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The Reason/Emotion Dualism in Western Political Thought and Psychiatric Practice

Alex Serafimov

4255416

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Introduction

Prologue

At the height of the Second World War, in 1943, Disney released perhaps its most remarkable propaganda film, the Oscar-nominated *Reason and Emotion* (IMDb 2019). 'Each one of us is equipped with the ability to think, known as Reason,' its narrator tells us, 'and the ability to feel, known as Emotion' (Roberts 1943).[1] It begins with a look inside the cranium of Junior, a young child. As the narrator explains, 'in the undeveloped mind of a child there is only Emotion'. In Junior's head is Emotion, a red-haired[2] little caveman wrapped in leopard skin – read, a hot-headed savage. Emotion 'has the whole place to himself. He can do as he pleases because Reason isn't born yet'. In the mind of the child, therefore, 'Emotion is complete dictator and has control over the child'. In this way, Emotion, who 'loves adventure and excitement', leads Junior into such mishaps as violently pulling a cat's tail, and tumbling down the stairs. While Junior cries at the bottom of the stairs, Reason suddenly comes into existence in his mind. With a large forehead and round glasses, little Reason wags his finger at Emotion and declares that 'Had I been here sooner, this would never have happened'. Emotion tries to assert that he is 'the boss around here', to which Reason knowingly replies, 'Time will tell'. So, the narrator concludes, 'The battle for mastery is on'.

In the next scene Junior has grown up 'into an average normal male'. Reason and Emotion, too, have matured. Sitting up front, steering and manipulating pedals, is Reason, now wearing a three-piece suit. Sitting in the back, Emotion, still wrapped in skins, is looking bored with his spiked club resting against the back of the cranium. As the narrator says, 'Reason seems to be in the driver's seat with Emotion under control in the rear'. However, walking past an attractive woman in the street one day, Emotion can no longer control himself and, clubbing Reason on the head, jumps into the driver's seat and does a screeching U-turn towards her. Making a crude come-on, Emotion earns the man a slap. 'And that's what you get for not listening to Reason!', the narrator chimes in.

The narrator now moves in for a closer look inside the cranium of the woman in the street, borrowing her 'pretty head', as he puts it. There are found the woman's Reason and Emotion. Reason, primly dressed, with a hat and glasses, is in the driver's seat. Emotion, again

[1] All subsequent quotations from *Reason and Emotion* are taken from Roberts 1943.
[2] Red hair has sometimes been associated with a quick temper and emotionality.

red-haired, sits bored behind Reason but is this time dressed in what would have then been considered a scandalously low-cut, strapless pink dress. 'You shouldn't have slapped him', Emotion complains, 'He was cute'. 'Remember, we're a lady', chides Reason, to the annoyance of Emotion, who is 'tired of being a lady' and proposes they 'have some fun' and go out to eat. In the ensuing argument, Reason proposes that they should order something sensible. 'Think of our figure… Remember, we're on a diet!', she pleads. Emotion pulls Reason's hair, slaps her away, and takes control of the wheel. Running around the cranium looking at charts labelled 'Chin', 'Profile', and 'Figure', Reason is horrified as she witnesses the woman becoming ever fatter. 'And here again', the narrator intones, 'you have the evidence that uncontrolled Emotion can cause you much trouble', this time with a peculiarly sexist spin.

In these ways it is shown what can happen when emotion comes to tyrannise reason. However, this is only one, more humorous, side of the equation. As a piece of wartime propaganda, *Reason and Emotion* has more ambitious goals. Showing a sequence of alarming headlines including 'JAPS BOMB' and 'FIFTH COLUMN…', the narrator explains how, 'in these strenuous times, it is more important than ever that we control this conflict between Reason and Emotion'. Now, the film moves on to show another everyman figure, Mr John Doakes, listening intently to the radio as various people spread irrational panic about the war. He becomes increasingly nervous and unsettled until he is pale and quaking with fear. Inside his cranium, Reason and Emotion are fighting over whether the war will be lost, with Reason trying to constrain Emotion from going along with 'hearsay' and using 'judgment' instead. Just before Emotion is about to bash Reason over the head with the steering column he had just ripped out, the narrator interrupts and says, ominously, 'That's right, Emotion. Go ahead. Put Reason out of the way. That's great… fine… *for Hitler*'.

With these words, Emotion drops his weapon, sits down open-mouthed, and listens as the narrator elaborates. 'That master rabble-rouser destroys Reason by preying upon the weakness of Emotion with fear, sympathy, pride, and hate just as he did in the minds of the German people'. Peering into the cranium of a man in attendance at one of Hitler's speeches, Reason and Emotion are seen again. This time, Emotion is wearing a spiked helmet, his red hair braided into a ponytail. As a sinister-looking, sharp-toothed Hitler deftly switches between the emotions of fear, sympathy, pride, and hate, Emotion profoundly experiences each emotion in turn. Reason tries to comfort a sobbing Emotion by calling Hitler a liar, but only earns a bash on the head.

In some of the most evocative imagery in the film, as Hitler uses the emotion of pride, Emotion swells to several times his size, while Reason shrinks at the same rate until Emotion

towers over him. An empowered Emotion kicks the enfeebled Reason in the backside and forces him to go along with saluting Hitler, which he half-heartedly does. Finally, when Hitler uses the emotion of fear, an even tinier Reason is encircled by a barbed wire fence, tied to a sign reading 'CONCENTRATION', as a colossal Emotion marches around him, saluting Hitler.

In the climax of the film, goose-stepping Nazis march past ruined buildings as gloomy music plays. 'Yes, it's madness. Reason has been enslaved, while Emotion is the master – a mad Emotion, stripped of all Reason leaving nothing but ruin in its wake'. There is a solution, however. The music swells heroically as the viewer peers into the cranium of a chiselled American bomber pilot. As the narrator concludes,

> You, Reason, your job is to think, to plan, to discriminate. And you, Emotion, to be a fine, strong Emotion. An Emotion that loves his country, his freedom, his life, and together you must be grimly determined to fight against all odds. With Reason firmly in the driver's seat handling the controls along the difficult course to victory and with Emotion by his side we will go on and do the job we've set out to do and we'll do it right!

Reason and Emotion in Western Political Thought and Psychiatric Practice

Although humorous and exaggerated, *Reason and Emotion* does speak to some influential ideas in the Western conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. It touches on a number of familiar themes in Western political thought including how children are yet-to-be rational creatures, how reason and emotion wage a battle in the mind, how reason should be in charge and how disaster strikes when the emotions take over, how the management of the emotions is the domain of public policy, and how people should beware emotion-manipulating demagogues. Furthermore, it does not counsel the complete obliteration of emotion, but the proper management and constraint of emotion. Emotion must know its place, as the subordinate of reason, and it must be channelled towards "acceptable" outlets like the patriotism.

Indeed, among the models of human nature developed in Western political thought, a view of the human mind as characterised by the interaction of conflicting parts, elements, or faculties has been very influential. Some have gone so far as to call it 'foundational' (Maiz 2011, 29). The most common variant of this view argues that there is a struggle between

"reason," the conscious ability to think, plan and make logical inferences, and the emotions, often unconscious desires, drives and feelings (Meyer 2000, Hall 2005). Many have noted how reason and emotion have been posed as opposites (Maiz 2011, 30), with emotion seen as 'subversive' to reason and the creation of knowledge (Jagger 1989, 151). Emotions are seen as something unconscious that sweeps the body involuntarily and 'disturbing and blinding, clouding judgement and agitating the mind' (Maiz 2011, 33), as the notion of "passions", from the Latin *pati* or "suffer", indicates (Jagger 1989, 152, Maiz 2011, 33). In this way, emotions are something people suffer, bear, or are subjected to. Thus, because 'emotion distorts, clouds or disturbs reason… it should be kept under control so as to achieve a rational reasonability' (Maiz 2011, 30-1). Maiz claims that Western civilisation has been driving towards a taming of the passions, for the sake of order, progress and the domination of nature (2011, 34; 36).

Important and influential thinkers in the Western political tradition have indeed denigrated the emotions and put reason on a pedestal. As Maiz puts it, for those drawing on the reason/emotion dualism, 'passion is always conceived of as the problem, while reason appears as the only possible solution' (Maiz 2011, 36). Western thinkers develop different solutions to deal with this "problem". However, despite their differences, they all develop answers to this question that involves some agency, either external or internal, dominating, constraining, nurturing or otherwise intervening on the individuals and groups whose passions are seen as constituting the problem. Of course, that is not to say that emotion is seen as playing no positive role or was to be wholly expunged. Emotions are sometimes seen as providing the necessary motivation and drive. Even the Stoics make rare and limited exceptions. Instead, the emotions require proper management and, sometimes, constraint (Jagger 1989, 151-2).

To such ends, every society employs unique "emotion regimes". Emotion regimes prescribe what kind of emotional display is appropriate or desirable in a given situation or context (Reddy 2001, 55; 129). Thus, those labelled as "emotional" and "irrational" (Meyer 2000, Hall 2005) could be denied access to the full suite of rights and privileges granted to normal, rational citizens. Not to mention that in the long history of mental illness, insanity and irrationality were treated as synonymous, with insanity seen as the loss, lack, or opposite of reason (Porter 2003, 165). Moreover, this idea, some have argued, did indeed have its starting point with the Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, and the Sophists (Porter 2003, 35), who began the tradition of posing reason and emotion as antagonists.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, given the long link between insanity and irrationality, just one year before *Reason and Passion* was released, an American neurologist, Walter Freeman and his neurosurgeon collaborator, James Watts, published the key textbook on a radical

surgical procedure for the treatment of mental disorders. Believing that nearly all mental disorders, from schizophrenia to depression and nearly everything in between, are characterised by excessive emotion, they would slice through the pathways linking the emotional and intellectual centres of the brain. The aim: to free the rational part of the brain from incoming emotional excess.

Not long after, in the mid-50s, two psychologists in the United States separately developed similar cognitive and behavioural therapies that would become the leading psychotherapeutic approaches in the Western world. They were Albert Ellis, who developed Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy, and Aaron Beck, who pioneered Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. Although radically different to lobotomy, CBT also sees the mind as characterised by two separate but interacting faculties: reason and emotion. In CBT, reason must be marshalled and properly applied to reduce the unpleasant and excessive emotions which characterise mental distress.

Do lobotomy and cognitive behavioural therapies, then, represent the fulfilment of anti-emotional, pro-rational trends in western political thought? Do they answer the call, coming from some thinkers, to manage, constrain and eradicate problematic and excessive emotions? Do they represent an innovation in the management of the passions that is neither political and social but rather medical? At a cursory glance, these might not seem like such outlandish arguments. However, the reality is not as simple and straightforward as it seems. Therefore, to shine some light on these issues, this thesis answers the following questions.

Main research question

Do Western psychiatric practices that attempt to alter the relationship between reason and emotion in the mind reflect how the relationship between reason and emotion has been conceptualised in Western political thought?

Sub-questions

1) Can Western political conceptions of the relationship between reason and emotion be used to criticise dualistic psychiatric practices like lobotomy and CBT?
2) Do these psychiatric practices harm a person’s ability or willingness to partake in political action?

Thesis Structure and Overview

Part I: The Reason/Emotion Dualism in Western Psychiatric Practice

Chapter 1: Case Study - Lobotomy

This chapter examines the theoretical basis and rationale behind the lobotomy procedure through an analysis of the primary medical literature between the years of 1936 and 1972, the period in which lobotomy was practised. This chapter discusses patient case histories in detail to demonstrate how, and to what ends, the operation was carried out. Lobotomy theory states that excessive emotional charge emanating from the thalamus travels into the frontal lobes and causes disordered thinking and behaviour. If that connection can be physically cut the emotional charge will not "infect" the frontal lobes, and free them to think more clearly, realistically, and rationally. This theory reflects a very dualistic view of the relationship between reason and emotion in the mind/brain. 'Dualistic' being understood in this thesis as a conceptualisation that the mind is divided into two, opposed and contrasting parts, in this case, reason and emotion.

In practice, lobotomy functioned as medical social control, which tried to fit patients into the demands of their era's emotional norms. Also, it seemed, by removing a patient's emotional motivation, to smother their political and ethical enthusiasm.

Chapter 2: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy

This chapter examines the theoretical basis and rationale behind Cognitive Behavioural Therapy through an analysis of the primary and secondary literature, including foundational texts such as Ellis' *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy* (1962) and Beck, et al., *The Cognitive Therapy of Depression* (1979). This chapter discusses how CBT has become the primary form of psychotherapy in at least the US and UK and includes interviews with CBT practitioners, as this is an on-going and widespread form of therapy.

CBT theory states, in an exactly opposite causation to lobotomy theory, that disordered thoughts lead to excessive emotions and unhelpful behaviours. If the patient can be shown the irrationality of their thinking, they can alter their feeling state. Emotions, however, are still the "problem" because excessive and unpleasant emotions are what CBT aims to change.

Part II: The Reason/Emotion Dualism in Western Political Thought

Chapter 3: Managing the Emotions

Chapter 3 thesis examines six thinkers from the Ancient, Medieval and Early-Modern periods. They have a conception of reason and emotion that is very dualistic and calls for emotions to be managed in various ways. Although this view is often expressed, the picture is not as simple as is sometimes thought.

Beginning with Plato's *Republic* (circa 380 BCE), his hugely influential criticism of Athenian democracy is outlined, wherein Plato marshals a theory of human nature based around the tripartite theory of the soul. This, serving as an allegory for social relations within the state, ends in the famous call for rational rule over irrational elements both within the individual soul and between the social groups represented in the state.

Then, moving on to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (circa 350 BCE), his doctrine of the mean is discussed especially in how it concerns the emotions. For Aristotle, legislation and proper upbringing can also create people more able to act according to virtue, and experience and express emotions in a "correct" and "proper" way. Relatedly, he argues that at certain times, and to certain extents, emotions are to be welcomed rather than avoided.

Beginning to look at the first of two Stoics, Seneca's *Moral Letters to Lucilius* (circa 65 CE) is examined. There, Seneca argues that good can only be accomplished, in large part, by living an emotionless life. Not one of moderate emotions, but one *free* of emotions. As he asserts, because the Stoics condemn those who are slaves to their appetites and lusts, the spirit should be freed from the desires of the body. The mind is responsible for all things, and people need to learn how to weather the blows of fate.

Looking at the second Stoic, Epictetus, in his *Discourses* and the *Enchiridion* (circa 108 and 125 CE), his philosophy of personal freedom and independence is elucidated. It is based on forsaking those externals over which people have no control and instead cultivating the one thing which *is* within people's control. Namely, the appropriate use of reason and the correct use of impressions. This means accurately appraising, and acting upon, sensory information so as to grant mental tranquillity, imperturbability, and the ability to cope with whatever the gods decree and fate brings.

Moving on the medieval period, Augustine's *Confessions* (circa 400 CE) is examined. There, Augustine traces his early life of sin to argue that it is a contemptible and un-Godly way

of living and that a good Christian life is one of self-control and temperance. In the *Confessions*, ideas about self-control and internal conflict are central. As Augustine says, the passions are sinful, and emotions can be excessive. However, if a person's will would be well directed, their emotions would be too.

Looking at the Early-Modern period, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651) is discussed. There, he argues that the war of each against all stems from people's passions. Still, Hobbes adds complexity to his view when he argues that although it is the passions which lead people to behave in the barbaric way that characterises the state of nature, it is other passions which help people escape from this condition.

Chapter 4: Rehabilitating the Emotions

Chapter 4 looks at three thinkers from the Early-Modern and Modern periods signal a shift in the conception of the relationship between reason and emotion from earlier periods. An alternative view appears that re-centres emotion as the vital driving force in human nature and denigrates reason.

Beginning by looking at David Hume in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), it is shown how he saw human nature and behaviour as made up of the responses to the multitude of phenomena which cause pain and pleasure. Hume also mounts an attack on the dualism between reason and emotion, even arguing for the primacy of passion in leading not only behaviour in general but moral behaviour. Reason, for Hume, is a mostly inert instrument wielded by the passions for meeting their ends or discerning the factual rightness or wrongness of mental assessments.

Then, elucidating Jean-Jacques Rousseau's arguments in *A Discourse on Inequality* and *Emile: or On Education* (1754 and 1762), it is shown how he understands the original goodness of humanity in the state of nature, criticises reasoning, and argues that modern man is subject to, due to the corrupting effects of society, many fictitious and dangerous passions that go beyond natural and limited self-love. Rousseau also wishes to show how one can guide the development of the passions in Emile to encourage the "correct" passions and sentiments while discouraging the dangerous and false. Rousseau also argues how the passions motivate human behaviour and none of them are harmful if properly mastered.

Moving ahead to look at Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) selected writings in *A Nietzsche Reade*r, Nietzsche argues that people need to nurture or take hold of the passions,

not necessarily to constrain them, so much as to harness their energies. Indeed, he goes to great lengths to criticise people's pretensions of being logical and rational, and their ability to access so-called universal truths. He also attempts to break down distinctions between reason and passion, arguing that the former is not an independent entity, but merely the system of relations between the passions themselves. In the final instance, Nietzsche's Superman is a passionate, aggressive, dominating, and highly driven being.

Chapter 5: Mental Health and the Emotions

In Chapter 5, the final chapter prior to the conclusion, a turn towards treating the emotions in the context of mental health and wellbeing is identified in the Modern period and today. Looking at a further three thinkers, it is shown how during this period, there is a discussion and criticism of how emotions are constrained under the nexus of mental health treatment.

Beginning with an analysis of Sigmund Freud's *Group Psychology* and *Civilization and its Discontents* (1921 and 1930), it is shown how Freud conceptualises civilisation's constraints on people's instinctual drives as a precarious process that leads to negative repercussions, most notably neurosis. Yet, Freud suggests that the alternatives of naked barbarism, unlimited satisfaction of urges, and unrestrained violence are perhaps more troubling. The price to pay for the benefits of civilisation is guilt, and neuroses, with the psychoanalyst well placed to deal with them once they develop. Freud also argues that the repressions necessitated by society are thrown off when individuals join a group. There, the passions are dangerously amplified, while critical faculties are stunted.

Following on from this, Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilisation* (1961) is examined. There Foucault relates a history, spanning from the classical to the modern era, of reason's subjugation of non-reason. He examines how reason has variously understood, subjugated, confined, and medicalised non-reason, while tracing a transformation from a non-medical, to a medical understanding of mental illness. This transformation, for Foucault, has only obscured the always-present moral judgement inherent in the treatment of the mentally ill and their thoughts and conduct.

Finally, this chapter ends with an analysis of Martha Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought* (2001) where she argues that emotions are evaluative and cognitive phenomena. For Nussbaum, emotions are just another sort of thought, one that signals urgency, highlights the importance of something for one's flourishing, and may or may not be correlated with a bodily

change or sensation. Nussbaum's argument is more radical than it seems at first. She is attempting no less than to break down the distinction between reason and emotion almost entirely. She also acknowledges the key role of social construction and child-rearing styles play in emotional formation and makes recommendations as to how societies may nurture positive emotions with greater justice in mind.

Methodology

Introduction

The thesis is written in a concise, clear, and simple style, with block quotations scattered throughout. These quotations allow the reader to engage with the texts examined here without paraphrasing what are already compelling and vividly written passages. Unambiguous statements are largely left to speak for themselves without excessive analysis. Accordingly, this thesis is not only of interest to political theorists and historians of political thought, but invites readers from the mental health fields, especially practitioners. It has much to say about the ideas and assumptions underlying psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practices and wishes to engage practitioners in an overdue discussion between these fields. Having such a discussion will demonstrate that all human practices, including psychiatry and psychotherapy, remain bound to material considerations, culture, context, *and* prevailing ideas about how to organise and order human life. These ideas about how to organise human life have often come from political theorists, and it would be useful for psychiatrists and psychotherapists to engage with this fact.

The method of textual and content analysis is used to examine the various sources in this thesis. This method is a critical examination of any of a variety of "texts" which teases out, among other things, their meaning, purpose, and ideological underpinnings. This uncovers how texts often operate to support dominant groups and interests in society. Furthermore, this method situates the text in its unique political, social and historical context and reveal its unspoken, presumed or "hidden" assumptions (Aitken 2005, 242).

Case Study Selection and Analysis

Case studies describe a series of related events or phenomena sharing a common underlying principle and can, therefore, be used to demonstrate an "ideal-type" of phenomena. Keeping this in mind, the lobotomy procedure and CBT are examined to determine whether they reflect how the relationship between reason and emotion has been conceptualised in Western political thought. The shared underlying principle in lobotomy and CBT is that both therapies treat reason and emotion as separate and conflicting faculties in the mind and aim to modify them. Lobotomy is an excellent and representative case study because it was seen as 'exactly

fulfilling the mission of modern psychiatry' by its supposed ability to 'return the patient to an unskilled job if male, or to domestic work if female' (Pressman 1998, 428). In this way, lobotomy is an ideal example of the theories and methods of twentieth century psychiatry taken to their logical extreme. CBT is also an ideal and representative case study as it is the leading and most widespread psychotherapeutic practice in the Western world today. More generally, psychiatric and psychotherapeutic interventions have been chosen as case studies because these are arguably the key institutions tasked with the management of errant emotion in the world today.

Existing texts on the lobotomy are limited by only looking at the American experience and a small number of cases, a single hospital, or archive. Also, none of these sources have examined the issue of reason and emotion in detail. Joel Braslow's *Mental Ills and Bodily Cures: Psychiatric Treatment in the First Half of the Twentieth Century* (1997) is an instructive, indignant discussion of the hospital records of a Californian psychiatric institution. It demonstrates how harmful bodily interventions, including lobotomy, could be justified as "cures" for mentally "abnormal" individuals. Jack Pressman's *Last Resort: Psychosurgery and the Limits of Medicine* (1998), a large, meticulously researched and detailed text, traces the history and theory behind lobotomy in the United States. Mical Raz's *The Lobotomy Letters: The Making of American Psychosurgery* (2013) is the only text which delves into the correspondence between Walter Freeman and his patients, uncovering the complex and overlapping motivations and issues at play in their relationship. Finally, Jenell Johnson's *American Lobotomy: A Rhetorical History* (2014) examines the history of lobotomy in America, like Pressman's book, but this time through a novel analysis of how lobotomy is portrayed in popular literature and the media, conspiracy theory, and more. These are excellent pieces of research and all are cited numerous times throughout this thesis. Going beyond their limitations, however, this thesis looks at lobotomy literature from the United States, but also the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, and beyond. Furthermore, this thesis is the first text to synthesise political theory and the theory and practice of lobotomy, and seriously examine how lobotomy reflects ideas about the relationship between reason and emotion.

Although modified forms of neurosurgery for mental disorder are still practiced around the world (Stone 2008), including by the British National Health Service (MIND 2018), the lobotomy is a historical phenomenon. Therefore, a current therapy is also worth examining. A contemporary case study will show whether ideas about the relationship between reason and emotion in Western political thought are reflected in ongoing practices. As already said, CBT has been chosen as the second case study because it has gained prominence as the psychological

treatment of choice for most mental health issues. It has become the only state-sanctioned and funded form of psychotherapy in the UK, with most British psychotherapists practising CBT or CBT-informed approaches. Some scholars have gone as far as calling CBT 'the Western world's therapy of choice' (Guilfoyle 2008, 237). The fact CBT is displacing and overtaking every other form of psychotherapy (Guilfoyle 2008, 237) makes it especially important to critically examine. Moreover, there exists only one book which attempts to discuss the links between political theory and CBT. This is Donald Robertson's *The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy* (2010), updated for a second edition in 2019. However, this book is limited by only explaining how CBT reflects Stoic thinking, and does not engage with political theory more generally. Further, it is not so much a critical examination of the philosophical lineage of CBT, but rather an extended argument for how CBT affirms the "common sense" truths supposedly enshrined in Stoic thinking. This is perhaps motivated by Robertson's career as both writer and CBT therapist. Nonetheless, these limitations are an opportunity for this thesis to delve more deeply into what may be the theoretical precursors of CBT theory, and to do so more critically.

It is also worth discussing which potential case studies were omitted from this thesis, and why. For example, another suitable case study might be antidepressants, a chemical therapy, as opposed to a surgical or psychological one, which also aims to change and reduce patients' emotions. It has not been included in this thesis because, as a treatment which is more widespread than CBT, it has garnered significantly more popular and academic interest. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly sharing some of the main findings of the antidepressant literature insofar as it applies to reason and emotion.

For instance, it has been shown that antidepressants, including Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), the most widely prescribed form of antidepressant drug (NHS 2018), cause emotional blunting (Goodwin, et al. 2017). An international study of 1,431 respondents from 31 countries showed that the most commonly reported adverse effect was 'feeling emotionally numb' (71%), with another being 'Reduction in positive feelings' (60%) (Read and Williams 2018). A detailed qualitative study, which involved 38 SSRI users, showed that

> Most participants described a general reduction in the intensity of all the emotions that they experienced, so that all their emotions felt flattened or evened out, and their emotional responses to all events were toned down in some way. Very common descriptions of this phenomenon included feelings of emotions being 'dulled',

> ‘numbed’, ‘flattened’ or completely ‘blocked’, as well as descriptions of feeling ‘blank’ and ‘flat’. A few participants described a more extreme phenomenon, in which they did not experience any emotions at all. Others felt that they often experienced their emotions as thoughts rather than as feelings, as if their emotional experience had become more ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’. Some participants were able rationally to recognise situations in which they should feel a certain way, and yet the actual emotional response was not there or was altered in some way. (Price, Cole and Goodwin 2009, 213)

Moreover, almost all respondents reported a reduction, sometimes extreme, in both the intensity and frequency of their positive emotions. Happiness, enjoyment, excitement, anticipation, passion, love, affection, and enthusiasm are all described as being reduced. As the study goes on to say,

> Some participants felt reduced love or affection towards others and, in particular, reduced attraction towards their partner or reduced feelings of love or pride towards their family. Some participants described reduced passion, zest and enthusiasm for life and its components. (Price, Cole and Goodwin 2009, 213)

All respondents reported the loss of negative emotions, and often described this as beneficial. However, for many respondents, the loss of negative emotions was actually seen as an unwanted side-effect. As the study explains, ‘Participants described the need to be able to feel negative emotions when appropriate, such as grief or concern. Some were unable to respond with negative emotions, such as being unable to cry when this would have been appropriate or respond appropriately to bad news’ (Price, Cole and Goodwin 2009, 213).

It is particularly interesting that the respondents in this study reported that their experiences had become more “cognitive” or “intellectual” but viewed this condition as unwanted and distressing. Often, they intuitively knew, it is right and necessary to experience strong and even negative emotions. This is a warning for those who would think, such as some of the thinkers examined in this thesis, that a state of emotionless rationality would be a desirable one. Nonetheless, it is exactly because such excellent research into the emotionally blunting effects of antidepressants have been carried out, that they are not repeated here in greater detail.

Semi-structured interviews

To try to understand CBT beyond what is readily accessible in manuals and textbooks, interviews have been conducted with four qualified, accredited, and practising CBT therapists in both Nottingham and Chester. These interviews were carried out to shine a light on how CBT is carried out in practice and to give the therapists a chance to challenge, or support, the ways in which CBT is portrayed in the literature. For the purpose of anonymity, these individuals are simply referred to as therapists A, B, C, and D without any gender-specific language. These interviews were semi-structured, meaning that there are predetermined topics and questions which were asked in a specific order. However, when it seemed appropriate, the author digressed from the scheduled questions and topics to probe beyond the answers to these predetermined questions (Berg 2000, 70).

Ethical approval for the interviews was granted in October 2017 by the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham. The interview transcripts, with all identifying information removed, are stored in the author's password-protected Dropbox account. The signed consent forms for the interviews are securely stored at the author's home address. To view the interview transcripts, and ethical approval form, visit tinyurl.com/CBTinterviews and tinyurl.com/ethicalapproval respectively.

Text Selection and Analysis

The texts discussed in this thesis were chosen from the Western canon of political theory for their influence, the fact that they discuss the relationship between reason and emotion, and because they are accessible to non-political theorists. In other words, these texts are not only still widely read, taught, and analysed, but are the writings in which these thinkers discuss their views on the relationship between reason and emotion in the greatest detail. In analysing each political theorist, this thesis does not rely greatly on the secondary literature. Rather, it attempts to give a general overview of how these thinkers understood the relationship between reason and emotion, and allow them to speak for themselves. On the issue of accessibility, this thesis engages with, for example, Augustine's *Confessions* much more fully than his *City of God* because the latter text is much larger and less penetrable. Similarly, this thesis engages with Freud's sociological writings instead of his strictly psychological texts because these sociological texts bridge the divide between his psychological and sociological thinking. They

are also some of his most accessible texts, and, coming late in his life, synthesise many of his main contributions. Further, the works of Spinoza and Kant are not included. Despite their wide-ranging influence, these formidable writings are omitted to keep this thesis accessible to non-political theorists. As will be shown below, these thinkers have already received scholarly attention in existing books on reason and emotion, while many of the thinkers discussed in this thesis have not.

Furthermore, existing books discussing the relationship between reason and emotion, or the role of passions in political theory, have limitations which this thesis overcomes. For example, Cheryl Hall's *The Trouble with Passion: Political Theory Beyond the Reign of Reason* (2005), while arguing convincingly that emotion is necessary in both driving and sustaining political motivation, only examines the writings of Plato, Rousseau, and a handful of feminist theorists, particularly Audre Lorde. Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano, and Daniela Coli's edited volume, *Politics and the Passions, 1500-1850* (2006), while bringing together excellent contributions from scholars such as Judith Butler, only examines thinkers over this limited time period. More recently, Paul Ginsborg and Sergio Labate's *Passion & Politics* (2018), examines the role of passions in political discourse and action from the ancient period to today, but only looks at the writings of Hobbes, Descartes, and Spinoza in detail. These books examine their chosen thinkers in significantly greater detail than this thesis. Nonetheless, no existing writings have attempted to examine such a variety or number of thinkers, neither do they discuss trends in thinking about the relationship between reason and emotion over time, or analyse case studies from psychiatry and psychotherapy.

Meanwhile, texts from neuroscience and psychology have examined what they believe are the neural and psychological bases for reason and emotion. However, they have done so with no, or only a very cursory glance, at the political theory literature. For example, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (1994) shows, using experimental data from living subjects, that emotional and rational processes in the brain are inextricably linked and damage to one necessarily impairs the other. Damasio makes it clear that the traditional and still influential view that emotion interferes with reasoning is deeply flawed and scientifically illiterate. However, despite its title, this book does not seriously engage with Descartes' work, nor of any other philosopher. Instead, Descartes is more of a representative, an 'emblem' in Damasio's words, for dualistic thinking about both mind and body, and reason and emotion (1994, 247). In the same year, psychologists Richard and Bernice Lazarus' *Passion & Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions* (1994), was released. It argues that the emotions are not, as European and Americans are apt to think, independent

from or in opposition to reason. Instead, the two researchers show, emotions are in themselves rational and predicable reactions to people's experiences (Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, 10). However, this book does not engage with political theory in any meaningful way, and treats dualistic ideas about the relationship between reason and emotion as widespread and influential without interrogating their origin. This is another opportunity for this thesis to fill a gap in the literature by combining insights from political theory with case studies drawn from psychiatry and psychotherapy, and tracing their potential intellectual influences.

Contribution and Relevance

Scholars in a great variety of fields, from feminism to neuroscience, have criticised the theoretical basis of reason and rationality as exclusionary categories which are biased in favour of dominant social groups, while also challenging the reason/emotion dualism (Maiz 2011, 43). However, less work has been done on investigating how these categories have been reflected in actual practices. This thesis fills this gap in the literature by providing a novel investigation into the reason/emotion dualism rooted in a discussion of real-world practices, while also making an explicit criticism of this dualism.

Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis is a more comprehensive study of the reason/emotion dualism than has been attempted to date, utilising two different, but related, case studies. Moreover, those philosophers who have taken an interest in the relationship between reason and emotion, from Plato to the present day, have not been very concerned with the practical implication of their arguments beyond advocating for utopian states or intrusive and authoritarian legislative change. Even more importantly, they have not been interested in the practical and therapeutic implications of their basic assumptions. Namely, what kind of practical attempts might be made to intervene in the relationship between reason and emotion in individual people. Thus, this thesis looks at the attempts to directly redress "imbalances" of emotion and reason in individuals labelled as emotional and irrational, and how this reflects conceptions developed in Western political thought.

Overall, what this thesis accomplishes is combining the disparate fields of psychiatry and psychotherapy, and political theory, because each has something to say to the other. In other words, this thesis brings these literatures together in such a way that the discussion of each sheds light on the other. This is particularly important because the literature on lobotomy and CBT makes assumptions about the relationship between reason and emotion, often

uncritically, without articulating and defending them in any great detail, or acknowledging their potential influences. This is despite the theorists of CBT cursorily paying homage to the Stoics. In this sense, lobotomists, and at least some CBT theorists and therapists, are not aware of or do not acknowledge the fact that their theoretical justifications and practices rest upon assumptions about the relationship between reason and emotion already expressed in Western political thought. Accordingly, this thesis invites psychiatrists, psychotherapists, and other mental health professionals to examine their own practices in light of debates in political theory. These professionals are reminded that their fields, like all others, are politically and philosophically informed. Despite the appearance of scientific objectivity that psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practices possess, they are still created and operate within certain material, social, cultural, and intellectual contexts. An engagement with this fact would benefit both their own practices, and their patients.

Part I: The Reason/Emotion Dualism in Western Psychiatric Practice

Chapter 1: Case Study - Lobotomy

1.1. Introduction

In 1942, the American neurologist Walter Freeman and his neurosurgeon collaborator James Watts published the highly influential (Raz 2013, 6) 'standard book in the field' (Kalinowsky and Hoch 1952, 215) on a radical surgical procedure for the treatment of mental disorder. They called it prefrontal lobotomy. The lobotomy, and operations like it, would be carried out on over 50,000 people in North America by 1954 (Gostin and Bridges 1980, 149) and around 15,000 in the UK alone by 1957 (Sargant 1957, 69, Sargant 1962, 1197). The operation was in use from 1936 to the mid-1960s (Johnson, Thinking with the Thalamus: Lobotomy and the Rhetoric of Emotional Impairment 2011, 186).

The aims and outcomes of lobotomy were understood through the lens of the leading theory of mental health and illness of its time, Adolf Meyer's maladjustment hypothesis. This theory, as will be explained, conflated mental distress in the individual with a threat to the social order, and saw the performance of one's various, gendered roles, in accordance with societal norms, as a sign of good mental health and "adjustment." Lobotomy medicalised deviant behaviour, "abnormal" thoughts, and "inappropriate" emotions which did not accord with social norms, which are 'statements that regulate behavior' by providing rules for appropriate conduct in the social world (Chriss 2013, 43). Medicalization, meanwhile, is 'the process by which personal, and social problems are redefined as psychiatric or medical problems' (Chriss 2013, 82). Accordingly, lobotomy is

> arguably the limit case of the medicalization of emotion. As emotion is medicalized, old binaries and hierarchies (reason/emotion, weak emotion/strong emotion, negative emotion/positive emotion) are subsumed under the dominant medical binary of normal/pathological, and intense emotion, negative emotions, and, to a certain extent, emotion itself become characterized as impairments to be remedied by medical intervention. (Johnson, Thinking with the Thalamus: Lobotomy and the Rhetoric of Emotional Impairment 2011, 186-7)

Medicalisation sees the application of scientific and medical knowledge and techniques to "fix" these deviancies (Chriss 2013, 98). Lobotomy is an excellent example of one of the myriad

ways such power is exercised over the human body (Foucault 1984, 182). In this case, with the aim of altering the relationship between reason and emotion in the minds of patients.
To examine these issues, this chapter first looks at Adolf Meyer and the theory of adjustment, which places the lobotomy in a theoretical context. Then, it moves on to look at how the lobotomy procedure, by reducing the autonomy of the patient and rendering them suggestible, opened up space for personality restructuring. Then, it examines how lobotomy aimed to reconfigure the relationship between reason and emotion in the mind and encouraged patients, now more suggestible, to take on a more "appropriate" and less "excessive" emotional expression. Lastly, before concluding, this chapter looks at the various ways in which political thought and behaviour were policed by lobotomy. Through an analysis of numerous patients who were subjected to a lobotomy, the chapter contends that patients were often targeted with therapeutic intervention due to their political beliefs and actions with the expressed aim of decreasing their political enthusiasm.

1.2. Adolf Meyer and Adjustment

The theories of Adolf Meyer, the Swiss-born American pathologist and psychiatrist, were the most influential at the time when lobotomy was developed and practiced. Freeman and Watts, and most other lobotomists, relied on Meyer's concepts in assessing the aims and outcomes of the lobotomy (Raz 2013, 118). Meyer's theory of mental health and illness, psychobiology, was a move away from a disease-centred model, and instead spoke of maladaptation or maladjustment (Pressman 1998, 20). Adjustment is the 'measure of the soundness of fit between an organism's capabilities and the demands of its immediate environment' (Pressman 1998, 223).

So, for Meyer, mental illness was not merely a structural defect in the body or brain, 'but a lowering of the individual's ability to function in the struggle for existence' of which successful social relations are an essential part (Pressman 1998, 20). In a good summary of this ethos, British psychiatrists Sargant and Slater write how

> in the great majority of patients who come our way, we cannot single out any specific pathogenic agent. A breakdown in social adaptation has occurred with the appearance of a variety of symptoms, and only because… the patient has not been able to bear up

> against stresses, mainly social and psychological, which are no different in kind, though perhaps in degree, from what we all have to support. (1972, 6)

Indeed, with the Meyerian approach, searching for the precise psychological or physiological defect was not necessary, 'Instead, what mattered was simply to promote a better functional relationship between the individual and the environmental challenges posed by family, employer, and society' (Pressman 1998, 222).

Meyer was heavily influenced by the functionalist school in sociology which sees society as a complex organism composed of 'differentiated social roles and institutions' whose 'collective health depended upon the ability and willingness of each citizen to fulfil these necessary functions' (Pressman 1998, 20-1). Indeed, society's evolution was considered as 'dependent upon the ability of each citizen to perform his or her respective duties' (Pressman 1998, 431) and the goal of therapy became the 're-establishing an individual's ability to fulfil' these duties (Pressman 1998, 428). As Pressman says, 'For Meyer, then, mental disorder could be seen as an 'individual's social failure', their inability to be a 'good citizen' (1998, 21). In this way, in this new era of psychiatry, 'Scientists, physicians, social reformers and the public' all looked to psychiatry to restore 'unproductive and suffering individuals to society as fully functioning citizens' (Pressman 1998, 45)

At this time, psychiatric therapy often had as its aim 'social adjustment' which meant encouraging patients 'to adopt "appropriate" social roles' (Roth and Lerner 1974, 802). This radical expansion of the psychiatrist's role would mean, Pressman argues, that psychiatrists now took on the dual responsibility of not only maintaining individual health but the health of the wider social body (1998, 21). Accordingly, 'The mentally ill were not just the disturbed but those who were disturbing; the mission of the new psychiatrist was to intervene whenever a maladjusted person threatened the social order' (Pressman 1998, 223). Keeping this in mind is key to understanding the cases discussed in this chapter, as well as lobotomy's dual goal of alleviating mental suffering and encouraging individuals to take up their expected social roles and "feel" in accordance with their society's emotion regime.

Along similar lines, Mariette Meier says that after the Second World War, 'concepts of normality dominated according to which an individual was to adapt, to subject themselves to goals concerning the whole of society, and to function in the interests of the collective' (Meier 2009, 362). Further, because conceptions of health, disease, mental disorders and clinical interventions at this time were underpinned by 'socially determined and culturally binding concepts of order' (Meier 2009, 354), it becomes clear how the post-war order shaped

lobotomy. As Meier summarises, 'The goal of psychosurgical intervention was thus to make patients once again adapt to the order inside and outside the asylum... for which work and the ability to earn a living, but also the amount of supervision required and community life in the clinic played a central role' (Meier 2009, 361-2). As Freeman and Watts themselves candidly put it,

> The crucial decision must be made in each case as to whether a portion of the brain possessing some of the noblest functions of the personality must be sacrificed in order to restore the individual to a more effective existence. (Freeman and Watts, Psychosurgery: Intelligence, Emotion and Social Behavior Following Prefrontal Lobotomy for Mental Disorders 1942, 214)

Accordingly, the way various lobotomy studies define improvement, cure, and related concepts is of crucial importance. The lobotomists definition of "cure" reveals how social adjustment was at the heart of quantifying the aims and outcomes of the operation, and how it was common for studies to divide patients into categories based on their degree of social adjustment. A large study, discussing 503 lobotomies in Rochester (Minn.) State Hospital, explains how

> By "social adjustment" is meant that the patient has been dismissed from the hospital and *has returned to his or her place in society*. The patients classified as "much improved" may be either in or out of the hospital. If they are out of the hospital, they are still in need of guidance and some supervision. If they remain in the hospital, they require but little supervision, and usually they are good workers. By "slightly improved" is meant that the patient is more pleasant, less disturbed, and in better contact with reality than he was before the leukotomy.[3] The term "not improved" is self-explanatory' (Petersen, et al. 1955, 774, emphasis added).

Similarly, another large study noted that 'Social behaviour was analysed in 958 patients' with the results being: 'unchanged, 244; milder in behaviour or psychosis, 295; coöperative 166; living as citizens, 242; worse, 11. Changes in violent or difficult behaviour

[3] Leukotomy is another term for lobotomy, favoured, for example, in the UK. It is also occasionally spelled leucotomy.

and in habit of work were analysed in all cases where relevant information was given….' with 'Habit of work' mentioned in 115 cases, 95 of which were reported to have 'Gained', with only 1 'Lost' and 19 'Unchanged' (Prefrontal Leucotomy: Report on 1000 Cases 1947, 266). Or even more clearly, another study explains that 'By good result is meant that the patient not only is out of the hospital but is actively engaged in some type of useful activity, earning a living, keeping house, or going to school' (Freeman 1953, 490-1).

Accordingly, lobotomies were rarely performed solely for the benefit of the suffering patient. A key part of justifying and carrying out a lobotomy was when the social good or social order was at stake. As one source put it, 'our attitude is pragmatic…. We are more concerned with social adjustment and ability to work than with insight and ability to discuss personal problems' (Watts and Freeman 1948, 229). As another source said, the 'exhibition of behaviour which society is unable to tolerate' lends itself to psychosurgery which can 'permit the patient a more satisfactory adjustment to himself or his environment' (Field, Rollin and Watts 1973, 594). Or, as a critical commentator put it, 'the operation appears to be performed to modify behaviour when faced with continually unacceptable social conduct' (Gostin and Bridges 1980, 150). It is no wonder that Foucault claimed that doctors have come to function as 'programmers of a well-ordered society' (1984, 284).

Some study authors classified operative outcomes as to whether an 'institutional' or 'social' recovery was attained, although this was defined in various ways (see Malone 1947, 574; Ström-Olsen and Tow 1949, 87). As to what a social recovery entails, one study explains how 'Under "status" it is the social level and adaptation which are graded. "Social recovery" implies that the patient is living in his own home, at ease with his family; that he takes part in everyday activities outside his home, in harmony with his fellow citizens; and that he is a satisfactory social fit' (Ström-Olsen and Tow 1949, 88). As another source helpfully explains, 'When the terms "cured" or "improved" are employed in medical and psychiatric practice, it is usually implied that the illness of the patient is relieved so that he can resume normal citizenship in work, play, and social activities; or at least that he has recovered these natural attributes to a degree in keeping with the relief from his illness.' (Ström-Olsen and Tow 1949, 88). And even further, 'The term "recovered" must be taken to mean social recovery – that is, ability to leave hospital, live at home under normal conditions, and resume some form of useful employment, not necessarily up to former standard' (Berliner, et al. 1945, 326).

Thus, Meier has written about how terms such as 'social competency', 'social adjustment', 'social behaviour', 'social utility' – in a word, 'social factors' – abound in descriptions of postoperative patients (Meier 2009, 357). This reached such an extent that

Meier quotes lobotomists arguing that 'the social utility' of patients is both 'the goal and glory of the prefrontal leucotomy' (Walther and Czernigewycz 1950, translated by and cited in Meier 2009, 357). As a lobotomist himself put it, 'Lobotomy has been recommended extensively in the treatment of the hospitalized psychotic patient, with the ultimate aim of effecting a social recovery outside the hospital' (Kolb 1953, 1085). Indeed, he continued, lobotomy 'seems to promise return to the community of a greater number of patients with chronic mental disease who have been hospitalized for more than two years than does any other therapeutic procedure' (Kolb 1953, 1089)

Therefore, lobotomy is an excellent case study from which to generalise about the aims of psychiatry during this period because 'The introduction of the somatic therapies' like lobotomy 'did not signify a revolutionary break with existing treatment philosophies but in important ways were interpreted as their fulfilment' (Pressman 1998, 225-6). Indeed, lobotomy was seen as 'exactly fulfilling the mission of modern psychiatry' by its 'purported ability to improve a patient's "adjustment" on the wards – and perhaps restore enough functioning to return the patient to an unskilled job if male, or to domestic work if female', as will be explained (Pressman 1998, 428). In this way, lobotomy is an ideal example of the therapeutic theories and methods of twentieth-century psychiatry taken to their logical extreme.

1.3. Creating Appropriately Emotional Patients

Before it is possible to argue that lobotomy aimed to alter the relationship between reason and emotion in the mind it is necessary to establish the mechanisms by which it could affect any personality and behavioural changes in patients. According to critic Peter Breggin's 'brain-disabling hypothesis', lesions in the frontal lobes, and also elsewhere in the brain, reduce the 'higher capacities of the individual rendering him less autonomous' and hence less troublesome and less capable of generating independent choices (1983, 48). Such procedures reduce the patient's abstract reasoning, creativity, emotional sensitivity, and other mental functions (Breggin 1983, 48). The patient is rendered more helpless, easily manageable, more tractable and more docile (Breggin 1981, 306; see also Breggin 1983, 47). Further, the patient is emotionally indifferent, blunted or sometimes even euphoric (Breggin 1981, 303, Breggin 1983, 47). The helpless state of the impaired individual renders them 'a fit subject for control by any authority' (Breggin 1981, 306, Breggin 1983, 49) and 'especially suitable candidates for suggestion and influence at the hands of the physicians' (Breggin 1981, 309). For example,

in two female patients, the operation rendered them totally deferent to their physicians, with one previously resistive patient replying to the question of whether she wants to go home with 'that's up to the staff and I never debate with the staff', while the other declared 'Oh, doctor, I want to do anything you ask' after her operation (Johnson 2014, 56).

Indeed, several lobotomists openly testified to these effects. For example, Morgan and Denney wrote how 'After a lobotomy, a patient is childlike, lethargic, and regressed. Re-educating him to resume his adequate social function is no small task' (1955, 59). Frankl and Mayer-Gross similarly writes how 'In the postoperative period the patient's life and personality are pliable and easy to mould, ready for a systematic reconstruction' (Frankl and Mayer-Gross 1947, 824). Turner, too, writes how 'The early days and weeks were crucial for success if new patterns of behaviour were to be imposed' (Turner 1982, 104). Sicely writes how 'The one symptom which is a useful one from the rehabilitation point of view is that of suggestibility. Practically all leucotomy patients are very suggestible even when they are paranoid, hostile or just anti-authority, but may be persuaded to do things which they refuse to do when told directly' (Post-Leucotomy Rehabilitation 1953, 73). Finally, one article explains how 'For several days after lobotomy most patients are tranquil, friendly, and cooperative. They eat well, sleep well, do what they are told, and seem to come back suddenly into the world of reality' (Freeman, Davis, et al. 1954, 941).

In agreement, lobotomy advocate Sargant candidly explains how brain damage is a necessary part of opening a patient up to suggestion. As he bluntly puts it, 'Before being able to change behaviour patterns of thought and action in the human brain with speed and efficiency, it is apparently in many cases necessary to induce some form of physiological brain disturbance' (Sargant 1957, 61). Lobotomy was seen as providing this "therapeutic" brain disturbance, or rather, damage.

All of this makes the patient 'accessible to social and therapeutic approaches' and 're-educating, re-socialising and re-habilitating' (Crump 1959, 20). Many lobotomists speak about this as a 'golden opportunity' to manipulate the patient (Watts and Freeman 1948, 228), that it offered 'good opportunities to build up the patient's personality along new lines' (Kalinowsky and Hoch 1952, 245), that it was a 'new opportunity to crystallize personality organization into a more wholesome pattern' (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 40), or argued that it was 'important to exploit this opportunity in therapy' (Ring 1952, 384). As another source put it, after operation, 'Patients tend to be emotionally shallow, easily influenced in mood and act' (Dax, et al. 1948, 424) or, once distress has been relieved by the operation, 'the process of rebuilding the patient's social existence becomes possible' (Freeman, Davis, et al. 1954, 941).

It was thought that resocialisation would accomplish more on lobotomy patients than in many other groups of psychiatric patients (Kalinowsky and Hoch 1952, 246-7). It was also recommended to begin the 'work of readaptation' (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 40) and 'habit training and guidance' as soon as possible after a lobotomy had been carried out. Indeed, patients were so 'malleable, more trainable, and more susceptible to external influences' that the question only remained as to 'how best to take advantage of this potential for growth' (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 46). Indeed, where active training and resocialisation had been 'quite useless when given before operation' it 'begins to work wonders when the rigid morbid patterns of behaviour have been broken down by leucotomy' (Sargant and Slater 1972, 118).

The lobotomy, it was said, gave patients 'freedom from old habits of reactions to stress' and thus 'the patient may more easily be trained into new ones' (Sargant and Slater 1972, 128). As Sargant and Slater argue, following the operation, 'One is, so to speak, back to square one, with avenues previously closed, opening again on all sides' (Sargant and Slater 1972, 129). The patient is, effectively, a blank slate. Similarly, Freeman, in his unpublished memoirs, argued that the operation marked a 'turning point' after which the 'personality of the patient is changed in some way in the hope of rendering him more amenable to the social pressures under which he is supposed to exist' (cited in Raz 2013, 105).

In fact, it is argued, the *worse* early symptoms of confusion and disorientation are the better, as this renders patients all the more suggestible (Morgan and Denney 1955, 60). Thus, 'we have found that better therapeutic results can be expected when these early symptoms are marked, since such patients usually become more amenable to suggestions and therapeutic efforts' (Morgan and Denney 1955, 60).

This opportunity to complete reshape the patient's personality was used for many ends, such as encouraging female and male patients to take up their "appropriate" social roles along gender lines. However, how the operation aimed to reconfigure the relationship between patients' reason and emotion is of interest here. This goal was summarised in a 1953 report which argued that lobotomy 'entails cutting into the nerve pathway connecting the frontal lobes (the "seat of reason") of the brain to the thalamus (the seat of "emotion"),' as part and parcel of its therapeutic aim and effect (cited in Braslow 1997, 139). Simply put, 'the purpose of the operation is to break the connection between the patient's thoughts and his emotions' (Wilson and Warland 1947, 5). The frontal lobes themselves were not the target, neither did Freeman and Watts believe that psychopathology was to be found there. 'Instead,' Johnson says, 'they theorized that psychopathology developed as a result of an uneven exchange of emotion

between the frontal lobes and the thalamus' (2011, 190) an organ in the limbic system which Freeman and Watts believed endowed sensations 'with emotional feeling tone' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 27 cited in Johnson 2011, 190). For Freeman and Watts, it was 'ideation powered and fixed by emotional excess' which lead to mental illness (Johnson, Thinking with the Thalamus: Lobotomy and the Rhetoric of Emotional Impairment 2011, 191). Indeed, emotional tension is an important symptom in many types of mental disorder, especially in melancholic and obsessional cases. The schizophrenic, though he appears unemotional, may be dominated by the emotion associated with his hallucinations and fantasies' (Prefrontal Leucotomy: Report on 1000 Cases 1947, 265). It is worth nothing that of these 1000 cases, 348 were men, and 652 were women (Prefrontal Leucotomy: Report on 1000 Cases 1947, 265) and lobotomy was often applied disproportionally to women.

Excessive emotion seems, from the start, to have been key to all psychosurgical attempts. Gottlieb Burckhardt, perhaps the first psychiatrist to experiment with brain operations for the alleviation of mental illness beginning in 1888, removed pieces of his patient's cortex with the aim 'to extract from the brain mechanism the emotional and impulsive element' and thus calm agitated patients (Rodgers 1992, 9). Believing that the mind was made of discrete faculties represented in the brain, Burckhardt theorised that if any of those areas was overactive, surgical ablation could check this excess (Berrios 1997, 71). Later, in 1936, the Portuguese pioneer of lobotomy, Egas Moniz, believing that mental illness was caused by "fixed" connections within the brain, and that severing these which with a special coring instrument, would 'free the patient from pathological emotions and behavior' (Raz 2013, 5).

Thus, by entering the brain with a surgical tool and severing the pathways connecting the "emotional" thalamus to the "intellectual" frontal lobes, lobotomy was said to alleviate the symptoms of mental illness by depriving "abnormal" thoughts of the morbid emotions that had been sustaining them (Ewald, Freeman and Watts 1947, 210). 'It is as though the fires of emotion that have kept these ideas glowing have become extinguished', Freeman and Watts say, 'and the ideas reverted to psychological ashes' (1950, 237). These thoughts were to fizzle out of significance with time. In a word, the aim of lobotomy was to 'reduce the affective charge' emanating from the thalamus by cutting the fibres that connected it to the frontal lobes (Freeman and Watts 1950, 75).

Accordingly, Freeman developed a theory based on his empirical observation that a lobotomy led to what he called the 'retrograde degeneration of the thalamus' (Freeman and Watts 1947). Thus, although targeting the frontal lobes, the procedure, Freeman claimed,

actually had its therapeutic effect by causing degeneration in the thalamus, a principal seat of feeling and emotion in the brain. As Wilson and Warland explain,

> The particular fibres concerned form a band known as the fronto-thalamic tract which connected the pre-frontal area of the frontal lobe with the thalamus. The pre-frontal or forward part of the frontal lobe is concerned with thought, but its precise functions are obscure…. The thalamus has functions which are better known – they are concerned with feeling and emotion. There is a portion of the thalamus called the nuclear medialis dorsalis which degenerates when the fronto-thalamic fibres have been cut (1947, 5).

By freeing them of emotional tension, the patient 'ceases to care about them [their hallucinations and delusions] and is thus freed from their overwhelming power and can take up some everyday activities' (Wilson and Warland 1947, 6). Freeman and Watts, as was the mainstream understanding at the time, believed that the thalamus is the 'physical substrata' - the basis and foundation - of human emotion (Kalinowsky and Hoch 1952, 320). Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon refer to it as 'an important emotional center' (1950, 44). Indeed, the repeated claim that the lobotomy is best indicated for those with strong and vigorous emotions (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 23), and that already blunted emotions were a contraindication, is excellent proof that emotions were the key problem and target of the operation.

In this way, the lobotomy procedure altered the 'correlation between intellect and feeling tone in the brain' (cited in Pressman 1998, 83). In an excellent summary, it is explained how following a lobotomy, patients 'can go outward into their fields of rational endeavor, their intellect unharmed, their emotions under control' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 154). Even the transorbital lobotomy pioneered by Freeman, infamously using an ice-pick type instrument inserted past the eyeball, also worked on similar principles, again placing lesions so as to interrupt the connections between the frontal lobes and thalamus (Pressman 1998, 338). So, it seems that lobotomy reflected, or acted upon, the notion that excessive emotions could disrupt people's reason, and that a surgical intervention could repair this broken 'economy of the brain' (Johnson 2011, 191). As one lobotomist put it, 'The Emotions of these people are warmer and healthier than they were before operation' (Turner 1982, 124).

Indeed, lobotomists were quick to argue that the operation did not 'appear to affect the patient's judgment, reasoning, or concentration, or his ability to do arithmetic' (Lyerly cited in Pressman 1998, 105). There was thus the belief that emotion could be reduced while leaving

the intellect intact. For instance, Sargant believed that one could 'diminish excessive anxiety… without affecting other thought processes or the intelligence itself to any marked degree' (Sargant 1957, 69). However, this claim is very problematic. Lobotomy patients' ability to carry out these conventional forms of reasoning did indeed seem to remain intact. However, recent neuroscientific analysis has cast new light on this claim. As the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio concluded, lobotomy patients had impairments to reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling alongside 'an otherwise largely intact neuropsychological profile' (Damasio 1994, 61). This is because, he argues, reasoning and feeling are more intimately bound in the brain than is often thought. As he writes, discussing one of his patients with brain damage,

> I had been advised early in life that sound decisions came from a cool head, that emotions and reason did not mix any more than oil and water. I had grown up accustomed to thinking that the mechanisms of reason existed in a separate providence of the mind, where emotion should not be allowed to intrude, and when I thought of the brain behind the mind, I envisioned separate neural systems for reason and emotion. This was a widely held view of the relation between reason and emotion, in mental and neural terms. / But now I had before my eyes the coolest, least emotional, intelligent human being one might imagine, and yet his practical reason was so impaired that it produced, in the wanderings of daily life, a succession of mistakes, a perpetual violation of what would be considered socially appropriate and personally advantageous. He had had an entirely healthy mind until a neurological disease ravaged a specific sector of his brain, and, from one day to the next, caused his profound defect in decision making. The instruments usually considered necessary and sufficient for rational behavior were intact in him. He had the requisite knowledge, attention, and memory; his language was flawless; he could perform calculations; he could tackle the logic of an abstract problem. There was only one significant accompaniment to his decision-making failure: a marked alteration of the ability to experience feelings. Flawed reason and impaired feelings stood out together as the consequence of a specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason. Two decades of clinical and experimental work with a large number of neurological patients have allowed me to replicate this observation many times, and to turn a clue into a testable hypothesis. / I began writing this book to propose that reason may not be as pure as most of us thinking it is or wish it were, that emotions

> and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks, for worse *and* for better. (Damasio 1994, xi-xii)

In describing his original patients with brain damage in these terms, Damasio could easily be describing a lobotomy patient. The parallels are striking. Indeed, Damasio concludes that frontal lobotomy showed that 'impaired reasoning/decision making and impaired emotion/feeling' could in fact be caused by damage elsewhere in the brain such as in the site operated on by lobotomy (Damasio 1994, 61-2). As was discussed above, Breggin had already shown that damage elsewhere in the brain can lead to the same effects seen after a lobotomy.

