US Foreign Policy towards India: 1993-2005.

A study emphasizing the importance of systematic selection and usage of documentary evidence

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Abstract

This thesis studies the implications of the selection of empirical evidence underpinning reported interpretations and conclusions about US foreign policy towards India. US-India relations have been investigated by a number of scholars whose work has been reported in well-regarded books and journal articles. Their studies typically rely for empirical evidence on official documents, and occasionally on interviews. In spite of their qualities, none of these studies provides explicit rational for their selection of US and Indian primary sources and about the procedures and the criteria used to identify relevant information from these sources. This shortcoming poses a risk for the validity of their conclusions. To assess the nature of this risk, this thesis reports a fresh study of US foreign policy towards India in which all publicly available US documents are used. These documents are the basis of a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), the results of which feed into the subsequent analysis. The substantive results of this research are compared with those in the existing literature. This comparison reveals, in addition to obvious similarities, important differences that can be attributed to unsystematic and incomplete use of empirical material in the existing literature. These differences, that emanate from a more explicit and systematic approach to evidence, provide grounds for a reassessment of the significance of many factors influencing US foreign policy towards India. This study identifies relevant factors that have so far been overlooked in the existing literature, and that need to be included in accounts to understand widely documented changes in this area of US foreign policy.

Substantively, this thesis highlights the vital importance of the Clinton period in understanding the foreign policy of the United States, a period which had not been examined in sufficient detail by existing studies. Contrary to what most of the existing literature suggests, elements of continuity between the Clinton and the Bush administrations are particularly important to explain the evolution of US foreign policy towards India. In spite of the change in the presidency from Democrat to Republican, President George W. Bush (hereafter Bush) continued to hold the same level of commitment shown by his predecessor in developing closer strategic ties with India, making it a priority of his foreign policy. This aspect is particularly important to furthering a more thorough understanding of US relations with India.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review

This thesis addresses a common, yet rarely recognised problem in many studies of inter-state relations, namely the lack of explicit attention to the question of selection of empirical evidence underpinning reported interpretations and conclusions. This renders replication impossible, and in thus also critical assessment of the validity of research. This lack of attention seems to reflect, at times, an ad hoc, rather than systematic approach to data selection, with obvious risks for the validity of reported results.

In order to identify this problem and its potential consequences, this thesis uses the evolution of US foreign policy towards India as an example. This topic lends itself as a case to be studied in this respect because many studies in this area do not provide explicit information about the procedures used to select primary sources and about the procedures and the criteria used to select relevant information from these sources.[1] This is particularly problematic because

[1] This is a list of studies on the transformation of US-India relations. Only studies in English focusing on the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations were considered. The 40 studies selected were identified using databases available at the University of Nottigham and Universita' degli Studi di Milano. The key words used to select these studies were: "US", "India", "South Asia", "Clinton", "Bush", "Washington", and "New Delhi". It is important to note that these studies do not explicitly discuss the procedures used to select the material analysed. Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement,* East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Ashton B. Carter, America's New Strategic Partner, *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 85, 2006, pp.33-44; Aneek Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity? An Anatomy of Post-Cold War India-US Relations, *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations,* vol. 14, 2010, pp. 20-39; Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle, *Political Perspective,* vol. 5, 2011, pp. 74-95; Evan Feigenbaum, India's Rise, America's Interest, *Foreign Affairs,* 2010, accessed through Lexis Nexis; Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Mistry, The Case for the US-India Agreement, *World Policy Journal,* 2006, pp. 11-19; Sumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell, India and the United States. Forging a Security Partnership?, *World Policy Journal,* 2005, pp. 37-43; Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective, *Strategic Analysis,* vol. 27, no. 2, 2003, pp. 145-171;. Zhang Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for China, *International Studies,* vol. 42, 2005, pp. 277-293; Robert Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush', pp. 6-29; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, India Research Press, 2006; Harsh V. Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics,* (Oxford University Press, 2011); Sophie Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis. L'établissement d'un « partenariat stratégique » instable (1991-2010), *AFRI*, vol. XII, 2011,

clarification of such procedures is generally regarded as a basic prerequisite for the reproducibility of empirical research, and essential for validity, and scientific critique.[2]

The nature of the problem can be illustrated by considering some of the most extensive analyses of the transformation of US-India relations during the period 1993-2005, which are authored by Itty Abraham, Sophie Agostini-

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available at http://www.afri-ct.org/article/l-inde-et-les-etats-unis-l/, accessed on 13 February 2017; 13. Sophie Agostini-Heinrich, La relation triangulaire entre la Chine, l'Inde et les Etats-Unis depuis la Fin de la Guerre Froide, *AFRI*, vol. VIII, 2007, http://www.afri-ct.org/article/la-relation-triangulaire-entre-la/, accessed on 13 February 2017; Sumit Ganguly and Ashok Kapur, The Transformation of US-India Relations. An Explanation for the Rapprochement ad Prospects for the Future, *Asian Survey*, vol. 47, no. 4, 2007, pp. 642-656; Selina Adam Khan, The Realist/Constructivist Paradigm: US Foreign Policy towards Pakistan and India, *Reflection*, no. 8, 2010; Dennis Kux, India's Fine Balance, *Foreign Affairs*, May 2002, accessed through Lexis Nexis; Dennis Kux, A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations, *Foreign Service Journal*, vol. 79, 2002, pp. 18-23; M. A. Levi and C. D. Ferguson, US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward, *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, no. 16, 2006; Chintamani Mahapatra, India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor, *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2011, pp. 407-421; David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, India-US Relations. The Shock of the New, International Journal, 2009, pp.1057-1074; Lalit Masingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership. Are We There Yet?, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 2006, p. 2, available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/439796419IB39-LalitMansingh-IndoUSStrategicPartnership.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2017; Patrick Mendis , and Leah Green, US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', *Case Studies Volume I*, 2008, pp. 173-254; Bhabani Mishra, India-US Relations: A Paradigm Shift, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 29, no. 1, 2005, pp. 79-100; C. Raja Mohan, A Paradigm Shift toward South Asia?, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2002/2003, pp. 141-155; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt, Natural Friends? Relations Between the United States and India After 2001, vol. 87, *Prif*, 2009; Harsh V. Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, *Asian Security*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2009, pp. 272-295; Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011); G. Parthasarathy, Emerging Trends in India-US Relations, *India Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 4, 2009, pp.373-381; Rajeswari Rajagopalan, Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 545-556; Venu Rajamony, India-China-US Triangle: A Soft Balance of Power System in the Making, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (2002); Bruce Riedel, South Asia's Nuclear Decade, *Survival*, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 107-126; Teresita Schaffer, Building a New Strategic Partnership with India, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2002, pp. 31-44; Teresita Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century : Reinventing Partnership*, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press 2009), electronic edition; Ashely Tellis, *India as a new global power: An action agenda for the United State*s, (India Research Press, 2005); Ashley Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging India and Pakistan, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 4, 2008, pp. 21-42; Ashley Tellis, Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in US-Indian Relations, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2013.

[2] Gary King, Robert O. Keonhane, Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 8

Heinrich, C. Raja Mohan, and Harsh V. Pant.[3] Table 1 provides an overview of the kind of empirical evidence that is employed in these studies.

Table 1: Sources used by some scholars studying US-India relations

	Newspaper articles	Secondary literature	US official documents	Interviews
Abraham	√	√	√	√
Agostini-Heinrich	√	√	√	
Mohan	√	√	√	√
Pant	√	√	√	

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Sophie Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis. L'établissement d'un « partenariat stratégique » instable (1991-2010), *AFRI*, vol. XII, 2011, available at http://www.afri-ct.org/article/l-inde-et-les-etats-unis-l/, accessed on 13 February 2017; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

As can be seen from Table 1, these authors all use official documents from the United States, as well as secondary sources, such as newspapers articles and academic works, to investigate the transformation of US-India relations and its drivers. Yet, in spite of the fact that they focus on the same period of analysis (1993-2005), they rely on quite different quantities of sources. Table 2 shows the number of American official documents used by these scholars.

[3] These studies were selected because they provide the most exhaustive account of the period 1993-2005.

Table 2: Number of US official documents used covering the period 1993-2005

Author	No. of US official documents
Abraham	1
Agostini-Heinrich	6
Mohan	11
Pant	2
This study	329

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Sophie Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis. L'établissement d'un « partenariat stratégique » instable (1991-2010), *AFRI*, vol. XII, 2011, available at http://www.afri-ct.org/article/l-inde-et-les-etats-unis-l/, accessed on 13 February 2017; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Table 2 shows that in spite of the fact that they focus on the same period (1993-2005), Abraham, Mohan, and Pant rely on different quantities of primary US documents. As mentioned in the table, this study identified 329 relevant US government documents (see Chapter 2). The documents referred to in Table 2 belong to the same population that has been used for this thesis, but these authors have only used a very small number of available and relevant documents, without specifying on which grounds they selected the few documents they included in their studies. As previously mentioned, lack of information about data-collection and data-selection procedures makes it impossible to assess the validity of the findings. If selection was based (consciously or unconsciously) on compatibility of selected material with a particular substantive interpretation of the development of US-India relations, then these scholars will likely have overemphasised the importance of certain factors and ignored relevant information.

Table 3: Factors impacting upon the transformation of US relations with India which are identified in different studies

Themes	The end of the Cold War	India's economic reforms	US role in the Kargil conflict	Clinton's visit to India	Common values	Rise of China	Role of leaders	Changes in US nuclear policy towards India
Authors								
Abraham	√	√				√	√	√
Agostini-Heinrich	√	√	√	√		√		
Mohan (2006)	√	√		√		√		√
Pant (2011)	√	√		√	√	√	√	√

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Sophie Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis. L'établissement d'un « partenariat stratégique » instable (1991-2010), *AFRI*, vol. XII, 2011, available at http://www.afri-ct.org/article/l-inde-et-les-etats-unis-l/, accessed on 13 February 2017; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Table 3 summarizes the factors identified by the four scholars previously mentioned as the driving forces of the transformation of US relations with India. The table shows that there is no unanimity among scholars about the factors that paved the way for the improvement of US relations with India that occurred during the period 1993-2005 (an outcome they all agree on). While all four agree that the end of the Cold War, India's economic reforms, the rise of China, and changes in US nuclear policy, had a positive impact on US-India relations, they are divided over the importance of other factors, such as the US role during the Kargil crisis, President Clinton's visit to India, the importance of shared values, and the role of leaders. These different descriptions and interpretations of the period 1993-2005 raises the question of whether they are rooted in different theoretical perspectives which reflect themselves in how analysists 'weigh' and combine different parts of empirical evidence, or in different selections of evidence from the population of available material. The first possibility could promote more fruitful academic debate, the second could not.

This thesis addresses the question of the importance of the selection of evidence by considering a fresh study of US foreign policy towards India for the entire period from 20th January 1993, when President Clinton came into office, to 18th July 2005, when President Bush announced the beginning of civil nuclear cooperation with India. It also seeks to uncover which factors, identified in government documents, played a significant role in shaping US foreign policy towards India. This is the same historical period covered by the authors mentioned in Tables 1 to 3. By using publicly available US official documents as evidence, and analysing them in the same way as practiced by other authors in this field (including the major studies referred to in Table 1-3), this thesis

remains comparable to other studies in the field which use the same kind of sources. This comparability makes it possible to focus on the consequences of different selections of the documentary evidence in these studies.

This thesis investigates the change in US foreign policy by focusing primarily on three dimensions: nuclear, economic, and defence. This emphasis stems from the fact that since the beginning of the Cold War, disagreements over nuclear, economic, and defence policy represented stumbling blocks to the establishment of closer ties between the two countries. These areas are also considered the most important in the secondary literature which stresses that the rapprochement between the two countries was favoured by progress in the nuclear, economic, and defence fields.[4] Therefore, other topics, such as human rights, intellectual property rights, and climate change, which could be considered to be aspects of foreign policy were not coded as such for the purpose of this thesis.[5]

The nuclear factor was significant because, in spite of the fact that during the Cold War both India and the United States were in favour of nuclear disarmament, they had different views on the way in which this goal should be achieved. India was a supporter of universal nuclear disarmament. The United States wanted to prevent other non-nuclear weapon states from developing nuclear weapons and having access to sensitive technology without giving up its own nuclear arsenal. This contrasting approach to the issue of nuclear proliferation led to further difficulties in the relationship between the two

[4] See particularly S. Ganguly and A. Kapur, The Transformation of US-India Relations, pp. 642-656; Amit Gupta, Gupta, A., 2005. *The US-India relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?*, DIANE Publishing; I. Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement.*

[5] For a more detailed description of what was categorized as 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' see the Technical Appendix.

countries which were exacerbated after the first Indian nuclear test (in May 1974).

The economic dimension was important because for almost forty years US-India economic relations remained very limited. After its independence, India adopted a centrally planned economic strategy that was incompatible with US free market capitalist policy. Moreover, owing to its poverty and underdevelopment, India was not seen as a potential market for US goods and investments.[6] These weaknesses contributed to strengthening the idea among US policy and business communities that there was no vital US economic interest in India.

The defence dimension was relevant because during the Cold War period defence cooperation between the United States and India was almost non-existent. The lack of strong defence ties between the two countries was the result of India's policy of non-alignment and close friendship with the Soviet Union. In 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Moreover, the Soviet Union began to provide sophisticated military technology to India under very favourable conditions, thus becoming India's major military supplier.[7] These developments contributed to increasing US concerns about India's relations with the USSR.

1.1 Framework used to analyse the change in US foreign policy towards India

As will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2, in order to analyse US publicly available government documents, this thesis combines Qualitative Content

[6] Sumit Ganguly and Ashok Kapur, The Transformation of US-India Relations, p. 645.
[7] Ibid., p. 644.

Analysis (QCA)[8] with narrative event analysis. QCA helps to create a rigorous way through which to review the full range of content in official US documents that are used as empirical basis for this study. Narrative event analysis is a broad term for the way in which virtually all literature in this field uses documents (and other sources) in developing a perspective on, in this case, the evolution of US-India relations. This method will be described in more detail in Chapter 2. This kind of analysis is strengthened by QCA which reduces the risk of 'selective' usage of content from documents.

1.2 Period of analysis

Many studies focus on the period 2001-2005 to explain the origins of the change in US foreign policy and the drivers of the US-India civil nuclear deal that was concluded in 2005. According to these analyses, the rise of China and the strong determination of the US president to forge a strategic partnership with India were among the key factors which paved the way for the rapprochement. Although the importance of these factors is recognised by many scholars, these factors alone are unable to explain the change.

This study therefore covers a longer period to explore the evolution of American foreign policy towards India, focusing on the period from 20th January 1993, when President Clinton took office, to 18th July 2005, when President Bush announced the civil nuclear deal with India.

The analysis presented in this thesis distinguishes three periods to identify the factors that had an impact on the US approach towards India and how it changed over time. The first period (20th January 1993- 10th May 1998)

[8] QCA stands for Qualitative Content Analysis not for Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The abbreviation QCA will be used hereafter to refer to qualitative content analysis.

deals with American foreign policy prior to India's nuclear test. This period is crucial to develop a thorough understanding of the change in US policy, as will be seen in Chapter 3. The second period (11th May 1998- 19th January 2001) focuses on India's nuclear tests, which, on the one hand, marked the emergence of India as a de facto nuclear power, and on the other, had a strong impact on the evolution of American nuclear strategy and foreign policy towards New Delhi. The last period (20th January 2001-18th July 2005) starts with the G. W. Bush administration entering the White House and ends with the announcement of the US-India civil nuclear deal.

1.3 Relevance of the thesis

This study is relevant for several reasons. First, this thesis shows the problems deriving from the lack of clear and systematic attention to the selection and usage of documentary data. Such problems are pervasive in established ways to study inter-state relations, but there are still relatively few studies exploring the implications of this methodological problem.

This thesis seeks to contribute to filling this gap in the existing literature by using the change in US relations with India as an example to provide a detailed account of the nature of these methodological problems and of their implications for substantive conclusions.

Second, this study employs Qualitative Content Analysis, a method which is relatively new and which has not previously been used to investigate US-India relations. The use of QCA proved to be extremely useful not only to uncover factors otherwise overlooked, but also to re-assess the salience of factors already identified in the existing literature.

Finally, QCA has facilitated the systematic comparison of the foreign policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, highlighting elements of continuity and change that were largely neglected by the secondary literature, but that are relevant to understand the transformation of the US relationship with India. As section 1.5 will show, the majority of scholars tends to emphasize the importance of the differences existing between President Clinton and Bush's approaches to deal with India's nuclear program rather than their common desire to get the US-India relationship on a positive footing. This study, by contrast, will show that President Bush continued the commitment of his predecessor to forge closer strategic ties with India. This is indispensable to explain why the transformation could be accelerated during the period 2001-2005.

1.4 Scope of the thesis

It is important to point out that this thesis aims not to present a self-contained and fully-fledged study of the quality of US-India relations and their evolution in the period under investigation. Rather, it takes as its starting point the generally shared understanding among scholars and policymakers that the relationship between the two countries improved during the period 1993-2005. Much of the literature is interested in understanding the factors that contributed to this improvement, and, as already stated, bases its research to an important degree on documentary evidence. This study focuses on how these documentary evidences are selected and used, and how this affects substantive conclusions. This particular focus requires that, apart from the selection of documents and extraction of content from those documents, this study is as comparable as possible to the dominant strain of work in the existing literature. Therefore, this

study will not undertake a conceptual analysis of the notion of rapprochement, but instead follows to the way in which that concept is used in the relevant literature.[9] For the same reason, this study does not engage in an extensive discussion about what would be the most appropriate empirical basis for characterizing the quality and evolution of US-India relations, but conforms to the dominant practice of characterizing inter-state relations on the basis of the content of official documents. In order to focus on the implications of document selection and extraction of information from documents, this study also conforms to the dominant form of qualitative analysis employed in the relevant literature, which consists of a form of narrative event analysis that will be described in more detail in Chapter 2.

These decisions make it possible to replicate the approach of other scholars and compare their results with the results emerging from this thesis in order to show the consequences deriving from their lack of attention to the methodological problems of document selection and extraction of meaning (coding) from documents. The parameters of the fresh study of US-India relations that is presented in this study are therefore defined by the choice discussed in this section.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This study consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 comprises this introduction and the review of the secondary literature concerning the transformation of US foreign policy towards India. The aim of the literature review is to provide an

[9] It is important to note that most of the relevant studies on US-India relations do not engage in conceptual analyses of the concept of rapprochement. They use this concept as so-called primitive, that is to say its meaning is derived from everyday language.

overview of the factors identified by scholars as the drivers of the change and of the approaches that they have employed to reach their conclusions. It also shows that many, if not all, of the scholars examined fail to specify the procedures used to select documents and to interpret the findings emerging from the analysis. This gap in the secondary literature makes it difficult to assess the validity of these studies and to understand the way in which factors influencing the development of US-India relations have been identified.

Chapter 2 presents the methodological framework used to analyse US government documents. This framework consists first of all of a procedure to identify the population of (publicly available) official US documents. Using these as the empirical basis of this study, the next element of the methodological framework consists of combining Qualitative Content Analysis with narrative-event analysis. QCA is a method which offers the advantage of establishing systematic and rigorous procedures to examine a large number of documents. Findings emerging from QCA have been used to 'feed' narrative event analysis, an approach which helps to develop an understanding of relevant pieces of information extracted from the material analysed. The combination of these two approaches contributed to creating an account of the change in US foreign policy based on a wider, and more systematically exploited empirical basis than that which is commonplace in the secondary literature.

Chapter 3 is the first of three analysis chapters investigating the driving forces of the transformation in US foreign policy towards India. It focuses on the period from January 1993, when President Clinton took office, to 10th May 1998, before India conducted its nuclear tests. This chapter shows that in spite of the fact that the end of the Cold War and US policymakers' perceptions about India's

economic reforms and its potential contributed to creating a favorable context for rapprochement between the two countries, the relationship with India continued to be characterized by estrangement. The secondary literature does not explain in detail why the relationship did not change. This chapter seeks to fill this gap in the literature by showing that the dominance of nuclear-related issues in US foreign policy towards India and that disagreements over non-proliferation contributed to undermining the potentially positive impact of the demise of the Soviet Union and India's rapid economic growth.

Chapter 4 examines the period from 11th May 1998, when India conducted a series of nuclear tests (also known as Pokhran II), to 19th January 2001, when the Clinton administration finished its second term. This chapter shows that during this period, the transformation of US foreign policy was propelled by a series of factors: the Indian nuclear tests, the decision of the Clinton administration to side with India during the Kargil crisis, and by his strong commitment to get the relationship back on track. The relevance of Pokhran II in accelerating the change is reflected in the secondary literature, which is, however, divided on the importance of the other two factors (the US role during the Kargil crisis and Clinton's commitment to improving US-India relations). This chapter reveals that the Kargil crisis, together with the aspiration of President Clinton to improve the relationship with India, had a strong impact on creating a more favorable context on which the Bush administration could build.

Chapter 5 focuses on the period from 20th January 2001, when the Bush administration came into power, to 18th July 2005, when the president announced the civil nuclear deal with India. It shows that the process of

transformation of US relations with India, which began during the Clinton administration, was accelerated by the convergence of three factors: changes in US nuclear policy towards India, President Bush's commitment to building a strategic partnership with India, and US policymakers' perceptions about changes in the international system. The majority of the secondary literature tends to link the change in US policy to the differences between the Clinton and the Bush administrations in terms of their approach towards India's nuclear program and to US concerns about the rise of China, but little attention is given to Bush and Clinton's common aspiration to improve the relationship with India. This chapter argues that the elements of continuity between the two presidents are extremely important to understand the overall change in policy.

Chapter 6 illustrates the implications deriving from the lack of specific criteria of data selection and analysis and presents the most relevant findings emerging from the analysis.

1.5 Literature Review

The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the existing literature and of the factors stimulating the change in US foreign policy towards India as identified in the literature. Table 4 summarizes the main factors impinging on US relations with India in the period 1993-2005 as proposed in the secondary literature. It does so in the form of a table, in which the rows represent publications (referred to by their authors) and the columns represent factors affecting US-India relations that are proposed in these publications. The 40 publications represented in this table constitute the universe of relevant academic publications on US-India relations focusing on the Clinton and the Bush periods

as it existed in 2017.[10] They were identified using a variety of databases available via the facilities of the University of Nottingham, Universita' Statale di Milano, and the Library of Congress.[11] A 'tick'-mark indicates for each of these publications whether the factors displayed in the columns of the table were identified by the respective author(s). Summing these 'ticks' across the publications (leading to the result displayed in the bottom row, labelled, 'Total') gives an impression of the relative emphasis on these various factors in the available literature.

[10] Only studies exploring both the Clinton and the Bush periods were considered. Studies analysing the Bush period, but mentioning the Clinton administration have been included too.
[11] The databases used were: Google Scholar, Jstor, Lexis-Nexis, Proquest, and International Political Science abstract

Table 4: Factors favouring the transformation of US foreign policy towards India and the frequency of their appearance in the relevant literature

Themes	The end of the Cold War	India's economic reforms	Talbott-Singh dialogue	US role in the Kargil conflict	Clinton's visit to India	Common values	The rise of China	Role of leaders	Changes in US nuclear policy towards India
Authors									
1. Abraham	√	√					√	√	√
2. Carter (2006)							√		√
3.Chatterjee (2010)	√	√	√	√	√				√
4.Chatterjee (2011)	√	√		√	√	√			√
5.Feigenbaum	√	√						√	√
6.Ganguly and Mistry							√		√
7.Ganguly and Scobell	√	√	√		√	√			
8.Guihong (2003)	√	√		√	√	√	√		
9.Guihong (2005)	√				√	√	√	√	
10.Hagerty (2006)	√	√			√	√	√		√
11.Hathaway	√	√	√	√	√			√	
12.Heinrich-Agostini (2007)									
13.Heinrich-Agostini (2011)	√	√		√	√		√		
14.Kapur and Ganguly	√	√		√		√	√	√	√
15.Khan						√	√		√
16.Kux	√	√	√	√	√	√	√		
17.Kux	√	√		√	√			√	

	The end of the Cold War	India's economic reforms	Talbott-Singh dialogue	US role in the Kargil conflict	Clinton's visit to India	Common values	The rise of China	Role of leaders	Changes in US nuclear policy towards India
18.Levi and Ferguson						√	√		√
19.Mahapatra		√				√	√		
20.Malone and Mukherjee	√	√		√	√	√	√	√	
21.Mansingh			√				√		√
22.Mendis and Green						√	√		√
23.Mishra B.	√	√	√	√	√				√
24.Mohan (2002/2003)				√	√		√		
25.Mohan (2006)					√	√	√	√	√
27.Muller and Schmidt		√					√	√	√
28.Pant (2009)	√						√	√	
29.Pant (2011)	√	√			√	√	√	√	√
30.Parthasarathy		√		√	√				√
31. Rajagopalan	√	√			√		√		
32. Rajamony	√	√		√	√		√		
33. Riedel			√	√	√				√
34. Rubinoff	√	√			√				√
35. Schaffer (2002)	√	√				√			
36. Schaffer (2009)	√	√					√		√
37. Tellis (2005)				√	√		√	√	√
38. Tellis (2008)	√	√	√	√	√		√		√
39.Tellis (2013)	√	√		√	√	√	√		
40.Vickery		√		√	√		√		√
Total	24	26	8	18	24	16	27	11	23

Sources: 1. Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*; 2. Carter, 'America's New Strategic Partner'; 3. Chatterjee, 'From Uncertainty to Solidarity? An Anatomy of Post-Cold War India-US Relations'; 4. Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle, *Political Perspective*; 5. Feigenbaum, 'India's Rise, America's Interest'; 6. Ganguly and Mistry, 'The Case for the US-India Agreement'; 7. Ganguly and Scobell, 'India and the United States. Forging a Security Partnership?'; 8. Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China:; 9. Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership:; 10. Hagerty, 'Are We Present at the Creation? Alliance Theory and the Indo-US Strategic Convergence', pp. 11-37; 11. Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush'; 12. Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; 13. Agostini-Heinrich, La relation triangulaire entre la Chine, l'Inde et les Etats-Unis depuis la Fin de la Guerre Froide; 15. Selina Adam Khan, The Realist/Constructivist Paradigm: US Foreign Policy towards Pakistan and India; 16. Kux, India's Fine Balance,; 17. Kux, A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations; 18. M. A. Levi and C. D. Ferguson, US-India Nuclear Cooperation; 19. Chintamani Mahapatra, India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor; 20.David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, India-US Relations.; 21. Masingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership. Are We There Yet?, I; 22. Mendis , and Leah Green, 'US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement'; 23. Bhabani 'Mishra, India-US Relations: A Paradigm Shift'; 24. Mohan, A Paradigm Shift toward South Asia?; 25. Mohan, *Impossible Allies;* 27. Muller and Schmidt, Natural Friends? Relations Between the United States and India After 2001; 28 Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, 2009; 39. Pant, *The US-India nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics*, 2011; 30. Parthasarathy, Emerging Trends in India-US Relations; 31. Rajagopalan, Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House; 32. Rajamony, India-China-US Triangle; 33. Riedel, South Asia's Nuclear Decade, *Survival*; 35. Schaffer, Building a New Strategic Partnership with India; 36. Teresita Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century;* 37. Ashely Tellis, *India as a new global power;* 38. Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging India and Pakistan; 39. Ashley Tellis, Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in US-Indian Relations; 40. Vickery, *The Eagle and the Elephant.*

Table 4 shows that five factors are identified as affecting the evolution of US relations with India by a majority of the studies summarised here: (1) the end of the Cold War; (2) India's economic reforms; (3) the existence of common values; (4) the rise of China; and (5) changes in US nuclear policy towards India. Scholars are in less agreement about the importance and the impact of other factors, such as the Talbott-Singh dialogue, the US role in the Kargil crisis, President Clinton's visit to India, and the role of leaders.

The next section explores in more detail each of the factors mentioned and displayed in Table 4. Factors are presented in order of the frequency with which they have been identified in the literature, from the highest to the lowest.

The rise of China

Table 4 shows that the majority of scholars identify the rise of China as an important factor that contributed to accelerating the transformation of US relations with India. They claim that during the Bush period, US policymakers became increasingly concerned that power was shifting away from the US towards Asia, where China was taking its first steps as a great power in the international system.[12] Pant claims that these considerations pushed the Bush administration to recalibrate its strategy towards the region and to strengthen US cooperation with old allies in the region, such as Japan, and with new potential partners, such as India.[13] Tellis makes a similar point and stresses that President

[12] Abraham, *Origins*, p. 12; Chatterjee, India-China-United States; Ganguly and Mistry, The Case for US-India Agreement, pp. 12-13; Mendis and Green, 'US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', p. 198; Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia, p. 147; Malone, India-US Relations, 1068-1069; Mansingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership; Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact,2009, pp. 275-276; Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation, p. 24; Tellis, *India as a New Global Power*,p.8; Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats Unis.
[13] Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact, p. 275-276.

Bush's commitment to forge a strategic partnership with India was largely driven by geo-strategic considerations. He also points out that by the beginning of 2000s, the United States began to recognise that India, with its large population, economic power, and military capabilities, could "not only be an important partner for the United States in its own right, but also serve as a critical source of geopolitical balance vis-à-vis a rising China".[14]

Other scholars, however, suggest that the importance of the China factor has been overestimated. Chatterjee, for example, stresses that former US ambassador to India Bob Blackwill publicly denied that the strategic partnership between the United States and India was directed against China.[15] This view is also emphasized by Hathaway who points out that the United States was extremely cautious about portraying the strategic partnership with India as an alliance directed against China. This was because in spite of the numerous references to strategic competition with China during the presidential campaign, the Bush administration wanted to maintain friendly relations with China.[16] Moreover, some US officials believed that in case of conflict with China, India would not have been necessarily been a "logical partner" for the US.[17] This was because most of the Indians were not "eager to join with the United States in an anti-China consortium in which they would inevitably [have been] the junior partner".[18]

These two scholars deserve credit for offering a different interpretation of the relevance of the China factor and of its impact on shaping US foreign

[14] Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation, p. 24.
[15] Chatterjee, India-US-China.
[16] Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship', p. 20.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

policy towards India, but they do not provide very strong evidence to support their argument. The small number of documents and interviews with US policymakers from the Bush administration makes it difficult to determine to what extent this factor contributed to transforming of US foreign policy. Moreover, this limited empirical basis makes it difficult to explore and gauge the relevance of internal US factors, such as divisions within the administration.

India's economic reforms and growth

The vast majority of the relevant literature identifies India's reforms and its economic growth as one of the most important drivers of the change in US foreign policy towards India.[19] At the beginning of the 1990s, following a serious balance of payments crisis, the Indian Prime Minister Rao and his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh moved away from Nehru's socialist development model and launched a series of economic reforms aimed at liberalising India's economy and attracting foreign investments.[20] The success of this new economic policy helped to heighten the US interest in India and to overcome the economic estrangement that had characterised the relationship between the two countries throughout the Cold War.[21]

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[19] Abraham, Origins, p. 8; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 20; Feigenbaum, India's Rise; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, pp. 648-649; Guihong, US Policy towards South Asia, p. 146; Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship', p. 7; Hathaway, 'Are We Present at the Creation', pp. 17-18; Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; Kux, India's Fine Balance; Mahapatra, India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor, *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2011, p. 411; Malone and Mukherjee, India-US Relations, p. 1060; Mishra, India-US Relations, p. 79; Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt, Natural Friends? Relations Between the United States and India After 2001, *PRIF Reports* no. 87, 2009, p. I; Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact*, p. 43; Rajagopalan, Indo-US Relations, p. 545; Rajamony, *India-US-China Triangle:*; Raymond E. Vickery Jr., *The Eagle and the Elephant*,p. 29.

[20] Abraham, *Origins*, p. 8; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 20; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 649; Balachandran, Nuclear Realpolitik, p. 544; Malone and Mukherjee, India-US Relations, p. 1060.

[21] Vickery, *The Eagle and the Elephant*,p. 29.

Many scholars have argued that India's rapid economic growth and the improvement of US-India economic and commercial relations continued to play a significant role in shaping US foreign policy throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.[22] For example, according to Abraham, these developments created the conditions for further transformation of US-India relations. He stresses that "for the first time, the United States had an interest in better ties with India without the mediation of a global struggle or a local crisis… [and] even without the China factor".[23] Feigenbaum claims that growing bilateral economic ties have contributed to increasing US stakes in developing closer ties with India, which was seen as a rising economic power and a partner which can "contribute to global growth, promote market-based economic policies, and maintain a mutually favourable balance of power in Asia".[24]

Although this factor seemed to facilitate a rapid rapprochement between the United States and India, their bilateral relationship remained strained throughout the 1990s. Some scholars attribute the lack of improvement in diplomatic interactions between the two countries to disagreements about how to deal with nuclear proliferation and to US efforts to curb India's nuclear program.[25] These scholars deserve credit for seeking to explain why after the end of the Cold War, there was no improvement in US relations with India. However, they do not explain in a detailed way the impact that India's economic growth and the improvement of US-India economic relations had on shaping US policymakers' perceptions and to what extent this factor continued to be relevant

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[22] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 22; Feigenbaum, India's Rise; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 649; Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact, 2011, p. 45.
[23] Abraham, Origins, p. 15.
[24] Feigenbaum, India's Rise.
[25] Pant, the US-India Nuclear Pact, 2011, p. 22; Mishra, India-US Relations, pp. 79-80; Tellis, *Opportunities Unbound*, p. 3.

over time. For studies that emphasize this factor, too, the empirical basis (in terms of the number of official US documents) is generally quite limited, which makes it difficult to explore the countervailing effects between the economic and the nuclear factors.

The end of the Cold War

Many scholars claim that that the end of the Cold War paved the way for the change in the quality of US diplomatic relations with India.[26] They conclude that this watershed event pushed India to move away from its long-standing policy of non-alignment and to revise its strategic options. In their view, this was because India came to realise that it could no longer rely on the USSR for diplomatic and military support and that developing closer ties with the United States was indispensable to counterbalance the loss of its superpower ally. The result was that the Indian government abandoned its critical attitude towards US economic, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives in order to engage with the United

[26] Abraham, *Origins*, pp. 7-8; Chacko, A New Special Relationship, p. 330; Chatterjee, From Uncertanty to Solidarity? An Anatomy of Post-Cold War India-US Relations, *p*p. 20-23; Chatterjee, India-China-United States, p.78; Frigenbaum, India's Rise, America's Interest; Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and Its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 2, April-June 2003, p. 145-146; Zhang Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for China, *International Studies*, 42, 2005, 277; Robert Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush', in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), *India as an Emerging Power*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 7; Devin T. Hagerty, 'Are We Present at the Creation? Alliance Theory and the Indo-US Strategic Convergence, in Sumit Ganguly (Ed.), *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century. More than Words*, (Londong; New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 17; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 647; Kux, India's Fine Balance, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2002, accessed through Lexis Nexis;. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, India-US Relations. The Shock of the New, *International Journal*, 2009, pp. 1059-1060; Bhabani Mishra, India-US Relations,, p. 83; Harsh V. Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, *Asian Security*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2009, pp. 275; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2001, p. 545; Teresita Schaffer, Building a New Partnership with India, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2002, p. 33; Ashley Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging India and Pakista, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 4, 2008, p. 22; Ashley Tellis, 'What Should Be Expect from India as a Strategic Partner', in, *Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation*, edited by Henry Sokolski et al. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007), p. 234.

States.[27] These developments contributed to transforming US perceptions about India and to defusing US concerns that derived from India's close relationship with the Soviet Union.[28]

In spite of the fact that the changes in the international system created a more positive context for a rapprochement between the two countries, the vast majority of the secondary literature does not explain why the bilateral relationship did not significantly improve during the 1990s. Some scholars argue that the lack of change stemmed from the US focus on non-proliferation and on its efforts to roll back India's nuclear program, but they do not explore in detail the extent to which US and India's divergences on non-proliferation tended to delay the change in US foreign policy towards India.[29]

Clinton's visit to India

As is shown in Table 4, some scholars claim that President Clinton's trip to India in March 2000 heralded in the development of closer ties between the United States and India. They describe the presidential visit as "historic"[30], "a resounding success"[31] and "the first visible manifestation of improved Indo-US relations".[32] This was because it was the first visit by a US president in twenty-two years.[33] Moreover, Clinton spent five days in India and just a few hours in Pakistan. According to Balachandran, this was the signal that the United States

[27] Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 647.
[28] Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 647; Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership, p. 277.
[29] Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 21; Tellis, What Should We Expect from India, p. 235.
[30] Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia, p. 151
[31] Malone, India-US Relations, p. 1063.
[32] Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia, p. 151.
[33] Ibid.

wanted to "delink its relations with India from those with Pakistan".[34] Finally, during the visit, the US president publicly declared his intention to build closer strategic ties with India to sign the "Vision Statement", a document which outlined in detail a framework for strengthening cooperation between the two countries.[35]

Hathaway argues that "yet, for all the glow surrounding US-India ties by the end of the Clinton presidency, it remained in many respects a stunted relationship".[36] Heinrich-Agostini and Pant claim that this was because the relationship between the two countries continued to be hostage to the nuclear question, but they do not investigate in great detail the extent to which nuclear related-factors represented a stumbling block to the full US-India rapprochement.[37] This makes it difficult to reach compelling conclusions about the impact of the Clinton visit amidst the other factors identified.

Changes in US nuclear policy towards India

As Table 4 shows, many scholars believe that the US-India civil nuclear deal had a positive impact on the transformation of US relations with India.[38] Ganguly and Kapur claim the decision of the Bush administration to put aside US non-proliferation concerns contributed to accelerating the development of

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[34] Gopalan Balachandran, Nuclear realpolitik The prospects for Indo-Us Relations, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 4, 2007, p. 545.
[35] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, pp. 26-27.
[36] Hathaway, The US-India Courtship, p. 8.
[37] Pant, *The US-India nuclear Pact* ,2011, p. 39; Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis.
[38] Abraham, *Origins*, p. 2 and 14-16; Carter, America's New Strategic Partner; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, pp. 29-31; Chatterjee, India-China-United States; Feigenbaum, India's Rise, America's Interest; Ganguly and Mistry, The Case for the US-India Agreement, p. 12; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 653; Mendis and Green, US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, p. 209; Malone, India-US Relations, p. 1064; Pant, *The US-India nuclear Pact*, p. 21.

closer bilateral ties. This is also confirmed by Abraham who stresses that the US president and his advisors believed that in order to establish a strategic partnership with India, it was necessary to satisfy India's quest for nuclear technology.[39] Mistry and Ganguly point out that the nuclear deal would have not only helped to improve US-India relations, but it would have also contributed to mitigating "India's lingering reliability of American promises and commitments with respect to the supply of sensitive technologies".[40]

Some scholars stress that the civil nuclear deal represented a major departure from previous US non-proliferation policies. Carter, who makes such an argument, claims that the Bush administration moved away from Clinton-era nuclear policy aimed at containing and eventually eliminating India's nuclear program, but he does not provide any information on the Clinton period.[41] The lack of a detailed comparison between the nuclear strategies of the two administrations makes it impossible to understand to what extent the nuclear policy of the Bush administration marked a clear break from the approaches adopted by his predecessor. Moreover, it makes it difficult to assess the impact that this factor had on the evolution of US relations with India.

US role during the Kargil crisis

According to some scholars, US relations with India began to improve following the Kargil crisis (in the spring of 1999). They claim that this was because the Clinton administration publicly condemned Pakistan's actions and urged it to withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control. The US decision to side with

[39] Abraham, Origins, p. 16.
[40] Ganguly and Mistry, The Case for the US-India Agreement, p.12.
[41] Carter, America's New Strategic Partner; Tellis, What Should We Expect from India, p. 35.

India during the conflict had, according to some scholars, a positive impact on the evolution of US relations with India.[42] As Ganguly and Kapur point out, this was because it showed that contrary to the past, the United States was unwilling to ignore the actions of its traditional ally, Pakistan, and to offer it unconditional support.[43] Hathaway adds that according to the Indians, the actions of the Clinton administration also signalled that the United States had come to recognise the legitimacy of India's Kashmir position.[44] Chatterjee concludes that US support for India during the conflict was "a significant step forward for bilateral relations" and "helped to bring back all the important factors of faith and confidence about America in Indian minds".[45]

It is important to point out that the scholars referred to tend to focus on the limited period of the Kargil crisis, itself, without a detailed investigation of US policy towards Kashmir in the pre-Kargil period (1993-1999). The lack of evidence-based comparison between the two periods makes it impossible to assess whether there was a real change in US policy towards Kashmir and the extent to which this change contributed to paving the way for the improvement of US relations with India.

Common values

Many scholars stress that the US and India's common belief in democracy and in free market was one of the main drivers of the change in US relations with

[42] Heinrich-Agostini, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Reality, pp. 25-26; Hathaway, The US-India Courtship, p. 8; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 650; Kux, India's Fine Balance; Malone, India-US Relations, p. 1063; Mishra, India-US Relations, p. 84.
[43] Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 650.
[44] Hathaway, The US-India Courtship, p. 8.
[45] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 25.

