Universal Credit and Behaviour Change

An Investigation of Universal Credit's Influences on Claimants' Benefit and Employment Behaviour Change

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the policy implementation of Universal Credit (UC), and how welfare behavioural conditionality is interpreted and co-produced by stakeholders and recipients in the United Kingdom (UK). It is inspired by neoliberal and government paternalist discourse which reveal that individuals can make mistakes, errors and failures in judgment. Hence, paternalist intervention by governments is warranted to correct failures and further one's own good and that of the whole society.

This thesis challenges the paternalistic assumption that wellbeing can be defined by the government and achieved exclusively through correcting individual reflective behavioural processes. It provides a complex picture of how, when and why behavioural changes, including a broad discussion relating the implementation of welfare conditionality to wellbeing.

Empirical data is collected through face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 32 respondents who have past experiences claiming working-age social security and UC, and 18 stakeholders in South London. Interview transcripts are analysed by employing selective, thematic and axial coding. Empirical findings are analysed using a broad discussion on stakeholders' perceptions and experiences dealing with UC recipients, and recipients' views and experiences with benefit claiming and responding to welfare behavioural conditionality, with a focus on change in benefit- and employment- related behaviour.

Based on empirical findings, this thesis presents an ontological, epistemological and methodological contributions to knowledge, and re-conceptualises the meaning of harm – in policy implementation, and at community and social levels – highlighting that it is warranted to implement protections from institutional, communal and social barriers, and capital relationships in the neoliberal and digital era. Overall, this thesis contributes to understanding the appropriate state intervention and the legitimacy between the state and recipients.

Acknowledgements

Most social research owes some debt to its participants, in the case of a research project such as this, that debt is vast. It is remarkable that so many participants, with all manner of demanding responsibilities, found the time, energy and enthusiasm contribute to this study. The hope is that retelling them here gives some voice and stories to a still largely unheard perspective on Universal Credit. Their stories enable me to be more determining to complete this PhD research.

I must thank my supervisors Professor Bruce Stafford and Dr Simon Roberts for their willingness to provide this PhD research opportunity. I must thank Dr Tony Fitzpatrick and Professor Ian Shaw for their advice and suggestions to my PhD progress.

I must thank Professor Peter Dwyer for his enthusiasm, and references of conceptual, theoretical and empirical analysis of the ethics and efficacy of welfare conditionality, and invaluable suggestions on how to analyse the key components of sanctions and mandatory support, and advice and encouragements with regard to my forthcoming publications.

I must thank my friends Jenny Guo, Lenny Meliani, Ruth Tarlo and postgraduate researchers of the University of Nottingham for taking an interest in my work and offering invaluable advice.

I am also grateful to Veronica Blake for her excellent administrative support through this process.

I would acknowledge academic researchers, and professionals of the Social Policy Association and Development Studies Association for their academic and professional insights.

I would also like to thank all the encounters and all helpful people whose name I could not know, for their understanding, generosity, protection, guidance, and help to my PhD journey.

I must thank my parents who offer me understanding, insights, and encouragement through many blind alleys and meanders that mark the journey from thoughts to a PhD thesis, for giving me space, respect, and financial support to enable me to follow my own thoughts and desires. My enduring gratitude for much more than a thesis goes to them.

Abbreviations

AC	Advice Centre
ACs	Advice Centres
AD	Assisted Digital Support
AFDC	Aid to Families with Dependent Children
APA	Alternative Payment Arrangements
BIT	Behavioural Insights Team
C1 - C32	Claimant 1 – Claimant 32
CC	Claimant Commitment
CPAG	Child Poverty Action Group
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CTC	Child Tax Credit
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DHP	Discretionary Housing Payment
DLA	Disability Living Allowance
DPC	Work and Pensions Committee
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
EEA	European Economic Area
EU	European Union
FB	Food Bank
FSA	Family Support Act
GP	General Practitioner
GPoW	Genuine Prospect of Work assessment
HA	Housing Association
HB	Housing Benefit
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HoC	House of Commons
IB ESA	Income-Based Employment and Support Allowance
IB JSA	Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance
IFS	Institute for Fiscal Studies
IS	Income Support

JCP	Jobcentre Plus
LA	Local Authority
LAs	Local Authorities
LCW	Limited Capability for Work Element
LCWRA	Limited Capability for Work and Work Related Activity Element
LHA	Local Housing Allowance
MP	Member of Parliament
NDYP	New Deal for Young People
NFPI	National Family and Parenting Institute
NI	National Insurance
NMW	National Minimum Wage
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PA	Personal Advisors
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PAYE	Pay As You Earn System
PBS	Personal Budgeting Support
PLM	Paid Labour Market
PM	Prime Minister
PRWORA	Personal Responsibility and the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
RTI	Real Time Information
SETF	Social Exclusion Task Force
SEU	Social Exclusion Unit
SMI	Support for Mortgage Interest Payments
SWIM	Saturation Work Initiative Model
TANF	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
UC	Universal Credit
UK	The United Kingdom
US	Universal Support
WCA	Work Capability Assessment
WFI	Work Focused Interview
WTC	Working Tax Credit

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The Coalition government of the Conservative and Liberal Democrats parties' (2010-2015) discourse on social security seeks a behavioural explanation for social problems (Cameron, 2012). Compared to the Labour Party's (1997-2010) approach to social security, the Coalition government extended and intensified punitive conditionality. The structural aspects of persistent unemployment and poverty are marginalised and transformed into individual behaviour 'pathologies' of benefit dependency and unemployment. For example, the discourse of 'shirkers' and 'scroungers' describes the outsiders of citizenship (Edwards and Gillies, 2016; Ellison, 2016). The Conservative Member of Parliament (MP), the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (from 2010 to 2016), Iain Duncan Smith (2010) makes a speech depicting benefit claimants as 'the unemployed who lack the work habit', and 'detached from the rest of us'; describing them as a 'residual group who need recovery' (Duncan-Smith, 2010).

The state's responsibility for reducing risk and poverty has been reframed and associated with 'family breakdown, economic dependency and unemployment, educational failure, addiction and indebtedness' (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.3). This underlines the cause of poverty and unemployment as an individual failure, so as to encourage out-of-work benefit recipients to move into employment, and imposes sanctions on those who fail to take up the opportunity to work (Department for Work and Pensions [DWP], 2010a). Similar to the Labour governments' discourse, the Conservative/Liberal Coalition government's construction of behavioural problems and anti-social behaviour appears to be relatively decontextualised. More emphasis has been put on the individual causes, and less on the structural causes of 'failure', such as the global economic crisis and the constrained labour market opportunities (Dwyer and Wright, 2014).

The Labour governments between 1997-2010 used tax credits as a policy instrument to reduce poverty amongst families with children and pensioners, whereas the Coalition government reduced the level of tax credits, and reduced the amount of child benefit payments (Bochel and Powell, 2016). Similar to the Labour governments' focus on work and conditionality, the Coalition government reinforced

the idea that moving into 'fulfilling work' is 'the best route out of poverty' (Cameron, 2012; DWP, 2010a-c). The Coalition government's discourse of 'dependency culture' extends to in-work benefit claimants, social security policies and focused on 'economic rationality and includes flexible labour and punitive conditionality' (DWP, 2010a).

Universal Credit (UC), which contains financial incentives and conditions, is designed to incentivise more people into the paid labour market (PLM), ensuring that work always pays (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Financial and non-financial punitive incentives are key features of UC, which are designed to move recipients off benefits into employment. UC, re-regulates social security policy, aims to increase labour market flexibility (Wiggan, 2012).

> 'UC will match the structure of today's labour market more closely, where part-time jobs and flexible working are much more common than they once were. Furthermore, this reform will increase the range of jobs in the economy.'

> (DWP, 2010b, p. 4)

UC replaces six social security benefits, with a single means-tested benefit (DWP, 2010c). There appears to be some continuity and discontinuity in the legacy benefits. For example, the concept of in-work progression is applied to encourage and support in-work claimants to increase their earnings by increasing the hours they spend on work searches or finding better-paid employment (DWP, 2018a). UC introduces personalised conditionality to non-work claimants and in-work claimants (DWP, 2010c). UC extends conditionality to claimants who have low-paid, part-time and insecure (zero hours working contract) employment, which suggests they are subject to sanctions in cases of deemed non-compliance with UC requirements (DWP, 2011; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Watts et al., 2014). Central to the personalised, extended and intensified system of behavioural conditionality within UC is the individual's action plan and the Claimant Commitment (CC), which aims to increase the expectation of job seeking (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Changes to conditionality and sanctions (see 2.4.5) reflect neoliberalism and government paternalism (Le Grand and New, 2015) that exercise surveillance, activity and intervention. With respect to

efficacy and ethicality of conditionality, criticisms have been made on various grounds (Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Dwyer, 2019; Dwyer et al., 2019a; Dwyer et al., 2019b; Fletcher and Wright, 2017; Reeves, 2017; Wright and Patrick, 2019). This thesis explores the influences of UC on recipients' benefit- and employment-related behaviours.

Chapter 2 begins from the policy context of the social security policy about the Labour governments of 1997-2010 that immediately preceded the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government. This chapter addresses the similarities and differences in how both these governments approached social security benefit reform and policy. The chapter reviews the relevant literature focusing on the origins, aims and structure of UC, welfare conditionality, and its relevance to behaviour change.

According to DWP (2017e), behaviour change pertains to 'strengthening incentives to enter paid work', 'increasing hours or earnings amongst those who are already in work', 'removing barriers to temporary, flexible and part-time work, while also ensuring claimants are not worse off in work', and 'a wider range of employment-seeking behaviours to diversify the types of roles considered by claimants'. There is a discussion on how certain fundamental concepts are defined and used in relation to welfare conditionality and behaviour change. The concepts include: (in-work) conditionality, the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), the Claimant Commitment (CC), work coach, the waiting period, advance payment, Alternative Pay Arrangements (APA), earnings threshold, easement and flexibility of work requirements. How UC works with these elements and with amendments, and how UC is delivered is also discussed in this chapter. An analysis of behaviour change shows that in government discourse, which tends to take an atomised, decontextualised perspective, the individual is perceived as irresponsible. It is increasingly evident that the policymakers tend to take an atomised and decontextualized perspectives that means, they focus on the individual behavioural irresponsibility of claimants at the expense of more structural factors.

Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical perspectives on paternalism, which has been widely used in behavioural science and intervention studies. Social policy and administration are deemed theoretically and practically interrelated and interconnected within a multi-disciplinary subject (Spotswood, 2016). This chapter first discusses where paternalism fits within the wider framework for understanding behaviour change in relation to social security policy and UC. Then, this chapter critically reviews the paternalist theories of Lawrence Mead, Julian le Grand and Bill New, and Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, as well as its relationship with the core concept of this research: behaviour change. From paternalist theories, the exemplar of the nudge of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, is examined in relation to the Coalition government social security. This chapter outlines the justifications of 1) why paternalism is more attuned to the context of behaviour change, 2) why paternalism is relevant to the concept of behaviour change and social security and 3) why paternalism is useful to understanding behaviour change more generally as opposed to behaviour science. This chapter examines how government paternalism, as termed by Le Grand and New (2015), can be more relevant and explicit in exploring how, why, if and when UC influences (or not) the employment-related decisions of respondents, and thus be employed as a theoretical foundation to steer data analysis with critiques.

Chapter 4 examines methodological underpinnings, where ontological and epistemological matters are discussed as the foundation of research methods and research question design. Specifically, this thesis asks:

1. **To what extent do staff in Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), and a Food Bank (FB) see changes in the benefit- and employment-related behaviour of their clients due to UC?** What do the stakeholders understand about how UC has influenced the claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour? What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of UC, with regard to its influence on claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour?

2. **To what extent does UC lead to changes in claimants' experience of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs and Jobcentre Plus (JCP)?** What are the recipients' experiences of claiming UC and reporting changes in circumstance post-UC? What are the claimants' understandings of how UC influences their experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, and JCP? Compared to pre-UC, what changes have arisen post-UC?

3. **To what extent does UC lead to changes in out-of-work and in-work UC claimants in making employment-related behaviours?** What are the factors that affect recipients' decisions to move off benefit into employment post-UC? What are the recipients' experiences and perceptions of how UC influences their experiences of changing employment-related behaviours?

Chapter 4 justifies a series of methodological issues to generate research rigour and to answer the research questions. These are the qualitative research design, the case study method, the chosen sample sites, the reflections on the access to the field, the semi-structured interviews – which draw on lessons learned from other research – with a reflection on the method conducted in the field and, finally, adjustment. This chapter justifies data analysis techniques and presents ethical issues.

Drawing on the discussions on the relations between state intervention and recipients in the theoretical chapter, chapter 5 discusses the social construction of UC implementation and practices. This includes stakeholders' meaning-making of their experiences regarding their clients' benefit claims, reporting changes in circumstances, and benefit- and employment-related behaviour changes, in relation to UC. This research explores the behaviour changes that stakeholders have translated, interpreted, constructed and reflected upon in relation to the social interaction and social experience with their clients. This chapter leads to two main findings. The first finding is that stakeholders' views and opinions relate closely to their experiences of dealing with their clients within the scope of their service. Stakeholders' explicit or implicit interpretation of barriers and bridges contribute to a relatively partial and incomplete picture of behaviour change. Second, Le Grand and New's concept of government paternalism is extended to concepts of Osborne (1993) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) to analyse the policy implemented by stakeholders influencing benefit- and employment-related behaviours. The conceptualisation of *helpful friend* endorsed by government paternalism is typified and extended to *facilitating*, *negotiating* and *brokering* roles (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007) based on the empirical findings. This re-conceptualised *helpful friend* of stakeholder assists recipients in coproducing benefit and employment behavioural conditionality, and in moving toward a good life.

Chapter 6 explores claimants' interpretation of change in seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, and JCP, comparing pre- and post- UC. The discussions mainly cover claimants' interpretation of changes in experiences in benefit claiming, and reporting changes in circumstances, and interaction between claimant and stakeholders, in relation to UC. This chapter also examines the nature of changes that have risen post-UC. Claimants' attributions of blame, shame and failures are analysed. The conceptualisation of the appropriate personalised approach, on the theoretical basis of government paternalism, is constructed. Through critiquing the epistemological error of Le Grand and New's (2015) conceptualisation of government paternalism, chapter 6 moves claimants' perspectives and lived experiences of benefit claiming and behaviour change from the margins in paternalist literature to the key analysis. This chapter concludes that the appropriate personalised approach corresponds and coincides with primary experiences and the subjectivity of paternalised individuals, reproduces gendered reasoning and is solidary-driven.

Chapter 7 examines the influence UC has on claimants' employment behaviour change, experiences and opinions, as compared to legacy benefits pre-UC. This chapter discusses the barriers and bridges for claimants to move into work and/or make in-work progression. Chapter 7 reveals the tensions between the institutionalised definition of rational entrepreneurial behaviours, which entails rational deliberation of calculation, cost–benefit and efficiency, and social, family, moral and emotional behaviours. By drawing on the concept of government paternalism, it is shown that a personalised appropriate approach, alongside more universal, legitimised and publicised community support to co-produce benefits and employment behavioural conditionality, better ensure individual wellbeing.

Chapter 8 provides a conclusion of this thesis. It answers the research questions by summarising the main empirical findings, drawing on conceptual and theoretical frameworks discussed in previous chapters. The final chapter presents the discussions on how empirical findings contribute to the knowledge, from ontological, teleological, aesthetic, methodological, theoretical and epistemological aspects. The next chapter provides a critical review of social security policy context since the

Labour governments of 1997-2010, and concepts in relation to the origin and aims of UC, welfare conditionality, and behaviour change.

Chapter 2 Critical Review of Behaviour Change Concepts

This chapter begins from the policy context of the social security policy about the Labour governments of 1997-2010 that immediately preceded the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government. This chapter addresses the similarities and differences in how both these governments approach social security benefit reform and policy. The chapter reviews the relevant literature focusing on the aims and structure of Universal Credit (UC), welfare conditionality and its relevance to behaviour change. There is a discussion on how certain fundamental concepts are defined and used in relation to behaviour change. The concepts include conditionality, the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), the Claimant Commitment (CC), work coach, the waiting period, advance payment, Alternative Payment Arrangements (APA), earnings threshold, easement and flexibility of work requirements. This chapter discusses how UC works with these elements and with impairments, and how UC is delivered.

An analysis of behaviour change shows that in government discourse, which tends to take a decontextualised perspective, the individual is perceived as irresponsible. The existing literature demonstrates the importance of structural factors, as opposed to individual ones. The literature offers important and useful insights into how behaviour change is investigated, understood, and applied. It explores extensively how behaviour change is understood in relation to, contingent environment, work on familial situations, social notions, past experiences, and stakeholders-recipients interactions. Reviewing the relevant literature in this chapter informs the understanding of the subsequent chapters which provide the empirical analysis of the fieldwork. The conclusion argues that compared to the social policies made by the Labour governments, the Coalition government make the system less generous, and increasingly conditional.

2.1 A Critical Review of the Labour Governments Discourse of Behaviour Change

Since 1997 under the Labour governments, the definition of behaviour in social policy had been contextualised and used more narrowly in relation to labour market participation and benefit related behaviour (Halpern et al., 2004). The primary aim

of this section is to identify perspectives on behaviour change relevant to the Labour's discourses, and intervention techniques in social policy. Several theoretical perspectives which emphasise the individual (such as gender and neoliberal perspectives) and interactive relationship (social, cultural, institutional, and communitarian perspectives) are examined and discussed in detail. This contextualises how the concepts of behaviour change and conditionality are defined and used in the policy context of the 1997-2010 Labour governments.

2.1.1 The Blair Government and Murray's Perspectives on Behaviour Change

The Blair government shared some continuation of Thatcher's neoliberal policies that suggest combating anti-social behaviours through reconstructing a new association of social solidarity, rights responsibility, and citizenship (Dwyer, 2000; Harvey, 2005). The Blair government individualised causal agents, with less emphasis on structural factors and root causes of exclusion, welfare dependency, antisocial behaviour, family problems and individual poor choice in defining behaviour failure (Department of Social Security [DSS], 1998; Dwyer, 2000; Levitas, 2005 [1998]). For example, the Blair government associated a dependency culture with fraud, abuse, laziness in Tony Blair's Beveridge Lecture (Blair, 1999). The core of the Blair government agenda concentrated on the remoralisation of deviant behaviour, work ethics, and promoted a work-first approach (DSS, 1998). Such discourses shared the Thatcher government's method of economic practices, and conditional welfare provisions. Duty and responsibility in the reciprocal relations were the key messages of the Blair government's social security approach, which legitimised the association between welfare rights and personal responsible behaviour (Dwyer, 2000).

Deacon (2000, 2002) remarks that the Blair government's social security approach is influenced by the Americanisation of the welfare state. This can be seen in Blair's description that the Labour party has come up with the New Deal policy, which draws from the ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1930s New Deal addressing unemployment (Blair, 1996a-b, 2010). The principle of Roosevelt's New Deal aims to address unemployment in line with Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy objectives of full employment and a mixed economy.

Murray (1984, 1996) defines behaviour change as an indefinite adaption to a changing pattern of the culture of dependence. More specifically, the term of welfare dependency is used by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) to analyse the behaviour of people in poverty, where race plays a crucial and sensitive component in welfare politics in the USA (Deacon, 2002). As such, welfare dependency is depicted as the culture and values that chronic welfare recipients transmit from generation to generation (Murray, 1994). However, Murray does not fully acknowledge the systematic barriers of benefit claimants (Deacon, 2003).

Murray (1984, 1996) suggests that behaviour change can be law-abiding, socially approved or encouraged in the process of rationally maximising one's self-interest. However, in his later publication *In Our Hands*, Murray (2016) rejects a purely utilitarian feature of an individual's behaviour, which can be altruistic, cooperative and responsive when the circumstances require them to do so. Murray highlights the effects of social norms on behavioural outcomes: 'when economic incentives are buttressed by social norms, the effects on behaviour are multiplied' (Murray, 1984, p. 161). The behaviour creates differences between individuals who behave in a more socially desirable way than the others, and thereby is more deserving than the other (Murray, 1984). Moreover, Murray (1984) advocates to include rewards and penalties in social policy, when they are buttressed by social norms, govern human behaviour change either subtly or overtly, which leads to multiple effects.

Murray (1984, 2016) refers to the term dependency as the culture of behaviour. This concept of dependency differs from that of Pinker (1971) who sees dependency as a stigmatised condition for recipients to exchange status for help; and Mead's (1992) definition of dependency as a phycological and financial dependent relationship. Murray's (1984) conception of the American underclass focuses on common patterns of behaviour as types of poverty, such as people addicted to drugs or alcohol, single parenthood, illegitimacy, homelessness, unemployment and habitual crime in America from the 1950s to 1980s.

The main critic, Walker (1996, p. 68), argues that Murray fails to acknowledge the significance of institutionalised conditionality in behaviour change of the underclass, 'it is the poor that are to be blamed because they are conditioned to do so' or they are responding to what the social security imposes upon them. Although Murray identifies social influences on individual behaviours, he does not specify the differences in the effects of personal failure and socioeconomic misfortune in much detail (Walker, 1996). Moreover, other types of behaviour change, such as those of the non-disabled or non-elderly poor, are not fully investigated in Murray's interpretation of data (Deacon, 2002).

Frank Field MP presented the idea of an inclusive society (see 2.1.3) that recognised the needs and responsibility of the individual, who should actively seek self-improvement of the working class and mutual aid (Deacon, 2002; Field, 1996a, 1996b). The individual was encouraged to take more responsibility to control their own welfare (Blair, 1996b; Field, 1996a). Field (1996a) suggested there was a link between human motivation and behaviour, which entailed that welfare should accept the role of self-interest playing in human motivation. This entailed social policy should allow rewards (benefits) and punishments (loss of benefits), by which human behaviours may operate in a way to promote the public good. The critics argued that Field provided a comparatively thin concept of human agency, as he did not specify the distinction between behaviour change and personal character, and behaviour change was not merely the product of incentive and punishment (Green, 1996). This implied that changes in social policy were made on the basis of a peculiar view of motivations structure and behaviour change, leaving varied motivational structures insufficiently unrevealed (Le Grand, 1997). (see more discussions in chapter 5)

2.1.2 Neoliberal Perspectives on Behaviour Change

Neoliberal perspectives have been demarcated as a new paradigm, and it is viewed as a totality of economic-political theory, ideology and practices (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960; Nozick, 1974; Thorsen and Lie, 2009; Wacquant, 2012). Neoliberalism is loosely constructed in terms of a relationship between state and market (legislative, executive and judiciary) authorities which entails an individual relationship essentially protect individual's liberty and property rights (Friedman, 1962; Hayek,

1960; Nozick, 1974; Thorsen and Lie, 2009). Neoliberalism is generally interpreted as a practical theory rather than building on the metaphysical conception of democracy and freedom (Thorsen and Lie, 2009). In opposition to theory building, Harvey (2005) redefines neoliberalism as a political-economic practice which advances individual well-being through the realisation of individual freedom and skills within an institutional framework.

Neoliberalism has provided several critiques of the welfare state. First, neoliberalism claims that the welfare state undermines the market principle, exacerbating the burdens of failure but reduces the rewards for success (Giddens, 1998, 2000). This claim implies that the welfare state encourages laziness but undermines competition and innovation. Second, neoliberal claims that the welfare state monopolises the delivery of welfare services, which causes inequality of welfare distribution where the 'non-producer takes wealth out and too few producers left to create the wealth' (Fitzpatrick, 2011a, p.127).

Third, neoliberals criticise that welfare state for creating a dependency culture, in the words used by Murray (1984, 1996). Self-sufficiency is instead thought to be a 'precondition' of belonging to society (Murray, 1984, p.180). Moreover, the state may unintentionally lead an individual to serfdom and an autocratic society where the ends of the common good are independent of and considered before the self-interests of the individual (Hayek, 1944).

Harvey (2005) underlines that individuals should conduct themselves with a minimum of state intervention, assuming that the state's role is to create, guarantee and secure appropriate resources to individual practices in a free market. Neoliberalism hence criticises the increasing dominance of government which may create dangers – as new giants - alongside inflation, paralysing taxation and social service bureaucracy (Hayek, 1960). Neoliberalism proposes to minimise the likelihood that unfettered market activity, innovation and productivity are damaged by those who advocated redistribution and state ownership (Hayek, 1960).

However, Miller's (2010) critique is that Hayek fails to specify how the *new* giants, such as arbitrary and coercive examples of bureaucratic procedure in the front line or at street-level (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]) implementation then influence changes in individual behaviour. A similar argument has been made by Fraser (1989), who argues that the delivery of social rights renders the recipients dependent on social service providers and bureaucrats which may pre-empt individual capacity to interpret their needs, behaviour and life problems.

One alternative explanation from Soss et al. (2011a, p. 20) notes that neoliberalism does not seek to minimise state's role but 'mobilises the state on behalf of the market and reconfigure the state as a quasi-market operation'. This implies practices such as redesigning state operations and capitalism in line with market principles in a wide range of political, constitutional and legal reorganisations, such as privatisation and austerity (Harvey, 2005). Laissez-faire doctrines and state involvement in the market inform client interaction, which is framed as a market relation. Individual behaviour is thus viewed as *market behaviour*, which should actively construct the free market (Soss et al., 2011a).

Market principles are generally thought of as 'normative ideal and preeminent standard' for 'evaluating individual behaviours' (Soss et al., 2011a, p. 21). Critics of neoliberalism point to the tension between market fundamentalism and conservative philosophy, acknowledging that conflicts may arise when individuals are forced do what liberal market requires them to do (Giddens, 1998; Harvey, 2005). The preservation of market freedom could result in sacrificing conservative values, such as emotional connectedness, which are less compatible with a market imperative (Fitzpatrick, 2011a, 2011b).

According to Soss et al. (2011a), the concept of neoliberalism makes a connection between neoliberal practices and paternalist supervisory commitment (see chapter 3). On the micro-level, neoliberalism is generally depicted in terms of a variety of policy instruments to secure the compliance, cooperation and contributions of low income and socially marginalised populations (Soss et al., 2011a; Soss et al., 2011b). Poverty governance is viewed as it weakens benefit access, strengthens punitive policy and

penal logic, reduces the level of aid and stigmatises rituals while deepening civic exclusion of the benefit recipients, who 'have virtually no institutionalised ability to counter arbitrary exercises of power or to participate in the authoritative processes that govern them' (Soss et al., 2011a, p. 15).

A similar view comes from Brown (2003, 2006, 2015) who envisages neoliberalism as a process of depoliticised and privatised social and political principles (Brown, 2015). Neoliberal perspectives are widely employed in analysing New Labour's discourse. For example, New Labour's neoliberal responsibility discourse is deemed as a way of modifying irresponsible behaviours, including around alcohol and drug addiction, or behaviour that damages the health or does not contribute to the community, such as unemployment, with a reluctance to change such behaviour as deemed irrational (Dwyer, 2000). Such perceived irresponsible behaviours are viewed as individual practices. Neoliberal perspectives on accessing and exercising claimants' social right are hence contingent on how social and political problems are depoliticised and privatised. Behaviour change is framed as the actions of an atomistic individual who is motivated by self-interest and should recognise personal responsibilities (Friedman, 1962; Levitas, 2005 [1998]). New Labour regulates and punishes those behaviours that do not conform to socially constructed norms and morality (Deacon, 2004).

Brown's (2015) neoliberalism prevails in a social order that underpins individual rational entrepreneurial action and behaviour. Neoliberalism is thought to marketise all spheres of existence in aiming to deregulate and control in the private sphere, while privatising the public sphere, 'yet valorises public-private partnerships that imbue that market with ethical potential and social responsibility and the public realm with market metrics' (Brown, 2015, p. 49). Individual behaviour change is underpinned by Brown's (2015) account of how neoliberalism loses its orientation towards the public sphere (see section 2.1.3). The hegemony of neoliberalisation orients individual towards behaviour change, from political sovereignty to financial entrepreneurship.

Brown's perspectives on neoliberalism are built on Foucault's construct of *homo œconomicus* (Foucault, 2008). *Homo œconomicus* means 'being for himself his own

capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of his earnings' (Foucault 2008, p. 226). *Homo œconomicus* is regarded as an intangible partner of exchange and laissez-fair to the entrepreneur of himself, who is in relation to the needs, utility and strategies of individual internal rationality in economic and non-economic activities. Foucault (2008) conceptualises how behaviour change is embedded in a relationship between ends and means. Foucault conceives neoliberalism as a normative order and mode of reasons, which shift from the commodification of production, exchange and consumption, to regenerate the order of the individual in public life, social life, welfare life and family life (Brown, 2015; Dilts, 2011; Foucault, 2008).

From Foucault's perspective, behaviour change is shaped and reshaped by technical means of political rationality which 'can both formulate its truth (on a theoretical level) and propose it to governmental practice as rule and norm (on a practical level)' (Foucault, 2008, p. 30). Behaviour change is not only produced by the hand of the government, but also presents wider concerns of individual intersubjectivity, humanity and democracy in the face of neoliberalism which reorients individual itself to freedom (Brown, 2003, 2006; Soss et al., 2011a). Brown's views on neoliberalism not only devalue Foucault's term of *homo politicus* (political being) but also erodes humanity and dignity: 'neoliberalism is the rationality through which capitalism finally swallows humanity' (Brown, 2015, p. 44). Similar arguments from Harvey (2005) and Thorsen and Lie (2009) remark that neoliberalism is silent on how political processes should be organised. This allows for an ambiguous definition of the political aspects of neoliberalism.

Furthermore, neoliberalism endorses the belief that individuals are expected to be self-disciplinary, exhibiting disciplined and prudent behaviour and seeking to fix individual failure (Soss et al., 2011b). Neoliberal ideas aim to transform the clients from *homo politicus* (political being) to *homo oeconomicu*s (economic being) and behave as they should and voluntarily make particular kinds of choice (Brown, 2015; Foucault, 1995, 2008; Soss et al., 2011b). Prevailing relations between stakeholders and individuals bring practical meaning to the concept of active citizenry who are co-producing social policy. This calls for continuity of different forms of governance

built on a social order of normative reason, which constructs specific fields of knowledge, identity and behaviour (Brown, 2015).

An individual's behaviours are reconceptualised as one's self, which has been *categorically repositioned* in the neoliberal terms of production activities. They are constructed as the behaviour of individual workers, consumers, citizens, fathers, mothers, criminals, immigrants. Natives and corresponding subjectivities of reality are attached to each fixed category (Dean, 2007, Dilts, 2011, Foucault, 2008). A similar perspective is found in Nozick (1974) who perceives of individual behaviour as customers who seek goods and services from a wide range of providers with similar values. New Labour seeks to drive consumer-oriented service in the non-socialist welfare state, which aims to improve efficiency and effectiveness (Page, 2007). For example, New Labour underlines the role of voluntary and private sectors, and the innovation of service delivery in a mixed economy. New Labour highlights the needs of service users, and ensures the service quality, such as Performance Assessment Frameworks, and Public Service Agreement, and independent audits and inspections (Page, 2007).

An alternative perspective comes from Le Grand (2003) who perceives that the provision of welfare service under the Labour governments becomes consumer-oriented. However, ethical criticism has been raised over whether consumer-oriented and consequential dominated service providers in quasi-markets are ethically inferior or superior to the state service providers (Le Grand, 2011). Ethical concerns are raised when the quasi-market envisages that service providers transform from altruistic knight to knaves to pursue self-interest entirely (Le Grand, 2011). This argument provides insightful resources to analyse the systematic factors which imply constraints and barriers to service recipients (see more discussions in chapter 5).

Furthermore, neoliberalism challenges the values of universalism, egalitarianism and the public good because the active citizenry of liberal democracy has been devalued to a market role (Brown, 2006, 2015; Nozick, 1974). For example, Nozick (1974) suggests that a consumer-oriented security service could be selective, writing that, 'ultraminimal state provides protection and enforcement services only to those who

purchase its protection and enforcement policies' (p. 26). Furthermore, the neoliberal state's services may experience an acceleration of commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and are mainly available to customers who have purchased such membership or contributed to this system in practice. As such, individual market liberty is viewed as a substitution for some political values and liberty, such as universal access to social services to meet social needs and an active citizenry co-participating in building up public goods (Soss et al., 2011a).

Hayek (1960, p. 230) does not deny that social services should be universal and should not be only confined to individuals who contribute to the common goods. Nonetheless, Hayek's (1960) conception of universalism narrowly focuses on a minimum of sustenance for all people – as part of basic needs - rather than inclusion as a component of Dean's (2002) term of social need. The critic argues that such dominant consumer-oriented services may exacerbate exclusion to individuals who could or would not contribute to the common goods (Dwyer, 2000; Levitas, 2005 [1998]).

Nozick's (1974) utilitarianism of right is thought to be built on classical Lockean contractarian perspectives on natural liberty where the individual is free from any superior power or legislative authority. The classical Lockean contractarian position elucidates that consent from the governed individual is the *precondition* to triggering behaviour change in the individual. Nozick (1974) views the intervention of enforcement as a morally repellent activity. Nozick (1974) believes that the punishment for behaviour violates an individual's right (Patterson, 2005). A similar view is offered by Friedman (1962), who argues that individuals should be free from enforced substantial conformity, being that infringement to individual's right is deemed as unjust. This provides a simplistic view, which implies that the mode of distribution is viewed as just, only if individuals' rights have not been infringed.

Furthermore, a neoliberal account of an individual's rights is set up within constraints and incentives within them, as individual behaviour is considered to be shaped by other people's behaviour and social institutions (Nozick, 1993). To draw on Nozick's theory, an individual's behaviour should have merit approval*, and be relative* rather

than *neutral* that non-consequentialist favours (Pettit, 2006; Smith, 2009). This suggests that the individual may rank the order of possible states of affairs in relations with behaviour change (Pettit, 2006). This perspective presents a more complex picture of the economic agent's behaviour change and rejects the conventional liberalist account of behaviour as a neutral or rationalising instrument or product.

A republican argument is that Nozick's neoliberalism is thought in terms of the spread of conservatism, which envisages citizens as duty-bearers in *non-consequentialist deontological* frameworks (Pettit, 2006). Deontologically, Nozick's neoliberalism draws on Kant's (1997) argument that behaviour change is driven by individual needs but, at the same time, individual should conform to the moral law. The Kantian philosophy of dutiful behaviour is endorsed by a rule that is based on socially-shared values of how man ought to behave (Kant, 1997). Kant's notion of the moral requirement entails that it is necessary for the individual to manifest Categorical Imperative unconditionally, which suggests that individuals should not treat others as means, while individuals should pursue their own ends, rather than the ends of other (Kant, 1997; Wilson and Denis, 2018).

Nozick (1993) provides an explanation of the non-violation of rights in non-consequentialist deontological frameworks which denies that an individual ought to opt for whatever the best outcome is (Alexander and Moore, 2016; Arneson, 2011). Nozick discusses the moral principle which guides the instrumentality of the moral agent's own behaviour, which may not change due to an immediate incentive. Nozick's (1974) moral constraints mean that the individual should not violate any other people's rights (Otsuka, 2011; Pettit, 2006).

Moreover, Nozick's (1993) notion of symbolic utility bounds well-being with social values, rituals and culture. The reductive conception of utility reduces the social facts that entail interactive, interdependent and interrelated actions and the values of each individual (Smith, 2009). Moreover, consequentialist goal or telos is depicted as minimising the totality of the violations of rights by the end state in order to 'avoid catastrophic moral horror' (Nozick, 1974, p. 30). This depicts *unpredictable, unique,* and *irregular* nature of acts by individuals in a perspective on solidarity that produces

social security provision as a pre-emptive and discretionary means; that is, a means by which the state to reduce the worst result overall when the individual pursues personal own utopias to shape their own definition of a good life and moral principles (Dean, 2007; Pettit, 2006). In a broader sense, this approach underscores 'self-provisioning, prudentialism, and an individualist ethic of self-responsibility' (Dean, 2007, p. 6). Such moral and prudential considerations inform the individual's responsibility for managing risks (Dean, 2007; Wilson and Denis, 2018).

Nozick (1974) constructs feasible approaches drawing on ontological forms of behaviour that are built upon Nozick's utopian framework. Nozick's (1974) feasible approach of service provision reveals a way of addressing the *agent-relative*, and *pluralist* nature of utopias that are built upon the perfectibility of humans. However, Nozick fails to specify how social distribution can avoid the infringement of individual rights. De Gregori (1979) correctly indicates that Nozick's approach could only be useful for analysing the operation of social security delivery, when it complements or incorporates other conceptual resources about implementation and operation.

2.1.3 Social Perspectives on Behaviour Change

Titmuss's approach (1963a, 1963b) offers a general view regarding the social aspect of understanding behaviour change. Titmuss (1968) highlights the mutual relations of members in the community, defining stigma as 'spoiled identity' which he defines as 'felt and experienced discrimination and disapproval on grounds of poverty, ethnic group, class, mental fitness and other criteria of "bad risks" in all the complex processes of selection-rejection in our society' (p. 142).

Titmuss (1968) associates stigma with denial of access or corresponding barriers to access to social services, alongside individuals thinking and feeling inferior and subordinated. Titmuss rejects means-testing and the selectivity of social security receipt, opting instead for a universal system of welfare to combat stigma, making services available and accessible to the whole population (Deacon, 1993; Reisman, 2001b, 2004; Spicker, 2011; Titmuss, 1963a). In turn, the continuous process of

selection and denial of access is perceived as the greatest form of stigma by Reisman (2001b).

Titmuss (1968) disavows individual explanations of poverty to social right delivery in response to individuals' own needs. Titmuss advocates structural solutions that entail legitimised rules and a state-led community-reinforcing approach in an approach offering a link to the moral obligation in the delivery of social service. Titmuss frames a humanitarian, non-judgmental and non-stigmatic delivery of social rights in interpreting and institutionally administering human dignity to ensure that needs are met (Glennerster, 2014; Reisman, 2004). Titmuss's perspective is criticised by Deacon (1993) and Reisman (2001a) who argue that Titmuss underestimates the effects of fraud and free riding. Titmuss's non-judgmental approach is based on his vision of good conduct as a generalised obligation: 'Titmuss was the product of a less permissive Britain where most people were decent, honest and self-policing, regarded employment as honourable and cared uncomplainingly for their kin' (Reisman, 2004, p. 788).

Furthermore, Titmuss fails to specify how his vision of good behaviour could be legitimised as a concern for social policy (Reisman, 2004). Reisman (2004) highlights that stigma can be employed as a socially functional view because stigma can protect the system from free riders, parasites and cheats. Spicker (2014) offers a more explicit explanation of moral obligations which are now categorised into five aspects - humanitarianism, solidarity, charity, reciprocity, and rights - writing that:

> '… the main moral obligations are based in recognising the needs though common humanity (humanitarianism); recognising mutual obligations to help others (solidarity), conducting moral duties to help others (charity); the mechanism of exchange which requires people not just to make return for benefits, but to help those who have helped others (reciprocity), and the recognition of moral obligations inherent in the status of each individual'.

> Spicker (2014, p. 37-38)

Spicker (2014) provides two ideal types of moral stigma. They are the situations where a social security claimant is deemed undeserving of help and, in the second

place, deny that people are genuinely in need or people who have socially unapproved behaviour.

The issue of stigma has been reframed by New Labour's discourse of social exclusion. Theoretically and critically, exclusion has been widely explored by numerous scholars. Habermas (1992) employs a social structural view, defining exclusion as being formed in several arenas of communication, as well as subcultures and a class-specific public sphere existing the hegemonic bourgeois public sphere. The occurrence of exclusion entails cultural and political pluralisation of the public sphere and, the relations and structure of the private sphere. Differing from Friedman's neoliberalism which frames the individual as atomistic self-interest pursuing agent in a free market, Habermas provides a socially relational, transformative and diverse subjectivity that compounds interactive communications with others, so forming the agent's identity (Asen, 2018). Critics argue that Habermas's dichotomy of private (hidden interactions) and the public sphere (open interactions) offers an exploration of how a historical bourgeois public excludes or includes participants either explicitly or implicitly but fails to acknowledge the polycentric feature of social realities in late modern societies (Susen, 2011).

Compared with Habermas's (1992) concept of the traditional public sphere, Fraser (1989) offers an institutionalised arena of interaction, reframing the scope of social as:

> 'a site of discourse about people's needs, specifically about those needs that have broken out of the domestic and/or official economic spheres that earlier contained them as "private matters". Thus, the social is a site of discourse about problematic needs, needs that have come to exceed the apparently (but not really) self-regulating domestic and official economic institutions of male-dominated, capitalist societies.'

> (Fraser, 1989, p. 156).

Fraser argues that recognition can be generated by remedies to redistribution and redress of some forms of misrecognition, in recognising that people's needs can promote reciprocity and solidarity (Fraser,1997). Socially integrated action can be achieved communicatively through coordination by different individuals in reference

to intersubjectively shared meaning and consensus about norms, values, reciprocity and ends (Fraser, 1989). Need satisfaction requires 'juridical, administrative, and therapeutic management' that entails 'dialogical, participatory processes of need interpretation' (Fraser, 1989, p. 156).

New Labour's discourse of exclusion was embedded in three main discourses: a redistribution discourse (RED) concerning poverty alleviation in British social policy; a moral underclass discourse (MUD) concerning the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded and incomplete citizenship, and a social integrationist discourse (SID) that stresses social inclusion through paid work (Levitas, 2005 [1998]; Lister, 2004). Social exclusion is narrowly defined by New Labour, who places the emphasis on paid work as an instrument of inclusion and non-paid work as a means of exclusion. Such an account inherently privileges market activity but does not specify social integration in the whole picture of the social organisation of labour; it hence results in conflicts between policy, community and paid work behaviours (Levitas, 2005 [1998]):

> '... [social exclusion is] a shorthand term for what can happen to people when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health, poverty and family breakdown …'

> (Social Exclusion Unit [SEU], 1997, p.1)

To confront social exclusion, SEU was established in 1997 (DSS, 1999). Individual motivation is to be constructed in a deprived neighbourhood, while the consequences of social exclusion are to be stigmatised (Lister, 2001a):

> '… What is at issue is not just the exclusion from the bonds of common citizenship of those at the bottom, but also the way in which those at the top can exclude themselves from these bonds and thereby fail to acknowledge the equal worth of their fellow citizens.'

> (Lister, 2001a, p.438)

The Labour governments highlight the importance of eradicating antisocial behaviour and breaking the grip of unemployment across generations. In their

reasoning, organised antisocial and long-term benefit dependency behaviour isolate people and prevent them from gaining opportunities:

> '… The raison d'être for reform was set out earlier: incapacity benefit was abused; too many people were in long-term benefit dependency; too little was done by way of active support to shift them into the labour market …'

<div align="right">(Blair, 2010, pp. 580 - 581)</div>

The Third Way looks beyond both the small and the big state, seeking to create modern welfare that bound the responsibility of the citizen and to that of society (Blair, 2010). The Labour governments focus on dealing with social exclusion, albeit with the risk of families being isolated from the mainstream of society.

Paid work is a defining factor of social integration, and is constructed as 'a means of social discipline' and inclusion, in 'social, cultural and moral' (Levitas, 2005 [1998], p.8). The value of decent hard-working has been stressed, alongside the construct of inclusion. Differing with Titmuss's perspectives on the causes of poverty, claimants are framed by the Labour governments as being irresponsible for their behaviour at the expense of the more structural causes of disadvantages (Page, 2007). A discourse of irresponsible behaviour is depoliticised as the 'outcome of an individual making some kind of socially isolated rational choice' (Dwyer, 2000, p. 132). Another critic warns dangers may arise when the discourse of paid work is equivalent to work ethic:

> '… when punitive measures are deployed, especially when employability is being promoted rather than employment through actual jobs; and when paid work is fetishised as the citizenship responsibility over other forms of work such as care work and community or voluntary work …'

<div align="right">(Lister, 2001a, p. 432)</div>

Levitas (2005 [1998]) raises the concerns with regard to the inequalities in the labour market, gender role and care work (see section 2.1.6), and contributions to the community (see section 2.1.5).

One alternative perspective argues that socialism has been weaved into the discourse of New Labour (Levitas, 2005 [1998]). In this account, New Labour's discourse is

embedded within Blair's construction of socialism where, 'individuals are socially interdependent human beings ... individuals cannot be divorced from society in which they belong. It is, if you will, social-ism' (Blair, 1994, p.4). This account contains a socialist view of citizenship, whereby an individual owes a duty to another one in society, which suggests that an individual's wellbeing is extricably associated with other social members (Page, 2007).

However, Blair's (1994) socialism mainly expressed a principle that society advances through personal responsibility, moral powers and social cohesion rather than a narrowly quasi-scientific construct of narrow, time-bound social class (Levitas, 2005 [1998]). Blair's view of socialism had some roots in Marx's (1926) socialism which humanises capitalism through social and economic management (Giddens, 1998). New Labour clearly did not intend to create a socialist society, and it developed an economic and social strategy that worked with economic globalization. This suggested that the Labour governments aimed to enable an independent and self-governing relationship among families, entrepreneurs, and voluntary communities (Page, 2007). New Labour's reform of the public sector placed more emphasis on developing working public-private partnerships and recreating civil society by allowing collective action while eschewing market individualism (Driver and Martell, 2001).

2.1.4 Institutionalised Perspectives on Behaviour Change
Max Weber (1947) provides an institutionalised structural-functional view of personal behaviours embedded within the social system and institutions. The ideal type of behaviour change extends from a personal to an institutionalised scope. Weber's conception of bureaucracy refers to an effective instrument of administration and hierarchy developed in social order within diverse spheres, which carries out control over behaviours.

Compared with Weber's conception of bureaucracy, Lipsky (2010 [1980]) reframes bureaucracy concerning street-level practices that entail frontline bureaucrats framing and then remodifying the concept of clients and control over clients. The behaviours of clients, who depend on social services and states, are deemed as not

entirely voluntary by Lipsky (2010 [1980]). In order to control the context for clients' behaviour changes, Lipsky (2010 [1980]) envisages that street-level bureaucrats should translate and make policy by exercising discretion, developing routines, controlling interaction contexts, processing clients, and teaching clients what behaviours are expected in their roles as clients. A sanction is employed by frontline bureaucrats to apply perceived 'deviance from acceptable standards of client behaviour change' (Lipsky, 2010 [1980], p. 58).

Street-level bureaucracy is widely applied to analyse social policy and administration (Dwyer, 2019; Wright, 2003). Compared to Habermas, Levitas and Fraser's conception of inclusion, here inclusion refers to user-led and user-controlled service in social service delivery sphere. Lipsky envisages that front-line service process people into clients, and categorise clients based on the construction of social reality, which is incompatible with a personalised and individualised service tailored to a client's behaviour change (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]; Wright, 2003).

Wright's (2003) research on *Jobcentre Staff and Client's Perspectives* finds that social policy is produced and reproduced by stakeholders and clients through the interaction between stakeholders and clients. In her investigation on front-line practice in relation to New Deal users, stakeholders' interpretation of policies influences how they administer and implement policy, shaping the client-centeredness, personalised policy (Wright, 2003).

Wright (2003) also underlines the importance of an interpretivist approach (see chapter 4) to understand intersubjectivity and interdependency between bureaucrats, the bureaucracy and its clients, writing that: 'what a policy is depends on both how it is officially conceived and how it is interpreted and put into operation by those who deliver policy and those who receive it' (Wright, 2003, p. 304). Street-level bureaucracy theory hence provides an insightful lens to New Labour's social policy such as conditionality (see section 2.2.3) and an increasing reliance on behavioural requirements.

2.1.5 Communitarian Perspectives on Behaviour Change

In contrast with the perspectives of Friedman (1962, p. 1), who defines the state as the 'collection of individuals' who compose it, the concept of community is constructed as a context where an individual who has personal values and goals are encouraged to adhere to shared values (Etzioni, 1997). The community provides a base to define the types and standard of what does or does not constitute reasonable and moral behaviour in relation to agreed notions of the good life (Dwyer, 2000; Etzioni, 1997; Titmuss and Alcock, 2001). Communitarians highlight that the state can intervene in promoting the concept of good of the community, which ensures a state discourse of distribution where the state faces a limitation in pursuing a particular notion of the good (Dwyer, 2000).

The concept of community entails relations of embeddedness between individual and society, where those communities constitute an important part of individual identity (Bell, 2010; Etzioni, 2015). This perspective is close to Habermas's (1994) concept of achieved membership in which an individual's identities are conceptually tied to their participation in and integration with society. The individual is viewed as a social asset rather than an asocial creature.

On the other hand, there are several visions of communities. For example, Orford (2008) uses the community psychology to refer to personal interactions in relation to social and economic arrangements. One alternative vision of community refers to a conservative ethical society which has a functional hierarchy (Tönnies, 2001). The concept of the just emerges from particular social location, community and tradition, which may be the same or different from the individual's own notion of just (Dwyer, 2000). Tönnies (2001) introduces a concept of organic community (Gemeinschaft) that bounds intrinsically sociological relations. Tönnies (2001)'s concept of organic community entails shared values, history, reciprocity networks of right and duties. Ontologically, an individual's self-consciousness is bounded with and co-exist with the mutual understanding or consensus of the community who make distribution of goods and social services (Tönnies, 2001). Tony Blair's 'good mantra' (Blair, 2010, p. 212) integrated 'right' with 'responsibility' (Labour Party, 1997). The communitarian model of New Labour's discourse on employment behaviour change

entailed that social security was conditionally related with the degree of willing, activities, and proof of accepted responsibility to the individual, organic community and society, within the legally sanctioned powers to control and disposal.

Communitarianism has been defined by Etzioni (1995; 1997; 2015) and Selbourne (1994) in terms of a generally accepted relation and balance of shared norms, civic virtues and the consciousness of identities of a group of individuals who reinforce each other. Etzioni's (1995) construct of communitarianism is hence deemed to be a warm response to excessively selfish individual behaviour. Behaviours are then ordered in a social context, with the hope that these behaviours are improved or enforced by informal social processes, and where collective moral norms and values are formed by the community (Etzioni, 2015). Such a notion of the common good, with its combination of individual rights, establishes itself as a major source of normality (Etzioni, 2015). Etzioni's perception of communities thus relies on social interaction, which is also an instrument of social control (Levitas, 2005 [1998]).

However, there have been several criticisms made of Etzioni's perspectives. Firstly, communitarian perspectives have little to offer practical moderniser. Etzioni's communitarianism excludes any form of authoritarian nature of intervention to an individual's freedom, opportunity and self-realisation. The perspective provided by communitarianism is powerful only in an imperfect world in which social order is based on common values (Driver and Martell, 1997). In turn, this suggests that a responsive community can also be authoritarian and exclude in practice (Deacon, 2002). Moreover, communitarianism may overestimate the level of solidarity present the community and voluntary sector, entailing that communitarianism underestimates the divisions and conflicts within the community, voluntary sector and other social/local context (Deacon, 2002; Powell, 2000).

Etzioni's perspective has been developed by Driver and Martell (1997), who draw more emphasis on the neoliberal, ethical and individualist features of New Labour's communitarianism. In line with Titmuss's (1970) perspectives on social interdependency, Driver and Martell's (1997) communitarianism suggests that embeddedness and interdependence within a community promote individual's social

and moral position, and civic potentialities of all citizens. Driver and Martell's (1996) communitarianism reframes self-help within a market culture, whose narrow individual identity applies only to customers who purchase private and public goods, and who choose private lifestyles, culture and beliefs.

The Labour governments constructed a new view of conservative morality or a moral community (with shared values of morality and behaviours) where citizens earned their social rights by conducting responsible behaviours, reflecting the responsibilities of parents, teachers and domestic sphere (Driver and Martell, 1997; Dwyer, 2000). New Labour highlighted the opportunity and resources for active citizenry in 'a participatory, democratic, small-scale society characterised by civic virtue and public ideals' (Driver and Martell, 1996, p.7), albeit the Labour governments did not fully specify the notion of community responsibility in much detail (Driver and Martell, 2000).

2.1.6 Gender and Behaviour Change

Conceptually, there have been insightful arguments regarding the feminist aspect to construct behaviour change. Compared to a man of underprivileged status, it is of structural importance that women may not accomplish the change of their underprivileged status, as this has relevance to the political public sphere and conjugal family of the private sphere (Habermas, 1992). Feminist behaviour is dichotomised into the dual aspects of the phenomenon: behaviour in relation to the sphere of paid work is deemed *material reproduction* that is made by the practice and activity, whereas domestic unpaid childcare is considered as *symbolic reproduction*, socialisation and solidarity formation (Habermas, 1984). Unpaid mothers and paid workers may be perceived as two different types of clients (Fraser, 1989). Fraser defines the females who are excluded from the market as 'the negatives of possessive individuals' who have less power and dignity than the alternative purchasers (1989, p. 152). From gendered perspectives, behaviour change is interrelated with gendered constraints and motives in doing unpaid care work and paid employment-related choices. Gendered order of reasons is produced, and reproduced through caring and working responsibilisation (Brown, 2015; Fraser, 1989).

Gender norms have been generally associated with care work. It is important to recognise that the balance between Habermas's notions of material reproduction and symbolic reproduction is linked to the gender division of labour (Lister, 2001a-b). New Labour establishes a policy instrument to improve females' lives, a Women and Equality Unit (Lister, 2003a). However, New Labour's discourse concentrated on highlighting the male-dominated masculine role in the paid labour market of the classical capitalism, whereas females' contributions in unpaid domestic labour and care provision were generally devalued (Lister, 1998). When benefit rewards were governed in relation to different forms of work, as unpaid care work in the domestic sphere was devalued, reinforcing women's subordination in the domestic sphere (Lister, 2001a).

2.2 Social Security Approaches of 1997-2010 Labour Governments

The social security approaches of the Labour governments of 1997–2010 did not appear to be completely new, as they had some roots in Lloyd George, Keynes, and the mixed economy of welfare (Blair, 2010; Hewitt, 1999; Levitas, 2005 [1998]; Powell, 1999; 2000; 2002a-c; 2008). Underpinned by the mantra 'investment and reform together', Tony Blair claimed that the Third Way approach was a realistic and feasible solution (Blair and Schroeder, 1998). The Third Way approach aimed to differ from the Old Left ('Levellers'), which was concerned with the traditional distribution of wealth (Blair, 1996a; Powell, 2000). The Third Way sought to change the initial distribution of endowments, the production of skills and jobs on the supply side of the labour market and the behaviour of non-employed people and employed a laissez-faire approach to the demand side of the labour market (Blair, 1996a; 2010; Giddens, 1998; Lister, 1998). The Third Way redefined the welfare reform, which favoured redistribution of opportunities such as education, training and paid employment, as the mechanism of inclusion (Lister, 1998; Page, 2007).

> '… we reject equality of opportunity not because it is too radical but because it is neither desirable nor feasible. Instead, New Labour is adopting a "more demanding view of equality of opportunity", … which means employment opportunity for all and lifeline educational opportunity for all … second, third and even fourth chances …'

The Third Way was designed for the 'middle way', which appeared to be both 'investor' and 'reformer' (Blair, 1996b; 2010). It was stated in *New Ambitions for our Country* that 'welfare is not only about acting after events have occurred ... the welfare system should be proactive, preventing poverty by ensuring that people have the right of education, training and support' (DSS, 1998, p. 20). This suggested the key characteristics of investment in human capital that operated in New Labour's discourse on a modernised welfare society, with the emphasis on promoting the opportunities of education and welfare-to-work (Powell, 2000). However, the distribution of opportunity was increasingly reliant on the carrots and sticks (see section 2.2.3) of social security approaches (Powell, 2000).

2.2.1 Social Investment Approaches

The Labour governments aimed to be wise spenders and saved to invest, which suggested giving high priority to efficiency and value for money. Being closer to libertarian, left of the political spectrum, the government had been defined as an 'enabler', 'benefactor' and 'provider' for individuals who could not enable, benefit and provide good quality of education, health, housing and welfare for themselves, 'empowering citizens, right and responsibilities, building trust', claiming that:

> '… we [New Labour governments] seek to modernise the welfare state. The benefits system will be restructured around work; support for children and families through the tax and benefits system will be transformed; cash and services for pensioners will be radically improved... '
>
> (Blair, 2010, p. 92)

New Labour constructed the discourse of good and bad spending (Blair, 1999). Drawing on the traditional views of the deserving poor, it was deemed justified to invest in senior citizens (pension), young people (Child Benefit) and people with disabilities to combat social exclusion (Labour Party, 1997). However, the social investment agenda paid less attention to the social inclusion of asylum seekers. New Labour's discourse on social investment unwittingly raised stigma to recipients in

benefits (Powell, 2000). For example, it was deemed bad when social security money had been spent on benefits for the unemployed who should be working (Blair, 1999).

The social investment practices were regarded as a state-provided or regulated response to control social risks and improve economic competitiveness by financing human, financial and social capital in transformation in governance (Lister, 2003a). The Labour governments introduced a series of policy instruments such as New Deal schemes, the National Childcare Strategy, Sure Start and Connexions that had been employed to invest in human capital. With respect to investing in financial capital and social capital, the Labour governments invested in the Child Trust Fund as 'asset-based welfare' for the consideration of future-oriented good (Lister, 2003a). The delivery of social investment practices employed a series of approaches, which mainly included central standard mode, area-based (Sure Start), devolution and limited decentralisation (free elderly care), extended private sector (IT system for matching jobseekers to work), and access (call centres, drop-in service, web service) (McKay and Rowlingson, 2008). The Labour governments employed communitarian approaches to promote social inclusion, such as the establishment of the Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF) and the National Family and Parenting Institute (NFPI), and the Neighbourhood Nurseries (Dobrowolsky and Lister, 2008).

2.2.2 Reform and Policy Changes
In light of Hall's (1993) three orders of change, the Labour governments' social security approaches are categorised by levels or settings, policy instruments and paradigm shift by McKay and Rowlingson (2008). Hall's (1993) three orders of change pertain the level of policy instrument (the first order); the techniques and policy instrument settings to attain policy goals (the second order); the whole changes in the techniques, the instrument settings, and the goals (the third order).

With respect to the first order, the Labour governments increased the level of benefits for children and the incomes of the low-income pensioners, such as increasing the guarantee element of the Pension Credit from 1997 to 2007. For the second order, New Labour introduced tax credits for families with children, the Child Trust Fund for families with children, New Deal schemes and the National Minimum Wage

(NMW) in 1999, and increased the role of the private and third sectors in the delivery of social security, and increased the use of call centres and electronic forms of delivery (McKay and Rowlingson, 2008). The third order of changes pertained transformation in the way of managing and regulating social risks. The Blair government re-claimed to eradicate child poverty by 2020 (Clasen and Clegg, 2007; McKay and Rowlingson, 2008).

Although the alleviation of child poverty had not been entirely achieved as the Labour governments' first target, the number of children who lived in a low-income family had reduced by 600,000 by 2005/2006 (Dobrowolsky and Lister, 2008). To eradicate work poverty, the New Deal policies (so-called 'activation' policies) were introduced in 1998 and changed by the Labour governments. However, the system of administering tax credits led to overpayment and underpayment to tax credit claimants because Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) were not sufficiently informed as circumstances changed (Department for Work and Pensions [DWP], 2014a). Working Tax Credit (WTC) was paid in advance, but for any overpayments incurred, claimants should pay back the overpaid WTC (McKay and Rowlingson, 2008). The Local Housing Allowance (LHA) was used to determine Housing Benefit (HB) for new claimants and those who had moved into the private rented sector (Freud, 2007). Research showed that little incentive was given to claimants to seek cheaper accommodation because the level of LHA was higher than previous local reference rents (Rugg et al., 2008).

