Assessing the Impact of Peacebuilding on Human Security in Conflict-Affected States: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2015)

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In memory of my father, Wuro Issaka Ateku Afora who passed on to eternity a year before the completion of this research

and

All those who lost their lives and others who are struggling to cope with the effects of the Ivorian Civil War

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Alitte Toyo is endless! Koffi and Scandia I will forever be grateful to you for the long hours you spent with me in the field – our usual *futu* (Ivorian) *fufu* (Ghanaian)!

Synopsis

This thesis examines the impact of peacebuilding on human security in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2015). It makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature on peacebuilding and human security.

Theoretically, the study offers a framework to assess the impact of peacebuilding initiatives. It is based on literature on human security and peace and the interviews I conducted with 62 research participants. They were officials of international governmental and international non-governmental organisations, Ivorian national security institutions, peace and security experts, officials of local NGOs, citizens, and community leaders. I identify four areas of assessment for the impact on human security: personal safety of people, human rights, health and education. All the four areas are hinged on the three key elements of human security - "freedom from fear", "freedom from want" and "freedom from indignity." The four main variables used in assessing the impact of peacebuilding addressed issues relating to all the seven except one of the human security indicators espoused in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme Human Security report. The only exception is the environmental indicator which has been partly discussed in the health area. Environment could not be fully analysed for security reasons at the time of data collection in the most environmentally affected areas in the West of Côte d'Ivoire.

Empirically, the study uses this framework to analyse the impact of peacebuilding on human security in Côte d'Ivoire. International peacebuilding by the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and France prioritised issues of elections, re-establishing of democracy, and disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, and the development of state security over health and education. The study argues that: 1) the latter are more important than the former for durable peace in conflict-affected states; and 2) peacebuilders have an overall limited positive impact –and in some cases made no impact on human security.

Peacebuilders' interventions failed to protect people's personal safety. They could not retrieve most of the arms, and only reintegrated a few former fighters into their economically impoverished communities. The limited number of peacekeepers, and their geographically-limited areas of deployment affected their protection responsibility of citizens' personal safety. About 6200 peacekeepers were deployed in 2004 which was increased to 8000 in 2008. The peacekeepers' peak strength of 9700 in 2012 was reduced to 4000 by December, 2015. Their geographically-limited areas of deployment exposed citizens to various forms of abuses and killings. By the end of 2015, citizens continue to experience violent crime resulting from the war, but on a reduced scale.

Peacebuilders' policies to address gross violations of human rights made only a minimal impact. Only President Laurent Gbagbo, his wife, Simone Gbagbo, and the youth leader from pro-Gbagbo camp, Charles Blé Goudé have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, with President Gbagbo and Blé Goudé alone currently standing trial at the ICC. Individuals and groups from the pro-Ouattara camp who perpetrated sexual abuses, torture and extra-judicial killings have not been held liable for the egregious violations of human rights by either a domestic court or the ICC. Sexual abuse remains an issue to be comprehensively addressed by local and international institutions.

United Nations agencies, notably United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, World Health Organisation and others such as the French government's Agence Française de Développement have been the main actors in the implementation of education and health policies in war-affected communities. They built schools, provided teaching and learning materials, recruited teachers and implemented policies intended to address problems that affected children's enrolment, drop-out rates, female children's retention in school, completion rates and pupil-teacher ratio. Nonetheless, their policies have had extremely limited impact on gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination perpetrated against girls in school. Others included lack of classrooms and facilities such as toilets, lack of teachers, no or poor counselling services, high poverty and inequality.

Peacebuilding interventions have also not obliterated war-related health effects. Access to preventive and treatable healthcare services to address infant and maternal health problems remains extremely low among war affected populations in Côte d'Ivoire. Children face a high risk of dying due to low access to paediatric services such as immunisations, extremely low access to antenatal and postnatal services by women owing to poorly equipped medical facilities and inadequacy of professional birth attendants is a debilitating factor to the health of pregnant women. This has resulted in poor maternal health outcomes. The war-affected populations are still exposed to other health-risks. They lack safe water and face food shortage. They are exposed to poor hygienic practices. They still have to deal with poor sanitation, and poor shelter. The thesis concludes with recommendations to mainstream critical health and education issues which are essential in human security in peacebuilding in order to make peacebuilding more successful in the long term in war-affected states.

List of Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
AI	Amnesty International
ANC	Ante Natal Care
AU	African Union
APSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCG	Bacillus Calmette–Guérin
CDVR	Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation)
CHS	Commission on Human Security
COJEP	Congrès des Jeunes Patriotes
ComNat-ALPC	Commission Nationale de lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation illicite des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre
CONARIV	Commission Nationale pour la Réconciliation et l'Indemnisation des Victimes des Crises en Côte d'Ivoire
COSOPSCI	Societé Civile Pour la Paix et le Développement Démocratique en Côte d'Ivoire
CNN	Cable News Network
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPT	Diphtheria, Tuberculosis, Pertussis
ECOMICI	Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEPTC	Education in Emergency and Post-Conflict Transition Countries
EU	European Union
FANCI	Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire
FESCI	Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire

FENOSCI	Fédération Nationale des Organisations de Santé
FN	Forces Nouvelles
FPI	Front populaire ivoirien
FRCI	Forces Républicaines de Cote d'Ivoire
GNR	Government of National Reconciliation
GPP	Groupement des Patriotes pour la Paix
HDR	Human Development Report
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IAC	Immunisation Action Coalition
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LMA	Linas-Marcoussis Agreement
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NITAG	National Immunisation Technical Advisory Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPA	Ouagadougou Political Agreement
PDCI	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
PBEA	Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
PNC	Post Natal Care
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RDR	Rassemblement des Republicains
RHDP	Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix
RFI	Radio France Internationale

RASALAO-CI	Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest Section Côte d'Ivoire
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RWSSI	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative
SODECI	Société de Distribution d'Eau de Côte d'Ivoire
TBAs	Traditional Birth Attendants
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
US	United States
UDAID	United States Agency for International Development
WANEP-CI	West Africa Network for peacebuilding – Côte d'Ivoire
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Table of Contents

Chapter One

Peacebuilding and Human Security in War-Affected States

The core question underlying this research is: To what extent have interventions by international peacebuilders addressed human security concerns in Côte d'Ivoire? Until the early 1990s, peacebuilding was not a term used in international security literature as it is now. Rather, "peace operations" was a generic term used to describe the variety of missions that were conducted by the United Nations (UN) in war-affected states. Today, peacebuilding has become a widely used concept in the literature of peace and security in the post-Cold War era, particularly in the attempts to create stable societies after years of violent conflict. The international security interventions have been the main instruments for building peace in the war-shattered states, and have since the post-Cold War period, been implemented in states including Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

However, over the last two decades, international peacebuilding interventions have come under attack from scholars, analysts and practitioners including Roland Paris (1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2004), Mary Anderson (1999) and Séverine Autessere (2010) due largely to their destabilising side effects. Seven out of the eight states that have experienced peacebuilding programmes by international partners by 1995 - Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia had destabilising side effects hindering the consolidation of peace in these states. In some cases, these states relapsed subsequently into violent conflict (Paris, 1997a:55; Cousens and Kumar, 2001; Collier, et al, 2003). In the case of Congo, Séverine Autesserre (2010:5) notes that "70% of peace processes benefiting from significant international mediation still fail to build a durable peace." Despite the relapses and failures in peacebuilding, research suggests that significant third-party interventions are critical for peace implementation to be

successful (Cousens and Kumar, 2001; Autesserre, 2010; 2014). However, it is established that although the internationally-supported peacebuilding interventions have been critical in post-conflict states, and have become increasingly prominent in the last two decades, there is limited knowledge of their impact on the ground (Scherrer, 2012).

Previous research adopted a top-down approach to assess the contributions of international peacebuilding interventions, particularly the successes and failures of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in war-affected states (Diehl, 1993; Doyle et al., 1997; Downs and Stedman, 2002; Pickering, 2007; Bellamy et al., 2010; Druckman and Diehl, 2012). However, conflict-affected states require international efforts beyond peacekeeping for sustainable and resilient communities to be built (see Pickering, 2007:165). The UN remains the important actor in peacebuilding, but works with its agencies and other international actors whose contributions are key to addressing the root causes of conflict. Assessing peacebuilding interventions in conflict affected states requires a comprehensive micro-foundation peace framework. A micro-foundation peace framework addresses itself to solving the basic needs of war-affected people. These needs include protection of personal safety and dignity of individuals, access to good drinking water, sanitation and hygiene practices, quality healthcare, medical facilities and health staff, food, shelter and quality education. These needs are the human security concerns prevalent in war-affected communities. When these needs are addressed, human security levels of war-affected people are likely to increase. On the other hand, when they are not addressed the human security levels either remain the same or decrease.

This thesis investigates the extent to which international peacebuilding impacts on human security in war-affected states. Using Côte d'Ivoire as the case study, our assessment of the impact of peacebuilding in conflict-affected states is carried out within a human security

framework that is developed in chapter three. Côte d'Ivoire is a recent post-conflict state located in one of the troubled regions of the world - West Africa.

Côte d'Ivoire descended into political turmoil after the death of the country's first President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993. This was the consequence of a power struggle between Henri Konan Bédié who eventually became President after Houphouët-Boigny and Houphouët-Boigny's Prime Minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, now the substantive President. The Ivorian constitution stipulated that in the event of the death of the President of Côte d'Ivoire, the president of the National Assembly which happens to be Henri Konan Bédié, should assume the duties of the president until a new election was conducted. Alassane Ouattara opposed this arrangement after the death of the country's president, and argued for an interim president who should be appointed before elections. Hours after the death of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié declared himself president and his arch rival in the power struggle, Alassane Ouattara, left both the governing Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), and the country. In his quest to win the election, Bédié caused the promulgation of the "Ivoirité", an electoral law that required anyone interested in voting or contesting the national election for the position of a president should have both parents being Ivoirians by birth. This requirement disenfranchised most northerners including the country's former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara who became the candidate for the "Rassemblement des Republicains" *(RDR)* - Rally of the Republicans, and many who were descendants of people from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea who had been working on Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa and coffee farms for several years, and have been recognised as Ivoirian citizens (Ayangafac, 2009). Bédié won in the 1995 presidential election in which the Ouattara-led RDR and Laurent Gbagbo's Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) - the Ivorian Popular Front boycotted the result (Crook, 1997).

In 1999, however, Bédié was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état led by Robert Gueï who promised to clean up Ivorian politics and organise new elections. Robert Gueï's pledge was not

trustworthy as he himself harboured presidential aspirations. He did not only sustain the policy of *Ivoirité*, but practised it by stirring up ethnic tensions which gave him some political advantage. The policy of "Ivoirité" was put in the newly drafted constitution. Article 35 required that a presidential candidate must be Ivorian by birth; both parents must be Ivoirians by birth and such candidates must never have acquired another nationality. These rules affected Alassane Ouattara and many others from the north of the country who were perceived to be of Burkinabé descent (Daddieh, 2016). In the October 2000 elections, only two candidates; Robert Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo were cleared to contest after the ruling of the Ivorian Supreme Court presided over by Gueï's legal adviser on October 6, 2000. The other nineteen candidates including Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié were disqualified. While Ouattara was disqualified on citizenship ground, Bédié was disqualified because he could not present a proper medical certificate. The provisional results from the polling stations across the country put Gbagbo in the lead with 59.36% though the turn-out was very low at 35% (Théroux-Bénoni, 2012; Daddieh, 2016). Robert Gueï accused the National Electoral Commission of perpetrating fraud, he disbanded it and declared himself as the winner of the elections. This triggered protests and violence from pro-Gbagbo supporters with Ouattara's RDR calling for fresh elections which Gbagbo vehemently opposed. Subsequently, Gbagbo became the President.

In September, 2002, an insurrection from the north of Côte d'Ivoire led by Guillaume Soro, the current President of National Assembly led to the death of Robert Gueï under some mysterious circumstances which saw Alassane Ouattara taking refuge in the French Embassy. This second violent conflict effectively divided Côte d'Ivoire into the rebel-held north and the government controlled south. The Ivorian security predicament remained the same and despite the presence of the French military base in Abidjan as well as the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire since 2004, the post run-off election violence killed and displaced many people.

Aim and justification of the study

The main purpose of this thesis is to offer an understanding of the impact of peacebuilding on human security in post-conflict states, using Côte d'Ivoire as the case study. Peacebuilding interventions by external actors are intended to address problems in the war-affected communities in a manner that would ensure that individual citizens enjoy basic rights and are protected from threats. Assessing the impact of international peacebuilding interventions on human security in conflict-affected states is undertaken by assessing the extent to which the implemented peace initiatives alleviated threats to, or enhanced individual lives and dignity. This also involves assessing the extent to which people freely are able to live in peace and dignity, and move about doing their daily activities without let or hindrance.

Within the broader theoretical debates of peacebuilding and human security in conflict-affected fragile states, this research applies a theoretical framework that draws on human security and peacebuilding literature and interviews in Côte d'Ivoire. The framework in chapter three was applied in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. This framework could be applied in other war-affected states when assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security. The relevance of human security in our analyses hinges on the fact that it focuses on issues that are human-centred including personal safety and security of communities, protection of human rights, protection against deprivation and social inequality, diseases, shelter, food, water and hunger. Peacebuilding interventions address these concerns; therefore, any assessment of peacebuilding interventions impact should be conducted using an analytical framework which focuses on the critical concerns of war-affected people.

Why Côte d'Ivoire is a suitable case study

Peacebuilding is a neo-liberal project undertaken to achieve "western moral sentiments … to assert the hegemony of the Western moral-political outlook" with the intension of passing a "moral judgment on the cultural and political ways of other people" (Begby and Burgess, 2009: 92-93). Undertaking this study in Côte d'Ivoire is based on three reasons. The first is that Côte d'Ivoire is strategically important in terms of economic and political benefits to France – its former colonial power. France maintains some umbilical relationship with her former colonies and takes every strategic step to ensure that its neo-colonial vestiges with the former colonies remain intact. Côte d'Ivoire is one of the few states (originally Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroun, and Central African Republic) in Africa where France maintains permanent military bases since the reign of the country's first President, Houphouet-Boigny. This bilateral military arrangement allows the presence of French troops and officers to be among the ranks of their African counterparts with the option for the French state to militarily intervene in the event of a crisis (Charbonneau, 2008). Empirical evidence shows that in the Côte d'Ivoire crisis, France not only played a mediatory role, but assumed direct military action against the pro-government forces which subsequently assisted the ousting of Laurent Gbagbo, a Pan-African nationalist (see Piccolino, 2012:7), who was replaced by a neo-liberal puppet.

Critical theorists and some western as well as neo-colonial writers have questioned the political economy of peacebuilding by international actors (Pugh, 2004; Begby and Burgess, 2009; Pugh et. al, 2011; Haag, 2011; Schellhaas and Seegers, 2009). Other scholars provide empirical analyses on why European powers intervene in Africa. In her most request work, *Why Europe Intervenes in Africa*, Catherine Gegout shows the various political and economic arrangements which helped France and the United Kingdom keep their control and influence over their former colonies in Africa. Michael Pugh, for example, sees international action to ensure peace

as an opportunity of the interveners to sustain the neo-liberal system, which plays an important

role in causing the conflicts the interveners come to resolve. Pugh succinctly noted:

> The evolution of [Peace Support Operations] PSOs and the merger with humanitarianism has reflected and reinforced the structures of the world system, promoted the globalisation of a particular ideology of good governance – liberal peace – and served as riot control when resistance has been encountered. The limits of the current forms of peacekeeping and humanitarianism lie in the inherent contradictions of a capitalist hegemony trying to keep the lid on instability. PSOs and humanitarianism deal with the manifestations of that instability, masking the extent to which the system fails to benefit large parts of the world (Pugh, 2004:53-54).

Thus, international peacebuilding actors do not take steps to bring real change to the standards

of living of people in war-affected states. The critical and neo-colonial writers argue that

peacebuilding in post-conflict fragile states are implemented to achieve some political and

economic objectives of western powers. This controversy can be seen in Roland Paris'

observation that, ''the process of political and economic liberalisation is inherently tumultuous:

it can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in the fragile

conditions that typically exist in countries just emerging from civil war'' (Paris, 2004: ix).

While much controversy surrounds peacebuilding in post-conflict fragile states, an empirical

assessment of the exact impact of peacebuilding interventions in a state that is known to be in

the firm grips of its former colonial power would bring to the fore whether or not peacebuilding

addresses the real needs of war-affected communities. Côte d'Ivoire is well placed in this sense

to conduct such a study. The second reason is that Côte d'Ivoire has been under international

peacebuilding since the outbreak of the war in 2002. It was the economic power of francophone

West Africa, and among the most growing economies in the West African region. The war in

Côte d'Ivoire attracted the initiatives of all the key international peacebuilders, the UN, EU,

AU, ECOWAS and France as well as many of the UN's agencies, international non-

governmental organisations and international capitalist institutions – the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in particular. On this score, this case presents the

advanced form of international peacebuilding necessary to measure the real impact of

peacebuilders' interventions on human security in war-affected states. Thirdly, the war in Côte d'Ivoire has affected the country's key human security concerns such as maternal and child health, access to water, sanitation and hygiene, children's education, shelter, food security and access to medical facilities. This is also why Côte d'Ivoire is a strong case for the assessment of the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security.

Relevance and added value

Based on the purpose and the approach adopted, this thesis contributes to the literature in two main ways: theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, the thesis offers a conceptually rigorous analytical framework for assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security in war-affected states. Attempts at assessing peacebuilding such as the Collaborative Learning Project's Reflection on Peace Practice (RPP) developed by the Collaboration for Development Action and the recent framework by Diehl and Druckman focus on the peace missions or operations - top-level (See Diehl and Druckman, 2013). Specifically, these addressed what the interveners have done in terms of getting parties to sign peace accords, and support them to conduct elections. These assessment approaches have not taken into account the extent to which the interventions impact on what the literature and interviews considered as the critical factors necessary to be addressed in the war-affected communities (human security) for a durable peace to be achieved.

Empirically, the constructed framework in chapter three was applied to the critical factors for Côte d'Ivoire. Unlike other top-level assessment frameworks such as the Collaboration Learning Project's Reflection on Peace Practice (RPP) and the Diehl and Druckman's framework, the present framework focuses on human security concerns of war-affected populations. Diehl and Druckman's framework, for example, focuses on why missions undertaken by the United Nations or related organisations succeeded or failed (See Diehl and

Druckman, 2013). The present framework is based on a gamut of factors which directly affect war-affected populations, and are common in most conflict and post-conflict states. The framework could be used to assess the impact of international peacebuilding on human security in states where the indicators considered in the framework are affected.

Academically, the thesis fills an important lacuna in the literature of peacebuilding because of its focus on human-centred indicators. A critical interrogation of the impact of international peacebuilding interventions on the critical domestic structures as captured in the research question cannot function in isolation. It requires an understanding of the domestic situations before the interventions and the changes that have occurred with the interventions. This makes the local context (human security) in any peacebuilding inquiry extremely important in war-affected states.

Last but not the least, the empirical assessment of the impact of peacebuilding interventions detailing the critical issues relating to interventions implemented, and the challenges encountered by the people in accessing the interventions provides policy makers and implementers at the international, national and local levels the opportunity to revisit how the interventions can address the core human security issues affecting people in the war-shattered states.

Definition of concepts

Peace and human security are the key concepts that drive this research. A comprehensive review of peacebuilding and human security is in chapter two of the thesis.

Peace

In this thesis, the concept peace as used must be understood within the classic work of Johan Galtung's "positive" and "negative" peace domains (Galtung, 1964). Johan Galtung is one of

the founders and a key figure in peace research who first introduced these two terms as part of efforts to deepen the understanding of the philosophy of peace and peace research. By negative peace, Galtung meant the "absence of violence" or "absence of war", and positive peace, he explains "is the integration of human society" (Galtung, 1964:2).

In his later writings, Galtung (1969; 1976; 1996) used the term "structural violence" in place of "human integration." To Galtung, peace is not just the absence of direct violence or large-scale violent conflict, that is, negative peace, but more importantly it is the absence of structural violence (positive peace) or the pursuit of harmony, social justice, and equity in the distribution of scarce resources, rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and liberties, and access to social services, particularly access to water, sanitation and hygiene, health facilities, food, and shelter are of a paramount importance in this respect. When organisations such as the UN, NATO, AU or when states equip their armies to undertake military mission, they do so to bring about "human integration" (positive peace). In addressing negative peace, peace projects involving arms control, anti-personnel landmines and multilateral action constitute the methods of addressing issues of negative peace. The methods to achieving positive peace may include conflict resolution and management, national reconciliation, transitional justice, arbitration and peace education as well as the provision of basic needs of war-affected communities.

To a very large extent, peacebuilding as used in this thesis appropriates both Galtung's positive and negative peace understanding of peace. Both positive and negative peace are important in our analyses because positive peace alone cannot be built in war-affected states which are characterised by violence. Christina Steenkamp suggests that since the transition from war to peace also occurs in the social, economic and cultural spheres, "all these spheres need to be considered to fully comprehend the occurrences of violence and its impact" (Steenkamp, 2011:360). In peacebuilding, the conflict-affected environment needs to be secured for peacebuilding interventions to achieve the desired outcomes (Schnabel, 2001; Schnabel and

Ehrhart, 2005:3; Cross, interview, 2016). Peacebuilding's distinctiveness from other approaches such as development aid and humanitarian assistance is its focus on removing the root causes of conflict. In this regard, John G. Cockell argues that Johan Galtung's 1976 work appears to be the foremost in drawing distinction of peacebuilding from other approaches. John Cockell notes that "unlike other approaches to the management or resolution of conflict, peacebuilding is based on an associate approach: peace as the abolition of structural violence (oppression and domination) and not just of direct violence (warfare)" (Cockell, 2000).

Galtung's classification of peace into negative and positive stems from the fact that peace research of the 1950s focused extensively on direct violence, such as war to the neglect of other potential ways by which peace can be destabilised. The indirect or structural perspective of violence introduced by Galtung challenged this conception of peace. Thus, there have been some shifts in the theory of peace since 1964 relating to what peace and violence mean in his later writings and this culminated in several works on his structural theory including aggression (1964), non-violence (1965), internationalised conflict resolution (1965), integration (1968), violence, peace and peace research (1969), structural and direct violence (1971) and the structural theory of Imperialism (1971).

The shift in Galtung's work to include violence does not mean that Galtung's theory of peace was not accepted; rather, his theory of peace was well received but with criticisms from young radicals of peace research at the time making peace studies an ongoing academic project. One such critic was Schmid who argued that the focus of peace research is negative peace which serves the interest of the power holders; positive peace, he argues lacks actual content (Schmid, 1968). Another major criticism came from Kenneth Boulding (1977) who criticised Johan Galtung's labelling of international peace as negative peace in his introduction of structural violence. Borrowing from both negative and positive peace propositions, Boulding calls his

'stable peace' which he argues is increased or decreased by social systems including religious or ideological inclinations and economic behaviour (Boulding, 1991).

In sum, peace means the long-term goals in a society in which there is public order and economic opportunities for the people. The achievement of these long term goals in a society demonstrates the level of human security in that society. In a previous study, Boulding (1977:78) noted that Galtung's positive peace appeared to contain "any state of affairs which gets high marks on his scale of goodness", and this according to Boulding "may have very little to do with peace." Boulding further criticised Galtung for downgrading the costs of inequality (Boulding, 1977:80). From this perspective, Rudolph Rummel re-echoed Boulding's position describing Galtung's view as "a socialist theory of peace" and positive peace as "a construct within a neo-Marxist theory of exploitation" (Rummel, 1981:83-50).

Human security

Human security is a post-cold war concept which emerged in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Human Development Programme (UNDP). It emerged as an approach to address the new forms of insecurity and threats to human survival and vulnerabilities including widening poverty and inequality, intra-state conflicts, diseases, problems of refugees and internally displaced persons in the societies that have emerged or are emerging from the ashes of the Cold War politics. The emergence of human security challenged the traditional concept of security which focused on the state, and moved the focus to a new form of security that was human-centred. Human or individual needs and not nation-states were at the centre of security approaches. Effectively, human security stresses the need to look at security more holistically than just national security domains. In peacebuilding, human security is supposed to be its end result. It is the basis of interaction between international actors and the domestic structures of peace. Due to the premium placed on human security, the concept

has become an important hub of foreign and aid policies of states such as Canada, Japan and Norway (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005). As I have discussed in chapter two, the Canadian and Japanese conceptualisations of human security hinge on "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" which are the two key elements in the human security concept as espoused in the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994).

"Freedom from want" addresses itself to the security of individuals in terms of economic and social opportunities which provide them with protection from hunger, poverty, disease, and malnutrition. "Freedom from fear" focused on protecting individuals from the consequences of war and this is achieved through conflict prevention and management systems or more specifically addressing threats to personal safety and security of people and their property and the protection of human rights from egregious violations. Failure to address problems of post-conflict states often results in relapse of violence, as observed by Paul Collier (2003).

Research methodology

This section presents the methodology used in investigating the research. It consists of the research approach, research instruments, data collection methods and procedures followed that ensured that the data collected satisfied the cannons of scientific investigation and scholarly inquiry. In investigating the research question, the study appropriates the qualitative research approach, and causal inferences were made in explaining the outcome of peacebuilding interventions on the factors considered necessary to be addressed by peacebuilders to increase human security concerns.

The qualitative research approach allows the researcher to explore a particular phenomenon from different lenses using a variety of data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008:544). Despite the criticism of qualitative case study approaches due to the potential subjectivity of the human being, analysts have argued that the potential subjectivity does not write-off its objectivity

(Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Baxter and Jack, 2008; Yin, 2014). Through interviews with research participants intended to unravel the reality, researchers are in a better position to understand the actions and inactions of the participants (Robottom and Hart, 1993). This research is not an experimental investigation. It was interested in the experiences of peacebuilders and war-affected people on the impact of peacebuilding on human security. In this regard, it sets out to examine in detail the changes that have occurred on human security with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions in Côte d'Ivoire. Having settled on the appropriate research approach and the research question to be investigated, the next in the series of actions is cases selection; that is, the selection of the "units of analysis" for the thesis. The units of analysis in this thesis are the provision of personal safety and security of civilian population against violence and insecurity, human rights issues, particularly the abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, unlawful executions, sexual violence against women, girls and minors, and the state of maternal and infant health provisions. Other factors included gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality, poverty alleviation in poor families, provision of school infrastructure, recruiting teachers to teach children and the provision of psychosocial support to children in war-affected communities which all affect children's enrolments and completion of primary school education.

The empirical validation in the strength of qualitative case study as used in this research is fortified by two political science studies; Lisa L. Martin's Coercive Cooperation (1992) and Robert D. Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993) as reported by King et al., (1994). In the first study, Martin quantitatively analysed ninety-nine cases of attempted economic sanctions in post-Cold War era. Her objective was to explain the degree of international cooperation on economic sanctions. While the analyses gave her some information, they could not help her draw valid conclusions from the quantitatively collected data because the causal inferences suggested by the data were unclear. To address this problem, Martin finally carried out six

detailed cases based on which she was successful in making valid interpretations (see King, et al., 1994:5). Similarly, between 1970 and 1982, Robert D. Putnam and his associates interviewed 112 Italian regional councillors, 115 community leaders. In addition to these interviews, mail questionnaires were completed by over 500 community leaders in 1983, and four (4) mass surveys across the nation to gain an understanding of intra-political manoeuvring and personalities (King et al., 1994; see also Putnam, 1993:190). He could also not get his core issues addressed; as a result, he carried out a detailed qualitative case study which helped him draw valid inferences. Drawing on these and other examples, King et al., (1994:5-6) made the point that neither quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to the other, irrespective of the problem being investigated. The choice of qualitative approach for the peacebuilding impact assessment in this thesis merits scientific and scholarly investigations as it provides us with the opportunity to conduct detailed interviews with peacebuilders and people affected by peacebuilding interventions.

In order to make robust interpretations based on causal inferences from the variables; the thesis conducted a cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analysis (King et al., 1994; George and Bennett, 2005). This enabled the research to benefit from tracking the changes that have occurred in a variety of indicators over a period of time. The selected timeframe for the analyses is 2002 to 2015. The conflict started in September 2002, and in 2003, the Linas-Marcoussis peace accord was signed by the parties. The conflict continued after the Linas-Marcoussis accord until the conduct of first post-conflict election in 2010 which also resulted in a disputed run-off with tragic outcomes following the spate of violence that killed several people. The new government was formed in 2011 following the defeat of forces and militia loyal to the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo. Tracking the period from 2002 to 2015 helped in observing the changes that have occurred beyond the disputed run-off election.

Sources of research data

The qualitative research approach used in this research allows the use of both primary and secondary data including field notes, interviews and review of texts whose content have been analysed. Data on the impact of interventions on violence, arbitrary killings, unlawful arrests and detentions, forced disappearances, sexual and child rights abuses, maternal and infant health and the education of children were collected through interviews and reports of both local and international organisations and institutions such as the UN, EU, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the domestic peace actors.

Primary sources

The primary data were collected by means of interview of respondents drawn from officials of international and national political actors, civil society organisations, and women's groups whose work are connected to peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire. The interviewees also included journalists, community members, internally displaced persons and refugees living in the Ampain Refugees Camp in Ghana which is a few kilometres from the Elubo border which separates Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. The Ampain Refugees Camp hosted refugees who fled from the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The instrument used in the collection of interview data was a semi-structured questionnaire.

Documentary sources

The study relies on analyses of documentary evidence including official government publications, policy papers, meeting briefings, and press releases of both external partners and local actors. Additionally, the data used included utmost scrutiny of academic, journalistic and electronic databased information. The analyses were carried out in pursuit of the work's stated objectives with utmost consideration accorded throughout to the requirements and canons of scientific investigations and scholarly inquiry. The secondary or documentary research data used in the thesis were derived from library and online searched data. In this regard, published scholarly works on peacebuilding and human security in authored or edited books and peer reviewed journals on international peacebuilding and human security concerns were used. These addressed issues such as people's personal safety and security, human rights, access to water, sanitation and hygiene, food, infant and maternal heath, medical facilities, and shelter. Other issues addressed include gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality, poverty of war-affected families, school infrastructure and equipment, teachers and provision of psychosocial services for school children were veritable documentary sourced data.

Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing has been used in this thesis because of its capacity to bring out hidden information which survey is incapable of doing under some circumstances. Three slightly different sets of interview instruments were used in the collection of data. The first set of interview instrument composed of questions used in extracting information from the officials of international peacebuilding actors. The second set of interview questions were used in the interview with domestic actors including national peace and security institutions and civil society organisations, and the last set of questions were administered to people at the community level. At the community level, the interviews were conducted with the youth, children in or out of

primary school, women and women groups, and opinion leaders of communities on what they expected peacebuilders to do, and the extent to which peacebuilders' interventions addressed their expectations.

The decade long crisis affected community members in one way or the other. They knew their situation prior to the conflict, the state of their living during the crisis and their present standards of living. Some were displaced internally by the war or were refugees, some continue to be displaced both internally and externally, and some have lost their family members and friends and also lost their prestige and status in the communities. The multiple set of data gathered from the three levels in a study that assessed the impact of international peacebuilding interventions helped the research in two ways. Firstly, it enabled the utmost understanding of the germane issues from different perspectives of peacebuilding of international actors who worked in tandem with the officials of state institutions and civil society organisations. Secondly, it enabled the research data to be triangulated by doing across group and intra-group validation which brought to the fore the common issues that recurred in the interview data. The period of field data collection was January-March, 2016.

Cases selected for the study, and why these cases

As discussed in detail in chapter 3, the cases selected for this study are the dependent variables used in assessing the impact of peacebuilding initiatives on human security. They address issues of physical security, abuse of fundamental human rights and freedoms, health and education of war-affected populations. Each of the four empirical chapters (4, 5, 6, and 7) addresses one of the four dependent variables. They have been selected based on review of extant literature and the interviews conducted on what key issues should be addressed by peacebuilders in war-affected states. Physical security is one of the core issues that needs to be addressed in a war-affected state. While many people in war-affected states die due to violence

or are exposed to insecurity, international peace actors' work including peacekeepers could suffer if the issue of physical security is not addressed. Primarily, the deployment of international peacekeepers to war-affected states is to first and foremost provide physical security to the affected population. When assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions in war-affected states, it is therefore important to establish the extent to which peacebuilders addressed physical security. The provision of physical security by peacebuilders in armed conflict states ensures negative peace, and this is within the "freedom from fear" component of UNDP's human security concept.

Physical security is also important in ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms in war-affected states. This has been discussed in chapter 5 of the thesis. The abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms border on human dignity or human indignity. When physical security of the citizens is addressed, it has a consequence on the extent to which citizens enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms in war-affected states. In armed conflict states in particular, such abuses occur because of physical insecurity or the prevalence of violence. Since human rights abuse or human indignity in armed conflict occurs due to the absence of physical security, this thesis assesses the impact of peace initiatives on human rights abuse and war crimes within the 'freedom from indignity' component of human security framework. It is important to note that a link exists between abuse of human rights in war and other war crimes on one hand, and negative peace on the other hand. This is because violence reduction or improvement in the physical security affects the extent to which human rights and freedoms would be protected or not. Chapter four addresses the issues of human rights abuse and war crimes within the "freedom from indignity" standpoint.

The third and fourth cases – health and education which constitute the empirical chapters six and seven respectively have been selected also based on existing literature and interviews on what issues are considered necessary that should be the target of peacebuilders' initiatives. As

discussed in chapter 3, these two dependent variables which are key to the socio-economic security have been selected because existing literature as mentioned in chapter 3 observes that they are the first key areas targeted by peacebuilding interventions. The interviews show that access to good drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services, medical facilities and health professionals, maternal and child health, food and shelter have been identified as necessary in war-affected communities. Access to educational facilities for war-affected children such as classrooms, teaching and learning aids, addressing issues of discrimination and gender-based violence and the recruiting and training of teachers are the key issues that could be addressed by peacebuilders. Addressing these health and education indicators by peacebuilders in war-affected states which are critical in the provision of socio-economic security ensures not only Galtung's positive peace (that is, structural violence or human integration as discussed above), but also the critical issues at the heart of the "freedom from want" element of human security. In understanding how the war-affected populations access health and education, it is important to state that both the literature and interviews recognise livelihood as a key issue which should be addressed in war-affected states. Issues of livelihood overlap in the discussion of accessibility of the people to health and education facilities. If human security concerns in war-affected states are critical in peacebuilding, livelihood issues that border on access to health and education such as food, shelter, medical facilities, and children's learning aids and materials should be addressed by peacebuilders. In this thesis, issues of livelihood discussed in chapter 3 (the theoretical framework) are addressed in relation to the extent to which the war-affected populations are empowered economically to be able to be self-reliant in a manner that they are able to address their present and future problems. Their unhindered access to health facilities, food and shelter, schools, books and fees after the war is largely dependent on the extent to which they are well-placed, economically. Therefore, livelihood in war-affected states is discussed in terms of how peacebuilders have supported the affected populations to

overcome their impediments which restrict or limit their ability to access the aforementioned facilities or items.

Population, sample and selection procedure

Selecting participants for a study is important. Essentially, it accurately creates a smaller number of people or objects to be studied from a set of big data in a manner that the smaller subset so selected is representative of the larger set (Creswell, 2003; see Trotter, 2012:399). A combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques was used in the selection of the interviewees for this study. As indicated earlier, there is a part of the research that bordered on specialised knowledge of the kinds of interventions such as the disarmament, reintegration and demobilisation which have been implemented by the international peacebuilding actors. The study considered international interveners who implemented programmes such as these as important data collection sources as well as the national institutions such as the *La Commission Nationale de lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation illicite des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC)* – a state institution responsible for the eradication of illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons in Côte d'Ivoire as well as civil society organisations including *le Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest Section Côte d'Ivoire (RASALAO-CI)* and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding – Côte d'Ivoire.

The selection of the participants was undertaken in accordance with the advice offered to qualitative researchers that their actions in sampling and selection must be underpinned by "measures of reliability, replicability, and validity to assure that the data coverage is correct" (Trotter, 2012:399). The selection procedures are critical to the research's validity and reliability because it is able to establish a good rapport between the research questions and sampling (Bryman, 2008:458). The interviews were conducted with people at community level because they are those affected by peacebuilding. They provided information on what

peacebuilders were expected to do, and how the peacebuilding initiatives have addressed the issues they considered critical in building stronger and resilient communities.

The purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used in the selection of key figures at both domestic and international levels who have played various roles in the making or implementing or both of international security intervention programmes. Based on previous established relationship through conferences with the officials of some civil society organisations in Cote d'Ivoire, the researcher accessed some key personalities in international organisations who worked to ensure peace and security in the country.

A total of 62 research participants constitutes the basis of our analyses of peacebuilding interventions impact on human security. Within the scope of the study, the sample size is considered fair and reasonable, given that the research anchored on qualitative research which is underpinned by the quality of the information. The 62 interviews were conducted in Abidjan (Adjamé, Marcory, Koumassi, Angré Chateau), Alépé, Dabou, Sinfra, Issia, Noé, Yamoussoukro, Dimbokro and Bouaké in Côte d'Ivoire and Ampain refugee camp in Ghana which is a few kilometres from the border towns of Noé (Côte d'Ivoire) and Elubo (Ghana). Since the war affected all the districts in Côte d'Ivoire, steps were taken to ensure that the data collected represented the people of Côte d'Ivoire. In this direction, the fourteen districts of Côte d'Ivoire were grouped into four zones: north, south, east and west. All the nine (9) selected cities, towns and villages in Côte d'Ivoire where research participants were interviewed, were drawn from seven out of the fourteen districts. The distribution of research areas is as follows: Bouaké in the *Valée du Bandama* district, Yamoussoukro in the *Yamousoukro* district, and Dimbokro in the *Lacs* district were drawn from the northern zone; Issia and Sinfra in the *Sassandra/Marahoue* districts were selected from the western zone; Dabou in the *Lagunes* district and Abidjan in the *Abidjan* district, both represented the southern zone, and Noé and Alépé in the Comoe districts represented the eastern zone (see appendix 1 – Map). Also, an

interview was conducted in Ghana with Professor Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu who was a member of the 2014 United Nations Secretary-General's High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. She once served as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The 62nd interview was conducted with Major-General Tim Cross in the United Kingdom on peacebuilding and human security in post-conflict fragile states. The interview data were complemented with data generated from the content analyses of documentary evidence.

Pre-testing of interview instrument and data gathering

To ensure the validity of the semi-structured questionnaire, the questionnaire for civil society and national agencies whose information were similar to that of the officials of international peacebuilding actors' were piloted with one staff of RASALAO-CI and the one for the community was also piloted with one person at Adjamé Liberté in Abidjan. Adjamé Liberté was one of the suburbs that came under heavy attack during the crisis where several people were killed. This pilot study took place about 15 metres from the place of the 'Adjamé massacre' where the pro-Gbagbo forces killed many people claiming they were militants being harboured in the vicinity. This place was close to the headquarters of RASALAO-CI in Abidjan. The information generated from the pilot interview was not used in the study. However, the information generated by the research tool helped to make some minor corrections in the questionnaire before the actual interviewing with participants started.

All the interviews were conducted solely by the researcher in all the communities. I hired research assistants to help me in all the cities, towns and villages where I conducted interviews. My first two research assistants (a male and a female) were hired in Abidjan through the recommendation of the President of RASALAO-CI. All the other research assistants were hired in those places where the interviews were conducted. They did not participate in the

interviewing of the research participants. They were also hired through the recommendation of their town or village heads. My research protocol did not allow the hired research assistants in the communities where interviews were conducted to sit-in during interviewing. I did this to ensure that my participants shared in confidence whatever information they wanted to share with me. The research assistants were told the interviews with the participants were to be conducted by the researcher and the participants alone from the beginning of their engagement. Their role was clearly defined during their hiring. Their role was mainly to help the researcher to move into and out of the communities without being harmed. They knew which vicinities or suburbs of the towns were safer, and which were not, so that the researcher did not unknowingly fall prey to any hardened criminals anywhere. At the end of each day of the interviews, and in particular, where electricity was available and under right conditions, I typed some of the interviews so as to reduce the workload upon my return to the United Kingdom. The research protocol I adopted requires that wherever I visited, the town or village head or in cities where these were non-existent, the opinion or local authority leader was to be visited to introduce myself to him and his elders that I was in their community to undertake research on the war and peace. This is necessary in most African societies where chiefs and opinion leaders are held in high honour and revered by the people. The researcher risked being driven away by the community if this was not followed.

Research variables

This section of the methodology discusses the research variables used in the study. Two key variables; namely independent and dependent variables have been used in this thesis. The first variable is human security which is affected by the peacebuilding interventions. Human security was measured through the identified measurable indicators including personal safety and security of people, human rights, education and health whose outcome had been explained

with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. The independent variables involve the peacebuilding interventions – that is, the activities of international actors undertaken to ensure that people and their communities were safe, human rights abuses were contained and perpetrators punished for serious human rights crimes and enhanced health and education for the people were considered critical for peace in the country. The changes that have taken place in the dependent variables when the peacebuilding policies were implemented determined the extent of the impact of peacebuilding interventions on the peace of the country.

Validity and reliability of data

The validity addresses issues of whether the results generated by the instruments were actually about what they were intended. This is measured by the extent to which the applicable methods accurately produce what they were intended to measure. In this study, the pre-testing of the research instrument afforded the researcher the opportunity to fine-tune the tool that helped in collecting data necessary to answer the key research question which drives the thesis. On matters relating to generalisability (external validity), the selection of the variables for assessment were conducted based on extant literature and interviews on peacebuilding and human security in war-affected states. This involves the need for enhanced safety and security of individuals, protecting civilians from gross human rights violations, addressing issues of health and education which are often disrupted in armed violence. These were considered essential in building stronger communities to ensure the durability of peace. Therefore, in assessing peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states, the human security model as applied in this thesis could be used to ascertain the real impact that peacebuilding interventions make on human security. The factors for the assessment as applied in this research are common to most post-conflict fragile states. Care was taken during interviewing to ensure that every

information given was captured and the analyses based on interview data were complemented with existing official data as well as peer reviewed material.

To ensure that threats to the forms of validity critical to this study were resolved so that the data that were collected did not suffer any ill-effect, a number of steps were taken during data collection process. A key issue that could border on external validity is the fact that the assessment was made on one case – Côte d'Ivoire. So, the critical question is how do results generated hold for other cases - external validity (generalisability). To address this threat, the critical dependent factors considered were what existing literature and interviews showed should be addressed by peacebuilders. These factors are common in war-affected states so the results on Côte d'Ivoire could hold for war-affected states with similar characteristics. The developed assessment framework could also be used to assess the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security of other war-affected states with similar features. In defence of a single case or small number of cases, Gary King et al., (1994:124-128) and Shadish et al., (2002:92-93) agree that where the total number of cases to be included in a study is relatively small, purposive sampling is suitable and more appropriate. Due to the fact that qualitative studies are more detailed in their analyses, the sample in qualitative study is far smaller than samples in quantitative studies and this study was conducted using purposive sampling in the selection of participants to collect detail information on the impact of peacebuilding interventions implemented in Côte d'Ivoire. In this respect, the selection of people was done across three levels. Representation in this respect involved sampling people based on their expert knowledge about the nature of peacebuilding interventions and how they were implemented and the impact of the interventions on human security.

To ensure that people who have been involved in these interventions were actually selected a snowball sampling technique helped in the identification of the experts who have been particularly involved either as international or local peace actors. Since the conflict and the

peacebuilding interventions affected all manner of people in the communities, community members in war-affected areas were important participants in this study. However, the protocol used in the research included only people who have experienced the war and the post-conflict transition period were included. Both men and women, young and old, were included in the study. The minimum age for inclusion in the research was 12 years old, but there was no age limit placed above 12 years. The minimum age limit was to ensure that children who were interviewed were those who could share some experiences of at least the post run-off election violence, if not the situation prior to the post run-off dispute itself, and also their present circumstances in the post-conflict transition period. Also, inference was critical in this qualitative study; it is argued that when generalisation cannot be based on statistical inference, inference can be based on logic. The measurement units were based on contextual and content analyses of collected data as advanced by King et al., (1994). In this regard, the dependent variables – the selected cases or the units of analyses were addressed within their specific contexts which allowed us to make valid inferences.

To address issues relating to construct validity, a clear operationalisation of peacebuilding and human security in the literature review and extensive discussion of the theoretical arguments about the impact of peacebuilding interventions clearly brought to the fore what needed to be measured in conflict-affected states as well as the distinction between peacebuilding policies and observed variables (human security concerns). This guided the drafting of the research instrument which helped in collecting necessary data for the measurement of the selected dependent variables. Another key issue is the reliability of the research. By reliability, we mean the extent to which the results of the research which have been undertaken and concluded can be replicated with same results generated if the future research was carried out in the same way the first one was undertaken. Essentially, to ensure reliability in this research, data were

carefully collected and triangulated by means of other textual data which helped to reduce to the barest minimum the errors and biases in the course of data collection and analyses.

In the data analyses stage of the research, steps were taken to ensure that threats to validity were addressed. To be sure that the conclusions that the research would establish were supported by empirical evidence collected based on rigorous scientific procedures and standards of scholarly investigations, efforts were taken to analyse the data procedurally, and within the limits of qualitative inquiry. With all the transcripts of the interviews completed, I made some preliminary observations of the transcripts to tease out the emerging issues. After the preliminary observations, I made a detail observation of the data, and provided summaries of individual transcripts in the margins of the scripts. This enabled me to have a firm understanding in clear terms what the interviewee was referring to in the interview she or he granted. On the basis of the emerging themes, I developed a coding frame or scheme which captured all the lists of all the themes to the data (the themes or headings/sub-headings of the empirical chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 were developed from this). Having finished coding all the data, I brought all the views that went into one direction or one side with their respective examples, where these were stated. The views of my research participants written under these themes were the fountain of the empirical chapters, which also supported extant literature in the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3 that established what war-affected populations expected peacebuilding interventions to address. In order to maximise the validity of my research findings, I did a triangulation of the collated data by undertaking a group-to-group validation where I compared the gathered data from the three semi-structured interviews to see the pattern. Where the views of research participants coincided it strengthened my faith on how important the interviewees considered the issue(s). Those that were opposed to the mainstream, the "deviant cases" were also treated as important research information, and I accounted for why they differed; and this, reflected in the write-up, accordingly. I also compared data within

cases in the dataset in terms of rural-urban, male-female, rich-poor divides which reflected in the empirical chapters such as rural-urban populations' access to health facilities, health staff, access to water, sanitation and hygiene services. The conclusions arrived at were based on the research findings which have been distilled from the data that were analysed through the key processes and procedures required in the scientific analyses of qualitatively collected data described above.

