

Conflict Resolution Processes towards Ending Ethno- nationalist Conflicts

**A Comparative Analysis of the Northern
Irish and Turkey's Kurdish Peace
Processes**

İbrahim Aytaç Kadiođlu

Thesis Submitted to the University of Nottingham
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2017

Abstract

This thesis analyses conflict resolution efforts between states, sub-state armed groups and independent third parties during the explicitly ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey. It considers that a predominantly armed response by states towards terrorist groups is an inadequate method for ending ethno-nationalist conflicts. It argues that exploring ethno-nationalist groups who use violence as a tactic to pursue their political goals, provide a better approach to understanding non-violent, political resolution attempts. However, the existing literature has paid relatively little attention to political attempts to bring their violent campaigns to an end. The thesis aims to close this gap through a comparative analysis of the Northern Irish conflict conducted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Kurdish conflict conducted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) as these conflicts have similar ethnic and territorial issues, armed campaigns, political attempts and peace processes. The Northern Irish conflict reached an agreement, but the Kurdish conflict has not. The reasons for the different outcomes are assessed by concentrating on a specific timeframe that is between the beginning of peace efforts and a peace agreement (or the failure of a peace process). The period involves the term between the emergence of the Provisional IRA and so the beginning of the 'Troubles' in 1969 and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 for the Northern Irish conflict. The conflict in Turkey is examined from 1984 to 2015 since the latest conflict resolution efforts collapsed and violence returned in July 2015.

The thesis argues that ethno-nationalist conflicts are too complicated to be brought to an end solely through official negotiations. Therefore, it suggests a more comprehensive framework which begins at the pre-negotiation stage through secret contacts of the main armed protagonists and the initiatives of peace organisations which are pursued along with negotiations between the political parties and independent third parties at the negotiation stage. It investigates these two stages of conflict

resolution processes through three major aspects: backchannel communications, peace and conflict resolution organisations, and official negotiations. These three aspects focus on the roles of political parties, government officials, opposition leaders, the IRA and PKK, and their political wings and intermediaries. This thesis recommends that a peace agreement between states and opposition parties, consisting of sub-state armed groups and their political wings, requires the mediation of an independent third party. It argues that a conflict resolution process may encourage conflicting sides to consider talks and to enter into a negotiation process at the pre-negotiation stage. The process then supports reaching a peace agreement at the negotiation stage.

Dedication

To the memory of those who lost their lives in the ethno-nationalist
conflicts in Turkey and the UK.

Acknowledgements

The writing of this thesis was possible only because of the generous help and encouragement of a number of people to whom I am indebted. I am very grateful, first and foremost, to my supervisors Dr Andrew Mumford and Prof Wyn Rees for their invaluable guidance, comments, patience and fantastic support during this journey. I feel truly privileged for being supervised by Andrew, as he has been not only a great mentor, but also a good friend. I am also grateful to Dr Vanessa Pupavac who supervised me for the first two and a half years of my research and helped to build the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis with her insightful comments. I am also thankful to my annual review examiners who helped me to sharpen my arguments and to deepen my research.

This research was funded by the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey. Without this financial support, this research would not have been possible. PGR Funding and the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism's (CST) fund were very helpful with their conference and fieldwork funding. Particularly, their support in helping me to attend the annual conferences of the Conflict Research Society, the annual convention of the ISA and other conferences in the UK is very much appreciated.

The CST has been a great academic environment and a challenging scholarly engagement. I would like to thank the staff of the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham and Hallward Library. My officemates in B113, Görkem Altınörs (my coffee-mate), Fanni Toth, Nana Agyeman and Ender Faruk Uzunoğlu, thanks for being such amazing friends. I spent most of my last four years with great colleagues in B113.

I would also like to thank to the PGR colloquium and community, and all friend for their continuous support. Jon Mansell, Dimitris Anagnostakis, Cemal Burak Tansel, Filippo Boni, Dishil Shrimankar, Annabelle de Heus and Vladimir Rauta receive thanks for their great support. Jon and Dimitris

provided great feedback for various chapters of this thesis. Thank you very much for your help and comments.

A big thank you is directed to my extended family, but especially to my mum and dad for their endless support, love, care and encouragement which made it possible to complete this thesis. Lastly, I am very grateful to Deniz, who made this journey easier with her love, help, encouragement and limitless patience.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
Dedication	3
Acknowledgements	4
Table of Contents.....	6
List of Abbreviations.....	11
List of Figures	13
List of Tables	14
CHAPTER 1	15
Introduction	15
1.1. Research Questions.....	17
1.2. The Purpose and Significance of this Study.....	18
1.3. Background and Case Selection.....	20
1.4. Theoretical Premises.....	24
1.5. The Limitations of the Research	26
1.6. Structure of the Thesis.....	28
CHAPTER 2	32
Literature Review: Problematising Conflict Resolution and Ethno-nationalist Conflicts.....	32
2.1. Introduction	32
2.2. The Nature of Terrorism and Ethno-nationalist Terrorism.....	33
2.2.1. The Terminology of Terrorism	33
2.2.2. The Nature of Ethno-nationalist Conflicts and the IRA and PKK.....	36
2.2.3. How Terrorism Ends.....	40
2.3. Conflict Settlement Debates and Conflict Resolution Theory.....	43
2.3.1. Non-violent Settlement Theories and Conflict Resolution Theory.....	44
2.3.2. Debating the Schools of Thought	49

2.3.3.	Conflict Responses and International Relations Theory	51
2.3.4.	The Evolution of Conflict Resolution Theory	56
2.4.	Conclusion	61
CHAPTER 3	63
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework for Understanding Conflict Resolution Approaches		63
3.1.	Introduction	63
3.2.	Conflict Resolution Approaches for Understanding Non-violent Resolution Efforts.....	64
3.2.1.	The Bottom Level (Grassroots) Approaches	68
3.2.2.	The Relevance of the Elite level of Conflict Resolution	70
3.3.	Operationalising the Elite Level Approaches.....	74
3.3.1.	Backchannel Communications.....	77
3.3.2.	Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations' (P/CROs) Initiatives	86
3.3.3.	Official Negotiations.....	94
3.4.	Conclusion	104
CHAPTER 4	105
Research Design and Methodology		105
4.1.	Introduction	105
4.2.	Comparative Case Study Method.....	106
4.3.	Case Selection.....	108
4.3.1.	Case Selection Criteria.....	108
4.3.2.	The Northern Ireland and Turkey Cases.....	110
4.3.3.	The Congruence Method and Theory Testing.....	115
4.4.	Data Collection and Analysis	118
4.4.1.	Research on Ethnic Conflicts	118
4.4.2.	The Field Research Conditions in Northern Ireland.....	119

4.4.3.	The Field Research Conditions in Turkey.....	121
4.4.4.	Document Analysis: Archival Research and Secondary Sources	123
4.4.5.	Semi-Structured and Elite Interviews.....	127
4.4.6.	Triangulation	132
4.5.	Methodological Reflections.....	133
CHAPTER 5	135
The Northern Irish and Turkey’s Kurdish Peace Processes: A Historical Overview.....		135
5.1.	Introduction	135
5.2.	The Background of the Northern Ireland Peace Process	137
5.2.1.	Period I: From Emergence to Escalation (1969-1976)	139
5.2.2.	Period II: From Escalation to De-escalation (1976-1994)..	146
5.2.3.	Period III: From De-escalation to Agreement (1994-1998)	149
5.3.	The Background of Turkey’s Kurdish Peace Process.....	153
5.3.1.	Period I: From Emergence to Escalation (1984-1995)	155
5.3.2.	Period II: From Escalation to De-escalation (1995-2005)..	160
5.3.3.	Period III: From De-escalation to Deterioration (2005- 2015).....	164
5.4.	Comparison: From Armed to Political Struggle	170
CHAPTER 6	174
Backchannel Communications: Talking to the Enemy behind the Scenes		174
6.1.	Introduction	174
6.2.	Locating Backchannels into Conflict Resolution Processes	175
6.2.1.	The Nature of Backchannel Communications.....	176
6.2.2.	The Cost of Entry vs. Credibility.....	179
6.3.	Backchannels in Northern Ireland	181
6.3.1.	Indirect Communications.....	181

6.3.2. Direct Talks.....	190
6.4. Backchannels in Turkey	197
6.4.1. Indirect Communications.....	197
6.4.2. Direct Talks.....	205
6.5. Comparison: Peacemaking in Progress?	212
CHAPTER 7	218
Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations: Catalysts for Peace?	218
7.1. Introduction	218
7.2. P/CROs as a Determinant of Conflict Resolution Approaches ...	219
7.2.1. The Middle-Range Approaches of Conflict Resolution Processes.....	220
7.2.2. Meeting in the Middle: Track-Two Diplomacy	221
7.3. Rationale behind the Selection of P/CROs	223
7.4. P/CROs in Northern Ireland	225
7.4.1. The British-Irish Association.....	226
7.4.2. The Peace People.....	232
7.5. P/CROs in Turkey	237
7.5.1. The Wise People Committee	239
7.5.2. The Look at Peace Platform	246
7.6. Comparison: Great Effort, Little Help?.....	249
CHAPTER 8	257
Official Negotiations: The Long, Narrow Road to Peace.....	257
8.1. Introduction	257
8.2. The Negotiation Stage of Conflict Resolution Processes	258
8.2.1. Major Principles of a Negotiation Process.....	258
8.2.2. Conflict Transformation through Official Negotiations.....	261
8.3. The Official Negotiations in the Northern Irish Peace Process..	263

8.3.1. Bilateral Talks.....	263
8.3.2. Multilateral Efforts	269
8.4. The Official Negotiations in Turkey’s Kurdish Peace Process....	278
8.4.1. Bilateral Talks.....	278
8.4.2. Multilateral Efforts	287
8.5. Comparison: A Road to Peace?	293
CHAPTER 9	298
Conclusion.....	298
9.1. Introduction	298
9.2. The Outline of Outcomes.....	299
9.3. Summary of Findings.....	300
9.4. Theory Implications.....	312
9.5. Policy Implications.....	315
9.6. Future Research	317
Appendix: Index of Interviews	321
Bibliography.....	324

List of Abbreviations

AIA	Anglo-Irish Agreement
AIIC	Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANC	African National Congress
APNI	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
BIA	British-Irish Association
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CHP	Republican People's Party
CRC	Community Relations Commission
DEP	Democracy Party
DSD	Downing Street Declaration
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ETA	Basque Country and Freedom
EU	European Union
FAP	Popular Self-Defence Forces
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FP	Virtue Party
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HADEP	People's Democratic Party
HAK-PAR	Rights and Freedoms Party
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
HEP	People's Labour Party
HPG	People's Defence Forces
IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KADEK	Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
KDGM	Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security
KONGRA-GEL	Kurdistan People's Congress
LPP	Look at Peace Platform
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MGK	National Security Council
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6 (Secret Intelligence Service)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIT	National Intelligence Organisation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NIF	New Ireland Forum
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
NIWC	Northern Ireland Women's Coalition
NUI	National University of Ireland
OHAL	State of Emergency
ÖZDEP	Freedom and Democracy Party
P/CROs	Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PJAK	Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PM	Prime Minister
PP	Peace People
PTO	Peace Train Organisation
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PUP	Progressive Unionist Party
PYD	Democratic Union Party
RAF	Red Army Faction
RP	Welfare Party
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF	Sinn Féin
SHP	Social Democratic People's Party
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
START	Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TNA	The National Archive of London
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces
TSKA	Turkish Armed Forces Archive
UCAN	Ulster Community Action Network
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UDP	Ulster Democratic Party
UK	United Kingdom
UKREP	UK Representative
UKUP	United Kingdom Unionist Party
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UUC	Ulster Unionist Council
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UWC	Ulster Workers' Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPC	Wise People Committee
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
YDG-H	Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement
YPG	People's Protection Units

List of Figures

Figure 2.1	The Hourglass Model.....	46
Figure 3.1	Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding.....	66
Figure 3.2	Conflict Resolution Processes.....	68
Figure 4.1	Stage I - Case Study Method of the Research.....	107
Figure 4.2	Stage II - Case Selection Criteria.....	109
Figure 4.3	Stage III - Sampling for the Research.....	109
Figure 4.4	Stage IV - Case Analysis.....	115
Figure 4.5	The Consistency of Independent Variables for Analysing Peacemaking Efforts.....	116
Figure 4.6	The Route of Case Selection and Analysis.....	117
Figure 4.7	Triangulation of Collected Data.....	132
Figure 5.1	The Casualties in Northern Ireland (1969-1998).....	150
Figure 5.2	Map of Turkey.....	156
Figure 5.3	The Casualties in Turkey (1984-2012).....	168

List of Tables

Table 2.1	A Typology of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms.....	58
Table 3.1	Conflict Resolution Approaches from Top to Bottom.....	72
Table 3.2	Conflict Resolution Processes for Peacemaking.....	77
Table 6.1	Characteristics of Intermediaries in Northern Ireland and Turkey.....	213
Table 6.2	Characteristics and Outcomes of Direct Talks in Northern Ireland and Turkey.....	215
Table 7.1	Consequences of Incidents between 1973 and 1978.....	233
Table 7.2	Methods and Results of the Initiatives of the P/CROs in Northern Ireland and Turkey.....	249
Table 8.1	Westminster By-Election Results in 1986.....	266
Table 8.2	The 1998 Good Friday Agreement Referendums.....	277
Table 8.3	Overview of the Influence of Official Negotiations on Northern Ireland and Turkey.....	293

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

'There are two things that democratic people will always find very difficult, to begin a war and to end it' (de Tocqueville, 1840).

For most of the history of conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups in the 20th century, the initial response to the violent campaigns of such groups has been through counter-terrorism tactics, namely the use of force against terrorism. Investigations into the causes of these conflicts and of the goals of these groups by decision makers have resulted in the application of non-violent, political resolution efforts between the main armed protagonists. As ethno-nationalist groups have predominantly political aims, and tend to organise violent attacks as a tactic, it is important to assess peace efforts towards ending these conflicts (Cordell & Wolff, 2010). While states respond to the violence conducted by sub-state armed groups through counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies as a first resort, their failure is most likely to result in the application of political attempts at conflict resolution. This thesis argues that an armed struggle between the security forces of states and sub-state armed groups is not an effective method of bringing ethno-nationalist conflicts to an end. It also argues that such conflicts are too complex to be resolved through official negotiations that only involve the main armed protagonists. Ethno-nationalist groups' ethnic identity, desire for self-determination and territorial concerns are related to a specific context, which reveal a dilemma related to the choice of whether a state pursues armed struggle or a non-military solution. There has been a marked increase in efforts to find non-violent resolutions to these intra-state conflicts, particularly in the post-Cold War era, in arenas such as the Cyprus, Israeli-Palestinian and South African conflicts (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Darby & MacGinty, 2008;

Richmond, 1999). However, the existing literature has paid relatively little attention to political attempts towards ending violence in ethno-nationalist conflicts. In addition, the existing conflict resolution literature primarily focuses on negotiations and largely overlooks the importance of other peace initiatives for making peace. This thesis aims to fill this gap in two ways: firstly, it suggests a more comprehensive framework for resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts, which begins at the pre-negotiation stage through backchannel communications and the initiatives of peace organisations. Subsequently, the momentum of a peace process is maintained through official negotiations between the major stakeholders and independent third parties at the negotiation stage. Secondly, this research applies this conflict resolution framework to the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts deployed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, henceforth: PKK) respectively.

This thesis argues that the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts are comprehensive cases as both have witnessed similar conflict resolution processes with different outcomes. Ethno-nationalist conflicts have taken place in Northern Ireland since the early 1920s and in Turkey since the late 1920s (Bell, 1973, p.398; Ergil, 2000b). However, this thesis has a specific timeframe that involves the emergence of the Provisional IRA¹ and PKK groups and it investigates the relevant conflict resolution efforts made during that timeframe. This timeframe covers the period between the beginning of peace efforts and the signing of a peace agreement (or the failure of a peace process). Hence, the conflict in Northern Ireland is investigated between 1969 and 1998 as peace efforts began as soon as the 'Troubles' broke out in 1969 and a final agreement, referred to as the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), was signed in 1998. The

¹ This thesis uses the term IRA to refer to the Provisional IRA (Provos, PIRA) for the sake of consistency.

conflict in Turkey is examined from 1984 to 2015 as conflict resolution efforts collapsed and violence returned in July 2015.

1.1. Research Questions

The central research question of this thesis is: 'What has been the impact of conflict resolution processes towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey?' This question focuses on a comparison between the political resolution efforts for ending the IRA and PKK's armed campaigns and establishing a peace agreement. It assesses peace initiatives as an on-going process containing not only formal peace initiatives, but also informal and secret peace efforts. It differs from the existing scholarly literature that tends to overemphasise the role of political actors only for peacemaking. However, this research argues that other groups and actors also play a key role in establishing a political settlement. This research indicates that formal and informal initiatives together embody conflict resolution processes through three major aspects: backchannel communications as the unofficial aspect, peace organisations as the informal and semi-official aspect, and negotiations as the official aspect of conflict resolution efforts, which operate at the elite level of conflict resolution.

The central question identified above has three sub-questions which correspond to the three major aspects of a conflict resolution process. The first sub-question is: 'How did backchannel initiatives play a role in de-escalating the violent acts carried out by the IRA and PKK during the pre-negotiation stage?' This question examines secret communication channels between the main armed protagonists and independent intermediaries and aims at ascertaining whether these channels helped to reduce the level of violence. Although secret talks can create a flexible environment for states and terrorist groups to discuss their demands, there has been little exploration of the influence of backchannel initiatives in the conflict resolution processes in the existing literature. The second sub-question is: 'To what extent have peace and conflict resolution organisations facilitated

peacemaking efforts during existing violence in Northern Ireland and Turkey?’ It analyses the contribution of peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) towards reaching an agreement between conflicting parties during the period of violence. The third sub-question is: ‘What has been the impact of the official negotiations towards ending violence and reaching peace agreements in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts?’ This question concentrates on the negotiation stage of a conflict resolution process which is almost always led by governments and the political wings of sub-state armed groups. This research includes ‘mediators’ in this stage and identifies them as independent third parties who assist conflicting parties to negotiate or facilitate a negotiation process. The above questions are investigated through a range of source material including semi-structured interviews, archival research material, government documents, the memoirs of major actors, newspaper articles, reports and other secondary sources.

1.2. The Purpose and Significance of this Study

This thesis has five principal objectives: Firstly, it aims to assess whether conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey were influential in ending violence. This objective considers the recommendation of expanding the framework of peacemaking efforts from a focus only on the conflicting sides to a wider group consisting of political parties, sub-state armed groups and their political wings, other political elites, and national and international third parties.

Secondly, the purpose of this study is to analyse conflict resolution processes in a wider context which requires an investigation of not only official efforts but also unofficial (secret) efforts. Therefore, it prioritises the importance of backchannel communications between the main armed protagonists, namely the representatives of the British and Turkish governments on the one hand, and the IRA and PKK respectively on the other. It argues that both direct and indirect communications have played an important role in reducing the intensity of both conflicts. It is crucial to

reveal the correlation between the secret talks and the outcomes of peace efforts since many ethno-nationalist conflicts use secret communication channels.

Thirdly, this thesis aims to deepen the understanding of the impact of P/CROs as a component of conflict resolution processes. The role of these organisations has been analysed with regards to community relations and reconciliation attempts in the existing literature. However, their impact on the elite level of conflict resolution has been neglected particularly in situations where they may push political elites towards political reforms and a non-violent resolution, as well as forward the demands of conflicting communities to decision makers. This study intends to reveal the P/CROs' contribution to a peace process in a broader context by comparing the relevant groups in Northern Ireland and Turkey. By so doing, this study advances a unique understanding through the assessment of P/CROs as both top-down and bottom-up initiatives.

Fourthly, the existing literature covering peace and conflict studies has focused on how a peace agreement aimed at ending a violent conflict can be reached. However, this approach has involved largely overlooking the fact that conflict resolution is an on-going process aimed at disclosing the underlying reasons for unresolved issues between the disputing parties, such as the reaction of opposition parties and veto players who are able to affect political decisions. This thesis aims to close this gap in understanding by analysing official negotiations via a tripartite approach consisting of representatives of governments, opposition groups and mediators. In this context, the role of international mediators in determining, facilitating or obstructing the two identified peace processes will be investigated by comparing the US mediation in the Northern Irish case and the British mediation in the Turkish case. This thesis, therefore, seeks to reveal whether the inclusion of international mediators in intra-state conflicts helps to establish peace agreements. In addition, the influence of official negotiations not only in ending violence (negative peace), but also in transforming the root causes of a conflict (positive peace)

will be examined (Galtung, 1996). Although a 'positive peace' includes conflict transformation in both the conflict resolution and post-agreement processes, this research focuses only on the transformation that occurs during the conflict resolution process.

Finally, this thesis is intended to contribute to the understanding of the Northern Irish and Turkish cases (a) through its comprehensive framework which contains the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages of conflict resolution processes, and (b) by examining and comparing backchannel communications, P/CROs and official negotiations. Regarding the Northern Irish case, this study aims to reveal the influence of different attempts to achieve peace in order to represent a framework for resolving similar ethno-nationalist conflicts elsewhere. Regarding the Turkish case, this study aims to explore Turkey's collapsed peace process in 2015 and the underlying reasons for its failure. In addition, comparing a successfully resolved case with an unsuccessful case can demonstrate a better understanding of conflict resolution processes as it explores the two very different consequences of similar efforts at bringing an ethno-nationalist conflict to an end.

1.3. Background and Case Selection

There has been an increasing interest in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking approaches relating to ethno-nationalist conflicts in the existing peace and conflict studies literature (Brown, 1993; Cordell & Wolff, 2010; McGarry & O'leary, 2013; Stavenhagen, 1996; Welsh, 1993). Ethno-nationalist conflicts address separatist, ethnic and territorial issues, but are not individual-level disputes. Instead, they tend to emerge as a consequence of the polarisation between ethnic identities in war-torn societies (Montalvo & Reynal-Qerol, 2005). These conflicts are group movements and cannot be mitigated through the dominance of the largest ethnic group (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Cederman et al. (2009, p.499) suggest that these are political conflicts over a modern state's control which involve state elites on one side, and ethno-nationalist groups on the other.

There are several reasons for investigating ethno-nationalist conflicts. In the first instance, groups with ethno-nationalist claims, use violence as a tactical tool and organise violent attacks in order to achieve their political aims. Further, ethno-nationalist groups attack not only the security forces of states, but also civilians which make it crucial to seek non-violent solutions. Finally, these groups often have political wings which sit at the negotiating table with governments and act on behalf of the movement and ethnic community which situation leads to a political resolution (Field, 2009, pp.197-198; Simon & Benjamin, 2001, p.5). Although ethno-nationalist groups are politically motivated and usually have a variety of goals ranging from independence and federation to the recognition of the ethnic identities they claim to represent, there has been relatively little focus on ethno-nationalist conflicts in terms of non-military resolution attempts during violent conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey.² Particularly, the studies on peacemaking approaches address concepts and issues related to ending conflicts, but do not concentrate on the transformation of the underlying reasons of ethno-nationalist conflicts (Bloomfield, 1998; Brewer et al., 2001; Curle, 1971; Walton, 1969).

The intractable conflicts in Turkey and Northern Ireland embody not only ethnic claims, territorial issues, armed campaigns and political resolution attempts, but also peace processes with regards to the elite level of conflict resolution. Although the structure and evolution of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts are not identical, these two cases bear similarities in terms of the actors involved in the conflicts and peace processes, the settlement strategies, the involvement of national and international third parties, the approaches of the governments (British and

² There are a couple of exceptions by Aydınli and Özcan (2011), Çelik (2009), Cochrane (2013), Dixon (2008), McGarry and O'Leary (1995) and Özçelik (2006). Although these studies examine political resolution methods, they do not suggest conflict resolution theory as a framework for resolution of these conflicts regarding the role of political initiatives.

Turkish), and the intentions of the respective republican and pro-Kurdish³ movements regarding the use of violence. These factors together constitute an extensive comparative analysis for three reasons: first of all, both groups primarily aimed to change the political systems of their states and organise attacks against both armed forces and civilians in order to achieve their goals (Crenshaw, 2011; Guelke, 1995). While the primary objective of the IRA was the reunification of Ireland, the PKK's goal is to establish an independent Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007, p.100; Stavenhagen, 1996). Further, although the Northern Ireland conflict involved religious issues between the Catholic and Protestant communities, this conflict was dominated by political, national, ethnic and territorial concerns. The major dispute was on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and was fought between two polarised groups, unionists/loyalists the majority of whom were Protestants and who considered themselves British, and nationalists/republicans the majority of whom were Catholics and who considered themselves Irish. While the nationalist/republican side demanded to leave the United Kingdom (UK) and join Ireland, the unionists wanted to remain part of the UK (Stavenhagen, 1996). In terms of the Turkish case, the PKK have a Marxist-Leninist ideology believing that violence is necessary to achieve a radical revolution against the oppressive states (Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria) (Aydınlı & Özcan, 2011, p.449). The political project of the PKK evolved from a perceived discrimination against the Kurdish population in constitutional, economic and social areas which led commentators to describe the movement as a class struggle (Bell, 2000; Post, 2007). Despite this ideology, the objective of the PKK has been to establish an independent state and so it is driven by ethnic and separatist concerns (Somer & Liaras, 2010). These political and ethnic concerns form the basis for the major

³ The term pro-Kurdish is used to refer to the population consisting of the PKK, its political wing and their supporters. Although there are different classifications for this population such as the pro-minority movement (Akbulut, 2010), this community is mostly called the pro-Kurdish movement, even by the movement itself (Barkey, 1998; HDP, 2015; Watts, 1999).

focus of this research. However, the similarity between these two conflicts in terms of their structures and peace processes did not lead to the same outcomes which demonstrates a more comprehensive analysis compared to a single case study. Although the IRA's armed campaign ended successfully in a peace agreement, there has been no success in ending the PKK's armed campaign in Turkey.

Finally, an investigation of the role of the political wings of the republican movement (Sinn Fèin) and the pro-Kurdish movement (the HDP⁴ and its predecessors) is crucial in terms of their relationships with the IRA and PKK respectively, their respective influences on the Catholic and Kurdish communities and in the transformation of the nature of both conflicts from violence towards a peaceful resolution.⁵ The relationships between the two groups and their political fronts are also important, as they may not hold parallel perspectives under all conditions. Hence, Sinn Fèin (SF) in Northern Ireland and the HDP and its predecessors in Turkey provide important cases for analysing the role of political elites. For example, SF had no links with parliamentary politics in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for most of its history (Murray & Tonge, 2005). It had only a specific policy which argued the invalidity of the partition of Ireland in 1921 and, as a result, refused to serve in any government which recognised that partition (Murray & Tonge, 2005, p.14). However, this view changed during the Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 as SF began to participate in national elections in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Dixon, 2001b, p.12). Indeed, the balance of power between the groups defending the armed struggle on the one hand, and others promoting the political struggle for the reunification of Ireland on the other shifted from one to another invariably after those strikes (Hancock, 2008,

⁴ HDP: The Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*)

⁵ Despite the PKK's claim of being the representative of Kurdish identity, there is no homogenous Kurdish bloc in a cultural or political sense as the term 'Kurdishness' refers to a great range of identities and dialects that are not mutually exclusive, such as the speakers of Zaza, Gorani, Kurmanji and Sorani (Jacoby & Özerdem, 2013; McDowall, 2004).

p.206). Similarly, despite the dominance of the PKK, the struggle within the pro-Kurdish movement between the PKK and pro-Kurdish parties for leadership of the movement continued until the peace process collapsed in July 2015 (Coşkun, 2015; Karayılan, 2015). Hence, an investigation into the influence of SF and the HDP on their paramilitary counterparts will help establish an understanding of the impact of conflict resolution processes on peacemaking actions.

1.4. Theoretical Premises

This thesis explores non-violent resolution attempts towards ending violence and establishing political settlements in the two ethno-nationalist conflicts identified above. This settlement means an agreement between the main protagonists that includes both the termination of violence and the transformation of the root causes of a conflict.

A conflict resolution process is concerned with political, non-violent peace efforts by conflicting parties and national and international third parties to address the requirements, and demands of disputing parties in order to reach agreeable circumstances for ending violence (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Conflict resolution in the traditional sense focused on conflicts between states which addressed international negotiations between two states under the mediation of a third state (Kremenjuk, 2002). Since the end of the Second World War (WWII), the character of warfare has gradually changed together with the rise of non-state actors in conflicts which has resulted in 'asymmetric' warfare between states and sub-state actors. Such forms of warfare include terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts and civil wars (Crenshaw, 2011). This change led to a modification in conflict resolution theory that considers the transformation of actors in conflicts, issues, demands and resolution methods. The differences include conflict resolution processes that produce solutions accommodating some mutual gains for the opposing parties (Kriesberg, 2008, p.16). This thesis focuses on intra-state conflicts (rather than international conflicts) which are driven by identity, ethnicity and territorial concerns such as

independence, federation or autonomy of a region, through a new form of conflict resolution theory. This modified theory does not consider the power or authority of any of the disputing parties. Rather, it indicates a need for equality between conflicting parties in order to achieve a settlement (Kelman, 2004, pp.112-119; Rouhana, 2011, pp.294-295). Therefore, this theory provides a suitable framework for the analysis of ethno-nationalist conflicts, which involve a state authority, and a sub-state armed group and its political wing (Galtung, 1965). The Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts relate to armed conflicts between the state security forces and sub-state armed groups, and therefore, a balance between the powerful and weak parties in the conflicts would be necessary in order to achieve the demands of both sides in order to avoid a zero-sum game. This relationship describes a more complicated relationship than that involving only conflicting parties as it also contains other parties involved in a conflict resolution process (Fisher, 1983). This thesis identifies the role of the third parties as the key factor in determining the nature of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes.

Based on the existing conflict resolution literature, this thesis establishes the common requirements of both sides in a violent conflict such as security, recognition and autonomy. By emphasising these requirements, conflict resolution theory concentrates on the common interests of the conflicting sides and focuses on creating trust between disputing parties. Lederach's (1997) classification of conflict resolution exhibits a comprehensive understanding of conflict resolution theory and defines an approach to this field via three levels: top (elite), middle-range and grassroots levels. Whilst the grassroots level avoids the national and extra-national politics of a conflict and concentrates on local and indigenous stages of a peace process, the middle-range level covers the attempts of unofficial representatives to bring opposition parties together (Carayannis et al., 2014; Kelman, 1998). In contrast, the elite level addresses peace efforts which are mainly managed by negotiations among political leaders and main protagonists, and then expands it to society (Hancock, 2008). As this thesis investigates how the destructive campaigns

of the IRA and PKK could be brought to an end in a political way, political parties and actors at the elite level and other non-political actors are examined, namely peace groups and both national and international intermediaries who played a role in the decisions of political elites and contributed to these peace processes.

This thesis examines these theoretical assumptions by considering ethnic and nationalist differences in the Northern Irish and Turkish societies and to what extent the republican and pro-Kurdish movements respectively have driven these intractable conflicts. It analyses political resolution efforts by defining a conflict resolution process as a comprehensive approach containing both the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. It therefore focuses on the backchannel initiatives as a pre-negotiation activity between the main armed protagonists, P/CROs as national third parties involved in the two peace processes, and official negotiations between the conflicting parties and international third parties which together identify conflict resolution processes.

1.5. The Limitations of the Research

This thesis aims to produce a comprehensive understanding of peacemaking efforts towards a political settlement. By applying a structured, focused comparison, this research aims to overcome the difficulties to analyse both the strengths and weaknesses of the conflict resolution processes in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts. However, this research inevitably has some limitations which must be considered for further research. Firstly, although this research analyses and compares peacemaking efforts up to the point an agreement is reached (or the process fails), it does not assess peacebuilding attempts conducted by NGOs, community and religious leaders and other local leaders in the same time period. Although peacebuilding approaches are predominantly post-settlement efforts, these grassroots initiatives are usually initiated before making an agreement. The analysis of their influence until the success or failure of conflict resolution efforts could form the basis of further research.

Secondly, this study is limited to conflict resolution efforts up to successful or unsuccessful settlement but not efforts of political elites in a post-agreement era. The role of political elites, main armed protagonists and other peace initiatives could also be analysed following an agreement. The Northern Irish case can be analysed with respect to peace groups and political parties and efforts of actors in the post-settlement process regarding the achievement of peace. Such a study could reveal the consequence of pre-agreement efforts, especially on transforming the underlying reasons for the conflict including identity issues, political reforms and changes in legislation which might provide an understanding of peace efforts in a deeply divided society.

Thirdly, analysing backchannel initiatives is complicated as they are difficult to discover. These communication channels provide a great advantage for conflicting parties as they are often considered safer for the discussion of a range of diverse topics which cannot be discussed in public for fear of the reaction of conflicting communities and spoilers from opposition parties. Additionally, these initiatives are difficult for academics to analyse due to a lack of primary sources. This thesis uses archival materials in TNA in London, the NUI archive in the Republic of Ireland, interview materials and personal memoirs for the Northern Irish case, and interviews with intermediaries and conflicting parties, revealed meeting records, public statements of the main armed protagonists and limited archival sources in the TSKA in the Turkish case. However, there is still much to analyse in both cases. While the secret talks in Northern Ireland could be analysed through a specific focus on the late 1980s and early 1990s when TNA papers are released publicly thirty years after they were written.⁶ Similarly, the memoirs of the actors involved in the peace process and other archival sources can be assessed following their release in Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Once these documents are released and published, research could provide a more comprehensive understanding of

⁶ All cabinet papers, memoranda and other files in TNA of London are confidential documents and are only released to the public after thirty years of creation which is called the thirty-year rule (TNA, 2015).

the contribution of these initiatives to both cases. Also, this research could have focused on the role of religious leaders as intermediaries such as Fr Alec Reid and Fr Gerry Reynolds during the backchannel initiatives since there was a clear religious dimension of the conflict.⁷ Although this thesis takes the Northern Irish case as an ethno-nationalist conflict, the contribution of Catholic and Protestant churches in peacemaking is an essential question.

Lastly, this thesis prioritises the attainment of peace. However, it does not ignore the importance of issues related to justice. The study addresses peace efforts towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts. It underlines that reaching an agreement between conflicting parties is crucial, as justice is difficult if there is existing violence or threat of violence. Therefore, the focus is on non-violent, political peace attempts in order to explore the role of political elites on resolution efforts. For further research, the focus would be the concerns relating to justice in both peace processes. Such an analysis would reveal both peace and justice issues, and present a broader understanding of the concerns of the conflicting communities towards ending the violent conflicts in both Northern Ireland and Turkey.

1.6. Structure of the Thesis

Following a brief overview of the thesis in the first chapter, Chapter Two reviews the literature to establish an understanding of methods of bringing ethno-nationalist violence to an end. The chapter has two parts; the first part deals with the main characteristics of terrorism and ethno-nationalist terrorism. It concludes with an appraisal of the nature of ethno-nationalist groups and of the question of how terrorism ends in order to establish the causes, consequences and insights of ethno-nationalist conflicts. The second part of the chapter reviews the literature on peacemaking theories;

⁷ For more information on Fr Reid and Reynolds, see Brewer et al. (2011), Mallie and McKittrick (1997) and Wolffe (2014).

conflict settlement, management, transformation and resolution, and the relevance of conflict resolution theory.

Chapter Three examines the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. This framework addresses conflict resolution approaches for understanding non-violent resolution efforts towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts. The chapter divides conflict resolution approaches into three levels; the elite, middle-range and grassroots level approaches. As the study focuses on peacemaking efforts between states, opposition groups and third parties, the relevance of the elite level approaches as well as other groups and the initiatives of other actors towards peace is clarified by conceptualising three major parts which play a role in peacemaking efforts: backchannel communications, P/CROs and official negotiations.

Chapter Four discusses the research design and methodology of the thesis in two sections. The first section covers the comparative case study design to compare the Northern Irish conflict and Kurdish conflict in Turkey. It also analyses the rationale behind the selection of these two cases and the investigation methods of conflict resolution. The remaining section describes the data collection and analysis methods selected for this study and includes elite interviews and archival materials as primary sources since the study assesses political resolution attempts and the two governments and P/CROs' reports as the secondary sources.

Chapter Five provides an overview of the background of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes and aims to demonstrate the relationship between the violent conflicts and non-violent, political resolution efforts. This historical account explores the transition in the perception of the British and Turkish governments on the one hand, and the leadership of the IRA and PKK on the other. It explores the strength of this transition in both conflicts historically and provides an understanding of how the attitudes and actions of the conflicting parties influenced the outcome of both peace processes.

Chapter Six focuses on the influence of secret communication channels between the principle armed protagonists on reducing the level of

violence and facilitating a political settlement. The chapter establishes the importance of backchannels by emphasising the characteristics of intermediaries, the demands of the governments and sub-state armed groups, and the contents of discussions and their influence on the achievement of a peaceful solution, through interview data and archival materials. The chapter then compares the two cases regarding the role of these factors in de-escalating the conflict or obstructing peacemaking attempts.

Chapter Seven investigates P/CROs as peacemaking initiatives and their role in promoting or hindering a conflict resolution process. Regarding middle-range efforts, P/CROs aim to close the gap between the elite and grassroots levels through public events, conferences and marches, which helps to include war-affected society's demand for political decisions and the promotion of political resolution attempts. Regarding elite-level efforts, they play a role in political decisions thanks to their personal contacts with political elites. It assesses whether these groups have reduced the tension in the society and have encouraged political efforts in Northern Ireland and Turkey. The P/CROs in both conflicts have operated since the early stages of both conflicts. They are assessed through official documents, semi-structured interviews and archival materials.

Chapter Eight explores official negotiations as the key factor in conflict resolution processes in both conflicts. The comparison of negotiation efforts provides a comprehensive understanding of the conflict-affected environment which determines the nature of political resolution attempts through the analysis of the root causes of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts. This analysis broadens the process from negative to positive peace that includes transformation of the underlying reasons of conflicts and restoration of relationships. It provides clear evidence from both cases which will help to establish an extensive analysis in establishing peace. The research reaches a deeper analysis by containing other actors and factors, namely 'spoilers' who aim to distract a peace process, and mediators in facilitating or hindering progress.

Chapter Nine concludes this thesis by appraising its outcomes and summarising the findings that can be applied to other ethno-nationalist conflicts which involve similar peace processes. It discusses the implications of conflict resolution theory and the policies applied in the two specified conflicts which demonstrate a suitable framework for further research. Although this thesis is a comparative analysis of two comprehensive conflict resolution processes, it nevertheless has some limitations such as the focus on peacemaking but not peacebuilding approaches and these limitations are discussed in this chapter. This thesis represents a challenge to the existing peace and conflict literature which primarily focuses on negotiations for making peace. Instead, this thesis examines conflict resolution as a process which begins with indirect communications and results in a political settlement.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review: Problematizing Conflict Resolution and Ethno-nationalist Conflicts

'Peace has always been hard to define. It has a passive quality about it, as in "the absence of war". But, according to the concepts of conflict resolution, peace is seen, not as a passive state but as a continuous process: peacemaking or peacebuilding' (Montville, 1987, p.162).

2.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews theories which assess potential resolution ways towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts. Before explaining these theories, it analyses the components and characteristics of different types of terrorism in order to understand the motivations of ethno-nationalist groups to carry out violent attacks. It highlights the inadequacy of traditional counter-terrorism approaches in exploring the nature of ethnic conflicts. It also assesses the role of non-violent settlement approaches in the existing literature and the relevance of conflict resolution theory compared to other theories in analysing intrastate conflicts during the period of violence.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 2.2 discusses the terminology and debates of terrorism, the importance of ethno-nationalist groups, and the IRA and PKK specifically. Then, the literature on how terrorism ends is investigated in order to underline the importance of non-violent resolution attempts. Section 2.3 firstly analyses the nature of conflict and other conflict settlement notions within the existing literature. Subsequently, specific schools in the literature are briefly explained in a

comparative way. Finally, the evolution and background of conflict resolution theory are investigated.

2.2. The Nature of Terrorism and Ethno-nationalist Terrorism

2.2.1. The Terminology of Terrorism

The term 'terrorism' first came into use during the French Revolution of 1789, and was used to explain the fear and anxiety directed at a community (Crenshaw, 2011). Since then this term has been fundamental for how states frame security issues. Although there are many different definitions, there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).⁸ This section aims to address major components of terrorism by considering the lack of a globally accepted definition. Terrorism is a violent action towards an organised structure (Turk, 1982, p.122). Therefore, violence alone cannot be considered as a terrorist act. An intended use or threat of symbolic and low-intensity violence, at least, by a secretive organisation is necessary for the act of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, p.379). In addition, even though terrorism emerges through violence and causes damage to lives and property, it is not the primary aim of terrorist organisations. Instead, the primary goal is the creation and maximisation of fear through violence or the threat of violence for political change (Hoffman, 1998, p.43). Thus, it is generally used as a tool to create 'fear' in a society. It increases fear and anxiety even if the harm is moderate (Friedland & Merari, 1985, p.591).

It is also essential to consider the targets of terrorist groups, their attack strategies and tactics. Symbolic targets chosen for violence represent the desire of the groups to draw attention to their political struggle (Tilly,

⁸ Schmid and Jongman (1988) argue that there are 109 different definitions of terrorism. Although they classify 22 different features from these definitions, their frequency changes from one survey to another. For example, Schmid and Jongman's (1988) survey, and Weinberg's (2004) survey exhibit different frequency of the characteristics for the definition of terrorism.

2004, p.5). Terrorists target civilians to achieve political purposes that include federation, autonomy and establishing an independent state (Ganor, 2002, p.288; Weinberg et al., 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1998). Schmid and Jongman's definition brings these aspects together:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p.28).

Furthermore, terrorist attacks are organised by groups who impose violence on other people in society (Black, 2004, p.16). These attacks are also designed by non-state groups against civilians to affect a larger group of people for political, social, religious or other purposes (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004, p.50). For example, the IRA organised random attacks in parks, shopping areas and public houses to put pressure on the British government as it believed that violent attacks would convince the British government to relinquish Northern Ireland (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p.50). The target and main objective of terrorist groups are rarely the same. While the immediate targets are members of a group or people who are valued in this group, the primary target is a group or class, such as a racial, ethnic or religious group (Card, 2007, p.6). For example, the PKK launched its attacks by not avoiding any civilian loss and aims to force the Turkish government to initiate a political change which might lead to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Turkey's southeast (Stavenhagen, 1996, p.100).

Despite the differences in targets and objectives of different armed groups, there is a disagreement in the literature on the existence of a project of radical change within the meaning of terrorism. While the 'old' terrorism school of thought is based on the desire to achieve political power through anarchic, national, ethnic, rightist or leftist violence, the 'new' terrorism school of thought emphasises the claims of terrorists to transform the world through religious motivations (Crenshaw, 1981, 2000; 2011, p.411; Laqueur, 1999). It is argued that the 'old' terrorism addresses terrorists who 'want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead' (Jenkins, 1974,

p.4). Rapoport identifies 'four waves' of terrorism, as 'anarchist', 'anti-colonial', 'new left' and 'religious' (Rapoport, 2002). This explanation considers religious terrorism to be a new wave of terrorism rather than a 'new' explanation. However, some scholars claim that there has been a revolution in the meaning of terrorism (Hoffman, 1993; Laqueur, 1999; Lesser et al., 1999). This revolution has been labelled 'postmodern' (Laqueur, 1996, p.24), 'catastrophic' (Carter et al., 1998), 'super terrorism' (Medd & Goldstein, 1997, p.286) and 'hyper-terrorism' (Sprinzak, 2001). In contrast, it has been argued that the period of 'traditional' terrorism saw attacks by the PIRA and the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the PKK during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Arbour, 2012; Criss, 1995, p.19; Hoffman, 1989; 2001, p.417). As Rees and Aldrich (2005) note, significant elements of the old terrorism remain and thus many terrorist attacks do not indicate a change since the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, neither of the other types (e.g. leftist and revolutionary) nor ethno-nationalist groups' motivations were relegated by religious groups (Cronin, 2002, pp.22-32; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Kaldor, 2012). Also, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)⁹ aims to create a territorial presence via a self-sustaining Islamic state in the Middle East and has a hierarchical structure just like other types of terrorist groups (Weiss & Hassan, 2016). The division between the 'old' or ethno-nationalist and 'new' terrorism is broadly artificial (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004, pp.449-450; Field, 2009, p.200).¹⁰ Thus, it is 'impossible to separate religious from ethno-nationalist or separatist motivations' (Quillen, 2002,

⁹ The group first used the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and al-Qaeda in Iraq. Afterwards it used the name Islamic State in Iraq in 2006, and added 'al-Sham' to make ISIS in 2013. There are many abbreviations used to define the group. The most frequently used abbreviations are IS, ISIS, ISIL (The Islamic State and the Levant) and Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham (DAESH) which is mostly used by Arabic-speaking countries (Dearden, 2014).

¹⁰ There is a great deal of research on the comparison between 'old', 'new' and ethno-nationalist terrorism (Cilluffo & Tomarchio, 1998; Copeland, 2001; Crenshaw, 2011; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Field, 2009; Harmon, 2008; Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Morgan, 2004; Neumann, 2009; O'Lesser, 1999; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Spencer, 2006; Tucker, 2001).

p.288). The next section describes the characteristics of ethno-nationalist conflicts, and the IRA and PKK.

2.2.2. The Nature of Ethno-nationalist Conflicts and the IRA and PKK

'Nationalism' is described as the gathering of people together in terms of a language, or common history and culture to generate a distinctive race or group of people (Simpson & Weiner, 1987). Nationalists are defined as 'people whose actions or reasoning gives indiscriminate precedence to the interests of one nation (usually their own) over those of other nations, and who are prepared to disregard those others for the sacrosanct honour of their own nation' (Alter, 1994, p.19). Nationalism has two major types: ethnic and civic. This division is based on the meaning of members of a society's requests and their norms to contain people in describing national collectivism (Greenfeld, 1992). Ethnic nationalism focuses on common race, culture, religion, language, historical experiences or affinity relationships. In contrast, civic nationalism is based on demands regarding different political cultures, associations and values (Reinares, 2005, p.123). Reinares further describes the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism:

Nationalist doctrines resembling the ethnic version usually adopt an exclusionary character and would therefore be prone to violent confrontation with the excluded aggregate inside or outside a given country. Whereas civic nationalism would emphasise the protection of individual rights and public liberties, ethnic nationalism concedes priority to the claims of presumed aggregate demands, to the point of justifying or tolerating human rights violations insofar as these shared aspirations are advanced (Reinares, 2005, p.123).

As this research focuses on non-violent resolution efforts towards ending violence, the violent confrontation of sub-state armed groups to achieve political aims is the topic of the thesis which address ethnic, cultural and other group rights. Thus, the term 'ethno-nationalism' is chosen when investigating political resolution efforts where features can be analysed

through six aspects and in relation to the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts.

Firstly, ethnic nationalism involves lethal and influential separatist attacks, which are performed mostly against democratic states. Although such states have democratic regimes, sub-state armed groups criticise discrimination, ethnic identity references and nationality issues. For example, the IRA defended Irish nationalism against the British government (Reinares, 2005). With regards to separatism, the aims of the IRA and PKK strengthened ethnic separatism and prevented the application of democratic reforms (Ergil, 2000a; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007, p.100; Stavenhagen, 1996).

Secondly, ethnic identity is a fundamental issue for ethno-nationalist groups. For instance, the Catholic community in Northern Ireland supported Irish self-determination and a united Ireland. Both secular principles and religious beliefs were influential in this conflict. Therefore, religious and political markers are mostly used together with national identity and minority groups asserting Irish identity (Evans & Tonge, 2013, p.357). However, there is a questionable link between public support and ethnic identities in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts. According to Hayes and McAllister (2001), public support for the IRA was only between 11% and 28%.¹¹ Moreover, public support for the PKK in elections was only between 3% and 7% between 1999 and 2007 (Gergin et al., 2009). This questionable link will be assessed through an investigation into the correlation between armed and political struggle.

Ethno-national understandings of national labelling and competitive nationalism (symbolic and aggressive affiliations of being British or Irish) constitute one of the major problems in Northern Ireland (McGarry & O'Leary, 1995). Ethno-national identities belonging to either British or Irish

¹¹ According to the Irish Mobility Survey (1973), public support for the IRA was 16% among Protestants and 25% among Catholics in 1973. In addition, the Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Survey (1998) shows that public support for the use of violence was 11% among Protestants and 28% among Catholics (Hayes & McAllister, 2001).

nationalists have been a problem by presenting themselves in the foreground and exhibiting the loyalty of militants to their nation at the cost of a mutual Northern Irish identity (Dixon, 2001a; Evans & Tonge, 2013, p.360). This ethno-nationally separated community as an assertion of a shared society in Northern Ireland is fundamental for resolution efforts in this type of conflict (Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p.79). Turkey's struggle with the PKK is another significant example of ethnic and national identity issues that are caused by pro-Kurdish paramilitary groups against Turkey's security services and civilians. The PKK asserts that it represents Kurdish identity and it is at war with the Turkish state (Art & Richardson, 2007, p.5; Welsh, 1993, p.44). As ethnic and national identity issues and the resolution efforts towards these conflicts address the political agenda, conflict resolution approaches as on-going peace initiatives are significant for the analysis.

Thirdly, ethno-nationalist issues connect cultures of violence which might act as cultural or social coordinators for terrorism. While cultures of violence might be used to define a terrorist group's attack strategies, it might create room for states to put pressure on them. The IRA's attack type demonstrated a culture of violence which was against the British security forces. However, the IRA had to apologise from the Northern Irish society due to its armed campaign after targeting civilians randomly through car bombings (Alter, 1982; Townshend, 1983).

Fourthly, as explained in the previous section, ethno-nationalist groups are generally characterised as having regional concerns. However, this type of conflict does not encompass only domestic issues. For example, the IRA obtained financial and political support from Irish-Americans in the USA and even from Libya at a state level (Reinares, 2005, p.127). Likewise, the PKK has been supported by sympathisers in the Republic of Ireland and throughout Europe and this financial support has helped it to survive (Gücenmez, 2009).

Fifthly, ethno-nationalist conflicts are neither individual-level processes nor reducing factors for polarisation (Montalvo & Reynal-Qerol,

2005). These conflicts are group movements and do not decrease differences in society. As Collier and Hoefler (2004) suggest, these conflicts cannot be reduced to the dominance of the largest ethnic group. Cederman, Buhaug and Rod (2009) suggest that these are political conflicts over the control of the modern state which contains state elites on the one hand, and ethno-nationalist groups on the other. Ethno-nationalist conflicts are displayed as a result of specific means of nation-state formation. They may emerge when the elites of national states fail to contain the majority of citizens into the imaginary society of the nation (Cederman et al., 2009, p.499).

The Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts encompass political resolution attempts. In Ireland, for example, a hunger strike was organised by members of the IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) to influence the public to recognise Irish self-determination in 1981. During this period, the British government urged hunger strikers to cease their strike. Nevertheless, this communication channel did not lead to official negotiations as the British government was reluctant to negotiate with the IRA (Tannam, 2001, p.502). Similarly, the Turkish government, namely the leading members of the AKP,¹² made some efforts to make contact with the PKK. High-level secret talks in Oslo between the PKK and Turkish government ended as thirteen Turkish soldiers were killed by PKK militants in June 2011 (ICC, 2012, pp.3-4). Conflict resolution attempts in both conflicts will be assessed through successful and unsuccessful non-violent efforts in the subsequent chapters.

Finally, self-maintenance is also essential for terrorist organisations (Crenshaw, 1985). The self-maintenance aim might change potential victims of terrorism when active support or passive tolerance is effective within the group. This might influence people from the same ethnic or religious society that practices terrorism to the extent that this population

¹² AKP: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*). Although the party staff uses the term 'AK Parti' (the term 'ak' means, 'white or clean' in Turkish) and the English abbreviated version is the JDP, the Turkish initial AKP is widely used in the literature and so, the initials AKP are adopted in this research.

become victims of it (Reinares, 2003). The next section discusses possible ways to end terrorism.

2.2.3. How Terrorism Ends

As explained in the previous sections, the nature of terrorism depends on various determinants. These factors change from one case to another as each conflict has different characteristics. There are three options in the fight against terrorism by states: the use of force, legalistic options and operations other than war (Martin, 2010, pp.463-466). Firstly, the use of force is a hard-line policy which allows state authority to use the force of arms against terrorist groups. In this case, states respond to terrorist attacks through military campaigns only. However, armed response is not always an appropriate approach for states as terrorist groups do not limit their methods to traditional armed tactics. They also aim to force governments to abandon a territory through psychological and physical attrition (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007, p.295; Simon & Benjamin, 2000, p.65). These tactics emerge from an awareness by the terrorist groups that they cannot defeat states through armed struggle. For example, both the IRA and PKK use violence to achieve their ethnic and nationalist purposes (Abrahms, 2008, pp.97-98). As these groups' aim to change the political systems (the reunification of Ireland and an independent Kurdish state in Turkey's southeast), states are aware that armed response is often not a viable method.

Secondly, legalistic options are another fundamental strategy for eliminating terrorism. While some legal protocols are applied to international cooperation, others are adapted from domestic needs. Law enforcement at the domestic level addresses the application of law enforcement agencies via the prosecution of suspected terrorists (Martin, 2010). It has been argued that 'a high-quality rule of law is considered to dampen ordinary citizens' opportunity and willingness to engage in political violence, protecting democracies from becoming victims of terrorism' (Choi, 2010, p.940). Further, if the rule of law is firmly imposed,

this guarantees the response of a government to its citizens and when a greater number of citizens are stakeholders in the decision-making mechanism, fewer people are likely to perpetrate or sympathise with terrorist acts (Schmid, 2005a; 2005b, p.28). Although law enforcement is an essential part of eliminating terrorism, the focus of this research is not the rule of law.

Finally, operations other than war constitute a two-fold approach that includes repressive non-military options and conciliatory initiatives. There are four repressive non-military options: non-violent covert operations, intelligence, enhanced security and economic sanctions (Johnson, 1992; Jones & Libicki, 2008, p.9; Martin, 2010, p.464; Westby, 2007). This thesis classifies the repressive options as a supportive approach since they are non-military operations aimed at stopping or preventing violence caused by terrorist groups. However, the main focus of the research is insufficient explanation surrounding resolution attempts in terms of the pre-negotiation and negotiation processes. Therefore, these options are used as supplementary tools alongside conciliatory options. Conciliatory options address soft-line efforts, which are non-violent, political resolution attempts towards peace. These attempts are voluntary and contain the consent of both conflicting sides vital for sustainable peace. There are two types of conciliatory options: diplomacy and social reforms (Martin, 2010, p.465). Diplomatic efforts aim to reach an agreement for the decommissioning weapons of terrorist groups and address contact with terrorist groups to negotiate an applicable resolution to a conflict (Jackson, 2000, p.325). For example, diplomatic efforts played a key role in the Northern Ireland conflict through the use of soft power by the US administration since it was a significant aspect in the construction of the IRA ceasefire and the political negotiations leading to the GFA of 1998 (Cochrane, 2007, p.217; Dumbrell, 2000, p.218). Diplomatic efforts have not been assessed by counter-terrorism scholars sufficiently. Instead, political efforts have been predominantly conceptualised by conflict resolution scholars which are investigated in the next section. In addition, social reforms highlight the reasons for terrorist groups to emerge and

attack. It also seeks the underlying reasons that encourage terrorist groups to act (Martin, 2010, p.465). For example, during the late 2000s and early 2010s the Turkish government aimed to achieve social and democratic reforms to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism in Turkey through the democratisation project (Sandıklı & Kaya, 2012, pp.25-26). Similar attempts have been applied by the British government during the 'Troubles'. These attempts will be assessed in order to understand whether non-violent, political initiatives helped to reduce or end the violence in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts.

The existing literature on talking to terrorists addresses different aspects of non-violent resolution methods. Goerzig (2010) identifies the effects of concessions on groups with similar and competitive motivations. Connable and Libicki (2010) focus on the outcome of these talks throughout the duration of the conflicts and external factors such as outside interventions and argues that it takes longer for governments to end these conflicts in the long term. In contrast, Cronin (2009, 2010) suggests that terrorist groups are more likely to engage in negotiations if these groups have been in existence for a long time. Post and Berko (2009) underline the requirement of talking to terrorists and discuss who should talk to them. Brannan et al. (2001) examine psychological interpretations of terrorism and state that counter-terrorism agencies overlook the fact that terrorists are human beings forming parts of human society, so this feature needs to be considered. Although these interpretations offer partial insights, they are insufficient to offer a comprehensive framework on talking to terrorists. Instead, Pruitt (2006) and Wanis-St John's (2006) classifications of different types of backchannel communications present a detailed understanding which will be investigated as part of conflict resolution processes in the next chapter.

2.3. Conflict Settlement Debates and Conflict Resolution Theory

This study focuses on non-violent resolution efforts of ethno-nationalist conflicts which require to assess political settlement theories. Before assessing them, it is crucial to understand characteristics of different armed conflicts. The term conflict has various definitions and characteristics in terms of motivations.¹³ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program classifies armed conflicts into three types. Whilst 'interstate armed conflict' emerges between two or more countries, 'internationalised internal armed conflict' arises between a state and an internal opposition group, with the intervention of the armed forces of another state. Finally, 'internal (intrastate) armed conflict' addresses conflicts between an internal opposition group and a government (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2009, p.586). The focus of the present research is internal armed groups due to their territorial, ethnic and separatist concerns.

Conflict regulation theories are aimed at exploring institutional changes in order to eliminate ethnic and nationalist conflicts (McGarry & O'Leary, 1993, 1994). Partition/secession, integration/assimilation, genocide and forced mass-population transfers focus on eliminating ethnic communities in the society or the use of force to divide or move them (McGarry & O'Leary, 1993, 2006, 2009).¹⁴ Consociationalism (power-

¹³ According to Deutsch (1973), a conflict reveals differences in interests, views, or desires. The term conflict is also identified as opposing differences (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Likewise, it has been explained as a belief in which the ambitions of the conflicting sides cannot reach their aim at the same time (Rubin et al., 1994).

¹⁴ Examples for the approaches to eliminate ethnic differences included partition of the Indian Kashmir and Iraqi Kirkuk regions (Lemarchand, 1962, p.404; Snyder & Jervis, 1999), assimilation of different identities into a new identity such as Soviet or Yugoslav identity (Bowskill et al., 2007, p.800; Harles, 1997, p.711; McGarry & O'Leary, 1994, p.102). In addition, the genocide of a Hutu community massacre in Burundi, Ibo inhabitants' massacre in North Nigeria and the genocide of the tribes of Bagandas, Nilotic and Lango in Uganda are all significant examples (Bhavnani & Backer, 2000; Gellner, 1983; Hintjens, 1999; Hughes, 2013; Lemarchand, 1996; McGarry & O'Leary, 1994; Prunier, 1995) as they are the forced mass-population transfers in Bosnia and Herzegovina through dislocations

sharing), hegemonic control, federalism/cantonisation, and arbitration (third-party intervention) intend to manage diversities between ethnic communities in a society (Horowitz, 2002; Lijphart, 1969, 1979, 2002).¹⁵ In contrast to the first four approaches, the latter approaches constitute the basis of ethnic conflict regulation. Nevertheless, none of these recommend a non-violent resolution by considering conflicting parties as two equal sides for peace. These theories mostly focus on the settlement process of disputes rather than resolution and agreement processes. This section firstly explains non-violent settlement theories in the existing literature. Subsequently, it describes different schools of thought regarding resolution attempts and dimensions of conflict resolution theory.

2.3.1. Non-violent Settlement Theories and Conflict Resolution Theory

There are various peacemaking theories and models within the existing literature. However, different theories and models exhibit similar features and common characteristics. The impact of conflict resolution theory among different theories and models differs from other theories regarding the consideration of both conflicting sides and an independent third party and, the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. Although it is not possible to examine all theories in the existing literature, the key differences

of many Bosnian Muslims due to the armed struggle are significant examples (HWR, 1992; O'Leary & McGarry, 1995, pp.253-254).

¹⁵ There are many examples of these approaches, such as the consociational model of democracy in Northern Ireland, hegemonic control of the Fijian and South African governments after 1987 and in South Africa until 1991 created by supporting the largest or most powerful ethnic community (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990, p.285; O'Leary, 1989, pp.563-565). Federalism was applied as an asymmetrical form of a decentralised unitary state by applying cantonisation in Catalonia, but not in the Basque country (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994, p.110; 2005; Riker, 1964; Stepan, 2001), and arbitration of the intervention of multi-partisan authorities emerging through the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping and peacemaking forces operated in Cyprus, the Middle East and Asia (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994, pp.108-109).

between these approaches must be examined in order to explore the impact of conflict resolution theory.

Ramsbotham et al. (2011) developed an inclusive model called the hourglass model of conflict resolution (Figure 2.1). According to their model, conflict resolution covers the whole conflict-affected environment from conflict containment and conflict settlement to conflict transformation. The model explores the space for political resolution for constructive solution attempts. Initially, conflict containment provides limitation and peacekeeping together. In this sense, war limitation contains 'geographical constraint, mitigation and alleviation of intensity, and termination at the earliest opportunity' (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.31). Next, conflict settlement addresses peacemaking and aims to overcome polarisation, which is one of the most visible threats of conflict. Finally, conflict transformation is the deepest level of the model that addresses structural and cultural peacebuilding. While structural peacebuilding examines the structural problems of violence, e.g. poverty, cultural peacebuilding explores the differences of group behaviours, interests and beliefs. Conflict transformation is aimed at managing reconciliation by considering cultural and structural differences in a society (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.31). Each theory focuses on a specific phase of non-violent peace efforts, whereas conflict resolution is accepted as an approach which encompasses all of these theories. This model provides a comprehensive approach by focusing on major theories within the field. However, it does not describe the specific role and route of conflict resolution.




Figure 2.1: The Hourglass Model (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.14)

The conflict transformation theory is also analysed by other scholars in the existing literature. It involves changing relationships, discourses and crucial formations which exacerbate violent political conflict. It aims to transform negative approaches in dealing with conflicts into positive ways in the long term (Austin, 2011, p.10). It also aims at decreasing the influence of the negative factors of conflicts. Undoubtedly, it might require long-term efforts as the conflict might deeply affect society. While positive approaches explain successful attempts at conflict resolution, negative approaches refer to unsuccessful conflict resolution efforts. It emphasises the value of thoughts and actions inclusively for initiating and sustaining current transformation (Kriesberg, 2011, p.50). Despite this model's significance, it does not mention about how to use conflict resolution and transformation together. This research aims to close this gap by identifying the role of conflict transformation during the negotiation stage of a conflict that will be discussed in the next chapter. These resolution attempts are described by different scholars who address different aspects of peace efforts. For example, Bendana (1996) focuses on the link between conflict management and conflict resolution. He evaluates these theories in the same direction:

Conflict resolution and management are, in effect, social accords which constitute the containment of societal contradictions within

a framework upholding neoliberal dogmas with regard to the role of the state, the central place of the market, fiscal responsibility, and the primacy of the private sector (Bendana, 1996, pp.69-70).

However, Bendana has been criticised by a number of scholars who argue that conflict management and conflict resolution have different characteristics. On the one hand, the reconciliation or destruction of disagreements and problems implies the need for conflict resolution. This emerges when the tension between conflicting parties vanishes or the reason for the conflict disappears (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). On the other hand, conflict management explains the control and limitation. Hence, in neither situation conflict management removes the reasons for the conflict. However, the reasons can still be removed as conflict management resolves the tension. If it is impossible to solve conflict, conflict management can make the situation bearable (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Kuenne, 1989; Lebow, 1985; Nardin, 1971; Prei, 1985; Stein, 1987). Therefore, while conflict resolution solves the problem, conflict management describes the boundaries of the problems and makes it achievable.

One other model in conflict regulation is developed by Cordell and Wolff (2010). According to their model, a conflict regulation model has three elements: conflict management, conflict settlement and conflict prevention. Conflict prevention should be taken before violence arises and after violence is eliminated (Cordell & Wolff, 2010, p.79). Additionally, conflict prevention is investigated as competent and focuses on diplomatic action and developing the situations for democracy to improve. In fact, it is related to making the rule of law more powerful and respecting human rights. It also aims to achieve better economic possibilities and promote a culture of peace, tolerance and diversity in society (McKinnon, 2004, p.17). Cordell and Wolff's model assesses conflict management as efforts to include, limit or direct the results of a tension if a settlement is impossible. Finally, conflict settlement contains negotiation efforts towards a non-violent agreement that considers the interests of both parties (Cordell & Wolff, 2010, p.79). While this model suggests an extensive model, these elements are not investigated in detail.

Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) describe conflict settlement in great detail suggesting it has been divided along a continuum into three types: ceasefire, partial settlement and full settlement. While ceasefire refers to stopping violence, partial settlement describes not only the stopping of violence but also the initiation of engagement between parties with the resolution of certain conflict issues. For instance, the conflict between Egypt and Libya was mediated by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in which some of the issues were agreed to have been resolved in 1977. Lastly, full settlement describes an end to violence that solves many of the parties' basic problems first hand. This condition can be illustrated by the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict, which was settled by Lord Carrington in 1979 (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006, p.825). However, conflict settlement is not appropriate for this research as it contains only negotiation attempts and does not include other initiatives for assisting peace attempts during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages.

Taking all these initiatives together, as the study focuses on a specific period of a conflict when violence existed, conflict prevention is not a suitable theory. Similarly, as the research contains the analysis of destructive campaigns of terrorist groups and how these campaigns have attempted resolution, conflict transformation will only be used as part of conflict resolution initiatives to understand whether the root causes of the two conflicts under discussion were transformed during the negotiation and mediation efforts. Conflict transformation focuses on both ending destructive conflicts and building constructive conflicts that address wider use of persuasion and positive incentives (Kriesberg, 1998; Rouhana, 2011, p.306).

Conversely, conflict resolution theory seeks to reach circumstances that are agreeable for ending tensions in a form that meets the requirements of conflicting parties. The theory does not consider the power or authority of disputing parties. It accepts both conflicting parties as equal for negotiating with each other. Therefore, it provides a suitable ground for the analysis of ethno-nationalist conflicts which involve a state authority

and an armed group within the conflict. Besides this, conflict resolution also investigates the reasons behind conflicts by seeking out the background information and evolution of these conflicts. It also underlines the common requirements of both conflicting sides, such as security, recognition and autonomy. Conflict resolution theory encourages the identification of the common interests of opposing sides and focuses on creating trust between them. It suggests that an agreement can be reached through equality and mutuality (Kelman, 2004, pp.112-119; Rouhana, 2011, pp.294-295). Considering these two factors, conflict resolution involves a non-violent process and avoids dominance and oppression by one party over another through its voluntary and consensus-based structure (Bercovitch, 1991).

Moreover, this theory addresses political, non-violent resolution attempts that are relevant for answering the questions identified in this research. Lederach's (1997) classification of conflict resolution exhibits a comprehensive understanding of the theory by incorporating the whole conflict resolution theory into three levels of approaches: top (elite), middle-range and grassroots levels. Whilst the grassroots level avoids the national and extra-national politics of the conflict and concentrates on local and indigenous stages of a peace process, the middle-range level contains attempts of unofficial representatives that bring opposing parties together (Carayannis et al., 2014; Kelman, 1998). In contrast, the elite level approaches address peace efforts which are mainly managed by negotiations among political leaders and other institutional approaches, and then expand them to wider society (Hancock, 2008). The dimensions and levels of conflict resolution will be examined in the next chapter in detail. The next section explores the views of the major schools of thought in the field of conflict resolution.

2.3.2. Debating the Schools of Thought

Several schools of thought address conflict and peace studies, and solution efforts, such as the Bradford, Oslo, and Stockholm Schools (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). However, they do not explain the conflict resolution area in detail

as they focus on specific phases of a peace process. There are two key schools which aim to explore the environment of conflict resolution: the Harvard and Chicago Schools. While the Chicago School looks at the sociological dimensions, the Harvard School focuses more on the different concepts of conflict resolution and the various ways in which it is attempted and achieved (Deutsch, 1994; Fisher, 1997).

The Chicago School emphasises the sociological extensions of conflict which argues that conflicts can be overcome by sociologists rather than politicians or scholars. Scholars following Deutsch state that conflict is a primitive situation, a very frequently faced condition in human relations, and can be solved through the focus on human relations by sociologists (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.46). The interests of the two parties reveal two distinct procedures of conflict resolution. These concerns are defined as 'integrative' and 'distributive bargaining' by Walton and McKersie (1965), and as 'cooperative' and 'competitive' by Deutsch (1973). Cooperative and competitive approaches are classified as social processes and a way of analysing conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1994, pp.15-25). These concerns address a sociological focus on dispute resolution. In addition, these social processes have a social-psychological approach to solution processes. However, the Chicago School overlooks the role of the mediator and explains only human relations rather than a broader perspective, such as conflicts between states or conflicts created by armed groups (Deutsch, 1994).

Unlike the Chicago School, the Harvard School analyses tensions and focuses on how to solve them through the active participation of practitioners/scholars. Practical opportunities for resolution efforts became possible after the transformation created by the Harvard School. The attitudes of the Harvard School towards third party consultation, problem-solving workshops, negotiation process and win-win solution methods are supported by this study (Fisher & Ury, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 1996). These methods will be analysed in this study to measure the resolution of conflicts in detail. The Harvard School also focuses on the

practice of conflict resolution through problem-solving and principled negotiation actions. The representatives of the Harvard School firstly attempted to apply the problem-solving methods to workshops in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and the conflict between Greek and Turkish associations in Cyprus in 1965 and 1966 (Doob, 1970). Kelman, one of the chief developers of the school, was also instrumental in the problem-solving workshops of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over a thirty-year period (Kelman, 1996).

Undoubtedly, these two schools both have their advantages and disadvantages. However, the thoughts of the Harvard School are more relevant for examining current conflicts than the Chicago School as it addresses practical efforts towards resolving conflicts. However, even the Harvard School is divided between formalist (official resolution attempts) and informalist (unofficial peace efforts) practitioners, and there is no integrated analysis of conflict resolution. Therefore, this study proposes to bring different types of analyses together and to construct a unique model in order to understand ethno-nationalist conflicts. In this sense, the study will look at deconstructing the literature from the position of the methods rather than the points of view of these schools.

2.3.3. Conflict Responses and International Relations Theory

Conflict resolution evolved as a criticism of 'realism' in international relations theory. In realist theory, conflicts are characterised as being between states over the control of resources and the power they handle in international society (Morgenthau, 1973b). According to realist scholars, realism is the only means of thinking about an anarchical world, as well as issues relating to war, peace, tyranny and freedom (Keohane, 1986; Waltz, 2001). The conflicts emerge due to competition for limited resources and the actions of states striving to gain control over these resources. Within this theoretical paradigm, conflicts are predictable and measurable, and hence they are objective (Waltz, 2001). Traditional realist scholars criticise

conflict resolution because they think that a struggle between antagonistic groups over the control of power is inevitable and 'soft power' approaches to conflict resolution overlook this potential for conflict. For instance, the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) group in Sri Lanka by the government is cited as an example of the success of 'hard power' (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.6). However, there are many other aspects to violent conflicts. Conflict resolution scholars suggest alternative theories because they claim that realist theory does not reflect the real world: the objective source of a conflict are human needs, but not human interests (Burton, 1990b), and violent conflicts do not only have objective, but also subjective factors (Burton & Dukes, 1990) and these emerge through inter-group relations when parties perceive that they have incompatible aims (Fisher, 1990).

Furthermore, as Burton (1990b, p.33) argues, certain ontological human needs must be considered regarding identity, recognition, security issues and how the current situation might develop. Realism assumes that human beings live within the borders of states and so conflicts can be controlled. In addition, the interests of states and the structure of the international system are the causes of conflicts. Hence, the best way to approach conflicts is via control and containment. Thus, the associated conflict settlement approach encompasses controlling the boundaries of conflicts. In this sense, conflict settlement can be seen as being a result of the realist approach.

However, conflict containment approaches are insufficient for interpreting the nature of violent conflicts since they ignore human needs (Fetherston, 2000, p.4). In contrast, as conflict resolution theory prioritises human needs, conflict resolution practitioners work on overcoming the realist win-lose approaches of competitive inter-state and intra-state relations through the role of international mediators (Woodhouse, 2015). Thus, they aim to reach a win-win result for both conflicting parties.

A key aspect of realist thinking is that the main actors are states and individuals are difficult to identify which strongly contrasts with conflict

transformation theory since individual agents are at the heart of conflict transformation theory (Avruch, 2011, p.253). Conflict transformation also suggests that transforming the underlying reasons for conflicts is vital in order to resolve a conflict and this was not possible according to the realist school of thought (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Instead, the realist viewpoint encapsulates conflict management at best. According to this theory, conflict resolution is doubtful and conflict transformation is not possible because realism assumes that actors in the global political framework are rational and seek to maximise their utilities (Avruch, 2011, p.250).

There is little difference between the realist and neo-realist school of thought regarding their perception of the resolution of conflicts. The difference stems from the respective explanations of state behaviour. While the realist school of thought explains the actions and interactions of states, and predominantly focuses on military power (Morgenthau, 1973a); the neo-realist school of thought describes systemic structure and state behaviour, and concentrates on authority by arguing that the lack of authority above states and power is related to the combined capabilities of states (Waltz, 1979). However, both realism and neo-realism concentrate on state behaviour which prioritises power and see states as rational actors for coercion by force. Neo-realist perspectives indicate that war and conflict are inevitable results of structural anarchy which inhibits the possibility of applying conflict resolution or transformation procedures. This is because of the world system which comprises of self-maximising states for which conflict management is the optimum attainable solution via the use of power mediation or peace enforcement (Jackson, 2009, pp.173-174). Therefore, realism is an insufficient theory to explain today's intractable conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups.

In contrast to realism, the 'liberal' view focuses on cooperation between states. While the realism school of thought explains the characteristics of conflict but cannot adequately explain cooperation, conversely the liberalism school of thought concentrates on collaboration and does not adequately explain conflict (Zartman, 2008, p.212). Liberals

believe that one party in a conflict situation can choose to deal with other parties and thus cooperation is possible through international institutions which aid the flow of information between each other (Doyle, 1986). In addition, conflicts are costly when international actors do not choose to adopt a cooperation path due to 'short-sightedness' and 'misperception' (Beriker, 2011). Cooperation and competition are products of strategic choices. While decision criteria, outcomes and viewpoints lead actors to make strategic choices, peace is the norm in the normative tradition (Beriker, 2011, pp.259-263).

Ramsbotham et al. (2011, p.7) state that strengthening the role of conflict resolution within societies and political institutions is crucial in order to respond to ethno-nationalist conflicts. Conflict resolution plays a role in war zones in reaching an understanding between divided communities with regards to ending violent conflicts by focusing on the root causes of those conflicts. However, liberalism is still insufficient in explaining the conflicts within states and largely overlooks the ethnic, constitutional, identity and cultural concerns of contemporary conflicts. Just like realism, the liberal school of thought focuses on states as the main actors. While neo-liberalism focuses on formal democratic procedures and market economies, it fails to embody the root causes and consequences of ethnic, religious or other national and intra-state conflicts (Lipschutz, 1998). Thus, liberalism does not encompass the approaches associated with conflict transformation due to a lack of analysis of non-state actors as being the main actors of conflicts in the contemporary world. However, in contrast to realism, liberalism includes more room for the explanation of both the resolution and the negotiation of violent conflicts. However, these two theories 'have done little to fold negotiations into their promises' (Zartman, 2008, p.3).

