

The Transformations of Sino-Indian Relations, 1950-2013

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Abstract

With or without global consent, China and India are the rising powers in Asia. After 1962, these two states have experienced enduring rivalries with historical and intricate hostility over the issues of territory, the sanctuary of Tibetan refugees on Indian territory, polarized relations with Pakistan, and geopolitical and resources competition. However, these disagreements have evolved from confrontation to the mixed elements of competition and cooperation to date. Sino-Indian relations have undergone a transformation with momentum toward cooperation on a number of regional and global issues over the last two decades.

This thesis aims at exploring why Sino-Indian relations have been transformed from enmity to amity. To do so, I apply the peace and war theory of an international relations theorist, Benjamin Miller, as a main theoretical framework to analyse the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1950s and 2013. Thus, this thesis finds alternative explanations of the regional orders to account for why rivals states tend to peacefully coexist, contributing to peace studies.

This thesis argues that the transformations of Sino-Indian relations from hot war to cold war, then to cold peace can be contributed to two factors: firstly, the end of superpower competition and the presence of the great powers – Russia, between 1990 and 1999, and the US, after 2000 –imposing regional stability. Secondly, China and India suffered from the problems of a “state-to-nation imbalance”, causing the 1962 war. Moreover, the Sino-Indian relations were characterized by the challenges to the unresolved border disputes associated with China’s Tibet issue, making peace reversible and a high level of warm peace more difficult.

Key words: Sino-Indian relations, cold peace, great power involvement, state-to-nation imbalance

Acronyms

| | |
|-------|---|
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| AIIB | Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank |
| ARF | ASEAN Regional Forum |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Company |
| BCIM | Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar |
| BJP | Bharatiya Janata Party |
| BMD | Ballistic Missile Defence |
| BRIC | Brazil-Russia-India-China |
| CBMs | Confidence-Building Measures |
| CCP | Chinese Communist Party |
| CEATO | Central Treaty Organization |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CICIR | China Institute of Contemporary International Relations |
| CISS | China Institute for International Strategic Studies |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty |
| EU | European Union |
| ETIM | East Turkistan Islamist Movement |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| G20 | Group of Twenty |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |

| | |
|-------|--|
| IDSA | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |
| IO | Indian Ocean |
| IR | International Relations |
| ISI | Inter-Services Intelligence Agency |
| JeM | Jaish-e-Muhammad |
| LAC | Line of Actual Control |
| LOC | Line of Control |
| MEA | Ministry of External Affairs |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MTCR | Missile Technology Control Regime |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NMD | Natural Missile Defence |
| NPT | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| NSG | Nuclear Suppliers' Group |
| PAP | People's Armed Police |
| PLA | People's Liberation Army |
| PLAN | People's Liberation Army Navy |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| RAW | The Research and Analysis Wing |
| REF | Russia's Far East Region |
| ROC | Republic of China, Taiwan |
| SAARC | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation |
| SEATO | Southeast Asia Treaty Organization |
| SCO | Shanghai Cooperation Organization |
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| TAR | Tibet Autonomous Region |

| | |
|--------|--|
| TGIE | Tibetan Government-in-exile |
| TMD | Theatre Missile Defences |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UPA | United Progressive Alliance |
| US | United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WMCC | Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destructions |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Backgrounds

International history is characterized by recurring cycles of geopolitical tensions and wars – as Aristotle wrote, “We make war that we may live in peace” (Zavaliy&Aristidou, 2014:25), implying that war is inevitable. Nevertheless, mankind is in constant search for peace. The end of the Cold War raised the prospect of peace, and in the era since, the world has witnessed a wider range of regional peace and stability, in particular in Western Europe and Latin America (Miller, 2010a:134). Even historical interstate rivalries have been transformed from hostility to accommodation, in particular, between the world’s most populous states, China and India, which have, during the same period, undergone dramatic economic growth and emerged as rising powers. Indeed, at the present rate, by 2050 they have two of the top three largest economies, in which case they will undoubtedly reshape the international balance of power and, whether in competition or cooperation, stable relations between them will be crucial, both regionally and globally, since, their actions will have important implications both for foreign policy and scholarly debates in international relations (PwC, 2015:1;Dadush&Stancil, 2010:9).

After being strategic rivals for thirty years, a process of *rapprochement* began after Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China in 1988, heralding a period of multi-faceted interactions and cooperation in bilateral settings and global forums, culminating in a series of formal agreements, as Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh more than ten times to establish a cordial friendly atmosphere for facilitating border negotiations and confidence-building measures (CBMs). These leaders reiterated many times that “We are partners in win-win cooperation, not rivals in competition”, and “There is enough space in the world for the development of China and India and enough area for two countries to cooperate” (Gokhale, 2012a;Press Trust of India, 2014). However, alongside both states’ increasing economic interdependence, the complex mix of Sino-Indian relations was characterized by cordial diplomatic discourse, but also with an unbalanced trade deficit for India and an asymmetric military competition, which have resulted in some extent of mutual threat and suspicion. Moreover, from a Chinese perspective, apart from some offshore and maritime territorial disputes, India has remained its only neighbouring state with whom it has a substantial unresolved land border dispute¹ (Fravel, 2008:172). However, as the Indian former national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, said, the Indo-Pakistani border, for which there is an agreement on the Line of Control (LOC) together with an official ceasefire, but where shootings and casualties still regularly occur. In contrast, the Sino-Indian border has never

¹ Compared to Sino-Indian territorial disputes with 130,000 square kilometres, China has 269 square kilometres, a relatively minor land dispute with Bhutan.

been formally demarcated on the ground or delimited by treaties, yet it has been well managed and remains tranquil and peaceful since the last shooting in 1967 (Talbot, 2014). It seems, therefore, that Sino-Indian *rapprochement* has led to a relatively peaceful regional outcome.

There is a gap between political developments in the real world and theoretical constructs, therefore, twenty years ago, few people would have predicted that China and India would undergo a dramatic transformations to peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, Sino-Indian relations have been deeply disputatious during the last two decades. Most literature defines Sino-Indian relations as enduring rivalry, whereas others characterize them as cooperative and constructive and yet a third school portrays them as being complex offering both challenges and opportunities. Scholars provide at least three perspectives on Sino-Indian relations since the end of the Cold War, firstly, the “hard-line” school defines it as one of mutual threats and strategic rivalries (Garver, 2001; 2002b; Emmott, 2008; Pant, 2009c; Cunningham&Medcalf, 2011; Malik, 2011; Frankel, 2011; Hellstrom&Korkmaz, 2012). Secondly, the “liberal” school defines it as a constructive and cooperative relationship (Deshingkar, 1999; Mansingh, 2007b; Shen, 2010; Zhang, 2010). The third school sees it as a mix with an opportunity and a challenge to cooperate on some issues but compete on others; this school accepts that bilateral relations have improved but some irritants remain (Sidhu&Yuan, 2003; Sharma, 2009; Dutt, 2010; Holslag, 2010; Singh, 2011b; Wang, 2011b; Tellis et al., 2011; Malone, 2011a:Chapter 6).

All the researchers concerned, however, pose the same question: What factors have contributed to the transformations of Sino-Indian relations from rivalry to the complexity? To answer this, and to predict their future trajectory, it would help to examine their complexity in some depth. Consequently, this thesis will explore the fundamental theoretical determinants of the Sino-Indian relationship transformations alongside international relations (IR) theory in order to explain interstate behaviour and area security studies. Such policy-oriented results may also help to unravel those complex political problems faced by other enduring rivalries.

As most research shows, the end of the Cold War was an important watershed for Sino-Indian relationships from the primarily rival dimension to a more diversified one. Before the 1990s, the literature paid little attention to Sino-Indian relations but only on historical interpretations of the 1962 border war. Sumit Ganguly (2010:4) states that, partly because China and India were weak, neither wielded significant strategic global influence. They had also become bogged down in the swamp of the Cold War and in their own historical military hostilities; hence there were little diplomatic interactions between them.

In the early 1990s, researchers such as Liu(1994), Mansingh (1994), Malik (1995), and Garver (1996; 1992) focused particularly on border disputes and geopolitical competition; however, the emerging literature from the late 1990s and into the 2000s reflected a growing interest

in evolving Sino-Indian relations. With a theme that would come to underlie many more recent studies – the possible trajectories of bilateral relations and whether the two countries were friends or rivals (Frazier, 2000;Ma, 2000;Sidhu&Yuan, 2003;Mansingh, 2007a;Wang, 2011b). The predominate viewpoint, mainly viewed through a realist geopolitical lens, was propounded by Garver (2001; 2010b), Malik (2011), Mohan (2012b), and Pant (2007b; 2013), who considered them to be enemies and who predicted continuing rivalry. Other researchers, such as Frankel (2004), Zhang (2005), Singh(2008), Dutt (2010), and Tellis (2011) emphasized the fragility of Sino-Indian ties due to their numerous conflicting interests. The principal irritating factors were, (i) the historical legacy of border wars and disputes (Vertzberger, 1982;Liu, 1994;Fravel, 2005;Singh, 2011a;Maxwell, 2011b), (ii) geopolitical competitions, in particular, maritime competitiveness in the Indian Ocean (Khuranaa, 2008;Pant, 2009c;Bhaskar, 2010;Chellaney, 2010;Cordner, 2010;Khuranaa, 2009; 2011), (iii) nuclear competition (Kapur, Fall, 2008;Chakma, 2011), (iv) Tibet issues (Garver, 2004b;Sikri, 2011;Smith, 2013), (v) Chinese military support for Pakistan and Indian neighbouring countries (Garver, 1996;Singh, 2008;Dutt, 2010;Frankel, 2011), and (vi) shared river issues² (Chellaney, 2011b;Ninkovic&Lehmann, 2013).

At the other end of the continuum, however, Ramesh (1999), Chung (2007b), Shen (2010), and Zhang (2010) insisted that China and India were friends and that they were pursuing cooperative courses, while others offered slightly different interpretations in terms of the countries' common interests, such as their economic interdependence (Virmani, 2006;Singh, 2009b;Denoon, 2009;Wu, 2010;Zhu, 2011), non-traditional security issues and multilateralism (Raman, 2007a;Mukherjee&Malone, 2011a;Wu, 2012;Stapran, 2012;Krishnnnan, 2013). Some researchers, such as Zhao (2008) on energy and Panda (2013) on multilateralism, argued from both the competition and cooperation sides.

Regrettably few studies escaped the confinement of the friend-enemy dichotomy. Even so, a small, but growing, segment of the literature over the last few years, notably Malik (2011), Pant (2012), Kavalski (2013), and Smith (2013) has focused on the more complex aspects of the Sino-Indian relationship. Additionally, book-length studies and edited books have offered insightful works from the perspective of (i) globalization (Lal, 2006;Sharma, 2009), (ii) economic mercantilism and constructive nationalism (Holslag, 2010), (iii) domestic, socio-political systems (Sidhu&Yuan, 2003: Chapter 1;Malone, 2011a: Chapter 3;Antholis, 2013), (iv) strategic cultures (Malik, 2011: chapter 2;Gilboy&Heginbotham, 2012;Ogden, 2014) , and (iv) threat perceptions (Fang, 2014).

In spite of the diverse debates on Sino-Indian relations, the existing literature does not provide a clear and systemic theoretical framework to explain the underlying reasons for

² A Chinese plan on the construction of three dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, the downstream of Indian Brahmaputra River, is supposed to cut off the water supply to India's northeast by 2020.

the transformations of Sino-Indian relations, indeed the debate has varied, depending on which analytical tools have been used. Most IR analysts develop their arguments from three main camps, (i) realism, (ii) liberalism, and (iii) constructivism, each perspective producing different conclusions about the underlying causes for the evolution of dyadic relations (The detailed discussion in 2.1).

1. **Realism:** this camp takes the views that states under international anarchical structure are difficult to cooperate, thus making the achievement of peace less likely (Lamy, 2008:130). Thus both China and India which are preoccupied with great powers' aspiration and seeking-security are predisposed towards conflict and competition, in which either they create the necessary countervailing forces to sustain the balance of power, or seek to dominate the region (Garver&Wang, 2010;Mohan, 2012b;Pant&Joshi, 2015). Such an approach has been predominant in the analysis of Sino-Indian relations.
2. **Liberalism:** this perspectives highlights the incentives for states to cooperate, such as through economic interdependence, effective international institutions, democratic regimes (Baldwin, 1993;Doyle, 1997;Oneal&Russett, 1999). However, this thesis argues that these factors have been relatively contributing factors that have auxiliary effect on interstate cooperation but not underlying factors that facilitate the transformations.
3. **Constructivism:** in a socially constructed world, state behaviour is influenced by norms, culture, identity, and other ideational processes. For instance, friend and enemy are social concepts that operate in world politics where changing identities and interests transform the relationship of states with each other (Wendt, 1999:133-4;Reus-Smit&Snidal, 2010:305). The literature has been written about "historical legacy" shaping perceptions and images of Sino-Indian hostility (Muppidi, 2001;Saalman, 2011b;Miller, 2013). This thesis argues, therefore, that shared norms such as "Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence" (Indian terms *Panch Sheel*), which was merely official rhetoric and were not sufficient enough to construct a "security community"(Holslag, 2010:116).

None of these IR camps that produce theories to explain bilateral transformations appear to be complete, as they do not offer nuances to specific regional or bilateral contexts, such as historical legacy, ethnic conflict (T.V.Paul, 2012:12). As Stephen Walt (1998:30) points out, "No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics". Robert Jervis (1991:40) is of the same view in terms of the Post-Cold War era when he stated that, "only rarely does a single factor determine the way politics will work out". Therefore, this thesis will align itself with Benjamin Miller's theory of regional war and peace, by which he attempted to span the theoretical divide of IR theories in order to explain their transitions. By moving beyond the single realist, liberalist and constructivist prism, such an approach, which takes into account the full array of causal factors, offers a competing framework to explain the transformations of Sino-Indian relations. This thesis

finds that the validity of Miller's theory could explain the peaceful transformations between two emerging powers and also suggest an effective theoretical approach for other dyadic settings.

1.2 Research Questions

Typically, scholars examine the difficulties and opportunities for Sino-Indian relations but tend to neglect the questions as to why they change and what the underlying determinants are of the transformations in both states' behaviour. Thus, this thesis seeks to explain the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1950 and 2013:

“What factors have contributed to the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1950 and 2013?”

Sino-Indian relations have undergone dramatic changes during the last sixty years. After a short period of brotherhood in the 1950s, China and India became geopolitical rivals after the 1962 border war, which had reduced the relations to freezing point. The regional cold war between 1963 and 1987, which mirrored the two competing superpowers Cold War, saw an Indo-Soviet quasi-alliance and a China-Pakistan-US nexus (Liu, 1994; Mishra, 2004). In 1976, with the resumption of an exchange of ambassadors, there followed a long period that perhaps should be called normalized, in spite of a tension-ridden atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion. This uneasy period culminated in the Sumdorong Chu Sino-Indian border standoffs even though eight rounds of the border talks had been held.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi's, visit to China in 1988 marked a significant landmark in Sino-Indian relations, which turned out to be the starting point for *rapprochement* and, since then, in the aftermath of the end of global Cold War, relations have entered positive period of engagement, during which mutual trust has been the dominant characteristic of official rhetoric. Paradoxically, though, both academics and security establishments continue to focus on the rivalry of the two sides rather than the cooperative relations.

However, this thesis will argue that, following two countries' spectacular economic growth in the 1990s, their relations have changed dramatically from antagonism to relaxation and the following five significant results will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3.

1. *From estrangement to engagement*: following Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to China, regular high-level meetings that culminated in several formal agreements that recognized the unsettled border *status quo* and a resumption of border trade. Seventeen rounds of Special Representatives meetings on border negotiations held by 2014, and, although, the border disputes has not been finally resolved, the 2,500 miles long border, which has been managed well by ways of CBMs, to date remains tranquil.

2. *Reciprocal respect of sovereignty*: both countries have shown concessions on sovereignty. In the 1960s, India supported anti-China Tibetan guerrillas and China armed Naga and Mizos separatists in northeast India. However, after the 1980s, both countries stopped supporting each other's insurgents. In 2003, India accepted the "One China policy" that recognized the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) to be a part of China³. In return, China tentatively acknowledged Sikkim as Indian territory⁴, whereas it had previously treated it as an independent state (Agence France-Presse, 2003; Ministry of External Affairs, 2003). However, after 2008, with the border disputes still unresolved, Tibet and Sikkim are in contention again⁵ (Chellaney, 2014) .
3. *Kashmir and Pakistan issues become less salient*: although China supported Kashmiri people's rights to self-determination in the 1970s, in the 1990s, it took a more neutral position on the Indo-Pakistani Kashmir dispute by declaring it to be India's internal affairs (Garver, 2004a). China's military support of Pakistan had long been an irritant for India, since the 2000s, the Pakistani factor played a less important part in three respects (Haider, 2005b:82; Small, 2010; Smith, 2013:136; Markey, 2013a), firstly, India and Pakistan have had a series of peace dialogues. Secondly, China's Uighur separatists were trained in Pakistan, bringing tensions to Sino-Pakistani relations. And thirdly, the transformation of Sino-Pakistani relations, to some extent, from security allies to infrastructure-investment economic partners (also see 6.3).
4. *Bilateral trade*: resumed in 1978 followed by a significant increase in economic cooperation; by 2008, China had become India's largest trading partner. In 1988 bilateral trade was \$ 200 million USD dollars and it had reached \$70.56 billion by 2014 (Krishnan, 2015) .
5. *Multi-faceted cooperation*: economics, defence, counter-terrorism and, Afghanistan issues have been discussed frequently and joint military exercises were held in 2007, 2008 and 2013; also they have converging interests in global issues and cooperated in multilateral settings, including climate change, agricultural quotas, and global financial governance (Madan, 2015).

³ Previously, India and UK recognized Tibet as a Chinese 'suzerain'—paid tribute to China— but not Chinese territory. In 2003, India recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet, followed by the UK in 2008. See Spencer, R. The Telegraph, 05 November 2008.

⁴ In 2005, the PRC issued a notice 'How to Change the Manifestation of Sikkim on the Map' to its State Bureau of Survey and Mapping, marking Sikkim to be no longer a Chinese territory on the Chinese official map.

⁵ In 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister declared Sikkim to be a disputed territory. In 2011, China refused to issue visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir, implying an unwillingness to endorse India's sovereignty over Sikkim and Kashmir.

Nevertheless, Sino-Indian relations have suffered from several complex problems deriving from historical legacies and geopolitical proximity, such as unsolved territorial disputes, the sanctuary of Tibetan exiles in India, polarized relations with Pakistan, and the nuclear arms competition. Moreover, following thirty-nine rounds of border negotiations before 2014, the border disputes are still not resolved. India's condemnation of Chinese incursion of disputed borders and China's revisionist territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Kashmir after 2006, were the dark sides of cordiality, overshadowing the rapprochement. Moreover, potential irritants have cast shadows on their relations, such as, (i) India's worries about the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) increasing presence in the Indian Ocean, (ii) the water issue of a shared river⁶, and the competition for natural resources, (iv) opposing interests in competition of the sphere of influence, and (v) an increase in the numbers of border troops and infrastructure after 2006.

This combination of irritants and entente suggests that Sino-Indian relations are not a simple matter of rivalry or friendship. This thesis, therefore, seeks to explore what factors account for changes in both countries' pursuit of reconciliation by including the following sub-questions that relate to the main research question: firstly, why China and India decided to engage with each other in the late 1980s? secondly, why did they exercise restraint on the Tibet and Kashmir issues in the 1990s and early 2000s? Thirdly, why did they reverse this policy in the late 2010s? Fourthly, will it be possible for them to escape the dictates of geopolitical confrontation? And lastly, despite the conflicting flashpoints and disagreements, have the booming bilateral trading and increasing engagement in the international institutions contribute to the peace process?

Research Objectives

If China and India should return to regional conflict and the region be transformed from cold peace into cold war, southern Asia will descend into a state of instability and the rare and hard-fought regional peace may be lost. The research objective of this thesis, therefore, will examine the reasons for the transformations of Sino-Indian relations in order to bridge the theoretical divide between the traditional perspectives of balancing of power and the sub-systemic factors. The research will test Benjamin Miller's theory (details introduced below) in order to examine in depth the following elements: firstly, the underlying causes of the initiation of the Sino-Indian entente, secondly, the influence of structural changes in regional contexts, thirdly, the underlying determinants of the transformations of state behaviour, which may produce the key to unlock the peaceful resolutions of outstanding regional disputes in Asia and other regions.

In summary, therefore, the aim of this thesis is to:

⁶ See footnote 2.

1. Explain how and why Sino-Indian relations have been transformed from rivalry to a more complex relationship featuring the mixture of competition and cooperation.
2. Clarify the evolving nature of Sino-Indian relations first, and then provide systemic explanations of the transformation of state behaviour by presenting evidence and evaluating the propositions derived from the theoretical framework.
3. Highlight the limitations in these variables and identify an assortment of factors reflecting how states' behaviour and calculation change.
4. Complement the limitations of Miller's theory in the Sino-Indian dyadic context and to enhance explanatory power and relevance of IR theory.
5. Propose policy-oriented ideas in order to suggest how geopolitical rivalries can manage change peacefully.

1.3 The Theoretical Framework

In order to achieve its research objectives, this thesis will use Benjamin Miller's peace and war theory as a main theoretical framework to analyze the evolved Sino-Indian relations. The aim is to identify which hypotheses derive from this framework and to provide the best explanations of transformations of state behaviour. The following section will synoptically introduce the work of Benjamin Miller and explain why choose his theory, presenting the theoretical framework of this research.

1.3.1 An overview of Benjamin Miller's theory

In his book *State, Nations and the Great power* (2007a) Benjamin Miller, a professor in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, Israel, proposes a theory that offers an explanation for the variations of regional war and peace. Miller seeks to explain the reasons why regional peace and war come about. His study offers a competing explanation and insightful ideas combined with the lens of realism and liberalism to understand the transition of war and peace by exploring the regional studies in Western Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and South American in certain periods (see Table 1.1). In particular, his theory focuses on the transition from war to peace, and vice versa, by integrating two levels of analysis into one theory, taking into account systemic and domestic attributes, such as territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts.

Table 1-1 : Four categories of regional order were explained by Miller’s theory

| Great power involvement | State-to-nation balance | State-to-nation imbalance |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| Hegemony/ cooperation | Category 1: warm peace | Category 2: cold peace |
| | Western Europe during the cold war (high-level peace under US hegemon) 21 century South America (normal peace under US hegemon) | Post-Camp David Israel-Egypt (US hegemony) The Balkans, 1930-1878 (Cooperation) |
| Competition/ disengagement | Category 3: warm peace | Category 4: Cold war punctuated by hot war |
| | Western Europe during the post-Cold War (high-level peace under partial US disengagement) | The Middle East in the Cold War era (competition) The Balkans, 1878-1393 (competition) East Asia/ South Asia in the Cold War era (competition) |

Source: Benjamin Miller (2007: p. 65)

In order to provide a nuanced explanation, Miller (2007a:12) distinguishes five types of regional outcomes (see Figure 1.1), (i) hot war, (ii) cold war, (iii) cold peace, (iv) warm peace, and (v) high-level warm peace. Specifically defined, Miller argues that hot war is defined as a situation of organized armed force aiming at destroying the enemies, including interstate wars and domestic wars. Cold war refers to a situation of negative peace, characterizing recurrent military crises and a likelihood of escalation of war. Cold peace is a situation characterized by formal agreements among the states and the maintenance of diplomatic relations. The parties still feel threatened by increases in each other’s power, and are concerned with relative gains. Warm peace is characterized that the substantive issues in the conflict between states have been resolved, which is highly unlikely to use force. A high-level warm peace is more generally seen as a pluralistic security community (Miller, 2005; Miller, 2001a:6-7).

Figure 1-1 : The transition of war and peace


Hot war \rightleftharpoons cold war \rightleftharpoons cold peace \rightleftharpoons warm peace \rightleftharpoons a high level of warm peace

Source: Benjamin Miller (2007: p. 12)

The underlying causes for transition in regional order are based on three key concepts: state, nation, and international system. The specific balance between states and nations in any given region determines the “hot” outcomes – hot war and warm peace, while the type of great power engagements in the region affects the “cold” outcomes – cold war and cold peace (Miller, 2007a:2). The following two factors in terms of international and regional level of analysis account for regional transition (Miller, 2007a:13) (see Figure 1.2):

1. Great power involvement – this refers to the four different types of great power engagement in a region: firstly, competition, secondly, cooperation, thirdly, disengagement, and fourthly, hegemony, all of which affect local states moving from hot war to cold war, from cold war to cold peace, or back to hot war, etc. In particular, great powers play important roles in encouraging local states to transit from cold war to cold peace (Miller&Kagan, 1997:58;Miller, 2001a:3).
2. State-to-nation balance– this refers to, firstly, the degree of congruence between a state’s geographic boundaries and its national aspirations and the political identifications of its people, and secondly, the prevalence of strong or weak states, which accounts for the occurrence of hot war and the emergence of warm peace (Miller, 2005:233). This factor could lead to different outcomes. For instance, imbalances caused by states with domestic problems, such as irredentism, secessionism, or ethnic conflicts, can lead to a tendency to regional war. Whereas state-to-nation balance means that nation-building problems have been resolved, thereby contributing to regional stability and warm peace. (Miller, 2007a:58-9).

Figure 1-2: Benjamin Miller’s key arguments



Source: Miller (2007: pp. 66-70)

By this means in the forms of great power involvement at an international level, and the state-to-nation balances at a regional/domestic level best account for the transition from war to peace, and vice versa, in different regions over particular times periods.

1.3.2 Why choose Benjamin Miller's theory?

This thesis will use Miller's theory of regional war and peace as its main theoretical framework. The reasons for choosing this theory outlined below:

1. Miller's definition of the war-peace continuum accords with the transformations of Sino-Indian relations.

Because the transformations of Sino-Indian relations in the past sixty years fits Miller's regional war-peace continuum, from hot war to cold war, then to cold peace, it meets the research purposes of this thesis. China and India conducted a border war in 1962, followed by a cold war of military confrontation between 1963 and 1987, which coincided with the US-USSR superpower Cold War. Even though the two countries re-exchanged ambassadors in 1976 and undertook eight rounds of border talks, border skirmishes up to 1987 until the rapprochement in 1988 with Rajiv Gandhi's China visit. For purposes of this thesis, the transition from cold war to cold peace between 1998 and 2013 had not yet reached a full-blown warm peace.

2. Miller's explanations of the transition of regional order accord with the research questions of this thesis.

In the literature, the causes of war and peace are usually treated separately (Waltz, 1959; Galtung, 1969; Boulding, 1978; Gilpin, 1981; Holsti, 1996b; Oneal & Russett, 1999; Webel & Galtung, 2007; Van Evera, 2013); however, Miller's theory, by connecting the causes of regional wars and the strategies of regional peace, offers a compelling explanation for the transition, thus meeting the expectations posed by the research questions.

Moreover, his theory not only synthesizes different schools of IR scholarship into a theoretical construct, it combines the crucial three ideals of realism, liberalism and international society, while also bridging the divisions between systemic and regional/domestic explanations of state behaviour (Miller, 2007a:2-4). Structural realism treats the primacy of international system as the explanatory variables of state behaviour, while liberalist approach focuses on unit-level developments, emphasizing the importance of domestic politics, economic interdependence and international institutions. While IR theorists agree that both levels are important for analyzing state behaviour, but they fail to integrate the two. Miller, however, integrates them in a single framework suitable for analyzing dyadic relations (Miller, 2007a:6,24).

His theory also takes some substantive domestic issues into account, such as nationalism, sovereignty and territorial conflicts, which are overlooked in the dyadic political context by the realists and liberalists and he includes state-to-nation problems as a causal factor. Since Sino-Indian relations are fraught with unsolved border disputes, nationalism, and restive Tibetan minority conflicts. I believe his theory to be suitable in this context.

Lastly, Miller convincingly explains, in terms of state-to-nation balance, various regional crises and conflict resolutions, of which Sino-Indian relations is a case. However, importantly, he did not address the Sino-Indian case in the post-Cold War era on which this thesis will focus and ignore some domestic political attributes which account for states' foreign policy behaviour. In this respect, therefore, this thesis will broaden, refine and extend the use of Benjamin Miller's theory.

3. Miller's research unit might apply to the dyadic relations.

Miller's theory of regional war and peace uses "region" as a research unit, however, the research unit of this thesis is "the dyadic relations of two states". Although there exists the difference of analytic "unit", this thesis argues that it would not give rise to the problem of incongruence or biased case selection, implying that an inappropriate case selection might lead to a wrong causal deduction (George&Bennett, 2004:50). The main reason for this is that Miller defines a region as a certain group of states with a certain degree of geographic proximity and strategic interaction. A dyadic relation could fall into this category because states are the constituent units within a region.

1.3.3 The theoretical framework of this thesis

This thesis will explore the underlying causes of the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1950 and 2013. The dependent variable is "the transformations of interstate relations", which refer to the changes from confrontation to rapprochement, from hot war to cold war, and to cold peace". The independent variables comprise two set of variables, the systemic level of variable is "great power involvement", and the domestic level is "state-to-nation balance".

1. The dependent variable

The discussion above demonstrates that the literature contains a recurring theme regarding the nature of Sino-Indian relations. This thesis postulates that the transformations of Sino-Indian relations in the post-Cold War was characterized by a transition from cold war to cold peace; hence, the dependent variable is the nature of Sino-Indian relations.

Firstly, the term "cold war" fits the description of Sino-Indian relations between 1963 and 1987. Miller's "cold war" definition is "a negative peace during which there is no ongoing violence, although war may erupt at any moment" (2007a:45). States make military shows-of-force as a deterrence, since it might lead to retaliation. In Sino-Indian case, these two

countries had become trapped in respective domestic turmoil and disengaged with each other since the 1962 hot war. Also, between 1962 and 1976, there had been very little trade between them and both countries had armed each other's internal insurgency groups and struck alliances with each other's adversaries – China with Pakistan and India with the Soviet Union– thereby exacerbating hostilities during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, while there were skirmishes in 1976 and military standoffs between 1986 and 1987 along the Sino-Indian border with the regional situation mirroring the global Cold War (Liu, 1994:115, 136).


Secondly, after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, relations has been in a state of "cold peace", which Miller characterizes as the establishment of formal agreements together with the maintenance of diplomatic relations although the parties still feel threatened by perceived mutual increases in power, retain a concern about relative gains – an overall state of moderation and mitigation while, longstanding conflict remains unsolved (Miller, 2007a:45)(see Figure 1.3 and Chapter 2).

Thirdly, by comparing similar terminology proposed by other scholars with Miller's definitions of the transformations from war to peace, his definitions adequately fit the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations during this period.

They are similar to Arie M. Kacowicz (1998:9) study of regional evolution from war to peace, whereby he categorized zones of negative peace, stable peace, and pluralistic security. Similarly, a study by Charles Kupchan (2010:30) on the transformation of regional order, postulated three stages of peace, (i) rapprochement, (ii) security community, and (iii) union.

In view of the above, in what sequence of regional order does the Sino-Indian transformation fit? This thesis suggests that cold peace, being a form of "*rapprochement*", is a starting point for the establishment of stable peace (see Figure 1.3). This view is supported by Kupchan's (2010:30) definition of *rapprochement* as the most basic form of stable peace, during which long-standing adversaries stand back from rivalry and agree to settle their disputes amicably in the eventual expectations of peaceful coexistence. It is the view of this thesis that Miller's regional war and peace continuum best fits the ambit of transformations of Sino-Indian relations in the last two decades from cold war, or negative peace, to cold peace, or *rapprochement*. These, then are this study's dependent variables.

Figure 1-3: The transitional stages from war to peace



Source: The author

2. The independent variables

In Miller's theory, there are two sets of independent variables, firstly, the structural variable based on international system level, and secondly, an unit-level variable based at a regional/ domestic level (see Figure 1.4 and Chapter 3).

Figure 1-4 : The combined effects of the types of great power involvement and the state-to-nation imbalance

The international level: "cold" outcomes

1. Great power competition under a state-to-nation imbalance may intensify regional conflicts, thereby prolonging regional cold war.
2. Great power cooperation or a benign hegemony under a state-to-nation imbalance mitigates regional conflicts and thus leads to cold peace.

The domestic/ regional level: "hot" outcomes

1. State-to-nation imbalance is the underlying cause of regional war proneness.
2. Strong states and coherent states are conducive to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts, leading to normal peace.

Source: Miller (2007: p.65)

The structural variable: neither international anarchy nor polarity determines the regional outcomes of war and peace, but the types of great power involvement, especially under the conditions of great power competition lead to cold war, whereas great power cooperation and hegemony lead to cold peace (Miller, 2007a:371). The balance of great power interests, combined with their relative capability, determines the pattern of their regional involvement.

The unit-level variable: state-to-nation balance leads to warm peace. State-to-nation balance is comprised of two factors: firstly, state-building, which refers to the extent of state strength, and secondly, nation-building, which refers to the national identity of people and which is consistent with the geopolitical boundary of state (2007a:54-55). When states have effective institutions and states are able to control their sovereign territories, as a strong state with a consolidation of state power, states may maintain the territorial integrity against their domestic challenges. Successful nation-building, as a congruent state, denotes that the most majorities of people accept the territorial identity of the state. Strong and congruent states, as coherent states, denote state-to-nation balance. Therefore, the combined effects of the types of great power involvement and the state-to-nation imbalance yield the following propositions (Miller, 2007a:65) (see Table 1-2).

Table 1-2 : The independent variables involved in the transformations of regional order

| <i>The independent variables</i> | <i>Causal Mechanism</i> | <i>Predicted Effects</i> | <i>Predicted Outcomes</i> |
|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| structural factor | | | |
| Great power competition Or Disengagement | arms provision diplomatic support regional alignments | change capabilities deter regional adversaries | cold war |
| Great power hegemon Or Cooperation | assistance reassurance sanctions security guarantee | change capabilities moderate security dilemma | cold peace |
| unit-level factors | | | |
| Weak state and State-to-nation incongruence or Congruence | inability to control domestic violence | target of expansion by a neighbouring state | hot war |
| Strong state and State-to-nation imbalance | revisionism irredentism pan-unification separatism | intensify security dilemma the motivation for expansion | hot war |
| Strong states and State-to-nation congruence | domestic legitimacy effective institutions political stability | control the domestic conflicts resolved territorial disputes | warm peace |

Source: The author revised based on Miller's theory

3. Research hypothesis

This thesis will put forward five hypotheses derived from the combined effects of two types of independent variables, which are based on two levels, (i) international system level, and (ii) the domestic/ regional level in terms of the regional outcomes of transitions between war and peace proposed by Miller.


Hypothesis 1– Hot War: weak states, which have failed in nation-building as evidenced by secessionism, irredentism, and pan-unification movements, cause state-to-nation imbalances, lead to intensified security dilemmas and create incentives for either expansionist or diversionary hot war.

Hypothesis 2 – Cold War: under the condition of state-to-nation imbalance, either great power competition or their disengagement in the region aggravates regional conflict and leads to cold war.

Hypothesis 3– Cold Peace: under the condition of a state-to-nation imbalance, great power cooperation, or a hegemon, may mitigate regional conflicts and moderate the problems of state-to-nation imbalance, thus leading to cold peace.

Hypothesis 4 – Warm Peace: no matter whether or not states are democratic nor which types of great power are involved, successful state-building and nation-building are conducive to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts as a prerequisite to warm peace.

Figure 1-5: The causal chain of the hypothesis



Source: Miller (2007: p. 65)

These hypotheses and their explanations are not mutually exclusive; under certain conditions, they may reinforce each other in such ways as to answer the research questions. However, as mentioned in 3.1.2, China and India are an anomaly of the democratic peace theory; hence, this thesis will exclude Hypothesis 5.

1.4 Thesis Structure

Chapter 1 will, firstly, introduce the research questions and explain the rationale behind the central research question, secondly, set the theoretical framework, and thirdly, describe the research purposes.

Chapter 2 will focus on the independent variables. The first section will discuss the weaknesses and strengths of using a single IR paradigm on the analysis of interstate relationships. The second section will define the terms using in the theoretical framework derived from Benjamin Miller’s theory. And the third section will introduce the methodology.

Chapter 3 will focus on the dependent variable. The first section will present an overview of the transformations of Sino-Indian relations from hot war, to cold war, then to cold peace. The second section will introduce two steps on the path to Sino-Indian rapprochement, and the third section will demonstrate the post-1988 Sino-Indian cold peace in four dimensions.

Chapter 4, 5, and 6 will explore the structural variable and test the factors of great power involvement. Chapter 4 will analyze the factor of great power competition affecting the regional cold war in the Cold War period. Chapter 5 and 6 will test the factor of a hegemon,

exploring the role of Russia in the 1990s and the United States after 2000 in the transition from cold war to cold peace.

The next three chapters will analyze the variable of state-to-nation imbalance. Chapter 7 will discuss the alternative causes of war and will conclude that acute state-to-nation imbalance caused the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Chapters 8 and 9 will analyze the effects of the moderation of state-to-nation imbalance on the Sino-Indian cold peace, focusing on both the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian territorial disputes.

Chapter 10, will conclude this thesis by reflecting on the overall empirical analyses, proposing the research contributions, and introducing the implications for the future Sino-Indian relations.

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework on the Transformations of Sino-Indian Relations between 1950 and 2013

This chapter will present the theoretical framework based on Benjamin Miller's theory of peace and war in five sections, firstly, a review of the weaknesses and limitations of paradigmatic IR theories that explains the transformations of Sino-Indian relations, secondly, a discussion about the weaknesses and strengths of Miller's theory, thirdly and fourthly the definitions of terms of the causal factors of Miller's theory, based on two level of analysis: the international level and the regional/ domestic level and, fifthly, the introduction of methodology of this thesis .

2.1. The weaknesses and limitations of a single paradigm

When reviewing the different approaches in international relations (IR) theories regarding the transformations of regional orders, three major paradigms stand out, namely, realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Although these yield rich insights, they often arrive at diverse explanations of state behavior and the transformations of international politics. For instance, most contemporary realists underplay the sources of conflict and cooperation that come from within states, while the liberals ignore important structural sources of conflict and cooperation, while the constructivists focus on the social structure to explain anarchy and national interests as opposed to materialism. Unfortunately, none of these viewpoints are able to comprehensively capture the underlying reasons for transformations as a mixture of cooperation and competition among states; this is especially true in the Sino-Indian case.

2.1.1 Realism

Over the past fifty years, realism has been one of the most important paradigms in terms of IR theories in world politics. The explanation for the transformation of states' behaviour has been based on the notion of structural realism⁷, mainly based on three core factors: the shifts in the distribution of power, the perception of security, and the balance of power (Lamy, 2008:127-8).

1. Realism and the distribution of power

Realism rests on the primacy of power politics. The calculations about power and its distribution are central to how states relate to the world at large. The gross distribution of power in the international system influences greatly state's behaviour (Waltz, 1979:195).

⁷Structural realism, as one version of neo-realism, represented by Kenneth Waltz – the hugely influential theorist – states that structural realism refers to a broader family of systemic theories.

Therefore, a change in the distribution of power leads to shifts in policy that can transform the international system.

Morgenthau (1985:5) is considered to be one of the founding fathers of classical realism. He argues that states strive to gain power because they have an innate desire for it and because the concept of national interest is defined by power; hence, because states make policy in terms of national interest, they end up in pursuit of even more power.

However, the nature of international system is anarchic. Because the aim of states is to survive for their own self-interest, in the absence of any central authority to resolve disputes and to impose law and order, the military and economic capabilities in an international system are important to states, since they are decisive in shaping their relations with other states. Two important strands of neorealism are offensive realism and defensive realism, both of which are based on systemic structures rather than on human nature (Lamy, 2008:129-130; Wohlforth, 2010:138).

Offensive realism offers an approach to explain why and how the changes of distribution of power as a structural restraint on states' behaviour and a reason for regional changes, especially as they are affected by great powers. Anarchy, therefore, provides strong incentives for expansion. Mearsheimer argues that in an anarchic system security is the end to which states will give priority. Hence, the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security. When the distribution of power changes, great powers behave aggressively because they want to maximize their odds of survival (Mearsheimer, 2001:34-5). States not only want to prevent the rise of a potential hegemon, but ultimately, that want to be that hegemon, which results in military actions because they cannot be certain about the intentions of other states (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995:11-12).

Applying Mearsheimer's argument to the Sino-Indian case, the distribution of power changed when the power of the former superpower, Russia, declined, both China and India, as the rising powers, competed for hegemony; consequently, given their significant offensive capability and unknowable intentions, cooperation with each other was highly unlikely. Mearsheimer (2010:382) suggests that the outcome would be an intense security competition between China and the US, with considerable potential for war; hence, most of China's neighbors, including India and Russia, would join with the US to contain China. Such a conclusion would be the consequences of offensive realism.

Given the logic of offensive realism, both countries maximize their power by continuing to improve their military and economic capabilities. In reality, however, the national security policies of China and India are only partly consistent with offensive realism, since it cannot explain the cooperative dimension. However, some research supports the offensive view that both countries increased their naval position by developing their port infrastructure

and transportation links in the countries of Indian Ocean littoral in order to expand their sphere of influence. In particular, India views Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean as “expansionist ambition” and China’s intention was to prevent India from emerging as a hegemon (Pant, 2009a:283;Frankel, 2011:8-9;Kaplan, 2011a;Mohan, 2012b:10).

A contrasting perspective was that China’s “strings of pearls” – i.e. its investments in Indian Ocean rim countries – as driven by, firstly, its need for energy security by protecting its 80% of energy supply through the sea line of the strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean, secondly, its initiatives on anti-piracy, thirdly, its incapability to operate in such remote sea but look for collective action by carrying out joint military drills with India, and that it was not a confrontation with India (Holslag, 2009a:25-26;Bhaskar, 2010:315;Lo, 2011:32;Smith, 2013:237). These perspectives, therefore, took the line that the actions did not constitute “offensive realism”.

2. The perception of security

While offensive realism claims that maximizing superior capabilities is the best guarantee of security, defensive realism specifies the incentives for interstate conflicts or cooperation. This view emphasizes additional variables that encourage the pursuit of moderate strategies as the best means of gaining security, including an offense-defense balance in military technology, geographic proximity, the perception of threat, international economic pressure, and regional military balances, all of which lead to an increase in the prospects of cooperation and a decrease in the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978:211-212;Walt, 1990:17;Glaser, 1994-1995:53;Van Evera, 1998:5;Taliaferro, 2001:137;Rendall, 2006:524).

According to the logic of defensive realism, agreed confidence building measures (CBMs) and military exchanges demonstrate states’ effort to reduce hostility, even though states would not abandon military expansion for security. Moreover, defensive realists would expect that the development of a small force of nuclear weapons to mitigate security dilemma on the grounds that they are useful for deterrence, not for offense (Waltz, 1981:8;Van Evera, 1999:240). In Sino-Indian case, defensive realism could support that China and India have maintained the border tranquility and they have not repeat the 1962 war due to the institutionalized CBMs. However, both expanded their military spending by two-digit figures during the last decade, they insist that this has been for defensive considerations (Holslag, 2010:126). Moreover, such expansion has been interpreted by each as having possible offensive intent, also, each countries’ development of nuclear weapons was interpreted by the other side as adding to very real security dilemmas (Cunningham&Medcalf, 2011:15;Gilboy&Heginbotham, 2012:133;Mohan, 2012b). Hence, firstly, there are difficulties in differentiating between offensive and defensive capabilities. Secondly, under certain conditions, defensive and offensive realism stances both require the pursuit of expansionist strategies in order to achieve security, especially when military capabilities are asymmetrical and industrial capacity, strategic depth and raw materials are

cumulative that compel states to adopt expansionist policies (Glaser, 1997:185-186). Hence, states with strong neighbours and difficult to defend borders have powerful incentives to maintain large armies and seemingly offensive military doctrines (further discussions see Chapter 9).

The literature shows that a security dilemma has existed between China and India due to their geographic proximity, asymmetrical military capabilities and military build-up, all of which resulted in misperceptions of aggression on both sides (Maxwell, 1970;Garver, 2004b; 2010b;Hoffmann, 2006;Blazevic, 2009;Holslag, 2010:120;Fang, 2014:10-11). Therefore, while defensive realism accounts for their competition, it might fail to offer a complete explanations of what factors have led to the transformation of their behaviour despite the military and geopolitical conditions remaining constant. For example, the researcher, John Garver (2002b; 2010b) oft-quoted contention that China's alliance with Pakistan, contentious issues over Tibet and Sikkim, and China's encirclement of India, locked both countries into security dilemmas. He did not expect that China would concede sovereignty to Sikkim in 2003. Defensive realism, therefore, offers alternative explanations for states' behaviour in that the outcomes of security dilemmas can be moderate. However, the Sino-Indian exacerbated security dilemma after 2006 is puzzling on the grounds that the defensive realism ignores the domestic political contexts when states concern issues of nationalism, territory, and sovereignty (Miller, 2007a:4).

3. The balance of power

Kenneth Waltz (1979:126,186-7) argued that international anarchical structures determine important types of state behaviour – such as balancing or making alliances and that the balance of power dynamics between them can be a source of security and order. Bipolarity at the international level preserves regional peace, while multi-polarity promotes disorder. In a bipolar world, the military might of both great powers makes quick and easy conquest impossible for either, and uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make (T.V.Paul, 2012:7;Waltz, 1981:3), a view that might account for the Sino-Indian relations in the Cold War era in that China was aligned with US and India with USSR to balance against each other. After the Cold War ended, however, no matter whether the situation was uni-polar under the US's hegemon, or multipolar (Wohlforth, 1999b;Pant, 2006b;Kupchan, 1998), the balance of power in South Asia became extremely complex and ambiguous. There were three aspects to the changing balance of power during this period. Firstly, the 2005 US alignment with India to counteract a rising China, by the George W. Bush administration allowing India “quasi-nuclear” nation status at the expense of violating its own domestic laws (Ganguly&Mistry, 2005;Kaplan, 2010;Tellis et al., 2011;Batabyal, 2006). Secondly, by a Sino-Indian alignment designed to balance the post-1990 US unipolar hegemony (Deng, 2008), during this time they both promoted global multi-polarity (Ganguly, 2003). Thirdly, China and India would bandwagon with the US because they all recognize the importance of the US in their foreign policy configurations (Tellis et al., 2011;Harding, 2004;Garver, 2002a).

These divergent scenarios weaken the “polarity” approach, although they might partly be explained by international realpolitik (see Chapter 6) in that a regional balance politics is rendered ambiguous, since the presence of a global US hegemon in the post-Cold War era can bring about different regional outcomes, such as a security union in Western Europe, mixed cooperation and competition in Sino-Indian relations, and continued hostility in Indo-Pakistani relations.

Therefore, a key problem for the realist approach is its overemphasis on international systems and the distribution of power, which leading to the outcomes of confrontation, and ignores the importance of unit-level factors. However the newer variant of realism – neoclassical realism – combats that weakness in that it identifies the domestic factors that influence an individual state’s foreign policy and security behaviour, which should include political leaders’ perceptions, the state’s autonomy and the influence exerted by domestic societal actors (Rose, 1998:152;Lobell et al., 2009;Levy&Thompson, 2010:37). As William Wohlforth (2010:140) contends, neoclassic realism is a more problem-focused theory that makes use of specific features of a given situation in order to explain it better. Proponents of the neoclassic realist theory argue that there is no single neoclassic realist theory, but rather a diversity of neoclassic realist theories, and also that the theory can strengthen analysis by considering domestic politics to be an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behaviour (Lobell et al., 2009:10). However, the theory has been criticised in that it has yet to develop a coherent theoretical approach to regional order (T.V.Paul, 2012:10).

This thesis, therefore, leans more heavily on Benjamin Miller’s theoretical framework in that it incorporates domestic factors which appear to coincide with neoclassic realism, in such aspects as the ability of state leaders to extract and mobilize societal resources as a function of state strength. However, because they go beyond the scope of Miller’s theory, this thesis would complement some domestic factors, such as the political leaders’ policies and the autonomy of a state (see Chapter 6 and 8 respectively), reflecting the thought of neoclassic realism.

2.1.2 Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism presents convincing challenges to neo-realism in that it offers alternative explanations for state behaviour and the peaceful transformation of regional orders. Several versions of neoliberalism exist. Scholars, Baldwin (1993), Stein (1993:243), and Moravcsiak (2010:234) have offered different classifications of neo-liberalism that influence state’s preferences and influence its foreign policy behaviour. Baldwin (1993) identified four varieties of neoliberalism, referring to theories of effects of democracy, economic interdependence, international institutions, and community as “republican liberalism”, “commercial liberalism”, “institutional liberalism”, and “sociological liberalism” respectively. Sociological liberalism, which describes a community of nations with shared values and

international norms, reaches much the same conclusions as constructivism (Sterling-Folker, 2000). This, however, will be discussed in the next section. Oneal and Russett (1999:4-5) see the three core assumptions as a continuation of the classic liberal tradition, which are accepted and described as three legs of a Kantian tripod: democracy, international institutions, and economic interdependence are attributed to peace, discussed as follows:

Firstly, democratic peace theory does not explain the Sino-Indian case, which it expects that a community of democratic states ensures peace and peaceful resolution to conflicts in terms of their shared democratic cultures and internal domestic institutions, which constrain policy makers from resorting to armed conflicts (Baldwin, 1993; Russett et al., 1995:174; Doyle, 1997). Moreover, some democratic peace theories argue that democracies are friendly with democracies, but, especially, hostile to non-democracies (Owen, 1994). In Sino-Indian case, however, China's and India's divergent political regimes, which have existed since the 1950s establishment of their states, did not prevent them from developing a "brotherhood" relationship. Moreover, India, as a pluralist democratic state, paradoxically ran counter to expectations of a democratic peace theory, in that from the 1950s it enjoyed friendly relations with authoritarian China, and, from 1971, a quasi-alliance with the communist Soviet Union, whereas it had a confrontational relationship with democratic US between 1965 and 1999 and also with democratic Pakistan in the 1970s (Muppidi, 2001:65). Furthermore, China is unlikely to be democratic in the short term. Even though China has become more open and economically more globally integrated, it is possible that such openness produced a more extreme nationalist tendency in that it resorted to a more assertive foreign policy, especially in its territorial disputes (Friedberg, 2005:30; Lai, 2013:28). Therefore, democratic peace theory does not apply in this case.

The second core factor – international institutions – serve as mediators and also providing information that could reduce fears of cheating (Keohane, 1984; Haas et al., 1993; Baldwin, 1993:41). Moreover, international regimes potentially improve each side's information base, in which reduce transaction costs and misunderstanding, thereby promoting international cooperation (Krasner, 1983). Neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on mutual interests that extend beyond economics. In particular, states have been compelled to address new security concerns, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, and global financial crises; hence, regional and multilateral forums have been created in order to combat such non-traditional security threats. This approach may well account for the convergence of interests between China and India on global issues, which includes negotiations regarding CO2 emission, agricultural subsidies, joint operations against piracy and the sharing of seabed research technology, etc. (also see 3.3.3). However, international institutions only play a limited and peripheral role and they do not encroach on the security field, especially when states are primarily concerned with relative gains (Grieco, 1988:487-8). This approach, therefore, appears to only be a partial explanation for the transformations of the relationship between China and India (see 5.2).

The third factor – economic interdependence – makes states less likely to fight each other, which is based on the principle that states cooperate with each other in order to maximize their absolute gain (Keohane&Nye, 2011;Oneal et al., 1996:24;Powell, 1991:1303). Some (Sharma, 2009:165;Engardio, 2007;Singh, 2005) hold that economic linkages and interdependence between China and India have increased exponentially resulting in a transformations in the context of globalization. However, as Copeland (1996:6) and Barbieri (Barbieri, 2002) suggests, economic interdependence can also produce political friction, which comes back to a “realist” view. Rapkin and Thompson (2006) and Holslag (2010:120) are also of the view that economic convergence does not necessarily bring about cooperation and regional economic integration is no guarantee of peace among China and India.

Increasing economic cooperation and commercial openness have increased Sino-Indian motivation for preserving cordial relations, since this forms a strong foundation for supporting their domestic legitimacy, but it was not an underlying cause of transition to cold peace (Fravel, 2011b:39). Three additional points support this argument, firstly, in 1988, when rapprochement was initiated, the bilateral trades and economic interactions were at a low ebb; moreover, Rajiv Gandhi’s motivation for his China visit was not economic (see chapter 5). Secondly, there are no direct evidence to suggest that increased economic interdependence overcame Chinese and Indian concerns about relative gains and national security issues, since India blocked China’s economic investment plans in India and rejected its domestic request for reopening extra border trade posts due to security concerns. The diplomatic setback happened at a time when bilateral trade was at a historical high (see chapter 9). The sensitivity on security appeared to outweigh the benefits it would gain from trade. Thirdly, the asymmetries of interdependence, the increasing trade deficits on the Indian side, and the competition in the global markets have become a source of political friction(see 3.3.3). As Miller argues (2007a:22), when realist factors are salient, both the effects of interdependence and international institutions on regional outcomes are minimized.

