibly useful for precisely this reason, it unfortunately means there are no examples of the real-world applications of the tactics espoused, including how to react if the initial charge failed.

Aside from *escuiers*, there are occasional mentions of others including *garsons à pié* and *vahlet gentil home*, in conjunction with squires, particularly in modern literature. The former appears in the retinues of the ‘officers’ of the knight-brothers, notably those of the Seneschal (whose full retinue also included two dedicated *escuiers*, as well as a knight-brother with two further *escuiers*, as well as two of these *garsons à pié*) and the Commanders of the Lands of Tripoli and Antioch, who were restricted to one *garson à pié* each.<sup>82</sup> Given the emphasis on frugality and functionality present throughout the text, and the fact that general knight-brothers did not have *garsons* in their retinues, they were probably not considered crucial for a knight to function effectively in battle, while *escuiers* were. This might suggest the role of a *garson* being that of a more generic, domestic servant. The second term, *vahlet gentil home*, appears only once, in the retinue of the Master of the Order.<sup>83</sup> The role of this *vahlet gentil home* is described in plain terms: *por porter son escu et sa lance*. This role, of carrying the shield and lance of the Master equates to the role of squires described in modern literature. However, the Old French term used is not *escuier*. Based on the evidence of *La Règle* therefore, *vahlets* and *escuiers* performed different roles, with the former being concerned primarily with equipment and the latter with horse-care. It must also be noted that the *vahlet* was also described as *gentil home*, implying that the term alone did not convey heightened social status.

Chronologically the next vernacular Old French source, Ambroise’s *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* is an account of the Third Crusade. The text is more problematic than that of *La Règle*, at least with regards to military matters, due to its composition as verse. Of particular issue are the very obvious attempts to have words at the end of consecutive lines rhyme. With regards to squires specifically, *escuier* has been used throughout to denote the group. The evidence provided by the text hints far more at the confused picture found in the historiography, with a number of perhaps contradictory contexts found throughout. To consider that

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<sup>82</sup> For the Seneschal of the Order, see: *Règle*, §99. For the Commanders of the Lands of Tripoli and Antioch, see: *Règle*, §125.

<sup>83</sup> *Règle*, §77.



which supports the conclusions from *La Règle* first, there are three significant instances supporting the argument for squires being non-combatant auxiliaries at the end of the twelfth century. First is the anecdote where a group of *escuiers* were out foraging, under the protection of *li preu seignor del Temple*.<sup>84</sup> This is evidence against squires being capable of defending themselves, let alone committing offensive actions in battle. More likely is that they required guards because of their task; that they were considered vulnerable because they were foraging (thus presumably spread out and not all that alert to their wider surroundings) rather than because they were squires.

The next passage of particular interest followed the decision to crown the Marquis Conrad of Montferrat as King of Jerusalem. Squires are described as polishing swords and ‘rolling’ hauberks, something reminiscent of the chapters in *La Règle* linking squires directly with equipment.<sup>85</sup> Also significant is that they are distinguished both from ‘*chevalier e serjant*’, who are in the same sentence and described as preparing for the the assault on Jerusalem.<sup>86</sup> The implication is that the squires were responsible for equipment care, as opposed to the knights and sergeants who would do the actual fighting. The final piece of evidence immediately precedes the description of Richard’s attack on a caravan, towards the end of the campaign: ‘There the bold men dismounted, all set for battle, and sent to Ascalon for provisions, remaining there until the squires returned.’<sup>87</sup> Although, the squires were not explicitly sent to Ascalon to fetch provisions, the phrase ‘remaining there until the squires returned’ heavily implies that they were. The sentence is curious for two reasons. First, and most obvious, is that the value of squires for fetching provisions clearly outweighed their value as soldiers, given the imminence of combat and the ease with which they were despatched. Second is the fact that the *gent hardie* dismounted, perhaps implying that they were able to care for their own horses, making the squires were surplus to requirements and therefore free to go to Ascalon for provisions. While both arguments are conjecture, the undeniable picture painted is of a non-combatant squire.

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<sup>84</sup> Ambroise, ll.7223-6.

<sup>85</sup> Ambroise, ll.8737-9

<sup>86</sup> Ambroise, ll.8741

<sup>87</sup> Ambroise, ll.10280-4: *La descendi la gent hardie, tote garnie de bataille, e enveierent por vitaille a Escalone, e la se tindrent tant que li escuier revindrent.*

There seems to be overwhelming evidence for squires performing a non-combat role, but Ambroise's account contains just as much evidence for squires taking part in the fighting of the Third Crusade. *Escuiers* are described as *preu e legier* when they 'armed themselves' (*s'armerent*) and tried to breach the city over a tower brought down through undermining.<sup>88</sup> Not long thereafter, *escuiers* described again as *preu* are described as attacking the heavily defended walls, despite being few in number.<sup>89</sup> A more specific instance of combatant squires comes later, during the storm of Darum, when Ambroise described a named *escuier* being the second over the walls, behind Seguin Baré.<sup>90</sup> A case could perhaps be made for Espiard the squire merely providing close combat support to Seguin Baré, but this seems unlikely given the fact that it was a siege and the two were therefore on foot. The squire would therefore not have been required to provide a replacement mount or lance for his master. Espiard was therefore clearly present only to fight. The final evidence for squires taking part in combat actions is found later, during a minor skirmish which involved a number of named knights of the expedition.<sup>91</sup> There is very little information about what role the *escuiers* played in the action however -it is merely noted that they were present- and it is more than possible that they were there as the non-combatant auxiliaries portrayed above.

### 3.4. Squires: Military Function at the Start of the Thirteenth Century

The next vernacular Old French source comes around a decade later, with the eyewitness account of the Fourth Crusade of Geoffrey of Villehardouin. Despite the length of the account, the term *escuier* may only be found twice in the text. The first instance comes in the Treaty of Venice, which was likely copied directly from the document itself due to Villehardouin's direct role in its establishment. The appearance of *escuier* in the Treaty gives little insight into the debate over the combatant nature of squires, but it supports their primary role being the care of horses. The construction of the sentence suggests the separation of the forces making up the expedition into two groups, according to their transport needs. The *chevaliers* and *serjanz à pié* are to be transported in *nés*, while the horses and the

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<sup>88</sup> Ambroise, ll.4982-7

<sup>89</sup> Ambroise, ll.4996-5016

<sup>90</sup> Ambroise, ll.9278-82

<sup>91</sup> Ambroise, ll.9931-45

*escuiers* are to be provided *nissiers*, a ship specialised for the transport of horses.<sup>92</sup> The second appearance of *escuier* comes far later, in the battle outside the walls of Constantinople in the summer of 1203.<sup>93</sup> Sergeants and squires are described as forming up on foot behind the rumps of the horses, and this is significant for a few reasons. First is that the squires are qualified as being on foot. The Treaty of Venice supports that the primary duty of these squires was probably horse care, so why were they on foot? On foot they were too far back to properly support the knights of the preceding formations but were still implicitly anticipating an active combat role. The explanation for their placement is perhaps as follows: the emphasis through the encounter is on just how much the crusaders were outnumbered by the Greek forces, and it is conceivable that anyone capable of bearing arms was thrown into the potential engagement. Alongside this, the appearance of a battle of two hundred *chealiers à pié* in the same paragraph suggests that the expedition was suffering from an acute lack of horses.<sup>94</sup> If the role of squires was horse management, then the lack of horses deprived them of any other specific role on the battlefield. Combined, these two considerations perhaps serve to explain the presence of squires in a combatant role as an anomaly.

A contemporary of Villehardouin, Robert of Clari's Old French account of the Fourth Crusade was again eyewitness. However, where Villehardouin was the high-ranking Marshal of Champagne, Robert frequently identifies with those he describes as *povres chevaliers*.<sup>95</sup> What is striking is that there are no mentions of *escuiers* in the text of Robert of Clari. This does not however mean that there was no mention of squires, this perhaps best illustrates the problem of the term *escuier*. At the same point as Villehardouin mentions the sergeants and squires forming up on foot behind mounted divisions, Robert of Clari describes how the cooks and *les garchons qui les chevax gardoient* were armed and placed opposite the Greek forces.<sup>96</sup> The terminology already suggests a certain degree of parity with squires, but the description of their position and formation is strikingly similar to

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<sup>92</sup> Villehardouin, §21: *Nos ferons nissiers a passer iv mille et v cents chevans et ix mille escuiers, et es nés iv mille chevaliers et v cent, et xx mille serjanz a pié...*

<sup>93</sup> Villehardouin, §178: *Et lors issirent les vi batailles qui furent ordenees et se rengent par devant lorlices, et lor serjanz et lor escuiers a pié par derriere les cropes de lor chevans, et les archiers et les arbalestiers par devant als.*

<sup>94</sup> Villehardouin, §178.

<sup>95</sup> Clari, *passim*.

<sup>96</sup> Clari, §45, 46.

the way Villehardouin describes the disposition of the sergeants and squires. This terminological variation could evidence stratification present in the grouping, even as early as the end of the twelfth century, with *escuiers* towards the top and *garçons* towards the bottom. The easier assumption to make might be that one of the two was inaccurate, with Robert's testimony being considered an easy target due to Villehardouin's widely-argued greater reliability. Robert's lower rank could be considered an aid here however. Robert's description is much simpler- perhaps more 'functional'- while Villehardouin's *escuier* is a term with various possible translations. Given the relative positions of the two, Robert seems far more likely to be familiar with the depths of the medieval military structure than Villehardouin and this is perhaps illustrated by the terminological differences which can be found between the two accounts. Another possibility is that Robert was trying to exaggerate the hopelessness of the situation for dramatic effect, while Villehardouin was more concerned with technically accurate descriptions.

Aside from familiarity, a further potential explanation exists for the differing perceptions of the two men. Villehardouin's high social standing likely meant that squires directly serving him were of higher relative status than those who served Robert of Clari. It is conceivable that those serving the former were of greater social status, either by birth -and using service to a high-ranking noble as a means to gain knighthood- or by mere fact of association, and perhaps therefore had wider duties, which may have included combat action. Such a view of squires would certainly compare with their later incarnation as a coherent group in the second quarter of the thirteenth century.<sup>97</sup> Similarly, those serving Robert of Clari would probably have had very different origins, perhaps resulting in lower expectations. It is these very different possibilities which potentially caused such terminological variation between the two countrymen.

Although there is the suggestion of diversity among squires, the examples found in the Old French sources starkly illustrate the difficulties of relying on such a restricted collection of terms. Any conjecture on the variation of the grouping is therefore somewhat unstable. The Old French picture is therefore uncertain. Either squires were an incredibly varied grouping, whose roles ranged from horse

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<sup>97</sup> Bouchard, "*Strong of Body, Brave and Noble*", p.25; Evergates, *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne*, p.52; Crouch, *The English Aristocracy*, p.xvi.

and equipment care to active combat, or or it was a narrow group which performed a wide range of duties. One cannot pass judgement on which is more likely based solely on the limited Old French terminology, which in the sources of the end of the twelfth century does not extend past *escuier* and *garchon*.

### 3.5. Squires: *Armigeri* of the Third Crusade

As well as the Old French sources, there are numerous Latin sources. The terms utilised in reference to squires are far more diverse among the latter. This is problematic in its own way, due to the sheer number of terms present in the sources. The seeming variety of the grouping of squires at the end of the twelfth century means that each term must be examined in turn. *Armiger* recurs most often through the sources at the end of the twelfth century, though it appears primarily in the sources of the Third Crusade, and specifically those describing the exploits of the Angevin and German contingents. Of particular interest is the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, given the close relationship between it and the Old French *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*.<sup>98</sup> A particular problem with the theory that both sources drew on a third now lost source, is the question of whether that source was in Latin or Old French. The answer skews the relationship of the words *armiger* and *escuier*. For example, if the original source was in Old French, *escuier* was simply copied, and *armiger* was deemed the suitable translation for the grouping carrying out the duties described. It is therefore possible that *armiger* was used to describe the fighters at the siege of Acre, and then used as a direct equivalent to the imprecise *escuier* throughout the text.<sup>99</sup> However, if the original source was in Latin, *armiger* was the word copied, with *escuier* used as a translation. The problem lies with the generality of the term, and the suggestion is therefore that *armiger* constituted an equally general term to *escuier*.

What aids in this determination is the fact that the term *armiger* does also appear in the *Itinerarium* on occasions other than those recorded in the *Estoire*, and there are a few occasions when the former expands on the account given in the latter. First, there are two occasions upon which *armigeri* are sent foraging under the

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<sup>98</sup> Ailes, (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, p.13.

<sup>99</sup> References in IPGRR, 3:14; 5:39

guard of the Templars, the first of which is recorded in Ambroise's account.<sup>100</sup> Although Ambroise only mentions squires being involved in the act of foraging, the *Itinerarium* states that on the first occasion, they are joined by *satellites* (traditionally translated as 'sergeants'), while on the second they are joined by *servientes* (either 'sergeants' or 'servants').<sup>101</sup> This does not give particular evidence to the combatant nature of the grouping, but it attests to the imprecision of Ambroise's account, either by intention or ignorance. The *Itinerarium* also provides a fuller account of the later skirmish which according to Ambroise, included squires. While the evidence provided in the latter is inconclusive with regards to the squires taking part in the fighting, an anecdote in the *Itinerarium* clarifies the picture considerably.<sup>102</sup> When Baldwin of Carew was unhorsed (something noted by Ambroise and mentioned above), one of his *armigeri* gives up his mount to save his master and is immediately killed for his trouble. The Latin author notes however that 'while he was mounted on horseback, he had displayed great prowess.'<sup>103</sup> This would illustrate that he was directly involved in the combat.

Aside from these expansions on the material found in Ambroise, there are two mentions of *armigeri* in the *Itinerarium* which are not present in the Old French account. The first is a brief mention of the death of a knight and his *armiger* from snake bites towards the end of the campaign.<sup>104</sup> Again, this does not provide particular evidence as to whether or not squires fought, but reinforces the close relationship between knights and *armigeri* - perhaps closer at least than that between knights and sergeants. The second reference is more illuminating and comes during Richard's attack on the caravan.<sup>105</sup> The *armigeri* are here involved in the combat itself, following the knights as they rode down the fleeing Saracens, and killing those who were thrown from their horses or left wounded. Although

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<sup>100</sup> IPGRR, 4:30; 5:30.

<sup>101</sup> On etymology: the modern 'sergeant' comes originally from the Old French term variously spelt as *sergent* or *serjant*, which itself came from the Medieval Latin *serviens*. This in turn came from the Latin *servientem*, the present participle of *servire* 'to serve'. It is clear then that the subservient connotations of the term are present from the start, with the specific military aspects only being attested from the late-thirteenth century. See: <https://www.etymonline.com/word/sergeant> accessed 14/11/17. Given the frequency and ease with which the majority of crusading authors place 'sergeants' in combat situations it seems highly unlikely that these men were domestic servants.

<sup>102</sup> IPGRR, 5:52

<sup>103</sup> IPGRR, 5:52: ...*qui dum equo sederat, probissime se gesserat...*

<sup>104</sup> IPGRR, 5:48

<sup>105</sup> IPGRR, 6:4

technically part of the action, it does not imply that squires were usually used as combat troops. The fact they were used for such a task possibly even suggests that they were only capable of taking on stunned or wounded troops who were part of an already-broken force. It is probable that the *armigeri* were given this task because they happened to be on hand -and mounted- where other troops were not available, and this suggests the crusaders were outnumbered. As noted above, it seems that Richard's force was small and mobile when he attacked the Saracen caravan, so it stands to reason there was no room for superfluous troops. Therefore, it might be that the *armigeri* were recognised as necessary for the preparation of the knights, but that Richard was therefore not content to dismiss them as non-combatants and assigned them the easy task of dispatching downed foes.

Outside of the *Itinerarium*, *armiger* appears occasionally in the *Historia Peregrinorum*, a source of German origin. The overwhelming impression from the source as a whole is that *armigeri* were used by the author to inflate casualties where required. They appear primarily as victims of the Turks; whether by falling into their traps, or being killed during Turkish raids.<sup>106</sup> Once again, there is a brief mention of them taking part in foraging activities, specifically in search of horse-fodder, but again they come under attack by the Turks with poisoned arrows, so it seems possible that the incident was added purely to illustrate the enemy harassment of the German march.<sup>107</sup> The examples of *armigeri* being victims of Turkish aggression are striking for their commonality, and the similar terms used in each case suggests the anecdotes were included more for illustrative purposes than as an accurate record of events. Undoubtedly, a lot of men were picked off by Turkish arrows, and repetition seems the way the author chose to convey this. Of most interest is a mention of *armigeri* while the army was still in modern-day Greece, where on the approach to Philippopolis, the *armigeri* and *pedites* formed a fifth division after the divisions including all the knights.<sup>108</sup> There are perhaps two possibilities. One is that the fifth *acies* of the army was simply comprised of all the leftovers of the army, and that the *armigeri* were on foot with the common *pedites*. The other possibility, for which there is very limited evidence, is that the *armigeri*

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<sup>106</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, pp.147, 153.

<sup>107</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.132.

<sup>108</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, pp.138-9.

formed the cavalry component of the division, acting as a substitute for the *milites* of the other *acies*. Such a possibility is based on the fact that the *armigeri* remain distinct from the *pedites*, though it is unclear whether such a distinction was based on military function or something else.

Conclusions concerning crusading *armigeri* at the end of the twelfth century are based largely on evidence from Third Crusade sources, given their absence by and large in the sources for the subsequent Fourth Crusade. Such conclusions must therefore remain limited, though this should not devalue them too much, as the expedition included representation from a geographically wide area. The conclusions drawn from such evidence could follow two broad directions. The first is that the *armigeri* fulfilled a broad spectrum of roles on campaign, including horse and equipment care, as well as taking an active part in combat. The second, which would follow the historiography noted above, would be that the contemporary authors used the term *armiger* in a very imprecise fashion. The second possibility is more compelling, but one must also consider the similar term *scutifer*. Conclusions must remain limited. Weaker evidence exists for the specific range of duties performed by squires. Therefore in the absence of evidence, far more likely is that it was very imprecise.

### 3.5.1. Squires: *Scutiferi* at the End of the Twelfth Century

Often seen as a broadly equivalent term, *scutiferi* appears sparsely in the sources under consideration: once in the *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* from Germany, once in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, and once in the Fourth Crusade *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*. The mentions in the two German sources of the Third Crusade come at precisely the same point of the narrative. Each account uses the same source material, the diary of Tageno, and the sentence is therefore almost copied verbatim. The *scutiferi* are described as carrying their masters, stricken with illness, over high mountain passes in Anatolia.<sup>109</sup> This example provides no overt evidence either way regarding their status as combatants or not, but it is clear that the *scutiferi* were servants rather than an independent group. The menial nature of the task would suggest that their duties were domestic in nature rather than the more militaristic -and literal- 'shield-bearers'. With the militarised nature of the German expedition being heavily emphasised, it would suggest that such a

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*Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.516; HEF, p.90.



limited group would not have been permitted, meaning perhaps that the *scutiferi* were military servants forced through necessity to perform a more domestic role. A decade or so later, the *scutifer* appears once in the Fourth Crusade source the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*. Mentioned along with two *milites* as having died in battle, the sentence suggests a close relationship with them.<sup>110</sup> It also suggests that the *scutifer* in question died fighting. While there is no explicit mention of *scutiferi* fighting, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that they did.

A few other related terms do appear in the sources of the end of the twelfth century, though their link to the grouping of squires is somewhat more tenuous than *armiger* and *scutifer*. The first, *vallatus*, appears only once in the *Itinerarium*, during the battle of Arsuf. The author describes Richard riding to the rescue of the beleaguered rear-guard with his *vallatus*, which one might be tempted to translate as ‘valets’.<sup>111</sup> Together with the appearance in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* of *vallati* guarding *milites* on the march, assisted by contingents of crossbowmen, it appears once more to provide evidence for at least a certain type of squire performing combat duties.<sup>112</sup>

The second related term is more tenuous, appearing in Richard of Devizes’ *Chronicon*. The term *scutarii* is included largely due to the shared etymological link with *scutum* and *scutifer*.<sup>113</sup> It appears only twice, with the first instance being used to describe the Muslim defenders of Acre.<sup>114</sup> This is indicative of the carefree way in which Richard of Devizes applies terminology. This same looseness means that a degree of scepticism must be employed when considering the second appearance of the term later in the text. Richard of Devizes described the King of England readying his forces for an assault towards Jerusalem, and that he mustered some five hundred *milites* and two thousand *scutarii*. Past gleaning that *scutarii* were considered different from *milites*, while still also being considered *equites*, the link with a master is once again emphasised. The *scutarii* are described as being those ‘whose lords had perished’. This would seem to place the term

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<sup>110</sup> ‘Devastatio Constantinopolitana’, in MGH SS 16, p.11.

<sup>111</sup> IPGRR, 4:10

<sup>112</sup> HEF, p.35.

<sup>113</sup> *Scutarius* has generally been translated as “shield-bearer” or simply “squire”. See: Ashdowne et al., *Dictionary*, (3 vols.).

<sup>114</sup> Devizes, p.44.

*scutarii* with the others above in describing a group of soldiers with a strong link to service.<sup>115</sup>

Finally, and seemingly specific to the German sources of the Third Crusade, are the *pueri*. Appearing most consistently in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, their strong association with the grouping of squires is evidenced by the fact that the later author of the *Historia Peregrinorum* substituted it for the perhaps more distinguished *armigeri*.<sup>116</sup> The frequent use of *pueri* in the former source suggests that the grouping's primary connotation was one of service, and perhaps also of youth, with the implication being that they were younger than the majority of the army.<sup>117</sup> This would make them teenagers and younger, which makes it much more unlikely that they were intentionally involved in fighting, due to physical limitations if nothing else. By contrast, the use of *armigeri* later perhaps means that there was a degree of evolution in the grouping, though one should be careful in assuming causal links between the earlier squires of the twelfth century and those of the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. That being said, a mere comparison of the etymology of the two words would suggest that *armigeri* were more combatant than *pueri*, and this in itself perhaps represents a military change if nothing else. By the time of the *Historia Peregrinorum*, it is possible that *armigeri* and *servientes* were easily mistaken for one another, perhaps due to similar equipment and/or both groups fighting. This represents a military development at the least.

Although the change in terminology from *pueri* to *armigeri* might represent a growing sophistication in the language used to describe them, *pueri* as a standalone term was clearly not all that specific, given the appearance of frequent qualifications in the *Historia de Expeditione*. First to consider is the description of *pueri pabularii* being killed by Turks while watering horses for the army.<sup>118</sup> The most striking evidence is for the function of the grouping, which appears to once again be based around menial horse-care. Aside from that, the qualification of *pabularii* perhaps illustrates a youthful connotation for the group. A later example where the group is simply described as *pueri exercitus* implies that they were not

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<sup>115</sup> Devizes, pp.81-2: ...*quorum domini perierant*...

<sup>116</sup> For example, see *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, pp.138-9 and the HEF, p.34.

<sup>117</sup> For more information on the background of the term *pueri*, see G. Dickson, *The Children's Crusade: Medieval History, Modern Mythistory* (Basingstoke, 2010), pp.33-5.

<sup>118</sup> HEF, p.83

particularly able to defend themselves, implying that they were vulnerable because they were accompanied by 'barely three hundred *sociis militibus*'.<sup>119</sup> The most significant appearance of the *pueri* in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* comes when a group of *servientes* and *pueri militari* scared off a Turkish attack with just the noise of their advance.<sup>120</sup> Though the distinction is clearly made, the group was acting as one, and clearly were intended for combat, had they not been faced with such flighty opponents. This implies that fighting squires existed even at the time of the Third Crusade, though there is also significant evidence for others in the group performing menial and non-combatant functions.

The Latin sources, through the appreciable breadth of both context and terminology displayed, have presented a more complicated picture than that painted by the Old French sources alone. With the Old French sources, there were two equally likely possibilities with regards to possible diversity among the grouping of squires, that they were a wide group, with different individuals having a narrow range of duties, or that they were a very narrow grouping, but with a wide range of duties. However, it seems that most conclusions must be based on the terms *armiger* and *scutifer*, rather than the modern grouping referred to as squires. In the evidence above the latter is associated with the duties of servants, while the former performs more as an active combatant. The choice of the word *armiger* in the *Itinerarium*, together with their grouping together with sergeants on multiple occasions, also suggests that they intermingled to a degree. Given the role of the sergeant as a combatant, this would suggest that *armigeri* at least were similarly combatant. Together with the remaining evidence throughout the *Itinerarium*, it supports the idea of *armigeri* as actively involved in combat, during siege warfare and during the small skirmish involving Baldwin of Carew, where his squire was described as having 'displayed great prowess while he was mounted on horseback'.<sup>121</sup>

Given the nature and constraints of the evidence examined above, any conclusions must be considered tentative. The group was clearly diverse. The difficulty of working in two languages is also made abundantly clear by consideration of the crusading material from the end of the twelfth century. The

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<sup>119</sup> HEF, p.58: ...trecentist vix sociis militibus comitatus,...

<sup>120</sup> HEF, p.44.

<sup>121</sup> IPGRR, 5:52: ...qui dum equo sederat, probissime se gesserat,...

fact that *escuier* is the prevalent term in the Old French sources throws up a problem also found in the modern historiography with the term 'squire'. There are a variety of Latin terms to describe this grouping, and this perhaps serves to illustrate the very diversity the appearance of just *escuier* obscures. Even in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, with its closeness to Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* the author does not use a single term. Although the passages which are directly comparable do seem to use *armiger* as a direct translation for the Old French *escuier*, other related terms do appear, such as the *vallati* who accompany Richard on the fighting march in the lead up to the battle of Arsuf.<sup>122</sup> *Armigeri* and *scutiferi* appear far more consistently through the sources of the Third and Fourth Crusades however, and as noted above, most conclusions should primarily relate to these terms.

*Scutiferi* seemingly represent the more menial end of the spectrum, responsible for weapons and horse care. By contrast, *armigeri* seem to have had duties closer to those of a sergeant, though with some crucial additions. The argument is therefore that *armigeri* were more the mounted and armoured cavalrymen described in the armies of Edward I noted above, though with significant qualification. The usage in the sources of the end of the twelfth century suggests that *armigeri* had a far more personal connection to those they served than did sergeants. The conjecture would therefore be that *armigeri* represented personal armed retainers, whose service was likely more flexible than that of sergeants, who are more often characterised as more common, possibly paid fighters. The modern term 'squire' is therefore an imprecise one, which masks the truth of the diversity of the grouping, particularly at the end of the twelfth century. Further scope for study certainly exists, but if anything is to be discovered in the earlier history of those described, care must be taken in the consideration of contemporary terminology.

### **3.6. Light Cavalry: Proliferation and Usage**

The emerging picture is therefore of mounted sergeants and *armigeri* forming 'medium' cavalry together with the poorer, largely unnamed knights, who added to a charge in the second and third ranks but utilised broadly the same tactics as their 'heavy' counterparts. Another broadly defined 'grade' of cavalry may be

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<sup>122</sup> IPGRR, 4:10

identified, which is perhaps more neglected. Although as noted above, mounted sergeants are often incorrectly identified with this grouping, a better definition for 'light cavalry' might be specifically those who fought using 'hit-and-run' tactics, as well as being of wider strategic use as scouts, skirmishers and ravagers. It should be emphasised that this did not necessarily make them horse archers, as has often been assumed.<sup>123</sup> There exists evidence for a wide range of types of light cavalry, ranging from the English *bobelars*, to the Catalan *alforrats* and those from usually isolated or marginal regions where earlier military traditions survived, including Brittany and Ireland.<sup>124</sup> The paucity of evidence in the crusading material however suggests that western light cavalry in this sense was very scarce on the expeditions of the twelfth century. This was probably because truly effective light cavalry required extensive skill and training. One notable exception is the grouping of turcoples, which itself creates a unique methodological problem. The main focus of the thesis is to extrapolate information from the crusading expeditions for application to western Europe. The turcoples represent one grouping which, while present in the Latin East, were not a component of the armies local to western Christendom. Although this places them outside the thesis, they are the best representation of light cavalry in the sources and warrant some consideration.

Most often associated with the military orders, significant evidence for turcoples can be found in *La Règle du Temple*, as well as through much of the source material for the Third Crusade.<sup>125</sup> Although not an eyewitness, Roger of Howden described some hundred turcoples dying together with forty *milites* of the military orders at the Springs of Cresson, so while the relative numbers are likely inaccurate, the former were probably present.<sup>126</sup> The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* frequently describes turcoples accompanying Templar forces in particular, with the specific assignment of scouting around Darum.<sup>127</sup> Turcoples frequently appear as scouts, with the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describing Richard sending a Bedouin and two 'native Turcoples' (*vernaculos Turcopolos*) to locate a caravan.<sup>128</sup> Significantly, Roger of Howden uses the more general term *exploratores* to mean

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<sup>123</sup> Harari, 'The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples,' p.75

<sup>124</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, pp.70-1; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.65

<sup>125</sup> *Règle*, §77

<sup>126</sup> Howden, 3:21.

<sup>127</sup> IPGRR, 4:20. For scouting, see: IPGRR, 5:33

<sup>128</sup> IPGRR, 6:4

scouts when describing the same events.<sup>129</sup> In Villehardouin's later account of the Fourth Crusade, he described the forces of the nascent Latin Empire as including both Syrian turcoples and mounted crossbowmen (*arbalestiers à cheval*). The two are distinguished, but they are assigned the same task; sent 'to ascertain the situation at the castle' by Villehardouin himself.<sup>130</sup> While there was clearly a difference, whether in origin or equipment, they both performed scouting duties, something which has traditionally been assigned to light cavalry contingents.

Very little evidence exists for the specific tactics of western light cavalry -as opposed to turcoples- particularly because the grouping could be so diverse depending on terrain and geographic location. The sense in grouping them together is therefore questionable. Although their specific tactics were diverse, it is important to note that western light cavalry battlefield activities remained similar. Generally tasked with harassment and skirmishing duties, the way in which these troops went about such tasks was determined -as noted above- by concerns like terrain and geographic location. In the sources for the Third and Fourth Crusades combined, there is only one mention of mounted crossbowmen, and in an non-combat setting.<sup>131</sup> Other contemporary references to *balistarii equites* or *arbalestiers à cheval* appear either in administrative records from the reign of Philip II Augustus of France, from the early-thirteenth century until as late as the 1280s, or among the Italian *condotte* mercenary contracts which indicate that at this point at least, they acted more as 'mounted infantry' (they rode horses for transport but dismounted to fight).<sup>132</sup>

The latter examples come from 'domestic' sources rather than crusading ones, and this suggests that mounted crossbowmen were far more active in the conflicts of Western Christendom than in the Latin East. This possibly because they were made redundant as light cavalry by the easy availability of turcoples, which are mentioned frequently throughout the source base as noted below. Similarly, the converse is true: turcoples appear rarely in the 'domestic' sources where mounted crossbowmen were more prevalent, and this suggests that

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<sup>129</sup> Howden, 3:182

<sup>130</sup> Villehardouin, §438: ...*por savoir le covine del chastel.*

<sup>131</sup> Villehardouin, §438

<sup>132</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.71; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.30, p.74; D.P. Waley, 'Condotte and condottieri in the thirteenth century,' *Proceedings of the British Academy* (1975), p.343

specialist light cavalry was difficult to export. This is understandable due to the aforementioned diversity of the grouping.

Mentions of turcoples involved in direct combat are far more prevalent, appearing particularly frequently in the Third Crusade sources. Roger of Howden stated that the Emperor Isaac Angelos of Cyprus agreed as part of his surrender to send some four hundred *turcoples equites* as part of an expeditionary force to protect the Holy Land.<sup>133</sup> This seemingly confirms that turcoples fought on horseback, and this is further supported by Ambroise using the analogy of 'harrying them like a Turcopole' when describing the attacks of Isaac Angelos on the forces of King Richard.<sup>134</sup> While this example does not necessarily support the idea of turcoples fighting on horseback, harrying tactics remain far more effective on horseback than on foot. Also significant is the observation that if the expression was included in a song meant for a wide consumption in Europe, it implies that both turcoples and the tactics they employed were well-known in western Christendom. The term 'harrying' itself suggests, as Harari has argued, that turcoples used general light cavalry tactics and the use of such an analogy implies that such tactics were not unknown in western Christendom at the time.<sup>135</sup>

### **3.7. The Military Role and Definition of the Knight by the End of the Twelfth Century**

What then was the military role of the knight by the end of the twelfth century? Could they be defined by military parameters alone? The latter is a theme which will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six. Considerable attention has been devoted to knights in modern literature, not limited to their more militaristic aspects. Part of the reason for this is that a wealth of contemporary material describes them, something borne of several factors. The majority of authors in the twelfth century were relatives of those in the increasingly self-aware grouping described by modern writers as knights.<sup>136</sup> The most common term used by writers of the medieval period was *milites* in Latin or *chevalier* in Old French. However, knights were not referred to by these terms alone, nor were these

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<sup>133</sup> Howden, 3:109.

<sup>134</sup> Ambroise, l.1919: ...*com Turcoples en berdeiant*,...

<sup>135</sup> Harari, 'The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples,' p.112

<sup>136</sup> Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.55

terms only applied to those who have ‘qualified’ as knights in the eyes of modern historians. Other terms described heavy cavalry, who were also termed *milites*. Of these, *loricis* is the most indicative of heavy equipment, given a more literal translation might simply be ‘armoured cavalryman’. The term appears occasionally in the German *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, and frequently in the work of William of Tyre. The translation of *loricis* is not in doubt; what is uncertain is the relationship of *loricis* and *milites*. From the source base alone, all that may be inferred from the former term is that it described armoured troops, who were probably mounted given the specific appearances. The *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* in particular describes twelve *loricis* riding with the Duke of Merania to guard the flanks of the German expedition in Serbia.<sup>137</sup> From the relative usage of the terms, *loricis* was probably a far more pragmatic designation of a certain level of equipment and military function alone, as opposed to *milites* which had connotations beyond the military sphere for the majority of the century.