India.[46] According to Guihong, these similarities helped the United States and India to "create a conducive political atmosphere [that] constitutes the basis of the strategic partnership".[47]A similar point is also made by Ganguly and Scobell who point out that the US-India special relationship "rests on a belief in the value of democracy, both as an ideal and as a system".[48] Dennis Kux highlights that this factor became particularly important during the Bush administration, when the US government came to recognise the advantages deriving from close cooperation with a democratic emerging power like India.[49]

Some scholars recognise that the existence of common democratic values has contributed to facilitating the dialogue between the United States and India, but that this by itself would not be sufficient to be the driving force for the change in US relations with India. As Malone points out, in spite of the numerous similarities between the two countries, the United States "failed to see the potential in India to be a strong and democratic partner in Asia".[50] A similar point is made by Chattarjee who claims that democracy "provide[d] a very broad and loose framework for friendship", but also that US-India relations remained estranged owing to the lack of convergence of national interests until during the Cold War and beyond.[51]

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[46] Chatterjee, India-China, United States; Ganguly and Scobell, India and the Unites States Forging a Security Partnership, pp. 40-41; Balachandran, Nuclear realpolitik, p. 547; Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for China, p. 282.
[47] Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership, p. 282.
[48] Ganguly and Scobell, India and the Unites States Forging a Security Partnership, p. 41.
[49] Kux, India's Fine Balance.
[50] Malone, India-US Relations, pp. 1066-1067.
[51] Chatterjee, India-US Relations: Expectations, Reality, and the Future, p. 10.

The Talbott-Singh dialogue

After the 1998 nuclear tests, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh engaged in a series of meetings which were aimed at resolving the differences between the United States and India over non-proliferation. Some scholars point out that in spite of the lack of progress, the Talbott-Singh dialogue helped to stimulate a change in US relations with India.[52] According to Chatterjee, these meeting "acted as a confidence building measure between the two countries".[53] A similar point is made by Hathaway and Mansingh who stress that the Talbott-Singh dialogue signalled that the United States was beginning to take India seriously, recognising its potential to become a major international player.[54] Riedel claims that these discussions helped to "set the stage for a revolution in the relationship between the world's two largest democracies… and [for the development] of a new strategic partnership".[55]

In spite of the fact that the Talbott-Singh dialogue made the United States more aware of India's aspirations and of its reasons for going nuclear, the United States and India were unable to accommodate their divergences on the nuclear question. Some of the scholars previously mentioned rely on Talbott's memoirs, newspapers articles, and on the secondary literature to show the significance of this factor. The lack of use of primary sources, however, makes it impossible to assess the extent to which this factor contributed to transforming the US foreign

[52] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 25; Ganguly and Scobell, India and the United States, p. 2005; Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship', p. 8; Kux, India's Fine Balance; Lalit Masingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership, p. 2; Riedel, South Asia's Nuclear Decade, p. 116.
[53] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 25.
[54] Hathaway, 'The US-India Courtship', p. 8; Mansingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership, p. 2.
[55] Bruce Riedel, South Asia's Nuclear Decade, p. 116.

policy.

The role of leaders

Some scholars believe that President Bush and some of his key officials played a crucial role transforming the quality of US relations with India. Pant claims that even before his election and throughout his first term, Bush showed a strong commitment to improving the quality of the relationship with India and to making the nuclear deal the driver and the symbol of the rapprochement between the two countries.[56] Ganguly and Kapur stress the reorientation of US nuclear and foreign policy towards India was not the result of a normal interagency policy process formulation, but rather it emerged from a small group of people, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, counsellor Philip Zelikow, and President Bush, "who had made up their minds to lead a bold departure from long-standing [nuclear] policies towards India".[57] A similar point is also made by Mendis and Green who argue that during the period 2001-2004, Rice's efforts to move away from previous US non-proliferation strategies "often met the resistance of Power-led Department of State … [which] insisted that India [met] certain benchmarks before cooperation could proceed".[58] They claim that nuclear cooperation between the United States and India gained momentum in 2005, when Rice became Secretary of State.[59]

The authors deserve credit for seeking to explore the impact key US

[56] Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact* 2011, pp. 61-62.
[57] Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 652.
[58] Mendis and Green, 'US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', p. 206-207.
[59] Ibid, p. 215.

policymakers and the presidential commitment to improving US-India relations had on transforming US foreign and nuclear policy, but they do not provide sufficient information to assess the significance of this factor. In order to reconstruct the foreign policymaking process of the US during the period 2001-2005, these scholars rely only on secondary sources and newspaper articles. The lack of extensive use of US government documents and interviews with US policymakers serving in the Bush administration makes it difficult to discern to what extent this factor contributed to favoring a revision of US foreign and non-proliferation policy and to explore division within the US government.

Conclusion

The review of the secondary literature shows that many studies on the transformation of US relations with India neither conduct a systematic and rigorous selection of the available primary sources nor of the criteria employed to identify and interpret relevant content contained in these documents. The lack of information about the data-collection and data-selection procedures used makes it difficult to assess the validity of conclusions. Moreover, it increases the risk that the significance of certain factors may have been overemphasised and relevant information ignored. As Table 4 shows, there is considerable disagreement among scholars about the factors that propelled the improvement of US relations with India. The majority of the existing literature identifies the rise of China, the end of the Cold War, and India's economic reforms as the most salient factors, but even in the case of these factors a considerable number of studies does not subscribe to these conclusions. Scholars are divided on the impact of other factors, such as the Talbott-Singh dialogue, the Kargil crisis,

Clinton's visit to India, and the role of leaders. It is, therefore, the aim of this thesis to analyse the Clinton and the Bush periods combined in order to provide a more detailed account of the transformation of US foreign policy, of its drivers, and of its timing. Moreover, it will do so on the basis of an approach that utilises a much more extensive body of documentary material and systematic procedures to extract salient content from those documents.

Chapter 2: Research Design

Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, scholars who contributed to the literature on US-India relations rarely, if ever, describe in detail how they select their data and which aspects of its content they use when analysing and interpreting their evidence. This makes it difficult to assess the validity of their conclusions, and to evaluate whether differences in their conclusions should be understood as the result of different theoretical perspectives, or as the result of having made a different selection of documents that are used as empirical evidence.

This study focuses on these problems by using a research design that seeks to provide a systematic basis for selecting and using empirical material to be used in a fresh study of the shift in US foreign policy towards India in the period 1993-2005. This study starts with a clear demarcation of the empirical material to be used, and a description of the universe of documents contained in that demarcation. Subsequently, it relies on Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) as a method to identify salient topics in the raw empirical material, thereby facilitating that all of the topics identified are included in a subsequent interpretive analysis. QCA has thus far never been used in studies of US foreign policy towards India (or in other studies of foreign policy) and this thesis aims to demonstrate its utility for such research.

The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. The first section defines and demarcates the kind of empirical material to be used for the study of US foreign policy towards India. The second section describes the procedures used to identify and collect relevant the documents. The third section illustrates

the potential methods that were initially considered to analyse the documents and discusses their strengths and limitations. The fourth section explains Qualitative Content Analysis as an approach and details how it has been applied to analyse official US documents. The final section describes some of the findings emerging from this application of QCA and how these are used in the subsequent stage of narrative event-structure analysis.

2.1 Choice of empirical material

The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the sources used to study US relations with India, elite interviews and US government documents (for a detailed discussion of the kind of documents analysed see section 2.2).

One of the first questions addressed when studying foreign policy and interstate relations over a protracted period of time is about the kind of empirical material that can be obtained and the approach(es) for using this material. Two kinds of empirical material stand out as particularly popular in the existing literature in this field: elite interviews and official documents.[60]

Given the fact that many official documents from the period 1993-2005 are still classified, elite interviews may appear to be a useful approach for collecting empirical evidence. Interviews with US policymakers serving in the Clinton and Bush administrations could, in principle, provide relevant information on factors and events that played a key role in re-shaping the US approach towards India. Moreover, such interviews enable the researcher to go

[60] A self-contained and full-fledged study of the evolution of US foreign policy towards India can be based on other kinds of empirical material, such as observed mutual support and cooperation in international organizations, or economic data on trade and foreign investments. These approaches would not yield relevant information for the primary purpose of this study, which is to assess the consequences of the predominantly non-systematic manner of selection of documentary evidence and identification of content in those documents.

beyond what emerges from available (i.e. non-classified) official documents.[61] Elite interviews may also provide information about the perceptions and interpretations of US policymakers about events and how they based their own decisions on these perceptions and interpretations.[62] At the same time, however, some of the pitfalls of elite interviews have to be recognized. Apart from problems of accessibility, political elites generally have their own agenda which affects their recollection, interpretation and narration of relevant events. Policymakers often seek to portray themselves as playing a positive or important role or as having contributed to a particular policy outcome.[63] Their recollection of events can also be subject to error and self-serving distortions, especially when dealing with events of a decade or more ago.[64]

A predominantly interview-based approach was not an appropriate option for this study given one of its objectives, which is to assess the consequences for substantive conclusions of different selections of relevant documents and of more, or less systematic approaches to appraise the content of these documents (see also Chapter 1). This requires the use of documentary evidence. Admittedly, many authors in this field of research also rely on information from interviews (see also Table 1, Chapter 1), and for this thesis interviews were also conducted. However, these served the function of providing opportunities for triangulation with other (documentary) evidence, and to ascertain that information from publicly available documents was not

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[61] Osini Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 40, issue 4, 2007, p. 767.
[62] Joel A. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, p. 673.
[63]Jeffrey M. Berry, ‘ Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing’, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, pp. 679-680.
[64] Charles Morrissey, ‘On Oral History’, in *Elite and Specialised Interviewing*, edited by Lewis Anthony Dexter, (Colchester : ECPR, 2006), pp. 93-99.

overlooked. However, the analysis of factors that influenced US foreign policy towards India, to be reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, is not based on these interviews, but on official documents. The rare instances where analysis of documents led to tentative interpretations that were contradicted by interviewees are flagged up in Chapters 3-5 together with an argumentation about how the contradictory evidence was used to inform the substantive analysis.

Documents constitute the empirical material used in this thesis. This kind of evidence also presents a number of problems. The investigation of changes in US foreign policy during the period 1993-2005 is hampered by the fact that not all relevant official documents are publicly accessible, as many are still classified. In the United States classified government material are declassified after twenty-five years, sometimes earlier as a consequence of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.[65] Some government documents can remain classified beyond twenty-five years if they contain information that could pose a risk to the national security, defence and foreign relations of the United States.[66]

The unavailability of classified documents does present an obstacle when trying to identify the factors favoring the change in US foreign policy over the period 1993-2001. Only the very beginning of this period is more than 25 years old, meaning that classified documents from early 1993 should become

[65] The literature on the classification of documents uses some criteria to categorize them. A preliminary distinction can be made between primary sources, which "consist of the written material produced more or less contemporaneously with the object of research", ideally recorded by eyewitnesses, and secondary sources, which "consist of records written a considerable time after the fact and not by eyewitnesses". For more information on this topic see C. Lorenz, History: Theories and Methods, *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2001, p. 6871; and Tim May, *Social Research. Issues, Methods, and Process*, (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2001) p. 136.

[66] US Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, available at https://foia.state.gov/Learn/FAQ.aspx, accessed 18th December 2016.

declassified in 2018. Most documents from this period that were classified will still remain so for years to come. Moreover, it is quite likely that some of the documents will remain classified for more than 25 years in view of their continuing relevance to US national security, defence, and foreign policy relations. As a consequence, it is likely that the empirical evidence contained in non-classified documents is biased when compared to the entire universe of documents (classified as well as unclassified) pertaining to US relations with India. Such bias would consist of the underrepresentation of material pertaining to factors that are most affected by classification, for example, factors related to US defence, nuclear policy, and other sensitive aspects of foreign policy.

It is important, however, not to overstate the significance for this study of the unavailability of relevant classified documents. A wide range of government documents pertaining to US foreign policy towards India is available. Furthermore, many previous studies in this field have relied on government documents as their basis of empirical evidence (e.g. the review of the literature in Chapter 1) which suggests that the documents available provide a useful basis from which to draw conclusions. This will be even more so when in this thesis such documents are identified, included in the basis of evidence and used to extricate content in a more systematic and analytical manner than has been the case in other studies. Finally, it has to be reiterated that one of the objectives of this thesis is not to present an assessment of the consequences for substantive conclusions of the scant and unsystematic manner in which most of the existing literature makes use of available documents. For this assessment it is irrelevant that part of the total universe of documents is classified because this comparison involves the use of publicly available and accessible documents and

that (sub)universe is the same for this study and for the studies referred to earlier in Chapter 1.

The unclassified information exists in open-archives and open-published documents that are available in the public domain and are easily accessible through online archives of US institutions and databases.[67] These documents consists of speeches, briefings, reports from the White House, the Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defence (DOD). They also include testimonies of US government officials before the US Congress and speeches and public pronouncements made by Presidents Clinton and Bush.

The official documents used can be expected to contain less detail than documents that are still classified. Moreover, their content has most likely been 'sanitized' in view of their public status, potentially concealing some considerations of policy makers, particularly when these are deemed to be socially or politically sensitive. Yet, the very public nature of these documents and the fact that they derive from an institutional system that is not homogenous in its outlooks and political orientations is somewhat of a safeguard against mere fabrications. The leaks, informed political opponents, the press, and other domestic or foreign policy actors would be quick to expose blatant untruths, and even glaring lacunae in these documents. This is particularly so with respect to Congressional hearings, where testimony is given under oath. For these reasons, the choice to base this study on publicly available official documents is reasonable, even while acknowledging its limitations.

[67] The list of online archives and databases used is provided in the Appendix A.

2.2 Identification and collection of documents

This section describes the procedures used to identify and collect publicly available US official documents. The literature on the classification of documents uses some criteria to categorize them on the basis of their accessibility. These categories are: 1) closed, documents that are classified and whose existence is unknown, such as memos, private letters and conversations between the president and his advisors; 2) restricted, documents that are not accessible because they contain sensitive pieces of information, such as National Security Strategies and nuclear-related documents; 3) open-archival, documents which are available in archives after thirty years have elapsed, such as documents available in the US National Archive and in Presidential Libraries; 4) open-published, documents that are in the public domain and are easily accessible on the websites of US government agencies and in other databases.[68]

For the reasons already mentioned in section 2.1, this study relies on open published documents. This study considered as relevant only US government documents focusing on US foreign policy towards India related to the period 20th January 1993-18th July 2005. Documents were collected from the electronic archives of relevant US government institutions that are involved in taking decisions related to nuclear, defence, and economic policies and foreign policy decisions, such as the White House, the DOS, and DOD, and databases available at the Library of Congress, University of Nottingham, and Universita' degli Studi di Milano.[69] These databases were searched using the following key words: 'India' or 'New Delhi' or 'South Asia', and 'U.S.' or 'United States', or

[68] Tim May, Social Research. Issues, Methods, and Process, (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2001) p. 136.
[69] For a full list of the electronic archives used see the Appendix A.

‘American’. It was necessary to adopt broad search criteria to prevent the loss of relevant information. Although it cannot be excluded that documents exist that are relevant to the study at hand, and cannot be identified with the search string described, it is, nevertheless, exceedingly unlikely that many such documents exist. After all, ‘India’ is the official name of the country and ‘New Delhi’ its capital and seat of the government. The term ‘South Asia’ was used to identify documents that relate to foreign policy towards both India and Pakistan.

Once the data collection phase was completed, the relevant material was separated from that which was irrelevant. (For a detailed description of the ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ material see Appendix B). Any document containing references to any aspects of US policy related to economic, defence, and nuclear field and strategic interests that had an impact on shaping US foreign policy towards India was considered to be relevant.

As already indicated in the previous chapter, this procedure resulted in the identification of 329 relevant official documents. For reasons explained earlier, these documents can be expected to constitute the entire population of relevant US official documents that are publicly available at the time this exercise was undertaken (March 2016). The number of documents is considerably larger than which is used as evidence by any of the currently existing studies on US-India relations in the period 1993-2005 (for illustrative examples, see Table 2 Chapter 1). It was decided to use all these documents in the substantive analysis of US relations with India that is to be reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. This decision was taken in order to be able to demonstrate the consequences of selecting just very small parts of this population of available evidence.

The procedure used to identify the universe of relevant available documents may, when applied to the topics of other studies result in a number of documents that is too large to be used completely and exhaustively. In such situations, a choice has to be made as to which parts of the material to use, and which to exclude. Such choices would ideally rest on an explicit procedure that ensures that the resulting sample is representative for the entire population. A procedure that would make this possible has been sketched below, in the discussion of QCA. In the current study, such sampling was not necessary as using the entire population of relevant documents was quite feasible within the constraints of this study.

2.3 Approaches to the analysis of documents

Having chosen official documents as the kind of empirical evidence to be used in this study of US relations with India over the period 1993-2005 and having collected for that period all such documents identified by the search procedures employed, the next question is how to use these documents. A variety of possibilities will be discussed below, in particular process tracing, narrative event analysis, discourse and critical discourse analysis, content analysis, and qualitative content analysis.

Process tracing

Process tracing is a qualitative method frequently used to "explore the chain of events or decision-making by which initial case conditions are translated in case outcomes".[70] According to John Gerring, in order to investigate cause-effect

[70] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 64.

mechanisms, the researcher needs to "peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect".[71] Alexander George and Andrew Bennett add that process-tracing requires collecting a large amount of data from different kind of sources, such as histories, archival documents, and interview transcripts.[72]

Although official documents occupy a central place in any procedure of process tracing, this approach was nevertheless not seen as relevant for this study for various reasons. First of all, a proper process tracing of the origins of changes in US foreign policy towards India would have required government documents which are still classified. The inability to access such archival material makes it hard, if not impossible, to reconstruct step-by-step the causal mechanisms which paved the way for the improvement of US-India relations. Moreover, process tracing would have required additional kinds of empirical information, such as interviews with the key policymakers that were directly involved in the US decision-making process towards India during the period 1993-2005. It was not possible to achieve this within the constraints of this study. Finally, process tracing is most useful for a distinct and discrete event or decision, but less easily applied to a more diffuse and heterogeneous set of phenomena such as the evolution of US-India over a period of twelve years.

Narrative event analysis

Most of the currently existing scholarly work on US-India relations uses narrative event analysis for the analysis of documentary evidence, which makes

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[71] John Gerring,, What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 98, no. 2, 2004, p. 348.
[72] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005) , p. 6 and 223.

this a relevant approach for this study. Admittedly, hardly any of the authors in this field are very explicit about how they analyse documents. Yet, from reading their work, it becomes clear that they mainly use an approach akin to what Griffith refers to as *narrative event-structure analysis,* albeit generally in a less formalized and rigorous fashion.[73] This approach involves, in the current context, the analyst attempting to "unpack an event, that is breaking it into its constituent parts and analytically reconstructing it as a causal interpretation of what happened and why it happened as it did".[74] This method is used to interpret text in order to analyse the temporal order of events and to uncover the causal links between actions and factors leading to an event.[75] The use of this method implies the immersive reading of documents in their context. This context includes an historical aspect (the location of the event amidst other events); the author of the document and their position in the network of political relations with other actors who may influence the author to include or omit particular information; the audience that is addressed, implicitly or explicitly, and the content and framing of other relevant document.[76] Larry J. Griffith claims that complex political processes can be understood using narrative explanations that focus on the temporal order of sequences of actions and events and the causal logic behind them.[77] To develop an adequate understanding of the dynamics and

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[73] Larry J. Griffith, Narrative Event-Structure Analysis and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology, *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 98, np. 5, 1993, pp. 1094-1133.
[74] Larry J. Griffith and Robert Korstad, Historical Inference and Event-Structure Analysis, *International Review of Social History,* vol. 43, 1998, pp. 145.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Dvora Yanov and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, *Interpretation and Method. Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, (London : M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. xix-xxii; David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p. 199; Ariadne Vrome 'Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, pp. 263-264.
[77] Larry J. Griffith, Narrative Event-Structure Analysis and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology, *American Journal of Sociology,* p. 1098.

of the factors which led to the change in US foreign policy towards India, it is, therefore, necessary to interpret documents taking into account the historical context and political process in which the rapprochement between the two countries eventually occurred.

One of the drawbacks of narrative event analysis is its sensitivity to being coloured by the analyst's personal beliefs, interpretations, experiences, and theoretical perspectives. This issue may result in problems of replicability, with different researchers focusing on different aspects of a document that capture their attention or that appear important to explain a sequence of events.[78] This subjectivity may thus result in the selective reading of documents, an issue that is intimately linked to the problem of selection of empirical evidence that is addressed in this thesis.

Discourse and critical discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is described as "a cluster of related methods for studying language use and its role in social life".[79] There are many varieties of discourse analysis. Scholars generally distinguish between two traditions: descriptive discourse analysis which has its roots in linguistics and explores the organization of texts, [80] and critical discourse analysis, which has its origins in social sciences and focuses on the relationship between power and discourse.[81]

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[78] Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 391.
[79] Potter, 'Discourse analysis', in, *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, edited by Lisa M. Given (SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008) p. 217.
[80] Margrit Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, (London : SAGE Publications Ltd 2012) p. 46.
[81] Teun A. Van Dijk Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, *Discourse and Society*, vol. 4, issue 2, 1993, pp. 249-283.

All types of discourse analysis are interested in certain aspects of language, such as the use of metaphors, rhetoric, syntax, and arguments.[82] One of the key features of this methodological approach is its emphasis on the role played by language in shaping reality.[83] Discourse analysis seeks to understand events by giving more importance to how something is expressed rather than to what is said.[84] Studying the way in which language is used is of high significance when analyzing political speeches because it helps to reveal the mechanisms employed by policymakers to construct social reality.

This method was not considered suitable for this study because the analysis of US foreign policy toward India involves not only the discursive elements in which that policy is expressed, but also the description of 'what' happened and which factors were more relevant in favouring the rapprochement. For this latter purpose discourse analysis is much less suited.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is defined as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context".[85] It is used to analyse various types of material: news media, policy documents, letters, books, radio broadcast, videos, films, and television programs and it consists of "categorizing textual

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[82] M. Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis*, pp.46-47.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid., p. 48.
[85] Klaus Krippendorff , 'Content Analysis' in *International Encyclopedia of Communication*, edited by E. Barnouw, G. Gerbner, W. Schramm, T. L. Worth, & L. Gross, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 403-407, http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1232&context=asc_papers&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.it%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3D%2522content%2Banalysis%2522%2BAND%2Bdefinition%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C5%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22content%20analysis%20definition%22, (accessed 1st November 2014).

data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes".[86]

Content analysis looks for recurrent words, themes, and topics, and counts how frequently they appear in texts. Therefore, the relevance of a theme is often evaluated on the basis of its presence (or its absence) and of its frequency. The coding-the categories and subcategories- is usually built from a conceptual framework, thus making this approach very suitable to test hypotheses.

Content analysis of this form was deemed to be inappropriate for this study because the different kinds of official documents that have been identified vary too much in authorship, audience, particular purpose, style and historical context to justify the strong assumption that frequencies of words or topics are comparable across documents.

Qualitative Content Analysis

Qualitative Content Analysis is a method that systematically describes the content of documents. It does so in terms of a set of categories which reflect themes or topics, the presence or absence of each of which is coded for each document. The same set of categories is applied to all documents, and this approach therefore facilitates the description of "the meaning of qualitative material in a systematic way".[87] The coding process is applied to segments of text that are cohesive in terms of their content. Such a segment is most often a paragraph, but it may also be a sentence, a number of consecutive paragraphs,

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[86] Heidi Julien, "Content Analysis", in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, p. 217.
[87] Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis*, p. 5.

or even an entire document. The analyst determines the beginning and the end of each such segment, and subsequently codes this segment as belonging to one or several of the categories employed. All text has to be assigned to segments, and the approach therefore ensures that all documents are examined "in each and every part".[88] This is important because it prevents the researcher from ignoring those parts which do not reflect "concepts and ideas that [they] bring to [their] research".[89] Another aspect that makes QCA suitable for this study is its flexibility. This is because the categories to be used in QCA can be derived from a pre-existing conceptual framework, but it is also possible to have them emerge from the data during the coding process. Generally, the perspective from which to identify what is important (i.e. what coding categories to use) is guided by the research question (or by a theory).[90] In this case, any respect of American foreign and domestic policy towards India related to the nuclear question or any aspect indirectly related to the nuclear question, which had a crucial impact on US attitude towards India, were considered relevant.

An important advantage that QCA shares with other forms of content analysis, is that it contributes to reducing the amount of information, by focusing on specific aspects of the documents being analysed.[91] The necessary demarcation in QCA of text segments to be coded also allows for a representative sampling possibility in situations where the entire population of relevant documents is too large to be analysed within the constraints and resources of a given study. Random sampling from all the text segments contained in all relevant documents would ensure representativeness of content

[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., p. 4.
[91] Ibid., p. 7.

in the sample and thus the possibility for making inferences about the population from the sample (within limits of sampling variation). Stratifying such a random sample may help to minimize sampling variance of aspects deemed to be of importance, such as chronology or source documents. Most importantly, such a sampling procedure would reduce the volume of data analysis without resorting to ad hoc procedures.

Choice of approach

The discussion above of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches for analyzing texts has already indicated that some of these approaches are not well suited for the purpose of the study of the evolution of US relations with India that is to be reported in the subsequent chapters. The most relevant are the narrative event analysis and QCA. It was decided to use these in combination. By using narrative event analysis, this study emphasizes that the meaning of documents is to be derived in a contextualized way. Moreover, by using this approach, the study remains comparable with much of the extant literature that was summarized in Chapter 1. The use of QCA mitigates one of the weaknesses of narrative event analysis, which consists of the possibility of selective reading of documents. QCA identifies, without ignoring any part of a document, the themes of topics that are present in various text segments. Feeding this information into the immersive reading that is at the heart of narrative event analysis reduces the likelihood of selective reading and thus some of the 'subjective' elements of this approach.

2.3 Application of QCA

Once the data collection phase was completed, the relevant material was separated from that which was irrelevant. In order to facilitate the selection, it was necessary to build a coding frame composed by two categories "relevant" and "irrelevant" and to describe the meaning of each category. This phase was crucial to identify the documents on the basis of which the coding frame was built. A coding frame is a structure which acts as a sort of filter, keeping the material that is covered by categories and retaining what is irrelevant.[92]

The relevant material was broadly defined on the basis of the research question. Relevant material was considered any document referring to aspects of American foreign policy related to the nuclear, economic, and defence fields and strategic interests which had an impact on the evolution of US foreign policy towards India. On the contrary, the category irrelevant was narrowly defined to avoid the loss of relevant data.[93] Irrelevant material included any aspect of US foreign policy towards India that did not present any connection or reflected only a weak connection to the nuclear, economic, and defence field.[94]

The set of main categories and subcategories to be used in QCA for the study of US foreign policy towards India has been defined on the basis of the existing literature. This also provided the possibility to compare findings emerging from QCA with those obtained by other scholars studying US-India relations. The existing literature in this field suggested the necessity to include three main coding categories: US policy, US policymakers' views and

[92] Ibid., pp. 61-62.
[93] Ibid.
[94] For examples belonging to category "relevant" and "irrelevant" material see the Appendix B.

perceptions, and presidential preferences.[95] Subcategories of content to be distinguished within these three main categories represent potential factors impinging upon US foreign policy towards India. The categories specify the content on which to focus while coding the material. The themes to be used as subcategories were generated every time a text segment (or 'passage') highlighted a new theme.[96]

It is important to point out that in spite of the fact that most of the subcategories are similar to the themes already identified in the secondary literature, the coding scheme employed in this thesis offers a more comprehensive framework through which to study US foreign policy towards India. This is because contrary to the vast majority of studies in this field, this thesis uses more documents, as well as a more systematic approach to identify the content of documents, thus minimizing the risk that important themes or factors may have been overlooked.

Before applying the coding frame, the material was divided into segments which are smaller pieces that fit the categories of the coding frame. As discussed earlier, this ensures that content in the documents is examined, reducing the chances that relevant passages may be ignored.[97] These segments are units of coding which are uninterrupted segments of text that are homogeneous in their content, and whose lengths generally vary from one sentence to a paragraph.

The reliability of the coding was tested by asking an independent coder to code a random sample of ten percent for each of the three periods from the

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[95] For a more detailed description of the coding scheme, please see the next section.
[96] Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis*, p. 116.
[97] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

total population of documents. Results emerging from the independent coder were compared to ones obtained by this author and their agreement was assessed with Krippendorff's Alpha reliability coefficient. Krippendof claims data with reliability below 0.667 should not be accepted to draw valid conclusions.[98] In this study, the coefficient was found to be 0.85, thus it is considered sufficiently reliable. This means that if someone else would code the documents using the same coding scheme, they should obtain very similar results.

During a pilot phase, it was deemed necessary to include a 'miscellaneous' category to represent relevant text segments that did not fit in any category that was already defined.[99] The miscellaneous subcategories could not be converted to more informatively defined subcategories because the themes addressed did not recur on a sufficiently frequent basis.[100]

To assess the quality of a coding frame, a set of criteria needs to be met. These criteria are: unidimensionality, mutual exclusiveness, exhaustiveness, and saturation.[101] For unidimensionality to be met, "each category in the coding frame should capture only one aspect of the material".[102] This reduces the probability that subcategories overlap.[103] Mutual exclusiveness implies that subcategories within the same dimension "mutually exclude each other".[104] A coding frame should also be exhaustive meaning that each unit of coding is

[98] Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis. An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2004, p. 241.
[99] Ibid., p. 93.
[100] Ibid., pp. 93-94.
[101] Ibid., p. 71.
[102] Ibid., p. 72.
[103] Ibid., p. 74.
[104] Ibid., p. 75.

assigned to at least one subcategory.[105] Finally, saturation "requires that each subcategory is used at least once during the analysis".[106]

Coding frame

This section describes the categories and subcategories that comprise the coding frame used to conduct a qualitative content analysis on US official documents.[107] As mentioned in the previous section, the coding frame contains three main categories: US policy, US policymakers' perceptions and views, and presidential preferences. These categories were derived deductively, taking into account the conceptual frameworks employed by other scholars working in the field of US-India relations.

Scholars studying the change in US foreign policy towards India (mentioned in Chapter 1) employ Foreign Policy Analysis to establish some of their main categories and to frame their analysis, however, they often only do so implicitly. The majority of the existing literature seeks to study the transformation of the attitude of the United States towards India and its nuclear program by delving into the black box of the state in order to provide a deeper understanding of the foreign policy decision making process and outcomes and of policymakers' views and perceptions.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to replicate the approach used by scholars in this field to illustrate the consequences of the lack of specific criteria of data selection and data analysis. This thesis thus employs the three main categories used in the secondary literature._The first category

[105] Ibid., p. 76.
[106] Ibid., p. 77.
[107] For a more detailed description of each subcategory and examples see the Appendix C.

refers to different aspects of US foreign policy towards India related to the nuclear, economic, and defence field. These areas were chosen on the basis of previous knowledge and on the secondary literature. The second category refers to content in the documents that reflects views and perceptions of American officials about changes in American nuclear, economic, and defence policy towards India and about factors and events that were crucial in shaping the change in US foreign policy towards India. The third category pertains to content in the documents that reflects preferences of Presidents Clinton and Bush about US policies, factors, and events related to their perceptions and their foreign policy choices towards India. Each of these three categories was specified in more detail by subcategories. The entire set of categories and subcategories that were used in the QCA is specified below. More detailed descriptions of the subcategories and examples are included in the Appendix C.

Key:

- Main category
    - Subcategory

- **1. US Policy**
    - 1.1 Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan
    - 1.2 Changes in US nuclear policy towards India
    - 1.3 Urging India to adhere to the non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes
    - 1.4 Strengthening economic and commercial cooperation with India
    - 1.5 Improving US defence cooperation with India
    - 1.6 Importance of de-hyphenation on US-India relations
    - 1.7 Policy seeking changes in US domestic legislation
    - 1.8 Preventing the spread of sensitive technology in South Asia
    - 1.9 Cooperation between the US and India
        - 1.9.1 Against terrorism
        - 1.9.2 In fighting the spread of WMD
    - 1.10 Sharing high-technology with India
    - 1.11 Policy seeking to establish a strategic engagement with India

- **2. US Policymakers' Opinions**

- 2.1 Impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations
- 2.2 Impact of India's liberalization reforms and rapid economic growth on US-India relations
- 2.3 Concerns related to tensions between the India and Pakistan and possession of nuclear and missile capabilities
- 2.4 Impact of de-hyphenation on US-India relations
- 2.5 China's role in affecting the security dynamics in South Asia
- 2.6 Constraints to US foreign and nuclear policy towards India deriving from domestic legislation and international non-proliferation agreements
- 2.7 Appreciation of the role of individuals in improving US-India relations
- 2.8 Changes in US nuclear policy and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities and posture
- 2.9 Shared values and interests
- 2.10 Importance of sharing high-technology with India
- 2.11 Importance of establishing a strategic partnership with India
- 2.12 Importance of strengthening US-India defence cooperation
- 2.13 Effect of concerns about terrorism on US-India relations

- **3. Presidential preferences**
  - 3.1 President's commitment to transform the relationship with India
  - 3.2 Importance of India's economic rapid growth and market potential in transforming president's perceptions about India
  - 3.3 Changes in president's policies and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities
  - 3.4 Impact of concerns related to terrorism on president's commitment to get closer to India

2.4 Results from QCA

As stated earlier, one of the main purposes of QCA is to ensure that all relevant content of documents is taken into account during the subsequent analysis of these documents. The coding is also useful as a basis for a descriptive perspective of the content of these documents. Table 5 provides a summary of the result of QCA coding for the three periods covered by the analysis (1993-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2005). In the table, the columns indicate the

categories and subcategories that comprised the coding scheme and the rows show the relative frequencies pertaining to each period.

Relative frequencies have been calculated per period rather than as a total for the three periods. The periods have been distinguished on the basis of critical junctures in US-India relations that were highlighted in the literature. This ensures that any findings identified by QCA can be compared to those from previous studies. It also ensures that the significance of each period is not overlooked and is assessed both on its own merits and in conjunction with the other periods.

Table 5 Subcategory presence and relative frequency (in percentages) for the three periods

Period	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9.1	1.9.2	1.10	1.11	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.10	2.11	2.12	2.13	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	M	Tot.
1	17	19	5	7	6	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	7	11	0	3	0	0	7	0	0	0	1	0	3	2	1	0	6	100
2	12	21	4	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	8	0	1	2	1	20	1	0	1	0	0	7	2	8	0	4	100
3	17	5	1	2	5	1	0	0	5	2	4	1	2	5	16	2	0	1	0	5	2	0	6	1	2	6	1	0	1	7	100

When considering the salience of aspects of US policy towards India (subcategories 1.1 through 1.11), Table 5 shows that US policy tended to be dominated by the nuclear issue in periods 1 and 2 (subcategory 1.2). Subcategory 1.2 captures 19% and 21% of all coded content in periods 1 and 2 respectively. In period 3, however, the saliency of this policy dropped considerably, with subcategory 1.2 containing only 5% of all coded content. US policy relating to reducing tensions between India and Pakistan (subcategory 1.1) is of distinct salience in all three periods, without significant change over time.

Concerning US policymakers' views (subcategories 2.1 through 2.13), Table 5 shows that concerns about India's possession of advanced nuclear capabilities (subcategory 2.8), which was quite high during period 1 (7%), significantly increased during period 2 (20%) when India conducted its nuclear tests. In period 3, however, the relevance of this subcategory significantly decreased. US policymakers' concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan (subcategory 2.3) tended to remain more or less consistently high across all three periods.

Regarding presidential preferences (subcategories 3.1 through 3.4), it is interesting to note that presidential commitment to improve the relationship between the US and India (subcategory 3.1) began during the Clinton administration in period 1 and increased only slightly in subsequent periods, thus highlighting the importance of this subcategory throughout. Presidential concerns about India's nuclear capabilities (subcategory 3.3) were particularly high in period 2, but were largely absent in periods 1 and 3.

Although the frequencies in Table 5 are a useful indication of the salience of a particular theme or topic, they do not provide sufficient detail to understand the roots and context of US foreign policy and its evolution. For that purpose this study employs narrative event analysis.

The use of the narrative event analysis approach is not novel in the study of US-India relations. Indeed, many scholars employ it to interpret relevant pieces of information emerging from US and Indian primary sources and newspapers.[108] Their studies demonstrate that in order to understand the origins of the transformation of US relations it is indispensable to take into account the historical, political, and economic context in which this process occurred, and that is exactly what the narrative event analysis attempts to achieve. Yet, as mentioned in Chapter 1, these studies rarely, if ever, explain the procedures used to identify what is relevant in the documents being analysed, with only these relevant aspects feeding into the interpretive analysis that is developed. This lack of information makes it difficult, if not impossible, to replicate findings emerging from these studies and increases the risk of bias generated by the omission of relevant empirical information. In order to minimize these risks, this study is based on all documents that could be identified via a systematic search, and additionally ensures, by way of the use of QCA, that all the relevant pieces of information are examined when using narrative event analysis.

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[108] Abraham, Origins, pp.1-41; S. Agostini -Heinrich, La Relation Triangulaire, pp. 293-310; Chatterjee, India-US Relations, pp. 22-35; Mohan, *Impossible Allies*; Mishra, India-US Relations, pp. 79-100; Rajagopalan, Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House, pp. 545-556; Tellis, India. As a New Global Power, pp. 1-52.

Comparing the results emerging from QCA with the secondary literature

The aim of this section is to compare the results emerging from QCA with those emerging from the existing literature. The table below provides an overview of the US documents used by the most prominent authors in the field. The numbers correspond to the number assigned to the documents in the analysis (see the List of documents coded, pp. 207-240).

Table 6: Documents used by other scholars

Author	US documents used
Abraham	321
Pant	135; 321
Agostini-Heinrich	51; 90;136; 279; 306; 321.
Mohan	182; 241; 253; 267; 274; 301; 308; 310; 329; 311; 321.

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Table 6 shows that these scholars only used a very small number of the documents used in this study to analyse US foreign policy towards India. This implies, almost unavoidably, that they are at considerable risk of arriving at quite a different distribution of content from these documents than what is obtained (in Table 5) from the complete population of relevant documents that is used in this thesis. They are therefore, likely to miss, understate or overstate the importance of certain factors affecting US foreign policy towards India.

To further understand the significance of the number of documents used in this study in comparison with the previous works included in Table 6, it is necessary to break down the distribution of documents and the distribution of coded segments from those documents by period. To this end, three tables are

presented below. In all three tables the distribution of codes over the various (sub) categories is presented for the documents used by, respectively, Abraham, Agostini-Heinrich, Mohan, and Pant, and finally for the entire population of publicly available studies as used in this thesis. The numbers in each table represent frequencies as relative frequencies are of little use when the absolute numbers of coded document segments is as small as in the case of the four studies indicated.

Table 7 Distribution of coded document segments absolute frequencies period 1 (1993-1998)

	US policy												US policymakers' views													US presidential preferences					
	1.1	**1.2**	**1.3**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**1.8**	**1.9.1**	**1.9.2**	**1.10**	**1.11**	**2.1**	**2.2**	**2.3**	**2.4**	**2.5**	**2.6**	**2.7**	**2.8**	**2.9**	**2.10**	**2.11**	**2.12**	**2.13**	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.3**	**3.4**	**M**	**Tot.**
Abraham																															
Agostini-Heinrich	3		2			1									1																7
Mohan																															
Pant																															
This study	65	72	18	27	24	4	0	8	0	0	0	0	9	25	41	3	10	0	0	25	4	0	1	4	0	11	6	3	0	21	380

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Table 8 Distribution of coded document segments absolute frequencies period 2 (1998-2001)

	US policy												US policymakers' views													US presidential preferences					
	1.1	**1.2**	**1.3**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**1.8**	**1.9.1**	**1.9.2**	**1.10**	**1.11**	**2.1**	**2.2**	**2.3**	**2.4**	**2.5**	**2.6**	**2.7**	**2.8**	**2.9**	**2.10**	**2.11**	**2.12**	**2.13**	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.3**	**3.4**	**M**	**Tot.**
Abraham																															
Agostini-Heinrich	1	5						1																							7
Mohan																										1	1		1		4
Pant				1																						3		1			5
This study	74	127	26	8	1	0	10	3	0	0	0	6	4	9	49	0	6	9	3	112	5	0	5	0	0	42	15	48	0	31	593

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Table 9 Distribution of coded document segments absolute frequencies period 3 (2001-2005)

	US policy												US policymakers' views													US presidential preferences					
	1.1	**1.2**	**1.3**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**1.8**	**1.9.1**	**1.9.2**	**1.10**	**1.11**	**2.1**	**2.2**	**2.3**	**2.4**	**2.5**	**2.6**	**2.7**	**2.8**	**2.9**	**2.10**	**2.11**	**2.12**	**2.13**	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.3**	**3.4**	**M**	**Tot.**
Abraham		4		1			1		1	3	1															1		2			14
Agostini-Heinrich		5		1			1		1	3	1										1			1		2		2			18
Mohan	2	5	3	1	3		1		2	3	5	2	4	3	1			1	3	4	3		5		1	5	1	2		6	66
Pant		4		1			1		1	3	1															1		2			14
This study	103	32	6	10	29	6	3	3	31	10	24	9	14	29	101	10	2	6	7	28	10	2	34	5	10	35	7	2	8	41	617

Sources: Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007; C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Harsh V. Pant, The US-India nuclear Pact : Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2011).