Furthermore, with respect to the activation policy instrument to help job search, the Gateway service operated alongside New Deal for Young People (NDYP), which aimed to provide a jobseeking service, career advice and training from Personal Advisors (PA) that was tailored to a client's needs. The main criticism of the Gateway service was that service providers failed to address the needs of the most marginalised clients. One explanation was that the 'client-focused' approach of the Gateway service defined their clients' needs in a narrow sense, meaning it overlooked severe personal and social disadvantages (Hasluck, 2000). One of the consequences was that the marginalised people remain outside the PLM (Dwyer, 2000).

2.2.3 Conditionality

The advancement of conceptions of conditionality is the core element in the Labour governments' reform agenda about behaviour change (Dwyer, 2008; Halpern et al., 2004). The concepts of conditionality have been extensively and intensively explored by a wide range of academic scholars (Clasen and Clegg; 2007; Deacon, 2004; Dwyer, 1998; 2000; 2004a; 2008; 2018, 2019; Reeves and Loopstra, 2017; Shutes, 2016; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Wright et al., 2018; Wright and Patrick, 2019). The concepts of conditionality have been defined in several aspects. Friedman (1962, p. 25) defines the conditionality as an instrument for the government (as an 'umpire') to govern relations among the 'players' of the rules, and mediate different interpretations of rule players on the meaning of the rules (such as the meaning of property rights, the interpretation of conditionality and enforcements), based on the neoliberal provision of a monetary framework. The importance of Friedman's (1962) conception is that it allows differently interpreted conditionality, through which the government enforces compliance with the generally accepted rules. As such, conditionality is not a *neutral* term, but it is *pluralist, interpretivist* and *government-relative* and *client-relative*. Moreover, Friedman (1962) envisages that the nature of *generally accepted* conditions pertains to the unintended outcome of custom, which means that conditionality can be accepted with less thorough considerations or less reciprocal agreement between stakeholder and the claimants.

The concept of conditionality is reframed in a more general way by Clasen and Clegg (2007), who typify three *types* and *levels* of conditionality, namely conditions of *category*, conditions of *circumstance* and conditions of *conduct*:

> 'The first, or primary, condition for the receipt of social security is always membership of a defined category of support … Analytically secondary to conditions of category are conditions of circumstance or in more common social security parlance, eligibility and entitlement criteria … The third and final level of conditionality … intervening only after eligibility for benefit has been otherwise established and having the function of regulating the ongoing benefit receipt.'

> (Clasen and Clegg, 2007, pp. 172-174)

The first level refers to the socially constructed category of benefit support. For example, the concept of an unemployed lone parent had been extended from a lone parent with no children under the age of eleven to a lone parent with no children under seven by the Labour governments (McKay and Rowlingson, 2008). Another example is that a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) is applied to determine the category of benefits (Patrick, 2011). The usage of a work test can be traced back to the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act (Spicker, 2011; Walker, 1996). Compared to the previous personal capability assessment, the introduction of a stricter work capability assessment had led more claimants to be categorised as 'fit for work' (Kennedy, 2016). The first level of category combines with Shutes's (2016) conditions of circumstance (entry and temporary residence in a country, entitlement to claim social security, and permanent residence or citizenship status), acting as a lever to control access to social rights. The social security right had been increasingly restricted since the 1970s on the European Union (EU) level, the UK level, and the local implementation level (Dwyer et al., 2019a).

The second level of conditionality refers to eligibility criteria (such as need-based criteria) applied to access to social benefits. For example, since the Labour governments came to power, fewer unemployed people had access to contribution-based support (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). The third level refers to behavioural conditionality, which is applied after eligibility is determined and includes behavioural requirements as a condition of ongoing entitlement (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). The Labour governments' reforms reinforced the 1980s Conservative governments' focuses on influencing the behaviour of unemployed benefit claimants.

Tony Blair described conditionality as one of the consequences of labour market reform, which focused on individual choice, competition, and flexibility (Blair, 2010). Tony Blair underlined a contractual idea that the 'modern notion of citizenship gives right but demands obligations, shows respect but wants it back, grants opportunity but insists on responsibility' (Blair, 1996a, p. 218). The mantra of 'no right without responsibility' had been applied in social security and extended to education, health, pensions, housing tenants, family dysfunction, and anti-social problems (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, which was

further developed in the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act and the 2003 Criminal Justice Act), where citizens were 'encouraged, cajoled and compelled' to comply with requirements as obligations to behave in specific ways (Dwyer, 2008, p. 200). Conditionality was seen as a contractualist, paternalist and utilitarian and a technique to convince citizens to take responsibility and against irresponsibility and anti-social behaviours (Deacon, 2004; Dwyer, 2008; Griggs and Evans, 2010; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). The behavioural condition was bonded with individual responsibility (duty), which determined 'the context where social rights are given' by the Labour governments (Blair, 1996a, p.5; 1999), meaning individual and mutual responsibilities (rather than agreed notions of needs) to enter into paid work were highlighted in return for access to social rights, which endorsed individuals to be eligible to (continue to) access the benefit and entitlements and thus deserving of collective support (Dwyer, 1998, 2000, 2008; Griggs and Bennett, 2009). Those who did not comply with rules of membership were deemed as 'undeserving' of full social rights (Dwyer, 1998).

Sanctions have been explicitly defined in mandatory elements of the New Deal in case of non-compliant behaviours. The common feature was that a claimant's award might be reduced or removed if the claimant did not perform the prescribed responsible conduct (DWP, 2010a-c; Jarvis, 1997). For example, NDYP claimants who refused to take up at least one of the available options, which included training courses and 'taster' placements, could be sanctioned (Dwyer, 2008; Jarvis, 1997). New Labour eliminated the fifth option of remaining on the benefit to reduce welfare dependency. This suggested the welfare state was not flexible and generous as it was supposed to be (Driver and Martell, 2001).

The Labour governments' levering of behaviour change reinforced the stigma of social unacceptability (Hills, 2001). The conditional element of welfare provision and stigmatisation, such as the use of 'scroungers' discourse, reduced Marshall's (1950) concept of citizenship that pertained to state-guaranteed universal, unconditional and equal opportunity of social rights and undermined social solidarity among vulnerable citizens (Dwyer, 1998; 2000; 2004a). Critics argued that the

discrepancy had been created between 'others' (homogenised as the 'underclass') and 'us' (citizens) as 'tax payers' (Hills, 2001; Lister, 2001a).

Other critiques of the operations on conditionality concerned poor payment and job vacancies in the local labour market, which had less relevance to behaviour change (Dwyer, 2000). These factors alongside past behavioural failure and new behavioural problems exacerbated social exclusion from employment (Dwyer, 1998; 2000; Lister, 1998). Hills (2001) highlighted that conditionality exerted counter-productive effects on behaviour change. For example, claimants may increase demand to spend benefits rather than saving for their old age which was viewed as punitive, or some people would believe that they had done enough as required and no extra efforts were needed (Hills, 2001). This suggests contribution has been interpreted by the claimants in their own ways, prohibiting behaviour change (Hills, 2001). This finding has been confirmed in Summers's (2018) research on UC.

Clasen and Clegg (2007) argue that social security provision can balance these three types of conditions that act as a 'lever' in service delivery. The effectiveness of certain levers of behavioural conditionality implementation depends on the street-level front-line stakeholders (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). Dwyer (2019), extends Clasen and Clegg's (2007) categories of conditionality to Lipsky's (2010 [1980]) street-level implementation as the fourth category of conditionality at the delivery level, providing a useful framework for the data analysis of this research.

Regarding the fourth type of conditionality in service delivery, Dwyer's (1998, 2000) empirical research shows that a client's behaviour change depends on the approaches of front-line stakeholders, such as doctors or healthcare professionals. Factors include whether stakeholders are likely to use moral or personal judgements and non-clinical factors to assess individuals' anti-social behaviours, allocate care or impose sanctions, and whether stakeholders consider their clients' needs alongside cultural, environmental and social factors (Dwyer, 1998; 2000). The 'client-focused' approach of the Gateway service of NDYP has been criticised for overlooking severe personal and social disadvantages when it was delivered by advisors (Hasluck, 2000).

One of the consequences was that the marginalised people remained outside the PLM (Dwyer, 2000).

2.3 The Similarities and Differences Between the Labour Government's Approach and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government's Approach on Behaviour Change and Conditionality

The 2010 Coalition government reaffirmed and strengthened the Labour governments' discourses on unemployment-related behaviour, with an emphasis on work as a route out of poverty, and focused more on individual agency, personal responsibility and choice (Bochel and Powell, 2016). The structural aspects of persistent unemployment and poverty were marginalised and transformed into individual behaviour 'pathologies' of benefit dependency and unemployment. For example, the discourse of 'shirkers' and 'scroungers' described the outsiders of citizenship (Edwards and Gillies, 2016; Ellison, 2016). The Conservative MP, Iain Duncan-Smith (2010) made a speech depicting benefit claimants as 'the unemployed who lack the work habit', and 'detached from the rest of us', and describing them as a 'residual group who need recovery' (Duncan-Smith, 2010).

The state's responsibility for reducing risk and poverty had been reframed and associated with 'family breakdown, economic dependency and unemployment, educational failure, addiction and indebtedness' (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.3). This underlined the cause of poverty and unemployment as an individual failure, so as to encourage out-of-work benefit recipients to move into employment, and imposed sanctions on those who failed to take up the opportunity to work (DWP, 2010a). Similar to the Labour governments' (1997-2010) discourse, the Conservative/Liberal Democrats Coalition government's construction of behavioural problems and anti-social behaviour appeared to be relatively decontextualised. More emphasis had been put on the individual causes, and less on the structural causes of 'failure', such as the global economic crisis and the constrained labour market opportunities (Dwyer and Wright, 2014).

The Coalition government shared a substantial degree of similar discourse with the Labour governments' policies in relation to transforming the welfare state from a

'hand up' to a 'handout' organisation with an emphasis on paid work as an approach to moving out of poverty, and with an increasing emphasis on individual responsibility and choice (Bochel and Powell, 2016). This aimed to transform the welfare state into a 'springboard' to economic opportunity and liberty instead of a safety net (Bochel and Powell, 2016, pp. 347-349). Similarly, both governments retained the National Minimum Wage and some childcare provision. The Coalition government reduced benefit and increased the income tax threshold, simplified the system and increased the level of conditionality. In 2012, they introduced UC in the Welfare Reform Act (see section 2.4).

The Coalition government reinforced and maintained a neoliberal approach which focused on choice, marketisation and responsibility, alongside devolution and economic inequality (Bochel and Powell, 2016). Compared to the Labour governments' investment approach, the Coalition government had a marked preference for using a deregulatory approach, such as reducing the power of Local Authorities (LAs) (Bochel and Powell, 2016). Moreover, the Coalition government strengthened the competition, such as in the Health and Social Care Act (2012) which aimed to increase the competition from the independent sector (National Archives, 2012). In particular, public services were delivered by an increasingly wide range of social enterprises, voluntary organisations and other non-state providers. The Coalition government was under pressure from political parties who sought to prevent the immigrants (EU/EEA) from accessing social security benefits (Bochel and Powell, 2016). There was a reduction in funding allocation to LAs along with a reduction in central and local government funds to local charities and communities. These 'unprecedented' cuts were criticised for the assumption that it may limit LAs' ability to fulfil all their statutory responsibilities (Glasby, 2016).

The Labour governments used tax credits as policy instruments to deal with families with children and pensioners, whereas the Coalition government reduced the level of tax credits and reduces the amount of child benefit payments (Bochel and Powell, 2016). From 6 April 2017, UC payment for a third child and subsequent child/children (so called 'two child' policy) was removed (DWP, 2017d). The level of work allowances was reduced since 11 April 2016 (DWP, 2019c). This meant a work allowance was only available for claimants who had child care responsibilities

or were not able to work due to illness or disability (DWP, 2019c). The eligibility for Child Benefit was limited to households in which no one earned above £60,000 per year, and the payment was tapered away for households whose earnings were between £50,000 and £60,000 till 2017 (DWP, 2017a-c). For example, the Child Benefit and WTC were frozen from 2011 to 2013 and from April 2016 to 2020 there had been no increase in most working-age benefits, including UC. The LHA, which was used as the criteria for measuring and determining HB levels for private sector tenants, was reduced in 2011, and frozen in 2012. It was linked and adjusted to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 2013 and was frozen again from 2016 to 2020 (Summers, 2018; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018).

The benefit cap, which was applied to claimants aged 16 or above, but below state pension age, restrained the total amount of benefits that a claimant or household could get (Bochel and Powell, 2016; Cameron, 2012; DWP, 2019a; House of Lords, 2016). The Benefit Cap was reduced from £26,000 in 2013 to £23,000 for households in London and to £20,000 for those living outside London in 2016 (DWP, 2019a). This reflected the Prime Minister (PM) Cameron's claim to reduce the burden of 'the legacy of debt', 'overspending' and 'waste' (Cameron, 2012). Moreover, the spare room subsidy was withdrawn in 2013, which led to a reduction in the payment of the housing cost element of UC for households renting social housing who were deemed to have one or more extra bedroom(s) (DWP, 2019b). However, Bochel and Powell (2016) criticised this and argued that changes in the benefit cap and bedroom tax (the removal of the spare room subsidy) affected people on low-incomes. Other academics such as Levitas (2012) and Defty (2016) had raised concerns that the Coalition government widened the inequality gap.

Social security policy underlines that the individual is required to modify individual behaviour and imposed a moral obligation on citizens to move closer to the PLM (DWP, 2010b; Wiggan, 2012). It is increasingly evident that welfare conditionality (Webster, 2014, 2015, 2019) has been seen as a core component of the reform agenda since the Labour government. Compared to the Labour government's approach to deal with welfare dependency and poverty, the Coalition government personalised,

extended and intensified benefit conditionality and sanctions (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Dwyer, 2019; Fletcher and Wright, 2017).

2.4 Universal Credit: Aims, Components and Critiques

This section examines the aims, design and policy detail of UC and its key components. It includes out-of-work and in-work conditionality, and flexibility in work-related requirements, the WCA, the Claimant Commitment (CC), reporting changes in circumstances, work coaches, the waiting period, easements, advance payments, and Alternative Payment Arrangements (APA). The following section discusses how UC works with these elements, and how UC is delivered.

2.4.1 The Aims of Universal Credit

The perspective of framing the causes of poverty was shaped by the narrative of Iain Duncan Smith (2010), who was passionate about the Coalition's attitude to poverty and social security reform. Similar to the Labour governments' focus on work and conditionality, the Coalition government reinforced the idea that moving into 'fulfilling work' was 'the best route out of poverty' (Cameron, 2012; DWP, 2010a-c). The Coalition government's discourse of 'dependency culture' extended to in-work benefit claimants, social security policies and focused on 'economic rationality and included flexible labour and punitive conditionality'.

> 'A life on benefits is a poor substitute for a working life but too much of our current [working age benefit] system is geared toward maintaining people on benefits rather than helping them to flourish in work; we need reform that tackles the underlying problem of welfare dependency … the benefits system has shaped the poorest in a way that has trapped generation after generation in a spiral of dependency and poverty. This has cost the country billions of pounds in cash payments and billions more in meeting the social costs of failure.'
>
> (DWP, 2010a)

UC was designed to incentivise more people into the paid labour market, ensuring that work always pays (Dwyer and Wright, 2014).

Individual failure manifested itself in various ways under the working-age benefit system. This was because, firstly, the financial gains for claimants under the system

of working-age benefits ('legacy benefit') were somewhat limited. For example, the deduction rate, which signified the financial loss because of benefits and tax credits, was high. The Marginal Deduction Rate, which comprised the benefit withdrawal rate and additional tax, could reach as high as 96 percent (DWP, 2010b). The DWP identified that the financial loss to claimants' as their earnings increased undermined the work incentive (DWP, 2010c). UC has been portrayed as a way of simplifying the benefits system, moving recipients off benefits and into the PLM and reducing overpayments due to fraud and error (DWP, 2010c).

Critique has been made with regards to the assumption that UC neglects the capacities of recipients in employment, irrespective of job availability in the labour market and macro-economic demand (Wiggan, 2012). Secondly, UC, which re-regulates social security policy, aims to increase labour flexibility (Wiggan, 2012). As DWP (2010) writes,

> 'UC will match the structure of today's labour market more closely, where part-time jobs and flexible working are much more common than they once were. Furthermore, this reform will increase the range of jobs in the economy... The government wants to create a welfare system that provides people with the confidence and security to play a full part in society through a flexible labour market within a competitive modern economy'

(DWP, 2010b, p. 4, 10)

The concern is raised with regards to the concept of 'flexible working', as it entails a series of job types, such as part-time work, zero-hours working contracts, and temporary jobs which claimants are encouraged to take (Wiggan, 2012). (see discussions in chapter 5-7) Furthermore, systematic factors, which contribute to unemployment and poverty may be underestimated in the trajectory of employment behaviour change (see discussions in chapter 5-7).

2.4.2 Universal Credit and its Components
UC replaces six social security benefits (Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance, Income-Based Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, HB, CTC and WTC), with a single means-tested benefit (DWP, 2010c). UC is designed to make one payment per month to mimic wages and uses digital services for applications and

payments. UC merges in-work with out-of-work payments and uses the Pay As You Earn system (PAYE) to update payment entitlements for working claimants in real-time. UC includes a standard allowance, and elements for children, housing, capability for work, carers, and childcare costs (DWP, 2019d).

The child element means that a young person qualifies up to the 1st September following their 19th birthday. This differs from child benefit and CTC where young people qualify until they reach the age of 20, as long as they remain in full-time education before their 19th birthday (DWP, 2019i). In-work claimant(s) can apply for the childcare cost element of UC which is up to 85% of the claimant's costs, and is paid in arrears (DWP, 2019h). The aim is to enable the claimant secure paid work. To get the childcare costs element, the claimant(s) must meet two conditions: 1) they must be in work before the end of the assessment period; 2) they must be responsible for a child or young person, (who is qualified until the 1st of September after their 16th birthday). Claimants who are responsible for children aged from 16 to 19 years can get the childcare costs element if their children are enrolled in 'full-time, non-advanced education or approved training' (DWP, 2019i).

The housing cost element is to help claimants pay rent to private landlords, for service charges and rent to a housing association or LA (council housing). It can also be paid for interest payments on a claimant's mortgage in a property they own or share ownership of (DWP, 2019j). The housing element has conditions such as being liable for payments in respect of the accommodation they occupy (DWP, 2019j). Claimants who have been claiming benefits for 39 weeks with no breaks can apply for Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI) payments that helps them to pay their mortgage interest. Before 6 April 2018, SMI was paid in the form of a benefit, but is now a loan, meaning the claimant has to repay it with interest (DWP, 2019k).

Regarding the capability for work elements, prior to 3 April 2017 there were two elements: the limited capability for work element (LCW) and the limited capability for work- and work-related activity element (LCWRA). Prior to 3 April 2017, claimants who were assessed (see section 2.4.10) as having limited capability could get either of these two elements but LCW was removed after then (DWP, 2019i).

Furthermore, claimants who meet the conditions for a carer's allowance such as caring for a severely disabled person for at least 35 hours per week, are entitled to receive carer element (DWP, 2019h).

2.4.3 A Comparison Between Universal Credit and Working-Age Benefits

There appears to be some continuity and discontinuity in the legacy benefits:

1) An award of UC is usually paid directly to the claimant to spend (Millar and Bennett, 2017); UC is usually paid monthly whereas claimants of Child Benefits, WTC, and CTC could decide the frequency of their payments (DWP, 2019d-h). Claimants, who have difficulty in coping with the way in which UC is paid, can apply for an APA (see section 2.4.10-2.4.11);

2) HMRC develops Real Time Information (RTI) to record changes and respond to people's needs. The removal of the 16-hour rule and the real-time information link (so-called 'flexibility components'), along with in-work payments, aim to incentivise single claimants to be more likely to consider various types of work, such as part-time, short-term, and flexible work (DWP, 2017b).

3) UC is administered by the DWP. This differs from multiple administrative authorities who administered a range of benefits and tax credits (DWP, 2019d-h);

4) The concept of in-work progression is applied to encourage and support in-work claimants to increase their earnings by increasing the hours they spend on work searches or finding better-paid employment (DWP, 2018a).

The DWP's (2018a) research highlights several factors that improve in-work progression. Factors such as strong personal motivation, a good relationship with their work coach, and more frequent support are highlighted (DWP, 2018a). Concern has been raised about claimants' financial management of monthly payments of UC which has merged six benefits/tax credits into one payment (Millar and Bennett, 2017). Different to the yearly rate assessment, UC assessments are made on the basis of a claimant's circumstances on only one day each month (unhistorical) and applied to the previous month as a whole (Millar and Bennett, 2017). Critiques are made by

Daly (2017) and Millar and Bennett (2017) that UC creates challenges to claimants' budgeting behaviour. Furthermore, Daly's research (2017, 2018) provides both functional and relational views of the meaning and management of benefit payments, and the existence of a money value structure, the behaviour categories of UC claimants and provides a broader view of the data analysis of the behaviour-related data.

2.4.4 Conditionality Components: Conditionality, Work Coach and Claimant Commitment

UC introduces personalised conditionality, such as work-related activities to non-work claimants and in-work claimants (DWP, 2010c). The idea of personalised conditionality has been a part of the Work Programme, which is 'creating a structure that treats people as individuals and allows providers greater freedom to tailor the right support to the individual needs of each customer' (Coombs, 2012). Personalised conditionality seeks to secure paid employment whilst taking account of individual contingent situations.

UC extends conditionality to claimants who have low-paid, part-time and insecure (zero hours working contract) employment, which suggests they are subject to sanctions in cases of non-compliance (DWP, 2011; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Watts et al., 2014). Eligible claimants are categorised into four conditionality groups on the basis of their capacity to work and circumstance. These are all work-related requirements; work-focused-interview and work preparation requirements; work-focused interview requirements; no work-related activity requirements (DWP, 2019h). Pre-claim behavioural conditionality refers to preparing a Curriculum Vitae (CV), setting up an email address, and registering on the government's 'Universal Jobmatch' job website (DWP, 2019h; Watts, et al., 2014).

Central to the personalised, extended and intensified system of behavioural conditionality within UC is the individual's action plan and the CC, which aims to drive to behaviour change, such as job seeking (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). The CC outlines specific conditions and responsibilities for claimants, which usually includes specific requirements to carry out job searches which the claimant must agree to do

in relation to preparing to look for work and increase their earnings (DWP, 2011; DWP, 2019h; Loopstra et al., 2015). The CC can be viewed online and may be altered when the claimant's circumstances change (DWP, 2016b).

At Jobcentre Plus (JCP), a work coach (adviser) is assigned to claimants at the outset of any claim (DWP, 2019h). The intention is that each CC will clearly specify the various job-search and mandatory training conditions (such as attending the Work Programme) that the claimant must comply with in return for their UC payment (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Through an ongoing discussion between the work coach and the claimant, these work-related conditions are expected to take into account the particular circumstances and capabilities of the individual (DWP, 2019h). A work coach uses techniques to assist his or her clients to achieve their health and work goals, such as in-work progression, on the basis of each claimant's circumstances and capabilities (DWP, 2016a). Those claimants whose gross earnings are below the conditionality threshold (equivalent to around 35 hours weekly payment at the national minimum wage rate) are expected to increase their working hours or earnings.

UC places no restrictions on the number of hours worked. In-work UC claimants, who continue to receive UC, are expected to increase their earnings from employment by searching for an additional or better-paid job (DWP, 2014a). The CC also shows that UC claimants who do not comply with their CC or have any justified (deemed 'good' causes) reasons face sanctions (see section 2.4.6) (DWP, 2013a, 2019h). It is through these personalised measures that the Coalition government has declared that UC would foster the capacity for individuals. It assumes greater responsibility to prepare for, find and progress in paid work (DWP, 2016b).

The income-based working-age benefits and tax credits ('legacy benefit') were calculated on a family basis. This means that one member of a couple usually made a joint claim. This claimant was required to fulfil the conditionality for the benefit claimed and also for the additional benefit received for the partner (DWP, 2011). In couples with dependent children, the partner of the benefit claimant was expected to

attend a Work Focused Interview (WFI) every six months (DWP, 2011). In couples with no dependent children, both members were required to fulfil conditionality and access to JCP services (DWP, 2011).

Under UC, both members of a couple are required to make a joint claim and meet conditionality on the basis of their circumstances and capability (Bennett and Sung, 2013; DWP, 2011). This aims to extend conditionality to both partners, rather than just one member of a household (Bennett and Sung, 2013). Concern has been raised about gendered inequality to access to financial resources within a couple (Bennett and Sung, 2013). Females, who are usually responsible for childcare after a couple splits, are more likely to suffer from financial hardship. This issue of appropriate and flexible allocation of resources between a couple has not been fully acknowledged by the Welfare Reform Act of 2012.

Changes to conditionality and sanctions (see section 2.4.5) reflect Foucault's (2008, p. 132) neoliberal governmentality that exercises vigilance, activity and intervention. The aim is to make citizens productive and active via institutionalised behaviour change, from a state-dominated view (Foucault, 2008; Reeves and Loopstra, 2017). With respect to efficacy and ethicality, critiques have been made on various grounds (Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Dwyer, 2019; Dwyer, et al, 2019a, 2019b; Fletcher and Wright, 2017; Reeves, 2017; Wright and Patrick, 2019). Wacquant's (2009) theory has a wider implication in analysing and criticising the implementation of intensified and extended conditionality (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). Welfare conditionality unintendedly distances the claimant from engaging in and accessing both social support and work, exacerbating hardship and mental health, and poverty (Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Watts, et al. 2014). The counterproductive aspect of conditionality is related to the unrealistic targets set in the CC which does not fully acknowledge a claimant's capability, responsibilities and vulnerabilities to fulfil prescribed means of job search (such as the Universal Jobmatch online tool), training courses and mandatory interviews (Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Wright et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2018). Oakley's (2016) report demonstrates a range of characteristics, alongside active work searches that influence employment outcomes. These include qualifications, mental health conditions, improving conditions, and

age and time since the last job. To improve employment behaviour outcomes, supportive, less judgemental, and less enforcement-based services are important (Dwyer, 2018; Watts, et al. 2014).

2.4.5 Sanctions and Hardship Payments

DWP (2019h) refers benefit sanctions to the circumstance 'if a claimant fails to meet any of the responsibilities that this claimant agreed in the Claimant Commitment without good reason, this claimant may receive a reduction in her/his benefit payment, known as a sanction'. The enhanced sanction regime was introduced in 2012. There are four levels of sanction and penalty fines imposed on claimants who fail to comply with the work-related activities of their CC: lowest, low, medium and high level (see Table 1). The three-year sanction has been removed in 2019.

Table 1. Enhanced Sanction Regime Introduced Since 2012 prior to UC

Sanction Level (for UC and JSA claimants)	Length of Sanction		
	First Failure (within a 52 week period of their last failure)	Second Failure (within a year within a 52 week period of their last failure)	Third and subsequent failure (within a year within a 52 week period of their last failure)
High Level	13 weeks	26 weeks	156 weeks
Intermediate Level	4 weeks	13 weeks	13 weeks
Low level	Until claimant complies plus 1 week	Until claimant complies plus 2 weeks	Until claimant complies plus 4 weeks
Lowest Level	Until claimant complies	Until claimant complies	Until claimant complies

Source: DWP (2013a)

Benefit sanctions have been criticised as being comparatively harsh, because many claimants are vulnerable with physical and mental disabilities. They have found the system and the CC difficult to comply with (Dwyer, 2019; Oakley, 2016; Watts et al. 2014). Since October 2012, sanctions have been used intensively (Watts et al. 2014). Benefit sanctions have disproportionate effects on lone parents (previously subject to light conditionality) and young people aged below 25 years (Watts et al., 2014). The number of JSA claimants who received sanctions increased significantly since 2008 peaking at 899,960 in 2013. The number of JSA claimants who received sanctions in 2013 was 0.15 million more than that in 2011. Due to the introduction

of the new sanction regime, the number sanctioned in 2014 was double that of 2009. As such, the systematic critiques have been made on various grounds by Loopstra et al. (2015), Reeves (2017), Webster (2014, 2019). (see more discussion in chapter 5-7)

The official definition of 'good cause', which is used as the criteria to distinguish compliance and non-compliance behaviours, has been criticised as being unrealistic and narrow (House of Commons [HoC]/Work and Pensions Committee [DPC], 2015). A claimant who has been sanctioned can apply for a hardship payment. The hardship payment is discretionary and aims to meet a claimant's basic needs. To obtain hardship payments, the UC claimants are usually required to show that certain corresponding conditions have been met, such as making an effort not to spend the money on non-essentials and to have carried out all the work-related activities (DWP, 2019h). Hardship payments are made as loans, meaning the claimant has to repay it back when the sanction ends (DWP, 2014a).

Webster's (2014) report finds only a quarter of sanctioned JSA claimants actually received hardship payments. Oakley's (2014) review raises concerns about the difficulty to access to hardship payments, with systematic critiques of client interactions and understanding of the system. Another controversial issue in relation to sanctions is that the claimants increasingly rely on food banks (FB) and charities (Reeves, 2017; Watts, et al., 2014). Research by Loopstra et al. (2015) finds quantitative evidence that rising sanction rates increases the number of claimants moving off benefits ('welfare exit') and creates disconnections between welfare and work. Research by Loopstra et al. (2015) also shows the limited impact of the rising number of sanctions on increasing concomitant employment recovery. However, this study does not tell us the qualitative aspects of behaviours change. A critique is that the claimant may not change employment behaviour when faced by sanction (Grover, 2012). Wright et al. (2018) provide a more comprehensive understanding of support, sanctions and behaviour change: sanctions worsen financial hardship, borrowing and debt, anti-social behaviour. Sanctions exacerbate the claimants' mental wellness and create unnecessary barriers to getting paid work. This finding is useful to support the analysis of the qualitative data in empirical findings chapters 5, 6 and 7.

2.4.6 Earning Taper and the Work Allowance

As discussed in section 2.4.1, UC aims to increase work incentives by ensuring a consistent and predictable rate of reduced support (DWP, 2010c). UC introduced a single withdrawal rate, and it was reduced from 65 to 63 percent in April 2017 (DWP, 2017e). This means decreasing a deduction of the amount of earnings as the earnings increase (DWP, 2010a-c). Moreover, the financial gains of paid employment are showed to claimants to smooth their path from labour market inactivity into paid work.

With respect to the quantitative aspects of the incentives to move into work, research conducted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) anticipates that overall, UC would improve the work incentives of low-income single people (Adam et al., 2014). Furthermore, it is anticipated that UC would unwittingly reduce the work incentives of second earners (usually female) in couple families. This is because the withdrawal rate for second earners under UC would be faster. This would result in any income from work being deducted after taking account of the first earner's wages (Adam et al., 2014). This reflects Bennett and Sung's (2013) view that perversely, UC may exacerbate the gendered, economic dependency of women within families.

Citizens Advice (2018) demonstrates that several benefit cuts and reductions may reduce incentives to work. Firstly, the work allowance, which was a set amount of money that a claimant can earn before UC was reduced. Since April 2016, this has been reduced for families with children and claimants who have limited capability to work (Citizens Advice, 2018; DWP, 2019c). Work allowances were removed for non-disabled adults with no children. Additionality, research finds that claimants who misunderstand or inappropriately interpret the Work Allowance and UC components might be reluctant to take up flexible work and increasing hours or earnings (DWP, 2017b).

2.4.7 The UC Claim Process

The method for claiming UC is different from that for claiming working-age benefits. Previously, to apply for HB, claimants either wrote to or completed an online form

to LA or alternatively, they could call JCP (DWP, 2019h). To claim WTC/CTC claimants ordered a tax credit form online or called HMRC Tax Credits helpline. Similarly, to claim IB JSA, IB ESA and IS, claimants applied by phone, or filled in a claim form and posted it along with any fit/doctors notes (for an ESA claim) to their local JCP. IS claim forms and ESA application forms required the claimant's signature. Furthermore, after submission of the claim forms, applicants might be asked to provide proof, such as a fit note from a doctor and income-related documents. ESA claimants might also be referred for a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) of their health condition (see section 2.4.9).

The process for claiming UC aims to be simpler (DWP, 2010c). The full UC service has been rolled out in some parts of the UK, including Sutton since November 2014 and some areas of Croydon since June 2015. Claimants in full service areas claim UC online, and are required to provide bank details, an email address, National Insurance (NI) numbers, housing information (e.g. rent), details of work and earnings, including savings and investments, health and childcare details (DWP, 2019h). Claimants in full service areas cannot claim UC by telephone (DWP, 2019h). Claimants have to verify their personal identity online using proof such as a driving licence, passport, debit or credit card (DWP, 2019h). Claimants who cannot verify their personal identity online (if they do not have a bank account, passport or driving licence), have to go to their local JCP to provide personal identification-related documents to verify their identity. To support the online delivery of UC, the DWP has awarded contracts to providers including, the Post Office, Cassidian, Digidentity, Experian, Ingeus, Mydex, and Verizon which are delivering a secure online registration service to verify the identity of benefit claimants (DWP, 2019h). Claimants with health conditions that prevent them from working are required to submit medical evidence, including a fit/doctor's note, if their health condition lasts more than eight days (DWP, 2019m). The medical evidence can be provided by a General Practitioner (GP) (DWP, 2019m). A critique is that the online claiming process has unintentionally created difficulties for those claimants who have literacy, learning and language issues (see chapter 5 and 6). Having to claim online may have generated barriers to access to benefits and negotiate with the system (Dwyer and Wright, 2014).

2.4.8 Reporting Changes in Circumstance

To report changes in circumstance, a UC claimant can login to his or her universal account (online journal), make changes and wait for their work coach or JCP decision maker to update the system. Claimants who do not have an online account can telephone the UC helpline to update their records. From 29 November 2017, the UC helpline (starting with 0800) is free for both landline and mobile users. Prior to this, mobile phone users were charged differently depending on their mobile companies' charges per minute. For some mobile users with different contracts, calling an 0800 number does not incur additional costs if the call length does not exceed the maximum number of minutes included in their contract. Pre-UC, concerns have been raised because the number of changes to people's circumstances may have been overlooked (Millar and Bennett, 2017) (see more discussion in section 6.2.1).

2.4.9 Work Capability Assessment

For claimants with a health condition or disability that hinders them from working, they are required to attend a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) (DWP, 2019i). Based on the outcome of the WCA, claimants who are categorised into either a 'fit for work group', or 'having an LCW' that are placed in the work-related activity group, or 'having an LCWRA' group that are placed in the support group (DWP, 2019i; Kennedy, 2016). The claimants who are categorised as 'fit for work' are expected to seek work and increase their earnings or hours. Claimants who are categorised as LCW, can prepare for work with the aim of undertaking work in the near future (DWP, 2019h). Those claimants who are assessed as having LCWRA are not expected to find work or prepare for work (DWP, 2019i).

The research by Reeves and Loosptra (2017) shows the redefined criteria of WCA has unwittingly created disincentives to comply with the conditionality and exacerbated exclusion for disabled claimants. Similarly, Oakley's (2016) report reveals that the WCA creates disincentives to move into work. Recommendations have been made by Oakley (2016) to close the gap in disability employment outcomes. Proposals have been made by Oakley (2016), such as splitting the assessment of benefit eligibility from the assessment of an individual's ability to

move into work, and financing the extra costs of disability and ensuring there are incentives to engage with support to move into work.

2.4.10 Easements and Flexibility in Work-Related Requirements

Easements refer to reducing or removing work-related requirements. Easements are provided to particular claimants who are deemed as having difficulties in participating in the PLM (DWP, 2019h). With respect to work-related requirements for responsible carers under the Welfare Reform and Work Act (2016), lone parents, whose youngest child is aged from three to two years old, will be expected to undertake mandatory work preparation (DWP, 2017f). Similarly, the claimant who is perceived as having limited capability to work is encouraged to undertake regular part-time work (DWP, 2019h; Stinson, 2019). Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) (2017) demonstrates how the use of easements is insufficient, due to a lack of sufficient information on claimants' circumstances. Similar critiques have been made with regard to a lack of publicity for easements and that jobseekers are unaware that such flexibilities can be negotiated and tailored to their circumstances (Reeves and Loosptra, 2017). Due to this insufficient awareness, vulnerable claimants may not always provide sufficient information about their circumstances to their work coaches (PAC, 2017). Suggestions have been made in relation to privacy protection and retraining work coaches to identify claimants' needs appropriately (PAC, 2017).

2.4.11 Waiting Time, Advance Payment, Alternative Payment Arrangements, and Discretionary Payments

New claimants usually received their first UC payment after approximately six weeks (there are seven waiting days after the UC claim, an assessment month, and a week waiting time for working out the entitlement and making the UC award). Since the end of 2017, the waiting time has been reduced to five weeks. UC is paid in arrears and assesses earnings in the one month after the UC claim is made and paid seven days after the end of the assessment month. Claimants can apply for an advance payment before their first UC payment (DWP, 2014a). In 2017, the advance payment is usually paid within one week, and some claimants get it within three days before their first payment of UC (DWP, 2019h). Advance payments are deducted from the claimant's UC award. Moreover, any claimant who has difficulty coping with the

way UC is paid, can apply for an APA. An APA aims to pay claimants more frequently; allows the housing element of UC to be paid directly to the landlord; and allows the household payment to be split between a couple (DWP, 2014a). A critique is that advance payments or hardship loans are insufficient to cover living costs and meet basic needs (Millar and Bennett, 2017).

The Welfare Reform Act of 2012 ended the discretionary social fund, including crisis loans and community care grants from 1 April 2013. Discretionary support has been devolved and transferred from central to local government administration, based on the assumption that local provision can meet local residents' needs better. For example, any emergency payments, such as a discretionary housing payment (DHP) is made to HB claimants for the housing cost element of UC, where there is a shortfall in the rent due to welfare reform or where a claimant is required to pay a rent deposit in advance (DWP, 2019l). Concern has been raised by Simmons (2013) from the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) that the removal of the discretionary social fund implies a removal of the social safety net, which may have significant implications for low-income groups (see more discussion in section 5.7).

2.4.12 Universal Support

The DWP publishes a 'Local Support Service Framework' with details of the partnership working arrangements during the UC implementation period (DWP, 2013b). In the report, the concept of Universal Support (US) is defined as advice, assistance, and support provided by agreed US joint-working partners, such as LAs, Citizens Advice, credit unions, social housing providers and charities (DWP, 2013b). The report shows how partnership working arrangements are expected to identify complex needs that required ongoing and long-term support, such as that for vulnerable adults with limited ability (both mentally and physically), support for, people with numeracy and literacy difficulties, prison leavers, domestic violence victims, geographically isolated people, and support to help them get through the transition period while moving off benefits into employment (Duncan-Smith, 2017; DWP, 2013b). According to Duncan-Smith (2017), the rolling out of the universal system has been tested.

US consisted of Assisted Digital support (AD) and Personal Budgeting Support (PBS) (DWP, 2013b). Along with the central government, the partnership working arrangements were expected to identify local needs and provide a series of services. This included information and support with online claims, money advice and job searches, to equip claimants to become self-supporting in the long term (DWP, 2013b). Research shows how including support for digital skills, budgeting and literacy rather than support for employment alone were more effective in changing the claimant's behaviour (DWP, 2016c). Universal Support ended at the end of March 2019, which was replaced by 'Help to Claim' which delivers service by local Citizen Advice (DWP, 2018b).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter critically reviewed how concepts of behaviour change and conditionality were defined and used since the Labour governments of 1997-2010, and the origins and aims of UC. It reviewed the historical changes in social security policy under the Labour governments and made comparisons with those of the Coalition government. Overall, the welfare reform agenda was shifted into a lever for changing behaviour. The role of governments in welfare service provision had gradually diminished, while that of non-government bodies and individuals was increased.

The term of welfare dependency has been reframed and extended to in-work claimants by the Coalition government. Neoliberal governance depoliticised and privatised social problems as individual irresponsibility, which oriented individuals towards a transformation of values and behaviours, in relation to individual needs, utility, rationality, morality. As such, the concept of behaviour change was stakeholder-relative and client-relative. Neoliberal governance challenged political values such as universalism. The Labour governments and the Coalition government employed government-dominated prescribed moral criteria, with a legitimate and conditional contractual approach, which gradually diverted away from Marshall's (1950) unconditional and de-commodified social rights. It was increasingly evident that the policymakers took decontextualized perspectives that meant, they focused on the individual behavioural irresponsibility of claimants at the expense of more

structural factors. The extended and intensified use of sanctions eroded Nozick's (1974, 1993) idea of a non-violation of rights.

The ontological view of behaviour depicted *unpredictable, unique, irregular features.* It entailed 'individual self-provisioning, self prudentialism and ethnic responsibility' (Dean, 2007, p. 6). The democratic socialist Titmuss's (1963a, 1963b) humanitarian, non-judgemental, non-stigmatic and inclusive approach of social rights related to frontline stakeholders and administrative service. Needs were interpreted by different individuals in reference to Fraser's (1989, 1997) notion of shared meaning and intersubjective reciprocity. This was differing from the arguments made by Murray (1984, 1996), who remarked that the removal of stigma undermined the responsible civil society. This led to discussions in chapter 5-7 regarding the personalised approach(es) to attend to the UC recipients' needs, given the interpretivist and relative nature of service delivery on the micro-level.

The concern with reciprocity was related to communitarian perspectives on mutually-reinforcing responsibilities within a moral community. The deservingness was framed by the Labour governments on the basis of the contribution to the moral community and undertaking work-related activity. Utilitarian arguments in favour of behaviour change and conditionality underlined its goal or purpose in promoting overall social solidarity.

The aim of UC was to simplify working-age benefits, to ease in-work progression, to increase work-related incentives, and to reduce fraud and error. Compared to the Labour governments who used tax credits as policy instruments to deal with families with children and pensioners, the Coalition government reduced the level of tax credits, and introduced capping and cutting which made the system less generous (Summers, 2018; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). The context change would influence what it originally aimed to achieve, when it interacted with personalised, intensified and extended conditionality (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). It was prominently evident that the extended, intensified and personalised conditionalities changed the distinction between traditional deserving and undeserving poor (Watts et al., 2014). It is crucial to investigate how such change can better inform the behavioural change

of active citizenry. Before the chapters of empirical findings, the next chapter explores the paternalist theoretical framework, from which an analytical framework is chosen with justifications to steer the data analysis.

Chapter 3 Critical Review on Paternalism and Behaviour Change

The thesis's theoretical perspective draws on paternalism, which has been widely used in behaviour science and intervention studies. Social policy and administration are deemed theoretically and practically interrelated and interconnected within a multi-disciplinary subject (Spotswood, 2016). This chapter outlines the justifications of 1) why paternalism is more attuned to the context of behaviour change, 2) why paternalism is relevant to the concept of behaviour change and social security and 3) why it is important to understanding behaviour change more generally as opposed to behaviour science.

The structure of this chapter is made as follows. This chapter first discusses where paternalism fits within the wider framework for understanding behaviour change in relation to social security policy and Universal Credit (UC). Before the discussion of paternalist framework, a wide discussion and analysis of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is presented. Then, this chapter critically reviews the paternalist theory of Lawrence Mead, Julian le Grand and Bill New, and Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, as well as its relationship with the concept of this research: behaviour change. From paternalist theories, using the exemplar of the nudge of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, it is examined in relation to the Coalition government social security. This chapter argues that government paternalism appears to be more relevant and explicit in exploring how, why, if and when UC influences (or not) the employment-related decisions of respondents, and thus be employed as a theoretical foundation to steer data analysis with critiques.

3.1 Paternalism, Behaviour Change, and Social Security

The definitions and constructs of behaviour change have been broadly investigated across a wind range of fields, such as social psychology (Bandura, 1971, 2001; Davis et al., 2015; Deci and Ryan, 2000; Festinger, 1962), behavioural economics and public policy (Oliver, 2015; Sunstein, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008; Thaler, 2015), organisational management (Soss et al., 2011b), social practices (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Welch, 2016), sociology and social policy (Daly, 2018; Dwyer, 2018,

2019; Hill, 2003; Halpern et al., 2004; Le Grand and New, 2015; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Wright et al., 2018), and public administration (Brodkin, 2007, 2008; Brodkin and Marston, 2013; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007; Dunleavy et al., 2005; Herd and Moynihan, 2018; Hupe and Hill, 2007; Lispky, 2010 [1980]; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000; Osborne, 1993). The concepts of behaviour change are generally defined as social phenomena, including social practices and entities, which are variously interpreted regarding a response of doing or not doing, which reproduces internal factors (motivations, the structure of feelings, capital and cultural resources, socially learnt skills, the order of volitions, desires, values, reasons, and responsibilities and bodies) or external factors (behavioural change/intervention policy, interpersonal relations with social actors, praise or punishment, socially shared and cultural meanings, and social structures), sedimented on the basis of past struggles, and conditions for present and future ones (Chatterton, 2016; Frankfurt, 1971; Fraser, 1989; Halpern et al., 2004; Scanlon, 1998; Spotswood and Marsh, 2016; Welch, 2016).

Compared with behaviour science, which lends a narrower view to behaviour change, paternalism seeks a wider framework for investigating the understanding and meaning in choice-making by individuals in the complex social world, thereby informing 'behaviour change' social security and, more recently, UC (Chatterton, 2016; Oliver, 2013a). First, the paternalist approach is relevant to the Coalition government's social-economic contexts of UC implementation (Hallsworth and Sanders, 2016). In light of Foucault's (2008) neoliberalism, which states that individualised citizenry should be encouraged, as one should be encouraged to think for oneself, produce for oneself, and earn for oneself, a. k. a. homo œconomicus (see section 2.1.2), the paternalist approach seeks to guide the choice and behaviour of social-economic human beings, which is as a part of the toolkit for the Coalition government's approach to exercise a broader form of social control (Denford et al., 2016; Leggett, 2014; Sunstein, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Watts et al., 2014).

Richard Thaler advised the Coalition Party in the 2010 general election (Osborne and Thaler, 2010). Paternalist approaches, alongside social market strategies, become increasingly evident, as the Behaviour Insights Team (BIT) in the cabinet office was established in 2010. For example, the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit employed Thaler

and Sunstein's nudge techniques as policy tools to inform behaviour change in 2010 (Dolan et al., 2010). Behaviour change has been extended by the Cabinet Office from economic behaviour to focal issues regarding personal wellbeing in social security.

Furthermore, paternalism has been attuned with conservative thinkers that reject the coercive approach in favour of 'a post-bureaucratic approach to regulation that makes use of new technologies and insights from social psychology and behavioural economics to achieve our policy goals in a less burdensome and intrusive way' (Conservatives, 2009, p. 3). The Coalition government of 2010 claimed that 'government [the Coalition government of 2010] will be a much smarter one, shunning the bureaucratic levers of the past and finding intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable people to make better choices for themselves' (Her Majesty's Government, 2010, pp. 7–8). One of its purposes was to reduce administrative burden, termed by the Conservatives (2009, p. 5), referring to the costs of 'complying with each new regulation' for the public, private and third sector that 'weigh down innovation, community action and social responsibility'. Paternalism was in agreement with the social-economic contexts of the financial crisis of 2008–2009 in which the paternalist approach was deemed inexpensive, fast and an accessible toolkit in achieving policy goals. It was also attuned to the social-economic contexts of the 2010 Coalition government context, which introduced a series austerity approach, such as freezing, cutting and capping, where UC was introduced to simplify the system, reduce fraud and error, and incentivise work-related behaviour change (House of Commons, 2016).

In addition to the Coalition government's social security approach, the concept of behaviour change has been investigated in *Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour* by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office (Halpern et al., 2004). Thaler and Sunstein's paternalist approach was perceived as a useful conceptual tool. It is relevant in understanding the conceptions of behaviour change and interpersonal relations more generally, as what shapes an individual's choice appears more contextualised (Halpern et al., 2004). The choice architecture is proposed to employ heuristics to guide the individual to choose the options that the policymakers believe to be optimal (paternalist component), albeit individuals preserve the freedom to choose as they desire (libertarian component) (Denford et

al., 2016). The BIT, also known as the 'nudge unit' and 'behaviour insight unit', develops strategies in a wide range of areas, such as public health, energy use, consumer empowerment, and work and entitlement (BIT, 2019).

Finally, paternalism is relevant to public policy and social security policy, as well as latterly relevant to UC design. The BIT from behavioural economics and social psychology seeks to reduce benefit fraud, error and debt by the Cabinet Office (2012). The BIT (2019) proposes strategies to handle poverty and decision making in relation to work and entitlement. With respect to UC, the BIT has been underlined by the House of Common and the Department for Work and Pensions Committee, as a foundational framework to achieve the original aims of UC that 'both internal and external experts consider how the BIT could be applied to maximise the UC claimant's engagement with communication' (House of Commons and Work and Pensions Committee, 2015, p. 19).

In the following section, critical reviews are provided concerning the different concepts of paternalisms, namely, Mill's (1859) liberty principle, Mead's (1997b) new paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein's (2008) paternalist nudge (libertarian paternalism), and Le Grand and New's (2015) government paternalism. As liberty and freedom constitute the focal issues of paternalisms, Mill's liberty principle is analysed before critical reviews made on new paternalism, nudges and government paternalism to pave the way for the forthcoming discussions on paternalism and its relevance in empirical research on UC.

3.2 Mill, Paternalism and Liberty

Mill's (1859) *On Liberty* is influential in government and libertarian paternalism and has been widely cited by Le Grand and New (2015) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Mill reveals a social aspect of the paternalist intervention, which is built on the basis of the formation of individual-reflective consciousness (Aristotelian and Kantian) and Hume's rational control of sensation, self- (re) production and self-mastery of personhood, subjectivity and behaviour (Kantian). In the work of Mill, we can trace the philosophical underpinnings of the appropriate state intervention, which entails a

direct, personalised, contextualised, plural, heterogeneous, interactive, interrelated, protective approach to subjectivity, autonomy and behaviour change (chapter 6 and 7). It is aligned with what authorities, social actors and stakeholders have designed to (de-) legitimatise individuals' self-regarding behaviours, social freedom and needs. This section critically reviews Mill's liberty principles and examines its relations to the paternalist framework.

Mill's principle of liberty is built on the idea of utilitarianism (Bentham, 1962; Mill, 1863). Mill (1859, p. 13) remarks that the utility that drives interest for a progressive being that warrants it in the end. Berlin's (2002 [1958]) critique is that Mill does not elucidate whether maximising the utility is via widening the diversity, versatility, fullness of life, of a spontaneous and unique individual, a community and civilisation.

Jeremy Bentham (1999) associates the individual disposition with the sensibility of happiness and pleasure. Such principles of happiness and pleasure refer to the standard, final and efficient causes that conform to one's thought, and fashion one's behaviours during a given period (Bentham, 1999, Chapter 3). Bentham remarks on the sensation of happiness as a right and end of behaviour (Schofield, 2011), as Bentham (1999, p.31) writes, 'pleasure, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends [sic] that the legislator has in view'. Nevertheless, Bentham does not specify whether and how citizenry can have and maintain both non-violable rights and citizenry-related ends. Moreover, the consequentialist claim would be problematic as it only attends to the outcomes of the person involved. It would be contradictory to the deontological theory if the utilitarian theory is applied to determine where punitive sanctions are deserved. This is because utilitarianists do not deny that it is morally permissible for a free person with a morally wrong intention to conduct behaviour that leads to the best outcomes for the individual's own interests. This means that neither Bentham nor Mill offers an account regarding the discrepancy between a consequential and a non-consequential deontological utility. Fitzpatrick (2008) defines 'social utility' in relation to distributive justice, which insightfully highlights its associations with the interdependency, interrelation and interaction in the field of social space, while leaving the meaning of this concept unexplained. But, this concept does not tell us conflict, contradiction, incompatibility and irreconciliation, in relation to the

consequential and the non-consequential utilities and motivations of behaviour change (Cole, 1945).

Mill defines the Greatest Happiness Principle as 'the greater amount of happiness altogether', suggesting an improvement to the happiness of the most people possible (1863, p.14). However, Mill does not provide a scientific, logical or theological approach to justify whether the reductive conception of utility can be measurable, and if so, how it can be measured. Bentham (1962) leaves his utilitarian approach, which attempts to quantitatively measure the happiness principle, unclear. As it overlooks that facts that, some elements such as the reproduction process of perception cannot be merely measured by Bentham's (1962, 1999) six measurements, namely, intensity, duration, certainty, remoteness, repeatability, and purity. Due to the dynamic process of perceiving, feeling, understanding and behaving in the pursuit of happiness, the attainment of Greatest Happiness cannot be quantitatively measured or totalised. The happiness principle in Mill's (1859) term does not circumscribe to sensory experiences but also refers to the reflecting faculty embodied in intelligent judgement, Hume's (1994 [1817]) rational control of emotion and imagination, moral sentiment, self-respect and dignity per the well-being of the mind and body (Rawls, 2007). As such, Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle does not justify how it could inform and be manifested in driving behaviour change.

Mill's (1859) civil and social liberty refer to 'the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual' (p. 6). Mill's (1859) liberty principle is placed on the discussions about the adjustment between individual independence and social control. Moreover, Mill's (1859) liberty principle focuses on the interference with individual behaviour, either by the dealing of social compulsion and control, legal penalties or public moral coercion or norms. Mill's (1859) civil and social liberty relies on the purpose of the individual and social progress developed from the balance between the individual and the government. Unlike Locke (1960 [1690]), Mill does not offer an explicit discussion of the freedom of will and its necessity in determining peculiar behaviour change.

In favour of Constant's conception of modern liberty, which refers to civil rights and practical freedom free from external constraints in the constitutional state, and Montesquieu's (1977) liberty as the right to exert an action within the law, Berlin (2002 [1958]) develops Mill and Bentham's conceptions of liberty to a negative conception of liberty (Claeys, 2013). Berlin's (2002 [1958]) concept of negative liberty refers to an area where a man can act without external obstruction which are internalised as obstacles that hinder self-perfection and hence self-realisation (Skinner, 2002).

Before Berlin, negative liberty is defined by Hobbes as 'a man's act with the absence of external impediment' where a man exercises his power, either being able or unable to (1651, p. 75). Hobbes's (1651) conception of the liberal individual is that someone is free from being hindered from doing certain things that a person is able to do. Both Hobbes and Berlin highlight the existence of the individual that is free from social control. Hobbes (1651), however, does not reject the paternalist function of legislation, hoping to increase centralised control, writing that:

> '… for the use of laws (which are but rules authorized) is not to bind people from all voluntary actions, but to direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion; as hedges are set not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way…'

However, Berlin remarks on the paternalist approach as despotic, which shapes an individual against their own autonomy and desires, as he writes, the 'paternalist approach is to treat men as if they were not free' (Berlin, 2002 [1958], p.11). Another critique made from Berlin is that Berlin's vision of the paternalist approach does not respect reason embodied within an individual's conception of self and behaviour in accordance with one's own purpose.

Berlin (2002 [1958], 2003) constructs a positive conception of liberty. It suggests an individual who has an appropriate capability and disposition in particular situations can exercise self-mastery on the basis of one's consciousness of being, thinking, willing, deemed rightness in choosing in relation to one's purposes (Crowder, 2018; Svendsen, 2014). As such, Berlin remarks that 'I am free only in the fastness of my own inner self', justifying one's behaviour (2003, p. 62). Berlin's conception of

positive liberty is derived from and superior to the actual wish, internal forces and acts of the individual. Berlin (2002 [1958]) remarks on the cognitive fallacy where a paternalist interference would be justified. In addition, Berlin remarks on the dangers of the overuse of positive liberty to justify authoritarian or totalitarian regimes where the paternalised individual has a limited positive sense of liberty (Miller, 2003).

Incorporating Berlin's positive and negative concept of liberty, Kleinig (1983) develops a negative paternalism that protects the individual's rights from harm or detrimental effects, whereas a positive sense of paternalism seeks a rationale to endorse a positive benefit. However, neither Berlin (2002 [1958]) nor Kleinig (1983) demonstrates how a paternalist interference is justified to enable a person to pursue his or her own good, and to achieve what Berlin (2002 [1958]) calls the dominant 'true' self, which is self-identified or self-abnegated by the identified one's wishes, needs, good and freedom (see discussion in section 8.4).

Berlin's positive conception of liberty is developed on the basis of Mill's (1859) concept of individuality, which suggests individuals should pursue one's own well-being through one's own means. Mill's concept of individuality is woven from Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1854, p. 13, 27, 43) concepts of individual spontaneity, originality, energy, individual vigour and manifold diversity, which highlights one's capability to exercise one's freedom, the virtue of individuality. Human nature is analogous to a tree that 'requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces (e.g. autonomous form) which make it a living thing' (Mill, 1859, p. 55). Teleologically, Mill agrees with Humboldt (1854, p.11) who writes that:

> '… the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent of whole …'

Mill does not encourage the liberty to be un-progressive or downplay the standard of taste (Claeys, 2013). Mill (1859) asserts that individual independence is absolute, meaning the individual has the absolute sovereignty of his own mind and body to improve his or her dispositions.

The tensions between liberty and conformity run through Mill's argument (Claeys, 2013). Mill (1859) denies a contractual relationship between the individual and society from which a social obligation can be deduced from it. Instead, Mill (1859) states that the individual is accountable for his or her self-regarding behaviour. Mill does not specify how the individual conforms himself to the required behaviours or the ideal, positioned in the light of some accurate relevance to that individual's basic characters, values and talents, self-culture and appropriateness (Arneson, 1980).

Moreover, Mill (1859) states that the individual is accountable to others and can be punished by society if the individual's conduct cause harms to society. To rightfully exercise intervention over the individual, Mill (1859) remarks that the reason for mankind to interfere with someone's liberty is mainly for the purpose of self-protection. Mill's concept of individuality is in line with Gierke's (1990) perspectives on the sovereignty (dominant principle) of the individual and the sovereignty of the state (Li, 1998). Here, individual sovereignty must be interfered upon by the sovereignty of the supervisory state when the individual could be inexperienced, weak in body and mind, or does not have superior insights, common sense or political authority; hence, they should be 'supervised, directed, restricted and regulated' wherever these elements concern public interest, thereby leading to the effect of state sovereignty governing the collective (Gierke, 1990, pp. 110–111). Such sovereignty of the supervisory state is regarded as having transformative and regenerative effects on individual behaviour. As such, Mill (1859, p. 13) seeks to develop individual sovereignty to be 'over himself, over his own body and mind' to enjoy full-fledged liberty of thought before acting upon individuality.

Mill (1859) examines how the individual should freely act upon their thoughts, opinions and perspectives, and this should compound one of the elements of well-being for individual and social progress. Furthermore, Mill stresses the importance of having the freedom to an individual's own good and public goods from utilitarian respects (1859, p. 16), writing that:

> 'The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or

impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.'

Mill's individuality entails the idea that one's thought and behaviour changes are irreducible, self-transformative, diverse, novel, lived and incomplete, and problem solving-related (Berlin, 2002 [1958]). In line with Bentham, Mill (1859) stands against dogmatism, as he regards dogma as a mere profession that prevents the revealing of the truth from experiences.

Mill (1859) depicts behaviours in relation to the freedom of the expression as the presupposition of exercising one's consciousness, mind and body, subjectivity, practical reasoning, sensation, speculation, scientific logic, morality and theology. Mill is a descendent of subjective idealism, such as Berkeley (1901), who sees the human perception as existence of thought, imagination, memory as being perceived in a way that can be applied to sensible things (Hamilton, 1998). Moreover, Berkeley (1901) offers the connection between behaviour and the weakness of human understanding. Mill's (1859) ontology of sensation reveals the fallibility of human's subjective opinion. However, Mill does not specify whether the epistemological assumption is fully discoverable by means of reasoning, moral theory or behavioural form of practice beyond sensation.