The uncertainty over this fact however reveals just how widespread heavy equipment was among knights. Several explicit descriptions exist, of knights at the end of the twelfth century wearing hauberks, mail hose and a helm, particularly in the Old French of Ambroise and of *La Règle du Temple*.<sup>138</sup> In the Latin material, the much vaguer qualification of *armati* is favoured.<sup>139</sup> The sparse appearance of the qualification possibly represents an illustration of a spectrum of equipment. This can be viewed in two ways: either the *milites armati* were heavily-armed, while unqualified *milites* were not, or just that they were especially heavily-armed, beyond the usual level of armour expected of a knight. Beyond the explicit evidence above, one may also surmise heavy armour from the descriptions of knightly casualties (or rather the lack thereof). The German sources of the Third Crusade in particular note that while it was common for *milites* to be wounded, it was far rarer for them to be killed. The *Historia de Expeditione* describes the German assault on Dimotika, stating that ‘although many were wounded by javelins and other missiles, only three of our knights were killed here...’<sup>140</sup> The contemporary *Epistola de Morte Friderici* states that on an

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<sup>137</sup> *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, p.509

<sup>138</sup> Ambroise, ll.4617-30; *Règle*, §138

<sup>139</sup> HEF, p.85; Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.813

<sup>140</sup> HEF, pp.53-4 (...*licetque telis et missilibus plures sunt sauciati, tres autem solummodo milites ex nostris ibi fuerunt occisi*...). For a further example, see HEF, p.78.



occasion passing through Byzantine territory ‘although many of our knights were wounded, only one was killed.’<sup>141</sup> This evidence is not particularly decisive however, as there are a number of reasons why authors reported a high number of wounded but few actual deaths. Not least is the construction of a heroic narrative: the fact that the *milites* were wounded but succeeded nonetheless attested to their courage and determination. Significantly, the phenomenon only really occurs in relation to *milites*, and is not applied to other soldiers. This emphasises the distinction, though it is unclear whether this was due to their heavier equipment, or more social or economic concerns.

Perhaps the most iconic item of a knight’s equipment was his lance, and this seems to confirm the tactics they used. Passages of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and corresponding sections of the *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* describe Geoffrey of Lusignan leading five knights to force a bridge crossing by charging.<sup>142</sup> The precise usage of lances comes from another section of Ambroise, who describes ‘the lowering of the lances’ as the moment immediately before contact.<sup>143</sup> From this evidence therefore, lances were indeed used as part of the couched lance, shock charge technique. Further testimony from *La Règle du Temple*, illustrates that such a charge was conducted in small tactical units, described as *eschielles* in *La Règle*, or later *conrois*.<sup>144</sup> Such formations required significant discipline and training to maintain, especially in contact with the enemy. This somewhat more sophisticated view of knightly warfare directly contradicts the views of the traditionalist historians noted above.

Knights did not just appear as shock heavy cavalry, however. The group appears to have performed a wide range of military functions. The centrality of horses to the knightly condition is well-documented, with the *Epistola de Morte Friderici*, and the works of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, all emphasising that the knights who were on foot at various points in the Third and Fourth Crusades did usually go mounted.<sup>145</sup> In contrast, the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* describes the Duke of Swabia leading ‘a force of picked knights, who got ready while it was still dark,

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<sup>141</sup> *Epistola de morte Friderici Imperatoris*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.175: *Quamplures etiam milites ex nostris vulnerate sunt, unus solus occisus est.*

<sup>142</sup> IPGRR, 1:62; Ambroise, 4073-84

<sup>143</sup> Ambroise, ll.2544-9

<sup>144</sup> *Règle*, §105, 161; McGlynn, ‘The Myths of Medieval Warfare,’ pp.29-30.

<sup>145</sup> *Epistola de morte Friderici Imperatoris*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.177; Villehardouin, §178; Clari, §98

and at dawn, he ordered them to attack the enemy, sword in hand.<sup>146</sup> The implication is that the emphasis of the attack was on stealth and surprise, and that the *milites* were therefore likely on foot, with the sense therefore being that their role was less one restricted to performance as heavy cavalry, and more as general purpose, elite soldiers.

Further evidence from the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and the *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* which describes the first interaction between the Angevin contingent of the Third Crusade and the Cypriots of Emperor Isaac Angelos supports this. One of the ships of Richard's fleet was shipwrecked on the island, and the locals proceeded to attack the survivors. Among these were a number of Richard's household troops, though they only had three bows between them.<sup>147</sup> Only one of these, Roger de Harcourt, was specified as a knight: Ambroise described him as 'a companion of the king and one of his court.'<sup>148</sup> This illustrates another aspect of knightly warfare: the use of ranged weapons. Ambroise later also described the Count of Ferrers as the best archer between the Holy Land and Duens.<sup>149</sup> Far from the traditional view that knights were disdainful of archery, they were -to use the words of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*- 'always eager to practise the art of the archer and crossbowman'.<sup>150</sup> As well as this, and perhaps particularly specific to the crusading expeditions, with their inherent need for naval power, there were several instances of knights fighting aboard ships. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* describes one hundred knights together with fifty crossbowmen being set to defend each galley, with the King of England supposedly sending fifty ships so outfitted to the service of the King of Sicily.<sup>151</sup> The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* also describes *milites* fighting aboard ships, though it is stated that they are impeded by *arma graviora*, their heavy armour.<sup>152</sup>

The emerging picture is that of knights as utility soldiers, used for any and all tasks as required. This suggests they were supreme soldiers, though not due to the shock, mounted charge, as has been argued in the past.<sup>153</sup> A more balanced

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<sup>146</sup> HEF, p.44

<sup>147</sup> IPGRR, 2:30

<sup>148</sup> Ambroise, 11399: ...*del rei Richard, de ses maisness...*

<sup>149</sup> Ambroise, ll.3120-2

<sup>150</sup> For knights being disdainful of archery, see: Hatto, 'Archery and Chivalry,' p.43; IPGRR, 4:18: ...*quorum est stadium se jugiter arte sagittaria exercere, et balistis...*

<sup>151</sup> HEF, p.104

<sup>152</sup> IPGRR, 1:34.

<sup>153</sup> See above, Chapter 1.

view is that of the post-revisionist John France: knights were significant but not necessarily decisive.<sup>154</sup> Although there are many examples of knights seeming to perform all the tasks that might be required in warfare, there are many more of the same requiring support from other soldiers. For example Roger of Howden described that forty *milites* had the support of at least a hundred turcoples at the Springs of Cresson, and later noted five hundred *milites Christiani optimi* with ten thousand *hominum pugnatorum*.<sup>155</sup> Howden also stated that, as part of his surrender, the Emperor Isaac Angelos of Cyprus agreed to send a hundred *milites* with the support of four hundred *Turcoples equites* and five hundred *pedites bene armatis*.<sup>156</sup> Ralph of Coggeshall stated that the eighty knights accompanying Richard to Jaffa at the end of the Third Crusade were supported by a force of forty crossbowmen.<sup>157</sup> Richard of Devizes, describing the Angevin ship-borne contingent, stated that there were forty *equites* with expensive warhorses, supported by forty *pedites* and fifteen sailors on each ship of the fleet, and later described two thousand knights being supported by a thousand foot-archers making up Richard's initial retinue.<sup>158</sup> The work of Richard of Devizes must be treated with particular caution however, due to the author's heavy emphasis on satire.<sup>159</sup> The main aim of the text means that Richard's main concern was entertainment of his audience, and his concern with accurately reporting military events was definitely secondary. While the two may have overlapped, it gives significant cause to question the terminology in use throughout the account.

When one looks at the full contingents, knights clearly represented a very small proportion of medieval military forces. For example the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes the German army being made up of three thousand *milites* and eighty thousand *reliquorum*, before stating that the force initially led to Acre by Guy of Lusignan numbered a mere seven hundred knights as part of a total force of nine thousand, with the rest being described as *alii plures*.<sup>160</sup> Likewise, Roger of Howden distinguished between five hundred *milites* and ten thousand *homines pugnatores* in the forces of the Third Crusade, and seemed unconcerned with

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<sup>154</sup> France, 'Warfare in the Mediterranean,' p.19.

<sup>155</sup> Howden, 3:21.

<sup>156</sup> Howden, 3:109.

<sup>157</sup> Coggeshall, 43-4

<sup>158</sup> Devizes, p.15; p.22.

<sup>159</sup> Devizes, p.xi; Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, p.248.

<sup>160</sup> For the former see: IPGRR, 1:22; for the latter: IPGRR, 1:26

identifying the latter.<sup>161</sup> This theme of ‘knights and others’ continued in the Fourth Crusade *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, with the author making references to ‘*militum et aliorum*’.<sup>162</sup> The terminology is vague, and while the specific numbers may be doubted, the proportions are significant. It is abundantly clear that knights did indeed represent only a small proportion of the total soldiers found in medieval armies.

### 3.8. Conclusion

Medieval cavalry forces therefore remain complex in makeup. The difference in equipment reflected wealth and status rather than function and attempts to make clear and definite distinctions are misguided.<sup>163</sup> There were clearly a number of different groupings, and each with varied equipment, function and military standing. From the evidence above, knights did not form a distinct functional military grouping. Instead, they performed a wide variety of tasks in a military setting. While most knights were heavily-armoured by contemporary standards, ‘traditional’ heavy cavalry and heavily-armoured individuals were not all necessarily knights. That being said, the grouping of knights was clearly pre-eminent among medieval cavalry. From comparison with mounted sergeants in particular, this was not based on function or even equipment. Knights probably had access to higher-quality equipment -specifically trained warhorses- which only made it tactically sound for them to act as the front-rank soldiers. With second rank cavalry soldiers (including the poorer knights unable to afford true warhorses, as well as mounted sergeants and *armigeri*) still being mounted however, there was no quantitative difference in their level of equipment. What is clear from the evidence above is that it is difficult to define a knight. This represents a challenge to the clear popular conception of knights as heavy, shock cavalry.

A third category must be added between heavy and light cavalry to illustrate the disparity between knightly heavy cavalry mounted on trained warhorses, and those who could not afford such expensive mounts, including poorer knights, mounted sergeants, and the *armigeri* retainers. While broadly there was no

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<sup>161</sup> Howden, 3:21

<sup>162</sup> ‘*Devastatio Constantinopolitana*’, in MGH SS 16, p.10.

<sup>163</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.71.

difference in the quantity of other equipment, if one could afford a trained warhorse, one could probably also afford higher quality weapons and armour than average. Knights were therefore positioned as the de facto highest rank in the medieval military hierarchy and may be broadly grouped into the 'heavy' cavalry, which represented those cavalymen who fought in the front rank, using unsubtle, shock charge tactics. At the other end of the tactical spectrum was the light cavalry; including but by no means limited to horse archers. 'Light cavalry' can be said to represent any mounted troops utilising the hit-and-run tactics with their greater mobility and included the likes of the mounted crossbowmen described by Villehardouin, and the turcoples which appear throughout the crusading material. The third tactical category placed in between 'heavy' and 'light' cavalry -though decidedly closer to the former than the latter- might most sensibly be termed 'medium' or second-rank cavalry. This third category of cavalry included those who added mass to a charge. They also had the capacity for independent activity. Of the groupings examined above, this probably included the poorer knights, the mounted sergeants and the *armigeri*. While these groupings are useful on a functional basis, it should be emphasised that the lines between each of them were blurred. Medieval cavalry existed on a spectrum of functionality, and one must conclude based on this and the evidence above that attempts to tightly define the military terms of the twelfth century are impossible. There remains scope to consider social and cultural influences which caused authors to use different terms.

## Chapter 4 – The Infantry Forces of the Crusading Expeditions

The study of medieval infantry is somewhat limited compared to that of cavalry, due largely to the neglect of the traditionalist school discussed in Chapter 1. Most prevalent is disdain for infantry such as that conveyed by Sir Charles Oman, who marginalises an ineffectual twelfth-century infantry.<sup>1</sup> Only after the rise of tactics precipitated by the infantry revolution of the early fourteenth century have historians identified infantry as potentially significant, either in open battle or in warfare in general.<sup>2</sup> There is considerable evidence that the infantry formed the numerical bulk of medieval armies, with Villehardouin asserting that there were some twenty thousand *serjanꝝ a pié* expected to participate in the Fourth Crusade.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile Robert of Clari gave an unrealistic figure of one hundred thousand *hommes a pié*, but he nonetheless conveys a sense of considerable numbers.<sup>4</sup> The former contrasts them with 4,500 *chevaliers*, with the latter placing that number at some four thousand. It is obvious that extreme proportions are present even among figures which show more dramatic restraint: Villehardouin suggests five *serjanꝝ* to one *chevalier*. Outside the Fourth Crusade, William the Breton claims the French forces left under the command of the Duke of Burgundy after the siege of Acre numbered some five hundred *milites* and ten thousand *pedites*.<sup>5</sup> Even among the enemy forces, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes Saladin's army numbering some twenty thousand *equites* and 'a countless horde of *pedites*...'<sup>6</sup> This chapter will examine the efficacy, equipment and diversity of the infantry forces of various crusading expeditions, with focus on a few specific groupings. 'Sergeants', *pedites*, crossbowmen, archers and foot-knights are the focal points of the chapter, with their relationships being particularly significant.

### 4.1. The Equipment and Use of Crusading Infantry

The specific numbers given by Villehardouin and Robert of Clari themselves may be doubted, but the effort made to quantify the relative sizes of the cavalry and infantry contingents of the Fourth Crusade make it clear that more men fought

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<sup>1</sup> Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol.1*, p.270; 282; 296; 309.

<sup>2</sup> McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare,' p.29; Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.8

<sup>3</sup> Villehardouin, §21

<sup>4</sup> Clari, §6

<sup>5</sup> William the Breton, *Philippide*, 4:279-84

<sup>6</sup> IPGRR, 6:12: ...*peditum nihilominus a montanis innumerabilis multitudi...*

on foot than on horseback. The proportions of infantry to cavalry, are inconsistent: Villehardouin's is five to one, Robert of Clari's and William the Breton's are twenty to one. But although not all forces had the same proportions, it is indisputable that infantry vastly outnumbered cavalry. Of course, scepticism should be expressed concerning the specific numbers reported, but the salient point is that there were far more infantry than cavalry in most military forces. There are many reasons for this, though the logical explanation is one of economics.<sup>7</sup> However, this oversimplifies the picture considerably. The concept of well-equipped infantry did exist in the twelfth century, as evidenced by Roger of Howden's description of the surrender of the Emperor Isaac Angelos of Cyprus. Among the terms forced upon Isaac was the provision for a force of soldiers to defend the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which included some five hundred *pedites bene armati*.<sup>8</sup> The authors of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and the *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* even provided a useful list describing a well-equipped infantryman: 'His armour was quite adequate for a *pedes*: his head was protected by an iron covering; he also had a mail-shirt and a tunic made of quilted linen, popularly called a 'doublet'.<sup>9</sup> This anecdote was almost certainly a literary construction, since its purpose was to demonstrate the power of God: the word of God stopped a crossbow bolt where all this armour failed. Such well-equipped infantrymen were probably unrepresentative rather than inaccurate, but the evidence provided by the anecdote should not be ignored.

Similarly, the pragmatic Old French Rule of the Temple describes the equipment of mounted sergeants as including mail hose without feet.<sup>10</sup> It is possible that this was to allow a degree of flexibility, so that they could fight on foot if the need arose. Given the remainder of the equipment listed, the Templars would have been provided with mailed and helmed infantry.

Against this however can be placed the evidence of Gunther of Pairis who, in one of his verse sections, describes the crusader army: 'The majority are infantry; a cohort unprotected by breastplates, helmets, shields – useful items for those

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<sup>7</sup> McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, p.135; M. Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.83.

<sup>8</sup> Howden, 3:109

<sup>9</sup> IPGRR, 1:48 (*Armatus quidem erat more peditum satis competenter, ferreo tegmina capite munito; lorica quoque, tunica etiam linea multiplici consuta, lineis interioribus difficile penetrandis...*). See also: Ambroise, 1.3560 (...*armez de coife e de hauberk / e de porpoint a meint bel merc.*).

<sup>10</sup> Règle, §141

attacking a city...<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately there are difficulties inherent in using Gunther's evidence in a military context, primarily that he must be considered cautiously, for similar reasons to those noted above in consideration of the *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium*.<sup>12</sup> Gunther's account was more extensive than the *Gesta Episcoporum*, but served a similar purpose. It provided an *apologia* for Abbot Martin of Pairis and his actions on the Fourth Crusade, as well as those of the expedition as a whole. Similarly, Gunther was a monk with limited direct experience of both crusading and wider warfare. The perception therefore is of hordes of poorly-equipped men on foot, barely worthy of the description of soldier. This conforms to the impressions of traditionalist military historians.

Unsurprisingly, this implicit trend of 'useless infantry' is present in other primary sources as well. Perhaps the most poignant example comes towards the end of Richard of Devizes' account of Richard I on the Third Crusade, where he described the king supposedly preparing to march on Jerusalem: 'A host beyond numbering came to him, of whom the greater part were *pedites*. When he had sent them all away, since they were useless...'<sup>13</sup> The author of the *Historia Peregrinorum* joined Devizes in his dismissal of the efficacy of infantry forces, stating that Frederick Barbarossa 'issued an edict so that no one on foot, and no one unfit in the use of arms,...' would accompany the expedition.<sup>14</sup> The latter example does not explicitly state that Barbarossa considered those on foot useless, but the fact that those on foot and those who lacked arms (*inermes*) were likewise forbidden suggests they were both considered useless. Villehardouin on several occasions implied that any troops who were not *chevaliers* were 'not as much help in battle', stating also that 'there were men in our battalions who were not knights and were not skilled in arms...'<sup>15</sup> Although one might immediately point to simple pilgrims, the fact that they were 'men in our battalions', suggests that they were still considered combatants, just less useful than knights. Villehardouin was

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<sup>11</sup> Gunther von Pairis, ed. Orth, 16:V4-5 (*Maxima pars peditum lorica casside parma / Immunita cohors, quibus oppugnantibus urbem...*)

<sup>12</sup> See above, Chapter 2.

<sup>13</sup> Devizes, p.81: *Conuenit ad eum populus sine numero, ex quibus pars plurima pedites fuerunt. Quibus quibus quia inutiles erant repulsis...*

<sup>14</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.126: *...edicto prohibuit, ut nemo pedes, nemo usibus armorum minus idoneus, nullus etiam qui ad minus in biennium sumptus itineris habere non posset...*

<sup>15</sup> For the former, see: Villehardouin, §155 (*...qui n'avoient mis si grant mestier en bataille furent...*). For the latter Villehardouin, §359 (*Et li n'orent bataille d'autre gent que de chevaliers, qui ne savoient mie assez d'armes...*).



unconcerned with the affairs of the non-combatant elements of the expedition throughout, and there is nothing overt to suggest that these men were unskilled in any way other than relative to the knights they accompanied. Given the author's reticence with regards to non-combatants, it is unlikely that these men represented a wholly unskilled mass. Perhaps instead they approximated a crusading equivalent to the rural levy of western Christendom. The example is unclear, but knights remain emphasised as the most effective combat troops in the encounter.

Ambroise also implies that *chevaliers* were the only useful troops, stating that a group of *serjanz à pié* died quickly 'for they received no help apart from some knights who hurried over, but there was not a large number of them...'<sup>16</sup>

Ambroise does not explicitly describe the foot soldiers as useless, but the implication is that they were unable to defend themselves, and their only hope came from a small group of *chevaliers*. At this point it is important to acknowledge that most contemporary authors would have been influenced by elite culture. Authors would largely have come from socially superior families, so elitism was likely embedded in their attitudes to combat and combatants. This might well have manifested in the use of rhetorical devices to valorise the importance of mounted warriors, particularly in sources written for the elite.

Despite the disparaging descriptions of infantry found even in the primary sources, infantry was nonetheless useful -or essential- in fulfilling wide-ranging duties: as parts of garrison or besieging forces, or engineers.<sup>17</sup> In the secondary literature, infantry has been described as the 'natural arm' of defence due to its comparatively low mobility, although they were capable of offense.<sup>18</sup> This is contrasted against cavalry, who were highly mobile, but poor for static defence. The most frequent mentions of infantry associate them with defence. There are examples throughout the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* of both Christian and Muslim forces utilising infantry as blocking forces, or to protect the camp, the horses or - on the march- the knights and their horses.<sup>19</sup> These forces are described as *pedites* and *satellites*, with the two being distinguished in the forces which assisted Count

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<sup>16</sup> Ambroise, ll.3478-88: ...*que onques succurru ne furent / fors de chevalier qui corurent, / mais n'en I curut pas grantment...*

<sup>17</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.46.

<sup>18</sup> Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited,' p.49.

<sup>19</sup> IPGRR, 1:61; 1:62; 4:7; 4:17. See also: 'France' Warfare in the Mediterranean,' p.19.

Henry of Champagne in protecting the flank of the fighting column, as well as when the infantry were used in the rear-guard of the army.<sup>20</sup>

There are numerous examples of infantry being used in a more offensive capacity. Even when these occur however, the infantry tends to appear in a support role. For example, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes how ‘the *militēs* knocked [the enemy] down and our *pedites* beheaded them.’<sup>21</sup> The implication is that the heavy cavalry shock charge broke the enemy formation, with the *pedites* advancing in support to ensure there was no possibility of a rally and counterattack. The positioning of foot-soldiers in a supporting offensive role is also described by Villehardouin, who placed *serjan̄* together with *escuiers à pié* behind the squadrons of *chevaliers* as they prepared to face a Greek army which supposedly outnumbered the crusaders two to one.<sup>22</sup> Here their role might have been different however, with the text of the passage indicating the crusader forces were expecting defeat. The infantry was not placed in a position to follow and ‘mop up’ fallen enemies, but rather to be utilised more as a mobile bulwark - to form a rally point- in case the initial shock cavalry charge was repulsed. In any event, the engagement did not proceed, with Villehardouin -supported by Robert of Clari- stating that the Greeks took one look at the Latin host and fled.<sup>23</sup>

Villehardouin’s description of the landing outside Constantinople provides further clarity regarding infantry used in offensive actions. The *chevaliers* came out of their *uissiers* on their warhorses, all fully-armed, supported by companies of archers, sergeants and crossbowmen from the *gran̄z nés*.<sup>24</sup> Once again it seems that cavalry was used to sweep away enemy skirmishers and establish a beach-head for the infantry to then secure. This illustrates well a problem with the perception of infantry in warfare. A fine line exists between what is classed as ‘offense’ and what is considered ‘defence’ particularly regarding the interplay between tactics and strategy. For example, one might be tactically defensive (i.e. the infantry holding position) while simultaneously being strategically offensive (establishing the beach-head in the first place). While the cavalry elements of this, and other examples, very obviously constitute a tactically offensive arm, it is

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<sup>20</sup> IPGRR, 4:17 and 1:62 respectively. For the rear-guard, see also: Ambroise, ll.4055-8.

<sup>21</sup> IPGRR, 4:19: ...*ipsos enim a militibus prostratos decollaverunt pedites nostri.*

<sup>22</sup> Villehardouin, §178.

<sup>23</sup> Clari, §47

<sup>24</sup> Villehardouin, §155-6.

unfair to describe infantry fulfilling a strictly defensive role, however defensive their tactics were. To take the latter example once more, the infantry utilised defensive tactics to aggressively achieve an objective (taking the beach). It suggests that infantry was used in a strategically offensive capacity, if perhaps not tactically.

In the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, after the forces of Frederick Barbarossa had broken a Turkish force, there was a further engagement when the defeated enemy rallied enough to counterattack. In response, the Latin infantry advanced to meet the Turks ahead of the cavalry.<sup>25</sup> The impression this gives is of the infantry screening the Latin heavy cavalry against Turkish light cavalry skirmishing before they conducted their shock charge, something widely-argued in the secondary literature as being the primary role of infantry.<sup>26</sup> It is possible to discern a conscious difference in deployment according to the general composition of the enemy forces. The Greek army faced by the Latins of the Fourth Crusade in 1203 was likely similar in make-up to that of the crusaders, meaning there was limited need for a screening force of infantry to protect against horse-archers. In general, the Byzantine armies included fewer horse-archers than their Turkish counterparts, and none of the specific accounts which deal with the battle on the 17 July 1203 note the presence of Byzantine horse-archers.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, when the German forces marching to join the Third Crusade encountered the Turks in Asia Minor, the enemy forces were rather different. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* frequently characterised the Turkish forces as using hit-and-run probing tactics.<sup>28</sup> It therefore stands to reason that the infantry would have preceded the more valuable cavalry to soak up enemy fire.

These tactics are somewhat reminiscent of those utilised very early during the crusading expeditions, at the Battle of Dorylaeum in 1097. The action at Dorylaeum was not one chosen by the Christian forces. However, they appear to have stumbled upon tactics which handled the unfamiliar steppe warfare effectively. The crusader infantry came under attack first by more mobile forces.

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<sup>25</sup> HEF, p.79

<sup>26</sup> Powicke, 'Review: Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), by R.C. Smail,' p.135; Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, tr. Willard, Southern, p.195

<sup>27</sup> Nicolle describes a 'preponderance of foreigners' in the armies of Emperor Alexius I. Though he concedes that there were subsequent attempts to scale back this dependence, it seems likely large numbers remained by 1204. See: Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, pp.167-77.

<sup>28</sup> HEF, p.76

Instead of breaking, they held. This allowed the heavy cavalry-led counter-attack which proved so decisive. Given the nature of the initial attack, it is unlikely that this was planned by the leaders of the First Crusade. Their reactions were undeniably effective though. They then seemingly learnt from their victory snatched from the jaws of defeat. The First Crusade arguably consciously adopted such tactics in their few further pitched battles and spread knowledge of them upon their return home.<sup>29</sup> This would seem to be a very tangible legacy of the First Crusade.

Against enemies with similar troops, cavalry was deployed to the front because by-and-large the enemy would likely deploy cavalry as a direct counter (the cavalry of both armies would charge each other, and one side would break the other). The value of the infantry was to support the charge and provide a rallying point should the cavalry be broken. By contrast, against armies which included greater capacity for massed firepower, including Middle Eastern armies with their large numbers of horse-archers, infantry was vital. With their famed hit-and-run tactics, Muslim forces did not adhere to the 'established rules' of western warfare. The role of the infantry was to protect the crucial horses of the cavalry from enemy fire, who would then charge and break the enemy once they had been drawn in closer in an effort to exert more pressure on the infantry. Of course, this tactic would begin to break down if massed fire broke the infantry formation before the enemy came within reach of a heavy cavalry charge.

Regardless of where the infantry was deployed in relation to cavalry, it clearly performed a vital role, with the ability to maintain a solid formation proving crucial.<sup>30</sup> Villehardouin's consideration of any who were not *chevaliers* as being 'not as much help in battle', and the implication this entails has precipitated arguments for the importance of cavalry even in infantry warfare.<sup>31</sup> A recent trend in the historiography has claimed that dismounted cavalry were crucial for stiffening the resolve of infantry, with the argument being that solid infantry formations neutralised the shock charge of heavy cavalry due to the fact that the

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<sup>29</sup> Although speculation, discussion of the spread of such tactics could likely fill a further thesis on its own.

<sup>30</sup> A significant example of this is Richard's famed fighting march along the coast to Jaffa.

<sup>31</sup> Villehardouin, §155, §359

tactics was more of a psychological weapon than a physical one.<sup>32</sup> It is conceded that such infantry and formations were rare, but a degree of generalisation exists in the historiography. A great degree of emphasis has been placed on the importance of infantry in ‘revisionist’ arguments. However, the prevailing trend is that the majority of medieval infantry forces required integrated dismounted cavalrymen to be useful – that they were generally of low quality when deployed alone.<sup>33</sup>

## 4.2. Functional Diversity among Crusading Infantry

As with cavalry, the diversity of medieval infantry is difficult to ascertain by terminology alone, due to the paucity of different terms. The terms used are also applied in a variety of ways, making accurate definitions and translations more elusive than when considering cavalry. The Latin term most associated with ‘infantry’ of the medieval period is *pedites*. Perhaps because of the widespread usage of the term, the only solid conclusion is that the term described those who went on foot. Although it is most common in military contexts, *pedites* also appears describing the *inermes* camp followers of the expeditions. The vernacular Old French sources describe both *serjanz à pié* and *gent à pié*, and it is unclear if this was a meaningful military distinction.<sup>34</sup> Villehardouin, referred to *serjanz* throughout, and implied they formed the entirety of the Latin infantry. They therefore included archers and crossbowmen, in addition to their usual characterisation as *mêlée* troops. Robert of Clari’s terminology was similar, however he also used the word *quemun* in a military context, where Villehardouin tends to associate them with the mass of camp followers, those described as *inermes* in Latin.<sup>35</sup>

A common trend in modern historiography has divided infantry according to whether they fought with *mêlée* or missile weapons.<sup>36</sup> This is reflective of primary sources, with the most common distinctions being the establishment of archers

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<sup>32</sup> Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.30; p.83; Morillo, ‘The “Age of Cavalry” Revisited,’ p.50.

<sup>33</sup> See Villehardouin, §178. See also Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.106.

<sup>34</sup> Ambroise, ll.1634-41 and 1665-8.

<sup>35</sup> *Quemun* is potentially a variation on *comun* meaning “common people; local population; retinue.” See: A. Hindley, F.W. Langley, B.J. Levy, *Old French-English Dictionary* (Cambridge, 2000). *Inermes* has more specific connotations of being defenceless or unarmed, see Ashdowne et al., *Dictionary*, (3 vols.).

<sup>36</sup> Bennett et al., *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World*, p.151

and/or crossbowmen as a subset of *pedites*.<sup>37</sup> By contrast, the only ‘extra’ term which appears to distinguish among the *mêlée* infantry was that of ‘foot-knight’. Also referred to as ‘dismounted cavalry’, they appear frequently in modern literature, though the Anglo-Norman knights are the focus of study, with their performances at Tinchebrai and Lincoln.<sup>38</sup> It is clear that the practice was more geographically widespread however, as is argued by Bradbury.<sup>39</sup> Foot-knights are mentioned by both Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, with both describing their presence outside the walls of Constantinople in 1203.<sup>40</sup> It is important to note the circumstances however. Both Villehardouin and Robert of Clari described these knights on foot as being those who had lost their horses, and this implies that it was a necessity rather than a conscious strategic decision.

Beyond foot-knights, the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* describes a division of Frederick’s army consisting of *pedites et fortiorum ex pueris*, the *pedites* and the stronger of the *pueris*.<sup>41</sup> This appears to place the *pedites* above the *pueris*, with all the former included but only some of the latter. However, the *pueri* were possibly mounted, given the association -noted above- of the word *puer* with the grouping of squires. Similarly, Richard of Devizes, who used the word *scutarii* towards the end of his account to describe cavalry soldiers who were not *milites*, also used the word to describe Muslim troops on the ramparts of Acre during the siege.<sup>42</sup> Given their position on the ramparts, in this case the *scutarii* fought on foot, even if in the later example they were definitely mounted.<sup>43</sup> The most obvious explanation is a simple imprecision of vocabulary because of Devizes’ disinterest in the specifics of military terminology. If not, then the usage must still be considered carefully. The application of the term to Muslim soldiers is somewhat problematic, as it inevitably reflects a Christian author locating foreign troops within his own concept of military framework.

Foot-knights are often characterised as strictly *mêlée* infantry, but there are several examples suggesting familiarity with more ranged roles as well. An

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<sup>37</sup> J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer* (Woodbridge, 1985), p.25; Nicolle, *Fighting for the Faith*, p.25; Edbury, ‘Warfare in the Latin East,’ p.93

<sup>38</sup> Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare*, p.54; Prestwich, ‘*Miles in Armis Strenuus*: The Knight at War,’ p.204

<sup>39</sup> Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer*, pp.39-51

<sup>40</sup> Villehardouin, §178, Clari, §45.

<sup>41</sup> HEF, p.34

<sup>42</sup> Devizes, p.44.

<sup>43</sup> Devizes, pp.81-2

example later in the *Itinerarium* describes foot-knights using bows and crossbows, stating they were ‘always eager to practise the art of the archer and crossbowmen’.<sup>44</sup> Although the term *miles* could be considered exceptional due to the uncertain connotations of the word, it shows the reality of soldiers usually considered *mêlée* troops using ranged weapons as a matter of course.

The Angevin sources of the Third Crusade particularly contain examples of persons associated with skilful archery. The first episode comes when the Angevin crusaders neared Cyprus, and some of Richard’s ships were wrecked on the coastline. Both Ambroise and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* emphasise how underequipped and outnumbered the crusaders were, and both name ‘the Norman William du Bois, who was a very skilled archer’.<sup>45</sup> While William is not identified as a knight, unlike his erstwhile comrade-in-arms Roger de Harcourt, the author stated that both were men of King Richard’s household; indeed, Ambroise described them as *de ses maisnees*, or ‘of his retinue’, which suggests standing, if not outright professionalism.<sup>46</sup>

The relative tactics used by the two named members of the household are also interesting to note. Roger de Harcourt made do with what was at hand, mounting a mare to scatter the enemy, though apparently with nothing but a bow. Of more interest is the description of William du Bois. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes him as firing arrows and darts untiringly, *nunc hos nunc illos*, which might be translated as ‘this way and that’, but might also be translated far more literally, as ‘now here, now there’.<sup>47</sup> This is a vague description, and the Old French description varies a little. Ambroise stated that he struck them *devant et derriere* or ‘in front and behind’.<sup>48</sup> The suggestion is that both these sources were describing hit-and-run tactics, and that they represented William changing position between shots in an attempt to confuse and terrify the enemy by suggesting more than one attacker. It is important to note that the anecdote is likely inflated to emphasise the heroism of members of Richard’s household, and the specifics of the encounter were probably invented. This does not discount the conclusions

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<sup>44</sup> IGPRR, 4:18: ...*quorum est stadium se jugiter arte sagittaria exercere, et balistis...*

<sup>45</sup> IPGRR, 2:30 (*Willelmus etiam de Bosco Normannus, areus peritissimus...*); Ambroise, 1398-1419 (*E Guillams del Bois Normant, / li bon archiers...*)

<sup>46</sup> Ambroise, 1399

<sup>47</sup> IPGRR, 2:30

<sup>48</sup> Ambroise, 1418

however. While the specifics might be inaccurate, the fact that such tactics were known and readily described attests to their commonality. This suggests that, while the hit-and-run tactics of Turkish horse archers were relatively foreign to the Western crusaders, ‘traditional’ light infantry tactics were used at least around the Angevin realms.

### 4.3. Foot-knights: Frequency and Circumstance

A soldier fighting on foot in the twelfth century normally signified that they could not afford a combat-worthy mount, which likely also denoted low social status. There are however occasions upon which soldiers who usually fought as cavalry dismounted and became infantry. By reason of the nature of the source material, and the focus of contemporary authors, the most abundant examples are of *milites*. These examples are broadly divided between those of *milites* fighting on foot out of necessity, and those evidencing a conscious tactical decision. There were three contexts in which cavalry could be forced to dismount, ranging from siege warfare, to naval warfare and finally when the *milites* had lost their horses.