2.1.3 Social constructivism

An alternative model for explaining the change in international relations is social constructivism, which postulates that the basic structure of international politics is socially constructed, that this shapes actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1999:133-134). Wendt (1999:247-259) assumes that, in the international arena, states intend to survive under the status of anarchy, which is socially constructed among states. He describes three cultures of anarchy – Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, or, respectively, enemy, rival, or friend. Firstly, Hobbesian anarchic culture is characterized by enmity or the identity adopted by states in reference to their image of self and others; i.e. it is in the national interest to diminish the rival and conquer their territory. Secondly, Lockean anarchic culture is characterized by rivalry, where states recognize each other’s sovereignty and the national interest is seen in

terms of security rather than power-seeking and conquer; the driving force for this relative self-restraint. Thirdly, Kantian anarchy, which is characterized by friendship, is based on two principle rules – non-violence and mutual aid.

Katzenstein's perspective (1996:60-61) is of national interests formed by social interactions, which are the product of "specific historical and cultural environments". Muppidi (2001:58-59) argues that, in that sense, states identities shaped the Sino-Indian relations and that, from an Indian perspective, given the historical memory of the 1962 war, India's defeat was a "betrayal" that India was seen a "victim" of China's imperialism and expansionism; whereas, from a Chinese perspective, it resulted from India's insistence on adhering to British-enforced imperial borders. From the perspective of constructivism, therefore, much has been written about "historical legacy" shaping perceptions and images of hostility (Holslag, 2009b:54;Saalman, 2011b:174;Miller, 2013;Fang, 2014:8), which suggests that Sino-Indian relations have been constructed along either the Hobbesian anarchic culture or Lockean's, which is relegated to realism (further discussion in Chapter 7).

Although constructivism offers compelling explanations for permanent peace or a pluralist security community, Sino-Indian relations which were characterized by the absence of a sense of community did not yet evolved into this stage. Moreover, the official view of China and India sharing common norms along with the lines of "Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence" (Indian term *Panch Sheel*), civilization greatness, pan-Asian sentiment, and anti-imperial ideology (Cheng, 2002:90-91;Mishra, 2004:326) did not prevent them from going to war in the 1960s, and still remained as official rhetoric in the post-1988 cold peace.

As Holslag (2010:166) mentions, "the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" reflect both states' anxieties over their sovereignty being violated by external powers. However, they were criticized in the Indian media since it considered China had violated them by regularly encroaching across the LAC S after 2006; this suggests that both states actually still adhere to traditional norms of sovereignty in matters of internal affairs (Panda, 2014). It also suggests that these norms have been unable to transcend their relations to a state of warm peace since 1988. As may be seen from official documents, both have labelled themselves as "developing countries", described themselves as " large emerging state", and asserted that, "we are friends" (see 3.3.1). Such foreign policy discourses, which try to establish the "us" identity, is an ongoing process of socialization and construction; therefore, as long as "historical memory" is dominant in Sino-Indian rivalries, a further examination is well merited, since, it might be necessary to wait for a long time to observe how the social construction of rivalries might be transformed into friendship in view of the historical notion of greatness, the drive for national revitalization, the desire of both states for international prestige, the changes of perceptions of their political leaders, and the reaction of their respective publics. A more eclectic approach is needed in order to explain the complexities surrounding the transformations of Sino-Indian relations.

2.2 Benjamin Miller's theory of war and peace

In view of the limitations of the various theories described above, it is apparent that a single IR paradigm is unable to either capture comprehensively the transformations of regional orders or reconcile the competing explanations for them. It is important to find a viable analytical framework in order to explain regional outcomes. Therefore, this thesis will utilise Benjamin Miller's theory of war and peace, which combines several different theoretical approaches and two levels of analysis in order to bridge the gaps in understanding. The next section will firstly explore the weaknesses and strengths of Miller's theory, and secondly, it will introduce his analytical framework.

2.2.1. The strengths and weaknesses of Benjamin Miller's theory

Miller uses the various factors from the realist, liberal and international society theories, in order to bridge the gaps in each theoretical approach by representing empirical evidence from the following examples to support the validity of his theory: (i) the Middle East after 1945, (ii) the Balkans between 1830 and 1913, (iii) South America during the twentieth century, (iv) post-1945 Western Europe, and (v) South Asia in the Post-Cold War period (2010b; 2007a).

Strength 1: addressing the problems of levels-of-analysis

Miller's theory addresses the levels-of-analysis problem by establishing the causal links between different levels of analysis. This thesis will argue that causations at a single level predispose the analysts to overlook the interaction between any two levels of determinants. Waltz (1959) classified the causes of war in terms of the individual, the nation-state, and the international level, which he labeled respectively as first, second, and third-image explanations. However, this raises questions about which level most effectively explains international outcomes, how variables from different levels may interact with each other.

However, Waltzian thoughts that omit leaders' motivations and state attributes as causal variables created a problem for realism, since it overemphasizes "structure" and "the distribution of power", while giving less importance to agency and state-level variables (Baldwin, 1993:294-95). In response to this weakness, IR theorists have refined the utilities of the levels-of-analysis framework and recognize it as an effective organizing device for studying international politics (Gourevitch, 1978; Doyle, 1986; Putman, 1988; Fearon, 1994). In summary, this thesis argues that it will create incomplete explanations for the lack of the analysis at the systemic and national level. Miller's theory overcomes this weakness by integrating the structural and unit-level variables. T. V. Paul (2012:17) describes Miller theory linking systemic variables with state capabilities and attributes, as an eclectic approach .

Strength 2: addressing the division among the IR paradigms

Apart from the levels-of-analysis problem, each IR paradigm yields predominant explanations for one form of regional outcome. For example, realism best accounts for conflicts, while liberalism and constructivism explain either conflict or cooperation but not enduring rivalries. Even different variants of realism lead to different explanations and predictions of international outcomes. One of the solutions is to incorporate different variables derived from different theories or mainly focused on specific theories that generate more determinant and propositions (Levy, 1998:146). Because Miller understood the limitations of a single paradigm, he incorporates variables derived from three IR paradigms and includes the theory of hegemonic stability and cooperation theory to the conflict resolution, in order to explain the variations of war and peace.

Also, because he believed that realist and liberalist approaches might overlook regional actors and issues, such as sovereignty, territory and nationalism, which are critical in terms of regional order, his theory fills this crucial gap in the realist-liberal theories by proposing a 'state-to-nation' balance as part of his alternative approach (Miller, 2007a:22).

Weakness 1: it does not fit all regional contexts and time periods

A weakness of Miller's theory is that it might not fit all regional contexts and time periods. Firstly, Holsti (2009) argues that his theory is time-bound in that it could not be employed in the period immediately prior to the French Revolutionary, when a nationalist era was characterized by state-to-nation balance. Holsti also mentions that many "great power" wars, for example the 1941-1945 Pacific War had little to do with regional state-to-nation balance. Gleditsch (2009) also states that Miller's variable of state-to-nation balance primarily focuses on developments in post-1945 Western Europe, but it failed to explain why state-to-nation imbalances could not be overcome in earlier periods.

Weakness 2: it could not explain the reason for some ethnic groups resorting to violence and some to peaceful means

Miller's theory does not explain why some ethnic groups use peaceful rather than violent means in expressing their secessionist desire. Saideman (2008) argues that Miller overstates the state-to-nation balance in Western Europe at a time when there were well-known secessionist movements – for instance, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in Britain, Basque and Catalan in Spain, Corsican and Basque in France. Therefore, he states, not all secessionist movements fit into state-to-nation imbalance. Neither can institutions and incentives within each state explain why some secessionist movements choose peace rather than violence. The key reason for the difference in attitudes depends on whether these groups believe that violence is necessary in order to achieve meaningful change. Hence, secessionists in Quebec see violence as unacceptable, preferring to gain victories through legislation and the courts.

2.3 Great power involvements

This section will define the international/ systemic-level factor in terms of great power involvement. It will also explain the motivations for great power involvement.

2.3.1 Definitions

Miller postulates that four types of great power involvement, great power competition, cooperation, hegemony, and disengagement, lead either to cold war or cold peace. The detailed theoretical propositions on great power involvement will be in Chapter 4.1; however, in order to clarify these general terms in relations to this thesis, the following are the operational definitions.

1. Great powers

Miller (2007a:15) describes great powers as having superior power-projection capabilities combined with interests in changing the capabilities of regional states in such ways as to exert their influence on regional outcomes. The capabilities refer to overall capacities in the key areas of military, economics, socio-political cohesiveness, and the power-projection capabilities to specific regions (2007a:208; 2001a:9). This definition both distinguishes great powers from local states and reflects Miller's tutor, Kenneth Waltz's (1979:131), own "realist" criteria for great powers, which are based on population, territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, political stability and competence, and military strength. Paul Kennedy (1989) also focused the transition of great powers in terms of the interplay of military and economic power on the rise and decline of Spain, Britain and the US. Martin Wight (Bull&Holbroad, 1986:34) divides powers into dominant powers and great powers, where the former masters the state-system in that they are able to defeat coalition of most other rival powers at the cost of exhausting wars. Wight listed the great powers, rather than defining the term, when he articulates (Bull&Holbraad, 1986:41), "since World War Two, they have been the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China".

All of the above definitions are based on the preconditions of material capabilities; however, whether a state may be included depends on different definitions of the term. For example, by Wight's definition, China was a great power, but not in Kennedy's. Here are Barry Buzan's and Levy's definitions, which take the regional context into account. Buzan (2004) defines "great powers being influential in more than one region", whereas "regional powers are influential mainly within one region"; and Levy (1983:8) defines them as "having the intentions and capabilities to shape the international system". Accordingly, the US and the Soviet Union were great powers during the Cold War era. With its global-reach military power and first rank economic capacities since the end of Cold War, the US is undoubtedly a superpower. In contrast, by definition, China and India are regional powers (detailed discussions will be at Chapter 5.2.1 and 6.1.1).

It is analytically necessary to distinguish a great power from a regional power, because, for two reasons, this helps in defining the conceptual framework. Firstly, up to the end of Cold War, China and India were regional powers, the US and the USSR were “great powers”. Secondly, even with their post-2000 growing economics and military infrastructures, China and India have both increased their leverage in the international system; however, this thesis argues that, compared to the US, neither China nor India have the capability to change the international system; hence they are still merely rising regional powers before 2013 (Rajagopalan&Sahni, 2008:6). As a result, the factor – great power involvement, great powers did not include China and India.

2. Miller’s “concerts”

In the early period of Miller’s research, in order to explain the emergence of great power cooperation, he used the concept of “concert”, which is based on a well-acknowledged nineteenth-century historical case – the “European Concert” – an international institution or a security regime, involved in high-level diplomatic collaboration. Even though IR scholars hold different definition of “concert”, Miller used it to describe great power cooperation that refers to a conscious cooperation in managing international conflicts as a characteristic of a concert (Miller, 1994:332). To avoid confusion, however, this thesis will continue to use the term ‘cooperation’, since it has a relatively broad-scope and may be used for different kinds of cooperation, which includes concerts, security regimes, and collective security mechanisms, although this thesis will not cover the latter two.

3. Hegemony

A hegemon is a state so powerful that it dominates all other states in a region. This means that a hegemon is the only great power in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001:40). Miller states that a hegemon exercises a major influence on the patterns and outcomes either benignly or coercively with the difference being the means it employ (Miller, 2001a:17; 2007a:218) and that a coercive hegemon imposes cold peace through deterrence and negative sanctions, in spite of, or against, local states’ wishes, while a benign hegemon leads towards cold peace by diplomatic means, by offering assurances and by minimizing encroachment on the client states’ sovereignty and autonomy. This is similar to Keohane’s (1984:32) definition that, that “a benign hegemon exercises its leadership through persuasion and negotiated diplomacy”.

2.3.2 The sources of great power involvement

Why are great powers willing to become involved in, or be estranged from, a particular region? Miller states that the four types of involvement are determined by the nature and balance of great power capabilities and of their regional interests. He integrates two variants of realism into his theory, classic realism – interest – and neo-realism – the distribution of capabilities, to shape the forms of great power involvement. As mentioned

above, these capabilities cover all key areas, such as military and economic power, and the power-projection capabilities and the interests of great powers refer to their stakes in the regional material resources and, which are influenced by the geographical proximity. A common threat to great power interests may also induce their involvement in a specific region.

2.4 State-to-nation balance

According to Miller, state-to-nation balance is a key underlying factor at the regional/ domestic level that explains both regional hot war proneness and the maintenance of warm peace. The detailed theoretical propositions on state-to-nation balance will be in chapter 7.1.1.

State-to-nation balance comprises two factors, state-building – state strength, and nation-building – state-to-nation congruence (Miller, 2007b:68,101). For analytical purposes, it is necessary to define nation and state, strong states and weak states.

1. State vs. nation

In general, IR theorists regard state and nation as an interchangeable concept. However, Miller (2007a:34) notes that the nation/state is not a “unified actor”, hence he considers them to be conceptually different although he intentionally did not define them. Because the literature has a wide-range of definitions, this thesis will follow those of Gellner and Hobsbawm (Gellner, 2006;Hobsbawm, 2012) as they will help to clarify the operational definition of state and nation. They define a “state” as a political unit in which an organized political entity has an exclusive domain over an autonomous territory, people and sovereignty, whereas a “nation” is a national unit in which a community of people share a common language, culture, ethnicity, descent, or history. The ideal form of a political organization is a “state-nation” in which the political unit is congruent with the national unit (Van Evera, 1994a). However, only 10% of the world’s states are constituted as one nation where all people speak the same language, or come from the same ethnic group; examples of these are Japan and Iceland. Most states are multi-ethnic nations, such as the US, China and India (Miller, 2007b:89;Buzan, 2007).

Even so, multi-ethnic states do not necessarily give rise to a state-to-nation incongruence. Miller argues that incongruence can derive from either ethnic or civic nationalism (2007b:89-91). Ethnic nationalism is based on blood ties, lineage, and common descent, while civic nationalism emphasizes a citizen’s identification with the nation-state within its current territorial boundaries. It is important to note that Miller’s ethnic nationalism not only denotes “a nation”, but it also indicates “an ethnic group”, since an ethnic group based on common ancestry and a shared language and culture, is not necessary synonymous with a “nation”. Only if an ethnic group claims the right of self-determination and pursues the power of political autonomy, might this coincide with the concept of a “nation” and

nationalism. Anthony Smith (1991:51) defines this as “an ideological movement aiming at and maintaining autonomy, unity with identity for a social group which is deemed to constitute a nation”. Wolff (2006:25) also defines it as, “the desire to gain political power for an ethnic group is expressed in the concept of nationalism”; all these are similar to Miller’s definition of ethnic nationalism, that “a politically conscious group belonging to the same ethnic group claims the right of self-determination through statehood leads to ethnic nationalism” (2007b:34).

Civic nationalism, which takes the forms of state-initiated nationalism or immigrant societies in a new state, may challenge interstate order. However, civic nationalism tends to have a high level of congruence, such as the US, Brazil, or Australia, because the state precedes the nation. Therefore, a new nationhood of assimilation can replace the old nationhood of ethnic-nationalist claims. However, civic nationalism will not be discussed further in this thesis.

By contrast, ethnic nationalism has created severe and enduring conflicts. When ethno-national groups aspire to establish their own state based on ethnic affiliations as a major political force, a problem of state-to-nation incongruence emerges. Therefore, when a state’s boundaries do not coincide with a pre-existing ethnic nation’s boundaries, they cause a state-to-nation imbalance.

2. State-building: strong vs. weak states

The extent of state strength is a different concept from the realist notion of state power or capabilities, but is an underlying factor for achieving state-to-nation balance, which refers to the success of state-building (Miller, 2007b:54,90). On the one hand, strong states have an effective set of political institutions; i.e. showing state’s capability by mobilizing manpower for military service and gaining its legitimacy by extracting financial resources in order to provide material benefits, and whether it is able to control the violence in its territory through a combination of armed force and domestic legitimacy. On the other hand, a failure of state-building results in a weak state that will lack effective institutions and resources to implement policies and fail to fulfil key functions. Weak states also lack effective control over the means of internal violence and lack an effective law-enforcement system.

3. How to measure state strength?

In IR studies, states are primarily defined by power, which means their capacity to achieve and defend their purposes, either through persuasion or coercion, and, if necessary, to defeat their adversaries in war.

In Miller’s views, for the analytical purposes, state strength is neither measured in military or economic terms, nor is it a form of government. Rather, it refers to the capacity of the state to extract the resources necessary to rule and provide services and to maintain an

essential element of sovereignty. The literature on the measurement of state strength emphasizes instrumental capacities of statehood such as degree of institutionalization, capabilities for extraction of surpluses, the delivery of services, and a state's autonomy (Miller, 2007b:82;Holsti, 1996a:84;Kacowicz, 1998:13). Therefore, a threat to a state tends to be domestic rather than external. In contrast, the threat to a strong state tends to be external.

Miller's definition of state strength is similar to Holsti's in that it refers to a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and that it operates in the context of a consensus-based political community. Therefore, the strength of a state is shown by it having (i) civilian control of its military, (ii) clearly defined and stable political institutions and territory, (iii) the recognition of international borders by other states, and (iv) the most of its social groups assimilated into its polities (Holsti, 1996a). The last three points were categorized by Miller's into his definition of state-to-nation congruence.

4. Do strong states make peace?

The literature suggests that strong states have been an essential factor in regard to peace. Some scholars agree that some regions of the world contain weak and failed states that have become war zones, while many regions contain strong states are peace zones (Buzan, 1991;Holsti, 1996a:141;Arie, 1998;Miller, 2007b;Paul, 2010). For instance, empirical evidence shows a significant correlation between the growth of state strength in South America between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and a decline in the incidence of internal wars, armed crises, interstate wars, and interventions (Holsti, 1996a;Arie, 1998).

2.5 Methodology

This thesis will test the theoretical propositions derived from the research of Benjamin Miller in order to explain the Sino-Indian case in great depth. Through analyzing the single case – the transformations from “hot war” to “cold war”, then to “cold peace” – the purpose of this analysis is to gain insights into the changes and complexities of Sino-Indian relations over time. It will then try to refine the propositions on empirical grounds in order to offer a powerful theoretical approach in explaining the dyadic relationship. As Rosenau put it (Crumm&Rosenau, 1994:127-129), “A theory of dyadic relationship should be capable of explaining, describing, and predicting basic changes in the parameters of a relationship”. These parameters include the patterns of conflict and cooperation that prevail across time. The history provides empirical evidence regarding the transformations of Sino-Indian relations (Marsh&Stoker, 2010:286;Trachtenberg, 2006:39). This thesis will then use process tracing to establish the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables, thus, process-tracing will test the single case regarding the mechanism that incorporates systemic and domestic variables (King et al., 1994:226;Van Evera, 1997:70;George&Bennett, 2004:205).

Using a framework devised by Stephen M. Walt (1988) , this thesis will then follow three steps in conducting the research:

Step 1: will outline the hypotheses and examine several important interpretative issues to derive concrete, falsifiable predictions from the theory in order to raise counterarguments, such as “expect to see” and “expect not to see”.

Step 2: will describe the transformations of Sino-Indian relations from foreign policy, political statements and historical documents, and identify why each acted as it did.

Step 3: will analyze the hypotheses with respect to these variations and explore the implications of the outcomes.

2.5.1 Timeframe

The timeframe for the analysis – 1950 to 2013 – was characterized by different phases of transformations from a brief period of friendship in the 1950s, to a hot war in 1962, then two decades of cold war, and after 1988, cold peace to the present. Accordingly, these phases are selected for examining Sino-Indian relations. In particular, the post-1988 cold peace, which was a period of remarkable change in Sino-Indian relations, was marked by economic reforms, sustained economic growth, an increase in military spending, increasingly strong economic ties, a series of formal agreements and strategic partnership, and an aspirations to great power status (Mansingh, 2007a:92;Gilboy&Heginbotham, 2012). This period also saw the end of Cold War era, the end of bipolar confrontation following the Soviet collapse, a preponderance of US global power, a rapidly changing international environment, and emerging non-security challenges, all of which pushed China and India towards rapprochement.

Regarding the dependent variable, Sino-Indian relations have undergone a transition of war and peace (see Chapter 3), which reflected variations in different levels of analysis. For instance, at the international system level, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 marked the end of the bipolar confrontation, which compelled adjustments to both states foreign policy (see Chapter 5). At the domestic level, for China, the switch from an under-performing centrally-planned economy to market-oriented economy one began at 1978, although, for India, it did not start until 1991. The resultant economic changes represent a turning point in both countries economic reform and desire for stable and peaceful relations (see Chapter 8). Together with their sustained economic growth and the increase in military power, both China and India are active in the global political arena, thereby fuelling their great power aspirations.

The timeframe of this research began in 1950, which marked the two states’ establishment of diplomatic relations, and ended in 2013, which marked the end of the incumbency of Hu Jintao’s and Wen Jiabao’s periods of leadership in China and the final year of Manmohan

Singh tenure as Prime Minister in India. In 2014, leadership transition to “Xi Jinping” in China and “Narendra Modi” in India were achieved peacefully.

2.5.2 Sources

In order to explore the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1988 and 2013, I conducted library research combined with an examination of historical agreements and official documents, which included each government’s publications, annual reports, defense white papers and interstate agreements, policy announcements and speeches to obtain primary sources of information. Secondary sources included academic journal articles, books, news and information obtained from media and the Internet.

Particular attention was paid to the changes in Sino-Indian relations in the last decade by using data from government documents (Bryman, 2012:543), such as interstate treaties, legislative reports, and statistical compilations, which came in many formats, including books, periodicals, maps, and online databases, collect from Chinese and Indian governmental websites, and the British library. In order to complement some empirical material and theoretical perspectives, in the final stage of research, I conducted several email and face-to-face interviews with academics, think tanks specialists, for which I used semi-structured questions (see Appendix 1).

2.5.3 Limitations

Unavoidably, this thesis is subject to several limitations. Firstly, material resources– under Chinese law and also official rules, sensitive diplomatic records and documents, without official approval, are not open to the public. Moreover, the archives on border war have been not open by Indian government. Chinese military information, such as the numbers of personnel and spending, has been based on academic writings and other data sources, such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Secondly, due to the limited available time and finance, I was neither able to conduct fieldwork in China and India, in particular, the Sino-Indian border regions, or interview higher-ranking officers. To compensate, I gained access to (i) authoritative official interviews and speeches by media, (ii) speeches and lectures by academics, (iii) webcast seminars run by think-tanks, (iv) YouTube interview of scholars who have done relevant fieldwork in China and India in the last five years.

Thirdly, due to the limitation imposed by the length of this thesis, the time available for research, and the huge range of issues that emerged over the time period, it was not possible to cover all-dimensions of the various topics, such as the two countries’ relations with neighboring states, the shared water and energy issue. However, although the primary focus has been Sino-Indian relations, this thesis has, to some extent, covered relations of both countries with Pakistan.

.Chapter 3 The Transformations of Sino-Indian Relations between 1950 and 2013

China and India, the largest of the ancient civilizations that have experienced centuries of dynastic changes and the rise and fall of numerous empires, had maintained two millennium of undisturbed relations (Panikkar, 1957:10;People's Daily, 2004). However, after their establishments as newly dependent states in 1947 and 1949 respectively, Sino-Indian relations have undergone different phases of transformations, from a brief friendship in the 1950s to a hot war in 1962, then two decades of cold war, and, after 1988, cold peace to the present.

This chapter will introduce the dependent variable – the nature of Sino-Indian relations that has transformed differently between 1950 and 2013 according to Benjamin Miller's definition of the war-peace continuum and will be divided into three sections. The first section will introduce the changing contours from 1950 to 1987 between the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 April 1950 and the end of the cold war confrontation in 1987. The second section will introduce the initiation of cold peace in 1988 and the third will discuss the important events in four dimensions that changed the nature of Sino-Indian relations from cold war to cold peace.

3.1. An overview of the transformations of Sino-Indian relations between 1950 and 1987

Benjamin Miller (2007a:12) defines the transition of regional war and peace as five types of outcomes, ranging from hot war at one end of continuum, cold war, cold peace, to warm peace at the other. The transformations of Sino-Indian relations in the past sixty years fits Miller's regional war-peace continuum, from hot war to cold war, then to cold peace, but unable to reach warm peace (see Table 3.1).

Table 3-1: The transformations of Sino-Indian relations

| PERIOD | SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS |
|-----------|-----------------------|
| 1950-1957 | brotherhood |
| 1962 | border war |
| 1961-1987 | cold war |
| 1988-2013 | cold peace |

Source: the author

3.1.1 Brotherhood in the 1950s

When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, India was the first non-communist state to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1950, and this was followed that year India advocated for China's membership in the United Nation (UN). The relationship reached its climax of a friendship when Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru visited to China in 1954 and signed an agreement of "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" as the foundation of Sino-Indian brotherhood with Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai. Nehru, known as the Indian diplomacy architect, anticipated the non-alignment policy would shield India from Cold War confrontations. In particular, his emphasis on pan-Asianism and anti-colonialism led him actively to seek friendly ties with China (Tanham, 1992:40;Nanda, 1998:228-230;Mansingh, 2007a:286;Acharya, 2010:1005). As a consequence, during the 1950s, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by the aphorism, "*Chini-Hindi bhai bhai*" (China and India are brothers). However, the period of Sino-Indian brotherhood did not last long. In 1962, a short but bitter war broke out.

3.1.2 Hot war in 1962

Benjamin Miller (2007a:44) states that hot war is a situation of actual use of force aimed at destroying the military capabilities of adversaries. What, then, were the reasons for China and India to decide that military force should be used against each other in 1962 (for a discussion of the 1962 war, see chapter 7)? There has been much scholarly discussion and literature produced to address this question by writers and academic such as Sinha and Athale(1962), Lamb(1964), Maxwell (1970), Whiting (1975), Vertzberger(1982), Hoffmann(1989), Yan (1993), Liu (1994), Mishra (2004), Garver(2001; 2006), Raghavan (2006), Xie (2013).

The crucial happenings that precipitated the war were the Tibetan uprisings against China in 1959, which caused the 13th Dalai Lama to flee to India and to establish a government in exile. As a consequence, China accused India of colluding with the US in order to undermine its rule over Tibet, and in particular with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its support of the Tibetan guerrilla insurgency (Whiting, 1975:17;Shakya, 1999:283;Garver, 2004b:18). Moreover, the figure of the 3,380 kilometres⁸ of Sino-Indian un-demarcated border had been inherited from each of their predecessors (CIA, 2013). Such a territorial dispute, together with the disagreement over Tibet status, escalated to the point that military deployments and standoffs were perceived by both sides as territorial aggressions in the late 1950s, alongside the deteriorating border disputes, were the armed clashes in Longju and Kongka along the border, culminating in 1961 with minor skirmishes that escalated into

⁸ It has to be noted that the length and the areas of the Sino-Indian border are disputed. It varies, both in the media reports and in "authoritative" figures announced by each government, because the border was never demarcated officially. The measure by the CIA World Factbook approximates the Indian government estimate of 3,488 kilometres.

more serious military confrontation due to India's "forward policy" of pushing northward into the disputed territory (Whiting, 1975:46). Full scale war eventually burst out on 20 October 1962 and after one month of fighting, China overwhelmingly defeated India and announced a unilateral ceasefire on 27 November.

However, the border war did not resolve the disputes and both sides reverted to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) set in 1959 (Liu, 1994:18,41). The war, though, critically influenced on Sino-Indian relations, by encouraging India to engage in military modernization and China to reach a strategic alliance with Pakistan, both elements locking them into a period of cold war (Garver, 2004b:9).

3.1.3 The Sino-Indian cold war between 1963 and 1987

Benjamin Miller (2007a:45) states that cold war is characterized by recurrent military crises and a likelihood of escalation to war. Two important indicators of a cold war situations are, firstly, the exercise of military power for "show-of-force" purposes in order to influence rival states by a process of deterrence and containment, and secondly, a long-drawn-out rivalries , both of which, as will be described below, fitted Miller's descriptions of cold peace.

Firstly, after the 1962 war, India became committed to its military modernization, led to a build-up of troops along its Chinese border, reciprocated by China until more than 400,000 troops had been deployed (Sidhu&Yuan, 2003:18). Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s, India supported the Tibetan guerrillas to carry out anti-Chinese activities on Tibet and by initiating official contact with the Taiwanese Nationalists (Liu, 1994:114), while China both supported the Naga and Mizo rebellions in India's Northeast region and openly endorsed the Naxalbari movement in West Bengal which was working to overthrow Congress rule in India (Garver, 2001:94-5;Upadhyay, 2009:48). Hence, each state supported internal insurgencies against the other in a mutual policy of threat and deterrence. Then, 1967, both sides expelled each other's diplomats.

Secondly, the Sino-Indian cold war became enmeshed in the global Cold War (see chapter 4 for detailed discussion). Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union and the US had been deeply trapped in a nuclear arms race. However, followed the Sino-Indian 1962 war, because both perceived China to be their common enemy and wish to contain it, both sided with India by providing it with military aid (Liu, 1994:106). Hence, with the increasing Sino-USSR antagonism and Indo-Pakistani tensions, the Sino-Indian cold war came to be associated with both India's alignment with the Soviet Union and China's strategic partnership with Pakistan. The net result was to drag China and India into a longstanding and complex rivalry. Moreover, an intention of compellence was strengthened by China in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war that China sided with Pakistan by deploying troops along the Sino-Indian border; it opened up a potential two-front threats against India. Consequently, after the

war, and for the next two decades, China became the primary arms supplier for Pakistan, which became the principle generator of Sino-Indian rivalry (Vertzberger, 1983;Wirsing, 1985).

China and India resume diplomatic changes in 1976. However, there had been neither state visits nor signature of official agreements between 1976 and 1987. Any diplomatic attempt was constrained by the Sino-Soviet hostility and the Indo-Pakistani confrontation. A component of cold war situations was that military crises re-emerged. This was a case when a border standoff between Chinese and Indian military patrols from July 1986 to May 1987 in the Sumdurong Chu valley of the Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border led to the brink of war. The crisis was ended due to Indian leaders' exercise of self-restraint (see 5.1.3). The real rapprochement did not come until Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988.

3.2. The initiation of Sino-Indian cold peace in 1988

Benjamin Miller (2007a:12) uses the term "cold peace"⁹ in his typology of hot war, cold war, cold peace, and warm peace. Kupchan (2010:30) uses *rapprochement* as the first stage on a continuum through security community and union to stable peace. He (2010:68) defines it as "longstanding adversaries moving away from rivalry, agreeing to settle their disputes amicably, and ultimately developing mutual expectations of peaceful coexistence". Achieving rapprochement, or cold peace, does not necessarily mean that conflicts have been resolved or that either side accepts the ideological principles of the other. It is merely a stage on the way to warm peace or a security community. The initiations of rapprochement are,

1. Sending cordial signals – showing good will and a desire to avoid hostility. Meanwhile, they probe the other's intentions through talks or by benignly undertaking an unusually costly action, such as withdrawing armed forces, or granting concessions on disputes (Kupchan, 2010:38).

2. Reciprocal restraint – the making of mutual concessions, such as demilitarization, territorial concession, or the removal of barriers to trade between parties in order to communicate benign motivations and to reduce rivalry (Kupchan, 2010:42).

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 China visit, the first since Jawaharlal Nehru's visit in 1954, was considered to be historic (Liu, 1994:9), a turning point (Cheng, 2011:221), a major breakthrough (Mansingh, 1994), and a starting point for rapprochement (Garver, 2002b). Notably, when 84-year-old Deng Xiaoping met the 37-year-old Gandhi, he said warmly, "I welcomed you, my young friend, and I met your grandfather and mother when they visited China in 1954" (Singh, 2009a:127). Judging from the three-minute-long

⁹ The definitions of cold peace see Chapter 1.3.

handshake, ninety-minute-long meeting, and Deng's suggestion to forget the past, everything pointed to an "ice-breaking" move in Sino-Indian relations (Xinhua, 1988). Rajiv Gandhi later said, "We have moved forward. 1962 is now behind us" and viewed his visit as "a new beginning" (Bobb, 1989;Singh, 2009a:127).

Therefore, Rajiv's breakthrough visit, in terms of the operational definitions mentioned above, was characterized by:

1. *Sending cordial signals* – China's sent the first signal in 1985, when Premier Zhao Ziyang met Rajiv Gandhi in New York and proposed resuming the long-suspended border trade and reopening consulates in Lhasa and Shanghai, which had been closed since 1961. Gandhi's expressed his willingness to initiate a rapprochement (Liu, 1994:134). His 1988 reciprocal visit followed.
2. *Reciprocal restraint* – before Gandhi's visit, China and India had been on the brink of war with military standoffs in the Sumdurong Chu valley. In May 1987, Gandhi's special envoy, P.N. Haksar, to Beijing, made a "reassurance" visit to China and the dispute ended in bilateral restraint by withdrawing the increased forces (Ramesh, 1999 ;Bose, 1987). Gandhi also confirmed that Tibet was a Chinese internal issue and that he would not allow anti-China political activities by Tibetans on Indian soil, showing an unilateral concession on recognizing China's sovereignty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988;Ganguly, 2004:122). Gandhi, however, was criticized by anti-China opposition for losing bargaining chips without "reciprocity" (Baral et al., 1989:268), he took a different approach that the settlement of border disputes was no longer the precondition for normalization of Sino-Indian relations, thereby initiating the Sino-Indian cold peace.

3.3 The transformation from cold war to cold peace after 1988

Benjamin Miller (2007a:45-6) states that cold peace is characterized by formal agreements and the maintenance of diplomatic relations. The parties still feel threatened by the increases in each other's power and are concerned with relative gains, but they attempt to moderate the level of the conflict through negotiations and crisis-prevention regimes. However, the underlying issues of conflicts are still unsolved. In contrast, warm peace is characterized that it's highly unlikely to use of force and that overcomes security dilemma. Also frequent interactions between states expand to all levels of societies. Moreover, the substantive issues in the conflict between states have been resolved. Each state recognizes each other's sovereignty and reaches an agreement on boundaries, resource allocation, and refugee settlement. If states could not solve their disputes and still feel threatened by the increases in each other's power, it means a continuation of cold peace.

As discussed in 1.1, the nature of Sino-Indian relations in the post-Cold War era has been disputed among scholars and strategists. However, this thesis argues that, according to

Miller’s definition, the post- 1988 Sino-Indian relations that manifested a dynamic transformation from a state of cold war to cold peace could be measured in the following dimensions.


3.3.1 Enhancing political exchanges

Four aspects of both states’ efforts at reconciliation are noticeable:

Firstly, between 1976 and 1987, there had been no state visits, after 1988 state summits and the ratifications of formal agreements became routine, with fourteen President, Premier, and Prime Ministerial visits up to 2013. Leaders also met annually at the United Nations, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICs), the Group of Twenty Meetings (G20). Such high level exchanges have significantly increased since 2000, thereby contributing greatly to cold peace (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3-1: The comparisons of the highest-level leadership exchanges in different periods


(B: including the meetings in the third countries and international organizations, such as UN, BRICs etc.)



Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs (1999 to 2015), and Yan, Xueteong (2006).

The second aspect is that between 1988 and 1999, ministerial visits averaged three per year, whereas there were only six in total between 1976 and 1987; between 2000 and 2013, however, the average increased to seven (see Figure 3.2). These exchanges, together with improved coordination of initiatives that affected both sides, allowed many substantive issues to be addressed.


Figure 3-2 : Ministerial level visits



Source: Calculated on the basis ¹⁰ of Indian Ministry of External Affairs Annual Reports (1967-2015)

The third aspect is that a hundred bilateral agreements were ratified in the post-1988 cold peace (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). Figure 3.3 shows how these numbers, which include agreements, MOUs¹¹, and protocols, increased drastically after 1988 and exponentially improved between 2000 and 2013. Moreover, after 2014, the new leaders, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, signed forty agreements in two years, exceeding the thirty-six issued between 2000 and 2010. It seems that the new leaders are still inclined to engage deeply with each other.

Figure 3-3: Sino-Indian bilateral agreements



Source: Calculated from Indian Ministry of External Affairs annual reports (1954-2015)

¹⁰ This includes Parliament leaders, but excludes vice-ministerial and senior military commanders.

¹¹ MOU refers to Memorandum of understanding.

Fourthly, the analysis of document (see Table 3.2 and Appendix 2¹²), such as joint communique, statements, lectures, declarations, and agreements, show that both states were strongly committed to strengthen cooperation and maintain rapprochement; efforts that were aided by regular diplomatic contacts. Thirteen out of fourteen state visit documents contained expressing both sides' determination to resolve border disputes, and nine covered the Tibet issue, thus demonstrating a determination to manage intractable problems and respect China's sensitivity on Tibet. However, the Indian territorial issue of Kashmir did not appear once, resulting in the criticism that "only India made unilateral concessions" (Scott, 2011b:212).

This thesis would argue that Sino-Indian rapprochement was achieved not only by India's unilateral concessions, China took reciprocal actions, such as in 1989, China refused to supply weapons to Nepal and took a muted stance to India's military actions in Sri Lanka. After 1991, it took a more neutral position on the Kashmiri issue, in which it had previously supported Pakistan (Singh, 1997:4; Mishra, 2004:325). During Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China, reciprocal concessions were made on Tibet and Sikkim (see 1.2). Stephen Walt (1997) states that *détente* refers to roughly equal concessions in which both sides benefit, implying a mutual recognition of legitimate interests. Sino-Indian rapprochement also took this form of mutual concessions. Thus, India recognized Tibet as an Autonomous Region "within" the PRC, which was an endorsement of its "One China policy", whereas, previously, India only accepted Tibet as "an autonomous region of China". Reciprocally, China changed its position on Sikkim from an "independent state" to an "Indian state"¹³. Such territorial concessions were a recognition of mutual legitimate interests (Mansingh, 2005:5).

Documentary analysis also shows the leaders' efforts towards shaping shared identity. In particular, *Panch Sheel*, or the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", created by Nehru and Zhou Enlai in the 1950s Sino-Indian brotherhood, appeared eleven times out of fourteen, was used as an ideological foundation for peaceful coexistence, as was the seven mentions of them both being "developing" countries, in order to present an "us" identity. The documents also indicate that the areas where they held identical positions on many international issues, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural subsidy quotas, intellectual property rights, reducing greenhouse emissions, which often positioned them against the US and European countries (Wu, 2010; Wu, 2012:827; Sharma, 2009:166; Fang, 2014:181). Such ideational factors are important characteristics of warm peace and a security community (Kupchan, 2010:50), however, they only stayed at official-

¹² The methodology of the analysis of document and the method of coding explained in the Appendix 3.

¹³ China's stance on Sikkim is written in the 2003 Sino-Indian Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade.

led constructs without spilling over to societal and public domains, reflecting from the public opinions and limited citizens' interactions (see 3.3.4).

Table 3-2 : The coding table of the documents of fourteen state summits

| Key issues/Number ¹⁴ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | sum |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Positive discourse¹⁵ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cooperation in many fields | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 13 |
| To resolved border disputes | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 13 |
| Crisis management regimes | | | X | X | X | | | X | X | | | | X | X | 7 |
| Panch Sheel | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | | X | X | 11 |
| Tibet | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | | X | | 11 |
| Kashmir | | | | | X | | X | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Pakistan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Equality | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | 1 |
| Anti-imperialism | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| As a developing countries | X | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | | 7 |
| The convergence on global issues | | | | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 8 |
| Common outweighs difference | | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | X | | 4 |
| Negative discourse | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Disagreements | | | | | | X | | | | X | X | X | | | 4 |
| Left over history | | | | | | X | | | | | | | X | | 2 |

Source: The author

3.3.2 Managing border disputes

For improving both ties, China and India have given top priority to the border issues as their main goal of settlement of border disputes and maintenance of peace along the border. Some progress was made between 1981 and 2013.

1. Institutionalization of border negotiations

Three institutionalized mechanisms were created (see Table 3.3) (Liu, 2011:153-154;Singh, 2011a:89;Parameswaran, 2012).

¹⁴ The numbers refers to each state summit, see Appendix 1.

¹⁵ The meanings of discourse were explained in Appendix 2.

Table 3-3 : The Three Stages of Sino-Indian Border Negotiations

| STAGE/ PERIOD | ACHIEVEMENTS |
|--|---|
| 1. BORDER TALKS: 1981- 1988 | Eight rounds achieved (i) reduced tensions during cold war confrontations, (ii) a period of détente, with China giving up its ‘package deal’ and accepting an Indian proposition for a ‘sector by sector’ approach. |
| 2. JOINT WORKING GROUP: 1988-2003 | Fourteen rounds of JWG meetings, post-Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China which precipitated two confidence-building agreements in 1993 and 1996, stabilizing the <i>status quo</i> . India and China exchanged maps of the middle sector of the LAC for the first time and agreed to respect and observe it. |
| 3. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES: 2003-2013 | Sixteen rounds ¹⁶ held, following P.M. Vajpayee’s visit to China. Latest progress: completion of the first step of a three step process involving agreements on the draft of a framework and the eventual consensus on a boundary line demarcation. |

Source: media coverage

The first stage of border negotiations followed Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua’s 1981 visit to India. Although eight rounds of border talks made little progress, the talks eased tension and resulted in “agreement on disagreements”, while China insisted on a package deal, India preferred a “sector-by-sector” approach (Liu, 2011:153-154) .

During Rajiv Gandhi’s 1998 visit, when it was decided that resolving border disputes was no longer a precondition for normalizing bilateral relations, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was created, resulting, after fourteen rounds, in the passage of two important confidence-building agreements (1993 and 1996), which focused on identifying a mutually acceptable LAC (Singh, 2011a:89). Later, in 2002, a map of the least disputed middle sector of the LAC was agreed and exchanged.

In 2003, a policy shift from a bureaucratic exercise to a ministerial level negotiation was signalled with the appointment of Special Representatives (SR) to explore the boundary settlement framework and, in 2005, after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, an “Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Questions” was signed. This was divided into three stages of boundary settlements, firstly, a draft of the framework; secondly, an agreed framework of the final boundary settlement; and thirdly, the demarcation of the boundary. The SR meetings have now reached the second stage, which involves the different interpretations of its provisions.

¹⁶ There were sixteen rounds of SP meetings before 2013, with the 18th round in 2015.

For example, Article 7 “safeguard the interest of their settled populations in the border area” triggered a Chinese revisionist claim on Arunachal Pradesh, which caused a diplomatic setback after 2006 (see 9.1).

Peace along the border has been maintained by way of three stages of negotiations, with fifteen rounds of meetings, after which Special Representatives, Dai Bingguo, said that the security of both countries could be achieved through negotiations (China Daily, 2012) while the Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said, in 2009, that the boundary was “most peaceful... along which few troops had been injured or killed since 1988” (Bhardwaj, 2009) . In comparison, during the same period over 1,600 military incidents occurred in the disputed Indo-Pakistani Kashmir border with over 550 civilians and security personnel killed (Kapur, 2010:111).

2. Confirmation of the middle sector

The disputed Sino-Indian border has been traditionally divided into eastern, middle, and western sectors, therefore, the other positive outcome was the 2002 clarification of the lesser contested 640 kilometres long, 2,000 square kilometres¹⁷ middle sector from Spiti region in the northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh to the tri-junction of India, China and Nepal (Chang, 2005) (See Map 3.1).

Map 3-1 : The Sino-Indian disputed border (unit: kilometre)



Source: Tzou (1990: pp. 60-3).

After the middle-sector map exchange clarifying the LAC, the border disputes centred mainly around two pieces of territory (Tzou, 1990:60-3;Chen, 2009:170-171;Liu, 2011:148):

1. The 38,000 square km western sector– of Aksai Chin, mostly in its Hotan County, Xinjiang, and part of Ari District, Tibet, which has been administered by China since 1962 Sino-Indian border war. India claims that China has occupied 43,180 square kilometres of Jammu and Kashmir, including 5,180 square kilometres “illegally” ceded to China by Pakistan in the 1963 China-Pakistan boundary agreement.
2. The 90,000 square km eastern sector – of Arunachal Pradesh, which conforms to the 1914 McMahon Line and was formerly the North-East Frontier Agency of Assam State. This region has been administered by India. However, China claims that the occupation to be unlawful, since they see it as South Tibet.

Four-fifths of this border remains disputed with frequent accusations of violations by both sides (will be discussed in 9.1.5). Because of the absence of a mutually agreed LAC, incursions have been regarded as either an offensive move or a defensive patrol, depending on interpretations and reactions (Panda, 2014). However, official statements show restraint, with both governments either downplaying or denying the accusations; also, crisis management is exercised by way of confidence building measures (CBMs) (discussed below). Moreover, in order to address the ‘incursion’ disputes, a “Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs” (WMCC) was agreed in 2012 after the 15th round of SR meeting. However, Indian media perceived any incursion as an “offensive Chinese threat”, so, until an LAC can be established “incursions” will continue (Ramachandran, 2014;Parameswaran, 2012).

3. *Border agreements and the implementation of CBMs*

Following the state summits, three landmark border agreements were signed, producing a series of CBMs (see Table 3.4), which are sure signs of rapprochement.

Table 3-4 : Three Sino-Indian Border Agreements

| Year. Month | Venue | Agreements and Major Contents |
|--------------------|--|---|
| 1993.9 | Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China | Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC: the renunciation of use of force; respect for the LAC; minimum military presence. |
| 1996 .11 | Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India | Agreement on CBMs along the LAC: reopening border trades; extending the existing CBMs along the border. |
| 2005.4. | Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited to India | ‘The Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles: three stages of boundary settlements |

Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Annual Report (2012)

Three “border agreements” bound both sides to peaceful boundary resolutions through consultations and military reduction (Singh, 1997). For example, Article IV of the 1996 agreement categorises certain types of offensive weapons, exhorts against large scale military exercises – more than one division of 15,000 troops – close to the LAC, and that each side should inform the other of planned exercises.


Moreover, according to three “border agreements”, both sides initiated a number of CBMs, including, (i) a reduction of border troops, (ii) bilateral visits of border defense officers, (iii) annual exchanges of professional and training delegations, (iv) frequent meetings and contacts at border points between troops¹⁸, (v) a joint mountaineering expedition, participation in each other's national days, festive and sporting occasions, and (vi) taking part as observers in each other's military exercises. Even though holding sporting events, like volley ball matches in Nathu la, might seem trivial (Hindustan Times, 2004), the venue was symbolic that it was the 1962 border war battlefield. Therefore, its transformation into a playground for both sides’ military personnel symbolized the building of friendliness between two states’ defense forces.

In 1988, India had approximately sixty thousand combat troops on its Himalayan and other frontiers while Chinese strength on its Himalayan border was estimated to be greater. For implementing arms reductions along the border, India claimed that over 35,000 troops had been redeployed away from the eastern sector in the early 1990s (Mansingh, 1994:291) , while the Chinese announced that they had cut their troop numbers by 500,000 between 1997 and 2000, but it did not specify whether this included the Sino-Indian border areas (State Council White Paper, 2005).

However, precise information about military deployments and troop numbers along the border is difficult to obtain, particularly on the Chinese side, according to database of Bonn International Center for Conversion cited by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it reported that armed forces and weapon holdings decreased in China and India between 1993 and 1997 (SIPRI, 2010)(See Figure 3.4 and 3.5). For China, the reduction of armed forces was more obvious. Although these statistics do not specify proportions of border armed forces, they could indicate an overall reduction in Chinese armed forces. It should also be mentioned that China signed the “*Shanghai Five’s Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Areas*” together with four other Central Asian countries in 1997, which supports these statistics.


¹⁸ Personnel meetings were held at Arunachal Pradesh border points, Chushul, Nathu la, Bumla , Kibithu in 2006. See Hindustan Times, December 29, 2006. The second meeting was held on September 25, 2008, on the Chinese side of LAC. See Hindustan Times, October 2, 2008.

Figure 3-4: Chinese and Indian Armed forces personnel (units: per hundred persons)



Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion

Figure 3-5 : Chinese and Indian weapons holdings (unit: the number of items delivered or produced)



Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion

Hence, the effectiveness of CBMs during the 1990s had engendered an ethos of mutual trust. However, since 2006 a more militarized border has re-emerged (see in 9.1.5). It seemed to suggest that the scope of CBMs was limited due to a temporary phenomenon of disarmament and increasing accusations of border incursions (Mohan, 2012b:193). Moreover, neither state was willing to extend CBMs due to China's lack of transparency and India's perception of asymmetric military power (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001:360; 2003:135). There

were two major pieces of evidence showing the limitation of CBMs. Firstly, since the late 2000s both China and India had been increasing their military forces and infrastructure along the border. The Chinese build-up in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has gradually increased since the 2008 Tibetan riots, alongside increasing investments in major infrastructure projects along the Sino-Indian border, such as road, rail, air bases, and airstrips (Parameswaran, 2012). Moreover, People's Liberation Army (PLA) joint-level exercises have increased since 2011 close to the LAC on the TAR plateau, which alarmed India, though they informed India of every military exercise. India interpreted these actions as China's preparation for high altitude combat (Frankel, 2011:4; Garver, 2010b:128). In response, India planned to deploy two additional divisions comprising of nearly 30,000 troops, held in reserve since 2006, and it also fortified its own border infrastructure (Gokhale, 2014) (more details see 9.1.5).

Secondly, in 2013, there was the most serious two-week military standoff for the last two decades in the border area at Ladakh, which China called Aksai Chin (NDTV, 2013). Although it was peacefully resolved through flag meetings and diplomacy, when Prime Minister Singh visited China in 2013, the incident was due to the absence of a mutually agreed LAC, leading to an increase in mistrust (Panda, 2014). Hence, both states still feel threatened by enhancing military build-ups. Such military and infrastructure competition, generating mutual suspicion and insecurity, has resulted in the concerns of relative gains to both states which was in accordance with Benjamin Miller's definition of cold peace (also see 9.3).

4. *Resumption of border trades*

Followed by several state summits and the signing of various border agreements, three border crossings and a pilgrims' route have been reopened since the 1962 border war (see Table 3.5 and Map 3.2), including in June 2006 following road construction, the Nathu La pass – an ancient trade route wedged between Yadong County of Tibet's Xigaze prefecture and India's Sikkim State and one of the main arteries of the legendary Silk Road, which historically linked China and Europe via Central Asia before its closure after the 1962 war. The reopening appeared to reaffirm Beijing's recognition of Indian authority over Sikkim and a promise to promote border trade (Singh, 2005:118), both of which actions indicate signs of *rapprochement*.

Given the usual restrictions on limited travel time¹⁹ and tradable items²⁰, poor road infrastructures, landslides and bitter cold weather periodically blocking the routes, the

¹⁹ The trade was limited with four days from Monday to Thursday weekly. Moreover, because the passes closed in the winter, the trade only opens from May to November.

²⁰ India have made the restrictions of importing 15 items from China including silk, yak pelts and horses, and exporting 29 goods that include textiles, tea, rice, vegetables and herbs in 2006. Given the request for


volume of traffic through Lipulekh and Shipki la border posts is limited, with trade averaging \$36, 000 USD dollars every year, although an annual average of 1,000 pilgrims have been able to reach holy Tibetan places of Kailash and Mansarovar (The Times of India, 2014;Bodh, 2012).

Table 3-4: The resumption of border trade

| Date | Opening of border posts for trade and pilgrims | Agreements |
|------|---|--|
| 1991 | Lipulekh Pass in the Indian Uttara; benefiting Indian pilgrims travelling to Mountain Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet | Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade |
| 1993 | Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh | the 1993 agreement |
| 2003 | Nathu La pass | The Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade |
| 2014 | China opened Nathu La as the second route for Indian pilgrims to Kailash and Mansarovar | Announced during President Xi’s visit to India |

Source: media coverage

Map 3-2 : The Sino-Indian border posts for trade




Source: virendrasahai.com

increasing the trading items by the Sikkim government, the trading items from China expanded to 20; whereas items of exports to China 36 in 2010.

By contrast, the third trade route, the Nathu La post, carrying exports from Sikkim in India to Tibet has been increasing since 2006 from a mere US \$ 19,141 dollars in 2006-07 to \$1.29 million dollars in 2012-2013. However, due to the restriction imposed by the Indian government, exports from Tibet to Sikkim were steadily low from US \$ 23,371 dollars in 2006-07 to nil in 2011-2012. Although some traders noted that the items involved were outdated and had little commercial value, illegal trade has been rampant (Subba, 2011;Hasija, 2012). Since 2012-2013, there has been a growth of exports of Chinese goods to India in due to India adding five additional items on the allowable list (Subba&Rizal, 2013:126).