From Tables 7-9, it can be seen that although the number of documents (and of coded document segments) varies between the four studies listed, they do not all use documents for all three periods. Only Agostini-Heinrich, for example, uses any documentary evidence for period 1, while the other three studies base their analysis for this period entirely on secondary sources (i.e. interviews, newspapers, other literature). Even when they used documentary evidence for a period, they still overlook relevant and important information. This is particularly noticeable in Tables 7 and 8. The high salience of periods 1 and 2 of nuclear policy concerns (category 1.2) for example, is not reflected in the very small number of documents used for these periods by, respectively, Agostini-Heinrich, Mohan, and Pant. To the extent that when the four studies listed in the tables use documentary evidence, they do so most extensively for period 3.

Tables 7-9 allow an assessment of the primary evidence basis for various claims made by each of these four scholars. Abraham claims to have examined US foreign policy towards India since the end of the Cold War, yet his analysis uses only one document pertaining to the third period. Pant uses two documents as primary evidence and he, too, uses no primary evidence at all in his analysis of period 1. Agostini-Heinrich uses six documents spread over the three periods, however, this is still a very small number of documents on which to draw conclusions about US foreign policy towards India. Mohan examines eleven documents, but most of these pertain to the third period, thus again highlighting the absence or very limited nature of primary evidence on which to base analyses of US foreign policy towards India across the three periods.

It is also very important to point out that across the works of these authors their examination of US policymakers' views is very weak, as can be seen by

the absence of frequencies in subcategories 2.1 to 2.13 in periods 1 and 2, as well as relatively few occurrences in period 3. All of these scholars argue that some US policymakers played an important role in shaping US foreign policy across the three periods. Yet, the lack of documentary evidence to support this assertion is problematic and contrasts starkly with the frequency obtained by this study's analysis of a much wider range of documents. This demonstrates that this study provides greater insight and more compelling evidence to support the arguments being made and the conclusions being reached, thus highlighting the value of this study compared to previous works.

The absence of documentary evidence is particularly noticeable with respect to US nuclear policy concerns in periods 1 and 2, and with respect to evidence of presidential commitment to improving US relations with India in periods 2 and 3. When looking at the entire population of publicly available official document, one of the most important subcategories across all three periods is subcategory 1.2, which pertains to US nuclear policy towards India. None of the four studies looked at in the Tables 6-9 used any documents that demonstrate its saliency. Similarly, subcategory 3.1 about presidential commitment to improving relations between the US and India is only identified in a small number of documents examined by the aforementioned scholars, whereas in this study it is identified as being very significant based on evidence gathered by a much larger number of documents from periods 2 and 3. These two examples are not the only, but the most salient clear-cut ones to illustrate the differences in documentary evidence between these existing works and this study. These examples, furthermore, show that the selection of documents is crucial to explain issues of change and continuity in policymaking. This thesis

thus offers a more persuasive and complete basis of primary evidence than the previous works cited and examined in the literature review (Chapter 1) and in these tables.

Timelines

While the results of QCA coding can be easily displayed in a tabular form (Table 5) that helps to assess the salience of the various categories, such a display is not helpful to clarify the historical location of these documents vis-à-vis each other, and amidst other events that may be of relevance to understand their meaning. Such a historical perspective can, however, be achieved by timelines that visually represent documents on a time-axis that can be used to locate other relevant events as well. Figure 1 presents such a timeline, in this instance for the first period of this study of US-India relations, from 1993 to 1998.



Figure 1 Distribution of documents and the key events occurring during the period 1993-1998

Figure 1 shows two timelines, one for the location in time of relevant US government documents, and a second for key events occurring over the same period, from 20th January 1993, to 10th May 1998. Each document is presented on the first timeline as a vertical marker; the height of these markers indicates the number of co-occurring documents at a given moment, as reflected in the calibration of the vertical axis. The second timeline refers to relevant events affecting US relations with India. A first conclusion that can be drawn from these timelines is that relevant documents are not evenly spread across the entire period.

Although these timelines are only suggestive in this respect, document presence appears in some instances to be associated to important events, such as the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Rao to the United States in 1994. Obviously, it requires inspection of the documents themselves to establish whether such temporal connections are indeed reflective of a linkage between document presence and these events, but these timelines are of assistance in contextualizing the content of the documents in question, and may also help to alert the analyst to the absence of documents in relation to events that could be expected to give rise official documents.[109]

Timelines can be useful not only to put the documents to be used in the interpretive analysis in context, but also to visualise the risk of incomplete usage of available empirical information. As an illustration, consider the top timeline of Figure 2, which presents for the third period of this study (2001-2005) the

[109] It is probable that a closer link between events and documents could be established if currently classified documents would be available. In other words and emphasised earlier in this thesis, the absence of publicly available official documents should not be interpreted as the absence of any official document. There is no expectation that all documents would be connected to relevant events as will be the product of the calendar of ongoing regular official activity.

temporal location of the relevant official documents identified by the process described in section 2.2. The two subsequent timelines in Figure 2 represent which of these documents were actually used in the two studies of US-India relations that were also referred to in Chapter 1 (Tables 1 and 2). The contrast between the top and subsequent two timelines illustrates the paucity of documentary evidence used in the respective studies and also that the documents used by these authors do not reflect the temporal distribution of all publicly available documents. Figures 2 also shows that these two studies did selected documents pertaining to different moments in the 2001-2005 period. This implies that the different interpretations of these authors of the drivers of US foreign policy towards India are not just the consequence of different theoretical perspectives, or of different interpretations of a shared empirical basis. To a considerable degree, then, the differences between these authors' accounts of the evolution of this bilateral relationship- as summarized in Table 4- are driven by each of them having looked at different bits of evidence. In the absence, however, of any explanation or justification for their divergent choices of selection of evidence these studies fail to provide a fruitful basis for confrontation of rivalling conceptual or theoretical perspectives.



Figure 2 Distribution of documents during the period 2001-2005

Sources: C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and the Global Order*, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006); Itty Abraham, *Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement*, East-West Center, Washington, 2007.

Conclusion

To understand the evolution US foreign policy towards India, this study relies on US official documents as empirical evidence. A systematic search for such documents yielded a grand total of 329 publicly available documents, all of which will be used in this study. The content of these documents will be subjected to a two-pronged analysis, combining Qualitative Content Analysis with narrative event analysis. This helps to maximise the advantages and mitigate the weaknesses of each of these two methods. QCA is used to ensure that all aspects of the documents are taken into account, and thus safeguards against partial reading and implicit and ad hoc selection of content from various documents. The development of a set of coding categories from QCA was partly driven by the content of the documents, thus avoiding that information is overlooked that does not fit (either in a falsificatory or in a confirmatory sense) with particular expectations or theoretical perspectives. The results from QCA feed into the next stage of analysis, by alerting the analyst to aspects of content of documents that have to be taken into account during the analysis. Narrative event analysis helps to construct meaning of documentary content with regard to US-India relations, putting the documents and their content into context. It also offers the advantage of providing an understanding of the phenomenon investigated, by building a narrative through which putative causal factors are identified and stages of evolution of the phenomenon under study can be uncovered. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 report the results of these analyses and the resulting interpretations for each of the three periods distinguished: 1993-1998; 1998-2001; and 2001-2005.

Chapter 3: 20th January 1993-11th May 1998

Introduction

This chapter examines the period from 20th January 1993, when President Clinton came into office, to 11th May 1998, the date in which India conducted a series of nuclear tests in Pokhran. This chapter examines the evidence for signs of change in US foreign policy towards India in this period and identifies the factors behind such change.

As seen in Chapter 1, the survey of the literature shows that the demise of the Soviet Union and India's improved economic growth favoured the rapprochement between the United States and India.[110] For example, Sophie Heinrich-Agostini claims that the events taking place in the period 1989-1991 laid the foundation for the improvement of the bilateral relationship.[111] A similar view was also expressed by Teresita Schaffer who points out that the US-India partnership was made possible by India's loss of its Soviet friend and by steadily improving economic growth that widened its opening to the world.[112] Despite a post-Cold War context seemingly more favourable to rapprochement, the bilateral relationship did not experience marked improvement.[113]

To date, the existing literature fails to explain why the relationship between the two countries remained unchanged. Some scholars link the lack of change to the US nuclear policy and to Clinton's emphasis on capping, reducing,

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[110] Ganguly and Kapur, The transformation, pp. 647-649; Harsh V. Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact and the Non-Proliferation Regime. Triumph of Politics over Institutions, Paper presented for the 48th Annual ISA Convention, *Politics, Policy, and Responsible Scholarship*, Chicago, IL, USA, 28 February-3 March 2007; Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, India-United States Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan, *Berkley Journal of Social Sciences*, 2011, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 5; Hathaway, The US-India Courtship, pp. 7-8; Abraham, *Origins*, pp. 7-8.
[111] Heinrich-Agostini, La Relation Triangulaire, pp. 295-296.
[112] Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century*, pp. 1-17.
[113] Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 21.

and eliminating India's nuclear weapon program, but they do not sufficiently explore the negative impact that nuclear-related factors had on delaying the change in retarding the improvement of US relations with India.[114] Moreover, these scholars do not explicitly mention the way in which sources were collected and relevant information identified and interpreted. As a result, it is impossible to have a thorough account of the period and of the role played by the nuclear question on shaping US relations with India.

This chapter aims to offer a more complete account of the period 1993-1998 using all available documents (as described in chapter 2) and by combining Qualitative Content Analysis with narrative event analysis. As explained in chapter 2, QCA helps to establish systematic and rigorous procedures through which to analyse US government documents. It is important to point out that it is through the use of this method that it is possible to systematically assess (or where necessary re-assess) the significance of some of the factors identified in the secondary literature, as well as to identify new factors. The combination of a wider basis of evidence, analysed by using QCA and the narrative event analysis, thus provides fresh insight into the understanding of the complex relationship between the United States and India in a way which has not been feasible when relying solely on previous studies.

The qualitative content analysis of US documents for this period will show that the lack of change in US relations with India stemmed from the fact that nuclear-related factors had a stronger impact than claimed by the secondary literature on the relationship, thus minimizing the positive implications deriving

[114] Agostini-Heinrich, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, p. 21; Tellis, What Should We Expect from India, p. 235.

from India's economic reforms. Moreover, this study calls into question the importance attributed by the existing literature to the demise of the Soviet Union in transforming US foreign policy towards India. The analysis shows that the desire of US policymakers to improve US-India relations did not result in India becoming a priority of Clinton's foreign policy agenda. This was because at that time, the Clinton administration had other urgent preoccupations, such as the economic and political crisis in Russia, the ongoing strife in Somalia, the Balkan wars, and the humanitarian crisis in Haiti.[115] All these events distracted the US government and prevented it from investing more time and resources in improving the relationship with India. In addition, in spite of India's steady adoption of market-oriented reforms delivered improved growth, the country remained a difficult market for US businesses. As a consequence, US efforts to make economic engagement the driving force of the rapprochement produced only limited results. This chapter argues that these two factors (the dissolution of the USSR and India's economic reorientation) were necessary but not sufficient conditions to trigger the process of transformation leading to a rapid rapprochement at a later moment. This suggests that the change was not "a paradigm shift"[116]as sometimes suggested in the secondary literature, but rather the result of the convergence of various factors, emerging at different points of time.

The chapter is divided into nine sections, each of which corresponds to a subcategory of QCA. Subcategories are reported in discussed in order of

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[115] Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutin Press, 2004), p. 25.
[116] C. Raja Mohan, A Paradigm Shift toward South Asia, *The Washington Quarterly*, 2002, pp. 141-155; Mishra, India-US Relations: A Paradigm Shift,. 79-100.

frequency, from the highest to the lowest.[117] Section 3.1 looks at changes in US nuclear policy towards India. Section 3.2 focuses on US policy aimed at reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. Section 3.3 deals with US policymakers' concerns related to subcontinental tensions and India's possession of nuclear capabilities. Section 3.4 examines US policy aimed at strengthening economic and commercial cooperation with India. Section 3.5 focuses on US policymakers' views about India's liberalization reforms and economic growth. Section 3.6 concerns US policymakers' views about US non-proliferation policy and India's nuclear posture. Section 3.7 focuses on US policy of urging India to adhere to non-proliferation treaties. Section 3.8 deals with US efforts to build defence cooperation with India. The last section explores American policymakers' views on how changes in the international system affected US-India relations.

3.1 Changes in US nuclear policy towards India

During this period, the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach underwent a significant transformation. The new policy was never systematically and consistently implemented, owing to divergent views within the US government on how to deal with the Indian nuclear program. This is an important finding because it provides a more thorough understanding of the lack of change from 1993 to 1998 and of the dynamics within the foreign policymaking process.

US non-proliferation policy lacked consistency during this period. At the beginning of 1995, the US government announced a change in its non-proliferation approach towards India, which shifted from capping, reducing, and

[117] Only subcategories which occurred more than ten times were considered salient and reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

eliminating to seeking to cap India's nuclear capabilities.[118] The new policy, however, was not implemented until after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. The analysis has revealed that the primary sources contradict one another: some speeches and testimonies before the US Congress acknowledge the shift in American nuclear objectives, while US national strategy and the Department of Defence report on nuclear proliferation show that the non-proliferation strategy of the United States continued to be focused on persuading India to give up its nuclear weapons.[119] These contradictions seem to suggest that US decision making process towards India was dominated by the struggle between two groups with incompatible foreign policy objectives and interests.

The existing literature does not explain the discrepancies emerging from the documents coded. Some studies focusing on this period of the relationship claim that the Clinton administration remained anchored to the capping, reducing and eliminating approach until May 1998. These works portray the US government as a unitary rational actor without accounting for the impact of

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[118] William Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=828, accessed 21April 2015.

[119] The primary sources reporting the change in the policy of the United States are: William Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995; Lynn E. Davis, US Department of State Daily Briefing, 28 February 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/arms_briefing/950228arms_briefing.html, accessed 21 April 2015; Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995) pp. 111-112; Robin Raphel, Responses to Questions Asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995) p. 184; John Holum, US Department of State Briefing, 13 April 1995, available http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/arms_briefing/950413arms_briefing.html, accessed on 21st April 2015.The primary sources that do not report the change are: The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995, p. 14, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/nss.pdf, accessed 10 February 2016; William Clinton, The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, 11 April 1995, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, available in Nexis; US Department of Defence, Proliferation Threat and Response 1996, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/prolif/preface.html, accessed 22 April 2015.

bureaucratic factors on foreign policy choices.[120] Other studies, instead, recognise that American nuclear policy underwent a transformation between 1994 and the beginning of 1995. These articles tend to focus on the implications of the change on US nuclear strategy and on the non-proliferation regime, but they pay limited attention to the foreign policy making process of the United States. George Perkovich argues that the shift in US nuclear policy signalled the acceptance by the president and his advisors that "nuclear weapons would be part of South Asia for the foreseeable future".[121] A similar view is also expressed by Mario Carranza who stresses that Perry's statement marked the recognition by the Clinton administration that "non-weaponized deterrence was at work in South Asia".[122] Francine Frankel mentions that by 1995, it became clear that reducing and eliminating "[were] increasingly regarded as unrealistic",[123] but she does not does not go any further.

Despite the growing awareness that India's nuclear program had become a reality, evidence from various interviews shows that there were institutional constraints which prevented significant change in US nuclear policy at this time. The main factor impeding substantial change was that non-proliferation experts within governmental institutions were opposed to accepting that India's development of a nuclear program should be recognised. Some policymakers

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[120] Vinay Kumar Malhotra, *The Clinton Administration and South Asia, 1993-1997,(* New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1997); Harold A. Gould, *The South Asia Story. The First Sixty Years of US Relations with India and Pakistan*, (Los Angeles; London: SAGE, 2010), p. 91;Vendana Bhatia, Non-proliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India: Shifting of Nuclear Goalposts?, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 32, issue 3, 2013, pp. 261-282.

[121] George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: the Impact on Global Proliferation*, (Berkeley, California; London: University of California Press,1999) p. 335.

[122] Mario Carranza, Asian Security at Crossroads: US Non-proliferation Policy towards South Asia after the Indian and the Pakistani Tests, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 23, no. 1, 2002, p. 107.

[123] Francine Frankel, Indo-US Relations: The Future Is Now, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1996, p. 130.

and scholars argued that although the Clinton administration had to come to terms with the idea that India possessed advanced nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, there were elements within the US government that were very committed to arms control and non-proliferation. As a result, they were reluctant to make concessions to India which could compromise the non-proliferation regime and American global non-proliferation commitments.[124] Stephen Cohen claimed that non-proliferation specialists working in the US government at that time "looked at non-proliferation as a religion"[125], meaning that they were so obsessed with curbing nuclear proliferation and advancing US non-proliferation goals in the subcontinent to "realise that India could cap, but it was never going to roll back and eliminate".[126] A similar view was expressed by Bruce Riedel who stressed that some officials "wanted to change the reality that India had nuclear capabilities".[127] The incapability of non-proliferation specialists to come to terms with the idea that India was never going to give up its nuclear option led to the adoption of a nuclear policy whose goals were unrealistic and unachievable.

During the period 1993-1998, the US foreign policy agenda towards India largely focused on the nuclear question. The Clinton administration devoted a lot of time and resources to seeking to persuade India to cap, reduce, and eliminate its nuclear capabilities without achieving any significant result. The lack of progress stimulated a shift in US nuclear goalposts from capping, reducing, and eliminating to seeking to put a lid to India's nuclear program. The

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[124] Based on author's interviews with Phil Zelikow, Dov Zakheim, Stephen Cohen, Bruce Riedel, March 2014.
[125] Interview with Stephen Cohen, March 2014.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Interview with Bruce Riedel, March 2014.

new policy was officially announced at the beginning of 1995, but it was never carried out. The secondary literature does not provide a thorough picture of the change in the policy and of the contradictions emerging from the qualitative content analysis. Interviews with Clinton era officials and scholars for this thesis have revealed that the non-proliferation strategy of the United States was not carried out because of frictions within the US government between groups with conflicting foreign policy goals, interests, and views about how to deal with a nuclear capable India. The impossibility of establishing a compromise on this issue created a stalemate that made it impossible for the Clinton administration to advance US non-proliferation goals in South Asia and to get closer to India. This is a very salient finding because this impasse impeded the adoption of a more realistic policy that, if implemented, could have minimised the negative impact of the nuclear issue on the improvement of the US-India relationship.

3.2 Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan

Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan was together with fighting the spread of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent a number one priority for the Clinton administration. The official policy did not significantly change throughout this period. The lack of change is shown by the president and his advisors continuing to urge India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their nuclear and ballistic missile programs, to implement a series of nuclear and non-nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs), to avoid any escalatory move that could lead to a conflict between the two countries, and to enter into a bilateral dialogue to solve their territorial disputes. US war prevention efforts tended to focus on Kashmir which was seen as the flashpoint for a nuclear

confrontation between India and Pakistan. Findings from QCA call into question the degree of importance accorded by the secondary literature to this factor.

Some scholars claim that US-India relations were adversely affected by the Clinton administration's emphasis on Kashmir.[128] They argue that the US posture concerning Kashmir increased India's level of mistrust and suspicion towards US intentions, strengthening the feeling that the United States was tilting towards Pakistan.[129] They report that in September 1993, in a speech to the UNGA President Clinton compared the Kashmir question to the ethnic, religious, and civil wars in Angola, Caucasus, and Bosnia.[130] One month later, in an off-the-record briefing said the United States saw Kashmir as "a disputed-territory",[131] meaning that "[the US] did not recognise the Instrument of Accession".[132] She also downplayed the importance of the Simla Accord stressing that "it [was] 20-plus years old and there [had] been very few discussions, if any, under that accord".[133]

Results from QCA have shown that the Clinton administration refused to be drawn on Kashmir for two reasons. Throughout the period 1993-1998, the president and his advisors repeatedly stressed that "the best way to resolve the

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[128] Amulya K. Tripathy and Rabi Narayan Tripathy, *US Policy Towards India: A Post-Cold War Study*, (New Delhi: Reference Press, 2008), p. 180; Malhotra, *The Clinton administration and South Asia*, pp. 130-133; Mansingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership, p. 2; Nalini Kant Jha, Reviving US-India Friendship in a Changing International Order, *Asian Survey*, 1994, vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 1036-1037; Anand Mathur, *Indo-American Relations: Foreign Policy Orientations and Perspectives of P.V. Narasimha Rao and Bill Clinton*, (Jodhpur: Scientific Publishers, 2003), pp. 51-55; C. Raja Mohan, Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion, *The Washington Quarterly*, 2007, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 102-103.

[129] Malhotra, *The Clinton administration and South Asia*, , pp. 130-131; Mansigh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership, p. 2; Bukhari, India-United States Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan, p. 6.

[130] Malhotra, *The Clinton administration and South Asia*, p. 129; Tripathy, *US Policy Towards India*, p. 179; Mathur, *Indo-American Relations*, p. 51.

[131] Robin Raphel as quoted in V. K. Malhotra, *The Clinton administration and South Asia*, p. 130.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

dispute over Kashmir [was] through direct discussions between the governments of India and Pakistan".[134] The Clinton administration was concerned that a direct involvement in the Kashmir dispute could compromise American attempts to maintain stable relations with both India and Pakistan. As John Malott explained when he appeared before the US Congress, the US government was seeking to pursue a more balanced approach towards India and Pakistan which implied avoiding any potential misunderstanding that could create "a zero-sum situation"[135] in which any US move would "immediately produce a reaction either from India or from Pakistan".[136] Moreover, evidence from the documents indicates that American policymakers reported that the United States had limited influence on resolving the Kashmir question because the Indian government had made it very clear that it saw it as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan that needed to be settled without any external mediation.[137]

Reducing subcontinental tensions was a number one priority of US foreign policy agenda towards India, but its impact on the transformation of US relations with India was not very high during this period. Some scholars argue that according to the Indians, in 1993, US statements questioning the Kashmir's accession to India hindered the relationship between the two countries and

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[134] McCurry, US Department of State Daily Briefing, 29 October 1993, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9310/931029db.html, accessed on 21st April 2015.

[135] J. Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 86.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Kenneth Bacon, US Department of Defence News Briefing: Mr. Kenneth Bacon, 17 January 1995, available at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=88, accessed on 21st April 2015; R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 February 1995, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 51; R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 7 March 1995, p. 52.

signalled a tilt towards Pakistan. The documents analysed, conversely, have indicated that the Clinton administration sought to maintain a balanced approach in order to avoid becoming involved in the zero-sum game dynamics characterising the relationship with New Delhi and Islamabad.

3.3 Concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear conflict

The Clinton administration saw South Asia as one of the areas of the world where there was a higher probability that a regional conflict would lead to a nuclear escalation.[138] The advanced stage of India and Pakistan's nuclear programs together with the deterioration of their bilateral relationship, largely contributed to strengthening the feeling in the United States that the Indian subcontinent was "the most dangerous place on earth".[139] The Clinton administration was extremely concerned that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could affect the peace and the stability in the region and also have a negative impact on US economic and geo-strategic interests in the subcontinent and beyond. This finding is indispensable to have a better understanding of the strong impact that policymakers' perceptions and concerns had on shaping US foreign policy agenda during this period.

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[138] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, April and May 1993), p. 250; R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 February 1995, p. 252.

[139] Interview with scholar 1. Anonymity requested.

The Indian subcontinent became of interest to Clinton officials owing to India and Pakistan's possession of sophisticated nuclear capabilities and means of their delivery that could be used in case of military conflict. American policymakers described the rapid progress of the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan as "terribly destabilizing"[140], "worrisome"[141] and "one of the most dangerous situations"[142] which the US had to face. Official information about India and Pakistan's nuclear programs before the 1998 nuclear tests remains unavailable. Nonetheless, the documents which are available show that Clinton's advisors had no doubt that the two countries "could assemble a number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short timeframe, and [had] combat aircraft that [could] be modified to deliver them in a crisis".[143] Moreover, both countries had successfully tested missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and of reaching the other's territory, thus putting at risk major population areas, including Islamabad and New Delhi.[144] US

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[140] R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 9 March 1995, p. 92.

[141] Warren Christopher, Testimony before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st session, 25 March 1993, (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 212.

[142] Madeleine Albright, Remarks at the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, 15 April 1997, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/970415.html, viewed on 22nd April 2015.

[143] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, p. 250.
See also: J. Malott, Questions for the Record submitted to Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, p. 255 and 261; McCurry, US Department of State Daily Briefing, 24 November 1993, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9311/931124db.html, accessed on 21st April 2015; R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 7 March 1995, p. 36; Joseph Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, March 1995) p. 99.

[144] James Woolsey, Prepared Statement before the Committee of Government Affairs, US Senate, 103rd Congress, 1st session, Washington D.C., 24 February 1993, available at http://www.archive.org/stream/proliferationthr00unit/proliferationthr00unit_djvu.txt, accessed on 21st April 2015.

policymakers believed that a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent would have not only threatened the precarious peace and stability in the subcontinent, but also nullified American economic interests in "a region that contained a quarter of the world's population and one of its most important emerging markets".[145] Department of Defence officials also stressed that an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would have had a detrimental impact on US interests in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf.[146]

Another element that played a crucial role in shaping US policymakers' perceptions was the underlying tension between India and Pakistan. There is substantial evidence which highlights that relations between the two countries were "bad and showing no sign of improvement".[147] A major obstacle to the rapprochement between India and Pakistan was Kashmir, where the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Clinton officials reported of skirmishes across the Line of Control (LOC) and of ongoing tensions and disorders caused by Kashmiri militants supported by Pakistan.[148] They also stressed that the domestic political pressure to which the Indian and the Pakistani governments were subjected made it difficult, if not impossible, to find a common ground

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[145] The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/, accessed on 5th December 2015.

[146] William J. Clinton, The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, 11th April 1995, Public Papers of the Presidents, available in Nexis; J. Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, pp. 99-100; R. Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, p. 92.

[147] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st and 2nd session, 5 December 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 8.

[148] J. Malott, Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994) p. 165.

on Kashmir. [149] Given the complexity of the situation, the US government believed that there was serious danger that a future crisis between the two nuclear capable neighbours could get out of control.[150]

US policymakers' concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan potentially leading to a nuclear conflict are indispensable to understand the lack of change in US relations with India and to determine the direction of US foreign policy towards India during the period 1993-1998. Officials in the Clinton administration strongly believed that the deterioration of the relationship between India and Pakistan increased the chances that nuclear weapons in a military conflict, with Kashmir as the flashpoint. These concerns significantly contributed to making reducing tensions and fighting nuclear proliferation top priorities of the US foreign policy agenda towards India to the detriment of US efforts to strengthen US-India economic and defence cooperation. They also led the Clinton administration to maintain a hard line on non-proliferation that contributed to widening the political divide between the United States and India.

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[149] Robin Raphel, Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, p. 98; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st and 2nd session, 5 December 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 8; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, 10 March 1994, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 141.

[150] Robin Raphel, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104 Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, (Washington DC: US government printing office), pp. 93-94.

3.4 Strengthening economic and commercial cooperation with India

In spite of the fact that the Clinton administration sought to use economic engagement as a way to move closer to India, the US-India relationship did not undergo any significant change. Between 1993 and 1998, the volume of US-India trade increased, but not sufficiently to make economic interaction the driving force for transforming the relationship because India's transition to market-oriented economy was slow and difficult. Some scholars acknowledge that progress in the development of closer economic and commercial ties between the United States and India was quite slow.[151] These studies, however, do not explain the impact of this factor on the transformation of the US relationship with India. The use of qualitative content analysis combined with interviews with American policymakers has been extremely useful to fill this gap in the literature and to provide a more thorough understanding of why US policy of economic engagement with India failed to become the driving force of the rapprochement between the two countries during the period 1993-1998.

The US made strenuous efforts to develop economic ties with India by identifying it as one of ten Big Emerging Markets (BEMs).[152] This strategy was aimed at fostering US economic and commercial ties with India, a country that

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[151] S. P. Kapur and S. Ganguly, The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations, p. 649; Aneek Chatteijee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity? An Anatomy of Post-Cold War India-US Relations, *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 2010, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 22-23 V. K. Malhotra, *The Clinton Administration and South Asia*, p. 165; Stephen P. Cohen, *India Emerging Power*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 288; K. Jha, Reviving US-India Friendship in a Changing International Order, p. 1043; A. Mathur, Indo-American Relations, pp. 174-192.

[152] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 2 February 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 10. See also Robin Raphel, Prepared Statement Submitted to the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, 10 March 1994, p. 143; Jeffrey Garten, Prepared Statement Submitted to the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 7 March 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 21.

could "be one of the most important growth markets for US exporters in the coming decade".[153] To broaden the scope of US-India economic engagement, the Department of Commerce organised a Presidential Business Development Mission to India led by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, in January 1995. Through this visit the US government wanted to deepen US-Indian commercial relations, in order to help US companies to do business in India, and to develop solid relations with the Indian policymakers and the private sector.[154] The establishment of closer economic ties would have also enabled the Clinton administration to forge stronger political and security ties with India.[155] Ron Brown and his group of twenty-five CEO's signed $7 billion worth of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for commercial deals.[156] Moreover, the mission provided the opportunity to build personal relationships with government officials and representatives of the private sector and to establish fora, such as the Indo-US Joint Subcommission on Economic and Commercial Relations and other working groups, [157] where the two countries could "bring up crucial issues and concerns, from intellectual property rights to high tariffs, from human rights to regulatory concerns".[158]

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[153] John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st session, 28 April 1993, p. 93.
[154] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before to the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 7 March 1995, pp. 14-15.
[155] Robin Raphel, Statement before Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 9 February 1995, p. 74.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., p. 72.
[158] Jeffrey Garten, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 2 February 1995, p. 183.

These strenuous efforts did not achieve any tangible result. This was because India's transition from a top-down, nominally centrally planned economy to one of market-oriented policy was quite slow and difficult. The first wave of economic reforms created "significant opportunities for the United States",[159] attracting more US investments and opening up competition in some sectors, such as power generation, public infrastructure, and telecommunication.[160] Notwithstanding this, India's high tariff barriers in some sectors, restrictions on investments, lack of transparency in government procurements, intellectual properties right issues, and the slow resolution of commercial disputes, were major obstacles to the development of strong commercial and economic ties during the 1993-1998 period.[161] This is confirmed by a 1993 Congressional Research Service report stressing that in spite of the positive results achieved by Indian Prime Minister Rao's liberalisation reforms, the process of transition towards a market-oriented economy remained extremely slow. The CRS study reports that although tariffs on many goods had been cut, India's tariffs remained the highest in the worlds. The process of privatisation of state industries was slowed down by strong opposition from trade unions, the majority of whose members were government

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[159] Charlene Barshefsky, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 2 February 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 9.

[160] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Session, 2nd session, 10 March 1994, p. 3 and p. 142; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 February 1995, p. 254; Raymond Vickery, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st and 2nd session, 18 April 1996, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 46-47; S. Cohen, *India Emerging Power*, p. 104.

[161] Raj G. Javalgi and Vijay S. Talluri, The Emerging Role of India in International Business, *Business Horizons*, September-October 1996, vol. 39, issue 5, pp. 83-85.

employees. Moreover, Rao's economic reforms contributed to raising the level of foreign direct investments in India, but not by enough to attract the large amount of investments necessary to improve the efficiency of the Indian economy.[162]

This is also reflected in interviews with key American officials. A former government official pointed out that despite the success of India's economic reforms, it needed time to see results from a transformation from a state planned economy to a market-oriented one. He said this was because "Indian market was always a complicated one for the US because there were a lot of protective arrangements that made things hard… It took Manmohan Singh a long time. The Indians were still tied up in a kind of Nehruvian idea about the role of the state and to get rid of that required a huge change".[163] Bruce Riedel confirmed this time lag by stressing how, in the early 1990s, India remained "a yet-to-emerge market. You can dream that one day one billion Indians will all want to buy things made in the United States but in 1993 that was a dream and not a reality".[164] A similar view was also expressed by another former government official who stressed that "initially, the economic reforms process was more about opening India to the world than it was about internal restructuring its policies". He also added that the transformation occurred slowly, "it took ten years to transform to the point that the Indian economy began to grow".[165]

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[162] Richard P. Cronin and Barbara Leitch LePoer, *South Asia: U.S. Interests and Policy Issues, Report for Congress*, no. 93-243, available at http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/93-243f.htm, accessed on 8th February 2016.
[163] Interview with senior government official 2. Anonymity requested.
[164] Interview with Bruce Riedel.
[165] Interview with senior government official 1. Anonymity requested.

Between 1994 and 1995, the Clinton administration sought to develop closer economic and commercial ties with India, a country destined to become one of the major world's markets. American policymakers believed that strong economic and commercial relations would have enabled the Clinton administration to rapidly overcome the estrangement that had characterised the US-India relationship for almost five decades, strengthening the cooperation between the two countries in the political and security field. Although the volume of trade and investments between the United States and India had increased, US policy of economic engagement with India had a limited impact on the transformation of the relationship during the period 1993-1998. Evidence from the documents and interviews has shown that high tariff barriers, restrictions on foreign investments, and IPR issues, continued to make India a difficult market for American companies.

3.5 US policymakers' perceptions about the impact of India's liberalisation reforms and economic growth on US-India relations

The economic liberalisation reforms launched by the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh caught the attention of American officials who began to show increasing interests in India's enormous economic potential. It also contributed to positively changing US policymakers' perceptions about India which was no longer seen as ally of the Soviet Union with a "state-dominated socialist-type economy"[166] but as "one of

[166] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 7 March 1995, p. 30.

the most important growth markets for US exporters in the coming decade".[167] The secondary literature stresses the importance of India's economic growth and of its crucial role in paving the way for a rapprochement between the two countries.[168] This finding, however, remains crucial to have a better understanding of the strong impact that policymakers' perceptions about India's economic growth had on shaping US foreign policy agenda during this period.

The success of India's economic reforms combined with the increasing commercial opportunities deriving from a stronger economic cooperation between the two countries, prompted a significant transformation in US policymakers' outlook towards India. According to Raymond Vickery, the economic changes taking place in India in the early 1990s removed a major obstacle to improving US-India relations. During the Cold War, the adoption of incompatible economic approaches contributed to deepening the economic estrangement between the two countries. The socialist economic strategy introduced by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru was not compatible with the American capitalist system and contributed to strengthen the feeling among US policymakers that India was aligned with the Soviet Union.[169] The demise of the USSR and a subsequent shift in India's economic policy served to change this dynamic, which led to improved economic relations between the United States and India.

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[167] John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st session, 28 April 1993, p. 93.

[168] S. P. Kapur and S. Ganguly, The transformation of US-India relations, p. 643; I. Abraham, Origins of the United States-India Agreement, p. 8; V. K. Malhotra, *The Clinton Administration and South Asia*, p. 165; S. Cohen, *India Emerging Power*, pp. 287-288; A. Mathur, *Indo-American Relations*, pp. 174-192.

[169] Interview with Raymond Vickery, March 2014.

India's economic growth pushed the United States to recognise India's enormous potential and the numerous affinities existing between the two countries. American officials described the economic changes taking place in India as "impressive",[170] "the most exciting development in Indo-US relations for the past several decades",[171] and a "tremendous opportunity for the United States".[172] They stressed that with a population of 870,000,000 people and a middle-class approaching 250,000,000 people,[173] India had the potential to become "a very major market for the United States"[174] and "a very important economic partner".[175] This contributed to strengthen the feeling among key Clinton officials that the demise of the Soviet Union and India's abandoning of the Nehruvian socialist approach offered the unprecedented opportunity to overcome decades of estrangement and to forge closer ties with a country with which the United States shared "tremendous commonalities".[176]

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[170] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, 2 February 1995, p. 18.
[171] John Malott, Statement before the Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1993, p. 93.
[172] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 March 1995, p. 13.
[173] John Malott, Statement before the Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1993, p. 93.
[174] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, 2 February 1995, p. 18.
[175] Ibid.
See also: John Malott, Statement before the Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1993, p. 93; Robin Raphel, Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1994, p. 142; Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, 2 February 1995, p. 186; Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 March 1995, pp. 13, 17, and 20.
[176] Jeffrey Garten, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 March 1995, p. 13, and pp. 16-17.

India's transition towards market-based economy had a strong impact on shaping US policymakers' perceptions during the period 1993-1998 and in determining the direction of US foreign policy. American policymakers believed that the increasing convergence of US and Indian economic and commercial interests provided the unique opportunity to President Clinton to get closer to India, and in thus doing, to put an end to decades of estrangement. As seen in the previous section, the Clinton administration sought to build closer economic ties with India, but the policy produced limited results. The US policy of economic engagement served to lay the foundations for economic cooperation between the two countries, but it did not help to bridge the political divide existing between the two countries.

3.6 US policymakers' perceptions about changes in US nuclear policy and about India's nuclear capabilities

South Asian experts working in the Department of State and Department of Defence officials were critical of the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach pursued by the Clinton administration in South Asia. By 1995, these officials came to recognise that reducing and eliminating were "not realistic"[177] and "unattainable",[178] owing to India's security concerns and domestic political considerations. This is a relevant finding because many studies focusing on this period describe the nuclear policy carried out by the Clinton administration, but they do not explore policymakers' views and perceptions. These opinions are important to understand the reasons that led to a minor revision of the capping,

[177] Bob Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 March 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996) p. 112.
[178] William J. Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995.

reducing, and eliminating approach. They also help to explain why the non-proliferation strategy of the United States became an obstacle to the improvement of the bilateral relationship during the period 1993-1998.

The failure of the capping, reducing, eliminating approach stemmed from the fact that the policy did not sufficiently take into account the complexity of the triangular dynamics between India, China, and Pakistan and their impact on India's security concerns and nuclear aspirations. After attending to India and Pakistan's military briefings at the beginning of 1995, the US Secretary of Defence William Perry recognised that reducing and eliminating were impossible to achieve, owing to India and Pakistan's asymmetrical threat perceptions.[179] He explained that Pakistan saw "its nuclear program as a deterrent not only to India's nuclear capability, but also to India's conventional superiority".[180] India, instead, "[was worried] about Pakistan, but it want[ed] to retain its nuclear capability to deter the Chinese military, which [was] superior to India both in nuclear and in conventional capabilities".[181] This means that in order to persuade India to give up its nuclear capabilities, it would have been necessary not only to tackle India's security concerns about the Pakistani nuclear

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[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] William J. Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 93; Joseph Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 111; US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, April and May 1993), pp. 250-251; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 9 February 1995, p. 52 and p. 253; William J. Perry , Ever Vigilant in the Asia-Pacific Region, Remarks at the Japan Society, New York City, 12 September 1995, available at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=971, accessed on 22 April 2015; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific Committee on International Relations, , 5 December 1995, p. 9.

program, but also the perceived threat from China. Evidence from the documents suggests that US policymakers believed that this would have been highly unlikely to succeed, owing to US limited influence on China. Robin Raphel explained to the US Congress that despite the growing awareness within the Clinton administration that India "need[ed] a strong defence" against China,[182] the US could not do anything but to "seek to engage China more fully in discussions on South Asia and to encourage China to discuss with India mutual threat perceptions".[183]

Domestic political considerations in India represented an obstacle to the implementation of the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach too.[184] American policymakers pointed out that the development of a nuclear arsenal enjoyed "strong public support [in India]"[185] since they were seen as the currency of power and of equality to nuclear weapons states, especially to China.[186] In the 1993 report to Congress on US non-proliferation progress in South Asia, the Clinton administration reported that according to an Indian opinion poll, 85 percent of the respondents were in favour of keeping India's

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[182] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 111.
[183] Ibid., p. 98.
[184] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 8 April 1993, p. 259; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 94; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific Committee on International Relations, 5 December 1995, p.16; US Department of State, Report to Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Non/proliferation in South Asia, Released by the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, 15 June 1997, available at http://fas.org/irp/threat/970615-dos-nonpro.htm, accessed on 22 April 2015.
[185] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 94.
[186] US Department of State, Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia, Report to Congress, 8 February 1994, available at http://fas.org/irp/threat/940216-327448.htm, accessed 21 April 2015; US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 28 April 1993, p. 251.

nuclear option open.[187] The report also added that the Indians would have seen "any retreat by the government from the principle that India [had] the moral and strategic right to nuclear weapons … could cause the government to fall".[188] This made it more difficult for the United States to gain concessions from the Indian government on non-proliferation.