For siege warfare, *milites* or *chevaliers* appear most frequently in the sources for the Fourth Crusade outside Constantinople. Early in the siege, *milites* of the Doge of Venice used the bridge of a ship-mounted tower to force entry into the city. Although little mention is made of their equipment, the context makes it unlikely that they were mounted. The example appears in both Robert of Clari and Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, and the Venetian soldiers appear both as *chevaliers* and *milites* respectively.<sup>49</sup> The seeming equivalence of terms shall be examined further below. More significant is that, even if the *chevaliers* described by eyewitness Robert of Clari were not equivalent to *milites*, the Frenchman clearly used the term to denote troops who usually fought mounted. Robert repeated such a term later when describing an attack made upon the walls of Constantinople by his lord, Pierre d’Amiens. The contingent was described as ten *chevaliers* and sixty *serjanz*, and while they are not specified as being on foot, nor are they specified being mounted. The soldiers were described breaking down a gate with axes, and one can surmise that they were probably on foot.<sup>50</sup> *Chevaliers* -a word with

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<sup>49</sup> *Albrichi monachi Triumfontium Chronicon*, in MGH SS 23 (Hannover, 1874), p.883; Clari, §74.

<sup>50</sup> Clari, §75, §76.



connotations of being mounted- was once again associated with those fighting on foot.

Robert's countryman Geoffrey of Villehardouin also described *chevaliers* as directly involved in siege operations. Jacques d'Avesnes, in the comparatively minor engagement at the Tower of Galatia, fought on foot in the midst of his *maisnie*.<sup>51</sup> Jacques is described throughout Villehardouin's work as a *chevalier*, often specified as being one of good quality, having been described as *preudomme* in the opening chapters of the account.<sup>52</sup> Similarly Robert of Clari describes his as one of *li plus rike homes*.<sup>53</sup> Given his obvious standing, his retinue, described as a *maisnie*, probably included more than a few knights, albeit of lower standing or lesser economic means. Jacques was himself a knight fighting on foot in an attempt to seize fortifications. A similar although somewhat more obscure example exists in William of Tyre's account of the Second Crusade. Describing an effort by Conrad's men against Damascus, he stated they 'all leaped down from their horses and became foot soldiers, as is the custom of the Teutons...'<sup>54</sup>

The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* yields a further example in the naval context, with the description of an engagement which involved *milites* defending ships, even despite their being impeded by *arma graviora* (heavier arms).<sup>55</sup> These *milites* were probably fighting on foot and, given their presence aboard ships this would have been a physical necessity rather than a tactical decision. Aside from ship-to-ship combat, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes knights on foot -led by King Richard himself- being involved in the action outside Jaffa. The king is said to have jumped into the sea 'with no armour on his legs' before 'all the rest [of his household] followed...advancing on foot.'<sup>56</sup> This is supported by the Anglo-Norman Ambroise.<sup>57</sup> The capability for mounted amphibious assaults did exist, as is evidenced by the earlier landing at Limassol, and the debarkation of the Fourth Crusade outside Constantinople, and there are any number of reasons why the landing at Jaffa was undertaken on foot rather than horseback.<sup>58</sup> The

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<sup>51</sup> Villehardouin, §160.

<sup>52</sup> Villehardouin, §8.

<sup>53</sup> Clari, §1.

<sup>54</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 17:4: *Ubi tam ipse quam sui de equis descendentes et facti pedites, sicut mos est Theutonicis...*

<sup>55</sup> IPGRR, 1:35

<sup>56</sup> IPGRR, 6:15: *...tibus inermis...hos sequebantur omnes alii prosilientes in mare, ut pedites procederunt.*

<sup>57</sup> Ambroise, ll.11096-110.

<sup>58</sup> See above, Chapter 3.

availability of suitable horses or the right landing craft would have been very real concerns, as would the nature of the terrain under assault. If the beach was too steep, or the footing too unsure, it is unlikely that expensive warhorses would have been risked. It is of course possible that Richard decided the assault was just more likely to succeed on foot rather than horseback, in which case this would qualify as a tactical decision.

Far more common were examples of knights fighting on foot for lack of another option. On crusading expeditions, there were numerous instances where those soldiers who normally fought on horseback were reduced to fighting on foot through lack of mounts. Both Villehardouin and Robert of Clari described *chevaliers* being deployed on foot in July 1203. Robert states that there were seven battles each of 700 knights, of which fifty were on foot, with the suggestion that they followed their mounted counterparts, along with three or four companies of *serjanx à pié* each.<sup>59</sup> Villehardouin's description is similar, but differs in several details. *Serjanx* and *escuiers à pié* were formed up behind the rumps of the horses, and he then stated that there was also a 'division of foot-knights, some two hundred, who had no horses'.<sup>60</sup> The expedition was not necessarily short on horses, but it suggests there were no trained warhorses available, required for a knightly charge.

This phenomenon was not unique to the Fourth Crusade however, with the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describing 'milites who had lost their warhorses walking on foot with the *pedites*'.<sup>61</sup> The author used the terms *equis dextrariis*, which suggests that *milites* would rather fight on foot than from the back of an untrained mount. That said, there are examples of knights choosing to ride a substandard mount rather than go on foot.<sup>62</sup> The *Itinerarium* described it as a mare, which was perhaps considered shameful for a knight.<sup>63</sup> Ambroise described the same incident with Roger of Harcourt mounting a *ywe* (pack-horse).<sup>64</sup> Both authors are thought to have accompanied the expedition, but they were probably absent for the events

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<sup>59</sup> Clari, §45.

<sup>60</sup> Villehardouin, §178: *Et firent bataille de lor chevaliers a pié, dont il avoient bien cc qui n'avoient mais nul cheval.*

<sup>61</sup> IPGRR, 4:18: *Ibi videres milites nostros, equis dextrariis amissis, cum peditibus pedites ambulare,...*

<sup>62</sup> IPGRR, 2:30. Outside of the sources primarily under consideration, the records of the First Crusade are rife with such examples. See Kostick, *Social Structure*, p.185.

<sup>63</sup> *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, ed. & tr. Nicholson, p.181; Chrétien de Troyes, *Perceval (Le Conte du Graal)*, ed. K. Busby (London, 1993), 6908-11

<sup>64</sup> Ambroise, ll.1398-1419

on Cyprus they described.<sup>65</sup> The passage must be considered as an anecdote serving a literary or dramatic purpose: to contrast the bravery and prowess of the crusaders against the perfidy and cowardice of the Greeks. The way in which both authors emphasised the poverty of the crusaders, with bows as their only weapons, limited armour, and outnumbered substantially by the Greeks, suggests that their aim was to emphasize the bravery of those shipwrecked by making the adversity they faced seem insurmountable. Placing Roger de Harcourt on an inferior mount was possibly just another way to do this, rather than necessarily being an accurate representation of what occurred.

Before even the Third Crusade there was a theme of knights fighting on foot being considered poor or needy. Odo of Deuil suggested on a few occasions that knights performed better on horseback, particularly in his description of the French defeat in Anatolia during the course of the Second Crusade.<sup>66</sup> William of Tyre similarly described 'noble knights, of high birth and warlike deeds, on foot.'<sup>67</sup> The suggestion is that despite their knightly attributes of high social standing and military prowess, their lack of mount made them substandard. This was possibly because it made them unable to act as cavalry -which was perhaps their natural state- but a more nuanced view would be that the lack of mobility afforded by being on foot limited their tactical and strategic value as soldiers. The suggestion remains therefore that the knight's association was with the horse and not necessarily with mounted status.

The distinction may seem a small one, but it is significant, as there are different connotations. The former implies that the horse was primarily a piece of equipment, which provided a strategic and -in some situations- tactical advantage. Indeed, the situations in which horses provided a tactical advantage were -in the context of medieval warfare- limited to pitched battles where the terrain was suitable for shock charge tactics – something notably not the case at Mount Cadmus during the Second Crusade. Of course, another possibility is that these attitudes were more reflective of cultural ideals surrounding the valorisation of mounted warfare.

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<sup>65</sup> For more in the authorship of the respective sources, see: Ambroise, pp.1-13

<sup>66</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 7:118-9

<sup>67</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 6:22: *...multi nobiles et apud suos tam genere quam strenuitate preclari ea die, qua bellum indictum est, consumptis opibus inopes facti et equos non habentes, partim pedites,...*

Given the evidence cited earlier in this chapter, non-knightly, well-equipped infantry did exist. Whether this was an issue of apparent rarity, or merely one of authors being unwilling to or disinterested in reporting heavily-armoured infantry is unclear. One must ask on what basis foot-knights were distinguished however. Was it simply that the terms *milites* and *chevaliers* both connoted those who usually fought from horseback? Given the economic status required to acquire and maintain a warhorse, it is possible that even afoot, knights were more heavily-equipped than their poorer counterparts, usually described as sergeants or *pedites*. Even those described in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* as *gregarii milites*, or poor knights, were described along with *iuvenes* and *milites* fleeing on foot, weighed down by their armour.<sup>68</sup> The emphasis was once again on the heavy equipment associated with knights, and the phrasing suggests that even the comparatively poor knights were more heavily-equipped than the basic *pedites*. If foot-knights were present in an infantry formation, it follows that they would have been in the front rank to stiffen resolve, as well as adding anchors to the line; living strongpoints. In this respect, there are similarities with the cavalry formations noted above, with the best troops placed at the front of a *mêlée* formation, and the remainder being used primarily to add weight or mass to a formation. The evidence suggests however that foot-knights were rare, with instances of this being a conscious decision even more occasional.

#### 4.3.1. The Connotations of Fighting on Foot on Crusade

The inability to afford a mount probably determined whether a soldier fought on foot or on horseback. This assertion does not appear significant, but it shifts perception of the source material. For example, when Ambroise described the defeat at the Springs of Cresson, he stated that the Orders lost five thousand *gent menues*, or poor/lesser men.<sup>69</sup> The assumption is that these represented the infantry component of the defeated Christians, but this may be inaccurate. The only other casualty listed was the Grand Master of the Templars, in an anecdote designed to emphasise his bravery. Against such a paragon of virtue, all other men would surely be considered 'lesser', regardless of their military function or social standing.

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<sup>68</sup> IPGRR, 1:40

<sup>69</sup> Ambroise, ll.3030-1

There are numerous examples associating infantry and the poor. Ambroise described *la gent de pié* being *la menue*.<sup>70</sup> Likewise, the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* associates *pedites* and *pauperes*, and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes *vulgus* being the ones travelling on foot and being weighed down by their weapons.<sup>71</sup> The other word which probably had social rather than military connotations yet was still applied to combatants is *vernaculos* (perhaps ‘low-born’ or ‘native’), appearing in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*’s account of the defence of Jaffa.<sup>72</sup> It is the only appearance of the term in a military setting, probably as a description for troops fighting on foot. The context is also suggestive of non-noble *mêlée* fighters, given their distinction from both *milites* and *balistarii*. One must remain careful when considering non-military terms in a military setting. Where the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes those who are clearly fighting infantrymen as *vulgus*, the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* used the same word to describe the non-combatants of the German expedition.<sup>73</sup>

#### 4.4. Conclusion

One must clearly exercise caution in the evaluation of medieval infantry forces. On a functional basis there existed *mêlée* infantry with varying degrees of armour, which can be classed in the same fashion as the cavalry above in Chapter Three. *Mêlée* troops ranged from armoured men such as foot-knights, classed as true ‘heavy infantry’ all the way down to the poorest of *pedites* potentially being equipped with little more than a spear and possibly a shield. Missile troops, by the nature of their armament, proved far more versatile, something which possibly precipitated Oman dubbing them the only useful form of infantry.<sup>74</sup> Particularly in the Latin East, they fulfilled the function of traditional light infantry, acting as scouts and skirmishers. Where *mêlée* infantry required disciplined, regular formations to be most effective in a pitched battle, the light missile infantry thrived in looser order, whether they were equipped with bows, crossbows, slings or javelins. However, the performance of Richard’s crossbowmen outside Jaffa also shows that they could be effective when integrated as part of a solid formation, and this supports the argument for their

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<sup>70</sup> Ambroise, ll.1634-41

<sup>71</sup> HEF, p.28; IPGRR, 4:11

<sup>72</sup> IPGRR, 6:15

<sup>73</sup> HEF, p.84.

<sup>74</sup> Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol.1*, p.296.

versatility. The most obvious distinction to make on a functional basis is therefore between *mêlée* and missile troops. *Mêlée* troops probably all used similar tactics, based largely around solid formations, with the relative equipment levels being the main determinant of their efficacy. As the examples above illustrate, missile troops were far more diverse, and appeared either in formations or acting independently.

The distinction between descriptions of military function and social condition must be carefully considered. The infantry forces of the period were neither entirely useless, nor entirely under-equipped, and they were certainly not of a uniform, low social standing. The argument is that economic status was a common determining factor. The presence of foot-knights shows that this was not universal however, and infantry clearly fulfilled a significant if not crucial tactical role. This economic determinism can be challenged with the descriptions of 'poor knights' particularly characteristic of Robert of Clari's account of the Fourth Crusade. It is important to note that these knights being poor was relative to other knights, and not compared to the wider army; all knights were expected to pay the same for their passage, an amount double that owed by mounted sergeants. Mounted militia among the forces of the Italian city-states also provide evidence for economic determinism rather than social, but obviously such an example could well prove unique to the area.

The phenomenon of foot-knights has been a focus of modern literature. Much has been made of the extraordinary nature of knights dismounting to fight in pitched battles, but it should be remembered that the same grouping would (indeed did, see above) dismount to fight in other contexts, such as naval or siege warfare. Their existence does attest to a tactical awareness and sophistication which challenges the views of the older 'traditionalist' school. It suggests that medieval commanders valued well-equipped and well-trained infantry, even as early as the mid-twelfth century, a century and a half before Courtrai in 1302 and the other famous victories of pike-armed militias. The emphasis on 'cavalry' service was therefore likely due to the more diverse strategic opportunities being mounted afforded, rather than the tactical superiority which has dominated the historiography of medieval warfare.

There remain some fundamentally challenging questions surrounding the study of medieval infantry. The first is whether we can appreciate the complexities of the functions of infantry in warfare. There are reasons why we may not. Most significant is the degree to which cultural assumptions and values interacted with descriptive accuracy. The extent of this will always be the subject of debate. The core question is therefore whether or not one can make distinctions between authors' descriptions of infantry and the actual complexities of their functions in warfare.

## Chapter 5 – Paid Crusaders and Paid Knights

### 5.1. The Definition of a Mercenary: Past and Present

Soldiers fighting for pay have appeared in various settings throughout the previous chapters. The temptation is to designate all of these soldiers ‘mercenaries’, but there are numerous reasons why this is counter-productive. Even the modern word -let alone the medieval one- has connotations which it is inaccurate to extend to all soldiers who fought for pay in the twelfth century. The definition of ‘mercenary’ in a twelfth century context has been examined extensively. Such discussions have often lacked a clear distinction between mercenaries and simple ‘paid soldiers’, with Prestwich summing up the problem neatly: ‘All too often historians write of ‘mercenaries’ when they mean no more than ‘paid troops’.’<sup>1</sup> Indeed this imprecision is echoed throughout modern historiography.<sup>2</sup> This chapter will establish a definition for the medieval mercenary before exploring different methods of payment. This will crucially allow for more specific distinctions within the wider grouping of ‘paid soldiers’, most notably between the mercenary and non-mercenary elements in the various crusading forces of the twelfth century.

The complexity of the distinctions obscured by the general phrase, ‘paid soldiers’ is illustrated in various ways. Prestwich emphasises the difference between the king paying his own subjects -most obviously household knights- and recruiting allies overseas through treaties. The latter appears frequently in relations between the various crusader expeditions and the Byzantine Empire. Richard I of England was supposedly offered some hundred knights, four hundred Turcoples and five hundred infantrymen by the Emperor Isaac of Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> Prestwich notes that even these were different to ‘true’ mercenaries, because they were not directly paid by those they fought for.<sup>4</sup> France suggests the distinction between fighting for duty or obligation, as ‘feudal’ troops have traditionally been characterised, and fighting for desire (most often for wealth, but sometimes merely for honour).

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<sup>1</sup> M. Prestwich, ‘Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,’ in H. Vollrath, A. Hoverkamp (eds.), *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages* (London, 1996), p.136.

<sup>2</sup> Noted in DeVries, ‘Medieval Mercenaries,’ p.44; Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.132; M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, 1996), p.147.

<sup>3</sup> Howden, 3:109. In Ambrose, 1777-8 this hypothetical force is merely five hundred *hommes a cheval*.

<sup>4</sup> Prestwich, ‘Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,’ p.136.



Even France admits dissatisfaction with the distinction as being highly artificial however.<sup>5</sup> David Bachrach notes that urban militias might be paid for their services but certainly could not be considered mercenary, and Rowlands argues that humbler paid troops raised from royal lands were not mercenaries because their service arose from obligation as well as financial payment.<sup>6</sup>

*Fief-rentes*, or money-fiefs constitute the most extensive evidence for paid, non-mercenary soldiers. Found as early as 1127 in Bruges, they usually took the form of an annual payment and were central to the military forces of the twelfth-century Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. Although prevalent in the Latin East, formal money-fiefs possibly originated in Flanders, primarily as a military institution to attract foreigners.<sup>7</sup> The description of these phenomena as ‘fiefs’ is perhaps misleading, given their specific association with knights alone. There is evidence for ‘money-fiefs’ held by sergeants as well as knights. The latter was more common, with large proportions of retainer or ‘household’ knights holding money-fiefs.<sup>8</sup> What does transfer from the traditional ‘fief’ however is the sense of permanence. The ‘money-fief’ probably constituted a regular payment for certain obligations of service (much like their ‘traditional’ counterparts). The difference of the ‘money-fief’ was that instead of income deriving from rents and taxes on a piece of land, it was a payment of cash from one’s lord. Simply being paid did not make one a mercenary. A satisfactory definition of mercenaries remains elusive.

Abels, Rowlands, Mallett and Contamine have all pursued a definition however. Contamine also states that ‘one cannot call every soldier a mercenary from the moment he received payment in one form or another’.<sup>9</sup> Many have looked

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<sup>5</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.1.

<sup>6</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.8.

<sup>7</sup> A.V. Murray, ‘The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem,’ in J. France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages, Proceedings of a Conference held at University of Wales, Swansea, 7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> July 2005* (Leiden & Boston, 2008), pp.275-6; see also D. Heirbaut, ‘The Fief-Rente: A New Evaluation, Based on Flemish Sources (1000-1305),’ *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 67 (1999), pp.1-37; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.92. For the Latin East, see: A. Forey, ‘Paid troops in the service of the military orders during the twelfth and fourteenth centuries,’ in A.J. Boas (ed.), *The Crusader World* (Abingdon, 2016), p.84; K.-F. Krieger, ‘Obligatory Military Service and the Use of Mercenaries in Imperial Military Campaigns under the Hohenstaufen Emperors,’ in H. Vollrath, A. Hoverkamp (eds.), *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages* (London, 1996), p.150.

<sup>8</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.14; J.L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, 1932), pp.141-4; Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, p.113.

<sup>9</sup> Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.99.

further into definitions, with Abels emphasising the lack of political or social ties to those who employed them, and Rowlands likewise noting, ‘those who have a particular relationship, personal or tenurial with his commander.’<sup>10</sup> Mallett brings together these ideas into the concept of ‘foreignness’ which he uses to distinguish mercenaries from ordinary paid soldiers, and this is now widely accepted.<sup>11</sup> Later, in the thirteenth century, the combination of foreignness and expertise became characteristic of mercenaries, rather than solely the former.<sup>12</sup> In combination, the words ‘paid’ and ‘foreign’ are principal in the traditional definition of the twelfth century mercenary.<sup>13</sup>

The term ‘foreign’ is itself problematic when applied to medieval soldiers.

DeVries in particular questions whether the word is itself a modern construct.

This relates to discussions concerning the contemporary awareness of emerging national identities, with Leyser and Bartlett questioning their existence. Others such as Wormald, Contamine and DeVries, assert that they were in fact present.<sup>14</sup>

While the use of the term ‘foreign’ in the modern sense is problematic, the use of ‘foreignness’ is suitable in the context of the arguments set forward by Abels and Rowlands. Medieval ‘foreignness’ can therefore be described as those outside of one’s immediate ‘sphere’; the complex web of personal and tenurial relationships characteristic of medieval society. The existence of differing medieval and modern notions of ‘foreignness’ illustrates the futility of applying the term. The idea of ‘spheres’ (also described as ‘affinities’, or *mouvances*) serves to make an adequate distinction in the case of paid soldiers, though as shall be seen below, there are still difficulties evident with its application. Dispensation of the term ‘foreign’ in favour of the descriptor ‘outsiders’ to distinguish those who fell outside the ‘sphere’ of their employer is therefore possible. The definition of the medieval mercenary may therefore be established at the intersection between those who were paid, and those who were ‘outsiders’. The picture of twelfth century hired soldiers is a complicated one.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.5.

<sup>11</sup> M. Mallett, ‘Mercenaries,’ in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999), p.209; DeVries, ‘Medieval Mercenaries,’ p.45.

<sup>12</sup> Mallett, ‘Mercenaries,’ p.211.

<sup>13</sup> DeVries, ‘Medieval Mercenaries,’ p.46.

<sup>14</sup> DeVries, ‘Medieval Mercenaries,’ p.46.

<sup>15</sup> Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.296; S. Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ in D.J. Kagay, L.J. Villalon (eds.), *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp.106-7.

## 5.2. The Hiring of Mercenaries: Judgement, Efficacy and Hatred

The application of the term mercenary must be cautious and precise, therefore. A crucial question is why the spectrum of paid troops to true mercenaries was required. As noted above, those described as paid troops -those paid using *fief-rentes*, for example- were probably utilised to maintain soldiers where there was little land but a need for militarisation, such as in the Kingdom of Jerusalem or Flanders.<sup>16</sup> In these areas the traditional system of enfeoffment provided insufficient numbers of soldiers for their defence. As will be seen below, paid soldiers appeared in garrisons throughout Christendom, and in the retinues of higher-status knights and lords. It is in the latter capacity particularly that these non-mercenary paid soldiers -as retinue soldiers they could not be considered 'outsiders'- performed offensive duties.<sup>17</sup> 'True' mercenaries were far less common as defensive forces. Mercenaries were hired because they were convenient and effective.<sup>18</sup> They were convenient because they represented manpower outside of the more limited system of tenurial service.<sup>19</sup> A soldier fighting due to obligation might only serve for forty days as a standard term, mercenaries could be employed as long as their employer could afford to pay them.

The reasons for mercenaries' efficacy included that they were far more skilled than their 'feudal' counterparts, something highly valued by medieval commanders.<sup>20</sup> With barely-trained rural levies forming a sizeable chunk of contemporary military forces, skilled infantry in particular was highly sought-after.<sup>21</sup> The fact that mercenaries were professional soldiers meant that they were also generally well-equipped. This has sometimes been characterised by their use of crossbows, as was possibly the case on the Third Crusade, in the numerous examples cited in Chapter Four.<sup>22</sup> An example from the *Historia de expeditione*

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<sup>16</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.14.

<sup>17</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, pp.185-6.

<sup>18</sup> Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' p.210.

<sup>19</sup> Vollrath, Hoverkamp, *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, p.20 Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' pp.210-3; Krieger, 'Obligatory Military Service and the Use of Mercenaries in Imperial Military Campaigns under the Hohenstaufen Emperors,' p.155.

<sup>20</sup> Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' p.140; Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' p.210.

<sup>21</sup> DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries,' p.51.

<sup>22</sup> Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' p.140; France, 'Warfare in the Mediterranean,' p.11; Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' p.213.

*Friderici* also suggests occasional emphasis on heavy armour. The author described a band of Latin infantry present in Greece equipped with *arcus et phaleras*, despite also characterising them as light infantry.<sup>23</sup> These soldiers were not explicitly called ‘mercenaries’, but their presence within the Byzantine Empire, and their explicit description as Latin infantry suggests that they were ‘outsiders’. This satisfies the latter of the two conditions for the term ‘mercenary’ established above.

The clergy bias against mercenaries is well-known and has led to the assumption that twelfth-century mercenaries were hated by their contemporaries. This view can be challenged. From the evidence above and the sheer amount of secondary literature regarding the subject, mercenaries were clearly a widespread and integral part of twelfth-century warfare. However there remains significant evidence that mercenaries were unfavourably perceived, with evidence from the *Gesta Stephani* and Walter Map’s account of the Third Lateran Council being cited most often.<sup>24</sup> The current consensus emphasises this evidence, though the reasons for these perceptions are heavily contested. The most persistent argument is that it was their fighting for financial gain that earned them opposition. This trait has caused them to be judged harshly by traditionalist historians such as Oman and Delbruck.<sup>25</sup> Isaac points to Machiavelli’s strong denunciations as the origin of modern disdain for mercenaries.<sup>26</sup> From the source material under consideration, Odo of Deuil presents the most in-depth consideration of why mercenaries and those who employed them were criticised by their contemporaries:

‘...and the lazy [Greeks] would have lost all if they had not defended themselves by importing knights from various nations, thus compelling gold to redeem gold. Nevertheless, they always lose (but since they possess much they

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<sup>23</sup> HEF, p.74

<sup>24</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.1; Krieger, ‘Obligatory Military Service and the Use of Mercenaries in Imperial Military Campaigns under the Hohenstaufen Emperors,’ p.166; S.D. Brown, ‘Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,’ *History* 74 (1989), pp.20-38; Prestwich, ‘Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,’ p.142; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p.148.

<sup>25</sup> Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ pp.101-3.

<sup>26</sup> Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ p.102.

cannot lose all at once), for mercenaries (*alienae vires*) do not suffice a people without forces of its own.<sup>27</sup>

For the purposes of this thesis, the extract must be used carefully. First, Odo was talking about the Greek forces, at a time when relations were strained between the crusaders and the Byzantine Empire.<sup>28</sup> Second, Odo's contempt seems more directed at the latter than the mercenaries themselves. What Odo's evidence does reveal is that mercenaries, or rather 'foreign knights' were considered either too unskilled or too few to be sufficient. Given the assertions above that mercenaries were often characterised by their skill, the latter was probably true. This supports the notion that they were expensive to hire.<sup>29</sup> Intertwined with the willingness to fight for pay, mercenaries were demonized for their fickleness and general indiscipline in many circles.<sup>30</sup>

With no investment other than a potential pay-check, it is easy to see how mercenaries might be induced to change sides (colloquially: 'fighting for the highest bidder'). This has understandably led to the conclusion that paid status was the cause of fickleness. Indeed, there are numerous examples of non-mercenary troops with all too fluid loyalty.<sup>31</sup> This all suggests paid status caused fickleness if not ill-discipline. However, the nature of one's involvement in a conflict seems to have determined their commitment to a cause. A paid mercenary and a paid household knight on the same side of a conflict both received payment, but the latter was probably far more invested in the cause (perhaps due to the permanence of their arrangement), and therefore arguably less likely to change sides. Given how widespread paid soldiers were, it seems impossible that paid status alone was grounds for condemnation.

The most infamous characteristic of twelfth-century mercenaries is perhaps their brutality and cruelty. Examples abound throughout western Christendom, with early mentions associating them with adventurers, rogues and bandits.<sup>32</sup> John

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<sup>27</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 5:88-9: ...*et perdidisset omnia populus iners, sed aurum auro redimens, diversarum gentium conductis militibus se defendit. Semper tamen perdit (sed multa possidens, non potest omnia simul), non enim sufficiente alienae vires propriis destitute.*

<sup>28</sup> See C. Kostick, 'Social Unrest and the Failure of Conrad III's March Through Anatolia, 1147,' *German History* 28:2 (2010), pp.130-1

<sup>29</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.130; Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' p.214.

<sup>30</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.2-3; Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' p.142.

<sup>31</sup> Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries,' p.101.

<sup>32</sup> Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, pp.117-21.

France points out however that they may simply have been employed in such a fashion; that they were not by nature brutal but were merely commanded to commit brutal acts. It should also be pointed out that cruelty was not a trait associated with just mercenaries in the period.<sup>33</sup> Frequently, an enemy would be characterised as brutal or cruel to gather support for one's own cause. The medieval concepts of cruelty and brutality have been examined in other contexts, though the specific debate remains heavily linked to the use of legitimate violence.<sup>34</sup> The specific terms have often been generalised as mere components opposing the established order, but Baraz in particular has considered them more closely. In an article considering both the Vikings and the Mongols, Baraz identifies a tradition of associating cruelty with the 'other'.<sup>35</sup>

The medieval concept of 'othering' is usually characterised as the identification of certain elements as anathema to social norms; as everything that normal society was not. Contemporary authors generally used 'othering' as a device to target, diminish and in some cases dehumanise the subject. There has been extensive analysis of the medieval concept of the 'other', particularly within the crusading context. Most often however, 'othering' has been examined on religious grounds by modern historians, particularly regarding Muslims, Jews, Pagans and heretics.<sup>36</sup> 'Othering' can be detected in relation to mercenaries as well, especially considering the medieval characterisation of cruelty as 'excessive violence'. Association of mercenaries with the specific trait of 'cruelty' was therefore seemingly because of their description as a societal 'other' (i.e. opposed to the established social order). It should be stressed that this description was only a component of their characterisation as 'outsiders', which encompassed other concerns such as geography and political affiliations. These supposed traits surrounding cruelty are also often linked to those above, with indiscipline

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<sup>33</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.70-5.

<sup>34</sup> D. Baraz, 'Violence or Cruelty? An Intercultural Perspective,' in M.D. Meyerson, D. Thiery, O. Falk (eds.), *"A Great Effusion of Blood"? Interpreting Medieval Violence* (London, 2004), pp.164-89

<sup>35</sup> Baraz, 'Violence or Cruelty?' p.169

<sup>36</sup> For a good introduction to the topic of the medieval 'other', see: R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe 950-1250* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn.) (Oxford, 2007). See also: S.C. Akbari, *Idols in the East: European Representations of Islam and the Orient, 1100-1450* (Ithaca, 2009) and M. Frassetto (ed.), *Heresy and the Persecuting Society in the Middle Ages: Essays on the Work of R.I. Moore* (Leiden, 2006).

manifesting as brutality, and Tyerman combining the two into their general conduct.<sup>37</sup>

Brutality and indiscipline appear most frequently in the sources, but the breadth of aspersions cast is perhaps indicative of authors using any reason at all to demonize mercenaries, to build them up as the enemies of the church and all decent people.<sup>38</sup> The fact that each of these characteristics have been challenged by modern historians only serves to support this, with a compelling alternative being suggested. Tyerman, France and Mallett have all noted that mercenaries represented a threat to the established social order.<sup>39</sup> Their tendency to originate in poorer rural areas and rise from nothing based solely on their military ability alarmed those who perceived themselves naturally superior.<sup>40</sup>

### **5.3. Terms Associated with Soldiers Fighting for Pay in the Twelfth Century**

The definition and characteristics of medieval mercenaries -as professional warriors also perceived as outsiders- have therefore been clarified somewhat. There is a cursory examination of terms in Chapter Two, illustrating that modern historians have examined numerous terms in various contexts. It would certainly be beneficial to consider them in the crusading context. The overt terms which described mercenaries or paid soldiers are comparatively few. Although there are examples earlier, Nicolle and Tyerman have both looked at the eleventh century, with the former noting increased usage of mercenaries in mid-century France, before spreading into England and Wales through the twelfth century, with the grouping appearing to perform any military function outside of heavy cavalry.<sup>41</sup> Tyerman refers to stipendiaries rather than mercenaries, emphasising that they did not constitute standing armies, but much smaller retinues made up of household troops.<sup>42</sup> Paid men were present from the very inception of the crusading movement and grew to be used by the military orders later on. The

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<sup>37</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, pp.132-3; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p.153

<sup>38</sup> Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium*, ed. M.R. James (Oxford, 1914), 1:29

<sup>39</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, pp.132-3; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p.153; France, *Western Warfare*, pp.70-5.

<sup>40</sup> See: France, *Western Warfare*, p.70-5; Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' p.213.

<sup>41</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.27.

<sup>42</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.130.

term *stipendiarii* was arguably common in the late thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, though somewhat more elusive in the twelfth.<sup>43</sup>

*Mercenarius* also appeared in western Christendom, although infrequently. John France characterises this term as a far blunter description, often derogatory and approximately translated as ‘self-serving hireling’.<sup>44</sup> More generic terms include *rutharii* (from *rupta* or *ruta*), analogous to *routiers*, *conducticii* and *coterelles*, as well as *palearii*.<sup>45</sup> While there clearly was significant evidence for mercenaries and other paid troops from the late-eleventh and early-twelfth centuries, it remains comparatively sparse when compared to the thirteenth century.<sup>46</sup> This might be reflective of changing attitudes either to mercenaries or to record-keeping. However, it possibly also illustrates an unwillingness to use monetary reward as a means of incentivising service to God, and this highlights a significant difficulty.

The nature of the source material is problematic when considering mercenaries therefore. The emphasis of many -but not all- authors of the source material was on the spiritual and pious aspects of the expeditions. It should also be noted that political factors would have had a significant effect on descriptions of outsiders. As such many sources were therefore seemingly unconcerned with (or actively avoided) precise reporting on matters of payment and loot, merely content to acknowledge its existence. Given the widespread nature of soldiers receiving pay noted above, this has necessarily led to certain dramatic license, which appears almost as ‘euphemism’ and innuendo. This appears frequently in the source material as gift-giving among other things, the examples for which shall be examined further below.<sup>47</sup> One must therefore cast a wider net when searching for relevant terms, because specific terms describing paid soldiers are even rarer than those examined in the preceding two chapters. It also attests to the significance of specific terms which connote paid -or even mercenary- status.

### **5.3.1. Terms Associated with Crusaders Fighting for Pay in the Twelfth Century**

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<sup>43</sup> Forey, ‘Paid troops in the service of the military orders during the twelfth and fourteenth centuries,’ pp.84-5.

<sup>44</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.73.

<sup>45</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp.6-7.

<sup>46</sup> Prestwich, ‘Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,’ p.131; Forey, ‘Paid troops in the service of the military orders during the twelfth and fourteenth centuries,’ p.88.

<sup>47</sup> See below.



