Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

Yu, Zhixian (2020) Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment. Economics Letters, 192 . p. 109247. ISSN 01651765

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We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Bargaining, Endogenous commitment, alternating-offer bargaining game, History-dependence
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham Ningbo China > Faculty of Business > Nottingham University Business School China
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Depositing User: Zhou, Elsie
Date Deposited: 10 Jun 2020 01:02
Last Modified: 10 Jun 2020 01:02

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