Figure 3-6: Border trade through Nathu La (unit: lakh²¹)



Source: Commerce & Industries Department of Sikkim Government (2006-2013)

However, for the reasons stated earlier, the amount of Sino-Indian border trade is trivial in terms of overall Sino-Indian bilateral trading. Also, such tentative and limited border trading is an indication of India’s wariness regarding security since the improved route might allow Chinese military easy access to a sensitive region of India known, in military jargon, as the “chicken’s neck”. This is why India was reluctant to open the fourth ancient route at Jelep La on the India-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction, which would connect Lhasa to Kalimpong in West Bengal (Singh, 2005:131;Jacob, 2011b:44).

3.3.3 Growing bilateral trade and cooperation in multilateral forums

Even though border trade is minimal, the growth of bilateral trade and economic cooperation has been a significant feature of Sino-Indian rapprochement since it resumed in 1984. Following the high-level political exchanges already described, several institutionalized mechanisms have been established enhancing economic and commercial cooperation. Therefore, the mutual economic gains resulting from rapprochement


²¹One lakh is 100,000 rupees. One lakh is about equivalent to 2,158 in \$ USD.

demonstrate a convergence of national interests and increasing economic interdependence, which encourages further bilateral trade and investment.

1. The growth of bilateral trade

Bilateral trade increased dramatically after 1988, rising from about \$200 million in 1988 to \$65.9 billion in 2013. In 2008, for the first time in history, China became India’s largest trading partner with the bilateral trade reaching US\$ 41.85 billion, while India became China’s the ninth largest trading partner. This was a nearly twenty-fold increase in ten years. Figure 3.7 (below) shows how bilateral trade was reduced in 2009 and 2012, due to the global economic crisis in 2008 and global economic downturn. Overall, the bilateral trade shows an upward trend.

Figure 3-7: Sino-Indian bilateral trade and trade deficit (value: US \$ billion)



Source: Ministry of Commerce, PRC (1988 -2014)

However, the bilateral trade was characterized by asymmetry in two respects. Firstly, since 2011, China’s exports to India have been three times as much as India exports to China. India’s trade with China is about 10% of its overall external trade, ranking third in terms of exports and first in terms of imports. By contrast, China’s trade with India is still roughly 2% of its overall external trade in 2012. India was the 15th largest trading partner of China, ranking 7th in terms of exports and 19th in terms of imports (The Embassy of India, 2015).


Secondly, the trade deficit favoured China, which was 31.4 billion in 2013, has been expanding since 2006, compared to \$908 million trade deficit favoured India in 2003. Excluding oil imports, China accounted for almost half of India’s global trade deficit (Economist, 2012b). There is a correlation between economic disparities and political tensions for states’ transition to peace (Press-Barnathan, 2006:264). In order to address the

increasing trade deficit, which severely disturbed India, both states leaders signed free trade agreement (FTA), which has had the result of encouraging Chinese investment in India.

2. The trivial bilateral investment

Mutual investment has been steadily increasing, cumulatively Chinese investment in India reached US \$2.73 billion in 2013; whereas Indian investment in China amounted to \$ 0.56 billion (The Embassy of India, 2015). However, in terms of their differing investment areas and sectors and investment strategy, neither are in each other’s top ten Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) states (Hong, 2011:24;Prime et al., 2012). In particular, according to a 2015 report by Ernst and Young, China, whose outbound investment flows in 2014 exceeded US\$ 100 billion, became the world’s third largest overseas investor (Taneja&Wadhwa, 2015). However, Chinese investments in India have been very low, totalling \$ 3 billion between 2000 and 2013, while Japanese investments in India over the same period were \$ 15 billion (The Embassy of India, 2015;The Ministry of External Affair, 2014). Bilateral investment, therefore, has great potential for further development through current institutionalized mechanisms (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3-8: Bilateral investment (unit: US \$million)



Source: Ministry of Commerce, PRC (2007-2014)

3. The complementary advantages of economic cooperation

Strengthened economic ties, coupled with the complementary nature of their economies have been the driving force behind the economic cooperation between the 1990 and 2010s. The two major aspects of bilateral economic complementarities are:

Firstly, certain industries dominate the two economies and complement each other in certain areas (Wu, 2010:97;Wignaraja, 2011;Qureshi&Wan, 2008:1339). For instance, China specializes in manufacturing items for foreign multinationals with global sales networks, whereas India has developed a reputation, and a global market, in engineering, pharmaceuticals, services sectors and the IT industry. UN COMTRADE database (UN, 2015) supports this view, in that it reports that China's share of the world's manufactured exports increased from 0.5% in 1985 to 18% in 2012, while India's share rose from 0.5% to 1.8 % over the same period. Hence, Indian manufacturing will not compete with China in a future decade. By contrast, however, India's performance in exports has been in services rather than in manufacturing. Such analyses demonstrate their considerable difference in trade performance.

Secondly, in the 2000s, the trading structures with each other were complementary. Table 3.6 shows that China's principal exports to India were manufacturing goods, such as machinery and organic chemicals, which accounted for 54% of the whole. Conversely, India's main exports to China were mainly raw materials, such as iron ore, slag and ash, cotton yarn and fabric, and copper, which accounted for 59% of the whole.

Table 3-5: The composition of China-India trade

| | China's top 5 Exports to India | India's top 5 export to China | China's top 5 Exports to India | India's top 5 export to China |
|------|--|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| rank | 2003 | 2003 | 2012 | 2012 |
| 1 | Machinery and transport equipment 28.65% | Crude materials, inedible, except fuels-40.1% | Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery Etc. 23% | Ores, Slag and Ash 23% |
| 2 | Chemicals 26.15% | Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 36.74% | Electric Machinery Etc. Sound Equip; TV Equip 21% | Cotton, Including Yarn 22% |
| 3 | Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 23.57% | Chemicals 15.59% | Organic Chemicals 10% | Copper and Similar items 12% |
| 4 | Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7.21% | Machinery and transport equipment 3.8% | Fertilizers 6% | Nat Etc Pearls 7% |
| 5 | Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 7.05% | Food and live animals 1.41% | Articles of iron or steel 4% | Organic Chemicals 7% |

Source: The Embassy of India, 2003 and 2012

Economists argue that China is keen to import much raw material from all over the world- including Latin America, Africa, and Asia. A theory that was dominant in Latin American economics literature envisioned states in the centre as exporters of industrial goods and those on the periphery as exporters of raw materials (Hong, 2011;Virmani, 2006:274). In this sense, China may stand closer to the “centre” than India. Thus India’s exports of raw materials to China and imports of manufactured products from China has been a consequence of protectionism in that it has set up certain restrictions and regulations, such as tariffs and limitations on wireless telecommunication equipment and electric power plants and imposing a ban on Chinese companies investing in port construction and border areas, as well as restricting working visas to prevent Chinese labourers from working in India (Ministry of Commerce, 2014:46-48). For example, a Hong-Kong based company was forbidden from investing in projects in Mumbai and Chennai ports, when the Indian intelligence Bureau and the military-based think tank the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) warned that allowing the Chinese bid would give them access to the Indian Ocean, which would have serious consequences for Indian maritime security (Ghildiyal, 2006).

Given the increasing two way trade volume, the immense potential markets and opportunities, and the complementary trades and different areas in FDI, there are huge incentives to sustain *rapprochement* (Engardio, 2007;Hong, 2009:101). However, economic interdependence may also lead to competition (Keohane&Nye, 2011:9;Copeland, 1996:8). The Indian textile and clothing sector, for example, has long been an important export industry, in 2003, the sector contributed 4 % of GDP and 14 % to value added in manufacturing; amounting to \$13 billion, or 23% of total exports. By 2010, the sector, now worth US \$25 billion had declined to 12% of all exports. However, by 2011, China’s textile exports rose to US\$ 200 billion, or 35 % of world market share, with India being reduced to 4% of world market share (Department of Commerce, 2011). Furthermore, China accounted for about 25 % of both US and EU textile. Thus, China’s gain is India’s loss, and, incidentally, it is also a loss for the US and Europe (Cerra et al., 2005:14). Therefore, India, especially in clothing and electronics, is highly sensitive to Chinese competition although there is also competition in manufactured goods and other commodities. On the other hand, some scholars argue that, even though China had previously enjoyed an advantage in computer hardware, more recently, it had been losing its competitive edge. In the respect, India has caught up with it (Sharma, 2009:167;Holslag, 2010:72-73).

Moreover, both states are trying to integrate into international organizations by showing the two sides of cooperation and competition. For example, they cooperated in the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiation, even though India was one of the highest numbers of states for appealing to the trade remedy investigation against Chinese anti-dumping measures through WTO (The Economic Times, 2013). Cooperation between them is also apparent at both regional and global levels, through Russia-India-China (RIC), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM), BRICS, G-20, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Moreover, this regional forum also creates space for cooperation and competition for influence and alliance-making, through ASEAN plus Six mechanism, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Zhang, 2010:182;Palit, 2012;Panda, 2013).

Bilateral trade expansion has increased the strength and depth of existing ties in that economic interactions for boosting state economy have fitted both Chinese and Indian national interests and underlie their domestic legitimacy, which, in turn, tend to restrain rivalry. However, the trade deficits favouring India, the increase in economic competition, India's feeling of insecurity, shown by its protectionist policies, and strategic mistrust, are the sources of potential tensions that mean economic interdependence does not necessarily spill over into the political and security arenas, thereby showing the complexities of two states' economic and political relationship (Smith, 2013:240;Economist, 2012b).

3.3.4 Mutual perceptions

This section, which explores the element in the public perceptions of two states, shows that a gradual change has taken place from solid hostility and suspicion to manifold variations and diversities seen firstly in the early phase of rapprochement, but which turned into uncertainty in the later phase.


Generally speaking, hostility and perceptions of mutual threat have prevailed in both states minds due to the legacy of border war and the long-term confrontations. Also, public attitudes can be attributed to mutual ignorance of the other state due to the longstanding rupture in contact. Given the lack of consistency and reliable quantitative surveys, it is difficult to find materials tracing back to the 1980s. In both states public opinion polls only became available in the 2010s. The next section compares the various polls with an analysis of academic research and media reporting.

The typical Chinese public view of India is of it being weak and poor (Egreteau, 2011;Seervai et al., 2014). By contrast, the Indian public, including the younger generation, have been fed with the media perceptions of the 'China threat' (Zhang, 2006:95). Given the longstanding perceptual biases and misunderstanding, mutual perceptions towards each other remain problematic.

A British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Service Poll has conducted mutual perception surveys consistently from 2006 to 2013, interviewing between 1005 and 3600 respondents each year (see Figure 2.9). Despite decades of political tensions and deep suspicion, results showed that, the views of one to the other were relatively benign. In 2005, 66% of Indian interviewees saw China's influence in the world positively and only 20% viewed it negatively (BBC, 2005). However, positive perceptions took a downturn in 2013 at 36% and in 2011 the negative rating reached a high point of 52% (BBC, 2014a:7-9). These up-and-down changes

were also seen when Chinese positive views on India similarly dropped from 39% in 2006 to 23% in 2013, while the negative views increased from 32% to 45%.

Figure 3-9 : Chinese and Indian perceptions towards each other



Source: BBC World Poll (2006-2013)

A latest poll survey, conducted by the Lowy Institute (Mecalf, 2013), showed that 83% of Indians considered China to be a security threat, because of the border disputes, China's possession of nuclear weapons, competition for resources in third countries, and China's presence in the Indian Ocean. Only 31% agreed that China's rise had been good for India, although more than 60% agreed that India should cooperate and strengthen its relations with China.

This section has argued that the mutual perceptions of both states have experienced fluctuations from an historical hostility and distrust, through a period of more benign perceptions in the middle 2000s, to a more negative in the early 2010s. These diversified and multifaceted perceptions reflect changes of foreign policies that have shaped rapprochement. For instance, only 168,952 Chinese nationals traveled to India in 2012 compared to 610,194 Indians who visited China, excluding Hong Kong (Madan, 2015). There are no government statistics, however, according to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), neither China nor India in each other's top ten of destinations for studying abroad, in 2012, while 682 Chinese students went to study in India, only 204 Indian students went to China (BBC, 2015; Thomas, 2015; UNESCO, 2014); this compared with 194,029 and 100,270 students from China and India respectively, who went

to the US during the same period (Open Doors, 2012). Such figures show that the interactions of citizens between the two states still were limited.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how Sino-Indian relations have fluctuated between war and peace between 1950 and 2013, starting with a short period of brotherhood in the 1950s, regressing to a brief period of war in 1962, locking into a state of cold war from 1963 to 1987 and then reverting to cold peace between 1988 and the present. In particular, throughout this relatively short period of cold peace, China and India have transited through the four dimensions of progression, characterizing by rare political contacts to frequent official exchanges, border conflict to border stability, poor bilateral trading to highly economic interdependence, and changing public opinion from solid mutual hostility to a widening spectrum of perceptions.

Consequently, Sino-Indian relations continue to be mixed with an interplay of cooperation and competition, to an extent that, firstly, officially-constructed cordiality has not resulted in public perceptions being such that they have led to social integration, secondly, border disputes have still not been resolved, since, after 2006, a gradual move from disarmament to competition has led to the re-emergence of military build-ups along the border, thirdly, economic interdependence has been overshadowed by asymmetrical trade deficits and competition, and fourthly, mutual public perceptions have become more negative recently. As a consequence these four factors, Sino-Indian relations remain in a state of cold peace, not warm peace.

How to interpret these seeming contradictory perspectives? Most research has underscored the problems and fragilities of the two states in terms of realism or geopolitical competition, but it has failed to account for the incredibly complex factors that have moved them beyond an orthodox bilateral relationship. Any such research, therefore, will require a more nuanced methodological analysis and rigorous interpretations.

Chapter 4 Great Power Competition during the Cold War

This chapter explores the influence of great power competition on Sino-Indian relations at an international systemic level during the Cold War period. The first section will introduce the regional balance of power in the 1960s and 1970s and discuss the effects of the bipolar international system. The second section will review Benjamin Miller's theory of great power involvement and will explore the influences of US-Soviet competition on the Sino-Indian cold war – two events, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the Soviet Union's 1979 military intervention in Afghanistan; will be used as case studies.

4.1 The global superpower competition and the regional alignments in the 1960s

During the global Cold War, between the mid-1950s and 1989, the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, in competition for global ideological and geopolitical dominance, built military alliances with their respective client states, thereby becoming trapped in an arms race (Brzezinski, 1992). This is reflected in Krause's finding (1995:109.113) that the US and the Soviet Union (USSR), respectively the first and second largest economies in the world, were responsible for 70% of global arms delivery between 1960 and 1988, of which the US accounted for 33% and the Soviet Union, 37%.

As structural realism suggests, the nature of the international system drives states' behaviour and determines regional order (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 3; Merom, 2003:112). Therefore, the bipolar configuration of the two major conflicting blocs – the US and the USSR – by virtue of their individual capabilities, determined the centrality of international politics, which, as the only two superpowers, led to an international Cold War. During this period, they competed for allies in order to contain each other's ambitions, particularly, in South Asia. In the 1950s and early 60s, the US through arms aid, attempted to encircle the communist world by encouraging Pakistan to become members of both the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Kux, 2001:71). This initiative was followed in 1971 by a Sino-American rapprochement designed to counter the efforts made by the USSR to recruit as its client state, India, which, by offering military supplies and economic aid in the name of "anti-colonialism", had come to represent the newly independent Afro-Asian countries (Jain, 2003; Liu, 1994:107; 2010:34). Consequently, in the context of South Asia, the effect of the Cold War was that the Soviet Union supported India and the US supported Pakistan.

Meanwhile, China, the other major actor in the region, recognized that under the systemic constraints of anarchy a weaker state would either form alliance to balance against the

most powerful state or to bandwagon with the threatening power ²² in order to protect its national security (Waltz, 1979:126,186-7;Walt, 1990:17). In the 1960s, Sino-Soviet antagonism was aroused due to ideological frictions between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev (Griffith, 1966;Medvedev, 1986:35,80); hence, in response, China allied itself with Pakistan and became hostile towards India.

As Stephen Walt (1998:31) notes, realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War, because it provided powerful explanations for war, alliances, obstacles to cooperation; also, because of its emphasis on competition was consistent with the main characteristic of US-USSR rivalry. However, structural realism was limited to explaining why China was audacious enough to strike a balance between two superpowers in the 1960s; hence, prior to 1972, it took a “dual adversary policy” toward them by preparing for a possible “two-front” war. According to Levine (1995:30-35), in the 1960s, it seemed that ideology had been an important factor in China’s foreign policy due to Chinese political leaders’ belief in Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao Zedong’s “Thought”; thus, it portrayed itself as a revolutionary force and a true opponent of superpower machinations – setting itself firmly against the USSR hegemony and US imperialist. Ideological factors concerning non-alignment were also important role in guiding India’s resistance to being drawn into either the American or the Soviet blocs, due to Nehru’s hatred of western colonialism, his view that the US was heir to British imperialism, and his profound commitment to socialism (Ganguly, 2001:37).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the regional balance of power was as follows: China’s relations with both superpowers were still hostile owing to US containment policy of curbing the spread of communism and Sino-Soviet antagonism was intense. Consequently, the US and the USSR separately, but mutually, were hostile toward China. At the same time, Pakistan was allied to the US as it was receiving military and economic aid through its membership of SEATO in 1954 and the “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement” of 1959; whereas India was dependent on the Soviet sources of arms supplies since 1959.

Under the same condition of Cold War bipolarity, the two Indo-Pakistani wars resulted in different outcomes, in that when both superpowers coordinated a cease-fire after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, and when Soviet Union secured seven year of Indo-Pakistani cold peace after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Meanwhile, China stood different blocs and responded differently to the two wars, even though they had similar longer term outcomes, in that they perpetuated the Sino-Indian cold war. Structural realism, therefore, is unable to provide an explanation as to why China balanced against two superpowers in the 1960s and

²² Kenneth Waltz notes that balancing is alignment with the weaker side and bandwagoning with the stronger power. Stephen Walt notes that balancing is alignment with the less threatening one and bandwagoning is alignment with the source of danger.

why the US saw India as a threat to its national interests during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war (Hayes, 2012:64) (for a more detailed discussion, see 4.3.2).

In addition to the structural and idealistic factors, this thesis argues that Miller's theory might provide more nuanced explanations for the shifting regional realignments. In doing so, the following sections will select the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars and the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 as case studies in order to examine both the regional conflicts and the prolonging of the Sino-Indian cold war. These cases will provide a strong test of Miller's hypotheses, in that they included the significant factors surrounding (i) superpower involvement, (ii) interstate conflict, and (iii) intense state-to-nation problems experienced throughout the period. These factors lie at the heart of Miller's hypotheses.

4.2 The theory of great power involvement

Benjamin Miller's (2007a:207-210; Miller&Kagan, 1997:54) theory of regional war and peace argues that the polarity in the international system is not an important factor in affecting regional outcome, but the balance of great power interests combined with their relative capabilities that determines the pattern of their regional involvement. Great power involvement, as an international systemic factor, may contribute to the occurrence of either cold war or cold peace among local states in the region, because the different types of great power involvement in which they become involved in order to further their strategic interests, together with their superior capabilities, create causal linkages that affect regional outcomes. Hence, the different forms of great power involvement are determined by the various balances of both their capabilities and their regional interests. It is important, therefore, to introduce the definitions of the four types of great power involvement.

1. Competition: when great powers, with equal capabilities, have conflicting interests in the same region, they tend to compete with and balance against each other, since their common interest is to prevent the other from emerging as a hegemon, which means that their local allies and clients become the keys to their regional goals. As a consequence, in order to avoid realignments, they will bid for the support of local states (Walt, 1985:16; Miller, 2007a:62). Miller argues that competition between great powers leaves space for their client states to manipulate their patrons. Therefore, in order to establish strong patron-client relationships, the great powers offer them military and financial support and diplomatic commitments (Miller&Kagan, 1997:59). Moreover, because of competition, the fear of losing clients reduces their capacity to moderate regional conflicts; this, therefore, discourages client states from escaping their war-prone position by reaching a settlement. Thus great power competition may exacerbate regional conflicts, thereby prolonging a regional cold war.

2. Disengagement: when great powers have no interests in a region, they refrain from political and military involvement; hence, local states retain a high level of autonomy in

order to pursue their preferred policies. For example, in the post-Cold War Balkans, where the decline of Soviet hegemony led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and a regional cold war due to its disengagement (Miller, 2007a:26).

3. Cooperation: when great powers, with equal capabilities and converging interests, cooperate in order to prevent local wars and promote regional stability they allow a region to move from cold war to cold peace. Miller (2007a:62) emphasizes the value of such affirmative cooperation, the US-Soviet cooperation in the Gorbachev era (1985-1991), resulting in a transition from superpower competition to cooperation. Such cooperation exerted pressure on the superpowers' client states in order to engage in settlement of regional conflicts in Third World regions, such as the Middle East and Central American countries (Hampson&Mandell, 1989). The pressure came from great power cooperation by limiting the room for manoeuvre of their client states, thereby making progress in regional conflict reduction. Great power cooperation, therefore, leads to a region from cold war to cold peace. As Miller and Kagan put it (1997:60), during the Cold War era such progress had been impossible. In their analyses, though, they did not mention the Sino-Indian case, which I shall discuss later (see 4.3).

4. Dominance: by acting as a stabilizer, a hegemon, which refers to a dominant power either benignly or coercively, leads to regional cold peace, since no competing great power can intervene. Because local states are left with limited autonomy, they succumb to dependence. Thus, the hegemon can manage regional disputes effectively, such as influencing the regional outcome by offering public goods and inducing a cooperative involvement, thus limiting the scope and duration of hot war and imposing a peaceful regional order in exchange for stability (Kacowicz, 1998:36). An example of this is when cold peace was achieved by a US-led initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict by way of peace talks made possible by the ending of the Arab-Israeli cold war in the post-1973 period (Miller, 2007a:236).

According to Miller's theory, at the domestic and regional level, the underlying cause of regional war is the problem of state-to-nation imbalance, as a unit-level factor, which refers to local actors with domestic problems of irredentism or secessionism or ethnic conflicts (Miller, 2007a:84). At the international systemic level, while great power involvement, as a systemic factor, cannot change the basic motivations of local actors to wage a hot war, though competition, their intensity and the duration of regional wars may increase, or, on the other hand, great power cooperation or a hegemon may limit the scope or the prospect of a hot war (Miller, 2007a:215).

In sum, great power competition and great power disengagement may intensify regional conflicts. Leading to regional cold war, as *Hypothesis 2* presented in Chapter 1. In order to test the effects of the great power competition and disengagement, Hypothesis 2 will be divided into four theoretical propositions (Miller, 2007a:213):

Proposition 1: reducing superpowers' intention to prevent local wars and moderate regional conflicts due to the fear of losing their clients;

Proposition 2: offering space to their clients to manipulate their patrons and intensify regional conflicts;

Proposition 3: generating a regional arms race and raising the fears of its regional adversaries by means of superpowers' commitments;

Proposition 4: discouraging of local states from reaching a settlement through diplomatic compromises.

In contrast, a great power dominance and great power cooperation, as *Hypothesis 3* shown in Chapter 1, have similar effect on regional cold peace in respect of Miller's theory (1997:58):

Proposition 5: leaving local states limited autonomy and reduce the space for local states manipulating their patrons, in turn, make progress in regional conflict reduction.

Proposition 6: exerting effective pressure on local states in either a benign or a coercive way engaging in settlement of regional conflict²³.

Proposition 7: when rival clients come to share the same patron local states succumb to dependence on the hegemon; the hegemon is able to manage the regional disputes effectively and influence the regional outcome.

Proposition 8: imposing a regional stability and promote a cold peace through a combination of the following strategies and mechanism: (a) diplomatic mediations, (b) the restraint of aggressive local clients, (c) reassurances, (d) deterrence and containment, (e) security guarantee, and (f) co-management of an international system and policy coordination (Miller, 2001a:15-16; 2005:236-237).

The next sections will use two events: the two Indo-Pakistani wars and the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, in support of Miller's contention that great power competition aggravates Sino-Indian hostilities, thereby sustaining the cold war. By contrast, in the next chapter, I will explain that the end of great power competition in 1989 contributed to a moderation in Sino-Indian relations, thereby facilitating Sino-Indian cold peace.

²³ As discussed in 3.3.1, a benign hegemon emphasizes negotiated diplomacy for promoting regional peace-making and focuses on reassurance and positive inducements, while minimizing the encroachment on the local states' sovereignty and autonomy; a coercive hegemon emphasizes deterrence and negative sanctions, imposing a resolution of the regional actors regardless of their wishes.

4.3 Case one: The Two Indo-Pakistani War

India and Pakistan fought two wars in 1965 and 1971. The causes of war derived from different domestic turmoil – the former is Kashmir, the latter is Pakistan’s constitutional crisis. However, the 1965 and 1971 wars were waged within the global context of the superpower Cold War. Accordingly, different types of great power involvement brought different regional outcomes. Furthermore, China had different response to the two wars but lead to the same outcome that contributed to hardening the estrangement between New Delhi and Beijing. For the purpose of comparison of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the following section will examine the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war first.

4.3.1 The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war

India and Pakistan fought in Kashmir in 1965. The source of the Kashmiri disputes was from India’s claim to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir and from Pakistani irredentist claims to the Indian-held portion of Kashmir (Ganguly, 1999:2-3; 2001:48;Garver, 2001). Hence, the outcome of the 1965 war was influenced by the great power involvement, bearing out three elements of Miller’s theory as below:

1. *Great powers’ arms supplies to client states may trigger a regional arms race*

The US and the Soviet Union were the main arms suppliers for Pakistan and India respectively, even though, in the 1960s, the patron-client relationship had not been clearly defined by either side – especially the Soviet-India side. Prior to 1965, the US had been providing roughly \$400 million annually to Pakistan²⁴ (Kux, 2001:156). In contrast, the Soviet Union, being India’s main arms supplier, between 1959 and 1961 provided \$500 million for its third Five-Year Plan projects and supplied it with military arms (Graham, 1964). Also, between 1962 and 1964, the Soviets supplied India with twelve MIG fighter aircrafts with the intention of countering F-104s the US had delivered to Pakistan in 1961 (Thakur, 1991:828). By acquiring such weaponry from the contesting superpowers, India and Pakistan strengthened their capabilities, thus, raising their leaders’ aspirations for recovering Kashmir (Ganguly, 1995:169), which, since the first Indo-Pakistani war in 1948, had been a seething issue. This unresolved territorial problem – a “state-to-nation imbalance” in Miller’s terms – which had created a sense of insecurity greatly enlarged by arms races, led, eventually, to hot war, bearing out Miller’s *Proposition 3* that great powers’ arms supplies to their client states may trigger a regional arms race, changing the regional balance of power and raising the prospects of hot war (Miller, 2007a:234).

Paradoxically, Pakistan and India had used US weapons against each other in the 1965 war. In the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, an American and British military aid

²⁴ The aid included \$200 million in economic, \$160 million in food aid, and \$40 million in military assistance. See KUX, 2001, P. 156..

program provided arms to India in order to strengthen its ability to counter a possible threat of Chinese communist attack. This aroused Pakistani resentment and uncertainty, because, since the mid-1950s, it had considered itself to be a loyal American ally for supporting the anti-communist effort (Garver, 2001:195). Moreover, Pakistan believed it would lose its military advantages for the recovery of Kashmir if it did not take action very quickly (Kux, 2001:159;Ganguly, 2001:42). Since the defeat by China in 1962, India had embarked on a military modernization program; therefore, western military assistance unquestionably strengthened its military capability. As Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote to President Ayub Khan, claiming that “the current relative superiority of the military forces of Pakistan is in danger of being overtaken as India’s defence build-up progress” although the aim of US arms aid to India and Pakistan was to contain communism, both countries used them to confront each other (James&Lyon, 1993:128). This, therefore, unintentionally gave both client states an opportunity to wage war against each other. Thus, the US and the Soviet Union had, in Miller’s definition (2007a:122), created the regional arms race, thereby intensifying security dilemma, which became the trigger for the second Indo-Pakistani war of 1965.

2. Great power cooperation may diminish the prospect of hot war

In September 1965, when the Indo-Pakistani war started, under the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral agreement, Pakistan requested the US for military support to suppress India’s aggression. However, the US not only rejected the request, but also suspended its military and economic support to both Pakistan and India. There were two reasons for the embargo, Firstly, the US had little security interest in this dispute, since, mired as it was in the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration had modified President Kennedy’s dual approach²⁵ by withdrawing its economic and military support from both countries. Seemingly, the US was reluctant to devote further resources to the resolution of the Indo-Pakistani war between 1963 and 1970 (Gould, 2010:36-8).

Secondly, the US considered that Pakistan had not made an effort to perform an ally’s obligation to prevent the communist involvement in the region, which was its only regional interest. The background to this situation was that, according to a statement issued by the US State Department to its Embassy in Karachi, it had requested Pakistan to keep its distance from China and also to send its army to Vietnam (State Department, July 29, 1964). However, by ignoring the Vietnam war request, and by retaining its close relations with China, which the US saw as a threat to its interests in Vietnam, Pakistan did exactly the opposite (Kux, 2001:151,156-7). Moreover, Pakistan had violated the stipulation that it

²⁵ Kennedy’s dual strategy refers to offering economic aid to India, while continuing to offer military assistance to Pakistan. Kennedy’s foreign policy toward India was distracted from his predecessor the Eisenhower administration that regarded Pakistan as the only ally in South Asia.

would not use US weapons that intended to resist communist aggression on the incursion across the India-Pakistani border in Kashmir. As a consequence, the US suspension of military aid had a huge impact on Pakistan; it suffered from shortages of ammunition and was forced to accept a cease-fire (Kux, 2001:162).

For Pakistan, unlike the US, China behaved as a genuine ally when it was asked for assistance during the 1965 war. As mentioned in 4.1, ideology had been an important factor in China's foreign policy. In the context of China-US- Soviet hostility and Sino-Indian confrontation, China regarded India as a neo-colonialist state built up by US imperialism and Soviet revisionism in order to contain China. Under the banner of "wars of national liberation", China sided with Pakistan in the name of opposing Indian regional expansionism and supporting Kashmir's struggle for self-determination (Garver, 2001:201;Holslag, 2010:42). In addition to the official threatening rhetoric to India and diplomatic support to Pakistan, its most revealing action was an increase in armed forces deployed along the Sino-Sikkim border justified by Indian aggression by incursions across the Sino-Indian border. China also increased its forces in Tibet and western Xinjiang which, CIA reports stated, were adequate for small-scale frontier clashes along the lines of the 1962 border incursions (Garver, 2001:201).

China's intention of using a two-front threat to divert Indian forces away from fighting with Pakistan was intended to relieve the pressure on the Pakistani army in Kashmir (Liu, 1994:111;Vertzberger, 1983:36). Furthermore, on 17 September, during the peak of the Indo-Pakistan war, China issued an ultimatum, with a three-day deadline, stating it intended to intervene in the war if the Indian government failed to dismantle its military fortification along the Sino-Sikkim boundary. In view of a likely second Sino-Indian border war, however, China sent another note stating that, because Mao Zedong wanted to gain the sympathy of international opinion and of the Indian people (Mao, 1996:461), they would extend the deadline to 22nd September. However, on September 20th the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) passed a unanimous resolution deploring the Chinese ultimatum, warned it not to aggravate the situation and demanding that India and Pakistan accept a ceasefire, which both countries accepted; thus, by September 23, the second Kashmir war ended without Chinese intervention.

Despite China having given the reason for postponing the ultimatum, Vertzberger (1983:37) and Haqqani (2013:99) both believed that the real reason was the pressure exerted by both superpowers, since, shortly after the ultimatum was issued, they sent China a joint warning statement to the effect that the US or the Soviet Union "would not stand still" if it intervened militarily. At that time, as Gerald Segal (1982:48) put it, the Soviet Union was so strong that China could not successfully challenge it directly; while, the US had sufficient troops in East Asia because of the Vietnam War; finally, the United Nation's (UN) cease-fire request coming as it did on the same day meant that China stepped back. Later, China claimed that India had been dismantling its military fortification, thereby fulfilling the

purpose of the ultimatum. Consequently, a settlement was reached and China had flexed its muscle against India without shooting a bullet (Ganguly, 2001:46;Liu, 1994:113). Thus the superpowers successfully contained China's bellicosity, thereby supporting Miller's *Proposition 5* that by exerting coordinated pressure on local states, great power cooperation diminished the chances of hot war (Miller, 2010a:67).

3. *A hegemon can serve as a final arbiter and lead to cold peace*

After the suspension of military aid to India and Pakistan, the US disengaged generally from South Asia. Also, great power involvement as a result of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war changed (Kux, 2001:159;Ganguly, 1992:89;Hardgrave&Kochanek, 2010:414). As Gould (2010) points out, by the end of President Johnson's tenure, Indo-US relations had cooled considerably and Pakistan-US relations had also turned sour; consequently, in the aftermath of the 1965 war, it became clear to Pakistan that the US was not prepared to issue a "blank cheque" in support of its desire for political revenge, since the US had not taken a unilateral approach but had supported the UN cease-fire resolution. At the same time, the Soviet Union had not taken a pro-India position, which made it possible for the UN to play an important role (Kux, 2001:160-3). Thus both the US and the USSR had a common interest in maintaining the regional *status-quo* and their coordinated stance secured an UN-sponsored cease-fire. As Miller notes, competing great powers may cooperate tacitly in limiting the scope and duration of hot war; yet such limited great-power cooperation will not go beyond a regional cold war (Miller, 2001b:205). As expected, therefore, India and Pakistan were to have a third war in 1971.

A further consequence of US disengagement from South Asia had been the emergence of the Soviet Union as a hegemon in the region. US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated that 'The US encouraged the Russians to go ahead with the Tashkent idea²⁶, because we felt we had nothing to lose. If they succeeded in bringing about any détente at Tashkent, then there would be more peace on the subcontinent and we would gain from that fact. If the Russians failed at Tashkent, at least the Russians would experience some of the frustration that we had for twenty years in trying to sort things out between India and Pakistan' (Kux, 2001:165). As Miller's *Proposition 6* holds that a hegemon can serve as a final arbiter in the case of disagreements by imposing a ceasefire (Miller, 2007a:222). The Soviet interest was to expand its influence in the region and to contain China, which motivated the Soviet Union to engage in the post-war settlement; also the US had the converging interests in "containment of China" in the 1960s (Sisson&Rose, 1990:239). Hence, without conflicting interests and the US's disengagement, in 1966, the Soviet Union served as a "neutral mediator" to settle the conflicts of the 1965 war at the Indo-Pakistani negotiations, resulting

²⁶ The Tashkent idea refers to the Soviet Union played a role of mediation to settle the conflicts of the 1965 war and resulted in the Tashkent Agreement.

in the Tashkent Declaration, which dealt with Indo-Pakistani relations for six years of tranquility (Kux, 2001:165;Ganguly, 2001:46;Sisson&Rose, 1990:196,238;Rajan, 1966;Donaldson, 1972).

In addition, the Indo-Pakistani war also aggravated the Sino-Indian confrontation, thereby making it difficult for the region to move from cold war to cold peace. The US disengagement in Pakistan and the Soviet hegemon in South Asia led to China's strategic engagement closer to Pakistan. The Chinese intention was to contain Soviet influence and India's expansion. China's strengthening support of Pakistan had influences on Sino-Indian relations. Firstly, China's intended "two-front" threat on the Tibetan and western Xinjiang borders, strengthened Sino-Indian hostility. One Chinese scholar argues that China's deployment of forces was one of the reasons for India's accepting the cease-fire, since, the two-front threat appeared to create a psychological deterrent (Xu, 1993:215). Secondly, in the wake of the 1965 war, China replaced the US as Pakistan's main arms supplier because of the US embargo against Pakistan. Therefore, between the 1970s and 1980s, China not only played an important role of advancing Pakistani weaponry, which included the nuclear weapons program and missile system, but also offered military aid; for instance, by the 1980s, China's annual military aid to Pakistan had reached \$600 million (Wirsing, 1985:276). China's military equipment constituted 75% of Pakistan's tank force and 65% of its air force (Vertzberger, 1983:90). Thirdly, because of Indo-Pakistani hostility, Chinese military assistance to Pakistan exacerbated the Sino-India security dilemma (Garver, 2002b). Thus, the strengthening of Sino-Pakistani cooperation prolonged the Sino-Indian cold war during the Cold War.

In summary, the second Indo-Pakistani war at different stages supports Miller's arguments in three ways: firstly, before the war, the respective arms supply from superpowers created a regional arms race, changing the regional balance of power and raising the prospects of hot war. Secondly, during the war, the tactic cooperation of the superpowers forced India and Pakistan to accept the UN cease-fire. Thirdly, after the war, a further consequence of US disengagement from South Asia had been the emergence of the Soviet Union as a hegemon, serving as a "neutral moderator" and bringing about a short period of cold peace in the region between 1966 and 1971.

4.3.2 The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War

This war, which grew out of Pakistan's civil conflict²⁷, caused millions of refugees to cross the eastern Indo-Pakistani border, resulting in Indian military intervention and the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh (Wolpert,

²⁷The Bengali-led Awami League had won a majority in the election in December 1970, claiming further autonomy, which resulted in its suppression by the Pakistan-based military regime.

2010:42-45;Chopra, 1973;Sisson&Rose, 1990). The 1971 war, unlike the 1965 war²⁸, was characterized by India having become involved in the Pakistan civil war and by the superpowers' intervention, in that Pakistan had used US-equipped M24 tanks in the civil war and India had received the support of heavy Soviet-made artillery, tanks, and missile boats (Kohli, 1989:89-91). Therefore, with their respective superpowers' support, India and Pakistan became embroiled in their third war.

At this point, it is pertinent to explain the background of shifting relations between the US, China, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Also this section will answer the puzzle raised in 4.1 that why the US saw democratic India as a threat? The strategic realignment led to the emergence of two antagonistic alliance blocs, cultivating the superpower competition. The driving force was the Sino-US rapprochement following US President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, whose purpose was to use China to contain the Soviet regional expansion (Goh, 2005:171;Komine, 2008:33). Moreover, Nixon's hostility to India and his tilt toward Pakistan²⁹ forced India to align with the Soviet Union (Gould, 2010:108;Van Hollen, 1980b;Liu, 1994). Therefore, superpower competition contained two major elements – the US moved to support Pakistan and China, and the Soviet consolidated its relationship with India – which intensified Indo-Pakistani conflicts and prolonged Sino-Indian cold war. Sino-Indian hostility, meanwhile, which was determined by three major factors, firstly, the continuing Sino-Soviet hostility, secondly, an emerging Sino-US rapprochement, and thirdly, the consolidation of India-Soviet friendship, which had been sustained after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

The course of the 1971 war is a major illustration of the influence of great power competition. Four aspects of the war support Miller's theory as follows:

1. *Superpower competition reduces superpowers' intention to prevent local wars due to the fear of losing their clients*

According to Henry Kissinger's memoir, *White House Years*, the secret alliance with China was a major factor accounting for Nixon's and Kissinger's reaction to the 1971 East Pakistan crisis (Kissinger, 1979:Chapter 11). This change led to the US recruitment of Pakistan as a client. Three reasons have been given for Nixon's support of Pakistan: firstly, his personal animosity toward India; secondly, he wanted it to be a communication channel for the China venture; and thirdly, his attempt to enlist China's support due to Pakistan being China's

²⁸The US government disengaged and suspended its military aid to both India and Pakistan during the 1965 war (explained in section 4.3.1).

²⁹ Nixon had visited Pakistan five times- twice as a Vice President and three times as a US citizen. He received a red-carpet welcome, as if he were a visiting 'royal' during all his visits. However, the Indians treated him as a defeated politician with the minimum courtesy. This is one reason for Nixon's personal attitude towards Pakistan and India. See Kux, 2001, p. 179. Gould, 2010, pp. 56-7.

strategic partner (Ganguly, 2001:65-66;Gould, 2010:65;Van Hollen, 1980b;Tudda, 2012:151).

Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan also demonstrated that the US revitalized its Eisenhower administration's military strategy of supporting Pakistan. Despite the US ban on arms supplies in the wake of the 1965 war, the Nixon administration made a "one-time" exception to allow Pakistan to procure about \$50 million worth of aircrafts and armoured personnel carriers in October 1970 (Kux, 2001:183). As Miller's theory (2007a:228) suggests, external powers may affect the capabilities of regional states through arms supplies and increase the risk-taking propensity of local states by waging a war. The underlying reason for the civil war was Pakistan's constitutional crisis and Bengal's secessionism, not the US arms supplies; however, with an American-equipped army, Pakistan had an increased capability to wage a civil war in March 1971 against secessionists among its East Pakistani people (Gould, 2010:59). Moreover, superpowers' strategic support, especially in times of crisis, encourages client states to initiate adventurous behaviour (Miller, 2007a:229). As Ganguly (2001:67) and Kux (2001:199) suggest, thanks to Pakistan playing the intermediary between the US and China, its president Yahya had mistakenly believed that both China and the US would offer it military assistance, a miscalculation that led to Pakistan boldly waging a war with India in 1971.

In March 1971, when the Pakistani military used US-equipped arms to suppress its own people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), leading to a massacre, the US Congress and public opinion condemned the state on humanitarian grounds, but did not impose any sanction. On April 6, the State Department ordered the suspension of arms sales.

Sisson and Rose (1990:261) have argued that the US capacity to influence Pakistan to undertake a political accommodation was limited; even the sanctions that resulted in the loss of economic and military aid to Pakistan were not of such magnitude as to convince it to change its policy towards East Pakistan. Indeed, as Miller (2007a:64) notes, great powers are unable to solve the problems of state-to-nation imbalance of local states, such as the legitimacy of the Pakistani Government in East Pakistan or the secessionist aspiration of Bengalis. But great powers could offer incentives to encourage their client states to make concessions through sanctions or rewards, which means that, while the US government could not prevent the outbreak of the civil war, it could encourage a political settlement. In the event, in August, the Nixon administration did make an effort to mediate between the Pakistani government and the Bengali-led Awami League; however, by September it had failed, due to India's intentional use of forces in East Pakistan and Pakistani lack of interest. Such facts seem to contradict Miller's theory that a hegemon could moderate regional conflicts. As a matter of fact, during the first stage of the civil war, in April, the US had missed the opportunity to exert pressure on Pakistan, and even their officials acknowledged that their efforts of encouraging a political solution may have been "too little and too late" (Sisson&Rose, 1990:196). More importantly, it should be emphasized that, if the US

comprehensive arms embargo and economic sanction had been initiated in April, and not in November, the situation could have been different. Therefore, it did support Miller's point.

2. *Superpower competition offers space to clients to manipulate their patrons and intensify regional conflicts*

A month after Kissinger's first secret trip to Beijing, in August 1971, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, visited New Delhi and signed a "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" with India, because Moscow was wary of the new Beijing-Washington nexus and sought to strengthen its relations with New Delhi. This treaty not only contributed to the establishment of special ties and a time-tested friendship between India and the Soviet Union, but also to a Indo-Soviet quasi-security alliance (Jain, 2003). Due to India's non-alignment policy, the treaty did not, in a strict sense, mean that India had become a military ally of the Soviet Union. However, this treaty was intended to act as a psychological deterrent against the US and China's direct military engagement on behalf of Pakistan in the 1971 war; therefore, it had different implications for both the Indo-Soviet bloc and the new China-US-Pakistani nexus.

The first dimension regarding the effect of the 1971 Treaty is that the treaty offered a tool for India to manipulate the Soviets to commit to a fully pro-India position. The following two aspects of the treaty demonstrate how the India took advantage of its patron:

1. By fully endorsing India's position, the treaty compelled the USSR to change its former balanced policy and it gave a rationale for India to press for the USSR's reassurance of support in case of a Pakistani attack. As mentioned in section 4.2, the USSR, as a hegemon, had acted as a neutral mediator in settling the 1965 war. After the 1965 war, the Soviet Union had adjusted its South Asia policy to a more balanced relationship with India and Pakistan in order to contain China's influence in South Asia. Hence, in 1966, Moscow offered Pakistan economic aid and, for the first time, in 1968, \$30 million worth of military equipment, thereby arousing India's severe concern (Haqqani, 2013). The USSR, though, found that Pakistan was unable to loosen its ties with China, therefore, in 1970, it suspended its arms sales to Pakistan. Even so, after the Pakistani crackdown of the Bengalis in March 1971, the Soviets hesitated to agree to India's military intervention in the East Pakistan for two reasons: (i) it was reluctant to undermine the process of détente with the US, since Pakistan was its ally (Ganguly, 2001:66) and, (ii) it preferred a political solution rather than encouraging the Indians to resort to force. However, in the wake of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war, hostilities with China had intensified; thus China had become its main enemy³⁰. So, in response to the emergence of a Sino-US rapprochement in

³⁰ After the Sino-Soviet border war, China and the Soviet Union deployed their main arms forces along the border; there were more Soviet troops (100,000) on the USSR-PRC border than in the Eastern Europe between

July, the USSR signed the 1971 treaty with India, compelling it to abandon its ambiguously balanced position between India and Pakistan and tilt towards India. Moreover, the Soviet Defence Minister visited New Delhi in November and assured India of further military aid in the event of a Pakistani attack. Therefore, as a result of the 1971 Treaty, together with this quasi-alliance, New Delhi had successfully convinced Moscow to change its stance from being unwilling to commit to military intervention in August, to a full endorsement of a military resolution in October.

2. In contrast to how it affected the USSR that committed to India's military actions, as may be seen from above, the 1971 treaty carried more weight on India's side, since it took it as an assurance that, if they become involved in armed conflict, it would receive Soviet support; hence it consolidated India's will to pursue a military action in the East Pakistan border area, as accords Miller's *proposition 2*, which is great power competition intensifies regional conflict. Although Article 9 declared that "an attack on either party would automatically lead to "joint consultation to remove the threat", the terms "joint consultations" and "the threat", being ambiguous, left room for different interpretations in that it could mean either a quasi-military alliance against either China or Pakistan, or that there would be no obligation on the part of the Soviets to offer actual material assistance (Kapur, 1972;Donaldson, 1972). India, therefore, interpreted the treaty as a public assurance against Chinese intervention and US involvement (Ganguly, 2001:65;Chopra, 2003). India's conviction was further confirmed by the military aid and diplomatic support offered by the USSR, including the Soviet veto the US-backed cease-fire resolution in the UNSC on December (Kohli, 1989:19;Sisson&Rose, 1990:243). India considered itself to be well shielded by a superpower's protection should the US contemplate meting out punishment (Kohli, 1989:19;Sisson&Rose, 1990:243).

The second dimension is how it affected the new China-US-Pakistani nexus. Based as it was on the precondition of Chinese and US support of Pakistan, the Chinese viewed it as a political and military alliance against themselves, as did Nixon and Kissinger, who saw it as a Soviet deterrent aimed at both the US and China. Kissinger actually described this treaty as a "bomb-shell", asserting that "Moscow had thrown a lighted match into the powder keg" and that it was a door for the Soviets to open in order to become involved in a war on the subcontinent³¹ (Kissinger, 1979:767;Goh, 2005:186). As a consequence of their perspectives, the treaty consolidated superpower support for their respective clients and the ensuing

1969 and 1978; while, 45 divisions of Chinese People Liberation Army (about 450,000) along the PRC-USSR border. See Segal, 1982, p. 49. And Vertzberger,1983, p. 54.

³¹ However, a CIA intelligence report saw it differently, arguing that the Soviets might regard the treaty as an instrument to ask India to exercise restraint and, importantly, that "this treaty was not against the US", Times, (August 13, 1971), *The New York Times*.

supplies of military aid created a regional arms race, resulting in disincentives for diplomatic compromises, thereby intensifying regional conflicts, including Sino-Indian hostility, as Miller's fourth theoretical proposition.

Regarding China's role on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, China sought to maintain a supportive relationship with Pakistan in order to contain the Indo-Soviet bloc. Paradoxically, though, China had weakened its support for Pakistan, in particular, compared to what it had offered in the 1965 war (see 4.3.1). China's restraint was because, in 1971, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had not yet fully recovered from the displacements of the Cultural Revolution and China as a whole had suffered a severe domestic crisis when Mao Zedong's designated successor, Lin Biao, attempted a coup. Therefore, although China, as Pakistan's ally, continued its economic aid and political support to Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistani war started in 25 March 1971; it refused to take direct military intervention in East Pakistan. However, Chinese unwillingness to offer military support in the 1971 war did not moderate the Sino-Indian confrontation. On the contrary, due to superpower competition, it both intensified and prolonged Sino-Indian hostility. The following points illustrate that the influence of superpower competition worsened the regional confrontation between China and India:

1. China's support left space for Pakistani manoeuvre in order to contain India. China had privately informed Pakistan in April 1971 that it would not intervene militarily in East Pakistan. Even on the verge of the Indo-Pakistani war, the Pakistani government's request for China's military assistance was rejected by China's Premier Zhou Enlai that Chinese military forces would not intervene directly in support of Pakistan (Sisson&Rose, 1990:252). However, Pakistan claimed publicly that China had assured its support in the event of an Indian attack; whereas it had done no such thing. The scenario for there being two seemingly contradictory accounts here, was that the Pakistani intention was to raise uncertainties in New Delhi about China's response to Indian intervention in East Pakistan (Sisson&Rose, 1990:252;Garver, 2001:207). The other alternative explanation was that Pakistani intention was to force China's involvement by indicating the existence of a commitment (Vertzberger, 1983:59). At the time, China did not denounce Pakistan for the falsehood, even though it was displeased, because it also had an interest in deterring India from taking military action. By exercising such a "bluff", China gave Pakistan the opportunity to manipulate by propagating the "China threat" against India. Nonetheless, the Indian intelligence agency had heard that China would not intervene in another Indo-Pakistan war. In the event, China did not increase its arms forces along the Sino-Indian border, as it had during the 1965 war.
2. However, China's verbal support, which fed the perception of a "China threat", led to the strengthening of mutual hostility with India. Zhou Enlai, in his letter to Yahya Khan in April 1971, had stated that "China would firmly support the Pakistan

Government and people in their just struggle for preserving national independence and state sovereignty should Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan” (New York Times, 1971). This statement was frequently cited in India both by officials and media in the following decades, as proof of China’s support of Pakistan to threaten India’s security. Moreover, before the end of the war, Beijing protested the alleged incursion of Indian troops across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier on 10 December, replaying the tactic it had used in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Following the cease-fire in 16 December, though, China’s protest disappeared quietly. At the time, although India did not feel threatened by Chinese protests, they left an unfriendly impression of China being India’s “true enemy” (Sisson&Rose, 1990:253).

Consequently, China’s support for Pakistan stayed at the moral and verbal level, such as endorsing the US- proposal in the UN for a ceasefire (Ganguly, 2001:67;Goh, 2005:188-192). After the war, China continued its military support of Pakistan, in particular, by assisting in the development of a nuclear programme. Therefore, even though China and India resumed diplomatic relations in 1976 by an exchange of ambassadors, their bilateral relations still contained elements of confrontation and counterbalance in terms of the Pakistan factor.

3. Great power competition generates a regional arms race and raises the fears of its regional adversaries by means of superpowers’ commitments

Despite the US imposition of an arms embargo in April 1971, the *New York Times* reported that over \$2 million of arms had been shipped to Pakistan in June, thereby igniting Indians’ indignation (Kux, 1992:294). The US explained that it did not violate the arms embargo because this military equipment was purchased by Pakistan prior to 25 March (Tudda, 2012:145;Kux, 1992). However, the US continuation of arms supplies strengthened India’s hostility towards the US. The Indian Foreign Minister, Swan Singh, speaking in the Parliament in June, declared that the US arms supplies to Pakistan were encouraging the Pakistani civil war (Sisson&Rose, 1990:192). Against this background³², and, in the aftermath of Indo-Soviet treaty, the Soviet arms supplies also increased, thereby leading to the arms race, which bears out the third Proposition in Miller’s theory, which is great power competition generates arms race and raises the fear of client states’ adversaries by means of great powers’ commitments.

Moreover, near the end of the war, Nixon ordered an eight-ship naval task force; headed by the aircraft carrier “Enterprise”, to sail towards the Bay of Bengal, purportedly to evacuate American civilians, but actually, as a warning to the Soviet Union and a signal to India of a commitment of US military aid to Pakistan. This action did raise India’s uncertainty and fear.

³² The US did not stop all the arms transfer, including the unused valid export license issued before 25 March, and economic aid until November 8. See Sission and Rose, 1990, p. 261.