According to constructivism, ideas and identity matters are constructed through the interaction between actors in an international structure. In contrast to realism and liberalism, the constructivist school of thought contends that interests and perceptions are not sufficient to

explain the system since states embody beliefs, desires and ideas regarding possible ways of acting which are shaped by the self-conceptions of the states themselves. Identity concerns of states are determined by social interaction and shared ideas between states (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, constructivism encompasses identity and recognition issues best when compared to realism and liberalism. However, constructivism still overemphasises that the anarchic international system was created by ideas and values (Adler, 2013).

Constructivism presents a detailed understanding of conflict resolution at the international level since it points out significant factors and processes that are missing from the neo-realist and neo-liberal descriptions:

The historically contingent and mutually constitutive nature of the structures and agents of international conflict; the socially constructed nature of identities, interests and structures; the role of discursive factors, such as political language, ideas, norms, knowledge, symbols, history and culture, in the initiation and reproduction of conflict; and the key role played by elites and other conflict agents in constructing and manipulating group identities (Jackson, 2009, p.172).

As Jackson (2009) argues, constructivism is the most well-suited approach of international relations theory for understanding conflict resolution since it places an emphasis on many issues and actors with regards to the role of agencies. As with conflict resolution, constructivism investigates the perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of the parties in a conflict, the communicative-discursive strategies used by intermediaries, the formation of regimes, the role of language and the events that groups and actors can take to shape the conflict-affected environment to resolve conflicts (Jackson, 2009, p.173).

A constructivist account of conflict focuses on the analysis of identity construction by arguing that elites play a fundamental role in constructing the identities of ethnic groups (Wilmer, 2002). Ethno-nationalist elites reconstruct group identities which exist in the society into antagonistic and threatening oppositions by describing the interests of their groups in zero-sum ethnic descriptions. This is similar to conflict transformation

approaches (Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Jackson, 2009, p.178). However, even though constructivism seems to be the most relevant approach to adopt when considering an international relations theory for the interpretation of identity issues, it has certain limitations when attempting to understand how ethno-nationalist conflicts can be brought to an end. Firstly, constructivism does not present a theoretical framework to resolve and transform violent conflicts. Secondly, there are very few constructivist studies focusing on conflict resolution processes; many of them emphasise norms but largely overlook war and conflict debates (Jackson, 2009). There are a few exceptions, namely, the Carnegie Commission's (1997) work on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and Duffield's (2001) study on 'new wars'. However, constructivism offers some useful insights into conflict resolution with regards to identity and elite-driven processes which can only be achieved through problem-solving approaches in which both sides can reach at least their minimum aims as opposed to zero-sum approaches (Burton, 1972; Fisher, 1990). This will be explained in the next chapter. In addition, constructivism can play a role in the research of the grassroots level of conflict as it addresses 'positive peace' by including the perceptions of communities in a violent conflict, the transformation of the root causes of violent conflicts, the reconstruction of relationships and the strengthening the cooperation between elite, middle-range and grassroots initiatives (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1997). As such, it also provides further insight to conflict transformation approaches.

2.3.4. The Evolution of Conflict Resolution Theory

This section aims to focus on major scholars and the foundations of conflict resolution theory. Therefore, the evolution of this theory might be understood more explicitly. Conflict resolution has several components and comprises of many efforts for development. Theodore Lentz's Peace Research Laboratory has been an important initiative for peace researchers (Lentz, 1955, pp.52-53). The foundations of conflict resolution theory were developed in the following decade by three founders: Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung and John Burton. Building upon the work of these three

founders, Kalevi Holsti, Herbert Kelman, Ronald Fisher and other scholars made great efforts to develop the discipline and will be indicated following a discussion of these three founders.

The creation of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1957) by Boulding was one of the first efforts to shape the environment of conflict resolution. Boulding founded this journal with the collaboration of Rapoport and Kelman, and initiated the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in 1959 (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.43). Boulding (1957) argues that the most fundamental route to conflict resolution is avoidance. If avoidance of the conflict is not possible, this condition forces the improvement of organisational solutions in international relations. The avoidance exposes a necessity for the resolution of conflicts. In this sense, conflict resolution is determined by two factors: a reduction of the conflict's intensity and the growth of overruling organisations that contain both conflicting sides (Boulding, 1957, p.133; 1962). Based on these factors, the outcome of a successful conflict resolution process is sustainable peace which itself requires a peaceful social system. The fault of peacemakers is that they still try to solve tension as if it was a physical problem, but in reality, tension is part of a physical system (Boulding, 1963, p.76). Conflict resolution theory explains both the positive attitudes of the conflict-affected environment and an absolute normative interest in the resolution of conflicts (Boulding, 1978, p.343).

Galtung, the second founding scholar, contributed to conflict resolution theory through his studies into violence and peace. These have been major resources in the field of peace studies and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1969). Galtung (1985) explains major challenges and responses to peace efforts and puts forward not only requirements to prevent wars, but also approaches for peaceful solutions between conflicting parties. He describes conflict resolution as one of the earliest studies and as a process that guides the 'model of action-system' in a country where the model should no longer have two or more incompatible goals (Galtung, 1965, p.351). Conflict resolution brings inconsistent aims into compliance by

creating mutual agreement between conflicting sides. He explains conflict resolution as a mechanism (Table 2.1.) that demonstrates the components of resolving a conflict under three stages. To 'decide' has two sub-stages, which are to define the winner and loser, and expected distribution of values. The second stage is the management of a value 'distribution'. The final stage is 'termination' that addresses the definition of the conflict as having ended (Galtung, 1965, p.354).

		Same winner in conflict and meta-conflict	
		Affirmation	No Affirmation
Different winner in conflict and meta-conflict	Redistribution	Direct mechanism ↓	Unlikely combination
	No redistribution	Indirect mechanism	→ Independent mechanism

Table 2.1: A Typology of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (Galtung, 1965, p.357)

Galtung's definition of conflict termination involves one of the opposing sides' endeavours to acquire some benefit which can be identified as the cause of frustration. Concordantly, the meta-conflict is described as the actions of two sides towards new types of conflicts. In Table 2.1, the horizontal axis refers to affirmation options of the different 'winners' in conflict types. In this situation, the winner of the meta-conflict is not the original winner. On the one hand, if the mechanism is direct, the situation would lead to redistribution. On the other hand, if it is an indirect mechanism, it results in the idea of compensation. This means that the meta-conflict suggests a compensatory worth which may create a balance with the casualties in the original conflict. If the winner of the original conflict and meta-conflict are the same, meta-conflict can emerge as a mechanism of a direct conflict resolution in the vertical axis (Galtung, 1965, pp.356-357).

Burton was the third scholar to build the theory of conflict resolution and he examined conflict resolution as the problem of

transmitting the case from power bargaining or a zero-sum result to a problem-solving one in which both sides can acquire at least their minimum aims and practical cooperation (Burton, 1969, p.324; 1972, p.159). Therefore, traditional approaches might be insufficient for resolving conflicts as the prejudices, stereotypes and doubts of conflicting sides and the possibility of seeing other problems during the negotiation process is very high. So, traditional approaches might be insufficient for resolving problems (Burton, 1972, pp.152-153). Hence, the insufficiency of traditional negotiations led him to produce the 'human needs approach' which suggests that there are negotiable and non-negotiable issues during a peace process (Burton, 1990a, 1990b). This understanding constitutes the base of conflict-resolving procedures and this can be implemented in many different circumstances. Burton names this approach 'controlled communication' and was first used at the international level. For example, his first workshop to apply the approach was among the unofficial representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Burton's second study was towards the Cyprus conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Burton, 1969, p.324). Burton's workshops were the first practical efforts regarding conflict resolution processes.

After Boulding, Galtung and Burton, the analysis of conflict resolution was expanded by a number of scholars. Burton's practical endeavours of conflict resolution were improved by Fisher and Kelman. Fisher (1972) established the 'third party consultation' approach to stress the scientists or practitioners' fundamental roles. He aimed to differentiate his method from traditional third party interventions and mediations by including the degree of coercion applied to the parties, nature of different goals and flexibility of communication (Fisher, 1990; 1993, p.124). Later, Fisher improved this approach and named it 'interactive conflict resolution'. This involves problem-solving approaches between unofficial representatives of parties engaged in violent conflict (Fisher, 1993, 1997). Fisher's third party approach will be investigated in order to understand the role of independent third parties in conflict resolution processes.

Kelman is another important scholar who used the term 'interactive problem-solving' to assess unofficial conflict resolution attempts (Kelman, 1990, p.200). This approach addresses negotiations beyond the achievement of a political agreement to resolution of a conflict. This resolution contains structural and attitudinal changes and promotes reconciliation between conflicting parties and the transformation of their relationship (Kelman, 1990). He applied interactive problem-solving methods to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman, 1997a).

Holsti is a significant contributor to conflict resolution theory. He identified some major elements of the new international environment with respect to the use of war, systems of governance for the commonality of countries, conflict-resolving mechanisms and procedures, the solution of warfare-producing affairs and specific concepts of arrangement which will preclude wars of revenge (Holsti, 1966, 1991). In addition, he examined governance systems and suggested that procedures and institutions should be built for identifying, managing and resolving problems in this system. He established that procedures and institutions might interfere with conflicts and constitute a long-term peace (Holsti, 1991, p.338).

Wallensteen applied the theory to the practice in international conflicts. Wallensteen (2007) argued that conflict resolution can be applied to the problems between states, in civil wars or in state formations. He explained the emergence of Nazi Germany in terms of state formations and territorial conflicts. While he drew a clear idea on conflicts between the Israeli-Palestinian and Greek-Turkish Cypriots conflicts, he did not explain the problem-solving methods of counter-terrorism especially regarding armed conflict groups (Wallensteen, 2007, p.153).

There are certain other scholars worth considering in terms of resolving conflicts. For example, Clapham (1998) placed an emphasis on independence by focusing on conflicts between states and how nations achieved independence following a war or political settlement. Ceasefire is also an option which might provide a short-term peace, and leave space and time for peace negotiations via third party mediation (Clapham, 1998). He

offered a two-step solution that may be useful for problems within states. In the first model, parties debate an agreed plan which is continued by elections under international support or control. In his second model, a provisional government which involves a coalition is set to explain multiple confidence-building acts. This would make a new composition possible and resulting in elections which comprise multiple parties (Woodhouse, 2005, p.10). The influence of conflict resolution processes in reducing the level of violence and declaring a ceasefire is another important question that will be assessed in this thesis.

Attempts related to conflict resolution in the 1990s are mostly based on different points of view when compared with those prevalent during the Cold War as warlord insurgencies were against negotiation and encourage military forces to stay in power. According to Shearer (1997, p.845), most civil wars have been followed by military success and there is no such thing as military tactics cannot fix. In contrast to Shearer, Woodhouse (2005) argues that the cost of enforcement in military action of one side is higher than a political intervention. He maintained that the important point is not the victory of one side, but forceful internationally legitimised intervention to establish a politically achievable solution (Woodhouse, 2005, p.14). This thesis adopts this argument and will be highlighted in greater detail.

Considering all of these approaches, conflict resolution theory has challenged traditional attitudes focusing on wars, moved on to modern attitudes addressing deeper analyses centring on human needs and the role of third parties. The disputes of conflict resolution theory concentrate on the issue of military operations and peaceful efforts rather than conflict type.

2.4. Conclusion

The chapter has reviewed the literature in relation to terrorism and non-violent resolution attempts. It has demonstrated the relevance of ethno-nationalist conflicts for analysing political efforts. In addition, it has

illustrated various conflict resolution approaches to identify the relevant theoretical framework for understanding peaceful forms of resolution due to a focus on peace processes towards ending conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups. It has investigated the importance of conflict resolution attempts among all other conflict settlement and ethnic conflict regulation theories (Section 2.3). It has been argued that conflict resolution forms a suitable basis for analysis of non-violent, political resolution efforts with respect to the IRA and PKK groups, particularly for the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. Although, it is argued that states mostly apply armed responses to eliminate most types of terrorist groups, the nature of ethno-nationalist groups constitutes suitable grounds for resolving these conflicts in a non-violent way (Section 2.3).

To explore the influence of theories, the existing terrorism literature has been investigated with respect to how terrorism ends (Section 2.2.4) and how conflicts are eliminated peacefully (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). In this sense, the chapter has argued that the armed responses of states might not be the only option for ending the violent campaigns of ethno-nationalist groups. In addition, the review of the existing conflict resolution literature has demonstrated that none of these arguments offers an adequate framework for analysing conflict resolution as a process. In order to fill this gap, the next chapter will investigate the dimensions and levels of conflict resolution by exploring the significance of the elite level of conflict resolution.

CHAPTER 3

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework for Understanding Conflict Resolution Approaches

'By peace, we mean the capacity to transform conflict with empathy and creativity, without violence; this is a never-ending process... By without violence, we mean that this process should avoid any threat or use of direct violence that hurts and harms' (Galtung, 2009, p.361).

3.1. Introduction

Conflict resolution is a 'vibrant, interdisciplinary field where theory and practice pace real-world events' (Bercovitch et al., 2009, p.1). Conflict resolution theory seeks to understand and support practical interventions. Conflict resolution is a multilateral process which addresses both state-level and group-level aspirations behind political violence (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.46). Hence, this process is relevant to explore solutions to ethno-nationalist violence between states and sub-state armed groups. In this context, conflict resolution theory differs from realism because of the realist approach's overemphasis on conflicts between states.

The chapter focuses on two interrelated arguments. Firstly, conflict resolution efforts of states, sub-state groups and third parties provide a framework for ending ethno-nationalist violence. Secondly, conflict resolution as a process develops an understanding of non-violent resolution efforts during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. This chapter aims to justify the theoretical foundations of the thesis. It outlines how the characteristics of conflict resolution approaches adapted in this study produce a convenient framework for analysing non-violent resolution attempts.

These two arguments provide a comprehensive theoretical background for analysing the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts which will be analysed in the following chapters. Within a specific context, the ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey, as well as the claims of the British and Turkish governments on the one hand, and the republican and pro-Kurdish movements on the other, can be emphasised in relation to the efforts to reach a peace settlement. It underlines the importance of two directions for understanding this influence: a particular time period in which states and armed groups can be directed from an armed struggle to political or non-violent disputes, and a particular level of approaches which uncover the relationships between conflicting parties and an independent third party in terms of peace attempts. Both directions emphasise how certain approaches affect the cessation of sub-state ethno-nationalist violence. However, the research does not argue that the only way for non-violent resolution of intra-state armed conflicts is conflict resolution, but rather it underlines a specific period for this type of tension, which needs to focus on a specific term of conflict resolution approaches. Hence, the research does not aim to discover post-violent process. Instead, it aims to explore the influence of peacemaking efforts during the period of violence.

The chapter, firstly, has a general overview of the classifications of conflict resolution approaches. Afterwards, three major levels of conflict resolution are examined in order to understand the relationships between them and to highlight the relevance of the elite level of conflict resolution in order to demonstrate the influence of this research. Lastly, the elite level of conflict resolution and its main dimensions are explored to analyse the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts in detail.

3.2. Conflict Resolution Approaches for Understanding Non-violent Resolution Efforts

The conceptual growth of the conflict resolution field helps to identify the multilateral approaches of the theory. Boulding, Galtung and Burton

established the bases of the theory as state-centric and resting on mutual agreement (Boulding, 1957, 1963; Burton, 1969, 1972; Galtung, 1965, 1985). However, the procedures of the theory have diversified in recent decades. First has been the emphasis on the importance of an independent third party in a peace process (Fisher, 1983; Kelman, 1996). Second, conflict resolution efforts are analysed as official negotiations (track-one) between conflicting parties and an independent third party (Ikle, 1964). Third, Babbitt and Hampson (2011, p.46) analyse conflict resolution as a constructivist theory that is divided into two approaches: conflict settlement and transformation. As explained in the previous chapter, Ramsbotham et al. developed a more detailed model, called the 'hourglass model'. They classify the approaches of conflict resolution as conflict transformation, settlement and containment (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.14).

However, none of these debates offer a comprehensive account of conflict resolution theory towards examining the relationships between states and sub-state armed groups in the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages of a conflict. This research investigates political, non-violent resolution attempts to stop ethno-nationalist violence and the influence of conflict resolution theory through the case studies of Northern Ireland and Turkey. In order to do so, it divides approaches of conflict resolution to analyse the variables of the research. Lederach's (1997) classification of conflict resolution is useful here as it seeks to provide a comprehensive conflict resolution theory. Lederach (1997) divides conflict resolution theory into three levels of approaches: top, middle-range and grassroots levels.¹⁶

¹⁶ The terminology of 'top-level, 'middle-out' and 'bottom-level' has been established by a number of frameworks for analysing peace processes. David Bloomfield's (1998) structural and cultural aspects, Lederach's (1997) sub-categories under the three-level of classification, Landon Hancock's (2008) examination from top-down to middle-out and bottom-up approaches and Harold Saunders's (1996) approaches from the official to civil society approaches are significant frameworks.



Figure 3.1: Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997, p.39)

As shown in Figure 3.1, conflict resolution approaches can be examined at three levels. On the one hand, each level has different approaches which identify horizontal effects within each phase. On the other hand, the relationships between the levels demonstrate a vertical connection between actors and goals of these approaches. Thus, Lederach's (1997) classification of conflict resolution approaches allows a clear understanding of the relationships between the levels and purposes of each level.

Coleman supports Lederach's classification and develops a relational design between conflict resolution approaches. Coleman (2006) argues that there are three different levels of conflict resolution, which demonstrate power relations in peace attempts: top-down, middle-out and bottom-up. These approaches flow from the peak to the bottom or in the opposite way. The top-down (the elite level) approaches apply command and control strategies of effect that have a strong influence on organisations deployed by elite leaders and decision makers who are political parties and actors. Conversely, the bottom-up (the grassroots level) approaches address the changes at the local stage such as changes on personal attitudes

or behaviours that tend to have considerable influence on democratic systems. However, these influences are more likely to take a long time to emerge. Furthermore, the middle-out (the middle-range level) approaches consist of the mid-level leaders and associations of social order, for example, community-based and non-governmental institutions (Coleman, 2006). This conflict resolution classification is supported by various scholars.¹⁷ Yet, the subject of the research is peacemaking efforts during existing violence, which addresses the attempts of conflicting parties and independent third parties (mediators, intermediaries and other third parties) towards ending ethno-nationalist violence. The peacemaking efforts for ending a conflict between a sub-state armed group and security forces of a state require investigating conflict resolution processes which identify a term between the beginning of non-violent, political resolution efforts and the sign of a political agreement between conflicting parties. More specifically, a conflict resolution process has two major stages: the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages (see Figure 3.2). While, the negotiation stage consists of official negotiations and mediations by two conflicting parties and an independent actor as the elite level of conflict resolution processes, the pre-negotiation stage addresses secret and/or informal communications between the warring parties and intermediaries (Kelman, 1982). In addition, peace organisations as informal or semi-official peace efforts operate at the middle-range level of conflict resolution and affect decision-making mechanisms at the elite level by contributing to the negotiation stage, thus embodying a conflict resolution process together with official and unofficial communications. This thesis suggests a framework that divides conflict resolution processes into three-fold: track-one (official efforts), track one-and-a-half (unofficial, secret conflict resolution initiatives) and track-two (informal or semi-official attempts by peace organisations) diplomacy (Kriesberg, 1998; Nan & Strimling, 2006;

¹⁷ Gersick (1991) recommends a three-level approach (episodic, developmental and radical) which addresses top-down, middle-out and bottom-up approaches of conflict resolution. This three-level approach is also recommended as bottom-up grassroots, middle-out influential and top-down structure (Bennis et al., 1985; Coleman, 2004).

Richter-Devroe, 2008). Therefore, as peacemaking efforts are top-down approaches, this thesis will investigate these approaches in the Northern Irish and Turkish cases. Before explaining the relevance and dimensions of conflict resolution processes towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts, it is necessary to provide an overview of the bottom-level, grassroots level of conflict resolution.




Figure 3.2: Conflict Resolution Processes¹⁸

3.2.1. The Bottom Level (Grassroots) Approaches

The bottom-level approaches tend to avoid the national and extra-national politics of ethno-nationalist conflicts and concentrate on local and indigenous stages of a peace process (Carayannis et al., 2014). The representatives of the grassroots level are local communities and members of national NGOs who are experts in local politics and have face-to-face experience with local actors of the government (Lederach, 1997, p.43).

¹⁸ This figure is converted from the frameworks of Gidron et al. (2002), Hancock (2008), Kriesberg (1992), Lederach (1997) and Ramsbotham et al. (2011).

Hancock (2008) classifies the bottom level into two approaches: structural and institutional approaches. While structural approaches focus on the existence of distinctive national identities and communities, and adopt large-scale political, social and economic reforms, behavioural approaches address cultural, psychological and relational forms of conflict resolution (Hancock, 2008). These approaches together aim to deal with the traumas which are revealed during the post-conflict process (Lederach, 1997, p.55). They exhibit interdependent relationships at the societal level. Although the meetings of local leaders with representatives of a society seem to include the demands of the society regarding a peace process, it only helps to reach a resolution if an agreement exists. As the thesis investigates the peace settlement process, and whether the IRA and PKK groups tended to reach a peace agreement, armed struggles, ceasefires and negotiations are the subjects of interest for the research. In addition, there is little evidence to illustrate that grassroots initiatives are able to bring armed conflicts to a halt and to play a critical role in peacemaking action. For example, as Byrne (2001) and Güller (2012) argue, the peace processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey have been conducted by the governments and are thus the product of political resolution attempts. However, the research does not ignore the role of the grassroots level in conflict resolution. Instead, as the grassroots level can help to understand the relationships between political elites and the war-affected communities, the strong relationships between these two levels will help to understand the influence of political elites at the other levels.

Although grassroots efforts address the importance of establishing a common culture of peace, the elite level leads to the grassroots level (Byrne, 2001; Kriesberg, 1998; Rothman, 1997). It is argued that the capability of powerful transformational politics and effective conflict resolution lead to grassroots citizen authorisation and participatory democracy (Byrne, 1995; Love, 1995; Ruane & Todd, 1996; Woolpert et al., 1998). Therefore, the elite level as the starting point of conflict resolution is the relevant approach towards ending terrorist violence, which is assessed in the next section.

3.2.2. The Relevance of the Elite level of Conflict Resolution

The spectrum of activity in a peace process can be classified from violence to reconciliation. According to Kelman (2010), resolution of a conflict begins with the pre-negotiation stage, which explores the right conditions for moving conflicting parties to the negotiating table. It continues with the negotiation stage, which describes building momentum, defining options and re-evaluating the underlying reasons for a conflict. If a negotiation breaks down, trust and sense of feasibility between conflicting parties are investigated in order to rebuild an effective negotiation environment. After an agreement is reached through negotiations, decisions are applied for contribution into a system; peacebuilding and reconciliation are performed in the post-negotiation stage (Kelman, 2010, p.394). However, the research focuses on the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages as it investigates the question of how ethno-nationalist conflicts can be brought to an end in a non-violent way.

The elite level approaches address peace efforts which are mainly managed by negotiations between political leaders, and then they are expanded to the society. It is also called the elite-oriented model of peacemaking, as the elite level is directed by political elites. The elite-oriented school of thought aims to reach an agreement first, and then to sell the idea to the members of the society who would otherwise uphold the conflict environment (Hancock, 2008, p.205).

Furthermore, many scholars in the existing literature discuss the grassroots effects in order to transform a conflict.¹⁹ Similarly, official negotiations are frequently conducted in order to reach a political settlement (Druckman, 1997; Guelke, 2003). However, there is little

¹⁹ There are many scholars arguing about the dominance of grassroots initiatives. For example, Sapio and Zamperini (2007, pp.266-271) focus on bottom-up procedures rather than top-down settings. Similarly, Doob and Foltz (1974) underline the influence of the grassroots level in the Northern Ireland conflict through their experiments with grassroots leaders. Likewise, O'Dowd and Mccall (2008) examine the grassroots level as the significant factor of a resolution effort.

interest in offering a comprehensive framework during a violent conflict to reach a political agreement (Lederach, 1997). Similarly, there is little attention on how elites and independent third parties can deal not only with negotiations, but also the desires of society (Hancock, 2008; Lederach, 1997). Although the grassroots level is under the responsibilities of unofficial actors and international organisations, political elites are still responsible for leading peace processes. In this context, the role of unofficial actors in promoting or undermining conflict resolution towards peace is another question of the research in addition to the role of political agents.

The research criticises the argument that peacemaking initiatives are only composed of negotiations. Although negotiations are one of the vital parts of conflict resolution approaches, there are some other approaches essential for making peace. This view is highlighted by some conflict resolution scholars who raise the importance of backchannel communications and P/CROs (Cochrane, 2001; Gidron et al., 2002; Pruitt, 2006; Wanis-St John, 2006). The elite level of conflict resolution is a key factor for both the top-level (horizontal) and inter-level (vertical) relations.

This research underlines that not only the elite level, but also the middle-range and grassroots approaches are necessary for a peace process. However, the focal point of the study is the elite level and middle-range approaches due to the particular focus on the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages towards a political agreement, but these approaches do not ignore the influence of the civil-society approaches.

	Elite Level Approaches	Middle-Range Approaches	Grassroots Level Approaches
<i>Approaches</i>	- Backchannel communications - Peace organisations - Official negotiations	- Problem-solving workshops - Training Programmes - Semi-official Peace Commissions	- Structural Approaches - Behavioural Approaches
<i>Stages</i>	- Pre-negotiation - Negotiation	- Pre-negotiation - Negotiation	- Post-conflict - Post-negotiation
<i>Actors</i>	<i>Officials</i> - Political parties and actors - Independent third parties - Military and religious leaders	<i>Unofficial</i> - Ethnic/religious leaders - Academics/intellectuals - Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)	<i>Civil-Society Leaders</i> - Local leaders - Leaders of indigenous NGOs - Community developers
<i>Perspective</i>	- Interest-based - Resource-based	- Identity-based - Resource-based	- Identity-based - Resource-based

Table 3.1: Conflict Resolution Approaches from Top to Bottom²⁰

The elite-level (instrumental) and grassroots (identity) strategies are compared to develop an understanding of these levels. While the instrumental strategies are driven by the political leaders of the society, the identity-related strategies are driven by citizens or local leaders usually organising the society (Table 3.1). However, the identity-based perspectives lack the power to promote large-scale reforms as they do not have long-term organisational support and sustainable citizen leadership (Potapchuk, 1996, p.56). Similarly, the influence of the grassroots initiatives is controversial. Although the grassroots initiatives may include the desires of the society and represent them, there is little evidence that shows the grassroots level of conflict resolution can mitigate the level of a conflict by raising attention to local aspects and actors in a conflict (Carayannis et al., 2014, p.17). Similarly, even though elite-level approaches predominantly focus on making a peace agreement, they consider the

²⁰ The table is converted from several frameworks on conflict resolution approaches, namely, Byrne (2001), Kriesberg (2001), Lederach (1997), Pearson (2001), and Rothman and Olson's (2001) frameworks.

requirement to transform identity issues for a peaceful resolution and focus on ethnic identity concerns through P/CROs.

There is a necessity to strengthen links between the elite and grassroots approaches to achieve peace by non-violent means (Carayannis et al., 2014, p.17). Political elites close this gap through the power of a decision-making mechanism by considering the desires of the society. Van der Merwe (1998) supports this argument by underlining the requirement of cooperation between civil society (the grassroots level) and governments to achieve conflict resolution. These two approaches should consider inter-generational memory, that is, the memories of the people who were exposed to violence and the next generation which will feel the effect of this trouble (van der Merwe, 1998). Yet, as the research focuses on a particular timeframe, which is the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages, peacemaking initiatives will be investigated by addressing conflict resolution efforts. The relationships between the elite level and other levels will be used in terms of this specific timeframe. For example, the Northern Irish peace process was initiated by political actors and reached intergovernmental agreements such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985. These initiatives encouraged the way for power-sharing agreements by declining the power of the central authority and transferring authority to the local level and encouraging local parties to join negotiations. Besides, the process had exogenous motives through the US administration's involvement and originating by the elite level and later expanding to the local level (Pearson, 2001, p.277). Similarly, the Turkish government applied official conflict resolution methods to stop the violent campaign of the PKK through the 'democratic opening project' (Keyman, 2014).

As conflict resolution efforts are initiated with political actors and there is little attention to the elite level as a transformative approach for resolving conflicts with sub-state armed groups, it is convenient to focus on the elite level of conflict resolution such as traditional negotiations between state officials and representatives of armed groups. However, it does not mean that this work focuses only on traditional modes of conflict

resolution. Instead, it investigates transformational conflict resolution, which involves not only traditional resolution efforts but also political parties and actors' initiatives for transforming the root causes of conflicts for sustainable peace and middle-range groups' initiatives at the elite level to contribute to peacemaking efforts.

To sum up, the research argues that the elite level of conflict resolution does not consist only of negotiations between sub-state groups and government officials. Official negotiations (track-one) are one of the most crucial elements of the elite level of conflict resolution. However, they should be supported by backchannels (track one-and-a-half diplomacy) and peace organisations (track-two diplomacy), as they have influence over resolving disputes successfully, which is described in the next section.

3.3. Operationalising the Elite Level Approaches

The elite level approaches describe resolution attempts of political leaders. As Lederach (1997, p.39) argues, these approaches to peacemaking focus on high-level negotiations, ceasefires and disarming under the leadership of a highly visible, single mediator. This argument addresses the traditional meaning of a negotiation process. Conversely, the goals of the elite level in conflict resolution cannot only be limited to ceasefires. Political parties and actors, who consolidate negotiations between conflicting parties, aim for not only a temporary solution, but also a permanent one to reach sustainable peace in coordination with the other levels of conflict resolution.

Elite level leaders are the highest representatives of governments and opposition parties. These leaders remain at the peak of all conflict resolution initiatives and the spokespersons for their constituencies (Lederach, 1997, p.38). Thus, in many cases, elite initiatives take the lead in conflict resolution efforts. For example, the long-standing Colombian peace process was also dominated by the Colombian government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leadership

(ColombiaPeace, 2017). Similarly, non-violent resolution attempts in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts have been conducted by political leaders. However, the influence of the elite level in a peace settlement with the IRA and PKK groups is not precise. The influence will be explored in light of the sub-dimensions of this level. Although conflict resolution initiatives have been conducted in these cases, whether these approaches have been successful, have helped to solve these ethno-nationalist conflicts, or have had a negative effect on resolution attempts will be explored in the following chapters. As the elite level reflects the efforts of the political actors, sub-state armed groups, and independent endogenous and exogenous third parties, exploring the characteristics of this level can help to formulate this approach.

Firstly, as political parties and actors are generally visible, their behaviours and statements are easily followed by society. As a result, they are faced with plenty of press coverage and air time (Lederach, 1997, p.38). It results in public pressure on them that affects conflict resolution methods in different ways. For example, while 'mediators' organised secret negotiations to prevent public reaction in the Turkish case, they arranged official meetings in the Northern Irish case, whose outcomes will be compared in the empirical chapters. Secondly, mediators are given significant and exclusive power by decision makers who represent conflicting parties (Lederach, 1997, p.40). For example, Senator George Mitchell's mediation in Northern Ireland and the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) mediation in Turkey are remarkable attempts that will be investigated in the subsequent chapters. Thirdly, the elite level approaches may produce a calendar which demonstrates a timeframe and order of the peace process. The first step of this order addresses the efforts for declaring a ceasefire between military and official leaders. The second step is a national transition which includes political leadership for establishing a new structure that provides democratic elections or decisions. It is a step-by-step process which involves an issue-oriented accomplishment dominated by top-level actors (Lederach, 1997, p.45). Although this feature

seems systematic and puts a peace process in order, it can have an adverse effect, especially if the calendar puts pressure on conflicting sides.

Moreover, the accomplishments at the top-level move to the lower levels. Lederach (1997) argues that the highest possibility for achieving peace settles with the representative leaders of the disputing sides. According to Lederach, 'If these leaders can agree, that sets the stage, the framework, and the environment for delivering the rest of society in the implementation of the agreement that will end the war' (Lederach, 1997, p.45). In fact, the aim of the elite level of conflict resolution is not only to make peace between political actors, but also to expand the agreements to the broader society. Political actors and independent third parties also ensure the success of a peace agreement by supporting its context in the post-conflict environment. The research does not ignore the functions which refer to post-violence processes, but focuses on the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages.

The elite-oriented school of thought has three approaches, which can be classified according to their motivations as focusing on secret talks, peace organisations and official negotiations (Kriesberg, 1992; Lederach, 1997). Hence, peacemaking efforts of conflict resolution processes can be divided into three approaches: backchannel communications, peace and conflict resolution organisations' initiatives, and official negotiations. As Wanis-St John (2006) argues, backchannels and official negotiations, when paired in sets, can form feedback effects which might be seen as a positive, deliberate consequence since the product of backchannel initiatives leads to official negotiations. Peace and conflict resolution organisations support these two approaches to reaching a political agreement. Each approach examines different aspects of top-leadership efforts and complements the other (Table 3.2). Together with this tripartite framework and its sub-components, conflict resolution efforts can produce a detailed understanding of violent conflicts.

Actors / Issues	Backchannel Communications	Peace Organisations	Official Negotiations
Actors	Main armed protagonists, intermediaries	Unofficial groups, NGOs, disputing parties	Disputing parties, mediators
Process	Unofficial, secret	Informal, semi-official	Official
Stages	Pre-negotiation	Pre-negotiation, negotiation	Negotiation
Issues	Indirect, direct	From above, from below	Bilateral, multilateral
Tracks	Track 1.5	Track 2	Track 1

Table 3.2: Conflict Resolution Processes for Peacemaking

3.3.1. Backchannel Communications

The first aspect of conflict resolution processes in resolving intra-state conflicts is backchannel communication channels between the main armed protagonists, who are state officials and the leaders of sub-state armed groups. This aspect addresses the secret negotiations of these armed protagonists in an unofficial way through direct and indirect contact. It is vital to understand the relationships between these actors as they initiate a conflict resolution process and can lead to official negotiations. Although secret talks have been examined in the context of talking to terrorists, the existing literature has paid little attention to the role of backchannels as part of conflict resolution processes (Kriesberg, 1992; Pruitt, 2006; Rubin, 1981; Wanis-St John, 2006). The aim of this section is to close this gap by assessing their role as a pre-negotiation initiative and aiming to frame theoretical assumptions for analysing the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes. Before describing the major components and characteristics of backchannel communications, the chapter discusses them as the early stage of conflict resolution processes by describing them as high-level secret efforts and track one-and-a-half diplomatic initiatives.

3.3.1.1. Backchannel Communications as a Pre-negotiation Initiative

Backchannel communications form the pre-negotiation stage, which embodies conflict resolution approaches prior to official negotiations (Pruitt, 2008). This definition addresses a specific phase when there is a strong reaction against talking to terrorists; it is possible for conflicting parties to move gradually towards official negotiations through backchannel communications (Pruitt, 2005; Spector, 2003). Therefore, even though it is possible to apply these secret initiatives in both the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages, they are mostly applied when it is difficult to achieve official negotiations between disputing parties (Pruitt, 2008). Therefore, as Kriesberg (1992, p.123) notes, secret meetings are a pre-negotiation activity which can later lead to official negotiations.

Backchannel negotiations can be used together with other lower-level channels. Backchannel initiatives may operate 'in parallel with or replace acknowledged "front channels"²¹ of negotiations and can be described as the "black markets" of negotiations, providing separate negotiation spaces where bargaining takes place in the shadows' (Wanis-St John, 2006, p.120). These separate spaces enable third parties to make use of covert negotiations to prevent any other states or groups to spoil these initiatives, unlike the negotiation stage (Rubin, 1981). Although other lower-level front channels are part of the pre-negotiation stage, these channels are not the question of the thesis as they do not play a critical role in peacemaking efforts. For example, the low-level diplomats Israeli Joel Singer and Palestinian Sa'eb Eraqat carried out a front-channel talk in Cairo in 1994, who discussed an agenda for the next round of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Palestinian elections, but this talk did not bring about any outcome (Savir, 1998). These talks do not involve any decision makers and are limited to specific discussion topics instead of

²¹ The term 'front channels' means open discussions between lower-ranking diplomats which are unofficial talks and can be achieved at any time prior to official negotiations (Wanis-St John, 2006).

negotiating an agreement. Similarly, the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts do not contain any effective front channel. In contrast, backchannel talks are described as secret meetings between high-ranking leaders of states (or conflicting parties) seeking to negotiate a settlement (Zartman & Berman, 1982). Backchannel communications between the US diplomat Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese officials for negotiating a ceasefire in Vietnam in 1970 are a significant example of the high-level secret talks (Sebenius & Kogan, 2016). As Pruitt (2006) indicates, there would be very few negotiations and thus very few agreements without backchannel talks.

Furthermore, track one-and-a-half diplomacy (track 1.5), coined by Nan (2003, 2005), describes the nature of backchannel communications as unofficial interactions between official representatives of parties in a conflict that are facilitated by unofficial bodies. These parties are governments and the leadership of terrorist groups in ethno-nationalist conflicts (Mapendere, 2005). Although track-one (Section 3.3.3) and track-two diplomacy (Section 3.3.2) will be investigated in the next sections, it is appropriate to explain track 1.5 diplomacy through a comparison that utilises understanding their key features. On the one hand, the major difference between track-one and track 1.5 diplomacy is that while track-one diplomacy includes official third parties, track 1.5 initiatives have unofficial groups or actors as third parties. On the other hand, the major difference between track 1.5 and track-two diplomacies is the parties in the process. The parties in track-two diplomacy are not official representatives of the conflicting parties who are involved in the conflict resolution process, but those who have the capability to influence both the elite and grassroots levels. Whereas, in track 1.5 diplomacy, the parties are official representatives of conflicting parties who are involved in the conflict resolution process (Aall, 2001; Agha et al., 2003; Schiff, 2010, p.95). Hence, as Mapendere (2005, p.70) puts it, track 1.5 is a 'hybrid diplomacy' as it is a cross-fertilisation of track-one and track-two. Track 1.5 diplomacy bridges the gap between tracks one and two by providing both official actors from the conflicting parties and the strength of track-two actors to bring them

together in an unofficial way (Mapendere, 2005, p.77). Similar to the other tracks, track 1.5 diplomacy prioritises building trust between conflicting parties and intermediaries who build the communication channel or facilitate the talks between the warring parties during the pre-negotiation stage. It is argued that track 1.5 diplomacy makes it possible to directly transfer the outcome of these discussions to official negotiations (Nan, 2004). When these discussions are successful, they are expected to be moved towards official negotiations. Thus, the backchannel talks are significant for resolving violent conflicts which have two major aspects.

3.3.1.2. Direct and Indirect Talks

Backchannel communications have two major aspects which are classified regarding their nature: direct and indirect talks (Pruitt, 2006). Direct talks bring representatives of disputing parties together in a secret place (Pruitt, 2006, p.381). For example, the British government and IRA, the Turkish government and PKK, the Israeli and Palestinian officials, and the South African government and Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) achieved several meetings confidentially to discuss possible ways to resolve these conflicts (Ben-Porat, 2008; Demir, 2013; Lieberfeld, 2002). While the Israeli-Palestinian peace process witnessed intensive secret talks in the early-1980s, the South African Minister of Justice, Jacobus Coetsee built a secret channel with imprisoned Nelson Mandela and then the leaders of the ANC in 1985 (Wanis-St John, 2006). Indirect talks can be achieved through communication chains which involve one or more intermediaries (Pruitt, 2006, p.382). For example, the indirect communication channel between the Israeli and Palestinian officials were built by two university professors in the early-1990s (Pruitt, 2008, p.39).

Both direct and indirect talks provide a suitable environment for the parties in a conflict to discuss their needs, aims, fears and demands without any pressure, as it is easy to keep them secret. Together with these aims, backchannel talks aim to reduce uncertainty which prevents a move towards a political settlement (Wanis-St John, 2006). However, compared

to direct talks, indirect communications are easier to keep secret since it is more difficult to follow the communication chain. For instance, the indirect communication between American and Vietnamese officials in 1964 was not revealed, as American officials talked to British officials, which was followed by British officials' contacting an Eastern European country, which finally led to this country's talk with North Vietnamese authorities (Gardner & Gittinger, 2004; Kraslow & Loory, 1968). In this context, two conditions are essential to point out regarding the role of intermediaries in a backchannel negotiation which determines the success of secret initiatives. The first condition is about whether communication is built by a single intermediary or more than one intermediary. Although it is common to have more than one intermediary in complicated issues, they might create 'messy, difficult and even chaotic' results if they are not well-organised (Crocker et al., 1999). For example, the Oslo negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials had more than one intermediary who acted with great leverage capacity (Kriesberg, 1996). However, having only a single intermediary can also create problems in a backchannel initiative as it is hard for a single intermediary to be sure about whether he is talking to the right people in a terrorist group when he builds the channel (Pruitt, 2006, p.385).

The other condition is related to the role of third parties, which has two aspects: weak and powerful third parties. While weak intermediaries transmit messages between disputing parties and coordinate concession making, powerful intermediaries help parties in a conflict to plan the process and recommend attainable solutions or put pressure on these parties to make an agreement on disputes (Pruitt, 2006, p.385). The role of third parties determines the success of backchannel communications as they initiate the dialogue between warring parties, define the strength or looseness of the channel, dominate or facilitate the two groups' discussions and help to move gradually towards official negotiations. The thesis will assess the consequences of weak and powerful intermediary efforts to understand whether they are useful for closing the gaps between states and sub-state armed groups in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish

conflicts (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1). The assumptions about the characteristics of backchannel initiatives help to provide a framework for analysing their reflection in both conflicts.

3.3.1.3. Characteristics of Backchannel Initiatives

The characteristics of backchannel communications are determined by the structure of terrorist groups and regarding whether states are willing to negotiate a non-violent settlement. Pruitt (2006) defines two forces which push parties to negotiate with their opponents: 'A sense that the conflict is counterproductive or pressure from third parties, coupled with a belief that the other party is ready to make concessions' and 'contact with and dependence upon moderates' (Pruitt, 2006, p.384). Here, the term 'moderate' refers to contingent groups who are willing to negotiate their intentions, contrary to absolute terrorists who are against any non-violent resolution (Hayes et al., 2003). Moloney (2002) argues that SF acted under real constraints and so the British and Irish governments might have had to make concessions to support their position within the republican movement. These concessions and their outcomes will be examined in both peace processes. In addition, the IRA and PKK have been willing to discuss their goals with government officials, which illustrates them as moderate groups. These two important aspects need to be assessed in both conflicts together with some features which determine the route of these initiatives.

Firstly, as they are not formal, there is no cost of entry into these meetings. The costs of entry into talks may result in conflicting parties being reluctant to attend official negotiations. Since official negotiations with an armed group can be seen as a governments' *de facto* granting of legitimacy for this group, backchannel negotiations are conducted secretly, which enables parties to maintain their opposition in public while they are seeking ways to de-escalate conflicts secretly (Wanis-St John, 2006, pp.125-126). It also helps governments to use the argument of 'we do not talk to terrorists'. It is argued that backchannels do not mean recognition of the other side of the conflict, which is one of the major concerns of states in

negotiating with terrorists (Pruitt, 2006). Chapter 6 will examine how the costs of entry to backchannels are determined for both conflicting parties. It also raises the question of whether there were any preconditions for achieving these events. As Wanis-St John (2006) argues, backchannel talks are suitable for conflicting parties to come together without facing each other's preconditions for official negotiations. Despite this claim, the IRA Army Council and British government had two preconditions from each other (the IRA's ceasefire and the government's release of political prisoners) to come together in the Whitelaw talks in 1972 (Smith & Neumann, 2005). Similarly, both Prime Minister (PM) Süleyman Demirel and President Turgut Özal thought that a ceasefire was the precondition for initiating dialogue in 1993 (Çandar, 2014). However, whether other backchannel initiatives had a prerequisite is an important question that will be investigated in Chapter 6.

The other feature of backchannels is that they can easily be concealed, as it is difficult for outsiders to reveal these talks and also easier for both states and terrorist groups to deny that the chain exists (Pruitt, 2005). In Northern Ireland, secret communications between the British government and republican movement were kept secret not only from the public and opponent parties but also from security forces in the early 1970s (Wanis-St John, 2006). Therefore, they exclude both internal and external spoilers from a peace process by keeping them in the dark (Pruitt, 1994, 2006). In parallel with this assumption, the secret talks in the Colombian peace process between the Santos administration and FARC successfully excluded opposition parties and groups who were against peace talks and hence these talks maintained until they were made public in 2012 (Renwick, 2014). However, if adversaries and spoilers reveal these communications, it can undermine the reliability of governments. This issue will be assessed in the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases to understand how adversaries might affect the success of backchannels. As they are disavowable, they have to rule out various audiences including the media and the wider public. This exclusion is a prerequisite for backchannel initiatives as the attention and reaction of the public can make it difficult to

focus on the achievement of a negotiated settlement (Dochartaigh, 2011b, p.768). For example, when the Oslo talks were leaked to the Turkish media, it triggered a strong reaction and criticism against these talks.

Backchannel initiatives also provide flexibility by encouraging informality and frank discussions about aims, fears and proposals of both sides for resolution, in contrast to public discussions (Pruitt, 2006; 2008, p.41). The backchannels create an environment for conflicting parties to agree on their prerequisites, to discover common ground and to identify the root causes of conflicts through brainstorming (Pruitt, 2008). The existing literature defines a few major effects which provide flexibility (Crocker et al., 1999; Pruitt, 2008; Wanis-St John, 2004, 2006). The first two effects, as mentioned before, are to reduce audience effects due to the exclusion of scrutiny from society and the media, which may affect these attempts negatively, so they reduce the number of people who are involved in these talks (Pruitt, 2008; Wanis-St John, 2004). These effects create great flexibility for conflicting parties to discuss their major demands and help to focus on the root causes of the conflict. Following these effects, it is not essential for backchannels to adhere to the front-channels of what is decided or discussed in backchannels (Ikle, 1964, p.134). This point is significant as it illustrates that the outcome of these talks can lead directly to official negotiations. For example, the outcome of the secret Oslo talks between the National Intelligence Organisation (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, henceforth: MIT) of Turkey and the leadership of the PKK was reflected in the formal negotiations and regulations, namely, the Democratic Opening of 2013, which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. Finally, increased informality is a result of the involvement of fewer people in backchannel negotiations, which produces a more interpersonal and less intergroup situation. It is significant as people in secret talks begin to see each other as human beings, not simply as part of a rival group (Brown, 2000). This condition is more likely to reduce issues related to trust, stereotyping and negative feelings about their opponents (Bartoli, 1999; Pruitt, 2008).

Backchannel communications may not work precisely in all circumstances. Although the nature of these talks provides flexibility, lack of costs of entry and deniability, these assumptions might not be achieved. Hence, they may not result in official negotiations due to some limitations. The credibility of backchannels is one of these limitations that affect the success of backchannels. The credibility of actors who attend the secret talks is an important question as it might create a problem in reaching a settlement due to the exclusion of major stakeholders. Therefore, whether these talks represent the main protagonists of the conflict is an important issue of this thesis. Besides, even though secrecy of these talks provides a suitable environment for negotiations, it can also create mistrust and prevent public support for political reforms (Pruitt, 2008; Wanis-St John, 2006). When the secret talks between the Çiller administration and PKK were revealed, it created mistrust in the wider Turkish society which caused the government to focus on hard-line policies (Çandar, 2014). The result of these initiatives will be assessed to understand their role in bringing the Kurdish conflict to an end (Section 6.4).

There are some other concerns related to the limitations of backchannels. If there is no unity among terrorist groups concerning who will represent the group, it might create a problem regarding the applicability of the decisions. However, this concern can be eliminated if government officials or intermediaries insist that the groups appoint a valid representative (Pruitt, 2006). Whether these situations occurred in the backchannel communications in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts is an important question to be discussed. Even though a valid representative is appointed to secret talks, the main armed protagonists may find it difficult to understand the other party's desire for a solution as the talks are carried out secretly and so it is difficult to commit to them without knowing whether they comply with the agreed points for a political settlement (Wanis-St John, 2006).

3.3.2. Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations' (P/CROs) Initiatives

The term P/CROs describes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who are involved in a conflict resolution process to make a political settlement. This aspect investigates P/CROs' initiatives in relation to their role in facilitating, promoting or preventing conflict resolution efforts towards peace (Byrne, 2001).

There has been increasing interest in the efforts of non-governmental peace organisations towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts (Fisher & Keashly, 1990; Kelman, 1998; Lederach, 1997). Although peace groups have operated in many conflicts since the end of WWII, as Taylor (2002b, pp.71-76) notes, the focus on conflict resolution and peacemaking has been noticed through the proactive peace efforts of South African P/CROs such as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa and the Centre for Intergroup Studies. Although there is sufficient literature on the role of peace groups at the societal level as peacebuilding and social movement organisations, there is little focus on their role in making political agreements during existing violence (Cochrane, 2001; Donnelly-Cox et al., 2001; Gidron et al., 2002; Giugni et al., 1999; Slim & Saunders, 2001). This section aims to close this gap in our knowledge by providing a framework for understanding P/CROs' role in conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey. It analyses the relevance of conflict resolution theory for analysing peace organisations, the role of P/CROs as middle-range groups, and track-two diplomacy as an unofficial interaction concept for assessing P/CROs.

3.3.2.1. Peace Groups as Conflict Resolution Organisations

The existing literature on peace groups assesses these groups through four major theoretical perspectives: organisational theories, social movements, third sector, and conflict resolution and peacemaking studies (Gidron & Katz, 1998). The studies which aim to assess peace groups as organisational bodies describe the endogenous and exogenous characteristics of these

bodies whose main focus is organisation-environment relations as the determinant of organisational behaviour (Gidron & Katz, 1998, p.7). These endogenous and exogenous characteristics identify organisational values in a few aspects: the responsibilities regarding decision-making mechanisms in the organisation, a set of rules that define the administrative motivations for the members, and the operational goals of the organisation (Benson, 1975; Gidron & Katz, 1998; Hasenfeld, 2010; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). However, this research does not assess peace groups' organisational entities, hence organisational theories are not the topic of this thesis.

Social movement theories are frequently applied to research which analyses non-institutionalised collective events (McAdam et al., 1996). The existing social movement literature suggests three analytical forms of social movements: While the 'political opportunity structures' describe how the groups escalate or de-escalate the political environment regarding the role of state and political elites, 'mobilising structures' define the capacity of social movement groups (Eisinger, 1973; Gidron et al., 2002, p.17). Lastly, framing examines social movement organisations that aim to mobilise potential supporters and to demobilise potential antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988). Nevertheless, these theories had little interest in these organisations as peacemaking efforts (Gidron & Katz, 1998; McAdam et al., 1996). Similarly, the theories which analyse peace organisations as the third, voluntary or non-profit sectors intend to understand where these groups operate and how these groups provide support regarding funding and personnel. Although these features are significant in defining the survival of P/CROs, they mostly focus on their relationship with the state actors and the notion of civil society in the context of NGOs (Cochrane, 2002). In contrast, this research aims to understand P/CROs' role in facilitating, encouraging or obstructing peacemaking efforts during an existing conflict instead of a sector analysis for understanding their voluntary structure or funding conditions.

Conflict resolution and peacemaking studies describe the substance, characteristics and philosophy of P/CROs in contrast to other theories.

Peace and conflict studies scholars argue that conflicts are not usually isolated, but are connected to other issues in accordance with endogenous or exogenous causes of the conflict (Fitzduff, 1995; Gidron & Katz, 1998; Kriesberg, 1992). These issues define the characteristics of P/CROs which choose their strategies to promote peace and the resolution of conflict. P/CROs are influenced by peacemaking and conflict resolution studies as peacemaking addresses peace efforts to seek resolutions or de-escalation of conflicts (Galtung, 1996; Gidron et al., 2002, p.19). This influence helps to frame conflict resolution organisations' interests and how they frame the conflict in which they operate. For example, while many of the P/CROs focus on social justice in South Africa, they concentrate on mutual recognition of the rights of both nations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Gidron et al., 2002, p.19). They also aim to facilitate a successful negotiation process through the use of a peaceful language and cultural symbols that bring conflicting parties closer to each other, which underlines the importance of trust and mutual respect (Mayer, 1987). Regarding the use of a peaceful language, Women in Black in Serbia built a network against violence by advocating human rights. Their focus on feminism and commemoration of the Serbian victims limited their role in peacekeeping (Stephenson & Zanotti, 2012, p.12). These aims reveal a significant concept in the conflict resolution and peacemaking literature: readiness which describes a characteristic of a conflicting party reflecting the attitude of its top leadership to prepare for conciliatory solutions (Pruitt, 2007, p.1525). P/CROs can play a critical role in encouraging parties for readiness to negotiate by developing bridges between parties, and between the elite and societal levels of conflict resolution through independent bodies such as the Peace People in Northern Ireland, and the Wise People Committee in Turkey (Knox & Hughes, 1996; Oran, 2014). Therefore, they act as middle-range actors between these two levels during conflict resolution processes, whose features are described in the next section.

3.3.2.2. P/CROs as 'Middle-Range' Approaches

The 'middle-range' approaches is a term coined by Lederach (1997) and Kelman (1998) and has been used to refer to peace attempts of unofficial groups and actors that encourage, promote and facilitate a non-violent resolution. They have mostly been reviewed as important actors in extending the impact of political efforts to society (Lederach, 1997). Although the leaders of this level are generally known by formal authority, the position of the middle-level leaders is not necessarily controlled by political elites. Similarly, as the nature of their work does not depend on publicity and/or visibility, they have flexibility to move or act without any permission from top-level leaders. The middle-range actors are in connection with various people in positions of power affiliated with the conflict (Lederach, 1997, pp.41-42). The middle-range approaches appear as different types of instruments such as problem-solving workshops,²² training in conflict resolution, consultative and conciliation meetings and cooperation to develop and produce other types of conflict resolution methods consistent with local norms and culture during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages for resolving a conflict (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.51).

Firstly, problem-solving workshops as a process-oriented approach bring participants together who have knowledge about the issue and who cannot be top-level initiators. In addition, these are informal discussions which make interactive conversations possible without any prejudices (Coleman, 2006; Fisher, 1997; Richmond, 2001). For example, problem-solving workshops between two Israeli academics and some Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) members have been successful as they were converted to formal negotiations at a later stage (Egeland, 1999). Secondly, training programmes are different from problem-solving workshops as

²² Problem-solving workshops are called 'interactive problem-solving' (Kelman, 1998, 2010), 'third-party consultation' (Fisher, 1972) or 'creative problem-solving' (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Sanson & Bretherton, 2007) in the existing literature.

these programmes provide training facilities which increase awareness by educating people about de-escalation of a conflict and aim to motivate internal factors such as developing the skills of participants and adapting different discussion topics into the conflict (Lederach, 1995; Schultz, 1989). Lastly, peace organisations contribute to peace processes by encouraging conflicting parties to join peace talks, influencing public opinion towards peace, and through cross-community events to oppose armed struggle (Gidron & Katz, 1998). Academic conferences, training programmes and workshops such as academic workshops in Cyprus, Kashmir, Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, are not the focus of this research, since these workshops have little influence in ending a violent conflict (Azar, 2003; Burton, 1969; Fisher, 1972, 2007; Kaye, 2001, 2007; Kelman, 1987).

This research differentiates between these three activities according to the scale of these activities. While problem-solving workshops organised by academics and training programmes are micro-scale aims as they focus on small-group activities, macro-scale aims are to encourage conflicting parties engaging in a political process as opposed to armed struggle, promoting peace at both the elite and societal levels, and suggesting possible ways for resolution, which are the topics of this research (Fisher, 1972; Gidron & Katz, 1998; Kelman, 2010; Sanson & Bretherton, 2007). The groups with macro-scale aims assist political parties and actors towards sustainable peace by providing a strong link between elite and grassroots efforts, accessing the members of both levels and rebuilding trust (Knox & Quirk, 2000, p.201).

The middle-range approaches of conflict resolution explore ethno-nationalist conflicts in a wider context providing a close link between the effectiveness of peace institutions and the decisions of political elites (Knox & Hughes, 1996). Hancock (2008, p.214) states that these organisations help to reduce individual actors' autonomous role in facilitating conflict resolution processes. Since political elites' personalities influence decision-making, reducing their role may foster a suitable environment to reach a

peace agreement. As both the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts have ethnic and nationalist origins, decreasing the role of political elites' personalities illustrates the importance of the P/CROs' role.

3.3.2.3. Track-Two Diplomacy

Track-two diplomacy, as defined by Montville (1987, p.162) is 'an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organise human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict', but it is not a substitution 'for official, "track-one" government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationships'. Instead, track-two diplomacy is intended to bridge or complement official negotiations (Nan, 1999). Track-two activities supplement an official negotiation process by producing inputs at each stage of a conflict resolution process into the decision making mechanism and thoughts of policy makers and the society (Kelman, 1992, p.68). P/CROs produce inputs by insisting upon and encouraging changes which originated in the attitudes, approaches and thoughts of the political parties and actors during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages (Azar, 2003; Burton, 1987; Fisher, 2007; Kelman, 2003; Schiff, 2010). They also enable unofficial discussions between non-state actors but those who are 'close enough to the centre of power to have some sort of influence over decision makers, political elites and/or public opinion' (Kaufman, 2003).

Track-two activities can influence public opinion by reducing the sense of victimhood of both sides and 'rehumanising' the figures of opponents and providing incentives, institutional support and persistence of the political and psychological process which constitutes the route of the track-two approach to assist official negotiations (Davidson & Montville, 1981; McDonald & Bendahmane, 1987; Montville, 1987, pp.163-164). The Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus peace processes witnessed several track-two initiatives to help political leaders manage these conflicts, which were organised by academics, journalists and other intellectuals (Kelman, 1987; van der Merwe, 1998). The Dartmouth Conference of 1960 is a successful

example of track-two dialogue when the US and Soviet citizens came together to improve the US-Soviet relationship (McDonald, 1991; Montville, 2006).

Track-two diplomacy can serve as a forum to bring together different aspects of a conflict and connect with a wider section of society that demonstrates some expertise regarding this aim (Arthur, 1990, p.415). The BIA is a clear example of track-two efforts as it organised annual conferences each year since 1972 which hosted eminent people in public settings in the UK and Republic of Ireland. The conferences were organised with invitations from the Association 'to discuss in private urgent, controversial and often sensitive political, social and economic issues' (Arthur, 1990, p.415). The confidentiality and informality of these forums make a deeper conversation and exchange of views possible compared to events that are more public, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Track-two diplomacy is vital for a conflict resolution process for three reasons: Firstly, traditional negotiation and mediation processes focus on resolving resource-based issues, e.g. territorial, power-sharing issues and distribution of economic facilities (Chigas, 2003). In contrast, the identity and survival issues, and fears of the opponents can only be undertaken by focusing on human relationships, eliminating prejudices and encouraging a reciprocal understanding in parallel with the constructivist school of thought (Kelman, 1997b; Rothman, 1997). Secondly, the experience of threats in ethno-nationalist conflicts is a dominant factor which is effective at the societal level. The traditional negotiation process alone cannot transform this threat which is spread in the society (Saunders, 1996). Lastly, a conflict consists of both objective and subjective factors which together intensify and escalate the situation, for instance the perception of the opponent with deepening mistrust and dehumanisation (Fisher & Keashly, 1990). For example, the Neemrana Process of 1991 was organised between the Indian and Pakistani academics, and former military officials and diplomats to discuss the conflict in Kashmir (Kaye, 2007). Although the Indian and Pakistani governments did not attend this

initiative, the influential elites who attended the conferences from both sides built a sustainable link with both governments and presented their policy papers to the two governments (Waslekar, 1995). Official negotiations are not sufficient to cover these issues. Therefore, it is essential to engage in track-two dialogue through P/CROs' initiatives for confidence-building measures (Chigas, 2003). Chapter 7 will assess whether P/CROs met with these assumptions in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes.

Track-two diplomacy aims to strengthen conflict resolution processes through a number of major aspects: Firstly, parties in a track-two dialogue are not restricted by political decision makers. Hence, they are able to express their views freely (Mapendere, 2005, pp.68-69). Secondly, track-two agencies do not fear losing a constituency, as they represent the constituency. Thirdly, track-two diplomacy encourages social, political and economic developments in conflict-affected society through peace groups by enabling them to discuss how to reach a peace agreement (Chigas, 2005, p.128). Lastly, these initiatives are led by middle-range leaders who have direct contact with the decision-making mechanism (Lederach, 1997; Mapendere, 2005; Sanders, 2012). Despite its strengths, the existing literature suggests that these initiatives have some weaknesses: Firstly, Mapendere (2005) argues that track-two diplomacy has a limited capacity to influence foreign policy and political structures due to their lack of political power, which makes them unaccountable to the public. However, this assumption does not affect the research question as it aims to understand the role of peace groups as catalysts in the Northern Irish and Turkish cases. This supposition is significant to analyse as it might affect the influence of P/CROs at the societal level. Secondly, it can take too long for track-two initiatives to reach their aims and they have limited influence in transforming a conflict from war to peace. This aspect addresses these groups and actors' roles regarding whether they helped to transform a violent conflict. Finally, it is argued that these peace organisations are known for insufficient accordance between them, which might be a result of talking to the 'wrong' people (Kaye, 2007, p.25). The assumptions

regarding the strengths and weaknesses of track-two groups will be analysed to understand their contribution to peace (Sections 7.4 and 7.5).

3.3.3. Official Negotiations

Official negotiations involve both supporters and opponents of a political resolution, and address the role played by parties and actors at both national and international levels (Hancock, 2008, p.214). The approach will be examined under the nature of negotiations and their role in transforming conflicts, the role of a third party as a mediator and the importance of 'ripeness'. In fact, although ripeness is crucial in both the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages, there is no doubt that these aspects are more sensitive during negotiations.

3.3.3.1. The Nature of Negotiations

After advancing the grounds for a peace settlement during the pre-negotiation stage, analysing the characteristics of a negotiation process becomes important. Negotiation has different classifications in distinctive fields.²³ It is identified as a useful tool for handling disputes, which describes not a single process or one discrete dispute; rather, it is a foregoing setting of relevant acts involving disputants, decisions and conditions (Jackson, 2000, p.324). Therefore, it needs a sustainable process to end a violent conflict. Fisher and Ury (1996) went further and developed a model called 'principled negotiation', which focuses on interest and invent choices of conflicting parties for the collective benefit (rather than focusing on people in trouble), and insists on objective criteria to investigate resolutions. The term 'collective benefit' can have an impact on equality in a decision-making process.

Diplomacy is a crucial dimension of a negotiation process, as it remains the key point of peacemaking action despite the possible change in

²³ The term negotiation has been used in various disciplines for many years such as in the area of psychology (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Pruitt, 1991). It has also been used for ending conflicts since the beginning of states' relations (Jackson, 2000, p.324).

negotiation efforts from one condition to another. It explains 'track-one' diplomacy that defines problem solving efforts at the state level through official resolution attempts (Richmond, 2001). Although these diplomatic efforts do not provide an outcome for a political settlement, they can be seen as steps towards the final agreement. For instance, almost all of the track-one initiatives had ended in failure until the GFA of 1998, such as the power-sharing assembly of 1974 and the AIA of 1985 (Fitzduff, 2002, pp.122-124). Similarly, the Kurdish peace process witnessed different track-one interventions through the Turkish government's negotiations with the pro-Kurdish movement, some of the outcomes of which were the Dolmabahçe Declaration and constitutional reforms such as the democratisation package (Al Jazeera, 2015; UPOS, 2013). According to Fisher (2006), official (track-one) and informal (track-two) diplomatic interventions together provide a positive outcome through the complementarity of these conflict resolution efforts. It can add a value to negotiations through expanding the agreed points to the grassroots level, which helps to reach sustainable peace in some cases, but not in others (Hartzell, 1999; Licklider, 1995). This respect provides an understanding of why some ethno-nationalist conflicts reach agreements (e.g. the Northern Irish conflict), while others do not (e.g. Turkey's Kurdish conflict).

The existing literature on negotiations suggests two major official resolution efforts to reach a political settlement: bilateral and multilateral negotiation approaches (Druckman et al., 1999). While bilateral conversations have a limited number of participants and no pressure (e.g. a deadline), multilateral negotiations are more comprehensive as they include all conflicting parties and third parties in official negotiations (Druckman, 1997; Druckman et al., 1999). This research will use this classification as it helps to distinguish different political actors' influence on the negotiation stage. Multilateral negotiations describe the inclusiveness of official negotiations both at the national and international levels. The national level includes the parties in a conflict consisting of governments, political wings of sub-state armed groups and other political parties in a war-affected society, which embrace a greater majority of conflicting

parties. In addition to these actors, the international level involves international mediation which facilitates a peace process (Hancock, 2008; Hopmann, 1995). However, the inclusion of all disputing parties in political resolution attempts may not result in a successful outcome due to the intentions of the parties in negotiations. For example, the multilateral negotiations in the Cyprus conflict through an international mediator, the UN between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots failed to establish an agreement as the parties locked in an adversarial frame due to the refusal of the political settlement by the Greek-Cypriot community (Sözen & Özersay, 2007).

Ikle and Leites argue that 'governments often enter negotiations without being conscious of their minimum disposition and without making an effort to estimate the opponent's minimum disposition' (Ikle & Leites, 1962, p.22). This disposition and minimum will of conflicting sides are characterised in an intractable ethno-nationalist conflict, as the two sides in a conflict are assumed equal. There is a moral hazard when a party joins negotiations in bad faith which suggests the will for confrontation in a negotiation (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.49). Hence, although the timing of negotiations may be convenient, an unexpected situation can emerge, as one party does not join discussions with good will. Echoing Steadman (1997), this hazard emerges when extremists involved in a conflict join discussions but are not interested in the arrangement and try to destroy negotiations, these parties are called 'spoilers'. To prevent these spoilers' actions, it is necessary to apply an effective spoiler management policy (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011; Stedman, 1997). This policy refers to reciprocity between disputing sides to understand each other's demands for ending violent conflicts. These assumptions and the spoilers who aim to hinder a political resolution will be investigated in Chapter 8.

The negotiation process has two basic perspectives in addition to the functions and assumptions. The perspectives provide an understanding of conflict situations and possible drawbacks during peace negotiations. On the one hand, the relationship-based perspective underlines that a

sustainable communication process can allow to overcome the concerns related to 'trust' and 'reciprocal bargaining'. Although negotiators claim that they represent society, the mass-level might not agree with them if their demands are not being raised or reconciled during the meetings (Byrne, 2001; Pearson, 2001, p.279). According to George Mitchell (1999), the mediator of the official negotiations in Northern Ireland, the Ulster talks broke down as there was no trust between the parties. Therefore, an *ad hoc* process was applied to break down the barriers, which provided an interaction between conflicting sides to understand each other's perceptions. As Pearson states,

Previously implacable enemies can, given the right circumstances of exhaustion or stalemate, raise hopes by initial agreements or concessions and by forthcoming statements, as when hardened IRA and Unionist fighters apologised for past transgressions in 1997 (Pearson, 2001, p.277).

On the other hand, the political-risk perspective highlights that the parties in a conflict will not be interested in joining negotiations unless they think that they can achieve their goals without an armed struggle. Besides, even if these groups sit at the negotiating table, they may experience problems in gaining the trust of the other (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.52). The perspective gives prominence to 'costing' negotiations. The costs of negotiations and elite bargaining outcomes should be compared with the costs of armed conflict itself along with future expected costs for an ethno-nationalist conflict. It is argued that if conflict pays, the parties in a civil conflict will not be willing to negotiate (Zartman, 1989; Zartman & Touval, 1985). Both perspectives will be considered throughout the analysis of the negotiations between government officials, and the IRA and PKK.

3.3.3.2. Transforming a Violent Conflict through Official Negotiations

The existing conflict resolution literature addresses the significance of transforming underlying reasons for a conflict in order to make peace (Boulding, 1962; Burton, 1987; Galtung, 1965; Ramsbotham et al., 2005).

This transformation refers to a 'positive peace'²⁴ to eliminate the major causes of a violent conflict, instead of 'negative peace', which describes the lack of violence only (Galtung, 1996). Conflict transformation has five major aspects to transform a violent conflict: structural, actor, issue, personal-group and context transformation (Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Vayrynen, 1991). The context transformation addresses social, regional and international contexts that determine the continuation of a conflict. Changes in a context can influence a conflict more than changes in parties or their relationships. A significant example of this transformation is the end of the Cold War, which resulted in unblocking protracted conflicts in Central America and Southern Africa (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). These internationally fuelled local conflicts could not be resolved, unless the context of these conflicts changed (Holsti, 1996). The end of the Cold War changed the terms of the threat and so facilitated non-violent resolutions. However, the context transformation is not the topic of this research as the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts have not been affected by this transformation since secret peace efforts are almost as old as these conflicts themselves (Güller, 2012; Taylor, 1998).

The structural transformation addresses the underlying reasons for a conflict; particularly, if a conflict originates from the relationships within conflicting parties, a structural change is crucial to resolve this conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). The power relationship within one side of the conflict might be decisive to define their strategy. For example, the dissociation (withdrawal from unbalanced relationship) is a possible result that was an issue when Kosovar Albanians decided to boycott the Serbian elections and assembled a 'quasi-state' in the 1990s (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.176). The power balance within a movement between the dominant and weaker party is another significant issue which was evident through the relationship between the pro-Kurdish parties and the PKK determined

²⁴ In order to achieve a positive peace, social justice, sustainable development, the equal distribution of resources, prevention of structural, social and cultural violence, women rights and a secular administration are vital (Özerdem, 2013, p.28; 2014, 2016).

the route of the ethno-nationalist conflict in Turkey for most of its history (Section 8.4). Despite the willingness of the pro-Kurdish parties to achieve a negotiated settlement, the PKK was reluctant to pursue a non-violent resolution (Birand & Yalçın, 2001). The influence of this transformation in both conflicts will be investigated in Chapter 8.

The actor transformation refers to the requirement of changes in the attitudes of conflicting parties and actors to bring a violent conflict to an end. This transformation focuses on transitions of the current direction, goals and thoughts of parties in a conflict (Cunningham, 2006, p.875). While the purpose is to eliminate factors which are against making peace, this transformation might create a division in conflicting parties, namely, more veto-players. The result of the efforts to change the thoughts of conflicting parties is significant in understanding the route of a conflict resolution process. For instance, the transformation in the thoughts of the pro-Kurdish side from only armed struggle to both armed and political struggle resulted in a division within the pro-Kurdish movement that will be investigated in the subsequent chapters.

The issue transformation emerges through two aspects. It can emerge due to the change in the positions of conflicting parties. It can also occur when the issues of concern lose their importance and neither conflicting parties concentrate on these specific issues any more. When the issues lose their importance, new issues arise, which means that the previous issues are transformed (Vayrynen, 1991). Issue transformation played an important role in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts as it appeared through the choice between the armed campaign and political resolution. This choice is also related to trust and gain issues and a dilemma between zero-sum and win-win approaches as explained in the previous section. By transforming these issues, conflict resolution theory aims to overcome realist theory's zero-sum approaches.

Finally, the personal and group transformation depends on the leadership of the main protagonists of a violent conflict. For example, leaders of sub-state armed groups can apply different strategies including

official or secret negotiations to reach their ultimate goals (Curle, 1994). The leaderships of the IRA and PKK have dominated the conflict on behalf of the republican and pro-Kurdish movements, which resulted in determining their strategies according to armed groups instead of political actors. The thesis will examine whether their strategies helped or obstructed the peace processes.

3.3.3.3. Mediation (The Role of Third Parties)

The role of third parties is important in the negotiation stage as there is a change in the formulation of mediation.²⁵ Unlike many of the conflicts in the past, the majority of the conflicts in the 1990s were resolved by negotiated settlements and with the support of a third party (Babbitt, 2009; Babbitt & Hampson, 2011).²⁶

The concept of mediation is illustrated as a dispute settlement, requiring an independent party's intervention as invited by the disputants (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993; Koch, 1974, p.28). Mediation has two conceptual approaches. Mediation as a social approach makes interpersonal, intergroup and international negotiations possible (Wall, 1993; Wall et al., 2001). While the role of international actors was decisive in dealing with conflicts as in the liberal perspective, it is not the only major factor towards ending violent conflicts. For example, to establish negotiation protocols can lead to reach a political settlement by considering

²⁵ Mediation is one of the oldest settings of conflict resolution (Wall et al., 2001, p.370). It has been used by various disciplines such as sociology, psychology and politics. According to a general definition, mediation means to assist two or more conflicting sides by third parties who have no authority to rule and influence anyone or settle and outcome (Kressel & Pruitt, 1989). As Read and Michelson (2008, p.742) note, the concept of mediation should be thought with the broader perspectives of political acts.

²⁶ The focus of this study is related to official mediation which refers to solve disputes between and within states. In this context, mediation is applied to many cases such as Japan (Cortazzi, 1990), Malaysia (Ott, 1972), China (Diamant, 2000), Israel (Abu-Nimer, 1996), Korea (Sohn & Wall, 1993), Poland (Olszanska et al., 1993) and Norway (Polley, 1988).

distinctive relationships e.g., inter-negotiator and mediator-negotiator relationships (Wall, 1981, pp.171-175).

This approach will be assessed to understand ethno-nationalist conflicts and their resolution attempts in terms of identifying problems, composing requirements of negotiation procedures and informing negotiators to clarify the real issues. Mediation as a transformational approach is identified as a unique capability to transform people's perceptions by supporting them to fight in difficult situations and to fill the gap that exists between people due to the differences during the conflicts (Bush & Folger, 1994, p.2). Related to its transformative capability, it contains consensus and independent decision-making (Bercovitch, 1991, p.4). The role of mediator for leading resolution efforts or assisting disputing sides only determines the route of a peace process.

There are various aims for mediators to achieve resolution of conflicts with sub-state armed groups. For many scholars, the primary aim of the mediator is to reach an agreement between conflicting sides (Kochan & Jick, 1978; Pruitt, 1971; Wall, 1981; Warren, 1954). This goal can be achieved by forming an international perspective with no force or arbitrate rules (Bercovitch, 1991, p.3). The mediation of the US Senator George Mitchell in Northern Ireland and the British mediation in Turkey are significant examples (Sections 8.3.2 and 8.4.2). For example, Mitchell did not concentrate on creating any coalition between political parties in Northern Ireland or establishing the credibility of these negotiations by pushing for a deadline (Mitchell, 1999). Instead, he focused on incorporating major parties which represented the majority in the Northern Irish conflict into negotiations (Mitchell, 1999). The role of British intelligence agents during covert peacemaking efforts in the Kurdish conflict is also noticeable as the actors of the negotiation process were different (direct representatives of the PKK), but the role of the mediators was the same during the Oslo talks (Demir, 2013). These principles and influence of the mediators will be investigated to understand the contribution of this concept to the conflict resolution process.

In this respect, how this influence is shaped between opponents can be questionable. Herein, the response of a mediator is not to help only one side of the conflict but to come up with a solution by mutual agreement (Jeong, 2000, p.180). The International Contact Group's mediation in the Mindanao conflict played a complementary role in negotiations for more than fifteen years by mobilising international support for the peace process and providing the link between the conflicting parties through the reduction of trust issues (Herbolzheimer & Leslie, 2013). Yet, the response of mediation cannot be limited to organising the relations between conflicting parties. The role of a mediator can begin with negotiations or during the pre-negotiation stage. It means that a mediator can take responsibility for bringing conflicting sides to the negotiating table. Alternatively, his/her responsibility can start with the beginning of negotiations if conflicting parties so desire.