Of these, perhaps the most-studied term is *stipendiarii*, which appears variously as a noun or adjective in the sources.<sup>48</sup> Throughout documents of the twelfth-century, it was seemingly used in place of the blunt and even rude *mercenarii*.<sup>49</sup> The argument is that, the latter meant ‘hireling’, but the former was respectable, implying men in receipt of regular income.<sup>50</sup> The main distinction was that *stipendiarii* were unlikely to hold land fiefs, but rather received money-fiefs.<sup>51</sup> This distinction can be found in a charter of the *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitana*, which includes both *stipendiarii Amalrici* and *homini Amalrici* in the witness list.<sup>52</sup> Both groups include those described as knights elsewhere. The only distinction therefore seems to be the paid status of the former but not the latter.

In contrast to this, the two main French authors for the Third Crusade, Rigord and William the Breton, both associate *stipendiarii* with *cotarelli*, *ruptus*, *rupta* and *routier*, all of which have far more negative, destructive connotations.<sup>53</sup> These are partly because of their relation to the functional description *raptores* or ‘ravagers’ with its overtly negative implications, and its etymological roots in the verb *rumpere*.<sup>54</sup> The verb has implications of a graphic meaning of breaking, bursting through and forcing.<sup>55</sup> Alongside this, William of Newburgh, an Angevin author, applied the term *stipendiarii* to the Duke of Austria following his imprisonment of King Richard. The reading suggests the term was insulting at face value, but it possibly constitutes a complaint rather than an insult. The implication of the passage is that a degree of respect if not loyalty was expected of the Duke of Austria, something at odds with his conduct.<sup>56</sup> From this example, those who took payment from others -or enjoyed the patronage of a lord- were supposed to retain residual loyalty even outside the period of their service. It is this assumption -which was so widespread it required no overt mention in Newburgh’s eyes- that made the Duke of Austria’s treatment of Richard all the more shocking. This perhaps evidences the ‘fickleness’ described in the

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<sup>48</sup> Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.288; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.90.

<sup>49</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.7.

<sup>50</sup> Murray, ‘The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem,’ p.278.

<sup>51</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.73.

<sup>52</sup> Mayer (ed.), *Urkunden*, 2:525-8.

<sup>53</sup> Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.292.

<sup>54</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.71

<sup>55</sup> Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.292.

<sup>56</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:23

secondary literature, though it was probably not what the author had in mind. It does provide evidence -if any was needed- of 'fickleness' being considered a negative trait. Among the generally sycophantic Angevin sources, William of Newburgh is noted precisely due to his somewhat ambivalent attitude to Richard, but caution must still be exercised.<sup>57</sup> From the crusading evidence, *stipendiarii* appear as an overtly economic category though there were clearly other connotations and expectations. Crucially, there is no evidence that *stipendiarii* were possessed of specific military qualities or tendencies.

Another term common to the sources under consideration is the Old French *sodoier* and the seeming Latin equivalents of *solidarii* and *sodali*. The Old French *sodoier* appears frequently throughout the so-called Eracles continuation of the chronicle of William of Tyre. A Master of the Temple, Gerard de Ridefort, is described as formerly being employed on several occasions by King Amalric as a *sodoier*, and in the same sentence as a *chevalier dou siecle*, or 'lay knight'.<sup>58</sup> This is revealing for numerous reasons. The association of a *sodoier* with employment (*fu aucune fois*), whether permanent or not, heavily implies the paid connotation of the word. It also shows that one could be both *sodoier* and *chevalier* simultaneously, which suggests the existence of paid knights. This precipitates further questions about the relative specific definitions of *sodoier* and *chevalier*. It is possible that the former was an economic term, while *chevalier* was a more military or social one. Later, the Eracles continuator used *soudoier* to describe a Norman *chevalier* found in the Emperor Isaac's pay.<sup>59</sup> Although brief, this example is perhaps more telling than the last. The existence of a Norman knight fighting in the pay of the Emperor Isaac constitutes a mercenary under the stipulations above. These two examples combine to prove that the term *so(u)doier* described an economic situation more than anything else and should not necessarily be translated as 'mercenary'.

The Latin term *sodali* appears in the satirical text of Richard of Devizes, describing Richard's relationship to Philip II of France.<sup>60</sup> The translation is given as simple 'companion' in the modern edition, but the similar appearance of *sodali*

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<sup>57</sup> P.G. Walsh, M.J. Kennedy (eds. & trs.), *William of Newburgh, The History of English Affairs* (Warminster, 1988), p.15.

<sup>58</sup> CGT, 33.

<sup>59</sup> CGT, 114.

<sup>60</sup> Devizes, p.58

and the Old French *sodoier* seems too similar to be coincidence, implying at least a connotation of pay. The similar term *solidarius* has been considered more extensively. It arguably developed later in the twelfth century, and was used to denote hired men.<sup>61</sup> For the best contemporary example however, one must look to the work of Gilbert of Mons.<sup>62</sup> Walter of Sottegham was elsewhere described as a knight, and his marriage to the daughter of the castellan of Tournai surely afforded him social status. Napran extensively argues there was a definite distinction between the terms *sodali* and *stipendiarii*, with the former supposedly being restricted to men of higher social standing. *Stipendiarii* made up the larger contingents of paid soldiers.<sup>63</sup>

The final term which appears in a number of sources is *conductitii*. Used primarily to denote 'hired' troops, it appears in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*. The latter example is a description of the forces of the Byzantine Empire, and included Vlachs and Cumans.<sup>64</sup> Given the established proclivity for the Emperors of Byzantium hiring mercenaries, which was well-known even earlier by Odo of Deuil, the description seems apt for the Vlachs and Cumans described.<sup>65</sup> Curiously, the author later described Turks and Pagans in the service of the Emperor of Constantinople as *tributariis*, or tributaries. These tributaries were set to garrison Berrhoe.<sup>66</sup> The word suggests that the Turks and Pagans were not paid by the Emperor, but rather were bound to serve by some form of treaty obligation. Under the definition laid out above then, they were not mercenaries, but is this a fair assessment? The *tributariis* were certainly fighting outside of their 'sphere', but they were not paid. To the local population however, who were likely unaware of treaty obligations to the emperor, would they have been considered mercenaries, even if by the 'modern' definition, they were not? Later in the passage, the Vlachs and Serbs accompanying the Germans were described as *auxilarii* which suggests different terminology between those who fought for the Latins and those who did not.<sup>67</sup> The paid status of those

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<sup>61</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.73; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Jones, p.90.

<sup>62</sup> Gislebert de Mons, ed. Vanderkindere, 60; Napran, 'Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,' p.291.

<sup>63</sup> Napran, 'Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,' pp.287-300.

<sup>64</sup> HEF, p.63

<sup>65</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 5:88-9. For mercenaries in Byzantine armies, see: Y.N. Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100-1550* (2009), p.60, Carey, *Warfare*, pp.30-5.

<sup>66</sup> HEF, p.44.

<sup>67</sup> HEF, p.68

accompanying the Germans is unclear. These auxiliaries were noted as seeking crusader aid in overthrowing their Byzantine overlords, so they probably went unpaid.

*Conductitii* was also the favoured term of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, twice describing Richard as hiring *servientes*. In the first example, it appears as the verb *conducere*, with *servientes probissimos* being hired to garrison castles.<sup>68</sup> The troops which Richard *conduxit* were paid to fulfil a specific task, namely garrisoning castles, rather than denoting ‘true’ mercenaries.<sup>69</sup> Later, in preparation for his attack on the Saracen caravan, Richard supposedly led a force which included a thousand *servientes expeditissimos conductitios*.<sup>70</sup> The exact tactical function of these *servientes* remains up for debate, but their paid nature is indisputable from the usage of the term *conductitios*.

Already from the evidence thus far, a difference in meaning between *stipendiarii* and *conductitii* is discernable. Where the Duke of Austria was described as *stipendiarii*, and where they appeared in the *Regesta*, the sense is that they were (or had been) in receipt of regular pay. Both times, the *conductitii* were hired for a specific purpose or time period: to garrison fortresses for a limited period; or to conduct a lightning raid on a moving target. This more limited ‘contract’ could be evidence for these soldiers being outside of Richard’s usual ‘sphere’. This would make them mercenaries. Ralph of Coggeshall used the verb *conducere* when describing Richard’s interactions with the French forces after the conclusion of the siege of Acre. Significantly Richard *conduxerat* not only the *exercitus Francorum*, but also the *alienigeni*, or ‘foreigners’.<sup>71</sup> This passage possibly describes Richard hiring a variety of mercenaries, which happened to include the French forces but also independent companies in the area. It seems indisputable that the *alienigeni* who were hired were mercenaries, given the definition established above and the specific terms used. The French army is also hired, ostensibly for a limited period of time, but the fact that they are specifically identified, and collectively referred

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<sup>68</sup> The term *probissimus* is usually translated as ‘most valiant’, and here is likely applied to denote the quality of the troops. It is possibly a reflection of the perceived importance of the fortification to Richard.

<sup>69</sup> IPGRR, 5:39

<sup>70</sup> IPGRR, 6:3

<sup>71</sup> Coggeshall, 51-2

to as *exercitus* suggests ‘prestige’ which is not bestowed upon common mercenaries.

#### 5.4. The Military Functions of Mercenaries and Paid Troops

The examples above have suggested that some individuals were described by terms with more military connotations than economic ones. For example, there are frequent instances of those described as knights also receiving pay. This alone represents a departure from the assumptions of particularly traditionalist views of medieval warfare and recruitment. Crusade recruitment was significantly different to that which occurred in ‘domestic’ conflicts, but the point above still stands. Overt mentions of paid troops in the source material are rare, probably because of the noted focus on the more religious aspects of the movement. Crucially, fewer mentions of paid troops in the crusading material was not necessarily reflective of the reality. In conflicts where spiritual concerns were of less interest, it follows that no such reticence was displayed. Gilbert of Mons’ *Chronicon Hainoniense* is arguably a good example of this, with his frequent and detailed descriptions of military forces including *stipendiarii*, both *equites* and *pedites*.<sup>72</sup> Gilbert’s use of *solidarius* to describe a man also described as a *miles* (noted above) suggests that paid heavy cavalry was not unknown in western Europe by the middle of the twelfth century. In this specific case then, crusading recruitment was not so different from its ‘domestic’ counterpart after all.

The appearances of *so(u)doiers* in the Eracles continuation also support this idea that heavy cavalry existed outside of the usual ‘feudal’ levy, with Gerard de Ridefort described as both a *sodoier* and *chevalier* in his early career under King Amalric.<sup>73</sup> The author also described *chevaliers as sous de l’emperere* under Frederick Barbarossa, or ‘knights in the pay of the empire’.<sup>74</sup> These *chevaliers* travelled with *barons d’Alemaigne* to Apulia to take the cross, where they were commanded by the chancellor of Germany. Given their association with local barons that the *chevaliers* were probably also local to the Empire. Under the definition established above, this therefore disqualifies them from being mercenaries, meaning that they instead received money-fiefs than land fiefs. Their status as employees of the

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<sup>72</sup> Gislebert de Mons, ed. Vanderkindere, 114, 116

<sup>73</sup> CGT, 33.

<sup>74</sup> CGT, 177.

Empire is cited as the reason they accepted the command of the Chancellor however, and this suggests they were outside of the traditional 'feudal' structure. Whether this seeming reluctant loyalty is simply due to them holding money-fiefs or them actually being external mercenaries is unclear.

More variation is present in the Latin examples. William the Breton described Philip II Augustus leaving some five hundred knights in the Holy Land after his departure, with 'sufficient pay' for three years. In his *Gesta*, the implication is of wage-paying, however the later *Philippide*, he used the word *expensas*, which has different connotations.<sup>75</sup> The former suggests the knights fought for profit, under an employer – the king. William's description of the king covering expenses implies a mere 'breaking even', with any bonuses being earned on a very personal basis through loot, ransoms and the like. It is difficult to argue either description had mercenary connotations. 'Paid wages' implied regular payments in a system not unlike money-fiefs, though with one significant difference. Unlike money-fiefs, they were strictly limited term in nature. By contrast, the term *expensas* suggests that such service was expected of them, but that it was simultaneously recognised as being unusually demanding. The paying of expenses was therefore expected as recompense; while someone owing a mounted soldier as *servitia debitum* might be expected to replace a lost horse within his usual terms of service, outside of those terms the onus was more on the employer to recoup such losses. The first iteration in William's *Gesta* seems closer to the mercenary definition, with its much more temporary connotations. The fact that the second example - found in his *Philippide*- came later could suggest a degree of refinement. The intervening period would have provided William a wider perspective, and access to more sources of his own. It potentially represented a more accurate description of events.

Knights were not the only paid soldiers in the twelfth century however, despite their frequent mention. Sergeants were also hired or paid throughout the period, including as integral parts of the military orders. As noted in Chapter Four, crossbowmen also have strong associations with mercenaries, especially among the crusading expeditions. Particularly in the Latin East there is evidence that knights were not even the only paid mounted soldiers. The general consensus is

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<sup>75</sup> William the Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, 62; William the Breton, *Philippide*, 4:282

that the light cavalry known as Turcoples appeared mostly as paid soldiers, in both expeditions and local armies.<sup>76</sup>

Most examples of paid sergeants appear in the sources for the Third Crusade. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes the Archbishop of Canterbury's contingent including two hundred *milites* and three hundred *satellites* who 'followed his banner and fought in that holy man's pay.'<sup>77</sup> The author's use of the term *stipendiis* to describe the pay potentially suggests that they were paid by their employer on a more permanent basis, representing a paid household retinue, rather than perhaps being products of the 'Saladin Tithe'. The retinue may seem large, but the Archbishop of Canterbury was a prominent churchman, and this retinue was small compared to that of King Philip, which included some two thousand knights and squires.<sup>78</sup>

This is evidence for paid, regular retinue forces participating in the expedition, but there were also more fixed-term payments. Roger of Howden describes both Philip and Richard loaning (*tradidit*) a hundred *milites* and five hundred *servientes* to the Prince of Antioch to aid in the city's defence.<sup>79</sup> Robert de Quincy was appointed as the leader of the Angevin contingent, with each *milites* given forty marks of silver in payment. The implication is that Robert de Quincy became a de facto mercenary captain from the feast of Saint Michael until Easter, leading a modest contingent of mercenary *milites* and *servientes* to aid the Prince of Antioch. The idea of the contingent being ultimately within Richard's 'sphere' throws up a problem. On the one hand, the troop of soldiers were operating under the nominal command of the Prince of Antioch, serving for pay, and originating outside of his sphere. On this basis, these troops should be called 'mercenaries'. On the other hand, Richard paid them, though the implication is that this was because of the abnormal service rather than their 'outsider' status. This is more

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<sup>76</sup> Murray, 'The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem,' p.278; J. Richard, 'Les turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: Musulmans convertis ou chrétiens orientaux?', *Revue des études islamiques* 54 (1986), pp.259-70; A.G.C. Savvides, 'Late Byzantine and Western Historiographers on Turkish Mercenaries in Greek and Latin Armies: the Turcoples/Tourkopouloi', in R. Beaton and C. Roueché (eds.), *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies dedicated to D.M. Nicol* (Aldershot, 1993), pp.122-36.

<sup>77</sup> IPGRR, 1:61

<sup>78</sup> C. Tyerman, *God's War* (London, 2007), p.389.

<sup>79</sup> Howden, 3:125

suggestive of paid troops rather than mercenaries. This contingent should perhaps be considered ‘temporary mercenaries’.

Aside from these examples, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* also mentioned hired sergeants. The first instance describes sergeants paid to garrison castles.<sup>80</sup> The inclination is to assume these sergeants were infantry troops, but garrison forces did often include cavalry contingents meaning this was by no means certain. The example gives no indication as to the equipment of these sergeants. Later, during Richard’s attack on the caravan, the crusader forces included some five hundred well-armed *milites* and -more significantly for this chapter- a thousand *servientes expeditissimos conductitios*.<sup>81</sup> The first description of Richard’s detachment includes these soldiers and nothing else, but the account of the battle specifies other soldiers. Crossbowmen, archers and *armigeri* are all mentioned during the battle, with the light, ranged troops being sent to slow the caravan, allowing the remainder of Richard’s forces to catch up. The *armigeri* killed those enemies who were knocked down by the *milites*.<sup>82</sup> The suggestion is that, given the initial placement of *milites* against *servientes*, the later *balistarii*, *sagittarii* and *armigeri* were all included in this latter grouping. This further reinforces the argument that the terms broadly translated as ‘sergeant’ were not military in nature. The broad usage suggests that *servientes* fulfilled a range of combat functions. What these examples also suggest is that the ‘sergeant’ was not categorised by mode of remuneration either; they were neither strictly paid soldiers nor strictly tenured. This does not however make ‘sergeant’ a social term alone either, as it remains possible also that the term represented a certain degree of affluence rather than a mode of payment. The grouping clearly was a very fluid one.

The Old French examples are different, however. As in many other areas, where the Latin terms and phrasing are varied, the few Old French examples remain restricted to the Eracles Continuation of William of Tyre. The description of the army raised by Guy de Lusignan prior to the Battle of Hattin in 1187, includes the assertion that all those who would serve him were offered *bon sos*, or ‘good wages’.<sup>83</sup> Although the phrasing was vague, the author expanded a paragraph

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<sup>80</sup> IPGRR, 5:39

<sup>81</sup> IPGRR, 6:3

<sup>82</sup> IPGRR, 6:4

<sup>83</sup> CGT, 28.



later, where he described the king taking money from the Templars in order to hire -the term *sodea* is used- *chevaliers et serjans*. The numbers given as twelve hundred of the former, and thirty thousand *autres personnes*.<sup>84</sup> Aside from reinforcing the focus on *chevaliers* in contemporary sources, this is another instance where soldiers were paid for a limited term and for a specific task, namely the campaign against Saladin. The fact also that Guy put out an open recruitment call suggests that they were not bound by obligation to serve him through the system of land and money-fiefs, which would categorise them as ‘outsiders’, and thus mercenaries.

A later example is more valuable for this thesis, given its concern with a strictly ‘western’ army; that of King William of Sicily on the eve of the Third Crusade. King William’s preparations at home included the production of a fleet, and the hiring of ‘as many men as he could.’<sup>85</sup> Although familial obligations and the dowry of Richard’s sister Joanna might have spurred William’s efforts, he displayed a willingness to pay soldiers for extenuating service, rather than relying on his traditional levy forces. King William’s army was therefore not necessarily comprised of mercenaries and may have been entirely comprised of retinue troops. However the implication is that King William was hiring soldiers specifically for the expedition, which is more suggestive of mercenaries. The other significant part of King William’s preparation included sending to Outremer ‘and all the lands nearby’ to recruit *chevaliers et serjanz*, to whom he then ‘gave pay’ in accordance with each man’s status [*esteit*].<sup>86</sup> These hired soldiers would immediately seem to be mercenaries: they were both paid and outside of King William’s sphere. The tendency to equate the *chevaliers/serjanz* dichotomy to *militēs/peditēs* also suggests that King William hired both cavalry and infantry. As has been shown in prior chapters this is perhaps an overgeneralisation. Both Old French terms had far wider meanings and did not necessarily equate to specific military function. Logically, King William would have hired both cavalry and infantry, but the author’s phrasing does not necessarily constitute evidence for it. ‘Sergeants’ fought both mounted and on foot, as did *chevaliers*.

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<sup>84</sup> CGT, 29.

<sup>85</sup> CGT, 72.

<sup>86</sup> CGT, 72.

Medieval mercenaries are most often functionally associated with infantry. Given the fact that most infantry were arguably so because they were generally drawn from less affluent echelons of society, this supports the hypothesis that many mercenaries came from poorer backgrounds and therefore threatened to upset the social status quo. This is of course an oversimplification, and the precise connection between violence, power and social mobility is a thesis unto itself, but the upper echelons of society undoubtedly opposed the challenge to their perceived monopoly on violence that mercenaries represented. William of Tyre described *stipendiarii pedites* being gathered prior to the Battle at Hattin in 1187, before accompanying *equites omnes*.<sup>87</sup> Aside from the fact that the infantry was paid, and that it was to support cavalry, there is nothing to describe their origin, their method of payment, or even their military functionality. Similarly, the garrison at Banyas is described exclusively as *stipendiarii*, including both *equites* and *pedites*.<sup>88</sup> This reinforces the idea that garrison service was at least sometimes in exchange for direct payment, and is also explicit evidence for the cavalry being present in garrison forces. Garrison infantry should not necessarily be classed as 'specialist' troops, but such an assertion cannot be extended to all those who fought on foot. Siege technicians were one group of specialist infantry, and they could often be paid. William of Tyre noted the Count Raymond of Toulouse paying engineers at the siege of Jerusalem.<sup>89</sup>

With regard to defending fortifications rather than attacking them: during the siege of Edessa by Zangi, William of Tyre described the defence being entirely in the hands of *mercennariis*.<sup>90</sup> This term is considered a cruder version of *stipendiarii*, often translated as 'hireling'. The resignation in William's description implies that the defence was a doomed one, perhaps because of their military prowess. It has been established above that *stipendiarii* described a soldier paid in a specific way rather than being indicative of military function, but *mercennariis* may have had military connotations - it was the only word used to describe the defenders. *Mercenariis* were perhaps even further from professional soldiers than *stipendiarii* were. William of Tyre's phrasing possibly suggests that the term described untrained conscripts, offered pay if they survived, or for unusual service of the

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<sup>87</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 13:9

<sup>88</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 14:17

<sup>89</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 8:6

<sup>90</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 16:4

type noted throughout the chapter. This aligns with the general sense of desperation prevalent in Edessa as Zangi's forces encroached. Certainly the term *mercenarii* stands alone, and in the crusading material at least, it is rare. Given the scarcity of evidence, it remains difficult to assign an accurate definition.

The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* provides a further telling example of the military functions of paid soldiers. Richard 'ordered an edict to be issued stating that anyone who wished to be hired and paid by the king should assemble to give him their help. Two hundred infantry and fifty knights flocked together without delay.'<sup>91</sup> The use of both the terms *stipendia* and *conducti* is significant. There is no way to tell whether one was for the *pedites* and one for the *milites*, but the different terms might represent a corresponding difference in the type of service owed - as has been suggested above- or their initial relationship to their employer - in this case Richard. The phrasing also suggests that the soldiers were not a standing force but coalesced at the offer pay. The tentative suggestion, to be explored further below, is that *stipendia* was for service outside of the regular expectation, almost like 'overtime', while *conducti* was the hiring of anyone at all for a fixed period or task.

### 5.5. Different Soldiers and Different Payments

It is possible to discern differences in the way soldiers were paid for the various services they performed. Such variation, and the drawing of conclusions solely based on it remains problematic as it has throughout the thesis. Primarily, different words meant different things to different authors, according to their influences and origins among other things. Conclusions must be drawn with caution therefore, though the problem may be largely mitigated by careful consideration of context and multiple examples within the same text. Were there distinctions in the way different soldiers were paid? Did the way in which soldiers were paid have a bearing on whether they were considered mercenaries or not? The evidence above suggests that there were different types of payment, including the covering of expenses, the 'paying of overtime', wages, or bestowing money-fiefs. The short answer is that yes, different soldiers were paid in different ways. The true questions are therefore: which types of troops were paid

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<sup>91</sup> IPGRR, 6:27: ...*promulgari jussit edictum, ut quicumque regis stipendia voluissent conducti recipere, convenissent ad succurrendum. Nec mora, confluent duo millia peditum et milites quinquaginta.*

differently and why? ‘True’ mercenaries were probably described differently to those who gave exclusive service to those within their usual ‘sphere’ and were paid.

Once again, the focus is on terminology. The Old French terms are limited and skewed because they almost all come from a single source – the Eracles continuation. The author often used the term *sos* (most likely ‘pay’) in descriptions of giving. The examples are examined further above, but they clearly represent a degree of variation. The German *chevaliers as sous de l’emperere* (knights in the pay of the Emperor) hints at money-fiefs, whereas Guy de Lusignan’s hiring of knights and sergeants is more suggestive of soldiers paid for a specific campaign -in this case that which culminated in the disastrous Battle at Hattin - though whether they were being paid ‘overtime’ or were ‘true’ mercenaries is unclear.<sup>92</sup> King William of Sicily’s crusade preparation provides a unique insight. The suggestion above is that the first men the author described, hired at home in Sicily, were paid domestically; most likely ‘overtime’. By contrast those he hired abroad were probably mercenaries, as noted above. The terms used are different. Where the author used *sos* for the latter group, the first were *loerent* (from *loer*: most likely ‘to enter service’, but also possibly ‘to hire, engage, pay or reward’).<sup>93</sup>

The Latin terms include more variation, but descriptions are far less precise. There are more in-depth descriptions of paid men. For example there are explicit mentions of pay rather than simply describing paid soldiers, with the term *stipendia* appearing frequently as the means of payment. Many of the examples are isolated to the work of William of Tyre, with *commilitones militia* and *equites* all being paid in this way. The latter represents a very general instance, with Baldwin II of Jerusalem being unable to pay his cavalry.<sup>94</sup> On another earlier occasion, Count Baldwin of Edessa could not afford to pay his *commilitones* their stipends [*stipendia*] for the military service [*militia*] they had performed.<sup>95</sup> Significantly, those described as the *commilitones*, or household knights, are paid in the same manner -

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<sup>92</sup> For the latter, see: CGT, 28-29.

<sup>93</sup> CGT, 72.

<sup>94</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 11:21.

<sup>95</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 11:11.

with *stipendia*- as the lay princes Renaud of Chatillion and Walter of St. Omer, with the former also described as *militia quasi gregario*.<sup>96</sup>

Similarly, Baldwin of Boulogne the future Count of Edessa was offered payment during the course of the First Crusade, but he ‘scornfully rejected this proposal, which seemed to imply that he was to be paid a wage [*stipendia*] for his services like a common soldier [*gregarius*].’<sup>97</sup> Those described as the *commilitones* of Count Baldwin of Edessa are paid in the same way as those described as *gregarii*. This could suggest either that the two are equated, or that payment of *stipendia* was far less discerning than might have been supposed. The exact standing and function of the *commilitones* remains contested, but this example suggests that at least in the twelfth century they were far from the inner circle of the household, and closer to hired bodyguards.

At the end of the period, Hugh of Saint-Pol described *milites* who went without *stipendia* on the Fourth Crusade, such was the poverty of the expedition.<sup>98</sup> The nonchalance with which this is included implies that such an arrangement was commonplace by the late twelfth century. By contrast, the *sariantes* of his account noted in Chapter Three were paid with *solidi*. As with numerous other examples of *stipendia*, the implication is one of regular, annual payment where the latter perhaps suggests a one-off lump sum. was A direct link between *stipendia* (literally ‘stipends’) and ‘horse service’ is therefore perhaps detectable. The overarching hypothesis therefore suggests a difference between paying *stipendia* in exchange for military service -whether a permanent recurring payment, or ‘overtime’ pay- and the hiring of soldiers for a fixed purpose.

Even if such an assumption is made, payment in exchange for ongoing military service should be subcategorised into those performing the service due for their money-fiefs, and those who required payment to continue beyond the regular term. The former simply represented an annual stipend in place of land fiefs or rents. While this is certainly rare in the sources for the expeditions, it is common in the records of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The latter by contrast -termed

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<sup>96</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 17:21. For Renaud described as both *miles* and *stipendiarius*, see 17:26.

<sup>97</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 4:3: ...*omnino respuens, ut tanquam gregarius aliquis apud eum stipendia mereretur...*

<sup>98</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi* in MGH SS 17, p.812.

‘overtime’ through the chapter- represented those who owed the usual *servitia debitum* of forty days, based on either land- or money-fiefs, but accepted pay to serve past that. There are frequent examples of this, though the popularity of the phenomenon is attributable to the very nature of the expeditions. Participants frequently performed service outside of that usually expected of them. The terminology is complex however, as there was little literary distinction between ‘overtime’ and regular service. This was possibly because many authors saw no difference between the two given the soldiers in question still served the same person. The greatest point of distinction was between regular levy troops -in whatever capacity they were paid- and ‘true’ mercenaries. The crucial point is that where both were paid, the latter were considered outsiders too. From the evidence above, such mercenaries were common in the source material, on both sides.

### **5.5.1. Paid Knights and Honour**

The examples throughout this chapter suggest that paid soldiers were widespread, but it is difficult to reconcile the idea of paid knights, particularly the idea of direct payment of those considered noble. This stems from earlier modern literature argument that the nobility found cash payments disdainful, with DUBY emphatically stating that there were no mercenary knights at the end of the twelfth century.<sup>99</sup> Such disdain seems to be upheld in certain primary sources. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described the natives of Anatolia demanding ‘protection money’ from Frederick Barbarossa, lest they attack the expedition. According to the author the Emperor preferred to fight his way through by strength of arms rather than with the weight of coin.<sup>100</sup> This suggests disdain for the substitution of money for deeds of knighthood, at least in the author’s romantic conception of the latter. Crucially, this was not necessarily an accurate reflection of reality. The anecdote was possibly more idealistic: a reflection of attitude rather than necessity.

Knights appear frequently in crusading material, and interrogation of the various contexts of *militēs stipendiarii* indicates that at least some were waged household troops, while others received money-fiefs for lack of available land-fiefs. There

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<sup>99</sup> Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ p.108.

<sup>100</sup> HEF, p.83

was possibly a distinct difference between the types of household troops, but the two have often been placed together. John France has described this elusive group best as: ‘men whose relationship was essentially political but needed funding to support the cost of their military service,’ going on to say that ‘many of these were gentle persons, and they could not be called mercenaries.’<sup>101</sup> With that being said, the differentiations made among knights are unclear. Many knightly retainers cannot be described as mercenaries, but a reasonable inference is that mercenary cavalry was drawn from knightly families, and the ‘overtime’ examples discussed above clearly illustrate that a landed knight might serve both as a vassal and as a paid man.<sup>102</sup> The use of certain vocabulary by Gilbert of Mons for example, does demonstrate a perceived difference between professional mercenaries and paid nobles. Gilbert did not refer to the latter as *stipendiarii*.<sup>103</sup> Crouch likewise notes a difference in the way Mercadier and William Marshal are referred to, and that the nobility of the twelfth century were far more careful about how they presented themselves than their forebears.<sup>104</sup>

Those accepting *fief-rentes* or performing paid, regular duties in service to a lord were clearly regarded as respectable, given the lack of effort made to describe the emerging knights and squires as mercenaries, despite frequent examples of them being paid.<sup>105</sup> Among these examples, and notably outside of the crusading expeditions, Gilbert of Mons made frequent mention of *milites stipendiarii*, who may well have been honourable, unenfeoffed household troops by virtue of the money-fief.<sup>106</sup> The argument is that the *miles stipendiarius* was simply another ‘subset’ of the coalescing grouping of knights – used just like other qualifiers such as *gregarius* to distinguish among the heterogeneous grouping.<sup>107</sup> As Isaac states, the term placed them within fief-holding knights, while explaining their particular relationship, rather than setting them apart.<sup>108</sup>

There was a clear difference between paid knights and mercenaries. It was perceived by medieval observers themselves, whether in the relative functions

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<sup>101</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.7.

<sup>102</sup> See above, and France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.12; France, *Western Warfare*, p.61.

<sup>103</sup> Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.293-5.

<sup>104</sup> France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.10-1.

<sup>105</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p.62.

<sup>106</sup> Vollrath, Hoverkamp, *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, p.19; Napran, ‘Mercenaries and Paid Men in Gilbert of Mons,’ p.290.

<sup>107</sup> Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ p.109-10.

<sup>108</sup> Isaac, ‘The Problem with Mercenaries,’ p.110.

they fulfilled, or the way they operated.<sup>109</sup> While terms such as *stipendiarii* were probably applied in an arbitrary manner, warriors who were both noble and salaried were not described as *routier*, or any of the other explicitly derogatory terms used to describe mercenaries.<sup>110</sup> There are explicit examples for this in crusading material. Similarly, Hugh of Saint-Pol describes *milites ad stipendia*, explicitly placing them against the grouping he describes as *sariantes*. This implies a degree of elevation, at least over *sariantes*.<sup>111</sup> Finally, Erlebaud of Vaubercey sold his land possessions to a monastery in preparation for going on crusade.<sup>112</sup> In return the monks agreed to pay him a yearly stipend of six measures of grain, to an equal value of about twelve *livres*. As a charter source, there is little room left for interpretation. Erlebaud is explicitly described as *miles*, and the fact he had land possessions to sell suggests he was an enfeoffed knight, at least before the execution of the charter. This suggests a degree of affluence if not outright wealth.

### 5.5.2. Financial Support for the Crusader States

Aside from explicit mentions of paid soldiers, money was often sent to the Holy Land as a gesture of support, instead of physically going to the Holy Land. A famous example of this was the penance assigned to Henry II of England for the murder of Thomas Becket. Henry was to send a large sum to the Kingdom of Jerusalem to pay for knights for its defence.<sup>113</sup> This was considered an acceptable alternative to conducting a full-scale expedition from the perspective of western rulers. Such an arrangement was certainly formalised by the inception of the Fourth Crusade in 1198. Innocent III's *Post Miserabile* ordered local lords to levy soldiers or a fixed amount of money.<sup>114</sup> This substitution of soldiers for money is particularly significant in the crusading context, as it raises questions over whether paying for someone to go on crusade had the same spiritual rewards as going on crusade oneself. The substitution encouraged above by Innocent would

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<sup>109</sup> Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries,' p.102.

<sup>110</sup> Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries,' p.109.

<sup>111</sup> Hugh of St.-Pol in *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, in MGH SS 17, p.812.

<sup>112</sup> T. Evergates, (tr. & ed.), *Feudal Society in Medieval France: Documents from the County of Champagne* (Philadelphia, 1993), pp.86-7.

<sup>113</sup> Forey, 'Paid troops in the service of the military orders during the twelfth and fourteenth centuries,' p.87.

<sup>114</sup> Reported in Howden, 4:70-5; Innocent III, *Post Miserabile*, August 13, 1198, in J. Bird, E. Peters, J.M. Powell (eds.), *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291* (Philadelphia, 2013), p.35.



suggest that the two were broadly equivalent in the eyes of the Papacy. Earlier in the text too, Innocent III also called upon the nobility to send warriors to the defence of the Holy Land.<sup>115</sup> While the hope was clearly that the nobles would accompany their respective troops, the language did not bind them to such a course.

The fact also that Innocent specified that his legates ‘are not to be supported by offerings given through charity, but at our own cost and that of our brethren,...’ suggests that the former was perhaps the assumed means by which ecclesiastics went on crusade, and attests to its widespread nature.<sup>116</sup> The fact that Innocent so definitively stated that this would not be the case with his legates perhaps suggested distaste for the practice on a more individual scale as well. It is possible to discern a difference between large-scale provision of troops and the same on an individual basis, where a community worked together to send one member on crusade. The former was not necessarily considered charity but perhaps a rough, crusading approximation of the practice of *scutage*, with nobles paying for a body of troops to go on crusade in their place. Although these represent but a few examples, their high-profile nature suggests that the large-scale provision of troops was a commonplace, for it to have been suitable penance for Henry II, or an acceptable contribution to the Fourth Crusade. These and the other examples above evidence the fact that paid knights were not considered in any way less honourable than their enfeoffed counterparts, but there are many more ways in which the paying of soldiers and particularly knights was ‘euphemised’ by contemporary authors.