When India threatened to reopen the battlefield on the western front, President Nixon warned India, via the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, Matskevich³³, that if it did so, the U.S. would not “stand by” (Liu, 1994:108; Seth, 1975; Nichter, 1972). This strategy was confirmed by Kissinger in his memoirs where he states that, while the “mission of the Enterprise”, was never divulged to the Navy, it was intended to warn the Indians and Soviets about US intentions towards West Pakistan (Kissinger, 1979:912). Stephen Cohen (2000:6) argues that “the ‘Enterprise’ sailed on for an extra twenty years in the pages of Indian strategic journals and books” as an example of American hostility to India. Moreover, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi regarded US military aid to Pakistan, as an attempt by the US and China to destabilize and destroy her country, a perception that led India to develop its nuclear weapons after the 1971 war (Ganguly, 2001:73; Van Hollen, 1980b; Kux, 1992:307). As a matter of fact, the proponents of nuclear weapons in India repeatedly asserted that the deployment of the “Enterprise” was the reason why a nuclear capability was necessary. As Indian defence analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, pointed out, “Had India possessed nuclear weapons the Enterprise would not have steamed into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war in what appeared from New Delhi to constitute atomic gunboat diplomacy” (Subrahmanyam, 1974:122) .

4. *Superpower competition discourages diplomatic compromises of local states from reaching a settlement.*

Miller’s fourth proposition – that superpowers’ competition discourages diplomatic compromises – is perhaps borne out by the fact that, at the peak of escalation of the military tension of the Indo-Pakistani war, on 2 December the US announced a suspension of military sales to India amounting to about \$70 million of communication systems equipment which was designed to improve its air defence capabilities, while, at the same time freezing its economic assistance to India, which included \$87.6 million of aid (Kux, 1992:302). Using these suspensions as sanctions, the US urged an immediate cease-fire, since, for strategic purposes, it wished to prevent India from dismembering Pakistan (Van Hollen, 1980b). However, its efforts proved fruitless and its position was further weakened as a result of competition from the other superpower. This was because Soviet assurances derived from the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty, which included military and economic aid and diplomatic supports against UN resolutions; thus, India was shielded by the other competing superpower’s protection against punishment (Kohli, 1989:19; Sisson&Rose, 1990:243) . At last, India gained military success, on 16 December, and Pakistan surrendered. Although, by 1974, the US economic aid had been reinstated, the anti-American and pro-Soviet mind-set had taken shape in India and lasted for the remainder of the Cold War period (Kux, 1992:311).

³³ At that time, Vladimir Matskevich was visiting Washington.

To summarise, the two Indo-Pakistani wars originated from a regional state-to-nation imbalance – the former including the divergent ideological commitments of nation-building and Pakistani irredentist claim on Kashmir, the latter including the fragility of the Pakistani military regime, the problem of Bengali refugees, and long-term hostility between the two states (Ganguly, 2001:51;Kapur, 2011b:64-5). However, under the same bipolar international structure, but different types of superpowers' involvement, in 1965, India and Pakistan accepted a cease-fire resolution at the coordinated request of the US and the USSR after a seventeen-day standoff and severe fighting. In contrast, the Bangladesh regional crisis was elevated into a global US-Soviet geopolitical competition (Van Hollen, 1980b:355;Tudda, 2012:148).

4.4 Case Two: The 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan

This case, which will illustrate how great power competition resulted in an intensification of the Sino-Indian conflict, describes the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which the US regarded as an important element of Cold War Soviet aggrandisement that brought to an end the US-Soviet détente and had a profound effect on South Asia.

In response to the invasion, the Carter administration, worried that the increased tensions would endanger the oil-rich regions in the Persian Gulf, imposed, to defend its interests, a trade embargo against the Soviet Union and resumed its military assistance to Pakistan on a massive scale. The ensuing superpower competition contained three elements relevant to the regional security. Firstly, it created the space for client states to manipulate their patrons – the second point in Miller's theory (see 4.2 above). Secondly, it allowed the superpowers to retain their client states through arms sales and by intensifying the regional arms races – Miller's third proposition. Thirdly, the Chinese factor escalated the tensions between Pakistan and India, contributing to the destabilization of South Asia in the 1980s.

1. Superpower competition creates space for client states' manipulation

Pakistan was given bargaining chips to ask its patron for more military and economic aid because it played a crucial role in fulfilling US strategic goals in Afghanistan by training Afghan and mujahedeen groups to resist the invasion; hence Pakistan presented a formidable challenge to Soviet forces (Schofield, 2010:281). Therefore, in order to support its willingness to face the Soviet threat, President Carter made a rapid foreign policy turnabout by lifting the US arms embargo and offering Pakistan USD \$400 million worth of military and economic assistance (Noman, 1990:120-125).

In order to explain what lay behind Pakistani manipulation of the US, it is necessary to explain the political background that led to the big shift in US foreign policy. The Carter administration had been applying a non-proliferation policy, which had been the central concerns of his tenure; hence, due to Pakistan's development of military nuclear weapons,

in April 1979, the US terminated all economic and military aid to Pakistan. However, neared the end of the Carter tenure, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed Carter's moral-oriented diplomacy to a more flexible variety, since he regarded Soviet expansion as a more serious threat to US interests than nuclear proliferation (Gobeen, 1992:131;Gould, 2010:68-70). Accordingly, the US, ignoring its moral imperatives, including human rights considerations³⁴, abandoned its military and economic embargo.

For both historical and tactical reasons, however, president Zia ul-Haq turned the offer down, describing the \$400 million aid as "peanuts" and declaring that "Pakistan deserves more" (Kux, 1992:369;Gould, 2010:72). The reasons for this refusal was based on Pakistan having signed mutual defence agreements with the US in the mid-1950s, by which the US would offer military assistance because Pakistan was the only state joining both CENTO and SEATO. In return, Pakistan offered military bases on its territory. After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US reaffirmed its support under the CENTO agreement; however, in Pakistan's view, CENTO provided no security at all. Pakistan indicated a preference for a new, formal agreement with the US instead of through CENTO, which it saw as offering a clearer guarantee of protection against any aggressor, including India (Van Hollen, 1980a:38-40).

The tactical reason for Zia's refusal to accept US aid came from his desire both to consolidate his power and obtain domestic legitimacy, by asserting his Islamic fundamentalism following his military coup, in July 1977, against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the elected civilian president, who was subsequently executed. Although the sudden change of US policy came as a surprise to Zia, his tactical calculations proved visionary, in that Carter, who was defeated in the election of November, 1980, was replaced by Ronald Reagan, whose administration proved to be more conservative and anti-communist, and less concerned about non-proliferation and human rights (Van Hollen, 1980a). Consequently, Pakistan gained \$3.2 billion in economic and military aid over the next five years, then \$4.02 billion in aid over the following six years (Ganguly, 2001:80;Kux, 2001:257;Haqqānī, 2005:188). In total, therefore, Pakistan received over \$7 billion in loans and credits for military and economic assistance from the US during the Soviet Afghanistan war (Cohen, 2000:4). Alongside these advantages, the new security relationship enabled Zia ul-Haq to bolster his own internal position and upgrade his country's military capabilities.

It seems clear, given the facts of this case, that a dramatic change in superpower policy left space for a client state, the autocratic Pakistan, to manipulate its patron, the US, which it sacrificed many American's liberal principles, including the goals of curbing nuclear

³⁴ The US had suspended military and economic assistance due to Pakistani government brutally oppressed its East Pakistani people on humanitarian ground in 1971. Moreover, Pakistani military regime executed its elected civilian President Ali Bhutto in 1977 and performed martial law between 1979 and 1983.

proliferation, instead of providing substantial military and economic assistance to Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Paul, 2014:119); and, by so doing, significantly increase Pakistan's capabilities to confront India³⁵, even though it was not the US original intention, in which was to contain the Soviet Union. By standing by its ally, China had increased its military cooperation with Pakistan to counter the potential Soviet-India encirclement along the Indo-Afghan border (Vertzberger, 1983:74).

2. Superpowers competition generates a regional arms race and intensifies regional conflicts

At the same time that the Carter administration offered \$400 million to Pakistan in order to build an anti-Soviet alliance, it made the same offer to India, which was refused by India on the grounds of "encouraging intraregional instability and conflict" (Gould&Ganguly, 1992). Clark Clifford, a former Defence Secretary, visited India to talk with India's president, P.V. Narasimha Rao. In Harold Gould's interview with Rao, Gould notes (1992:12),

Clifford said to Rao, "if you are concerned about our offering \$400 million to Pakistan, we are willing to provide you with the same". Rao replied, "The best policy would be to introduce no more armaments into South Asia[...], because it is India's view that to do so would encourage another round of intraregional instability and conflict [...]"

India turned down the US offer, but China coordinated with the US in aiding Pakistan. Not only did China support US arms supplies to Pakistan, but it also offered small arms to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and increased heavy arms to Pakistan. China feared that the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan could lead to their controlling all sea lines across the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, posing a grave threat to China's security. Finally, the US and China reached an assistance agreement when the US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, visited Beijing in January 1980 (Garver, 1991:61).

Up to this point, the Soviet Union had faced growing geopolitical encirclement, therefore, in order to gain India's support and to placate India's own concerns, in March 1980, its Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, visited India to explain its Afghan position and to offer a generous package. By this time, the pro-Soviet Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, who had recently returned to power, accepted the deal, which amounted to \$1.63 billion in the form of credits payable over a period of ten to fifteen years (Ganguly, 2001:82). Hence, the US-Sino-Pakistani arms deal had led directly to a strengthening of the Indo-Soviet relationship, and also to India's tacit approval of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Also, instead of

³⁵ Sumit Ganguly argues that American military aid to Pakistan emboldened Pakistani leaders to exploit India's weaknesses; as the Sikh insurgency peaked in India in the late 1980s, Pakistan covertly aided the insurgents to deteriorate Indian domestic violence. See Ganguly, 2001, p. 84.

blaming the Soviets for their Afghanistan venture, India blamed the US for promoting regional arms competition (Ganguly, 2001:82;Cohen, 2000:5).

The other consequence of great power competition was the intensification of regional conflicts, which in the case of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, took the form of curbing the process of Sino-Indian détente after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. On the one hand, the US support, which had been steadily sustained during the 1980s, led Pakistan to assume, incorrectly, that its security was guaranteed against any Soviet military attack, including its provision of sanctuary to Pakistani guerrillas fighting in Afghanistan; while, on the other hand, China perceived Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan as posing great threat to it, therefore, kept strengthening relations with the US and firmly support Pakistan (Garver, 2001:219), which had led to a China-US-Pakistan axis, increased Sino-Soviet hostility, which was then under such structural constraints, the progress of Sino-Indian normalization was limited.

After the Simla agreement in 1972, South Asia enjoyed a period of relative stability. In 1976, China and India, who had resumed an exchange of ambassadors, established a series of border talks, pursued a more balanced foreign policy with their respective superpowers. The Janata Party, which defeated the pro-Soviet Congress party, came to power in India in 1977, and Deng Xiaoping, the new leader in China, began to initiate his reform of “Four Modernizations”. Even though China and India had intention to improve ties, Russia had expressed discontent about Indian Prime Minister Desai’s opening gambit to China (Garver, 1991:61). However, Desai was ousted in 1979 and pro-Soviet Indira Gandhi returned to power, which created the possibility for the USSR, by using its arms deal, to entice India from China. This is a classic example of how great power involvement, namely, the Soviet Union, was able to affect the direction of Sino-Indian reconciliation, in that, with the entrenched Indo-Soviet friendship and Sino-Soviet hostility, thereby the Soviet leadership repeatedly warning India that China’s intent was to weaken their friendship (Liu, 1994:124;Garver, 1991:70;Nihal Singh, 1986:172-188). A good example of this stratagem was when Mrs Gandhi visited Moscow in 1982, Soviet leaders warned her that Beijing’s final goal was to dominate all of Asia, and they especially warned her that the Indian border was being aggressively intruded upon by Chinese troops. Meanwhile, by promising more generous economic and military aid, the Soviets dissuade India from improving relations with China (Horn, 1983:900-901). Hence, because of the superpower pressure of using carrot and stick, in the forms of warnings and arms aid, Sino-Indian conciliatory moves were limited; as Miller’s theory notes, superpower competition blocks the transition from cold war to cold peace.

4.5 Conclusion: Systemic effects: Superpower Competition and the Sino-Indian Cold War

This chapter shows how the superpower competition affected the Sino-Indian relations in the Cold War. During the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation, the superpowers supported their regional client states, thereby intensifying regional conflicts and prolonging Sino-Indian cold war. However, the structural realism was unable to offer the variant outcomes of regional conflicts under the same condition of bipolar US-Soviet confrontation. Accordingly, Miller's approach offers more nuanced explanations that the shifting regional realignments and the changing of the superpowers' interests altered the types of great power involvement, which lead to different regional outcomes.

It especially was the case that the influence of great power involvement on the regional outcome in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war was different from the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war due to the differences of great powers' interests. During the 1965 war, the US-Soviet concerted positions compelled India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire resolution due to great powers' common interests in maintaining regional *status quo* and further deterred China from triggering the second Sino-Indian border war. Great power involvement as a result of the 1965 war changed. The United States suspended its military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan in 1965. The US disengagement from South Asia enabled the Soviet Union to become a hegemon in the region, which served as a 'neutral moderator' to settle the conflicts of the 1965 war resulting in seven-year Indo-Pakistani cold peace.

By contrast, in the 1971 war, two competing alliance blocs were clearly shaped by, on the one side, the conjuncture of Sino-US rapprochement and their joint support for Pakistan, and, on the other side, the reinforcement of the Indo-Soviet relationship by way of the 1972 agreement; the combination of these created superpower competition, thereby exacerbating the Indo-Pakistani confrontation and prolonging the Sino-Indian cold war. Furthermore, China took a clear pro-Pakistan position, by providing political and diplomatic support, leaving space for Pakistan to manoeuvre by brandishing the 'China threat' in order to deter India. Hence, even though China had exercised restraint in avoiding direct military intervention in the war, Sino-Indian hostility, nevertheless, intensified.

In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another case of superpower competition that prolong Sino-Indian cold war. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the reinstatement of American arms supplies to Pakistan had brought the US back into the South Asia theatre, leading to superpower competition, thus creating the space for a client state – in this case Pakistan – to manipulate its patron – in this case the US – by requesting further arms supplies and diplomatic support. Thus, because the Indo-Pakistani arms race was emboldened by superpowers providing arms supplies, regional conflicts were prolonged. This resulted in the efforts made by the Janata regime between 1977 and 1979 to achieve Sino-Indian normalization made being curbed, in particular, after 1979 pro-Soviet

Indira Gandhi coming to power, by the continuation of strategic confrontation at regional and global level through Indo-Pakistan animosity, Sino-Soviet hostility, and the US-Soviet confrontation respectively. Therefore, the transformations of Sino-Indian relations did not happen until a change in the international system was brought about by the end of the Cold War.

Chapter 5 A Russian Factor on Sino-Indian relations in the 1990s

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War drastically transformed the landscape of global politics. This chapter will discuss what factors led to the initiation of the Sino-Indian *rapprochement* and what factors accounted for the maintenance of the cold peace. This chapter will argue that the structural change had a profound impact on the transformations of Sino-Indian relations from “cold war” to “cold peace” along the line of Miller’s theory, that competition between superpowers leads to cold war and that the cessation of competition leads to cold peace. Thus, with superpower rivalry ended and the United States’ disengagement from South Asia, Russia encouraged Sino-Indian reconciliation, by offering incentives to China and India by way of the growing dependence on Russia’s arms transfer, the coordination of common geo-strategy, and the appeal for multi-polarity. This chapter is presented in two sections. The first section, from 1988 to 1992, shows the influence the end of the Cold War had on the initiation of Sino-Indian reconciliation. The second, from 1993 to 1999, shows how Russia, a benign great power, although declined, played a role in sustaining the duration of Sino-Indian rapprochement. After 2000, the US’s re-engagement in South Asia affected the regional outcome, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 (see Table 5.1).

Table 5-1: The effects of great power involvement on Sino-Indian relations

| Period | Presidency | Factors | Outcomes |
|-----------|-----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1988-1992 | Gorbachev and Yeltsin | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Soviet rapprochement with China 2. Soviet forces withdrawal from Afghanistan 3. Russia’s estrangement from India. | The end of superpower competition |
| | Reagan and Bush | | |
| 1993-1999 | Yeltsin | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arms sales 2. Common geo-strategy 3. Appealing for multi-polarity | Russian dominance |
| | Clinton | | |
| 2000-2013 | Putin | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-terrorism cooperation 2. Civil nuclear cooperation between India and the US 3. US-led liberal economic order | US dominance |
| | Bush and Obama | | |

Source: The author

5.1 The end of superpower competition from 1988 to 1992

5.1.1 Clarifying the theoretical task

As mentioned in Chapter 3, India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 led to an initiation of Sino-Indian cold peace until the present (2016). Before his visit, China and India had been on the brink of war with military standoffs in the Sumdurong Chu valley.

How, then, did the rivalry deescalate within such a relatively short time and how was the cold peace maintained?

Scholars argue that interstate relations are often influenced by dual interactions of international and domestic politics (Putman, 1988:431-4; Rose, 1998:146; Goldstein&Martin, 2000:203). At the International level, structural factors included the distributions of power, economic interdependence, and transnational institutions, while at the domestic level lie primarily non-structural factors, included regime type, elites' decision-making, nationalism and ideology, and an attachment to territory (Friedberg, 1993:6; Snyder, 1991:14).

In the case of China and India, in the early 1990s, the international-level factors concerning the distribution of power did not weigh much to change the international system due to Chinese and Indian military and economic power were relatively limited (further comparisons with great powers see 5.2.2 and 6.1.1). The factor of transnational institutions was largely absent due to the few interactions between the two states. The only international organization either had encountered was the United Nation (UN), in particular, between 1960s and 1980s where they had confronted each other on issues, such as Kashmir, Tibet, and the UN membership of Bangladesh (Garver, 2001:48,231; Kim, 2004:45). They did not become involved with transnational institutions, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC), Group of Twenty (G20), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which would deepen and sustain regional peace, until the late 1990s and early 2000s (Mukherjee&Malone, 2011a). Moreover, the factor of economic interdependence was absent because the bilateral trade was limited to US \$ 200 million by 1988. Also, India's economy was still autarkical and reform did not occur until 1991. It might be assumed, therefore, that Rajiv Gandhi's motivation for his 1988 China's visit was not for economic reasons.

Considering the domestic-level factors, since their establishment in the 1950s both their regime types and national ideologies had been constant with China being authoritarian and communistic and India being democratic and secular. Territorial disputes had never been resolved, however, leaders were destined to play important roles by influencing the initiation of a cold peace. Some scholars, such as Checkel (1997:10), Zhao(2007:150), and Singh (2009a), hold that policy entrepreneurs, empowered by new ideas, are a factor in changes of foreign policy that lead to the de-escalation of rivalry, which suggests that such a novel approach on the part of Rajiv Gandhi might have initiated the cold peace. This is particularly so in the Sino-Indian case, since foreign policymaking had been dominated by its Prime Ministers, from Nehru to his daughter Indira Gandhi, to his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, and their associated staffs (Sikri, 2009:258; Pardesi, 2011:90). Similarly, China's paramount leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, held ultimate Communist Party, State Council, People's Liberal Army authority to determine the national security affairs (Hamrin, 1995:89-91; MacFarquhar, 1997b:12; Swaine&Tellis, 2000:12).

Rajiv Gandhi adopted different approaches, such as not making the settlement of border disputes a precondition for improvement of bilateral relations (Scott, 2011b:212), and taking a different position on the Tibet issue, even when the Lhasa uprisings were happening at the time of his visit, unlike his grandfather, Nehru, who had given the 13th Dalai Lama political asylum (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8). Therefore, Rajiv's concessional posture demonstrated good will and helped to mitigate the perception of Indian threat that India won't support Tibetans to undermine China's rule.

However, this thesis argues that leaders' initiatives were necessary, but not sufficiently powerful to transform Sino-Indian relations because India's Chinese engagement policy had been consistent since the premiership of Indira Gandhi and beyond (Malhotra, 1989:143;Singh, 2012a;Garver, 2010a:89). In 1976, Indira Gandhi had resumed diplomatic relations with China. Also, in the same year, China's first Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman, Mao Zedong, died, to be succeeded by Deng, who, in 1978, instigated his economic reform and, recognizing the need for maintaining peaceful and stabilized international environment, welcomed India's initiatives for the normalization of relations (Mishra, 2004:54-5). In the early 1980s, Deng also proposed a concession³⁶ in order to resolve the border disputes, however, this was rejected by India (see 9.3.5 for further discussion). Consequently, the move toward normalized relations was limited.

Why, then, were both countries' leaders unable to normalize relations by consensus in the 1970s yet managed to do so in the late 1980s? As *Hypothesis 3* suggests, different types of great power involvement can result in different regional outcomes. During Indira Gandhi's premiership, because of superpower competition, which resulted in India's alignment with the Soviet Union, together with both Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet hostilities, the constraints placed on normalizing relations were much too great (Baral et al., 1989:260). By contrast, the end of superpower competition created a transformation in the balance of power, thereby removing structural constraints. Such a shift of distribution of power in the international system is a primary factor that shapes both international outcomes and influences interstate relations. Consequently, China became less worried about the Russian factor in its relations with India and India's concern about the threat from a tri-lateral 'Chinese-Pakistani-US' axis was also reduced. The next section will test Benjamin Miller's theory by exploring the competing theoretical perspectives involved in the initiation of the Sino-Indian cold peace in 1988.

5.1.2 The end of superpower competition

³⁶ Deng proposed a "swap package" that China would accept India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian acceptance of China's claim to Aksai Chin in the western sector. India rejected it because it believed that two sectors are all Indian territory.

Benjamin Miller's theory of regional war and peace refers to different type of great power involvement, as a systemic factor, that are conducive to different regional outcomes. The superpower competition during the Cold War intensified Indo-Pakistan conflicts and prolonged the Sino-Indian cold war. In contrast, an outbreak of change emerged from superpower competition to the end of superpower rivalry in 1989, further facilitated a transition from one type of great power involvement to another. In Miller's view (1997:57-58), the end of superpower competition may change the regional outcome, because the end of superpower competition, firstly, limits the manoeuvring room of client states, thus increasing the capacity of great powers to induce cold peace, secondly, increases the capacity of great powers to exert pressure on their clients to moderate their diplomatic positions and the level of conflicts, and thirdly, evolves into great power cooperation or hegemony.

For the purpose of testing Miller's theory, it is necessary to review the theoretical propositions of *Hypothesis 3* (shown in Chapter 4) that a great power dominance and great power cooperation, have similar effect on regional cold peace in respect of Miller's theory (1997:58):

Proposition 5: leaving local states limited autonomy and reduce the space for local states manipulating their patrons, in turn, make progress in regional conflict reduction.

Proposition 6: exerting effective pressure on local states in either a benign or a coercive way engaging in settlement of regional conflict³⁷.

Proposition 7: when rival clients come to share the same patron local states succumb to dependence on the hegemon; the hegemon is able to manage the regional disputes effectively and influence the regional outcome.

Proposition 8: imposing a regional stability and promote a cold peace through a combination of the following strategies and mechanism: (a) diplomatic mediations, (b) the restraint of aggressive local clients, (c) reassurances, (d) deterrence and containment, (e) security guarantee, and (f) co-management of an international system and policy coordination (Miller, 2001a:15-16; 2005:236-237).

This section will argue that the initiation of Sino-Indian reconciliation was mainly caused by the transformation of the international system after the end of the Cold War, when Mikhail

³⁷ As discussed in 3.3.1, a benign hegemon emphasizes negotiated diplomacy for promoting regional peace-making and focuses on reassurance and positive inducements, while minimizing the encroachment on the local states' sovereignty and autonomy; a coercive hegemon emphasizes deterrence and negative sanctions, imposing a resolution of the regional actors regardless of their wishes.

Gorbachev³⁸ initiated the drastic changes that ended the superpower competition. From 1987 he had also initiated a series of political and economic reforms, in particular, his “new thinking” about foreign policy, which led to the end of superpower competition.

In particular, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of the main factors contributing to ending the superpower competition in the region and further altering the regional balance of power. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates, more than fifteen thousand soldiers died in the Soviet war in Afghanistan and between 1981 and 1986 the costs of its Afghan, Angolan, and Nicaraguan incursions amounted to \$13 billion, which led to the economic decay and domestic instability of the Soviet empire (Haqqānī, 2005:193). Hence, in December 1987, at a US-Soviet summit in Washington, Gorbachev announced a withdrawal from Afghanistan over a twelve-month period as part of his policy of “*perestroika*” (the economic reform) in order to shrink the state’s commitments and obligations to the Third World and to trim the Soviet military budget. In April 1988, the ratification of *Geneva Accords* contained a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (Halliday, 1999;Reuveny&Prakash, 1999:699).

The subsequent withdrawal, as a factor of structural change, had a critical impact on the regional balance of power, especially as it affected Pakistan, China and India. Regarding Pakistan, the US interest in Soviet Afghan campaign was exclusively to contain the Soviet Union; to further this goal, it had given economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Consequently, with the 1990 Soviet departure from Afghanistan, Pakistan became less strategically important. As a result, the divergence of interests between Pakistan and the US showed that the nature of the Kabul government, whether anti-communist or pro-Islamist, was of little interest to Washington, but of huge strategic importance to Pakistan (Kux, 2001:287;Haqqānī, 2005:196-197). Moreover, without the fear of losing its client, the US was able to pursue its policy of nuclear non-proliferation, as a further signal of its disengagement in South Asia, stopping military and economic assistance to Pakistan³⁹ in October 1990 because of its possession of a nuclear device (Kux, 2001:309). With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the emerging Sino-Soviet thaw, Pakistan’s strategic value to the US and China, in terms of the containment against the Soviet Union, also declined, thereby diluting the Sino-Pakistani relationship and encouraging China to improve its relations with India (Garver, 1996:323-24;Tang et al., 2005:230).

In summary, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, which led to the US’s disengagement with Pakistan and China’s improved relations with the USSR, thus, marked

³⁸ Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985 at a time when the Soviet economy was stagnating.

³⁹ For example, in 1991 alone, Pakistan lost \$564 million in military and economic aid, which was a heavy blow to its defence ability and economic development.

not only the end to the global superpower contest, but it transformed the South Asia regional balance of power.

5.1.3 The initiation of Sino-Indian reconciliation

During the Gorbachev presidency, the transformation of both the international and regional system was the result of the end of superpower competition, which created both space and incentives for China and India to initiate reconciliation. The transformation of structural factors included (i) The Soviet rapprochement with China, (ii) Russia's estrangement from India.

1. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement

The Sino-Soviet relationship had been antagonistic since 1959, when both leaders, Chairman Mao and President Khrushchev, became open rivals; an antagonism that lasted throughout the Cold War period. However, in a 1986 speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev revealed his intention of seeking rapprochement with China, which was followed in May 1989 with an official visit, thus marking the end of the three-decades of confrontation and the beginning of a new chapter of the normalization (Keller, 1989).

Following this rapprochement, China and the Soviet Union undertook a series of cooperative arrangements, including the increase of arms sales, bilateral trade, and wide-ranging military-technological cooperation. This convergence of interests continued to deepen, even when Russia faced economic "meltdown" in the early 1990s, and the amity lasted throughout the Yeltsin and Putin terms (Donaldson&Donaldson, 2003;Kerr, 2005;Li, 2007). Not only did these changes herald a shift in both the regional and international system, but they also created incentives for Sino-Indian rapprochement.

2 The Soviet (Russia) estrangement from India

Gorbachev's new foreign policy thinking centred on engagement with the West, mainly the US and China; however, this led to an estrangement from India, which forced India to readjust its stance toward the US and China. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, for India, resulted in (i) a disruption to its main sources of defence supplies, (ii) its loss of a major export market, (iii) its vulnerability to potential hostile resolutions in the United Nations and, (iv) more competitors for foreign aid (Thakur, 1993:831). As a consequence, India had no choice other than to recalculate its traditional non-alignment policy and to adjust its strategic options. Hence, one of the adjustments had to be mending its relations with China. The end of the Cold War, therefore, along with the Soviet disintegration, provided three major lessons regarding its foreign policy.

Firstly, having lost its superpower patron, India had to search for new friends. In particular, Russia deprived India of the advantage of purchasing defence weaponry for soft currency instead of hard currency. In effect, India was not on Russia's engagement list and some

Indian scholars noted that the era of “special ties” between the Soviet Union and India had come to an end (Jain, 2003:379;Dutt, 2009:74). India had no other option than to seek to mend its relations with the formerly estranged China and US in response to the Soviet estrangement.

Secondly, the Soviet Union had been India’s largest defence supplier since 1965. Because the Soviet collapse resulted in a disruption to defence production and deliveries to foreign customers, India needed to look for new arms suppliers. Moreover, problems emerged regarding the rupee-rouble exchange rate and repayment of previous credits⁴⁰ that were not solved until President Yeltsin’s 1993 visit to India. For all these reason, India was compelled to diversify arms procurement, looking for UK, US and French market.

Alongside the systemic international structural change, India sought to improve relations with some historical estranged states, such as Israel and the US. Also, the shift in the balance of power gradually improved India’s relations with the US. Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi’s 1985 US visit had already resulted in a more balanced strategy toward the two superpowers. However, India was still dependent on Soviet support and the US would not abandon Pakistan in the face of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan (Cohen, 1992:146). Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, US-Indo relations were gradually but slowly warming. US defence relations with India were dramatically transformed after a major US military delegation visited in December 1990 and an Indian military delegation made a reciprocal visit in August 1991. In summary, the Soviet estrangement from India led to the US filling the vacuum of Indo-Soviet friendship.

Thirdly, because it suffered substantially by losing its vast East European market, which had accounted for approximately 20 % of India’s exports, along with the severe financial crisis after 1991, India had to look for new markets and to embark on economic reforms. The gradual reforms of the 1980s under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi had generated consensus about the desirability of economic liberalization. Therefore, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh abandoned the state’s historical commitment to import-substituting industrialization and chose to orient its domestic and international economic policies towards economic liberalization. At the same time, Indian embarked on its “Look East policy”, designed to gain access to the markets and capital of the rapidly growing Southeast Asian countries, with China as the greatest potential market of all (Ganguly, 2003;Jaffrelot, 2003;Ganguly&Pardesi, 2009b).

⁴⁰The rupee-rouble exchange rate was fixed as final in a 1978 agreement. India argues that the agreement unfairly penalized it for the continually depreciating rupee without any penalty for the artificially inflated rouble.

In summary, India has adjusted its non-alignment policy to forge ties with China and the US as a result of losing its patron after the Soviet collapse in 1991. The following section will discuss the Sino-Indian border standoff in 1986-1987 to support Miller's theory that the end of superpower competition accounts for the initiation of Sino-Indian cold peace.

5.1.4 Case study: A test – the 1986-1987 Sino-Indian border standoff ⁴¹

A border standoff between Chinese and Indian military patrols from July 1986 to May 1987 in the Sumdurong Chu valley of the Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border led to the brink of war. Arunachal Pradesh, which was claimed by China, but administered by India as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), when, in 1984, India established a seasonal observation post on the south bank of the Sumdurong River. The fuse for the skirmishes was ignited by India's unilateral granting of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh in December 1986, and exacerbated by China's military build-up along the border (Mishra, 2004:322;Maxwell, 2011b:80). In July 1987, Indian found Chinese soldiers setting up semi-permanent structures in the Sumdurong Chu valley, although China claimed the soldiers were on a routine patrol. Then an Indian army military exercise "Chequer Board Operation" was viewed by China as an offensive provocation (Southerland, 1987).

The resulting standoff led to the fears of another border war, similar to the one that took place in the same battlefield in the 1962 border war. In particular, China deployed 20,000 troops from the Chengdu region to the Sino-Indian border in May 1987. However, this crisis soon ended by mutual self-restraint. This case demonstrates the effect of great power involvement which bring different regional outcome. Hence, two factors seemed to have been operative to explain the moderation of this Sino-Indian security dilemma.

- 1. Soviet neutrality limited India's room for manoeuvre to intensify the crisis, thereby increasing its capabilities to moderate the conflict.*

In October 1986, the US defence secretary, Caspar Weinberger, visited India and conveyed a message from the Chinese to the Indian leadership to the effect that India should 'stop nibbling at Chinese territory, otherwise China would teach India a lesson' very much as China had proclaimed the same warning during the Vietnam war in 1978. Later, Weinberger visited Pakistan and announced that the US would supply it with F-16 fighters and AWACS aircraft (Garver, 1991:79). Both the Chinese warnings and the US arms supplies to Pakistan exerted pressures on India by intensifying its worries about a US-China-Pakistan nexus. As a consequence, India turned to the Soviet Union for support in terms of their 1971 Indo-Soviet agreement, as the Soviets had offered during the Indo-Pakistani war that year. As

⁴¹ The 1986 Sino-Indian border skirmish happened before the end of the Cold War, falling beyond the time period of this chapter. However, the sequential impact of this border standoff on the Sino-Indian relations lasted till the post-Cold War, thereby putting this event in this chapter.

Miller's theory would expect, superpower competition would intensify the Sino-Indian border conflict.

However, Soviet neutrality moderated the conflict. In August 1986, during the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the 1971 Indo-Soviet agreement, the leader of the Soviet delegation, S.B. Tatilaev, refused to declare the Sumdorong incident a "Chinese incursion". Three months later, Gorbachev visited India and reiterated the importance of Soviet-Indo friendship; however, he was reluctant to side with India in the current Sino-Indian border disputes- a policy reflecting Gorbachev's intention to improve relations with Beijing (Garver, 1991:79). Moreover, he called for better Sino-Soviet-Indian relations so that no one would have to choose sides (Clarity&Freudenheim, 1986;Weintraub, 1986). Soviet neutrality left no space for India to manoeuvre its patron by using Soviet support as a shield in its confrontation with China, as Miller's *Proposition 5* holds.

Moreover, despite the US-Sino-Pakistani nexus, the US did not become involved in the Sino-Indian skirmish, neither by siding with either side, or by acting as a mediator. Hence, the Soviet Union became the only hegemon in the dispute, whom only India could count on, thus leaving its client state with limited autonomy to intensify the conflict. As Miller argues (1997:58), this was a mechanism imposed by a hegemon in such a way that the client state cannot escape the hegemon's restraining pressure to mitigate conflict. The result was that the Soviet Union's obvious neutrality led to Rajiv Gandhi's decision to de-escalate the border crisis. As a direct consequence, in May 1987, India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, sent a special envoy, P.N. Haksar, to Beijing, to reassure the Chinese that India did not intend to aggravate the border situation, with the result that the dispute ended in bilateral restraint. Shortly thereafter, the border skirmish ended quietly and in December 1987, Sino-Indian border talks resumed (Bose, 1987;Ramesh, 1999).

2. *The Soviet hegemon advanced the "cold peace" by offering assurances.*

Amid the escalation of the Sino-Indian stand-off in Sumdorong Chu valley, in January 1987, the Soviet foreign ministry announced the withdrawal of a mechanized infantry division from the Sino-Mongolian border in order to hold the first round of Sino-Soviet border talks on the following month (Michaek, 1986;Southerland, 1987). This was yet another sign of the changing interest of the Soviets, which was now to improve Soviet relations with China by decreasing their military burden and presence along its border. Thus, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement led to India's self-restraint and, ultimately, reconciliation (Garver, 1991:82;Liu, 1994;Mansingh, 1994;Mishra, 2004:156). John Garver and Stephen Cohen both hold the view that this border skirmish became a test of Soviet support for India under the new condition of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement (Cohen, 1992:147;Garver, 1991).

This was achieved, firstly, by Gorbachev's attitude of seeking rapprochement with China, while still remaining close to India. Certainly, his India visit in November 1986 when he

extended military assistance⁴² assured India that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement would not be at the expense of Indo-Soviet relations (United Press International, 1987). Moreover, he called for better relations between the Soviets, Indians, and Chinese. As a consequence, Rajiv Gandhi reappraised his China policy, initiated a series of ministerial-level exchanges during which Indian Defence Minister, K.C. Pant, visited China in April 1987, followed by Minister of External Affairs, N.D. Tiwari in June (Xinhua New Agency, 1987). These goodwill political visits culminated in China's leader Deng inviting Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing and China reciprocating with a high-level visit led by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Ministry, Liu Shuqing, in December. These political exchanges created a conciliatory atmosphere and greatly eased Sino-Indian tensions.

Secondly, a year later, Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1988, just one month before a visit to China by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, reaffirmed the special Indo-Soviet friendship and that the Soviets would not weaken in their support for India, as Miller's Proposition 4 notes, which a hegemon promotes a cold peace through reassurances. Consequently, with the Soviet assurance and the sign of a Sino-Soviet thaw, India's China policy, which had been based on Sino-Soviet confrontation, had to be rapidly readjusted. India was further motivated to improve ties with China (Liu, 1994:137).

In sum, as Miller's *Proposition 5* holds, the change of great power interests, Gorbachev's intention of normalization with China led to Soviet neutrality in the 1987 Sino-India border skirmish, leaving no space for India's exploiting Soviet support in its confrontation with China. India's leadership adjusted to the Soviet change and exercised self-restraint to de-escalate the crisis. Thus, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement changed the regional balance of power, leading to the transformation of Sino-Indian relations.

5.2 Russia's dominance from 1993 to 1999

After the Soviet Union's collapse, the US became the world's only superpower. However, during the 1990s, a peculiar scenario emerged in the regional context that Russia, for the first time, became the first and second largest arms suppliers to China and India. Moreover, both China and India, China and Russia, respectively signed critical border agreements that they reduced the deployment of military forces along their borders, thereby establishing the foundations of border stability. The multi-polarity became common diplomatic rhetoric among China, India and Russia. This section intends to answer what factors could explain the declining power, Russia, but not the global power, the US, to exert influence on China-India dyadic relations? How Russia affected Sino-Indian cold peace? This thesis argues that because of the US's disengagement from South Asia the US played a limited role in the Sino-

⁴² The Soviet assistance included \$ 1.5 billion worth of new credits for India and outlined Soviet participation in a nuclear plant, steel and other projects. The USSR also promised to sale India two squadrons of brand-new Soviet MiG-29 jet fighters. See the Washington Post, November 28, 1986.

Indian evolving relations in the 1990s but Russia played a role in imposing a peaceful regional order from 1993 to 1999. In contrast, Russia's dominance subdued after 2000 due to American reengagement in this region and China's decrease in dependence on Russian arms sales.

5.2.1 Addressing the theoretical puzzles

As introduced in Chapter 2, the changes of state's behaviour can be understood in three international relations (IR) paradigms by examining states' assessments of their external constraints, domestic incentives and social constructions. According to the balance of power theory, states will try to balance the dominant power in the international system by developing military build-ups internally, or by forming alliances with other countries externally (Waltz, 1979:99). Therefore, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the balance of power logic would be expected to result in the declining power of Russia, and the regional powers, China and India, would look to other alliances in order to shore up their positions vis-à-vis the more dominant power, the US. As the empirical evidence shows, they were both discontent with the US-led hegemonic order, thus, Russia attempted to forge closer ties with China and India; however, they rejected the interpretations of their partnership as alliances in terms of the balance of power logic (MacFarlane, 1999; Wohlforth, 2003). In contrast, after 2000, shifts in the regional balance of power evolved into a situation whereby Russia, China and India all joined the bandwagon of the US-led anti-terrorism coalition (see Section 6.1 for a more in-depth discussion). As Harsh Pant (2006a:51) holds that the US has more comprehensive ties with Russia, China and India than any two of them have between themselves.

Walt's balance of threat seems to suggest that Russia perceived the US to be a threat, hence its alignment with China and India as a balance against the US. However, three of Walt's key variables (1985:9) – aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and especially geographic proximity, indicate that Russia may have perceived a rising China to be a potential threat. However, balance of threat could not explain why Russia choose to become aligned with a potential rival and became that state's largest arms supplier and coordinating China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) where was Russia's traditional spheres of influence. Also, how would India accept Russia's arms deal to China? It manifests that Russia's interests in saving its defence industry and economy have dominated in its arms sales relationship with China and India to the extent to which short term economic motivations had prevailed over security concerns (see further analysis in 5.2.4). Application of Walt's fourth key variable – perceived intention– might help to explain the reduction of threat by reduction of military along the border and the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between China and India, Russia and China (see 5.2.4). Moreover, in relation to Walt's definition of threat, it is hard to perceive the US as having been a threat to India, since there had been no substantial conflict between them up to the 1990s. Why the India aligned with Russia but estranged from the US? This question might be answered by Miller's

variable of great power involvement that great power disengagement led to the US's little sway on India as well as the Sino-Indian cold peace during the 1990s (see 5.2.2.1 below).

Social constructivism suggests that the changes of states' foreign policy are shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationships to experienced historical events (Legro, 2005:4), but it may explain only part of the story. When Russia and China, China and India initiated their separate reconciliation it was clear that they shared few common norms. They did not have long histories of friendship, their elites had only just begun to build a rapport with each other and the atmosphere of mistrust that had persisted throughout the Cold War period did not encourage the constructivists to expect them to be able to develop a trilateral community in terms of cultural affinity and shared norms (Donaldson&Donaldson, 2003:724). Nevertheless, as I argue in Section 5.2.5, a number of ideational and identity issues are important for understanding the trilateral relationship.

As a consequence of these conflicting theories, I will apply Miller's theory to explore the alternative explanations of Russia's interactions with China and India, since it better explains Russia's motivations for forging such constructive relations with an erstwhile hostile China-Indian dyad. However, Miller's theory does leave gaps in the evolving dynamics how a declining great power gained sufficient leverage to manage its relations with two ascending powers. Therefore, I shall complement three factors, including domestic politics, international institutions, and great power identity, in the analysis of interactions between China, India, and Russia.

5.2.2 Russia's dominance in the 1990s

As asked in the 5.2.1, why did the US play such a limited role in the Sino-Indian evolving relations in the 1990s? After the end of the Cold War, the US became the only global superpower. However, there is much scholarly debate as to whether the world order at that time was uni-polar or multi-polar (Layne, 1993; Wohlforth, 1999a; Waltz, 1993; Kupchan, 1998; Huntington, 1999). What is true is that there were great variations among the different regions operating under the same international system. Miller (2007a:29) holds that polarity is not the most important factor that affects the type of regional involvement by the great powers, it is the balance of great powers' interests, together with their relative capabilities. The scenario in South Asia after 1993 accords Miller's point, in that the US was the only superpower shaping the uni-polar world order – in particular, after its overwhelming victory in the 1991 Gulf War – however, it showed little interest in South Asia, and therefore it had only a marginal influence on Sino-Indian relations (Kampani, 2001:256). Hence, Russia became the only dominant great power in the region.

Miller (2007a:211) noted that "low interest regions", which contain no key strategic or economic importance and are distant from the great powers or their major allies, are associated with an unwillingness to engage; therefore, the US disengaged from South Asia

due to its low interest in the region, because South Asia lacked rich resources such as those of the Middle East or geo-strategic importance such as the East Asia, it involved few economic exchanges⁴³ (Ganguly&Mukherji, 2011:43;Cohen, 1992:150;Feigenbaum, 2010), and Pakistan was no longer a US ally following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which led Washington to cut off all military and economic assistance in 1990 (Kronstadt, 2009b:32). President Clinton's foreign policies between 1993 and 2001 had centred on nuclear non-proliferation and human rights issues, in particular on the civil war in the Balkans and Somalia, Haitian refugees' crisis, and the Middle East peace process, which he regarded as being his state's national interests, consequently his engagement in Indo-Pakistani conflicts was sporadic (Cohen, 2000:9;Talbot, 2006:25), such as its mediation in the 1999 Kashmir crisis and the sanctions it imposed due to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.

Moreover, despite the US's improving economic ties with China and India respectively during the 1990s, the US had little interest in the region's overlapping triangular relations, and it also exerted only a marginal influence on the transformation of Sino-Indian relations, therefore, this thesis determines the US disengagement in the dyadic context from 1993 to 1999.

After a brief period of estrangement between 1989 and 1992, India and Russia resumed their special relationship after President Boris Yeltsin's visit to India in 1993, whereas Sino-Russia relations had been thawing since President Gorbachev's visit to China in 1988. Although there were still some constraints on each bilateral relation, Russia had become the only great power exerting its influence on Sino-Indian relations.

According to Miller's theory, the types of great power involvement are determined by the balances of great power capabilities and of their regional interests; therefore, in the next part, I will explore the hypothesis of Russia being a benign dominant power in terms of its capabilities and interests. Although Russia had been in economic recession since its collapse⁴⁴, in contrast to China and India, this thesis will suggest that Russia possessed a dominant great power status in Sino-Indian interstate relations due to its military superiority and its capabilities in arms transfers with China and India.

1. Russia's capabilities


⁴³ In the early 1990s, India's share of US exports and imports was relatively low with 0.4% and 1.2%. Even in the 1996, the Indo-US bilateral trade was \$10 billion dollars, India was the 32nd largest market for the US exports and the 25th largest market for the US imports. See Martin, M.F. and K.A. Kronstadt, 2008, *India-US Economic and Trade Relations*.

⁴⁴ After 1991, Russia's GDP had continued to decline until the end of financial crisis in 1998.

This thesis will argue that the power asymmetry between Russia, China, and India was characterized by three factors.

Firstly, Russia’s military scale and defence expenditure were three times larger than China’s and India’s individually throughout the mid-1990s (See Figure 5.1). Even though Russia has gone through a stunning process of demilitarization by withdrawing forces from its former republics, closing bases in Cuba and Vietnam and reducing its own military from over three million to about one million (Trenin, 2011b:75), it was still a military power in terms of military expenditure and nuclear capacity. Russia possessed the second largest stockpile of conventional military hardware (GlobalFirepower, 2015) and weapons of mass destruction in its nuclear arsenal by 2015. In the mid-1990s, China and India had not yet caught up with it. In particular, they were heavily dependent on its arms transfers, consequently, between 1995 and 2000, China and India together accounted for approximately 70% of Russian arms sales (Galeotti, 2001). Arms supply and military aid are a critical foreign policy tool for the exertion of great power influence on the recipient states (Krause, 1995;Mihalka et al., 1980;Miller, 2007a:222).

Figure 5-1: The fluctuations in military expenditure among three nations (units: US billions)




Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2000

Secondly, for most of the period after World War Two up to its collapse, the Soviet economy had been the second largest economy in the world by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the third in the world from 1985 to 1989 (CIA, 1991). A decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a serious decline in its economic strength. Between 1990 and 2000, the tables had turned abruptly, and its economy was overtaken by both China and India. For instance, in 1990, the Soviet Union’s GDP had been roughly the size of China’s, however, a decade later, China’s was four times larger, and India’s twice as large, as Russia’s (See Figure 5.2). By 2000, China was the world’s sixth economy in term of GDP,


India was the thirteenth, and Russia had fallen to nineteenth (World Bank, 2013). Some would argue that both China and India's GDP already exceed Russia. However, throughout the 1990s, Russia's GDP per capita was twice that of China's and ten times larger than India's, while Russia was higher than the world average, at present China and India are still below the level of the world average (see Figure 5.3). The index GDP per capita, however, reflects a nation's actual socioeconomic strengths and prospects, therefore, countries with low per capita GDP would struggle to translate their GDP power into effective international power (Perkovich, 2003:130). For example, in 2000, China had 15.9% of its population, India, 46%, living below the \$1.9 in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms of poverty line, in total, 700 million people (Palit, 2012:7). Hence, the problems of poverty are a great challenge to both states to reach great power status. Russia retained the leading role in terms of GDP per capita among them.

Figure 5-2: The changes of GDP among the three nations (units: US billions)



Source: World Bank, between 1990 and 2000

Figure 5-3: The changes of GDP per capita among the three nations (units: US dollars)



Source: World Bank from 1989 to 2013

Last but not least, given the historical ties with China and India, Russia was able to exert its influence on constructing “common geo-strategy” during this period. During the 1950s Sino-Soviet alliance, the image of the Soviet Union, being “a big brother”, were popular among the Chinese due to the ideological affinity and the Soviet support for China’s building nuclear programs and fighting for Korean War against the US (Shen, 2007;Deng, 2007:879). Associated with the bitter memory left by three-decade confrontation, during the 1990s, China was relatively cautious towards Russia, however, when China was still in the early stages of becoming a regional power, its essentially inward-looking foreign policy and post-Tiananmen international isolation created space for Russia’s influence in international affairs (Lo, 2008:4). The Soviets and the Indians had developed a “time-tested” relationship as friend and ally during the Cold War era during which time India received substantial assistance in the defence, energy and industry fields. However, most Indians would not agree to the term “clients” being used to describe their state’s subordinate position to the USSR, nevertheless India kept in mind that this “unequal partnership” was valuable because, during the 1971 war with Pakistan, Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Ocean had been a reminder to the Chinese and Americans that it would not tolerate intervention on behalf of Pakistan (Lounev, 2002:109;Sikri, 2007:30;Mastny, 2010:68-70). Moreover, the Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), had exercised its veto power to shield India from UN’s sanctions (Jain, 2003). In addition, a “benign” view of Russia was reflected by the BBC’s poll in 2004, while the Europeans had dominantly negative views over Russia, over 67% of Chinese and 64% Indian interviewees viewed Russia’s influence positively (BBC, 2005).

2. Russia’s interests

As Miller (2007a:209) notes, great power interests entail their stakes in a particular region with regard to their regional material interests, the importance of geographical proximity, and the presence of a common threat. These factors, therefore, explained the interests of Russia. During Yeltsin’s first term from 1991 to 1996, Russia’s foreign policy was pro-Western; hence its bidding for Western and US assistance to save its economy. Disappointed with the little help that was offered, during Yeltsin’s second term from 1996 to 1999, it adjusted its foreign policy from the West to the balance between the West and the East by reinvigorating relations with its long-time friends – India and North Korea– and further raising its regional profile through partnership with China and India, hoping to restore its great power status (Donaldson&Donaldson, 2003:727;Tsygankov, 2013:25).

The main interests of Russia, during the period between 1991 and 1999, were that it should be considered a great power, which it achieved by exerting its military and political influence in Eurasia, mainly in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), China and India. Moreover, with wounded pride and resentment after the Soviet collapse, Russia viewed the US as a direct challenge to prevent it from regaining a great power status; thus, inviting China and India to join the coalition in order to counter the US hegemony, all of which

factors Russia saw as being in its interests whilst laying the foundation of Russia-China and Russia-India relations (Graham, 2009:16;Trenin, 2011b:17;Tsygankov, 2013:99).

Therefore, scholars and strategists argued that Russia may no longer be a superpower nor an empire, but it still viewed as a dominant power in the region (Donaldson&Donaldson, 2003:716;Graham, 2009;Trenin, 2011b:81;Mankoff, 2012:91). Even though Russia's economic power was in decline during this period, Russia had exerted its influence benignly through arms sales and by pressing for multi-polarity in order to pursue its interests, thereby creating space for China and India to continue their rapprochement.

Was this, then, how Russia advanced the Sino-Indian cold peace? As Miller's theory states (2001a:17), a benign hegemon emphasizes negotiated diplomacy for promoting regional peace-making, accommodative diplomacy focuses on reassurance and positive inducements, while minimizing the encroachment on the local states' sovereignty and autonomy. Therefore, the three Russian factors – (i) arms transfers, (ii) Russia's geo-political strategy, and (iii) appeals for multi-polarity, contributed to its encouragement of good Sino-Indian relations. The next section will describe how a great power, Russia, created a peaceful space through the encouragement of self-restraint and confidence-building measures on the part of China and India, thereby inducing interstate cold peace during Yeltsin's term.

5.2.3 Security commitment by arms transfer

The first significant Russian factor on Sino-Indian relations was arms sales. In the late 1990s, India and China accounted for 80% of Russian arms exports (Galeotti, 2001) and they became its first and second largest arms recipients. Russia's motivation for selling arms to both China and India was primarily to save both its defence industry and its economy. However, its clients, China and India, had different reasons to become dependent on Russian-sourced weapon supplies, thereby leading to subtle changes in their relations with each other.

The following three parts will discuss the motives for Russian arms sales and the respective backgrounds of China and India's reasons for purchasing them. Following that, the influence of Russia's arms transfer on Sino-Indian relations will be explored.

1. Russia's motives and interests

In 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's arms exports had been seriously undermined; however, it had inherited the Soviet military industrial complex (MIC), comprising of around 2000 enterprises, more than 900 research organizations and design centres and a work force of roughly five million, which meant that after petroleum products, military equipment was the second largest item in Russia's export market portfolio (Bakshi, 2006:450). However, partly because of the negotiated settlement of a number of regional

conflicts in the Third World and partly because of the Soviet equipment was seen to be defeated by high-tech American weaponry in the 1991 Gulf War, the market for arms sales in developing countries had dropped to \$28.6 billion, down sharply from \$61 billion in 1988 (Shenon, 1996); therefore, global sales of Soviet arms had dropped significantly. Regarding Russian interests, it has five reasons for selling arms to China and India, including enhancing its national economy, strengthening its defense industry, maintaining its long-term viability by achieving economies of scale, preserving its infrastructure, and covering its research and developmental costs (Donaldson&Donaldson, 2003:725;Sergounin&Subbotin, 1998).