The responsibilities of mediators also depend on their experiences both in the selection of the mediator and the operation of the process (Bercovitch et al., 1991, pp.9-10; Bercovitch & Houston, 1993, p.303). This aspect addresses the personality of a mediator. It is suggested that trust between people brings mediators to the foreground and the language of mediation has analytical importance (Felstiner, 1974, pp.74-83; Greenhouse, 1985, p.111). Even though these are essential issues, a lack of power balance between two sides is still a matter of importance. Indeed, the stronger sides in a conflict may have difficulties in accepting a mediator (Modelski, 1964, p.131). At this point, a mediator's responsibility is to preserve the balance between stronger and weaker parties (Assefa, 1987, p.19).

In relation to personality, the power of a mediator is also important. It is argued that when third parties offer a payment and/or deadlines or penalties, these conditions may not work for a negotiated settlement. In this case, these conditions may need mediators 'with muscle' who use leverage and coercion regarding promised rewards or threatened punishments (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Touval & Zartman, 1985). If a third party has 'less

muscle', it is more likely that it will move away from the conflict or it is weaker to resolve the conflict (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011; Zartman, 1989; Zartman & Touval, 1985). In this context, defining deadlines for each section of negotiations and encouraging conflicting parties to identify their fears and expectations may possibly increase the reliability of this process. The contradictions on the characteristics of a mediator are important for a negotiation process, and this influence will be explored through a comparison between the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases (Sections 8.3 and 8.4). Hence, the thesis will examine the characteristics of the mediation in both conflicts, their process of joining or organising negotiations, and their influence in bringing ethno-nationalist conflicts to an end.

There is an idea that certain times are better for beginning negotiations than others. These starting points address pre-negotiations, clandestine negotiations, negotiating to a settlement, acquiring endorsement, application and institutionalisation (Guelke, 2003, p.56; Kriesberg, 1987). The framework of ripeness can be used as a predictive tool. However, it is claimed that to demonstrate whether a specific time for negotiation is a ripe moment or not depends on if a conflict has successfully been resolved (O'Kane, 2006, p.281). A ripe moment shows the suitable time to de-escalate violence created by intractable terrorist groups. This moment has three conditions: a 'hurting stalemate' at which the combatants should feel that the stalemate imposes unacceptable costs to all conflicting sides, the existence of valid interlocutors who are able to bring the majority of their followers to achieve a settlement, and a framework for an agreement for the basis for negotiations (O'Duffy, 2000; Zartman, 1995). Mediators have to explore this moment for resolving conflicts successfully since intervening in a conflict at a non-ripe time may be devastating (e.g. undermining trust or escalating the conflict), as unripe moments cannot be changed to ripe moments by skilful third parties (Haas, 1990, p.139; Hancock, 2001). It means that even though a mediator is powerful and has influence on conflicting parties, this circumstance may not be enough to successfully settle agreements as other psychological and motivational factors are also crucial (Coleman, 1997; Kleiboer, 1994; Pruitt, 1997). The

moments to intervene in ethno-nationalist conflicts are essential for analysing ethno-nationalist conflicts. Besides, the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases present suitable examples as negotiations between state officials and representatives of sub-state groups have been interrupted several times.

3.4. Conclusion

The chapter has given an overview of conflict resolution approaches by describing the characteristics of three levels of approaches and their influence on resolution attempts (Section 3.2). It has demonstrated the relevance of the elite level of conflict resolution processes through a comparison with grassroots initiatives. It has been stated that conflict resolution is convenient for understanding peace attempts during ethno-nationalist conflicts as it addresses the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages towards ending violence. To investigate political resolution efforts in both conflicts, this chapter has suggested a tripartite framework which incorporates a conflict resolution process: backchannel communications, peace organisations and official negotiations. Thus, this framework provides complementarity not only between track-one and track-two initiatives, but expands this approach by including track 1.5 diplomacy, so, contains track-one, track 1.5 and track-two diplomacy for a successful conflict resolution process.

This chapter has argued that conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups should be mediated by national and/or international third parties. While this process involves secret and informal peace attempts at the pre-negotiation stage, it has official negotiations and mediation at the negotiation stage. The roles of political parties, government officials, opposition leaders and independent third parties which together incorporate political interventions by the British and Turkish governments, political parties which represent the views of the IRA and PKK, and P/CROs which support de-escalating and resolving these conflicts will be analysed in the empirical chapters.

CHAPTER 4

Research Design and Methodology

'We inquire when we question; and we inquire when we seek for whatever will provide an answer to a question asked. Thus, it is of the very nature of the indeterminate situation which evokes inquiry to be questionable; or, in terms of actuality instead of potentiality, to be uncertain, unsettled, disturbed' (Dewey, 1939, p.105).

4.1. Introduction

This chapter describes case selection, data collection and analysis methods for assessing how ethno-nationalist conflicts are brought to an end in a non-violent way. To reach a comprehensive understanding, it employs a comparative analysis of a small number of cases through in-depth assessment and systematic sampling. It identifies the reasons for choosing the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts and the analysis and comparison methods of these cases. The study aims to answer a research question to focus on these objectives. The key research question is: What has been the impact of conflict resolution processes towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey?

The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section discusses the comparative case study method and its relevance for the thesis. The second section explores the case selection criteria of the research and the relevance of the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases. The third section examines how the data have been collected and analysed in the two cases. The chapter contains an analysis of semi-structured interviews, elite interviewing, document analysis, and data triangulation.

4.2. Comparative Case Study Method

This research employs a cross-case comparative analysis instead of a single-case analysis, as cross-case research offers an in-depth analysis for not only theory-testing, but also case selection between arbitrary and practical conducting methods (Eckstein, 1975, p.116). It does not employ statistical analysis, as the research objective requires a detailed qualitative investigation which is not possible with the statistical method. It applies a comparative case study method for an in-depth analysis of a 'real world' issue or a test of historical investigations that might be generalisable in order to analyse other issues (George, 1979; George & Bennett, 2005, p.17). It can be applied to many cases superficially, or just one or a few cases more comprehensively (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2003).

Case study methods can be classified regarding the number of cases under investigation and the aims of the case study methods. While 'typical' and 'influential' cases address examinations to confirm or disprove a specific theory, 'diverse', 'extreme' and 'deviant' cases are used for exploration and/or confirmation of a theory (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp.299-304). However, none of these methods represent a suitable framework for a cross-case analysis. As this research aims to explore a particular theory and is intended as representative research for ethno-nationalist conflicts, it is essential to have a comparative case analysis. In addition, it does not employ the most similar or most different case designs, as it is a comparative analysis of peace processes of two similar cases with key differences (Figure 4.1: Stage I). Notably, this research does not compare systems in general, but the same factors in peace processes in the two cases with different political, social and cultural systems (Mill, 1851; Przeworski & Teune, 1970).




Figure 4.1: Stage I-Case Study Method of the Research

This selection relies on George’s (1979) method of structured, focused comparison which deals with the examination of certain aspects of historical cases. Thus, it does not require matching cases in each dimension, unlike the most similar systems design. The method is ‘structured’, which allows researchers to use general questions reflecting the objective of the research and ‘these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardise data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p.67). These questions help to distinguish the main characteristics of ethno-nationalist conflicts and how they are brought to an end. The method is also ‘focused’ that concentrates only on certain elements of the cases through a theoretical focus suitable for cases in comparison (George & Bennett, 2005, p.70). These two aspects help to select suitable cases for comparison when there is a variation in the dependent variable at different points (Drozdoва & Gaubatz, 2009; van Evera, 1997). Hence, this method suggests focusing on not only cases with similar structure but also different outcomes of the dependent variable for an in-depth analysis. It is highlighted that the comparison between positive cases that have the outcome of interest and negative cases that lack this outcome is one of the overarching methods for theory-testing (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). It aims to explore the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases through cross-case analysis of three fundamental aspects of conflict resolution since comparative cases are more representative of the population than single-case studies. Three major aspects of conflict resolution are backchannel communications, peace organisations and official negotiations. These

aspects were selected due to their role in peace processes towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts and as they are major factors during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages of a violent conflict.

4.3. Case Selection

4.3.1. Case Selection Criteria

Case selection is one of the fundamental issues for the analysis of hypotheses and theories. As this research aims at a detailed understanding of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts regarding the influence of non-violent, political resolution attempts towards ending violence, it has required a greater-depth analysis instead of a greater-breadth examination (Gerring, 2004). There were two decisions to make regarding case selection: small-n or large-n analysis and random or systematic sampling.

Firstly, as this thesis focuses on peace processes, it requires an in-depth analysis of the role of the main armed protagonists, political parties and actors, mediators, intermediaries and peace groups in making peace. A piece of quantitative research cannot produce an in-depth analysis (Denscombe, 2014, p.30). Therefore, this research employs a qualitative research design for a greater-depth investigation as opposed to large-n analysis (Figure 4.2: Stage II). As the research necessitates analysing the role of political actors towards ending violent conflicts, a small-n study allowed the researcher to analyse a small number of cases that have undergone similar conditions. According to Gerring (2007, p.33), small-n research provides a more in-depth analysis of empirical cases. Besides, a large-n analysis is very difficult in qualitative research and data collection which methods require face-to-face interviews.




Figure 4.2: Stage II-Case Selection Criteria

There is a strong relationship between a small-n research and systematic (non-random) sampling for case selection. It is argued that random sampling can cause serious problems in small-n research as the investigation of a small number of cases needs the selection of essential cases considering theory-guidance (Collier et al., 2004; Gerring, 2007, pp.87-88; King et al., 1994, pp.124-128; Levy, 2008, p.6). Therefore, this study is based on a systematic selection of the two cases through a small-n research and face-to-face interviews as it focuses on political efforts towards ending violent conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey (Figure 4.3: Stage III). This research selected systematic sampling as random selection often prevents the analysis of desired variables in small-n research and small-n cases necessitate a careful and theory-guided selection of systematic sampling (Collier et al., 2004; Gerring, 2007, pp.87-88; King et al., 1994, pp.124-128; Levy, 2008).




Figure 4.3: Stage III-Sampling for the Research

Secondly, this research employs a structured, focused comparison of two cases to analyse the impact of non-violent resolution efforts towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts. For a detailed analysis, it applies Garfinkel’s (1981) ‘contrast space’ concept which utilises the analysis to

answer a research question when it has a specific focus on a dependent variable. In this situation, it is crucial to describe the specific distinctions of that variable. According to Collier and Mahoney (1996, p.67), 'this contrast space *vis-a-vis* the dependent variable in turn helps to define the appropriate frame of comparison for evaluating explanations'. As the research question of the thesis regards the success of political resolution efforts towards making a peace agreement, comparing successful and unsuccessful cases that have experienced similar conflict resolution processes allows a better understanding of the analysis. Choosing positive and negative cases prevents concerns about an inappropriate dimension of variance in the dependent variable.

4.3.2. The Northern Ireland and Turkey Cases

The selection process began with choosing ethno-nationalist conflicts that address not only high-profile but also the most relevant cases for investigating political, non-violent resolution attempts. It continued with an investigation of ethno-nationalist conflicts which embody conflict resolution processes. As the context of the research encompasses a specific time period, which is peace processes between the beginning of non-violent resolution efforts and a political agreement (if one is achieved), the role of political parties and actors, and independent third parties for making a peace agreement has been investigated. This process has been maintained with the analysis of two similar cases with different outcomes in terms of not only aims, attack strategies, motivations and organisational structures, but also peace processes, which has provided a detailed understanding of the influence of conflict resolution processes in ethno-nationalist conflicts.

These circumstances help to define the boundaries of the thesis. The next step was to select the specific terrorist groups to investigate. There are several classifications regarding casualties, claims and structure of terrorist groups.²⁷ However, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and

²⁷There are several counter-terrorism databases such as the National Counterterrorism Centre by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of the US, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium by counter-terrorism experts

Response to Terrorism (START) provides a comprehensive dataset as it classifies terrorist organisations regarding ideology.²⁸ According to START (2013), there were 339 ethnic, nationalist and separatist terrorist organisations throughout the world between 1920 and 2013. As this study analyses political resolution attempts, these terrorist groups are investigated by considering this condition. In this context, it is found that resolution efforts appeared in only thirty-nine cases in different regions. Although these were ethno-nationalist conflicts, they either ended due to other reasons or did not fully engage conflict resolution processes. For example, the Middle East region embodies several ethno-nationalist conflicts which illustrate negotiation attempts between states and armed groups. However, many of these attempts were organised on hostages with sub-state armed groups such as Ansar al-Jihad and the Holders of the Black Banners in Iraq and Committee of Solidarity with Arab and the Middle East Political Prisoners in Iran and Lebanon (START, 2013). Therefore, these groups cannot demonstrate a suitable background to investigate conflict resolution processes for ending terrorist campaigns of ethno-nationalist groups. The Israeli-Palestinian tension is also an important territorial issue which incorporates official and unofficial conflict resolution efforts for sustainable peace. Although the conflicts in this region have some political resolution attempts, they are not appropriate for the analysis due to the existence of two divided territories (Israel and West Bank) and as the research focuses on ethno-nationalist conflicts 'within a state'.

Similarly, many of the African conflicts have ethnic and nationalist claims. Additionally, some of them are located within states and illustrate some assumptions of conflict resolution. For example, whilst Popular Self-Defence Forces (FAP) and Polisario Front had negotiations with the

called the Beacham Group and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents by the RAND Corporation.

²⁸START is a centre of excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security conducted by the University of Maryland. The Global Terrorism Database is presented by START (see <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>). This classification does not address ethnic conflicts which do not include terrorist violence.

governments under the leadership of the UN, the negotiations with the FAP were organised for returning hostages rather than resolving this conflict. In contrast, the negotiations and mediation attempts for ending the armed campaign of Polisario Front is important. However, as this group disbanded itself apart from the conditions of peace talks, it is not a suitable case (START, 2013). Therefore, these groups were not analysed.

The Asia mainland also has several ethnic, nationalist and separatist terrorist groups. While sub-state groups in Southeast Asia are largely dominated by religious rather than ethno-nationalist claims, groups in Southwest Asia mostly have ethnic and nationalist purposes to reach their political aims. Although there are a few conflicts which are similar in structure (motivation, aims and targets) and different in outcome in Southwest Asia such as Karbi Langri in India and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, these conflicts are not included in the analysis as conflict resolution instruments were not applied completely. For example, the Tamil Eelam was defeated by the Sri Lankan security forces. Thus, there was no peace settlement or a peace process (START, 2013; van de Voorde, 2005). The conflict in Kashmir is also a significant ethnic and territorial conflict, and embodies both identity issues and peace initiatives such as track-two efforts. However, while these informal talks reduced the concerns on trust, they did not create a measurable policy influence on both governments (Waslekar, 1995). More importantly, this is not a suitable case because this conflict is between two state actors. Thus, it is not an internal dispute but a regional conflict between India and Pakistan (Wirsing, 1998). Another long-standing conflict in the Southeast Asia is the conflict in the Mindanao region of the Philippines between the Philippines government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Despite the ethnic and regional motives, this is a predominantly religious conflict since the MILF seeks for ruling the south-eastern Philippines with sharia rules and having an Islamic education system (Herbolzheimer & Leslie, 2013). Therefore, it is not the topic of this project.

The Europe and America mainlands embody various ethno-nationalist conflicts which address violent groups claiming to represent an ethnic community within a state and use violence as a tactical tool. Although armed groups in France, Corsica and Spain exhibit these conditions and illustrate similarities, their political aims could not be achieved due to the lack of political representatives such as in the conflicts deployed by Irrintzi and the Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces (Forest, 2012; START, 2013). The peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC does not include three major component of peacemaking efforts during existing violence. Instead, the process was conducted by official negotiations and partially unofficial talks (Neumann, 2007). Conversely, the Basque Country and Freedom (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, henceforth: ETA) in Spain demonstrate a distinctive example for both characteristics of the group and conflict resolution endeavours. However, this group is not suitable due to one condition: despite intensive armed and political struggle until 1979, the regime change in Spain altered the statue of ETA and Basque region without a negotiated settlement (Barros, 2003). This condition hinders to examine the influence of political efforts and hence, it was excluded from the research. In addition, Cyprus and Serbia conflicts were not included in the analysis because of several reasons. The Cyprus conflict is not an internal conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but an international conflict between Turkey and Greece where the Greek and Turkish forces intervened, and the three states (Greece, Turkey and the UK) became guarantors under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (Fisher, 2001). The Serbian conflict is a useful example of the initiatives of peace and conflict resolution organisations such as the events organised by the Women in Black (Stephenson & Zanotti, 2012). Nevertheless, it was part of an international conflict which emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia as a result of intensive conflicts in the 1990s between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro (Gagnon, 1994).

In contrast, the deep-rooted conflicts in Turkey and Northern Ireland embody not only ethnic claims, territorial issues, armed campaigns and political attempts, but also peace efforts regarding conflict resolution

processes. The IRA and PKK groups represent comprehensive comparative cases for a few reasons: Firstly, these groups have political aims and use violence to achieve their political desires. Secondly, these conflicts have many similarities regarding the armed struggle between security forces and sub-state armed groups, political claims, ethnic and separatist aims, and peace processes. Nevertheless, these similarities did not lead to the same outcome. As discussed earlier, choosing one positive and one negative case prevents the concerns of the inappropriate dimension of variance in the dependent variable (Collier & Mahoney, 1996). Thirdly, the political wings of the IRA (SF) and PKK (the HDP and its predecessors) played an imperative role in announcing and promoting the will of these groups, affecting the republican and Kurdish communities and transforming the nature of these conflicts from violence to peace. Fourthly, as the research investigates the role of political elites and independent third parties in terms of the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages, these two cases demonstrate far-reaching samples at these specific stages. Both conflicts incorporate three major aspects of a conflict resolution process. Lastly, testing instrumental approaches, which identify the role of political actors in the deep-rooted ethno-nationalist conflicts, makes this exploration representative for similar cases. The conditions of these two territories create a unique opportunity to analyse the theoretical and conceptual foundations of conflict resolution theory whether they are dependent on the theory or not (Sections 2.3 and 3.2).

Findings of the research provide a dual benefit to the existing literature. Firstly, the evidence that verifies the hypotheses through empirical results reinforces the theoretical framework that is discussed in the next section through the congruence method, which is the sub-set of structured, focused comparison (Levy, 2008, p.10). Secondly, evidence that does not confirm the predictions of the theory may illustrate a requirement to improve the existing literature.

4.3.3. The Congruence Method and Theory Testing

This research applies a comparative case study method through a cross-case comparative analysis as mentioned in the previous sections. It employs the congruence method as it requires a theory which predicts consequences on the basis of particular initial circumstances (George & Bennett, 2005, p.179). The congruence method is useful for the research since it enables the researcher to develop the value of independent and dependent variables and then compare the observed value of dependent variables in different cases and with predictions of an existing theory (George & Bennett, 2005). The primary characteristic of this method is to begin with a theory and then to examine its capacity to explain or predict the outcome in a single case or multiple cases. It can be used for comparison when coupled with counter cases as a form of controlled comparison which fits into the framework of this research (George & Bennett, 2005, pp.182-183).




Figure 4.4: Stage IV-Case Analysis

The congruence method does not require tracing the causal process that leads from the independent variable to the outcome in each condition (Figure 4.4). Hence, this research does not require the process-tracing method which aims to describe the intervening causal process between the outcome and independent variable (Collier, 2011). Besides, the congruence method prioritises avoiding spurious or inconclusive tests or loosely formulated theories. Whether conflict resolution theory's predictions and case outcomes are consistent or not is an important question. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, this study pays attention to Lederach's classification of the actors and issues for peacemaking, the practical implications of the Harvard

School's third party approaches, and the scholars who work on unofficial and informal resolution attempts not only between states, but also between a state and a sub-state armed group. It also provides support for causal interference between a theory and the outcome of cases. While the Northern Irish peace process resulted in the expected directions of conflict resolution theory, Turkey's Kurdish case is a counter-case as it does not illustrate a similar outcome. In this sense, the case might confirm the theory partially or invalidate it in specific contexts, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters (van Evera, 1997).




Figure 4.5: The Consistency of Independent Variables for Analysing Peacemaking Efforts²⁹

As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the link between the use of force as a hard-line policy and ending ethno-nationalist conflicts is spurious since these are political and identity-based problems which cannot be brought to an end through armed struggle. Moreover, there are several methods for ending violence and resolving these conflicts. Legal regulations are used as part of making peace between states and non-state armed groups; hence, they are partially consistent with the outcome. However, they are put into

²⁹ The outcomes of the independent variables are gained from different sources (Knox & Quirk, 2000; Martin, 2010; Rouhana, 2011). Although legal changes can be applied during existing violence, they are predominantly applied when an agreement is settled (Crenshaw, 2011).

action after a political settlement between conflicting parties, but not used to end a violent conflict (Figure 4.5). Thus, they do not constitute a causal priority for the analysis. Similarly, even though reconciliation is an important theory for peace and conflict studies, it is applied as peacebuilding approaches at the grassroots level that mainly focuses on community relations. In contrast, conflict resolution theory addresses peacemaking efforts until a peace agreement is reached. Hence, the link between conflict resolution procedures and the outcome of making peace demonstrates a strong causal inference. As George and McKeown (1985, pp.31-32) state, the stronger and more precise a general theory, the more confident a researcher should be that the consistency is not spurious.

Another important aspect of the congruence method is whether an independent variable is a necessary condition for a dependent variable's outcome. While official negotiations between the disputing parties is a necessary condition for a political solution, it is not sufficient since ethno-nationalist conflicts witness more comprehensive peace attempts. Therefore, this research suggests a conceptual framework in which three independent variables are influential in ending violence and reaching a political agreement: backchannel communications, peace organisations and official negotiations.



Figure 4.6: The Route of Case Selection and Analysis

As Figure 4.6 shows, the research contains a comparative analysis of two cases through the structured, focused comparison method. Although the selected cases illustrate the main characteristics of ethno-nationalist conflicts, this research may not be suitable to generalise for all violent conflicts. However, the research is important to explore the influence of conflict resolution processes in ethno-nationalist conflicts and provides the

potential to apply these findings to similar cases in the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages, as this study has aimed to reach a greater depth through small-n case analysis. Theory testing, an extension of existing frameworks, and a detailed analysis of two comprehensive conflicts require systematic sampling for exploring cases embodying political resolution attempts. The congruence method has provided a suitable framework for the consistency of conflict resolution theory rather than other conciliatory methods. Thus, the comparative case study design through an in-depth cross-case comparison is appropriate for the research as it allows a greater understanding of these cases.

4.4. Data Collection and Analysis

4.4.1. Research on Ethnic Conflicts

Research on ethnic conflicts has various challenges especially research on violent conflicts. One of the challenges is when conducting research into politically sensitive issues. Because the aim of the research has been to explore peacemaking efforts undertaken by political parties and actors, and national and international third parties, the field works in Northern Ireland and Turkey have witnessed several sensitive issues with regards to conflict-affected societies, their political representatives, and their ethnic and territorial claims. These issues have raised sensitive discussions. The reflections of the researcher on these issues have been related to ethical concerns of conducting fieldwork in dramatically divided societies and these concerns' projection in political arena. As Romano (2006a) states, different researchers tolerate different types of risks and doing research in the real world, and especially in a conflict zone undoubtedly has some risks. These different risks mainly stem from being an 'insider' or 'outsider' of a conflict zone.

The researcher has experienced different issues in the two field studies as a result of his nationality. While being 'insider' raised different challenges in Turkey's Kurdish peace process as the researcher is a Turkish

citizen, being an 'outsider' in the Northern Irish case in a highly polarised society produced different limitations during the fieldwork. There is no agreement in the literature as to whether an 'insider' or an 'outsider' is more successful in collecting data in social research. On the one hand, Adler and Adler (1987) argue that membership of a society offers an opportunity to acquire understanding in use as opposed to reconstitution of understanding. Similarly, Riemer (1977) and Brannick and Coghlan (2007) state that being an 'insider' in a research situation provides a far more comprehensive analysis opportunity for researchers due to their inherent expertise in the subject of the research. On the other hand, many other scholars argue that the research of an 'insider' is problematic and thus contentious since 'insiders' have 'a personal stake' and a significant emotional involvement in the situation. Hence, being an 'outsider' removes these potential issues (Alvesson, 2003; Anderson et al., 2007). While it may be impossible to avoid these problems, it is essential to be aware of these potential hazards in order to address the potential pitfalls. Conducting research as an 'outsider' in the Northern Irish peace process and an 'insider' in Turkey's Kurdish conflict therefore revealed different challenges which are investigated in the two field studies respectively. The following sections explain how these issues were addressed and limited during the data collection and analysis stages.

4.4.2. The Field Research Conditions in Northern Ireland

The fieldwork in Northern Ireland was challenging for several reasons: Firstly, although the researcher had worked on this topic for several years prior to the fieldwork, it was still challenging to be involved in an ethno-nationalist conflict as an 'outsider'. In contrast to the Kurdish case, there was no concern of positionality for the researcher. However, it is still difficult for any researcher to distance himself/herself following emotional involvement in an ethnic conflict which deeply divided Catholic and Protestant communities. The researcher was aware of this potential risk and so aimed to diminish this effect during the data collection stage.

The time-frame of the research was another important factor that determined the Northern Ireland-specific research conditions. The researcher expected to have a relatively free and empathetic discussion environment (compared to the Kurdish case) because the time-frame of the research fell between the late 1960s and the GFA of 1998. In contrast to the Kurdish case, the investigation of events which took place in a period that ended seventeen years prior to the date of this research, did not facilitate respondents to tell their opinions easily. This was because of the on-going discontent between the two communities and the continuing confrontation of past events in the post-conflict stage. Hence, it was challenging for both the researcher and interviewees to be part of this fieldwork. This perception required reaching key figures through 'gatekeepers'. Compared to the data collection stage in Turkey, to reach representatives of political parties who played a role in the Irish peace process was more difficult as an 'outsider' due to the lack of personal contacts. Fortunately, the Conflict Research Society's (CRS) annual conference in 2014 facilitated finding gatekeepers to help reach respondents where the researchers met the co-founders of 'Engi'. Engi is a conflict management institution which operates in many different war zones and is based in London. It has strong connections with both unionist and nationalist political agents. Engi's contacts in Northern Ireland were used as the starting point for the field research. As the purpose of the fieldwork was to interview the representatives of the political parties in Northern Ireland which played a role in the peace process, the contacts provided by Engi were a suitable fit for the sample of this project. The field research then continued with the contacts of the respondents interviewed with and the interviewees who responded to the researcher's interview request by email.

The other important part of the fieldwork was archival research in order to collect primary documents in TNA in London. The language of the archival documents was English, so the researcher collected and analysed a rich source of information on the backchannel communications between the British government and the republican movement, the contact within the Catholic community, and between the British government and peace

groups. The role played by intermediaries and other secret meetings was also revealed from the declassified secret archival papers. This primary document analysis was vital due to the timeframe of the project and was very helpful particularly in assessing the events of the late 1960s and the 1970s.

4.4.3. The Field Research Conditions in Turkey

The fieldwork in Turkey was undertaken together with several major challenges. The identity of the researcher was one of the challenges that needed to be mitigated during the data collection and analysis stages. As a Turkish citizen, there was a potential pitfall that the identity of the researcher would prevent the emergence of an emotional investment in the Kurdish peace process. The researcher was able to diminish this influence by aiming to interview the representatives of both sides, namely the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement, and this increased the reliability of the research. The researcher aimed to reach key respondents for both sides in order to reduce the role any conscious or unconscious personal bias might play at the data collection stage. Even if both sides were included in the analysis, it is still difficult for the researcher to isolate his own positionality from the project at the data analysis stage. However, as Mullings (1999, p.337) indicates, a researcher's knowledge always has the potential for bias since his/her positionality is 'shaped by his/her unique mix of race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality and other identifiers' and is affected by the location and timing of the research conducted. Hence, this is not a peculiar problem to 'insiders', instead, each researcher has the potential to affect the outcome of research. Furthermore, despite this project being fully funded by the Turkish Ministry of National Education, the Ministry did not make any requests that the researcher either works on a specific topic or attempt to determine the framework and route of the research in a specific way. Thus, this funding did not cause an ethical issue in this project.

Being an 'insider' in the Kurdish peace process provided a substantial advantage due to the researcher having a broad understanding of the political, social and cultural context of this conflict, and experience of events in the peace process. In addition, being an 'insider' facilitated the researcher to use the advantage of being 'local' and thus to more easily establish contact with political parties and actors, as well as local and national third parties. This opportunity resulted in interviews with many important political figures from both conflicting parties which will be explored in the next section. This advantage at the data collection stage was followed by the primary document collection and access to the archive. Knowledge of the Turkish language facilitated the investigation of the official documents during the data collection and analysis stage as the majority of these documents are not translated to English. This condition provided a notable advantage to the researcher and hence, strengthened understanding and insight into this violent conflict.

The fieldwork was conducted between June and July 2015, and in September of 2015. The reason the fieldwork was separated into two phases was to avoid the holiday period in Turkey in August, as it was not possible to interview key respondents. The first phase of the fieldwork was carried out before the collapse of the long-standing ceasefire. Therefore, even though there was no peace effort taking place due to the reluctance of the government at the time the fieldwork was carried out, the peace process did not end officially. Therefore, it was a safe enough environment for conflicting sides to talk about their perceptions, and hence, it was easier to explore their intentions and reluctance towards non-violent, political resolution attempts. The ceasefire term helped the researcher to negotiate access to a greater number of political figures. However, the second phase of the fieldwork in Turkey was conducted after the ceasefire was broken and when the peace process failed. This created a twofold reflection. Firstly, after the confidence building measures between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement collapsed, representatives of both sides were unwilling to be interviewed about the peace process itself. Therefore, it was relatively difficult to reach respondents during this second phase. However,

the advantage of being local was capitalised on in order to reach respondents by virtue of the personal contacts of the researcher. Specifically, these personal contacts helped reach key political figures from the Turkish government and HDP. Having arranged the meeting dates with a sufficient number of respondents, the remainder of the contacts were negotiated through these key contacts using the 'insider' advantage. The 'snowball effect' helped to complete the data collection stage with a relatively broad range of primary material. Overall, the fieldwork in Turkey did not create any ethical issues regarding personal risks because the field research was conducted in İstanbul and Ankara where peacemaking initiatives were being conducted by political figures and peace groups. Thus, the researcher was not required to visit Turkey's south-eastern cities, a region declared a war-zone and where the violent conflict had moved into urban areas.

4.4.4. Document Analysis: Archival Research and Secondary Sources

A further method of collecting and analysing primary sources is document analysis as it provides a detailed understanding of the policies of political parties and governments. This is because the method includes precise information about events and covers a substantial time span (Gray, 2009, p.259; King et al., 1994, p.125). In addition, texts are explored by emphasising not only what is said but also what is not said (Rapley, 2007, p.111). Keeping these features in mind, official documents, including government policy papers, public statements issued by the IRA and PKK, secret meetings and public statements from state officials as well as the political wings of terrorist groups, were selected from the National Archive (TNA) in London, the National University of Ireland (NUI) archive in the Republic of Ireland and the Turkish Military Forces Archive (TSKA) in Ankara.

The primary documents were collected in respect to the research question of this thesis, which concerns specific timeframes for each of the

two cases. The context of events and the specific periods are from 1969 to 1998 for the Northern Ireland case and from 1984 to 2015 for the Turkey case. Therefore, this analysis has investigated a wide range of information in order to understand the policies, intentions and efforts of political parties concerning resolution efforts of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts. This timeframe covered hundreds of archival folders in the NUI and TNA archives. The NUI archive was used to access backchannel communication notes between the British government and republican movement. These texts were not particularly comprehensive in length, but provided very rich information with regards to the direct and indirect communication channels between the mid-1970s and early 1990s. TNA provided hundreds of archival files and folders between 1969 and 1986 due in part to the thirty-year rule where confidential documents are released to the public thirty years after their creation. The researcher focused on the Cabinet Papers (CAB), Prime Minister Office's confidential papers (PREM), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Home Office and Northern Ireland Office (CJ) files, and records of the Ministry of Defence (DEFE). In contrast, there were very few available sources with respect to the Kurdish case due to the more recent timeframe and these were confined to the TSK's MGK meeting notes.

In order to assess these documents, several major codes were followed which were determined by the theoretical framework. These codes were the correlation between secret talks and the outcome of peace efforts, mediators as key actors or facilitators, the contribution of P/CROs regarding pushing political elites towards political reforms and a non-violent resolution. In addition, forwarding the demands of conflicting communities to decision makers, the relationships between the governments and sub-state armed groups and their political wings in the application of armed and political resolution methods, conflicting parties, their intention and reluctance towards peace, and spoilers to distract, interrupt or collapse peace processes were also important factors determining the theoretical framework. These key codes were analysed for the two peace processes through a tripartite assessment, which involved

not only conflicting parties but also national and international third parties. Of specific focus were the attitudes of the British and Turkish governments towards non-violent peace efforts, changes in these attitudes, the positions of the IRA and PKK towards ceasefires, decommissioning, peace deals, and the role of intermediaries and international mediators which were all assessed through the collected data. These codes helped to distinguish the necessary archival papers from a wide range of documents. Therefore, the first step was to distinguish the parties and actors who mostly dominated the peace processes. For example, as the purpose was to examine the role of the conflicting parties in the two peace processes, the role played by smaller parties in Northern Ireland, such as the Green Party and Alliance Party of Northern Ireland was not investigated in the Northern Irish case. This was because of their limited role in the conflict resolution process (Archick, 2014). Similarly, the parties, which were not represented in the Parliament, were not investigated, as they did not play role in the peace process. For example, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) and Great Unity Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*) are not included in the analysis due to the lack of their role in the Turkish case. Secondly, the papers, which are related to communications within political parties or within communities, were excluded from the assessment. Although these were important exchanges, they provided an indirect effect instead of affecting the nature of the conflict resolution efforts in a substantial manner. In this sense, the dialogue within nationalist and unionist communities aimed at creating a pan-nationalist and a pan-unionist approach in Northern Ireland, and within the nationalist movement were not included in the assessment. The focus therefore was to explore peacemaking efforts that were mostly dominated by the stakeholders, namely, the British government, the unionist, nationalist and republican parties, and national and international third parties. Lastly, the declassified secret documents, which revealed the underlying community relations at the grassroots level, were not consistent with the codes of the theoretical framework of this thesis, and so they were excluded from the assessment.

When reflecting on the archival research, it is apparent that this method yielded broad information consisting of thousands of declassified government documents of state, intelligence, defence and other departments. Incomplete records and inaccessibility were two major problems encountered during this research. However, the increasing accessibility of secret documents in TNA in London, particularly with respect to the government's secret strategies towards the future of Northern Ireland, aided the analysis due to certain government initiatives, most recently the 2005 Freedom of Information Act. However, certain intelligence agency files are exempt from this Act; attempts were made to overcome this obstacle through the investigation of the same topics in the archives of other government departments. Although there is limited data on the TSKA in documents recorded in the 1980s and 1990s, an investigation of the policy papers published by the Turkish government and the political parties that claim to represent the PKK enhanced the research. As archival documents are frequently redacted by the governments, there is a possibility that the truth has been manipulated. In this type of situation, the primary data obtained from the archives was checked against secondary sources.

In addition to the archival research, secondary resources proved essential for the research as they offered different interpretations of this topic. A broad range of secondary sources were used, namely, academic literature, official reports published by governmental bodies, and reports of NGOs and peace groups. The academic literature mainly concentrates on peacebuilding measures regarding community relations, and on peacemaking initiatives that predominantly focus on official resolution attempts. In order to investigate unofficial and informal conflict resolution efforts, policy reports from NGOs and peace groups, and human rights reports from national and international organisations provided useful data. A detailed reading of the existing literature on the two cases provided alternative explanations that helped to verify the findings of the primary sources with the academic and non-academic secondary literature. The wide-ranging nature of the narrative sources in both conflicts including

academic books, journal and newspaper articles facilitated an understanding and interpretation of the collected data from the primary sources. This was achieved through methodological triangulation, a crosscheck between the data collected from the interviewees, archival sources and secondary sources.

Several reflections emerged regarding the secondary sources. Personal memoirs of former political actors and important figures in both cases were used to fill the gap of archival research and interviews. Autobiographies were used to gather the perceptions of eyewitnesses such as the memoirs of John Major, Margaret Thatcher, Jonathan Powell, Cengiz Çandar and Abdullah Öcalan, who all played key roles in their respective peace processes. However, these sources might create problems of reliability due to the danger that the authors might wish to present a better image of themselves. Nevertheless, by taking into account the potential problem of reliability, these sources provided detailed information to understand their motivations.

4.4.5. Semi-Structured and Elite Interviews

Interviews take different forms, such as structured, semi-structured, unstructured, informal and naturalistic (Davies, 2006, p.158). This research adopted the semi-structured interview method for collecting data as it not only enables a series of questions to be asked in the general interview form, but it also allows changes in the sequence of questions (Littig, 2009, p.105; McEvoy, 2006). This method gave the interviewer the freedom to ask questions regarding the most significant points being investigated (Bryman, 2012, p.212). Furthermore, as the interviewer needed to conduct one-to-one interviews and collect information on a sensitive issue (i.e. terrorism), semi-structured interviews were deemed to be the most appropriate method (Adams, 2010, p.367). This type of interview provided a more flexible data-gathering environment in both the UK and Turkey.

Thirty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from conflicting parties, other political parties from the

conflict-affected societies, the British and Turkish governments, peace groups, intermediaries, and other groups and actors who played role in the two peace processes (see Appendix). The sample was selected with respect to the particular nature of the peace processes. As the purpose was to assess peacemaking initiatives, the parties and groups which played role in aiding, facilitating or obstructing peace initiatives were the topic of this project. Therefore, purposive sampling was adopted in order to explore the conflict resolution processes of the two cases through elite interviewing. As political resolution attempts have been dominated since the beginning of each conflict by disputing parties, namely, governments and political wings of sub-state armed groups, and independent third parties, they were the sample of the research in these two conflicts. The desires of the IRA and PKK were examined through their political wings. Thus, the sample of this project was the representatives of the British and Turkish governments, political parties which played a role in the Kurdish and Northern Irish peace processes, pro-Kurdish and republican parties, and other political agents and independent third parties who affected both peace processes. The aim of this research was not to interview current or former members of the IRA and PKK. Instead, as the intention was to understand the role of political elites in a peace process, interviews with members of SF and the HDP (and its predecessors), other political parties and government officials provided the primary data.

The sample in the Northern Irish case consisted of the political agents who played role in the peace process: the DUP, SDLP, SF, UUP and the British government. The role played by the backchannel communications and peace groups was investigated through declassified confidential archival papers in the NUI and TNA since the time-frame of the research did not allow the researcher to contact the key figures. The official negotiations were assessed through semi-structured interviews with key political agents. For example, John Hume was a key figure in the peace process, however, it was not possible to interview him since his secretary stated that he was not able to respond any questions any more due to illness. In fact, many of the political figures who played a role in the early

stage of the conflict were either very old or were deceased at the time the fieldwork was conducted. The researcher was able to fill this gap by interviewing another key figure, the co-founder of the SDLP, Dennis Haughey. In addition to Engi's help as gatekeeper (Section 4.4.2), the researcher emailed many of the political figures who were involved in the peace process. Although many of them did not reply, some of the political actors consented to the interview request. For example, the researcher interviewed key figures such as the former leader of the UUP and member of the House of Commons, Lord Reginald Empey, and senior member of SF, Jim Gibney. All interviews were conducted in Belfast and London according to the availability of the respondents.

The sample in the Kurdish case was relatively limited when compared with the Northern Irish case since the peace process was mostly dominated by the Turkish government and a pro-Kurdish movement consisting of the PKK and its political wings (which was specifically the HDP at the time the field research was carried out). As the pro-Kurdish parties (which were founded following their predecessors' closure by the Constitutional Court) had the same ideology and their membership was almost identical to their predecessor organisation, the HDP was representative of the political nature of the conflict. In addition, it was possible to reach the chairpersons and other members of the peace groups and intermediaries and therefore interviews took place, in part due to the Kurdish conflict being a contemporary issue. Overall, the researcher successfully reached many of the key figures in the peace process due to his 'insider' status in the conflict. For example, interviews with the co-leader of the HDP, Figen Yüksekdağ, pro-Kurdish deputies and the members of the İmralı Committee, Altan Tan and İdris Baluken, and the chief advisor to the PM Hatem Ete provided unique information for exploring the root causes for the failure of the peace process. The researcher reached these respondents due to the assistance of personal contacts, such as the HDP deputies. Similarly, it was possible to reach the representatives of the Turkish government and many of the independent third parties due to academic contacts of the researcher in Turkey. The remainder of the

respondents were reached through requests by the researcher via email and telephone calls. Refusal was not an issue in the Turkish case; instead, the main obstacle was the difficulty in reaching the high-level officials who were responsible for deciding the future of the peace process. Bearing in mind these limitations, the interview material provided a broad range of data in order to analyse the Kurdish peace process. The sample in both cases, therefore, was representative as the opinions of all conflicting parties were included at the data collection stage. In addition, a 'snowballing' effect enabled reaching other important political figures thanks to the interviewees. The interview material was verified by crosschecking with personal memoirs of political figures and with secondary literature through methodological triangulation method which will be explained in the next section.

The interview discussions focused on various topics and were comparable with the data collected from the archival sources. Discussion topics included the opinions of the respondents on the causes of the conflict, the reasons for the failure of various peace initiatives, the function of the interviewees in the peace process, the key issues and events of the conflict and their thoughts on the future of the two respective cases. The use of semi-structured interviews strengthened the receptivity of the interviewees, because, as Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p.674) state, it increases response validity for the interviewer. The interviewer initiated semi-structured interviews with open questions and allowed the interviewees to answer these questions independently as it is easier to collect information from politicians through face-to-face interviews (De Leeuw, 2008, p.318).

Nevertheless, it was recognised that adopting semi-structured interviews and elite interviewing methods was a risky strategy because such methods might provoke more subjective opinions from respondents. Richards (1996, p.200) claims that the reliability of interviewees is questionable as interviewees may give misleading answers by overlooking the real issue. However, the reliability of interviewees is not a specific

problem during elite interviewing. Rather, it is a general concern in all interview techniques (Morris, 2009, p.213). In response to this issue, the researcher conducted semi-structured and face-to-face interviews with officials, former officials and independent groups and actors who work or have worked on the peace efforts in Northern Ireland and Turkey in order to ascertain their core opinions. This risk was reduced through methodological triangulation by verifying the data across the interviews as well as with archival material, reports and secondary sources.

All interviews were conducted in English in the UK, and in Turkish in Turkey. Therefore, a very rich discussion with the interviewees was facilitated by conducting the interviews in the native language of the respondents. The interview locations were chosen by the respondents. These were usually their work place and, on occasion, a coffee shop. At the beginning of each interview, the respondents were asked for their consent for the interviews to be recorded and for the resulting records to be used in this academic project. In this context, there was only one ethical concern: anonymity. One interviewee asked for his/her anonymity to be maintained during the interview. Only the association or job title of this interviewee was used in this thesis to secure the interviewee's anonymity, which allowed him/her to speak freely. In addition, there was only one interviewee who preferred that the interview was not recorded. All other interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees involved.

The interviews were transcribed and the key codes were examined, comprising of the theoretical assumptions of conflict resolution theory (Sections 3.3 and 4.4.4). All interviews were assessed with respect to these themes and the assumptions of the elite level of conflict resolution (relating to the three major aspects of conflict resolution theory) to understand both peace processes. The findings from the semi-structured interviews were verified with archival material. The primary sources were then tested with secondary sources.

4.4.6. Triangulation

The term triangulation refers to the observation of an issue by (at least) two different methods (Flick, 2006, p.305). The triangulation approach utilises selected methods to obtain the most integrated and thorough data available (Denzin, 1978). This approach was useful as it facilitated the uncovering of data and expansion of the perception of the two cases and also demonstrated different aspects of empirical research (Hall & Rist, 1999; Patton, 1990). It provides an opportunity to test the findings of one type of study with another and simplifies these findings to increase the reliability and validity of research to present the data coherently (King et al., 2004, p.192; Mabry, 2008, p.221; Punch, 2005, p.241).




Figure 4.7: Triangulation of Collected Data

The research is a combination of semi-structured interviews and archival research and has been supported by secondary sources. Therefore, it is essential to bring these methods together coherently. The research followed methodological triangulation since this approach serves as a detailed means of checking the appropriateness of data obtained from these methods. More specifically, methodological triangulation gathers complete data that strengthens the investigation of outcomes, allows improvement of the theory and information, and increases the validity and reliability of this research (Morse, 1991, p.122). It has been used to increase the validity and reliability of the empirical analysis of the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases and has deepened the investigation of peace efforts to end violence in these conflicts.

4.5. Methodological Reflections

As a result of the application of the methodological tools of this research, a few reflections have emerged. Firstly, the archival research has yielded broad information consisting of thousands of declassified government documents of state, intelligence, defence and other departments. Incomplete records and inaccessibility were two major problems during this research. However, the increasing accessibility of secret documents in TNA in London, particularly on the government's secret strategies towards the future of Northern Ireland, aided the analysis thanks to a series of government schemes, most recently the 2005 Freedom of Information Act. However, some intelligence agency files are exempt from this act; it was attempted to overcome this obstacle through the investigation of the same topics in other government departments' material. Although there is limited data on the TSKA in documents recorded in the 1980s and 1990s, policy papers published by the Turkish government and the political parties that claim to represent the PKK were investigated to enhance the investigation. As archival documents are mostly redacted by the governments, there is a possibility that they can manipulate the truth. For this type of situation, the primary data obtained from the archives was checked against secondary sources.

Secondly, personal memoirs of former political actors and important figures in both cases have been used to fill the gap of archival research and interviews. Autobiographies have been used to gather the perceptions of eyewitnesses such as memoirs of John Major, Margaret Thatcher, Jonathan Powell, Cengiz Çandar and Abdullah Öcalan, who all played key roles in the two peace processes. However, these sources might create problems of reliability due to the danger of the authors wishing to present a better image of themselves. By considering the potential problem of reliability, these sources provided detailed information to understand their motivations.

Lastly, there was only one ethical concern of the research regarding interviews: anonymity. One interviewee asked to maintain his/her

anonymity during the interview. Only the association or job title of this interviewee was used in this thesis to secure the interviewee's anonymity, which allowed him/her to speak freely. In addition, there was only one interviewer who preferred that the interview would not be recorded. All other interviews were recorded thanks to the consent of the interviewees.

CHAPTER 5

The Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish Peace Processes: A Historical Overview

'The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle' (Rousseau, 1895).

5.1. Introduction

The chapter focuses on the background of the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes. The purpose of the chapter is to use narrative descriptions of the two conflicts to highlight the structures and agencies used to bring about conflict resolution approaches. The intractable conflicts in Turkey and Northern Ireland encompass not only ethno-nationalist claims, territorial issues, armed campaigns and political attempts to resolve these disputes, but also similar conflict resolution processes. Both the IRA and PKK groups primarily aim to change political systems of states and organise attacks against armed forces and civilians to reach their political goals (Crenshaw, 2011; Guelke, 1995). These primary purposes address their separatist aspirations. While the primary aim of the IRA was the reunification of Ireland, the PKK's goal is to establish an independent Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey (Laqueur, 2004; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007, p.100; Stavenhagen, 1996). These goals have determined the evolution of these conflicts and peace processes which are assessed in this chapter.

Having developed a conceptual and theoretical framework in order to assess the two ethno-nationalist conflicts in question, it is significant to

identify the history and evolution of both peace processes. When assessing the background of both cases, the aim was to distinguish the issues and actors who played a role in the evolution of these conflicts and conflict resolution processes. Based on the assumptions of conflict resolution theory, different types of events will be demonstrated, namely, backchannel communications, initiatives of peace and conflict resolution organisations, and official negotiations. The analysis of each event was not possible, thus, the selection of major events inevitable which depended upon the parties and actors involved in these initiatives. While secret talks were achieved between the conflicting parties and intermediaries, official negotiations were carried out between the major political parties, governments and political representatives of the PKK and SF. Therefore, the events organised by other agents, for instance within the nationalist and unionist communities aiming to create pan-nationalist and pan-unionist approaches were not examined as their influence was deemed to be limited in both peace processes. For example, although Father Alec Reid is an important figure in the Northern Irish peace process, his influence in peacemaking efforts was limited since he focused on bringing nationalist groups together and creating a shared democratic approach (Alonso, 2004). The perceptions and initiatives of representatives of disputing parties, namely the pro-Kurdish and republican movements on the one hand, and the Turkish and British governments on the other, determined the position of the conflicting communities. The intensity of these conflicts and major issues also affected deep-rooted ethnic concerns of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland and the Kurdish community in Turkey. The reaction of society and reluctance of conflicting parties affected the progress in both peace processes negatively when the level of violence increased. Besides, even though peacebuilding efforts were influential at the grassroots level, their influence on peacemaking initiatives was limited (Section 3.2.1), so they were not discussed in this chapter. In addition, insufficient or no progress in political resolution efforts resulted in the application of armed campaign. The correlation between armed and political struggle determined the success of the peace processes. These

complicated relationships will be discussed in both conflicts by focusing on their effect on de-escalating these conflicts, ending violence and establishing a political agreement.

The chapter is split into three parts. Firstly, it describes the background of the Northern Irish conflict from the beginning of the 'Troubles' in 1969, to the final accord called the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998. The research firstly focuses on non-violent, political resolution attempts at peacemaking, namely, the peace process including ceasefires, secret and official talks between the British government and republican movement, political parties in Northern Ireland and the representatives of the IRA, and the armed conflict between the security forces and IRA. Secondly, it defines the background of the Kurdish conflict from 1984 to 2015 when the peace process collapsed and violence returned. In contrast to the Northern Irish conflict, the Kurdish conflict still remains active.³⁰ Both cases are divided into three periods which are determined by the intensity of the conflicts, and the frequency and efficiency of resolution attempts. Although both cases followed a similar path from escalation to de-escalation together with official negotiations, the final periods were decisive in bringing these conflicts to an end. Therefore, the section on Turkey explains the evolution of the peace efforts since there is no agreement to end the conflict. The last section compares the evolution of both cases and the balance between armed and political struggle.

5.2. The Background of the Northern Ireland Peace Process

The Anglo-Irish War between 1919 and 1921 caused a division in Ireland. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 gave twenty-six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland independence (the Republic of Ireland). The other six counties remained in the UK as their majority preferred union with Britain. After the

³⁰ Although the Northern Irish peace process reached an agreement and violence came to an end, the dissident republican groups are not dissolved.

division, Northern Ireland was ruled from the parliament at Stormont. Since this time, the violence in Northern Ireland increased with the armed campaign of the PIRA (Cairns & Darby, 1998, p.755). The violent conflict continued until the signing of the GFA. The IRA did not hesitate to kill people and damage financial interests to end British authority, according to the rules set out in the Green Book³¹ (Coogan, 2002). According to Catholic nationalists, the main cause of the conflict was the involvement of the British state (Byrne, 2002, pp.140-141; Wolff, 2002, p.43). In addition, Article 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution deepened the political violence as it maintained the constitutional claim of the Republic to Ireland as a whole by addressing citizens of Ireland and the Irish nation. The opposition between the nationalist and unionist sides extended the degree of violence. By the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement in the US inspired Catholics as they founded the Civil Rights Association in 1967 for social justice and reforms. The main concern of the Catholic community was to get some sort of equality under the law. Although the protests began with sit-ins and media engagement, they were transformed into an uprising due to Catholic and Protestant extremists. The situation became worse which led to civil violence known as 'the Troubles' (Little, 2006, p.58). As conflict resolution efforts were predominantly initiated after the beginning of the Troubles, this term is the beginning point of this research.

This section is divided into three periods. The first period defines the origins of the modern Troubles and escalation of the conflict. It also describes the backchannel communications between the main armed protagonists which was the first step of the peace process. The second period illustrates a change in the characteristic of the conflict as the political initiatives were on the rise as opposed to counter-terrorism measures. The last period witnessed comprehensive official negotiations and mediation that resulted in the signing of the final agreement.

³¹ The Green Book was a blueprint to give trainees the ability to keep the IRA's political aims in mind and to oppose external pressures. The book described all trainee aspects and the purpose of the republican movement (Coogan, 2002, p.544).

5.2.1. Period I: From Emergence to Escalation (1969-1976)

The modern Troubles in Northern Ireland began in the late 1960s, subsequently almost 3,500 people died as a result of the political violence until 1999 (Archick, 2014, pp.1-2; Lavery, 2002). Both Catholic and Protestant communities caused violence during the civil rights marches in the mid-1960s.

Before the Troubles, on the one hand, the IRA's view was 'when the guns came out and people were being shot, the only ones who could protect [the Catholic community] were the IRA' (Hanley, 2009, p.27). Similarly, Catholics assumed that the IRA could defend them against the British troops before the intervention of the British Army (Bell, 1973, p.402). On the other hand, the British government arranged meetings through the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)³² to prevent clashes between Catholic marchers and Protestant communities (Charters, 2013, p.206). In addition, it established the Community Relations Commission (CRC) to bring Catholic and Protestant communities together to encourage societal development (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007, p.13). The British government's initiatives to close the gap between these two communities were not sufficient to prevent the Troubles.

During 1969, the degree of violence in Northern Ireland rapidly increased. The reason for this was the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant communities over the future of Northern Ireland regarding the reunification of the whole island or Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK. The British government followed two paths to end the Troubles. The first path was the military intervention of British forces in Northern Ireland. The intervention created different expectations on the unionist and nationalist sides. The Catholic community initially welcomed the British

³² The JIC is part of the British Cabinet Office which events and situations relating to external affairs, international criminal activities, defence, terrorism, and other transnational issues, focusing on secret intelligence (Goodman, 2014).

troops as it halted Protestant attacks on their communities. However, the IRA militants blamed their leaders for their inability to secure Catholics and Republicans in Northern Ireland. The division of the IRA stemmed from another group within the IRA which sought to participate in the political system instead of organising violent attacks (Copeland, 2001). This dissidence led to a division within the IRA. While the new group named itself the Provisional IRA (PIRA or Provos), the original IRA became known as the Official IRA. The dissidence emerged over decisions on maintaining the armed campaign or appealing to the political struggle. While the Official IRA was inclined to declare a ceasefire in 1972, the PIRA (henceforth: IRA) began its violent campaign in 1970 (Little, 2006, p.60). The violent campaign was dominated by bombings, murders and violent protests. The marches were brought to an end by the British Army in 1969 (Little, 2006, p.59). However, the intensity of the violence did not decline because of the belief of the British government and republicans that they could defeat their respective enemies through military means.

In the early 1970s, SF began to play an active role in the Northern Irish conflict. SF declared its manifesto called *Eire Nua* written by David O'Connell (vice president of the IRA) and Ruairi O'Bradaigh (president of the IRA) in January 1971. This was its first attempt to consider unifying Irish people and their independence. It has been argued that the manifesto was not a successful strategy, as it overlooked the importance of Ulster Unionism as a greater obstacle to its goals rather than the British authorities. However, it is an important document since it illustrates the IRA's negotiation aim (Craig, 2012, p.99). Nevertheless, this intention did not stop clashes between unionists and nationalists which coincided with the unionist government of Northern Ireland's introduction of an 'internment policy'. Although the Northern Irish government introduced this policy for ending violence, it was used for the internment of IRA suspects without trial in 1971 (Moore, 1997, p.85). Despite the opposition of the Catholic community, 2,447 people were arrested between 9 August 1971 and 14 February 1972, and this triggered republican violence (Kennedy-Pipe & Mumford, 2009, p.59). British troops interfered in a

march on January 30, 1972 a day that became known as 'Bloody Sunday' as thirteen unarmed Catholics were killed by British soldiers (Little, 2006, p.60). This disaster deteriorated the situation. For example, an Official IRA bombing caused three civilian deaths, this was followed by an attempt to assassinate a Northern Ireland government minister. Immediately after this attack, British PM Edward Heath, introduced the 'direct rule' system from Westminster. Although the purpose was to bring violence to an end, it was dramatically increased following the events of July 21, 1972, known as 'Bloody Friday' when nine civilians were killed and 130 people injured by IRA bombings across Belfast. Direct rule would be maintained until the GFA (Little, 2006, p.61). In addition, the IRA set off nineteen car bombs in Belfast. The British troops intervened in the situation by aiming to crush the IRA and to break the link with its supporters. 'Operation Motorman' launched on July 31, 1972 was organised to intervene in the 'No Go' areas of Londonderry³³ and Belfast, ending the presence of IRA safe houses. According to Craig (2012, p.106), Frank Steele (the SIS Officer and UK Representative, henceforth: UKREP) had allowed the IRA to be warned in advance, so the risk to their lives was minimised. Although Steele's notification helped to make further talks possible for both sides, it was his personal intention instead of the government's decision. Arguably, the reason for applying traditional military tactics was to destroy the enemy which resulted in dividing the Catholic and Protestant communities. This was because of the belief that the British army was defending the Protestant community and the IRA was fighting to defend the rights of the Catholic community (Section 1.3).

The second path was political intervention. In August 1969, the British government was suspicious about the Stormont administration and hence, established the Office of the UKREP to pay attention to Stormont's reform programme led by three officials: Oliver Wright, Ronnie Burroughs and Howard Smith. The purpose of the UKREP was to gather political

³³ The official name of the city is Londonderry. However, many residents call it Derry. While the unionists prefer to use Londonderry, the nationalists use Derry.

intelligence and to begin discussions about Northern Ireland politics. Wright obtained information by creating a 'backdoor' channel to talk to the IRA which was completely separate from the Northern Ireland government sources (Craig, 2012, p.101). These backchannels were initiated by intermediaries during the period of intense violence since the early Troubles. For example, Tom Caldwell, a former British Army officer, was the first intermediary between the British government and IRA whose personal intention helped the declaration of the first IRA ceasefire in March 1972 that will be discussed in Chapter 6. It is an important question why the British applied to secret communication channels. Arguably, it can be said that it was because of the difficulty to initiate official talks due to the on-going violence. While the aim of the British government to attend these talks was to stop violence, potential outcry in the society against talking to the enemy was the reason for confidentiality.

Even though the year 1972 was the bloodiest year of the Troubles, two of the three peace attempts were launched after Bloody Sunday even if the hope for peace tended to be low. For example, the secret talks between the leaders of the IRA and British officials brought about the IRA's temporary ceasefire on June 26, 1972 by calling a 'bi-lateral truce'. In the end, the IRA declared a temporary ceasefire on June 26, 1972. Nevertheless, the ceasefire ended after only thirteen days. The critical point was that even though the ceasefire ended, both sides were willing to talk to each other which was evident through the IRA senior members led by Joe Cahill's talk again with the Labour Party leader Harold Wilson in the UK (Craig, 2012, pp.105-106). This backchannel was the first direct contact between the republicans and the British. This contact was a chance for understanding the desires of both sides for peace whose result will be examined through the pre-negotiation stage of this conflict resolution process. However, it was not the only secret meeting. Mumford (2011, p.636) notes that the most meaningful secret talks were the meetings between six senior IRA members and the Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw on July 7, 1972. Why this event happened is an important question particularly during the term of violence. According to the IRA, it was a test to determine

whether the British officials were ready for negotiations (Taylor, 1998, p.136). Hence, it was clear that the IRA attended these meetings seeking to understand the willingness of the British government to negotiate. This event had a paramount importance in the pre-negotiation stage. There were various disagreements during the Whitelaw talks such as the question of self-determination and the British Army's withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Therefore, the ceasefire lasted just two days. However, PM Edward Heath defended talking with the IRA (Mumford, 2011, pp.637-638). Despite the lack of an agreement, the secret talks are vital as they are the commencing stage of a conflict resolution process that will be assessed in Chapter 6. The important point is that the IRA called 1972 its 'year of victory' for their military campaign, but did not interrupt the communications with British officials (Craig, 2012, p.104). Therefore, it is said that there was a shift in the policy of SF and the IRA to develop a political strategy other than the armed struggle and short-term military tactics (Bishop & Mallie, 1988). However, the increased militarisation of both sides resulted in the failure of this political strategy, leading the IRA to the long-war strategy in the late 1970s (Darby & MacGinty, 2000). The aim of this strategy was to worsen the economic problems in the region (Arthur, 1984). The role of major political actors to establish, promote or maintain peace initiatives will be analysed in Chapters 6 and 8. Besides, the decisive role of political elites in preventing and hindering the evolution of the process will be a significant factor for the analysis.

Another series of peace attempts were achieved by the Londonderry businessperson Brendan Duddy who played an intermediary role between British officials and the IRA. The intermediary and messenger role of Duddy in 1974 and 1975 between MI6 (Military Intelligence Section 6, also known as the Secret Intelligence Service) and the Provisionals' Army Council helped to extend the IRA ceasefire in 1975 (Craig, 2012, p.99). Duddy was also an intermediary between the MI6 officers, Frank Steele and Michael Oatley (successor of Steele) and the IRA. These communications were significant since they strengthened the peace talks. For example, Steele

played an important role in extending Laneside's³⁴ contacts further into war-affected communities in Northern Ireland thanks to Duddy's successful part as an intermediary (Craig, 2012, p.102). The underlying reason for building these communication channels are at the forefront of the peace process at the pre-negotiation stage which was the intention of the intermediaries such as Brendan Duddy and Tom Caldwell. These secret initiatives will be examined regarding the indirect communications in Chapter 6.

Finally, with the participation of Whitelaw, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. At Sunningdale, the Irish government recognised Northern Ireland for the first time (McDaid, 2013, p.25). However, the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed in 1974 resulting in a change of the approach to talking to armed groups. James Allan of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Michael Oatley followed a low-level discussion strategy and organised meetings with loyalists instead of republicans. As Craig (2012, p.108) notes, Allan and Oatley played an important role in talks by communicating with loyalist paramilitaries within the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) before and after the UWC strike in relation to prisoners and community politics. As these talks were achieved within the unionist bloc, their influence in changing the nature of the conflict and reducing the level of violence was limited. However, the British government maintained its standpoint on peaceful resolution despite the lack of significant success. The Feakle Talks were a cover story between the political wing of the republican movement and Sir Frank Cooper, the Permanent Secretary to the NIO in Stormont and were mediated by Protestant clergymen that facilitated the IRA ceasefire in December 1974. Wilson and Merlyn Rees (the British Secretary of State for

³⁴ Laneside is a house which was suspected of being a station of the British Intelligence in Northern Ireland. It was officially the residence of the British political reporting service. Many of secret talks were achieved in the Laneside House between the British officials and the members of the IRA (Craig, 2012, p.102).

Northern Ireland) had personally met with the leaders of the IRA and negotiated a ceasefire (Muircheartaigh, 2013; Powell, 2008, p.69).

Secret talks between the representatives of the British government and the republican movement were not the only resolution attempts. Constitutional reforms were also applied to facilitate the peace process. For example, the White Paper published in March 1973 by the Callaghan government and entitled the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals determined the specific issues such as direct rule, ethnic divisions and civil violence since 1969. Although the Paper was published through a majority of votes, there was strong opposition from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) (Arthur, 1984). These constitutional changes could not contribute to progress as a majority of the constitutional reforms were only put into action after the GFA. Thus, these efforts are not the major topic of this thesis.

The peace efforts were not only conducted by the armed protagonists in the 1970s. There were two other facilitators for organising peace talks. Firstly, peace groups played an important role in promoting and encouraging peace such as the British-Irish Association (BIA) which facilitated peace by bringing the representatives of the British and Irish governments, and the Northern Irish parties together in an unofficial environment. For example, the BIA's Oxford Conference of 1974 brought together Merlyn Rees, Garrett Fitzgerald (the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs) and deputies from the Republic of Ireland in a space which created an informal and confidential atmosphere for exchanging views at a point when it was not possible to achieve formal negotiations (Arthur, 1990). The contribution of the BIA to the resolution efforts will be assessed in Chapter 7. Secondly, international actors were involved in the peace process. For example, the US's involvement in the process became visible during the late 1970s when the Carter administration's soft power efforts and the Irish-American civil society's political role began to influence the course of the conflict and helped to focus more on conflict resolution efforts rather than 'hard power' (Cochrane, 2007, p.220). The continuous peace efforts

illustrate that the early stage of the Northern Irish peace process was dominated by backchannel communications. A common characteristic of all efforts to create a path towards peace is to arrange non-violent resolution efforts continuously.

5.2.2. Period II: From Escalation to De-escalation (1976-1994)

The characteristics of the conflict began to change gradually in the second half of the 1970s, as the republican movement was increasingly aware of the importance of the political struggle. In 1976, the status of political prisoners was changed and they no longer had the same status as prisoners of war. At the same time, the violence remained as the IRA organised bomb attacks which killed eighteen British soldiers on August 27, 1979 in Warrenpoint. On the same day, Lord Mountbatten (the Queen's cousin) along with three other people were killed by an IRA bomb in his boat (Cochrane, 2013, p.117). The bombings affected the peace process along with protests of prisoners through a hunger strike. The first 'hunger strike' began in the Maze Prison on 27 October 1980 and was led by an IRA member, Brendan Hughes. After a short time, Bobby Sands took over the leadership from Hughes. As the British government did not recognise the strikes, Sands organised the second hunger strike in 1981. This act enabled Sands to be elected to a seat in the Parliament, but he died on the sixty-sixth day of the strike (Little, 2006, pp.65-66; Sanders, 2012, p.132). Although these strikes helped to increase the popularity of the IRA and SF, British PM Thatcher refused to step back. Thatcher's position was that of not treating terrorists differently than other prisoners (Mallie & McKittrick, 1997, p.20). After nine more prisoners died in the hunger strikes, other strikers' families accepted medical support. The prisoners, afterwards, declared an end to the strike on 3 October 1981 and Thatcher made concessions to their requests (Little, 2006, p.66). Although the hunger strikes were examined as a hard-line policy of the British government, this thesis reveals that there was a secret channel built by Brendan Duddy whose influence will be assessed in Chapter 6.

The hunger strikes led to the 'New Ireland Forum' (NIF) in 1983 along with the attendance of all major nationalist parties from both north and south. It was because of SF's policy change from rejecting any political initiatives to participating in elections. The reason for this policy change was the belief amongst republicans that it could be possible to reach their aim through political campaign, particularly following the success of resistance in the hunger strikes that resulted in the leader of the hunger strikes, Bobby Sands to be elected in the national election of 1981 (Little, 2006). The NIF helped to think of alternative ways to move forward beyond merely Irish unification such as the rights and interests of Northern Catholics/nationalists (Boyle & Hadden, 1995, p.274). The NIF also opened the way to an agreement that was followed by Thatcher and Taoiseach³⁵ Charles Haughey's assignment of a commission to work on the future of the UK, Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The commission's reports on the future of Northern Ireland had an influence on the later talks between the British and Irish governments. After discussions, the AIA of 1985 was signed by the declaration of Britain and Ireland on the possible change of Northern Ireland's status if only the majority demanded it. According to Ingram (1998), these meetings aimed to create an agreement between the two governments by highlighting the requirement of self-determination and the right of Irish people to decide their future. The agreement has paramount importance as it ended the unionist veto and included the Irish government in the conflict resolution process. The agreement also included marginal political organisations in the non-violent, political process for the subsequent peace attempts (Byrne, 2001, p.327). However, the agreement was opposed through massive protests by both republicans and unionists (Little, 2006, p.68).

During the massive protests and violence, high-level, confidential talks were organised between the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP, John Hume) which represented the majority of Catholics and always stood against violence, and SF (Gerry Adams) which is the political wing of

³⁵ Taoiseach is the Gaelic name of the prime minister of the Republic of Ireland.

the IRA and represented around one third of Catholics (Boyle & Hadden, 1995, p.271). The negotiations had continued for a long time and they were publicly known by late 1987. Despite the on-going talks, the violence remained, such as the IRA bombing in November 1987, which killed eleven people and wounded sixty-three people when thousands of people attended to the memorial on in the centre of Enniskillen Remembrance Day³⁶ (Little, 2006, p.72). The talks between Hume and Adams called the 'Hume-Adams Principles' helped create the 'Downing Street Declaration' (DSD) as it determined the demands of Catholic nationalists. This attempt and other initiatives will be examined to understand the influence of political elites on reaching an agreement (Chapter 8). During the same years, the British government organised a series of pre-negotiations with various constitutional parties in Northern Ireland that were known as 'talks about talks'. However, as Hauss (2010, p.87) states, these talks did not bring any success because the parties representing the paramilitary groups were not included.

The DSD (the Joint Declaration) was signed between PM John Major and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds on December 15, 1993, affirming the right of self-determination for Northern Ireland citizens. It also affirmed that 'Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland if the majority of the island's population favoured this move; and parties associated with paramilitaries could play a role with the governments in seeking a peaceful solution, if they renounced violence' (Little, 2006, p.77). The Declaration on the one hand was an indicator of political dialogue, on the other hand needed the support of both nationalists and unionists. The recommendation of including the political wings of armed groups demonstrated the intention of the British government, but did not meet with approval from the republican movement due to their reluctance to renounce violence. Although there were several negotiation attempts and an effort made by Gerry Adams, he defended the primary importance of the

³⁶ Remembrance Day is a memorial day remembered in the Commonwealth of Nations member states since the end of WWI for remembering their soldiers who lost their lives.

armed campaign of the IRA: 'The tactic of armed struggle is of primary importance because it provides a vital cutting edge. Without it, the issue of Ireland would not even be an issue. So, in effect, the armed struggle becomes armed propaganda' (Adams, 1994, p.51). In contrast, Richard McAuley from SF underlined the importance of electoral politics for resolving the Northern Ireland conflict during the early 1990s:

We are not going to realise our full potential as long as the war is going on in the north and as long as SF is presented the way it is with regard to armed struggle and violence. I think that is a reality that perhaps we were not conscious or aware of back in the early 80s when we first got involved in electoral politics (McAuley, 1992, quoted in Wilson, 1992, p.5).

These views demonstrated a shift between political and armed tactics, and were an indicator of using 'the ballot box in the one hand, and an Armalite in the other'.

5.2.3. Period III: From De-escalation to Agreement (1994-1998)

By August 1994, the IRA declared a ceasefire in the hope that it would lead to an agreement. However, the loyalist paramilitary groups did not announce a ceasefire due to the lack of trust in the IRA's ceasefire. The Combined Loyalist Military Command eventually declared a ceasefire six weeks later. The peace environment lasted eighteen months until the IRA declared the end of the ceasefire in February 1996, blaming the British government for not stepping forward in negotiations, but helped decrease the level of violence (Figure 5.1). Fortunately, the eighteen-month ceasefire helped improve the relationship between loyalists and republicans and led to the GFA (Little, 2006, pp.79-80).




Figure 5.1: The Casualties in Northern Ireland (1969-1998)³⁷

During the ceasefire, the international mediation of the US again stepped into the process through the Clinton administration's granting of a visa to Gerry Adams to attend a conference in 1994. Irish commentator Deaglan de Breadun perceived this moment as a fundamental change in the US policy as it had a great influence on advancing the peace process (De Breadun, 2001, p.11). However, British diplomats were affronted by the granting of a visa to Adams which caused a rupture in Anglo-American relations and caused Clinton-Major relations to become 'frosty' (Lynch, 2003). Fortunately, this confrontation did not bring the peace attempts to an end in Northern Ireland. In addition, the ceasefire in 1994 provided Adams with another visa in March 1995 to attend the St. Patrick Day celebrations in the US for fundraising activities (Cochrane, 2007, p.220; 2013, p.154). Additionally, the European Union (EU) conducted the Peace-I (1994-1999) and Peace-II (2000-2006) Programmes. While the Peace-I focused on paramilitary ceasefires, the Peace-II emphasised the legacy of the conflict and proceeding negotiations in the post-violence period (O'Dowd & Mccall, 2008, p.87). However, the major focus of these programmes was cross-border cooperation between the north and south of

³⁷ The data on conflict-related deaths were taken from McKittrick et al. (2007) and Melaugh's (2002) works.

Ireland, and were to complement political efforts at peacebuilding by implementing projects at the grassroots level (Buchanan, 2008).

Inter-party talks were organised very intensively during the ceasefire. The aim of the British and Irish governments was to facilitate the progress, which maintained the British and Irish governments' announcement of 'A New Framework for Agreement' in February 1995. Actually, the Framework was not a blueprint for both sides, but it demonstrated a commitment including expectations of self-determination. The Framework recommended three strands for both communities: North/South structures (in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), East/West structures (in the Republic of Ireland and UK) and internal Northern Ireland structures (Ingram, 1998).

Official and high-level secret talks between the British government and SF were maintained during 1995. Nevertheless, there was no significant success in these negotiations. The end of the IRA's ceasefire in February 1996 interrupted the peace process. However, it was not a long-term interruption since multilateral peace efforts coincided with the beginning of all-party meetings with the declaration of the Irish and British governments. The meetings were followed a by-election in May 1996 to determine the parties to join the peace negotiations. Although SF polled 15.5% of the vote, the party was not permitted to attend negotiations as republican violence remained and SF did not sign the Mitchell Principles of democracy and non-violence. There were six major principles that parties had to affirm:

a) To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues, b) to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations, c) to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission, d) to renounce for themselves and to oppose any effort by others to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations, e) to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods if trying to alter any aspect of that out come with which they may disagree, and f) to urge that 'punishment' killings and beating a stop and to take effective, steps to prevent such actions (Mitchell et al., 1996).

The Principles were the key element of negotiations indicating an obligation to move forward politically. Michael suggested that all-party negotiations must declare their agreement to the principles for 'democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues' (Michael, 1996, quoted in Knox, 2002, p.170). The multi-party talks could not reach an agreement in the first year. In the UK general election of 1997, the Labour government was elected and the election created a perception particularly among nationalists regarding the change of the British government's approach to Northern Ireland. The IRA therefore renewed the ceasefire and SF signed up to the Mitchell Principles. Therefore, it can be said that two expectations had primary importance in changing the perceptions of both sides: the prospect of the republicans regarding the British government to include SF in the official negotiations, and the expectation of the British government related to SF to force the IRA to accept disarmament. Then, the party was permitted to join the multi-party talks at Stormont which resulted in the UUP and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leaving the talks. Intensive negotiations took place for more than six months among the British and Irish governments, and eight Northern Irish parties resulting in the GFA (the Belfast Agreement) (Knox, 2002; Powell, 2008; Wolff, 2002, p.55). The position of the British and Irish governments, the Northern Irish parties and particularly SF will be examined and the reasons for preventing SF from joining negotiations, its results, and the shift in the policies of the British government and SF will be analysed in Chapter 8.

The former US senator George Mitchell's mediation efforts are remarkable. As discussed in Section 3.3.3.3, Mitchell's focus on gathering political parties with different views on the future of Northern Ireland provided the majority of Northern Irish people to be represented. During the negotiations for the GFA, he aimed to stick with the principles and deadlines and this focus resulted in a successful agreement (Mitchell, 1999, p.57). Mitchell's mediation efforts will be analysed in terms of how the exclusive power of mediation affected the peace process in Northern Ireland.