As was discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the anthropologist William Reddy argues that different societies employ different emotion "regimes", that is, socially enforced norms of ideal emotional experience and expression (Reddy 2001, 55; 129). Lobotomists aimed to enforce an emotion regime derived from the prevailing norms of their era. As already discussed earlier in this chapter, for lobotomists, emotions are a problem insofar as they "fuelled" inappropriate and morbid thoughts. Thus, 'the principle effect of operation was a reduction of the emotional components of the psychic life' (Partridge 1950, 5), 'a reduction in the intensity of emotional experience' (Partridge 1950, 122) or simply, that the operation works best for those with 'emotional excesses' (Partridge 1950, 470). For the practitioners and proponents of lobotomy, all psychiatric disorders came to be seen as 'at root, affective impairments' and this became in their hands a 'universal theory of psychopathology' (Johnson 2011, 187; 191). For Johnson, Freeman and Watts 'universal theory of psychopathology' which they employed in lobotomy, 'positioned emotion as the primary impairment of mental illness, a theory that corresponded exactly with treatment they had developed' (Johnson 2014, 29). As Johnson wrote elsewhere, 'Lobotomy's primary objective was to "flatten," "blunt," or "bleach" emotion in persons with psychiatric disabilities' (Johnson 2011, 186).

Thus, one of the main aims of lobotomy was to reduce the overall capacity of patients to "feel", and in this aim, it was grimly successful (Damasio 1994, 60). As Freeman and Watts argue, after a lobotomy, 'The emotional nucleus of the psychosis is removed, the "sting" of the disorder is drawn' (Freeman and Watts 1942, vii). Lobotomy patients themselves often testified to this effect, saying things such as 'Doctor, you have cut out my worry center' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 304), 'In my heart I've no pity or feeling, and I used to have' and 'I don't feel the same, I'm not sentimental like I was, it's hardened me' (Partridge 1950, 45). Or, as one patient asked, 'Why did you pierce my head, did you take those silly love ideas out of my brain?' (Reitman 1947, 584).

Lobotomy thus functioned as a form of medical social, that is 'the ways in which medicine functions (wittingly or unwittingly) to secure adherence to social norms – specifically, by using medical means to minimize, eliminate, or normalize deviant behaviour' (Conrad and Schneider 1980, 242 cited in Chriss 2013, 82) in this case, deviance from norms of rationality and "proper" emotionality. As Shields points out,

> Criteria for the "right" kind and quantity of emotion, for example, are not inherent to the emotion displayed, but reflect cultural conventions and norms that are situationally negotiated and applied…. That said, only the expert has the authority to say when and by whom unreasoned and uncontrolled emotion happens. (Shields 2007, 93)

The lobotomy offers an important example of these dynamics in practice. Indeed, for psychosurgeons in general, 'the target was feelings, not tissue; mind, not brain' (Rodgers 1992, 28). As Johnson summarises, 'Lobotomy's primary objective was to "blunt" strong emotions in order to return mentally ill people to "productive" roles in their families, communities, and the economy' (Johnson 2014, 21).

Beyond this, lobotomy aimed to encourage appropriate emotional responses. For lobotomists, the 'difference between normal and abnormal emotion was not one of kind, it was one of degree' (Johnson 2011, 191). As Johnson succinctly put it, this was a view that saw the mentally ill mind as a 'disordered economy in which the supply of emotion exceeded the demand' (Johnson 2011, 191). Indeed, Freeman and Watts conclude their book with a call for a more balanced role for emotions. As they say, 'It is a good thing to have a little anxiety, a little fear of consequences, a degree of self-consciousness' they tell us, but when these emotions become exaggerated, they make a patient unable to function 'effectively' and cause suffering (Freeman and Watts 1942, 138). Similarly, another proponent of psychosurgery reaches the same conclusion that 'Some anxiety is a physiological necessity' and may even help people in the creative fields, for example, but it is unacceptable and requires treatment when the patient becomes 'overwhelmed' (Field, Rollin and Watts 1973, 596). Thus, liberated from these excessive emotions by lobotomy, the patient is able to respond 'appropriately according to his mood' which is usually more cheerful (Freeman and Watts 1942, 138).

Indeed, one strong indication that lobotomists thought of their therapy in strictly dualistic reason/emotion terms is how the debate around lobotomy was itself framed. For instance, the critics of lobotomy were often described as irrational. It was claimed that 'Strong opinion and emotional bias continue to becloud the issue of psychosurgery', (Greenblatt, Arnot

and Solomon 1950, 7). Beyond this, in a passionate debate about lobotomy with other psychiatrists, Freeman responded by 'quipping during his closing remarks that Roy Grinker, a psychoanalytic critic of lobotomy, had been "thinking with his thalamus" during the discussion' and had based his criticism of lobotomy on his "feelings" (Johnson 2014, 35). Further, Morris Fishbein, the esteemed editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, warned how 'an emotional attitude of violent unreasoning opposition to this form of treatment [lobotomy] would be inexcusable' (Fishbein 1941, 535 cited in Johnson 2014, 36). As Johnson summarises, 'For Fishbein and for Freeman, an emotional attitude did not just signify an absence of reason, but a threat to reason, a violent unreason, an emotional impairment to the dispassionate judgment of medical science' (Johnson 2014, 36).

Helping the patient to display "appropriate" and "normal" emotional response was, therefore, a central aim of lobotomy. Patients' grief was often used as a yardstick of emotional response. For example, Freeman and Watts use the case of a woman whose loved one had died soon after the operation. She cried but was calmed down and did not mention the incident further. As Freeman and Watts tell us, this is an example of 'an appropriate emotional response even in the early phase following operation' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 134). In another case, a patient suffered the death of a beloved daughter-in-law to which she responded with the 'normal regret' but without anxiety, apprehension or nervous tension (Freeman and Watts 1942, 134). A summary of an article on lobotomy explains how the related bimedial lobotomy allowed patients to express 'more warmth and appropriate emotional reaction' (Lewis 1952, 272). Here, appropriate is taken to mean the appropriate *quantity* of emotion in a given situation. The ability to emote is not lost, per se, it is just 'appropriate to the occasion' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 134). As Freeman and Watts explain, 'These patients retain the capacity for experiencing emotion and for displaying the response *appropriate* to the occasion…' (1942, 134, emphasis added). For instance, a female patient could 'respond appropriately' towards events that 'called for a display of emotion' (Freeman and Watts 1942, 134). Moreover, the duration of emotional experience is significantly reduced, and events like the above 'make no deep impression' and patients have little tendency to brood (Freeman and Watts 1942, 134). Others claim that only 'morbid' and excessive emotions like anguish are targeted, or put even simpler, 'unpleasant' emotions are 'selectively decreased' while 'pleasant reactions' remain unimpaired (Worthing, Brill and Wigderson 1949, 633).

In some cases, patients show what has been called 'Affective incontinence' following operation (Freeman and Watts 1950, 159). This is the tendency to have short-lived emotional outbursts after lobotomy, but lobotomists are quick to add that these responses may be

exaggerated, but they are fleeting, ‘lacking in depth and quickly evaporate’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 312; see also Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 38), with patients ‘incapable of keeping a grudge alive’ (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 38), and reminding the reader that, nonetheless, the emotion displayed is itself ‘appropriate’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 162). Indeed, any tendency towards unrestraint in some patients is ‘more than offset by the combination of emotional blunting and reduced activity’ which most patients display (Partridge 1950, 51). In fact, relatives are apt to comment on their loves one’s ‘stoicism’ or indifference to suffering (Freeman and Watts 1950, 162) because patients become able to withstand ‘grave personal disasters’ after the operation without breaking down (Sargant 1962, 1198).

Female candidates for a lobotomy are more likely to be described as “hysterical”, “emotional”, “unstable”, “ill controlled” or having “excessive worry” in their case histories. Indeed, the only males who are labelled as “emotional” are a man the author thought was homosexual and a ‘youth of 20’ (Partridge 1950, 318; 459). On this topic, scholars from many fields, but especially feminism, have made a significant contribution to the debate surrounding emotion, reason, and the exclusionary nature of the labels of emotionality and irrationality. Crucially, it has been noted how notions of reason and emotion have never been equally applied to all people in Western history. As Jagger points out, ‘reason has been associated with members of dominant political, social, and cultural groups and emotion with members of subordinate groups’ notably women, people of colour (Jagger 1989, 163-4) and those of lower classes (Shields 2007, 93; 107). As Kohli argues, because such individuals do not fit the profile of “rational discourse” which is ‘white, middle class, masculine’, they can be accused of appearing “unreasonable” in public conversation (1995, 110). To this end, some go as far as to say that the ‘emotional disciplining of women’ was crucial to the enlightenment’s project to create rational subjects (Ruberg 2010, 16). Reason has long been a supposedly male characteristic, and emotion a female one. Simply put, ‘Reason and emotion were believed to be expressed differently for each sex because of underlying “natural” difference’ (Shields 2007, 97). Indeed, even the ability to control and master the passions and express appropriate emotions has been associated with masculinity (Maiz 2011, 36; Shields 2007, 98; 106).

Thus, in the lobotomy literature, there are numerous examples of female patients who are supposedly ‘swept away by the vagaries of [their] temperament’ (Partridge 1950, 440) or let their emotions take ‘charge’ of them (Partridge 1950, 180). Another woman, ‘driven this way and that’ by her morbid emotions, is described as rendered ‘mistress of herself’ by lobotomy (Partridge 1950, 94-5). In another instance, a woman is improved in that her ‘affect appeared normal’ and she was ‘more serious and less romantic’ and ‘stable’ (Partridge 1950,

348). In another example, there is a case of a woman whose troublesome 'rich phantasy life, which had not helped her symptoms disappeared. She ceased to be dramatic and in perpetual turbulence, in favour of being quietly efficient' and within 6 months, she had married and 'led a contented domestic life since' (Partridge 1950, 366). A similar case describes a woman who, postoperatively, is not only an adequate housewife and mother, but now 'tends to take things more calmly and without the ups-and-downs, the emotional storms, the ecstasies and the moody desperations' and 'has grown to take the world for what it is' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 234). In another case, a woman is described as 'more stable, in the sense of reacting to events with more control' (Partridge 1950, 292). Another woman, who had caused many "scenes" due to her 'histrionics' and 'nauseating and maudlin sentimentality' had her emotions reduced by lobotomy and this was of 'immediate practical value, for she no longer made scenes nor sulked' (cited in Partridge 1950, 112). In another case, the very lack of emotions a woman had after the operation is described as 'a factor in improving her stability' and, she was simply 'never gloomy and had not cried since the operation' (Partridge 1950, 420). Yet another woman is described by one of her doctors as 'more emotionally stable this time than he had ever known her to be' after the operation (Worthing, Brill and Wigderson 1949, 649). Three women, in one instance, are even described as less irritable on their periods than before the operation (Hofstatter, Smolik and Busch 1945, 127). All of these striking and deeply sexist examples are in keeping with cultural stereotypes about women's supposed over-emotionality.

1.4. Political and Behavioural Control

In 1997, two modern proponents of psychosurgery, an associate Professor of Neuropsychiatry, and a consultant psychiatrist, wrote that there is a lot of concern that psychosurgery may have been used for political control. However, they claim that in the last sixty years, 'There is no evidence that [such] abuse has occurred, even in totalitarian regimes' (Sachdev and Sachdev 1997, 462). However, there is some clear evidence to the contrary in the lobotomy literature. To begin with, Freeman and Watts display a particular disdain what they call the "fantasy life" of the patient. They argue that contemplation, critical thinking, and philosophising are potentially dangerous activities that can lead to mental illness. As they put it, 'We believe that fantasy is the source of mischief in the so-called functional mental disorders' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 561). As Freeman and Watts continue, if a person 'sets out to think about himself, to daydream and speculate, philosophize and enter into abstraction, he finds a world in which

his imagination is no longer trammelled by the harsh necessities of reality' (1950, 561-2). Freeman and Watts explain how the question '"Wouldn't it be nice if - ?"' appears in the mind of the patient who 'proceeds to develop his ideas for abolishing poverty, bringing peace on earth and good will to men' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 561-2). These are evidently dangerous ideas because 'The man who gives himself over to fantasy tends to drop out of social existence' and spends 'less and less on the practical affairs of life' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 561-2). In other words, they become maladjusted. As another lobotomy study put it, 'The majority of patients examined displayed features of a continuous course of the illness; they isolated themselves from society, lost their grip on reality, became inactive, abandoned their interests, and enclosed themselves in an internal world of their own experiences' (Jęczmińska 2017, 14-5).

As being "socially useful" and social adjustment is such a priority to lobotomists, it is not surprising that these are undesirable behaviours. In the end, with such wild "fantasies" as abolishing poverty, the individual can drive themselves into madness, aloofness, and idleness in the eyes of their doctors. This may necessitate a lobotomy. Again, linking back to the prevailing notions of adjustment at the time, such thinking was seen as disordered. In an example of this type of "fantastic" thinking, the psychiatrist Austin Riggs explains how 'The nihilist anarchist, the parlor Bolshevik, the cubist, and the free love doctrinaire are examples of essentially maladjusted and discontented people'. Psychiatry was to step in whenever such individuals were 'disturbing the smooth course of social progress' as Albert Barret declared in his 1922 presidential address for the American Psychiatric Association (cited in Pressman 1998, 27).

In such cases, the fantasy life must be "smashed", in Freeman and Watts' terms, to save the individual from such "pathological" dreaming. The 'source of mischief', as they call it, must be cut off at its source. In a slightly different but very demonstrative example, Freeman and Watts describe a 14-year-old boy who would often imagine a baseball game in which he played in every position simultaneously. This seemingly harmless daydream, in the hands of Freeman and Watts, was 'obviously a pathological case' (1950, 546). After lobotomising this boy, they cheerfully reported that 'he was not only no longer able to bring these fantasies back on command but also had lost interests in trying to do so' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 546-7). His 'fantasy life was smashed beyond repair' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 546). With his ability to dream out of commission, the boy went from 'living within himself and in the future' and 'came right down to earth' and acted like a normal boy of his age (Freeman and Watts 1950, 547). Indeed, elsewhere, patients are described as lacking the ability to dream and daydream

after the operation (Kalinowsky and Hoch 1952, 243-4), being now to become ‘abstractly angry in a sustained fashion’ and becoming ‘more matter of fact’ (Tow 1955, 47).

The ability to feel strongly, to dream and project oneself into the future, to become angry, to get upset at injustice, or empathise with others is necessary for a healthy political imagination. However, the lobotomised individual is largely incapable of political or social participation because ‘introspection, contemplation and philosophizing are no longer feasible’ after the operation (Freeman and Watts 1950, 519). As Sargant flippantly explains, ‘Whether it be a mistake to convert mentally agonized persons into more ordinary ones, who have not such overwhelmingly strong feelings one way or another, will of course always remain a moot point for some people’ (Sargant 1957, 70). Or, as another source put it, ‘the lobotomized patient has lost his zealousness, his ardent enthusiasm, and active interest’ (Allison and Allison 1954, 222). In practice, lobotomised patients ‘get along quite satisfactorily without feeling the necessity for the advancing of the welfare of the community’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 228) and are similarly said to lose interest in community activities (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 77).

Losing all passion for social change, lobotomy patients ‘tend to take things as they come’ and while they may attend the citizens’ association or a church meeting, ‘they do not take part in campaigns of one sort and another that are meat and drink to so many socially-conscious individuals’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 228). Similarly, ‘Most of the other patients show some residual defects in their drive for social betterment, for community endeavour, for uplift and human welfare’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 536). Thus, they cannot rally behind any political idea and

> they don’t look around to see what needs doing; they don’t marshal their forces, get other people interested, sit down at the telephone or at the typewriter, address envelopes or collect money for the schoolboy patrol or the local Democratic party or for the repair of the organ at church. (Freeman and Watts 1947, 228)

This seems to add some credence to Rousseau’s idea in the *Discourse on Political Economy* (1755) that ‘a man who had no passions would be a very bad citizen’ (cited in Hall 2005, 102). Even more worryingly, there are several vivid descriptions of how patients lose their firmly held beliefs and the ability to *have* or maintain such beliefs. Thus, ‘Fanaticism on any topic may no longer be as easy to maintain, but more balanced points of view on religious and social issues are again made possible to the patient’ (Sargant 1953, 802). As was discussed,

abolishing poverty or advocating world peace may qualify as a fanatically held idea. As one patient is quoted as saying, ‘A great many strong opinions that I used to have seem to have disappeared altogether’ (Frankl and Mayer-Gross 1947, 821). This is because, as Kalinowsky and Hoch explain, ‘Zeal is understood as ardent enthusiasm and active interest, and is always reduced after the operation’ (1952, 241). Finally, Freeman explains how ‘lobotomy seems to reduce the impulse of the patient to do things differently. Patients tend to conform to the standards that have been set up in their own social medium’ (Freeman 1953, 490).

In a word, lobotomy patients are politically neutered. For Freeman and Watts, the explanation for this lies in how the operation removes ‘the spark that sets normal people to doing things for the betterment of the community’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 228). At no point do Freeman and Watts describe this as an unequivocally negative operative effect and simply state it in a matter of fact way. This is not helped by the fact that following a lobotomy, people who were previously interested in philosophy, psychology and world affairs are now more engrossed by more straightforward forms of media such as the sports pages and comic books (Freeman and Watts 1950, 227; see also Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 166), or take pleasure in simpler things such as an ice cream, a hotdog, or going to the cinema (Pressman 1998, 123). Simply put, ‘a cultured intelligent individual will be less so after operation. He will be less sensitive and appreciative, more concrete and more immediate in reaction, simpler and slower in mental processes; and he will have a less rich, imaginative response’ (Tow 1955, 234-5). Indeed, in one case, a patient who had once ‘been a vigorous personality, with political interests’ was said to have ‘gradually lost his interest and drive, and restricted his activities’ following a lobotomy (Tow 1955, 29). In general, lobotomy patients are said to become ‘more orthodox and matter-of-fact’ in their points of view (Sargant and Slater 1972, 125).

This loss of enthusiasm creates compelling evidence for the claim put forward by political theorist Cheryl Hall that

> In order to become politically involved, then, people must *care* about an issue, they must have some *vision* of how things ought to be done, and they must have *hope* that at least some progress can be made toward realizing this vision. But this caring, this vision, and this hope are precisely the work of passion. It is passion that motivates people to engage with the world around them and to try to make a difference in their lives. Passion is a particularly important force in political movements working for change. Resignation and disaffection keep people docile and obedient to the dominant

political order. Indeed, apathy may support the status quo better than any repressive institution. (2005, 125-6)

Hall may well have been describing the effects of a lobotomy. The lobotomy "plucks" passions from the mind, rendering people unable to envision, and unwilling to work towards a better world, not to mention the inability to sustain strong feelings towards any particular point of view which, along with their "pathological ideas", withers away. Indeed, some have characterised the goal of psychosurgical interventions as trying 'to find what the nineteenth-century natural philosophers knew as "the seat of the passions," and to destroy it' (Rose, Lewontin and Kamin 1990, 170). On the issue of the status quo, Freeman and Watts made it clear what they made of passionate visions such as eliminating poverty: they are signs of pathology potentially necessitating a lobotomy.

Returning to Damasio, he discusses a female patient rendered unemotional by brain damage and explains how 'It appears that there had been no normally differentiated thought and reasoning in Mrs. T's mind, and naturally no decisions made and even less implemented' (Damasio 1994, 73). This 'lack of drive was translated externally to a neutral facial expression, mutism, and akinesia' (Damasio 1994, 73). This may help to explain why lobotomy patients are often so inert and immobile, both physically and mentally. They lack the emotional component necessary to reason and act.

There are also cases in which unconventional and radical political views or actions were seen as justification for a lobotomy. Although 'Personal behavior that does not meet with the approval of society may indicate a problem in the social structure of society rather than merely a case of individual pathology or deviance' (Chriss 2013, 105) lobotomists were quick to pathologise non-standard political thoughts and behaviours. However, this medicalisation serves to depoliticize the behaviour in question, and so 'precludes us from recognizing it as a possible intentional repudiation of existing political [or social] arrangements' (Conrad and Schneider 1980, 24 cited in Chriss 2013, 105)

In two striking cases, people were lobotomised, at least partly, because of their communist views. In the clearest case, a Swedish newspaper headline in 1947 screamed how 'The Carolinska Hospital turns Communists into Conservatives' (cited in Ögren 2013, 208). The article describes how an 'energetic communist' had lost 'all enthusiasm for communism' postoperatively (cited in Ögren 2013, 209). The article went on to argue that lobotomy could be a potential way of 'correcting extreme political thinking' (cited in Ögren 2013, 209). A Stockholm psychiatrist commenting on the case said that the patient had 'devoted too much

frenetic energy to his party but post-operatively he took life in more of an easy-going manner' (cited in Ögren 2013, 209). Commenting on the same case, and three others, another article elaborated further by noting that 'one who had been interested in books lost that interests through the operation, another', the communist patient mentioned above, 'who had been obsessed by the idea of social reform and had joined various radical political parties, lost her fervor for radicalism, and a third lost his sense of the value of money. The relative of a fourth patient complained that "she has lost her soul."' (Personality Shift is Laid to Surgery: Stockholm Psychiatrist Warns Against a Wide Use of Pain-Easing Brain Operation 1947, 51).

In the other case, the example is given of an eccentric female artist who spent many hours in her studio painting in oils. Not only was she reclusive, but she also had the "strange" habit, from her psychiatrist's point of view, of forming 'warm attachments to others of a lower cultural level' than herself (Partridge 1950, 221). She would invite homeless people and artists into her house, and associated with those of a lower class (Partridge 1950, 221). In perhaps the most definite sign of her unbalanced mind, she is described as selling 'Communist papers in strongholds of Toryism' (Partridge 1950, 221). This is clearly seen as a pathological sign. Her thinking 'became bizarre' and her examiner thought she displayed some signs of schizophrenia although he could find 'no neurological signs' (Partridge 1950, 221). Despite this, she was lobotomised, and after the operation, she became inert and apathetic, for a long time wetting the bed, and at six months had taken up some rote work in a market garden and could contribute to the household chores (Partridge 1950, 222). No further word is made of her painting, associating with people outside of her class, or expressing any more radical political ideas (Partridge 1950, 222).

Another patient was lobotomised for complaining about ill-treatment at work, amongst other thought and behavioural issues. As the authors explain, 'The patient was first taken ill while teaching…. She began to have ideas that the board of education was trying to take away her job. The patient's brother and sister said she was worrying over $1,500 owed her by the board of education' (Bennett, Keegan and Wilbur 1943, 811). After her lobotomy, she was reduced to a person who 'is pleasant, is careful of her personal appearance and loves to go to the movies…. She has absolutely no insight but is able to make a good social adjustment. She has been spared institutional life and is a fairly useful, capable person' (Bennett, Keegan and Wilbur 1943, 811).

A similar case involves a 22-year-old man, an excellent but introverted university student diagnosed with schizophrenia. A noted day-dreamer in his childhood, he was 'Preoccupied with world problems and illogical thoughts' and, at university, he 'expressed

much concern over world problems, and especially wanted to combat communistic influences among students' (Bennett, Keegan and Wilbur 1943, 812). After his lobotomy, he became cooperative, pleasant, displayed gratitude for his care and was now 'capable of useful work under supervision' (Bennett, Keegan and Wilbur 1943, 812). Although the patient's views were in this case anti-communist, there is, again, no further word of any political ideas or interests remaining after the operation.

Another case describes a man who had been 'preoccupied over the wickedness of war'. Postoperatively, however, he could discuss politics 'without rancour' and was now not even troubled by a film about war, even though his wife had worried it would upset him like such films had in the past (Partridge 1950, 312). He had lost his passion for his political views and had seemingly lost his hatred of war.

In another case, which has only recently become known, members of Eva Peron's medical team have claimed that she may not have only received a lobotomy for metastatic cancer pain, as was previously thought, but for political reasons. As an article explains,

> direct correspondence with members of Eva Peron's medical team suggest that Peron became increasingly belligerent and anxious as she neared the end of her life. Her increasingly aggressive political speeches reflected her change in demeanor, and her husband Juan Peron, the president of Argentina at the time, may have perceived her behavior as a political threat and ordered her lobotomy to permanently pacify her. (Caruso and Sheehan 2017, 6)

Religiousness, which, like political ideals is often firmly held, is also lost after a lobotomy. As one study summarises about the research at the time:

> One of the several conclusions… from a detailed analysis of personality and character traits before and after leucotomy indicated a definite reduction of interest taken in religion. Eight out of ten patients were less interested than before. Brief extracts from her case summaries bear out this deduction. A male patient, religious, conscientious, dogmatic, after operation would not go to church, said he did not believe in religion. Of another, a female patient who came from a good home, had been brought up in religious atmosphere, and used to attend church regularly: "although she still conforms occasionally to the church-going habits of her home, this is no longer from any inner

> conviction, for she now says that she does not believe in any of that rot". (Malone 1947, 578)

Similarly, another source quotes Freeman and Watts saying that 'It is becoming more and more plain that patients who undergo lobotomy must sacrifice some of the virtues, some of the driving force, uplift, altruism, creative spirit, soul, or whatever else one would call it. The more the patient is endowed with this in the first place, the better the eventual outcome' (cited in Ström-Olsen and Tow 1949, 87). But they go further, and add that 'qualities much less subtle and spiritual than that referred to are, as a rule rather than as an exception, destroyed by the operation' (Freeman and Watts 1948, 417 cited in Ström-Olsen and Tow 1949, 87).

Overall, these results are perhaps unsurprising because, as Sargant explains, following a lobotomy, 'the result is, in general, to make them ordinary members of a group, open to suggestion and persuasion without stubborn resistance; for they will have ceased to feel as deeply about their ideas and can therefore think more logically, and examine new theories without emotional bias' (Sargant 1957, 70). This is a claim that patients become more rational after the operation and are receptive to different ideas. It was not unheard of for psychiatric therapy of the time to open the possibility of change or reversal in political views. Indeed, Sargant explains how after 'particularly severe abreaction', a type of therapy that uses emotional discharge, 'a patient will sometimes 'box the compass'', that is, make a total reversal in opinion, 'in his views on religion or politics, or in his attitudes to family and friends; or these attitudes may chop or change with alarming rapidity' (Sargant 1957, 55). Lobotomy proved an effective means of accomplishing this same phenomenon: reversing, or helping patients lose their firmly held moral, political, and religious beliefs.

Political resistance and troublesome, violent, and undesirable behaviour within the asylum also came under attack by lobotomy. One female asylum patient is described as writing letters, threatening legal action, and 'encouraging the recipients to propagation of her views on the social system' (Partridge 1950, 236). Her views on the social system are never revealed, but they were clearly considered unusual. She received a lobotomy for her 'delusions' (Partridge 1950, 236). Another committed patient, a man who had also been writing 'letters to authorities', had protested his treatment and the threats made to him that he would receive electroshock therapy. He began a hunger strike on the ward (Worthing, Brill and Wigderson 1949, 654). A lobotomy was performed in response and it was 'followed by immediate cessation of a hunger strike. The patient admitted that he had been "imagining things." He became friendly and approachable' (Worthing, Brill and Wigderson 1949, 654). Thus, there

are cases of resistance to mistreatment in the asylum “cured” by recourse to a lobotomy. As patients become highly suggestible and helpless following operation, it is no wonder that the patient was convinced to give up his hunger strike and repudiate his issues as part of his “imagination.”

As one commentator has written, ‘The line between mental health treatment (done strictly for the sake of the patient) and behavior control (which may benefit others) is blurry’ (Casey 2015, 119). As was discussed earlier, an important way of assessing success and recovery was ‘whether or not the patients needed less supervision after the intervention’ (Meier 2009, 357). Accordingly, a vital part of the function of lobotomy, especially in state institutions, was the quieting and calming of disruptive, challenging and violent patients, with the express purpose of ‘easing the nursing burden’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, 519). Or at the very least, leading to a ‘reduction in the wear and tear on hospital equipment and personnel’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, ix). As Pressman simply put it, ‘Some patients, it is clear, received a lobotomy primarily because their obnoxious behaviors made life difficult for everybody around them’ (Pressman 1998, 11). Along these lines, one study was candid when it declared that ‘even in the least satisfactory cases the patient is usually found to be quieter, less impulsive, more amenable, easier for the nursing staff to manage and less disturbing for the other patients’ after a lobotomy (Hutton 1943, 362). Or, simply that patients can be rendered ‘less combative and more docile’ and thus able to be transferred to an open ward (Meschan and Scruggs 1951, 70).

Thus, in many cases, the doctors do not even pretend the lobotomy is solely or even mainly for the benefit of the patient. For example, an article explains frankly how ‘In some cases full recovery was not looked for; we hoped only for removal of suicidal, homicidal, or otherwise dangerous, destructive, or asocial habits, so that the patients should be made manageable and useful in the institution’ (Duff 1946, 640). So, here, there is full admittance that the recovery of the patient in any meaningful way was not even the aim of the therapy. Calming patients was the overarching goal in these cases. Meanwhile, “usefulness” likely referred to the ability to work in the asylum. Elsewhere, it is explained how 150 male patients were lobotomised ‘because they constituted severe management problems’ and 20 female patients were lobotomised solely to reduce the ‘nursing difficulties’ (Jackson 1999, 61), or simply that in many cases ‘the operation was done more in the hope of relieving the troublesome destructiveness and the frequently accompanying combativeness [of some patients] than in the hope of relieving the psychosis’ (Greenblatt, Arnot and Solomon 1950, 105-6). There are even instances where patients are ‘recommended for operation in the hope that they would be easier to manage in the hospital [rather] than with any hope of recovery or

ultimate discharge' (Sicely 1953, 71). Again, it is clearly admitted that the operation often served those around the patient, and had no relation to cure or alleviation of mental distress. Of course, the use of psychiatric therapy in maintaining hospital order is not unique to the lobotomy. This was a general tendency of psychiatric institutions, but lobotomy 'intensified this legacy' (Pressman 1998, 213). Because of this, lobotomy established a reputation for itself as the 'most effective – read permanent – means of behavioral control' (Pressman 1998, 216).

Patients are also helped to become productive members of society and to acquiesce to group goals outside of the asylum. In one of the most striking declarations on the topic, a hospital superintendent declared that 'Hopeless and miserable misfits of social life, who for years have resisted all other methods, may be made happy and useful members of the community' by the operation (Duff 1946, 639). Similarly, as another source put it, 'Prefrontal leukotomy converted many patients suffering from supposedly hopeless mental disorders into contented and useful members of society' (Current Literature: Hutton, E. L. Results of Prefrontal Leukotomy [Lancet, 1:362, 1943] 1945, 72-3). Often, articles are clear about the operation being done for both 'the patient himself *and* the community' (Leading Articles 1954, 1223, italics added).

Using the metaphor of an army, Freeman and Watts write how a little anxiety is good for the soldier as it aids in self-preservation. Too much anxiety, however, 'destroys the effectiveness of the individual for the unit of which he is a member' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 236). So, the patient loses his effectiveness in the group, and even stands in the way of group goals. As he is rendered helpless and incapable of acting, he may well become 'a liability – even a menace to his fellows' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 236). Writing in his unpublished memoirs, Freeman explains how the mentally ill individual turns his attention away from the group and onto himself, where this 'exaltation of the ego at the expense of the group is an evil influence on the group as a whole – whether it is the family, squad or business organization' (cited in Raz 2013, 40). In this case, if the person cannot be restored to playing a useful role, 'he must be removed from the group to prevent spreading demoralization and disaster to the whole' (cited in Raz 2013, 40). If the operation is performed before the group has disintegrated 'and when there is still a place in the group for the member after his disorder is relieved will rebuild the group into a harmonious and effective whole' (cited in Raz 2013, 40). In this way, it serves to keep society together. Further, the operation removes excessive worries while still allowing the patient 'enough foresight to carry out effective work in order to gain his livelihood' (Freeman and Watts 1950, 237). The individual is no longer a burden or obstacle for the group and can resume taking up their duty to look after themselves. Thus, one article

argues that ‘None can be considered worse, while in roughly two-thirds of the cases a severe and crippling illness has been strikingly relieved and the patient enabled to fulfil the role of a useful citizen once more’ (Baker and Minski 1951, 1242).

Indeed, the grading of ‘citizen’ is sometimes used as the highest classification of recovery for lobotomy patients (Wilson and Warland 1947, 14), understood as those ‘discharged recovered. Patients earning their living, managing their homes, or in other ways apparently being as “citizens”’. (Wilson and Warland 1947, 15). Indeed, in the 1940s, restoring a patient to citizenship was seen as the ‘highest criterion of mental health’ (Pressman 1998, 11). Or, similarly, is it said that lobotomy allows people, now free from their psychosis, ‘to function in the highly competitive world of today’ (Freeman and Watts 1950, xxii). In a word, the lobotomised patient becomes ‘a socially acceptable individual’ (Bennett, Keegan and Wilbur 1943, 810). This discussion of group cohesion and harmony, Raz argues, is underlined by a moral rather than medical imperative. The operation, then, ‘was presented as a solution to a risk in society; the aim was to restore the desired functioning of the social whole’ where the operation not only benefitted the individual it was applied to but for the benefit of society at large (Raz 2013, 40-1), as was previously discussed. Along these lines, the use of lobotomy was justified for its economic benefits to society. As one author explains, ‘many believe from present indications that the operation may ultimately reduce the number of mental patients permanently institutionalized by as much as 30 per cent in the country at large. This may be optimistic, but whether the percentage is 5 or 50 it is clear that the operation has wide economic significance…’ (Fulton 1947, 621). Similarly, a newspaper article quoted Soviet psychiatrist Nikolai Oserezki, explaining how a lobotomy ‘By making a patient apathetic and indifferent, he said, it becomes possible to send him home and thus free a hospital bed. “This may be good for the psychiatrists who complain of the overcrowding of mental institutions, but what about the patient?”’ (Laurence 1953, 13).

1.5. Summary

To begin to understand the lobotomy procedure, this chapter put the operation into the context of the prevailing mental theory of its day, namely, Meyer’s theory of maladaptation or maladjustment. Adjustment is the measure of how well the individual could meet the demands of their environment, whether at home, at work, or in society more generally. How various lobotomy studies define improvement, cure, and related concepts was examined, revealing that

social adjustment was at the heart of quantifying the aims and outcomes of the operation. Then, it was shown how the operation aimed to reconfigure the relationship between patients' reason and emotion by cutting the connections between the "rational" frontal lobes and the "emotional" thalamus. For the practitioners and proponents of lobotomy, all psychiatric disorders came to be seen as disorders of excessive emotion. The aim was to allow patients to live a rational life, their intellect intact and unharmed, but their emotions adequately constrained. However, this is robustly challenged by modern neuroscience. Further, looking at Reddy's concept of emotion regimes, evidence was presented to show how lobotomists aimed to enforce an emotion regime derived from the prevailing social notions of their era. Namely, they wanted to reduce the intensity of emotion experienced by the patient and help them have more "appropriate" emotional reactions. Indeed, Freeman and Watts conclude their famous textbook with a call for a more balanced role for emotions, noting that a little anxiety and fear is helpful, but excessive manifestations harm the ability of the patient to function effectively. "Appropriate" and "normal" response was, therefore, a central aim of lobotomy and, here, patients' grief was often used a measure of their overall emotional response. Beyond this, female candidates for a lobotomy are more likely to be described as "hysterical", "emotional", "unstable", "ill controlled" or having "excessive worry" in their case histories. Lastly, the operation not only aimed to "correct" radical political views but also, by harming the ability of patients to feel strongly, robbed them of the ability to have or maintain such political or religious beliefs. In other words, lobotomy patients were politically neutered by being rendered less emotional.

Chapter 2: Case Study - Cognitive Behavioural Therapy

2.1. Introduction

Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was developed in the middle of the twentieth century and has gained prominence as the psychological treatment of choice for most mental health issues. It has become the only state-sanctioned and funded form of psychotherapy in the UK with most British psychotherapists practising CBT or CBT-informed approaches (B 2018). Some have gone as far as calling it 'the Western world's therapy of choice,' (Guilfoyle 2008, 237; B 2018, 8). As 'the dominant therapy now' (B 2018) it is displacing and overtaking every other form of psychotherapy, such as psychoanalysis (Guilfoyle 2008, 237; B 2018, 8). As therapist D explains, CBT is overtaking other forms of therapy because it 'gets good, quick results, so that's why it's so prominent'; it is a '"quick fix"' (D 2018). CBT is used in a great variety of settings, and with a great variety of patients, from 'the treatment of anxiety and depression', in those who have been referred by a GP, to 'the management of disruptive school children, and the rehabilitation of criminal offenders' (Moloney and Kelly 2008, 278).

There are two main and related strands of cognitive therapy. The first is Albert Ellis' Rational-Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT), most famously propounded in the book *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy* (1962). REBT, therapist B explains, is 'very cognitive, so it's got a lot of emphasis on changing thinking' (B 2018). The second is Aaron Beck's cognitive therapy, most associated with the handbook, *The Cognitive Therapy of Depression* (1979), co-written with Rush, Shaw and Emery, which is still used as a manual for therapists today. The Beckian approach to CBT is the leading one in the UK, and the most taught at university level (B 2018) and is discussed in greater detail in this chapter. Still, there are many practising Rational-Emotive Behavioural Therapists around the country, and the University of Birmingham hosts the *Centre for Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy* which is accredited by the *Albert Ellis Institute* in New York.

2.2. CBT Theory

According to a famous definition from Beck, et al.,

> Cognitive therapy is an active, directive, time-limited, structured approach used to treat a variety of psychiatric disorders (for example, depression, anxiety, phobias, pain problems, etc.). It is based on an underlying theoretical rationale that an individual's affect and behavior are largely determined by the way in which he structures the world. His cognitions (verbal or pictorial "events" in his stream of consciousness) are based on attitudes or assumptions (schemas), developed from previous experiences. (1979, 3)

In the simplest of terms, therapist B explains how CBT is characterised by the idea that 'your thinking and your behaviour is going to influence your mood'. Accordingly, 'CBT is concerned with helping clients to deal with irrational and disturbing *emotions*, and to cultivate rational, healthy, and proportional ones in their stead' (Robertson 2010, 3). Or in other words, 'your thoughts and your behaviours, interacting with the environment will keep you in an over-anxious, or excessively-down state, and that's what you need to work on changing' (B 2018). It asserts that cognitive activity produces emotions and behaviour, and because this cognitive activity and behaviour can be monitored and altered, changes in the type and intensity of emotions can be brought about by the cognitive and behavioural change. In CBT theory, a specific feedback and interaction loop, or 'circle' (D 2018) exists between thinking, feeling, and behaviour, but negative thinking is understood as the start of the cycle (D 2018), and thus of primary importance. As therapist B explains 'situations will trigger negative thinking…. Then, that affects your mood' (B 2018). Alternatively, as therapist D said, 'if we can't change that way of thinking, we're never gonna reduce the emotion or change the behaviour' (D 2018). Similarly, as therapist C explains, referring to Ellis' ABC model, there is an Activating event, such as being late to a meeting, followed by a Belief about lateness, such as that it may come across as rude and inconsiderate, and finally a Consequence, such as a negative emotion or behaviour, in this case, shame or embarrassment (C 2018).

Therapist B also argued that the goal of CBT is reducing excessive and irrational emotions. As they explained, 'that's where I use the thought records and get people to challenge their irrational thoughts' (D 2018). Discussing their own experience of 'irrational' anxiety which was treated with CBT, therapist D explains how they learned to 'think about it [the issue] in a more rational manner' (D 2018). Indeed, thoughts, emotions, and behaviours in a patient may feel rational to them, but to a rational outside observer like the therapist, they do not (D 2018). In this way, therapist D agreed that therapists have access to the knowledge of what is rational and what is appropriate because they are a rational person and have good control over their own emotions, or 'self-awareness', as they put it (D 2018). The therapist is 'looking at it

[a patient's issue] rationally' (D 2018). Indeed, they continued, therapists go through an ongoing process of self-analysis. As they said, 'You're constantly monitoring yourself and checking your own emotions and making sure that you're fit to practice' (D 2018). Moreover, therapist D asserted that even though people from non-Western cultures might not view their psychology through the lens of '"logic and emotion" or "reason and emotion"… it's still there, it's still how the human brain works', (D 2018). In other words, it is a universal reality of how the mind is organised.

Beck, et al. explain that 'a patient is able to recognize that by changing the content of his thought he is able to alter his feeling state' (1979, 148). In other words, 'when dysfunctional thoughts are subjected to rational reflection, one's emotions generally change' (J. S. Beck 1995, 15). Alternatively, as Ellis put it, 'if you change [your] beliefs, you soon change the negative feelings or emotions to which they lead"' (1962, 219). When CBT theorists speak about emotional change, they are usually talking about emotional *reduction*. Therapist B said that it is better to say that the patients' 'emotion has become "dysregulated" in the sense that there's too much, or sometimes almost not enough' (B 2018). In most cases, however, therapist B agreed, the problem is "too much" emotion, and the goal of CBT is to reduce the overall level of negative emotions, specifically excessive depression and anxiety (B 2018). The method of reducing these negative emotions is to use one's reason to look back on one's emotions and question them (B 2018).

Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that both Ellis and Beck have written about the influence of Stoic thinking on their approaches. As Robertson has written,

> It is important to emphazise that Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis, often regarded as the main pioneers of CBT, have stressed the role of Stoicism as a philosophical precursor of their respective approaches. There is only a relatively vague appreciation of this fact among many therapists, however… (Robertson 2010, 5)

Indeed, none of the interviewed therapists mentioned Stoicism. It is true that Beck's approach is influenced by the Socratic method of questioning and Stoicism very broadly. Although Beck did not seriously engage with Stoic thinking, he does include quotations from and references to Stoicism and Stoic thinkers in his work (Robertson 2010, 8). For example, as Beck writes, 'the philosophical underpinnings go back thousands of years, certainly to the time of the Stoics, who considered man's conceptions (or misconceptions) of events rather than the events themselves as the key to his emotional upsets' (A. T. Beck 1976, 3). Ellis made even more

references to Stoicism. For example, Epictetus' statement in the *Enchiridion* that 'Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them'[4] was noted by Ellis as of particular importance to his thinking (A. Ellis 1962, 54) and he even gave it to clients in early therapy sessions (Still and Dryden 1999, 146).

Accordingly, even though changing the patients' thoughts and behaviours may be the means, emotions are ultimately the target of CBT. This is because they are the 'immediate source of distress' (A. T. Beck 1991, 214), and what brings people to therapy in the first place. As therapist B explains,

> the target is always going to be the emotional state, because that is what the patient presents with. So, they'll say "I'm excessively anxious" or "excessively depressed". So, obviously there's a normal amount of sadness or anxiety that'll be appropriate for a situation. But, these patients are anxious all the time, they're depressed all the time, so it's become quite excessive. So, what you're trying to do then is to build up - is to change aspects of, you know, cognition, behaviour, possibly the environment, to try to being about a change in that emotional state. (B 2018)

Therapist B is stating that there is a "normal" and "appropriate" amount of sadness or anxiety for a given situation. However, it is not clear whether this can be objectively established beyond what the patient reports or what the therapist decides. Alternatively, as therapist C said, it is 'the Consequent negative emotion that is the problem' (C 2018). Still, patients understandably want help in reducing their intense and unpleasant emotions. Indeed, one leading CBT practitioner in the UK has written how, 'After all, the major diagnoses of depression and anxiety are simply another way of labelling troublesome emotions' (Clarke 2008, 38).

In Beckian CBT, there are several techniques that the therapist uses to try to help a patient deal with these troubling emotions. Patients are aided in identifying, "reality-testing", and finally, correcting the 'distorted conceptualizations and the dysfunctional beliefs (schemas)' which underlie the unhealthy cognitions (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 4). The patient does this by being helped to monitor their negative, automatic thoughts (cognitions), being shown the connection between their thoughts, feelings and behaviour (namely, how they proceed precisely in that order), is confronted with evidence against their cognitions, learns to 'substitute more reality-orientated interpretations for these biased cognitions', and finally,

[4] This is the translation used by Ellis.

begins to ‘alter the dysfunctional beliefs which predispose him to distort his experiences’ (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 4). Indeed, therapist D agreed that the therapist’s role is to help patients become better at understanding and appraising reality on a day to day basis (D 2018).

Ellis, meanwhile, carried out a very similar method, a process he called ‘disputing’. In “disputing” he challenged, often in harsh terms and sometimes to the point of losing his voice, the irrational thoughts that his patients harboured, which he believed were causing them to develop emotional distress. As he explains in one example, he exposed the irrational thoughts of one female patient ‘to the merciless light of rationality’ (A. Ellis 1962, 213). Similarly, in the case of another female patient he writes how he ‘vigorously attacked her idiotic notions’, and how he ‘very directly took this girl’s major and minor irrational philosophies of life and ruthlessly beat them – the philosophies, mind you, not the girl – over the head until, after three months of counselling, she decided to give them up’ (A. Ellis 1962, 226). Ellis was well-known for being harsh, straightforward, and uncompromising with his patients.

2.3. Becoming Your Own Therapist

As was discussed, a primary aspect of CBT is encouraging the patient to turn ‘inwards’ and ‘bring reason to bear upon the internal workings of the mind. However, this ‘turning inwards’ remains unproblematized, as does the position of the therapist, judging which beliefs are realistic and which are distorted’ (Bracken and Thomas 2008, 88). As therapist D explains, CBT is ‘about challenging your negative, automatic thoughts. It’s about looking for evidence to see how realistic your thoughts are and whether we can come up with, maybe, a more balanced view’ (D 2018). As they continued, CBT is ‘about looking for evidence about that thought, challenging that thought, and coming up with the more balanced way of thinking’ (D 2018). Alongside terms such as “balanced” and “realistic”, some thoughts are labelled as plainly irrational. For example, although therapist D would not say to a client that their thoughts are excessive or irrational ‘Because, obviously, that sounds a little bit judgmental’ and has negative connotations, CBT is ‘very much about irrational thoughts’ (D 2018). Indeed, they continue, ‘it’s very much about getting them [the patient] to see that those negative automatic thoughts are, perhaps, irrational without actually saying to them “well, d’ya think that’s a bit irrational?”’ (D 2018).

Accordingly, an essential part of CBT is instituting the therapist’s voice in the mind of the patient. This is especially important because CBT is a time-limited therapy, with patients

often having a relatively small amount of sessions. As Beck, et al. put it, once it is established, the patient '"hears" the therapist's voice 'beckoning them to show the evidence for their cognition, or to demonstrate "What is the most adaptive thing for me to do right now?"' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 29). This is something that happens in practice. As therapist B explains,

> Sometimes patients say "oh, when I was doing this I heard your voice! Like you were saying, 'why don't you try this and that?'" So, you do get patients saying that. It can be a good idea. But the therapist's voice is… with the patient when they're trying to do challenging things in the real world. (B 2018)

Over time, however, the therapist aims to "wean" the patient off depending on their voice, or on a therapist in general (B 2018). Accordingly, as therapist A explains, the voice starts out as that of the therapist, but if it is to last, it must become that of the patient:

> I'm not trying to make them hear my voice forever. No chance. I want them to hear their own voice. And for me, the reason my voice is important to them is because they hear something in them. So, you know, it's just me sounding out something that they haven't been able to sound out for themselves. But it has to be your own. If it's mine, it's not going to last. (A 2017).

As Beck, et al. continue, 'One of the powerful components' of their approach 'is that the patient begins to incorporate many of the therapeutic techniques of the therapist. For example, patients frequently find themselves spontaneously assuming the role of the therapist in questioning some of their conclusions and predictions' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 4-5). One of the ways patients do this is by using 'the skills and the techniques and the ability [given to them by the therapist] to recognise irrational thoughts in the future so that they can manage their emotions better when they're no longer in therapy' on a daily basis and in other situations (D 2018).

Another way is that patients incorporated the techniques of the therapist is by beginning processes of 'self-questioning' when outside of therapy, such as asking themselves 'What is the evidence for my conclusion? Are there other explanations? How serious is the loss? How much does it actually subtract from my life? What is the degree of harm to me if a stranger thinks badly of me? What will I lose if I try to be more assertive?' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 4-5). For example, therapist D explains, the patient begins to

> automatically… recognise negative automatic thoughts and challenge them. So, if you've had a bad day and you think "oh, god, everything goes wrong for me" and you think "well, hang on a minute, that's a negative automatic thought: everything goes wrong for me. No, it doesn't, there's been loads of times when I've had success." (D 2018)

As they continue, 'you've actually done your own CBT there without even thinking about it or realising that you've done it. So, it can become like a natural way of thinking' (D 2018). In this way, the process becomes internalised, automatic, and even perhaps unconscious.

Another way that the patient becomes their own therapist is by observing the therapist modelling 'self-care' and demonstrating the 'ability to question oneself without judgment' (A 2017). Alongside this, the patient has an opportunity to 'take home different options, different ways of looking at things, different ways of thinking about things, different ways of responding to their feelings when they *do* feel them' (A 2017). As therapist A added, 'you can definitely be overt about it [encouraging the patient to be their own therapist] in some cases', and there is 'That sense of taking the therapy space outside because it's outside that we want things to happen differently' (A 2017). As Beck, et al. explain further, the automatic negative cognitions can become "autonomous", and the depressed person can begin acting according to fixed, automatic patterns which they call "thoughtless thinking". Thus, this self-questioning is critical in helping to break this cycle (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 5).

Similarly, 'The most critical stage of cognitive therapy involves training the patient to observe and record his cognitions' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 146). These observations and recordings are done in journals, through homework assignments, and even using wrist-mounted counters to record how often they have an irrational thought. Homework exercises include telling the patient 'how to do a negative thought diary… and to learn for yourself that challenging negative thoughts using a diary is a technique you need to use' (B 2018). This activity could be described as trying to institute in the patient a form of self-examination and rational self-control. By meticulously recording, and ultimately, preventing "irrational" thoughts from being entertained, the person can reduce the likelihood of such cognitions triggering unhealthy and unwanted emotions and behaviours.

Accordingly, 'there's a real emphasis on homework' and 'trying to get patients to practise techniques at home' (B 2018). As therapist C exclaimed, 'If there's no homework, there's no CBT' (C 2018). Alternatively, as they joked, 'I tell people "if you're gonna see me

once a week then you get an hour off [from the homework exercises].'' (C 2018). In this way, the therapy itself is just a break from the constant need to observe and record one's cognitions in one's own time. Although humorous, this is indicative of how vital and constant homework exercises are envisaged as being.

The behavioural aspect of CBT, the recommendation of behavioural changes for patients, is also closely tied to fostering cognitive change. As Beck, et al. explain, 'for the cognitive therapist it is a means to an end – namely, cognitive change' (1979, 119). Thus, 'the behavioral methods can be regarded as a series of small experiments designed to test the validity of the patient's hypotheses or ideas about himself' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 118). Thus, 'By helping the patient change certain behaviors, the therapist may *demonstrate* to the patient that his negative, overgeneralized conclusions were incorrect' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 118). For instance, Beck, et al. contend, a housewife had depression stemming from her belief that she could not control her environment. They thus prescribed that she do some housekeeping 'such as making the beds, getting dressed in the morning, and straightening out rooms around the house, to demonstrate to her that she could, indeed, control the world around her' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 132).

However, some critics of CBT have gone as far as comparing this monitoring and correction of thought and behaviour to Bentham's Panopticon as discussed by Foucault because 'the client begins to regulate and discipline themselves in line with how the therapist would do this' and because 'clients take over the therapist's role and become surveyors and regulators of their own thoughts' (Proctor 2008, 252). In this way, 'the patient begins to think like the therapist and incorporates the therapist's view of what is reasonable, logical, and sensible' (Bracken and Thomas 2008, 88). This is problematic for two reasons. For one, it raises questions about the power relations between therapist and patient, and about the patient's autonomy. Also, it is worrying because what is considered a rational or sensible thought, feeling or behaviour is a genuinely normative question which is culturally variable and shifts over time.

For example, Ellis, in his 1962 book, discusses how he attempted to "cure" gay and transgender people using cognitive therapy. He explains that one of the very first patients he tried his cognitive approach on was gay. Ellis saw being gay, at its core, as irrational. What he called 'fixed' homosexuality was '*necessarily*' a sign of neuroticism or psychosis because as he explains,

> they rigidly stick to these activities while living in a society which (unfortunately or unfairly) severely punishes them for doing so. Fixed homosexuality is not inborn but arises when an individual is exceptionally *fearful* of having heterosexual relations, or is *fetichistically fixated* or *obsessively-compulsively attached to* members of his or her own sex. (A. Ellis 1962, 249)

These fears, fixations and obsessive-compulsions which drive people to "fixed" homosexuality, for Ellis, are signs of 'irrational and groundless self-criticism', and thus homosexuality is, at its core, a form of irrationality. Ellis is wrong, of course, he later repudiated these views, and homosexuality soon dropped out of classifications and manuals of mental illness. However, this case does show that certain behaviours may at one point in time be seen as irrational, but with changing social norms, no longer be classified as such. This brings up the question of what behaviours and attitudes are being classified as irrational by therapists today, which may one day be seen as normal or acceptable and no longer worthy of intervention.

2.4. Change Yourself, Not Society

Why is all this thought modification, behavioural change, and inward reflection favoured over, say, changes to a person's environment or situation? CBT theorists have several answers. They argue, for example, that if experiences were inherently depression-causing, they would cause the same or similar symptoms in all who experience them, but they often do not. As they explain, 'Unpleasant – even extremely adverse – life situations do not necessarily produce a depression unless the person is particularly sensitive to the specific type of situation because of the nature of his cognitive organization' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 16). Accordingly, as therapist A says, 'life events *show* where we are unwell', they bring out something pre-existing in the personality, but they do not cause people to be unwell (A 2017). Because of this, the world cannot, or should not, be altered. As Robertson explains,

> it might be better, and more accurate, for [patients] to "blame" their depressed mood on their own way of looking at the world, their own judgements and automatic thoughts. While there is little we can do to change the face of the world itself, we can take

> *responsibility* for our own thoughts and attitudes, and, with some effort, learn to change them' (Robertson 2010, 3).

Thus, CBT practitioners have a particular, "realist" view of the world and the possibility, and desirability, of environmental change. Ellis talks about 'this grimly realistic world' and how patients have to 'accept' and 'confront' reality, often in what appear to be patronising tones (A. Ellis 1962, 207; 229; 230). As was just discussed, although he admitted that gay people were discriminated in his time, he still targeted their sexual orientation and behaviour, instead of, for example, advocating greater acceptance.

Moreover, in transcripts of his discussion with patients, Ellis frequently repeats the mantra that just because they find something unpleasant, it does not mean that it can, or should, be changed. As Ellis lectured a man who disliked a particular part of his job and resented his boss for making him do it,

> For the full sentence that you are saying actually goes something like this: 'Because *I* dislike doing this thing, *other people* and the *universe* should be so considerate of me that they should never make me do what I dislike.' But, of course, this sentence doesn't make any sense: for why *should* other people and the universe be that considerate of you? It might be nice if they were. But why the devil *should* they be? In order for your sentence to be true, the entire universe, and all the people in it, would really have to revolve around and be uniquely considerate of you. (A. Ellis 1962, 97)

If it appears that this sounds like a harsh parent scolding a child, it may be because Ellis himself saw it in the same way, arguing that irrational adults behave and think like big children. It is clear, too, that Ellis is exaggerating greatly when he says that a problem at work requires the whole universe and the entire human race to have special consideration for that particular individual. It appears that, at least in this case, Ellis is delegitimising the complaint of the patient.

Of course, these are all profoundly normative questions, and the fact that CBT practitioners counsel little to no environmental change is particularly controversial because the ideologies implicit in medical practices are often veiled by their "scientific", ostensibly factual, and value-free nature. Put another way, an outlook which states that there is little that can be done to change the world, and that people must thus take personal responsibility is inherently conservative, and when coming from qualified therapists, has the veneer of "science".

CBT practitioners frequently stress that, unlike some types of psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, CBT is concerned with the "here and now." By this, they mean that the 'major thrust is toward investigating the patient's thinking and feeling during the therapy session and between therapy sessions' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 7). As Beck, et al. explain, the patient's childhood experiences are only discussed to the extent that they 'clarify present observations' (1979, 7). Similarly, therapist D explains how CBT suits their 'solution-focused' personality because it is 'obviously in the "here and now" and not really looking back at the past and going, delving deep into your history' (D 2018). In other words, CBT can help with the everyday, "here and now" problems and quite quick results' (D 2018). Indeed, they defined CBT as

> a way of working with what's affecting you now. So, we're not gonna look at your childhood or your past or anything like that. We'll look at what's happening for you now, and we'll try and work to improve your symptoms and make you feel a bit better. So, with CBT, we can teach you some tools and techniques which might help you to reduce your anxiety or manage your anxiety a bit better. But, it's very much about the "here and now" rather than delving into your past. (D 2018)

Or as therapist A explains, 'For most people… repairing that [the bad adaptations picked up during childhood] in *itself* is not really where the key is. For most people, repairing what is happening now in their lives is where the key is' (A 2017). Even more interestingly, CBT practitioners admit to having little interest in exploring or intervening on the "ultimate" causes of mental illness. As Beck, et al., write, 'the cognitive model… does not address itself to the question of the possible *ultimate etiology* or cause of unipolar depression…' for example (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 19).