Application of the human security assessment framework

The human security assessment framework has been comprehensively discussed in chapter three. An intervention could produce positive or limited positive or no impact. The assessment framework of peacebuilding interventions developed in this thesis measures the impact of the interventions; that is, the changes that have occurred in the dependent variable(s) with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions in the beneficiary state. In this thesis, positive impact presumes changes that have occurred or occurring in the dependent variables which have helped or are helping to address problem in the selected human security indicator(s). Any changes or change after the implementation of the interventions (independent variables) which leads to a removal or a reduction of threats to the key measurable indicator - dependent variable or improvement in human security, the intervention has produced a positive impact which can be said to be the contribution of the peacebuilding intervention. Where the intervention has improved a little bit, but not improved human security variable fully, the intervention has produced a limited positive impact. If, after the intervention, the situation remains the same as it was during or before the conflict or deteriorates, the intervention has not produced any impact; it is presumed the intervention contributed nothing to improve human security of the state.

The expected assumption is that levels of human security will be lower during armed conflict owing to being in a state of civil war. If the intervention produces positive or limited positive or no impact, a judgment would be passed and thoroughly discussed to show the extent of the impact of the peacebuilding intervention on the respective human security variable. In this thesis, the empirical assessments have been carried out on the identified critical factors in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 8 which concludes the research assigned three assessment designations on the outcome produced with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions (these are: positive impact, limited positive impact and no impact) on each of the factors assessed.

Ethical considerations

Although the information sought from the participants did not involve matters that would put participants to any form of risks, undertaking research in a state recovering from war required that issues of ethical values were given a considerable importance. Even though the research questions were written in a manner that would not cause any ill-effects on both the research participants and the research team, this researcher's prior interviews on Liberian crisis with the Liberian refugees in Ghana in 2005 gave him some idea of what could happen. The likelihood of my participants experiencing abuse of any kind or being perpetrators of abuse in the crisis was high. I took steps that ensured that the participants as well as the research team did not suffer any harm; as a result of the research. From the onset, every interviewee was thoroughly briefed on the research in which they were participating, and why their views were important. Their minds were prepared well ahead of the interview about the nature of the research and the direction of the questions. They were told that during interviewing, the questions or answers may elicit information that may address abuse of all kinds, and how these were addressed in their communities. Participating in the research was voluntary; therefore, they could withdraw

at this stage without going further, if the subject of the research introduced to them could cause them any harm, socially or psychologically. Even where they agreed to participate in the study, in the course of interviewing, they still reserved the right to withdraw at any time. They were also told that even where interview data have been collected, they reserved the right to contact the researcher through his temporary contact address in Côte d'Ivoire for him to expunge their version of the interview (researcher's mobile number used in Côte d'Ivoire during the research was given to each interviewee). In case where the researcher had finished his work, and was not within Côte d'Ivoire, they could still contact him through his University address (researcher's name card was given to participants who required it). Also, consent of the respondents was taken. Before each interview the participants were reminded of their voluntary participation in the research and that they understood clearly why they were being interviewed. In order to protect the participants and research team from any societal harm as a result of the information the participants provided, the research protocol adopted allowed the interviews to be conducted solely by the researcher with the interviewees with no relatives or friends or anyone listening to the questioning and answering. Even though the interviewees were briefed about the nature of the research and their rights to withdraw, none of the participants withdrew from the research – both during and after fieldwork. No participant has called the researcher to inform him that he/she does not want his/her data to be used for the research. The assurances to participants and making them aware of any potential issue that could be shared and the fact that they were participating out of their own volition, and reserved the right to withdraw, have contributed a lot to the interviewees being comfortable and opened to the interviewer throughout the interviewing.

In order for participants to give information out of their free-will and not to please the researcher, they were told that the researcher was only a student writing his thesis and there was no monetary or material benefits. Participants were made aware that the research was being

undertaken purely for academic purposes only and that the data generated would be handled with circumspection, and in strict compliance with the University of Nottingham Code of Research Conduct and Research Ethics, a gist of it was explained to the research participants. The participants were assured of utmost confidentiality. They were told their names were not necessary, but those who consented to be mentioned were told only their names which were common in the Ivoirian communities and not traceable to any one particular individual may be used in the study for purposes of anonymity. For example, a male person born on a Friday is called Koffi, and Kouadio and Kouakou are male children born on Monday and Wednesday respectively in Côte d'Ivoire. Such common names exist for female born on any of these days, so these common names were mostly used in the thesis where names were mentioned.

Limits of the research

As discussed previously, the main issue that was of concern was the study's focus on one post-conflict state, Côte d'Ivoire. The selection of one state for empirical examination raises questions of generalisability (external validity); that is, the extent to which conclusions arrived at on a particular set of data can hold for other cases with same times, context and measures. This relates to the validity which has been addressed under the validity and reliability section of this chapter. Also, to make sure that the data collected addressed the core issues which underlay the research, extensive fieldwork was conducted with interviewees drawn from international peacebuilding actors who had participated in the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. Data were also collected from national actors, specifically key institutions who participated in the implementation of peacebuilding interventions and civil society and also at the community levels since these interventions impact on people. The triangulation of data as mentioned previously had good implications for validity issues in the thesis. The final point is that the factors which have been identified in the thesis as necessary when measuring the impact

of peacebuilding interventions could be used to assess the impact of peace initiatives in other war-affected states.

Structure of thesis

In the discussion of the impact that peacebuilding made on human security in Côte d'Ivoire, chapter 1 provides the design and conceptual underpinnings of the thesis. Specifically, it outlines the research context which frames the core research question. It also discusses the aims and justifications of the thesis; why Côte d'Ivoire provides an important case for understanding the impact of peacebuilding interventions in war-affected fragile states, relevance and value addition, research methodology and the limits of the thesis.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the concept of peacebuilding and human security. In this regard, scholarly works on key issues underpinning peacebuilding and human security; in particular, the extent to which peacebuilding impact on human security of war-affected states constitute the thematic concerns of the chapter. Chapter 3 of the thesis takes an in-depth analyses of the essential factors that should be addressed by peacebuilding interventions in war-affected states. The discussion on the critical factors of human security which peacebuilding should target constitutes the theoretical matrix framing the thesis. The chapter details the key measurable indices which could be used in assessing the impact of international peacebuilding on human security in conflict-affected states.

Chapters 4-7 constitute the empirical examination of the impact of international peacebuilding on human security in Côte d'Ivoire. The chapters track the changes that have occurred in the selected factors in the framework with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. Specifically, chapter 4 examines the impact of peacebuilding interventions on personal safety of individuals and security of war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire. Chapter 5 critically analyses the impact of international peacebuilding interventions on human rights violations in

the country. In this chapter, the extent of the impact of international pressure, sanctions, monitoring, investigations, and accountability for serious violations of human rights on the peace of the country have been examined. The impact of international peacebuilding on key factors drawn on health and education variables in the country have been analysed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and makes recommendations for international and domestic peace actors so as to be able to address the key human security concerns which confront people in conflict-affected states. It also engages with existing literature pointing out where it departs from others, and where the evidence collected supported extant literature. On the basis of what has been considered in this research, the chapter reflects in greater detail the aspects that have not been researched which should be carried out in future research.

Chapter Two

Peacebuilding and Human Security in War-Affected States: A Review of Literature

The chapter reviews relevant literature on peacebuilding and human security which have been examined within the broader context of international action in addressing the root causes of conflict in post-conflict states. The chapter is written under two main headings. The first reviews scholarly works on what peacebuilding is; its definitional ambiguities, and how peacebuilding interventions can be effective in addressing the root causes of conflicts. The section operationalises the concept of peacebuilding and the new taxonomy of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as espoused in Boutros-Boutros Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In this section, the review takes into consideration the critical issues at the heart of peacebuilding interventions including violence, human rights and transitional justice systems encompassing criminal trials, truth or reconciliation or reparation commission, and social cohesion. These are all critical for peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. The second part of the chapter examines human security; detailing the underlying principles of the concept of human security which constitute the goals for peacebuilding interventions.

Literature review theme list

Concept	Theme/Works cited
Definition & operationalisation of the concept – peacebuilding	*What peacebuilding is *Distinction between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding * Why peacebuilding **Authors** (Galtung, 1964; 1976), Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), Cousens and Kumar (2001), Cutter (2005), (Menkhaus, 2009), Paris, 2004; Autesserre (2010); Mac Ginty (2011), Ficsher (1993); Barnett et al (2007), Rotberg (1996), Ball (1996), Schwarz (2005), Doyle (2007).
Understanding human security **- Peacebuilding & human security nexus** **Human security and Peacebuilding in war-affected states**	* Definition & debate on the boundaries of human security * The UNDP's conceptualisation of human security (1994 HDR) *The approaches of human security - Japanese approach (freedom from want) - Canadian approach (freedom from fear) Interventions and relevance of human security: - Economic - Social - political * Local communities' responses/contributions - state security versus human security - International and local peace actors - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) **Authors** Pugh (2009), Smith (2004), Chopra and Hohe (2004), Lund (2003), Bosold and Werthes (2005), King and Maclean (2002), King and Murray (2001), Konrad (2006), McFarlane and Khong (2006), Thomas (1999), Bellamy and McDonald (2002), Thomas and Tow (2002), Krause (2009), Bergby and Burgess (2009), Richmond (2010), Mansuri and Rao (2012), King (2013), Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002), Ferroni et al (2008) Hayami (2009; Fearon (2009), Lederach (2013), Brown and Zahar (2015), Conteh-Morgan (2006), Autesserre (2010;2014), UNDP (1994), Chetail (2010)

Peacebuilding in war shattered states have repeatedly been at the centre of academic discourse after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War was expected to open a new chapter with peace driving future development goals. However, developments in the 1980s and early 1990s were punctuated by a surge in the number of intractable conflicts around the world. Smith's (2003) *Atlas of War and Peace* indicates there were over 125 violent conflicts waged since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003:75) record not less than 31 new civil conflicts in the 1990s. In 1999 alone, 25 civil wars were active (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:77). This period, as far as violent conflicts were concerned, rivalled only the 1960s and 1970s which witnessed as many as 19 and 25 active civil wars respectively. Another important dimension in the discussion of wars of the 1990s is the shift from inter-state to intra-state violent conflicts. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg made a disturbing observation on the changing dynamics of armed conflict which have become more internalised. Their research identified 108 violent conflicts each of which witnessed at least 25 battle deaths yearly between 1989 and 1998, with about 100 of them being intrastate in nature (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1999; 2000; 2001). Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) show that of the total of 119 armed conflicts fought between 1989 and 2004, only 7 were inter-state conflicts. During this period, only 2 (Eritrea-Ethiopia and Ecuador-Peru) out of 139 peace agreements signed in 46 conflicts were interstate conflicts (Hoegbladh, 2006).

Since the 1990s, Africa remains the hardest hit with armed conflicts fought in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Burundi, Somali, Sudan, Rwanda, and Cote d'Ivoire. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, Obidegwu (2004) indicates that there were 19 major armed conflicts during the period 1990 and 2000. Nonetheless, the Human Security report (2005:9) recorded a decline of the number of armed conflicts, globally, from 66 in 2002 to 56 in 2005. What is also welcoming of this report is the considerable decline which was more visible and remarkable in Africa from a high figure of

16 in 2002 to a low of 5 in 2005. Despite this decline, the effects of these armed conflicts remain a significant blot on the conscience of society.

Understanding peacebuilding

Peacebuilding falls into the web of definitional ambiguities of social science concepts. Consequently, peacebuilding has been defined by people from different perspectives; as a result, its meaning has often been mixed with concepts such as state-building which is concerned with creating stable, responsive, accountable, legitimate and functional states. State-building, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines it as:

> an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state (OECD, 2008:1).

While some of the peacebuilding definitions are generic encompassing all manner of international assistance to states that have either experienced or under stress or risk of sliding towards state collapse, some are more specific on issues explaining international mandates rather than prevailing conditions in conflict affected states. Unsurprisingly, the concept "peacebuilding" itself appears misleading as its usage creates the impression of building peace in war shattered states which were previously peaceful. The stark reality is that, most of the civil wars fought in the post-Cold War period were conducted in underdeveloped states. Prior to these wars, the concerned states faced serious developmental problems and lacked social cohesion which connects individuals, groups and communities together. The use of peacebuilding to connote attempts by actors, both domestic and external, to build peace in states which were previously stable, in this sense is a misnomer, except that if peace is understood to be the absence of violent conflict or war – negative peace (Galtung, 1964; 1976).

In *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile States*, Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (2001) classify peacebuilding definitions into deductive and inductive dimensions. The deductive approach definitions centre on all international efforts geared toward building peace in post-conflict societies. In this case, definitions proffered in Boutros-Boutros Ghali's (1992) An *Agenda for Peace*, and Roland J. Ficsher's (1993) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* which see peacebuilding as an interface between a robust third-party action in armed conflict, and Michael Barnett et al., (2007) encapsulation of peacebuilding in post conflict terms as appeared in their work *Peacebuilding: What is in a Name* are all part of the deductive approach. Using Somalia as a case, Kenneth Menkhaus cautions against the very act of tagging a particular context as "post-conflict" and the required intervention as "peacebuilding" which he argues may be pernicious (Menkhaus, 2009).

Despite Menkhaus' fears, all international programmes and activities by the UN agencies and other donor institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, have post-conflict rebuilding as their main focus in conflict affected states. On the other hand, the inductive definitions start with the causes and effects of certain conflicts and/or all kinds of conflicts. In this case, the focus is about what are the root causes of the conflict or what caused this conflict and how can those causes be addressed. Specifically, peacebuilding under this category they define refers to "an analysis of whatever constellation of political, social, and economic forces led to a particular armed conflict" (Cousens and Kumar, 2001:8). It is important to point out that by placing a high premium on the diagnosis of the problem before proffering solutions to address the malaise, the inductive approach not only widens the scope of the most often neglected traditional peace and security terrain, but has adopted a more nuanced solution to the problem of the failed peace overtures (Cousens and Kumar, 2001:9).

With this depth of analyses, it is expected that Cousens and Kumar will offer a definition of peacebuilding that would be comprehensive. Rather, Cousens and Kumar provide a narrow definition of peacebuilding that focuses attention on creating stable political processes and political actors, hence the title of their work: *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (2001).* In this book, they see peacebuilding as "The most effective path for preventing renewed hostilities … for international efforts to help a given society build its political capacity to manage conflict without violence" (Cousens and Kumar, 2001:12). The argument in this viewpoint is that the resuscitation of political institutions constitutes an important area where foreign actors can play a legitimate role in post conflict environments. They acknowledge that certain key spheres of post-war recovery - including cultural, psychological and spiritual domains are internal processes where these foreign actors' role may make some limited impact.

Peacebuilding, as a political process from this perspective is an important concept that is deeply rooted in a conviction that development aid may have deleterious implications for, or have positive effect in conflict dynamics. In this sense, building peace does not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, it hinges on particular political processes with the active participation of political elites. Explaining the importance of political processes, Ana Cutter (2005:781) concludes that "peace building as politics forces external actors to understand themselves as political agents that have multiple impacts on the situations in which they choose to intervene." However, the capacity of these actors to "transform intergroup relations into viable political processes'" as gleaned from Cousens and Kumar (2001: 187) is dependent on the capacity of the actors "to support a course by which national actors reach agreement on how to create or re-create their own political institutions" (Cutter, 2005:781). By depending on external efforts to create viable political processes, it is required that problems prevailing in post-conflict

societies would be addressed by external actors' in a manner that would remove the suffering of the affected populations.

In his 1992 policy statement, "An Agenda for Peace", former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali drew a distinction between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacekeeping, he notes involves the deployment of UN military personnel to the field which must be conducted in compliance with "the established principles and practices" of traditional peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:29). By peace enforcement, Boutros-Ghali referred to the deployment of missions that are close to peacekeeping operations, but these were more heavily armed and have the authority to use military force for self-defence purposes. The last classification of peace operation, which is, post-conflict peacebuilding, refers to "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11 and 32).

Peacebuilding which is the subject of this thesis as operationalised in *An Agenda for Peace* involves some of the elements mentioned in the following passage, and others, such as health and education needs of conflict-affected states:

> Disarming the previously warring parties, and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:32).

From these perspectives, the term peace building as used in the UN vocabulary describes strategies that have been designed to address the needs of states recovering from deadly conflict. However, peacebuilding can also serve as a means to prevent further conflict. Robert Rotberg (1996:32) indicates that: "…what the UN now refers to as post-conflict peacebuilding, seeks to prevent conflicts from recurring where they have already taken place." In their post-conflict framework, Nicole Ball and Tammy Halevy (1996) identify two stages of post-conflict societies. The first is, cessation of conflict, which includes negotiation and cessation of

hostilities; and the second is, peace building, which covers a period of transition and consolidation.

Traditionally, this second stage has been divided among humanitarian agencies that respond to post war emergency needs. These include the needs of the civilian population and development agencies that focus on the long term development objectives including building political institutions, economic resuscitation and social reengineering or social reconciliation. In this thesis, being a standard term, peacebuilding includes all activities and programmes intended to ensure cessation of hostilities and also include a period of transition and consolidation of peace in a conflict torn state.

Ken Menkhaus (2004) identifies two types of peacebuilding projects that have been implemented over the last two decades. The first is 'indirect peacebuilding', in which peacebuilding objectives are integrated into sectoral aid projects. The second, is 'direct peacebuilding', where projects are exclusively devoted to the promotion of dialogue, consolidation of peace, building of local capacity to manage conflicts, and prevention of recurrence of conflict. Our analyses of the impact of international security interventions on peacebuilding are within the contexts of direct peacebuilding since it is this type of peacebuilding that focuses on creating conditions that allow mutual co-existence and the realisation of economic, political and social opportunities for the people.

The peacebuilding projects implemented in Côte d'Ivoire aimed at engendering dialogue, building trust and cohesion in individuals and groups, and use of nonviolent means of resolving or managing conflicts and the provision of personal safety and security of communities and socio-economic opportunities for the war-affected people. Peacebuilding efforts in Côte d'Ivoire on the whole include attempts at righting the wrongs committed before, during and after the war. The failure to address the impunity perpetrated by the combating groups risk a

post-conflict state relapsing into severe war. This fits squarely in Collier's threshold of relapse to violence a decade after the ending of the war (Collier, 2007).

Building peace in conflict-affected states

The United Nations Secretary-General's report (2004): *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* provides a series of reforms that were necessary, if the global body was to make any significant progress in promoting collective peace and security in the twenty-first century. Part of the reforms included the creation of a new inter-governmental body, known as the 'Peacebuilding Commission', whose core functions included identifying:

> … countries which are under stress and at risk of sliding towards state collapse; to organise, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary (UN, 2004:69).

Why the need for such a focus on peacebuilding in fragile states? The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD notes an intrinsic nexus between peacebuilding interventions and development when it argued that "helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable development" (Rubin, 2002:171). Also, affirming the significance of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states, Nicole Ball (1996:607) recognises peacebuilding not to be a distraction from development efforts "but a critical condition for development in post-conflict environments." The peacebuilding portfolio has, therefore, been widened to include the achievement of security, welfare, rule of law and justice. Rolf Schwarz (2005) identifies peacebuilding activities within three key functions of the Weberian state including provision of security, socio-economic prospects, and justice. These key functions which are performed by states are central to human security in post-Cold World period.

In building peace, Neil Cooper cautions stakeholders not to underestimate the complicity of the peacebuilders, especially the developed world's actors in creating conditions for conflict through the provision of market for goods from conflict zones (Cooper, 2005: 468-9). The observation of Cooper is a stark reality which has often been relegated to the background by peace givers. Heiko Nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard call on governments, international organisations and other societal actors not to side-step, but consider the political economy perspective detailing the dynamics of the post-conflict setting as part of their peacebuilding goals (Nitzschke and Studdard, 2005). Some difficulty has also been identified in attempts at linking security efforts with peace and developmental mandates. With particular reference to Afghanistan, Astri Suhrke (2012) observes that the military intervention dragged on so the international peacebuilding efforts ended up "waging war while building peace".

From the discussion, it is clear that peacebuilding efforts take place within certain prevailing circumstances. Obviously, the role of international security interventions in building peace over the years in war affected states has been mixed (Paris, 2004; Autesserre, 2010). How these peacebuilding interventions overcome these overarching conditions in the implementation of peace initiatives determine whether or not these initiatives will achieve lasting peace or exacerbate the conditions prevailing in the conflict torn state. The question, then is, how can the objectives of peacebuilding be achieved to ensure that the drivers of fragility in these war shattered states are removed? The answer lies in the international security interlocutors such as the UN, EU, AU, and ECOWAS as well as the liberal states and capitalist institutions in the effective implementation of peacebuilding interventions targeted at improving human security concerns in war-affected communities. The United Nations Department of Political Affairs, cited in Anna Cutter, points out that for peacebuilding to be effective, it:

> requires concurrent and integrated action on many different fronts: military, diplomatic, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and the many imponderables that go to make up a coherent and stable social fabric. These efforts range from demilitarisation to building up

national institutions, including police and judicial systems; promoting human rights; monitoring elections; encouraging formal and informal processes of political participation; providing sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilised combatants and returning refugees and displaced persons, through training programmes, the reactivation of the economy and the provision of social services; and stimulating the normal process of economic and social development which will benefit the population as a whole and provide the most secure basis for lasting peace (Cutter, 2005:780; UN Department of Political Affairs, 2004).

When peacebuilding is effectively implemented, it "creates a unified polity, one army, a return to civilian participatory rule, an economy geared to civilian consumption, and the first steps toward reconciliation", [and if successful], "peacebuilding changes not mere behaviour, but more importantly, it transforms identities and institutional contexts" (Doyle, 2007:9). From this perspective, peacebuilding, therefore, entails the activities that construct a culture of peace through oneness, trust, we-feeling and institution building which are more enduring and capable of curbing the risk of relapsing of a war shattered state into violent conflict. It can also be surmised from UNDPA (2004) and Doyle's (2007) observations that for peacebuilding interventions of outsiders to achieve the desired impact, the strategies adopted must be fashioned along the specific needs of the state concerned with active local participation (see Autesserre, 2010, 2014).

The local ownership dimension has also been a focus of academic discourse (Autesserre, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011). In building peace in conflict states, there are always the local actors and an intervener or interveners, a donor or donors and a recipient or recipients; both are interwoven into a complex web of political, and in some cases legal relations. Local participation in building peace in conflict states is crucial if peacebuilding interventions are to make any meaningful impacts. However, evidence abounds that most of the peacebuilding interventions to alleviate the suffering conditions that people find themselves in war torn states have been imposed by external powers without local participation (Autesserre, 2010:6). In view of the increased growth of foreign participation and the failures of these peacebuilding interventions in El Savador, Cambodia, Bosnia, Guatemala, and Somalia. Roland Paris, likens the continuous

umbilical relationship of these foreign interlocutors with the strife torn states to the old

"mission civilisatrice" (Paris, 2002). From the foregoing discussion, it is abundantly clear that

the essence of peacebuilding is to address human insecurity concerns in post-conflict states;

socially, politically and economically.

Understanding human security in conflict and post-conflict states

One of the new lexicons which gained prominence in the literature of international security

politics in post-Cold War period is "human security." The exact meaning of human security

remains contestable in the academic literature. Human security as an approach to development

was championed by "middle powers", particularly Canada, Norway, and Japan, and have

argued for changes in the security politics in the United Nations. Increasingly, the inability to

clearly define or demarcate the contours of human security has intensified the tension between

those who embraced the new approach as a new development paradigm and those who opposed

it.

Within the broader context of the ongoing debate about what security is, its contours and who

should be the recipient or focus of security, Nicholas Thomas and William Tow (2002) examine

whether or not human security is an effective approach. In their quests to interrogate this

conundrum, they argue that in order for the debate to be appreciated, and for it to achieve some

analytical and policy value, the understanding of human security ought to be narrowed; this

they argued "would then represent a distinct class of security problems – separate from those

embraced by traditional national security criteria – that have become more urgent in recent

years" (Thomas and Tow, 2002:178). While they agree with the opponents that human security

completely departs from the traditional-militaristic character of state security which has

dominated international relations before the end of Cold War, they argue that human security

should find space within the existing statist and militarist frameworks. In other words, human

security should be co-opted into the state-centric domain (Thomas and Tow, 2002). On the other hand, Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald opposed the viewpoints of Thomas and Tow arguing that their position was problematic because their conception of human security within the state-centric approach was inconsistent with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda. Bellamy and McDonald argue that an attempt to make human security amenable to state policy makers was untenable for three main reasons.

The first reason is that states are part of the problem and cannot be the solutions. This perspective is anchored on the position that if human security was allowed to be co-opted within the state-centric policy framework, as argued by Thomas and Tow, the emancipatory potential of security will be limited, and this will have dire consequences for human security concerns. The second criticism is their operationalisation of what constitutes human security priorities. Thomas and Tow prioritises "death by politics" over "death by economics". This dimension of the discourse is the result of their explanation that the human security approach needs to be understood by defining it in the context of "providing tangible threat parameters" (Thomas and Tow, 2002:181; see also Bellamy and McDonald, 2002: 374).

This thesis departs markedly from the statist propositions of Thomas and Tow on human security, especially their focus on the 'death by politics' argument. It embraces the arguments of Bellamy and McDonald's human-centred viewpoints of human security because the issues under the study's examination are issues that threaten human livelihoods and dignity. Nonetheless, the thesis associates itself with Thomas and Tow's position that humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding operations are the most effective practical strategies for responding to human security threats and this is relevant in our analyses in this thesis in so far as such peacebuilding interventions are directed at removing human suffering or reducing human vulnerabilities which are critical in building peace in post-conflict communities. The third criticism levelled against Thomas and Tow's propositions is their failure to recognise the

over concentration in military assistance at the expense of tackling important issues intended to ease human suffering by international and state-centric actors. In this regard, Bellamy and McDonald argue that such interventionist politics in the domestic economies of the Third World states are only intended to promote neoliberalism through democracy promotion and the free market, and these only serve the interests of these international actors and the local elites (Bellamy and McDonald, 2002:375).

Despite the contribution of Thomas and Tow and Bellamy and McDonald on the boundaries of human security, what human security is or is not remains unclear. Defining the concept of human security or operationalising it provides an important starting point for a study interested in analysing peacebuilding interventions from human security framework. Much of the literature on what human security actually is focuses on issues relating to insecurity and whose responsibility it is to provide this kind of security, and who should be the focus of this security. In the view of Caroline Thomas, human security is a form of security that prioritises the security of individuals which can only be said to be achieved if basic material needs are met, which is critical in enhancing human dignity and security of communities in general (Thomas, 1999:1).

Her definition of human security follows the findings of the post-Cold War pioneering work that popularises human security; that is, the 1994 UN Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). This report sees human security as safety from pervasive threats of hunger, disease and human rights abuses. The consensus is that the referent of security is underpinned by the implementation of human-centred policies that will enhance the survival of the individual and the reduction of human vulnerabilities. Human security in this sense considers all kinds of threats relating to poverty and inequality and misery. Human security in the 1994 Human Development Report, therefore means "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger,

disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP, 1994:23).

The conceptualisation of human security from the perspective of the United Nations constitute the 'broad approach' to human security which lays emphasis on development that is sustainable. As a demonstration of the commitment of the United Nations towards the 'new approach' to development, beside the UNDP, the UN set up the Human Security Unit at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) tasked with the responsibility of coordinating global efforts at addressing human security concerns. This broader conceptualisation of human security is within the confines of human development which have become the referent of policies championed by some states which have become known as the Canadian and Japanese approaches of human security. The two approaches differed from each other in terms of focus, and constituted an important part of their foreign policies.

The Japanese approach – "freedom from want" links security to socio-economic development and this position clearly follows the UNDP's conception of human security which encourages the world to implement policies by making, for example, healthcare and education easily accessible, ensuring gender equality and expanding economic opportunities to all people (McFarlane and Khong, 2006). The Japanese sponsored Commission on Human Security defines it as the protection of:

> the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspiration. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Commission on Human Security, 2003:4).

The Japanese leadership (under Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, and later Ryutaro Hashimoto) promotion of human security was occasioned by the financial crisis which affected Asia in 1997. In order to confront Asia's economic downturn, Japan with an independent global outlook redefined its foreign policy underpinned by the "freedom from want" component of human security which drove its overseas development assistance (Remacle, 2008:6). On the other hand, the Canadian perspective of human security which focuses on "freedom from fear" emerged as a result of the failure of the Japanese approach to address issues of conflict and insecurity which confronted many states as well as UNDP's ineffectiveness in protecting people vulnerable due to violence. Canada led a campaign of human security focusing on the protection of people from violence and threats of violence (King and Murray, 2001; MacLean, 2002).

The Canadian approach of human security is encapsulated in the consequences of violent conflict on personal safety and human dignity which strictly speaking have not been the focus of human development-oriented approach. The Canadian perspective of human security addresses dangers encountered by people due to the failures of states to protect them against armed hostilities. This Canadian dimension of human security challenges the Japanese approach as human livelihoods are often disrupted as a result of the realities of violent conflict and this also impact negatively on human rights and dignity that require greater attention. But these have been ignored in the conceptualisation of human security in the perspective of broad approach. The Canadian approach of human security focuses on taking measures to alleviate the suffering that human beings face in violent conflicts which equally impede on human dignity.

The narrow approach of human security (freedom from fear) was championed by the Canadian government through its Foreign Ministry which made it a national and international issue. Canada engaged more on issues relating to armed conflict, particularly it led a campaign on

anti-personnel landmines which resulted in the Ottawa Treaty of 1997. Canada took decisions to address issues of child labour, sexual exploitation and abuse of children and also implemented policies relating to trade which spur economic development (Bosold and Werthes, 2005). Canada led initiates to adopt this new approach to security following the failure of the United Nations to abate the genocidal crimes in Rwanda in 1994. The then Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy questioned the morality of the principle of non-interference and state sovereignty and argued for an obligation to intervene to prevent the egregious abuses of human rights in Kosovo in 1999.

Efforts are required by actors to address the consequences of violent conflict on human security concerns. In armed conflict, people face problems such as dislocations either internally or externally, illicit use of arms by belligerents and banditry; accessibility of basic necessities of life such as water, shelter, food, health care and delivery and education. Against this backdrop, the UNDP embraces the two approaches of human security because if it is understood only in terms of protection from physical violence (freedom from fear) which is a crisis prevention and management mechanism, peace is unlikely to take root in post-conflict fragile states without economic security, food security, health security, and political security for the people.

From the discussion even though the two approaches, the Japanese and Canadian approaches to human security prioritised individual's security over state security, they differed from each other, both conceptually and empirically. While some scholars considered the Japanese approach as being the broad approach as the UNDP's, as pointed out in the scholarly works of King and Murray (2000) and Konrad (2006), the Japanese perspective of human security does not totally follow the UNDP's, which equally embraces human security from the perspectives of 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear'. Rather, they argue that the Japanese approach of human security focuses attention on 'freedom from want' which focuses on the economics aspect of development which addresses issues of basic human needs that lead to the

improvement of the living standards of people; and less on freedom from fear which focuses on securing people from threats of violence (King and MacLean, 2000:5).

Scholars of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect including Alexander J. Bellamy, Tim Dunne, Robert A. Pape, Nicholas J. Wheeler, and Ramesh Thakur advance the protection of human beings in all interventions. The protection of the dignity and lives of human beings are considered sacred and ought to be the primary concern rather than territorial sovereignty in any international interventions (see Wheeler and Dunne, 1998; Bellamy. 2008; Bellamy, 2010; Dunne and Gifkins, 2011; Smit, 2013; Bellamy and Dunne, 2016). The argument here is that in cases of extreme abuses of human rights as experienced in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999, the inviolableness of state sovereignty cannot be absolute (Hubert and Bonser, 2001:113). These, and many other concerns, brought Norway into contact with Canada who signed the Lysoen Declaration in 1998 aimed at addressing issues of disarmament, human rights, and support for the creation of humanitarian law and other matters relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

About 10 years after the popularisation of human security by the UNDP, Secretary-General Kofi Annan took steps further by urging member states to pay particular attention to issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms which were key elements within the human security agenda. In the UN Secretary-General's report, *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005),* freedom to live in dignity and gained concern as freedom from fear and freedom from want. The 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/60/1 which lays emphasis on human rights and fundamental freedoms, "all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy their rights and fully develop their human potential" (see paragraph 143, Outcome Document A / RES / 60/1,

General Assembly, 2005). In 2012, the UN General Assembly as part of its agenda of ensuring that member states took necessary steps to address human insecurity issues reminded states of the following as constituting the key components of human security:

> The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential (General Assembly, 2012: resolution 66/290).

It is important to stress that the different perspectives have not diminished the importance of human security in the improvement of human survival, life and dignity against all forms of threats, especially in developing countries. The works of Hasting (2011), Martin and Owen (2010), Owen (2014) and the programmes and publications of the UNOCHA and the Japan's Official Development Assistance around the world demonstrate the relevance and attractiveness of human security as a development paradigm. Due to its importance in contemporary times, human security remains at the centre of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The launch on August 19, 2016 of the Oxford Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect at the Asia Pacific Centre for Responsibility to Protect (R2P), University of Queensland marks another milestone in the quests to making human security the centre of security in this century.

The nexus between peacebuilding and human security in war-affected states

As previously discussed, peacebuilding and human security are two new global vocabularies which became popularised in the UN commissioned works written by the former Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali and the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq respectively. These works address the new emerging challenges of the world following the collapse of bipolarity. As we saw in the previous discussion, 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' constitute the pillars of the human security concept. It is these significant freedoms of individuals that peacebuilding interventions hope to achieve in post-conflict societies.

In post-conflict peacebuilding, when conceptualised, human security is understood in terms of "protecting individuals from existential and pervasive threats to their personal safety and physical well-being" (Krause, 2009:147). This view, as expressed by Krause, clearly encapsulates the 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' strands of human security.

Despite the concerns raised about the feasibility of human security and the views of its opponents that it is an empty concept, post-colonial and radical thinkers see human security as an answer to liberal peace in terms of theory and practice (Begby and Burgess, 2009). Oliver Richmond calls the earlier conceptualisation of human security as the emancipatory forms of human security (see Richmond, 2010:1). In order for this emancipatory forms of human security to make strides, Richmond recommends that human security must pursue a security approach that is post-liberal where local actors see external interveners as partners and not see themselves as incapable without the liberals; this is, what he calls post-colonial hybridity which in his view is critical in peacebuilding (Richmond, 2010:2).

In terms of peacebuilding, Richmond sees an intrinsic relationship between human security and peacebuilding. Richmond posits that even though the term human security may not be used by many international actors working in non-civil society enclaves, the broadest conceptualisation of human security as 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' makes human security a validating concept which is at the centre of the goals of the liberal peace project. According to him, these international actors present human security as a set of basic needs constructed within the liberal state; and it is these security needs that mandate these international helpers to defy the principle of 'non-interference' where appropriate by intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Richmond, 2010:3).

In peacebuilding, Richmond identifies two key versions of human security; namely, institutional and emancipatory approaches. While the former considers human security as being

central to the protection of liberal institutions, the latter empowers the individuals, and addresses the vulnerabilities of people. The emancipatory approach, according to Richmond, is a bottom-up approach where people are empowered "to negotiate and develop a form of human security that is fitted to their needs—political, economic, and social, but also provides them with the necessary tools to do so" (Richmond, 2007:461). Both institutional and emancipatory approaches are important in our analyses in this thesis because the success of interventions in post-conflict states depends to a very large extent on how the interventions help to addressing issues of human vulnerabilities. One key issue which is critical in protecting human lives is the reforms of state institutions which are often decimated during years of war. In Kosovo, for example, the ills in the legal systems left judges poorly trained in human rights, a situation that has negatively affected their interpretation of "the penal code or the criminal procedure code through the lens of international human rights instruments …" (Sannerholm, 2007).

Socially, building cohesive societies has increasingly been seen as an important goal for conflict affected societies. While criticisms have been levelled against the influence and value of social cohesion in war-affected societies (Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Harriss, 1997), King (2013) not only sees it as an input variable, but it has also been admitted as having the capacity to engender development outcome (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002; Ferroni et al, 2008; Hayami, 2009). Indeed, the value of social cohesion as an important peacebuilding function is embedded in the fact that it is about the attitudes and behaviors that build bridges of communication or relationship where they are broken down (Chan et al, 2006; Stewart, 2010; Brown and Zahar, 2015). It also serves as an important conflict transformation toolkit capable of building stronger societies (Lederach, 2003).

In his examination of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states, Earl Conteh-Morgan identifies human insecurity at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels (Conteh-

Morgan, 2005). The sources of human insecurity at the personal level include banditry, looting, rioting, and hate crimes; the institutional level of human insecurity come in the form of oppression, corruption, torture, paramilitary brutality, and state repression. Lastly, the sources of structural-cultural levels of human insecurity include poverty, hunger, inequalities and deprivation and unemployment (Conteh-Morgan, 2005:71). Weighing Conteh-Morgan's categorisation of the issues that need to be addressed in post-conflict societies at the personal, institutional and structural levels, it can be argued that his perspective highlights the importance of both 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' as critical issues that ought to be addressed by interveners. Conteh-Morgan contends that the only way to address human insecurity at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels is by means of a more effective peacebuilding process underpinned by the bottom-up approach to peacebuilding by the peacebuilders in their quests to solve issues of critical concern to the marginalised people in the post-conflict societies. Séverine Autesserre (2010; 2014) and Roger Mac Ginty (2011) concur with Conteh-Morgan on the need for the inclusion of local population in the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. Mac Ginty refers to this as hybridity in peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2011: 69-71).

Unlike state security, human security emphasises the need to protect people from threats, and in situations where they are affected by threats of war, hunger, food, environment, health, political and economic threats. States and non-state local actors, international governmental and non-international governmental bodies have a prima facie duty to assist the suffering people during a crisis. In the words of the 1994 HDR, the essence of human security is to transform and give meaning to security "from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security" (UNDP, 1994:22-4). The United Nations General Assembly reinforced its affirmation of human security when it succinctly established in the '2005 World Summit Outcome' document:

We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognise that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly (UN General Assembly, 2005:31).

From this standpoint, security from 'fear' and 'want' have become important goals to be achieved, and these are critical in post-conflict societies in the third world. First, because they are underdeveloped; and second, because the little development they have achieved in the past is destroyed by war. In post-conflict societies, personal security is threatened by physical violence, domestic violence and other banditry crimes; economic security is threatened by poverty, deprivation, unemployment, hunger and famine. Individuals also face health security threats such as lack of access to primary health care, diseases and malnutrition and the educational facilities are often destroyed by war. The community security is also threatened by inter-ethnic, religious and identity crises. As a consequence, and due to the primacy accorded to human security, international security institutions and states have over the years in post-cold war period in particular taken initiatives to address these human insecurity matters. This practice involves international actors working closely with state and non-state actors to implement programmes in fragile states to remove threats to human security; these programmes are the peacebuilding interventions. The quest to achieve the objectives of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states provokes questions on how to ensure that people were indeed safer and protected in their countries.

In post-conflict societies, the means of achieving sustainable peace are not in doubt. The commitment of the international community actively working with domestic actors of the armed conflict state, resource mobilisation by the peacebuilders as well as a detailed analysis of the core needs of the people remain crucial. Despite these known facts, post-conflict peacebuilding remains one of the most difficult concepts struggling to move from rhetoric to reality (Chetail, 2010:25). The question is, how do peacebuilders' interventions intended to

address issues of personal safety and security of communities and socio-economic opportunities, particularly health and education impact on peace in war-affected states? While these interventions continue to be implemented in war-torn states to reduce humanitarian catastrophes, there are a number of challenges that affect peacebuilding interventions.

Scholarly inquiries including Chopra and Hohe (2004), Autesserre (2010) and Mac Ginty (2011) criticise the strategies used by the international community as not giving adequate consideration to local realities and very little attention to the needs of the local population. In the case of the Congo, the peacebuilders did not establish cordial relationships with communities in which they built peace; rather, they were detached from the people. The situation, according to Séverine Autesserre, denied peacebuilders of critical information that could be used in responding promptly to pressing peacebuilding needs (Autesserre, 2014). To address these needs, Michael Pugh (2009) encourages peacebuilders to reconsider the political economy of welfare of post-conflict societies in the liberal peace framework in order to capture the 'whole of life' potential of individuals and communities. They should not leave out informal or even criminal elements who constitute an important hub in any welfare provision. This thesis examines the impact of peacebuilding interventions on the 'whole of life' by specifically examining the impact of such interventions on personal safety and the security of people, human rights, water, sanitation and hygiene, maternal and infant health, medical facilities and staff, shelter and children's access to education in post conflict Côte d'Ivoire.

Another argument to make post-conflict peacebuilding effective is the recognition that peacebuilding is a complex and arduous task involving facets including "not only multi-dimensional but also multi-sectoral in terms of what the international community should be doing on the ground, multi-levelled in terms of how much should be done, and multi-staged in terms of when the international community should be involved" (Lund, 2003:13). In this regard, effective policy coherence and coordination and broader strategies through consensus

approach on how to successfully execute peacebuilding interventions should be the pre-occupation of the international community. However, this is one key area of challenge affecting post-conflict states. The challenge hinges on the numerous institutions and agencies involved in peacebuilding which makes it difficult for coherence in what they do. The impact that these peacebuilders make on peace in the suffering state depends to a very large extent on how they are able to develop a broader strategy which is achieved through the harmonisation of individual policy choices and priorities as well as coordinating these policy choices and priorities. Strategic deficits have been identified as one of the key failures of peacebuilding interventions. Utstein study concludes:

> More than 55 per cent of the projects do not show any link to a broader strategy for the country in which they are implemented. Some projects are not linked to a broader strategy because there is no strategy for them to be linked to. In other cases, the broader strategy exists but projects show no connection to it (Smith, 2004:10-11).

Notwithstanding these and many other challenges, effective implementation of peacebuilding interventions to address human security concerns in post-conflict states can strengthen the safety and security of people, reduce socio-economic malaise and build stronger social relationships. Domestically, the key areas of human security which are impacted by peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states which is the focus of this thesis are categorised into: personal safety and security of people and socio-economic security which has the health and education of the war-affected people as its core issues to be addressed. These areas are at the hub of post-conflict states' progress and interventions to address the key areas are critical for sustainable peace.

Conclusion

The chapter examined scholarly works on the core issues of peacebuilding and human security in war affected societies. These are analysed by conceptualising peacebuilding and drawing the distinction between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and the nexus between peacebuilding and

human security. Peace studies featured prominently in the classic works of Johan Galtung (1964; 1969; 1976; 1996; 2000; 2003). However, peace gained popularity in early 1990s when Boutros-Boutros Ghali used the term in his work, *An Agenda for Peace*. The chapter also discussed the vital ingredients for ensuring peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. A wide range of interventions are implemented in post-conflict states as part of the broader concern of actors of peace to address issues that threaten human vulnerabilities including poverty, disease, hunger and general humanitarian catastrophes. These implemented interventions can broadly be categorised into security of individuals from physical attacks and socio-economic security in terms of fighting threats to health and education. The next chapter which discusses the theoretical matrix framing peacebuilding interventions in conflict and post-conflict fragile states is anchored on the "freedom from fear", "freedom from want" and "freedom from indignity" components of human security. The framework is the analytical approach in assessing the impact of peacebuilding on human security.

Chapter Three

Human Security: The Theoretical Framework for Assessing the Impact of Peacebuilding in War-Affected States

The chapter provides the theoretical matrix for assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security in war-affected states. The framework is drawn on the core standpoints of human security – "freedom from fear", "freedom from want" and "freedom from indignity". Human security is used as the analytical framework because, as reviewed in chapter two, the essence of peacebuilding interventions in war-affected states is to mitigate factors that threaten human vulnerabilities and insecurity during armed conflict, and to prevent the post-conflict state from relapsing into armed violence. The threats of human security of populations can be caused by disasters such as Typhoon Yolanda (Eadie, and Su, 2018; Atienza, Eadie and Tan-Mullins, 2018) or armed conflicts (Busumtwi-Sam, 2008). This theoretical milieu, however, focuses on how peacebuilding interventions address human insecurity in violent conflicts. Human security increases in war-affected states when peacebuilding interventions target violence reduction to improve the safety of citizens from physical harm, improve human rights, and also improve the accessibility of citizens to socio-economic opportunities (Lambourne, 2004). This framework focusses on the issues that are critical to protecting and/or dealing with the vulnerabilities of war-affected populations with the implementation of peacebuilding initiatives. Wars affect both rich and poor, males and females, adults and children. However, in many contemporary wars fought around the globe, the deprived and excluded urban and rural poor, with the majority of them being women and children, have been the most vulnerable to violence (Busumtwi-Sam, 2008:23). It, therefore, takes into particular concern how the peace initiatives of international actors address the problem of war-affected urban and rural poor populations

The framework details the basics necessary for assessing the extent to which individuals and/or communities enjoy basic social, economic and political security as a result of peacebuilding interventions in conflict and post-conflict societies. Based on the extant literature on peacebuilding and human security, the protection of the personal safety of individuals and the security of the war-affected communities by eliminating or reducing violence and violent crime is one of the dependent variables. This variable is anchored on the 'freedom from fear' standpoint of human security and also hinged on Johan Galtung's negative peace as discussed in chapter one. Protection is critical to human security because it is through it that human beings can escape physical harm. By protection, we mean the strategy or means for mitigating threats to personal safety and security of individuals which affect basic rights and freedoms or measures that remove the risks or dangers that threaten people's lives. The freedom from fear component in this regard is partly linked to freedom to live in dignity which is a critical human security element. This is because human rights and the need to live in dignity which is operationalised in the "freedom from indignity" strand of human security suffer in war situations due to physical violence experienced by people. If human security in war-affected communities is to be increased, individual rights and dignity need to be protected in armed conflict. Protection connotes people receiving some degree of humane, decent, fair treatment and respect without any shred of discrimination from both the state and non-state actors. From the "freedom from want" component of human security, addressing the socio-economic security of people in conflict and post-conflict states is the third identified dependent variable because it is one of the noticeable human security concerns affected in armed conflict. Therefore, it is crucial in our analytical framework. Based on the existing literature and interviews, a number of health and education indicators have been constructed to assess the impact of peacebuilding interventions on socio-economic security, as shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Summary of human security concerns and measurement indicators targeted by peacebuilding interventions

Nature of human security	type of human security threats	peacebuilding policies	measurement indicators for assessing peacebuilding interventions (factors to be addressed)
Freedom from fear	interpersonal/collective security (physical violence)	diplomatic policies (identity and citizenship policies; government of national reconciliation; elections and inclusivity); military policies (international military presence and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration);	provision of personal safety and security of communities
Freedom from indignity	human rights	international human rights monitoring, sanctions, investigations and accountability for war crimes	eliminating summary and extra-judicial killings, assault, rape and all forms of sexual abuse, forced disappearances/abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions
Freedom from want fear	socio-economic security (health)	international health support programmes	access to preventive and treatable healthcare services relative to infant and maternal health; access to functioning and good medical facilities and trained heath workforce; access to safe drinking water and good hygiene practices; access to food and nutrition; and access to shelter
Freedom from want fear	socio-economic security (education)	international education support programmes	addressing gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality relative to children's access to education; building and equipping schools with facilities for children in war-affected communities; training, recruiting and enhancing teachers' professional capacities; alleviating poverty in families of war-affected communities; psychosocial support to children in war-affected communities

As we saw in chapter two, the success of peace interventions in post-conflict states depends to a very large extent on how peacebuilding interventions contribute to removing threats to human vulnerabilities and insecurity. The critical areas of human security which are at the heart of peacebuilding interventions based on extant literature which form the foundation of our assessment are how peacebuilders address threats to personal safety and security of people and

socio-economic concerns in war-affected communities. The security and socio-economic matters are the considered measurable factors when assessing peacebuilding interventions because they are usually the first areas targeted by interventions for rebuilding (Haidari, 2008; Pavignani, 2005). In the subsequent sections, the critical factors are discussed.