Evidence from documents and interviews has shown that the emphasis of the United States on reducing and eliminating India's nuclear capabilities had a detrimental impact on the attempts of the Clinton administration to improve the relationship with India. Robin Raphel argued that the ability of the United States to broaden the bilateral relationship was negatively influenced because it proved to be impossible to "find a common ground [with India] on this vital issue of non-proliferation".[189] A similar point was also made by Philip Zelikow who claimed that the relationship between Washington and New Delhi had "a split personality because of the nuclear issue".[190] He also added that "the nuclear question represented a stumbling block. [On the one hand] you have the structure of permanent hostility to India's nuclear status and [on the other] you have this other structure that says let's be friend with India. The two structures were in permanent conflict and in permanent tension".[191] A former government official said that the impossibility to reconcile these two foreign policy objectives prevented the Clinton administration from "develop[ing] a more congenial relationship with India".[192]

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[187] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 28 April 1993, p. 259.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 93.
[190] Interview with Phil Zelikow, March 2014.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Interview with senior government official 3.

US policymakers' views about the non-proliferation policy of the United States towards India changed over time. Some South Asian experts in the Department of State and officials working in the Department of Defence came to recognise that reducing and eliminating were impossible to achieve. They also believed that the primacy accorded by the Clinton administration to non-proliferation was an obstacle to improving the relationship with India which saw nuclear weapons as indispensable to satisfy its security needs and fulfil its great power aspirations.

3.7 Urging India to adhere to non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes

President Clinton and his advisors repeatedly urged India to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), to join the negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).[193] US policy of urging India to adhere to the non-proliferation regime failed because the two countries had conflicting views on the non-proliferation regime and how to deal with nuclear weapons. Numerous studies have already highlighted that the huge gap in terms of goals and perceptions existing between the two countries on nuclear proliferation.[194] Nevertheless, this finding remains indispensable to understand that the

[193] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 28 April 1993, p. 255; John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 28 April 1993, p. 77; Bill Clinton, Joint Statement on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery, 14 January 1994, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, available in Nexis; Kenneth Bacon, Department of Defence News Briefing, 17 January 1995; Lynn E. Davis, US Department of State Daily Briefing, 28 February 1995.

[194] A. Mathur, Indo-American Relations, pp. 100-121; S. Heinrich-Agostini, La Relation Triangulaire entre la Chine, l'Inde et les Etats-Unis, p. 296; V. Bhatia, Non-proliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India, p. 265; Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramana, US-India Tensions. Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation, Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, issue 1, pp. 13-18.

impossibility to bridge the nuclear divide between the United States and India was an obstacle the transformation of the bilateral relationship.

Evidence from the documents analysed has shown that the US non-proliferation policy towards India reflected the Clinton administration's global efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapons states and the spread of nuclear technology.[195] In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and as a result of the impact of the first Gulf War in 1991, concerns about a global Armageddon between two superpowers had strengthened US concerns about horizontal proliferation.[196] These concerns resulted in Clinton attempting to strengthen non-proliferation through the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the negotiation of the CTBT.[197] These treaties would have helped to advance US non-proliferation objectives in volatile regions like South Asia, where India and Pakistan were rapidly developing a nuclear arsenal and where the danger of a nuclear conflict was more than theoretical.[198]

India saw the efforts of the Clinton administration to strengthen the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory. American policymakers reported that the Indians repeatedly refused to sign the NPT, arguing that the treaty crystallised the division of the world into two classes of membership, the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.[199] Strobe Talbott points out that from an Indian

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[195] Robin Raphel, US policy toward South Asia, *US Department of Statement Dispatch*, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 248, 27th March 1995.
[196] A. K. Tripathy, *US Policy Towards India*, pp. 89-92.
[197] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, pp. 26 and 35-36.
[198] US Department of State, Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia, Report to Congress, 8 February 1994, available at http://fas.org/irp/threat/940216-327448.htm, accessed on 21st April 2015.
[199] US Department of State, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia presented to Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 28 April 1993, p. 258; John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1993, p. 88; Robin Raphel, Responses to Question Asked by the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 184; US Department of Defence, Proliferation Threat and Response 1997, available at

standpoint, the indefinite extension of the NPT was "part of a US-led effort to keep [India] from developing nuclear weapons of its own and to make permanent a nuclear monopoly that excluded India".[200] This would have made future attempts to amend the NPT to enable India to sign up as a nuclear weapons state more difficult.[201] Evidence from the documents indicates, furthermore, that India refused to sign the treaty because "it was not in its national interest".[202] Indian policymakers were extremely concerned that after securing the indefinite extension of the NPT, the Clinton administration would seek to universalise the CTBT, thus making the test ban applicable to all countries regardless of whether they had signed the treaty. This would have deprived India from the chance to conduct further nuclear tests, a chance that was unacceptable for the Indian political establishment.[203]

Between 1993 and 1996, the Clinton administration put pressure on India to sign the NPT and the CTBT. This policy reflected US global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation in regions like South Asia, where the spread of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery posed a serious threat to international peace and stability. Indian leaders systematically refused to sign the treaties, on the basis that they perceived them as highly discriminatory and that this would have been against India's national interest. The US and India's conflicting views on the NPT and CTBT represented an insurmountable obstacle to the transformation of the bilateral relationship during the period

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file:///C:/Users/Francesca/Downloads/nps37-100608-09.pdf, accessed on 5th December 2015; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 1st session, 12 March 1997, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 11.

[200] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 35.

[201] Ibid., p. 36.

[202] Robin Raphel, Foreign Press Center Briefing, 12 December 1996, *Federal News Service*, available in Nexis.

[203] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 36.

1993-1998. The huge gap existing between the two countries in terms of non-proliferation goals and interests created a stalemate that made it impossible to find a common ground on this issue. This finding is supported by the secondary literature which claims that the non-proliferation regime was one of the major sources of disagreement between the United States and India. These studies highlight that the impossibility to reconcile their divergences on the NPT and CTBT had a negative impact on the evolution of the relationship and contributed to increasing India's mistrust and suspicion towards the United States.

3.8 Improving US defence cooperation with India

In 1995, the Clinton administration began to pay more attention to developing close security and defence ties with India, owing to its geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and its military potential.[204] In January 1995, US Secretary of Defence William Perry visited India to sign the US-India Agreed Minutes of Defence Relations which was aimed at gradually "establishing an expanded security dialogue and a more cooperative defence relationship"[205] and at providing a framework through which to broaden the security cooperation between the two countries.[206] The existing literature tends to emphasise the importance of the Agreed Minutes in the history of US-India defence relations. Some scholars argue that this agreement helped to

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[204] Joseph Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 99; Bruce Riedel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st and 2nd session, 5 December 1996, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 11-12.
[205] Bruce Riedel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, 5 December 1996, p. 13.
[206] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Paicific, and International Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, 9 February 1995, p. 75.

institutionalise the defence relationship between the United States and India which had been developing since 1991.[207] According to Itty Abraham, progress in the establishment of military-to-military ties "provid[ed] an important point of institutional continuity during the turbulent decade of the 1990s, offering a point of bilateral contact which was independent of the traditional bugbears of the relationship".[208] Findings emerging from QCA have shown, instead, that US-India defence cooperation was not sufficiently established to have a significant impact on the transformation of the quality of the bilateral relationship. Throughout the period 1993-1998, US-India defence cooperation was quite limited, owing to US reluctance to sell arms to India and the lack of interaction during the Cold War.

During the period 1995-1998, US defence cooperation with India was "really quite small",[209] owing to US reluctance to transfer arms to India. During his visit to India in January 1995, US Secretary of Defence Perry made it clear that the United States was willing to discuss steps that in the future could lead to increased defence research and production, but arms sale and joint technology development continued to remain no-go areas.[210] In a statement before the US

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[207] A. K. Tripathy, *US Policy Towards India: A Post-Cold War Study*, pp. 20-22; Ramesh Thakur, India and the United States: A Triumph of Hope over Experience?, *Asian Survey*, 1996, Vol. 36 No. 6, p. 580; Sandy Gordon, South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers, *Asian Survey*, 1995, Vol. 35, No. 10, p. 885; Dipankar Banerjee, 'An Overview of Indo-US Strategic Cooperation', in Sumit Ganguly, *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century. More than Words*, p. 70; A. Mathur, Indo-American Relations, pp. 94-96; Cherian Samuel, Indo-US Defence Cooperation and the Emerging Strategic Relationship, *Strategic Analysis*, 2007, vol. 31, issue 2, pp. 216-217; Vergheses Koithara, India-US Defence Cooperation, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2005, vol. 40, no. 32, p. 3586; T. Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century*, pp. 74-75.

[208] I. Abraham, Origins of the United States-India Agreement, p. 8.

[209] Bruce Riedel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, 5 December 1996, p. 16.

[210] William J. Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995; Joseph Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 101.

Congress, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye explained that the decision to abstain from transferring arms was aimed at preserving the military balance of forces in the subcontinent. [211] In an interview with the author, Nye argued that at that time the Department of Defence (DoD) was divided between on the hand, the desire to improve US defence and military cooperation with India, and on the other, the concern that arms sale to India could change the balance of power in the subcontinent at the expenses of Pakistan. He stressed also that "the danger was that if you change the military balance the military balance [in the subcontinent] this could affect the relations between India and Pakistan] in term of willingness to take the risk. We did not want any conflict to break up between them".[212]

Another factor to consider is that US-India defence relations were not sufficiently established at that time. Statements and speeches of Clinton officials seem to suggest that it would have taken time to build strong defence and security ties with India. They explained that for almost fifty years India's policy of non-alignment and its friendship with the Soviet Union represented the major obstacles to establishing US-India defence relations during the Cold War.[213] From the documents analysed, it also emerges that DoD officials found it very difficult to persuade Indian policymakers "of the value of a relationship with the- United States".[214] Indian policymakers saw the United States as a "flick strategic partner and an unreliable supplier of military hardware".[215] A

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[211] Joseph Nye, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 March 1995, p. 101.
[212] Phone call interview with Joseph Nye, May 2015.
[213] William J. Perry, Establishing Strong Security Ties with India and Pakistan, 31 January 1995.
[214] Bruce Riedel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, 5 December 1996, p. 17.
[215] John H. Gill, ' US-India Military-to-Military Interaction. In the Context of the Larger Relationship', in S. Ganguly, US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century, p. 118.

Department of Defence study on the Indo-US military relationship indicates that many Indian officials continued to harbour a deep suspicion about American intentions even after the end of the Cold War. The vast majority of the Indians interviewed said that "if they had to choose tomorrow between the United States and Russia, they would opt for Russia due to current uncertainty about access to advanced US technologies and the possible unreliability of the United States as a supplier".[216]

The Clinton administration sought to improve US-India relations through the development of closer defence and security ties with India. The existing literature stresses the importance of this factor on the evolution of the relationship between the two countries, claiming that the US-India Agreed Minutes of Defence contributed to facilitate and to institutionalise the interaction between the military of the two countries. QCA, instead, has shown that US attempts to engage with India in the defence field did not have a significant impact on the transformation of the relationship because during the period 1993-1998, US-India defence cooperation was not sufficiently established.

3.9 US policymakers' views on the impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations

As seen in chapter 1, the majority of the scholars claims that the end of the Cold War removed the major obstacle to the improvement of the bilateral relationship, freeing the United States from seeing India as an ally of the Soviet Union. Findings from QCA call into question the degree of importance accorded by the

[216] Juli A. McDonald, Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions, Department of Defence, Washington D.C., 2002, p. xxv, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500476.pdf, accessed on 29th July 2016.

secondary literature to this factor. Frequencies related to this factor (nine) were below the threshold originally established to determine which subcategories to discuss in the analysis chapters. Nevertheless, this factor was included in order to compare results from QCA with claims made by the secondary literature claims.

US policymakers were aware that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for a fresh start with India. Robin Raphel explained that for many decades the United States "viewed its relationship with [India] largely through the prism of [its] rivalry with the Soviet Union".[217] These events not only altered the balance of power in the international system, but they also had a remarkable impact on US relations with India, opening up the unprecedented opportunities to forge closer ties between the two countries.[218] These events led the Clinton administration to increase its interest in India, a country with which the US "[had] many values in common"[219] and that "[had] the potential to be among the great world powers of the twenty-first century".[220]

The documents analysed show that the desire of US policymakers to improve US-India relations did not, however, translate into this becoming a

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[217] Robin Raphel, Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, 14 September 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 45.

[218] John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1993, p. 77; Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, 9 February 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 56; US Department of State Daily Briefing, 9 November 1993, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9310/931029db1.html, accessed 17 November 2015.

[219] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Paicific, and International Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, 9 February 1995, p. 56.

[220] Robin Raphel, Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 14 September 1995, p. 45.

priority area for US foreign policy. Strobe Talbott claims that President Clinton came into office determined to "seize the opportunities that came with being the first post-cold-war president," including new engagement with major developing non-aligned countries.[221] Despite this intent, during the period 1993-1998 the US devoted limited attention to India. Strobe Talbott explains that the lack of change was a general result of the administration's preoccupation with multiple international crises, such as "civil wars in the Balkans and Somalia, a political crisis in Russia, a humanitarian catastrophe just off American shores, and the demands and frustrations of the Middle East process". [222] A similar view is also expressed by Bruce Riedel who also argues that the relationship between Washington and New Delhi remained hostage to the estrangement of the Cold War period. He openly recognises that Clinton's diplomatic attempts to improve US-India relations produced very modest results.[223]

The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on transforming US policymakers' perceptions about India. American officials believed that this watershed event represented a unique opportunity to narrow the distance with India, putting aside decades of reciprocal mistrust, suspicion, and misunderstandings. US policymakers showed increasing interest in improving the relationship with India, however, this did not result in the US government making India a top priority of its foreign policy agenda. At that time, President Clinton had to focus on more urgent international matters that did not leave him enough time to focus on India. This is a highly significant finding because it shows that India was still of marginal importance to the United States. This

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[221] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 25.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Bruce Riedel, *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2013), p. 118.

retarded a prompt revision of US policy towards India and precluded a more direct move to take advantage of post-Cold War opportunities.

Conclusion

As seen in the introduction of this chapter, the existing literature claims that although the dissolution of the Soviet Union and India's economic reforms seemed to create a more favourable environment for the rapprochement between the two countries, US relations with India did not undergo any significant transformation. Some scholars claim that the lack of change stemmed from differences between the United States and India over non-proliferation and from US policy of capping, reducing, and eliminating, but they do not sufficiently explore the significance of this factor and its impact on the evolution of US relations with India. Qualitative content analysis has been extremely useful to develop a more complete understanding of US nuclear policy towards India and of its implications. The use of this method has also helped to re-assess the importance that the demise of the USSR had on shaping US policymakers' perceptions.

The analysis has shown that the nuclear question represented an impediment to enhancing US relations with India. The US policy vis-à-vis India tended to be focused on the non-proliferation issue throughout the entire period of analysis. Findings emerging from the analysis revealed that the approach of the Clinton administration changed over time, shifting from capping, reducing, and eliminating formula (announced in 1993) to seeking to cap India's nuclear program (in 1995). The new policy was not implemented until after the Indian nuclear tests (1998), owing to divergences within the US government on how to

deal with India's nuclear program. Some US policymakers were willing to engage with India on non-proliferation, some others were reluctant to make concessions to India that could hamper the non-proliferation regime. These differences created a stalemate that prevented the Clinton administration from adopting a more realistic policy that could have contributed to reducing the negative impact of the nuclear factor. This is a very salient finding because studies on the transformation of US-India relations do not explain why the US government changed its nuclear goalposts towards India and why the new policy was never carried out.

The analysis has also shown that the impact of the nuclear question in shaping US foreign policy was increased by US inclination to link tensions between India and Pakistan with non-proliferation. This factor had a negative impact on the quality of the US-India relationship, creating a stumbling block to the rapprochement between the two countries. Given the long history of conflict and the advanced stage of the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs, American policymakers were seriously concerned that tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could easily lead to a nuclear conflict. These concerns played a significant role in shaping US policy agenda vis-à-vis India during that period, contributing to making the nuclear question the main issue in US-India relations. They also hampered change in US policy outlook toward India. The emphasis on the dangers inherent in the nuclearisation of a volatile area like South Asia prevented American officials from taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and India's economic growth to improve US-India relations.

The second most salient finding emerging from the analysis is that contrary secondary literature claims, during the period 1993-1998, the disintegration of the Soviet Union had a limited impact on shaping US policymakers' perceptions about India. The material analysed shows a growing appreciation within the US government of the numerous American economic and security interests at stake in India, but there was no significant intent to make India a priority in US policy agenda. India was of marginal importance to issues that concerned the United States during this period. This was because the Clinton administration had to focus on more urgent matters on the global stage which resulted in India losing any precedence on his foreign policy agenda. This is a very important finding because it shows that India was still of marginal importance to the United States. This prevented and delayed a prompt revision of US policy towards India and precluded a more direct move to take advantage of post-Cold War opportunities.

Chapter 4: 11th May 1998- 20th January 2001

Introduction

This is the second empirical chapter investigating the transformation of US relations with India. It covers the period from 11th May 1998, when India conducted a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran (also known as Pokhran II), to 20th January 2001, when President George W. Bush took office. The chapter seeks to uncover the full range of factors that during this period paved the way for the transformation of US relations with India that culminated in the third period (which is discussed in Chapter 5).

As seen in Chapter 1, some scholars claim that during the period 1998-2001 the relationship between the United States and India improved, but they are divided on which factors favoured this change. One group of scholars stresses that the role of the US during the Kargil crisis and the US decision to side against Pakistan was positively received by the Indians and set the stage for the development of closer ties between the two countries. Another group of writers emphasises instead the importance of President Clinton's visit, which in their view contributed to laying the foundation for a qualitatively different relationship with India. These divergent views make it difficult to assess the respective significance of these two factors and to determine the exact timing of the change.

In addition, the review of the existing literature has shown that some scholars claim that although the environment during this time period seemed to become more favourable for a rapprochement between the two countries, the nuclear question continued to be an obstacle to the improvement of the bilateral relationship. These scholars explore the evolution of US nuclear policy only

after India's nuclear tests, while limited or no attention is paid to the pre-Pokhran period. This is problematic because by focusing mainly on the period 1998-2005, it is impossible to have a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the various factors that contributed over time to the transformation of the US relations with India have had over time.

This chapter aims to provide a more thorough anlaysis of the period 1998-2001 by using all publicly available official US documents, instead of only a few, as is commonplace in the literature (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). These documents were analysed first with qualitative content analysis (QCA as reported in Chapter 2), which is followed in this chapter by a narrative event analysis. QCA facilitates a systematic comparison of the Pokhran and pre-Pokhran periods, and in so doing, makes it possible to uncover changes in terms of the impact of the various factors over time.

The analysis presented in this chapter tends to confirm the significance of some of the factors identified in the literature, such as the Indian nuclear tests and the positive role played by the US during the Kargil crisis. However, it adds to existing knowledge by offering a more nuanced account of the evolution of US foreign policy by systematically comparing the period 1998-2001 with the previous one. Results emerging from the comparison between the two time periods highlight that other factors, such as presidential commitment to improving US-India relations and nuclear-related factors, had a much greater impact on shaping the transformation in US foreign policy than the literature claims. This is an important finding because it helps to provide a more in depth understanding of the change and of its timing.

This chapter has seven sections. Section 4.1 deals with changes in US nuclear policy towards India. Section 4.2 focuses on US policymakers' views about changes in US nuclear policy and about India's nuclear capabilities. Section 4.3 focuses on US policy of reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. Section 4.4 highlights US policymakers' concerns about subcontinental tensions having the potential to escalate to a nuclear confrontation. Section 4.5 focuses on President Clinton's views about India's nuclear capabilities. Section 4.6 explores the president's commitment to transform the relationship with India. The last section describes US policy of urging India to adhere to non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes.

4.1 Changes in US nuclear policy towards India

During the period 1998-2001, non-proliferation continued to be an obstacle to the development of closer ties between Washington and New Delhi. This was because American and Indian policymakers struggled to find a common ground on non-proliferation. This is a very salient finding because it helps to understand why President Clinton's attempts to forge closer ties with India produced only modest results during this period. The documents analysed for this chapter have also shown that Pokhran II had a significant impact on shaping US non-proliferation policy towards India. This watershed event stimulated a process of revision of US non-proliferation goals in the subcontinent which led to the Clinton administration abandoning the capping, reducing, and eliminating formula in favour of an approach aimed at capping India's nuclear program. The failure of the previous non-proliferation policy resulted in the adoption of a new more flexible approach. The new strategy employed by the Clinton

administration involved condemning India's decision to go nuclear and working with other countries to elaborate a common strategy targeted at pushing India to exercise restraint. In order to maximise US leverage over the behaviour of India, the Clinton administration also imposed sanctions under the Glenn amendment and embarked on a bilateral dialogue with the Indian government on non-proliferation. The approach adopted by the United States struggled to achieve much success, owing to US limited influence on India and the difficulty in establishing a common ground on non-proliferation.

The 1998 nuclear test was, unsurprisingly, a very important factor in transforming the non-proliferation goalposts of the Clinton administration during the period 1998-2001. A key difference, compared to the first period, was that the focus of US non-proliferation policy shifted from seeking to persuade India to give up its nuclear option to putting a lid to India's nuclear capabilities. As Bob Einhorn explained, Pokhran II forced the Clinton administration to permanently abandon the idea of reducing and eliminating to prioritise objectives which could be achieved in the short-term. He also added that the US government was setting its sight on "ban[ning] all nuclear testing and ban[ning] additional production of unsafeguarded fissile material".[224] The relevance of this finding is supported by the secondary literature which claims that the transformation of US non-proliferation approach towards India stemmed from the fact that following the Indian nuclear tests, the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach was no longer feasible.[225]

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[224] Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2 session, 13 May 1998, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998) p. 15.

[225] Ashton Carter, America's New Strategic Partner, p. 35; M. Carranza, Asian Security- At the Crossroads, pp. 93-108; V. Bhathia, Non-proliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India, pp. 262-272.

The failure of the capping, reducing, and eliminating formula pushed the Clinton administration to find a new strategy that would have prevented India from taking the necessary steps to arm itself and deploy its nuclear capabilities without depriving it of its nuclear option.[226] The new strategy was implemented in a number of different ways. The first was the condemnation of the nuclear tests carried out on 11th and 13th May, which also involved the US government urging other countries to join the United States in expressing displeasure for India's actions.[227] This action was designed to send a strong message to India and to would-be nuclear testers that India's decision to go nuclear "ran counter to the efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and to steps to enhance regional and international peace and stability".[228] In the aftermath of Pokhran II, the US government began to engage with other countries in the United Nations, at the G-8, and in other international fora to garner international support for a common strategy targeted at making India take a series of steps to "secure [India's] active and responsible adherence to international non-

[226] White House, Joint Statement on South Asia, 27 June 1998, Public Papers of the President; Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 15; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June and 13 July 1998, p. 56 and 107; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 3 March 1999, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) p. 68; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 1st session, 18 June 1998, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998) p. 17.

[227] John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, 10 June 1998, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/holum/dswahol.htm, accessed on 11th February 2016; Madeleine Albright, Press Conference at Lancaster House, Foreign & Commonwealth Office London, 12 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980612a.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

[228] The White House, Birmingham Group of Eight Summit Statement, 17 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents.

proliferation norms".[229] These steps (also called benchmarks) were: signing and ratifying the CTBT without delay or conditions, halting the production of fissile material, agreeing not to deploy or test missile systems, maintaining existing restraints against sharing nuclear and missile technology or equipment with other countries.[230]

In addition, President Clinton imposed an array of sanctions against India, which included "the termination of US development assistance to India, the termination of US Government sales of defence articles and services, denial of credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by the US Government, and opposition to loans or assistance by international financial institutions, prohibition on exports of specific goods and technology".[231] Some scholars argue that the US post-Pokhran hard-line approach reflected the intent of the Clinton administration to punish India's defiance of the non-proliferation

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[229] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, p. 56.

[230] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, pp. 56-57; President William J. Clinton, Remarks on the International Crime Control Strategy, 12 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; President William J. Clinton, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters, Birmingham, 17 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; William J. Clinton, Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, 22 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; The White House, Statement on Further Nuclear Testing by Pakistan, 30 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980603.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; Madeleine Albright, Opening Remarks Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington, DC, June 16, 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980616a.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; White House, Joint Statement on South Asia, 27 June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Intervention at the ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary, Manila, 27 July 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980727a.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 15.

[231] Barbara Leitch LePoer et al., India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and US Response, CRS Report for Congress, pp. 20-21, available at https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/98-570.pdf, accessed on 7th June 2016.

regime.[232] Evidence obtained from QCA, conversely, has shown that the US sanctions were not targeted at "mak[ing] an international pariah out of India".[233] US officials explained that these measures "were necessary for several reasons".[234] First, they were mandatory under the US non-proliferation legislation.[235] Second, they were aimed at dissuading other would-be nuclear testers to follow India's suit, showing them the cost and the implications that they would have paid in doing so.[236] Finally, they were used as a bargaining tool to maximise US influence over India's behaviour and to persuade it to accommodate US non-proliferation requests.[237]

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[232] I. Abraham, Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement, p. 10; V. Bhatia, Non-proliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India, pp. 266-267; L. Mansingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership, p. 2; B. Mishra, India-US Relations: A Paradigm Shift, pp. 83-84.

[233] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, p. 56.

[234] Strobe Talbott, US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report, Address at the Brooking Institutions, Washington DC, 12 November 1998, available at http://fas.org/news/india/1998/11/98111204_nlt.htmll, accessed on 7th June 2016.

[235] Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3rd June 1998; David Aaron, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 8; President William J. Clinton, Interview With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom by David Frost of the British Broadcasting Corporation in Weston-under-Lizard, 16 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; Strobe Talbott, US Diplomacy in South Asia, 12 November 1998; B. Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, pp. 121-123.

[236] US Department of State, Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan sanctions, 18 June 1998, available at http://fas.org/news/india/1998/06/98061807_npo.html, accessed on 18th February 2016; Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3rd June 1998; The White House, Remarks by the President and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 3 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/980603_clinton_china_mfn.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, 10 June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Press Conference at Lancaster House, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 12 June 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, p. 63; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 106th Congress, 1st session, 25th May 1999, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999) p. 14; Karl Inderfurth, before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998, p. 4.

[237] US Department of State, Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan sanctions, 18 June 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 July 1998, p. 97; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998,p.

Another significant difference between the two periods of analysis is that after the Indian nuclear tests, there was more engagement between the United States and India on non-proliferation. Throughout the period 1998-2001, the Clinton administration was committed to "keep[ing] open the lines of communication with India"[238] to discuss the nuclear question. US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth announced before the US Congress that the US government had begun a process of re-engagement with India in the form of a dialogue finalised to "secure a genuine progress on [US] non-proliferation concerns".[239] The purpose of these talks was to "harmonize [India's] security perspectives with [the US] security concerns about non-proliferation"[240] in order to "create sufficient common ground on these issues".[241] This is particularly important because US increasing engagement with India signals that to get the US-India relationship back on track, the Clinton administration was inclined to find a compromise with India on non-proliferation.

US policy of engagement resulted in the Clinton administration lifting some of the economic sanctions against India at the end of 1998. This decision

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4; David Aaron, Statement Karl Inderfurth, before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998, p. 8; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, p. 56.

[238] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998, p. 4.

[239] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 July 1998, p. 95.

[240] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 3 March 1999 p. 67.

[241] Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2000, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000314.html, accessed on 1th February 2016.

stemmed from India's "largely promissory progress"[242] on the some of the benchmarks previously mentioned.[243] By easing sanctions, the Clinton administration wanted to create a more positive environment that would have encourage India to take further steps towards the non-proliferation benchmarks.[244] Another reason that pushed the Clinton administration to take advantage of Brownback I was the fact that sanctions had a detrimental impact US companies making business in India.[245] As explained by US Undersecretary of Commerce Aaron David, this was because the Glenn amendment sanctions precluded the export of selected items and significantly constrained the ability of the US government to provide financial assistance and support to US companies in India.[246]

The strategy of the Clinton administration failed to produce any tangible result, owing to the limited duration of sanctions. The Glenn amendment sanctions did not remain in place long enough to have an impact on India's economy, and as a consequence, on its behaviour. In a statement before the US Congress, Karl Inderfurth openly recognised that "sanctions by themselves [didn't] move India… very far".[247] This was because India's economy was too

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[242] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 3 March 1999, pp. 54-55.
[243] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 3 March 1999, pp. 54-55.
[244] The White House, Easing of Sanctions on India and Pakistan, 7 November 1998, available at http://fas.org/news/india/1998/11/981107-wh1.htm, accessed on 7th June 2016.
[245] Arona Butcher, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20 October 1999 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999) pp. 17 and 60.
[246] David L. Aaron, Testimony before the Subcommittee for the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, second session, 18 June 1998, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998) p. 9.
[247] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18th June 1998, p. 17.

robust and growing too fast to be negatively affected by US sanctions.[248] A report by the US International Trade Commission presented to Congress confirmed that "the Glenn amendment sanctions appear[ed] to have had a minimal overall impact on [India's] economy".[249] The postponement of loans from the World Bank and other institutions did not seriously affected India whose economic stability was not dependent on bilateral and multilateral assistance. This study also stressed that the overall cost of US sanctions was around $ 1.5 billion in 1998, approximately 0.4 percent of India's gross domestic product (GDP). It also added that despite the initial economic downturn caused by the imposition of the Glenn amendment measures, India's economy was able to recover by the end of 1998.[250]

Throughout the period 1999-2000, the Clinton administration continued to engage with India on non-proliferation through a bilateral dialogue. The aim of these meetings was to press India "to take five practical steps that would [have] help[ed] avoid a destabilizing nuclear and missile competition … and to bolster [US] non-proliferation goals".[251] Despite the numerous rounds of talks, the US strategy struggled to have much success. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged that the United States and India had "not yet found a way to create sufficient common ground on these [nuclear] issues".[252] This was because the United States and India continued to have divergent views on non-proliferation as well as on the scope and on the nature of the dialogue. These

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[248] Kenneth Bacon, DoD News Briefing, 28 May 1998, available at http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1129, accessed on 11th February 2016.
[249] Arona Butcher, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20 October 1999, p. 17.
[250] Ibid, pp. 17-18.
[251] Strobe Talbott, US Diplomacy in South Asia, 12 November 1998.
[252] Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2000.

differences continued to be a stumbling block to the American efforts to bridge the non-proliferation divide with India. Strobe Talbott points out that "since the beginning [India and the United States] saw [their] destination differently".[253] From an American standpoint, the bilateral dialogue was aimed at urging India to restrain its nuclear capabilities, and in thus doing, reducing the extent to which the nuclear question was an impediment to the development of closer ties between the two countries. For the Indian government, instead, the purpose of these talks was to reconcile with the United States without surrendering to US pressure to accept the non-proliferation benchmarks.[254] Strobe Talbott reports that for the Indians reconciliation implied the acceptance by the United States that India was a great power with the right to possess nuclear weapons.[255]

Following the Indian nuclear tests, US non-proliferation policy underwent a significant transformation. The US government stopped putting pressure on India to cap, reduce, and eliminate its nuclear capabilities and began to urge India to exercise restraint. This is particularly important because it marked a clear break from the period 1993-1998 in which American policymakers were reluctant to recognise that India was never going to give its nuclear option and to find a compromise with India on non-proliferation. In addition, after Pokhran II, the United States abandoned the hard-line policy adopted in the previous period in favour of a more flexible approach aimed at engaging with India on non-proliferation. By way of this engagement, the Clinton administration sought to find a compromise with India on this issue that would have enabled it to keep its nuclear program and at the same time to

[253] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 88.
[254] Ibid, p. 5.
[255] Ibid, p. 86.

assuage US concerns about India's development and deployment of nuclear weapons. This would have helped the United States to get the relationship with India back on track. In spite of the fact that these changes seemed to create a more favourable environment to overcome the US and Indian divergences on non-proliferation, the policy of engagement did not manage to achieve any tangible result. This was because for the Indians, the rapprochement between the two countries involved the unconditional recognition by the United States that India was a nuclear weapon state and was entitled to have nuclear weapons. The divergent views and preferences about how to deal with non-proliferation made it more difficult for the Clinton administration to find a common ground on this issue with India and to repair the relationship.

4.2 US policymakers' perceptions about changes in US nuclear policy and about India's nuclear capabilities

Pokhran II was a watershed event in the history of US-India relations. This event played a significant role in changing US policymakers' perceptions about India's nuclear program and in pushing for a rapid revision of US non-proliferation policy and goalposts. American policymakers saw India's nuclear tests as a terrible mistake and a serious challenge to the Clinton administration's global efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In spite of the initial dismay and disappointment, US officials distanced themselves from the previous approach because they acknowledged that India's development of nuclear capabilities was irreversible. This transformation in US policymakers' views and perceptions stemmed from the growing awareness that following the nuclear tests, support for the nuclear programme in India had increased and

domestic political considerations made it more difficult to gain concessions from the Indian government. Another factor that contributed to changing policymakers' perceptions was the fact that officials believed that traditional non-proliferation approaches had failed to persuade India to give up its nuclear program, and had a negative impact on the evolution of the bilateral relationship. It was a combination of these factors which led to the Clinton administration changing its non-proliferation policy. This finding provides a better understanding of the role played by American policymakers' views and perceptions in transforming the US non-proliferation approach, an aspect neglected by the secondary literature.

The 1998 nuclear tests compelled the United States to rethink its overall foreign policy approach. The Clinton administration had no choice but to focus mainly on the nuclear problem. This was because, from an American standpoint, Pokhran II unquestionably represented a "setback… for the cause of global non-proliferation".[256] As General Kenneth Backon pointed out, India's action undermined the successes achieved by the United States in preventing the spread nuclear weapons in other countries, such as the former USSR and North Korea, and in strengthening the non-proliferation regime through the indefinite extension of the NPT and the CTBT.[257] Moreover, American policymakers were seriously concerned that this watershed event could set "a dangerous precedent for the international non-proliferation regime".[258] They reported that Indian

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[256] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998 p. 55.
[257] Kenneth Bacon, DoD News Briefing, 28 May 1998.
[258] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 8.

leaders expected that the nuclear tests would open them the door for the nuclear club, thus signalling the recognition by the international community of India's nuclear status.[259] Some key members of the Clinton administration made it very clear that Indian government had to realise that the NPT was never going to be amended to include India as a nuclear weapon state.[260] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright added that if the United States "[were] to allow India to test its way to nuclear status under the NPT, it would create an incentive for other countries to follow India's example".[261]

The importance of Pokhran II to explaining the shift of US foreign policy is highlighted by the fact that this watershed event pushed American policymakers to recognise openly that India's development of nuclear capabilities could no longer be reversed. Clinton officials stressed that reducing and eliminating could no longer be achieved because the nuclear tests boosted India's nuclear power aspirations, and with it, its determination to preserve the status and the prestige acquired. The Indians saw Pokhran II as not only the symbol of "India's scientific and technological prowess",[262] but also the signal that "India [had] arrived on the world stage, and that it should [have] be[en] taken seriously".[263] Another factor that made more difficult to persuade India to

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[259] Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Press Conference on the Crisis in South Asia, Geneva, 4 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980604.html, accessed 11th February 2016; Madeleine Albright, Remarks to Stimson Center, Washington DC, 10 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980610.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

[260] Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Statement at the Opening of the Meeting of the G-8, London, 12 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980612.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

[261] Madeleine Albright, Opening Remarks before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington, DC, 16 June 1998.

[262] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 17.

[263] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

give up its nuclear program was the fact that Indian decision-makers strongly believed that nuclear weapons were necessary to defend the India's security and deter potential attacks from China and Pakistan, both of which had nuclear advanced nuclear capabilities and had unresolved border disputes with India.[264] American policymakers also added that domestic political considerations played an important role in determining the failure of the reducing and eliminating approach.[265] The nuclear tests had contributed to increasing the popularity of the newly elected government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and a strong supporter of India's development of a nuclear deterrent.[266]

The failure of capping, reducing, and eliminating policy contributed to strengthening the feeling among American officials that traditional hard-line non-proliferation approaches were not suitable to deal with the nuclear challenge in the subcontinent, and therefore, they had to be replaced with a different policy aimed at engaging more with India on non-proliferation.[267] Key members of the Clinton administration believed that the Glenn Amendment sanctions were an impediment to carrying out the new policy of engagement. This was because the Glenn Amendment did not provide any degree of flexibility, meaning that once sanctions were in place, the president had no power to lift them.[268] This lack of

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[264] Madeleine Albright, Statement at the Opening of the Meeting of the G-8, London, 12th June 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 7, 17-18, 20-21; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998, pp. 17-18.

[265] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, pp. 17-18 and 20-21.

[266] Kalpana Sharma, The Hindu Bomb, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July-August 1998, vol. 54 no. 4, p. 30.

[267] Karl Inderfurth, Prepared Statement before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 3 March 1999, *Federal News Service*.

[268] Michael McCurry, The White House Regular Briefing, 28 May 1998, Federal News Service.

flexibility made it impossible for the US government to use sanctions as a tool to gain concessions from India on non-proliferation and to achieve US non-proliferations goals in the region.[269]

US policymakers' perceptions and preferences about how to deal with India's nuclear program were significantly affected by the nuclear tests. This watershed event exponentially increased the importance of the nuclear question, abruptly putting an end to the attempts of the US government to develop a more broad-based relationship with India. Key Clinton officials were extremely disappointed because India's action represented a big challenge to Clinton's policy of fighting the spread of nuclear weapons and a serious threat to the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the nuclear tests led an increasing number of US policymakers to recognise that India's nuclear ambitions and security concerns made the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach impossible to achieve. The confluence of these factors stimulated a process of revising of US non-proliferation policy which resulted in the Clinton administration adopting a new strategy aimed at engaging with India on the nuclear question.

4.3 Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan

Changes to the policy of the US in respect of reducing subcontinental tensions had a positive impact on the evolution of US-India relations during the period 1998-2001. This was because the Clinton administration took a more pro-Indian attitude during the Kargil crisis, openly condemning Pakistan for initiating the conflict and urging it to quickly withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control. The significance of this finding is supported by the secondary literature which

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[269] Madeleine Albright, Interview by Wolf Blitzer, 14 June 1998, available at http://fas.org/news/india/1998/06/98061503_tpo.html, accessed on 9th August 2016.

argues that the approach adopted by the US government contributed to mitigating India's mistrust towards the United States and to paving the way for a rapprochement between the two countries.[270] It is important to stress that the vast majority of these studies tends to focus on the period 1998-2001, while limited or no attention is paid to the previous period. This makes it more difficult to have a thorough account of the impact of the Kargil crisis on the evolution in US-India relations. The use of QCA expanded on the points made by the secondary literature, highlighting that the change in US approach towards Kashmir from the first to the second period was one of the factors that that contributed to paving the way for transformation of nature of the diplomatic interactions between the two countries during the period 1998-2001.

US policy in dealing with subcontinental tensions underwent a significant change during this period. A key difference, compared to the period 1993-1998, was that President Clinton was directly involved in defusing Indo-Pakistani tensions. This was because he was concerned that the rapid deterioration of the situation in Kashmir could induce India or Pakistan to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict. These concerns were of such high magnitude that Clinton took a personal interest in actively engaging with the Indian and the Pakistani governments to resolve the confrontation in the subcontinent.[271] His involvement proved to be crucial in preventing the Kargil crisis from escalating into a larger conflict, persuading the Pakistani Prime

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[270] Bruce Riedel, American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, *Policy Paper Series*, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002; S. Cohen, *India Emerging Power*, p. 155; S. Heinrich-Agostini, La Relation Triangulaire entre la Chine, l'Inde, et les Etats-Unis, p. 299; M. Carranza, Asian Security at Crossroads, pp.109-111; A. Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, pp. 25-26; Dipankar Banerjee, An Overview of Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, p. 71.

[271] William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and an Exchange With Reporters, 2 December 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents.

Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw the Pakistani forces behind the LoC.[272] Moreover, the president played also a key role in keeping the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee constantly informed about US negotiations with the Pakistani leader and in persuading the Indian government to exercise restraint. This was particularly helpful to allay India's suspicions about the content of the private negotiations between the president and the Pakistani Prime Minister and the nature of US involvement in the crisis.[273] Clinton also successfully managed to maintain US lines of communication with the Indian and the Pakistani governments throughout the crisis, thus putting the United States in a better position to manage future crises in the region.[274]

The Kargil crisis represented a critical juncture in the history of US-India relations. This was because, compared to the previous period, the US government tilted towards India on the Kashmir question. According to some key members of the Clinton administration, this change in US approach paved the way for a rapid reconciliation between the two countries.[275] In some speeches and statements, President Clinton and his advisors publicly blamed Pakistan for initiating the incursion into the territory on the Indian side of the LoC. Karl Inderfurth reported that the Pakistani military "was an active proponent of the Kargil incursion [which] was approved… at the highest level of the civilian

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[272] James Rubin, Department of State Regular Briefing, 11 August 1999, Federal News Service; President William J. Clinton, Remarks to a Joint Session of Parliament in New Delhi, 22 March 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents.