With respect to paternalist intervention, Mill (1859) highlights the fallibility of social interference to one's judgment, which may be unwittingly wrong or misapplied to an individual's contingent circumstance. Asserting liberty, 'the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress' (Mill, 1859, p. 53), Mill's harm principle refuses external restriction on individual liberties (including suicide), unless such intervention reduced harm to others (the social aspect of liberty), or even if it is to promote the individual's own good with no other effective means:

'the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them; it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be

done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually or in voluntary combination.' (Mill, 1859, p. 100).

Mill (1859) criticises government interference for three main reasons: 1) certain things can be done better by the individual than by the government when an individual is fit to conduct their own business and maintain personal interests; 2) the behaviour of the individual may strengthen their mental faculties and exercise their own judgement, and; 3) government interference should be restricted when it is unnecessary. Although Mill admits to the fallibility of the individual, he advocates for individual sovereignty in terms of an individual knowing his or her own situation better than anyone else, which differs when others imposed their own preference on another individual.

However, Mill does not deny to paternalist intervention or the government's role in the self-regarding and non-self-regarding sphere, writing that: 'those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury' (Mill, 1859, p.14). From Mill's perspective, paternalism can be justified by preventing someone from being harmed by undertaking involuntary behaviours and preventing inappropriate intervention to one's interest for that person's own good or welfare, as he writes that: 'all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen' (Mill, 1859, p. 93). Mill's paternalism, in the forms of autonomy-enhancing and deliberation-enhancing interference, can be justified to preserve and maximise one's free choice in the future (Arneson, 1980; Claeys, 2013; R. Dworkin, 2005)

Mill narrowly endorses the prevention of inappropriate intervention to an individual's interest. The problem remains in that Mill fails to specify 1) whether a paternalist intervention can be justified if a person consciously seeks to behave against one's own good as a part of one's values, such as altruism. Mill's types of harms are extended by Feinberg (1971) to involve self-inflicted harm and by Buchanan and Brock (1989) into risk management (e.g. a trade-off between self-determination/voluntariness and wellbeing). 2) As Mill's claim that self-regarding action includes moral actions, Mill's paternalist approach is vague in how it can be justified to intervene on moral behaviours (Arneson, 1980). 3) And it is less clear whether and how Mill's paternalist intervention can enhance an individual's liberty,

ability and rationality to perform individual decisions and achieve human excellence, whilst not restricting liberty (R. Dworkin, 2005); and 4) when paternalist intervention is justified while restricting individual's will and liberty if different degrees of risk exist in every decision (Arneson, 1980). This suggests that Mill fails to specify how, and in what conditions, to ensure that paternalist intervention in the name of harm-prevention would not cause alternatively perceived and actual detrimental effects (Oh, 2016).

Mill (1859) denies extending the role of legitimate means to act as the role of moral police until the harm of the other-regarding behaviours encroaches the legitimate liberty of the individual. Mill has made social sense of liberty that renders paternalist intervention. However, Mill's concept of other-regarding behaviour does not fully capture Durkheim's (1984 [1893]) subjective and interdependent nature of social-moral ties that permeate in the social reciprocity and cooperation among individuals in an organic society. A conservative argument is made that Mill (1859) narrowly decontextualises the barriers to legislative liberty of the individual and self-protection from harm directly caused by other-regarding behaviour *in the first instance*, and fails to address the harm caused *indirectly* from the interdependent society (Li, 1998). Lord Devlin (1965) proposes the enforcement of moral laws in order to preserve social-moral order and protect citizens from indirect harms and immoral effects by others, rather than merely enforcing particular behavioural patterns. On the basis of the enforcement of morals, Gerald Dworkin (2005) develops moral paternalism, which is made for the moral sense, the moral rightness and morally better-off for a person interfered upon. Feinberg (1971, 1984), who endorses legal paternalist intervention, with both soft and hard paternalist approaches, remarks that government rule should prevent immoral acts that cause harm to individual concerns. Lord Devlin addresses that a legitimate instrument should protect the moral principles accepted by the welfare of the society in which the individual lives. Slipping between legal and moral paternalisms, Mill does not sufficiently specify how to balance, either compatible or conflicting elements of ends on individual and social concerns, among legislation, paternalist duty, and moral values that affect the prudence of individual behaviour and the welfare of the society.

In company with Mill's paternalist argument, it is undeniable that paternalism is inevitably created alongside different forms of liberty. Mill's concept of liberty is aligned with the reflective form of liberty endorsed by Kant (1994 [1781]), who highlights the individual exercise of one's will in some orders by which individual control of his or her behaviours on the basis of perceived moral rightness and wrongness. Kantian paternalism could be justified when the person having distortion in instrumental reasoning hinders self-realisation and reflection with critiques (Rawls, 2000).

Moreover, Hegel makes a holistic account of liberty as a social telos. Hegel constructs a concept of social liberty that endorses self-determining will to be realised externally in existing rules, policy, legislation and social institutions (family, civil society, and constitutional state), which offers a foundation to secure social conditions and constitute a socially organic whole (Neuhouser, 2003; Steven, 1989). Hegel (2001) incorporates Mill and Kant's reflective, presenting the idea that social behaviour is not entirely the product of one's own will, mind and dispositions, and hence, social behaviour is not entirely one's own (Neuhouser, 2003). Hegel endorses the paternalist claim, which seeks social institutions to secure the condition of pursuing one's substantive concept of life. However, Habermas (2002) remarks that the Hegelian account of the function of paternalism may be limited, unless it secures the legal framework to regulate capitalist commodity exchanges and the labour force in the labour market.

3.3 New Paternalism and Behaviour Change

Mill's liberty principle has been embraced, 'violated', modified and reframed by different paternalist frameworks. The new paternalist approach (Mead, 1997b) aims to deal with poverty with an emphasis on changing employment-related behaviour by social policy, which has some relevance with what the Coalition government reinforced, which is moving into 'fulfilling work' is 'the best route out of poverty' (Cameron, 2012), as well as the aims of UC in dealing with out-of-work and in-work poverty. This section critically reviews new paternalism that Mead (1997b) endorses, in relations with empirical cases of social policy, to justify why new paternalism does not sufficiently fit within the framework to steer data analysis of UC research.

Enforcement and directives are depicted as two main features of new paternalism (Mead, 1997b). Enforcement implies 'action taken by society to secure compliance with values that are not themselves contentions' (Mead, 1997b, p. 4). To enforce a recipient to conduct socially accepted behaviour and values, work ethics and morality are embedded into Mead's vision of paternalist policy. The new paternalist policy required recipients to conform to agreed-upon values and state-defined responsibilities before they are entitled to benefits. Second, Mead's version of the family program includes a lack of authority, and thus, it should be informally directed: 'they (policy as well as administration) must tell the people obligated what they are supposed to do' (Mead, 1997b, p. 4). Mead's (1986, 1997b) version of state aid requires benefit recipients to undertake compulsory work search and training as instructed in order to retain eligibility. Mead's new paternalist approach is generally thought of as a tough approach to 'sort the deserving out from among the undeserving poor' (Wilson, 1997, p. 343). The new paternalist way emphasises obligation rather than rights and need. New paternalism has both utilitarian and authoritarian features (Deacon, 2002; Soss et al., 2011a). It aims to make people believe they *must* work (authoritarian), and conditionality is constructed as something that they can use to justify that they have done something in return to produce the moral good to the moral community (contractual) if they desire help:

> '… paternalist principles and good reason suggest to justify the hard work and personal forbearance of those who have helped create and sustain prosperity and freedom, whereas denying them implies that having a good character is unrelated to maintaining a good society.'

> (Wilson, 1997, pp. 342-343)

New paternalism seeks to build up a contract where the government is subject to provide benefits for recipients; in return, recipients are expected to be self-governed, achievable through regular work (Mead, 2012). A critique of new paternalism is that it does not fully acknowledge the government's responsibility to create jobs. In contrast with Marshall's citizenship, Mead's version of the provision of entitlement is neither universal nor unconditional, such as the application of work enforcement in US social policies (Dwyer, 2000). For example, the Work Incentive amendment

of 1967 established the first work requirement in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Schram, 1999). From 1986 to 1988, Republicans strengthened federal rules to enforce work-related conditionality, such as the Family Support Act (FSA) (Mead, 1997a, 1997b). In 1992, Republicans cut coverage and devolved welfare control, such as the Personal Responsibility and the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and its stricter sanctions in cases of deemed non-compliance with welfare requirements (Mead, 1997b). The number of states which imposed full sanction increased from nine in 1996 to thirty from 1998 onward (Fang and Keane, 2004).

State aid is given on the basis of lifestyle and the degree of acceptance of the principle of conditionality, rather than merely on the basis of a claimant's need (Mead, 1986, 1997b). Mead (2010, pp. 51–52) fails to acknowledge the importance of the investment approach to human capital. Compared with investing in training, Mead (1997b) highlights the importance of investing in high-quality and decentralised administration, where the stakeholders at the national and local levels collaborate and make new policies to interact with clients, such as the Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) welfare employment program of California and the PRWORA of 1996, which has a high-quality administration and advanced skilled committees. Mead (2010) narrowly demonstrates that a good administration should not only take account the conditionality of eligibility but also should direct people to perform agreed-upon behavioural conditionality, where work becomes a client's responsibility, rather than providing more choices for customers in the quasi-market.

Mead (1997b, 2010) narrowly concentrates on the behavioural failure that renders willingness and capacity to conform work disciplines and demanding lifestyles, such as showing up for work and taking employment offers. New paternalism puts too much emphasis on punitive sanctions and places personal failures as the reason for claimants being stuck in the benefits system, such as less desire to move off benefits into employment, unwillingness or unable to meet the eligibility of employment or a lack of work disciplines (Deacon, 2002). However, it fails to specify structural factors, such as market failures and barriers, in the labour market opportunities, which may be inaccessible for vulnerable groups of people. To make employment

behaviour change, Mead (1997b) favours a mandatory approach, which is thought of as it can be more effective than voluntary policies, in terms of moving recipients off benefits into work. With respect to in-work poverty, Mead (1992) narrowly demonstrates low working hours as the main causal factor, and it is crucial to enforce recipients' behaviour change that means seeking and working for longer hours is advisable to alleviate in-work poverty.

New paternalism has limitations with respect to the individual, the community and social aspects. On an individual level, new paternalism underestimates the disincentives coming from inadequate individual capital, such as travelling resources constraints, which would undermine the feasibility of job seeking. Another critique is that new paternalism does not distinguish the roles of interest and incapability in behaviour change. For example, PRWORA pushes for deemed incapacity working poor into workfare, regardless of the best interest of recipients, causing mismatches between available jobs and skills of recipients (Smith, 2007). This unwittingly causes recipients to repetitively claim benefits. The work-first approach, which aims to place recipients in unsubsidised employment as soon as possible, may not be sufficient in enabling citizens to keep their employment for a long of period time (Feldman, 2011).

Second, new paternalism signifies work as a primary source of mainstream value and morality that individuals should adhere to. However, new paternalism does not endorse a collective action to deal with the benefits and employment-related behaviour issues on a community basis, where shared norms, civic virtues and the consciousness of identities of a group of individuals foster the values of work and responsibility (Deacon, 2002). For the social aspects, it has been criticised that an individual's capabilities could be constrained when an individual's autonomous status is infringed upon by behavioural conditionality, and these constraints could be exacerbated by non-recognition from the society (Ben-Ishai, 2012). Foucault's (1995, p. 25) idea of 'reciprocal relations', cited by Fletcher (2011), who develops a mutually reciprocal relationship by incorporating Lipsky's (2010 [1980]) theory, entails non-judgemental, discretionary and professional services when front-line staff interpret an advisor role. As such, new paternalism fails to acknowledge

whether, how and to what extent social actors affect individuals' perception and experiences of behaviour change.

3.4 Nudge, Choice Architecture and Behaviour Change

Thaler and Sunstein's nudges seek empirical validity of neo-classical behavioural economics. Nudges do neither draw on reducing harms to others nor deal with behaviours that are detrimental to others, or what economists term as externalities (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013). Incorporating arguments from the Heuristics and Biases literature (Gilovich et al., 2001), Herbert Simon's (1955, 1972) bounded rationality as nudging is designed to minimally intervene on one's autonomy, and preserve people's freedom and preference in a wide range of practical environments (Sunstein, 1997, 2014). Thaler and Sunstein's (2008) account of human rationality and behaviour change is developed as a technique, and its application is made on the basis of the interplay of physical, economic-social and psychological underpinnings.

Deontologically, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 5) highlight that it is of moral duty and responsibility to steer people's choices to make people's 'lives longer, healthier, and better', which can be judged by those interfered upon. Nudges are encouraged to be made to inform self-regarding behaviours to improve healthier lifestyles, as Thaler and Sunstein explain (2008). The term of better-off is advocated by Thaler and Sunstein's paternalist approach and is largely assessed by an individual's subjective informed and desired standard of well-being (Blumenthal-Barby, 2013). One's own perception of better off largely depends on the extent of realistic of the target that individual makes; capability to own, assess and judge one's better-off, which is contingently embodied among multiple selves, such as short-term and long-term selves, as well as past, current and future selves, and when one autonomously and rationally assess such heterogenous good (Blumenthal-Barby, 2013).

Thaler and Sunstein (2008) empirically distinguish asocial homo œconomicus as self-serving, utility maximisers in economic theory, and humans whose actual behaviours with social and psychological complexity and fallibility (Whitehead et al., 2011). The fallibility of a human includes being lazy, busy, making mistakes and chronic inertia. In the same vein, Hume (1994 [1817]) remarks on the fatal errors that occur when prudent and deliberate decisions are not made in every contingent

circumstance. By drawing upon two forms of thought, which are 1) intuitive, automatic, unconscious, uncontrolled, associative, emotional, and effortless system and 2) a more complex, reflective, controlled, self-aware, deductive, and rational system (Sunstein, 2014), Thaler and Sunstein (2008) employ the usage of heuristics to influence the human thinking systems and trigger unconscious and responsive behaviours.

A nudge can be used to control the contexts for the individual to make choices (Sunstein, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nudge is designed for incentivising behaviour change without using significant economic incentives to the person interfered upon (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). A nudge is generally thought of as 'remonstrating, reasoning and persuading rather than compelling' one's well-being beyond the utility endorsed by Mill (Sunstein, 2014, p. 18). The use of choice architecture alongside its social meanings are designed to improve human well-being in creative and private ways. Sunstein and Thaler (2003) offer a series of nudging approaches and liberty-preserving psychological techniques to deal with the conscious and sub-conscious predictable irrationality to promote choice. Main nudging techniques are means-related, such as 1) providing (personalised) default options that are designed to encourage healthy choices, so-called ecological rationality (Sunstein, 2015); 2) manipulating the frame or context where the individual makes choices, such as giving information on social norms (Sunstein, 2014); 3) regulating the timing of decision-making that provides individuals enough time; 4) tax and subsidy that influences the choice of consumers with less economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).

It has been advocated that government should mimic the techniques used by social actors in the private sector, which harnesses sociable, emotional, and human's fallacy (such as inertia to accept default option) and engage in a 'cooling-off' period of human's reflective system to evaluate the consequences before making a choice (Leggett, 2014). However, nudging choice-making and budging behaviour could not be interchangeable in contingent circumstances (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013; Oliver, 2013b). By manipulating one's context of choice-making without correcting cognitive biases, or a lack of what Fraser (1989) called mutual recognition, one's willpower and voluntariness may be constrained, and hence, may leave some

individuals with more or less difficulty in achieving one's end (Pennington, 2019). Feinberg (1984, 1989) remarks on the actual voluntariness, which does not reach the required level and would, therefore, fail to trigger behaviour change. This implies that how a (paternalist) nudge informs social policy, which places difficult choice-making directly into the design of social life, is not fully investigated in nudge-related literature (Blumenthal-Barby, 2013; Gilovich et al., 2001; Kelly, 2013).

Some of its tacit infringement of autonomy, which may contain trickery or deception, may interfere on people's choice with insufficient recognition or inaccurate understanding (such as herd mentality) of such interference (Caraban et al., 2019; Sunstein, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2011). Nudges could not necessarily produce sustainable behaviour change when people does not necessarily realise they have to change their behaviours (Oliver, 2017; Sunstein, 2017; Thompson, 1989). In the same vein, Foucault (1982, 1995) employs the concept of subjectivity, hoping neoliberalism seeks to liberate the individual to produce and struggle against an ideological structure, and to build up one's individuality, counterbalancing the techniques of paternalism with the analysis of the techniques of the self. Foucault (2010) incorporates Kant's deontological argument and highlights the importance of virtues, duty, and self-reflective and self-governing techniques as the central of generating subjectivities and governing practices. A Foucauldian critique is made that it is unclear about how and where a nudge improves the capacity of self-reflection, self-governing and exercising responsibility and interrogates what Festinger (1962) called cognitive dissonance, making a coherent connection between reasoning, choice-making and sustainable behaviour change.

Bovens (2009) highlights that for people who are less capable of taking autonomous control and making judgement changes and can unmask choice architecture and explicit manipulation, may loss actual autonomy, and a nudge may not create sustainable behaviour change. In the same vein, White (2013) remarks that a nudge does not work when nudgers employ more on the mechanism of behavioural economics, which is regarded as considering less social and psychological aspects of choice-making, such as interests, preferences, and what Max Weber called, value rationality (Hausman, 2012; Oakes, 2003). Sunstein (2017) highlights how a nudge may incur short-term, no net effects or counterproductive effects when 1) the

understanding of behaviour is inaccurate; 2) the information is complex or confusing; 3) people are upset or resentful towards the mandatory behaviour requirements; 4) people internalise nudging information or messaging to a minimal degree; 5) desired conduct is nullified by compensating behaviour. This argument is useful for the analysis of the empirical data (see chapter 6 and 7).

Furthermore, the social space of a nudge contributes to a comparatively thin concept, and hence, it may contribute to the narrow scope of practices of behaviour (Leggett, 2014). Bourdieu (1977, 1990) highlights how an internalised sense of knowledge and conditions of existence forming as a precondition to produce and reproduce practical behaviours, attitudes and structures in habitus. This means products of the perception, thought, behaviours, and subsequent experiences inherently owing to the institutional and social space and corresponding relations (between state and clients, for example) of its production. Social practices are produced through the interaction of individuals and the interplay with individual *habitus*, social position and various forms of *capital* within the social *field* (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Social behaviours are investigated from the phenomenological and pragmatist tradition of philosophy within the social structure, which is regarded as a sensuous form that 'we make ourselves in particular ways, in response to the conditions we find ourselves in' (Crossley, 2002, p. 172). Bourdieu (1977, 1990) provides concepts of structured (objectification) and structuring (subjectification, such as thought, perception and behaviour) that drive the practical functions and social trajectory. It has been remarked by Bourdieu that social behaviours are made in contrary to intellectualist idealism, as one has to reflect upon the primary experiences and relations, and reconstructs and responds to the hypothetical relationship existing outside the history and explanation of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990). In short, Bourdieu highlights behaviour changes as a product of heterogeneous combinations of the habitus of the individual and historical experiences, doxic assumptions and beliefs, subjective value-added components, (feeling) structures, types of resources, the degree of involvement of social facts and social control (Bourdieu, 1977; Crossley, 2002; Gane, 2010). Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of structure, nudge fails to specify how such intervention interplay within a deeper and wider concept of social space, including sense-making and practising in the field (Leggett, 2014).

The recurrent social practices and their self-transformation are analogous to vectors that operate in line with the liberal market and seek to re-legitimatise neoliberalism (Giddens, 2011; Leggett, 2014). Paternalist techniques are deployed to assist mutual communication in relation to the sphere of commodity exchange and of social labour in the increasingly privatised spheres. It is crucial to address Habermas's (1991) communicative rationality, seeking mutually agreed principles of reasoning whereby an individual can communicate, exchange and negotiate their opinions. Due to the unpredictable, unstable and precarious nature of human behaviours, difficulties arise for policymakers to understand what types of behaviour change that social and public policy actually leads to (Jones et al., 2011; Leggett, 2014; Whitehead et al., 2011), and how continually reconstructed and reproduced policy by nudgers, as well as the nudged, influence behaviour change that might emerge within the communicative spaces.

3.5 Government Paternalism and Behaviour Change

Government paternalism (including nudges) calls for better deliberation and prudence to reduce the harms caused by internalities, such as ill-considered automatic decision-making and behaviour change (Oliver, 2015). Supplementing Mill's paternalist argument, Le Grand and New develop a synthetic, analytical framework of paternalist government agency. Advocating for market-based reforms to public service, Le Grand and New provide a paternalist government framework through direct provision and regulation of redistributive benefits with a desire to improve the range of choices and the efficiency of supply (Pennington, 2019).

Le Grand and New (2015, p. 25) define government paternalism if A) its rationale involves addressing the failure of self-regarding decision-making autonomy by that individual; B) in order to further the individual's own good. New (1999) makes the teleological argument that government paternalism is made for correcting market failures for social redistribution and for enabling individual reasoning ability.

Le Grand and New (2015) provide a more explicit and nuanced discussion to justify government paternalist interventions. By assessing various kinds of paternalist approaches using two criteria, namely, the impact on well-being and that on

autonomy, Le Grand and New (2015) highlight that the most appropriate paternalist intervention should have the maximum impact on one's well-being as possible, while a minimal impact on one's autonomy.

Government paternalism is justified as it is deemed as being less likely to suffer from means-related reasoning failures compared with individuals, by writing that:

> '... because they [government] are obviously distinct from the individual herself, they do not suffer from the other three sources of her reasoning failure … of course they will have their own reasoning failures that will apply to the decisions that affect themselves; but they will not apply to decisions they make on behalf of others …' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 180).

Le Grand and New (2015) claim that the government may have a better judgement of individual's welfare than the individual herself/himself, because the government has a powerful ability to source information. It is plausible that New (1999) affirms that government paternalism can be justified for several reasons: 1) the state may be less likely to be swayed towards unconscious and emotional impulsions in making a judgement; 2) the state generally may have a better position to make relatively accurate judgements of individual's experiences; 3) the state may have relevant resources (long-term services, a wide perspective, large quantities of information, legitimate coercive power) to deal with means-related reasoning failures, such as the technical inability of able people, and hence, the state is deemed an appropriate actor to minimise the risks of reasoning failure.

However, government paternalism, which is designed to correct market failures, excludes the types of knowledge and realities to be gained through the process of competition that among users (Hayek, 1948). Teleologically, Hayek (1948) remarks on the importance of facts revealed from the wishes and desires of the consumers towards goods and services in competitive activities, rather than direct provisions from the 'expertise' for a particular area, writing that 'the function of competition is here precisely to teach us who will serve us well' (p. 97). Here, competition refers to the process of the development of opinion, where information and knowledge are spread to form unity and coherence of the economic system of the market (Hayek, 1948). On a micro-level, New's argument decontextualises the non-neutral, relative,

contingent nature of decentralised intervention on a peculiar individual (Lodge and Wegrich, 2016; Pennington, 2019).

Le Grand and New (2015, p. 182) assert that 'the government of the state can help its citizens to achieve its own ends, and thereby promote their own well-being and that of the whole society. Not a nanny state – rather, a helpful friend.' This suggests that government paternalism should work towards a greater virtue, meaning it should not infantilise, dominate, nor brutalise the person interfered upon (Claeys, 2013). Instead, it should improve the individual's capacity in making paternalist decisions and implement it to promote their own well-being and the common good of the whole society. As communitarianism demands, so must paternalist government policy.

Le Grand (1997, 2003) explores the plural, diverse and heterogenous kinds of motivations of users and providers in the quasi-markets and the procedures (such as rules, principles, instructions) alongside the array of ends to appeal to different individuals, hence, seeking to achieve more successful outcomes in behaviour change. However, Le Grand and New do not specify to secure public goods as an alternative component to individual well-being (Pennington, 2019).

Being fully aware of the social psychology theory of self-determination of behaviour (Deci and Ryan, 2000), a paternalist government framework works with the internal and external environments in which recipients find themselves. This process is in relation to the degrees of internalised processes of past experiences of raking external regulations, behaviour in different social contexts and the present ones, in accordance with one's integrated sense of self, needs, and goals. Le Grand and New (2015) typify reasoning failures in three main categories: autonomy-related, means-related and ends-related failures (see Table 1), as discussed below.

Autonomy is of importance in Kantian self-governing principles to achieve one's own deontological (Kant, 1997) and consequential ends (Mill, 1859). Feinberg (1989) refers to autonomy as the capacity for and right of sovereign authority, condition of self-government, and one's character traits deriving from one's own concept of the ideal within one's own self-imposed duties and moral principles

shaped by general rules that are derived from social practices. Le Grand and New (2015) refer to autonomy as a normative status and capacity, which remarks on the relations embodied between the government and the person with an accord of paternalist intervention. The social psychology theory of self-determination asserts that behaviour change can be more autonomous when the person fully internalises and experiences the greatest ownership of the conduct with less conflict within his or her own interpretation, translation and transformation of the policy (Deci and Ryan, 2000).

Le Grand and New (2015) synthesise autonomy-related barriers that hinder individualistic forms of behaviour change. It can be motivated by either intrinsic or intrinsic factors, and external or extrinsic causes of autonomy-related failure, which pertains to fallacy caused externally. This includes the ones caused by uninformed and unredeemed information from non-market conditions (Goodin, 1993) or an individual's 'procedural independence' (G. Dworkin, 1988, p. 20), and reflection is coerced by others or behave in nonvoluntary ways, hindering the person interfered upon to achieve what Feinberg (1988) called authenticity. This means autonomous individual behaves genuinely in his or her own character, and governs himself or herself through continually reconstructing the moral values and is free of coercion. For Miller (2003), the autonomy of making genuine choices is analogous to the situations that 'the world is arranged in such way that someone has many doors open to him, but it also depends on whether he is able to choose, genuinely, which door to pass through' (p.57). Internal or intrinsic causes of autonomy-related failures entail various forms of mental incapability and/or immaturity of an individual, ignorance, misevaluation of risks and benefits, misuse of evidence, cognitive disabilities, failures of understanding communications, failure of memory, failure to respect one's beliefs and the implications that lead faulty in self-rule by which an individual would take to be the best reason as acting in what Rawls (1971) explained as one's rational will to identify his real self through realising his actual values and commitments and achieve his own ends (Feinberg, 1988, 1989; Dworkin, 1988).

Le Grand and New (2015) remark that means-related and ends-related types of paternalism are justified as the ideal types of intervention, as both of which do not

significantly constrain one's instinct motivations derived from autonomy. Le Grand and New (2015) believe means-related and ends-related types of paternalism do increase the range of a rational and reasonable instrument to control one's emotions and passions. As Hume (1994 [1817]) wrote, 'reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' (p. 410). Means-related reasoning failures have been typified into four categories. The first one echoes Kantian paternalism, which recommends inputting one's deliberation to prevent distorted instrumental rationality (Cholbi, 2013). It refers to the limited technical ability of analysis and perception to understand the contingent situations and proceeding information, such as a lack of skills to estimate the probability of certain events (Le Grand and New, 2015). The second one refers to the limited experience to judge, imagine, and predict the prospective utility. This suggests that paternalism is designed to take into account the well-being of the future self, which is supposedly appropriately estimated by the decision-making of the current self (Pennington, 2019). The reasoning failures employed by government paternalism differ with that employed by Scanlon (1998), who contextualises the reasoning failures in accordance with contingent circumstances, thereby denying a normative concept of the failure of desires, motivations and reasoning. This means behavioural motivation can be different to a person who does not have appropriate information, experience and sensitivity to justify and voluntarily act according to their critical reflection in order to achieve one's own good and to control the self in every circumstance. The third source of reasoning failure pertains to limited willpower, such as the weakness of will and balance between deliberate rationality and emotion in choice-making and the lack of what Frankfurt (1971) called second-order preference that pertains preference about preference, or desire to desire. In Miller's (2003) words, the choice made by the people who do not have an independent reflection on one's desires, such as addiction, is not a genuine choice, as it is not a product of this person's inner freedom and does not belong to this person. The latter refers to limited objectivity, such as over-optimism and bias (Le Grand and New, 2015).

Ends-related reasoning failures pertain to errors made in establishing the ultimate goals and values, which have been chosen by the individual for themselves that affect

his or her own good (self-regarding behaviours in Mill's term) (Le Grand and New, 2015). Reflecting on the normative approach of behavioural economics and empirical evidence, government paternalism intends to impose the assumed harms made by the *future* self on the *current* self or equally, imposes the assumed harms made by the *current* self on the *future* self, depending on how rights are allocated within the *selves* between activities *currently* and in the *future* (Pennington, 2019). Le Grand and New do not fully acknowledge which self should take responsibility and whether the current or future activities should be given the privilege (Pennington, 2019). As such, government paternalism establishes a 'veil' (ontological division) separating (or externalising) a more complex picture of choice-making and behaviour change in the social reality and, or as, reasoning failures to match with certain behaviour patterns in the foregoing analysis.

Table 2. Reasoning Failures

Autonomy-related/reasoning failures:
Ignorance or lack of information (external);
'procedural independence' and 'reflection' is coerced by others (external);
Hypnosis and drugs (external);
Mental disability, mental illness and immaturity (internal);
'mistakes', misjudgement, and the misuse of evidence (internal), such as weakness of the will;
not act sufficiently voluntarily (internal), emotional decision making
Means-related failures/reasoning failures or barriers:
Limitations of technical ability, such as failure to process information properly; decision overload;
Limitation of experiences or imagination, such as status quo bias, endowment effect, myopia;
Limitation of willpower, such as procrastination, addiction, akrasia;
Limitation of objectivity, such as confirmatory bias
Ends-related failures:
For example, the government does not approve the perceived 'wrong' aims, ends and outcomes that someone themselves have voluntarily chosen and are going to achieve

Source: Le Grand and New (2015)

3.6 Using Government Paternalism to Steer Data Analysis, with Justifications

Government paternalism endorses the accommodation of the greatest possible individualistic form of autonomy. Government paternalism makes a rights-based argument that respects human dignity and a virtue ethical argument that seeks to minimise perceived intervention into one's capacity to make choices as a prerequisite of individuality. Five arguments have been made to justify why government paternalism is chosen as the main analytical framework to inform data analysis with critiques:

1) Government paternalism of Le Grand (1997, 2003) and Le Grand and New (2015) provides conceptual resources to be more relevant to the front-line providers and users in the British quasi-market than the context where new paternalism operates. However, there are important critiques of government paternalism. In particular, it would appear that Le Grand (2003) depicts relatively homogenised experiences, and motivations of social actors (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013; Wright, 2012). Le Grand and New's (2015) framework necessitates further empirically based research exploring the trajectories of behaviour change, and the interaction, intersubjectivity and interdependency between stakeholders, policy and its clients;

2) Mead's version of state aid requires benefit recipients to undertake compulsory work search and training in order to retain eligibility, writing that 'local agencies must emphasise putting recipients to work and not be satisfied with their old mission, which is mainly to determine eligibility and pay out grant money accurately' (1997b, p.61), which fails to provide a relevant analytical framework to analyse the eligibility of UC (Department for Work and Pensions [DWP], 2019d). New paternalism operates in the context that neither applies explicit and detailed discretion nor personalised support to assist the benefit claimants, as it is deemed 'costly' and 'unstable' for staff (Mead, 1997b, p. 62–63). New paternalism reinforces the rule enforcement by local caseworkers. As such, new paternalism is inconsistent and less relevant with the aims, approach, and operation of UC claiming heterogeneous, personalised support.

3) Nudging techniques provide insufficient explanations on how individuals internalise the dynamic, intersubjective, interdependent nature of social interaction and the interpretive, heterogenous, and oxymoronic nature of meaning-making of concepts (such as coercive, liberal) by individual and social actors, embodied in the trajectories of behaviour change (Veetil, 2011). Interpersonal and intrapersonal relations between the stakeholder and clients, social resources of capital and culture and expressions are important to the investigation of behavioural changes as the social process of production, which is not metaphysical reality (van Inwagen and Sullivan, 2007).

4) Both the paternalist nudge and government paternalism employ empirical evidence. The paternalist nudging approach largely employs non-transparent strategies, which provides ambiguous evidence that could not necessarily inform evidence-based policy (Lodge and Wegrich, 2016). Although Thaler and Sunstein advocate for increasing the degree of publicity and transparency of policy, it is less clear on how to make it more realistic in practice (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013). Government paternalism provides a more nuanced, explicit, direct approach (Le Grand and New, 2015). Le Grand and New (2015) state that the most appropriate and effective paternalist intervention should have the maximum impact on one's well-being as possible with perceived minimal impact on one's autonomy. This thesis applies this perspective to analyse why (which types of failure do government paternalist deal with) and how (when and what approaches do government paternalist employ to incur behaviour change, if, any behaviour change has occurred) UC influences benefit employment-related behaviours of respondents;

5) Government paternalism, which explores the ideal types of 'failures', is insightful to be employed to distinguish and analyse the extent of bureaucratised and institutionalised 'failures' claimed by Member of Parliament (MP) Iain Duncan-Smith (2010), which has been criticised as 'presenting a muddied homogenisation, full of inconsistency and uncertainty in terms of the nature of the subject that it envisaged' (Whitworth, 2016, pp. 412–431). This thesis elucidates and discusses how UC, alongside policy co-produced by providers and users, makes recipients with

different motivations of work and practice in the same direction, such as for both the well-being and public good.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed philosophical underpinnings regarding paternalism and behaviour change to assess an individual's liberty, autonomy, individuality, well-being and image of self. Paternalism provided not only a theoretical and conceptual framework but also an empirical and pragmatic analysis of how ontological, epistemological and ethical concepts of behaviour change were incorporated with tenets such as choice, freedom, rationality, responsibility, individuality, and mechanisms, such as quasi-markets (Whitworth, 2016). The main philosophical underpinnings to behavioural change covered Mill and Bentham's utilitarianism, Berlin's positive and negative concepts of liberty, Mead's modified social contract and new paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein's dichotomy of autonomous emotion and reflective rationality, and Le Grand and New's government paternalism, echoing Hume's reason, rationality and passion.

Behaviour change, in Mill's perspectives, was deemed as an individualist form of an irreducible, self-transformative, diverse, novel, lived and incomplete problem solving-related practice. Mill respected diverse, plural, and heterogenous individuality that reflected an individual's basic characters, values, talents and interests. Mill's liberty required other forms of freedom to achieve what Berlin called self-realisation and the realisation of freedom. They were human autonomy of reflection and prudence, self-reproduction of personhood and moral subjectivity, self-mastery and self-determination, which rendered appropriate paternalist intervention from the social and legal realms.

Mill's (1859) liberty principle remarked on the individual having the absolute sovereignty of protecting one's mind and body against the tendency of society and authority to impose penalties on the individual, writing that 'the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others' (p. 13). The justification of paternalism was gradually shifted from Mill's claim of preventing *external* harms in the non-self-

regarding sphere, to Berlin's dichotomy of preventing harms from *internal* development and *external* constraints respectively, to reducing the heterogeneously combined harms caused by the *external* constraints and the one *internalised* by the individual in different degrees and angles.

This chapter justified where paternalism fitted within the wider frameworks for understanding behaviour change, particularly in relation to social security policy and, more latterly, UC. New paternalism, paternalist nudges and government paternalism provided largely empirical and pragmatic suggestions in exploring human behaviour change in social practices. As discussed and justified in section 3.6, the paternalism-related literature insufficiently revealed the interpretivist and interactive nature of social intervention in the trajectories of behaviour change. Compared with the paternalist nudge, government paternalism was more direct and explicit in analysing the empirical and pragmatic aspects of human behaviour change, while it endorsed the accommodation of the greatest possible individualistic form of autonomy. A rights-based argument was made that government paternalism respected human dignity, and a virtue ethical argument was made that government paternalism sought to minimise perceived intervention to one's capacity to make choices as a prerequisite of individuality. Government paternalism was employed as a foundational framework in necessitating further empirically based research exploring the trajectories of behaviour change, and the interaction, intersubjectivity and interdependency between stakeholders, policy and citizens.

Drawing on the discussions on the paternalist frameworks in this chapter, chapter 5 discusses the social construction of UC implementation and practices. This includes stakeholders' meaning-making of their experiences regarding their clients' benefit claims, reporting changes in circumstances, and benefit- and employment-related behaviour changes, in relation to UC. This research explores the behaviour changes that stakeholders have translated, interpreted, constructed and reflected upon in relation to the social interaction and social experience with their clients. Chapter 6 explores claimants' interpretation of change in seeking and obtaining information and advice from the Local Authorities (LAs), Advice centres (ACs), food banks (FBs) and Jobcentre Plus (JCP), comparing pre- and post- UC. The discussions

mainly cover claimants' interpretation of changes in experiences in benefit claiming, and updating change in circumstances, and interaction between claimant and stakeholders. Chapter 7 analyses the influence of UC has on claimants' employment behaviour change, experiences and opinions, as compared to legacy benefits pre-UC. This chapter discusses the barriers and bridges for claimants to move into work and/or make in-work progression. In light of government paternalist framework, the personalised appropriate approach of state intervention is typified with justification in chapter 6 and 7. Next chapter provides justification on methodological underpinnings, with the discussion on ontological and epistemological matters as the foundation of research methods and research question design.

Chapter 4 Research Methodology, Design and Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the research's methodological underpinnings, design and approach to data analysis. In order to investigate the extent to which stakeholders and their clients in two areas of South London understand the effects of UC in relation to benefit- and employment-related behaviour changes, in-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 18 stakeholders and 32 UC recipients. Non-probability sampling techniques, such as purposive sampling, and convenience or opportunity sampling, were employed in recruiting the participants. The research employs an interpretative approach to investigate stakeholders' and the recipients' understanding and meaning-making from their past and recent lived experiences of benefit-claiming and employment changes.

A series of methodological issues are necessary to generate research rigour and to answer the research questions. These are the qualitative research design, the case study method, the chosen sample sites, the reflections on the access to the field, the semi-structured interview – which draws on lessons learned from other research – with a reflection on the methods conducted in the field and, finally, adjustment. In terms of data analysis techniques, selective, thematic, and axial coding techniques are justified.

It is important to present ethical issues in research, with discussions on the basic criteria drawing on the nature of consent, voluntariness, confidentiality, and reflection on critiques in practice. The chapter is structured as follows. The chapter begins with an explanation of the research questions, followed by the philosophical underpinnings in relation to ontological and epistemological matters. Justification of the interpretivist approach is then examined. The remainder of this chapter presents an explanation of the fieldwork and process in practice, including the sample sites chosen, access to the field, recruitment of participants, the piloting interview, the semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interview, with a reflection on the chosen research method and its limitations. Next, data analysis techniques are examined in

detail and, finally, ethical issues and relevant considerations are discussed and justified.

4.2 Towards a Research Agenda: Research Questions

To understand the phenomenon of behaviour change of a citizenry, it is important to explore the lived experiences of social actors, such as front-line stakeholders and administrators, and how they translate and deliver the policy and interpret and conceptualise the behaviour change of their clients, reflecting the nature of the policy process and behaviour change. Drawing on Daly's (2017, 2018) functional and relational views from studying behaviour change, stakeholders are related to the practices in interaction with clients, and their clients' experiences of benefit- and employment-related behaviour change. Accordingly, the first question for this research is intended to explore a set of the social actors' interpretations of their clients' benefit- and employment-related behaviour change, and how such interpretations are implicated in the stakeholders' roles and translations of UC and the corresponding supporting service:

1. **To what extent do staff in Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), and a Food Bank (FB) see changes in the benefit- and employment-related behaviour of their clients due to UC?** What do the stakeholders understand about how UC has influenced the claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour? What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of UC, with regard to its influence on claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour?

This question explores the factors that either help or hinder the claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour change, according to the insights and experiences of stakeholders from LAs, ACs and the FB, in relation to UC. It also seeks to understand how UC-related factors and other factors drive or hinder the claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour change from the lived experiences of stakeholders. It explores the social construction of reality that stakeholders observe, understand, translate and interpret from the policy design and its operation, such as approaches to help their clients to overcome barriers and arrangements (in a certain hierarchy), and make sense of their experiences as they subjectively experience reality from stakeholder–client interaction. This question explores stakeholders' interpretations of whether there have been behaviour changes and, if there have been,

what the behavioural changes are, along with the factors that stakeholders translate and interpret to make sense of their interpretations of observed performance of social practices of their clients, together with the shared meanings that emerge from those social interactions and social experiences.

Secondly, to explore the claimants' lived experience of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and FB, a further question is made as below:

2. **To what extent does UC lead to changes in claimants' experience of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs and JCP?** What are the recipients' experiences of claiming UC and reporting changes in circumstance post-UC? What are the claimants' understandings of how UC influences their experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, and JCP? Compared to pre-UC, what changes have arisen post-UC?

This question explores recipients' understandings of how UC, alongside services and policies either created or re-created by social actors, affect claimants' experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from JCP, LAs and ACs, based on claimants' experiences of claiming UC, compared with their past experience of legacy benefits. It explores how claimants interpret and fulfil the official definitions of conditionality and the corresponding categorisation and changes underlined by the social construction of the concepts of being 'deserving' or 'undeserving'. It explores the extent to which claimants interpret their interactions with UC and other social actors, and how these influence claimants' benefit-related behaviour change. Individual perceptions, understandings and meaning-making from experiences of constraints and bridges are explored, namely how and why the introduction of UC and the interactions with social actors leads to behaviour outcomes for claimants. To investigate claimants' employment-related behaviour change, a third research question was developed:

3. **To what extent does UC lead to changes in out-of-work and in-work UC claimants in making employment-related behaviours?** What are the factors that affect recipients' decisions to move off benefit into employment post-UC? What are the recipients' experiences and perceptions of how UC influences their experiences of changing employment-related behaviours?

The aim is to explore the factors that either drive or hinder employment-related behaviour change as experienced by claimants. It explores if, when, how and why UC influences recipients' employment-related decisions. This question explores recipients' subjective interpretations of taking on and internalising the social construction of reality shown towards them by stakeholders, and from their participation in the ongoing policy, production/reproduction and maintenance of external social reality. Together with the second research question, this question explores how recipients behave in a given situation, according to their internalised experiences gained from interactions with stakeholders, and reflections on imputed sentiments, and their subjective reality. This includes the articulation of stakeholders' social construction of reality, developed via social interactions with families, the community and society in which the individual seeks to fulfil the requirements and conditionalities to be entitled to claim working-age benefits and UC, and to access to relevant support throughout the process of employment-related behaviour decisions and/or change.

4.3 Philosophical Underpinnings

This section discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the chosen research method, with a justification of the ontological and epistemological positions adopted. Finally, this section presents a justification of the interpretivist approach, followed by a discussion on the qualitative research method.

4.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Matters

Ontological and epistemological matters inform the research, chosen methods of data collection and analysis. Ontological philosophy studies beings and social reality. Ontology encompasses a broad range of properties and elements, such as social products (social actors, mind and body, emotion, consciousness, thoughts, feelings, perspectives, motivations, identities, things, objects and nature); social and cultural practices (actions, interpretations and interactions); social processes, social reproduction, (interpersonal, structural, connected) relations; social resources (capital and culture); forms of expressions (communications, words and discourse) (Mason, 2002). In social science, ontology falls largely within the investigation of concepts regarding the nature of human actions, and the interrelation between

actions, social actors and institutions (Giddens, 1990). Weber (1947) highlights human behaviour attached to the virtue of subjective meaning by the acting individual. Behaviour change can be either overt or hidden and may happen by deliberately interpreting the intervention or passively acquiescing. Ontologically, this research is based on social security users who pragmatically make sense of their benefit- and employment-related experiences and the perceptions of recipients, from different ethical backgrounds and contingent circumstances.

Epistemologically and phenomenologically, this research is underpinned by the insights and cognitively reflective lived experiences of stakeholders and recipients in response to social security intervention alongside their interactions (Schutz, 1970). It investigates the contextualised effects of UC alongside working-age benefits, by exploring contingent and shared, intersubjective realities and several heterogeneous claims of knowledge obtained from the lived experiences of interaction with the external social reality that forms individuals' internal subjective realities (Dillon, 2020; Schutz, 1970). This contrasts with Husserl's (1964) homogenous knowledge gained from transcendental subjectivities outside the individual, which goes beyond experiences. This research adopts the theory of knowledge approach, which confirms, or extends, or challenges many insights that are related to government paternalism; and contributes to understanding the appropriate state intervention and the legitimacy between the state and recipients.

4.3.2 An Interpretivist Approach

Weber (1947, p. 88) employs 'verstehen' in pursuit of subjective points of view and understanding, as a methodological foundation of interpretation in exploring human sociocultural phenomena. Weber (1947) highlights an interpretivist approach that helps to generate knowledge and explanation from an individual's understanding and meaning-making, observed by that individual and attached to their motives, value and interpretation of contingent situations, and where intersubjectivities of the experiences of the individual whose behaviours in both the past and the present are being studied. It differs from the positivistic paradigm that explores descriptive, value-free facts and technical order of nature, and 'jigsaw-puzzle solution of normal science' (Kuhn, 2009, p. 38). This is regarded as being independent and less

applicable to understanding and subjective perception, and as being value-oriented, meaning-making knowledge of the social-cultural world and vice versa.

4.3.3 Qualitative Approach

Compared with quantitative research, which investigates and defines operational variables and measurement, and investigates the statistical correlations and measurable phenomena, the qualitative approach fits with the research data regarding participants' accounts, descriptions and meaning-making of their lived experiences relating to understanding, perception and sensations, and interrelates with social contexts (Silverman, 2006). This differs from the quantitative method, which explores statistical generalisation based on probability or deductive reasoning. Through capturing participants' lived experiences, qualitative research analytically generalises social phenomena, such as social relations, and processes in contingent circumstances. Qualitative research also generates an explanation of the meanings underpinning social phenomena (motivations, actions and behaviour change), and produces a 'conceptual leap' between research data, analysis and epistemological assumptions (Ashworth et al., 2018, p. 319). It is manifestly evident that a balanced combination of rigour (methodological) and richness (empirical and theoretical) underpin conceptual and theoretical contributions led by the qualitative approach in social and public policy and administration research (Ashworth et al., 2018; Nowell and Albrecht, 2018).

4.4 Research Design

This section justifies the case study approach employed by this research, followed by a description of the chosen case study sites A and B in South London. This includes the relationship between these two sites and the relationship with the introduction of UC. Then, this section examines the selection of the sample participants, alongside a justification of the techniques used to access the field.

4.4.1 Case Study Approach

The case study approach is the preferred approach for a qualitative study given my research questions, as it corresponds with investigating the behaviour change in

contextualised cases and in contingent circumstances. There are several points to improve the generalisation of the case study approach (Schofield, 2011), namely selection of case study for varied characteristics of the study population, and explicit, authentic and plausible understandings emerging in the interaction and negotiation between researcher and participants, and participants' interpretations and meaning-making from their lived experiences (Rapley, 2004). Individual participants detailing descriptions of their past and present experiences and behaviour change help to form valuable sources from which to gain tacit knowledge pertaining to new meanings, thoughts, consciousness, emotion, values and motivations that are elusive and rooted in past and present contexts and passed through socialisation (Stake, 2011). The case study approach helps researchers to develop immersive imagination and to generate what Weber (1947) called penetration of different forms of participants' experiences, and what Schutz (1970) called intersubjectivity between researcher and participant.

With respect to the advantage of the case study approach, it can provide a comprehensive description and analysis of participants' perspectives and lived experiences (Yin, 2018). The selection of the case in this research is relevant to the research questions. This research has multiple units of an embedded case study design with three levels: two discrete geographical sites, five types of organisations and institutions working in study sites (LA, AC, HA, JCP and FB), and individuals either staffing the organisations or in receipt of UC.

Starman (2013) provides a discussion of the paradox of the case study approach. For example, case study approach may contain bias and/or speculation which is not necessarily the accurate description of an event. This means that careful investigation and analysis (see section 4.6) to reduce the likelihood of misrepresentation are essential. This thesis investigates participants' beliefs, perspectives and lived experiences. As Yin (2018, p. 23) explains, 'neither the case nor the case study represents samples'. The goal is to generate analytic generalisations based on government paternalism. Next section discusses the reasons for the selection of two case study sites and the similarities or differences between both.

4.4.2 The Case Study Sites

In order to gather a heterogeneous group of participants with various lived experiences of dealing with various stakeholders, and to generate a diverse sample so a wide range of views and experiences could be obtained, two field sites – rather than one – were chosen. Two study sites – site A and site B – in South London were chosen. Due to the gradual implementation of UC, these two field sites are the first two original pilot areas to implement the full UC digital service since April 2016. This fits with the focus of the investigation of participants' lived experiences of claiming UC and, reporting circumstances digitally.

According to the 2011 census (Office for National Statistics [ONS], 2011), residents living in site A have relative similarities (age structure, marital and civil partnership status, and the structure of ethnic groups) that are closer to that of the national level. The 2011 census showed several relative similarities between sites A and B (see Table 2). For example, the retail industry dominates in both sites A and B. Main similarities are found in age structure and household composition structure. For both sites, the majority of employees work in retail, with the second-highest proportion of male employees working in construction, and the second-highest proportion of female employees working in health and social care.

Table 3. Demographics of Residents Living in Either Sites A or B

1. Ethnic group:
White British: A (78.6%), B (55.1%);
African/Caribbean British: A (4.8%), B (20.2%)
2. National identity:
At least one of English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British identities only: A (87.5%), B (82.8%);
other identities only: A (11.1%), B (15.5%);
3. Tenure:
Owned house: A (68%), B (58%);
Social rented: A (14.6%), B (17.9%); Rented from Local Authority: A (8.2%), B (9.9%)
Private rented: A (15.9%), B (21%);
4. Household composition:
Couple with dependent children: A (18.4%), B (15.5%)
Lone parent with dependent children: A (7.1%), B (11.6%)
5. Adults not in employment and dependent children:
No adults in employment in household (count): A (78,174); B (145,010)
No adults in employment in household: A (3.6%), B (6.4%);
Dependent children in household (age 0 to 4): A (13.2%); B (15.3%)
6. Economic Activity:
Economically Active: A (75%), B (72.3%);
In full-time employment: A (43.3%), B (40.2%);
Economically Inactive: A (25%), B (27.7%)
Long-term unemployed: A (2,155/1.6%), B (5,805/2.2%)

Source: ONS (2011)

ONS (2011) also shows another difference in the characteristics of the population living in the sites Area A comprises mainly of residents with White British identities, there are fewer renters – in particular, fewer LA renters, fewer lone parents with young dependent children, and fewer long-term unemployed residents than area B.

Moreover, the differences between the two areas are evident in the number of institutions, such as JCP, ACs that delivered 'Universal Support' prior to 31 March 2019, charities and food banks. In area A, only one JCP office and one advice centre delivering Universal Support operated around mid-2017 when data collection began, and only one voluntary FB team operated in two locations in area A. Selection of area B as an alternative study site helped to increase opportunities to access to stakeholders with relevant lived experiences, and helped to gather rich data from different angles of stakeholders working in varied positions in different institutions and advice agencies.

4.4.3 Pilot Interview

Before carrying out data collection in areas A and B, I conducted a pilot interview with staff from Citizens Advice Nottingham. The exercise helped me to reflect on how a rapport could influence the quality of research data to be collected. Moreover, I noted unforeseen circumstances, such as background noise during, the pilot interview. Instead of a voice recorder, I decided to use data recording software on my smartphone – which largely reduced the background noise – to record the interviews, and I backed up the recordings online via iCloud, and then saved on my private computer. My private computer and research data were protected by a password. Furthermore, thanks to the pilot interview, before entering the field, I reflected upon the method used to ask interview questions, thus avoiding repeated information or the use of jargon. The pilot interview took place in the formal setting of a meeting room. Although the office space was conducive to maintaining clarity when recording the interview, it was less likely a flexible, loose atmosphere would be created and, therefore, helped to produce a rapport that led to a better quality of data. Other public domains, which fell within the approval of research ethics committees and the consent of each participant, were considered as a plan B. Due to the delay of implementation of UC in Nottingham, limited data relating to the influences of UC was collected from the pilot interview; hence, the pilot interview data was not taken into account in data analysis and the research findings.

4.4.4 Access to Participants

In order to recruit participants, three non-probability sampling techniques were employed, namely purposive sampling, snowball sampling and convenience sampling. Purposive sampling was employed to recruit participants who were most likely to provide relevant information to address the key research questions. The purposive sampling technique was used to recruit stakeholders from JCP, advice centres and LAs. By sending an approved cover letter and participant information sheet by post to stakeholders based on their likely insights and lived experiences, I recruited and interviewed managerial-level representatives from advice centres and LAs. I was subsequently informed that the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) had strict guidelines on independent researchers interviewing work coaches, thus it was impossible to undertake this research directly with any JCP staff (see Appendix: Email from JCP). This research does not, therefore, include data gathered from JCP stakeholders.

In order to recruit UC claimants, I requested help from managerial and front-line stakeholders who interacted with clients, and volunteers working in advice centres and communities. Client-facing staff and volunteers in advice centres helpfully distributed 30 research invitation letters and participant information sheets with prepaid envelopes to their clients who had relevant benefit-claiming experiences. Unfortunately, after a month there was zero response from potential participants. After a further month, I was informed that the manager who had agreed to distribute the research invitation letters had been promoted and transferred to another advice centre. Unfortunately, the replacement manager denied me any further access to approach potential participants.

Finally, to approach eligible UC claimants who were willing to take part, I employed an online recruitment method. I requested and obtained approval from the administrators of the website 'Mumsnet' and a UC-related closed discussion group on Facebook with over 30,000 members. Before this, I ensured that the information given to participants was aligned with the terms and conditions of these online social media and communication tools. With the administrators' approval, I pinned a thread

on the online talk boards, in which I briefly outlined the research aims and purpose, confidentiality and anonymity, such as how the research data would be stored, used and eventually destroyed. Potential participants who were interested in taking part in my research could contact me either by telephone or by email, rather than leaving messages on the thread that might identify them to other members online. This aimed to ensure that no identifiable information about participants was exposed to other members or to the public. Within three months, I received responses from four potential participants who were eligible and willing to take part. However, three of these participants withdrew without any stated reasons before the interview.

To recruit more participants, I employed the snowball sampling technique by requesting help from representatives of advice centres and communities. During interaction with stakeholders in advice centres, I found a role as a self-funded PhD student (rather than a government-funded researcher) allowed me to be viewed as less of a threat. It also helped to put the stakeholders at ease when explaining things that were obvious to them. With their invaluable help, I was informed that some of their clients were willing to participate in my research. I recruited and interviewed approximately ten eligible participants, who had diverse experiences in benefit-claiming, interaction with stakeholders and employment-related behaviour change.

In addition, the interaction and communication with staff representatives in the advice centre built trust via their understanding of my research aims and importance, hence they helpfully provided me with useful opportunities to approach potential participants. For example, some staff suggested that I join their activities, such as the work club (for employment support) and the money course (for budgeting advice) to approach and interact with potential UC claimants. With the consent of 'gatekeepers' in the advice centres and communities, I gained several invaluable opportunities to join the work club and money course, where I was able to approach and interact with potential participants, by using a convenient sampling technique.

I dressed appropriately to fit with the environment as this affected how I was viewed by members of the work club and money course. I also volunteered to help, such as allocating handouts, donating and preparing refreshments, and cleaning the activity room. This enabled me to be viewed as a volunteer, and this facilitated building up a trusting rapport. In particular, I found that socialising with members was useful in being able to approach participants through informal conversations during breaks. This provided me with opportunities to learn about these clients' needs and the barriers regarding benefit- and employment-related behaviour.

From interactions with staff, I identified some clients who might be interested and willing to join my research, so I requested and obtained email addresses and telephone numbers directly from those clients. I emailed potential participants with the approved cover letter, participant information sheet and participant screening questionnaire (see Appendix: Participant Screening Questionnaire). Every eligible participant who was interested in taking part was given sufficient time to consider whether or not to participate in my research interview and to complete the participant screening questionnaire. After I received the completed participant screening questionnaires, I contacted eligible participants by telephone to answer any questions they had, before ascertaining whether or not they still wished to take part. Once I had obtained verbal consent to participate in the research, I booked the research interview appointment by telephone. I conducted individual interviews with each participant in the public domain of either area A or area B, after obtaining a signed consent from each participant.

Research shows the use of FBs is associated with welfare reform, when sanction rates increased from 2009 onwards (Loopstra et al., 2018). Given that context, I requested and was granted the useful opportunity of donating groceries and volunteering in a FB in area B. During October and November 2017, I approached some potential participants. Similarly, by volunteering, I had opportunities to have informal, private conversations with potential participants, and this facilitated learning about eligible participants' needs and barriers, which differed to those experienced by members of the work club and the money course. This also provided me with insight when

reflecting on the questions and topic guides; thus, I was able to make the relevant adjustments and amendments to gather the lived experiences of participants with differing needs.

4.4.5 The Participant Samples

Data from stakeholders and UC claimants was collected between 17 May 2017 and 5 December 2017. There were two main reasons why data collection ended. First, I found that factors and accounts of themes were being repeated. Second, due to an administrative delay, I had only a relatively short period time – 13 months in total – to conduct the fieldwork, and subsequent data transcription, analysis and thesis writing. The whole procedure of data collection lasted five months. This meant I had to cease conducting interviews in order to leave sufficient time – eight months – to complete appropriate data transcription, data analysis and thesis writing before the first formal submission deadline.

Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. Participants comprised 18 stakeholders in total: seven managerial and front-line LA stakeholders (A:2, B:5), nine managerial and front-line stakeholders from advice centres (A:5, B:4), including three Housing Association (HA) stakeholders (A:2, B:1), and two FB volunteers operating in area B (see Table 3).

Table 4. Study Population - Stakeholders

Institutions and Advice Agencies	Study Site and the Number of Respondents
1. Local Authorities	**7**
Interim Head of Revenues, Benefits, Insurance and Pensions	A: 1
Welfare Reform Outreach/Enablement Manager:	A: 1; B:2
Employment Support Manager	B:1
Discretionary Housing Payments and Discretionary Scheme manager	B: 1
Housing Benefit team staff	B:1
2. Advice Centres	**9**
Welfare Support Team Manager/ Benefit and Debt Advisor in Housing Associations	A: 2; B: 1
Work Club, Debt Advice officer/Coach in Charities	A:3 B:3
3.Food Bank	**2**
Food Bank volunteers	B:2

Source: Research data

In total, 15 male UC recipients and 17 female UC recipients participated in the research data collection process. Of the UC recipients who participated in my semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face individual interviews, 13 were single jobseekers, ten were lone parents with dependent children (four male, six female), five were couples (three male, two female) without dependent children, and four were couples with dependent children (two male; two female). Three in-work participants from two-parent families were second earners, whose earnings were lower than that of their partner.

The sample included one participant aged between 20 and 25, 21 participants aged between 26 and 49, and 12 senior citizens aged between 50 and 65. Sixteen participants defined themselves as being White British; six defined themselves as being either Caribbean or African British; six defined themselves as being of Caribbean or African origin; three defined themselves as being EEA nationals; and one participant defined herself as Asian British. Of the 14 in-work participants, seven had multiple 'mini' jobs, including volunteering, zero-hour and part-time contracts. Two participants had successfully obtained full-time jobs; hence, their UC awards had automatically stopped after moving into full-time work. Five participants were self-employed with fluctuating working hours. Eighteen were out of work. UC recipients who participated in my research had different Claimant Commitment, such as work search hours and easements/discretion, depending on the individual circumstances; childcare for young children, for example.