The multi-party negotiations provided a comprehensive approach and both the views of nationalist and unionist communities from north and south were discussed (Dunn & Nolan-Haley, 1998, p.1372). The GFA was conducted by President Bill Clinton, PM Tony Blair, Senator Mitchell and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern created a semi-autonomous government body in Northern Ireland (Hammer, 2009). The GFA has brought various changes. Firstly, the GFA recognised ethno-national cultures, accepting nationalists as nationalists not simply as Catholics (Evans & Tonge, 2013; McGarry & O'Leary, 2009, p.34). Secondly, the Agreement declared that Northern Ireland citizens should decide their constitutional future. For this purpose, the Agreement was voted both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland in 1998. After violence for hundreds of years in Ireland, the unionist and nationalist parties were united in support for the agreement (Little, 2006, p.81). Thirdly, the GFA contained the transfer of power from London to Belfast through the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee. The Committee foresees power sharing between nationalists and unionists. Fourthly, the GFA also addressed questions related to decommissioning, policing, disarmament, human rights, the UK's demilitarisation in Northern Ireland and the status of prisoners in terms of being war criminals (Archick, 2014; Galtung & Duffy, 2000). It contains the issues of civil rights and the political condition for a semi-autonomous Northern Ireland system as well (Elliot & Flackes, 1999). Lastly, the Agreement created two councils; a North-South Ministerial Council which enables the northern and southern leaders to consult on cross-border issues, and a British-Irish Council which allows the examination of regional issues by the representatives of the two governments, the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Northern Ireland (Archick, 2014, pp.1-2).

5.3. The Background of Turkey's Kurdish Peace Process

The contemporary conflict in Turkey emerged in 1978 and has been dominated by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Although the Turkish

state's relation with its Kurdish citizens has been problematic since the 1920s,³⁸ this research focuses on the contemporary Kurdish conflict which is the most protracted armed conflict in Turkey's history (Heper, 2007). The PKK was established by a small group of people who came together in Lice, Diyarbakır in November 1978 and called themselves 'Kurdistan revolutionaries'. Abdullah Öcalan was selected as the secretary of the PKK and leader of the group (Mango 2005, p.34). The PKK focused on forming its ideology and personnel for armed attacks in its early years by eliminating other Kurdish groups in eastern Turkey and putting pressure on local people to join the PKK (İmset, 1992). Öcalan (1993) admitted that the PKK also killed its members who disagreed with the leadership and who did not deserve to be killed.

The PKK's aims have differed over time from cultural and political rights to federalism and separate statehood (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, p.439). To achieve these aims, the PKK's violent campaign has claimed more than 35,000 lives and still keeps its importance as a major and long-standing problem of Turkey (Mango, 2005, p.31). According to the US Department of State's (2000) Country Report, the Turkish government carried out village evacuation due to the conflict that resulted in the evacuation of 3,236 villages in the early years of the conflict. Eventually, 362,915 Kurds were obliged to leave their homes due to the threat of terrorist attacks (US Department of State, 2000). According to Özerdem and Jacoby (2007, pp.162-163), the internal displacement was due to both the claim of the Turkish Army that local populations (voluntarily or involuntarily) supported the PKK logistically, and the PKK's pressure on the people of the region who did not support the insurgency's armed campaign.

Turkey's attempts to end the on-going armed conflict contain both armed and political resolution efforts. The Kurdish question was accepted as a terrorism problem through most of its history and this resulted in counter-terrorism and denial policies, namely the denial of the existence of

³⁸ There are seventeen Kurdish rebellions in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Three of them, those of 1925, 1930 and 1937 were the major ones (Heper, 2007).

Kurdish ethnic identity by the Turkish state officials and labelling the conflict as 'eastern' or 'south-eastern' problem instead (Başbuğ, 2015; Marcus, 2015; Tan, 2015; van Bruinessen, 2013; Yeğen, 2015). Similar to the Northern Irish peace process, the Turkish case is divided into three periods: the first period describes the rise of the military conflict and secret peace efforts. The next term defines the rise of the political struggle and the last term demonstrates official and secret conflict resolution efforts and informal initiatives of independent third parties as well as the failure of these attempts. In contrast to the Northern Irish peace process, this peace process was led by the Turkish government instead of different political parties. The peace process was led by presidents and prime ministers thanks to their personal intentions since the early stages of the conflict. The characteristics of these efforts changed when the AKP identified it as an ethnic problem to be resolved through official initiatives. The peace efforts in Turkey initiated by Turgut Özal during his second term as PM (1987-1989), and then as President (1989-1993), Süleyman Demirel as PM (1991-1993), Tansu Çiller as PM (1993-1996), Necmettin Erbakan as PM (1996-1997) and Tayyip Erdoğan as PM (2003-2014) and President (2014-present) as the AKP rule (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014).

5.3.1. Period I: From Emergence to Escalation (1984-1995)

The PKK organised its first attack on the Gendarmerie Station in Eruh, Siirt on August 15, 1984 in which one soldier was killed; three of them injured and also three civilians were killed in Turkey's southeast (see Figure 5.2). The PKK's second attack was one of the most lethal attacks in the whole conflict, killing 29 people including five children and eight women in Pınarcık, Mardin in June 1987 (Mango, 2005, p.38). In 1988, in order to respond to the PKK's hit-and-run tactics, the Turkish state established a special counter-insurgency strike force consisting of 5,000 well-trained soldiers to fight against the PKK (Entessar, 1989, p.95). However, the PKK increased the number of its militants to nearly 8,000 operating inside Turkey, using Syria, Lebanon, Iran and northern Iraq for training grounds,

their camps and launching pads for organising attacks in Turkey very quickly by the mid-1990s (Kaliber & Tocci, 2010, pp.195-196). This regional and international support helped the PKK to survive. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Syria's support was the most comprehensive one including both weapon supply and financial support. The Syrian government also gave permission for the PKK to use the Bekaa Valley for training purposes and Öcalan to live in Syria (Barkey, 1993, p.53). The reason for Syria's support for the PKK was to use this insurgency campaign in order to force Turkey to consent Syria's demands regarding fresh water sources in the region (Hinnebusch & Tür, 2013). In addition to regional support, the PKK received a great amount of financial support from Kurdish immigrants in Europe (Abramowitz, 1993, p.174).




Figure 5.2: Map of Turkey (Mapa Europeo, 2013)

Despite the dominance of military struggle, there were some political attempts to interrupt violence. For this purpose, the first contact between the Turkish government and PKK was provided in 1988 by the Özal administration. Özal sent intermediaries to meet with Öcalan to gauge the views of the PKK and to ask for a PKK ceasefire (Aslan, 2010; Donat, 2011). These indirect communications resulted in the first PKK ceasefire

beginning on March 17, 1993 thanks to Jalal Talabani's³⁹ intermediary work to exchange messages between Özal and the PKK that will be examined in Chapter 6. Then, the ceasefire was extended indefinitely on 16 April, at the request of Özal (Aslan, 2010; Birand & Yalçın, 2001; Romano, 2006b). Unfortunately, 40 days after Özal's death, the PKK killed 33 unarmed soldiers in Bingöl who had completed their army duty and were returning home (Ensaroğlu, 2013, p.11). This attack brought the first ceasefire to an end.

During this period, peace attempts remained in the shadow of the military struggle due to the high-intensity of armed conflict and mostly armed response by the Turkish authorities. The Turkish government has adopted a traditional military response to fight against 'Kurdish terrorism as a zero-sum game' (Cizre, 2009, p.3). The PKK's deadly attacks in eastern Turkey obliged Turkey to seek alternative policies in the 1980s. Firstly, the government declared the 'State of Emergency' (*Olağanüstü Hal*, henceforth: OHAL) in thirteen eastern cities in 1987 which lasted until 2002. As stated by the Turkish Armed Forces' (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, henceforth: TSK) General Staff, the aim of the OHAL rule was to secure these provinces and to provide decisions quickly for countering terrorism (TSKA-EK/980/26, 1980).

The other political pressure was the closure of the pro-Kurdish parties in the 1990s. Firstly, the People's Labour Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*, henceforth: HEP) was founded as a predominantly Kurdish party. Since the HEP had the lack of support for an election threshold⁴⁰, it formed an electoral pact with the left-of-centre Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*, henceforth: SHP) in the 1991 national election that provided the HEP 22 deputies in the Turkish Grand National

³⁹ The leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. He was the president of Iraq between 2005 and 2014.

⁴⁰ In Turkey, the electoral threshold in national elections is 10%.

Assembly.⁴¹ However, the HEP was banned due to the deputies of the party choosing to speak in Kurdish and the claim for promoting the PKK's insurgency campaign in 1993. The Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*, henceforth: DEP) was founded to replace the HEP in the same year. Yet, the DEP was also shut down by the Constitutional Court because of the claim of it being an extension of the PKK. However, it did not stop pro-Kurdish political actors founding a new party called the People's Democratic Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, henceforth: HADEP) in 1994. The HADEP took part in the 1995 national election, but could not reach the electoral threshold with 4.2% of the votes (Ergil, 2000b, p.129). Its successor, the Freedom and Democracy Party (*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi*, henceforth: ÖZDEP) was also closed by the Constitutional Court (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, p.448). Overall, there were two problems with Kurdish politics in Turkey. Firstly, many pro-Kurdish parties were shut down by the Constitutional Court which prevented them using their rights to present themselves in the Parliament. The reason for the closure of these parties was the claim of the Constitutional Court that they advocated the PKK's armed campaign. Even though they did not advocate the PKK's violence, apparently being Kurdish was sufficient to be accused of defending the PKK (White, 2000, p.171). These events also resulted in the Kurdish community losing their trust in the Turkish government and caused to a breakdown since they were not allowed to be represented in the political arena. Secondly, electoral support for the pro-Kurdish parties was limited during the 1990s. Ergil (2000b, p.129) noted that this insufficient support was because of the lack of a political agenda and the lead of the PKK over the Kurdish community.

Along with the problems over pro-Kurdish parties, the Turkish government carried out some amendments regarding Kurdish rights. For example, in 1991, the government allowed publications in the Kurdish language (Bozarlan, 1996, p.16). In addition, Kurds have also been permitted to bring court cases against the crimes of the TSK during the

⁴¹ Turkish: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (TBMM). This thesis uses the terms TBMM and parliament interchangeably to refer to the Turkish Assembly.

violent conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces (Blum, 2005, p.349). Furthermore, the Özal administration sought to modify the constitutional meaning of monolithic Turkish identity. Özal wanted to change Kemalist⁴² policy and aimed to follow a constructivist approach by identifying the existence of each ethnic identity in the country. Özal followed the structure of the Ottoman Empire which had several ethnic groups and those groups were brought together under different religious groups. Ethnic identities were aimed to be classified as cultural and ethnic dimensions (Ataman, 2002, p.128). However, these changes could not be accomplished as Özal died in 1993. His successor Demirel failed to follow political overtures due to his belief in the success of military tactics rather than a political resolution (Barkey & Fuller, 1997, p.69).

During the increasing political resolution attempts, the 1990s witnessed intensive armed conflict leading to thousands of lost lives due to the government's hard-line counter-terrorism policies (21YYTE, 2013; Özcan, 1999). Particularly in 1992, when the situation deteriorated, according to the TSK's general statement of 1984, the state designed 'the village guard system' consisting of loosely or closely affiliated groups with the state for the sake of stopping village raids and massacres by the PKK (TSKA-EK/984/34, 1984). These guards were paid and armed by the state for the war against the PKK. Most of them were Kurds, so they were forming a barrier between the PKK militants and local people (Barkey & Fuller, 1997, p.69). Jacoby and Özerdem (2013, p.78) argue that 'the village guards reduced accountability and increased the polarisation of Kurdish society'. Political, non-violent efforts, such as secret talks and minor amendments to Kurdish rights, were overshadowed during the early stage of the conflict

⁴² Kemalist reforms and the ideology of Kemalism was the emergence of the modern Turkish society and state. The major aim is to bring Turkey to a level even above contemporary civilisation. There are six principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism, and reformism. These aims would be achieved through national unity. Kemalism formed the ideological basis of the commitment to modernisation, and the reforms contained the practical application of the basic principles of this ideology (Kili, 1980, p.387).

which was dominated by the armed conflict the influence of which will be assessed in the subsequent chapters.

5.3.2. Period II: From Escalation to De-escalation (1995-2005)

The political attempts towards peace during this period witnessed both indirect communications through intermediaries and direct talks through political actors. Firstly, PM Tansu Çiller, successor of Demirel, focused more on non-violent resolution attempts and called for a political solution in 1995. She declared that she was against the so-called military solution (Bozarslan, 1996, p.16). She sent her advisor Ercan Vuralhan to meet with Talabani to forward her letter to Öcalan asking for a PKK ceasefire. Öcalan replied through Talabani and said that if the Turkish government developed a dialogue with the PKK, he would declare a ceasefire (Aslan, 2010; Birand & Yalçın, 2001). After this indirect dialogue, Öcalan declared a ceasefire on December 15, 1995 that was broken immediately as the PKK blamed the Turkish government for not stopping air strikes and not taking any steps forward towards peace (CNNTürk, 2010; Öcalan, 2011b).

The first direct talks between the Turkish government and PKK were achieved in 1996. The initial step was the intermediary work of İsmail Nacar.⁴³ In June 1996, Zübeyir Aydar, one of the leading members of the PKK, called Nacar and wanted him to provide the connection between them and the Turkish government. Then, Nacar met with PM Necmettin Erbakan, successor of Çiller, and forwarded Aydar's message. Erbakan responded positively to this request and appointed one of his deputies, Fethullah Erbaş, to conduct negotiations along with Nacar. Erbaş met with Öcalan claiming to release Turkish soldiers who had been taken captive by the PKK. The negotiation resulted in the release of eight soldiers. However, they could not be moved on due to the opposition of political parties and the TSK (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, pp.446-447; Yeni Çağ, 2009). It was

⁴³ İsmail Nacar is a Kurdish writer and NGO spokesperson from the Committee of Peace, Fraternity and Solidarity.

important to understand the underlying reason of the PKK initiating secret negotiations. Although the PKK was generally in favour of talking to the Turkish government, it can be said that the reason for building this communication channel was the TSK's oppressive counter-terrorism measures which resulted in the increase in deaths of PKK militants from 1,340 in 1992 to 4,111 in 1994, and 3,007 in 1995 (21YYTE, 2013). Although they were direct talks, the negotiations were achieved secretly and the purpose of the negotiations was limited to releasing Turkish soldiers who had been taken by the PKK. The outcome of these efforts will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The mid-1990s were dominated by political efforts. However, it did not stop the violent conflict. In order to stop the PKK's attacks in Turkey's southeast, Turkish officials started to put diplomatic pressure on Syria threatening that it was a *casus belli* if Syria continued to harbour Öcalan. Hence, Syria had to deport Öcalan in the autumn of 1998. After moving from Russia to Italy, Turkey's diplomatic efforts to extradite Öcalan continued. He sought political asylum status to turn his military defeat into a political victory and applied for political asylum in European states. For example, when he was arrested in Rome's Da Vinci Airport, he immediately applied for political asylum (Aliboni & Pioppi, 2000, p.37). However, Turkey's diplomatic efforts through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) compelled first Italy and then Greece to reject his application (Gunter, 2000, p.850). His last stop was Kenya where he was located in the Greek Embassy. Together with the US intelligence, Öcalan was captured in Kenya on February 16, 1999 imprisoned in the İmralı Prison where he serves a life sentence (Ergil, 2000b, p.128).

After the capture of Öcalan, the term between 1999 and 2004 witnessed several peace attempts to de-escalate the conflict. Immediately after Öcalan's capture, a secret channel between the Turkish authorities and the PKK was built by the MIT. Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT, Emre Taner, secretly met with Öcalan and asked about his demand for the PKK's dissolution. In addition, MIT officers talked with Cevat Soysal, one of the

leading members of the PKK, after his capture in Moldova. While the MIT requested the disarmament of the PKK, Öcalan responded to this request by asking for legal arrangements in which constitutional changes should be included for each PKK militant (ANF, 2011; Güller, 2012; Kapmaz, 2011, pp.91-92). As a result of these meetings, Öcalan commanded the PKK militants to move out of Turkey in 1999. Although it seemed like a positive step of the peace process, Öcalan did not want the PKK militants to lay down their arms (Kapmaz, 2011, pp.92-93). Instead of disarmament, the PKK changed its organisational structure. In 2002, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) claiming that the PKK has completed its historical mission and would now be operated as a political group. In late 2003, the organisation changed its name to the Kurdistan People's Congress (*Kongra-Gel*), but none of these changes resulted in a change of either strategy or tactics of the PKK (Baybars-Hawks, 2013, p.279). Instead, according to Öcalan (2003), *Kongra-Gel* declared the ideal of Independent United Kurdistan by including Turkey's southeast. Additionally, as Cagaptay (2007) put it, to re-establish the PKK under different names was related to the pressure of international society. The EU and US declared the KADEK and *Kongra-Gel* as terrorist organisations after a short time following their foundations thanks to diplomatic efforts from Turkey. In response to these changes, the Turkish government passed an amnesty law to provide a suitable environment for the PKK militants to lay down their arms in August 2003 in response to the PKK's organisational change. It followed the PKK's unilateral ceasefire on May 29, 2004. One year later, the group restored the name PKK. The PKK announced another ceasefire in 2004 which slowed down the intensity of its attacks, but did not bring them to an end. The PKK's attacks and the Turkish government's response were maintained in the following years (Baybars-Hawks, 2013, p.279). However, neither the amnesty law nor ceasefires were sufficient to cease the armed campaign of the PKK. Even though the amnesty was a great effort on the government's side, it was not in demand amongst PKK militants. The initiative, therefore, remained as an unsuccessful resolution effort. The root causes of the tactics of the Turkish government and PKK in

the early 2000s were imperative. On the one hand, the PKK's aim in changing the name of the group was to illustrate to western countries that the PKK had departed from the armed campaign and would continue to exist as a political organisation only (Bahar, 2013). On the other hand, the reason for the efforts of Turkish officials can be examined as a quest for responding to Öcalan's call for the withdrawal of the PKK militants from Turkey. This was because it was seen as part of these discussions, and the hope that these talks could lead to substantive negotiations, eventually leading to the end of the Kurdish conflict. However, these were insufficient efforts towards ending a deep-rooted ethno-nationalist conflict.

This period also witnessed the PKK's strategy change and began to communalise the Kurdish question through new-found opportunity spaces through the regulations of the EU. In fact, the EU asked Turkey to reform its legal system and provide Kurdish minority rights on the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006, p.103). In addition, the reforms required abolishing the State of Emergency and the State Security Courts, decreasing detention periods pending trial and lifting the ban on Kurdish publications (Ensaroğlu, 2013, p.12). According to Özerdem (2013, p.26), the EU accession criteria played a facilitating role to create a suitable environment to initiate peace talks. However, these developments did not prevent violence as Öcalan called upon the PKK to return to Turkey to develop the Kurdish forces (Çandar, 2011, p.81). In 2003, the PKK had approximately 1,500 militants within the borders of Turkey (Kapmaz, 2011, p.202). As a result, another positive step did not result in a successful outcome.

The Iraq War of 2003 was another important incident which affected the nature of the region and precipitated the establishment of a Kurdish province in northern Iraq. Turkey's loss of control after the US operation caused the rise of the PKK again. The Kurdistan Regional Government's establishment in Northern Iraq after 2003 has made the situation more complicated and helped foster cooperation between Kurdish militant groups in Iraq (Özcan, 2014). For the Turkish government,

it was an indicator of the insufficiency of traditional security tactics and so it was necessary to produce more comprehensive policies. The rise of Kurdish nationalism in the region began to undermine the moral basis of Turkey's monolithic Turkish identity. Additionally, the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq was affecting claims and expectations of Turkey's Kurdish citizens (Çiçek, 2011, p.19).

5.3.3. Period III: From De-escalation to Deterioration (2005-2015)

The period between 2005 and 2015 witnessed an increase in both political and security efforts to end the conflict. From 2005 to 2008, the PKK organised several attacks on Turkish security forces and civilians, such as tourist resorts, which together caused 1,500 deaths (Barrinha, 2011, p.170). The PKK's attacks in 2007 raised an issue of how to stop the PKK militants based in northern Iraq. Turkish politicians and military authorities began to discuss the need for a 'cross-border military operation' into northern Iraq in order to demolish the PKK camps and to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region. After a serious discussion and cooperation with the US, Turkey launched cross-border operations including many air strikes and land operations (Efegil, 2008, p.54).

Together with its violent attacks, the PKK established a congress called the Kurdistan Communities Union (*Koma Civakên Kurdistan*, henceforth: KCK) by bringing the PKK members in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria together. The KCK is an umbrella group constituting of both youth and women councils, the PKK, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (*Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê*, henceforth: PJAK) which operates in Iran, Democratic Union Party (*Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat*, henceforth: PYD) and its armed wing People's Protection Unit (*Yekineyen Parastine Gel*, henceforth: YPG) which operates in Syria, and the PKK's another armed group People's Defence Forces (*Hezen Parastina Gel*, henceforth: HPG). The KCK incorporated so-called legislative (Kongra-Gel), executive and jurisdiction

systems that aim to serve as a state form. These groups were a clear sign of the PKK's aim to maintain its ultimate goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state. This was responded to by the Turkish government through military operations and detentions of the members of these terrorist groups (BiaNet, 2013; Deligöz, 2012).

In 2009, political resolution efforts again increased, but with a different character. The Turkish government, for the first time, launched an official 'opening' policy to bring the conflict to an end. The policy was called the 'Kurdish opening' by PM Erdoğan. It was later broadened under the title of 'democratic opening' and afterwards 'the national unity project' (Milliyet, 2009). The project was a sign that armed struggle alone was not sufficient to achieve the disarmament of the PKK. The insight of the government's democratic opening project was announced by Beşir Atalay, Minister for Internal Affairs: opening the first official Kurdish TV channel (TRT-6), giving back the ancient Kurdish names of the villages, Kurdish courses in private schools and opening many institutions for other languages used in Turkey (Milliyet, 2009). Öcalan found this project insufficient as he threatened the government that if the collective rights of the Kurdish people are not recognised, the war would be maintained for another 50 years (Sendika, 2009). It was clear that this was the greatest effort towards ending this conflict in a non-violent way in Turkey's history. The reason for the failure of this initiative was that it was very difficult to reach a successful result since the country is too divided. On the one hand, many Kurds in Turkey were following the lead of Öcalan. On the other hand, there was a vast population strongly criticising the democratic opening project (Abramowitz & Barkey, 2009, p.122). The Resolution Commission was an outcome of this project which aimed to provide a suitable environment for peace talks. It was a significant indication that, after prolonged trouble, Turkish authorities demanded to solve the conflict in a non-violent way through political parties. The outcomes of the democratic opening project and initiatives of the Resolution Commission will be analysed in Chapter 8.

The government's aim was to solve the problem in the Parliament during the late 2000s. However, despite the Democratic Society Party's (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, henceforth: DTP)⁴⁴ claim to represent the Kurdish community, it was blamed for being a mouthpiece for the PKK. It was argued that the party was founded 'under the instructions of Abdullah Öcalan and was controlled mainly by the PKK leadership' (Çandar, 2009, p.18). According to Çandar (2009, p.18), since the pro-Kurdish party had no experience of formulating policies, the Kurdish opening was led by the PKK leadership which questioned the role of the DTP as a political party. As a result, the Constitutional Court closed the DTP by declaring the party to be the centre for acts 'against the indivisible integrity of the state with its country and nation, considering its actions and also ties with the terrorist organisation' (Official Gazette, 2009). This was a step back from the use of democratic rights to the party closure similar to the 1990s and so negatively affected the environment for a non-violent resolution. Fortunately, it did not stop the intention of the Turkish government to achieve a political resolution, unlike the previous decade.

Another milestone in the conflict was the secret talks between the MIT and PKK leaders under the mediation of the British SIS in Oslo, known as the 'Oslo talks'. It was the beginning of official negotiations with the PKK. Although the negotiations were being held secretly since 2006, they were leaked through a news agency in Turkey in 2011. It triggered pressure by a great majority in Turkey to end the talks. Then, the pro-Kurdish movement put pressure on the government to achieve constitutional reforms (Öcalan, 2011a). However, these talks had an important contribution that direct talks (even if it was organised secretly) between the Turkish government and PKK provided hope for both sides of the possibility to solve the military-dominated conflict with political, non-violent attempts (Ensaroğlu, 2013, p.13). The Oslo talks will be examined in detail since these are the

⁴⁴ The DTP was closed by the decision of the Constitutional Court in December 2009. The Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, henceforth: BDP) was the successor of the DTP which was dissolved to join the HDP on April 22, 2014. The latest and current pro-Kurdish party is the HDP (Celep, 2014).

most comprehensive secret talks (Chapter 6) and due to the involvement of international mediation (Chapter 8).

As an outcome of these clandestine initiatives, the Turkish government and PKK organised an event for a PKK group to surrender at Turkey's Habur Border. Thus, eight PKK members were chosen from the Qandil Mountain area and twenty-six of them from the Makhmour Refugee Camp in northern Iraq. These militants were called the 'peace group'. Although their arrival was presented as a further step in the peace process, it led to different responses from different communities in Turkey. On the one hand, it was celebrated at the Habur Border by PKK sympathisers. On the other hand, their arrival and the celebrations triggered angry protests across Turkey and caused a drawback in the peace process (Ensaroğlu, 2013, p.13). This unsuccessful attempt proved that the government had not thought out the results of the Kurdish opening in practice and could not manage its fulfilment, let alone its consequences (Gunter, 2013, p.89). The Habur event as an outcome of backchannel communications will be investigated in Chapter 6.

In 2012, the PKK's increased attacks led the state to undertake more military operations. At the same time, hundreds of inmates who were convicted of being PKK militants, organised hunger strikes calling upon the government to end Öcalan's isolation on the İmralı Island. The government gave permission for prisoners to make contact with Öcalan and hunger strikes ceased following Öcalan's press release. A few months later, PM Erdoğan stated that 'the state would re-initiate talks with Öcalan if necessary' (Ensaroğlu, 2013). Then, the peace talks started between the government, the BDP and Öcalan in late 2012 and resulted in a ceasefire. In March 2013, Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down arms. The next day, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire indefinitely. The first group of PKK members retreated from Turkey to northern Iraq in May 2013 (Tocci, 2013, p.74). This date was also called the beginning of the 'solution process' which lasted until July 2015. The solution process intended different levels of bilateral negotiations whose only outcome was the Dolmabahçe

Declaration of 2015 composing of a statement on the social-economic dimensions, and national and local dimensions of democratic rights (HDN, 2015b). These negotiations will be assessed in Chapter 8.

The peace organisations in Turkey have been active only in this period. Some of these organisations have concentrated on peacemaking efforts, promoting and encouraging peace. For instance, the Wise People Committee (WPC), which was introduced in April 2013, was initiated to contribute to the decision-making mechanism. The members of the Committee were journalists, academics, experts and other public figures who organised hundreds of meetings, peace events and conferences (KDGM, 2013). The influence of these attempts and the underlying reasons for their outcomes will be examined in Chapter 7.




Figure 5.3: The Casualties in Turkey (1984-2012)⁴⁵

Nevertheless, neither the democratic opening project nor other changes in the law and other peace efforts were sufficient to solve the problem. There were a few reasons for the unsuccessful outcome: firstly, the government did not seek consensus amongst major political parties in the Parliament. In addition to the reluctance of the government to insist on

⁴⁵ The data on conflict-related deaths were obtained from 21YYTE (2013) and TBMM's (2013a) works. There is no concrete data for the lost lives between 2013 and 2015. However, after the ceasefire ended in 2015, 532 security personnel (army personnel and police officers) lost their lives in only one year as of June 2016 (Yeni Çağ, 2016).

the opposition parties to join peace initiatives, the opposition parties, namely the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, henceforth: CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, henceforth: MHP), were against the peace process.⁴⁶ The lack of consensus on even basic premises resulted in polarisation between autonomy seeking Kurds and other Turkish citizens. The Turkish government did not talk with the pro-Kurdish DTP which caused some concerns about the representativeness of the Kurds. It triggered the radical components of the party to turn towards the lead of the PKK (Criss, 2010, p.15). Secondly, there was no positive development towards the Kurdish problem's solution and as a result, violence remains (Figure 5.2). There were only a few attempts which were the surrender of the PKK members, known as the Habur event, the return of the ancient Kurdish names of the villages and the introduction of education in languages other than Turkish in private schools (Çiçek, 2011, p.15). Lastly, the talks between the Turkish government and HDP continued until the ceasefire was broken. However, all these pro-Kurdish political parties were accused of being spokespersons for the PKK which made the situation more complicated since Turkish authorities did not want to negotiate with the PKK. In addition, the PKK established another armed group called Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (*Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi*, henceforth: YDG-H) to organise attacks in urban areas that threatened the solution process. After more than thirty years, the PKK still exists and is one of the major security problems facing Turkey. The Turkish government has failed to disband the PKK or stop its attacks.

⁴⁶ Although the CHP did not support the peace process, the first reports regarding the Kurdish question was published by the CHP during the 1990s (Yayman, 2011). The MHP has always defended counter-terrorism measures against the PKK (Özdağ, 2014).

5.4. Comparison: From Armed to Political Struggle

The chapter has explained the Northern Irish and Kurdish peace processes together with the violent conflicts which have provided a detailed understanding of the dilemma between the armed and political struggle. The discussion on the application of these methods helped to understand the transition from armed to political struggle. It has demonstrated that political resolution initiatives have been applied since the early stages of these conflicts. These initiatives illustrate different levels of resolution efforts including direct and indirect talks, secret and official negotiations, intermediaries and initiatives of P/CROs. The Northern Ireland and Turkey cases have various similarities regarding conflict resolution efforts. Firstly, both peace processes demonstrate similar political efforts in their early stages. Both conflicts witnessed secret and indirect talks to interrupt violence, declare ceasefires and give way to peace negotiations. Namely, the British government and IRA achieved several secret talks during the early phase of the Troubles even when violence was at its peak. Secret talks led to the IRA ceasefire of 1972. Similarly, the Turkish government and PKK organised secret talks which resulted in the PKK ceasefires when the violence rapidly increased in the early 1990s. In both conflicts, secret and indirect talks played a significant role in order to interrupt violence and to move the peace talks forward from the pre-negotiation to the negotiation stages.

Secondly, indirect talks through intermediaries were used in both conflicts. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the British government and IRA used intermediaries to keep up with each other. Brendan Duddy was one of those who met with the republican prisoners during the hunger strikes. His effort led to the extension of the IRA ceasefire in 1975 (Section 6.3.1). Similarly, the Turkish government and PKK used intermediaries to make contact with each other. Particularly, the early years of the conflict witnessed Cengiz Çandar and Jalal Talabani's peace attempts (Section 6.4.1). The influence of indirect talks in both cases demonstrates similar characteristics for a few reasons: firstly, they were organised when there

was no suitable ground for direct talks between the conflicting parties. In addition, they helped the British and Turkish government officials to move towards direct talks. Therefore, although the impact of intermediaries is limited in terms of conflict resolution approaches, they are successful in making progress in both cases.

Thirdly, official negotiations were achieved in the later stages in both conflicts. Whilst these talks provided different agreements, official talks could not lead to any accord in the Kurdish conflict. In the Northern Irish conflict, it started with the Sunningdale Agreement and lasted until the GFA. Nevertheless, official talks between the Turkish government and PKK (and its political wings) did not reach an agreement except the Dolmabahçe Declaration. In this sense, two important aspects are required to be discussed. The first point is that even though the Northern Irish conflict has ceased, it witnessed a few agreements in almost thirty years. As explained earlier in this chapter, the reason for the previous agreements not to terminate the conflict was the fact that they did not include all conflicting sides. Although their wills were claimed to be represented, the AIA was massively protested by the Catholic and Protestant communities. In contrast to the previous accords, the GFA's success can be explained through the involvement of all political views in the agreement. The other point is the different outcomes of the two conflicts even though they have similar conflict resolution processes. It shows that the impact of conflict resolution processes may change from one case to another to understand the implications of these procedures. Hence, it is necessary to look at other conflict resolution initiatives (e.g. mediation) related to official negotiations.

Fourthly, international mediation is an essential determinant of official negotiations. It played a significant role in both peace processes, but it was reflected differently in both conflicts. On the one hand, the US administration's efforts and George Mitchell's mediation led to official negotiations and helped to reach the GFA in the Northern Irish peace process. The major condition for the process was the participation of almost

all political views in the official talks. In addition, Mitchell's strong mediation role was crucial to keep on track the British government and Northern Irish political parties (Section 8.3.2). The involvement of Mitchell in the peace negotiations was because of both the intentions of the US towards halting this conflict and the consent of both the British and republicans for Mitchell being accepted as the 'mediator' of the official negotiations. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the intention of the US was due to the pressure of Irish-Americans towards bringing this conflict in a non-violent way. On the other hand, Turkey's peace process also had mediation initiatives in the 2000s. However, the mediation of British intelligence was achieved as secret negotiations and organised with the participation of Turkish officials and representatives of the PKK. Although the negotiations demonstrate two sides with the authority of bargaining on behalf of their communities, the nature of negotiations did not illustrate a complete success since it was not officially accepted as a declaration in the end (Section 8.4.2). It was an unsuccessful initiative due to the mass protests and the reaction of wider Turkish society. The underlying reason for the Turkish government not to declare the outcome of these negotiations can be explained through the traditional approach of 'we do not talk to terrorists'. It is clear that implementation of the decisions made in secret negotiations was not always easy. This difficulty created a dilemma for the Turkish government and resulted in an outcry in the society against talking to the PKK. As the very existence of talks was enough to create anger in the society, it was very difficult to discuss the outcome of these meetings.

Fifthly, both conflicts have P/CROs which played a significant role in facilitating the peace processes. Different P/CROs were established since the early 1970s to assist peacemaking efforts in Northern Ireland. For example, the BIA and Peace People (PP) played a role in closing gaps between conflicting communities, encouraging both the British government and republican movement towards a non-violent, political resolution (Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2). Similar types of groups were established in Turkey in order to strengthen the influence of political actors. The WPC, for instance, was established to bring together the

participants from conflicting communities to discuss their demands and carry out talks about the peace process (Section 7.5.1). All these political resolution initiatives have an influence on both peace processes. However, while some of them have a direct influence on the peace processes (to move forward to official talks), others' impact was limited whose influence will be explained in Chapter 7.

Lastly, political parties in both conflicts played a crucial role in conducting, maintaining or interrupting the peace processes. The British and Turkish governments followed different strategies against nationalist/republican parties in Northern Ireland and pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey. While the approach was to exclude extreme parties from the peace process in Northern Ireland, it was to close pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey. This approach resulted in radicalising the pro-Kurdish movement in Turkey since there was no opportunity for representatives of this movement to express their thoughts in the political arena. While it caused the Kurdish community feeling mistrustful towards the government, these events did not create an ethnicity gap between the Kurdish and Turkish communities because ethnic groups in Turkey were intertwined with each other even before the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In contrast, the British government chose not to include SF in the political resolution process. However, both peace processes moved forward when SF and the HDP (and its predecessors) joined peace talks. Whilst political peace attempts in Northern Ireland were conducted by several political parties including republicans, nationalists, unionists and the British government, the political peace efforts in Turkey were dominated by the Turkish government and representatives of the PKK. The influence of the perception changes of the conflicting sides and their consequences regarding the conflict resolution approaches will be investigated along with the empirical evidence of both cases.

CHAPTER 6

Backchannel Communications: Talking to the Enemy behind the Scenes

'Negotiation with ethno-nationalist terrorists is more common and more successful than with other kinds of terrorists' (Pruitt, 2006, p.371).

'Without the possibility of back-channel communication, there would be little front-channel negotiation and very few settlements of the major conflicts in the world' (Pruitt, 2008, p.51).

6.1. Introduction

This chapter assesses the role of backchannel negotiations in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes. The reason for choosing backchannels as one of the three major aspects of the analysis is their role in initiating a peace process and forming the pre-negotiation stage of a conflict resolution process. The chapter examines the secret channels which were opened to make contact between the British government and republican movement that included both SF and the IRA, and between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement that contained both the HDP and its predecessors, and the PKK. These channels were active for more than twenty years in both conflicts.

The chapter argues that secret negotiations in Northern Ireland and Turkey reduced the concerns of disputing parties about trust and reliability. Therefore, these negotiations facilitated a level of understanding when it was not possible to meet officially. The chapter states that direct and indirect backchannels made it possible to carry out official negotiations and played a significant role towards de-escalating both conflicts. These

talks enable a discussion of conflicting parties' demands in a flexible environment which do not require any preconditions to come together (Wanis-St John, 2004). There is relatively little exploration of both cases about the influence of backchannel talks in these conflict resolution processes (Dochartaigh, 2011b; Güller, 2012; Mumford, 2011). There is also little interest in how these secret initiatives defined the nature of official negotiations. The chapter asks the following question to explore these initiatives: 'How did backchannel initiatives play a role in de-escalating the violent acts carried out by the IRA and PKK during the pre-negotiation stage?'

To answer this question, the chapter firstly discusses the theoretical assumptions about the secret talks. It frames backchannel communications within a wider theoretical framework and brings an explanation to the under-explored pre-negotiation stage of conflict resolution. It then assesses the impact of direct and indirect secret talks in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes. Their impact is described through the role of intermediaries in building trust and exchanging information between the two conflicting parties, and the structures and outcomes of the direct talks. It also aims to understand how these secret talks were transformed into official negotiations. Afterwards, the influence of the talks in the two cases is compared by examining their major components.

6.2. Locating Backchannels into Conflict Resolution Processes

Backchannel communications are the major initiatives to resolve a conflict in a non-violent way when it is not possible to achieve discussions openly during the pre-negotiation stage of conflict resolution processes (as discussed in Section 3.3.1). These communications are assessed as secret negotiations between the main armed protagonists who are state officials and the leadership of sub-state armed groups (Pruitt, 2008). The pre-negotiation stage of a conflict resolution process happens during the period when the resolution of a conflict begins and explores the right conditions

for moving conflicting parties to the negotiating table (Kelman, 2010, p.394). While the pre-negotiation stage began during the early 1970s and lasted until the early 1990s when the Northern Irish parties and British government commenced official negotiations, it was between the 1980s and early 2010s in the Turkish case.

6.2.1. The Nature of Backchannel Communications

The existing literature on backchannel negotiations encompasses several analyses of talking to terrorist groups regarding concessions, stalemate and psychological approaches (Sections 2.2.4 and 3.3.1). Although these interpretations have partial insights, they do not offer a comprehensive framework on talking to terrorists. In contrast, track 1.5 diplomacy, and Pruitt (2006) and Wanis-St John's (2006) classifications on different types on backchannel communications present a detailed understanding, including not only disputing parties, but also intermediaries and different communication chains.

Track 1.5 diplomacy explains backchannel communications as unofficial diplomatic initiatives between representatives of conflicting parties, and which are facilitated by unofficial groups or actors (Nan, 2003; 2005, p.165). The major characteristic of track 1.5 is that while the official parties are represented in the secret talks, the communication channels are initiated by independent groups acting as third parties. Track 1.5 diplomacy is significant as it builds a bridge between official negotiations (track-one) and informal conflict resolution initiatives (track-two), hence, it is called 'hybrid diplomacy' (Mapendere, 2005, p.77). It is stated that track 1.5 initiatives enable the outcome of these meetings to be transferred to the official negotiation process (Nan, 2004, p.62).

There are two major ways of conducting backchannel communications: direct and indirect talks. Firstly, direct talks bring representatives of disputing parties together in a secret place (Pruitt, 2006). Conflicting parties are expected to discuss their major claims, to de-escalate the dispute, to facilitate formal negotiations and to declare a

ceasefire during the direct talks. Together with these aims, direct talks aim to reduce uncertainty which prevents a move towards a political settlement (Wanis-St John, 2006). Secondly, indirect communications are achieved through communication chains which are built by one or more intermediaries. The role of the intermediaries can be to pass messages between disputing parties, including their desires and claims (Pruitt, 2006, p.382). These intermediaries can be a third party - someone unofficial - who makes contact between conflicting parties, acts as a messenger engaging in officially sanctioned diplomatic efforts or defines the agenda to facilitate de-escalation of the conflict (Wanis-St John, 2006, p.121). Intermediaries in the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases played a role as unofficial, individual actors who did not represent any of the conflicting parties. Besides, the influence of intermediaries depends not only on their position as key influencers, but also as independent actors (Princen, 1992, p.6). For instance, Tom Caldwell and Brendan Duddy were unofficial and individual intermediaries whose mediation was accepted by both the British government and republican movement.

As described in Section 3.3.1, it is difficult to reveal these channels as there is no physical contact between the conflicting parties. Lieberfeld (2007) states that governments are more likely to engage with intermediaries than talk directly to rebels as they have concerns about talking to armed groups due to the potential result of legitimising these groups. Furthermore, these channels can be built between different actors, but this thesis focuses only on the talks which have had direct influence on peace processes. Therefore, the secret talks between the nationalist or unionist parties are not the topic of this chapter. For example, although Father Alec Reid played a role in secret initiatives, his primary aim was to create a pan-nationalist approach by bringing both nationalist parties together and creating a shared democratic strategy (Alonso, 2004; Rafter, 2003; RPM, 1988). Even though these efforts were significant, they did not affect the peace process directly, so they are not the focus of this chapter.

Indirect communications between conflicting parties are provided by one or more chains and by personal and collective attempts. Pruitt (2006) identifies these channels through the length of communication channels: whether a communication channel is built by a single or more than one intermediary. Although more than one intermediary's involvement is common in complicated issues, it is assumed that they might create 'messy, difficult and even chaotic' results if they are not well-organised (Crocker et al., 1999, p.4). However, a single intermediary can also create problems in a backchannel initiative as it is hard to be sure whether he is talking to the appropriate people in a terrorist group when he builds the channel (Pruitt, 2006, p.385). These two issues are investigated in relation to the Northern Irish and Turkish cases as these conflicts witnessed the involvement of more than one intermediary. Cengiz Çandar and Jalal Talabani's intermediary works are clear examples of multitudinous involvement in a communication channel between the Turkish government and PKK and they will be assessed in terms of whether they created a more chaotic situation or facilitated the peace process.

The role of intermediaries is also a significant aspect that determines the success of secret negotiations. The role of intermediaries has two aspects: weak and powerful third parties. Weak intermediaries are the people who transmit messages between disputing parties and coordinate concession making, whereas powerful intermediaries help parties in a conflict by planning the process and recommending attainable solutions or putting pressure on these parties to reach a political settlement (Pruitt, 2006, p.385). The role of third parties determines the success of backchannel communications as they initiate the dialogue between warring parties, define the strength or looseness of the channel, dominate or facilitate the two groups' discussions and help to gradually move towards official negotiations. This chapter examines the consequences of weak and powerful intermediary efforts in order to understand whether they were useful for closing the gaps between states and sub-state armed groups in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts.

A significant question regarding the nature of backchannels is: How and why do conflicting parties engage in direct and indirect talks? There are three major factors which define the parties' involvement in a peace process: invitation by one party or both sides, demands of other concerned outsiders to a specific group or actor to involve themselves in the process, and the personal intention of third parties (Mapendere, 2005, p.72). Zartman (2000) and Pruitt's (1997) 'ripe moment' term will be investigated to investigate the reasons for the application of backchannel communications. As discussed in Section 3.3, ripeness is a predictive tool which describes whether a specific time for negotiation is a ripe moment or not depends on if a dispute has successfully been resolved (O'Kane, 2006). The question of engaging in these talks is investigated through indirect communications led by intermediaries and direct talks between the British and Turkish governments on the one hand, and the representatives of the IRA and PKK on the other.

6.2.2. The Cost of Entry vs. Credibility

After third parties initiate discussions in indirect communications, and encourage and facilitate face-to-face dialogue, the warring parties can come together secretly to discuss their demands. As Wanis-St John (2006) points out, if official negotiations with a sub-state armed group can be identified as a government's *de facto* granting of legitimacy for this group, then backchannel communications provide secret negotiations that make it possible for conflicting parties to continue their opposition in public. Therefore, it is asserted that there is no cost of entry to engage in these communication channels since governments can use the argument of 'we do not talk to terrorists' (Pruitt, 2006). As there is no cost of entry to these talks, whether there were any preconditions to accomplish is a significant issue to be investigated in both cases. It is argued that these talks are convenient for parties in a conflict to meet without facing their opponent's preconditions for official negotiations (Wanis-St John, 2004). However, the IRA Army Council and British government had preconditions (the IRA's ceasefire and the British government's release of political prisoners) from

each other to come together in the Whitelaw talks (Smith & Neumann, 2005). Similarly, both PM Demirel and President Özal informed the PKK through intermediaries that a ceasefire was the precondition for initiating dialogue in 1993 (Çandar, 2014). It is questioned, however, whether other backchannel initiatives had prerequisites or not. If so, how these claims were responded to by the other side are assessed in the next section.

The covert negotiations are difficult for outsiders to reveal and are easier for both governments and terrorist groups to deny that the chain exists (Pruitt, 2005). For example, the British officials kept their contact with SF secret because of their fear that these communications would be revealed, which could have resulted in the unionists feeling that they had been betrayed, resulting in possible loyalist violence (Dixon, 2006, p.67). In this context, there is a question regarding the result of these initiatives if they have been revealed by adversaries and 'spoilers' as it might affect the reliability of governments. This issue is analysed to understand whether adversaries obstructed the success of backchannels.

In contrast to public discussions, backchannel initiatives provide flexibility to parties in a conflict to discuss their demands by encouraging informality and blunt discussions about aims, fears and proposals from both sides for a peaceful resolution (Pruitt, 2006; 2008, p.41). However, these informal discussions may raise concerns regarding the credibility of these talks as they are not legally binding. The credibility of the actors who attend the secret talks is an important question in this chapter in terms of whether they are the major stakeholders and so can give decisions on behalf of the community they represent. Even if a valid representative is appointed to secret channels, the main armed protagonists may find it difficult to understand the other party's desire for resolution as the talks are carried out secretly and hence, it is difficult to commit to them without knowing whether they comply with the agreed points (Wanis-St John, 2006). These issues are investigated in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes to understand how these different aspects affected the success and failure of backchannels. However, these are not the

only factors which affect the success of backchannel talks. Pruitt (2006) identifies two indicators of a successful backchannel: to declare a ceasefire and to move towards official negotiations. A ceasefire can help both to build trust between states and sub-state armed groups by narrowing the gap between them and to make progress regarding official resolution efforts by developing plans for negotiations. These assumptions are assessed in the secret talks in Northern Ireland and Turkey. Both peace processes witnessed indirect talks first and then direct talks since indirect talks can also be applied when it is not possible to bring conflicting parties together. Therefore, the indirect talks emerge as the initial step of backchannels and so they will be investigated first. After establishing a reliable contact between disputing sides, it can be possible to achieve face-to-face discussions secretly, these will therefore be assessed after indirect communications.

6.3. Backchannels in Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland peace process was initially started with a dialogue between the SDLP and SF in the mid-1980s (Spencer, 2005). However, when the secret contact between the British government and republican movement, and the intermediaries' role in establishing communication and facilitating the progress was revealed after the archival sources had been investigated, the peace process needed to be examined in a greater context. This section aims to reveal the secret contact between the British government and republican movement. Thus, it gives the opportunity to assess the role of backchannels in the whole peace process.

6.3.1. Indirect Communications

In the early 1970s, an anonymous letter written on behalf of the Northern Ireland Office revealed that British authorities rejected contact with the IRA by claiming 'there was not any one man or group in the IRA who were both willing and able to deliver an efficient and lasting ceasefire' (TNA-PREM/15/1016, 1972). Therefore, they initially tested each other's

authority on minor issues such as releasing hostages or the transfer of prisoners. These minor issues in the early 1970s helped to establish an understanding that both sides had the authority to deliver their promises. Indirect communications initiated secret contact between the British government and republican movement through intermediaries.

The first intermediary in the Northern Irish peace process was Tom Caldwell, a former British Army officer. Although his contact with the republican movement began at the Dublin Horse Show when he bumped into a senior Provisional in 1971 where they 'exchanged pleasantries but nothing more', the nature of these talks changed after the Abercorn explosion on March 4, 1972, which killed two women and injured more than a hundred people (Taylor, 1998, p.131). This explosion triggered Caldwell's initiation of secret dialogue. The structure and consequence of Caldwell's initiatives are crucial for understanding the impact of the first covert peace effort. Regarding the structure, as Caldwell states, it was his own intention to make contact with SF leader Ruairi O'Bradaigh, but not a negotiation on behalf of anyone (Caldwell, 1972, cited in Fortnight, 1972). However, the information was being passed on to British officials. Therefore, there was no binding discussion between the two sides, but it was still helpful in understanding both sides' demands. His contact with the IRA was only known by Harold Wilson, leader of the opposition, not the British government (Taylor, 2002a). Although Caldwell was the only intermediary for this channel, his mediation was supported by Wilson, which demonstrates that it was a collective attempt between an unofficial intermediary and a British politician. However, it was not supported by the British government, and this affected the result.

Regarding the discussion and outcome, Caldwell's meeting with O'Bradaigh concerned the republicans' plan for peace, but it was also about a truce (TNA-CJ/4/4245, 1972). Caldwell forced the republicans to think about the inadequacy of their strategy of daytime bombing as it resulted in more civilian casualties (Fortnight, 1972, p.6). Even though he put pressure on the republican movement to reduce the level of violence, this effort is

not a powerful mediation because it was limited to violence and was not related to peace efforts. His meetings with O'Bradaigh and Chief-of-Staff of the IRA, Sean MacStiofain, created a political perspective since Caldwell passed their messages to London. Therefore, Caldwell's mediation was weak intermediary work, but, fortunately, as it was stated in a meeting note between Caldwell and William Whitelaw (the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland), he provided the first backchannel between the two sides (TNA-PREM/15/1127, 1972). As a result of his efforts, the IRA declared its first ceasefire lasting for three days beginning on Friday, 10th March 1972. This demonstrates that despite limited authority of weak intermediaries, suggested in the existing literature (for example Pruitt, 2006), Caldwell was successful in facilitating the ceasefire. The critical point was the republican movement's intention to test the water for their political claims for the first time in the Troubles. As a defector from the republican movement, Maria McGuire in her memoirs stated, 'we were by now sure that the British government would be compelled to ask where we stood politically, such was the success of our military campaign' (McGuire, 1973, p.100). McGuire's statement was evidence of their intention for a political resolution, but was also a statement of their aim for an armed campaign victory. Because Caldwell's contact with the republican movement was his personal initiative, it can be said that the ceasefire was a one-sided event by the IRA which did not get a response from the British.

After the ceasefire ended and the level of violence dramatically increased, the British government sent in troops and carried out the largest military operation in the entire history of the Troubles, called Operation Motorman. Fortunately, the Operation on 31 July 1972 did not result in a cessation of secret talks as the former General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland, General Sir John Hackett, contacted the Provisional IRA Army Council member David O'Connell after this incident. It was a personal initiative and the communication channel was built only by one intermediary, just like Caldwell's attempt. The letters between Whitelaw and Hackett illustrated that Whitelaw was reluctant to talk to O'Connell and was unhappy about Hackett's dialogue with him; he said that Hackett's

contact with an IRA member was very damaging and dangerous (TNA-CJ/4/319, 1973). There is an important question here: although the existing backchannel literature (Wanis-St John, 2006) assumes that there is no cost of entry to indirect communications, why was the British government reluctant to engage in these initiatives?

The failure of Hackett's efforts stemmed from two factors. Firstly, these initiatives were achieved immediately after unsuccessful talks undertaken by Whitelaw himself. Thus, the British government was reluctant to carry out another covert initiative immediately. The disagreement between Whitelaw and senior republicans made it difficult to organise another set of meetings in a short time period. Therefore, it was not a ripe moment to start dialogue between the conflicting parties even though it was initiated by a mediator. As Zartman (2000, p.227) argues, even if communication is commenced by a third party, it cannot be turned into negotiations if parties in a conflict are not in favour of a non-violent resolution. Secondly, although on-going violence did not cease covert initiatives, they created mistrust between the parties. This situation could only be overcome by an intermediary who was accepted by both sides (Princen, 1992, p.10). Hackett's mediation was clearly not accepted by the British side.

The last and most comprehensive indirect communications were built by Brendan Duddy⁴⁷, a Londonderry businessperson. Duddy's intermediary role began when he was asked by Steele and Oatley, senior SIS officers, to make contact with O'Bradaigh (Taylor, 2002a). As Duddy personally knew O'Bradaigh, he played a key role in passing the messages between the British and republican sides (Dochartaigh, 2011a, p.217). Therefore, even though Duddy was the only intermediary between the two sides, the communication channel was initiated by the SIS officers as mentioned in Section 5.2.1. It was a clear sign of the demand of the British

⁴⁷ Brendan Duddy was an intermediary between the British government and IRA between the mid-1970s and 1993. The Brendan Duddy papers were archived at the James Hardiman Library Archives, National University of Ireland in the Republic of Ireland.

officials to communicate with the republican movement. However, it was not only the British government's intention, but also that of the republicans as the collapse of the political arrangements of Sunningdale aroused the 'dovish' component of the republican movement (Mumford, 2012, p.103; Taylor, 2002a, p.170). Duddy's intermediary efforts can be examined in three periods: the mid-1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s.

Firstly, his personal archive acknowledges that 'the contact'⁴⁸ played a key role in extending the 1975 IRA ceasefire since he acted as both a messenger and an intermediary between Wilson, Oatley and the IRA Army Council by hosting several meetings in his home (Craig, 2012). The importance of Duddy's role was explained by Oatley later on, as the primary problem for him was 'how to begin a dialogue and then contact with the IRA leadership without doing so directly. If there were to be negotiations at some stage, the ground had to be prepared' (Oatley, 1975, quoted in Taylor, 2002a, p.170). It was also essential for the IRA leadership to feel that there was an on-going and a secure contact with the government. It is evident through the statement of Frank Cooper, a senior British official in Northern Ireland, that it was necessary for 'O'Bradaigh and, to some extent, O'Connell to feel that they were in contact with part of the British government which might, at some stage, help them to move in a political direction' (Cooper, 1975, quoted in Taylor, 2002a, p.170). However, it was still very risky for the government to contact the IRA directly. Even Whitelaw was not informed about these talks (Taylor, 2002a). Therefore, it can be said that the reason for the secrecy of these meetings was the difficulty to consider it government policy during the early stage of the conflict. As Pruitt (2006) indicates, secrecy might help disputing sides to discuss their demands without any precondition. It could have been harder to conduct covert negotiations by including or informing a government representative. Therefore, this initiative provided a twofold advantage to making progress: It, firstly, reduced uncertainty on both sides as both parties were feeling

⁴⁸ Jonathan Powell (2008), one of the key architects of the GFA revealed that Duddy was the key in the secret talks and was called 'the contact' during the secret initiatives.

that they were in contact with their opponents. It was also successful on the government's side as it did not mean that they gave *de facto* legitimacy to the IRA.

Concerning the content of the discussions, he put pressure on the British government to make concessions that would help the IRA leaders who took a pro-ceasefire position. In that time, Billy McKee, Commander of the Belfast IRA was in the position of declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Duddy told his British contact:

Be generous, give McKee a chance. Consider his position; he needs help... He is not a miracle worker... Pull out some mar[in]e comm[andos]. Release his buddy from Purdysburn. Release nineteen internees on Tuesday; give the names to McKee... We are all in this together (NUI-POL/35/4/62, 1975).

Even though Duddy's intention was not successful in bringing the British closer, it was clear evidence of Duddy's active role as a powerful intermediary in the secret negotiations. As Princen (1992) indicates, intermediaries can put pressure on the conflicting sides and insist on applying the requirements of secret dialogue, which was clearly seen through Duddy's efforts. Yet, the violent campaign of the IRA eventually returned due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the 1975 ceasefire negotiations demonstrate that the British government aimed to weaken the IRA militarily instead of carrying out non-violent resolution efforts. This was admitted by the government. An anonymous British official said 'we know that the Provisionals fear that we may be stringing them along' and 'if the Provisionals stop violence, they must not now expect immediately to raise the process of talking to new levels' (NUI-POL/35/69, 1975). Therefore, Duddy's great effort at building the backchannel could not help to focus political resolution efforts. This was because of the British government's intention to use the ceasefire as an opportunity for weakening the IRA. As Merlyn Rees, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stated: 'The importance of a ceasefire is that it offers us the opportunity to create the conditions in which the Provisionals' "military" organisation and structure may be weakened. They would not find it easy to start a campaign again from scratch' (TNA-CAB/134/3921, 1975).

Secondly, the lack of trust prevented a better outcome as the British government did not rely on the IRA ceasefire. Rees pointed out in a private Cabinet discussion:

There is the risk that the Provisionals can rest, re-supply and regroup so as to re-emerge more strongly... They badly needed a ceasefire if only in order to reorganise after a long period of attrition and disruptions at the hands of the Security Forces. But they are not beaten. Their cohesion and discipline are remarkable (TNA-CAB/134/3921, 1975).

These statements are clear evidence of the British government's aim to defeat the IRA. Therefore, these contacts did not bring a positive outcome towards peace. Finally, the IRA Army Council's letter in the Duddy papers asserted that the insufficient response of the British government, on-going pressure from British troops and inadequate numbers of released prisoners caused an end to the ceasefire (NUI-POL/35/68/1, 1975). However, General Sir Frank King, GOC of Northern Ireland, revealed just a few months after the announcement of the ceasefire, in May 1975: 'The PIRA was becoming stronger every day, but the Security Forces were becoming weaker... It would take a considerable time now to reverse the PIRA's new-found strength' (TNA-CJ/4/839, 1975). In fact, the ceasefire did not weaken, but helped to strengthen the IRA. As former Belfast IRA member Anthony McIntyre told Moloney:

I cannot understand these people who say that the truce wrecked us. In my view, it strengthened us. We had a lot of internees coming back in for active service. It was so unlike the situation in 1974 when we had four active volunteers. By the start of 1976, we were bursting at the seams (McIntyre, 2000, quoted in Moloney, 2002, pp.177-178).

This initiative demonstrates that despite the credibility, powerful mediation and reduction in uncertainty, it did not provide a clear outcome towards peace. Therefore, this research reveals that the success of backchannels is not reliant only on the inclusiveness of the initiative, but also the intentions of disputing parties. It can be said that these negotiations were not 'serious' talks in order to lead the discussion to a broader level by discussing the underlying causes of the conflict. It was because the British government's intention to use this dialogue as an opportunity to defeat the

IRA by declaring a ceasefire which proved that it was a 'false' motive for a ripe moment (Zartman, 2003). Although the secrecy of these talks secured them from the effect of wider and external issues, for instance national and international politics, it also created an environment in which the intention of the parties were difficult to understand by each other.

Duddy's second major initiative was during the republican hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981. The Duddy papers reveal an intense and accelerating series of phone calls between Duddy and an anonymous representative of the British government. He met the strikers several times in the Maze Prison and forwarded their messages to his contact in the British government. According to the records, Duddy insisted on a negotiated settlement of the hunger strikes. In response to his claim, the British officials stated that 'the British government is prepared to issue a statement only if there is an immediate end to the hunger strike' (NUI-POL/35/166/2, 1981). However, the hunger strikers made a number of demands from the government to end the strike: civilian clothing, the right of the prisoners to decide what work should be done and visits for prisoners (NUI-POL/35/166/3, 1981). While the backchannel communications were being conducted, PM Thatcher refused to negotiate with the strikers as her position was that of not treating terrorists differently to other prisoners (Thatcher, 1993, p.389). Hence, there was nothing to discuss with the republican strikers. However, while the government continued its opposition in public, the secret negotiations helped to pursue ways to weaken the conflict behind the scenes. This is in parallel with Wanis-St John's (2006) assumption which is that backchannels make it possible to maintain the governments' opposition to talking to terrorists while they are talking to them behind the scenes. This situation helped both sides to understand each other's major demands which also hindered any potential spoilers to destroy this channel.

Duddy sought possible ways to end the strike by contacting both strikers and their families. According to Duddy, the hunger strikers' lives could only be saved through a mutual understanding regarding the strikers'

required conditions (NUI-POL/35/167/3, 1981). Eventually, after ten prisoners died in the strike, other strikers' families accepted medical support. The prisoners finally declared an end to the strike on 3 October 1981 and Thatcher made concessions to their requests (Little, 2006, p.66). Undoubtedly, it was not only Duddy's efforts, but also the government and strikers' perception of change. Together with these developments, the 1980s witnessed more active political resolution efforts.

Duddy's last intermediary attempt was in the early 1990s which led to the 1994 IRA ceasefire. When Duddy's mediation between John Major's government and the IRA was leaked to the media in 1993, it caused a political storm (Spencer, 2000). Although maintaining the backchannel initiatives was threatened, these secret talks led to the IRA's 1994 ceasefire. It can be said that a sufficient dialogue was built between the British government and republican movement that facilitated official negotiations. A similar situation emerged in Turkey when the secret Oslo talks were leaked to the press. Fortunately, none of these incidents caused an interruption to conflict resolution efforts. The reaction in the wider society was because of the content of the meetings as Duddy pointed out that there was an agreement during the discussions between the two sides:

Walter's [IRA representative] position has been accepted and a new draft British paper has been formulated and approved by Mayhew [when he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] which is to be put in a special meeting on Tuesday May 18th 1993 to Mr Major in Downing Street (NUI-POL/35/266/1, 1993).

These covert negotiations resulted in finding common ground which was evident through the message of the British representative Robert McLarnon to Duddy to facilitate peace efforts: 'We are appalled at the present mess. We are trying to think of questions that you could put that will give you all the assurance of our goodwill and good intentions that you need' (NUI-POL/35/9/279, 1993). Although the message did not find an immediate response from the government's side, the process brought about the IRA's 1994 ceasefire after protracted negotiations. There were some other initiatives which facilitated the IRA's ceasefire together with Duddy's efforts. Haughey, the chairperson of the SDLP, notes that the SDLP worked

hard in the late 1980s and early 1990s to make contact with the IRA through SF to stop its armed campaign. The secret talks between the two parties helped to build a closer relationship between republicans and nationalists (Haughey, Interview, 19/01/2015). Together with these attempts, Duddy's efforts contributed to an understanding between the main armed protagonists.

6.3.2. Direct Talks

The first direct contact came into effect on the last day of the first IRA ceasefire in March 1972 between Harold Wilson, his press secretary, Joe Haines, and Merlyn Rees, the Labour Party's Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the one hand, and the IRA Army Council member Joe Cahill and the IRA's Belfast Brigade Commander, John Kelly, on the other. The meeting was facilitated by another intermediary, John O'Connell, a Labour Party MP in the Irish government, which was a clear sign of the Irish government's facilitating role in the resolution efforts (Taylor, 1998, p.182). This secret meeting signalled a change towards both sides creating a path to peace. Haines later described the extent of the difficulty facing this meeting, saying: 'a meeting of minds was clearly impossible. We were planets apart; words had different meanings' (Haines, 1977, p.128). However, he also highlighted the importance of the talks: 'We had broken the taboo of talks with the IRA, and thus held a door ajar for the future' (Haines, 1977, p.129). Nonetheless, the difference in the focus of the two sides made it impossible to move these talks forward. The British side's focus was limited to only a ceasefire with Wilson insisting on the extension of the ceasefire which would provide space for non-violent efforts. This claim was not responded to by the IRA (Taylor, 1998, p.133). In contrast, the IRA aimed to reach a satisfactory level of discussion that would lead to the recognition of their demands before declaring a ceasefire. Thus, the violence returned on the following day with the IRA's shooting at the British Army in the Bogside area of Londonderry. Although the British government announced that the Stormont Parliament was suspended on March 24, 1972, this suspension did not result in the breaking of the secret talks

between the main armed protagonists thanks to the lack of an official link. As Pruitt (2005) argues, these talks were easier for both states and sub-state armed groups to deny, so both sides were not reluctant to meet.

As discussed in the previous section, the efforts at indirect contact by Caldwell helped to bring the British government and senior republicans together which was the second direct contact between the British and republican sides (Guardian, 2008). Prime Minister's Office noted that their first meeting was on 20 June 1972 between the IRA representatives David O'Connell and Gerry Adams on the one hand, and officials from William Whitelaw's office; Sir Phillip Woodfield and Frank Steele on the other (TNA-PREM/15/1009, 1972). It was a step towards the meeting with Whitelaw. As a result of Steele's initiatives, Whitelaw had a meeting with six IRA leaders on 7 July 1972. This talk was offered by a public IRA statement for Whitelaw, with the group inviting him to Londonderry on 13 June 1972 through the republican media. Although the invitation was officially refused by Whitelaw, John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, and a senior member of the SDLP, Paddy Devlin, convinced the government that the offer was genuine (Taylor, 1998, p.136). Hence, Whitelaw accepted to meet the republicans secretly.

The structure of the IRA negotiating team gives a clue to the importance attached to these clandestine talks. The six members consisted of three senior members of the IRA's Belfast Command: Gerry Adams, Seamus Twomey and Ivor Bell and the IRA's Londonderry battalion commander Martin McGuinness, the IRA's Army Council member David O'Connell and Chief-of-Staff Sean MacStiofain (Mumford, 2011, p.636). On the other side, Whitelaw and Paul Channon, Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), represented the British government. Despite the high-level representatives in the talks, mistrust was revealed when Whitelaw focused on attrition instead of conciliation. An anonymous attendee of the talks informed Coogan that Whitelaw said; 'we can accept the casualties' and continued by asserting 'we probably lose as many soldiers in accidents in Germany' (Whitelaw, 1972, quoted in Coogan, 2002,

pp.393-394; Smith, 1997). As discussed in Section 3.3, trust between disputing parties is one of the most salient aspects of a successful negotiation process (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011). Due to the lack of trust, there were many disagreements during the meeting such as over self-determination and the withdrawal of British troops. However, there was minor progress in the form of an agreement between the two sides on a week-long bilateral ceasefire with immediate action and on arranging another set of negotiations after this ceasefire. According to an anonymous meeting note of the Northern Ireland Office of the British government, after the Whitelaw talks had come into effect, the ceasefire was immediately announced, but lasted only two days (TNA-CJ/4/1456, 1972). Fortunately, the intensive discussions between warring parties is a sign that these talks provided a flexible environment by encouraging informality and discussions about both sides' fears, aims and proposals (Pruitt, 2006, 2008). Even though this initiative was unsuccessful, it illustrated the British government's intention to conduct political resolution efforts, as Whitelaw defended secret negotiations by saying that 'a refusal to talk would leave the political initiative in the hands of the IRA' (Whitelaw, 1989, p.100). Overall, the Whitelaw talks were a constructive effort to reach a mutual understanding. The talks provided an environment which strengthened the position of the Provisionals since they sat at the negotiating table with the government. They also used this initiative as a chance to understand the position of the British side: 'It was time to test the water and see if the British were prepared to negotiate' (Taylor, 1998, p.136).

Although there was on-going violence, this initiative embodied the advantage of the two sides' intention for a non-violent resolution, which is one of the major requirements for a conflict resolution process. On the one hand, Whitelaw points out his demand in the application of peace talks in February 1972: '...our aim is not to conquer or occupy the city but to bring it back permanently and with as little rancour as possible in a peaceful and orderly state' (HC Deb, 1972). On the other hand, the IRA also demanded a meeting with the British government to discuss the IRA's peace plan, which encapsulated the Irish people's right for self-determination, the British

troops' withdrawal from Northern Ireland and a general amnesty for prisoners in Britain and Ireland (Sinn Fein, 1973). Even though the two sides intended to conduct negotiations, the underlying reason for the lack of success was a great gap in their desires. McGuinness explained that the republican movement's only interest in meeting with Whitelaw was 'to secure a binding agreement from the British declaring their intention to leave Ireland at some date in the future' (McGuinness, 1987, quoted in McKool, 1987). In contrast, even though Whitelaw's approach during the secret meetings was criticised, he aimed to create conditions of political bargaining instead of a violent campaign, unlike Rees and some other British officials. This was evident through the British government's statement in a Cabinet discussion: 'Recent developments offered an opportunity for a political advance that the government could not afford to miss' (TNA-CAB/128/48/3, 1972). The difference between the two sides' desires prevented progress. Whitelaw later examined the meeting in his memoirs as 'a non-event', he continued: 'the IRA leaders simply made impossible demands which I told them the British Government could never concede. They were in fact still in a mood of defiance and determination to carry on until their absurd ultimatums were met' (Whitelaw, 1989, p.100). Therefore, initiating the dialogue was not a 'hurting stalemate' for both sides. As Zartman (2003) indicates, a hurting stalemate emerges when disputing parties are locked in a conflict and cannot reach victory, and hence seek a way out of the conflict to end this deadlock. Whitelaw's attrition policy instead of conciliation, demonstrated that it was not a ripe moment for resolution from the British side. In addition, it is also critical that objective elements (conflicting parties' refusal to recognise the facts as accurate) are necessary but not sufficient for a political resolution. Subjective elements were also necessary which are not only a hurting stalemate for both sides and their intention towards a negotiated settlement, but also other parties that they can cultivate these dialogues from a painful situation to a preferable alternative (Zartman, 2000, p.229). The Northern Irish parties were not included in the process due to the secrecy of the meetings and so the agents who were in favour of the peace

initiatives did not play an encouraging role in the progress. Thus, the discussion in this backchannel can be examined as not a 'false' event, but an event in appearance only due to the great gap between the perceptions of both sides.

The last significant secret initiative was arranged by a group of Protestant clergymen from the Irish Council of Churches in Feakle on 10 December 1974. According to English (2003), the Feakle talks were made possible because the British were keen to send signals to the IRA that they were thinking of withdrawing from Northern Ireland. There was a clear intention to conduct peace attempts by the British as the talks were achieved three weeks after the Birmingham pub bombings which killed 19 people and injured 182 (McKittrick et al., 2007). Therefore, the political parties in the UK were against a political resolution due to anger towards the IRA's violent campaign resulting in killing many civilians (Dixon, 2001b). Ending the IRA's armed campaign was a national policy and at the top of the British government's agenda. However, there is little evidence that the backchannel communications were affected by international politics. Instead, they were defined by the nature of the conflict, and intentions of the British and republican sides. However, despite the intensity of the conflict, the meeting was carried out due to the change of government and thanks to the willingness of PM Harold Wilson's minority government for a political resolution in March 1974 (Mumford, 2011, p.640). The change of the government created a positive effect to apply peace initiatives, hence, the change in the national political environment in the UK helped to conduct non-violent, political resolution attempts. It can be said that national politics played an encouraging role during the Feakle talks in contrast to the previous secret dialogues because this time Wilson's government aimed to discuss a political settlement.

The declassified secret TNA papers revealed that Marilyn Rees, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stated that even though Wilson was willing to talk to the IRA about a cessation of violence, this minority government was reluctant to respond to any of the IRA's demands as they

would lead to a misunderstanding in public regarding negotiations with SF (TNA-PREM/16/158, 1974). Therefore, the reluctance of the British government was because of the possibility of this channel being revealed, which seemed vital for the government in order to prevent a public outcry against an agreement with the IRA (Dochartaigh, 2011b). Arguably, it could be said that the change in the ruling party facilitated the peace efforts between the IRA and British government. It was a ripe moment for initiating peace negotiations since the British government and republican movement were in favour of the peace talks. In addition, the efforts of the mediators to bring together both sides facilitated the dialogue and determined an approachable agenda for the talks prevented this event to look like a simulation exercise. Instead, it was a 'serious' event as it was motivated by 'true' motives⁴⁹, namely, the intention of both conflicting parties and attempts of intermediaries as internal factors, and the change in the political environment in the UK as national development. As Ikle (1964) and Zartman (2000) indicate, true motives might help to reach a ripe moment to turn into negotiations in order to establish a political resolution. This was also a 'hurting stalemate' because the pub bombings were one of the lethal attacks in the IRA history. After this attack, both sides started to think that they could not reach victory by armed campaign. Instead, the loss of civilians created anger in the society and caused to divide the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland more deeply. This belief also helped to apply non-violent, political resolution efforts. The insight of the discussions demonstrates that the topics discussed in the Feakle talks were at the core of the Northern Ireland conflict.

The Feakle talks were carried out between the political wing of the republican movement, which was represented by the leader O'Bradaigh, vice-leader Maire Drumm and Seamus Loughran, SF's Belfast organiser and

⁴⁹ The term 'serious' events and 'true' motives were coined by Zartman, which describe the sincere contribution of negotiations into resolution of a conflict (Zartman, 2003).

the IRA wing that was represented by Billy McKee, David O'Connell and three helicopter escapees from Mountjoy prison; O'Hagan, Twomey and Mallon. Sir Frank Cooper, the Permanent Secretary to the NIO in Stormont represented the British side (Megahey, 2000; Taylor, 2002a, pp.176-177). Four factors are crucial to understanding the significance of these talks: firstly, reducing audience effects helped to build a stronger communication channel (Wanis-St John, 2004). As these discussions excluded audiences, they made it possible for the British government to meet with the IRA escapees. It was also a sign of the intention of the two sides for a non-violent resolution. Secondly, it helped to overcome mistrust on the republican side as it was a face-to-face discussion (Bartoli, 1999). Similarly, the IRA's ceasefire encouraged the British side to think about further steps for peace (Hennessey, 2015; TNA-CJ/4/860, 1974). Thirdly, it was an obvious example of how spoilers could undermine a backchannel. As Stedman (1997) argues, this threat emerges when extremist elements of a conflict-affected environment intervene in the situation. It was a well-organised event because the clergymen had prepared a document and aimed to get the IRA's agreement and to present it to the British government as a framework for ending violence. However, the meetings did not bring an outcome immediately as they were stopped due to the Irish Special Branch's raid on the hotel where the meeting was being conducted.

Despite this obstacle, the IRA's statement demonstrated that the IRA informed Oatley later about their declaration of a ten-day ceasefire from midnight on 22 December, hoping to create a climate in which a more productive dialogue might be achieved (TNA-CJ/4/2263, 1975). The clergymen undoubtedly played their role in crystallising the IRA's thinking towards a political discussion. The ceasefire was then extended until 16 January through another intermediary, Brendan Duddy, as discussed in Section 6.3.1. Lastly, the discussion gives the clue of the underlying reason for the ceasefire. McKee asserted that 'I asked what was on the agenda and he [Oatley] said "Withdrawal"⁵⁰ and he said that he needed our help... They

⁵⁰ Double quotation mark and capital are in original.

said, that is what they wanted' (McKee, 1974, quoted in Taylor, 1998, p.179). McKee continued: 'If they had not mentioned withdrawal, there would have been no ceasefire and no truce at that time' (McKee, 1974, quoted in Taylor, 2002a, p.180), So, the withdrawal was the primary reason for the republicans to come together with the British and to declare the ceasefire. Therefore, it is important to understand that secret talks are not the only important factors in leading the way towards official negotiations and a political settlement, more importantly; it is the promises given by the conflicting sides related to their major claims such as withdrawal.

6.4. Backchannels in Turkey

Turkey's Kurdish question has witnessed several secret initiatives through intermediaries and direct talks. While different intermediaries played a role in exchanging the messages between the Turkish government and PKK, secret talks were carried out between the leading members of the MIT and PKK. The influence of these channels was defined by different factors, which are discussed in this section.

6.4.1. Indirect Communications

The secret contact between the Turkish government and PKK was initiated by different intermediaries. The first secret contact was initiated by Jalal Talabani, who was the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), when President Özal asked him to make contact with Öcalan between the late 1980s and 1993 (Aslan, 2010). The content of these messages was revealed through the interview data. Cengiz Çandar, who was Özal's chief advisor, stated that Özal's message to Öcalan was a request for a ceasefire (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015). Similarly, it was also admitted by Öcalan during his interview with a Turkish journalist, Oral Çalışlar,⁵¹ that he met with Talabani and Çandar in an attempt to de-escalate the conflict

⁵¹ Çalışlar is a journalist who met with Öcalan in the Bekaa Valley. The purpose of the meeting was not part of a peace initiative, but for an interview which was later published as a book (Çalışlar, 1993).