### **5.5.3. The Covering of Knightly Expenses**

Authors found various ways to get around knights being overtly described as ‘paid’, but there is a degree of overlap, and this possibly suggests that they were artificial distinctions. The most common description is that of covering expenses. As noted above, this was apayment, but only for the replacement of lost or broken equipment, including horses. Although often monetary, the payment did also take the form of a direct replacement of like-for-like. Aside from the example noted above in William the Breton’s *Philippide*, a few more

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<sup>115</sup> See Howden, 4:70-5; Innocent III, *Post Miserabile*, p.34

<sup>116</sup> See Howden, 4:70-5; Innocent III, *Post Miserabile*, p.35

examples relate particularly to the Third Crusade. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes Richard wanting to lead a further expedition for which he would supply seven hundred knights and two thousand *servientes* at his own expense.<sup>117</sup> This example is unclear, but the phrasing suggests that Richard intended to cover the expenses of his soldiers for extra service even in the context of the crusade.

The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* claims that early in the expedition, the King of England offered Frederick Barbarossa some fifty galleys, 'with crews, expenses and everything else belonging to them, and he shall place one hundred knights and fifty crossbowmen in these same galleys...'<sup>118</sup> Defining the status of these troops proves difficult. They were troops paid by the King of England. However, they were fighting under the nominal command of Frederick Barbarossa, as mercenaries, given they were 'outsiders'. This feels inaccurate however, given the specific phrasing, and these troops might properly be described as an attached allied force rather than mercenaries.

A final example is the well-documented recruitment of the remaining French troops to Richard's cause. He was described by Angevin sources as lending some five thousand silver marks to the Duke of Burgundy, so he could pay his troops.<sup>119</sup> The act is portrayed as one of great benevolence on Richard's part, while simultaneously demeaning the Duke for his inability to pay his own troops. Modern literature has suggested that the French forces lacked proper finance following the departure of their king, with a focus on their dependency on Richard after the capture of Acre.<sup>120</sup> Richard's payment might rather represent a mere covering of expenses however, with the Duke's being comparatively higher due to his having to pay the whole remaining French contingent. With the departure of King Philip, the Duke of Burgundy possibly sought a different commander in the short term. Richard's payment was not indicative of the Duke's poverty -with evidence from the French sources of Rigord and William the Breton supporting this- though this was a possibility.

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<sup>117</sup> IPGRR, 6:2

<sup>118</sup> HEF, p.104: ...*cum hominibus et expensis et aliis omnibus attinentiis et centum milites cum quinquaginta balistariis in eisdem ponet galeis...*

<sup>119</sup> Ambroise, ll.5344-9; IPGRR, 3:23

<sup>120</sup> J. Gillingham, *Richard I* (New Haven & London, 2002), p.166; J. Flori, *Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight*, tr. J. Birrell (Edinburgh, 1999), p.342.

The service was also possibly considered extraneous, with the covering of expenses therefore expected of a commander under the circumstances. This might be a stretch given the strained relations between the French and Angevin crusaders in the latter stages of the expedition, but the phrasing ‘to pay his troops’ does not necessarily suggest an inability to do so. The same passage in Ambroise does describe the Duke of Burgundy asking for help, but there are numerous reasons why this might have happened. Aside from a lack of funds, it might just be characteristic of the anti-French bias which is inherent in both major Angevin sources: the implication is that Richard saved the French forces with his generosity.

Although this covering of expenses was expected when outside of the usual service, it was considered generous to cover those same expenses during regular service. The examples above fall under the former category, while the latter frequently appears in sources described as the giving of gifts. William the Breton described King Philip distributing many gifts to his nobles and knights after making the difficult crossing to Sicily.<sup>121</sup> Similarly, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described Richard giving generous gifts to knights and others -*milites et alii*- who had incurred heavy expenses on the same journey.<sup>122</sup> Both Richard and Philip were later described as conferring gifts upon ‘the needy knights’.<sup>123</sup> There is a definite difference in terminology between these examples -up to and during the siege of Acre- and those above, which came later. The contrast suggests that many contemporary observers considered the conclusion of the siege of Acre to be the end of regular service in the context of the expedition. Even at the conclusion of the siege, yet before Philip departed, Richard was described distributing treasure to his knights, and paying for extensive repairs to the walls.<sup>124</sup> Those described in lesser terms also received gifts -again from Richard- at Messina. *Pedites* and *inferioris fortunae satellites* are described in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and *cil qui a pié esteient* in Ambroise and this illustrates that gift giving in was not restricted to knights, or those described as *milites* in the crusading context.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> William the Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, 53

<sup>122</sup> IPGRR, 2:23

<sup>123</sup> IPGRR, 3:4

<sup>124</sup> IPGRR, 4:1

<sup>125</sup> IPGRR, 2:23; Ambroise, 1.1066

#### 5.5.4. Gift Giving

The weight of evidence suggests that this last example was an anomaly, with infantry and lesser ‘sergeants’ appearing to be paid on a far more occasional basis than their knightly counterparts. Ralph of Coggeshall described Richard distributing his treasure with a generous hand to his knights, and the Chronicle of Otto of St. Blasien described Frederick Barbarossa giving generous gifts to his knightly retinue, as well as sending a large army of *stipendiatum* to Apulia.<sup>126</sup> Of course, these *stipendiati* were possibly a different type of troop, completely unconnected to *militēs* and knights in any way. The usage of the term suggests that these soldiers were paid, and the fact that such *stipendiati* were described separate from knights illustrates a clear distinction, but the lack of specificity leaves its extent and nature unclear. The evidence examined so far indicates that the significant difference between the *militēs* and the *stipendiati* was that the former were enfeoffed knights, while the latter were paid through stipends or money-fiefs. Given the etymology of the word, it is undeniable that these soldiers - whether they were knights or not- were paid via regular payments. The term therefore possibly represented a regional variation on the far more commonly-used *stipendiarii* which has appeared frequently in the examples listed above.

With regards to gift giving, the example was at the beginning of the German expedition. Frederick Barbarossa’s Third Crusade began significantly earlier than those of his French and Angevin counterparts. The term of ‘standard’ service appears to end with Philip’s departure from the Holy Land, this was not necessarily the case when it came to German authors. Given just how early the example appeared however -the host was in the process of assembling- a reasonable assumption is that it fell within the term of expected service. As with his French and Angevin counterparts, the giving of gifts here probably represented a display of largesse on the part of ruler. In French and Angevin domains at least, the giving of gifts often constituted the paying of expenses during expected or ‘regular’ service and was considered a sign of generosity or largesse in a commander. Testing this argument against the other examples where commanders paid expenses, the hypothesis is that the only difference between

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<sup>126</sup> Otto of St. Blasien, *Chronica*, in MGH SRG 47, 38; Coggeshall, 51-2.

the two in the majority of cases is that one occurred during regular service, when under no obligation, while the other was a means of extending service.

#### 5.5.5. Anomalies

Aside from these there are occasional examples which do not fit one category or another, but which are significant nonetheless. The first is a specific example at the siege of Acre, where Philip of France seeks to recruit more *milites* to his command, offering some three *aureos* per month in payment. Richard then stated ‘that he would pay a fixed rate of four gold coins a month to each knight who wanted employment, regardless of country of origin.’<sup>127</sup> Ambroise described the incident similarly in his *Estoire*, stating that ‘any knight, of any land who wished to take his [Richard’s] pay would receive four gold besants...’<sup>128</sup> This example is significant because, at face value at least, it blurs the line between mercenary and paid soldier. The initial thought is that many of those targeted by both Philip and Richard for recruitment were not necessarily mercenaries, perceived or otherwise. The phrasing ‘taking of pay’ suggests a formal obligation. What is striking is the focus on the concept of country of origin. This combined with the fact that both Philip and Richard tried this suggests that their target demographic was largely comprised of knights from the smaller contingents at Acre, namely the remnant German forces, as well as local knights, and maybe some of the mercenaries hired by William II of Sicily according to the Eracles Continuation. These soldiers would not all have been mercenaries when they joined the siege of Acre, it is plausible that they became so as a result of their taking pay in exchange for service to a lord outside of their ‘sphere’ (in this case Philip or Richard).

#### 5.5.6. Treasure and Loot

The regulated distribution of loot and treasure was common among victors in twelfth century warfare, and the crusading expeditions were no exception. This is arguably surprising given the disdain displayed for the pursuit of crusading for financial gain. Bernard of Clairvaux’s *Apologia* for the failure of the Second Crusade is the most well-known and extensive example of the association

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<sup>127</sup> IPGRR, 3:4: ...*ut milites singuli, cuiuscunque regionis oriundi, qui stipendiis egerent, ab ipso reciperent singulis mensibus quatuor aureos, certa conditione statutos.*

<sup>128</sup> Ambroise, ll.4574-82: ...*que chevalier de quelque terre / qu’il fust, qui ses solz voldreit quere, / quatre besanz d’or lui doroit...*

between material wealth and sin, but his sentiment was echoed elsewhere. Helmold of Bosau expressed contempt for the commanders of the Wendish Crusade, who were concerned with not damaging their future acquisitions during the campaign.<sup>129</sup> This culminated in his near-incredulous description of the crusaders' raiding being curtailed to prevent damage to lands they would own with a successful campaign.

Of course, when considering treasure and loot, no discussion would be complete without the crusaders of the Italian city-states. Historiography has largely dismissed Italian crusaders as "a tired caricature of the greedy trader, obsessed with profit alone."<sup>130</sup> Caffaro represents a significant source from the perspective of one such city-state, suggesting that a combination of civic pride, piety and commercial profit lay behind at least Genoese crusading motivations. His mentions of loot and treasure are somewhat unusual. Caffaro blatantly celebrated the link between victory and financial gain; a contrast to most of the other sources under consideration.<sup>131</sup> This should be considered a more realistic appraisal of the necessities of crusading. Loot and treasure secured through crusading was crucial to sustain the individual expeditions and the movement in general, offsetting as it did the ruinous expenses of the ventures.<sup>132</sup>

The later Fourth Crusade is arguably characterised by the promise of financial gain. Robert of Clari noted that Doge Enrico Dandolo supported both of major diversions of the expedition, first stating that 'the city of Zara is very rich and well-supplied,' and then that 'Greece is a very rich land.'<sup>133</sup> While this feeds into the narrative of Venetian premeditation preferred by more traditionalist historians such as Runciman, Robert himself displayed no particular objection to the inducements of the Doge. With specific regard to Constantinople, Robert previously noted the crusaders' lack of provisions and money, arguing they would be ineffectual in the Holy Land. This therefore justified the diversion to Constantinople.<sup>134</sup> Villehardouin's account, with his position of greater power

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<sup>129</sup> Helmold of Bosau, ed. & tr. H. Stoob, 1:65; 1:68.

<sup>130</sup> J. Phillips, 'Caffaro of Genoa and the Motives of Early Crusaders,' in P. Ingesman (ed.), *Religion as an Agent of Change: Crusades, Reformation, Pietism* (Leiden & Boston, 2016), p.84

<sup>131</sup> Phillips, 'Caffaro of Genoa', pp.84, 99.

<sup>132</sup> Phillips, 'Caffaro of Genoa', p.90

<sup>133</sup> Clari, §13 (...le vile de Jadres est mout boine et molt plentive de tous biens!); 17 (...Grece a molt rike tere et molt plentive de tous biens...).

<sup>134</sup> Clari, §16.

provides more specifics, with the price of the expedition's services to Alexius noted at some two hundred thousand silver marks, provisions for their campaign in the Holy Land, and an allied army to accompany them.<sup>135</sup> After Alexius failed to fulfill his promises, Villehardouin described a meeting of the crusade leaders to divide the spoils of Constantinople, before the city was even captured.<sup>136</sup> Aside from a display of self-confidence, such an example potentially illustrates that the motives of the leaders of the Fourth Crusade were far from pious and spiritual, as might be expected. The problem with these Fourth Crusade examples is that they come from secular observers. They were all well-versed in the realities of war and were probably not outraged by such everyday occurrences. It is among ecclesiastical commentators where such outrage is evident. Innocent III was certainly outraged in the immediate aftermath of the campaign, with an angry letter to his legate stating that he sent the man to gain not temporal, but rather 'eternal' riches.<sup>137</sup> However Innocent III was unhappy with the outcome of the Fourth Crusade for numerous reasons, most significantly his hope for the reunification of the Western and Eastern churches. He possibly sought to denigrate the crusaders' actions to illustrate his displeasure, primarily by noting the perception they had simply attacked the best source of loot. By contrast to the papal viewpoint, Gunther of Paris described the theft of relics by Abbot Martin as an almost jovial anecdote, with minimal judgement.<sup>138</sup>

The position on financial reward for crusading was therefore somewhat mixed. At the highest levels of the church where crusading was at its most idealised, financial reward was considered taboo. However in the lower levels it was considered far more acceptable if it did not compromise the expedition. Roger of Howden described Richard's distribution of loot and treasure throughout the crusade in glowing terms, praising the king for his generosity. This treasure was distributed as payment to both knights and sergeants at Messina, an incident which was described differently by other authors and has been examined above regarding the giving of gifts.<sup>139</sup> The comparison confuses the picture a little, as it suggests association between gift-giving and the distribution of loot. In this

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<sup>135</sup> Villehardouin, §93.

<sup>136</sup> Villehardouin, §234-5.

<sup>137</sup> J. Brundage, *The Crusades: A Documentary History* (Milwaukee, 1962), pp.208-9.

<sup>138</sup> Gunther von Paris, ed. Orth, 29

<sup>139</sup> Howden, 3:95

instance however, it was probably not loot, because it took place before even Richard's attack on Messina. This 'treasure' was probably from Richard's treasury, and this distribution therefore represented payments in response to a difficult crossing.

Roger of Howden also described distribution of treasure after Richard's attack on the caravan, noting the distribution of the spoils from the engagement to the *milites*.<sup>140</sup> The differences between the two examples are striking. First is that the distribution came as a direct and immediate result of the engagement, as opposed to at Messina where it seemed a spontaneous display of generosity. The second is that only *milites* were paid after the action, where both *milites* and *satellites* were reimbursed at Messina. Both the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and Ambroise described knights and other soldiers as present, with the latter grouping including *satellites*, archers and crossbowmen. Roger of Howden therefore possibly meant *milites* here in its much more general, classical sense - as 'soldiers'. It should be stressed that he far more frequently used the term in its more contemporary sense, as 'knights'. The example clearly was not one of distributing cash but rather portions of the goods directly seized from the caravan. By contrast, the payments described at the end of the Fourth Crusade were probably financial payment. Although Villehardouin did not give specific values, he valued the different groupings relative to each other.<sup>141</sup> The *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* supports his gradation but with more specificity. *Milites* were paid some twenty marks, clerics and mounted sergeants ten, and *pedites* five.<sup>142</sup> These examples of spoils being distributed are nowhere near as contentious as those noted above, despite the fact that the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* was likely a clerical source. The delineation seems to be between those who were eyewitnesses or relied on them, and those who were not. Those who had not experienced the realities of an expedition held the movement as a whole to a more idealised standard. The distribution of treasure was perhaps not seen as inherently sinful. Much of the criticism for such practice seems linked with intent; the active pursuit of financial gain was disdainful, but a cash reward for service to God, humbly accepted, was perfectly reasonable.

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<sup>140</sup> Howden, 3:182

<sup>141</sup> Villehardouin, 254.

<sup>142</sup> 'Devastatio Constantinopolitana', in MGH SS 16, p.11.



## 5.6. Conclusion

Did the context of the crusading expeditions make it more acceptable to be paid to fight, precisely because it was in service to God? Excommunication was threatened against those who would employ mercenaries, but the Second Lateran Council placed a similar ban on the use of crossbows and even bows against Christians specifically.<sup>143</sup> Many other things were permissible in the service of God, or against the Muslims, so was the payment of troops? The weight of evidence above, coupled with the lack of a unified stance on the realities of financial gain on crusade suggests that it was permissible. By the second half of the twelfth century however, significant financial preparations were undertaken for each expedition with the most well-known example being the so-called ‘Saladin Tithe’.<sup>144</sup> At their inception the Crusades were a popular movement characterised as armed pilgrimage. The failures of the Second Crusade spurred the leaders of subsequent campaigns to try to restrict involvement, with a significant focus on securing combatant participants. Given the exceptional nature of the crusading campaigns, the payment of troops was arguably a natural necessity with the increased focus on military concerns alongside spiritual ones.

The existence of established and wide-ranging terminology, and the examples given above of paid soldiers also present within Western Christendom suggest that if anything the crusading context made the payment of soldiers less acceptable. The examples found in crusading material possibly represented a minority of occurrences. If there was any disdain for or outright opposition to the payment of crusaders, many authors would have tried to marginalise such activities, particularly regarding the focal figures of their works. The argument for widespread popular opposition seems flimsy due to the numerous examples of authors describing their central protagonists either receiving or giving pay, as has been evidenced throughout the chapter above.

Was there opposition to the idea of payment or merely to the far more difficult to evidence concept of ‘greed’? The latter is far more realistic, given the spiritual

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<sup>143</sup> For the Third Lateran Council, see Canon 27, <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum11.htm> accessed 22/12/17. For the Second Lateran Council, see Canon 29 in Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils*, pp.195-213.

<sup>144</sup> For an overview of the Saladin Tithe, see T. Asbridge, *The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land* (London, 2012), pp.385-9

basis of the movement, the Biblical association of greed and sin, and the primary source of the criticism. Of particular note is the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, known for its condemnation of the corrosive effects of greed, and the way it seemingly ran counter to the tenets of crusading.<sup>145</sup> ‘Greed’ as a detestable trait also perhaps explains several of the reasons examined above that mercenaries were hated. For example, the combination of payment and greed might cause a mercenary commander to display ‘fickleness’. The traits above were probably only displayed occasionally, but these became publicised and used as examples of what mercenaries were capable of, despite representing the exceptions and not the rule. Given the case-by-case nature of such judgments, it remains difficult to determine whether certain types of mercenaries or paid troops were hated more or less than others.

At this point, a return to the efforts at categorisation of different payment types is beneficial. Certain types of payments, such as the distribution of loot and treasure were possibly associated more with greedy recipients. Similarly, if commanders were known to be generous, soldiers might enter their employ solely for the gifts they might bestow. It is inaccurate to tar those paid for regular service with the same brush, however. Heirbaut argues that in Flanders at least, the money-fief constituted a military institution designed specifically to attract foreigners.<sup>146</sup> These knights seemingly became paid foreigners, which would place them very close to the definition of mercenary established above. They were not however considered mercenaries by contemporaries, which seems to devalue earlier definitions of mercenaries involving payments and ‘foreignness’. While initially these paid, foreign knights might have been considered ‘mercenaries’, the type of payment they received -a regular stipend- would suggest a position within the ‘sphere’ of their employer, or at least more so than those employed on a short-term basis in exchange for a lump sum. A caveat must seemingly be added to the definition established above. A ‘mercenary’, as well as being outside of their employer’s sphere and paid, did not receive regular stipends in the same way as a household knight might.

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<sup>145</sup> See *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, pp.82-3. See also M. Bull, *Eyewitness and Crusade Narrative: Perception and Narration in Accounts of the Second, Third and Fourth Crusades* (Woodbridge, 2018), p.133.

<sup>146</sup> Heirbaut, ‘The Fief-Rente’, pp.1-37.

For all the attempts to categorise and sub-categorise the various methods of payment in existence on the twelfth-century crusading expeditions therefore, an argument can be made against a fundamental distinction between mercenaries and recipients of money-fiefs.<sup>147</sup> The most significant distinction is between payment for regular service (i.e. money-fiefs or similar arrangements on an annual basis) and payment for anything beyond that, including for a fixed term or service, and this continues to tighten the definition of what constituted a mercenary in the twelfth century. While those are the most significant, a variety of arrangements are discernible, though the sheer range coupled with the frequent overlap and imprecision makes categorisation past the broad dichotomy above difficult.

There was clearly a marked increase in the amount of paid service recorded, particularly in chronicle sources, and one can agree with Holt that this was a result of the changing demands of warfare in the twelfth century.<sup>148</sup> A large part of these 'changing demands' was the need for greater periods of service, past the traditional forty days. The easiest way to provision for such service was with financial payments. In a crusading context specifically, the majority of paid participants fell under the category of those who were paid expenses or 'overtime', and this was largely due to the nature of the campaigns; they were not governed by a fixed term of service but by an objective. There are numerous examples of those paid with stipends and money-fiefs, but these soldiers were possibly disproportionately represented due to format of many of the chronicle sources which often began with lists of participants.<sup>149</sup>

Of great significance to the wider thesis is the conclusion that not only did paid knights exist, but that they were common. The suggestion in prior chapters has been that knights were not -as has been perpetuated- exclusively heavily-armoured mounted warriors who fought as shock cavalry. The previous two chapters include examples of them fighting also as infantry in sieges, pitched battles and even naval engagements during the course of the various expeditions. This chapter similarly proves that the grouping of knights was also not

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<sup>147</sup> J. France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century,' *Mediterranean Historical Review* 15 (2000), p.58.

<sup>148</sup> Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' p.133.

<sup>149</sup> See Villehardouin, §5-10, Clari, §1-2; *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium* in MGH SS 23, pp.116-7; HEF, pp.18-22; IPGRR, 1:31, 1:42.

economically exclusive in the crusading arena. Members ranged from those who were enfeoffed down to poor retinue knights who were paid regular stipends or through the system of money-fiefs, and even those who could be considered 'true' mercenaries. If, on Crusade, the designation of knight was no longer solely indicative of military function or economic status or circumstance, it leaves few options to explain their distinction and elevation, with one popular suggestion being social status. The issue of whether or not *milites* did indeed enjoy a privileged social status will be discussed at length below.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility,' p.801.

## Chapter 6: The Crusades in the Formation of the Knighthood and Knightly Identity

### 6.1. Introduction

The significant work done on the knighthood of the twelfth century has had several broad results, as summarised in Chapter One. Significantly, knights of the early twelfth century clearly differed from those of the later period: some described as knights at the start of the period, were not by the end of the period. The change has often been summarised as that from soldiers to landholders. In the earlier period, knightliness was supposedly in the arms rather than the man, and it was this which changed through the twelfth century.<sup>1</sup> Socially elevated knights existed earlier, and had their own retainers, but it was not universal until later in the period.<sup>2</sup> This elevation is perhaps traceable to the sporadic instances of hereditary knighthood from 1140 in Sicily, which contributed social prestige to the knightly condition.<sup>3</sup> This change in status is also detectable in the Rule of the Temple, which asserted that knights and sergeants were distinguished by their dress, with the relevant sections of the Primitive Rule drawn up as early as 1130.<sup>4</sup>

The social elevation of the grouping was largely complete by the end of the century, but the timing of the change remains uncertain. The current consensus is that it had occurred by the latter quarter of the century, with Flori giving a specific turning point as 1180. With that established, efforts have turned towards why and how this social elevation occurred. One significant focus has been knightly culture, beginning in earnest around the 1980s. Knightly culture -often summarised as chivalry- has been largely credited for the social ascent of the grouping, which has perhaps caused confusion. There were common factors impacting the growth of knightly culture and the social ascent of the knightly grouping, but there were significant differences. The consensus is that the social mobility occurred due to the mutual sharing of ideas between the 'traditional' members of the nobility -the barons, counts and dukes- and the grouping of knights, usually their dependents. These ideas were not restricted to chivalry,

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<sup>1</sup> J. Scammell, 'The Formation of the English Social Structure: Freedom, Knights, and Gentry, 1066-1300,' *Speculum* 68:3 (1993), p.592.

<sup>2</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.135.

<sup>3</sup> Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, p.107; Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility,' p.805.

<sup>4</sup> Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, p.141.

despite their wholesale characterised as such. The rate of this sharing supposedly varied according to region, but Flori in particular has emphasised that this led to a general, if diversified rise in social status.<sup>5</sup>

As noted in Chapter One, chivalry is difficult to pin down, encompassing a vast amount. Different historians have necessarily focused on specific aspects of the topic because of this, including both religious and secular chivalry. Older historians have been criticised for their narrow focus on religion, with Bloch in particular emphasising the role of the church in driving the growth of chivalry.<sup>6</sup> More recent efforts have attempted to establish a counter-trend, with historians such as Keen, Kaeuper and Flori examining secular chivalry. The work of Jaeger is also significant. His study is on the concept of knights as courtiers, but questions remain over his timeline. There has been a certain degree of post-revisionism more recently, with a reconsideration of aspects of religious chivalry by Kaeuper in his *Holy Warriors*.<sup>7</sup> One of the widespread hard and accepted facts of the history of chivalry is that the ideal of the chivalric courtly knight influenced the creation of a similar social ideal. From this, Aurell and his Anglophone counterparts Turner and -more recently- Crouch, have emphasised literature in their studies of the concept of the literate knight. Crucial is that this did not mean 'literate' by modern standards but described those whose understanding of Latin was above average. They could not necessarily write but could probably read. The argument is that from around 1050, there was a growing inclination (particularly in Francophone regions) towards the ideal of the thoughtful knight, which caused the association more with a grouping than a function. Together with self-definition through military identity, this served to associate social power and knightly rank.<sup>8</sup>

Most of studies of chivalry have focused upon the social and cultural changes undergone by knights across the period. The established assumptions are that knights were affluent, mounted shock warriors. The implication is that the former contributed to their social exclusivity if not ascent, with the well-documented rising cost of knighthood pricing many of the earlier, lower

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<sup>5</sup> Flori, *L'essor de la chevaleries*, pp.223-30.

<sup>6</sup> As cited in Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.16.

<sup>7</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.18-9.

<sup>8</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.20.

members out of the grouping. The case has been made that this exclusivity contributed to the social ascent of the grouping. The aim below is to interrogate and perhaps challenge some of the fundamental associations regarding knights and the knighthood, starting with their military role and definition.

## 6.2. The Military Role of Knights

The previous Chapters Three, Four and Five all include attempts to locate the knight as a military entity, with limited success. Chapters Three and Four together suggest that knights were not distinct on a functional basis. Rather they represented an exceptional level of training and skill uncommon in warriors of the twelfth century. The established historiography in Chapter Two suggests that knights fought exclusively as heavy cavalry, and that they were the sole members of said functional grouping. 'Knights' have been credited with a great deal by many, especially regarding military history, and this has muddied the waters significantly. The assumptions have been that knights fought as heavy cavalry, that heavy cavalry was effective if not preeminent in twelfth-century warfare, and that this therefore made knights the focal point of any medieval army.

All of these perceptions need to be addressed. As the above chapters have shown, knights did not exclusively fight as heavy cavalry, with numerous examples in the crusading context alone showing that knights from across Western Christendom fought on foot in battles, sieges, and even naval engagements. Even fighting on horseback, examples are evident in the works of Odo of Deuil and the Eracles Continuation of William of Tyre which suggest that they were not always heavily-armoured. During the Second Crusade, Odo of Deuil described Conrad III of Germany being accompanied by his chief barons and 'a multitude of agile knights' (*militum multitudinam expeditam*).<sup>9</sup> The meaning of *expeditam* is varied, but it has frequently described light troops. Conrad was described as undertaking reconnaissance -something usually undertaken by light cavalry- it is probable that the *milites* described were equipped in as light a fashion as their task suggests.

The Eracles Continuation description of Richard's attack on a Muslim caravan towards the conclusion of the Third Crusade also yields an example. The

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<sup>9</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 4:80-1.

principal Angevin sources for the expedition, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* both imply it was a quick, strike force, but the Eracles Continuation explicitly described Richard accompanied by 'lightly-armed knights'.<sup>10</sup> Even when knights did fight as heavy cavalry, they did not enjoy a monopoly on such tactics. As shown in Chapter Three, mounted sergeants acted independently of knights at the conclusion of the Fourth Crusade, and the Rule of the Temple combined with chronicle evidence suggests that these soldiers could be similarly equipped to the less affluent knights.

Regarding the second assumption, the pre-eminence of knights and cavalry in general, has already been challenged extensively in modern historiography, as noted in Chapter Two. Knights probably were the focal point of the twelfth century armies of Western Christendom, but this was probably unrelated to their military function. This almost returns us to the actual military definition of a knight. The argument is that by the end of the twelfth century knights merely represented superior soldiers, in whatever context they fought, rather than acting as heavy cavalry. Previous historiography has characterised knights primarily as heavy cavalry, who were proficient in other forms of fighting, where this thesis contends that they were actually just general purpose, elite warriors. There are numerous reasons why this was the case, including training and other opportunities afforded by affluence.

With the evidence from Chapters Three and Four, it seems undeniable that knights were all-purpose soldiers. Knights appeared fighting on horseback and on foot, with lances, swords and other close combat weapons, as well as with bows and crossbows.<sup>11</sup> Towards the start of the century, there clearly was an association between knights and horsemen however. Most symptomatic of this is the interchangeability of *equites* and *milites* in the earlier sources. This tendency survived into the later twelfth century in the work of William of Tyre, who described the People's Crusade as including 'a large company of foot soldiers, but very few *equites*'.<sup>12</sup> Throughout his account of the expeditions of 1096-1099, he used *equites* far more frequently than *milites*.<sup>13</sup> Given his lack of eyewitness status

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<sup>10</sup> CGT, 141.

<sup>11</sup> See for example, Clari, §44; IPGRR, 2:30

<sup>12</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 1:18: ...*cum ingenti multitudine pedestrium turmarum – nam paucissimos secum habebat equites*...

<sup>13</sup> William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 1:18-1:25



for the First Crusade however, he probably copied an earlier source. There was clearly a shift during the twelfth century. At the time of the First Crusade knights could arguably be distinguished by their mounted status, but by the Fourth they were not distinguishable on function alone. They did not monopolise shock cavalry tactics, and they did not fight exclusively as cavalry, shock or otherwise. One distinguishing military factor may have been their efficacy -whether down to skill or equipment- but in an age with increasingly common effective infantry and mercenary forces, this was not necessarily significant. A coherent definition of the military aspect of a knight is therefore valuable.

### **6.2.1. The Military Definition of a Knight**

At the start of the period that knights could be defined on a largely military basis. The 'elite' characterisation partly explains this early distinction. The earlier crusading expeditions often represented popular movements as much as military expeditions, so the military efficacy of knights was a starker contrast. The argument has been that knights were effective because they were mounted and heavily armoured. Odo of Deuil's descriptions of the Muslim ambush of the French army in Anatolia have clear implications about knights in the first half of the twelfth century. Past associations of knights with horses and heavy armour, Odo provided clear reasoning: heavy armour was more effective on mounted soldiers because it did not hamper their movements as much; spear thrusts were more damaging from horseback due to the added weight of the horse; mail-clad Franks on foot were quickly overwhelmed by large numbers; and to deal with long range attacks, one required either archers or fast horses.<sup>14</sup> The implication is that knights were useless without their horses and the shock charge, but the highly contextual basis of his argument is significant.

One cannot dispute Odo's first two points. They constitute the observations of basic physics. However, spears were not particularly effective once battle was joined, where a far shorter weapon (a sword, axe or mace) was preferable. The third point can be explained by the state that Odo described the army in. His phrasing suggests no kind of formation, which would have left them open to being swarmed, armour or no. The final observation does not imply that knights

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<sup>14</sup> For the first three, see Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 6:116-9; for the last see 5:94-5.

were useless without their horses, merely that in the case given, they lacked the proper situational equipment, a fact which he laments.

The earliness of the account is also significant, as there were far lower standards of equipment for one to be considered a 'knight'. There is the famous example of the eleventh century, where farmer's sons brought horses to the host of William the Conqueror on the eve of his invasion of England and were named knights. This standard does not seem to have been raised by the Second Crusade. The implication from Odo of Deuil is that all that stood between description as *gregarii milites* and *pedites* was the possession of a horse.<sup>15</sup> This example does suggest that Odo did not consider *milites* without their horses to be equivalent to *pedites*. He seems instead to have used *pedites* -on this occasion- in a far more literal sense, merely describing *milites* on foot. Odo also used the passage to lament the 'wretched' state of the army.

Later in the century however, soldiers performed ever better in engagements. The reason for this could fill another thesis alone, and possibly included but were not limited to the growth of a money economy, the rich growing richer, and the general increase of centralised power. This meant that knights needed more ways to distinguish themselves from the general masses. The last vestiges of knights defined by their military function were still discernible towards the end of the period however, in the descriptions of quantities of knights given by Villehardouin. Particularly towards the end of his account, he described various contingents of knights being sent around Greece to assert the new emperor's control over his lands. While the specific numbers given were perhaps inaccurate, the sense is of lords, both major and minor, leading their followers to secure their assigned lands. Louis of Blois was given the Duchy of Nicaea, said to be one of the highest honours awarded, which he then used to support his 120 knights. William of Champlitte and Geoffrey of Villehardouin himself are said to have led some hundred knights with mounted sergeants and non-combatant followers into Morea in an attempt to carve out their own fiefs. Macaire of Sainte-Menehould, Matthew of Walincourt and Robert of Ronsoy were instructed to lead their knights from Nicomedia, of which there were 'at least a hundred' to the Emperor's aid. Renier of Trit commanded some 120 knights at Philippopolis,

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<sup>15</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 7:130-1

though a group of thirty led by his kinsmen abandoned him to return to Constantinople, with a large portion of the remainder deserting thereafter.<sup>16</sup> The list of examples could go on, as many more are found in subsequent chapters.<sup>17</sup>

One hundred and forty was the largest such contingent, though they were often accompanied, as above, by both mounted sergeants and non-combatant attendants. In this sense, Villehardouin's source possibly best illustrates the changes in the grouping of knights over the period. His reference to specific numbers of knights is arguably representative of the 'old' style of distinction - their description as soldiers - where the frequent instances he praises individuals, often as 'one of the best knights in the world', represent the newer, less coherent type of elevation.<sup>18</sup> Beyond perhaps any other evidence, this shows that the grouping was certainly not cohesive on a military basis by the early thirteenth century. The way in which knights were distinguished and elevated changed over the period. At the inception of the First Crusade knights represented the most effective soldiers in Western Europe, but by the Fourth this notion of efficacy was not sufficient to separate them, with other considerations required - among them, economic condition.