Most of the participants had a work history before claiming UC: one participant had worked as a solicitor; two had been senior managers in the banking and finance sector; five had worked in property and construction; two had work experience in the security sector; one had worked in transport and logistics; nine worked in retail and sales; seven worked in administration and support services, and; two were long-term unemployed.

Twenty-nine participants were repeated claimants of legacy benefit since 2008. The remaining three participants had claimed at least one working-age benefit, at least once. Three participants were mature students with dependent children. Six had limited access to the internet or a computer. Three described themselves as needing both digital and literacy assistance. Two participants described themselves as having a criminal record (see Table 4).

Table 5. Study Population - Claimants

1. Gender:	5. Tenure
Male: 15	Owned house: 8
Female: 17	Private rented:19
2. Household composition:	Social rented (excluding LA rented): 3
single jobseekers: 13;	LA rented: 2
lone parents with dependent children: 10;	**6.Industry of Employment History**
couples without dependent children 5;	Administrative & support services: 7
couple with dependent children: 4;	Financial & insurance activities: 2
3. Age Structure:	Construction: 5
20-25: 1	Long-term unemployed: 2
26 to 49: 21;	Wholesale, retail & repair of motor vehicles: 9
50 to 65: 10;	Professional, scientific & technical activities:1
3. Ethnicity:	Transport & storage: 1
White British: 16;	Public admin & defence; social security: 2
African / Caribbean British: 6;	Accommodation & food services: 3
Asian British:1	**7. Working age benefit claiming duration:**
European citizens:3	Less than 1 year: 2
African/Caribbean origins:6	1-5 years: 17
4. Employment Status	5-10 years:8
In-work:14	More than 10 years: 5
('mini' jobs: 7;	**8.UC claiming duration:**
full-time jobs: 5;	3-6 months: 7
self-employed: 2)	6 months to 1 year: 7
Out-of-work:18	More than 1 year: 12

Source: Research data

4.5 Data Collection Method

This section justifies lessons learned from existing research on UC, with a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the selected approach, followed by a justification of choosing a semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interview. Challenges that emerged and their resolution are then examined with reflections.

4.5.1 Lessons Learnt from Previous Research

Existing research on UC has employed qualitative data collection methods or mixed or multiple data collection methods. For example, DWP (2016c) employed a prospective longitudinal approach where multiple researchers collected data from trial leaders, project managers, operational staff and delivery providers. The prospective longitudinal approach has not been employed in this research design. This is because the prospective longitudinal approach was not feasible for this PhD research, as it has been conducted by a sole researcher within a relatively limited timescale. The time between waves has to be relatively short given timescales and had I adopted it, which means there would be a high risk that the second (and any subsequent) wave(s) of interviewing would have revealed little, if there has no change in participants' experiences given the topic of study. This is why it wasn't desirable – it was technically feasible, however.

DWP (2016c) employed a telephone survey to investigate the effect of Universal Support. This approach is not suitable for use by a PhD candidate for three main reasons. First, in terms of research ethics considerations, an independent PhD candidate would find it impossible to obtain contact information from the DWP – or any other institution – without the consent of the owner of the information. To request consent from their clients would incur unnecessary costs and place an unnecessary administrative burden on stakeholders. Second, the telephone survey would be less likely to achieve a satisfactory response, as it has been shown by DWP (2016c), that the telephone survey achieved only an 18% response rate. Third, it would be more difficult to build up a rapport and may, therefore, affect the quality of the data. Furthermore, there was missing data and a relatively high opt-out rate and refusal (DWP, 2016c). In light of the considerations above, the telephone survey was not employed as a data collection method.

4.5.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

The in-depth, face-to-face interview has been employed by a wide range of researchers (DWP, 2017b; Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Dwyer, 2019; Wright et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2018). This data collection method can be insightful, allowing the gathering of rich and the highly relevant data from participants. Data collection

started with interviewing stakeholders from the advice centres and LA. Unlike their clients, stakeholders have dealt with a relatively wide range of UC claimants, through their experiences of dealing with a high volume of claimants – between 200 and 1,200 cases by the institution – since the implementation of UC. This helps to gain a general overview of claimants' needs and barriers, upon which I reflected and reviewed the relevant factors and topics to guide the participants' topic guide, before the in-depth interviews were conducted.

From an ontological position, interviews are helpful to collect people's views, which are regarded as meaningful elements of social reality (Mason, 2002). From an epistemological position, interviews offer opportunities for the researcher to distinguish between genuine and false knowledge. This suggests that interviews help to generate epistemological assumptions that already exist outside the interview context, such as critical self-reflection resulting from interactions between researchers and participants (Hekman, 1997, pp. 341-365). Interviews offer a way to form different types of knowledge; for example, a participant's sense-making and construction of their experiences (Silverman, 2006).

Proponents of this approach defend the use of interviews to explore specific emotions, beliefs, experiences, reasons and judgements of participants (Mason, 2002). The semi-structured interview provides room to prompt a participant's insights and comments, especially where participants could continue their thread of ideas (Silverman, 2006). Compared to a structured interview that is entirely pre-scripted, this approach enables the researcher to follow up responses from the interviewees that were not anticipated, hence minimising the bias and prompting authentic, nuanced, rounded and in-depth data of interviewees' perspectives (Mason, 2002). The semi-structured interview enables interviewers to control the interaction more than in unstructured interviews, where interviewees may 'act as a "sponge" soaking up information that passively yields information' (Mason, 2002, pp. 62-83). Ethically, this leaves room for interviewees to give richer, more rounded information.

In comparison to telephone and Skype interviews, face-to-face interviews provide greater opportunities for the researcher to gather a wide range of data from visual

expressions, such as attitudes, sensations, affections and beliefs. This requires the researcher to be a good listener, exercising caution in the understanding of a participant's expression about sensitive issues, and undertaking sympathy to claimants, who sense a stigma of benefit-claiming and either satisfactory or unsatisfactory experiences of dealing with stakeholders in the past. Face-to-face interviews develop trust and a deep mutual understanding, through which participants may be more open and able to offer richer interview accounts – particularly regarding thoughts about their own attitudes and experiences of change, which are less likely to be gleaned in the context of telephone or digital communication (Silverman, 2006).

4.5.3 The Topic Guides

Two topic guides have been developed to steer data collection. One part is made for officials from LA, AC, HA and FB; and the other part is made for UC recipients. The first part covers questions of stakeholders' background information and their relations to a specific institution or organisation. This first part explores stakeholders' experiences and perspectives of stakeholders in terms of factors affecting their client/customers pre-and post-UC, along with their perspectives on conditionality and sanctions. Stakeholders' decision-making process to help their client and their assessment of UC are also investigated.

The second part explores the UC recipients' experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LA, JCP and AC pre – and post- UC. It covers the background information; recipient's experiences of changes in information and advice from LAs, JCP, AC and FB; experiences of working incentives and decision making on employment pre- and post-UC; experiences and opinions of conditionality and sanctions and understanding and assessment of UC (see Appendix: Topic Guides).

4.5.4 Challenges and Resolutions

Pre-interview communication and interaction with participants who needed digital and literacy support were valuable for me to understand the different barriers to benefit- and employment-related behaviour change. Some of the claimants' barriers

that effected the research data collection were recognised prior to the interview. For example, three participants described themselves as having a limited literacy level; before they decided to participate, they found it difficult to read and understand some of the concepts in the cover letter and participant information sheet. To resolve this issue, I read the approved participant information sheet and consent form to them slowly – word by word – and elucidated the meaning of words, the purposes of this research, the process of the involvement, and the method of data protection to ensure they understood entirely and were still willing to participate, before the consent forms were signed. One participant, who described himself as having a limited literacy level, attended the research interview with his friend to help him to review the cover letter, participant information sheet and consent form (see Appendix: Consent Form). I reimbursed the friend for his time and travel costs involved in assisting the participant to give his consent. To avoid any influences on participants' taxes or benefits, each participant was given a £20 gift card – rather than cash – as compensation for the time and travel costs involved in participating in this research at either site. A gift card was given to each participant before the research interview commenced with the aims of respecting the participant's participation, building up trust and rapport, and guaranteeing the consistency and coherency of the research data. All participants completed the research interview and no-one withdrew without reason.

During data collection from the participants with literacy needs, I found some were lacking in confidence, resulting in limited data production in the field. To build up a trustworthy relationship with interviewees, complementary reciprocity was employed (Rapley, 2004). At an early stage, I shared my own personal experiences of encountering barriers in learning foreign languages, and this helped the participants to feel more at ease, thus building up a rapport, before they felt sufficiently comfortable to express their subjective inputs of feelings about their difficulties and internalised barriers. There were examples of how stakeholders effectively addressed their barriers and provided them with training courses to improve their literacy level and job search efforts. Furthermore, by sharing experiences and building trust, I found engaging in complementary reciprocity led claimants to generate information which was sensitive and hidden and, therefore,

difficult to discern naturally, such as budgeting needs related to UC payment waiting time.

Some of the participants had limited access to digital facilities, such as computers, the internet and printers. This resulted in limited contact between me and those participants. For example, most of the participants preferred to be contacted by a telephone call or a face-to-face conversation. This limited access to digital facilities meant that some participants were unable to complete the approved participant screening questionnaire before the fieldwork. To overcome this obstacle, staff in the local advice centres had helpfully printed the questionnaire for their clients to complete before the interview. Alternatively, I handed participants a screening questionnaire in person. This enabled me to select the eligible participants who were willing to take part and to tailor the interview questions based on the individual participant's demographics and past working and benefit-claiming history.

Challenges were faced when recruiting participants who had been in receipt of sanctions, who had shown interest in participating in this research. Due to the limitations in telephone use, contacting the potential participants with sanction experiences via telephone was not effective. This issue was not raised by other participants and I did not, therefore, recognise this issue when recruiting other types of participants. This resulted in the limitations of the research data gathered regarding participants with experience of sanctions.

Likewise, a trusting rapport generated an ethical dilemma where I faced difficulty in distinguishing between a professional role and a helper in the advice centres and communities. For example, a conflict of interest arose between understanding claimants' barriers and the limitation of the provision of panacea to help some claimants' dilemmas, for example, a participant with a dependent child with autism, and another who described herself as a victim of domestic violence with facial scars. I found it difficult to distance myself from an inherently emotional response to the participant's life circumstances. I also recognised the limitation in providing advice, partly due to the lack of financial licence, and partly due to the lack of relevant advisory experience. Where participants requested advice, I referred them to the

stakeholders with the relevant knowledge and financial licence in the advice centres to give appropriate advice or refer to other institutions or advice centres with the appropriate resources.

4.6 Data Analysis

All interview recordings were transcribed manually in English by using software (InqScribe) before data analysis. The transcription took respondent's hesitation, repetition, stammering, pausing, thinking, onomatopoeias into account which helped me to be aware of the emotions, attitudes, perspectives of respondents, who put it in words, and hence the authenticity of the accounts generated. The research interview data was analysed using Nvivo 11 and 12. The process of qualitative data analysis included data familiarisation, nodes generating, categorising nodes and generating the coding frame and theme, reviewing and re-categorising the coding frame and theme, and grouping similar themes, and conceptualising the coding frame and theme. There are several stages of detailed data analysis as detailed below.

Field notes were made during the data collection. With the consent of the participants, field notes formed as a part of the analysis. Field notes are conducive to emerging themes that guide data analysis afterwards.

At the initial stage of reading and re-reading the interview transcripts, initial descriptive nodes were developed from the first five interview transcripts, from which an initial coding frame of emerging themes was made, such as 'bridges' and 'barriers' to the process and outcomes of behaviour change. These initial nodes, and coding frame were reviewed and changed, as the rest interview transcripts were reviewed and coded via open coding.

The selective codes were made to develop dimensions to the research questions (Urquhart, 2013). This helped to analyse the experiences and perceptions of stakeholders and claimants and understand the underlying issues of the process and outcome of benefit claiming, reporting the change in circumstances and employment-related behaviour change.

Latterly, for an in-depth analysis, the relations between the coding frame of theme and research question were identified and reviewed. This included grouping similar themes to make the main themes and factors to be identifiable.

Next, the connection between the coding frame of theme and concepts of government paternalism theory was explored (Franzosi, 2004). This stage included identifying the extent of the subconcepts in the coding frame of any theme that might be 'compatible' (in Weber's term) with concepts of government paternalism (Corbin and Strauss, 2008a). The axial coding enabled me to assign subconcepts to the themes/concepts in relation to government paternalism. This helped to achieve the scrutinisation, modification and theme saturation as the analysis accumulated (Corbin and Strauss, 2008b). Using government paternalism as an analytical tool allowed an analysis of the claimants' meaning-making of autonomy, means and ends of benefit and employment-related behaviours, and whether the meanings changed over time, in relation to the implementation form of working-age benefits, UC, and policy made by front-line stakeholders.

Within-case analysis and cross-case analysis were conducted. Within-case analysis means to employ descriptive analysis of an individual's interpretations of benefit and employment experiences (Yin, 2018). Thick description of context, motivations, attitudes, means, and purposes was made to identify whether the typical cases fit with the cases to be generalised (Hammersley, 2008; Payne and Williams, 2005; Schofield, 2011). Cross - case analysis is used to interpret the relations between individual respondent and sample (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). Matrix coding was employed by operating 'query' which searched the relations between respondent's attribute values (such as, age, gender, ethnicity, family types, locations), and items/themes (such as, benefit, and employment-related behaviours), with shading colours filling in each cell. The query results were taken into account in identifying the similarities and differences between the cases, which were incorporated into explanatory case study analysis and generalisation (Stake, 2011), and form the bases of the analysis presented in later empirical chapters.

4.7 Research Ethics

The candidate considered and reflected upon research ethical issues throughout this research. Before fieldwork started, the candidate gained ethical approval of ethics from the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham. This fieldwork was conducted in accordance with research ethics rules. Besides, respect and building trust with participants were taken into account before the fieldwork. This research does not involve any participants who are known to be vulnerable due to: being aged under 18; residing in institutional care; having a learning disability; having physical or sensory impairments.

Before the interviews, all participants were informed about their rights to ask any questions about this research and participation, and their rights to withdraw at any stage throughout their participation. All participants were given a Cover Letter and Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix: Participant Information Sheet). The data collection and recording were not started until the actual consent from each participant was gained. All data was stored in an anonymous form and was password protected and securely stored. All data collected about participants was kept strictly anonymous and confidential. For example, a pseudonym was used, and findings including any quotations were cited without identifying their source, for example, 'a stakeholder comments that…'; 'a UC claimant suggests that…'.

The official research ethics rules did not sufficiently cover the entire research ethics issues that were considered and reflected upon in practice. For example, particular attention was paid to protecting respondents from any form of unpredictable harm, both physically and psychologically (Hammersley and Traianou, 2012). This meant the candidate gained consent from each respondent regarding the public domain chosen for data collection, for the best convenience of the respondent. For respondents who attended the research interview with a dependent child, the candidate also ensured the child was staying safe in the public domain. Furthermore, every respondent was treated with respect and sympathy.

I took precautionary steps when interacting with respondents (Silverman, 2006), concerning the likely sensitive issues that were raised in the interview which were

unpredictable, such as victim domestic abuse, prostitution and criminal history, or unsatisfied experiences of dealing with stakeholders. The respondents were provided with sufficient voluntariness of answering each question or not, or withdraw the research interview anytime without stated reasons.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter examines the research aims and objectives, from which three overarching research questions were developed. This chapter examined the philosophical underpinnings of the research, followed by a justification of an interpretivist approach, and case study design. Drawing lessons learnt from existing research, the candidate adopted a qualitative approach, and non-probability sampling techniques. Purposive, snowball and convenience sampling techniques were used, along with semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews as data collection method. The chapter discussed the data analysis processes followed, including thematic coding and matrix coding techniques. Research ethics issues are considered.

The research design alongside its consideration helped to achieve a combination and a balance between rigour and richness of authentic accounts of participant's perspectives. The next chapter examines the interpretation of social actors regarding their clients' benefit and employment-related behaviours, and its relations with the policy. It presents diverse and conflicting views incorporating thick description and discussion of empathetic understanding of social actor's attitudes, meaning-making underpinning experiences of the interactions with their clients within situational contexts. It also explores to which government paternalism fits the interpretations of social actors.

Chapter 5. Stakeholders' Perspectives on Clients' Behavioural Change

5.1 Introduction

Drawing on the previous discussions on the boundaries of policy and legislation of social authorities/actors and individual autonomy, this chapter discusses the social construction of Universal Credit (UC) implementation and practices. This includes stakeholders' meaning-making of their experiences regarding their clients' benefit claims, reporting circumstances, and benefit- and employment-related behaviour changes, in relation to UC. This research explores the behavioural changes that stakeholders have translated, interpreted, constructed and reflected upon in relation to the social interaction and social experience with their clients.

Social actors contribute to, construct and reproduce the social meanings of barriers and bridges to change benefit- and employment-related behaviour in relation to UC. This chapter primarily demonstrates the social actors' interpretations of what Fraser (1997) calls the 'pathology' of welfare dependency (p. 136) and Le Grand and New's (2015) reasoning failures regarding phenomenological accounts of the UC recipients' experienced situations and life problems, which are subsequently translated into an institutional definition of needs and eligibility.

The empirical chapters employ individual factors within the self-regarding sphere, and systematic factors within the non-self-regarding sphere to develop discussions. Several conceptualisations are used to support discussions on bureaucratic deservingness, needy deservingness and earned deservingness in the empirical chapters. Bureaucratic deservingness is termed as an institutionalised criterion to determine whether the claimants' behaviours conform to the welfare behavioural conditionality. Two concepts introduced by Jilke and Tummers (2018, p. 226), 'needy deservingness' and 'earned deservingness', are used to support this analysis. 'Needy deservingness' refers to claimants requiring assistance who are thus deemed as 'the needy client'; 'earned deservingness' refers to claimants that are viewed as deserving social security assistance because of their work history, such as 'the hardworking client' (Jilke and Tummers, 2018, p. 226).

This chapter answers the first research question:

To what extent do staff in Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), and a Food Bank (FB) see changes in the benefit- and employment-related behaviour of their clients due to UC? What do the stakeholders understand about how UC has influenced the claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour? What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of UC, with regard to its influence on claimants' benefit- and employment-related behaviour?

This chapter leads to two main findings. The first finding is that stakeholders' views and opinions relate closely to the scope of responsibility and particular roles. The second finding is that stakeholders partly or fully attributed barriers to make benefit- and employment-related behaviour change to claimant factors and/or systematic factors. Fraser (1989) remarks that claimants are personalised as cases against collective identification. The argument made in this thesis challenges Fraser's (1989) claim. As demonstrated in section 5.6, stakeholders attribute the barriers that their clients face to systematic failures. However, Le Grand and New (2015) do not make this systematic argument regarding this important factor in government paternalism. Stakeholders' explicit or implicit functionalist interpretation of behaviour change, barriers, needs and deservingness contribute to a relatively partial and incomplete picture of benefit- and employment-related behaviour change. Le Grand and New's government paternalism is extended to concepts of Osborne (1993) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) to analyse the paternalist policy implemented by stakeholders influencing benefit- and employment-related behaviours.

The findings presented in this chapter are based on stakeholders' interview data. This chapter is structured as follows. It starts from an overview of stakeholders' typification of the reasoning failures. Then it analyses the interpretation of varied stakeholders with a wide discussion on individual barriers and/or systematic failures. The similarities and differences of stakeholders' perceptions are examined with the explanation. Finally, it constructs an appropriate paternalistic approach, extending the concept of the helpful friend that is endorsed by government paternalism (Le Grand and New, 2015).

5.2 Overview of Stakeholders' Typifications of the Reasoning Failures

By employing Le Grand and New's (2015) concepts in government paternalism, this section lifts the veil separating the ideal types of reasoning failures, the claimant barriers and systematic failures in relation to the internal phenomena and complex social processes. In relation to the claimant barriers, stakeholders have identified several internal/intrinsic causes of autonomy-related failures or barriers (see section 3.5), such as health, mental illness and physical or learning disability. With respect to the external/extrinsic causes of autonomy-related barriers, respondents have presented some typification, including lack of information on or lack of appropriate awareness of an Alternative Payment Arrangements (APA) and/or sanction policy. Several means-related barriers of the claimants are discussed by stakeholders: the limitation of digital/technical claiming skills; limited employment-related experiences, such as long-term unemployment; and the lack of appropriate financial skills to manage and control some uncertainties, in relation to benefit payment time.

In addition to the ideal types of paternalised individual-related reasoning failures (Le Grand and New, 2015), systematic failures are characterised as the perceived uncertainty of the waiting time period before the first payment of the UC award; and the lack of clear explanation on the system's digital journal. The stakeholders who participate in this research also acknowledge that those UC claimants who experience the claimant barriers and systematic failures, intensify the complexity of issues to be resolved, given the political climate of austerity. The next section presents the first finding: stakeholders' views and opinions related closely to their areas of focus and particular roles. Contrary to the top-down or bottom-up processes, this reflects the dynamic and contingent process of defining claimant barriers and need in social policymaking.

5.3 No Claimant/Systematic Reasoning Barriers

As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, the typification of social pathology of managers in street-level bureaucracies differs from that of front-line staff. In this specific context, managerial awareness of the influences of UC on claimant behaviour change is relatively implicit, compared to the description given by front-line staff who interacts directly with UC claimants. The responsibilities of managers in the local

government of site A and B are joint works with the central government and societal communities, regarding a micro-network of relations (Hupe and Hill, 2007). Managerial-level bureaucrats who participate in this study do not deal directly with UC claimants. For example, the welfare reform outreach manager in Local Authority (LA) of site A works with the central government, the third parties, and coordinates with some employers, and his responsibility focuses on communication with other stakeholders within and outside this local government and made decision making on coping with changes in social policy:

> '... I am [the] welfare reform outreach manager so it's my responsibility to contact all stakeholders and third parties that are affected by the government welfare reforms and go out to offer support and give the advice on how to deal with government changes...'

> (LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

Due to the scope of responsibility, managerial awareness towards UC's influences on the UC recipients is closer to the original design of UC that 'moves towards a system that brings together existing income-related out-of-work benefits and Tax Credits into a simpler, integrated system that supports people in and out of work' (Department for Work and Pensions [DWP], 2010a, p. 19). Managerial staff in Local Authorities (LAs) reflects less upon pragmatic accumulated description regarding its implementation process and forms, such as how claimants respond and co-produce the policy. This suggests managerial awareness (in both site A and B) provides a relatively fragmented picture on policy influences on claimants with no reasoning barriers (see section 3.5). For example, a manager commented: 'we wouldn't have the whole picture of the customer in terms of what they need ...' (LA-B5, welfare enablement manager, site B).

With respect to the UC claiming process, LA managers describe that the digital claiming process brings convenience to digitally confident claimants who do not need digital help:

> '… UC is simpler now for people that are able to access digital claiming, so in terms of UC this feature is more efficient, before [UC] six [working age benefits] in one place, that's a lot simpler in communication ...'

'… the actual claiming process itself is easier, digital claiming. It's online and there is no paperwork to be sent to be checked internally for UC and Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) …'

(LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

Notions of the claiming process being 'simpler', 'very, very easy', 'easier' and 'convenient' from the point of view of staff mean little to no paperwork is required by the UC claiming process, such as forms to complete. In contrast to managerial awareness, front-line staff provides a more detailed picture regarding UC's influences on claimants with no reasoning failures, including those who struggle to use the digital system and those who display an understanding of the elements of UC as shown on the claimant journal, in relation to working-age benefits:

'... we do find our customer [s] who do struggle with the digital system, such as how to logon [to] their journal and understand it, and understand what that one payment includes, what is to cover, so understand that, the housing cost contributes to your rent, the child element is [to] oversee if you got a child and how much you are entitled to ... it takes a lot of time to understand it to be honest ...'

(LA-B4, housing benefit team front-line staff, site B)

'... clearly, the online system, the actual presentation of that information, is very confusing, we mentioned about deduction, which is very difficult to see what the deductions fall, how long it's going to last for and everything else, so it's just the full figure, and it's not giving a necessary indication to as exactly what it actually about, so whilst it's accessible, it can be more complicated ...'

(AC-B1, debt coach, front-line staff, site B)

Due to the scope of responsibility of front-line stakeholders, such as LA-B4 in LA and AC-B1 in Advice Centre (AC), the UC's original purpose of benefit-related behaviour change is deconstructed and then reconstructed with a new, more systematic meaning-making. This means the some of the UC claimants are struggled to understand the information shown on the UC system. Front-line stakeholders

provide understandings to benefit-related behaviour, such as the 'struggle to understand the digital system' (LA-B4), and systematic and causal explanations:

> '... because of the system, the system throws [UC claimants] and send them away and then they have to go through lots of loops to actually come back into the system properly, so we found the very challenging operation to re-connect to UC system ...'

> (LA-B4, housing benefit team front-line staff, site B)

In this specific research context, the simplified benefits and tax credits system have, unwittingly, caused confusion to some claimants with no identified barriers, compared to the benefit-related behaviour influenced by the separated, working-age benefit system. This is a central issue to some of the debates concerning deemed failures that have arisen in relation to the UC system (Dwyer, 2019).

5.4 Claimant Internal Causes of Autonomy/Means-Related Barriers, and Systematic Means-Related Failures

Stakeholders have identified several internal/intrinsic causes of autonomy-related failures/barriers (see section 3.5), which are closer to the ideal types of reasoning failures of Le Grand and New (2015). These internal/intrinsic causes of autonomy-related barriers are health, mental illness and physical or learning disability. Stakeholder perspectives are driven by the composition of UC claimants who visit different institutions. The majority of UC claimants who visit LA in sites A and B are both mentally or physically vulnerable. The UC system unknowingly creates barriers for vulnerable claimants in claiming digitally; intensifying the difficulties to initially access – and then continue access to – the UC system (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018):

> '... [it was] lots easier for vulnerable clients to access the service when they were under legacy benefits [working-age benefits], but UC, because it's all online that can be very difficult for some people [that have] been thinking maintaining the claim so it's not just to make the claim, it's about maintain[ing] that claim [by fulfilling ongoing behavioural conditionality] ...'

> (LA-B4, housing benefit team front-line staff, site B)

From the view of the stakeholder LA-A2, removing the disability premium may affect disabled claimants to move into employment (see quotation below). This suggests the system changes the eligibility criteria for 'needy deservingness', termed by Jilke and Tummers (2018, p. 226). This concept refers to the claimants who need help and who are, thus, deserving. In this specific research context, this suggests the eligibility for disadvantaged claimants to access the social security provision is changed post-UC. This means that – under UC – some disabled claimants fail to benefit from the disability premium, resulting in being financially worse-off:

> '... because there is a reduction in financial support for UC, such as, under UC all the disability premiums have gone. So people with disabilities are receiving less money under UC than before. Some are struggling financially, they feel the only way they can survive is probably is to move into employment ...'

> (LA-A2, interim head of revenues, benefits, insurance and pensions, site A)

Compared to managerial awareness in LAs, front-line staff, who deal directly with their clients with mental health issues provides more nuanced perspectives on the systematic failures on addressing the role of the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) and its influence in determining the eligibility of needy claimants accessing social security services (Clasen and Clegg, 2007):

> '... the low level of mental health problem is assessed as being "fit for work", I don't think the WCA works very well with mental health, because mental health can fluctuate very much, [WCA practitioners] don't understand the issue of mental health which can fluctuate, they are not General Practitioners [GPs], they don't tend to really take what GPs report seriously, some of them [are] even not medically trained, DWP would disregard the GP and the professional. [UC claimants] should not be penalised because they are not being able to work, in our opinion this was unfair...'

> (AC-B5, social worker, health care, site B)

This front-line staff member's perspective is generated from her own experiences of direct interaction with her clients. WCA underestimates the severity of mental health and its constraints, thus undermining the effectiveness of conditionality, such as fulfilling the full-time work search or in-work progression conditionality in the workplace. This finding is closely aligned with research on the link between

conditionality and mental health, most prominently by Dwyer et al. (2019b). The introduction of UC does not change such deemed systematic failure regarding WCA, which, as Wacquant (2009) remarks, largely aligns with 'the benefit system [redefining] medical conditions that qualify as a disability in a restrictive manner' (p. 91; see also further discussions in section 7.2.4 and 7.2.5).

5.5 Claimant External Causes of Autonomy/Means-Related Barriers, and Systematic Means-Related Failures

This section analyses the external/extrinsic causes of autonomy-related barriers that stakeholders have typified, including a lack of information or lack of appropriate awareness of an APA and sanction policy. Several claimant means-related barriers are discussed by stakeholders: namely a lack of appropriate communication and a lack of budgeting and financial skills to manage and control some uncertainties in relation to benefit payment time. Stakeholders also identify systematic means-related barriers, such as barriers of accessing to an APA.

5.5.1 Awareness, Stability, and Controllability of an APA

Weiner (1984) offers three causal dimensions: the factor of the external locus, stability and controllability. According to Fishman (2014), perception of control within the causal attribution process is helpful to understand the causal factors of behaviour change. This thesis argues that Weiner's (1984) dimensions - when extended to Fishman's (2014) perceptions of control within the causal attribution process - can explain the extent of stakeholders' perceptions of claiming an APA with regard to perceived awareness, stability and controllability.

For the internal processes of perceived controllability and stability of an APA, perspectives of front-line staff largely draw on their roles and responsibilities in specific institutions. The perception of a social worker, who is in charge of domestic health care, reflect upon domestic relations. For example, stakeholder (AC-B5) raises that claimants who are less aware of an APA (see section 2.4.11) may leave control of the UC payment to one person in the household, limiting the independence of controllability to one member of the household.

> '… the worry is there, someone could be controlling that bank account, may get all [the] money …'

<div align="right">(AC-B5, social worker, health care, site B)</div>

Debt coaches reflect mainly on *financial* behaviour. For example, less awareness of an APA results in financial destitution and, therefore, escalates the situation of being in debt. This is raised by a debt coach who interacts directly with his or her clients in debt and helps these clients to become debt-free. A benefit sanction is another factor causing debt:

> '... so what we can do is to help those people in debt, what we find is we get people who get the [housing element of UC] and spend it. There is nothing [paid] with the housing, and then they are in [a] more vulnerable position [debt], and the landlord just got no control over it ...'

<div align="right">(AC-B1, debt coach, site B)</div>

Social housing landlords provide a more nuanced description of the operation of an APA. Social landlords consider there to be a lack of control over the stability and long-lasting payment duration of an APA. An APA is perceived to be unstable; being temporary and only covering a specific duration. The awareness of the APA leads to the motivational consequences of discouraging access to an APA:

> '... [social landlords] recognise that people need those APA[s], but we try to *dissuade* from happening [access to an APA], because it's very unstable, we don't know how long it's going on for, it's difficult to monitor from our point of view, for somebody who is vulnerable, it's [an APA is] very misleading, because they believe they are [going to] get it all the time, it's based on that short time term to it. Personally, I don't think it [APA] works ...'

<div align="right">(AC-A5, welfare support team manager, HA, site A)</div>

The perceived controllability sheds light on how stakeholders assess APAs to help their clients to access this social right. In this specific context, a social landlord (AC-A5) provides a causal explanation from the internal process of external circumstances and considered the APA to be unstable and uncontrollable. Such beliefs may dissuade claimants to access to the APA. As explained by Chipperfield et al. (2012), perceived

controllability may influence claimants' behavioural outcomes. Morten et al. (2016) argue that stakeholders' perceptions may influence claimants' assessment of the policy, meaning claimants are more likely to wrongly attribute bad experiences to the public institutions and policy. The contributes to understandings how the UC claimants access and continue to access this social right.

5.5.2 Debt and Employment Behaviour Change

Alongside the financial situation of being in debt, a debt coach (AC-A1) identifies the external causes of autonomy-related barriers (Le Grand and New, 2015). This debt coach (AC-A1), for example, identifies a claimant who is sanctioned and in debt as a result. Regarding the external causes of autonomy-related barriers (Le Grand and New, 2015), the same stakeholder (AC-A1) recognises that claimants who lack the budgeting skills to understand the system 'need to plan ahead'. Front-line debt coaches in sites A and B, however, provide different views of debt issues, depending on the individual front-line staff member's experiences and interpretations:

> '... there are at least [six] weeks, without money, and they get sanctions in [six] months. The main barrier is negotiating the system and for them understanding the system. I have somebody who borrowed £7,000. Six months later with compound interest it's now £14,000, so they are borrowing money to fix the problem, usually from moneylenders. They have been usually living in a certain way for so long, and now they have not really understood: they need to plan ahead, and that's partly [the claimants'] own fault. They have to accept the responsibility for their actions ...'

> (AC-A1, debt coach, site A)

Debt coach (AC-A1) personalises claimants to some extent as individual cases and considers the failures as being the 'claimants' own fault', meaning fewer systematic failures are constructed and attributed to the debt issue. This finding aligns with previous research of Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) who find that claimants may be 'partially or fully personalised to the targeted individuals' circumstances, needs or capabilities' (p. 36). In contrast to debt coach (AC-A1), debt coach (AC-B1) below ascribes the failures to the ineffectiveness of sanction and conditionality (systematic failures). As Fraser (1989) and Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explain, such ambivalent

conceptualisation of social phenomenon is due to varied individual interpretations of lived experiences of varied individual cases.

With respect to *digital* behaviour and means-related failures, working-age benefit claimants – who are accustomed to applying for jobs face to face – have to become familiar with applying for jobs online.

> '… so people who actually come into the jobcentre to look at these vacancies and talk to somebody about them to follow them up [pre-UC], now these vacancies are all online, it's much more impersonal, it's [UC conditionality] not effective, they [UC claimants in debt] have got very little chance to find work, so [the DWP is] penalising them for the situation where they are very unlikely to actually get a job. I would say, absolutely, UC is not helping them, it hinders them [UC claimants in debt] from getting anything, in sense of work ...'

> (AC-B1, debt coach, site B)

Conditionality for claimants faced with this digital challenge is deemed ineffective. This research finding is aligned with previous research findings of Wright et al. (2016) that criticise UC for its harsh and ineffective conditionality.

5.5.3 Sanctioning Policy: Communication and Ethics

Inappropriate communicative behaviour is viewed as one causal factor in understanding the severity of sanctions. This results in claimant ignorance of the sanction, as some of the claimants are not appropriately informed about the severity and the length of sanction. For example, a UC claimant does not notice the sanction until his or her psychological and physical situations worsen:

> '… one client had an appointment in the JCP at the end of March, she did not know about it, we had a dispute at the moment we were saying there was not an appointment, but this was slightly beside the point, because she did not attend, she was given an open-ended sanction. I don't think the sanctions were explained, in the way at the beginning [to make] the claimants understand A: the severity and B: most important was the length, so it was an open-[ended] one, [it] meant that she missed an appointment in March and until she re-engaged. We did not find [out the] reasons, but because she did not know she did not [engage] because there was nothing to say, nothing to report at the beginning of June, somebody realised in the UC system and she

was sanctioned from the moment she did not attend till she [attended] again at the end of June plus another [seven] days penalty...'

(AC-B6, in-house benefits and debt advisor, Housing Association [HA], site B)

The use of 'client' highlights an objectification of stakeholder-claimant relationship, whereby it lays the power to the professional stakeholders to figure out what the passive client needs (McLaughlin, 2008). Furthermore, as defined by Moynihan et al. (2014), the administrative burden on the claimants includes the burden of learning the policy, eligibility and conditionality (learning costs) and psychological stress (psychological costs) in order to access the social policy, which is useful for the analysis here. For low literacy and digitally disadvantaged claimants, access to the digital system causes an administrative burden; the inability to access initially and on an ongoing basis the relevant policymaking information, such as sanctions, leaves claimants mentally and financially vulnerable and inadvertently intensifies the dependence on societal community supports. In this example, this UC claimant does not find out about being sanctioned at the beginning, because her payments are continuing but, subsequently, this UC claimant's personal standard allowance element is withdrawn, so she receives only the housing cost element of UC. Such experiences negatively affect this claimant's mental health, since this claimant, who needs literacy and digital support, could not independently communicate with the government via the journal.

Stakeholders' views and opinions relate closely to their areas of responsibilities and roles. For stakeholders who are responsible for assisting with benefit behaviour and securing tenancies, explicit arguments are made regarding the ineffectiveness of conditionality and sanctions for people with external causes of autonomy-related and means-related barriers, such as alcohol addiction (Le Grand and New, 2015). But they provide very limited accounts of employment-related behaviour change:

'... I work as a welfare support officer [in a HA] that involves doing benefit and debt advice, taking up of any benefits that residents may be entitled, and assisting their debt to secure their tenancy. We have [a] client who is [an] alcoholic and [whose] phone [ran] out, she got sanctioned because she was not [getting] text messages, you could argue that she got a responsibility to go, and see them [work coach], but she [client with alcoholic addiction] was

sanctioned as a general person, and we cannot push them towards the job. I don't know, I cannot comment on that ...'

Le Grand and New (2015) remark that the paternalist approach is justifiable when the individual behaves voluntarily in making a decision. But Le Grand and New do not tell us which and when paternalist intervention approach is appropriate and justifiable, when the individual does not have sufficient voluntariness of behaviour change. In this example, individual responsibility is highlighted by stakeholder (AC-A4), who perceives the sanction policy as wrongly treating this UC claimant with alcoholic addiction as having sufficient autonomy. This also implies the conditionality for the claimant with alcohol addiction is viewed ethically as less fair and less feasible, in the view of stakeholder (AC-A4). As such, this kind of intervention would seem to be unjustifiably paternalistic.

5.5.4 Reporting Circumstances, and the Attribution Process of Behavioural Explanation

Inappropriate communication escalates the need to inquire by telephone to report changes in circumstances. For example, claimants simply provide updates to their circumstances by leaving messages on their online journal for DWP staff to verify. Claimants must also send fit notes by post or deliver by hand directly to their work coach. However, if claimants only send their fit note by post, but do not also report it in their journal, no verification is triggered. Confusion surrounding the system has escalated the need to use the telephone and dependency on societal community supports.

'… you cannot upload the sick note to your own system [journal], because there is no facility for that. The way forward to is phone through an expensive line, whenever they pick it up in the country, they answer it and through them you report: "Yes, I put something on my journal I [report] it in changes of circumstances, "I am not well …", and we are on a 55p per minute phone call. The housing [cost] element of UC, for example, or how many hours they work. We give them the information; we phone them [JCP staff] saying we update it, within 24 hours, [and in] nine out of ten, ten out of ten [times] it [updating circumstances] will never happen, I think there is some issue at the UC side of training needs, so they are not trained properly or overstretched,

our concern is sometimes things just get lost amongst all these levels of [DWP] authority…'

(AC-B6, in-house benefits and debt advisor, HA, site B)

As the customer service advisor on the UC helpline is not necessarily the decision maker with regard to updating changes in circumstances, the staff operating at different levels have different degrees of control and scope of service. Confusions for both claimants and stakeholders arise when circumstances are not updated at the time promised by UC helpline staff. The term of compliance costs as defined by Moynihan et al. (2014) is useful for the analysis here, as it means the burden of completing the administrative process demanded by the system.

Stakeholders' conceptualisation of compliance costs can also be analysed from a social psychological aspect. Fiske (1991), Heider (1958) and Weiner (1984) elucidate how individuals make sense of perceived causality of behaviour. Causal explanation of behaviour can be empirically attributed to personal factors, such as motivations, capacity, control and external factors, such as policy contexts (Heider, 1958).

The analysis in this section highlights the social psychological aspect of attribution of causality – when extended to compliance costs – can analyse how stakeholders make sense of the process of updating changes in circumstances. For stakeholder (AC-B6), subjective meaning-making attributes compliance costs to the UC system – for example, overstretching (external factor) – and placed the blame on UC helpline staff (personal factor) due to perceived lack of training or loss of the document. As Sunstein (2014) explains, 'there is no reason to think that stakeholders are immune from the kinds of biases that affect ordinary people' (p. 100). This suggests stakeholders' attribution-related beliefs influence causal explanation and evaluation of the operation of the UC system. This analysis has similarities to Barnes and Henly's (2018) research on clients' interpretation of street-level bureaucrats in the US. Their research solely analyses the interpretation of the client; in comparison, the analysis presented in this thesis has developed this approach to include both policy implementation and behaviour change, providing a more complex picture of

intersubjectivity between stakeholders and their clients, and the social processes of social policymaking (see chapters 6 and 7).

5.6 Systematic Failures

This section analyses the perceived systematic factors within the non-self-regarding sphere, according to stakeholders' perspectives and lived experiences. The analysis leads to the finding that due to the systematic failures, the apparent simplicity of government paternalism (see section 3.5), has been compromised at the conceptual level, as it fails to capture the systematic failures within policy implementation.

5.6.1 Fewer Face-to-Face Staff

Managerial awareness provides a wider link to the systematic failures and reduction in staff numbers who directly interact with UC claimants. Reduction and withdrawal of the state provision from face-to-face frontline services imply changes in intersubjectivities, social relations and processes in the neoliberal era (Wacquant, 2012). This leads to claimants losing face-to-face services, which means the previous cut undermines the UC goal of reaching targeted claimants. For example, a welfare rights team manager attributed the reduction in DWP staff. Managerial staff (LA-B1) provides an overview of the perceived context change during the early stage of UC implementation:

> '… UC is not entirely satisfactory, partly due to cuts to DWP staff … that's one of the problems in B we have met. The local JCP and they [clients] say they [JCP] haven't had that staff, it might be getting better now and in terms of putting staff in place and recruiting over a thousand more staff …'

> (LA-B1, welfare rights team manager, site B).

The managers of the housing association in site A have different perspectives to those of the managers in the LA, however, due to the differences in job responsibility and the complexity of the cases. HA managers translated the staff cuts in LA in site A and the local JCP as an administrative burden:

> '... our management fee is less and the services we are expected to provide before are no longer there because financially, the money isn't there, we are

always driven by the government and the local government ... we deal with very complex cases, they [UC recipients] seem to repetitively visit us, so we are in conduct taking more [responsibilities], it costs us more, because we are doing more than what we would do usually, but the longer-term it keeps them [UC recipients] sustaining the tenancy and in their property so what you lose [administration costs] here you are going there [tenancy]… the nature will continue for the few years that come...'

(AC-A5, welfare support team manager, HA, site A)

The attribution of systematic factors, such as cuts to frontline staff and simplification and digitalisation of the UC system, means that access to the collective provision of social rights is viewed as costly from a stakeholders' perspective at an administrative level. The perceived change in context implies the re-allocation of HA stakeholders' administrative responsibility, or what Dunleavy (1991, p. 174) calls 'bureau shaping', assuming the stakeholders maximise self-regarding utilities (business income from 'tenancy') through workload redesign. This suggests paternalist and non-paternalist justifications are made together during implementation when stakeholders maximise stakeholders' and claimants' self-regarding utilities.

Mill (1859) argues to impede perceived harm or compel the paternalist intervener to perform actions to reduce the perceived harm. Mill's (1859) concept of the boundary (between individual and social authorities) and the boundary for harm are too ambiguous, however. Mill's harm principle (see section 3.2) does not include a systematic discussion of the present and future administrative burdens or harms (such as the example of above). Here, Mill's (1863) concept of self-protection is extended to the protection of interdependent relations of stakeholders and clients.

From a consequentialist perspective (Pettit, 2006), the reallocation of administrative responsibility minimises the totality of the perceived administrative burdens. This is aligned to Feinberg's (1989, p. 2) analogy of a 'good Samaritan', who enforces a benevolent manner to prevent harm and what Le Grand (2003) calls *altruistic* and *knightly* provision of service. It obscures the distinction between harm and something being nonbeneficial and the boundary between statutory duty and supererogation.

That said, for stakeholders, they voluntarily undertake the administrative burden to maintain the social rights of their clients as UC implementation needs a mixture of paternalist and non-paternalist justifications that exceed the proposals of government paternalist policy (Le Grand and New, 2015). For UC claimants, who have literacy and digital needs, they are obliged to adapt to, depend on and unwittingly cause administrative burdens to societal communities as a means of maintaining their social rights. In this regard, stakeholders *and* their clients would be closer to what Le Grand (2003) calls *pawns* as they were ultimately given less freedom when complying with benefit requirements.

5.6.2 Childcare and Employment Behaviour Change

Andersen's (2019) research reveals the tension between work incentives and unpaid childcare, which reminds us of female's citizenship. In this research, childcare is identified as a systematic barrier to finding employment for families with dependent children. For example, some participants (AC-B5) identify the delayed payment of the UC as a key barrier to single parents accessing childcare and practising social citizenship:

> '... we have a number of mums who have to give up work. If you want to place your child in the nursery, you've got to be careful that the nursery pays in advance. UC will only pay in arrears, but the waiting times are so long, anybody who has got a child in nursery struggles with the UC childcare element being paid directly to the nursery, it's not working, in site B on average the wait for the first payment is at least 10 weeks, and then because they are already in arrears, the nursery payments are constantly always in arrears, so the nursery is refusing... '

> (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B)

Large families with young children have been more likely to fall into debt since April 2017, when the childcare element of UC payment was reduced to cover only two children per family (see section 2.3). This implies that any subsequent children born on or after April 2017 are not eligible for child element (DWP, 2017d).

> '... I have a client with seven children and all the children are young. If they only give benefits to two children, she is going to fail into massive debt, obviously... she just takes out loans to buy food ... she says she will be able

to do the repayments, but a part [of the loan] has been left, then she has not been able to do the repayment [of the loan] anymore because of the really high-interest rate of 18% ... it is not viable for them, financially... I don't think UC has changed the incentive to work ...'

(AC-A2, debt coach, site A)

The two-child policy is deemed 'not viable' for large families with more young children and hence does not significantly change the incentive to work. Drawing on Lister's (2003b) concept of citizenship, this implies the UC system does not give appropriate recognition to the relationship between the gendered nature of work incentive of moving into a paid work and childcare payment. (see more discussions in section 7.3.2)

5.6.3 Work Allowance

Manager in LA links the original design of policy change (rather than details of policy delivery) and the likely changes in employment behaviour – as a response to the policy design. For example, welfare rights team managers perceive that the removal of the work allowance (see section 2.4.6) would disincentivise UC claimants to move into work. As managers who participate in this study not directly deal with the UC claimants, a somewhat implicit interpretation is made to elucidate the link between different implementation forms and employment outcomes:

'… you know that [work allowances] changed in 2016, the government reduced all those work allowances and tapers, so it's no longer the benefit it set out to be. In fact, it does not encourage people to work because now you could earn less than what you would have got, so that is the biggest change to UC. It has become a disincentive now ... so lots of households are worse-off on UC than they were under legacy benefits …'

(LA-B1, welfare right team manager, site B)

This manager does not explain clearly the extent of the claimant's awareness of the work allowance (DWP, 2017b). This is because the co-production of policy with their clients exceeds the scope of responsibility of this manager.

5.6.4 Social Policymaking of Eligibility on Community Level

Again, stakeholders' views and opinions closely relate to the scope of responsibility. Volunteers working in local FBs do not provide a detailed description regarding the benefit- and employment-related behaviour change. One stakeholder (FB-B4) working in a FB attributes the increased workload to systematic failures, such as the lack of centralised control by central or local government in terms of standardising the eligibility criteria of food vouchers.

Post – UC, the local FB witnesses an increasing number of clients than before. Concerns are raised regarding the quality of service delivery and the sustainability of the provision of community services in the future. Lambie-Mumford (2013) highlights the tension between pursuing fundamental solutions to poverty and inequality, and meeting immediate need of food shortage. To address perceived tension, volunteers in a local FB made a policy to control their clients, which jeopardise the universalistic provision of services:

> 'We accept people coming to us three times every six months. If they exceed this, we would signpost them to another FB in the same area. It seems that the DWP does not inform them about this time limitation, but they [DWP] just keep printing the food voucher … the thing is, if they come here every week or more and need our help, we would remind them that we can only help them three times every six months, but if they came to us again and again, we would hardly refuse … this year we find more people coming to us, maybe because of Brexit or because of UC, I don't know …'

> (FB-B4, volunteer in FB, site B)

Volunteer (FB-B4) does not provide an explicit causal link between the implementation of UC and an increasing need for food provision. By commenting on the voucher distribution and administration, this volunteer highlights the systematic failure, meaning their original aim of meeting immediate need of food shortage is wrongly viewed as a long-term solution to deal with the root cause of the long-term poverty and food inadequacy.

As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, community action is motivated by concerns for a specific community body. To maintain the sustainable and relatively universal

provision of services, the frontline volunteer staff who play a crucial role in the local FB control the amount of 'commodities' given to each client who repeatedly visits them. This implies that their clients must accept the arrangement in the specific community body. This, unwittingly, exacerbates the tension which arises between control of the distribution of FB groceries, and an increasing demand for food provision.

> '... I think the problem of UC is the six weeks of waiting time, the number of people coming into the food bank [in area B] is more than last year. The problem is, we cannot guarantee the sustainability of our charity. For example, pre-UC, we usually gave people two cans of fish, four cans of tomato soup and two packets of pasta and something else they needed, but now [post-UC] I can only give people one can of fish, two cans of tomato soup and one package of pasta/rice and maybe something else they need …'

> (FB-B3, volunteer in a FB, site B)

Their clients who visit the local FB cannot necessarily choose the service that provides what they need, according to Dean's (2015) concepts of thin and thick needs. To meet their basic needs while waiting for their first UC payment, some clients have to increase the frequency with which they visit the local FB (see Chapter 6). As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) argues, 'frontline' or 'street-level' implies some distance from the central authority. This suggests that the policymaking conducted by individual frontline staff may not be sufficiently relevant or achieve the original target of UC (such as moving people out of poverty and reducing dependency on community service), as UC is established by the central authority and entails collective action and endeavour (see discussion in Universal Support in section 2.4.12). Policymaking on a societal community level unwittingly curtails people's social right to access community services, which would seem to be unjustifiable paternalistic. Wacquant's (2009, 2012) conceptualisation of a strong central governance is useful for the analysis here. This entails that the central control of the universal provision of societal community service should be enhanced to guarantee the social right to access the universalistic provision of service, including community services (Fletcher and Wright, 2017).

5.6.5 Time of Claim and Pay

UC assesses monthly earnings before calculating how much money a client should receive. Two income payments within one assessment period (for example, monthly income together with holiday pay or a tax rebate from a previous year's work) may lead to a very low UC payment or even no UC payment at all (CPAG, 2018). For the following assessment month, because claimants receive two payments in the preceding assessment period, they may be subject to the benefit cap (see section 2.3) rather than receiving an allowance from UC to increase their income (CPAG, 2018). This situation leaves claimants who claim UC just before two payments within the assessment period to be confused or financially vulnerable, for example,

> '… she [client] claimed [for UC] on 28 December, the employer's payslip was dated 31 December, and she got paid a bonus on 31 December as well. She did overtime around Christmas, so when she got her first UC payment it might be March, they [UC] assessed her earnings in December, I think she got paid nothing ... her money was spent in December, so in March when she wanted to pay her bills, she had about £300 [personal allowance from UC] for the month to pay housing, rent, gas and electricity, food ...'

> (AC-A3, debt coach, site A)

The UC assessment period for this client starts from the day UC claimants submit their claim (DWP, 2018a), that is, 28 December 2015. This claimant's two payments are assessed during the period from 28 December 2015 to 27 January 2016 and used to calculate their first UC payment, which is paid in arrears. As the earnings received during the assessment period include a combination of salary and bonus (two payments in total) that exceed the UC threshold, her first UC payment received in February is zero. During her second assessment period from 28 January to 27 February 2016, only her monthly salary is included. As this is below the threshold of the benefit cap, this UC recipient is not subject to it.

Based on the second month's assessment, this claimant starts to receive the payment in March because the first UC payment is zero. If this claim had been made later, say, on 1 January 2016 rather than 28 December 2015, this claimant could have received her UC payment earlier, say, around mid-February 2016 rather than March 2016 (as long as her monthly earned income is lower than the benefit cap threshold).

This highlights how the timing of a claim can lead to different times and amounts of UC payments.

Claimants who do not understand the impact of timing on UC payments may encounter difficulties when budgeting and are more likely to fall into debt. The Real Time Information (RTI) system is deemed to be a failure in terms of assessing claimants' needs and does not provide what Freud (2007, p. 22) called a 'safety net'.

> '... what we are not able to do is get some sort of discretion in the system. We should have separate procedures, and if you have not applied, they should advise: "don't apply today, do apply on Monday". This would make a month income different to our client, if the information has not transferred clearly from one department to another. So our client ends up with rent arrears they never had before, and sometimes council tax arrears, which can be quite a difficult problem, it is not real-time, so people are penalised for what they earned ...'

> (AC-A3, debt coach, site A)

Discretion is defined by Lipsky (2010 [1980], p.13) as judgement and decision making in 'determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies'. In this specific context, it is warranted to inform the claimants about the difference of how the timing of a claim can lead to different times and amounts of UC payments.

> '… the problem we faced is that people are ashamed they are in debt, they are ashamed they have let themselves down, all their family down. People get into difficulties, some of it is not their fault ... debt isolates people, they become lonely and isolated ...'

> (AC-A1, debt coach, site A)

The argument made here is that the concept of 'penalties' from the perspective of a debt coach is much broader than the DWP's institutional definition of sanction, that is, 'if you fail to do what you have agreed in your Claimant Commitment without good reason, your UC may be reduced for a section period' (DWP, 2019d). Here, penalty means that the systematic failures cause claimants, who do not know about the difference of how the timing of a UC claim can lead to different times and amounts of UC payments, to fall into debt, which causes them to feel ashamed.

The causal factors of being in debt are attributed to systematic failures, such as a lack of appropriate advice to help claimants to be aware of an advance payment, and how to manage it when their clients made their UC claim:

> '... with UC, obviously, with that transition period, they can get an advance payment. The issue that you have is that not everyone's aware of it, not everybody can get it, you don't get it until they have confirmed you will be getting UC and also when they get that advance payment, it's very hard to manage it ...'
>
> (LA-B4, housing benefit team staff, site B)

Staff in LA comments on the less publicised social right of accessing an advance payment request. Also, as the payment amount is less than what Freud (2007) would call a safety net, the advance payments are viewed as insufficient for helping claimants get out of debt and to meet the basic need (Dean, 2015).

> '... our money [rent] is [due on] the 25th of each month, we get paid every four weeks [13 monthly payments per year], for everybody, UC pays us on the 26th, which will miss that [rent] payment, so we will get no money for that month [ending on the 25th]. We have to wait for another four weeks. We don't know, but it looks like we don't have a payment for eight weeks. The payment we get from the DWP doesn't tell us what it covers, so the payment for October to November, we might not get that until the end of December, but we do not know if that one [payment] is missed because they [clients] have been sanctioned or if this is the 12 payments of the year, we miss one payment a year because we don't get 13 monthly payments...'
>
> (AC-A5, welfare support team manager, HA, site A)

The stakeholder (AC-A5) from the HA recognises that this HA misses one month's rent payment. UC pays in arrears in the month after the assessment, causing the rent for the assessment month to be left unpaid. Since UC pays in 12 monthly payments per year, which does not match with 13 times rent payments per year in the local HA, which leaves one month unpaid. This payment arrangement generates confusion and may jeopardise the tenancies of UC claimants.

5.7 Behaviour Change, 'Helpful Friend' and Government Paternalism

This section extends Le Grand and New's (2015) government paternalism to the concepts of Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) and Osborne (1993) to explain the bridges for the UC recipients' benefits and employment behaviour change. Stakeholders, particularly the managers in LAs, who have decentralised powers attend to UC claimants' needs. Due to the overall funding cut, stakeholders in LA in site B have to reduce dependency on the funding received from the central government since 2012: 'for two years, 2012 and 2014, we got £1.7 million and then that was it [no further funding comes in]...they said it's normal' (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B).

The role of local government is closer to Osborne's (1993) concept of the rowing role. It refers to providing services and/or referring their clients to the (mixed) public goods and services (Osborne, 1993). Social actors also play an independent serving role, extending the concept of 'helpful friends' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 177). This can also be analysed by using what Denhardt and Denhardt (2007, p. 92) called 'facilitating, negotiating, or brokering' solutions to help UC claimants to deal with the barriers that hinder UC digital claiming, reporting changes in circumstances and employment-related behaviour change.

5.7.1 The Whole Picture or Part of the Whole Picture

Again, the stakeholders' description does not constitute a whole picture of how UC incentivises behaviour change. A similarity between the local governments in sites A and B is the composition of the UC claimants who visit them for advice. As the majority of UC claimants who visit LA in sites A and B are both mentally or physically vulnerable, stakeholders in LAs in both sites A and B make less description of changes in benefit and employment behaviour of their clients who have no identified vulnerability pre- and post-UC (see section 5.7.1): 'we support the vulnerable people and local residents who need personal budgeting support and who are subject to a benefit cap and who are affected by the local housing allowance changes ...' (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B). This composition of its UC claimants is similar to the UC claimants who visit the local government in site A: 'they are *all* financially, mentally or physically vulnerable, so I wouldn't

understand the full picture of the incentive of UC to change their employment behaviour for claimant...' (LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A).

Another reason is that the LA in site B has a comparatively large team, compared to the LA in site A. This implies that the LA in site B has a larger team of discretionary housing payments and scheme. This also implies that stakeholder, who is subject to manage discretionary housing payment and scheme, does not capture the whole picture of the process of benefit and employment behaviour change, albeit they recognise this:

> '... they are two separate schemes, but as staff of only one team, we wouldn't have the whole picture of the customer in terms of what they need. So, they may get something from both of the schemes if they need it ...'

> (LA-B3, discretionary housing payments and discretionary scheme manager, site B)

The third reason is that the benefit and employment behaviour outcomes depend on and are interrelated with other policy co-produced by stakeholders and their clients:

> '... all of the policies come into effect, so that's the benefit itself ... you know ... you can't look at UC and say, "it's going to help people back into employment and help sustain" because it's one tiny part of a massive big picture ...'

> (LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

This suggests that claiming UC and fulfilling the conditions is deemed to be the behaviour part of a woven package, which is shaped by the policy delivery of UC, service provision from varied stakeholders, the context of policy delivery and policy made by stakeholders to respond to perceived context change.

5.7.2 'Helpful Friend': 'Facilitator', 'Negotiator' or 'Broker'

The realisation of benefit and employment behaviour change *depends* on and is *related* to the benefits and employment service of varied service providers. This section examines how behaviour change and services are interrelated from the perspective of stakeholders. Another argument made in this section is that claiming UC and fulfilling conditionality is deemed as the behaviour part of a woven package

of employment behaviour change. This suggests that stakeholders' employment service in the local governments (as a complementary component to policy implementation by JCP) helps UC claimants who are aware of this service and who access it to get closer and/or move into paid work.

The employment service in the local government (the rowing role) complements the role of the JCP. For example, the employment support service in the local JCP refers their clients to the local government and charity to receive the employment service. For the local government of site B, a managerial stakeholder perceived that more claimants are referred to the budgeting support team and employment support team post-UC compared to pre-UC: 'certainly since UC, we have seen increased employment referrals from the budgeting support team' (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B).