Worryingly, even some therapists who use CBT techniques believe that it is a "quick fix" or "sticking plaster" solution. As therapist D explains,

> CBT gets you the "quick fix". So, for the NHS with waiting lists and everything the quicker they can turn people around the better. But, the way I describe CBT is: if you think you've got a wound on your arm, it's like the sticking plaster. But, if we don't actually use some of the other types of therapy like psychodynamic or person-centred to look at the wound underneath and actually *heal* that wound, it's gonna keep coming. So, with CBT it's quite common that people will have six or eight sessions, go off and end up back on the waiting list and then have another six or eight sessions and go on

> and end up back on the waiting list 'cos they're actually not *dealing* with the underlying issues and the underlying problems. (D 2018)

Alternatively, as they said later,

> that would be my criticism, that it's just a quick fix, it doesn't deal with underlying issues and problems, and then that's when I find people can still have the same presenting problems a number of times. It's great for the here and now but if you don't understand *why* you respond in a certain way, *why* you behave in a certain way, why you *think* a certain way then you're always carry on behaving like that' (D 2018).

A better approach would be a more integrated one, they concluded, which brings in psychodynamic and person-centred approaches.

One of the main reasons that CBT practitioners deal with the here and now is that they do not believe that those events or things that predispose a person to depression are either within their competence or ability to change. This is because, firstly, the adverse childhood experiences or various biological factors which they believe make a person susceptible to depression are irreversible, in the past, and out of reach. As one CBT textbook explains, 'Often difficulties are rooted in the past as well as in a person's genetic predisposition, neither of which are directly treatable' (Skinner and Wrycraft 2014, 21). Secondly, therapists believe environmental change is not their responsibility, or within their power. As one CBT practitioner writes,

> I can only agree with… others that therapy cannot cure the ills of a sick society, or transform the situation of an individual ground down by poverty, injustice, and a degraded environment. On the other hand, as a therapist I feel a bit powerless to fix the social malaise of contemporary life. (Clarke 2008, 34).

Indeed, therapist A, in response to the above quotation, said

> I identify with that statement very strongly, and I think my response to that has been to not try! …. Yeah, I'm completely with her on this. Nothing to add, nothing to take away. This is the situation that I feel I find myself in…. So, I suppose I'm happy to offer this space to work with the person in front of me, or the couple in front of me, and do what

> we can within a positive environment. But, in terms of the social world out there - that I think I find very difficult. I find that actually makes me feel very powerless. (A 2017)

As a consolation, therapist A explained how, despite not helping facilitate changes in people's lives, their patients are doing better nonetheless. As they said,

> when I see how my clients' lives changes, I think, "we're doing something good here!" And, the number of times I hear, "now, my world hasn't really changed. But do you know what I've noticed? This, that, and the other!" And, you're having people that are living more fulfilled and contented and satisfied lives within social situations that haven't changed at all. And, so, it begs the question: is it really the social situation that we should be looking at, or we that make up the social situation? Is that where the difference is? Is the difference in the actual content of the social situation or the social situation in itself? Because the social situation doesn't exist without those of us who make it. (A 2017)

This statement might demonstrate a belief that social change is effected through change on the individual level, rather than change on the individual level being effected by structural change, and still has personal responsibility as a focus.

Further, when therapist A says that 'if we had a magic wand and we could just, you know, eradicate all these practices that make people unhappy, bring it on, give me the wand, I'll be the first to wave it! But, I don't think growth and progress works like that' (A 2017), this belies a further belief that social change is difficult, or an unrealistic endeavour. Similarly, when the possibility of preventing the development of negative schemas through reforming schooling or parenting styles was broached, therapist B exclaimed that this 'sounds a sort of utopian approach!' which brings up 'issues about the right of the state to be… interfering in people's lives and doing these interventions that people don't really want' (B 2018). This, therapist B continued, 'kind of assumes that there is some way you could make all families completely healthy and there never being any stress, never being any criticism…. it seems too ambitious to me' (B 2018). Indeed, attempting to reform the family is a type of manipulation, a form of social engineering that can go wrong (B 2018). As they continue,

> That doesn't feel like something that the state should be really involved in unless people are… wanting help…. generally, I think, if people are asking for some help then they

can get it, but it's not the state's role to be trying to… micromanage all families in the country. That would seem quite ridiculous and intrusive. (B 2018)

Early intervention, and greater children's mental health provision would be a better bet, therapist B, says. Indeed, they stated that 'we do quite well in this country, you know. We've got quite a reasonably stable country, and we've got reasonable support systems for people and hard to think it could be improved dramatically' (B 2018). Perhaps, then, social change is not even necessary. Continuing, therapist B also says that 'There's always gonna be mental health problems, it's like trying to get rid of murder, it's never gonna happen. There'll always be problems, and I'm not completely sure you *can* prevent them actually' (B 2018). This, again, belies a certain belief about the difficulty or impossibility of achieving meaningful social change.

As for the issue of the therapist's responsibility and competence to effect social change, therapist A commented on how

> I don't think it's our role, actually. I think our role is primarily to meet the person and the people who come to us for an alternative space to do the therapy work that they need. I believe that's our role. Now, if we have things to say to the social context then I think we should address it in social context, and we can use the work we do and what we know from, sort of, people that are on the ground, people that're experiencing it, the, sort of "ground level people". We can use them as examples of what we're trying to address in society. But, I don't think it's right for us to use our clients as, sort of, pawns toward social change. And, I sit with a client who is rich and runs their own business, and has X, Y, Z, employees and this and that - and thinking that I am going to change the social world by telling this person that: "do you know how people who are on minimum wage suffer? You know, we really need to move it up to living wage!" And make it a political debate. I don't think that's what therapy is. But if I want to speak to political debate and if I want to talk about living conditions and the differences between minimum wage and living wage, I can do that. But I need to do that in that context and I can use my experience as, you know, evidence-base for that. (A 2017, 12)

Similarly, therapist A explained how 'it's one thing to sit here with people, and have this wonderful psychotherapeutic environment and do all this, but actually, it's the outside world where the rubber hits the road' (A 2017, 1). Thus, social change cannot and should not

happen in the space of the office, and it is improper to try to affect it in the role as a therapist. As therapist A continues, 'it would happen in its own rightful context because that's not therapy' (A 2017). This is, of course, a valid principle. No one is advocating that patients should be used by therapists as a means to effect social change that the therapist favours. Yet, to what extent someone feels powerless to help fix social problems is itself a political question. Is this therapist really powerless? Indeed, it could be argued that a therapist, as someone with a higher education and everyday experience of mental distress, may be in a greater position to affect social change than many others. Further, as already mentioned, encouraging patients to change their thinking instead of their environment is already a political project. However, as it is carried out within the nexus of objectivity and science, it is depoliticised.

Therapist B shared many of these ideas. On the issue of the responsibility or competence of the therapist to effect social change, they repeated the mantra that 'I think that's very hard to do as an individual therapist, because you've just really got the person in the room and you can just work with that' (B 2018), and that change may be unrealistic or impossible, as was shown. Thus, they continued,

> I think if a person has got very adverse social circumstances, that sometimes is the case, then… you would try to maybe help the person problem-solve that but it can be quite difficult to change those circumstances. So, I think it's hard as an individual therapist to do that. Some people - some therapists *may* think that. They feel that the problems are coming more externally. But that's probably not how I would see it, and I think - one, it's, you can just generally more work with the person in the room. And secondly, it's not really realistic to try to change all these social circumstances. And, I wouldn't even know how to go about doing it. So, I don't really say that's my responsibility in particular. (B 2018)

Meanwhile, therapist C simply exclaims that it is not within their role or competence as a therapist to improve contemporary life, instead,

> I actually see that primarily as the responsibility of politicians…. if we take happiness as the opposite of malaise, I see happiness as being the responsibility of the individuals. Your happiness is your responsibility…. I certainly don't see global society, societal malaise as being the responsibility of CBTists' (C 2018).

Another reason that CBT does not concern itself with ultimate causes, or prescribe many environmental changes, is that patients vary in how much their symptoms can be alleviated (or made worse) by other people, and because of the fact that, for example, ‘Some depressions are relatively nonreactive and proceed along an inexorable path despite favorable environmental influences’ (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 17). Alternatively, it is argued that those people who are suffering from depression are not in a fit state to make decisions, anyway, so making environmental changes during this period is not recommended, even if the patient is convinced that their life circumstances are at the root of their problem. As Beck, et al. explain,

> The patient often believes his job, family, or other outside situations are *the cause* of his depression and, consequently, that if he leaves the problematic situation, the depression will lift; but he is unsure of the wisdom of this decision. Another common type of problem occurs when the patient has some move – new job, new area – and is dissatisfied with this move. The patient believes that if he reverses the change, he will no longer be depressed. In general, the therapist tells the patient that it is unadvisable to make major decisions when one is depressed. In nearly every case, the major decision can be postponed without dire consequences. The depressed person is told that when he is functioning below his normal capacity, he is not as able to make long-term decisions as when he is not depressed. Also, he may view his life situation differently when he is over his depression. (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 185-6)

This extract is telling of the CBT attitude towards the cause and treatment of mental illness. It belies the distrust of the depressed person’s analysis of their situation, likely due to the theory that depression is the outcome of irrational and unrealistic cognitions. It also offers up the possibility that once a person has worked out their unrealistic cognitions, the seemingly troubling situation may now be reappraised, and therefore not have to be altered, preventing what may have been effective changes in the person’s life or environment.

As was explained, CBT theorists state that one of the ways that people develop a predisposition to depression is in the past and therefore cannot be intervened on. They do not seem to accept that new or on-going problems, such as spousal abuse, may be actively predisposing people to, or causing, mental illness. As they claim, schemas are not created anew with every incidence of depression. Instead, they As therapist B explains, schemas are ‘Something that becomes *fixed* in your developmental years’ which are then activated by suffering ‘similar stressful experiences or critical experiences in the real world’ (B 2018,

emphasis added). Alternatively, as therapist D said, schemas 'do tend to stay with you throughout your life' and are 'quite static unless you undergo some type of therapy' (D 2018). Nonetheless, as therapist B continued, 'if things are ticking over and well in your life, then they [unhealthy schemas] may be more in the background', but similar experiences to those which formed the schema in your developmental years 'could activate the whole… schema which is very strong and just leads to filter everything through that schema viewpoint' (B 2018).

However, this also ignores the fact that they could be advocating more strongly for intervention in children and young people growing up in adverse circumstances if this is where predisposition is generated as therapist B mentioned. Perhaps that is far too "political" for the average therapist, who reminds themselves that they only deal with the patient in front of them, their immediate "psychological" factors, and are not concerned with 'ultimate' causes of mental distress. CBT theorists are quick to remind the reader that CBT deals with 'specific' rather than 'global' issues (Skinner and Wrycraft 2014, 7).

If, in the final instance, circumstances and other people cannot *really* foster depression and if patients are socialised into the belief that all, or almost all, responsibility for their mental wellbeing and emotions rest in their cognitions, this can be used to justify the lack of meaningful environmental change, or the maintenance of existing social roles such as 'homemaker' and 'wage earner' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 117). As one critics of CBT put it, 'In the long run, this attempt to gaze into the client's 'cognitions' while downplaying the consequences of their world, their experience, and their history may have the effect of suggesting that oppression doesn't matter and that it's just the way in which you view it that counts' (Moloney and Kelly 2008, 284). From sociological studies into mental illness, however, strong evidence has been put forward that one's class position, ethnicity, and gender are strongly associated with the incidence of mental ill-health. Indeed, some have gone as far as arguing that stronger evidence exists for the social causation of mental ill-health, such as poverty and gender oppression, than that of its purely psychological or biological origin (Rogers and Pilgrim 2014).

2.5. Rebelling in the Right Way

That is not to say that CBT practitioners do not pay *any* attention to the need for the patient to make environmental changes to deal with what Beck, et al., call 'Impaired Coping with "Practical Problems."' They do, however, counsel a moderate, considered, calm, and limited

form of environmental change. In Beck, et al.'s book, although this section only makes up five paragraphs in the whole 400-page volume, they explain that,

> The patient frequently presents practical problems he is encountering in his life. These might be difficulty in finding a job, problems with parenting, or general organizational problems. These practical problems… require that the patient do something to change his environment. *The therapist has to be able to discriminate between the patient's real problems and the patient's distortion of events*. These practical problems shouldn't be avoided simply because of their nonpsychological nature. Solving practical problems often can ameliorate or lessen psychological problems. In a number of cases, psychological problems develop out of unresolved practical problems. (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 204, emphasis added)

The italicised part of the extract reveals, again, a belief that patients often misappraise and exaggerate their own experiences. Still, one patient, they tell us, 'was able to avoid lengthy therapy by use of a simple intervention. The woman came to therapy complaining of fatigue and inability to cope with her everyday duties' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 204). It turned out that 'she was spending nearly all of her time chauffeuring five children to various activities. This left her little time for her other duties and virtually no free time. After she took the therapist's suggestion to hire a driver for her children, her psychological symptoms quickly disappeared' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 204). This is the kind of environmental change which Beck, et al., think is demonstrative of their approach. However, it is worth asking how many patients can hire a driver to prevent the need to see a therapist.

Alternatively, in a later chapter on 'Technical Problems' in therapy, they describe a series of challenging and frequently encountered problem patients. For instance, some patients claim that '"*I'm not depressed because I distort reality, but because things really are bad. Anyone would become depressed.*"' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 300). Beck, et al., respond that the therapist cannot know immediately if the patient is correct, namely, whether things really are as bad as they report. It must be noted, however, that they doubt the testimony of depressed people, who are apt to exaggerate or misappraise a situation, as was already mentioned. Even more importantly, Beck, et al., argue that the second part of the contention, that anyone would become depressed, is merely incorrect. As they say, 'Most people become frustrated and unhappy over negative events but *do not become clinically depressed*' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 300) so not 'everyone' would be affected in the same way, as the patient claimed.

Crucially, in the final instance, 'If the patient had a problem that is beyond the therapist's competence, he should not hesitate in referring the patient to an expert. This referral might be for medical, legal, financial, or vocational consultation' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 204). This statement further reveals the extent to which CBT practitioners wish to attempt to prescribe environmental changes to patients. If it cannot be immediately remedied by the therapist's advice and by the patient on their own, the therapist's only responsibility is to refer the patient to other services and authorities. As they explain, 'One therapist, for example, referred a battered wife to a women's organization that provided support in this area and to the District Attorney's office for legal help' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 300). Or, as therapist C explains, if a patient's relationship with their spouse or employer is negative, the therapy can be put on 'hold', and the patient should rather 'be speaking to an employment lawyer or a family lawyer or a relationship counsellor' (C 2018, 14).

In the same chapter, Beck, et al., give another problem example. A patient may claim that '*"You can't treat my depression without seeing my wife, too. She caused the depression."*' They answer this by saying that the way to deal with this type of problem patient is to address the 'fallacy' that "My wife caused the depression." Instead, repeating a CBT maxim, therapists should 'demonstrate, in a variety of ways, that the interpretation of events plays a primary role in precipitating depression' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 307). Accordingly, 'The therapist has to guard against the notion that another person can produce depression' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 307). Therapist D shared an exchange they had with a patient which exemplifies these points. As they said,

> So, I had a client not long ago, and she was dead angry, her issue was anger with everyone. And, she said "oh, and my partner... and he *made* me angry!" So, I said, "he *made* you angry?" She said, "yes, he *made* me angry!" And, I said, "he can't *make* you angry, he can't control your emotions. You control your emotions, and *you* can change how you respond to him. Because I'm sure, if he had a choice, he'd *make* you happy. And, just like he can't *make* you happy, he can't *make* you angry". And, she really thought about that, and she came back the next week, and she said "I haven't been angry. People *can't* make me angry; I've thought about what you've said, and you're right". (D 2018)

Again, the point is well made that the patient must take full responsibility for their emotions.

Moving on, Beck, et al. *do* recommend that the therapist sees significant people in the patient's life, such as their spouse or friends. In this way, therapists marshal the patient's close friends or family members to act as what they call 'auxiliary therapists.' The therapist can teach these significant others to 'help the patient to follow activity schedules, to monitor his automatic thoughts, and to question and challenge these thoughts…' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 308). As therapist B explains, using family members as auxiliary therapists

> works really well because, if you think that they're [the patients] only seeing you for every week or every fortnight, if you can get a relative onboard that will help them and encourage them to do the CBT therapy, that's gold dust, that is, that'll be really helpful. (B 2018)

Or, as therapist C explains, auxiliary therapists are used 'Often. If they are happy to do it. Sometimes, the significant others will come along in here to a meeting. We will agree interventions' (C 2018). Therapist D said, similarly, that they always allow significant others to come to therapy if the patient asks, while also saying, 'I do encourage clients, as well, to involve people even if they don't have somebody coming into the therapy session. I would encourage them to go through all of the material with a partner or a friend' (D 2018). Further, therapist C explains, the partner is not there to 'bully and cajole' but rather to see what the process of therapy looks like, to aid their understanding, and realise 'what elements of *their* behaviour is actually collusion' with the patient's negative thoughts, behaviours, and emotion (C 2018). Therapist D mentioned how 'in the beginning, when you're learning to challenge your thoughts, it can be quite difficult to recognise them. So, having somebody else that can be a reality check for you and, maybe, just say "well, was that one of those thoughts or is that real?"' (D 2018). As they reiterated, 'if you think about therapy, it's fifty minutes a week or a fortnight. The client, the patient, has got an awful lot of time on their own when they're *not* in the therapy room with a therapist, so, if they've got someone that can act in that way at home, then it's gonna help'. (D 2018). In this way, 'they can do the exercises together. They can challenge the thoughts together' (D 2018).

When it is possible to bring in a spouse, Beck, et al., caution against taking sides, but in the final instance, a spouse's disturbing behaviour might have to be put up with. As they explain,

> The therapist obviously can't force a spouse to come to therapy. In this case, the patient can be told, I can't do marriage counselling with one person. However, we can work on changing those things within your power that are causing you trouble. For the time being, *we will just have to take your spouse's behavior as a given and work with you.* (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 308, emphasis added)

Indeed, involving significant others might even improve the patient's relationships. As therapist D explains, the skills learned in CBT 'can help you be a better friend or a better partner because you're better at listening and you're better at accepting other people's… views and thoughts… without judging' (D 2018). Accordingly, therapist D agreed that CBT 'very much' becomes a way of life (D 2018).

Ellis, meanwhile, counsels a peculiar type of moderate and unemotional resistance to unpleasant circumstances. He is well aware of the criticism that could be levelled against his approach, namely that it might be seen as 'superficial in that it adjusts the patient all too well to his poor life situation and stoically induces him to tolerate what may well be intolerable conditions' (A. Ellis 1962, 361). This is a wrong interpretation of both Stoicism, and his method, Ellis argues. Only when events and circumstances are *really* irremediable should people resign themselves calmly and philosophically to them. As he puts it, 'When faced with a correctable and not too risky situation, the rational individual will tend to rebel against it in a definite but discreet way' (A. Ellis 1962, 362). It is clear that his understanding of "rebellion" is a mild one; it is a discreet action, which avoids an undefined "high" risk. Alternatively, he continues, the rational individual 'will fight against unnecessary restrictions and impositions; temporarily accept what is truly inevitable; and remain undisturbed whether he is fighting or accepting' (A. Ellis 1962, 363).

This is problematic for two reasons. First, the issue of what is *really* unchangeable is a hotly contested question. Secondly, the idea that one is more likely to successfully bring about change through calm and discreet opposition has been challenged. Ellis argues that 'Being relatively unanxious and unhostile, he [the rational individual] will normally be able to modify undesirable situations more quickly and effectively than if he wasted considerable time and energy fearing and fuming against the people or conditions around him' (A. Ellis 1962, 362). On the paralysing effect of fear, Ellis is probably correct, but it is uncontroversial to observe that people who have been "fuming" have brought about significant social change and that without substantial emotional investment in an issue, people may lack the motivation to act upon it. Moreover, the attitude to "rebellion" displayed in Ellis' work belies a philosophy of

life which he wishes to advocate. One that is on the whole accepting of negative situations through personal change, and cautions against any overt or "angry" resistance.

2.6. Gender Roles

Beck, et al. discuss two patient case studies at length which they believe exemplify their overall approach to therapy as they say 'it reflects a typical response to cognitive psychotherapy' (1979, 104). This is common, with other books on CBT using a single patient as an ideal exemplar of both a certain mental illness *and* how CBT works to treat it. This is a telling exchange between a therapist and a patient. The therapist begins, discussing the patient's problems:

> Now boiling down the various problems that seem to be troubling you, we see three main areas. First, you are disturbed about your son's problems in school…. The second major area seems to have to do with your husband. You are concerned that since he seems to be coming home late more frequently, he may have a girlfriend. You are afraid to broach the subject with him because he may confirm your suspicion. You also are concerned that if you ask him to come home early, he is going to take this as *more* nagging on your part…. Then the third problem is that you are disgusted with yourself because you don't seem to be taking very good care of yourself. You've let yourself go. You have been gaining weight and you generally seem to be out of control. Does that seem to summarize the problems? (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 101)

The patient then comments on what the therapist summarised. She says,

> I guess you are suggesting that I stop nagging my husband and blaming him when he comes in late. When I feel up to it, I guess I can try to inquire as to whether there is another woman. In the meantime, I can work on my depression and make myself more attractive so that I'll be in a better position to work on the problems with my husband later on. (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 101)

Beck, et al. write that 'This summary demonstrates not only that the patient accepts the therapist's analysis of her problems but shows that she is capable of volunteering constructive

solutions to her problems' (1979, 101). The gender politics running through this excerpt are clear and very problematic. They demonstrate how the patient is told to alter her thoughts, behaviour, and even appearance, instead of the therapist problematising the state of the relationship itself and how her husband treats her.

Very similarly, the chapter entitled a 'Typical Course of Therapy' and the patient it discusses is very telling. In this chapter, Beck, et al., discuss a '36-year-old married homemaker', mother of three, and wife of 'sales manager of an automotive supply company.' This patient was depressed, they tell us, because of the belief that she was utterly failing in her various roles of housekeeping, mothering, and being a good wife to her husband, considering herself a burden to them, and fearing rejection from her spouse (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 105-8). They say that 'The main theme of the patient's cognitions was her belief that she was failing in her duties as wife. These "duties" ranged from doing housecleaning to responding sexually. She believed that her husband would eventually leave her unless she "snapped out" of her depression' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 109). Not only this, they report that her husband was 'highly critical of her if she did not keep a "spotless" house and prepare his favorite food' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 112-3).

Through therapy, she 'became aware of her cognitive errors and was able to practice more reasonable responses to her "automatic thoughts,"' and thus 'observed a significant decrease in her depressive symptoms' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 111). By stopping to believe that she was a terrible wife and mother, and a burden, she began to improve. For instance, she realised that she did not, in fact, like many of the household chores and tasks she had to do, but grew to believe that she 'deserved praise for doing a job she didn't like rather than one that she "should" accomplish' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 113). The case also mentions that she would pre-empt criticism from her spouse and family by becoming severely self-critical. It could be speculated that this was a response to a long trend of criticism which had become internalised. Instead, Beck, et al., see the problem as emanating from herself, from her irrational cognitions whose origin is not thought to be environmental and relational. Following CBT theory, which states that outside events in themselves can never cause mental illness; Beck, et al. are implying that the fact that her husband was highly critical and demanding could not have possibly contributed to this her issues and in and of themselves.

Perhaps even more interestingly, in the same chapter, Beck, et al. discuss how it is essential to quickly help a severely depressed patient, because they, and their family and friends, depend on them fulfilling their social role. As Beck, et al. explain, at length,

> In the early stages of cognitive therapy and particularly with the more severely depressed patients, it is often necessary for the therapist to concentrate on restoring the patient's functioning to the premorbid level…. The rationale for this approach is based on the clinical observation that the severely depressed patient, and often the important people in his life ("significant others"), believe that he is no longer capable of carrying out the typical functions expected in his role as a student, wage earner, homemaker, spouse, parent, etc. (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 117)

This is a clear statement on the ethic underpinning CBT which, as was discussed, wants to adapt and optimise the individual for their given social conditions, instead of altering the potentially distressing environment.

2.7. A Western Conception of the Mind

One of the more interesting aspects of CBT is how it tries to institute the therapist, the therapist's "voice", and the associated mindset, inside the patients themselves. Therapists are in the business of 'Teaching the client to be their own therapist' (Skinner and Wrycraft 2014, 37), as was already discussed. This, alongside their advocacy for continuous recording and dwelling upon supposedly irrational thoughts, self-questioning, homework exercises, and the like, make CBT not just a momentary therapy but the expression of a particular philosophy of life. Namely, a very particular type of rational, self-mastery, what Ellis and Harper called living a "Rational Life" in the multi-million selling self-help book *A New Guide to Rational Living* (1975).

CBT has come under criticism, however, precisely because it advocates a particularly Western, rationalist, atomised and individualistic concept of the mind and its disorders. As one critic of CBT writes, 'Cognitive approaches embody the central assumptions of what has been called the 'Enlightenment project' which 'privileges the importance of reason in human affairs' (Bracken and Thomas 2008, 89). Cognitive approaches to mental illness also accept the 'central premises of rationalism: the primacy of thought over sensation…' (Bracken and Thomas 2008, 89). CBT is an expressed form of ''methodological individualism' and a belief in the possibility and importance of detached reflection upon the contents of the mind' (Bracken and Thomas 2008, 92). To this, therapist A had some interesting criticisms of CBT theory, despite practising it. As they explain,

> Our thoughts are always involved, and our feelings are always involved…. And our environment is always involved - that social aspect. We can't pull ourselves apart just because we want our theory to work. It just doesn't work that way. Human beings don't lend themselves to, you know, behaving this way so that the theory will stack up as true. (A 2017)

Nonetheless, as therapist A continued, criticising the notion of putting cognition first,

> I think assuming that if we sort our cognition we've sorted everything out is minimising the human experience to a thinking project, which is just not true. It doesn't even take a lot of *thinking* to know that that's not true! … If we're about the person, then we can't be about cognition only. (A 2017)

Not only this, but these approaches to the mind are literally foreign to other cultures. For instance, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that the

> Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against a social and natural background is... a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. (Geertz 1975, 48)

Meanwhile, some argue that one common conception of the self in China is seeing oneself as situated in a web of critical relationships, instead of emphasising a 'deep, hidden private self' (Kleinman 1988, 98). Furthermore, the self-critical language which is supposedly commonly found among Westerners with depression, according to CBT theory,

> seems to be much less common among distressed people from other cultural groups, including those who originate from many South-East Asian and African communities. This is because such cultures seem less inclined to favour the kind of guilt and responsibility-based explanations for personal unhappiness, that are associated with Western Christianity and the Protestant work ethic. (Moloney, 2008, 280).

Not only this, but some have also argued that CBT represents a neoliberal logic of therapy, because of its quick turnover of short sessions, how it prepares people for returning to work, and its emphasis on personal responsibility. Accordingly, as therapist C said,

> People used to say to me "why are you doing that [CBT] when you've been in commerce?" And I found that the training I had in commerce, you know, it's goal-orientated, problem-solving, it's just, the fit was *remarkable*. The fit was remarkable. (C 2018)

Or, as they simply exclaimed at another point in the interview, 'hey, I'm a businessman' (C 2018). Relatedly, as therapist B noted, despite saying that the patient is not being made to think or act in a certain way, they are encouraged to come to certain conclusions about their financial responsibility. As they explain,

> say the patient's over-anxious, and they've got a lot of bills, and they're not organising their bills, and avoiding paying their bills, and avoiding opening the letters to look at their bills and are getting behind. So, we might say "right, that's a kind of avoidance thing. What are the different options for you? What are the different ways to deal with this problem? What's the best way to do it?" We do all this in a kind of Socratic way, as we say, trying to draw out from the patient - we're not telling the patient what to do - trying to draw the solutions from them. Because that's going to get it a bit more fixed in their head. So, would hopefully get them to see it's not a good idea to not open the bills, and try and open them every day. I need to have a system of planning my budget. (B 2018)

In this way, the emphasis on personal responsibility is stated again.

2.8. Summary

CBT is concerned with helping clients to deal with irrational and disturbing emotions and to cultivate rational, healthy, and proportional ones. It asserts that cognitive activity produces emotions and behaviour, and because this cognitive activity and behaviour can be monitored and altered, changes in the type and intensity of emotions can be brought about by the cognitive

and behavioural change. In other words, by changing the content of their thoughts, or reflecting rationally on them, people can change their emotions. It is these disturbing emotions, ultimately, that are the target of CBT even though changing patients' thoughts and behaviours is the means. Patients are aided in correcting the 'distorted conceptualizations and the dysfunctional beliefs (schemas)' which underlie their unhealthy cognitions. CBT is concerned with encouraging the patient to turn 'inwards' and 'bring reason to bear upon the internal workings of the mind. Accordingly, an important part of CBT is instituting the therapist's voice "in" the mind of the patient. It is hoped that the patient will eventually take on the therapist's role in managing their own cognitions and emotions going forward – what is called 'self-questioning'. There is also an ample space for homework activities that involve recording, and ultimately, thwarting "irrational" cognitions. CBT practitioners display a "realist" view of the world and the possibility, and desirability, of environmental change. Relatedly, CBT practitioners frequently stress that CBT is concerned with the "here and now." Worryingly, even some therapists who use the technique believe that it is a "quick fix" or "sticking plaster" solution which cannot deal with root causes. One of the main reasons for this is that CBT practitioners do not believe that those events or things that predispose a person to depression are either within the competency, or ability, of the therapist to change. That is not to say that CBT practitioners do not pay *any* attention to the need for the patient to make environmental changes but only limited and moderate ones. Further, two case studies which were said to exemplify the CBT approach were examined. These cases were shown to have regressive gender politics which instruct female patients to alter their thoughts, behaviour, and even appearance, instead of examining the state of the family relationship itself. In the final instance, it appears that CBT is not just a momentary therapy but the expression of a particular philosophy of life. Namely, a very particular type of rational, self-mastery what Ellis called living a "Rational Life.

Case Study Discussion

Now that both lobotomy and CBT have been examined at length, it is possible to discuss their affinities and divergences. In a way, the determinism which is at the heart of CBT is the exact opposite of the lobotomy theorists'. Yet, it has a similar outcome of trying to foster emotional self-control and rational living. CBT theorists believe that there is a mostly one-way relationship between thoughts and feelings (and thus behaviour). While lobotomists believed that excessive emotions emanating from the mentally ill person's thalamus imbued their irrational cognitions with sustaining energy, CBT theorists flip this around and argue that irrational cognitions lead to excessive and inappropriate emotions and dysfunctional behaviours. As they explain, for the depressed person, 'The meanings that flood their consciousness are likely to be extreme, negative, categorical, absolute, and judgmental. *The emotional response, thus, tends to be negative and extreme.*' (Beck, Rush, et al. 1979, 14, emphasis added). However, both therapies intervene on the mind, whether surgically or psychologically, and emotions remain the "problem". As was explained, CBT theorists state that brain dysfunction, such as the theory of chemical imbalance, can explain mental illness, and thus retain a biological conception of mental illness alongside the view that adverse childhood experiences can play a role. Not to mention that both therapies, despite being radically different, seek to remove "excessive" emotional experience and expression from the lives of patients.

This thesis now moves on Part II, which examines a dozen Western political thinkers from various periods and traditions and details their understanding of the relationship between reason and emotion. It will become clear, as each thinker is discussed in turn, which traditions and trends in Western political thought are most reflected in the practices of lobotomy and CBT. The next chapter begins with six thinkers, Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Epictetus, Augustine, and Hobbes who are traditionally considered "anti-emotion" thinkers who have starkly dualistic views about the relationship between reason and emotion.

Part II: The Reason Emotion Dualism in Western Political Thought

Chapter 3: Managing the Emotions

3.1. Plato - The *Republic*

3.1.1. Introduction

The Republic (380 BCE) was written by the Athenian philosopher Plato as a dialogue between Socrates and various interlocutors (Lane 2007, xii). It seeks a definition of justice and asks what political 'constitution' (Lane 2007, xv) would best serve this goal, with Plato famously advocating an ideal state ruled by philosopher kings. Important contextual events at the time of writing include Plato's experience with oligarchy following a coup after Athens' defeat by Sparta and the execution of his friend and mentor Socrates, which Plato blamed on Athenian democracy. Consequently, neither system, oligarchy or democracy, would suffice as an ideal or just political constitution (Lane 2007, xii). The former could not meet Plato's judgement of good rule (Lane 2007, xiii-xiv) while the latter was mobbish, unwise, disdained philosophising and was anathema to Plato after the "murder" of Socrates. In his hugely influential criticism of Athenian direct democracy, Plato marshals a theory of human nature based around the tripartite theory of the mind. This theory of mind, also serving as an allegory for social relations within the state, ends in the famous call for rational rule both within the individual psyche and between the various social groups represented in the state. To examine these arguments, this section begins by looking at Plato's theory of human nature and the mind. Then, before concluding, it moves on to examines Plato's arguments about guardianship and democracy.

3.1.2. Human Nature and the Mind

Plato's understanding of human nature and natural inequality is key to his overall philosophy *in The Republic,* so it is an ideal starting point. Plato develops the basis of his human nature theory - the natural inequality of humans, who have different inborn aptitudes - for the first time when he explains the origin of human community. In showing that this original condition would consist of several individuals in a division of labour, he explains that 'no two of us are born exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs' and it is better to stick to one (Plato 2007, II, 56-7). This, as will be explained, is Plato's definition of

justice, understood as 'minding your own business' in the sense of doing what one is naturally suited to and 'not interfering with other people' (Plato 2007, IV, 137).

Meanwhile, the notion of natural aptitudes is developed in one of the most controversial passages of *The Republic*. Plato sets out what has been called the 'noble lie' or 'magnificent myth'[5] (Plato 2007, III, 115). Socrates attempts to convince his interlocutor of the need for 'a fairy story' to increase people's 'loyalty to the state and to each other' (Plato 2007, III, 117). Hesitatingly and self-consciously, Socrates proposes to tell first the Guardians and Auxiliaries, the rulers and protectors in his perfect society, and then the people, that 'the upbringing and education we have given them was all something that happened to them only in a dream. In reality they were fashioned and reared… in the depths of earth' (Plato 2007, III, 116). Then, the story continues, 'You are, all of you in this community, brothers. But when god fashioned you, he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers (which is why their prestige is greatest); he put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in the farmers and other workers' (Plato 2007, III, 116). Thus, Plato establishes the 'myth' of natural inequality. All within the community are fraternally bonded and have been reared in shared mother earth, but some are naturally superior. It is these superior individuals that are suited for rule because, the myth concludes, 'there is a prophecy that the State will be ruined when it has Guardians of silver or bronze' – in a word – the majority of the populace (Plato 2007, III, 117). The magnificent myth serves as a thought experiment for Plato with which he aims to achieve two goals: unity within the community, which he sees as an important good, while at the same time legitimising a rule by elites based on the notion of natural inequality. Lastly, although referred to as a "myth", it is to be taught literally as a truth to the populace who may not be immediately convinced but may be brought around in 'the second and latter generations' after propagandising (Plato 2007, III, 117).

To further justify the rule of some over others, Plato develops his famous tripartite theory of the mind. In an excellent summary of this notion, Plato explains how the mind of the individual can be divided into 'three elements, corresponding to the three classes in the state' (Plato 2007, IX, 319) mentioned above. As Plato explained earlier, 'the elements and traits that belong to a state must also exist in the individuals that compose it' (Plato 2007, IV, 142). In the mind, one element gives the individual understanding and reason, the other 'spirit and enterprise' and the third, broadly, the 'desires' (Plato 2007, IX, 320). Plato's understanding of the 'desires' and 'appetites', and 'reason' is crucial to his overall philosophy in the *Republic*.

[5] In the translation used here.

As aptly explained by his translator, appetite in *The Republic* means 'the purely instinctive desires in their simplest form', while reason 'includes not only the ability to understand but to think before we act, the faculty of calculation and foresight, but also the ability to make up one's mind, the faculty of decision' (Lee 2007, 140-41). The third element in Plato's configuration is more nebulous, though Lee refers to it as qualities such as 'indignation, courage, determination, spirit and so on' (Lee 2007, 140-41). Further, the appetites, centred around their own insatiability, can be understood as a form of self-interest. As Socrates says, 'would it not be best to say that its pleasures and affections were centred in gain? So we could correctly describe it by saying that its motive was love of profit or gain' (Plato 2007, IX, 320).

To examine this divided and conflicted mind further, Socrates describes a grotesque creature. As he says,

> Imagine a very complicated, many-headed sort of beast, with heads of wild and tame animals all round it, which it can produce and change at will…. Add two other sorts of creatures, one a lion, the other a man. And let the many-headed creature be by far the largest, and the lion the next largest' and man the smallest (Plato 2007, IX, 331).

Combined into one creature, this being takes on the form of man; it is us. To do wrong is to feed the 'many-headed beast' representing the appetites, while starving the man, representing reason. Meanwhile, to be just is to strengthen the man, reason, so that he may rule over the much larger and normally predominant appetites, with the aid of the lion, spirit (Plato 2007, IX, 331). That is why, Socrates concludes, indulging the appetites has always been frowned upon; it 'gives too much freedom to the monstrous multiform creature within us' (Plato 2007, IX, 331)

Furthermore, using the allegory of a thirsty man, the *Republic* further elaborates on the 'civil war' (Plato 2007, IV, 151) between reason and the appetites in the mind. As Socrates explains, the mind of a thirsty man has the sole aim of drinking, but people are known not to drink even though they are thirsty. The cause of this, Socrates concludes, is that there is some element preventing them. That element is reason (Plato 2007, IV, 147). What this shows is that appetites do not need to be indulged; they can be constrained.

In particular, the *Republic* exhibits a consistent disdain for the appetites. In a telling passage, Socrates states that 'the greatest number and variety of desires and pleasures and pains is generally to be found in children and women and slaves, and in the less respectable majority of so-called free men' (Plato 2007, IV, 135). Meanwhile, 'the simple and moderate desires,

guided by reason and right judgement and reflection, are to be found in a minority who have the best natural gifts and best education' (Plato 2007, IV, 135). Not only this, Socrates describes as the central feature of his ideal state the notion that 'the desires of the less respectable majority are controlled by the desires and the wisdom of the superior minority' (Plato 2007, IV, 135). A state which masters its pleasures and desires, is said to be 'self-disciplined' (Plato 2007, IV, 135). This self-discipline is required because it corresponds to the 'natural concordance between higher and lower about which of them is to rule in state and individual' (Plato 2007, IV, 136). This is, namely, the self-disciplined elite in the state, and reason in the mind. Therefore, just as the 'monstrous multiform creature' (Plato 2007, IX, 331) must be ruled in the mind by reason, the mass of people, who correspond to the multiform beast in the state, must be ruled by philosophers, representing reason, with the aid of spirited "protectors" – the Auxiliaries.

Furthermore, in descriptions of the ordinary citizen - in a passage that Socrates' interlocutor describes as like 'an oracle on the life of the common man' (Plato 2007, IX, 327), it is explained how these individuals 'stuff themselves and copulate, and in their greed for more they kick and butt each other... and kill each other because they are not satisfied' (Plato 2007, IV, 327). In other words, Socrates is describing the common person as subordinated to their desires and appetites. Furthermore, philosophy is 'impossible among the common people' because it is synonymous with reason and objective truth (Plato 2007, VI, 216). Socrates considers that 'some of the unnecessary pleasures and desires are lawless and violent. Perhaps we are all born with them, but they are disciplined by law and by combination of reason and the better desires till in some people they are got rid of altogether… though in some they retain their numbers and strength' (Plato 2007, IX, 308). By these desires, he means the sort that appear unleashed in people's dreams when they are not constrained by the 'reasonable and human part of us' which is asleep. When asleep and dreaming, people's 'fierce and bestial nature, full of blood and drink rouses itself', lusting for satisfaction. People's desirous nature would drive them to copulate with their mother, to murder, and more (Plato 2007, IX, 308-9). As Socrates explains, 'even in the outwardly most respectable of us there is a terribly bestial and immoral type of desire, which manifests itself particularly in dreams' (Plato 2007, IX, 309). A limited number of men, however, of 'sound and disciplined character', manage to control and limit these natural drives (Plato 2007, IX, 309). They are elite philosophers. The average person is clearly incapable.

3.1.3. Guardianship and Democracy

In perhaps the most quoted passage of the *Republic*, it is said that 'there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed… of humanity itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers' (Plato 2007, V, 191-92). Philosophers are those individuals whose 'passion is for wisdom of every kind without distinction', and true philosophers are those 'who love to see the truth' (Plato 2007, V, 197-98). Knowledge concerns itself with 'what is *as* it is' (Plato 2007, V, 200) and ignorance, its opposite, with '*what is not*' (Plato 2007, V, 200-201). The philosopher is concerned with 'eternal, unchanging things' (Plato 2007, V, 203), 'the central and immutable' (Plato 2007, VI, 204). For example, in all of Plato's well-known discussions of 'forms' - which 'are what is ultimately real (as opposed to what appears or seems)' (Lee 2007, 195) - what is clear is that only a minority of people, the philosopher kings, can attain this 'highest form of knowledge' (Plato 2007, VI, 229). Meanwhile, 'most ordinary people', controlled and driven by their appetites, can only conceive that 'pleasure is the good' (Plato 2007, VI, 229).

In further outlining Plato's view towards democracy, some of his most memorable and frequently allegorical statements the rule of the ordinary people will be outlined. Firstly, the reader is asked to imagine a ship captain who is 'larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-sighted, and similarly limited in his seamanship' (Plato 2007, VI, 210). It is shown how some in the crew, demagogues, line up to flatter and mislead the ship captain, representing the populace at large. They lack any expertise in navigating the ship and, in the end, turn it into a 'drunken pleasure-cruise' (Plato 2007, VI, 210). Plato is trying to argue that great expertise is needed to navigate the ship of state (Plato 2007, VI, 210). In other words, the appropriate skills for the task of leading are known only to experts.

Later, in denouncing the actions of sophists, Socrates invokes the image of a man in charge of a large and powerful animal. If the man 'made a study of its moods and wants; he would learn when to approach and handle it, when and why it was especially savage or gentle, what the different noises it made meant, and what tone of voice to use to soothe or annoy it' (Plato 2007, VI, 215). Here, Socrates not only demonstrates his disdainful image of the 'mass of the common people', who are portrayed as a lumbering, idiotic beast, but also how they can be swayed, coddled and manipulated by unscrupulous politicians (Plato 2007, VI, 216). Thus, Plato shows his disdain for the populace and what he would classify as the low arts of democracy.

Lastly, Plato's analogy of the cave is often understood as an abstract treatment of the 'ascent of the mind from illusion to pure philosophy' and its difficulties (Lee 2007, 240). Yet, it also has much to say about Plato's notion of the ignorant majority in day-to-day life. The reader is asked to imagine

> an underground chamber like a cave, with a long entrance open to the daylight and as wide as the cave. In this chamber are men who have been prisoners there since they were children, their legs and necks so fastened that they can only look straight ahead of them and cannot turn their heads. (Plato 2007, VII, 241).

Different kinds of objects, illuminated by the light, are carried along behind a curtain, with their various carriers sometimes talking and sometimes not. The prisoners would be bound to assume that the shapes they see, and the sounds they hear echoing in the cave, are real. In a word, they would likely believe they saw 'the whole truth' (Plato 2007, VII, 241). If one of the men were freed and hesitatingly and forcedly made his way out of the cave and into the light outside he would at first be blinded by the raw reality, represented by the sun's rays, but he would slowly start to discern things as they really are (Plato 2007, VII, 242-43). Driven by honour, glory and duty, the released prisoner would return to the darkness of the cave to share his knowledge. However, the other prisoners would accuse *him* of ignorance, as they are still holding onto mere appearances, and if they could, they would murder him (Plato 2007, VII, 243-44).

Plato is perhaps only presenting an allegory of the mind's difficult ascent into intelligibility of the form and the role of philosophers. However, when Socrates' interlocutor expresses scepticism about the cave analogy, Socrates announces that these examples are 'drawn from life', or in a literal translation, are 'like us'. (Plato 2007, VI, 214; see Translator's note no. 73, 401) Though the meaning of this comment is disputed (Lee 2007, Translator's note no. 73, 401), at the very least what it conveys is that ordinary people are often uncritical and unreflective in their views, which are thus little more than a 'careless acceptance of appearances' (Crombie 1962, cited in Lee 2007, 401). Plato is thus making a statement about ordinary people or people in general. After all, the cave analogy is introduced with the solemn words 'I want you to go to picture the enlightenment or ignorance of our human condition' (Plato 2007, VII, 241).

Plato's critique of Athenian democracy is one of the most vivid and influential critiques of the rule of ordinary people in Western political thought. The reader is taken on a tour of the

so-called 'imperfect societies' (Lee 2007, 275). It has been said that Plato's historiography should not be taken too seriously (Lee 2007, 275). However, his ideas about the genesis of democracy, its functioning and its corresponding 'personality' reveal much about his view towards the public and their emotions and desires and the need for rational constraint.

Plato shows how democracy has its violent and forceful genesis when 'the poor win, kill or exile their opponents, and give the rest equal civil rights and opportunities of office (Plato 2007, VIII, 292). In the following disdainful and mocking passages, Socrates explains how democracy is characterised by 'liberty and freedom of speech in plenty' where every individual 'is free to do as he likes' (Plato 2007, VIII, 292). Further, as people can choose to arrange their lives in any way they wish, this gives democracy the only positives Plato sees in it: its variety, which is like a 'gaily coloured thing' women and children enjoy looking at, which makes it an excellent place to go 'constitution hunting' (Plato 2007, VIII, 293) and it is charming 'in the short run' (Plato 2007, VIII, 293). Not only this, but democracy allows people to shirk their responsibilities. This is because no one must submit to authority, one can dodge war during conflict, and perhaps worst of all, democracy treats naturally unequal individuals equally (Plato 2007, VIII, 292-93). Above all, democracy is undesirable because it 'treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not' and it 'doesn't mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people's friends'; it is an 'anarchic' form of social organisation (Plato 2007, VIII, 294). Here, the relation between Plato's conception of human nature and how it corresponds to the dysfunctions of democracy is made clear.

The democratic individual's life, like that of someone who does not successfully order their mind and constrains their desires, shows 'no order or restraint', 'he lives from day to day, indulging the pleasure of the moment', whether that be drink, women, politics, all on a whim (Plato 2007, VIII, 298). Simply, this 'democratic man' leads a disordered, appetite driven existence, corresponding to the freedom to do as one pleases. Furthermore, in a characterisation of the assembly, court or any popular gathering, Plato is disdainful. The populace 'crowd into the seats… and, with a great deal of noise and a great lack of moderation, shout and clap their approval or disapproval of whatever is proposed or done' (Plato 2007, VI, 214). In such a situation, one is bound to be 'swamped by the flood of popular praise and blame, and carried away with the stream till he finds himself agreeing with popular ideas of what is admirable or disgraceful, behaving like the crowd and becoming one of them' (Plato 2007, VI, 214).

Moving on to describe tyranny, Socrates asks his interlocutor 'what is the nature of tyranny? It's obvious, I suppose, that it arises out of democracy' (Plato 2007, VIII, 298). If

oligarchy as a system is marked by the 'excessive desire for wealth' to the ruin of society, democracy too is based on its own excess: the desire for liberty. Thus Plato explains, 'an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny' (Plato 2007, IX, 299). Democracy leads to tyranny over several steps. A democratic society's 'thirst for liberty' allows it to come under the sway of demagogues who 'intoxicate it with excessive quantities of the neat spirit' of liberty (Plato 2007, IX, 299). Democratic society degenerates when this excessive freedom drives individuals to scorn those who 'obey the authorities' and eventually will 'disregard all laws' (Plato 2007, IX, 299-300). Popular leaders would then plunder the rich and redistribute wealth to the people, the rich would be forced to defend themselves and through a confrontation, the people, Plato says, would put forward a single popular leader who 'leads a class war against the owners of property' and in time become a tyrant (Plato 2007, IX, 303). And so, Plato concludes, 'from an extreme of liberty one is likely to get, in the individual and in society, a reaction to an extreme of subjection…. the most savage subjection from an excess of liberty' (Plato 2007, VIII, 301). Excess and desire thus define democracy, unsurprisingly, as its constituents, the populace, are naturally apt to excess and unable to constrain their desires.

Finally, Plato's definition of justice as doing what one is naturally suited for is related to democracy in the sense that although a builder and shoemaker swapping jobs is largely innocuous, if someone 'who belongs by nature to the class of artisans and businessmen… tries to enter our military class; or if one of our military Auxiliaries tries to get in to the class of administering Guardians for which he is unfit… this sort of mutual interchange and interference spells destruction to our state' (Plato 2007, VI, 138-39). Therefore, the 'greatest harm' to Plato's ideal state and the 'worst of evils' comes when the three classes interchange jobs (Plato 2007, VI, 139). This, by elimination, then, becomes Plato's definition of injustice (Plato 2007, VI, 138-39). The importance of this cannot be exaggerated. The administration of the state by the majority, a simple definition of democracy, is, therefore, the archetype of injustice in *The Republic*. This is because the lower classes, uncontrolled and prone to excess as they are, attempt to assume a task they are naturally unsuited for.

Overall, then, to help define his ideal state and attack the radically democratic social and political system of his native Athens, Plato developed the notion that desirous excess should be constrained by reason. This, however, was not a task that the majority of ordinary people could accomplish as they lack the natural aptitude for, or inclination towards, self-control. Just as the ordinary people are unrestrained, prone to excess, and desirous, their rule, democracy, would naturally reflect these traits, and likely develop into an even more unjust

form of government, tyranny. Moving from a call for self-constraint in the mind, to domination of a rational minority of philosopher kings, Plato planted the idea, built upon by so many of his philosophical successors, that the desires, and thus the desirous population itself which expresses them, requires rational constraint and management.

3.1.4. Summary

For Plato, because people are all naturally different and unequal, some of them are suited by nature to different jobs, and it is better to stick to one, Plato's definition of justice. People must be convinced of this using the 'noble lie' which establishes a narrative justifying natural inequality. This 'magnificent myth' not only helps to bind the community together but also justifies the rule of elites. Further, Plato develops a tripartite theory of the soul. According to Plato, one element in the soul gives the individual understanding and reason, the other 'spirit and enterprise' and the third, broadly, the 'desires'. It is not a dualism, of course, but the primary conflict is between reason and the appetites and desires in what he calls a 'civil war'. Crucially, for Plato, the elements and traits that belong to a state must also exist in the individuals that make it up. Therefore, just as the appetites and desires must be ruled in the soul by reason, the mass of people, who correspond to the appetites and desires, must be ruled by philosophers representing reason, with the aid of spirited "protectors". Beyond this, Plato denounces democracy using various evocative allegories. The commonalities across these allegories are that great expertise is needed to rule a state, which ordinary people lack, and how they are apt to be manipulated by demagogues. In the final instance, the administration of the state by the majority is the archetype of injustice in *The Republic*. This is because the lower classes, uncontrolled and prone to excess, attempt to assume a task they are naturally unsuited for and deliver the state into an inevitable tyranny.

3.2. Aristotle - The *Nicomachean Ethics*

3.2.1. Introduction

Barnes summarised the aim and structure of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (350 BCE) in the following way. 'Our task', Barnes begins, 'is to become good men, or to achieve the highest human good. the good is happiness; and happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue' (2004, xviii). This necessitates analysing virtue, pleasures, emotions, and conduct, among other considerations. For Aristotle, happiness 'is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed' (Aristotle 2004, Book I, 15). And when is a man happy? For Aristotle, 'if and only if, over some considerable period of time, he frequently performs with some success the most perfect of typically human tasks' (Barnes 2004, xxxiv). High among those typically human tasks is the use of the rational faculty in contemplation. To analyse Aristotle's views throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics,* this section first examines Aristotle's general statements about his understanding of the relationship between reason and emotion, and the various complexities he brings to the debate. Then, it examines Aristotle's practical recommendations for how the state, and particularly legislation and proper upbringing, can create people more able to act according to virtue, and experience and express emotions in a "correct" and "proper" way. The final examines his influential doctrine of the mean especially in relation to the experience and expression of emotion, where he argues that at certain times, and to certain extents, emotions are to be welcomed rather than avoided.

3.2.2. Reason and Emotion

Aristotle makes many references to the relationship between reason and emotion throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Although clearly placing reason at the top of the hierarchy, what is particularly interesting is that Aristotle goes further, and subdivides reason and emotion and discussed how, and to what extent, different emotions and desires are amenable, or responsive to, reason.

For Aristotle, 'man is a rational animal, and that his typical task is therefore rational activity' (Barnes 2004, xxxiv). As Barnes explains, 'The good man, or expert human, is an ace rationalist, either in that his actions are as a rule soundly based on excellent reasoning, or in

that he indulges fairly often in fine excognitions' (2004, xxxv). For Aristotle, in Barnes' words, the intellect, the faculty of contemplation, 'is the most complete and perfect faculty of the soul and is, in a sense, identical with the real self of man' (2004, xxxix). Or, in one of several examples when he speaks in spiritual terms about reason, Aristotle says that 'The man who exercises his intellect and cultivates it seems likely to be in the best state of mind and to be the most loved by the gods' because, he argues, 'they take pleasure in the part of us which is best and most closely related to themselves (this being intellect), and that they reward those who appreciate and honour it most highly' (2004, X, 276).

Interestingly, Aristotle does not seem concerned with precisely in what way reason and emotion are constituted in the mind beyond asserting, in agreement with others, that they are in some way separate and in opposition. As he explains,

> Some aspects of psychology are adequately tested in discourses elsewhere, and we should make use of the results: e.g. that the soul is part rational and part irrational (whether these are separate like the parts of the body or anything else that is physically divisible, or whether like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle they are distinguishable as two only in definition and thought, and are by nature inseparable, makes no difference for our present purpose). (Aristotle 2004, I, 28)

As he continues,

> the soul too contains an irrational element which opposes and runs counter to reason – in what sense it is a separate element does not matter at all. (Aristotle 2004, I, 29)

Aristotle also refers to other thinkers that see the rational contrasted with, and in conflict with, the irrational. For instance, Aristotle says that 'It has been said… that there are two parts of the soul, one rational and one irrational' (Aristotle 2004, 145). As he explains, 'in discussions of the subject', such as by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, 'the rational is contrasted with the irrational part of the soul, and those who take this contrast seriously actually believe that there is such a thing as injustice towards oneself, because it is possible for each of these parts to have its impulses thwarted to some extent <by the other>; so that there is a sort of justice between them similar to that which there is between ruler and subject' (Aristotle 2004, 143).

Yet, adding more complexity, Aristotle further subdivides the rational and irrational elements, although he still highlights their conflictual relationship. For instance, he explains how

> there seems to be another element of the soul which, while irrational, is in a sense receptive of reason. Take the types of man which we call continent and incontinent. They have a principle – a rational element in their souls – which we commend, because it urges them in the right direction and encourages them to take the best course; but there is also observable in them another element, by nature irrational, which struggles and strains against the rational. (Aristotle 2004, I, 29)

As he continues, 'Evidently, then, the irrational part of the soul also consists of two parts. The vegetative has no association at all with reason, but the desiderative and generally appetitive part does in a way participate in reason, in the sense that it is submissive and obedient to it' (Aristotle 2004, I, 30). Or even further, 'That the irrational part is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated by our use of admonition, and of reproof and encouragement of all kinds' (Aristotle 2004, I, 30). In this way, Aristotle shows how there is an internal mental conflict and that, even if the exact configuration of the two elements is not of great importance, the irrational element can struggle with, and be swayed, by the rational.

Moving on to the distinctions within the rational element, Aristotle explains how

> We must now make a similar distinction in the case of the rational part: let us assume that it consists of two parts, one with which we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and one with which we contemplate things that are variable…. Let us call one of them the scientific and the other the calculative part; because deliberation and calculation are the same, and nobody deliberates about things that are invariable; so the calculative is one distinct part of the rational soul. (2004, VI, 145)

So, there are distinctions within the rational element too.