[273] B. Riedel, American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, pp. 14-16; Chintamani Mahapatra, US approach to Kargil Conflict, *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, p. 88.

[274] Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington D.C., 14 March 2000, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000314.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

[275] B. Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at the Blair House, p. 1.

authorities, including Prime Minister Sharif".[276] From an Indian standpoint, the US government's tilt towards India was a strong signal that the United States was able to "judge the crisis on its merits, rather than siding automatically with its long time Pakistan ally".[277] This change of approach helped Indian leaders to overcome the deep reservoir of mistrust and suspicion that had characterised the relationship with the relationship with the United States since the beginning to the Cold War, thus creating a more favourable environment for the rapprochement.[278]

During the period 1998-2001, US policy related to reducing subcontinental tensions had a positive impact on the transformation of US-India relations. The use of QCA has been useful to uncover the key differences existing in US approach during the first and the second period of analysis, and in thus doing, to provide a more thorough explanation of the change. The analysis has shown that, compared to the past, President Clinton abandoned the policy of disengagement towards Kashmir to play a more active role in the solution of tensions between India and Pakistan. Another key difference with the previous period was that the United States sided with India on Kashmir, publicly condemning Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil. In the eyes of Indian leaders the change in the US policy signalled a growing acceptance by the US government of India's position on the Kashmir dispute. It was also the evidence that the evolution of US-India relations was no longer hostage to US close ties with Pakistan.

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[276] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Near East and South Asian Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 14 October 1999, Federal News Service.
[277] B. Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at the Blair House, p. 5.
[278] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 169.

4.4 Concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear conflict

Following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the Clinton administration began to pay more attention to South Asia, a region where there was a high probability that nuclear weapons would be used. The nuclearisation of the subcontinent, combined with India and Pakistan's developments of ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, significantly contributed to creating the feeling in the United States that "events in South Asia were proceeding in a very dangerous direction".[279] American policymakers strongly believed that given their long history of mistrust and hostility and their geographical proximity, India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, had a destabilizing effect on the security dynamics of the region. This finding is important because it provides a more thorough understanding of the impact that US policymakers' perceptions had in making reducing subcontinental tensions one of the main priorities of the Clinton administration's foreign policy agenda. It also helps to explain why, compared to the previous period, the US government played a direct role in defusing Indo-Pakistani tensions.

During the period 1998-2001, South Asia became a priority for US foreign policy. This was because the Clinton administration believed that deterrence in the subcontinent was ineffective for different reasons. First, India and Pakistan were working on long-range ballistic missile delivery systems and wanted to arm them with nuclear warheads.[280] According to American

[279] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session , 3 June 1998, p. 55.
[280] Ibid.

policymakers, these developments posed a serious threat to regional peace and stability because they increased the risk of a subcontinental nuclear arms race that could get out of control.[281] Second, from an American standpoint, the long history of conflict between India and Pakistan, combined with ongoing tensions in Kashmir, made South Asia a region of the world where the danger of the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict was more likely.[282] Third, India and Pakistan's geographical proximity "create[d] a uniquely dangerous situation"[283] because the warning time in case of the deployment of nuclear-powered missiles was almost non-existent.[284] John Holum stressed if India and Pakistan had fired their nuclear armed missiles, "there [would have] be[en] two countries adamantly hostile to one another, with exposed, vulnerable nuclear arsenals as little as three minutes away from each other, and with no reliable way of knowing if an attack [was], or not, underway".[285] Fourth, India and

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[281] Madeleine Albright, Address to the United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut, 20 May 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980520.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; Kenneth Bacon, DoD News Briefing, 28th May 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session , 3 June 1998, p. 56; Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18th June 1998, p. 28.

[282] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before Subcommittee in Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 3 June 1998, p. 55; Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998; The White House, Remarks by the President and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 3rd June 1998; John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, 10 June 1998; William Cohen, Speech addresses R&D, threats to national security, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Boston, 17 September 1998, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100301162014/http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=732, accessed on 11th February 2016; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20 October 1999, p. 20; Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2000.

[283] Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998.

[284] Madeleine Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998; John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, 10 June 1998; John Holum, Statement to the United Nations First Committee General Debate, New York, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/holum/unfc.htm, accessed on 11th February 2016.

[285] John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, 10 June 1998.

Pakistan did not possess the economic resources necessary to develop command-and-control systems and safeguards that could help to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.[286] Finally, India and Pakistan's lack of adequate intelligence and information increased the chances of miscalculation. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen argued that the inability of the leadership in India and in Pakistan to understand fully what was taking place in the other country coupled with the deep level of mistrust and suspicion that characterised the Indo-Pakistani relationship threatened to trigger a nuclear Armageddon in the region.[287]

US policymakers' concerns that deterrence breakdown was highly likely in South Asia are extremely important to understand the change in US foreign policy towards India. Officials in the Clinton administration strongly believed that the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear tests, together with the nuclearisation of their ballistic missiles programs, could trigger a full-fledged nuclear and missile arms race in the subcontinent. These concerns are highly salient in explaining why India and Pakistan were moved off the backburner of US foreign policy, placing them instead at the forefront of the agenda. They also led the Clinton administration to play an active role in preventing that the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race could get out of control.

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[286] Strobe Talbott, Remarks at Brookings Institute on South Asia, Washington DC, 12 November 1998, available at http://fas.org/news/india/1998/11/98111204_nlt.html, accessed on 10th August 2016.

[287] William Cohen, Remarks to the Boston Chamber of Commerce, Boston, 9 November 1998, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100301162311/http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=796, accessed on 11th February 2016.

4.5 Changes in President's policies and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities

During the period 1998-2001, Clinton began to pay more attention to India, owing to the Indian nuclear test and its negative impact on regional peace and stability and on US global policy to fight nuclear proliferation. This resulted in the president playing a more active role in shaping US non-proliferation policy towards India. As seen in chapter 1, only a few studies explore the influence that individual leadership factors had on the transformation of the relationship. These works tend to emphasise the importance of the role played by President Clinton during the Kargil crisis, but limited or no attention is paid to the impact that his involvement had on the transformation of US non-proliferation policy during the period 1998-2001. QCA has shown that the president's determination to narrow the distance with India on non-proliferation was one of the driving forces of the change in US non-proliferation strategy towards India.

An important difference, compared to the past, is that President Clinton was directly involved in US non-proliferation policy towards India during the period 1998-2001. This was because he was deeply concerned about the negative impact that the nuclear tests had on the security dynamics and stability of the subcontinent. In numerous speeches and statements, he pointed out that India's actions made the subcontinent less safe and less stable, exponentially increasing the risk of triggering a dangerous nuclear arms race between the two countries that could escalate into a nuclear conflict, with Kashmir as a flashpoint.[288] He also stressed that South Asia was one of the regions where the

[288] William Clinton, Remarks on the International Crime Control Strategy, 12 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor

risk of nuclear deterrence breakdown was the highest. This was because unlike the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan were in close geographical proximity to one another. Moreover, they knew very little about each other's capabilities and doctrines and did not have sufficient economic resources to develop command and control systems that could have helped them to reduce the risk of the accidental use of nuclear weapons and miscalculation.[289]

Another reason that pushed the president to focus more on India was the fact that Pokhran II had seriously threatened his efforts to fight the spread of nuclear weapons. In many speeches, he expressed his disappointment about India's nuclear tests, stressing that they were "a terrible a mistake"[290] and "an irresponsible act" [291] that had contributed to undermining India's security and international prestige.[292] Moreover, India's actions set a dangerous example, dramatically increasing the prospects that Pakistan and other aspiring nuclear powers could follow in India's footsteps. According to President Clinton, this "reverse[d] decades of movement away from the nuclear precipice"[293] and

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Helmut Kohl of Germany and an Exchange With Reporters in Potsdam, Potsdam, 13 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan and an Exchange With Reporters in Birmingham, Birmingham, 15 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, pp. 6-8; William J. Clinton, Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco, San Francisco, 26 February 1999, Public Papers of the Presidents; William J. Clinton, Interview With Charlie Rose of CBS' "60 Minutes II", 22 December 1999, Public Papers of the Presidents.

[289] William Clinton, Remarks to a Joint Session of Parliament in New Delhi, 22 March 2000.

[290] William Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 13 May 1998.

[291] Ibid.

[292] William Clinton, Remarks on the Patients' Bill of Rights, 28 May 1998, *Public Papers of the Presidents.*

[293] William Clinton, The President's News Conference With European Union Leaders in London, London, 18 May 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents.

"[made] it harder for [him] to secure the "Senate's ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty".[294]

There is a strong indication that President Clinton played an important role in shaping US non-proliferation policy after the nuclear tests. Evidence obtained from QCA has indicated that in spite of the disappointment deriving from India's decision to go nuclear, the president was deeply committed to finding a constructive way to engage with India on non-proliferation.[295] This was because he strongly believed that narrowing the differences between the United States and India regarding non-proliferation and developing a better understanding of each other's security concerns would have helped the United States and India to fulfil the full potential of their relationship.[296] This is a salient finding because it shows that President Clinton's decision to engage with India on non-proliferation led to a revision of US non-proliferation policy. This was linked to the abandonment of the previous hard-line strategy in favour of a new more flexible approach, which seemed to be more consistent with India's security needs and nuclear aspirations and US non-proliferation concerns and interests in the region, thus showing how US policy was changing both at a presidential and departmental level.

In the aftermath of the nuclear tests, President Clinton started paying more attention to India. This was because he was extremely concerned that

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[294] William Clinton, *My Life*, London: Hutchinson, 2004 , p. 786.

[295] William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 13 May 1998; William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 15 May 1998; The White House, Birmingham Group of Eight Summit Statement, 17 May 1998.

[296] William J. Clinton, Videotape Remarks to the Carnegie Endowment's Annual Non-proliferation Conference, 16 March 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents; The White House, Joint Statement on United States-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century, 21 March 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents; Madeleine Albright, Press Briefing on the President's Visit, Maurya Sheraton, New Delhi, 21 March 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000321.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

India's actions could increase the instability in South Asia and threatened his policy of fighting the spread of nuclear weapons. President Clinton's growing interest in India favoured a process of revision of US non-proliferation policy towards India, which resulted in the US government forgoing the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach to adopt a new more flexible strategy aimed at engaging with India on non-proliferation. By way of this engagement, the president and his advisers tried to find a solution that would have allowed India to maintain its nuclear program and at the same time mitigate US concerns about India's further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. According to Clinton, this would have helped the United States to improve the relationship with India that had been negatively affected by the 1998 nuclear tests. In spite of the fact that the new policy seemed to create favourable conditions to help the United States and India to find a compromise on non-proliferation, the policy was ineffective because the Indians saw the American attempt to put a lid to India's nuclear program as a violation of India's sovereignty and freedom to determine its own defence needs and interests.

4.6 President's commitment to transform the relationship with India

Bill Clinton played a crucial role in improving the relationship with India which had been adversely affected by the Indian nuclear tests. During his last two years in office, the president worked very hard to get US-India relations back on track. This was because he strongly believed that forging a close relationship with India, a large democracy and a rapidly growing big emerging market, was in the interest of the United States. This led to President Clinton visiting India in March 2000 in order to develop a more broad-based relationship between the two

countries. QCA has shown that the presidential visit helped to create a more favourable environment for the rapprochement between the United States and India. While this finding is not new, its significance has not been sufficiently recognised. It is crucial, therefore, to take into account of the impact of this factor had on the transformation of the US-India relationship and on the US foreign policy during the period 1998-2001.

The most significant change compared to the previous period is that Clinton took a personal interest in transforming US-India relations. This was because he was convinced that the nuclear tests had had a negatively impact on the bilateral relationship, minimising the chances offered by the end of the Cold War to develop a long-lasting partnership with India.[297] The president points out that the demise of the Soviet Union provided him with an unprecedented opportunity to overcome the estrangement that had characterised the relationship with India, a country with which the United States shared many similarities.[298] In many speeches, he repeatedly stressed that the fact that both the United States and India shared a strong faith in democratic ideals and values and were market-oriented economies with strong economic growth, creative entrepreneurial societies, and had a large population, provided a solid foundation on which the two countries could build a stronger and more mature

[297] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20th October 1999, p. 14; W. Clinton, *My Life*, p. 786.
[298] William Clinton, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Luncheon in Palo Alto, 23 September 2000, *Public Papers of the Presidents*; W. J. Clinton, *My Life*, p. 597.

relationship.[299] Moreover, he wanted to leave a legacy of improved US-India relations that could be carried on by the next administrations.[300]

Clinton played a crucial role in laying the foundation of a "qualitatively different and better relationship with India".[301] He was deeply committed to getting the relationship back on track before the end of his presidency.[302] This is confirmed by Strobe Talbott who also added that the Indian nuclear tests gave the president the opportunity to "make up for the lost time",[303] putting India at the centre of US diplomacy.[304] This resulted in Clinton paying a five-day visit to India in March 2000. QCA reveals that this visit had a positive impact on US relations with India. This was because Clinton's trip was the most extensive visit to India paid by an American president since 1978, when President Carter was in office.[305] This was particularly significant because it indicated the desire of President Clinton to pay more attention to US-India relations, a relationship that for almost two decades had been neglected owing

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[299] William J. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Democratic National Committee Reception in Aspen, 25 July 1998, Public Papers of the Presidents; William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters, 1 February 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents; Madeleine Albright, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington D.C., 16 February 2000, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000216.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; The White House, Joint Statement on United States-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century, 21 March 2000; William J. Clinton, Remarks to a Joint Session of Parliament in New Delhi, 22 March 2000; Madeleine Albright, Op-Ed on the President's Trip to South Asia Printed in Diario las Americas Miami, 2 April 2000, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000402.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India, 15 September 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents; Madeleine Albright, Press Briefing on the President's Visit, 21 March 2000.

[300] William J. Clinton, Remarks at a National Democratic Institute Luncheon in Los Angeles, 14 August 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents.

[301] Madeleine Albright, Op-Ed on the President's Trip to South Asia Printed in Diario las Americas Miami, 2 April 2000.

[302] William J. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Democratic National Committee Reception in Aspen, 25 July 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 106th Congress, 1st session, 25th May 1999, p. 6.

[303] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 78.

[304] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[305] Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., 14th March 2000.

to India's limited strategic and economic importance to the United States during the Cold War. Clinton's visit was also important because President Clinton and the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a five-page "Vision for the 21st century", a document in which the two leaders showed their commitment to "closer and qualitatively new relationship".[306] They also signed a series of agreements aimed at strengthening and US-India cooperation in various fields, such as trade, environment, energy, and health. Moreover, in order to institutionalise the relationship, the two leaders agreed to hold regular bilateral summits in Washington or in New Delhi and to create joint working groups where the two countries could discuss issues of common interest.[307]

The significance of Bill Clinton's visit is also reflected in memoirs and interviews. According to the president, his visit helped to lay the foundation of a solid and long-lasting bilateral relationship.[308] A similar view was also made by some US officials serving in the Clinton and in the G. W. Bush administration interviewed for this study who claimed that Clinton's visit was a real turning point for US-India relations.[309] Bruce Riedel argued that the Bill Clinton's visit helped to consolidate the positive trend in US-India relations which had begun during the Kargil crisis, when the United States publicly sided with India against Pakistan. He also added that Clinton's visit showed the Indians that the US "had a very rich agenda which went beyond non-proliferation".[310] In his memoirs, Strobe Talbott claims that in spite of the fact that the five days that the president spent in India helped to "dispel the mistrust

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[306] The White House, Joint Statement on United States-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century, 21 March 2000.
[307] Ibid.
[308] W. J. Clinton, *My Life*, pp. 900-902.
[309] Based on the interview with Dov Zakheim, Bruce Riedel, and senior government official 2.
[310] Interview with Bruce Riedel.

that had accumulated over half a century",[311] US-India relations continued to be hostage to the non-proliferation question.

4.7 Urging India to adhere to non-proliferation treaties and export-control regimes

During the period 1998-2001, the US policy of urging India to adhere to non-proliferation treaties changed. The Clinton administration stopped urging India to join the NPT and sought to persuade it to sign the CTBT and to take part in the negotiations in Geneva for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). US policy failed to achieve any significant result, owing to domestic political considerations in the United States. Some studies highlight the shift in US nuclear goalposts, stressing that this shift marked the acceptance by the Clinton administration that India was not going to give up its nuclear program to become a member of the NPT.[312] These works, however, do not explore the impact that the transformation of US non-proliferation strategy and its failure had on the US-India relationship. QCA, instead, has shown that this factor was highly significant because it reveals that the nuclear question continued to be an obstacle to President Clinton's desire to improve US relations with India.

Pokhran II had a significant impact on US non-proliferation policy towards India during the period 1998-2001. An important difference, compared to the past, was that the focus of the Clinton administration shifted from putting pressure on India to join the NPT to signing and ratifying the CTBT and

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[311] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 202

[312] Harsh V. Pant, India and Nuclear Arms Control: A Study of the CTBT, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 91-105; V. Bhatia, Non-proliferation Policy of the Clinton administration towards India, pp. 270-273.

actively engaging in the FMCT.[313] This change stemmed from the fact that following the 1998 nuclear tests, the US government came to recognise that India would have never joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon state and that it was necessary to focus on objectives that could be realistically met in the short-term.[314] Therefore, the Clinton administration preferred to focus on persuading India to join the CTBT which, from an American standpoint, was "a fairly easy step" for India to make because the provisions of the treaty were "consistent with India's own policy of not conducting other nuclear tests". [315] The CTBT became one of the most important benchmarks of the US non-proliferation strategy aimed at capping India's nuclear program because it would have helped to constrain India's ability to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons.[316]

The new policy did not achieve any tangible result, owing to domestic political constraints in the United States. Evidence uncovered by this study has shown that the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT (on 13th October 1999) significantly contributed to undermining US chances to persuade India

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[313] The White House, Birmingham Group of Eight Summit Statement, 17 May 1998; Madeleine Albright, Press Conference, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980528b.html, accessed on 11th February 2016; John Holum, Speech at Defense Special Weapons Agency International Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, 10 June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Remarks to Stimson Center, Washington DC, 10th June 1998; Madeleine Albright, Intervention at the ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary, Manila, 27th July 1998; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 9; Robert Einhorn, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 13 May 1998, p. 15; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 3 June 1998, p. 57; Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20th October 1999, p. 13; Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., 14th March 2000.

[314] Strobe Talbott, Remarks at Brookings, 12 November 1998.

[315] John Holum, Foreign Press Center Briefing Regarding Arms Control Issues, State Department Briefing, 9 December 1999, Federal News Service.

[316] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 146.

to sign the treaty. [317] As John Holum pointed out, US rejection of the CTBT made it more difficult, if not impossible, to persuade India to "formalize [its] testing moratoria through the CTBT… when [the United States] retain[ed] it".[318] A similar view is also expressed by Strobe Talbott who argues that the rejection of the treaty "had deprived [the United States] of the principal means of applying pressure in New Delhi… to get the government to sign the CTBT".[319] He also added that this contributed to strengthening the position of those in India who opposed to the treaty which they perceived as an instrument to preserve the nuclear global supremacy of the United States and to deprive India from the opportunity to conduct the necessary tests to further develop its nuclear program.[320] This minimised the opportunities for the BJP-led government to develop a broad political consensus on this issue in the Indian Parliament and among the electorate.[321]

In the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests, the Clinton administration stopped putting pressure on India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and began to encourage India to take a series of steps, signing the CTBT and taking part in the negotiations for the FMCT, aimed at capping India's nuclear capabilities. This is salient finding because it marked a break with the period 1993-1998 in which American policy was targeted at rolling back India's nuclear program. It is also important because it shows that the US government was seeking to find a realistically achievable strategy consistent with India's

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[317] William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9 November 2000, Public Paper of the Presidents.
[318] John Holum, Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, 12th February 2000, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/global/arms/remarks/holum/holum_fp.html, accessed on 12th May 2016.
[319] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 180.
[320] Ibid., pp. 36 and 38.
[321] Ibid., pp. 98-100, and 130.

security needs and self-declared moratoria from testing and with US goal of preventing India from further developing its nuclear arsenal. Despite an apparent convergence between the United States and India on the CTBT, the policy of the Clinton administration failed to achieve any tangible result. This was because in October 1999, the US Senate rejected of the CTBT, thus weakening US pressure on India to sign the treaty. Moreover, the reluctance of the United States to ratify the treaty increased the influence of those within the Indian policymaking and scientific community that strenuously opposed to India's joining the CTBT. This is an important finding because it shows that to a certain extent the US government underestimated the fact that India was reluctant to accept any proposal imposed by an external power aimed at constraining the development of India's nuclear program.

Conclusion

The period covered by this chapter saw the beginning of the improvement of US relations with India. The chapter showed that this positive change in relations was triggered by the convergence of three factors: the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, US tilt towards India during the Kargil crisis, and President Clinton's desire to forge a new and close relationship with India. Findings emerging from the analysis supports the existing literature which claims that these three factors were crucial to paving the way for a rapprochement between the United States and India. Numerous authors have previously identified the change in the post-Pokhran period, but they have not investigated in great detail the impact on the overall evolution of the US-India relationship. Moreover, the impact of these factors during this period has not previously been compared in

a systematic way with the previous period. This is where the analysis presented in this chapter is particularly revealing and goes beyond the existing literature. Using QCA in combination with the narrative event analysis, this chapter was able to highlight that the change in US relations with India that manifested itself most clearly in the third period,was not the result of an abrupt or remarkable turnaround during the Bush administration. Instead, it showed that the shift was an incremental process, resulting from factors at different moments in time.

Regarding Pokhran II, findings from the analysis confirm what emerges from the survey of the literature which claims that this event forced the US government to pay more attention to India and to move away from the capping, reducing, and eliminating approach, in favour of a more flexible approach aimed at putting a lid on India's nuclear weapons program. However, the analysis in this chapter also uncovered an important nuance: compared to the previous period, US policymakers' perceptions from 1998-2001 played a crucial role in prompting a revision of US nuclear policy towards India. as the chapter showed, following the nuclear tests, a growing number of US officials came to acknowledge openly that India was never going to give up its nuclear capabilities, which were seen as indispensable to maintain India's security and its nuclear power aspirations. They also believed that previous attempts to persuade India to eliminate its nuclear weapons program had a detrimental effect on the development of closer bilateral ties. It was a combination of these two factors which led the US government to adopt a different nuclear policy. This finding is important, because it provides a better understanding of the strong impact that US policymakers' perceptions had on the change in US nuclear policy, an aspect that tends to be overlooked by the existing literature.

Another factor that created a more favourable environment for a rapprochement between the United States and India was President Clinton's intervention in defusing tensions between India_and Pakistan over Kashmir. The president publicly sided with India, condemning Pakistan for causing the conflict and urging it to withdraw its forces beyond the LOC. The analysis presented in this chapter confirmed the importance of this factor. In addition, it revealed that the US tilt towards India was particularly important because it marked a clear rupture with the previous period in which the Clinton administration did not want to be drawn into the Kashmir dispute in order to maintain a balanced relationship with both India and Pakistan. It was also important because it contributed to mitigating the deep reservoir of mistrust and suspicion that for almost fifty years had characterised US-India relations.

The second most significant finding emerging from the analysis is Clinton's commitment to transforming the relationship with India which had been adversely affected by the 1998 nuclear tests. Chapter 1 has shown that the significance of this factor has previously been recognised by some scholars who stress that President Clinton significantly contributed to developing closer ties between the United States and India. However, these scholars tend to focus on the president's successful visit to India (in March 2000), but pay limited or no attention to the impact that Clinton's growing interest in India and direct involvement in the US foreign policy making process had on the transformation of the relationship during the period 1998-2001. By using all available US government documents (instead of a small number as is commonplace in the literature, see in the discussion in Chapter 1), the chapter was able to show that the president worked very hard to engage with India on non-proliferation in

order to get US-India relations back on track. He was convinced that developing a close partnership with India, a large democracy, a big emerging market, and a rising power, was in the interest in the United States. The primary sources analysed for this study combined with memoirs and interviews with US policymakers have revealed that Clinton's personal interest in India and his decision to engage with India on non-proliferation had a significant impact on accelerating the process of revision of US non-proliferation policy.

In spite of the fact that these three factors had a positive impact on the evolution of US-India relations, there was not a full rapprochement between the two countries in this period. The nuclear question continued to be a stumbling block to the development of a broad-based partnership between the United States and India. As this chapter showed. this was because Clinton's commitment to the non-proliferation regime and his policy aimed to cap India's nuclear programme were incompatible with India's decision to accept no constraints on its nuclear options. While the secondary literature takes this factor into account, it fails to highlight its salience across multiple periods, thus further demonstrating the additional insight provided by this comparative analysis.

Chapter 5: 20th January 2001-18th July 2005

Introduction

This chapter examines the period from 20th January 2001, when President Bush took office, to 18th July 2005, when the US-India civil nuclear deal was announced. The aim of this chapter is to identify the full range of factors which affected US foreign policy and contributed to the transformation of the bilateral relationship.

Most scholars claim that during the Bush period US-India relations underwent a significant transformation. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 there is no agreement among scholars about which factors were most significant for stimulating change during this period. The majority of scholars writing about this topic (see Chapter 1 for an enumeration) claimed that the process of change was accelerated by growing concerns of the US about the rise of China, which pushed the Bush administration into forging a strategic partnership with India as a counterweight for China's rising power and to preserve US interests in Asia.[322] Other scholars stress the importance of common values and shared interests, which in their view contributed to creating a more favourable environment for the development of closer bilateral ties.[323] Some authors also argued that the role played by President Bush and by some of his key advisors

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[322] Abraham, *Origins*, p. 12; Chatterjee, India-China-United States; Ganguly and Mistry, The Case for US-India Agreement, pp. 12-13; Mendis and Green, US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', p. 198; Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia, p. 147; Malone, India-US Relations, 1068-1069; Mansingh, Indo-US Strategic Partnership; Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact,2009, pp. 275-276; Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation, p. 24; Tellis, *India as a New Global Power*,p.8; Heinrich-Agostini, L'Inde et les Etats Unis.

[323] Chatterjee, India-China, United States; Ganguly and Scobell, India and the Unites States Forging a Security Partnership, pp. 40-41; Balachandran, Nuclear realpolitik, p. 547; Guihong, US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for China, p. 282

(Condoleezza Rice, Phil Zelikow, and Bob Blackwill) had an important impact on the shape of US policy towards India.[324]

In addition, the review of the secondary literature has shown that during the Bush period, the nuclear question, which for a long time represented a source of friction between the United States and India, became the symbol and the driving force of the improvement of US relations with India. According to some scholars, this was because the Bush administration decided to put aside US non-proliferation concerns to begin civil nuclear cooperation with India. In their eyes, by satisfying India's quest for nuclear technology, the Bush administration significantly contributed to changing the nature and the temperament of the relationship.[325] The same authors claim that the new nuclear policy marked a clear break from Clinton's efforts to persuade India to roll back its nuclear weapons program. However, none of these scholars supports their claims with a systematic analysis of the stances of both the Clinton and the Bush administrations on matters relating to nuclear strategies and foreign policy.[326] As a consequence, it is difficult to assess the extent to which US nuclear policy really changed from the Clinton to the Bush period.

The analysis presented in this chapter confirms the importance of some of the findings emerging from the secondary literature, such as the relevance of

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[324] Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact* 2011, pp. 61-62; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 652; Mendis and Green, 'US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', p. 206-207.

[325] Abraham, Origins, p. 2 and 14-16; Ashton Carter, America's New Strategic Partner; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Solidarity, pp. 29-31; Chatterjee, India-China-United States; Feigenbaum, India's Rise, America's Interest; Ganguly and Mistry, The Case for the US-India Agreement, p. 12; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 653; Mendis and Green, US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, p. 209; Malone, India-US Relations, p. 1064; Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact*, p. 21.

[326] Heinrich-Agostini, L'Inde et les Etats-Unis; Chatterjee, From Uncertainty to Reality, pp. 25-26; Hathaway, The US-India Courtship, p. 8; Ganguly and Kapur, The Transformation, p. 650; Kux, India's Fine Balance; Malone, India-US Relations, p. 1063; Mishra, India-US Relations, p. 84.

changes in US nuclear policy and President Bush's commitment to building a strategic partnership with India. However, it also adds to existing knowledge by providing a more thorough account of the Bush period by systematically comparing it with the previous two periods. It thus provides a much more comprehensive and detailed picture of the relative influence and significance of different factors over time. As such, the results presented in this chapter are more nuanced than existing studies of the subject, which have evaluated relevant developments in isolation from previous periods.

This chapter consists of ten sections. Section 5.1 looks at US aimed at policy of reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. Section 5.2 focuses on US policymakers' concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear conflict. Section 5.3 examines US policymakers' views about establishing a strategic partnership with India. Section 5.4 focuses on President Bush s commitment to improving the relationship with India. Section 5.5 looks at changes in US nuclear policy towards India. Section 5.6 deals with US policy of improving US-India defence cooperation. Section 5.7 deals with US policy of sharing high-technology with India. Section 5.8 focuses on US policymakers' views about the impact of India's economic reforms. Section 5.9 explores US policymakers' perceptions and views about changes in US nuclear policy towards India. The last section looks at US policymakers' views on the impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations.

5.1 Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan

During the period 2001-2005, US policy of reducing subcontinental tensions remained unchanged. The US government continued to be directly involved in preventing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir from spiralling out of control. Throughout the duration of the twin peak crisis, Bush and his advisors worked very hard to persuade the two countries to take a series of steps aimed at reducing tensions and promoting stability in the region. The president made it very clear that the United States refused to mediate in the Kashmir dispute which had to be solved by India and Pakistan through diplomacy and a bilateral dialogue. Despite the numerous similarities between the strategies adopted by the two administrations, US policy of reducing subcontinental tensions had no impact on the change in US-India relations during the period 2001-2005.

US policy of defusing subcontinental tensions did not undergo any significant change between the period 1998-2001 and the period 2001-2005. In order to deal with the twin peak crisis, the Bush administration maintained the same strategy adopted by the Clinton administration during the Kargil crisis. The policy of the United States consisted of actively engaging with the Indian and the Pakistani governments in order to prevent the Indo-Pakistani conflict from escalating. The Bush administration hoped that by urging both countries to exercise restraint and to avoid provocative steps it would reduce any potential trigger towards a nuclear exchange.[327] The rapid deterioration of the situation in Kashmir pushed Secretary Powell and US Deputy Secretary

[327] Colin L. Powell,Press Briefing on President's Trip to Russia, St. Petersburg, 25 May 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10493.htm, accessed on 17th May 2016.

Armitage to take a personal interest in defusing the Indo-Pakistani crisis. They frequently travelled to the region in order to "to bring the situation [in the subcontinent] down to a point where serious de-escalation [could] start".[328] The findings of this study indicate that Richard Armitage played a crucial role in defusing the twin peak crisis because he was able to elicit from President Musharraf an assurance that he would have used his authority to stop infiltrations along the LoC, which were indispensable to persuade the Indians to move their troops away from the border.[329] This is also confirmed by Strobe Talbott who stresses that "this episode was- in terms of motivation, execution, and consequences- a replay of the Blair House talks over the Fourth of July weekend in 1999".[330]

Another element of continuity was that the Bush administration maintained that the Kashmir question had to be solved only by India and Pakistan, without the mediation of the United States. President Bush and his advisors repeatedly stressed that the US involvement in the twin peak crisis was aimed at reducing tensions in the subcontinent and at facilitating the beginning of a dialogue between India and Pakistan on Kashmir.[331] Evidence

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[328] Colin L. Powell, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, New York, 10 June 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10983.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[329] Colin L. Powell, Interview by Jon Leyne of BBC News, Washington DC, 31 May 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10618.htm, accessed on 10th August 2016; George W. Bush, Exchange With Reporters During a Tour of the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, 3 June 2002, Public Papers of the Presidents; George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange With Reporters, 3 June 2002, Public Papers of the Presidents; Colin L. Powell, Interview by Juan Williams on NPR's Morning Edition, Washington DC, 4 June 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10850.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, New York, 10 June 2002.

[330] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 215.

[331] The White House, Joint Statement for the Visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to New York, 10 November 2001, Public Papers of the Presidents; Colin L. Powell, Interview by Jon Leyne of BBC News, Washington DC, 31 May 2002; Gerry J. Gilmore, Rumsfeld Trip Includes NATO, India, Pakistan, Mideast Stops, Washington DC, 3 June 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/20120414184939/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.asp

x?ID=43793, accessed on 21st May 2016; Gerry J. Gilmore, Rumsfeld Discusses India-Pakistan Situation, Pending Visit, Washington DC, 4 June 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120414184930/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=43787, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Interview by Juan Williams on NPR's Morning Edition, Washington DC, 4 June 2002; Colin Powell, Press Briefing on Board Plane, 12 June 2002,available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/11053.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability in New Delhi, 12 June 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/20100302024119/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3508, accessed on 21st May 2016; Kathleen T. Rhem, Rumsfeld Praises India for Steps Forward, Islamabad, 12 June 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120414184814/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=43756, accessed on 21st May 2016; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Press Briefing en route to Bahrain, 13 June 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100302024125/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3510, accessed on 21st May 2016; Christina Rocca, Statement before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2nd session, 18 July 2002, p. 7; Colin Powell, Press Briefing with Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Inam ul Haq, Islamabad, 28 July 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/12229.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Richard Armitage, Remarks to the Press, Islamabad, 24 August 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/2002/13176.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 26 January 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/16869.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Remarks With Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khursid Mahmud Kasuri Following Meeting, Washington DC, 29 January 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17047.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), p. 44; Colin Powell, Interview on Pakistan Television, Washington DC, 10 April 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19533.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Richard Armitage, Remarks Following Meeting with President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, 8 May 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/20409.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; George W. Bush, The President's News Conference With President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan at Camp David, 30 June 2003, Public Papers of the Presidents; Mary Ann Peters, South Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks to the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 1 July 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/22296.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Message to the India Today Conclave, Washington DC, 12 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30408.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Remarks on NDTV 24x7's India Questions Colin Powell Dialogue with Indian Youth with Host Prannoy Roy, New Delhi, 16 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30663.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, The Promise of Our Partnership, *The News*, 17 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30490.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Remarks to Pakistani Youth, Islamabad, 18 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30563.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Christina Rocca, New Horizons in United States Relations with South Asia, University of Pennsylvania's Center for the Advanced Study of India, Philadelphia, 21 April 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/31702.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Richard Armitage, Interview by GEO Islamabad Bureau Chief Hamid Mir, Islamabad, 15 July 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/34429.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Condoleezza Rice, Interview With Raj Chengappa of India Today, New Delhi, 16 March 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm//2005/43626.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Condoleezza Rice, Interview with Quatrina Hosain Currim of Pakistan Television, Islamabad, 17 March 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm//2005/43604.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

obtained from QCA shows that the Bush administration did not want to be drawn in the Kashmir question because this could have had a negative impact on US relations with India and Pakistan, and as a consequence, on US ability to help defusing future crises in the region.

In spite of the fact that there was a high degree of continuity between the strategies adopted by the two administrations, the policy of the US in respect of reducing subcontinental tensions did not seem to have a significant impact on the transformation of the US-India relationship during the period 2001-2005. This was because President Bush did not have the option to tilt towards India to the extent to which his predecessor did because of the need to preserve Pakistan's support for US military action in Afghanistan. The US government was concerned that a conflict in South Asia could result in Pakistan moving its troops from its western to its eastern border, thus undermining US military efforts in Afghanistan which were a priority for the Bush administration at that time.[332] A report conducted by the Congressional Research Service shows that after 9/11, Pakistan provided "unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan".[333] This is extremely important because it shows that the strong strategic link with Pakistan pushed President Bush to adopt a more even-handed approach which was aimed at keeping Pakistan onside, and prevented the Bush administration from siding with India.

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[332] Colin L. Powell, Interview on CNN's Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, St. Petersburg, 26 May 2002, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10494.htm, accessed on 17th May 2016.
[333] K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistani-US Relations, Congressional Research Service, 11th December 2002, p. 15.

The significance of this finding is supported by claims in the secondary literature which stress that the US-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan significantly affected the way in which the Bush administration managed the crisis between India and Pakistan. According to Michael Krepon and Polly Nayak, the twin peak crisis represented at the eyes of American policymakers "an unwelcome diversion from the war on terror" for American policymakers.[334] Srinath Raghavana asserts that at that time the United States was working with the Pakistani army in order to prevent Al-Qaeda from leaving Afghanistan. He also adds that the Bush administration had a clear interest in preventing the [Indo-Pakistani] crisis from spiralling and resulting in the redeployment of Pakistani forces from the Afghanistan border to the borders with India".[335] A similar view is also expressed by Stephen Cohen and P. R. Chari who argue that even though the United States came to recognise that the twin peak crisis was triggered by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, "it was reluctant to come down hard on Pakistan".[336]

US policy of reducing tensions did not undergo any significant change between the second and the third periods of analysis. The Bush administration continued to be actively involved in defusing the conflict between India and Pakistan. This was because the US government was seriously concerned that tensions between the two rivals could trigger a nuclear Armageddon in the subcontinent. Moreover, a potential conflict in the region would have forced

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[334] Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Pick Crisis, Stimson Center, Report 57, September 2006, p. 22, available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/USCrisisManagementFull.pdf, accessed on 10th August 2016.

[335] Srinath Raghavan, A Coercive Triangle: India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Crisis of 2001–2002, *Defence Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, (June 2009), pp. 247-248.

[336] P. R. Chari, et al., Peace and War in South Asia, in *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia*, Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p. 193

Pakistan to move its military forces from the western to the eastern border, thus undermining US military actions in Afghanistan. Evidence obtained from QCA has indicated that the need to preserve Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror had a significant impact on shaping US policy of reducing tensions and on preventing President Bush to side with India to the extent to which President Clinton did during the Kargil crisis. This is an important finding because it helps to explain why during the period 2001-2005, this factor did not seem to have an impact on the change of US relations with India.

5.2 Concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear conflict

During the period 2001-2005, American policymakers were very concerned about the dangers inherent in Indo-Pakistani tensions and their potential implications. The terrorist attack perpetrated against the Indian parliament in December 2001 and in Kashmir in May 2002 brought the subcontinent to the verge of a military confrontation (known as the twin peak crisis) that, according to American policymakers, could have led to a direct nuclear exchange between the two countries. American officials in the Bush administration were extremely concerned that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could have a devastating impact not only for the regional peace and stability, but also on the US War on Terror and on the efforts of the Bush administration to build close ties with India. This finding is important because it provides a more thorough account of the impact of the concerns expressed by US policymakers on making the reduction of subcontinental tensions one of the priorities of the Bush administration's foreign policy towards India.