> 'Me: What is the similarity or difference between the role of work coach in JCP and your role?
>
> LA-B2: Complementary, and also we provide more intensive support than our work coach has... you come to my support service [LA] and each of the employment support staff [officers of LA] spend at least 60 minutes understanding your needs and what kind of employment would be suitable. Afterwards, they [staff in employment service of LA in site B] match you up individually with an employer in here so that you can fit the employer to the employee, and it's a sustainable outcome.'
>
> (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B)

Concepts of 'facilitating', 'negotiating' and 'brokering' are constructed by Denhardt and Denhardt (2007, p. 553) to describe the local government's accountability. When extended to the client and frontline stakeholder relationships (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]), these concepts are useful to analyse the bridges (employment service) for UC claimant behaviour change and how stakeholders mould citizens to conform to them at the service of commodification (see section 2.1.2).

In this specific context, 'facilitating' means the frontline staff of the employment service team in local governments understanding the needs of UC claimants and providing them with advice that encourages them to move into work. 'Brokering'

means frontline staff in the employment service of LA in site B provide the available job vacancies to assist their clients to move into work. 'Negotiating' means frontline staff dealing with the perceived conflict between employers and employees (UC claimants). This reflects the aims of government paternalism (see section 3.5), which is designed to help UC claimants to achieve wellbeing. However, Le Grand and New (2015) do not present their discussion of harm prevention, claimant-related reasoning enablement and frontline policy implementation systematically:

> '... certainly, since UC, our *customers* need to get work or work more hours or better-paid employment … what I think is it's [employment behaviour change] a direct result of the support agencies helping people ... when you've got them in front of you, you can do a "better-off" calculation ... you can physically show people how much better off they would be after the deduction of childcare, but I don't think that's really directly the result of UC … we have got our own employment **brokerage** service, so the inward investment team know who [employer] is coming into [area] B and which employer is coming into B, so 3,000 jobs are going to be created in the borough. We will work with those employers to make sure that we get the best deal for our residents. So, it's quite easy to find better-paid jobs. We **negotiate** with the employers and say, "can you give Mrs X 16 more hours a week or some on a contract?" or "well it doesn't work for us financially, you know if you can offer 16 hours as the minimum that would be a start for a zero-hour contract" … we are quite successful and very persuasive in how we support people getting either better- paid employment or increasing their hours…'

> (LA-B2, employment support team manager, site B)

> 'We have got an officer here whom we have worked quite closely, who is called an employment coordinator…for vulnerable adults, so we would go out and sourcing employers that would employ vulnerable people… we have got one particular *customer* who has not worked for 22 years. In fact, she is not that old, she probably never worked in her life. She is now going into her third year of employment with the same employer because of the support we offered that assisted her return to work …'

> (LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

Conceptually, the stakeholders' accountability in local government is largely aligned with what government paternalism proposes (see section 3.5). This includes enabling external causes of claimant autonomy reasoning (see section 3.5), highlighting the financial benefits that are imperfectly known in the market and steering and

facilitating UC claimants (as 'customers' here) to move into work or increase their working hours, and its interaction with non-market factors, such as deduction of childcare, for the customer's own good. The label of 'customers' describes those UC claimants who use social services. Drawing on McLaughlin's (2008) view, it highlights a marketisation of a local government-provided service, wherein service in LA is viewed as a commodity for a customer to buy-in (see section 2.1.2).

According to Le Grand and New (2015), the stakeholders intend to address a perceived failure of judgement (LA-B2) or lack of employment experience (LA-A1) and further one's own good (Le Grand and New, 2015). Local governments in both sites A and B also systematically broker and negotiate with local employers to enable UC claimants' to access work, increase their working hours and make in-work progress. This implies that what government paternalism proposes depends on the form of policy implementation, which translates the higher-level goals of UC into street-level actions in practice (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]).

Two years of funding from the central government is allocated to the local government in site B to help with the UC claimants who are subject to the benefit cap. Limited funding is viewed as one of the systematic barriers, is available to deliver benefit- and employment-related services. There has been a cut in government funding allocated to LA in site B since 2012, including the European Social Fund, and the Local Enterprise Partnership Growth Initiative grant. Revenue Support Grants allocated to LA in both sites A and B were reduced since 2014/2015.

> ' … if money [funding for benefit and employment service] has been given, obviously they [UC claimants] are gonna get a result [employment behaviour change]. You know we have *not* got that money from the UC system ... we put them [funding to support claimants who are subject to benefit cap] into the reserve, so all of the money lasts two years. When it's gone, we need to find the money ourselves … But again, that money, for now, is to stop the service, so that's why we could provide less [service] ...'

> (LA-B5, welfare enablement manager, site B)

Furthermore, the local government in site B moves closer to the role of an 'enterprising government' (Osborne, 1993, p. 355), which includes the responsibility of making earnings (such as 'we need to find the money ourselves') from business

and reserves for sustaining the service in the local government body. Similar with stakeholders in LA in site B, stakeholders in LA in site A recognise the cuts in the funding, including the crisis loan, Social Care grants, the Welfare Milk Subsidy grant since 2012. But they encourage their clients to undertake more responsibilities to be self-reliant:

> '... we got the first two years of funding and there is nothing, they have stopped. So fortunately, we did not spend what they gave the first two years so we got a little bit of reserves, but I would suggest by 2020 we wouldn't have money left to fund it. That's a bit of change we become much more stringent about the type of awards we give now... if we don't have that [funding], we are not able to help people, it's my responsibility and my team's responsibility to assist people [UC recipients] moving forward so they [UC recipients] are able to manage on their own...'
>
> (LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

Within this specific research context, stakeholders are expected to respond to the cuts, while still *acting* as a 'helpful friend' (Le Grand and New, 2015) and 'good Samaritan' (Feinberg, 1989, p. 2) by helping with claimants' physical, psychological and social needs. Le Grand and New (2015) highlight that the government should act as a helpful friend. Government paternalism does not specify the bridges and barriers to implementing paternalist interventions in relation to the wider political context, however. Due to the uncertainty of funding allocated to benefit and employment services in local government, stakeholders could not necessarily guarantee to perform the paternalist interventions as before UC. This means acting to help UC claimants is deemed obligatory, but the target population and scope of the benefit and employment advice, and the boundary of the intervention would be decided and amended by the stakeholders:

> '... that's a bit of change we become much more stringent about the type of awards [financial support] we give now. This means we use to give some type of awards we don't offer people financial support, it's [because] the funding just being taken... we try offering them advice which would boost their [clients] confidence and help them [clients] move back into employment, so they [clients] can actually manage their own lives better and with additional support, so they [clients] can take steps to better themselves. We have found by helping people sorely with financial awards and payments does not help them in the long run, because they unfortunately, a lot of people become to

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rely on that, so by paying everything they [clients] are still not independent...'
(LA-A1, welfare reform outreach manager, site A)

Stakeholder (LA-A1) do not provide explicit and relevant perspectives of employment behaviour change due to UC. It appears that their clients' employment behaviour change is related to the service provided by the local government. This implies that stakeholder in local government in site A perceives that they are less likely to provide financial support to their clients, compared to pre-UC. Here the paternalist intervention is employed to increased individual responsibility for employment-related behaviour change. This implies the scope of their service is reduced, leading to uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of conditionality in relation to benefit and employment-related behaviour 'correction' (Wright et al., 2018, p. 278).

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the extent to which stakeholders in LAs, ACs, HA and the FB saw changes in the benefit- and employment-related behaviours of their clients due to UC. Stakeholders partly or fully attributed barriers to claimant factors (see section 5.4 and 5.5) and/or systematic factors (see section 5.6). Stakeholders' views and opinions were closely related to their areas of focus and their particular roles (see section 5.5.2 and 5.7.2). Their perspectives were also driven by the varied compositions of the UC claimants who visited the different institutions (see section 5.4).

Stakeholders made an explicit or implicit interpretation of behaviour change, barriers and bridges. Each stakeholder captured a relatively partial picture of the whole administrative processes in relation to UC. This suggested that reasoning barriers were not viewed in comparison with a normative model of behaviour. The interpreted reasoning barriers were embedded within the individual, institutional and social situations in relation to the role and experiences of varied stakeholders. The nature of the interpretation stakeholders made was imbued with meaning, which was contingent, in terms of claimants' barriers, bridges and perceived need and assumed responsibility in service provision. It was important to recognise different uses of the 'client' by ACs in the section of 5.5.3, and 'customer' by LAs in the section of 5.7.2,

which meant varied stakeholders described the nature of the relationship between stakeholders and UC claimants differently, with different nuances.

From the view of the managerial stakeholders, the UC digital system was convenient for claimants who did not need digital help. For claimants who were deemed vulnerable, however, the digital system meant less face-to-face advice (see section 5.6.1), which created barriers to accessing the UC system at the early implementation stage (see section 5.4). When the UC recipients claiming an APA, stakeholders did not employ a yes or no criteria in describing changes in benefit claims. Instead, stakeholders employed the criteria of *perceived awareness*, *stable* or *unstable* and *controllable* or *uncontrollable* to evaluate benefit claiming of an APA (see section 5.5.1). Stakeholders' belief may dissuade the claimants' benefit behaviour to access an APA. With respect to reporting changes in circumstances, stakeholders (see section 5.5.4) attributed compliance costs to personal factors and external factors of the UC system.

Benefit and employment behaviours were related to *digital*, *communicative* and *childcare* behaviours. From the view of the managerial stakeholders, changes in employment behaviour were influenced by the removal of the disability premium and the removal of work allowance. The 'two child' policy (see section 2.3) was deemed insufficient for large families to cover childcare costs and hence does not significantly change the incentive to move into a paid work (see section 5.6.2).

Due to the interrelatedness of client-related barriers and systematic failures, the apparent simplicity of government paternalism has been compromised at the conceptual level. The lack of centralised control from a central or local government regarding the eligibility criteria for food vouchers undermined the universalistic provision of this community service for UC claimants while they were waiting for their first payment. The timing of their claims also made a difference to when they received UC and how much it was.

This chapter extends Le Grand and New's (2015) government paternalism to concepts of Osborne's (1993) and Denhardt and Denhardt's (2007) concepts to analyse the paternalist policy implemented by stakeholders to influence benefit- and

employment-related behaviours. The conceptualisation of *helpful friend* endorsed by government paternalism was typified and extended to *facilitating*, *negotiating* and *brokering* roles based on the empirical findings. This re-conceptualised *helpful friend* and its implementation forms assisted recipients in coproducing benefit and employment behavioural conditionality. Stakeholders delivering employment service in LA of site B played the role of *helpful friend* to assist their customers to move into or get closer to the paid labour market. Future research would inform us how stakeholders' policy making in the local government to respond to perceived context changes (see section 5.7.2) affect their clients' behaviour change during the later stage of UC implementation.

Chapter 6 Interaction and Relations Between Stakeholders and Claimants, and Benefit-Related Behaviour

This chapter explores the claimants' interpretation of change in seeking and obtaining information and advice from Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), Food Banks (FBs) and Jobcentre Plus (JCP), comparing pre- and post-Universal Credit (UC). Discussions mainly cover the claimants' interpretation of changes in experiences in benefit claiming, and updating changes in circumstances, and interaction between claimant and stakeholders in relation to UC. This chapter employs individual factors within the self-regarding sphere, and systematic factors within the non-self-regarding sphere to develop a wider discussion in relation to benefit-related behaviour.

This chapter discusses the research findings and answers the second research question:

> **To what extent does UC lead to changes in claimants' experience of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs and JCP?** What are the recipients' experiences of claiming UC and reporting changes in circumstance post-UC? What are the claimants' understandings of how UC influences their experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, and JCP? Compared to pre-UC, what changes have arisen post-UC?

This chapter analyses the nature of changes that have risen post-UC. The findings presented in this chapter (and also chapter 7) are based on the claimants' interview data. This chapter reveals the extent of frontline stakeholders resolve policy-related contradictions affects claimants' perceived control of benefit-related behaviour, as well as their evaluation of UC. Recipient's views are widely linked to the personal barrier, stakeholders' control or systematic barriers, reflecting the varied culture of attribution of responsibility, and challenges institutionalised definition of responsibility.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, it analyses claimants' perceptions and experiences of benefit claiming. Then it examines claimants' experiences and evaluations of using digital and telephone service and face-to-face service with

varied stakeholders. Conflict, tension and negotiation are presented in the analysis of stakeholder-client relationships. Finally, it provides an alternative explanation and construction of the personalised appropriate approach of intervention and social control, drawing on the framework of government paternalism. This chapter concludes that the personalised appropriate approach - on policy implementation level - corresponds and coincides with primary experiences and the subjectivity of paternalised individuals, reproduces gendered reasoning and could be more solidary-driven, rather than individualistic societies, indifferent to decision makers, passive obedience and fragmented powers.

6.1 Claiming Benefits

As Dunleavy et al. (2005) explain, technology-centred changes are linked with critical debates related to cognitive, behavioural, institutional, cultural and social influences. Digital benefit claiming is not an entirely new approach as it is already employed by some local authorities to manage Housing Benefit (HB) claims from local residents. However, as examined in section 2.4.7, the UC claiming process differs from that for most benefits and tax credits as all claims should be made online. Claimants who cannot verify their identity online can instead wait for a phone call from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and make an appointment with staff in their local JCP to provide the required documents to verify their identity before completing their benefit claim. This reflects changes in how social security systems are being organised as bureaucratic processes and delivered to their clients or customers. This section analyses the claimants' perceptions of changes in benefit claims, reporting the change in circumstances and its influences on benefit-related behaviour. This section finds that more participants from site B encounter digital and/or literacy barriers that hinder benefit-related behaviour change. This is because 1) more participants in this study are from site B; 2) site B has a relatively large proportion of the population with minority ethnic background, whose first language is not English (see details in section 4.4.2).

6.1.1 Queuing in JCP

Queuing arrangements and likely costs imposed on clients in social security services have been highlighted in research regarding bureaucratic processes (Lipsky, 2010

[1980]). For the claimants who do not need digital help (support with access to and use of digital facilities) or literacy help, the online (digital) survey approach is viewed as 'simpler', with lower time costs imposed as this avoids repetitive queuing to attend an appointment in a JCP for interaction with a staff member (C10). Filling out a digital application form online leaves claimant some flexibility to manage their time to gather evidence to support the processing of their UC claim (C10). According to Lipsky (2010 [1980]), flexibility reinforces the common belief that policy is part of the solution rather than part of the problem. In this specific context, online claiming is interpreted by C10 as an appropriate provision for flexibility, providing a *liberal* way for him to fill in the form when he needs to:

> '... I think UC is probably easy now, in terms of the electronic survey [claiming form]. It's simpler in that you can look at the questions in your own time, you can go and find the information they need, whereas if you have to meet face-to-face, you have to bring half of the information [to JCP], then you have to come back for another appointment [pre-UC], but when [post-UC] it's all online, you can fill in all the related questions if you need to, it's relatively easier from that perspective ...'
>
> (C10, aged 61, female, single, Asian British, site B)

For claimants who do not need digital help (support with access to and use of digital facilities) or literacy help, the UC benefit claiming process is viewed as a reduction in administrative burden ('more organised', 'less waiting time'). The online system reduces the time spent queuing to attend an appointment in JCP compared to the face-to-face and telephone-based approaches for claiming working-age benefits and tax credits pre-UC.

> '... it can be a five-to-ten-minute process [to complete the UC digital form] ...'
>
> (C12, aged 46, female, lone parent, White British, site B)

> 'JCP is more organised now, there are more appointments, less waiting time than before, but now, because it's all digital, I think at one point, I have to wait there, be in the Jobcentre, maybe 20 minutes before seeing an Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance [IB JSA] job advisor. I should have seen him at 10:00 am, but he saw me at 10: 20 am…'

6.1.2 Lower Compliance Cost and Cognitive Biases on Lost Files

'Compliance costs', defined by Moynihan et al. (2014) as the burden of completing administrative processes demanded by the system, is also useful for the analysis. The UC digital system saves the application information and the recipients' files.

> '... lost files by DWP... basically it's their [DWP staff's] mistake... they [DWP staff] lost my files, our information was sent by letters pre-UC ... so I had to restart [claiming] again ... now they have all the information here [in the digital system] ...'

> (C11, aged 46, male, lone parent, White British, site B)

According to C11's response above, his working-age benefit application forms are lost or misplaced, so he is not available for his pre-UC benefit claim to be processed. As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) remarks, lost or misplaced files may incur biases against bureaucracy or bureaucrats, which is relevant for the current analysis. The UC digital system entails appropriate administrative control and treatment of UC benefit application files, thus reducing cognitive biases ('basically it's their [DWP staff's] mistake') against the benefit system caused by losing files and failing to process claimants' applications.

6.1.3 Claimants' Internal Autonomy and/or Means - Related Barriers and Social Support

Claimants who have internal barriers such as mental health illness and/or means-related barriers such as having neither a passport nor a driving licence, a helper in JCP is deemed useful for alleviating psychological costs (Moynihan et al., 2014). This can be through assisting with evidence collection for verification and processing online claims:

> '... I have to go to the office, the JCP, I have to go online and make a claim. I don't have an ID, because I was asked security questions, while I don't remember [the answer], some people do [remember the answer to the security questions], so it's quite hard, because not everyone has a passport, not

everyone has a driving licence, so it can be a bit hard, but I am able to go online, which is quite easy, but I was anxious going online at the first time... because I suffered from anxiety anyway, and post-traumatic stress disorder then. So, I have a helper at the JCP, a caseworker. They help me through it, which is quite easy. So, yes, I do get it easier, as I am saying, than all the paperwork from before...'

(C21, aged 48, single, female, White British, site B)

In Goffman's (1958, 1963) discussions of face-to-face communication and interaction, he highlights the socially structured expectations imposed on the performance of social actors in relation to face-to-face interactions. As social behaviour, such interactions can be viewed as role-playing behaviour that provides assistance. This social interaction is conducted in reciprocal terms with social actors (for example, needy claimants) and hence is required social policy delivery. Blumer (1969, p. 2) remarks that people act in accordance with:

'… [the interpretation of] things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them (such as government, policy, bureaucratic encounters); the meanings of such thing are derived from, arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows; these meanings are handed in, then modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.'

Blumer (1969) also views behaviour change as a product of the interrelatedness of meaning that is taken for granted by the social actors and of the factors that incentivise human behaviour.

For claimants who have experienced means-related barriers of limited access to digital and internet facilities (digital barriers) and insufficient access to (computer) literacy help (such as C18 and C13), initial access to the digital system is viewed as less easy compared to the process for claiming working-age benefit pre-UC. This type of needy claimant, as a relational social actor (Goffman, 1958), expects and depends on the social role of a 'helpful friend' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p.177) from the government (through telephone-based or face-to-face interaction and guidance) and other social support such as family members, social workers and volunteers in advice centres for additional help to access the welfare provision. Through the process of requesting help, the structure of the social relationships is

changed to shape the development of the relational self (to use Blumer's [1969] terminology).

> '... telephone [claiming] is easier because it's easy to talk to them. Benefit claiming via telephone was really good, because it was like a conversation pre-UC, sometimes we don't have the internet, sometimes we don't know how to read, we have to ask someone about everything. They can read or do it, or they can access the internet ...'
>
> (C18, joint claim, aged 45, female, African/Caribbean origin, site B)

> 'I have to go to my journal to fill in certain things and sometimes I get confused and mixed up with how I log in, so I cannot get in and then my daughter helps me. But if she is not there, I get stuck because the knowledge that she has that lets her help me. I don't have that, sometimes I feel like I am giving too much trouble to my daughter, the staff in the JCP leaves everything for me to do [UC claim] and they expect that I could do it. I don't get help from them, because they are busy, but I need face-to-face help, sometimes I feel ashamed to ask for that help ...'
>
> (C13, single claim, aged 50, female, African/Caribbean origin, site B)

Mead's work (1934) dichotomises the self into the subjective acting self ('I') and the object self ('me'). The subjective acting self ('I') is viewed as:

> '… a reaction to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. I see "Me" (as an object) through how others see me as indicated by their attitudes toward me. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the "Me" and we react to it as an "I".' (Mead, 1934, pp. 174–175).

C13 states that, 'they [JCP staff] expect that I could do it [UC claim]', indicating that a sense of the self *out* of social interaction is developed from the speculation of C13. The subject self 'I' of C13 internalises the imagined attitudes of the JCP staff towards the object self 'me' of C13. The need of the subject self 'I' ('I need face-to-face help') is viewed as not being consistent or reciprocal with the imagined attitudes of the JCP staff towards the object self of the claimant ('they [JCP staff] expect that I could do it [UC claim]'). C13 does not change their benefit claiming behaviour according to the process of formation of self *out* of actual social interaction within JCP. The benefit behaviour change is instead made in response to the *actual*

interaction with her daughter: 'my daughter would help me'. The interaction with her daughter thus enables the interacting self of C13. However, neither Goffman (1958) nor Blumer (1969) discusses the emotional side of reflection as a constituent part of the subjective self. The participant further states that, 'I feel ashamed to ask for that [digital and literacy] help', which indicates a reflexive self embedded with what Cooley (1998 [1902], pp. 164–165) calls 'imputed sentiment, and the imaged effect of this reflection upon another's mind'. This implies a social process of self-concept formation that is embedded in emotion and reflection (see more discussion on face-to-face interaction in section 6.3).

Routinely accessing the UC online is viewed as a barrier. Failing to check on messages from one's work coach for nearly one month, and hence missing an appointment, may cause sanctions in terms of benefit payments:

> '… my own experience is for almost three weeks I have had no internet, so even though they [work coach] have a message for me, I have no internet, so I don't know, they [DWP staff] would cut the claim [of UC] and then I won't get anything to feed my children …'
>
> (C25, aged 35, female, lone parent, African/Caribbean origin, site B)

> '… because it's an internet-based system, I have to use a library more often because I have not got enough credit on the mobile side, and then, when I look into getting that time at the library, it may be five days before I can actually book a computer to work on …'
>
> (C27, aged 63, male, couple, White British, site B)

C27 recognises that he has to keep checking his UC online account to maintain his UC claim. This implies that the new communication approach has raises his awareness of the virtual presence of benefit claiming. C27 mentions relying on digital facilities provided by the societal community – the public library – which is viewed as *less universalistic* in terms of access.

6.1.4 Benefit Transferring and Extended Conditionality

Initially, C6 is transferred to make a joint claim of UC with her non-British husband. However, her husband does not pass the residence eligibility test for a joint UC claim;

therefore, C6 has to change from a joint claim to making a single claim. During the waiting time for checking her husband's eligibility, C6 could not receive any advance payments.

> '... my partner is not from the UK. I applied for advance payment at the start, but they wouldn't give it to me, and the reason why they wouldn't get me an advance on UC was because they [DWP staff] were waiting for a residence test from my partner, because it was a joint claim, so they could not give me payments in advance. But he did not pass the joint test because he had not been in this country for five years; he must be in this country for five years to be able to claim. So they [DWP] wouldn't give me any advance payments for me and the kids, so we got no money for nine weeks...'

> (C6, aged 29, female, single claim, couple, White British, site B)

As discussed in section 2.2.3, since the 1970s, the right to social security has been increasingly restricted on the EU level (Dwyer et al., 2019a). Under UC, extended conditionality is applied to require *both* members of a couple to be assessed to ensure their eligibility (Millar and Bennett, 2017). C6 waits for a total of nine weeks before she receives her first payment of UC. C6 has to wait for checking the eligibility of her husband's *circumstances* in terms of the right to reside rule for making a joint claim (Shutes, 2016). Then, C6 has to change to a single claim when C6 knows her husband is not eligible to make a joint claim with her. For this example, the institutionalised restriction to the eligibility of an EEA national to access social security unwittingly jeopardises the social right of the family member (British citizen).

C6 views the nine weeks' waiting time for her first payment, which is longer than the waiting times for IS and CTC, as a systemic failure of benefit transferring: 'they [JCP staff] change me over to UC. It isn't my choice, they change me... so it is problems, problems, problems over time...' (C6). C6 thus attributes the waiting time as a policy problem. C6 believes that extended conditionality, as a systemic problem, does not sufficiently protect her autonomy to choose to resist a change in the benefits which she was claiming pre-UC. According to Le Grand and New (2015), the policy is justified to engage in a paternalist intervention when it is least harmful to an individual's autonomy and the highest level of well-being. In this specific context, the extended conditionality could not be sufficiently justified on paternalistic

grounds in this claimant's opinion as it is viewed as 'not my choice' (involuntary choice) and she receives 'no money for nine weeks' (financially worse off). Thus, in Le Grand and New's view (2015), the government appears not to approve the eligibility of the husband of C6, as her husband benefit claiming (as a joint claim) was perceived as conflicting with government *ends* of 'toughening up the rules on access to UK benefits' (DWP, 2015).

Even though C6 is able to access food vouchers from her local JCP, she highlights that the local FB is less universalistic as a provider of de-commodified goods because the specific community has a certain level of control over eligibility and conditionality in the specific community, which affects citizen's integrated sense of belonging, affiliation and self.

> '… they [staff in JCP] gave me a food voucher... because I was not in this area long enough, I just came to this area, I was not allowed to use food vouchers. So, I had no food at the beginning, so that I had to go to another FB [in area B] ...' (C6)

As discussed in section 5.6.4, this implies a lack of centralised control from central or local government in terms of standardising and legitimising the eligibility criteria and conditionality of food vouchers to guarantee the universalistic provision of societal community services. Mill (2001 [1848], p. 1120) provides an insight on how to balance the conditionality of receiving assistance and welfare dependence while providing help to those needing it:

> '... the problem to be solved is, therefore, one of peculiar nicety as well as importance; how to give the greatest amount of needful help, with the smallest encouragement to undue reliance on it. Energy and self-dependence are, however, liable to be impaired by the absence of help, as well as by its excess. It is even more fatal to exertion to have no hope of succeeding by it, than to be assured of succeeding without it. When the condition of any one is so disastrous that his energies are paralysed by discouragement, assistance is a tonic, not a sedative: it braces instead of deadening the active faculties: always provided that the assistance is not such as to dispense with self-help, by substituting itself for the person's own labour, skill, and prudence, but is limited to affording him a better hope of attaining success by those legitimate means.'

Mill's ideal is not realised in policy implementation in this specific research context. The description of C6 reflects that the systematic process unwittingly restricts access to citizenship when the local FB assesses the UC claimant's conditions in terms of *status* (such as duration of local residence) rather than merely considering their *need* to determine their eligibility for collecting necessities from a specific FB (Clasen and Clegg, 2007; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). The system thus does not guarantee a legitimate means to access universalistic citizenship by which the claimant could obtain the help needed to attain success.

6.1.5 Confusion and Complexity of Benefit Transferring

As Sunstein (2017) explains, policy instruments can be ineffective, or less effective than intended, if they generate confusion among the targeted population. C17, who used to work as a solicitor before he becomes unemployed, perceives that he has been wrongly treated as a new claimant. He borrows a mortgage from Local Banking for Britain, who takes mortgage interest, adding to the mortgage by £354 per month by October 2017 (the time of the research interview). Before claiming UC, C17 is receiving multiple benefits, including IB JSA and HB. Moreover, he is offered a mortgage subsidy from the government, which pays his mortgage interest directly by covering 2.5 per cent of his mortgage (about £178,000 in total) before his UC claim.

After his UC claim, C17 believes that his mortgage interest would be funded as before. However, he realises that the government has stopped paying mortgage interest eight months after he agrees to transfer his working-age benefit to UC in Feb 2017. One of the issues that leads to his confusion is that he is told in the local JCP that his Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI) should continue to be paid as it has been before his UC claim, in which case C17 and his wife should have been financially better-off after his UC claim. Once C17 realises that he is not actually receiving the SMI payments that he has thought would still be provided post-UC, he attends three tribunals, which all reject his arguments. C17 is informed by the court that the reason he has to wait for his mortgage interest payments is as follows: 'because your wife is working, you have an assessment period for six to nine months before we [DWP] pay anything else ...' (C17).

'… we were told our existing benefits would be supported and transferred under UC, but now they [DWP] are saying: "that is not the case, you are new claimants ...". I have nothing in writing, so the JCP sometimes change their mind, I guess. They said: "No! You cannot, you don't get it now...". I would never have changed to UC if I had known I would lose our benefits. We're £400 a month worse-off post-UC …'

(C17, aged 41, joint claim, male, White British, site B)

As C17 believes that UC is the causal factor that leads to the loss of his SMI payments, he requests the Member of Parliament (MP) in area B to become involved. The MP writes directly to the DWP's operations department to demand an explanation for the eight-month waiting time for SMI payments after the UC claim. As indicated by the DWP (2019k), SMI is usually paid for individuals who are also UC claimants (and are below the pension age) after nine consecutive UC payments, or after 39 consecutive weeks' payments of other benefits. In the example of C17 and his wife, who makes a joint UC claim, they have to wait for what C17 describes as eight months waiting time. However, the DWP (2019k) does not explicitly demonstrate whether these arrangements of waiting times are for new claimants of UC and/or for claimants of working-age benefits. Due to this unclear information, C17 believes that he and his wife are mistakenly treated as new claimants, as his eight-month waiting time for his SMI payments is the same as the waiting time for new claimants (normally 13–39 weeks) that he has been informed of by JCP staff.

This confusion could also have been generated by the information given by the JCP staff who interacted with C17 in February 2017, as such information could not possibly have been updated at that time to make it consistent with the later changes to SMI in 2018. Furthermore, due to a lack of any audio or visual monitoring system of the advice quality in the local JCP, no evidence is gathered to help the claimant to process his benefit information and alleviate his confusion. In terms of meaning-making regarding confusion about the complexity of UC, the policy is closely linked to *non-paternalist* justification rather than paternalist justification, as C9 comments that: 'UC makes it much easier for them [DWP] to track then to administer… I think it's not helpful as a user, because it's not as clear and it does not explain each feature ...'. According to the description of C17, the UC process is failing to address

confusion and improve the system to increase transparency (DWP, 2010c; Millar and Bennett, 2017). This systemic failure unwittingly influences the targeted population's assessment of the system's effectiveness and fairness.

6.2 Updating Changes in Circumstances and UC Helpline

This section analyses claimants' interpretations of the client processing in relation to benefit-related behaviour control, including their views of the updated circumstances with online or telephone communication, their perspectives on experiences of making enquiries through the UC helpline, and their meaning-making of such social processes of being treated as a client. Different ways of processing clients have different implications for the quality of treatment and services (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). Kiousis (2002) remarks that interactivity plays a role in media and psychology across communication techniques (such as speed, flexibility and sensory complexity), communication contexts (such as virtual presence) and perceptions (such as perceived control, pace, content and timing). As Roda and Thomas (2003) explain, changing interactions with stakeholders from face-to-face or telephone-based communication to a digital method of updating changes in circumstances implies a physical, social and cognitive space change. This section finds changes in updating changes in circumstances create a new interface of social interaction for stakeholders and the UC recipients to exchange benefit-related information. This implies that UC recipients' perspectives of updating changes in circumstances are – to a large extent – related to the perceived appropriateness of policy delivered by UC work coach, and by staff working on the UC telephone service and the UC digital system.

6.2.1 Updating Changes in Circumstances

The UC system of updating changes in circumstances online means that claimants can input new information in their journal or leave a message for their work coach to reply to. The whole process of updating changes in circumstances includes interactivity (claimant–digital journal account management–work coach) or intersubjectivity (claimant–work coach). For the former one, the UC system creates a new interface of social interaction for stakeholders and the UC recipients to exchange benefit-related information. The waiting time involved in updating changes in circumstances online differs from that of interpersonal communication. It also

depends on the speed with which the work coach or JCP decision makers reply to a recipient's update request or enquiry. The main argument here is that recipients' perspectives of the official process of updating changes in circumstances are related to reporting the changes in *circumstances* of the claimants, the proceeding process of any updated information of the DWP staff/work coach, and the concept of 'change' (DWP, 2019d).

> '... it's very well signposted online, it's quicker. I think it's easy to put information online, but it's going to be between two and five days before you hear. Reporting UC circumstances change takes a longer waiting time [than the time spent on helpline pre-UC]; it can be a pain, especially when you work. You check your emails every day and they don't ...'

> (C1, aged 39, lone parent, male, White British, site B)

C1 views the UC individual online journal as an institutionalised process of symbolic interaction wherein claimants interpret and respond to signposts, cues, signals and messages in their personal account (Blumer, 1969). According to C1, the UC online journal provides simplicity: 'it's very well signposted online, it's quicker. I think it's easy to put information online…' (C1).

However, for C1, processing online involves more time waiting for a response from his work coach or other DWP staff. C1 internalises such waiting time as being treated neglectfully, which generates a cognitive bias: 'You check your emails every day and they [DWP staff] don't...'. As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, processing clients implies behaviour control. Drawing on the administrative burden of Moynihan et al. (2014), this suggests that psychological costs ('it can be a pain') and compliance costs ('it took a longer time') may be imposed upon the client during the waiting time for updating changes in circumstances.

When a client is processed online in a shorter time and in a routine, online connections with the government are deemed as a favourable way to control claimants' behaviour (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). Such online approaches have been proven to be useful in regard to citizens connecting with the government (Thomas and Streib, 2003). In the current study, the institutionalised process of updating

changes in circumstances via an online journal is viewed as convenient when the processing time is shorter compared to before. The differing perspectives between C1 and C27/C7/C22 are due to UC claimants being processed by different work coaches in different *speed* in terms of the timing of dealing with claimants' messages:

'... it's pretty straightforward, but the waiting time is probably quicker than the local JCP office pre-UC, when I had to call them, and I had to wait for a long time – sometimes it was more than one hour ... before UC I could update my circumstances on the phone, but now I do it online and I feel it's easier and quicker. It's more convenient and less information is required, I change my circumstances online at the end of the day [the same day] ...'

(C27, aged 63, couple, male, White British, site B)

'I told my work coach I am working now, it is easy to update my circumstances [via face-to-face interaction with work coach] ...'

(C7, aged 29, male, single, White British, site A)

'... the best thing about UC is that I can do lots of things online. That allows me to stay at home, and it's a lot more convenient ...'

(C22, aged 36, male, single, African/Caribbean origin, site B)

C22's statement ('that allows me to stay at home') highlights the claimants' perceived control (Fishman, 2014) and autonomy of benefit behaviour. This is in contrast to the psychological costs of queuing on the telephone pre-UC (such as C10 and C13):

'... when I changed from JSA to ESA when I was ill, there were lots of stressful phone calls. I had to explain why I had to, why I was always changing it. There was lots of stress that I did not need, with the UC I can just go online and type it, which is easier...'

(C10, aged 61, female, single, Asian British, site B)

'I made more than five calls to update my circumstances pre-UC. When you call, you sometimes don't get through straightaway and you have to keep calling, and when you do get through ... how they explained it to you was sometimes a bit difficult ... No, I don't like it [UC helpline]. Because when you call them, they say "go online" ... can you go and take the information and look and do it, because I cannot do it ...'

The structure of interaction plays a role in influencing the range of behavioural actions that clients choose (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). The pre-UC method of updating changes in circumstances via telephone is viewed as onerous by C10 as she has less autonomy in controlling the structure of the interactions (for example, the frequency of telephone communication). The UC digital system is perceived to be easy to adapt to by some claimants (including C10), but not by claimants who needs digital help to access and maintain interactions on the digital system (for example, C13).

C4's working hours are uncertain and temporary, and she perceives updating changes in circumstances in their online UC journal to be somewhat onerous as she has to adapt to the 'unprecedented scrutiny' (Millar and Bennett, 2017, p. 179). This refers to the claimant having to update the circumstances every month due to the uncertainty and changes in her working hours.

> '... it's not easy, it's very difficult. Because it doesn't help keep you updated with the information [of when the request will be progressed]. Because the job I work is temporary, the number of hours worked changes every month. I don't know my working hours each month, so I have to update it every month, in my case I have two periods of employment, and they are both temporary, I can manage it by myself, but it's a lot of delays, you have to make sure you put the right information because it could affect you ...'

(C4, aged 39, single, female, African/Caribbean British, site B)

According to the description of C4, the claimant is under pressure to update their circumstances. As the DWP (2019d) highlights, a claimant 'could be taken to court or have to pay a penalty if [they] give wrong information or do not report a change in [their] circumstances'. From the psychological perspective, this imposes psychological burdens upon the claimant to comply with the policy rules, which could be exacerbated when there has been a delay (Moynihan et al., 2014).

With respect to the definition of 'changes', this thesis finds that conditions of circumstance (Clasen and Clegg, 2007) under UC includes 'starting to care for a child or disabled person' (DWP, 2019d). This means that, compared to IB JSA and Income

Support (IS), more circumstances are taken into account in the official definition of 'updating circumstances' of UC system (DWP, 2019d). Before the introduction of UC, updating changes in circumstances rules of IB JSA and care allowance are made separately, which fail to consider the likelihood of the tensions between caring responsibilities for a disabled person and job search commitments in terms of conditionality. For example, before UC, because of their caring responsibilities, claimants such as C24 has to have her JSA withdrawn when she fails to fulfil their commitment to their work search conditionality.

> '... they [IB JSA system] were not understanding of situational difficulties; it was either I looked for work or I [did caring responsibility for a disabled person at home and hence] was kicked off the whole JSA. They [DWP staff] did not understand how everything was going at home. So, the programme [IB JSA] did not take [the caring responsibility for a disabled person] into the assessment ... When I was a carer [for a disabled person], they would give me carer allowance and I wouldn't be on IB JSA, or whatever it is. This means for IB JSA, they did not take into consideration the fact that [caring] things can go on, that [caring responsibility] can impact my job searching, so UC does [include the caring responsibility into] changes circumstances at home. With the pressure being lifted, I can do more [towards fulfilling work search commitments] ...'

> (C24, aged 29, female, single, African/Caribbean British, site A)

UC conditionality takes the caring responsibility for a disabled person into the circumstances, which means that C24 is qualified for the Carer element of UC by fulfilling her caring responsibilities for a disabled person and her working responsibilities. This reflects a change in the institutionally organised and administered process in requiring efforts in qualifying and maintaining eligibility. This means that C24 could undertake paid caring responsibilities for a disabled person in her family as well as taking on paid work to increase her earnings (see more discussions in section 6.5.3).

6.2.2 UC Helpline and Perceived Control

Different perspectives are revealed regarding the participants' experiences of calling the UC helpline. Telephone communication is viewed as convenient by some: 'telephone calls are more convenient ...' (C8). In contrast, dealing with UC helpline staff is viewed by others to cause uncertainty due to speaking to different staff

members on each call (C1). The claimant lacks control in choosing appropriate staff to deal with on telephone calls. The procedure of processing clients is regarded as lacking an appropriate translation of clients' needs into institutional conceptualisation and rules (explaining the 'reason of deduction'). In the view of C1:

> '… when I phone them [UC helpline], I don't always get through to the same person. If we have not spoken before, I have to tell the whole story from the beginning. Sometimes I get frustrated, they don't seem to understand what I am saying, sometimes it takes me time to process, to sort things out, I say, "please, I want this [confusion of a £62.80 deduction for eight months] resolved", now, they don't like it when I ask to speak to the supervisor or manager. They all know [why I requested to speak to the supervisor], and they hate that ...'

> (C1, aged 39, lone parent, male, White British, site B)

C16 states that the staff does not provide consistent advice when processing clients. C16 attributes psychological and compliance costs (Moynihan et al., 2014) to the service UC helpline; for example, by placing blame on the helpline staff (personal factor) having a 'lack of training' (C16). Due to the questions C16 raises on the telephone remaining unresolved, C16 makes further calls later. C16 feels stress and a sense of being misled by the UC helpline staff who deals with her question about UC payments after she makes numerous calls:

> '… so me, personally, I am a student. I was told they [UC helpline staff] would only take my maintenance grant into account [as income in UC assessment], and they wouldn't take my [student] loan into account. The next person I spoke to said: "No. no. It's not the grant they are taking into account, it's the loan they are taking into account", So no two people said the same thing, it's very misleading and very stressful... I get conflicting answers and never speak to the same person twice! I feel they are lacking training, they don't understand the system, so they cannot give you the right answer...'

> (C16, aged 29, lone parent, mature student, African/Caribbean British, site B)

Helpline communication involves talking with a real person in real-time, unlike communicating via the claimants' UC journal. Talking on the helpline (one-to-one) allows for interaction and explanation, and both online communication and the helpline permit mutual communication between front-line stakeholders (not

necessarily decision makers) and clients. C16 perceives the UC helpline staff who deals with her questions as having a lack of control over decision making, hence undermining their perceived control (Fishman, 2014) of this claimant's benefit behaviour.

> '... they [UC helpline staff] actually have low control over anything, all they can do is pass on a message to this distant case manager [decision maker] who you never speak to, never get to hear from, and that's all they can do, all they are is human voicemails, that's what I feel. They just take a message, pass it onto someone, we have no control to do anything. I think they need to be given more control [in decision making] ...'(C16)

C16 cannot interact with a decision maker ('distant case manager') because her communication takes place within a heterogenous social space, among front-line staff with different job responsibilities from those of decision makers. Perceived constraints on responsiveness engendered by client processing, such as uncertainty and confusion, are generated from C16's experience of the telephone-based processing system. This implies that claimants' opinions on the *perceived* control and autonomy of claimants' benefit behaviour are related with their *perceptions* of stakeholders' control of the content, speed and quality of interactions through the helpline.

6.3 Face-to-Face Interaction and Co-production of Conditionality

This section analyses claimants' experiences and opinions towards their personal advisors (working-age benefit) and UC work coaches, and the influence of their co-production of policy delivery on the efficacy of UC in terms of behaviour change (see also chapter 7) through a face-to-face approach. As explained by Lipsky (2010 [1980]), policies are co-produced between the individual stakeholders and claimants, which means that the stakeholders interact with clients to symbolise, reinforce or constrain their relationships. Drawing on Whitaker's (1980) view, co-production is understood as citizen participation in the delivery of policy, as he writes, 'this [citizen participation] is particular the case in human services where change in the clients' behaviour is the "product" which is supposed to be delivered' (p. 240). Here, a face-to-face approach – as a form of co-production of policy delivery - entails real-time communication in the real space of a visual physical setting, where stakeholders and

clients exchange and negotiate shared meanings of social roles and conditionality in policy implementation.

Goffman (1958) employs the metaphor of theatrical performance to illustrate the factors that affect face-to-face interaction. This dramaturgical model posits individuals who are describing their subjective world to the audience. Face-to-face interaction includes visual notice, social recognition, a mutual activity that entail coproducing in reciprocal expectations and behaviours of social actors who request for assistance, communicate, and negotiate with the system. This implies that the appropriate conduct of co-producing policy is expected to 'incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society' (Goffman, 1958, p. 35). Face-to-face interaction helps to define and translate the problems and needs of citizens and to mediate conflicts with lower-level workers. This also affects clients' self-respect and self-expectations more generally (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). Habermas (1984) claims that communicative interaction has implications for social integration. This section discusses the co-production of conditionality through face-to-face interaction approach, from which a personalised appropriate approach is constructed. This section leads to the finding that the digital approach and the telephone helpline influence claimants' perceptions of policy implementation because individuals are confused about the interaction structure (see section 6.3.1) and policy eligibility rules are interpreted in different ways (see section 6.3.2).

6.3.1 Respect the Claimants' Autonomy and Prevent Social Harms

Ontologically, social harm is defined as an act, or condition or misrecognition hinder the fulfilment of needs, and self-realisation (Pemberton, 2015). This conceptualisation is useful to understand the appropriate personalised approach. It should acknowledge that the personalised approach to benefit and employment services is not a novel concept of policy design, as it was introduced under the Major government and was expanded to become the key defining feature of Blair's New Deals (Driver, 2009; Freud 2007). The concept of personalisation is loosely elucidated as a tailored service to serve recipients' needs which allows citizen, member of the community, and resident participation to co-produce personal transformation (Ferguson, 2007; Freud, 2007; Grover, 2012). The underlying

changes intended here focus on perceived changes in *implementation forms* delivered by varied UC work coach from UC recipients' experiences, compared to job adviser's approach pre-UC. Work coaches who do neither make personal judgements about claimants' privacy nor do cause harm, but provide understanding, professionality and empathy, are viewed as helpful in coproducing with the UC recipients in fulfilling the Claimant Commitment (CC) and underpinning social solidarity.

For example, C21 thinks that her work coach listens to her and understands her past experiences of prostitution and a criminal history without making any personal subjective judgements. C21 attributes this to the work coach being of the opposite gender; C21 thinks he (work coach) would be less likely to judge her past activities than her pre-UC job advisor, who is also female. According to Feinberg (1989), privacy is viewed as being equivalent to autonomy. This implies an intervention should not violate the recipient's privacy and autonomy.

> '... I don't lie about certain things, my work coach knows my past. I have come out of prison, I told him about working on the street. While I was a private dancer, I used to take drugs, and all that, so he [work coach] can work with me [to co-produce the conditionality], and understood it [past experience], and he is actually a man, who is nice, with women [job advisor pre-UC], sometimes they might judge me , he [work coach post-UC] helps me because he knows [the claimant's circumstances]. If I am in debt, budgeting, he will tell me where to go [for financial advice] and it's my choice... yes, he does work with me on my financial skills ...'

> (C21, aged 48, single claim, female, White British, site B)

For C21, her pre-UC job advisors, who are deemed as being likely to make a subjective judgement, unwittingly reinforces stigma through this recipient's social interactions with them. This social phenomenon can be analysed by employing Cooley's (1998 [1902]) concept of 'looking-glass self'; C21 imagines the social norms attached to her past experiences (social self) by her pre-UC job advisors and experiences a self-feeling of mortification when she feels she is being subjectively judged in her own reflection of herself.

Goffman (1958, p.141) refers to 'the art of impression management' as 'dramaturgical structure of social interaction' that represents 'an effort to gain control over the reality they [social actors] present to their audience'. However, Goffman's (1958) argument does not capture the whole picture of interpersonal interactions between the clients and stakeholders.

Post-UC, C21 does not engage in impression management behaviour to hide her socially stigmatised experiences of prostitution, drug addiction and crime to gain social acceptance and respect from her work coach: 'I don't lie about certain things' (C21). The post-UC socialisation process informs C21 how her past experiences are perceived, interpreted and translated in the new social relationship. According to her description, her UC work coach treats the claimant playing her role as a needy claimant. This helps a new social meaning of self to emerge for C21 in this social interaction. This suggests that a trustworthy work coach may enhance a client's feeling of their past history and life experiences being listened to and understood, as such work coach's strong work ethic is independent of the prevailing social–moral stigma attached to certain types of past experience in the social world. C21 receives appropriate advice from her work coach, who signposts her to a professional agency to help deal with her debt, budgeting and financial needs, while still respecting her autonomy: 'he [the work coach] told me it's my choice to go or not to go' (C21). It is important to emphasise that the story of C21 raises matters of independent judgement and the empirical variety of policy implementation forms.

Moreover, as Zhao and Zhang's (2016) research highlights, the targeted person is more likely to trust people of the opposite gender than people of the same gender in interpersonal relationships. This interesting finding has important implications in terms of understanding client–stakeholder interpersonal relationships. In the current research context, C21 (the client) trusts a stakeholder of the opposite gender who shows understanding and empathy towards her past experiences. C21 positively evaluates the role performance of her work coach post-UC. This interpersonal phenomenon is widely consistent with Eagly and Crowley's (1986) finding that the male gender role is viewed as playing generously helping social roles. Here it means the appropriate personalised approach of work coach entails protection that prevents

devaluation, and disparagement of past experiences which are widely linked to harm suffered by economic marginalised and socially stigmatised female.

6.3.2 Social Control of EEA nationals

European Economic Area (EEA) citizens' access to benefits is deemed to be a contentious issue. According to the *Migrant Access to Benefit Measures*, in order to be eligible for income-based JSA, EEA claimants must pass the habitual resident test, meaning that they must be residents with the right to reside in the EEA (DWP, 2013c; Sibley and Collins, 2014). Since January 1st, 2014, EEA citizens have had to meet several conditions in order to be categorised as residents. For example, EEA nationals must be residents in the UK for at least three months, and they must take the habitual residence test (DWP, 2013c; Sibley and Collins, 2014). Importantly, since 1st April 2014, EEA nationals are restricted to claim HB.

For example, C30, who came to the UK from Croatia (EEA) in 1994 and married a British citizen, has a UK permanent residence document. In 2014, C30 divorces her husband, with whom C30 has joint custody of two dependent children. C30 is informed that she is subject to the DWP (2013c) amendment that enforces the following actions: 'cutting off benefits after six months for EU jobseekers with no job prospect and stopping Housing Benefit claims for EU jobseekers'. C30 is informed that she is only subject to six-months IB JSA till October of 2014. However, she has since been informed by the advice centre that the Immigration (EEA) amendment no. 2 of 2013 (The National Archives, 2014) does not apply in her circumstance. C30 wrongly believes that her IB JSA benefits being taken away after six months is a failure of the JCP staff.

> '... it said you are a foreigner and you are allowed to stay on benefits for six months, what are you talking about? I went to citizens advice bureau and she [staff in citizen advice bureau] explained that this rule is nothing to do with me. This rule only applies to people who came to the UK from 2014 onwards. It doesn't apply to me — I came here in 1994. The head office of Jobcentre is in Belfast, they [staffs at the Belfast JCP head office] said I didn't qualify [for HB and IB JSA], and they took my benefits away. I had nothing to pay my bills with and I was starving for five months [while waiting for mandatory reconsideration]. I nearly fainted and my stomach was physically hurting, and I was stooping like this because of the problems [of not qualifying for HB

and IB JSA]. I just wanted to sleep, and I could not. I took some sleeping pills. Since then I have been in debt, and I have two children at the time. I just have nothing to live off ...'

(C30, aged 50, female, Croatian, lone parent, site B)

The staff at the advice centre, who correctly identifies that the habitual residence test does not apply to C30 (see the previous quote). However, this explanation does not capture all factors which affect C30's social right to continue to access IB JSA and HB. Since the 1st of January 2014, EEA migrants are subject to a Genuine Prospect of Work (GPoW) assessment, in which EEA migrants must provide compelling evidence that demonstrates a genuine prospect of work in order for them to be eligible to continue to access IB JSA, if EEA migrants are unemployed for over six months or a total of more than 91 days (DWP, 2013c, 2016d; Dwyer et al, 2019a; Kennedy, 2015; O'Brien, 2016; The National Archives, 2014). As such, the categories and circumstances of eligibility (Clasen and Clegg, 2007; Shutes, 2016) for IB JSA have changed.

With respect to access to HB, DWP (2014b, p. 4) publishes that 'the amendments in SI2014/539 remove access to HB for EEA jobseekers who make a new claim for HB on or after 1 April 2014'. It means that this amendment to limit EEA migrants to access to HB comes into effect since 1st of April 2014. As DWP (2014b, p. 4) explains, 'EEA jobseekers who make a new claim for HB on or after 1 April 2014 who retain their worker status have the same rights to HB as a UK national and their situation remains unchanged'. With respect to the 'work status', the Immigration (EEA) (amendment) no. 2 of 2013 indicates that 'a person may only retain worker status for a maximum of six months unless he (or she) can provide compelling evidence that he (or she) is continuing to seek employment and has a genuine chance of being engaged' (The National Archives, 2014). C30 made IB JSA new claim in April 2014, and C30 was subject to the restriction to access HB. This is because C30 did not provide compelling evidence to show that 'for the last three months C30 has been earning at the level at which employees start paying National Insurance' or other compelling evidence of changes in circumstances showing a genuine chance to move into work, according to DWP (2014c). The outcome is that C30 was neither able to access IB JSA nor able to access HB in October 2014.

C30 wrongly attributes this benefit experiences (IB JSA was stopped at the end of October 2014) as the faults of the DWP staff working on the telephone helpline and job advisor, as C30 wrongly believes that the helpline staff and her job advisor make the decision to stop her IB JSA and HB: 'in the end, I complained to the JCP, and she [job advisor pre-UC] made a big mistake, I don't think she is there now [post-UC], she was there for a while and then she left' (C30). This implies that a client, who has the confusion of decision making, makes (inappropriate) actions to react to *perceived* injustice of decision making (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]).

Furthermore, C30 has the psychological burden of waiting for a mandatory reconsideration, which lasts for five months, until C30 is told she can claim IB JSA for a limited amount of time. This waiting time is perceived by C30 to be unnecessarily long; using Fraser's (2000) terminology, this waiting time constitutes institutionalised harm, as it causes psychological effects such as powerless, anger and dependence on the benefit system (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). During this time, C30 suffers from financial shortages, including being in debt from the end of 2014 until the time of the interview in October 2017, as well as food shortages and the deterioration of her physical health.

O'Brien (2016) has provided a useful analysis of EEA citizenship and social security policy in the UK. However, it is still unclear how policy implementations influence EEA citizens' perspectives of benefit behaviours and access to citizenship. EEA citizens' internalised citizen-stakeholder relationships and meaning-making are different pre- and post-UC. Whether they are treated with or without respect, EEA citizens internalise certain symbols of authority, which have psychological implications on the claimants' views of benefit behaviour and access to social citizenship.

Post-UC, C30, who has a permanent resident status that satisfies the right to reside under the Immigration (EEA) regulation 2016, is eligible to access UC (The National Archives, 2015, 2016a). C30 works with her UC work coach towards fulfilling the requirements of UC. In terms of the implementation of the policy, C30 thinks that she is treated with human dignity, which protects her self-esteem and self-evaluation.

The work coach respects her autonomy and past working experiences and seeks job vacancies that are best suited to her experience. This helps C30, as a jobseeker, to fulfil the conditionality of the updated measures for EU migrants to access UC in 2015 (DWP, 2015).

> '… this time [post-UC] I have a really, really good work coach. I am really happy with her. This time my work coach is absolutely fantastic. If the [work coach] knows they have the types of jobs I am interested in, they put it on the computer. They need to know their clients [and] everyone's history about what types of jobs they are looking for. When we go there, we show them the job search, so they can advise us based on the type of jobs we are looking for, and then they tell us: "Oh I found something for you, can you give [HR/the employers] a ring?" or "you have an interview at that date". I am actually treated like a human being. Before [UC] they just looked at us (claimants) as though we had no brains or anything. That's how the [job advisors pre-UC] treated us, like we were worth nothing. That's how they saw us. They didn't respect us whatsoever, but this time around, it's completely different. There is much more help.' (C30)

This claimant's experiences and perceptions are generated after reflecting on certain socialisation processes, including social networks and structures, such as interactions with her work coach and employers. Perceived changes are generated from social interactions with different stakeholders; however, this claimant does not attribute the perceived and experienced benefit-related change to the policy change from working-age benefits to UC: 'I don't know whether it is about UC' (C30).

Respect is largely connected to Kant's (1994 [1781]) argument of recognition, which forms the foundation of experience. Respecting one another's characters and behaviours shows the nature of humanity, with regard to every individual having equal demands and legal and moral standings (Rawls, 1971). A contractual argument is created by Scanlon (1998), who also highlights mutual respect and recognition as a constitutive part of moral reasoning. Respect forms the basis of unity and subjective morality between a client and a work coach. As such, respect, which is internalised as a reinforcement of what Hegel (2001) calls an ethical life, refers to knowing and actualising through self-consciousness and autonomy. This reveals the ethical reasoning behind the claimant's interpretation of whether decisions by different

stakeholders are right or wrong in terms of conducting benefit behaviour, fulfilling conditionality and regulating the life of the claimant post-UC.

This also implies why, when the claimant's interpretation of the stakeholders' language, referred to as 'symbols' by Mead (1934), is in conflict with the claimant's own perception of the conditionality of the policy, the claimant was less likely to make a positive evaluation of benefit behaviour pre-UC. On the other hand, when the claimant shared an understanding of the meaning (symbols) of the conditions of the policy with stakeholders, the claimant is more likely to make a positive evaluation of benefit behaviours and to responsibly work towards fulfilling the eligibility requirements alongside the work coach post-UC.

6.4 Conflict, Tension and Negotiation

Stakeholders play an important role in determining entitlement and influencing the redistribution and allocation of social security by increasing or decreasing benefit availability (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). However, Lipsky does not state the extent to which stakeholders influence claimants' understanding of the policy in relation to immediate and individual behaviour change.

This section presents the extent to which claimants perceive and internalise the differences between working-age benefits, tax credits and UC. As discussed in Chapter 3.5, the paternalistic government framework set out by Le Grand and New (2015) explores the internal and external environments that recipients find themselves in, taking into consideration the social psychology theory of self-determination of behaviour (Deci and Ryan, 2000). This process relates to the extent that past and present experiences are internalised when dealing with policies in relation to the self, needs and goals.

This section leads to the finding that claimants who fully internalise and understand the structure and various elements of UC perceive the claimants' benefit behaviour to be controlled and participated in the requirements for UC. However, claimants who have not fully internalised or understood the elements and structure of UC perceive the claimants' benefit behaviour to be out of control. This reveals the fact

that the extent to which frontline stakeholders resolve policy-related contradictions affects claimants' perceived control of benefit-related behaviour, as well as their evaluation of UC.

6.4.1 Processing Clients in LA and AC

Claimants perceive that it is more difficult to find appropriate staff in LA and AC post-UC, compared to pre-UC. For example, C15 thinks it is difficult to find an appropriate staff member in the JCP in site B. Claimants attribute the shortage of face-to-face staff to system failures, such as cuts to staff who are able to deal with queries about UC benefits: 'it's very difficult [to find appropriate staff in LA] because they have been taken away. It's mostly now everything online, and over the phone' (C15). Similar experiences are encountered by C26, who has sought advice from an advice centre both pre- and post-UC: 'because they [advice centre in site B] have reduced staff, the government reduced staff, although the quality of their service is good, as always' (C26). The reduction of frontline staff implies that they may be experiencing heavy caseloads for decisions regarding citizenship.

> 'I was informed by a member of LA staff that she could "only be with [me] for two minutes so [I had] to be quick, as [she had] three people waiting." She was very much in a rush...you can see that there is a long queue, of people waiting on the phone post-UC. Before [pre-UC], it's [LA service is] good because I can talk face-to-face ...very good....'.

> (C15, aged 55, single, female, Spanish, site B)

> 'I managed to speak with someone from AC [in site A]... I never see them in person, just online. They are helpful, but I have to be patient online because it takes ages for them to get back to me, so I have to be kind of patient... before [pre-UC] it was easy to find a person to communicate, but it was still online... '

> (C7, aged 29, male, single, White British, site A)

Relationships with stakeholders may be limited in terms of face-to-face human interactions with those who can meet their clients' needs for benefit-related advice. According to the description of C7, the client is imposed salient costs by taking the time of stakeholders. It is perceived that stakeholders predominantly carry out relationships with socially and economically needy claimants, who are cued by

symbols of online advice service. As a result of this social control, their clients have to be 'patient' (C7). C7 does not attribute such online client processing approach as a constituent part of UC.

6.4.2 Perceived Control, the Attribution of Adaptability, and Benefit Behaviour

As discussed in Chapter 5, perceived control, termed as such by Chipperfield et al. (2012), refers to the beliefs that influence an individual's behavioural outcomes. For example, C21's work coach helps her to request an APA so that her rent could be paid directly to her landlord. This helps C21 to pay rent at the appropriate time and secure her tenancy. The controlling of the rent payment by UC is perceived as resolving the failures of a lack of financial control (internal factor of the autonomy-related barrier): 'they sort it [inappropriate budgeting and rent arrears] out now, I am OK now' (C21). This resolution is perceived as controlling external factors (changes to the rent payment method using an APA) in order to prevent the failure of the individual's control over their autonomy, in relation to their budgeting behaviour (paying rent in arrears). This suggests that the perceived control of external factors to autonomy (through an APA), enables C21 to feel secure and able to engage in benefit-related behaviours that do not conflict with housing-related behaviours, which ultimately lead to desirable outcomes (paying rent appropriately).