2. China-Russia arms transfer relationship

The history of Sino-Soviet military-technical cooperation, including the build-up of nuclear weapons, dates back to the early 1950s. In 1959, Moscow withdrew all its economic and military support experts and technicians from China after the deterioration of their relations (Gill, 1995:18). However, thirty-years later, Russia had resumed its military cooperation with China.

In the wake of the post-Tiananmen sanctions, Chinese defense spending rose from 12.4 % in 1988 to 17.9 % in 1990, reversing a previous ten year decline (Gill, 1995:49;Kelley&Shenkar, 1993:120). Russia became the only supplier who was willing to ignore the international pressure not to sell weapons to China. Even though Soviet weapons were seen to be inferior to high-tech American weaponry in the Gulf war in 1991, China had little option but to purchase Soviet arms.

In terms of the arms sales since its first arms shipment to China in 1991-92, sales averaged \$1-1.5 billion per year throughout of the rest of the 1990s and this both kept the Russian defense industry alive and China's military machine modernized over the following two decades (Archick et al., 2005). Throughout the 1990s, 90% of China's imported arms were from Russia; meanwhile, Russian arms sales to China accounted for its 20% of the bilateral trade turnover and about 40% of Russia's arms exports. Owing to western countries' reluctance to sell arms and technology to China, Moscow's offer of defence cooperation satisfied China's demand; consequently, most analysts agree that even though there was a possibility of a long-term threat to Russia from a resurgent China; they agree that Russia's commercial motivations have dominated in its arms sales relationship to the extent to which short term economic motivations had prevailed over security concerns (Wishnick, 2001:797;Anthony, 1998;Sergounin&Subbotin, 1998). Hence, by October 2000, China had become the biggest buyer of Russian weapons, accounting for 49.9% of Russian arms sales, which surpassed the former titleholder, India, who accounted for 22% of Russian arms sales (Trenin, 2011a;Wishnick, 2001:806). Defence technological cooperation followed arms sales. Resulting in the modernization of China's armed forces and frequent bilateral senior military official exchanges, the consolidation of Sino-Russian relations resembles the period of Sino-Soviet friendship that pertained between 1955 and 1958.

3. Russia-India arms transfer relationship

India and Russia have maintained a long history of arms transfer and military cooperation, dating back to the mid-1960s. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviet Union became the primary supplier of Indian weaponry. In the second half of the 1980s, two-thirds of India's arms purchases were imported from the USSR (Dutt, 2009:72), a state of affairs that was not interrupted till the Soviet collapse, when many of its defence establishments in the integrated Soviet military-industrial conglomerate were shut down (Sikri, 2009:155). However, in the early 1990s, India badly needed to supplement its defence equipment in response to the escalation of tension with Pakistan in Kashmir. After solving various problems, including in what currency payments would be made – dollars or rupees – in 1993, during President Yeltsin's visit, a series of agreements were made, which included defence cooperation, whereby India was able to resume its purchase of military equipment, to the point where, by the mid-1990s, 70% of its army, 80% of its air force, and 85% of its naval arsenals were made up of Russian hardware (Trenin, 2011a).

Moreover, India, which had been labouring under UN arms embargos imposed in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani war and later the 1998 Indian nuclear tests – instigated mainly by the US – had become heavily dependent on Russian arms and military hardware to the point where its defence forces had become extremely familiar with Russian design and equipment (Jain, 2003:384;Ollapally, 2009:196). Thereafter, the Soviet Union – and later Russia – became India's only reliable supplier, for both small and large items, such as nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers (Sikri, 2009:158). Eventually, the arms transfers from Russia proved to be vastly important to India for the modernisation and indigenisation of defence forces and equipment in order to meet its burgeoning defence needs after the 1990 Kashmir crisis.

4. The impact of Russia's arms sales on Sino-Indian relations

Theoretically, arms transfers may become foreign policy tools for patrons to exert their political influence and change the regional balance of power, resulting in peace treaties and cease-fires, influencing voting in the United Nations, and restraining client behaviour to influence the outcomes of conflicts (Krause, 1995). Moreover, arms transfer can create a network of commitments and interest that preserve the prestige and credibility of the donor and maintain its relationships with client states (Thakur, 1993:835).

During the Yeltsin terms and the first term of the Putin presidency from 2000 to 2004, at very practical level, due to China's post-Tiananmen isolation and US-led sanctions against India, both China and India heavily dependent on Russian arms supplies; therefore, the continuously enhanced military-technical cooperation and arms sales constituted the core of their strategic interstate partnership.

On the one hand, by maintaining and strengthening the arms transfer relationship, Russia had benignly offered both China and India rewards by promising advanced arms sales, technological cooperation, and the improvement of recipients' indigenous capabilities. Such promises may be examined in bilateral diplomatic statements, policy announcements, and contract of arms purchase to show Russia's reliability by promising continuing arms transfers (Sergounin&Subbotin, 1998;SIPRI, 2005;Li, 2007).

On the other hand, Russia, as a major arms supplier to both countries, decreased their perceptions of threats towards against each other by brokering strategic triangular cooperation and by pushing for CBMs between each other, as a means of crisis-prevention, thereby stabilizing the region (the example will be discussed in 5.2.4). Moreover, Russia decreased its clients' sensitivities by assuring them that Russia would not sell weapons to their rivals. Hence, regarding China's sensitivity, Russia did not sell weapons to Taiwan, even though its own defence plants put great pressure on them to do so; however, the Russian leadership opposed the idea for fear of damaging its relations with China (Bakshi, 2000;Zhang, 2013:171). Regarding India's sensitivity, Russian transfers of weapons to both China and Pakistan could threaten India's security and trigger a regional arms races (Jain, 2003:395). Moscow openly declared it would not sell arms to Pakistan.

However, Russia justified transferring arms to both India and China by stating that its aim was to maintain regional peace (Bakshi, 2000). The Indian government refrained from reacting negatively to Russia's arms transfers to China because of the promise of a growing Indo-Russian defence cooperation and strategic partnership (Conley, 2001;Bakshi, 2004). Since the mid-2000s, however, in order to increase their autonomy and decrease their dependence on Russia's weaponry, both China and India have diversified their sources of military equipment and technology acquisitions, therefore, it decreased Russia's regional influence⁴⁵.

5.2.4 Promoting border security

Great powers may impose regional stability and reassure their neighbours by constructing crisis-prevention regimes and building CBMs (Miller, 2005:236-237). The interest of Russia's improved relations with China is determined by its concern for geopolitics and economic development. Therefore, alongside its arms sales and bilateral trade, the border security and the development of the Far East region (RFE) as a whole were among Russia's national

⁴⁵ During the 2000s, Russia was still China's and India's main arms suppliers, however, some subtle changes occurred. There has been a dramatic decline in the volume of Chinese arms imports from Russia since 2007 due to China's increasingly capable of meeting its domestic needs, Russian unwillingness to provide China with advanced weapons and technology because it is concerned that China would copy Russian technology and compete with Russia on the international arms market. After 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal, the US increased its arms sales to India.

interests. In order to accommodate its post-Soviet economic crisis, its first move was to reduce the size of the army to 1.2 million – a reduction that only could be justified under conditions of peace and security on the long borders.

Therefore, Russia pushed for a series of agreements with its neighbouring countries on CBMs and reduction of arms forces along borders and solved its border problems with China in 2008. These agreements included, first, in 1990, the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement on reduction of military forces and the enhancement of confidence Building measures (CBMs) in the border area; second, in April 1996, Russia, China, and the other members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed an agreement on CBMs, which stipulates further the reduction of military forces along the borders in 1997.

Meanwhile, in 1993 and 1996, China and India also signed similar agreements⁴⁶, which both sides agreed on significant troop reductions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and pushed CBMs in the military field. These agreements which was termed as “landmark border agreements” created an atmosphere of mutual trust and laid the foundations of border peace (also see Chapter 3).

Because Miller’s theory assumes that when local states are dominated by a great power, there is an asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the great power, which means that the great power is able to influence its client state’s foreign policy behaviour. Even though the various bilateral and multilateral agreements on CBMs and reduction of arms forces were initiated in 1989 by Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping during the process of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 (The People Daily, 2000), the Sino-Indian agreement were not pressed by Russia. Two factors might explain why China and India simultaneously performed similar border policy – however, Miller’s theory does not take such circumstances into account.

The first factor that may have led to explain Chinese willingness to agree with Russia’s border stability policy, which included its willingness to forge border agreement with India, lay in China’s domestic politics. A significant body of literature suggests that, following the period of isolation it experienced due to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese leadership strived to maintain a stable international environment by focusing on economic development in order to cope with domestic challenges (Swaine, 1998:9;Swaine&Tellis, 2000:112;Gill, 2010:10;Goldstein, 2005:26). Having a stable border with Russia and India fitted China’s primary national interest.

⁴⁶ The 1993 Sino-Indian agreement was “Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas. And the 1996 agreement was on “Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border”.

Regarding India, since 1991, it had embarked on economic reform by developing a “Look East” policy in which it engaged quite comprehensively with Southeast Asia in its searching for new markets and partners. This had developed by 1996 into the “Gujral Doctrine” – a wider regionalism named after the Indian Foreign Minister, Inder Gujral. Its politico-military rationale, therefore, became domestic economic liberalization together with a search for a larger role in Asia (Jaffrelot, 2003; Scott, 2011a:121; Ogden, 2014:86). Consequently, by focusing on both domestic development and challenges at home and abroad, the Narasimha Rao government was able to take a more pragmatic posture in foreign policy, which included an improvement in relations with China (Ganguly&Pardesi, 2009a:14; Malone, 2011b:52).

The second factor involved in strengthening their border security derived from liberal institutionalism that international regimes compelled them to focus on mutual interests in order to facilitate cooperation. Transnational institutions can shape or promote a foreign policy agenda by providing critical information and decrease the cost of cheating (Baldwin, 1993:4-8). Much of the literature agrees that from the mid-1990s China and India have both modified their assessment of regional multilateral institutions for them to become more compatible with their foreign policies and to serve their national economic interests (Shambaugh, 2004/2005:69; Deng, 2007:866-72; Gill, 2010:2; Stephen, 2012:289). In the case of China, whose foreign policy has manifestly been consistent with international norms and practice, its membership of international governmental organizations has increased dramatically from only two in the 1960s to fifty-two in the 1990s (Johnston, 2003:23-5; Kim, 2004:42). Similarly, since the 1990s, India has engaged in multilateralism in its co-management of international economic systems, ranging from a bid for reform of the UNSC, its membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, followed by its forming a loose coalition of developing countries within the WTO in the late 1990s, membership of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa Forum) in the early 2000s, and by pursuing regional relationships through Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SCO (Mukherjee&Malone, 2011a). As a consequence, the cooperative security approach adopted by the SCO not only became a coordinated platform but it also had an expanding normative influence on the Sino-Indian agreements (Sidhu&Yuan, 2003:115).

Therefore, China and India would each concur that the 1996 and 1997 Russia-led agreements on promoting CBMs and demilitarization with neighbouring states by the “Shanghai Five” was applicable to the whole of the Asian-Pacific region⁴⁷ as a security model. As Lowell Dittmer (2001:412) notes, Sino-Indian agreement in 1996 was modelled on

⁴⁷The ‘Shanghai Five’ refers to China and Russia and the three neighbouring states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In June 2001, Uzbekistan became the sixth member of this group.

the five-nation CBMs, calling for both sides to make significant troop reductions along the LAC, which amounted to an important step for settling the Sino-Indian border disputes.

5.2.5 Promotion of common geo-strategy

Russia, as a dominant power, has exerted its influence on the regional balance of power by (i) creating a political discourse of converging interests, (ii) promoting a common geo-strategy, and (iii) advocating multi-polarity, in order to counter the potential threat, the US, and serve its interests of military cooperation with China and India.

1. *Creating the political discourse of converging interests:* Russia, China, and India all suffered domestic problems of irredentist claims, Chechnya, Tibet and Xinjiang, and Kashmir respectively. However, the methods these three countries had used to crackdown on their separatist movements were viewed by the West, especially by the US, as violations of human rights. As a result, Russia invited China and India to join together to promote what they viewed as their common interests and oppose American interference in their domestic affairs on human rights grounds in the name of territorial integrity. Also, Russia repeatedly used its vote to block the condemnation of India and China by the UN Human Rights Commission⁴⁸. In the 1990s and 2000s, the separatist movements were viewed by the three countries as terrorist in nature, including Central Asian Islamic extremists and the separatist movements that threatened Russia's Islamic-majority territories and China's Xinjiang region. India also suffered from cross-border terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast region. Fighting terrorist activities became common interests for the three countries, taking the shape of coordination and cooperation in multilateral forums, such as SCO and Russia, India and China Foreign Ministers' meeting (RIC) (Li, 2007; Tsygankov, 2013) .

2. *Promoting common geo-strategy to counter the potential threat of the US:* in the mid-1990s, Russia viewed the further enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a security concern and a way of containing Russia's power by the US. Hence, Russia coordinated with the Chinese to oppose the US policies, ranging from national missile defence (NMD), NATO expansion, to US's intervention in the Iraq and Kosovo conflicts (See Table 5.2) (Umbach, 2004:45). India also shared the same positions (Deng, 2007).

For China, US arms sales to Taiwan and the reviving of the US-Japan alliance were serious concerns, consequently, China supported Russia's strong opposition to the TMD (theatre missile defences) and NMD issues. China also viewed American plans to achieve unilateral military superiority as undermining its security (Deng, 2001; Gill, 2010:18-19). Hence, Russia has continuously endorsed China's territorial claim to Taiwan. In return, China has supported Russia in its longstanding territorial disputes with Japan over the Kuril Islands

⁴⁸ However, this situation changed after 9/11 attacks. Russia, China, and India joined the US-led anti-terrorism coalition.

(Bakshi, 2004).

Regarding India, Russia has supported India's Kashmir policy since the Cold War and has wielded its veto to block US condemnation. Indian hostility towards the US on the Kashmir issue did not change till the US adopted a more neutral position during the 1999 Kargil crisis (see 6.3.1) (Kapur&Ganguly, 2007:650). As a consequence of the foregoing mutual support alignments, Russia has coordinated the three countries' common positions on key international issues in order to counter-balance the US position. The considerable degree of convergence in certain international affairs led by Russia offers China and India incentives for further cooperation and maintaining cold peace.

However, as Miller's theory (2007a:212) argues that great power intrinsic interests which conclude security threats posed by actors in a certain region to the great power will determine the level of great power involvement. A common threat is also insistent with Walt's balance of threat theory which was the underlying cause of alliance. However, this perception of US threat became subdued when the US signed nuclear deal with India in 2006 that drawing India more tilted toward the US (see discussion in 6.4). As a consequence, Russia's diplomatic effort by managing the common geo-strategy faltered, thereby weakening Russia's leverage on Sino-Indian relations and giving way to the US hegemon during the 2000s.

Table 5-2 : Russia-India-China common strategic issues

| Sino-Russia common geo-strategy | Russia-India common geo-strategy |
|---|---|
| Mid-1990s: China and Russia opposed US-led NATO expansion | 1950-60s: India silent about Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 |
| 1995-1996: both oppose US defense arrangements with Taiwan | 1979 : muted Indian response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan |
| 1997: both oppose expanded definition of Japan-US Security Treaty in reviving Japan-US alliance | 1970-80s: the Soviet Union blocks UN veto on Kashmir issues |
| 1998-1999: both protest against US interventions in Iraq and Yugoslavia | 1998-1999: both protest against American bombing campaigns in Iraq and Yugoslavia |
| 2000: both oppose US NMD (National Missile Defense) | 2000: India supports Russia's opposition of NMD |

Source: The author

3. *Advocating multi-polarity*: During the Yeltsin's second term from 1996 to 1999, Russia's Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, replacing Andrei Kozyrev, brought about a significant

foreign policy shift, aiming at “multi-polarity” and “great power balancing” rather than embracing the West. As a consequence, Russia eagerly pressed for such a “multi-polar” world and brokered a Russia-India-China strategic triangular partnership in order to consolidate its military cooperation arrangements with those countries, even though its primary aim had been to counter US hegemony (Tsygankov, 2013:25;Primakov, 2003).

Regarding the Russia-India-China triangular partnership, in the beginning, China and India showed little interest in benefiting from Russia’s multi-polarity initiatives, during Yeltsin’s term of office, Russia’s proposal merely stayed at a rhetorical level, possibly because not only does each bilateral relationship have its difficulties and limits, but also because of the weakening capabilities of Russia (Curtis, 2007:109;Tsygankov, 2013). According to Miller’s theory (2007a:223), a weakening of the hegemon’s power could result in a collapse of regional cold peace; nevertheless, the Sino-Indian cold peace was maintained, and, together with increasing distributions of economic capacities, China and India proved themselves to be willing to subscribe to Russia’s proposal of multi-polarity, which contradicts to the expectation of both Miller’s theory and that of structural realists.

The following two factors appear to have contributed to Chinese and Indian support for Russia’s proposal of multi-polarity:

1. The ideational factor – rising powers, such as China and India, because, since their establishment as independent states. they have long developed a distinct identity, perceived themselves to be progressing toward great-power status; furthermore, if such great-power identity are bolstered by a resurgence of economic growth and a sense of historical greatness, they experience great frustration when these identities are not acknowledged by other great powers (Swaine&Tellis, 2000:3;Ogden, 2011:3;Eisemann et al., 2015:19). Hence, because the discourse of multi-polarity was seen by them as a signalling of Russia’s willingness to recognize their rising status, they perceived themselves no longer to be Russia’s junior partners. As Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri (2009:157) notes, the Indo-Russian relationship has evolved into a more equal one in which they share the goal of creating a multipolar world.

Moreover, these three states all adhere to traditional norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, and territoriality; hence, they were reluctant to subscribe to the prevailing western norms of human rights and to submit their political sovereignty to transnational organizations (Trenin, 2011a:250). Thus, the status and identity as a great power to the conception of their roles in the international arena define their motivations and interests in foreign policy. China and India began to see themselves as great powers with strategic interests different from those of the US and Europe, simply by sharing in the discourse of multipolarity (Larson&Shevchenko, 2010:80,92;Ogden, 2013:247).

2. The domestic politics factor – both China’s and India’s evolving foreign policies fitted the

discourse of multipolarity. In the mid-1990s, Chinese analysts characterized the world power configuration as “one superpower, as well as many great powers”, which accords with the discourse of multi-polarity (Yan, 2000:6;Zhao, 2006:174;Zhang, 2013:174). As Deng Yong (2004:121) notes, China used this discourse to transform the “China threat” into “peaceful rise”. Meanwhile, India began its quest for a multipolar world amid fears of American hegemony following the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1998;Ollapally, 2009;Mohan, 2012a:25). Thus, the emergence of a multi-polarity policy accorded with Chinese and Indian aspirations to become great powers on the global stage and “poles” in a multi-polar world.

Accordingly, in 2001, the idea of a Russia-India-China triangle began to take shape in a forum known as “RIC Foreign Minister’s meeting” as a geopolitical coordination. The agenda of RIC forum have been to oppose the unilateralism and to promote trilateral cooperation in some certain international issues, such as energy cooperation, anti-terrorism, and economic development (Kundu, 2012;Singh, 2012b). As a form of public goods offered by Russia, the discourse of multi-polarity and the RIC forum offer them strong incentives for shaping common interest and further cooperation.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that during the period in which the Clinton and Yeltsin administration overlapped between 1991 and 1999, the type of great power involvement evolved into a Russian dominance. The dominant great power, Russia, desired to recover its economy and maintain a regional strategic balance. Hence, it exerted its influence on the regional balance of power by strengthening arms sales, creating a political discourse of converging interests and promoting the common geo-strategy, all of which – bore out Miller’s theory of “great power assurance and common geo-strategy being conducive to on-going Sino-Indian cold peace”.

Chapter 6 The US Hegemon Since 2000

This chapter will discuss the changes of great power involvement because of the US reengagement in South Asia after India's nuclear tests in 1998 and 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001⁴⁹. The US became the hegemon in the region in 2000, providing the common goods, such as economic order and regional stability, and imposing a regional peace. The following sections will firstly define the type of great power involvement, then, in order to illustrate US influence on dyadic outcomes, will use examples of three occurrences, firstly, the 9/11 terrorism attack on New York, secondly, the Indo-Pakistani cold peace, and thirdly, the 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal.

6.1 The US hegemon

This section will argue that after 1999 the type of great power involvement evolved into the US hegemony, replacing Russia and re-engaging in the region in terms of its superior capabilities and its interests in anti-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

6.1.1 A review of Miller's theory

It is necessary to review Miller's theory that a hegemon with any contender, is able to manage regional disputes effectively in order to shape and dominate the environment (Miller, 2005:236-7). As *Hypothesis 3* shown in Chapter 1, a great power dominance and great power cooperation, have similar effect on regional cold peace in respect of Miller's theory (1997:58):

Proposition 5: leaving local states limited autonomy and reduce the space for local states manipulating their patrons, in turn, make progress in regional conflict reduction.

Proposition 6: exerting effective pressure on local states in either a benign or a coercive way engaging in settlement of regional conflict⁵⁰.

Proposition 7: when rival clients come to share the same patron local states succumb to dependence on the hegemon; the hegemon is able to manage the regional disputes effectively and influence the regional outcome.

⁴⁹ The 9/11 terrorist attacks referred to the al-Qaeda- led terrorists had hijacked four US commercial airplanes and stoke three targets in the US territory, the two towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, killing several thousand people on 11 September 2001.

⁵⁰ As discussed in 3.3.1, a benign hegemon emphasizes negotiated diplomacy for promoting regional peace-making and focuses on reassurance and positive inducements, while minimizing the encroachment on the local states' sovereignty and autonomy; a coercive hegemon emphasizes deterrence and negative sanctions, imposing a resolution of the regional actors regardless of their wishes.

Proposition 8: imposing a regional stability and promote a cold peace through a combination of strategies and mechanism (Miller, 2001a:15-16; 2005:236-237).

The US hegemon reengagement in South Asia not only changed the regional balance of power, it also influenced interstate outcomes. Firstly, the US led a cooperative operation on counterterrorism, thereby maintaining the Sino-Indian cold peace. Secondly, the US induced the emergence of an Indo-Pakistani cold peace after 2004. Thirdly, the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2006 led to India's realignment with the US and a shift of regional balance of power. The following section will use these three initiatives to explore the influence of the US on regional outcomes in respect of Benjamin Miller's propositions.

6.1.2 The pre-eminence of US capabilities


Since the Soviet disintegration, the US has become a global hegemon in terms of the following indexes (See figure 6.1-6.4). Firstly, according to GDP and GDP per capita, the gap between the US and Russia, China and India, is huge. In 2013, Russia was the eighth largest economy in GDP terms, India the tenth, whereas China, which was four times larger than Russia, has been ranked the second largest since 2011. However, the US accounted for 30% of the world's GDP (\$16.8 trillion) which was nearly twice as large as China (\$ 9.24 trillion) in 2013 (2013). Secondly, in terms of military expenditure, China has been the second largest spender since 2008; Russia was the third largest spender in 2011 and India has been the largest arms importer in the world since 2011. However, US military expenditure was almost three times as large as Russia, China and India combined (see Figure 6.2) between 2000 and 2010; two times as large between 2011 and 2013. The projection of the US military capabilities can reach globally that no other power can remotely match the capabilities that the US possesses (Nye, 2003:60; 2010:2). Thirdly, despite China's and India's remarkable economic growth rates⁵¹, GDP and increasing military spending, they still were not included as developed countries in terms of GDP per capita, the UN Human Development Index (HDI)⁵² and the soft power rank⁵³ thus excluded them as great powers. Finally, hegemonic powers should have "system-shaping capabilities and intentions" (Levy, 1983:8-13). It would appear that, on all four grounds, the US dominates the international system and that Russia, China and India together cannot make any appreciable difference to the system (Pant, 2006a:70; Brzezinski, 2007).

⁵¹ Indian GDP grew 5.6 in the 1990s and 8.4 in 2005.

⁵² HDI is a measure of human well-being, such as health, literacy, life expectancy, which refers to the efforts of improving living standards and equality by countries.

⁵³ The soft power survey conducted by the UK-based Institute of Government and Monocle magazine is using 50 different indicators of 'Soft Power' assets, including diplomatic infrastructure, appeal to business, cultural output, quality of architecture, Olympic success, famous brands, and standard of government, which could show the influences of a state. See website http://powerbase.info/index.php/Soft_Power.


Figure 6-1: The change of GDP among the four nations (units: US \$ billions)



Source: World Bank


Figure 6-2: The change in military expenditure among four nations (units: US \$ billions)

Military Expenditure



Source: SIPRI Yearbook

Figure 6-3: GDP per capita (units: US \$ dollars)



Source: World Bank between 1989 and 2013

Figure 6-4: The comparison of HDI rank and soft power

| State | The rank of HDI | | | The rank of soft power | |
|--------|-----------------|------|------|------------------------|-----------|
| | year | 2000 | 2012 | 2010 | 2014/2015 |
| US | 12 | 12 | 12 | 3 | 1 |
| Russia | 67 | 67 | 67 | 26 | 29 |
| China | 81 | 81 | 81 | 17 | 19 |
| India | 128 | 128 | 128 | 23 | Beyond 30 |

Source: The UN Human Development Report 2013 and Monocle soft power survey

6.1.3 The changes in US interests

According to Benjamin Miller's theory (2007a:211), a hegemon is willing to engage in a region because of its intrinsic interests that has geostrategic importance, raw materials and economic resources, important for trade, investment, and financial links with the hegemon, or the presence of common security threats. The reasons for the US reengagement with South Asia were, India's economic attractions, its own non-proliferation goals, and its counter-terrorism aims, which grew from India and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on its own territory in 2001. Because the US had a stake in anti-

nuclear proliferation and it wished to prevent a nuclear war in South Asia, the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests triggered its re-engagement in South Asia for the first time since its departure at the end of Cold War. Alongside this issue, India's economic rise attracted US economic interests in developing its relations since 1991 India's economic reform had centred on liberalization, hence Indo-US economic ties experienced a remarkable growth, representing an impressive 743% growth in the last two decades (Sharma, 2009:203).

6.2 The 9/11 terrorist attacks

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on US territory triggered its global war on terrorism, which has had a critical effect on the South Asian region, as it deployed forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan and then cooperated with Pakistan to track and capture the Al-Qaeda terrorists and Taliban forces seeking refuges there. The US reengagement in South Asia led to a reestablishment of its military and economic assistance to Pakistan, the transformations of Indo-US relations, and the creation of a platform for cooperation with China, India and Russia, in the name of counterterrorism. More importantly, the hegemon, the US led concerted actions on the prosecution of the war against terrorism, enabling China and India to join it in coalition, including Russia⁵⁴, which strengthened political dialogues, enhanced cooperation on sensitive issues and produced a cooperative regional outcome. Hence, in order to pursue their respective national interests, 9/11 created the opportunity for China and India to improve relations with the US, on whose markets and technology both depended.

India and China took part in the US-led counterterrorism coalition. In the meantime, China and India also established their own bilateral cooperation, which launched three rounds of anti-terrorism dialogue between 2002 and 2005 to cooperate with intelligence sharing (Raman, 2007a; Krishnnan, 2013). They also conducted two rounds of anti-terror joint training in 2007 and 2008 and held anti-terrorism joint exercises, which were beneficial to military-to-military cooperation and CBMs. Some scholars argued that the anti-terrorism cooperation between India and China has been limited and artificial because the source of terrorist threat for each state is different, for China Uyghur separatists movement, for India Kashmir separatists (Friedberg, 2002; Raman, 2007a). However, without the US's engagement, China and India might go their own way; by joining the US-led anti-terrorist coalition, both countries seized the opportunity to justify their repression of pro-independence activities in Xinjiang and Kashmir by framing the conflict as the global war on terror (Fayaz, 2012:245). Hence, countering the new emerging threat of terrorism has

⁵⁴ Russia offered its broad support for US-led counterterrorism, including intelligence sharing, opening its airspace to relief missions, taking part in search and rescue operations, rallying Central Asian countries to the US cause, and even accepting a US military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, thereby giving way to US's hegemony. Russia's coordination with the US lay in that President Putin intended to legitimize his domestic and international posture by vindicating his anti-terrorist actions against the rebels in Chechnya.

become a common security objective for them to join the US-led anti-terror coalition and perpetuate Sino-Indian cold peace (Shen, 2008:146), lending support to Miller's point that a hegemon is able to induce cooperative involvement.

6.3 Indo-Pakistani Cold Peace

Indo-Pakistani rivalry and Sino-Pakistani entente have been long-time major sources of friction between India and China. However, the initiation of Indo-Pakistani cold peace suggests that it offers a possibly new avenue for redefining the Sino-Indian relationship in ways that would change the triangular dynamics. In particular, following the 9/11 attacks, the US played an important role on improving the Indo-Pakistani cold peace (Raghavan, 2004). For the first time, the US developed good relations simultaneously with India and Pakistan by mediating in the 1999 Kargil crisis, mediating in the 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani border standoffs, and encouraging an Indo-Pakistani cold peace through reassurances, arms sales and financial assistance, thereby supporting Miller's point. At the same time, the easing of Indo-Pakistani relations made the role of Pakistan less salient in the perception of threat in the Sino-Indian relations.

The US had revived its economic and military aid to Pakistan after its suspension in 1989 with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan now became the US's ally again and a front state in the US anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan, because of Pakistan's shared border with Afghanistan and its extensive links with the Taliban regime. The US would pursue a rapprochement with Pakistan because of its potential to eliminate terrorist activities and to influence the political structure in Afghanistan (Riedel, 2012). Moreover, Pakistan offered air bases to support US flights over Afghanistan from the airbase at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Hence, the core interest of the US was cooperation with local states to counter terrorism and the maintenance of the regional stability (Kronstadt, 2003:15). In return, Pakistan received a rise in its average military and economic assistance from \$10 million in 2001 to \$ 1 billion in 2002, including debt cancellation and the most advanced US weaponry (Kronstadt, 2009b:3). Between 2001 and 2007, arms sales worth \$ 5.3 billion included anti-armour missiles, air-to-air missiles, combat aircraft, patrol aircraft, and surveillance radars(Kronstadt, 2009b). In particular, the US announced a renewal of F-16s aircrafts in 2006, which raised Indian concerns that the F-16s were suitable for fighting against India, rather than against terrorists.

Even though both India and Pakistan verbally criticized the US for triggering the interstate arms races and enlarging the regional imbalance of power due to the US's arming the two rivals after the 2001 (The Times of India, 2004;Fani, 2006:153;Kronstadt, 2009b:60); virtually, these two countries kept close ties with the US in order to purchase the US weaponry. Unlike great power competition during the Cold War, India did not keep its distance from the US but steadily strengthen its relations with the US, in spite of the emerging US-Pakistani ties. Two factors contributed to India's reactive change of

abandoning its Cold War hostility towards the US. Firstly, the US's reassurances placated India's misgivings, together with its increasing advanced arms sales to India per year, which they had longed sought, but which had been embargoed by the US (Ganguly, 2001:141;Cohen&Dasgupta, 2012), and lifting nuclear sanctions in the wake of 9/11. Secondly, the US neutrality on the Kashmir issue alleviated its fears about a revived US-Pakistani friendship. Particularly, though, the 1999 Kargil crisis marked a major shift in US Kashmir policy by calling for maintaining the international cease-fire LOC (Line of Control) instead of calling for international arbitration and Kashmiri self-determination, which was more consistent with India's position rather than with Pakistan's (Tellis et al., 2001;Kronstadt, 2009a:21;Paul, 2014:121). The US's abandonment of a peacemaker role by, instead, calling for bilateral negotiations was viewed by Indians as an "accommodative" policy by a benign hegemon since its longstanding tenacious position was to reject international arbitration in favour of asserting its internal affairs (Cohen, 2006).

Hence, the single hegemon would not repeat the history in the Cold War when, under the conditions of superpower competition, the US tilted towards Pakistan, resulting in the further alienation of India. As a consequence, the US was able to reassure India by providing important leverage in order to court its alignment, thereby supports Miller's Proposition 5 that a hegemon, without other contenders, may impose a peaceful regional order.

6.3.1. The US hegemon's Role on the Indo-Pakistani cold peace

In the wake of the 2002 Indo-Pakistani standoff, both countries undertook a series of peace initiatives in order to normalize their relations, (i) by starting, in June 2004, a series of "composite dialogue" in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute, (ii) by reaching a formal cease-fire agreement along the Kashmir LOC and the entire international border, (iii) by restoring transportations and communication links, which had been suspended during the 1999 Kargil crisis, (iv) by declaring, on 11 November 2004, a reduction of troops in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, (v) by launching, in June 2004, a series of conventional and nuclear CBMs since 2004, and (vi) by reaching an agreement assuming responsibility for notifying each other in case of accidents relating to either nuclear or conventional wars (Chari et al., 2007:209;Padder, 2012). The Indo-Pakistani cold peace has still a long way to go, which the "composite dialogue" had been stalled but resumed many times due to both sides' incursions of LOC.

Since 2004, three factors may be considered to have contributed to the Indo-Pakistan cold peace. Firstly, regarding Pakistan, under pressure exerted by the US anti-terrorism war, Pakistan was forced to reduce its support for Islamic insurgents in Kashmir in order to avoid infuriating the US and enjoying US financial aid (Kapur, 2008:86). Secondly, regarding India, (i) its national priority has become continued economic growth, hence it prefers a peace and

stable regional environment, (ii) following the Parakram military mobilization in 2002⁵⁵, India's adoption of a combination of offensive and coercive diplomacy has created a deterrent effect on Pakistan (Ganguly&Kraig, 2005), and (iii) the political shift from a BJP to a Congress regime in 2004 opened up the possibility of a more conciliatory relationship with Pakistan. Thirdly, nuclear deterrence has had a pacifying effect, resulting in restraint being exercised by both countries (Raghavan, 2004:154).

In addition to the domestic factors mentioned above, with regard to great power involvement, the US has played a "pacifying" role on the Indo-Pakistani cold peace. Because Russia has been unwilling to engage in their seemingly unending disputes since the end of the Cold War, India has been receptive to US mediation and assurances. Therefore, unlike during the Cold War, both countries sought US support against the other. The presence of a US hegemon supports Miller's theory, which states that, 'without competing great power, no space is left for client states to maneuverer but to exercise restraint, which enables a hegemon to impose a peaceful order'.

6.3.2 Indo-Pakistani cold peace on Sino-Indian relations

Given Pakistan has been an irritant factor on Sino-Indian relations, after the 1990s, alongside the Sino-Indian rapprochement, the China-India-Pakistan triangle seemed to undergo dynamic changes. China tried to "de-hyphenate"⁵⁶ the linkages between Sino-Pakistani friendship and Sino-Indian rapprochement. Chinese scholars note that the principal goal of China's South Asia policy is not to use Pakistan as a counterweight to contain India but to have a stable relationship with all its frontier neighbours (Zhang, 2005:66;Ma, 2007:107;Zhao, 2014:49). Moreover, Beijing appears to be willing to use its strong ties with Pakistan in order to facilitate a diplomatic reconciliation between Islamabad and New Delhi because it serves China's national interests (Haq, 2010:67;Markey, 2013b:21). In contrast, India still had the zero-sum mentality that regarded the coherent Sino-Pakistan friendship as an irritant affecting geopolitical tensions in Sino-Indian relations. Since Pakistan is India's biggest security threat and China is Pakistan's "strategic ally" against India, in a "worst-case scenario" whereby Indian might be unable to accommodate both the Sino-Pakistani cordiale and Sino-Indian entente, it has prepared its forces for a possible "two-front war" (Sikri, 2007:34;Raman, 2013). As quoted from Indian scholar Malik Mohan (2011:175), "mutual suspicion, geopolitical tensions, and a zero-sum mentality add to a very competitive dynamic in the China-India-Pakistan triangular relationship". However, the Indo-Pakistani cold peace would ease the Pakistan factor in the perception of a threat to Sino-Indian relations (Smith, 2013:137). In contrast, the ongoing Indo-Pakistani rivalry would

⁵⁵ India launched a military exercise, named "Operation Parakram", mobilizing 500,000 troops along the LOC in order to deter Pakistan's incursion of border.

⁵⁶ "De-hyphenate" is taken from Ashley Tellis, in which he describes the US's successful engagement in India and Pakistan after 2000 due to its "de-hyphenation" strategy. See Ashley J. Tellis (2008: pp.21-42).

continue to act as an irritant, thus adding to the mutual suspicions regarding the very competitive dynamics of Sino-Indian relations.

The literature argues that the Sino-Pakistani entente and Indo-Pakistani rivalry were contributed greatly to Sino-Indian tensions (Garver, 1996;Dutt, 2010;Singh, 2008;Malik, 2011), since, as John Garver (2002b:12) notes a solid strategic alliance between China and Pakistan is a key element in the China- India constrained ties, hence, it is a serious threat to India.

Since the 1960s, China and Pakistan have enjoyed political and strategic security ties. In particular, China began assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program shortly after India's nuclear test in 1974. Then, during the 1980s, China provided Pakistan's bomb program with technical documentation and assistance. Although Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons production ended after Beijing's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, they still continued to assist in the development of Pakistan's civilian nuclear energy reactors, and they later supply M-11 missiles and missile technology in 2001-02(Malik, 2003:2;Chakma, 2011:102). Moreover, China is Pakistan's main arms supplier. Between 2004 and 2013, 54% of Pakistan's arms had been imported from China (SIPRI, 2013:6). The enduring Indo-Pakistani hostility was not only because of the three India-Pakistani wars, but also by the 2010s, Pakistan's cross-border terrorist activity being the principal source of domestic turmoil in India. From an Indian strategic viewpoint, China's arming of Pakistan has been intentionally aimed at constraining India's aspiration to become a great power in Asia (Dixit, 2003:439;Paul, 2003:3;Frankel&Harding, 2004;Malik, 2011:189).

However, since the 1988 Sino-Indian rapprochement, the Sino-Indo-Pakistani triangular has undergone dynamic changes. Firstly, since the 1990s, Beijing had modified its pro-Islamabad position on the sensitive Kashmir question. China's original position on Kashmir was based on UN resolutions from 1948 and 1949 in that it supported the right of Kashmiri people to self-determination. However, this stance irritated Sino-India relations for decades, consequently, after Den Xiaoping came to power in 1978, China changed its former long-standing position by stating that Kashmir was 'a bilateral issue to be solved through peaceful negotiations between India and Pakistan', which is in accord with India's position (Garver, 2004a). Moreover, after 1990, China did not endorse internationalization of Kashmir issue or plebiscites, or reference of the Kashmir conflict to the United Nations, thereby creating the incentive for India to accommodate China (Garver, 2004a:20). Hence, Beijing's adoption of a more neutral position demonstrated its concession over the Kashmir issue and showed its benign intent to New Delhi, thereby contributing to the post-1988 Sino-Indian thaw. Furthermore, China has adopted a more neutral position on Indo-Pakistan conflicts. For example, China refused to endorse Pakistan's incursion into Kargil in 1999.

Secondly, during the 1990s, the East Turkistan separatists established their training camps in Pakistan⁵⁷, the sources of terrorism in the Muslim-populated areas in Xinjiang in China, this caused problems for the Beijing-Islamabad relation. Their relations have improved when Pakistan supported China to crackdown the Uighurs in its soil (Dutt, 2010;Kapur, 2011a;Haider, 2005b;Fayaz, 2012:248;Sumbal, 2013).

Thirdly, Sino-Pakistani relations have more focused on economic orientation. During the 2000s, the joint construction of large-scale development projects has been the core of the Sino-Pakistani ties (see Table 6.1). Although China’s interests in these projects were ostensibly to consolidate its relation with Pakistan by helping it to diversify and secure its crude oil import routes and also to extend its economic interests and presence in South Asia, from Indians’ point of view, it was an offensive attempt to encircle India in order to further curtail its great power aspirations (Haider, 2005a; 2005b;Zhou et al., 2011;Sikri, 2009:107;Pant, 2009b). In particular, China’s investment in disputed Jammu and Kashmir, which are under Pakistani control, has triggered India’s great concerns, which includes India’s serious unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan (Mohan, 2012b:116;Ranjan, 2015:14).


Table 6-1 Sino-Pakistani joint Construction and Development Projects

| time | Projects |
|------------------|---|
| 2001- to present | The Gwadar port for which China provided \$198 million in Phase I |
| 2006 to date | Construction of the strategically important Karakoram Highway by supplementing the logistics and also developing a pipeline connection-between Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang and Islamabad in Pakistan. |
| 2006 to date | The second and the fifth Chashma nuclear power plants |

Source: Media coverage

⁵⁷ The movements of radical Uighur militants in Xinjiang have arisen from Uighurs’ sense of religious and ethno- national alienation, combined with socioeconomic discontents, resulting in open conflicts in Xinjiang from the 1990 to date. Two exiled groups have claimed responsibility for those riots, one is United National Revolutionary Front, and the other is East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

Map 6-1: The China-Pakistan economic corridor



Source: Pakistan Defence Forum

In summary, China has emphasized that Sino-Pakistani ties should not be the expense of India, thereby showing China's "de-hyphenation" strategy. In contrast, few strategists in New Delhi held such optimistic views about China's intentions. Hence, two implications may be considered when assessing the Indo-Pakistani cold peace in the light of current Sino-Indian relations, firstly, it provides an important impetus to dilute the perception of threat in Sino-Indian relations (Mansingh, 2005:9; Bhadrakmar, 2010), and secondly, the stability of South Asia, including nuclear stability, is in the best interests of the US, as well as of China and India (Markey, 2013b:14). Therefore, in terms of Miller's theory, the US induces the regional peace, in which the better the Indo-Pakistani relations, the less of a source of tension for Sino-Indian relations.

6.4 The 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal

In July 2005, US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, issued a joint statement declaring a "US-Indo strategic partnership", also including "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India". In December 2006, the US Congress passed the Hyde Act⁵⁸ (the following discussions used as the Indo-US nuclear deal), a

⁵⁸ This nuclear deal, *Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006*, is known as a "Hyde Act" or "123 Agreement", which is the US domestic law that modifies the requirements of

recognition of India as a *de facto* nuclear weapon state and an acknowledgement of its regional primacy (Burns, 2007:135). This US policy shift, which reversed three decades of non-proliferation policy, adjusted its domestic law and persuaded the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) to amend its guidelines to cover the sale of nuclear reactors and fuel to India. The deal not only improved India's strategic partnership with the US, but it introduced a new variable into Sino-Indian relations.

6.4.1 The change in US interests

Three factors could be said to have contributed to the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005, (i) a nuclear deal with India would benefit American economic interests, (ii) as a ploy to meet its non-proliferation goals, and (iii) as a counterweight to contain the rise of China.

1. *Economic interests*: owing to India's significant economic growth rate⁵⁹ and its potential to become the third world's largest economy by 2020 (NSC, 2011), the first George W. Bush administration intended to improve its relationship with India, in particular, by selling India nuclear reactors and fuel. As the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, wrote: "India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012. If US companies win just two of those reactor contracts, it will mean thousands of new jobs for American workers." (Rice, 2006). One month after the bill was passed in 2008, the US Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the US; there was a strong bipartisan majority of support for this deal.
2. *Non-proliferation goal*: the deal allowed the US to ask India to separate its civilian and military facilities and place the civilian component under international safeguards, to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing, and to adhere to the international guidelines for nuclear and missile export controls (Tellis, 2005a). In February 2009, India signed an "India-specific" safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bringing its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, thereby reaching the US goal on international non-proliferation, set by the Clinton administration.
3. *To contain China*: the second term of Bush administration had regarded China as a strategic competitor. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review (The US Department of Defence, 2006), China had emerged with the potential to compete militarily with the US, which meant that China could offset traditional US military

Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India. The US congress passed the *Hyde Act* in December 2006.

⁵⁹ The Indian economy has grown at about 7.5% during the first decade of this new century, placing India's in fourth place globally when measured by PPP methods (Purchasing Power Parity).

advantages if the US lack an effective counter strategy. Without formally saying so, though, the intention of the US was to align itself with India in order to contain the rise of China (Tellis, 2005b;Pant, 2009b:20;Chari, 2013:21). As a consequence, the US changed its policy to treating India as on a par with China as a regional power, rather than as being Pakistan's counterpart in South Asia (Pant, 2008:64).

As a consequence of these factors, the 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal as an evidence of a change in the Indo-US relations. However, the deal met strong domestic opposition in India, mainly from the opposing party, the BJP, the Communist party and some segments of the nuclear science community, because of the worry that this deal would limit the state's nuclear autonomy, restrict its political options, make it subservient to the US (Mistry, 2006:687;Sasikumar&Verniers, 2013;Gopalakrishnan, March 2006;Ganguly&Mistry, 2006). In the face of such domestic opposition, India's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, led by the Congress Party, finally broke with the left-wing parties and sought a vote of confidence from Parliament. The deal was finally passed in August 2008 ⁶⁰ (Kronstadt, 2009a:12).

6.4.2 The US-Indo nuclear deal on Sino-Indian relations

The Indo-US nuclear deal was strategically significant to India, because it was now receiving advanced nuclear technology and fuel⁶¹, thereby breaking its international isolation, advancing its nuclear plants and meeting its increasing energy needs (Mistry, 2006), and removing the main barrier in Indo-US relations (Chari, 2013:23;Ganguly&Mistry, 2006). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, India adjusted its non-alignment policy in order to improve its standing with the great powers, and especially with the global power of the US. However, nuclear issues had turned out to be an intractable barrier to Indo-US relations. In particular, India had viewed the international non-proliferation regime as being discriminatory against itself, because the existing nuclear powers were enjoying the benefits of nuclear weapons possession, while other states were forced to accept "second-class" status (Singh, 1998). However, when the US approved its nuclear weapon state status, India was encouraged to cement its ties with the US, which were to include defence cooperation and arms sales.

Moreover, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, India's foreign policy and strategies gradually deviated from its former positions, showing its endorsement of US stance on such issues as by, (i) supporting the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in 2004, which India had opposed in 2001 resulting in a collision with Russia (Varadarajan, 2004), (ii) becoming the fifth-largest

⁶⁰ However, by 2015, the implementation of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement remained blocked due to India's restrictions on (i) liability for nuclear reactor accidents, and (ii) arrangements for tracking and accounting of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials in India.

⁶¹ The NSG granted the waiver to India in September 2008 allowing India to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries, even though India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

donor of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in support of the US anti-terrorist war, (iii) committing itself to the guidelines of NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Afterwards, the Indo-US nuclear deal transformed US-Indo relations into a full strategic partnership and pushed India even further towards the US, such as, (i) holding joint military exercises with the US's close allies, Japan and Australia in 2007 which had the strategic implication of encircling China (Scott, 2011a:248;Pant&Joshi, 2015:42) , and (ii) supporting US-led resolutions in the IAEA and UN Security Council sanction against Iran between 2005 and 2006 even though it had previously enjoyed amicable relations with Iran (Feigenbaum, 2010) .

In contrast, the Indo-US nuclear deal triggered China's concern. China opposed India's exemption from the NSG guidelines and criticized the US double-standard (Xingchun, 2016)⁶². However, under US pressure⁶³, China gave its approval in the NSG vote in 2008. Some scholars argue that the Indo-US nuclear deal forced China to take countermeasures in order to counter the emerging Indo-US nexus, such as, China offered two nuclear reactors to Pakistan (Hibbs, 2010), taking the risk of violating the NSG guidelines⁶⁴, and China took a more aggressive approach on Sino-Indian territorial disputes after 2006 (detailed in 9.1).

However, China's aim was to restrict the anti-China alignment shaped by India and the US; therefore, its strategic choice was to continue to improve relations with India, showing in four aspects: firstly, China adjusted its former position and supported India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005; in contrast, the US rejected India's bid⁶⁵ (Chaulia, 2011:287). In 2006, Hu Jintao visited India and reassured the latter of China's support for India's bid. Secondly, China allowed India to join the SCO as an observer in 2005. Thirdly, reflecting Indo-US nuclear cooperation, China and India also signed an agreement on the nuclear energy cooperation in 2006. Fourthly, in 2008, Manmohan Singh visited China and issued "A shared Vision for the 21st Century", signing ten agreements to improve cooperation in various fields. As one Chinese scholar holds, under either the Indo-US alignment or the Sino-US competition, China would consolidate ties with India to prevent an Indo-US strategic alliance against China (Guihong, 2005:289).

⁶² The criticism of the US double-standard refers to approving a deal for a non-NPT signatory while punishing Iran and North Korea for their nuclear programs.

⁶³ The US President Bush called Chinese President Hu personally and pleaded for China's approval. However, due to the oppositions from Austria, Ireland or New Zealand, India's did not get the membership of NSG during Obama administration. See WILLIAMS, L. 2016. A Path Forward on Indian NSG Membership, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/a-path-forward-on-indian-nsg-membership/>. The Diplomat.

⁶⁴ The NSG guidelines forbid nuclear transfers to non-signatories to the NPT and countries that do not adhere to international nuclear safeguards.

⁶⁵ The US did not endorse India's candidature for the permanent seat of UNSC until Obama's presidency of 2010. See STOLBERG, S. G. & YARDLEY, J. 2010. Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council, New York Times, November 8.

Bill Emmott (2008:2-3), a journalist, compared George Bush using the Indo-US nuclear deal to court India to balance China with Nixon using China in order to balance the Soviet Union in 1972. The similarity of these two episodes is that common threats triggered the US alliance-making, the Soviet Union was the common threat to the US and China in 1972, whereas the rise of China in the 2000s posed a common threat to the US and India. However, a critical difference deriving from the changes in “great power alignments” explains the different outcomes, as Miller’s theory would expect. During the Cold War, superpower competition shaped the opposing groups – the Sino-US alliance versus the Indo-Soviet nexus – i.e. while China and the US came together to contain the common Soviet threat, India moved into a close alignment with the Soviets. Whereas, in the 2000s, the single hegemon left China and India with limited space to maneuver: they had either to bandwagon with the US or to cooperate with each other in order to balance the US.

6.5 The influence of US factor on Sino-Indian relations

6.5.1 The alternative theoretical approaches

The Indo-US nuclear deal sparked debates about whether India would align with the US in order to contain China. Moreover, the 2011 proposal from George Bush II’s successor, Barack Obama, of a “pivot to Asia” or “rebalancing in Asia” showed the US intention of containing China in order to prevent it becoming a hegemon (Manyin et al., 2012). The question, therefore arises regarding whether the hegemon US will still maintain the cold peace between China and India, or whether it will result in some other outcome. This section, therefore, tries to explore the level of influence the US exercised on Sino-Indian relations in the 2000s.

Scholars hold different opinions regarding whether India will align with the US in order to contain the rising China. Such different perspectives derive from viewing the situation through differing perspectives in terms of the balance-of- power or balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1997;Waltz, 1979): firstly, India will ally with the US in order to contain and encircle China’s rise. Because of this assumption, China is viewed as a potentially powerful state, hence it is viewed as a common regional threat to both India and the US (Scott, 2008;Frankel, 2011;Kaplan, 2011b;Malik, 2011;Montgomery, 2013). The 2011 US “pivot policy”, which was intended both strengthening its current allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, and build new partners, such as India, signalled its intention to balance China’s growing influence in Asia (Bush III, 2012;Pant&Joshi, 2015:5). However, the balance of threat theory could not explain why Obama adopted an accommodating strategy to respond to China’s rise in the G2 initiative, despite the growing tensions and distrust that exist between China and the US (Bush III, 2011). Secondly, India and China will bandwagon with the US should they be unable to seriously challenge the US hegemony (Pant, 2006a;Garver, 2002a;Harding, 2004;Rajagopalan&Sahni, 2008). As 6.2 shows, China and India did join the US-led anti-terrorism bandwagon after 9/11 attack events. Thirdly, China will align with

India to counter the US hegemony because they see a unipolar US dominance would not be their best interests of weaker states. As discussed in 5.2.5 that Chinese and Indian's claim to multi-polarity, this scenario seems to be a plausible one. Besides the theory of balance of power, the other theoretical debate that liberals argues that the US hegemon with its consistent championing of liberal ideas, such as open market, international institutions, and cooperative security, supplies a wide range of public goods to the international community may offer a more cooperative assumption (Ikenberry, 2005). This approach is also true that will discuss below.