### 6.3. Economic Considerations

Chapter Five has established that knights appeared throughout the different types of paid soldiers, from those receiving money-fiefs or annual stipends to those who received lump sums for a fixed service. Immense variation is detectable before one even considers non-money payments. A great proportion of knights were paid indirectly through the process of traditional enfeoffment. There was no real consistency among knights in terms of livelihood, past that they were paid in exchange for military service when required. This military service was itself varied. Significant is that traditional enfeoffment was not unique to the grouping of knights, even if they were most commonly recorded as recipients. Some sergeants also held fiefs in return for military service, something dubbed 'tenure by sergeanty' by Norman.<sup>19</sup> The fiefs held by such individuals were smaller, with

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<sup>16</sup> Respectively: Villehardouin, §304; 328; 342; 345-6;

<sup>17</sup> Villehardouin, §367; 369; 376; 382; 402; 403; 405; 421; 452; 464.

<sup>18</sup> It is perhaps fitting that Villehardouin ends his account with a description of 'one of the finest knights in all the world' (the Marquis of Montferrat), see Villehardouin, §500: ...*des meilleurs chevaliers qui fust ei remanant dou monde*.

<sup>19</sup> Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, pp.115-6.

the demands for service being correspondingly lesser. Sergeants could be expected to provide horsemen -though not a fully accoutered knight- but also footmen, bowmen and crossbowmen. For example the Eracles Continuation of William of Tyre describes the enfeoffment of some two hundred mounted sergeants, while the burgesses received *terres et granz garrisons*.<sup>20</sup>

Method of payment did not distinguish knights either then. This was not the only means of economic distinction however, and the emergent grouping of knights clearly consisted of more affluent members of twelfth-century society. The increasing cost of knighthood through the period has been well-documented and has been credited for the emergence of both squires and mounted sergeants in their later medieval sense. Frequent allusions are made to the immense amount of baggage knights required, from Helmold of Bosau's *Chronica Slavorum* to the Treaty of Venice as reported by Geoffrey of Villehardouin.<sup>21</sup> Much has been made of the association of knights and horses, with even the poorest of knights expected to own a destrier, armour and weapons.

The list of equipment in the Rule of the Temple illustrates the potentially extensive costs of knighthood in the latter half of the twelfth century, depending on the quality of the items. Aside from the full armour, helm, lance and sword one might expect, each knight was to carry a surcoat, three knives and a Turkish mace. Outside of his personal equipment, the knight was supposed to bring three or four horses, and one or two squires as well.<sup>22</sup> Significantly, the Templars were famous for their vows of poverty, and secular knights were likely somewhat more extravagant in their equipment and retinues both. Also crucial to note is that the higher status a knight was, the more likely he was to have dependents of his own, which would each also need to be provided for.

The requirement for multiple horses is supported in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, where a German knight recognised three of his horses during the sack of a Greek city which had been stolen in Bulgaria.<sup>23</sup> This requirement, together with the rising price of trained warhorses -which a knight probably had only one of- serves to illustrate the cost of being a knight. Only the Templars and the wealthy

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<sup>20</sup> CGT, 136.

<sup>21</sup> Helmold of Bosau, ed. & tr. Stoob, 1:60.

<sup>22</sup> *Règle*, 138

<sup>23</sup> HEF, p.54.

knights still retained their destriers by the end of the Second Crusade, reinforcing the difficulty and cost required to replace those lost while on campaign.<sup>24</sup> This ruinous expense of knighthood even as early as the middle half of the twelfth century led to the famous example in Otto of Freising of a *strator* -likely a sergeant- rejecting an offer of knighthood from Frederick Barbarossa himself due to poverty.<sup>25</sup>

The definition of knights so far is therefore that of general purpose, elite soldiers, who were necessarily affluent as to maintain their equipment. Neither trait alone was enough to distinguish knights from other types of soldiers. Many mercenaries were elite soldiers who were not knights. Likewise there are examples of non-knightly affluent soldiers, most notably among the urban militias developing in Flanders and Italy. The mounted merchant militia of the rich, northern Italian cities such as Milan stand out in particular. Although able to buy all the equipment of their knightly counterparts, they were still not considered the same. There were also those dubbed 'peasant knights' -though they were probably local equivalents of mounted sergeants- in areas such as Iberia and the French Midi, where the obligation to serve on horseback was borne of wealth rather than birth.<sup>26</sup> Even the two traits together were arguably present among successful mercenaries.

Perhaps symptomatic of this combination of affluence and military function is a categorization by reference to military equipment. This is also unsatisfactory due to the arguments set forward above in Chapter Three however. In short, being an armoured horseman did not necessarily make one a knight. In the specific case of Gilbert of Mons, Jackson argues that categorization by reference to military equipment does not fully explain the semantic distinction between *milites* and *servientes*. Some *servientes* were armed like *milites*. Subsequently Jackson also argues that being a knight was no longer [by the late twelfth century] solely an indication of military function, but rather a designation of social status, with *milites* enjoying a privileged status.<sup>27</sup> An examination of social considerations is therefore crucial before moving onto the linked but distinct cultural concerns.

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<sup>24</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 7:134-5

<sup>25</sup> Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris*, ed. G. Waitz in MGH SRG 46, 2:23.

<sup>26</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.25.

<sup>27</sup> Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility,' p.801.

#### 6.4. Social Considerations

The early examples of an elevated knighthood are generally dismissed as outliers. William Marshal and his career could be suggested as evidence for an established and socially superior knighthood. More recent arguments state that the very knightly identity remained nascent through Marshal's early life (the third quarter of the twelfth century).<sup>28</sup> This supports the timeline suggested within this thesis. Marshal's life indicates that social mobility was possible in the second half of the twelfth century, if only within upper echelons of society. This is key: Marshal certainly was towards the lower end of the spectrum within the context of higher social strata. This constituted only a narrow sliver of overall contemporary social structure. Marshal's rise arguably did not change his status as a 'knight'. The fact that such a rise was possible within the knightly grouping illustrates a certain coherence, even allowing for the exceptionality of Marshal's life.

Bernard of Clairvaux's famous *De Laude Novae Militiae* contains crucial evidence. The second chapter -On Worldly Knighthood- outlines contemporary perceptions of the knightly grouping between 1120 and 1136.<sup>29</sup> The source should be viewed with caution given its purpose was to denigrate secular knighthood. It is unlikely that Bernard invented characteristics however, lest the treatise lose credibility. Instead he emphasised and exaggerated what was present. Bernard spent the chapter lambasting secular knights for their worldly extravagance and their pursuit of temporal glory. Although the reports on motivation can be challenged given Bernard was not himself a knight, the extravagance and wealth of the knightly grouping in the early twelfth century is less contestable. The poor knights described above were therefore most likely described relative to the rest of the grouping. It must be acknowledged that there is an assumption of a link between affluence and extravagance, and superior social standing. If knights were best characterised as all-purpose elite soldiers at the start of the century, they arguably felt a need to confirm and illustrate their own social importance. The argument is that knights were guilty of extravagant

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<sup>28</sup> T. Asbridge, *The Greatest Knight: The Remarkable Life of William Marshal, the Power behind Five English Thrones* (London & New York, 2015), p.36. Asbridge even goes so far as to argue that Marshal's own career helped to shape what he describes as 'this warrior class'.

<sup>29</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*

spending on equipment early in the twelfth century merely to prove that they could.

By the end of the twelfth century, knights were clearly socially elevated. The Eracles Continuation includes several examples. Following the conclusion of the siege of Acre, knights were allocated properties in the city, regardless of the former -burgess- owners surviving.<sup>30</sup> They were also implicitly elevated over sergeants by their prowess, but perhaps most significant is their distinction from *gentils homes*.<sup>31</sup> This final example is important because the author explicitly stated that the grouping of the *chevaliers* included members of the baronial, comital and ducal nobility.<sup>32</sup> What this suggests is a degree of social elevation, but questions remain: when did it occur, and why? The cited examples are wide-ranging and vague, and do not reveal a coherent date range. By the end of the century, this social superiority was clearly widespread if not universal. Earlier, social superiority was arguably the first factor which truly distinguished the collective knighthood from knights as units of soldiers.

Relative social standing perhaps provides a means of final distinction for knights, even in the early period, but alone it seems insufficient. The intersection of the military, economic and social distinctions is where the full distinction of the early knightly grouping may be found. Their origins were as tactically-flexible, elite warriors who required a certain degree of affluence to maintain their flexibility. The grouping grew to be socially superior relative to others who appeared in the military forces of Western Christendom, potentially as a result of this specific combination. However, the precise reasons for the ascendance of the grouping remain unclear and will be examined further below.

### **6.5. Locating the Emergence of a Coherent Knighthood**

The assumption has been that the grouping of knights was coherent. Clearly this was accurate by the Fourth Crusade, but how far up the twelfth century does such an assertion remain accurate? Attempts to establish a means of distinction seems pointless to make if there was no coherent grouping of to which they could belong. 'Coherence' is a wide term, and even in the late eleventh century,

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<sup>30</sup> CGT, 124.

<sup>31</sup> CGT, 103, for the latter see 101.

<sup>32</sup> CGT, 101.

knights were arguably part of a grouping defined by their military prowess and equipment. Such a grouping could be described as coherent but does not fulfil the objective of this thesis. The dating of a socially coherent grouping of knights -when it truly became the 'kighthood'- is the aim. As noted above, such a grouping was clearly present by the time of the Fourth Crusade, and many modern historians have placed the coalescence around the third quarter of the century.<sup>33</sup> A crucial distinction to make is that between a coherent knightly grouping and a coherent knightly identity. The hypothesis is that the two developed at different times, but not independently of one another. The grouping in its socially coherent form is detectable as early as the 1120s. The coherent identity was constructed by the 1170s-1180s, a symptom of growing elitism, concurrent with increased professionalism. Initially, entry into the social grouping of the kighthood was far more fluid than it became, and the evidence below will confirm this. The hypothesis is that the increasing elitism of the grouping (evidenced by decreased fluidity of entry) was symptomatic of an increasingly coherent knightly identity. The effort to date the existence of a socially coherent group of knights relies on numerous disputable assumptions. First is that there was indeed a social means of defining the knight. Was mere social elevation above the masses enough? If so, when did this occur?

The coherent, socially superior group has usually been dated to the latter portions of the twelfth century. The term 'kighthood' is only really applicable after this transformation. Some of the strongest arguments for coherence come from the awareness displayed by contemporary observers of such a change. The concept of an *ordo* of kighthood appeared throughout the century and suggests that contemporary authors recognised a knightly grouping. Arguments for later coherence in particular note the work of Stephen of Fougères, which refers in 1170 to the 'Order of Kighthood'.<sup>34</sup> Examples appear long before this however. Otto of Freising and Ralph of Coggeshall both mention the *equitum ordine* -order of horsemen- with the latter term heavily reminiscent of the language used by those such as Adalbero of Laon and Gerald of Cambrai to describe the 'three

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<sup>33</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>34</sup> For Stephen of Fougères, see Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, p.145, for the latter see: Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, p.107.



orders' discussed at such length by George Duby.<sup>35</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, wrote about the *secularis militia* -secular, or 'worldly' knighthood- in opposition to the *militia Christi* around 1130.<sup>36</sup> His target audience was probably the 'worldly' knighthood he so criticised, it is likely that Bernard used the term *militia* to describe the collective of knights if not the socially-elevated 'knighthood'.

The term *militia*, and what might loosely be considered its Old French counterpart *chevalerie* represent complicated terms. The two terms should certainly not be considered equivalent and doing so invites inaccuracy and confusion. The Old French *chevalerie* has often been translated as the collective of knighthood; to describe the socially coherent grouping of the knighthood. The term has sometimes been translated simply as 'chivalry', either to mean the same, or to represent the 'ideal of knighthood' in the form of values and practices.<sup>37</sup> This is undoubtedly due to the obvious etymological link to the modern term but has caused confusion over definitions of the respective terms. Where chivalry has been used to mean the grouping of the knighthood, it unnecessarily confuses the picture.<sup>38</sup> A useful solution to this would be to confine the term chivalry to a description of the later collection of virtues which came to aid in the definition of the knightly identity. 'Chivalry' clearly remains a problematic term.

The sources written in the vernacular Old French are sparse, but the term *chevalerie* appears throughout all three. Examples are particularly frequent in the verse composition of Ambroise, with the later prose texts of Villehardouin and Clari yielding significantly fewer. The possible reasons of this are many, including difference in styles, geographical location, influences and intentions. What is immediately clear upon reading the texts is that the Angevin source often used the term in romanticised contexts, while the latter two restricted usage to a simple description of plurality. Indicative of Ambroise's use of the term is the appearance of the phrase *la flur de chevalerie*, or 'the flower of knighthood'. This represents a romanticised construction no doubt heavily-influenced by *chansons*, and at its core denoted 'elite knights'.<sup>39</sup> The traction of the phrase, and its

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<sup>35</sup> Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris*, ed. G. Waitz in MGH SRG 46, 2:22; Coggeshall, 50. See Duby, *The Three Orders*, tr. Goldhammer, pp.29-45.

<sup>36</sup> Evergates (tr. & ed.), *Feudal Society in Medieval France*, p.100.

<sup>37</sup> Ambroise, l.1612

<sup>38</sup> Scaglione, *Knights at Court*, p.6.

<sup>39</sup> Ambroise, l.6341.

presence in more than just the work of Ambroise supports that there was a grouping of knights. The prestige of the phrasing suggests an elevation of secular knighthood, where previous efforts had focused on more pious aspects. The phrase also suggests gradation within the grouping, although it remains unclear whether this was on a military, social or economic basis.

Parallel to this 'flower of knighthood', there was significantly a corresponding concept of *la grain de la bachelerie*.<sup>40</sup> The *bachelerie* is a similarly complicated term to *chevalerie*, though on the few occasions it appeared it seems to have been a similar yet distinct complement to the latter. The term *bachelor* has connotations of youth, which will be examined further below, but the relationship between the two terms was more likely complementary than antagonistic.<sup>41</sup> It also reinforces the elevation of the grouping, as the *chevalerie* was undoubtedly placed above the *bachelerie*.

Ambroise did not use *chevalerie* to describe the grouping alone however. Occasionally, he used it to describe vague 'deeds of knighthood'.<sup>42</sup> Worthy of note is that two of these 'deeds' were attributed to King Richard, confirming that even royalty was not disdainful of the association. This illustrates that the knighthood was socially elevated to the extent that they were associated with the very highest echelons of society. The third example, found in line 6599 of the text described Richard as *fist chevaleries*; he literally 'did acts of knighthood'.<sup>43</sup> This seemingly confirms the varied translation of the term, and simultaneously serves to illustrate the difficulties of language. Above all, the usage of the term in Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* emphasises the elevation of the knighthood as a grouping. The elevation was undoubtedly in large part social in nature. It was considered suitable for association with King Richard, who is described favourably throughout the source supports this. A later example also reveals elevation, with the *chevalerie* being separated from -and implicitly raised above- mere *genz*.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ambroise, ll.6341-2.

<sup>41</sup> Ambroise, ll.5728-9.

<sup>42</sup> Ambroise, ll.3040, 5621, 6599, 11616

<sup>43</sup> Ambroise, l.6599.

<sup>44</sup> Ambroise, ll.6707-8.

By the end of the period the term was still used to pluralise a group of individuals, rather than describing the social collective, with Villehardouin particularly using it in such a manner.<sup>45</sup> There are numerous reasons for this. Most compelling is that *chevalerie* had multiple meanings, as evidenced above; Ambroise occasionally used it in the same manner as Villehardouin. The difference in geographical origin of the sources is also significant. Ambroise was from the Angevin domains, but both Villehardouin and Clari came from more north-easterly regions, potentially resulting in different usage. Crucial is the fundamental difference of the sources. Ambroise composed a verse text with inherently more romanticism, but Villehardouin's was a prose account of his respective expedition, which was designed as a sober recollection. Even despite these variety of meanings, the term had clearly garnered prestige by the conclusion of the Fourth Crusade, and this contributed to the social elevation of those it described. As noted above, the concept of a knighthood existed outside of the vernacular Old French however.

### 6.5.1. Locating the Emergence of a Knighthood: *militia*

The Latin term *militia* is more complicated. Through the twelfth century it was often a far more general term used to describe military forces in general. Roger of Howden, describing the battle at the Springs of Cresson in 1187, stated that 'the Christians also lost many other soldiers (*militia*), and among them forty knights and one hundred Turcoples.'<sup>46</sup> While this term encompassed the forty *milites* as perhaps expected, the Turcoples certainly would not be considered members of the social grouping of the knighthood. An allowance might be made because in this specific case, *militia* was potentially used as a collective term for the forces of military orders, who made up most of the Christian forces at Cresson.<sup>47</sup> Even with this allowance, the term clearly could be used for more than a simple plurality of knights. Roger also used the term in relation to the Saracens, placing the 'better of [Saladin's] *militiae*,' against the *multos alios*.<sup>48</sup> The bipartite nature of the distinction is reminiscent of descriptions of various crusading expeditions,

<sup>45</sup> Villehardouin, §219. Similarly found in Ambroise, ll.1173, 2791, 11999.

<sup>46</sup> Howden, 3:21: ...*et aliam etiam amiserunt Christiani militiam usque ad milites quadraginta, et centum Turcoplos.*

<sup>47</sup> Such a tendency was common, with examples found among later Fourth Crusade sources: Register of Innocent III 2:258 (270), 0828D-0831A. For other contemporary examples, see: IPGRR, 1:5, 1:15, 1:28, 1:29, 1:61, 4:20; Coggeshall, 21; William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:19

<sup>48</sup> Howden, 3:21.

with the differentiation between ‘knights’ and ‘the rest’ being a common one.<sup>49</sup> In this case *militia* was seemingly applied to the best fighters in Saladin’s army, which in Roger’s context were best described as knights.

*Militia* appears frequently in other sources contemporary to Roger of Howden, particularly in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, but also the remaining Angevin accounts, as well as those of the Holy Roman Empire. Outside of association with the military orders, most contemporary sources did use *militia* to describe a plurality of knights.<sup>50</sup> One of the examples of this found in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* is significant, because the *militia* were considered one component of an army which also included *juventutes* and *satellites*.<sup>51</sup> The distinction between particularly the first two categories potentially suggests a similarity to the relationship between the Old French *chevalerie* and *bachelorie*, with *militia* enjoying elevation. Elevation is detectable elsewhere in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, with *electa militia* also described.<sup>52</sup> The term *electa* elevated by its very nature, marking them ‘elite’ or ‘chosen’ and investing prestige. The author described the rear-guard of the expedition consisting of the elite of the army - the *militia*. This usage undoubtedly described a coherent grouping, but the elevation was seemingly on a military basis rather than a social one. This usage can therefore be considered a description of the early military grouping of knights.

The vicinity of the terms *militia* and *electa* is not restricted to the Angevin sources however. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described *alii egregii milites cum electa militia*.<sup>53</sup> The seeming equivalence of the two elements suggests a very literal translation of ‘other illustrious knights, with elite soldiers’. The other possibility is that it described knights with their retinues, which contained other knights of lesser social stature. The descriptor *egregii* was possibly intended to elevate the former to positions of command, while still conveying that their companions remained knights of high calibre.

Another usage of the term *militia*, particularly in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, is in the phrase *cingulum militiae*, denoting the ‘belt of knighthood’.<sup>54</sup> Although the

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<sup>49</sup> See above.

<sup>50</sup> IPGRR, 5:2; Devizes, 30.

<sup>51</sup> IPGRR, 4:10

<sup>52</sup> IPGRR, 4:17

<sup>53</sup> HEF, p.52

<sup>54</sup> IPGRR, 1:3; 5:12

concept will be examined further below, in this context *militiae* meant knighthood, either as an identity, or as a social grouping. The distinction is minor, but important. The *cingulum militiae* was arguably a metaphorical embodiment of the knightly ideal, or the less abstract token proving membership of a socially coherent grouping. It was possibly both, but more significant is the notion that it was a token bestowing membership into the grouping. If it was, its very existence arguably proves a degree of coherence.

The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described -in a passage laden with rhetoric- Richard as *vertex militia*, or ‘the crown of knighthood’.<sup>55</sup> This could be taken in a literal fashion, but it was more probably metaphorical; that Richard represented the pinnacle of knighthood. As with the *cingulum militiae* there are two possibilities: either this characterisation was to convey Richard’s status as the living embodiment of the knightly ideal, or it literally described Richard as the commander of Christian knighthood. In the context, both seem outrageous claims to make, but the heavy rhetoric of the passage, and the fact that the source was part of the wider crusader source-base means that either intent was possible.

Most valuable given the objective are the occasional explicit descriptions of the knighthood as a socially coherent order or grouping. Upon his death, Andrew of Brienne was described as *militiae primatu* in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*; that he was ‘first among the knighthood’.<sup>56</sup> Given the nature of the passage as an obituary of sorts, this was probably sincere, and suggests both that knighthood was a grouping and that Andrew of Brienne was a member of it. The description was clearly a compliment, which supports the elevation of the grouping, especially given that Andrew was brother to Count Erard of Brienne. The membership of one from a comital family illustrates the increasing association between the upper echelons of society and the grouping of the knighthood.

*Militia* therefore seemingly had quite readily-definable boundaries which, similar to *chevalerie* encompassed usage as a plural term for ‘knight’, and for the social grouping of the knighthood. Contrasting the Old French term however, *militia* was also used to describe the complete forces of the military orders, regardless of their component parts. This was not the extent of the potential generality of the

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<sup>55</sup> IPGRR, 6:4

<sup>56</sup> IPGRR, 1:30

term. William of Newburgh and Roger of Howden both seemingly used *militia* for general bodies of soldiers rather than specifically knights at least once each.<sup>57</sup> Newburgh possibly even used the term to mean ‘warfare’, and ‘military service’.<sup>58</sup> One can argue for a degree of overlap between ‘warfare’ and ‘deeds of knighthood’, similar to appearances in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*. Newburgh used *militia* to mean ‘warfare’ in his description of the death of Count Phillip of Flanders, which is euphemised as ending his ‘pious deeds of knighthood’ -*piae militiae*- a little before the capture of Acre.<sup>59</sup> Newburgh also used *militia* as military service in a description of Richard’s coffers running with his support of *dinturnae militiae*. This has traditionally been translated as ‘protracted service’. Given the perception of the crusading movement as the pinnacle of Christian knighthood, the term might have been used to describe a ‘deed of knighthood’; a deed which constituted the entire crusading expedition - hence it’s protracted nature.<sup>60</sup> This seems tenuous, and there are numerous examples within the source of *milites* being the only term used to describe the Christians in combat situations.<sup>61</sup> The King of France arrived to the siege of Acre *cum nova militia*, so Newburgh probably used both terms with great flexibility.<sup>62</sup> The other possibility is that the author was unconcerned with reporting on anyone who was not a knight, and that his descriptions were incomplete rather than vague.

The confusion here is indicative of the problems faced when attempting to translate the word *militiae* and is repeated in the *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*. A short source describing the capture of a Portuguese town named Silves, the author used the variant term *milicia* frequently.<sup>63</sup> The term was applied easily to describe any body of troops. For example the leader of the Portuguese troops -*princeps...milicie*- brought only a small escort to meet the crusaders, leaving the rest of his army -*milicia*- in the main camp.<sup>64</sup> This was not a sole occurrence, with unnamed *principes milicie* appearing throughout the source.<sup>65</sup> The position of command attributed to these *principes* on a contextual as well as titular basis,

<sup>57</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:19; Howden, 3:21

<sup>58</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:22; 4:29

<sup>59</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:22

<sup>60</sup> See below, prestige surrounding *milites Christi*.

<sup>61</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:23; 4:29.

<sup>62</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:19.

<sup>63</sup> For a thorough background on the source, see Bull, *Eyewitness and Crusade*, pp.198-9.

<sup>64</sup> *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*, in MGH SRGNS 5, 183.

<sup>65</sup> *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*, in MGH SRGNS 5, 183-4; 192.

means that the individuals probably commanded the full host, thus causing *militia* to be translated as a general term for the army.<sup>66</sup> Contrasting this is the parallel example of the related *miles* used with specificity to describe *quidam miles de Galicia* -a certain knight of Galicia- suggesting that precision was well within the author's capabilities.<sup>67</sup>

From the examples above, the Latin term cannot be relied upon to draw consistent conclusions from the crusading context. From *militia* we can perhaps conclude -as expected given the dating of the sources- that there was a degree of elevation among the knighthood. Similarly, the Old French examples of *chevalerie* originate in the Third Crusade, merely confirming the established timeline. Crucially, even in the later period the terms *militia* and *miles* were potentially at different points in their development and were therefore not as related as they might seem. Despite the variation, there are a number of examples which show that the socially superior grouping of knighthood was a concept which existed and was -by the Third Crusade at least- established to the extent that it appeared throughout geographically diverse sources. Where the variation above is in the breadth of certain terms, there were numerous variants of those described as knights, which must be examined further.

### **6.5.2. Variation within the Knighthood**

The theme of variation itself arguably constitutes evidence against the coherence of the grouping, and that only when it ceased was there true 'knighthood'. Before an exploration of these variants it is crucial to note that they remained relative within the grouping – even the 'poor' knights were socially superior in the wider context of medieval society. Particularly common in the sources were very general bi- or tripartite divisions. Modern historians have emphasised the one between the greater and lesser aristocracy and characterise it as being between those who had social standing to begin with, and those who gained it as part of the socially coherent knighthood. The clearer examples come in the source material for the later expeditions. In Latin, the distinction has been characterised

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<sup>66</sup> Bull, *Eyewitness and Crusade*, pp.201-4. No leader is identified for the expedition. There is a recurring theme of corporate identity and cohesion, with the force often presented as a single entity.

<sup>67</sup> *Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam*, in MGH SRGNS 5, 187.

as that between *nobiles* and *militēs*, despite the fact that former were also often described by the title *miles*.<sup>68</sup>

Simple distinctions were more common in Old French, with its vocabulary being less open to interpretation. Villehardouin in particular frequently used the phrase *li chevalier et li baron*, with the latter not necessarily restricted to those of baronial rank but rather encompassing the whole nobility.<sup>69</sup> Robert of Clari's descriptions were more expansive and varied, with his interlinked descriptions of *haut homme* and *rike homme* placed against both the general *menue gent* and the more specific *poivre chevalier*.<sup>70</sup> As noted in Chapter Three, Robert often lumped the *poires chevaliers* -with whom he identifies- together with both *serjans* and the *quemun* of the host.<sup>71</sup> This illustrates the variation of social status and affluence of within the knighthood, and suggests that the social distinction between the grouping and the lower echelons of society was not as great as might have been expected. This opposes the consensus that there was a definite divide between the social grouping of the knighthood and those beneath them by the end of the twelfth century. The general flavour of Robert's text is very much one of rich versus poor, with the former taking advantage of the latter. Robert's association with the poorer elements of the crusade is probably due to his own perceptions of how the leaders treated the rest of the expedition –he even seems to issue retrospective rebukes.

The frequent bipartite distinctions provide the simplest explanation for the variation in the knightly grouping, but consideration of the wider source base illustrate that is insufficient. Ambroise described Richard of England giving gifts to knights according to their station, dividing the grouping into 'those of high, middle and low degree'.<sup>72</sup> Guy de Lusignan is described in the German *Historia Peregrinorum* as being 'of middling rank, but a knight of handsome appearance and valiant in war'.<sup>73</sup> Both these examples illustrate that a tripartite division is a more suitable characterisation for the grouping. The suggestion is for

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<sup>68</sup> Aurell, 'Society,' p.40. Also found in Gilbert of Mons: Jackson, 'Knighthood and Nobility,' p.801.

<sup>69</sup> Villehardouin, §145

<sup>70</sup> Clari, §80

<sup>71</sup> Clari, §81

<sup>72</sup> Ambroise, ll.1050-67

<sup>73</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.118: ...*mediocris quidem genere sed miles elegantis forme et armis strenuus*.



multiple socially distinct sub-groups within the larger knighthood. This classification is probably unnecessarily strict and would undermine the generality of several other terms associated with members of the knighthood.

*Prodomme* is one such Old French term which appears frequently later in the twelfth century. The exact meaning of *prodomme* is unclear, though its origins are possibly in the combination of *preu* and *homme*. A literal translation would be ‘valiant man’, although *preu* remains itself ill-defined. Regardless of the precise traits it connoted, it was undoubtedly applied as a compliment, and Villehardouin used *prodomme* to describe men he associated with such esteemed figures as the Counts Baldwin of Flanders and Thibault of Champagne, as well as William, advocate of Bethune and Jean de Nesles, Castellan of Bruges.<sup>74</sup> Given the likely origins of the term, the appearance of *preu* appears as a description of a number of *chevaliers* both in Villehardouin’s account and elsewhere is significant, and suggests overlap between the two terms.<sup>75</sup> It is possible that all those described as *prodomme* were *chevaliers* but the reverse was not necessarily true. This would reinforce elevation within the grouping, the extent and nature of which is unclear. Given such general terms, a more suitable construct might be a spectrum of social standing. Too many terms relate to knights to divide the grouping into two or even three coherent sub-groups.

The Latin term *proceres* frequently appears alongside *nobiles* and *milites*, particularly in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, and reflects the confused position of *prodomme*.<sup>76</sup> Similarly the later Anonymous of Soissons, described the German component of the Third Crusade as including *proceres* and *milites*.<sup>77</sup> The same group were described by Ralph of Coggeshall in a list of dukes, counts and ‘the rest of the princes, counts and barons, and the foremost knights (*Praecipui milites*) of all Christianity’, which he said included some two dukes, nineteen counts, three marquises and three thousand knights.<sup>78</sup> There was clearly a wide range of terms used in relation to the upper echelons of society, and the knightly grouping was more-closely associated with the top of the scale than with the bottom. This was

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<sup>74</sup> Villehardouin, §7, 8.

<sup>75</sup> Ambroise, ll.2686-91 – Geoffrey of Lusignan (Guy’s brother) as a *preu vassal*.

<sup>76</sup> IPGRR, 5:6

<sup>77</sup> Anonymi Suessionensis, *De Terra Iherosolimitana*, p.4

<sup>78</sup> Coggeshall, 23-4: (...*et reliqui principes, comites et barones, et praecipui milites totius fere Christianitatis*,...)

probably due to the overlapping terminology applied to both the nobility and the early knighthood.

Past these, there are further examples of elevation of knights themselves rather than by implicit association with the nobility. Many of these also reveal distinctions within the grouping. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described Andrew of Brienne as the ‘first among the knighthood’.<sup>79</sup> The description is clearly a compliment and elevates both the knighthood and Andrew of Brienne’s position within it. The *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium* described the presence of a ‘multitude of noble knights’ on the Fourth Crusade.<sup>80</sup> This specific multitude was either considered more ‘noble’ than most knights -which evidences social variation within the group- or the wider grouping of knights was ‘noble’, and the multitude merely described a contingent. The latter supports the established assertion that the knighthood had socially risen by the time of the Fourth Crusade, while the former continues to reinforce the variation present in the grouping.

The tendency of the contemporary Robert of Clari was to establish a bipartite division, but he did acknowledge stratification within the knighthood. Alongside descriptions of *chevaliers haus hommes* and *povres chevaliers* are mentions *chevaliers* who ‘carried banners’ of their own.<sup>81</sup> These are placed a step above the *povres chevaliers*, and commanded others, though they are not equated with the *haus hommes*.<sup>82</sup> From the examples thus far that there was clearly a consistent effort made to elevate the traditional nobility above the rest of the knighthood. This effort perhaps illustrates a danger of the two becoming wholly synonymous in meaning. The strength of the association between the two previously distinct groupings is clearly detectable by the end of the century. It illustrates that both the coherence and the social superiority of the grouping was well-established by the end of the twelfth century – with the implication that the process had been under way for some time.

Most efforts were to maintain a distinction between the nobility and the knights. Even within the wider grouping of the knighthood however, there were

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<sup>79</sup> IPGRR, 1:30

<sup>80</sup> *Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium*, in MGH SS 23, p.120.

<sup>81</sup> For the former, see: Clari, §1, 81, 116; for the latter, see: §1 (...*si portoient baniere...*)

<sup>82</sup> Clari, §1

descriptions of knights distinguished for their relative lower social standing. Often characterised in secondary literature as *milites gregarii*, the concept appears throughout the period. The later *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described a portion of the Christian army sallying from their camp at the siege of Acre. The detachment supposedly included *milites gregarii* and *juvenes*.<sup>83</sup> The latter term has connotations of youth and lack of establishment -that is, unlanded and unmarried, without a family- which will be examined further below. The association with the poorer elements of the knighthood perhaps supports a lack of establishment in particular. Here and in the earlier work of Otto of Freising, these knights probably were described in such specific terms because of their unusual nature.<sup>84</sup> The branding of certain knights as 'poor' or 'of humble origin' possibly represented an early effort to discourage if not bar entry to some of those deemed unworthy. The rampant elitism epitomised by these descriptions at both ends of the grouping proves that as a whole, the grouping's social standing had risen as early as the Second Crusade. There was social variation within the grouping, but this is expected considering the amalgamation of professional elite warriors and traditional nobility.

Social variation was not the only type present within the grouping, however. Some terms did not have overtly social meanings but were applied to certain knights. As with so many of the terms considered in this thesis, they varied according to authorial preference. The term *vavassores* -most often described as a 'sub-vassal'- was clearly not a military designation and enjoyed a curious relationship to those surrounding the knighthood. The term appears most frequently in the Eracles Continuation of William of Tyre. The first example describes Guy de Lusignan's acquisition of Cyprus and his distribution of rich fiefs, so that all manner of people 'became knights and great vavassors in the island of Cyprus.'<sup>85</sup> Knights and vavassors were seemingly different -one was either or, and not both- but a second example contests this. The author described 'members of the Antiochene baronage' which included the Constable, Ralph of Mons, Bartholomew the marshal, Oliver the Chamberlain and Richier of Lerminet, along with 'many other vavassors'.<sup>86</sup> With the dating of the source in the latter portion of the period, the members of the Antiochene baronage probably self-identified as knights by this

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<sup>83</sup> IPGRR, 1:40

<sup>84</sup> See also Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 7:130-1; Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.24.

<sup>85</sup> CGT, 136: ...*sont devenus chevaliers et grans vavassors de l'isle de Chypre.*

<sup>86</sup> CGT, 152: ...*assés d'autres vavassors...*

point, and this suggests overlap between one's status as a knight, and as a vavassor. The two arguably described different functions. Vavassor seems less a social term, and more one denoting the specific relationship with one's lord. This suggests a legal term rather than a social one.