Returning to discussions of the amenability of the temper and desires to reason of Aristotle discusses how one's temper may be amenable and responsive to reason to a certain extent, while one's desire is not. As Aristotle explains,

> Let us now consider the view that incontinence of temper is actually less shameful than incontinence in respect of one's desires. Temper seems to pay some attention to reason, but to hear it imperfectly…. temper, owing to the heat and impetuosity of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and so hurries to take revenge. For when reason or imagination informs somebody that he is being insulted or slighted, temper infers, as it were, that such a person is to be treated as an enemy, and so instantly takes offence. But desire only needs reason or the senses to tell it that a thing is pleasant, and sets off to enjoy it. Thus temper is amenable to reason up to a point, but desire is not. So it is more disgraceful; because the man who is incontinent of temper is up to a point swayed by reason, but the other is swayed not by reason but by desire. (2004, VI, 180-81)

Moreover, on the topic of resisting our desires, Aristotle makes a distinction between continence and endurance. As he explains, 'endurance consists in resisting one's desires, but continence in conquering them – two quite different things, just as avoiding defeat is different from winning. Hence continence is preferable to endurance' (Aristotle 2004, 184). Interestingly, this kind of resistance is linked by Aristotle to differences between men, and women, who are by nature less able to withstand pains. As he puts it,

> A man who fails to withstand pains which most people can and do support is soft and effeminate (indeed effeminacy is a kind of softness). … - but it *is* surprising if someone gives way without a struggle to pleasures and pains that most people can resist – unless his weakness is due to disease or congenital defect, like the hereditary effeminacy of the Scythian royal family, or the difference between male and female constitutions. (Aristotle 2004, VII, 184-85)

Thus, Aristotle argues that young people, and women, are more apt to be overcome by emotion, or lack the constitution to resist pains.

Along similar lines, Aristotle speaks about how certain groups are, by their nature, irrational. As he explains, there are 'those who are congenitally incapable of reasoning and live only by sensation, like some tribes of remote barbarians, are brutish; while those who are victims of disease (such as epilepsy) or madness are morbid' (Aristotle 2004, VII, 180). Brutishness, for Aristotle, which is characteristic of such tribes, 'is not as bad as vice, although it is more alarming, because it consists not in the corruption of the highest part, as it does in man, but in the absence of it' (Aristotle 2004, VII, 182). As he continues, one may resist or be

mastered by these 'proclivities'. Namely, 'It is possible in certain cases for a man to have these proclivities without giving way to them… but it is also possible not only to have them but to be mastered by them' (Aristotle 2004, VII, 180). Again, this highlights the element of mental struggle involved with dealing with the desires and emotions.

When speaking of the emotions, Aristotle categorises them as 'desire, anger, fear, daring, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity and in general all conditions that attended by pleasure or pain' (2004, II, 38). On the topic of children and young people, Aristotle frequently refers to them as beholden to their emotions, 'living as they do under the sway of their feelings', as he puts it (2004, IV, 110). Early on in his discussions, Aristotle argues that because a young man, or someone young at heart, 'tends to follow his feelings' he is 'not a fit person to attend lectures on political science, because he is not versed in the practical business of life from which politics draws its premises and subject-matter' (2004, I, 6). Or later, he writes how 'the lives of the young are regulated by their feelings, and their chief interest is their own pleasure and the opportunity of the moment' (Aristotle 2004, VIII, 204-5). Similarly, he writes how in those 'who are in the grip of emotion… fits of temper and sexual craving and certain other such excitements actually produce physical changes, and in some cases even cause fits of madness' (Aristotle 2004, VII, 174). Therefore, Aristotle is arguing that it is possible in some cases, for some people, to be overcome by emotion.

Moving on, Aristotle defines two forms of incontinence, impetuosity and weakness, again demonstrating the struggle between reason and emotion. As he explains,

> Some people deliberate and then under the influence of their feelings fail to abide by their decision; others are carried away by their feelings because they have failed to deliberate. For these are some people who can hold out against strong emotion, whether pleasurable or painful, if they feel or see it coming and have time to rouse themselves – that is, their calculative faculty – beforehand…. It is quick and excitable people that are most prone to the impetuous kind of incontinence, because the former are too hasty and the latter too vehement to wait for reason, since they are disposed to follow their own impressions. (Aristotle 2004, VII, 185)

Similarly, in comparing the incontinent man to the licentious, Aristotle rates the incontinent as superior because in him, at least, the rational principle is still to be found. As he says,

> there is a type of man who is impelled by his feelings to deviate from the right principle, but who, although mastered by his feelings to the extent of not acting in accordance with the right principle, is not so completely mastered as to be capable of the conviction that he should pursue such pleasures unrestrainedly. This is the incontinent man. He is superior to the licentious man, and is not to be called bad without qualification, because in him the highest element, the first principle, is preserved. (Aristotle 2004, VII, 187)

In discussing self-love, Aristotle defines that voluntary and involuntary actions, and continent or incontinent people, are classified as to whether their reason is in control. As he puts it, 'one who loves this authoritative part and gratifies it is in the truest sense a self-lover. Also, a person is called continent or incontinent according as his reason is or is not in control, which implies that this part *is* the individual. Also it is our reasoned acts that are held to be in the fullest sense voluntary and our own doing' (Aristotle 2004, IX, 244). Further, this type of self-lover is as superior to other forms of self-lover as 'as life ruled by reason is to life ruled by feeling, and as desire for what is fine is to desire for an apparent advantage' (Aristotle 2004, IX, 244). Therefore, Aristotle creates a hierarchy of dispositions or characteristics in reference to their ability to resist or master their emotions and be ruled by reason.

3.2.3. Taming the Emotions

In several places in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle criticises the "masses", and the majority of humanity, who are beholden to their desires and live a vulgar, "bovine" life. As Barnes explains, 'Aristotle deploys a bottomless contempt' for 'men who prefer the sensual delights of Ovid to the austere pleasures advocated in the *Ethics*' and thus 'abjure their humanity and choose a bestial life'. In the final instance, 'If they will not think as men, they cannot hope to act as men' (Barnes 2004, xl). Or, as Aristotle himself puts it,

> To judge by their lives, the masses and the most vulgar seem – not unreasonably – to believe that the good or happiness is pleasure. Accordingly they ask for nothing better than the life of enjoyment.... The utter servility of the masses comes out in their preference for a bovine existence; still, their view obtains consideration from the fact that many of those who are in positions of power share the tastes of Sardanapalus [an infamously sensuous Assyrian king]. (2004, I, 8)

Or as he says elsewhere, 'the many', because they live 'under the sway of their feelings, they pursue their own pleasures and the means of obtaining them, and shun the pains that are their opposites; but of what which is fine and truly pleasurable they have not even a conception, since they have never had a taste of it' (Aristotle 2004, X, 277). Similarly, he adds, 'those who try to get more than their share of these things gratify their desires and their feelings generally, and the irrational part of their soul; and such people are in the majority' (Aristotle 2004, X, 244).

So, how would the problem of the bovine inclinations of the populous be dealt with? As was already alluded to, Aristotle defined human goodness as a 'goodness not of the body but of the soul, and happiness also we define as an activity of the soul' (2004, II, 28). 'This being so,' he continues, 'it is evident that the statesman ought to have some acquaintance with psychology, just as the doctor who intends to treat the eye must have a knowledge of the body as a whole…. so the statesman too must study the soul, but with a view to politics…' (Aristotle 2004, II, 28). Thus, the psychological propensities of the masses, and their attendant issues, are a concern of the state in general, the statesman in particular, and also of the family, as will be shown.

Accordingly, the state must intervene because, 'just as a piece of land has to be prepared beforehand if it is to nourish the seed, so the mind of the pupil has to be prepared in its habits if it is to enjoy and dislike the right things…' (Aristotle 2004, X, 278). And why is this? It is

> because the man who lives in accordance with his feelings would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or understand it if he did. And when a man is in that state, how is it possible to persuade him out of it? In general, feeling seems to yield not to argument but only to force. Therefore we must have a character to work on that has some affinity to virtue: one that appreciates what is noble and objects to what is base. (Aristotle 2004, X, 278)

Thus, 'the whole concern of both morality and political science must be with pleasures and pains, since the man who treats them rightly will be good and the one who treats them wrongly will be bad' (Aristotle 2004, II, 36-7). Indeed, again referencing the emotional and desirous nature of children, Aristotle explains how desires and appetites are to be made docile. This is particularly crucial because, using children as a metaphor, their desires drive them, and their appetite for 'pleasant things is strongest', so 'unless this is rendered docile and submissive to authority it will pass all bounds' (Aristotle 2004, III, 80). As he continues, 'and just as the

child ought to live in accordance with the directions of his tutor, so the desiderative element in us ought to be controlled by rational principle. Thus the desiderative element of the temperate man ought to be in harmony with the rational principle...' (Aristotle 2004, III, 80-1).

Building on the premise that just as 'people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments', so, too, do people become good or bad through practice and habituation (Aristotle 2004, II, 32). As Aristotle continues,

> 'Similarly, we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. This view is supported by what happens in city-states. Legislators make their citizens good by habituation; this is the intention of every legislator, and those who do not carry it out fail of their object. This is what makes the difference between a good constitution and a bad one' (2004, II, 32).

In a similar vein, Aristotle explains how 'like activities produce like dispositions' and it thus of top priority that we 'give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age – it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world' (2004, II, 32). Finally, he explains how temperance is built up through practice. As he puts it, 'It is by refraining from pleasures that we become temperate, and it is when we have become temperate that we are most able to abstain from pleasures' (Aristotle 2004, II, 34-5). 'Hence', Aristotle continues, 'the importance (as Plato says) of having been trained in some way from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things: true education is precisely this' (2004, II, 35). Early training might be particularly important because once a person becomes unjust and licentious, 'it is no longer open to them not to be such' (Aristotle 2004, II, 63). Thus, 'it is easier to train oneself to resist pleasures, because there are plenty of such opportunities in life, and the methods of habituation involve no danger…' (Aristotle 2004, III, 79).

Continuing with the discussion of how to nurture goodness, Aristotle makes three key points. Firstly, he stresses the need to bring people up under correct laws because of the difficulty in training people into goodness from a young age. Secondly, he argues that the correct upbringing and supervision is not enough, it must be continued and supplemented through life. Thirdly, he argues that compliance should be achieved using pleasure and pain. As he explains,

> to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard thing, unless one has been brought up under right laws. For a temperate and hardy way of life is not a pleasant thing to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason upbringing and occupations should be regulated by law, because they will cease to be irksome when they have become habitual. But presumably it is not enough to have received the right upbringing and supervision in youth; they must keep on observing their regimen and accustoming themselves to it even after they are grown up; so we shall need laws to regulate these activities too, and indeed generally to cover the whole of life; for most people are readier to submit to compulsion and punishment than to argument and fine ideals. This is why some people think that although legislators ought to encourage people to goodness and appeal to their finer feelings, in the hope that those who have had a decent training in their habits will respond, they ought also to inflict chastisement and penalties on any who disobey through deficiency of character, and to deport the incorrigible altogether. For they hold that while the good man, whose life is related to a fine ideal, will listen to reason, the bad one whose object is pleasure must be controlled by pain, like a beast of burden. This is also why they say that the pains inflicted should be those that are most contrary to the favoured pleasures. (Aristotle 2004, X, 278-79)

Resuming the discussion, Aristotle continues to stress not only the importance of a good upbringing but also the need for 'reputable occupations'. As he puts it,

> in order to be a good man one must first have been brought up in the right way and trained in the right habits, and must thereafter spend one's life in reputable occupations, doing no wrong either with or against one's will: then this can be achieved by living under the guidance of some intelligence or right system that as effective force. (Aristotle 2004, X, 279)

Crucially, this system would be instituted by laws. This is because the orders given by a father have, Aristotle argues, 'no forceful or compulsive power, unless he is a king or somebody of that sort…' (2004, X, 279). The law, however, 'being the pronouncement of a kind of practical wisdom or intelligence, does have the power of compulsion. And although people resent it when their impulses are opposed by human agents, even if the latter are in the right, the law causes no irritation by enjoining decent behaviour' (Aristotle 2004, X, 279). Finally, Aristotle laments that 'in Sparta alone, or almost alone, the lawgiver seems to have

concerned himself with upbringing and life. In the great majority of states matters of this kind have been completely neglected, and every man lives his life as he likes, 'laying down the law for wife and children', like the Cyclopes' (Aristotle 2004, X, 279). He is arguing that all states should intervene in the upbringing and life of their citizens in nurturing the correct habits, as Sparta does.

Clearly, for Aristotle, 'The best solution would be to introduce a proper system of public supervision of these matters' (Aristotle 2004, X, 280). But this may not always be possible. In those cases, as was already mentioned, upbringing within the family should be utilised. In some ways, it may even be superior. As he says,

> if they continue to be completely neglected by the state it would seem to be right for each individual to help his own children and friends on the way to goodness…. The instruction and habits prescribed by a father have as much force in the household as laws and customs have in the state, and even more, because of the tie of blood and the children's sense of benefits received; for they are influenced from the outset by natural affection and docility. Moreover, individual tuition, like individual treatment in medicine, is actually superior to the public sort…. It would seem, then, that particular cases receive more accurate treatment when individual attention is given, because then each person is more likely to get what suits him. (2004, X, 280)

In such ways, Aristotle prescribes the role of the state, and the family, in creating people perceptive to living well. In some cases, this will mean steering them into correct occupations, or in others, perhaps more ominously, into learning to feel the right things at the right time about the right thing.

3.2.4. The Mean

The call to "observe the mean" is a crucial doctrine in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and put simply means that virtue is found in observing moderation - neither too much, nor too little - in one's actions and emotions. Interestingly, this is a call for restraint, at least to a certain extent, but not just restraint. At times, Aristotle goes to some length to defend the experience and expression of certain emotions, to certain extents. Further, at times he even seems to take seriously the idea that some things can indeed be felt too *little*, although this may be rare. As

he himself puts it, 'some thinkers actually define the virtues as forms of impassivity or tranquillity. But they are wrong in speaking absolutely instead of adding 'in the right (or wrong) manner and at the right time' and any other due qualifications' (2004, II, 35-6). There is absolutely a right time to show certain emotions.

In a clear, practical explanation of observing the mean in regards to emotion, Aristotle explains how

> it is in the nature of moral qualities that they are destroyed by deficiency and excess, just as we can see… in the case of health and strength. For both excessive and insufficient exercise destroy one's health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases and preserves it. So it is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues. The man who shuns and fears everything and stands up to nothing becomes a coward; the man is afraid of nothing at all, but marches up to every danger becomes foolhardy. Similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and refrains from none becomes licentious; but if a man behaves like a boor and turns his back on every pleasure, he is a case of insensibility. Thus temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the mean. (2004, II, 34)

That is not to say, of course, that the call to observe the mean should be taken as strict or arithmetical moral advice (Barnes 2004, xxii-xxiii). As Aristotle says elsewhere,

> The equal part is a sort of mean between excess and deficiency; and I call mean in relation to the *thing* whatever is equidistant from extremes, which is one and the same for everybody; but I call mean in relation to *us* that which is neither excessive nor deficient, and this is *not* one and the same for all…. In this way, then, every knowledgeable person avoids excess and deficiency, but looks for the mean and chooses it – not the mean of the thing, but the mean relative to us. (2004, II, 40)

Further, Aristotle makes it clear he is not anti-emotion, per se. For instance, he writes, 'a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed just for being angry; it is for being angry in a particular way…. We are not called good or bad, nor are we praised or blamed, merely because we are *capable* of feeling' (Aristotle 2004, II, 39). Indeed, it is strange, and perhaps unhealthy, *not* to experience and express certain emotions. As he continues, 'The person who carries fearlessness too far has no distinctive name… but if he were afraid of

nothing – not even of an earthquake or inundation, as they say of the Celts – he would be a maniac or insensate' (Aristotle 2004, III, 68).

However, Aristotle considers such cases rare. As he explains, 'Cases of deficiency in respect to pleasures, that is of enjoying them less than one ought, hardly occur; because such insensibility is subhuman.' (Aristotle 2004, III, 79). Later, he also comments on how

> There is also a type of person who finds too little enjoyment in bodily pleasures, and fails to abide by the right principle in this respect. The continent man represents the mean between this type and the incontinent…. Now if continence is a good thing, the two contrary states must both be bad – as they evidently are; but because one of them is observed only rarely and in few people, incontinence is regarded as the only contrary of continence – just as in the case of temperance and licentiousness. (Aristotle 2004, VII, 188-89)

In this way, people are, by their nature, more likely to indulge in excess pleasure rather than a lack of enjoyment.

How the mean is determined in practice is a sticking point in the doctrine and Aristotle makes the tensions clear himself. In one example, Aristotle explains how 'virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it' (2004, II, 42). Namely, the mean is what a prudent and rational man determines it to be. But this remains a problematic answer and displays a circular logic.

Aristotle also dispenses more loose and practical advice to get around this problem. For instance, 'anyone who is aiming at the mean should… keep away from that extreme which is more contrary to the mean, just as Calypso advises: 'Far from this surf and surge keep thou thy ship.' For one of the extremes is always more erroneous than the other; and since it is extremely difficult to hit the mean, we must take the next best course, as they say, and choose the lesser of the evils…' (Aristotle 2004, II, 48).

Furthermore, Aristotle recommends that people gauge in which way they err away from the mean based on what pleases and pains them, and 'drag ourselves in the contrary direction' (2004, II, 48). Moreover, 'In every situation one must guard especially against pleasure and pleasant things, because we are not impartial judges of pleasure' (Aristotle 2004, II, 48). Lastly, Aristotle says, 'one should incline sometimes towards excess and sometimes towards

deficiency, because in this way we shall most easily hit upon the mean, that is, the right course' (2004, II, 49). These are some practical, everyday tips for staying close to the mean.

Anger is frequently commented upon by Aristotle, with some understanding that anger is justified and, in fact, to be expected in certain situations. As he begins,

> In the field of anger, too, there is excess, deficiency and the mean. They do not really possess names, but we may call the intermediate man patient and the mean patience; and of the extremes the one who exceeds can be irascible and his vice irascibility, while the one who is deficient can be spiritless and the deficiency lack of spirit. (Aristotle 2004, II, 44-5)

Again, a deficiency is also to be avoided. As he continues, 'There are some things at which we actually ought to feel angry, and others that we actually ought to desire – health, for instance, and learning' (Aristotle 2004, 54). As he says similarly,

> The man who gets angry at the right things with the right people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the right length of time is commended…. those who do not get angry at things that ought to make them angry are considered to be foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right way or at the right time or with the right people. Such a person seems to be deficient in perceptivity and sensitivity, and (because he does not get angry) incapable of defending himself; and to put up with insults to oneself, and overlook those done to one's friends, is regarded as servile. (Aristotle 2004, IV, 101)

In this way, "correct" anger may play a role in serving justice, as without it, people cannot defend themselves and their friends and would be considered servile.

As before, however, there is an inherent difficulty in laying down a standard for the mean. Indeed, a small deviation from the mean of anger is usually excused, with only large deviations attracting censure. As Aristotle continues,

> it is not easy to determine what is the right way to be angry, and with whom, and on what grounds, and for how long. Indeed we sometimes praise those who show deficiency, and call them patient, and sometimes those who display temper, calling them manly, however, the man who deviates only a little from the right degree, either

> in excess or deficiency, is not censured – only the one who goes too far, because he is noticeable. Yet it is not easy to define by rule for how long, and how much, a man may go wrong before he incurs blame; no easier than it is to define any other object of perception. Such questions of degree occur in particular cases, and the decision lies with our perception. (2004, II, 49)

So, once again, as Barnes says in his note on this statement 'a person of good character *feels* that he is getting too angry; he does not, in a particular case, refer to a general principle of ethics' (Aristotle 2004, n. 2, II, 49). As Aristotle reiterates in very similar terms,

> it is not easy to define how and with whom and for what reasons and for how long one ought to be angry, or within what limits a person does this rightly or wrongly. One who transgresses a little (whether towards excess or deficiency) is not blamed for it; indeed we sometimes praise those who fall short of the mean and call them patient, or call those who show annoyance manly as being capable of leadership. So it is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision likes with our perception. However, this much is clear: that the mean state, which makes us angry with the right people for the right reasons in the right way (and all the rest) is commendable, while the excesses and deficiencies are to be censured – gently or more strongly or very strongly according to the degree of the error. Clearly, then, we must keep closely to the mean state. (2004, IV, 102-3)

This brings up fundamental issues. This tension inherent in prescribing the mean shows that the mean is a social construct which is dependent on people's perception, or what a "good" person judges it to be, neither of which are very convincing arguments.

3.2.5. Summary

Although Aristotle does not seem concerned with precisely in what way reason and emotion are constituted in the mind, he does argue that the soul contains an 'irrational element which opposes and runs counter to reason'. Aristotle speaks about how certain groups are, by their nature, incapable of reasoning. Therefore, the psychological propensities of the masses are a

concern of the state in general, the statesman in particular, and of the family. Accordingly, the state must intervene to help tame the emotions. Relatedly, the call to "observe the mean" is a crucial doctrine in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Simply put, this means that virtue is found in observing moderation in actions and emotions. Interestingly, however, this is not just a call for restraint. Aristotle goes to some length to defend the experience and expression of certain emotions, to certain extents. He makes it clear that it would be strange and perhaps unhealthy *not* to experience and express certain emotions. For example, he argues that anger is justified and, in fact, expected in certain situations. In this way, "correct" anger may play a role in serving justice, as without it, people cannot defend themselves or their friends.

3.3. Seneca – *Moral Letters to Lucilius*

3.3.1. Introduction

Seneca's *Moral Letters to Lucilius* (circa 65 CE) are a collection of meditations on a great variety of topics in the style of letters written to a close friend. Although it is disputed whether these were ever actually composed as letters, they nonetheless give Seneca scope to discuss many essential themes in Stoic thinking. To examine his arguments, this section begins by looking at how Seneca defines reason, and his arguments in favour of the need to live an emotionless life. Then, it moves on to discuss Seneca's view that the mind is crucial in creating the meaning of experiences, events, and phenomena, and how a pleasant change of scenery has no automatically positive effect on a person's mood. Then, this section discusses Seneca's view that people should learn to face whatever fate comes, and the various ways this can be accomplished through mental preparedness. Following on from this, this section moves on to discussing how the Stoical life is made more difficult by the influence of the crowd, and literature. Finally, Seneca discusses the value of study in whether it aids an individual in the goal of self-mastery.

3.3.2. Reason and Passion

Beginning his argument, Seneca states that what is unique to man is 'his spirit, and the perfection of his reason in that spirit. For man is a rational animal' (1969, Letter XLI, 88-9). The Good, for Seneca, is to have

> a clear and flawless mind, which rivals that of God, raised far above mortal concerns, and counting nothing of its own to be outside itself. You are a reasoning animal. What Good, then, lies within you? Perfect reason. Are you willing to develop this to its farthest limits – to its greatest degree of increase? Only consider yourself happy when all your joys are born of reason, and when – having marked all the objects which men clutch at, or pray for, or watch over – you find nothing which you will desire... (Seneca 1925, CXXIV)

This summarises many of the themes Seneca touches on. In the text, the attainment of the good can only be accomplished, in large part, by living an emotionless life - not one of moderate emotions but one *free* of emotions. As a definition, Seneca uses the term *impatiens* to refer to a 'mind devoid of feeling', somewhat like the Greek term *apatheia* (1969, IX, 47). He takes the word *impatientia* to mean a 'man who refuses to allow anything that goes badly for him to affect him', or put another way, a mind which is "invulnerable' or 'above all suffering" (Seneca 1969, IX, 47-8), a way of life that will be expanded on more later. Still, this, in a word, is the ideal for Seneca. As he asserts, Stoics 'condemn men who are slaves to their appetites and their lusts' (Seneca 1925, CXXIV). Thus, the spirit should be freed from the desires of the body. The spirit is, and should be, independent of the body (Seneca 1969, LXV, 123). The body is simply a 'fetter on my freedom' and 'Refusal to be influenced by one's body assures one's freedom' (Seneca 1969, LXV, 123-4). After all, Seneca declares that 'I am too great, was born to too great a destiny to be my body's slave' (1969, LXV, 123).

As Seneca continues, 'The question has often been raised whether it is better to have moderate emotions, or none at all. Philosophers of our school reject the emotions; the Peripatetics keep them in check' (1925, CXVI). Elaborating elsewhere, he explains how the Peripatetics would 'not abolish the passions… only moderate them' (Seneca 1920, LXXXV). Seneca defines the passions as 'objectionable impulses of the spirit, sudden and vehement' (Seneca 1920, LXXV). Seneca explains how passions pass over into vices, such as ambitions and greed, and from there, when these vices become established, they are called diseases of the mind (1920, LXXXV). Seneca, however, asserts that moderating the passions is neither possible nor desirable as a moderate fever is still a sign of ill health, just as a moderate amount of emotion would be a sign of a disordered mind (1920, LXXXV). Just as no animal can obey reason, 'so the passions do not follow or listen, however slight they are' for 'Vices are never genuinely tamed' (Seneca 1920, LXXXV).

The real prevailing of reason would be to have never allowed the passions to 'get a start' in the first place, not to attempt to combat them once they have become established. This is because 'if they get under way against the will of reason, they will maintain themselves against the will of reason. For it is easier to stop them in the beginning than to control them when they gather force' (Seneca 1920, LXXXV). Moreover, Seneca thinks it is misguided to believe that the passions, which have their cause and start outside of people and outside of their control, could then be controlled and end once they have been triggered. This is because once they are let in, like even a mild disease, they may lay waste to the body as it progresses over

time (Seneca 1920, LXXXV). In the end, the passions simply cannot be moderate or moderated (Seneca 1920, LXXXV).

At one point, Lucilius argues that it is natural to grieve and cry and to be affected by the opinions of others. Seneca answers that it is in the nature of every vice to be potentially defensible and that 'Every emotion at the start is weak', but with time gains strength and that, again, it is better, and 'easier to deny them admittance than to make them depart' because 'if you allow it to begin, you cannot make sure of its ceasing' (1925, CXVI). If one were allowed 'a certain amount' of any emotion, as Lucilius seems to be pleading, Seneca warns that 'the "certain amount" can be too long-drawn-out, and that it will refuse to stop short when you so desire' (1925, CXVI). A wise man can 'safely control himself without becoming over-anxious; he can halt his tears and his pleasures at will; but in our case… it is best not to push ahead at all' (Seneca 1925, CXVI). Most people are simply incapable of the wise man's level of self-control.

Giving the example of a teaching of Panaetius which said that people should not give themselves to love because this would mean falling 'into a state that is disordered, uncontrolled, enslaved to another', Seneca says this notion should be applied to all emotions (1925, CXVI). As for the common charge that this is an impossible task, Seneca replies that the issue is not that people are unable to live up to this Stoic ideal, but instead that they refuse to believe in their power to meet it, are unwilling, and would rather defend their vices because they love them (1920, CXVI). Or as he puts it elsewhere, vice has a terrible grip on people 'primarily, because we do not combat it strongly enough, because we do not struggle towards salvation with all our might' (Seneca 1917, LIX).

Interestingly, though, in a discussion about grief Seneca seems to soften his view and counsels that grief must be kept under control and to the proper intensity and duration, instead of being wholly eliminated or avoided. Lucilius has lost a friend, and Seneca advises that he should not 'grieve unduly over it' (1969, LXIII, 113). Even if total avoidance would be best, it does not seem to be the fitting counsel for a recently bereaved friend. Instead, Seneca advises that the proper amount of grief to feel is a 'twinge… but only a twinge' (1969, LXIII, 114). Tears are forgivable, but within limits, as 'When one has lost a friend one's eyes should be neither dry nor streaming' (Seneca 1969, LXIII, 114). Tears can be shed 'so long as they have not run down in excessive quantities and we have checked them for ourselves' (Seneca 1969, LXIII, 114). After all, excessive weeping is often driven primarily by people's wish to display that they feel loss, Seneca believes (1969, LXIII, 114). Even further, Seneca speaks of how women in his time had customarily been limited to mourning for a year, while 'for men no

period is prescribed at all because none would be decent' (1969, LXIII, 116). Even of all the 'pathetic females' that Lucilius may know, Seneca continues, none of them had their tears last for more than a month (Seneca 1969, LXIII, 116). This is part of a trend in this text which takes emotional displays and weakness as womanly and effeminate. Still, even Seneca says that he should be counted among the men 'defeated by grief' when he wept excessively at the loss of a close friend, but he is critical of how he acted then (1969, LXIII, 117). He does, after all, not count himself among the 'wise men' capable of total self-mastery and apathy, discussed earlier.

3.3.3. The Importance of Perspective

Another recurring theme in the text is that of the mind's importance in creating the meaning of experiences, events, and phenomena for individuals. Seneca quotes an unknown comic poet who says that 'Not happy he who thinks himself not so' (Seneca 1969, IX, 53). Elsewhere, on a theme he discusses several times, Seneca explains how cheerful surroundings are not the main contributors to peace of mind, and neither is a change of scenery helpful in improving one's character. Instead, it is the spirit itself which 'makes everything agreeable to oneself' (1969, LV, 108). Indeed, he explains how 'nothing is burdensome if taken lightly, and how nothing need arouse one's irritation so long as one doesn't make it bigger than it is by getting irritated' (Seneca 1969, CXXII, 226).

As an example of how little difference a change of environment makes to an individual's mental state, Seneca explains how 'I've seen for myself people sunk in gloom in cheerful and delightful country houses, and people in completely secluded surroundings who looked as if they were run off their feet' (1969, LV, 108). Or indeed, perhaps what a person travelling to a different place might really need is 'to be a different person', not to be in a different locale, as they are still taking themselves, the actual thing that requires change and intervention, with them (Seneca 1969, CIV, 186). After all, 'you're travelling in the company of your own emotions, followed by your troubles all the way' (Seneca 1969, CIV, 189). Travel is thus not what will 'make a better or saner man of you' (Seneca 1969, CIV, 189). Indeed, 'What good has travel of itself been able to do anyone? It has never acted as a check on pleasure or a restraining influence on desires; it has never controlled the temper of an angry man or quelled the reckless impulses of a lover; never in fact has it rid the personality of a fault' (Seneca 1969, CIV, 188). The solution, instead, is study and gleaning the answers of wise men

to the question of how to free the spirit ‘from its miserable state of slavery’ (Seneca 1969, CIV, 189).

Similarly, when discussing pain, Seneca argues that ‘Provided that one’s thinking has not been adding anything to it, pain is a trivial sort of thing’ (1969, LXXVIII, 134). In repeating to oneself how trivial it is, how it is ‘nothing – or nothing much, anyway, - let’s stick it out, it’ll be over presently’, one ensures that it *is* trivial (Seneca 1969, LXXVIII, 134). Turning one’s mind away from suffering helps, and if a person can endure torture by smiling, could it not also ‘be conquered by reason?’ (Seneca 1969, LXXVIII, 136). After all, as was discussed, ‘Everything hangs on one’s thinking’ and ‘A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is’ (Seneca 1969, LXXVIII, 134). Thus, one must

> steel your spirit and brace it against whatever threatens. For the only safe harbour in this life’s tossing, troubled sea is to refuse to be bothered about what the future will bring and to stand ready and confident, squaring the breast to take without sulking or flinching whatever fortune hurls at us. (Seneca 1969, CIV, 190)

As a great example of this kind of fortitude in practice, Seneca gives, as other Stoics do, the example of Socrates. The Athenian had taken nearly every blow life could inflict on him, Seneca says, yet ‘To the very last no one ever saw Socrates in any particular mood of gaiety or depression. Through all the ups and downs of fortune his was a level temperament’ (1969, CIV, 192).

3.3.4. Facing Fortune

As already briefly discussed, another important part of Seneca’s doctrine is to learn to ‘face the up to the blows of fortune’ (1969, XCI, 180). Because of the randomness and unpredictability of fortune, ‘we need to envisage every possibility and to strengthen the spirit to deal with the things which may conceivably come about. Rehearse them in your mind: exile, torture, war, shipwreck’ (Seneca 1969, XCI, 179). One must be ready not only for that which is likely but for all that is possible, ‘if we do not want to be overwhelmed and struck numb’ by such events (Seneca 1969, XCI, 179). Again, people must be prepared for any eventuality because ‘it is invariably unfamiliarity that makes a thing more formidable than it really is’ (Seneca 1969, CVII, 198). In other words, ‘the spirit must be trained to a realization and an acceptance of its

lot', with fortune never shrinking from anything, and affecting all alike (Seneca 1969, XCI, 181). As Seneca puts it elsewhere, 'Let's not be taken aback by any of the things we're born to, things no one need complain at for the simple reason that they're the same for everybody' (1969, CVII, 198). If something that one faces in life is 'an injustice decreed against yourself personally', then it can be resented, but if 'this constraint is binding on the lowest and the highest alike', one must make peace with destiny (Seneca 1969, XCI, 182).

In many respects, people must simply put up. Life is complicated, often painful, filled with suffering. 'Things will get thrown at you and things will hit you. Life's no soft affair. It's a long road you've started on: you can't but expect to have slips and knocks and falls, and get tired, and openly wish – a lie – for death' (Seneca 1969, CVII, 197). Put another way, 'These are the conditions of our existence that we cannot change. What we can do is adopt a noble spirit, such a spirit as befits a good man, so that we may bear up bravely under all that fortune sends us' (Seneca 1969, CVII, 199). There is nothing to be gained by cursing the inevitable and unchangeable. Thus, people 'should assume that whatever happens was bound to happen and refrain from railing at nature' fate, or the gods (Seneca 1969, CVII, 200). Indeed, what differentiates a 'noble' spirit from a 'puny degenerate' one is that the former 'put itself in the hands of fate' while the other 'sees nothing right in the way the universe is ordered, and would rather reform the gods than reform itself' (Seneca 1969, CVII, 200). Similarly, what the spirit can tolerate is tested in practice when 'it views annoyances in a manner not merely unruffled but serene, when it refrains from flying into a fit of temper or picking a quarrel with someone…' (Seneca 1969, CXXIII, 227). Thus, we should 'retreat from the things that attract us', such things as wealth and pleasure, 'and rouse ourselves to meet the things that actually attack us', like death, pain and poverty (Seneca 1969, CXXIII, 230).

3.3.5. Criticising the Dangers of the Crowd. Luxury, and Liberal Studies

One thing which makes living a Stoical life more difficult is the influence of the crowd. As Seneca tells Lucilius, in one of several examples of his anti-popular sentiment, it is particularly important to avoid the crowd. Even he, Seneca says, is not immune to the effects of being around a crowd and he never comes home 'with quite the same moral character I went out with; something or other becomes unsettled where I had achieved internal peace, some one or other of the things I had put to flight reappears on the scene' after contact with it (1969, VII, 41). Indeed, the greater the size of the crowd, the greater this unsettling effect to the extent that

'Associating with people in large numbers is actually harmful: there is not one of them that will not make some vice or other attractive to us, or leave us carrying the imprint of it…' (Seneca 1969, VII, 41).

Indeed, the mind, even that of a Socrates, is susceptible to being entrapped by the crowd. As Seneca explains, 'When a mind is impressionable and has none too firm a hold on what is right, it must be rescued from the crowd: it is so easy to go over to a majority' (Seneca 1969, VII, 42-3). Thus, even a Socrates 'might have been shaken in his principles' by the multitude, 'such is the measure of the inability of any of us, even as we perfect our personality's adjustment, to withstand the onset of vices when they come with such a mighty following' (Seneca 1969, VII, 42-3). Indeed, 'If you wish to be stripped of your vices you must get right away from the examples others set of them' (Seneca 1969, CIV, 190). Elsewhere, on the same theme, Seneca describes how following the examples of others means that people are seduced by convention, instead of being guided by reason (1969, CXXIII, 227). Further, even though being in the audience of a philosopher may stir some noble sentiments in the listener as they 'enter into the emotions of the speaker', this effect is undone when the listener comes into contact with the crowd, 'that discourager of noble conduct' (Seneca 1969, CVIII, 202).

Seneca uses the example of whiling away one's time at a show as the worst and most dangerous interaction with the crowd. These shows, where blood is often barbarically spilled, make the viewer 'more selfish, more self-seeking and more self-indulgent', and what is more, 'crueller and less humane' (Seneca 1969, VII, 41). All the more for being entertainment, this helps 'vices creep into one with more than usual ease' (Seneca 1969, VII, 41). Similarly, it is during the time of public festivals that one should 'be keeping the soul under strict control, making it unique in abstaining from pleasure just when the crowd are all on a pleasure bent' (Seneca 1969, XVIII, 66).

Another obstacle to a Stoical existence is the negative effect of luxury. After discussing how nature provides all that people require, Seneca explains how luxury has fostered the development of vices in people. Luxury causes people to look for what is 'inessential', then 'injurious', and finally hands 'the mind over to the body and commanded it to be the out and out slave of the body's whim and pleasure' (Seneca 1969, XC, 168). All the luxury goods and trades of the city reverse the proper relationship between mind and body, with the body having all it desires procured for it (Seneca 1969, XC, 168). Not to mention that a life of pleasure causes one to become 'soft and womanish' (Seneca 1969, CIV, 194).

For Seneca, the value of study is held up against the standard of whether it aids an individual in the goal of self-mastery. This also serves to demonstrate further how central self-

mastery is in Seneca's notion of a well-lived life. Accordingly, in a lengthy discussion of whether liberal studies make a man better, Seneca declares that, although such studies may prepare an individual for more significant endeavours, because nothing in them 'dispels fear, roots out desire or reins in passion' they are not all that valuable in and of themselves (1969, LXXXVIII, 151). Taking music and geometry as examples, Seneca declares that there is nothing in them 'which tells us not to be afraid of this desire or that – and if anyone lacks this kind of knowledge all his other knowledge is valueless to him' (1969, LXXXVIII, 152). Indeed, Seneca says, what is the point of learning of the storms Ulysses has faced in studies of literature when 'every day we're running into our own storms, spiritual storms, and driven by vice into all the troubles that Ulysses ever knew' (1969, LXXXVIII, 153). Returning to music, the scholar may teach musical harmony, but 'I would rather you brought about some harmony in my mind and got my thoughts in tune' (Seneca 1969, LXXXVIII, 153). Geometers can define a straight line, but 'what use is that to you if you've no idea what straightness means in life? (Seneca 1969, LXXXVIII, 154). On more physical pursuits, Seneca continues the same line of argument. 'What's the use, after all, of mastering a horse and controlling him with the reins at full gallop if you're carried away yourself by totally unbridled emotions? What's the use of overcoming opponent after opponent in the wrestling or boxing rings if you can be overcome by your temper?' (Seneca 1969, LXXXVIII, 156). Tending to one's emotions should always come first.

3.3.6. Summary

For Seneca, attainment of the good can only be accomplished, in large part, by living an emotionless life. Not one of moderate emotions, but one *free* of emotions. Moderating the passions is neither possible nor desirable because just as a moderate fever is still a sign of ill health, a moderate amount of emotion would be a sign of a disordered mind. It would be better never to allow the passions to 'get a start' in the first place, rather than attempt to combat them once they are established. Interestingly, in a discussion of grief, Seneca seems to soften his view and counsels that grief must be kept under control and to the proper intensity and duration, instead of being wholly eliminated or avoided. Tears are forgivable, within limits. Another important part of Seneca's Stoicism is to learn to 'face the up to the blows of fortune'. In many respects, Seneca argues, people must simply put up. Life is complicated, often painful, and filled with suffering. An obstacle to a Stoical existence is the negative effect of crowds, where

even a Socrates cannot maintain equanimity of mind, and luxury goods which reverse the proper relationship between mind and body, with the body having all it desires easily supplied for it. Lastly, in an extended discussion of whether liberal studies make a man better, Seneca declares that because nothing in them 'dispels fear, roots out desire or reins in passion' they are not all that valuable in and of themselves and people should rather develop self-control.

3.4. Epictetus – *Discourses* and *Enchiridion*

3.4.1. Introduction

In his *Discourses* and the *Enchiridion* (circa 108 and 125 CE), Epictetus develops a philosophy of personal freedom and independence based on people forsaking those externals over which they have no control and instead cultivating the only thing which *is* within their control. Namely, the appropriate use of their minds and their reason, the ability which differentiates humans from animals. For Epictetus, this entails what he calls the correct use of impressions. Namely, properly appraising, and acting upon, the sensory information that is received. This has the aim of granting mental tranquillity, imperturbability, and the ability to cope with whatever the gods decree and fate brings. To discuss these themes, this section begins by looking at how Epictetus defines the uniquely human faculty of reason and his discussion of self-control and the management of the passions. Then, it will discuss how Epictetus calls on people to make proper use of impressions. Lastly, it will look at Epictetus' ideas about living in accordance with the will of the gods, and what fate brings, and thus, how to cope with whatever comes.

3.4.2. Defining Reason and Managing the Passions

Epictetus begins his *Discourses* with a discussion of reason. As he explains, reason is unique among the faculties as it 'analyses itself as well as the others' and can thus 'evaluate itself – what it is, what it is capable of, how valuable it is' (2008, Book I, Chapter 1, 5). As an example, Epictetus says that the 'art of grammar' can help people decide which words to use, but cannot tell them whether it is a good time to write to a friend, nor can the 'art of music' tell them whether it is a good time to sing and play (2008, I, 1, 5). Reason, is the faculty that can. Not only this, but reason is what is godly about humans. People should care for their rational side because, there, they 'and the gods are equals' (Epictetus 2008, I, 12, 36). Indeed, what is 'divine' about people's nature is their 'mind, intelligence and correct reason' (Epictetus 2008, II, 8, 92).

As for what the purpose of reason is, it is to establish truth and falsehood. As Epictetus explains, reason purports to 'Establish what is true, eliminate what is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases' (2008, I, 7, 20). In other words, people must 'learn how to test

and distinguish what is true, false and unclear', and reason's role is to ''accept the consequences of what has been admitted to be correct'' (Epictetus 2008, I, 7, 21).

Reason is also what differentiates people from animals. As Epictetus explains, 'Two elements are combined in our creation, the body, which we have in common with the beasts; and reason and good judgement, which we share with the gods. Most of us tend toward the former connection, miserable and mortal though it is, whereas only a few favour this holy and blessed alliance' (2008, I, 3, 11). Animals can make use of impressions, but they 'lack the ability to reflect on them' which humans possess (Epictetus 2008, II, 8, 92).

Passions, for Epictetus, 'stem from frustrated desires', and the inability of some people to shape conditions to their wishes makes them 'maul anyone' who stands in their way (2008, I, 27, 65). Thus, if a person cannot alter unpleasant circumstances, or tear the obstructive person to pieces, they 'sit and bawl' and abuse everyone, including the gods (Epictetus 2008, I 27, 65). Instead of trying to change circumstances, which is often impossible as will be discussed later, or abusing others and finding fault with the gods, Epictetus counsels managing the emotions and ultimately learning to live a passionless life. As he says, 'Cast out of your mind… sorrow, fear, lust, envy, spite, greed, petulance and over-indulgence' (Epictetus 2008, II, 16, 116-7). As he reiterates elsewhere, one should 'Banish anger, rage, jealousy and pity. Be indifferent to women, fame, boys and tempting foods' (Epictetus 2008, III, 22, 158). Similarly, he says, 'A student should practise how to expunge from his life sighs and sorrow, grief and disappointment, exclamations like 'poor me' and 'alas'; he should learn what death is, as well as exile, jail and hemlock…'' (Epictetus 2008, I, 5, 14). For Epictetus, just as 'People with a strong physical constitution can tolerate extremes of hot and cold; people of strong mental health can handle anger, grief, joy and the other emotions' (2008, Fragment 20, 216). In this way, Epictetus has the goal of creating emotionally hardy people.

Thus, Epictetus writes that it is essential that we ''tend to our passions, and our opinions, and the like.'' (2008, I, 17, 43). This, he continues, 'is why Stoics put logic at the head of our curriculum' because 'if we haven't fully grasped and refined the instrument by which we analyse and understand other things, how can we hope to understand them with any precision?' (Epictetus 2008, I, 17, 43). For Epictetus, 'True peace is characterized by nothing so much as steadiness and imperturbability' (2008, IV, 4, 199) and a Stoic is 'untroubled with disturbing thoughts about illness, danger, death, exile or loss of reputation' (2008, II, 19, 127). Or, in a fragment of Epictetus', recounted by Aulus Gellius, it is explained how

> According, to Favorinus, Epictetus would also say that there were two vices much blacker and more serious than the rest: lack of persistence and lack of self-control. The former means we cannot bear or endure hardships that we have to endure, the latter means that we cannot resist pleasures or other things we ought to resist. 'Two words,' he says, 'should be committed to memory and obeyed by alternately exhorting and restraining ourselves, words that will ensure we lead a minimally blameless and untroubled life,' These two words, he used to say, were 'persist *and* resist'.' (Epictetus 2008, Fragment 10 from Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights XVII, 19, 212-3)

Even in death, suffering, and exile, people should maintain emotional equanimity, and even be willing to face death. As Epictetus put it, 'No, I cannot escape death, but at least I can escape the fear of it – or do I have to die moaning and groaning too?' (2008, I, 27, 64). As he explains elsewhere, 'I must die. But must I die bawling? I must be put in chains – but moaning and groaning too? I must be exiled; but is there anything to keep me from going with a smile, calm and self-composed?' (Epictetus 2008, I, 1, 7). Indeed, Epictetus explains that people's 'duty is to prepare for death and imprisonment, torture and exile – and all such evils – with confidence' and in this way 'show the superiority of reason and the mind over forces unconnected with the will' (2008, II, 1, 81). Even in illness, Epictetus writes how he will outdo himself 'in calmness and serenity; I will neither beg the doctor's help, nor pray for death…' (2008, III, 20, 156)

Interestingly, when discussing Epicurus, Epictetus is quite lenient towards some experience and expression of emotion, which indicates that he is not always counselling apathy. To begin with, he teases by asking 'Why is it, Epicurus, that you dissuade the wise man from bringing up children? Are you afraid that he may become emotionally involved and unhappy? And is that why you have been anxious on behalf of your house-slave Mouse?' (Epictetus 2008, I, 23, 55). Epicurus is disturbed by Mouse coming crying to him, and 'he realizes that, once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love or care for it' (Epictetus 2008, I, 23, 55). Finally, Epictetus concludes by saying that such a doctrine of abandoning one's children, like Epicurus', falls to pieces because 'whoever remembers your advice when they see their little child fallen and crying on the ground?' (2008, I, 23, 56). Even sheep and wolves do not abandon their young, Epictetus says, and 'what's to keep us from living as if we were as unsocial as flies' (2008, I, 23, 56), under Epicurus' doctrine?

3.4.3. Healthy Emotional Habits

For Epictetus, 'Every habit and faculty is formed or strengthened by the corresponding act' and 'The same goes for moral inclinations' (2008, II, 18, 121). This comes to the fore and becomes an issue when a person allows themselves occasional failures in emotional self-control. As he explains,

> When you get angry, you should know that you aren't guilty of an isolated lapse, you've encouraged a trend and thrown fuel on the fire. When you can't resist sex with someone, don't think of it as a temporary setback; you've fed your weakness and made it harder to uproot. It is inevitable that continuous behaviour of any one kind is going to instil new habits and tendencies, while steadily confirming old ones. (Epictetus 2008, II, 18, 121)

This will only entrench bad habits and make one more likely to succumb to passion and less likely to exercise self-control in the future. More worryingly, such continued lapses in constraining the passions leave permanent scars and lead to an ever-greater weakening of the ability to resist them. As Epictetus continues,

> If you are seized by greed on some occasion, reason can be invoked to alert you to the danger. Then the passion will abate and the mind will be restored to its former balance. But if you don't bring anything by way of relief, the mind will not return to normal; when it's inflamed by the impression, it will yield to passion more quickly the next time. Keep it up, and the mind grows inured to vice; eventually the love of money is entrenched. When someone contracts smallpox, if he lives he is not the same as he was before the illness, unless recovery is complete. It's the same with the passions of the soul; they leave certain scars and blisters behind. And unless you remove them well, the next time you're flogged on the same spot those blisters will be open wounds. (2008, II, 18, 121-2)

Thus, to ward off deterioration of the character, the very first impulse to anger must be resisted. As he explains,

> if you don't want to get cantankerous, don't feed your temper, or multiply incidents of anger. Suppress the first impulse to be angry, then begin to count the days on which you don't get mad. 'I used to be angry every day, then only every other day, then every third…' If you resist it a whole month, offer God a sacrifice, because the vice begins to weaken from day one, until it is wiped out altogether. (Epictetus 2008, II, 18, 122)

Epictetus discusses resisting sexual desire in two examples. In the first, he explains how, if he can overcome his lust when a 'woman is willing, if she calls to me or gives me a nod, if she takes me by the arm, and begins to rub up against me', then that is a 'test far greater' than solving the liar paradox, and other such quandaries (Epictetus 2008, II, 18, 122). In the second example, Epictetus invites the reader to 'Consider Socrates; look how he lay next to Alcibiades and merely teased him about his youthful beauty. Think how proud he must have been to have won that victory over himself' (2008, II, 18, 123). Related to this, Epictetus counsels moderation when it comes to the body. As he explains, 'Tending to the body's needs should be done incidentally, as it were; the mind and its functions require the bulk of our attention' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 41, 240).

Moving on to fear, Epictetus writes that when he shows fear in response to Caesar then, 'in effect I have been brought face to face with my master' and become slave-like. To liberate oneself from this master requires liberating oneself from 'the emotions that make my master frightening' (2008, I, 29, 74). If that is the case, Epictetus concludes, then 'what troubles can I have? No man is my master any longer' (2008, I, 29, 74). As he explains elsewhere, 'no one in a state of constant fear is free either. By the same token, whoever has gained relief from grief, fear and anxiety has gained freedom' (Epictetus 2008, II, 1, 79). Thus, one of the characteristics of those who are 'truly educated' is that they have 'freedom from fear' and thus 'freedom in general' (Epictetus 2008, II, 1, 79).

Epictetus uses the example of someone witnessing a friend breaking a glass or even experiencing the death of their wife or child to encourage another way to deal with difficult emotions. When such things happen to others, people are quick to say 'Oh, bad luck', and 'Well, that's part of life' (2008, Ch. 26, 232). 'But', he continues, 'if one of our own family is involved, then right away it's 'Poor, poor me!' We would do better to remember how we react when a similar loss affects others' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 26, 232). This is another good habit to which can help people to tolerate such situations.

Another good habit Epictetus encourages is to practise not cursing and complaining when suffering a minor setback. As he explains, 'If you have a headache, practise not cursing.

Don't curse every time you have an earache. And I'm not saying that you can't complain, only don't complain with your whole being' (Epictetus 2008, I, 18, 47). Another good emotional habit Epictetus describes is for people to not allow themselves to be carried away when they see something pleasurable. Would it not be better, he tells us, if we 'Counter temptation by remembering how much better will be the knowledge that you resisted' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 34, 238).

A final good habit is training oneself to realise the power of endurance people have to deal with setbacks. As he explains, 'For every challenge, remember the resources you have within you to cope with it. Provoked by the sight of a handsome man or a beautiful woman, you will discover within you the contrary power of self-restraint. Faced with pain, you will discover the power of endurance. If you are insulted, you will discover patience' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 10, 225). Thus, there is no reason for people to not be able to master their emotional responses to events.

For Epictetus, 'education has no goal more important than bringing our preconception of what is reasonable and unreasonable in alignment with nature' (2008, I, 2, 8). In a statement to those wishing to attend school, Epictetus says, among other things, 'calm your mind, bring it to school when it is free of distraction. Only then will you be in a position to realize reason's potential' (2008, II, 21, 135), giving the impression that a fraught mind would interfere with the ability to reason. In a similar discussion of an ideal student, Epictetus explains how a student who wishes to live 'without sorrow and frustration' and is without fear towards whatever might happen, is 'born to honour philosophy' (2008, II, 17, 119-20). Epictetus describes how this same student wishes to be 'free from fear and emotion, but at the same time I want to be a concerned citizen and philosopher, and attentive to my other duties, toward God, my parents, my siblings, my country, and my guests…. I want to be faultless and unshakeable, not just when I'm awake, but even when I'm sleeping, even when I'm drunk and delirious' (Epictetus 2008, II, 17, 119-20). This, for Epictetus, would mean that this student is a 'god' and is 'headed for the stars' (2008, II, 17, 119-20). This demonstrates how highly Epictetus such self-control and imperturbability.

3.4.4. People's Own Thoughts Disturb Them

Epictetus argues that people' are fully responsible for their emotions, as no one can compel them to think or feel anything if they forsake externals, as will be elaborated on later. As he

discusses in one dialogue ‘aren’t *you* threatened, even a little [by a tyrant ordering you to be chained, beheaded, put in prison or exiled]?’ If I feel that these things are nothing to me, then no. But if I fear for any of them, then, yes, it is I who am threatened’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 29, 69). In this way, neither can a tyrant conquer someone’s judgements, as ‘the mind is subject only to itself. It alone can control it’ so the threats and condemnations of tyrants should have no effect (Epictetus 2008, I, 29, 69-70). Thus, ‘A person’s own thoughts unnerve them’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 19, 49). In the final instance, he continues, ‘Is there any reason to fear someone to whom I stand ready to surrender my miserable corpse?’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 24, 57).

To examine these points further, Epictetus gives the example of a sea voyage. He explains how it is not the sea that terrifies people, it is rather their ‘imagination…. So what oppresses and scares us? It is our own thoughts, obviously. What overwhelms people when they are about to leave friends, family, old haunts and their accustomed way of life? Thoughts’ (Epictetus 2008, II, 16, 114). Thus, ‘In general, remember that it is we who torment, we who make difficulties for ourselves – that is, our opinions do’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 25, 61). Or, as he explains elsewhere, we must remember that ‘it is not enough to be hit or insulted to be harmed, you must believe that you are being harmed. If someone succeeds in provoking you, realize that your mind is complicit in the provocation’ (Epictetus 2008, Chapter 20, 228-9).

People’s happiness or unhappiness is also something of their ‘own making’ (Epictetus 2008, II, 16, 116). Thus, Epictetus counsels that when people see someone distraught over losing a child, or some material loss, they need to ‘Have ready the reflection that they are not upset by what happened – because other people are not upset when the same thing happens to them – but by their own view of the matter’ (2008, Chapter 16, 227). Still, that does not mean that one cannot sympathise with them ‘at least with comforting words, or even to the extent of sharing outwardly in their grief. But do not commiserate with your whole heart and soul’ (Epictetus 2008, Chapter 16, 227).

3.4.5. What is in People’s Power

Epictetus’ philosophy is often concerned with educating people as to what is within their control to alter, bring about, or prevent, and what is not. Indeed, one of the goals of education, for Epictetus, is precisely to learn to distinguish ‘what is in our power and what is not’ (2008, I, 22, 54). This is important, because if people become attached to externals, they are

guaranteed to become emotionally upset if they lose them. In the final instance, the only thing which people have full control over is their minds. As he summarises,

> We are responsible for some things, while there are others for which we cannot be held responsible. The former include our judgement, our impulse, our desire, aversion and our mental faculties in general; the latter include the body, material possessions, our reputation, status – in a word, anything not in our power to control. (Epictetus 2008, Ch 1, 221)

Or as he explains elsewhere, 'if we direct it [the will] at what is outside us and is none of our responsibility, wanting instead to avoid what's in the control of others, we are necessarily going to meet with fear, upset and confusion' (Epictetus 2008, II, 1, 78). As he continues, if people do not treat externals in this way, they should not be surprised to find themselves emotionally upset. As he explains, 'You desire what is not in your control: fine, but be prepared to be refused, to be frustrated, to come up empty-handed….' (Epictetus 2008, IV, 4, 200).

Giving the example of a lyre player, Epictetus explains that 'his nervousness would end at once' if he 'had not set his sights on things outside man's control', namely, how well an audience receives his performance (2008, II, 13, 103). Similarly, if people value and look after externals then 'of course, we are going to experience fear and nervousness. Faced with external circumstances that we judge to be bad, we cannot help but be frightened and apprehensive' (Epictetus 2008, II, 16, 103).

In another example, a short dialogue, Epictetus says that although a person's son has died, 'Since it's nothing he can control, it isn't bad', but his reaction to the event was bad because it is within his control. So, to the fact that the man 'lamented these events', Epictetus replies 'That *is* in his control – and bad.' But, to the fact that the person 'withstood is like a man' Epictetus says, 'That is in his control – and good' (2008, III, 8, 152). As he strikingly puts it elsewhere,

> It is not events that disturb people, it is their judgements concerning them. Death, for example, is nothing frightening, otherwise it would have frightened Socrates. But the judgement that death is frightening – now, that is something to be afraid of. So when we are frustrated, angry or unhappy, never hold anyone except ourselves – that is, our judgements – accountable. An ignorant person is inclined to blame others for his own

misfortune. To blame oneself is proof of progress. But the wise man never has to blame another *or* himself. (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 5, 223)

Epictetus uses another metaphor of a voyage to demonstrate what is, and is not, in people's power. As he explains, when going on a sea voyage, 'What can I do? Pick the captain, the boat, the date, and the best time to sail. But then a storm hits. Well, it's no longer my business; I have done everything I could. It's somebody else's problem now – namely the captain's' (Epictetus 2008, II, 5, 86). And, if the ship does indeed sink, the only option is to drown. This, too, is out of people's power and should not be lamented.

However, it is interesting to note that Epictetus does not mean that we should become 'apathetic' about life when we discover that it is 'indifferent' (2008, II, 6, 89), an indifferent being something that we have no control over (2008, I, 30, 75). Neither should people become 'superficial and conceive a passion for externals', however (Epictetus 2008, II, 6, 89). Furthermore, that is not to say that death should be welcomed. As Epictetus explains, 'we must not part with it [the body] rashly or irrationally, or on trivial pretext' (2008, I, 29, 71). But, 'If he [God] sounds the signal for retreat, though, as he did for Socrates, we must obey the signal as if it came from our commander-in-chief' (Epictetus 2008, I, 29, 71).