During the twin peak crisis, US policymakers became even more convinced that the risk of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan was more than real for various reasons. First, the ongoing nuclear missile arms race between India and Pakistan made the subcontinent more volatile and unstable than in the past. According to DOD *The Proliferation Threat and Response*, both countries possessed sizeable nuclear infrastructures which could enable them to improve the quality and the size of their nuclear arsenals. They had also made significant progress with their short-range ballistic missile and medium-range ballistic missile programs.[337] Second, India and Pakistan had deployed their soldiers along the border, thus making the situation even more dangerous and more difficult to solve because the risk that another terrorist attack or an incident between the Indian and the Pakistani military forces could degenerate into a conflict was extremely high.[338] Finally, India and Pakistan knew very little about each other's red lines, thus increasing the potential for miscalculation.[339]

US officials were also extremely concerned that subcontinental tensions could undermine the US war on terror. According to defence officials, India's decision to mobilise its forces in Kashmir would have forced Pakistan to divert attention from the border tribal area with Afghanistan, where the United States believed that al Qaeda and Taliban forces were hiding.[340] US Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly described the situation in the subcontinent as "unhelpful

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[337] US Department of Defence, Proliferation Threat and Response 2001, January 2001, available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, accessed on 10th August 2016, p. 30.
[338] Thomas R. Wilson, Testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 6 February 2002, *Federal News Service*
[339] Ibid.
[340] Linda D. Kozaryn, Pakistan-India Conflict Concerns U.S. Military, American Forces Press Service, Washington DC, 28 May 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120414184314/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44007, accessed on 17th May 2016.

with respect to [US] efforts in Afghanistan".[341] He also pointed out that "that President Musharraf [had] indicated that there would [have] been more of his forces in the Afghanistan border area if the tension was not so high with respect to his eastern border".[342] Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke stressed that the US government was working very hard to defuse the Indo-Pakistani crisis in order to encourage Pakistan to remain extensively involved in the war on terror, which was a priority for the G. W. Bush administration.[343] These statements are particularly important because they show that from an American standpoint, the twin peak crisis was "a distraction from the efforts against the global war on terrorism".[344]

Another element that played an important role in shaping US policymakers' perceptions was the fact that tensions between India and Pakistan could jeopardize the efforts of the United States to forge a close partnership with India. As US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca stressed, progress in US-India relations were "too often overshadowed by the spectre of a war between India and Pakistan".[345] A similar view was also expressed by other American officials who pointed out that the threat of a potential conflict in the subcontinent forced the US government to devote more time to defusing tensions between India and Pakistan, rather than

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[341] Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability, 22 May 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100302014443/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3457, accessed on 17th May 2016.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Linda D. Kozaryn, Pakistan-India Conflict Concerns U.S. Military, 28 May 2002.
[344] Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Operational Update Briefing, Pentagon Briefing Room, Virginia, 4 June 2002, Federal News Service.
[345] Christina Rocca, Statement before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2nd session, 18 July 2002, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p.7.

to focus on building a close partnership with India.[346] According to Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, this could create the feeling among the Indians that in spite of its commitment to de-hyphenate US-India relations from US-Pakistan relations, the Bush administration continued to look at India through the prism of Indo-Pakistani tensions.[347] Richard Haas also pointed out that the growing instability of the region prevented India from "realiz[ing] its immense potential on the global stage", owing to the fact that immense economic resources were devoted to countering Pakistan by the Indian government and Indo-Pakistani tensions had a negative impact on US investments in India.[348]

US policymakers' perceptions are indispensable to understand why the Bush administration made reducing subcontinental tensions one of the priorities of its foreign policy agenda. They also help to explain why during the period 2001-2005, the US government sought to defuse the twin peak crisis, without tilting neither towards either India or Pakistan. US officials were convinced that India and Pakistan's decision to deploy troops in Kashmir could seriously hamper the US war on terror in Afghanistan, where the United States was relying on Pakistan's military support to fight against al Qaeda. Moreover, they were concerned that the situation in the subcontinent could have a negative impact on President G. W. Bush's efforts to develop a strong partnership with

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[346] Richard N. Haass, The United States and India: a Transformed Relationship, Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, 7 January 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16399.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Paul Wolfowitz, Q&A session following remarks at the IISS Asia Security Conference in Singapore, 31 May 2003, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20150619001534/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2704, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[347] Paul Wolfowitz, Q&A Session Following Remarks at the IISS Asia Security Conference in Singapore, 31 May 2003.

[348] Richard N. Haass, The United States and India: a Transformed Relationship, Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, 7 January 2003.

India: a country which was perceived as having a high potential to emerge as a major player in the international system.

5.3 Importance of establishing a strategic partnership with India

American policymakers became more interested in building a strategic partnership with India during the period 2001-2005. The change in US policymakers' perceptions was shaped by India's enormous potential to become a major international and economic player. Moreover, they believed that strong ties between the United States and India were indispensable to deal with common global threats and challenges. The existing literature stresses that the Bush administration made establishing a strategic partnership with India a priority of its foreign policy agenda, but limited or no attention is paid to the impact that US officials perceptions had on shaping US approach towards India during this period. This study shows that the change in US policymakers' views about the importance of deepening US-India cooperation is indispensable to understand the quality of the transformation of the relationship between the two countries.

A key difference, compared to the past, was that during the period 2001-2005, American officials became more aware of the importance of developing a strategic partnership with India. According to US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, the commitment of the Bush administration to deepen US-India relations reflected a radical change in US perceptions about India. In a speech before the Confederation of Indian Industries, he openly declared that the United States was no longer obsessed with eliminating India's nuclear weapons and missiles programs and no longer saw its relationship with India through the

prism of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, but rather it "perceive[d] India as a strategic opportunity for the United States".[349] This was because, by the time President Bush took office, an increasing number of American policymakers came to recognise that it is was in the interests of the United States to forge close ties with India, which was perceived by the Americans as being the world's largest democracy, a rapidly growing economy, and a growing world power.[350] In some statements and speeches, key US officials stressed that the Bush administration recognised the numerous advantages deriving from a close partnership between the United States and India. As Christina Rocca pointed out, the US government was committed to taking advantage of "the benefits of [US-India] natural alliance as the world's strongest and largest democracies". She added that "many of these benefits [were] to be found at the global level, where India [had] rightly assumed a position commensurate with its size and potential, and where [American and Indian] interests [were] complementary and overlapping".[351] A similar point was also made by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who argued that the Bush administration was "willing and

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[349] Robert D. Blackwill, The Future of US-India Relations, New Delhi, 17 July 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/22615.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[350] Christina Rocca, The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership, Remarks At a Luncheon Meeting Hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, 11 September 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/23987.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Nicholas Burns, Interview With Katja Gloger of Stern Magazine, Washington DC, 15 June 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/48714.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Nicholas Burns, Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India, Washington DC, 19 July 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Paul Wolfowitz, Interview with Channel News Asia, 31 May 2002, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100302014420/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3477, accessed on 21st May 2016; Condoleezza Rice, Interview With Raj Chengappa of India Today, 16 March 2005; Condoleezza Rice, Interview by Amitabha Chakrabarti of Doordarshan Television, Washington DC, 15 July 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49681.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[351] Christina Rocca, The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership, 11 September 2003.

ready to assist on that growth of India's global power and implications of that, which [were seen] as largely positive".[352]

Evidence obtained from memoirs and interviews has indicated that during the period 2001-2005, US perceptions about India's potential and its rise in the international system were stronger than in the past. According to a scholar who spoke under condition of anonimity, the idea that India was destined to become a major international power gained momentum towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s.[353] This is confirmed by Condoleezza Rice who argues that since during Bush's election campaign, there was a growing feeling that India was not only as "the world's largest democracy",[354] but also as "a power of global significance"[355] with which the United States wanted to develop close ties. Phil Zelikow explained that the Bush administration worked very hard to build a strategic partnership with India. This was because the president and his advisors believed that a strong US-India relationship was going to be vital for the United States.[356]

During the period 2001-2005, US policymakers' perceptions about the importance of building a strategic partnership with India were stronger than in the past. This change stemmed from the fact that US officials became more aware of the advantages deriving from closer ties with India, a country with which the United States shared the same faith democratic ideals and growing economic interests. This study shows that the numerous commonalities existing

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[352] Condoleezza Rice, Interview With Al Hunt, Janine Zacharia and Matt Winkler of Bloomberg News, Washington DC, 26 May 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46826.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.
[353] Interview with scholar 1.
[354] C. Rice, *No Higher Honour*, p. 23.
[355] Ibid.
[356] Based on the author's interview with Phil Zelikow.

between the United States and India were particularly important in shaping US policymakers' views about India and in making developing a strategic partnership with India a priority of its foreign policy.

5.4 President's commitment to transform the relationship with India

During the period 2001-2005, President Bush continued Clinton's policy of transforming the relationship with India. Like his predecessor, Bush was convinced that it was important to build a strategic partnership with India: a country with which the United States shared numerous similarities and common interests. The significance of this finding is supported by the secondary literature which argues that during his campaign, President Bush showed a growing interest in making India the centrepiece of his foreign policy.[357] It is important to point out that the vast majority of existing studies tends to focus on the differences which existed between the two presidents in terms of their views and attitudes towards non-proliferation and arms control treaties, rather than on the similarities between the two. This study, by contrast, indicates that the elements of continuity between the two presidents were more important than the secondary literature suggests.

President Bush maintained the same level of commitment as his predecessor in transforming the relationship with India. In a joint statement with the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, Bush declared his intention to deepen the bilateral dialogue that began in March 2000 and to make India a priority for his foreign policy. [358] This was because he was convinced that a strategic

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[357] Hathaway, The US–India courtship: from Clinton to Bush, p. 10.
[358] The White House, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, 12 January 2004; the White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005.

partnership with India would have been beneficial for the United States for various reasons. First, India was a rising power, destined to become one of the leading countries of the 21st century.[359] Second, India shared with the United States a strong faith in freedom and democratic principles with the United States. This, according to the president, provided a solid basis for a long-lasting partnership.[360] Third, thanks to its large middle-class and its rapidly growing economy, India was an important commercial partner for the United States.[361] Finally, close cooperation between the two countries was necessary to tackle the common challenges that they were facing in Asia and beyond and to promote global peace and prosperity.[362]

Evidence from interviews with American policymakers and scholars has confirmed that there was a certain degree of continuity between Clinton and Bush's approaches towards India.[363] An eminent scholar interviewed for this study claimed that both presidents wanted to improve the relationship with India.[364] A similar point was made by Dov Zakheim who stressed that "there was much more continuity [between President Clinton and Bush] than people realise".[365] He argued that the change began during Clinton's visit to India in

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[359] George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 214.
[360] The White House, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, 12 January 2004; the White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005; George W. Bush, The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Singh of India, 18 July 2005, Public Papers of the Presidents; George W. Bush, Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, 18 July 2005, Public Papers of the Presidents.
[361] President George W. Bush, Remarks following Discussions with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India and an Exchange with Reporters, 9th November 2001.
[362] The White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005; George W. Bush, Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, 18 July 2005.
[363] Based on the interview senior government official 2; goverment official 4; Bruce Riedel; and Dov Zakheim.
[364] Phone call interview with scholar 2. Anonimity requested.
[365] Author's interview with Dov Zakheim.

2000 and was continued by Bush.[366] According to Bruce Riedel, the fact that both presidents were deeply committed to pay more attention to India was particularly important because generally, "when the White House goes to one party to another one there is a tendency to dispense with everything the previous party did. In the case of India, President Bush worked on the basis of what President Clinton had accomplished and he accelerated it, bringing it to a new level".[367]

This factor is highly significant because it reveals that Bush's policy towards India was far more consistent with Clinton's objectives than has been suggested in the secondary literature. Bush shared Clinton's ambition to improve US-India relations. This was because both presidents believed that it was important to pay more attention to India, a country that seemed to be destined to become increasingly important from an economic and international point of view. This investigation has revealed that the high degree of continuity existing between President Clinton and Bush had a positive impact on the transformation relationship between the two countries because it facilitated the consolidation of a process of change which had already begun under President Clinton.

5.5 Changes in US nuclear policy towards India

During the period 2001-2005, US non-proliferation policy towards India underwent a significant transformation. The Bush administration sought to expand US-India civil nuclear and civil space cooperation with India through the Next Step in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The new policy had a

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[366] Ibid.
[367] Interview with Bruce Riedel.

positive impact on the relationship, but it failed to achieve full civil nuclear cooperation. This was because US domestic legislation and its international obligations made it impossible for the Bush administration to provide nuclear technology and material to India because it was not a member of the NPT. On 18th July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to begin full civil nuclear cooperation and his commitment to remove all the domestic and international constraints that had previously made it impossible to enhance cooperation between the two countries in the nuclear field. In exchange, India promised to identify and separate its civilian from its military nuclear facilities, to voluntarily place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to sign the Additional Protocol, to continue its unilateral moratorium from nuclear testing, to work with the United States for the conclusion of the FMCT.[368] The civil nuclear deal (CND) contributed to improving the quality of US-India relations. The salience of this finding is confirmed by the secondary literature which stresses that this agreement paved the way for the rapprochement between the two countries.[369] It is important to point out that the majority of these studies tends to focus on US nuclear policy during the period 2001-2005, while limited attention is paid to previous periods. By highlighting elements of continuity and change, this study, instead, provides a more thorough account of the impact that the nuclear question had on the evolution of the US-India relationship across the three periods of analysis.

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[368] The White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Washington DC, 18 July 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm, accessed on 10th August 2016.

[369] I. Abraham, Origins of the United States-Nuclear Agreement, pp. 11-21; Evan A. Feigenbaum, India's Rise, America's Interest, The Fate of the U.S.-Indian Partnership, *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2010; Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Mistry, The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement, *World Policy Journal*, vol. 23, no. 11, 2006, p. 11; Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. Vol. 27, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2003, pp. 152-167.

Bush maintained the same pragmatic approach adopted by his predecessor towards India's nuclear program. As Christina Rocca explained before the US Congress, the US government "acknowledge[d] the reality that [India had] nuclear weapons, and there [was] no prospect that it [would have] abandon[ed] its nuclear program in the foreseeable future".[370] The growing awareness that India would have never given up its nuclear arsenal led the Bush administration to focus on the same goals previously pursued by the Clinton administration. During the period 2001-2004, the US government continued to urge India and Pakistan to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests, exercise restraint, bring to an end the production of fissile material, and tighten their export control systems.[371] This is also confirmed by Strobe Talbott who argues that Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, and Christina Rocca put pressure on India to conform to the Clinton administration's benchmarks without "advertising the extent to which they were picking up where their predecessors left off".[372] This is a salient finding because it shows that there was more continuity in the nuclear goalposts of the two administrations than the secondary literature indicates. As seen in chapter 1, many studies on US-India relations focus on the differences in terms of the non-proliferation approaches of the Clinton and the Bush administration, while limited or no attention is paid to the commonalities between the two administrations. This

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[370] Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), p. 43; US Department of Commerce, Statement of Principles for U.S India High Technology Commerce, Washington DC, 5 February 2003, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/india-high-technology-trade/11-policy-guidance/462-statement-of-principle-for-u-s-india-high-technology-commerce, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[371] Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003, pp. 21-22 and 43.

[372] S. Talbott, *Engaging India*, p. 212.

makes it difficult to have a thorough account of the quality of the change in the US-India relationship.

In contrast to the continuity between the two leaders, there is a crucial key difference, which is that President Bush was more willing than his predecessor to make concessions to India in the nuclear field. This was because strategic considerations tended to prevail over non-proliferation concerns. The president and his advisors believed that enhancing US-India civil nuclear cooperation would have facilitated the development of a closer strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi. Kenneth Juster explained that the Indian government had indicated that progress in civil nuclear area was a "litmus test for the overall transformation of the relationship".[373] A similar view was also expressed by an American government official who stressed that from an Indian point of view, the development of a closer bilateral partnership was conditional to changes in US nuclear policy towards India.[374]

In January 2004, the Bush administration launched the NSSP, a three-phase initiative to enhance US-India relations, which was aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade.[375] In order to facilitate progress in each of these three

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[373] Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-tech Cooperation with India, at the 28th Annual Meeting of the US-India Business Council, New York, 2 June 2003.

[374] Interview with government official 5, anonymity requested.

[375] George W. Bush, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, Washington DC, 12 January 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin L. Powell, Remarks with Indian Minister of External Affairs Yashwant Sinha After Their Meeting, Washington DC, 20 January 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/28265.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Message to the India Today Conclave, Washington DC, 12 March 2004; Colin L. Powell, Joint Press Availability With Minister of External Affairs Yaswant Sinha, New Delhi, 16 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30445.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Remarks on NDTV 24x7's India Questions Colin Powell Dialogue with Indian Youth with Host Prannoy Roy, 16 March 2004; Christina Rocca, New Horizons in United States Relations with South Asia, 21 April 2004; Christina Rocca, United States Interests and Foreign Policy Priorities in South Asia, Statement before the House Committee on International

areas, the US and the Indian governments had to take a series of reciprocal steps which involved broadening engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues and missile defence to enhance cooperation in peaceful uses of space technology, creating the appropriate environment for successful high-technology commerce, and strengthening regulations and procedures aimed at fighting the proliferation of WMD.[376]

The NSSP represented "an important milestone in [US-India] relations"[377] which enabled the United States to engage with India "in a number of key areas in which cooperation [had] previously been limited or non-existent.[378] It is important to point out that in spite of the numerous benefits deriving from this policy and its positive impact on the evolution of the bilateral relationship, civil nuclear cooperation between United States and India was restricted only to nuclear regulatory and safety issues.[379] The development of full civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India was constrained by US domestic legislation and US international non-proliferation commitments.[380] US Secretary of State Colin Powell made it very clear that these efforts to expand US-India civil nuclear relations would have been

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Relations, Washington DC, 22 June 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/33774.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Kathleen T. Rhem, Rumsfeld Arrives in India for Meetings With 'Rising Global Power', New Delhi, 8 December 2004, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120414172616/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=24642, accessed on 21st May 2016; Adam Ereli, United States - India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, Washington DC, 17 September 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa//prs/ps/2004/36290.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[376] George W. Bush, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, 12 January 2004.

[377] Colin L. Powell, Press Briefing En Route to India, 15 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30422.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

[378] U.S. Department of State, United States and India Successfully Complete Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, Washington DC, 18 July 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49721.htm, accessed on 20th July 2016.

[379] Ibid.

[380] George W. Bush, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, 12 January 2004; Colin Powell, Interview by the Washington Post, 3 October 2003; Colin Powell, Remarks on NDTV, 16 March 2004.

undertaken without crossing "certain redlines that [the US had] with respect to proliferation".[381]

According to Christina Rocca, this decision stemmed from the fact that even though India had a very good record as non-proliferator, the United States wanted to be sure that India had adopted the necessary measures to strengthen its export-control legislation and enforced them before responding with similar steps that would have expanding civil nuclear cooperation. Moreover, full civil nuclear cooperation with India would have required the United States to make significant changes to its domestic law and in the guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), which would have required a significant period of time. Finally, there were people within the Bush administration and within the US Congress who were reluctant to make concessions to India in the nuclear field.[382]

In spite of the fact that Bush administration had repeatedly stressed that civil nuclear cooperation with India would have taken place in accordance with US legislation and international non-proliferation commitments, in July 2005, the president declared that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages of other [nuclear weapon] states". [383] He also expressed his commitment to achieving full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, to seeking agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies and the United States, and to working

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[381] Colin Powell, Interview by the Washington Post, Washington DC, 3rd October 2003.
[382] Based on the interview with Christina Rocca.
[383] White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005. Emphasis added.

with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade".[384]

Evidence from memoirs and interviews with US policymakers has shown that the change in US nuclear policy stemmed from the fact that the Bush administration was convinced that achieving full civil nuclear cooperation would have paved the way to forging closer strategic ties with India. President Bush points out that the US-India civil nuclear deal (CND) represented "the culmination of [the US] efforts to improve relations between the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy".[385] Condoleezza Rice claims that the CND became the centrepiece of rapprochement between the United States and India.[386] A similar point was also made by Dov Zakheim who also stressed that the agreement enabled the United States and India to overcome the stalemate created by the nuclear issue which represented a major divider between the two countries.[387] According to Phil Zelikow, the Bush administration came to terms with the fact that the US-India nuclear conundrum could be solved only cutting the Gordian knot. He added that the United States had to recognise that it would have been impossible to untie the knot strand by strand, therefore, the only way to deal with it was to "accept the fact that India was a nuclear power and the United States had to grandfather it into the nuclear regime".[388]

The US-India civil nuclear deal represented a remarkable turnaround in US nuclear policy towards India. This was because the agreement marked a

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[384] Ibid.
[385] G. W. Bush, *Decision points*, London: Virgin, 2010, p. 214.
[386] C. Rice, *No Higher Honour. A Memoir of My Years in Washington*, London: Simon and Schuster, 2011, p. 436.
[387] Based on the interview with Dov Zakheim.
[388] Based on the interview with Phil Zelikow.

clear departure from previous American non-proliferation policies aimed at preventing India from further developing its nuclear program. While the analysis found in the secondary literature tends to confirm the salience of these findings, there is an important point which emerges from QCA that is insufficiently stressed by the existing literature. This is that between 2001 and 2004, the Bush administration maintained the same pragmatic approach adopted by his predecessor towards India's nuclear capabilities. Recognising that India would have never renounced to its nuclear program, President Bush and his advisors continued to urge India to conform to the Clinton administration's benchmarks. This is important because it shows that at the beginning the Bush administration did not completely take the distance from the goalposts of his predecessor.

5.6 Improving US-India defence cooperation

The Bush administration sought to develop closer defence ties with India during this period. This was because the president and his advisors believed that strong defence cooperation between the two countries would have helped to preserve US interests in Asia and to advance the US-India strategic partnership. The US government took a series of steps aimed at reviving and expanding defence relations between the two countries. Between 2001 and 2005, US-India defence relationship improved, but not sufficiently to make this factor a driving force for transforming the quality of the overall bilateral relationship. Some scholars recognise that the defence relationship between the two countries was still in the early stage of its development. These studies, however, do not explore the impact that this factor had on the transformation

of the relationship with India. The findings presented below help to fill this gap in the literature and to provide a better understanding of the change in the US-India relationship.

The Bush administration worked very hard to strengthen US-India defence relations. This was because from an American standpoint, strengthening military and defence cooperation between the United States and India would have contributed to maintaining stability and security in Asia and would have helped to deepen the bilateral strategic partnership. [389] In December 2001, in order to enhance the defence relationship, the US and the Indian governments revived the Defence Policy Group (DPG) which provided a forum in which the two countries could plan and coordinate defence activities and initiatives and discuss issues of common concern.[390] Between 2002 and 2005, the United States and India held a series of joint army, air, and naval exercises which helped to increase interoperability for joint military operations.[391] Moreover, in June 2005, the United States and India signed the *New Framework in the US-India Defence Relationship*, a ten-year agreement aimed

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[389] Joint Statement on US-India Defence Policy Group Meeting, 23 May 2002, available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3355, accessed on 20th May 2014; Christina Rocca, The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership, 11 September 2003; Christina Rocca, Transforming US-India Relations, Remarks to Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, 14 May 2002.

[390] Christina Rocca, Transforming US-India Relations, 14 May 2002; Richard Haass, The United States and India: a Transformed Relationship, 7 January 2003.

[391] Jim Garamone, Myers Speaks on Terror War, U.S.-India Contacts, New Delhi, 29 July 2003, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120414175425/http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=28660, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Joint Press Availability With Minister of External Affairs Yaswant Sinha, 16 March 2004; Donald Rumsfeld, Statements by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, 9 December 2004, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100302021723/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1987, accessed on 21st May 2016; Condoleezza Rice, Interview With Shirvaj Prasad of NDTV, New Delhi, 16 March 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm//2005/43511.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Condoleezza Rice, Interview by Amitabha Chakrabarti of Doordarshan Television, Washington DC, 15 July 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49681.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.

at augmenting cooperation in multilateral operations, expanding two-ways defence trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfer, co-production and research, and expanding missile defence cooperation.[392]

The improvement did not, however, have a significant impact on the transformation of the quality of the bilateral relationship. This was because defence cooperation between the United States and India was relatively new.[393] As seen in the Chapter 3, it was only after the end of the Cold War that the United States began to engage with India in the defence field. This was because India's policy of non-alignment and its friendship with the Soviet Union were seen by US policymakers an obstacle to establishing US-India defence relations during the Cold War. Moreover, the India nuclear test in 1998 was also another factor in disrupting the American attempts to deepen cooperation in this area. This event forced President Clinton to impose a series of sanctions calling for that. As V. P. Malik pointed out, the US reaction to the nuclear tests contributed to "wiping clean previous slate of cooperation and to increasing India's mistrust towards the United States.[394]

The Bush administration sought to improve US-India relations through the development of closer defence ties with India. The existing literature stresses that during this period, the defence relationship between the two countries flourished quite quickly. The existing literature does not explain to what extent the development of closer ties in this field favoured the

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[392] New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship, available at http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3211/2005-06-28%20New%20Framework%20for%20the%20US-India%20Defense%20Relationship.pdf, accessed on 6th August 2016.

[393] Condoleezza Rice, Interview by Amitabha Chakrabarti of Doordarshan Television, 15 July 2005.

[394] V. P. Malik, 'Indo-US Defence and Military Relations. From Estrangement to strategic partnership,' in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century. More than words*, p. 87.

transformation of the quality of the bilateral relationship. QCA has shown that US attempts to engage with India in the defence field did not have a significant impact on the transformation of the relationship because during the period 2001-2005, US-India defence cooperation was not sufficiently established.

5.7 Sharing high-technology with India

In November 2001, President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee declared their intention to develop closer ties between the United States and India in high-technology trade. The meeting between the two leaders triggered a process of revision of US export control policies towards India and led to the creation of a specific forum in which the two countries could discuss problems and ways to improve bilateral cooperation in this field. Even though the new US policy had a positive impact on US-India high-tech trade, there was not a full rapprochement between the United States and India, owing to the fact that India's access to US civil space and civil nuclear technology continued to be restricted. This is a salient finding because it shows that the nuclear question remained an obstacle to the development of a strategic partnership between the United States and India.

An important difference, compared to the previous periods, is that the United States started sharing strategic technology with India. This change in US policy stemmed from the fact that the Bush administration believed that a vibrant high-technology trade relationship would have contributed to satisfying India's desire to have access to high and dual-use technology, and in thus doing, facilitating the development of a strategic partnership between the two countries. As seen in section 5.3, key members of the Bush administration

reported that the Indian government made it clear that from an Indian standpoint, the transformation of the quality of the relationship with the United States was conditional to progress in the area of strategic trade, including civil space and civil nuclear trade.[395] This is also confirmed by a CRS report which stresses that since 2001, Indian officials stated that removing the obstacles to the transfer of dual-use technology to India and to bilateral civil nuclear and space cooperation were "necessary to provide the tangible evidence of a changed US-India relationship".[396]

Between 2001 and 2004, the US government worked very hard to stimulate bilateral high-technology trade. Kenneth Juster reported that following President Bush's decision to waive the remaining sanctions against India in September 2001, the volume of strategic trade between the United States and India increased because many items were no longer subject to control.[397] In November 2002, The United States and India also established the High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) to discuss issues related to strategic trade, to create the appropriate economic and legal conditions to promote high-tech trade, to provide information to Indian and American businessmen about commercial opportunities and export control requirements, and to assist India to strengthen its export control regulation.[398] Moreover, in 2003, the US and the Indian governments signed a "Statement of Principles for

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[395] Colin L. Powell, Interview by The Washington Post, Washington DC, 3 October 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/25139.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, speech at the 28th Annual Meeting of the US-India Business Council, New York, 2 June 2003.

[396] K. Alan Kronstadt, India-US relations, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 3rd December 2003, p. 14.

[397] Kenneth Juster, Stimulating high-technology cooperation with India, New York, 2 June 2003.

[398] Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003, p. 44; Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, 2 June 2003.

US-India High-Technology Cooperation" which was aimed at strengthening high-tech commerce between the two countries.[399] The two governments agreed to take a series of steps aimed at "remov[ing] systemic tariff and non-tariff barriers, identify[ing] and generat[ing] awareness of [high-tech] market opportunities, and build[ing] additional confidence in the two countries for such trade".[400] The US government also agreed to review its export control policies in order to broaden India's access to US high-tech items, while the Indian government agreed to strengthen its export control system.[401]

In spite strenuous efforts of the US to stimulate US-India high-tech trade, the relationship with India did not improve to the extent to which the Bush administration expected. This was because US domestic legislation and its international commitments represented an obstacle to transferring civil space and civil nuclear technology that India was seeking to acquire from Americans. In numerous documents, key members of the Bush administration repeatedly stressed that the US government was deeply committed to enhancing strategic trade with India, including controlled dual-use goods and technologies, in a way consistent with US laws, national security goals, and international treaties.[402] This meant it that cooperation in areas related to sensitive missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological activities restrictions remained precluded.[403] According to Condoleezza Rice, these constraints made

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[399] Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003, p. 44.
[400] Statement of principles for US-India High-Technology Commerce, 5 February 2003.
[401] Ibid.
[402] Christina Rocca, Statement before Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st session, 20 March 2003, p. 44; US Department of Commerce, Statement of Principles for U.S India High Technology Commerce, 5 February 2003.
[403] Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, 2June 2003.

it difficult to expand the cooperation between the two countries in this field and represented an impediment to a true breakthrough in US-India relations. She also stressed that another obstacle to deepening cooperation between the United States and India in this field was the presence of a strong non-proliferation lobby in the DOS and in the Congress that would "resist anything that looked like a change of US policy in that area".[404]

During the period 2001-2004, the new US policy of the sharing high-technology with India resulted in the rapid increase of the volume of US-India strategic trade. In spite to the fact that this seemed to create favourable conditions for a rapprochement between the United States and India, the bilateral relationship did not improve to the extent to which the Bush administration had envisioned. The possibility to develop a strategic partnership with India was significantly decreased because US domestic legislation and international commitments made it impossible to grant India access to the American civil space and civil nuclear technology that it desperately wished to acquire.

5.8 US policymakers' perceptions about the impact of India's liberalisation reforms and economic growth on US-India relations

India's liberalisation reforms and its rapid economic growth continued to play a significant role in shaping US policymakers' perceptions and views. The Bush administration showed a strong interest in building closer commercial and economic ties with India, owing to its potential to become a world leading country. In spite of the growing appreciation of this potential, many American

[404] Rice, *No Higher Honour*, p. 129.

policymakers were concerned that the slow pace of India's economic reforms, bureaucratic constraints, and high tariff barriers could hamper India's economic growth and be an obstacle to US efforts to establish a broad-based bilateral partnership. This is a salient finding because it provides a better understanding of the impact that US policymakers' perceptions and opinions had on shaping US foreign policy agenda during this period.

US policymakers sought to develop closer economic and commercial ties with India for different reasons. First, India was seen as a country which had the potential to become one of the world's leading economies. Owing to the economic reforms launched in the early 1990s, India "was rapidly fulfilling its potential as one of the world's greatest economies".[405] American policymakers believed that if the Indian government continued the economic reforms and opened up the country's economy, India would have been able to maintain its growth rate of 7-8%.[406] Second, India was projected to become the world's third largest economy by 2015, and as a consequence, one of the major trading and economic partner for the United States.[407] Finally, India's "spectacular accomplishments in information technology and software"[408] and its "talented labour pool"[409] made India "another Asian miracle".[410]

In spite of the fact that the overall quality of the relationship between the United States and India was improving, bilateral economic and commercial cooperation remained quite limited, owing to the slow pace of India's economic

[405] Christina Rocca, New Horizons in United States Relations with South Asia, 21 April 2004.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Robert Blackwill, The Future of US-India Relations, 17 July 2003.
[409] Ibid.
[410] Ibid.

reforms. [411] American policymakers were concerned that this could be an obstacle to India's economic growth and to the development of a strong bilateral strategic partnership. Kenneth Juster asserted that even though the United States was India's largest trading partner, the level of bilateral trade remained below what it could have been. This was because from an American standpoint, India's tariffs and taxes continued to remain too high, while there were restrictions on foreign investments, and the bureaucracy and administrative procedures were too complex and time-consuming.[412] Christina Rocca also made the point that if India did not take the necessary steps to open up its economy, it would be impossible to develop the strategic partnership envisioned by the Bush administration.[413] Robert Blackwill, in addition, stressed that if India did not take full advantage of its potential and did not continue to liberalise its economy, it would become a less effective partner for the United States in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia.[414]

Between 2001 and 2005, the Bush administration showed significant interest in developing closer economic and trading ties with India, a country destined to become one of the world's major economies and a great international power. They believed that a strong India would have been an indispensable partner to maintain peace and prosperity in Asia and to preserve US economic and commercial interests in the region. Although the volume of

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[411] Christina Rocca, New Horizons in United States Relations with South Asia, 21 April 2004; Colin Powell, Interview by Karan Singh of Doordarshan News, New Delhi, 16 March 2004, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30450.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016; Colin Powell, Message to the India Today Conclave, 12 March 2004; Mary Ann Peters, South Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective, 1 July 2003; Robert Blackwill, The Future of US-India Relations, 17 July 2003.
[412] Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, 2 June 2003.
[413] Christina Rocca, The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership, 11 September 2003.
[414] Robert Blackwill, The Future of US-India Relations, 17 July 2003.

trade and investments between the two countries had increased following the first wave of the India's economic reforms, US-India economic cooperation did go as far as US policymakers had expected. This is a very important finding because it shows that US policymakers were aware of India's limitations.

5.9 US policymakers' perceptions about changes in US nuclear policy and about India's nuclear capabilities

During the period 2001-2005, US policymakers' perceptions about India's nuclear program changed. Some US officials distanced themselves from previous American non-proliferation policies aimed at putting pressure on India to join non-proliferation treaties and to roll back and eliminate its nuclear capabilities because they believed that these policies had a negative impact on the evolution of the US-India relationship. Another factor that contributed to changing American officials' opinions was the widespread feeling among American policymakers that as the non-proliferation regime had failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, it was necessary to take a different approach and engage with countries like India, which were not members of the NPT but had an excellent record as non-proliferators. It was a combination of these two factors which pushed the Bush administration to take a radically different approach towards India's nuclear capabilities. This finding provides a better understanding of the role played by US officials' perceptions in shaping US nuclear policy. These opinions are important to understand the reasons that led the president and his advisors to enhance full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

American policymakers were convinced that previous American policies aimed at persuading India to sign the NPT and to give up its nuclear program had a negative impact on the transformation of US-India relations. According to former US ambassador Robert Blackwill, the US and India's divergences over nuclear proliferation created a stumbling block to the development of closer bilateral ties, making the nuclear question the main, if not the only, issue dominating US foreign policy towards India for almost three decades. He also stressed that the tendency of the United States to look at India as "a nuclear renegade whose policies threatened the entire non-proliferation regime"[415] had contributed to strengthening anti-colonial and anti-American feelings in India. As a result, he concluded, it was indispensable to adopt "a radically different approach to policy interaction with India" aimed at "narrow[ing] the seeming unbridgeable gap between the two sides".[416]

A similar point was also made by Philip Zelikow who claimed that the relationship between Washington and New Delhi had "a split personality because of the nuclear issue".[417] He stressed that "the nuclear question represented a stumbling block. [On the one hand] you have the structure of permanent hostility to India's nuclear status and [on the other] you have this other structure that says let's be friend with India. The two structures were in permanent conflict and in permanent tension".[418] According to Zelikow, the only way to deal with these tensions was to make a tabula rasa of all the

[415] Robert Blackwill, The Future of US-India Relations, 17 July 2003.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Interview with Phil Zelikow.
[418] Ibid..

structural constraints which made it impossible to enhance US-India civil nuclear cooperation and to accept the fact that India was a nuclear power.[419]

American policymakers believed that the decision of the Bush administration to sign the civil nuclear deal with India contributed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. This was because according to American policymakers, the agreement contained a series of obligations that would have brought India within "the international mainstream of international thinking and international practices on the non-proliferation regime".[420] US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns pointed out that the civil nuclear deal was extremely important for the United States and for the entire non-proliferation community because for the first time India committed itself to undertake steps[421] that it previously had been reluctant to undertake and that would have helped India to conform to the measures that most NPT states had agreed to conform. [422]

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[419] Ibid.

[420] Nicholas Burns, Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India, 19 July 2005.

[421] As mentioned in section 5.3, the Indian Prime Minister promised that
"India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines". White House, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18th July 2005.

[422] Nicholas Burns, Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India, 19 July 2005.

The significance of the CND for the non-proliferation regime is also stressed by Condoleezza Rice who argues that many non-proliferation experts believed that the agreement with India could challenge the existence of the NPT, encouraging its members to "be more inclined to regard the non-proliferation treaty as an anachronism, reconsider their self-restraint, and be tempted by the precedent that India [had] successfully established".[423] She explained that unlike Iran, which was a signatory of the non-proliferation regime and which had sought to divert its nuclear program from civil to military use, India was a responsible country which had an excellent record of not transferring sensitive nuclear technology and material to other countries.[424] A similar view was also expressed by former ambassador David Mulford who points out "India's nuclear capabilities were accomplished without inward or outward proliferation, and so in spirit India had complied with many of the rules of the 1974 treaty without being a signatory".[425]

The change in US policymakers' perceptions and views on India's nuclear program had a strong impact on shaping US non-proliferation policy during the period 2001-2005. US policymakers were convinced that previous US efforts to deprive India of its nuclear capabilities had had a negative effect on the transformation of the US-India relationship. This pushed key members of the Bush administration to recognise that the only way to solve the US-India nuclear conundrum was a nuclear power and the United States had to grandfather it into the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, US officials stopped looking at India as a country whose nuclear policies represented a

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[423] C. Rice, *No Higher Honour*, p. 440.
[424] Ibid.
[425] David Mulford, *Packing for India A Life of Action in Global Finance and Diplomacy*. (Potomac Books, Inc.; 2014), p. 240.

threat for the non-proliferation regime. This was because unlike Iran, India was a responsible country with an exceptional record as non-proliferator. The existing literature tends not to pay too much attention to the role that opinions and perceptions played in influencing US foreign policy. QCA shows that American policymakers' opinions are indispensable to have a more accurate account of the remarkable turnaround that US nuclear policy underwent during the period 2001-2005, and of its impact on the overall transformation of US-India relations.

5.10 US policymakers' views on the impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations

During the period 2001-2005, the Bush administration showed a strong interest in forging closer ties with India, which was seen as an international rising power with which the United States shared many similarities and common goals. The vast majority of the literature stresses that President Bush's interest in India and his commitment to enhance US-India civil nuclear cooperation were largely motivated by the desire to lay the foundation of a strategic partnership with India aimed at balancing China. This study, however, calls into question the degree of significance accorded by the existing literature to this factor.

By the time President Bush took office, American policymakers began to show a growing appreciation for India and for its potential to become a major international player. Kenneth Juster pointed out that the United States "view[ed] India as a world power, whose influence internationally [was]

important and growing".[426] Former US ambassador Mary Ann Peters claimed that India's enormous potential caught the attention of the Bush administration which worked hard to "make up for the time lost [during the Cold War, when] the relationship between the U.S. and India [was] unnaturally limited".[427] She also stressed that the president and his advisors sought to transform the quality of the bilateral relationship in order to make India a close US partner in dealing with global issues, such as commerce, counter-terrorism, and fighting HIV.[428]

Some American policymakers became increasingly convinced that a closer relationship with India would have helped to preserve US influence in the Asia, a region that was becoming increasingly important because of the rise of China. In a speech at the Institute for Defence Analyses in New Delhi, former ambassador Robert Blackwill declared that "Asia [was] poised to become the strategic center of gravity in international politics".[429] As a consequence, he continued, "one of the key objectives of the American grand strategy [was] to use US diplomatic, economic, and military power and influence to help maintain a durable and robust framework in Asia, in which its allies and friends [could] prosper".[430] According to Blackwill, in order to achieve this goal, the Bush administration had to strengthen its economic, political, and military ties with countries like India with which the United States shared similar interests and values.[431] A related point was also made by Condoleezza Rice who stressed that US efforts to forge closer ties with India

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[426] Kenneth Juster, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, 2 June 2003.
[427] Mary Ann Peters, South Asian Security, 1 July 2003.
[428] Ibid.
[429] Robert Blackwill, The United States, India and Asian Security, Presented to the Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference, New Delhi, 27 January 2003, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16884.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.
[430] Ibid.
[431] Ibid.

and with other countries in the region "[were] not against China", but they were devoted at "creating an environment in which China is more likely to play a positive role".[432]

This position is supported by the interviews with some influential members of the Bush administration conducted for this study. Phil Zelikow stressed that the president wanted to get the US-India relationship back on track because India seen as a potential key geo-political player and as a valuable partner to maintain peace and stability in Asia. He also claimed that even though many people claimed that the civil nuclear deal and US efforts to build a strategic partnership with India were part of the US grand strategy to contain China, the Bush administration had no intention to use India as a bulwark against China.[433] A senior government official, in addition, pointed out that the US government made it very clear to the Chinese and the Indians that the United States had no intention of using the one against the other.[434] This was also confirmed by another policymaker who stressed that the civil nuclear deal was not aimed at helping India to build its nuclear strategic armament against China, but rather at providing evidence to the Indians that the United States was willing to assist India in its attempts to become a major power.[435]

Significantly, other US policymakers and scholars interviewed for this study, instead, argued that the rise of China had a significant impact on shaping the foreign policy of the Bush administration towards India. Some US policymakers who spoke under condition of anonymity stressed that contrary

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[432] Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at Sophia University, Tokyo, 19 March 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm//2005/43655.htm, accessed on 21st May 2016.
[433] Based on the interview with Phil Zelikow.
[434] Based on the interview with government official 2..
[435] Based on the interview with government official 6.

to the claims made by made in the Bush administration, China was, in fact, one of the drivers of the transformation of US-India relations. [436] One interviewee claimed that the Bush administration was concerned about China, even though publicly the administration was very careful to portray the strategic partnership with the Indians as not being a move against the Chinese. Moreover, this scholar stressed the strategy of the Bush administration consisted of maintaining good commercial relations with China on the one hand, while on the other, seeking to strengthen US relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan, Singapore, Australia, and India, which were interested in maintaining peace and stability in the area .[437]

US policymakers' perceptions and views about changes in the international system had a strong impact on shaping US foreign policy towards India during this period. The Bush administration showed a strong interest in India and in improving the quality of the relationship. This was because American policymakers believed that, owing to its large population and its rapidly growing economy, India had the potential to become a great power and a valuable partner for the United States. According to the vast majority of the existing literature, President Bush's commitment to supporting India's nuclear and great power aspirations was largely motivated by the US concerns about the rise of China and its implications. This is also reflected in interviews with some American policymakers who pointed out that the rise of China was one of the drivers of the rapprochement between the United States and India. What it is highly significant is that this study calls into question whether this is the case. Evidence from documents and interviews with other key members of the Bush

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[436] Based on the interviews with three US government officials. Anonymity requested.
[437] Based on the scholar 2.

administration has revealed that US efforts to advance civil nuclear cooperation with India and to forge closer bilateral ties were not designed to make India a potential ally of the United States against China. This is a salient finding because it shows that many scholars have overemphasized the significance of the influence of the China factor on US policy-making towards India. This has contributed to creating the impression that China was the main, if not the only, driving force of the transformation of the US-India relationship, yet, this must now be called into question, owing to the findings presented in this section.