(Çalışlar, 1993). Özal asked the PKK to declare a ceasefire, which he believed was the first step towards a non-violent resolution. Talabani's contact with Öcalan in the Bekaa Valley in Syria (where the PKK's headquarters were located) was the first initiative for a non-violent peace (Çalışlar, Interview, 07/07/2015). As Pruitt (2006) puts it, the role of intermediaries can only be to pass messages which include the desires and claims of parties between each other. Talabani's role was also limited to passing Özal and Öcalan's messages to each other, which makes his effort as a weak intermediary. Despite his limited attempt, Talabani's messenger role was successful in decreasing the level of violence and understanding both sides' desires. It is evident that even though Talabani did not play a key role, his messenger role facilitated the PKK's first ceasefire which was one of the major aims of the backchannel communications. Özal informed the TSK about these indirect dialogues in 1988 (TSKA-MGK/989/4, 1988). However, he was faced with a strong reaction as the Chief of the General Staff Necip Torumtay said 'the state does not talk with the bandits' (TSKA-MGK/988/9, 1988). This reaction prevented the expansion of the framework the indirect dialogues were based on.

Talabani then began to make contact with PM Süleyman Demirel. Birand and Yalçın's interview with Talabani reveals the insight of his contact with Demirel. According to Talabani, when he asked Demirel about his demand, Demirel replied: 'I do not want to negotiate with him [Öcalan]. But, you [Talabani] can contact him and ask to stop violent attacks. The ceasefire is crucial for us to achieve political reforms in the south-east of Turkey' (Demirel, 1993, quoted in Birand & Yalçın, 2001, p.474). These talks and initiatives are a sign of the intention of both sides to conduct political resolution efforts instead of an armed campaign. Both Demirel and Özal thought that a ceasefire was the precondition for initiating dialogue. The exchange of the messages resulted in the PKK's first ceasefire starting on 20 March 1993. Öcalan declared that the PKK was ready for a political

resolution and the Nevruz⁵² celebration would be lived in peace (Öcalan, 1993, cited in Birand & Yalçın, 2001, p.476). The ceasefire was a result of Talabani's efforts thanks to his trustworthiness as seen by both sides. As Princen (1992) notes, intermediaries are expected to be trustworthy or, at least, more trustworthy than one's opponent. Therefore, they can improve communication and enhance the disputing parties' understanding of each other's intentions and desires (Princen, 1992, p.29). It can be said that President Özal's trust in Talabani's mediation encouraged him to initiate the process while Öcalan's reliance helped him to improve communication between the warring parties. It was also due to the intention of the PKK, which was to resolve the conflict through negotiations as Öcalan noted, the first choice for the PKK being to reach their aim through political struggle (Öcalan, 1989, cited in Perinçek, 2014, p.87).

The second intermediary during the early peace efforts was Cengiz Çandar. Çandar met with Öcalan a few times before and after the 1993 ceasefire. Çandar's first contact was before the ceasefire when he went to the Bekaa Valley. According to Çandar (2015), Öcalan was not reluctant about either a ceasefire or a political resolution, but asked for the cessation of an intimidation policy against the PKK; otherwise, the PKK would respond to it with an armed campaign. After the declaration of the ceasefire, he contacted Öcalan through Talabani and asked for the ceasefire to be extended indefinitely and without preconditions. Three days later, Talabani called Çandar and agreed that Öcalan had accepted to extend the ceasefire indefinitely. However, as President Özal died a few days later, the dialogue ceased (Çandar, 2014). The ceasefire was ended by a dreadful terrorist attack in which the PKK executed thirty-three unarmed off-duty soldiers and five civilians on 24 May 1993 (Hürriyet, 2012). Overall, Çandar's mediation contained more than one chain as he contacted Öcalan via Talabani. It can be said that this effort created a more chaotic situation since it resulted in both sides blaming each other. For example, Öcalan later

⁵² Nevruz is a traditional celebration day of spring for both the Kurdish and Turkish people. It is also called Nowruz and Newroz. The term Nevruz is chosen as it is the official use in Turkish.

blamed the Turkish government for the failure of this initiative: 'we declared a ceasefire. However, the Turkish state was not ready for resolution. Özal did not prepare the security forces and his party for peace. He could not convince them' (Öcalan, 2011, quoted in ANF, 2011). These initiatives illustrate two important factors of secret talks. Firstly, it was evident that both sides were willing to discuss the future of the Kurdish question in a non-violent context. Çandar stated that 'both Özal and Öcalan were willing to solve the conflict in a political way' (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015). The intention of the conflicting parties formed the starting point of the peace process. Secondly, as Wanis-St John (2006) indicates, the personal initiatives of intermediaries made officially sanctioned communications possible. Although Çandar was the advisor to Özal, it was his personal initiative to communicate with Öcalan. Çandar (2015) explained that he was not asked by Özal or any other Turkish officials to do so. Therefore, both contacts were achieved thanks to the intermediaries' personal efforts. Talabani's initiative resulted in the PKK ceasefire, while Çandar played a facilitating role to achieve this backchannel.

The contact between the two sides was maintained through Talabani in the mid-1990s despite the political pressure of the Chief of the General Staff Doğan Güreş. He pointed out that the only place to discuss the Kurdish issue was the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, henceforth: MGK)⁵³ (Saybaşı, 1995, pp.62-63). Even though it was never attested in public, the analysis on the declassified secret documents revealed that Özal informed the MGK about the indirect talks and asked the Chief of the General Staff to stop counter-terrorism operations. Güreş's reply is a clear indicator of the Army's opposition to a political resolution:

We are not going to cease operations. I am not following your order in this regard. Otherwise, what would I say to my soldiers on duty at the operation theatre? You can dismiss me from the office if you

⁵³ The MGK was a Council consisting of President, PM, National Defence, Internal and External Affairs Ministers and the chiefs of the Turkish Army. The Act 2945 on the MGK assigned great power to the MGK; 'not just in the defence of Turkey's territory and its political and economic interests, but also the preservation of its Kemalist legacy' (Cizre, 2003, p.221; Jenkins, 2001, p.46).

can afford to. Then, you can do whatever you want (TSKA-MGK/993/4, 1993).

The reaction of Güreş prevented peace efforts being conducted as government policy, and so resulted in secret initiatives being personally maintained by political leaders. As a ripe moment is also affected by national politics (Pruitt, 1997), it is clear that it was not the right time to conduct official negotiations towards ending the Kurdish conflict. It was because of the dominant role of the MGK in the national politics and being one of the major executive bodies in Turkish politics in security issues even if a political decision was being discussed.

Talabani was again the key messenger between PM Tansu Çiller and Öcalan. However, this indirect initiative had a different structure as Çiller took great care that this channel was not revealed by spoilers. Çiller, therefore, sent her chief advisor, Ercan Vuralhan, who later became Minister of National Defence, to meet with Talabani. The significant point of this backchannel was the length of the communication chain as this channel contained two intermediaries, just like Çandar's mediation. While Vuralhan acted as a messenger between Talabani and Çiller, Talabani played a pivotal role as he was the direct contact with the two principal actors. It can be said that the length of backchannels in the Turkish case has been used to ensure that these dialogues remain in the dark.

In terms of the insight into the backchannel, Günay Aslan,⁵⁴ the director of the PKK's Med-TV, revealed Çiller's dialogue with Talabani through his letter to Öcalan on 14 March 1995, 'Tansu Çiller seeks a political resolution' (Aslan, 2010). As Aslan (2010) stated, Çiller asked the PKK to declare a ceasefire for a year and later to end the armed campaign. Öcalan's reply focused on dialogue. In Öcalan's words, 'if the government avoids any attacks against the people [in the south-east of Turkey] and [armed]

⁵⁴ Günay Aslan is a Kurdish journalist and a moderator of a TV programme in Kurdish Med-TV. During the programme, Öcalan was hosted on the phone to many of his live broadcasts. He gave messages to Kurdish people and Turkish political actors. Aslan also went to the Bekaa Valley to meet Öcalan (Oğur, 1996; Tayyar, 2008).

operations against the PKK, I am ready to declare a ceasefire' (Öcalan, 1995, quoted in Aslan, 2010). The exchange of claims finally resulted in a ceasefire, which was announced by Öcalan during a live broadcast of Aslan's Med-TV programme. Nevertheless, the ceasefire was broken by the PKK after three days. The PKK blamed the government for not responding to the PKK's claims and for organising a cross-border operation in northern Iraq, where the PKK's camps were located (CNNTürk, 2010). The reason for the failure of this dialogue was the TSK's hard-line policies (Cemal, 2003). The TSK as the spoiler of this effort aimed to prevent building a communication channel. This backchannel illustrated that it was not a 'hurting stalemate' by the Turkish army's side since the TSK was willing to maintain traditional counter-terrorism measures instead of conflict resolution procedures through intermediaries. This indirect communication channel illustrates that trust in the intermediary facilitated the building of communication channels between the conflicting parties, whereas the role of intermediaries was restricted to transmitting messages.

There was also an unsanctioned backchannel initiated by Seyyit Haşim Haşimi, a deputy of the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, henceforth: RP). Although Haşimi was a deputy of the coalition party in the government, it was not an RP initiative. It was Öcalan's demand to talk to Haşimi as he is a Kurdish politician and a well-known figure in Turkey's southeast. This was an untold and overlooked issue but was important in the conflict resolution process since it illustrated the intention of the pro-Kurdish side to conduct peace talks despite the high-intensity conflict. Haşimi (2015) noted that Öcalan called him and asked to contact Erbakan for a political settlement. Haşimi and Mukadder Başeğmez, who later became a deputy of the Virtue Party (the successor of the RP, *Fazilet Partisi*, henceforth: FP), talked with PM Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan accepted this recommendation and decided to begin secret talks with the PKK. Nevertheless, Erbakan deployed İsmail Nacar, who was an NGO leader, as an intermediary (Haşimi, Interview, 03/07/2015). The reason for Erbakan's choice of Nacar instead of Haşimi was explained through Nacar's earlier meetings with Erbakan on the Kurdish question (Alphan & Albayrak, 2010). Although this attempt was

not successful, it provided paramount information on the Turkish government's perception of secret communications. This issue can be explained through mistrust in Haşimi which resulted in the lack of an outcome. The existing backchannel communication literature addresses the requirement to overcome trust and credibility issues regarding the implementation of secret talks (Pruitt, 2008; Wanis-St John, 2006). In this context, while Haşimi's attempt was not a credible contact from the government's side, Nacar's effort helped to build the first direct contact between the government and PKK. His involvement in this initiative will be assessed in the next section as he became part of direct talks.

İlhami Işık⁵⁵ was the last intermediary who played a role from 1998 to 2004. Işık's early efforts between the government and senior members of the PKK resulted in a PKK ceasefire on September 1, 1998 (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015). It was critical as the ceasefire dramatically decreased the casualties from more than a thousand to less than a hundred in a year (Figure 5.2). According to Işık (2015), both the Turkish officials and PKK leaders were not ready to come together. Therefore, Işık exchanged information between these two sides. Işık's mediation was weak intermediary work as he only exchanged messages between the Turkish government and PKK. Işık met with leading members of the PKK; Karayılan, Karasu and Ok on the one hand, and the MIT members on the other, who later attended the Oslo talks (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015). The significant point was that the PKK leadership asked Işık to send messages to the government for the sake of non-violent resolution. Therefore, he made contact with the leading members of both sides. He even met with Öcalan in İmralı Prison. In contrast to Haşimi, Işık's mediation was accepted by both parties. So, it can be said that he met with the expectations of an intermediary in this conflict, who, in Princen's words, is required to be

⁵⁵ The details of Işık's intermediary were revealed later on which illustrated his pivotal role during the secret initiatives and who called 'the fisherman' (HaberTürk, 2013).

'neutral or impartial, or, at least, to act to preserve one's expected -and deserved- outcome' (Princen, 1992, p.60).

In terms of the insight into the discussions, after his intermediary role, the PKK fulfilled the major claims of the Turkish government as it changed its name, withdrew its militants from Turkey and did not apply an armed struggle. Nevertheless, the Turkish government did not progress regarding human rights and democratic changes for equality and self-governance (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015). Işık revealed that, during his mediation, Öcalan's primary claim was that the Turkish government should have recognised that the PKK did not create the problem, but that there had been an existing Kurdish issue before the PKK (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015). However, as discussed in Section 5.3.2, these changes did not help the progress. The reason why this backchannel failed after six years of exchanging demands and claims of both sides should be analysed. In 2004, the PKK brought its ceasefire to an end by blaming the TSK for maintaining military operations and the AKP rule for not making any political reforms related to the Kurdish question (CNN Türk, 2010). After declaring the ceasefire, the PKK changed its name to KADEK and then Kongra-Gel (Coşkun, Interview, 04/09/2015). In response, the government did not discuss a political resolution. Therefore, as Yayla (2015) notes, Turkey could not use this five-year ceasefire to its advantage. This was because of not only the reluctance of politicians, but also the 'deep state'⁵⁶ (Yayla, Interview, 07/07/2015). Although it is not the topic of this research, many unresolved crimes were alleged to have been related to the deep state in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, while Işık's intermediary work facilitated the communication between the conflicting sides, the failure of

⁵⁶ The term 'deep state' (derin devlet) is asserted to be powerful anti-democratic coalition groups within the Turkish political system, composed of high-level elements within the intelligence services (domestic and foreign), Turkish military, security, judiciary, and mafia (Kanlı, 2007). The existence of the deep state was even admitted by Erdoğan: 'I do not agree with those who say the deep state does not exist. It does exist. It has always had—and it did not start with the Republic; it dates back to Ottoman times. It is simply a tradition. It must be minimised, and if possible even annihilated' (Erdoğan, 2007, quoted in Barlas, 2007).

the process was due to the perception of the disputing parties. Even though the government was blamed for being reluctant, two factors have been paid little attention: the division within the PKK and regional factors. On the one hand, Coşkun noted that the PKK came to a crossroads in 2004 (Coşkun, Interview, 04/09/2015). While one side wanted a political struggle instead of an armed conflict, the other defended carrying out an armed campaign. As a result, the group which advocated the armed conflict eliminated the other side and the PKK turned to a violent campaign again in June 2004 (Coşkun, Interview, 04/09/2015). On the other hand, the PKK's end of ceasefire and cessation of conflict resolution efforts were also due to the Iraq War of 2003. The US's invasion of Iraq changed the nature of the region, and the PKK used the authority gap in Iraq to their advantage. When Saddam Hussein's regime was stopped, and the US army left northern Iraq, the PKK found great ammunition supplies in Iraq from the Saddam regime. The group wanted to use this opportunity to fight against Turkey as its government was not willing to take steps towards a political settlement (Oğur, Interview, 25/06/2015). Even though the Iraq War seems an external issue for Turkey's Kurdish question, it had a direct effect on the nature of the peace process due to the PKK's use of the northern Iraq as its headquarter and for its camps. The war in Iraq therefore resulted in the reluctance of the PKK to maintain the peaceful language. As a result, the intermediaries' efforts in the 1990s and 2000s did not have a major effect on the peace process.

6.4.2. Direct Talks

The first direct contact between the Turkish government and PKK came into effect during Erbakan's RP rule in 1996 (Alphan & Albayrak, 2010). Zübeyir Aydar, president of the executive committee of the Kurdish parliament-in-exile, made contact with Nacar and asked Nacar to make contact with the government. Nacar's personal contact with PM Erbakan led him being selected as the intermediary of this channel on 27 July 1996 (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, p.446). Erbakan then appointed Fethullah Erbaş, the RP deputy, to conduct secret negotiations with Nacar. Öcalan later told

during his interrogation that 'Nacar was one of the intermediaries during the RP rule who contacted me on the phone from time to time' and 'Erbakan claimed the PKK to end the violent conflict in order to achieve political, economic and cultural reforms in the south-east of Turkey' (Uğur, 2014, p.42). When this backchannel was leaked to the press, an outcry emerged from the other parties in the Parliament (Radikal, 2015). During the secret talks, Öcalan demanded the amnesty for Kurdish deputies and other prisoners, Kurdish broadcasting on state television and Kurdish education in private schools. Erbaş's request on behalf of the government was an immediate ceasefire, the release of eight captured Turkish soldiers and an end to border violations (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, p.447). Erbaş later described the secret talks as partially successful as they led to the release of captured Turkish soldiers, even though they also caused an outcry from the TSK and MGK (Erbaş, 2013; Yeni Çağ, 2009). Although the government was defending the argument of 'we do not talk to terrorists' in public due to the lack of cost of entry to this talk, the spoilers' reaction resulted in ending these talks (Pruitt, 2005). The outcome of the talks was a result of their secrecy, but the process was then prevented from continuing due to the spoilers, namely the TSK and opposition parties. Although Dochartaigh (2011b) suggests that it is easier to keep these channels in the dark and to exclude both internal and external spoilers, it was not possible in the Turkish case in the late 1990s due to the dominance of the TSK.

Furthermore, the TSK's role in Turkey's national politics caused to diminish the influence of this direct communication channel just like the impact of indirect dialogues. Fortunately, this initiative did not remain as a 'simulation exercise' since it contributed to the peace process by testing the willingness of both sides towards a political resolution. However, even though Turkish soldiers were captured by the PKK, it was not a 'hurting stalemate' for resolution since the major political agents in Turkey, including the Turkish army and political parties, were in favour of maintaining armed struggle (Uğur, 2014). It was because of the belief that predominantly armed response by the Turkish army would be adequate to destroy the PKK. Later, the Turkish government realised that it was an

insufficient policy as it largely overlooked the fact that it is an ethnic conflict. This change appeared in the last secret communication channel.

The last and most comprehensive secret talks between the Turkish government and PKK was achieved during the AKP rule. The significance of the Oslo talks derived from a number of major factors: the duration of the talks, participants, insights and outcome. Firstly, it is largely understood that these talks were carried out between 2009 and 2011, despite some disagreement. For example, the CHP spokesperson Haluk Koç asserted that the meetings began in 2009 (HDN, 2015a). However, Etyen Mahçupyan, the chief advisor to the PM, revealed that the talks were first launched in 2006 and lasted until 2011, being conducted in different locations including Brussels and Oslo, until some parts of the records were leaked to the media (Mahçupyan, Interview, 22/06/2015). Similarly, a senior member of the PKK, Nuriye Kesebir who attended the talks, stated that the talks began in 2006 (Kesebir, 2013, cited in Söylemez, 2013). The start date of the talks is very significant, as 2006 was a dreadful year in the conflict, seeing 111 security officers, 149 PKK members and 38 civilians losing their lives with many more injured (21YYTE, 2013; TBMM, 2013a). Murat Karayılan, one of the five top leaders of the PKK, argues that the process transformed the official peace negotiations, which took place in September 2008 (Karayılan, 2013, cited in Cemal, 2013). It was an indicator of the government's demand to conduct a political strategy rather than an armed campaign. In parallel to Pruitt's (2006, p.382) assumption of backchannels' positive role during existing violence, these initiatives provided a suitable environment for paving the way to official negotiations.

It is also significant that the year 2006 witnessed a 'hurting stalemate' for not only the Turkish government, but also the PKK due to the high-intensity violence. Although 1996 was one of the most devastating years of the Kurdish conflict, the belief of the political and military agents in armed struggle to defeat the PKK prevented the success of the Erbakan administration's backchannel communication. The change in the perception of the Turkish government and the application of negotiations

illustrate a similar situation with Zartman's (2000) argument that both sides locked in a conflict from which they cannot reach victory through armed struggle. The data on the lost lives (298 in total) demonstrate the intensity of the violence which was the highest number of loss security members and civilians and second highest number of loss members on the PKK's side in the 2000s (21YYTE, 2013). The casualties demonstrated the cost of the escalation of the conflict and proved the inability of both sides to de-escalate the conflict. Thus, this term illustrates a mutually hurting stalemate that a sense of a way out emerged in both parties. This stalemate was a subjective element to lead a peaceful process together with the events in the international context. The international politics was important to initiate peace events in the mid-2000s. The EU's support for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in a political way was an incentive to talk to the PKK and learn their demands in order to resolve this conflict (Yüksekdağ, Interview, 13/07/2015). These talks also opened the way for political changes through the reforms in the constitution. Although the reason for the British, Norwegian and Swedish governments to organise the secret talks as mediators and facilitators is not clear due to a lack of primary sources, their involvement was a clear indication of their intention and help towards the resolution of the conflict in a non-violent way. Besides, the agreement between Turkey and the US on organising joint operations and appointing reciprocal private representatives against the PKK militants in northern Iraq was a triggering factor for the PKK to be willing to apply negotiations. More importantly, the meetings between the two states witnessed the US's insistence on the resolution of the conflict that can only be reached through negotiations (Dilek, 2013). The Iraq war also helped the PKK to use the authority gap in this region. Therefore, the agreement between Turkey and the US was a threat for the PKK to maintain its armed campaign. All these factors helped both sides to apply conflict resolution efforts as opposed to maintain the violent conflict.

Secondly, the participants of the talks illustrate high-level representation in the talks, which shows the importance given to the talks by both sides. The talks were carried out between the Undersecretary

(Head) of the MIT, Emre Taner (later on by Hakan Fidan, the successor of Taner), alongside Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT, Afet Güneş, and the leadership of the PKK; Sabri Ok, Mustafa Karasu, Adem Uzun and Zübeyir Aydar (Başaran, 2016; Taraf, 2011). There was also a third party to mediate the talks. Although these actors have never been declared by the Turkish government, Karasu later noted that while British intelligence was the mediator of the meetings, the Norwegian government attended the talks as a facilitator (Karasu, 2013, cited in Akşam, 2013). Hence, the role of mediation is significant for a peace process. As Bercovitch (1991) indicates, a mediator's role can be to form an international perspective with no force or arbitrative rules. Similarly, British intelligence did not define a route for negotiations, but organised the meetings and brought both sides together in independent locations.⁵⁷ Related to the representatives of the disputing parties, the high-level representation helped to make progress. On the one hand, the attendance of the head of the MIT illustrates the significance of the secret talks. Further, Hakan Fidan⁵⁸, later appointed the Undersecretary of the MIT, pointed out the importance of PM Tayyip Erdoğan being represented in the talks stating; 'I am the Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT, but I am here as the private representative of PM [Erdoğan]' (Fidan quoted in Taraf, 2011). Besides, Fidan declared that he had the authority of making political decisions on behalf of the Turkish government (Fidan cited in Uğur, 2014). The high-level attendance at the talks demonstrates that the political authority was willing to resolve this problem in a non-violent way. In this regard, compared to the secret talks in Northern Ireland, although Steele and Oatley were senior officers, neither were the key decision makers and this is a great difference between the two cases. On the other

⁵⁷ The role of this mediation will be assessed in Chapter 8 regarding international mediations.

⁵⁸ Although the date of the meeting was not stated in the leaked record, there are a few indicators illustrating that the meeting was achieved in the early 2010. During the meeting, it was talked about the Habur crisis and Reşadiye attack of December 2009 (Taraf, 2011). In addition, Hakan Fidan introduced himself as the Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT. So, the leaked meeting should have been achieved in 2010, but before April 2010 when Fidan took the office.

hand, the PKK members who attended the talks were leading members of the group. Similar to the backchannels in Northern Ireland, the PKK's negotiators are officially on the wanted terrorist lists (EGM, 2016a, 2016b). In both initiatives, the high-level representation in these talks played a promoting role for overcoming trust issues. In addition, the HDP deputies Altan Tan, Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan also played a messenger role, forwarding the result of the meetings to the PKK's imprisoned leader Öcalan.

Thirdly, the discussion topics of the meetings are crucial to understanding the role of secret talks in the peace process. During the meeting, Fidan encouraged the PKK members to support a political resolution by noting that if a communal movement is supported by the people, it will achieve its aim sooner or later, so, he offered a model of direct societal support for the political environment instead of an armed campaign (Taraf, 2011). In addition, the purpose of the Oslo talks was to demonstrate that even if the armed struggle was maintained, the government and PKK would keep talking behind the scenes. Further, the insight of these talks illustrates a secret agreement between the two sides, since Fidan underlined that he was involved in the talks. It was because the dimension of the talks were changed from only a technical channel to a political discussion including major dimensions for the future of the conflict and political reforms. He then followed with one of the most important statements of the secret talks as a whole, stating that there was 90-95% agreement between the government and PKK on their general claims (Fidan cited in Taraf, 2011). The agreed topics were constitutional changes repealing ethnic differences in the rule of law, and Öcalan's amnesty (Uğur, 2014). It means that the government and PKK agreed on the main themes for resolving the conflict. It was clear evidence of the success of the Oslo talks. However, the government was careful to secure this initiative by not declaring the agreement in public. Arguably, keeping the agreement secret could have been used for gaining time to destroy the PKK through armed struggle. Koç revealed the agreement between the AKP rule and PKK. According to the agreement:

The parties agree to work on the names to be included in commissions that were to be founded as per Öcalan's drafts, namely the "Constitution Council", the "Peace Council" and the "Truth and Justice Commission".⁵⁹ The Turkish government promises to have two people representing the PKK meet with Öcalan right after the elections, apparently the general elections on June 12, 2011, and have some sub-commission members meet him after the foundation of the commissions mentioned above. ...the release of people arrested on allegations of ties to the KCK would be an appropriate step to resolution. In this context, the Turkish side promises to release arrested Kurdish politicians after Nevruz as a first step. The parties also promise each other to halt military operations mutually until June 15, 2011, while planning to meet once again in the second half of June 2011 (HDN, 2015a).

Referring to this revealed document to the public, the CHP, the leading opposition party, blamed the AKP for making an agreement with the PKK. In fact, even though the spokesperson of the AKP, Ömer Çelik, refused to acknowledge the existence of an agreement, it had accepted earlier by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Efkân Ala: 'The problem was caused by the PKK. We had an agreement in Oslo. It was collapsed by the PKK' (Çelik, 2015, cited in NTV, 2015; Ala, 2014, quoted in Selvi, 2014). While a series of secret negotiations were maintained, PM Erdoğan denied the claims of talking to terrorists with harsh language and even called people who made the allegations 'dishonoured slanderers' (HDN, 2012). It was parallel to Pruitt's (2005) assumption that these backchannels enable parties to continue their opposition in public whilst they are seeking ways to de-escalate the conflict secretly. When the secret talks were revealed in the media, the CHP's leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, blamed the government: 'It is understood that the meetings took place with the desire of PM Erdoğan. The language behind closed doors and in public is 180 degrees different' (HDN, 2012). However, many of the agreed points were not implemented as the process ended due to the negative reaction of wider Turkish society.

Lastly, the 'Habur event' was a clear outcome of the Oslo talks. Fidan called the Habur event the consequence of the agreement between the government and PKK (Taraf, 2011). According to the agreement between the MIT and PKK, a symbolic surrender of 34 PKK members was organised

⁵⁹ Double quotation marks are in original.

at the Habur border checkpoint of Turkey in 2009. The two groups, one from the Makhmour Refugee Camp in northern Iraq and the other from Qandil Mountain surrendered. The Turkish government had agreed to arrange an investigation at the border and release these militants. After the government had kept its promise, the militants were released. They were welcomed by great celebration, victory marches and propaganda for the PKK. These marches resulted in an outcry in the wider society (Oğur, Interview, 25/06/2015). Algan, a witness to the event, stated that the Habur event was a clear sign that the Turkish government was taking steps towards resolution of the conflict (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). The event illustrated a significant effort on the government's side, since a court was established just to investigate the surrenders at the border, the judges were brought in via helicopter, and everything was settled to release these militants prior to their investigation. The first impression of the residents of Turkey's southeast was very positive as they felt that peace was not impossible anymore. Nevertheless, the pro-Kurdish movement introduced the event as the PKK's triumph by claiming the PKK was successful in the war against Turkey. These PKK members travelled around many cities in the south-east of Turkey in an open-topped bus. This show resulted in strong opposition in the wider population of Turkey, and so interrupted the peace process (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). It can be said that although the Habur event was a remarkable effort on the government's side to legalise the conflict resolution process, the pro-Kurdish movement's aim to demonstrate it as their victory negatively affected the success of this event. The Kurdish politicians also attested this, as Tan, a deputy of pro-Kurdish HDP, stated that the Habur celebrations in different cities did not help the peace process (Tan, Interview, 24/06/2015). As a result, the Habur event did not bring a positive outcome to the peace process.

6.5. Comparison: Peacemaking in Progress?

The secret communications between the British government and IRA, and between the Turkish government and PKK are as old as the history of these

conflicts. Therefore, Cronin (2009) was right regarding strong leadership in terrorist groups as a major reason for initiating these talks since both groups had strong leadership. In contrast, this thesis contradicts his argument on terrorist groups regarding the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts in that they are more likely to engage in negotiations if conflicts exist for a long time, since backchannel communications were initiated shortly after the conflicts emerged (Cronin, 2010). The backchannels in Northern Ireland and Turkey were determined by the contact of the intermediaries in indirect dialogue and by the actors who aimed to resolve these conflicts in non-violent ways during direct talks. The success of these channels depended on different factors, including: the desires of disputing parties, the influence of the spoilers, whether a violent conflict exists and these parties keeping their promises.

Outcome	Northern Ireland	Turkey
Partial Consent	<u>Caldwell</u> : Weak Collective	<u>Talabani</u> : Weak Precondition
Consent	<u>Duddy</u> : Powerful Collective Extend ceasefire	<u>Işık</u> : Weak Collective Ceasefire
Reaction	<u>Hackett</u> : Individual Weak Mistrust	<u>Haşimi</u> : Individual Weak Mistrust

Table 6.1: Characteristics of Intermediaries in Northern Ireland and Turkey

In terms of the influence of indirect dialogue, both conflicts embodied personal and official actions to make contact between the main armed protagonists. The first backchannels in both conflicts aimed to decrease the level of violence. While Caldwell’s intermediary work was his personal initiative, but was known by Wilson, Talabani was asked by Özal to exchange messages between him and Öcalan (Table 6.1). Both resulted in the armed groups’ ceasefires to show their intention for a political resolution. Which was important was that neither side gave promises to each other, including to lay down arms on the part of the IRA and PKK, nor an immediate political reform by the British and Turkish governments.

Although both intermediaries had contact with the leaders of the IRA and PKK, this contact did not lead to the same outcome. It can be said that the lack of the British government's intention to make progress and information prevented a better outcome. However, it was still significant that this contact was sufficient to make direct contact. As Özal initiated the backchannel in the Turkish case, it provided a much stronger link between the conflicting sides and helped to overcome trust issues. Therefore, this chapter reveals that when the officials of the governments initiated a communication channel, these talks were more successful than the channels provided by independent third parties with regards to moving towards official negotiations and conflict de-escalation. However, both dialogues were conducted as personal initiatives, but not the policy of the British and Turkish governments. It was because of the anger of the society regarding any attempts towards political resolution. This anger demonstrated that these were not ripe moments for resolution.

Moreover, two other intermediaries had direct contact with leaders of the republican and pro-Kurdish movements. While Duddy was asked by the SIS officers to make contact with the IRA, Işık was asked by the PKK in contrast to Talabani's mediation (NUI-POL/35/69, 1975). As Table 6.1 indicates, both intermediaries played a more extensive role than only exchanging messages because of the consent of the conflicting parties. Duddy's facilitating role turned into encouraging action to make progress when he put pressure on his British contact to give a chance to McKee to de-escalate the conflict by pulling out some of the British troops from Northern Ireland (NUI-POL/35/4/62, 1975). This was also due to both sides' implicit consent for Duddy's mediation. Although Steele and Oatley forwarded the messages to British officials, their role was to represent the British government during the secret talks. Similarly, Işık was also accepted as an intermediary by both sides, as his peace efforts were maintained even after Öcalan's capture. More specifically, Işık was one of the few people who went to the İmralı prison to talk about the PKK's demands on the nature of the conflict and helped to bring the PKK's violent campaign to an end (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015).

Duddy and Işık were not only messengers, but also facilitators, as they were involved in the discussions and aimed to keep the communication channels open. However, this was not always possible since the perception of the governments and armed groups were not always in favour of political resolution. For example, as discussed in Section 6.3, the 1975 ceasefire was used as an opportunity by the British government to weaken the IRA. It was evident through Rees’s statement during a secret Cabinet discussion: ‘The importance of a ceasefire is that it offers us the opportunity to create the conditions in which the Provisionals’ “military” organisation and structure may be weakened’ (TNA-CAB/134/3921, 1975). In parallel, Işık had difficulties keeping the on-going secret channel open, due to the TSK’s oppressive military strategy. Hence, both initiatives witnessed non-ripe moments for resolution. However, the political actors’ willingness to politically resolve the conflict helped Işık to maintain contacts even though they were not officially sanctioned.

Outcome	Northern Ireland	Turkey
Little Progress	<u>Wilson:</u> Low-level No outcome No precondition	<u>Erbakan:</u> Low-level Limited agenda No precondition
	<u>Whitelaw:</u> High-level Ceasefire Little progress Caldwell	
Substantial Progress	<u>Feakle:</u> High-level (lower) Consent Ten-day ceasefire Spoilers	<u>Oslo:</u> High-level Consent Democratisation Decision-makers

Table 6.2: Characteristics and Outcomes of Direct Talks in Northern Ireland and Turkey

In terms of the direct talks, both Wilson and Erbakan’s efforts were low-level talks regarding the profile of attendees and their aims (Table 6.2). However, as stated in Section 6.3.2, even though Wilson’s initiative seemed to fail unlike Erbakan’s efforts, the outcomes of both attempts were opposite to each other. Namely, after the talks were revealed in Turkey,

there was a reaction by both opposition parties and the TSK. The reaction of spoilers affected the process in a significant way, as they resulted in turning into hard-line policies in the 1990s. In contrast, the suspension of the Stormont Parliament and the IRA's statements on their victory did not break the chain in Northern Ireland. Instead, it continued with more comprehensive talks, the Whitelaw talks. Although there was disagreement on the major claims of both sides such as on self-determination and withdrawal of the British troops, they agreed to a bilateral ceasefire for one week and promised another set of negotiations. The PKK's major dispute during the negotiations was the government's recognition of their existence as a Kurdish authority. In the end, both the IRA and PKK's ultimate aims were to secure a binding agreement from the British and Turkish governments, which were unsuccessful. It can be said that whilst the disagreement between the republican movement and British government did not result in breaking the chain, it helped to make more progress through Erbakan's initiative.

Lastly, both the Feakle and Oslo talks had similar structures in terms of participants, methods and outcomes. The secret talks with the wanted members of the IRA and PKK members were risky for both the British and Turkish governments, but illustrate that both governments gave principal importance to secret negotiations. For example, the leaked secret meeting record revealed that Fidan stated during the talks that there was a high risk for him being involved in these meetings, and if these discussions were revealed, it would have been a disaster for the AKP rule (Fidan cited in Taraf, 2011). While the Oslo talks were mediated by British intelligence, the Feakle talks were mediated by Protestant clergymen. Besides, the level of violence demonstrated a 'hurting stalemate' in both conflicts in order to apply secret negotiations. This chapter has found that the influence of both mediation parties was limited, since they did not propose a route for these meetings or any deadlines that provided a reduction in the level of violence through a ceasefire. However, without their efforts, it would not have been possible to initiate the process. In addition, even though both talks witnessed the discussion of the main armed protagonists about their major

claims, there was no concrete outcome in the Feakle talks, other than a temporary ceasefire. In contrast, as it was stated during the leaked records of the Oslo talks, there was a general agreement on the future of the conflict between the Turkish officials and PKK (Taraf, 2011). Besides, the specific outcome of the talks was the Habur event which was a great hope for the Kurdish community to reach a non-violent resolution, but the talks collapsed. The interview data reveals that one of the main problems during this event was that even though the HDP and PKK manipulated the initiative by announcing it as their victory, it could still be successful if the media had not stirred up the trouble instead of calling for society to stay calm (Haşimi, Interview, 03/07/2015). Thus, it can be said that both the pro-Kurdish movement and the media's devastating reaction prevented this initiative from helping de-escalate the conflict. As a result, despite the lack of an agreement after both initiatives, the Oslo talks can be labelled as more successful, since it is believed that all official efforts were initiated after these discussions, such as the İmralı talks and Resolution Commission, applied the contacts and framework of these talks through the Democratisation Package of 2013, which will be discussed in Chapter 8 (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015).

To sum up, the direct talks' collective attempts were more successful than the indirect communications' personal efforts as high-level attendance helped to discuss major claims and so facilitated official negotiations. Both the British and Turkish governments and the republican and pro-Kurdish movements had a chance to discuss their claims and demands for the future of the two conflicts. While the indirect talks focused on interrupting violence, the direct talks witnessed a bargaining process including the limits of applicability of the demands of conflicting sides. Therefore, the interviews and declassified secret archival material demonstrates that while the intermediaries formed the basis of communication, the direct talks were built upon these indirect dialogues. It can be said that the influence of direct talks towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts is broader than indirect communications.

CHAPTER 7

Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations: Catalysts for Peace?

'The best agent for a peace initiative is one who is known to have access to his government's leaders and can convey their intentions accurately, but who holds no official position' (Pillar, 1990, p.254).

7.1. Introduction

Unofficial peace groups are significant players in a peace process, who have largely been assessed regarding their role in community relations. However, the P/CROs have been paid little attention in the existing literature in relation to their role in shaping, promoting or hindering a conflict resolution process. The research aims to close this gap by focusing on relevant peace groups which played a role both in reducing the level of violence and maintaining the peace processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey. There has been little focus on the peace groups' role in shaping and promoting the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes.⁶⁰ This chapter argues that official negotiations are not an adequate method as it is more complicated to bring ethno-nationalist conflicts to an end through official negotiations only. It suggests complementing official negotiations (track-one diplomacy) with peace organisations in order to create unofficial conflict resolution approaches (track-two diplomacy) by

⁶⁰ The peace groups related to the topic of the research have only been analysed by a few sources in Northern Ireland (Arthur, 1990; Hadfield, 1986; Hughes & Knox, 1997; Hylton, 1981). Similarly, there are only a few sources related to the peace organisations in Turkey (Çıtak & Alkan, 2015; Kızılkaya, 2015; Oran, 2014). None of this research underlines the importance of peace groups' role as conflict resolution organisations.

exploring ethno-nationalist conflicts in a wider context, providing a close link between the effectiveness of peace institutions and the decisions of the political elite (Knox & Hughes, 1996).

The P/CROs can influence decision-making mechanisms through public and non-public conferences, forums and events with the participation of current or former politicians; representatives of conflicting parties and actors; important figures and intellectuals in the conflict-affected society; and other grassroots initiatives. The role of peace organisations may begin in the pre-negotiation stage and continue until an agreement between conflicting parties is reached. This chapter argues that the efficiency of these organisations has facilitated progress in ending violence in both peace processes. Thus, it is crucial to understand their influence in both conflicts. This chapter aims to answer the following question: 'To what extent have peace and conflict resolution organisations facilitated peacemaking efforts during existing violence in Northern Ireland and Turkey?'

The chapter firstly explains the theoretical assumptions regarding the P/CROs. It also describes the rationale behind the selection of peace groups in Northern Ireland and Turkey. Then, it focuses on the groups which have had an influence on political decisions. Finally, it compares the influence of these groups on the conflict resolution processes.

7.2. P/CROs as a Determinant of Conflict Resolution Approaches

P/CROs as a conflict resolution instrument can be assessed through their role in bridging elite-driven peacemaking efforts and restoring community relations. P/CROs contribute to a peace process in two main ways: On the one hand, they act as 'middle-range' peace groups by aiming to include the demands of the society in the decisions of political parties and actors, and to reduce the tension between the conflicting communities. This feature defines its role as bridging the gap between the elite and societal levels

(vertical). On the other hand, these groups operate at the elite level of conflict resolution through unofficial interactions of track-two initiatives for peacemaking (horizontal).

7.2.1. The Middle-Range Approaches of Conflict Resolution Processes

The 'middle-range' approaches describe peace efforts of unofficial groups and actors to promote, encourage and facilitate a conflict resolution process (Kelman, 1998; Lederach, 1997). As the middle-range groups are not controlled by political elites, they are not exposed to public pressure, unlike political parties and actors. Hence, they have flexibility to move or act without permission from decision-makers. The middle-range level of conflict resolution provides an advantage to peace processes by closing the gap between the elite and societal levels (Lederach, 1997). However, unlike the societal level, the middle-range peace organisations have an influence on peacemaking initiatives through incentives, the promotion of peace by bringing conflicting communities together and advocating the persistence of the political process (Montville, 1987). The middle-range approaches are applied as different types of instruments such as problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, consultative and conciliation meetings and cooperation to develop and produce other types of conflict resolution methods consistent with local norms and culture (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.51).

Middle-range peace groups have three major aspects regarding their level of activities as described in Section 3.3.2. The macro-scale events of P/CROs in influencing public opinion through cross-community events, and providing incentives and institutional support for possible ways of resolution are the question of this chapter, rather than the micro-scale activities of the middle-range level, such as problem-solving workshops organised by academics and training programmes, which have limited influence on a peace process (Fisher, 1972; Kelman, 2010; Sanson & Bretherton, 2007). For example, prominent members of the Turkish

academy organised a workshop to discuss possible ways to solve the Kurdish question but it did not help the progress (Çelik & Blum, 2007). In contrast, the analysis of macro-scale aims is significant as they provide a detailed understanding of how to encourage conflicting parties to engage in a political process as opposed to an armed struggle, promote peace at both the elite and societal levels, and suggest possible ways for resolution through P/CROs (Gidron & Katz, 1998). These organisations can serve as a forum to bring different views together in an unofficial environment. For instance, the British-Irish Association (BIA) brought Catholic and Protestant political actors together through its annual forums (Hylton, 1982). They can also provide a strong link between elite and grassroots efforts by contacting members of both levels and rebuilding trust (Knox & Quirk, 2000, p.201). This chapter aims to understand the effectiveness of the macro-scale initiatives through the balance between these initiatives and the decisions of political elites (Knox & Hughes, 1996). It is assumed that P/CROs reduce the autonomous role of individual actors and so operate as a catalyst for making peace in conflict resolution processes (Hancock, 2008, p.214).

7.2.2. Meeting in the Middle: Track-Two Diplomacy

Track-two diplomacy is an unofficial interaction which aims to develop strategies, to influence public opinion and to organise human and material resources through peace groups (Montville, 1987, p.162). This interaction aims to complement official negotiations through input into the decisions of political actors, policymakers and society (Kelman, 1992; Nan, 1999). Thus, it is significant to understand the role of P/CROs during a conflict resolution process. It is assumed that these organisations facilitate peace processes by enabling unofficial discussions between non-state parties and groups which are close enough to the centre of political power to influence the decision makers, political elites and conflicting communities (Kaufman, 2003). These assumptions are examined to address the contribution of P/CROs in making a political agreement in both conflicts.

Track-two dialogue aims to fill the gaps of official negotiations and mediations (track-one) and to strengthen conflict resolution processes in the following major ways: firstly, in contrast to traditional negotiations, track-two dialogue can concentrate on human relationships, promoting a mutual understanding and eliminating prejudices (Rothman, 1997). While traditional negotiations concentrate only on resolving resource-based issues such as territorial and power-sharing issues, P/CROs can overcome prejudices, for instance on identity, survival and fears of opponents, by closing the gap between conflicting communities and parties (Kelman, 1997b; Rothman, 1997). This chapter thus investigates whether P/CROs have eliminated biases in society in order to strengthen peacemaking efforts. Secondly, the experience of threat in ethno-nationalist conflicts is significant and can be transformed through strong cooperation between the elite and grassroots initiatives, which are provided by middle-range actors (Lederach, 1997; Mapendere, 2005; Sanders, 2012). This approach assesses whether P/CROs could build cooperation between the two levels. Thirdly, track-two diplomacy suggests structural analyses of social and political developments regarding the conflicting communities through P/CROs' peace initiatives (Chigas, 2005, p.128). Although it is assumed that track-two dialogue provides these opportunities for peacemaking along with the flexibility in their events, P/CROs are accused of having limited ability due to the lack of political power which makes them unaccountable to the public (Mapendere, 2005). However, the P/CROs' proximity to the decision-making mechanism can aid peace processes through non-public conferences, forums and events with the participation of current or former politicians, representatives of conflicting parties and actors, influential figures and intellectuals. These events are closed to the public, but are not secret events. This feature provides flexibility in the discussions and has no prevention by the society or any spoilers. The existing literature on track-two diplomacy suggests that middle-range peace organisations have direct contact with the decision-making mechanisms (Lederach, 1997; Sanders, 2012). These assumptions will be investigated regarding whether they gained public support or not, which, undoubtedly, affects their ability to

change public opinion. Furthermore, a conflict consists of both objective and subjective factors which together intensify and escalate the situation, for instance the perception of the opponent of deepening mistrust and dehumanisation (Fisher & Keashly, 1990). Official negotiations are not sufficient to cover these issues. Therefore, it is essential to engage in track-two dialogue through P/CROs' initiatives for confidence-building measures (Chigas, 2003). This assumption will be assessed to understand the impact of P/CROs in Northern Ireland and Turkey. In addition, P/CROs are also criticised as track-two initiatives can only reach their aim after a significant amount of time and so are less effective in resolving the reasons of a conflict to achieve a peace agreement. Besides, it is argued that track-two initiatives might result in talking to 'wrong type of people' or 'right type of people with limited influence' due to insufficient information (Kaye, 2007, p.25). The dichotomy between the opportunities of these initiatives to fill the gap of official negotiations and mediations and their possible weaknesses are explored through relevant P/CROs in both conflicts. The relevance and selection of P/CROs are identified in the next section.

7.3. Rationale behind the Selection of P/CROs

To investigate the influence of P/CROs towards ending violence and reaching a political settlement, the analysis begins by setting out key criteria to select the relevant groups. Firstly, peace organisations must be national, so they should have national demands. Secondly, these groups should reflect the perceptions of the conflicting sides. Therefore, the groups which contain only one side's opinion are not relevant. One such example is the Ulster Community Action Network (UCAN) in Northern Ireland, which was perceived to be exclusively pushing the Ulster Protestant community's demands (Cochrane & Dunn, 1999). Similarly, the Islamic Resolution Committee for the Kurdish Question (*Kürt Meselesine İslami Çözüm Çalıştayı*) is not used since it operates within a religious context and therefore overlooks the demands of both communities (Radikal, 2013). Thirdly, groups should aim for peacemaking rather than other contexts

such as training or peace education. The groups such as All Children Together and the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education are not included in the analysis since they focus only on peace education in the Northern Irish peace process (Duffy, 2000; McGlynn et al., 2004). Similarly, the Children under Single Roof Association (*Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği*) is not analysed as its remit is not peacemaking in Turkey (Hafıza Merkezi, 2015). Fourthly, the relevant peace groups should play a role in elite-level decision-making, rather than grassroots initiatives: for instance, community relations. Therefore, the Community Relations Council (CRC) in Northern Ireland will not be investigated, even though it was established by political actors. As the CRC promotes relations between communities only, it did not work on establishing a peace agreement. Although it is an important part of peace efforts, this research assesses the groups which have been active in the elite-driven process, but not peacebuilding institutions. Lastly, the selected peace groups need to have been active during the time frame of the research. The peace groups should have been active between 1969 and 1998 in the Northern Irish conflict, and between 1984 and 2015 in the Kurdish question of Turkey.

Following these criteria, peace groups in Northern Ireland and Turkey were investigated. It was seen that several peace and reconciliation groups were active during the time frame in both cases. Those groups operating in Northern Ireland are composed of 'the voluntary sector' with a large turnover (over £400 million) (Cochrane & Dunn, 1999). Although there are no specific figures for the Turkish case, peace organisations do not act independently from the government due to insufficient internal and international funding. However, the economic foundations of the peace groups are not the topic of the chapter, as the intention is to investigate conflict resolution initiatives. The initial stage was to distinguish peace groups from other groups concerned with such issues as community relations, reconciliation, training and education. The second stage was to eliminate groups which had been established to defend specific groups' interests. The research could now concentrate on groups which meet with the demands and interests of both conflicting parties. The final stage was to

investigate peace groups in regards to their contribution to the peace processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey. In this context, groups which emerged in reaction to a specific event or incident were included in the discussion due to their influence on the peace process (Hughes & Knox, 1997). Thus, these criteria led to the selection of the Peace People and the British-Irish Association in Northern Ireland, and the Wise People Committee (*Akil İnsanlar Heyeti*) and the Look at Peace Platform (*Barışa Bak Platformu*) in Turkey. The next sections will investigate the peace organisations in Northern Ireland and Turkey.

7.4. P/CROs in Northern Ireland

The P/CROs in the Northern Irish peace process were founded to contribute to peacemaking. On the one hand, Blackwell's letter to James Prior (the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) illustrated that the BIA was formed in 1972 by a group of academics, journalists, politicians and others who sought to contribute to the resolution of the political problems of Ireland by advancing Anglo-Irish understanding (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982a). On the other hand, the Peace People (PP) was established in August 1976 in reaction to an incident in which a terrorist crashed his car and killed three children when he was escaping from security forces. According to the PP's statement, the children's aunt Mairead Corrigan founded the movement with Betty Williams who was a local person and a witness of this incident (McKeown & McLachlan, 1977; TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977a). Hence, both groups were founded to play an active role in resolving the Northern Irish conflict. The BIA aimed to promote common understanding between the British and Irish people, to describe concerns and to enable them to be solved in a positive manner. It brought official and unofficial actors together, who were senior politicians, government officials, former paramilitaries and community leaders; and provided a suitable environment to discuss the conflict without any restraint (Arthur, 1990, p.415; BIA, 2015). It illustrates that the BIA's major characteristic is to create a flexible environment for political parties and actors by bringing

them together in an unofficial environment as a track-two initiative, thanks to their direct contact with government officials. Therefore, the BIA aims to fill the gap of official negotiations as a middle-range organisation. In contrast, the PP aimed to aid the conflict resolution process by directing peace from below: from the society to the elite level. Although it was a reactive peace group, its aims were not limited to local or regional events. Instead, as the PP's declaration, the group's aim was 'to give peace a chance to solve problems which all the politics and all the violence have failed to solve' (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977a). With respect to this aim, the PP announced that '... All we want is to show the terrorists - and that includes all paramilitaries - that the vast majority of people want them off our backs' (TNA-CJ/4/4025, 1976). This section investigates the contribution of these groups to the Northern Irish peace process.

7.4.1. The British-Irish Association

The BIA aimed to contribute to the peace process by creating an environment in which private discussions by governmental and non-governmental bodies could take place on sensitive political issues through its annual conferences as noted by the BIA leadership (TNA-CJ/4/296, 1973; TNA-CJ/4/4169, 1981a). The significant feature of the BIA is its ability to bring together current or former political actors from the British and Irish governments and Northern Irish parties. As the BIA was founded and has been active since 1972, its activities during the intense violent conflict were crucial for the contribution of P/CROs. Its initial events were the Cambridge Conference of 1973 and the Oxford Conference of 1974, which hosted high-level politicians, journalists and civil servants. For example, Lyons's (a Minister from the Northern Ireland office) letter to Roy Hattersley (the Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) illustrated that Merlyn Rees (the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland), Garrett Fitzgerald (the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs) and deputies from the Republic of Ireland attended the conference in Oxford (TNA-CJ/4/582, 1974). This illustrates the influence of the BIA in bringing influential officials together, those who were reluctant to come

together at official events. It was the first initiative to bring Rees and Fitzgerald together at an unofficial event which was a chance for increasing the attention paid to political resolution attempts. In the early 1970s, political parties and actors were brought together by these unofficial events as it was not possible to achieve official negotiations without first de-escalating the conflict.

In regards to the contribution of the BIA, the political events organised by the members of the BIA's personal contacts were a significant dimension of track-two diplomacy since they enabled informal discussions between the people who were close enough to the centre of power that is an important step of having a degree of influence over decision-makers (Kaufman, 2003). For example, as Merlyn Rees was one of the founders of the BIA, he successfully built the communication channels with political actors and facilitated political parties and actors to attend to the BIA's events. Although these events did not change the nature of the conflict, they helped to create a flexible environment through informal interaction during a period of minimal political efforts due to the intense conflict, as explained in Section 5.2. In contrast, Rees's successor Roy Mason kept his distance from the Association as he said that it would be better for him and other ministers not to attend to the BIA's events unless they receive official invitations from the BIA (TNA-CJ/4/4169, 1982b). The BIA as a middle-range peace organisation facilitated discussions between not only the British and Irish governments, but also the Northern Irish parties. However, Rees and Mason's positions demonstrated that this contribution depended on the members of the BIA's links with political elites. Although Rees played an encouraging role for the BIA events, Mason was reluctant to contribute to its initiatives. As this bridge was not successfully linked during Mason's term (1976-1979), this period did not witness the facilitating role of the BIA. However, the British government maintained its willingness to attend the BIA's events in the following years, which illustrates that the British wanted to support the BIA's activities explicitly, unlike the PP's events. The situation, undoubtedly, increased the reliability of the Association on the island. It therefore fostered greater understanding by reinforcing peace

attempts in the UK and Republic of Ireland (Hylton, 1981, p.333; 1982, p.32).

The events of the BIA witnessed important discussions for the future of the island. Humphrey Atkins, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, echoed the prospects of political progress in the conferences of 1979 and 1980. In addition, Lord Gowrie, then a NIO Minister, spoke about the Northern Ireland policy of the British government in 1981. Gowrie's speech was evidence of the confidentiality of the BIA's events as he said that 'Direct Rule was not very British' and dual citizenship consisting of Britain and the Republic of Ireland should be recognised for the people who identify themselves as Irish (TNA-CJ/4/4169, 1982a). In fact, it was very difficult to make this statement in public, but was possible through the informal and confidential discussions of the BIA, which provided a better atmosphere for exchanging views compared to public events (Arthur, 1990, p.415). Moreover, the discussions at the BIA's events helped not only to facilitate a political process, but also to direct decision makers towards a political solution. For example, the BIA insisted on the establishment of a new local government in Northern Ireland, a government which would contain more than one regional council. The BIA suggested that several Northern Ireland Departments should be split up between new regional councils in relation to different centres throughout the region (TNA-CJ/4/2228, 1978). This suggestion is important as it demonstrates the outcome-oriented discussion at the BIA's meetings. Particularly, the BIA conference in 1979 was important since the discussion at the conference addressed political changes in the province. The BIA noted that a simple majority rule regime would not be acceptable in Northern Ireland due to the ethnic division of the province, since it would mean that one-third of the province would be overlooked. In addition, Northern Ireland would not be able to fully integrate either in the South or the UK (TNA-CJ/4/2580, 1979b). These suggestions made by the BIA were intended to solve the conflict in a political way by considering different views and demands. This approach helped the group as Kaufman (2003) notes, to stay close enough to the centre of political power to influence decision makers.

The BIA is a unique organisation in the Northern Irish peace process since it has brought together high-level politicians from all disputing parties. Therefore, Gee's Letter's to Lane (Northern Ireland Ministers) revealed that the discussions were very helpful in political debates (TNA-CJ/4/2580, 1979a). In particular, the BIA's Lambeth Conference of 1981 hosted both nationalists and official unionists and witnessed their opposition regarding power sharing. Nevertheless, there was no representative from Republicans and 'Paisleyites'. Arguably, it can be said that despite the unofficial character of the meetings, the opposition of both parties to this peace initiative was due to the BIA's semi-official structure, gathering political actors in an unofficial environment. It was a sign that both parties were unwilling to solve the problem in a political way. Regarding the discussion, while the unionists were defending the majority rule, the nationalists were demanding Catholics' political rights. Besides, Harold McCusker, a member of the Parliament for the UUP, argued that Direct Rule had failed and the only possible way was to return a Northern Ireland government (TNA-CJ/4/4169, 1981b). However, the discussions raised a question about whether unionists might walk away from meetings. The declassified secret meeting notes revealed that the discussions even resulted in polemics between John Hume and unionists, a great example of the insight of the BIA discussions: 'John Hume also enunciated a stripped-down version of unity. He was strongly attacked on Fermanagh/South Tyrone elections and was both uncomfortable and unconvincing' (TNA-CJ/4/4174, 1981). These activities provided unofficial discussions between political actors that contributed to political resolution attempts.

The BIA's events helped to change the nature of the peace process. Firstly, the BIA members' critiques of the political environment in the province resulted in a change. Its proposals on political development in Northern Ireland were passed into law and were implemented. For instance, one of the significant discussion topics in the Association's meetings was elections in Northern Ireland. After long-standing debates, elections were held for the first time after eight years and a locally elected Assembly met in Belfast in 1982 (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982c). Although these

were political decisions, according to the declassified secret meeting note of the British government, the Association's conferences helped to change these policies by bringing together the official representatives of the British government, Republic of Ireland and Northern Irish parties, and pushing them to seek political means (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982c; TNA-FCO/87/1303, 1982). The BIA as a middle-range group created a suitable environment for discussion and so helped to influence decisions about the future of Northern Ireland. In addition, the BIA underlined the importance of different identities' existence in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Secretary of State, James Prior attested that different identities in Northern Ireland needed to be represented in the political environment (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982c). The Association helped to underline these differences, through informal discussions amongst the official representatives of disputing parties. These track-two initiatives were influential also because of the fact that the participants were representing conflicting communities (Montville, 1987). Lastly, the BIA facilitated political agreements through its policy reports that were prepared after long-standing discussions between current and former politicians, academics and journalists. For example, one of the BIA's reports, the Kilbrandon Report, helped to modify the AIA of 1985 in terms of the demands of Catholics and Protestants, since both communities were represented in the talks (Hadfield, 1986, p.18). More significantly, the Kilbrandon Report suggested a number of reforms regarding political arrangements which would help to establish a middle ground between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Even though the British government did not take into account the Kilbrandon Report immediately, the suggested reforms by the BIA were reflected in the AIA. Reforms included a bill of rights to guarantee the rights of the minority, and a reform of the justice system with the introduction of trial by two judges, one from the UK and the other from the Republic of Ireland (Cochrane, 1997, pp.8-10).

The Association complemented the peace process even after the beginning of the official efforts. For example, the BIA's conference in 1993 witnessed intense discussion about the competition between the British

and Irish governments. Dick Spring, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Ireland, had a speech, which revealed the rivalry between the two governments:

I would like ... to see Britain rivalling with Ireland in its eagerness to build bridges, "to abolish the memory of past dissensions"⁶¹ and to enable all those who inhabit Ireland to find, by agreement among themselves and without external hindrance, arrangements and institutions which all could endorse and support as their own. I would like to see Ireland rivalling with Britain to make sure that unionists felt certain that political change in Ireland was irrevocably conditional on respect for their rights and their sense of identity and allegiance (Spring, 1993, quoted in Rea, 1996, p.40).

These intense discussions were proof of flexibility that these events provided, but could not encourage the disputing parties for a change. Instead, they revealed more disputes in the 1990s as the BIA focused more on the intractability of the conflict. For example, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, argued about the deep-rooted characteristic of the conflict in his speech to the BIA in September 1996 (Mayhew, 1996, cited in Aughey, 1997, p.2). Therefore, it can be said that the BIA complemented the progress in the 1970s and 1980s more than in the 1990s.

Despite the comprehensiveness of the BIA's events, it was criticised by political parties in Northern Ireland. However, in contrast to the assumptions of track-two diplomacy, this criticism was not related to the question of the influence of the group (Mapendere, 2005). Instead, the major criticism towards the BIA was made by unionist ministers since they thought that the BIA was supporting and attracting moderate nationalists (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982b). However, the Association's efforts to bring disputing sides together and to create a suitable environment for discussions on possible ways for peace demonstrate that the group has been a useful body for both unionists and nationalists.

Overall, the British government thought that the BIA was a useful body which deserved official support and encouragement. It appeared

⁶¹ Double quotation mark is in original.

through the representation of the British and Irish governments at ministerial and official levels at the conferences between 1973 and 1976 (TNA-CJ/4/1947, 1977). To conclude, the BIA's efforts to make peace and to bring the violent conflict to an end were significant and helped to maintain the peace process.

7.4.2. The Peace People

The PP aimed to promote and encourage peace attempts through bottom-up approaches in contrast to the BIA. The Peace Movement⁶² recommended bringing conflicting sides together, and to avoid sectarian and confrontational politics (Fairmichael, 1987, p.5). Community support was vital for the success of the group and this support was increased due to its rejection of any type of discrimination or violence and its aim of keeping distance from both communities (O'Donnell, 1977; TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977c).

The group contributed to the peace process in three major ways. Firstly, the PP weakened the emotional popular support for the IRA in Catholic areas. The NIO's report on the PP stated that the group helped to decrease the level of sectarian attacks and indiscriminate bombings (see Table 7.1). The report states that the PP helped to de-escalate terrorism by encouraging people to come together against violent attacks (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977f). Although the NIO argued that the PP played a role in reducing the level of violence, it was not the only actor in de-escalating the conflict, since the backchannel communications between the British government and IRA were also influential, as discussed in Section 6.3. That said, this secret report of the NIO is clear evidence of the British government's awareness of the PP's influence in de-escalating the conflict, as is seen through the incident numbers in total. For example, according to the British government, the Movement had a direct impact on facilitating peacemaking attempts through its marches and so the Movement was

⁶² The Peace People is also known as the Peace Movement (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977b; TNA-CJ/4/4025, 1976).

successful in creating a united voice against violence in Northern Ireland in 1977 (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977d). Its focus on both communities' identities and fears resulted in reducing the prejudices of both sides, as is suggested by track-two scholars (Kelman, 1997b; Rothman, 1997). The PP was successful in changing the view of people in Northern Ireland in relation to the IRA. The PP encouraged the Catholics to speak out against the IRA defending them and their rights. The Movement asked for the same from Protestants related to the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (TNA-CJ/4/4025, 1977).

Year	Deaths	Injuries	Shooting Incidents	Explosions
1973	250	2,651	5,018	978
1974	216	2,398	3,206	685
1975	247	2,474	1,803	399
1976	297	2,729	1,908	766
1977	112	1,398	1,081	366
1978 (to 31 October)	70	753	658	285

Table 7.1: Consequences of Incidents between 1973 and 1978 (TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1979)

Their attempts to close the gap between the two communities resulted in both Catholic and Protestant communities turning against violence. Their opposition to any type of violence and their peace efforts led to Williams and Corrigan winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976. The Movement's success was also praised by the Queen in her Christmas Broadcast and was described as a glimmer of hope for the people in Northern Ireland (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977a). In addition, as noted in an anonymous NIO paper, while the British government did not openly support the PP, they chose to get in touch with them secretly (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977b). Hence, the British government did not have a major influence on the Movement's events. In contrast, the Movement began to influence the peace process through its well-supported protests.

Secondly, the PP was involved in the peace process through their position against security forces' action. The PP met with the British government several times to discuss political decisions and their

implications in Northern Ireland. The Movement criticised the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)'s approach towards the conflict. It was opposed to any internment without trial, and to violence from any of the nine armies in Northern Ireland; 'one British, three Roman Catholic and five Protestant' (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977b).⁶³ For example, the group was strongly opposed to the British Army's arrest policy. The leading members of the group discussed it with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason. Although the Army was displeased, the Army agreed with the PP's suggestions and their publicity claims (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977c). The declassified secret paper of the British government revealed that the Army was unhappy about both the PP's policy on accompanying troops when people were arrested and the group's visit to the prisons of Port Monagh (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977c). However, in contrast to the assumption regarding insufficient confirmation that might result in talking to the 'wrong' people (Kaye, 2007), the leaders of the PP reached political parties and actors, and put pressure on the government to reconsider the actions of security forces. These situations illustrate the PP's contribution related to changing the region's environment.

Thirdly, the group was involved in political decisions in different ways. The blanket protest of the prisoners (the H-Block issue) is an important event in which the PP was involved, talking to prisoners to understand their demands. According to Seanna Walsh, the leader of the blanket protest and former member of the IRA, this protest was a political event that aimed take a stand against British rule (Walsh, Interview, 19/01/2015). The leading member of the PP, Ciaran McKeown requested an amnesty for political prisoners from the British government once a peace agreement had been settled (TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1978c). Although there were different types of peace groups, an anonymous declassified secret NIO paper noted that the PP was the only group which crossed the

⁶³ The Republican paramilitary groups are the Provisional IRA, Official IRA and INLA. The loyalist paramilitary groups are Ulster Volunteer Force, UDA, Red Hand Commando, Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Young Militants.

sectarian divide and created links between divided communities (TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1978a). In particular, two members of the PP, McLachlan and Campbell met with the Minister of State for Northern Ireland, Don Concannon on 30 November 1978 and discussed the H-Block protest, which was assisting the IRA's propaganda war. Furthermore, the Movement was lobbying for reforms in the methods of fighting terrorism. For example, it was lobbying for the renewal of the Emergency Provisional Act in 1979. The PP demanded the removal of the Act since it had not decreased the level of violence in Northern Ireland (TNA-CJ/4/3706, 1979a, 1979b). The group complemented the progress through an exchange of information which provided a mutual understanding from the societal to elite level. They also suggested that the RUC was more helpful than the Army in relation to supplying information about suspects. However, the Minister insisted that the Act was necessary. Campbell suggested two things: first, the Bennett Inquiry might not be useful anymore due to police brutality in the province. Second, she recommended political status for prisoners related to the Act (TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1978b). The Minister agreed that there would not be a return to the Special Category (TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1978b). Thus, it can be said that in contrast to Mapendere's (2005) assumption on the limited influence of track-two interventions, the lack of political power did not restrict the PP's impact, as the group focused on the major reasons for the on-going violence and the disagreement between both communities: it was because of the PP's ability to represent the constituency (Chigas, 2005).

The PP's attempts were not limited to the discussion with the Northern Ireland Minister. The insight they gained from their meetings with the H-Block protesters resulted in their contact with Thatcher. According to the PP's letter to Thatcher, three of the five demands of the prisoners were resolved as of 23 January 1981 (TNA-CJ/4/3706, 1981). The remaining issues were work and clothing issues. However, resolution of these two issues could not guarantee political status. According to the PP, 'it is a red herring: the objection to political status is that it implies an amnesty, which is to encourage violence on the promise of eventual absolution' (TNA-CJ/4/3706, 1981). Further, the Movement sent a letter to

Thatcher on 19 March 1981 suggesting that the political status term had lost its meaning and had been transformed into a device for manipulating public opinion (TNA-CJ/4/3706, 1981). However, the letter was sent 47 days before Bobby Sands died. Particularly, the deteriorating condition of the strikers caused an outraged reaction in society and the death of Bobby Sands on 5 May 1981 changed the political environment in Northern Ireland. An estimated one hundred-thousand people attended his funeral in Belfast, illustrating the level of reaction (O'Hagan, 2008). In addition to this, the PP said that Direct Rule was unacceptable. James Galway, treasurer of the group, noted that the establishment of a non-legislative administration with all the powers previously administered by central government resulted, in the end, in the 'political sterility' of Northern Ireland (TNA-CJ/4/4024, 1979). These initiatives demonstrate that the PP was actively involved in political elites' decisions, which facilitated progress towards peace by complementing official initiatives by including the demands and claims of the society.

The PP was, however, criticised by the DUP and SF. The DUP's reaction was two-fold. While the DUP's media organ, the Protestant Telegraph, described the Peace Movement as 'spurious', the DUP blamed the Movement for playing into the IRA's hands (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977e). In addition, SF condemned the PP and claimed that the group was not objective. The declassified archival document demonstrates that the British government thought that these parties' criticisms were not related to the help of the movement, but on the impartiality of the group (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977e). However, the disputing sides had little influence on the PP's activities. In contrast, the group behaved as an independent organisation by bringing the Catholic and Protestant communities together. It can be said that there was no strong opposition to the existence and activities of the group.

Finally, the British government noted that the PP contributed to the peace process through bringing hope to Northern Ireland by underlining the aspiration for peace and reconciliation (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977a).

Similar to other reactive groups, the support for the PP rapidly increased. The mass protests organised by the group demonstrate its support. Fortunately, it has been influential in de-escalating violence and changing political decisions related to the Northern Irish problem.

7.5. P/CROs in Turkey

Two peace organisations have been chosen for the analysis: the Wise People Committee (WPC) and Look at Peace Platform (LPP). On the one hand, the WPC was founded by the Turkish government and announced after the meeting between the members of the Committee and PM Erdoğan on 3 April 2013 (WPCCAG, 2013). The Committee was composed of seven groups which represented seven regions of Turkey and consisted of 63 members. On the other hand, the LPP was founded as a reaction to the increasing level of violence. The LPP's level of action against violence increased after a slaughter in the south-east of Turkey, known as the 6-7 October Incidents, which claimed 50 lives (Hürriyet, 2014). Cengiz Algan, the chairperson of the LPP, noted that the LPP intensified their peace initiatives immediately after this incident (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). Therefore, both P/CROs were established to complement the conflict resolution process towards a peaceful settlement. The purpose of the WPC was to understand the society's demand for a non-violent resolution. The Committee, therefore, aimed to forward the Turkish and Kurdish communities' views to political actors (WPCEAG, 2013). In addition, the WPC aimed to play an active role in the peace process by influencing the decisions of the Turkish government and promoting a non-violent resolution (Hürriyet, 2013a). Although the government founded the Committee, it was not an official body. Its members were intellectuals, opinion leaders, academics, writers, journalists and well-liked⁶⁴ public figures, but not officials or politicians. Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, the chairperson of

⁶⁴ The term 'well-liked' public figures refers to well-known academics, members of labour and trade unions, journalists, lawyers, actors, and some other public figures (Hürriyet, 2013a).

the Committee's South Eastern Region, who was later appointed as the chief advisor to the PM, confirmed that even though the WPC was founded by the Turkish government, the activities and events of the Committee were completely independent from the government (Ensaroğlu, Interview, 02/07/2015). Similarly, PM Erdoğan stipulated that the Committee should work independently without being influenced by either any governmental or non-governmental authorities (WPCSG, 2013). However, these special characteristics negatively affected its role in the peace process. Although the members of the Committee were independent in organising any types of events and meetings, they were reporting the outcome of their events to the Turkish government. While these reports provided them a unique opportunity to contact political parties and actors, arguably it can be said that it laid a burden on the group with regards to the promotion of government's peace initiatives. It caused to diminish the critical thoughts and different opinions in the Committee which will be analysed in the next section. Keeping this feature in mind, the WPC was the closest peace group to investigate in Turkey's Kurdish peace process. The differences in the structure between the WPC and the Northern Irish peace groups were considered during the analysis. However, in contrast to the WPC's unique advantage at the elite level due to the direct contact with the government, this function did not provide an exceptional role towards peacemaking initiatives. The characteristics of the WPC and the outcome of its events will be assessed in the next section.

Furthermore, the LPP was formed by journalists, academics, former politicians and activists who expressed the existence of a threat to cease the peace process. Therefore, it was vital to keep supporting a non-violent, political resolution. Atilla Yayla, a member of the LPP, stated that the Kurdish problem affects Turkey's developmental, economic, social and cultural issues. The LPP aimed to help solve this problem by creating a suitable environment for disputing communities to come together (Yayla, Interview, 07/07/2015). This section firstly assesses the influence of the WPC and then analyses the LPP to understand their contribution to the peace process.

7.5.1. The Wise People Committee

The foundation process of the WPC gave the group a great advantage because it could contact the government, which is a vital aspect for the success of a middle-range peace group (Lederach, 1997; Sanders, 2012). The WPC aimed to contribute to the peace process through three methods: firstly, the WPC organised panels, public talks, small town meetings and visits to opinion leaders to understand the society's demands and to increase their support in resolving the conflict in a non-violent way (Uçum, Interview, 02/07/2015). These events uncovered each community's lack of trust in the government in a few key areas: the fear of partition and Öcalan's amnesty; the government's negotiations with the PKK; and opening discussions about the Turkish flag and national anthem, which were perceived as a threat towards the unitary system (WPCMG, 2013). In addition, Ensaroğlu said that society's major problem was trust in the government in relation to carrying out legal regulations to solve the Kurdish question of Turkey (Ensaroğlu, Interview, 02/07/2015). As Mayer (1987) indicates, trust and mutual respect are necessary conditions for a successful negotiation process which concerns emerged in the Kurdish community during the official negotiations. The P/CROs aimed to overcome this issue to facilitate the process. On the one hand, these concerns highlighted the difference between Turkish and Kurdish communities' views of the peace process. For example, the main concerns of the Turkish community were whether Öcalan would be released and which promises were given to the PKK (Kızılkaya, 2015). On the other hand, the WPC was a unique initiative which revealed these concerns, so it helped to maintain the conflict resolution process by creating a suitable environment in which to discuss the Kurdish question at the societal level. It also facilitated the elimination of these issues through not only public talks and small town meetings, but also meetings with several different associations, groups and people such as NGOs, and representatives of people who are ethnically Kurdish but do not support the PKK (Erdem, Interview, 10/07/2015 and Oran, Interview, 18/06/2015). Beril Dedeoğlu, vice chairperson of the

Central Anatolia Region, noted that their expectations helped the Committee to draw a road map on how to maintain the peace process and how to help achieve a political agreement (Dedeoğlu, Interview, 17/06/2015). Thus, in parallel to Montville (1987) and Nan's (1999) suggestions on track-two initiatives, it can be said that the WPC complemented official negotiations by overcoming trust and fear issues, and by drawing a framework on how to reach a political settlement.

These meetings revealed a very significant aspect related to the nature of the peace process: it was stated that many people in the south-east of Turkey thought that the PKK was not the Kurdish people's representative. Therefore, as Ensaroğlu points out, the government should consider all communities' demands in the region including Kurdish, pro-Kurdish, Sunni, Alevi people in order to reach a successful settlement (Ensaroğlu, Interview, 02/07/2015). These outcomes of the meetings raised awareness in society of the peace process (Belge, Interview, 30/06/2015). Ayhan Oğan, Secretary of the Eastern Anatolia Region, noted that the WPC's efforts helped the society initially to believe that there was an acceptable degree of support for a political agreement. After society's support was gained, the group expressed the people's demands in public and so aimed to influence political decisions. The Committee successfully built communication between the Turkish and Kurdish communities and encouraged society to support a political resolution (Oğan, Interview, 18/06/2015). It was clear evidence of the WPC successfully promoting the peace process through the use of peaceful language and encouraging the government and pro-Kurdish side to use a common language for a peaceful resolution (Oran, 2014). As Mayer (1987) indicates, it is crucial to close the gap between the conflicting communities in order for peacemaking to take place. Hence, the WPC played a role as a middle-range group to influence the decision-making mechanism. It also identified the reason of high-support for political resolution in eastern Turkey due to the weariness, tedium and demoralisation of the people. The WPC was seen as an organisation to help decrease violence by creating hope in people's mind (Oğan, Interview, 18/06/2015).

The WPC was a useful group for promoting peace and understanding the demands and requests of different communities in the society. However, as mentioned in the previous section, it is not a typical peace group which aims to close the gap between conflicting communities and to contribute peace through public pressure to the political agents. Instead, even though the special characteristics of the WPC exhibit an independent organisation due to its members and mechanism, the group operated as a quasi-governmental body since it was responsible to forward the demands of the society to the government. This nature caused the group to act as a body to promote peace negotiations between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement. This promotion resulted in diminishing critical voices by the WPC concerning how the condition of the peace process should be defined and made in action. Instead of this, the WPC was perceived as the promotion of the government's peace agenda which was to end the PKK's armed campaign. The public talks and small town meetings of the WPC demonstrated that the audiences and civil society representatives acted as they were talking to a governmental body. This was evident through the interview data. Members of the WPC stated that the audiences wanted to learn how the government aimed to reach a political settlement (Can, Interview, 25/06/2015 and Dedeoğlu, Interview, 17/06/2015). Therefore, the outcry was directed to the WPC members through protests aiming to prevent their meetings and by attacking members of the group during their meetings and visits. For example, a two-hundred people group attacked the WPC members in Amasya city aiming to beat them because of the claim that the WPC members were the government's spokespersons (Vatan, 2013).