> 'I would rather the rent is paid directly to my landlord. Let's say I have £2,000 in my bank account — all of that money — especially for people who have no money and have no food in the fridge, what would you do? Okay, I am going to take £300 out and do what I have to do, or are you going to buy a jacket or a coat and not pay the rent? Realistically, come on [laughs]. What I am saying is that I pay the majority of [UC] and my [work coach] has helped me because the rent is now being paid straight to the [landlord]. They sort it out now, so I am OK now. It [UC] makes me budget more. It makes me look at my responsibilities more and it makes me work out my priorities and my needs because I had no money at the end of the month, so I need priorities. Before I did not like the fact that you could wait for a fortnight and you needed to work out what to spend on.'

> (C21, aged 48, single claim, female, being in-debt, drug addiction and criminal history, White British, site B)

Not being aware or requesting an APA to arrange frequent payments (DWP, 2014a), C21 merely recognises the difference in payment frequency of working-age benefit

as being a characteristic of social control. Therefore, the structure of choices available to C21 limits the range of alternative behaviours (such as shopping) that C21 perceives to be realistically available. C21 internalises and assimilates these differences into her behaviours. This involves practical decision-making and prioritising basic needs and desires (Frankfurt, 1971; Pettit, 2006) in accordance with the financial resources of the claimant. This finding is consistent with Summers' (2018) research finding.

Drawing on the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan (2000), this phenomenon also reveals the interrelatedness of benefit behaviour, budgeting behaviour, and a claimant's reflective and rational processes. According to Deci and Ryan (2000, p. 229), psychological needs include 'innate psychological nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being', rather than motivation generated from incentives. The monthly benefit payment reinforces the claimant's responsibility to adapt, self-organise and self-regulate claimant's own budgeting behaviour in order to meet their psychological need for wellness. These psychological needs are addressed through the supportive relationship and advice from her work coach (see 6.4.1). This implies that a psychologically integrated sense of behaviour change is related to the degree of social integration.

The work coach who advises the claimant to change the payment frequency of their UC using APA also helps the claimant to select the social security that would best suit her budget management and benefit-related behavioural habits.

> 'My work coach post-UC is an angel. She is lovely. I have told her about the problems that I have been having [and] she is going to try to get my money [UC] back every two weeks, because I told her I just cannot manage. I can budget and manage financially [after APA]'.

> (C26, aged 36, lone parent, African/Caribbean origin, site B)

Advice from the work coach has helped the claimant to understand and internalise policy regulation (APA), through which C26 has internalised and assimilated the social control (fortnightly payments) as a sense of budgeting habits. In contrast, when the claimant does not realise or internalise the option of requesting an APA to change the payment frequency, C26 experiences financial shortages that are attributed to the

conflict between budgeting habits (the fortnightly payment of working-age benefits) and UC monthly payments. As another example, C8 experiences financial shortages during her wait for her first UC payment. C8 recognises the fact that her advance payment, which would only last for six weeks, is not sufficient to cover her and her son's basic needs. Her financial burden is perceived as being escalated when she borrows money from a high-interest rate moneylender (named Provident) with an annual percentage rate of up to 535.3%.

> 'The con of UC is the waiting time [for the first payment], and the [DWP] have to pay me just once a month. Before [UC], I think I used to get paid every two weeks. By the time my money comes in, I am not [used to this payment frequency]. I prefer the two-week payments, which is much better. The monthly one, it's gone, because everything is paid for and you are left for another month waiting until you get your money. I borrow the money and I pay back every week. It's [moneylender companies], like sharks — money-lending sharks. I have borrowed at least £600 and I have to pay at least £1,000 after a week, so I end up paying so much more. They [staff at the moneylender companies] know me and they come to me. It's good when they come [for me to borrow money], but when it's paying time [and I have to return the borrowed money with a high-interest rate]. Oh, the money [that was initially borrowed] is tripled!'

> (C8, aged 36, lone parent, female, African/Caribbean British, site B)

The relationship between systematic failures with regard to conditionality, sanctions, and accumulated debt have been widely explored in *Final Findings: Universal Credit* by Wright et al. (2018) and other recent publications (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Wright and Patrick, 2019). Drawing on the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan (2000) and the attribution theory (Fiske, 1991; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1984), this thesis aims to develop an alternative perspective on the social phenomenon of debt in relation to UC, emphasising the subjectivities of claimants and their perceived adaptability to benefit behaviour change.

A new concept, the attribution of adaptability, is constructed here. It entails behavioural outcomes are viewed as a result of the perceived adaptability of the claimant. I argue that the self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2000) and the attribution theory (Fiske, 1991; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1984) complement previous research on UC implementation by clarifying the relationship between benefit

behaviour and the claimant's subjectivity. High-interested debt undermines C8's psychological needs for autonomy and competence for her fulfilment on her financial capability and freedom to self-organise behaviour. This reveals the fact that C8 perceives the UC monthly payment frequency to be less adaptable, as it fails to meet the basic needs of her family. Therefore, there are behavioural Implications on her budgeting and debt-related behaviours in relation to the claimant's spiralling levels of debt. This implies a limited awareness and experience in seeking advice regarding an APA. Stinson's (2019) research provides a useful argument about vulnerable people who have internal and external barriers to both autonomy and the financial means to access an APA. This implies that more publicised information about access to an APA (such as the example of how C8 manages to maintain fortnightly payments and maintain her UC budgeting habits) may have important implications on claimants' financial behaviours. This also has an implication on culture which appears as a strategy for a behavioural response (such as borrowing money) and the perceptions of UC.

6.4.3 Blame, Shame and Failures

Claimants have attributed blame to various personal or systematic factors. Durkheim (1984 [1893]) has elucidated that individual and subjective meaning-making stems from social structures. Scanlon (2008, p. 202) defines blame as 'attributability', rather than simply negative moral judgement. Drawing on Scanlon's (2008) view, blame is always attributed to the individual's benefit-related behaviour, even though blame can be attributed to factors within a system that is out of control. This means that the claimant does *not* necessarily have freedom as a precondition of blame; in other words, their responsibility is rooted in the freedom to place oneself in a position from which one can make appropriate choices and have the opportunity to avoid blame while fulfilling a responsibility (Scanlon, 2008). I have noted different ways of internalisation that reflect their experiences of interacting with the UC system, which are responsible for various perceptions and attributions of blame and shame (as seen in C29, C26, C11 and C5).

UC is perceived as obscuring changes between the claimants' past and present selves. The monthly waiting time is perceived as being distressing, as it does not change the

claimants' self-evaluation: 'I am the worst person with money, it [UC monthly waiting time] doesn't bother me, because I have never been good at the money' (C29, aged 41, male, self-employed and in long-term debt, Wight British, site B). The system's waiting time barrier is internalised by claimants, as C29 blames his past and present self, thus mistaking systematic consequences as entirely personal failures.

To give another example, C26 attributes her food shortages to the UC monthly waiting time (including monthly payment), which has led to barriers in budgeting, compared to pre-UC. C26 blames perceived system failures for experiences of income poverty and food shortages that have led to destitution, stigma, frustration and sadness. The tensions between the inadequacies of fundamental solutions to address the root causes of poverty and meet immediate needs are displayed in the conservation with C26. Requesting groceries at the local FB causes C26 to feel a sense of embarrassment and shame. Embarrassing social situations highlight the claimant's lack of means to afford necessities and food, which can be shameful to admit in public.

> 'This is the wrong world. I don't understand [what they have done]. It's like I cannot control my money anymore. Why can't [UC claimants] go out to shop with that? [DWP] They said "go to the FB", but it's not filling enough. Everyone is complaining. When they are going to the JCP there are people arguing with the staff. There are people there, you know, [who are] really hungry for food. You can see the way they are looking at you, I just feel very sad. It's wrong, they are sitting there and starving. The queue for the food vouchers is long in the JCP because they [DWP] are putting people on this UC. But everybody uses FBs now... When you go there, they are packed now *more* than before, you know, *more* people are using them now'.

> (C26, aged 36, female, lone parent with a dependent child, African/Caribbean origin, actively seek work, site B)

Securing access to commodities is regarded as an achievement of social inclusion that prevents the social harms of shame and disgrace (Smith, 1776). Sen (1992, p. 6) employs the capability approach to argue that shame is a result of a lack of appropriate means to acquire primary goods and resources. Requesting access to food aid causes the negative emotional experiences of embarrassment and psychological

stress: 'one day I was crying, I told the lady, because I have a kid, I am picking up my food voucher' (C26).

The perceived system failure of monthly payments saddles C26 with a crippling hatred of the FB: 'they [system failures] put the families in poverty, I hate it [FB] with fear, it's wrong' (C26). Visiting a FB has been internalised as stigma and shame, and it has also restricted C26 from freely choosing to have fresh food. This experience is internalised as doing harm to C26's dignity and integrity through a lack of recognition of the groceries she needs: 'I don't eat out the cans, I like to buy the fresh food, but not in the can you know, you got no choice but to eat it, it's quite embarrassing, you know, it's very embarrassing when I go to the FB' (C26). Drawing on Fraser's (1995) argument, this reflects the fact that the claimant's social practices are entangled with her meaning-making and conceptualisation of moral judgement: 'it is wrong!' (C26). That said, C26 does not mistake the perceived systematic failure for her own failure to control her budgeting behaviour.

In contrast, C11 attributes his food shortages to having less money post-UC:

> 'I am worse off by about £110-£120 on UC. I cannot see why [there is such a difference]. UC restricts me on what they gave me. I think they should improve the system, for people who have not got themselves into debt. I use it [UC] to pay back what I borrowed. After that, I have only £20 to live on. Obviously, that would be for my son's food'.

> (C11, aged 46, male, lone parent, White British, site B)

In order to adapt to such changes in his benefit payment post-UC, C11 visits the local FB for groceries. As a consequence of feeling stigmatised when visiting the FB, C11's son wears a pair of sunglasses to hide from the experience of visiting the FB, thereby employing what Goffman (1986) calls stigma management behaviour. From social respect, this reveals the fact that the FB service is perceived as having a social stigma. C11, as a single father with a dependent child, is responsible for the social status in which he finds himself and, because receiving groceries from the FB is perceived as having a certain stigma, he prevents his child from experiencing this social label. Therefore, stigma management behaviour is employed in this specific context to prevent social actors from mistaking the perceived failure of the system for his son's personal failure.

This implies a social interaction in public life between stigmatised citizens, stakeholders, strangers, and acquaintances. Drawing on Goffman's (1986) argument, those who experience conflict (see the previous quotation from C26) and those who perceive stigmatisation when relying on societal community services in a local FB (such as C11), illustrate the fact that those who complain or are perceived to be threatening are, ironically, the stakeholders and volunteers who provide the most help in terms of tangible and material resources.

Hume (1994 [1817]) elucidates that every independent perception can be linked to form connections between the subjectivity of one's mind and one's experiences. This argument is relevant to this specific research context here. For example, C5 wrongly believes that LA's social housing policy is a part of UC: 'the accommodation [social housing] where I am living, I am paying high, but I am not given a comfortable room, my three dependent children and I live in two rooms, so UC is not helping at all' (C5, aged 45, Ghanaian female with three dependent children, site B). Blame is formed on the basis of an incorrect assumption that linked two separate policies. As discussed in Chapter 2.4.3, the working-age benefit allows one member of a couple to make a joint claim (DWP, 2011a). The ex-husband of C5 manipulates the working-age benefits and leaves C5 in a financially vulnerable situation: 'because I am [a victim of] domestic violence who give you the money? He [her children's father] was claiming everything [pre-UC]' (C5). This means that C5 does provide very limited accounts about the extent to which UC has led to changes in her experiences of interacting with the system.

6.4.4 Loan and Deduction

As Donnison (1977) explains, a distinction should be made between judgement, the application of rules and discretion. In this specific research context, this relates to JCP staff being perceived as less favourable when claimants thought interest-free loans are insufficiently provided by their local JCP office. C6 attributes this perception of 'no help' to failures of the staff in the local JCP offices who are in charge of interest-free loans post-UC.

'My son has a broken back [and] I phoned them and said [can] I have an advance payment [because] my son's back is broken. I owed £20-something [to JCP and] that was it. They said, "no [more interest-free loan], not until the last pound is paid!" So, my son is six years old. He is sleeping on the mattress on the floor until the last pound is paid. When I was on IS…I could apply for a budgeting loan or something like that and I could get that [pre-UC] when I am desperate, for things like a broken back, but now there is no help.'

(C12, aged 46, female, lone parent, White British, site B)

As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, frontline stakeholders make discrete decisions in relation to the citizens with whom they interact, and this decision making may be varied. The disparity in the decision making (such as the story of C12) leads to varied distribution levels of interest-free loans pre- and post-UC. Inconsistent decisions about access to financial lending through interest-free loans influence citizens' perception and evaluation of stakeholders, as it leads to claimants perceiving discrimination. This variation may reveal political pressures in relation to austerity. Stinson (2019) provides the analysis of the barriers to accessing additional support in UC, which states that claimants' borrowing behaviours may be taken into account by stakeholders in the local JCP if their clients are viewed as being unable to appropriately budget and have to rely on additional financial help.

The level of discretion may be circumscribed by certain rules in specific JCP offices, where stakeholders adhere to fundamental aspects of eligibility to access loans. This can be seen in the description of C12, who has had to return the advance payment she borrowed before requesting an interest-free loan, if she is urgently in need. The various levels of discretion influence the subjectivity of claimants and policy implementations, both pre-and post-UC. Furthermore, policy implementations by frontline staff influence citizens' perceptions and evaluations of the boundaries of state intervention and its effects, in relation to their wellbeing and the wellbeing of their family. Lipsky's (2010 [1980]) argument of discretion is useful here. It implies that social processes require impartial rules implemented by frontline stakeholders as well as empathy for special circumstances and a certain flexibility in the allocation of loans, dependant on appropriate explanations.

Furthermore, confusion has occurred following social interactions with stakeholders in JCP, which influences claimants' perceptions of UC and social security allocations. For example, C16, who is a single mother with a dependent child, undertakes a full-time study with a student loan and claims UC. The amount of her UC payment after the deductions is £15 in total.

> 'I receive about £15 a month, as I am a student, and the [staff in JCP] said that, as a student and even though I have a child, that's what I am entitled to. I gave up fighting and I said "OK! You know, fair enough!" I have lost my jobs and I have now gone for two months without [earning] a penny!'
>
> (C16, aged 29, a mature student and single mother, mature student, African/Caribbean British, site B)

According to the DWP (2019o), 'loans that cover maintenance, such as living expenses, rent and bills, will be deducted from your Universal Credit'. For mature students with dependent children, '30 % of a postgraduate master student loan in relation to the year of the course in which the assessment period falls' is taken off UC (The National Archives, 2016b). C16 seeks an explanation from the UC helpline (see section 6.3.2) and face-to-face interactions with staff at a local JCP. Due to her overpayment of the child tax credit (CTC), C16 owes DWP £15 per month, which is deducted, once again, from C16's UC payment, which is why C16 has not received any money since being out of work and claiming UC:

> 'I was waiting for UC because they still pay me CTC, but they said that I am not entitled to that CTC during that period, so I owe them [DWP] money. So, the £15 a month I get from UC is taken by CTC ... Now I get nothing. They give me £15 and they take £15 [to return the overpayment of the CTC]' (C16).

The description of C16 shows that insufficient UC payments (following the deductions) lead a single mother in a full-time study to fall into financial destitution. Drawing on Fraser's (2000) argument, this institutionalised process simplifies the complexity of being a female, mother and carer for her one-year-old child, and a mature student; an investor and consumer of higher education. The UC assessment system of student income insufficiently captures the complexity of and devalues the tensions between the claimant's life and the multiplicity of her identity, family and social roles. This leaves claimants such as C16 financially vulnerable, struggling with

the lack of institutionalised recognition of her multiple identities and social roles. This implies that sufficient institutionalised recognition may remedy the redistribution of social security by improving interaction with policies and enabling people to move forward with their lives. Recently, DWP (2019p) sets a threshold to restrict all the deductions to 30% of UC standard allowance. Future research into the changes in the deductions rule would provide us with a fuller picture of UC recipient's benefit-related behaviour change in relations to the deduction, along with its changes.

6.5 Government Paternalism and Appropriate Personalised Approach

As Le Grand and New (2015) highlight, government paternalism aims to justify government intervention which is designed for the individual's own good. This definition allows for many different interpretations of the meaning of one's freedom, own good, wellbeing and on what government intervention entails. In this research, it implies that changes made by a policy depend on how the policy is officially defined, and on how it is interpreted, implemented and perceived by the citizens and different stakeholders who apply it in their interactions and relationships.

There has been much discussion on the importance of the work coach–client relationships between claimants who view UC as simplifying or complicating the benefit system, and increasing or decreasing the perceived control over benefit behaviour (Chipperfield et al., 2012). The appropriate personalised support can be perceived as a way to simplify the system and improve the transparency and understanding of benefit change, which enables people to move forward with their lives. This finding is widely consistent with and confirms the research findings of Dwyer and Bright (2016), Dwyer (2018), Dwyer (2019), Fletcher and Flint (2018), Wright et al. (2016) and Wright et al. (2018). The sections below provide an analysis of the appropriate personalised approach in relation to government paternalism, taking into account multi-dimensional aspects.

Le Grand and New (2015) propose four main techniques of paternalist intervention to promote the well-being of citizens: legal restrictions, positive financial incentives, negative financial incentives and choice context change (including the choice of

liberal paternalism). These four main measures are portrayed by Le Grand and New (2015) as having a minimal impact on the individual's autonomy in making choices, whilst maximising the individual's wellbeing. Government paternalism is described as a way 'to correct an individual's judgement as to what is the best decision for him or her' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 177). However, when it comes to implementing policies, government paternalism is not deemed as independent or objective as it appears.

Based on the discussion on the heterogeneous and fragmented social phenomena represented in this chapter, I argue that UC, which is originally designed as a government paternalist policy carried out by non-market institutions – such as governments, community services and charities – is not fully perceived as falling under the category of government paternalism nor is it a sufficient method for correcting individual reasoning barriers. Interpretation, translation and interaction – as ways of implementing the appropriate personalised approach – are important elements for understanding government intervention. This section evaluates the critiques of government paternalism. Government paternalism does not sufficiently specify the importance of systematic barriers in understanding reasoning failure when claimants interact with the UC system. It commits the epistemological error of prioritising Le Grand and New's (2015) conceptualisation of government paternalism as a solution to individual reasoning failures. This chapter seeks to move claimants' perspectives and lived experiences of benefit claiming and behaviour change from the margins in paternalist literature to the key analysis.

6.5.1 Neoliberalism, Responsibilisation and Individualisation

As outlined by Harvey (2005, p. 3) and discussed in 2.1.2, neoliberalism reflects the interests and pursuits of information technologies, leading societies to becoming information societies. Furthermore, it entails 'creative destruction,' challenging societal institutional forms and relationships (see section 6.5.2), gendered reasoning of behaviour change (see section 6.5.3), and social solidarity (see section 6.5.4). As Wacquant (2012, p. 66) explains, neoliberalism involves the 're-engineering' and 're-deployment' of the authority agencies, policies, subjectivities and social relationships. Similarly, neoliberalism works to 're-structure' and 'harness' the

power of the state, which employs technical means to govern, transform and regulate the individual, whilst sustaining individuals' autonomy to 'freely choose to conduct themselves' (Brown, 2003; Foucault, 2008; Soss et al., 2011a, p. 156; 212). The political climate of austerity in the UK remarks the retrenchment of the welfare state and the deregulation and privatisation of social and public services and spaces as features of neoliberal ideology.

UC has interwoven with conceptualisations – such as freedom, responsibilisation and individualisation – of neoliberal ideology in benefit-related behaviours. As discussed in 6.2 and 6.3, benefit-related behaviours – benefit claiming or transferring and reporting new circumstances – are shaped by the digital approach of client processing. Post - UC, citizens are increasingly viewed as customers. The communications between UC claimants and varied stakeholders are increasingly dependent on digital and private access (see section 6.1-6.2). This reinforces the freedom within the private space (such as home and/or private mobile) of claimants, such as C9 and C21, to control their private time. As Habermas (2002) explains, communication entails the extension of social actors' consciousness and autonomy, as well as the expansion of networks. This change, however, does not necessarily lead to a world with an intersubjective shared meaning: 'the public produced by the internet remain closed off from one another like global villages' (Habermas, 2002, p.121).

In terms of changes in benefit behaviour, such an online communication approach cannot independently serve social ties with other communication contexts (face-to-face interaction) produced by DWP at the very early stage of UC implementation. For example, C18, who has digital and literacy needs, states: 'I have to confirm in the JCP whether my [UC] application and circumstance changes have been submitted,' Me: 'Have you checked DWP's online service?' C11, who has digital needs, comments: 'No, no, no, I am not aware of it.' Claimants use neoliberal discourse when talking about individual responsibility – such as physically visiting a local JCP office for advice and services – to adapt to changes in communication approach.

Neoliberalism directly influences various aspects of citizens' lives (Brown, 2015). As discussed in chapter 2, since 2010, there have been numerous cuts on state expenditure, which have reduced working-age people's benefits (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). For example, cuts on LA funding have undermined the face-to-face service provided to evaluate their clients (see section 6.4.1). Post-UC, a single mother, who is also a full-time student, experiences a strict income assessment when UC is given alongside the student loan, as the financialisation of the derivate market (see discussion in section 6.4.4). This enhances capital constraints, which are ever-present in the neoliberal era, to self-invest in access to public goods such as Universities. To give another example, institutionalised conditionality of an EU/EEA citizen reinforces EU/EEA identities as a collective who have limited or partial citizenship rights, making access to UK social security more difficult to obtain (see section 6.1.4 and 6.3.2). When EU, UK immigration and welfare laws operate together, EEA immigrants' access to the social security system is more stringent (Dwyer et al., 2019; O'Brien, 2016).

Furthermore, claimants who need digital and literacy help – such as C18 in section 6.1.3 – reflect the neoliberal responsibilisation discourse, which is to adapt to the digital approach of benefit claiming and report circumstances at the individual and family unit level. Hence, the responsibilities to correct what Le Grand and New (2015) call reasoning failures in relation to benefit-behaviour change – such as barriers in relation to the digital and literacy needs of C13 or the mental health illness of C21 – are partially or fully undertaken by individuals and families and are influenced by policies implemented by community services. For claimants such as C9 and C17 in section 6.1.5, who do not have autonomy-related and means-related barriers, UC does not necessarily enable them to achieve the institutional definition of optimal actions. As Pennington (2019, p. 566) explains, 'citizens are unlikely to look kindly on policies that make no reference to their own conception of their ends.' Due to the complexity and confusion in implementing UC in local JCPs, UC is not necessarily perceived as falling under the category of government paternalism. Sunstein (2017) highlights that a paternalist policy might be ineffective when it produces confusion on some of the targeted recipients. For example, UC is not sufficient for addressing the barriers of having insufficient or inappropriate information about benefit claiming (see section 6.1.5). Also, C6 commented: 'it was not my choice, they

changed me [from working-age benefit to UC].' The implementation of UC is perceived as a loss of autonomy in making free choices. That said, to achieve the government policy's aim of benefit behaviour change as the behaviour part of a woven package of behavioural conditionality, benefit behaviour change should be viewed as the product of the combination of government policy, the individual and family's responsibility and community service.

New's (1999, p. 66) argument that 'they [paternalist polices] must be undertaken without the paternalised individual's consent' conflicts with the aim of government paternalist policy to further one's wellbeing. Government paternalist intervention without the individual's actual consent may unlikely achieve the aim of improving one's psychological wellbeing, as is the story for C30 in section 6.3.2, and making them financially better-off, as is the story for C17 in section 6.1.5 (see also section 7.2.4 and 7.2.5). This implies that the definition of one's own good is constructed and co-produced by the government and the paternalised individual. Without the actual consent of the paternalised individual, even if it is technically feasible, government paternalist policies cannot necessarily operate to further one's own good.

6.5.2 An Appropriate Personalised Approach Coincides with Paternalised Individual's (Inter-) Subjectivities

Drawing on the arguments of Halpern et al. (2004), and Wolf (1987), government policy is perceived as providing insufficient help in prescribing therapies to help individuals make better decisions. For example, the waiting time – especially for claimants who are unaware of an APA to alter the payment frequency – to receive the first month payment of UC causes the increasing demand for a food voucher, as was the story for C11 in section 6.4.3. Lambie-Mumford (2013, p. 86) highlights that it is of 'a very real danger of the simultaneous entrenchment of emergency food provisions and retrenchment of welfare,' risking social justice and the realisation of human rights. The demand for non-market de-commodified goods such as food vouchers unwittingly entails social costs (Wolf, 1987). This diverts from the original aim of UC, that is, 'to tackle the underlying problem of welfare dependency and poverty which has incurred social costs of failure' (DWP, 2010a). This concern can be analysed by employing Coase's (1960) argument that the government is less likely

to know the possible social costs before the policy implementation, and hence it is less likely to take preventative measures.

As discussed in section 3.5, Le Grand and New (2015) and New (1999) believe that the government is in the position to make relatively accurate judgements on the basis of individual experiences. However, this thesis argues that government policy cannot necessarily provide an objective sense of judgment to correct what Le Grand and New (2015, p. 213) call 'a failure to act sufficiently objectively and without bias toward one's own perspective.' To give an example, interactions with stakeholders may incur what Moynihan et al. (2014) call psychological and compliance costs (see discussion in section 6.2.1). Some of the costs caused by interactions between stakeholders and claimants are unpredictable before decision making, as was the story for C30 in 6.3.2. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explain that, when individuals have to deal with some uncertainties, there are psychological sources – such as heuristics or rule of thumb – of bias in their decision making. Such uncertainty causes bias, as is the story for C1 in section 6.2.1 (see also sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5), and/or mental and physical harm, as is the story for C30 in section 6.3.2. Therefore, government paternalist policies can neither sufficiently predict nor be appropriately informed about the likely biases of claimants' internalisation or how their interactions with stakeholders will affect their decisions. This implies that a government paternalist approach cannot secure that people are not placed in conditions which generate blame and shame for systematic failures (see discussion in section 6.4.3), influencing the benefit-related behaviour change.

Le Grand and New (2015, p.171) highlight that governments are more 'phlegmatic' and hence 'they are not encumbered by the subjectivity that encourages individuals to underestimate their own liability to risk or to misjudge their own fallibility.' This thesis challenges this argument. Hume (1994 [1817]) elucidates that every independently separated perception can be joined and formed from individuals' feelings which draw on past experiences. Durkheim (1984 [1893]) remarks that social behaviour is constrained by shared subjective meanings, values and reciprocity. Dewey (1910, p.170) calls subjectivity, which is derived from experiences, the 'necessary truth,' forming the ground of knowledge. Weber (1947) argues that subjectively meaningful perception – a.k.a. the ideal type of perception – forms

empirical knowledge. The conceptualisation of subjective is widely linked to people's moral values, social surroundings, psychological entities and motivations, and influences the meaning-making in relations to experiences (Weber, 1947). Wacquant (2012) highlights that the neoliberal state entails to 'fabricates the subjectivities, social relations, and collective representations' (p. 68). My thesis argues that the intersubjective dimension of interactions with the work coach/stakeholders, which should be the centre of epistemology in paternalist literature. It extends the literature of government paternalist approach, and advances understanding of benefit-related behaviour change from a social lens.

Teleologically, the argument that 'reasoning relates to the internal and reflective processes of an individual rather than to an interaction between individuals in a "system"' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p.116) is wrong. The era of post-UC has witnessed a change in social and interpersonal relationships between claimants and work coaches. Social interaction is deemed as influencing reciprocity of meaning-making. Interactions between work coaches and claimants reflect the societal institutionalised culture of interpretation and communication in ways which influence the subjective sense of past, present and future self, individuals' understanding of the UC and the meaning of benefit behaviour in regulating and reproducing forms of intersubjective life and social actors' identities.

Behaviour change is not merely driven by incentives, but it is shaped by an individual's psychological need for competence, autonomy and reasoning, which can be achieved through behaviour change (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). This involves an appropriate interaction which reinforces the individual's intra-psychologically integrated sense of behaviour change in social integration. An appropriate personalised approach enables claimants to fully and accurately internalise the policy content, structure and purposes (see discussion in 6.4.2). It also helps claimants to access social right, such as an APA, and cultivate financial and debt-related capabilities by their own free will. Attributions of blame are viewed as dimensions of the conceptualisations of responsibility (Scanlon, 2008). This perspective implies that an appropriate personalised approach addresses social-psychological dimensions, and hence coincides with the subjectivity of the

paternalised individual. An appropriate personalised approach entails what Scanlon (2008, pp. 179-190) calls 'psychological accuracy'. Scanlon (2008) does not tell us the meaning of the concept of psychological accuracy but only informs us it presupposes that free will coincides with appropriate reasoning which, in turn, renders behaviour change appropriate. Removing mistaken subjectivity in attributions of blame, as is the story for C30 in section 6.3.2, and inappropriate understanding of the policy, such as individuals' unawareness of an APA, as is the story for C8 in section 6.4.2 and C26 in section 6.4.3, is important for decreasing the likelihood of mental and/or physical harm.

Spinoza's (1985, p. 259–378) conceptualisation of freedom highlights that it can be realised when an individual, on the basis of reason, understands why he or she is being told how to behave. Spinoza (1985, p. 259–378) writes that 'our freedom is placed neither in contingency nor in a certain indifference ... freedom belongs to our nature [of thought and reasoning].' An appropriate personalised approach reinforces paternalised individuals' interpretations of Aristotle and Spinoza's responsibility to adapt, think and conduct prudently – as showcased by C21 in 6.3.1 – Kant's self-legislation according to moral autonomy – as showcased by C30 in 6.3.2 – and Scanlon's contractualist theory of help and prohibition of harm – as showcased by C21 in 6.3.1. This underlines an appropriate personalised approach enables the claimant to achieve what Feinberg (1989) calls moral authenticity, meaning autonomous individual behaves genuinely in his or her own character, and governs himself or herself through continually reconstructing the moral values and is free of coercion.

Aesthetically, the appropriate personalised approach is founded upon the shared understanding between subjectivities of recipients and stakeholders who implement policy. Kant (1994 [1781]) gives aesthetics a major role in *the Critique of Judgement.* Kant views deity as the source of thought and judgement, but the information that lies outside of deity is viewed as redundant for forming one's judgement. Bourdieu reduces power relations within the symbolic system to communicative relationships, which entails a legitimate definition of the social world. The argument made in this thesis highlights that appropriate state intervention is not imperfectly founded upon

communication rationality, but is analogous to what Bourdieu (1994, p. 2) terms 'intrinsic aesthetics', given by the perfect tie connected between recipients' primary and socially-related experiences, the subjective reality and intersubjectivities (stakeholders-recipients), and the appearances of the interference of the state.

The argument made in this thesis also challenges Feinberg's (1989, p.14) view that 'when pity, sympathy, benevolence, or compassion erodes one's resolution, judgement is not as harsh. True integrity will not be displaced by tender feelings.' An appropriate personalised approach requires very limited personal judgement, willingness to listen and mutual trust (see the story of C21 in section 6.4.1). It is important for work coaches to implement emotional roots of empathy, reinforcing their understanding of the circumstances and the needs of the paternalised individual, and achieving the shared meaning(s) of integrity.

Applying an appropriate conditionality underpins solidarity and social inclusion (see 6.5.4). This is consistent with and confirms the research findings of Dwyer (2018). Moreover, drawing on G. Dworkin's (2005) view, an appropriate personalised approach operates not only in accordance with professional duties, but it also works independently from the prevailing social norms, allowing work coaches to avoid imposing perceived moral values on paternalised individuals. This combination enables people to move forwards in their lives. Drawing on Bourdieu's (1994) argument, this implies that the appropriate personalised approach does not reinforce the dogmatic and prevailing boundaries between social-economic groups, reproducing social order. This work coach–claimant relationship is viewed as a remedy for social harm, as it prevents an increase in devaluation, disparagement and universal contempt attached to individuals' past experiences of economic marginalisation and activities such as prostitution, crime and drug addiction. That said, the appropriate approach is not merely limited to the interactions between private individuals in paternalist literature, but it translates seemingly private issues to the bureaucratic field which is configured as a set of institutional bodies that define and determine the distribution of public goods (Bourdieu, 1994), whereby the reasoning capability of paternalised individuals is cultivated to allow them to improve their wellbeing.

An appropriate personalised approach involves the application of appropriate recognition. 'Recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need' (Fraser, 1995, p.71). As Pemberton (2015) explains, disrespect is a form of harm production linked to neoliberalism. It entails a remedy to reposition humanity out of the 'iron cage' within neoliberalism (Brown, 2015, p. 44; 119). Similarly, the appropriate personalised approach reinforces empathy for others and therefore social inclusion and solidarity on the interpersonal level of prevailing relationships between the clients and stakeholders (Pemberton, 2015). It also underpins feelings of personal value and self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001), and reproduces the benefit behaviours (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]).

For example, the appropriate personalised approach acts as a transformative remedy which requires respectful interactions for the protection of individuals' autonomy, as showcased by C30 in 6.3.2, between work coaches and claimants with multiple identifications, such as C16 in section 6.4.4. This underpins the neoliberal discourse on responsibilisation, individualisation, self-transformation and self-realisation. The appropriate personalised approach is pluralistic, multiple, debinarised, and ever-changing between pre- and post-UC, so does the boundary of the government paternalist intervention. This entails that the appropriate personalised approach is more justifiable than the normative and public nudging techniques endorsed by Le Grand and New (2015).

6.5.3 An Appropriate Personalised Approach Reproduces Gendered Order of Reasoning

The redistribution and recognition highlighted by Fraser (1995, 2000) stress the importance of gender identity and culture recognition in fixing systematic failures such as injustice and material inequality of socio-economic redistribution. This chapter discusses the extent to which social security officially recognises the status of gender when assessing a citizen's social rights. Drawing on Fraser's argument, the appropriate personalised approach does not only entail a material basis – such as positive or negative financial incentives proposed by government paternalism – but it also entails gender recognition. Levitas (2012, p. 322) remarks that the 'Big Society'

endorsed by the Coalition government is the continuation of the Labour's communitarianism (see section 2.1.5). This has resulted in the reduction in state provisions for social security services and an expansion of the responsibilities of the voluntary sector, charities and community services in addressing local issues. Levitas (2012, p. 322) refers to it as 'little more than an attempt to get necessary social labour for nothing, disproportionately by women, by pushing work back across the market/non-market boundary.' As a matter of social justice, an appropriate paternalised approach would be a remedy to the social harm caused by the Big Society.

UC takes on the caring responsibility as a conditionality in the official definition of the 'updating circumstances' (DWP, 2019i), which means that domestic carers (for a disabled person) are qualified for the carer element of UC by fulfilling their caring and working responsibilities (see section 6.2.1). Drawing on feminist and critical theory literature (see section 2.1.6), this suggests that the dual aspects of female roles in the spheres of *paid* work and *paid* care for a disabled person are woven together (Habermas, 1984). Habermas (1984) uses the term 'material reproduction' to refer to paid work and 'symbolic reproduction' for unpaid domestic care (*unpaid* caring work). *Paid* caring work implies what Esping-Andersen (1990) refers to as an acceleration of commodification of domestic labour in the neoliberal state's social security services.

Such change has an implication in the role of female domestic carer in the paid labour market. This has an implication for claimants like C24, who can undertake domestic caring responsibilities for a disabled person at home alongside a paid job to increase her earnings and not find herself economically marginalised (Fraser, 1995). This implies that the recognition of caring status would be helpful for individuals to have access to paid domestic care, and hence have more financial resources to find for paid work, compared to pre-UC. Drawing on Lister's (2003b) argument of social citizenship, it entitles female care as social citizenship rights. This implies that the UC system obscures the gender division within the paid labour market, decentres Bourdieu's (2001) androcentric norms.

This change reproduces what Brown (2015) calls 'the gendered order of reasons of behaviour change,' which involves reprivatising, repatriating and balancing caring for a disabled person and working responsibilities, thereby generating new sources of motivation for individuals to undertake paid work (Fraser, 1989, 1997). For updating changes in circumstances post - UC, the gendered feature of an appropriate intervention has an implication in women's lives and the neoliberal individualist form of social citizenship. The UC system for updating changes in circumstances also reflects functional and social implications. It contributes to facilitating socialisation, social solidarity and social integration. However, the effects on the female are disproportionate, that is, the UC system devalues the paid (usually female) childcarers (Andersen, 2019). Section of 7.3.2 provides more discussions on the tensions between female child carers and paid labour within the UC system.

6.5.4 An Appropriate Personalised Approach Is Holistic and Solidarity-Driven

The era of neoliberalism is characterised by deregulation, increased privatisation and personalisation, extended and intensified conditionalities and communitarian discourses on solidarity (see discussion in 2.1 and 2.2.3). This has placed the citizen as an entrepreneurial individual, a.k.a. '*homo oeconomicus*' (see discussion in 2.1.2). Neoliberalism has shaped and restructured state responses to poverty and inequality. There are wider debates on UC and conditionality which increasingly employ the punitive ideology which creates the client, whose dependency is beyond this client's control to prevent (Foucault, 1995; Wacquant, 2009; Wright et al., 2020). The rise of FB, which is embedded in social security, has resulted in a need for food provisions. Relying on privatised care as a response to food insecurity, given the role of welfare retrenchment, has personalised, extended and intensified conditionalities, which, in turn, have driven the need for food provisions (Lambie-Mumford, 2018).

Government paternalism fails to take into consideration insights which could secure universal access to public goods and community services (Pennington, 2019). Neoliberalism implies a decentralised and fragmented nature of authority and social policy at the community level, which involves disciplining and controlling the lives of low-income citizens (Soss et al., 2011a). As discussed in section 5.6.4 and 6.2.4, the decentralised, fragmented and privatised control of grocery provisions in the local

FBs lacks a centralised, standardised and legitimised control, as well as a defined eligibility criterion for individuals to access local community services. The client control activities, which are undertaken by specific FBs within communities, constrain C6 (see section 6.1.4) from accessing social rights. As explained by Pemberton (2015, p. 144), 'fragmented societies exhibit a higher level of harm.' This means that the decentralised and fragmented features of social control, which are supposed to serve humanity as a whole, unwittingly challenge the universality of social citizenship. According to the description of C6, the FB is deemed insufficient for correcting individual reasoning barriers within non-market arenas. Such social policymaking at the community level is not fully perceived by claimants, such as C6, as falling under the category of government paternalism.

This implies that social processes, such as referral, of the clients at the community level, increase the complexity of service provisions of community-run, non-for-profit franchises. This is in line with Lambie-Mumford's (2013) view that challenges arise to address both the social phenomenon of an emergency need for food provisions and the root causes of food inadequacy and social injustice. Paternalised individuals' barriers, or so-called 'reasoning failures' by Le Grand and New, should be seen as barriers forged within a group. The boundary of state intervention should look beyond the symptoms of individuals' reasoning barriers of government paternalism. It is warranted to provide solutions to address barriers within a collective (and a combination of paternalist and non-paternalist approach); the solutions should be more inclusive, and each member should receive appropriate personalised help. This is in some ways an analogy of a combination of government paternalism of preventing harm of self-regarding decision-making in the self-regarding sphere, and the harm principle of preventing *external* harms in the non-self-regarding sphere. This implies that a government intervention approach should convey a holistic understanding of the social, cultural, psychological and moral significance of individuals' experiences at FB. It is warranted to provide centralised control and legitimate policy solutions to remedy the system failure of the constraints of food provisions. Long-term solutions to address the issue of social injustice in regard to food security and promote human rights are crucial (see also discussions in 7.5).

Furthermore, from the discussion on C12 in section 6.4.4, it is clear that tension exists in exercising individuals' social rights. Especially when requesting JCP stakeholders to exercise discretion – such as borrowing extra loans – or other requests regarding eligibility and rules in a local JCP. The appropriate personalised approach of social processes is therefore important for ensuring not only impartiality from rules implemented by frontline stakeholders, but also for securing empathy, as showcased by C12 in 6.4.4, for special circumstances and flexibilities in the allocation of loans. As such, government paternalism should secure the legitimacy of exercising a higher degree of discretion towards front-line staff on the policy implementation level, permitting them to come up with a social policy which deals with emergent, contingent and significant aspects of their interactions with clients. This enables claimants to have access to support to meet their emergency needs, social rights, and a better, more solidary and convivial life.

Similarly, Hegel's (2001) social freedom, which incorporates Mill's and Kant's reflective freedom, calls upon the social facts of social interactions between social actors. The Hegelian tradition of social freedom considers social contexts which liberty is embedded and depends in practice (Iser, 2019). Solidarity is regarded as beyond Berlin's (see 3.2) freedom of self-mastery. Individuals' beliefs, purposes and practices are influenced and derived from the institutionalised order of social rights. Drawing on communitarian literature, this implies that the appropriate approach generates common beliefs and practices and shared solidarity which contributes to the public good (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]; Tönnies, 2001). This may secure recognition of the claimants' autonomy, dignity and need within a community, and may provide them with the means necessary to build a successful relationship with themselves.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the increasingly digital communication context in benefit claiming and reporting circumstances post-UC. Overall, a digital approach reduced the queue time, compliance costs and cognitive biases on lost files (see section 6.1.2). However, for the recipients who do not have literacy or digital needs, UC did not necessarily achieve the institutional definition of optimal actions; on the contrary, UC and reporting circumstance changes were occasionally perceived as onerous (see

section 6.2). Complexity and confusion were generated in some specific circumstances, such as C9 and C17 in section 6.1.5. For the recipients who had literacy and digital needs, a more neoliberal discourse of responsibility was employed at the individual level, such as, individually and physically visiting local JCP offices for advice and services to adapt to online communication.

This chapter found that recipients' perspectives of the official process of updating changes in circumstances are related to reporting the *circumstances* of the claimants, the proceeding process of any updated information of the DWP staff/work coach, and the concept of 'change' (DWP, 2019d). This implied that a combination of redistribution of social security and recognition of domestic caring for a disabled person would help individuals gain access to paid domestic care and paid work.

Post-UC has witnessed changes in social relationships between stakeholders and recipients. The co-production approach involved respect, mutual trust, empathy and prevention of social harms, including the devaluation and disparagement of economically marginalised and socially stigmatised women (see discussion in section 6.3.1). It also involved accurate and clear explanations to reduce confusion, and psychological and physical harm (see section 6.3.2). This chapter presented the tensions arose when claimants had bad experiences with face-to-face staff in LA and ACs post-UC (see section 6.4.1). UC recipients who were unaware of an APA and therefore, being used to debt behaviour, found it difficult to adapt to monthly benefit payments (see section 6.4.2). Not all claimants attributed changes in experiences of seeking advice and suggestion to UC. But rather, UC recipients largely attribute changes in client processing to the context of policy delivery (see section 6.4.1). UC recipients attribute their experiences of the long queue waiting in JCP for requesting food voucher to UC monthly waiting time or perceived insufficient UC payment amount (see section 6.4.3). This chapter argued that the personalised appropriate approach coincided with paternalised individual's (inter-) subjectivities; reproduced gendered order of reasoning and was holistic and solidarity-driven (see more discussions on page 242).

Drawing on government paternalism, this chapter has argued that UC, which was originally designed as a government paternalist policy implemented by non-market institutions such as governments, community services, and charities, was not fully perceived as falling under the category of government paternalism. Government paternalism was not sufficiently justifiable for correcting individual reasoning barriers. The appropriate intervention respected the subjectivity of paternalised individuals (see section 6.5.2) with the appropriate recognition of individuals' needs, encouraging self-transformation and self-realisation, reproducing gendered reasoning (see section 6.5.3) and contributing to a holistic understanding of social mediated harm prevention and hence, the appropriate personalised approach should be solidarity-driven (see section 6.5.4).

Chapter 7 Universal Credit, Coproducing Policy and Employment - Related Behaviour Change

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the influence Universal Credit (UC) has on claimants' employment behaviour change, experiences and opinions, as compared to legacy benefits before the implementation of UC. This chapter discusses the findings and answers to the third research question:

> **To what extent does UC lead to changes in out-of-work and in-work UC claimants in making employment-related behaviours?** What are the factors that affect recipients' decisions to move off benefit into employment post-UC? What are the recipients' experiences and perceptions of how UC influences their experiences of changing employment-related behaviours?

This chapter begins with the discussion of the barriers and bridges on policy implementation level (stakeholders-clients relationships) to move into work and/or make in-work progression. An appropriate personalised approach is constructed to help the claimant to get closer and/or move off benefit into paid work. Following this is a discussion of the tensions between the institutionalised definition of rational entrepreneurial behaviours, which entails rational deliberation of calculation, cost–benefit and efficiency, and social, family, moral and emotional behaviours. By drawing on government paternalism, this chapter finds that an appropriate personalised approach, alongside more universal and publicised community support to co-produce benefits and employment behavioural conditionality, better ensure individual wellbeing.

7.2 Internalised Policy Content and Employment-Related Behaviour

This section discusses the bridges and barriers for claimants to get closer and/or move into work and/or make in-work progression. This section finds that an appropriate work coach-client relation is conducive to coproducing the employment behaviour conditionality. This section finds that drawing on the self-determination of behaviour (Deci and Ryan, 2000) (see section 3.5), a claimant's decisions on co-producing the Claimant Commitment (CC) (see section 7.2.2), contestation (such as requesting mandatory reconsiderations, see section 7.2.4 – 7.2.5) or disengage with UC (see

section 7.2.1) largely depend on the degree to which the claimant has internalised the policy, and the feasibility of fulfilling the conditionality of UC, depending on the individual contingent situation.

Overall, more participants from site B make change in employment behaviour results until this research interview time in December of 2017. This is for several reasons: 1) more participants joint in this study are from site B so more participants with no change in employment behaviour results are recruited, compared to other types of participants; 2) this section shows that participants (usually lone parent) encounter barriers that hinder employment behaviour change, such as childcare costs, and a lack of work experiences. Site B contains a relatively large proportion of lone parents with dependent child/children and has more long-term unemployed populations than site A (see section 4.4.2). This section constructs an appropriate personalised approach (see section 7.2.2) to provide an analysis of the bridges to help the out-of-work claimants to move closer to and get paid employment.

7.2.1 Voluntariness, Claimant Commitment and Ethics

Le Grand and New (2015, p. 121) claim that 'paternalism intervention is justified when the actual voluntariness has not reached the required level'. However, Le Grand and New do not tell us how a paternalist intervention would improve the actual voluntariness to reach the required level, and if there has any change in one's voluntariness, how it relates to the wellbeing – as the aim of a paternalist intervention. This research finds that UC does have limited influence on changing claimants' actual voluntariness of fulfilling behavioural employment conditionality, as most claimants, who participate in this research, desire to move off benefit into work.

> '… I do want to work, and I have worked hard to achieve to get a mortgage and all of this [financial hardship], I am not the person who did not work that hard and say: 'I claimed UC or benefits', I want to be able to support myself ...'

> (C4, aged 39, single, female, African/Caribbean British, site B)

When the claimant agrees with the CC made by the work coach, it appears that insufficient options are given to the claimant to achieve their actual consent to the CC: no signature for the claimant is acquired to confirm the claimant's actual consent. One of the consequences of this is that some claimants have subsequently found it to be unrealistic to fulfil the personalised CC but have still agreed with the CC to prevent their financial hardship. This means that the CC agreement process, which is analogous to the choice architecture (Sunstein, 2014), lacks the opportunity for all the potential claimants to deliberately consider and choose whether the CC is suitable for them, and if not, how to negotiate and co-produce the CC to ensure that the conditionality is more realistic, and hence effective in practice, prior to claiming UC:

> '… obviously, if I don't agree with them [CC made by the work coach], I don't get paid [laugh], so I have to agree with what the work coach says, [I] should be there [to claim UC] ...'

> (C31, aged 61, female, single, White British, no change, site A)

Locke (1960 [1690]) employs a metaphor to describe the circumstances for voluntary actions as a person, who is unaware of having been fast locked in, feels at liberty to stay. However, according to the description above, C31 is aware of 'being locked fast in' (agreeing CC with her work coach) and 'has not freedom to be gone' (Locke, 2001 [1690], p.188), as C31 believes she does not have any alternative solutions to her financial difficulty other than claiming UC. As such, C31 does not have an appropriate choice context to make a genuine choice (Miller, 2003). C31 makes what Hyman (2016) calls an admixture of voluntariness, where state intervention is allowed (Feinberg, 1989; Le Grand and New, 2015). However, this intervention approach does not necessarily enable the claimant to fulfil the employment behaviour conditionality.

This can also be manifested by the accounts of UC claimants who maintain there are barriers to their claim, such as ageing. For example, C27, who has worked as an electrician for over 50 years, find that he is no longer able to deal with the work he is accustomed to by the age of 63. He finds that it is impossible to be accepted by employers in a different industry, where he does not have relevant work experience,

and, hence, he finds it difficult to raise the level of his actual voluntariness, and even the individual-control, to the required level to fulfil his CC.

> '... I did job applications, but nine times out of ten I did not get any reply, because I know what my capabilities are, and being an electrician for over 50 years to deal with somethings completely different to start training again to do, I am 63 years old, it's not that wanting to [get training and working in a different industry], things just slow down for me, my pension is another four years away, so that's why they [work coach] wanted me to go to work, I am not saying it's impossible, but it's difficult [to move into paid work] ...'

> (C27, aged 63, couple, male, White British, no change, site B)

By contrast, C29 chooses to withdraw from UC after he fulfils his CC, i.e. the search for 35 hours of work, as he finds his CC is unrealistic for him. In this situation, this claimant applies for 100–200 job vacancies online per week, via Universal Jobmatch, in the construction industry. Since he has already made enough job applications online for the first month, he found there are limited vacancies in the same industry for him to apply for in the subsequent month on Universal Jobmatch even though he spends two hours participating in the job club every week. As C29 has been self-employed for 20 years in the construction industry, he decides to withdraw from UC as he recognises the difficulty in finding two or more referees to write recommendation letters for him to apply to another industry in which he does not have relevant working experience. Feinberg's (1989) argument of failures of consent is relevant here, which pertains the individual is incapable of having a will in respect to fulfil the CC, even C29 realises his situation when he claims UC. Feinberg (1989) remarks the circumstantial coercion hinders the individual voluntariness. Here the systematic barriers fall within the policy implementation level. This implies Universal Jobmatch does not provide sufficient job vacancies to significantly inform and reinforce the sense of competence and the capability to perform employment behavioural conditionality:

> 'I said I could not commit to 35 hours job search, it's too much, and I said to him: "I cannot do it", he [work coach] looked at me in the face and he [work coach] said: 'tick YES, tick YES, YES on the box' on the computer in front of me, and goes to the next claim, so they [work coach] know it's unrealistic, that's what they [work coach] expected, for the contract [CC] isn't it? I signed on UC, but I stopped doing it after a month [UC claiming]

because I do not like take money from the government, I don't want to be a slippery con artist, it's better for me to have a clean conscience rather than taking their [government] money and said: "OK, I am able to get a job" and have a default conscience. It's the wrong way around ...'

(C29, aged 55, male, White British, voluntarily disengage with UC, site B)

As Hyman (2016) explains, making a literal choice does not necessarily increase a claimant's actual voluntariness. Compared with the stories of C27 and C31, C29 has taken more control as he has full claimant's voluntariness to choose whether to act in line with what his CC requires or not. It is fair to say that his UC claiming has limited impact on his actual autonomy and control, but his relatively short-term claiming of UC does not significantly improve his financial circumstances as he is still in debt when he withdraws from UC. Before he attends this research interview, C29 informs the candidate that he could only receive messages and calls due to having insufficient credit on his mobile account. Although C29 has been plunged into the depths of melancholy, he still actively seeks work and attends the work club of a local charity.

As Sunstein (2017, p. 3) explains, the paternalist approach can be counterproductive and ineffective when 'it involves strong contrary preferences on the part of the chooser, who will therefore opt out'. This argument does not reveal the full picture of factors influencing behaviour change. Deontologically, C29 recognises the moral culpability of committing to claim unrealistic CC that he could not actually achieve with a default conscience – in the light of the ethical connotation. Here, the intention of the CC is internalised into an ethical conception. It is not deniable that the process of complying with the CC leads claimants (such as C29) to reflect upon the claimant's moral autonomy (Dworkin, 1988). However, the default conscience is not the original purpose of the UC. Instead, it is a hybrid of the internalisation process by which the claimant cognitively recognises, and makes a link, to the fullest and freest possible exercise of the personal values of the moral virtues. This is contrary to Aristotle's concept of free choice that pertains only to external factors (Finnis, 2020; May, 2010). The internalised purpose of the CC could not supply the individual-related autonomy to move it to be the most proximate of one's teleological objectives. That said, the CC, as a mediation, unwittingly diverts UC's original

purpose in one's deliberation; this does not necessarily increase the actual admixture of voluntariness to the required level as it fails to guide a good overall state of affairs (for example, C31 and C27). This is because the CC includes applications to vacancies for which they do not have relevant work experiences, and hence leads to C29 disengaging from the UC system. This finding is largely aligned with the research findings of Dwyer (2018).

As discussed in 2.1.2, Nozick's neoliberal argument reflects that actual behaviour change is driven by individual needs and by the prudent deliberation on how an individual should conform to the moral law. This argument draws on the Kantian philosophy of dutiful behaviour, which is widely linked to socially shared values of how man ought to behave (Kant, 1997). As Hurley (2009) explains, the individual reflects upon the deontic status of their behaviour and links it to the moral values of the required behaviour in which these behaviours are performed. That implies that the CC is not entirely justified in reconciling between the claimant's (for example, C29's) own concept of morally right behaviours (Dworkin, 1988; Hegel, 2001) and practical reasons to achieve a good overall state of affairs and the commitment required by the CC that underlies an institutionalised moral norm. The institutionalised ethics translated by the claimant, such as default conscience, fail to inform the claimant's contextualised moral judgement (clean conscience) in the behavioural form (Dean, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2008; Habermas; 1996).

7.2.2 Dual Control, Intersubjectivity and Interdependency

Compared with pre-UC, the intensive encouraging and pushing approaches employed by the UC claimant's work coach (such as C26's) are conducive to compliance in the CC. This approach strengthens the claimant's determining power and respects and allows the claimant to follow their own way in achieving the out-of-work conditionality and moving on with their life:

> 'Me: What makes the difference?
> A: I think it's the people, because this one, my [UC] work coach, is more pushing and urging to want you to get a job, she [UC work coach] will come over every week, "have you applied for that job yet?" I feel good because I need that push to understand I am lazy, so, sometimes, I need someone to push me, it makes me more determining to get the job, whereas before [UC],

they [JSA advisor] do nothing, before I did not get that support, no push, they [JSA advisor] were not even pushing me ...'

(C26, aged 36, female, lone parent with a dependent child, African/Caribbean origin, actively seek work, site B)

'...This time I have a better [UC] work coach, I feel I have a routine of doing something and be busy, so UC has pushed me, and has made me feel better in myself. I think it helps me look harder the jobs really ...'

(C3, aged 23, female, single, African/Caribbean British, move into full-time paid work, site B)

For C26 and C3, UC recipients deem it to be an appropriate approach to assist the claimant to attend to the means-related barriers of a lack of willpower, via building up a work-search routine and a more organised life structure that enable them to act in accordance with Aristotle's view of exercising one's reason (Le Grand and New, 2015).

'I think the policy [UC] encourages me, they [UC work coach] tell me it's my commitment, they say to me: "you can do this and this", that's encouraging me. Before [UC], I felt the enforcement, I told the UC work coach about my experiences [discrimination, socioeconomic harm in the workplace] and she said: "you will be the best!" I smiled and said: "I will come back [for professional advice]", she [UC work coach] listens, it's a different person, actually she is nice, she is really trying what I am trying, it's a softer approach, so it does work, she is more genuinely interested in, I think she wants me to find a job, she wants me to improve. Yes, precisely, a big difference [compared to pre-UC] ...'

(C10, aged 61, female, single, Asian British, actively seek for work, site B)

For C10, the work coach employs a comparatively softer, service-oriented (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007) approach that respects the claimant's heterogeneity of preferences, interests and past work-related experiences. The appropriate approach encourages and facilitates the claimant's self-esteem (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007), and prevents incurring socioeconomic harm (Pemberton, 2015). This client–stakeholder interaction also creates a positive emotional atmosphere (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]), seen when the claimant says, 'I smile and say: "I will come back [for professional advice]"' (C10). This suggests that the appropriate interactive ways

respect the claimant's internal factor of autonomy and sufficient voluntariness and, hence, create a mutually accepted, agreed and shared social space (Crossley, 1996, 2002).

The appropriate approach, here, can be termed as dual control: 1) that controls and conciliates to ensure the co-production in her out-of-work conditionality to ensure that the claimant is sufficiently willing to fulfil her bureaucratic deservingness (nonpaternalist justification); and 2) that also listens to the claimant's needs and helps the claimant by providing the professional support that respects the claimant's autonomy, preferences, interests and needs to maximise the likelihood of self-realisation in practice (paternalist justification). The story of C10 shows that the commitments of the stakeholder and the client are interdependent and reciprocal: the claimant needs the professional support of the stakeholder, and the stakeholder needs the claimant to come back, so that the stakeholder could ensure the claimant's coproduction of policy implementation (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]) in the CC, extending Durkheim's (1984 [1893]) term of interdependency. This finding confirms and develops Wright's (2003) perspectives on the intersubjectivity and interdependence of the street-level strategies of the claimant–stakeholders' interactions in this empirical case study. This also implies that policy implementations and coproduction are made according to a mixture of paternalist and nonpaternalist justifications, both of which coincide and are interconnected, interrelated and interdependent. Le Grand and New (2015) view paternalist and nonpaternalist policies in an isolated way, failing to acknowledge this important point.

According to the view of Le Grand and New (2015), the appropriate approach respects the autonomous action that the UC claimant finds intrinsically preferable, enjoyable and crucial and, hence, the claimant's autonomy is not coerced by the front-line level of paternalist intervention. This is largely aligned with what self-determinism proposes to respect in the innate psychological need that is important to psychological integrity and well-being (Dean, 2015; Deci and Ryan, 2000). Hence, the UC claimant does not have to be pushed to act when they are naturally inclined to act on their inner states and actively engage in the activities to move toward

personal (inner state) and interpersonal (client–stakeholder relationships) coherence (Deci and Ryan, 2000).

This phenomenon can also be analysed by employing a social cognitive perspective (Bandura, 2001). This suggests a shared and collective intention and an interdependent policy of behavioural change that is conducive to the realisation of coproduction of policy. In contrast, if the claimant believes that he or she is treated with disrespect or manipulated, the claimant may respond and behave in a way that is opposite to the policy's original aims (Bandura, 2001). In line with Schutz's (1970) and Crossley's (1996) intersubjectivity, the appropriate approach remarks that the claimant's subjective views of the social facts are contingently bonded with the intersubjective (claimant–stakeholder) shared social reality. This also highlights Berlin's (2002 [1958]) view of a positive sense of liberty by which an individual develops an appropriate capacity and disposition, and exercises sufficient self-mastery to reflect upon their thought, will, and rightness, 'over herself, over her own body and mind' (Mill, 1859, p. 13). The appropriate personalised approach enables the claimant to enjoy fully-fledged liberty of thought before acting upon their individuality (see discussion in 3.2). The appropriate approach enables the claimant to adopt the best reason in acting according to what Rawls (1971) elucidates as one's rational will in identifying one's real self through realising one's actual values and commitments and achieving one's own ends (Dworkin, 1988; Feinberg, 1988, 1989), 'with civic virtue and spiritual fulfilment, in the sense of fully realising one's human personality' (Dean, 2015, p. 22). This is in accordance with Kant's (1997) categorical imperative, which suggests that the appropriate approach treats a claimant not as the stakeholders' means, but, rather, the stakeholder respects the claimant's right to pursue their own ends. This entails that the appropriate way of dual control not only respects the claimant's right to work but also protects their right to seek individuality and human development (Dean, 2015), as well as self-transformation and self-realisation (Berlin, 2002 [1958]; Skinner, 2002).