When discussing desire, Epictetus explains that 'Freedom is not achieved by satisfying desire, but by eliminating it…. work day and night to attain a liberated frame of mind' (2008, IV, 1, 195). As he puts it elsewhere, 'Just keep in mind: the more we value things outside our control, the less control we have' (Epictetus 2008, IV, 4, 201). As Epictetus explains, 'If I cherish my body, I make a slave of myself, if I cherish my property, I make a slave of myself...' (2008, I, 25, 61). Similarly, he calls being lovesick a condition of 'slavery', and refers to a man enamoured with a pretty woman as being a 'perfect slave' (Epictetus 2008, IV, 1, 175-6).

Along similar lines, Epictetus offers practical advice as to how to cope with the potential, or actual, loss of externals. The goal, he says, is to 'make our desire and aversion safe against any setback or adversity' (Epictetus 2008, I, 1, 7). To achieve this, he counsels that people start with small things before progressing to the more significant. As he explains, they should start by envisaging losing a piece of china, before reminding themselves when they kiss their loved ones that ''I am kissing a mortal.' Then you won't be so distraught if they are taken from you' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 3, 222). As he elaborates on this point elsewhere, 'starting with things of little value – a bit of spilled oil, a little stolen wine – repeat to yourself: 'For such a small price I buy tranquillity and peace of mind.' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 12, 225-6). Similarly, Epictetus writes how people should 'disdain external goods, so that no opening exists for that

irrational, intemperate and impulsive form of desire. With such an attitude toward things, you can no longer be intimidated by anyone' (2008, IV, 1, 184).

Epictetus holds up the Cynics as examples of how to live a happy and free life without the need for externals. As he explains, it is possible for 'someone who has nothing – no clothes, no hearth or home, no luxuries, no slaves, no city he can call his own' to be cheerful, tranquil, and free, never angry with God or another person, or with a sad expression (Epictetus 2008, III, 22, 162). Giving Diogenes as an 'exemplar', Epictetus writes how Diogenes was free because 'Everything he owned was disposable, and only temporarily attached' (2008, IV, 1, 193). That is not to say that externals should be totally dispensed with. At times, Epictetus speaks of people as being stewards of externals, which they can use modestly and enjoy for as long as they are with them (Epictetus 2008, IV, 3, 198).

3.4.6. The Proper Use of Impressions

As was explained, Epictetus is concerned with what is within people's power. As he says, 'The intelligent use of impressions', a God-given gift, is within our power (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 6, 223-4; I, 1, 5). As he continues, just as the body is the raw material of the doctor, and land the raw material of the farmer, 'The raw material of the good man is his mind – his goal being to respond to impressions the way nature intended' (Epictetus 2008, III, 3, 146). Furthermore, 'As a general rule, nature designed the mind to assent to what is true, dissent from what is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases' (Epictetus 2008, III, 3, 146). For Epictetus, nature has armed people with reason so that they can 'make the correct use of impressions' (2008, I, 20, 51). As he bemoans at one point 'How long does it take to say, 'The goal is to follow the gods,' and 'The essence of the good is the proper use of impressions'?' (Epictetus 2008, I, 20, 52). This is because, for him, 'the first and most important duty of the philosopher is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test' (Epictetus 2008, I, 20, 51). Thus, choice is a hallmark of Epictetus' doctrine.

As Dobbin explains, 'We can make considered choices among 'impressions' or 'appearances', meaning anything that comes within range of our senses, together with whatever thoughts and feelings these sensations evoke' (2008, xii). For example, with money, Epictetus says, people have created elaborate ways of telling which coins are real and which are counterfeit (2008, I, 20, 51). However, he continues, many people are sloppy when it comes to the use of impressions. As he explains, 'When it comes to our poor mind', where our loss is

less evident than when it comes to money, 'we can't be bothered; we are satisfied accepting any and all impressions' (Epictetus 2008, I, 20, 51).

Or, in a discussion of a lost Fifth Book of the *Discourses*, Aulus Gellius writes how Epictetus believed that

> Impressions… striking a person's mind as soon as he perceives something within range of his sense, are not voluntary or subject to his will, they impose themselves on people's attention almost with a will of their own. But the act of assent… which endorses these impressions *is* voluntary and a function of the human will. Consequently, when a frightening noise comes from heaven or in consequence of some accident, if an abrupt alarm threatens danger, or if anything else of the kind happens, the mind even of a wise man is inevitably shaken a little, blanches and recoils – not from any preconceived idea that something bad is about to happen, but because certain irrational reflexes forestall the action of the rational mind. / Instead of automatically assenting to these impressions… our wise man spurns and rejects them, because there is nothing there that need cause *him* any fear. And this, they say, is how the mind of the wise man differs from the fool's: the latter believes that impressions apparently portending pain and hardship when they strike his mind really are as they seem, so he approves… them and accepts that he should fear them as if this were self-evident. But the wise man, soon regaining his colour and composure… (does not assent), reaffirms his support of the view he's always had about such impressions – that they are not in the least to be feared, but are only superficially and speciously frightening. (Epictetus 2008, Fragment 9 from Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, XIX, 1, 14-21, 212)

The proper use of impressions will lead to mental tranquillity because it allows a person to carefully consider what they are subject to and can thus avoid being swept away by it. As Epictetus says, if people identify with the ability to make good use of impressions, they will 'never be blocked and frustrated' or have to complain (2008, I, 1, 6). As he explains,

> With these thoughts to defend you [such as how Socrates resisted Alcibiades], you should triumph over any impression and not be dragged away. Don't let the force of the impression when first it hits you knock you off your feet; just say to it, 'Hold on a moment; let me see who you are and what you represent. Let me put you to the test.' Next, don't let it pull you in by picturing to yourself the pleasures that await you.

> Otherwise it will lead you by the nose wherever it wants. Oppose it with some good and honourable thought, and put the dirty one to rout. Practise this regularly, and you'll see what shoulders, what muscles, what stamina you acquire…. I'm presenting to you the real athlete, namely the one training to face off against the most formidable of impression. (Epictetus 2008, II, 18, 123)

As he continues,

> Steady now, poor man, don't let impressions sweep you off your feet. It's a great battle, and God's work. It's a fight for autonomy, freedom, happiness and peace…. Put away the fear of death, and however much thunder and lightning you have to face, you will find the mind capable of remaining calm and composed regardless. (Epictetus 2008, II, 18, 123)

In this way, people should not let impressions disturb them. Indeed, For Epictetus, a person cannot be considered wise if they 'are frequently dazed or disturbed by certain sense impressions whose appearance of truth gets the better of you' and are 'subject to sorrow, fear, jealousy, anger and inconsistency' (2008, II, 22, 136). Therefore, he tells us, 'it is essential that we not respond impulsively to impressions; take a moment before reacting, and you will find it is easier to maintain control' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 20, 228-9).

Training oneself in the proper use of expressions is something that Epictetus frequently returns to. As he says, 'keep a sharp eye on your impressions, and never fall asleep. It is no small thing that is being watched over, it equates with honesty, trustworthiness and stability. It is freedom from passion, grief, fear and consternation – it is freedom itself' (Epictetus 2008, IV, 3, 197). Epictetus also has practical advice on this topic. As he explains,

> Here is the primary means of training yourself: as soon as you leave in the morning, subject whatever you see or hear to close study…. Today what did you see – some beautiful woman or handsome man? Test them by your rule – does their beauty have any bearing on your character? If not, forget them. What else did you see? Someone in mourning for the death of a child? Apply your rule. Death too is indifferent, do dismiss it from your mind. (Epictetus 2008, III, 3, 147-8)

With continued practise, results would become apparent. Still, people should be wary not to allow impressions to sweep them away and have them assenting to things they should not (Epictetus 2008, III, 3, 148). After all, no one can compel a person when it comes to their impressions. As Epictetus asks, 'Can anyone make you assent to a false proposition? …. in the field of assent you cannot be hindered or obstructed' (2008, IV, 1, 182). As mentioned before, nothing less than one's freedom is at stake. As Epictetus concludes, the right use of impressions 'leads to freedom, serenity, happiness and satisfaction; it is also the source of justice, law, restraint and virtue in general' (2008, Fragment 4, 210-11).

3.4.7. Fate and the Gods

For Epictetus, a vital part of being able to tolerate loss and cope with misfortune and remain emotionally imperturbable is to accept that what happens is fated by the gods. Thus, acceptance of negative events is closely tied to the doctrine that people's lives are part of a divine plan. As Epictetus says, if people view themselves as being part of a whole then 'for the sake of the whole, circumstances may make it right for you to be sick, go on a dangerous journey, endure poverty, even die before your time' (2008, II, 5, 88). As Epictetus explains, coping is an issue of piety. So, people must 'obey them and welcome whatever happens, in the conviction that it is a product of a higher intelligence' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 31, 234-5).

People's acceptance that they are bound by fate means entirely handing over their lives to the gods. As Epictetus says,

> Remember that you are an actor in a play, the nature of which is up to the director to decide. If he wants the play to be short, it will be short, if he wants it long, it will be long. And if he casts you as one of the poor, or as a cripple, as a king or as a commoner – whatever role is assigned, that accomplished actor will accept and perform it with impartial skill. But the assignment of roles belongs to another. (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 17, 227-8).

In this way, people should be adequately devout, accept fate, and make the best of it.

Accordingly, there is nothing people can do change circumstances. As Epictetus puts it, 'The nature of the universe was, is and always will be the same, and things cannot happen any differently than they do now…. If we try to adapt our mind to the regular sequence of

changes and accept the inevitable with good grace, our life will proceed quite smoothly and harmoniously' (2008, Fragment 8, 211). As he says elsewhere, trying to change reality is a lost cause and will only cause more emotional problems. As he explains, 'Resistance is vain in any case; it only leads to useless struggle while inviting grief and sorrow' (Epictetus 2008, Fragment 3, 210).

As most of the things that happen to people are out of their control, they cannot prevent them. They should, instead, learn to bear them properly, which is something they *can* control. As Epictetus says, 'The chips don't matter, and the cards don't matter; how can I know what the deal will be? But making careful and skilful use of the deal – that's where my responsibility beings' (2008, II, 5, 85-6). Again, emotional equanimity rests on this. As he says, 'Don't hope that events will turn out the way you want, welcome events in whichever way they happen: this is the path to peace' (Epictetus 2008, Ch. 8, 224). Indeed, 'Whoever chafes at the conditions dealt by fate is unskilled in the art of life; whoever bears with them nobly and makes wise use of the results is a man who deserves to be considered good' (Epictetus 2008, Fragment 2, 210).

In any case, Epictetus reiterates again, people have the faculties available to deal with such situations (Epictetus 2008, I, 6, 18-19). Or, in a fragment of the *Discourses*, Marcus Aurelius explains how people should be pleased that they can maintain their composure, even in a difficult situation:

> 'Poor me, because this happened to me.' No, say rather, 'Lucky me, because though this happened to me I'm still happy, neither broken by present circumstance nor afraid for the future.' Because the same thing could have happened to anyone, but not everyone could have remained content…. So does this misfortune prevent you in any way from being just, generous, sober, reasonable, careful, free from error, courteous, free, etc. – all of which together make human nature complete? / remember from now on whenever something tends to make you unhappy, draw on this principle: 'This is no misfortune; but bearing with it bravely is a blessing.' (Epictetus 2008, Fragment 28b from Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, IV, 49, 2-6, 218)

Similarly, instead of moaning about some ill fortune, people should either ameliorate what is happening or learn to tolerate it and not dream up ideal situations where such misfortunes do not exist. As one brief dialogue goes, ''But my nose is running!' What do you have hands for, idiot, if not to wipe it? 'But how is it right that there be running noses in the

first place?’ Instead of thinking up protests, wouldn’t it be easier just to wipe your nose?’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 6, 19).

It is inevitable, Epictetus says, that people will face some upsetting events in their lives. As he puts it, ‘In this body, this universe, this community, it is inevitable that each of us faces some such event. Your job, then, is to… make the best of the situation’ (Epictetus 2008, II, 5, 88). As he explains, the ruler of the universe ‘arranged for there to be summer and winter, abundance and lack, virtue and vice – all such opposites meant for the harmony of the whole’ (Epictetus 2008, I, 12, 35). However, Epictetus believes that difficult situations are, in various ways, something that strengthen and improve people or allow them to demonstrate their ability to cope with anything (Epictetus 2008, I, 24, 56).

3.4.8. Summary

Epictetus develops a philosophy of personal freedom and independence based on forsaking those externals over which people have no control and instead cultivating the only thing which is within their control, namely, the use of their minds and their reason. This entails what Epictetus calls the correct use of impressions, that is, accurately appraising, and acting upon, the sensory information that is received. This has the aim of granting mental tranquillity, imperturbability, and the ability to cope with whatever the gods decree and fate brings. Passions, for Epictetus, ‘stem from frustrated desires’ and he writes that it is essential that we ‘tend’ to their passions. Even in death, suffering, and exile, people should maintain emotional equanimity. Allowing themselves occasional failures in their emotional self-control will only entrench bad habits and make them more likely to succumb to passion and less likely to exercise self-control in the future. He argues that people’s minds are responsible for their emotions, as no one can compel them to think or feel anything if they forsake externals. As he says, ‘A person’s own thoughts unnerve them’. Interestingly, when discussing Epicurus, Epictetus is quite lenient towards some experience and expression of emotion, which indicates that he is not always counselling total apathy. Still, Epictetus holds the Cynics up as examples of how to live a happy and free life without the need for externals and offers practical advice as to how to cope with the loss of externals. Finally, as most of the things that happen to people are out of their control, they cannot prevent them. They should, instead, learn to bear them properly as they decreed by the gods.

3.5. Augustine – *Confessions*

3.5.1. Introduction

In his *Confessions* (circa 400 CE), Augustine traces his earlier life of sin to try to argue that it is a contemptible and un-Godly way of living and that a good Christian life is one of self-control and temperance. This section discussed Augustine's philosophy of the emotions before examining two essential scenes from the *Confessions* which elucidate some of Augustine's critical ideas about the self-control and internal conflict. Throughout, some references to Augustine's *City of God* are also made. This section begins by looking at Augustine's conception of childhood and adolescence, where he discusses how these parts of a person's life are full of temptations, and how these same passions remain throughout human life. Then, it examines how Augustine defined reason, emotion, the will, and their relation to each other within the soul. Then, it will examine his description of the public games to demonstrate that self-control is not always enough to weather the temptations of the world. Finally, this section discusses Augustine's climactic conversion to Christianity, where he elaborates on many of the themes of the text, especially the struggle between competing wills in the mind.

3.5.2. Childhood and Growing Up

Augustine begins with the idea that 'not even a child who has lived only one day on earth' was free from sin, and that if babies are innocent 'it is not for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength' (1961, Book I, Chapter 7, 27-8). Childhood and adolescence are described as full of temptations, which Augustine prays God will free people from. Indeed, salvation by God is said to be 'sweeter' than all earthly temptations (Augustine 1961, I, 14, 35) and 'sweeter than all pleasure' (Augustine 1961, IX, 1, 181). However, the 'same passions' follow man throughout his various life stages (Augustine 1961, I, 19, 40). Augustine explains how the 'soul that is blinded by wicked passions is far from you [God]' and that the measure of the distance between a man and God could be gauged by how 'blinded' by pleasure his heart was (1961, I, 18, 38). Summarising his sin as a young boy, Augustine says that his error was that he 'looked for pleasure, beauty, and truth not in him but in myself and his other creatures', however, this only resulted in 'pain, confusion, and error' (1961, I, 20, 40-1). Famously, as a youth, he had

prayed 'Give me chastity and continence, but not yet' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 7, 169). He did not want his prayer to be answered just yet as he wanted to indulge, not quell, his desires.

Augustine continues to elucidate his earlier life of sin, saying that 'For love of your love I shall retrace my wicked ways' (1961, II, 1, 43). Augustine envisaged himself in a 'whirlpool of sin', a 'broiling sea of fornication', a 'hissing cauldron of lust' and being 'carried away by the sweep of the tide' of his own wickedness. Augustine explains how he grew to manhood and was 'inflamed' by love, lust, bodily desire and all manner of temptations (1961, II, 2, 43-4; III, 1, 55). For instance, in Book IV, when Augustine discusses his time as a teacher of public speaking, he says that he lived with a mistress simply because his 'restless passions had alighted on her' (Augustine 1961, IV, 2, 72). Similar, in conversion, Augustine talks about how 'a great storm broke within me, bringing with it a great deluge of tears' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 12, 177). Relatedly, Augustine has a lot to say about the dangers of allowing oneself to be subject to emotions such as jealousy, fear, and suspicion. Accordingly, Augustine refers to his 'disordered state of mind', a 'disease' which only God can cure (1961, IV, 3, 73).

3.5.3. Reason and Passion

Reason, for Augustine, is the capacity for discernment, it 'delimits, defines, distinguishing, for example, between (a) perceived colour, (b) the sense of sight that perceives, (c) the internal sense, and (d) itself, the distinguishing agent' (O'Daly 1987, 178). Elsewhere, Augustine defines the power of reason as the process by which 'the facts communicated by the bodily senses are submitted for judgement' (1961, VII, 17, 151). Similarly, he explains how reason is the ability, lacked by animals, to inquire into the meaning of the universe, reason being able to 'sift the evidence' relayed by the senses (Augustine 1961, X, 6, 213).

For Augustine, the mind is part of the soul, and specifically its "best" part (O'Daly 1987, 7). Further, he differentiates between the seat of the mind and will, the *anima rationalis*, and the powers of 'appetite, sense-perception and memory' which he called the *anima irrationalis*. He also sometimes refers to the *anima intellectualis* (O'Daly 1987, 7). Throughout the *Confessions* and elsewhere, Augustine often uses the term 'passion' as a derogatory term when distinguishing unvirtuous emotions from the, at least potentially, virtuous affections (Scrutton, 2005, 170). For Augustine, 'passion is a movement of the lower animal soul, which is involuntary in the sense of not in accordance with the will' (Scrutton 2005, 171).

Augustine believed that, unlike angels who exist in perfect wisdom and are free of the passions, men and demons alike are disturbed by tempestuous passions (Scrutton 2005, 171). Affections, meanwhile, 'are a movement of the higher, intellective soul, which is voluntary in that it is in accordance with the will' (Scrutton 2005, 171). Augustine describes the basic emotions which the mind can experience, that is, desire, joy, fear, and sorrow (1961, X, 14, 221) or grief (O'Daly 1987, 46). Still, Augustine wants to remind the reader that the emotions are not easy to categorise. As he says, 'Man is a great mystery, Lord. You even keep count of the hairs on his head and not one of them escapes your reckoning. Yet his hairs are more easily counted than his feelings and the emotions of his heart' (1961, IV, 14, 84). Similarly, commenting on this self-control, Augustine notes how 'It was a misery to feel myself so weak a victim of these human emotions, although we cannot escape them, since they are the natural lot of mankind…' (Augustine 1961, IX, 12, 201). Emotions are, for Augustine, a complex but inescapable phenomenon. Still, Augustine defends at least the virtuous affections by writing that

> If these emotions and feelings, that spring from love of the good and from holy charity, are to be called faults, then let us allow that real faults should be called virtues. But since these feelings are the consequence of right reason when they are exhibited in the right situations, who would then venture to call them morbid or disordered passions? (City of God 1972, XIV, 9, cited in Scrutton 2005, 171)

Interestingly, Augustine does not posit these emotions, or affections, as contrary to reason. As Scrutton explains, 'With respect to affections, there is no dichotomy between the heart and the head' (2005, 171). While Augustine does sometimes counsel that the passions, 'disordered movements of the lower, animal soul' should be subject to rational control, the affections, in contrast, are already, in a way, aspects of the rational mind (Scrutton 2005, 171). However, this does not mean that affections must necessarily always be virtuous, or passions always sinful. As Scrutton explains, what distinguishes a passion from an affection is that the latter is a movement of the will and of the higher, intellective self, and the former is an 'act of appetite', an aspect of the lower, sensitive self. Two further qualifiers decide whether an emotion is a vicious passion or a virtuous affection. These are, firstly, whether it accords with reason, and secondly, what subject the emotion is directed towards (Scrutton 2005, 171-2). As regards to what ends emotions are directed, Augustine writes that

> The important factor in these emotions is the character of man's will. If the will is wrongly directed, the emotions will be wrong; if the will is right, the emotions will be not only blameless, but praiseworthy. The will is engaged in all of them; in fact, they are essentially acts of the will (Augustine, City of God 1972, XIV, 6, cited in Scutton 2005, 173)

For instance, rational control of the mind over the 'lower parts' of the soul means that Christians can apply their emotions appropriately, and if restrained, these can be 'adapted to the service of justice' (Augustine, City of God 1972, IX, 5, cited in O'Daly 1987, 49). Because the irrational faculty, like the rational, is also created by God as part of the human soul, 'its affections are both natural and good, if they are kept under the control of reason and moderated by it' (O'Daly 1987, 49). For O'Daly, the struggle over one's emotions is a 'moral one', even perhaps only a 'question of their proper *use*' (1987, 49). As Augustine puts it, people should not be concerned as much with 'whether a pious soul is angry, but why it is angry, nor whether it is sad, but what is the reason for its sadness, not whether it fears, but what it fears' (Augustine, City of God 1972, IX, 5, cited in O'Daly 1987, 49). In this way, anger towards sinners is permissible, as is pity for those in need, or compassion (Augustine, City of God 1972, XVI, 4, see O'Daly 1987, 50). Similarly, 'The good and bad alike desire, fear and rejoice, but the former in a good way, the latter in a bad manner, according as their will is right or wrong' (Augustine, City of God 1972, XIV, 8, cited in O'Daly 1987, 50). Emotions can be both morally good and bad, and after all, are an inescapable part of the human condition, as was explained (O'Daly 1987, 50). Furthermore, Augustine was well aware that Jesus and Paul felt emotions (O'Daly 1987, 50). However, to add further complexity, even feelings such as pity can lead a person to 'lose themselves' and be 'absorbed' in them, at the cost of their original calm (Augustine 1961, III, 6, 61-2).

Thus, for Scrutton, Augustine's philosophy towards the emotions, and the distinction between passions and affections, is a 'far more positive ethic of human emotion than has often been claimed' (2005, 173). Robert Solomon, for instance, pins the 'the Myth of the Passions' on Augustine, namely, the view that emotions are always non-cognitive and involuntary and must always be subject to reason (R. Solomon 1976, cited in Scutton 2005, n. 15, 173). Instead, Augustine offers a less dualistic view of the interaction between reason and emotion (Scrutton 2005, 174). In criticism of the Stoics, who thought that almost all instances of emotion are undesirable, Augustine advocated rightly directed and rational emotions. To aim for apathy was repulsive for Augustine, and he says of those who are happy not to be 'stirred or excited

by any emotions at all' that 'they rather lose every shred of humanity than achieve a true tranquillity' (Augustine, City of God 1972, XIV, 9, cited in Scrutton 2005, 173). Further, 'if *apatheia* [a mental condition in which no emotions can disturb one's reason] is the name of the state in which the mind cannot be touched by any emotion whatsoever, who would not judge this insensitivity to be the worst of all moral defects?' (Augustine, City of God 1972, XIV, 19, cited in Scrutton 2005, 174).

Similarly, O'Daly notes that Augustine has an affinity with Plato's theory of the tripartite soul in the sense that, although the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul are 'vicious parts', they can, if properly restrained and directed, be put to legitimate use (1987, 52). As O'Daly explains, emotions lead to actions for Augustine. First, there is an emotion, then it is subject to the will, which can consent or not to the emotion, and finally, there is the action itself. For example, anger can lead to angry words, or physical violence, if not intervened on by the will. The one exception is sexual desire, which bypasses the will entirely and is not subject to consent (O'Daly 1987, 52-3).

Augustine also developed an understanding of how emotions can become ingrained parts of a person's behaviour. He explains how what starts off as a desire, such as lust, then becomes a habit due to indulgence, and finally, a necessity (Augustine 1961, VIII, 5, 164). As he explains, 'For my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the habit it became a necessity' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 5, 164). This he referred to as his chain, holding him in servitude. Habit, too, for Augustine, is a crucial component in sin because 'the rule of sin is the force of habit, by which the mind is swept along and held fast even against its will, yet deservedly, because it fell into the habit of its own accord' (1961, VIII, 5, 165).

In practice, thus, it is true for Augustine that passions *are* often sinful and non-rational because, as a consequence of the fall, the lower self is in conflict with the higher self, which should be 'its master and guiding principle' (Scrutton 2005, 172). Passions cannot be rational by the fact that they are involuntary and do not involve, or are not subject, to reason. They are thus 'necessarily and inherently arational' (Scrutton 2005, 172). For Augustine, one of the origins of sin is to become enamoured with one part of God's creation, instead of the whole (1961, III, 8, 66), and try to find joy in things outside themselves, but these are only temporary and short-lived (1961, IX, 4, 188). Thus, people are too apt to become a slave of the material things around them. Crucially, this disrupts their ability to reason, to 'question nature', because 'slaves cannot be judges'. In the end, the world will 'not supply an answer to those who question it, unless they also have the faculty to judge it', and those enslaved by worldly delights

have lost this faculty (Augustine 1961, X, 6, 213). Augustine also speaks about how indulging the senses perturbs the mind and reason, saying that

> I ought not to allow my mind to be paralysed by the gratification of my senses, which often leads it astray. For the senses are not content to take second place. Simply because I allow them their due, as adjuncts to reason, they attempt to take precedence and forge ahead of it, with the result that I sometimes sin in this way but am not aware of it until later. (1961, X, 33, 238)

Similarly, he describes how

> Crimes against other men are committed when the emotions, which spur us to action, are corrupt and rise in revolt without control. Sins of self-indulgence are committed when the soul fails to govern the impulses from which it derives bodily pleasure. In the same way, if the rational mind is corrupt, mistaken ideas and false beliefs will poison life (Augustine 1961, IV, 15, 86).

For Augustine, God demands self-control, a kind of "self-examination" (1961, X, 37, 245) and is, indeed, the only one can genuinely grant it. 'You command us to control our bodily desires…. You command me to be continent', Augustine says of God. Quoting the *Book of Wisdom* Augustine says how only through God's bounty can man ever be master of himself and frequently comments that the ability for self-control is, ultimately, an endowment from God, or faith (1961, X, 29, 233). As he explains elsewhere, 'I believed that continence was to be achieved by man's own power…. Fool that I was, I did not know that no man *can be master of himself, except of God's bounty*, as your bible tells us' (Augustine 1961, VI, 11, 128). Still, despite God being the only one able to grant continence, it is up to us to 'shed my troubles on to you [God]' and thus be open to potentially receiving it (Augustine 1961, VI, 11, 128). Thus, agency comes not in people thinking they are capable of self-control on their own, but in being able to choose whether to accept God or not. Similarly, Augustine quotes *Ecclesiastics* which tells people not to follow the '*counsel of appetite*' and instead to '*Let the itch of gluttony pass me by'* (1961, X, 31, 236). It is through continence, the exercise of self-restraint and especially the restraint of sexual desire, that one is made whole and regains the 'unity of self which we lost by falling apart in the search for a variety of pleasures' (Augustine 1961, X, 29, 233) presumably referring to when competing wills batted in Augustine's mind. Through God, a

person's soul can be freed from strong sexual desire 'which binds it, and rebel no more against itself', and thus be better able to follow God (Augustine 1961, X, 30, 234).

Interestingly, Augustine says that the 'satisfaction of [the mind's] own inquisitiveness', this 'futile curiosity [which] masquerades under the name of science and learning', is 'more dangerous because it is more complicated' than the indulgences of the body (1961, X, 35, 241). Augustine seems to be criticising the "idle", secular pursuit of knowledge for satisfying the desire to "know", or because people should not put God 'to the test' (1961, X, 35, 242). As he explains, those that have the 'skill to number stars and grains of sand, to measure the tracts of constellations and trace the paths of planets', 'lapse into pride without respect for you, my God' (Augustine 1961, V, 3, 93). They do not understand that the 'reason and understanding', the senses and intelligence, 'by which they investigate these things are gifts they have from you', and can thus take the credit and become proud, perhaps the worst transgression because of it (Augustine 1961, V, 3, 93-4). In the end, believing themselves to be high and mighty, 'as high and as bright as the stars', and despite saying many true things about the natural world, 'they do not search with piety for the Truth, its Creator' (Augustine 1961, V, 3, 94).

Even then, this knowledge does not grant its possessor much, as 'the man who knows you, and knows these things as well, is none the happier for his knowledge of them: he is happy only because he knows you' and honours God rightly (Augustine 1961, V, 4, 95). Augustine even goes as far as to say that it is better to know and honour God and be relatively ignorant of his creation, than the opposite. As he says, 'A man who knows that he owns a tree and thanks you for the use he has of it, even though he does not know its exact height or the width of its spread, is better than another who measures it and counts all its branches, but neither owns it nor knows and loves its Creator' (Augustine 1961, V, 4, 95). In other words, the mistake of such people is to not honour God fully or properly for both what they describe and discover, and for the faculties with which they discover it. In this sense, Augustine does not put reasoning for reasoning's sake on a pedestal, as some thinkers do but instead wants it to be incorporated into his view of faith.

3.5.4. Alypius at the Games

In a vivid part of the *Confessions*, Augustine shares an instructive warning about his friend and ex-student Alypius. Here, as discussed previously, Augustine demonstrates how haughty it is to think that one's own self-control is sufficient when dealing with the temptations of the world.

Alypius, although a good man, had been too caught up in the 'easy morals' of Carthage and had become besotted with the games in the amphitheatre. Augustine worried that this would be the ruin of Alypius' future (1961, VI, 7, 120). Alypius had one day been dragged to the arena in Rome by his friends, despite his protests and his charge that although he may be physically present 'do you imagine that you can make me watch the show and give my mind to it?' Once seated in the arena, amidst this place 'seething with the lust for cruelty', Alypius shut his eyes, determined not to be pulled in and watch the spectacle. However, he could not prevent himself from hearing the thrilling noise of the crowd. Not able to contain his curiosity, he was nonetheless mistakenly confident that even if he saw the spectacle before him 'he would find it repulsive and remain master of himself' (Augustine 1961, VI, 8, 122), and opened his eyes. What he saw struck and wounded him, in Augustine's metaphorical language. As Augustine explains,

> When he saw the blood, it was as though he had drunk a deep draught of savage passion. Instead of turning away, he fixed his eyes upon the scene and drank in all its frenzy, unaware of what he was doing. He revelled in the wickedness of the fighting and was drunk with the fascination of bloodshed. He was no longer the man who had come to the arena, but simply one of the crowd which he had joined, a fit companion for the friends who had brought him. (1961, VI, 8, 122)

'Need I say more?' Augustine explains, 'He watched and cheered and grew hot with excitement, and when he left the arena, he carried away with him a diseased mind which would leave him no peace until he came back again, no longer simply together with his friends who had first dragged him there, but at their head, leading new sheep to slaughter' (Augustine 1961, VI, 8, 122-3). This would be a lesson for Alypius. Alypius would later demonstrate 'extraordinary self-possession' when dealing honourably with a corrupt and influential senator (Augustine, Confessions 1961, VI, 10, 125). Alypius would even find God. Still, this is a warning against the belief that one's self-control, without the intervention of God, can be sufficient.

3.5.5. The Conversion

In Book VIII, which recounts Augustine's final, tearful conversion to Christian faith, many of the points discussed throughout this section are expanded upon, in what is perhaps the best example of Augustine's understanding of internal struggle within the soul. Here, he elucidates the struggle of competing 'wills' within himself. During the long process of his conversion, a 'new will' was emerging within him but was not yet 'strong enough to overcome the old, hardened as it was by the passage of time' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 5, 164). As he explains

> So these two wills within me, one old, one new, one the servant of the flesh, the other of the spirit, were in conflict and between them they tore my soul apart. From my own experience I now understand what I had read – that *the impulses of nature and the impulses of the spirit are at war with one another.* (Augustine 1961, VIII, 5, 164).

Augustine continues the discussion by saying that he took the side of that part of himself that he approved of, rather than that of which he disapproved. His 'true self was no longer on the side of which I disapproved, since to a great extent I was now its reluctant victim rather than its willing tool' even though it was his own will and habits that had put him in the problematic state in the first place (Augustine 1961, VIII, 5, 164-5). What is this true self, and which is this part of Augustine which stands above his competing wills and chooses?

He recounts how he would finally be freed 'from the fetters of lust which held me so tightly shackled and from my slavery to the things of this world' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 6, 166). As he explains, 'I now found myself driven by the tumult in my breast to take refuge in this garden, where no one could interrupt the fierce struggle, in which I was my own contestant, until it came to its conclusion' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 8, 171). Augustine's conversion would be completed by an act of will, a wholehearted act of will, coming out victorious in the conflict between competing wills occurring in his mind.

As already shown, Augustine speaks much about internal conflict and division. At one point, he discusses reasoning with himself, his heart being 'buffeted hither and tither by winds blowing from opposite quarters' (Augustine 1961, VI, 11, 128). Elsewhere he describes himself as having 'cudgelled my soul and belaboured it with reasons why it should follow me now' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 7, 170). Or very vividly,

> My inner self was a house divided against itself. In the heat of the fierce conflict which I had stirred up against my soul in our common abode, my heart… (Augustine 1961, VIII, 8, 170) .... I wrangled with myself, in my own heart, about my own self. (Augustine 1961, VIII, 11, 177)

Similarly, Augustine talks about his soul "wrestling" with itself, 'part of it trying to rise, part falling to the ground' (1961, VIII, 8, 171). Describing in detail how there are competing wills within the mind, Augustine explains that a 'full will' is required for the mind to 'command' itself do what it wills (1961, VIII, 9, 172). 'So there are two wills in us,' he explains, 'because neither by itself is the whole will' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 9, 172). However, that is not to say that having two wills must mean that people have two minds, one good and one evil (Augustine 1961, VIII, 10, 172-3). Nonetheless, a part of Augustine willed to follow and serve God, and another willed that he should not. Indeed, this struggle within the mind between these wills is '*but from the sinful principle that dwells in me.* It was part of the punishment of a sin freely committed by Adam, my first father' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 10, 173). Holding Augustine back from freeing himself of his chains were 'My lower instincts, which had taken firm hold of me, were stronger than the higher, which were untried' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 11, 175), referring back to the consequences of habituation.

Strikingly put, Augustine's habits, in his lower self, beckon and tempt him,

> They plucked at my garment of flesh and whispered, 'Are you going to dismiss us? From this moment we shall never be with you again, for ever and ever. From this moment you will never again be allowed to do this thing or that, for evermore.' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 11, 175-6)

Although they still pulled and tempted Augustine, the voices were now weaker, quieter, and not even half as loud as they had once been. By now, 'the voice of habit was very faint', and instead, standing in front of Augustine, personified, was 'the chaste beauty of Continence in all her serene, unsullied joy, as she modestly beckoned me to cross over' (1961, VIII, 11, 176). Continence is personified as a mother, surrounded by many children and people of all ages, widows and virgins. Smiling at Augustine, she continues

> 'Can you not do what these men and these women do? Do you think they find the strength to do it in themselves and not in the Lord their God? It was the Lord their God

> who gave me to them. Why do you try to stand in your own strength and fail? Cast yourself upon God and have no fear…. He will welcome you and cure you of your ills.' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 11, 176)

Feeling ashamed of still listening to the 'futile mutterings of my lower self', Continence once again beckons Augustine and tells him to 'Close your ears to the unclean whispers of your body…. It tells you of things which delight you…' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 11, 176).

Throwing himself down under a fig tree and crying, Augustine hears a child's voice beckoning him to 'Take it and read, take it read' (Augustine 1961, VIII, 12, 177). Rushing back, Augustine picked up a copy of a book containing Paul's Epistles, and opening it, read the first passage that he happened to see: '*Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, arm yourselves with the Lord Jesus Christ; spend no more thought on nature and nature's appetites*' (1961, VIII, 12, 178). In that instance, his conversion was almost complete. Later, telling his mother, who was overjoyed, Augustine explains how 'You converted me to yourself, so that I no longer desired a wife or placed any hope in this world but stood firmly upon the rule of faith…' (1961, VIII, 12, 178). Still, even following his final conversion, Augustine explains how he struggles daily to 'wage war', sometimes still unsuccessfully, against pleasure and satisfaction, lest he becomes their 'captive' once more (Augustine 1961, X, 31, 235).

3.5.6. Summary

Augustine begins by arguing that childhood and adolescence are full of temptations and how the 'same passions' follow man throughout his various life stages. Augustine believes that, unlike angels who exist in perfect wisdom and are passionless, men and demons alike are disturbed by tempestuous passions. The passions, for Augustine, being an involuntary movement of the lower animal soul. Elsewhere, he defines the power of reason as what allows people to inquire into the meaning of the universe, reason being able to 'sift the evidence' relayed by the senses. Further, he differentiates between the seat of the mind and will, the *anima rationalis*, and the powers of 'appetite, sense-perception and memory' which he called the *anima irrationalis*. Interestingly, Augustine does not posit affections, a kind of emotion, as contrary to reason. While Augustine does sometimes counsel that the passions should be subject to rational control, the affections, in contrast, are already, in a way, aspects of the

rational mind. At times, it appears that Augustine's philosophy towards the emotions and the distinction between passions and affections is not as dualistic as may be expected. In criticism of the Stoics, for example, who think that nearly all instances of emotion are undesirable, Augustine advocated rightly directed and rational emotions. Still, for Augustine, God demands self-control and Augustine has much to say about internal conflict and division. At one point, he discusses reasoning with himself, vividly describing how his 'inner self was a house divided against itself'. Lastly, even following his final conversion, he explains how he still swages 'war' against pleasure and satisfaction lest he becomes their 'captive' again.

3.6. Thomas Hobbes - *Leviathan*

3.6.1. Introduction

Gaskin has written that 'The analysis of natural, unrestrained human behaviour is thus the hinge upon which the whole of Hobbes's political theory turns. In sum, his thesis is that it is a fact of nature that we are wired up to act according to our desires' (1996, xxxi). Indeed, Hobbes himself writes in *Leviathan* (1651) that 'Life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire' (1996, Chapter 6, 58) and that 'the greatest part of mankind' are 'the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure' (1996, 15, 94). So, to examine how Hobbes conceptualises the relationship between reason and emotion, this section first looks at how Hobbes' defined the state of nature as a condition stemming from the passions of humankind. However, he adds complexity to his argument by saying that although the condition exists because of people's natural passions, the passions are also one avenue *out* of the state of nature. Secondly, this section examines Hobbes' understanding of reason as a faculty of addition and subtraction which all people possess. Thirdly, it shows how Hobbes understands the passions and argues that an utterly unemotional life is neither possible nor desirable. Lastly, this section discusses some of Hobbes' critiques of popular rule as corruptible by people's passions, which become amplified and disturbed in groups.

3.6.2. The State of Nature

Although Hobbes noted that the war of each against all has never actually existed exactly as he described (1996, 13, 85), he says that

> I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, that he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. (1996, 11, 66)

This condition stemmed from people's individual passions. As he explained, men are inclined to 'contention, enmity, and war' because the attainment of one's desires sometimes compels

one 'to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other' (Hobbes 1996, 11, 66). Alternatively, as he put it elsewhere, 'the miserable condition of war… is necessarily consequent… to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature' (Hobbes 1996, 17, 111). This is because 'the laws of nature (as *justice, modesty, mercy* and (in sum) *doing to others, as we would be done to*,) of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like' (Hobbes 1996, 17, 111). In the final instance, this is because 'the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason' (Hobbes 1996, 19, 124).

Hobbes defines the passions as the emotions of 'hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness' (1996, 27, 197). The outcomes of these passions, Hobbes claims, are so clear to everyone that they need little explanation (1996, 27, 197). Hobbes refers to the 'common infirmity of human nature' in where passions may lead it (1996, 27, 201). Indeed, these effects can only be constrained by what Hobbes calls an 'extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them' (1996, 27, 197). Of all the passions, fear is that which least inclines individuals to break the laws, and is indeed 'the only thing… that makes men keep them' (1996, 27, 198). To add a layer of complexity, as will be elaborated on later, although it is the passions which lead people to behave in the barbaric way that characterises the state of nature, it is also the passions which help them to escape this condition.

3.6.3. Reason

Hobbes sees the passions as insatiable and ever-present, while reason, defined as the faculty of mathematical calculation, is rare (1996, 5, 27). Reasoning, for Hobbes, even in the field of politics, is a form of addition and subtraction. As he explains, in politics, people add together '*facts* to find what is *right* and *wrong* in the actions of private men' (Hobbes 1996, 5, 28). Wherever there is 'place for *addition* and *subtraction*, there also is place for *reason*' (Hobbes 1996, 5, 28). For Hobbes, the words 'man' and 'rational' are 'mutually one another', signify the same thing and are interchangeable (1996, 4, 22). Still, the *desire* to know how and why something happens is curiosity, and it is this 'singular passion' along with reason, that distinguishes man from animals (Hobbes 1996, 6, 37). Man is therefore not defined simply by a unique faculty of reason, but a unique passion, that of curiosity.

Like many before and after him, Hobbes believed that 'children, fools, and madmen… have no use of reason' (1996, 18, 108). However, unlike some thinkers who associate reason with an educated elite or minority, Hobbes argues that even professors and 'the ablest, most attentive, and more practised men, may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions' (1996, 5, 28). This is not because reason itself is wrong, but that 'no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty' because it does not affect the truth of a thing to be believed by many (1996, 5, 28). He may be alluding to the anti-monarchical sentiment of his time. Still, there is something to be done about the fact that many people may believe something which is false. Some third-party, 'some arbitrator, or judge', must be put forward to decide what right reason is. Men cannot be trusted to use their own faculties to decide what is right because they will confuse their passions, 'as it comes to bear sway in them' for 'right reason' (Hobbes 1996, 5, 28). People's clamouring to have their definition of right reason imposed only leads to disagreement, disunity, and chaos.

Still, all people, Hobbes continues, 'by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles' (1996, 5, 31). Even "fools" will reason correctly if someone points out their errors in reasoning to them (Hobbes 1996, 5, 31). After all, reason is not so much an inborn sense, or innate, like memory, but 'attained by industry' (Hobbes 1996, 5, 31). Children are reasonless at birth, as they are without language, but Hobbes sees them as potentially reasonable because they have the capability to become so (1996, 5, 31). Still, most people live their lives depending on experience, memory, fortune and so on, some better and some worse, while scientific reasoning escapes them (Hobbes 1996, 5, 31-2). Nonetheless, those without science are in a better position than those who "mis-reason" and imagine false generalities (Hobbes 1996, 5, 32). Wit, too, defined as quickness of the imagination and '*steady direction* to some approved end', is gained through use. However, this quickness or slowness of mind is caused 'by a difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 45).

Hobbes discusses how Aristotle argues that some individuals are by nature suited to rule while others are to be ruled. Many believe, Hobbes says, that they are wiser than the rest and therefore better suited to rule (1996, 17, 113) However, for Hobbes, master and servant relationships are introduced by 'consent of men' and the 'laws civil', and are not ordained by nature (1996, 15, 102). This is not only 'against reason: but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others' (1996, 15, 102).

As he puts it, 'in the condition of mere nature… all men are equal' (Hobbes 1996, 15, 102). Indeed, he explains that the only things inherent in an individual's mind are the five senses, while other 'faculties' are 'acquired, and increased by study and industry' as was explained (Hobbes 1996, 3, 19). Even the appetites are not unchangeable and 'born with men', unlike those for hunger and excretion, instead they 'proceed from experience, and trial of their effects' (Hobbes 1996, 6, 34). Aversion is more inborn, as people are averse to things which they both do and *do not* have experience of being negative. As Hobbes explains, discussing the natural equality of people,

> NATURE hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest… (1996, 13, 82).

Continuing, he says

> And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; not attained (as prudence,)… I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves to' (Hobbes 1996, 13, 82).

Men only believe by conceit that they have more wisdom than ordinary people. Still, it is precisely this physical, and especially mental, equality that leads to conflict, as when two men want something they both cannot have, they become enemies. So, the natural equality of people leads to the condition of war 'of every man, against every man' (Hobbes 1996, 13. 84).

3.6.4. The Passions

As was already explained, Hobbes speaks of the 'appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind' (1996, 5, 26). However, Hobbes' view is perhaps surprisingly subtle, especially when considering that he is often read as arguing that the passions lead people to behave in the ways which make the state of nature as barbaric as it is. For instance, Pacchi unequivocally states that 'It is well known that the cornerstone of Hobbes' political philosophy is the opposition between reason and the emotions' (1987, 111)

Firstly, for Hobbes, it is impossible to live an apathetic or emotionless life, 'For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, not without fear, no more than without sense' (1996, 6, 41). Hobbes does not believe that the passions are merely inborn, as already mentioned. The differences in people's passions arise

> partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies, and discretions. It [the differences of wits] proceeds therefore from the passions; which are different, not only from the difference of men's complexions; but also from their difference of customs and education. (Hobbes 1996, 8, 48)

Hobbes is making the quite novel claim that passions are socially constructed, as opposed to the innate biological inheritance of individuals.

Further, for Hobbes, a man without passion would not be able to judge well in daily life. As he says, 'a man who has no great passion for any of these things [power, for example]; but is as men term it indifferent; though he may be so far a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, or much judgment' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 48). Not only this, but, very significantly, all reasoning proceeds from the search for what the passions desire. As Hobbes continues, 'For the thoughts, are to the desires, as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired: all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence' (1996, 8, 48). Moreover, Hobbes concludes

that 'For as to have no desire, is to be dead: so as to have weak passions, is dullness…' (1996, 8, 48).

Still, when it comes to being a good judge, in the much stricter sense of an interpreter of the laws, one should be completely passionless. As he explains, such a figure must, among other things, be '*able in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion*' (Hobbes 1996, 26, 187). Along similar lines, Hobbes explains that the cause of crime is either 'some defect of the understanding; or some error in reasoning or some sudden force of the passions' (1996, 27, 194), with crime resulting from the passions less punishable than that which is premeditated (1996, 27, 201). However, no passions are a complete excuse, as by the law, men 'ought by meditation of the law, to rectify the irregularity of his passions continually' (Hobbes 1996, 27, 202). Similarly, elsewhere, Hobbes explains that the law exists to 'not to bind the people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in their way' (1996, 30, 230). The most common passion which leads to crime is that of 'vainglory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth' (Hobbes 1996, 27, 196).

Hobbes then proceeds to explain, an excess of passions, is but madness. Continuing the above statement, Hobbes explains how 'to have passions indifferently for every thing GIDDINESS, and *distraction*; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESS' (1996, 8, 48-9). Although not wanting to see the total obliteration of the passions, Hobbes still counsels that passions should be expressed within a healthy range. Hobbes states that powerful and frequent passions can indeed arise not only from continued use but from an 'evil constitution'. As he explains, 'Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 49).

In this way, the passions may cause madness, and the passion most often implicated is 'great *vain-glory*: which is commonly called *pride*, and *self-conceit* or great *dejection* of mind' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 49). This is because pride subjects the mind to excess of anger, leading to a madness called rage, and fury. From there,

> it comes to pass that excessive desire for revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage: that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage:

> excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form, and the like, becomes distraction, and giddiness: the same joined with envy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, rage. (Hobbes 1996, 8, 49)

Meanwhile, dejection leads to melancholy, which is a disorder of causeless fears (Hobbes 1996, 8, 49).

In summary, Hobbes explains how all the passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour are called by the general name of madness. Hobbes describes how the ancients saw two causes of madness, either the passions, or demons, spirits, and possession (1996, 8, 50-1). As he says, 'if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 49). In other words, Hobbes is saying that some passions, or passions taken to an unhealthy extent, are but a form of madness.

Further, Hobbes is alluding to civil war when he says that excessive passions shared by many can lead to internecine warfare. The effect of folly, madness, in one person is not very visible,

> yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secure from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man…. we may be well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation' (Hobbes 1996, 49-50).

Indeed, their act of sedition is itself proof enough of their madness. As was shown elsewhere, madness is 'too much appearing passion' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 50). As Hobbes explains, the fact that even sober men would not want all their idle thoughts publicly seen, 'is a confession, that passions unguided, are for the most part mere madness' (Hobbes 1996, 8, 50).

However, Hobbes again complicates his view of the passions. Just as with those who lock their doors at night, neither does Hobbes

> accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it' (1996, 13, 85).

Hobbes is not only reiterating that in the state of nature all is permissible and nothing is unjust (1996, 13, 85), but that the passions are only conceived as bad by common agreement, by legal norms, and not by their very nature. As mentioned briefly before, the passions, and their disorders are in the final instance socially constructed.

Further, it is by the passions, or a combination of both reason and passion, that men come out of the condition of war that characterises the state of nature. Firstly, he explains how 'Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common power: because by such desires, a man doth abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry, and labour. Fear of death, and wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason' (Hobbes 1996, 11, 67). Furthermore, 'Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power: for such desire, containeth a desire of leisure: and consequently protection from some other power than their own' (Hobbes 1996, 11, 66-7). So, the passions cause civil war and lead to the war of each against all, which is "rational", incidentally, as will be explained below, but also lead people to submit to a common power. So, the passions are both the cause *and* solution of the problems of human nature.

Secondly, Hobbes continues, 'the ill condition [of war], which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting *partly in the passions, partly in his reason*' (1996, 13, 85-6, emphasis added). Hobbes goes on to explain that

> The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature' (1996, 13, 86).

The right of nature is the liberty to do all things for self-preservation by any means one reasons to employ, while a law of nature is 'a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive to his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same' (Hobbes 1996, 14, 86). It is only rational, then, to employ any means,

including violence and cruelty, within the state of nature (Hobbes 1996, 14, 86). Still, the covenant which creates the commonwealth cannot simply be one of words because 'the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power' (Hobbes 1996, 14, 91).

Hobbes even feels the need to answer the potential charge that his commonwealth will be too offensive to the natural passions of men. As he says, 'a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands' (Hobbes 1996, 18, 122). For Hobbes, this is a much better alternative to the state of nature, and people are apt to exaggerate their losses, after all.

3.6.5. Passionate Popular Rule

Hobbes, inspired by Thucydides, who he translated, believed that Athenian democracy was flawed and bred disunity (Gaskin 1996, xv). As Hobbes writes in his verse autobiography (Hobbes 1680, cited in Sahlins 2008, 10):

> There's none that pleas'd me like *Thucydides*.
> He says Democracy's a Foolish Thing,
> Than a Republick Wiser is one King.

In *Leviathan,* Hobbes also develops his understanding of the passions through a criticism of popular, or parliamentary, forms of rule. As Pacchi says, 'even if the State, which provides the only guarantee of peace and welfare for mankind, is a model of rational construction, its stability is threatened not only by ignorance but also by the disrupting influence of the passions, which operate directly or by way of destructive doctrines or religious superstitions' (1987, 111). Hobbes presents various examples of these disruptive passions.

In important statements on the functioning of a democratic assembly, the learned counsel received by a monarch is superior to that received by an assembly because, in an assembly, people are prone to 'long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it. For the *understanding* is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled' (Hobbes 1996, 19, 125). Similarly, in a multitude, the reason of a person's speech cannot be interrupted and interrogated as when it comes from one person in

private (Hobbes 1996, 25, 171). Counsel is ruined when it represents private passions (Hobbes 1996, 25, 172). Also, Hobbes says that counsellors must speak in a clear form of speech because '*all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion* (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own) *are repugnant to the office of a counsellor*' (1996, 25, 172).

Later, when continuing the comparison of the counsel given by people individually or when assembled, Hobbes says that the advantage of hearing counsel individually is that 'you have the advice of every man', without interruption or oration and in secrecy (1996, 25, 173-4). In an assembly, however, 'many of them deliver their advice with aye, or no, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another…. For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another (especially when they blow one another with orations)' (Hobbes 1996, 25, 173-4). Those in an assembly, with their dazzling oration and narcissism in wanting to seem learned and versed in politics, make examining the 'truth, or probability of his [a counsellor's] reasons' difficult (Hobbes 1996, 25, 174). Furthermore, the counsel of demagogues who have 'been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge', are more likely to spread confusion because 'the *understanding* is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, only dazzled' (Hobbes 1996, 19, 125). Therefore,

> no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them; or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for very little commonwealths, be they popular, or monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours. (Hobbes 1996, 25, 175).

Moving on, Hobbes says that unlike strong and learned men, 'the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them' (1996, 30, 224). What does Hobbes see fit to write on this clean paper? He propagandises: 'the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in their neighbour nations [including democracy], more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change' (Hobbes 1996, 30, 224).

Besides the 'inconstancy' of human nature, assemblies also have practical problems such as how the absence or presence of delegates 'undoes to-day, all that was concluded yesterday' (Hobbes 1996, 19, 125). In other words, they are inefficient. Since a monarch 'cannot disagree with himself' while an assembly can, out of 'envy, or interest', events can reach such a pitch as to cause a civil war (Hobbes 1996, 19, 125). Furthermore, Hobbes sees assemblies as susceptible to 'orators' and 'flatterers' who have 'great power to hurt…. For to accuse, requires less eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse' (Hobbes 1996, 19, 124-5). Hobbes explains how 'a multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that have gained a reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate the laws, from a hope of oppressing the power' (Hobbes 1996, 27, 196). Similarly, Hobbes says that 'So easy are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance' (1996, 12, 77). In this way, demagogues take hold of their passions.

In a passage describing the 'multitude' seemingly engaged in democratic-type debate, Hobbes concludes that 'being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing' (Hobbes 1996, 17, 112). A crowd of people is, for Hobbes, 'an irregular system' whose legality can be judged on the occasion and number assembled (1996, 22, 158). A large number of assembled individuals seems to worry Hobbes as potentially tumultuous and unlawful (1996, 22, 158). In regards to these crowds, Hobbes reserves some of his most grotesque imagery. As he explains, 'assemblies of people, which may be compared (as I said,) to the similar parts of man's body; such as be lawful, to the muscles; such as are unlawful, to wens [warts], biles, and apostems [abscesses], engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours' (Hobbes 1996, 22, 158-9).

3.6.6. Summary

Hobbes argues that the condition of war characterising the state of nature is a consequence of the natural passions of people when they lack an overawing power to bind them by fear. This is because observing the laws of nature, among them justice, mercy, and treating others as we would like to be treated stand contrary to the passions. In the final instance, this is because people's passions are commonly stronger than their reason. Indeed, the harmful effects of the passions can only be constrained by an 'extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in

punishing them'. Hobbes believes that 'children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason'. Hobbes then proceeds to explain how the opposite, an excess of passions, is but madness. In this way, the passions may cause madness through 'long continuance of the passion' among other things. Some third-party, 'some arbitrator, or judge', must be put forward to decide what right reason is. People cannot be trusted to use their own faculties to decide what is right because they will confuse their passions for 'right reason'. Still, Hobbes complicates the picture when he argues that passions, hand in hand with reason, are not only the cause but also the *remedy* for the pitiable condition of humankind in the state of nature. This is because the *desire* for ease, the *fear* of death and injury, and the *desire* for knowledge, which are all passions, make people obey a common power. Not only this, but for Hobbes, it is impossible to live an emotionless life, as one without passions would be dead, and one with few passions would be dull. Finally, he argues that and a man without passion would not be able to judge well in daily life, and that the desires marshal thinking to meet their ends.

Chapter 3 Discussion

Now that six thinkers spanning several philosophical periods and traditions have been surveyed, it is possible to discuss some of their commonalities and divergences. These thinkers have been grouped together on the basis that they want to manage the emotions in various ways. Plato argued that the appetites and desires must be ruled in the soul by reason, and therefore the majority of people, who correspond to the appetites and desires, must be ruled by philosophers representing reason in the state. Aristotle talks about how certain groups are incapable of reasoning and that the state must intervene to help tame people's emotions. Seneca argued that a good life is an emotionless one. Not a life of moderate emotions, but free of emotions, as moderating the passions is neither possible nor desirable. For Epictetus, passions are the result of frustrated desires so it is essential that people manage and constrain their emotions by not valuing externals and properly appraising impressions and not allowing themselves to be swept away by them. Augustine argued that people, unlike passionless angels, are disturbed throughout their lives by tempestuous passions. Speaking evocatively about internal conflict and division, Augustine says that God demands self-control. For Hobbes, the state of nature would be brutal because people's passions are stronger than their reason and can only be constrained by an outstanding use of reason.

As may be expected, these thinkers take a hard-line approach to the emotions. However, there are important exceptions, even among the Stoics. Even in Plato's ideal state, there is a space left for "spirited" defenders. Aristotle, in his doctrine of the mean, goes to some length to defend the experience and expression of certain emotions, to certain extents. Without appropriate anger, for example, people cannot defend themselves or their friends. Seneca seems to soften his view and counsels that grief must be kept under control and to the proper intensity and duration, instead of being wholly eliminated or avoided. Even tears are forgivable, within limits. Epictetus, too, is quite lenient towards some experience and expression of emotion. Augustine does not posit affections, a kind of emotion, as contrary to reason and in criticism of the Stoics, he advocated rightly directed and rational emotions. Finally, Hobbes argues that passions are not only the cause of the state of nature but also the remedy for escaping it. Indeed, for Hobbes, it is impossible to live an emotionless life and that a person without passion would not be able to judge well in daily life, and even said that a person's desires marshal thoughts for their ends.

Now, moving on to Chapter 4, this thesis looks at three thinkers, Hume, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, who represent a turn towards the rehabilitation of the passions, a re-centring of human nature around the emotions, and a denigration of reason.

