Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

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Yu, Zhixian (2020) Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment. Economics Letters, 192 . p. 109247. ISSN 01651765

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247

Abstract

We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Bargaining, Endogenous commitment, alternating-offer bargaining game, History-dependence
Schools/Departments:	University of Nottingham Ningbo China > Faculty of Business > Nottingham University Business School China
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247
Depositing User:	Zhou, Elsie
Date Deposited:	10 Jun 2020 01:02
Last Modified:	10 Jun 2020 01:02
URI:	https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/60821

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