Secondly, the WPC promoted attempts of non-violent, political resolution by political parties and actors. The Committee played a role in maintaining the peace process and promoting the talks between the Turkish government and PKK leaders. It developed a positive environment even for those opposed to a political agreement. The Committee's efforts became apparent with the leak of the secret Oslo Talks between the government and PKK members. As discussed in Section 6.4.2, the Oslo Talks

created a negative reaction in wider Turkish society, since it was perceived as bargaining between the government and a terrorist group. Ironically, the greater reaction in the society was related to the claim for reaching an agreement with a terrorist group, not on building a communication channel, hence, the Committee also aimed to understand society's perception of these talks and to increase support for a non-violent resolution (Oğur, Interview, 25/06/2015 and Korkut, Interview, 10/07/2015). Similarly, Hatem Ete, the chief advisor to the PM, stated that the outcome of the WPC events was used by the Turkish government during the negotiations regarding the concerns of both communities (Ete, Interview, 03/07/2015).

The characteristics and structure of the WPC helped to gain public support and promote the peace process through its members who were ethnically Turkish, Kurdish or had different religious and other backgrounds such as non-Muslim citizens (Çalışlar, Interview, 07/07/2015). The variety of backgrounds facilitated public support and acted as a bottom-up initiative which insisted on bringing a political resolution, a new constitution and peace project which contained the demands of disputing communities (WPCEAG, 2013; WPCMRG, 2013). As Rothman (1997) puts it, the WPC's aim to close the gap between different ethnic identities is vital in eliminating prejudices. To achieve this aim, the WPC focused on reciprocal understanding by helping each community to be introduced not as a threat or enemy, but as human beings. This gained the public support for the group.

The variety of the WPC members' ethnic and religious background provided support in the grassroots level. However, it caused the blame of many groups that the members of the group were the representatives of the government. Even the leader of the nationalist MHP, Devlet Bahçeli blamed PM Erdoğan to manipulate the WPC, 'that delegation members were AKP and PKK sympathisers, that they are acting as PKK spokespersons and that they were aiming at dividing the Turkish nation' (Bahçeli, 2013, quoted in Gursel, 2013). Whether the events and aims of the WPC could have been

different if it was not initiated by the government and its members were not selected by the governmental bodies remained as a question mark. Although this condition gave a unique opportunity to the group to contact with political agents directly, this emerged a threat towards the impartiality of the group since it was the government's initiative. The WPC was successful in promoting peace in the grassroots level and in encouraging different communities to talk about their demands towards a political resolution. These discussions successfully increased conflicting communities' support for a non-violent resolution. However, it was seen as the only clear contribution of the group. It can be said that it was because of the lack a programme of this group. It was attested by Dedeoğlu, as she said that the lack of their agenda during their events arose an uncertainty towards the potential outcome of their activities regarding the contribution to the peace process (Dedeoğlu, Interview, 17/06/2015). The characteristics of the group also resulted in missing the opportunity for contributing the peace process in a greater detail, such as, to force the AKP and CHP towards constitutional reforms for the resolution of disputes which stem from ethnic discrimination.

Thirdly, the WPC met with the Turkish government and political parties in order to further contribute to the peace process. The Committee insisted on a new constitution, one of the most notable demands from society, to resolve the conflict (Can, Interview, 25/06/2015). The report written by the WPC's Black Sea Group revealed that the Turkish and Kurdish communities believed that the new constitution would eliminate all restrictions in terms of ethnic identity, fundamental rights of freedom, the definition of citizenship, religious and linguistic restrictions, participatory and pluralistic democracy that are part of the principles of human security (WPCBSG, 2013; WPCEAG, 2013).⁶⁵ The group also demanded the repeal of the Counter-terrorism Legislation, and Police Duty

⁶⁵ Although human security is not the focus of this research, it is significant for resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts. The three basic principles of human security are freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity (Annan, 2000, p.17; Özerdem & Özerdem, 2013, p.2).

and Authority Law, since these two items of legislation seemed to be causing an increase in the level of violence (TBMM, 1934, 1991). Furthermore, the group recommended that the Law on the Compensation of Damages Arising from Counter-terrorism (Legislation Number 5233) was insufficient to amend the condition of the people who were exposed to violence (WPCSG, 2013). However, none of these laws was changed or amended to help decrease the effect of terrorism on society. Hence, the group was unsuccessful in facilitating change in any legislation. Despite its foundation process (initiated by the government and proximity to political agents), the group was lacking power in pushing the government for constitutional reforms by using their support in the grassroots level. It can be said that the WPC's different nature and function within the peace process in Turkey and compared to the Northern Irish P/CROs did not provide help towards a positive outcome in the peace process.

Lastly, the group aimed to persuade the government to accept the European Charter of Local Self-Government, and to repeal its reservations on this act (WPCSG, 2013). The Charter suggested increasing the local governments' authority (EU, 1988). The WPC believed that it was an important step towards decreasing the tension in the south-east of Turkey (Arıboğan, Interview, 08/09/2015). However, the group, again, was unsuccessful in influencing the government to change its perceptions in relation to legislation, as the government believed that it was a restriction on its authority.

The only achievement related to the constitutional changes was to help the declaration of the Democratisation Package of 2013. The package contained the regulations on political rights, the fight against discrimination and hate crimes, steps to guarantee the respect of different lifestyles and an expansion of the rights of meeting and demonstration (UPOS, 2013). The Package was a great opportunity for reducing the discrimination which had caused the ethnic conflict. The changes included the repeal of the law to fight against terrorism in Specially Authorised Courts (*Özel Yetkili Mahkeme*) which was authorised to try cases only

involving terrorism and organised crime. It also decreased long detention periods, the requirement of concrete evidence for custody and arrest, and allowed political parties to use Kurdish and other languages for election campaigns and for education in private schools in languages other than Turkish. It also allowed former non-Turkish names of villages to be reinstated, which enabled the use of Kurdish names for villages (TBMM, 2014a). Although the democratisation law helped the progress, the pro-Kurdish BDP blamed the government for the insufficiency of this reform as there were still cases pending against Kurdish politicians for using Kurdish in their election campaigns (SETA, 2014).

Furthermore, the WPC was criticised by some groups in Turkish society and political parties. On the one hand, the WPC was protested against during its events and meetings. Although they were small protests, they were extensively discussed in the media. Oğur and Sayman, members of the WPC, admitted that the protests affected the WPC's activities during the public talks (Oğur, Interview, 25/06/2015 and Sayman, Interview, 03/07/2015). On the other hand, the WPC was also criticised by political parties. Tan, a deputy of the pro-Kurdish HDP, argued that the WPC promoted the government's decisions and policies (Tan, Interview, 24/06/2015). Thus, he said, the group did not serve the peace process, but the government. Fortunately, these situations did not prevent the WPC's activities from happening.

Lastly, Şükrü Karatepe, a member of the WPC's Mediterranean Region, said that the WPC played a barrier role between the Turkish government and society. This was not the intention of the government or the Committee, but the group's function was unique in facilitating the progress of resolution efforts. Particularly, the group changed the perception of people who had refused to carry out a political resolution process by declaring that the unitary system would remain the same, and this facilitated the peace process (Karatepe, Interview, 13/07/2015). In fact, there was no sign of the partition of the state. In addition, the chief advisor to the PM, Etyen Mahçupyan indicated that the Committee was a

group which was successful in increasing the support of a non-violent resolution to the Kurdish question. It successfully brought together people who had never been together, and discussed their demands in order to end the conflict. Besides, the reaction towards the Committee was not very strong and, overall, it increased the support for a political resolution, opposed to an armed struggle (Mahçupyan, Interview, 22/06/2015).

7.5.2. The Look at Peace Platform

The first event of the LPP was to publish a statement in relation to the peace process, a call to all citizens of Turkey to support a political resolution (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). In addition, it was a protest against any type of violence and the killing of innocent people (BarışaBak Platformu, 2014). The statement insisted on maintaining the peace process, which was the major purpose of the Platform (BiaNet, 2014). The LPP contributed to the peace process following two methods: firstly, the Platform organised public events, panels and protests against any type of violence deployed by the PKK and responded to by the security forces. The group's biggest event was a peace train that started in İstanbul and completed its trip in Diyarbakır in 2015. The Peace Train Organisation (PTO) aimed to give a peace message to society, stopping at eleven cities between İstanbul and Diyarbakır and organising different activities, such as a petition drive. The Train arrived in Diyarbakır on the day of Nevruz which is a traditional celebration day of spring for both Kurdish and Turkish people (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). The deputies of the political parties in the Parliament and people from different ethnic backgrounds, including Turkish and Kurdish, attended this event, showing political actors' support for the peace process (Yayla, Interview, 07/07/2015). The PTO was an indicator that the group could successfully act as a representative of these communities, since many people from both Kurdish and Turkish communities attended these events. This is in parallel to Chigas's (2005) assumption that track-two agencies can represent both communities. Besides, even though it was an informal group, the deputies of political parties attended the events of the PTO in order to stand against violence.

Although political parties did not express their support for the group explicitly, it was a unifying event which brought people with different views together.

The group also organised other events. For instance, they organised meetings in many cities and marches against both the security forces and PKK to stop violence. More specifically, the group organised conferences such as 'Samsun Barışa Bakıyor' and 'Uşak Barışa Bakıyor' (Samsun-Uşak are Looking at Peace) (Algan, Interview, 30/06/2015). Through these events, the LPP aimed to bring the Turkish and Kurdish communities closer to each other and to discuss possible solutions (Yayla, Interview, 07/07/2015). These events encouraged disputing communities and other groups in society who were reluctant about a political agreement. Therefore, the LPP helped to transform society's perception of a non-violent resolution by convincing them of the possibility of ending the Kurdish conflict.

Secondly, the LPP had direct contact with the political parties in the Parliament. The leading members of the LPP met with four major political parties in the Assembly. The group met with the deputy chairpersons of the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP. Contacting political parties increased both the reliability of the LPP and the possibility of their contribution to the peace process. Moreover, Algan said that the group even witnessed a softer and more approachable attitude from Yusuf Halaçoğlu (vice chairperson of pro-Turkish MHP). Halaçoğlu was supportive and positive towards the LPP even though the MHP's attitude in general was against the peace process (Algan, Interview, 07/07/2015). However, the LPP did not play a role in putting pressure on the political actors for a political change. Its only purpose was to promote peace. Hence, its contribution related to political decisions was only through facilitating peace talks between the government on the one hand, and the HDP and Öcalan on the other. In this sense, it can be said that the group acted as a catalyst in order to maintain official negotiations. Nevertheless, in contrast to the existing literature which suggests that this contact results in their contribution in the decisions of

political actors, the LPP's direct contact with the political parties did not result in their suggestions being considered by the decision-making mechanism (Kaye, 2007). The LPP's limited contribution on political decisions was because of its limited influence on transforming issues which are the causes of the conflict, but is not because of talking to the wrong people.

The LPP was also faced with protests from nationalists and some pro-Kurdish groups. For example, the group was exposed to some aggression from local people in the cities of Sivas and Kirikkale (Algan, Interview, 07/07/2015). Algan said that the LPP was also criticised by the HDP who accused it for being the government's initiative (Algan, Interview, 07/07/2015). Fortunately, these claims did not decrease support for the group and did not create a reaction against it in society as it had Kurdish, leftist, religious, non-religious, and feminist members (Yayla, Interview, 07/07/2015). Even though the HDP supported the peace process, it opposed the LPP's events that did not help the events of the group. It is a dilemma which illustrates that the peace process contains misunderstandings and a lack of trust even between political actors and P/CROs.

Finally, even though the LPP aimed to create a change and to facilitate the peace process, it could only influence society to support a non-violent, political resolution. Its aim to reduce the level of violence could not be achieved. Similarly, Mahcupyan said that the Platform's activities remained very limited with regards to facilitate reducing the level of violence and changing regulations on ethnic discrimination (Mahcupyan, Interview, 22/06/2015). Their communications with all political parties in the Parliament did not result in a change in the peace process. It can be said that the limited contribution of the group was due to the lack of political and constitutional claims, as well as the focus of action being solely on public support. Therefore, the influence of the LPP's events, meetings and protests remained limited.

7.6. Comparison: Great Effort, Little Help?

This chapter has demonstrated the role played by P/CROs during the conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey. While the peace groups in Northern Ireland illustrated a wider contribution, peace groups in Turkey had limited influence on bringing the violence to an end and making a peace agreement.

Conflict	Northern Ireland		Turkey	
Groups	BIA	PP	WPC	LPP
Foundation	Political and unofficial actors	Reactive groups (unofficial)	Political and unofficial actors	Reactive groups (unofficial)
Support	Publicly supported by the government	Covert support by the government	Publicly supported by the government	Covert support by the government
Method	Panels, high-level conferences, meetings	Meetings with communities, marches	Panels, low-level conferences, meetings	Meetings with communities, demonstrations
Goal	Changing the legal arrangements	De-escalating the conflict, promoting peace	Changing the legal arrangements	De-escalating the conflict, promoting peace
Outcome	Successful in changing some regulations	Partially successful in changing regulations	Partially successful in changing regulations	Unsuccessful in changing regulations

Table 7.2: Methods and Results of the Initiatives of the P/CROs in Northern Ireland and Turkey

The BIA in Northern Ireland and WPC in Turkey have similar characteristics as political actors played a significant role in establishing or assisting these groups. Considering the distinctive nature of the WPC due to its initiation process by the Turkish government, it was the closest P/CRO in the Kurdish peace process to assess the effectiveness of the peace groups, as mentioned in Section 7.5. Fortunately, the similarities between these groups helped to compare their influence. The Turkish government founded the WPC and the political actors were actively involved in the

establishment of the BIA. Besides, both P/CROs were led by academics, journalists and other intellectuals (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982a; WPCAG, 2013). While the PP was founded as a reaction to a specific incident caused by an IRA member, the LPP was established as a general reaction to an increasing level of violence, but the LPP's greatest event was the PTO that was a reaction to an incident that caused the loss of 50 civilians' lives (Algan, Interview, 07/07/2015). The PP and LPP have many similarities in terms of their *raison d'être*, characteristics and demands. The comprehensiveness of these four groups regarding the inclusion of all disputing views resulted in gaining the governments' support publicly or secretly (Table 7.2). While both governments assisted the BIA and WPC publicly by being involved in their foundation, they preferred to give covert support to the PP and LPP. It can be said that the communication between these groups and the governments helped the groups to contribute to the peace process.

In relation to the methods and results of the BIA and WPC's activities, they organised very similar events, for instance, panels, conferences, meetings between disputing communities and with political parties and government officials. Regarding their activities at the grassroots level, they both organised panels and meetings between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, and between the Kurdish and Turkish communities in Turkey. As a result of these bottom-up activities, they successfully increased public support for the conflict resolution processes. As solely top-down changes are likely to maintain earlier issues or create other grievances, P/CROs' activities were reduced the political elites' responsibilities by encouraging all communities to take part in the peace processes (Jacoby & Özerdem, 2013, p.136). This success was attested to by the British and Turkish governments, underlining the contribution of the two groups in facilitating the peace processes and gaining public support (TNA-CJ/4/1947, 1977; Uçum, Interview, 02/07/2015). Both groups' conferences had similar types of structures and attendees, with one exception. While the BIA organised private conferences, the WPC organised public conferences, but the participation in these conferences was by invitation only. The interview with Dedeoğlu

revealed that the reason for this was due to hindering the intervention of potential spoilers (Dedeoğlu, Interview, 17/06/2015). Although they had similar structures and had similar participants, such as academics, representatives of NGOs, experts and opinion leaders, there was an important difference between the BIA and WPC; the BIA's conferences hosted high-level politicians during the 1970s and 1980s. +This difference affected the contribution of these conferences. For example, as the declassified secret meeting notes indicated, the Cambridge Conference of 1973 and Oxford Conference of 1974 witnessed salient discussions on power-sharing between Merlyn Rees, Garrett Fitzgerald and the deputies of the Irish Republic (TNA-CJ/4/582, 1974). In contrast, the WPC's conferences were organised to identify the demands of society and to determine the requirements of a peace agreement (Ensaroğlu, Interview, 02/07/2015). Therefore, the WPC's conferences had little achievement compared to the BIA's conferences. These track-two initiatives of the BIA created an informal dialogue between political parties and actors, and other participants who have knowledge on this conflict, as official negotiations were impossible due to high-intensity conflict.

The last method of the two groups was to make contact with government officials. The meetings between the members of the BIA and WPC, and the British and Turkish governments were significant opportunities to contribute to the peace processes and to decrease the level of violence. Whilst the BIA was aiming to provide a change in relation to majority rule, the establishment of a new local government and constitutional politics, the WPC had the objective to change counter-terrorism policy, strengthen local governments' rights and the articles in the law related to ethnic identities (TNA-CJ/4/2228, 1978; TNA-CJ/4/2580, 1979b; WPCSG, 2013). As a result of its activities, the BIA was successful in changing some legal arrangements through the Association's conferences and meetings with the British government. For example, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior argued that the BIA helped to re-establish the basis of the Northern Irish government through local elections and a locally elected Assembly after eight years (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982c).

Its informal and flexible environment, as Lederach (1997) suggests, helped to change some regulations by bringing official representatives of the Northern Irish parties into an unofficial environment. In contrast, the WPC's activities did not result in changing legal arrangements. The only change was made through the Democratisation Package of the Turkish government, which contained the Committee's suggestions, including changing regulations related to the ethnic discrimination between communities (UPOS, 2013). Nevertheless, the majority of the WPC's suggestions were not considered by the government. Therefore, the great effort of the WPC resulted in little help to the progress. Overall, both groups were successful in promoting and maintaining the peace processes. However, the NIO Minister Marshall's letter to Lord Melchett revealed that the BIA's contribution is more extensive as it did not only facilitate the progress but also helped to improve the rule of law (TNA-CJ/4/1947, 1977).

The PP and LPP followed similar methods, namely meetings between the communities and with the governments and political actors, as well as organising marches that were well supported by both disputing sides in the two conflicts. The PP and LPP easily gained public support compared to the BIA and WPC. An anonymous declassified secret TNA paper demonstrated that this was because of the Northern Irish P/CROs' focus, which was more on the promotion of peace at the grassroots level (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977b). In particular, the PP and LPP aimed to affect the British and Turkish governments in respect to maintaining non-violent, political resolution efforts. The leaders of the PP, Corrigan and Williams, met with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and some other officials in the British government to initiate a change in the rule of law, and to decrease the level of violence. The PP insisted on a change in the British Army's internment policy and of the Army's visibility, an amnesty for political prisoners and the Emergency Provisions Act. Although the British government did not change its internment policy, it agreed with the PP on the visibility of the Army. Therefore, the British government's declassified secret meeting note revealed that the government decided to inform the

public about the internment of terrorist suspects, which undoubtedly helped to decrease the level of the unionist and nationalist communities' opposition towards the Army's actions (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977c; TNA-CJ/4/2380, 1978b). In addition, the PP's efforts regarding political prisoners allowed them to talk directly to the prisoners in H-Block. They played an intermediary role between the government and prisoners, which added value to the peace process. They also informed society of the H-Block issue, which helped to minimise the reaction of the Catholic community.

Furthermore, the leading members of the LPP met with the chairpersons of the four parties in the Parliament including the government's chairperson during their events. Although both the PP and LPP were not supported explicitly by the governments, they were supported implicitly, which differentiates them from other peace groups. The governments' covert support for the groups, for example for the PTO's activities, and the on-going communication and cooperation between them make their activities significant. This support is evident through the conferences and peace talks which were organised during the PTO's trip from İstanbul to Diyarbakır, and which were promoted by the Turkish government (Sabah, 2015). However, the LPP's aim to help make an agreement for a more democratic constitution by refusing any discrimination could not be achieved since its events were not continuous. The previous section provided the evidence that it was also because of the limited aim of the LPP: to promote peace.

The PP and LPP were active during the violent conflicts and their aim to help reduce the level of violence facilitated the progress. While the LPP had a positive influence on increasing public support for the peace process, the PP provided a change in the Province. Therefore, they contributed to positive peace through the restoration of the relationships in society. This was acknowledged by the British government revealed through David Goodall's letter to Peter Foster (Northern Ireland Ministers) that the Movement was successful in bringing hope to Northern Ireland (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977a). The personal reputation of the leaders was

also used as an advantage, extensively by the PP and partially by the LPP, since they were not administered by political actors, but they partially affected these actors' decisions. Their influence also were related to the personal reputation of the PP's leaders, as they won the Nobel Peace Prize and met with the Pope. These situations resulted in the Queen's support for the Movement (TNA-CJ/4/1549/1, 1977a). It can be said that these aspects helped the Movement to be seen as a successful peace group.

These four peace organisations' influence on the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes can be explained in two major ways: their impact in reducing or ending violence and in encouraging political actors to reach a peace agreement. Firstly, all four groups helped to de-escalate the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts. While the PP's influence in reducing the violent attacks of unionists, republicans and the British government was very effective through its well-supported marches, the BIA, LPP and WPC had less influence. Although the WPC's aim was to understand society's demands, it was perceived as an elite-driven group, since society used the group to forward their messages to the AKP government. Hence, reducing the level of violence was an indirect outcome of the group through the promotion of peace and by closing the gap between the Kurdish and Turkish communities thanks to its events as a civil society organisation. In this point, the proximity of these groups to society, namely the communities in the conflicts, is an important factor, which was measured through the peace groups' focus on the demands of the societies and whether they were successful in bringing disputing communities together. Thus, the closer the peace commissions were to society, the more successful they were in helping to reduce the level of violence in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes.

Secondly, the four groups' influence on political actors is another salient aspect. All four groups had the chance to communicate with high-level politicians. This advantage allowed them to play an active role in the decision-making mechanisms. However, as they are not official representatives or elected people, their impact might remain limited in the

peace processes. In this context, the BIA and WPC had a greater influence than the PP and LPP since the political actors played a role to establish these P/CROs. On the one hand, the BIA and WPC brought high-level politicians, experts and opinion leaders together in an unofficial environment which provided the freedom to express their ideas and thoughts. The British and Turkish governments took into account the outcome of these conferences and meetings. However, the BIA's political events were much more effective than the WPC's activities due to the nature of these initiatives. The BIA's conferences hosted far more politicians with different political views, such as the unionist and nationalist parties and British government, than the WPC's events, which was undoubtedly a significant factor in determining the outcome of these events. The WPC had the chance to contact only the government but not the republican and nationalist parties as they refused to attend any peace attempts. Undeniably, the lack of a political contribution restricted the peace groups to talking only to the government, which affected the acceptability of a political resolution. Although it was an external factor for the WPC, it affected the efficiency of the group. Besides, the foundation of the WPC by the Turkish government affected the perception of the wider Turkish society and opposition parties towards the impartiality of this group. On the other hand, the PP and WPC also contacted political actors who were important people in the peace processes. However, their contribution was very limited compared to the BIA and WPC's impact. It can be said that the closer the peace groups are to the decision-making mechanism, the more they can influence political actors in order to maintain the conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey.

To sum up, it can be said that the contribution of the P/CROs in Northern Ireland was more comprehensive than the P/CROs in Turkey's Kurdish peace process. Even though they affected political actors, these groups were not the key players in political decisions. Instead, they were supplementary groups who supported this mechanism. Fortunately, they played a far better role in helping to reduce the level of violence, since the reaction of society had an influence on the violent levels in both cases.

These two aspects illustrate the fact that these four groups acted as a bridge between society and political actors. Therefore, they successfully brought these two levels of the conflict resolution processes closer, facilitating official negotiations, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8

Official Negotiations: The Long, Narrow Road to Peace

'If you cannot kill them all [terrorists], then sooner or later you come back to the same point, and it is a question of when, not whether, you talk. If there is a political cause then there has to be a political solution' (Powell, 2014).

8.1. Introduction

Jonathan Powell, one of the architects of the GFA and the chief advisor to PM Blair, states that political conflicts require non-violent resolutions, which can best be achieved through official negotiations. The focus of the chapter is to examine the role of these negotiations through bilateral talks, multilateral initiatives and third party approaches towards bringing the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts to an end. It also aims to understand how political parties and actors have determined these two peace processes. The chapter aims to answer the following question: 'What has been the impact of the official negotiations towards ending violence and reaching peace agreements in the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts?'

The chapter firstly investigates the negotiation stage of a conflict resolution process to illustrate theoretical assumptions concerning official negotiations and the major aspects for transforming the root causes of conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups. The official negotiations in Northern Ireland and Turkey are then assessed through bilateral talks and multilateral initiatives, including mediation efforts. The next section compares the findings of the two cases and the reasons for the successful and unsuccessful outcomes of the peace initiatives. It concludes

with an explanation of how these initiatives helped to achieve a political resolution.

8.2. The Negotiation Stage of Conflict Resolution Processes

Official negotiations address interests of parties in a conflict for the collective benefit, in contrast to P/CROs which predominantly focus on identity, fear and other community concerns (Sections 7.4 and 7.5). This thesis investigates the negotiation stage as one of the major processes of conflict resolution. To understand the influence of this stage, the major principles of negotiation will first be assessed. Then, how a violent conflict can be transformed through official negotiations will be investigated.

8.2.1. Major Principles of a Negotiation Process

The existing literature on conflict resolution suggests different principles for successful official negotiations between conflicting parties. This chapter assesses the negotiation stage of the conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey by gathering these principles under the following banners: inclusiveness, sustainability, reciprocity, trust and gain. Firstly, the term inclusiveness describes both supporters and opponents of the agreement. It also contains disputing communities' views in making a peace agreement which enables negotiations to embrace a greater majority of conflicting communities. In relation to parties and actors, a negotiation process represents people at both the national and international level (Hancock, 2008, p.214). While the national level includes conflicting parties, the international level refers to independent third parties who facilitate a peace process. This assumption will be analysed at both levels to assess whether the two peace processes were inclusive, including not only conflicting parties, but also independent third parties. These levels concern track-one diplomacy efforts, which describe a conflict resolution process between official representatives of governments and the decision-making apparatus of another party (Said et al., 1995). Track-one interventions in

ethno-nationalist conflicts focus on the adaptation of resolution efforts through official negotiations and mediations by bringing disputing parties together (Richmond, 2001). For example, the AIA and DSD did not bring all conflicting parties together in Northern Ireland, so, these bilateral efforts were insufficient to provide inclusiveness. Regarding independent third parties, mediation is an essential component of a negotiation process, which describes an independent party's involvement in peacemaking efforts (Koch, 1974, p.28). Although the mediation approach has many different concepts, this thesis applies two main concepts as they address conflicts not only between, but also within states. On the one hand, mediation as a social approach refers to a requirement of interpersonal, intergroup and international negotiations (Wall, 1981, 1993). As described in Section 3.3.3, this concept refers to deliberate misrepresented situations and the establishment of protocols, which may lead to achievable negotiations. The British SIS and George Mitchell's early meetings with both governments and the opposition sides are examples of mediation as a social approach, whose influence will be examined in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. On the other hand, mediation as a transformational approach represents an opportunity to transform people's views by supporting different opinions to fill any gaps due to differences in their perception (Bercovitch, 1991, p.4; Bush & Folger, 1994, p.2). Mediation efforts should contain active cooperation between the weak and strong parties in a conflict by advancing active association and planning steps, which provides a positive peace and requires that both conflicting parties accept that they are equal in negotiations (Curle, 1971). The role of mediators in transforming a conflict through official negotiations will be analysed in the next section.

Secondly, negotiation as a process illustrates not a single dispute, but a setting of relevant acts involving disputants and actions (Jackson, 2000, p.324). Thus, it requires a sustainable process for reaching a political settlement. As explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, official negotiations occur in the latter stage of a conflict resolution process so need to be treated as an on-going process. This leads to another assumption, namely that assessing one negotiation or a small period of negotiations are not sufficient

for understanding the impact of official negotiations since these initiatives need to be analysed as a continuous process. In parallel, the interruption of official negotiations affected the success of these negotiations as single events cannot move the process forward.

Thirdly, reciprocity between disputing sides is an important determinant for a successful negotiation process, which seeks to understand the will of states, sub-state armed groups and their political fronts. It also allows the investigation of political actors who enter negotiations without being willing to reach a settlement, that addresses spoiler parties who affect the success of negotiations negatively (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.49). This aspect also determines a ripe moment for negotiations, as intervention in a conflict at a non-ripe moment may be devastating and may escalate a conflict (Haas, 1990; Hancock, 2001). This assumption helps to raise the question of the existence and efficiency of spoilers in the Northern Irish and Kurdish peace processes. While both cases had different spoilers which interrupted peace efforts, the degree of their opposition and influence in the progress will be investigated in this chapter.

Lastly, trust and gain issues between warring parties define the route of a peace process. These issues can be explained from two perspectives. While the relationship-based perspective explains a sustainable peace process which requires overcoming the concerns of trust and bargaining, the political-risk perspective addresses the situations in which political parties would not be interested in joining negotiations unless they believe that they can achieve their goals without an armed struggle (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011, p.52). This is also related to Zartman's (1989) argument which suggests that if conflict pays, the parties in a conflict are not willing to negotiate. In this case, it is preferable to maintain conflict if the conflicting parties think that they can achieve their aims through armed struggle. The IRA's intention to use an armed campaign primarily until the 1980s will be investigated according to this assumption. Transformation within these principles and the shift between political and

armed strategies will be assessed to understand the influence of these issues in both conflict resolution processes.

8.2.2. Conflict Transformation through Official Negotiations

As explained in Chapter 3, according to Galtung, Burton, Boulding, Ramsbotham et al. and Curle's theories, resolution of a conflict can be possible if the underlying reasons of a violent conflict are transformed, which reveals a complicated shifting relationship between conflicting sides (Boulding, 1962; Burton, 1969, 1972; Curle, 1971; Galtung, 1965; Ramsbotham et al., 2011). However, it is important to understand how a violent conflict is transformed. This research investigates four major transformers which outline a framework for examining violent conflicts: structural, actor, issue and personal-group transformations (Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Vayrynen, 1991). As discussed in Section 3.3.3, these aspects were selected in respect to their effect in transforming ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey. Structural transformation exhibits that if the root causes of a conflict stem from the structure of relationships within the parties in a conflict, a transformation within these parties is essential for resolution of the conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Transformation of the root causes of a conflict concentrates on changing power relations between conflicting parties and reducing uncertainty (Jacoby & Özerdem, 2013; Maney et al., 2006). A structural change addresses the shift of the power relationship between disputing parties in Northern Ireland and Turkey. For example, a transformation in the structure of the conflict occurred when SF joined the official negotiations, whose outcome will be examined in this chapter.

Actor transformation describes significant changes in the direction, goals or thoughts of conflicting parties. These changes might result in a division within these parties and can create more veto-players (Cunningham, 2006, p.875). This assumption describes division within a

disputing party resulting in more veto players.⁶⁶ For example, the split within the pro-Kurdish side from only the leadership of Öcalan to a triangle consisting of the HDP, Öcalan and Qandil (the PKK's military headquarter) will be an important issue to assess. Further, issue transformation explains a change in conflicting parties' positions or emerges when issues lose their importance. In this case, new issues arise and the conflict is transformed (Vayrynen, 1991). This type of transformation frequently emerged in both conflicts, in the selection of armed or political struggles. This chapter aims to reveal the power balance between the IRA and PKK on the one hand, and SF and the HDP (and its predecessors) on the other, as this is one of the crucial factors determining the outcome of these peace processes. Lastly, personal and group transformation addresses how leaders of sub-state armed groups reach victory in any means including political resolution who as a result can be a unifying national leader (Curle, 1994). Both peace processes will be assessed by investigating whether there was a change in the perception of the leadership of the IRA or PKK and these groups' political wings.

As the boundaries between these transformers and principles are not distinctive and mostly overlap within the same events, their influence on the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes will be assessed through two different official resolution efforts: bilateral talks and multilateral efforts. While the bilateral talks were largely used as the initial stage of the official negotiations in both peace processes, the multilateral efforts were implemented at the later stage. Therefore, firstly, the bilateral talks and then the multilateral efforts will be examined.

⁶⁶ Although the term 'veto player' is used to refer to political actors, it is also used to explain players in a bargaining process who have the ability to affect decisions (Tsebelis, 2002).

8.3. The Official Negotiations in the Northern Irish Peace Process

8.3.1. Bilateral Talks

The official negotiations in the Northern Irish peace process began in the early 1980s through bilateral talks between the British and Irish governments, and between Northern Irish parties. The first peace effort was initiated between the British and Irish governments. According to the Anglo-Irish Summit's Draft Communique, this was because the British government believed that the only solution in Northern Ireland could be reached through cooperation with the Irish government (TNA-PREM/19/509, 1981a). Therefore, the 1980s was dominated by Anglo-Irish talks. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Summit of 1981 between PM Thatcher and Taoiseach Haughey was the first official peace initiative between the two governments. Although the governments' different concerns prevented a better outcome (e.g. creating more comprehensive negotiations with the Northern Irish parties), the Summit helped to establish a discussion environment for political resolution efforts. It was a significant initiative since the British government accepted that there were two different traditions with religious and cultural backgrounds in Ireland. The NIO recorded that 'the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland' (TNA-PREM/19/509, 1981a). Yet, the Irish government was reluctant to talk about security issues due to the negative reaction of the nationalist community in the South. Even though political cooperation was not the priority of the British government, Thatcher accepted Haughey's suggestion to move relations forward. At the end of their meeting, Thatcher and Haughey declared a communiqué helping to form joint working groups between the two states with regard to new institutional structures, namely the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC), which was established on 6 November 1981 (TNA-PREM/19/509, 1981b).

The AIIC witnessed disagreement between the two governments over the Irish government's proposal for establishing an inter-parliamentary body and the British government's recommendation for founding a joint security commission (TNA-CAB/128/71/17, 1981; TNA-PREM/19/814, 1982; TNA-PREM/19/1068, 1982). These initiatives demonstrate that even though there was a disagreement between the two sides over security and political cooperation, there were still some changes. It is evident that there was a change in the position of the British government, as it admitted the existence of two different traditions. As Vayrynen (1991) notes, the change in the identification of the problem is a sign of issue transformation. This came into effect by recognising the existence of the Catholic and Protestant communities. It was a significant point in the negotiations, but did not bring to an end the British government's coercive measures and security policies which did not help to conduct resolution efforts in a peaceful environment. For example, the hunger strikes of 1980-81 demonstrate that the government was willing to maintain coercive policies, as Thatcher declared the triumphalism of the British government when she went to Belfast on 28 May 1981. She said: 'Faced with the failure of their [the IRA] discredited cause, the men of violence have chosen in recent months to play what *may well be their last card*'⁶⁷ (Thatcher, 1981). Similarly, Moore (1997, p.87) describes the British government's position as consistent regarding the refusal to concede to any of the political demands of the hunger strikers. However, the government's approach was not consistent compared to official statements, as the government and republican movement were negotiating secretly (Section 6.3.1). This demonstrates that even though there was a change in the political context, this change did not create a transformation in the official security policy of the British government.

The AIIC's failure in de-escalating the conflict through political reforms did not help to end the IRA's 'long war' strategy, just like the British government's coercive policies. However, as discussed in Section 6.3, the

⁶⁷ Emphasis added.

secret talks between the British government and republican movement resulted in a change in the republican strategy, as they began to believe in the possible success of political resolution efforts. Namely, it represents a change in the republican view, as noted by Danny Morrison, a senior republican; 'Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?' (Morrison, 1981). The strategy change from predominantly armed struggle to both ballot and bullet led to the republicans' involvement in political resolution efforts. However, it did not lead to de-escalation of the conflict.

The AIA was eventually signed by the British and Irish governments on November 15, 1985. The Agreement widened the scope of the root cause of the conflict's definition from only an ethnic to both an ethnic and constitutional problem. While the definition of the Irish government determined *de jure* sovereignty over the whole of Ireland, which was close to the SDLP and SF's positions, the British government defined the problem as identical with the unionist definition and there were some concessions to the nationalist view. The AIA widened both governments' views on the conflict. Irish nationalists conceded by 'recognising and respecting the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and the right of each community to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means' (Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985). Together with the change in perception of Irish nationalists, the British government widened its understanding to include constitutional nationalists and recognised the existence of two communities with different cultures and political aspirations (Thatcher, 1993, p.402). This was different from the early Anglo-Irish talks, since the British government's perception began to introduce political rights for the two communities instead of only cultural traditions. The Agreement also considered unionist demands as it stated that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority (Connolly & Loughlin, 1986). The change in perception by the two governments was a significant step for a negotiation process which helped to close the gaps between them and to make sitting at the negotiating table possible

(Hancock, 2008). However, the inclusiveness of peace attempts is vital for their success as they need to embrace both supporters and opponents of the resolution process.

The British government's consideration of the unionists' main concern in the AIA did not prevent the unionist community's outcry. Their initial reaction was strongly hostile and was unexpected by Thatcher: she described it 'as much worse than [she] expected' (Thatcher, 1985). The unionist community reacted to the AIA through protests and marches (TNA-CAB/128/83/36, 1986). Besides, the unionist parties reacted by resigning all their seats at Westminster, aiming to use by-elections as a mini-referendum (TNA-CAB/128/81/34, 1985; TNA-CAB/128/81/37, 1985). The significant point here was that their purpose was to understand the demands of the Northern Irish people as a whole. However, the result of the election disappointed the unionists as they could not achieve their aim of 500,000 votes and the UUP, DUP and UPUP's total vote was 418,230 (Table 8.1). As a result, they lost one seat to the SDLP. As described in Section 3.3, spoilers emerge when there is a peace process to undermine and after making an agreement (Stedman, 1997). The unionist parties played a spoiler role in interrupting the progress, which affected the sustainability of the peace process by demolishing the AIA. In addition, as the main protagonists did not attend official negotiations, personal and group, structure and actor transformations were not applicable for reaching a successful result, so did not lead to a positive peace in the 1980s.

Parties	Votes	Percentage	MPs
UUP	302,198	51.7%	10
DUP	85,239	14.6%	3
SDLP	70,917	12.1%	1
SF	38,821	6.6%	
Alliance	32,095	5.5%	
UPUP	30,793	5.2%	1
Workers Party	18,148	3.1%	
Peter Barry (For the AIA)	6,777	1.2%	

Table 8.1: Westminster By-Election Results in 1986 (ARK, 2001b)

After different attempts by the British and Irish governments, official peace efforts were shaped around the Northern Irish parties after 1993. As discussed in Section 6.3, it was not a *volte face*, but a smooth transition thanks to the secret talks. After many years of unsuccessful attempts, it was understood that the talks on the framework for a political resolution could only be achieved through the involvement of the Northern Irish parties. The first peace initiative that changed the nature of negotiations in the 1990s was between John Hume and Gerry Adams in April 1993. The two-party dialogue on self-determination drew a mutual understanding between nationalists and republicans on the future of Northern Ireland. It addressed the SDLP and SF's claims on the Northern Irish people to decide their political future (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). Although it was not a new claim, it was important in illustrating the intention of the two leaders to make progress. In addition, Hume aimed to highlight the collective benefit of nationalists and republicans for a non-violent resolution perspective, particularly on SF to give up its 'ballot box and Armalite together' strategy. Therefore, the SDLP insisted on laying the arms down and tried 'to persuade the Provos to bring their campaign of violence to an end' (Haughey, Interview, 19/01/2015). The Hume-Adams dialogue demonstrate that it is vital to include all conflicting parties in the peace process, as it needs to be complemented with sustainable political attempts. Hence, it can be said that the continuity of different political efforts helped to increase the contribution of republicans and nationalists in the official negotiations.

The negotiations resulted in the DSD on December 15, 1993 which witnessed the Irish government's insistence on self-determination for the Northern Irish people. As the British government did not accept this demand, the British and Irish governments' mutual declaration stated that the status of Northern Ireland could only be changed 'if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland are so persuaded' (British and Irish Governments, 1993). These discussions illustrated that both governments constantly defended contrasting issues which made it impossible to change their perceptions. As Vayrynen (1991) suggests, it is difficult to transform

issues unless they lose their importance or new issues emerge. In this case, there was no change in the ultimate goals of the republican movement and British government so the level of conflict could not be mitigated. There are a few important factors which affected the outcome of the DSD. Firstly, Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's statement that Britain had 'no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland' was published in the Declaration (Brooke, 1990). Nonetheless, it can be said that the lack of the term 'no political interest' of Britain towards Northern Ireland affected the trust of the republican community (British and Irish Governments, 1993). In addition, the Brooke-Mayhew talks helped signing the DSD, which aimed establishing a settlement by creating new structures for governing Northern Ireland by achieving a series of negotiations with the Northern Irish parties (O'Kane, 2004). As a result of these attempts, the document presented a structure in which a political agreement could be settled. According to Rev. Gary Mason, Methodist Minister of Belfast Mission, the DSD illustrates that 'the door was beginning to open to allow some to sit around in order for peace to be built. But, the door was not fully opened' (Mason, Interview, 20/01/2015). Even SF accepted that it was progress which was a hope towards peace. Jim Gibney, a senior member of SF, states that there was clear progress from the AIA to the DSD that encouraged Northern Ireland people to believe in peace (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). In contrast, according to Mason, even though John Major was a reasonable PM, the Declaration's ultimate aim, which was to reach a peace settlement, could not be achieved because of the lack of a ceasefire during the negotiations (Mason, Interview, 20/01/2015). After the announcement of the DSD, both nationalist and unionist communities were expecting republican and loyalist ceasefires.

According to the republican movement, to stop using arms was possible after the change in the British government's perception and decision to negotiate with republicans instead of focusing on destroying them, in addition to Hume-Adams dialogue (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015 and Walsh, Interview, 19/01/2015). After the announcement of the Declaration, Adams gave a speech to a republican event and said:

I am especially confident that after twenty-five years of unparalleled courage and self-sacrifice, the nationalist people of this part of Ireland are prepared to show the way to a new future while at the same time reaching out the hand of friendship to unionists (Adams, 1994, quoted in Rowan, 1995, p.91).

As both sides realised that they could not achieve their goals through armed struggle, it was a 'hurting stalemate' and so a ripe moment for a negotiated resolution. As described in Section 3.3.3, the phrase hurting stalemate, coined by Stedman (1991) and Zartman (2000), refers to a stalemate that forces an armed group to choose political efforts as opposed to an armed struggle, which was evident in the 1990s.

The loyalist paramilitary groups also had different expectations from the British government. Parallel to the unionist community, loyalists wanted a guarantee from the British government to remain part of the UK (Mason, Interview, 20/01/2015). Perhaps, they were comforted by the phrase that the union was safe 'until a majority of people want otherwise' (British and Irish Governments, 1993). Therefore, the DSD was significant in many contexts. On the one hand, the two-party dialogue opened the way to further negotiations and helped SF to believe in politics instead of armed struggle. The change in SF's perception led the IRA to declare an eighteen-month ceasefire. On the other hand, loyalists' claim on securing the current situation was also mentioned in the Declaration. After all, it can be said that both republican and loyalist ceasefires saw significant improvements in the 1990s. From the republican perspective, the war was over by the mid-1990s that removed the barriers behind the peace process (Mason, Interview, 20/01/2015). This emerged not only in the Northern Irish context, but also in an international context through Adams' visa from the Clinton administration, which is discussed in the next section.

8.3.2. Multilateral Efforts

After the bilateral talks provided the basis for more comprehensive initiatives, the multi-party and all-party negotiations and mediation efforts were applied in the 1990s. The first significant issue was Gerry Adams's visa. Adams was granted a visa from the US in January 1994, which changed

the nature of the process due to two interrelated reasons: firstly, it was a chance for Adams to explain the problem in the US and to meet with Irish-Americans who had been a great help and supported the reunification of Ireland. As Gibney (2015) notes, 'the Gerry Adams visa was one of the most important gestures of bringing peace to Ireland'. When Adams visited the US, he saw a high degree of support and sympathy for the Northern Irish peace process. Even the unionists admitted that this visit brought about a change in the perception of the Clinton administration and helped to make the president look at it differently (Empey, Interview, 27/01/2015). It was a significant point in relation to structural transformation. As Vayrynen (1991, pp.3-4) suggests, the scale and nature of a national violent conflict can be altered through the inclusion of a regional or an international actor, which may result in a transformation in the structure of a conflict. In the Northern Irish conflict, this transformation facilitated the conflict resolution process and helped to create a positive peace for overcoming the root causes of the conflict by changing the context from national to international. Secondly, even though the US administration was always interested in the Northern Irish conflict, their direct involvement came into effect through the Adams's visa. Unlike the previous leaders, Clinton had a great interest in ending the violence in Northern Ireland and in solving the problem in a peaceful way by bringing in SF. However, the British government resisted this perception as is seen by PM Major's fury at Clinton offering a visa in the first place. Major (2000, p.456) explained his resistance by stating 'on my instructions Rod Lyne, my Foreign Affairs Private Secretary, told the White House *forcefully* that we believed the offer of a visa should be held open until there was an end to violence'.⁶⁸ In contrast, the Irish-American lobby applied intense pressure for the visa to be granted (Major, 2000, p.456). In the end, it was also a sign for the British government to think that it was not just Britain's problem anymore. It was attested by republicans, as Walsh (2015) states, until the involvement of

⁶⁸ Emphasis added.

the Clinton administration, the British government believed that it was an internal issue of the UK.

Another issue that triggered multilateral efforts was the lack of trust in the British government. There was a general desire for a political settlement after secret talks in the 1990s, contrary to the previous decade. However, there was still opposition from the unionist community. By referring to the DSD, Lord Reginald Empey, the former leader of the UUP and member of the House of Lords (2015), said that 'we traditionally relied on the British government but they proved to be unreliable; then, the only way forward was to do this, ourselves'. The unionist community decided to defend their rights on their own, believing it was the only way to get what they wanted. As discussed in Section 3.3, mistrust between parties in a conflict might intensify and escalate the problem (Fisher & Keashly, 1990). The empirical analysis showed that the trust issues existed in two ways in the Northern Irish negotiations: not only during the talks which resulted in walking out from negotiations, but also as a determinant to 'joint' discussions. The UUP's decision to be more involved in negotiations was due to the lack of trust in the British government. In contrast to the literature on conflict resolution that suggest that there is a negative influence on the lack of trust in maintaining a peace process (Fisher & Keashly, 1990), this issue helped the success of negotiations by participating in each peace initiative.

The peace efforts in the mid-1990s were maintained through the mutual work of PM Major and Taoiseach Bruton. The republican and loyalist ceasefires moved the discussion forward to the decommissioning of paramilitary groups and the framework for negotiations. The discussion between the two leaders led to the Joint Communiqué of 28 November 1995, which announced a two-fold approach 'to make parallel progress on decommissioning and all-party negotiations' (British and Irish Governments, 1995). The agreement between the two governments provided two critical aspects in the peace process: the establishment of an international commission for decommissioning that aimed to end the

armed struggle, and the appointment of former US Senator George Mitchell to chair the all-party talks, which were one of the major elements of the conflict resolution attempts in Northern Ireland.

One of the significant situations that changed the direction of the peace process was the report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning in 1997 whose members were Mitchell, General John de Chastelain from Canada and Harri Holkeri, former PM of Finland. Despite the opposition of the unionist community and British government, the report declared that decommissioning was a part of the all-party negotiations, but did not contain rules requiring decommissioning prior to such negotiations (Mitchell et al., 1996). The declaration of the report was a call to all parties to carry out negotiations without any prerequisites. Nevertheless, the British government accepted the UUP's proposal for an elected assembly (Bew & Gillespie, 1996, p.162). This caused a great division between Britain and the Republic of Ireland. While it was welcomed by Britain with statements such as 'the most creative proposal yet advanced for moving the peace process forward', it was criticised by the Irish Republic as a 'serious breach of faith' (Bew & Gillespie, 1996, p.154). The political gridlock between the two states interrupted the peace process and caused it to lose momentum. This was a significant point as it triggered the IRA to use violence again. The IRA's Canary Wharf bombing in London (February 9, 1996) ended its ceasefire, blaming the British government for preventing progress in the peace process: 'The resolution of the conflict in our country demands justice. It demands an inclusive negotiated settlement. That is not possible unless and until the British government faces up to its responsibilities' (IRA, 1996). It was clear that the IRA was not interested in maintaining negotiations, as the cost of negotiations was higher than the armed struggle. This is in parallel to Zartman's (1989) assumption, since the direction of the talks was not moving as the IRA demanded. In this context, it can be said that a lack of transformation in actors from the military to the political wing of the republican movement was the result of the IRA standing as the only decision-maker.

The significant point here was the aim of the parties to maintain the negotiations despite the return of paramilitary violence. A close deadline (30 May 1996) for the Northern Ireland Forum⁶⁹ election for the parties who would be involved in the negotiations was a motivation to illustrate that peace was possible. Furthermore, the desire to maintain the peace process was opened through bilateral talks between the British and Irish governments, and was a hidden, but critical element of the peace process. The track-one initiative between Major and Bruton provided the Irish government with a joint coordinator role in the negotiations (The British Government, 1996). In spite of the opposition from the unionists, the change helped to conduct the Forum election. Furthermore, it became a more comprehensive process along with the inclusion of the demands of the Republic of Ireland. After the Forum election, the last and final stage of negotiations began on June 10, 1996. Although ten parties⁷⁰ in Northern Ireland were invited to the negotiations, SF was not invited due to the ongoing IRA violence. These efforts revealed the fact that even though the dialogue between the British and Irish governments was helping the progress, the major component of the peace process were the negotiations between the Northern Irish parties and British government. The controversy between SF and other parties could not be overcome by the British government and this demonstrated the vital importance of an independent party in the negotiations.

The efforts in 1996 illustrated that one of the most complicated aspects of this negotiation process was bringing conflicting sides together.

⁶⁹ The Northern Ireland Forum (formally called the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue) was a body founded in 1996 as part of a process of negotiations that eventually led to the GFA (MacGinty, 1999, p.240).

⁷⁰ Ten parties who attended the talks were the most successful ten parties in the Forum election: the UUP received 30 seats (24.2%), the DUP received 24 seats (18.8%), the SDLP received 21 seats (21.4%), and SF had its best ever showing and received 17 seats (15.5%), the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) received 7 seats (6.5%), and the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) received 3 seats (3.7%), the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) (3.5%), the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) (2.2%), the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) (1.0%), and a Labour coalition (0.9%) (Bew & Gillespie, 1996, p.177).

Mitchell interpreted these negotiations as ‘a serious effort to address and resolve the many substantial obstacles to agreement’ (Northern Ireland Office, 1996). Another critical aspect was the victory of Tony Blair’s Labour Party in the general election of 1997. Immediately after the election, PM Tony Blair focused on establishing an independent commission on decommissioning in August 1997. In his words; ‘the issue of decommissioning was one very unfortunate legacy from the previous administration which was to become a big ball and chain round our legs in the years to come’ (Blair, 2010, p.163). The establishment of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD)⁷¹ helped to maintain peace negotiations in a more peaceful environment. In addition, the Mitchell Report’s key recommendation to begin all-party talks and arms decommissioning in parallel helped SF to attend the negotiations (Darby, 2003). Hence, this peace process illustrates that a powerful mediator broke down one of the greatest taboos of the political efforts by including SF in the official negotiations. This issue illustrates a similar direction with Touval and Zartman’s (1985) assumption that a mediator with ‘muscles’ can break the barriers between the conflicting parties even if these are the major concerns, such as preconditions to reject any type of violence and to declare a ceasefire. This will be compared with the mediation in the Kurdish peace process in the comparison section.

While the negotiations were being held between all parties (except SF), there was another important initiative between Hume and Adams. The negotiation stage was again shaped by bilateral talks, which shows how bilateral and multilateral talks interlocked with one another and were applied interchangeably during the official negotiations. Hume and Adams’s talks on July 18, 1997 and their joint statement pointed to democracy and equality. These elements became the two major claims of the two parties in the peace process. They stated that ‘a just and lasting commitment will only be achieved if it is based on principles of democracy

⁷¹ The IICD was consisting of General John de Chastelain, Brigadier Tauno Nieminen from Finland and Ambassador Donald Johnson from the US as of 1997.

and equality and has the allegiance of both traditions' (Hume & Adams, 1997). The IRA declared a ceasefire just two days after the statement, which helped to resume the negotiation process. As happened in the 1994 ceasefire, the republican ceasefire played a fundamental role in facilitating the talks. It is important to bear in mind that the IRA ceasefire statement was addressing the progress in the political situation (IRA, 1997). Therefore, it can be said that there is a dual relationship between the conflicting parties: whilst the British government and other parties in conflict were expecting a peaceful environment to conduct peace efforts, the IRA waited for political progress which included its claims as a condition to lay down arms. The Northern Irish peace process gained its momentum when these two aspects were brought together. It was because the ceasefire led to the invitation of SF to attend peace negotiations, one of the most important aspects of official negotiations that a comprehensive peace accord was able to be reached. SF signed the Mitchell Principles that addressed abandoning and condemning the use of arms. However, this caused a deadlock in the negotiations since DUP leader, Ian Paisley, urged Blair to scrap the negotiations and asserted that he would leave for good if SF were let in (Mitchell, 1999, p.108). Paisley's approach here can be explained through the long-standing opposition of the DUP towards any political attempts. Further, as Mitchell (1999) states, the three unionist parties (the DUP, UUP and UKUP) insisted on the IRA's decommissioning prior to SF's inclusion in negotiations. After the British and Irish governments' proposal on maintaining negotiations without prior decommissioning had been accepted, the DUP and UKUP walked out and never returned. Yet, the DUP and UKUP blamed the UUP for 'selling-out the union' as the UUP did not walk out (Mitchell, 1999, p.109).

The existing violence also negatively affected multi-party negotiations. After the renewal of the loyalist groups' violence, the UUP resigned from negotiations immediately before its suspension. Similarly, SF was suspended after the IRA's violent attacks. The two parties were allowed back before the deadline of the agreement. Mitchell's effort to include all parties in the negotiations was a promising effort since he successfully

established 'an outwardly rippling, relatively inclusive, coalition of the centre against extremes' (Curran et al., 2004). As a former US senator, he knew that all conflicting sides should join the negotiations and hence, their supporters should be represented in the peace negotiations. Therefore, the influence of the agreement was broad (Empey, Interview, 27/01/2015). As Jeong (2000) suggests, the response of a mediator is not to help only one side of the conflict, but to come up with a solution by mutual agreement. It was successfully carried out during the mediations led by Mitchell.

After several two-party, multi-party and all-party talks, the GFA was declared on April 10, 1998 through the attendance of all parties involved in the talks. The all-party talks before the Agreement helped to bring all disputing views together and so addressed all parties' demands (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). The following dimensions helped reach the successful outcome. Firstly, the political parties in the negotiations were much more approachable than in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, according to Empey (2015), SF was careful not to refer to the IRA and also softened its language. Therefore, it helped to create a positive atmosphere by pushing for non-violence and democracy (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). The reason for being more approachable is that the parties began to believe that they could not achieve their aims through armed struggle. Similarly, the British government helped to conduct the negotiations by keeping secret the details of the discussions.

Secondly, the desire of the Northern Irish people for a political settlement was the major element for the successful outcome. According to Ben Mallon, the DUP Councillor for Lisburn and Castlereagh, they were sick and tired of murdering on the streets after many years of terrorism (Mallon, Interview, 19/01/2015). A peace agreement would not be possible without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. The consent and support for the GFA was clearly seen through the two referendums in North and South of the island with a great majority of the people's approval (Table 8.2). A guaranteed referendum was also important to increase public support. It was argued that the difference of these negotiations from previous

attempts was its structure, which was formed of elected members, and its agreed process, which guaranteed a referendum at the end of the negotiations (Empey, Interview, 27/01/2015).

Referendum	Yes	No
Northern Ireland	676,966 (71.1%)	274,879 (28.9%)
The Republic of Ireland	1,442,583 (94.4%)	85,748 (5.6%)

Table 8.2: The 1998 Good Friday Agreement Referendums (ARK, 2001a)

Thirdly, the international involvement in the peace process was one of the crucial elements of the peace. Although the US administration was criticised for having a nationalist approach due to the Irish-American population in the US, the Clinton Administration changed the view of the Northern Irish people, which helped Mitchell to mediate the talks in a peaceful environment. In addition, Mitchell carried the authority of the President of the US, which was a significant source of influence. He also informed President Clinton periodically about the developments (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). This authority helped him to act as an independent mediator, which is one of the basic characteristics of a mediation approach. He resisted any attempt to interrupt the process of the British and Irish governments since they behaved ‘in the mood of the big boys who could do the deal’ (Empey, Interview, 27/01/2015). Moreover, as mentioned in Section 3.3.3, mediation as a social approach requires making interpersonal, intergroup and international negotiations possible (Wall, 1993; Wall et al., 2001). In addition to his personality as an international actor, he carried out interpersonal and intergroup negotiations through his talks with all parties himself and with his two colleagues (Empey, Interview, 27/01/2015).

Lastly, the GFA brought a political framework and political institutions which responded to the questions of the people in Northern Ireland. The three strands of the GFA, namely; the Northern Ireland Assembly (within Northern Ireland), North-South ministerial Council

(between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) and a British-Irish Council (between the Republic of Ireland and Britain) offered a comprehensive political approach that included the concept of self-determination, power-sharing and other constitutional amendments. These institutions successfully addressed unionists, nationalists and republicans' demands (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015).

8.4. The Official Negotiations in Turkey's Kurdish Peace Process

The official negotiations in Turkey's Kurdish peace process have witnessed two-party and multilateral negotiations, political reforms and mediation efforts, which revealed some breaking points, spoilers and changes in the disputing parties' attitudes. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, even though the EU accession criteria provided help for constitutional amendments regarding human rights, civil-military relationship and democratisation, they were subsidiary steps towards peace. Rather, the major events were the bilateral and multilateral initiatives. This section will firstly analyse the influence of bilateral talks through the Democratic Opening Project, the İmralı talks and the Dolmabahçe Declaration. Then, it will assess the impact of the multilateral efforts through the Resolution Commission and Oslo talks.

8.4.1. Bilateral Talks

The official talks in Turkey began after a democratic initiative was announced by the Turkish government. The Democratic Opening Project of 2009 was a critical point for resolution, which was initiated at a meeting in Büyükdada, İstanbul and led by Kezban Hatemi, an attorney who had joined many humanitarian initiatives in different countries. This initiative brought different ethnic and religious leaders, and the Turkish government together. It was a declaration which initiated a democratic project related to all ethnic and religious identities in Turkey. As Hatemi (2015) noted, the project contained non-Muslim citizens' rights, the right of property,

freedom of religion and conscience, and ethnic identity rights. Hence, it was a comprehensive effort to achieve political reforms for not only ethnic identities but also different religious sects. There was also a specific reference to the Kurdish question, which as Hatemi argues, 'let's begin the democratisation project from İmralı'⁷² (Hatemi, Interview, 07/09/2015).

However, the Project was not put into action immediately since it was declared that the content needed to be decided upon through a consensus of all political parties in the TBMM. Although the AKP administration had meetings with all political parties in the TBMM, the opposition parties' unwillingness to attend peace initiatives led the AKP government to conduct law amendments by cooperation with only the pro-Kurdish DTP and its successors BDP and HDP.⁷³ After the discussions between the parties, PM Erdoğan announced the democratisation package which contained reforms related to the Kurdish issue (NTV, 2013). The package was passed into law in the TBMM in March 2014 and introduced rights, including the right to political campaigning in languages other than Turkish, a co-leadership system of political parties, and punishment for the hate and discrimination of different languages, religions, nationalities and races (TBMM, 2014a).

The Project was one of the major steps of the peace process since it emphasised the rights of Kurdish people. The changes in legislation were even acknowledged by pro-Kurdish figures such as Celalettin Can, who noted that the government brought more democratic rights than all of the

⁷² Turkey's Kurdish conflict witnesses many issues related to rhetoric. When the peace process is conducted, the term 'the PKK's headquarter' is replaced with 'Qandil' (where their camps are located) and 'Öcalan' (the leader of the PKK) is replaced with 'İmralı' (where Öcalan is imprisoned). The analysis of these metaphors is not the topic of the research. Having said that, it is crucial to consider that the use of Qandil and İmralı by political actors is a sign of creating space for non-violent resolution efforts.

⁷³ As discussed in Section 5.3.2, three pro-Kurdish political parties witnessed political resolution efforts. The Constitutional Court closed the DTP in December 2009. The BDP was the successor of the DTP which was dissolved to join the HDP on April 22, 2014. The latest and current pro-Kurdish party is the HDP (Celep, 2014).

previous governments in the history of Turkey (Can, Interview, 25/06/2015). Similarly, Mehmet Uçum (2015), an AKP deputy, stated that the implementation of the reforms, for instance reinstating ancient Kurdish names of the villages, permission to make political speeches in Kurdish, a Kurdish television channel, Kurdish education in private schools, and the opening of Kurdish institutions, all created a peaceful environment in society (Uçum, Interview, 02/07/2015). The significance of the reforms was to mitigate one of the underlying reasons of the Kurdish question which was to end assimilation and the denial of Kurdish ethnicity. In addition, it was stated that one of the major advantages of the democratisation project was to demonstrate to society that a political resolution without violence was possible (Arıboğan, Interview, 08/09/2015). The Turkish government's recognition of Kurdish ethnicity transformed one of the root causes of the conflict. This was an issue transformation from rejecting the Kurdish conflict's existence to make political reforms in order to eliminate ethnic discrimination. Such a position change is crucial for resolving an ethno-nationalist conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). This change led to the reframing of issues. As noted by Starkey et al. (2005), recognition of Kurdish ethnicity helps to re-examine other issues related to ethnicity and to institutionalise resolution efforts. However, even though there was an issue transformation, the democratic opening project was not adequate to resolve the conflict, due to the existence of ethnic references in the constitution. As Aydınli and Özcan (2011) put it, the lack of proper preparation before launching the project resulted in the PKK dominating the peace process, as the government did not plan to marginalise radical elements of the PKK which defend the armed struggle. Therefore, the negotiations were mostly conducted between the government and Öcalan.

In order to institutionalise the peace process, the AKP government's democratic opening project established the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (*Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı*, henceforth: KDGM). According to the law passed in June 2014, the KDGM was declared as the official association for conducting the peace process (TBMM, 2014b).

The KDGM took responsibility of the official resolution attempts. One of the senior officers of the KDGM stated that the democratic opening was a declaration in which the Turkish government declared the existence of the problem and committed to solving this conflict (Senior Officer of the KDGM, Interview, 01/07/2015).⁷⁴ As Babbitt and Hampson (2011) underline, reciprocity between conflicting parties can change the nature of the conflict by putting agreed points into action. The KDGM played a role in official negotiations on behalf of the government by negotiating the conditions of the peace with Öcalan on İmralı Island, which became known as the İmralı talks (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015).

The İmralı talks were the second bilateral initiative between 2013 and 2015 which was carried out between the Turkish government on the one hand, and the PKK's jailed leader Öcalan and BDP (later on the HDP) on the other. Unlike the secret talks between the MIT and Öcalan in the mid-2000s, these talks were official and publicly known, but the content of the talks remained untold. Before exploring the untold negotiations during the İmralı talks, it is important to understand the components of these talks. Similar to the Northern Irish peace process, the bilateral talks came into effect between the government and the pro-Kurdish BDP. However, the BDP did not play a major role in the negotiations. Instead, it played a communicator or messenger role between the government and Öcalan. It was publicly known that negotiations between the government and BDP followed a framework suggested by Öcalan, as revealed by Sırrı Süreyya Önder during the İmralı Committee's⁷⁵ meeting in the İmralı Prison. Önder said to Öcalan: 'you will decide the condition and future of the peace process' (Öcalan, 2015, p.26). Similarly, another member of the İmralı Committee and the HDP deputy, İdris Baluken (2015) asserted that the transformation of the government's standpoint from destroying the PKK

⁷⁴ The interviewee did not want the researcher to use his name.

⁷⁵ The İmralı Committee was a group of the pro-Kurdish BDP (later on the HDP) who met with Öcalan in the İmralı prison and which consisted of three BDP deputies: Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Pervin Buldan and Altan Tan. In 2014, Tan was replaced by İdris Baluken.

and its leader, to organising official negotiations with him illustrates the importance of Öcalan as the major actor. Therefore, the first thing to understand about the nature of the talks is Öcalan as the leading actor and decision maker on behalf of the Kurdish community, not the pro-Kurdish party (Baluken, Interview, 01/09/2015). Secondly, although one of the main actors was Öcalan, the government wanted to move the talks into the political environment. Therefore, the government needed the BDP at the negotiating table. This was admitted by the chief advisor to the PM on the peace process, Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, that 'the only way for resolution is to bring the peace efforts into the political framework' (Ensaroğlu, Interview, 02/07/2015).

The framework of the talks was very comprehensive. Firstly, it was an opportunity to understand the desire of the two sides, their resolution offers and the reciprocal bargaining between the two sides. As Baluken states, the government realised that Öcalan's recommendations for a resolution were moderate and acceptable during the talks (Baluken, Interview, 01/09/2015). This was publicly confirmed by Beşir Atalay, Minister of the Interior, as he noted 'they [the PKK and Öcalan] are more moderate and consistent than the HDP' (T24, 2013). Further, Baluken referred to the change in the position of the government following Öcalan's claims. According to Baluken (2015), Öcalan's recommendation addressed democratic reforms, including constitutional changes in Kurdish rights and equal citizenship, which would be guaranteed in the constitution. It is also noted that Öcalan's recommendations during the İmralı meetings, such as democratic autonomy for not only the south-east of Turkey but the whole country, was a chance for a non-violent resolution, which nevertheless remained a missed opportunity (Tan, Interview, 24/06/2015). The significant point was that even though the official negotiations were carried out in only the short-term, it helped to change the position of the government. As Ramsbotham et al. (2011, p.176) identify, position changes in an ethno-nationalist conflict are closely related to interest and goal changes. Turkey's Kurdish question has also witnessed changes in interest, including allowing the leader of the PKK to implicitly act as the chief

negotiator. This was not official since he was the imprisoned leader of a terrorist group.

Secondly, according to the İmralı Committee, there was an agreement between the government and Öcalan. Baluken reveals the insight of this agreement:

Before the 2013 Nevruz letter from Öcalan, the government and Öcalan agreed on a three-stage plan. The first stage was to withdraw the PKK to create a suitable environment for peace negotiations. After Öcalan's call, the KCK firstly declared a unilateral ceasefire and then the PKK began to withdraw on May 8. The second step was the government's duties. According to the commitment, the Turkish government should have legislated a rule of law related to withdrawal, amendments in democratic rights of Kurdish people, to clear the way and to establish a mechanism which would administer the process in relation to the democratisation process of Turkey. The third step was disarmament. Even though the PKK began to withdraw, the government did not change any regulations, which were the causes of inequality between different ethnic identities of Turkey (Baluken, Interview, 01/09/2015).

The agreement was a milestone for the process. The first step of the agreement came into effect through Öcalan's Nevruz letter, which was read in Diyarbakır during the Nevruz celebrations and was a call for the PKK's withdrawal (Hürriyet, 2013b). Öcalan stated:

We are entering the new process in the Turkish Republic on the basis of free and equal constitutional citizenship as a democratic society with democratic identity in the peace and live fraternal. In this way, to get over the ninety years of the Republic's history which is full of conflicts, we are walking into the future with knitted real peace and universal democratic criteria (Öcalan, 2013).

Murat Karayılan, one of the leading members of the PKK, respected Öcalan's call and announced that the PKK would withdraw all of its forces from Turkey as of May 8 as a part of the peace agreement (NYT, 2013). Nevertheless, the group halted withdrawal from Turkey in September 2013, being announced by Cemil Bayık, one of the five founders and among the top leadership of the PKK (BBC, 2013). So, why did one of the biggest steps of the peace process fail? From the government's perspective, the PKK should have completed withdrawal prior to political reforms (Ete, Interview, 03/07/2015). Likewise, a senior officer of the KDGM (2015) said

that the withdrawal was the first step in the negotiations. It was reported that only 600 PKK members left Turkey as of September 2013 (Radikal, 2013). From the pro-Kurdish perspective, Baluken (2015) asserts that even though the government had guaranteed to legislate the withdrawal process during the İmralı talks, it was not passed into law. If it had been legislated by 'clearing the way', it is less likely that the PKK's withdrawal would have been interrupted, and for preventing to capture the PKK members during the withdrawal process (Baluken, Interview, 01/09/2015). The term 'clearing the way' was about freedom of thought, association, and media, to eliminate all barriers standing in the way of democratisation and to legislate regulations related to local administrations (Baluken, Interview, 01/09/2015). As the government did not bring it to the TBMM, the process suffered and an environment 'full of mistrust' emerged (Tan, Interview, 24/06/2015). However, as Karayılan (2014, p.402) admitted, the PKK had problems with its members, as they did not obey the PKK's rules regarding the withdrawal. Therefore, any type of transformation could not be achieved due to the lack of trust between the two sides. Although there was an agreement between them, sustainability of the process could not be maintained unlike the Northern Irish peace process, as both the government and pro-Kurdish movement believed that the other side would not fulfil their promises. As mentioned before, this was firstly because the government's political reforms were not respected by the pro-Kurdish side during the İmralı talks. Similarly, Uçum (2015) states that although the government accomplished several regulations, the PKK was the spoiler of this initiative since it did not withdraw from Turkey, did not lay down its arms, and did not keep its promise of maintaining non-violent resolution attempts. As Özhan (2015) notes, the unsuccessful peace attempt is also related to the PKK's reluctance to both withdraw from Turkey and disarm. Besides, both sides blamed each other for the order of their responsibilities, which further did not help the process. In this context, an independent third party could have been useful in mediating these talks by organising interpersonal and intergroup relations between them, if not transforming people's rejections which hindered the progress (Wall, 1993).

Nevertheless, it was impossible since both sides did not trust in any mediators during official negotiations.

The last two-party initiative was the Dolmabahçe Declaration of 2015. It was the first and only official agreement declared in public between the Turkish government and HDP. During the Declaration, two papers were read by the two sides (Al Jazeera, 2015). Öcalan's statement, which addressed the definition of national and local dimensions of a democratic solution, socio-economic dimensions, the relationship between state and society, and legal and democratic warranties of free citizenship, was accepted by the government (Daily Sabah, 2015; HDN, 2015b). After reading the Declaration on behalf of Öcalan and the HDP, Önder said 'we are closer than ever to achieving peace in Turkey' (FT, 2015). Nevertheless, the Declaration did not help make progress due to the issues on implications, structure and content of the agreement.

Figen Yüksekdağ (2015), the co-leader of the HDP, notes that the Dolmabahçe Declaration was a commitment between the Turkish government and HDP, but the Turkish government did not implement its instructions. The negotiations on the implementation of the Declaration should have been conducted by mixed commissions consisting of the Turkish government, state bureaucracy's central associations, Kurdish party and non-Kurdish democratic society representatives (Yüksekdağ, Interview, 13/07/2015). Moreover, Hatem Ete (2015), the chief advisor to the PM, claims that the Dolmabahçe Declaration was 'a premature declaration' which did not have a strong structure or background. He also blamed the PKK:

As long as the PKK dominates the south-east of Turkey, there was no point of declaring a statement. Therefore, it was an early and not very-well planned initiative. During that time, the PKK had not withdrawn from Turkey. Hence, there was no point in declaring a statement on this occasion. Therefore, the government did not apply this declaration. Furthermore, the government blamed the HDP for using this situation as a justification of defending armed struggle. However, even if the declaration was not applied, there is no excuse for using arms or killing people (Ete, Interview, 03/07/2015).

As a result, although this track-one effort resulted in a declaration, this declaration could not contribute to the peace process, as its conditions were not applied. The reason for the lack of progress was the disagreement between the disputing parties. Çandar (2015) asserts that the Dolmabahçe Declaration failed due to the Turkish government's unwillingness to take responsibility for the Declaration. After President Erdoğan's⁷⁶ speech on disagreement with the Declaration, the Turkish government did not take a step forward, so it became void (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015). Therefore, it can be said that the government's reluctance to maintain the negotiations was one of the major reasons for the failure of this initiative.

The Declaration was also criticised in terms of the structure and content of the agreement and this was another reason for its failure. For example, Kemal Burkay (2015), honorary leader of pro-Kurdish Rights and Freedoms Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*, henceforth: Hak-Par) underlines that ten articles of the Dolmabahçe Declaration were not related to Kurdish rights. It included women's, environmental and ecological rights, but there was nothing related to Kurdish rights. Burkay also criticised the PKK of minimising its ultimate goal from establishing an independent Kurdish state to a democratic autonomy, which was called 'being from Turkey' (*Türkiyelilik*) (Burkay, Interview, 02/07/2015). Similar to Burkay, Vahap Coşkun (2015), a member of the WPC, argues that Öcalan's ten-point declaration could have been a party's election programme, which could be applied in the long-term. Nevertheless, it did not offer anything to the peace process. Therefore, it could not be accepted as a framework or roadmap for resolution because some recommendations of the Declaration did not address Kurdish questions. It is important not to equate both sides' announcements of their demands with the resolution of each problem in Turkey. A more concrete framework should have been determined (Coşkun, Interview, 04/09/2015). Overall, the interview data revealed that the Declaration between the disputing sides did not result in a successful

⁷⁶ Tayyip Erdoğan was prime minister between 2003 and 2014. He became president on August 28, 2014.

outcome due to the content and structure of the Declaration, and the reluctance of both parties to take any steps forward since the direction of the process was not moving as they demanded. The outcome of this initiative reveals one of the critical issues in the negotiation stage, that if conflict pays, disputing parties are not willing to negotiate (Zartman, 1989). This problem was intense during the talks which led to the Declaration because of the conflict of interest instead of a win-win approach.

8.4.2. Multilateral Efforts

There are two major multilateral initiatives in Turkey's Kurdish peace process. While the Resolution Commission was the TBMM's initiative, the Oslo talks were carried out together with international mediators. The Resolution Commission of 2013 was the result of the pro-Kurdish BDP's insistence on formalising the process. As a result, a commission was founded to decide the future of the peace process and all constitutional parties were invited to join the Commission. Nevertheless, the CHP and MHP refused to attend the talks. This affected the official resolution efforts' inclusiveness since it prevented a greater majority of people being represented. This was attested to by Ete, saying that the TBMM would have made progress in a shorter time if the CHP and MHP had joined the peace efforts (Ete, Interview, 03/07/2015). As a result, the Commission remained an AKP-BDP initiative, but it was supported by other political parties who were not in the Parliament and other peace institutions. An interview with a member of the Commission, İmran Demir, helps to understand the role of the Commission in the peace process. Demir (2015) states that the Resolution Commission was important to legitimise the peace process, helping to transform the peace efforts from the unofficial to the political arena. Indeed, it was a facilitating event for the BDP because the party insisted on maintaining peace efforts in the TBMM rather than by the MIT or individual political actors. By insisting on taking the TBMM as the headquarters of the peace process, the BDP aimed to reach binding decisions for the Turkish government (Demir, Interview, 15/09/2015). He reveals the approach of the BDP during the meetings:

How are you going to make sure that the political authority will fulfil its promises? The only way to make them to fulfil their promises is to put them under an obligation. The only obligation at that point was to make it as public as possible and to make it as a process that belongs to the Parliament because the Parliament was the voice of the people. I think that was the major concern (Demir, Interview, 15/09/2015).