Chapter 4: Rehabilitating the Emotions

4.1. David Hume – *Treatise on Human Nature*

4.1.1. Introduction

Hume, in his *Treatise on Human Nature* (1739-40), aims to develop the first empirical, "scientific" approach to the study of human nature. To achieve this, he crafts an argument of increasing complexity, and employs anecdotes observed from everyday life, hoping to appeal to the common sense and experience of the reader. Simply put, Hume saw human nature and behaviour as the responses to the great multitude of phenomena which cause pain and pleasure, which are in turn mediated by the impressions and ideas they elicit. Hume defines impressions as 'our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and sentiments', and ideas are the 'fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and imagination' (1985, Advertisement, 503, emphases removed). Importantly, Hume also challenges metaphysical and rationalist views that put the faculty of reason on a pedestal and see it as the originator and motivator of both behaviour and decision-making, and people's moral and ethical sense. Moreover, Hume mounts an attack on the reason/emotion dualism and even argues for the primacy of passion in directing behaviour in general and even moral behaviour. Meanwhile, for Hume, reason is to be found in the rear. It is a largely inert instrument wielded by the passions for meeting their ends or discerning the factual rightness or wrongness of mental assessments. Thus, to examine Hume's thought on the reason/emotion dualism, this section first shows how he defined reason, passion, and the will while discussing how he subdivides them. Secondly, it outlines his criticism of the reason/emotion dualism. Finally, it discusses how Hume sees passion as the starting point of all moral and ethical behaviour.

4.1.2. Reason, Passion, and the Will

Hume defines reason as the discovery and assessment of reality for an instrumental purpose. 'Truth or falsehood', he says, 'consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact' (1985, Book III, Part I, Section I, 510). Reason, as will be discussed in more detail later, is not an active faculty for Hume. Instead, as he puts it, 'reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection' (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 509).

Further, Reason is not so clearly distinguishable from passion as many argue, as it is a similar motion of the mind. Sometimes, Hume argues, our passions can proceed 'more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper' and thus be easily mistaken for motions of the intellectual, as opposed to emotional, faculties (1985, II, III, VIII, 484). As he reiterates, what some do not understand is that many passions 'are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul' themselves, and are thus 'very readily taken for the determinations of reason' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 464). Hume goes on to explain how people are often apt to mistake tranquillity of mind for reasoning. This is because reasoning only very rarely produces any pleasure of its own, such as that felt in 'the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtleties of the school' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 464).

Hume talks eloquently about the difficulty of defining the passions, saying that none of the passions can be given a 'just definition' by a 'multitude of words', but can only be described 'by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them' (1985, II, I, II, 329). Still, he does seem to specify passion as a type of powerful emotion. As he puts it, 'What we commonly understand by *passion* is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite' (Hume 1985, II, III, VIII, 484). As to what elicits the passions, Hume explains how 'Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception' (1985, II, I, I, 328). Also, Hume goes on to explain that, besides the pain and pleasure principle, 'the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites' (Hume 1985, II, III, IX, 486). Later, it will be shown how Hume introduces the role of custom and education in shaping the passions.

Hume further divides the passions into several categories. The first division is between calm and violent passions. As he explains,

> Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division if far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd *passions*, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotion arising from beauty

> and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. (Hume 1985, II, I, I, 328)

Thus, he seems to use the term emotion to describe a calmer passion and passion as a more violent emotion, although he admits passions can subside into gentleness.

Another division Hume discusses is that between the direct and indirect passions. As he explains,

> By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain and pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities…. under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. (Hume 1985, II, I, I, 328)

What differentiates these two forms of passion, then, is the form in which they arise.

For Hume, passions also have both a cause and an object, as well as a quality and subject. Hume provides an excellent example of both sets of distinctions. As he explains,

> a man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house…. Here the *object* of the passion is himself, and the *cause* is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, *viz*. the *quality*, which operates upon the passions, and the *subject*, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. (Hume 1985, II, I, II, 331, emphasis added)

Here, it is also apparent that Hume treats externals as direct causes of emotions, in opposition to the Stoics. The beautiful quality of the house causes the passion to arise, not a perception the man has about the house and its beauty.

The passions for Hume, like human nature in general, are also necessarily subject to change and transformation. As he explains, 'All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated' (Hume 1985, II, I, V, 335). For Hume, in this way, passions are interrelated in a predictable way.

Hume also has much to say for the immense power of empathy between living creatures, especially people, and how this leads to the transference of passion. As he explains,

> No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own…. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. (Hume 1985, II, I, XI, 367)

Not only are these emotions easily felt by others, but Hume also reports that these communicated emotions are more potent than those conjured by this own mind. As he continues, 'The best method of reconciling us to this opinion is to take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy thro' the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another' (Hume 1985, II, II, V, 411-2). As he famously said, 'the minds of men are mirrors to one another' as they reflect each other's emotions (Hume 1985, II, II, V, 414)

Similarly, people are mostly identical in their constitutions and passions, with exceptions for women and labourers. As Hume says, 'Now 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures, and what we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves' (Hume 1985, II, I, XI, 368). This resemblance is the case for both mind and body. However, as mentioned above, for Hume, particular classes and genders "feel" differently, in keeping with long term stereotypes about the labouring classes and women. As Hume explains,

> The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners', this being the outcome of the 'different stations of life' and how they 'influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. (Hume 1985, II, III, I, 450)

As regards to women and children, Hume often mentions how they feel more deeply, especially the passion of pity. For instance, he explains how 'women and children are most subject to pity, as being most guided by that faculty. The same infirmity, which makes them faint at the

sight of a naked sword…. makes them pity extremely those, whom they find in any grief of affliction' (Hume 1985, II, II, VII, 418). In another example, he explains how 'every one, but especially women, are apt to contract a kindness for criminals, who go to the scaffold' (Hume 1985, II, II, IX, 436).

Relatedly, the will also arises from pain and pleasure. Again, fearing that mere words cannot do it justice, Hume nevertheless defines the will as '*the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind*' (1985, II, III, I, 447). Moving on, however, Hume, goes into a long and complex discussion of free will and its limits, arguing, for example, that 'the scholastic doctrine of *free-will*,… enters very little into common life, and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking' (Hume 1985, 362). Still, what Hume is trying to express is that there is a faculty related to passion, but distinct from reason, which gives rise to intentioned bodily and mental acts. Further to this, Hume explains how, 'Generally speaking, the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will' (1985, II, III, VIII, 484). The calmer passions, through 'reflection' and 'resolution' can be controlled in 'their most furious movements', but this is made more difficult by the propensity for calm passions to transition into more violent ones through the 'borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination' (Hume 1985, II, III, VIII, 484).

4.1.3. Criticising the Reason/Passion Dualism

Hume opens Book II, Section III, Part III, with some of his most famous and evocative words. As he says,

> NOTHING is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, antient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity,

> invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive of any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will…. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (Hume 1985, II, III, III. 460-2)

Hume then proceeds to layer on his argument for these claims. As he eloquently explains, when one faces the prospect of pain or pleasure, not only does one feel a consequent and corresponding emotion, but that emotion makes

> us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 461-2)

Further, because one's passions are self-generating, prior, and wholly complete phenomena within themselves, they can neither be disproved by reason, or be irrational. As Hume explains, 'Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood…. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves… 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.' (1985, III, I, I, 510).

A passion can only be called irrational, and even then in a limited or modified sense, for two reasons. These are, 'First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 463). Even then, in such cases ''tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 463). As Hume continues, 'Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable…. The merit and demerit of actions frequently

contradict, and sometimes control our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason' (1985, III, I, I, 510), as is elaborated on later. Indeed, 'actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it' (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 510).

Even desiring something which may be harmful is not irrational per se. This is because in Hume's schema, the role of reason is to aid the passions and desires in their ends by informing their actions, and reason and passion are not in conflict. As Hume explains, ''tis impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions' (1985, II, III, III, 464). This point is proven, for Hume, by the fact that when one's ignorance is corrected, and the error in reasoning is pointed out, 'our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases' (1985, II, III, III, 464). As for passions yielding easily, Hume adds that 'Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions' (Hume 1985, II, III, IX, 485).

Moreover, people can only reason backwards after their passions have made themselves evident, and in that sense, retroactively justify them. As Hume explains, 'any harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency to excite our hatred, and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion' (1985, II, II, III, 400). Taking this argument even further, reason cannot begin or end any particular action in a person. As he explains, 'Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 462). As, Hume says that those who can counteract violent passions in seeking their interest are described as having 'strength of mind' (1985, II, III, III, 465). For Hume, what is really being observed here is not the preponderance of reason, but instead 'the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 465). Not only this, but passions alone do not decide all human behaviour. Instead, human behaviour is also influenced as well by the '*general* character or *present* disposition of the person' and their varied tempers, which only creates more difficulty in 'deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions' (Hume 1985, II, III, III, 465).

To make matters even more complicated, Hume brings in the concepts of education, habituation and custom. As he explains, ''Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action' (Hume 1985, II, III, IV, 466). Thus, the repetition of custom can play an essential role in determining human behaviour.

As he strikingly puts it, 'nothing has a greater effect both to encrease and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition' by creating a '*tendency or inclination*' towards it (Hume 1985, II, III, V, 469).

Lastly, for Hume, another significant influencer of passion is skilful oration. As he explains, 'Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours' and ''till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections' (Hume 1985, II, III, VI, 473-4). Moreover, even striking eloquence and force of emotion is not always required. This is because humans are so susceptible to emotional influence from their peers in everyday encounters due to their natural sympathy, (Hume 1985, II, III, VI, 474). Still, if one wishes to modify a person's behaviour and push them into specific actions, to 'govern a man', in Hume's terms, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly call'd his *reason*' (Hume 1985, II, III, IV, 466). So, Hume reiterates that the passions are the main motive factor in human behaviour.

4.1.4. Morality and Ethics

In Book III, Hume constructs an argument which bases virtue, and ethical and moral behaviour on the emotions. Namely, he argues that the emotions are a reliable, internal guide to right and wrong conduct and thought. As Hume explains,

> For if all morality be founded on the pain and pleasure, which arises from the prospect of any loss or advantage, that may result from our own characters, or from those of others, all the effects of morality must be deriv'd from the same pain or pleasure, and among the rest, the passions of pride and humility. The very essence of virtue, according to this hypothesis, is to produce pleasure and that of vice to give pain. The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility. (1985, II, I, VIII, 347)

For Hume, it seems that there are many 'who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them' (1985, III, I, I, 508). From reason alone, this belief holds,

people can discover and distinguish between morally reprehensible and morally laudable behaviour and ideas, as an inherent quality. However, as was already noted, reason is never the starting point of behaviour for Hume. So, he continues, ‘Reason by itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason…. An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances’ (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 509). As he puts it even more bluntly, ‘Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals’ (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 510). As was mentioned previously, actions may only be deemed irrational if reason has made a mistake when applied to a problem of meeting a passion’s desire. However, significantly, this can scarcely be the source of immoral behaviour, as it is more in the realm of an innocent mistake. As Hume explains, such acts ‘extend not beyond a mistake of *fact*, which moralists have not generally suppos’d criminal, as being perfectly involuntary’ (1985, III, I, I, 511). This is related to the claim that people can reason wrong if their reasoning is based on ignorance, and that this can be set to rights by simply learning the facts of the situation.

If this is the case, and Hume is right in reframing the role and responsibility of reason, he must explain how morally good and bad behaviours can be distinguished. Hume gives the example of an intentioned murder. What is inherent in the act of murder itself which distinguishes it as a vice? When examining it, all one can find are ‘only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts’ (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 521). Instead, Hume argues, people must turn their attention inwards to find the answer. As he says,

> The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (Hume 1985, III, I, I, 521)

Therefore, the entire basis for judging the morality of an action is whether it elicits a feeling of blame when it is considered. Indeed, if objects and relations could be inherently virtuous, or the opposite, it would be as if ‘‘twere possible for inanimate matter to become virtuous or vicious’ (Hume 1985, III, I, II, 523). Hume is quick to remind the reader, and again makes his

argument even more subtle, by saying that by ‘pleasure’, he is not describing a simple, singular, or universal feeling. A great multitude of objects of the passions can elicit a great many types of pleasure. So, he continues,

> ‘tis evident, that under the term *pleasure*, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance…. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin’d merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? (Hume 1985, III, I, II, 523)

Again, on the topic of “governing” people, if people’s natural sentiments could be said to be ‘favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice’ then nothing else is necessary to regulate ‘our conduct and behaviour’ than the emotions (1985, III, I, I, 521). In the final instance, Hume claims, ‘Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg’d of’ (1985, III, I, II, 522). The very feeling of the positive or negative emotion in regards to an object, and to be conscious of this feeling and describe it, is enough to discern what virtue and vice are. As Hume elegantly puts it, ‘We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous, because it pleases’ (1985, III, I, II, 523).

This brings Hume to the issue of where the principles of pain and pleasure, which distinguish good and evil, originate. To this problem, he answers that because people’s various duties in life are so varied, indeed, ‘infinite’, he thinks it scarcely possible that all could be the outcome of an ‘*original* quality and *primary* constitution’ (1985, III, I, II, 525). Namely, to be exclusively inborn. Instead, ‘from our very infancy… multitude of precepts, which are contain’d in the compleatest system of ethics’ are impressed upon people (Hume 1985, III, I, II, 525). Thus, again, custom and education convey to people ‘some more general principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded’ (Hume 1985, III, I, II, 525). Therefore, Hume is saying that the sense of morally good and evil behaviour may not be singularly inborn but is also the product of culture.

However, it is not as crucial for Hume’s overall argument to discern from when or where this inner feeling originates, but to realise that people’s feelings are still the final, ultimate means by which they daily test what constitutes morally good and evil behaviour. Also, more than this, it is almost universal. Finally, summarising the schema he has created,

Hume, explains how ‘we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain’ (1985, III, I, II, 527). Thus, people are not required to go ‘looking for any incomprehensible relations and qualities’ inherent in an object of their passions, ‘which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination’ (Hume 1985, III, I, II, 527).

4.1.5. Summary

In the *Treatise on Human Nature*, Hume aimed to develop the first empirical, “scientific” approach to the study of human nature. Hume defines reason as “simply” the discovery and assessment of reality for an instrumental purpose. Hume goes on to explain how people are often apt to mistake tranquillity of mind for reasoning and how they do not understand that many passions ‘are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul’ and are thus mistaken for reasoning. As regards to women and children, Hume argues that they feel more deeply, especially the passion of pity. Hume comments in length on how ‘NOTHING is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason’. Reason, for Hume, however, is an inert faculty until marshalled to the ends of passion. Reason’s role is to aid the passions and desires in their ends by informing people’s actions. This is why reason and passion can never conflict. As he famously says, ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions’. Hume still believed, however, that eloquent speech could elicit any passion. He even counsels those wishing to ‘govern a man’ to ‘work upon the violent than the calm passions’ rather than appealing to his “reason”. Hume bases virtue, and ethical and moral behaviour on feelings. Namely, as a reliable, internal guide to right and wrong conduct and thought. Indeed, the goodness or badness of an action cannot be uncovered by looking at the action itself. Instead, it lies in people themselves, with their feeling of guilt and blame signalling rightness or wrongness. So, Hume concluded, morality is more felt than judged.

4.2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau – *A Discourse on Inequality* and *Emile*

4.2.1. Introduction

This section examines two of Rousseau's texts, *A Discourse on Inequality* (1754) and *Emile, or On Education* (1762), to elucidate his views on the relationship between reason and emotion. Rousseau does neatly define what he means by these terms, although he defines in detail the difference between the passions of *amour de soi* and degenerate *amour-propre*. By reason, Rousseau understands the faculty that aids understanding and can help define and secure one's ends. It is an inert faculty that can never be the originator of behaviour or action. Passion, which Rousseau defines as intense and potentially overwhelming emotion, is the motivator of action and behaviour. By emotion, or more commonly, sentiment, Rousseau is referring to a gentler or perhaps more benevolent feeling such a love. As will be shown, Rousseau is more critical of reason than most of his predecessors, even arguing that following reason instead of one's passions (pity, specifically), may lead to unjust outcomes. He also mounts a defence of the passions, arguing that they are not in a conflicted relationship with reason. However, Rousseau's permissiveness towards the passions varies. He sometimes argues that all the passions are welcome as long as they are kept under control, while at other times he says that some are dangerous and must be mastered or avoided altogether. This section begins by looking at *A Discourse on Inequality.* There, it examines, in turn, how Rousseau defines the original goodness of humankind in the state of nature, how he criticises reasoning and argues that modern people are subject to many fictitious and dangerous passions, beyond the natural and limited self-love. Moving on to *Emile*, it shows how Rousseau wishes to guide and delay the development of the passions in Emile. Then, it shows how this is accomplished by showing Emile certain sights and experiences while disallowing others. This encourages the growth of the correct passions and sentiments, and discourages the dangerous and false. Finally, this section ends with an examination of how Rousseau genders reasoning and emoting, and discusses the climax to *Emile* where Emile is called on to exercise complete self-mastery and 'Be a man.'

4.2.2. The Limited Passions in the State of Nature

In *A Discourse on Inequality*, one of Rousseau's major claims is that society has corrupted humankind by fostering in it many artificial and destructive passions. To accomplish this, Rousseau wishes to uncover the original essence of humankind, because it has been overtaken by 'mutations taking place in the constitution of the body, and by the constant impact of the passions' after entering society (1984, 67). On entering society, people become characterised by 'the false clash of passion believing itself to be reasoning and understanding inflamed to delirium' (Rousseau 1984, 67). The human soul, at least in its original condition, is characterised by 'two principles antecedent to reason: the first gives us an ardent interest in our own preservation, the second inspires in us a natural aversion to seeing any other sentient being perish or suffer', especially a fellow human (Rousseau 1984, 70). These pre-rational principles are self-love and pity.

Similarly, Rousseau says, before the savage person's soul can reason its only functions are 'Willing and rejecting, desiring and fearing' (1984, 89). However, when entering society, humankind is corrupted, and many false passions are introduced into people's hearts. That is why Rousseau says that Hobbes was wrong to introduce, 'illogically, into the savage man's care for his own preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions which are the product of society' (1984, 98). Thus, people's passions 'through imperceptible degeneration change their objects in the long run', meaning that society only presents 'an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions which are the product of all men's new relations and which have no true foundation in nature' (Rousseau 1984, 135).

Instead, what makes savage people good, for Rousseau, is not their knowledge of the good, or restraining laws, 'but the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil' (1984, 99). As he goes on to explain in *Emile*, and as was mentioned above, the original soul of humankind was not encumbered with many strong passions, but with few, gentle ones. Rousseau goes as far as saying that savage man had 'such inactive passions' and was 'subject to so few passions… he had only such feelings and such knowledge as suited his condition', nothing was 'so tranquil as his soul and nothing so limited as his mind' and that even 'the *ataraxia* of the Stoic does not approach his profound indifference' (1984, 102; 104; 161; 136). Even more strikingly, Rousseau explains how he

> cannot imagine where our philosophers locate the origin of all the passions they attribute to natural man. Apart from the physically necessary, which nature itself demands, all our other needs are needs only because of habit, prior to which they are not needs at all, or because of our desires, and one does not desire what one is no position to know about (1984, 161).

Thus, someone totally unfamiliar with the kind of luxuries and ways of living that characterise the modern world is not able to envisage, let alone desire them.

4.2.3. Criticising Reason, Challenging the Dualism, and Defending the Passions

Rousseau attacks reasoning and philosophising for breeding a certain emotional distance and selfishness. As he says,

> It is reason which breeds pride and reflection which fortifies it; reason which turns man inward into himself; reason which separates him from everything which troubles or affects him. It is philosophy which isolates a man, and prompts him to say in secret at the sight of another suffering: 'Perish if you will; I am safe'. (Rousseau 1984, 101)

Sarcastically, Rousseau continues, 'savage man entirely lacks this admirable talent, and for want of wisdom and reason he always responds recklessly to the first promptings of human feeling', such as when the 'ill-bred mob, the market woman' are those to first tear people away from killing each other during a scuffle, while 'the prudent man departs' (1984, 101). Thus, it may be perfectly rational to avoid a confrontation, but it may not be just. Pity, and acting on pity, is not always rational. Indeed, pity may be impossible without acting against, or without, the dictates of reason. As Rousseau continues, 'It is pity which carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering' (1984, 101). Reflecting, or in other words, reasoning, may actually lead to unjust outcomes compared to merely following the passionate call of pity.

Furthermore, in an idea Rousseau develops in *Emile*, passions are not only moderated by reason, but some "superior" passions are used to constrain the "inferior." As he says, 'pity is a natural sentiment which, by moderating in each individual the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the whole species' (Rousseau 1984, 101). Reiterating

an earlier point, Rousseau argues that reasoning is not necessarily the path to goodness. As he explains, 'it is to this natural feeling [pity], rather than to subtle arguments, that we must look for the origin of that repugnance every man would feel against doing evil, even independently of the maxims of education' (Rousseau, 1984, 101). Although reasoning oneself into goodness 'may be proper for Socrates and other minds of that class', he jokes, the species would long be extinct if being virtuous depended on reason alone (Rousseau 1984, 101-2). In fact, 'improving human reason' came at the price of 'worsening the human species' and 'making man wicked while making him sociable', as his original condition was usually solitary and self-sufficient (Rousseau 1984, 107). Expanding on a thought of Mandeville, Rousseau says that people 'would never have been any better than monsters if nature had not given them pity to support their reason' (Rousseau 1984, 100).

In an attack on pure reasoning, like the one seen in his *Discourse on Inequality* above, Rousseau explains how 'Reason alone is not active. It sometimes restrains, it arouses rarely, and it has never done anything great. Always to reason is the mania of small minds. Strong souls have quite another language. It is with this language that one persuades and makes others act' (1979, Book IV, 321). This language is that of eloquence, not only of beautiful phrases but of evocative signs (Rousseau 1979, IV, 322).

Property is one of the institutions of modern society that makes humankind, in contrast to their peaceable natural condition, more prone to things such as conflict, competition, and avarice. Rousseau quotes Locke approvingly when he said that 'Where there is no property, there is no injury' (Coste 1723, Book IV, III, §18 cited in Rousseau 1984, 115). The desire to increases one's fortune in relation to another is also a cause of immoderate passions. Such 'evils are the main effects of property and the inseparable consequences of nascent inequality' (Rousseau 1984, 119). Accordingly, such modern institutions stifle the natural passion of pity and inflame the unnatural passions of greed, ambition, and others. As Rousseau says, 'The usurpations of the rich, the brigandage of the poor and the unbridled passions of everyone, stifling natural pity and the as yet feeble voice of justice, made men greedy, ambitious, and bad' (1984, 120).

Rousseau also develops a less dualistic view of the relationship between reason and emotion. As he explains,

> Whatever our moralists say, human understanding owes much to the passions, which, by common consent, also owe much to it. It is by the activity of the passions that our reason improves itself; we seek to know only because we desire to enjoy; and it is

> impossible to conceive a man who had neither desires not fears giving himself the trouble of reasoning. The passions in turn, owe their origin to our needs and their development to our knowledge, for one can desire or fear a thing only if one has an idea of it in the mind. (Rousseau 1984, 89)

For Rousseau, reason and emotion exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship, not a conflictual one. As he develops in *Emile*, reason is an inactive faculty. The motivator for human behaviour, and perhaps the stronger means by which human behaviour can be modified, is via the passions.

Rousseau gives an extended treatment of the passions in *Emile*, especially in Books IV and V which examine the boy's transition into puberty, and his falling in love with his ideal counterpart Sophie. Emile's entry into pubescent age is described as Emile's 'second', and more crucial birth. 'This', Rousseau says, 'is where ordinary educations end, is properly the one when ours ought to begin' (1979, IV, 212). Here Rousseau defends the importance of the passions, in their proper place, and argues that the role of education at this life stage should be concerned with allowing the healthy flowering of the passions. Although he denies any role in actively nurturing the development of the passions, and instead claims he is merely fostering their natural development, it does appear that Rousseau's interventions are more active, as will be shown.

The beginning of puberty is when Emile will have emotional outbursts and emotional instability when he will be 'flustered and intimidated' around the opposite sex, and the like (Rousseau 1979, IV, 212). However, Rousseau argues, the job is not to try to obliterate these nascent feelings. As he says,

> Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation. It is, therefore, an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them – it is to control nature, it is to reform the work of God…. I would find someone who wanted to prevent the birth of the passions almost as mad as someone who wanted to annihilate them; and those who believed that this was my project up to now would surely have understood me very badly. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 212).

So, Emile, having had the growth of his passions delayed and shaped, is 'rarely passionate' (1979, IV, 252). However, again, in defence of the passions against their total suppression, Rousseau writes that,

> It is not the case, however, that he [Emile] is completely phlegmatic and cold. Neither his age nor his morals nor his tastes permit it. In the fire of adolescence the vivifying spirits, retained and distilled in his blood, bring to his young heart warmth which shines forth in his glance, which is sensed in his speech, which is visible in his actions. (1979, IV, 252)

Or in a striking summary,

> although I want to form the man of nature, the object is not, for all that, to make him a savage and to relegate him to the depths of the woods. It suffices that, enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that he feel with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 255)

Still, not all passions are desirable, and as Rousseau claims in his *Discourse on Inequality*, society has increased the number of passions in general, and the number of undesirable passions specifically. Rousseau wants to defend himself from the accusation that he wants to obliterate the passions.

Continuing, Rousseau makes a similar point as he had in his *Discourse on Inequality.* Namely, that people in their original condition are devoid of the great many corrupt and corruptible passions that abound in modern life, and that these are artificial and introduced on entry into society. As he explains,

> would it be reasoning well to conclude, from the fact that it is in man's nature to have passions, that all the passions that we feel in ourselves and see in others are natural? Their source is natural, it is true. But countless alien streams have swollen it. It is a great river which constantly grows and in which one could hardly find a few drops of its first waters. Our natural passions are very limited. They are the instruments of our freedom; they tend to preserve us. All those which subject us and destroy us come from elsewhere. Nature does not give them to us. We appropriate them to the detriment of nature. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 212)

4.2.4. Self-love and *Amour-Propre*

Rousseau defines self-love, *amour de soi*, are the original passion of self-preservation and argues that it is transmuted into *amour-propre* when people enter society. As he says,

> The source of our passions, the origin and the principle of all the others, the only one born with man and which never leaves him so long as he lives is self-love – a primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all the others are in a sense only modifications. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 212-3)

Again, the repertoire of human passions has been unnaturally increased. As Rousseau continues,

> all passions are natural. But most of these modifications have alien causes without which they would never have come to pass; and these same modifications, far from being advantageous for us, are harmful. They alter the primary goal and are at odds with their own principle. It is then that man finds himself outside of nature and sets himself in contradiction with himself. (1979, IV, 212-3)

However, although a child's self-love naturally inclines it to benevolence, the emergence of *amour-propre* has a disruptive effect. As Rousseau explains,

> Self-love, which regards only ourselves, is contended when our true needs are satisfied. But *amour-propre*, which makes comparisons, is never content and never could be, because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible. This is how the gentle and affectionate passions are born of self-love, and how the hateful and irascible passions are born of *amour-propre*. Thus what makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare himself little to others; what makes him essentially wicked is to have many needs and to depend very much on opinion. On the basis of this principle it is easy to see how all the passions of children and men can be directed to good or bad. (1979, IV, 213-4)

Alternatively, as he explains in *A Discourse on Inequality*,

> One must not confuse pride [*amour-propre*] and self-love [*amour de soi*], two passions very different in their nature and in their effects. Self-love is a natural sentiment which prompts every animal to watch over its own conservation and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Pride is only a relative, artificial sentiment born in society, a sentiment which prompts each individual to attach more importance to himself than to anyone else, which inspired all the injuries men do to themselves and others, and which is the true source of honour. (Rousseau 1979, III, 167)

Thus, in *A Discourse on Inequality*, it is society which increases and corrupts the natural, limited passions. Accordingly, as Rousseau says elsewhere, *amour-propre* 'not having its germ in children's hearts, cannot be born in them of itself; it is we alone who put it there, and it never takes root except by our fault' (1979, IV, 215).

4.2.5. Aiding and Delaying the "Natural" Emergence of the Passions

As mentioned earlier, Rousseau claims that he does not want to 'order' the passions himself, but only aid and perhaps delay their natural progress. As he mentions elsewhere, part of this would come in isolating Emile from the corrupting influences of society, such as the immorality which abounds in city life. As he explains, 'Do you wish to put order and regularity in the nascent passions? Extend the period during which they develop in order that they have the time to be arranged as they are born. Then it is not man who orders them; it is nature itself' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 219). Crucially, he continues, 'Your care is only to let it arrange its work. If your pupil were alone, you would have nothing to do. But everything surrounding him influences his imagination. The torrent of prejudice carries him away. To restrain him, he must be pushed in the opposite direction' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 219).

How is this accomplished? As Rousseau explains,

> Do you wish, then, to excite and nourish in the heart of a young man the first movements of nascent sensibility and turn his character toward beneficence and goodness? Do not push the seeds of pride, vanity, and envy in him by the deceptive image of the happiness of men. Do not expose his eyes at the outset to the pomp of courts, the splendor of palaces, or the appeal of the theatre. Do not take him to the circles of the great, to

> brilliant assemblies…. To show him the world before he knows men is not to form him, it is to corrupt him; it is not to instruct him, it is to deceive him. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 221-2)

Accordingly, Rousseau says, 'I have always seen that young people who are corrupted early and given over to women and debauchery are inhuman and cruel' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 220). On the other hand, a young man 'raised in a happy simplicity', may still be passionate, may cry, may get carried away, get furious and the like, but is quickly brought back. This is because 'At the height of his fury, an excuse, a word disarms him' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 221). It is not wrong to be passionate, feel deeply, and even be swept away. What matters more for Rousseau is to what ends, and on which passions, one is carried along. Thus, a child, as long as it is well-born and not corrupted by the age of twenty, is 'the most generous, the best, the most loving and loveable of men' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 221).

Pity, the first and most natural of sentiments, must also be fostered. As Rousseau explains,

> To excite and nourish this nascent sensibility, to guide it or follow it in its natural inclination, what is there to do other than to offer the young man objects on which the expansive force of his heart can act…. That is, to say it in other terms, to excite in him goodness, humanity, commiseration, beneficence, and all the attractive and sweet passions naturally pleasing to men, and to prevent the birth of envy, covetousness, hate, and all the repulsive and cruel passions. (1979, IV, 223)

To this end, Rousseau invents maxims by which to summarise and prescribe these desired behaviours. The first of these stays with the theme of guiding the emotional development of children by presenting them specific experiences and disallowing them others. Namely, 'in order to incline a young man to humanity, far from making him admire the brilliant lot of others, one must show him the bad sides of that lot, one must make him fear it' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 223). Another of these maxims, similarly, instructs that pupils should be taught to love all people, 'even those who despise men', and by doing such things 'penetrate the heart of a young adolescent in order to arouse the first emotions of nature and to develop his heart and extend it to his fellows' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 226).

Rousseau is aware of the possible accusation that he wants to parade uncomfortable and shocking sights before the eyes of his pupil (1979, IV, 227). He is quick to say that he does not

wish to march his pupil from 'sick person to sick person, from hospital to hospital', and that a single object of suffering is enough to supply the pupil with enough knowledge of, and pity towards, his fellow man, at least for some time (Rousseau 1979, IV, 231). Still, Rousseau again says that

> when the critical age approaches, furnish young people with sights which restrain them and not with sights which arouse them. Put their nascent imaginations off the track with objects which, far from inflaming, repress the activity of their senses. Remove them from big cities…. Bring them back to their first abodes where rustic simplicity lets the passions of their age develop less rapidly…. Choose with care their society, their occupations, their pleasures. Show them only scenes which are touching but modest, which stir them without seducing them, and which nourish their sensibilities without moving their senses. Be aware also that everywhere there are excesses to fear and that immoderate passions always do more harm than what one wants to avoid by means of them… to the extent his desires catch fire, choose scenes fit to repress them' (1979, IV, 230-1).

Relatedly, the act of getting too easily or frequently what one desires tends to inflame the passions. As Rousseau says, 'The habit of easily getting the objects of his desires leads him to desire much and makes him sense continual privations…. All the devouring passions take flight at the same time' (1979, IV, 229). Teaching history to Emile is also essential because it will allow him 'to know ahead of time how to dispel the illusion of the passions before they are born; and seeing that in all times they have blinded men, he will be warned of the way in which they can blind him in turn' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 243). Similarly, in a section called *Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar*, a new character is introduced. The priest advises Emile and comments on the passions, among other topics. As he says, 'I am active when I listen to reason, passive when my passions carry me away; and my worst torment, when I succumb, is to sense that I could have resisted' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 279).

Lastly, when describing the twenty-year-old Emile, Rousseau demonstrates what an ideal man would be like. Emile should be

> well formed, well constituted in mind and body, strong, healthy, fit, skillful, robust, full of sense, reason, goodness and humanity, a man with morals and taste, loving the beautiful, doing the good, free from the empire of cruel passions, exempt from the yoke

> of opinion, but subject to the law of wisdom and submissive to the voice of friendship… (Rousseau 1979, V, 418-9).

4.2.6. Sexuality, Gender, and the Passions

The arrival of sexual feelings in Emile is a crucial time. As Rousseau says, 'The true moment of nature comes at last. It must come…. instantly abandon your old tone with him forever. He is still your disciple, but he is no longer your pupil. He is your friend, he is a man. From now on treat him as such' (1979, IV, 316). Accordingly, Rousseau admits that it would be wrong and counterproductive to try to overtly suppress the new desires welling up in Emile. As he explains, 'if you were to clash head on with his nascent desires and foolishly were to treat as crime the new needs he is feeling, you would not be listened to for long' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 317). The choice is either 'encouraging his inclinations or fighting them' (1979, IV, 317). Both options are fraught with danger. It would be easy to quickly marry Emile off so as to safely deal with these desires by allowing them to be indulged in wedlock, or to even try to 'greatly prolong this period of continence' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 317). However, Rousseau believes it would instead be best to arm Emile with the knowledge of 'the perils by which he is surrounded' now, and 'make him accountable to himself for his actions' (1979, IV, 318).

Rousseau again employs tactics of diversion to keep Emile on the right track and away from these dangers. As he explains, Emile is constantly close to peril in the 'society of women and young people', and so must be diverted (1979, IV, 320). Once again,

> It is by means of other objects of sense that I put his senses off the track; it is by setting another course for his energies that I turn them away from the one they were beginning to take. It is by exercising the body with hard labor that I restrain the activity of imagination that is carrying him away. When the arms work hard, the imagination rests. When the body is tired out, the heart does not become inflamed. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 320).

An even easier course of actions is to, again, take Emile away from the corrupted and corrupting cities, to 'tear him away from the locality of danger… far from objects tempting him' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 320). However, this is not enough, because even in a desert memory could bring him back to such thoughts. Thus, this would all be for nought if Rousseau cannot 'find

the art of detaching him from everything, if I do not distract him from himself' (1979, IV, 320). For instance, hunting could distract Emile from sexual passion. Hunting, itself a 'ferocious passion', 'serves to suspend a more dangerous passion, so that he will listen coolly to me when I speak of it and I will have the time to depict it without exciting it' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 321).

Similarly, Rousseau instructs that when reasoning with young people, one's arguments should be "clothed" in the language of the heart. As he explains, 'Never reason in a dry manner with youth, clothe reason in a body if you want to make youth able to grasp it. Make the language of the mind pass through the heart, so that it may make itself understood' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 323). As he reiterates, 'it is important at every age to clothe reason in forms which will make it loved. Speak to him gravely when necessary, but let what you say always have an attraction that forced him to listen to you. Do not combat his desires with dryness' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 325). Thus, it would be inappropriate to 'go all of a sudden to Emile's room and pompously make a long speech to him about the subject in which I want to instruct him. I shall begin by moving his imagination' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 323). As he explains, 'cold arguments can determine our opinions, but not our actions. They make us believe and not act. They demonstrate what must be thought, not what must be done' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 323).

At one point, Emile himself speaks and proclaims,

> Defend me from all the enemies who besiege me, and especially from those whom I carry within myself and who betray me…. Make me free by protecting me against those of my passions which do violence to me. Prevent me from being their slave; force me to be my own master and to obey not my senses but my reason. (Rousseau 1979, IV, 325)

As Rousseau says, 'the most dangerous of all the enemies that can attack a young man, and the only one that cannot be put out of the way, is himself' (1979, IV, 333). However, Rousseau says that even if one's pupil gets to such a stage, one must still warn him that 'You do not know the fury with which the senses, by the lure of pleasure, drag young men like you into the abyss of the vices…. You will never break faith, but how often you will repent having given it!' (1979, IV, 326). This is because Emile will resent being held back, although he knows he needs to be.

Yet, Rousseau does not think it wise to keep a pupil away from all the desires and inclinations he has. Instead, he will allow him to indulge those that are healthy, and thus, in a crucial move, 'I shall disgust him with libertinism, and I shall make him moderate by making

him fall in love' (1979, IV, 327). Thus, in this way, Rousseau proclaims how 'One has hold of the passions only by means of the passions. It is by their empire that their tyranny must be combated' (1979, IV, 327). By this seeming contradiction, Rousseau means that some worse and more dangerous passions can only be avoided by indulging in other, safer, less fraught passions – such as a 'sweet sentiment' like love (1979, IV, 327). In this sense, the passion of love can be used to constrain the passion of lust. It is not through the exercise of a constraining reason, but through the substitution of a superior passion, that other, perhaps undesirable, passions are kept at bay.

When discussing the differences between men and women, Rousseau reveals, apart from his sexism, a lot about his view towards the passions. Women have 'unlimited desires', Rousseau says, on which shame is the only 'brake' (1979, V, 359). As he explains in full,

> While giving man inclinations without limit, He [the Supreme Being] gives him at the same time the law which regulates them, in order he may be free and in command of himself. While abandoning man to immoderate passions, He joins reason to these passions in order to govern them. While abandoning women to unlimited desires, He joins modesty to these desires in order to constrain them. (Rousseau 1979, V, 359)

Thus, not only this, but 'The first education of men depends on the care of women. Men's morals, their passions, their tastes, their pleasure, their very happiness also depends on women' (Rousseau 1979, V, 365). As Rousseau says elsewhere, women are to blame for many of men's problems. As he explains,

> Dissipation, frivolity, and inconstancy are defects that easily arise from the corruption and continued indulgence of their [women's] fine tastes. To prevent this abuse, teach them above all to conquer themselves. Amidst our senseless arrangements a decent woman's life is a perpetual combat against herself. It is just that this sex share the pain of the evils it has caused us. (Rousseau 1979, V, 369)

Thus, with 'habitual constraint comes a docility which women need all their lives, since they never cease to be subjected either to a man or to the judgments of men' (Rousseau 1979, IV, 370).

Similarly, after introducing the character of Sophie, the ideal counterpart for Emile, Rousseau explains how she is to master herself. As her father says to her, 'My daughter, it is

to Sophie's reason that I entrust you; I do not entrust you to the inclination of her heart. So long as your blood is cool, remain your own judge. But as soon as you are in love, return yourself to your mother's care' (Rousseau 1979, V, 401). Sophie is described as having the perfect balance of the different "national temperaments". She possesses 'the temperament of an Italian woman and the sensitivity of an Englishwoman, Sophie combines with them, in order to control her heart and her senses, the pride of a Spanish woman, who, even when she is seeking a lover, does not easily find one she esteems worthy of her' (Rousseau 1979, V, 401).

Rousseau attacks the notion that women should be 'limited to housekeeping functions alone' or rendered a 'veritable automaton' (1979, V, 364). Nature, instead, made them to 'think, to judge, to love, to know' (Rousseau 1979, V, 364). Still, Rousseau believes that their capabilities are below those of men (1979, V, 364). As he says, 'The use of reason that leads man to the knowledge of his duties is not very complex. The use of reason that leads woman to the knowledge of hers is even simpler' (Rousseau 1979, V, 382). As he puts it elsewhere, 'The quest for abstract and speculative truths, principles, and axioms in the sciences, for everything that tends to generalize ideas, is not within the competence of women. All their studies ought to be related to practice' (Rousseau 1979, V, 386). Similarly, 'Nor do women have sufficient precision and attention to succeed at the exact sciences' (Rousseau 1979, V, 387). Accordingly, 'Women's reason is practical and makes them very skillful at finding means for getting to a known end, but not at finding that end itself' (Rousseau 1979, V, 377).

However, what they lack in strength they make up for in the ability to manipulate men via their passions. As Rousseau explains,

> Woman, who is weak and who sees nothing outside the house, estimates and judges the forces she can put to work to make up for her weakness, and those forces are men's passions. Her science of mechanics is more powerful than ours; all her levers unsettle the human heart. She must have the art to make us want to do everything which her sex cannot do by itself and which is necessary and agreeable to it. (Rousseau 1979, V, 387).

In this way, women have the uncanny ability to pierce into the minds and hearts of men, and 'penetrate their sentiments' with a word or gesture alone (Rousseau 1979, V, 387). Thus, 'Woman has more wit, man more genius; woman observes, and man reasons' (Rousseau 1979, V, 387).

Emile eventually encounters Sophie and they fall deeply in love. Their encounter ends with the heart-rending demand that Emile leaves Sophie, at least for now, as a final lesson

about self-mastery, and Emile's proper place as student beholden to his master. As Rousseau explains,

> Who, then, is the virtuous man? It is he who knows how to conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it. Up to now you were only apparently free. You had only the precarious freedom of a slave to whom nothing has been commanded. Now be really free. Learn to become your own master. Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous. (1979, V, 445)

Virtue is thus tied up with one's aptitude at self-mastery. Moving on, Rousseau discusses the passion of love and sexual attraction. If adequately mastered, it too is a pure passion. As he explains,

> You have your first passion. It is perhaps the only one worthy of you. If you know how to rule it like a man, it will be the last. You will subject all the others, and you will obey only the passion for virtue. This passion is not criminal, as I well know. It is as pure as the soul which feels it. Decency formed it, and innocence nourished it. Happy lovers! …. But, tell me, sincere man, has this passion, which is so pure, any the less subjected you? Did you any the less make yourself its slave; and if tomorrow Sophie ceased being innocent, would you stifle it beginning tomorrow? Now is the moment to try your strength. (Rousseau 1979, V, 445).

Moreover, in what is perhaps the climax of the *Emile*, Rousseau explains that the passions are not in themselves evil, and only become so when not mastered, and thus challenges Emile to have total self-control. That is, to be a man:

> It is an error to distinguish permitted passions from forbidden ones in order to yield to the former and deny oneself the latter. All passions are good when one remains their master; all are bad when one lets oneself be subjected to them. What is forbidden to us by nature is to extend our attachments further than our strength; what is forbidden to us by reason is to want what we cannot obtain; what is forbidden to us by conscience is not temptations but rather letting ourselves be conquered by temptations. It is not within our control to have or not to have passions. But it is within our control to reign over

> them. All the sentiments we dominate are legitimate; all those which dominate us are criminal. A man is not guilty for loving another's wife if he keep this unhappy passion enslaved to the law of duty. He is guilty for loving his own wife to the point of sacrificing everything…. Do not expect lengthy precepts of morality from me. I have only one precept to give you, and it comprehends all the others. Be a man. Restrain your heart within the limits of your condition. Study and know these limits. However narrow they may be, a man is not unhappy as long as he closes himself up within them. (Rousseau 1979, V, 445)

In this way, Rousseau again reiterates that the passions are not bad in themselves, only when not properly mastered and calls for them to be reigned over. Emile is apprehensive on hearing this and asks, "What must be done?", to which his educator replies, "You must leave Sophie." (Rousseau 1979, V, 447). The lovers will later be reunited, marry, and start a family. Rousseau had allowed and even encouraged Emile to fall in love, but chose to exercise his ability to overrule Emile, and postpone his commitment to Sophie, as a final, harsh lesson about emotional self-control, and the educator's rule over the student.

4.2.7. Summary

In *A Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau argues that society has corrupted original humankind by fostering many fictitious and destructive passions in it. The human soul, in its original condition, is characterised by self-love and pity. However, when entering society, people are corrupted, and many false passions are introduced. In society, self-love, that original passion, is transmuted into *amour-propre*. That is why, for Rousseau, Hobbes was wrong when he argued that savage people needed to satisfy a multitude of passions which only came about after they had entered society. Instead, what makes savage people good is not their knowledge of the good or restraining laws, 'but the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil'. Indeed, he goes as far as arguing that they would trump the imperturbability of the Stoic. Rousseau also attacks reasoning and philosophising for breeding emotional distance and selfishness. For example, it may be perfectly rational to avoid a confrontation, but it may not be just. Pity, and acting on it, is not always rational, and pity may be impossible without acting against, or simply without, the dictates of reason. Reason is also not the motivator of action as people would not go to the trouble of reasoning without emotional

motivation. Further, through seeking the ends of passions, reason improves itself. Moving on to *Emile*, passions are not only moderated by reason, but some "superior" passions are used to constrain the "inferior." Like pity moderating self-love or love moderating sexual desire. Rousseau defends the importance of the passions, in their proper place, and argues that education should be concerned with allowing the healthy flowering of the passions. Rousseau claims that he does not want to 'order' the passions himself, but only aid and perhaps delay their natural progress. Thus, Rousseau argues, the job of the educator is not to try to obliterate these nascent feelings nor to return Emile to the woods to live and feel like a "savage". In the climax of *Emile*, Rousseau reiterates that none of the passions are bad in themselves, but that any of them can be bad if not properly mastered, and so challenges Emile to have total self-control. Finally, by allowing Emile to fall in love with Sophie before denying her to him, Rousseau teaches a final, harsh lesson about emotional self-control and the educator's rule over the student.

4.3. Friedrich Nietzsche – Selected Writings

4.3.1. Introduction

It has been noted that Nietzsche had some 'striking thoughts on the passions', or even advocated "irrationality" (Ansell-Pearson and Ure 2013, 1) and Robert Solomon described Nietzsche as a 'passionate defender of the passionate life' (2011, cited in Ansell-Pearson and Ure 2013, 1). Nietzsche, in the selected writings examined here (1844-1900), does indeed talk about the need to nurture or take hold of the passions, but not so much to constrain them as to harness them. He goes to great lengths to criticise and mock human pretensions of being logical and rational, and the ability to access so-called universal truths. He also attempts to break down distinctions between reason and the emotions, arguing that the former is not an independent entity, but merely the system of relations between the passions themselves. In other words, Nietzsche conceives the 'self as inclusive of its desires, drivers, and affects. The self is not a "doer behind the deed," not a thing that thinks, desires, and feels, but *is* the activity of thinking, desiring, and feeling.' (Armstrong 2013, 21). Meanwhile, Nietzsche argues that the will is itself an emotion, the emotion of command, while freedom of will is more a perception of the relationship between the desires than a reality in and of itself. Not only this, but he reconceptualises and rehabilitates the passions as what is truly human and "free" about humankind. In the final instance, his superman is a passionate, aggressive, dominating and highly driven being. As one commentator argues, although Nietzsche is in some ways influenced by Stoicism, such as calling on people to accept fate, he distances himself from the Stoics by 'refusing to identify flourishing with freedom from the passions' (Armstrong 2013, 6). Nietzsche criticises philosophies that leave 'the individual split between the cognitive and the affective, the mental and the bodily, the rational and the instinctive' – as in a 'torn state'. Instead, the passions could be harnessed to 'increase our power in the world' (Ansell-Pearson and Ure 2013, 3). This section begins by looking at how Nietzsche challenged the notion of the divided mind. Then, it examines Nietzsche's critique of reason and logic. After this, it discusses Nietzsche's attack on the Church's for attempting to "extirpate" the passions.

4.3.2. Challenging the Divided Mind

In one of his most striking passages, Nietzsche challenges the distinction between thinking, willing, and feeling. In his final analysis, the emotions are in control and the will itself is nothing but an emotion. He begins by arguing that 'Philosophers are given to speaking of the will as if it were the best-known thing in the world... that the will alone is truly known to us' (Nietzsche 2003, Beyond Good and Evil 19, 226). This is not the case; reality is much more complicated. So, Nietzsche defines will:

> As feelings, and indeed many varieties of feeling, can therefore be recognized as an ingredient of the will, so, in the second place, can thinking: in every act of will there is a commanding thought – and do not imagine that this thought can be separated from the 'willing', as though will would then remain over! Thirdly, will is not only a complex of feeling and thinking, but above all an *emotion*: and in fact the emotion of command. (2003, BGE 19, 227).

Feeling, thinking, and willing are thus wholly intertwined. As for freedom of will, something Nietzsche dismisses at various points, it can be explained as the perception of commanding and obeying that happens within the individual mind. However, this perception is misleading because it is the same faculty that both commands and obeys. This misperception is aided by the fact that the "thing" which is imagined to be doing the obeying is used to feeling constrained. As he explains,

> A man who *wills* – commands something in himself which obeys or which he believes obeys. But now observe the strangest thing of all about the will… inasmuch as in the given circumstances we at the same time command *and* obey, and as the side which obeys knows the sensations of constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance motion which usually begin immediately after the act of will… (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 19, 227).

Because people are deceived by the 'synthetic concept 'I'', as he continues, they believe that 'willing *suffices* for action'. However, what is happening is that the perception of the will as a driver of actions exists only because willing has, in most cases, occurred when the *expectation* of action, and obeying, has already taken place (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 19, 228).

Similarly, for Nietzsche, the only real and truly identifiable part of people's mental lives are the desires and passions. As he says, 'nothing is 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions… we can rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the reality of our drives – for thinking is only the relationship of these drives to one another' (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 36, 228). Further, for Nietzsche, man's whole instinctual life can be understood as the development of *one* basic principle, not several, – the will to power – and not several. As he says, 'The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character' – it would be 'will to power' and nothing else' (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 36, 229).

Nietzsche goes to great length to break down the distinctions between the drives, emotions, passions, instincts, and cognition, logic, consciousness, reason, willing, and thinking. For example, he criticises the common habit of seeing opposites everywhere in nature where none exist. This, he says, extends to people 'wanting to comprehend and analyse the inner world, too, the spiritual-moral world, in terms of such opposites. An unspeakable amount of painfulness, arrogance, harshness, estrangement, frigidity has entered into human feelings because we think we see opposites instead of transitions' (Nietzsche 2003, The Wanderer and his Shadow 67, 86). Nietzsche is saying that people should see the various parts of the mind as existing on a single continuum, instead of as stark opposites.

As Nietzsche argues, along similar lines, conscious thinking cannot be considered as separate from instinct, and even philosophical enquiry is directed by underlying instinctual drives. As he explains,

> the greater part of conscious thinking must still be counted among the instinctive activities, and this is so even in the case of philosophical thinking… being conscious; is in no decisive sense the *opposite* of the instinctive – most of a philosopher's conscious thinking is secretly directed and compelled into definite channels by his instincts. (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 3, 62-3)

As for what kind of channels these might be, as part of his trend of biological explanations for the mind and human behaviour, Nietzsche argues that 'Behind all logic, too, and its apparent autonomy there stand evaluations, in plainer terms physiological demands for the preservation of a certain species of life' (2003, BGE 3, 63).

4.3.3. Criticising Reason and Logic

Nietzsche believes that people's nature changes over time, and that philosophers were mistaken to 'involuntarily think of 'man' as a *aeterna veritas*, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux'. Instead, they were only describing man as he was to be found in a '*very limited* period of time' (Nietzsche 2003, Human, All Too Human 2, 29). Nietzsche also argues that the faculty of cognition was something that had developed over time in humankind, and was not the basis of human life. As he says, philosophers 'will not learn that man has become, that the faculty of cognition has become; while some of them would have it that the whole world is spun out of this faculty of cognition' (Nietzsche, 2003, 29; *HA* 2). The basis of human behaviour is instinct, not conscious thought. As he explains, 'Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and consequently also the most unfinished and weakest part of it' (Nietzsche 2003, The Gay Science 11, 158). Indeed, if people's instincts were not by far the stronger and controlling part of their natures, they would long have died out due to the many errors introduced into the mind by consciousness (Nietzsche 2003, The Gay Science 11, 158).

Nietzsche challenges the idea that there are universal truths, and instead, argues that 'the *strength* of items of knowledge lies, not in their degree of truth, but in their age, their incorporatedness, their character as a condition of life' (2003, GS 110, 59). Similarly, as he explains, 'For we have no organ at all for *knowledge*, for 'truth': we 'know' (or believe or imagine) precisely as much as may be *useful* in the interest of the human herd, the species' (Nietzsche 2003, GS 354 (1887), 67). The preservative nature of "knowledge" is again key, not its objective validity. Moreover, people have no particular and separate faculty or ability, such as reason, which might discern the truth.

Relatedly, Nietzsche argues that, perhaps ironically, logic developed out of what were once very illogical evaluations. He explains how the struggle for existence shaped how people reason and it did so out of thinking which is clearly illogical, in hindsight. Not only this, but Nietzsche sees life as characterised, at least in the past, by irrationality. As he says, 'The irrationality of a thing is no argument against its existence, rather a condition for it' (Nietzsche 2003, HA 515, 198). Even more interestingly, as he explains,

> Whence did logic come into existence in the human head? Certainly out of illogic, whose realm must initially have been tremendous. But countless creatures who have

> reasoned differently from the way we now reason have perished: they could always have been better reasoners…. In and for itself, every high degree of caution in reasoning, every sceptical tendency is a great danger for life…. The course of logical thinking and concluding in our present brain corresponds to a process and struggle of drives which in themselves individually are all very illogical and unjust… (Nietzsche 2003, GS 111, 60-1).

Moreover, the advantage afforded in the struggle for existence by the ability to, for example, discern patterns and extrapolate from limited information, has shaped how people reason today. However, this was, at its core, actually an illogical and simply incorrect way to make assumptions about and order the world. As Nietzsche explains, 'we see ourselves… entangled in error, *necessitated* to error, to precisely the extent that our prejudice in favour of reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being: however sure we may be, on the basis of a strict reckoning, *that* error is to be found here' (A Nietzsche Reader 2003, Twilight of the Idols, 'Reason' In Philosophy 5, 69-70). Similarly, Nietzsche argues that logic is based on falseness and a falsification of the unknowable, continually changing world. Again, however, this falseness may be preservative (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 4, 63).

That is not to say that Nietzsche sees no value in reason as a way to create knowledge, and he also criticises some irrationality. For instance, he says that 'passion, error and self-deception' are 'the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them' (Nietzsche 2003, HA 9, 55). Moreover, he writes elsewhere, 'How can anyone become a thinker if he does not spend at least a third of the day without passions, people and books?' (Nietzsche 2003, WS 324, 279). Still, in this small statement, a total absence of the passions is not the condition for becoming a thinker. Nietzsche also argues that piously religious people are irrational and that this is problematic. As he put it, 'Among certain pious people I have lit upon a hatred of reason and I was grateful to them for it: at least the bad intellectual conscience thus betrayed itself!' (Nietzsche 2003, GS 2, 34). Continuing, he says how 'none of our dear religious people asks such questions even now: they feel, rather, a thirst for things which are *contrary to reason* and do not put too many difficulties in the way of satisfying it – thus they experience 'miracles' and 'rebirths' and hear the voices of angels! But we, we others, thirsty for reason, want to look our experiences as fixedly in the eye as a scientific experiment, hour by hour, day after day' (Nietzsche 2003, GS 319, 36).

4.3.4. Rehabilitating the Passions

Nietzsche gives primacy to sensations over thoughts, writing that ‘Thoughts are the shadows of our sensations – always darker, emptier, simpler than these’ (2003, GS 179, 159). He criticises Stoicism as a form of ‘paralysis and coldness, hence a form of anesthesia’. He summarises Stoicism as hatred of ‘the passions themselves as if they were a form of disease or something entirely unworthy’. He argues, instead, that he is

> very antipathetic to this line of thought. It undervalues the value of pain (it is as useful and necessary as pleasure), the value of stimulation and suffering. It is finally compelled to say: everything that happens is acceptable to me; nothing is to be different. There are no needs over which it triumphs because it has killed the passion for needs. (Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe 9:15[55], 652-3 cited in Armstrong 2013, 19)

Summarising, Armstrong writes that ‘Insofar as the Stoic ideal of virtue gives expression to a desire to be free from passion and suffering, Nietzsche pronounces it “hostile to life”’ (2013, 20).

Beyond this criticism, Nietzsche discusses in several places how modern society and philosophy is anti-passionate. As was already mentioned, for Nietzsche, those ‘evil spirits’ of human nature have been productive in advancing the species, and secondly, that society tries to lull the passions to sleep. As he explains, ‘It is the strongest and most evil spirits who have up till now advanced mankind the most: they have again and again re-ignited the slumbering passions – all ordered society makes the passions drowsy…’ (Nietzsche 2003, GS 4, 97-8).

Indeed, Nietzsche argues that all instincts which cannot be discharged outwards, are turned inwards in a destructive way. As will be shown, Nietzsche’s superman is characterised by the ability and willingness to force his dominating nature onto the world (2003, On the Genealogy of Morals 'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience' and the Like 16-9, 117-8). This process did not happen gradually. The shaping and forming of society from the previously ‘free’ mankind was itself an act of violence (Nietzsche 2003, GM 'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience' and the Like 16-9, 118).

This policing of society also found another expression. Nietzsche sees excessive or hard labour as not only destructive of reason but also of strong emotions. Worst of all, this would lead to the prevention of the growth of ‘the individual’, which society sees as dangerous. This

is another reason why the development of the passions is vital for Nietzsche. As Nietzsche says,

> such work is the best policeman, that it keeps everyone in bounds and can mightily hinder the development of reason, covetousness, desire for independence. For it uses up an extraordinary amount of nervous energy, which is thus denied to reflection, brooding, dreaming, worrying, loving, hating… (2003, Daybreak 173, 233).