*Ministeriales* are another group worthy of mention despite their rarity in the considered sources. Significant work outside of the crusading context has focused on the meteoric rise in status these *ministeriales* enjoyed, and their relationship to the grouping of knights.<sup>87</sup> The examples of *ministeriales* explicitly mentioned on crusade are rare, and perhaps unsurprisingly appear exclusively in the German sources. They are restricted to the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* specifically, with the suggestion being that they were considered a subset of knights. The implication is that they had the same military value as *electi milites* and were thus similarly equipped.<sup>88</sup> The other two mentions of *ministeriales* appear in lists of participants, with one placing a whole crowd of them as subservient to a Dietmar, described as a *liber*, or free-man.<sup>89</sup> This seemingly emphasises their legally unfree status rather than suggesting anything about the military connotations of the word. The other appearance locates them together with *privati milites* and *nobiles* as subservient to those of comital rank or above.<sup>90</sup> Similar to vavassors, one cannot confidently place the grouping of *ministeriales* relative to the knighthood. A similar degree of overlap is possible, but the term was probably not a social or military one, even at the time of the Third Crusade. Most likely it denoted legal status. Significant also is that they were an exclusively German phenomenon.

Within the grouping of the knighthood, even by the 1190s, significant variance in social standing was clearly present. The ease with which contemporary authors mixed legal terms such as *vavassores* and *ministeriales* in with those which were not - most significantly here, *miles*- has made defining the boundaries of the knighthood difficult. The knighthood seemingly extended from royalty such as Richard the Lionheart, through those elevated relative to the bulk of the grouping by terms such as *nobiles* and *proceres*, to the most common *milites*, down to those *milites* who merited a specific descriptor of poverty, for example *milites gregarii* or Robert of

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<sup>87</sup> Norman, *The Medieval Soldier*, pp.108-9.

<sup>88</sup> HEF, p.22

<sup>89</sup> HEF, p.97

<sup>90</sup> HEF, p.112

Clari's *povres chevaliers*. The likelihood is that both *vavassores* and *ministeriales* appeared at any point on this spectrum depending on the context, similar to the arguably more generic *vassales*. Specific sub-groupings are detectable among the knighthood and each will be examined in turn.

### 6.5.2.1. Knightly Commanders

Numerous well-documented terms exist to differentiate between the top-most echelons of the knighthood, usually collectively described as the nobility. Dukes, Marquises, Counts, Barons and even Castellans appear frequently through the sources of the twelfth century. Such differentiation is also detectable within the ranks of the 'middling' knights, although the traditions of terminology were comparatively unestablished. Robert of Clari's description of knights carrying their own banners provides a late example of this but was not alone. 'Knightly commanders' appear throughout the period, as field commanders or holding formal positions within the households of the nobility noted above.

Knightly field commanders appear on numerous occasions in the various expeditions of the twelfth century, particularly when units of knights were led by those not explicitly described as nobility. Early examples come in the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* and the work of Odo of Deuil, writing about two arms of the Second Crusade. The *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* described these leaders as *optimates* but did not indicate the numbers commanded by each, describing merely *milites et ceterorum*.<sup>91</sup> Odo of Deuil was more specific in his description of the French component of the Second Crusade, with a *magister* named Gilbert assigning some fifty *milites* each to his *socii*.<sup>92</sup> A unit of fifty knights was seemingly a standard size, given its appearance in the later *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*. In this case, the commanders were described as *pentarchos* as well as *magister*.<sup>93</sup> Later in the source however, this arrangement was so unpopular among the knights of the army that it was abolished.<sup>94</sup> The term itself seems less significant than the fact that some 'middling' knights -those towards the centre of the spectrum- commanded others who were ostensibly their peers. Ralph of Coggeshall merely

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<sup>91</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, pp.110-1.

<sup>92</sup> Odo of Deuil, ed. & tr. Berry, 7:124-5

<sup>93</sup> HEF, p.46.

<sup>94</sup> HEF, p.69.

described the commanders of the garrison of Jaffa as *milites et audaciores* -knights and the 'bolder ones'- despite the forces there being described as *milites et servos*.<sup>95</sup>

In contrast to the more situational field commanders, knights appear in positions of authority within the households of both kings and magnates. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described King Richard's marshal as *quidam miles Pictavensis* -'a certain Poitevin knight'- while the Eracles Continuation described the Marshal of France leading numerous *chevaliers* to their deaths at the siege of Acre during the Third Crusade.<sup>96</sup> The precise role of the Marshal within the household remains contested, and probably varied according to region. Most commonly it seemingly was the military head of the household. This was different to the Constable, who was more of a second-in-command, in charge of all military forces should the lord be absent. Ambroise mentioned a knight encountered near Messina described as the Constable of the King of Sicily. The man was an emissary sent to treat with the participants of the Third Crusade, and therefore held some significant power following the death of King William II.<sup>97</sup> Knights within the households of their socially superior counterparts were not restricted to positions of authority however; they frequently filled the retinues of greater lords.

#### 6.5.2.2. Household Knights

Some knights were clearly subservient -and therefore considered socially inferior- to others. The terminology did vary to suitably reflect such a distinction and is most apparent in descriptions of the retinues of the nobility. One difficulty is that often knights were obscured beneath the general umbrella of 'household' or 'retinue'. *Commilitones* did appear frequently as do specific descriptors such as *milites sociis*. However, there are numerous examples of retinues described only as *sociis*. On many occasions, the author clearly intended the word to mean the same as full *milites sociis* but skipped a word for the sake of brevity. This undoubtedly varied by author, with *sociis* sometimes constituting a far more inclusive term. Elsewhere, simple use of a possessive term when describing knights sufficiently labelled them members of an individual's household. The terms must therefore be treated with due caution.

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<sup>95</sup> Coggeshall, 41-2

<sup>96</sup> For the former, see: IPGRR, 4:8; for the latter, see: CGT, 108.

<sup>97</sup> Ambroise, ll.975-81.

Household knights were most common in the retinues of those described as baronial rank or higher: comital, ducal or regnal. The overlap between this 'traditional nobility' and those with the title of *miles* was small earlier in the twelfth century. However the practice of taking knights into one's household did trickle down to those who were a step above regular *milites* but were not barons. Even considering households of the nobility no one convention of terminology was prevalent.

In the Old French sources, the terms are predictably restricted. Villehardouin described Eustace of Marchois as a *chevaliers de la masnie* of Henry, brother to Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut.<sup>98</sup> By contrast in the Eracles Continuation of William of Tyre, Philip II Augustus was described with a company including 'plenty of barons and knights, as befits the crown of France...'<sup>99</sup> This example is striking because it shows that given sufficient status, one's retinue could include nobles. Granted, the example in question described the retinue of the King of France, with the author emphasising the ruler's authority. The precedent it sets is significant nonetheless.

*Commilitones* is one of the more specific -and common- terms appearing particularly in the Third Crusade Latin sources. The German *Historia Peregrinorum* described the household of Reynald of Chatillon -Prince of Antioch- as including both *commilitones et satellites*, with a clear distinction between those who were knights and those who were not.<sup>100</sup> Similarly, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* frequently used the term in descriptions the retinue of King Richard, awarding them particular agency in the amphibious assault to retake the town of Jaffa.<sup>101</sup> Ralph of Coggeshall similarly described the same knights in Richard's immediate vicinity as *suos commilitones*.<sup>102</sup> More problematic for its variability is the term *sociis*. *Milites sociis* appear in both the Angevin *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* to describe the retinue of the Earl of Leicester, and in the contemporary *Historia de expeditione Friderici* describing elements of the German force near Adrianople.<sup>103</sup> From both examples, the translation is seemingly narrow. However the *Historia de expeditione*

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<sup>98</sup> Villehardouin, §168.

<sup>99</sup> CGT, 107: ...*barons et chevaliers, si come il afereit a la corone de France...*

<sup>100</sup> *Historia Peregrinorum*, in MGH SRGNS 5, p.118

<sup>101</sup> IPGRR, 6:15-6:16. For other uses, see IPGRR, 1:2; 1:29; 6:21.

<sup>102</sup> Coggeshall, 45

<sup>103</sup> For the former, see IPGRR, 4:33. For the latter, HEF, p.58.

did also describe an instance when Frederick Barbarossa ‘took counsel and selected Duke Berthold of Dalmatia, the Count of Holland and Frederick, Advocate of Berg, and other *prestantes milites* with twelve hundred *armatis sociis*...’<sup>104</sup> The meaning of the term *sociis* is uncertain in this case. The named nobles were possibly leading their retinues, including *milites* and *armatis sociis*. This would imply that the latter were not knights. However the construction of the sentence and the suggestion of association between the named nobles and the *prestantes milites* suggest that the *armatis sociis* could well be socially inferior household knights undeserving of anything more than a quantity, where the others merited naming or terms of distinction.

Household knights were most commonly identified through the use of simple possessive terms however. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* used this in conjunction with *milites sociis* with the exact phrasing being *milites sociis comitis* - household knights of the Earl [of Leicester]. Roger of Howden likewise described William des Barres as *quidam miles optimus de familia regis Franciae*, or ‘a certain fine knight of the retinue of the King of the French.’<sup>105</sup> This trend continued later to the time of the Fourth Crusade, where Simon de Malesnes was described as *miles, homo meus* in a charter, which also placed him as part of the retinue of Baldwin of Béthune, Count of Aumale.<sup>106</sup> An earlier example was present in the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, which described *milites* in the household of the King of Portugal at the capture of Lisbon as part of the Second Crusade.<sup>107</sup>

As noted above, the households of the traditional nobility are places where the presence of knights is unsurprising. Given the potential origins of the knighthood as professional, elite warriors, these *milites* possibly fulfilled this purpose and nothing more. More significant are examples of knights in the households of others whose only title is ‘knight’. This best illustrates that those described as knight could be socially superior even within the grouping. There were however striking differences between the households of knights and those of the traditional nobility. The terms *maisnie* and *familia* -and variants thereof- were not used to describe the households of knights. This is potentially further evidence of

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<sup>104</sup> HEF, p.55: ...*habito consilio delegit ducem Dalmatie Pertholdum et comitem de Holland et Fridericum advocatum de Perge et alios quosdam prestantes milites cum mille ducentis armatis sociis*...

<sup>105</sup> Howden, 3:93

<sup>106</sup> C.K. Slack, *Crusade Charters, 1138-1270*, tr. H.B. Feiss (Tempe, 2001), pp.140-2

<sup>107</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, p.140-1



the distinction between the upper ranks of the knighthood and the rest. Where the traditional nobility had a full entourage worthy of a specific term, their less affluent knightly counterparts were poorer emulations. Significantly, the more explicit examples of households of knights appeared only in the second half of the century.

The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described Arnold of Hornberg being accompanied by sixteen *armatis sociis egregiis*.<sup>108</sup> The problem of the term *sociis* recurs. The complimentary description suggests that they were knights on this occasion, but it remains uncertain. Far more overt is the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*'s description of Andrew de Chauvigny being accompanied by *quindecim milites sociis*. Here, the retinue were explicitly described as *milites*, and while Andrew of Chauvigny is endowed with substantial social status, he remained a knight.<sup>109</sup> Finally, Jacques d'Avesnes was saved by a man named Nichols of Jenlain - described as one of his knights-during a skirmish outside the Tower of Galatia on the Fourth Crusade.<sup>110</sup> Similarly to Andrew on the Third Crusade, Jacques was praised by Villehardouin and was implicitly described as a *prodome*. He did remain below baronial rank, however he was clearly among the higher-ranking crusaders.<sup>111</sup> The implication is therefore that he was a high-ranking knight with considerable social standing.

Even as late as the Second Crusade, *milites* did not appear in the retinues of other knights. The *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* described *milites et eorum convictualibus* operating a mangonel outside Lisbon, later stating that the former used *eorum suffraganeos* to defend the siege engine in their stead.<sup>112</sup> There are reasons why this description was possible, the first of which is extremely mundane. On a literary level, it seems reasonable to assume the author did not wish to repeat the same term within a sentence. The knights in question were possibly not of sufficient standing, but this is unconvincing given they were entrusted with the command of one of the few siege weapons. More damaging to this thesis however is the argument that all knights were of insufficient standing to lead others in their retinues. This argument seems flimsy however, given the very nature of the

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<sup>108</sup> HEF, pp.56-7

<sup>109</sup> IPGRR, 4:30

<sup>110</sup> Villehardouin, §160.

<sup>111</sup> Villehardouin, §8. See also Villehardouin, §114, 201, 226, 279, 284, 324, 331-2.

<sup>112</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, p.142-3; 162-5.

expedition to Lisbon. Very few members of what was considered the traditional nobility were present; Count Arnold of Aerschot was the only man endowed with comital rank. None of the other leaders possessed any particular social rank, though the English contingent leaders were described as constables.<sup>113</sup> There were more knights in the crusader force than the six men named, thus it stands to reason that they were under the command of the leaders, despite their seeming lack of nobility.

This, along with all the prior examples illustrates social disparities within the knightly grouping throughout the period, but they should not be overexaggerated. The socially ascended knighthood came to include everyone from kings at the very top of society, down to 'poor' knights. The term 'poor' is perhaps inaccurate, as it gives the impression of true poverty than the much more relative reality. The description was almost certainly in relation to the wider knightly grouping rather than wider society. Similarly the fact that household knights existed does not mean that they were of low social standing. They appeared in the households of the nobility and later socially superior knights, and often enjoyed positions of power and responsibility, such as those of Marshal or Constable. This closeness of association with the nobility probably also contributed to the initial rise in social status of those who served, with the result being -as evidenced above- that knights came to lead knightly retinues in their own right. Of course, the descriptor of 'household knight' denoted but one subgrouping in the wider knighthood, and the description was not so much a social as more of a functional one. They were still described as knights, and therefore shared many characteristics with those they served (who themselves were often termed *milites*).

For all the consideration of the variance present within the knighthood, there remained numerous significant points of similarity. Many knights fought in units together with their leaders, which indicates a unity through the shared profession of arms, as well as largely equivalent equipment. This in turn implies a certain level of affluence. This combination, as well as the proximity to the traditional nobility suggests that the whole grouping enjoyed significant social elevation by comparison to the rest of medieval society. One concept significant for its

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<sup>113</sup> *De Expugnacione Lixbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, p.52-7

absence is the wielding of legitimate violence, although this can perhaps be explained by the source material, the majority of which are crusading chronicles.

### 6.5.2.3. Knights Errant: The Youth

The other major subgroup which commonly appears in the source material is one generally characterised as the 'youth'. Duby and more recently Kositzk have conducted significant studies on the medieval concept of youth. The common associations have been between the term *iuvenes* and 'restlessness', with the possibility that the grouping represented knights who were as yet unsettled and unmarried.<sup>114</sup> Tyerman describes them as undubbed and unlanded knights which appear throughout the period.<sup>115</sup> The common characterisation across the secondary literature is that of lack of establishment, with focus placed on the Latin *iuvenes*, and later the Old French *bachelor*. The Latin term appears frequently in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, with associations -both explicit and implicit- with the traits of recklessness and bellicosity.

Two examples are particularly significant. The first is during the siege of Acre, when a group of *iuvenes* and *milites gregarii* sally out of the camp.<sup>116</sup> The *iuvenes* are later explicitly also described as *milites*, but the initial association with 'common knights' is an interesting one. It suggests that both were on the bottom rung of knighthood, but perhaps for different reasons. The relative poverty or low social standing hindered the *milites gregarii* but was perhaps the unproven nature of the *iuvenes*. Later in the same source there is a clear distinction between the youth - characterised as warlike, reckless and hungry for glory- and the *militia*, which was 'proven in so many crises.'<sup>117</sup> The association with recklessness specifically frequently appeared throughout the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* as well as other contemporary sources such as Roger of Howden and even earlier, in Saxo Grammaticus' *Historia Danorum*.<sup>118</sup> Robert of Clari made a similar distinction between *chevaliers* and *li joule bachelor* during the Fourth Crusade.<sup>119</sup> The trait of

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<sup>114</sup> Perhaps the best summary of this 'restlessness' is Ambroise describing the *bachelorie* leaving their lands and their *meisnees* to go on crusade, see: Ambroise, ll.354-60. For the prevalence of this idea in secondary literature, see: Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, p.31; Hunt, 'The Emergence of the Knight in France and England, 1000-1200,' pp.5-6; Evergates, 'Nobles and Knights in Twelfth-Century France,' p.15; Kostick, '*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-9),' p.177

<sup>115</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.161.

<sup>116</sup> IPGRR, 1:40

<sup>117</sup> IPGRR, 5:2. See also 4:18.

<sup>118</sup> IPGRR, 3:13; Howden, 3:70; Saxo Grammaticus, ed. Friis-Jensen, tr. Fisher, 14:3.11

<sup>119</sup> Clari, 105

recklessness can be contrasted with the 'proven' nature of the established knighthood, and the sense one gets is of youthful exuberance not yet tempered by experience.

Although a common trait attributed to the *iuvenes*, this youthful exuberance was not always foremost when the term appeared. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described Count Frederick of Abenberg as *iuvenis*, despite him being girded with a sword during the course of the expedition.<sup>120</sup> The implications of this example are significant, not least the emphasis placed on the act of girding with a sword. Crucial is that initially he was a Count, but not yet formally a knight, merely a *iuvenis*. This alone suggests that *iuvenis* was outside of the knighthood grouping, although they were seemingly 'knights-in-waiting' and once proven they would be admitted. The distinction was therefore perhaps more cultural than social in nature and did not detract from the social coherence of the grouping.

Characterisations of youthful exuberance and a lack of establishment meant that members of this subgroup undoubtedly possessed individual hunger to prove oneself, with the crusading expeditions providing opportunities to do so. These associations likely provided both the loose inspiration and paradoxically the model for the romantic figure of the knight-errant. By the Third Crusade, authors were probably influenced by both crusading *chansons* and the works of Chretien de Troyes and his contemporaries.<sup>121</sup> This is detectable in some of the imagery used particularly by Ambroise, who described the *bachelorie* leaving their lands and their *meisnees* -presumably those they were part of, rather than commanded- and rushing *en masse* to join the expeditions of the Third Crusade.<sup>122</sup> While the terms *bachelor* and *iuvenis* were the most common to describe this group of 'knights-errant', other terms did appear, even within the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*. Examples come at both ends of the account of *ephebi* engaging in practice battles, with full *milites* also involved.<sup>123</sup> Given the context these probably constituted the war-time equivalent of tournaments, used to sharpen the skills of martial elite of the army.

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<sup>120</sup> HEF, p.27

<sup>121</sup> Ailes (tr.), *The History of the Holy War*, p.1, p.20; H. Nicholson, 'Review: The History of the Holy War: Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* by Marianne Ailes, Malcolm Barber,' *The Catholic Historical Review* 91:1 (2005), p.145.

<sup>122</sup> Ambroise, ll.354-60

<sup>123</sup> IPGRR, 1:52; 5:25.

Further complication arises with the wide meaning of some of the more common terms. The assumption was that the early *iuvenes* were the real-life precursors to the romantic knights-errant. An important example the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* contests this however. During the siege, the author described a combined force of *milites*, with *archiferis* and *iuvenes expedites* pressing the attack.<sup>124</sup> In this case, the ‘agile youths’ were more closely associated with the archers than with the *milites*. The implication is that they were just boys with javelins or slings. Such an association is repeated later in the source, with *iuvenes expedites* being associated with archers and crossbowmen rather than with *milites*.<sup>125</sup>

### 6.5.3. Variation and Coherence

The existence of several subgroups with their own distinct characteristics seemingly contradicts the coherence of the wider knighthood. This thesis argues for the existence of a socially coherent grouping with elevation present even in the earlier portion of the century. The consensus is that the social coherence of the knighthood was well-established by the final quarter of the twelfth century. The evidence above largely supports this, with the majority coming from later sources. Many of the examples evidencing variation throughout the century did not do so on a social basis and do not therefore challenge the social coherence of the grouping. The strongest evidence for a coherent knighthood coalescing in the first half of the twelfth century is in Bernard of Clairvaux’s *De Laude Novae Militiae* and the later descriptions of the crusader forces at Lisbon during the course of the crusade.

The English and Flemish participants of the Second Crusade proved that knights of comparatively limited standing were capable of organising and leading expeditions, which suggests a degree of social standing. The decisions taken by the collective of the crusaders were also unusually democratic in nature, with the *De Expugnatione* in particular noting extensive group discussions at various points.<sup>126</sup> This suggests that the relative standing of the various knights of the host was not particularly diverse, and therefore that general elevation was detectable among the grouping. The very existence of a grouping is evidenced by

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<sup>124</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, p.128-9

<sup>125</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, p.160-1

<sup>126</sup> *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. & tr. David, *passim*.

the basic assumption of the *De Laude Novae Militiae*, which is that Bernard was addressing a coherent knighthood, which were subsequently characterised as wealthy and socially superior.<sup>127</sup> As early as 1120 then, the likes of Bernard of Clairvaux characterised a nascent, socially coherent knighthood as consisting of affluent, exuberant warriors. Important to note also is that already by the time of the Second Crusade, there were detectable hints in contemporary sources of the more romantic connotations of knighthood which would come to be included in ‘chivalry’.

## 6.6. Chivalry and the Knightly Identity

Although social elevation is evident, the evidence above does not account for this change in distinction, nor does it locate when it occurred. In addition to social changes, the coherent knighthood underwent a profound cultural refinement, towards the modern perception of ‘chivalry’. It is crucial to acknowledge the difference between the knightly grouping -the knighthood- and the knightly identity. The fact of a socially coherent grouping was its own means of distinction. That is to say: a socially coherent grouping existed before and in the absence of a coherent knightly identity. The cultural changes discussed below represented searches for a knightly identity. Extensive work -referenced in Chapter One- has been done on the codified system of values. Even in its later more coherent form, chivalry has proven a contentious topic, with varied discussion among modern historians concerning its origins, breadth, and the extent of its real-world application.<sup>128</sup> In the crusading context, there is an understandable focus on ‘religious chivalry’ of the type examined extensively by Gautier, and later Bloch.<sup>129</sup> The aspects of chivalry approved by the church did not appear alone in the sources however. Strong military themes were also unsurprisingly present,

Of greatest significance to the nascent knightly identity was their definition by the profession of arms and martial prowess, something which has been described by Aurell as ‘the chief characteristic defining the nobility’.<sup>130</sup> This is unsurprising

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<sup>127</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.921-3: See Chapter 1, then Chapter 2 ‘On Worldly Knighthood’

<sup>128</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>129</sup> See: Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, pp.16-7.

<sup>130</sup> Aurell, ‘Society,’ p.37.

given the origins of the knightly grouping. However it is also clear, that by the early thirteenth century the mere fact of bearing arms did not make one elite.<sup>131</sup> The numerous examples of knights bearing arms throughout the twelfth century support Aurell's assertion. Those found in the Third Crusade sources particularly suggest that the association continued through the period. The examples which illustrate the elevation of individuals through the profession of arms generally complimented their ability, with Richard of Devizes describing William of Fors as 'a knight much experienced in arms,' and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describing Geoffrey de Lusignan as 'a knight of extraordinary prowess'.<sup>132</sup> The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* similarly described Frederick Barbarossa as 'a knight of vast experience in all the aspects of his craft'.<sup>133</sup>

There is a striking contrast between these examples of knightliness clearly being in the man, and those which came earlier, with prestige attributed to the arms and equipment themselves. There are examples in both the Third and Fourth Crusade of knights explicitly associated with extensive lists of arms, armour and equipment. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* describes Christian *militēs electos* equipped with weapons, shining mail shirts, glittering helmets, noble horses and white coverings.<sup>134</sup> Even among the Muslim forces, the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* makes the association between elaborate, costly equipment and authority and power, though the description reveals an understandable double-standard.<sup>135</sup> Where the Christian armaments were described in aesthetically glorious terms, similar extravagance is criticised in their Muslim counterparts. The sentiment supports the austerity and humility preached in Bernard of Clairvaux's *De Laude Novae Militiae* in the first half of the century and illustrates that the ideas certainly did take root. Even at the time of the Fourth Crusade, Robert of Clari provided insight into the requirements of knightliness in the description of his brother's actions during the course of the expedition. Aleaumes of Clari deserved a knight's reward because 'he had a horse and a hauberk, like a knight, and had done as many feats of arms as any knight'.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Nicolle, *Crusader Warfare, Vol.1*, p.30.

<sup>132</sup> Devizes, p.10 (...*miles probatus in armis*...); IPGRR, 3:5 (...*miles egregiae probitatis*,...).

<sup>133</sup> HEF, p.108 (...*in variis militia casibus miles exercitatusissimus fuerit*,...)

<sup>134</sup> IPGRR, 3:5

<sup>135</sup> IPGRR, 4:19

<sup>136</sup> Clari, §98

Common towards the end of the century were more romantic, anecdotal associations between knighthood and arms-bearing, and this perhaps evidences a departure from the reality. There are examples particularly in the Third Crusade sources which overdramatized if not outright invented versions of conversations or actions of the participants or antagonists of the expedition. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described a supposed conversation between Mamluks (imagined to be the Muslim equivalent of knights) and Kurds. The two groups discussed which of them should try to capture King Richard and his men at Jaffa. The Kurds suggested the Mamluks take on the responsibility, to which the latter replied: “You should go on foot,” the Mamluks replied, “because we are of higher rank. Knighthood is our duty, while this footwork is more appropriate for you.”<sup>137</sup> As with the elaborate equipment, this example perhaps illustrates another trait deemed negative by the ‘new knighthood’, namely pride. It also reinforces the association between knights and horses, though this was probably a more romantic link than realistic, in an anecdote which was almost certainly the creation of the author.

Romantic associations also continued in the descriptions of Christians however. Ambroise described a haughty King Richard talking down to a clergyman, stating that knights were concerned with chivalry, and clerks should stick to writing.<sup>138</sup> This example is important because it illustrates the association between knights and the codified system of values known as chivalry, and its appearance in a popular verse suggests fairly widespread association. It does however suggest contradiction of the ideal of the literate or thoughtful knight, to be examined further below. Similarly, in the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, bandits supposedly demanded payment of Frederick Barbarossa on his passage to the Holy Land, lest they attack. Frederick answered that he and his men were knights, and that as such they preferred to clear the way with swords rather than gold.<sup>139</sup>

Knights were clearly not exclusively self-defined by arms – arguably no one grouping of the twelfth century was defined by arms alone. This thesis argues that the the sources above tended favourably towards a romantic perception of

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<sup>137</sup> IPGRR 6:21: *Quibus Menelones, 'Vestrum,' inquit, 'potius est pedites incedere, quia nos potiores dignitate. Nobis quidem ab officio competit militia, vos hoc pedestre ministerium aptius respicit.*

<sup>138</sup> Ambroise, ll.1604-21

<sup>139</sup> HEF, p.83



knightliness, something which represents a bleeding through of certain values and ideas from *chansons de geste* to ostensibly non-fiction sources. The *Chanson d'Aspremont*, one of the more famous crusading songs of the twelfth century is rife with examples romanticising the bearing of arms. In almost every mention of *chevaliers* throughout the source, there is an accompanying description of the arms they bore, or the armour they wore.<sup>140</sup> Weapons and armour are a theme which remains common throughout the source, with recurrent -and lengthy- descriptions of swords, shields, armour and often also lances. Significantly, these examples did not always come complete with a warhorse. That is not to say warhorses were absent from the source. Warhorses also appeared frequently as an association with knights.<sup>141</sup> Given their commonality that while not necessarily interlinked, both equipment and warhorses remained central to a romantic knightly identity.

The language of the examples listed possibly suggests these romantic associations with equipment and horses were outliers, despite their commonality. However the terms appeared in widely-disseminated texts, likely confirming their veracity. There are several counter-examples however, most significantly among the clergy. Clergymen frequently fought, led contingents of troops, and did many of the things more commonly associated with the knighthood. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described 'a very great number of bishops and magnates' arriving to aid the Christians 'each with their retinues.'<sup>142</sup> The Archdeacon of Colchester is particularly praised for his prowess, by both the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* and Ralph of Diceto. Diceto described him as 'a man both lacking the arms of knighthood and proven in arms.'<sup>143</sup> The Archbishop of Canterbury is also apparently led some two hundred *milites* and three hundred *satellites* to the siege of Acre during the Third Crusade, with the clergy at large said to have 'claimed no small share of military glory. Fighting faithfully for the Faith, abbots and bishops led out their cohorts and joyfully contended for God's law.'<sup>144</sup>

<sup>140</sup> *The Song of Aspremont (La Chanson d'Aspremont)*, ed. & tr. M.A. Newth (New York, 1989), 41:75:1257; 51:91:1579-84; 59:106:1817-20; 62:109:1900-10; 71:127:2186-92; 82:144:2504-6

<sup>141</sup> *The Song of Aspremont (La Chanson d'Aspremont)*, ed. & tr. Newth, 6:11:160-3; 32:57:979-80; 99:166:3092; 112:188:3479-80; 122:208:3799-801.

<sup>142</sup> IPGRR, 3:6: ...*episcopi et magnates quam plurimi, singuli suorum comitati sequela.*

<sup>143</sup> Ralph of Diceto, *Opera Historica*, ed. Stubbs, 2:84: ...*vir tam inermi militia quam armata probatus...*

<sup>144</sup> IPGRR, 1:61: *Clerus autem non modicum militaris gloriae partem vindicat; nam et abates, et praesules suas educunt cohorts, et pro fide fidenter dimicant, pro lege Dei laeti contendunt.*

Perhaps most significant is the ‘heroic bishop of Salisbury’. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* described his actions in glowing terms, stating that ‘he played an honourable role in the war: his virtues made him a knight in battle, a leader in the camp, and a pastor in ecclesiastical matters.’<sup>145</sup> The clear suggestion is that the knight’s primary function was found in battle. The context does suggest a romantic turn of phrase however, with evocative descriptors used. This would reinforce the argument above, that the definition of knights by their profession of arms was merely a romantic one, not reflective of reality. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described *milites inermes*, illustrating that *milites* could still be so even when they were unarmed. The later *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri* retained the description, though it should be noted that both sources used the same material.<sup>146</sup> At another point, the *Historia* praised one who, ‘although he had not yet been dubbed a knight, nonetheless exercised the warrior’s craft.’<sup>147</sup> The association here is clear: that between the identity of the knight and that of the warrior, which aligns with the earlier and therefore established conception of knights.

It is difficult to reconcile the earlier group of knights with the latter, due to the fundamental changes which the grouping underwent across the period. Although there was overlap between the respective groupings, the evidence suggests that there were many newcomers to the latter grouping, and that these mainly originated in the upper echelons of society. This association between the later grouping of knights -collectively the knighthood- and the profession of arms likely therefore originated with the ‘old’ grouping of knights of the eleventh and early twelfth century. This earlier grouping was largely defined by military function, in stark contrast to their later namesakes. The knighthood had also garnered a certain prestige by the end of the twelfth century. This was partially due the influx of socially superior members who came to be labelled knights and contributed to a growing elitism within the grouping. There was also an increasing emphasis on the more ceremonial aspects of knighthood, including dubbing and the twinned concepts of belts of knighthood -*cingulum militiae*- and girding.

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<sup>145</sup> IPGRR, 1:61: ...*cujus virtus in armis militem, in castris ducem, in ecclesiasticis implet pastorem.*

<sup>146</sup> HEF, p.84; *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, 514.

<sup>147</sup> HEF, p.108: ...*nondum militem induerat, non minus tamen militis officium exercebat.*

Examples of the *cingulum militiae* appear primarily in the more florid passages of Angevin Third Crusade sources. The *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* made explicit and specific mentions of a belt of knighthood in terms consistent with those above.<sup>148</sup> The first example placed it at the centre of a rite usually described as dubbing, with a knight receiving his *cingulum* from a superior. The second came later, towards the end of the expedition in a likely fictional account of Richard bestowing a belt of knighthood upon Saphadin, the son of his primary antagonist Saladin. This example is of great significance, seemingly proving a separation between the rite and religion. This is perhaps supported by the rite's frequent secular appearance in the *Chanson d'Aspremont*.<sup>149</sup> Given its seeming significance as a formal means of entry into the knighthood, the tentative suggestion would be for no fundamental link between religion and the grouping. Even if the example was fictitious, as seems likely, the inclusion suggests that the author did not consider it impossible that a non-Christian might be considered a knight. The traits and values required for one to be given a belt of knighthood were therefore possibly divorced from overtly Christians virtues. However, it could also be argued that Saphadin was recognised for his adherence to the same, even despite of his position both as a Muslim and as an enemy. It is possible to argue for the virtues of knighthood to be separate from those of the Church, the author probably intended the compliment as one based on his Christian-like -rather than knightly- virtues, although they clearly did line up.

Richard of Devizes is another author who frequently mentioned belts and girding. Early in the source there is a vague description of the rite itself, which included King Richard using a 'bare sword' to gird another a knight.<sup>150</sup> One must use the works of Richard of Devizes cautiously, given his heavy use of satire, but the example possibly confirms the existence of a formal rite surrounding the making of a knight, as early as the preparations for the Third Crusade. The process of girding a knight was not permanent according to Devizes however, with cowardly knights stripped of their belt, and by symbolic extension, their knighthood.<sup>151</sup> The implication is clear: that knights were brave, and failure to

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<sup>148</sup> IPGRR, 1:3; 5:12

<sup>149</sup> *The Song of Aspremont (La Chanson d'Aspremont)*, ed. & tr. Newth, 6:10:156-9; 41:75:1259; 77-8:137:2401

<sup>150</sup> Devizes, p.10

<sup>151</sup> Devizes, p.22.

meet the set standards resulted in expulsion from the grouping. From a further example in Richard of Devizes, the *cingulum* quite literally served as a connection between a knight and his sword, with the description being of *milites...spatis accincti*, or 'knights girded with swords'.<sup>152</sup> Devizes at least clearly saw a strong correlation between the knighthood, the ceremony of girding, and swords. The ceremonial girding of a knight with a sword-belt again suggests an emphasis on the profession of arms, although it also serves to illustrate the fundamental changes undergone in the period. The significance of the profession of arms is undoubted, the ceremonial emphasis implies a more romantic association, which supports many of the other examples above.

Perhaps symptomatic of the introduction of dubbing was the growing elitism of the grouping, with increasing distinctions made down the century.<sup>153</sup> As has been noted above, there were increasingly tighter restrictions on what exactly it was to be considered a knight economically, socially and culturally. Even within the grouping there was gradation, as will be examined further below.<sup>154</sup> The practice of dubbing and girding was not the only contributory factor to the elitism of the knightly grouping, with the emergence of the ideal of the thoughtful or literate knight also playing an important role.