Conclusion

During the period covered by this chapter, the relationship between the United States and India continued to improve. As previous studies of this period showed, this change stemmed from the convergence of two factors: shifts in US nuclear policy towards India and the commitment of the Bush administration to develop a strategic partnership with India. The significance of these factors is supported by the findings emerging from the analysis of US government documents in this chapter.

It is important to point out that many of the existing studies on US-India relations explore the evolution of the relationship during the period 2001-2005, while limited attention is paid to the previous periods. The lack of an in-depth comparison between the three periods makes it difficult to arrive at a conclusive account of the importance of these two factors for the change in the US-India relationship. This is where this thesis makes a substantial contribution to the existing literature. Taking into account a much longer time than that studied by other authors, this thesis showed that the change in US relations with India was

not simply the result of a paradigm shift occurring during the Bush administration, but rather of an incremental process which already began during the Clinton administration. Moreover, by being able to highlight empirically continuity and change over a longer period, this study avoids a simplistic perspective that is mainly framed in terms of sudden changes. The use of QCA, which avoids that some aspects of the content of documents are overlooked, and by using all publicly available documents rather than only a handful, this study revealed a much higher degree of continuity of approaches and preferences between the Clinton and the Bush administration than the literature in this field suggests. President Bush and his advisors did not, as suggested, completely distance themselves from the policies of the Clinton administration, rather they worked on the basis of what his predecessor had achieved, taking it to a new level. This is a salient finding because it shows that elements of continuity are as indispensable as elements of change to understand the transformation of US relations with India.

Concerning changes in US nuclear policy, the analysis presented in this chapter confirms that the Bush administration worked hard to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India. This was because the president and his advisors believed that satisfying India's demands in this area would contribute to facilitating the development of a strong strategic partnership between the two countries. To achieve this goal, the US government removed the remaining sanctions against India and in 2004 launched the NSSP. The new policy had a positive impact on the relationship, but it did not lead to full civil nuclear cooperation. This was because US domestic legislation and international commitments made it impossible for the United States to provide nuclear

technology to a country that was not a member of the NPT. In July 2005, President Bush announced his commitment to begin civil nuclear cooperation with India and to remove all the obstacles that made it difficult to enhance cooperation with India in this field. This change in US nuclear policy removed a stumbling block to the development of closer ties between the United States and India, thus helping to overcome the estrangement that characterised the relationship between the two countries.

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, another factor that had previously been identified as important for the creation of more favourable conditions for the rapprochement between the United States and India was the deep commitment of the Bush administration to forging closer ties with India. The analysis presented in this chapter supports finding emerging from the secondary literature, but it also shows that there was a much greater degree of continuity between the Clinton and the Bush administration than claimed by the existing literature. Results of QCA have revealed that President Bush and his advisors believed, like the Clinton administration, that a strong strategic partnership with India, a large democratic rising power, was in the interest of the United States. The results also showed that President Bush's personal interest in India resulted in the United States making improving US-India relations a priority of US foreign policy agenda, even though the US needed Pakistan's support for the war on terror in Afghanistan. Moreover, this factor had a positive impact on the transformation of US nuclear policy towards India, paving the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

Regarding changes in the international system, many US members of the Bush administration showed a strong interest in India, owing to its enormous

potential to become a major global power. The vast majority of the existing literature stresses that President Bush's strong commitment to supporting India's rise and satisfying its demands to have access to nuclear technology stemmed from US determination to balance the rise of China. This study, instead, has revealed that there is no clear evidence that the rise of China may have been one, if not the main, driving force of the transformation in US-India relations. Findings emerging from QCA and from interviews with US policymakers cast severe doubt on this interpretation in the relevant literature.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

During the post-Cold War period, US relations with India underwent a significant transformation, shifting from the estrangement characterising the diplomatic interactions between the two countries at the beginning of the 1990s to the development of closer ties in mid-2000s. As seen in Chapter 1, some scholars acknowledge the importance of factors emerging during Clinton period, but they do not explore in great detail their impact on the overall evolution of US-India relationship. The lack of a systematic comparison between the two administrations has contributed to strengthening the feeling that the Bush period marked a clear break from the Clinton period and to emphasising the differences existing between the two administrations in terms of foreign policy goals and approaches towards India.

The analysis presented in this thesis confirms that the Clinton period is crucial to providing a more thorough account of the reasons why President Bush succeeded in forging closer ties with India. This is because factors emerging during the period 1993-2001 contributed to mitigating the deep reservoir of suspicion and mistrust that characterised US-India diplomatic interactions, thus creating a more favourable environment for a rapprochement between the two countries by the time the Bush administration came into office. Results from the analysis have also shown that President Bush's foreign policy towards India was far more consistent with the approach adopted by President Clinton than has been suggested previously. President Bush and his advisors worked on the basis of what his predecessor had accomplished and sought to bring it to a new level.

Table 10 summarises the factors impinging upon the transformation of US relations with India throughout the period 1993-2005. These factors were: US policymakers' views of India's economic reforms, the US role during the Kargil crisis, President Clintons's strong commitment to getting US-India relations back on track, changes to US nuclear policy towards India, President Bush's personal interest in establishing a strategic partnership with India, and changes in the international system. Factors are not listed in order of significance.

Table 10: Factors favouring the change in US relations with India (1993-2005)

Period 1993-1998	Period 1998-2001	Period 2001-2005
US policymakers' perceptions about India's economic reforms	US role in defusing tensions between India and Pakistan	Changes to US nuclear policy towards India
	President Clinton's commitment to transforming the relationship with India	President Bush's commitment to transforming the relationship with India
		US policymakers' perceptions about changes in the international system
		US policymakers' perceptions about India's economic reforms

The analysis presented in this study has shown that there are five major findings to be discussed in relation to the evolution of US relations with India. These findings amend the predominant views in the extant literature about the factors leading to the improvement of US-India relations. These five conclusions are: (1) the strong impact of India's economic reforms on shaping US policymakers' views; (2) the limited importance of the end of the Cold War; (3)

the role played by the United States in defusing Indo-Pakistani tensions in Kashmir; (4) Presidents Clinton and Bush's commitment to improving US-India relations; (5) changes in US nuclear policy towards India.

Of all the findings identified in this thesis as being the most influential, the most salient one is US policymakers' perceptions and views about the reorientation of India's economic policy. This factor was crucial to triggering the process of change during the period 1993-1998. As seen in chapter 3, India's decision to abandon the Nehruvian pseudo-socialist approach, in order to launch a series of liberalisation reforms, contributed to removing the economic estrangement that had characterised the relationship between the United States and India during the Cold War. Moreover, the positive results achieved by the India's market-oriented policies and its enormous potential strengthened the feeling among American policymakers that India was fated to become one of the most important emerging markets and a potential economic partner for the United States. This resulted in the Clinton administration seeking to make economic engagement with India a high priority. In spite of US efforts to build closer economic ties with India, the bilateral relationship did not undergo any significant change. This was because India continued to remain a difficult market for the United States.

It is important to stress that in spite of the fact that the existing literature recognises the significance of this factor during the period 1993-1998, little or no attention is paid to its importance in transforming US foreign policy towards India over time. This thesis has demonstrated that the reorientation of India's economy continued to have a significant impact on shaping US relations with India throughout the three periods of analysis. This factor contributed to

consolidating the process of transformation begun in the early 1990s, thus strengthening US policymakers' perceptions and Clinton and Bush's views about the need to develop closer ties with a country with which the United States shared growing economic and commercial interests. Chapters 4 and 5 have revealed that US officials believed that if the Indian government continued to advance the economic reforms launched in the early 1990s and took the necessary steps to further open up the country's economy, India would have been able to become a major economic power.

The second most important finding is that the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not have a significant impact on shaping US policymakers' views and perceptions about India, in spite of the importance attached to this factor in much of the existing scholarship on this subject. Contrary to what the secondary literature claims, the thesis uncovered that despite US policymakers' awareness that this watershed event offered a unique opportunity for a new beginning with India, it did not translate into prioritising US-India relations. As seen in Chapter 3, during the period 1993-1998, the US government was preoccupied with other international matters, which meant that recalibrating the relationship with India was not regarded as urgent. This is a highly salient finding because it contrasts with the secondary literature; a finding whose significance was only identified through the use of QCA.

The third most significant finding is the role played by the United States in defusing the Kargil crisis in 1999. Following the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, the US government was very concerned that tensions in South Asia could trigger a nuclear conflict, with Kashmir as a flashpoint. Concerns were of such magnitude that President Clinton took a personal interest in engaging with the

Indian and the Pakistani governments to prevent the situation from escalating. Moreover, the president and his advisors publicly sided with India, condemning Pakistan for initiating the crisis and urging it to withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control. The Kargil crisis represented a turning point in US-India relations because instead of taking its previous position of supporting its regional ally, Pakistan, the United States opted to support India. As seen in Chapter 4, the significance of this finding has already been highlighted by other works on this subject. Some scholars have stressed how the change in US approach helped Indian policymakers to slowly overcome their mistrust towards the United States. These studies, however, do not clarify how US role during the Kargil crisis fits into a particular context of other factors that play out in given sequence over a longer period. Evaluating the factor over a longer period of time, this thesis was able to show that the US role in the Kargil crisis helped to creating a more favourable environment for Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, thus confirming the important effect of this factor on subsequent events.

The next most salient finding was Clinton's strong personal commitment to transforming the relationship with India. This commitment came about to improve US-India relations which had deteriorated as a result of the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. This watershed event forced the president into paying more attention to India than had previously been the case, resulting in a much more active involvement by the president in US foreign policy making process towards India. This resulted in Clinton's aforementioned visit to India in March 2000. The importance of this trip has already been recognised by the secondary literature, which shows that this factor helped to improve the quality of the relationship with India. Chapter 4 builds on these findings and shows that

Clinton's visit was of particularly great importance for the transformation in US relations with India, because it helped to consolidate a longer-term positive trend in US-India relations that had already begun during the Kargil crisis. In its aftermath, the visit also prepared the ground for the continuation of rapprochement by the Bush administration.

As seen in Chapter 5, the president's strong personal commitment to transforming US-India relations continued to have a strong impact during the period 2001-2005. In spite of the change in the presidency from Democrat to Republican, Bush retained the same level of commitment shown by his predecessor in deepening the bilateral relationship, making it a priority of his foreign policy agenda. Right from the start of his first term, the president sought to use Clinton's accomplishments as the foundation on which to build closer strategic ties between the two countries.

The thesis makes a major contribution to our understanding of the subject in that it demonstrated a high degree of continuity in US relations with India between the Clinton and the Bush administrations. This is contrast to the vast majority of previous works on the transformation of US-India relations which tends to emphasise difference between Clinton and Bush's policies towards India nuclear program, while ignoring the continuity and the similarities in both presidents' aspirations to forge closer ties with India As this thesis demonstrated, acknowledging the elements of continuity between the two presidents is indispensable for a better understanding of why the process of change seemed to proceed at a greater rate during the period 2001-2005.

The fourth most salient finding is the transformation of US nuclear policy towards India during the period 2001-2005. Chapter 5 has shown that

Bush sought to advance civil nuclear cooperation with India. This was because the president and his advisors were convinced that accommodating India's requests to have access to US civil nuclear technology and material would have paved the way for closer strategic ties between the two countries. The prominence of strategic considerations over non-proliferation concerns led to President Bush announcing, together with his Indian counterpart, the civil nuclear deal (on 18th July 2005) and his commitment to removing all the domestic and international obstacles that had previously prevented the cooperation between the two countries in this field. As seen in chapter 1, the salience of this factor has already been identified by the secondary literature which claims that changes in US nuclear policy towards India, together with the rise of China, were the main drivers of the rapprochement between the United States and India. This study, instead, has shown that even though this factor contributed to accelerate the transformation, its impact on US foreign policy can only be fully appreciated when examined together with other factors present during the period 2001-2005. Such factors included Bush's commitment to improving US-India relations and India's international rise.

The last important revision that this thesis necessitates in the views about the evolution of US-India relations that exist in the wider literature concerns the impact of changes in the international system had on the US-India relationship. During the period 2001-2005, the growing awareness that the balance of power was shifting towards Asia played a crucial role in shaping the US policymakers' perceptions about the importance of forging strong ties with India, which was increasingly seen as an international rising power with which the United States shared common interests and values. Chapter 1 showed that the vast majority of

scholars claim that the interest of the Bush administration in forging closer bilateral strategic ties and beginning civil nuclear cooperation with India stemmed from concerns about the rise of China and of the consequences for US interests in the region. This thesis, instead, indicates that the civil nuclear deal and the attempts of the Bush administration to get closer to India were not aimed at using India as a potential ally to counterbalance Chinese hegemonic ambitions. This is particularly significant because it shows that there is a risk of exaggerating the significance of the China factor in stimulating the change in US foreign policy towards India.

The above five findings are of greatest significance in explaining the transformation of US foreign policy towards India. Although some of them have already been identified by other studies, their role in explaining US foreign policy towards India is enhanced, and in some cases differs, from how they are assessed in the existing literature. These differences in terms of interpretation can be attributed to the fact that this study adopted rigorous and systematic approaches to data selections which enabled the identification of 329 relevant official documents from the open-archive and the databases of different US government institutions. By using a wider basis of evidence than the existing literature, this study has provided a fresh insight into the improvement of US diplomatic interactions with India. This was achieved with the inclusion of information from a large range of US documents. The significance of these documents (and possibly even their existence) for a detailed understanding of changes in US-India relations had been largely overlooked by the secondary literature, which relied on only a small fraction of the publicly available material included in this study. As seen in Chapter 1, many, if not all of, the studies on

US-India relations fail to clarify how they select their data and which aspects of its content are actually used in the phase of analysis. The lack of detailed information on data-collection and data-selection approaches employed is particularly problematic because it renders difficult to assess the validity of empirical research and it undermines replicability.

As explained in Chapter 2, all the 329 US government documents used for this study were subjected to a two-pronged analysis, combining Qualitative Content Analysis with narrative event analysis. QCA is a relatively new method that offers the advantage of establishing systematic procedures through which to review the full range of content in official US documents used as the empirical basis for this study. Results emerging from QCA were interpreted using narrative event analysis which helps to develop an understanding of relevant pieces of information extracted from the documents analyzed and to put them into context. It is important to stress that without the use of QCA, narrative event analysis is very sensitive to unsystematic and partial extraction of meaning from documents. QCA ensures that the documents are examined in each and every part, thus facilitating the identification of themes that are present in various text segments. Feeding this information into narrative event analysis also helps to reduce the likelihood of selective reading.

Overall, the use of a wider basis of evidence and the combination of QCA and narrative event analysis have revealed that some commonly held perceptions about the factors explaining US foreign policy towards India need to be revised. The findings of this thesis thus represent a breakthrough in terms of adding to the understanding of US-India relations in a way which would not have been possible without having adopted a systematic and methodological approach to

the identification, collection, and analysis of documentary evidence. The availability of new information, alongside established findings, makes it possible to advance our understanding of US foreign policy towards India. Finally, the methods used in this thesis for the identification of the population of US government documents and for systematically identifying categories of relevant content in them can be can be applied not only to study US foreign policy towards India, but also to similar research of inter-state or inter-organisational relations.

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Appendix A: List of archives and interviews

List of and online archives, databases, and websites used to collect US government documents:

- Congressional material and reports of the Congressional Research Service are available on hard copy as well as digitally through ProQuest Congressional, the database HATHI and the website of the Federation of American Scientist (www.fas.org).
- A comprehensive variety of declassified documents is also available through the Digital National Security Archives (accessible at the Library of Congress).
- Department of State online archive
  Documents covering the period 1993-1997 are available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html
  Documents belonging to the period 1998-2001 are available at https://1997-2001.state.gov/
  Documents focusing on the period 2001-2005 are available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/
- Department of Defence online archive accessible through the website of the Department of Defence
- The Public Papers of the Presidents can be accessed using the database Nexis.

List of interviewees:

- Scholar 1. Anonymity requested.
- Scholar 2. Anonymity requested.
- Government official 1. Anonymity requested.
- Government official 2. Anonymity requested.
- Government official 3. Anonymity requested.
- Government official 4. Anonymity requested.
- Government official 5. Anonymity requested.
- Stephen Cohen, an eminent expert on US-India relations and a member of Brookings.
- Joseph Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1994 to 1995.
- Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at Brooking. He also served during the Clinton administration and helped to organized Clinton's trip to India.
- Christina Rocca, she was United States Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs from 2001 to 2006.
- Raymond Vickery Jr., during the Clinton administration he worked in the Department of Commerce where he had particular responsibility for India.
- Dov Zakheim was appointed Under Secretary of Defence from 2001 to 2006.
- Phil Zelikow served as Counselor to Secretary of State Rice during the Bush administration.

Appendix B: Relevant material vs. irrelevant

Relevant material was considered:

- Any aspect of American foreign policy related to economic, defence, and the nuclear field and strategic interests which had an impact on the evolution of American foreign policy towards India;
- Any economic or geostrategic factor which may have contribute to change American foreign policy towards India.

Examples belonging to this category are:

- References to India and Pakistan's missile and nuclear capabilities.
- References to WMD and risks of proliferation of sensitive technology in the Indian subcontinent.
- References to tensions between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.
- References to risk that tensions between India and Pakistan may lead to a (nuclear) confrontation;
- References to international agreements and treaties focusing on non-proliferation, such as the NPT, the CTBT, the FTC, and MTCR.
- References to similarities and affinities between the United States and India, such as shared values, convergent interests, and similar forms of governments.
- References to episodes of terrorist attacks in the United States and India.
- References to US-Indian defense relations and interests.

- References to US domestic legislation and international agreements focusing on non-proliferation.
- References to India's economic growth and liberalization reforms and the potential economic and commercial advantages to US economy and companies deriving from this factor.

Irrelevant material included:

- Any aspect of US foreign or domestic policy toward India that did not present any connection to the nuclear question;
- Any aspect of US foreign or domestic policy toward India that presented a weak link to the nuclear question.

Examples of irrelevant material are:

- References to aspects of US non-proliferation nuclear policy which are not related to American foreign and nuclear policy toward India.
- References to divergences between the US and India on climate change and environmental issues.
- References to US humanitarian assistance to India.
- References to cooperation between the US and India to fight narcotraffick.

Appendix C: Description of the main categories and examples

Key:

- Main category
    - Subcategory

Main category 1

US policy: A unit of coding is assigned to this dimension to refer to the most salient features and changes in US nuclear strategy and posture towards India. This category refers to policies enacted by the US government not necessarily related to the nuclear question which significantly affected and contributed to the formation American foreign and nuclear policy toward India. It also includes statements explaining or describing the policy implemented by the USG. Units of coding belong to this main category if they are related to statements explaining the official position of the USG on the policy or on a specific matter.

Main category 2

Policymakers' opinions: A unit of coding is assigned to this category to refer to views and critical comments expressed by policymakers on aspects of US nuclear strategy towards India and to domestic or international factors and events directly and indirectly related to the nuclear issue which had a significant impact on US nuclear and foreign policy. This dimension comprises units of coding related to judgments from policymakers dealing with the nature of the evolution of US-Indian relations and other issues not directly related to the nuclear question which played a fundamental role in shaping American attitude towards India.

Main category 3

Presidential preferences: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if President Clinton and G. W. Bush expressed their views on the nature and aspects of US nuclear policy toward India. Units of coding are also assigned to this dimension if they capture presidents' perceptions on the evolution and the nature of the relationship between Washington and New Delhi. This category also includes opinions of Clinton and G. W. Bush on domestic and international events, circumstances, and factors which influenced US nuclear and foreign policy towards India.

Main Coding Frame used to analyse US government documents

- **1. US Policy**
    - 1.1 Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan
    - 1.2 Changes in US nuclear policy towards India
    - 1.3 Urging India to adhere to the non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes
    - 1.4 Strengthening economic and commercial cooperation with India
    - 1.5 Improving US defence cooperation with India
    - 1.6 Importance of de-hyphenation on US-India relations
    - 1.7 Policy seeking changes in US domestic legislation
    - 1.8 Preventing the spread of sensitive technology in South Asia
    - 1.9 Cooperation between the US and India
        - 1.9.1 Against terrorism
        - 1.9.2 In fighting the spread of WMD
    - 1.10 Sharing high-technology with India
    - 1.11 Policy seeking to establish a strategic engagement with India

- **2. US Policymakers' Opinions**
    - 2.1 Impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations
    - 2.2 Impact of India's liberalization reforms and rapid economic growth on US-India relations
    - 2.3 Concerns related to tensions between the India and Pakistan and possession of nuclear and missile capabilities
    - 2.4 Impact of de-hyphenation on US-India relations
    - 2.5 China's role in affecting the security dynamics in South Asia

- 2.6 Constraints to US foreign and nuclear policy towards India deriving from domestic legislation and international non-proliferation agreements
- 2.7 Appreciation of the role of individuals in improving US-India relations
- 2.8 Changes in US nuclear policy and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities and posture
- 2.9 Shared values and interests
- 2.10 Importance of sharing high-technology with India
- 2.11 Importance of establishing a strategic partnership with India
- 2.12 Importance of strengthening US-India defence cooperation
- 2.13 Effect of concerns about terrorism on US-India relations

- **3. Presidential preferences**
  - 3.1 President's commitment to transform the relationship with India
  - 3.2 Importance of India's economic rapid growth and market potential in transforming president's perceptions about India
  - 3.3 Changes in president's policies and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities
  - 3.4 Impact of concerns related to terrorism on president's commitment to get closer to India

Category descriptions and examples

Main category 1

US policy: A unit of coding is assigned to this dimension to refer to the most salient features and changes in US nuclear strategy and posture towards India. This category also refers to policies enacted by the US government not necessarily related to the nuclear question which significantly affected and contributed to the formation American foreign and nuclear policy toward India.

1.1 *Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to policies enacted and approaches taken by US government to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan and to promote peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent. This category includes units of coding related to policies, initiatives, and measures aimed at preventing that tensions between India and Pakistan could lead to a nuclear conflict and at defusing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

Example:

"War prevention and regional stability are our top priorities in south asia, and this requires an improvement in indo-pakistani relations. Thus US interests have been adversely affected. We have urged both governments to avoid recriminatory statements, resume regular official counterpart visits, and work seriously to reduce tensions between their two countries".[438]

[438] John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 267.

1.2 *Changes in US nuclear policy towards India*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to changes in policies enacted and approaches employed by the US government to deal with India's nuclear capabilities. It also includes units of coding related to bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives promoted by the US government to deal with India's nuclear program. A unit of coding is also assigned to this category if it refers to US efforts to discuss with India the problem of nuclear proliferation and its impact on the Indian subcontinent.

Decision Rules: In cases where units of coding contain references to US efforts to persuade India to conform to the non-proliferation regime and other initiatives too, this category does not apply. The unit of coding is, instead, placed in the urging India to adhere to the nonproliferation regime and WMD-related export control regimes subcategory.

Example:

"Now and for the foreseeable future, Mr. Chairman, we will enforce sanctions firmly, correctly, and promptly, in full compliance with the Glenn amendment and other legislative authorities. We will continue working to ensure the widest possible multilateral support for the steps we have taken. A vigorous enforcement regime will be necessary for india and Pakistan to perceive that their actions have seriously eroded their status in the international arena, it will have a substantial negative impact on their economies, and that they have compromised rather than enhanced their security. We will firmly reject any proposal for India and or Pakistan to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear weapons state. We do not believe that nations should be rewarded for behaviour that flies in the face of internationally accepted norms. At the same

time, we do not wish to make international pariahs out of either india or Pakistan".[439]

1.*3 Urging India to adhere to the non-proliferation regime and WMD-related export control regimes*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to US efforts to persuade India to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to conform to the non-proliferation regime. This category also includes units of coding related to US efforts to persuade India to adhere or support other non-proliferation treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and WMD-related export control regimes. Units of coding containing references to US initiatives aimed at persuading India to strengthen and conform to export control regimes belong to this subcategory.

Decision Rules: In cases where units of coding contain references to aspects and initiatives related to US nuclear policy but not to US efforts to persuade India to adhere to the non-proliferation regime, this category does not apply. The unit of coding is placed in the changes in US policy and posture towards India nuclear capabilities subcategory.

Example:

"We urge India and Pakistan to resto their standing in the world by renouncing further tests, signing the CTBT and the NPT, and taking immediate steps to reduce tensions".[440]

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[439] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 3 June 1998, (Washington D.C.: US Governmnet Printing Office, 1998), p. 56.

[440] Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980528b.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

1.4 Strengthening economic and commercial cooperation with India: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to policies and initiatives implemented by the US government to deepen economic and commercial ties with India. A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to initiatives and policies aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the US government and the private sector in strengthening economic and commercial relations with India. Units of coding belong to this sub-category if they contain references to US policies aimed at encouraging India not to abandon its economic liberalization reforms.

Example:

"A third priority is encouraging free market economies. South Asia's dramatic shift toward free market economies continue. India's economic reform programs has cleared the way for unprecedented trade and investment between our two countries. A trend that has been reinforced by recent high-level visits on both sides, including by Secretary Brown and Secretary O'Leary".[441]

1.5 Improving US defence cooperation with India: A unit of coding belongs to this category if it refers to US efforts to strengthen defence cooperation with India. It also contains units of coding related to initiatives promoted by the US government, such as agreements, joint military and naval exercises, defence supplies, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, high-level visits, and exchange of personnel.

Example:

[441] Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 9 February 1995, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 52.

"We told them that we want to build on our shared security interests and deepen our defence cooperation, even though we disagree on the nuclear issue. Our primary vehicle for deepening this cooperation will be through military-to-military ties. These are an important component of any healthy strategic relationship".[442]

1.6 Importance of de-hyphenation on US-India relations: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to US policy seeking to build a relationship with India separate from US relationship with Pakistan.

Example:

"We really do not consider this an "India-Pakistan" relationship. There is a relationship with India, a great and vibrant democracy with whom we have broad scale economic, increasingly technological and defense contacts, and we have an excellent relationship with Pakistan, where we have a very important ally in the war on terror, where we have a relationship to try and help with modernization of that country away from extremism. And they're on different tracks, but obviously occupy the same region. And so when we have good relations with both countries, and when those countries have good relations with each other, it's a very good thing for the region. But we don't think of them any longer as having to be spoken in the same sentence, so to speak".[443]

1.7 Policy seeking changes in US domestic legislation: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to policies seeking to change US domestic

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[442] William J. Perry, Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 31 January 1995, available at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=828
Accessed on 21st April 2015.

[443] Condoleezza Rice, Interview with Raj Chengappa of India Today, New Delhi,16 March 2005.

legislation dealing with non-proliferation in order to grant the US president more flexibility in dealing with the non-proliferation issue in South Asia.

Example:

"The sanctions will require affirmative action by Congress to lift. That decision will be in your hands. At some point, if we make enough progress on the steps that we have outlined with the CTBT, or reductions in tensions or movement toward addressing the roots of the causes of the dispute between the countries, all of these things would be taken into account. And at some point, if these steps were taken, we would want to make a recommendation to Congress on how we think we should proceed, but it will be an affirmative action by Congress on whether or not the Glenn amendment sanctions will be lifted. It will be in your hands".[444]

1.8 Preventing the spread of sensitive technology in South Asia: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to US policies and efforts to fight the spread of nuclear and missile technology to India and Pakistan. It also includes units of coding related to US efforts to prevent India (and Pakistan) from exporting nuclear and missile technology to other countries.

Example:

"In addition, the U.S. seeks to inhibit the export of WMD, the missiles that carry them, and related technology from the region to other countries. We also actively

[444] Karl Inderfurth before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 18 June 1998.

discourage the export of WMD-related equipment and technology from other countries to India and Pakistan".[445]

1.9 Cooperation between the US and India: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it is related to US policies targeted at strengthening the cooperation between the US and India. It is placed in a specific sub-category depending on the target of the cooperation:

1.9.1 Against terrorism: Units of coding referring to policies seeking to improve counter-terrorist cooperation between the US and India.

Example:

"The two delegations exchanged views on the global campaign against international terrorism. They emphasized that the military operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan is an important step in the global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world. They expressed satisfaction at the cooperation between the two countries in the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Noting that both India and the United States have been the targets of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their defense cooperation on counter terrorism initiatives, including expanding mutual support in this area".[446]

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[445] Warren Christopher, Report to Congress on Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia, Hearing before a Subcommittee on Appropriations House of Representative for 1994, 103rd Congress, 1st session, Washington DC, 28 April 1993.

[446] Joint Statement Third Meeting of the US-India Defense Policy Group (DPG), December 3-4, 2001, New Delhi.

1.9.2 *In fighting the spread of WMD*: Units of coding related to US and India's joint efforts in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction are assigned to this sub-category.

Example:

"They reaffirmed their commitment to work together to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. To this end, the two sides agreed to hold further consultations in the coming weeks on the threat such proliferation poses to their common security interests".[447]

1.10 *Sharing dual-use technology with India*: A unit of coding is placed in this category if it refers to policies and initiatives seeking to expand high and dual-use technology commerce with India. This category also includes units of coding referring to policies aimed at facilitating the trade of dual-use technology between the two countries, such as removing some Indian entities from the Entity List.

Example:

"To provide a standing framework for discussing high-technology issues of mutual concern, the United States and India decided last November to establish the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), or in short hand, HTCG. Our two governments have agreed that the HTCG will have two primary interrelated substantive components. One will be facilitating and promoting high-technology trade, and will focus on cooperative steps that our two countries can take to create the appropriate economic, legal, and structural environments that are

[447] US Department of Defense, News Release. Joint Statement on US-India Defense Policy Group Meeting, 23 May 2002, available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3355, accessed on 24th January 2015.

necessary for successful high-technology commerce. The second component will be building confidence for additional strategic trade, and will focus on discussing ways to enhance trade between the United States and India in controlled dual-use goods and technologies".[448]

1.11 *Policy seeking to establish a strategic engagement with India*: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to policy seeking to deepen US strategic engagement with India. It also includes units of coding related to the benefits and the reasons behind the decision of the US government to engage more actively with India on the strategic level or to build a strategic partnership.

Example:

"The United States has established a global partnership with India which encourages India's emergence as a positive force on the world scene".[449]

Main category 2

Policymakers' opinions: A unit of coding is assigned to this category to refer to views expressed by policymakers on aspects of US nuclear strategy towards India and to domestic or international factors and events directly and indirectly related to the nuclear issue which had a significant impact on US nuclear and foreign policy. This dimension comprises units of coding related to judgments from policymakers dealing with the nature of the evolution of US-Indian relations and other issues not directly related to the nuclear question which played a fundamental role in shaping American attitude towards India.

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[448] Kenneth I. Juster, 'US-India Relations and High-Technology Trade", Remarks at luncheons hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry, Chennai, 17 November 2003.

[449] US Department of State, US-India Civil nuclear Cooperation, Washington DC, 22 July 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/49969.htm, accessed on 25th January 2015.

2.1 *Impact of changes in the international system on US-India relations*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to views expressed by American policymakers on changes in the international context and their impact on US policy towards India. Units of coding referring to the impact of the fall of the USSR on US-India relations, changes in the balance of power, and the emergence of new great powers, are also classified as belonging to this category.

Example:

"The impending collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War became increasingly evident, and India and the United States began to rediscover each other as friends and potential partners. With the old equation changing, the U.S. began- through a cooperative and balanced approach- an effort to break the longstanding stalemate with South Asia over this issue".[450]

2.2 *Impact of India's liberalization reforms and rapid economic growth on US-India relations*: A unit of coding is placed in this category if it contains statements dealing with the impact of India's economic reforms and rapid economic growth on the evolution of the relationship between the two countries and the numerous commercial and economic advantages deriving from it. This subcategory contains comments on India's middle class and on the presence of highly qualified labour. A unit of coding is allocated to this subcategory if it includes statements on the need to remove those factors which negatively affect India's economic performance and the pace of its economic growth, and that, as

[450] Robin Raphel, Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia, Statement before the Subcomittee on Near East and South Asia Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 9 March 1995.

a consequence, slow down the improvement of US-India economic and commercial cooperation.

Example:

"I would agree with you, congressman fingerhut, that economic changes that are taking place in india are probably the most exciting development in indo-us relations for the past several decades. It is a major reversal of traditional indian thinking. First of all, to do away with their sort of fabian socialist approach toward economic organization, to do away with the idea that the public sector should dominate in industry and to actually welcome foreign investment, and in particular, American investment, in mind boggling".[451]

2.3 Concerns related to tensions between Indian and Pakistan and to the use of nuclear weapons in case of conflict: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if US policymakers express their concerns about tensions between India and Pakistan or of an arms race in the subcontinent. This category also includes policymakers' statements about the risk of military confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. A unit of coding fits also into this subcategory if it refers to concerns and views about India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities, the potential use of these weapons, and their impact on the dynamics in the region and on the US-India relationship. It also contains units of coding related to policymakers' opinions on the US policy aimed at reducing tensions between India and Pakistan.

[451] John Malott, Statement before the Subcommittee in Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 28 April 1993, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 93.

Decision rules: In cases where US concerns about tensions and the evolution of security dynamics in South Asia contain references to China, this category does not apply. The unit of coding is placed in the China's role in affecting the security dynamics in South Asia category.

Example:

"While, during the Cold War, we clearly had the United States and the Soviet Union facing each other with nuclear weapons, there were thousands of miles of ocean between the two. And here, these two countries are cheek by jowl. So that creates a uniquely dangerous situation. As you all know, the conflict between these two countries goes back a long way, to the partition in 1947 and the fact that they have had difficulty accepting each other's birth and presence; and also does involve a long-standing conflict over Kashmir. We are obviously very concerned about what has happened. I have been saying to colleagues, as I've gone around to various international meetings, that in foreign policy and in international relations, there are many acts that take place between countries and, in some way or another, they can be walked back or can be nuanced, to use a diplomatic phrase. It is very hard to roll this movie back; and that is our concern about how to deal with the issue now and then also, to make sure that it does not escalate".[452]

2.4 Importance of de-hyphenation on US-India relations: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to US policymakers' views on the importance of cultivating separate relations with India and with Pakistan too. It

[452] Madeleine K. Albright, Press Remarks on India and Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980603.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.

also includes statements stressing the positive implications and advantages of this policy on the relationship between the US and India.

Example:

"But it's important the role that we play right now in the subcontinent, and that, for the first time in many, many years, we have good, strong relations with both of them---strong US-India relations, strong US-Pakistan relations. And we are doing everything we can to show both of them that they are a partner, a friend of the United States and we don't view them through the India-Pakistan relationship".[453]

2.5 China's role in affecting the security dynamics in South Asia: A unit of coding is placed in this category if it includes statements by US policymakers stressing China's role in affecting the security dynamics in South Asia. Units of coding containing US policymakers' opinions on China's role and its nuclear capabilities in affecting India's security perceptions and nuclear program are also included into this category, as are views on China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs.

Decision rules: In cases where US concerns about tensions and the evolution of security dynamics in South Asia do not contain any reference to China, this category does not apply. The unit of coding is placed in the concerns related to tensions between India and Pakistan and their possession of nuclear and missile capabilities.

Example:

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[453] Colin Powell, Interview by The Washington Post, Washington DC, 3 October 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/25139.htm, accessed on 25th January 2015.

"The relationship among these three powers has long been one of fear and mistrust. While India worries about the threat from Pakistan, it also keeps a strong force because it feels threatened by China. And Pakistan keeps a strong force as a deterrent against India's forces. What makes this tension truly worrisome is the potential for nuclear weapons use in the event of a conflict".[454]

2.6 Constraints to US foreign and nuclear policy towards India deriving from domestic legislation and international non-proliferation agreements: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it deals with policymakers' statements referring to constraints which affect US foreign and nuclear policy towards India. A unit of coding is also placed in this subcategory if it contains policymakers' views on the limitations deriving from US domestic legislation and US commitments deriving from international non-proliferation agreements to deal with India or to improve the relationship with India.

Example:

"Mr. Chairman, we too want a long-term relationship. And we also said this publicly on several occasions: we also want to be moving in the direction of a sanction-free relationship with both countries. These sanctions clearly inhibit the potential we have with both India and Pakistan, two countries that we want to establish long-term sustainable relationship with; two countries that are quite different in many respects".[455]

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[454] William J. Perry, Ever Vigilant in the Asia-Pacific Region, New York, 12 September 1995, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=971, accessed 24th January 2015.
[455] Karl Inderfurth, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 106th Congress, 1st session, 25th May 1999, p.13.

2.7 Appreciation of the role of individuals in improving US-India relations: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to policymakers' views on the role played by individuals in transforming the relationship with India. A unit of coding is assigned to this subcategory if US policymakers underline the role played by American or Indian policymakers and leaders in strengthening the relationship between the two countries. It also includes units of coding containing US policymakers' appreciation for the positive role played by the Indian American community in favouring the improvement of the relationship between the US and India.

Example:

"A good deal of credit for this progress should go to our two talented ambassadors Bob Blackwill of the United States and Lalit Mansingh of India. I have had the pleasure of working closely with each of them, and I know how committed they are to the fundamental transformation of the relationship".[456]

2.8 *Changes in US nuclear policy and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities and posture*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it contains policymakers' views on US nuclear policy towards India. It also includes US policymakers' perceptions about India's possession of nuclear capabilities and security concerns. A unit of coding is placed in this subcategory if it includes opinions about India's nuclear tests and their impact on the evolution of the relationship. A unit of coding is also assigned to this category if it refers to policymakers' views on India's nuclear policy or posture towards the non-proliferation regime.

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[456] Kenneth I. Juster, Address at the 28th Annual Meeting of the US-India Business Council, Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India, New York, 2 June 2003.

Example:

"India wants to be considered a great nation. But India was already a great nation with which we were actively pursuing a warmer and more wide-ranging relationship. I personally conveyed this message to India's previous government during my visit six months ago, while reconfirming our warning that a decision to test nuclear weapons would have serious consequences. The choice India made last week does not reflect that nation's greatness, but rather a reckless disregard for world opinion and for India's own reputation. The leaders in New Delhi have made a grave historical error".[457]

2.9 *Shared values and interests*: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if it refers to statements by US policymakers stressing the importance of the numerous similarities, shared values, and common interests existing between the US and India. This category includes units of coding containing policymakers' appreciation for India's democracy because the US is implicitly mentioned as a large democracy.

Example:

"The common democratic traditions of our countries remain the bedrock of their relationship and the foundation for long-term strategic cooperation. Collaboration within the community of democratic states constitutes the best strategy for preserving the security, the liberty, and the prosperity of open, pluralistic, and multi-ethnic societies".[458]

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[457] Madeleine K. Albright, Commencement Address to the United States Coast Guard Academy New London, Connecticut, 20 May 1998, available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980520.html, accessed on 11th February 2016.
[458] Joint Statement Third Meeting of the US-India Defense Policy Group (DPG), 3-4 December 2001, New Delhi.

2.10 *Importance of sharing high and dual-use technology with India*: A unit of coding fits in this category if it refers to policymakers' views about the importance of sharing high and dual-technology with India and the benefits for both the US and India deriving from it.

Example:

"We have really reconstructed a new relationship with the Indians and it's a quite strong and satisfactory relationship. And there was a basket of issues that they were always asking us about called, well, we called it--- we nicknamed it, "The Trinity". How could you help us? How can we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry? We have been trying to be forthcoming as much as we can because it's in our interest to be forthcoming".[459]

2.11 *Importance of establishing a strategic partnership with India*: A unit of coding is placed in this category if it includes statements by US policymakers about the policy seeking to engage with India to establish a strategic partnership with India and the numerous advantages for both the US and India deriving from it. A unit of coding is included in this subcategory if it refers to common values and interests on which the partnership is based.