Factors peacebuilders should address to ensure personal safety and security of communities in armed conflict states

This section critically examines the factors peacebuilders could address in mitigating the factors that threaten the safety and security of people. In considering these factors, the section draws on how peacebuilders could eliminate or reduce violence, and promote human rights. These two critical matters are within the "freedom from fear" and "freedom from indignity" strands of human security. In this section, our analyses which draw on the "freedom from fear" standpoint take into consideration the provision and/or protection of personal safety of people and their communities from violent harm or destruction. James Busumtwi-Sam (2008:20) suggests that interventions to address human security threats should first prioritise the protection of vulnerable or most deprived populations whose safety or survival and well-being/livelihoods are threatened. On the basis of prior literature and my interviews, this section provides a list of factors which peacebuilders could address to mitigate violence and human rights abuses. These factors could be tested in conflict and post-conflict states to establish how far people have recovered or are recovering from the effects of violence with the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. The identified factors which are tested in chapters four and five for Côte d'Ivoire are shown in the table 3.2. The table is composed of two parts; the first part consists of factors which peacebuilders are expected to address to mitigate violence. These factors are hinged on "freedom from fear" and negative peace. These factors are tested in chapter four. The second part which addresses issues within the "Freedom

from indignity" standpoint of human security is composed of factors which peacebuilders could address to protect human rights violations in war-affected communities. These are tested in chapter five.

3.2 Factors peacebuilders should address to ensure personal safety and security of communities in armed conflict states

Factors organised in themes
Part I (freedom from fear and also negative peace)
Elimination or reduction of violence and threats of violence in war-affected communities. This can be done by: - addressing violence through diplomatic engagements by peacebuilders with feuding parties - addressing ethnic, citizenship and exclusionary politics in war-affected states - addressing elections and inclusivity problems in war-affected states.
Provision of security to protect lives and property in war-affected states. Can be achieved by: - providing international military presence to protect war-affected people - retrieval of arms and disbanding of armed groups - reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants into their communities
Part II (freedom from indignity – also addresses issues of negative and positive peace)
Confronting human rights violations in war-affected communities through: - international pressure to deter perpetrators of human rights abusers from killing, torturing and committing other forms of inhumane treatment in war-affected communities - imposition of international sanctions on human rights violators - monitoring and reporting human rights abuses in war-affected communities - addressing sexual abuse of women and girls in war-affected communities - addressing perpetrators of war crimes - international investigations and trials of war criminals

Addressing violence and violent crime in war-affected communities

The perception and pervasiveness of violent crimes relating to armed conflicts and the (mis)treatment of political opponents and civilians are critical. Essentially, available datasets and qualitative investigations into citizens' perceptions of their own safety, security and the promotion of human rights are very important. To determine the extent to which peacebuilding has influenced the personal safety and security of war-affected communities, one needs to weigh the existing security situation at the time of the intervention against the current situation on how people perceive they are safe and secure in terms of their protection from violent harm or abuse resulting from war.

The safety of individuals and their communities from violence has been identified to be a key determinant of post-conflict peace (United Nations, 2007: 33-34). None of the dimensions of human security can be achieved in an atmosphere of violence or insecurity. Research shows that violence affects post-conflict state's capacity to recover fully and in a timely way; it derails democratisation as people will be unable to effectively participate in the political processes, it builds a culture of impunity, causes family disintegration and eliminates or reduces social capital and engagement (World Bank, 2010). The different types of violence that individuals and communities are susceptible to in post-conflict societies are categorised into interpersonal and collective violence (WHO, 2008; see also Steenkamp, 2011; 2017).

Violence relating to domestic affairs including child abuse in schools and work places and others at the community level are considered interpersonal violence. Collective violence on the other hand, has been defined by the World Health Organisation as "the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives" (WHO, 2008:215). In this regard, both state-perpetrated violence and non-state actors' violence such as repression, torture and other forms of abuses which people are subjected to as well as organised crimes by groups constitute the collective violence. The war-affected people expect peacebuilding initiatives to eliminate violence because it threatens the security of their communities (interviews with members of communities, 2016). The elimination of violence is intrinsically linked to human security because the latter stresses personal, communal and political security including repression and protection from organised violence (Commission on Human Security, 2003:2; Ewans, 2007:184-185). Therefore, building peace in post-conflict societies should consider the extent to which personal safety and security are guaranteed in the communities. Steenkamp argues that the protection of citizens against organised crime can be achieved when

communities are given adequate security because inadequate security leads to less detection, appreciation and conviction of criminals (Steenkamp, 2011: 363).

It is expected that people in post-conflict societies will enjoy their basic rights and freedoms such as rights to life and personal dignity, as well as freedom from repression and torture from both state and non-state actors, with the help of peacebuilding interventions. If peacebuilding interventions are implemented in a post-conflict state, it is expected that there will be a reduction or removal of the risks and dangers that threaten human beings and their livelihoods. Typically, the risk factors which ought to be mitigated in post-conflict societies range from the proliferation of arms and organised banditry to the failure of the state to provide protective public security. Such a situation often becomes a safe haven for bandits who effectively use the vacuum created to exact violence against unarmed civilians (Yacoub et al., 2006: 428–34). Some literature expects peacebuilding to strengthen the institutions of the state and their legitimacy so that the state is able to take over the administration of the post-conflict state when peace finally returns. This is because strengthening state legitimacy helps in mitigating the risk factors of violence in post-conflict states as it empowers state institutions to undertake tasks that lead to improvement in personal safety and liberties of citizens. The Commission on Human Security observes that "effective state security institutions upholding the rule of law and human rights are an essential component for achieving human security, development and governance. The key to rebuilding trust and confidence in institutions" (CHS, 2003:63). However, war-affected populations expect interventions to first and foremost address issues that hinder social service delivery after war (interviews with members of communities, 2016). This is because the provision of social services would make communities more resilient, and it is resilient communities that could serve better as the bridge for peace than peacebuilding approach which largely focuses on strengthening state institutions to promote peace after years of war. The state institutions role in the promotion of peace in war-shattered states raises the

question of state legitimacy. This is because an intrinsic relationship exists between legitimacy and armed violence. As Bruce Gilley states, such a relationship is at best "complex and uncertain" (Gilley, 2009:158). The war-affected communities are characterised by a loss of trust and confidence in the elites who most often are the architects of the war. In most cases, this same group of persons become representatives of the state, and if this happens a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of war-affected population takes place. Once state legitimacy dissipates, citizens begin to disengage with it, and the state loses its monopoly over the use of force.

Other literature argues for the strengthening of fragile societies' capabilities to lesson propensities for violence and crime (United Nations, 2007:33). Addressing threats to personal safety and security of war-affected persons requires peacebuilding to prevent violence. To address violence and crime, peacebuilders could diplomatically engage feuding parties and their communities. In this regard, peacebuilders could deploy international peacekeepers with the right size, resources and clear mandate to be able to protect citizens against harm. It is also expected that peacebuilders would take steps to retrieve all arms from the fighters, dismantle the fighting groups and reintegrate the disarmed and demobilised groups back into their communities. Undertaking DDR programmes in war-affected states should be comprehensive and effective because Steenkamp (2011:363), citing Virginia Gamba, notes that "ineffective and incomplete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants leave a combination of available small arms and disgruntled, unemployed ex-combatants on the streets of a post-accord society—a certain recipe for violence" (Steenkamp, 2011:363; see also Gamba; 2003). Peacebuilders could economically empower the reintegrated and the most economically marginalised members of the communities so that they do not go back to the bush to start fighting, and are able to cope with the effects of war.

A new dimension to conflict and post-conflict stabilisation is the changing roles of the military in international security, this has been pursued in recent academic scholarship (see Eadie and

Wyn, 2016:1-2). The security environment in which the military operates has changed, and the technology of the 21st century has also seen a remarkable advancement. In their book, Eadie and Wyn pointed out that it is easier today for the most technologically advanced state to win wars than centuries ago. However, they argue that there is a limit to what military power can do as far as conflict stabilisation is concerned in this challenging security environment. Military power can achieve negative peace, but not positive peace which is sustainable as evidenced in Afghanistan and Iraq. As part of the changing roles of the military in conflict stabilisation, peacekeepers no longer limit their roles to the provision of military muscle in their protection of war-affected populations, but do actually undertake programmes and projects that ensure socio-economic security. Thus, the international peacebuilding role of the military has a social component. The assessment of the impact of peacebuilding on human security in Côte d'Ivoire includes data on the contribution of peacekeepers to socio-economic security – freedom from want (see chapters five and six).

One other critical factor which peacebuilders could address to ensure the safety and security of people is that they should confront human rights violations. This could be achieved by mounting international pressure on fighting groups to stop all forms of human rights abuses, sanctioning perpetrators of human rights abuse, monitoring and reporting all human rights violations, and holding accountable through international trials of people found to be responsible for war crimes.

Addressing socio-economic security problems in war-affected communities

In this section, we discuss the second critical component of human security – "freedom from want" which is essential in post-conflict states. It is important to stress that some of the issues which are germane to" freedom from want" have significant relationship with "freedom from dignity." Based on available literature on socio-economic security of post-conflict states, the core measurement indicators which constitute the foundation of the assessment of the extent to

which peacebuilding interventions contribute to the human security of post-conflict states are developed. The significant role of socio-economic security in the rebuilding of states emerging from armed conflict cannot be overemphasised. Chukwuma Obidegwu notes that new governments emerging from war face the daunting tasks of building new economies (Obidegwu, 2004). The signing of peace agreements following the cessation of hostilities is not sufficient for sustainable peace unless there is the resumption of socio-economic activities; this makes socio-economic recovery essential (Obidegwu, 2004:20). This means that there is some intrinsic relationship between socio-economic development and human security in post-conflict fragile states. As we saw previously, the "freedom from want" element of human security links security to socio-economic development. Therefore, threats to socio-economic opportunities in conflict states are significant threats to human security (Human Development Report, 1994).

Peacebuilding, as noted by the United Nations, is "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development" (United Nations, 2007). The socio-economic characteristics essential for the sustainability of peace and development include health, education and job opportunities. However, the parameters of this framework pays minimal attention to the impact of job creation interventions. This is because at the macro-level, job creation intervention is useful in protecting livelihoods as well as a stimulus to the economic activity of states (Mallett and Slater, 2012). It serves as a buffer in reducing grievances or as a disincentive to people who may want to engage in conflict (Collier, et al. 2009). However, the empirical data and evidence gathered at the micro level from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines show that there is no connection between the risk of conflict and unemployment (Berman et al. 2010; Berman et al, 2011). Similarly, Mercy Corps' (2015) researched the key drivers or incentives that influence

youth's proclivity for political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. The finding of this research is that in most countries, individuals' employment or unemployment status has very little influence on their participation and/or willingness to engage in violence. The measurement indicators for socio-economic security are drawn from the key variables in health and education in assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions.

The selection of health and education hinges on the fact that they are the first critical areas targeted by peacebuilding interventions at the micro-level (Pavignani, 2005; Haidari, 2008; Haar and Rubenstein, 2012). These critical areas are central to the achievement of socio-economic goals of post-conflict fragile states as they are central to poverty reduction. The populations of states that have experienced violent conflict face grave health and education concerns than people in states that have not experienced war (Haar and Rubenstein, 2012; Rose and Greeley, 2006). There is growing evidence that equitable and effective healthcare and improved educational systems are key contributory factors to sustainable peace in post-conflict societies (Rose and Greeley, 2006; Save the Children UK, 2010; Haar and Rubenstein, 2012). For post-conflict states in particular, international peacebuilding intervention programmes are implemented as a means to ensure sustainable peace.

However, the extent to which interventions implemented in the area of health and education during armed conflict impact on the progress of post-conflict states remains under researched. The extant literature in the field of conflict and health focuses extensively on the effects of conflict on health; and only a few attempts have examined the extent to which peacebuilding interventions impact on human security which is a route to a sustainable peace. Similarly, research on education in conflict affected societies have to a very large extent neglected an approach that assesses the extent to which peacebuilding interventions impact on human security. These studies have in most cases interrogated the effect of armed conflict on education and less on turning the issue the other way round – the impact of peacebuilding interventions

on education. This framework adopts this approach in its investigation to unravel the contribution that peacebuilding interventions make on war-affected populations. It is interested in uncovering how the peacebuilding interventions are implemented, and how they impact on health and education.

Factors peacebuilders should address to recover health in conflict-affected communities

This section examines the critical factors which peacebuilders' healthcare interventions could address to ensure the state of health of war-affected persons in conflict and post-conflict states. In considering the factors that measure the impact of peacebuilders' health interventions, the section adopts the World Health Organisation's (WHO) understanding of health, which it defines as, "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO, 1948: 100; see Grad, 2002:982; WHO, 2006). What is considered to be health, therefore, goes beyond the state of being free from illness or injury to include other important matters which improves the quality of life of people - what they eat, drink, wear and where they sleep.

Health systems in conflict and post-conflict states face a number of interlocking challenges because they are severely disrupted during armed violence. This makes healthcare service accessibility and delivery difficult for many people. The case of underdeveloped or developing states which have experienced violent conflict is worst. This is because the regular disease monitoring systems and immunisation programmes for preventable diseases such as poliomyelitis, yellow fever, cholera, acute respiratory illness in children, malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, meningitis, and onchocerciasis are heavily disrupted. The health units or infrastructures are interrupted as well, and a vast majority of health staff also leave which combine to make health systems malfunction (Iqbal, 2006: 634; ICRC, 2011: 14; Nickerson, 2015: 347; Safeguard Health in Conflict, 2016: 10). They malfunction when the people do not have access to medical facilities and competent health staff to treat ailments and handle

maternal and child healthcare related problems. The malfunctioning of the health of people also occurs when there is no quality water to drink, no food, poor sanitation and hygiene, and no shelter to protect the people from the vagaries of the weather (interviews of members of communities, 2016).

Under the circumstances of malfunctioning health systems owing to war, international peace actors have a responsibility to intervene. These actors are expected to help in constructing necessary structures to uplift the human security levels which could lead to a durable peace. Based on present literature and my interviews, this section provides a full list of factors which peacebuilders could address when undertaking peacebuilding in conflict affected states. These factors are the hypotheses which could be tested in conflict and post-conflict states to establish how far the health of a conflict-affected state has recovered from the effects of war. The identified factors which are tested in chapter six for Côte d'Ivoire are shown in table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Factors to be addressed by peacebuilders to recover health in armed conflict states

Factors organised in themes (freedom from want/Galtung's positive peace)
Access to adequate water (in terms of quality and quantity). - access to wells, boreholes and hand pump installations; water storage facilities; protection of water sources; rehabilitation of water-treatment plants; transportation of water from water-treatment plants to populations in need) - access to good sanitation and hygiene facilities - access to good sanitary conditions and primary health care
Access to medical facilities and health professionals. - access to medical care in insecure areas - protection of medical establishments, personnel and supplies - help to reduce limitations such as: physical access, transportation, travelling distance, and financial constraints of women (especially during pregnancies and birthing).
Access to maternal healthcare services – both antenatal care (ANC) and post-natal care (PNC). - Access to ANC providers (medical facilities) - Access to trained birth attendant (private, public and traditional birth attendant) - Help to reduce cost and travelling time.
Access to infant health services. - Access to treatment of diarrhoeal diseases and acute respiratory infections which are the main causes of death among children in conflicts - Access to paediatric services such as infant immunisation against preventable diseases - Access to infant medical facilities - Access to paediatric health staff.
Access to food and nutrition. - access to food to affected populations (especially for women during pregnancy and lactation and children) - access to supplementary feeding - support to local agricultural services
Access to shelter.

| - Access to temporary structures such as tents in emergencies |
| - Access to permanent accommodation structures through financial support to families |
| - Access to blankets and clothing to preserve the health and dignity of the war-affected person |

The section is divided into two parts. The first section briefly reviews literature on the effects of war on the health of people. This discussion brings out the gap in the literature on the impact of peacebuilding on human security. The second section discusses in detail the measurable factors that could be used in determining the real impact of peacebuilding on human security in conflict and post-conflict states.

The research gap on the impact of peacebuilding on the health of people in war-affected states

Extensive work has been done on the health of people in states that have experienced armed conflicts (Whiteside, de Waal and Gebretensae, 2006; Iqbal, 2006; Corbin, 2008; Johnson et al, 2008; Seckinelgin, Bigirumwani and Morris, 2008; Gupta et al, 2009; Davenport and Loyle, 2009; Miller and Rasmussen, 2010; Betancourt et al., 2010). However, this thesis departs from these scholarly inquiries in terms of focus and content. Prior studies examine the effects of armed conflict on the health of people in armed conflicts and post-conflict settings, but few attempts have examined the impact that peacebuilding interventions could make on the health of post-conflict states. This is a critical human security matter with several implications on the peace of post-conflict states. The consensus in the burgeoning literature is that several strata of interventions are required in post-conflict settings, and they should target the necessary health needs including war-related trauma which are essential in building local community resilience (WHO, 2000; IASC, 2007; WHO, 2008a; Borba et al., 2016).

Past studies on health in armed conflict states have neglected the impact of peacebuilding interventions. They have focused extensively on the physical and psychological effects of violence (Campbell, 2002; Iqbal, 2006; Small et al, 2008; Johnson et al, 2008), mental health

(Gupta et al, 2009; Miller and Rasmussen (2010), relationship between armed conflict and disease vulnerability (Davenport and Loyle, 2009, Binega, 2008; Whiteside, de Waal and Gebretensae, 2006; De Waal, 2004; Prince-Smith and Daly, 2004; Spiegel, 2004); and health of women combatants in armed conflicts (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Corbin, 2008; Seckinelgin, Bigirumwani and Morris, 2008). Others analyse the effects of war on child soldiers (Betancourt et al., 2010), and the health policy impact on the military on the UN and AU peacekeeping missions (Kershaw, 2008).

Despite their exclusive focus on the effects of war on the diverse arena of health issues affecting people in post-conflict states, they nevertheless provide robust foundations on which to construct health related measurement indicators. These indicators are useful in conducting an impact assessment of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states. What these health and related studies failed to do is identify whether or not international peacebuilding interventions impact positively or do not produce any impact on the health of people in post-war states. This is addressed in the present study. This framework agrees with the extant literature which argues that establishing a post-conflict health services requires a special attention given to the removal of conflict iniquities, and the view that the provision of health services should target populations most vulnerable during conflict (Pavignani, 2005; Borba et al., 2016).

Based on the greatest health needs of the war-affected people, the under-discussed health threats are selected as the dependent variables for our assessment of the impact of peacebuilding interventions on health. The first is access to adequate and good drinking water, good sanitation and hygiene services; the next is access to medical facilities and health staff. The third is access to maternal and infant health care. Others are access to food and nutrition and shelter. All these factors as discussed below are considered critical in the improvement of human security in war-affected communities.

Access to quality water, sanitation and hygiene services in war-affected communities

Accessibility of the war-affected persons to adequate quality water, good sanitation and hygiene is a necessity. International peace actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC: 2009:4-5) have spearheaded the need to make good drinking water and the provision of sanitation and hygiene services to war-affected people; for instance, in Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. In 2004, an ICRC study expected peacebuilders to undertake a number of measures to address access to water, sanitation and hygiene (ICRC, 2004: 57-59). Peacebuilders could provide safe and proximate access to water by the construction of wells, boreholes and hand pump installations; constructing water storage facilities; protecting water sources; rehabilitating water-treatment plants; transporting water from water-treatment plants to populations in need. My interviewees expected peacebuilders to provide good drinking water, good sanitation and hygiene facilities in their communities. They recommended that peacebuilders provide support to ensure proper drainage systems, and good waste disposal facilities in order to reduce or prevent communicable diseases (interview with members of communities, 2016).

Access to medical facilities and the health workforce in war-affected communities

During war, non-state combatants in particular target the health systems of states for destruction. The clinics and hospitals infrastructure become the targets of destruction, interrupting supplies of drugs and other medications. They also target food supply systems, water supplies, sewage and sanitation facilities for destruction (Urdal and Primus Che, 2013). A combination of all these leads to the flight of professional health workers (Nagai et al, 2007; Rytter, Kjaeldgaard, Bronnum-Hansen, and Helweg-Larsen, 2006; Betsi et al, 2006). The aim is to destabilise governments (Cliff and Noormahomed, 1988). According to Henrik Urdal and Chi Primus Che (2013:492), combatants do this as a means to construct social disorder, and to

destabilise the opponent. When this occurs, health systems become badly affected which limits citizens' access. This has a dire present and a long-term effect on health because of the suspension of critical public health programmes such as obstetrical care and paediatric services and regular preventive vaccinations of the distressed populations.

Under certain circumstances, the health systems become vulnerable due to government's own resolve to spend more on the prosecution of the war by acquiring more armaments at the expense of investing in critical sectors of the economy; notably health, education, and political governance (Agborsangaya-Fiteu, 2009). In the Iraqi war, Owen Dyer (2003) observes the extensive looting of laboratories and destruction of health facilities which affected the state's capacity to confront the pressing health needs, leading to the outbreak of cholera. The precarious health conditions have often invited the response of the highly professional international humanitarian organisations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent and the *Médecins sans Frontières* who often leave an impressive footprint working in extremely difficult conditions (Balasegaram et al., 2009; Ritmeijer et al., 2007). The destruction caused to medical facilities creates deficits. It makes it extremely difficult for the war-affected state to undertake its core responsibility of providing health care to its citizens. The infrastructural deficits and lack of trained medical staff could be reversed by increasing access. Peacebuilders' interventions could build or rehabilitate abandoned or damaged infrastructure and the recruiting and training of health professionals to assist communities in need. War affected people should be able to access medical facilities. Accessibility here means that people should have physical access, transportation access, less travel time, and less financial burden in terms of cost of treatment (interviews, 2016).

Access to maternal and child health services to reduce morbidity and mortality in conflict and post-conflict communities

The two key factors considered essential in this framework are war-related morbidity and mortality relative to maternal and child health when assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions on human security. Maternal mortality is the risk of dying either in pregnancy or shortly after delivery, and this is the highest in post-conflict countries (WHO, 2007; Chi et al., 2015). Child or infant mortality, on the other hand, is the risk of dying before attaining the age of five. The incidence of war-related morbidity is far greater than mortality. The highest ever mortality ratio recorded is Afghanistan's Badakshan province owing to the protracted conflict Afghanistan experienced (Bartlett et al, 2005). A quantitative study undertaken in the Democratic Republic of Congo concluded that many deaths in the surveyed areas were the result of malaria, diarrhoea, malnutrition and acute respiratory infections rather than violence (Coghlan et al., 2006). States that have experienced war suffer persistent high mortality and morbidity because of the disruption to human livelihoods and the inadequacy of food and water, as well as the destruction of health systems and the flight of professionals (Kruk, 2010; Haar and Rubenstein, 2012).

One would expect morbidity to be reduced in a post-conflict period; however, evidence from a study on the 1990/91 Gulf War notes that, far more persons died from post-war health effects than from direct war effects (Daponte, 1993; see also Falk, 2015; Pedersen, 2002; Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, and Lozano, 2002, chap. 8). Jessica Falk (2015: para 2) notes the devastating health effects of war as follows: "the health impacts of war extend far beyond the battlefield and into the lives of communities, often with devastating results." Since maternal and child morbidity and mortality are the highest in armed conflict states; the two could be focused upon when assessing the impact of interventions on human security in conflict and post-conflict states. If peacebuilding interventions adequately tackled conflict related

morbidity, there was the likelihood of a significant reduction in mortality in pregnant women and children which would increase human security levels.

Access to maternal health services to reduce morbidity and mortality during pregnancy and childbirth

Peacebuilders could reduce maternal morbidity by improving the health status of pregnant women and mothers by making maternal health services easily accessible to them. To reduce maternal morbidity and mortality rates, respondents proposed that peacebuilders could support the post-conflict state to strengthen the capacity for safe delivery by ensuring that all impediments to reproductive health services are removed. The impediments are often found in poorly equipped health centres as well as the domestic environment of the pregnant women (interviews, 2016). In this regard, peacebuilders should ensure easy access of pregnant women to antenatal care (ANC) and post-natal care (PNC) facilities and trained health professionals. They could also be economically empowered by means of financial resources so that they become self-sufficient and self-reliant so as to be able to pay for the ANC (Tiehi, 2013:155). Pregnant women should have access to trained birth attendants whether private or public or trained traditional birth attendant (TBAs) (interviews, 2016). Peacebuilders could train more TBAs in post-conflict communities where there is very minimal or no trained professionals and support them with basic delivery facilities so that they operate under good hygienic conditions (Black et al., 2014: 156; interview with members of communities, 2016).

Access to paediatric health services to reduce morbidity and mortality in children under-five in conflict and post-conflict communities

Children, like pregnant women, are extremely vulnerable to the vagaries of armed conflicts. A report of the Human Security Centre (2005) established that the leading cause of child mortality

in post-conflict states is malnutrition resulting from food insecurity as well as disruption of water supply and poor sanitation. It is estimated in post-war Afghanistan that about 600 children under the age of five died every day; as a result of poor diet, diarrhoea, pneumonia and from other preventable diseases (UNICEF, 2008). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a study found that even though children accounted for less than 20% of the population, more than 45% of deaths after the cessation of hostilities were children under the age of five (Coghlan et al., 2006). In Côte d'Ivoire, malnutrition accounts for 54 percent of deaths, and it is estimated that it is responsible for more than a third of ailments in children under five (IRIN, 2014: para 12).

To improve children's health in war-affected communities, peacebuilders could implement disease preventive measures as well as ensuring that paediatric services are available and easily accessible to all children (interview with members of communities, 2016). Paediatric programmes such as a full coverage of immunisations of all children against childhood killer diseases irrespective of geographical and social status in the conflict-affected state could be undertaken. A full vaccination under the World Health Organisation's guidelines is when a child receives one dose of the BCG vaccine, three doses each of DPT and polio vaccine, and one dose of measles vaccine (Immunisation Action Coalition [IAC], 2016: 1; WHO, 2018). The BCG vaccine is given to protect children against tuberculosis; as a result, should be given to children at birth or where a child has his or her first clinic contact (WHO, 2018). The DPT vaccine administered to children protects them against diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus. The DPT and polio vaccines are expected to be given at approximately 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age (IAC, 2016:1). The measles vaccine is expected to be given to the children at or as soon as the child reaches nine months of age (IAC, 2016).

Access to food and nutrition

Food availability, and eating with the right nutrients, are essential in the development of children, mothers and the adult population. Every year about 50 million children's lives are at risk because of the dangers they face from acute under-nutrition (Branca, 2015:27). In armed-conflict states, children lack food and nutrition which affect their very existence. They suffer from lack of vitamins and mineral deficiencies. Children, pregnant and lactating women and women of reproductive age are threatened with food and nutrition shortages due to the non-availability of food. Peacebuilders could support this with short and long-term solutions on nutrition and food. The short-term solutions should occur during the period of their dislocation (emergency reliefs). Peacebuilders could ensure that food was sufficiently and regularly given to the displaced to protect them from hunger. Peacebuilders' interventions could also include food supplements for children under five years old, pregnant and lactating mothers and the aged. The moment people are dislocated as a result of war, peacebuilders could support the dislocated interested in engaging in farming activities with agricultural incentives to grow what they can eat and earn income from their agricultural activities so that they become self-reliant (interviews, 2016).

Access to shelter

Shelter connotes the various facets of accommodation including housing and temporary structures such as tents, and blankets, clothing and heating facilities necessary to protect people from the vagaries of the weather. The International humanitarian law (IHL) requires the treatment of shelter as a fundamental protection essential for civilians in situations of armed conflict (ICRC, 2004:69-71). This fundamental requirement of IHL is to ensure that civilian dwellings are not attacked, and also to ensure that civilians do not suffer arbitrary displacement owing to the war. The rules of IHL requires civilians who suffered displacement due to a war to be given adequate accommodation during the period of their dislocation. To address the

problem of shelter in war-affected communities, peacebuilders could assist people access temporary structures such as tents, and provide them with blankets and clothing to preserve their health and dignity. Peacebuilders could support families to acquire permanent accommodation.

Factors to be addressed by peacebuilders to recover children's education

This section analyses the factors necessary to be addressed in order to recover children's education in war-affected communities. The growing importance for peacebuilders and researchers of education in states that have experienced conflicts has led to the emergence of terms such as 'emergency education', 'education in crisis situations', 'education in fragile states', 'education in emergencies' and 'education for reconstruction' (Nicolai, 2003; Karpinska, Yarrow and Gough, 2007). Susan Nicolia (2003:11) defines emergency education as a "set of linked project activities that enable structured learning to continue in times of acute crisis or long-term instability."

Education has a powerful role in peacebuilding by promoting mutual trust, reconciliation, conflict prevention and the consolidation of peace and stability of post-conflict states (Sinclair, 2002; Nicolai, 2003; Davies, 2004; Penson and Tomlinson, 2009; Paulson, 2011; Barakat, 2013). Marc Sommers (2002:12) underscores the importance of peacebuilders' interventions in children's education in conflict and post-conflict states as follows:

> Communities have difficulty having their teachers accredited, trained and paid, getting stable and reasonably safe school structures built, … increasing the number of girl students in school, ensuring that the psychological needs of teachers and students are addressed, and promoting values and methods for peacefully resolving present and future conflicts.

Research on education in conflict-affected states has neglected the impact of peacebuilding on education and focused extensively on the effects of war during emergencies or during armed conflict (Sinclair, 2002; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Davies, 2004; Tawil and Harley, 2004; Buckland, 2004; Smith, 2005; Sany, 2010; Dabalen and Saumik, 2014; Ouili, 2017), education

and violence in terms of gender (Leach, 2003; Kirk, 2004; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2009; El-Bushra, 2017), impact of flawed educational policy on state fragility (Buckland, 2011; Davis, 2011), and the nexus between educational reconstruction and social and economic development (Brannelly, 2009; Dolan and Ndaruhutse, 2011). None of this research attempts an examination of the impact of peacebuilding policies on education. This is the focus of this thesis. The task of assessing the impact of peacebuilding interventions on education in societies recovering from violent conflict remains unexplored. Academics such as Harber (2004), Davies (2005), Smith (2005), Novelli and Cardozo (2008) and Brown (2011) have emphasised the need to conduct more critical studies on the role of education in the reconstruction of states.

This section offers a comprehensive list of factors which peacebuilders could address for the recovery of children's education. The identified factors constitute the hypotheses which could be tested in post-conflict states to establish the extent to which peacebuilders have recovered education after years of conflict. They are tested in chapter seven of this thesis for Ivory Coast. These factors have been drawn from literature on children's education and my interviews. These factors are summarised in table 3.4.

Table 3.4   Factors for mitigation by peacebuilders to recover education in armed conflict states

Factors organised in themes (freedom from want/Galtung's positive peace)
Dismantling gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination against children in communities affected by war. This should be done by: - addressing discrimination and inequality by addressing cost of schooling in conflict affected   communities. - addressing gender-based violence in children's education - punishing perpetrators of gender-based violence in conflict affected communities
Poverty Alleviation of families affected by armed conflict - addressing the basic school needs of children in war-affected communities - addressing poverty in families affected by armed conflicts to ensure children's education
Recruiting, training and capacity building of teachers. This can be done by: - addressing teaching staff shortages in war-affected communities - addressing training and building capacities of teachers

Building and equipping of schools in communities affected by armed conflict - addressing school infrastructural deficits - addressing school equipment and facilities deficits
Dealing with the psychological effects of war on children - addressing deficits in public counselling facilities in war-affected communities - addressing shortages in psychological therapists to address psychological needs of children in communities - addressing problems in school counselling services in war-affected communities

As noted in the table above, I distinguish five key issues which should be addressed by peacebuilders. All of these factors are considered essential in improving children's education; as a result, they have not been organised in order of significance. Discussion in this section follows the arrangement in the table.

Dismantling gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination in children's education in post-conflict states

Evidence from international human rights institutions' reports shows that almost 50 million primary and lower-secondary-age children from various backgrounds face denial of equal or any access to education in armed conflict states. The majority of these children are internally displaced and refugee children, or children from rural areas, low caste children and children of ethnic or religious minorities (Save the Children, 2013: iv). In sub-Saharan Africa, 54% of 29 million out of school children are girls (UNESCO, 2011:2). Of the percentage of the out-of-school girls, those in armed violence communities suffer the most of discrimination and gender-based violence.

Peacebuilders could contribute to remedy socio-cultural biases against girls through sensitisation programme. Girls are forced to stay at home instead of attending school for several reasons. Socio-cultural biases based on masculinity perpetrated and perpetuated against girls' affect their education (Phuong, 2008). Also, economic reasons have caused parents and carers to prioritise boy's education. Girls are subordinated to the boys and their assigned roles include undertaking household duties such as drawing of water, cooking, and taking care of younger siblings or aged grandparents or sick adults (interview with members of communities, 2016).

Peacebuilders could address the socio-cultural and economic impediments on girls' education by undertaking programmes in schools and communities that eschew the socio-cultural acts, and financially supporting the war-affected families (interview with members of communities, 2016). Research suggests that the discriminatory tendencies reinforce gender inequalities which increase the risk of violence by boys against the girls (WHO, 2009:1-3). The case of children in armed conflict states are worst in terms of the perpetration of gender-based violence, inequalities and discrimination. Girls suffer both in the schools and communities in which they live (WHO; 2009: 4-5; HRW, 2012). The Action for the Rights of Children (2000:48) observes that: "girls and young women are, by far, more vulnerable to being excluded from the educational process, or having it cut short, than boys are." Peacebuilders need to address these to ensure equal educational opportunities for all children in war-affected communities

Implementing school-based policies on gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination
Peacebuilders could promote gender equality and equity in schools by implementing sensitisation programmes to children on equality, equity and non-discrimination. Research has established that initiation of school-based policies has the potential to counteract gender norms and attitudes if they are applied to young children (WHO, 2009: 5). Peacebuilding should take a critical view of these discriminatory tendencies and all forms of abuse against girls.

Peacebuilders need to take measures to ensure equal or more female teachers in basic schools (Bird, Higgins and McKay, 2013: 71; interview with members of communities, 2016). A study found that female teachers have a significant impact on gender-based education, through their ability to inspire and serve as role models (Kirk, 2006). Aside from helping to bridge the gap of female teachers in primary schools, both male and female teachers should be professionally trained in gender equality, and on how to get school children and the communities to get rid of gender stereotypes and discrimination (Michael, 1986; Golombok and Fivush 1994; Berk, 2003; Phuong, 2008). It is also argued that teachers in primary schools tend to promote

"feminine" traits rather than "masculine" ones; therefore, getting teachers sensitised about the issues of stereotyping or discrimination has the potential to alter gender discrimination in schools (Fagot 1985; Oettingen 1985; Michael, 1986; Kirk, 2006; interviews, 2016).

Implementing community-based interventions to dismantle gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination

Peacebuilders could implement community-based interventions to alter societal norms and attitudes toward girls. They could sensitise community members in a manner for them to redefine the concept of masculinity and control. Gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination are social constructs; therefore, in fighting these tendencies, peacebuilders need to help societies to deconstruct them. If communities address these norms and attitudes, children would be affected positively (Banlori, interview, 2016).

In the interviews, it emerged that members of communities who participated in sensitisation and training programmes that promoted gender equality tend to deconstruct the previous stereotypes and discrimination they have held against girls for years. To reverse gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination, the respondents suggested that peacebuilding programmes should include sensitisation programmes intended to help members of the communities to unlearn these negative attitudes. These attitudes should be replaced by attitudes that perpetrate equality and respect for all manner of persons irrespective of gender differences. One of the interviewees, a gender advocate said there is the need to "construct a new outlook based on gender equality. Peacebuilders should create awareness in communities affected by war to protect girls' education" (interview with Ibrahim, a gender activist, 2016).

Alleviating poverty in families affected by war and children's education in post-conflict transition communities.

Peacebuilders could undertake programmes that would economically empower families. This is the means to alleviating poverty of families in war-affected communities. Scholars have long linked educational accomplishments with economic progress and living standards (Lipset, 1960; Deutsch, 1961; Croke et al., 2016). The economic discrimination against girls from attending school exposes them to a low quality of life in the post-conflict period. The discrimination affects their marketable capacities or skills needed to put them in a state where their job prospects would be enhanced; so when this is addressed, it impacts positively on their income status (interviews with members of the communities, 2016).

Families affected by armed conflict remain economically distressed unless they are helped. Families in poverty have a high chance of their children being out of school (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley, 2002:443-7; Rumberger and Lim, 2008; Rumberger, 2011; 2013; Dakwa, Chiome and Chabaya, 2014:234; interview with members of communities, 2016). Prior research suggests that children from the most economically marginalised families are discouraged from attending schools because of the high costs of schooling (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003). Displaced populations grapple with survival opportunities in their host communities most of whom also face problems of accessing the basic necessities of life due to the war (interview with members of communities, 2016).

Under the circumstances of economic deprivation and poverty, girls or older children where girls are not in such families are often withdrawn from school by their parents to supplement family income (Brock and Cammish, 1997; Glick & Kahn, 2000; Guo & Harris, 2000; Pong, Dronkers & Hampden-Thompson, 2003; Kingdon, 2005; Ersado, 2005). This serves as the means for families to support the paying of school fees for the children. The net effects of this is that it affects enrolment and completion rates of children in schools. If children are unable

to acquire some level of education, their income levels, ability to gain employment and chance to escape from poverty are all affected (interview with Assiatou, 2016). In a study, Carol Bellamy (2008:14-15) argues that: "poverty inhibits the capacity of families and communities to care for children .... Impoverished children often grow up to be impoverished parents who in turn bring up their own children in poverty. In order to break the generational cycle, poverty reduction must begin with children."

Another study carried out in Northern Uganda found that households' ability to cope with the conflict depended hugely on education (Bird, Higgins and McKay, 2013). The study found that war-affected persons who had primary education were able to adjust more quickly and easily than those who had no education at all. In order to address the chronic and intergenerational poverty caused by the conflict, the study recommended that war-affected households should be supported to overcome their poverty so that they are able to educate their children. My interviewees requested peacebuilders to support the economically marginalised families by providing them with income generation opportunities so that they are able to be self-reliant, and through this they believed parents can have the capacity to invest in their children's education on their own (interview with members of the communities, 2016). Similarly, Patricia Justino (2014:10) suggested that peacebuilders' policies should address poverty, both during and after violent conflict by focusing on measures that could increase economic resilience in communities. This can be achieved through the reduction of levels of vulnerability of all affected households. She describes poverty as constituting the central demand-side barrier to the education of children in many areas of the world, and in particular, the war-affected states (Justino, 2014). Provision of some necessities, such as food and clothing, by peacebuilders are important in emergencies and the early recovery period, but these do not contribute meaningfully to resolving the problem in the long term (interview with members of the communities, 2016). The programme of "Familias en Accion" cash transfer was an economic

intervention to reduce poverty in Columbia (see Bozzoli and Wald, 2011; UNICEF, and UIS, 2012). A study assessed the Colombian intervention and found out that within a short period of time the children mostly from conflict-affected areas were attracted to the schools and the schools also had a reduced overall absenteeism (UNICEF and the UIS, 2012). However, unlike the interventions such as "cash transfers" the respondents in this study in Côte d'Ivoire expected peacebuilders to adopt more permanent solutions that would completely obliterate the threads of endemic poverty. They suggested to peacebuilders to support families to engage in productive economic activities such as commerce, agriculture and transport. The views of respondents in this study are supported by prior research which recommends the provision of social policies such as safety nets and cash transfers should in addition be complemented by more permanent interventions which are directly focused on reducing the economic marginalisation of families of children affected by war (Justino, 2014: 11). The economic empowerment of war-affected families are worthy and considered in this framework because the literature suggests that several reasons may be adduced for individuals and their families' proclivity for participation in armed conflict, but the economic reasons, poverty in particular, overlap with all the factors (see Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008).

Recruiting, training and building capacities of teachers in conflict and post-conflict communities

Peacebuilders could recruit and train teachers as well as organise teaching programmes to enhance their capacity. The role of teachers cannot be overemphasised as they contribute significantly to children's learning outcomes (Mourshed et al., 2010; Sayed et al, 2015). In conflict and post-conflict settings, teachers contribute to not only the learning outcomes of children, but their peacebuilding role in communities where they teach is massive (McGlynn, Caims and Hewstone, 2004; Barret, 2007; Durrani and Dunne, 2010; Smith et al 2011;

McGlynn, and London, 2011; Sayed et al, 2015; Novelli and Sayed, 2016; Rubagiza, Umutoni and Kaleeba, 2016). Teachers do not only teach, they serve as role models to many children in their schools and communities. Children and young persons learn from what teachers do, and teachers also help children to acquire skills necessary for their future employment. In a study, Davies (2011:47) made an important remark that teachers agency is in "developing values of mutual respect and tolerance" which is *sine qua non* to "a post-war context characterised by persisting division and mistrust." Conversely, teachers' bad attitude toward children, especially the girls has the potential to lead to high attrition rates in schools (see Colclough et al. 2000). Research on Sub-Saharan Africa shows that teachers view girls as unintelligent who are only good to be married by men; as a result of this, teachers give more attention to boys than girls. This situation has been identified as being one of the causes of drop-out rates in schools (Njau and Wamahiu, 1994; FAWE, 2001; Nekatibeb, 2002, FAWE, 2012). This attitude should be addressed by peacebuilders by instilling gender sensitivity into the recruiting and training programmes of teachers so that they shed the gender stereotypes which are detrimental to the educational progress of all children in schools.

In recovering the education of children in conflict and post-conflict times, peacebuilders should focus their attention on recruiting, training and posting teachers, particularly in rural communities which usually suffer high attrition rates of teachers during war (Sommers, 2002: 24-25; interview with members of communities, 2016). Peacebuilders' could provide schools with teachers so that schools do not become dysfunctional. Peacebuilders should undertake recruiting exercises of displaced teachers to communities where they feel safe to live and teach. Peacebuilders could revive the war affected state's teacher training colleges, and use these colleges as centres to train newly recruited teachers (interviews, 2016). Peacebuilders should also take steps to train and recruit more female teachers to work in primary schools because studies show that female teachers have a greater impact on girls' academic achievement

outcomes (Rothstein, 1995; Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999; Nixon and Robinson, 1999; Hoffman and Oreopoulos, 2009; Carrell et al., 2010).

Building and equipping schools in armed conflict-affected communities

Peacebuilders should build and equip schools with teaching and learning facilities in war affected communities. They remain the only hope in armed conflict states where government budgets are often used in prosecuting the war rather than undertaking social services. During armed conflict, schools are used as military bases, barracks, firing points, armouries, and places of detention of opposing forces by government and militias. Schools also serve as places for the recruitment of children as fighters (World Bank 2005; Davies, 2011; McCandless 2011). Due to these purposes, there is ample evidence that parents, guardians, school administrators, teachers, students and classrooms have become the targets of fighters in armed conflict (interviews, 2016). This impacts negatively on education (Buckland, 2005; UNESCO 2011, 131–132). In the Rwandan conflict, schools were targeted for destruction; school facilities were looted and destroyed. Before the April 6, 1994 genocide, there were 1,836 schools in session in the country. By the end of the armed violence, about two-thirds of these schools were damaged; less than 650 schools functioned (Mathisen, 2012: 34). The destruction and the neglect of school infrastructure resulting from fighting caused serious deficits which affect conflict states. It is estimated that the damage caused to schools in Mozambique left two-thirds of the two million primary school children with no access to education (UNICEF, 1996). Schools are often deliberately targeted and destroyed by the fighting groups either because they are deemed to be sheltering opposing forces or they are connected to the conscription of young men for fighting purposes by the government (Sesnan, 1998; Peterson, 2001). All these make it not only difficult in achieving a harmonised school calendar in the conflict torn country, but the psychological effects on students is colossal (Abdi, 1998; Buckland, 2005; UNICEF, 2005;

Sany, 2010). It becomes imperative for peacebuilders to undertake significant measures by building and equipping schools to reverse the deficits in school infrastructure.

Peacebuilders could build new schools in war-affected communities and rehabilitate dilapidated ones as part of necessary measures to address problems confronting children's education. The schools should be equipped with feminine facilities with good sanitation so that the girls can use the facilities with ease. Schools without proper sanitation and privacy for the girls' impact negatively on their drop-out rates (Lizettee, 2000; Birdsall et al, 2005). Equipping schools also involves the provision of security so as to prevent the physical and sexual abuse of children and teachers by armed persons (interviews, 2016).

Psychological support for children and their social reintegration

Peacebuilders should not only undertake measures to counteract the physical vulnerabilities and abuses of war-affected persons, but should promote the psychological well-being and social reintegration of war-affected people. Children have not been left out of psychological services of international peace actors in conflict affected states. Advocates of international psychological therapy argue that war-affected persons suffer trauma-related conditions such as fear, grief, flashbacks and nightmares as a result of the experiences of abuses in armed conflict (Baro and Mustafa, 1999; UNICEF, 1999; Eriksson et al., 2001). International psychological adherents argue that armed conflict result in family disintegration, people witness the killings of their parents and friends and many of them are subjected to torture, rape, and threats of deaths. For these reasons, they need external actors' help to overcome these traumata related conditions.