In another critical passage, Nietzsche criticises philosophers for not only seeing the passions as terrible but labelling them as such. Instead, Nietzsche calls on people to harness them. As he explains,

> In order to raise an accusation against the whole nature of the world, you dismal philosophical blindworms speak of the *terrible character* of human passions. As if wherever there have been passions there had also been terribleness! …. it is you yourself who first allowed the passions to develop into such monsters that you are overcome by fear at the word 'passion'! It was up to you, and is up to us, to *take from* the passions their terrible character and thus prevent their becoming devastating torrents. – One should not inflate one's oversights into eternal fatalities; let us rather work honestly together on the task of transforming the passions [*Leidenschaften*] of mankind one and all into joys [*Freudenschaften*]. (Nietzsche 2003, WS 37, 232).

Nietzsche also sometimes mentions how people are ensnared and controlled by their desires, and that this is not necessarily a negative. For instance, he speaks about how people suffer 'those states of distress and psychic convulsions which arise when we are torn back and forth by conflicting motives until we finally choose the most powerful of them – as we put it (in truth, however, until the most powerful motive chooses us)' (Nietzsche 2003, HA 107, 78). As already explained, those so-called evil forces which characterise humankind are necessary and useful. As he explains, 'in the history of mankind: the most savage forces beat a path, and are mainly destructive; but their work was nonetheless necessary, in order that later a gentler civilization might raise its house. The frightful energies – those which are called evil – are the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity' (Nietzsche 2003, HA 246, 80).

Nietzsche makes it clear that being ashamed of oneself, and all the attendant desires, is his definition 'bad' (Nietzsche 2003, GS 268-75, 236). Thus, a celebration of the unrestrained

individual is to found throughout his work. For instance, in explicating his vision of the superman, Nietzsche creates an image of an unconstrained individual, even mad, and evil. As he explains, true freedom means a total breakdown between the heart and mind.

> I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart: thus *his head is only the bowels of his heart…*
>
> (Nietzsche 2003, Z I Prologue 3-4, 240, emphasis added).

Continuing, Nietzsche again aims to rehabilitate the passions, at least in the right hands. As he says,

> Once you had passions and called them evil. But now you have only your virtues: they grew out of your passions.
>
> You laid your highest aim in the heart of these passions: then they became your virtues and joys.
>
> And though you came from the race of the hot-tempered or of the lustful or of the fanatical or of the vindictive:
>
> At last all your passions have become virtues and all your devils angels.
>
> Once you had fierce dogs in your cellar: but they changed at last into birds and sweet singers.
>
> From your poison you brewed your balsam: you milked your cow, affliction, now you drink the sweet milk of her udder.
>
> And henceforward nothing evil shall come out of you, except it be the evil that comes from the conflict of your virtues. […] (Nietzsche 2003, Z I Of Joys and Passions, 240-1).

As for 'taking' from the passions, as alluded to above, Nietzsche continues by arguing that the overcoming of the passions creates a 'fertile ground' on which much positive matter can be grown. Namely,

> The man who has overcome passions has entered into possession of the most fertile ground; like the colonist who has mastered the forests and swamps. To *sow* the seeds of good spiritual works in the soil of the subdued passions is then the immediate urgent task. (Nietzsche 2003, WS 53, 233).

For Nietzsche, the overcoming of the passions is only a means to an end. As he continues,

> The overcoming itself is only a *means*, not a goal; if it is not so viewed, all kinds of weeds and devilish nonsense will quickly spring up in this rich soil now unoccupied, and soon there will be more rank confusion than there ever was before. (Nietzsche 2003, WS 53, 233).

Although here Nietzsche sounds like the drives necessitate proactive cultivation, elsewhere he is more circumspect. The drives can be proactively nurtured, or they can be pruned. Most interestingly perhaps, they can be left to grow wild. As he explains,

> One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis; … one can also let nature rule and only attend a little embellishment and tidying-up here and there; one can, finally, without paying any attention to them at all, let the plants grow up and fight their fight out among themselves – indeed, one can take delight in such a wilderness, and desire precisely this delight, though it gives one some trouble, too. All this we are at liberty to do: but how many know we are at liberty to do it? (Nietzsche 2003, D 560, 235).

That is not to say that the passions and drives should have total free reign. Nietzsche at times advocates unrestrained passions, but at others, he advocates nurtured passions, marshalled for higher ends. Similarly, "getting lost" in emotion is not always positive, depending on the emotion. In one of his many criticisms of the feeling of pity, Nietzsche argues that 'Pity [*Mitleiden*], insofar as it really causes suffering [*Leiden*] – and this is here our only point of view – is a weakness, like every losing of oneself through a *harmful* affect' (Nietzsche 2003, D 134, 95).

Still, Nietzsche's superman would in the final instance be a creature which takes hold the passions, and wields them as power-extending instruments, as virtues. As Armstrong summarises,

> Nietzsche develops an alternative account of flourishing as self-mastery. The virtue we are now called on to exercise is that of creatively shaping and transforming the inner world. For this form of self-creativity to result in the enhancement of power, in growth

> and fertility, it must not weaken or excise the passions. Instead, Nietzsche exhorts people to put the passions, '"those impetuous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming" (KSA 13:14[163]), into service and subject them to "a protracted tyranny" (KSA 12:1[122]), so that they may be turned to our advantage, becoming sources of strength and vitality instead of suffering. (2013, 21-2).

Indeed, as part of his discussion of the positive aspects of 'evil' drives, Nietzsche argues that 'Supposing, however, that someone goes as far as to regard the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and lust for domination as life-conditioning emotions, as something which must fundamentally and essentially be present in the total economy of life, consequently must be heightened further if life is to be heightened further' (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 23, 159-60).

4.3.5. Religion, The Church, and Asceticism

Morality, for Nietzsche, was part of the taming of man that was discussed above. As he explains,

> In all ages one has wanted to 'improve' men: this above all is what morality has meant. But one word can conceal the most divergent tendencies. Both the *taming* of the beast man and the *breeding* of a certain species of man has been called 'improvement'…. To call the taming of an animal its 'improvement' is in our ears almost a joke. Whoever knows what goes on in menageries is doubtful whether the beasts in them are 'improved'. They are weakened, they are made less harmful, they become *sickly* beasts through the depressive emotion of fear through pain, through injuries, through hunger. (Nietzsche 2003, T The 'Improvers' of Mankind, 119-20)

This is a process also carried out by the Church, the medieval menagerie par excellence. As he continues,

> It is no different with the tamed human being whom the priest has 'improved'. In the early Middle Ages, when the Church was in fact above all a menagerie, one everywhere hunted down the fairest specimens of the 'blond beast' – one 'improved', for example, the noble Teutons. But what did such a Teuton afterwards look like when he had been

> ‘improved’ and led into a monastery? Like a caricature of a human being, like an abortion: he had become a ‘sinner’, he was in a cage […] There he lay now, sick, miserable, filled with ill-will towards himself; *full of hatred for the impulses towards life*, full of suspicion of all that was still strong and happy. In short, a ‘Christian’… (Nietzsche 2003, T The 'Improvers' of Mankind, 119-20, first emphasis added).

In this way, using the emotion of fear as a cudgel, people are turned against their own impulses for life, their instincts, desires, drives and passions. Moreover, Nietzsche says, ‘*every* means hitherto employed with the intention of making mankind moral has been thoroughly *immoral*’ (2003, T The 'Improvers' of Mankind, 120-1).

Further, Nietzsche explains the rise of the ascetic ideal of self-control as giving meaning to an otherwise meaningless existence. As he explains, ‘Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, *animal* man, hitherto had no meaning. His existence on earth contained no goal…’. As he continues, ‘The meaninglessness of suffering, *not* suffering itself, was the curse which hitherto lay over mankind – *and the ascetic ideal gave it meaning*!’ However, there was an issue at the core of this. As he says,

> One cannot conceal from oneself *what* this whole will really expresses which has acquired its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred for the human, even more for the animalic, even more for the material, this abhorrence of the senses, of reason itself, fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to flee from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, desire itself – all this, let us dare to grasp, signifies a *will to nothingness*… (Nietzsche 2003, Gm What is the Meaning of the Ascetic Ideals? 28, 162).

Nietzsche continues his defence and rehabilitation of the passions against the Church which wants to extirpate them. As he says,

> Formerly, one made war on passion itself on account of the folly inherent in it: one conspired for its extermination – all the old moral monsters [such as Augustine] are unanimous that ‘*il faut tuer les passions*’ [you have to kill the passions]. The most famous formula for doing this is contained in the New Testament, in the Sermon on the Mount, where […] it is said, with reference to sexuality, ‘if thy eye offend thee, pluck it out’: fortunately, no Christian follows this prescription. To *exterminate* the passions

> and desires merely in order to do away with their folly and its unpleasant consequences – this itself seems to us today merely an acute form of folly. We no longer admire dentists who *pull out* the teeth to stop them hurting … The Church combats the passions with excision in every sense of the word: its practice, its 'cure' is *castration*. It never asks: 'How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire?' – it has at all times laid the emphasis of its discipline on extirpation (of sensuality, of pride, of lust for power, of avarice, of revengefulness). – But to attack the passions at their roots means to attack life at its roots: the practice of the Church is *hostile to life*… (Nietzsche 2003, T Morality as Anti-Nature 1-3, 163).

Indeed, the inability to moderate one's desires is just a sign of weakness and degeneracy. Only for such people is extirpation really an option. As Nietzsche continues,

> The same expedient – castration, extirpation – is instinctively selected in a struggle against a desire by those who are too weak-willed, too degenerate to impose moderation upon it: by those natures which need… some sort of definitive declaration of hostility, a *chasm* between themselves and a passion. It is only the degenerate who cannot do without radical expedients; weakness of will, more precisely the inability *not* to react to a stimulus, is itself merely another form of degeneration. (Nietzsche 2003, T Morality as Anti-Nature 1-3, 163-4)

In another attack on the Church, Nietzsche explains how it acts as an anti-progressive institution which preserves the weak and degenerate, those who would otherwise not prosper. This is an issue because it devalues the strong and their "tyrannical" drives (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 61-2, 181). This leads to no less than to the '*corruption of European race*', the breeding of a 'ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of goodwill, sickly and mediocre… the European of today…' (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 61-2, 181; 183). As he continues, religion and the Church

> smash the strong, contaminate great hopes, cast suspicion on joy in beauty, break down everything autocratic, manly, conquering, tyrannical, all the instincts proper to the highest and most successful of the type 'man', into uncertainty, remorse of conscience, self-destruction, indeed reverse the whole love of the earth and the earthly…' (Nietzsche 2003, BGE 61-2, 182)

In other words, they continue their attack on the drives and passions of man.

Going even further, asceticism is, for Nietzsche, just a misdirected, or self-directed, expression of the ubiquitous will to power, but as expressed over the self by failed men. Not only this, but he continues his critique of seeing the mind as “divided”, or made up of segments which can be pitted against each other. As he explains,

> There is a *defiance of oneself* of which many forms of asceticism are among the most sublimated expressions. For certain men feel so great a need to exercise their strength and lust for power that, in default of other objects or because their efforts in other directions have always miscarried, they at last hit upon the idea of tyrannizing over certain parts of their own nature, over, as it were, segments or stages of themselves…. This division of oneself, this mockery of one’s own nature… is actually a very high degree of vanity. (Nietzsche 2003, HA 137, 215)

In this sense, ‘The triumph of the ascetic over himself […] this final tragedy of the drive for distinction in which there is only one character burning and consuming himself’ (Nietzsche 2003, D 113, 218).

Nietzsche even goes as far as to suggest that those who wish to practise self-control go out of their way to harm others, so they can then turn on themselves and feel the satisfaction of self-mastery. As he puts it, ‘Could this circle not be run through again from the beginning […] doing hurt to others in order thereby to hurt *oneself*, in order then to triumph over oneself and one’s pity and to revel in an extremity of power!’ (Nietzsche 2003, D 113, 219). As he summarised later, ‘To condemn oneself can also be a means of restoring the feeling of power after a defeat’ (Nietzsche 2003, D 140, 220).

4.3.6. Summary

Nietzsche challenges the distinction between thinking, willing, and feeling. In his final analysis, the emotions are in control, and the will itself is nothing but an emotion. The only real and truly identifiable part of people’s mental lives are the desires and passions. Not only this but what people call “thinking” is only the perception of the relationship between the drives themselves. As Nietzsche argues, conscious thinking cannot be considered as separate from instinct, and even philosophical enquiry is directed by underlying instinctual drives such as the

preservation of the species. Not only this, but he saw life as characterised, at least in the past, by irrationality. That is not to say that Nietzsche saw no value in reason. For instance, he writes, 'How can anyone become a thinker if he does not spend at least a third of the day without passions, people and books?' Further, the drives can be proactively nurtured, pruned, or even left to grow wild. That does not mean that the passions and drives should have total free reign. Nietzsche at times advocates unrestrained passions, but at others, he says they should be nurtured, marshalled for higher ends. Still, Nietzsche gives primacy to sensations over thoughts. He criticised Stoicism as a form of 'paralysis and coldness, hence a form of anesthesia' and as hatred of 'the passions themselves as if they were a form of disease or something entirely unworthy'. He takes the very opposite view. Nietzsche discusses in several places how modern society, philosophy, and the Church are anti-passionate. For Nietzsche, they are all part of the same process attempting to "tame" humankind, ruining it in the process. In opposition to this, he calls on people to harness the energies of the passions. For Nietzsche, true freedom means a total breakdown between the heart and mind. So, he tells us, the Superman's 'head is only the bowels of his heart'.

Chapter 4 Discussion

Now that three further thinkers spanning two philosophical periods have been surveyed, it is possible to discuss some of their commonalities and divergences. These thinkers are grouped together on the basis that they want to rehabilitate and re-centre the emotions, while criticising reason and logic. It was already shown that those thinkers traditionally seen as being anti-emotion made important exceptions in their theorising, and it has now been shown that an even more significant shift began in the 1700s with Hume.

Hume criticises the common philosophical trend of disparaging the passions and treating them as constantly in conflict with reason. Instead, for Hume, reason, is an inert faculty until marshalled to the ends of passion and they can therefore never conflict. Indeed, he famously said that reason is passion's slave. Going even further, Hume bases virtue, and ethical and moral behaviour, on the emotions, concluding that morality is more felt than judged. People make moral decisions based on how contemplating various behaviours makes them feel. Meanwhile, Rousseau launches a defence of the passions, and an attack on Hobbes, arguing that society has corrupted humankind by fostering in it many artificial and destructive passions. The human soul, in its original condition, is characterised by self-love and pity. Rousseau also attacks reason, giving examples of behaviours or thoughts that may be perfectly rational, but nonetheless unjust. Sometimes, it is better to follow the call of pity than of reason. Rousseau also argues that trying to constrain or manipulate the passions is foolish, and that none of the passions are bad in themselves, but that any of them can be bad if not properly mastered. Reason alone does not motivate behaviour as people would not go to the trouble of reasoning without emotional motivation. Indeed, in seeking the ends of passions, reason improves itself. Rousseau also puts his sexism on display in arguing that women have unlimited desires and control men through appeal to men's passions. Lastly, Nietzsche discusses similar themes. He challenges the distinction between thinking, willing, and feeling and argues that the emotions are in control, and that the will itself is nothing but an emotion. Nietzsche at times advocates unrestrained passions, but at others, he says they should be nurtured, marshalled for higher ends. Nietzsche gives primacy to sensations over thoughts and criticises Stoicism as a kind of paralysis. Trying to extirpate the passions is part of the violent process of taming humankind, and comes at the cost of mutilating and weakening it.

What occurs during this period is the beginning of a vigorous challenge to anti-emotional thinking which Hume, Rousseau, and Nietzsche believed characterised many

thinkers, if not Western political thought in general, before them. The significance of this shift should not be underrated, as many important notions about the relationship between reason and emotion are upturned during this period.

Now, moving on to Chapter 5, this thesis looks at the final three thinkers in this thesis, Freud, Foucault, and Nussbaum. Freud and Foucault, in different ways, represent a turn towards examining the relationship between reason and emotion in the context of mental health, while Nussbaum begins the radical reframing of emotions as simply another form of cognition, breaking down the reason/emotion dualism almost entirely.

Chapter 5: Mental Health and the Emotions

5.1. Sigmund Freud – *Civilization and its Discontents* and *Group Psychology*

5.1.1. Introduction

Civilization and its Discontents (1930) discusses how one of the necessities, and at the same time most significant problems, of civilisation is how it fosters self-control through guilt by instituting the super-ego. Although civilisation forces many instinctual constraints on people, often leading to neurosis, the alternatives are worse. These are naked barbarism, unlimited satisfaction of urges, and unrestrained violence. The price to pay for the benefits of civilisation is guilt, and neuroses, with the psychoanalyst well placed to deal with them once they develop. As Strachey explains, 'The main theme of the book [is] the irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization' (Strachey 1962, 6). Meanwhile, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), Freud discusses how the repressions necessitated by society are thrown off when an individual joins a group. The group itself would then act as a replacement for that society and harken back to the original form of human existence – the primal horde. Heavily inspired by the crowd psychologists of his time, such as Gustave Le Bon and William McDougall, Freud argues that in the group, passions are dangerously amplified, while the individual's critical faculties are stunted. This section begins with how Freud defines human nature, then how he viewed the problem of civilisation. Next, related to the problems posed by civilisation is the struggle between the life and death instincts. Then, it looks at the various methods people use to displace or sublimate their dangerous instincts. This is followed by what Freud saw as the most important of such methods: civilisation's fostering of the super-ego. This section then examines how Freud's crowd psychology reproduces the reason/emotion dualism. It then concludes with how Freud saw the aim of psychotherapy as dealing with those who have become neurotic through developing an over-active or over-demanding super-ego

5.1.2. The Problems of Civilisation

Freud believes in a constitutionally fixed human nature. This nature is both the "stuff" with which civilisation contends with and tries to moderate, but can also never fully master or tame. It is what makes civilisation necessary, but never fully successful. Freud believes that

people do not wish to confront the reality that they are not 'gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness' (1962, 58). As he put it elsewhere, 'the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man' and 'it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization' (S. Freud 1962, 69). When the usual 'mental counterforces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action', aggression can be spontaneous, and not require provocation (S. Freud 1962, 59). Man is, in the final instance, 'a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something alien' (S. Freud 1962, 59).

In the mind, Freud believes that 'what is primitive' coexists to this day with the 'transformed version' (S. Freud 1962, 15). Indeed, the primitive and less reformed part often rules. Accordingly, civilisation barely holds together and is at constant risk of disintegration. As Freud puts it, 'The interest of work in common would not hold it together; *instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests*. Civilisation has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check' (S. Freud 1962, 59, emphasis added). This all leads to the problems civilisation must contend with.

Rational interest cannot maintain the bonds of civilisation. Instead, people are 'libidinally bound to one another', and this is the work of Eros, or the life drive. On the one hand, 'civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind' (S. Freud 1962, 69). On the other, however, there is Thanatos, or the death drive, driving people apart. The aggressiveness which Freud identifies at the core of human nature is its chief manifestation. Thus, 'This aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares world-dominion with it. And now, I think, the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the struggle between Eros and Death' (S. Freud 1962, 69).

One of Freud's main contentions is that civilisation, which might be totally indispensable and necessary, may also be at the root of unhappiness. Civilisation, for Freud, is the whole gamut of 'achievements and regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes – namely to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual relations' (1962, 36). Further, civilisation is characterised by 'its esteem and encouragement of man's higher mental activities – his intellectual, scientific and artistic achievements – and the leading role that it assigns to ideas in human life' (S. Freud 1962, 41).

In that way, civilisation values thinking and intelligence over feeling and desiring. Civilisation is also, to a large extent, 'built up upon a renunciation of instinct' and 'This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings…. it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations have to struggle' (S. Freud 1962, 44).

As already mentioned, there are prices to pay. As Freud explains, 'what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery, and that we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions' (1962, 33). This is all the more astonishing because 'all the things with which we seek to protect ourselves against the threats that emanate from the sources of suffering are part of that very civilization' (S. Freud 1962, 33). Living in civilisation is thus a very ironic state of affairs. It limits one's happiness and *ability* to be happy by imposing all sorts of limits and barriers to unlimited instinctual satisfaction, all of which are necessary for its existence. Not only this, but civilisation is the root of neuroticism. Those who 'cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes' are destined to become neurotic (S. Freud 1962, 34). People must either reduce or abolish their demands, in return for the possibility of *some* happiness under civilisation, as will be explained.

For Freud, the 'purpose and intention' of life is the striving for happiness: the desire to be and remain happy. In the final instance, happiness is equated with pleasure, with sexual pleasure being the prototype for all happiness (S. Freud 1962, 48). Freud calls this the pleasure principle. As he puts it, 'What decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. There can be no doubt about its efficacy, and yet its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world' (S. Freud 1962, 23). The fulfilment of any person's unlimited desire for pleasure is simply impossible for various reasons. Pleasure is, in reality, only episodic, limited by people's very constitution which is doomed to decay, by the blows of the world, and by the contention of their fellows (S. Freud 1962, 23-4). For Freud, unhappiness is much easier to experience than happiness. Thus, because 'civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization' (S. Freud 1962, 62).

All people realise that their claims to happiness must be moderated. So, the pleasure principle, due to these outside influences, is transformed into the 'more modest reality principle' (S. Freud 1962, 24). Now, a person sees satisfaction more as the lack of unhappiness and suffering, than the presence of happiness and pleasure. Although the attempt to have 'unrestricted satisfaction of every need presents itself as the most enticing methods of conducting one's life', this has many issues. As Freud puts it, although 'primitive man was

better off in knowing no restrictions of instinct. To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length of time were very slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security' (1962, 62). However, there are many ways to deal with the necessity of moderating the pleasure principle. As he puts it, 'this task can be attempted along very different paths; and all these paths have been recommended by the various schools of worldly wisdom and put into practice by men' (S. Freud 1962, 24). This will be expanded upon even more when Freud deals with instinctual sublimation. Still, some of the methods he gives are as follows.

5.1.3. Methods of Self-mastery

Everyone seeks to 'master the internal sources of our needs' (S. Freud 1962, 26). How they do so depends on many factors, and may involve the mastery, within the mind, of the "higher" faculties, as was mentioned previously. As Freud puts it,

> There is no golden rule which applies to everyone: every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved…. It is a question of how much real satisfaction he can expect to get from the external world, how far he is led to make himself independent of it, and, finally, how much strength he feels he has for altering the world to suit his wishes. (1962, 31)

Thus, people can either kill off the instincts entirely, at the cost of killing off their "selves", or try to control them but only achieve imperfect, incomplete happiness or a reduction of suffering. As Freud explains,

> The extreme form of this is brought about by killing off the instincts, as is prescribed by the worldly wisdom of the East and practised by Yoga. If it succeeds, then the subject has, it is true, given up all other activities as well – he has sacrificed his life; and, by another path, he has once more only achieved the happiness of quietness. We follow the same path when our aims are less extreme and we merely attempt to *control* our instinctual life. In that case, the controlling elements are the higher psychical agencies, which have subjected themselves to the reality principle. Here the aim of satisfaction is not by any means relinquished; but a certain amount of protection against suffering is

> secured, in that non-satisfaction is not so painfully felt in the case of instincts kept in dependence as in the case of uninhibited ones (1962, 26).

Relatedly, people can employ the 'displacements of libido' where the 'task here is that of shifting the instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration from the external world' (S. Freud 1962, 26). One way this can be done by throwing oneself into artistic pursuits. As he puts it, 'One gains the most if one can sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure from the sources of psychical and intellectual work. When that is so, fate can do little against one. A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist's joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a scientist's in solving problems or discovering truths' (S. Freud 1962, 26). These "finer and higher" satisfactions can successfully displace instinct, but are poor replacements for the 'sating of crude and primary instinctual impulses', as these pursuits do not, after all, 'convulse our physical being' (S. Freud 1962, 26-7). Again, with these different methods and extents of self-mastery, the level of 'happiness derived from the satisfaction of a wild instinctual impulse untamed by the ego is incomparably more intense than that derived from sating an instinct that has been tamed' (S. Freud 1962, 26). Further, artistic pursuits cannot shield one from the blows of fate, and 'it habitually fails when the source of suffering is a person's own body' (S. Freud 1962, 27).

Another method is to escape from reality into fantasy, conjured up by the imagination. The first method of doing this is enjoying art. The purpose here is to make 'oneself independent of the external world by seeking satisfaction in internal, psychical processes' (S. Freud 1962, 27). As Freud puts it, 'At the head of these satisfactions through phantasy stands the enjoyment of works of art' (1962, 27). Further, even those who are not creative can enjoy art. Still, however, the appreciation of art, despite causing 'mild narcosis', 'can do no more than bring about a transient withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs, and it is not strong enough to make us forget real misery' (S. Freud 1962, 28).

The second method is to escape into a fantasy world entirely of one's own creation. This method

> regards reality as the sole enemy and as the source of all suffering, with which it is impossible to live, so that one must break off all relations with it if one is to be in any way happy…. But one can do more than that; one can try to re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others that are in conformity with one's own wishes. (S. Freud 1962, 28)

However, this method is doomed to result in failure and madness for the individual, as 'Reality is too strong for him. He becomes a madman' (S. Freud 1962, 28). Many people attempt this method on their own or in concert. Freud counts religious delusions as one example. However, as was discussed, all these attempts at moderating the pleasure principle or finding fulfilment by other means have, perhaps, insoluble issues.

Women, even more so than men, struggle with the demands of instinctual sublimation. Women, for Freud, laid the foundations of civilisation, and 'represent the interests of the family and of sexual life' (1962, 50). However, 'women soon come into opposition to civilization' and as 'The work of civilization has become increasingly the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual sublimation of which women are little capable' (S. Freud 1962, 50). Not only are women less up to the task of instinctual sublimation, but they are 'forced into the background by the claims of civilization' and thus adopt a 'hostile attitude towards it' (S. Freud 1962, 50). This may explain why, for Freud, women are more likely to become neurotic and rebel against the strictures of society.

5.1.4. Establishing the Super-ego

Freud, quite far into the book, discusses what he considers the most crucial method for rendering the aggressive and dangerous instincts of humankind more innocuous. This is the creation of conscience, guilt, or the super-ego. Freud acknowledges that he sometimes uses these terms quite interchangeably (S. Freud 1962, 83). He, therefore, attempts to define them:

> The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. (S. Freud 1962, 83)

This "agency" comes about when people have their aggressiveness 'introjected, internalized… in point of fact, sent back to where it came from – that is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the go, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience' (S. Freud 1962, 70). Thus, this agency puts 'into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would

have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals' (S. Freud 1962, 70). This is the only way civilisation can deal with the problem of innate aggression. It needs an outlet and cannot be done away with entirely, but an extraneous one would mean unending barbarity, so as a condition for civilised life and the security it brings, that aggression must be turned inwards. Therefore, in a striking phrase, Freud explains how the establishment of the super-ego means that civilization has obtained 'mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city' (1962, 71).

How did this agency come about? Guilt and conscience, Freud admits, did not arise for the first time with the super-ego. They existed before but were fear responses to the genuine threat of external authority (S. Freud 1962, 83). As he explains, 'A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage' (S. Freud 1962, 72). Guilt is the perception that something is bad, from the intention of wanting to do it or having had done it. However, where does the perception of good and bad originate? Freud immediately dispenses with the idea that people may have an innate sense of good and bad. Instead, he figures, it must have been brought about by the influence of an authority. This authority, at one time, had been real and physical, the threat of violence and punishment from others. Under civilisation, this authority has become internalised as super-ego, which sadistically carries out this punishment. As Freud explains, 'Thus we know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of an authority, and the other, later on, arising from the fear of the super-ego' (S. Freud 1962, 74). Chronologically, the sequence appears thus:

> First comes renunciation of instinct owing to fear of aggression by the *external* authority (This is, of course, what fear of the loss of love amounts to, for love it a protection against this punitive aggression.) after that comes the erection of an *internal* authority, and renunciation of instinct owing to fear of it – owing to fear of conscience. In this second situation bad intentions are equated with bad actions, and hence come a sense of guilt and a need for punishment' (S. Freud 1962, 75).

Thus, tragically, 'A threatened external unhappiness – loss of love and punishment on the part of the external authority – has been exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt' (S. Freud 1962, 75). So, the super-ego comes into being.

5.1.5. Crowd Psychology

All the repression discussed above can be thrown off in a crowd, something that can even be pleasurable. As Freud explains, 'in a group the individual is brought under condition which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instincts. The apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the manifestations of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition' (1949, 9-10). This is precisely because in a crowd, the "dread of society" which equates to "conscience" disappears, or is replaced (Freud 1949, 10). As Freud explains in more detail later, the individual fears being on the wrong side of the crowd and so surrenders his conscience to it. As he puts it,

> For the moment it [the group] replaces the whole of human society, which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears, and for whose sake he has submitted to so many inhibitions. It is clearly perilous for him to put himself in opposition to it, and it will be safer to follow the example of those around him and perhaps even 'hunt with the pack'. (1949, 28)

Thus, 'In obedience to the new authority he may put his former 'conscience' out of action, and so surrender to the attraction of the increased pleasure that is certainly obtained from the removal of inhibitions' (Freud 1949, 28). It is no surprise for Freud, then, that individuals do or approve of things in a group which they would avoid in 'the normal conditions of life' (1949, 28-9).

Moreover, Freud agrees with Gustave Le Bon, a race theorist, that when an individual enters a group, their intellectual level is brought down to that of children or "primitive" people (Freud 1949, 14). Freud praises Le Bon's 'identification of the group mind with the mind of primitive people' as 'well justified' (1949, 18). Similarly, quoting psychologist William McDougall, Freud explains how a group's behaviour is 'like that of an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage' (McDougall 1920, 45, cited in Freud 1949, 30). Freud is also impressed by Le Bon's emphasis on the unconscious nature of group psychology 'because it fits in so well with our Psychology', he says (Freud 1949, 23). Freud discusses how this 'weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotional restraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay, the inclination to exceed every limit in the expression of emotion' reveal that a process of 'regression' occurs in groups towards 'an earlier stage such as we are not surprised

to find among savages or children' (1949, 81-2). In the final instance, Freud explains how 'the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde. Just as primitive man virtually survives in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out of any random crowd' (1949, 92). These were popular views within the field at the time, and it speaks volumes that Freud goes along with the racist notion of groups acting as "passionate savages", understood as devoid of reason.

Accordingly, Freud clearly expresses the reason/emotion dualism throughout *Group Psychology*. For instance, he discusses how a group has 'no critical faculty' and that it 'thinks in images… whose agreement with reality is never checked by any reasonable function [*Instanz*]. The feelings of a group are always very simple and very exaggerated' (Freud 1949, 15). Further, following McDougall, Freud writes that 'men's emotions are stirred in a group to a pitch that they seldom or never attain under other conditions; and it is a pleasurable experience for those who are concerned to surrender themselves so unreservedly to their passions and thus become merged in the group and to lose the sense of the limits of their individuality' (Freud 1949, 27). Again following McDougall, Freud writes how in a group 'in general an intensification of emotion creates unfavourable conditions for sound intellectual work' (1949, 29). Moreover, in primitive as opposed to organised or artificial groups, Freud writes how there is 'the intensification of the emotions and the inhibition of the intellect' (1949, 33). Finally, in what Freud calls a 'fundamental fact', when an individual enters a group 'His emotions become extraordinarily intensified, while his intellectual ability becomes markedly reduced, both processes being evidently in the direction of an approximation to the other individuals in the group; and this result can only be reached by the removal of those inhibitions upon his instincts which are peculiar to each individual' (1949, 33).

Lastly, because guilt feelings are the root of unhappiness in civilisation. The role of the psychoanalyst is thus, through various means, to reduce guilt feelings which may be a result of an over-active, or over-demanding super-ego. Its commands may not always be possible to obey. As Freud explains, 'we are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego, and we endeavour to lower its demands'. (1962, 90). Freud, however, ends on a fatalistic note. With the rise of European Fascism already progressing as he was writing, he wonders which of the two 'Heavenly powers', Eros or Thanatos, 'will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his immortal adversary' (S. Freud 1962, 92). The result, however, he saw as uncertain.

5.1.6. Summary

Freud believes in a fixed human nature which tends towards aggression. This nature is both the "stuff" with which civilisation contends with and tries to moderate, but can also never fully master or tame. It is what makes civilisation necessary, but also never entirely successful. In the mind, Freud believes that 'what is primitive' coexists with the 'transformed version'. Often, the primitive and less reformed part rules. Accordingly, civilisation barely holds together and is at constant risk of disintegration. Thus, living in civilisation is a very ironic state of affairs. It limits one's happiness by imposing all sorts of limits and barriers to unlimited instinctual satisfaction and is the root of neuroticism. For Freud, all people seek to 'master the internal sources of our needs'. How they do so depends on many factors, and may involve the mastery of the "higher" faculties over the "lower", which Freud considers the most crucial method for rendering the aggressive and dangerous instincts of humankind more innocuous. As a condition for civilised life and the security it brings, this aggression must be turned inwards. This is the creation of conscience, guilt, or the super-ego. Therefore, in one of the most striking lines, Freud explains how the establishment of the super-ego means that civilisation has obtained 'mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city'. These elicited guilt feelings are the root of unhappiness under civilisation and the role of the psychoanalyst is to reduce them. In *Crowd Psychology*, Freud discusses how all the repression discussed above is thrown off in a crowd. In a group, an individual's 'emotions become extraordinarily intensified, while his intellectual ability becomes markedly reduced'. In the final instance, because individuals fear being on the wrong side of the crowd, they surrender their conscience to it.

5.2. Michel Foucault – *Madness and Civilization*

5.2.1. Introduction

Foucault's *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1961) tells a history, from the classical to the modern eras, of 'reason's subjection of non-reason', of the creation of 'the void instituted between reason and what is not reason' (1988, ix-x). It tells of various ways in which reason has encountered non-reason. Namely, how reason has variously understood, subjugated, and confined non-reason. Alongside this, Foucault traces a transformation from a non-medical, to a medical understanding of mental illness. This transformation, however, obscured the always-present moral judgement inherent in the treatment of the mentally ill, their thoughts and their conduct. First, this section discusses how passion has been seen throughout history as the cause, or at the least, the condition for madness. Then, it will discuss the multiple ways reason has encountered "unreason", attempted to confine, and treat it. Then, there is a discussion of the varied role religion plays in both stimulating *and* calming the passions that lead to madness. Finally, this section ends with a brief discussion of how Foucault saw madness, in its internal logic, as a kind of mockery of logic and rationality.

5.2.2. Madness as Passion/Passion as Madness

Foucault begins by claiming that 'European man, since the beginning of the *Middle Ages*, has had a relation to something he calls, indiscriminately, Madness, Dementia, Insanity. Perhaps it is to this obscure presence that Western reason owes something of its depth…. In any case, the Reason-Madness nexus constitutes for Western culture one of the dimensions of its originality…' (1988, xi). Western thought posits madness as the counter to reason, its opposite and its lack. In other words, for Foucault, madness and passion have a long history of the association in Western thought. Since before the eighteenth century,

> passion and madness were kept in close relation to one another. But let us allow the classical period its originality…. The moralists of the Greco-Latin tradition had found it just that madness be passion's chastisement; and to be more certain that this was the

case, they chose to define passion as a temporary and attenuated madness. (Foucault 1988, 89)

As the physician François Boissier de Sauvages says, '"We call madmen those who are actually deprived of reason or who persist in some notable error; it is this *constant error* of the soul manifest in its imagination, in its judgments, and in its desires, which constitutes the characteristic of this category."' (1772, cited in Foucault, 1988, 104). Alternatively, in a definition Foucault takes from Robert James' famed medical dictionary, 'The simplest and more general definition we can give of classical madness is indeed *delirium:* "This word is derived from *lira*, a furrow, so that *deliro* actually means to move out of the furrow, away from the proper path of reason."' (1746-48, cited in Foucault 1988, 99-100). Further, in its article on mania, the '*Encyclopédie* put forward its famous definition of madness: to depart from reason "with confidence and in the firm conviction that one is following it – that, it seems to me, is what is called being *mad*"' (cited in Foucault 1988, 104). The *Encyclopédie* would also proclaim that '"Veritable madnesses, then, are all the derangements of our mind, all the illusions of self-love, and all our passions when they are carried to the point of blindness, for blindness is the distinctive characteristic of madness."' (cited in Foucault 1988, 105). Alternatively, as Foucault explains, 'once the mind became blind through the very excess of sensibility – than madness appears' (Foucault 1988, 158). Foucault writes that the classical understanding of unreason is 'not as reason diseased, or as reason lost or alienated, but quite simply as *reason dazzled*' (1988, 108).

Accordingly, Sauvages could thus advocate rational persuasion as therapy. Sauvages writes that '"One must be a philosopher to be able to cure the diseases of the soul. For as the origin of these diseases is nothing more than a violent desire for a thing which the sufferer envisages as a good, it is part of the physician's duty to prove to him by solid reasons that what he desires so ardently is an apparent good but a real evil, in order to make him renounce his error."' (1772, cited in Foucault 1988, 183). Madness was also classically seen as being an expression of negative instincts. As Foucault explains, 'For madness, even if it is provoked or sustained by what is most artificial in society, appears, in its violent forms, as the savage expression of the most primitive human desire. Madness in the classical period, as we have seen, is rooted in the threats of bestiality – a bestiality completely dominated by predatory and murderous instincts' (1988, 193). Thus, Foucault writes that at the end of the eighteenth century, there was a transformation in Western thinking about unreason. Thus, 'unreason

transformed into delirium of the heart, madness of desire, the insane dialogue of love and death in the limitless presumption of appetite' (1988, 210).

As Foucault delves into the various and changing theories of madness, he explains how 'The savage danger of madness is related to the danger of the passions and to their fatal concatenation' (1988, 85). Foucault writes how

> Sauvages had sketched the fundamental role of passion, citing it as a more constant, more persistent and somehow more deserved cause of madness…. the real target of this denunciation was the radical relation of the phenomena of madness to the very possibility of passion (1988, 85).

Thus, passion is seen as the very condition for madness. As Foucault explains, 'passion is no longer simply one of the causes – however powerful – of madness; rather it forms the basis for its very possibility' and that 'The possibility of madness is therefore implicit in the very phenomenon of passion' (1988, 88). Even medical theories of the humours saw passion implicated, with the belief that

> The passions necessarily cause certain movements in the humors; anger agitates the bile, sadness excites melancholy (black bile), and the movements of the humors are on occasion so violent that they disrupt the entire economy of the body, even causing death; further, the passions augment the quantity of the humors; anger multiplies the bile as sadness increases melancholy. (Bayle and Grangeon 1682, cited in Foucault 1988, 86)

Similarly, medical theories referring to the "spirits" also kept a central role for the passions. As Foucault explains, 'The medicine of spirits substitutes for this vague idea of "disposition" the rigor of physical, mechanical transmission of movements' (1988, 87). These spirits would be disrupted and channelled by passion. Accordingly,

> Before the sight of the object of passion, the animal spirits were spread throughout the entire body in order to preserve all the parts in general; but at the presence of the new object, this entire economy is disrupted. (Malebranche, cited in Foucault 1988, 86-7).

As Foucault explains, the spirits are disposed to and moved by passion, and 'when all the spirits are grouped around this object of passion, or at least around its image, the mind in its turn can no longer ignore it and will consequently be subjected to passion' (1988, 87). This is what makes the objects of the passions irresistible.

Similar arguments were made in theories of mental illness based around the "fibres". As Foucault explains, citing the famed Scottish physician Robert Whytt,

> Whytt admits that an intense emotion can provoke madness exactly as impact can provoke movement, for the sole reason that emotion is both impact in the soul and agitation of the nervous fiber: "It is thus that sad narratives or those capable of moving the heart, a horrible and unexpected sight, great grief, rage, terror, and the other passions which made a great impression frequently occasion the most sudden and violent nervous symptoms." (1777, cited in Foucault 1988, 89-90)

Yet more theories about madness spoke about irritation of the "nerves". In this view, 'one fell ill from too much feeling; one suffered from an excessive solidarity with all the beings around one. One was no longer compelled by one's secret nature; one was the victim of everything which on the surface of the world, solicited the body and the soul' (Foucault 1988, 157). Similarly, Foucault writes how, according to Tuke, 'the sight of evil is for every sensitive soul the cause of suffering, the origin of all those strong and untoward passions such as horror, hate and disgust which engender or perpetuate madness' (Foucault 1988, 243-44). Such views led to a more significant transformation in how madness was understood. So, Foucault continues, nervous irritation was envisaged as the possible outcome of a failure to properly nurture and cultivate one's passions (1988, 157).

Interestingly, Foucault also discusses how passion, its discharge or its redirection, could also be employed as a therapy, what he calls the cure by passion. One passion would be marshalled in helping to master another. As Foucault explains,

> Fear, in the eighteenth century, was regarded as one of the passions most advisable to arouse in madmen. It was considered the natural complement of the constraints imposed upon maniacs and lunatics; a sort of discipline was even imagined which would immediately accompany and compensate every attack of anger in a manic by a reaction of fear…. But fear is efficacious not only at the level of the effects of the disease; it is

> the disease itself that fear attacks and suppresses. It has, in fact, the property of petrifying the operations of the nervous system… (1988, 180).

There was also an argument that the "excessive" liberty of England was to blame for unleashing the passions, and thus madness (Spurzheim 1818, cited in Foucault 1988, 213). As Foucault summarises, 'In short, liberty, far from putting man in possession of himself, ceaselessly alienates him from his essence and his world; it fascinates him in the absolute exteriority of other people and of money, in the irreversible interiority of passion and unfulfilled desire' (1988, 214).

5.2.3. The Encounter Between Reason and Non-reason

One of the first innovations in the encounter between reason and non-reason in the classical era of the seventeenth century is the institutional act of confinement. Confinement, Foucault says,

> in the history of unreason… marked a decisive event: the moment when madness was perceived on the social horizon of poverty, of incapacity for work, of inability to integrate with the group; the moment when madness began to rank among the problems of the city. (Foucault 1988, 64).

This was the decisive break from the Renaissance treatment of madness, which had allowed it an 'imaginary freedom' and a space in which it 'floundered about in broad daylight: in *King Lear*, in *Don Quixote*. But in less than a half-century, it had been sequestered and, in the fortress of confinement, bound to Reason, to the rules of morality and to their monotonous nights' (Foucault 1988, 64).

Thus, a 'sensibility was born… which chose – only to banish' (Foucault 1988, 64). As Foucault says, there was a new feeling that 'All those forms of evil that border on unreason must be thrust into secrecy. Classicism felt a shame in the presence of the inhuman that the Renaissance had never experienced' (1988, 68). Thus, 'Confinement hid away unreason, and betrayed the shame it aroused; but it explicitly drew attention to madness, pointed to it. If, in the case of unreason, the chief intention was to avoid scandal, in the case of madness that intention was to organize it' (Foucault 1988, 70).

With the belief in the eighteenth century that bad air and vapours were a source of infection, the asylums came under a reforming pressure, and the intention for organising madness became apparent. As Foucault explains,

> The ideal was an asylum which, while preserving its essential functions, would be so organized that the evil could vegetate there without ever spreading; an asylum where unreason would be entirely contained and offered as a spectacle, without threatening the spectators; where it would have all the powers of example and none of the risks of contagion. In short, an asylum restored to its truth as a cage. (1988, 206-7).

So, Foucault summarises, 'the political critique of confinement functioned in the eighteenth century. Not in the direction of a liberation of the mad; nor can we say that it permitted a more philanthropic or a greater medical attention to the insane. On the contrary, it linked madness more firmly than ever to confinement...' (Foucault 1988, 227).

The same period saw a great fear of madness. This is because, Foucault argues, the classical period had confined 'not only an abstract unreason which mingled madmen and libertines, invalids, and criminals, but also an enormous reservoir of the fantastic, a dormant world of monsters…. Even as they separated reason from unreason on society's surface, they preserved in depth the images where they mingled and exchanged properties.' (1988, 209). These images were to haunt civilised people, as would the idea that their grip on reason was tenuous. This is because it was now believed that a sudden emotional experience might shake even the wisest person from their reason (Foucault 1988, 211-2).

This period of reform was to see the most significant changes to the treatment of the mad. Here, Foucault talks of William Tuke in England and Phillipe Pinel in France. They both liberated the mad from chains and shackles and delivered them into a new form of treatment based around the model of the family, bourgeois values, and guilt and responsibility. As Foucault explains, 'the patriarchal calm of Tuke's home, where the heart's passions and the mind's disorders slowly subside; the lucid firmness of Pinel, who masters in a word and a gesture the two animal frenzies that roar against him as they hunt him down…' (1988, 242).

Beginning with Tuke, Foucault recounts one of Tuke's stories of a 'maniac subject to seizures of irrepressible violence' who, one day when walking in the gardens, picked up a stone and made the pretence of throwing it at his keeper. However, Tuke says, 'The keeper stopped, looked the patient in the eyes; then advanced several steps toward him and "in a resolute tone of voice… commanded him to lay down the stone"; as he approached, the patient lowered his

hand, then dropped his weapon; "he then submitted to be quietly led to his apartment." Something had been born, which was no longer repression, but authority', Foucault concludes (1988, 251). As Foucault continues in this crucial passage,

> Until the end of the eighteenth century, the world of madmen was peopled only by the abstract, faceless power which kept them confined; within these limits, it was empty, empty of all that was not madness itself; the guards were often recruited among the inmates themselves. Tuke established, on the contrary, a mediating element between guards and patients, between reason and madness. The space reserved by society for insanity would now be haunted by those who were "from the other side" and who represented both the prestige of authority that confines and the rigor of the reason that judges. The keeper intervenes, without weapons, without instruments of constraint, with observation and language only…. In fact, though, it is not as a concrete person that he confronts madness, but as a reasonable being, invested by that very fact, and before any combat takes place, with the authority that is his for not being mad. Reason's victory over unreason was once assured only by material force, and in a sort of real combat. Now the combat was always decided beforehand, unreason's defeat inscribed in advance in the concrete situation where madman and man of reason meet the absence of constraint in the nineteenth-century asylum is not unreason liberated, but madness long since mastered. (1988, 251-2).

Thus, believing that the breakdown of family relations was at the root of madness, Tuke attempted to reconstitute it in the asylum. For Tuke, family relations were 'both the truth and norm for all relations that may obtain between the madman and the man of reason' (Foucault 1988, 253). As Foucault continues, 'The entire existence of madness, in the world now being prepared for it, was enveloped in what we may call, in anticipation, a "parental complex."' (1988, 253). Finally, for Tuke, 'in the modern world, what had been the great, irreparable confrontation of reason and unreason became the secret thrust of instincts against the solidity of the family institution and against its most archaic symbols' (Foucault 1988, 254). Tuke, Foucault says,

> reconstitutes around madness a simulated family, which is an institutional parody but a real psychological solution. Where the family is inadequate, he substitutes for it a

> fictitious family décor of signs and attitudes.... the madman remains a minor, and for a long time reason will retain for him the aspect of the Father. (1988, 254)

Foucault argues that 'The operation as practiced at the Retreat was still simple: religious segregation for purposes of moral purification' (1988, 259). In the French case, however, it was more complicated. As he continues, 'The operation as practiced by Pinel was relatively complex: to effect moral synthesis, assuring an ethical continuity between the world of madness and the world of reason, but by practicing a social segregation that would guarantee bourgeois morality a universality of fact and permit it to be imposed as a law upon all forms of insanity' (Foucault 1988, 259). Treatment at Bicêtre was thus nothing less than the transmission of bourgeois values, and the punishment of those who depart from them. Accordingly, Pinel had many ingenious methods for "restoring" patients to sanity.

One such method was treatment by mirror. Pinel recounts another story, this time of a man believing himself the king. The keeper begins to refute the patient's views calmly and persistently. As Pinel explains,

> One day when he was calmer, the keeper approached him and asked why, if he were a sovereign, he did not put an end to his detention, and why he remained mingled with madmen of all kinds. Resuming this speech the following days, "he made him see, little by little, the absurdity of his pretentions, showed him another madman who had been long convinced that he possessed supreme power and had become an object of mockery. At first the maniac felt shaken, soon he cast doubts upon his title of sovereign, and finally he came to realize his chimerical vagaries. It was in two weeks that this unexpected moral revolution took place, and after several months of tests, this worthy father was restored to his family." (1801, cited in Foucault 1988, 263-4)

Thus, the patient 'is now pitilessly observed by himself. And in the silence of those who represent reason, and who have done nothing but hold up the perilous mirror, he recognizes himself as objectively mad' (Foucault 1988, 264). In this way, the patient is brought back to reason.

As Foucault continues, in such methods, 'madness is ceaselessly called upon to judge itself. But beyond this, it is at every moment judged from without; judged not by moral or scientific conscience, but by a sort of invisible tribunal in permanent sessions. The asylum Pinel dreamed of and partly realized at Bicêtre, but especially at La Salpêtrière, is a juridical

microcosm' (Foucault 1988, 265). Another method, perpetual judgement from without, would be one of the most significant innovations of the asylum. As Foucault says,

> Formerly, unreason was set outside of judgment, to be delivered, arbitrarily, to the powers of reason. Now it was judged, and not only upon entering the asylum, in order to be recognized, classified, and made innocent forever; it is caught, on the contrary, in a perpetual judgment, which never ceases to pursue it and to apply sanctions, to proclaim its transgressions, to require honorable amends, to exclude, finally, those whose transgressions risk compromising the social order. Madness escaped from the arbitrary only in order to enter a kind of endless trial for which the asylum furnished simultaneously police, magistrates, and torturers; a trial whereby any transgression in life, by a virtue proper to life in the asylum, becomes a social crime, observed, condemned, and punished; a trial which has no outcome but in a perpetual recommencement in the internalized form of remorse…. The asylum of the age of positivism, which it is Pinel's glory to have founded, is not a free realm of observation, diagnosis, and therapeutics; it is a juridical space where one is accused, judged, and condemned, and from which one is never released except by the version of this trial in psychological depth – that is, by remorse…. For a long time to come, and until our own day at least, it is imprisoned in a moral world. (1988, 268-9)

Thus, 'Freed from the chains that made it a purely observed object, madness lost, paradoxically, the essence of its liberty, which was solitary exaltations; it became responsible for what it knew of it truth; it imprisoned itself in an infinitely self-referring observation; it was finally chained to the humiliation of being its own object' (Foucault 1988, 265). What was being instituted is self-control. As Foucault explains,

> For his part, the keeper declared he had no desire to use the means of coercion at his disposal. "The maniac was sensible of the kindness of his treatment. *He promised to restrain himself*." He sometimes still raged, shouted, and frightened his companions. The keeper reminded him of the threats and promises of the first day; if he did not control himself, it would be necessary to go back to the old ways. The patient's agitation would then increase for a while, and then rapidly decline. (1988, 246)

Thus,

> The obscure guilt that once linked transgression and unreason is thus shifted; the madman, as a human being originally endowed with reason, is no longer guilty of being mad; but the madman, as madman, and in the interior of that disease of which he is no longer guilty, must feel morally responsible for everything within him that may disturb morality and society, and must hold no one but himself responsible for the punishment he receives. (Foucault 1988, 246)

Overall, Tuke had accomplished an amazing transformation:

> Tuke created an asylum where he substituted for the free terror of madness the stifling anguish of responsibility; fear no longer reigned on the other side of the prison gates, it now raged under the seals of conscience. Tuke now transferred the age-old terrors in which the insane had been trapped to the very heart of madness. The asylum no longer punished the madman's guilt, it is true; but it did more, it organized the guilt; it organized it for the madman as a consciousness of himself, and as a non-reciprocal relation to the keeper; it organized it for the man of reason as an awareness of the Other, a therapeutic intervention in the madman's existence. In other words, by this guilt the madman became an object of punishment always vulnerable to himself and to the Other; and, from the acknowledgment of his status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and consequently to reason. (Foucault 1988, 247).

In this way, the patient is brought face to face with reason, and is helped to return to it.

5.2.4. The Medicalisation of Madness

Perhaps in the most significant move, mental illness itself was finally brought about by the introduction of the 'medical personage' under Tuke and Pinel. Thus, there is the medicalisation of madness, which was previously far from seen as a uniquely medical concern. As Foucault explains,

> It is thus not possible to use as a valid or at least meaningful distinction for the classical period the difference – immediately apparent to us – between physical medications and psychological or moral medications. The difference only begins to exist in all its profundity the day when fear is no longer used as a method for arresting movement, but as a punishment; when joy does not signify organic expansion, but reward; when anger is nothing more than a response to concerted humiliation; in short, when the nineteenth century, by inventing its famous "moral methods," has brought madness and its cure into the domain of guilt. (Foucault 1988, 181-2)

At the same time, there was the appearance of what Foucault calls the medical personage. As he continues,

> To silence, to recognition in the mirror, to perpetual judgment, we must add a fourth structure peculiar to the world of the asylum as it was constituted at the end of the eighteenth century: this is the apotheosis of the *medical personage*. Of them all, it is doubtless the most important since it would authorize not only new contacts between doctor and patient, but a new relation between insanity and medical thought, and ultimately command the whole modern experience of madness. Hitherto, we find in the asylums only the same structures of confinement, but displaced and deformed. With the new status of the medical personage, the deepest meaning of confinement is abolished: mental disease, with the meanings we now give it, is made possible. (Foucault 1988, 269-70).

Finally, this meant that 'A purely psychological medicine was made possible only when madness was alienated in guilt' of the type previously discussed (Foucault 1988, 183).

5.2.5. Religion

Foucault discusses the dual nature of religion and religiousness in both stimulating or suppressing the passions. He describes how it was both criticised for the first phenomena, and conversely, marshalled for the second. In the first sense, Foucault says, 'Religious beliefs prepare a kind of landscape of images, an illusory milieu favorable to every hallucination and every delirium. For a long time, doctors were suspicious of the effect of too strict a devotion,

too strong a belief. Too much moral rigor, too much anxiety about salvation and the life to come were often thought to bring on melancholia' (1988, 215). Religion could also stimulate powerful emotions. As Foucault explains, discussing Catholicism and Pinel's work,

> A source of strong emotions and terrifying images which it accuses through fears of the Beyond, Catholicism frequently provokes madness; it generates delirious beliefs, entertains hallucinations, leads men to despair and to melancholia…. The asylum must thus be freed from religion and from all its iconographic connections…. Nothing takes us further from Tuke and his dreams of a religious community that would at the same time be a privileged site of mental cures, than this notion of a neutralized asylum, purified of those images and passions to which Christianity gave birth and which made the mind wander toward illusion, toward error, and soon toward delirium and hallucinations. (1988, 255-6)

However, Pinel did not wish to completely do away with religion in the asylum, and even believed that it could "calm" the passions. As Foucault elaborates,

> Pinel's problem was to reduce the iconographic forms, not the moral content of religion. Once "filtered," religion possesses a disalienating power that dissipates the images, calms the passions, and restores man to what is most immediate and essential: it can bring him closer to his moral truth. And it is here that religion is often capable of effecting cures.... Restored to the extreme simplicity of this moral content, religion could not help conniving with philosophy and with medicine, with all the forms of wisdom and science that can restore the reason in a disturbed mind. (1988, 256-7)

Thus, again, religion could function to stave off madness, and could even work as a form of preliminary therapy. As was already mentioned, religion had once been seen 'only as an element in the transmission of error' (Foucault 1988, 216), but a change was about to occur. As Foucault says, 'even before Pinel, there had been analyses of a more rigorous historical nature, in which religion appeared as a milieu of satisfaction or repression of the passions' (1988, 216).

5.4.6. Challenging the Reason/Emotion Dualism

Foucault also wishes to challenge the idea that madness is the opposite of reason, or is inherently irrational or illogical. At least within the constraints of its own initial propositions, madness meticulously follows logic, and can thus be seen as a parody of reason or sanity. As he explains, in detail,

> The man who imagines he is made of glass is not mad, for any sleeper can have this image in a dream; but he is mad if, believing he is made of glass, he thereby concludes that he is fragile, that he is in danger of breaking, that he must touch no object which might be too resistant, that he must in fact remain motionless, and so on. Such reasonings are those of a madman; but again we must note that in themselves they are neither absurd not illogical. On the contrary, they apply correctly the most rigorous figures of logic. And Paul Zacchias has no difficulty finding them, in all their rigor, among the insane. Syllogism, in a man letting himself starve to death: "The dead do not eat; I am dead; hence I do not eat." Induction extended to infinity, in a man suffering from persecution delusions: "A, B, and C are my enemies; all of them are men; therefore all men are my enemies." Enthymeme, in another sufferer: "Most of those who have lived in this house are dead, hence I, who have lived in this house, am dead." The marvelous logic of the mad which seems to mock that of the logicians because it resembles it so exactly, or rather because it is exactly the same... (Foucault 1988, 94-5)

Alternatively, in another example which Foucault borrows from Diemerbroek, he tells of a man who accused himself of having killed his son, and blaming himself, thought that God had assigned him a demon as punishment, whose presence he saw. Diemerbroek learns that the boy had drowned while being bathed by his father, and his father, believing that the punishment for murder is eternal damnation, tells himself

> "that a horrible demon is assigned to him." This demon he does not as yet see, but since "he does not cease thinking of it," and "regards this notion as necessarily true," he imposes on is brain a certain image of this demon; this image is presented to his soul by the action of the brain and of the spirits with such insistence that he believes he continually sees the demon itself." (Diemerbroek 1685, cited in Foucault 1988, 96)

Thus, Foucault concludes, this example seems to show

> a dismantled reason which converses with a phantom. But at a deeper level, we find a rigorous organization dependent on the faultless armature of a discourse. This discourse, in its logic, commands the firmest belief in self, it advances by judgments and reasonings which connect together; it is a kind of reason in action. In short, under the chaotic and manifest delirium reigns the order of a secret delirium. In this second delirium, which is, in a sense, pure reason, reason delivered of all the external tinsel of dementia, is located the paradoxical truth of madness. And this in a double sense, since we find here both what makes madness true (irrefutable logic, perfectly organized discourse, faultless connection in the transparency of a virtual language) and what makes it truly madness (in its own nature, the special style of all its manifestations, and the internal structure of delirium). (1988, 96-7)

Therefore, at the heart of madness is the contradiction between a kind of reason in action, a faultless and correctly proceeding logic, and manifestations such as melancholia or hallucinations, which signal madness.

