Efficiency versus equality in bargainingTools Galeotti, Fabio, Montero, Maria and Poulsen, Anders (2018) Efficiency versus equality in bargaining. Journal of the European Economic Association . ISSN 1542-4774 Full text not available from this repository.AbstractWe consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earnings outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoid an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
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