7.2.3 Shame, Blame and Counteract Countereffects of UC

In contrast with the direct and interactive approach discussed above, the UC claimant also internalises the counterproductive side of UC and reacts to it. As Sunstein (2017)

elucidates, the intervened individual may be enabled to act for their preferred directions when the financial circumstances of the individual are at stake. This argument has some relevance in analysing the trajectories of employment behaviour change. For example, C26 recognises that she has a stronger intention to move out of financial hardship when she is on UC – where she does not gain as much as financial help as she needs – and hence she has to visit the FB:

> '... I can tell you that, it makes me [to find] work quickly. I am planning to get a job before Christmas, how desperately I need money right now. I would say that [UC] is positive, for me, because I cannot live like this anymore, they make me worse [than being in work], because it's such a small amount that I live on, you know I have to use FB, it is embarrassing ...'

> (C26, aged 36, female, lone parent with a dependent child, African/Caribbean origin, actively seek work, site B)

However, Sunstein's (2017) view does not cover a social consideration of the harms, by which behavioural change takes place as a result of the deemed countereffects of the intervention. Claimants who participate in this research recognise that the individual's circumstances are mainly at stake in a social sense. The claimants also internalise the circumstances of being on benefits as a stigma: as the counterproductive side of UC. Goffman (1986, p. 8) refers to the term of stigma as the 'undesirable differentness' that implies a stereotype of what a given type of claimant generates as a 'discrepancy between virtual and actual social identify'. Such a discrediting stereotype marks the claimant as worthless (such as C4) and undermines their self-esteem. This suggests that the system fails to treat the claimant with respect. Some claimants (such as C3 and C4) react to this perceived counterproductive side of UC in the social sense and self-transformed the perceived social harm as an incentive to move out of benefits:

> '... I don't want to tell my friends I claim benefit, I don't want to be embarrassed, you know, there is a stigma of claiming benefit like, I am a lazy people, I think I have to go to a workshop, to look for the job...'

> (C3, aged 23, female, single, African/Caribbean British, move into full-time paid work, site B)

'... UC does not help improve your confidence, not for me. I was always working since 16, they [work coach] make every people feel you are worthless, they drag your self-esteem, like I don't want to work ...'

(C4, aged 39, single, female, African/Caribbean British, moving into work and making in-work progress, site B)

The claimants' (C3 and C4) accounts refer to the social meaning of social and interpersonal disapproval of self that is attached to being unemployed and on benefits. The claimants internalise such socioeconomic harm as counterproductive and generate a stronger sense of incentive to act against such perceived social harm (termed as counteracting deemed counterproductive effect of UC), such as actively seeking work in various ways and moved into work(s). C3 succeeds in obtaining full-time work in the fourth week after she claims UC, when she has not yet received her first UC payment. C4 moves into work and increases working hours by undertaking several part-time jobs.

This type of behaviour change is a response to the deemed counterproductive side of intervention, by which claimants draw more prudent and deliberate consideration on the habitus of a claimant (for example, C26 above), with a catalyst of subjective value-added components (such as self-esteem). Obtaining a well-paid and full-time contract job also contribute to the social resources (see 7.3.3) that C3 has sought and the high degree of involvement in social activities that enable her to develop a new social space for change (Bourdieu, 1977). This underlines the negative sense of liberty that enables the claimant to seek an area (Berlin, 2002 [1958]) or social space (Bourdieu, 1977) from which claimant seeks to move into work being freed from external coercion. This reduces such internalised socioeconomic harms that are generated from the stigmatised situations (such as financial hardship, debt) and the social category of being worthless. This marks a social process of the 'transformation of self', termed by Goffman (1986, p. 13). This means that the claimants transform themselves from someone with a social 'blemish' into someone with a record of having 'corrected such a social blemish' (Goffman, 1986, p. 13) and who have earned deservingness by doing hard work (Jilke and Tummers, 2018, p. 226). This type of

UC claimants becomes more prepared to deal with the situation of their out-of-work behaviours to respond to the countereffects of the social category of worthlessness.

7.2.4 'He Is Not Even A Doctor' – Complex, Confusion and Limited Employment Behaviour Change

This section discusses the claimants' confusion or inappropriate understanding of the UC system; however, this leads to a limited change in employment behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.4.9), Reeves and Loopstra (2017) argue that eligibility and conditionality change the distinction between traditional notions of the deservingness and undeservingness of social security, but their quantitative research shows less clear how such a change in deservingness informs a behavioural change. From the description below, the claimants with an updated Work Capability Assessment (WCA) result recognise a change in the institutionalised category of deservingness. This means that claimants, who were defined and grouped into Limited Capability for Work- and Work-Related Activity Element (LCWRA), has recently been assessed by WCA as a fit-for-work group of claimants. This leads to the conditionality change that appears on the CC. Claimants, who participate in this study, either receive such change in WCA result before or after the implementation of UC. This change in condition causes the claimants' confusion. For IB ESA claimants who have been informed such changes in WCA result pre-UC, perceive UC does not remove the confusion when UC interacts with WCA (see the description of C27, and C15 below). This remained confusion, unwittingly and indirectly, undermines the effectiveness of the CC. The findings of this research are widely consistent with the research findings published by Dwyer et al. (2019b) and Oakley (2016).

One cause of confusion could be due to the ambiguity of concepts: the claimants' definition of being unwell and the WCA's definition of limited capability to work and work-related activity. For example, being ill with a valid fit note from a General Practitioner (GP) may not necessarily be verified by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) as having an incapacity to work. Even the process of WCA decisions making is/or should be necessarily unclear for some claimants as, previous

to claiming UC, the claimants generally believe that WCA underestimates the severity of their physical health:

> '… they [WCA practitioners] ask for specific questions, "can you lift your arm?" "hide your shoulder" and if you can, "can you boil a kettle and make a cup of tea", my answer is a "Yes" on a good day. On a bad day, my answer is a "No", but because I answer "Yes, I can", this doesn't mean I can do every single time ...' (C27, aged 63, couple, male, White British, no change, site B)

Both stories show that WCA employs the time-slice principle to determine who ends up with what (Nozick, 1974). Such a principle fails to take account of the past and/or prospective health circumstances that have an implication in entitlements and conditionality (in contrast to Nozick's historical principle). The claimants internalise that WCA underestimates the barrier to the physical health of C27, who is self-assessed as not being able to meet full work conditionality. That implies that the system lacks appropriate means, such as offering feasible approaches to help such confused claimants who have been re-categorised according to the WCA and are not fully prepared to cope with such a category change (Oakley, 2016).

As Sunstein (2017) explains, the ineffectiveness of the paternalist policy is attributable to the confusions (unwittingly) generated on the targeted population. In this specific research context, the confusion, anger and physical inability are generated from the updated WCA result, by which the claimants (such as C27 and C15) are not institutionally defined as deserving of disability-related social security assistance.

> '... their [WCA] medical assessment, I feel that the person [WCA practitioner] interviewed me lied. I have an appeal [mandatory reconsiderations], because I think they [WCA practitioner and JCP staff] think that I can be working, but I cannot find a job in one day!' (C15, aged 55, couple, female, Spanish, no change, site B)

From the claimant's account, the intersubjective (claimants–stakeholders) relationships fail to build up a shared social reality regarding the ability to work. The subject-self 'I' of C15 internalises the imagined attitudes of the JCP staff ('they think that I can be working') toward the object-self of C15. The subject-self 'I' ('I cannot find a job in one day') is viewed as not being consistent and reciprocal with the

imagined attitudes of the work coach toward the object-self of the claimant. C15 is not able to act due to the conflicting views of self, with which the claimant generates the culture of resistance to the CC (Blumer, 1969; Crossley, 2002).

Another misunderstanding is that the participants in this study wrongly believe the work coach to be the decision-maker who change the WCA result and, hence, change the conditionality based on the claimant's description of their physical capability. As a result of such confusion, inappropriate blame is placed on the work coach by C28:

> '… I have shown the evidence [from my GP] to them [work coach], they [work coach] are not interested, I don't get it [the reason of WCA result change], because they [WCA practitioners] are not medically trained, they can overwrite the GP. The GP said: "no, you cannot go to work", because the treatment I was on, affected me. I did an appeal [mandatory reconsideration], they just sent me a letter that my appeal [mandatory reconsideration by letter] has been lost, it's over. We [C15 and C28] are stuck on the same decision ...'
>
> (C28, aged 55, male, couple, self-employed, no change, site B)

Being confused about the WCA result and panicking about conducting a work search in a short time, C15 appeals to the WCA. C15 is suspicious about the ethics of the practitioners attributes his WCA result to 'lies' made by the WCA practitioners. This type of claimant develops meaning-making (Festinger, 1962, termed as consonance) to analyse some of the uncertainty, which is a catalyst for resistance to the out-of-work conditionality. Such confusion and perceived systematic failures undermine C15's motivation to co-produce the CC, especially when he is informed that his appeal has been lost by the system for over a month from the date on his WCA decision letter. This suggests that C15 lost the opportunity to request a mandatory reconsideration of his WCA as this could only be accepted within one month of the WCA's decision date. C28 is not capable of coproducing the CC.

I note such confusion and constructed cognitive biases are transmitted within the organic community. According to Tönnies (2001), the organic community refers to the shared sensory experiences and social psychological views by which individuals are tied to an intrinsic intersubjectivity (Crossley, 1996). Both C28 and C15 (as a couple) believe the WCA results they receive as the limitation of objectivity, as

systematic means-related failures. This perceived systematic means-related failure is deemed as being contrary to a professional, value-free, objective description of the claimant's health status. The similarity of the descriptions of C15 and her partner C28 suggests that they share the sensory experiences and social psychosocial views by which they transmit their confusions. From the cultural aspect, this results in recipients who have the confusion of WCA within their own community to sustain the resistance (since pre-UC) to engage in the new conditionality of UC, establishing themselves as separate to welfare conditionality system, and make no change in employment behaviour.

7.2.5 'Felt Like Committing Suicide' – Social Exclusion and Isolation

The change in the WCA results not only leads to confusion but also causes a sense of isolation and exclusion. This section discusses the special indication of the extremes to which social pressure and confusion, and, hence, the social pains of the circumstances, lead a claimant to these extremes.

C14 worked in a building site where he fell on his spine and hurt his back; however, he receives a recent health condition result as being fit for work from his GP. Consequently, he believes that his GP is under pressure from the government to underestimate his health problem as another systematic means-related failure (Le Grand and New, 2015). C14 also requests a mandatory reconsideration against the fit for work decision made by the WCA. As a result of the institutionalised re-categorisation, he recognises that the financial resources he receives when he is on UC are less than those he has received pre-UC. This panic is exacerbated by confusion and sensory difficulties in adapting to such change, and C14 describes that he 'feels like committing suicide':

> 'My doctor has told me that I have chronic osteomyelitis of the spine from L1 to L5 and it's chronic, meaning it can never be fixed and it can only get worse, now I have been on this since 2001. Why would they [GP and DWP] think by 2017 it is getting better? It has only got worse in 17 years! They [GP and DWP] think I am better and I can work. It doesn't make sense, my doctor, the same GP, has told me: "you have been unemployed for 16 years, I [GP] think you should work …" he [GP] has told me that, his own words from his mouth. I think, he [GP] is under the pressure, he [GP] never said these four

years ago, but about two years ago, he [GP] changed. I feel like committing suicide ...'

(C14, aged 50, male, lone parent, White British, no change, site B)

C14 indicates that means-related barriers (such as having literacy needs, being divorced and having been unemployed for 16 years) are further compounded with systematic means-failures (as discussed in 7.2.4). C14 does not fall within this institutionalised category of needy deservingness (Jilke and Tummers, 2018). Compared with the cases discussed in sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, C14, having transformed the social facts in his mind, finds C14 himself to have insufficient means to comply with his CC.

'I can tell you the reasons [of changes in welfare conditionality], because the bank spends out our money, and the poor people have to pay for what the bank does. We are in austerity now, who causes this austerity? Not people on the dole, banks cause austerity... why punish me who have a chronic disease...' (C14)

Discussions of ethical debates in relation to the implementation of welfare conditionality link to the criminalisation of unemployed benefit claimants and low-paid workers (Fletcher and Wright, 2017; Wacquant, 2009, 2012; Wright et al., 2020). Strategies such as surveillance, sanction and deterrence are employed in the compliance-based benefit system (Fletcher and Flint, 2018; Fletcher and Wright, 2017). The argument made here is that the concept of 'penalties' from the perspective of a claimant is much broader than the DWP's institutional definition of sanction, that is, 'if you fail to do what you have agreed in your Claimant Commitment without good reason, your UC may be reduced for a section period' (DWP, 2019d). C14 internalises the change in WCA result as a way of punishment, as it is deemed as a violation of the social right of the poor people, and as a factor of social injustice. C14 is keen to distinguish themselves from the social-economic systems that are viewed as having failures.

Furthermore, Durkheim provides a useful analysis of the social phenomenon of a suicidal tendency that is attributed to an anomic cause (such as sadness) and a social cause (such as 'social pathology') (2002 [1897], p. 324). On the social level, the

eligibility assessment system fails to eradicate the confusion of a claimant and lacks a 'splitting benefit' to ensure the incentive to move back into work (Oakley, 2016, p. 44). On the claimant's aspect, C14 lacks skills to conciliate and negotiate with such an institutionalised categorisation change, and he spiritually isolates himself from social ties and the institutional system in which he is ineffectively integrated and in contact with. As Feinberg (1989) explains, suicide can be viewed as escapism from perceived social contexts (self-harms or self-punishments) or maybe an impulse to threaten others (threaten self-harms). From Pemberton's (2015) perspective, individual-level harms are influenced by the social-level contexts (I will return to this point later).

> 'Me: Have you discussed the CC with your work couch?
>
> C14: Yes, of course. I have seen her [work coach] twice, with 15-20 minutes, she said, who she was, what she got to say, and, I said, what I got to say, and then, I left. I don't know about what she was talking, and she did not know about me. There is no help. There is no concern. There is no empathy, she just does her job, for 8 hours a day and she goes home, but this is my life I do this every day, for 24 hours a day, for me I can work 8 hours a day, if there is a job I can do ...' (C14)

In contrast to the case discussed in 7.2.2, the case of C14 shows that the communicative action between the claimant and the stakeholder fails to achieve the intersubjectivity, that is, the shared meaning and understanding (concern, listen and translate claimant's need and empathy), to the subjectivity of C14 and the fulfilment plans of the normative rules of the CC. As Habermas (1996) explains, the communicative action is tied with mutual understanding and action coordination. The communicative action, when it is lack of mutual understanding, is less productive in coproducing the policy and making an agreed plan. Hence, the lack of a co-production could not enable C14 to move into a full-time job. C14 perceives that his work coach does not make a general agreement and there is no reciprocity about the social reality on what is going to be feasible to satisfy the CC (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). C14 perceives that his CC of employment behavioural conditionality is treated as a means of her 'doing her job' (C15), rather than being treated as a representative and pervasive feature or component of the broader life or lifestyle of UC recipient, who self-assesses as being unfit for work.

7.3 Family, Community and Social Relationships

This section examines 'the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping–Andersen, 1990, p. 37), before moving into work and/or increasing working hours/hourly payment, in relation to UC. As discussed in section 2.1.2, this section also draws on consequentialism to examine a claimant's rank of the order of desires (Frankfurt, 1971; Pettit, 2006), in relation to the needs of family, community and the social networks that affect employment-related behavioural change post – UC.

7.3.1 Family Responsibility and Easements

Habermas reframes the concept of responsible behaviour as an action within which the 'individual adopts expert perspectives, generalised order, and his/her own self as criteria to govern his own acts to meet functional, social, and temporal validation' (Habermas, 1992, p.454). For lone/couple parents with dependent child/children, the claimant's interpreted needs of the dependent child/children are made as the first order. For example,

> '... if I did not get UC, I cannot pay my child, I search for work, I just get a new pair of shoes and new trousers although I get what he [dependent child] wants I make sure he [dependent child] has everything, I was making myself suffer to give him [dependent child] what he needed ...'

(C11, aged 46, male, lone parent, White British, actively seek for work, site B)

This finding is consistent with, and hence confirms, the research findings of Summers (2018). In contrast to the type of claimant discussed in the case study above, the desires of moving into work or increasing working hours conflict with the first order of desire (Frankfurt, 1971) as these two commitments, that is, employment-related behaviour required by the CC and family commitments, are conflicting. This implies that the realistic conditionality and the degree of free childcare which aims to take some family commitments from lone/couple parents with dependent child/children are conducive to coping with the conflicting relationship between work and family, underpinning the work incentives. The social relationships of the realisation of well-being are influenced by structuring both symbolic utility (see 2.1.2) and material gains from employment-related action (Millar and Bennett, 2017). As

discussed in 2.1.2, symbolic utility refers to the meaning derived from interactive, interdependent and interrelated actions and the values of each social being (Nozick, 1993; Smith, 2009). Here, it refers to the altruistic and conservative value of fulfilling the responsibility of family commitment and emotional connectedness, by which the realistic conditionality and childcare are made to reconcile the relationship between the conservative values of the fulfilment of parental responsibility and the market imperative (Kirst–Ashman, 2010). The relatively universal, 75% free childcare cost, alongside its enhancement to 85% free childcare provision, is endorsed by the liberal value orientation that draws on the social responsibility to facilitate work–family reconciliation (Dean, 2015; Kirst–Ashman, 2010).

Female claimants with a very young dependent child/children (aged between six months and five years) or with a sick child prefer having the mixed value of parental childcare responsibility (conservative value orientation) and social childcare responsibility (liberal value orientation) to taking a job with a higher hourly pay rate or a full-time job. For example, C18 prefers her current job with the minimum wage, which is lower than the hourly payment rate of her last job, as it is more convenient for her to fulfil the childcare. C18 is required to fulfil 20 hours work a week in her CC, as she did pre-UC.

> '... I prefer my current job, even it pays the minimum wage. It's near my house, and when I am still breastfeeding, my boss allows me to go home to feed my son, because my son is sick, so I have more time for childcare. I am not gonna work full time because of my sick baby. I have an assistant who takes care of my son, so I start working four hours. Now I have two kids, so I have not thought about working full time ...' (C18, aged 46, female with two young children, African/Caribbean Origin, part-time paid work, site B)

When claimant with a very young dependent child/children choose to work in multiple locations depending on the available job vacancies, his/her family members and social services together fulfil the responsibility of providing childcare when they work in a remote area. For example, C1 continues to work 16 hours as a security guard. C1 has a slightly higher hourly payment rate because of his experience in working in the same professional area.

> '... it's difficult to balance, my son is number one, no matter what. Going back to work, one time it might be in London, another time it could be in Manchester, the next time it could be somewhere else in the country. Unfortunately, myself, my father, my brother and my sister-in-law pick him [dependent child] up from the nursery...' (C1, aged 39, lone parent, male, making in-work progression, White British, site B)

Similarly, the childcare responsibility is shared with family members, as in the case of C27. In a family unit, the overall utility is shared and coincided within family members. The senior citizen below the pension age who participate in this research is less likely to undertake full-time work because of the shared childcare responsibility. Bourdieu (1994) highlights the dynamic relations between institutional behaviour (such as family, culture) and its interrelations (see also Dillon, 2020). As Bourdieu (1977, 1990) argues, social practices are produced through the interaction of individuals. C27 altruistically carries out such childcare behaviour to enable his son and daughter-in-law to increase their working hours. The case of C27 below highlights that employment behaviour change is embedded, and sometimes is constrained, within the structuring of family relations and the altruistic culture.

> '…my grandchildren are left with us. Because we don't charge their parents. In my household the *free childcare policy* is that my wife and I look after the children while their parents work, it's a *free* system. So, can I as a senior citizen look for full-time employment? No, because I am supplementing my children's income by looking after my grandchildren. I think my daughter-in-law receives childcare that is insufficient for a complete working week, which means that she cannot have a full-time job…'(C27, aged 63, male, couple, White British, no change, site B)

This suggests that more universal childcare is conducive to the effectiveness of the realisation of the extension of conditionality and thus facilitates in-work progression and maximises the overall utility of C27 post-UC.

An out-of-work claimant, C6, believes that 15 hours of childcare is not sufficient for her to cover the full cost of childcare. Perceived constraints to moving into paid full-time work are raised: 1) claimants should have enough savings to pay for the childcare for the first month, as the childcare cost is paid in arrears (DWP, 2019n); 2) the DWP covers a maximum of £646.35 per month for childcare for one child and a maximum of £1,108.04 per month for two children (DWP, 2019n). For example,

C6, a female claimant with two young children, states that the childcare cost would still be unaffordable for her even if the government pays 75% of the cost of 15 hours of childcare. The UC claimant who is working is entitled to 30 hours of free childcare (DWP, 2019n). C6 has applied a discretionary easement of temporary childcare (DWP, 2019h), which means she does not have to work at the moment as she has to take care of her young children. In addition to the easement, these perceived barriers of childcare costs prevents C6 from moving into paid jobs even though she wants to move into work as soon as possible.

> '…I want to work as soon as possible, but childcare is so expensive. The cost of 15 hours of childcare every week for a three-year-old for three full days from 7: 30am to 6: 30pm is £800 a week, and UC told me if I find a job, I have to pay for childcare myself for one month, and when I have shown them the receipt [for childcare payment], they [DWP] will pay me back 75% of what I paid for childcare, but I just cannot afford it as it's £2,000 for one month of childcare. I tried to get 30 hours of free childcare, but I did not qualify for it because I have to be working. It [UC] doesn't encourage me to work at all at the moment. I don't think I could be better off if I was working…'(C6, female with two dependent young children, with an EEA national partner, a single claim for UC)

Furthermore, there is an insufficient number of childcare centres available to cover the evenings when some claimants had to work late (such as C8). Due to insufficient easement, C8 has a full-time job search conditionality, which leads C8 to avoid working late shifts as it is conflicting with their childcare responsibility, which confirms the final findings of Wright et al. (2018).

> '…I find it hard working while I have her because of the long hours. Sometimes the shop [workplace] closes at 10:00 pm, but there is no childcare open at that time, so I am just struggling…' (C8, aged 29, female, lone parent with a dependent child, African/Caribbean British, site B)

Moreover, an easement is deemed insufficient to cover the needs of a lone parent who is in full-time study. For example, C25, a lone parent with four dependent children (the youngest child aged one), starts a three-year full-time nursing education, aiming to improve her employability skills. According to the DWP (2019h, 2019d),

a claimant who is in further study with a child is eligible to claim UC. C25 is informed by her work coach incorrectly that as a full-time mature student, she is ineligible to claim UC. As shown below, C25 has to decide whether to choose further study (leave UC and therefore be financially destitute) or choose UC (leave further education and do a less technically demanding job). Le Grand and New (2015) describe this phenomenon as means-related failures of an individual; however, they do not elucidate the systematic causes of such means-related failures. C25 perceives that the system forces her to make a difficult choice, undermining the incentive to move into work as she believes she is less likely to move into the work she wants to do without completing professional nursery training. After further assessment with the DWP decision maker in the same JCP, C25 is informed that she can get UC for six months.

> '…I asked them [work coach], "Which one would you prefer for me, I stop studying and stay on the full benefit or I do professional training [in a higher education institution] and stop receiving a benefit?". What they [work coach] told me is: "It's up to you to decide on this…" Oh, you [work coach] are the people who do not want the country to move forward! It doesn't affect my employment behaviour change, but right now it [UC] is given to motivate people to stay on benefit. I did send the DWP a message. I said: "No, I am going [to do further study]". The DWP [staff] calls me and says that they are looking into my case, and my case had been forwarded to the person [DWP decision maker] who would deal with it for me, so they changed it [UC eligibility] to six months [UC payment] until my child is two years old [before the end of the further study]…' (C25, age 30, female, African/Caribbean origin, decreasing working hours, full-time mature student, site B)

The determination of eligibility enhances the social right to access social security services that may affect this claimant's life chances. The DWP decision maker increases the available benefits from the original decision made by C25's work coach, implicitly regulating the degree of redistribution of benefit. However, this means that C25 may have full work search (35 hours) conditionality after the easement of six months, when she has not completed her further study.

Childcare behaviour is interrelated with employment behaviour. For a claimant with a dependent child/child, employment behaviour change could not only be an instrumental rational action (Weber, 1947) that responds to strategically calculated

means–ends and cost–benefit. As Pettit (2006) explains, consequentialists seek the overall realisation of values (such as family commitment, human capital investment, civic virtue). Employment behaviour change discussions involve the claimants' value rationality (Weber, 1947) in relation to the adaptation to the contingent circumstances (such as C6). This suggests a more universalistic (flexible time availability, and affordable) social provision of childcare, and that sufficient easements (such as in the case of C25) may be conducive to making the CC more effective.

7.3.2 Societal Community Support

Employment behaviour is also social behaviour that is influenced by societal community relations, order and support in relation to UC. This suggests that behaviour change is not discrete. The effectiveness of the CC and paid work behaviour interrelates with the degree and relevance of community support. Two arguments are proposed: 1) the local community and charitable bodies play a critical role in employment behaviour change, such as online job search; 2) a universalistic and more publicised provision of community service, such as a trade union, is conducive to reducing workplace harm and improving work retention, and thus may facilitate the in-work progression.

The council of site B provides 12 laptops to a local charitable body in site B in addition to the eight laptops that are bought by the charitable body to help its clients to deal with the increasing need for digital online job application, such as Universal Jobmatch, and fulfil their CC requirements: '…I think their [charitable body] [digital] service is helpful…' (C5). Compared to this specific charitable body in site A, the charitable body in site B has more digital facilities provided by LA, and provides more resources to meet the claimants' digital needs. This means that the charitable body has a different capacity in different offices on sites A and B.

However, this digital service is not publicised, which means that only individuals who drop into the service of a specific charitable body can access it. For example, C4 and C26, who live in site B, do not have access to such a digital service (contrary

to C5) but rely on the local library to search for work within a limited service time. That is why the opinions of C5 and C4/C26 are different.

> 'Me: What do you feel about the work search process?
> C4: It's very difficult because I have only limited income to be able to go out to look for work. It's difficult, I have no budget for this, and I only have the internet on my phone. When my credit runs out, I use the library, so I have to have my internet, so, it's difficult…' (C4, in-work, site B)

The second concern is that the system lacks more universalistic support or coordination, such as outsourcing some digital services to the local library to directly address the needs of the UC claimants' job search stipulated by the DWP. Assisting the UC claimants' job search 'is not the target of the library': 'it was not the target of the library because you do it on your own' (C26), which unwittingly undermines the effectiveness of job search on Universal Jobmatch.

Importantly, C24 believes that the face-to-face service obtained from the charitable body complements the face-to-face employment service from the work coach in the local JCP in site A:

> '…they [staff in the charitable body] helped me to find a job actually. They [staff in the charitable body] told me about different websites that would directly go to the job vacancy ... two weeks later I applied for it and then I got the interview for it…the Job Club [in the charitable body of site A] link to other services that can help me to find jobs. The skills that I learn from here are what I do not learn from JCP, so I would say the bridge to employment would come from this charitable body...' (C24, in-work, site A).

Claimants are referred by the local JCP to access the service from the local community to receive training. This employment-related training reinforces the claimant's sense of self-efficacy and confidence, when the training is relevant to the job vacancy that the claimant is interested in applying for. For C10, who used to work in investment banking but left her previous job due to a lack of relevant qualifications, the training received from engaging in the local community is relevant and helpful for her to accumulate human capital in relation to the required qualifications in the specific professional area.

'… It's from the local community, it's government sponsored, it's funded by the government, it's £900 per person, getting it free, it's very helpful. I really, really like it, so I stayed up until 3:00 am last night doing the maths work because I am so determined, nothing is contested, and I am enjoying the [course], it's really good. I think it might improve my skills before I try to get the qualifications [that are required by the job vacancies in a specific professional area] …' (C10, out-of-work, site B)

However, a lack of funding or coordination with the community that provides the training service undermines the capacity of some of the local communities to provide the training service to help the UC claimant to effectively fulfil the CC. The reason for the different opinions of C7 (in-work, site A) and C10 (out-of-work, site B) is due to the fact that they access to different charitable and community bodies, and partly due to the fact that the different bodies have different policies, shaping the implementation and outcomes of their training service efforts (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]):

'S: Are you satisfied with their advice?
C7: Not really, but I may go again. It is just a list of different websites that I can contact, and they give me a list of agencies. It is OK, but I might go again, to ask for further help, just about doing a different type of job and training…'

Moreover, employment behaviour change can be facilitated by social relationships, such as friendship, where the claimant shares the same identity and values, and having mutual trust, where the claimant obtains a useful recommendation and referral to the job that he or she wants to have, improving the job quality and increasing the overall utility of combining the instrumental rationality (preferred job) and value rationality (childcare and family commitment).

'…. It was not easy to change to another job, so I told my friends that I wanted to find a different job because my previous job (domestic cleaning) was hard for me, and I need to take care of my young child. That's why I went to my friend and I said, "I want that job", and he said, "OK" …' (C18, in-work)

Social protection plays an important part in moving into work and/or making in-work progress. Due to harms (such as discrimination) generated in the previous workplace, some claimants decide to leave their previous well-paid full-time job (such as C10 and C4) and have obtained insufficient help to return to their previous well-paid, full-time job.

'…I was a senior person in Citi and I was not expected to resign. I do believe I can do the job, and I have been doing it for years. I think it was discrimination…' (C10, out-of-work, site B)

'…I was supposed to leave the employer in January 2016 because they [managerial staff in the work place] wouldn't help me to return to work because I was being bullied by my manager. They caused me to leave because I asked for a change of line manager because my manager would not admit to what she was doing. I made a complaint. She denied it and said that she did not do horrible things to me, and I could not work with her anymore because it made my hair fall out and made me very anxious and depressed because of how I was being treated. I did not have a trade union in the workplace, because it's in the private sector, so they use that [no trade union] to bully people because there is nobody to support you! I seek advice from my GP, the mental health service, and South West London Muslims. I am satisfied with their help. They give me support…' (C4, in-work, site B)

'I don't want to go back to crime, I don't want to go back to that life, my criminal record pisses me off sometimes, it makes me a bit less confident, the thing I would not lie about ... on ... on the application form, so you just don't get it [paid job] ...' (C21, out-of-work, site B)

This implies the less well publicised network of the trade union to protect employment rights and/or insufficient funding from the DWP allocated to (labour law focused) charitable bodies for conciliating in disputes occurring in the workplace for UC claimants, who suffer from harms at work (Pemberton, 2015) that jeopardise mental health and the employment retention. From this lens, employment behaviour change can be perceived as more than *fulfilling* the CC, but it would be viewed as a constitutive part of human rights inscribed in capitalist and social relationships of production. However, *protecting* employment rights is less clearly underwritten and legitimised by the provision by the societal community support in relation to UC.

7.4 UC, Compliance, and Employment Behaviour

As discussed above, employment behaviour is social behaviour that interrelates with social relationships. This section analyses the interaction between the work coach in the local JCP and the process and results of employment-related change. This section also demonstrates bridges and barriers for UC claimants to fulfil the employment behavioural conditionality.

7.4.1 Scope of Choices and Conditionality

Overall, respondents narrow the scope of their job search compared to pre-UC. The policy implementation and policy making have different forms in relation to the different approaches of the work coach in different JCP offices, confirming the findings of Lipsky (2010 [1980]). According to a participant's description, this thesis finds some work coach advise UC recipient to narrow down the job search to only paid work (such as C19) or some work coach advise UC recipient to accept both paid work and non-paid work (such as C24).

The claimants who participate in this research view that the UC work coach refers them to have more relevant and useful social networks, such as a Job Club and training in the local community for UC claimants to accumulate human capital and improve their social interaction and interpersonal relationships compared to pre-UC. This highlights that the employment service and support are not entirely delivered by the JCP. For example, C24 compares her experiences of the employment service pre- and post-UC:

> '…the [JSA] advisor that I was given pre-UC was not particularly helpful. When I went to JCP, for my interviews, once a month or every two weeks, my [JSA] advisor just looked at my notebook for job searches I had done and then sent me away. He [job advisor] just went to the computers downstairs and printed out a list of available jobs, but he provided no real help to GET the jobs. My [UC] work coach links me to several services such as this Job Club and helps me to build up my confidence by discussing interview skills and CV writing skills, they [Job Club in the charitable body] occasionally have people who come to help you with your interviews, so they help me to develop the skills, step by step, needed for interviews to get a job…' (C29 multiple temporary paid works, site A)

Policy implementation has different forms within and across different offices (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). For example, C19 has 45 hours full-time work search commitments (for paid work only) set by his work coach in JCP of site B, which is different from C24's 35 hours full-time work search (for paid and non-paid work) in the CC set by her work coach in JCP of site A. Another example is that for C11, his personalised conditionality of part-time work search has been changed from 20 to 25 hours when his case is transferred from the JCP office in the east to the JCP office in the south-east of site B:

> '… Sometimes I have a good appointment but sometimes I have a bad appointment. I'm supposed to look for work for 25 hours a week now, it was 20 hours pre-UC, because I move from JCP in the east of site B to another JCP office in the south-east side, and the latter one is stricter than the previous one. It is supposed to have a higher rate of people who move into employment than the previous one…' (C11, aged 46, male, lone parent, White British, actively seek for work, site B)

Furthermore, C24's work coach does not restrict to choose merely paid work, so C24 chooses a non-paid volunteering job to fulfil their conditionality. C24 is doing volunteering jobs pre-UC, which means that C24 does not have sufficient time and energy to search for paid jobs while fulfilling her conditionality: 'I was doing volunteering pre-UC. I was doing five days a week, so I cannot search for a paid job…but now it's two hours [non-paid work] a week, so it's better' (C24). C24 has more time to get training and search for paid work post-UC.

The scope of job applications and choices of C19 are narrowed down to the paid jobs only which differs with C24's work search scope. For example, C19's work coach allows C19 to pursue the career in which he is qualified, and the new area in which he is less qualified. As shown below, the new area is dominated by customer service, which is less relevant to C19's past working experience (security job). For C19, who already has experience in a specific professional area, this approach is perceived as diverting his energy and time to consider the vacancies in the alternative area in which he is less qualified and less interested. This implies C19's out-of-work conditionality would be not viewed as a justifiably paternalist ground.

> '… I accepted a commitment to searching for work, probably about 45 hours a week. When you go to see your work coach, they have a list of paid jobs and you have to give them three job titles and you are gonna search for three different job types, which means if you specialise in one field, you are forced to look for other fields, so you are "forced to work", so basically, if you cannot find work in the specific skills you have, you are forced to look elsewhere in jobs that you have never worked in. There are only customer service jobs, like McDonald's and KFC, but my main skill is security, I am not looking for anything else, which means it's not beneficial to you because if you have been forced to do a job that you are not comfortable with and you don't have a clue about, you may stay for a month and then leave, and you get penalised …' (C19, in full-time work, site B)

C19 has to update his employment circumstances but he realises that he could not update it until the day he starts work. Therefore, he could only report the change on the first day at work online. This means that he had to cope with the conditionality of *reporting circumstances immediately* and *start work immediately*: '…this is difficult because if you don't report a change the day you start work and do it on a later day, they can penalise you…' (C19).

Compared with working-age benefit, UC has a two-month duration for in-work claimants to *adapt* to the new jobs when the claimant still has conditionality, such as seeing the work coach. For C19, his CC of making in-work progress is considered as being less relevant to his ends, namely, fulfilling his full-time work. '…I have got a work coach meeting next week. It's pathetic, I don't see why I have to go to the meeting next Tuesday because I am working. It's a waste of my time…' (C19), To avoid being sanctioned, C19 complies with in-work conditionality, which conflicts with C19's working responsibility.

In contrary, C3, who is in the same situation but achieves reciprocity from her work coach in terms of next appointment time, provides a different perspective. This means that C3 prioritises her work at the expense of her appointment with her work coach. The different experiences of C19 (see above) and C3 relate to the different implementation approaches employed by different work coaches.

> '…The day before I was offered that job, I was due to meet with my work coach. I told my work coach that I had been offered a job but I had an appointment, so he [work coach] said: "You have to make your work the priority, and you should do that job and we can change the day of your appointment", so I take that job…' (C3, full-time work, site B)

Some adopted by work coaches is deemed less sufficient to meet the needs of well-qualified claimants. For example, C9, who used to work in investment banking as a senior manager in Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, receives insufficient help from his work coach. C9 says that few job vacancies and contacts related to the specific professional area of investment banking are provided by his work coach.

> 'I think the quality of her [work coach's] advice is poor. I think she [work coach] is focusing on a low level of manual labour and she [work coach] doesn't have experience [in providing advice for a candidate in investment banking]. She [work coach] talks to me once a month, that's it. She [work coach] doesn't spend any time and try to help me because she couldn't advise people like me. I understand her position [work coach], and she thinks she couldn't really help me, but she thinks she should be able to, so [laughs]…'(C9, temporary paid work, site B)

This suggests that scope of advice provided by the work coach is deemed relatively narrow for a well-qualified recipient who seeks for a well-paid job in the financial banking industry.

7.4.2 Pressure and Sanction

As Le Grand and New (2015) highlight, coercion causes external reasons for autonomy-related failures of an individual. This means that the inappropriate approach leads the C8 to feel that she is being pressurised by the approach. As shown below, C8 feels that she is being 'monitored' and she is afraid of being sanctioned. C8 perceives her work coach to be 'like the police, like a robot, so harsh and so cold'. This reflects that surveillance is made within the paternalist policy as evidence collection for behaviour correction (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). The system is deemed as giving insufficient respect for the claimant's autonomy in choosing the job that C8 actually wants. C8 is pressurised when she is attempting to become bureaucratic deserving (comply with her conditionality and requirements within the social process). C8 is pressurised to refuse the unstable job (e.g. zero hours working) suggested by her work coach even though she does not want to.

The past sanction experiences of C8, causes her mental health to deteriorate, and she is further pressurised by facing the threat of sanction. This is largely aligned with the research finding of Wright at al. (2016). This suggests that the structure of choice available to this recipient is deemed less appropriate (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). Wacquant's (2009, 2012) conceptualisations of neoliberalism, which entails disciplining individual behaviour subjectivities through the paternalist policy of disciplinary 'workfare' and castigatory 'prison-fare', have a wider implication here. This implies a combination of the work-first approach and a harsh punitive

instrument (Fletcher and Wright, 2017), could not enable the transition from welfare to work (Wright and Patrick, 2019) in the bureaucratic field (Bourdieu, 1994).

> '… sometimes, he [UC work coach] pressurises me because he [work coach] tells me: "I [work coach] can see you are not working, I [work coach] can see you are not looking for work, I [work coach] can sanction you if you do not do what you are supposed to..." sometimes if I don't want the jobs, I have been perceived as "not choosing", if I get zero hours working contract job, I cannot refuse it because he [work coach] says: "No, you refuse it!" They should be friendly. I just feel they are so harsh. When I am not able to do it, he [work coach] is like the police or a robot or something. He says: "You have to do this! Don't do that!" When this happens, I feel it's so cold, everything is monitored, it's like school, but I am an adult, I have been sanctioned before [UC], when I missed an interview because I was working... I feel frustrated…' (C8, out-of-work, site B)

7.4.3 Human Capital Investment

Human capital investment is deemed a useful bridge for out-of-work claimants and in-work claimants to increase working opportunities and earnings. For example, to make in-work progress and fulfil the extended conditionality, limited extra funding is deemed as a barrier for C1 to renew his licence to obtain a security job.

> '… It might be because of the security industry that I used to be in but I got the job posting literally every day in the security work. Unfortunately, my licence just expired, so I need to renew it. The cost of renewing one licence is about £125 but for renewing two licences, it's about £250. I have to find the money somehow, as it is the key to keep my job sustainable…' (C1, part-time work, site B)

For in-work claimants, in-work training is of paramount importance to make in-work progress, and an appropriate understanding of the incentive for moving into work is vital (for example, C7).

> '… it is a good incentive to get back into paid work because they [work coach] calculate that I would be better off in work, literally, how much more money I would be able to get if I am in work. If I could have skills training, I could learn certain skills, and then that would be more of an incentive [to make more earnings] as well.' (C7, full-time work, site A)

Due to the differences of implementation forms, completing experiences are generated. For example, C12, who has relatively long-term unemployed experience,

finds it is difficult for her to arrange an interview with and obtains training from her work coach since she is on UC.

> '... it's hard to get a job now, very hard, UC does not help me. When I asked them to help me get into work, get training, it was better before [UC], it was easier to get jobs [pre-UC]. I used to go to the Jobcentre and I saw a job advisor once a week, once every two weeks, and they would help me, but now I go up there and phone for an appointment ...' (C12, aged 46, female, lone parent, long-term unemployed, White British, site B)

In accordance with the final findings of Wright et al. (2018), mandatory training, which covers a broader professional area, is viewed as enforcement for a claimant who thinks it has irrelevance to the job area in which he is interested: '… JCP force you to go on those courses because they think it's gonna affect you. It's a waste of time because if you don't attend one day, they cut your benefit…' (C19)

7.4.4 Self Employment

Self-employed recipient who participated in this study is encouraged by the work coach to seek for multiple jobs. For example, C13 is a self-employed hairdresser and her earnings fluctuate each week from £30 to £90 per week because of the fluctuations in her hours worked. However, C13 believes her CC is unrealistic for her, as she thinks her work coach feels she is not active enough in seeking new jobs and is not working enough hours as a self-employed hairdresser to fulfil her in-work conditionality. C13 has very limited capital to expand her small business, and therefore she believes that the barrier to her employment behaviour change is the lack of appropriate advice to expand her small business:

> '... I am not happy with my work coach, because I feel that she [work coach] thinks I am not working enough. Why am I doing it [in-work conditionality]? If I am doing it, it's not good enough. Why do I have to work like that? There are people working in the market who get £1, £1, £1. Do you [work coach] mean to say that they [people with low earning] are also not working? They [people with low earnings] are there working but they [people with low earnings] earn a very small amount of money... My UC work coach says she will call me and show me how to get capital and expand my business. I waited for her for the whole day, but she did not call…' (C13, self-employed, site B)

C13 articulates the counter-hegemonic discourse and critiques fatalistic factors that causing earning inequality. For the self-employed claimant, making in-work progress means that she should increase the working hours of her self-employed business and/or find another paid job and thus increase her overall working hours and earnings. In terms of the latter option, barriers to seeking another job are: 1) a long-term self-employed claimant may have a limited number of references (in addition to the reference for the volunteering work) to support the job application; 2) applying for another job means that the self-employed claimant may have to consider a job in in which he/she is not qualified or has less relevant working experience, and thus is less likely to succeed:

> 'I think the fact that I have been self-employed, means that I have not really got any references on my CV. The fact is that I provide my own reference because I have been self-employed since 2001 when I started to work on my own, I volunteered in the church for four years. That's my only reference…' (C29, self-employed, site B)

Both C13 and C29 articulate that they – as self-employed claimant- feel less likely to comply for employment behavioural conditionality of job search and being financially better-off. An appropriate personalised way of designing and implementing in-work conditionality is warranted.

7.5 Government Paternalism, and Employment Behaviour Change

Henry Sidgwick remarks that 'the high ideal of human wellbeing burns like a flame at the core of his social philosophy' (cited in Claeys, 2013, p. 217). Government paternalism is portrayed as a way to correct one's failures and thereby further one's own good: 'it is better to define paternalism in relation to what we have called reasoning failure: a paternalistic intervention is one where the government intends to correct an individual's *judgment* as to what is the best decision for him or her' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 177). The UC system treats employment behavioural change as a *normative* rule or policy. Drawing on a government paternalist framework, this section discusses how, why, if and when UC influences employment-related decisions of respondents, in relation to one's own wellbeing. Also discussed is the ontological ambiguity in the institutionalised definition of

failure, which does not fully capture the individual and systematic constraints of employment behavioural change.

This section leads to several findings: when the neoliberal and government paternalist account of individual reasoning failures – on policy implementation level - is irrespective of systematic barriers, UC could *not* necessarily move recipients off benefit into employment. When claimants perceive that UC and its implementation constrain an individual's instinct motivation to pursue his or her own ends, recipients are less likely to make a long-term change in employment behaviour change, but may more likely lead short-term, intermittent change or, no change.

This section constructs the appropriate personalised approach that enables recipients to co-produce employment behavioural conditionality. This chapter reveals that the combination of individual responsibility, the appropriate personalised approach and a more universalistic, publicised, legitimised societal community membership provision and labour protection of capitalist social relationships are important to improve the effectiveness of conditionality, to move recipients off benefit into sustainable work, or help in-work progression.

7.5.1 Ontological Claim of Failure, Judgement and Behaviour Change

UC is designed to correct the 'the underlying problem of a spiral of welfare dependency and poverty. This has cost the country billions in cash payments and billions more in meeting the social costs of *failure*' (DWP, 2010a, p. 1). The relation of UC claimants to the ontological claim of institutionalised failures is provided according to the neoliberal logic of personalised, intensified and extended conditionality and sanction pressures (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). As discussed in 2.4.3, UC is designed to move out-of-work claimants into employment, and to encourage and support in-work claimants to increase their earnings by spending more time on work searches or finding better-paid employment (DWP, 2018a). This is closer to what government paternalism and neoliberalism endorse; that is, making the best judgment to conduct rational entrepreneurial action, based on calculating working (search) hours or earnings.

Government paternalism is based on theories of behavioural economics and psychology. Individuals are seen as rational, calculating and entrepreneurial actors in social life. Under government paternalism and neoliberalism, failure is framed as a reasoning mistake or result of suboptimal decision making, such as smoking or failing to secure sufficient savings to meet the interests of the 'future self' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 98; Whitworth, 2016). This implies that rational calculation involves mistakes, which are carried out and modified through the behavioural changes of social actors. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) claim that an individual's decision making is institutionalised to a frame of choice context, wherein a client is expected to exercise their employment-related choices to fulfil the neoliberal vision of responsibility, including evidence to record work search activities undertaken.

The institutionalised definition of failures underlined by UC results in an ontological ambiguity regarding the nature of failure within the choice framing discourse at the government implementation level (Whitworth, 2016). Institutionalised, neoliberal and government paternalist accounts of individual optimal decision making violate and are relatively irrelevant to improving a recipient's *own* judgement of optimal decision making for achieving their desired ends. Deontologically, a recipient's own judgement drives their value-dominated behaviour, which prioritises moral values other than financial incentive (such as C29 in 7.2.1). In *Critique of Judgement* (1994 [1781]), Kant argues that judgement does not necessarily lead to one's own happiness when pleasure is reduced to self-interest. As discussed in section 7.3.2, recipients prioritise consequentialist values and wellbeing shared within a family apart from instrumental values serving one's own maximal, financial wellbeing. In section 7.2.4, we can find that a recipient's own judgement drives need-dominated behaviour, which is sustained upon their own definition of deservingness (see discussion of needy claimants in section 7.2.5).

Since government paternalism allows for varied definitions of wellbeing, it fails to fully acknowledge the fundamental tensions between the institutional definition of judgement failures based on economic calculation, and the self-assessed, optimal judgements made and reflected upon by social, family, moral and emotional actions of human beings. Paternalised individuals pursue their own wellbeing and may not correct institutionalised reasoning failures imposed by the market logic of neoliberal

and government paternalist intervention. As such, the ontological ambiguity of reasoning failures, a government paternalist and neoliberal policy – aims at expanding the reach of market logic (Soss et al., 2011a) – is not a sufficient framework for correcting the individual reasoning barriers embedded within all social relationships, which are not concerned with merely serving market needs.

A recipient's varied social, emotional, deontological and consequential values are not necessarily compatible with what neoliberalism endorses. As Brown (2015, p. 44) highlights, 'neoliberalism is the rationality through which capitalism financially swallows humanity – not only with its machinery of compulsory commodification and profit-driven expansion, but by its form of valuation'. I argue that an appropriate government paternalist approach should consider the harm caused by the negative effects of neoliberalism to free the paternalised individual to pursue the good life. In other words, government paternalist policies could not sufficiently help individuals make what Le Grand and New (2015, p. 213) call 'the *best* decision' for individuals to serve their own ends. Furthermore, it is warranted to allow for a scope of institutionally defined *suboptimal* behaviours regarding a claimant's deliberate choice that exceeds what market rationales suggest (Kleiman and Teles, 2008). This implies the importance of considering both empirical and value-based varieties in balancing judgement and behaviour, which are embedded in ever-changing social relationships, rather than inviting categorically correct or failed decision making (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018).

7.5.2 Individual or Systematic Barriers

As discussed in 6.5, government paternalism does not specify systematic barriers for understanding factors influencing a recipient's employment-related behavioural change. When claimants perceive that paternalised policy constrains an individual's motivation to pursue his or her own ends, recipients are less likely to move into employment which recipients desire. A government paternalist policy is typified as an analogy of a 'nanny state', which 'infantilises them [paternalised individuals] and renders them incapable of exercising that autonomy' (Le Grand and New, 2015, p. 109). In the same vein, a paternalist policy might be less effective when a targeted population has an inaccurate understanding of a government's frame-of-choice

context, or of what kinds of choices will lead individuals to the PLM and their wellbeing (Sunstein, 2017).

As discussed in 2.1.2, Nozick's neoliberal argument highlights that actual behavioural change is driven by individual needs and prudent deliberation. As Bandura (2001) explains, behavioural change is driven by psychological needs, wherein an individual feels autonomous because he or she feels ownership of their social behaviour, and consequently achieves connectedness with social, communal and institutional relationships. Psychological needs drive individuals to produce desirable ends through self-mastery of social practices, self-regulation of desires and needs, and self-directedness of personal standard and goals, rooted in a value system and personal identity (Deci and Ryan, 2000). We can see this from cases discussed in 7.2.3. Recipients C26, C3 and C4 actively seek work to move away from benefits that have an attached stigma. This shows that recipients behave in ways that prevent self-devaluation, self-dissatisfaction and self-inflicted blame, and that protect autonomy. This implies that employment behavioural change is attributed to self-identity, which is derived from the options and attitudes from interactions with others (Goffman, 1958). To give another example, employment behavioural change could be driven by internal or intrinsic factors of autonomy. For example, C4 states 'I think that it is my own determination that helps me find work; I have to find it, with my motivation and confidence'. In this case, the internalised process of employment behavioural conditionality activities reinforces confidence and self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001), forming a new source driving employment behavioural change in line with official requirements, thus enhancing social solidarity, inclusion, and integration. This implies that instinctual sources of autonomy, such as psychological need, better elucidate some forms and types of employment behavioural consequences than the negative, punitive or positive, financial incentives proposed by Le Grand and New (2015).

Recipients' experiences interacting with the UC system reinforces prudent deliberation and a stronger determining will in employment-related behavioural change (such as section 7.2.3). For many cases discussed in section 7.2.2, most recipients who participate in this study desire to move into work, which indicates an

absence of judgement failure – according to the institutionalised meaning of failure of welfare dependency (DWP, 2010a). It is evident that interaction with an appropriate personalised help enables a recipient (such as C26 in section 7.2.2) to deal with claimant external source of autonomy-related barriers and means-related barriers. The appropriate personalised help also assists UC recipients to build a work-search routine, a more organised life structure, or more determination in conditionality fulfilment (such as C3 in section 7.2.2).

It is useful to distinguish between individual barriers that may hinder one from moving closer to the PLM and pursuing one's own good, and systemic barriers. Such systematic barriers involve perceived unrealistic conditionality (see section 7.2.1 and 7.2.4–7.2.5), and threat or experiences of sanction, anxiety and pressure, and being monitored (7.4.2), inadequate new job shown in the Universal Jobmatch tool (see C29 in section 7.2.1), less appropriate communication (see section 7.2.5), less appropriate application of an easement (see section 7.3.1), less sufficient advice in a specific professional area (see discussion in section 7.4.1), alongside less publicised digital facilities provision (see section 7.3.2), and a relatively selective provision of free childcare (see section 7.3.1). When neoliberal and government paternalist accounts of individual reasoning failures disregard systematic barriers, UC recipients would be less likely to move off benefit into employment. Drawing from the perspectives of neoliberal literature, fulfilling UC conditionality of employment-related behavioural change carries responsibility for the self to the new level. It implies that a rational, entrepreneurial 'individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her behaviour, no matter how severe the systematic barriers and constraints' (Brown, 2003) are to his or her fulfilment of UC conditionality in relation to employment-related behavioural change.

Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) term 'social space' pertains to all possible positions that are available within a network of relationships. The social process of UC implementation, alongside WCA, creates a new social space of contestation wherein citizens hold the confusion, sustain the culture of resistance within a community unit (see section 7.2.4) and dispute the benefit of belonging, and articulate the counter-hegemonic discourse (see section 7.2.5, 7.4.4). Foucault (1995) views such discourse

formation as standardised products (Heller, 1996). Habermas (1984) views institutionalised conflict arising from the social process of redistribution within the welfare state as a reification of communicative domains of behaviour that does not respond to varied ways of social control. The argument made in this thesis distinguishes between the reactionary responses from recipients who believe their social rights have been violated and hence appealed for a WCA result (see section 7.2.4–7.2.5), and a progressive resistance by recipients who actively seek any opportunity to do self-transformation and move away from social meanings attached to UC (see section 7.2.3).

Furthermore, these systematic barriers unwittingly constrain a paternalised individual's autonomy, and occasionally the recipient has to engage in a trade-off for benefit gains (Le Grand and New, 2015). For example, C31 remarks that 'obviously if I don't agree with them [CC made by the work coach], I don't get paid [laugh]...'. The perspectives by applied ethics recognise a complex picture of harms, as we may be obliged to harm as a means of accessing some aspects of social freedom, countering the simplified view of compromise in Mill's harm principle on a conceptual level (Fitzpatrick, 2008). Here, it appears UC recipients voluntarily engage in a trade-off, compromising actual autonomy for benefit allowance gains.

Considering Le Grand's and New's (2015) perspective, a paternalist policy is not justifiable if it depends on the diminution of the paternalised individual's autonomy. This perspective seems ambivalent considering Le Grand's and New's (2015, p. 111) argument that 'we can understand autonomy as an ideal', implying that 'true' autonomy may be impossible to obtain in practice. The argument made here suggests one's autonomy is relative and is embedded within the social-relative, micro-dynamic, inter-connectedness between recipients and stakeholders. This implies that government paternalism would be viewed as an ideal or norm for behaviours upon experiences.

For improving one's autonomy and reducing systematic constraints, an appropriate personalised approach enables recipients to gain appropriate translation, understanding and emotional input of empathy of needs and barriers, and to receive

feasible and realistic conditionality, and shared understanding on how to co-produce conditionality through means other than coercion. When recipients obtain face-to-face vocational advice, appropriate and relevant job vacancy information, and professional and vocational training for a specific professional area (see discussion in 7.2.2), recipients are more likely to move off benefits, and into employment in a desirable professional area, which consequently allows them to build a better relationship with themselves and also a better self-evaluation. An appropriate personalised approach reinforces the interdependency of support delivered by various stakeholders and recipients. An appropriate implementation of conditionality within institutional relationships or framework provisions is feasible, and realistic to coproduce employment behavioural conditionality.

More universalist and publicised societal community membership provisions play a critical role in employment behavioural changes (see section 7.3.2). This implies that New's (1999) argument that individual failures occurring in non-market conditions do not sufficiently warrant state intervention, is wrong. The individual internal factor of autonomy failures (such as mental illness) and means-related failures (such as having digital and literacy needs) constrain the paternalised individual's capacity to exercise his or her autonomy in complying with employment behavioural conditionality and pursuing wellbeing. As such, these impediments warrant state control of the societal community membership provision to legitimise intervention for preventing harm and fostering social solidarity, extending what Le Grand and New (2015) propose in addressing individual failures.

Drawing on Brown's (2015) perspective, government bodies increasingly play the role of a market actor in the neoliberal era. Wacquant (2009, p. 43) employs the conceptualisation of 'centaur state' to elucidate the social phenomenon wherein a state deploys fierce, harsh and tough conditionality rules and requirements (such as punitive welfare conditionality) against the people at the bottom of society, which counters the liberal and permissive approaches (such as deregulation of employment) for the top of the society. Wacquant's argument is applicable for analysing decentralised control of social and community bodies in the UK and has been applied to wider debates (Fletcher and Wright, 2017; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Wright et

al., 2018). For the government paternalist, the state would be the core agency for ensuring a universal and publicised societal community environment aimed at fostering social protections for autonomy and means of entrepreneurial, societal–communal, moral, and emotional self and subjectivity.

7.5.3 Employment Rights, and Make In-Work Progress

Feinberg (1989) refers the conceptualisation of autonomy as a right. The argument made here expands this view to capitalist social relationships. Employment-focused support in the specific area that recipients desire is important for triggering employment trajectory, re-engagement, and retainment of paid employment (Dwyer, 2018). As discussed in 7.4.5, UC recipients *without* sufficient tactics or social support, like a trade union, for negotiating and reconciliation the perceived inequality within the work place (such as C32 and C4), this type of behavioural change of moving into work is contingent, as it is relatively unstable. This type of behavioural change is widely linked to short-term rather than sustainable employment within social and interpersonal relationships. Dean (2015) has engaged in a broad debate regarding the labour rights at work under capitalism, concerned with protecting equal opportunity or non-discrimination. To make in-work progress, it is warranted to secure labour relation protection legislation that assists UC recipients in retaining paid job (s) and making use of their pre-existing professional and vocational skills, rather than being forced into areas where they are less qualified or lack relevant experiences (see discussion in 7.3.3).

In addition to employment-focused training, a universalistic and more publicised provision of community service like a trade union is warranted. As Pemberton (2015) explains, trade unions and law-focused charitable bodies would reduce workplace harm and improve negotiations regarding work-life balance rights and wage bargaining, which could reinforce a claimant's retainment of well-paid employment and the prospect of advancement, and hence may reduce in-work poverty – one of the original purposes of UC. Government paternalist policy would address socioeconomic harms (such as financial hardship, and workplace harm) that have occurred from the interaction between neoliberalism and capitalism to redress market imperfections, and to re-legitimate labour protections.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the extent to which UC led to employment-related behavioural changes among out-of-work and in-work claimants, and it identified factors that influenced moving off benefits and into employment, in relation to recipients' experiences and perceptions of UC. This chapter identified several factors that affected both out-of-work and in-work recipients' decision to move off benefit into employment post-UC, such as actual voluntariness, the feasibility of out-of-work/in-work conditionality, training and support delivered by UC work coach/community/charitable bodies (see section 7.2-7.4), the claimants' interpreted needs of the dependent child/children, childcare costs, UC easement (see section 7.3.1), and social relationships and social protection (see section 7.3.2).