5.4.7. Summary

Foucault claims that one of the unique things about Western thought is that it posits madness as the counter to reason, its opposite and its lack. For Foucault, madness and passion have a long history of association. Departing from reason was seen by many in the 1700s as the definition of madness. Foucault delves into the various and changing theories of madness and explains how 'The savage danger of madness is related to the danger of the passions and to their fatal concatenation'. Passion was seen as the very condition for madness, with madness 'implicit' in the passions themselves. Whether in medical theories of the humours, the spirits, the fibres, or the nerves, passion was always implicated. Further, one of the first innovations in the encounter between reason and non-reason in the classical era, for Foucault, was the institutional act of confinement. When discussing the therapeutic innovation of Tuke and Pinel, Foucault shows how they aimed to bring the mad back to sanity by subduing passion and instinct. Both Tuke and Pinel liberated the mad from their chains but delivered them into a new form of treatment based around the family, bourgeois values, and guilt and responsibility. What

was being instituted was self-control through the confrontation of the patient with the medical personage representing and standing for reason itself. Perhaps in the most significant move, madness was transformed into mental illness, a specific problem for the medical profession, when what Foucault calls the 'medical personage' was instituted under Tuke and Pinel. Thus, there was the medicalisation of madness, which was previously far from a uniquely medical concern. Finally, Foucault discusses the dual nature of religion in both stimulating, and on the other hand, suppressing the passions. Pinel, for example, did not wish to altogether remove religion from the asylum and even believed that it could "calm" the passions.

5.3. Martha Nussbaum – *Upheavals of Thought*

5.3.1. Introduction

In *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001), Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions are evaluative and cognitive phenomena. She calls this her neo-Stoic, cognitive/evaluative view of emotions. For Nussbaum, emotions are just another sort of thought, one that signals urgency, highlights the importance of something for one's flourishing, and may or may not be correlated with a bodily sensation. In this sense, her thesis is more radical than it may seem at first. Nussbaum is doing no less than breaking down the distinction between reason and emotion almost entirely. For instance, at one stage she begins to talk in the language of "emotional thinking", "nonemotional thinking" and "emotion thoughts" and arguing that emotions may themselves be a form of reasoning. For her, they are not a separate phenomenon and are even housed in the same "part" of the mind. Nussbaum backs up her claims by reference to psychological and neuroscientific research, which argues that emotions are cognitive phenomena, and she is informed by anthropological approaches which argue that emotions are largely socially constructed. Moreover, acknowledging the importance of social construction and child-rearing styles on the emotions, she makes some recommendations as to how societies may nurture the development of positive emotions, such as compassion, in children and adults. Throughout, many of Nussbaum's arguments are made in reference to the experience of losing her mother, and the grief this elicited. To examine Nussbaum's views, this section first outlines her cognitive/evaluative theory of the emotions. Then, it discusses the defences of her theory against what she calls the 'adversary's view', which sees emotions as irrational impulses that must be mastered. After this, it outlines how she differentiates emotions from appetites, moods, and drives. It then looks at how Nussbaum backs up her arguments through appeals to the psychological and neuroscientific literature. Following on from this, it shows how she outlines the role of child-rearing and social construction in emotional development. Before concluding, it examines her appeals for a nurturing of the proper emotional development through various means. This section then concludes with her argument that emotions are a part, or kind, of reasoning themselves.

5.3.2. The Cognitive/Evaluative View of Emotion

Nussbaum defines her view of emotions as 'neo-Stoic', and 'cognitive/evaluative'. She explains that by "cognitive" she means 'nothing more than "concerned with receiving and processing information." I do not mean to imply the presence of elaborate calculation, of computation, or even of reflexive self-awareness' (Nussbaum 2001, 23). In defending her cognitive/evaluative thesis, Nussbaum argues that the emotions are 'intelligent responses to the perceptions of value' (Nussbaum 2001, 1), and should be part of ethical consideration. As she explains,

> If emotions are suffused with intelligence and discernment, and if they contain in themselves an awareness of value or importance, they cannot… easily be sidelined in accounts of ethical, as so often they have been in the history of philosophy. Instead of viewing morality as a system of principles to be grasped by the detached intellect, and emotions as motivations that either support or subvert our choice to act according to principle, we will have to consider emotions as part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning. (Nussbaum 2001, 1)

Developing the notion that emotions are a form of judgment, Nussbaum explains how emotions 'involve judgments about important things, judgments in which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control' (2001, 19). This is explained, Nussbaum continues, by a

> modified version of the ancient Greek Stoic view according to which emotions are forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency. (Nussbaum 2001, 22).

This frailty and neediness inherent in human life is a point to which Nussbaum frequently returns.

However, this seems to be a more significant departure from Stoic thinking than Nussbaum admits. For Epictetus, for example, evaluative judgments may *lead* to an emotion depending on whether people correctly appraise and value the things they experience, but judgements are not an emotion in themselves. However, as will be explained later, for Nussbaum, the evaluation and the emotion are the same phenomena. This distinction marks her major modification of Stoic thinking.

Further, Epictetus calls on people to cast aside externals so they will not suffer emotionally when they are inevitably lost. Nussbaum, however, makes no indication that one should cast aside the people and things they care about. This is because Nussbaum has no intentions to advocate for a less emotional existence. She is eloquent when she says that humans 'are the only emotional beings who wish not to be emotional, who wish to withhold these acknowledgments of neediness and to design for themselves a life in which these acknowledgments have no place' (Nussbaum 2001, 137). Yet, for people to deny their emotional natures would be foolish because the emotions are indispensable parts of the cognitive apparatus and an unemotional being would not be able to reason about what is essential to its flourishing.

Still, Nussbaum is classically Stoical when she explains that what differentiates the emotions is the way the object of the emotions is evaluated. As she explains,

> What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate – is not so much the identity of the object which might not change, *but the way in which the object is seen*. In fear, one sees oneself or what one loves as seriously threatened. In hope, one sees oneself or what one loves as in some uncertainty but with a good chance for a good outcome. In grief, one sees an important object or person as lost; in love, as invested with a special sort of radiance. (Nussbaum 2001, 28, emphasis added)

Relatedly, Nussbaum argues that emotions are not only evaluations but are based on beliefs. As she elaborates on this point,

> emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs – often very complex – about the object…. In order to have fear – as Aristotle already saw – I must believe that bad events are impending; that they are not trivially, but seriously bad; and that I am not entirely in control of warding them off. In order to have anger, I must have an even more complex set of beliefs: that some damage has occurred to me or to something

> or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; probably, that it was done willingly. (Nussbaum 2001, 28-9).

Thus, she argues how ‘All cognitive views of emotion entail that emotions can be modified by a change in the way one evaluates objects’ and this means that, unlike what Kant argued, virtue is not just a matter of constraining the brutish impulses in human nature (Nussbaum 2001, 232). So, for example, if a person has ‘misogynistic anger and hatred’, for example, then there is hope ‘that a change in thought will lead to changes not just in behavior but also in emotion itself, since emotion is a value-laden way of seeing’ (Nussbaum 2001, 232).

Thus, as in classical Stoicism, when a new, more accurate evaluation is made of the situation, the underlying emotion can change. As Nussbaum explains, ‘If I should discover that not A but B had done the damage, or that it was not done willingly, or that it was not serious, we could expect my anger to modify itself accordingly, or go away…. my fear would have turned to relief… had the medical news [about mother] changed, or proved to be mistaken’ (Nussbaum 2001, 29). Not only this, but the evaluation is not just a way of understanding what one is feeling, but it constitutes the emotion itself and is necessary for being able to differentiate between what emotions one is feeling. As she continues in a crucial passage, ‘the feeling of agitation all by itself will not reveal to me whether what I am feeling is fear or grief or pity. Only an inspection of the thoughts discriminates’ (Nussbaum 2001, 29-30).

As to why emotions seem challenging to shift even when underlying beliefs change, Nussbaum has an answer. Giving some hypothetical examples, she explains how

> ‘Sandra, who was terrified by a dog during childhood, may learn that dogs are no danger to her well-being; but she still fears dogs. Jack may decide that he was wrong to accept his parents’ beliefs that African-Americans are ruining the country; but he still has intense anger against them. Does this mean, after all, that one may remove the evaluative beliefs without removing the emotions?’ (Nussbaum 2001, 35).

She answers in the negative. Emotions are indeed often difficult to shift, but this is mostly because of habit. As she continues, it is particularly challenging to change emotions based on ‘evaluative beliefs that we lay down in childhood, frequently in connection with attachment relations of deep intensity’ and that the ‘mind has a complex archaeology, and false beliefs, especially about matters of value, are difficult to shake’ (Nussbaum 2001, 36).

For Nussbaum, emotions also contain an awareness or evaluation of value. As she puts it, emotions are a 'certain sort of vision or recognition'; they are 'value-laden ways of understanding the world' (Nussbaum 2001, 88). As she explains, emotions

> are concerned with *value*, they see their object as invested with value or importance. Suppose that I did not love my mother or consider her a person of great importance; suppose I considered her about as important as a branch on a tree next to my house. Then (unless I had invested the tree-branch itself with an unusual degree of value) I would not fear her death, or hope so passionately for her recovery' (Nussbaum 2001, 30).

Relatedly, this value-evaluating aspect of emotion is key to what Nussbaum calls the eudaimonistic nature of emotions. For her, 'In a eudaimonistic ethical theory the central question asked by a person is, "How should a human being live?" The answer to that question is the person's conception of *eudaimonia*, or human flourishing, a complete human life' (Nussbaum 2001, 31-2). So, she explains, 'I do not go about fearing any and every catastrophe that I know to be bad in important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of damages impending that cut to the heart of my own cherished relationships and projects' (Nussbaum 2001, 31). Alternatively, as she summarises, 'In short, in an ethical and social/political creature, emotions themselves are ethical and social/political, parts of an answer to the questions, "What is worth caring about?" "How should I live?"' (Nussbaum 2001, 149).

Nussbaum argues that emotions play a role in reasoning or are a form of reasoning themselves. As she explains, 'Emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature's reasoning itself' (Nussbaum 2001, 3). Returning to her mother's death, Nussbaum asks, attempting to "locate" it in the mind:

> what element in me *is* it that experiences the terrible shock of grief? I think of my mother; I embrace in my mind the fact that she will never be with me again – and I am shaken. How and where? …. The grief itself must contain the thought of her irrevocable deadness. Now of course we could say that there is a separate emotional part of the soul that has all these abilities. But we seem to have lost our grip on the reason for housing grief in a separate noncognitive part: thought looks like just the place to house it. (Nussbaum 2001, 44).

The feelings of grief, and the thought of her mother's death, are the same. Continuing and reiterating this point, she says that

> It was my thought that was receiving, and being shaken by, the knowledge of her death. I think that if we say anything else we lose the close connection between the recognition and the being shaken the experience gives us. The recognizing and the upheaval, we want to say, belong to one and the same part of me, the part with which I make sense of the world. (Nussbaum 2001, 45)

This part with which people make sense of the world is cognitive, it is rational. It is also where they experience emotions.

In defining what a judgment is, Nussbaum takes her lead from her inspiration in Stoicism. For the Stoics, 'a judgment is an assent to an appearance. In other words, it is a process that has two stages. First, it occurs to me or strikes me that such and such is the case. It looks to me that way, I see things that way – but so far I haven't really accepted it' (Nussbaum 2001, 37). Crucially, assenting to an appearance is a cognitive act. As she elaborates,

> There seems nothing odd here about saying both that the appearance presents itself to my cognitive faculties and that its acceptance or rejection is the activity of those faculties. Assenting to or embracing a way of seeing something in the world, acknowledging it as true, seems to be a job that *requires* the discriminating power of cognition. Cognition need not be imagined as inert, as it is in the Humean tradition. In this case, it is reason itself that reaches out and takes that appearance to itself, saying, so to speak, "Yes, that's the one I'll have. That's the way things really are." We might even say that this is a good way of thinking about what reasoning is: an ability in virtue of which we commit ourselves to a view of the way things really are. (Nussbaum 2001, 38)

Still, she adds, assenting is not always a deliberate act because 'habit, attachment, and the sheer weight of events may frequently extract assent from us' (Nussbaum 2001, 38).

Returning to the experience of her mother's death, Nussbaum reiterates this crucial point: 'I am in the hospital room with her body before me. I embrace the appearance as the way things are. Can I assent to the idea that someone tremendously beloved is forever lost to me, and yet preserve emotional equanimity?' (Nussbaum 2001, 39-40). In other words, the

experience of an emotion is an inevitable component of assenting to the judgment that her mother is dead. In that sense, the assenting and the feeling are the same phenomena.

Elaborating on this point, Nussbaum asks 'Is the emotion the act of assenting, or is it a state that results from the act? (Nussbaum 2001, 46). She seems to answer that one does not proceed from the other, they appear to happen at the same time, and in that sense cannot be separated. She makes this point again in a striking section:

> If I go up to embrace the death image, if I take it into myself as the way things are, it is at that very moment, in that cognitive act itself, that I am putting the world's nail into my own insides. That is not preparation for upheaval, that is upheaval itself. (Nussbaum 2001, 45)

Continuing, Nussbaum argues that it

> is wrong to think of the judgement as an event that temporally precedes the grieving – as at least some of the causal language suggests. When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the proposition, "My wonderful mother is dead," and then set about grieving. No, the real, full recognition of that terrible event (as many times as I recognize it) *is* the upheaval. It is as I described it: like putting a nail into your stomach. (Nussbaum 2001, 45)

Therefore, the recognition of her mother's death, a cognitive act, is one and the same phenomena as the emotional suffering she feels.

5.3.3. The Adversary's View and Responses

Early on in *Upheavals of Thought,* Nussbaum begins answering the objection that emotions do not belong as a consideration in moral philosophy. She begins by admitting that there are potential dangers in emotion and responds to the argument that cognitive views of emotions, like her own, leave out what is 'messy and unforgiveable in the life of the passions' (2001, 16). She turns the charge upside down. As she explains,

> If we really were to think of emotions as like bodily tugs or stabs or flashes, then we would precisely leave out what is most disturbing about them. How simple life would be, if grief were only a pain in the leg, or jealousy but a very bad headache. Jealousy and grief torment us mentally; it is thoughts we have about objects that are the source of agony – and, in other cases, delight. (Nussbaum 2001, 16)

Indeed, seeing emotions as a type of thought actually helps to explain their troubling appearance. Thus, 'the peculiar depth and the potentially terrifying character of the human emotions derives from the especially complicated thoughts that humans are likely to form about their own need for objects, and about their imperfect control over them' (Nussbaum 2001, 16).

Above all, Nussbaum feels the need to explain some of the most contentious features that have been highlighted about the emotions. She aims to explain emotions'

> urgency and heat; their tendency to take over the personality and to move it to action with overwhelming force;… the person's sense of passivity before them; their apparently adversarial relation to "rationality" in the sense of cool calculation, or cost-benefit analysis… (Nussbaum 2001, 22)

Beginning to attend to these and related objections, Nussbaum introduces the construct of the 'adversary' (Nussbaum 2001, 25). The adversary's view argues that

> that emotions are "non-reasoning movements," unthinking energies that simply push the person around, without being hooked up to the ways in which she perceives or thinks about the world. Like gusts of wind or the currents of the sea, they move, and move the person, but obtusely, without vision of an object or beliefs about it… (Nussbaum 2001, 24-5)

Nussbaum wishes to dispel the image of the emotions as 'blind forces that have no selectivity or intelligence about them' (2001, 11).

As she continues, 'if emotions are just unthinking forces that have no connection with our thoughts, evaluations, or plans,' as the adversary contends, 'then they really are just like the invading currents of some ocean' and we would indeed be passive in their wake (Nussbaum 2001, 26-7). However, Nussbaum has several responses to this. What differentiates emotions from 'thoughtless energies' is that

> they are *about* something: they have an object. My fear, my hope, my ultimate grief, all are about my mother and directed at her and her life. A wind may hit against something, a current in the blood may pound against something: but they are not in the same way *about the* things they strike in their way. My fear's very identity as fear depends on its having some such object: take that away and it becomes a mere trembling or heart-leaping. (Nussbaum 2001, 27).

Further, Nussbaum replies to the idea that there may be 'objectless feelings of pain and/or pleasure' (Nussbaum 2001, 35). About such feelings, she says: 'What are they like if they are not *about* anything? What is the pleasure *in*, or the pain *at*? How are they connected with the beliefs, if they do not themselves contain any thought or cognition?' (Nussbaum 2001, 35). Again, there must always be an object.

At this point, Nussbaum is somewhat satisfied that she has answered the objections of the adversary. As she summarises, the adversary's view omits that 'central to the identity of an emotion and to discriminations between one emotion and another: their aboutness, their intentionality, their basis in beliefs, their connection with evaluation. *All this makes them look very much like thoughts*…' (Nussbaum 2001, 33, emphasis added). Nussbaum also has an answer to the fact that emotions are frequently disproportionate to their objects. As she explains, when this happens, it

> is usually because the person has a skewed view of the object, seeing it as more or less important than it really is. People will often suffer greatly over trivial losses – if they are used to the things involved, or think them their due…. it is the nature of the eudaimonistic evaluation that explains the intensity of the emotion. (Nussbaum, 2001, 56)

In most such cases, then, the person has a skewed view of the object. Still, the intensity of the emotion signals how important they *believe* the object is for their flourishing. Further, in those cases where the 'emotional response seems out of line with the *person's own view* of the object, or with her own assessment of what has occurred, we typically suppose that she really had a deeper concern for the object than she had realized… or that the present object has a symbolic significance, standing for another absent object; or that there is some further hidden content that really explains her emotion' (Nussbaum 2001, 56).

Nussbaum also explains the seeming passivity people feel in the face of their emotions. As she says,

> the experience of passivity in emotion is well explained by the fact that the objects of emotion are things and people whose activities and well-being we do not ourselves control, and in who we have invested a good measure of our own well-being. They are our hostages to fortune. In emotion we recognize our own passivity before the ungoverned events of life. (Nussbaum 2001, 78)

Nussbaum also feels the need to respond to the contention that emotions conflict with other judgments, and with each other. Nussbaum explains how, for the adversary,

> these conflicts are viewed as struggles between two forces, simultaneously active in the soul. In the latter case we have two uncomprehending forces battling it out, like two opposing winds; in the former, we have an articulate, reasoning force doing battle somehow with such a wind – and it would appear that the only way it can keep it down is to use force, since the wind does not listen to reason. Both forces go on acting on one another, until one wins. (Nussbaum 2001, 86)

However, this vision of mental conflict does not survive a confrontation with reality. Again, returning to her mother's death, Nussbaum explains how

> The adversary's view will say that my mindless emotional part is doing the grieving, while my reason is thinking philosophical thoughts and also (somehow) trying to restrain me from grief. The neo-Stoic view would urge us, instead, to regard this conflict as a debate between recognition and denial of the importance of the loss that has occurred. At one moment I assent to the thought that an irreplaceable wonderful person has departed from my life. At another moment I deny this…. Then the thought of my mother, lying in the hospital bed as I so often saw her lying at home, returns and I know that she is not like anyone else, and that I love her; and I assent once again to the thought that something has gone from my life that I cannot replace. (Nussbaum 2001, 86)

Moreover, she challenges the notion that reason could ever restrain a force such as emotion. Nussbaum does not believe that 'reason *could* restrain a force with which by hypothesis it could

not communicate. (2001, 86). Crucially here, she sees reason struggling with itself, not reason struggling against another separate thing called emotion. The struggle is between rejecting reality and feeling little, or accepting reality and feeling the full consequences of the realisation that a loved one lays dead (Nussbaum 2001, 86-7).

5.3.4. Psychological and Neuroscientific Research

As part of both the basis and support for her cognitive view of the emotions, Nussbaum refers to the psychological and neuroscientific literature. Thus, Nussbaum hopes 'it will emerge that a philosophical and humanistic account of the emotions, as this one is, need not be unscientific or indifferent to scientific evidence' and notes how 'all major investigators in the area grant that emotions can and should be studied in psychology, *and* that the emotions are richly cognitive phenomena, closely connected with the animal's way of perceiving and interpreting the world' (2001, 94).

Accordingly, Nussbaum lists some of these investigators with which she has affinities. She begins with the 'now-famous set of experiments' of Stanley Schachter and J. E. Singer which demonstrates that 'people's cognitions about the situation they are in are essential elements in their self-report of their emotional state' (Nussbaum 2001, 97). As for well-known psychologists with which her theory has affinities, Nussbaum lists Richard Lazarus, Keith Oatley, and Anthony Ortony, saying that their theories 'converge remarkably with the neo-Stoic position' (2001, 106). As she says, 'Lazarus's theory is thus in all essentials the view of emotions I have defended…. Like that theory, it stresses that emotions are usually eudaimonistic, concerned with one of most important goals and projects' (Nussbaum 2001, 109). She continues, bringing in Lazarus's concept of "hot" and "cold" cognition. Thus 'Lazarus points out perfectly correctly that there is no contradiction at all between analyzing emotions as cognitive appraisals and insisting that they embody a sense of importance and urgency: "Cognition can be relatively cold when there is *minimal self-involvement or low stakes* in what is thought; cognition may also be hot or emotional."' (Nussbaum 2001, 108).

Summarising, Nussbaum quotes Lazarus himself, who writes, 'To desire something and to recognize what must be done to attain it as well as to recognize when its attainment has succeeded or failed, is to be inevitably emotional. In this way, emotions and reason are inextricably linked in an inescapable logic' (Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptaion 1991, 468 cited in Nussbaum 2001, 109). As for psychologists who support the adversary's view, she can only

think of that of R. R. Zajonc, who advances ‘The only reductionist program currently influential in psychology’ (Nussbaum 2001, 113). Engaging in a long debate with Lazarus, Zajonc ‘begins with the unexceptional contention that any good account of emotion must do justice to emotions’ heat and urgency, their frequent reliance on nonverbal channels, and the fact that they frequently focus on their object in inchoate and incompletely articulated way’ (Nussbaum 2001, 113). Nussbaum’s answer to this contention was already explained.

As for literature from the neuroscientific field, Nussbaum concentrates on the well-known contribution of Antonio Damasio. He argues, in his book *Descartes’ Error*, that

> the emotion/reason distinction is inaccurate and misleading: emotions are forms of intelligent awareness. They are “just as cognitive as other percepts,” and they supply the organism with essential aspects of practical reason. They serve as “internal guides” concerning the relationship between subject and circumstances. (Nussbaum 2001, 115-6).

Indeed, as was discussed in the lobotomy case study, Damasio argues, with reference to a famous patient called Elliot, that damage to the frontal lobes affected Elliot’s ability to reason correctly because, although he could ‘reason his way through a problem’, his lack of emotion meant that ‘he lacked the kind of engagement that would give him a sense of what to do’ (Nussbaum 2001, 117). As Nussbaum summarises, ‘The point Damasio makes is that the same is true of emotions: they help us sort out the relationship between ourselves and the world. But the fact that the healthy functioning of a particular area of the brain is necessary for these processes is relevant and very interesting’ (2001, 117-8).

5.3.5. The Social Construction of Emotion and the Role of Childhood

Nussbaum moves on to explain how people’s emotions are shaped by their social realities as well as child-rearing and upbringing styles. As she says, ‘adult human emotions cannot be understood without understanding their history in infancy and childhood’ (Nussbaum 2001, 178). As for how she defines the social construction of emotions, Nussbaum defines the social construction of emotions as the process by which cultural and social variations ‘make a difference to a society’s emotional repertory’ (2001, 151). However, Nussbaum is quick to warn against falling ‘into one or the other of two extreme camps on the issue’, namely those

that argue that emotions are completely universal across social groups, and those that argue they are entirely socially constructed (Nussbaum 2001, 143).

Nonetheless, For Nussbaum, the cognitive/evaluative view of emotion is conducive to uncovering the role of social construction in shaping the emotions. As she explains, this view 'makes it easy to see how society could affect the emotional repertory of its members. If we hold that beliefs about what is important and valuable play a central role in emotions, we can readily see how those beliefs can be powerfully shaped by social norms as well as by an individual history; and we can also see how changing social norms can change emotional life' (Nussbaum 2001, 142). Returning to her own experience of grief, Nussbaum makes this point well when she says that

> My own grief was shaped not only by my attachment to my mother, but also by norms about the proper way to mourn the loss of a parent…. One is supposed to allow oneself to "cry big" at times, but then American mores of self-help demand that one get on with one's work, one's physical exercise, one's commitments to others, not making a big fuss (2001, 140).

Nussbaum lists the social factors which might explain why there are 'intersocietal differences in the emotional life' and examines several non-Western cultures (2001, 152). Still, closer to home, the American view, influenced by European Protestantism, says that 'one can conquer all contingencies through work: grieving is thus something felt as a sign that one is not making sufficient effort' (Nussbaum 2001, 153). Talking generally, Nussbaum says that 'anger is shaped by views about who is responsible for what, and how the causality of evil works. Fear is shaped by thoughts about what harmful agencies exist in the world, how harmful they are, and how to ward them off' (Nussbaum 2001, 147).

For Nussbaum, the role of social norms like those discussed above is perhaps the most important factor in shaping the emotions. As she explains,

> If emotions are evaluative appraisals, then cultural views about what is valuable can be expected to affect them very directly…. Societies have different normative teachings with regard to the importance of honor, money, bodily beauty and health, friendship, children, political power. They therefore have many differences in anger, envy, fear, love, and grief. (Nussbaum 2001, 157)

And as she concludes, 'social norms – about what all people in a culture should be like, about what men and women should be like, about what different social classes should be like – pervasively shape judgments about categories of emotion, either for society as a whole or for particular social actors' (Nussbaum 2001, 162).

This brings up the differences between the emotional socialisation of men and women. As she argues, 'In all cultures, practices of child rearing mark at least some differences between boys and girls, although the degree and nature of these differences will vary across cultures and individuals. The practice of training males for separation from the mother, and females for continuity with the mother's domestic function, profoundly shapes gender development in many societies' (Nussbaum 2001, 154). Furthermore, 'there is a good deal of research showing that, in our society, males are far more likely than are female to be inept at labelling their emotions…. the real conclusion to be drawn is that such men really do not have exactly the same "inner" life, or experience exactly the same emotions' as women (Nussbaum 2001, 150).

Therefore, Nussbaum is not just saying that social norms shape emotional expression. Rather, she is making the more radical claim that they shape the way emotions are actually experienced across and between different groups. As she explains, 'A person who does not know the emotional "grammar" of his or her society cannot be assumed to have the same emotional life as one who does know this "grammar."' (Nussbaum 2001, 149). Thus, men not only express their emotions differently but *experience* different emotions from women due to divergent socialisation.

5.3.6. Nurturing the "Correct" Emotions

Now that Nussbaum has given the evidence for how emotions are shaped by social norms and child-rearing practices, it follows that if a society wants to improve the emotional intelligence of the public and nurture more positive emotions, these would be two avenues by which to go about it. This is important because 'If we think of emotions as essential elements of human intelligence, rather than just as supports or props for intelligence, this gives us especially strong reasons to promote the conditions of emotional well-being in political culture: for this view entails that without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity as political creatures will be missing' (Nussbaum 2001, 3). For Nussbaum, this means showing how 'a society of the type we are considering, a constitutional liberal democracy, might promote appropriate judgements, and thence, appropriate emotion' (2001, 415). As she puts it, 'Social

constrictions of emotion are transmitted through parental cues, actions, and instructions, long before the larger society shapes the child. We teach children what and whom to fear, what occasions for anger are reasonable, what behavior is shameful…' (Nussbaum 2001, 172-3)

Although, as was shown, Nussbaum battles the adversary who sees emotions as irrational impulses, she still believes that emotions can be irrational and that proper child-rearing thus becomes crucial, despite its difficulty. This explains why 'emotions, though in their origin and in many ongoing functions adaptively rational, may frequently also be irrational in the sense that they fail to match their present objects, as they project the images of the past upon them. This rigidity has consequences, as well, for any attempt to become ethical or to produce children who are ethical' (Nussbaum 2001, 179).

Trying to extirpate the emotions entirely is foolish, as was already explained, and cannot be considered as a potential tactic in child-rearing. Nussbaum is not sympathetic at all to what she thinks are harsh and unrealistic calls to master the emotions. As she puts it plainly,

> My view, then, urges us to reject as both simple and too cruel any picture of character that tells us to bring every emotion into line with reason's dictates, or the dictates of the person's ideal, whatever that is… If Aristotle's view entails that the good person can and should demand emotional perfection of herself, so that she always gets angry at the right person, in the right way, at the right time, and so forth, then Aristotle's view is tyrannical and exacts of us more than humanity can delivery. (Nussbaum 2001, 234)

It might have been fine 'for the people of the Golden Age to be emotionless, since that condition was suited to the world in which they lived. But in our world emotions are needed to provide the developing child with a map of the world. The child's emotions are recognitions of where important good and bad things are to be found' (Nussbaum 2001, 206). There is hope, however, in the fact that 'Disgust appears not to be present in infants during the first three years of life. It is taught by parents and society' (Nussbaum 2001, 204).

Nussbaum asks what kind of environment will be most conducive to nurturing positive emotions, positive emotional development in general, and positive attitudes. It should not be a mollycoddling environment, however (Nussbaum 2001, 209). Neither should we make the mistake of looking at the 'family circle' as the only source of a positive facilitating environment because this would ignore the fact that 'People cultivate emotions in larger social and political groupings' (Nussbaum 2001, 225-6). Instead, 'we should acknowledge that political

institutions and systems of law are also part of the facilitating environment for the development of all the emotions of a citizen (Nussbaum 2001, 225-6).

If emotions can be nurtured and altered, then this also has 'important implications for moral education, in the area, for example, of emotions toward members of other races and religions: we can hope to foster good ways of seeing what will simply prevent hatred from arising, and we don't have to rely on the idea that we must at all times suppress an innate aggressive tendency' (Nussbaum 2001, 233). As Nussbaum is keen to remind the reader, the 'social constructionist view tells us that, as 'intelligent pieces of human normative activity', emotions can 'in principle, within certain limits, by changed by more intelligent human activity' (Nussbaum 2001, 173). Although it may appear relatively straightforward, the reality is more complicated because although

> Some angers may indeed shift directly with a new account of the facts; many do not. Again, some hatred and disgust toward groups can be prevented from arising by a good moral education; and yet, hatred seems to arise again and again, despite our best efforts, as if it had some deeper root in the personality. (Nussbaum 2001, 233).

As was already shown, emotions can be hard to shift, but she reiterates that this is because 'Emotion-thoughts involve… a stronger kind of investment, for they concern elements of our conception of well-being' (Nussbaum 2001, 233). This should not cast doubt on the cognitive account in general, however. Note her transition to the use of the language of emotional and non-emotional thoughts. Still, Nussbaum reminds the reader that this will require, following Iris Murdoch, 'long and patient effort of vision' and 'painstaking inner moral work' (Nussbaum 2001, 233). This is what is 'required if we are to change our ways of seeing people we fear, or hate, or resent. Precisely because such matters are both habitual and important to us, change will not be easy' (Nussbaum 2001, 233). Although, 'Emotions… do go away when the relevant beliefs about the object and value alter' (2001, 131).

Disgust is an emotion which Nussbaum wants to discourage or prevent from arising, and compassion is an emotion she most wants to engender. Even though compassion is 'far from being the entirety of public rationality…. Disgust and primitive shame, by contrast, while probably ineliminable from society and functional in some ways, offer nothing valuable to public deliberation, and even undermine it by setting up two classes of human beings, the high and the low. All emotions are not equal' (Nussbaum 2001, 453). As she argues,

> If we are persuaded that appropriate compassion is an important ingredient of good citizenship, then we will want to give public support to procedures by which this ability is taught…. Much of this will and should be done privately, within families. But every society employs and teaches ideals of citizenship, and of good civic judgment, in many ways. (Nussbaum 2001, 426).

Some ways in which this education could proceed is through school. As Nussbaum elaborates,

> ‘public education at every level should cultivate the ability to imagine the experiences of others and to participate in their sufferings…. This means giving the humanities and the arts a large place in education, from elementary school on up, as children gradually master more and more of the appropriate judgments and become able to extend their empathy to more people and types of people’ (2001, 426).

As for the role of the humanities and art, which Nussbaum sees as increasingly sidelined, they do not

> contribute only to the formation of citizens: for there are many other ways in which they enrich human life and understanding. We should, however, insist that they do make a vital and irreplaceable contribution to citizenship, without which we will very likely have an obtuse and emotionally dead citizenry, prey to the aggressive wishes that so often accompany an inner world dead to the images of others. Cutting the arts is a recipe for the production of pathological narcissism, of citizens who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of the issues at stake. (Nussbaum 2001, 426)

Here, Nussbaum is warning that people not engaged in humanities and arts education may be ripe for the development of dangerous, negative emotions. She stresses, though, that her aim is not ‘erudition’ for its own sake, but rather ‘empathy and the extension of concern’ (Nussbaum 2001, 432). Crucially, Nussbaum says, such works of art and literature, especially classics, ‘still play an important part in my imaginary curriculum, because they help us to overcome mental obstacles to full political rationality (within which I include rationality in emotion)’ (2001, 433). In this sense, they also strengthen the development of proper rationality.

Nussbaum also recognises that 'television and the other mass media are also potent educators of citizens and can nourish empathy or obtuseness, appropriate or inappropriate compassion' despite difficulties like the market pressures under which the media operates, and new financial imperatives in universities (2001, 433-4). Lastly, in a discussion about law and order, Nussbaum writes how 'From both judges and jurors, then, we should demand both empathy and an appropriate compassion as ingredients in the mastery of the human facts before them' and that 'we need judges who exemplify rationality; if my argument is correct, this means that we need judges who are properly emotional' (2001, 445; 446).

5.3.7. Summary

Nussbaum defines her view of emotions as 'neo-Stoic', and 'cognitive/evaluative', and argues that emotions are a form of judgment, a cognitive act involving assent, as the Stoics discussed. Nussbaum argues that emotion does not proceed from assent but because they appear to happen at the same time, they cannot be separated. As she says, judgements 'are not external causes, but constituent parts of what the emotion is.' Therefore, the recognition of her mother's death, a cognitive act and judgement, is inevitably the same phenomena as the emotional suffering she feels when the realisation is made. Also, when a new, more accurate evaluation of a situation is made, the underlying emotion can change. That is not to say, however, that emotions are easy to shift, especially due to the role habit plays. Nussbaum introduces the construct of the 'adversary' with which she contends throughout the text. She wishes to dispel the image of the emotions as 'blind forces that have no selectivity or intelligence about them' and argues against the concept that reason and emotion carry out a struggle in the mind. Instead, she argues, reason struggles with itself, not against another separate thing called emotion. Thus, for Nussbaum, emotions start to look 'very much like thoughts'. Nussbaum believes it is foolish to try to extirpate the emotions and is critical of harsh and unrealistic calls to master the emotions. Indeed, because emotions are indispensable parts of the human cognitive apparatus, an unemotional person would not be able to reason about what is essential to their flourishing. Nussbaum refers to some notable psychological and neuroscientific literature to support her thesis. She favourably quotes psychologists and neuroscientists like Lazarus and Damasio who show that reason and emotion are psychologically and neurally linked, and that emotions are forms of intelligent awareness. Nussbaum finally explains how emotions are shaped by social norms, upbringing, and education. After arguing that emotions are socially constructed, she

recommends ways that the emotional intelligence of the public can be improved and nurtured, promoting empathy and discouraging disgust to help to bring about a more just world.

Chapter 5 Discussion

Now that the final three thinkers, all from the modern period, have been examined, it is possible to discuss some of their commonalities and divergences. These thinkers have been grouped together on the basis that they all discuss reason and emotion within the context of mental health. Freud develops his famous theories on the basis of a dualistic view, Foucault tells a history of madness which saw the management of passion at its core, and Nussbaum consults neuropsychological research.

Freud believes that in human nature primitive and "transformed" elements coexist, and civilisation exists to constrain the former. For Freud, all people seek to master their primitive and desirous side and invent many ways to accomplish this. The most crucial method in taming people's negative instincts is the creation of conscience, guilt, or the super-ego, but this leads to neurosis which might bring the individual to the psychoanalyst. Lastly, in a group, an individual's emotions become extremely intensified, while their intellectual ability is severely reduced. This is what renders crowds passionate, irrational, and potentially dangerous. Moving on, Foucault shows how one of the unique things about Western thought is that it posits madness as the counter to reason. Not only this, but madness and passion have a long history of close association. Indeed, passion was seen as the very condition for madness, with madness 'implicit' in the passions themselves. Passion, Foucault showed, was implicated in mental illness in a great variety of medical theories. The therapeutic innovations of Tuke and Pinel aimed to bring the mad back to sanity by subduing passion and instinct through the institution of self-control. Lastly, Nussbaum argues that emotion does not proceed from assent to an appearance, but instead they appear to happen at the same time, and in that sense cannot be separated. Thus, emotions start to look like thoughts. She criticises the notion that reason and emotion carry out a struggle in the mind, instead, reason struggles against itself. Nussbaum believes it is foolish to try to extirpate the emotions and is critical of calls to master the emotions. She refers to the neuropsychological literature, discusses the largely socially constructed nature of the emotions, and proposes various ways to nurture empathy while discouraging disgust in society.

What occurs during this period is that there is a recapitulation of some classical conceptions of the relationship between reason and emotion. Freud speaks in very dualistic and dichotomous terms about emotion. What this demonstrates is that a mainstream thinker in psychotherapy conceptualises the relationship between reason and emotion as conflicted and

in need of active management and constraint. The influence of Freud on psychology and psychotherapy is sizeable, so this may indicate why such conceptualisations still remain influential in these fields. This hypothesis cannot be investigated further here, but it is worth noting that Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis both began their careers as Freudian psychoanalysts. Foucault is a fitting next step, as he shows how this kind of thinking about reason and emotion has been a constant and founding element of both Western thought in general, and the management of madness in particular. Nussbaum, meanwhile, draws upon neuropsychological research to buttress her philosophical claims which make a final break with the reason/emotion dualism and synthesise thinking and feeling under the heading of “emotion-thoughts”.

Now, moving on to the Conclusion, this thesis ends with a short epilogue, then a summary and discussion of its findings, before a brief final section which outlines promising avenues for further study.

Conclusion

Epilogue

Over 60 years after *Reason and Emotion* was released, Disney returned to the same topic in the acclaimed feature-length film *Inside Out* (Docter 2015). A comparison is particularly welcome because *Inside Out*'s director, Pete Docter, has said he took inspiration from *Reason and Emotion* (Go Inside Pete Docter's Mind: 5 Disney Classics that Inspired Inside Out 2015). *Inside Out* is set primarily within the cranium of Riley, an eleven-year-old avid ice hockey player, who makes the emotionally fraught move to a new city with her parents. Instead of two, there are now five anthropomorphised constituents at a control panel in her mind.

However, Reason is nowhere to be seen. All five residents in her "Headquarters" are emotions. They are the yellow, chipper Joy; dour "blue" Sadness in a turtleneck and glasses; purple, strait-laced Fear; green and perpetually unimpressed Disgust; and red and stocky Anger, whose head is prone to catching fire. Although the film portrays thinking as the Train of Thought, an actual train which carries a cargo of Thoughts and Opinions, and discusses faculties such as Inductive Reasoning and Critical Thinking, these cognitive elements are not anthropomorphised, and they are not agents.

"Ideas" are strewn about Headquarters; they are lightbulbs that can be screwed into the control panel and activated by one of the emotions. They are inert until marshalled by the emotions, and although Riley needs to accept them, they are not willed by her, and only emotions can insert or remove them. In the final instance, although the five emotions may tussle for dominance of the control panel, it is they who are firmly in the driver's seat in Riley's mind. Moreover, as the derailing of the Train of Thought is a plot point, one writer summarises how this means that 'Anyone who thinks that thinking alone will save us is in for a rude awakening' when watching this film (Dimock 2015).

The film also has much to say about the usefulness of the emotions, even those generally seen as unpleasant and undesirable. It shows that it is not only all right to feel sad, but necessary. This is demonstrated when Sadness empathises with Riley's imaginary friend, and he begins to feel better. Without the ability to feel sad, it is shown, empathy such as this is impossible. Although the film shows what can happen when Anger takes charge, it still highlights the importance of anger. As Joy explains when introducing Anger, 'He cares very deeply about things being fair' (Docter 2015). In the final scene of the movie, when Riley is

playing ice hockey, the film shows how all the emotions, working together, have essential functions in allowing her to succeed in the game. Anger motivates her to try harder and keep fighting, Fear helps her to avoid dangers and obstacles on the rink, and Joy allows her to thoroughly enjoy what she does for the sake of it.

Still, why is Reason absent? What has changed between the release of *Inside Out* and when *Reason and Emotion*? Unlike *Reason and Emotion,* which was seemingly based on common sense prejudices about the emotions, *Inside Out* was based on lengthy discussions between the filmmakers and leading psychologists Paul Ekman and Dacher Keltner (Judd 2015). Indeed, special thanks are given to Ekman and Keltner in the credits for guiding the filmmakers 'through this emotional journey', as well as to the Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute at Columbia University (Docter 2015). Furthermore, it has been noted that the movie reflects Damasio's anti-dualistic arguments (Dimock 2015). Keltner and Ekman themselves wrote an article shortly after the film was released discussing the science that went into it. As they say,

> Our conversations with Mr. Docter and his team were generally about the science related to questions at the heart of the film: How do emotions govern the stream of consciousness? How do emotions color our memories of the past? What is the emotional life of an 11-year-old girl like? (Keltner and Ekman 2015)

In this way, the film contains insights from over sixty years of neuropsychological research and innovation between the 1940s and the present day. Therefore, the movie handily reflects how perceptions towards the emotions have changed over time. As Keltner and Ekman continue,

> the movie's portrayal of sadness successfully dramatizes two central insights from the science of emotion. / First, emotions organize — rather than disrupt — rational thinking. Traditionally, in the history of Western thought, the prevailing view has been that emotions are enemies of rationality and disruptive of cooperative social relations. / But the truth is that emotions guide our perceptions of the world, our memories of the past and even our moral judgments of right and wrong, most typically in ways that enable effective responses to the current situation. For example, studies find that when we are angry we are acutely attuned to what is unfair, which helps animate actions that remedy injustice…. Other studies find that it is anger (more so than a sense of political

identity) that moves social collectives to protest and remedy injustice. (Keltner and Ekman 2015)

This film shows how thinking about emotions has changed, and how a new consensus has formed in, at least, the field of psychology. It is a consensus closest to what Hume, Rousseau, and Nussbaum envisaged in their texts. Indeed, it was already shown how Nussbaum draws on such modern neuropsychological insights to inform and support her theory of the emotions. What this demonstrates is that dualistic thinking about reason and emotion may not only be philosophically problematic but also under threat from psychology and neuroscience. The implication that Hume, Rousseau, and Nussbaum may be closer to neuropsychological reality than Plato and the Stoics, for instance, is an exciting one.

Discussion

Now that both psychiatric case studies have been examined and a selection of Western political thinkers have been surveyed, some conclusions can be drawn and the research questions can be answered. What appears clear is that Western political thought contains an abundance of arguments that take a more positive view towards the emotions than often thought. Although sometimes starkly dualistic when conceptualising the relationship between reason and emotion, and often arguing that emotion should be constrained by reason, a view seen most clearly in the Stoics, Western political thinkers also sometimes argue that emotions can play positive roles. Some attempt to rehabilitate the emotions, criticise human pretensions of being rational, give primacy to the emotions in human nature, or even completely break down the dualism between reason and emotion itself.

Furthermore, even those thinkers often thought of as “anti-emotion” such as Augustine and Hobbes have a more subtle view. Even the Stoics allow some demonstrations of sympathy, a little familial feeling, and the occasional tear. For example, Augustine does not treat the affections, a type of emotion, as contrary to reason and criticises Stoic *apatheia*, while Hobbes believes that the desire of ease, fear of death and injury, and the desire for knowledge, which are all passions, motivate people to bring an end to the dreaded state of nature. Hobbes even thought that one’s desires marshal the thoughts as ‘scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired’ (Hobbes 1996, 8, 48). This is surprisingly similar to what Hume

and Rousseau say about emotions motivating reasoning, even though Rousseau creates the impression of a wide gulf between Hobbes' thinking and his own.

Even more striking than this, however, beginning with Hume in the 1700s, is the shift that occurs from the denigration of the emotions to their veneration as the driving force in human nature and the very basis of morality. Hume reframes human nature around the passions, with reason relegated to an inert instrument wielded for their ends. Rousseau celebrates the original passion of pity which inclines people towards good and mounts an attack on those who foolishly wish to extirpate the passions. Nietzsche goes even further, arguing that attempts to extirpate the passions only serve to mutilate humankind, and that the passions should at times be left to grow wild and be marshalled for the dominating ends of the Superman. Moving to the present day, Nussbaum begins a radical project of subsuming the emotions into reason by reimagining them as just another type of cognition, albeit a "hot" one that can come with perceptible bodily changes. Although she calls her approach neo-Stoic, she makes a significant divergence from Stoicism by seeing emotions not as the outcome of mental assessments, as the Stoics did, but as part and parcel of mental assessments themselves.

It appears, then, that lobotomy and CBT reflect some of the less subtle and more dualistic trends in Western political thought. Although neither therapy wants to extirpate emotions altogether, their practitioners still envisage a significant reduction in the patient's ability to feel or experience emotion. Both also conceptualise reason in "classical", crudely dualistic terms. Reason, for them, is a mental faculty completely and physically removed from emotion. Thus, they envisage that this separate faculty of reason can be "liberated" from emotional contagion by the slice of a knife or a thrust of an ice-pick in a lobotomy, or turned against a patient's own emotions in CBT like a mental cudgel.

In this way, both therapies reflect Stoicism. Lobotomy comes closest to enforcing Stoic ideals with patient's rendered unable to feel as strongly as they once could and being described as "stoical" by their doctors and family members for their ability to tolerate setbacks and remain unperturbed in the face of grave personal disasters, like the sudden loss of a loved one. CBT, whose theorists are openly indebted to Stoicism, also reflects some of Stoicism's fundamental tenets. For example, it is a doctrine of fatalism and non-intervention, and contains a belief that emotions are the inevitable outcomes of irrational and inaccurate appraisals of reality.

Furthermore, because both therapies are bound, both in theory and practice, to socially constructed ideas about what is "excessive" and "appropriate" in emotional expression, they closely mirror Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Even Freeman and Watts, suspicious of the emotions as they are, argue that a certain, low level of anxiety is normal, expected, and

acceptable, while CBT only aims to reduce emotions that the patient has identified as excessive and unpleasant.

Therefore, to answer the main research question posed by this thesis, these therapies are representative of some early, dualistic conceptualisations of the relationship between reason and emotion, but do not take heed of the important exceptions which thinkers from Plato to Hobbes, and even the Stoics, make in their thinking. Not only this, but lobotomists and CBT therapists are not at all informed by the radical shifts occurring in Western political thinking about the emotions beginning in the 1700s.

It is worth noting, however, that one notion from Western political thought which is reflected well in these psychiatric practices is their gendering of emotion. For example, notions about women being more emotional than men are widespread, even in those who rehabilitate and re-centre emotions such as Hume and Rousseau, and are visible in both the lobotomy and CBT literature, in how they discuss the "excessive" emotions of female patients. Hume says that women and children feel more deeply, especially the passion of pity. Meanwhile, Rousseau puts his sexism on display when he argues that women have unlimited desires and control men through appeal to their passions.

Further, to answer the first sub-question, what has become apparent is that some arguments regarding the relationship between reason and emotion developed in Western political thought can actually be used as criticisms and correctives of lobotomy and CBT. In a word, psychiatry and psychotherapy could benefit from a serious examination of the surprising subtlety with which the relationship between reason and emotion has been treated in Western political thought. The rehabilitation of the emotions and arguments about the intelligence of the emotions developed in Western political thought could serve as stark warnings against trying to treat reason and emotion as separate and conflicting mental faculties. This dualistic conceptualisation seems to have strongly informed attempts to reduce the ability of individuals to experience emotion, with disastrous results.

However, vindicating Hume, Rousseau, and Nussbaum, this loss of emotion has proven fatal to patients' reasoning. Rather than serving to "liberate" their reason from emotional contagion, as lobotomists envisaged, it instead permanently impairs the ability to reason by removing the emotional motivation which underpins it. Going even further than this claim that emotions serve as a motivation for reasoning, emotions, for Nussbaum, signal what the individual finds indispensable for their flourishing. Nussbaum is convincing when she says that 'Emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning

creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature's reasoning itself' (2001, 3).

Writing a PhD thesis is an excellent example of the notion that emotions motivate reasoning, as Hume and Rousseau say. Writing a thesis is associated with many emotions and, above all, emotions seem to motivate the undertaking itself. As Rousseau says, people would not go to the trouble of reasoning without emotional motivation and, indeed, it seems unlikely that someone would have the motivation to carry out such an extended exercise in reasoning without emotional pushes or pulls. It seems impossible that a completely dispassionate search for answers could motivate an individual for several years at a time. A researcher is drawn to a topic because of curiosity, a fascination, frustration with current thinking, a desire to argue for or against something. A researcher is sustained by pride, satisfaction, and happiness at having written a particularly pleasing sentence, having crafted a convincing argument, contributing to the field, or receiving positive feedback. Conversely, they are driven by the fear of failure or by envisaging the relief they will feel when they finally submit. Emotions, therefore, seem implicated from start to finish, and, it can be added, it is not only positive emotions that motivate or sustain reasoning.

Nonetheless, Hume and Rousseau's arguments seem convincing. As Rousseau argues, reason cannot be a motivator of action because 'cold arguments can determine our opinions, but not our actions. They make us believe and not act. They demonstrate what must be thought, not what must be done' (1979, 323). Therefore, what gets a researcher out of bed in the morning is an emotional attachment to their project and the feelings, whether positive or negative, that are inevitably linked to the endeavour. Therefore, the idea of a PhD thesis as a purely intellectual pursuit appears unconvincing. It is more compelling to see doing a PhD as emotionally motivated and sustained reasoning.

Going beyond the notion that emotions motivate reasoning and are instead a form of reasoning themselves, as Nussbaum claims, it seems impossible to imagine an emotion which has no object or a thought that is unrelated to emotion, even if only faintly. A mood, a general or diffuse feeling, may appear to be an objectless emotion. However, this may simply be because one has not yet discovered what caused the mood. That is not to say that this is an easy process or that people always correctly identify what, and why, they are feeling. Nonetheless, it is in thinking about what one feels that one can even begin to discriminate between different emotions and investigate what may have caused them.

As for the emotional content of thoughts, they are emotional or unemotional to the extent that they pertain to what one considers essential for their flourishing, as Nussbaum puts

it. For example, people are struck harder by the news of a loved one being hurt than a stranger. This is not because they are uncaring about strangers, but because they consider that loved one a more indispensable part of their life and ability to be happy and fulfilled than a person they have never met.

As Nussbaum shows, the cognitive realisation that a loved one has been hurt is the same phenomena as the negative feelings that one experiences. One did not proceed from the other; they are concurrent. Of course, there is often a period when a person hears or sees something upsetting and has little to no emotional reaction. Here, they have not yet come to terms with what has occurred, perhaps due to shock, or are not ready to accept the full gravity of what has happened. Once they do, if their flourishing or something related to it is at stake, an emotion will inevitably accompany the realisation, and accompany it so closely that the realisation and the emotion appear to be the same phenomena. Furthermore, the *intensity* of the emotion they feel will correlate precisely to *how much* the individual considers their flourishing to be under threat. So, if a person hears that a loved one has been hurt, feelings of panic, sadness and dismay are likely to instantly spike to intense levels. However, on hearing that the news was wrong and their loved one is perfectly safe, these feelings are likely to just as quickly vanish, to be replaced by others such as relief and joy.

Therefore, if doctors and psychotherapists were more receptive to the arguments that emotions motivate reasoning, are intimately bound to reasoning, or are even a form of reasoning themselves, it is unlikely that they would have envisaged trying to literally chop and change the emotions of patients to fit a particular, socially constructed ideal of a rational individual in line with the prevailing emotion regime.

It is worth mentioning, however, that even Rousseau and Nussbaum, who rehabilitate the emotions and challenge the reason/emotion dualism, still want to see the emotions nurtured and shaped through novel child-rearing techniques, education, the media, and various other means. None of the thinkers examined here, not even Nietzsche, want to see the completely untrammelled development of human emotions without a guiding hand. Of course, it is not controversial to wish to encourage empathy and discourage disgust and hatred, but this intervention into the development of the emotions raises important questions about the ethics of nurturing and shaping the emotions. It must be asked to what extent this nurturing is necessary, who or what sets the goals, and how it can be accomplished and overseen to avoid abuses. Indeed, Nussbaum herself is convincing in showing how emotions are socially constructed, so there is no universal or knowable set of emotional ideals which could be nurtured, in a completely value-free way.

Not only this, but Rousseau may be more authoritarian than he admits in his schemes to nurture the "natural" development of the passions. While, for Nussbaum, nurturing is partly necessitated by the fact that she envisages something "dark" and potentially immutable in human nature. This is because, for her, hatred keeps arising among humans 'as if it had some deeper root in the personality' (Nussbaum 2001, 233). This, too, is up for debate. Whether one thinks nurturing the development of the emotions is necessary, and to what extent, depends on one's view of human nature and whether one believes that it tends towards malevolence or not.

Relatedly, to answer the second sub-question, it was shown how both lobotomy and CBT harm the ability or willingness of the patient to partake in political action. Lobotomy, by reducing the patient's ability to feel strongly about any particular thing, neuters their ability to be an effective political actor. Without an attachment to, and emotional motivation towards, a cause or belief, from religion to pacifism to communism, patients drop off entirely from political participation. Not only this, but having been rendered less emotional, lobotomy patients struggle to reason and make decisions because they lack an emotional "pull" to this or that idea or action and instead become inert. This is clearly visible in many lobotomy patients, and as was also shown by Damasio in his own subjects. Modern neuroscientific analysis of the lobotomy procedure, like Damasio's, adds credence to the idea that an emotionally impaired person also has impaired reasoning, thinking, and agency.

CBT can also render people less willing to participate in political action, albeit in a different way to a lobotomy. CBT, influenced by Stoic fatalism, discourages patients from treating their uncomfortable emotional experiences as normal reactions to unfair or unpleasant circumstances. Instead, it instructs them to treat their emotions as evidence of a failure to reason "realistically" or "correctly" about the world. In CBT, therefore, patients are expressly told to look within themselves for solutions to emotional difficulty and thus turn away from the potential injustices occurring around, and to, them. In this way, patients are discouraged from ameliorating their immediate circumstances, let alone envisaging more widescale social change or transformation.

Furthermore, Foucault is highly instructive in helping to unpack what is at play in both lobotomy and CBT. Not only does he convincingly show how mental health treatment has long associated madness with the loss of reason and the excess of passion, but he shines a light on how irrationality is brought face to face with the medical personage, representing reason, in both treatments. As he explains, in modern mental health treatment, patients are confronted by the medical personage which represents 'the rigor of the reason that judges' and deems them to be irrational (Foucault 1988, 251-2). The medical personage thus faces them 'not as a

concrete person… but as a reasonable being, invested by that very fact… with the authority that is his for not being mad' (Foucault 1988, 251-2).

So, as was shown, lobotomists confidently labelled patients' thoughts as irrational and their emotions as excessive, employing surgical means in an attempt to decouple thinking from feeling. Meanwhile, CBT therapists act as a role model of a prototypical "rational individual" and, just like lobotomists, believe they have access knowledge about what is and is not rational. Although not using surgical means, CBT therapists guide the patient to uncover, label, and scrutinise their irrational thoughts and emotions. In this way, both lobotomy and CBT patients are judged by a person who is the arbiter of rationality by the very dint of their position as a medical or psychotherapeutic "knower".

From Foucault's perspective, CBT might even be more insidious than lobotomy because it is entirely free of compulsion and threat, let alone an attack on the body. Yet, it still confronts the patient with the mental shackles of moral judgement. What, then, drives these therapies? As Foucault also deftly demonstrates, modern mental health treatment has at its core a preoccupation with the avoidance of scandal and with dealing with 'poverty, of incapacity for work, of inability to integrate with the group' (1988, 64). As was shown, both lobotomy and CBT clearly and openly demonstrate these preoccupations.

To reiterate, then, psychiatrists and psychotherapists would benefit from an examination of the surprising subtlety with which reason and emotion are treated in Western political thought. They would relearn the lesson expressed therein that an unemotional person would make a bad citizen, incapable of reasoning about what is most important for their flourishing, and unable and unwilling to fight against injustice.

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