Critics of the international therapeutic model, such as Derek Summerfield, see these views as cultural imperialism, and have argued that these interventions do not tackle the real issues confronting war affected persons (see Pupavac, 2001; Summerfield, 2002:422). Pupavac

(2002:490) contends the idea of populations being traumatised. She and others argue that conflict affected persons have their own coping strategies; therefore, interventions of external actors for war trauma do not necessarily result in a positive development for war-affected people.

Despite the criticism levelled against the international psychological model for war affected populations, peacebuilders strongly believe in the impact of these interventions. As a result, they continue to offer mental and psychological services to persons affected in armed conflict states. Assessing peacebuilders' interventions requires investigations to establish the extent to which these interventions impact on children's education. In this study, the extent of impact on children's education of peacebuilders psychological services is the focus of this section. Nearly 80% of children had lost immediate family members in Rwanda, 70% of children have witnessed someone being killed or physically being harmed: 80% stated that they have seen dead bodies or body parts littered in streets, while 16% indicated they survived the violence by hiding under dead bodies (UNICEF, 1996).

In Burundi in 2001, more than 150 students from two schools were abducted and raped by one of the rebel groups and several classrooms were set ablaze (HRW, 2002). In northern Uganda, fighting groups kidnapped school children directly from their classrooms, and the most recent was the abduction of over 200 school girls at Chibok in northern Nigeria by Boko Haram. When children suffer separation from their families or experience torture themselves or experience the torture of their loved ones, they suffer trauma. The result is that some may not attend school at all, whilst others at school may experience concentration problem or memory loss (Hasanovic, 2009: 463-65). A state of despondency may set in about their future, and many may become aggressive. In the view of peacebuilders in these circumstances, peacebuilding programming should include effective psychological support that would help the children recover from the trauma and socially reintegrate them back into the communities (Baro and

Mustafa, 1999; UNICEF, 1999; Eriksson et al., 2001). These psychological interventions undertaken by peacebuilders are critical in ensuring children's enrolment, retention and completion of their primary school, but these should also include measures to address poverty and economic deprivation which affect the psychological well-being of children (interviews of members of communities, 2016).

Peacebuilders could establish trauma coping strategies for children by establishing counselling services in schools, and train teachers to be able to help children to overcome trauma related conditions. A study by Angela Pirisi (2003) indicates that psychosocial interventions in educational settings can positively affect the educational performance or potential of children affected by wars. Pirisi notes in Sierra Leone that "children showed a 70 percent improvement in concentration at school after four weeks of a school-based program that integrated educational and emotional needs, using storytelling, drawing, drama, writing, music and games" (Pirisi, 2001: 2-3). To address the problem of traumatised children, Nylund, Legrand and Holtsberg (1999: 19) suggested for the implementation of targeted psychosocial policies "to ensure that psychological recovery and social reintegration can take place." Due to cultural peculiarities, some scholars have argued that the promotion, prevention, and treatment approaches of mental health and psychological well-being should be culturally modified for effective outcomes (Hasanovic et al., 2009:63-73; 2011:24-33; McMullen et al, 2013: 31-4; O'Callaghan et al., 2013; 359-69; Barron, 2013:16-21; Kalibatseva and Leong, 2014: 434-435; interviews, 2016). For the effectiveness of the psychological services, peacebuilders could identify and implement interventions based on the psychological needs of persons affected by war in their communities.

Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical framework for assessing the impact of peacebuilding on human security in war-affected states. On the basis of extant literature and interviews on what communities considered critical which need to be addressed by peacebuilders in war-affected states, the framework comprises of a gamut of factors which should be addressed by peacebuilders. The essence in the chapter is to show what peacebuilders should address so that they are able to contribute to human security increase in war-affected states which is the route to achieving positive peace - a more durable peace than the just ensuring the absence of war or violence (negative peace). Peacebuilders interventions can then be measured on the basis of what they are expected to address in war-affected states. The identified factors in the chapter hinge on the three key component of human security – "freedom from fear", "freedom from indignity" and "freedom from want." Each of these have been comprehensively discussed in this chapter, and the measurement indicators within the three areas have been designed to establish how human security threats in relation to the three components could be addressed by peacebuilders in war-affected communities. The factors in the framework are grouped into four categories with a number of measurable indicators within each of the groups.

The first category of factors focused on how peacebuilders interventions addressed personal safety and security of communities in war-affected communities. The factors on how peacebuilders can address personal safety and security are anchored on the "freedom from fear" strand of human security. The second group relates to how peacebuilders interventions have addressed human rights abuse and war-crimes. These factors are hinged on the "freedom from indignity" element of human security. The third category discussed what peacebuilders are expected to address to ensure the health of people in war-affected states. Health in this framework goes beyond the absence of infirmity mind and body to include accessibility of people to food, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene. The final category of factors focused on

how peacebuilders addressed problems such as gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality, economic deprivation and poverty of families, provision of schools and schooling materials to school children and psychosocial interventions which can constrain children's access to education. Both the health and education factors anchor on the "freedom from want" component of human security. All the four categories composed the empirical chapters of the thesis. The empirical chapters assesses the impact of peacebuilders interventions on all these factors in Côte d'Ivoire.

Chapter Four

The Impact of Peacebuilding on Personal Safety and Security of Communities in Côte d'Ivoire

This chapter examines the impact of peacebuilding on the elimination of the critical factors which militate against the personal safety of individuals and the provision of security for war-affected communities. The theoretical underpinnings of this empirical chapter are anchored on negative peace and the "freedom from fear" standpoint of human security which have been discussed in chapters one and three. Ensuring negative peace and addressing threats of fear in war-affected states are critical in war-affected states' progress towards achieving positive peace. While negative peace is the target of peacekeeping and positive peace that of peacebuilding, some intrinsic relationship exists between negative and positive peace. Addressing issues of negative peace is important for effective peacebuilding to take place because all the facets of peacebuilding cannot be completed in an atmosphere of fighting or insecurity or threats of fear or harm. Patricia Shields and Joseph Soeters (2015:2) reminded us of the relevance of positive peace which begins after the end of hostilities, "in a society at war, the first stage of peace begins as the end of personal violence and absence of war (negative peace). In the next stage, a stronger society would emerge." In examining the exact impact of peacebuilding initiatives, in other words, how peacebuilders ensured negative peace and addressed threats of fear, some factors considered critical which need to be addressed to ensure the safety and security of war-affected populations have been discussed in the theoretical framework (in chapter 3). These are examined in this chapter to determine the changes that have occurred with the implementation of peacebuilders' initiatives. The factors are those relating to the elimination or reduction of violence or threats of violence. The key factors which peacebuilders are expected to address in war-affected communities mentioned in the theory

chapter are as follows: 1) addressing violence through diplomatic engagements of peacebuilders with feuding parties; 2) addressing ethnic, citizenship and exclusionary politics; 3) addressing elections and inclusivity problems; 4) provision of an international military presence to protect war-affected people; 5) retrieving arms and disbanding of armed groups; and 6) reintegration of former combatants into their communities. From the evidence on all the factors assessed in this chapter, it is argued that peacebuilding interventions had overall a limited positive impact on curtailing violence and threats of violence in Côte d'Ivoire. The international peace actors adopted a three-pronged approach to address violence; namely, diplomatic or political engagement with feuding parties, an international military presence and the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Despite peacebuilders' success in getting the armed groups to sign peace agreements, the military muscle they provided to protect lives and property and the DDR programmes they implemented, failed to completely curtail violence.

Following the spate of violence that accompanied the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, international security interlocutors, particularly the United Nations (UN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and France intervened, diplomatically and militarily. The intervention was occasioned by the deterioration of internal security. In the crisis, civilians were subjected to physical attacks and the sexual abuse of women and girls. The inhumane molestations and treatment were meted out by the security forces who fought on the side of the government and the anti-government militias on the other side. Several people caught up in the hotspots of the crisis were either killed or were permanently disfigured. Many others were displaced, either internally or externally.

The intervention by third parties in this crisis became inevitable under the circumstances to help address the volatile security situation in the country. Analysts believe that these interventions have the capacity to transform conflict societies by removing the ills in the society

that support the perpetuation of these violent conflicts (Lederach, 1995; Galtung, 2000; Hugh, 2004). The core objective of the interveners was to abate the crisis in the short-term, and in the long-term, find a lasting solution by addressing the core issues underlying the conflict which led to insecurity and serious humanitarian crisis.

As rightly observed by Kofi Annan, post-conflict peacebuilding is "a multifaceted approach, covering diplomatic, political and economic factors" (Annan, 1998:64). Côte d'Ivoire experienced a complex and multifaceted attempt by the international community to find a solution to the crisis, which started in September 2002. Between 2004 and 2010, when the electoral processes, and the first post-conflict election was conducted, political, economic and social interventions were implemented as important measures to ensure sustainable peace in the country. Even though efforts to find a lasting solution to the crisis span over a decade - which shows that the approaches suffered setbacks - there is a very little knowledge about the impact of these interventions on the safety and security of war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire.

Politically, Côte d'Ivoire experienced peacebuilding interventions which took the form of political missions undertaken by international actors together with the domestic players - both state and non-state actors. These political undertakings came in the form of diplomatic missions that brokered peace deals among the feuding parties. One of the political undertakings was the deployment of military missions. They provided military power through international peacekeeping troops that monitored the cease-fire. Also, the military presence was to ensure the protection of people against violence until such time that the state was capable to assume its fundamental responsibility of providing security to its citizens. There were also socio-economic policies implemented by the international peacebuilding interveners which are examined in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

The chapter is composed of two main sections which focus on the impact of peacebuilding on curtailing violence in the country. Section one focuses on the impact of diplomatic interventions. This section examines the impact of diplomatic policies on violence reduction in the country. The diplomatic policies assessed are the key political decisions such as the peace agreements signed by the parties to the conflict. Section two critically analyses the impact of the military presence, and the impact of the DDR programme on violence.

The impact of political interventions on the security of people in Côte d'Ivoire

The political missions undertaken by the international security interlocutors in Côte d'Ivoire took two forms. The first was diplomatic missions undertaken under the auspices of the UN, ECOWAS, AU and France that brokered the various peace deals underwritten with the belligerent parties. The second political mission came in the form of the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The troops deployed to monitor the cease-fire were composed of French forces known as the 'Licorne' (Unicorn) and the ECOWAS military force known as the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), which was later absorbed into the mainstream UN forces (Obi, 2009). The first part of this section discusses the impact of the key diplomatic policies on curtailing violence. The second part of the section examines the impact of military presence as well as the implementation of the DDR.

Diplomatic undertakings and their impact on the safety and security of people

International mediation was used extensively by the emissaries of the UN, ECOWAS, AU and the French government as one of the means to transform the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Through the diplomatic envoys, a number of meetings and conferences were held, both in Côte d'Ivoire and outside its territorial jurisdiction to bring an end to insecurity, but to no avail. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mohammed Ibn Chambers before the Ouagadougou Political Agreement in 2007, held an optimistic view, "What is different this time is that the

two major protagonists have agreed, and have negotiated directly" (BBC, March 4, 2007). Following ECOWAS heads of state and government meeting in Accra on September 29, 2002, the first of the international mediations began with the arrival in Abidjan of a six-member ECOWAS contact group on 31st September, 2002. The contact group was a precursor to the deployment of a peacekeeping force into the country in the event of refusal of parties to cease-fire. This became known as the Accra I.

Subsequent mediation efforts followed when the Accra I failed to get the parties to a cease-fire. The arrival on 28th October, 2002 of a rebel delegation for direct talks with government officials at Lomé in Togo was one of the later diplomatic attempts at a peaceful settlement of the crisis. This was facilitated by Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema who was officially designated by the ECOWAS, on the 24th October, 2002, as the organisation's key mediator (Schori, 2015). The rest included the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement (2003), the Accra II & III peace accords (2003 & 2004 respectively), the Pretoria Accord and the Pretoria Declaration (2005) as well as the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), which was signed in 2007 (Akindès, 2012: 12; Schori, 2015:163). These were the key outcomes of international mediation towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

The multiplicity of peace accords – from Accra I to the OPA, and the continuation of the violence after these peace deals itself reveals the enormity of the challenges encountered in Côte d'Ivoire's peace process. The next sections discuss the key diplomatic policies that came out of these peace agreements, and the extent to which these policies limited the violence. These mediation outcomes were expected to lead to a lasting solution to the crisis. There were three key policies in this respect – identity and citizenship, the setting up of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) and elections and ending of violence – these are analysed in the following sections. The first section presents an examination of how the international peace actors addressed the question of identity and citizenship and its impact on violence and

insecurity in general in Côte d'Ivoire. This is followed by the impact of peacebuilders' policies on the GNR, and the last is the impact of elections and inclusivity on violence.

Limited positive impact on the ethnic undercurrents in the crisis

On the whole, peacebuilders made a limited positive impact in addressing the issues of ethnicity and citizenship. Ethnicity was a key issue in the Ivoirian conflict; as a result, the killings that took place had ethnic dimensions, which the policies of peacebuilders were expected to address. Every president after the country's first leader, Félix Houphouet-Boigny has questioned and altered the ethnic structure of the country, especially the military rulers, to the advantage of the president's own ethnic group (Ragnhild Nordås, 2008). There is no doubt that one of the main causes and the immediate triggers of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire was identity and citizenship (Gberie and Addo, 2004). Citizenship and nationality matters dominated public debate from January, 2000, when the idea of constitutional review was mooted, until the holding of the referendum on the Constitution on 23 July 2000. What ignited the debate and divided the Ivoirian people was the eligibility conditions of their president (under the concept of "Ivoirité") which was deliberately drafted to disqualify the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara, who had previously served as the Prime Minister under the country's first President.

It is important to stress that the concept of "Ivoirité" predates the 2000 Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, it was promulgated and popularised in 1995 by President Henri Konan Bédié. Ivoirité was an electoral law which required all persons interested in contesting as a presidential candidate in the Ivoirian election to have both parents as Ivorians by birth. Konan Bédié's electoral strategy was to get rid of Alassane Ouattara, his main competitor from the election. In 1999, Bédié referred to Alassane Ouattara as a Burkinabé who should not meddle with the country's 'succession affairs' (Bédié, 1999:147).

The Ivoirité disenfranchised many Ivorian people, particularly those from the northern part of the country who traced either one or both of their parents from another country. Specifically, the policy targeted people who traced their lineage to the neighbouring West African countries, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. This category of people, whose forebears had lived and worked on the cocoa and coffee farms, have contributed significantly to the economy of the country for decades (Ayangafac, 2009). Since Alassane Ouattara was targeted in the 2000 elections, he used every opportunity to clear doubts about his parentage.

Despite Ouattara's defence of his Ivoirian identity, he was disqualified to contest the election which saw Gbagbo becoming the President. Gbagbo who was initially opposed to the "Ivoirité" turned out to be the concept's chief adherent. Under Gbagbo, village committees were set up with the task of certifying which individuals in the villages were the rightful autochthons (Daddieh, 2016). As a solution to the insecurity that was increasing due to ethnic and religious differences, peacebuilders set up the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), which was tasked to ensure the promulgation of electoral laws which would address the issues underlying the conflict. The electoral laws were promulgated, but were not tied to any citizenship legislation. Other provisions outlined the need to re-organise the army, grant amnesty to army mutineers and militias composed largely of the rebels and the need to address issues of nationality to ensure the protection of millions of immigrants who the peace agreement recognised as having contributed meaningfully to the progress of the country (UNSC, s/2003/99 2003). However, these measures failed as parties reneged on their responsibilities to the agreement.

Like Konan Bédié, Gbagbo continued with the manipulation of ethnic, religious and citizenship differences which increased tensions and violence in the country. The politics of exclusion was perpetrated against the people of northern descent including the Malinké, Mandé, Sénoufo and the Dioulas, the majority of whom were muslims. Unsurprisingly, Ouattara's support came

mainly from muslims who were of northern descent who saw themselves as being targeted by Gbagbo's christian-south dominated regime (Roberts et al., 2016). In an interview, one of the anti-Gbagbo supporters stated,

> We were despised, we were mocked and treated with disdain, all because we bore northern or muslim names. Some of us were refused identity cards because we were northerners and will vote for Ouattara. We fought to be issued with identity cards because we can't do anything without it in this country, including voting (Kamilou, interview, 2016)

Limited impact of identity and citizenship policies on the security of people

Peacebuilders used the Linas-Marcoussis round table discussion of peace in Côte d'Ivoire to get the feuding parties to address issues of identity and citizenship. On the whole peacebuilders made a limited positive impact in addressing identity and citizenship issues. Peacebuilders focused extensively on building consensus among the top-level elites on identity and citizenship issues. Even though these issues were major problems affecting the social fabric of the country, there was no local representation or participation over how to address the problems of identity and citizenship. The Linas-Marcoussis conference considered issues that related to citizenship, identity and the status of foreign nationals. The parties agreed to create new rules on nationality and citizenship in order to deal with the tensions and the division of the country along ethnic and religious lines. However, a few months after the signing of the LMA, the deadlines to bring about acceptable, but effective legislation on these important matters elapsed without much progress. The result of this failure was the resumption of sporadic fighting across the country. Subsequent peace talks in Accra in 2004 and the 2005 Pretoria agreement all failed to get the parties to resolve the issues of citizenship. The inability to comply with the agreed deals by the parties also affected the conduct of elections, scheduled to take place in 2005. The rebels served notices indicating their withdrawal from the negotiations, citing Gbagbo's intransigence in not keeping faith on the agreed deals in the LMA (Schori, 2015). They resumed fighting and caused significant casualties in their fiefdoms.

Subsequently, the Ouagadougou political agreement, brokered in March 2007, made more progress than the previous negotiation attempts. Unlike the previous initiatives by international actors which had failed, these peace talks were at the instance of Ivoirian political leaders themselves, particularly President Gbagbo who together with the rebels for the first time directly addressed the citizenship question. Gbagbo's gesture to negotiate directly with the rebels "was because he realised the war was not going to be won so easily and also because of the rising level of insecurity and humanitarian catastrophes. He was compelled by circumstances to succumb" (interview with an official of AU office in Côte d'Ivoire, 2016). The OPA required the creation of a reliable identification system and the need to provide all Ivoirians proper documentation and the creation of mobile courts and judges to ensure the provision of legal documents to all people who had never been granted such documentation.

Despite this agreement, Gbagbo's government was still unconvinced. The statements from government officials affected the documentation process. They revisited their earlier position stating that the northerners were fraudulently procuring Ivoirian citizenship (Schori, 2015). This was dismissed by the rebels who felt that Gbagbo was taking steps to deny the people their citizenship rights. The failure to comprehensively address identity and citizenship question deepened the crisis as matters,

> never diminished in the minds of the northern tribes. And in Africa, where citizenship pride is tied to land ownership, it became more complex. The northern tribes realised that if they failed to address the citizenship question, they would have failed in the ownership of their lands in the north … stress that the issue of identity and citizenship remain unresolved till date. The fighting that killed hundreds and thousands of people across the country was the effect of our inability to resolve who is, and who is not, an Ivoirian citizen (Kouadio-Bi, interview, 2016).

Limited impact of the Government of National Reconciliation on the elimination of violence

Peacebuilders' policy of forming a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) as a measure of bringing the feuding parties together into dialogue and to take collective decisions, failed to achieve its objective. The GNR was the product of the Linas-Marcoussis peace

agreement (LMA). The GNR, according to the LMA, was to run the affairs of the state that would ensure the security of persons and property throughout the territorial jurisdiction of Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003). Under the leadership of a consensus Prime Minister, the GNR was to be composed of representatives of each of the Ivorian delegations that took part in the round table discussions at Linas-Marcoussis in Paris. To ensure the commitment and cooperation of the disputing parties towards peaceful settlement of the crisis, a balance was to be achieved in ministerial appointments throughout the term of office of the GNR.

To restore the security of persons and property, acting under delegated authority provided for in the Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire, the GNR was tasked to "organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces …. (and to) ensure that no mercenaries remained within the country's borders" (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003:3). It was also responsible for overseeing the implementation of all policy decisions that emanated from the Paris conference. This included the conduct of credible and transparent elections; addressing issues relating to citizenship and identity; land tenure regime and the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003). Annexed to the agreement were further critical issues which addressed eligibility criteria for candidates running for the presidency.

Right from the onset, the GNR encountered problems which did not help in improving the security of the country. Elimane Seydou Diarra's appointment as the "Consensus Prime Minster" at the Kléber summit in Paris on 24th January, 2003 was accepted, but with serious reservations. Seydou Diarra's past record as the Prime Minister in General Robert Guei's military junta that torpedoed Henri Konan Bedie's administration in 1999 was a source of anxiety in the camps of some of the feuding parties. Also, his appointment to the position of Prime Minister meant that the substantive Prime Minister, Pascal Affi N'guessan, was losing his position.

The newly arranged appointment sparked widespread demonstrations in Abidjan when it was announced. The simmering differences among the various political leaders over defence and internal security portfolios stalled the formation of the GNR. Not even the eventual formation of the GNR following the Accra II accord could get rid of the animosity and mistrust that had arisen. On the one hand, President Gbagbo's government was unwilling to practically commit to the success of the agreement. Publicly, Gbagbo endorsed the decisions to be carried out and promised to work with the rebels, but was hesitant about the implementation of the key policy decisions that emanated from the LMA, including the passing of the amnesty laws. He used all necessary means to thwart the smooth implementation of the Agreement (Wax, 2003: 17).

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was concerned about the lukewarm attitude towards the implementation of agreed policies, it was blunt to the Gbagbo administration in particular, on account of its lackadaisical attitude towards reviewing laws on amnesty to ensure that hostages or political detainees were freed. It pointed out the lack of statesmanship on the part of the leading figures in his government who had made inflammatory statements on their unwillingness to work with the opposing political elements as agreed in the LMA, especially the "Forces Nouvelles" (New Forces). Specifically, it made reference to the Speaker of the National Assembly who had authorised civil servants to disregard instructions from ministers from the Forces Nouvelles (UNSC, S/2003/688, 2003). By the last quarter of 2006, there was virtually a political stalemate involving the key Ivorian political actors and the international peacebuilders. The Secretary-General's frustration over the political impasse was expressed in his tenth progress report to the UNOCI:

> At every critical turn of the peace process, some of the main political leaders have resorted to calculated obstruction of the peace process, exploiting loopholes in the peace agreements, using legal technicalities and often inciting violent acts by their followers. Consequently, the second transition period, like the first, is coming to a close without elections … In this context, it would be necessary for the Council to review the mandate of ONUCI and to augment its resources. It is also important for the Security Council to closely monitor the implementation of the road map during the new transition period, in particular, with a view to imposing targeted sanctions

against those obstructing the peace process, or seizing the International Criminal Court (UNSC, s/2006/821, 2006).

The inability of the international community to get the parties to commit to the agreed policies increased tensions and insecurity which subsequently caused violence in the country. The Forces Nouvelles refused to disarm because of the foot-dragging of Gbagbo's government towards the implementation of the LMA, especially the failure to pass amnesty laws to free political opponents in detention. In a Communiqué on 30 June 2007, the Forces Nouvelles announced their boycott of the DDR, the closure of all entry points to the areas under their control and capped these actions with the declaration of a state of emergency. The lack of good faith on the part of the Gbagbo administration and the unyielding attitude of the opposing belligerent parties not only heightened tensions and insecurity, but it perpetuated violence in the country which resulted in deaths (Amnesty International, 2005). On the one hand, the police, gendarmes and the government-backed youth militia, the "Jeunes Patriotes" (Young Patriots), and the rebels on the other, mounted roadblocks in the areas under their control where instant punishment was meted out to people perceived to be either members of opposing ethnic groups or supporters considered to be anti-government or anti-rebels (Traore, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016; Eric, interview, 2016).

At these road blocks and in many other locations within their respective fiefdoms across the country, unarmed civilians were brutally molested and in some cases killed by the fighting forces (Kangoye, interview, 2016; Delphine, interview, 2016). Journalists were killed and some of them were declared missing and their whereabouts remain unresolved. Various reports by the international community decried the spate of violence perpetrated against people, including ethnic killings (interview with a Journalist, interview, 2016; interview with the Editor of a newspaper (Soir), 2016). The period also witnessed the beating, harassing and killing of journalists, use of excessive or inappropriate force by the police and gendarmes and gender-based violence perpetrated against women and girls (Human Rights Watch, 2008; interview

with the President of Journalists' Association, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016). In effect, the GNR was not only a dysfunctional institution, but its formation perpetrated violence in the country because the parties which were to make it functional used it as the conduit to deepen their differences.

No impact of using elections to curtail violence and insecurity of people

Peacebuilders attempted to build peace by conducting elections, but this produced a no impact; rather, the conduct of election caused violence leading to the increase in the level of insecurity in the country. Increased violence negatively affected human security concerns in the country. Instead of the elections producing a peaceful outcome they rather turned the despondency of the people into violence. The election was part of an exit strategy by the international security interlocutors including the UN, ECOWAS, AU, EU, France, the United States. However, instead of the election serving as an instrument for building a functional and an effective post-conflict state, it became a means for the perpetuation of violence. The election took place amidst a volatile security situation: the disarming of the combatant groups as well as reforms in the army had not been completed (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Bamba, interview, 2016). Eventually, when it was conducted in 2010, violence broke out, killing 3,000 people (Akindès, 2012:13).

It is argued in the chapter that in its minimalist sense the post-conflict elections held in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 were only successful in transferring political power from Gbagbo to Ouattara, but did very little to abate violence, and also failed to achieve a durable peace. The process towards the 2010 election was violent, and the election itself increased the spate of violence. The 2015 presidential election was internationally acclaimed to be peaceful (interview with the Political Affairs Officer of the European Union, 2016; interview with official of UNDP, 2016). However, at the local level, the election was deemed peaceful only

because of the absence and trial of President Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as the trial and imprisonment of key members of Gbagbo's government domestically (interview with officials of local CSOs, 2016; interview with community members and opinion leaders, 2016). Unlike the 2010 presidential election which was competitively contested, the 2015 election was managed by the victor, with virtually no competition (interview with local CSOs, members and opinion leaders of communities, 2016)

At the Linas-Marcoussis conference in Paris, the parties committed themselves to the principle of democratic transfer of political power. The round table expected the Government of National Reconciliation to hold credible and transparent elections. The GNR was to: ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify voters and draw up voter lists; submit several amendments to Law 2001-634 aimed at achieving better representation of the parties taking part in the Round Table within the central committee of the Independent Electoral Commission, including its officers; submit, within 6 months, a bill relating to the status of the opposition and to the public funding of political parties and election campaigns; submit within one year a bill on illicit personal enrichment and organise effective inspection of the personal asset disclosures filed by those elected; and take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the justice system and the impartiality of the media with respect to both election disputes and election propaganda (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003: 5-6).

On 24 April, 2008, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire concluded an agreement with international donors in which the latter committed $43 million to support the electoral process. The Independent Electoral Commission faced a shortfall of approximately, $18.5 million which was needed to enable it execute its undertakings in 2008. The total budget of the country's election management body was estimated at $86.5 million. Out of this figure, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire could fund only $35.5 million. The obvious source of funding for the remainder of the budget was international community which pledged $32.5 million, of which

$10 million was funded by the United Nations Development Programme fund for elections (UNSC, S/2008/451, 2008: 8).

Also, the UNOCI assisted the electoral process with maritime and surface transport assets, communications and personnel since its arrival in 2004 (UNSC, S/2008/451, 2004). The Pretoria Agreement introduced a novelty in the conduct of elections in the troubled region of West Africa which later provided the international community the opportunity to stand firm on the agreed decisions. It placed an important task on the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative to Côte d'Ivoire to certify the result of the presidential election held in 2010 (Théroux-Bénoni, 2012). Nonetheless, the much awaited election was finally conducted in October 2010, but failed to achieve the desired outcome of peacefully transferring political power from the defeated "Front Populaire Ivoirien's" candidate, Laurent Gbagbo to the candidate of a coalition of parties, the "Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix" (RHDP). Violence broke out across the country over who really won the run-off election.

Thus, the election in Côte d'Ivoire failed as a peace engendering instrument; rather, it caused heavy casualties following post run-off election dispute. The presidential election conducted in Côte d'Ivoire underscored the argument in the literature that the conduct of elections in countries emerging from armed conflict deepens the woes of the recovering state and serves as a trigger of violence. Through the election, violence and impunity flourished in the country. In the 2011 report, *They Looked at His Identity Card and Shot Him Dead*, Amnesty International observed that the election resulted in citizens being threatened with death, and in many cases, citizens were killed, buildings were looted and set ablaze, women and girls were sexually abused, and peacekeepers and their vehicles pelted with stones (Amnesty International, 2011). The state of affairs in the country shows that the electoral support by international actors failed to achieve their intended outcome – a pacific resolution of the crisis.

The inclusion of people in the electoral process helps in building strong state-society relations and increase the political participation of the citizens. But this cannot be said of the post-conflict elections held in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2015. The processes leading up to the first post-conflict election took about ten years for the election to be held. Participation in the electoral processes was limited to the leadership of the feuding parties with little inclusion of the masses. This affected its success. The first post-conflict election held in 2010 in the country received a high voter turn-out of 84%. Elections with such a high voter turn-out would be interpreted as highly participatory and perhaps inclusive in the literature of elections on Côte d'Ivoire (Crook, 1997; Théroux-Bénoni, 2009). But this did not happen because the election was characterised by violence like the previous elections held in 1990 and 1995 (Tiémoko, 1995; 1997; N'Da, 1999). Through inclusive elections, duty-bearers, particularly political power holders are held accountable for their stewardship by the electors. However, evidence from the field on the high voter turn-out in the first post-conflict election in Côte d'Ivoire point to something different. The high voter turn-out was indicative of the wide divisions and high level of rancour and acrimony existing along ethnic and religious lines.

The Government of National Reconciliation could not reconcile differences within itself, let alone the whole country. The north-south division of the country remained active at the time of the election which was detrimental to its success. The Ivoirians of northern descent who were affected by the citizenship legislation – the "Ivoirité" clothed in Article 35 of the Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire - used the elections as the opportunity to elect Alassane Ouattara who represented their cause because Ouattara like them was an Ivorian of northern descent. On the other hand, the lower participation in the election by the pro-Gbagbo supporters or the defeat of Gbagbo's Font Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) in the election also meant the triumph of the "aliens" – the northerners. The high turn-out in the election was the continuation of the conflict rather than it being a mechanism for its termination.

The 54% turn-out in the second post-conflict presidential election held in 2015 affirms the position that the high turn-out (84%) in 2010 does not tell the whole story. The politics of exclusion or disengagement of people from the state manifested in this election. The defeat of the "indigenes" (pro-Gbagbo) by the "aliens" (pro-Ouattara) in the first post-conflict election and the arrest and subsequent trial of their candidate President Laurent Gbagbo kept the "indigenes" away from the polls (Interview with the President of RASALAO-CI; interview with Ntaye, 2016; interview with N'guessan, 2016). There were violent demonstrations by the pro-Gbagbo supporters and in solidarity with Gbagbo and others, who were in detention, the supporters and sympathisers of the FPI decided to boycott the election (Roberts, et al., 2016). The refusal of Pascal Affi N'guessan, former Prime Minister under President Gbagbo to boycott the election, and his subsequent contest on the ticket of Gbagbo's FPI resulted in his 9% of votes in the election. The implication of this is that a significant proportion of people still harboured ill-feeling against the government led by Alassane Dramane Ouattara. The low participation of citizens in the 2015 election,

> should send a strong signal to the government and to the international community that hurriedly organised elections in such a volatile security environment is anathema to effective peacebuilding in post-conflict countries. Such elections increase insecurity and violence, and should not be encouraged (interview with Youssouf, a member of coalition of CSOs, 2016).

The impact of international military policies on the security of the people in Côte d'Ivoire's crisis

This section assesses the impact of military policies either directly implemented or facilitated by the international security interveners to address the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The section focuses on the military involvement of the UN, AU, ECOWAS and France in the crisis. Specifically, the first part of this section examines the impact of the international military

presence on the security of people. The second part interrogates the impact of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes on people's security.

The limited impact of the international military presence on violence

The evidence adduced in this section shows that peacebuilding interventions to address insecurity, particularly violence produced a limited positive impact. This is due to a number of factors including limited size of international peacekeeping force, unclear mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and their limited geographical deployment. These factors have affected their responsibility to protect citizens' personal safety and security.

The international military intervention was a key political strategy used as part of measures to abate violence following the armed insurrection against the government in Côte d'Ivoire. The initial deployment of ECOWAS peacekeepers to Côte d'Ivoire anchored on Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter with a mandate to monitor a cease-fire and to protect citizens. Under chapter VIII, regional organisations such as ECOWAS are mandated to intervene in the internal affairs of member states for the purposes of settling conflicts. The ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force known as the ECOMICI – Economic Community Mission in Côte d'Ivoire which operated alongside the French military force – the "Licorne." The initial military presence by ECOMICI and the Licorne as well as the legitimacy of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement were boosted on February 4 2003 with the adoption of Resolution 1464 by the UN Security Council. The Resolution backed the military presence of ECOMICI and the Licorne. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution authorised the forces to take necessary steps to ensure the security and free movement of their personnel. In this regard, Resolution 1464 urged the international forces to build trust with the combating parties while

ensuring the protection of civilians threatened with violence within areas of their deployment (UNSC, s/RES/1464/2003, 2003).

The passing on 13 May, 2003 of the UN Security Council Resolution 1479 established the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) which co-habited with the existing ECOMICI and the French Licorne to support peace efforts in the country. The total authorised strength of MINUCI was 26 liaison officers and up to 50 additional officers as civilian staff (UN, 2004). Among the key tasks MINUCI undertook were : providing advice to the Special Representative on military matters; monitoring the military situation, including the security of Liberian refugees and reporting to the Special Representative; establishing liaison with the French and ECOWAS forces for the purpose of advising the Special Representative on military and related developments; establishing liaison with the "Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire" (FANCI) and the "Forces Nouvelles" in order to build confidence and trust between the armed groups. They also provided input to forward planning on disengagement, disarmament and demobilization and identified future tasks, in order to advise the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and support the French and ECOWAS forces (UN, 2004).

Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council backed the peacekeepers with a Chapter VII mandate. Under Chapter VII, the UNSC may authorise the use of force by the peacekeepers. The disadvantage in resorting to the application of force is that it could possibly erode the neutrality virtue extolled in the traditional approach to peacekeeping which is underpinned by the chapter VI of the UN Charter (Donald, 2002; Levine, 2010). However, in view of the deterioration of security in Côte d'Ivoire, the peacekeeping force required the more robust Chapter VII peacekeeping mandate which clothed the peacekeepers with coercive powers as articulated in some research (Holt and Berkman, 2006; Williams, 2010). The peacekeepers were confronted with a number of challenges from the start of the war which worsened the security situation.

Despite ECOMICI's presence in the country, it could not use force to compel compliance to human rights and international humanitarian law because its power was derived from Chapter VI of the UN Charter. ECOMICI was thus constrained. Also, with a strength of about 500 troops it found itself in the midst of a government backed army and thousands of anti-government rebels. Resorting to the use of force with such a limited size was not viable, as scholars have argued (Pugh, 2004; Bellamy et al, 2010; Levine, 2010). The limited size of the peacekeepers was further compounded with the unclear mandate of their deployment. The former UN ambassador who also became President Obama's National Security Advisor, Susan Rice once cautioned against unclear mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions. Unclear, or imprecise mandates could derail the gains of a peacekeeping force, even those that with high chance of success will fail: "We need mission mandates that are more credible and achievable. We need peacekeeping operations to be planned expertly, deployed quickly, budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, led ably, and ended responsibly" (Rice, 2009). The UNOCI's operations fell short of Rice's caution. The UNOCI's mandate under UNSC Resolution 1528 (2004), which required it "to use all necessary means within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to prevent any hostile action within the Zone of Confidence", was unclear to troops on the ground whether or not they could use force. The UNOCI Force Commander complained to the UNSC in the 13th Progress Report of the United Nations Security Council. He noted that unlike the French Licorne, UNOCI's mission rules proscribed the use of force in its monitoring of the cease-fire which was affecting its expanded mandate of providing protection to the civilians under immediate physical threats (UNSC, S/2004/525, 2004). From the very beginning, the exact mandate of UNOCI was unclear to even the UN Secretary-General himself. The UN Secretary General's letter to the UNSC to clarify UNOCI's mandate attests to this fact. Part of the letter read:

> You will recall that in operative paragraph 6 (a) of the above resolution, UNOCI was mandated, inter alia, to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire

Agreement of 3 May 2003 (the Agreement) …. In this context, I should be grateful if the Security Council could confirm that UNOCI is authorised to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to prevent any hostile action within the Zone of Confidence (UNSC, S/2004/886, 2004).

The unclear mandate of the UNOCI constrained its military power and this affected the security of both the troops and civilians from violence perpetrated by the fighting Ivoirian forces. The difficulty created relational and operational problems with the Licorne because while the Licorne could use force, the UNOCI could not. The Licorne was also saddled with problems. Even though the Licorne was vested with power to use force, the French government had also deployed only a handful of forces to the buffer zone at the initial stages of the crisis. When the Licorne used force it faced stiff opposition and recorded some casualties (Interview with an official of the "Soir" Newspaper, 2016).

The military presence without the capacity to use force, emboldened their enemies. This increased the violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians (interview with official of peace and Security section of the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung- CI, 2016; interview with an official of the UN Embargo office, 2016). The foreign troops were treated as adversaries rather than as neutral interveners (interview with UN official, 2016). There were instances where the peacekeepers were pelted with stones in some areas because they were perceived to be either aiding a party in the crisis or using military capability to repel a belligerent party (interview with the Director of Programmes of RASALAO-CI, 2016, interview with a UN official, 2016; interview with Diakié, 2016). Violence in the country continue to spread. Physical attacks including assault and armed robberies on civilians increased in communities and in some cases camps hosting the displaced were attacked, and sexual abuse continued to be a major concern in the country (interview with the Head of AU Office, 2016, interview with Kangoye, Deputy Head of Amnesty International – CI, interview, 2016; interview with Tchedoh, RASALAO-CI, 2016). On numerous occasions the international community's attention was drawn to the tragic

incidences of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2008; Kangoye, interview, 2016)

By 2004, the crisis assumed an alarming dimension due to the violence being visited on people by the combatants. The French government increased its troops to about 5000 to enable the Licorne to live up to the task. One key issue was that the necessary military power required to help in abating the violence was lacking, from the start of the conflict to the first post-conflict election. Such a worsening security environment required the UN troops to establish an effective presence in major hot spots throughout the country (interview with Major-General Tim Cross (rtd), 2016). But this was lacking in Côte d'Ivoire. Civilians in most parts of the country were left to their own devices of protection (Ntaye, interview, 2016; Fanguafiga, 2016; Francoise, 2016). The situation allowed civilians to be harmed as violence spread in the face of the limited size of the troops to mount effective security across the country.

By 2008, there was an increase in the number of UNOCI troops to over 8000. Against the authorised strength of 8,115, UNOCI had 8,024 personnel by 1st July, 2008. This figure was composed of 7,700 troops, 195 military observers and 89 staff officers. Of this figure only 77 were women. UNOCI had 11 battalions deployed across the country, especially the most affected parts. Five of the battalions were deployed in the western part of the country and four sent to the east and two were in Abidjan (UNSC, S/2008/451, 2008). As part of their contribution to improving security in the country, the European Union undertook the rehabilitation and building of new police stations for the communities (interviews with two officials of the EU Delegation in Côte d'Ivoire, 2016). This helped to improve the maintenance of security in some key hotspots, but this was still not enough to address adequately the problem of the military's protection of civilians across the country. The absence of a military presence left communities unprotected and the fighting militia capitalised on the lapses to cause harm to

the civilian population. The importance of the military presence in the crisis was stressed in the interviews. One interviewee vividly described the state of affairs:

> It was a heave sigh of relief escaping from death in Abidjan through Baouké into my hometown where the UNOCI had a camp too. Each time we had information in my hometown that fighters were coming into the community, you find people moving closer to the camp for their safety. I personally did that on several occasions and some of the keepers became my friends. The fact that we had the peacekeepers around us was meaningful (N'guessan, interview, 2016).

Indeed, in the thirteenth progress report to assess UNOCI's operations in Côte d'Ivoire, the mission documented that there were a number of places such as Divo and Issia in the West and Adopé in the South, where there has been no military presence. The report also took notice of the deployed troops in the newly established camp in Dabakala in the north which was previously threatened and required a military presence (UNSC, S/2008/451, 2008). Thus, a military presence was important for the protection of lives and property in the country. The military presence was important in securing a volatile environment; getting rid of violent crime and helping to ensure a durable peacebuilding intervention (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005:3; Cross, interview, 2016,). In sum, two key issues confronted the effective operations of UNOCI in improving the safety and security of people as far as its presence and its role in the protection of civilians were concerned. The first was the limited size of the troops in such a precarious and declining security environment. The severity of the crisis required more troops, but this was lacking for a very long time and when more troops were eventually deployed the crisis had escalated and spread to so many places. The second issue has to do with the unclear mandate of UNOCI which have all been discussed previously.

The failure of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants

Substantially, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants was a failure in Côte d'Ivoire prior to the 2010 elections. This is because arms were not extensively retrieved from the fighters, groups were not fully disbanded and there was no proper integration

of former fighters into the communities. Yet, elections were allowed to be conducted in such a volatile security environment. Although the DDR programme implemented in the post run-off electoral crisis was somehow more successful than the DDR before the 2010 elections, arms remained prevalent posing major security threats in the country. The belligerent groups were partially disbanded, but their integration after their disarming have not properly been undertaken into the society.

The DDR programmes have been established in a plethora of literature as necessary conditions towards a country's recovery from war to a sustainable peace (Mehretheab, 1997; Frey and Boshoff, 2005; Bossire, 2006). At its 4020th meeting held on July 8, 1999, the United Nations Security Council called for the inclusion in its agenda the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in all of the peacekeeping missions that it undertakes (UNSC, 1999). In this regard, the UNSC called on the international community to include in the peace accords the disposal of arms and ammunition so that future peace negotiations do not encounter major obstacles. It urged the international community to take steps to address issues such as the predictable financing of DDR programmes, child soldiers, including girl soldiers and media publicity campaigns to disseminate information to galvanise support for programmes relating to the DDR (UNSC, 1999). Apart from the retrieval of weapons and dismantling of the combating groups, the programme has a unique social reconciliation function. How the DDR impact on the safety and security of people in war-affected communities in the country is the subject of this section

The tragedies and devastation that the weapons and their holders in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire caused to the society qualified a comprehensive implementation of a DDR programme in the country. The DDR was part of the strategies by the international peacebuilding actors to ensure that the crisis did not relapse into violence. However, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire relapsed after

the first-post conflict election in 2010. Discussion in this section examines the impact of the DDR on the security of people in the country.

Three elements – institutional, political and defence dimensions defined the DDR in Côte d'Ivoire. The institutional element includes the existence of the Ivorian Constitution and the government of national unity. It also included the peace accords, notably the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra agreements which all constituted the political dimension. The defence dimension concerned itself with the reform of the state security into one unit instead of the divisions along pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara "Forces Nouvelles" with two Chiefs of Staff overseeing the operations of the respective armed groups (UNSC, s/ 2003/99, 2003; Diakité, Fredrich Ebert Foundation-CI, interview, 2016).

In recognition of the deleterious effects of armed belligerents on violent crimes being perpetrated in the Ivoirian crisis, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement tasked the Government of National Reconciliation to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of people and property throughout the country. The LMA states *inter alia*, "In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders." (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003: 3). All other peace agreements that came after Marcoussis, notably the Accra II & III, the Pretoria Agreement and the Pretoria Declaration and the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), all made references to the DDR signed by the parties at Linas-Marcoussis (Interview with official of COSOPSCI, 2016).

Funding for DDR programme was very critical in the implementation because DDR programme were capital intensive requiring the support of international donors. Multilateral and bilateral donors including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United

Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), European Union (EU), France, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden agreed to fund about half of the programme with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire financing about 50% of the programme. The initial implementation of DDR in Côte d'Ivoire was estimated at USD150 million, spanning the period 2005-2008 (Oussou, 2014: 103). On May 14, 2005, the chiefs of staff of the two belligerent groups put out the modalities for the national implementation of the DDR. It was expected that 48,064 ex-combatants were to benefit from the programme comprising 5,500 fighters from the "Forces Armées Nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire" (FANCI) and 42, 564 combatants of the "Forces Nouvelles." The demobilised combatants were to receive a subsistence allowance of US$ 940. It was agreed that 25% of this amount would be paid upon demobilisation, 25% paid in the next 45 days and the remainder paid in the next 90 days (UNSC, S/2005/699). Despite the initial funding commitments, funds did not come in as pledged which negatively affected the process. Also, one of the major problems was getting the parties to accede to the successful implementation of the DDR programme.

The task of arms retrieval and dismantling of armed groups as well as the integration of the former fighters into civilian lives encountered several challenges. At the invitation of President Gnassingbe Eyadema who was a key ECOWAS mediator, the Ivoirian parties issued a Communiqué. In the Communiqué, they agreed to a cease-fire and to refrain from "the recruitment and use of mercenaries, enrolment of children, and violations of the accord on cessation of hostilities" (IRIN, 2002: 6). However, the parties turned a blind eye to their agreed peace deal. Rather, they stock-piled arms, recruited children as fighters and used mercenaries - some of whom had previously fought in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (interview with the President of RASALAO-CI, 2016; interview with the Head of WANEP-CI, 2016). While disarming the militias was a topmost priority, particularly in the run-up to the scheduled 2005 elections, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants never

materialised. No serious commitments were undertaken by the belligerent parties after the symbolic handing over of weapons by the pro-government militias on May 25, 2005 in Guiglo, which was supervised by the chief of staff of the government forces. Several of the armed militias refused to disarm (UNSC, s/2005/699, 2005). Where the pro-Gbagbo forces agreed to disarm, the anti-government rebels on the other side refused to reciprocate. Under the intervention of President Nguesso on 1 April, 2006, the commanders and army chiefs of the rebel forces agreed to proceed with the identification and disarmament exercise simultaneously. However, on 16 June, 2006, the pro-Gbagbo fighters failed to disarm on schedule. Even on 5 July, 2006, when the pro-Gbagbo fighters agreed to disarm and participate in the nationwide disarmament exercises following the meeting in Yamoussoukro with Secretary General Kofi Annan, they reneged on their promise (Schori, 2015; Daddieh, 2016). The protests by the Young Patriots and clashes with opposition elements in Abidjan led to the suspension the disarmament process on August 4, 2006. The anti-government militia responded in equal measure by suspending their disarmament participation (Daddieh, 2016).