During the negotiations, another deadlock occurred when the BDP insisted on all its claims being included in the report. According to Demir (2015), they would be able to use the argument that their demands were recognised by the government thanks to the published report. However, the government refused this, as the demands were unacceptable to them. For example, one of the major demands of the BDP (later the HDP) was to stop establishing fortified gendarmerie stations (Turkish: *kalekol*) in Turkey's south-east that was refused by the AKP government (Demir, Interview, 15/09/2015). Yüksekdağ (2015) confirms Demir's statement by highlighting that if the problem is discussed in the TBMM, it becomes a national problem. The pro-Kurdish parties, therefore, insist on bringing the issue to the agenda of the Parliament. Therefore, it can be the public's problem instead of only the AKP or pro-Kurdish parties' concern (Yüksekdağ, Interview, 13/07/2015). It can be said that there were two dilemmas: security and political implementations, and negotiating in private and public. Although the intention of both sides was to maintain negotiations, the lack of trust in each other resulted in the PKK's insistence on not giving up weapons, and the government's concerns about the security of the civilians and security personnel. The dilemma concerning negotiating in private or public centres on both the trust and gain issues, since the pro-Kurdish movement believed that they might achieve their otherwise unattainable demands in public. On the AKP government's side, the concern was the pro-Kurdish movement's demand to put pressure on the government that might affect the future of the conflict. It was clear that the different demands from both sides had resulted in the collapse of the peace process long before violence returned (Kadioğlu, 2016). The Commission also had meetings with academics to learn their view on a peaceful resolution. For example, Alpaslan Özerdem's suggestion for a

positive peace to strengthen peace negotiations with the grassroots initiatives through the cooperation between the state, private sector and civil society, and Jenny Pearce's information on the peace process between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), helped the Committee to draw a road map for the Parliament (TBMM, 2013c).

In terms of the negotiation outcomes, the Commission brought more confusion than progress. Tan states that the Resolution Commission worked only as 'a distraction commission'. It did not recommend anything related to the future of the peace process. It only maintained the current situation, without presenting possible solutions (Tan, Interview, 24/06/2015). However, the Commission's report produced some important points related to the peace process, including the new constitution, education in the mother tongue, strengthening local administrations and other political reforms related to amnesty, migration and counter-terrorism (TBMM, 2013b). The report was not sufficient according to the BDP, so the party prepared an alternative report which contained their demands for the resolution of the conflict. In their report, they declared the PKK's campaign to be the last Kurdish rebellion, and a legitimate action to protect Kurdish people (BDP, 2013).⁷⁷ It was also admitted that it was a symbolic initiative as the peace process was led by the MIT not the TBMM. In sum, it was a great chance to transform the issues which were the major reasons of the conflict. However, the identification of different aspects of the conflict did not result in the transformation of these issues.

The other peace initiative was the Oslo talks, which were a milestone in the peace process, as described in Section 6.3.2. Since the talks were carried out secretly, the role of these talks in ending violence and reaching a political settlement were analysed in regard to secret negotiations.

⁷⁷ Although the BDP's report was also presented in the Commission, it was not an official report and was prepared by the BDP only. The report was not published and so was taken from the General Secretary of the BDP.

However, the Oslo talks are also crucial to assess in terms of their multilateral structure and mediation efforts. The latter is important to analyse in order to understand whether they helped to change the nature of the conflict or facilitate the progress. The Oslo talks are examined under official initiatives, as these talks were mediated by an international and independent third party and led by the government and pro-Kurdish movement. As the outcome of these talks led to the conflict resolution process, it is one of the major aspects of official negotiations (Ural, 2014). As Bercovitch (1986, pp.9-10) points out, a mediation initiative is also possible by helping conflicting parties by bringing them together, gaining trust and cooperation, and setting out the route of peace talks, which is a fundamental stage of a peace process. The Oslo talks together with the involvement of a third party illustrate an important stage in the peace process.

The nature of the Oslo talks was different to previous peace efforts since the Turkish government and PKK were brought together by a third party in a place which was chosen by the British intelligence agency MI6. In this sense, the structure of these talks, the context of the discussions and role of the mediators in relation to the unsuccessful outcome need to be assessed. First of all, the talks were carried out between the head of the MIT, Emre Taner (later replaced by Hakan Fidan), and deputy head of the MIT, Afet Güneş, and the top leadership of the PKK; Sabri Ok, Mustafa Karasu, Adem Uzun and Zübeyir Aydar, and third parties (Başaran, 2016; Taraf, 2011). In relation to third parties, while British intelligence was the mediator of the talks, the Norwegian and Swedish governments attended the talks as facilitators. Although the Turkish officials did not declare the mediators' nationality, Karayılan admitted, during his interview with Avni Özgürel, a Turkish journalist, that the mediator of the talks was British intelligence (Karayılan, 2012, cited in Özgürel, 2012). Taner later on accepted MI6's mediation during the Oslo talks (Taner, 2016, cited in DHA, 2016). In terms of the time-frame of the talks, even though it was announced that the talks were maintained for two-and-a-half years (between 2009 and 2011), Mahçupyan states that the talks were carried

out between 2006 and 2011 in different locations in Europe (Mahçupyan, Interview, 22/06/2015). This reveals the fact that the talks were achieved during one of the most intense periods of the conflict.⁷⁸ Considering both parties' will to maintain the peace negotiations when there was violence, it can be said that they contributed to the sustainability of the conflict resolution process.

Furthermore, in terms of the role of the mediators, British intelligence brought the conflicting sides together, which is the first step of a mediation attempt. As Koch (1974, p.28) identifies, a mediation initiative begins with a third party's intervention by inviting disputants to peace talks. This can be achieved only by bringing these parties together and facilitating their negotiations, or by intervening intractable aspects of a conflict and aims to transform these aspects. The leaked meeting records reveal the mediator's effort to bring the two sides together. The mediator said:

We made a suggestion to both sides; there might be some kind of mini package which was surrounded based on Nevruz. The idea of being this might be a first step to establish the confidence in both sides. I wanted to emphasise that it was our idea. We were not asked by the Kurdish side to propose it and we were not asked by the Turkish side to propose it. So, it was an initiative which was taken on our responsibility, not on the responsibility of either side (Özgür Haber, 2012).

The British mediator's statement demonstrated that the influence of the mediator as a social approach made it possible to internationalise the resolution of this conflict. Furthermore, the British mediators also helped to identify the problem and to compose requirements of negotiation. Nevertheless, the secrecy of the talks prevented to analyse expectations and objectives of the mediators in detail. The leaked meeting records demonstrate that it was British intelligence's intention to initiate a series of talk between the Turkish government and PKK. Whilst the reason for British intelligence to build this communication channel is not clear due to

⁷⁸ People who lost their lives due to the Kurdish conflict are 1,054 between 2006 and 2011 (21YYTE, 2013; Milliyet, 2012; TBMM, 2013a). This number includes security members and civilians, but does not include members of the PKK.

insufficient primary sources, there are some important details negotiated in the secret negotiations which were revealed by a news agency. During the talks, the mediator states that the recommendations of Öcalan need to be considered when political reforms are being held in the Parliament (Taraf, 2011). Hence, the mediators facilitated to reach a solution which is acceptable to both sides and so a win-win solution. However, this facilitating role did not move forward in regard to transforming the disputing parties' views by focusing on making decisions during the talks. Instead, in parallel with Bercovitch's (1991) assumption, the British mediators focused on settling a perspective with no force or arbitral rules, which restricted the benefit of the mediators.

Finally, it was clear that the talks were about gaining more of their demands and moving the outcome of these talks forward to political reforms. Due to the lack of trust between the government and PKK, the mediators were the integrative part of the peace process, but not the primary component. British intelligence helped to overcome the concerns of trust and win-lose issues, which made it possible to sit at the negotiating table and discuss their major claims. As Babbitt and Hampson (2011, p.52) describe, it is important to overcome these concerns regarding relationship-based issues between warring sides. It is also clear that if one of the conflicting parties is a sub-state armed group, to sit at the negotiating table is always very difficult for a state. This difficulty was overcome thanks to the British mediation. However, as Coşkun (2015) underlines, this mediation was only about to understand what they expected from these negotiations. Nevertheless, the mediator did not play a role in bringing suggestions, presenting different alternatives for a solution and intervening talks (Coşkun, Interview, 04/09/2015). As a result, the mediation did not put pressure on the conflicting parties for a deadline or discussions of specific issues that could help to overcome related issues.

8.5. Comparison: A Road to Peace?

The Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes have been assessed through different efforts in relation to bilateral and multilateral initiatives. These initiatives illustrate different incentives and barriers which affected the transformation of the underlying reasons of these conflicts (Table 8.3).

Conflict	Northern Ireland			Turkey		
	Initiatives	Incentives	Drawbacks	Initiatives	Incentives	Drawbacks
Transformers						
Issue	<i>Reforms Anglo-Irish efforts</i>	Recognise two traditions	Unionists' opposition On-going violence	<i>Reforms Democratic Opening</i>	Recognise ethnic difference	Nationalists' opposition On-going violence
Actor	<i>Hume-Adams Talks</i>	Ripeness Hurting stalemate	-	<i>Imrali Talks</i>	Reciprocal bargaining	Lack of trust
Structural	<i>Change in the Nature Adams's visa</i>	US administration	British government	<i>Change in the Nature Dolmabahce Declaration</i>	Legitimacy	Timing Spoilers
	<i>Third Party Intervention All-Party talks</i>	Strong mediation	Spoilers	<i>Third Party Intervention Oslo talks</i>	Weak mediation	Spoilers
Personal and Group	<i>Changes in Adams's perception</i>	Drop precondition of disarming	-	<i>Changes in Ocalan's perception</i>	From partition to integration	The PKK

Table 8.3: Overview of the Influence of Official Negotiations on Northern Ireland and Turkey

Firstly, both peace processes witnessed political changes to resolve issues in order to overcome the underlying reasons of these conflicts. While political reforms in the UK were applied together with the negotiations and agreements between the British and Irish governments in the 1980s and early 1990s, the reforms were a result of the negotiations between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement. The key issues addressed in the AIA and DSD were the recognition of both identities, a bill of rights, intergovernmental cooperation, reform of the policing system and

abandonment of violence in Northern Ireland (Wolff, 2002). The political reforms in Turkey addressed similar issues, such as a change in the policing law, bill of rights, recognition of ethnic identities and their rights (Ensaroğlu, 2013). Both cases illustrate a transformation in the issues related to ethno-nationalist identities and recognition of their rights. Although these issue transformations were not sufficient for resolution, they were fundamental pieces of both peace processes. Nevertheless, both initiatives were faced with a reaction from the unionist parties in Northern Ireland and from the nationalist party in Turkey (Table 8.3). However, the interruption of the peace processes was not because of the outcry, but due to on-going violence deployed by the IRA and PKK. In addition, the efforts in the UK also provided a long-term benefit. The benefit of the AIA in the long-term, in Thatcher's words was that 'the international dimension [of Northern Ireland] became noticeably easier to deal with' (Thatcher, 1993, pp.406-407). In brief, both cases saw similar efforts and experiences which helped to maintain non-violent, political resolution efforts.

Secondly, the two-party talks in Turkey were conducted by the same parties, which resulted in the transformation of the actors. The İmralı talks between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish HDP caused a split within the pro-Kurdish side. While all pro-Kurdish actors appeared to be on the same side at the beginning of the talks, the negotiations emerged a difference of opinion which created more veto-players. The difference was particularly evident between the HDP and PKK. As Cunningham (2006) states, more veto-players involved in a process make conflicts more difficult to solve through negotiations. The split within the pro-Kurdish side resulted in the emergence of three veto-players: the HDP, Öcalan and the PKK. The different claims of these actors were revealed through the Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay's statement during the negotiations: 'They [the PKK and Öcalan] are more moderate and consistent than the HDP' (Atalay, 2013, cited in T24, 2013). In other words, when the HDP made a statement, the PKK warned them to change their statement which caused an inconsistency in the negotiation process (Oğur, Interview, 25/06/2015). This also created a lack of trust between conflicting parties during

reciprocal bargaining concerning the disagreement on whether the withdrawal or political reforms would come first. Hence, it became more difficult to solve the Kurdish problem due to more veto-players. In contrast to Turkey's Kurdish question, the Northern Irish peace process was not conducted only by the main armed protagonists but also through other bilateral talks. For example, the Hume-Adams talks allowed SF to join peace negotiations. As described in Section 8.3, it facilitated the end of the republican strategy of ballot in one hand and bullet in the other. Together with the great effort by Hume, both the British government and IRA began to think that they could not destroy each other (Gibney, Interview, 20/01/2015). It was a ripe moment for joining peace negotiations and resulted in the transformation of the goals of the republicans.

Thirdly, the US administration's visa to Gerry Adams resulted in the US's participation in official negotiations. As Lynch (2003, p.43) argues, 'the Northern Ireland conflict could more accurately be called a peace process when Clinton became involved.' Similarly, the Dolmabahçe Declaration changed the nature of the Turkish peace process. The Turkish government and HDP presented a political framework for peace, which was the first official declaration between them. The timing of the initiative was demonstrated as the reason of its failure. Ete (2015) names the Declaration 'a premature declaration' by emphasising that it was an earlier initiative than it had to be. Further, President Erdoğan denounced the Declaration by stating: 'I, by no means, accept the expression of Dolmabahçe Agreement' which thus caused the AKP to renounce the Declaration (Erdoğan, 2015, quoted in Daily Sabah, 2015). This situation created two drawbacks in the peace process: the first one was the reluctance of the government to maintain the process that affected the sustainability of resolution efforts. The other drawback was the trust issue, which re-emerged during the İmralı talks (Table 8.3). Coşkun (2015, p.49) describes the consequence of the initiative as 'disappointed Kurds for whom the peace process means a lot'.

In relation to third party intervention, whilst George Mitchell's mediation included all conflicting parties in the negotiations, the British mediation did not bring all Turkish parties together, since the negotiations were conducted secretly. During the negotiations in Northern Ireland, even though the DUP and UKUP walked out, it did not interrupt the process or inclusiveness of the process, as the unionist community was represented by the UUP. In contrast, negotiations and mediations did not include the opponent parties in the Kurdish peace process. This was not because of the government's attitude, but mostly due to the opposition and an outraged reaction in the CHP and MHP. This was attested to by the British mediators during the Oslo talks: 'If the CHP and MHP learn these negotiations, how do they react? If they knew about these negotiations, it would have been a great difficulty to maintain these talks' (Taraf, 2011). Furthermore, the role of the mediators was crucial in both peace processes. Echoing Touval and Zartman (1985), and Fisher and Keashly (1991), mediators 'with muscle' are more likely to make a contribution towards ending a conflict by offering deadlines, penalties, focusing on a mutual agreement and leading negotiations than mediators 'with less muscle' as they are unable to control the process or offer deadlines. On the one hand, Mitchell did not concentrate on creating a coalition to establish credibility to push for a deadline (Mitchell, 1999; Powell, 2008). Instead, he focused on incorporating major parties into negotiations, which represented the majority in the Northern Irish conflict. During the negotiations for the GFA, he aimed to stick with the principles and this focus resulted in a successful agreement (Mitchell, 1999). On the other hand, the British mediators in the Oslo talks did not offer a framework or define the structure of the route of the negotiations, which was, as Mithat Sancar, a deputy of the HDP, argues 'the major reason for the unsuccessful outcome' (Sancar, Interview, 08/07/2015). Hence, it can be said that while Mitchell's mediation was about structural prevention consisting of creating organisations and institutionalised rule of law to accommodate conflicting interests and to transform conflicts, British mediation was about facilitating meetings to enable conflicting parties to understand each other's positions and to create

an environment for a peaceful resolution (Beriker, 2009; Stern & Druckman, 2000). Overall, the structural transformation in the Northern Irish conflict was achieved by bringing SF in the process and through the direct involvement of the Clinton administration, which helped to reach the GFA. In contrast, the transformation of the relationship between the Turkish government and HDP was not very strong. Besides, this relationship did not provide an on-going, sustainable peace process in Turkey.

Fourthly, personal and group transformation is at the heart of a successful conflict resolution process. The two peace processes contained the same route from armed to political struggle through Adams and Öcalan's position changes. While the change in SF's perception helped to bring peace in the short-term, Öcalan's perception did not provide any help. Undoubtedly, the outcomes of their intentions were affected by other actors and issues. For example, the change in SF's perception was gradual through the Hume-Adams talks, the DSD and the Clinton administration's involvement. All these aspects helped to persuade SF to apply political resolution efforts. In contrast, the leader of the PKK's intention to end the war did not help to make a peace agreement due to the transformation of the actors on the pro-Kurdish side from Öcalan as the only decision maker to a trilateral structure consisting of the HDP, Öcalan and PKK.

Finally, the chapter has found that the concerns related to trust and gain issues between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish side did not help towards a successful result. It also appeared that the major concern of the two sides differed during the peace process: while the Turkish government re-determined its ultimate aim to be the disarmament of the PKK, the pro-Kurdish side described different goals ranging from federation, to integration with Turkey and democratic rights. In the end, the chapter has stated that more veto-players made the problem more complicated to resolve and thus caused the unsuccessful outcome in the Turkish case.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

'Terrorism cannot be overcome by the use of force because it does not address the complex underlying problems. In fact, the use of force may not only fail to solve the problems, it may exacerbate them and frequently leaves destruction and suffering in its wake' (Lama, 2002).

9.1. Introduction

This thesis has analysed the influence of the conflict resolution processes by focusing on non-violent, political peace efforts to bring the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts to an end. Even though both ethno-nationalist conflicts have similar characteristics, the Northern Irish conflict was brought to an end, but Turkey's Kurdish conflict has not. It has been argued that peacemaking efforts in Northern Ireland and Turkey have a broader scope than official negotiations. The conflict resolution processes in these two conflicts encouraged the conflicting sides to consider talks and to enter into a negotiation process at the pre-negotiation stage. The processes then intended to reach a peace agreement during the negotiation stage. This research has suggested that a peace agreement requires mediation by an independent third party between the British government and their adversaries, the IRA and their political wings in one case, and the Turkish government and their respective adversaries, the PKK in the other.

To explore the impact of political resolution efforts towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts, this research has argued that it is crucial to examine three major aspects; backchannel communications as the unofficial aspect, peace organisations as the informal and semi-official aspect, and official negotiations as the official aspect of conflict resolution processes (Table 3.2). There is a complementarity between the unofficial

(track 1.5), informal (track-two) and official (track-one) aspects that together constitute a conflict resolution process. Both peace processes began through backchannels rather than official negotiations. Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated that it is crucial to engage in pre-negotiation efforts as a component of a peace process. Besides, P/CROs have played a role in peacemaking efforts which have a direct link with the initiatives of political parties and actors. Lastly, negotiations should be considered as an on-going process instead of single disputes.

This chapter firstly outlines the outcomes from the two peace processes. It then assesses the contribution of this research and implications for theory and policy. Even though this study's contribution is postulated in both theory and practice, it has been achieved under some limitations which are discussed in the subsequent section. Finally, suggestions for future research are discussed.

9.2. The Outline of Outcomes

This research has revealed that peace efforts towards ending ethno-nationalist conflicts require a more comprehensive analysis beyond official negotiations. A tripartite analysis has therefore been constructed (backchannels, P/CROs and negotiations) within the wider theoretical framework on peacemaking and there has been a focus on an under-explored dynamic of peacemaking by investigating these three approaches as indispensable components of a conflict resolution process during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. These approaches have been led by representatives of the British and Turkish governments and leading members of the republican and pro-Kurdish movements respectively and assisted by national and international third parties. A recommendation is that peace efforts should be analysed before official negotiations as the process begins at the pre-negotiation stage through backchannels and P/CROs. This can provide a better understanding of the influence of non-violent, political resolution attempts. Therefore, it has resulted in an

analytical framework that can be applied to other similar ethno-nationalist conflicts.

By comparing a successful and an unsuccessful case, this thesis has embodied a more comprehensive approach than a single case analysis. Comparative analysis provides a better understanding of conflict resolution processes through a comparison of the transformation of issues responsible for the cause of conflicts. Significantly, the thesis has demonstrated that it is crucial to transform the root causes of these conflicts including personal-group relations, actors and issues related to the restrictions of the British and Turkish governments respectively (Chapter 8). It has also illustrated that P/CROs, and national and international third parties act as catalysts during the conflict resolution processes by bringing disputing parties together to discuss their demands, encouraging them to adopt a non-violent resolution to close gaps between each other (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Personal and collective efforts for ending violence or de-escalating conflict and the intervention of international mediators helped to bring about positive outcomes (Chapters 6 and 8). Although Turkey's Kurdish peace process has not reached an agreement, third parties did contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict.

9.3. Summary of Findings

The results from archival research material, semi-structured interviews, memoirs of major actors, government documents, newspaper articles and reports provided five main findings. For this analysis, short descriptions are provided first, which are followed by an explanation.

1. Indirect communications played an important role in de-escalating the violent conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey through intermediaries.

This significant finding relates to the establishment of communication channels, whether they were built by the personal initiatives of intermediaries or by the consent of the principal armed

protagonists. On the one hand, this research found that indirect communications in both conflicts between the main armed protagonists were successful when they were appointed by one of the conflicting parties. For example, Talabani successfully established dialogue between the Turkish government and PKK via the consent of President Özal and the PKK's leader Öcalan (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015). On the other hand, this research revealed that the intermediaries were unsuccessful in building the communication chain and passing on messages when initiating the chain was their personal intention or their mediation was rejected by one of the parties. Therefore, personal attempts were less successful than the collective efforts of representatives of the conflicting parties. Indeed, Hackett's efforts were not successful as his intermediary role was rejected by Whitelaw because he thought that Hackett's contact was seen as dangerous and damaging (TNA-CJ/4/319, 1973). Similarly, Haşimi's intermediary role was denied by PM Erbakan despite his direct communication with the PKK leadership. This was due to Erbakan's early initiative through another intermediary, İsmail Nacar, and the Turkish government's lack of trust in Haşimi (Section 6.4.1). Therefore, this study has revealed that the intermediaries, whose mediation was admitted by both disputing parties, played a role in bringing conflicting parties together, defining the agenda for discussions and establishing a ceasefire.

The analysis of the third parties in covert negotiations also revealed that the communication channels between warring parties remained in place longer if the intermediaries had personal contact with political elites and the opposition leadership. Both Duddy and Işık played a more extensive role than the mere exchange of messages as they helped to reduce violence and declare the respective ceasefires (Işık, Interview, 19/06/2015; NUI-POL/35/69, 1975). While Duddy contacted SF leader O'Bradaigh, Işık's personal contact with both the PKK's leader Öcalan and the Turkish government enabled him to easily overcome the trust issues which became evident during the longest PKK ceasefire in six years (Section 6.5). Chapter Six found that both intermediaries encouraged conflicting parties to carry out face-to-face negotiations. This was achieved several times during the

violent conflict due to the strength of the communication channels. The thesis also demonstrated that it was not always possible to maintain open communication channels since opposing parties were not always in favour of political resolution. This study provided evidence of this situation through the declassified secret Cabinet papers showing that indirect dialogue in the mid-1970s was used as an opportunity to weaken the IRA's armed campaign by the British government (Section 6.3.1).

II. The initial secret efforts had a similar influence on the two peace processes. However, the secret talks in Turkey were more successful in moving towards peace than in Northern Ireland. There was a negative correlation between the success of secret talks and the outcome of peace efforts.

Key direct talks during the first ten years of both conflicts demonstrated that the declaration of a ceasefire by both the IRA and PKK was respected by political elites (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.2). This produced a two-way opportunity: while political elites used the advantage of broadening the scope of discussions during the ceasefire terms, the sub-state armed groups achieved their aim of being recognised implicitly by both the British and Turkish governments as they were involved in face-to-face discussions. Since backchannels are pre-negotiation efforts, their success was evaluated through their outcomes. Even though both the IRA and PKK's ultimate aims to secure a binding agreement were unsuccessful, the secret discussions of political actors with the PKK aided the release of captured Turkish soldiers. Yet, the ceasefire in Northern Ireland only lasted two days after the 1972 Whitelaw talks (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.2). As backchannels are part of an on-going peace process, the lack of immediate success in moving towards official negotiations did not break the communication channels in both cases.

This research found that the differing outcomes of secret initiatives are critical as the Northern Irish conflict was brought to an end, but the Turkish conflict has not. Chapter Six highlighted that the mediation of third parties resulted in different outcomes in direct talks. It demonstrated that

similar peace efforts provided political elites and the leaderships of the sub-state armed groups the opportunity to discuss their major objectives. However, the lack of a concrete outcome to the Feakle talks other than a temporary ceasefire and a clear result from the Oslo talks in Turkey (a general agreement on the future of the conflict) meant the two processes diverged as a direct result of secret initiatives (Sections 6.3 and 6.4). As argued in Section 6.5, the position of the deputy head of MIT as the authority for making political decisions was the primary reason for the success of the Oslo talks. The analysis of the interview data and secret talks that were leaked to the media suggests that the authority of political elites to make agreements in secret talks provided concrete outcomes such as the Habur event and a deal on the commissions established by the Turkish Parliament (Sections 6.4.2 and 8.4.2). However, these outcomes did not lead to a successful conflict resolution process in Turkey because of the limited contribution of national and international third parties, and the failure of the negotiation stage.

This thesis suggests that the strength of the parties other than the main armed protagonists to maintain or hinder the peace processes is a significant aspect in determining the route of backchannels. When spoilers are dominant in a violent conflict, the strength of the communication chain might not necessarily facilitate a positive outcome (Section 3.3.3). The existing literature argues that there are no cost of entry into secret talks (Pruitt, 2005; Wanis-St John, 2004). Similar to this assumption, indirect dialogues through intermediaries were hard to discover due to the indirect nature of the communication chain in both conflicts (Sections 3.3.3, 6.2 and 6.5). However, Chapter Six demonstrated that spoilers affected peacemaking events negatively regarding the recognition of opponents as representatives of Kurdish community in Turkey and of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. For example, although covert negotiations were kept in the dark for a long time, they failed when spoilers (namely the opponent parties and TSK) discovered the secret talks between the Erbakan administration and the PKK (Section 6.5). The analysis of the backchannel initiatives also revealed that the secrecy of these talks created

mistrust in two ways: firstly, between disputing parties when it was used to gain time to destroy adversaries; secondly, in the wider social context of a backlash towards a perception of 'talking to terrorists' (Sections 6.2 and 6.5). For example, Duddy's secret papers demonstrated that the revelations of secret talks between the political elites and the republican movement undermined the credibility of the British government (Section 6.3.1). A similar reaction emerged when the Oslo talks were leaked to the press (Section 6.4.1). Furthermore, the secrecy of these discussions created mistrust especially for the sub-state armed groups and their political wings due to the credibility of these talks. Credibility was under question as it was not possible to implement topics discussed in backchannels. Fortunately, none of these situations prevented the maintenance of secret talks.

Overall, indirect communications were used as an initial dialogue step, eventually resulting in face-to-face meetings and bargaining over the demands of the conflicting parties. For example, Caldwell's initial contact with both sides resulted in direct communications firstly between Wilson and the republicans, and then Whitelaw and the leading members of the republican movement (TNA-CJ/4/1456, 1972; TNA-PREM/15/1009, 1972). These conflict resolution attempts evolved into official negotiation processes in both conflicts. The context of the discussions and their outcomes affected the role of backchannels over the formal negotiations. However, there was no correlation between the success of backchannels and the end of violence since conflict resolution as an on-going process must be supported by other actors and initiatives such as those of peace groups.

III. While the peace groups in Northern Ireland made a wider contribution, the influence of Turkish peace groups was limited in bringing the violence to an end and establishing political settlement.

This thesis revealed that the peace groups in both conflicts had a role in the conflict resolution processes, but their influence was different. Chapter Seven argued that peace groups in both conflicts contributed to the

peace processes through top-down and bottom-up initiatives. Regarding the bottom-up initiatives, the peace groups acted as a bridge between society and political elites by encouraging the latter to adopt society's demands for a resolution. Support at the societal level had different implications in each conflict. Chapter Five highlighted that Northern Ireland is a deeply-divided society which made it problematic in bringing the Catholic and Protestant communities together as many believed that the IRA was defending rights and legitimacy, while others relied on British security forces for the same reasons (Dixon, 2008; McGarry & O'Leary, 1995). In contrast, there is no sharp discrepancy regarding division between the Kurdish and Turkish communities in Turkey (Gunter, 1997; Kirişci & Winrow, 1997). The interview data illustrated that despite the high-intensity violence, the support of Kurdish community for the PKK's armed campaign was limited (Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2). Therefore, to create mutual understanding between the disputing communities was easier for the peace groups in Turkey than the Northern Irish groups. In addition, the analysis of the support for these groups within society illustrated that when public support for the peace groups is high, these groups deliver social demands to political elites more quickly. The comparison of both cases has provided the evidence for this: while the PP's events in Northern Ireland hosted several thousands of people from both sides of the conflict, the LPP's panels and other activities in Turkey witnessed less support and could not gain the support of all disputing communities (Sections 7.4 and 7.5).

The peace groups in Northern Ireland and Turkey helped to de-escalate the conflicts. As Cowling's letter to Mr Wilson (NIO Minister) revealed, the PP was influential in reducing the intensity of armed campaigns of the republicans, loyalists and British government through its well-supported marches (TNA-CJ/4/1549/2, 1977d). The BIA and WPC had relatively weaker influence on the societal level as their major focus was not to unify society. The analysis revealed that the closer the peace organisations were to communities in conflict, the more they were successful in facilitating the de-escalation of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey (Section 7.6). In addition, existing violence resulted in a

reluctance of warring parties to discuss a political settlement. Table 7.2 demonstrated that the P/CROs' protest campaigns, conferences and public talks which focused on the criticism of both conflicting sides' armed campaign made a clear contribution for making peace. Chapter Seven illustrated that the key point relating to the bottom-up initiatives of the peace groups was to defend community rights which resulted in the British and Turkish governments' support for these groups either publicly or implicitly at the elite level of conflict resolution. However, this support had limited effect in garnering public support for a political settlement in Turkey.

In terms of the top-down initiatives, the peace groups, which had direct contact with political elites and had support in public from the British and Turkish governments, contributed to political decisions and reforms more than those peace groups that were supported implicitly. For example, the analysis on the declassified archival material revealed that the BIA's semi-official structure played a role in re-establishing the Northern Irish government through local elections and a locally elected Assembly in the 1980s (TNA-CJ/4/4173, 1982c). The archival material suggested that the BIA's efforts were focused on transforming the anti-political reform views of political elites. Thus, it lobbied for peace during the conferences that hosted nationalist and unionist politicians (TNA-CJ/4/2580, 1979a; TNA-CJ/4/4169, 1981a). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, the influence of peace groups in establishing peace has been mostly overlooked in the existing literature. In contrast, this research highlighted that the P/CROs made these changes possible by bringing political elites together in an 'unofficial' environment. The lack of political pressure facilitated a discussion of both sides' claims in a peaceful environment in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the WPC's events and relationship with the Turkish government facilitated their initiatives to change regulations related to ethnic discrimination between Turkish and Kurdish identities in the constitution (Section 7.5.1). However, this influence was limited as the WPC was initiated by the Turkish government and so was restricted to peacemaking contributions. The analysis of relationships between peace groups and political elites

demonstrated that the closer the peace groups were to the decision-making mechanism, the more they could influence political actors to maintain the peace processes (Section 7.6). The proximity of these groups to political agents was a precondition for them to be effective in political reforms. However, this may not have provided an immediate influence unless the P/CROs had a continuous and long-standing relationship with decision makers which also had public support. Hence, this thesis revealed that despite the lack of political authority, the P/CROs in these conflicts put pressure on the governments to work towards eliminating ethnic and political discrimination. Although both the BIA and WPC were successful in promoting the resolution efforts at the elite level, the BIA's contribution is more extensive as it did not only facilitate the progress but also helped to improve the rule of law (TNA-CJ/4/1947, 1977). In contrast, Chapter Seven demonstrated that the British and Turkish governments implicitly supported the groups which emerged as a reaction to increasing violence (PP and LPP). This implicit support restricted these groups' success in contributing to peace efforts. Overall, the research found that the Northern Irish peace groups played a more comprehensive role than the Turkish peace groups, as the Northern Irish groups put pressure on the government for changing regulations on discrimination of Catholic groups and to work towards other political reforms such as the internment policy and policies relating to prisoners.

This study argued that the limited success of the peace organisations in Turkey was not due to the perception or pressure of the Turkish government, but as a result of these groups' objectives and actions. Even though peace groups in both conflicts contributed to the peace processes through the involvement and demands of wider society, their impact on the elite level to end the violent conflicts differs. Although the peace groups did not face high-intensity resistance, their activities could contribute to peace. Unlike the Turkish case, the peace groups in Northern Ireland were proactive even during the violent conflict, as they played a role in both de-escalating the conflict and applying political reforms to overcome the underlying reasons for the conflict. This thesis revealed that the P/CROs

could also be effective in facilitating peace when there is existing violence (Chapter 7). For example, it was impossible to conduct official negotiations during existing violence due to the objective of society and opposition parties. These organisations focused on closing the gap between the two communities through their popular public events and demonstrations and so became voice of society against any form of violence. Therefore, it is necessary to have more engagement between the decision-making mechanisms and those peace groups that have a potential influence on political elites.

IV. The official negotiations were criticised by opposition parties in both conflicts with regards to make an agreement with terrorist groups, but this criticism did not prevent the peace processes from moving forward. However, the greater number of veto players that emerge in the peace processes, the more complex the peace processes were to resolve.

Regarding the reaction of opposition parties, the Northern Irish and Kurdish peace processes were faced with different spoilers which aimed to destroy negotiations. Chapter Eight indicated that the unionist parties in Northern Ireland and the nationalist party in Turkey were against political resolution efforts (see Table 8.3). However, the criticism of these parties did not interrupt the peace processes. The peace conferences, for example, between the Northern Irish parties witnessed the DUP and UUP's anger about changes in legislation and this affected the outcome of these meetings (Section 5.2). As these conferences did not affect official negotiations, their influence remained limited. Instead, the interview data revealed that the interruption of the peace efforts was a result of on-going violence deployed by the IRA and PKK (Sections 8.3.2 and 8.4.2). In addition, the level of violence was influential over the transformation of political reform issues such as the recognition of ethnic identities, a bill of rights and reforms of the security system (Section 8.5). Both the British and Turkish governments made the interruption of the armed campaigns by the IRA and PKK a precondition for achieving political reforms. The interview data provided

evidence to state that the Turkish government claimed the PKK's unilateral ceasefire for carrying out changes in the constitution related to ethnic discrimination (Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2).

Regarding the veto players, it is expected that negotiations will take place between the same adversaries throughout the negotiation process (Powell, 2008). As highlighted in Section 3.3.3, non-violent resolution efforts need to include major stakeholders, but a possible split within conflicting parties may produce a more complicated negotiation environment. Chapter Eight revealed that Turkey's Kurdish peace process became more intractable when the pro-Kurdish movement's decision mechanism was split into three actors: the HDP, Qandil and Öcalan. While all pro-Kurdish actors appeared to be on the same side at the beginning of the talks, the negotiations eventually created a difference of opinion and thus more veto-players (Section 8.5). This thesis found evidence of disagreement particularly between the PKK and HDP through interviews and public statements. For example, when the HDP made a statement, the PKK warned them to change their statement which caused inconsistencies in the negotiation process (Sections 8.4.1 and 8.5). It resulted in a lack of trust between the government and pro-Kurdish actors during the İmralı talks from the 2010s to 2015. In contrast to the Turkish case, the primary stakeholders of the Northern Irish conflict played a facilitator role during the bilateral and multilateral negotiations (Section 8.3). For example, the Hume-Adams talks allowed SF to join peace negotiations. Chapter Eight suggested that together with the substantive efforts of Hume, both the British government and IRA began to realise their aims could not be achieved through armed struggle alone (Section 8.5). It was a 'ripe moment' for joining peace negotiations and resulted in the transformation of the republicans' goals. As the negotiations facilitated a political environment for the Northern Irish parties and British government to discuss their objectives, they facilitated the progress in contrast to the Turkish case. The involvement of more veto players in the Turkish case affected the progress, but the discussions between the same adversaries helped to make progress.

V. International mediators in the Northern Irish and Turkish cases played a significant role in facilitating the negotiation processes. However, their impact was different depends upon the framework of mediation.

This research has found that third parties had different impacts on the two peace processes and their role was dependent on the consent of conflicting parties and arrangements to determine the nature of negotiation processes (Chapters 3, 4 and Section 8.2). The consent of both conflicting parties was sufficient in containing specific mediators in efforts towards peace in both conflicts. This study revealed that the contribution of the mediators was determined through an extensive range of features from bringing conflicting parties together and setting the context of discussions to determining deadlines for an agreement (Sections 8.2 and 8.5). While Mitchell's mediation in Northern Ireland brought all Northern Irish parties together (apart from the DUP and UKUP), the British mediation in Turkey was between the government and the pro-Kurdish movement only. The analysis of the characteristics of mediators demonstrated that Mitchell had authority to define the agenda of peace talks due to the power of the US administration, whereas the British mediators in Turkey were not able to offer possible solutions for a political settlement or de-escalate the conflict (Mitchell, 1999; Özgür Haber, 2012; Powell, 2008). The form of the secret Oslo talks demonstrated that it was not possible to bring all conflicting parties together due to the secrecy of the meetings. The interview data and leaked meeting records illustrated that the objection of the opposition parties (the CHP and MHP) prevented their inclusion in the multilateral negotiations (Sections 6.2 and 8.4.2). During the multilateral negotiations in Northern Ireland, the absence of the DUP and UKUP did not interrupt the process as the UUP represented the unionist community.

The change in the standpoint of conflicting parties was another important factor which helped Mitchell during the negotiations, but which restricted the contribution of the British mediation. The change in SF's perception in the early 1990s facilitated a political agreement, yet the HDP's

insistence on not taking responsibility and addressing Öcalan and the PKK as decision maker did not help progress (Sections 8.3 and 8.4). More specifically, this study provides evidence that the transformation of the relationship between the Turkish government and HDP was weak. This was due to two reasons: firstly, the Turkish government was reluctant to strengthen the position of the HDP against the PKK by negotiating with them on behalf of ethnically Kurdish people. Secondly, unlike SF's position change, the HDP could not use the advantage of being in the Parliament and did not condemn the PKK's violent attacks. Hence, this relationship did not provide for an on-going, sustainable peace process in Turkey. Chapter Eight also found that certain other actors and issues influenced the relative perceptions of conflicting parties. For example, SF's standpoint gradually evolved throughout the Hume-Adams talks, the DSD and Clinton administration's involvement (Sections 8.3 and 8.5). All of these aspects helped to persuade SF to apply political resolution efforts. In contrast, the leader of the PKK's intention to end the war did not help to reach a peace agreement due to the transformation of the actors on the pro-Kurdish side from Öcalan only to a trilateral structure consisting of the HDP, PKK and Öcalan.

As a result, even though the structure of the bilateral talks in both conflicts provided an understanding of the major claims of the warring sides, minor reforms in the political structure aimed at building trust were necessary but not sufficient steps for an on-going peace process. The interview data showed that the issues, actors and structures that caused the violent conflict, were successfully transformed by incorporating the British and Irish governments and Northern Irish parties as this provided inclusiveness and strengthened the conflict resolution processes. As neither factor existed in Turkey's peace process, the negotiations were limited to the efforts of the Turkish government and its pro-Kurdish opponents.

9.4. Theory Implications

The findings of this thesis illustrate that the conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and Turkey have witnessed many political resolution attempts. Efforts by political elites to transform the underlying reasons for these conflicts created different responses from their adversaries, the opposing parties and wider Northern Irish and Turkish societies. This resulted in the failure of the Turkish case, but facilitated the GFA in Northern Ireland. To understand the conflict resolution approaches, this thesis suggested a tripartite framework: backchannel initiatives to examine unofficial efforts, peace organisations to assess informal and semi-official peace efforts, and official negotiations to analyse official resolution attempts towards peace. These three approaches constitute a comprehensive understanding of the conflict resolution processes.

This thesis has four major contributions to the existing conflict resolution literature. The first contribution relates to the process of conflict resolution efforts. This study suggests that these efforts are more comprehensive than official negotiations as they begin at the pre-negotiation stage by addressing backchannel initiatives. By investigating secret talks between the main armed protagonists in the Northern Irish and Turkey's Kurdish peace processes, this study revealed that conflict resolution attempts were in operation before the official negotiation efforts. It recommends that the backchannel talks provide a flexible environment to discuss the demands and claims of the governments and sub-state armed groups which then form the basis of official negotiations (Chapter 3 and Section 6.2). As secret meetings are accepted as a pre-negotiation activity (Kriesberg, 1992, p.123), this research investigated their role in leading official negotiations which prioritise conflict resolution as an on-going process. Therefore, the thesis has demonstrated an understanding of this stage by integrating these efforts within a broader conflict resolution framework.

The second contribution of the thesis is in the role of P/CROs which has been analysed under the middle-range approaches (Lederach, 1997).

However, this thesis states that P/CROs additionally contribute to peacemaking, rather than merely providing a link between war-torn societies and political elites. Therefore, an analysis of the role of peace organisations in making a political agreement is crucial. This study revealed that these track-two initiatives promote and encourage both political elites and their adversaries in their peace efforts by unifying communities against the violence of the IRA and PKK, and the British and Turkish governments' armed response which resulted in pressure on political elites to downplay the legal differences between ethnic groups. It highlighted that peace organisations are significant in reducing the level of violence, which facilitates a political resolution. This study found that these organisations help reduce the gap between conflicting communities and so conflicting parties form a broader understanding at a national level to accept ethnic differences in the society (Section 7.6). The PP successfully encouraged the Catholic and Protestant communities to outcry against violence through its popular marches, and this put pressure on political elites to focus on soft-line policies for overcoming identity disputes. In contrast, the BIA focused more on political conferences by containing political parties' representatives and other policy-makers (Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2). Although the contribution of peace groups was limited in Turkey, the WPC and LPP managed to unite the support of Turkish and Kurdish communities for a political resolution instead of an armed struggle through hundreds of public meetings, protests and conferences (Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2). The key point is that the link between these groups and political elites helped them influence decisions by insisting on maintaining peace efforts and pushing for a change to political regulations.

The third contribution relates to the results which contradict the existing literature on conflict resolution. Despite a consensus regarding the negative influence of a lack of trust for maintaining a peace process (Fisher & Keashly, 1990; Ikle & Leites, 1962; Knox & Quirk, 2000), the interview data demonstrated that the UUP's mistrust in the British government resulted in the party joining negotiations and playing an active role towards the GFA. This surprising finding needs to be assessed with respect to other

ethno-nationalist conflicts to determine whether this results in a contradictory outcome to that which exists in the existing literature. In addition, the existing literature assumes that it is possible for peace groups to establish dialogues with inappropriate or irresponsible people due to inadequate information (Kaye, 2007, p.25). However, the peace groups in Northern Ireland and Turkey reached the decision makers and put pressure on the governments to reform in the constitution. The direct contact between the P/CROs and governments necessitates a more comprehensive investigation of these groups not only at the grassroots level, but also at the elite level of conflict resolution. Similarly, one of the major assumptions related to backchannel initiatives is that there is no cost of entry into these talks (Pruitt, 2006; Wanis-St John, 2004). However, the analysis of secret talks demonstrated that even though both sides participated in many of the backchannels without any preconditions, the objectives of the two governments (to reduce the level of violence) and the aim of opposition movements (to tie the resolution efforts to ethnic identity problems) still came into effect. This was discovered in interviews with intermediaries in the Turkish case and the declassified secret papers in the Northern Irish case. For instance, PM Demirel and President Özal asked the PKK to declare a ceasefire through an intermediary before initiating direct talks (Çandar, Interview, 29-30/06/2015). Similarly, both the IRA and British government had preconditions during the indirect communications to come together in the Whitelaw talks (Smith & Neumann, 2005). Although the majority of these initiatives did not have a prerequisite, these situations contradict the theoretical assumptions through the two cases of this thesis in which conflict resolution procedures were applied. Although it is difficult to argue that these contradictions require modifying conflict resolution theory as a whole, it can be said that it is necessary to rethink these assumptions.

The last contribution of the thesis relates to the selected cases for examination. By assessing political resolution efforts of two comprehensive ethno-nationalist cases, this study presented a broader understanding than any single case study (Chapters 2 and 3). As the thesis compared the Northern Irish case, as a successfully resolved ethno-nationalist conflict,

with the Turkish case, which is an unsuccessful one, this is a unique study that shows the implications of conflict resolution theory. Although there is existing literature on the negotiation process of the Northern Irish conflict, it has paid little attention to the influence of backchannel initiatives and peace organisations (Sections 6.1 and 7.1). Similarly, the existing literature has paid little attention to the peace process in Turkey and this research aimed to close this gap in understanding (Sections 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1). This study contains three different levels of conflict resolution approaches to achieving a peace agreement: firstly, it illustrated the influence of the local level, namely the impact of conflicting communities through P/CROs and revealed the demands of ethnic identities and claims for resolution. Secondly, it demonstrated the resolution efforts at the national level through secret talks between the main armed protagonists and official negotiations between stakeholders (Chapters 6 and 8). Lastly, it revealed that despite the national borders of ethno-nationalist conflicts, political resolution attempts might be carried out at the international level through the involvement of international third parties (Chapter 8). This thesis, therefore, can be extended to other conflicts which have ethnic and nationalist characteristics, and involve non-violent initiatives by political elites, opposition groups and peace groups at these three levels.

9.5. Policy Implications

The Northern Irish and Turkish cases provided a far-reaching analysis of conflict resolution processes by investigating the underlying reasons for their success and failure. The investigation aimed to aid understanding of how political elites, leaders of sub-state armed groups, opposition parties and groups, and peace groups have shaped these peace processes. Because Turkey's conflict resolution process failed, the findings of this thesis can be applied to future peace efforts in Turkey. Lessons can be learned from both the failed Kurdish process and the Northern Irish resolution. The top-down approaches assessed in this study can be implemented in other ethno-nationalist conflicts which embody non-violent, political resolution efforts.

The Israeli-Palestinian and Bosnian conflicts both experienced conflict resolution processes aimed at ending ethno-nationalist conflicts which helped to inform conflict resolution theory. In addition, the P/CROs in both peace processes need to be assessed with regards to their role in peacemaking. More broadly, this thesis suggests that these groups should focus more on political reforms and transforming issues that are the causes of identity problems in ethno-nationalist conflicts with similar characteristics. For example, as Meyer (2004) indicates, the South African peace process illustrated a top-down approach, but the influence of peace groups during the conflict resolution process has garnered little attention.

The Northern Irish and Turkish cases illustrate that the dialogue between governments and sub-state armed groups should be continuous and form the basis of official negotiations by considering a win-win approach. Despite the reaction of opposition parties and wider society against 'talking to terrorists', the secret nature of these discussions can facilitate success. It is vital for governments and terrorist groups to come together to discuss their objectives as they are the main armed protagonists and sub-state armed groups claim to represent ethnic communities. As examined in Chapter Six, these initiatives can facilitate a gradual move towards official negotiations (Section 6.2). In this context, the Israeli-Palestinian secret talks could be compared to the Northern Irish and Turkish cases. This can add value to understanding secret talks in a broader perspective. Hence, the main stakeholders of an ethnic conflict should seriously consider the influence of backchannels as pre-negotiation efforts towards peace.

This thesis revealed that both top-down and bottom-up initiatives should work in conjunction in order to reach political settlements. This cooperation can emerge during the negotiation process which produces an engagement between political parties and elites, peace organisations and opposition groups. This thesis suggests that the negotiation process should be supported by a mutual understanding of the necessary political steps for resolution as opposed to a zero-sum approach (Chapter 8). This thesis

showed that these steps could successfully be taken if both conflicting communities react against violence. In this context, these findings can be investigated in other cases such as the ethnic conflict deployed by ETA which can reveal both top-down and bottom-up approaches in the Spanish conflict.⁷⁹ To summarise, the political wings of conflicting parties should be willing to resolve ethno-nationalist conflicts in a political way and peace efforts should be assisted and promoted by peace groups and wider society.

9.6. Future Research

The peacemaking initiatives in Northern Ireland and Turkey demonstrated the different characteristics of peace efforts which necessitated a detailed investigation. While official mediations and negotiations are at the core of each peace process, the significance of backchannel communications and the role of independent third parties towards establishing a peace agreement was largely overlooked in the literature focussed on analysing peace events. This is because pre-negotiation activities are not usually assessed as part of peace processes (Sections 1.1, 3.3 and 9.3). However, the contribution of secret talks and the initiatives of peace and conflict resolution organisations is vital in encouraging conflicting parties to engage in official negotiations. This contribution might help political elites by forming a basis for political resolution attempts through an understanding of the demands of the conflicting sides and by revealing the desires of conflicting communities and the effort to include these desires in political decisions.

A wider problem emerged in Syria following the Arab uprisings in 2011. Many different states (including the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Iraq) and non-state actors including the radical religious terrorist group ISIS, the PKK's Syrian branch, the PYD, and its armed wing YPG, and other opposition armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) were involved in the

⁷⁹ For more information for ending the violent conflict in Spain, see Whitfield (2014), Encarnacion (2004) and the US Institute of Peace's report by Idoiaga (2006).

Syrian civil war. The support for the PYD against the ISIS from the USA and Russia created an environment which enabled the PYD to gain control 20% of Syria, and more than 65% of the Turkish border (Stratejik-Ortak, 2017). While Turkey strongly condemned the US and Russia for their support of the PYD-YPG, the USA's currently president, Donald Trump, approved a plan to arm the YPG (BBC, 2017; NYT, 2017). Although this conflict did not affect Turkey's Kurdish peace process directly, Turkey expressed concern about the potential use of these supplied weapons against Turkey (Bozarslan, 2017). In fact, the Kurdish peace process had collapsed before this concern of the government raised. However, it can be said that the civil war in Syria negatively affected the potential of relaunching the peace process in Turkey. This caused pessimism in society regarding the future of the peace process. On the one hand, as a result of ISIS militants entering the country, the region experienced many devastating attacks (Milliyet, 2016). This created a more complicated situation and affected the perceptions of both conflicting parties. On the other hand, the war in Syria caused a difference in perceptions between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement. The government blamed the PKK for being unwilling to disarm due to the PYD's active role in the Syrian civil war and hence the PKK-PYD aimed to expand the territory under their control (Uçum, Interview, 02/07/2015). The pro-Kurdish movement accused the government of not taking any steps toward political reform in order to reduce ethnic discrimination (Yüksekdağ, 2015, cited in Sözcü, 2015). This instability in the region negatively affected the future of Turkey's Kurdish peace process and made it more difficult to relaunch a 'democratic opening' project in order to achieve constitutional reforms and to initiate a new peace process for ending the violent conflict in Turkey. Therefore, this war is more likely to influence the future of the peace process in Turkey and future research could assess this aspect with regards to attempts at peacemaking containing not only Turkey, Syria and Iraq, but also global powers, i.e. the USA and Russia.

There are indicators that suggest a cause for optimism with regards to the future of ethno-nationalist conflicts. The Northern Ireland conflict

was successfully resolved through an agreement between all conflicting parties. Although the political settlement was not intended to transform the underlying reasons of the conflict, it was a framework in which steps could be taken towards a 'positive peace'. It also gave reason for optimism with regards to the resolution of ethnic identity issues in deeply-divided societies. Whilst grassroots initiatives were vital for reconciliation of the conflict, political initiatives dominated the process in order to bring the violence to an end which is a great precedent for similar cases. For example, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, the Colombian government established an agreement with the FARC group, but this peace deal was rejected in a subsequent referendum (the no vote won by 50.2%) (Guardian, 2016). Despite an on-going opposition towards the peace process, how the official negotiations were conducted in the Northern Ireland case and how it was accepted by a majority of people in the GFA referendum might be the topic of future research.

This project has examined the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages by comparing the peacemaking initiatives of political parties and actors, and independent third parties who affected the nature of the two peace processes. A potential future study might involve the analysis on the events of NGOs, community groups and local leaders towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland and Turkey during the terms of violence. Such a study could demonstrate the contribution of these groups to elite-driven peacemaking efforts during both the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. In addition, future research could explore whether social and regional concerns are transformed through this process, the relationships between conflicting communities affect the progress and whether grassroots leaders help reduce the tension of the conflict by closing the gap between communities in conflict.

The post-negotiation stage is also a significant area that could be assessed in further research. This could involve an investigation of the role of political agents, sub-state armed groups, peace groups and independent third parties who played role in conflict resolution processes in a post-

agreement era. The GFA could be assessed in order to understand these actors' perceptions and attitudes towards a sustainable peace. Such a potential study could ascertain the outcome of peace agreements and whether the root causes of the conflict were transformed such as the initiation of constitutional changes intended to diminish dominance of the unionist community and identity issues.

Another important topic related to peacemaking initiatives is the role played by religious leaders as intermediaries. Although this project has assessed the Northern Ireland and Turkey cases as ethno-nationalist conflicts and has focused on political initiatives for making peace, the religious leaders also facilitated progress in a different context. For example, Fr Alec Reid and Fr Gerry Reynolds in Northern Ireland aimed at creating pan-nationalist and pan-unionist approaches respectively. Therefore, they created an indirect influence by placing an emphasis on bringing nationalist groups together and creating a shared democratic approach (Section 5.1). To date, the influence of these intermediaries has been paid little attention in the existing literature (Princen, 1992). Future research can discover the contribution of religious leaders towards the resolution of both the Northern Irish and Kurdish conflicts.

Appendix: Index of Interviews

- **Algan, Cengiz.** Chairperson of the LPP, journalist and civil society activist, İstanbul, 07/07/2015.
- **Arıboğan, Deniz Ülke.** Chairperson of the WPC's Marmara Region, professor at İstanbul Bilgi University, İstanbul, 08/09/2015.
- **Baluken, İdris.** Deputy and Parliamentary Group leader of the HDP, member of the İmralı Committee, Ankara, 01/09/2015.
- **Belge, Murat.** Member of the WPC's Southeastern Region, professor at İstanbul Bilgi University and civil rights activist, İstanbul, 30/06/2015.
- **Burkay, Kemal.** Founder of pro-Kurdish Rights and Freedoms Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*), Ankara, 02/07/2015.
- **Can, Celalattin.** Member of the WPC's Central Anatolia Region, İstanbul, 25/06/2015.
- **Coşkun, Vahap.** Member of the WPC's Central Anatolia Region, associate professor at Dicle University, İstanbul, 04/09/2015.
- **Çalışlar, Oral.** Member of the WPC's Black Sea Region, journalist and author, İstanbul, 07/07/2015.
- **Çandar, Cengiz.** Intermediary between the Turkish government and PKK, chief advisor to President Turgut Özal (1991-1993), İstanbul, 29-30/06/2015.
- **Dedeoğlu, Beril.** Vice chairperson of the WPC's Central Anatolia Region, later appointed the Minister for the EU, İstanbul, 17/06/2015.
- **Demir, İmran.** Member of the Resolution Commission (*Toplumsal Barış Yollarının Araştırılması ve Çözüm Sürecinin Değerlendirilmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu*, known as *Çözüm Komisyonu*), assistant professor at Marmara University, Leeds, 15/09/2015.
- **Empey, Reginald.** Lord, former leader of the UUP and member of the House of Lords, London, 27/01/2015.

- **Ensarođlu, Yılmaz.** Chairperson of the WPC's Southeastern Anatolia Region, the chief advisor to PM Ahmet Davutođlu on the peace process, Ankara, 02/07/2015.
- **Erdem, Tarhan.** Chairperson of the WPC's Aegean Region, former Deputy of the CHP, İstanbul, 10/07/2015.
- **Ete, Hatem.** Chief advisor to PM Ahmet Davutođlu, on behalf of the AKP government, Ankara, 03/07/2015.
- **Gibney, Jim.** Member of the Executive Committee of SF, Belfast, 20/01/2015.
- **Haşimi, Haşim.** Kurdish politician, former Deputy of the RP and FP, Ankara, 03/07/2015.
- **Hatemi, Kezban.** Vice chairperson of the WPC's Southeastern Anatolia Region, lawyer, İstanbul, 07/09/2015.
- **Haughey, Dennis.** Founder member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Belfast, 19/01/2015.
- **Işık, İlhami.** Intermediary between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish movement, columnist, İstanbul, 19/06/2015.
- **Karatepe, Şükrü.** Member of the WPC's Mediterranean Region, former Mayor of Kayseri, Ankara, 13/07/2015.
- **Korkut, Levent.** Secretary of the WPC's Marmara Region, chairperson of the Association of Civil Society Development Centre, Ankara, 10/07/2015.
- **Mahçupyan, Etyen.** Member of the WPC's Southeastern Anatolia Region, the chief advisor to PM Ahmet Davutođlu, İstanbul, 22/06/2015.
- **Mallon, Ben.** The Democratic Unionist Party Councillor for Lisburn and Castlereagh, Belfast, 19/01/2015.
- **Mason, Gary.** Rev. Methodist Minister of Belfast Mission, Belfast, 20/01/2015.
- **Ođan, Ayhan.** Secretary of the WPC's Eastern Anatolia Region, İstanbul, 18/06/2015.

- **Oğur, Yıldırım.** Member of the WPC's Black Sea Region, columnist, İstanbul, 25/06/2015.
- **Oran, Baskın.** Member of the WPC's Aegean Region, former professor at Ankara University and civil rights activist, Ankara, 18/06/2015.
- **Sancar, Mithat.** Deputy of the HDP, Ankara, 08/07/2015.
- **Sayman, Yücel.** Member of the WPC's Marmara Region, professor at Medipol University, Ankara, 03/07/2015.
- **Tan, Altan.** Deputy of the HDP, Ankara, 24/06/2015.
- **Uçum, Mehmet.** Deputy of the AKP, Ankara, 02/07/2015.
- **Walsh, Seanna.** Member of SF, former member of the PIRA and the leader of the Blanket Protest, Belfast, 19/01/2015.
- **Yayla, Atilla.** Member of the LPP, professor at İstanbul Ticaret University, İstanbul, 07/07/2015.
- **Yüksekdağ, Figen.** Co-Leader of the HDP, Ankara, 13/07/2015.
- **[Name Withheld].** Head of the department at the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (*Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı*), Ankara, 01/07/2015.

Bibliography

Primary Documents

National Archives, Kew, London

CAB 128, 129, 134

CJ 4

DEFE 24

FCO 87

PREM 15, 16, 19

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates

House of Commons Debates, vol.838

National University of Ireland Archive, Galway

POL

Turkish Armed Forces Archives, Ankara

TSKA-MGK

Parliamentary and International Official Reports

BDP. (2013). *Toplumsal Barış Yollarının Araştırılması ve Çözüm Sürecinin Değerlendirilmesi Komisyonu Raporu*. Ankara: BDP (Unpublished Report), accessed on 10/07/2015.

EUROPOL. (2013). *TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. Van Deventer: European Police Office.

Mitchell, G., De Chastelain, J., & Holkeri, H. (1996). *Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning*. Retrieved from Belfast: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199596/ldhansrd/vo960124/text/60124-08.htm> on 27/11/2014

New Ireland Forum, (1984). *Final Report*. Belfast: Stationery Office, Northern Ireland.

TBMM. (2013a). *Terör ve Şiddet Olayları Kapsamında Yaşam Hakkı İhlallerini İnceleme Raporu*. Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi.

TBMM. (2013b). *Toplumsal Barış Yollarının Araştırılması ve Çözüm Sürecinin Değerlendirilmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu*. Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi.

Secondary Sources

- 21YYTE. (2013). *Terörle Mücadelede Verdiğimiz Şehitler 1984-2013*. Ankara: 21.YYTE.
- Aall, P. (2001). What do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking? In C. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (pp.365-383). Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Aberbach, J.D., & Rockman, B.A. (2002). Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews. *Political Science and Politics*, 35(4), 673-676.
- Abrahms, M. (2008). What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. *International Security*, 32(4), 18-105.
- Abramowitz, M. (1993). Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal. *Foreign Policy*, 91, 164-181.
- Abramowitz, M., & Barkey, H.J. (2009). Turkey's Transformers: The AKP Sees Big. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(6), 118-128.
- Abu-Nimer, M. (1996). Conflict Resolution Approaches: Western and Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 55, 35-52.
- Adams, G. (1994). *Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace*. Niwot: Roberts Rineheart.
- Adams, W.C. (2010). Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews. In J.S. Wholey, H.P. Hatry, & K.E. Newcomer (Eds.), *Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation* (3rd ed., pp.365-377). California: Jossey-Bass.
- Adler, E. (2013). Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B.A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp.112-144). London: Sage.
- Adler, P.A., & Adler, P. (1987). *Membership Roles in Field Research*. California: Sage.
- Agha, H., Feldman, S., Khalidi, A., & Schiff, Z. (2003). *Track 2 Diplomacy: Lessons From the Middle East*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Akbulut, O. (2010). A Critical Analysis of Current Legal Developments on the Political Participation of Minorities in Turkey. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 17(4), 551-560.
- Akşam. (2013,24/04). PKK İlk Kez Açıkladı... Oslo'da Neler Oldu? Retrieved from <http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/pkk-ilk-kez-acikladiosloda-neler-oldu/haber-199057> on 17/03/2016
- Al Jazeera. (2015,28/02). Ortak Açıklamanın Tam Metni. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ortak-aciklamainin-tam-metni> on 01/03/2015

- Aliboni, R., & Pioppi, D. (2000). The Öcalan Affair Revisited. *Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 35(3), 37-47.
- Alonso, R. (2004). Pathways out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 695-713.
- Alphan, C., & Albayrak, Y. (2010). *Erbakan'ın Gizli PKK Zirvesi: Zirvenin Kilit Adamı İsmail Nacar*. İstanbul: Ares.
- Alter, P. (1982). *Traditions of Violence in the Irish National Movement*. London: St Martin's.
- Alter, P. (1994). Nationalism: An Overview. In C.P. Cozic (Ed.), *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (pp.18-25). California: Greenhaven.
- Alvesson, M. (2003). Methodology for Close up Studies-Struggling with Closeness and Closure. *Higher Education*, 46, 167-193.
- Anderson, G.L., Herr, K., & Nihlen, A.S. (2007). *Studying Your Own School*. California: Corwin.
- ANF. (2011,20/05). Öcalan: Kürtlerin Kellesine Karşı ABD-Türkiye Anlaştı. Retrieved from <http://www.turnusol.biz/public/haber.aspx?id=8477&pid=19&haber=%D6calan:%20K%FCrtlerin%20kellesine%20kar%FE%FDI%FDk%20ABD-T%FCrkiye%20anla%FEt%FD!> on 23/05/2015
- Anglo-Irish Agreement. (1985). *The Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland: Agreement*. Hillsborough: 15/11/1985.
- Annan, K. (2000). *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information.
- Arbour, L. (2012,27/12). 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2013. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/27/10_conflicts_to_watch_in_2013 on 06/02/2014
- Archick, K. (2014). *Northern Ireland: The Peace Process*. Washington: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service.
- ARK. (2001a,14/01). The 1998 Referendums. Retrieved from <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm> on 24/01/2016
- ARK. (2001b,04/11). Westminster by-elections, 23/01/1986. Retrieved from <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fw86.htm> on 20/01/2016
- Art, R.J., & Richardson, L. (2007). Introduction. In R.J. Art & L. Richardson (Eds.), *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons From the Past* (pp.1-24). Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Arthur, P. (1984). *Government and Politics of Northern Ireland*. London: Longman.
- Arthur, P. (1990). Negotiating the Northern Ireland Problem: Track One or Track Two Diplomacy? *Government and Opposition*, 25(4), 403-418.

- Aslan, G. (2010,10/07). TC'nin PKK ile Görüşmeleri. *Taraf*. Retrieved from <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-tc-nin-pkk-ile-gorusmeleri-53564/> on 09/06/2014
- Assefa, H. (1987). *Mediation of Civil Wars*. London: Westview.
- Ataman, M. (2002). Özal Leadership and Reconstructing of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38(4), 123-142.
- Aughey, A. (1997). A State of Exception: The Concept of the Political in Northern Ireland. *Irish Political Studies*, 12(1), 1-12.
- Austin, B. (2011). Introduction. In A. Beatrix, M. Fischer, & H.-J. Giessmann (Eds.), *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II* (pp.9-22). Opladen: Budrich.
- Avruch, K. (2011). Culture Theory, Culture Splash, and the Practice of Conflict Resolution. In D.J.D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Staroste-Sandole, & J. Senehi (Eds.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp.241-255). Oxon: Routledge.
- Aydın, S., & Taşkın, Y. (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Aydınlı, E., & Özcan, N.A. (2011). The Conflict Resolution and Counterterrorism Dilemma: Turkey Faces its Kurdish Question. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(3), 438-457.
- Azar, E. (2003). Protracted Social Conflicts and Second Track Diplomacy. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation* (pp.15-30). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Babbitt, E. (2009). The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding. *Negotiation Journal*, 25(4), 539-549.
- Babbitt, E., & Hampson, F.O. (2011). Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing Theory. *International Studies Review*, 13, 46-57.
- Bahar, H.İ. (2013). *Çözüm Süreci*. Ankara: Ankara Strateji Enstitüsü.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (1994). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Learning Conflict Resolution. *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(1), 75-92.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (2004). *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- BarışaBak Platformu. (2014,04/11). Barışa Bak! Retrieved from <http://vivahiba.com/article/show/barisa-bak/> on 28/12/2015
- Barkey, H.J. (1993). Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma. *Survival*, 35(4), 51-70.
- Barkey, H.J. (1998). The People's Democracy Party (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal Kurdish Party in Turkey. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 18(1), 129-138.
- Barkey, H.J., & Fuller, G.E. (1997). Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities. *Middle East Journal*, 51(1), 59-79.

- Barlas, M. (2007,29/01). Osmanlı'da Oyun Bitmez: Derin Devlet. *Sabah*. Retrieved from <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/01/29/yaz09-40-105.html> on 27/11/2011
- Barrinha, A. (2011). The Political Importance of Labelling: Terrorism and Turkey's Discourse on the PKK. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 4(2), 163-180.
- Barros, C.P. (2003). An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 14(6), 401-412.
- Bartoli, A. (1999). Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex world* (pp.245-274). Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Başaran, E. (2016,10/02). Oslo, Çözüm Süreci ve Hepimizin Bilmesi Gerekenler. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi-basaran/oslo-cozum-sureci-ve-hepimizin-bilmesi-gerekenler-1507850/> on 03/03/2016
- Başbuğ, İ. (2015). *Terör Örgütlerinin Sonu*. İstanbul: Remzi.
- Baybars-Hawks, B. (2013). Will Peace Flourish in the End? The History of Suffering: Terrorism in Turkey. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(10), 278-282.
- BBC. (2013,05/09). PKK'dan Açıklama: Gerillayı Durduruyoruz. *BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/09/130905_bayik_pk_k_cekilme_durdu on 28/04/2014
- BBC. (2017,10/05). Yıldırım'dan ABD'ye Tepki: PKK DEAŞ'a Karşı Kullanılmamalı. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39856911> on 15/05/2017
- Bell, J.B. (1973). The Escalation of Insurgency: The Provisional Irish Republican Army's Experience, 1969-1971. *The Review of Politics*, 35(3), 398-411.
- Bell, J.B. (2000). *The IRA, 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army*. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.
- Ben-Porat, G. (2008). Introduction: Implementing Peace Agreements. In G. Ben-Porat (Ed.), *The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process?* (pp.1-18). New York: Springer.
- Bendana, A. (1996). Conflict Resolution: Empowerment and Disempowerment. *Peace & Change*, 21(1), 69-70.
- Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D., & Chin, R. (1985). *The Planning of Change* (Vol. 4). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Benson, J.K. (1975). The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy. *Administrative science quarterly*, 20(2), 229-249.

- Bercovitch, J. (1986). International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 21(3), 155-168.
- Bercovitch, J. (1991). International Mediation. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), 3-6.
- Bercovitch, J., Anagnason, J.T., & Wille, D.L. (1991). Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), 7-17.
- Bercovitch, J., & Houston, A. (1993). Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behaviour on the Success of Mediation in International Relations. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 4(4), 297-321.
- Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V., & Zartman, I.W. (Eds.). (2009). *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. London: Sage.
- Bercovitch, J., & Langley, J. (1993). The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(4).
- Bergesen, A.J., & Lizardo, O. (2004). International Terrorism and the World-System. *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 38-52.
- Beriker-Atiyas, N. (1997). The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects. *Security Dialogue*, 28(4), 439-452.
- Beriker, N. (2009). *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Beriker, N. (2011). Conflict Resolution: The Missing Link between Liberal International Relations Theory and Realistic Practice. In D.J.D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, & J. Senehi (Eds.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp.256-271). Oxon: Routledge.
- Bew, P., & Gillespie, G. (1996). *The Northern Ireland Peace Process: 1993-1996*. London: Serif.
- Bhavnani, R., & Backer, D. (2000). Localized Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Accounting for Differences in Rwanda and Burundi. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(3), 283-306.
- BIA. (2015). The British-Irish Association. *The British-Irish Association*. Retrieved from <http://www.britishirishassociation.org/aboutus.htm> on 04/05/2015
- BiaNet. (2013,28/06). İki Buçuk Yıldır Gündemdeki "KCK" nedir? Retrieved from <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/131077-iki-bucuk-yildir-gundemdeki-kck-nedir> on 28/10/2015
- BiaNet. (2014,04/11). Barışa Bak Kampanyası 69 İmzayla Başladı. *BiaNet*. Retrieved from <https://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/159691-barisa-bak-kampanyasi-69-imzayla-basladi> on 27/12/2015

- Birand, M.A., & Yalçın, S. (2001). *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Bishop, P., & Mallie, E. (1988). *The Provisional IRA*. London: Corgi.
- Black, D. (2004). The Geometry of Terrorism. *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 14-25.
- Blair, T. (2010). *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: Hutchinson.
- Bloomfield, D. (1998). *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory*. London: MacMillan.
- Blum, A. (2005). The Futures of Conflict: Exploring the Use of Comparative Scenarios in Track II Peacebuilding. *International Studies Perspectives*, 6, 342-358.
- Boulding, K.E. (1957). Organization and Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1(2), 122-134.
- Boulding, K.E. (1962). *Conflict and Defense*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Boulding, K.E. (1963). Is Peace Researchable? *The Background*, 6(4), 70-77.
- Boulding, K.E. (1978). Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22(2), 342-354.
- Bowskill, M., Lyons, E., & Coyle, A. (2007). The Rhetoric of Acculturation: When Integration Means Assimilation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 46, 793-813.
- Boyle, K., & Hadden, T. (1995). The Peace Process in Northern Ireland. *International Affairs*, 71(2), 269-283.
- Bozarslan, H. (1996). Turkey's Elections and the Kurds. *Middle East Report*, 199, 16-19.
- Bozarslan, M. (2017,15/05). Will Arming of YPG Help Open Kurdish Corridor in Syria? *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/turkey-united-states-will-guns-open-kurdish-corridor.html> on 16/05/2017
- Brannan, D.W., Esler, P.F., & Anders Strindberg, N. (2001). Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24(1), 3-24.
- Brannick, T., & Coghlan, D. (2007). In Defense of Being "Native": The Case for Insider Academic Research. *Organizational Research Methods*, 10(1), 59-74.
- Brewer, J.D., Bishop, K., & Higgins, G.I. (2001). *Peacemaking among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland*. Queen's University of Belfast. Belfast.
- Brewer, J.D., Higgins, G.I., & Teeney, F. (2011). *Religion, Civil Society, and Peace in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- British and Irish Governments. (1993). Joint Declaration on Peace: Downing Street Declaration. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm> on 20/01/2016
- British and Irish Governments. (1995). Joint Communiqué. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/com281195.htm> on 25/01/2016
- Brooke, P. (1990,09/11). Peter Brooke's "No Selfish Strategic Interest" Speech. *BBC*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4072261.stm on 20/01/2016
- Brown, M.E. (1993). *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, R. (2000). *Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods* (Vol. 4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, S. (2008). Transforming Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. *Irish Political Studies*, 23(3), 387-409.
- Burton, J.W. (1969). *Conflict & Communication*. London: MacMillan.
- Burton, J.W. (1972). *World Society*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Burton, J.W. (1987). *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Burton, J.W. (1990a). *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. London: Springer.
- Burton, J.W. (1990b). *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*. London: MacMillan.
- Burton, J.W., & Dukes, F. (1990). *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution* (Vol. 4). London: MacMillan.
- Bush, R.A.B., & Folger, J.P. (1994). *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*. California: Jossey-Bass.
- Byrne, S. (1995). Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Party Intervention in Northern Ireland Conflict. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7(2), 1-24.
- Byrne, S. (2001). Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 327-352.
- Byrne, S. (2002). Toward Tractability: The 1993 South African Record of Understanding and the 1998 Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 13, 135-149.
- Cagaptay, S. (2007). Can the PKK Renounce Violence? *Middle East Quarterly*, 45-52.

- Cairns, E., & Darby, J. (1998). The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, Consequences, and Controls. *American Psychologist*, 53(7), 754-760.
- Çalışlar, O. (1993). *Öcalan ve Burkay'la Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: Pencere Yayınları.
- Çandar, C. (2009). The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the 'Opening'. *Insight Turkey*, 11(4), 13-19.
- Çandar, C. (2011). *Dağdan İniş-PKK Nasıl Silah Bırakır? Kürt Sorununun Şiddetten Arındırılması*. İstanbul: TESEV.
- Çandar, C. (2014). *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Carayannis, T., Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., Olin, N., Rigterink, A., & Schomerus, M. (2014). *Practice Without Evidence: Interrogating Conflict Resolution Approaches and Assumptions*. London: Justice and Security Research Programme.
- Card, C. (2007). Recognizing Terrorism. *The Journal of Ethics*, 11(1), 1-29.
- Carneige Commission. (1997). *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. New York: Carnegie Corporation.
- Carnevale, P.J., & Pruitt, D.G. (1992). Negotiation and Mediation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 43, 531-582.
- Carter, A.B., Deutch, J., & Zelikow, P. (1998). Catastrophic Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, 77(6), 80-94.
- Cederman, L.-E., Buhaug, H., & Rod, J.K. (2009). Ethno-nationalist Dyads and Civil War: A GIS-Based Analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(4), 496-525.
- Celep, Ö. (2014). Can the Kurdish Left Contribute to Turkey's Democratization? *Insight Turkey*, 16(3), 165-180.
- Çelik, A.B. (2009). Etnik Çatışmaların Çözümünde Siyaset Bilimi ve Uyuşmazlık Çözümü Yaklaşımları. In N. Beriker (Ed.), *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar* (pp.163-188). İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Çelik, A.B., & Blum, A. (2007). Track II Interventions and the Kurdish Question in Turkey. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 12(2), 51-81.
- Cemal, H. (2003). *Kürtler*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Cemal, H. (2013,24/03). Murat Karayılan ile Kandil'de 5,5 Saat. Retrieved from <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/karayilan-geri-cekilme-sonbahara-sarkar-kalici-baris-aponun-ozgurlugunden-gecer/6390> on 04/04/2016
- Charters, D.A. (2013). 'Have a Go': British Army/MIE Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland, 1970-72. *Intelligence and National Security*, 28(2), 202-229.