Without the consensus among those assumptions, some scholars raise the other prediction that the relationship between China, India and the US may feature as a complex cooperation and competition. Through this prediction, all three countries will pursue both common, and divergent, interests, with each dyadic relationship viewing the others as either presenting challenges or opportunities (Sidhu&Yuan, 2003;Holslag, 2010;Madan, 2014) or, as Harding holds (2004:340) each pair of countries will work together on some issues, but will disagree on others, without forming any firm or enduring alliance. This thesis supports this viewpoint: that the US hegemon's effect on Sino-Indian relations is a mixture of competition and cooperation, whereby China and India will align themselves with the US on some certain specific issues – such as countering anti-terrorism, and pursuing liberal economies. Otherwise, due to its shrinking global commitments and local states' increasing distribution of power, China and India will pursue their own national interests.

The following section will introduce three dimensions, firstly, a benign hegemon, secondly, a resolution of territorial disputes is beyond hegemon's ability, and thirdly, local states pursue strategic autonomy, in order underlie the assumption that China, India and the US may feature as a complex cooperation and competition. The first dimension bears out Miller's theory that suggests the US hegemon may contribute to the maintenance of Sino-Indian cold peace appears to hold good. At the same time, the second dimension is also consistent with Miller's theory (2001a:209) that the US has been unable to convert the Sino-Indian cold peace into a warm peace because the resolution of the Sino-Indian territorial disputes is beyond a US's ability. Furthermore, the third dimension is proposed to account for the subtleties of the interactions between a hegemon and local states when the local states have pursued their preferred policy as a result of their increasing material capabilities, economic interdependence, and ideational factors, which Miller's theory might fail to figure out. The three dimensions of this will now be explored.

6.5.2 The first dimension: a benign hegemon, the US

The first dimension is that the US, as Miller notes (2001b:213), a benign hegemon has offered public goods for its own interests, such as regional stability, liberal economic order and its anti-terrorist campaign, thereby inducing a cold peace and cooperative involvement in the region. As a consequence, China and India have actively engaged, by way of tacit

realignment, with the US-led actions in order to counter the emerging non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, piracy, and climate change; hence, there has been a convergence of US interests with the local states' interests in terms of ensuring the security of sea-lines, reducing the emission of carbon dioxide, and pacifying Islamic radicalism⁶⁶. As a result, the US has been able to facilitate an issue-based cooperative involvement between the two countries.

Neither China nor India has proved willing to confront the US, on whose markets and technology both countries depend. For example, in 2006 the US became both China and India's largest trading partner and by 2013 it was still China's largest trading partner and India's third largest (The US Census Bureau, 2013). As Tellis (2011:6) holds, "both China and India increasingly rely on foreign capital and export markets and benefit greatly as modernisers from the liberal international order maintained by US power". Therefore, both China and India have been receptive to the US hegemon.

Furthermore, domestic factors account for Chinese and Indian wiliness to accept the US's dominance. Both countries put their domestic development as top priority; hence realignment and bandwagon with the hegemon have been in line with their national interests. Both Chinese and Indian leaders of the time, Hu Jintao and Manmohan Singh, were characterized as "pragmatists" (Chai, 2003;Mohan, 2006;Zhao, 2010;BBC, 2012). Both were open to making new allies and straying from traditional alliance-making approaches in order to create peaceful environments, which has meant them both re-orienting their interests to concentrate on economic development, such as Hu Jintao's strategy of "peaceful rise and peaceful development", and Manmohan Singh's nuclear deal with the US (Deng, 2001;Malone, 2011a:170) (more discussion on domestic factor see 8.5).

Accordingly, Miller's hegemony theory, which draws on the hegemonic stability theory (Krasner, 1976:232-3;Keohane, 1980;Kindleberger, 1986:191-2), could explain why both China and India have received the benefits of common goods offered by the hegemon, they have both proved willing to maintain cold peace. However, Miller's theory did not address the dissatisfaction of local states regarding the regional order in terms of their increasing distributions of capabilities. This issue is more relevant to the other variant of the hegemonic stability theory that contains a realist element, in which when a hegemon's power declines, the smaller states will not be satisfied either with the current hegemon-led order or the institutions which operate contrary to their political and economic interests, thereby leading the hegemonic system to be weakened and changed (Gilpin&Gilpin, 1987:73; 1981:11). Thus, it seems that Miller's theory ignored the elements of local states which would experience increasing distributions of capabilities (for a more in-depth discussion, see 6.5.4).

⁶⁶ For India, the Islamic terrorism is Kashmiri separatists; For China, is radical Uighur in Xinjiang.

6.5.3 The second dimension: the resolution of the territorial disputes is beyond a hegemon's ability

The second dimension is that the US hegemon is unable to help China and India to transcend the cold peace to a warm peace because it is known that the maintenance of warm peace is determined by local states being led by liberal democratic regimes and being able to overcome any state-to-nation imbalances, such as the willingness to resolve their territorial disputes. However, changing the motives and capabilities of local states, such as their polities and the resolution of territorial disputes, is beyond a hegemon's ability (Miller, 2001b:209). Hence, despite the US's offering public goods and inducing regional peace, it has been unable to change China's authoritarian polity into a democracy and, equally, has been unable to resolve the Sino-Indian territorial disputes (detail discussion see chapter 9).

6.5.4 The third dimension: local states pursue strategic autonomy

The third dimension is that the constraints of US hegemon gave way in which China and India pursue their preferred policy, as in this case was affected by the following factors, firstly, the shrinking commitment of the hegemon, secondly, the changing distribution of local states, thirdly, increasing the economic interdependence between the hegemon and the local states, and fourthly, local states' determination of pursuing strategic autonomy. The first factor is consistent with Miller's argument, whereas the other three factors seem to be absent from Miller's arguments that lack explanation of addressing the subtle and highly complex relationships between the hegemon and local states, characterizing by both cooperation and competition.

As Miller's theory holds, the types of great power influence are related to the degree of interdependence between the great powers and smaller powers; hence, the extent of the autonomy enjoyed by local states is determined by the types of great power involvement (Miller&Kagan, 1997:57). When they are dominated by a hegemon, local states have very low levels of autonomy by which they can manipulate a hegemon. However, in the Sino-Indian case, China and India still enjoy some extent of autonomy to pursue their preferred policies whilst they are still subject to the US hegemon. The reasons may be outlined as follows:

1. The shrinking commitment and reassurance of the US hegemon

After the end of the Cold war, the US became the only global hegemon, as there were no contenders; however, Miller (2001b:219) notes the US took a "risk-free" policy, such as no deployment of ground intervention on Kosovo and Iraq war in 1991, which weakens the hegemon's coherence and credibility to coerce local states to change its policy. Friedberg (1993), Kupchan (2001) and Brzezinski (2012) also agree that, since the 1990s, its internationalism has been shrinking; hence, it is less inclined to project its power into every corner of the globe in order to pursue its national interests, although it has focused on

specific areas, such as the Middle East, both in the 1990s and its anti-terror war of the early 2000s. Also, in Asia, it has been concerned more with East rather than South Asia; consequently, given the absence of direct strategic importance on Sino-Indian relations, the US had left a larger space to China and India to act independently in dealing with their relations.

There is a major example to illustrate the US limited influence on China and India. The US had maintained an arms embargo against China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and subsequent crackdown. Thus, in the wake of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the US increased its arms sales and military cooperation to India to the point where, in 2013, it replaced Russia as India's largest arms supplier (Shukla, February 25, 2014). However, during the 2000s, Russia still was China's and India's main arms supplier, in that, between 2009 and 2013, it provided 75% of India's arms import, against US's 7%⁶⁷, and 64% of China's arms imports, against the US less than 2% (SIPRI, 2013). Compared to Russia's offer, the US commitment to offer more advance defence transactions was discounted to India because (i) the US was unwilling to sell an offensive weapon system and high-tech weaponry to India, but Russia (and Israel) were, (ii) Russia's offer was made without the imposition of political conditions, whereas the US insisted India accepting nuclear inspections (Dasgupta&Cohen, 2011), (iii) Russia was more capable of exerting leverage to influence China and India than was the US, based on the disparity of the respective arms sales relationships, and (iv) Russia, India and China have shared common concerns of multi-polarity, characterized by supporting each other's position as being "one of the great powers" and consequently acting as a "poles" in a "multi-polar" world.

given the limited leverage on arms sales and lack of any security assurance exercised by the US, the constraints of the US's ability has moderate effect on local states, thereby leaving China's and India's leeway for autonomy and being in place of cold peace.

2. The changing distribution of local states' power

In Miller's theory, it is unable to find that the issues of concerning the increasing distribution of local states' can shift the interactions between a hegemon and local states. Nor did he address how a hegemon responds in a situation such as this – i.e. China and India becoming rising powers in their own rights. China and India, along with their increasing economic power, don't need economic or security assistance from the US, unlike Miller's description of asymmetrical independence between great powers and local states. This thesis argues

⁶⁷ Prior to 2001, India had been imposed arms embargo by the US because of India's nuclear tests. Even so, between 1999 and 2003, the US arms only accounted for 0.6% of India arms imports. In 2009, India imports just \$237 million worth of US defence equipment; in contrast, in 2013, India imported \$1.9 billion, which was eight times large. It explains why the US only accounted for 7% of Indian's arms imports between 2009 and 2013. See SIPRI 2013. Trends in Arms Transfer 2013.

that the increasing distribution of local states may transform the relative power relationship between a hegemon and local states, which is accordance with the assumption of structural realism. The more economic and military capabilities increase, the more possible it is that China and India will pursue their preferred policies based on their converging interests. Although, they are not strong enough to be a hegemon and tend to align with the hegemon when their interests converge, each will tend to balance against the other on an “issue by issue” basis when their interests diverge. As the research of both scholars (Johnston, 2013:35; Bijian, 2005) show, Chinese president Hu Jintao’s “peace and development” strategy indicated that the Chinese leadership did not accept the claim that a major shift in the distribution of power had even occurred let alone had it given China new opportunities to challenge the US-dominated international order.

Therefore, with both countries determined to pursue national interests and increased their respective capabilities; they will either cooperate or compete with each other as they define their national interest. For example, even though they both support the US-led multinational initiatives for tackling climate change and terrorism, India has coordinated with China to oppose the monitoring of emission reductions in global climate negotiations and the imposition of agricultural quota in the Doha negotiations on grounds of their common positions of being developing countries (Wu, 2012). Moreover, the research of Heginbotham (2012:71), which was calculated Chinese and Indian voting in the UN General Assembly, has concluded that China and India were more closely aligned with each other than either is with the US, in particular, on the issues of Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, and weapon mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. The other example of the dissatisfaction of the existing international economic institutions is that China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an international financial institution, endorsing by India and challenging the established institution of World Bank led by the US (Shanghai, 2014; Sahasrabudhe, 2015).

3. The increase in economic interdependence

Miller (2001b:209) argues that the effects of economic interdependence are a condition for local states to advance to warm peace. However, he did not address the effects of changing relative power relationship when the increasing economic interdependence occurs between a hegemon and local states. It is noteworthy to mention that the saliency of economic interdependence between hegemon the US and local states China, as well as India. For example, the US has a tighter economic interdependence with China than it has with India in terms of the amounts of bilateral trade, foreign investments and foreign exchange reserves. In 2013, China-US bilateral trade valued at approximately \$562 billion was nine times greater than India-US, valued at \$63 billion (The World Bank, 2014). China was the largest US creditor whereby China held \$1.3 trillion US treasury bonds in 2016 (Long, 2016). Consequently, the US will be very cautious how it responds to any challenges involving China because of the obvious dangers of economic meltdown. Other economic

interdependence variable should also be taken into account, which would encourage the US to favour sustaining regional stability and deepening its cooperative relations with China. Because of China's strategic importance, even though the US's intention was to contain its rise, a two-track strategy led to it both engaging with and deterring China in order to pursue its own national interests (Saunders, 2010:125). Such a mutual economic combination far outweighs the US-Indo interests, to the point where the US would be reluctant to oppose China in favour of India. In contrast, India will inevitably doubt the extent of US commitment. Thus, India must be careful not to offend China since the US played the Indian card as a balancer to contain China. Therefore, given the saliency of economic interdependence between a hegemon and local states, in particular, China in economic terms, it limits the extent of US influence, on one hand; it gives China and India leverage over the US, on the other hand.

4. Indian strategic autonomy

In addition to the legacy of the distrust left over from the Cold War and US sporadic sanctions against India between 1965 and 2000, the main source of its domestic anti-US sentiment derived from its fear of losing strategic autonomy. India's communists opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal largely for this reason (see 6.4.1 above), as the head of India's leading communist party, Prakash Karat, notes, "India would be locked into a strategic tie-up which would have a long lasting impact on India's foreign policy and strategic autonomy" (Karat, 2007). Indeed, India has had a longstanding tradition of upholding its strategic autonomy by resisting alliance-making (Ganguly, 2002:374;Ollapally, 2011), as Indian strategist Mohan states (2012a:25), "India engaged with all great powers but allied with no one".

Following the Indo-US nuclear deal, a foreign policy debate regarding how India should deal with the US and China. In the opinion of India's realists, the US should be regarded as a balancer to counter China's growing military capabilities; consequently, given the Chinese irritants of border disputes and military support to Pakistan, India should use its entente with the US in order to achieve the balance between engagement and containment of China to protect its national interests (Pant, 2009b;Tellis et al., 2011:40;Mohan, 2012b).

However, in contrast, the Congress-led coalition government, citing the Indian tradition of strategic autonomy, prefers a multi-polar world order that it feels would best protect its national sovereignty; such a policy would be compatible with China's rising status (Kapur&Ganguly, 2007;Ollapally, 2011:215). Hence, India should not willingly become a US ally in order to directly encounter, nor even contain China (Curtis, 2008;Rajagopalan&Sahni, 2008). As the former Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri (2009:280) noted, in the sense of India's anti-colonial tradition and its self-worth based on a rich heritage of civilization and culture, India is too proud to become a camp follower of any power.

Accordingly, India's determination to pursue its strategic autonomy and its unwillingness to fully affiliate with the US resulted in disagreement with the US over the following issues in the wake of the developing Indo-US nexus: firstly, the Iranian issue: India, on the ground of its national interests, purchased Iranian oil and gas and agreed to a Pipeline Project in defiance of the US policy of isolating Iran (Pant, 2007a;Kronstadt, 2009a:23;Ollapally&Rajagopalan, 2011:153;Gilboy&Heginbotham, 2012:284); secondly, the US-Pakistani alliance: India was highly sceptical about US-Pakistani military cooperation and arms sales (Kapila, 2013); and thirdly, the US containment of China : India expressed that it would not be used as a pawn to contain China (Kapur&Ganguly, 2007:647;Gokhale, 2012b). Therefore, in response to a 2007 US-Indo-Japan-Australia joint military exercise in the Bay of Bengal, aimed at allegedly containing China, China and India also conducted a joint military exercise in the name of counter-terrorism, a gesture that symbolized India's refusal to 'choose sides' whilst still maintaining good relations with both the US and China.

India's old anti-Americanism and its traditional yearning for strategic autonomy, therefore left a contested space for them to manage their relationship, but it also ran counter to Miller's proposition that a hegemon leaves its client states' limited room to manoeuvre. In sum, neither China nor India is a former ally of the US; however, they are willing to accept the common goods offered by the US hegemon. However, due to their increasing autonomy and the US's limited leverage, China and India would pursue their respective national interests, either by cooperating with or confronting the US depending on the circumstances.

Conclusion

Two factors – the 1998 Indian nuclear tests and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on its territory – brought the US back to reengagement with South Asia, thereby inducing a regional cold peace.

In summary, the great powers – the hegemons Russia and the US – during the post-Cold War period – have played important roles by imposing a peaceful regional order. However, this is a cold peace because the Sino-Indian border disputes remained unsettled, and the domestic challenges and perceptions of threat remained on both sides. Consequently, such actions have prevented India and China from moving cold peace to the higher level of warm peace, since the obstacles are far beyond any hegemon's ability to change; the discussions will be in the following chapters.

Chapter 7 The Severe State-to-nation Imbalance and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War

This chapter will begin by exploring another key variable in Benjamin Miller's theory – the domestic factor: the state-to-nation balance, which might explain firstly, the underlying cause of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962; secondly, the occurrence of an initial level of normal peace after 1988 and thirdly, the odds of there being a hot war in the future. Chapters five and six have shown the systemic factors that the hegemons – Russia and the US – have brought to the Sino-Indian cold peace. This chapter will argue that the acute state-to-nation imbalance in regard to the Tibet issue exacerbated Sino-Indian territorial disputes and increased the intensity of the security dilemma between China and India, thereby leading to the 1962 border war. In contrast, the following chapter will explore the causal relationship between the moderation of the state-to-nation imbalance and a transformation of Sino-Indian relations from cold war to cold peace.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, during the 1950s, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by friendship. However, the friendship did not last long. The 1962 border war dragged two states into three-decade long rivalry. This chapter tries to address the following questions: Why did Sino-Indian brotherhood so drastically curtail in such a short time? What were the underlying causes of the war? This chapter will examine the variable of state-to-nation imbalance that led to the deterioration of Sino-Indian border negotiations, ultimately, the border war of 1962, in order to test the explanatory power of Miller's theory, firstly, his theory about state-to-nation imbalance and his assumptions about hot war, secondly, an analysis of the sources of internal state-to-nation incongruence, the causal relations with the Sino-Indian territorial disputes, and a discussion of diversionary war, and thirdly, an analysis of the external state-to-nation incongruence, and the correlation between acute state-to-nation imbalance and the Sino-Indian border war.

7.1. Background and Theory

7.1.1 Background

At the time of Indian independence in 1947 and the establishment of the People Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 2,500 miles of the Sino-Indian borders were undefined and undemarcated, neither on the map nor on the ground. More importantly, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) annexed Tibet in October 1950, this event, at least from Indian perspectives, changed the Indo-Tibetan border into the Sino-Indian border, and when Tibet revolts burst out and the 13th Dalai Lama established the Tibetan Government-in-exile (TGIE) in India in 1959, India was inevitably drawn to this dispute (Singh, 2008; Sikri, 2011:57). This, then, became the crux of the border disputes that have bedevilled Sino-

Indian relations for more than sixty years (Garver, 2004b:125;Malik, 2011;Sikri, 2009:95;Topgyal, 2011;Norbu, 1997;Pardesi, 2011;Liu, 1994:25;Whiting, 1975) However, after signing the “India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India” in 1954, India for the first time has accepted Tibet as being a part of China (Chang&Raghavan, 1954). Even though both China and India had divergent perceptions regarding the nature of border disputes and the approach to boundary settlements, between 1954 and 1959 both Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tried to negotiate them diplomatically, such as by letters, memorandums and notes. Importantly, both sides always referred to the phrase “in the spirit of Sino-Indian friendship” in their efforts to settle the boundary line (Maxwell, 1970:91).

After the Dalai Lama’s escape, the context of Sino-Indian relations changed so radically that border negotiations reached an impasse and turned into a physical confrontation. After the first skirmish occurred at Longju on the McMahon Line in August and in October, a second skirmish extended into the western sector at the Kongka Pass, both sides increased forces and established posts in the disputed western and eastern sectors (Raghavan, 2010:252-258). Despite the fact that Zhou offered a concessional proposal on boundary negotiation in April 1960, this proposal was rejected by Nehru. In 20 October 1962, China launched the first wave of attack in the western sector. After one-month fierce fight, China overwhelmingly defeated India, but declared a unilateral ceasefire in 20 November. The so-called “ceased-fire” line, which was in accordance with the *de facto* boundaries of the pre-1959 negotiations, have been regarded as actual control line (LAC) till now. As a consequence, this war, as Chinese scholar Xuecheng Liu (1994:18) comments, “The war solved nothing; on the contrary, it would lead to the icy freezer of Sino-Indian relations for twenty years”.

7.1.2 The theoretical explanations about the causes of the Sino-Indian war

Many leading conflict theorists have made significant contributions towards analysing the causes of various inter-state wars (Vasquez, 2009;Bremer, 1992;Kocs, 1995;Levy&Thompson, 2010;Holsti, 1996b;Barbieri, 1996;Snyder, 1991). As these scholars note, wars, when seen from different theoretical and methodological approaches, and ontological assumptions have multiple causes (Vasquez&Valeriano, 2010:1). This section did not intend to explain all the causes of interstate wars, which are too vast to cover. Instead, I have focused on the three main international Relations (IR) paradigms that are relevant to the possible theoretical explanations of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and are supported by the existing seminal literature based on its historiography. Admittedly, it will leave other causes unexplored, however, the intention of this chapter is to test Miller’s theory, which might constitute an alternative theory to the IR approach. After all, not many historians who used IR paradigms in their work to analyse the Sino-Indian war will have contributed to knowledge of interstate war in general.

A realist paradigm has dominated explanations for interstate war where sovereign states act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth from within an anarchic international system. As discussed in Chapter 2, offensive realists argue that, given the uncertainties of their adversaries, states would adopt offensive strategies in pursuit of regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001:4, 173). War comes about due to predatory aggression and attempts at expansion in order to advance state's interests through military force. Given that the 1962 war was waged over territory as a result of clashing security interests, because both China and India sought to maximize their security, they were driven into a territorial battle. The Chinese online encyclopaedia Baidu Baike and the studies of Chinese historians, Xu (1993), Wang (2012), Yang and Zhang (2015), and Xie (2013) attributed the causes of the war to India's expansionist and hegemonic ambitions.

Similarly, Fisher (1963:135) and Sinha and Athale (1962) stated that Indian official documents, together with and Nehru's semi-official biography (Gopal, 1984) showed that Indians perceived the reason for China's attack to be expansionist, hence they portrayed India as victim of China's betrayal. However, this approach fails to explain why India took such costly actions when they knew they were relatively weak militarily. Neither could it explain why China declared a unilateral ceasefire when it had already gained a huge military success if China simply intended to maximize its security interests (Maxwell, 2011b:78-9; Miller, 2013:56).

Additionally, defensive realists contend that uncertainties about the intentions of adversary may lead a purely security-seeking state to increase its military power solely for defensive purposes, whereas, the adversary perceives it as an offensive and threatening action, thereby creating a security dilemma and conflict spiral (Jervis, 1978; Glaser, 2010:58-60). Being different from offensive realism, defensive realists argue that war will not arise when states purely seek security. However, states sometimes act aggressively due to domestic pressure and extreme misperceptions of external threat can lead to war (Jervis, 1988:687). Defensive realist also try to incorporate other variables in order to explain the origins of war by emphasizing the roles played by domestic variables. Scholars such as Garver (Garver, 2004b:19; 2006:2), Whiting (1975), and Hoffmann (1989) have provided superior explanations for the causes of the Sino-Indian war by citing domestic political factors and misperceptions on the parts of both sides, who each perceived the other as threatening its security due to the increase in troops and military posts along the disputed border. Moreover, Mao mistook Nehru's intention as being to undermine his rule over Tibet, while Nehru underestimated Mao's willingness to fight, both of miscalculations led to war (This will be further discussed in 7.2).

A realist theoretical approach has been proposed by Senese and Vasquez (2008) – a step-to-war model – which offers good understanding of the causes of interstate wars. This postulates that the proximate causes of war are caused by the realist approaches and foreign policy practices adopted by states to solve their territorial disputes. If leaders do

not settle such disputes by diplomacy, but take realist approach by forging counter-alliances and triggering arms races with military build-ups, such cumulative processes increase the possibilities of war (Levy&Thompson, 2010:62). Moreover, Vasquez (1996) offered rich empirical evidence that disputes over territory are more likely to escalate into war than disputes over other specific policies.

The 1962 Sino-Indian war seems to support the Vasquez's paradigm – that territorial disputes were the key causes for China and India going to war. However, the Sino-Indian border war was not fully consistent with the step-to-war model, in that China and India did not follow the “disputes-alliances-arms-races” path, but they went directly to war. The alliance making and arms racing came after the war, not before it. In the absence of alliance and arms races elements, the step-to war model is incomplete; therefore, other factors must have made both states feel sufficiently threatened to resort to force.

The other theoretical approach – the bargaining model of war – proposed by James Fearon (1994; 1998:578-580), incorporates psychological and domestic variables, by asking a good question: “Why can't they settle the disputes?” Why, then, were China and India unable to reach a negotiated settlement instead of choosing a costly war? Fearon (1995:381-390) identifies three sets of conditions to account for the difficulties for reaching a settlement, (i) private information, (ii) commitment problem, and (iii) the indivisible issues.

Firstly, private information refers to a state's relative power and its willingness to go to war. Diplomacy may not allow rational states to share such private information, thereby resulting in the disagreement based on relative power and the misrepresentation of incentives. This distortion of information as it is processed, together with a tendency toward overconfidence, may prevent leaders from reaching a settlement (Levy, 2013:586). Secondly, commitment problem refers to a state's inability, under certain circumstances, to commit to restrain its foreign policy demands, such as making territorial concession, makes preventive attack a rational action for an antagonistic state. Thirdly, the indivisible issue refers to the disputes related to religious and ideological issues, which are not indivisible, increasing the difficulty of settlement and a likely outcome of a war (Walter, 2013:659).

Fearon's bargaining model of war seems plausible for explaining the causes of the Sino-Indian war. Raghavan (2006:3890) notes that India's actions reflect that Fearon terms “the commitment problem”. He argues that given the pressure on Nehru from parliamentary and public opinions and the long-term appreciations by India about China's territorial ambitions, his inability to commit to restrain its territorial claims made a preventive attack a rational action for China. This thesis also argues that Fearon's variable of private information seems tenable to explain Nehru's miscalculation on Chinese reasons for going to war. As the literature shows, Nehru's overconfidence in believing that China would not

go to war led to his launching his “forward policy”, which made mutually preferable negotiated solutions unattainable (see 7.2.3 for more details). Fearon’s model also adds the miscalculation of an opponent’s willingness to fight to the factors involved in the case of war.

Liberals argue that states are able to reduce the intensity of warfare by overcoming international anarchy – a classic perception of peace proposed by the Kantian tripod of democracy, international institutions and laws, and economic interdependence (Russett et al., 1998). Because the Sino-Indian war lacks the latter two components, here I shall only discuss the democratic aspect of that theory. As Huth and Alee (2002:3) stated, the 1962 Sino-Indian war appears to fit the democratic peace theory – that democratic-autocratic dyads are more prone to war than are authoritarian-authoritarian and democratic-democratic dyads. However, democratic peace theory says less about India’s bellicose behaviour regarding why India, which follows a democratic norms and institutions, sought to fight rather than took less aggressive action. In explanation, Huth (1996:176) suggested that there were powerful domestic political constraints on Nehru, which might have competed with the norm of negotiation and which failed to make him offer territorial concessions. India, therefore, presents as an exception to the democratic peace theory in that it fought Pakistan in 1971 and in 1991 in Kargil, when both states were democracies (Levy, 2013:587). As a consequence, the bargain model of war might help to explain these exceptions because the leaders may be reluctant to compromise for fear of being charged with failure by their domestic opponents and public opinions (Fearon, 1994).

As discussed in Chapter 2, constructivism emphasizes how agency (states) and social structure determine whether international politics will be in a state of war and peace. Social structure and shared knowledge and some elements of certain political culture, ideology, norms, and identity, determine whether states are friends or enemies (Wendt, 1999:260; Katzenstein, 1996). Muppidi (2001:59-61), through the prism of state identity, contends that, for China and India, a dominant theme of the war was that it was a discourse of betrayal within a social space where trust had existed in the past, for both states defined the war as imperialist aggression – India saw itself as victim of Chinese imperialism, whereas China claimed it was a resulted of Indian adhering to British-enforced imperial borders.

By giving weight to ideologies and beliefs, such as Miller (2013:25, 81) and Lu (2007) stressed that colonialism as a variable drawn from transformative historical events, influences state behaviour. Within a theoretical framework of collective historical trauma, Miller argues that China and India responded to their colonial history as a collective trauma, in which they saw themselves as victims; hence, they sought to maximize their territorial sovereignty and national statuses, which led to the failure of their border negotiations in the 1960s. It is not clear where to draw the line between social

constructivist approach and ideological factors; however, Lu's argument is in consistent with Vertzberger's view (1982:618) that they both hold that Nehru misunderstood Mao's ideology and worldviews especially with regard to the role of military, while Nehru believed China would not resort to war, whereas for Mao the use of military power was a tactical step to counter India's aggression. Moreover, an identity crisis created by mutual territorial challenges provoked strong feelings of nationalism. As a consequently, leaders' ideology and nationalism account for the war.

Besides the three IR paradigms, some specific factors at three levels of analysis are used by scholars to provide a wide range of hypotheses for examining the origins of particular interstate wars, including the scapegoat hypothesis, rational model (Allison&Zelikow, 1999), the influence of nationalism and public opinions (Van Evera, 2013;Brown, 2001;Toft, 2003). Since I will discuss the scapegoat hypothesis at 7.2.4, it is sufficient at this juncture to discuss two models, which will offer a useful conceptual framework for understanding the causes of the Sino-Indian war.

Firstly, the psychological theory: this theory on international conflict focuses on the levels of analysis between the individual and bureaucratic-political levels in authoritative decision-making processes, which include individual worldviews and perceptions, leaders' personalities, societal culture and ideologies, and intergovernmental politics (Jervis, 1976;Levy, 2013:594). In his influential research, Hoffman (1989) was critical of the Indian leadership's flawed decision-making process between 1959 and 1963, which, he says, was to blame for the state's military setback.

Secondly, even though there is no single theory of nationalism and war, nationalism and ethnicity appear to be critical causes of both internal and international wars. Scholarly literature (Posen, 1993;Lake&Rothchild, 1996;Toft, 2002; 2005;Wolff, 2006;Fearon&Laitin, 2003) has offered a wide range of hypotheses regarding the connections of nationalism to war, which according to Van Evera's (1994b) and Brown's (2001) research, can be divided into the three factors described below: (i) structural, (ii) political, and (iii) perceptual.

1. *Structural factors*, which are based on geography and demography, refer to weak states and ethnic geography. Weak states lack political legitimacy, have sensitive political borders, and their political institutions are incapable of exercising meaningful control over their territory. Ethnic geography refers to where ethnic minorities are capable of launching wars for independent statehood due to irredentist claims.
2. *Political factors* refer to states with exclusionary national ideologies and discriminatory political institutions against national groups.
3. *Perceptual factors* refer to states that indulge in self-glorification, chauvinism, and myth –making, together with cultural discrimination against minority groups. These attributes to war focus on ethnic violence and nationalism, which are usually treated

as features of internal conflicts, but overlaps to some extent with nationalism, which is considered to be a strong element in contemporary interstate warfare.

The main theme of this chapter, therefore, is to test Miller's domestic variable of state-to-nation imbalance, which, to some extent, is consistent with the nationalist elements in the causes of war and is the structural factor that relates to Miller's variable of external state-to-nation imbalance, in the case of Sino-Indian war, China's minority group, the Tibetans – by claiming independence and secession from China and then establishing government in exile in India. Moreover, the political factor acted as a similar to Miller's variable of internal state-to-nation imbalance (see Section 7.2). The theoretical linkage between nationalism approach and Miller's theory will be discussed in the following sections.

In sum, the literature and historical research have shown that China and India went to war because of diverging historical-legal interpretations of the disputed boundaries (Lamb, 1964:191; 1966; Gupta, 1971; Pan, 2009), postulated that the realpolitik of maximization of security derived from unsettled territorial disputes, leadership's miscalculations, problems of state identity, and the colonial legacy – i.e. both a constructivist and nationalist approach focusing on sensitive borders and irredentism. As mentioned in the beginning, wars have multiple causes. A single causal theory cannot entirely explain the causes of interstate warfare. Levy (2013) holds that a complete explanation for war must incorporate variables from several levels of analysis, thereby inviting the question about whether there is a coherent theoretical framework that accounts for the underlying causes of the Sino-Indian War?

7.1.3 Miller's theory

According to Miller's theory (2007a:12), the state-to-nation balance accounts for hot outcomes, such as hot war and warm peace of which there are three possible outcomes. Firstly, a region with problems relating to state-to-nation imbalances is prone to war. Secondly, if state-to-nation problems have been completely resolved, the local states may reach warm peace on their own. Thirdly, under the condition of great power cooperation or hegemony, if state-to-nation problems have been mitigated, the region may move from cold war to cold peace.

Miller's theory (2007a:54-55) holds that state-to-nation balance contains two dimensions: the extent of the success of state-building and the extent of the success of nation-building (see Figure 7.1).

1. A strong state possesses a multiplicity of hardware resources, which constitute coercive and effective institutions. In addition, strong states can control the means of violence in their sovereign territories and weaken or suppress ethnic nationalism, whereas a weak state can easily become a target of expansion by a neighbouring state (Miller, 2005:244). However, state-building success should be followed by an

effective nation-building process, thereby contributing to the effective resolution of conflict and the sustenance of a warm peace (Miller, 2007a:314). Otherwise, strong states with difficulties of nation-building tend to be revisionist states⁶⁸ which have competing territorial claims vis-à-vis their neighbours (Miller, 2007a:59).

2. State-to-nation congruence depends on success in nation building between state boundaries and national identification, which suggests that states without either a trans-border co-ethnic group in a neighbouring state, or nationalist-historical claims to a neighbours' land, leads both to a decline in secessionist movements and to a moderation in security dilemma. By contrast, unsuccessful nation-building, which leads to state-to-nation incongruence, results from a mismatch between ethno-national groups of a nation and the political boundaries of a state, which, in turn, may expectedly lead to secessionist and irredentist movements, or pan-national unification between or within states.


Such a state-to-nation incongruence may be construed in two ways, Firstly, internal incongruence, whereby sub-state ethnic groups, claiming their right to self-determination based on demographic and historic grounds, demand to secede and to establish their own states. Consequently, this domestic challenge to the existing state produces secessionist movements, undermines a state's sovereignty and territory integrity. Secondly, external incongruence, whereby a shared ethnic majority among states, based on the grounds of national affiliation and national-historical rights, advocate pan-national movements of unification or the irredentist claims of neighbouring states. Secessionist movements can be caused by anti-colonialism, self-determination and ethnic nationalism without irredentism and cross-border conflicts (Coggins, 2011:40), however, trans-border incongruence can lead to interstate territorial conflicts because of the claims and challenges by other states on a state's territorial integrity. Moreover, such irredentist aspirations become a source of revisionist claims, thereby providing strong states with the motivation for expansion (Miller, 2007a:56).

Hence, the degree of state-to-nation balance conditions the resolution of conflicts and determines regional war and peace. The combination of strong states and a state-to-nation congruence lead to a high state-to-nation balance, which results in coherent states, leading to the lasting success of the conflict resolution process and the maintenance of a warm

⁶⁸ Scholars have different definitions of revisionist states. This thesis follows Miller's definition that a revisionist state is dissatisfied with the current regional order on nationalist grounds and is willing to use force to change the territorial status quo. In Miller's term, a revisionist state pertains to an incoherent state with state-to-nation imbalance problems. See Miller, Benjamin, (2007: p. 233).

peace. In contrast, a high state-to-nation imbalance suggests an incoherent state that fails to resolve the conflicts and is prone to hot war.

Figure 7-1 The variable of state-to-nation balance



Source: Miller (2007: pp. 54-5)

Miller's theory (2005:234; 2007a:109-110) about the causes for a hot war in a region can be divided into the underlying cause, which is the state-to-nation imbalance, and an immediate cause, which includes the security dilemma and diversionary motives (see Figure 7.2). In sum, Miller offers three propositions to shed light on the causal relations between state-to-nation imbalance and hot war:

Proposition 1: the problem of state-building: incoherent weak states either produce opportunities for external interventions, or create incentives for insecure elites to initiate a diversionary war— that is – externalization of domestic conflicts by scapegoating the lack of domestic legitimacy (Miller, 2007a:19).

Proposition 2: internal incongruence determined by the factors of demography and history, which can be translated to nationalist challenges that create strong pressure for secessionist movements and the motivations for domestic wars of secession, undermining state's legitimacy and producing opportunities for external interventions that may lead to regional wars (Miller, 2007a:19,92). Moreover, it may pose difficulties for conflict resolution when territorial issues are involved with state-to-nation


imbalances, thereby increasing the possibility of an escalation towards war (Miller, 2005:233) .

Proposition 3: external incongruence occurs when a regional revisionist force challenges the territorial integrity of other states. One consequence of revisionist challenges may be that a state takes advantages of a restive minority in order to weaken its neighbouring state - i.e. an incoherent state could become a target of a neighbouring state, either for profit or for expansion (Miller, 2007a:97-99).

Proposition 4: the combination of strong state and acute state-to-nation imbalance produces revisionist powers, intending to use force to change territorial status quo on nationalist claims (Miller, 2007a:59).

Proposition 5: an acute imbalance, manifested in revisionist and nationalist challenges, provides grounds for the exacerbation of immediate cause of war, such as security dilemma, power rivalries and diversionary motives in regional states. Miller (2007a:84,121) proposes a causal chain of hot regional wars as follows:

Figure 7-2: A causal chain of hot regional wars



Source: Miller (2007: pp. 109 -110)

This thesis will argue that the Tibetans, claiming self-determination and secession from China, were one source of the state-to-nation imbalance that constitutes China's internal security problems, resulting in the persistent Sino-Indian tensions. Consistent with Miller's theory, such a state-to-nation imbalance took two forms of incongruence- internal and external. The internal incongruence was derived from Tibetan claim of independence and secessionism, leading to Chinese domestic insecurity. Moreover, in 1959, the Dalai Lama established a government-in-exile in India, coinciding with the climax of the Tibet revolts, created an external state-to-nation incongruence. Furthermore, China's domestic turmoil, which led to its adoption of a conciliatory approach towards border negotiations, had the

effect of encouraging India to misjudge China's weakness. Such was the severity of the state-to-nation imbalance between China and India that sharpened the territorial disagreements, intensified the security dilemma and, ultimately, caused the 1962 border war. This sequence of events between 1959 and 1962 was described by a Times of London Delhi correspondent– Neville Maxwell (2011b:75) – as "at the beginning it was contradictory territorial claims, a period of diplomatic stalemate and patrol confrontations leading to skirmishes and then to a battle that culminated into the border war". The following sections will analyse the two major factors that led to this severe state-to-nation imbalance.

7.2 Internal state-to-nation incongruence

China is a multi-national state that consists of fifty-six ethnic groups. Although the largest ethnic group – the Han – constitutes 91.6% of the population, the problem of internal incongruence mainly derives from two of the smaller groups – the Tibetans and the Uighurs⁶⁹, both of whom demand to secede and establish their own nation-states. These internal incongruences not only challenge China's ruling legitimacy and state sovereignty, but they also have become the source of tension with China's neighbours, India and Pakistan (Haider, 2005b).

The Tibetan national identity, which predated the creation of the PRC and its annexation of Tibet in 1950-51, is based upon ethnicity, demographic terrain, culture, religion, and their social system, therefore it is distinctly different in almost all respects from China's (Smith Jr, 2008:13). Tibetans live on the Tibetan plateau in today's Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and in Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan. In 630 A.D. they were introduced to Buddhism from India, which is now a defining characteristic of Tibetan culture. All Tibetans looked to Lhasa as the centre of their culture, and they all recognized, to a greater or lesser degree, the political authority of the Dalai Lama, the head of the Buddhist faith.

7.2.1 The source of internal state-to-nation incongruence

National identity and ethnic nationalism can either be a force of state-building or state-destroying, depending on the degree of integration of the different ethnic groups within the state (Ma, 1992:293); consequently, an internal state-to nation incongruence was created when the Tibetan national identity collided with Chinese state-building. Miller's theory holds that this distinct Tibetan national identity has its demographic and historic backgrounds (Miller, 2007a:92-3). Likewise, Van Evera (1994b:15) agrees that it is prone to war when a national minority based on geographic and demographic arrangement has the

⁶⁹ The Uyghur separatists claim that Xinjiang, which they refer to as East Turkestan, is not a part of China; the separatist movement is led by Turkic Islamist militant organization, most notably the East Turkestan Islamist movement (ETIM) against Chinese government. The tension between China and Pakistan in terms of ETIM see Chapter 6.3.2.

capabilities to launch a war for dependent statehood. Therefore, as *Proposition 2* shows, the sources of internal state-to-nation incongruence – history and demography – will be examined in three events which gave rise to the collision between nation identity and statehood, firstly, Tibet claimed independence between 1913 and 1950, secondly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) annexed Tibet in 1950, and thirdly, Tibetans revolted between 1956 and 1959 against the PRC. This conflict between nation and state has taken the form of a Tibetan request for self-determination, independence and autonomy, which is far from being resolved.

7.2.2 The manifestation of internal state-to-nation incongruence: The 1956-1959 Tibetan revolts

In 1956, Mao Zedong launched a series of what he called “democratic reforms”⁷⁰ in China, which for Tibetans, mainly focused on eastern Tibet in the forms of land redistribution, suppression of landlords, a purge of “counter-revolutionaries” and the initiation of class divisions based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Because of the 17-Point agreement of 1951, the PRC restrained their reforms in TAR.

The PRC, which saw the Buddhist religion as the primary institutional and ideological obstacle to communism, campaigned intensively against “superstitious religion”, mainly in eastern Tibet (Zhou, 2011). The subsequent “reforms”, for Tibetans, were carried out by brutal oppression, humiliation, and the arrest and public executions of lamas, the destruction of monasteries and the secularization of monks (Smith Jr, 2008:45). In particular, the “Anti-Local Nationalist” campaign and the “Great Forward Leap” movement led to an increased pace of reforms and collectivization in eastern Tibet. By mid-1958, after the influx of thousands of refugees flooded from eastern Tibet to central Lhasa, the protestors declared “Tibetan independence”, which resulted in a full-scale uprising in Lhasa where thousands are reported to have died.

Accordingly, a form of internal state-to-nation incongruence resulted from Tibet’s instinct nation identity, leading to the challenges of China’s sovereignty and territory integrity, as well as damaging its state’s coherence, as Miller’s theory suggests (Miller, 2007a:132).

⁷⁰ The ‘democratic reform’ in China included: (i) the “Hundred Flower” Liberation of 1956 which aimed to encourage dissidents to show their criticism of the regime and to educate them in Marxist-Leninist theory, (ii) an “Anti-Rightist Campaign” in 1957 was mounted against critics of the regime who were publicly criticized, condemned to prison labour camps and, in many cases, executed, (iii) also in 1957, a “Socialist Education Movement Opposing Local Nationalism “ was created which set out to combat local nationalism with a program of socialism and patriotism education, and (iv) in 1958, a campaign- the “Great Leap Forward “- was designed to both collectivize the agriculture surplus and to industrialize in order to achieve a transition from socialism to communism.

However, Miller's theory put little emphasis on the cultural factor that might account for the diverging response to Tibetan uprising between China and India. As Brown (2002:12) and Van Evera (1994b:31-7) point out, the cultural/ perceptual factors accounting for the sources of wars, whereby dominant nationalist groups perform cultural discrimination against minorities, either with self-glorifying, chauvinistic myth making justification, or because of ancient hatreds and divergent beliefs about mutual history. Such features, which were the sources of internal conflict, were manifested in China's cultural discrimination against Tibetans. In contrast, Indians held diametrically opposed ideas about Tibetan religion and culture, in that Hindus considered Tibet as part of their religious geography. For instance, Hindu images and religious emotions, attached as they are to the Himalayas, can be seen in medieval Indian literature, documents and Tantric texts (Norbu, 1997:1089; Mehrotra, 1997:11; Maxwell, 2011a:127). Thus, Indians' affinity to Tibetan Buddhism and culture led to its public support during the uprisings in 1959, which pressured Nehru into granting asylum to the Dalai Lama (Pardesi, 2011:103). Cultural factors also explain why India sought to differentiate between Tibet's political rights and its religious and cultural identity, in which, while the official position recognizes Tibet as being part of China, the Indian public continues to exercise humanitarian supports to Tibetans today (Muni, 2008:3; Chellaney, 2011a:30).

7.2.3 Internal state-to-nation incongruence exacerbated Sino-Indian territorial disputes

According to Miller's *Proposition 2*, territorial disputes resulting from state-to-nation imbalances are difficult to solve, thereby increasing the possibility of an escalation towards war. It is because that state-to-nation incongruence arouses strong emotions and passionate ideological commitments that make pragmatic compromise and bargaining more difficult (Miller, 2005:233; Huth, 1996). This section will argue that China and India would have had success on territorial resolutions without the Tibetan issues. The Tibetan issues involved two dimensions: (i) Tibet's historical status, (ii) the 1956-1959 Tibetan revolts, of which both endangered CCP's ruling legitimacy and domestic security, as a form of internal state-to-nation imbalance, therefore making territorial concession impossible.

The "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", which was regarded as the foundation of Sino-Indian friendship, was written into the preamble of this agreement and pronounced in a joint-statement when Zhou Enlai visited India in June 1954. According to Nehru's memorandum, which was issued to the External Affairs, Defence and Home Ministries, he said that the Sino-Indian border dispute had been resolved in the agreement and that the boundary was no longer an issue, given the Chinese had accepted the historical *status quo* (Maxwell, 1999:909). Hence, Nehru expected the friendship policy to reduce or neutralize the security threat from the PLA, stationed in Tibet, while at the same time it would enhance Asian solidarity (Norbu, 2001). However, the Chinese position was made explicitly clear that the boundary had never been delimited, and that there were still disputes which

could only be settled by mutual consultation and a joint survey on the boundary (Maxwell, 1970:94;Zhou, 1973:14).

This thesis argues that the Sino-Indian border disputes could have been resolved, whereby China and India would have maintained the territorial *status quo* and converted the McMahon line into an internationally accepted boundary during the mid-1950s if there had been no “Tibet problem”. My argument is based on two premises:

1. The PRC signed border agreements with Burma and Nepal in 1960, Mongolia in 1962, and Pakistan in 1963, thereby settling its border disputes, apart from with India. In particular, China’s border agreement with Burma and Pakistan ran along the McMahon Line, hence, China accepted a part of the boundary as a basis for that agreement (Lamb, 1966:169). This raises the question of why China held a different attitude towards its border with India. Norbu (2001:296) and Maxwell (2006), contend that China observed the McMahon Line as the *de facto* border with Burma and Pakistan due to under the climate of Sino-Soviet tensions. Given the Line was not marked on the ground and it had no physical existence, China’s objection to the case of the border with India was based not so much on the “physical details” of the McMahon Line but on its “legal foundation”. The treaty signed by Tibet in 1914 demonstrated that Tibet had “treaty making” power and, therefore, Tibet must have been, to a certain extent, independent before 1950. Inevitably, this contention shook PRC’s legal and moral foundations of takeover of Tibet, which is now the crux of the Sino-Indian territorial dispute. As a consequence, it is impossible for China’s making concessions on the boundary negotiation that called into question its legitimacy and sovereignty over Tibet, being in accordance with *Proposition 2*, which an internal incongruence undermines state’s legitimacy and poses difficulties for conflict resolution.
2. The border disputes could have been settled because India had recognized Tibet was part of China in 1954 and China’s intention was to maintain the boundary *status quo*. Indeed, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s speeches at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, and on his visit to India in 1956, had reassured Nehru that it was necessary for China to adopt a “realistic” attitude towards the McMahon Line as its boundary with both Burma and India. In January 1959, also, when both sides were preparing for the border negotiations, the Chinese declared their intention to preserve the territorial *status quo*.

Moreover, in April 1960, China would also have accepted the McMahon line and legitimised it as an international boundary if India had waived its claim to Aksai Chin in the west – a proposal that became known as the “east-west swap” proposal (Maxwell, 2011b;Garver, 2001:100). Zhou had also appeared to prefer a conciliatory approach because of Chinese domestic turmoil regarding the Tibetan rebellion, the failure of the

“Great Leap Forward” movement, and growing tension with Taiwan (Liu, 1994:37). Therefore, had Nehru accepted this proposal, the Sino-Indian border disputes would have been settled (Singh, 1976:78). Unfortunately, though, in March 1959, the Tibetan uprisings in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama’s escape to India drove the boundary negotiations into deadlock (Liu, 1994:22). As Norbu contends, if there had not been a revolt in 1959, it is possible that India would have made concessions regarding its claim over Tibet, and China would, in return, have respected the territorial *status quo* in terms of the McMahon line (Norbu, 2001:290)⁷¹.

In sum, from the late 1950s, Sino-Indian territorial negotiations were unsuccessful because of China’s internal and external Tibetan problems. The growing Tibetan resistance movement was by now beyond either Zhou’s or Nehru’s control. Therefore, the border disputes had escalated from deadlocks in 1959 to military standoffs in 1960, then to a border war in 1962, as Proposition 1 suggests that when territorial disputes are involved with state-to-nation imbalance territorial disputes are likely escalated towards war.

7.2.4 Internal state-to-nation incongruence and diversionary war

According to Miller’s *Proposition 2*, internal incongruence under the pressures of secessionist movements leads to state coherence being challenged; therefore, the higher the level of state incoherence, the more prone a region is to war. This is because secessionists not only create a major challenge to ruling elites by threatening their insecurity, but they also lead to sharp territorial disagreements, as discussed above. Moreover, Miller argues that incoherent and weak states either produce opportunities for external interventions, or create incentives for the initiation of a diversionary war— that is – the externalization of domestic conflicts by scapegoating the lack of internal legitimacy (Miller, 2007a:19). The following section will investigate whether the diversionary incentive played a role in this case.

A study by Thomas Christensen (1996) concluded that Mao’s 1950 declaration of war against the US in Korea and his 1958 bombardment of offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait were a use of confrontational international policies to strengthen his ruling legitimacy by launching a diversionary patriotic campaign. One might think that the 1962 Sino-Indian border war was also the result of Mao’s waging a similar diversionary war due to China’s domestic turmoil. That is not the case, however, because, for the following reasons, it does not fit the diversionary assumption in Miller’s Proposition 1.

1. *The timing*: between 1959 and 1961, China’s severe economic crisis and catastrophic famine was at its peak due to the failure of the 1958-1959 “Great Leap Forward” movement (MacFarquhar, 1997a:18). By contrast, by 1962, it had weathered the

⁷¹ A further discussion of the changing situation after the 1959 Tibet revolts will be at 7.3.3.

worst of the economic collapse and the 1962 harvest had relieved the famine considerably (Meisner, 1999:280). If Mao had intended to divert public attention from domestic problems to foreign wars, he would have waged it in 1959 and 1960, not in 1962.

2. *The perception of threat:* between 1959 and 1962, the perceived threat from the east coast was much more intense than it was from the Himalayan borders, because the US openly sided with the Chinese Nationalists in the Taiwan Strait; and, Mao thought that the leader of the Chinese Nationalists, Chiang Kai-Shek, unprecedentedly was planning to “reconquer mainland China” in terms of Mao’s discussion with Khrushchev (Khrushchev&Mao, 1958). Chinese leaders would have been reluctant to provoke hostilities in the Himalayas, which might have meant diverting military resources from the main danger point of the east coast (MacFarquhar, 1997a:300). This perception was also reflected in Liao and Whiting’s (1973:93,95) research which found that, by 1962, the national propaganda the People’s Daily was playing down events on the Indian border and that its propaganda contained more coverage of the US threat than Indian threat by 1962. A rational conclusion must be that, if Mao had attempted to exploit the war with India for domestic political purposes, it would have received more extensive coverage than either the Taiwan Strait crisis or his support for Cuba in the context of the US-Soviet confrontation over the missile crisis.
3. *The intention:* the literature indicates that between 1959 and early 1962, the Chinese had no intention to pursue war with India in order to justify its legitimacy over Tibet for three principal reasons (Wang, 2009:175;Garver, 2006:46;Maxwell, 2011a). As stated above, China adopted a political stance by taking a relatively conciliatory position on the disputed borders, such as by, firstly, in 1961, proposing a concessionary deal of an “east-west” swap, secondly, in February 1962, calling for border negotiations by reacting to India’s forward policy, and thirdly, in April 1962, suggesting mutual withdrawal from the line of actual control (LAC). Even as they were on the verge of the war, China proposed border negotiations on 15 October, alongside an ultimatum. As the director of Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East in the US State Department between 1961 and 1966, Alan Whiting (1972:58) concluded, the Indians refused to negotiate and continued to advance; therefore, on 20 October, China launched a pre-emptive attack.
4. *The outcome:* after defeating India in the war, China called for a unilateral ceasefire, withdrew from the McMahon Line, and relinquished all its captured territory, including the occupied Tibetan town of Tawang, and returned all prisoners and

captured material. Maxwell (2011b:78-79) argues that, this refusal to take any “spoils of war” demonstrated China’s determination, firstly, to obtain a unilateral ceasefire, secondly, to avoid exacerbating its international isolation, and, thirdly, to show the conflict had been a “self-defensive counter-attack war” rather than an “offensive” war. However, it is difficult to measure how much Mao might have justified going to war without considering the effect it would have on the consolidation of his ruling legitimacy.