By the time of the OPA, very little progress has been made regarding the implementation of the DDR programme. The key issues relating to the implementation of the DDR were not agreed and addressed properly before the election in 2010. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement allowed key tasks of disarming, dismantling and reuniting the Ivoirian army to be completed only after the elections. Significantly, it endangered the security of the electoral processes (interview with President of RASLAO-CI, 2016). The period after the signing of Linas-Marcoussis agreement to the first post-conflict election witnessed growing violence (US Department of State, 2005; Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2008, Amnesty International, 2011, Human Rights Watch, 2012).

The brokered Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement and later the Ouagadougou Accord of 2007 highlighted the need for the implementation of the DDR programme. This was envisaged to

allow the former combatants to disarm and to be integrated into the community. A successful disarmament and demobilisation of combatants meant the withdrawal of foreign forces under the UN mandate from the country. However, this did not happen. Despite the significance of this security intervention in stabilising the country, there were a number of interlocking challenges that stalled the programme. The first of the challenges was political. The recommendation of the African Union Peace and Security Council following the AU summit in October 2006 which required President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny to remain in office for not more than 12 calendar months created more problems (AU PSC, 2007). Gbagbo was not ready to relinquish power because he emerged as the winner of the acrimonious elections held in 2000 and his entire tenure was characterised by civil war. The constitutional basis of such a recommendation was questioned by President Gbagbo and his supporters because he only had one term and eligible for another term. This development affected the road map to peace resulting in subsequent failed peace deals. The result was that the human rights situations worsened and the election scheduled for October 2006 was postponed (interview with an official of COSOPSCI, 2016).

Second, the Forces Nouvelles refused to disarm until the nationality laws which revoked the citizenship status of the people of northern descent were reformed (interview with the Deputy National Network Coordinator, WANEP-CI, 2016). There were also financial constraints. Donors and bilateral partners' conditions were required; and this, together with bureaucratic procedures in terms of feasibility studies on project impact and recruitment, hampered the programme's take-off (interview with the Deputy Executive Secretary of ComNat-SALW, 2016; interview with an official of UNDP-CI, 2016). Some of the differences were addressed: it made it possible for the resumption of the DDR programme, which started with verification, screening and profiling of combatants and listing of their weapons at the cantonments. Despite the promise by parties to cooperate with the process, the programme could not

comprehensively be implemented, leaving many of the fighters armed which led to a high level of insecurity (interview with the president of RASALAO, 2016).

Part of the efforts for effective implementation of the DDR was the creation of public awareness. The set-up of the UN radio contributed to the creation of awareness about the DDR. What was lacking was the non-inclusion of the local people in the design and implementation of the DDR. It was the people going to be disarmed; yet, they were not part of the design, their needs relating to disarming were not mainstreamed into the DDR; and this contributed to the failure to get some people to be disarmed (Kounate, interview, 2016). The implementation of the DDR provided an opportunity for a bottom-up approach which will make the programme more participatory and inclusive, but this was not achieved, hence the inherent challenges that were encountered (Ntaye, interview 2016). The ex-combatants' integration component of the DDR was not thought through as well. The members of the communities were sceptical about the presence of former fighters in the communities (Bibaata, interview 2016; Bamba, interview,2016; Koné, interview, 2016). In instances where crimes were committed, members of community were easily suspicious of the former fighters because they did not trust them. A community member's interview on the reintegration of former fighters stated: "we could only sleep with one eye opened" (Koné, interview, 2016). The few of them who eventually went through the programme were also disarmed, demobilised and their integration into the communities hinged on the "West African CFA franc" given them without any concrete efforts to reconcile them with their victims. Some were also integrated into the communities with their "sins" intact; no steps were taken to reconcile them with their victims or at least have their sins forgiven by their victims (Diabo, Interview, 2016).

To a very large extent, the DDR programme implemented prior to the 2010 elections failed; the impact on the safety of citizens was grave. By 14 May 2008, one hundred and ninety-two combatants of the Forces Nouvelles who gathered at the DDR centre at Ferkessé-dougou

completed the DDR programme. The Bouaké and Séguéla DDR centres had about a thousand of the combatants of the Forces Nouvelles who gathered there to be disarmed, but this number was considered woefully inadequate in view of the numerous fighters of the combatants in those areas which were under the control of the Forces Nouvelles. After the disarmament, arms were still readily available and in use. Presently banditry crimes such as armed robbery is prevalent than the period before the crisis started all because of the availability of arms. Armed robbery increased markedly in the communities with the integration of ex-combatants There was also suspicion among community members about the behaviour of the former fighters. By virtue of one being an ex-combatant qualifies him or her in the community to be suspected of any crime committed (Youssouf, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016). The DDR programme in the country retrieved only handful of arms a failure despite some gains (Diakité, interview, 2016). Concerns were expressed about the continuous criminality and the pillaging of some parts of the country by armed militia, which operated with tacit support of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the anti-government militia. On August 15, a group of soldiers led by Corporal Diaby, and loyal to the Forces Nouvelles who were demobilised, blocked all points of entry to Bouaké (Daddieh, 2016). Reports of harassments, sexual abuses, disappearances and murders suspected to be executed by people linked with the Forces Nouvelles and pro-Gbagbo fighters were brought to the attention of the international community (Kangoye, interview, 2016; Amnesty International, 2011). Evidence from the field shows that there was an over concentration on the combating parties, during peace initiatives, to the neglect of ordinary people. The expectation was that the decisions made at the highest level will have a trickle-down effect to the grassroots, but this was not achieved (Bibaata, 2016; Koulsoum, interview, 2016).

Also, the DDR focused on the retrieval of weapons and disbanding the groups and did very little to change the livelihood status of the ex-combatants leaving them economically

impoverished. Their integration into the community further aggravated anti-social behaviours such as the sex trade and pick-pocketing (interview with the Deputy Head of Amnesty International – CI, 2016). The ex-fighters survived on racketeering, robbery and forceful confiscation of assets during the war, but were now expected to survive in a law abiding society. This condition proved difficult for many of them to adapt (Kounate, Interview, 2016; Yeo, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016).

Following the failure of the first attempt at disarming, demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants prior to the 2010 election, a review of previous undertakings contributed to the partial success of the second phase of the DDR programme implemented after the post run-off election dispute. The National Commission to Combat the Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (ComNat-SALW), with the support of its partners, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ECOWAS, EU, Japan, German Cooperation (GiZ), the United Nations, and the UNOCI, retrieved more than 9000 weapons and destroyed about 8000 obsolete ones (Deputy Executive Secretary, ComNat-SALW, interview, 2016). The UNOCI on its own undertook a programme of marking 30,153 weapons belonging to the Republican Forces, it rehabilitated 76 storage sites for arms and ammunitions and was able to install two Commission Deconcentrated in Duékoué and Bloléquin where it retrieved arms from the fighters (interview with official of the Embargo Office, UNOCI, 2016). Nonetheless, throughout the DDR programme implementation from the first post-conflict election, the issue of combating small arms and light weapons under the DDR programme remain an unfinished business and remained a critical security matter in the country. At the time of the interviews in Côte d'Ivoire in January-March, 2016, arms retrieval or confiscation and disposal continue to be a major security issue. Arms continue to be readily available and their circulation across the length and breadth of the country was a matter of

public knowledge. The country is yet to totally overcome the proliferation of arms and light weapons:

> In Anyama, where some people initially refused to be disarmed, we later had them disarmed and thought we had done a good job, a man came to us with five (5) AK 47 riffles after we had completed our work and about to leave the town …. In Abobo, we were so glad to retrieve fifty-eight (58) AK47 riffles, then a young man came to us that the 58 riffles we had were just smokescreen, the real arms were still hidden (Tchedoh, Executive Secretary, RASALAO, interview 2016, March 8, 2016).

From the discussions on the DDR programme implemented in the country, it is obvious that the design and implementation of the programme had not been comprehensive. It neglected local participation and local ownership in the process. No or insufficient attention was paid to the needs of children, women, victims, and the general civilian population (World Bank, 2003; UNDP, undated). Under the circumstance, analysts are of the view that the result of ineffective implementation of the DDR programme in post-conflict fragile states would cause the relapse of violent conflict (Solomon and Ginifer, 2003). Indeed, violent conflict relapsed in the country. The precarious security condition in Côte d'Ivoire following the implementation of the DDR contributed to the relapse of the conflict in 2010. Analysts have argued that poorly or ineffectively implemented DDR programmes have a higher chance of taking back a post-conflict state back into war. Lydiah Bossire was very succinct "ineffective, incomplete or badly designed DDR programmes which have an obvious result of increasing the insecurity of the environment in which transitional justice mechanisms are implemented … affecting such factors as the political capacity of a new regime to consider prosecutions" (Bossire, 2006:87).

Conclusion

The chapter examined the impact of peacebuilding interventions on personal safety and security of war-affected communities. Peacebuilders' policies to address personal safety and security of war-affected communities focused on eliminating violence and threats of violence. There were three key interventions; namely, diplomatic or political undertakings, the presence

of peacekeepers and the implementation of DDR programmes to confront violence in the country. They engaged the feuding parties diplomatically, implemented DDR programmes and deployed international military forces to provide security. All these interventions made a limited positive impact in curtailing violence. However, election which was one of the political strategies whose implementation was expected to contribute to curtailing violence failed completely. Instead of the elections being successful by electing a president for the country so that violence would be curtailed, the outcome of the election led to the deaths of over 3000 people in less than four months. Peacebuilders engaged feuding parties in Paris, Accra, Pretoria and Abidjan and also relied on the experience of eminent persons including former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and President Dennis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo to help the parties build consensus to lead to violence reduction. They also helped the parties to work towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis. All these undertakings were fraught with serious setbacks which affected the objective of abating violence which caused dire consequences on human security in the communities. The belligerents sent their representatives to the peace meetings and conferences while the rest of the fighters used the break to further arm themselves to ensure that they remained relevant in the war. None of the measures curtailed violence until the Ouagadougou conference in 2007 where a significant leap towards violence reduction was made. However, this was only temporary, and there was a return to violence three years of signing the OPA. The situation after the post run-off election violence to 2015 has improved, but many insecurity matters remained to be completely addressed in the country. Drawing on our discussions on "negative peace" and the "freedom from fear" conceptions in chapters one and three which undergirded this chapter, the analyses in this chapter show that the war-affected populations in Côte d'Ivoire continued to face serious insecurity problems even with the implementation of security interventions. Despite the fact that peacebuilders prioritised negative peace which scholars of liberal peace argued would have created space for durable

peace to be achieved, threats of violence and the use of violence against citizens persisted in the war-affected communities. Conclusively, the verdict in this chapter is that peacebuilders' initiatives to a very large extent made a minimal contribution to addressing personal safety problems and the security of war-affected communities. They did very little to mitigate threats of fear among war-affected populations in the country.

Chapter Five

The Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions on Human Rights Violations in Côte d'Ivoire

This chapter examines how international human rights interventions addressed human rights violations in the war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire. The chapter analyses the empirical data to establish the exact impact of the interventions. Theoretically, the chapter hinges on freedom to live in dignity and rights which is a third standpoint of human security. Peacebuilding interventions to address human rights violations and war crimes in the country were part of initiatives to achieve positive peace. In the previous chapters, it was established that the freedom to live in dignity has an intrinsic relationship with both freedoms from fear and want. For example, poverty and economic deprivation which are necessary in ensuring socio-economic security of the war-affected people have consequences on people's dignity and rights, but these are at the heart of freedom from want element of human security. Discussion of some of the issues which relate to freedom to live in dignity and rights have been undertaken in the other two empirical chapters because of how critical those issues are in the two other approaches. This chapter which underpins the freedom to live in dignity and rights milieu of human security focuses on issues of human rights abuse and war-related crimes caused during Côte d'Ivoire's crisis.

When war broke-out in Côte d'Ivoire on September 19 2002, reports of mass killings, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, gender-based violence, forced disappearances, and child rights abuses were some of the key human rights issues that confronted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the international community. A day later, the Council issued a statement urging the parties in the conflict to put an end to impunity and to ensure full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The Council also endorsed the decision of the UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to send a mission to gather first-hand information on the situation (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003).

The subsequent resolutions of the UN relating to the crisis which lasted from 2002 to 2011 required the UN offices and its agencies in the country to take necessary steps to prevent impunity by monitoring violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (SC/RES/1572, 2004; SC/RES/1528, 2004; SC/RES/1584, 2005; SC/RES/1594, 2005; SC/RES/1632, 2005; SC/RES/1643, 2005; SC/RES/1942, 2010; SC/RES/1967, 2011; SC/RES/1975, 2011). These resolutions also enabled peacekeeping troops, which had been deployed, to prevent threats to human rights. The UN instructed its agencies to assist in investigating human rights abuses, build capacity and provide technical support to domestic human rights institutions, as well as assist in redressing abuses (UNSC, s/2003/688, 2003; UNSC, s/2004/525, 2004; UNGA, A/HCR/17/48, 2011). Other international organisations in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC), Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have undertaken a wide range of measures towards human rights promotion in Côte d'Ivoire by investigating abuses in order for punitive measures to be applied to perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In assessing the impact of peacebuilding initiatives on human rights, a gamut of factors based on literature and interviews are used in examining the exact impact of peace initiatives. The factors are those relating to reduction of violence or threats of violence. The key factors which peacebuilders are expected to address, discussed in the theory chapter, are as follows: 1) international pressure to deter human rights abusers from killing or torturing; 2) imposition of international sanctions on human rights violators; 3) monitoring and reporting human rights abuses; 4) addressing sexual abuse of women; and 5) international investigations and trials of war criminals. The chapter examines the impact of international pressure, sanctions, monitoring, investigations and trials for the human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire. In assessing

the impact of international interventions, the chapter takes account of the extent to which the domestic structures' responses to human rights have changed since the implementation of international peace interventions from 2002 to 2015. The chapter tracks the changes that have occurred in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in the country following the implementation of these interventions. It is argued that while the international peacebuilders have worked tirelessly to uncover and document violations of human rights, few attempts have been undertaken to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable. Human rights abuses, which take various forms, continue to be perpetrated against citizens in the country.

The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one discusses the origin and evolution of human rights abuses in the country following the war. This helps us in tracking the changes that have occurred with the implementation of the interventions. Section two is composed of two parts. The first part critically analyses international monitoring, investigations, and sanctions of perpetrators of torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, unlawful killings, and gender-based violence. The second part critically assesses how the uncovered violations of have been dealt with and its overall impact on peacebuilding in the country.

The evolution and context of human rights abuse in the crisis

Although the 2000 Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire proscribed any forms of killings, including the death penalty, the war led to flagrant violations of not only these constitutional provisions, but also international humanitarian law. In the crisis, thousands of people lost their lives through unlawful executions, many were arrested, tortured and unlawfully detained on the basis of their political or ethnic affiliation, women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual abuses, and children's rights were neglected (Human Rights Watch, 2008; UNSC, s/2008/460, 2008; Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011). The crisis in the country led to high levels of insecurity caused by the forces loyal to the state and pro-

government militias. In addition, anti-government militias and rebel commanders all operated outside the law and the principles of human rights.

The inviolability of the right to life, as provided for in the Ivoirian constitution and international humanitarian conventions, protocols and declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were blatantly violated during Côte d'Ivoire's crisis. The violations of the right to life resulted in extra-judicial killings and disappearances of people in such cities as Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo, and subsequently across the length and breadth of the country. The abuses were evidenced by the mass graves that were uncovered in the country (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003). The modus operandi of the combating groups in violating the right to life included broad day light executions, secret executions where appropriate to conceal their crimes from international attention, and numerous abductions by pro-Gbagbo death squads and militias (US Department of State, Press Statement, 24 February, 2003; Ntemiké, interview, February 18, 2016). It has been established by a fact-finding mission headed by the Deputy High Commissioner of the UNHCR that most of the killings prior to the visit of the mission in December 2002 were summary executions by both pro and anti-Gbagbo fighters and supporters (UNSC, S/2003/90, 2003).

On a visit to the north of the country, a communiqué of 19 December 2002 by Amnesty International showed disturbing incidences of summary killings by the then anti-government militia – the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI). These were directed particularly at the gendarmes and police officers. Amnesty International recorded also cases of summary executions of people from the north or foreigners, undertaken in areas controlled by the forces loyal to the Gbagbo administration (Amnesty International, 2011). Two mass graves were confirmed in Daloa and Bouaké which were at the time part of the stronghold of the government: there was also a mass grave at Monoko-Zohi under the control of the rebels

(UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003; BBC, January 26, 2003). The BBC's Joan Baxter described two of the mass graves:

> We saw two mass graves here in the village of Monoko-Zohi in western Ivory Coast. They are almost joined together and are probably 30 metres by about 10 metres in size and not very deep - unfortunately. The earth has been heaped up over bodies, but there are still body parts visible. This is because local people here were terrified of further attacks and buried their dead in a great hurry (BBC, January 26, 2003).

All these happened in the first three months of the crisis. The issue of mass graves not only continued, but increased following the election dispute in 2010. On 30th December 2010, the UN alleged that its investigators were prevented by the pro-Gbagbo forces from accessing suspected mass grave sites. The security predicament occasioned by the political impasse gave room for the molestations of civilians by the state security forces who indiscriminately shot into crowds perceived to belong to the enemy camp.

On 21 October 2002, a 50-year old correspondent for the Paris-based Radio France Internationale (RFI), Jean Hélène, was shot and killed by a police officer close to the police headquarters while waiting to interview arrested opposition activists (Davenport, 2003). On March 25 2004, the UN estimated that more than 120 people were killed by the security forces and pro-Gbagbo militias during a peaceful political demonstration. The UN said many of the deaths occurred in police custody (UNSC, s/PRST/2004/17, 2004). On June 7 2004, there was an attack suspected to have been undertaken by the *Forces Nouvelles* on the Ivoirian and French forces near Mamingui which killed seven people. It was also reported that 100 people lost their lives in an inter-ethnic clashes in Duékoué (Daddieh, 2016; UNSC, s/PRST/2004/17, 2004). On July 27 2005, the deaths of five policemen were reported in Abidjan; a further seven soldiers and seventeen assailants died in Agboville when a suspected armed men believed to have come from Mali and Burkina Faso attacked the area. On 18 January, 2005 the UN shot and killed four people to repel attack on its base in an anti-UN protest in Guiglo. On 7 February, 2007, a French diplomat responsible for EU Security operations in West Africa, Michel Niaucel was murdered in his home (Financial Times, February 7, 2007; Daddieh, 2016). The killings

escalated in 2010 when the first post-conflict election was disputed. For instance, on 3rd April 2011, a Catholic charity known as Caritas reported the deaths of over 1000 civilians occasioned by the 3 days fighting in Duékoué. On 4th April, 2011, the International Red Cross recorded the killings of about 800 people in Duékoué after the town was captured by the Forces Nouvelles (Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

As indicated the violations of human rights of the people in the crisis also took the forms of disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions. A bullet riddled body of Dr. Benoît Dakoury-Tabley, who was abducted on the 6 November 2002, was discovered on 8 November 2002. Dr. Benoît Dakoury-Tabley was the brother of Louis Dakoury-Tabley, the MPCI Coordinator (UNSC, S/2003/90, 2003; Daddieh, 2016). The kidnapping and subsequent cold-blood murder of Habib Dodod, a student by FESCI, which was a pro-Gbagbo student body for expressing anti-Gbagbo sentiments took place on 23 June 2004. On same day, Richard Kouadio, also a student was attacked by the FESCI in Bassam and almost lost his life for being their opponent (Human Rights Watch, 2008). A UN report estimated that 150 persons were arrested by the government security forces during the period from September to December, 2002. Although it was difficult to know the exact number of people in detention, it was believed that 11 gendarmeries were in detention in the rebel camp, within the same period (UNSC, s/2003/90). The arbitrary arrests and detention of journalists and opposition party elements were very prominent. Journalists were however often released more quickly than other unlawful detainees due to international pressure (interview with the President of Journalists Association-CI/Chief Editor of 'l'Inter' Newspaper, 2016; interview with the Editor of 'Soir' Newspaper, 2016). In the first three months of the crisis, Mamadou Cissé, a close ally of the opposing party the 'Rassemblement des Républicains,' a Sergeant of the Navy, Tarine, Fofana Zian, Gendarmes Cissé Brama and Moussa Koné and Sergeant Alain Guei, son of the late leader of Côte d'Ivoire General Robert Guei were among the people in detention (UNSC, S/2003/90, 2003; Editor,

Soir, interview, February, 2016). In some instances, the youth militia, such as the 'Groupement des Patriotes pour la Paix' (GPP) and the 'Congrès des Jeunes Patriotes' (COJEP), helped the security forces in arresting people perceived to be enemies (Amnesty International, 2005; Amnesty International, 2011). Women were shot and killed during peaceful protestations. One such incidence occurred on March 8, 2011, at Treichville, a neighbourhood in the city of Abidjan, where women in a peaceful demonstration were killed (Adamou, interview, January 16, 2016; Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

There were also disappearances of people. In the areas controlled by both government and anti-government forces, several people were held incommunicado and in some situations secretly executed in cold blood. Although it was difficult to know the exact numbers, the bullet riddled bodies of people known to have been kidnapped, were later dumped in the streets or retrieved from rivers (Koné, interview, 2016; Editor, interview with a journalist of the 'Soir' Newspaper, 2016). Many people, "have since not known the whereabouts of their husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, and other close relations since the crisis ended" (Yeo, interview, 2016).

There was torture of people believed to be members of the opposing parties. Various categories of torture and ill-treatment were recorded by investigative institutions (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003; Amnesty International, 2005; Amnesty International, 2011, Human Rights Watch, 2011; UNGA, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). In the early years of the crisis, four MPCI combatants were reportedly arrested and tortured by civilians in Bouaké when the town was recaptured by the armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire. Some bodies of the MPCI were also burned by the civilians in this town (Adamou, interview, 2016). In Daloa, the MPCI combatants slashed the throats of some captured soldiers and some of the civilians whose names were of Baoulé origin - non-northern people. These combatants were reportedly drinking the blood of their victims (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003; Kone, interview, 2016; Youssouf, interview, 2016). Several months after the

investiture of Alassane Ouattara, Ivoirian security forces continued to subject people to torture and inhuman treatment. On 26 October, 2012 Amnesty International accused security forces under President Ouattara of ill-treatment by subjecting detainees to electric shocks and other forms of cruel punishment (Amnesty International, 2013).

Gender-based violence, particularly rape and sexual violence against women and girls was one of the instruments of war in the Ivoirian crisis. Women and girls were either individually raped in secret or public or were gang-raped in various locations in the country (Koulsoum, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016; Diabo, interview, 2016). In the government-controlled areas, women were picked from their homes during curfew hours and raped in the detention places (Amnesty International, 2011). The UNOCI's Human Rights division recorded several cases of sexual violence against women and minors including the rape on 27 February 2011 of a 23-year old woman by the Forces Nouvelles at Seboni II, which is about 200km north of Bouaké. The Seboni II rape occurred after a gang-rape of five women on 7 February 2011 by unidentified armed men who ambushed a bus in Fengolo, a community which lay 5km north of Duékoué. On the night of 1 May 2011, a 27-year-old woman in the Zanzan neighbourhood in Bondoukou was raped by an unidentified armed man (UNGA, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). Throughout the crisis, sexual abuses of women, and rape in particular "were means of demeaning women of opposing tribes, especially those women who were known in the communities as being the wives, daughters and close relatives of 'big men' were targeted for rape to disgrace the big men and their tribe" (Adamou, interview, 2016).

The impact of international peacebuilding interventions on human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire's Crisis

Peacebuilders adopted measures to counter the gross violations of human rights as part of their efforts to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country. The

main peacebuilding framework for the country was the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA). The LMA tasked the proposed Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) to set up a national human rights commission to be responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms in the country. Ironically, membership of the commission included representatives of parties whose militias were responsible for the serious human rights violations.

To achieve its objectives, however, the LMA required the GNR to: establish an international board to investigate and establish facts throughout the country in order to identify cases of violations of human rights since 19 September 2002; rely on the report of the international body of enquiry to determine which cases should be brought to justice; facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country; and act on the basis of the report of the established national human rights commission to compensate and rehabilitate victims (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003). Peacebuilders interventions took the form of pressure, monitoring, investigating, and sanctioning human rights violators in the country. The subsequent sections examine how these measures influenced human rights in the war-affected communities.

The limited impact of international pressure on killings, torture and other inhumane treatment in the crisis

On the whole, it can be argued that the international pressure mounted by the human rights institutions had a limited positive impact. Despite international pressure, violations of human rights continued to take place during and after the end of fighting. Peacebuilding by international interlocutors in Côte d'Ivoire was not limited to the provision of a military presence and the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme as we have seen in chapter four. The Linas-Marcoussis platform sets the framework

to bring to an end the killings that were being perpetrated against the people. The actions of the death squads were condemned in the beginning of the crisis at Linas-Marcoussis. The Linas-Marcoussis round table reminded those perpetrating these activities that they were all guilty of war crimes and that they would be brought to justice (UNSC, s/2003/99, 2003). Despite the caution to the parties to cease the executions, the killings never abated, and as the conflict continued the killings and ill-treatment escalated.

The UN and other international human rights institutions such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, urged the feuding parties to take necessary steps to stop the killings being perpetrated by the militias (Amnesty International, AFR 31/007/2005; Amnesty International 2011). They have undertaken site visits and conducted investigations to authenticate allegations of all forms of killings and inhumane treatment. In the crisis, the cautioning of the international peace actors to the warring groups to ensure the protection of civilians in their fiefdoms often brought some respite and hope to the people (Ntemiké, interview, 2016; Gambo, interview, 2016). Press releases and statements were issued to call to order perpetrators of all forms of violence. Methods such as cautions, reprimands, travel bans, and weapon embargoes have been used to either remind or deter perpetrators of war crimes as provided for in the international human rights laws relating to armed conflict (Amnesty International, AFR 31/007/2005; Human Rights Watch, 2008; Kangoye, Deputy Head, Amnesty International - CI, interview, 2016). Following the killing of more than 120 peaceful political demonstrators on 25 March, 2004, the UN called on the government of Gbagbo to conduct investigations into the killings and bring the perpetrators to justice (UNGA, A/HRC/17/48, 2011). However, no investigations and trials whatsoever were undertaken by the Gbagbo administration to punish those involved in the executions. No prosecutions for any breach of war crimes laws were undertaken by any international body between 2002 and 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Yeo, interview, 2016; Koffi, interview, 2016). Koffi expected

the numerous human rights abuses that took place across the country between 2002 and 2010 to be dealt with by the international community in line with international human rights laws so that it served as a deterrent for all would-be war criminals in the country. Unfortunately, as he puts it, "no single person was brought before the ICC or even tried at the national court for any crime committed within the period. It's a sad experience in this country which exposes the international community rhetoric about human rights abuses or war crimes" (Koffi, interview, 2016).

Indeed, the international pressure did not end human rights abuses. Rather, the period 2002 to 2012 witnessed horrifying killings and mistreatment of people by the combatants. The situation of human rights in the country led the human rights institutions to call on the international community to do something to stop the killings (Amnesty International, 2005). On 6 June, 2005, Amnesty International decried the spate of killings taking place in the West of the country and called for serious efforts to disarm the combatants. Amnesty International noted that 47 people from the Guéré ethnic group were killed in the villages of Guitrozon and petit Duékoué on 1 June, 2005 by individuals armed with hunting rifles and knives. On the night of the following day, a dozen people were shot or stabbed to death in the Belleville district, which was in the centre of Duékoué, bringing the deaths to 70. While Amnesty International noted that these killings took place in a region controlled by the government, which was located outside the "zone of confidence" controlled by the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), it emphasised that the killings appeared to be a revenge attack against the Dioula ethnic group (Amnesty International, 2005). Not even empowering UNOCI, under resolution 1572 (2004), to use 'all means necessary' to protect civilians stopped the killings by pro and anti-Gbagbo militias in the country.

No impact of internationally imposed sanctions on killings and torture

The peacebuilders' policy of sanctioning violators of human rights has had no impact on human rights in the country. Throughout the decade that followed the signing of the LMA, the country's political environment was characterised by impunity, due to the alarming proportions of torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, unlawful executions and gender-based violence that were committed against the people by the belligerents. The government of Gbagbo used coercive security forces – *"Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire"* (National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire), "Forces de Défense et de Sécurité" (Defense and Security Forces which is the collective term for the army [FANCI], the police and the gendarmerie) in the perpetration of gross violations of human rights. Also, it used extensively the "Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes" (Pan African Congress of Young Patriots) in exacting abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Young Patriots drew its support from the Federation of Students of Côte d'Ivoire known as the "Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire" (FESCI). The youth militias, composed largely of the Young Patriots and the FESCI, captured and murdered people and raped women (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Bamba, interview, 2016; Traore, interview, 2016)

The youth militias loyal to Gbagbo enjoyed the support of the government and in several instances, the security forces acted in concert with these non-state youth militias (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Youssouf, interview, 2016; N'guessan, interview, 2016). The Forces Nouvelles enjoyed the support from many quarters including mercenaries who had fought in the Liberian crisis and civilians drawn largely from some members of northern ethnic groups (UNGA, A/HRC/30/34, 2015). The flagrant abuses committed by the Forces Nouvelles were similar to the atrocities committed by the pro-Gbagbo fighters and supporters: they raped, killed and buried people in mass graves (Kamilou, interview, 2016; Hawawou, 2016; Gideon, interview, 2016).

The imposition of sanctions on key figures involved in the outrages was one of the measures undertaken by the international actors to redress war related abuses. On 7 February, 2006, the Security Council Committee, established under resolution 1572 (2004), imposed sanctions on key figures whose role the global body considered inimical to the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms. Wheat Goudé, a leader of the Young Patriots and Eugène Ngoran Kouadio suffered the sanctions of the United Nations Security Council, under paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004). These sanctions have also been affirmed by resolution 1543 (2005). Their crimes involve repeated acts of public incitement against the personnel and facilities of the UN and foreigners. They were sanctioned for participating in violence unleashed by street militias and also providing leadership to these violent street processions in which they intimidated the UN staff, international working group (IWG) personnel, sabotaging international radio stations and perpetrating violence against their political opponents. Their crimes also included rape and extra-judicial executions (UNSC, s/8631/2006, 2007). Other stalwarts of the Young Patriots who were sanctioned by the UNSC for acts of hatred and xenophobia, unlawful killings, rape and other war related crimes were Charles Blé Goudé and Eugène Djué (UNSC, s/8632/2006).

Martin Fofié Kouakou, who was the Master Corporal Commander of the Forces Nouvelles for the Korhogo sector, was also sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council on the 7 February, 2006. The forces under his command engaged in the recruitment of children as fighters, arbitrary arrests and detentions, extra-judicial killings, kidnappings, forced labour, and sexual violations. These acts by his forces impeded the smooth operation of the IWG, the UNOCI, the Licorne and the overall Ivoirian peace process enshrined in resolution 1633 (2005) of the United Nations (Diakité, interview, February, 20016; Tchedoh, interview, 2016).

Despite the sanctions imposed on the key figures identified as being responsible for the perpetration of atrocities committed in the crisis, between 2006 when these sanctions were

imposed on the key figures and 2010 when the first post conflict election was conducted, unlawful killings, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, abductions, recruitment of children into combat groups and sexual violence continued to be perpetrated. With the change of political power from Gbagbo to Ouattara, the FRCI loyal to Ouattara spearheaded the killings, torture and degrading treatment against the pro-Gbagbo supporters and remnant militia. During this period, acts of violence were perpetrated against Gbagbo supporters by the Forces Nouvelles-turned-state security (UNGA, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). By the close of May, 2011, the remnants of pro-Gbagbo militias had fled the fighting with the FRCI taking absolute control over places previously held by their fighters.

Despite the loss of political power and war by the Gbagbo government, the FRCI under Ouattara intensified their executions by sealing off and searching the neighbourhoods of strongholds of Gbagbo. Young persons were executed on the basis of their ethnicities or political orientation. The youth of Attié, Bété, Guéré, and Goro ethnic groups who supported Gbagbo in the elections were deliberately targeted for executions, tortured and their women sexually molested just to disgrace their ethnicity (Hudson, 2009; Rafiou, interview, 2016). The international human rights monitoring institutions have records of cases of unlawful executions whether summary or extra-judicial or both, rape and other forms of sexual abuses of women and girls, abductions, recruitment of children for combative purposes, and the involvement of mercenaries to perpetrate these human rights crimes. The records of these international monitors show that atrocities continue to be perpetrated after these sanctions were imposed. However, the psychological effects of being sanctioned by the UN for human rights violations cannot be totally written-off. At least, being aware of the sanctions for human rights crimes places an invisible bar on the perpetrators of heinous crimes. To avoid international sanctions, the perpetrators of these crimes, both the pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces undertook many of their crimes in secret. Even where executions took place publicly, they buried the bodies in

mass secret locations so as to escape the eye of international investigating institutions (Aminatou, interview,2016; Hikma, interview, 2016, Koffi, interview, 2016). Thus, the sanctions imposed on these key persons relating to human rights abuses only contributed minimally in reducing the abuses.

The impact of international human rights monitoring on violations of human rights

One of the peacebuilding measures adopted by the international actors in the Ivoirian crisis was to confront gross violations of human rights through monitoring of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law. On this count, the thesis argues that international monitoring of human rights, as one of the measures adopted by peacebuilders to promote and protect human rights, has made a limited positive impact. The international monitoring role was undertaken largely by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN agencies. Throughout the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were the two most active non-governmental global monitors for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This section examines the impact of international monitoring of human rights in the country. The first part of the section discusses the contribution and impact of the two international non-governmental human rights monitors in the crisis. The second part of the section discusses the impact of the UN monitoring role.

The limited impact of international non-governmental human rights monitoring on violations of human rights

In the crisis, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch launched campaigns against flagrant violations of human rights. Their campaigns were not limited to only violations being perpetrated by the core parties in the conflict, but also monitored abuses by the peacekeepers. Their activities extended beyond urban centres to very remote parts of the country. Between

2002 and 2012, reports of the two international human rights monitors have concluded that gross violations of human rights persisted and were perpetrated by both the pro and anti-Gbagbo militias. In a statement, Amnesty International notes, "all parties to the conflict have committed crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity" (Amnesty International, 2011). Where abuses were committed either by the core parties or the peacekeepers, or where the peacekeepers failed to act, they questioned the UN, and urged the global security interlocutor to act swiftly (Amnesty International, 2005).

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urged all parties in the conflict to work towards ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These included the protection of children, women, refugees, and prisoners, ending executions, torture and the death penalty, overcoming discrimination on grounds of race, gender, religion, and political dissent. The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire presented daunting challenges to the international human rights monitors in view of the abuses which accompanied the crisis. The monitors questioned all forms of abuses in the conflict such as political and non-political killings and disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, mistreatment of prisoners of war, child victims of war, sexual abuses of women and girls, hatred and xenophobic acts. Although the rebels were not signatories to international human rights conventions and protocols and international humanitarian law, to achieve their goals in the crisis, the international monitors called on all belligerents to observe human rights standards and international humanitarian law (Kandé, interview, 2016; Bamba, February, 2016).

The international non-governmental monitors also undertook series of educational activities on human rights by giving out leaflets to people and encouraging all non-governmental organisations, individuals and local human rights institutions to respect human rights (Kouadio Bi, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016). Systematically, the international monitors documented acts of human rights violations in the crisis by carefully interviewing victims.

Through their reports and statements, other institutions such as the International Criminal Court made significant follow-ups on these gross violations with the aim of bringing the perpetrators to justice. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch do not have powers to punish human rights abuses or war crimes, but their activities included naming and shaming (Kadigan-Kossi, interview, 2016; Kouakou Bi, interview, 2016). Their involvement has also prompted investigations into abuses by peacekeepers.

Despite the role of international monitoring the killings and other abuses in the country did not stop. Evidence of executions undertaken by the belligerent parties from 2002 to 2010 have been documented. Several reports of the UN and its agencies as well as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have chronicled these abuses (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003; UNSC, s/2003/688, 2003; UNSC, s/2004/525, 2004; Amnesty International, 2005; UNSC, s/2008/451, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008; UNGA, A/HCR/17/48, 2011; UNGA, A/HRC/17/49, 2011; Amnesty International, 2011). Yet, no prosecutions for war related crimes were undertaken either at the national or international level for abuses from 2002 to 2010. There was a failure to punish the perpetrators of killings and there were no prosecutions of pro-Ouattara fighters.

The impact of international governmental human rights monitoring on human rights promotion and protection in Côte d'Ivoire's Crisis

The UNSC and the UNHCHR showed particular concern about summary executions, extra-judicial killings, torture, mistreatment of prisoners of war, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, recruitment of children into armed militias, gender-based violence and the shelling of communities with heavy weapons. The UNHCHR urged the feuding parties to be mindful of human rights standards and international humanitarian law. Within the period of our study, Côte d'Ivoire, was considered to be a high risk country on the UNSC agenda. The UNSC found it necessary to send a mission to gather precise information about the violations

of human rights (UNSC, s/2003/688, 2003; UNGA, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). This was deemed worthwhile, if the UNSC was to act promptly in protecting civilians at risk.

A delegation of six, including the Deputy High Commissioner, a forensics expert, two human rights officers, a security advisor and an administrative officer of the UNHCR composed the first fact-finding mission between 23 December 2002, and 29 December 2002 (UNSC, s/2003/90, 2003). Other UN human rights missions were also deployed. The work of the missions updated the UN and its partners about the state of human rights in the country.

The investigations of human rights abuses were not limited to those perpetrated by the combating militias, but also abuses by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. On 20 July, 2007, there was confirmation by the UN that a group of Moroccan peacekeepers composed of 734 soldiers were confined to their base while allegations of widespread sexual abuses against them were investigated (Parsons, 2007; CNN, 21 July, 2007). The report "No One to Turn to" delivered on 27 May 2011, by the Save the Children, UK, a non-governmental organization, chronicled several cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of children by the peacekeeping troops and humanitarian workers. This report was the organisation's contribution to raising public awareness with respect to sexual violations, and sought to get UNOCI to be proactive in dealing with sexual abuses in the country. Following the BBC's coverage of the Save the Children report on the alleged rape of a 12-year-old girl by 10 peacekeepers of UNOCI in 2007, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services conducted investigations to assess the credibility of the allegations, which was shared with the concerned troop contribution country (UNSC, s/2008/451, 2008)

The availability of precise and detailed information on violations of human rights was necessary to enable the UN to deploy all its capabilities to end violence, because an intrinsic relationship exist between violence and human rights (UNSC, s/2008/451, 2008). Unfortunately, this was very difficult to achieved, as we saw in chapter four. A number of

human rights violations continued to be perpetrated by the combatant groups. Severe abuses were recorded in the country from 2003 when the LMA was signed to 2010 when the first post-conflict election was conducted (Amnesty International, 2011; Rights Watch, 2011; UNSC, s/2008/451, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2007). The human rights situation was horrifying that on 15 November, 2004, the special UN adviser on genocide warns the Ivoirian media which were being used to raise ethnic sentiments, reminding them of the statute of the ICC which proscribed acts of incitement to violence (Daddieh, 2016).

The period from 2011, when Alassane Ouattara was invested with power, and 2015 when the second post-conflict election was conducted, also witnessed flagrant abuses of human rights. The escalation of violence in the country engaged the attention of international human rights institutions. The subsequent creation of the human rights division of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was to make facts of abuses available to UNOCI for swift action to be taken. The human rights division of UNOCI was to update UNOCI on regular basis about the situation of human rights in the country so that the peacekeepers. This helped UNOCI to act promptly in some cases to protect civilians in looming danger of death and subjection to human indignity.

Following the post run-off election dispute, the UNOCI human rights office in December, 2010 established a 24-hour hotline for members of the public to report cases of violations of human rights. By close of May, 2011, the human rights division of UNOCI had received more than 12,000 calls (UNHCHR, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). The hotline not only served as an important link between the UN and the civilian population, but importantly it did enable the allied peacekeeping force to act in a timely manner to either prevent abuses from occurring or prevent the further escalation of human rights violations. The human rights division of UNOCI investigated and documented gross violations of human rights that had occurred in the crisis. In the killing of women demonstrators on 3rd and 8th March 2011 in two neighbourhoods in the

city of Abidjan - Abobo and Treichville, even though the Gbagbo camp denied complicity of the FDS elements in the incident, the investigations by the human rights division of UNOCI established that the killings confirmed that the FDS forces shot into the demonstrators.

The UNOCI's human rights division also undertook investigations into disappearances in the crisis as part of measures to help responsible authorities to punish the perpetrators of such acts. After failed attempts to investigate the alleged existence of mass graves in N'dotré since the close of December 2010, the UNOCI human rights division finally got access even though no traces of mass graves were uncovered. It established, however, that 250 bullet ridden corpses were deposited in a mortuary in Anyama which is close to N'dotré in November and December 2010. Several mass graves uncovered by the human rights division of UNOCI included 10 sites in Duékoué district comprising 68 bodies (UNHCHR, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). It also investigated the deaths of 15 people when Ibrahim Coulibaly's "Invisible Commandos" attacked Anonkoua-Kouté village, which comprised mainly of Charles Blé Goudé's ebrié ethnic group. The attack was in response to Charles Blé Goudé's call to the pro-Gbagbo youth militias on 28 February to mount roadblocks and conduct searches of all vehicles throughout Abidjan. Blé Goudé's ethnic ebrié welcomed the declaration by setting up roadblocks and attacked the Dioulas. Their action therefore was to protect the Dioula population from Blé Goudé's ethnic group.

In April, 2011, the UNOCI's human rights office also conducted investigations into human rights abuses in the west of the country. The west of the country was the most affected of all the regions following the post run-off election dispute. It established gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which occurred between December 1 2010 to April 24 2011. Summary executions, forced disappearances, rape, torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, arson and looting were the human rights crimes committed by both pro-Gbagbo FDS remnants, Young Patriots, Guéré militants and Liberian

mercenaries on one hand and the pro-Ouattara fighters which comprised the Forces Nouvelles-turned-Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, and the dozo hunters. Within the period, the UNOCI's human rights investigation confirmed that not less than 1,012 persons, comprising 103 women and 42 children, were killed in the Moyen-Cavally and Dix-huit Montagnes regions, and 46 rape cases were recorded, which included pregnant women and two minors. Human rights violations in places such as Grand-Lahou, Dabou and Irobo were all investigated and documented by UNOCI's human rights division (UNHCHR, A/HRC/17/49, 2011).

Despite the investigations by UNOCI's human rights division, there have been alarming numbers of human rights abuses which persisted several months after the investiture of Alassane Ouattara as the country's President. These abuses were perpetrated by elements of the new army, the republican forces constituted under President Ouattara and the pro-Ouattara militias. This was confirmed by UNOCI, between July 11 and August 10, 2011:

> UNOCI has found over the last four weeks that 26 people have been summarily executed and 85 people have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention. We also found 11 cases of rape, mainly in the Duékoué region. Our investigations indicate that in these cases of extrajudicial summary executions, most were committed by the elements of the FRCI (UNHCHR, A/HRC/17/49, 2011).

The international actors have been focused on the need to bring impunity to an end. Clearly, punishments for war related crimes are stated in the statute of the ICC and the expectation was that human rights crimes would be brought to justice. However, the international peace actors have failed on this count. Rather, they have turned a blind eye to the war crimes in the country by not taking the necessary steps to bring the perpetrators to justice. The UN and its agencies as well as other partners, notably Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have only been effective in the warnings and sanctions against some key persons.

The international peace actors were unconcerned while Ouattara rewarded key commanders, who superintended some of the gross violations of human rights, with high positions in the government and the army. A typical example is the promotion on 3 August 2011 of several key and controversial ex-chiefs in the New Forces who fought for President Ouattara, but have been

cited as culprits in gross violations of human rights. Martin Fofié Kouakou who was sanctioned by the UNSC on 7 February 2006 for extra-judicial killings, torture and rape was appointed as the new commandant of Korhogo where he had previously served as a Corporal Master Commander of the Forces Nouvelles (Holland, Kitty, 9 April 2011). Other former rebel leaders who had committed atrocities benefited from appointments from Ouattara. The former rebel leader Issiaka Ouattara, was appointed as the second in command of the Republican Guard. Ousmane Chérif a closest associate of Ouattara was appointed to the position of the Security Group Commander of the Presidency of the Republic (France Soir, 2011). The leader of the "MPCI – the group that started the insurrection from the north in 2002 and later the Forces Nouvelles which fought until the fall of Gbagbo in 2011 which committed serious human rights abuses was Guillaume Soro. This man! Soro, is currently the Speaker of our Parliament. Can you believe this! What does this tell about peacebuilding? It means there's reward in fighting" (Jabouni, interview, 2016). The silence of the UN in these and many other matters, where warlords who committed gross violations were rewarded with positions, constitute a significant blot on the integrity of the UN and allied organisations championing human rights in the country. At the time of fieldwork between January-March, 2016, communities in the west of the country still encounter occasional violent attacks and torture and other related crimes such as rape and sexual exploitation (Aminatou, interview, 2016; Hawawou, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016; Kounate, interview, 2016). Political opponents also continue to face harassment from the state army (Tchedoh, interview, 2008; Ntaye, January, 2016).

Ending impunity through international justice and its impact on peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire

The previous sections indicate the steps the UN and other international human rights institutions have taken to confront gross violations of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire's crisis.

One key issue which featured prominently in confronting impunity was how to reconcile the nation in view of the excessive violations of human rights that had occurred. In Côte d'Ivoire, two different but intrinsically linked mechanisms were adopted as a means to ensure justice. This included criminal trials and the establishment of truth, reparation and reconciliation commissions. This section examines only the international contribution regarding criminal trials and its impact on the violations of human rights in the country. Criminal trials are key in bringing war criminals to justice. Analysts have underscored the importance of bringing perpetrators of human rights abusers to justice because peace can mean justice (Ellis, 2006; Dwight, 2006)

The impact of international trials on human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire.

In terms of international criminal prosecutions in the Côte d'Ivoire's crisis, it was the ICC that invoked its jurisdictional powers to put an end to impunity for the most serious crimes committed. As we have previously discussed in this chapter, several international human rights investigating and monitoring institutions, including the ICC itself, concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed (ICC, 2011). The Rome Statute, which created the ICC in July 1998 and came into effect in 2002, empowered the ICC to punish war criminals in all countries except those that have not ratified the Statute.