- Chertkoff, J., & Conley, M. (1967). Opening Offer and Frequency of Concessions as Bargaining Strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 7(2), 181-185.
- Chigas, D. (2003,01/08). Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy. Retrieved from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy> on 11/07/2016
- Chigas, D. (2005). Negotiating Intractable Conflicts: The Contribution of Unofficial Intermediaries. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict* (pp.123-160). Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Choi, S.-W. (2010). Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(6), 940-966.
- Çiçek, C. (2011). Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish Politics: Limits of the AKP's Democratic Initiative. *Turkish Studies*, 12(1), 15-26.
- Cilluffo, F.J., & Tomarchio, J.T. (1998). Responding to New Terrorist Threats. *Orbis*, 42(3), 439-451.
- Çıtak, M.C., & Alkan, N. (2015). Terörden Kaynaklı Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Uygulamaları. *Bilge Strateji*, 7(12), 79-99.
- Cizre, Ü. (2003). Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey. *The Middle East Journal*, 57(2), 213-229.
- Cizre, Ü. (2009). The Emergence of the 'Government's Perspective on the Kurdish Issue. *Insight Turkey*, 11(4), 1-12.
- Clapham, C. (1998). Rwanda:The Perils of Peacemaking. *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(2), 193-210.
- CNNTürk. (2010,28/06). Geçmişten Bugüne PKK Ateşkesleri. Retrieved from <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/06/28/gecmisten.bugune.pkk.ateskesleri/581570.0/> on 01/06/2015
- Cochrane, F. (1997). *Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement*. Cork: Cork University Press.
- Cochrane, F. (2001). Unsung Heroes or Muddle-Headed Peaceniks? A Profile and Assessment of NGO Conflict Resolution Activity in the Northern Ireland 'Peace Process'. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 12, 97-112.
- Cochrane, F. (2002). Peace and Conflict Resolution Organisations in Northern Ireland. In B. Gidron, S. Katz, & Y. Hasenfeld (Eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* (pp.151-174). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cochrane, F. (2007). Irish-America, the End of the IRA's Armed Struggle and the Utility of 'Soft Power'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(2), 215-231.
- Cochrane, F. (2013). *Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace*. Cornwall: Yale University Press.

- Cochrane, F., & Dunn, S. (1999,23/09). CAIN: CSC Report: International Study of Peace/Conflict Resolution Organisations. *Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster*. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/cochrane99.htm> on 23/12/2015
- Coleman, P.T. (1997). Redefining Ripeness: A Social-Psychological Perspective. *Peace and Conflict*, 3(1), 81-103.
- Coleman, P.T. (2004). Paradigmatic Framing of Protracted, Intractable Conflict. *Journal of Peace Psychology*, 10(3), 197-235.
- Coleman, P.T. (2006). Conflict, Complexity, and Change: A Meta-Framework for Addressing Protracted, Intractable Conflicts-III. *Journal of Peace Psychology*, 12(4), 325-348.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing *Political Science and Politics*, 44(4), 823-830.
- Collier, D., & Mahoney, J. (1996). Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research. *World Politics*, 49(01), 56-91.
- Collier, D., Mahoney, J., & Seawright, J. (2004). Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias. In H.E. Brandy & D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp.85-102). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), 563-595.
- ColombiaPeace. (2017). Peace Timeline. Retrieved from <http://colombiapace.org/timeline2015/> on 25/03/2017
- Connable, B., & Libicki, M.C. (2010). *How Insurgencies End*. California: RAND.
- Connolly, M., & Loughlin, J. (1986). Reflections on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. *Government and Opposition*, 21(2), 146-160.
- Coogan, T.P. (2002). *The IRA*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Copeland, T. (2001). Is the "New Terrorism" Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 21(2).
- Cordell, K., & Wolff, S. (2010). *Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cortazzi, H. (1990). *The Japanese Achievement*. London: Sidgwick&Jackson.
- Coşkun, V. (2015). HDP Torn Between Violence and Politics. *Insight Turkey*, 17(4), 47-55.
- Craig, T. (2012). From Backdoors and Back Lanes to Backchannels: Reappraising British Talks with the Provisional IRA, 1970-1974. *Contemporary British History*, 26(1), 97-117.
- Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399.
- Crenshaw, M. (1985). An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. *Orbis*, 29, 465-489.

- Crenshaw, M. (2000). The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405-420.
- Crenshaw, M. (2011). *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Criss, N.B. (1995). The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 18(1), 17-37.
- Criss, N.B. (2010). Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments. *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 23(May 2010), 9-22.
- Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., & Aall, P. (1999). Introduction. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex world* (pp.3-18). Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Cronin, A.K. (2009). *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Cronin, A.K. (2010). When Should We Talk to Terrorists? *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, 1-16.
- Cronin, I. (2002). *Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press.
- Cunningham, D.E. (2006). Veto Players and Civil War Duration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 875-892.
- Curle, A. (1971). *Making Peace*. London: Tavistock.
- Curle, A. (1994). New Challenges for Citizen Peacemaking. *Medicine and War*, 10(2), 96-105.
- Curran, D., Sebenius, J.K., & Watkins, M. (2004). Two Paths to Peace: Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern Ireland with Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Negotiation Journal*, 20(4), 513-537.
- Daily Sabah. (2015,17/07). Erdoğan Renounces Dolmabahçe Declaration, Says HDP should Try Its Best for PKK's Disarmament. Retrieved from <http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/07/17/erdogan-renounces-dolmabahce-declaration-says-hdp-should-try-its-best-for-pkks-disarmament> on 30/08/2015
- Darby, J. (2003,23/09). Northern Ireland:The Background to the Peace Process. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm> on 08/04/2016
- Darby, J., & MacGinty, R. (2000). Northern Ireland: Long, Cold Peace. In J. Darby & R. MacGinty (Eds.), *The Management of Peace Processes* (pp.61-106). London: MacMillan.
- Darby, J., & MacGinty, R. (2008). *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes, and Post-War Reconstruction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.V. (1981). Foreign Policy according to Freud. *Foreign Policy*(45), 145-157.
- Davies, P. (Ed.) (2006) *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- De Breadun, D. (2001). *The Far Side of Revenge: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*. Cork: Collins.
- De Leeuw, E. (2008). Self-Administered Questionnaires and Standardized Interviews. In P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, & J. Brannen (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods* (pp.313-327). London: Sage.
- de Tocqueville, A. (1840). *Democracy in America, Book Three-Chapter XXII: Why Democratic Nations Are Naturally Desirous Of Peace, and Democratic Armies Of War*. New York: J. & H.G. Langley.
- Dearden, L. (2014,23/09). Isis vs Islamic State vs Isil vs Daesh: What Do the Different Names Mean – and Why Does It Matter? *Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-vs-islamic-state-vs-isil-vs-daesh-what-do-the-different-names-mean-9750629.html> on 02/01/2017
- Deligöz, Ö. (2012). *KCK: Demokrasi Kılıfında Terör*. İstanbul: Timaş.
- Demir, F. (2013). Debates over 'Negotiations in Oslo' in Context of Finding Solutions to the Terrorism Problem and its Reflections on Turkish Media. *International Journal of Human Sciences*, 10(1), 1314-1331.
- Denscombe, M. (2014). *The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects*. New York: Open University Press.
- Denzin, N.K. (1978). *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Deutsch, M. (1973). *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, M. (1994). Constructive Conflict Resolution: Principles, Training, and Research. *Journal of Social Issues*, 50(1), 13-32.
- Dewey, J. (1939). *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. New York: Henry Holt.
- DHA. (2016,09/11). Eski MİT Müsteşarı Emre Taner: Yapamadık, Alamadık. Retrieved from <http://www.dha.com.tr/eski-mit-mustesari-emre-taner-yapamadik-alamadik-1376379.html> on 09/11/2016
- Diamant, N.J. (2000). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in China: Beyond Mediation-Centered Approaches. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(4), 523-546.
- Dilek, C.A. (2013,27/05). Çapulcudan Özgürlük Savaşçısına, Terörden Direnişe, Direnişten Bağımsızlığa: PKK Terör Örgütünün Dönüştürülmesi. Retrieved from <http://www.21yyte.org/arastirma/terorizm-ve-terorizmle-mucadele/2013/05/27/7012/capulcudan-ozgurluk-savascisina->

terorden-direnise-direnisten-bagimsizliga-pkk-teror-orgutunun-donusturulmesi on 31/10/2016

- Dixon, P. (2001a). British Policy towards Northern Ireland 1969-2000. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3(3), 340-368.
- Dixon, P. (2001b). *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dixon, P. (2006). Performing the Northern Ireland Peace Process on the World Stage. *Political Science Quarterly*, 121(1), 61-91.
- Dixon, P. (2008). *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dochartaigh, N.O. (2011a). The Role of an Intermediary in Back-channel Negotiation: Evidence from the Brendan Duddy Papers. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 4(3), 214-225.
- Dochartaigh, N.O. (2011b). Together in the Middle: Back-channel Negotiation in the Irish Peace Process. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(6), 767-780.
- Donat, Y. (2011,12/10). Anilar Denizi. Retrieved from <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/donat/2011/10/12/anilar-denizi> on 05/10/2014
- Donnelly-Cox, G., Donoghue, F., & Hayes, T. (2001). Conceptualizing the Third Sector in Ireland, North and South. *Voluntas*, 12(3), 195-204.
- Doob, L.W. (1970). *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Doob, L.W., & Foltz, W.J. (1974). The Impact of a Workshop upon Grassroots Leaders in Belfast. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 18, 237-256.
- Doyle, M.W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.
- Drozдова, K., & Gaubatz, K.T. (2009). *Structured, Focused Uncertainty: Information Analysis for Multi-Method Comparative Case Studies*. Paper presented at the APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper.
- Druckman, D. (1997). Dimensions of International Negotiations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes. *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 6, 395-420.
- Druckman, D., Martin, J., Nan, S.A., & Yagcioglu, D. (1999). Dimensions of International Negotiation: A Test of Ikle's Typology. *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 8, 89-108.
- Duffield, M.R. (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Duffy, T. (2000). Peace Education in a Divided Society: Creating a Culture of Peace in Northern Ireland. *Prospects*, 30(1), 15-29.
- Dumbrell, J. (2000). Hope and History: The US and Peace in Northern Ireland. In M. Cox, A. Guelke, & F. Stephen (Eds.), *A Farewell to Arms?*

- From Long War to Long Peace in Northern Ireland* (pp.214-222). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Dunn, S., & Nolan-Haley, J. (1998). Conflict in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 22(4), 1372-1388.
- Duyvesteyn, I. (2004). How New is the New Terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27(5), 439-454.
- Eckstein, H. (1975). Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In F.J. Greenstein & N.W. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Science* (Vol. 7, pp.79-137). Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Efegil, E. (2008). Turkey's New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question. *Insight Turkey*, 10(3), 53-73.
- Egeland, J. (1999). The Oslo Accord: Multi-party Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding Cats: Multi-party Mediation in a Complex World* (pp.527-546). Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- EGM. (2016a). Aranan Teröristler: Kırmızı Liste. *T.C. Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü*. Retrieved from <http://www.terorarananlar.pol.tr/detaylar/Sayfalar/kirmizi.aspx> on 02/05/2016
- EGM. (2016b). Aranan Teröristler: Mavi Liste. *T.C. Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü*. Retrieved from <http://www.terorarananlar.pol.tr/detaylar/Sayfalar/mavi.aspx> on 02/05/2016
- Eisinger, P.K. (1973). The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. *American Political Science Review*, 67(1), 11-28.
- Elliot, S., & Flackes, W.D. (1999). *Northern Ireland a Political Directory, 1968-1999*. Belfast: Blackstaff.
- Encarnacion, O.G. (2004). Managing Ethnic Conflict in Spain. *Orbis*, 47(1), 89-105.
- English, R. (2003). *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. Oxford: Oxford University Pres.
- Ensaroğlu, Y. (2013). Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Peace Process. *Insight Turkey*, 15(2), 7-17.
- Entessar, N. (1989). The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord. *Third World Quarterly*, 11(4), 83-100.
- Erbaş, F. (2013,15/03). Farkında Bile Olmadan Karayılan'la Öpüşmüşüm. *Aksam*. Retrieved from <http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/farkinda-bile-olmadan-karayilanla-opusmusum/haber-177405> on 14/01/2016
- Ergil, D. (2000a). Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 43-62.

- Ergil, D. (2000b). The Kurdish Question in Turkey. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(3), 122-135.
- EU. (1988). *European Charter of Local Self-Governments*. Retrieved from <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/122> on 30/12/2015
- Evans, J., & Tonge, J. (2013). Catholic, Irish and Nationalist: Evaluating the Importance of Ethno-national and Ethno-religious Variables in Determining Nationalist Political Allegiance in Northern Ireland. *Nations and Nationalism*, 19(2), 357-375.
- Fairmichael, R. (1987). The Peace People Experience. *Dawn Train*.
- Fearon, J., & Laitin, D.D. (2000). Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. *International Organization*, 54(4), 845-877.
- Felstiner, W.L.F. (1974). Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing. *Law and Society Review*, 9(1), 63-94.
- Fetherston, A.B. (2000). *From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia*, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies.
- Field, A. (2009). The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution? *Political Studies Review*, 7, 197-207.
- Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1996). *Getting to Yes*. London: Business Books.
- Fisher, R.J. (1972). The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution. In R.L. Merritt (Ed.), *Communication in International Politics* (pp.168-204). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Fisher, R.J. (1983). Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(2), 301-334.
- Fisher, R.J. (1990). *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution*. New York: Springer.
- Fisher, R.J. (1993). Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Training, Funding and Institutionalization *Political Psychology*, 14(1), 123-138.
- Fisher, R.J. (1997). *Interactive Conflict Resolution*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Fisher, R.J. (2001). Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 307-326.
- Fisher, R.J. (2006). Coordination between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation. *International Negotiation*, 11(1), 65-89.
- Fisher, R.J. (2007). Assessing the Contingency Model of Third-party Intervention in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(3), 311-329.

- Fisher, R.J., & Keashly, L. (1990). Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution. In R.J. Fisher (Ed.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution* (pp.211-238). New York: Springer.
- Fisher, R.J., & Keashly, L. (1991). The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), 29-42.
- Fitzduff, M. (1995). Managing Community Relations and Conflict: Voluntary Organizations and Government and the Search for Peace. In N. Acheson & A. Williamson (Eds.), *Voluntary Action and Social Policy in Northern Ireland* (pp.63-81). Aldershot: Avebury.
- Fitzduff, M. (2002). *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Flick, U. (Ed.) (2006) *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970-2010: Is Ideological Orientation Relevant? *Crime & Delinquency*, 58(5), 769-797.
- Fortnight. (1972). Tom Caldwell's Initiative. *Fortnight*, 36, 5-6.
- Friedland, N., & Merari, A. (1985). The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword. *Political Psychology*, 6(4), 591-604.
- FT. (2015,28/02). Turkish Government and Kurds in Bid to Revitalise Peace Talks. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d305c18-bf67-11e4-99f8-00144feab7de.html> on 01/03/2015
- Gagnon, V.P. (1994). Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia. *International Security*, 19(3), 130-166.
- Galtung, J. (1965). Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm. *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(4), 348-397.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.
- Galtung, J. (1985). Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 22(2), 141-158.
- Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage.
- Galtung, J. (2009). What Does Professionalization Mean in Peace Research? In L. Reyhler, J.F. Deckard, & K.H. Villanueva (Eds.), *Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development* (pp.351-365). Bilbao: University of Deusto.
- Galtung, J., & Duffy, T. (2000). Northern Ireland: Further Steps in the Dialogue. *The Furrow*, 51(11), 602-609.

- Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287-304.
- Gardner, L.C., & Gittinger, T. (2004). The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968.
- Garfinkel, A. (1981). *Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gartner, S.S., & Bercovitch, J. (2006). Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(4), 819-840.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- George, A.L. (1979). Case studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In P.G. Lauren (Ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and Policy* (pp.43-68). New York: Free Press.
- George, A.L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- George, A.L., & McKeown, T.J. (1985). Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making. In R.F. Coulam & R.A. Smith (Eds.), *Advances in information processing in organizations* (Vol. 2, pp.21-58). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Gergin, N., Balci, F., & Eldivan, I.S. (2009). Turkey's Counter Terrorism Policies against the PKK: The "Fish" or the "Water"? In S. Ekici, A. Ekici, D.A. McEntire, R.H. Ward, & S.S. Arlikatti (Eds.), *Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together against Terrorism* (pp.264-283). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Gerring, J. (2004). What is a Case Study and What is it Good for? *American Political Science Review*, 98(2), 341-354.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gersick, C.J.G. (1991). Revolutionary Change Theories: A multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm. *Academy of Management Review*, 16(1), 10-36.
- Gidron, B., & Katz, S. (1998, 07/09). *The International Study of Peace/Conflict Resolution Organizations: Preliminary Findings*. Paper presented at the Third Conference of the International Society of Third Sector Research, Geneva.
- Gidron, B., Katz, S.N., & Hasenfeld, Y. (2002). *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giugni, M., McAdam, D., & Tilly, C. (1999). *How Social Movements Matter* (Vol. 10). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Goerzig, C. (2010). *Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence*. Cornwall: Routledge.

- Goodman, M.S. (2014). *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Gray, D.E. (2009). *Doing Research in the Real World* (Vol. 2). London: Sage.
- Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Greenhouse, C.J. (1985). Mediation: A Comparative Approach. *Man*, 20(1), 90-114.
- Guardian. (2008,18/03). Talking to the Enemy: The Secret Intermediaries Who Contacted the IRA. *Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/mar/18/northernireland.and.northernireland> on 19/03/2016
- Guardian. (2016,03/10). Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Peace Deal with FARC Guerrillas. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc> on 27/11/2016
- Gücenmez, B. (2009). *Terörizmin Finansmanı: PKK, ETA ve İRA Terör Örgütlerinin Karşılaştırılması*. Kara Harp Okulu, Ankara.
- Guelke, A. (1995). *The Age of Terrorism and International Political System*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Guelke, A. (2003). Negotiations and Peace Processes. In J. Darby & R. MacGinty (Eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, Peace Processes* (pp.53-64). New York: Macmillan.
- Güller, M.A. (2012). *Hükümet-PKK Görüşmeleri (1986-2011)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Gunter, M.M. (1997). *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*. New York.
- Gunter, M.M. (2000). The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan's Capture. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), 849-869.
- Gunter, M.M. (2013). Reopening Turkey's Closed Kurdish Opening? *Middle East Policy*, 20(2), 88-98.
- Gursel, K. (2013,15/04). Erdogan Asks 'Wise People' to Make Case for Peace. *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/04/erdogan-wise-people-commission-peace-process.html> on 24/06/2016
- Haas, R.N. (1990). *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- HaberTürk. (2013,29/04). Barış ve Çözüm Sürecinde Geri Dönmek Mümkün Değil. Retrieved from <https://www.google.co.uk/#q=cozum+sureci> on 12/08/2016
- Hadfield, B. (1986). The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985-Blue Print or Green Print? *Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly*, 37(1), 1-28.
- Hafıza Merkezi. (2015,15/11). Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği. Retrieved from <http://yeni.hafiza-merkezi.org/calisma/sivil->

[toplumun-kurt-sorununun-cozumune-etkin-katilimi-icin-kapasite-gelistirme/turkiyeden-stklar/cocuklar-ayni-catinin-altinda-dernegi-caca/](#) on 15/12/2015

- Haines, J. (1977). *The Politics of Power*. Kent: Coronet Books.
- Hall, A.L., & Rist, R.C. (1999). Integrating Multiple Qualitative Research Methods. *Psychology and Marketing*, 16(4), 291-304.
- Hammer, J. (2009,01/03). In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles. Retrieved from <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northern-ireland-getting-past-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist> on 16/07/2013
- Hancock, L.E. (2001). To Act or Wait: A Two-Stage View of Ripeness. *International Studies Perspectives*, 2, 195-205.
- Hancock, L.E. (2008). The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom. *International Studies Review*, 10, 203-238.
- Hanley, B. (2009). 'I Ran Away'? The IRA and 1969. *History Ireland*, 17(4), 24-27.
- Harbom, L., & Wallensteen, P. (2009). Armed Conflicts, 1946–2008. *Peace Research*, 46(4), 577-587.
- Harles, J.C. (1997). Integration before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 30(4), 711-736.
- Harmon, C.C. (2008). *Terrorism Today* (Vol. 2). Oxon: Routledge.
- Hartzell, C.A. (1999). Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(1), 3-20.
- Hasenfeld, Y. (2010). *Human Services as Complex Organizations*. London: Sage.
- Hauss, C. (2010). *International Conflict Resolution* (2nd ed.). London: Continuum.
- Hayes, B.C., & McAllister, I. (2001). Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. *Political Studies*, 49, 901-922.
- Hayes, R.E., Kaminski, S.R., & Beres, S.M. (2003). Negotiating the Non-negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 451-467.
- HC Deb. (1972). *House of Commons Debates*, vol.838, cols.1073-4. 12/06/1972.
- HDN. (2012,28/09). Chronology of Oslo Dialogues with PKK. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chronology-of-oslo-dialogues-with-pkk.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31190&NewsCatID=338> on 03/03/2016

- HDN. (2015a,22/10). CHP Reveals 'Documents' of Collapsed PKK-Gov't Talks. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-reveals-documents-of-collapsed-pkk-govt-talks-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90207&NewsCatID=338> on 23/10/2015
- HDN. (2015b,28/02). Kurdish Peace Call Made Amid Row on Security Bill. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-peace-call-made-amid-row-on-security-bill.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78999&NewsCatID=338> on 28/02/2015
- HDP. (2015). History of Kurdish Political Parties in Turkey. Retrieved from http://en.hdpeurope.com/?page_id=537 on 01/07/2015
- Hennessey, T. (2015). *The First Northern Ireland Peace Process: Power-Sharing, Sunningdale and the IRA Ceasefires, 1972-76*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Heper, M. (2007). *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Herbolzheimer, K., & Leslie, E. (2013). *Innovation in Mediation Support: The International Contact Group in Mindanao*. Retrieved from London: http://www.c-r.org/downloads/PracticePaper_MindanaoICG_ConciliationResources_0.pdf on 08/04/2013
- Hinnebusch, R., & Tür, Ö. (2013). *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Hintjens, H.M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(2), 241-286.
- Hoffman, B. (1989). The Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1(3), 361-377.
- Hoffman, B. (1993). Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends and Potentialities. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5(2), 12-29.
- Hoffman, B. (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2001). Change and Continuity in Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24(5), 417-428.
- Holsti, K.J. (1966). Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures on Procedures. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10(3), 272-296.
- Holsti, K.J. (1991). *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holsti, K.J. (1996). *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hopmann, P.T. (1995). Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 542, 24-47.
- Horowitz, D.L. (2002). Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes. In A. Reynolds (Ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy* (pp.15-36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hughes, J. (2013). Genocide. In K. Cordell & S. Wolff (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict* (pp.122-139). Oxon: Routledge.
- Hughes, J., & Knox, C. (1997). For Better or Worse? Community Relations Initiatives in Northern Ireland. *Peace & Change*, 22(3), 330-355.
- Hume, J., & Adams, G. (1997,18/07). Joint statement issued by Sinn Féin President Mr Gerry Adams MP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party Leader Mr John Hume MP. Retrieved from <http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15222> on 02/02/2016
- Hürriyet. (2012,09/04). 33 Şehitli O Günden Beri Hiç Kahkaha Atamadım. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/33-sehitli-o-gunden-beri-hic-kahkaha-atamadim-20303221> on 01/05/2014
- Hürriyet. (2013a,27/06). 'Akil' Rapor Tamam. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/akil-rapor-tamam-23595419> on 30/08/2013
- Hürriyet. (2013b,21/03). İşte Öcalan'ın Mesajı. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-ocalanin-mesaji-22866213> on 01/05/2013
- Hürriyet. (2014,06/11). 6-7 Ekim'in Bilançosu 50 Ölü. 21/02/2015. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/6-7-ekim-in-aci-bilancosu-50-olu-27525777> on 21/02/2015
- HWR. (1992). *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Helsinki Watch Report*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Hylton, R. (1981). The Peace-making Role of Christians in Ireland and Britain. *The Furrow*, 32(5), 333-335.
- Hylton, R. (1982). Opportunities for Peacemaking. *The Furrow*, 33(1), 29-35.
- ICC. (2012,11/09). Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement. *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved from [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.pdf) on 24/01/2014
- Idoiaga, G.E. (2006). *The Basque Conflict: New Ideas and Prospects for Peace*. Retrieved from <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr161.pdf> on 01/06/2016
- Ikenberry, G.J., & Kupchan, C.A. (1990). International Organization. *International Organization*, 44(3), 283-315.

- Ikle, F.C. (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper.
- Ikle, F.C., & Leites, N. (1962). Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6(1), 19-28.
- İmset, İ.G. (1992). *The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992)*. Ankara: Turkish Daily News.
- Ingram, J. (1998). The Irish Peace Process. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/talks.htm> on 16/07/2013
- IRA. (1996,09/02). Irish Republican Army: Statement Ending the Ceasefire. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira9296.htm> on 01/02/2016
- IRA. (1997,19/07). Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ceasefire Statement. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira19797.htm> on 10/02/2016
- Jackson, R. (2000). Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), 323-343.
- Jackson, R. (2009). Constructivism and Conflict Resolution. In J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, & I.W. Zartman (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of conflict resolution* (pp.172-190). London: Sage.
- Jacoby, T., & Özerdem, A. (2013). *Peace in Turkey 2023: The Question of Human Security and Conflict Transformation*. Plymouth: Lexington.
- Jenkins, B. (1974). *International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare*. California: RAND.
- Jenkins, G. (2001). *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*. Oxford: Taylor and Francis.
- Jeong, H.-W. (2000). *Peace and Conflict Studies an Introduction*. Hants: Ashgate.
- Johnson, L.K. (1992). On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations. *The American Journal of International Law*, 86(2), 284-309.
- Jones, S.G., & Libicki, M.C. (2008). *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*. California: RAND.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Kadioğlu, İ.A. (2016,15/02). The End of Turkey's Kurdish 'Peace Process'? Retrieved from <http://nottspolitics.org/2016/02/15/theendofturkeyscurdishpeaceprocess/> on 15/02/2016
- Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kaliber, A., & Tocci, N. (2010). Civil Society and the Transformation of Turkey's Kurdish Question. *Security Dialogue*, 41(2), 191-215.

- Kanlı, Y. (2007,29/01). The Turkish Deep State. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-turkish-deep-state.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-turkish-deep-state-2007-01-29> on 27/11/2011
- Kapmaz, C. (2011). *Öcalan'ın İmralı Günleri*. İstanbul: İthaki.
- Karayılan, M. (2014). *Bir Savaşın Anatomisi: Kürdistan'da Askeri Çizgi*. İstanbul: Gün Matbaacılık.
- Karayılan, M. (2015,14/07). Karayılan: Son Kararımız... Retrieved from <http://rudaw.net/turkish/middleeast/turkey/140720152> on 31/07/2015
- Kaufman, E. (2003). Sharing the Experience of Citizens' Diplomacy with Partners in Conflict. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second Track/citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation* (pp.183-223). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kaye, D.D. (2001). Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East. *International Negotiation*, 6(1), 49-77.
- Kaye, D.D. (2007). *Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia*. California: RAND.
- KDGM. (2013). *Demokratikleşme Paketi*. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı.
- Kelman, H.C. (1982). Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26(1), 39-75.
- Kelman, H.C. (1987). The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution? *Political Psychology*, 8(3), 347-363.
- Kelman, H.C. (1990). Interactive Problem-Solving: A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution. In J.W. Burton & F. Dukes (Eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (pp.199-215). London: MacMillan.
- Kelman, H.C. (1992). Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner. In J. Bercovitch & J.Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Mediation in International Relations* (pp.64-96). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kelman, H.C. (1996). The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (pp.500-520). Washington: Institute of Peace Press.
- Kelman, H.C. (1997a). Group Processes in the Resolution of International Conflicts: Experiences from the Israeli-Palestinian Case. *American Psychologist*, 52, 212-220.
- Kelman, H.C. (1997b). Social-psychological Dimensions of International Conflict. In J.L. Rasmussen & I.W. Zartman (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques* (pp.191-237). Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- Kelman, H.C. (1998). Interactive Problem Solving: An Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application in the Middle East. *Political Science and Politics*, 31(2), 190-198.
- Kelman, H.C. (2003). Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation* (pp.82-105). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kelman, H.C. (2004). Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation* (pp.111-124). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kelman, H.C. (2010). Interactive Problem Solving: Changing Political Culture in the Pursuit of Conflict Resolution. *Peace and Conflict*, 16, 389-413.
- Kennedy-Pipe, C., & Mumford, A. (2009). Is Torture Ever Justified? Torture, Rights and Rules from Northern Ireland to Iraq. In A.F. Lang & A.R. Beattie (Eds.), *War, Torture and Terrorism* (pp.54-68). Oxon: Routledge.
- Keohane, R.O. (1986). *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keyman, F. (2014). Çözüm Süreci, Müzakere, Güven ve Demokrasi. In M. Aktaş (Ed.), *Çatışma Çözümleri ve Barış* (pp.15-28). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Kili, S. (1980). Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey. *International Political Science Review*, 1(3), 381-404.
- King, G., Keohane, R.O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- King, G., Keohane, R.O., & Verba, S. (2004). Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. In H.E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *The Importance of Research Design* (pp.181-192). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kirişçi, K., & Winrow, G.M. (1997). *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*. London: Frank Cass.
- Kızılkaya, M. (2015). *Barışa Katlanmak: Bir Akilin 83 Günü*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları.
- Kleiboer, M. (1994). Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion. *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 109-116.
- Knox, C. (2002). See No Evil, Hear No Evil. *British Journal of Criminology*, 42(1), 164-185.
- Knox, C., & Hughes, J. (1996). Crossing the Divide: Community Relations in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), 83-98.

- Knox, C., & Quirk, P. (2000). *Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koch, K.F. (1974). *War and Peace in Jalemo*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Kochan, T.A., & Jick, T. (1978). The Public Sector Mediation Process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22(2), 209-240.
- Kraslow, D., & Loory, S.H. (1968). *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (Vol. 152). New York: Random House.
- Kremenyuk, V.A. (2002). *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. California: Jossey-Bass.
- Kressel, K., & Pruitt, D.G. (1989). *Mediation Research*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kriesberg, L. (1987). Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves. *Negotiation Journal*, 3(4), 375-384.
- Kriesberg, L. (1992). *International Conflict Resolution: The US-USSR and Middle East Cases*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kriesberg, L. (1996). Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts. *Negotiation Journal*, 12(4), 341-352.
- Kriesberg, L. (1998). *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kriesberg, L. (2001). Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 373-392.
- Kriesberg, L. (2008). The Evolution of Conflict Resolution. In J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, & I.W. Zartman (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of conflict resolution* (pp.15-32). California: Sage.
- Kriesberg, L. (2011). The State of the Art in Conflict Transformation. In A. Beatrix, M. Fischer, & H.-J. Giessmann (Eds.), *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II* (pp.49-74). Michigan: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Kuenne, R.L. (1989). Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33(3), 554-566.
- Kydd, A.H., & Walter, B.F. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security*, 31(1), 49-80.
- Lama, D. (2002,01/09). His Holiness the 14. Dalai Lama's Message on the Commemoration of the 1st Anniversary of September 11, 2001. Retrieved from <http://tibet.net/2002/09/his-holiness-the-dalai-lamas-message-on-the-commemoration-of-the-1st-anniversary-of-september-11-2001-2/> on 28/10/2016
- Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(5), 24-36.
- Laqueur, W. (1999). *The New Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Laqueur, W. (2004). *No End to War, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Continuum International Publishing.
- Lavery, B. (2002,17/07). I.R.A. Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Its 30-Year Campaign. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/17/world/ira-apologizes-for-civilian-deaths-in-its-30-year-campaign.html> on 16/07/2013
- Lebow, R.N. (1985). Generating Learning and Conflict Management. *International Journal*, 40(4), 555-585.
- Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lemarchand, R. (1962). The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession. *The American Political Science Review*, 56(2), 404-416.
- Lemarchand, R. (1996). *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lentz, T.F. (1955). *Towards a Science of Peace, Turning Point in Human Density*. New York: Bookman Associates.
- Lesser, I.O., Hoffman, B., Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., & Zanini, M. (Eds.). (1999). *Countering The New Terrorism*. California: RAND.
- Levy, J.S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25, 1-18.
- Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993. *The American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 681-690.
- Lieberfeld, D. (2002). Evaluating the Contributions of Track-two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(3), 355-372.
- Lieberfeld, D. (2007). Promoting Tractability in South Africa and Israel/Palestine: The Role of Semiofficial Meetings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 1542-1562.
- Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. *World Politics*, 21(2), 207-225.
- Lijphart, A. (1979). Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 12(3), 499-515.
- Lijphart, A. (2002). The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds (Ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy* (pp.37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lipschutz, R.D. (1998). Beyond the Neoliberal Peace: From Conflict Resolution to Social Reconciliation. *Social Justice*, 25(4 (74)), 5-19.

- Littig, B. (2009). Interviewing the Elite- Interviewing experts: Is There a Difference? In A. Bogner, B. Littig, & W. Menz (Eds.), *Interviewing Experts* (pp.98-113). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Little, D. (2006). *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Love, M.T. (1995). *Peace Building through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Lynch, T.J. (2003). The Gerry Adams Visa in Anglo-American Relations. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 14(1), 33-44.
- Mabry, L. (2008). Case Study in Social Research. In P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, & J. Brannen (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods* (pp.214-227). London: Sage.
- MacGinty, R. (1999). 'Biting the Bullet': Decommissioning in the Transition from War to Peace in Northern Ireland'. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 10, 237-247.
- Mahoney, J., & Goertz, G. (2004). The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 653-669.
- Major, J. (2000). *John Major: The Autobiography*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Mallie, E., & McKittrick, D. (1997). *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process*. London: Reed International.
- Maney, G.M., Ibrahim, I., Higgins, G.I., & Herzog, H. (2006). The Past's Promise: Lessons from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(2), 181-200.
- Mango, A. (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Mapa Europeo. (2013,31/08). Map of Turkey. Retrieved from <http://www.mapaeuropeo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Mapa-de-Turquia.jpg> on 01/04/2017
- Mapendere, J. (2005). Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks. *Culture of Peace Online Journal*, 2(1), 66-81.
- Marcus, A. (2015). *Kan ve İnanç*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Martin, G. (2010). *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues* (Vol. 3). London: Sage.
- Mayer, B. (1987). The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation. *Mediation Quarterly*, 1987(16), 75-86.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D., & Zald, M.N. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McDaid, S. (2013). *Template for Peace, Northern Ireland, 1972-75*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- McDonald, J.W. (1991). Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy. In L. Kriesberg & S. Thorson (Eds.), *Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts: Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (pp.201-220). New York: Syracuse University Press.
- McDonald, J.W., & Bendahmane, D.B. (1987). *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*. Washington: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State.
- McDowall, D. (2004). *Modern History of the Kurds*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- McEvoy, J. (2006). Elite Interviewing in a Divided Society: Lessons from Northern Ireland. *Politics*, 26(3), 184-191.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1993). Introduction: The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict. In J. McGarry & B. O'leary (Eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (pp.1-40). Oxon: Routledge.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1994). The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47(1), 94-115.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1995). *Explaining Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2005). Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, 1-30.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2006). Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland. *Government and Opposition*, 41(1), 43-63.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2009). Power Shared After the Deaths of Thousands. In R. Taylor (Ed.), *Consociational Theory* (pp.15-84). Oxon: Routledge.
- McGarry, J., & O'leary, B. (2013). *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*. London: Routledge.
- McGlynn, C., Niens, U., Cairns, E., & Hewstone, M. (2004). Moving out of Conflict: The Contribution of Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland to Identity, Attitudes, Forgiveness and Reconciliation. *Journal of Peace Education*, 1(2), 147-163.
- McGuire, M. (1973). *To Take Arms: A Year In The Provisional IRA*. London: MacMillan.
- McKeown, C., & McLachlan, P. (1977). *Strategy for Peace*. Belfast: Peace People.
- McKinnon, D. (2004). Conflict Resolution: A Commonwealth Perspective. *The RUSI Journal*, 149(2), 16-20.
- McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McEva, D. (2007). *Lost Lives: The Stories of Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

- McKool, K. (1987, August 6). Valuable Lessons in British Duplicity. *An Phoblacht*.
- McVeigh, R., & Rolston, B. (2007). From Good Friday to Good Relations: Sectarianism, Racism and the Northern Ireland State. *Institute of Race Relations*, 48(4), 1-23.
- Medd, R., & Goldstein, F. (1997). International Terrorism on the Eve of the Millennium. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 20(3), 218-316.
- Megahey, A. (2000). *The Irish Protestant Churches in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Macmillan.
- Melaugh, M. (2002). Sutton Index of Deaths. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/index.html> on 17/09/2015
- Meyer, M. (2004). Organizational Identity, Political Contexts, and SMO Action: Explaining the Tactical Choices Made by Peace Organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. *Social Movement Studies*, 3(2), 167-197.
- Mill, J.S. (1851). *A System Of Logic, Ratiocinative And Inductive* Vol. 1 and 2.
- Milliyet. (2009,31/08). Bakan Atalay 'Kürt Açılımını' Açıkladı. Retrieved from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bakan-atalay--font-color-red-kurt-acilimini--font--acikladi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/31.08.2009/1133933/default.htm> on 15/05/2015
- Milliyet. (2012,22/06). Son On Yıldaki Şehit Sayımız. Retrieved from <http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/son-on-yildaki-sehit-sayimiz/Blog/?BlogNo=368048> on 08/04/2014
- Milliyet. (2016,29/06). Türkiye’de Yaşanan IŞİD’in Eylemleri. Retrieved from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-de-yasanan-isis-in-gundem-2270438/> on 01/05/2017
- Mitchell, G. (1999). *Making Peace*. London: William Heinemann.
- Mitchell, G., De Chastelain, J., & Holkeri, H. (1996). *Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning*. Retrieved from Belfast: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199596/ldhansrd/v0960124/text/60124-08.htm> on 27/11/2014
- Modelski, G. (1964). International Settlement of Internal War. In J.N. Rosenau (Ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (pp.122-153). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moloney, E. (2002). *A Secret History of the IRA*. London: Penguin Books.
- Montalvo, J.G., & Reynal-Qerol, M. (2005). Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars. *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 796-816.
- Montville, J.V. (1987). The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track-Two Diplomacy. In J.W. McDonald & D.B. Bendahmane (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track-Two Diplomacy* (pp.161-175). Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State.

- Montville, J.V. (2006). Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History. *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 7, 15-25.
- Moore, J. (1997). Paramilitary Prisoners and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. In A. O'Day (Ed.), *Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution* (pp.81-94). Connecticut: Praeger.
- Morgan, M.J. (2004). The Origins of the New Terrorism. *Parameters*, 34(1), 29-43.
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1973a). *Politics among Nations*. New York: Knoph.
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1973b). Six Principles of Political Realism. In H.J. Morgenthau (Ed.), *From Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (pp.34-38). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morris, Z.S. (2009). The Truth about Interviewing Elites. *Politics*, 29(3), 209-217.
- Morrison, D. (1981, 05/11). By Ballot and Bullet. *An Problacht/Republican News*.
- Morse, J.M. (1991). Approaches to Qualitative-Quantitative Methodological Triangulation. *Nursing Research*, 40(1), 120-123.
- Muircheartaigh, J.O. (2013,12/06). The Death of Ruairí O Bradaigh and the Feakle Peace talks of 1974. Retrieved from <http://www.clarepeople.com/2013/06/11/the-death-of-ruairi-o-bradaigh-and-the-feakle-peace-talks-of-1974/> on 30/07/2015
- Mullings, B. (1999). Insider or Outsider, both or neither: Some Dilemmas of Interviewing in a Cross-cultural Setting. *Geoforum*, 30(4), 337-350.
- Mumford, A. (2011). Covert Peacemaking: Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the Early 'Troubles', 1972-1976. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 39(4), 633-648.
- Mumford, A. (2012). *The Counter-insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Murray, G., & Tonge, J. (2005). *Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation*. London: C. Hurst.
- Nagle, J., & Clancy, M.-A.C. (2012). Constructing a Shared Public Identity in Ethno-Nationally Divided Societies: Comparing Consociational and Transformationist Perspectives. *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 78-97.
- Nan, S.A. (1999). *Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria*. (PhD Dissertation), George Mason University.
- Nan, S.A. (2003). Track I Diplomacy. Retrieved from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy> on 01/11/2011

- Nan, S.A. (2004). Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Searching for Political Agreement in the Caucasus. In M. Fitzduff & C. Church (Eds.), *NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict* (pp.57-76). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nan, S.A. (2005). Track One-and-a-Half Diplomacy: Contributions to Georgia-South Ossetian Peacemaking. In R.J. Fisher (Ed.), *Paving the Way* (pp.161-173). Lanham: Lexington.
- Nan, S.A., & Strimling, A. (2006). Coordination in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. *International Negotiation*, 11, 1-6.
- Nardin, T. (1971). Theories of Conflict Management. *Peace Research Reviews*, 4(2), 1-93.
- Neumann, P.R. (2007). Negotiating with Terrorists. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(1), 128-138.
- Neumann, P.R. (2009). *Old and New Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Northern Ireland Office. (1996). *Statement by the Independent Chairmen of the Northern Ireland Talks*. Belfast.
- NTV. (2013,30/09). İşte Demokratikleşme Paketi. Retrieved from <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/iste-demokratikleşme-paketi,E5m3xY2fFEeYMj7ZCLopSA> on 01/11/2013
- NTV. (2015,22/10). Ömer Çelik: Kılıçdaroğlu'nun Belgeleri Açıklamasını Bekliyoruz. Retrieved from <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/omer-celik-kilicdaroglunun-belgeleri-aciklamasini-bekliyoruz,JfnFVsX-5kmraMZ6CXGF2g> on 01/05/2016
- NUI-POL/35/4/62. (1975). *Duddy Papers*. 01/06/1975.
- NUI-POL/35/9/279. (1993). *Robert McLarnon's Message to Brendan Duddy*. 01/05/1993.
- NUI-POL/35/68/1. (1975). *A Letter from the IRA to the British Prime Minister*. 24/01/1975.
- NUI-POL/35/69. (1975). *The Gardiner Report*. 01/08/1975.
- NUI-POL/35/166/2. (1981). *The Red Book*. 06/07/1981.
- NUI-POL/35/166/3. (1981). *The Red Book*. 06/07/1981.
- NUI-POL/35/167/3. (1981). *The Red Book*. 07/07/1981.
- NUI-POL/35/266/1. (1993). *IRA Ceasefire Offer*. 14/05/1993.
- NYT. (2013,25/04). Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw From Turkey. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from-turkey.html> on 01/05/2013
- NYT. (2017,09/05). Trump to Arm Syrian Kurds, Even as Turkey Strongly Objects. Retrieved from

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/trump-kurds-syria-army.html?mcubz=0&r=2> on 16/05/2017

- O'Donnell, D. (1977). *The Peace People of Northern Ireland*. Victoria: Widescope.
- O'Dowd, L., & McCall, C. (2008). Escaping the Cage of Ethno-National Conflict in Northern Ireland? The Importance of Transnational Networks. *Ethnopolitics*, 7(1), 81-99.
- O'Duffy, B. (2000). British and Irish Conflict Regulation From Sunningdale to Belfast. Part II: Playing for a Draw 1985–1999. *Nations and Nationalism*, 6(3), 399-435.
- O'Hagan, S. (2008,19/10). The Real Maze Men Speak. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2008/oct/19/northernireland> on 26/02/2016
- O'Kane, E. (2004). Anglo–Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: From Exclusion to Inclusion. *Contemporary British History*, 18(1), 78-99.
- O'Kane, E. (2006). When Can Conflicts be Resolved? A Critique of Ripeness. *Civil Wars*, 8(3-4), 268-284.
- O'Leary, B. (1989). The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland. *Political Studies*, 37, 562-588.
- O'Leary, B., & McGarry, J. (1995). Regulating Nations and Ethnic Communities. In A. Breton (Ed.), *Nationalism and Rationality* (pp.245-289). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Lesser, I. (1999). *Countering the New Terrorism*. Santa Monica: CA: RAND.
- Öcalan, A. (1993). *PKK IV. Kongresi'ne Sunulan Politik Rapor*. İstanbul: Zagros Yayınları.
- Öcalan, A. (2003). *Özgür İnsan Savunması*. İstanbul: Çetin Yayınları.
- Öcalan, A. (2011a,18/07). Demokratik Anayasal Çözüm Gelişmezse Halkın Direnme Hakkı Vardır! Retrieved from <http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=932> on 20/07/2015
- Öcalan, A. (2011b,27/06). Önümüzde İki Yol Var: Demokratik Anayasal Çözüm ile Devrimci Halk Savaşı. Retrieved from <http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=890> on 30/10/2015
- Öcalan, A. (2013,21/03). Öcalan's Newroz Message. *BiaNet*. Retrieved from <http://bianet.org/bianet/diger/163204-ocalan-s-newroz-message> on 22/03/2013
- Öcalan, A. (2015). *Demokratik Kurtuluş ve Özgür yaşamı İnşa (İmralı Notları)*. Neuss: Mezopotamya Yayınları.

- Official Gazette. (2009). *Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 11.12.2009 Tarih E. 2007/1, K. 2009/4 Sayılı Kararı*. Resmi Gazete, 14/12/2009.
- Oğur, Y. (1996,14/04). Asker Üç Yıl Boyunca PKK ile Görüştü. *Taraf*. Retrieved from <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/yildirayogur/asker-uc-yil-boyunca-pkk-ile-gorustu/11993/> on 29/05/2015
- Olszanska, J., Olszanski, R., & Wozniak, J. (1993). Do Peaceful Conflict Management Methods Pose Problems in Posttotalitarian Poland? *Mediation Quarterly*, 10, 291-302.
- Oran, B. (2014). *"Ben Ege'de Akilken...": Kürt Barışında Batı Cephesi*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Ott, M.C. (1972). Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases. *International Organization*, 26(4), 595-618.
- Özcan, A.K. (2014). *'Araf'taki Çözüm Süreci*. Ankara: Savaş.
- Özcan, N.A. (1999). *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi, Yöntemi*. Ankara: ASAM.
- Ozcelik, S. (2006). Theories, Practices, and Research in Conflict Resolution and Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 26(2), 133-153.
- Özdağ, Ü. (2014). *PKK ile Pazarlık: Öcalan ile Anayasa Yapmak*. Ankara: Kripto.
- Özerdem, A. (2013). Türkiye'ye Barış Gelir Mi? *Panorama Khas*, 10, 26-28.
- Özerdem, A. (2014,21/10). Turkey is Paying for Decades of Divisive Politics as It Fights to End Its Civil War. *Conversation*. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-paying-for-decades-of-divisive-politics-as-it-fights-to-end-its-civil-war-33197> on 01/11/2016
- Özerdem, A. (2016,22/08). Turkey Isn't A Failed State, But Maybe It Should Act Like One. *Conversation*. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/turkey-isnt-a-failed-state-but-maybe-it-should-act-like-one-64181> on 10/09/2016
- Özerdem, A., & Jacoby, T. (2007). Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement. In Z.F. Kabasakal-Arat (Ed.), *Human Rights in Turkey* (pp.159-169). Philadelphia: PENN.
- Özerdem, A., & Özerdem, F. (2013). Introduction. In A. Özerdem & F. Özerdem (Eds.), *Human Security in Turkey: Challenges for the 21st century* (pp.1-10). London: Routledge.
- Özgür Haber. (2012,19/09). İşte AKP ve PKK Arasındaki Yapılan Anlaşmaların Ses Kayıtları. *YouTube*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOy0LQAksjo> on 28/02/2013
- Özgürel, A. (2012,13/06). İşte Avni Özgürel'in Karayılan Röportajı. *Demokrat Haber*. Retrieved from

<http://www.demokrathaber.net/roportajlar/iste-avni-ozgurelin-karayilan-roportaji-h9428.html> on 08/02/2014

- Özhan, T. (2015). *Normalleşme Sancısı: Açılımdan Çözüm Süreci'ne Kürt Meselesi*. Ankara: Özgür.
- Patton, M.Q. (1990). *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. California: Sage.
- Pearson, F.S. (2001). Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 275-287.
- Perinçek, D. (2014). *Abdullah Öcalan'la Görüşmeler*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G.R. (2003). *The External Control of Organizations*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Pillar, P.R. (1990). Ending Limited War: The Psychological Dynamics of the Termination Process. In B. Glad (Ed.), *Psychological dimensions of war* (pp.252-263). California: Sage.
- Polley, R.B. (1988). Intervention and Cultural Context: Mediation in the U.S. and Norway. *Journal of Management*, 14, 617-629.
- Post, J.M. (2007). *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Post, J.M., & Berko, A. (2009). Talking with Terrorists. *Democracy and Security*, 5(2), 145-148.
- Potapchuk, W.R. (1996). Building Sustainable Community Politics: Synergizing Participatory, Institutional, and Representative Democracy. *National Civic Review*, 85(3), 54-59.
- Powell, J. (2008). *Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Powell, J. (2014,07/10). How to Talk to Terrorists. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/-sp-how-to-talk-to-terrorists-isis-al-qaida> on 08/10/2014
- Prei, D. (1985). Empathy in Conflict Management. *International Journal*, 40(4), 586-598.
- Princen, T. (1992). *Intermediaries in International Conflict*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Pruitt, D.G. (1971). Indirect Communication and the Search for Agreement in Negotiation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 1(3), 205-239.
- Pruitt, D.G. (1991). Strategy in Negotiation. In V. Kremenyuk (Ed.), *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. California: Jossey-Bass.
- Pruitt, D.G. (1994). Negotiation Between Organizations: A Branching Chain Model. *Negotiation Journal*, 10(3), 217-230.

- Pruitt, D.G. (1997). Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks. *International Negotiation*, 2, 237-250.
- Pruitt, D.G. (2005). Escalation, Readiness for Negotiation, and Third-party Functions. In I.W. Zartman & G.O. Faure (Eds.), *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflict* (pp.251-270). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pruitt, D.G. (2006). Negotiation with Terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 11(2), 374-394.
- Pruitt, D.G. (2007). Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 1520-1541.
- Pruitt, D.G. (2008). Back-channel Communication in the Settlement of Conflict. *International Negotiation*, 13(1), 37-54.
- Pruitt, D.G., & Rubin, J.Z. (1986). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (Vol. 1). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley.
- Punch, K.F. (2005). *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Quillen, C. (2002). A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 25(5), 279-292.
- Radikal. (2013,07/03). "Kürt Meselesine İslami Çözüm" Çalıştayı. *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/diyarbakir-haber/kurt-meselesine-islami-cozum-calistayi-1308384/> on 15/11/2015
- Radikal. (2015,22/10). CHP'den Ömer Çelik'e Yanıt: Protokol AKP-PKK Mutabakat Metnidir. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/chpden-omer-celike-yanit-protokol-akp-pkk-mutabakat-metnidir-1457434/> on 23/10/2015
- Rafter, K. (2003). Priests and Peace: The Role of the Redemptorist Order in the Northern Ireland Peace Process. *Etudes irlandaises*, 28(1), 159-176.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Polity.
- Rapley, T. (2007). *Doing Conversation, Discourse and Document Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Rapoport, D.C. (2002). The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. *The Journal of Generative Anthropology*, 8(1).

- Rea, D. (1996). The Political Dimension of Northern Ireland. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 23(12), 30-57.
- Read, B.L., & Michelson, E. (2008). Mediating the Mediation Debate: Conflict Resolution and the Local State in China. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(5), 737-764.
- Rees, W., & Aldrich, R.J. (2005). Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence? *International Affairs*, 81(5), 905-923.
- Reinares, F. (2003). Democratization and State Responses to Protracted Terrorism in Spain. In M. Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (Vol. 57-70). Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Reinares, F. (2005). Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective. In T. Bjorgo (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (pp.119-130). Oxford: Routledge.
- Renwick, D. (2014,01/12/2014). FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas. on 28/02/2015
- Richards, D. (1996). Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls. *Politics*, 16(3), 199-204.
- Richmond, O.P. (1999). Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(3), 42-63.
- Richmond, O.P. (2001). Rethinking Conflict Resolution: The Linkage Problematic Between "Track I" and Track II". *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 21(2).
- Richter-Devroe, S. (2008). Gender, Culture, and Conflict Resolution in Palestine. *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, 4(2), 30-59.
- Riemer, J. (1977). Varieties of Opportunistic Research. *Urban Life*, 5, 467-477.
- Riker, W.H. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Romano, D. (2006a). Conducting Research in the Middle East's Conflict Zones. *Political Science and Politics*, 39(3), 439-441.
- Romano, D. (2006b). *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rothman, J. (1997). *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, Organizations, and Communities*. California: Jossey-Bass.
- Rothman, J., & Olson, M.L. (2001). From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 289-305.
- Rouhana, N.N. (2011). Key Issues in Reconciliation: Challenging Traditional Assumptions on Conflict Resolution and Power Dynamics. In D. Bar-

- Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective* (pp.291-314). New York: Psychology Press.
- Rousseau, J.J. (1895). *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, Book I, Chapter III. The Right of the Strongest*. Ohio: Allen and Unwin.
- Rowan, B. (1995). *Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
- RPM. (1988). *The Mission Statement of the Peace Ministry*. The Redemptorist Peace Ministry. Belfast.
- Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (1996). *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rubin, J.Z. (1981). *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East*: Praeger New York.
- Rubin, J.Z., Pruitt, D.G., & Kim, S.H. (1994). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (Vol. 2). New York: McGraw Hill.
- Sabah. (2015,11/03). Barış Treni Yola Çıktı. *Sabah*. Retrieved from <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/03/11/baris-treni-yola-cikti> on 10/12/2015
- Said, A.A., Lerche, C.O., & Lerche, I.C.O. (1995). *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2007). The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19(3), 289-306.
- Sanders, A. (2012). *Inside the IRA: Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Sandıklı, A., & Kaya, E. (2012). *Çatışma Çözümü ve Türkiye'de Kürt Meselesi*. İstanbul: Bilgesam.
- Sanson, A., & Bretherton, D. (2007). Conflict Resolution: Theoretical and Practical Issues. In D.J. Christie, R.V. Wagner, & D.D.N. Winter (Eds.), *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century* (pp.193-209). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Sapio, A., & Zamperini, A. (2007). Peace Psychology, Theory and Practice. In C. Weibel & J. Galtung (Eds.), *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (pp.265-278). Oxon: Routledge.
- Saunders, H.H. (1996). Prenegotiation and Circum-Negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Managing global chaos* (pp.419-432). Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Savir, U. (1998). *The Process: 1100 Days that Changed the Middle East*. New York: Random House.
- Saybaşıllı, K. (1995). *DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Üç Yılı*. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık.

- Schiff, A. (2010). "Quasi Track-One" Diplomacy: An Analysis of the Geneva Process in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *International Studies Perspectives*, 11(2), 93-111.
- Schmid, A.P. (2005a). Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a multi-pronged approach. In T. Bjorgo (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (pp.223-240). Oxford: Routledge.
- Schmid, A.P. (2005b). Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17(1-2), 25-35.
- Schmid, A.P., & Jongman, A.J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. New Jersey: Transaction Books.
- Schultz, B. (1989). Conflict Resolution Training Programs: Implications for Theory and Research. *Negotiation Journal*, 5(3), 301-309.
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294-308.
- Sebenius, J.K., & Kogan, E.B. (2016). Henry Kissinger's Negotiation Campaign to End the Vietnam War. *Harvard Business School, Working Paper 17-053*.
- Selvi, A. (2014,03/11). Çözüm Süreci Stres Altında. *Yeni Şafak*. Retrieved from <http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/cozum-sureci-stres-testinde-56757> on 02/05/2016
- Sendika. (2009,25/12). Öcalan'la Görüşme Notu: Kolektif Haklar Tanınmazsa Savaş 50 Yıl Sürer. Retrieved from <http://www.sendika.org/2009/12/ocalanla-gorusme-notu-kolektif-haklar-taninmazsa-savas-50-yil-surer-anf/> on 15/05/2015
- SETA. (2014). *Turkey's 2014 Local Elections*. İstanbul: SETA (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Araştırmalar Vakfı).
- Shearer, D. (1997). Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone. *International Studies*, 26(3), 845-860.
- Simon, S., & Benjamin, D. (2000). America and the New Terrorism. *Survival*, 42(1), 59-75.
- Simon, S., & Benjamin, D. (2001). The Terror. *Survival*, 43(4), 5-18.
- Simpson, J.A., & Weiner, E.S.C. (Eds.). (1987) *The Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sinn Fein. (1973). *Freedom Struggle by the Provisional IRA*. Dublin: Irish Republican Publicity Bureau.
- Slim, R., & Saunders, H. (2001). The Inter-Tajik Dialogue: From Civil War towards Civil Society. In C. Barnes & K. Abdullaev (Eds.), *Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace process* (pp.44-47).
- Smith, M.L.R. (1997). *Fighting for Ireland?: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*. London: Routledge.

- Smith, M.L.R., & Neumann, P.R. (2005). Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland. *Contemporary British History*, 19(4), 413-435.
- Snow, D.A., & Benford, R.D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. *International social movement research*, 1(1), 197-217.
- Snyder, J.L., & Jervis, R. (1999). Civil War and the Security Dilemma. In B.F. Walter & J.L. Snyder (Eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (pp.15-37). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sohn, D.-W., & Wall, J.A. (1993). Community Mediation in South-Korea: A City-Village Comparison. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(3), 536-543.
- Somer, M., & Liaras, E.G. (2010). Turkey's New Kurdish Opening: Religious versus Secular Values. *Middle East Policy*, 17(2), 152-165.
- Söylemez, H. (2013,14/01). Oslo'daki o Kadın Konuştu: İradenin Yürütücü Gücü Kandil'dir. *Aksiyon*. Retrieved from http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/dosyalar/oslo-daki-o-kadin-konustu-iradenin-yurutucu-gucu-kandil-dir_534522 on 17/03/2016
- Sözcü. (2015,09/08). Türkiye IŞİD'e 3 yıldır destek veriyor. Retrieved from <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/turkiye-isis-3-yildir-destek-veriyor-905016/> on 28/02/2017
- Sözen, A., & Özersay, K. (2007). The Annan Plan: State Succession or Continuity. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(1), 125-141.
- Spector, B.I. (2003). Negotiating with Villains Revisited. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 613-621.
- Spencer, A. (2006). Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism'. *Peace, Conflict & Development*, 8, 1-33. Retrieved from
- Spencer, G. (2000). Negotiating Peace: Politics, Television News and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. *Irish Studies Review*, 8(2), 217-231.
- Spencer, G. (2005). The Northern Ireland Peace Process. In G. Spencer (Ed.), *The Media and Peace* (pp.123-141). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sprinzak, E. (2001). The Lone Gunmen. *Foreign Policy*, 127, 72-73.
- Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2005). *Negotiating a Complex World: An Introduction to International Negotiation*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- START. (2013). *Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism*. Retrieved from: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>
- Stavenhagen, R. (1996). *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*. London: MacMillan.

- Stedman, S.J. (1991). *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*. Boulder: L. Rienner.
- Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in the Peace Process. *International Security*, 22(2), 5-53.
- Stein, J.G. (1987). A Common Aversion to War: Regime Creation by Egypt and Israel as a Strategy of Conflict Management. In G. Ben-Dor & D.B. Dewitt (Eds.), *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (pp.59-77). Kentucky: Lexington.
- Stepan, A.C. (2001). *Arguing Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stephenson, M.J., & Zanotti, L. (2012). *Peacebuilding through Community-based NGOs: Paradoxes and Possibilities*. Virginia: Kumarian Press.
- Stern, P.C., & Druckman, D. (2000). *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington: National Academies Press.
- Stratejik-Ortak. (2017,31/03). Suriye Son Durum Haritası. Retrieved from <https://www.stratejikortak.com/2017/03/suriye-son-durum-harita-nisan-2017.html> on 10/05/2017
- T24. (2013,13/10). Beşir Atalay'dan Öcalan'a Övgü, BDP'ye Sert Eleştiri. T24. Retrieved from <http://t24.com.tr/haber/besir-atalaydan-ocalana-ovgu-bdp-ye-sert-elestiri/241823> on 24/12/2013
- Tan, A. (2015). *Kürt Sorunu: Ya Tam Kardeşlik Ya Hep Beraber Kölelik*. İstanbul: Timaş.
- Tannam, E. (2001). Explaining the Good Friday Agreement: A Learning Process. *Government and Opposition*, 36(4), 493-518.
- Taraf. (2011,14/09). PKK-MİT Görüşmeleri Tam Metin. Retrieved from <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-pkk-mit-gizli-gorusemeleri-tam-metin-78057/> on 05/01/2012
- Taylor, P. (1998). *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Taylor, P. (2002a). *Brits: The War against the IRA*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Taylor, R. (2002b). South Africa: The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in the Struggle against Apartheid. In B. Gidron, S.N. Katz, & Y. Hasenfeld (Eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* (pp.69-93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tayyar, Ş. (2008,15/10). Apo'ya 'Acil' Kodlu Mesaj. *Star*. Retrieved from <http://www.star.com.tr/gazete/yazar/samil-tayyar/apo-ya-acil-kodlu-mesaj-136307.htm> on 05/02/2010
- Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanunu, 2559 C.F.R. § 3 (1934).
- Terörle Mücadele Kanunu, 3713 C.F.R. § 5 (1991).
- TBMM, Temel Hak ve Hürriyetlerin Geliştirilmesi Amacıyla Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 6529 C.F.R. (2014a).

- TBMM, Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun, 6551 C.F.R. (2014b).
- Thatcher, M. (1981). Speech at Stormont Castle Lunch [Press release]
- Thatcher, M. (1985, 13/12/1985) *Interview with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher/Interviewer: D.M. Belfast Telegraph*. Thatcher Archive.
- Thatcher, M. (1993). *The Downing Street Years*. London: Harper Collins.
- The British Government. (1996,15/03). Ground Rules for Substantive All-Party Government. *University of Ulster CAIN Web Service*. Retrieved from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/cp15396.htm> on 24/01/2016
- Tilly, C. (2004). Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists. *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 5-13.
- TNA-CAB/128/48/3. (1972). *Confidential Annex: Northern Ireland Secretary*. 15/06/1972.
- TNA-CAB/128/71/17. (1981). *Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet*. 19/11/1981.
- TNA-CAB/128/81/34. (1985). *Cabinet Conclusion*. 28/11/1985.
- TNA-CAB/128/81/37. (1985). *Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet*. 19/11/1985.
- TNA-CAB/128/83/36. (1986). *Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet*. 06/11/1986.
- TNA-CAB/134/3921. (1975). *Memo on IRA ceasefire from Merlyn Rees to IRN (75), Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland*. 18/02/1975.
- TNA-CJ/4/296. (1973). *Nick Stadlen's letter to Mr Howell: British-Irish Association Programme*. 31/01/1973.
- TNA-CJ/4/319. (1973). *From the Principal Sir John Hackett to O'Connell*. 15/10/1973.
- TNA-CJ/4/582. (1974). *F.S.L. Lyons letter to Roy Hattersley*. 31/07/1974.
- TNA-CJ/4/839. (1975). *Force Levels and the Ceasefire: Note of a Meeting*. 02/05/1975.
- TNA-CJ/4/860. (1974). *Church Leader's Meeting with the IRA*. 18/12/1974.
- TNA-CJ/4/1456. (1972). *The IRA Truce 26 June-10 July 1972*. 10/07/1972.
- TNA-CJ/4/1549/1. (1977a). *Mr David Goodall's letter to Peter Foster*. 18/03/1977.
- TNA-CJ/4/1549/1. (1977b). *Northern Ireland Peace People Telegram No.236*. 07/04/1977.
- TNA-CJ/4/1549/1. (1977c). *Peace Leader Denies Helping Killers, see Irish Times*. 25/01/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977a). *Community of the Peace People: Annex B to Northern Ireland Office's report on the Peace People Report No.110/381/04*. 05/12/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977b). *J.E. Henderson's letter to Abbott: Relations with the Peace People: Betty Williams' Visit to West Germany*. 07/09/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977c). *M.W.J. Buxton's Letter to the Secretary of State: The Peace People and the Army*. 24/10/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977d). *N.N. Cowling's letter to Mr Wilson, Annex: Assembly of the Peace People* 10/11/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977e). *N.N. Cowling's letter to Mr Wilson: Evolution of Attitude towards the Security Forces in Annex: Assembly of the Peace People* 10/11/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1549/2. (1977f). *Northern Ireland Office's Report: The Peace People*. 05/12/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/1947. (1977). *J.A. Marshall's letter to Lord Melchett Annex: British-Irish Conference*. 05/09/1977.

TNA-CJ/4/2228. (1978). *British-Irish Association Conference: HMG's View on the Way Ahead*. 22/06/1978.

TNA-CJ/4/2263. (1975). *Statement by the IRA Ending the Ceasefire on December 22nd 1974*. 16/01/1975.

TNA-CJ/4/2380. (1978a). *Note For the Record: Assembly of the Peace People*. 09/10/1978.

TNA-CJ/4/2380. (1978b). *Note of a Meeting between the Peace People and Mr Concannon*. 01/12/1978.

TNA-CJ/4/2380. (1978c). *Peace Leader Ciaran McKeown, see the Irish Independent*. 30/01/1978.

TNA-CJ/4/2380. (1979). *Emergency Provision Legislation in Northern Ireland, J.A. Marshall's Note*. 21/11/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/2580. (1979a). *British-Irish Association Conference: T.H. Gee's Letter's to Mr Lane*. 27/07/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/2580. (1979b). *A.P. Wilson's letter to Secretary of State: After Dinner Speech to BIA*. 13/07/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/3706. (1979a). *Community of the Peace People's Report by Peter McLachlan*. 01/06/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/3706. (1979b). *Marshall's Letter to A.P. Wilson*. 12/06/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/3706. (1981). *Mairead Corrigan's letter to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher*. 19/03/1981.

TNA-CJ/4/4024. (1979). *Direct Rule not Acceptable, Says Peace Leader, see Irish News*. 05/07/1979.

TNA-CJ/4/4025. (1976). *J.H.G. Leahy's Letter to Graham Greene Attachment: Women's Peace Movement in Northern Ireland*. 21/09/1976.

- TNA-CJ/4/4025. (1977). *Ulster Woman Advocates Peace is Heckled by Dorchester Group*. 27/05/1977.
- TNA-CJ/4/4169. (1981a). *D. Chesterton's Letter to Lord Gowrie: BIA Lambeth Conference*. 20/11/1981.
- TNA-CJ/4/4169. (1981b). *R.A. Harrington's Letter to Mr Chesterton: British-Irish Association*. 30/11/1981.
- TNA-CJ/4/4169. (1982a). *Minister's Case 7849: British-Irish Association Written by B.A. Blackwell* 23/08/1982.
- TNA-CJ/4/4169. (1982b). *N.C. Abbott's Letter to Mr Merifield*. 27/10/1982.
- TNA-CJ/4/4173. (1982a). *B.A. Blackwell's Letter to Mr Abbott and Secretary of State*. 23/08/1982
- TNA-CJ/4/4173. (1982b). *C.L. Angel's Letter to Miss Mulligan about Mrs Marigold Johnson* 10/08/1982.
- TNA-CJ/4/4173. (1982c). *Secretary of State's BIA Speech*. 29/11/1982.
- TNA-CJ/4/4174. (1981). *Hayes's Letter to Mr Bell*. 01/12/1981.
- TNA-CJ/4/4245. (1972). *Account of Meeting with Tom Caldwell MP and R O'Bradaigh, President of Sinn Fein*. 24/02/1972.
- TNA-FCO/87/1303. (1982). *The Irish Association: Kilkenny Conference, D.E. Tatham's Letter to Mr Whiteway*. 04/10/1982.
- TNA-PREM/15/1009. (1972). *Note of a Meeting with Representatives of the Provisional IRA*. 21/06/1972.
- TNA-PREM/15/1016. (1972). *Frank Steele, IRA and Peace: From UKREP Belfast to Dublin*. 28/11/1972.
- TNA-PREM/15/1127. (1972). *Correspondence with Tom Caldwell MP on Northern Ireland Matters*. 25/02/1972.
- TNA-PREM/16/158. (1974). *Principal Private Secretary*. [No Date].
- TNA-PREM/19/509. (1981a). *Anglo-Irish Summit: Draft Communique*. 05/11/1981.
- TNA-PREM/19/509. (1981b). *Anglo-Irish Summit: Steering Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office*. 29/10/1981.
- TNA-PREM/19/814. (1982). *Note of a Meeting Held in the Northern Ireland Office*. 26/01/1982.
- TNA-PREM/19/1068. (1982). *Irish General Election: Comments by Mr Prior Telegram Number 322*. 17/11/1982.
- TNA. (2015). *The National Archive of London: Meetings and Papers*. Retrieved from <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/meetings-papers.htm> on 01/06/2016
- Tocci, N. (2013). *Turkey's Kurdish Gamble*. *Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 48(3), 67-77.

- Touval, S., & Zartman, I.W. (1985). *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Colorado: Westview.
- Townshend, C. (1983). *Political Violence in Ireland: Governments and resistance Since 1848*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- TSKA-EK/980/26. (1980). *Report about Implimentation of the State of Emergency Rule in Various Countries*. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Arşivi.
- TSKA-EK/984/34. (1984). *Report about the Village Guard System*. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Arşivi.
- TSKA-MGK/988/9. (1988). *Meeting of the National Security Council*. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Arşivi. September 1988.
- TSKA-MGK/989/4. (1988). *Meeting of the National Security Council*. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Arşivi. September 1988.
- TSKA-MGK/993/4. (1993). *Meeting of the National Security Council*. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Arşivi. April 1993.
- Tucker, D. (2001). What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13(3), 1-14.
- Turk, A.T. (1982). Social Dynamics of Terrorism. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 463, 119-128.
- Uğur, A.H. (2014). *Abdullah Öcalan'ı Nasıl Sorguladım: İşte Gerçekler*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- UPOS. (2013). Undersecretariat Public Order and Security: Demokratikleşme Paketi [Democratisation Package]. Retrieved from <http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/snetix/solutions/KDGM/resources/uploads/files/kitabcik.pdf> on 30/09/2013
- Ural, İ. (2014). *Bir Emniyet Müdürünün Kaleminden Oslo Görüşmeleri*. İstanbul: İleri Yayınları.
- US Department of State. (2000). 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/turkey.html on 20/05/2015
- van Bruinessen, M. (2013). *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- van de Voorde, C. (2005). Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. *Police Practice and Research*, 6(2), 181-199.
- van der Merwe, H. (1998). *The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Community Resolution*. Retrieved from <http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/publications/1735-the-south-african-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-and-community-resolution.html> on 20/06/2014

- van Evera, S. (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Vatan. (2013,30/04). Akil İnsanlar Heyeti'ne Amasya'da Protesto. Retrieved from <http://www.gazetevatan.com/akil-insanlar-heyetine-amasya-da-protesto-27628-galeri-haber-fotogaleri/?Sayfa=1> on 01/05/2013
- Vayrynen, R. (1991). To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts. In R. Vayrynen (Ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (pp.1-25). London: Sage.
- Wall, J.A. (1981). Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180.
- Wall, J.A. (1993). Mediation: A Current Review. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1), 160-194.
- Wall, J.A., Stark, J.B., & Standifer, R.L. (2001). Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3), 370-391.
- Wallensteen, P. (2007). *Understanding Conflict Resolution* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Walton, R.E. (1969). *Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third Party Consultation*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Walton, R.E., & McKersie, R.B. (1965). *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Waltz, K.N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Waltz, K.N. (2001). *Man, the State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wanis-St John, A. (2004). *Back Channel Diplomacy-Implications for Practice and Theory*. Paper presented at the IACM 17th Annual Conference, Washington.
- Wanis-St John, A. (2006). Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows. *Negotiation Journal*, 22(2), 119-144.
- Warren, E.L. (1954). Mediation and Fact Finding. In A.W. Kornhauser, R. Dubin, & A.M. Ross (Eds.), *Industrial Conflict*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Waslekar, S. (1995). *Track-two Diplomacy in South Asia*. Illionis: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illionis Urbana-Champaign.
- Watts, N.F. (1999). Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish politics, 1990-94. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31(04), 631-656.

- Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 777-794.
- Weinberg, L.B., & Eubank, W.L. (1998). Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10(1), 108-118.
- Weiss, M., & Hassan, H. (2016). *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Regan Arts.
- Welsh, D. (1993). Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict. In M.E. Brown (Ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. West Sussex: Princeton University Press.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425.
- Westby, J.R. (2007). Countering Terrorism with Cyber Security. *Jurimetrics*, 297-313.
- White, P.J. (2000). *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?: The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*. London: Zed.
- Whitelaw, W. (1989). *The Whitelaw Memoirs*. London: Aurum Press.
- Whitfield, T. (2014). *Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilmer, F. (2002). *The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in the Former Yugoslavia*. New York: Routledge.
- Wilson, R. (1992). Time for Magnanimity. *Fortnight*, 309, 5.
- Wirsing, R. (1998). *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*. London: Macmillan.
- Wolff, S. (2002). Conflict Management in Northern Ireland. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 4(1), 41-73.
- Wolffe, J. (2014). Conclusion: Overcoming 'Religious' Conflict: History and Practice. In J. Wolffe (Ed.), *Irish Religious Conflict in Comparative Perspective: Catholics, Protestants and Muslims* (pp.242-260). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Woodhouse, T. (2005). Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping: Critiques and Responses. In T. Woodhouse & O. Ramsbotham (Eds.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (Vol. 2, pp.8-26). Oxon: Frank Cass.
- Woodhouse, T. (2015). *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*. Virginia: Peace Operations Training Institute.
- Woolpert, S., Slaton, C.D., & Schwerin, E.W. (1998). *Transformational Politics: Theory, Study and Practice*. New York: SUNY Press.

- WPCAG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Ege Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Aegean Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/> on 05/05/2015
- WPCBSG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Karadeniz Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Black Sea Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://www.yeniturkiye.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AKIL-INSANLAR-KARADENIZ-GRUBU-RAPORU-28.06.2013.pdf> on 10/05/2015
- WPCCAG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti İç Anadolu Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Central Anatolia Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/> on 01/05/2015
- WPCEAG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Eastern Anatolia Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/> on 01/05/2015
- WPCMG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Marmara Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Marmara Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/> on 10/05/2015
- WPCMRG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Akdeniz Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Mediterranean Region's Report)*. Retrieved from <http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/> on 01/05/2015
- WPCSG. (2013). *Akil İnsanlar Heyeti Güneydoğu Bölgesi Raporu (Wise People Committee Southeastern Anatolia Region's Report)*. Retrieved from [http://bianet.org/system/uploads/1/files/attachments/000/000/885/original/Do%C4%9Fu Anadolu Akil Raporu.pdf?1372324271](http://bianet.org/system/uploads/1/files/attachments/000/000/885/original/Do%C4%9Fu%20Anadolu%20Akil%20Raporu.pdf?1372324271) on 03/05/2015
- Yavuz, M.H., & Özcan, N.A. (2006). The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party. *Middle East Policy*, 13(1), 102-119.
- Yayman, H. (2011). *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası*. Ankara: SETA.
- Yeğen, M. (2015). *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Yeni Çağ. (2009,23/10). Özal'dan Sonra Hoca da Apo'yla Temas Kurmuş. Retrieved from <http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/ozaldan-sonra-hoca-da-apoyla-temas-kurmus-25162h.htm> on 05/10/2014
- Yeni Çağ. (2016,06/06). Bir Yılda 532 Şehit Verdik. Retrieved from <http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/bir-yilda-532-sehit-verdik-138996h.htm> on 27/10/2016
- Yin, R.K. (2003). *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (3rd ed.). London: Sage.
- Zartman, I.W. (1989). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zartman, I.W. (1995). *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington: Brookings.

- Zartman, I.W. (2000). Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In P.C. Stern & D. Druckman (Eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War* (pp.225-250). Washington: National Academy Press.
- Zartman, I.W. (2003). The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. In J. Darby & R. MacGinty (Eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* (pp.19-29). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zartman, I.W. (2008). *Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Zartman, I.W., & Berman, M.R. (1982). *The Practical Negotiator*. Massachusetts: Yale University Press.
- Zartman, I.W., & Touval, S. (1985). International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 41(2), 27-45.