In summary, it appeared that Mao had been cautious about waging a war with India in the first instance because he had considered all the risks and difficulties, including India’s leadership of non-alignment movement in the Third World and a war with India that would exacerbate China’s international isolation (Garver, 2006:61). Thus, rather than being a Chinese “diversionary” strategy, as Miller’s first proposition leads us to expect it might be, the root causes of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, were firstly, the territorial dispute with India, secondly, the internal state-to-nation incongruence, resulting from Tibetan secessionism, and thirdly, India’s exploitation of the situation for its military actions as a result of Chinese weakness (expanded upon at 7.3). The acute state-to-nation imbalance intensified the security dilemma, thus becoming the principal cause of war (discussed in 7.4).

7.3 The external state-to-nation incongruence

During the Tibetan revolts, Tibetans feared the Chinese would kidnap the Dalai Lama, therefore, on 19 March 1959, after the PLA had bombed Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and most of his ministers escaped to northern India, where, in Dharamsala in 1960, he established the TGIE. Throughout the 1960s, the Dalai Lama was followed by some 80,000 other Tibetans (Norbu, 2001:210; Lama&Kang, 1990:48). By its action, the TGIE created external state-to-nation incongruence in that an ethnic minority living abroad had claimed its independence by challenging China’s ruling legitimacy. Consistent with Miller’s theory (2007a:152), a restive minority of Tibetan refugees had raised the level of both revisionist nationalism and incoherence to the extent at the Chinese state’s sovereign and stability had been undermined, leading, in turn, to revisionist challenges to the Sino-Indian relations, which included two dimensions of producing opportunities for external intervention, and producing revisionist powers which intends to use force to change territorial status quo.

7.3.1 state-to-nation incongruence produces opportunities for external intervention

In November, Zhou wrote a letter to Nehru calling for the maintenance of the *status quo* after which both sides withdrew twenty kilometres from the LAC in order to prevent further escalation. However, in December, Nehru’s letter in reply interpreted Zhou’s “territorial *status quo*” differently by only agreeing to withdraw from the McMahon Line, but rejecting his call for a withdrawal from Aksai Chin, which, Nehru stated, should have been

surrendered by China when they had been accepted the McMahon Line as the legitimate boundary (see Map 7.3). India's revisionist agenda was revealed by firstly, its position on border negotiation that was "non-negotiable", secondly, its revision of territorial claim, in particular, on Aksai Chin, and thirdly, its practice of forward policy (see 7.3.3).

Map 7-1: The Line of Actual Control of the Sino-Indian border, 1959-to date



Source: The Economist, 2012

As Xuecheng Liu (1994:22) argues, Nehru's position was one of "non-negotiation" and "non-recognition" and it was clear he had set a course for confrontation. What then had led to his strongly revisionist border aspirations and, in particular, his laying claim to Aksai Chin? Two factors could have been the cause. Firstly, in July 1958, the completion by the Chinese of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway across Aksai Chin had alarmed him into dispatching patrols to investigate and claim it for fear of conceding the territory to China (Liu, 1994:19;Norbu, 2001:286).

Secondly, the internal state-to-nation incongruence, which had resulted from China's domestic turmoil, led to its adoption of a conciliatory approach towards border negotiations, which had the effect of encouraging India to exploit China's growing domestic vulnerability, as Miller's *Proposition 1* expects. Other authors also suggest that Nehru's rejection of border negotiation grew out of misjudging China's motives for its self-restraint, which he saw as weakness; hence he believed they would not dare to attack in response to India's forward policy (Vertzberger, 1982:624;Maxwell, 2014;BBC, 2014b;People's Daily, 15 March 1963;Nanda, 1990:22-23;Xu, 1993:88). The actual reason for China's conciliatory stance, however, appears more to have been because China had to face the insurrection in Tibet, together with the need for restraint due to a potential

US intervention⁷² (Raghavan, 2009:159). What is more, the Tibetan nationalist challenge of 1959 together with its domestic insecurity and resultant international isolation had undermined China's state-building coherence (Fravel, 2008:169;Norbu, 2001:259,286). Fravel (2005:66) also argues that regime insecurity best explains China's attempt at compromise in its territorial disputes, in that, after occupying Tibet in 1951, it was confronted with serious challenges to its regional authority alongside the increasing costs of managing its territorial disputes with Burma, Nepal, and India. It therefore offered concessions in exchange for cooperation to crush the Tibetan rebellion. To add to its regional pressure, the US now viewed the Mao-led PRC as an international outlaw and, after 1959, the Soviet Union also broke away from it⁷³, which meant that China now faced the wrath of two hostile superpowers.

The Tibet uprisings, therefore, may be seen a combination of internal and external state-to-nation incongruence, in that, perceiving China to be weakened, India was emboldened to adopt a revisionist policy. As Miller's *Proposition 3* suggests, the state-to-nation imbalance provided targets for external intervention due to the internal insecurity and trans-border instability.

7.3.2 The acute imbalance intensified the security dilemma, making it an immediate cause of war

Miller (2007a:121; 2005:234) argues that a state-to-nation imbalance manifests revisionist and nationalist challenges, thereby intensifying the security dilemma and producing motives for war. When an imbalance is acute, the pressures arising from the security dilemma are high and there is a higher change of a state making a pre-emptive attack. A state-to-nation imbalance, may take the form of domestic secessionism, such as in Tibet, resulting in trans-border insurgence, such as the Sino-Indian border skirmishes, which create the destabilising conditions of a security dilemma—i.e. the increase of deployment of forces along the border and arms races of setting military posts. Thus, an acute state-to-nation imbalance not only produces confrontational territorial claims, it breeds insecurity and intensifies the security dilemma, all of which motivate states to go to war. As Miller's *Proposition 5* postulates, the extent of a state-to-nation balance affects the intensity of the security dilemma, which can be the immediate cause of war. This raises the question of what made China, from late 1959, change its placatory approach to a more offensive one that culminated in its pre-emptive attack in October 1962. The

⁷² In addition to the US openly siding with the Nationalists in the Taiwan Strait and covertly supported the Tibetan guerrillas, in May 1962, the Kennedy administration announced that the US troops would be stationed in Thailand. If Chiang Kai-shek had launched an attack along with the US against China, Mao was cautious, in consequence, that the US would have used force against China.

⁷³ The USSR leader, Khrushchev was neutral on the Sino-Indian border disputes. However, Mao regarded this position as "an act or betrayal". See MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 313.

following three events, prior to the border war are the evidence that explains the intensification of the Sino-Indian security dilemma.

1. *The flow of Tibetan refugees to India during the early 1960s*: the defeated Tibetan rebels and thousands of Tibetan civilians fled across the McMahon Line to India. Therefore, the Chinese found that the ease with which both they and the Dalai Lama were able to escape meant, logically, that Tibetan rebels and Indian forces could easily enter the state by the same routes. They therefore recruited thousands of Tibetans to work for the PLA, mainly deploying them in Southern Tibet near the disputed areas of Tawang and north of the McMahon Line, in order to cut off the flow of refugees and prevent rebels from crossing the border (Shakya, 1999:285;Liu, 1994:26;Norbu, 1997:1085). This action resulted in the first border skirmish at Longju along the McMahon Line and in its wake, Indian Military Intelligence increased forces in the western and eastern sectors by about 22,000 personnel, which was reciprocated by China (Raghavan, 2009:154). There followed the negotiations deadlock, which was compounded by India's "forward policy", resulting in a security dilemma as each side prepared to meet the potential threat, very much as described in Miller's *Proposition 5*.
2. *The CIA's support of the Tibetan revolts*: since 1951, the CIA had maintained close contact with the Dalai Lama's brothers— Gyalo Dhundup and Thubten Norbu – who had been involved in the free Tibetan movements. Gyalo, who had escaped to India in 1950, organized the Tibetan émigrés, however, up to 1954, the refugees had been prepared to accept Chinese rule in Tibet as a *fait accompli*. The revolt in eastern Tibet, though, changed the situation and attracted the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) attention, therefore, after 1956, Gyalo, together with his brother Thubten, developed a network of activists inside Tibet in liaison with the CIA (Shakya, 1999:283;Thondup&Thurston, 2015:167).

The US China policy to that point had been directed towards containing Communist China and maintaining the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan, consequently, while the US Secretary of State, John Forster Dulles was leading the diplomatic initiatives to contain China, the CIA supported the rebels, mainly by recruiting a number of Tibetan refugees to the US, giving them guerrilla training, communication equipment, arms and other supplies, and parachuting them back into Tibet. Moreover, in 1958, in the eastern Tibet Khampa region, a rebel movement called "*Chu-zhi Gang-drung*" (Four rivers, Six ranges) was formed, reportedly recruited by Taiwanese Kuomintang agents and supported by the CIA (Shakya, 1999:180;Maxwell, 1970:101;Garver, 2001:84;Conboy&Morrison, 2002:96-97).

China's fear of the US-supported "Four rivers, Six ranges" rebels was an important factor in the whole Tibetan situation, since the resultant revolts in Kham and Amdo had been enormously de-stabilising. Moreover, India's grant of asylum and royal treatment of the Dalai Lama strengthened Mao Zedong's conviction that India was colluding with the US in an attempt to weaken and undermine his rule in Tibet (Whiting, 1975:17), while Garver (2004b:18) is of the view that, at the very least, Nehru had turned a blind eye to CIA activities in India's northern border areas with an awareness of CIA Tibetan operations⁷⁴⁷⁵. As a consequence, India's collusion with the US to overthrow Chinese rule to Tibet was the destabilizing force to drive Mao to resort to war.

In the late 1950s, also, China had feared the US would use Pakistan as a base for operations against Tibet and Xinjiang, since, Pakistan was a SEATO member and in May 1959, President Ayub Khan had called for a joint Indo-Pakistani defense against the Chinese Communist threat, even though his proposal was rejected by Nehru (Gopal, 1984:91). However, China's concern was not negligible, and for this reason, China pushed forward with the rapid completion of the Aksai Chin Road. Also, as Dawa Norbu (2001:259) states, they established military and police posts along the western sector in order to counteract external challenges and to prevent the Tibetan revolts from infecting Xinjiang. China's aggressive military fortification along the western border derived from China's insecurity and was perceived as a further threat by India, thereby intensifying the security dilemma, which answers the question at the beginning of 7.4 regarding why China moved from the defensive to the offensive.

3. *Nehru's "forward policy"*: in the early 1960s, Nehru launched a policy that involved increasing the number of military posts along the disputed border. His objectives were to block potential lines of further Chinese advance, to establish an Indian presence in Aksai Chin, and to cut Chinese supply lines and ultimately force them to withdraw from the border (Maxwell, 1970:181-190;Hoffmann, 1989:95). Nehru believed that his forward policy was recovering legitimate Indian territory arbitrarily and illegally occupied by China during the 1950s, which was justified by nationalist grounds (Sinha&Athale, 1962;Garver, 2006:40). Therefore, in the winter of 1961-1962, Indian troops moved into the western border and dispatched patrols into Chinese-occupied territory. By April 1961, India had established forty-three military posts where the Chinese had withdrawn, which forced China to rebuild more posts, whereupon the

⁷⁴ By 1971, though, due to the US's rapprochement with China, the CIA's involvement in Tibet had waned.

⁷⁵ John Garver argues that Mao misunderstood Nehru's intention in believing that his attempt was to overthrow China's rule over Tibet; instead, Nehru's effort was to secure Tibet's autonomy inside China's rule. See Garver, 2006, p. 6.

dispute escalated into a race to set up posts. For instance, in the western sector, between May and July 1962, India established twenty-four new posts and the Chinese more than thirty (Maxwell, 1970:104;Raghavan, 2009:154).

Some scholars have reviewed the background of India's policy and the reasons why Nehru ignored China's repeated warning that his assertion of India's claims in the western sector would court deadly retaliation (CFM, 1962). Whiting (1975:46) contends that Nehru's forward policy sowed the seeds of Sino-Indian border war. The reasons revealed in the literature, including evaluations made by India's official establishment, were not that India's military capability was superior to China's, but that Nehru misjudged China's willingness to attack in response to his "forward policy", there were flaws in India's use of intelligence, and he had overestimated India's logistic capabilities (Nanda, 1990;Subrahmanyam, 1990:122;Palit, 1991:51;Raghavan, 2010:271;BBC, 2014b). In summary, it appears clear that in early 1962 Nehru's "forward policy", which led to his challenging China's territorial claims, also led to his misjudging China's intention. This situation accords with Miller's *Proposition 4*, that the combination of a strong state – even though it was only strong in Nehru's mind – meant that India has the capability to mobilize militarily, thus an acute state-to-nation imbalance produced revisionist powers that results in the use of force in order to change the territorial *status quo* along nationalist lines and that this culminated in war.

For China, Mao had concluded that Nehru's objective was to expunge Chinese influence from Tibet, and return the land to the status of a 'buffer state' (Xu, 1993:28;Xie, 2013;Zhou, 1973:9). Hence he perceived India as a threat that jeopardized China's national security and territorial integrity, which was the main reason driving China's turning to the offensive (Wang, 2009:218;Maxwell, 2011b). Later, in July 1962, Mao's exaggeration of an Indian threat led to his adopting a "militant PLA border stance" causing a nationalist upsurge in Indian public opinion that severely limited Nehru's ability to compromise (Whiting, 1975:166). As a consequence, in October 1962, China launched an attack in the western border, and within one month, defeated India, occupying Tawang in the eastern sector and evicting Indians from Aksai Chin of the western border. Mao showed his determination, as he did in the Korean War of 1950, to teach India a lesson: to "respect the power of New China" (Garver, 2006:39). Miller's *Proposition 5*, therefore, is born out, in that Nehru's forward policy challenged the territorial *status quo* and caused China's reactive attack, the result of both sides' effort to preserve their own security, thereby creating the conditions for the destabilizing effect of the security dilemma. This was the immediate cause of war.

Conclusion

As Miller's theory has it, internal incongruence refers to sub-state ethnic groups claiming their right for self-determination, demanding to secede from the governing state and

establishing their own states. In the context of the annexation of Tibet in 1950, China faced severe challenges to its domestic stability by Tibetan nationalists calling for independence and secession by way of protests and guerrilla activities, thereby leading to internal incongruence, the mismatch of identification of Tibet's nation and the boundary of China's state. Furthermore, the Tibetan Government-in-exile created external state-to-nation incongruence; challenging China's ruling legitimacy and sovereign integrity and exacerbating territorial disputes, leading to the intensification of the security dilemma and lighting the fuse of the Sino-Indian border war.

Chapter 8 The Moderation of the State-to-Nation Imbalance in the 1990s

This chapter will discuss the changing conditions brought about by variations in the state-to-nation imbalance after 1988 and how it affected the evolution of Sino-Indian relations. As Miller's theory suggests (2005:314), great powers cannot change the motivation of regional actors to solve their state-to-nation problems, since only local actors can directly address them through negotiations and conflict resolutions in order to transcend a situation to warm peace. In the late 1980s, an increase of state strength in both states and a moderation of the state-to-nation incongruence were conducive to the peaceful negotiation of territorial disputes, which contributed to a period of cold peace. In order to understand the causal relations between the variations in the state-to-nation imbalance that led to the improvement in Sino-Indian relations, this chapter will cite the 1989 Lhasa revolts and the Indian northeast insurgencies as case studies in order to compare the effects of a moderation of the state-to-nation imbalance had on their relations.

This chapter will be organized in five sections. The first section will review Miller's theory and summarize the situation of Sino-Indian cold war. The second and third sections will cite the 1989 Lhasa uprising in order to analyze the correlation between the moderation of state-to-nation imbalance and the initiation of cold peace. The fourth section will use India's northeast area to show that India's moderation of its state-to-nation imbalance also helped to maintain a cold peace. The last section will explore the additional domestic factors to strengthen the explanatory power of Miller's variables.

8.1 Miller's theory and after the 1959 Tibet revolts

8.1.1 Miller's theory

Benjamin Miller (2010a:67) argues that great power involvement – a hegemon and the great power cooperation – is conducive to the transition from cold war to cold peace and the decrease of the prospects of hot war. In the Sino-Indian case, the presence of a hegemon – Russia, from 1988 to 1999, and the US post 2000, as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, juxtaposed with the moderation of a state-to-nation imbalance, was conducive to the initiation and the maintenance of cold peace. Hence, this chapter will examine the variable at a domestic level – the state-to-nation balance – together with the global factor and their effect on dyadic outcomes. The following is a summary of Miller's theory as it relates to hegemons and the state-to-nation imbalance.

Proposition 1: The potential pathways to make peace are the presence of a hegemon at the global level and, to some extent, the state-to-nation balance. Under a regional state-to-nation imbalance, a hegemon or great power cooperation, can mitigate or reduce regional conflicts and thus bring about cold peace (Miller, 2007a:306).

Proposition 2: Because domestic factors may be more effective to change the motivations of regional actors, the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts may result from the success of state-building and nation-building, thereby bringing about a transition from war to peace (Miller, 2007a:306). As mentioned in 7.1, state-to-nation balance comprises two variables, state strength and nation-building, which lead to four types of states and the construction of a taxonomy of four possible regional outcomes (Table 8.1) (Miller, 2007a:58,101), outlining as follows,

Proposition 2-1: weak states combined with national congruence, so called “frontier states”, are likely to result in boundary wars and external intervention due to a state’s inability to control its sovereign territory.

Proposition 2-2: weak states combined with national incongruence will invite external intervention or civil wars, e.g. the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

Proposition 2-3: strong states, combined with a high level of national incongruence, create revisionist states, which are willing to use force to change the territorial *status quo*, leading to hot war.

Proposition 2-4: strong states, with high level of state-to-nation congruence, lead to *status quo*-oriented states and warm peace, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 8-1: Four types of states and regional outcomes

| | Strong states | Weak states |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| State-to-nation congruence | Proposition 2-4 Status-quo states | Proposition 2-1 Frontier states |
| Regional outcome | Warm peace | External intervention or border war |
| State-to-nation incongruence | Proposition 2-3 Revisionist states | Proposition 4-2 Incoherent states or failed states |
| Regional outcome | Hot war | Civil war or external intervention |

Source: Miller, (2007: p. 57)

As a consequence, with *Proposition 2-4* being the exception, three of these types of states have a state-to-nation imbalance, which makes them prone to war. However, according to the above formulae, the first condition for cold peace is the presence of a hegemon or cooperative great powers, the second is a strong state, since the effectiveness and durability

of conflict resolution is heavily dependent on strong states (Miller, 2005:243). Hence, institutionally strong states have a domestic legitimacy together with the ability to fully suppress domestic threats or violence, thus generating *status quo* orientations (Miller, 2005:244; 2007a:316).

However, strong states must be followed by successful nation-building, since this leads to warm peace. Otherwise, internal imbalance either indicates difficulties involved in nation-building, which pose severe problems for conflict resolution strategies, or external incongruence produces revisionist claims that challenge the legitimacy of other states in the region, thereby leading to revisionist aspirations (Miller, 2007a:154), which might result in dissatisfaction with the current regional order, and a willingness to use force to change the territorial *status quo*, as *Proposition 2-3* shows. In summary, the influence of a hegemon, coupled with both a strong state and successful nation-building, can contribute to peace-keeping and conflict resolution strategies. Therefore, this section will demonstrate that, since the late 1980s, the state strength of China and India have been growing, even though they both have moderate, but unresolved, problems of state-to-nation imbalance, which has reduced the likelihood of hot wars and facilitated the process of conflict resolution, which, in turn, initiated the rapprochement.

8.1.2 The Sino-Indian cold war

When the 1959 Tibet revolts were raging in Lhasa, the Indian government offered shelter to the fleeing Dalai Lama in the town of Dharamsala, where it allowed him to establish a Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and set up a haven for Tibetan refugees. However, the Nehru government pursued a relatively cautious policy by suppressing pro-Tibetan political activities in the rest of India and would not criticize China's Tibet policy. The reason for this reticence was that Nehru had been harboring pan-Asian idealism; he also wanted to avoid spoiling his friendship with China (Shakya, 1999:214-5). However, after the 1962 war, India radically revised its stance by openly supporting the Tibetan cause, and in 1963, supporting Tibetan guerillas by establishing a special frontier force, code named 22, set up to train able-bodied young Tibetan refugees. In 1965, the Indian delegate openly supported a United Nation (UN) resolution on Tibet for the first time since 1950 (Norbu, 2001:293). During the 1960s and early 1970s, China and India were entrapped in a domestic turmoil and, subsequently, they entered a period of mutual disengagement.

During the Sino-Indian cold war of the 1970s and 1980s, India played a dual strategic role on the Tibet issue. While it officially continued to declare Tibet to have been an autonomous region of China since 1959, it still facilitated the Dalai Lama's international movements and continued to assist the TGIE, offering as a justification the provision of humanitarian assistance to its refugees. This dualism was dictated largely to the persistence of Sino-Indian rivalry, a complex and competitive situation in which the People's Republic of China (PRC) held several important cards, such as the support for a Kashmiri plebiscite, the provision of

military supplies to Pakistan, the supply of arms to support Indian Northeast insurgencies in India (Norbu, 2001:295).

However, following Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to China, Sino-Indian relations were transformed from confrontation to rapprochement. The 1959 Tibet revolts, described in Chapter 7, had been the underlying cause of the Sino-Indian border war, however, in contrast, the 1989 Tibet revolts did not intensify Sino-Indian rivalry. Instead they were followed by a period of Sino-Indian rapprochement. This poses the question of why Sino-Indian rivalry de-escalated and what factors contributed to the peace-making. This thesis would suggest that this was because of two factors, firstly, at the international level – the neutrality of the Soviet Union, discussed in Chapter 5.1, and secondly, at the regional level – a moderation in both countries' state-to-nation imbalance, which could be observed in the cases of Chinese Tibetan revolts and India's north-east insurgencies, respectively. This will also be discussed in the following sections.

8.2 The moderation of state-to-nation imbalance

Compared to the 1959 Tibet revolts creating severe state-to-nation imbalance, the 1989 Lhasa revolts showed a critical trend – a moderation of the state-to-nation imbalance – which was conducive to bringing about different outcome regarding Sino-Indian relations, which will now be explored in terms of the following variables.

8.2.1 Growing state strength

Miller's theory (2007a:34,313; 2005:234), states that a strong state must have effective political institutions, and the means to control violence in its territories in order to maintain essential elements of sovereignty. In order to consolidate its state strength in Tibet, in 1980 and 1984, the PRC convened two Tibet Working Meetings, emphasising its policy of strategic development; this was particularly so at the 1984 meeting, which decided to invest 470 million Yuan on forty-three large construction projects. By the early 1980s, therefore, four highways and two airports had been completed, which effectively linked Lhasa with the rest of China. Regarding the military deployment, given the limited resources⁷⁶, in 1974 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had a strength of 300,000 in Tibet (Norbu, 2001:239). Margolis (2002:266) notes that, in the early 1990s, China had deployed around 500,000 troops on the Tibetan Plateau. Another estimation is that, in the 1990s, the PLA consisted of somewhere between 40,000 and 200,000 at the peak of military exercises (UNPO, 2007:70). The People's Armed Police (PAP), whose strength in 2000 was estimated to be 15,000 to 20,000, also played a dominant role during the various protests and revolts; for instance, it

⁷⁶ It is difficult to obtain reliable and sufficient data in order to evaluate the deployment of armed forces during certain periods in Tibet. Therefore, I have relied on what little information is available in order to infer certain estimations.

had the primary responsibility for suppressing the 1989 Lhasa uprisings (Norbu, 2001:239). The evidence mentioned above shows that the Chinese government and its institutions have shown themselves to be capable of performing effectively by their performance in suppressing the Lhasa uprisings, since they did not evolve into a civil war; in contrast to 1959 revolts, in 1959, a rival exiled government was established in India.

8.2.2 The maintenance of internal state-to-nation incongruence

According to Miller's theory (2005:245), internal state-to-nation incongruence refers to sub-states "ethnic groups" claims regarding their rights to self-determination based on demography and history, their demands to secede from the existing state, and their desire to establish their own states. Therefore, an internal imbalance suggests that a state has difficulties regarding nation-building, which pose severe problems for a conflict resolution strategy and the suppression of secessionist movements. Accordingly, the 1989 Lhasa revolts provides evidence that China was in a state of internal state-to-nation incongruence, which is manifested by its challenges to a Tibetans' claim to rights of self-determination and their appeal for independence.

The following section will explore the extent of the mismatch between PRC's implementation of nation-building and Tibetan resistance, showing the following aspects of the persistent and severe internal state-to-nation incongruence, (i) the confrontation between Tibetans' claim for self-determination and the PRC's interpretation of autonomy, and (ii) the failure of the Tibetan dialogue.

1. Tibetan self-determination vis-à-vis PRC's interpretation of autonomy

Tibet's claim to self-determination was based on its distinct national identity and history, which confronted with the Chinese vision; a mismatch between the Tibetan identity and the Chinese identity that resulted in internal incongruence. The Tibetans had already interpreted the Communist takeover in 1950 as an "invasion" and the subsequent mass encroachment of an ethnic Chinese population as being an act of 'internal colonialism' (Sloane, 2002:133). Chapter 7.1.3 has described the origins of the Tibetan claim to self-determination resulting in internal incongruence; therefore, the following section will explain the manifestations and confrontations that epitomised during the 1970s and 1980s.

According to the UN Charter, self-determination applies to peoples who consider themselves to be separate national groups, which qualifies them to determine their own political status and to pursue economic, social and cultural development. Self-determination, however, can take different forms in different contexts, ranging from independence, secession from an existing state, and the ability to receive domestic constitutional protections in order to guarantee minority group status within the parent state, such as by way of local autonomy or federal arrangements (Hannum,

2011:23;Coggins, 2011). Self-determination in a democratic society implies meaningful participation in the process of government, for instance, by way of autonomy, which may be a particular state's political resolution to issues of ethnic conflict. Autonomy, therefore, is compatible with the goals of self-determination, which are to preserve, protect, and promote cultural, ethnic, linguistic values within either a new or an existing state in order to retain national identity (Lapidoth, 1997:19). Hence, this thesis treats self-determination as a nation's right, and autonomy as a state's solution, since both concepts may be applied to protect minority rights and to deal with ethnic conflicts. Tibet's 1989 claim to self-determination within China manifested itself in two ways: internally, through its call for independence within China; externally, through a Dalai Lama-led TGIE appealing to the international community either to support its claim for independence or autonomy.

Between 1959 and the late 1980s, though, the PRC tried to deal with the problems of internal incongruence in order to accommodate Tibetan nationalist claims in numerous ways, which include, in 1959, signing a 17-Point Agreement resulting in the establishment in 1965 of a TAR in recognition of Tibet's distinct ethnic identity and its own willingness to grant it autonomy, and in 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, initiating an unsuccessful dialogue with the Dalai Lama-led TGIE.

In practice, however, there is a huge gulf between both sides' interpretation of autonomy and the practice of self-determination. For instance, the Tibetans' interpretation is that self-determination means "self-rule by Tibetans" and more importantly, that the ultimate authority should always be the Dalai Lama (Shakya, 1999:208). The PRC, on the other hand, sees the Communist Party as being the ultimate authority in deciding what self-determination means. In effect, the PRC granted Tibet administrative autonomy, but comprehensively rejected any idea that it should equate to the Tibetan interpretation of self-determination, since it would have been tantamount to "splitting the motherland" (Smith Jr, 2008:219). More seriously, the PRC considered Tibetan resistance during the 1959 and 1989 revolts to be a serious challenge to its sovereignty and national security; therefore, it made every effort to suppress all separatist activities. Since then, China has been inflexible on any issue related to its sovereignty, including territorial disputes with India related to Tibet (Smith Jr, 2008:269).

2. The failure of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue

Since 1979, the PRC and representatives from the TGIE have engaged in some rounds of dialogue. For the Tibetans, the dialogue has been about unresolved political issues, the nature of autonomy and the return of the Dalai Lama; while, the PRC has denied that there is any "unresolved political issue" and they have tried to confine the issue to the "personal" future of the Dalai Lama. The first stage of the dialogue was hindered by the 1989 Lhasa uprisings. The second stage in 2002, which reached no consensus, was criticized by the

Tibetans who claimed that China's strategy was to defuse international criticism of China by means of propaganda and to take a delaying tactic by waiting for the Dalai Lama to die (Smith Jr, 2008:219, 231;Economist, 2013;Tander, 2004).

As Miller's theory (2005:246) suggests, democratization provides a political strategy to reduce ethnic-based discrimination and strengthen state-building, thereby moderating the state-to-nation imbalance. Unfortunately, China's authoritarian polity was unable to perform to the prescriptions of democracy, such as a parliamentary arrangement of either minority right to the veto, proportional presentation, federalism or referendum (Lijphart, 1977:28,42;Adeney, 2007:6). On the other hand, the atheist essence of the Communist Party cannot tolerate the Tibetan tradition of theocracy; it can only denigrate it (Jin, 2015). Therefore, the repression policy, in particular, the denigration of the Dalai Lama, led the Tibetans to an increasing hatred of, and anti-Chinese, sentiments.

In summary, China's unshakably authoritarian regime showed its unwillingness to resolve its internal incongruence in terms of respective interpretations of autonomy and self-determination. The domestic demographic constraints and the religious attachments of Tibetan identity mean that there is no way that China can compel Tibetans to accept a Chinese identity, which accords with Miller's definition of internal incongruence. Hence, the Tibetan nationalist challenge undermines China's internal coherence, as well as being the underlying cause of the 1989 Lhasa uprising and the subsequent 2008 riots. This persistence of internal incongruence also accounts for the impossibility of a fully warm peace for Sino-Indian relations, which will be discussed below.

8.2.3 The moderation of external state-to-nation incongruence

The third aspect of state-to-nation imbalance is external incongruence: calls for national unification of an ethnic group across more than one states, and irredentism by revisionist states based on the grounds of national affiliation and national-historic rights. This trans-border incongruence challenges the legitimacy of the existing states (Miller, 2007a:66).

In 1960, the establishment of the TGIE created an external state-to-nation imbalance, which, because it undermined China's territorial integrity, was seen as a form of revisionist challenge and an underlying cause of the Sino-Indian war (see also in 7.1.4). However, the claims of TGIE on the pan-national movement against China changed subtly, therefore they may be divided into two periods, the first period, from 1961 to the late 1980s, when the appeal was for independence, and the second period, after 1987, when the appeal was for genuine autonomy (Smith Jr, 2008:294;Norbu, 2001:386;Dalai, 1998).

The first period, from 1959 to 1987 – an appeal for independence

Even though the TGIE has not been recognized by any states, including its host state, India, it has produced some international pressure on China, in particular, during the 1980s.

Between 1959 and 1965, the UN had passed three Tibet centred resolutions, accusing the Chinese of a violation of human rights and asserting Tibet's right for self-determination, although the political issue of independence had been excluded (Smith, 1996:501). Scholars predicated that China would ignore the UN resolution (Malik, 1971:290;Robinson&Shambaugh, 1995), and, indeed it did not react to the resolutions, since, at that time, it was not a UN member. Therefore, without trying to defend itself against the resolutions, it simply took total control of Tibet and adopted a quasi-isolationist policy since it was also in dispute with the US, the Soviet Union, and China's numerous neighbours, including, of course, India. Hence, the UN resolution carried little weight on challenging China's Tibet policy.

While the internationalization of the Tibet issue pressured China into adopting a coercive diplomatic approach in order to eliminate criticism; it did not change its hard-line Tibet policy (Smith Jr, 2009:250). Indeed, China views its "One China" policy to be the fundamental core of its national interests and a key factor for judging its diplomatic relationship with other countries. Therefore, because the legitimacy of its sovereignty over Tibet is an issue affecting its national identity, the subject is so sensitive that it cannot be in the slightest bit flexible over it. Thus, China views Tibet entirely as an internal issue; therefore, a comment by any foreign state on the issue is immediately dismissed as an intervention in its domestic affairs. Hence, India's support of the Tibet cause, despite its stated humanitarian justification, was perceived as a threat to China's sovereignty; as a result, it also had the effect of undermining the Sino-Indian relationship.

The second period, after 1987 – an appeal for autonomy

In the late 1980s, as a symbol of Tibetan religious and cultural identity, the TGIE leader, the 13th Dalai Lama abandoned his bid for independence by changing it to a call for "genuine and complete autonomy"⁷⁷, representing a realist way by which to establish Tibetan separate identity and to accommodate China vital national interests (Norbu, 2001:356). More importantly, the Dalai Lama, in his 1988 Strasbourg Proposal⁷⁸, officially accepted the "One China policy" and announced that Tibet would accept autonomy under China (Dalai, 1998). This was clearly a moderation to the state of external incongruence. Theoretically, a moderation of trans-border irredentism may decrease a revisionist challenge whilst leaving little space for a neighbouring state to take advantages of a restive minority. In effect, the

⁷⁷ In 1987, The Dalai Lama called for the transformation of Tibet into a "zone of peace" or the demilitarization and neutralization of Tibet. Later, at Strasbourg, France, he proposed Tibetan autonomy and that Tibet should have its own Foreign Bureau to deal with commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports, and other non-military activities. (Wang, 2008:33).

⁷⁸ In order for Tibet to be granted real autonomy, in recognition of Tibet's ethnic difference and historically independent statehood, the Strasbourg proposal was for a "one state, two systems" formula, which was what the PRC had offered to Taiwan and Hong Kong.

case of the 1989 Lhasa uprisings supported this argument. Such a moderation of external state-to-nation incongruence, in the Tibet case, may be seen as a strengthening of China's nation-building and a weakening of India's revisionist policy, while it would leave limited space for India to undermine China's state legitimacy and sovereignty. However, because internal incongruence persisted, the growing state strength and moderation of external incongruence failed to transcend the problem of state-to-nation imbalance – which might have led to a full-blown peace – because it would have been counterproductive to China's state-building.

In summary, while China's rejection of Tibetan autonomy remained constant, its growing state strength showed that China was capable of controlling Tibet and that it is no longer an issue that it would motivate, or encourage India, to exploit China's domestic weakness, the cause of the 1962 Sino-Indian war. This was consistent with Miller's theory that a revisionist force in decline is conducive to peace-making. The following section will discuss the other factors that explain why China and India were able to make peace.

8.2.4 The influence of the 1989 Lhasa uprising on Sino-Indian relations

Compared to the 1959 Tibet revolts, which led to a Sino-Indian hot war, the 1989 Tibet revolts brought about a very different outcome – a cold peace. Besides the factor of a moderation in the state-to-nation imbalance, the following two factors also served to both de-escalate the countries' rivalry and initiate the *rapprochement*.

1. India's change of Tibet policy

Unlike in 1959, when India welcomed thousands of refugees across the Sino-Indian border during, as recently as 1987, the Indian army took precautions to prevent such arrivals by sealing its border (Pardesi, 2011:110). Nevertheless, during the Lhasa uprisings, India restrained the activities of Tibetan exiles within its territory and took a position that distanced itself from the revolts. Consequently, even though China still suspected India of assisting the Dalai Lama, India sent a clear signal that it would not exploit the situation; thus, in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi made his landmark trip to China, thereby initiating the Sino-Indian *rapprochement*.

It is important to note that in 1976 both countries had normalized relations by restoring ambassadorial representations prior to the first stage of border talks in 1981. Moreover, Rajiv Gandhi's China visit had been arranged more than a year before it was officially announced in 1988; therefore, even though he was under considerable domestic pressure to oppose China's policy, he continued to engage with them and tried to downplay any influence he might inadvertently have had on the Tibet revolts (Baral et al., 1989:266). Indeed, in November 1987, when the eighth round of Sino-Indian border talks were held in

New Delhi, which coincided with the Lhasa revolts⁷⁹, India had declared that it would not give any support, either moral or physical, to the Tibetans. Therefore, in view of the severe criticism it received from the US, China was fully appreciative of India's reaction, which had the effect of cementing, even further, good Sino-Indian relations.

The following factors may have contributed to India's restraint regarding the 1989 Lhasa revolts. Firstly, as Pardesi (2011) argues, India's Operation Brasstacks in 1987 highlighted its serious proneness to war with Pakistan, therefore it was not prepared to over-stretch its military resources by using force against China. Secondly, the Indian military establishment made it clear that a unilateral war with China was not a realistic option either for the settlement of boundary disputes, or to guarantee Tibetan autonomy (Hussain, 1990;Singh, 2009a). Thirdly, India was more confident about its military capabilities than it had been in the 1960s, therefore knowledge of this could decrease its perception of China's threat and miscalculations (Pardesi, 2011;Mansingh, 1994:289).

In the late 1980s, by contrast to 1962, even though India was more confident about its military strength, it decided not to use force because it accepted the political reality of Tibet being under China's control. It seems, therefore, that the principal determinant with regard to whether India would respond with force was not the relative military capability, but each state strength. It also demonstrated that China's control over Tibet had ceased to be a target for external intervention, which accords with Miller's *Proposition 2* that a growing state strength may be effective to motivate regional actors to make peace.

As a consequence, during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China he reiterated that Tibet was an autonomous region of China and that India would not allow Tibetans from inside India to engage in political activities against China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988), which signified that India supported the "One China" policy and that it intended to improve relations with China. As a former Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, Rajiv Sikri (2011), notes, China's insecurity about Tibet was an important factor in its attitude towards India. Following the Sino-Indian *rapprochement*, India made subtle changes to its official rhetoric on Tibet's status (see Table 8.2), which reflected Rajiv Gandhi's assurance that it recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet (Malik, 2011:139); therefore, India's self-restraint and appeasement over the Tibet issue ameliorated bilateral relations, thereby, reducing the importance of the Tibet issue in the Indo-Chinese discourse.

⁷⁹ The Lhasa revolts lasted from 1987 to 1989.

Table 8-2: The different stages of Indian official positions over Tibet

| TIME | INDIA'S OFFICIAL POSITION |
|--------------|--|
| 1911 -1949 | Tibet as a <i>de facto</i> independent state |
| 1950 -1954 | Chinese suzerainty over Tibet |
| 1954-1987 | Tibet as a region of China. |
| 1988-2002 | Tibet as an autonomous region of China |
| 2003-TO DATE | Tibet as a part of China |

Source: Malik (2011: p. 139)

However, Indian domestic opinions on Tibet are contentious, which shows that the Tibet plays an important role in the ever present tensions of Sino-Indian relations (Malik, 2011). The first of these contentious opinions is that Tibet should pursue the goal of genuine autonomy, since it will act as a buffer zone in order to contain China (Cohen, 2004:259). The second opinion, supported by Communist Party of India, that Tibet is a barrier to Sino-Indian relations, hence India should treat it as a Chinese domestic issue, therefore no-one from outside should interfere. The third opinion accords with India's official statement whereby Tibet is a part of China and India's aid to Tibetan *diaspora* is humanitarian (Dutta, 2011). Whichever opinion is taken, given India's open democratic system and long tradition of giving asylum to persecuted peoples, it cannot ignore the Tibet issue.

2. Great power factor moderates state-to-nation imbalance

As already discussed, Chapter 5 shows that the USSR played a crucial role in Rajiv Gandhi's decision to recalculate India's relations with China. The following elements can be attributed to which the "Russian factor", firstly, the effect on India of Soviet neutral stance over the Sino-Indian border skirmish, the Sumdorong Chun Valley standoff, secondly, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and thirdly, the eventual loss of India superpower patron, which accords *Proposition 1*.

The change to India's playing Tibet card, brought about by the "Russian factor", was also critical for Sino-Indian *rapprochement*. In 1969, following the Sino-Soviet border war along the Ussuri River; the Russia was keen to support the Tibet cause. Since, in keeping with the Indo-Soviet quasi-alliance, the USSR used the Tibet card to contain China's influence in Central Asia and also to enhance India's deterrent posture against it (Jian, 2006). In the late 1980s, Moscow ceased to support Tibetan independence. As Norbu argues (2001:294-295), India's threat came to be more serious only when China perceived it to be coordinating with great powers in the 1970s; by contrast, the Tibetan card failed as a credible threat to China

when India and its ally, Russia, did not share similar levels of interest in Tibet in the late 1980s. Such a radical change, together with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, encouraged both countries to adopt a more friendly posture towards each other. Meanwhile, with the Tibet revolts and Tiananmen Square protests endangering its legitimacy, China also attempted to mend its relations with its other neighbours, in order to break its international isolation, which explains why its domestic turmoil resulted in a softening of its diplomatic posture.

8.3 India's northeast insurgencies

Since independence in 1947, India has suffered from persistent ethno-nationalist movements, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and separatist insurgencies in its north-eastern and north-western regions⁸⁰, which demand different kinds of self-determination, statehood and secession. The most pressing case is Jammu and Kashmir in its north western region, which has seen three full-blown wars with Pakistan and which remains a power-keg in Indo-Pakistani relations⁸¹. The north-eastern regions faces anti-India insurgencies, arms and drugs smuggling, and an inflow of illegal immigrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh, which creates a severe external state-to-nation problem and grave security concerns, most of which fall beyond the scope of this thesis. However, even though the northeast insurgencies have been less relevant and influential to the Sino-Indian relations than Tibet, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, during the Sino-Indian cold war period, China was involved in supplying weapons to the separatists of Naga and Mizo, which helped prolong the rivalry (Frankel&Harding, 2004:115); therefore, it is important at least to note India's moderation in its state-to-nation imbalance since this change had a moderating influence on overall Sino-Indian relations.

8.3.1 The origins of internal incongruence

Since the 1950s, in the north-eastern region, many states have struggled to contain separatists groups, who were discontented with the economic exploitation of their regions' vast national resources and the indigenous oppositions' to migration (Singh, 2010:258-9). Such a state-to-nation imbalance created by ethnic, communal, and separatist conflicts has endangered India's internal instability, resulting in persistent tensions with its neighbours, Myanmar and Bangladesh, over the issues of immigration, border lines and the use of river water, etc. The failure of many people in this region to fully integrate into the Indian Union means that there is always a threat of violence, even though India's growing state strength

⁸⁰ In the northwest region, the insurgences occurred mainly in Punjab, and Kashmir and Jammu.

⁸¹ The Kashmir issue is not a variable that directly influences Sino-Indian relations and was beyond, therefore Kashmir is beyond the scope of this section.

has reduced it to the point where the region is considered to be under control; at least, according to Indian army reports (Ministry of Defense, 2013:21).

More objectively, Friedman and Gilley (2005:34) show that death from interethnic violence per capita⁸² – declined steadily between 1947 and the 2000s. They also note that the democratic regime of India has acted as a pacifying force in ethnically diverse areas, which accords with Miller’s theory that democracy can act as an intervening variable to strengthen state coherence by allowing political rights in order to increase people’s identification with the state, thereby overcoming the remaining imbalance issues that threaten regional peace (Miller, 2007a:307-310). However, calls for better governance in order to enforce administrative empowerment on autonomous council institutions (Sen, 2014), suggests that the problems of state-to-nation imbalance are not completely settled in the north-east states.

Furthermore, the other factor is India’s economic cooperation with Myanmar and Bangladesh, which has contributed to India’s successful management with its insurgencies over the previous decade (Gupta, 2013:27;Bhattacharjee, 2014). Therefore, India may be assumed to be a strong state, which has the capacity to control insurgent movements with a combination of military, political and constitutional means in order to reduce violence.

8.3.2 The origins of external incongruence

After the 1962 border war, China responded to India’s support for the insurgency in Tibet by supplying weapons and training Naga rebels and the insurgents of Mizoram and Manipur for approximately twenty years in order to destabilize India’s north-eastern frontiers and to serve its strategic objective of containing India by a policy of confrontation (Bhaumik, 1996:11, 25). Given their increasing *rapprochement*, China ceased its overt support for these separatist groups; however, by the end of the 1990s, although China’s official arms supplies had dwindled, of great concern for India was the illegal arms trade run by the Yunnan “mafia”, which had access to China’s state run ordinance factories with the north-east insurgents – ULFA (United Liberation Fronts of Assam)⁸³ (Upadhyay, 2009:48,55;Bhaumik, 2009:45). Therefore, India’s northeast insurgencies played a less important role in Sino-Indian relations.

8.4 Alternative domestic factors

Miller’s domestic variable –state-to-nation balance– includes the two dimensions of state-building and nation-building, yet, it did not cover the range of possible domestic factors. In particular, he argues that institutionally strong states that are able to control violence in

⁸² The number killed in communal strife per 10 million people, mostly Hindu-Muslim, has decreased from the worst years of 1964, 1969, 1983, 1992 and 2002 , to 41, 13, 16, 12 and 8 respectively.

⁸³ ULFA was a separatist organization that is committed to Assam’s liberation from India.

their territories enjoy a domestic legitimacy (Miller, 2007a:54-5). However, Zhong (1996:214) suggests that such a definition only covers the dimension of “negative legitimacy” that prevents a state from surviving from a legitimacy crisis and keeps a regime in power whereas it does not explain all areas of domestic legitimacy. An analysis of state-building that neglects such factors as leaders’ decisions, good governance, and economic factors, cannot fully explain a state’s efforts to consolidate domestic legitimacy (Fukuyama, 2004:26; Holbig&Gilley, 2010b:396). Moreover, domestic legitimacy and state behaviour have a reciprocal relationship whereby efforts to enhance legitimacy may influence a state’s behaviour; equally foreign policy behaviour may also influence its domestic standing (Downs&Saunders, 2012). In particular, when international system has been relatively stable, domestic factors would be relatively salient (Nau&Ollapally, 2012).

China, especially, is such a case due to its authoritarian regime and lack of popular consent from democratic institutions. Shirk (2014:392) argues that its politically insecure leaders put the highest priority on the survival of the CCP, the stability of which it regards as being its principle interest. In contrast, India achieves its legitimacy and maintains state coherence through a pluralist democracy. Therefore, two domestic/unit level of factors, the importance of economic growth and pragmatic leadership, complement Miller’s variable of state strength in that both states’ new generation of leaders pursue pragmatic policies in order to engage with each other; hence, they are willing to set aside territorial disputes in order to maintain their economic growth, thereby consolidating their legitimacy and coherence.

1. Economic growth – following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incidents, in order to avert an isolation- induced legitimacy crisis, a policy consensus was formed after Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour regarding the importance of deep economic reform and the pursuit of social stability and regime legitimacy (Swaine&Henry, 1995:7; Downs&Saunders, 2012:118). In the event, this proved to be a successful therapy that not only helped China avoid isolationism, but also both consolidated the CCP’s ruling legitimacy and resulted in a stronger China with a magnificent performance of two-digit economic growth in this period. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, followed his policy of “putting territorial disputes on the shelf and left over to the history” in order to focus on economic development and to deal with domestic problems. Therefore, China’s economic growth, together with its increasing trade with India led to its integration into world’s markets, thus creating economic interdependence even though its original goal had been simply to shore up its political legitimacy. As a consequence, bilateral trade with India was boosted significantly, and it rose from US\$ 200 million by 1988 to \$1.9 billion in 1998, and \$41.85 billion by 2008 (see 2.3.3).

As suggested by neo-liberalism, economic interdependence decreases conflict and brings peace. The enormous increases in globalization has involved increasing degrees of

economic interdependence (Levy&Thompson, 2010:75). The pacifying effects of trade have undoubtedly contributed to the maintenance of Sino-Indian cold peace, since both China and India have integrated in the world economy. However, the increasing economic cooperation and commercial openness have increased Sino-Indian motivation for preserving cordial relations, since this forms a strong foundation for supporting their domestic legitimacy, but it was not an underlying cause of transition to cold peace (Fravel, 2011b:39). As mentioned in 5.3, Chinese leadership primarily sought to maintain a stable international environment in order to focus on economic development and cope with domestic challenges; therefore, pursuing economic development fitted China's primary national interest (Swaine, 1998:9;Swaine&Tellis, 2000:112;Goldstein, 2005:26;Gill, 2010:10). Regarding India, after 1991 it also embarked on economic reform. Accordingly, its politico-military rationale has been domestic economic liberalization and a search for a larger role in Asia (Jaffrelot, 2003).

2. Pragmatic leadership – Milner(1997:17), Gilley(2013:22), and Hudson (2013:23) suggest that key leaders' perception of decisions⁸⁴ are one of legitimacy sources and influencing the interaction between domestic decision-making and foreign policy

Both initiators of the Sino-Indian rapprochement, Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi, reversed their predecessors' policy and cold war thinking by re-orienting their states' interests in order to concentrate on economic development and more balanced foreign policies in order to both accumulate national power and pursue great power status (Chai, 2003;Mohan, 2006). Chinese scholars, Wang (2011a) and Xiong (2010) state that for two decades, Deng's "open up" policy and diplomatic strategy of "hide the light and keep in the shadow" had a profound influence on China's foreign policy; hence, during his leadership, China took a more neutral position on Kashmir where India was in dispute with its bitter rival, Pakistan, thereby showing China's good will by encouraging a reconciliation with India (also see 6.3.2). This "low-profile" national strategy was also taken up by successive leaders albeit with different slogans, such as Jiang Zemin's "New Security" and "Good Neighbours" policies, and Hu Jintao's "peaceful rise and peaceful development" policy, which were designed both to minimize the risks of direct confrontation with the US, and to avoid disrupting the peaceful regional environment, which was necessary for maintaining economic growth (Zhao, 2010;Chen&Wang, 2011:198;Yan, 2014:156). This strategy, which included active engagement with India led to the signing of three border agreements, considered to be essential maintaining a peaceful border.

⁸⁴ Domestic institutions, including bureaucratic politics, interest groups, and public opinions, also were the sources of domestic legitimacy and played roles on shaping foreign policy-making. However, these factors would not be discussed as mentioned in Chapter 2 that both states leaders dominant foreign policy-making.

Regarding pragmatic leadership in India, its national priority had also been to pursue economic growth and nurture a peaceful and stable regional environment. Hence, in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rajiv Gandhi pursued a more balanced foreign policy between the US, Russia, and China, unlike his mother Indira Gandhi, who had tilted towards the Soviet Union (Ogden, 2014:143)(also see 5.1). Moreover, successive leaders, such as Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, pursued a policy of economic reform and liberalisation by adopting a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy, which included improving relations with China in order to focus on its domestic development and challenges at home and abroad (Ganguly&Pardesi, 2009a:14;Malone, 2011b:52,166). Henceforth, successive leadership – i.e. the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of Vajpayee between 1998 and 2004, and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) of Manmohan Singh, adopted similar approaches by putting economic development and enhancing regionalism as the centrepiece of policies, while varying the extent of success, thereby seeking greater economic cooperation with China, both as a means to pursue cold peace and attaining great power status, even though India still perceives China as a potential threat and competitor (Ganguly, 2010;Ogden, 2010;Mukherjee&Malone, 2011b:89;Malone, 2011a:51-2;Jain, 2011;Ito, 2014:143).

In sum, the domestic and foreign policies that flowed from the pragmatism of both states' leaders, and from their pursuit of economic growth, both of which relate to Miller's variable of state strength, have provided China and India with the motivations for maintaining a peaceful coexistence in order to consolidate their domestic legitimacy and to increase the external legitimacy as rising powers.

Conclusion

Both China and India may be labelled as strong states in terms of their capability to exercise powers over political institutions, control domestic violence, and show their effectiveness in suppressing armed conflicts, thereby proving their domestic legitimacy. In the case of India's north-eastern secession-prone states, democratic governance and the growth of state strength have proved its state-building policy to have been successful. All these factors, therefore, accords with Miller's theory that strong states may show a decline in the power of subnational separatist/ secessionist movements because of a consolidation of state power over separatist groups (Miller, 2005:244). Hence, pragmatic leadership in pursuit of economic development driven by the need for domestic political legitimacy provided an important incentive for both states to maintain peaceful and cooperative relations.

However, the situation in Tibet, which has experienced recurrent revolts, tells a different story. The 1959 revolts triggered a severe state-to-nation imbalance, thereby leading to the 1962 Sino-Indian hot war. In contrast, though, the 1989 revolts, due to the Soviet neutrality, and a moderation in the state-to-nation imbalance, led to a de-escalation of rivalries,


thereby initiating a Sino-Indian cold peace. After 1988, China and Indian have pursued peace-making strategies, with the intention of reducing the impact caused by the outstanding territorial disputes. This could be seen in the Sino-Indian cold peace following agreements on, India's restraint on the Lhasa uprisings after 1987, Rajiv Gandhi's assurance of respect for China's sovereignty over Tibet in 1988 and Vajpayee's similar assurance in 2003, the establishment of a Joint Working Group to attempt to settle border disputes in 1989, and the 1993 and 1996 border agreements that called for the renunciation of force and CBMs; all of which factors have led to the maintenance of a Sino-Indian cold peace up to the present day.

Moreover, two factors, the importance of economic growth and pragmatic leadership, complement Miller's variable of state strength in that both states' new generation of leaders pursue pragmatic policies by engaging with each other in order to have a stable border to pursue their economic growth, thereby consolidating their legitimacy and coherence. Hence, Sino-Indian cold peace were maintained.