#### **6.6.1. The Literate Knight**

Evidence of the literate knight in the sources under consideration is limited. The emphasis -perhaps inevitably- was more on the virtues of piety and prowess, although wisdom was occasionally noted. While superficially similar, 'Wisdom' was superficially similar, but nowhere near as technically specific as the definition established for 'literacy' by other modern historians. The arguments of Aurell, Turner and Crouch are compelling: medieval and modern conceptions of literacy differ enormously, with the former constituting a mere understanding of Latin beyond average – not even the ability to write it. The focus on piety seems inevitable given the source material, while consideration of martial prowess seems equally inevitable given the origins of the 'knightly class'.

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<sup>152</sup> Devizes, p.41.

<sup>153</sup> Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade*, p.21.

<sup>154</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.247.

Precisely because the explicit evidence of the literate knight is sparse, contextual knowledge of the sources is crucial. Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, were both self-defined knights who composed their respective accounts of the Fourth Crusade, even if they themselves did not commit it to writing. Both sources were in the vernacular Old French rather than Latin, but the displayed talent for composition attests to their literacy under the medieval definition. The two came from opposite ends of the spectrum of knighthood, illustrating that by the end of the century such a standard of literacy was likely widespread in the grouping. It remains prudent however to restrict such a conclusion to the regions of north-eastern France and Flanders. Although different from literacy, the virtue of wisdom is worthy of consideration.

The trait of wisdom was by no means unique. Church- and clergymen were characterised as wise, while conversely lacking strength in arms. One could immediately point to the frequent examples of such men noted for their prowess, but these were noted due to their exceptionality. Perhaps more telling are the instances where general characterisations are presented together: knights were warriors while churchmen were sages with higher concerns. Where the former were more usually concerned with what Bernard of Clairvaux termed a war against ‘flesh and blood’, the latter clearly used their wisdom to combat ‘a spiritual army of evil’.<sup>155</sup> The combination of these two types of warfare was what Bernard sought in his conception of *milites Christi*, exemplified by his glowing description of the early Templars, with the emphasis on the parallel girding of spirit and body as opposed to ostentation.<sup>156</sup>

### **6.6.2. *Milites Christi* and the New Knighthood**

This combination meant that the *milites Christi* had a wider purview than that of mere *milites*, and this undoubtedly contributed to the cultural enhancement of the word, increasingly even absent the religious descriptor. Even outside the crusading arena, Gilbert of Mons indicated that knighthood was associated at least as strongly with secular glory, military power and an elevated social status, as with service and Christian humility.<sup>157</sup> There are frequent examples in the

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<sup>155</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.921:1.

<sup>156</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.923:4:8

<sup>157</sup> Jackson, ‘Knighthood and Nobility,’ p.808.

crusading sphere of the phrasing being used to garner prestige. William of Newburgh used the concept of *militiae Christi* to aggrandise the funeral of Frederick Barbarossa, and from his usage that he clearly considered the *militiae* to be a prestigious grouping.<sup>158</sup> Significantly, William of Newburgh's description was of a collective of knights, however this was not always the case. The *Historia de Expeditione Friderici* described the entire German army as the *militia Christi*, showing that the term had numerous meanings.<sup>159</sup> In situations where authors employed heavy rhetoric, the meaning of *militia* simply from the word is uncertain. The author's use of the more expansive *milites crucis Christi* was far more specific.<sup>160</sup> It seems likely that the more elaborate the description the greater the attempt to lend prestige.

The term *milites Christi* attributed prestige, certainly later in the twelfth century. Concerning crusading particularly, much of this prestige clearly originated with Bernard of Clairvaux's conception of the 'new knighthood', which he described at length in *De Laude Novae Militiae*. Given the strong religious and spiritual currents present during period of crusading activity, it is understandable that the conception of *milites Christi* gained prominence. Bernard of Clairvaux's work is symptomatic of this, and the association suggests that the prestige and cultural enhancement of the term were heavily linked with and possibly a direct result of the crusading movement. Although the concept of *milites Christi* existed earlier, Bernard codified the requisite system of virtues, and crucially provided an aspirational real-world example. Again, these traits were praised prior to Bernard's work, but had represented a more nebulous set of ideals, found in the earlier *chansons de geste*, such as the Song of Roland. Even by the second quarter of the twelfth century, the set of values collectively referred to as 'the new knighthood' likely did not constitute a codified version of chivalry.

Although the *chansons de geste* professed similar values to the 'new knighthood', they used far more stylised terms than Bernard. The *chansons* mentioned and indeed focused upon the splendid aesthetics of knighthood, but Bernard and the Templars took a far more ascetic approach. Bernard's rhetorical purpose potentially caused him to exaggerate the extravagance of what he referred to as

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<sup>158</sup> William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:13

<sup>159</sup> HEF, pp.33-4

<sup>160</sup> HEF, p.14

‘worldly knighthood’. While this must be considered, it is unlikely his work would have gained such traction were there not some element of truth behind it. Although the extent of the problem was perhaps exaggerated, its existence cannot be doubted.

Bernard clearly sought to curb the spending of the seemingly untamed knightly grouping at the end of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Bernard devoted a chapter to the extravagance of what he terms ‘worldly knighthood’, suggesting that it was potentially commonplace among the knightly grouping as early as 1120. Such extravagance was probably indicative of a degree of wealth. Wealth did not necessarily determine social status, but as established above the sheer expense of ‘membership’ meant that affluence was required to be part of the knighthood. Bernard’s treatise suggests that this affluence was present much earlier than the evidenced inflation of the cost of knighthood. It also reveals the presence of certain other aspects of the grouping significantly earlier than has usually been asserted.

The date given for Bernard’s treatise is between 1120-1136. It was addressed to Hugh of Payens (d.1136) and focused on the newly-formed Knights Templar (formed c.1119). This date range starkly contrasts many of the dates -often found in the latter half of the century- which are associated with the risen knighthood. Chapter Two of the treatise, which focused on ‘worldly knighthood’, strongly criticised ostentatious displays of wealth and the pursuit of worldly glory in general, with a strong association being drawn between the two.<sup>161</sup> The implication is that the ‘worldly knighthood’ had all the trappings of high social status, and Bernard almost lamented the fact that such an association was made. Central to his criticism was the idea that knights should concern themselves with being good Christian warriors above all. From the very inception of the crusading movement, there had been a clear association between the knightly grouping and the act of crusading.<sup>162</sup> What arguably started out as an opportunity for the knightly grouping to reconcile their violent impulses with traditional Christian

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<sup>161</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.923:2

<sup>162</sup> Shown in the various versions of Urban II’s speech at the Council of Clermont, 1095: Fulcheri Carnotensis, *Historia Hierosolymitana (1095-1127)*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913); Guibert de Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Mediaevalis* 127A (Turnhout, 1996); *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum: The Deeds of the Franks*, ed. & tr. R.M. Hill (London, 1962);

virtue became a requirement particularly with the proliferation of the *milites Christi* ideal.

As well as encouraging asceticism and humility, it is significant that even this early, the imagery of girding with swords and belts was present in more grounded sources than the stylised *chansons de geste*.<sup>163</sup> Clearly for Bernard, knights were duty-bound to be warriors -both physical and spiritual- and should aspire to true *milites Christi*. The central image of a knight girded with belt and sword remains, perhaps suggesting an early iteration of the token of membership it would become, despite the lack of formal ceremony.

The use of the set phrase *milites Christi* or the *milites crucis Christi* to lend prestige naturally elevated the term.<sup>164</sup> This very fact has made the study of the crusading knighthood so difficult. Every appearance of the term must be interrogated, in case the author meant it as a shorthand for the more general *milites Christi*. The phrase grew into an integral part of crusading rhetoric, even if Bernard of Clairvaux's treatise was specific to those who were considered *milites* in their own right. The origins of the knightly grouping were in comparatively well-equipped, professional warriors. This could of course suggest a detectable knightly identity early in the twelfth century. However, a central argument of the thesis is that membership of the grouping was not indicative of a coherent identity. Although the search for a knightly identity was underway, it was only towards the end of the twelfth century that it could be described as anything approaching coherent.

The vehemence of Bernard's passionate challenge perhaps shows that this description was perhaps insufficient by the early-twelfth century, very possibly due to integration with the higher social groupings of the aristocracy and nobility. Again, definition by arms was clearly no longer enough for the grouping of knights, even by the inception of the Knights Templar. Even the trappings of wealth and worldly glory so criticised by Bernard of Clairvaux can be construed as a fumbling attempt to establish an identity. Following from that, this identity was arguably refined over the course of the twelfth century, with significant influence from the Church and crusading movement in general, as well as more

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<sup>163</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.921-3:1

<sup>164</sup> For further examples, see William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett, 4:19; *Magni Presbiteri Chronicon*, in MGH SS 17, 514.



specifically the concept of *milites Christi*. The knightly grouping did not drop all trappings of wealth and social standing as a result of this influence, but it certainly was tempered to a certain extent.

The values themselves which embodied the *milites Christi* have been hinted at throughout the chapter, and obviously began with 'prowess'. A brief examination of Bernard of Clairvaux's text reveals many of the others, both explicitly and implicitly. The section on worldly knighthood is almost as useful as that on the new knighthood for teaching us about the latter, given the strong theme of contrast emphasised throughout the text. Many of Bernard's specific criticisms were clearly intended to be constructive: where he criticised extravagance and pride, he encouraged by implication austerity and humility.<sup>165</sup> Understandably given the author, there was also emphasis on spiritual concerns, which can be considered the virtues of piety and wisdom.<sup>166</sup> On the opposing concepts of pride and humility, there are a few specific examples evident. Eracles, in his praise for Frederick Barbarossa, described the emperor as a humble man.<sup>167</sup> This may be starkly contrasted with an incident where a number of sergeants were described boasting about their prowess to the knights of the host outside Acre, with the result that they attack the city and are promptly slaughtered by the enemy.<sup>168</sup> The message is clear: pride begets arrogance, and should certainly be considered a negative trait. By extension one was therefore to strive for humility instead. Although the quartet of virtues listed is very minimalist, it provided a framework from which to begin.

What was central to Bernard's conception of the 'new knighthood' was the legitimate use of violence and killing. Rather than being considered a murderer, if one were to kill an evildoer, 'he is evidently the avenger of Christ towards evildoers and he is rightly considered a defender of Christians.' First, it seems that the distinction of legitimacy was only considered of value to knights, which suggests a means of identification: knights were the only ones who could exercise legitimate violence. Such an identification is problematic, however. Bernard's definition of legitimacy is so wide and encompassing that many who participated

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<sup>165</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.923:2:3

<sup>166</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.924-5:3

<sup>167</sup> CGT, 95

<sup>168</sup> CGT, 103.

in the crusading movement could be said to have engaged in legitimate violence, but one cannot claim that all of the same were knights. However the focus of the *De Laude Novae Militiae* also suggests that the talk of *milites* was not abstract, even if it was rhetoric-heavy.

Bernard's work heavily influenced the development of the knightly identity, but one cannot claim that it embodied his conception of the 'new knighthood'. Although it bore resemblance, the later 'chivalry' did not fully align with these virtues. There were many other elements which are far more detectable -indeed prevalent- in other literature, notably the *chansons de geste*. The relationship between knights and the system of virtues to which they supposedly subscribed was a complicated one, particularly in this early period. Far from the process beginning later than 1150, efforts were clearly made potentially as early as the second decade of century both within and without the knightly grouping to establish a coherent identity. Bernard's treatise proves that the process was far from complete, and the identity underwent significant changes alongside the development of the crusading movement. However a coherent grouping -if not identity- is detectable as early as 1120. The lack of clear, coherent identity, and the struggles to establish one are themselves indicative of a grouping struggling to locate itself both culturally and socially. This grouping seems not to have been united by an identity, at least not to begin with.

## Conclusion

The source material has confirmed that the military structure of western Christendom was incredibly complex. Both knights and sergeants appear in all spheres of the crusader armies, and in this they resemble their counterparts active in Western Europe. However, many functional divisions are detectable amongst knights in the source material which have not been sufficiently highlighted in the numerous earlier considerations of 'domestic' warfare. The context of these functional divisions suggests that they were widespread in nature and were therefore present in Western Christendom. The 'domestic' sources appear not to address these divisions in depth, causing modern historians to underestimate and undervalue them.

Military history of this nature will always be difficult given the proclivity of the sources for the use of social terms. Social terms being used to describe military engagements facilitates assumptions of equivalency between military and social, and Old French and Latin terminology. The separation of terms is crucial. The modern term 'knight' cannot be equated to the Latin *miles*, which in turn cannot be equated to the Old French *chevalier*. This is the most obvious example. The same could be said of the modern English 'sergeant', the Old French *serjant*, and the wealth of Latin terms -most common of which were *sariantes*, *satellites* and *servientes*- usually associated with the grouping. The issues of equivalency and translation have been complicated by the variety of sources available for the crusading historian of the twelfth century. My examination of numerous specific examples has illustrated that only through careful consideration of context can accurate definitions even be attempted. The prevailing picture is of difference and variety in the ways in which terms were interpreted by different writers.

My research has confirmed the dangers of drawing overly confident conclusions regarding medieval military history. The examples and evidence above illustrate well the variety of terms found throughout the twelfth century, variance which confirms the difficulties inherent in overgeneralising. That said, conclusions have been drawn and should be emphasised.

Chapter One examined the historiography surrounding various aspects of medieval warfare in general, as well as some specifics of the knightly grouping and identity. Knights clearly remain crucial to military, social and cultural history.

Terminological studies have however been largely marginalised, with limited terms considered. The chapter moved on to establish the parameters and methodology of the thesis within this context. Most of the thesis was to focus on military history with a particular examination of the difference between military and social terms. Following this theme led to a particular emphasis on the difference between the knightly grouping and the knightly identity. The central point of the methodology was the use of a geographically and chronologically diverse source base to extrapolate conclusions back to Western Christendom. The source base was not wholly representative of crusading participation but provides a much more useful cross-section of Western Christendom than the traditional domestic sources. The addition of crusading rhetoric is also useful in its own way, given the significant role it played in the formation of the knightly identity particularly.

Chapter Two considered the current state of confusion surrounding medieval military terminology and how to confront it. The application of definitions on a source-by-source basis seems the best way to address the diversity of the sources. The assignation of weight to different sources was also explored in some detail. This was to reflect that some twelfth century authors were more qualified as military commentators. Another crucial observation was that it remains near-impossible to directly compare Latin and Old French terms. The Old French literary tradition was comparatively young compared to its Latin counterpart, resulting in some terms being more tightly-defined than others. The difference between the Old French *chevalier* and the Latin *milites* exemplified this best, with the latter remaining contentious. Comparisons like these were established as important for this thesis.

Chapter Three suggested that we need a significant refinement of the consideration of twelfth century cavalry. Differences in equipment were probably due to wealth and status rather than military function. Numerous distinct groupings of cavalry are detectable in the source material. Even within these loose groupings, equipment and function apparently varied on a near-individual basis. For example, knights were generally heavily-armoured, this trait was not exclusive to knights. As is also shown by the existence of second-rank cavalry, knights were also not the only ones involved in shock charges. This second-rank or 'medium' cavalry included most mounted sergeants. It also included the

distinct *armigeri* (translated often as ‘squires’). The remainder of the grouping of squires -broadly defined as military servants- was probably strictly non-combatant. In terms of functional categories, heavy and light cavalry alone are clearly insufficient. A third must be added to encompass the versatile, second-rank cavalry which formed the subsequent ranks of formations but were perfectly capable of performing independent tasks. This grouping is exemplified by those described by Villehardouin as *serjans a cheval*.

Chapter Four and its consideration of medieval infantry is somewhat more complicated. Similarly to cavalry, the variety of infantry forces had a diverse array of military and social connotations, with individuals once again possessing a wide array of equipment and social standing. The initial temptation is to establish similar functional categories to those found in Chapter Three – i.e. those of heavy, regular and light infantry. However the most useful functional distinction to make is simply between *mêlée* and ranged infantry. Perhaps the most significant conclusion is that the focus on mounted service was probably due to strategic flexibility, rather than the assumed tactical dominance. Of course, the cultural values which placed greater significance on mounted warriors likely also contributed. The suggestion is that horses were used for transport at least as much as for combat, with infantry clearly providing significant tactical value.

Combined, Chapters Three and Four yield crucial conclusions regarding the grouping of sergeants. The medieval terms used to describe the grouping had no detectable military connotations, and based on the crusading evidence, ‘sergeant’ was therefore not a military category but rather a socio-economic one. Their military position a step below knights meant that sergeants could be relatively well-equipped, though not necessarily to the same standard as their social superiors.

Chapters Three and Four gathered evidence primarily to consider military groupings and the differentiations between them. The insights into social and economic history were unexpected. Chapter Five examined the payment of soldiers. An undoubted increase in paid service is detectable throughout the twelfth century source material. This was most likely due to the changing demands of warfare, which called for longer periods of service. There emerges a distinction between the generalised category of ‘paid’ troops and that of

‘mercenary’. Rather than simply being paid, medieval mercenaries were also outsiders who rarely enjoyed regular payments (and the term ‘outsider’ is more useful than the more commonly applied ‘foreign’ as a descriptor). Furthermore, paid status was not widely-perceived to be an inherently negative trait in the medieval period. The most commonly found opposition to payment is, more specifically, the concept of greed and the related assumption of fickleness. Of specific interest to the thesis are paid knights, which not only existed but prove to have been relatively common. This illustrates that knights were not just paid in land-fiefs. In sum, paid status was not considered shameful and was also not restricted to the lowest echelons of society.

Chapter Six draws strands from the other research chapters to illuminate our understanding of knighthood of the twelfth century. Knights were not discernible on a military basis alone. They were not shock heavy cavalry but rather represented general-purpose elite soldiers. Knights were also not the only ones to be enfeoffed, nor was it their only means of payment. Chapter Five proved that knights undoubtedly received direct financial payment, both alongside and in place of land fiefs. They were distinguished on a social basis, resulting in a socially coherent knighthood. This socially coherent knighthood was present earlier in the century, perhaps a side effect of attempts to establish a knightly identity. These attempts were characterised by the search for cultural distinction, with Bernard of Clairvaux representing just one of the contemporary writers seeking to shape the nascent identity. The development of the grouping went back as far as the concept of *milites Christi* but was solidified both by the crusading phenomenon and Bernard of Clairvaux’s works on the early Knights Templar. The knightly identity must be stressed as distinct from the social grouping of the knighthood. The coherent iteration of the former became ‘chivalry’ and was only detectable later in the century. The embrace of a coherent identity was characterised by growing elitism and refinement in the social grouping. The findings of the research chapters warrant further consideration below. The discoveries concerning knights, the knighthood and the knightly identity in particular are significant and deserving of emphasis.

### **7.1. Knights**

In the first half of the twelfth century, the knightly identity is best characterised as a striving for a nebulous series of ideals found throughout early Christian

literature. These ideals were identified and termed in early crusading literature - in Papal Bulls, as well as Bernard of Clairvaux's works.<sup>1</sup> They were not restricted to the works of ecclesiastics however, with similar values appearing in the popular *chansons de geste*, both crusading and otherwise. As noted above, this series of virtues is too ill-defined to be considered chivalry, and the use of such a term would only serve to mislead. It was not the attainment of such virtues, but rather the striving for them which formed the early core of the knightly identity. One could be considered a good knight if one was possessed of even one or two qualities, emphasised above the others.

This concept of pursuit rather than attainment -seemingly a lowering of the standards- was perhaps due to the inherent difficulty of reconciling certain traits with realities. For example, a member of the 'new knighthood' was expected to lead an austere lifestyle -modelled after the early Templars- avoiding overt displays of wealth, and instead emphasising functionality over flamboyance. The reality was that knights were also expected to provide a certain level of equipment, which relied on a certain affluence, and which in itself constituted an overt display of wealth. Similarly, the reality of prowess and confidence could very easily mutate into pride -at direct odds with the virtue of humility- which was to be avoided. Another way in which this conflict manifested was in the distaste displayed by certain authors when discussing the temporal rather than spiritual rewards of crusading. The most oft-cited example of this is on the Wendish Crusade, discussed more at length in the Chapter Five.<sup>2</sup>

The concept of 'striving for ideals' is a problematic means of categorisation largely due to its intangibility. Some knights -most obviously the early Templars- clearly did subscribe to the virtues propounded by the contemporary literature, but the available source material perhaps obscures how widespread such a pursuit was. Particularly regarding knights, there are the intertwined problems of romanticism and intentional bias. Most sources of the period -not just those focused on crusading- were written by clergymen and ecclesiastics, many of whom were likely drawn from the same families as knights. Authors probably therefore harboured a degree of subconscious bias in favour of their knightly

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<sup>1</sup> See Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber, passim*; Allen, Amt (eds.), *The Crusades*, p.162

<sup>2</sup> Helmold of Bosau, ed. & tr. Stoob, 1:68.

counterparts. This inherent distortion, combined with that of *chanson*- and Arthurian-inspired romanticism reveals a highly suspect portrayal of contemporary knights.<sup>3</sup> The pursuit of the amalgamation of virtues which formed the precursor of chivalry was likely widespread, but one must use source material very carefully. This is arguably especially true of those considered here, given the interaction between heavy rhetoric and religious imagery and those inherent biases and romanticism already present. An important disclaimer is that not all source material -crusading or otherwise- had a favourable portrayal of the knightly grouping at all times, but a trend is certainly detectable. This concept is perhaps not all that useful for a modern historian investigating a knightly identity in the twelfth century.

This does not make the concept useless, however. Even with recognition of the limitations of the sources, one can assert that the pursuit of virtues was central to the self-identification of the knightly grouping in general. Although the sources are not altogether trustworthy, the trend undeniably favours this pursuit of virtues. Even if it remains somewhat disjointed and inconsistent, this trend arguably illustrates that a cultural impetus was present. There were knights -both self-proclaimed and described as such- who did not strive for these ideals, and there are examples of non-knights who did.<sup>4</sup> In terms of the former, a striking example is found in the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, and the description of Richard's conquest of Cyprus. Pagan of Cayphas was described as a member of the Emperor Isaac's household, but was also noted as *sui militis mendacis*, or a 'false knight of his'.<sup>5</sup> The author identified Pagan as a knight -i.e. part of the grouping- but also stated that he was false, and therefore insinuates that he was unworthy of the term, perhaps because he did not fulfil the expectations of the nascent knightly identity.

The events of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* came later in the century, when the knightly identity -not to mention the notion of chivalry- was growing more coherent. The construction of a knightly identity is more detectable in this later period, in contrast with Bernard of Clairvaux's earlier period. This is largely

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<sup>3</sup> J.D. Bruce, *The Evolution of Arthurian Romance: From the Beginnings Down to the Year 1300 (Vol.1)* (Gloucester, 1958), p.105.

<sup>4</sup> See the numerous examples of fighting clergymen above.

<sup>5</sup> IPGRR, 2:38



because, once the knightly identity was established, it became a primary means of distinction for the knighthood. The increased coherence of this identity was likely down to the solemnization of role, and the well-documented growing significance ascribed to the ceremony of dubbing and girding aspirants with a belt of knighthood.<sup>6</sup> In the first quarter of the century however, the knightly identity was still forming, and the more formalized notion of chivalry later in the century possibly represented the final establishment of a coherent knightly identity. Although the notion of *milites Christi* was not the complete identity, it was undoubtedly significant for the later concept of chivalry. Aside from this, the accompanying cultural enhancement of the term *miles* arguably caused a more widespread adoption ‘chivalry’ due to the perceived prestige the combination of the term and the virtues afforded.

Taking the century as a whole, the sources portray knightly self-identification as incredibly reactive in nature. Where knights began the period as an incredibly diverse collection of individuals defined by the profession of arms and nothing else, affluence grew in significance as a means of distinction when mercenaries became more common. Likewise, with the growth of a burgeoning merchant grouping affluence was no longer a means of true distinction. Though the affluence of the knightly grouping by the end of the century is widely agreed, Bernard’s *De Laude Novae Militiae* implies that as a grouping they enjoyed a degree of wealth far before that, and it seems likely that the combination of affluence with the romantic association with the profession of arms did much to distinguish a coherent knightly grouping in the absence of a lucid identity – that is, towards the start of the century.<sup>7</sup> Along with the growth of the crusading ideal and the accompanying acknowledgement of the knightly claim to legitimate violence encouraged by churchmen like Bernard in the second quarter of the century, they served to maintain a coherent grouping through the century. The introduction of dubbing and girding, usually cited as central to the development of coherence, served more as a means to refine the grouping, cropping those deemed unworthy. This would place the distinction of a coherent knightly

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<sup>6</sup> See above.

<sup>7</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Laude Novae Militiae Ad Milites Templi Liber*, Col.923:2:3

grouping significantly earlier, likely between the commencement of the crusading movement and the establishment of the Knights Templar.

## 7.2. From Knights to the Knighthood

The knightly grouping existed far earlier -in a far more coherent fashion- than its coalesced and refined identity. This seems non-sensical but may be explained as follows. The idea is that the very fact that there was a struggle to establish an identity -illustrated by the development and refinement of chivalry- was only made possible by the existence of a coherent grouping. This grouping was coherent and socially elevated, though still fairly wide by the inception of the Templars, and it was then refined and pruned with the accompanying changes undergone by the set of virtues which came to be chivalry. The grouping did not undergo widespread changes in personnel. It merely grew more elitist and selective, something aided significantly by a more formalised process for admission. The cultural prestige afforded by the combination of chivalry and the term *miles* had more of an effect later in the period, contributing not to the ascendance of the group but rather to its elitism. Having said that, it seems inevitable that the cultural enhancement of the word *miles* had an effect on the social standing of those described by the term.

Bernard of Clairvaux's work has been a focus of study for a number of reasons. It provides evidence for the existence of a grouping, not to mention a hint of its flavour. It is important to note that the concept of *militēs Christi* was not invented by Bernard, with evidence for its existence somewhat earlier.<sup>8</sup> What Bernard achieved was to proliferate the idea and provide real-world paragons for the rest of the knightly grouping to attempt to emulate. While the process of ascendance had thus likely begun by the time Bernard wrote his letter to the Templars, the abbot of Clairvaux served to solidify its progress. Although these early attempts to establish a knightly identity evidenced the existence of the grouping, it is quite possible that far from contributing to its coherence, it may well have detracted from it, with the nebulosity of the virtues, as well as the potential for offshoots and variations with each different author on the topic.

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<sup>8</sup> For more on the origins of the phrase, as well as in the crusading arena specifically: Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade*, pp.20-1.

If one is to believe Bernard, the crucial point of distinction for the knightly grouping in the early twelfth century was the use of legitimate violence. This is by no means a new idea, with the likes of Crouch noting its significance to the grouping.<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that even this alone was not sufficient and must be combined with affluence and the romanticised profession of arms. The knightly distinction was at the intersection of all these points. The assumption has been that the coherence of the grouping and the identity were intrinsically linked, and that the process of coalescence came about much later. On the contrary, the contention is that Bernard's work and the struggle it represents proves the existence of a grouping collectively self-aware enough to recognise the need for an identity.

Where the knightly identity was based around a set of virtues constantly undergoing changes and refinement, the grouping was -in this earlier period- far more based around the collective characteristics noted above, with a particular emphasis on the use of legitimate violence. Notable by and large by its documentary absence in the source material considered is the concept of the literate knight. That said, the discussion would be incomplete without its inclusion. Extensive work has been done on literate knights in western Christendom by the likes of Crouch, Aurell and Turner in particular, with the consensus being that the growth of the ideal of the literate knight changed the grouping from one based on functionality to a true social grouping, and that such a coherent collective did not exist prior to this. The ideal which supposedly pervaded the Plantagenet court by the rule of Richard I is said to have been the driving transformational force between the ill-formed ideas of the late eleventh and early twelfth, and their more fully-formed counterparts of the early thirteenth century.<sup>10</sup> Crouch attributes great agency to literate knights in stimulating the development of chivalry as a self-conscious code of noble conduct, dating the transformation similarly to Aurell, between 1170 and 1220.<sup>11</sup> Based on the evidence available, there can be no challenge to this chronology, and there must be an acknowledgement of the importance of the ideal in the development of the knightly identity. It enabled members of the knighthood to place themselves

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<sup>9</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.19.

<sup>10</sup> Aurell, *The Plantagenet Empire*, tr. Crouch, pp.51-2.

<sup>11</sup> Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility*, p.85-6.

more as administrators who fought than as reckless, barely-contained warriors. The premise that the ideal of the literate knight transformed the grouping from a functional one to a social one -and implicitly, made it more coherent- should be challenged, however. Firstly, it has been proven above through the sources used that the knightly grouping was by no means a functional one, even as early as the first quarter of the twelfth century. Prior to the dates given for the supposed transformation, there was far more to the grouping than mere military function, even if it did remain part of their definition.

In short then, there is nothing in the sources to challenge the significance of the dates which have been accepted by the majority of modern historians. The latter half of the twelfth century was indeed momentous for the knighthood, as it represented the point at which it developed -in chivalry- a fully-formed means of self-identification. The argument of this thesis is that a coherent grouping was present far before this, potentially as early as 1120. The separation between the two is crucial and has far too often been overlooked. Chivalry served to make the knighthood a far more elitist version of a socially coherent grouping which had existed prior to the Second Crusade. This socially coherent grouping may be evidenced both by examples from that expedition, and by the early efforts to establish a coherent knightly identity.

### **7.3. Defining Knights**

What exactly constituted a knight changed greatly over the period, and there truly can be no brief answer at any point in the century. The briefest answer is likely always the most lacking in nuance. Thus, the first challenge is to the traditional portrayal of knights as land-holding, heavily armoured lancers. As has been outlined at length, knights were functionally flexible in a military setting. Economically, they were necessarily affluent, to such a degree as to support their tactical flexibility. This would place military function -diverse as it was- at the forefront of the knightly identity in the earlier portions of the century, somewhat in line with what has traditionally been argued. It seems however that this affluence, combined with a degree of military efficacy as a grouping which precipitated the social elevation of the knighthood. It was not however sufficient to confirm this elevation. For this -with regards to the crusading evidence at least- agency must be awarded to the use of legitimate violence and the concept of the 'new knighthood' as embodied by both the abstract *milites Christi* and the

realities of the early military orders. It seems then that the knighthood benefitted greatly from the cultural enhancement of certain terms which accompanied the rise of the crusading movement. By the end of the century it is clear that this social and cultural enhancement had become intertwined and secured by the growth and subscription to 'chivalry', with the system of virtues constituting a means of solidifying both their social status and their monopoly of legitimate violence, as well as providing a means of regulating entry into the grouping.

Though it could be argued that knights formed a coherent military grouping from the eleventh century, this is not the point. Even so, based on the evidence above and throughout this thesis, one could even contest whether or not they were a militarily coherent grouping, as they certainly were not tactically. A case could be made for their tactical flexibility as their defining military feature, though whether this made them coherent or not is debatable. However, the search has been for when the knightly grouping came to be a social one; a knighthood. These difficulties of distinction are what comes of the avoidance of the loaded modern term 'class'. Grouping by contrast arguably constitutes a far more neutral term, which while avoiding the myriad connotations of something like 'class', falls prey to overgeneralisation. Was there truly a knighthood then? The answer is certainly yes towards the end of the period, with several subgroups detectable within a socially coherent -and elevated- knighthood. Even in the earlier period, the social standing associated with the requirements of relative affluence served as the first barrier for those deemed unsuitable for knighthood, and this suggests a degree of coherence in itself. It would seem then that such an assertion can be stretched further forward in the century than has generally been assumed.

The question then becomes, when did the grouping become socially coherent? Central to the argument above is that coherence was detectable as soon as there was obvious struggle to construct an identity; it represented a prerequisite for such struggle to take place. The argument is not that social cohesion was necessary for a group identity. A group identity could transcend social boundaries as in the case of the clergy and other religious groupings. Given the element of social superiority tied to knightly identity from the outset, the knighthood was likely never as socially diverse as such groups. A grouping also generally required coherence on any basis for an identity to be sought or indeed attained. It has

been established with the evidence above that the knightly grouping of the twelfth century was not coherent on any basis but socially.

The coherence of the knightly identity by contrast occurred later and signified the growing elitism, rather than the initial social coalescence of the grouping. In the crusading arena at least, the most publicised instance of a struggle for knightly identity came in the early 1120s with the inception of the Templars -the first of the crusading knightly orders- and Bernard of Clairvaux's accompanying *De Laude Novae Militiae*. The contention is that this date marked the commencement of a detectable 'kighthood', over thirty years prior to what has generally been assumed.

A significant aspect of the argument is the difference between the socially coherent grouping -which may be termed the 'kighthood'- and the knightly identity, which in large part came to be known as 'chivalry'. The kighthood was present in its socially coherent form much earlier than has previously been suggested, with the crusading movement proving significant in its formation. The Crusades contributed greatly to both the coherence of the grouping, and to the social rise of the grouping. Not only did the movement stimulate codifications of the appropriate uses of legitimate violence, it also provided a vehicle which greatly proliferated the concept of the *milites Christi*. Similarly the military orders, though in the first half of the century largely unique to the crusading arena, represented the same ideal which had been touted throughout Europe from the conception of *milites Christi*. Affluence and military prowess can be said to have precipitated the social ascendance of knights as a group of individuals. However it was the prestige garnered by the association with crusading and *milites Christi* which made the grouping far more coherent, and this in itself cemented the social standing of the individual members. The crusading movement was important to the formation of a knightly grouping but it was arguably central to the development of the knightly identity. Crucial evidence for a coherent grouping is found in the source material under consideration. This is perhaps more reflective of author influences and priorities than being necessarily representative of reality.

In terms of further study, the functional military and economic conclusions found throughout Chapters Three, Four and Five warrant further cross-

examination with the traditional source-base of western Christendom. The methodology of the thesis has suggested a direction for the deeper study of military, societal and cultural exports from the Holy Land to Western Christendom in the twelfth century. The methodology itself has wider application than the scope of this thesis and should be used to examine other facets of medieval warfare, social structure, piety and religious rhetoric. The specific use of extrapolation should also be used to illustrate both what the crusaders took with them to the Holy Land and also what they brought back. A particularly significant vehicle for these cultural exports from the Holy Land were the Military Orders. Finally, this thesis has convincingly located the social ascent of the knighthood significantly earlier than previously argued. The knightly grouping is central to the comprehension of twelfth-century European history. This shift in terminology likely has far-reaching consequences in all areas from warfare to social structures to romance literature, all of which are deserving of due consideration.

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