This section discussed how, why, if and when UC influenced employment-related decisions of respondents, in relation to one's own wellbeing. UC recipients' experiences of employment behaviour change were qualitatively varied, which were largely related to *work coach and client relation* (see section 7.2.2) and *the policy delivered by work coach* (see section 7.4). To a large extent, when UC recipients, who experienced tensions in their relationships with their work coach, or had confusion, pressure or inappropriate understanding of the UC system (peculiar the WCA result), and had a less feasible CC, were less likely to move off benefit into work (see section 7.2, 7.4). The past sanction experiences caused the UC recipient's mental health to deteriorate and being further pressurised by facing the threat of sanction was deemed less relevant to move into work (see section 7.4.2).

In-work conditionality, such as multiple work search in areas in which the recipient was not qualified, was deemed as less relevant to make in work progress (see section 7.4.1). For in-work recipient who had already moved into full-time work, a further two-months period of in-work conditionality (to adapt to the new job) occasionally conflicted with working responsibility (see section 7.4.1).

To a lesser extent, UC affected employment-related behaviour of both out-of-work and in-work recipients who had childcare responsibility (see section 7.3.1). The childcare costs (after deduction) was deemed as a disincentive to move into work

(see section 7.3.1). The application of UC discretionary easement of temporary childcare was deemed helpful to temporarily balance the family and work commitment (see section 7.3.1). But an easement was deemed insufficient to cover the needs of a mature student who was in full-time study (see section 7.3.1).

Drawing on the theory of government paternalism, this chapter concluded that when the neoliberal and government paternalist account of individual reasoning failures – on policy implementation level – disregarded systemic barriers, UC could *not* necessarily move recipients into the employment in a desirable professional area. When claimants perceived that UC and its implementation constrained an individual's motivation to pursue his or her own ends, recipients may have been more likely to make short-term or intermittent changes, or no change.

For improving one's autonomy and reducing systematic constraint, this chapter constructed an appropriate personalised approach that enabled recipients to gain appropriate translation, understanding and empathy towards needs and barriers; and to receive feasible and realistic conditionality, shared understanding on how to co-produce the conditionality, other than coercion based on a recipient's perception and experiences. This chapter revealed that the combination of individual responsibility, and an appropriate personalised approach and a more universalistic, publicised, legitimised societal community membership provision and labour protection of capitalist social relationships were warranted for improving the effectiveness of conditionality, moving recipients off benefits and into paid work.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter answers the research questions by summarising the main empirical findings, drawing on conceptual and theoretical frameworks discussed in previous chapters. This chapter discusses how the findings contribute to the knowledge, from ontological, teleological, aesthetic, methodological, theoretical and epistemological aspects. The empirical components of the thesis include: Chapter 5 discusses stakeholders' meaning-making of their experiences regarding their clients' benefit claims, reporting changes in circumstances, and benefit- and employment-related behaviour changes, in relation to UC. This chapter explores the behavioural changes that stakeholders have translated, interpreted, constructed and reflected upon in relation to the social interaction and social experience with their clients. Chapter 6 explores claimants' interpretation of change in seeking and obtaining information and advice from Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), Food Banks (FBs) and Jobcentre Plus (JCP), comparing pre- and post- UC. Discussions mainly cover claimants' interpretation of changes in experiences of benefit claiming, and updating changes in circumstances, and interactions between claimants and stakeholders, in relation to UC. This chapter also explores the nature of changes in *social processes*, *social security delivery* and *social relationships* that have risen post-UC. Chapter 7 examines the influence UC has on claimants' employment behaviour change experiences and opinions post-UC. This chapter discusses barriers and bridges to assist claimants to co-produce benefits and employment behavioural conditionality, with a wide discussion on individual wellbeing.

The arguments made in this thesis reveal the tensions between an institutionalised definition of rational entrepreneurial behaviours, which entails rational deliberation of calculation, costs-benefit and efficiency, and social, moral and emotional behaviours. It is warranted to use both empirical and value-based varieties in balancing judgement and behaviour embedded within ever-changing social relationships, rather than inviting the categorical expectations or decision-making failures assumed by government paternalism.

This thesis reconstructs the appropriate personalised intervention within the social security system. The term *appropriate* and *personalised* articulate the reciprocity of benefit and employment behaviour conditionality issues that recognise what, the extent of and how recipients' experience and perceive the benefit claiming and employment behavioural conditionality. It reconstructs the legitimacy of the appropriate state intervention, the relationships between the state and recipients, and the social good.

This thesis constructs the appropriate personalised approach which corresponds and coincides with primary experiences and the subjectivity of paternalised individuals, reproduces gendered reasoning whist recognising female caring responsibility, and could be more solidary-driven, rather than individualistic societies, indifferent to decision makers, passive obedience and fragmented powers. This chapter reveals that the combination of individual responsibility, the appropriate personalised approach and a more universalistic, publicised, legitimised societal community membership provision and labour protection of capital social relationships are warranted for improving the effectiveness of conditionality, moving recipients off benefits and into work in a desired professional area, or helping in-work recipients to retain paid employment.

8.2 Research Questions

The empirical findings of the research are discussed and analysed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The first question covers stakeholders' interpretations of barriers and bridges influencing benefit and employment-related behaviours, in relation to UC; the second question concerns claimants' perspectives and experiences of benefit claiming/transferring and reporting the change in circumstances; the final concerns the barriers and bridges to moving into employment and/or making in-work progress. Each research question is answered in turn below:

1. **To what extent do stakeholders in Local Authorities (LAs), Advice Centres (ACs), and a Food Bank (FB) see changes in the benefit and employment-related behaviour of their clients due to UC?**

Chapter 5 discusses the extent to which stakeholders in LAs, ACs and the FB see changes in the benefit- and employment-related behaviours of their clients due to UC. The analysis of UC recipients' benefit and employment-related behaviour change has four levels: 1) accessing the system of UC (see section 5.3-5.6); 2) interaction between varied stakeholders and UC recipients (see section 5.5; 5.6.5); 3) perceived context change during the early stage of UC implementation (see section 5.6.1; 5.6.3; 5.7); and 4) stakeholders' policy making in the local organisation (s) or institution(s) to respond to perceived context changes (see section 5.6.1; 5.6.4; 5.7).

Stakeholders made an explicit or implicit interpretation of behaviour change, barriers and bridges. Each stakeholder captures a relatively partial picture of the whole administrative processes post-UC. This implies that reasoning failures/barriers (see discussion in section 3.5) of UC claimants are not viewed in comparison with a normative model of economic behaviour. The interpreted reasoning barriers are reframed based on individual, institutional and social background in relation to the role and experiences of varied stakeholders. The nature of the interpretation stakeholders made is imbued with meaning, which is contingent, in terms of claimants' barriers, bridges and perceived need and assumed responsibility in service provision.

Stakeholders' views appear qualitatively different by *type of organisation*, *the composition of its UC claimant caseload*, and *the scope of (either front-line or managerial) responsibility*, *case study sites,* and *experiences* of stakeholders in the local organisations (see chapter 5). To a large degree, frontline stakeholders who have rich experiences of co-producing policy with their clients in both case study sites, articulate more factors of bridges and barriers in relations to benefit and employment-related behaviour change of their clients due to UC (see section 5.3, 5.4). While the majority of UC claimants who visit LA in sites A and B are both mentally or physically vulnerable, stakeholders in both LAs are less likely to highlight changes in benefit and employment behaviour of their clients who have no identified vulnerability both pre- and post-UC (see section 5.7.1). To a lesser degree, managerial stakeholders of both local governments provide the comments towards UC's influences on their clients, which are closer to the original design of UC and

the context of UC but place less emphasis on UC implementation process and forms, such as how claimants respond and co-produce the policy (see section 5.3, 5.4, 5.5.4, 5.6.3). HA stakeholders whose job responsibility does *not* cover employment service in both sites A and B, provide very limited accounts of employment behaviour change of their clients due to UC; instead, HA stakeholders in both case study sites A and B provide perspectives in relations to benefit behaviour change of their clients due to UC and the context of UC (see section 5.5.1, 5.5.3-5.5.4).

Some participants do not provide explicit and relevant perspectives of employment behaviour change due to UC; for instance, LA stakeholder who is subject to manage discretionary housing payment and scheme in site B (see section 5.7.1), a social worker who deals with the clients with mental issues (see section 5.5.1), a debt coach (see section 5.5.2), or volunteers in FB (see section 5.6.3). This lack of evidence about observing changing in clients' employment behaviour is likely to reflect that such behaviour was seen as falling, outside the scope of their responsibility. Again, due to the scope of job responsibility, managerial stakeholders who are in charge of employment service in LA of site B articulate many bridges (see section 5.7.2) to employment behaviour change. They perceive that changes in employment behaviour of their customers have more relevance with the employment service in LA of site B, but have less relevance with UC. This implies that the realisation of benefit and employment behaviour change *depends* on and is *related* with the benefits and employment service of varied service providers. Front-line debt coaches in sites A and B, however, provide different views of debt issues due to UC, depending on the individual front-line staff members' experiences and interpretations (see section 5.5.2). (See more details as below)

1a. What do the staff understand about how UC has influenced the claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviour? 1b. What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of UC, with regard to its influence on claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviour?

From the view of the managerial participants who *do not* directly deal with UC recipients, the UC digital system is viewed as for the convenience of claimants who do not need digital help (see section 5.3). From the view of the stakeholders who *do* directly deal with their client, the digital system with its less face-to-face advice (see

section 5.6.1), unwittingly creates barriers to accessing and maintaining access to the benefit system at the early implementation stage (see section 5.4). When claiming an Alternative Payment Arrangements (APA), stakeholders in the local Housing Association (HA) do not employ a yes or no approach in terms of benefit claims. Instead, HA stakeholders employed the criteria of *perceived awareness*, *stable* or *unstable* and *controllable* or *uncontrollable* to evaluate benefit claims for an APA (see section 5.5.1). In reporting changes in circumstances, stakeholders (see section 5.5.4) attribute compliance costs to personal factors and external factors of the UC system. Stakeholders' belief (and/or bias) of an APA may dissuade claimants' benefit behaviour to access to their social right of requesting an APA (see section 5.5.1).

With respect to benefit-related behaviour change due to UC, in section 5.3, managerial stakeholders identify that the UC digital claiming process is convenient for digitally confident claimants who do not need digital help to claim benefit online and reporting changes in circumstances (perceived strength). In section 5.6.5, frontline stakeholders identify that UC online system unwittingly causes confusion to understand the timing of their UC claims, and it also makes a difference to when they receive UC and how much it is (weakness). In section 5.5.4, HA stakeholders perceive UC online system causes confusion in upload evidence online to report changes in circumstances and understand what UC payment covers (weakness). Confusion surrounding the system has escalated the need to use the telephone and dependency on societal community supports (see section 5.5.4).

Information on social rights about accessing an advance payment, requesting an APA or knowing the difference of how the timing of a claim (see section 5.6.5) can lead to different times and amounts of UC payments is deemed less well publicised (weakness). Before 29 November 2017, stakeholder perceived that calling UC helpline was expensive (see 5.5.4). In section 5.6.1, stakeholders view fewer face-to-face staff unwittingly intensify the difficulties to initially access – and then maintain or continue access to – the UC system, hence co-producing the ongoing conditionality (weakness). In section 5.5.3, imposition of a sanction post- UC is deemed as a result of a lack of appropriate communication (weakness). A sanction is viewed ethically as less fair and less feasible for individual who is alcoholic (see

section 5.5.3). In section 5.5.2 and 5.6.2, this study finds that UC waiting time and monthly payment cause UC recipients, who have a lack of budgeting and financial skills, or have a large family, to be in-debt or in arrears for nursery payments/costs (weakness).

From the view of the stakeholders, changes in employment behaviour are influenced by the removal of the disability premium (see section 5.4). The removal of the disability premium may cause disabled claimants to be financially worse-off and hence disabled claimants may be more eagerly seeking for a paid employment than pre-UC. The April 2016 changes to work allowance (see section 5.6.3), the taper effect as earning increase, and the actual removal of the allowance when earning rise above the upper earning limit are viewed as disincentives for UC recipients to move into work (weakness). According to stakeholders' perspectives and experiences, UC recipient's *benefit* and *employment* behaviours are related to *digital* and *childcare* behaviours (see section 5.6.2). For large families, UC is deemed as ineffective in changing the incentive to work (see section 5.6.2). Drawing on Lister's (2003b) concept of citizenship, this implies the UC system does not give sufficient recognition to the relationship between the gendered nature of the work incentive to move into a paid work and childcare payment. For example, the 'two child' policy is deemed insufficient for large families to cover childcare costs and hence does not significantly change the incentive to move into a paid work (see section 5.6.2). UC job search conditionality for claimants faced with a digital challenge is deemed ineffective (weakness). In section 5.5.2, the debt coach perceives that UC claimants who are in-debt and hence have limited financial resources to go online to search for employment vacancies are viewed as being relatively unlikely to move into work (weakness). UC is perceived as a constituent part of factors affecting benefit- and employment-related behaviour change. JCP employment service, to a lesser degree, affects UC recipients' benefit- and employment-related behaviour change, compared to employment service (see section 5.7.2) in LA of site A (strength).

2. **To what extent does UC lead to changes in claimants' experience of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs and JCP?**

To a large extent, UC claimants identify changes in experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs and JCP. UC recipients' perspectives and experiences are varied, and are largely related to *the processing of clients* (see section 6.1 and 6.2), and *appropriateness* of UC policy delivered by UC work coach (see section 6.3 and 6.4). Overall, claimants perceive that it is more difficult to access appropriate face-to-face staff in LAs, JCP and ACs post-UC, compared to pre-UC (see section 6.4.1). To a large extent, UC recipients find no change in the quality of service delivered by local ACs (see section 6.4.1). UC recipients find that they are increasingly processed online or via helpline in a local LA or AC. UC recipients experience a relatively long queue in LAs, ACs, JCP (see section 6.4.1 and 6.4.3), compared to pre-UC. UC recipients largely attribute such changes in client processing to the context of policy delivery (see section 6.4.1). UC recipients attribute their experiences of the long queue waiting times in JCP for requesting and receiving a food voucher to UC monthly waiting times or perceived insufficient UC payment amount (see section 6.4.3; 6.4.4).

2a. Compared to pre-UC, what changes have arisen post-UC?

Overall, the UC digital era leads to changes in *the processing of clients* (see section 6.1) and *relationships with clients* (see section 6.3 and 6.4). As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, *the processing of clients* means treating clients within the institutional process that provide services to them. Different ways of processing clients have different implications for the quality of treatment and services (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]). To a large degree, UC recipients identify changes in *queuing times* in JCP (see section 6.1.1), *lower compliance costs and bias on lost files* of the UC claimants due to the digital system (see section 6.1.2). UC recipients have qualitatively varied perspectives on recipients' *perception* of stakeholders' control of the *speed of response,* and *quality* of staff working on the UC helpline service (see section 6.2.2), the UC digital system of benefit claiming (see section 6.1.3, 6.1.5) and the updating of changes in circumstances (see section 6.2.1). UC recipients find that they are increasingly processed online or via helpline in a local LA or AC. Compared to pre-UC, UC recipients experience a relatively long queue in LAs, ACs, JCP to find a

staff (see section 6.4.1 and 6.4.3). UC recipients largely attribute such changes in client processing to the context of policy delivery (see 6.4.1).

UC recipients also have varied perspectives of dealing with DWP staffs: UC recipients largely identify the merit of face-to-face interaction with UC work coach (see section 6.3), whereas and tensions between work coach and clients have been arisen (see section 6.4). This implies that the perceived changes in the *processing of clients* and *relationship with clients* are relatively *disproportionate*. This means UC recipients' perspectives of *the processing of clients* and *relationships with DWP staff* are – to a large extent – related to the perceived appropriateness of social policy delivered by UC work coach, UC helpline staff (see section 6.2.2) and the UC digital system (see more details below). Very limited evidence was found in assessing relationships with LA and AC staff. This is because a relatively limited number of participants sought advice and suggestion from LA and AC.

2b. What are the recipients' experiences of claiming UC and reporting changes in circumstance post-UC?

With respect to *benefit claiming*, the UC digital approach – to a large extent- reduces time costs imposed and avoids repetitive queuing to attend an appointment in a JCP for interaction with a staff member (see section 6.1.1). The online benefit claiming process of UC reduces financial costs which are previously incurred through queuing on the telephone to request working tax credits claim forms and the waiting time to receive the form (see section 6.1.1). Filling out a digital application form online leaves claimant some flexibility to manage their time to gather evidence to support the processing of their UC claim (see section 6.1.1). UC recipients perceive JCP to be more organised than pre-UC (see section 6.1.1). Furthermore, UC digital claiming system reduces compliance costs and cognitive biases on lost files, compared to pre-UC (see section 6.1.2).

This thesis finds that more participants from site B encounter digital and/or literacy barriers that hinder benefit-related behaviour change (see section 6.1.3). This is because 1) more participants joint in this study are from site B; 2) site B has a relatively large proportion of the population with minority ethnic background, whose

first language is not English (see details in section 4.4.2). The benefit behaviour change (to access and continued access UC online system) of claimants who have digital and/or literacy need, is, to a large extent, dependent on the help gained from the interaction with family members, social workers and volunteers in advice centres for additional help to access the welfare provision post-UC (see section 6.1.3).

With respect to the extended conditionality of UC, waiting time for benefit transferring and assessing the UC eligibility of both members of a couple, causes temporarily financial destitute (see section 6.1.4). For a couple of a British citizen with an EU citizen, waiting for the UK statutory residence test of the EU citizen means the British citizen (spouse) could not immediately access UC. Failing to pass the UK statutory residence test means this couple of an EU citizen and British citizen (such as C6) could only make a single claim, rather than a joint claim. Occasionally, UC recipient (such as C17) has the confusion and has encountered some complexity of the process of benefit transferring from working-age benefits to UC (see section 6.1.5). C17 believes the UC process is failing to address confusion and improve the system to increase transparency. This confusion and complexity existing in the process of co-producing policy delivery unwittingly influences the targeted population's assessment of the system's effectiveness and fairness (see section 6.1.5).

For *updating changes in circumstances*, the UC updating circumstances includes interactivity (claimant–digital journal account management–work coach). Comparing to updating changes in circumstances via telephoning or writing a letter, the UC digital system creates a new interface of social interaction for stakeholders and clients to exchange benefit-related information online. Overall, the UC online journal provides simplicity. UC recipients perceive that UC online system is largely well signposted online, and it's easy to put information online (see section 6.2.1). When a client can be processed online in a shorter time and in a routine compared to the pre-UC methods of updating circumstances, online connections with the government are perceived as a favourable way to control claimants' benefit-related behaviour (see section 6.2.1). However, a cognitive bias is generated when UC recipient experiences more time waiting for a response from his work coach or other Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) staff than pre-UC (see section 6.2.1).

Furthermore, the online system is viewed to be onerous for UC recipient who has the digital need, and UC recipient who has the uncertainty and changes in his or her working hours (see section 6.2.1). Moreover, updating changes in circumstances means limited change for the claimant who chooses to communicate via face-to-face appointment with his or her work coach, as he or she did pre-UC.

This research finds that recipients' perspectives of the official process of updating circumstances are related to reporting the *circumstances* of the claimants, the proceeding process of any updated information of the DWP staff/work coach, and the concept of 'change' (DWP, 2019d). Compared to Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance (IB JSA), this thesis finds that conditions of circumstance (Clasen and Clegg, 2007) under UC includes 'starting to care for a child or disabled person' (DWP, 2019d). This means that, compared to IB JSA and Income Support (IS), more circumstances are taken into account in the official definition of 'updating circumstances' of the UC system (DWP, 2019d). Before the introduction of UC, updating changes in circumstances rules of IB JSA and care allowance are made separately, which fail to consider the likelihood of the tensions between caring responsibilities for a disabled person and job search commitments in terms of conditionality. Post-UC, UC conditionality takes the caring responsibility for a disabled person into the circumstances, which implies a change in the institutionally organised and administered process in requiring efforts in qualifying and maintaining eligibility for a jobseeker who is also a domestic carer for a disabled person (see section 6.2.1). This means that a domestic carer could undertake *paid* caring responsibilities for a disabled person as well as taking on more *paid* work to increase UC recipient's incomes. This implies what Esping-Andersen (1990) refers to as an acceleration of commodification of domestic labour in the neoliberal state's social security services. Such change has an implication in the role of female domestic carer in the paid labour market. This implies that the recognition of caring status would be helpful for individuals to have access to paid domestic care, and hence have more financial resources to find for paid work, compared to IB JSA pre-UC. This change reproduces what Brown (2015) calls the gendered order of reasons of behaviour change, which involves reprivatising, repatriating and balancing caring and working responsibilities, thereby generating new sources of motivation for individuals to

undertake more paid work (Fraser, 1989, 1997). This change reflects the consequentialist grounds (Pettit, 2006) given for recipients to increase the value of gender roles in the social security system, and it has an implication in women's lives and a feminist and individualist form of social citizenship. However, the effects on females are disproportionate, that is, the UC system devalues the paid (usually female) caring responsibility for a child (Andersen, 2019). This implies that it is warranted to recognise the tension between the paid work and childcare cost in the process of behaviour change.

2c. What are the claimants' understandings of how UC influences their experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from LAs, ACs, and JCP?

Post-UC has witnessed changes in *social relationships* between stakeholders and recipients. Claimants have qualitatively different views towards policy delivered by UC work coach, who largely influences their experiences of seeking and obtaining information advice. UC recipients' experiences of seeking advice, to a large extent, are related to the perceived appropriateness of policy implementation by UC work coach. It should acknowledge that the policy design of *the personalised* approach to benefit and employment services was introduced under the Major government and was expanded to become the key defining feature of Blair's New Deals. In the sense of policy design, the personalised approach is *not* novel. The underlying changes intended here focus on perceived changes in *policy implementation forms* delivered by varied UC work coach from UC recipients' experiences, compared to job adviser's approach pre-UC.

Compared to pre-UC, UC recipients, to a large extent, have better experiences of seeking advice and suggestion from work coach, who exercises decision making properly and effectively (see section 6.3). Compared to pre-UC, UC recipients experience mutual respect, mutual trust, empathy and prevention of social harms, including the devaluation and disparagement of economically marginalised and socially stigmatised women (see discussion in section 6.3.1). In section 6.3.2, we can see that EEA citizen's internalised citizen-stakeholder relationships and meaning-making are qualitatively different pre- and post-UC. This implies that EEA national is more likely to co-produce with UC work coach when EEA national has clear

explanations of policy to reduce confusion, and psychological and physical harm and when autonomy, self-esteem and self-evaluation of EEA national are protected (see section 6.3.2). This also implies that when the claimants' interpretation of the stakeholders' language is in conflict with the claimants' own perception of the conditionality of the policy, the claimant is less likely to make a positive evaluation of benefit behaviour. On the other hand, when the claimant shares an understanding of the meaning (symbols) of the conditions of the policy with stakeholders, the claimant is more likely to make a positive evaluation of benefit behaviours and to responsibly work towards fulfilling the eligibility requirements alongside the work coach post-UC. UC recipient (such as C30) does not attribute such change in the experience of seeking advice and suggestions in JCP to UC: 'I don't know whether it [change in experience] is about UC' (C30) (see section 6.3.2).

In section 6.4.1, we can find that claimants perceive that it is more difficult to find appropriate face-to-face staff in LAs, JCP and ACs post-UC, compared to pre-UC. Claimants attribute the shortage of face-to-face staff to system failures, such as cuts to staff who are able to deal with queries about UC benefits. To a large extent, UC recipients find no change in good quality of service delivered by local ACs (see section 6.4.1). UC recipients find that they are increasingly processed online or via helpline in a local LA or AC. Compared to pre-UC, UC recipients experience a relatively long queue in LAs, ACs, JCP (see section 6.4.1 and 6.4.3). UC recipients largely attribute such changes in client processing to the context of policy delivery (see 6.4.1). To a large degree, UC recipients attribute their experiences of the long queue waiting in JCP for requesting food voucher to UC waiting time or payment amount (see section 6.4.3, 6.4.4). UC recipient, whose working-age benefit was manipulated by her ex-spouse, is not able to explicitly articulate the extent to which UC has led to changes in her experiences of interacting with the system (see 6.4.3).

The thesis finds that, to a large degree, frontline stakeholders who resolve policy-related contradictions, reinforce claimants' perceived control of benefit-related behaviour, as well as their evaluation of UC (see section 6.3). Frontline stakeholders, who advise claimants to be aware of and fully internalise policy elements, such as an APA, lead UC recipients to perceive that UC recipients need to responsibly control

benefit behaviour, and their benefit-related, housing-related, and financial-related behaviours are controllable due to UC (see section 6.4.2).

Claimants, who lack the appropriate and sufficient advice of front-line staff and have not fully been aware of and internalised an APA, perceive UC monthly payment is less adaptable, as it fails to meet the basic needs of the recipient's family (see section 6.4.2). UC recipient's adaptability has behavioural implications on UC recipients' budgeting and debt-related behaviours (see section 6.4.2 and 6.4.3). More publicised information about access to an APA has important implication in the culture which appears as a strategy for a behavioural response (such as borrowing the money), self-evaluation and, the perceptions of UC.

This study finds that UC, which is originally designed as a government paternalist policy implemented by non-market institutions such as governments, community services, and charities, is not fully perceived as falling under the category of government paternalism (see section 6.5). Government paternalism is not sufficiently justifiable for correcting individual reasoning barriers. The appropriate approach corresponds and coincides with primary experiences and the subjectivity of paternalised individuals and the appropriate recognition of individuals' needs, encouraging self-transformation and self-realisation, reproducing gendered reasoning with appropriate recognition of female responsibility and status, and contributing to a holistic sense of social harm prevention and should be more solidary-driven.

3. To what extent has UC led to changes in out-of-work and in-work UC claimants in making employment-related behaviours?

Chapter 7 discusses the extent to which UC leads to employment-related behavioural changes among out-of-work and in-work claimants, and it discusses factors that affect moving off benefits and into employment, in relation to recipients' experiences and perceptions of UC. UC recipients' experiences of employment behaviour change are qualitatively varied, which are largely related to *work coaches and client relation* and *the policy delivered by work coaches*. To a large extent, *the appropriate personalised policis delivered by UC work coaches* affect UC recipients' experiences

and perspectives of UC. Childcare (after the deduction), and sanction are deemed as less relevant to encourage those out-of-work to move off benefit into work and enable in-work recipients to make work progress (see details in answers to 3a and 3b below).

Overall, more participants from site B had made no change in employment behaviour *results* (at least until the completion of fieldwork in December of 2017). This is for several reasons: 1) more participants joined in this study are from site B so more participants with no change in employment behaviour results were recruited, compared to other types of participants; and 2) chapter 7 analyses that participants (usually lone parents) encounter barriers that hindered employment behaviour change, such as childcare costs, and a lack of work experiences. Site B contains a relatively large proportion of lone parents with dependent child/children and has more long-term unemployed populations than site A (see section 4.4.2). For these reasons, participants in site B largely describe themselves as making no changes in employment behaviour *results*, albeit many of them actively seek paid employment.

3a. What are the factors that affect recipients' decision to move off benefit into employment post-UC?

Chapter 7 discusses the factors that affect recipients' decision to move off benefit into employment post-UC. This study identifies several factors that affect both out-of-work and in-work recipients' decision to move off benefit into employment post-UC, such as actual voluntariness, feasibility of out-of-work/in-work conditionality, training and support delivered by UC work coach/community/charitable bodies (see section 7.2 and 7.4), claimants' interpreted needs of the dependent child/children, childcare costs, UC easement (see section 7.3.1), and social relationships and social protection (see section 7.3.2). For in-work recipients (peculiar the self-employed recipient), this study finds that capital for investing small business are largely relevant to make in work progress post – UC (see section 7.4.4, 7.5.3).

3b. What are the recipients' experiences and perceptions of how UC influences their experiences of changing employment-related behaviours?

This research finds that UC does have limited influence on changing in claimants' *actual voluntariness* of fulfilling behavioural employment conditionality, as most

claimants, who participate in this research, desire to move off benefit into work (see section 7.2.1).

To a large extent, the *support delivered by UC work coach and community* affects UC recipients' experiences and perspectives of UC. UC recipient, who obtains the professional training from the local community and charitable bodies, gets closer to paid employment which UC recipients are interested (see section 7.2.2). UC recipients, who obtain appropriate approach of UC work coach, deem UC reinforces their willingness to work through building up a work-search routine and a more organised life (see section 7.2.2). For claimant who is well-qualified, the employment advice delivered by JCP is deemed less sufficient (see section 7.4.1). For UC recipients who are unemployed for a relatively long period, JCP provides less advice and training than pre-UC which leads UC to be deemed as less helpful to move off benefit into work (see section 7.4.3).

The argument made in this thesis distinguishes between the reactionary responses from recipients who believe their social rights have been violated and hence appealed for a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) result (see section 7.2.4–7.2.5), and a progressive resistance by recipients who actively seek any opportunity to do self-transformation and move away from social meanings attached to UC (see section 7.2.3). For example, UC recipients, who experience tensions in their relationships with their work coach, have confusion or inappropriate understanding of the UC system (peculiar the WCA result), and have a less feasible CC, are less likely to move off benefit into work (see section 7.2.4-7.2.5). Out-of-work UC recipients who experience pressure (see section 7.4.2), a lack of professional advice (see section 7.4.3) and a lack of the most relevant job vacancies on Universal Jobmatch that match with their past working experiences (see section 7.2.1, 7.4.1) due to the policy delivered by their UC work coach, are less likely to move into paid employment. In contrary, UC recipients, who perceive UC payment as a *stigma*, believe UC causes a stronger intention to move off benefit into work (see section 7.2.3). This type of behaviour change is a progressive resistance to the internalised socioeconomic harms that are generated from the stigmatised situations (such as being on benefit, financial hardship, debt) and the social category of being worthless (see section 7.2.3). The

past sanction experiences cause the recipient's mental health to deteriorate and being further pressurised by facing the threat of sanction is deemed less relevant to move into work (see section 7.4.2).

This study finds that in-work conditionality, such as multiple work search in areas in which the recipient is not qualified, is deemed as less relevant to make in work progress (see section 7.4.1). For in-work recipient who has already moved into full-time work, a further two-months period conditionality (seeing the work coach) occasionally conflicts with working responsibility (see section 7.4.1).

To a lesser extent, UC changes employment-related behaviour of both out-of-work and in-work recipients who have childcare responsibility (see section 7.3.1). The childcare costs (after deduction) is deemed as a disincentive to move into work (see section 7.3.1). The application of UC discretionary easement of temporary childcare is deemed helpful to temporarily balance the family and work commitment (see section 7.3.1). But an easement is deemed insufficient to cover the needs of a mature student who is in full-time study (see section 7.3.1). Many findings above are largely consistent with and confirm the research findings of Dwyer (2018, 2019) and Wright et al. (2016).

8.3 Research Lessons

This research has several limitations in sample size, and variables that limit the generalisation of research findings. Two sites were selected in South London, during the early stage of UC implementation. As shown in empirical finding chapters, the interpretation and analysis of respondents' stories have been contextualised in relation to corresponding settings and backgrounds. However, this limits the generalisation of research findings for explaining the cases of recipients residing outside of London. Additionally, the research finding has limitation to explain the stories that happened during the recent stages of UC implementation, and other social policies carrying diverse forms of neoliberalism within a different political culture. Due to limitation in the recruitment of JCP stakeholders (see Appendix: Email from DWP), this research has made an adjustment on the original version of the topic guide, which re-focuses on the explanation and analysis of perceptions and experiences,

from stakeholders working in LAs, ACs, and a FB, and recipients in either site A or B.

By referring to and citing research findings from previous research of UC, this research widely confirms many insightful findings presented in *Welfare Conditionality: Sanctions, Support and Behaviour Change Project*. This thesis provides an alternative explanation of recipients' stories and analysis by employing government paternalism as an overarching theoretical framework and, is open to revision. Furthermore, since unforeseen circumstances extend the gapping period between data collection (by December 2017), and thesis submission, this limitation has been recognised in making policy implications to inform the *current* UC and related policy implementation and development.

8.4 Contribution to Knowledge

Ontologically and teleologically, government paternalism and neoliberalism see individuals as entrepreneurial or social actors, which is deemed as normative rather than ontological (Brown, 2003). This engenders the tensions between an institutionalised definition of rational entrepreneurial behaviours, which entails rational deliberation of calculation, costs-benefit and efficiency, and social, moral and emotional behaviours (Brown, 2003; Le Grand and New, 2015). This thesis reveals the ontological ambiguity of what Le Grand and New (2015) call reasoning failures. To address institutionalised behavioural deviance, a government paternalist policy is not perceived as a sufficient method for correcting individual reasoning barriers beyond the market rule perspective.

This thesis challenges the conceptualisation of reasoning failure within government paternalism, which overlooks systematic barriers preventing individuals from achieving what is expected in the neoliberal era. Also disputed is the assumption made by government paternalism that wellbeing can be judged by the government and achieved exclusively through correcting individual reflective behavioural processes (Le Grand and New, 2015). This thesis provides a complex picture of how, when and why behaviours change, including a broad discussion relating to the implementation of welfare conditionality and wellbeing. As discussed in 7.5,

employment change can be typified in several ways, based on a UC recipient's contingent situation and the varied forms of policy implementation and decision making at the front-line level. This is consistent with and confirms previous research findings on employment behavioural change, ethics and efficacy of welfare conditionality (Dwyer and Bright, 2016; Dwyer, 2018; Dwyer, 2019; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Wright et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2018).

In light of these findings, it is important to use both empirical and value-based varieties in balancing judgement and behaviour embedded within ever-changing social relationships, rather than inviting the categorical expectations or decision-making failures assumed by government paternalism. The apparent simplicity of conceptualising reasoning failures has been comprised at the conceptual level. According to Habermas (2002), individuals have already become institutionalised and socialised beyond their control. The arguments made in this thesis dichotomise the reasoning failures of government paternalism into individual and systematic barriers and analyses the interrelatedness and interconnectedness between them, with wider discussion concerning the barriers and bridges for pursuing wellbeing and individualised forms of a good life. This also reflects the fragmented, decentralised and de-regulative features of neoliberal authorities on the policy implementation level, which renders centralised, re-legitimised governments and social protections to reduce harm stemming from capitalist social relationships.

Aesthetically, the appropriate personalised approach is founded upon shared understanding between subjectivities of recipients and stakeholders who implement policy. The appropriate state intervention is not imperfectly founded upon communication rationality, but is analogous to what Bourdieu (1994, p. 2) terms 'intrinsic aesthetics', given by the perfect tie connected between recipients' primary and socially-related experiences, the subjective reality and intersubjectivities (stakeholders-recipients), and the appearances of the interference of the state. This implies that the appropriate personalised approach does not reinforce dogmatic and prevailing boundaries between social-economic groups, nor is it separating from primary experience, reproducing social and gender order (s) with an appropriate recognition of female status that might be interwoven with social practices. Service-recipient relation is *not* a peculiar type of a strict, value-neutral, objective and

independent form of state intervention. The intersubjectivity dimension of empirical perception within an appropriate personalised approach should be understood as a harmonious manifestation of the sense of synthetic unity within the self, and a cognitive understanding of the objects, such as social control, policy and forming the foundation of conscious consensus over state intervention.

Methodologically and theoretically, the arguments presented in this thesis reflect upon symbolic, intentional, dynamic and interactive communication between stakeholders and recipients, which I have substantiated by using multiple perspectives, including philosophical, institutionalised, social-psychological, cultural and gendered, communitarian, and social explanations of service-recipient relationships and policy implementation in the neoliberal era, extending or refuting some of the claims presented by government paternalism. This approach enables me to investigate explanation and conceptual interpretation regarding the extent to which social rights are assigned to facilitate mutual interaction, and coproduction between the recipients and stakeholders holding similar or conflicting values and interpretations of policy implementation, which leads a recipient to either resist within counter-hegemonic subject-positions, adapt to or (continued) engage in behaviour conditionality. This research shows reasoning barriers are not viewed in comparison with a normative model of economic behaviour. The interpreted reasoning barriers are reframed and embedded with the individual, institutional and social background in relation to the role and experiences of varied stakeholders. Stakeholders' views and opinions relate closely to their areas of focus and particular roles. The nature of the interpretation stakeholders made is imbued with meaning, which is contingent, in terms of claimants' barriers, bridges and perceived need and assumed responsibility in service provision.

Epistemologically, the argument made in this thesis commits the error of prioritising Le Grand's and New's (2015) conceptualisation of government paternalist intervention, which advocates a market-based reform to public service as a preferable solution to individual reasoning failures and a greater social justice. This thesis seeks to move claimants' perspectives and lived experiences of benefits claiming and behaviour change from the margins to the centre of epistemology in paternalist literature. Recipients' views are widely linked to personal barriers, stakeholders'

control or systematic barriers, reflecting varied cultures of attributing responsibility. This challenge institutionalised concept of responsibility for fulfilling employment behavioural conditionality, and also one's autonomy. While it is nonsensical to deny the validity of perceptions and experiences of UC recipients, this thesis is *not* exclusively prioritising users' voices. Pennington (2019, p. 575) correctly underlines that 'it is precisely the ineffectiveness of democratic accountability [favoured by government paternalism] given people's behavioural biases that is at stake'. The argument made in this thesis calls for an appropriate personalised approach for generating a shared understanding and coproduction, which reduces the likelihood of citizen's bias and the bound of rationality that would be inappropriately exploited.

This contributes to understanding how the extent of the distributions of social citizenship is perceived by stakeholders and recipients. The distribution of social citizenship is driven by policy implementation, as social movements and social practices in which citizens make benefit claims or transfers, and respond to welfare behavioural conditionality, in which the identity of self, gender, communal and social roles are embedded within the social process of social security recipients. The argument made in this thesis puts forward a new explanation of Berlin's (2002 [1958], p. 193) philosophical claim that 'making the best of themselves is viewed as a part of the realisation of my own "true" self'. This can be explained by employing what Feinberg (1988) called authenticity in autonomy, meaning an autonomous individual behaves genuinely in his or her own character, and governs himself or herself through continually reconstructing moral values and inner harmony, and is free from coercion. This appeals to an appropriate personalised policy with consideration of appropriate application of easements and discretions, which moves toward achieving effectiveness of welfare conditionality and inclusiveness within the wider community to secure social conditions and constitute a socially organic whole that helps satisfy needs and self-realisation. An appropriate personalised approach would enable citizens to actively engage in behavioural forms of self-transformation, which contrasts with the inappropriate policy implementation that precludes social citizenship rights and may sustain resistance or disengagement of social security. Active citizens can be seen as appropriately exercising deliberative and relatively free autonomy, with social rights, which are increasingly becoming conditional entitlements. Behavioural change needs to be understood as a heterogeneously social

artifact that is founded upon and shaped by an individual's reasoning (deliberate autonomy, means and ends), and its interactions with varied forms, degrees and social levels of distribution and provision of social citizenship and community membership.

Stakeholders, who have less discretion in determining the eligibility of benefits and sanctions, socialise and deploy surveillance and discipline citizens. As Lipsky (2010 [1980]) explains, stakeholders implicitly facilitate and reconciliate the legislative relationships of citizens and the government, and the stakeholders' discretion forms this dimension of citizenship. The social process of claimants forms personal identities that reflect – at the policy implementation level – making meaning of the world, service-recipient interaction, and intentional expression of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, offering phenomenological concepts for knowledge reproduction. This thesis has, therefore, contributed to the policy implementation literature by demonstrating that Le Grand's and New's theory of government paternalism – when it is extended to some concepts of Osborne (1993) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) – provides a useful explanation for the stakeholders' roles in assigning social rights. The conceptualisation of *helpful friend* endorsed by government paternalism is typified and extended to *facilitating*, *negotiating* and *brokering* roles based on the empirical findings. This re-conceptualised *helpful friend* assists recipients in coproducing benefit and employment behavioural conditionality, and in moving toward a good life.

The conceptualisation of harm evolves in varied forms. This thesis re-conceptualises Mill's harm principle, highlighting that it is warranted to legitimise harms protection to address institutional and systemic barriers and capital relationships in the neoliberal era. Such re-conceptualised harm protection measures might be seen as a clause in extended government paternalistic legislation, which might catalyse the effectiveness of welfare conditionality that helps citizens to better control behaviour and pursue psychological and physical forms of wellbeing, and the good of the whole society while reducing social costs incurred.

Behavioural economics is advocated as an instrument for informing paternalist regulations (Le Grand and New, 2015; Oliver, 2013b). However, the main point

intended here is that behavioural economics should not be employed to sufficiently justifiable reasons for government paternalist intervention, which could not realise employment behavioural conditionality by government paternalist intervention itself, so must give a legitimate justification of harm prevention measures within non-self-regarding spheres. The boundary of state intervention should look beyond the symptoms of individuals' reasoning barriers as defined by government paternalism. It is warranted to view barriers like low-income and food insecurity as systematic barriers that may not be addressed as exclusively individual failures. This is in some ways a combination of government paternalism preventing harm from self-regarding decision-making and the harm principle of preventing *external* harms in the non-self-regarding sphere. The struggle for labour protection legislation is viewed as a fundamental debate (Dean, 2015; Dwyer, 2004b). This thesis demonstrates the inter-related and inter-connected relation between systemic barriers and the wellbeing of paternalised individuals, and examining the behavioural forms of recipient self-transformation is based on recognising the role of legitimised labour protection, and the appropriate personalised approach at the policy implementation level.

This thesis challenges Lipsky (2010 [1980]), who argues that the boundary of state intervention is made by street-level bureaucrats. This thesis holds the optimistic view that the boundary of state intervention *can* and *should* be erratic, negotiable and exercised based on contingent situations in the pivotally central life that faces increasingly conditional welfare entitlements. This implies the heterogenous combination of the internal/intrinsic factors of autonomy of recipients alongside an appropriate personalised approach to policy implementation, and more universalistic, publicised and legitimised societal community membership provision, and labour protection of capital social relationships are to catalyse the effectiveness of conditionality, to move recipients off benefits and into paid work to achieve wellbeing.

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Appendix:

Topic guides

Exploration of Universal Credit's influences on claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviours

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Part 1

Research aims:

This study aims to investigate:

• experiences and opinions of representatives of Local Authorities, Jobcentre Plus and advice centres, on Universal Credit's influences on their clients' benefit and employment-related behaviours

• Universal Credit's influences on processing time and quality of decision making

• their assessment of the strengths and weakness of Universal Credit, with regard to its influences on claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviours

Study Population

Local Authorities, Housing Associations and Advice Centres, a Food Bank

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1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1 Self-introduction: an independent PhD researcher at the University of Nottingham

1.1.2 The purpose of the research and interviews

1.2. Explain confidentiality and anonymity

1.3. Explain digital voice recording and ask permission to record

1.4. Explain length of interview – about 60 minutes

2. Background Information

2.1. Briefly, what is your role and responsibilities?

2.2. Partnership working:

2.2.1 With respect to working age benefits and UC, which organisations does this organisation work with?

2.2.2   Why do you work together?

2.2.3   Whether there has been any change in the nature of partnership working since 2008-09 economic downturn? If so, what are the changes?

2.2.4   If so, what are the factors that drive these changes?

2.2.5   Has UC affected partnership relationships? If so, what are the changes?

2.2.6   If so, what are the factors that drive these changes?

2.3.   About working age benefit clients:

2.3.1   Why do they visit the organisations, with respect to benefits?

2.4.   Overview of local labour market trends:

2.4.1   Broadly what have been the key local labour market trends in [A or B] since the 2008-09 economic downturn?

2.4.2   Who are the main employers in (A or B)? How important are SMEs to the local jobs market?

2.4.3   Are local jobs well paid? Can you estimate the percentage of job vacancies which would pay people above the national living wage?

3. Experiences and opinions of participants in terms of factors affecting their working age clients pre- and post- Universal Credit

3.1. Pre - Universal Credit, what were the factors that hindered clients:

3.1.1   claiming benefit

3.1.2   reporting changes in circumstances

3.1.3   moving off benefit into employment?

3.2.   Pre - Universal Credit, what were the factors that helped clients:

3.2.1   claiming benefit

3.2.2   reporting changes in circumstances

3.2.3   moving off benefit into employment?

3.3.   Post - Universal Credit, what are the factors that hinder clients:

3.3.1   claiming UC

3.3.2   reporting changes in circumstances for UC

3.3.3   moving off UC into employment?

3.4   Post - Universal Credit, what are the factors that help clients:

3.4.1   claiming UC

3.4.2   reporting changes in circumstances for UC

3.4.3   moving off UC into employment ?

3.5   What is/are the most important of the factors you have just mentioned for Universal Credit's influence on clients? Why?

4.   Opinions of participants on conditionality and sanctions pre- and post- Universal Credit

4.1. In your view has the UC sanctions policy and changes introduced in 2012 for other benefits, lead to any changes in recipients' behaviour or attitudes? Why do you say that?

4.2. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the current sanction regimes? Why do you say that?

5.   Decision making process

5.1.   Has Universal Credit led to an improvement in processing time compared to the previous system?

5.1.1.   Do you know how long on average does it take to process new claims? Please provide estimates pre- and post- UC?

5.1.2.   If an improvement - What is/are the factors that drive this change?

5.2 Has UC led to a change in the quality of JCP decision making? Why do you say that?

5.2.1.   If change - What are the factors influencing a change in the quality of decision making?

6.   Assessment of Universal Credit

6.1   Strengths and weakness of Universal Credit:

6.1.1   What are the strengths and weakness of Universal Credit, with regard to its influences on claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviours?

7. Others

7.1.   Any other issues to be raised by participants

7.2.   Many thanks for their participation

7.3.   Inform participants how they can access the study findings

7.4.   Is there anyone else that should be interviewed?

Part 2.

Research aims:

This study aims to explore

- recipients' experiences of seeking and obtaining information and advice from Local Authorities, Jobcentre Plus and advice centres pre- and post- UC;

- any changes in seeking and obtaining information and advice from Local Authorities, Jobcentre Plus and advice centres pre- and post- UC;

- recipients' experiences of benefits claiming; reporting personal circumstance; and making employment-related decisions pre- and post- UC;

- any changes to recipients' benefit claiming; reporting personal circumstances and making employment-related behaviours pre- and post- UC

Study Population:

UC recipients (out-of-work; in-work) who have claimed Jobseeker's Allowance or Income Support; Employment and Support Allowance; Working Tax Credit; Child Tax Credit; or/and Housing Benefit pre-UC

1.   Introduction:

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1 Self-introduction: an independent PhD researcher at the University of Nottingham

1.1.2   The purpose of the research and interviews

1.2.   Explain confidentiality and anonymity

1.3.   Explain digital voice recording and ask permission to record

1.4.   Explain the length of interview – about 60 minutes

2.   Background Information

2.1   Benefits claiming information: Pre– UC: Have you ever claimed benefits? If so, which benefits and approximately when did you last claim benefit? If in a couple, was this a joint claim?

2.1.1   Benefit claiming pre – UC: Did you claim any benefits via telephone and/or face-to-face since 2008/9?

2.1.2   In terms of benefit claiming process, was it easy or difficult? Why?

2.1.3 Whether you have experienced any problems claiming benefit? If so, what were these?

2.1.4 Recipients' assessment of the pros and cons of past benefit claiming methods/processes?

2.1.5 Reasons for claiming [named benefit(s)]

2.2 Post- UC: When did you first claim UC? Are you currently claiming UC? [How many claims for UC have you made?] If in a couple, is this a joint claim?

2.2.1 Benefit claiming post – UC: Have you claimed UC online and/or by telephone?

2.2.2 In terms of benefit claiming process, is claiming UC easier or more difficult than it used to be? Why?

2.2.3 Whether you have experienced any problems claiming UC? If so, what are these?

2.2.4 Recipients' assessment of pros and cons of Universal Credit claiming methods/processes?

2.2.5 Do you know which allowances you (are receiving/received) within UC?

2.2.6 Reasons for claiming UC

2.2.7 Do you claim or/and receive other benefits? If so, which benefits?

2.3 Reporting circumstances change pre- and post- UC:

2.3.1 Pre- UC: Have your circumstances changed since 2008/9?

2.3.2 What was/were the change?

2.3.3 Have you reported your circumstances change since 2008/09?

2.3.4 If so, which methods did you use pre- UC?

2.3.5 Is it easy or difficult? Why?

2.3.6 Whether you have experienced any problems reporting your circumstances change? If so, what is/are this/these?

2.3.7 What is your assessment of pros and cons of this method?

2.3.8 Post- UC: Have your circumstances changed post- UC?

2.3.9 What is/are the change?

2.3.10 Have you reported your circumstances change post- UC?

2.3.11 If so, which methods do you use post- UC?

2.3.12 Is it easier or more difficult than it used to be? Why?

2.3.13 Whether you have experienced any problems reporting your circumstances change? If so, what is/are this/these?

2.3.14 What is your assessment of pros and cons of this method?

2.4   Overview of employment activity

2.4.1   Summary of claimant's (or/and partner) employment history since 2008/9 recession:

Currently out-of-work recipient: How long is your unemployment duration before claiming Universal Credit?

Currently in-work recipient: How many hours do [you /your partner] work per week before claiming Universal Credit?

2.4.2   Are you better off, the same or worse off under UC compared to pre-UC? Has the amount you in benefit changed as a result of UC? If yes, could you tell me how much amount of benefits do you lose/gain per week? Do you know why it has changed?

2.4.3 Do you understand how your benefits have been calculated under UC?

3. Recipients' experiences of changes in information and advice from Local Authorities (LAs), Jobcentre Plus (JCP), Advice Centres

3.1   Before UC was introduced, have you ever sought information and advice from anyone? What were your pre- UC experiences of asking for information and advice:

3.1.1   For the last time you sought information or advice from Local Authorities, Jobcentre Plus, or/and Advice Centres pre- UC, who did you contact?

3.1.2   Can I check did you look online for information or advice?

3.1.3   Why did you seek information and advice on this occasion?

3.1.4   How often did you contact with them?

3.1.5   How easy or difficult was it to find the appropriate person to talk to?

3.1.6   To what extent did you feel satisfied with the response? Why do you say that? Did it meet your expectations held before the discussions?

3.2   Since UC was introduced, have you ever sought have sought information and advice from anyone? What are your post- UC experiences of asking for information and advice:

3.2.1   For the last time you seek information or advice from Local Authorities, Jobcentre Plus, or/and Advice Centres post- UC, who do you contact?

3.2.2   Can I check have you looked online for information or advice?

3.2.3   Why do you seek information and advice on this occasion?

3.2.4   How often do you contact with them?

3.2.5   How easy or difficult is it to find the appropriate person to talk to?

3.2.6   To what extent do you feel satisfied with the response? Why do you say that? Does it meet your expectations held before the discussions?

3.3   What is your assessment of effectiveness of information and advice post- and pre- UC respectively? Why do you say that?

4   Experiences of working incentives and decision-making on employment pre- and post- Universal Credit

4.1   Recipients' employment behaviours since 2008/9:

4.1.1 How many hours approximately did you spend in job searching per week?

4.1.2 [If been in paid work since 2008/9]: For the last job you obtained, what method(s) did you use to find that job?

4.1.3 What do you see as the factors that influence whether someone gets paid work? What are the barriers and bridges to get paid work?

4.1.4 For your last job pre-UC, what sort of factors influenced your decision about whether to take it or not?

4.1.5 How satisfied are/were you with your pre- UC employment and pay? Why?

4.2   recipients' employment behaviours post- UC:

4.2.1 Since you claimed UC have you changed how you look for paid work? Why? Are you currently look for a new job? Why?

4.2.2 If looking for work since UC claim, how many hours approximately do/did you spend in job searching per week?

4.2.3 [If been in paid work post- UC]: For the last job you obtained post- UC, what method(s) do/did you use to find that job?

4.2.4 What do you see as the factors that influence whether someone gets paid

work post- UC? What are the barriers and bridges to get paid work?

4.2.5 For your last job post-UC, what sort of factors influenced your decision about whether to take it or not?

4.2.6 How satisfied are you with your [current/most recent post-UC] employment and payment? Why?

4.2.7 To what extent of UC influence your employment-related decision-making so far?

5. Experiences and opinions of sanctions and conditionality

5.1 If experiences of being sanctioned pre – or/and post - Universal Credit:

5.1.1. When were you sanctioned? Whether it happened pre and/or post 2012/UC?

5.1.2. What are/were the reasons for being sanctioned?

5.1.3. How much and how long was/is the sanction?

5.1.4. What happened then?

5.1.5. Did you seek to appeal the sanction? If yes, what happened?

5.2 What is your view about whether sanctions encourage people to move off benefit into employment or change how they look for work? Why?

6. Understanding of Universal Credit

6.1 Assessment of Universal Credit

6.1.1 What are the strengths and weakness of Universal Credit compared to what you experienced prior to Universal Credit?

7. Others

7.1 Any other issues to be raised by participants

7.2 Many thanks for their participation

7.3 Inform participants how they can access the study findings

7.4 Is there anyone else that should be interviewed?

Participant Information Sheet

What is the effect of Universal Credit?

Invitation
I am Shuo Fei, a PhD student at Nottingham University and I would be grateful if you would take part in my research, which explores how Universal Credit operates in practice for claimants and staffs.

Whether or not you take part is your choice. If you don't wish to take part, you don't have to give a reason. If you do take part, you can withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason.

If you agree to participate in my research, you will be asked to sign a consent form confirming that you understand what the research is about, your role in it and agree to the terms of participation. You will be provided with a copy of both this Participant Information Sheet and the Consent Form to keep.

Please feel free to ask any questions before making your decision whether to participate in the research.

Why have I been chosen?
You have been selected because of your likely insights and experience of how Universal Credit operates. Your participation will enable me to develop a better understanding of how Universal Credit works.

What kind of information will be sought?
You will be asked about your past and present experiences and opinions of working age benefits and Universal Credit.

What will happen if I participate?
The interview will be in public settings at site A/B in South London and the interview will last for no more than 60 minutes. There are no other commitments associated with participating. I wish to record the interview but will not do so without your permission. I will provide £20 towards travel expenses and inconvenience for taking part in my research.

Will my participation in this research be kept anonymous and confidential?
Yes. My research has been approved by Nottingham University Research Ethics Committees. All data will be stored in anonymous form and be password protected and securely stored; and will eventually be destroyed in line with University policy. All data collected about you will be kept strictly anonymous and confidential.

Findings including any quotations will be cited without identifying their source, e.g. 'an official commented that…'; 'a UC claimant suggested that…'.

What are the possible benefits of participation in this research?

Your participation will help the researcher complete her PhD research, which is on claimants' experiences of legacy benefits and Universal Credit.

What will happen to the results of the research?

The main output of the research will be my PhD thesis. If you are interested, I will be happy to provide you with a summary of my findings when my PhD is completed. This research may also be used to produce academic conference papers and articles.

Whom shall I contact if something goes wrong?

If you have any complaints or concerns about the research, please in the first instance contact the researcher: Shuo Fei (Shuo.Fei1@nottingham.ac.uk/Tel: 0745 988 1423), or her supervisors: Professor Bruce Stafford (bruce.stafford@nottingham.ac.uk/Tel: 0115 846 7439); and Dr. Simon Roberts (simon.roberts@nottingham.ac.uk/Tel: 0115 846 7767). If this does not resolve the matter to your satisfaction then please contact the School's Research Ethics Officer, Dr. Alison Mohr (alison.mohr@nottingham.ac.uk /Tel: 0115 846 8151).

Thank you for taking time to read this Participant Information Sheet and considering whether to take part!

Consent Form

School of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Nottingham

Participant Consent Form

Research Title: To what extent does Universal Credit modify claimants' benefit and employment-related behaviours?

In signing this consent form I confirm that:

I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the research project has been explained to me.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I have had the opportunity to ask questions.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw from the research project at any stage, without having to give any reason and withdrawing will not penalise or disadvantaged me in any way.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that the researcher may be required to report to the authorities any significant harm to a child/young person (up to the age of 18 years) that he/she becomes aware of during the research. I agree that such harm may violate the principle of confidentiality.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I agree that extracts from the interview may be anonymously quoted in any report or publication arising from the research.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that the interview will be recorded using electronic voice recorder.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that data will be securely stored.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that the information provided can be used in other research projects which have ethics approval, but that my name and contact information will be removed before it is made available to other researchers.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I understand that I may contact the researcher or supervisor if I require further information about the research, and that I may contact the Research Ethics Officer of the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint relating to my involvement in the research.	Yes ☐	No ☐
I agree to take part in the above research project.	Yes ☐	No ☐

Participant's name (BLOCK CAPITAL)	Participant's signature	Date

Researcher's name (BLOCK CAPITAL)	Researcher's signature	Date

Screening Questionnaire

Please answer these questions by putting a tick (√) in the appropriate box for each question. Thank you.

1. Age:

□ 16-24

□ 25-49

□ 50+

□ None of these

□ I prefer not to say

2. Gender:

□ Female

□ Male

□ I prefer not to say

3. Which option can describe your current family type?

□ Single, no child dependant

□ Single, with child dependant (s)

□ Couple, no child dependant

□ Couple, with child dependant (s)

□ I prefer not to say

If you choose **Couple, no child dependant**, or **Couple, with child dependant**, which option can describe you:

□ First earner

□ Second earner

□ Others, please identify

_____

□ I prefer not to say

If you describe yourself as **Single, no child dependant**; or **Single, with child dependant (s)**; or **Second earner, no child dependant**; or **Second earner, with child dependant (s) in couple families**, please answer question 4 and 5.

4. Have you claimed Universal Credit?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, when do you claim Universal Credit, and how many claims have you made?

Did you claim UC online and/or by telephone?

___

5. Have you claimed other benefits pre - Universal Credit since 2008/9?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, when did you last claim benefit?

___

What is/are the name (s) of benefits last claimed?

___

Did you claim via telephone and/or face-to-face?

___

If you have claimed Universal Credit **and** at least any one of following benefit and tax credit, please answer questions 6 and 7.

Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance

Housing Benefit

Working Tax Credit

Child Tax Credit

Income Support

6. Have you (or/and your partner) sought information or/and advice from Local Authority, Jobcentre Plus or any advice centre **pre** - Universal Credit since 2008/9?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, what is/are the names of agencies that you (or/and your partner) sought information or/and advice last time?

7. Have you (or/and your partner) sought information or/and advice from Local Authority, Jobcentre Plus or any advice centre **post** - Universal Credit?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, what is/are the names of agencies that you (or/and your partner) sought information or/and advice last time?

If you answer **Yes** to questions 6 **and** 7, please answer questions 8, 9, and 10.

8. Has your family type changed during since 2008/9?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, please identity when and what was/were the change (s):

_____

___

9. Which option can describe your current employment status?

□ Not in employment

  please identify how long is the

duration:_____

  please identify how long hours do you spend in job searching per week

_____

___

□ In employment,

  please identify weekly working hours on

average:_____

□ other, please identify

_____

□ I prefer not to say

10. Has your employment status changed during since 2008/9?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, please briefly summary when and what was/were the change (s):

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11. Have you reported your circumstances change to Jobcentre Plus since 2008/9?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I prefer not to say

If yes, what methods do you use?

Thank you for taking time to complete this research questionnaire. You may be invited into this research interview if you have answered all these questions. We will contact you soon.

Decline Email From DWP on my interview request

'Dear Shuo Fei

Thank you for your email and letter. I am sorry that DWP are not able to support your request to carry out data collection.
Unfortunately DWP has strict guidelines on independent researchers seeking to interview work coaches, so on this occasion it will not be possible for you to undertake this research directly with any Jobcentre Plus staff.

I wish you every success with your PHD and on going studies.'

Regards
Carol
Carol Bailey | Business Manager | Department for Work and Pensions