Example:

"It is clear that our two countries have embarked on a new and more productive course in bilateral relations. This is a change that supports the interests of us both. The United States is committed to move rapidly and decisively toward

[459] Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, Transcript: Washington Post Reporters Interview Powell, The Washington Post, 10 March 2003.

even greater cooperation in this partnership of equals. I believe Indians are also excited about the transformation of our relationship as it demonstrates your country's assumption of ever-greater responsibilities as a major power in the region and in the global arena.The US-India relationship is entering an exciting phase, a period of transformation which, if properly managed, can bring great benefits to both our countries. This will require constant attention and hard work. I think India and the United States have demonstrated their willingness to do this hard work, to overcome difficulties and keep our eyes on the benefits for us both. I am confident that together we will succeed".[460]

2.12 *Importance of strengthening defence cooperation with India*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to US policymakers' opinions on policies and initiatives aimed at deepening US defence and strategic relations with India. This category also includes US policymakers' comments on India's military capabilities as well as benefits resulting from strengthening defence cooperation between the two countries.

Example:

"And we in this building, we specialize in security relations, military-to-military contacts. And so, again, assuming they're willing, which they seem to be, then we can engage in ways that we have not with them in the past. So each of us has options that we didn't have before, and I think it's a positive thing. It's not aimed at anybody. It's not a threat to anybody. It's just something that it makes sense

[460] Christina B. Rocca, Remarks to Confederation of Indian Industry,
New Delhi, 14 May 2002, available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/10173.htm, accessed on 4th October 2016.

to do. And again, India will not -- I certainly don't expect India to compromise its independence and non-alignment".[461]

2.13 *Effect of concerns about terrorism on US-India relations*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if it refers to policymakers' views on the impact of common concerns about terrorism on the relationship between the US and India. It also includes units of coding dealing with policymakers' views about specific acts of terrorism perpetrated against the US or India and their implications. A unit of coding is placed in this category if US policymakers refer to the impact of the growing cooperation between the US and Pakistan in the war on terror. A unit of coding is assigned to this subcategory if it contains US policymakers' views on the importance of growing cooperation between the US and India in fighting terrorism and the spread of WMD.

Example:

"On this occasion, I took the opportunity to express condolences of the American people and my personal condolences over the events that took place in Kashmir yesterday, that terrible terrorist act, that heinous act, that killed innocent civilians and also struck at a government facility. It is this kind of terrorism that we united against. I also expressed my condolences to my colleague over the loss of Indian citizens at the World Trade Center, reaffirming once again that it was an attack not just against the United States but against the world.I thanked him also for the support that India and the Indian people have given to us in this time of difficulty. We are very grateful for that support, and

[461] Peter Rodman, Media Round Table, 22 August 2001, https://web.archive.org/web/20140929161324/http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1598, accessed on 17th May 2016.

we are very grateful for the good wishes of the Indian people and the expression of support that we have received from the Prime Minister. So, my colleague, it is again a pleasure to have you here".[462]

Main category 3: Presidential preferences

3.1 *President's commitment to transform the relationship with India*: A unit of coding is allocated to this category if President Clinton or G. W. Bush expresses his intention to transform and improve the relationship with India. A unit of coding is also assigned to this category if Clinton or G. W. Bush makes reference to his desire to establish a strategic partnership, its roots, and the benefits deriving from it. Units of coding are assigned to this subcategory if US policymakers report views expressed by the president on the need to transform the relationship with India.

Example:

"I'm going because it's the biggest democracy in the world, and I think we haven't been working with them enough. Just as I believe we have to engage China that has a political system very different from ours, we have to engage India that makes decisions sometimes we don't agree with, but is a great democracy that has preserved their democracy, I must say, against enormous odds. And we have an enormous common interest in shaping the future with them, and I'm looking forward to it".[463]

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[462] Colin L. Powell, Remarks with Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs and Defense of the Republic of India, Washington DC, 2 October 2001, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5176.htm, accessed on 17th May 2016.
[463] William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1 February 2000.

3.2 *Importance of India's economic rapid economic growth and market potentials in transforming president's perceptions about India:* A unit of coding is placed in this category if President Clinton or G. W. Bush makes references to India's liberalization reforms and economic growth. It also includes units of coding referring to President Clinton and Bush's statements about the numerous advantages for US economy and business deriving from India's economic growth. Units of coding fits into this subcategory if they refer to India as a source of talented labour and the positive impact of the presence of Indians in the United States.

Example:

"India's ongoing economic transformation offers the people of India great hope for fulfilling their aspirations and we stand behind them. The United States looks forward to realizing a full range of new personal, political, and economic ties with India in the future".[464]

3.3 *Changes in President's policies and perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities*: A unit of coding fits into this category if it refers to changes in President Clinton or G. W. Bush's approaches to deal with India's nuclear program. Units of coding referring to changes in President Clinton or G. W. Bush's perceptions about India's nuclear capabilities.

Example:

"Well, first of all, on this whole non-proliferation issue, we have had a dialog that has gone on for some time now under the leadership of Mr. Singh and Mr. Talbott. And I would like to thank the Indian Government for that work.

[464] William J. Clinton, Message on the Observance of Indian Independence Day, Public Papers of the Presidents, 2 October 1995.

Secondly, I felt today that there was a possibility that we could reach more common ground on the issue of testing, on the production of fissile material, on export controls, and restraint, generally. With regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, you heard the Prime Minister's statement about his position on testing. I would hope that the democratic process will produce a signing and, ultimately, a ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in India, just like I hope the democratic process will ultimately produce a ratification of the Test Ban Treaty in America that I signed. These are contentious issues. But I'm actually quite optimistic about our ability to make progress on them".[465]

3.4 *Impact of concerns related to terrorism on president's commitment to get closer to India*: A unit of coding is assigned to this category if President Clinton or G. W. Bush mentions his concerns about terrorist attacks in India and in the US. Units of coding are also allocated in this category if President Clinton or G. W. Bush makes reference to his desire to strengthen anti-terrorist cooperation with India.

Example:

"America and India also understand the danger of global terrorism, which has brought grief to our nations and united us in our desire to bring peace and security to the world".[466]

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[465] William J. Clinton, The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India in New Delhi, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 21 March 2000.
[466] George W. Bush, Remarks at a State Dinner Honouring Prime Minister Singh of India, Public Papers of the Presidents, 25th July 2005.

Codes assigned to documents

The table below represents the main coding sheet. In the table, the first column indicates to the units of analysis. The unit number is the number of the document, followed by the number of the unit of coding. So 1.1 stands for document one, unit of coding one. The subcategory numbers in the second, third, and fourth columns correspond to their equivalents listed in the main coding frame below.

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
1.1		2.3		
1.2		2.3		
1.3	1.2			
1.4		2.3		
1.5		2.3		
1.6		2.8		
1.7	1.8			
1.8	1.2			
1.9	1.1			
1.10	1.2			
1.11	1.3			
1.12	1.1			
1.13	1.2			
1.14	1.2			
1.15	1.2			
1.16	1.2			
1.17	1.1			
1.18		2.8		
1.19	1.1			
1.20	1.1			
1.21	1.1			
1.22	1.3			
1.23	1.2			
1.24	1.1			
1.25	1.3			
1.26	1.1			
1.27				M
1.28		2.3		
1.29				M
1.30		2.8		
1.31		2.8		
2.1		2.3		
2.2		2.3		
3.1		2.1		
3.2		2.2		
3.3	1.1			
3.4	1.2			
3.5	1.3			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
3.6				M
4.1	1.1			
4.2	1.5			
4.3	1.6			
4.4		2.4		
4.5	1.1			
4.6				M
4.7		2.8		
4.8		2.3		
4.9		2.2		
5.1	1.2	2.8		
5.2	1.2			
5.3	1.2			
5.4	1.1			
5.5				M
5.6		2.3		
5.7	1.3			
5.8	1.1			
5.9				M
5.10	1.2			
5.11		2.3		
5.12	1.2			
5.13	1.3			
5.14	1.2			
5.15				M
5.16	1.1			
6.1	1.2			
6.2	1.2			
7.1	1.1			
8.1	1.2			
8.2	1.2			
9.1	1.1			
10.1	1.2			
10.2		2.3		
10.3	1.2			
11.1	1.2			
11.2				M
11.3	1.1			
12.1	1.2			
13.1	1.2			
13.2	1.2			
14.1	1.8			
14.2		2.8		
15.1		2.8		
16.1				M
16.2	1.1			
16.3				M
16.4		2.2		
17.1	1.1			
18.1	1.3			
19.1	1.2			
19.2	1.2			
19.3		2.8		
19.4	1.2			
19.5		2.3		
19.6	1.2			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
19.7	1.2			
19.8	1.2			
19.9	1.1			
19.10	1.8			
19.11	1.2			
19.12	1.1			
19.13	1.2			
19.14	1.2			
19.15	1.2			
19.16	1.3			
19.17		2.8		
19.18				M
19.19		2.8		
20.1	1.1			
20.2	1.1			
20.3	1.1			
20.4	1.4			
20.5	1.4			
20.6	1.1			
20.7	1.4			
20.8		2.2		
20.9	1.4			
21.1			3.1	
21.2	1.2			
21.3			3.1	
21.4			3.2	
21.5			3.1	
22.1			3.2	
22.2			3.1	
22.3			3.2	
22.4	1.1			
22.5			3.1	
22.6			3.1	
22.7			3.3	
22.8			3.3	
23.1	1.2			
23.2	1.8			
23.3	1.1			
23.4	1.2			
23.5				M
24.1		2.3		
24.2		2.9		
24.3				M
24.4	1.5			
24.5	1.2			
24.6	1.2	2.8		
24.7	1.2			
24.8		2.5		
24.9		2.8		
24.10	1.2			
24.11		2.3		
24.12		2.4		
24.13	1.5	2.12		
24.14		2.12		
24.15		2.5		
24.16	1.5			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
24.17		2.12		
24.18		2.11		
24.19		2.1		
25.1	1.4			
25.2	1.4			
25.3	1.4			
25.4		2.2		
25.5	1.4			
25.6	1.4			
25.7		2.2		
25.8	1.1			
25.9		2.3		
25.10	1.3			
25.11	1.1	2.3		
25.12		2.5		
25.13	1.4	2.2		
25.14				M
25.15		2.1		
25.16		2.9		
25.17		2.2		
25.18	1.1	2.3		
25.19	1.4			
25.20	1.4			
25.21	1.5			
25.22		2.12		
25.23		2.2		
25.24		2.3		
25.25	1.1			
25.26		2.3		
25.27	1.2			
25.28	1.8			
25.29		2.3		
25.30	1.5			
25.31		2.5		
25.32		2.3		
25.33		2.1		
25.34	1.4			
25.35		2.2		
25.36				M
25.37		2.1		
25.38	1.5			
25.39	1.4			
26.1		2.12		
26.2	1.5			
26.3		2.12		
26.4		2.4		
26.5	1.1			
26.6	1.3	2.8		
26.7	1.1			
27.1	1.2			
27.2	1.8			
27.3	1.1			
27.4	1.2			
27.5		2.2		
28.1	1.3			
28.2	1.2			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
29.1		2.2		
29.2		2.9		
29.3		2.2		
29.4	1.4			
29.5	1.4			
29.6	1.4			
29.7		2.2		
29.8		2.2		
29.9		2.1		
29.10		2.2		
29.11		2.9		
29.12		2.2		
29.13	1.4			
29.14		2.2		
29.15		2.2		
29.16	1.4			
29.17	1.4			
29.18		2.2		
29.19		2.2		
29.20	1.1			
29.21		2.3		
29.22	1.4			
29.23	1.1			
29.24	1.1			
29.25	1.1			
29.26	1.5			
29.27	1.5	2.12		
29.28	1.1	2.3		
29.29	1.2			
29.30	1.5			
29.31	1.5			
29.32	1.5			
29.33				M
29.34	1.2			
29.35	1.2	2.8		
29.36	1.2			
29.37	1.1	2.3		
29.38		2.3		
29.40	1.2			
29.41	1.3			
29.42	1.2			
29.43	1.2			
29.44		2.3		
29.45	1.2			
29.46	1.1			
29.47				M
29.48	1.2			
29.49	1.1			
29.50	1.8			
29.51		2.8		
29.52	1.2			
29.53	1.1			
29.54				M
29.55		2.8		
29.56	1.2			
29.57	1.3	2.8		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
29.58	1.2			
29.59		2.8		
29.60	1.2			
29.61				M
29.62	1.5			
29.63		2.12		
29.64				M
29.65	1.2			
29.66	1.3			
29.67	1.2			
29.68	1.1			
29.69	1.1			
30.1			3.2	
30.2	1.1			
32.1	1.1			
33.1	1.2			
32.2	1.2			
32.3	1.1			
32.4	1.2		3.3	
33.1	1.2	2.8		
33.2	1.1	2.3		
34.1				M
35.1	1.1			
36.1		2.8		
37.1			3.1	
37.2			3.1	
38.1			3.1	
38.2			3.2	
39.1		2.5		
40.1	1.6			
40.2	1.8			
40.3		2.5		
40.4		2.1		
40.5	1.2			
40.6	1.6			
40.7		2.1		
40.8	1.4			
40.9	1.5			
40.10		2.3		
41.1		2.5		
42.1		2.3		
42.2	1.1			
42.3		2.5		
42.4	1.1			
42.5		2.1		
42.6				M
42.7		2.3		
42.8	1.1			
42.9	1.5			
42.10	1.5			
42.11	1.5			
42.12		2.3		
42.13	1.5			
42.14				M
42.15		2.12		
42.16	1.1			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
42.17		2.8		
42.18	1.5	2.12		
42.19		2.3		
42.20	1.3			
42.21		2.2		
42.22	1.4			
42.23		2.2		
42.24	1.4			
42.25	1.4			
42.26		2.2		
42.27	1.4			
42.28	1.4			
43.1	1.5			
44.1	1.1			
44.2	1.2			
44.3		2.3		
44.4				M
44.5		2.3		
44.6				M
45.1	1.1			
45.2	1.3			
45.3		2.3		
45.4		2.8		
45.5	1.8			
45.6		2.3		
45.7		2.8		
46.1	1.1			
47.1	1.1			
48.1		2.2		
48.2		2.3		
48.3	1.1			
48.4	1.2			
48.5	1.1			
48.6		2.8		
48.7				M
49.1		2.3		
50.1			3.1	
50.2	1.1			
51.1	1.3			
51.2	1.3			
51.3	1.1			
51.4	1.1			
51.5	1.6			
52.1		2.3		
52.2	1.1			
52.3	1.3			
52.4	1.3			
52.5	1.2			
52.6		2.3		
52.7	1.1			
52.8	1.2	2.8		
53.1			3.2	
53.2			3.1	
54.1			3.3	
54.2			3.3	

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
55.1	1.2			
56.1	1.2			
57.1			3.3	
57.2	1.2		3.3	
57.3			3.3	
57.4			3.2	
57.5			3.3	
57.6			3.3	
57.7			3.3	
58.1		2.8		
59.1			3.3	
60.1			3.3	
60.2			3.3	
61.1			3.3	
62.1	1.2			
62.2	1.3			
62.3	1.2		3.3	
63.1			3.3	
63.2			3.1	
63.3	1.2			
64.1			3.3	
64.2	1.2			
64.3			3.3	
65.1		2.8		
65.2		2.3		
65.3	1.2		3.3	
65.4		2.8		
65.5	1.2			
65.6	1.3			
66.1	1.2			
67.1	1.2			
67.2			3.3	
68.1		2.3		
68.2		2.3		
68.3		2.3		
68.4		2.3		
68.5		2.3		
68.6		2.3		
68.7		2.3		
68.8		2.3		
68.9		2.3		
68.10		2.8		
68.11		2.8		
68.12	1.2	2.8		
68.13		2.8		
69.1	1.3			
69.2	1.2			
69.3	1.1			
69.4		2.8		
69.5		2.8		
70.1			3.3	
70.2	1.2			
71.1		2.8		
72.1		2.8		
73.1			3.3	
74.1		2.3		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
74.2		2.3		
74.3		2.8		
74.4	1.2			
74.5	1.1			
74.6	1.2			
74.7	1.2			
74.8		2.8		
74.9	1.2			
74.10	1.2			
74.11	1.3			
74.12		2.8		
75.1	1.2			
75.2			3.3	
75.3			3.3	
75.4	1.2			
75.5				M
76.1		2.8		
76.2		2.3		
76.3	1.2			
76.4	1.2			
76.5	1.1			
76.6	1.2			
76.7		2.8		
76.8	1.2	2.8		
76.9		2.6		
76.10	1.2			
76.11		2.8		
76.12		2.8		
76.13		2.8		
76.14		2.5		
77.1		2.8		
77.2	1.1	2.3		
77.3	1.2			
77.4	1.1			
77.5	1.3			
77.6	1.2			
78.1	1.2			
78.2	1.1			
78.3	1.2			
78.4	1.1			
78.5	1.2			
78.6		2.8		
78.7	1.1			
78.8		2.8		
78.9		2.8		
78.10	1.1			
78.11		2.8		
78.12	1.8			
79.1		2.8		
79.2		2.8		
79.3		2.8		
79.4		2.3		
79.5	1.1			
79.6	1.2			
79.7	1.3			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
80.1		2.8		
80.2		2.3		
80.3	1.2			
80.4	1.3			
81.1		2.8		
81.2	1.2			
82.1		2.8		
82.2		2.8		
82.3	1.1			
82.4		2.6		
82.5		2.6		
82.6		2.8		
83.1	1.2			
83.2	1.2			
83.3		2.8		
83.4	1.2			
84.1		2.8		
85.1	1.1			
85.2	1.2			
85.3	1.2			
86.1				M
87.1		2.8		
87.2	1.3			
88.1				M
89.1	1.2			
90.1	1.2			
90.2	1.2			
90.3	1.2			
90.4	1.2			
90.5	1.1			
90.6	1.8			
90.7	1.2			
91.1		2.8		
92.1	1.2			
93.1			3.3	
94.1			3.3	
95.1	1.2			
96.1		2.8		
97.1			3.3	
97.2			3.1	
97.3	1.2			
98.1	1.2			
98.2	1.3			
98.3	1.1			
98.4		2.3		
99.1		2.8		
100.1			3.3	
100.2			3.3	
100.3		2.8		
100.4		2.8		
100.5			3.3	
100.6	1.2			
100.7		2.8		
100.8		2.8		
100.9		2.8		
100.10	1.2			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
100.11	1.3			
100.12		2.8		
100.13		2.8		
100.14	1.2	2.8		
100.15		2.8		
100.16				M
100.17		2.3		
100.18	1.2			
100.19	1.3			
100.20	1.2	2.8		
100.21	1.3			
100.22		2.3		
100.23		2.8		
100.24		2.7		
100.25		2.8		
100.26		2.8		
100.27		2.3		
100.28		2.3		
100.29	1.2			
100.30		2.8		
100.31		2.8		
100.32		2.8		
100.33		2.8		
100.34		2.8		
100.35		2.3		
100.36		2.3		
100.37		2.3		
100.38	1.2			
100.39	1.1			
100.40	1.2			
100.41		2.8		
100.42	1.3			
100.43	1.2			
100.44	1.2			
100.45	1.3			
100.46	1.2			
100.47		2.8		
100.48	1.2			
100.49	1.1			
100.50	1.2			
100.51	1.2			
100.52		2.8		
100.53	1.1			
100.54	1.1			
100.55				M
100.56	1.2			
100.57		2.8		
100.58	1.2			
100.59	1.2			
100.60	1.2			
100.61				M
100.62	1.7			
100.63	1.2			
100.64	1.7			
100.65		2.6		
100.66	1.7			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
100.67	1.1			
100.68	1.2			
100.69		2.8		
100.70	1.2			
100.71				M
100.72				M
100.73	1.1			
100.74	1.1			
100.75				M
101.1	1.2			
101.2	1.2			
101.3		2.2		
101.4		2.2		
101.5		2.8		
101.6	1.2			
101.7		2.8		
101.8	1.1			
101.9	1.2			
101.10	1.2			
101.11	1.2			
101.12	1.2			
101.13	1.2			
101.14	1.2			
101.15	1.7			
101.16		2.8		
101.17		2.8		
101.18	1.7	2.6		
101.19		2.8		
101.20	1.2			
101.21	1.1			
101.22		2.8		
101.23	1.2			
101.24	1.2			
101.25	1.2	2.8		
101.26	1.7			
101.27		2.8		
101.28		2.8		
101.29	1.1			
101.30		2.3		
101.31	1.1			
101.32		2.3		
101.33		2.8		
101.34				M
101.35	1.1			
101.36	1.2	2.8		
101.37		2.8		
101.38		2.8		
101.39		2.8		
101.40	1.3			
101.41	1.3			
101.42		2.3		
101.43		2.3		
101.44				M
101.45		2.5		
102.1		2.8		
102.2	1.2			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
103.1		2.8		
103.2		2.3		
103.3				M
104.1	1.2			
105.1		2.8		
105.2		2.3		
105.3		2.8		
106.1		2.3		
107.1	1.2			
108.1			3.3	
108.2	1.1			
109.1		2.3		
109.2		2.8		
109.3		2.3		
109.4	1.2			
110.1				M
110.2				M
110.3	1.1			
110.4		2.3		
110.5		2.8		
110.6		2.8		
110.7	1.2			
110.8				M
110.9		2.5		
110.10	1.2			
110.11	1.3			
110.12	1.2			
110.13		2.8		
110.14		2.8		
110.15	1.2			
110.16	1.2			
111.1				M
112.1			3.3	
113.1		2.8		
114.1	1.2			
114.2	1.1			
115.1		2.8		
115.2		2.8		
115.3		2.3		
115.4	1.2			
115.5	1.2			
115.6		2.8		
115.7				M
115.8			3.1	
115.9				M
115.10				M
115.11		2.8		
115.12		2.5		
115.13		2.8		
115.14	1.7			
115.15	1.7			
115.16		2.6		
115.17	1.2			
115.18	1.2			
115.19		2.3		
116.1		2.8		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
116.2	1.2			
116.3	1.2			
116.4		2.6		
116.5	1.2			
116.6	1.2			
116.7	1.2			
116.8	1.2			
116.9	1.1			
116.10	1.8			
116.11	1.1			
116.12	1.2			
116.13	1.2			
116.14	1.2			
116.15		2.8		
116.16	1.1			
116.17	1.2			
116.18	1.7			
116.19	1.7			
116.20	1.8			
116.21	1.2			
116.22	1.1			
116.23		2.8		
116.24		2.8		
116.25	1.2			
116.26	1.7			
116.27				M
116.28	1.1			
116.29		2.3		
116.30	1.1			
116.31				M
116.32		2.8		
116.33	1.3			
116.34	1.1			
116.35		2.5		
116.36		2.5		
117.1	1.1			
118.1	1.1			
119.1	1.1			
120.1	1.1			
121.1	1.3			
121.2		2.2		
121.3		2.2		
121.4			3.1	
121.5		2.1		
121.6		2.8		
121.7		2.8		
121.8		2.3		
121.9		2.3		
121.10	1.2			
121.11	1.7			
122.1	1.2			
123.1			3.2	
124.1	1.1			
124.2	1.1			
124.3	1.2			
124.4	1.1			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
125.1			3.3	
126.1	1.3			
126.2		2.8		
126.3		2.3		
126.4		2.8		
126.5		2.3		
127.1			3.1	
128.1		2.3		
129.1			3.1	
129.2	1.1			
130.1			3.3	
130.2				M
130.3	1.1			
130.4				M
131.1			3.1	
131.2		2.7		
131.3			3.1	
131.4		2.1		
131.5		2.9		
131.6		2.2		
131.7	1.2	2.8		
131.8	1.2	2.8		
131.9	1.3			
131.10		2.8		
131.11		2.6		
131.12	1.2			
131.13	1.1			
131.14		2.3		
131.15	1.1			
132.1	1.2			
133.1			3.3	
134.1			3.1	
134.2			3.1	
135.1			3.1	
135.2			3.1	
135.3			3.3	
135.4	1.4			
135.5			3.1	
136.1			3.1	
136.2			3.1	
136.3			3.2	
136.4			3.1	
136.5	1.4			
136.6			3.3	
136.7	1.2		3.3	
136.8			3.3	
136.9	1.1			
136.10			3.1	
136.11			3.1	
137.1			3.1	
137.2			3.2	
138.1			3.2	
138.2			3.2	
138.3			3.2	
138.4	1.4			
138.5			3.2	

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
139.1	1.1			
140.1		2.2		
140.2	1.11			
140.3	1.1			
140.4	1.2			
140.5	1.3			
140.6			3.1	
140.7		2.6		
140.8		2.8		
141.1		2.7		
141.2			3.1	
141.3		2.2		
141.4		2.9		
141.5		2.2		
141.6		2.1		
141.7		2.2		
141.8		2.1		
141.9		2.2		
141.10			3.1	
141.11	1.11			
141.12	1.4			
141.13		2.9		
141.14		2.8		
141.15			3.3	
141.16	1.2			
141.17	1.1			
141.18	1.3			
141.19		2.3		
141.20	1.1			
141.21	1.1	2.3		
142.1	1.1			
142.2			3.3	
142.3	1.2			
143.1			3.1	
143.2			3.2	
144.1		2.8		
145.1			3.1	
146.1			3.1	
146.2			3.2	
146.3			3.1	
146.4	1.1			
147.1			3.1	
147.2			3.3	
148.1	1.11			
148.2	1.4			
148.3	1.11			
148.4	1.4			
148.5	1.5			
148.6	1.1			
148.7	1.2			
149.1			3.1	
150.1	1.2			
150.2	1.3			
150.3	1.2			
150.4	1.3			
150.5	1.1			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
151.1	1.1			
152.1		2.11		
152.2	1.1			
152.3	1.2		3.3	
152.4			3.1	
152.5		2.8		
152.6		2.3		
152.7	1.1			
152.8		2.8		
152.9			3.1	
152.10		2.8		
152.11		2.11		
152.12	1.1			
152.13		2.11	3.1	
152.14		2.3		
153.1		2.8		
154.1			3.1	
155.1		2.3		
156.1	1.1			
156.2	1.1			
156.3			3.2	
157.1	1.2			
157.2			3.3	
158.1	1.2			
159.1	1.1			
160.1			3.2	
160.2			3.1	
161.1			3.1	
161.2	1.4		3.2	
161.3	1.1			
161.4			3.3	
161.5			3.1	
161.6	1.1			
162.1			3.2	
162.2			3.1	
163.1			3.2	
163.2			3.2	
163.3			3.1	
163.4			3.2	
163.5			3.3	
163.6	1.1			
163.7			3.1	
163.8			3.2	
163.9			3.3	
163.10	1.1			
163.11		2.9		
163.12		2.3		
163.13	1.1			
163.14		2.3		
163.15	1.2			
163.16	1.11		3.1	
163.17			3.2	
163.18	1.1	2.3		
163.19		2.3		
163.20		2.8		
163.21			3.2	

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
163.22		2.8		
163.23		2.11		
163.24	1.1			
163.25		2.11		
163.26		2.9		
163.27				M
163.28				M
163.29			3.1	
163.30				M
163.31				M
163.32	1.1			
163.33	1.1			
163.34	1.1			
163.35	1.2			
163.36			3.3	
163.37			3.3	
163.38			3.3	
163.39			3.2	
163.40			3.2	
163.41	1.11		3.1	
163.42			3.2	
163.43			3.2	
163.44	1.4			
163.45			3.1	
163.46		2.8		
164.1		2.3		
164.2		2.3		
164.3	1.2			
164.4	1.8			
164.5	1.2			
164.6	1.8			
164.7		2.3		
164.8		2.3		
165.1		2.3		
166.1			3.1	
166.2	1.11			
167.1				M
168.1				M
168.2		2.1		
168.3	1.5			
168.4				M
169.1	1.2			
170.1	1.1			
170.2	1.1			
171.1		2.11		
171.2			3.1	
171.3	1.9.1			
171.4	1.9.1			
171.5		2.13		
171.6	1.9.1			
171.7	1.2			
171.8	1.1			
171.9	1.9.1			
171.10	1.1			
171.11	1.9.1			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
172.1		2.13		
173.1	1.9.1			
174.1		2.13		
175.1	1.9.1			
175.2	1.1			
176.1		2.13		
177.1	1.5			
177.2	1.5			
177.3	1.9.1			
178.1	1.5			
179.1			3.4	
179.2			3.4	
179.3			3.1	
179.4	1.5			
179.5	1.10			
180.1	1.1			
181.1	1.2			
182.1			3.1	
182.2			3.2	
182.3			3.4	
183.1			3.1	
183.2	1.9.1			
183.3	1.5			
184.1		2.3		
184.2		2.3		
185.1		2.3		
185.2		2.3		
186.1		2.3		
187.1	1.9.1			
188.1		2.3		
189.1		2.3		
190.1			3.4	
191.1			3.4	
192.1	1.1			
193.1	1.5			
193.2		2.12		
194.1			3.4	
195.1	1.1			
196.1	1.2			
197.1	1.1			
197.2			3.1	
198.1		2.11	3.1	
198.2	1.9.1			
198.3	1.5			
198.4	1.6			
198.5	1.5			
198.6	1.10			
198.7		2.10		
198.8	1.5			
199.1		2.3		
199.2	1.1			
200.1		2.7		
200.2		2.11		
200.3			3.1	
200.4	1.5			
200.5	1.5			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
200.6	1.5			
200.7	1.3			
200.8	1.10			
200.9	1.9.1			
200.10	1.4			
200.11		2.11		
201.1	1.5			
201.2	1.9.1			
201.3	1.9.2			
201.4	1.9.1			
201.5	1.5			
202.1		2.3		
202.2				M
203.1	1.1	2.3		
203.2		2.3		
204.1		2.3		
204.2		2.3		
204.3	1.1			
204.4		2.3		
204.5				M
204.5	1.1	2.3		
205.1		2.3		
205.2				M
205.3	1.1			
206.1	1.1			
206.2		2.3		
206.3				M
207.1		2.3		
207.2		2.3		
208.1	1.1			
208.2	1.1			
208.3	1.1			
208.4	1.1			
209.1		2.3		
210.1		2.3		
210.2		2.3		
210.3		2.2		
210.4				M
211.1	1.1			
211.2		2.3		
211.3		2.3		
212.1	1.1			
213.1	1.1			
214.1	1.1			
215.1	1.1			
215.2				M
216.1		2.3		
216.2	1.1			
216.3	1.1			
216.4	1.1			
217.1		2.3		
217.2		2.3		
218.1		2.3		
219.1	1.1			
220.1	1.1			
221.1		2.3		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
222.1		2.3		
223.1		2.3		
223.2	1.1			
223.3		2.3		
223.4	1.1			
224.1		2.3		
225.1	1.1			
225.2		2.3		
225.3		2.3		
225.4		2.3		
226.1	1.1			
226.2	1.1			
227.1			3.1	
227.2		2.12		
227.3		2.3		
227.4	1.9.1			
227.5	1.1			
228.1				M
228.2	1.1			
229.1	1.5			
229.2		2.3		
230.1		2.3		
230.2		2.3		
230.3	1.1			
230.4		2.3		
231.1	1.1			
231.2		2.3		
232.1	1.1			
233.1	1.1			
233.2		2.3		
234.1	1.9.1			
234.2		2.3		
234.3	1.1			
234.4		2.1		
234.5			3.1	
234.6	1.5			
234.7		2.8		
234.8	1.9.1			
234.9	1.4			
234.10		2.11		
234.11		2.3		
234.12	1.1			
234.13	1.1			
234.14	1.5			
235.1	1.1			
236.1	1.1			
237.1	1.1	2.3		
237.2	1.1			
237.3	1.1			
237.4	1.1			
238.1	1.1			
238.2	1.1			
238.3		2.3		
238.4		2.3		
239.1	1.11			
239.2		2.3		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
239.3	1.1			
239.4		2.3		
239.5		2.5		
239.6		2.2		
239.7	1.11			
239.8	1.6			
240.1	1.1			
240.2	1.1	2.3		
240.3	1.1	2.3		
241.1	1.1			
241.2		2.1		
241.3	1.1			
241.4		2.1		
241.5	1.11			
241.6		2.9		
241.7		2.2		
241.8	1.9.1			
241.9	1.11			
242.1		2.3		
242.2		2.2		
243.1	1.1			
244.1		2.5		
244.2	1.6			
244.4			3.1	
245.1		2.3		
245.2	1.1			
246.1		2.3		
246.2	1.1	2.3		
246.3		2.3		
247.1	1.1			
248.1		2.3		
249.1			3.1	
249.2		2.13		
249.3		2.11		
249.4		2.11		
249.5	1.5			
249.6	1.9.2			
249.7	1.5			
249.8		2.2		
249.9	1.4			
249.10		2.3		
249.11	1.1			
249.13	1.1	2.3		
249.14		2.3		
249.15		2.11		
249.16	1.11			
250.1		2.1		
250.2				M
250.3			3.1	
250.4	1.2			
250.5		2.7		
250.6		2.11		
250.7	1.11			
250.8	1.9.1			
250.9	1.9.2			
250.10			3.2	

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
250.11		2.2		
251.1	1.1			
252.1	1.1			
252.2	1.1			
253.1	1.10			
253.2	1.3			
253.3	1.10			
253.4	1.3			
254.1		2.10		
254.2		2.6		
255.1		2.11	3.1	
255.2	1.11			
255.3	1.9.2			
255.4	1.3			
255.5	1.1			
255.6		2.8		
255.7	1.2			
255.8	1.3			
255.9	1.1			
255.10		2.3		
255.11	1.1			
255.12	1.2			
255.13	1.9.2			
255.14		2.3		
255.15		2.11		
255.16		2.4		
255.17	1.1			
255.18	1.9.1			
255.19		2.3		
255.20	1.9.1			
255.21	1.10			
255.22	1.2			
255.23		2.6		
255.24	1.1			
256.1	1.9.1	2.13		
257.1	1.1			
258.1	1.1			
258.2	1.6			
259.1	1.1	2.3		
259.2		2.3		
259.3		2.3		
259.4		2.3		
259.5		2.3		
259.6		2.3		
260.1				M
260.2		2.3		
261.1			3.1	
261.2		2.3		
261.3		2.3		
261.4		2.3		
261.5				M
261.6	1.9.1			
262.1	1.9.1			
263.1			3.1	
263.2		2.3		
263.3		2.4		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
263.4		2.3		
264.1				M
264.2	1.1			
265.1	1.10			
265.2			3.1	
265.3		2.7		
265.4		2.2		
265.5	1.4			
265.6		2.2		
265.7		2.2		
265.8	1.10			
265.9	1.10			
265.10	1.10			
265.11	1.10			
265.12	1.10			
265.13	1.10			
265.14	1.10			
265.15	1.10			
265.16	1.10			
265.17	1.10			
265.18	1.10			
266.1		2.3		
266.2	1.1			
266.3	1.1			
266.4		2.1		
266.5		2.11		
266.6	1.2			
266.7	1.8			
266.8	1.9.1			
266.9		2.2		
267.1		2.7		
267.2		2.8		
267.3		2.7		
267.4			3.1	
267.5			3.1	
267.8		2.8		
267.9		2.11		
267.10	1.3			
267.11				M
267.12	1.5	2.12		
267.13		2.2		
267.14			3.2	
267.15		2.2		
267.16		2.11		
267.17		2.7		
267.18		2.13		
268.1		2.4		
268.2		2.3		
268.3		2.3		
269.1	1.9.1			
269.2		2.2		
269.3	1.5			
270.1		2.2		
270.2		2.9		
271.1		2.2		
271.2		2.11		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
271.3		2.3		
272.1			3.4	
272.2		2.11		
272.3	1.11			
272.4		2.11		
272.5		2.11		
272.6			3.1	
272.7				M
272.8	1.9.1			
272.9	1.9.2			
272.10		2.13		
272.11				M
272.12	1.9.2			
272.13	1.5			
272.14		2.9		
272.15		2.2		
273.1	1.9.1			
273.2	1.1			
273.3		2.3		
274.1	1.10			
274.2		2.6		
274.3	1.10			
274.4				M
274.5		2.3		
275.1	1.9.1			
275.2	1.9.1			
276.1		2.9		
276.2		2.7		
276.3		2.1		
276.4	1.10		3.1	
276.5		2.11		
276.6		2.2		
276.7	1.10			
276.8		2.2		
276.9	1.10			
276.10		2.6		
276.11	1.10			
276.12	1.10			
276.13	1.10			
276.14	1.10			
276.15	1.10			
276.16	1.10			
276.17		2.6		
276.18	1.10			
276.19	1.10			
276.20		2.2		
276.21		2.11		
276.22		2.2		
277.1	1.1			
278.1		2.3		
278.2		2.3		
278.3		2.3		
278.4		2.3		
278.5		2.3		
278.6		2.3		
279.1	1.2			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
279.2			3.1	
280.1		2.8		
281.1				M
281.2		2.8		
281.3		2.9		
281.4		2.8		
281.5		2.11		
282.1			3.1	
282.2			3.1	
282.3	1.10			
282.4	1.2			
282.5		2.3		
282.6	1.1			
282.7		2.2		
283.1		2.8		
283.2		2.2		
284.1		2.11		
284.2		2.8		
284.3		2.2		
284.4	1.4			
284.5		2.12		
284.6		2.3		
285.1	1.4	2.2		
285.2				M
285.3		2.9		
286.1	1.1			
286.2		2.3		
286.3	1.1			
286.4	1.2			
287.1	1.1			
287.2	1.6			
288.1	1.1			
288.2		2.4		
288.3		2.3		
289.1	1.6			
289.2	1.1			
290.1	1.2			
291.1		2.2		
291.2			3.1	
291.3		2.8		
291.4		2.11		
291.5	1.2			
291.6		2.2		
291.8	1.1			
292.1	1.1			
293.1	1.2			
294.1		2.11		
295.1	1.2			
295.2	1.10			
295.3	1.10			
295.4	1.2	2.8		
296.1				M
296.2	1.2			
296.3	1.5			
296.4	1.4			
296.5	1.1			

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
297.1		2.3		
297.2		2.8		
298.1		2.3		
299.1		2.6		
300.1				M
300.2	1.1			
301.1	1.2			
302.1		2.11		
302.2		2.3		
303.1		2.3		
304.1		2.9		
304.2		2.1		
304.3		2.8		
305.1		2.3		
306.1		2.12		
306.2		2.9		
307.1		2.1		
308.1			3.1	
308.3	1.5			
308.4				M
308.5		2.8		
308.6		2.9		
309.1			3.1	
309.2		2.8		
309.3	1.5			
309.4		2.8		
309.5				M
309.6		2.2		
309.7		2.4		
309.8		2.4		
309.9				M
309.10	1.1			
309.11		2.3		
309.12		2.13		
309.13		2.13		
309.14		2.14		
309.15		2.2	3.2	
310.1			3.1	
310.2		2.8		
310.3	1.5			
310.4				M
310.5				M
310.6		2.9		
310.7				M
310.8				M
311.1		2.11		
311.2		2.1		
312.1		2.3		
312.2	1.1	2.3		
312.3				M
313.1				M
314.1		2.11		
314.2		2.1		
314.3		2.11		
314.4		2.1		
314.5			3.1	

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
314.6		2.11		
314.7				M
316.1		2.4		
316.2			3.1	
317.1		2.11		
317.2				M
317.3	1.5			
317.4	1.4			
317.5	1.1			
317.6				M
317.7		2.4		
317.8				M
317.9				M
318.1		2.11		
318.2		2.2		
318.3		2.11		
318.4		2.1		
319.1		2.4		
319.2				M
320.1		2.11		
320.2				M
320.3		2.8		
320.4	1.5			
320.5	1.9.1			
320.6				M
321.1			3.1	
321.2	1.9.1			
321.3	1.2		3.3	
321.4	1.4			
321.5				M
321.6	1.2			
321.7	1.9.2			
321.8	1.10			
321.9				M
321.10	1.9.2		3.3	
321.11	1.2			
321.12	1.7			
321.13	1.2			
321.14	1.9.2			
322.1		2.11		
322.2				M
323.1	1.2			
324.1	1.6	2.4		
324.2	1.2	2.8		
324.3				M
324.4		2.8		
324.5		2.8		
324.6	1.7			
324.7		2.8		
324.8			3.1	
324.9		2.11		
324.10	1.2			
324.11	1.2	2.8		
324.12		2.8		
324.13	1.2	2.8		
324.14		2.8		

Units of analysis	Subcategory of main category 1	Subcategory of main category 2	Subcategory of main category 3	Miscellaneous
324.15		2.8		
324.16		2.8		
325.1			3.1	
325.2	1.4		3.2	
325.3	1.1			
326.1	1.11			
326.2	1.2			
326.3	1.7			
326.4	1.2			
327.1			3.1	
327.2			3.2	
327.3			3.1	
328.1			3.2	
328.2			3.4	
328.3			3.1	
329.1		2.1		
329.2		2.11		
329.3		2.11		

Appendix D: Timelines



Figure 3: Distribution of documents and the key events period January 1993-May 1998



Figure 4 Distribution of documents and the key events period May 1998-January 2001



Figure 5 Distribution of documents and the key events January 2001-July 2005