Côte d'Ivoire had not ratified the Statute of the ICC at the time the war broke-out in the country: it only ratified it on 15th February, 2013. However, article 12 (3) of the Statute requires states that are not party to the Statute to make declarations to the ICC's Registrar accepting the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to crimes within the reach of the ICC. Similarly, a resolution of the UNSC to the Prosecutor could have triggered the ICC's jurisdictional powers to act under article 13 (b). Pursuant to article 12 (3), the Ivoirian government on 1 October 2003 submitted a declaration dated 13 April 2003, accepting the court's jurisdiction on matters relating to war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in the country since the mutiny

of September 19 2002 (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2003; ICC's statement, 2010). On the 28th of June, 2011, the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, during a visit to Abidjan, assured the public of the ICC's pledge to investigate human rights abuses perpetrated by both parties in the conflict. Just three days after this assurance, 1 July, 2011, an international arrest warrant was issued for the Minister of Youth and former leader of the Young Patriots, Charles Blé Goudé and some other pro-Gbagbo associates. Human Rights Watch investigations indicted 13 military leaders, on both sides of the conflict, for committing war crimes and urged the government of Alassane Ouattara to be even handed in prosecuting all suspected war criminals (Human Rights Watch, 2012). However, recommendations by these human rights institutions to the Ivoirian government to deal with crime irrespective of who was involved, floundered.

Evidence on the ground points to a little progress in redressing grave human rights abuses. So far, no judicial trials have commenced in respect of war crimes committed by the pro Ouattara forces, whether at the national or international level. Again, no criminal trials or charges have been brought against any pro-Ouattara Republican Forces and militias for war crimes committed since 2010. The only exceptions were the trials of President Laurent Gbagbo and his former youth minister Charles Blé Goudé at the International Criminal Court, for war crimes relating to period 2010-2011, as well as the domestic trials of Simone Gbagbo and 79 pro-Gbagbo fighters and aides (Seils, 2016). It meant that justice has not been served for a huge number of crimes committed during the conflict (International Republican Institute, 2015). The failure to punish perpetrators of heinous crimes committed by pro-Ouattara fighters and supporters remains a stumbling block towards the achievement of a sustainable peace in the country. Many analysts believe that achieving peace in a post conflict state is tied to the extent to which justice is served (see Blumeson, 2006; Ellis, 2006; Laplante and Theidon, 2006; Dwight, 2006). Many people who suffered abuses at the hands of pro-Ouattara fighters

boycotted the activities of the truth and reparation commissions established by the Alassane Ouattara administration because of the selective trial of only Gbagbo and his key aides (Aminatou, interview, 2016; Sangou, March, 2016; Kamilou, interview, March, 2016; Antoinette, interview, March, 2016).

The invitation by the Ivoirian government to the ICC was to help investigate and punish crimes. However, since the ICC's involvement in war crimes in the country, no single prosecution has been undertaken for crimes committed from 2002 to 2010. For all the established war crimes and the identified perpetrators, only three - President Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé and Simone Gbagbo were indicted by the ICC, and out of the three only Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé were brought before the ICC for war crimes perpetrated in the post run-off election violence.

In the case of Simone Gbagbo, the Ivoirian government challenged the case brought against her by the ICC on the basis that she was already facing charges for crimes against state security before the *Cours d'Assises* in Abidjan. Simone Gbagbo was tried with 82 other Gbagbo associates from December 26, 2014. Out of the 79 persons who appeared before the Cours d'Assises 18 were acquitted and discharged and 61 convicted and sentenced accordingly (Seils, 2016:48). This meant that all the egregious violations of human rights perpetrated against the people in the country by the pro–Ouattara fighters since September 2002, have not be brought to book either by the ICC or by the national court. This lapse has affected genuine attempts at reconciliation and reparation.

The trial of only Gbagbo and Blé Goudé was a source of worry among the people. Virtually all the interviewees raised concerns about the refusal of the Ouattara administration and the ICC to bring to justice to the perpetrators of war crimes who fought on Ouattara's side in the crisis. Some of the interviewees ridiculed the international community involvement in the crisis arguing that its role, particularly those of the western powers, was only concerned with

protecting the government that they helped to install (Ntaye, interview, 2016; N'guessan, interview, 2016; Traoré, interview, 2016; Yeo, interview, 2016; Kangoye, interview, 2016). Their role in building peace in the country was described as "a smokescreen intended to protect Alassane Ouattara who has emerged as the winner of the election and nothing else. If they were interested in punishing abusers of human rights or the war crimes in this country, then Gbagbo should be sharing his cell apartment at the ICC with Alassane Ouattara because both were complicit in the war crimes" (Gambo, interview, 2016). Catherine Gegout observed that ICC's operation creates a deterrent effect on the potential criminals in the long-term, especially when they are no longer in positions of power because of the consequences of fear for their acts (Gegout, 2013:801).

In the Ivoirian case, only one side of the political divide was being tried even though members from the two camps had been indicted by human rights monitoring institutions for war crimes. In this regard, the ICC's work would not deter the criminals in the other camp so long as the Ouattara administration remained in control of political power. The ICC's failure to punish crimes committed between 2002 and 2010 was due to the complementarity procedure adopted in Côte d'Ivoire, which was problematic. Complementarity, as stated in Article 1 of the Rome Statute, considers the ICC as the international criminal justice bulwark, a court of last resort, which complements the national justice system to redress war crimes. By accepting the Court's jurisdiction under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute, the Ivoirian government ceded its sovereign right to conduct criminal trials within its territory. However, in view of the situation where war crimes were committed by the two sides in the country, and with one side, the victor in the post run-off election inviting ICC to investigate war crimes, it was unlikely that Ouattara, the victor in the armed conflict would submit for criminal trials of people who fought for him to come to power.

Article 17 (a) of the Rome Statute which addresses issues of admissibility of cases states that where investigation or prosecution is being undertaken by a State which has jurisdiction over the case, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution, the ICC would decline admissibility. In Côte d'Ivoire only the former President and his aides were investigated and prosecuted. And with many of the prosecuted serving prison terms, with no single person on the pro-Ouattara side either investigated or charged for any war crimes, the ICC's dereliction of responsibility in assuming a primary jurisdiction under the States "unwillingness" or "unable" clauses to hold perpetrators of war crimes committed by the pro-Ouattara fighters has negatively affected peacebuilding in the country. On the other hand, a UNSC declaration under article 12 of the Treaty of the international Criminal Court and also under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would have enabled the ICC to assume a more effective primary responsibility to punish war crimes (Seils, 2016:6).

The lapses have both short and long term effects in building a sustainable peace in the country. The short term effect can be gleaned from the boycott of the operation of the "Commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation" (CDVR) and the "Commission nationale pour la réconciliation et l'indemnisation des victimes des crises survenues" (CONARIV) by the pro Gbagbo supporters. The two bodies were created by Ouattara to support victims of the war and to reconcile the nation. There were serious reservations about the work of the two bodies during our field visits by a cross section of the interviewees. Key issues that characterised the creation of the truth, reparation and reconciliation commissions focused on whether the commissions were free from manipulation by the government. The appointment of members of the commissions, especially Charles Konan Banny, a former Prime Minster and a known ally of President Ouattara as the Chairman of the dialogue and truth commission, "la commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation" (CDVR), was a source of worry in the country. Indeed, post-conflict states need to walk into the future on paths well-grounded in human rights principles.

Reconciling the nation by the CDVR and CONARIV was the reason for their creation. However, reconciliation and peace can effectively be only achieved when it is anchored on justice. So far, justice for war crimes in Côte d'Ivoire has not been served because of the failure to bring impunity of war criminals on the side of President Ouattara to book. The peace in Côte d'Ivoire was only a fragile peace. The country was being held together because people await how Laurent Gbagbo's and Charles Blé Goudé's trials will end.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we tested the extent to which international sanctions, pressure, investigations and trials impacted on sexual abuse, torture, extra-judicial killings and other forms of human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire. From the evidence, it is clear that peacebuilders, particularly the UNSC, the UNHCHR and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire have reprimanded key actors who superintended over these violations, but these have not put to an end the impunity of war crimes. The key international human rights monitoring institutions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Criminal Court and other concerned human rights groups mounted pressure on feuding parties, and investigated war crimes to deter and punish palpable violators of human rights; yet, they have not been able to give justice to the victims. Evidence gathered shows that peacebuilding has made only a minimal impact on crime reduction. Specifically, with the exception of the international actors monitoring role in which they recorded a limited positive impact, the overall assessment for all other factors showed no impact made by peacebuilders' policies. Peacebuilders failed to help war-affected populations to overcome abuse in the war-affected communities.

They only succeeded in sending Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé to the ICC for trial. Although investigations of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the ICC established war crimes in the country by people from both the pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara

camps, only the two personalities from Gbagbo's FPI are being held to atone for the egregious violations of human rights for only the crimes committed in the post run-off electoral dispute in the country. The phrase "la justice du vainqueur" (victor's justice) was very common among the people whenever they discussed the indictment and the subsequent trial of the two before the ICC. The failure to equally distribute justice has been weakening the tiny threads holding the peace being enjoyed by the people after several years of armed conflict. In an interview, a member of the United Nations Secretary-General's High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) who was also an OAU international jurist on Lockerbie case, Professor Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu believes that it is necessary to give justice to war victims whether they are dead or alive. This justice can be undertaken either by a national or international tribunal in post-conflict transition stage or a few years after the ending of the conflict. She observes that the challenge has often been how to balance punishment for war crimes and the possible threats to peace. This should carefully be undertaken so that attempts to give justice would not cause the war-affected state relapsing into another cycle of violence. But whatever the situation the affected state found itself, at some point in time the perpetrators of crimes should be held accountable; it may take a long time due to the vicissitudes of security threats and lapses at the initial stages of the conflict, but at the end of it all justice must be seen to have been served and served well. Justice is necessary for the state to regain the legitimacy it would have lost from the people during the war (interview with Professor Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu, 2016). Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are the least impacted of peacebuilding. The peacebuilders have neither been able to sensitise communities about the effects on the victims nor compel the Ivoirian state to take serious measures to address the problem of sexual violence in the country.

Drawing on the theoretical matrix which frames this chapter – freedom to live in dignity and rights which is critical in achieving positive peace, our evidence shows that the human rights

initiatives implemented by peacebuilders contributed very minimally to ensuring that the war-affected people lived in dignity and rights. In chapter four, the evidence suggests that the war-affected people faced serious insecurity problems, and most people were unprotected due to the geographically-limited areas of deployment of peacekeepers. Human rights abuse continue to be perpetrated in the country with virtually no serious measures to address it, and war criminals remained untouchable because they supported a western puppet – Alassane Ouattara to defeat a self-styled socialist-cum-Pan-Africanist advocate and president of Côte d'Ivoire – Laurent Gbagbo. It has also emerged that peacekeepers themselves abused civilian populations. Evidences of rape and sexual molestations have been perpetrated by peacekeepers. The inability of peacebuilders to address conditions that militated against human rights and freedoms or their failure in the provision of adequate protection for human rights of the war-affected people also explains why human security of war-affected communities in the country made a very marginal progress.

Chapter Six

Impact of Health Policies by Peacebuilders on the Health of War-affected People in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2015)

The chapter presents an empirical examination of the impact of international action to alleviate the pressing health concerns of the war-affected people in Côte d'Ivoire. As discussed in chapter three, ensuring socio-economic security in war-affected states is at the heart of "freedom from want" strand of human security. Human security, and in particular building durable peace (positive peace) in war-affected fragile states cannot take place without addressing the critical factors which hinder people's living standards. Conflict protraction affects the basic necessities of life which in most cases go beyond the capacity of the state concerned to reverse. Health which is the subject of this chapter as discussed in chapter three is one of the sectors of a country's economy which is heavily affected in war, and it is one of the first areas to be targeted for reconstruction. Health is a core variable in the quests to ensure that people affected by war were enjoy their freedom from want. It is also a route to ensuring durable peace or addressing structural violence in war states. International responses into the internal affairs of the Côte d'Ivoire became inevitable to help in the reconstruction of social services. The government budget towards the health sector was woefully inadequate. Since the start of the war, as shown in table 6.1, government's spending on public health to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has virtually stagnated, which necessitated the assumption of a *prima facie* responsibility by the international partners to help the distressed state.

Table 6.1: Public health expenditure in Côte d'Ivoire (% of GDP)

2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
1.8	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.7	NA

Compiled from the Human Development Reports from 2000 to 2014 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/53906).
NA   - Not Available

In measuring the impact of interventions of international peace actors on health, six key health factors mentioned in the theory chapter which are used in assessing peacebuilding include: 1) access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services; 2) access to medical facilities and medical personnel; 3) access to maternal health; 4) access to child health; 5) access to food and nutrition; and 6) access to shelter for war-affected people. Peacebuilding had an overall no impact on war-affected people's access to good drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services, medical facilities and health professionals and maternal health. It had a limited positive impact on child health, food and nutrition and shelter of war-affected populations.

Impact of peacebuilding on access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services in conflict affected communities

Through the rehabilitation of abandoned water pumping plants or investments in the construction of new ones, peacebuilders have made water accessible to people in communities affected by war which otherwise may not have access to water. However, the overall evidence suggests of a decline in the total number of people, mainly war-affected rural dwellers, who have access to sufficient water and good sanitation in 2015 than the period during and before the start of the conflict in 2002. Peacebuilders have not been able to address the inequities of the war as far as water access is concerned. The section argues also that sanitation and hygiene services have been one of the worst impacted areas of peacebuilding interventions. My interviews point to many war-affected people being exposed to poor sanitation and living in unhygienic environments in 2015 due to limited access to sewage infrastructures, broken or no latrines, and poor waste disposal culture. This situation is worse than before the war. This has led to many people dying from preventable diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera and malaria.

The assessment of the impact of peacebuilding interventions on access to water, sanitation and sewage services is based on data collected from urban (Abobo, Adjamé, Marcory, Koumassi,

Angré Chateau all in Abidjan, Dimbokro, Yamoussoukro and Bouaké), peri-urban and rural communities (Sinfra, Issia, Dabou, Alépé and Noé), and data from World Health Organisation (WHO), World Bank, UNICEF and other partners. Most people in the urban and peri-urban communities have their sources of water drawn either from the three major rivers in the country (rivers Komoe in the east, Bandama in the centre and Sassandra in the west) which run through Côte d'Ivoire, or from local rivers which are connected to these rivers. Apart from rivers, communities also rely on water sources from streams, taps, wells, dug-outs, and boreholes for their domestic, commercial and backyard gardening purposes. The majority of people in the rural areas drew their water from local rivers or streams, boreholes, dug-outs, wells and lakes such as lake Buyo which is a few kilometres from Issia, one of the towns where data were collected. Even though water and sanitation affected both urban and rural areas, the impact was more severe in war-affected rural communities.

Peacebuilders' failure to improve water and sanitation in war-affected urban and rural communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Peacebuilders have failed to make a positive impact because many more households have less access to these services now than the period before the war. After the end of the war in 2011, the growing urbanisation in Côte d'Ivoire in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, and Bouaké has caused huge population displacement. The World Bank estimates that Abidjan accounts for more than 40 percent of the urban population (World Bank, 2016:1). The increased urbanisation has increased water demand in the war affected urban communities.

The water and sanitation crisis in urban areas has been exacerbated by low investment in water and sanitation infrastructures owing to the war. Both the government's run National Office of Drinking Water and a privately owned water company which enjoys a 50-year-old-contract with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the *Société de Distribution d'Eau de Côte d'Ivoire*

(SODECI), have not been able to invest significantly in water (interview with official of SODECI, 2016). SODECI faces problems with the collection of revenue because its billing systems have been affected by the war. Due to the deaths and dislocation of families, a new customer data system needed to be built to facilitate and improve revenue generation of the company so that it could be effective in the delivery of water to communities (interview with Kinimo, 2016). In view of the extreme challenges for the national institutions, several organisations including the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), UNICEF, World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), United State Agency for International Development (USAID), Water Aid, Charity Water and Caritas supported financially various water projects in towns such as the construction of wells, boreholes and hand pump installations (interviews with officials of these international organisations, 2016). Under its Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative (RWSSI), the AfDB has supported access to water supply and sanitation services for communities in mostly peri-urban and rural areas. The AFD's project known as 'Social Connections' saw the provision of social services, particularly water to several war affected rural communities (interviews, 2016). The AFD, the Charity Water, the USAID and many such organisations have projects in rural communities which were outside the catchment areas of SODECI.

Despite the contribution of peacebuilders to make water accessible to people in war-affected communities, millions of people do not have access to water, in both urban and rural areas of the country. As a result of this, many people depended on unsafe water for their domestic use, and this has often resulted in serious health problems. 65% of war-affected urban communities of Abidjan before the war in 2002 accessed water directly from their tap or pipe-water which they claimed was regular, and the remainder 35% did not have any supply of tap/pipe water so they depended on water from boreholes and local dug-outs which was difficult to access during dry season (interviews, 2016). Of the 65% who had regular tap/pipe water before the war, only

52% said they now have regular supply of tap water. Out of the 35% who before the war accessed water from sources other than tap water, 19% now have access to water from these sources. There is a decline of 13 and 16 percentage points reduction in access to water respectively in the two categories of water users. At the time of interviews (January-March, 2016), only 58% of the interviewees in all the four urban towns, Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, Bouaké and Dimbokro, said they have access to water supplied regularly. There has been a significant decline in the supply of urban water between 2002 and 2015.

The International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities estimated that the percentage of population with access to water between 2000 and 2011 in the country dropped by 15 percentage points (World Bank, 2016). Since urban water was unable to meet the demands of households, water was rationed in most urban communities. This exposes communities to unsafe water sources. A teacher said: "water is our critical concern in this community after the war. Residents are forced to draw water from the creeks for their drinking and other uses despite warnings by public health professionals about the dangers" (Daouda, teacher, interview, 2016). By drawing water from the streams, "people risk contracting water related diseases such as cholera, bilharzia and even guinea-worm which was eradicated in 2007 could resurface" (Traoré, Medical Officer, interview, 2016).

Where communities such as Noé which had no treated water, but relied on the environmentally polluted river Tanoé, Traoré advised them to boil and filter water before drinking. Unfortunately, the majority of the people hardly do this. One interviewee explained: "They do not give us filters so how do we filter our water before drinking? We are peasant farmers, and we depend on river Tanoé for drinking on our farms, how do we filter water on our farms?" (Ewoussou, interview, 2016). In 2011, people "were hospitalised in Abidjan and many other health centres across the country due to cholera and other diarrhoeal related diseases, so the cost of drinking poor quality water is high" (Adjoua, public health nurse, interview, 2016). The

sewage and waste disposal systems in urban communities became extremely weak due to years of neglect; as a result, Abidjan, for example, known as the 'petit Paris', was very filthy: "the war has left our communities so dirty. After the end of the war, there was no drinking water, and no proper waste management system. Look at the filth in Abidjan, Abidjan is dirtier than it was before the war" (Margarette, interview, 2016).

The above shows that peacebuilders are yet to make any significant or positive impact in helping communities to access good drinking water. Damaged water pipes made it difficult for water to be transported to communities: "we have not been able to service or replace all broken down machines and rusted pipes after the war. The cost of treating water is high" (interview with a Director of SODECI, 2016). Another problem which is not addressed by peacebuilders is that the unemployed youth are now illegally mining gold in water sources (Kinimo, SODECI, interview, 2016).

Improving sanitation wash one of the key components of the WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) programme. Peacebuilders including UNOCI, WHO, World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO and other partner international governmental and non-governmental organisations have either directly implemented projects or supported national institutions to improve sanitation such as building of toilets and expanding access to drainage systems. However, these efforts by peacebuilders have not been significant to reverse the poor state of sanitary conditions prevailing in the war affected communities. Rural communities and poor urban ones including Abobo, Adjamé in Abidjan, Bossi, Kami, N'gbesou in Yamoussoukro lack good sanitary facilities such as toilets. Most of the latrines are described as *'bombes'* (in French), and were in very bad state: "the stench from the toilets can kill you instantly … [laughs!]" (Mounifatou, interview, 2016). Open defecation was preferred by community members where the toilets were not kept neatly, "as for this pit latrine I call it a bomb. It's not kept well … I prefer to defecate in the bush. This is the only toilet … built about 20 years ago, but it was

neglected during the war" (Ewousou, interview, 2016). All research participants whose households had no toilets wished they had built a toilet for the use of only the family, but they said it was expensive to build their own toilets. People suffered various forms of ailments due to the lack of access to water, sanitation and hygiene services. The WaterAid's 2015 report: "State of the World's Toilets" states that the percentage of Ivorian population without access to sanitation is 77.5%.

Absence of impact of peacebuilding on access to medical facilities and personnel

During the war, medical facilities were deliberately targeted for destruction. In some places, the physical buildings were shelled, and in other cases the medical supplies were looted by the belligerent fighters (interviews, 2016). In the two years following the start of the conflict, rebel-held regions lost between 75-90 percent of health personnel, and 72-90 percent of health facilities were closed down after their looting and destruction (Betsi et al. 2006). Nationally, between 2002 and 2010 over 52% of health centres were closed down in the central and northern part of the country (WB, 2014). In most places, only Non-Governmental (NGO) health facilities were opened. After the 2010/11 crisis, all health centres in the western part of the country and some suburbs of Abidjan; namely, Abobo and Yopougon were all closed down, with many health centres across the country looted (World Bank, 2014).

Other necessary medical infrastructures including medical equipment and medication could not be provided to the few operational health centres across the country because of insecurity. Most rural areas were also not easily reachable due to transportation problems. By 2007 when the last peace agreement - the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) was signed by the belligerent parties, the Ivoirian public health infrastructure stood at 1,591 first contact health establishments, 77 first-level referral facilities and the second-level referral facilities were nine

`which included the four university teaching hospitals and five national specialised centres (International Monetary Fund, 2009:54).

This section analyses how peacebuilding interventions have helped in the revival of health systems in the communities. It addresses two issues: patients' physical access to medical facilities and their access to health personnel. I analyse availability of medical facilities and personnel, travelling costs of patients to medical facility, availability of transportation, and the affordability of patients to pay for the cost of healthcare. This section argues that despite the support of international health institutions to address the problems in the health system, people in rural and urban poor areas are denied access to health care due to a distorted distribution of public health facilities and staff. This exposes the health system of the country, particularly rural and poor urban areas to a potential crisis situation in the event of an outbreak of major disease such as Ebola which broke-out in neighbouring Guinea.

Peacebuilders' inability to make medical facilities easily accessible

Peacebuilders, notably UNOCI, WHO, UNICEF, World Bank and donor governments implemented health programmes to reverse the declining state of healthcare services. The country director of the World Bank in charge of Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin and Guinea, Ousmane Diagana, remarked of the state of the health of Côte d'Ivoire:

> The country's health system has particularly suffered during the ten years of crisis and instability Côte d' Ivoire experienced. Investments in the sector were slow and insufficient. As a result, access to, and quality of services have deteriorated. This project will complement the country's ongoing efforts to address those challenges (World Bank, 2014, para 3).

The international peacebuilding agencies and donor governments have supported the rehabilitation of damaged health facilities or helped build new ones. For example, the Sirana health centre which served surrounding villages including Gbessaso, Touroni, and Samesso was abandoned following the 2002 crisis. In December 2010, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) rehabilitated the health centre made up of delivery rooms, wards, a

pharmacy, a consultation room and accommodation for a nurse. Koné Soumaila expressed joy and the feelings of the people when UNOCI's Civil Affairs Officer in Odienné, Ildefonse N'duwimana handed over the keys to the health centre: "we are very happy today because by rehabilitating this health centre you have created good conditions for our wives to give birth, and we will no longer have to travel long distances for treatment" (UNOCI, 2014).

A number of international institutions donated medical equipment to some hospitals to support their recovery. A typical example is the District of Bas-Rhein in France which donated defibrillators to hospitals in 2013 to some hospitals (Agence de Presse Africaine, 2013). International health interventions implemented to address the problems of accessing medical facility were woefully inadequate; as a result, they could not obliterate the issues hindering patients' access. On the whole, peacebuilders failed to address the challenges being faced by war-affected populations in accessing medical facilities and health personnel. The failure contributes to the poor health outcomes, particularly maternal and child health in the country. So far, no significant interventions have been implemented either directly by the peacebuilders or their agents to increase the Ivorian public health infrastructure in manner that would reverse the declining access of medical facilities in the war-affected rural communities.

The inability of patients to access medical facilities has dire consequences on the state of health, particularly respiratory infections, malaria, diarrhoea, and malnutrition (Fürst et al, 2009; see also Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2011). The health of the people in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly in the north, west and other places which were under rebel control worsened due to the parallel administration of the country where the rebels firmly controlled the north and the south under the control of the government (Sany, 2010). There were "no doctors, no nurses, no medicines available in the health centres in the north and many places in the west of the country which was the hardest hit. The few health professionals who happened to be among the displaced

treated almost every illness with paracetamol, just to reduce the pain" (Hamidatou, interview, February, 2016; also Kouakou-Bi, interview, March, 2016).

Absence of impact of peacebuilders' policies to support road transport to health facilities

One key factor which affected patients' access to medical facilities and personnel in the country is the road transport infrastructure, particularly the roads that connect rural-rural or rural to peri-urban or even in some cases rural-urban communities. The road transport of the country handles more than 99% of internal freight movements (Oxford Business Group, 2017: para 8). However, due to the years of war, maintenance and expansion lagged making it difficult for many communities to be easily accessible. International partners financing of Côte d'Ivoire's road infrastructure focussed largely on improving key passageways linking Côte d'Ivoire and its neighbouring countries, particularly the Abidjan-to-Ouagadougou road which connects Burkina Faso. Others are the roads that connect the urban cities. The World Bank's €100m road project linking Abidjan-Ouagadougou, and the 106 kilometres Northern Highway road project which links Abidjan-Yamoussoukro-Bouaké, are cases in point. The road infrastructural deficits in rural areas are so extensive that the securing of financing by the Agence Française de Développment (AFD) to rehabilitate about 400km roads could improve transportation in the rural areas that would be affected (Oxford Business Group, 2017: 13). However, to improve the prevailing circumstances of road infrastructural deficits to make for easy accessibility of medical facilities, it would be a drop in the ocean.

Indeed, the evidence from war-affected populations in Côte d'Ivoire shows that no changes have occurred to improve their access to medical facilities owing to improved transportation. Peacebuilders do not help patients or health centres with transport to facilitate the movement of people to the health centres. The first, and all the second-level referral facilities including the four university teaching hospitals and five national specialist centres are located in urban

centres. Accessing these facilities by the rural people meant more travel time and funds to manage urban life during hospital admissions. This drained the meagre finances of the already rural poor, and some also do not access these facilities because of the non-availability of transportation and travelling fatigue due to the deplorable nature of roads (interviews, 2016). Only a few trucks travel to and from rural areas which serve all manner of patients including pregnant women and children. Some interviewees travelled as far as over 30 kilometres to access healthcare (interviews with members of community, 2016). Averagely, majority of people interviewed in rural communities travel for 18 kilometres to access a medical facility located in a peri-urban *prefecture* (district). Before the outbreak of the war, some of them travelled for about 5 kilometres to access a medical facility. But due to the destruction caused to those medical facilities, they now travel for over 20 kilometres to access treatment in the closest neighbouring medical centres. Thus, the situation of transportation to enable patients access health centres has not improved.

Peacebuilders' failure to address overcrowding of patients in medical facilities

Another important factor which affects patients' accessibility of medical facilities is overcrowding in the health centres. The lack of expansion of medical facilities coupled with the high number of patients requiring medical attention at a time creates overcrowding in many health centres. Some attempts have been made by peacebuilders by way of investing in first contact health centres. Under the French Government's Debt Reduction for Development fund (C2D), projects to improve the health status of people such as support to health districts and about 400 first-contact health centres were implemented by AFD's partners. However, given the number of available medical facilities, and the populations that require medical attention, the efforts are not enough to practically address the issues of overcrowding. Overcrowding was of serious concern to the interviewees because few health centres serve several communities

mostly cited in peri-urban or urban areas as Dominique puts it, "lack of health centres in several places caused several towns and villages in this *prefecture* [district] to be serving people from those places because their health centres have been destroyed during the war, and have since not been replaced." The situation is severe whenever there was an "outbreak of diseases like cholera…. patients sleep on the floor" (Dominique, interview, 2016). This situation was particularly critical for women. They are denied access to antepartum and postpartum services (interviews, 2016). The issue of overcrowding of patients who visited medical facilities for treatment existed even before the war. It got exacerbated following the war. As at 2015, the situation has not improved.

Quasi-absence of peacebuilders' supports to address the problem of lack of health professionals

Côte d'Ivoire's crisis affected the health workforce (doctors, dental surgeons, nurses, pharmacists, and laboratory technicians). A 2004 report of the WHO's Health Action in Crisis stated that majority of medical staff either fled or relocated, or could not go to work because of insecurity in the country (WHO, 2004). Even the graduation rates of medical school students declined (USAID, 2006: v). Due to the level of attacks and killings that took place in the west, north and most areas outside the city of Abidjan, many health professionals could not function because of displacement, and the few who could function moved into Abidjan which for a very long time was in the firm grip of state security. The declining workforce affected healthcare and delivery in the rural areas of the country. To address the problem of healthcare in the country following the crisis, international health support institutions provided financial and technical interventions aimed at reversing the declining health systems of the country. A typical example is the joint partnership of the European Commission's humanitarian aid and civil protection department (ECHO), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the

Government of Côte d´Ivoire which led to restoration of basic health services to some war-affected communities (ECHO, 2016).

Presently, the situation has not changed in terms of not only the low rate of workforce in the health sector, but also the disproportionate distribution of public health workforce against rural communities. Presently, the WHO estimates the ratio of physicians to people of Côte d'Ivoire to be 0.14 physicians per 10,000 people (see IRIN, 2014: para 11). In sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d'Ivoire was one of the countries with a high graduation rate for physicians (14%); yet, in terms of the regeneration of midwives and nurses, it is only 2.7% (Kinfu, 2009:226). Côte d'Ivoire's health system represents a declining character often seen in most post-conflict states in view of the strength of its health staff. This questions the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions on the health of states recovering from war. The WHO points out that countries with less than 23 physicians, nurses and midwives per 10,000 people would fail to make any gain in terms of coverage for selected primary health care interventions (IRIN, 2014). The situation of lack of health service personnel to meet the demands of patients cuts across the country is making it extremely difficult to make any significant progress. The urban areas, particularly the Department of Abidjan still retained the highest number of health service personnel (Kinfu, 2009). The worst affected areas which lacked personnel to manage health situations in the country were the rural areas (interviews, 2016).

 pregnant women, newly delivered mothers, physically challenged persons, and children constitute the most affected with the less number of health personnel. The substantial absence of nurses in the war affected communities has created information gap about primary health, hygiene and healthy living practices (interviews with members of communities, 2016). The absence of information also impacted negatively on the prevention of childhood killer diseases such as malaria, acute respiratory diseases, malnutrition and HIV/AIDs which remain high in the country. Most community members do not have reliable information on preventive and

curative measures so that they are able to protect themselves from diseases. Reflecting on whether or not their access to health professionals in their current state was higher or lower than the period before the crisis, the majority of the interviewees thought that their access to health professionals was presently lower than the period before the crisis.

Impact of peacebuilding interventions on maternal health in conflict-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Taking care of a pregnancy in a conflict or post-conflict transition period is a very challenging task, particularly in relation to pregnant women's access to antenatal care (ANC) and post-natal care (PNC). As we saw in chapter three, most of the maternal mortalities occurred in conflict-affected fragile states. The case of Côte d'Ivoire has not proven to be different from other conflict-affected states in Africa, and elsewhere in the world. The Ivoirian civil war has contributed significantly in the reversal of many of the gains that had been made over the years in maternal health (see Betsi et al., 2006; IMF, 2009:54-55; UNICEF, 2009). The war has destroyed the health infrastructure and caused significant displacement of personnel, which affected pregnant women's access to healthcare and delivery (IMF, 2009). This section analyses the extent to which pregnant women in Côte d'Ivoire have accessed family planning, preconception healthcare; ANC and PNC. The section argues that peacebuilders have not been able to obliterate the high risk factors which affected maternal health of war-affected women. Women are still exposed to high risks of death owing to a low access to medical facilities, cost of transportation to access medical care, and a lack of access of regular immunisations and obstetrical care.

Peacebuilders' failure to provide pregnant women with access to trained birth attendants.

International peacebuilding institutions including the WHO, UNICEF, AU and the World Bank have undertaken programmes to deal with problems affecting access to obstetrical care and immunisations. The French Government through its development agency, the AFD implemented projects to address the problems facing pregnant women and children. Under the Debt Reduction for Development fund, from 2014 to 2015, over 340 000 pregnant women received free health care (ECHO, 2016). Similar interventions were implemented by related international agencies. However, the evidence shows that these efforts have failed to comprehensively increase access to trained birth attendants in war-affected communities resulting in high maternal mortalities. In 2004, almost 70% of births were delivered by a trained health professional. However, by 2006 when the war was at its peak stages, births delivered by a trained health attendant dropped to 57%. In 2004, the maternal mortality ratio of Côte d'Ivoire was at level of 725 deaths per 100,000 live births. The rates appreciated in the war years of 2005, 2006 and 2007, then it stabilised in 2008. A year after the signing of the Ouagadougou peace accord in 2007, the mortality rates began to decline. The rate in 2015 was 645 deaths per 100,000. Basically, some improvements have occurred in the maternal mortality rate, but the figure remains extremely high placing Côte d'Ivoire at the 12th position in Africa in terms of mortality rates. Fifty percent (50%) of the deaths in pregnant women are caused by haemorrhage infections (cancer of the uterus) followed by malaria (36%), with the rest (14%) caused by unsafe abortions, dystocia, and hypertension disorder (Tiehi, 2013: 1-2). Indeed, in 2009, the WHO, UNICEF, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) in collaboration with the African Union launched a programme to accelerate the reduction of mortality among pregnant women in Africa (Tiehi, 2013:1). As previously discussed, mortality rates in the country were higher in war times. However, even though some noticeable declines can be observed above, the rates remain too high which questioned the impact of peacebuilding

interventions relating to ANC services because deaths related to obstetric care are either preventable or treatable or both. In the sub-sections, I examine the impact of peacebuilding interventions on access of pregnant women to trained birth attendant, and the duration and cost of travelling to health centres.

Peacebuilders' failure to bridge the rural-urban imbalances in women's access to trained birth attendants

Nationally, there was a significant disparity in the access to medical facilities between the rich and the poor. While 95% of people in affluent areas received ANC and child delivery undertaken by a trained birth attendant, only 20% of their poor counterparts receives these services (interviews, 2016). The distribution of doctors had also not departed from the unequal distribution of facilities. For instance, only 750 doctors practised outside the district of Abidjan from a total of 3,614 doctors in 2007 (IMF, 2009:56). Still in 2015, the war-affected rural communities were left without doctors to attend to patients' needs (interviews, 2016).

As discussed previously, peacebuilders interventions have not been able to increase accessibility of medical facilities and the worst affected are the poor communities. The lack of medical facilities in poor or rural areas has a concomitant impact on the accessibility of trained medical birth attendants. There is a limited number of trained birth attendants. This has significantly affected the ANC and PNC services for the women.

Peacebuilders' failure to help with accessibility of health centres with maternity services.

Peacebuilders did not focus on addressing the lack of health centres with maternity services. Some of the existing few health centres were in serious state of dilapidation so they were not suitable for natal services. Peacebuilders did not help to decongest the overcrowding of women waiting for maternity services by expanding access to maternity services. Interviewees gave

evidences of instance where some pregnant women returned home without accessing ANC services because of the number of hours they spent in queue to see a medical practitioner.

Peacebuilders did not help with transport of pregnant women in war-affected rural communities. They had to travel several hours to access health facilities. Some could not honour their regular appointments for their ANC and PNC. They "stopped visiting medical facilities midway into their pregnancies because of long hours of travel distance and time due to bad roads. In the absence of access to orthodox medical facilities, they relied on traditional birth attendants (TBAs) in their villages, but some of the TBAs were untrained so when complications occurred during child birth they become hapless" (Dominique, interview, 2016).

Peacebuilders' failure to help with the cost of maternity services.

Peacebuilders did not help with the cost of ANC services. Many interviewees said they were too expensive for most families to bear. Three categories of health providers assisted pregnant mothers during delivery: public health service providers, private health service providers and the TBAs. Patients resorted to the TBAs, as this saved them transportation costs. Peacebuilders did not empower women to be self-sufficient and self-reliant. As a result, most of the pregnant mothers were heavily dependent on their husbands, and did not have incomes of their own. Their ability to even access TBA services depended on their husbands' ability to pay. Addressing maternal mortality problem needs to be looked at from women's economic emancipation and empowerment.

Limited impact of peacebuilding on child health in conflict-affected communities

As we saw in chapter three, most of the deaths in children in armed conflict occurred through indirect effects of war such as food deprivation, deaths through preventable and treatable diseases and the disruptions to child healthcare services rather than direct killings. The section

argues that peacebuilders have made a limited impact on making paediatric services accessible in terms of reduction of preventable and treatable diseases of war-affected children in Côte d'Ivoire. The first part examines the quasi-absent impact of peacebuilding on addressing two major diseases for children: malaria and diarrhoea. The second part analyses children's access to immunisation. The third part looks at the impact of sensitisation of local communities by peacebuilders on health issues.

Peacebuilders limited impact in helping to address malaria in children

In the year 2012, over two million cases of malaria were reported. Many households suffered because of poor sanitation: "the war has had a significant effect on sanitation … poor sanitation bred mosquitoes coupled with the inadequacy of child healthcare services, particularly in the rural areas, many children died from malaria" (Hiqra, interview, 2916). In 2015, the UNICEF in partnership with other interveners distributed millions of mosquito nets to families to protect them from mosquito bites and malaria transmission. However, majority of the interviewees said their households were more susceptible to malaria in 2015 than the period before the war because of extremely poor sanitary conditions. I have identified that some households have been given insecticide treated mosquito bed nets as a protection measure from any contact with mosquitoes. They brought out mosquito bed nets which were new and intact as they have been supplied to prove to me that they had mosquito bed nets. However, they do not use the treated insecticide mosquito nets. The reason is that sleeping under mosquito bed nets was discomforting due to heat that comes with the use of mosquito bed nets or they only use them when they experienced mosquito bites.

Some households do not use mosquito nets because they have not been supplied with the bed nets (interviews, 2015). Despite the distribution of mosquito bed nets by the international bodies such as UNICEF's 13 million distribution of bed nets as of 2015 (UNICEF, 2015), about

ninety percent (90%) of the interviewees said their children or children of their neighbours suffered multiple incidences of malaria (interview with members of communities, 2016). The lack of children's access or use of treated mosquito bed nets to prevent them from mosquito contacts were the key issues responsible for under-five morbidity and mortality in war affected communities in the country. The International Monetary Fund report shows that of the morbidity diagnosed in the country, 60% comprised infectious and parasitic diseases with malaria being not only the cause of morbidity and mortality, but was a major cause of maternal and under five mortalities in the country (IMF, 2009). The high prevalence of malaria in children as at 2015 shows that despite the contribution of peacebuilding interventions, they have not produced a positive impact.

Peacebuilders limited impact in helping to address diarrhoeal disease in children

Peacebuilders have very limited impact on preventing or treating diarrhoeal disease in children. Health practitioners and analysts argue that diarrhoeal disease is highly preventable and treatable (WHO, 2017:1). Côte d'Ivoire was one country which has suffered hugely from diarrhoeal disease. It was the most common case in emergencies. The inadequacy or a lack of quality water for drinking and for the preparation of food, poor personal and food hygiene practices and poor sanitation were the risk factors of diarrhoeal infestations in the country. A Carvajal-Vélez et al., (2016) study shows that deaths caused by diarrhoea in 1-59 month-olds in 2011/2012 was 15%. To mitigate the havoc of the disease, the WHO and partner health support institutions implemented health policies such as deploying trained "Blue Flag Volunteers" into communities where they administered Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) to children to save them from dying. They also provided and/or supported the provision of zinc supplements to children in need and supported sensitisation programmes on how to prevent or treat the disease (interview with an official of WHO, 2016). Our investigation shows that the

interventions have helped to contain the disease to a very minimal extent. Diarrhoeal disease remained very common in children under the age of five, and the scourge of the disease is challenging and worrying to families. An opinion leader has this to say about the prevalence and potential danger of the disease to families "to many of us especially when the rainy season was approaching we do not know the fate it's likely to bring to us. We often experience the worse of the outbreak of the disease from May to August every year (Jebouni, interview, 2016). The interviewees were aware of the preventive measures and treatment for the disease, but poor sanitary conditions, unsafe drinking water, non-accessibility of basic treatment such as the ORS, and lack of sensitisation have been some of the issues responsible for the easy susceptibility of the children (interviews with community members, 2016). The condition of diarrhoeal disease, and death in particular remained high in the country as it was at the start of the war in 2002 as shown in figure 6.1. As can be gleaned from the table, since the war broke-out in 2002 to 2010 (statistic data available for only this period), no change has occurred the number of death due to diarrhoea, despite the efforts by international health actors to address diarrhoeal disease in children. Côte d'Ivoire was mentioned in a recent study as one of the countries with low levels of coverage of ORS. The key factor mentioned as being responsible for the state of affairs is poor diarrhoea quality care (Carvajal-Vélez et al., 2016: 7).

Figure 6.1: Côte d'Ivoire - Deaths due to diarrhoea among children aged <5 years

Peacebuilders' limited impact in providing children's access to immunisation programme in war-affected communities

Immunisation against childhood killer diseases such as diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, and pneumonia have been implemented in Côte d'Ivoire by or under the auspices of a conglomerate of peacebuilding actors including the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and many other international non-governmental health interventions such as the Gavi vaccination programme.

Immunisation for children have been described as the most effective and successful health intervention. Immunisation was affected when the crisis occurred in 2002. The difficulty in accessing children's vaccination as a result of the war continued throughout the fighting until the cessation of hostilities in 2007 following the signing of the Ouagadougou accord. With the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of the international stabilisation programme, a significant change in terms of vaccination coverage against preventable diseases was expected. Significant measures were undertaken by the state together with international organisations to ensure that vaccinations would receive high participation. In 2010, for example, Côte d'Ivoire

became the first Gavi-eligible country to establish the National Immunisation Technical Advisory Group (NITAG) in Sub-Saharan Africa which allowed the country to benefit from more financial support as well as local and international expertise on the country's vaccination programmes. Through Gavi, the country benefited in terms of access to quality, but expensive vaccines. These measures ensured a greater collaboration of international health institutions with local ones to ensure the expansion of coverage than the period before the war. A typical example was the collaboration of Gavi and the *Fédération Nationale des Organisations de Santé* (FENOSCI) where the latter depended on the former to sensitise communities about the benefits of vaccination. Despite the contribution of international health stabilisation support to increase coverage of immunisation in the country, evidence suggests that the interventions have not resulted in any significant increase in the number of children immunised against the key childhood killer diseases in the post-conflict period, as shown in the table below.

Vaccine	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
% of under-five year-olds not received 1st dose of DTP	15	17	5	25	7	11	22	NA
% of under-five year-olds not received 1st dose of measles vaccination	32	16	30	51	26	24	37	NA

Source: compiled from WHO (2016) and UNICEF (2016) (est. of national routine immunisation)

From the above table, noticeable fluctuations can be seen in the number of immunisations against childhood diseases - measles and DTP from the start and end of war (2002-2010); but there is a significant decline of immunisations in the period after the end of the war. The worst affected were children in rural communities who remained vulnerable and on the fringes of immunisation programmes because of lack of paediatric services (interview with an official of the Ministry of Health, 2016). Peacebuilders' interventions have thus made a limited impact in this regard.

Peacebuilders' failure to sensitise war-affected communities about benefits of children's immunisation

Peacebuilders have failed to create the necessary awareness in war-affected communities about the benefits of vaccination against childhood diseases. Sensitisation programmes such as the *M-vaccin* under the auspices of Gavi, and related programmes of the UNICEF and WHO aimed at expanding immunisations to all children under the age of five were undertaken by peacebuilders in some communities. Despite the programmes, some parents refused the vaccination of their children. The reason is the prevailing perception that child vaccination, particularly poliomyelitis could paralyse children because some children were paralysed as a result of vaccination (interviews, 2016). Although some interviewees shared these stories of children becoming paralysed from polio vaccinations, when asked if they or any known family had a child or their children paralysed as a result of the immunisation, most of them claimed they have heard of such stories, but none has personally seen a paralysed child whose paralysis was caused by vaccinations. Some interviewees knew these claims were false. One said: 'the perception exists in our communities so some children do not get vaccinated and this increases children's risk levels' (Mamata, interview, 2016).

Limited impact of peacebuilders' interventions on food and nutrition

Food insecurity affects all, but especially women and children. Unfortunately, war-affected populations continue to face dire food insecurity despite the presence of interventions of UNICEF and other international agencies (interviews, 2016; IMF, 2009). Peacebuilders such as the Action Against Hunger's (ACF) could not continue to give food and nutrition to families in need. The ACP's country director, Andrea Dominici stated that the ACF was "no longer in the north and has no plans to return, mainly because of lack of donor support, but also because the Ivoirian government and UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] are able to respond in case of an emergency" (IRIN, 2014: para 7).

The nutritional status of pregnant women and children in Côte d'Ivoire before the war was not good due to inadequate dietary intake and diseases (IRIN, 2014: para 7-8; Kenkhuis, 2016: 8-10). This was exacerbated during the armed conflict, and the end of intensive fighting never abated food and nutrition insecurity. 40% of children in the conflict areas suffered malnutrition (IMF, 2009:55; IRIN, 2014; para 1). Malnutrition exacerbated under-five mortality rates, especially in the west and north of the country which were the heaviest affected by the war. In the north of the country, 17.5% of children under the age of five suffered from acute malnutrition, and 4% of this figure (22,000 children) suffered severe acute malnutrition. 80% of children in the north and peri-urban areas of Abidjan were anaemic (SMART, 2008). As of 2013, an estimated 6.9% (3.5 million) children under the age of five suffered malnutrition (UNICEF, undated). Peacebuilders undertook three key measures to address this: emergency relief, agricultural support services, and access to shelter. They had limited impact in the provision of emergency relief, but no impact in helping war-affected communities to engage in agricultural activities to support their families.

Peacebuilders' limited impact on emergency relief services to confront food insecurity

Despite the insecurity in the country, peace actors including UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), ACF, and the World Bank undertook short-term measures to address food insecurity and malnutrition in the country. A UNICEF's nutrition officer in Côte d'Ivoire called for a stronger international action to save children from under-five mortality (interview with a Nutrition Officer of UNICEF, 2016). The short-term measures were largely implemented during the crisis – more or less these were emergency reliefs provided to children in dire need (interview with an Agricultural Extension Officer, 2016). Supplementary feeding services were provided to children. This involved the distribution of either already cooked food or raw food

to moderately malnourished children, and therapeutic feeding for extremely malnourished ones. Despite this, malnutrition remains extremely high in the war-affected areas.

Peacebuilders failure to support agricultural services to war-affected farmers

Helping war-affected communities to be self-sufficient and self-reliant has not been the focus of the peacebuilders. Many families expected to be supported by peacebuilders to revive their agricultural activities. They wanted help to be able to; engage in livestock and fisheries farming in order to meet local community's food demands, and to increase household food security. Since the war was over, "we need to revive our farms so that the farms do not only provide us with food, but money. Farming will give us income, but there is no money to support our farming needs … I hope they come to help us … so far nothing has been given" (Mba Alassah, interview, 2016). Interviewees indicated that peacebuilders had pledged to support people's agricultural needs so that they could cultivate and feed their children. But these pledges were not fulfilled (interviews, 2016). Those interested in undertaking agricultural activities so that they became self-reliant needed financial support from the international agencies. They could not secure the necessary support from the peacebuilders they needed so they could not undertake these agricultural activities to achieve their long-term objectives (interviews, 2016).

Peacebuilders' limited impact in providing access to shelter in the urban and rural communities in Côte d'Ivoire

The provision of shelter is an essential component of post-conflict reconstruction of war-affected communities. The initial peacebuilding plan of UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, and other international humanitarian organisations in the country was to provide temporary shelter as a lasting solution instead of it being a temporary measure. They never anticipated a protraction of the war, so no permanent housing solution was factored into the initial plan of

sheltering the displaced people (interviews with officials of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, 2016). Unfortunately, the war continued for over a decade, and peacebuilders did not achieve much beyond their provision of temporary shelter.

The short term solution was the tents that were provided. As conditions deteriorated, and with no solution to the crisis in sight, displaced households with many members extended their accommodation beyond the tents given by the peacebuilders. Because of overcrowding, "new structures like kiosks surfaced, these were able to address the needs of households better than the tents which were provided …families were only able to cope with tents for just a few months" (Kamilou, interview, 2016).

Despite finding respite in the makeshifts, kiosks and other structures, these were highly of poor quality so the social, economic, physical and psychological well-being of households were affected due to the prevailing conditions; "it's very sad to be displaced by a war. It takes years to recover … it would take a long time to overcome war's effect on your accommodation. My accommodation remains bad, my household is overcrowded, my accommodation before the war was better than today. We need support" (Kandé, interview, 2016). The majority of the interviewees had concerns about their present accommodation. Their finances were irregular and accommodation was expensive, way beyond what they could afford. Many people who once lived in displaced communities do still not have access to good shelter, many continue to live in deplorable conditions. They live in poor structures and in poor neighbourhoods.

The Ivoirian war has caused serious havoc to families' survival as far as shelter was concerned. There were more female-headed households in 2015 than before the conflict. These female household heads were responsible for their families' shelter. Most of the female interviewees complained about how difficult it was as female household heads to afford accommodation and clothing. One said: "my husband was shot and killed. I assumed responsibility of our shelter

… but since I have no money to rent a better room and at the same time buy clothes, this is where I live with my two daughters. No one has come to support us … I hope they come to our aid" (Hafisatou, interview, 2016). The shelter was a wooden structure in a very deplorable state. Beyond the temporary structures, peacebuilders have not provided any financial support to enable the affected families put up their own permanent homes as a measure to reduce overcrowding in war-affected areas. This has had significant effect on the health of the people. Many households suffered meningitis, cholera and other infectious diseases due to poor housing and poor drainage in their communities (interviews, 2016).

Conclusion

Peacebuilding has made both a limited positive and no impact on three each of the six factors. None of the six indicators measured has scored a complete positive impact. Peacebuilding did not improve people's access to: 1) good drinking water; 2) sanitation and hygiene services; and 3) medical facilities, and health professionals (including for maternal health). However, peacebuilding has had a limited positive impact on helping with access to paediatric services, food and nutrition, and shelter. It is therefore argued that peacebuilders have failed to contribute to increase human security in the war-affected communities which continue to face high maternal and infant morbidity and mortality, a lack of access of medical facilities for war-affected communities, poor access to drinking water, food, sanitation and hygiene services, and shelter.

From the evidence, it is clear that peacebuilders have failed to make a significant impact in ensuring good healthcare for the people. In effect, health factors which have been discussed in chapter three as being critical within the "freedom from want" conceptions have not been achieved in the war-affected communities. The failure to ensure that individuals had access to healthcare not only affected the human security of the communities, but also negatively

affected positive peace. Progress in the socio-economic security in relation to the accessibility of the population to health such as access to water, sanitation and hygiene, food, shelter, and medical facilities, misery and poverty which also demean the dignity of the human being – "freedom from indignity" has been very slow. As seen in chapter one, peace is not just the absence of war, but also addressing the socio-economic needs of the people. We argued in the first chapter that when these are achieved, war-affected people would most likely experience peace that would be sustainable. On the other hand, if this fails it would be extremely difficult for durable peace to be achieved. Our evidence in Côte d'Ivoire shows that peacebuilders' interventions to help address the health concerns of the people have not achieved much for positive peace to be built. We argue that the peace in Côte d'Ivoire is fragile and would be on the path of sustainability if future interventions are specifically targeted to addressing the health issues which have been considered critical in the framework of peace. In other words, positive peace which is the end objective to be achieved in the war-affected country is unlikely to take place if the deficits in the health structures remain unaddressed.

Chapter Seven

Impact of International Peacebuilding on Primary Education in Côte d'Ivoire

(2002-2015)

The chapter examines the impact of peacebuilding on primary school education in Côte d'Ivoire. Like our discussions in chapter six which addresses the impact of international interventions on health, this chapter is also framed within the "freedom from want" conception of human security. Children's education as we saw in the theory chapter (chapter three) is one of the two areas which are the first to experience peacebuilding interventions, both in the literature and what the interviewees considered essential issues which they expected peacebuilders to tackle in their communities. In chapter three, we argued that education remains one of the greatest routes to achieving positive peace, and also securing a good future for the society. The backbone of war-affected states achieving socio-economic security which was framed within the "freedom from want" component of human security is by educating the children. Our theoretical discussion on education is that achieving positive peace in war-affected fragile states is dependent on the education of children. However, despite the interventions to help address problems of education, research on Côte d'Ivoire's crisis shows a declined state of primary education, especially during the peak of the war, between 2002 and 2007 - classrooms were destroyed, children dropped-out of school and the war made families poorer due to extreme poverty and economic deprivation. This chapter provides evidence on the exact impact of peacebuilders' interventions on children's education in Côte d'Ivoire.

Prior studies that examined the effects of war on children's education in Côte d'Ivoire expected peacebuilders to undertake measures that would address the problems confronting children's education in post-conflict settings (UNICEF, 2005; Sany, 2010; Dabalen and Saumik, 2014; Ouili, 2015). This chapter argues that although there is a noticeable progress in the recovery of children's education particularly in the net enrolment of children in the country, the number of

children who are out-of-school, the drop-out, and female enrolment remains extremely high by 2015, as shown in figure 7.1. Despite the contribution of international education support, there still remains a significant gap between the number of children enrol and the number of them who complete their primary education.

Figure 7.1: Statistics on Children's Education in Côte d'Ivoire (2000-2015)

As indicated in chapter three, we would expect peacebuilders to target and address the key drivers that obstruct: children's enrolment rates, out-of-school rates, drop-out rates, school completion rates, number of female students in school, and pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools in the country. Based on literature in academia and research institutes and interviews, I identified in chapter three the following five key issues which peacebuilders should target to improve children's education in conflict and post-conflict communities. This chapter critically examines how peacebuilders have addressed these key drivers, and how this has affected children's education in Côte d'Ivoire.

Dismantling gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination in children's education in Côte d'Ivoire

This section argues that while peacebuilders made efforts to mitigate gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination, they failed to do so. This had dire consequences for children's enrolment and completion of basic school education in the war-affected communities. Peacebuilders' policy failure can be seen in the difference in the contact hours of schooling for girls and boys in primary school education. The boys have more contact hours in learning at home than girls because girls undertake household chores than their male counterparts. In the 2012 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) in Côte d'Ivoire, of all the children in the age bracket (5-14), girls were more likely to undertake regular domestic tasks, scoring 74% as against 62% of boys (DHS, 2012). Similarly, available data on the gender disparity from the UNESCO's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) show that while 3% of boys in the age bracket of 5-14 undertake 28 hours a week or more, 7% of girls within the same age group engaged in work for 28 hours or more, with the most affected found in the centre-north region of the country (UNESCO, 2006). This had not changed at the time of my interviews in 2016. Families still considered household chores the responsibility of girls (interviews, 2016).

Addressing the current imbalances in gender distribution in schools is a meaningful variable to reducing gender inequalities in the adult population in the country (Banlori, interview, 2016). Peacebuilders undertook various programmes including counselling services for victims of abuses, gender empowerment, and sensitisation on the prevention of gender-based violence by creating awareness of the reporting channels of gender-based violence. This was necessary to bridge the gap of gender imbalance so as to ensure gender parity in school enrolments in conflict-affected communities (interviews, 2016; UNICEF, 2016). However, the situation on the ground remains extremely precarious for gender discrimination and imbalance in children.

Failure of Peacebuilders' policies to dismantle discrimination and inequality through cost of schooling

Fees in public school education for children between 6 and 16 years old were eliminated in 2011, but the cost of education remained a major concern to parents in terms of buying books, school uniforms and other essential learning materials. This is because the free compulsory education does not pay for everything that children need for their school. Many parents cannot not afford to cater for the upkeep of all their children in school. Under the circumstance, parents favoured the education of their male children against the female. Their reason is that boys were important assets to families than the girls (interviews, 2016). Some parents held the view that girls were at risk of becoming pregnant which may terminate or delay their education.

Others referred to culture. Some interviewees believed that it was men's responsibility, not women's, to be breadwinners of families (interviews, 2016). As a result, boys should be supported to be able to take full charge of their family responsibilities in their adult lives. In war-affected communities, the girls who dropped-out of school or who could not attend school at all engaged in petty economic activities such as buying and selling or undertaking menial jobs in their communities just for their present survival. The most readily available and decent

jobs for the drop-out girls or those who have not been able to access school in the communities was the retailing of 'mobile telephony credit' or 'top-up cards' dotted along the streets in the communities (interviews, 2016). This category of children who missed school would certainly be outside the research finding that girls' income would not only increase by 10 to 20 percent with a one-year increase in schooling, but higher attainments of women in education would result in women receiving higher returns with 9.8 percent, compared with their male counterparts who would receive 8.7 percent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The situation of fewer girls attaining higher heights in education in most communities was gradually being laid bare. A recent study on Côte d'Ivoire showed that both male and female experience income problems; however, the female had lower levels of income as compared to their male counterparts (Croke and Smith, 2013).

Failure of community-based policies to address gender-based violence in children's education

As we have seen in chapter five, UNSC resolution 1528 (2004) empowered UNOCI to pay particular attention to serious violations and abuses committed against women and children, particularly sexual and gender-based violence. However, several sexual and gender-based violence against children persisted in communities during the crisis period, and this has continued into post-conflict settings. Due to limited resources, UNOCI's operational units and activities were limited to a few areas across the country. Members of these communities were expected by UNOCI to report cases of abuses of their children for prompt action to be taken, but this proved to be difficult for communities (UNHCHR, A/HRC/17/49, 2011). For fear of being attacked for reporting cases of gender-based abuses, many people did not report these cases even where peacekeepers were within reach. Instead, the abused nursed and endured their pain (interviews, 2016). Complaints of abuses were reported to the peacekeepers in some cases, but no reprieves to the victims had taken place (interviews, 2016). Perpetrators faced no severe

punishments, and there was no deterrent effect because people abused women with impunity (Mako, interview, 2016; Issabelle, interview, 2016; Sesamebalou, interview, 2016).

Data from Côte d'Ivoire show that parents who were concerned about the sexual abuses of their children preferred preventing their daughters from going to school. This decision is occasioned by the experiences of children who had been sexually abused in the past, and the social stigma and 'disgrace' it brought to the respective families. The case of parents in communities without schools where children walked for long hours without protection was worst for the girls. In these communities, girls were exposed to all forms of sexual and physical molestations. One parent disclosed:

> several incidences of sexual abuses took place in this community … the perpetrators still live with us and have not stopped their criminal acts. Our girls and women live in fear of sexual abuse, especially rape, so the girls would be more protected when they are at home. At the moment, no protection for them from anyone (Ouadrago, interview, 2016).

In line with UNSCR 1325, Côte d'Ivoire was among the first countries to design and subsequently launch a National Action Plan in 2007 to combat sexual and gender-based violence. However, the country could not put in place structures to confront sexual and gender-based violence. Lack of resources, absence of structures, coordination and monitoring to ensure the actualisation of the plan's objectives have been identified as key in the failure of the national plan (Croke and Smith, 2013). In the absence of necessary support to establish state structures to deal with sexual and gender-based violence, peacebuilders established services for victims of gender-based violence across the country. This was to help them cope with the effects of violence perpetrated against women and girls which were deemed necessary to fill the gap. However, these attempts have also been insufficient because these services only operated in a few areas (estimated to be 2% of the country) in the southern (Abidjan), western (Man) and central (Bouaké) regions of the country (See Croke and Smith, 2013:6-7). Also, the centres lacked trained professionals to help the abused, and many of the abused did not also solicit the

limited services provided for them due to stigma associated with victimhood and lack of resources (see IRC, 2011; interviews, 2016).

Failure of school-based policies to address gender-based violence in children's education

UNICEF and UNESCO aimed at counteracting gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality in schools. A high proportion of girls mentioned the prevalence of gender-based violence including sexual abuses by teachers and older male students in the schools as being one of the main reasons for dropping-out of school (interview of members of communities, 2016). Research on child marriage shows that 1 in 3 teenagers have given birth in Côte d'Ivoire, with the rural areas recording higher number of child mothers (Parkes, 2017:12). Sadly, even though a high proportion of children suffered sexual violence they do not report sexual violence; simply because they either do not know where to report to or because of shame or abandonment (MENET-UNICEF, 2015). Failure to give adequate protection to the girls in school against school-based gender violence, discrimination and inequality affected their academic performance. Interviews show that some of the girls dropped out because they were not enthused about their academic performance. Apart from being subjected to sexual harassments, the boys received preferential treatment from the male-dominated teachers than the girls. Several others became teenage mothers out of sexual molestations (interviews, 2016). One of my interviewees, Mamata, explains how her abuse affected her academic progress:

> Today, some of my classmates earned a BAC [baccalauréat], and others have the *brevet d'étude du premier cycle*. But I have no certificate to show. After my teacher sexually assaulted me, and this went viral, …. I lost my concentration in class, I underperformed and subsequently I dropped out of school (Mamata, interview, 2016).

School-based violence in a country with high incidence of HIV/AIDS infections came with health implications for the abused children. Children's education in Côte d'Ivoire typifies the literature which suggests that exposure of children to sexual violence has poor education and health outcomes (Perez and Widom, 1994; Eckenrode, et al., 1995: 31; Norman, et al., 2012;

Pieterse, 2015: 76-78; Sherr, et al, 2016: 36-39). The sexual exploitation exposes the children to HIV/AIDS infection in the face of high incidences of poverty occasioned by loss of families' incomes during the crisis. Indeed, "many children, the girls, in particular are forced into prostitution to assist their parents to fend for the entire family due to poverty" (interview with Kpara, a health professional, 2016). The situation of girls who have the opportunity of attending school do so with a myriad of problems including discrimination. In Côte d'Ivoire, many children have become teenage mothers in post-conflict communities, to the extent that a club of child mothers for children who dropped-out due to pregnancies was established as part of the peacebuilding interventions to get these baby mothers back to school (UNICEF, 2009:33).

Absence of stiff punishment to deter perpetrators from gender-based violence

In Côte d'Ivoire, women, young girls and female minors continue to suffer various forms of physical and sexual molestations and discrimination on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, political affiliation and religion even after the end of the crisis (Dosso, interview, 2016; Zerebi, 2016; Kounaté, interview, 2016; Rose, 2016). The worst part of gender-based violence is the absence of stiff punishment to serve as deterrence for the offences committed against the victims. The UNICEF supported a national help line, *Allo 116 Enfants en détresse*, set up in 2013 to reach children so that they are able to report cases of gender based violence. The help line brought a few cases of gender-based violence to the fore, but not followed with stiff punishment for all the abusers. The high prevalence of gender-based violence in the communities shows that the interventions have not comprehensively obliterated the drivers that obstruct children's access to, and completion of primary school education.

Sexual exploitation of girls by their teachers was one key barrier of children's access and completion of primary school. Addressing this state of affairs required the employment of stringent measures to deal with the gender-based violence. The training and recruiting of more

female teachers, and giving them leadership roles so that they are able to implement policies that would give hope to the hopeless girls was necessary. In Côte d'Ivoire, teachers have a code of conduct relating to sexual relations with the children entrusted in their care, and punitive sanctions are prescribed for breaking the rules could attract punishment including criminal prosecutions at the courts. Unfortunately, even though the Ivorian laws proscribe sexual abuse in children and women as a whole, only a few cases are prosecuted at the courts. The lack of severe punishment makes it extremely difficult to confront gender-based violence in children.

Alleviating poverty of families in conflict-affected communities

A very minimal impact has been made by peacebuilders to address high levels of poverty among families, making it difficult for them to properly cater for the education needs of their children. Paying for food, water and other basic necessities of life continue to impact negatively on children's access to education and outcomes in the affected communities.

During the war, a number of organisations, notably UNICEF, UNESCO, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP) supported distressed communities by providing basic needs, but the work of these organisations were hindered with increased insecurity. The United Nations which was working to bring reprieve to the affected people was itself compelled by circumstances of war at various stages to evacuate its staff from danger zones to protect them against incessant attacks unleashed by the belligerent parties (UNOCHA, 2006). By 2004, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross all halted their work in Bouake and its environs because of insecurity. This heightened the plight of people in desperate need of help. Jan Egeland, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator in Abidjan, acknowledged that the prolonged suspension of support to communities in need "endanger thousands of lives" in the country (UNOCHA, 2004).

As discussed in chapter three, under the circumstance of economic marginalisation of families, peacebuilders were expected to support families financially to reduce their burden of paying for schooling materials, food and clothes. To alleviate the economic burden of families, the government with the support of international peace actors, especially UNICEF and UNESCO legislated to make education compulsory and free for 6 to 16-year-olds. While this would be judged as an important milestone in delivering education to children, especially the girls who have been on the fringes of family incomes, a large proportion of the interviewees, especially from the rural folks indicated that the compulsory free education has not been working as envisaged. Quite a high number of children, especially the girls do not attend school because their parents cannot afford the cost of the basic necessities that children needed such as uniforms, sandals, shoes, and books (Mamata, interview, 2016).

Failure of Peacebuilders' policies to assist families with school children to address their financial problems

Peacebuilders did not make any significant impact on providing financial support to families of children in school. Majority of interviewees, both children and adults, identified poverty as the key problem that confronted children's education, despite fee-free public education. Most of the out-of-school and school drop-outs interviewed gave related experiences of Chantal, a 12-year-old child:

> I wished to be in school, but my mother had no money because she became bedridden when I was only three years old. I run errands for many people in this area since age five when my mother's illness deteriorated. My errands for people gave some financial support and sometimes food for myself and my mother. Now, I work on daily basis drawing water for people in this community for money so that she can pay for her treatment and for our food (Chantal, interview, 2016).

The immediate concern of war-affected families was how to provide food and other basic necessities for the education of the children. The interviews show that many parents have had their incomes reduced or totally lost during the war and many children continue to suffer as a

result. "Our standard of living was good at Yamoussoukro. But the conflict swept everything that we had, …. What is important now is getting education for the children, but costs on food, shelter and clothing for the family make education extremely difficult" (Dosso, interview, January, 2016). Being displaced itself came with several problems. Even displaced persons who fled to their relatives encountered problems that they could not afford the cost of education of their children. The basic needs provided to families by peacebuilders could not expiate their loss. The situation of children in Ampain refugee camp was very appalling; children lived in very difficult conditions in the camp owing to extreme poverty. The initial support from the UNHCR for the children's education was encouraging, but this was gradually reduced; and now they only receive the support occasionally even though parents remained extremely poor. Families which lost everything during the conflict could hardly afford anything making it extremely difficult for their children to remain in the schools or even attend the schools where education materials were provided. Having lost their economic activities to the war, and without any form of economic empowerment or financial support to parents of children from extremely distressed homes, it did very little to improve the education outcome of children from poor homes.

Absence of impact of peacebuilders policies to eliminate poverty in war-affected families

Assisting poor families to undertake income generating activities would have made them achieve self-sufficiency and make them self-reliant. This would have lifted the poor families from the quagmire of endemic poverty and puts them in a position to be able to take full charge of paying for the cost of their children's education in post-conflict period. Unfortunately, the peacebuilders' support to address poverty in families was a top-down approach which focused on achieving macroeconomic stability (IMF, 2009; World Bank, 2011b; Akindès, 2012). For example, Côte d'Ivoire's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) expected poverty to be

reduced through the consolidation of peace and security which would promote good governance. These were seen as the prerequisites for economic recovery and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2011a). To achieve this, investment was heavily directed into the security to ensure government's control of the Ivorian territory, creation of a new and unified army and maintaining a sound and stable macroeconomics. Through the support of international partners, the PRSP document predicted a programme of:

> economic stabilisation targeting an average growth rate of 5.8 percent over the period 2009-2013. The program will consist of improved fiscal policies; deep structural reforms in the cocoa/coffee, energy and oil sectors; and improvements in transparency and governance, which are expected to strengthen investor confidence. Given the large post-crisis reconstruction needs, the PRSP projects increasing public investments by 24 percent and strengthening the poverty focus of these investments while also attracting private investments to growth sectors" (World Bank, 2011b: 7).

By this top-down approach, the expectation was a trickle-down effect on poverty at the grassroots level. The key poverty reduction strategy was a seven-year programme from 2009-2015 expected "to transform Côte d'Ivoire into an emerging economy in which poverty falls from the current 49 percent to 33 percent by 2013 and to 16 percent by 2015." (ibid). The PRSP noted that the framework "should make it possible to implement, monitor and evaluate effective strategies that will allow for significant poverty reduction in Côte d'Ivoire between now and 2015 in line with the Millennium Development Goals." (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009:1). Although no available comprehensive review of PRSP for the 2009-2015 exists, the state of poverty in Côte d'Ivoire questions the impact of the PRSP implemented to reduce poverty in war-affected communities. This is not surprising because the 2010 report on the PRSP implemented during the period 1993-2008 only revealed seven years later that "the proportion of the population living below the national poverty threshold had, instead of falling, actually risen considerably from 32.3% in 1993 to 48.9% in 2008" (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2010:24; Akindès: 2012:34). It is argued in this section that the interventions failed to make any meaningful impact on the poverty of families at the lower-levels. War-affected

communities needed targeted interventions to address endemic poverty rather than wait for the trickle-down effects to reverse economic deprivation and inequality (interviews with community members, 2016).

Most of the interviewees believe interventions to eliminate poverty could have a multi-task effects. One remarked that confronting poverty through financial and other economic incentives would not improve "their learning outcomes only, but would protect their vulnerability in terms of sexual abuses, infection of HIV and personal safety … but the absence of support to the needy makes it extremely difficult to reduce their vulnerability" (Kpara, interview, 2016). Another said that due to poor living conditions in post-conflict communities, young girls were pushed into sex trade which was their strategy to survive due to poverty in their families (Janice, interview, March 2016). Due to poverty, many children are unable to attend school despite the government's compulsory and free education policy because the war had pauperised families. For many families, their immediate responsibility was about how to pay for food, how to pay for shelter, it was about how to pay for water, and these they weighted higher than getting children to go to school. This is because their incomes were meagre so they were unable to pay for costs of their children's education and costs associated with domestic welfare issues. Education was only a consideration after they had "settled well in our host communities and gotten some semblance of tranquillity to start life anew after our harrowing experiences in the cross-fire." However, they are "…now unable to pay for the cost of education because we are poor" (Maigida, interview, February, 2016).

There is evidence that peacebuilders provided food to school children. When the schools re-opened:

> they helped our children to be in school. We did not pay fees, all that we did was to provide food for our children when going to school, and when they returned home after school. Whatever food that was provided to the children in school was provided by the foreigners. On some occasions, the children brought food home which helped parents in many ways (Janice, interview, March, 2016).

But peacebuilders did not do this everywhere and where they implemented this intervention food supplies were regular only during the fighting or emergencies period, but not a permanent solution to food security problems being faced by children displaced by war. The peacebuilders distribution of food has stopped even though the lives of families have not improved in a manner where they are able to take care of their children's domestic and school needs at the same time (interviews, 2016). Pière Kpenka's frustration in the interview showed the extent of despondency of parents interviewed in their quests to provide their children education in the post-war affected communities:

> how do you force a parent who has become a pauper because of a war you the political leaders visited on us to send all his or her children to school without any form of financial support for the family? Won't children eat before and after school? won't they be clothed in their homes? It is good to send children to school so that they become responsible citizens in future, but many of us are too poor to provide our families' needs and still educate all our children at the same time (Kpenka, interview, 2016).

In the nutshell, making education compulsory without a meaningful effort to confront poverty and economic privation of poor families affects educational attainments in the long term. As shown in in table 7.1, there is a significant proportion of out-of-school and school drop-out children in the country. Peacebuilders' efforts in getting children back to school did very little to tackle children's accessibility of education.

Recruiting, training and building capacities of teachers in Côte d'Ivoire

Getting teachers to teach in schools after years of conflict occupied an important part of peacebuilders' efforts towards ensuring education for children in conflict-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire. The teaching profession at the basic school was a key profession that commanded large workforce that suffered hugely due to the forced displacements in the country. Teachers who taught in ethnically dominant communities other than their own ethnicities were targeted for torture and execution. The section argues notes of efforts that were undertaken by peacebuilders to recruit teachers to teach in communities affected by the war.

However, during the crisis, there was a lack of untrained teachers to teach children in most communities. Presently, as a result of the massive displacements, most war-affected communities still attract a very low number of teachers. This has a negative impact on pupil-teacher ratio in primary school, as shown in table 7.1.

Limited successes in recruiting, training and building capacities of teachers

During the crisis, UNICEF, UNESCO and their partners provided emergency education. The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) and UNESCO education programmes in war-affected states aimed at providing education to children and to promote a culture of peace in the schools (UNICEF, 2011; UNESCO, 2013:56; UNICEF, 2014:1-4). This was implemented in two phases in the country. The first phase of the project was completed in February 2014, and the second phase was being implemented at the time of fieldwork in January 2016. In Côte d'Ivoire, teachers were considered to be important in the provision of education in emergencies and post-conflict period. Under the EEPTC and PBEA programmes, UNICEF recruited teachers, and provided them with opportunities to enhance their capacities. The education provided by peacebuilders during emergency had some positive effects. The teachers served as peacebuilding agents in the schools they taught. Also, without the emergency education in the beneficiary communities, children would have been out of school throughout the period of the war (interviews, 2016). There were also key problems that affected the education of children in both the crisis and post-crisis period.

Lack of trained teachers for the communities

Only a handful of teachers were recruited to teach in the war-affected communities. The teaching staff was made up of trained and untrained teachers with the latter constituting the bulk of teachers. The recruited teachers who were untrained were giving some teaching

knowledge and skills to help them function. Due to the limited number of teachers, only a few schools had the services of teachers which affected emergency education. In cases where trained teachers were available they assisted the untrained with their professional knowledge and experience so that the untrained could functioned effectively (Adisa, interview, 2016; Gagnei, interview, 2016; Maigida, interview, 2016).

Due to the untrained or unqualified nature of the teachers, some parents decided not to have their children taught by the untrained teachers. Some parents recounted their experience of teachers in their community schools which they said were taught by substandard teachers. As a result of the lowly qualified teachers, their children dropped-out because they felt they were not getting any quality teaching as compared to their previous schools. One parent had this to say about the type of teaching the children got in the emergency education,

> ... in Dimbokro, we lived well, my children attended very good schools. But when we took refuge at the village … there were no trained teachers. A few community volunteers were employed to teach, but my children were not happy with the type of teaching they were getting so they dropped-out (Alfa Karimou, interview, March, 2016).

The lack of teaching staff has not changed in the post-conflict communities where the services of teachers remained critical. Due to the lack of teachers, children trekked to neighbouring communities to be taught not because they do not have schools, they have schools built with local materials as those in other communities but they trekked to other schools because they "do not have replacement for teachers who had left during the war" (Zeenatou, interviews, 2016).

Another problem is the disproportionate allocation of recruited teachers to the communities. The war-affected urban centres have more of the qualified teachers than the war-affected rural communities. In rural areas too, some communities had teachers in all the classes in the schools, while several others had a handful of teachers or no teachers at all. In the case of one of my interviewees, Gagnei, and his colleague, faced logistical problems. They lived in Noé, a peri-

urban town in South-East of Côte d'Ivoire, had to cycle on daily basis to their duty station which was extremely deprived. Gagnei said: "the two of us were employed to teach in a village about 15 kilometres from this town, and it was very difficult for us. It was a tedious job because only the two of us accepted postings to this remote village to teach six classes in the school. The worse of all was that of a lack of teaching and learning aids." (Gagnei, interview, 2016).

The absence of teachers to teach in communities led to the growing of informal education, especially the koranic schooling. This form of education took place in the mosques or in some cases the Islamic instructors' houses. The form of education was faith-based, and on the teachings of the Holy Koran. Since,

> there were no government or NGO functioning schools during the conflict, many children accessed the education provided by the Islamic clerics who imparted Islamic teachings to the children. The services of these Islamic instructors were not paid for, so many children including non-muslim residents in some places attended these informal schools because there were no formal schools in their communities (Maigida, interview, 2016).

Lack of support to increase the size of female teachers

In chapter three, female teachers were said to be important in the improvement of children's education, particularly the girls. Unfortunately, peacebuilders have not been successful in helping to expand the size of female teachers. Nationally, the current rate of female teachers as captured in a Ministry of Education study (2012) shows that only 11% of schools had women as directors, while women made up 35% of the teaching profession; a profession that constitutes the highest number of civil servants in the country (Croke and Smith, 2013:3). This means that the girls continue to be educated in the male-dominated school environment with its attendant deleterious implications for girls as discussed in the theory chapter.

Building and equipping schools for children in conflict-affected communities

The building and equipping of schools by the peacebuilders have addressed only a small fraction of the bigger problem of school infrastructural deficits which affected children's ability to enrol, remain and complete primary education. Getting schools back functioning effectively by rehabilitating damaged ones, or where possible, building and equipping new schools with teaching and learning facilities in the aftermath of conflict were one of the central objectives of the peacebuilders. However, efforts of peacebuilders to revive the education of children by building and equipping schools in most affected communities of the country suffered setbacks due to growing insecurity during and after the conflict.

Peacebuilders failure to mitigate school infrastructural deficits and facilities

The educational support of the peacebuilding actors during the war was to address the emergency needs of crisis-affected children, and to support the state in the recovery of education. UNICEF, and associated non-governmental organisations and UN agencies implemented contingency programmes as a measure to achieve their humanitarian and development objectives. In the crisis, the actors worked closely with the belligerent parties to enable education services to reach the displaced populations. Under the emergency education, several temporary classrooms were built for Ivoirian displaced school children and their host communities during the initial stages of the crisis. Indeed, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs documented several NGO-run primary and secondary schools being attended by more than 300,000 children in the North, from 2002 to 2004 (UNOCHA, 2004).

At the initial stages of the crisis, UNICEF estimated 80% of women and children were going to be forced out of Côte d'Ivoire over the next twelve months following the September 2002 turmoil. Having anticipated that the situation would severely stretch facilities of the host

communities and neighbouring countries which hosted the displaced. UNICEF solicited for funding to tackle these eventualities, but the solicited fund was insufficient to comprehensively address the problem of children's education though its total contribution cannot totally be discounted. The initial preparation to tackle the educational needs in communities affected by the conflict in both the government-held and rebel-controlled areas was its budgeted US$ 1.2 million emergency fund for education intended to help about 340,000 children affected in Côte d'Ivoire and neighbouring countries playing hosts to refugees who fled from the Ivoirian crisis (UNICEF, 2003). Funding of children's education by UNICEF and its associates has been a major problem throughout the fighting period between 2002 and 2010. The main peace interlocutors including the UN and the French Government concentrated most of their resources in the stabilisation of the conflict through peacekeeping undertakings. They did very little to reverse infrastructural deficits existing in most parts of the country. The UN agencies, particularly UNICEF and UNESCO with the support of donor-governments implemented projects to rescue school infrastructure, but they were handicapped financially (interview of officials of UNICEF and UNESCO, 2016).

After the 2011 post run-off election crisis, "UNICEF undertook some assessment of the situation of schools and the results were clear that the war had caused devastation to children's education. It came out that only a handful of schools, in fact 17% had sufficient desks for pupils across the country. Less than one in four schools had at least a functioning toilet" (Trouaré, interview, 2016). Even in the southern part of the country where government controlled, schools which functioned intermittently were not well-maintained due to government's extra task of prosecuting the war with the little resources in the kitty. Children in towns and villages around Abidjan regularly trooped into the city to write their terminal exams because their schools were not equipped with facilities. The state of affairs affected the quality of education of children in the country (UNICEF, 2011). The crisis affected the education of all category of

children; both poor and the rich, but those in the rural areas mostly suffered. Children from urban or peri-urban areas or from wealthy families like Toyo suffered significantly in accessing schools fitted with necessary facilities due to their displacements. Toyo lost her childhood social status of attending an Ivy school at Cocody in Abidjan. She had two options when her family sought refuge in their remote home village, Noé. Either she walks to attend the unfenced and thatch roofed school in Noé or forfeited the education opportunity available to the children in the community. She chose the former (Toyo, interview, 2016). A public school teacher's description of the conditions of their school infrastructure sums the popular view of the negative impact of poorly equipped schools,

> we face serious health problems because we do not have toilets in the school. We had a pit latrine which served as toilets, but this collapsed recently because of the heavy rains because they were built with mud and roofed with thatch. At the moment children use the bushes as toilets and this exposes them to reptile bites and diseases (Elysée, interview, 2016).

Peacebuilders created "Child Friendly Schools" which targeted war affected communities to support existing programmes such as the "Back to School Campaign" in the country. This campaign was initiated under the auspices of UNICEF in the 2005/2006 school year. It worked alongside its "Ecole, Espace de Paix et de Tolérance." The aim of these initiatives was to provide opportunities in terms of school facilities, school materials, teachers and a peaceful environment that would ensure that the children got back to school. Under the Child Friendly Schools (CFS) initiative, the school environment was expected to be made conducive for academic work which would contribute to the progress and development of the children. The interventions implemented under this initiative included the rehabilitation and construction of classrooms, latrines and provision of water points in selected communities. Medical kits were included in the programme to assist teachers and pupils take care of their primary health and the provision of emergency health aid services.

The concept of child friendly schools was expected to alter the existing old school system where children had no good hygienic facilities such as good drinking water and toilets into a modern school system with modern facilities. Donor partners including the African Development Bank and the Japanese Government supported UNICEF in the implementation of projects to improve children's education in the conflict affected areas of the country (interview with a programmes officer, UNICEF, Abidjan, 2016). In the Central Northwest zone of the country which was heavily affected by the conflict, for example, UNICEF rehabilitated 80 government schools with the support of the African Development Bank and Japanese Government, and also trained over 1,800 volunteer teachers (UNICEF, 2011).

The capacity building for teachers was an important part of the initiatives. Medical kits to assist teachers and pupils in taking care of their primary health and emergency health aid services were provided under this programme. The LAB4LAB schools under the Education in Emergencies in Post-Conflict Transition Programme (EEPCT) were initiated on deprived and border communities of the country. The LAB4LAB, an acronym for Learning Along Borders for Living Across Boundaries (LAB4LAB) was initiated by the UNICEF with the support of donor-governments. The aim of EEPCT was to promote peace and stability in countries of the Mano River region including Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire (UNICEF, 2010: 16). The LAB4LAB schools were expected to integrate and keep children of school going age, including the displaced and refugee children in a high-quality school (UNICEF, 2010:19).

Building and equipping of schools no doubt contributed to ensuring the recovery of education in most conflict affected communities in the country. Without the peacebuilders' schools several war affected children and in particular those in the deprived areas would have had their education significantly affected. Education kits/materials such as the UNICEF bags and books were provided to children in communities (interviews with members of communities, 2016).

Children in some conflict-affected communities were supported with school materials by the peacebuilders,

> the desks, school bags, books and pens were donated to children to help them in their learning. All the blue bags children used in this community with UNICEF's logo embossed on them were provided by UNICEF for the children in this community and several other children in communities around us benefited from these UNICEF's learning aids (interview with Assiatou, 2016).

Despite the contribution by the peacebuilders, many daunting issues described in the previous sections remained unresolved which negatively impact children's education in a significant manner. The pledge to deliver the LAB4LAB schools faced some challenges. Only a very few of the schools have been built. In all, 25 LAB4LAB schools have been established; 5 in 2009, and 20 in 2010 (Osman, and Carlos Vasquez, 2009; UNICEF, 2011). The LAB4LAB schools, for example, "were in very remote and deprived rural communities which were extremely difficult to be reached due to the deplorable and non-existent vehicular roads" (Rose, interview, 2016). The result is that some schools were overpopulated, and others underpopulated.

Impact of psychological support on children's education and their social reintegration

The impact of psychosocial policies on children in Côte d'Ivoire's crisis has been marginal. Psychosocial support has been available to children in some war-affected communities. But many of the communities did not have access to this support either provided directly by the peacebuilders or provided under the auspices of the peacebuilders. It also emerges from the study that the few psychological service centres or counselling service contact points were associated by local folks as places for treating madness or insanity conditions. Their belief is that children who suffered trauma as a result of the war were not mad people; therefore, they did not want to use these services. Rather, children who suffered trauma as a result of the war required "spiritual" cleansing using traditional coping strategies (interviews with community members, 2016). However, traditional coping strategies were not factored into the psychological services provided by the peacebuilders to address traumatic disorders

experienced by children. The section analyses how the community or public level, and school level psychological therapeutic interventions affected children's education in the communities affected by war.

Psychosocial interventions were undertaken by Save the Children, UNICEF and *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) during the crisis and post-crisis transition period. In the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, many children witnessed the killing and torture of people in their communities. Children saw the sexual abuses of their siblings, mothers and the hacking to death of their close relations. Some of the children themselves were forced to kill, torture and many of them, especially girls, were sexually assaulted by people including members of their community. Some of the children suffered abuses themselves, and many of them experienced symptoms of psycho disorders and trauma such as shock, shame, daytime "flashbacks" and nightmares. However, most children and adults in the war affected communities did not consider these signs as significant health problems capable of affecting the progress of children's education.

Limited public counselling facilities and psychological therapists to address psychological needs of children

Although lack of psychological services was a key problem across the country, the worst affected were the rural communities. A handful of expertise in treating people with psycho disorders or trauma exists in the urban centres as compared with other branches of medicine in the country. Nationally, "the country has a limited number of professionals in this field of medicine anchored on a weak health system in the rural communities, and this defeats the purpose of ensuring good health for all after the conflict" (Delphine, interview, 2016). Most young persons in communities who suffered psychological injuries resulting from sexual abuses and drugs continue to live with their thoughts and pain without any help. Only a few of the interviewees who could not continue their primary education after the war made references

211

to their inability to overcome their experiences of war which they claimed affected their educational, as captured by Margarette in an interview:

> It's only God that I'm surviving and talking today. My experiences of violence at a very young age makes me have the feeling that it's just a waste of time to be thinking about school. The flashbacks of the killings I witnessed, the hacking to death of people makes me think the war would be waged again. When we were told to go back to school I ignored them (Margarette, interview, 2016).

Only a very few people had a contact with the international medical and humanitarian health teams, notably the *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF). They provided some emergency care and counselling services in the main northern and western cities such as Man, Danané, Korhogo and Bouaké (Amnesty International, 2007; interviews, 2016).

Limited school counselling services to deal with children's psychological needs

Peacebuilders implemented programmes to address the psychological needs of children in some schools (Hermann et al., 2009; Kang'ethe, 2009), but these attempts floundered significantly. Only a handful of schools had counselling services. Teachers were somehow equipped with knowledge and skills in counselling by the peacebuilders.

Children who were out of school who could have been helped through counselling could not accessed these counselling services. A few of the interviewees who were out-of-school attributed their inability to continue their schooling to occasional flashbacks and nightmares of their experiences of abuses in the war. They strongly held the view that the war would relapse at any time so there was no need to go back to school only to be out of school again in the event of a relapse. The limited availability of counselling services for children left many children who experienced abuses continue to live with flashbacks and nightmares years after the end of the war. The provision of effective psychosocial interventions could help children, but the local or traditional coping strategies in dealing with psychosocial issues could mainstreamed in peacebuilders psychosocial services.

Conclusion

Peacebuilding has had no single positive impact on all the dependent variables considered in our assessment. It has had a limited impact on teacher recruitments, and on training and building the capacities of teachers to teach in war-affected communities. It also had limited positive impact on addressing infrastructural deficits in schools by building and equipping very few schools in war-affected communities. However, on three key factors which obstructed children's education in war-affected communities; namely, gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality, poverty in war-affected families and psychosocial support, peacebuilders recorded no impact. Education is critical if human security of the country is to increase. As shown in table figure1, the number of children who are out-of-school, and those who have dropped-out remains high. There is also low enrolment of female children in primary education and the teacher-pupil ratio.

Drawing from the theory (chapter three), we argue that the impact of peace initiatives implemented to address the above problems confronting children's education in Côte d'Ivoire have made a very minimal contribution to achieving the objective of improving human security through education. On the basis of the critical factors discussed in chapter three which we argued when they are addressed comprehensively, it would lead to a greater positive consequence for socio-economic security which would address the issues of "freedom from want"; thereby would engender positive peace, it is concluded in this chapter that positive peace remained a distant objective to be achieved. The interventions failed to increase human security of war-affected communities because of their failure to alleviate the problems in children's education.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion and Recommendations

The thesis offers a comprehensive assessment of the impact of peacebuilding on human security in states in conflict and post-conflict situations. The research made both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature of peacebuilding and human security. Theoretically, chapter 3 built a framework based on the literature on human security and peace, and the interviews conducted in Côte d'Ivoire. This framework can be used in future research to assess the impact of peacebuilding on human security in war-affected states. Empirically, the theoretical matrix developed in chapter 3 was applied to the impact of peacebuilding on personal safety, human rights, health and education of Côte d'Ivoire (in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7).

The thesis expands the research on peacebuilding by providing an understanding of the real impact of peacebuilding on the human security of war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire. Over the past decade, several researchers have questioned the liberal peace framework due to its illiberal effects (Lederach 1997; Bleiker 2000; Duffield 2001; Clark 2001; Paris 2004; Richmond 2007; Jabri 2007; Pugh and Turner 2008; Steenkamp, 2011). The thesis agrees with the view of Christina Steenkamp who sees the current liberal peace framework as supporting a top-down peacebuilding where the peacebuilders neglect the local populations and needs. In the process, peacebuilders hastily integrate the recipient fragile states into the global economy. The consequence of these actions is that the post-conflict fragile state is opened up for organised crime (Steenkamp, 2011: 362). It departs markedly from the argument that state-building and/or peacebuilding is an interplay between international supra- or interstate interveners and submissive local actors as propagated in some literature (see Chandler, 2010).

On the contrary, the local actors in peacebuilding should not be seen as submissive actors but as key partners whose role in peacebuilding is as important as international actors. In this sense, it concurs with the position of Richmond (2011) and others like Mac Ginty (2011), and Brigg and Bleiker (2011) who argue that peacebuilding should be owned by both international and emancipated local actors. The thesis agrees with Chandler's integration of human security and resilience in his conceptual matrix. In this work (2012), Chandler proposes a bottom-up approach to addressing human security which is based on empowering war-affected communities so that they become resilient in the face of hurtful threats to people's lives in conflict and post-conflict situations (Chandler, 2012). But, what constitutes the local needs, and the extent of impact of peacebuilding on these local needs remain under-researched. The thesis filled this important lacuna by providing what the local people considered essential for peacebuilding to make any positive impact on their lives.

The thesis concurs with researchers who argue that there should be the need for an efficient theory and praxis of peacebuilding, which should guarantee the security, stability, and development of war-affect populations. However, unlike liberal peace defenders and actors' prioritisation of state security, this thesis prioritises issues such as access to water and sanitation, food, shelter, healthcare and education of war-affected communities over security as the means to building stronger and resilient post-conflict states. Scholars of peacebuilding and statebuilding argue that there is no way of knowing how to address post-conflict states except by muddling through (Tellidis, 2012:433). David Chandler succinctly puts it as follows: ''how can the problems of the post-colonial world be alternatively addressed'' (Chandler, 2010:38). This thesis argues that the problems of conflict and post-conflict states can effectively be addressed by building a strong foundation of health and education in war-affected communities. This should be implemented by a distinct peace framework that is not hatched purposely to achieve liberal peace objectives. Peacebuilders in Côte d'Ivoire had

liberal peace standpoint. They wanted to ensure the perpetuation of liberal peace ends without making conscious efforts to build peace based on what the local people considered necessary.

In the subsequent two sections, I give a detailed discussion of the key findings of the thesis. I then provide recommendations to improve peacebuilders' policies and suggestions for future research on peacebuilding and human security.

Key Findings

The key finding of the thesis is that peacebuilding interventions implemented by the key peace interlocutors, particularly the UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS and the French Government as well as the UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO and other non-governmental organisations failed to impact positively on human security of war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire from 2002 to 2015. Substantially, peacebuilders' policies failed to eliminate the critical war effects on personal safety, human rights, and health and education factors necessary to induce high human security. The failure of peacebuilders to engender high human security of war-affected populations was due to the main peacebuilding approach used by the key peace interlocutors. This approach failed to prioritise or pay particular attention to the provision of social services alongside issues of elections or re-establishing of democracy, market-based economics, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR), and the development of state security institutions which received special attention. It was counterproductive to prioritise state security over human security. Peacebuilding must address local needs and treat local agents as partners and not mere recipients of interventions (Richmond, 2011: 105). Unfortunately, in Côte d'Ivoire, the relationship between international and local actors was one of peace giver-recipient relationship respectively.

Neither the two key peace agreements, namely the Linas Marcoussis (2003) and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (2007) nor the ancillary ones, the Accra and Pretoria

Agreements which constituted the key peacebuilding frameworks to ensure durable peace in Côte d'Ivoire, contained a single provision on how to address the effects of war relating to access to quality drinking water, sanitation and hygiene, medical facilities and health staff, maternal and paediatric services, food and nutrition, and shelter. Other social services of importance to war-affected people were conspicuously absent. Peacebuilders did not completely address the factors that obliterated children's access to education in the war-affected communities during and after the war.

Peacebuilders failed to address the structural causes of the conflict. They did not address the following crucial issues: exclusion of most citizens from social services, economic inequality and deprivation, ethnic identity suppression and oppression, intra-elite scramble for political power, and competition over resource wealth (Daddieh, 2016; interviews, 2016). The thesis considered the provision of these social services to be the most important building blocks for durable peace which should have been the primary focus of the international peace actors. Due to the absence of adequate protection for the social service infrastructures during the war, their recovery became extremely difficult, and this negatively impacted on human security of war-affected communities.

The following sections offer an analysis of my key findings. They are summarised in the tables below. In the methodology, the human security assessment framework as comprehensively discussed in chapter 3 is operationalised as follows:

The implementation of a peace initiative could produce positive or no impact. The assessment framework measures the impact of the interventions. That is, it measures the changes that have occurred in the influenced variable with the implementation of peacebuilding intervention (influencing variable). As applied in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, positive impact presumes changes that have occurred or are occurring in the dependent variables which have helped or are helping

to mitigate the factors that have threatened or are threatening the selected human security indicator (s). If changes or a change occurs after the implementation of the intervention (independent or influencing variable) which leads to a removal or a reduction of threats to the key measurable indicator – dependent or influenced variable; or simply put, if there is an improvement in human security, the intervention would be judged as having produced a positive impact which is the contribution of the peacebuilding intervention. Where the intervention has improved a little bit, but not improved human security variable fully the intervention would be judged as having produced a limited positive impact. If after the intervention the situation remains the same as it was during or before the conflict or deteriorates after the end of intensive fighting, the intervention has produced no impact. It is presumed the intervention has not enhanced the human security of the war-affected communities.

Where peacebuilding made a positive impact, a designated value "P" representing "Positive Impact" is assigned to the dependent variable. Cases where the interventions have produced a change that is positive, but have not made a complete positive impact to be designated "P", the designated value is "LP" representing "Limited Positive Impact". Similarly, where peacebuilders' interventions have neither made any positive or limited positive impact, the assessment designation is "N" representing "No Impact".

Table 8.1 The impact of peacebuilders' interventions on human security by addressing threats to personal safety and security of communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Assessment Factors: Impact on	P	LP	N
eliminating threats to personal safety through the presence of peacekeepers in war-affected communities		✓	
engaging with feuding parties to curtail violence through diplomacy		✓	

	P	LP	N
reducing violence and providing personal safety through DDR		✓	
reducing violence by conducting elections or re-establishing democracy in war-affected communities			✓

Key: P = Positive Impact; LP =Limited Positive Impact; N= No Impact

Table 8.2 The impact of peacebuilders' interventions on human security by preventing human rights abuse in war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Assessment Factors: Impact of	P	LP	N
international pressure on feuding parties to curtail human rights violations		✓	
internationally imposed sanctions on key figures to curb human rights abuse			✓
international human rights monitoring to reduce human rights abuses		✓	
international trials on holding war criminals accountable for war crimes			✓
interventions on curbing sexual abuses of women and girls in war-affected communities			✓

Key: P = Positive Impact; LP =Limited Positive Impact; N= No Impact

Table 8.3 The impact of peacebuilders' interventions on human security by removing threats to the health needs of war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Assessment Factors: Impact on	P	LP	N
access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services			✓
access to medical facilities and medical personnel			✓
access to maternal health services			✓

	P	LP	N
access to child health services		✓	
access to food and nutrition		✓	
access to shelter for war-affected people		✓	

Key: P = Positive Impact; LP =Limited Positive Impact; N= No Impact

Table 8.4 The impact of peacebuilders' interventions on human security by eliminating threats to children's education in war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire

Assessment Factors: Impact on	P	LP	N
dismantling gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality affecting children's education			✓
alleviating poverty in war affected-families			✓
recruiting, training and building capacities of teachers in war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire		✓	
constructing and equipping of schools in communities affected by armed conflict		✓	
accessing psychological/counselling needs of children in war-affected communities			✓

Key: P = Positive Impact; LP =Limited Positive Impact; N= No Impact

The impact of peacebuilding on personal safety of war-affected populations

In terms of peacebuilding impact on personal safety, violence curtailment was the target of peacebuilders' policies. Peacebuilders adopted three-pronged approach; namely, diplomatic or political engagement, international military presence, and the implementation of DDR programme to curtail violence in the country. None of these measures completely curtailed violence in the next ten years following the outbreak of the war which started in 2002. Despite committing the feuding parties - the pro-Gbagbo government and rebel militias - to agree to all

the peace accords, violence did not end completely. By the end of 2015, there were pockets of violence and threats of violence in many areas across the country, particularly in the West of Côte d'Ivoire. The conduct of the first post-conflict election, and the integration of some of the rebel fighters into the mainstream army as means to disband the existence of rebel groups were two policies implemented to ensure peace, stability and security of society.

Elections legitimise the authority of the elected; therefore, with a high voter turn-out of 84% in the first post-conflict election, this could have been sufficient to conclude that the country had returned to peace. Unfortunately, this was not the case in Côte d'Ivoire. In a Clausewitzian way, the high participation of the citizens in the first post-conflict election was a continuation of the conflict by other means. Instead of the high participation in the election constructing structures to ensure durable peace in liberal terms, the election produced tragic moments with the killing of over 3,000 people and the displacement of many others which negatively affected human security in the war-affected communities. In their study on electoral violence, Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente (2012) concluded that weak parties with strong violent capacity use violence to either compel voters to vote for them or prevent them from voting. In contrast with this theoretical standpoint, Côte d'Ivoire's feuding parties, the pro-Gbagbo fighters and pro-Ouattara rebels had equal capacity of causing violence to achieve their aims. Peacebuilders used elections to build peace in a fragile environment instead of focussing on addressing the needs of local communities. The thesis suggests that excluding human security matters from the onset in peace agreements presents potential danger to the living conditions of civilians. It argues that it is then extremely difficult for any future attempts to protect the human security of war-affected communities. The UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO and other partner institutions lacked the much needed resources capable of salvaging the damage caused. This had deleterious implications for a durable peace in the long-term.

Another key political strategy was the use of peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire, and to protect civilian populations. Despite the presence of peacekeepers, they could not totally abate violence following the outbreak of the war in 2002 due to their geographically-limited areas of deployment and limited size. As of 2008, there was no protection for civilians in several places such as Divo and Issia in the West and Adopé in the South, and many other areas across the country, where there has been no military presence which required UNOCI's deployment to protect civilians who were facing imminent violence (UNSC, S/2008/451, 2008). During my fieldwork at Issia in 2016, there were occasional attacks in neighbouring towns in the forest Montagne and Moyen-Cavally regions separating Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia (as a result, fieldwork could not be conducted beyond Issia, towards Duékoué in the west of the country). The state of insecurity in Abidjan itself had not completely disappeared during fieldwork to the extent that I was advised by officials of RASALAO-CI to leave my hotel located near the *Grande Marché de Marcory* to a safer place near *Pharmacie du Angré Chateau* due to war-related violent crimes prevalent in Marcory and other suburbs of the city of Abidjan. The limited number of peacekeepers and their geographically-limited deployment affected citizens' personal safety and security of their communities. The UN first deployed about 80 peacekeepers to augment the French and African troops who were already overwhelmed by the conflict. The UN troops increased to about 8000 in 2008; and by December 2015, peacekeepers' peak strength of 9700 in 2012 was reduced to 4000 which worked alongside the French Licorne forces.

The final political strategy used by peacebuilders to ensure the safety of civilians was the programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). Substantially, the thesis found that that the programme implemented before the 2010 elections was a complete failure on all its key facets (arms retrieval; dismantling of the combating groups; and its social reconciliation function). While significant efforts were made to retrieve

arms following the run-off election violence, the availability of arms remained an important issue to be completely addressed even at the time of field work in 2016. Peacebuilders' policies on arms retrieval from fighters were not comprehensively undertaken. The combating groups remained active. They were not disbanded, and minimal attempts were made to reintegrate former fighters into their communities. Yet, elections were authorised by the international peacebuilders, and subsequently conducted. The ex-combatants returned into their communities without reconciliation. Peacebuilders provided very few socio-economic opportunities to the ex-combatants. In effect, many of them came out of combat grounds in poverty into poverty-stricken communities. Multilateral and bilateral donors including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), European Union (EU), France, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden agreed to fund about half of the programme with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire financing about 50% of the programme's total budget. Despite international peacebuilders' funding pledges, funds did not come in as pledged which negatively affected the security process. After the symbolic handing over of weapons by the pro-government militias in May 2005 in Guiglo, no serious commitments followed. Armed militias also refused to disarm. This had dire consequences on personal safety of the citizens.

The impact of peacebuilding on human rights

The study investigated the extent to which peacebuilding interventions protected people from violations such as torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, gender-based violence, forced disappearances, and child rights abuse. Peacebuilders' policies in this direction took the form of pressure by means of press releases and statements. They were issued to bring to order perpetrators of human rights violations, to monitor and apply sanctions on violators, and to hold perpetrators accountable for their egregious violations of human rights. The UN and its

agencies, the ICC, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have undertaken site visits and conducted investigations to authenticate allegations of all forms of killings and inhumane treatment in the country. Evidence of imposition of sanctions on key figures involved in the summary executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, rape, and other acts of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment, and forced disappearances existed. But arbitrary arrests and detentions continued to be perpetrated even under the government of Ouattara. Anti-Ouattara civilians, civil society organisations and journalists have complained about this (Human Rights Watch, 2017:3; interviews, 2016).

The Security Council Committee established in line with resolution 1572 (2004) imposed sanctions on Wheat Goudé, a leader of the Young Patriots, and Eugène Ngoran Kouadio whose actions were deemed inimical to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Charles Blé Goudé and Eugène Djué and Martin Fofié Kouakou of Forces Nouvelles were sanctioned by the UNSC for war related crimes (Schori, 2015). Despite these sanctions, the study found war-related crimes were perpetrated even up to 2012 across the country. As of the time of fieldwork, these crimes continued to be perpetrated in the west of the country. Trials to put an end to impunity have not been diligently pursued in the post-crisis recovery. Both government and rebels' complicity in the torture and killings of people was known to international peace actors such as the ICC.

Internationally, so far, no single individual has been held accountable for all the war crimes committed from 2002 to 2010. Also, no criminal trials or charges have been held against any pro-Ouattara Republican Forces and rebel militias for war crimes committed in the post 2010 run-off election. Only Charles Blé Goudé, the youth leader and President Laurent Gbagbo have been brought before the ICC for their roles in the crimes committed in the post 2010 run-off election violence.

The thesis found short and long-term effects of the ICC's dereliction of responsibility by holding only one faction liable for war crimes committed in the aftermath of the 2010 elections. The short-term effect is the refusal or boycott by pro-Gbagbo faction of the national reconciliation bodies established to ensure durable peace - the *commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation* (CDVR) and the *commission nationale pour la réconciliation et l'indemnisation des victimes des crises survenues* (CONARIV). The long-term effect is the failure to achieve national reconciliation. So far, there is no guarantee of letting go of the egregious violations of human rights committed by the pro-Ouattara faction in the event of losing future elections. Local criminal trials are key in holding war criminals accountable for their crimes in the country. Domestically, around 100 people including Simone Gbagbo have been hauled before the national judicial systems for war-related crimes. But all these were pro-Gbagbo supporters and fighters. The state of affairs in Côte d'Ivoire resulting from peacebuilders' failure to punish war crimes committed by pro-Ouattara fighters and supporters presents a real danger that could further worsen human security in the event of a relapse of war.

The study found sexual abuse of girls and women as one of the war-related weapons perpetrated on the basis of the victim's ethnicity or political persuasion (Hudson, 2009:310-311; interviews, 2016). Sexual abuse of women and girls resulting from the war have somehow reduced, but not been completely wiped out across the country. As of the period of fieldwork, majority of interviews in the communities show that women and girls still walked in some areas in their communities in fear and at their own risk due to the prevalence of sexual molestations (interviews, 2016).

The impact of peacebuilding on the health of war-affected people

The thesis tested the impact of peacebuilding on the following six health factors: 1) access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services; 2) access to medical facilities and medical

225

personnel; 3) maternal health; 4) child health; 5) food and nutrition; and 6) shelter for war-affected people. For all the six factors measured, the research found a considerable decline in the number of people in war-affected communities who have sufficient access to good health despite the noticeable interventions of peacebuilders to improve the health of war-affected people.

The study observes that the impact of peacebuilding on health factors such as diarrhoeal diseases in children depended on the extent of how other factors such as the provision of good drinking water to the population were addressed. The study found a significant decline in the provision of drinking water to the war-affected populations in 2015 than they had before the war. Access to preventive and treatable healthcare services relating to child and maternal health care has been extremely low in the war-affected communities in Côte d'Ivoire. Pregnant women and children under the age of five face a high risk of dying due to: low access to maternal and paediatric health services including immunisations; and extremely low access to antenatal and postnatal services for pregnant and newly delivered mothers. This is because of a lack of, or poorly equipped health facilities. The inadequacy of trained birth attendants remained a debilitating factor in the health of pregnant women.

Other important findings of the study relating to maternal health are the cost and fatigue in travelling to peri-urban and urban communities to access ANC and PNC. Due to this, war-affected women, particularly those from poor communities resort to traditional birthing process despite the risks involved. Traditional ANC and PNC providers do not have the requisite skills and knowledge of identifying the signs of child delivery dangers. Presently, war-affected populations are exposed to poor hygienic practices, and poor sanitation. They face food shortage and poor shelter, and this is worse in 2015 than before the war.

The impact of peacebuilding on children's education

The thesis examined how peacebuilding policies addressed five key drivers which caused: low primary school enrolment rates, high out-of-school rates, high drop-out rates, low school completion rates, low number of female students in school, and poor pupil-teacher ratio. The five key drivers for these problems were the following: 1) gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination against children in communities affected by war; 2) lack of poverty alleviation among families affected by conflict; 3) lack of recruitment of teachers and teachers' capacity building and training; 4) lack of construction and equipping of schools in communities affected by armed conflict; and 5) problems with dealing with the psychological effects of war on children and their social reintegration in communities.

Peacebuilders failed to dismantle gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination against children's education in communities affected by war. They also failed to support national institutions to put in place structures to confront sexual and gender-based violence. As a result, the national action plan to confront gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality failed because of lack of resources, absence of structures, poor coordination and monitoring to ensure the actualisation of the plan's objectives. As of 2016 when fieldwork was undertaken, families still considered household chores as feminine responsibilities. This situation has put the boys in advantageous positions as far as access to more contact hours in learning at home or being in school were concerned. Data sets from the 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster (MICS) and the 2012 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) in Côte d'Ivoire confirm the issue of gender disparity in children's access to education, but these studies did not examine the extent of impact of peacebuilders policies on gender-based violence and discrimination (UNICEF, 2006; DHS, 2012). Evidence from the field shows that peacebuilding policies have had no impact on impact on gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality though a few attempts have been

undertaken to obliterate the factors that caused gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality (interviews, 2016).

The study found discrimination to be reinforced by the poverty in families of war-affected persons. They found it extremely difficult to afford the buying of books, school uniforms and other learning materials to enable all their children of school going age to be in school, despite government's compulsory education. Parents who could not afford the education of all their children prioritise the education of their male children over the female because of the perception that girls were at risk of becoming pregnant which may terminate or delay their education. The study also found the prevalence of sexual abuse in the war-affected communities as being responsible for parents preventing their children to be in school. There were instances of complaints of abuses reported to peacekeepers, yet no reprieves to the victims were undertaken (interviews, 2016). A joint report of the UNOCI and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights states "Despite the end of hostilities since 2011 and the respite brought by the gradual stabilisation, instances of rape, mainly committed by individuals, continue." It notes further that the prevalence of sexual abuse, particularly rape was probably exacerbated by years of the war "which fostered a culture of violence due to the general climate of insecurity and which were marked by persistent impunity due to the lack of systematic prosecution" (UN Human Rights, 2016: para 5).

Under programmes such as the Back to School Campaign, Child Friendly Schools, Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) and the Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Transition (EEPTC) implemented by the UNICEF, new schools were built, and some old ones rehabilitated. Under these programmes, teachers were recruited to teach in the emergency education and post-transition period. In 2004, 286,000 children attended the Non-Governmental Organisation run (NGO-run) primary schools and an estimated 55,000 were attending the NGO-run secondary schools (Sany, 2010:7). The study found that these have

helped to revive education the places which lacked schools. It is estimated that 200 schools benefited from the Child Friendly Schools programme in 2008 and over 5,000 schools were rehabilitated (UNICEF, undated). Without these peacebuilders' programmes these places would have had no schools for the children to attend. However, the study found that what peacebuilders have done only solved a fraction of the bigger problem facing children's education in war-affected communities. The study found that war-affected communities face teacher shortages more in 2015 than before the war. There were no schools in many communities, so these forced children to risk their lives travelling for long distances to access education in other communities with schools. There was no or very few incentives to attract trained teachers to accept transfers or postings to extremely rural war-affected areas. There were no sufficient desks for children in most schools, and no toilets or school fitted with feminine facilities. UNICEF, UNESCO, and the AFD were key institutions who implemented policies on the education of children in war-affected communities. The EU supported efforts to conduct elections and rehabilitated police stations to provide security, but did not implement health and education programmes for war-affected populations (interview with two officials of EU Delegation in Côte d'Ivoire, 2016).

The impact of peacebuilders on traumas or emotional injuries of children was negative. The study found three key problems; limited psychosocial health centres; a lack of trained psychosocial therapists; and the perception of the people about psychosocial or counselling services in war-affected communities as centres for treating madness. The study does not discount psychosocial intervention of peacebuilders as unnecessary as suggested by critics of international psychosocial intervention including Derek Summerfield (2000) and Vanessa Pupavac (2001; 2002). However, it agrees with the critics of psychosocial interventions who argue that local needs such as alleviation of endemic poverty is necessary in healing the war-affected populations (see Pupavac, 2001).

Recommendations for policy-makers, and suggestions for future research

On the basis of the afore-examined findings, the thesis proposes the following recommendations that could influence peacebuilding policy so that resilient and durable communities can be built after war. This also sets the basis for future research in the field of peacebuilding and human security in conflict and post-conflict fragile states.

Human security: the bridge of peace in war-affected communities

The key international peacebuilding organisations and their partner agencies, and donor governments interested in building peace in conflict and post-conflict states should place human security considerations above matters of elections, re-establishing of democracy, market-based economics and state security. This is because they have the tenacity of developing domestic institutions which can effectively deal with the effects of war. For peacebuilding to be successful, peacebuilders should move away from the orthodox or traditional approaches of peacebuilding which starts or addresses issues from the top, and pursue peace from below by prioritising what the local people considered essential in building peace in war-affected communities (that is, human security concerns). For instance, key issues that affect war-affected populations such as health and education should be systematically incorporated into every peace agreement.

Empowering war-affected women through economic and financial support and training and equipping TBAs increase maternal health outcomes

On maternal health, the study identified key issues which when addressed could help in increasing the use of ANC and PNC in war-affected communities. Abject poverty was identified as one key factor impeding maternal health outcomes in war-affected communities. Due to costs involved in medical care such as transportation to and from medical facilities,

women who were poor resorted to the services of untrained traditional birth attendants. Peacebuilders could support women in war-affected communities with financial resources and income generating activities so that they are able to undertake economic activities that would enable them to support their own health during pregnancies and birthing. Peacebuilders could identify traditional birth attendants (TBAs) by equipping them with necessary facilities and skills to be able to provide high quality traditional birthing services to pregnant women in urban and peri-urban communities. If the TBAs are well trained, they can pick early warning signals so that they are able to refer their patients to access medical facilities that are well-equipped, and manned by high quality medical staff.

Expanding health access through infrastructure and medical health scholarship schemes for students from war-affected communities

The study revealed a low public health infrastructure with the urban Abidjan alone having about 60% of health infrastructure of the country. The war-affected states facing these conditions need to be assisted by peacebuilders who should invest resources to expand first contact access to health infrastructure in war-affected communities. They should build mini but well-equipped health centres there. The available evidence suggests a high attrition of graduation rates of medical students. Peacebuilders should reverse this by providing scholarship schemes to medical students. This scholarship schemes should be awarded to students who would be willing to be bonded to work in rural communities or students from such communities who would be willing to undertake medical profession training and be bonded to work for some number of years in their communities or posted to other war-affected rural communities after the completion of their medical training. Child health problems could also be mitigated with the expansion of health facilities and training of paediatric facilities, nurses and physicians in war-affected communities.

Provision of good drinking water and good sewage systems to improve health outcomes

Accessibility to water and sanitation is key for improvement in other health-related problems. Peacebuilders should invest in water and sanitation by drilling bore-holes in war-affected communities. Also, peacebuilders should invest in low technology water pumping systems. In terms of sanitation, the study found open defecation in most war-affected communities either because the people do not have toilets or the toilets were in deplorable conditions. Peacebuilders should support war-affected communities by building more toilets or help households have their own.

Peacebuilders' Expansion of access of education by increasing infrastructure, training teachers, equipping schools and economically empowering war-affected families

Through the expansion of children's access to education, war-affected communities could have physicians, nurses, and engineers among others who could help rebuild and sustain peace in communities devastated by armed violence. Peacebuilders, particularly the well-resourced ones such as the UN, EU, France, US, and Japan should invest in education access to children in war-affected communities. They should build and equip schools, support the manpower needs of schools, support poor families with financial resources. The needs of the girls should be addressed through gender empowerment for girls in war-affected communities. Peacebuilders should support the training of female teachers who could serve as first contacts or senior mothers or sisters for girls in schools. Peacebuilders should support war-affected communities with psychosocial support based on the needs of the local communities. Addressing psychosocial issues by economically empowering war-affected families to heal the war-affected populations is as important as peacebuilders improving access to counselling centres because psychosocial problems may not be caused by only the killings and torture that

people witnessed or are subjected to, but poverty as a result of war could be a cause. Economic deprivation or poverty for that matter, and inequality alone may not be sufficient to cause insecurity, but the failure to protect or remove the threads of extreme and/or pervasive poverty and inequality could create insecurity which could exacerbate or increase the vulnerabilities of individuals or groups to physical and psychological harms (Surhke, 1999). Interventions to address poverty in poor communities has been consistent in the literature of human security and development for years. Peacebuilding interventions should be focused more in alleviating war-affected populations from endemic poverty because survival as Pauline Eadie puts it, is "the primary concern of the state" (Eadie, 2007:636); if state is unable to perform its responsibility owing to the effects of war, peacebuilders have a responsibility to assist the vulnerable people. Survival is therefore at the heart of human security.

Peacebuilding and human security is a growing field of research. The present study achieved its objective of providing an understanding of the impact of peacebuilding on human security in Côte d'Ivoire, and demonstrating the importance of a focus for peacebuilders on human security, in particular health and education. Further research is required to understand the impact of peacebuilding on human security in other states in conflict. The factors which are discussed as critical in war-affected states as far as peacebuilding is concerned could be tested in other conflict situations. By applying this framework to other conflict situations and comparing the results here with results in other cases would help in broadening the frontiers of peace and human security research. It is also important to analyse the impact of peacebuilding on other human security issues, such as transport, electricity, telephone access and environment. These facilities are important in the socio-economic progress of war-affected communities. But these facilities are non-existent in so many communities even before the outbreak of wars. But where they existed before the war, and they are destroyed in the war, peacebuilding interventions impact could be measured on the extent to which communities

have bounced back after years of war. The environment is a key issue in human security; therefore, assessing the impact of interventions should also test the extent to which peace initiatives addressed environmental issues. As mentioned in the methodology, environmental factors could not be assessed to ascertain the impact of peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire. This is due to insecurity in the environmentally affected western part of Côte d'Ivoire. The extent to which peace initiatives address environmental issues should be examined in future research.

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Appendix 1

Map of Côte d'Ivoire's 14 Districts

Credit: Nordnordwest, Creative Commons (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/legalcode) (Data were collected in 7 districts (Vallée du Bandama, Lacs, Yamoussoukro, Sassandra-Marahoué, Lagunes, Comoé and Abidjan)

Appendix 2

List of Research Participants

1. Banlori Kouakou, February, 2016
2. Assiatou Hamza, March, 2016
3. Koffi Sylvère Tchedoh, March, 2016
4. Gideon N'guessan, February, 2016
5. Aminatou Jawaria. February, 2016
6. Ousman Youssouf, March, 2016
7. Diakité Karamoko, January, 2016
8. Kevin Ntaye, January, 2016
9. Bamba. January, 2016
10. Koné Konah, January, 2016
11. Michel Diabo, March, 2016
12. Kangoye, January, 2016
13. Bibaata Mamoudou, February, 2016
14. Koffi Dakoury, March, 2016
15. Koulsoum Gbangna, March, 2016
16. Alaine Ntemiké, February, 2016
17. Yopu Yeo, March, 2016
18. Rafiou Adamou, February, 2016
19. Bashirou Gambo, March, 2016
20. Kamilou Kassimou, March, 2016
21. Hawawou, January, 2016
22. Hikma, January, 2016
23. Kouadio-Bi, March, 2016
24. Kadigan-Kossi, January, 2016
25. Jabouni Momoh, February, 2016
26. Antoinette, January, 2016
27. Kinimo, January, 2016
28. Daouda, February, 2016
29. Adjoua Sangou, March, 2016
30. Mounifatou, January, 2016
31. Ewoussou Akouassi, January, 2016
32. Hamidatou, February, 2016
33. Koundé Kouakou-Bi, March, 2016
34. Hiqra, January, 2016
35. Mamata, March, 2016
36. Mba Alasah, March, 2016
37. Hafisatou, February, 2016
38. Mako, February, 2016
39. Issabelle, February, 2016
40. Sesamebalou, March, 2016

41. Ouadrago, March, 2016
42. Piere Kpara, January, 2016
43. Zeribi, March, 2016
44. Chantal, January, 2016
45. Janice Ntominassou, January, 2016
46. Maigida Samsudeen, February, 2016
47. Dosso Agumbire, January, 2016
48. Adisa, January, 2016
49. Gagnei, January, 2016
50. Alfa Karimou. March, 2016
51. Zeenatou, February, 2016
52. Toyo, January, 2016
53. Elysée, February, 2016
54. Rose Didier, February, 2016
55. Erique Delphine, February, 2016
56. Margarette Husseine, January, 2016
57. Traoré Touré, March, 2016
58. Audrey Anne Rochellemagne, January, 2016
59. Charles Girard, January, 2016
60. Ehl Othman Ethmane, January, 2016
61. Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu, March, 2016
62. Tim Cross, October, 2016

Appendix 3

Semi-Structure Questionnaire

(The research participants were officials of international governmental and international non-governmental organisations whose organisations either implemented directly or indirectly any peace initiatives, officials of national institutions/CSOs and war-affected persons in urban, peri-urban and rural communities including ordinary people, and opinion leaders/village heads/religious leaders. Fieldwork was conducted in 7 out of the 14 districts of Côte d'Ivoire, from January to March, 2016).

Introduction

My name is Jalilu Ateku, I am a second year PhD student at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom researching on the topic: **The Impact of Peacebuilding on Human Security in War-Affected States: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2015)**. Specifically, the aim of this research is to examine the impact of peace initiatives by international actors on human security (this should be explained) in Côte d'Ivoire. My field trip to this country (Côte d'Ivoire) is to solicit your views on this important subject which will contribute to peacebuilding research on not only Côte d'Ivoire, but the whole world in general. This research is purely for academic purposes only, therefore, the data gathered from these interviews would be used for my doctoral thesis and for academic research within the University of Nottingham.

You are assured of utmost confidentiality; the interview with you would be anonymised and the data that would be collected would be stored in a manner that would prevent access by unauthorised person/s or body. In this regard, I will strictly comply with the University of Nottingham Code of Research Conduct and Research Ethics which protect your data, yourself and myself. Despite these safeguards, I wish to state that your participation in this research is voluntary and in the course of the interview you could withdraw at any time, or where the interview data have been collected, you still reserved the right to contact me through my address (name card to be provided to the interviewee) to expunge any portion or withdraw the usage of the entire data derived from your interview. The interview may take at least 60 minutes, but unlikely to go beyond 1 hour and 30 minutes. If you accept to be interviewed, I would be grateful if you sign the respondent consent form below or I can take verbal consent from you (which ever you prefer). The signing/taking of consent does not write-off your right to withdraw your data or yourself from the interview. Thank you very much for your time with me.

Signature of Interviewee: ………………………………

(recorded oral consent also acceptable)

Date signed: ……………………………….

Questions for representatives/officials of international peacebuilding actors.

1. Could you share with me about your organisation's/country's role in building peace in this country? For how long has your organisation/country been involved in building peace in this country?
2. What specific interventions do you expect international peace actors to address to alleviate the suffering of war-affected communities (short and long term interventions)? Why?
3. Which specific interventions has your organisation/country implemented directly or through other agencies since its involvement in peacebuilding in this country? Do you still have these interventions being implemented?
4. Why have you chosen this area(s) and not any other area?
5. What was the situation before/during/after your implementation of these interventions?
6. Any noticeable changes with the implementation of these interventions in the communities where these are being/have been implemented?
7. How and why were impacts sustained or unsustain over a long term?
8. How do you measure your success or otherwise?

Specific interventions implemented to address human security issues in Côte d'Ivoire (these questions relate specifically to the interventions your organisation/country may have implemented in this country)

Questions on physical security of people/communities

1. If you implemented any intervention to provide safety to individuals and the security of communities, what specific intervention did your organisation or country implemented to achieve this? Could you tell me in detail what you have been doing since the outbreak of the war in 2002 or from the stage at which your organisation started working in the provision of physical security to people?
2. Did your organisation/country diplomatically engaged with parties to stop violence? What impact did this contribute to addressing the conflict in this regard?
3. Did you support elections as part of your peace efforts? What did you do in this area? What impact did you make as far as elections support is concerned?
4. Has your organisation or country undertaken part in the protection of individuals and communities through the peacekeepers? What role did you play in this? What was the situation before the deployment of peacekeepers to protect people? How did you work to ensure that all communities were protected? Any impact of this intervention in curtailing violence? How did you do this?

5. If you did deploy peacekeepers to protect people? What changes have occurred with the deployment of peacekeepers? What challenges have occurred with the deployment of international soldiers, and how were these addressed

6. How did communities relate with the peacekeepers? Any sexual abuses by peacekeepers? How were these addressed, if any?

7. Any knowledge of how the DDR programmes have been implemented? If you took part, how were the DDRs implemented in this country? Who were the actors in these? How did you disarm the fighters? How did you demobilise them? How did you re-integrate them back into their communities? Any support from the local communities? How did you design the DDR programmes? Any contribution from local communities or local peace actors? What were the positives and negatives with the implementation of DDRs? Any lessons drawn?

8.

Human rights violations/war crimes

9. What was the state of human rights since the outbreak of the war before your intervention? Could you share with me some details of the abuses? How were these perpetrated? Who were the actors behind these abuses?

10. How did you address human rights abuses in this war? What mechanisms did you put in place to ensure that the abuses were stopped?

11. How did the perpetrators respond to your interventions? Did they stop? If they did not, what other options were available to you? Were these options resorted to so as to abate the abuses? What results were achieved?

12. Who were the key actors in the protection of people against human rights abuses and war crimes? How did these actors addressed the issue of abuses in the war-affected communities?

13. What was the nature of the human rights violations perpetrated in this war? How did you address killings, kidnapping, extra-judicial killing, torture, sexual abuse etc?

14. How were war crimes addressed in this war? Was punishment for war crimes distributed well? Do you have any problems with how international peace actors addressed war crimes and human rights abuses in this war? Any impact on the communities in relation to how war crimes have been addressed?

15. Any lessons about peace actors' role in human rights abuse and war crimes in war-affected states?

Health

16. Did you implement or caused to be implemented any intervention(s) to address problems caused by the war in the following areas in the war-affected communities in this country? Tell me about your organisation's interventions first on the following: health (health means access to water, sanitation and hygiene; maternal and child health such as ANC and PNA and paediatric health services such as immunisations, food and nutrition, provision of access of war affected people to medical facilities and equipment, access to health professionals, access to shelter).

17. Did you provide any financial assistance or empower them economically to the war-affected so that they are able to access health frequently or when they were in need? If you provided financial support or empower them economically, which of the health issues did you address above?
18. Any agricultural support to farmers to produce food for the communities to reduce dependence on food aid?
19. Any support to pregnant and lactating mothers to access health?
20. What was the situation at the time of the war or time of your intervention, during the war and after the implementation of the intervention? Any changes? If there were some changes, what changes have occurred with the implementation of the interventions in access to water, sanitation and hygiene, access to ante-natal and post-natal care, access to medical facilities and personnel, food and shelter?
21. What Problems did you encounter, and how were these addressed? How did these problems affect your interventions? Any lessons learnt?

Education

22. How did you support war-affected communities to address problems in children's education, especially at the primary school level?)
23. Any interventions to help communities with (teachers, teaching and learning aids/materials, school infrastructure?
24. Any interventions to address gender-based violence against children to ensure that children's access education without sexual molestations? How did you address this if you implemented these interventions?
25. Any interventions given to families to enable families overcome economic deprivation and poverty so that parents are able to take charge of their children's education? Can you share with me how you did this?
26. Can you share with me if you implemented or caused to be implemented any psychosocial interventions in the war-affected communities to help children so that they are able to stay and learn? What was the nature of this intervention? How were these received by the communities? Has this brought any changes in the psychosocial health of the people, especially children?

Collaboration with others

27. Did you collaborate with international and/or local communities or local peace actors in the making and implementation of these interventions? Can you tell me more about this if you collaborated with any of these? How did this work?

Overall

28. Will you say that peacebuilding interventions by international actors have succeeded in addressing the key problems facing communities or failed to address the effects of war in Côte d'Ivoire? Why?

Questions for representatives/officials of national institutions and local CSOs

1. Can you tell me about your institution's/organisation's role in addressing the effects of war in this country?
2. What interventions do you expect international peace actors to address to alleviate the suffering of war-affected communities (short and long term interventions)? Why do you consider these as the issues they should address in war-affected communities?
3. If your organisation worked with or received support from any of the international actors to help in addressing the effects of war, what was the nature of this support and which area(s) did you work?
4. What was the situation before your implementation of these intervention(s)? (before or at the time of the war/during the war/after the war).
5. Any noticeable changes with the implementation of these interventions in the communities where these have been implemented? What changes have occurred, if any?
6. Did you make specific appeal for these interventions or how did your institution and the international partners got involved in this area?
7. Did you engage with the local communities to ensure that these interventions were critical to their needs?

Questions on the provision of physical security of people/communities

(kindly discuss with me about the contribution of international peacebuilders on the undermentioned issues in war-affected communities)

8. Which specific interventions were implemented by international peace actors to ensure the protection of people from violence? Could you tell me in detail what international peacebuilders have been doing since the outbreak of the war in 2002 in the provision of physical security to people?
9. What have been their role in the following:
10. How did their diplomatic engagement with feuding parties contributed to stopping violence? What impact did they make in protecting the safety and security of communities in this regard?
11. Support to elections. How did their support for elections and democracy helped build peace? What impact did they make in this country as far as elections support was concerned?
12. Protection of individuals and communities by peacekeepers? What role did the peacekeepers play in the protection of civilians? What was the situation before the deployment of peacekeepers to protect people? How did peacekeepers (UNOCI, French Licorne, ECOWAS and AU forces) work to ensure that all communities were protected? Any impact of the peacekeepers in curtailing violence? What impact did they make, positive, negative or no impact?
13. As national institutions or CSOs did you have concerns over the deployment of peacekeepers to the communities? How were these addressed? Any challenges/problems with the peacekeepers in the communities?
14. How did communities relate with the peacekeepers? Any sexual abuses by peacekeepers? How were these addressed, if any?

15. Any knowledge of how the DDR programmes were implemented? If your institution or organisation took part, how were the DDRs implemented in this country? Who were the actors in the implementation? How was the disarmament of fighters executed? How were the groups demobilised? How were former combatants re-integrated back into their communities?

16. Were there any measures put in place to ensure that the ex-combatants were fully integrated to the extent that they would not go back into fighting?

17. Any support from the domestic peace actors/local communities in the design and implementation of DDRs? How was the DDRs designed and implemented? Any contribution from your institution/organisation and local communities or local peace actors? What were the positives and negatives with the implementation of DDRs in the communities? Any lessons drawn for the future?

Human rights violations/war crimes

18. What was the state of human rights since the outbreak of the war before the intervention of international peacebuilders' intervention? Could you share with me some details of the abuses experienced in this country? How were these perpetrated? Who were the perpetrators of these abuses?

19. How did the international peacebuilders address human rights abuse in this war? What mechanisms did they put in place to ensure that the abuses were stopped?

20. How did the perpetrators respond to the interventions? Did they stop? If they did not, what did the international peace actors do to protect people? What results were achieved?

21. Which international peace actors were key in the protection of people against human rights abuses and war crimes? How did these actors addressed the issue of abuses in the war-affected communities?

22. What was the nature of the human rights violations perpetrated in this war? How did you address killings, kidnapping, extra-judicial killing, torture, sexual abuse etc?

23. How were war crimes in this country addressed by peacebuilders? (Both domestically and internationally) Was punishment for war crimes distributed well? Do you have any problems with how international peace actors addressed war crimes and human rights abuses in this war? Any impact on the communities in relation to how war crimes have been addressed?

24. Any lessons about peace actors' role in human rights abuse and war crimes in this country?

Health

25. Which intervention(s) were implemented by international peacebuilders to address health problems caused by the war in the following areas in the war-affected communities in this country? (access to water, sanitation and hygiene; maternal and child health and paediatric health services, food and nutrition, provision of access of war affected people to medical facilities and equipment, access to health professionals, access to shelter).

26. How did peacebuilders address problems of access of the following in war-affected communities (i.e access in terms of costs, transport and financial support etc):
- Access to water, sanitation and hygiene
    - Access to women's access to medical services
    - Access to paediatric services such as immunisations/vaccinations
    - Access to health centres
    - Access to food
    - Access to shelter
27. Are you aware of any financial assistance or any economic empowerment to war-affected people to improve their access to health? If they provided financial support or empower them economically, which of the health issues did they address above?
28. Are you aware of any agricultural support services to farmers to produce food for the communities to reduce war-affected communities' dependence on food aid?
29. What support were available to pregnant and lactating mothers to access health? Any ante-natal and post-natal services to pregnant women in war-affected communities?
30. How did the peacebuilders helped to improve on the existing local resources to make health interventions sustainable?
31. Have interventions improved or worsened or remained the same of the existing problems in the war-affected communities? If there were any changes, what changes have occurred with the implementation of the interventions in accessing water, sanitation and hygiene, ante-natal and post-natal care, medical facilities and personnel, food and shelter?
32. What Problems do communities encounter now as a result of the war? How are these being addressed now? Any lessons learnt about international peacebuilding in war-affected communities in this country?

Education

33. How did the international peacebuilders support war-affected communities to address problems in children's education, especially at the primary school level?
34. What interventions were implemented to help communities with (teachers, teaching and learning aids/materials, school infrastructure?
35. What interventions were undertaken to address gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality in families to ensure that children could access education without being constrained by these factors? How did the peacebuilders address these?
36. Any interventions given to families to enable families overcome economic deprivation and poverty so that parents would be able to take charge of their children's education? Can you share with me how these were implemented in the communities? Where were these implemented?
37. Can you share with me if peacebuilders implemented or caused to be implemented any psychosocial interventions in the war-affected communities to help children affected by the war so that they are able to stay and learn? What were the nature of these interventions?

38. How did the communities receive psychosocial interventions? Has this brought any changes in the psychosocial health of the affected people, especially children?
39. Overall, will you say that peacebuilding interventions by international actors have succeeded or failed to address the effects of war in Côte d'Ivoire? Why?

Questions for opinion leaders, village heads and members of local communities

1. If war occurs in a country as you have experienced in this country, and international peacebuilders come to help you to recover, what are the key areas you think they should help your community to alleviate your suffering? (short and long term support)

2. Why do you consider these as the issues they should address in war-affected communities?

3, Which international peace actors have implemented projects/programmes in your community to address the effects of war?

4. What were the interventions they implemented in your community?

5. Any noticeable changes with the implementation of these interventions in your community where these have been implemented? What changes have occurred, if any?

.6 Did you make specific appeal for these interventions or how did your community got international partners to implement these interventions?

7. Do you consider these interventions as being critical to your community's needs?

Questions on some specific interventions (kindly share with me about the contribution of international peacebuilders on the undermentioned issues in your community)

Provision of physical security of people/communities

8. Could you tell me in detail what international peacebuilders have been doing since the outbreak of the war in 2002 in the provision of physical security to people?

9. How did they engage with feuding parties in your locality for people to stop violence? What impact did they make in protecting the safety and security of the people in this community?

10. How did they support this community during elections and how did this help build peace? What impact did they make in this community as far as elections support is concerned?

11. What role did the peacekeepers play in the protection of civilians? What was the situation before the deployment of peacekeepers to protect people? How did peacekeepers (UNOCI, French Licorne, ECOWAS and AU forces) work to ensure that all people in this community were adequately protected? Any impact of the peacekeepers in curtailing violence? What impact did they make, positive, negative or no impact?

12. Did you have concerns over the deployment of peacekeepers to your community? How were these addressed? Were there any challenges/problems with the peacekeepers in your community?

13. How did you relate with the peacekeepers? Any sexual abuses by peacekeepers in your community? If there were, how were these addressed, if any?

14. Did the peacekeepers undertake any social service projects in your community? How did this contribute to alleviating your problems in the community?

15. Any knowledge of how the DDR programmes were implemented? How were the DDRs implemented in this country? Who were the actors in the implementation? How was the disarmament of fighters executed in this community? How were the groups demobilised here? How were former combatants re-integrated back into this community or other known communities?

16. Were there any measures put in place to ensure that the ex-combatants were fully integrated to the communities in a manner that they would not go back into fighting?

17. Any support from local communities in the design and implementation of DDRs in this country? What were the positives and negatives with the implementation of DDRs in the communities? Any lessons drawn for the future?

Human rights violations/war crimes

18. What was the state of human rights in your community since the outbreak of the war before the intervention of international peacebuilders' intervention? Could you share with me some details of the abuses experienced in this country? How were these perpetrated? Who were the perpetrators of these abuses?

19. How did the international peacebuilders address human rights abuse in this community? What mechanisms did they put in place to ensure that the abuses were reduced or stopped totally?

21. How did the perpetrators respond to the interventions? Did they stop? If they did not, what did the international peace actors do to protect people? What results were achieved?

22. Which international peace actors were key in the protection of people against human rights abuses and war crimes? How did these actors address the issue of abuse in the war-affected communities including your community?

23. What was the nature of the human rights violations perpetrated in this war? How did you address killings, kidnapping, extra-judicial killings, torture, sexual abuse etc?

24. How were war crimes in this country addressed by peacebuilders? (Both domestically and internationally). What is your view on punishment for war crimes? Was punishment for war crimes distributed across board? Do you have any problems with how international peace actors addressed war crimes and human rights abuse in this country? Any impact on your community in relation to how war crimes have been addressed?

25. Any lessons about peace actors' role in human rights abuse and war crimes in this country?

Health

26. Which intervention(s) were implemented by international peacebuilders to address health problems caused by the war in the following areas in the war-affected communities in this country? (access to water, sanitation and hygiene; maternal and child health and paediatric health services, food and nutrition, provision of access of war affected people to medical facilities and equipment, access to health professionals, access to shelter).

27. How did peacebuilders address problems of access of the following in war-affected communities (i.e access in terms of costs, transport and financial support):

- Access to water, sanitation and hygiene
- Access to women's access to medical services
- Access to paediatric services such as immunisations/vaccinations
- Access to health centres
- Access to food
- Access to shelter

28. Are you aware of any financial assistance or any economic empowerment to improve people's access to health in this community?

29. If they provided financial support or empower them economically, which of the health issues did they address above in your community?

30. Were they any agricultural support services to farmers to produce food for the communities to reduce war-affected communities' dependence on food aid?

31. What support were available to pregnant and lactating mothers to access health? Any ante-natal and post-natal services to pregnant women in this community?

32. How did the peacebuilders help to improve on the existing local resources/capacities to make health interventions sustainable?

33. Have interventions improved or worsened or remained the same of the existing problems in the war-affected communities? If there were any changes, what changes have occurred with the implementation of the interventions in accessing water, sanitation and hygiene, ante-natal and post-natal care, paediatric services, medical facilities and personnel, food and shelter?

34. What Problems do communities encounter now as a result of the war? How are these being addressed?

Education

35. How did the international peacebuilders support your community to address problems in children's education, especially at the primary school level?

36. What interventions were implemented to help communities with (teachers, teaching and learning aids/materials, school infrastructure?

37. What interventions were undertaken to address gender-based violence, discrimination and inequality in families to ensure that children could access education without being constrained by these factors? How did the peacebuilders address these?

38. Any livelihood interventions given to families to enable families overcome economic deprivation and poverty so that parents would be able to take charge of their children's education? Can you share with me how these were implemented in this community, if any? Any poverty reduction programme to alleviate the poverty caused by the war? How far about poverty alleviation programme in this community? Which peace actors implemented this?

39. Can you share with me if peacebuilders implemented or caused to be implemented any psychosocial interventions in the war-affected communities to help children affected by the war so that they are able to attend school and learn? What were the nature of these interventions? What problems do children face in this community? Are families being supported to address these problems?

40. How did the community receive psychosocial interventions? Has this brought any changes in the psychosocial health of the affected people, especially children?

41. Overall, will you say that peacebuilding interventions by international actors have succeeded or failed to address the effects of war (on physical security of people, human rights, and health and education issues raised) in Côte d'Ivoire? Why?

Thank you very much for taking time off your tight schedule to grant this interview. Please do not hesitate to give me a call or send an email if you have any further questions/clarifications. I am most grateful for your participation in this research.