Chapter 9 Incoherent States and the Impossible Warm Peace between 1988 and 2013

Benjamin Miller's theory that the degree of state-to-nation balance conditions the effectiveness of conflict resolution will provide the focus for this chapter, which explores why China and India cannot transcend their differences to a state of warm peace due to the problem of the state-to-nation imbalance associated with the territorial disputes being not resolved between 1988 and 2013. The chapter will examine the intractable state-to-nation problems experienced by China and India (Figure 9.1): firstly, how China's internal state-to-nation incongruence, which manifested itself in the 2008 Tibet revolts, led to the failure to resolve Sino-Indian territorial disputes, secondly, the problems of external incongruence for China of Tibetan refugees fleeing to India and how this led to sustained mutual distrust in both countries and China's revisionist territorial claims, and thirdly, the state-to-nation imbalance, which resulted in the strengthening of their defensive infrastructures and an increase in armed forces along the borders, leading to an intensification of the security dilemma. The chapter will show how all these elements led to difficulties in resolving border disputes for both countries and how it cast a shadow over attempts to forge warm peace, which appears to be unattainable.

Figure 9-1: The Sino-Indian unresolved state-to-nation problems (/ : referred to, → : caused)



9.1 Theories

9.1.1 The alternative theoretical explanations on the unsettled Sino-Indian territorial disputes

One of the necessary conditions of Miller's definition of warm peace and the long-term period of peace depended on the resolution of outstanding conflicts and an agreement on state's boundary (Miller&Kagan, 1997:46;Vasquez&Valeriano, 2008:202;Vasquez&Henehan, 2011). It follows, therefore, that the unresolved territorial disputes, discussed in Chapter 7, were the main cause for China and India going to war and remain the principal barrier preventing warm peace.

From a Chinese perspective, apart from some offshore and maritime territorial issues, India remained the only state with a substantial unresolved land border dispute with it (Fravel, 2008:172). While China and Japan never undertook official negotiations in the last two decades regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes (Tiezzi, 2015); by contrast, since the late 1980s, China and India have attempted to settle their territorial disputes by staging nearly forty rounds of diplomatic negotiations; however, they did not resolve them. So, why were they unable to resolve the disputes? Even though the literature has mainly focused on the causes of territorial disputes and not so much on the management and settlement of territorial disputes (Kacowicz, 1994;Frazier, 2006;Powell&Wiegand, 2010), this section will explore the theoretical explanations in terms of three IR paradigms by summarizing the existing research on the factors affecting Chinese and Indian approach to resolve their territorial disputes, and appraise these theoretical perspectives.

1. Realist paradigm

The dominant realist paradigm, which included the factors of balance of power, and balance of threat, explains how states manage their territorial disputes (Hongyi, 2009:491). The first factor –power– changes in the distribution of power and a state's ability to project military power means that states adopt different approaches towards settling disputes.

Mearsheimer (2001:43) points out that one approach, deriving from offensive realism, implies that states tend to use of force in order to maximize their security by gaining strategic territory. However, with regard to China, Fravel (2008:4; 2010:529) contends that China has rarely exploited its military superiority in order either to bargain for the territory it claims, or that it seizes it through force, as evidenced both in the 1962 Sino-Indian war and with a view to possible future armed conflict. India's four wars with Pakistan over Kashmir appears to be a similar case, in that India did not assert its military superiority to recover Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Bose, 2007:155;Kapur, 2010:107). Both these cases contradict the expectation of offensive realism.

Moreover, balance of power theory implies that a state's territorial compromise is rooted in the changes of the balance of power. As Hyer (1995:37) contends, China's handling of its

boundary disputes with neighbors in the 1960s and its off-land South China Sea disputes in the 1970-80s maintained a favorable balance of power approach. Wolf (2006:201-2) offers a similar view, in that China reached territorial compromises with its weaker, less threatening neighbors in order to form an alliance to balance against the stronger one. For example, China offered territorial compromise to Burma and Pakistan in the 1960s in order to balance against the stronger India and the Soviet Union. However, this does not explain China's territorial compromise in the 1990s, since its territorial settlement with Russia when Russia was established at a time when Russia was not a weak power (Wolf&Fravel, 2006:205).

The second realist paradigm factor – threat – derives from Walt's balance of threat theory (1990:5) which involves choosing either a compromise, or the use of force, in order to counter both internal and external threat. For example, states can offer territorial concession either to form alliances externally or to strengthen state's stability internally. This version of the realist approach implies that, when an adversary wished to strengthen its relative position in a territorial disputes inaction could be costly, hence it may choose the use of force as a resolution. On the other hand, where an adversary's power has been weakened, a window of opportunity may open for a more dominant state to seize land (Fravel, 2008:6-7). As discussed in Chapter 7, the consideration of India's launching "forward policy" in 1960 was to exploit China's weakness. Moreover, according to Fravel's research (2008:6), China's offer of territorial concessions with twelve neighboring countries, which even included acceptance of their historical legacy of "unequal treaties" that had been ceded to foreign countries, was a result of its "regime insecurity" due to ethnic insurgencies and crises of legitimacy. After the post-Cold War, by contrast, unlike during the Cold War, though, China and India did not face external threats from the Soviet Union or the US. Regarding internal threats, Fravel (2005:50) contends that China was fully capable of controlling Tibet, decreasing its willingness to make concessions. John Garver (1996:343) concurred, stating that Zhou Enlai's 1960 proposal to relinquish the eastern sector was made at a time when the PRC was weak and isolated, which, later, was no longer the case.

2. Liberalist paradigm

This approach explains the likelihood of resolution of territorial disputes, including the factors of regime types, international institutions, and trade and economic interdependence. The first factor of regime types implies that, while democracies settle border conflicts in more peaceful ways, undemocratic states intend to use forces to settle disputes (Huth&Allee, 2002;Gibler&Tir, 2010). Moreover, a singular type of political regime might form a normative consensus thus creating an environment conducive to peaceful settlement (Kacowicz, 1994:38). As Fravel (2008:2) mentions, in the Sino-Indian case, regime type is an insufficient factor to explain how authoritarian China has managed to resolve seventeen territorial disputes out of its twenty-three disputes, whilst, by contrast, democratic India has only resolved two out of five of its border disputes and these included

very minor territories and enclaves (Rahman, 2015). Hence, democratic India did less well than autocratic China, even though India did not have any border wars with its neighbors other than China and Pakistan. Therefore, this thesis argues that there are multiple reasons, rather than a single regime-based factor for its border disputes with China not being settled.

The second factor of international institutions suggests that international institutions are guarantee of conflict prevention and the international regulatory norms have impact on the opposition of territorial revisionism (Kocs, 1995;Zacher, 2001:215). A consensus on international norms determines the likelihood of a successful settlement of territorial disputes (Kacowicz, 1994:46;Krasner, 1983:195). However, the prerequisite for a successful conflict resolution is that states would submit their disputes to the international institutions on a voluntary basis. Both China and India have confined their boundary issues in a bilateral basis and were reluctant to submit to any third-party negotiation or international arbitration.

The third factor of trade and economic interdependence, discussed in Section 2.1 and 3.3, was insignificant that when China and India began their border negotiations in the late 1980s when bilateral trade was at a low level. After the mid-2000s, by contrast, when bilateral trade had reached a historic high, border negotiations were reduced to an impasse, even though both states had strong incentives to resolve their issues, in that both preferred a peaceful border in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic developments. Chung (2007a:152) also supported this argument when he states that trade has yet to become a major motivation factor for settlement to be pursued.

3. Social constructivist paradigm

Even though constructivism contains no direct theory of territorial settlement, territory-related issues, such as historical memory and legacy, and the construction of national identity, might offer clues for thinking that constructivism-oriented approaches contribute to conflict resolutions (Jackson, 2009:182;Tint, 2010:370;Cho, 2012:299). The historical legacies of conflict make the tasks of leaders, who wish to make concessions on territory, more difficult. This is especially true regarding unsettled Sino-Japanese territorial disputes arising from the memories of the Nanjing Massacre in 1943 (Yoshida, 2009:5) and the Sino-Indian disputes due to the Indian traumatic defeat of the 1962 war. Indian scholars (Ganguly, 1989:1127;Singh, 2011a:88) have argue that India took an uncompromising position on the border negotiations and claimed that both sectors were Indian territory because it was unwilling to legitimize China's gains of Aksai Chin, taken by force in the 1962 border war. Moreover, some indicated that India missed two chances to accept China's swap proposal to resolve the territorial disputes due to Nehru's concept of Indian "territory" being non-negotiable when Zhou En-lai and Deng proposed this swap deal, either in recognition of China's weakness, or to adopt a conciliatory approach in order to prioritize economic development (Maxwell, 2011b;Singh, 1976:78;Ramachandran, 2007;Mansingh,

2007a:124). Hence, Nehru's core belief of "territory", which was defined by Indian traditional greatness and ancient customary administration dated back before the British colonial rule (Garver, 2001:88-9), may be conceptualized in constructivist terms. In particular, Maxwell (2011b:79) attributes the unresolved border disputes to the "Nehruvian legacy of non-negotiation", which during the numerous rounds of fruitless border negotiations, left India permanently at its 1960 position of insisting that China should surrender Aksai Chin and accept the McMahon Line as the legitimate border.

However, constructivism also suggests that elites' changing values may guide the principles of settlement of disputes. As discussed in the documentary analysis at 2.3.1, the emphasis of the "*Panch Sheel*", or the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" appeared on eleven occasions out of fourteen state summits between 1988 and 2014. In particular, China has established a framework for settling boundary disputes with Burma, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in the 1960s, and Vietnam in the 1990s, based on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", particularly, "respect for each other state's sovereignty" (Chung, 2004:100;Pan, 2009:215). However, these principles were criticized by the Indian media since it considered that China had violated them by regularly encroaching across the LAC (Panda, 2014). Therefore, such ideational factors, which were seen to be an effort by leaders to generate trust and friendly discourse, stayed at official levels only without spilling over to the societal and public domains, thereby reflecting public mistrust.

The other ideational factor – national identity– influences a state's security practices and its approach to territorial disputes, in that sovereignty territory provides for the foundation of a homeland from states to form a national identity (Toft, 2003). As scholars, such as Gilboy and Heginbotham(2012:xxi) and Ogden(2013:256) note, the norms of territorial restoration has shaped China's security identity whereby their elites hold the responsibility for sustaining national unity and protecting the historically informed territory. Moreover, both states not only define the maintenance of territorial integrity as a core national interest, but they also consider it as supporting the legitimacy of their regimes. Therefore, national identity underlies both states' approach to settle territorial disputes with neighbours and cope with separatist movements. This thesis, therefore, argues that national identity especially could explain the disputed territory as it relates to national unification, such as are the cases of Taiwan and Tibet to China, and Kashmir to India, hence leaving no space for concession; a factor that is consistent with Miller's variable of internal state-to-nation incongruence, which will be discussed at 9.3.

4. Domestic politics factors

Fravel (2005) and Tir (2010) state that domestic politics, which are important for explaining both the causes and the termination of territorial disputes, include such factors as ideologies, domestic accountability and mobilization, while Kacowicz (1994:55) and Goertz and Diehl (1992) add nationalism, ethnic ties cross national boundaries, and the value of the

territory, to the list. Firstly, according to Chung (2004:169), Sino-Indian border war was not caused by ideological differences, since this would not be considered as determinants for settlement due to the logic of causality. However, ideological factors, such as the five principles of peaceful coexistence could be characterized as constructivist factor that might possibly become guiding principles for settlement.

The second domestic factors – domestic accountability and mobilization– suggest that states seem to be prone to using force to settle territorial disputes in order to deflect attention from social unrest, rather than to make concessions. Moreover, under the pressure of nationalism, leaders are limited to make concessions for fear to lose their domestic support (Wiegand, 2011:32). It seems that, due to domestic nationalism, neither state was willing to make concessions for fear of being criticized for losing territory (Shirk, 2008:62;Fravel, 2005:82). For China, its authoritarian leadership faced increasing vocal nationalist groups, which left it with limited space for offering territorial concessions. The Chinese professor Wang Yiwei concurs by noting that India lost an opportunity to settle the boundary question when Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong were alive. President Hu Jintao is not Deng or Mao. He is strong but he cannot be compared with them; he cannot make decisions without regard to domestic nationalism (Ramachandran, 2007). India's sensationalist media, in turn, harbours strong anti-China sentiments. Therefore, it is likewise hard for India to offer concessions owing to public perceptions; moreover, the passage referring to territorial revisions in its national constitution requires a two- thirds majority, which is always difficult to obtain (Smith, 2013:62).

However, in 2008, China resolved a fifty-year old territorial dispute with Russia by a *quid-pro-quo* agreement. China ceded part of the Heixiazi Island in the Ussuri river segment, which had been territory conceded to the Tsarist Empire by the Qing dynasty and considered the result of an imperialist intervention; thus, this triggered some nationalist grievances. However, this demonstrates that territorial disputes can be finally resolved, even in the face of nationalist oppositions (Wiegand, 2011:231;Carlson, 2003:688). Another argument that longstanding rivalry is an obstacle to settling territorial disputes was also dispelled in 2008, when China offered substantial territorial concessions to Russia and Vietnam, even though it had experienced longstanding hostility, and even border wars, with both countries (Smith, 2013). India, on the other hand, by overcoming the difficulties of constitutional amendments and severe domestic opposition, completed 162 land and population enclaves exchanges with Bangladesh in 2015, thereby ending century-long territorial disputes (Shewly, 2016;Rahman, 2015). The question, therefore, must be posed as to why the same process could not be applied to Sino-Indian territorial issues?

Another important domestic factor regarding settlements of disputes is the value of the territory concerned (Huth, 1996;Tir, 2003;Hensel&Mitchell, 2005). In particular, states are more likely to revert to armed conflict when disputed territories have strategic value. Such value would be determined by their locations and their physical, symbolic and nationalist

characteristics, particularly where they are ethnic links to home lands. In such cases, it is less likely that states would offer concessions. This thesis, therefore, argues that territorial value, as in this case of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, where ethnic ties cross national boundaries, are consistent with Miller's variable of state-to-nation incongruence. This will be discussed in the following section.

The multi-dimensional explanations derived from existing IR theoretical approaches help to understand the puzzle of why Sino-Indian territorial disputes were unsettled. Much scholarly literature has questioned why Sino-Indian border issues could not have been settled due to the lack of external threats, over the salience of territory, nationalism and national identity. However, those analyses were mostly focused on the period of the 1960s (see Chapter 7), although some were from the 1990s, such as Dutta (2011:1822), Hongi (2009), Fravel (2008) and Jacob (2011b), while few focused on the period after 2000s. Some factors that were constant, such as nationalism and the value of territory, are no longer seen as the barriers for China-Russian, China-Vietnamese, or India-Bangladeshi territorial disputes in the post-Cold War period; however, there appears to be no explanation regarding why this has not been so in the Sino-Indian case. This thesis argues that the answer to the question is the problem of state-to-nation imbalance: the Chinese considers Tibet part of the Chinese nation and China's territorial sovereignty to have been violated by the British India in the early 1900s and India in the period of the post-Sino-Indian border war. China and India cannot reach a border agreement until China resolves the Tibet issue. China's state-to-nation imbalance, involving another state, India, made concession unlikely and this led both to its revisionist claims on Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang, and to incurring the distrust of India, which in turn, intensified the security dilemma.

9.1.2 Reviewing Benjamin Miller's theory applied to the Sino-Indian case

Miller argues that the presence of coherent and democratic states brings about a high level of warm peace by way of a successful conflict resolution process (see figure 9.2). Coherent states are characterized by a combination of successful state-building— i.e. strong states – and nation-building – i.e. state-to-nation congruence. Rather than relying on external powers, local actors ought to focus on directly addressing state-to-nation issues by negotiation and conflict resolution, thereby resolving both outstanding territorial boundary issues and reducing the motivations for states to go to war (2007a:309-311; Miller, 2005:235).

Figure 9-2: The causal chain of the outbreak of warm peace

State-to-nation balance (successful state-building and nation-building) ➡ conflict resolution ➡ warm peace

Source: Miller (2007: pp. 309-11)

Miller also proposes a possible resolution to conflict that involves democratization, in that those states suffering from the problems of state-to-nation imbalance can strengthen their national congruence in the long term. Democratic states could reduce ethnic-based discrimination and enjoy domestic legitimacy, leading to status quo (2005:246). However, such a resolution does not fit the Sino-Indian case because China is not democratic. Also, as mentioned in 9.1.1, regime type is an insignificant factor that China has settled its disputes with 17 neighbours. Nevertheless, Miller cites South American countries as cases where relatively successful state-building had led to effective regional conflict resolution – even in the absence of democracy– since the state-to-nation balance remained constant through the late 19th century and into the 20th century⁸⁵. Thus, Miller isolates the effect of the variable of state strength and shows that, when combined with low level of national incongruence, it can generate a *status quo* orientation, thereby helping with conflict resolution (Miller, 2007a:330). Miller’s theory may be summarised in the following two propositions.


Proposition 1: if the regional actors are not democratic, coherent states referred to strong states and low levels of national incongruence, generate *status-quo* orientations and lead to warm peace (Miller, 2007a:316).

However, as mentioned in Chapter 8, successful state-building should follow of successful nation-building. Under the condition of state-to-nation incongruence, either internally or externally, states are characterized as ‘revisionist’ states that bring about different regional outcomes.

Proposition 2: strong states, with high levels of state-to-nation incongruence, are incoherent and characterized by dissatisfaction of current regional order on nationalist grounds, such as territorial and boundary problems and refugees; hence, they are inclined to pursue revisionist agenda, thereby making conflict resolution less likely. Moreover, unresolved problems have a destabilising effect (see figure 9.3), thus creating a security dilemma, which may lead, firstly, to revisionist challenges, and secondly, to hot war. In the presence of a hegemon, some destabilizing effects on regional stability are moderated if state-to-nation imbalances are unresolved, thereby leading to either a cold peace or a cold war (Miller, 2007a:191,197).

⁸⁵ South American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, suffered few ethnic conflicts and had been able to resolve most territorial disputes by the early twentieth century.

Figure 9-3: The effect of state-to-nation balance



Source: Miller (2007: p. 197)

I will follow Miller's approach in the following sections by examining the variables of state strength and state-to-nation congruence in order to explore whether *Proposition 1* explains the similar outcomes in Sino-Indian relations. In comparison to their relative positions in the 1980s, the state strengths of both China and India between the 1990s and 2010s grew considerably, with particular regard to Chinese Tibet and Indian Arunachal Pradesh. However, with the presence of strong states, the levels of state-to-nation incongruence have led to different outcomes. Either the case accords with *Proposition 1*, which is that coherent states generate status-quo orientations when combined with low level of national incongruence, thereby leading to warm peace, or it accords with *Proposition 2*, whereby strong states that have high levels of incongruence lead to incoherence, where there are still many unresolved issues related to the legitimacy of boundaries and the settlement of refugees, thus intensifying the security dilemma and making successful conflict resolution unlikely.

9.2 State-building

9.2.1 China and India: strong states

Benjamin Miller (2007a:58-59, 316) categorizes China and India as being strong states, in that they have effective institutions capable of implementing their policies and extracting national resources. In the light of neither state being able to resolve their border disputes, its ability to implement its policy needs to be analysed in light of the situation in the disputed border areas in order to explore the true extent of their state strength, which is determined by whether the states have been able to suppress their secessionist groups and consolidate their domestic legitimacy.

The provinces involved are Tibet and Xinjiang in China and Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh in India, all four of which are home to large ethnic minorities whose identities set them apart from the majority populations. With the exception of Arunachal Pradesh, three of these provinces have severe problems of state-to-nation imbalance, characterized by ethnic conflicts and militant insurgencies. For instance, Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed area between India and Pakistan, over which three full-blown wars have been fought (Cohen, 2002;Ganguly, 2001;Kapur, 2010), while Tibet, which experienced a border war in 1962, is situated in the disputed area between China and India (Sperling, 2010;Pardesi, 2011;Topgyal, 2011). Xinjiang – a Uyghur (Muslim) separatist trouble-spot –

and the Jammu and Kashmir, involve more Sino-Pakistan and Indo-Pakistani tensions respectively (Haider, 2005b;Kapur, 2011a), rather than Sino-Indian, tensions, which placed them beyond the scope of this thesis. In order to focus specifically on Sino-Indian relations, this section will concentrate on Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh.

9.2.2 The irritants over Arunachal Pradesh between 2006 and 2010

After the onset of cold peace in 1988, China's claim on Arunachal Pradesh continued to be limited, until 2006, when the Chinese ambassador, Sun Yuxi, revived its claim⁸⁶, which was made a week before China's President Hu's visit to India. China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh resurfaced in the media and official domains, causing a series of tit-for-tat and contentious events that affected Sino-Indian relations (Table 9.1). For example, in 2007, China denied visas to officials from Arunachal Pradesh on the ground that it belonged to China, hence no visas were required. India countered by allowing the Taiwanese presidential candidate, Ma Ying-Juou, to visit New Delhi and hold talks with senior Indian officials. In 2008, China extended the denial of visas to Indian officers from the "disputed" territories, such as Sikkim, Jammu and Kashmir; instead, it issued them with staple visas⁸⁷ since it declared them to be Chinese citizens⁸⁸. In 2009, in response to Indian Prime Minister Singh's first prime official visit to Arunachal Pradesh in more than ten years, China tried to block an Asian Development Bank (ADB) \$ 2.9 billion loan to India's four-year Country Partnership Proposal (CPP), including \$60 million for irrigation and flood control in Arunachal Pradesh. This is the first time the Chinese had made their territorial claim to Arunachal Pradesh in an international forum. The loan was only delayed; nevertheless, it irritated India, causing some belligerent media rhetoric and suspension of diplomatic exchanges.

⁸⁶ In November 2006, Sun Yuxi, replying to a question by an Indian interviewer from CNN-IBN television about the border disputes, said that "in our position, the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, including Tawang".

⁸⁷ Staple visas were loose sheets of paper rather than passport stamps, which were the norm for other Indian citizens.

⁸⁸ From an Indian perspective, Sikkim has ceased to be an issue since the Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 when, in a Joint Declaration, China described Sikkim as an Indian state.

Table 9-1 : The tit-for-tat irritants over Arunachal Pradesh (AP)

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1962 | Border war |
| 1986 and 1987 | Border standoffs |
| 2006 December | The Chinese ambassador, Sun Yuxi, revived China's claim over AP |
| 2007 May | China denied visa to Ganesh Koyu, an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer from AP from visiting Beijing, claiming he was a Chinese citizen. |
| 2007 June | India allowed Taiwanese presidential candidate, Ma Ying-Juou, to visit India and held talks with senior officials. |
| 2008 January | Indian Prime Minister Singh made his first official visit to AP in more than ten years. |
| 2008 May | The Chinese foreign minister claimed that Sikkim was a disputed area. |
| 2009 March | China tried to block a \$60 million loan from Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the AP irrigation and flood control project. |
| 2009 December and 2010 January | Prime Minister Singh visited AP in an election campaign. After AP's state elections, China protested. |
| 2010 August | China rejected Indian Northern Commander Lt. Gen B.S. Jaswal's visit to China because he was responsible for sensitive border areas, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. In return, India suspended defenses exchanges, and refused to hold the third round of joint military exercises. |
| 2012 January | China denied a visa to an Indian officer from AP as he was a member of ADD-related (Annual Defense Dialogue) visiting military delegation. In response, India called off the entire trip. |
| 2012 April | China "quietly" stopped issuing staple visas after the BRICs summits. |

Source: Media coverage

There are two questions related to Arunachal Pradesh: firstly, why did China renew its territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh in 2006? And, secondly, how much did the irritants influence Sino-Indian relations?

Question 1: Why China's claim on Arunachal Pradesh remerged in 2006? Some research offered explanations. Firstly, China's sensitivity to India's enthusiasm for an "India-US" strategic partnership, which included defence and nuclear cooperation, and the implication of "encircling" China, thus threatening China (Garver&Wang, 2010:244;Dutta, 2008);

however, India's "thaw" with the US began as far back as the early 2000s⁸⁹, which does not explain the exact timing. Secondly, China used this assertive territorial claim as diplomatic leverage over border negotiations (Economist, 2010:784;Goswami, 2011). Thirdly, China's internal insecurity in Tibet led to a modification of its foreign policy (Goswami, 2010:4).

Although this thesis argues that these factors may offer incentives that could affect China's revisionist behaviour, an underlying cause for the change in policy was that Sun Yuxi's comment, which was clearly a revision, appeared to be a response to India's interpretation of the "2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question" that was arrived at during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005. Article 7 of the Agreement had stipulated that "the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border area". India's interpretation was that the more than one million Indian citizens settled in Arunachal Pradesh, together with 39,000 people in the Tawang district, would be included, which was in accordance with India's longstanding territorial claim (Garver&Wang, 2010:246). This interpretation was challenged by China on the grounds that it undermined its sovereign identity, which it regarded as a core national interest. As Miller's theory indicates (2007a:97), a state-to-nation imbalance generates revisionist challenges against the legitimacy of the state. Accordingly, China's revisionist territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh stemmed from the threat to its legitimacy, in the overlapping territorial claims made by both India and China.

9.2.3 The intensification of the security dilemma

How the irritants influenced the Sino-Indian relations? China's revisionist claim on Arunachal Pradesh caused the cancellations of some official exchanges and the postponement of border negotiations. More positively, however, they were superseded by high-level leadership exchanges, which guaranteed the peaceful settlements of disputes through negotiations. Their more negative consequences, though, gave rise to the intensification of the security dilemma between the countries and a deadlock to border resolutions.

In the mid-1990s, arms reductions were facilitated by mutual confidence building measures (CBMs) and Sino-Indian border agreements in 1993 and 1996. However, according to several sources, China and India have respectively strengthened their defensive infrastructures by deploying more troops and building new posts and roads along their borders since 2006 (Sakhuja, 2009;Rajagopalan&Prasad., 2010;Sahgal, 2011); hence, a militarized Sino-Indian border has re-emerged.

⁸⁹ In particular, the Indo-US nuclear Deal began in July 2005, subsequently the related domestic negotiations finished in 2008, China's response has been discussed at Chapter 6.

India's concerns were triggered by a series of Chinese actions: firstly, its massive border infrastructure development in Tibet enhancing the PLA's (People's Liberation Army) forward presence and logistic capabilities (Rajagopalan&Prakash, 2013:11); secondly, its large-scale military exercises in 2009 to test the PLA's long range power projection capability to counter sudden events in Tibet and Xinjiang; thirdly, its deployment – reported by the US in 2010- of intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental missiles at Delingha, north of Tibet, which could be capable of targeting north Indian territory (Sperling, 2010:69;The US Defense Department, 2010:5).

In response to China's military upgrade in the border regions, India increased its infrastructure network and troop deployments. For instance, in 2009, it dispatched an additional two divisions of armed forces comprising 25,000 to 30,000 personnel along the border to Arunachal Pradesh, and announced its intention to deploy two squadrons of Su-30 fighter jets in Arunachal Pradesh (Sakhuja, 2009). In 2011, it announced a \$13 billion military modernization plan to recruit 10,000 soldiers over the following five years, for deployment alongside the Sino-Indian border, and built air strips, helipads and deployed supersonic cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh in order to reduce the "military gap". These moves represented India's biggest troop increase and infrastructure increases since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war (Parameswaran, 2012).

India's response to China's infrastructure and deployment forces in Arunachal Pradesh is consistent with Miller's *Proposition 2* – that the state-to-nation imbalance is a key factor in accounting for the intensity of the security dilemma. There are three underlying arguments for such a conclusion:

China's original Tibet policy was economic development in order to address dual strategic and security concerns; that is, economic growth and social stability. However, social stability was to become the driving force behind its massive deployment of forces and infrastructure construction in Tibet, implying that its control over Tibet, as a result of the recurrent riots, had become insecure, thereby leading to a state-to-nation imbalance. This was particularly true in that the 2006 opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway not only aimed at communicating with the Inner land of China for the economic reason but also being able to amass an extra 100,000 armed forces from outside TAR in a six week period for security concern in order to suppress the domestic riots (Rajagopalan&Prakash, 2013:11). In addition to the reported deployment of nuclear weapons⁹⁰, the improved mobilization of logistic forces, as an effort to consolidate state strength over Tibet, which ultimately led to its militarization, gave India great cause for concern. Therefore, China's internal security build-up inadvertently has become an external threat to India since there were signs that they were becoming involved

⁹⁰ The military nuclear base was reportedly located at Delingha in Qinghai province, with a stock of ballistic missiles.

in races on infrastructure and troop deployments (Ramachandran, 2008; Sperling, 2010:69). It accords with Miller's theory that (2007a:121) a state-to-nation imbalance with respect to Tibet creates insecurity, in that each state has to prepare to meet potential threats, which results in destabilization and, eventually, a security dilemma.

Miller (2007a:121) also argues that the security dilemma, produced by a state-to-nation imbalance, is caused by insecurity brought about by competing territorial and demographic claims. If the Sino-Indian border disputes had been settled and an agreement reached, a joint assurance of infrastructure construction could have presented an opportunity for improvement of trade and communications (Mishra&Upadhyay, 2004; Jacob, 2007). Arguably, the intractability of the border disputes led to the particular tensions on Arunachal Pradesh after 2006, which have become a destabilizing factor. Hence, China's revisionist claim on Arunachal Pradesh exposed the fact that neither state could resolve the enduring territorial disputes and that these led to a state of persistent insecurity in the region.

Consequently, this assessment accords with John Herz's definition of security dilemma (Herz, 1950): China's augmentation of infrastructure along the border due to its insecurity in Tibet and the unresolved border disputes were perceived by India as a threat of future potential military confrontation and as opening up a gap in its defense, thereby leading to India's growing insecurity and its taking self-help measures by increasing forces and border infrastructure. It also bears out Miller's arguments that, under the conditions of state-to-nation imbalance, realist factors are highly influential. Both countries were concerned about relative gains, which is consistent with Miller's definition of cold peace (2007a:45). Military factors, such as national security outweighing mutual trade, dictate the direction of a mutual relationship. So, despite the reopening of border trade at Nathu La on the Tibet-Sikkim border in 2006, India imposed regulations on trade goods and was also unwilling to open some traditional Arunachal Pradesh trade routes because of security consideration (Jacob, 2011b:44).

After 2007, India's media accused China of increasingly encroaching across the LAC, which was perceived by India as perfidy rather than partnership (Medcalf, 2014). Indian military personnel contended that China's road-building and aerial patrolling demonstrated an aggressive violation of the terms of the 1996 Agreement on Building Confidence Building Measure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the 2005 Protocol on Confidence Building Measure (Jacob, 2011a:135). However, the Indian media reports were repeatedly denied by China and they were also downplayed by India's Ministry of External Affairs trying to reduce the quarrel, because the LAC was never clearly delimited on the ground and there was disagreement from both sides about its interpretation.

The incursions of which each side accused the other was interpreted as "military patrols in the disputed territory", since the intention of each side was to reinforce its claim over the

LAC and certain parts of the disputed frontier, such as Chinese patrols on Tawang and parts of Ladakh and Indian patrols on Aksai Chin, by creating the evidence of their presence, such as piles of stone, cigarettes and cans (Holslag, 2010:124). Indian strategists (Rajagopalan&Prakash, 2013:2) agree that the LAC is a matter of perception, which reflects both complexities and flexibility. The complexities implied that potential confrontations could happen due to the un-delimited border; whereas the flexibility implied the conflicts could be managed through diplomacy. On one hand, the so called “incursions” no doubt have intensified the security dilemma, but moderated by both sides’ restraint on the other (Holslag, 2010:124). As the Indian Express (Pubby, 2008) described, when both sides came face to face with each other at disputed areas, both sides exercised restraint and adopted a standard practice of raising flags and shouting “*hindi chini bhai bhai*” (Indians and Chinese are brothers), and then disengaged.

This kind of security dilemma during the cold peace was less severe than the cold war with heavy militarization and the pre-1962 war with several military skirmishes for two reasons. Firstly, the primary aims of the increasing military deployments were to manage domestic turmoil, for China this being in Tibet, for India the insurgencies in Kashmir and rebellions in the north-east. In particular, both countries do not view each other as short-term threats, but rather as long-term potential threats (Singh, 2012a:154). Secondly, the posture of force deployments and military patrols along the borders appeared to be defensive rather than offensive (Anand, 2012), thereby moderating the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978). Given the establishment of CBMs over the last two decades, institutionalized military exchange meetings and cultural activities, such as mountain expeditions and sports, could help moderate border tensions. Moreover, the military strategies of force deployment were more focused on defensive mobilization rather than offensive attack. Also, the strategies of nuclear deterrence taken by both sides tend to aim at a minimal deterrence rather than cold-war-like mutual assured destruction (Saalman, 2011a:111). As Holslag (2010:140) contends, Sino-Indian border military deployment is far from an arms race, nor is either looking for military supremacy at the border; rather both are seeking rather to develop the capabilities to react flexibly to a wide range of challenges.

In summary, this episode accords with Miller’s *Proposition 2* that a strong state with state-to-nation incongruence leads to a revisionist state. Chinese and Indian state strength shown in the form of infrastructure construction and force build-up, alongside the state-to-nation incongruence, including China’s revision of territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh, the subsequent irritants originating from the unresolved territorial disputes, and races of infrastructure and troop deployment, exacerbated the security dilemma, thereby preventing the Sino-Indian cold peace from moving forward to warm peace and making the cold peace reversible.

9.3 The influence of the 2008 Tibet revolts on Sino-Indian relations

According to Miller's theory, successful nation-building includes the provision of non-material symbolic functions to the population through a national educational system, the media, and mythmaking. It also includes the promotion of a national language and the creation of identities, and if it is successful, it leads to identification of ethnic groups with the state and its territorial identity (Miller, 2005:244; 2007a:315). However, nation-building process may either fail or have destabilizing effects on the externalization of domestic conflict, and national-ethnic minorities who wish to exercise the right to self-determination.

The 2008 Tibet revolts, which revealed China's internal state-to-nation incongruence that was the failure of integrating Tibetan identity into Chinese identity, were a source of domestic turmoil and affected Sino-Indian relations in two ways. Firstly, after the revolts, some irritants emerged which resulted in some intense constraints on Sino-Indian relations, mainly due to China's territorial claim over India's Tawang. Moreover, India's subtle change regarding Tibet also added fuel to the fire. However, Sino-Indian relations did not revert to a state of cold, or even hot, war but a cold peace was maintained. The reasons why appear to be as follows:

1. *India's dual positions on Tibet*

Even though the Indian media and all Indian political parties unequivocally condemned China's policy on Tibet, the official positions remained politically cautious and diplomatically neutral, which was consistent with Delhi's official statements regarding the 1989 Lhasa revolts. Hence there was no change in its stance on Tibet; i.e., it stated categorically that, firstly, Tibet was a part of China, secondly, it would not allow Tibetan demonstrations against China, which resulted in the arrest of a hundred Tibetan protestors in India in March 2008, and thirdly, it would not either exploit China's domestic turmoil or sabotage its Olympic Games (Muni, 2008).

India's caution was attributed to, firstly, its need for China's support in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) vote on the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, secondly, its desire not to escalate cross-border tensions, as happened in the 1959 Tibet revolts, and thirdly, its reigning Congress party being part of a coalition, comprising left-wing, pro-China parties (Paradesi, 2011:115;Raman, 2008). India's stance was appreciated by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who stated that he expected India to 'follow the agreements reached between the two countries and handle this issue in a correct way' (Muni, 2008;Chu, 2008). Hence, India's restraint over the Tibet revolts contributed to the maintenance of the Sino-Indian cold peace.

However, during the 2008 revolts, India's stance subtly changed when its Ministry of External Affairs sympathized with Tibetan protestors by expressing, orally, his distress on hearing the reports of "the unsettled situation and violence in Lhasa and the deaths of

innocent people” (Chu, 2008). This demonstrated a dual strategy that politically upheld the “One China policy” while offering humanitarian support to the Tibetan refugees. As a consequence of this dual approach, India has highlighted Tibetan refugee problems and stirred up China’s sensitivity, which has damaged its relationship with China and opened it up to a retaliatory response, such as China’s blocking a loan from Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India and expanding territorial disputes to Kashmir and Sikkim by issuing stapled visas (see Table 9.2).

2. *The problems of Tibetan refugees*

The existence of Tibetan refugees is a form of external incongruence that has become an unresolvable Sino-Indian problem. Firstly, China accused the “Dalai clique” of orchestrating the 2008 revolts and, secondly, China sees India’s support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees as being tantamount to supporting “separatists” against it.

The Tibetan *diaspora*⁹¹ in India, according to the 2009 census, amounted to 94,203, and refugees have become a fact of life⁹². National identity with the refugees still being strong after experiencing fifty-years under different regimes, or living in different countries, there nevertheless is a cultural and social gap between them and Tibetans inside China (Martini, 2011;Shakya, 2008). Not only would it be difficult for a refugee to return to Tibet and submit to a Chinese nation-state, but China’s internal incongruence would hardly attract him or her to return. Therefore, if Tibet really did accord with the Chinese statement that the state was “one big happy family, with all Tibetans living in harmony and working together”, many would surely have surrendered their alienated identities and returned home. However, since 1985, each year, thousands of Tibetans, risking death, have crossed the Himalayas via Nepal to India to seek asylum (Blondeau&Buffetrille, 2008:98). It is unlikely that China, in the near or medium future, will ever grant greater religious freedom or genuine autonomy to Tibet, whereas it would be impossible for China to dilute the linkage between the Tibetans inside Tibet and Tibetan refugees in India.

As a consequence, China continues to suspect India’s intention toward Tibet, in spite of India accepting China’s sovereignty over Tibet and restricting the flows of Tibetans since 2003 (Tibet Justice Centre, 2011:17). Neither state is able to change the reality of Tibetan refugees unless China resolves the problem from within Tibet. Even though the irredentist forces have been subdued as a result of the Dalai Lama’s recognition of the “One China policy” and Indian respect of China’s sovereignty over Tibet, the external state-to-nation

⁹¹ There were 13,514 Tibetan refugees in Nepal; 1,298 in Bhutan. See TGIE, Latest Report on "Second Tibetan Demographic Survey" Released, 2010.

⁹²India allows Tibetans to live in the state against an annually renewable Registration Certificate (RC), which everyone over must obtain; however, RCs have not been issued to new arrivals since 1987. The government also issues "Yellow Books" after a year’s residence, which allows Tibetans with an RC to travel abroad.

incongruence means that Tibet casts a long shadow over China's internal instability and Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. As for India, it has been unable to assuage China's fear about Tibet's instability, so it will find its domestic politics impossible to meet China's expectations on the Tibet question (Sikri, 2011). All of which demonstrates that state-to-nation imbalance – regarding Tibetan issues will continue to play an important part in Sino-Indian relations; as Miller's theory makes clear, the degree of state-to-nation balance conditions the effectiveness of different peace-making strategies (Miller, 2007a:310). Therefore, in accordance with Miller's Proposition 2, if a state-to-nation imbalance continues, as is the case with the unresolved Tibetan refugees' problems, conflict resolution is less likely to succeed.

9.4 The Tawang issue and the difficulties of territorial settlement

Tawang, which is located on the western extremity of Arunachal Pradesh, is home to the Monpa people, who practice Tibetan Buddhism and once paid tribute to rulers in Lhasa; hence, the town is an enclave of Tibetan religion and culture. However, Tawang, which was drawn into British Indian territory by the 1913-14 Simla Convention, was annexed by India in 1951. During the 1962 war, though, China occupied Tawang but then withdrew to the northern section of the McMahon line and returned the town to India after the unilateral ceasefire. Even though China consistently rejected the 1914 Simla Agreement, it claimed Arunachal Pradesh as its territory; however, it did not press its claim until the mid-1980s. Accordingly, China appears to have pursued revisionist territorial agenda twice during border negotiations: firstly, after 1985, when it revised its "swap proposal" by adding the return of Tawang, and secondly, after 2006, when it renewed its territorial claim on Arunachal Pradesh (discussed earlier), seemingly as a consequence of its problem with Tibet.

Both in the 1960s and in the early 1980s, the Chinese leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping respectively proposed a "swap proposal", which effectively would alter the LAC into an international boundary whereby China would accept India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian acceptance of China's claim to Aksai Chin in the western sector (Singh, 1976:78;Garver, 2001:243;Maxwell, 2011b;Ramachandran, 2007). The swap proposal was the result of China's security concerns and its political considerations regarding control of Tibet. In the 1960s, the main purpose of China's offer had been the recognition of the British Indian McMahon Line in exchange for Aksai Chin in order to consolidate its control of Tibet. In the early 1980s, however, Deng took a conciliatory approach in order to establish a peaceful border so that he could fully focus on economic development. Nevertheless, China's "swap deal" was proposed by way of "authoritative leadership" verbally rather than written on paper, which led to ambiguity in the subsequent border negotiations, allowing China, in the mid-1980s, to revise its "swap proposal" by adding Tawang to the swap list.

Four reasons are given for this addition and the latter three are beyond explanations by Miller's theory. Firstly, the state-to-nation imbalance: the Sino-Tibetan dialogue had reached a stalemate and the Dalai Lama's internationalization of the Tibet case was giving Beijing great cause for concern, thereby pushing it into a hard-line position, which resulted in its claim on Tawang (Smith, 2013:60). Hence, it was a motive for China to claim Tawang. China's revisionist position on border negotiation after 2006, which was discussed in 9.2, also showed Tibetan issues being the center of Chinese motivations. The 2008 Tibet revolts intensified China's insecurity regarding its control of Tibet and cast a shadow on its legitimate claim to the state; however, in the same year, India refused the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang, a decision that was reversed in 2009, although foreign media coverage was prohibited due to Chinese sensitivities. It was on this visit that the Dalai Lama deeply infuriated China when he announced, for the first time, that Tawang was part of India (India Times, 2009;Wong, 2009). To compound Chinese irritation, in November 2011, India allowed the Dalai Lama to give a lecture at an international Buddhism conference in New Delhi, in response to which, China cancelled the fifteenth Special Representatives level talks, although they were rescheduled for January 2012 (Burke, 2011). China's reaction was of a similar nature to its response in 1998 to India's nuclear tests, which India had blamed China for provoking.

From a Chinese perspective, the cornerstone of its Tibet policy was the defence of its sovereignty and the legitimacy of its rule, which it considered to be at the core of its national interests (Carlson, 2004). Therefore, it has maintained its claim to Tawang in the border negotiations and seen the acquisition of Tawang as legitimizing its control over the power of the Dalai Lama- hence Tibet as a whole (Sikri, 2009:97;Ramachandran, 2008;Smith, 2013). Therefore, China took the dilatory strategy that it would resolve the Tibet issue before it settled the border disputes with India.

Secondly, bargaining leverage: as Wiegand (2011:65) notes, states may be unwilling to make concessions in order to reach a settlement so that a territorial dispute can be used as leverage over other disputed issues. China used its claim over Arunachal Pradesh as a bargaining chip to compel India's concession of other disputed areas, such as either Aksai Chin or Tawang (Ramachandran, 2008). Unlike China's maintenance of the territorial *status-quo* during the 1980s and the early 1990s (Carlson, 2003), its revisionist claims over Arunachal Pradesh, in particular Tawang, due to the insecurity of the situation in Tibet, made the dispute more salient, which, in turn, made concessions difficult. As Garver (2001:106) points out, China sought to harden its position in the eastern sector in order to add a bargaining chip, thus ensuring that Beijing bargained on an equal footing⁹³.

⁹³ During the first stage of border talks (1981-1988), there existed a critical disagreement, inasmuch as India noted the eastern sector was least disputed and only the western sector (controlled by China) needed to be

Thirdly, a structural factor: Fravel (2008:7) mentions that the waning of the external threat decreases a state's inclination to make territorial concessions. The Soviet Union's neutral position on the 1986 Sino-Indian border skirmish and the ensuing Soviet normalization with China reduced China's inclination to make concessions vis-à-vis India (Singh, 2011a:88).

Fourthly, the ethnic and strategic value of the territory: scholars, such as Huth (1996) and Hensel and Mitchell (2005) suggest that, depending on the values of the territory concerned, a challenger state chooses a different strategy to settle disputes. Also that territorial disputes involving ethnic values are less likely to be resolved than disputes involving economic values. This could particularly explain the case of Tawang, which was both ethnic and symbolic value to China, and which accords with Miller's *proposition 2* that problems of state-to-nation imbalance make conflict resolution more difficult. Tawang was where the sixth Dalai Lama was born in the 17th century; also the current 13th Dalai Lama hinted that his successor might be born on Indian soil with a view to "finishing his unfinished business"⁹⁴. Since he appeared to be hinting that this might happen in Tawang, this drove China into a state of "nervous panic" since it might be construed that it had taken over Tawang to control the next Dalai Lama in order to protect its domestic legitimacy and national interests (Economist, 2012a; Gardner, 2009; Raman, 2007b; Twining, 2009). As Tibetan scholar, Dawa Norbu (2001:296), argues, China is patiently waiting for the death of the Dalai Lama to prevent India using Tibet as a bargaining chip. Coming from a different angle, an Indian scholar, Malik Mohan (2011:157), contends that the 2008 Tibet unrest had weakened China's negotiating leverage with India over Tawang due to its fragile control of Tibet. Therefore, China preferred an undefined border as a source of bargaining leverage until Tibet had been totally pacified and Sinicized, as Inner Mongolia had been, because China suspected India's involvement in the Tibetan separatist and independence movements.

However, Tawang is of its strategic and military importance to India for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the defence of its north-eastern region, since the southern Himalayan slopes offered tactical offensive advantages to the Chinese. Therefore, Indian control would increase the cost of Chinese military adventurism; hence, their reluctance to give up Tawang led to the resultant border talks stalemate (Pardesi, 2011; Hoffmann, 2006; Smith, 2014; Garver, 2010b:127). China's renewed claim on Tawang, therefore,

negotiated. In return, China stated its claim on eastern sector (controlled by India) in order to add to its bargaining chips.

⁹⁴ The 13th Dalai Lama has raised several possibilities of what might happen after he dies in different interviews with media, for example, he will choose his successor during his lifetime, contrary to the usual tradition of identifying the new Dalai Lama only after the death of the old one. Or maybe his soul will be transferred to a person outside of Tibet. Or perhaps, the line of Dalai Lamas will end with him, if that is the wish of the Tibetan people. See BBC. (2014, 17 December); and Smith, N. (Sunday Times, 2015, 17 May).

supported Miller's theory that a revisionist state poses challenges to regional instability and also prevents relations from transcending conflict to a state of high-level warm peace.

Whatever the reasons, China and India cannot reach a border agreement until China resolves the Tibet issue, which fits Miller's theory that a strong state – such as China was shown to be through its actions in Tibet-- with an internal imbalance – such as Tibet's unrest – that renders it an incoherent state, is unlikely to resolve outstanding disputes.

9.5 The South China Sea territorial disputes vs. Sino-Indian border disputes

Arguably, China also became more assertive in the South China Sea territorial disputes of the late 2000s. Moreover, the nature of offshore island disputes is characterized by each state's desire to strengthen its physical presence in a disputed territory (Fravel, 2008:6), which is also similar to Sino-Indian border dispute that both states reinforced their claims by sending military patrols in the disputed border (Holslag, 2010:124). Nevertheless, it is pertinent to compare the South China Sea territorial disputes and their implications with Sino-Indian relations, even though they involve six states'⁹⁵ overlapping claims that are either all, or partly, concerned with territorial sovereignty and maritime rights to South China Sea Islands, reefs, and waters. Between the mid-1990s and 2007, China, as a key player in the disputes, pursued a strategy of freezing attempts to resolve them in order to pursue economic integration and joint resources development with ASEAN countries (Dutton, 2011:57-8). However, after 2007, China shifted its regional strategy from integration in favour of competition in the South China Sea disputes. Then, after Xi Jinping's tenure of 2014, it took a more aggressive unilateral action regarding its territorial claim by building artificial islands, runways and ports in the South China Sea, despite oppositions from all the other claimants.

Kaplan's (2011a), Fravel's (2012:14), and Hartchter's (2016) conclude that China's assertive behaviour is due to its growing naval capabilities, the aspiration of becoming regional hegemon, the emergence of domestic nationalist sentiments and the need to add space of bargaining in the negotiation process. Furthermore, both the area's geostrategic value as a maritime security buffer zone and the need to protect its Middle Eastern energy supply and reserves for its increasing energy needs, China perceived the South China Sea as being a core national interests (Fravel, 2011a:294) .

Miller's theory to the South China Sea disputes gives two different dimensions to the similarities and differences between offshore and frontier disputes. Firstly, in terms of the variable of great power involvement, the US has not become involved in the Sino-Indian territorial disputes. By contrast, the US expressed publicly that it has interests in freedom of navigation and regional stability in the South China Sea (Rowan, 2005:249). Moreover, the

⁹⁵ The six states include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

Philippines and Vietnam, which are claimants to the South China Sea disputed waters, the former is the US's longstanding ally; the latter, Vietnam, also welcomes the US active engagement in the South China Sea. Therefore, the presence of a hegemon – i.e. the US – would help to moderate the disputes and constrain China's behaviour by strengthening its military presence in the region, whilst strengthening its allies' military capabilities (Fravel et al., 2012:5; Glaser, 2015). However, because of China's increasing military capabilities, such regional disputes could become more serious. Given that India is a long way from the South China Sea and its naval capabilities do not even reach that far, it is not active involved in this dispute. However, thanks to India's "look East" policy, claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, perceive their strengthened relations with India as a counterweight to China (Simon, 2012:1009). Also, India appears to be so concerned about China's increasing influence in the Indian Ocean that it has established some military bases in the South China Sea (Pardesi, 2016).

Secondly, Miller's state-to-nation variable does not apply to this case because there are no aboriginal inhabitants in the South China Sea islands. However, both the offshore territorial disputes and the land disputes share the same characteristic in that they are concerned with China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which makes them non-negotiable since China abjures any negotiations on sovereignty (Scott, 2012:1001; Fravel et al., 2012:13). After the early 2010, China perceived the South China Sea as its core national interests, escalating the importance of this territorial disputes identical with Tibet and Taiwan. Hence, the South China Sea disputes have become an irritant between China and India., as since 2012 India's largest oil company, ONGC Videsh, has cooperated in oil and gas exploration with a Vietnamese company, while China has claimed that both states' actions constitute an attack on its sovereignty (Simon, 2012:1011). Therefore, both the strategic value of the territory and US involvement play important roles in the South China Sea disputes, whereas the problems of state-to-nation as the core issue in the Sino-Indian territorial disputes.

Conclusion

In summary, as Miller's theory implies, incoherent states make successful conflict resolution less likely. China's state-to-nation imbalance, due to its revisionist territorial claim on Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang, made concessions impossible and border negotiations deadlocked, since they simply incurred India's distrust of its motives and intensified the security dilemma. This also accords with Miller's *Proposition 2*, that a state-to-nation imbalance intensifies the security dilemma and hampers conflict resolution.

China's consolidation of the process of state-building, alongside its revisionist claim on Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang, neither helped to settle the territorial disputes nor reduced the security dilemma. When a state is incoherent, its state strength shown in the form of infrastructure construction and troop deployments can actually undermine regional stability. Moreover, the 2008 Tibet revolts were a result of China's flawed Tibet policy and

the consequent resistance of Tibetans due to the threat to their national identity. Alongside the Tibetan refugees' problems emanating from the trans-border identities, all factors contributed to China's problems of insecurity and legitimacy regarding Tibet, which in turn, created a state-to-nation imbalance, all of which accords with Miller's *Proposition 2*.

According to Miller's theory, strong states with state-to-nation imbalance revert to revisionist states, leading to hot war. However, the conditions described above did not result in either a hot war or even a cold war. Three key factors underpin the ensuing cold peace. Firstly, the presence of Russia and the US hegemony influenced the regional balance of power. Secondly, the strong desire on the part of the Chinese and Indian leaderships to maintain a peaceful relationship since it fits in their national interests in order to cement their domestic legitimacy. For instance, India's ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government did not wish to add foreign challenges to deflect it from dealing with its severe domestic problems (Jacob, 2012). Also, it was more confident in engaging with China due to its own rapid economic growth and consequent growing international importance and bilateral interactions, which have made it more aware of China's rapid economic growth and its huge domestic problems (Jacob, 2013:8). As for China, its economic development is the main source of its domestic legitimacy; so it recognizes it is in its best interests to maintain the status quo (Holbig&Gilley, 2010a; Gilley, 2006). Therefore, in order to increase bilateral trade, maintain its image as a responsible stakeholder, and increase its involvement with the international regimes, it also did not want to slip into a state of conflict with India (Jacob, 2011a:141).

These factors offer incentives for China and India to engage with each other; however, they are not strong enough to operate independently to encourage either state to move to warm peace, until, and unless, they resolve their border disputes, which support Miller's assumption that the resolution of state-to-nation imbalance allows states to make the transition to warm peace. Finally, the state-to-nation imbalance is still unresolved; hence, China and India remain in a state of cold peace.

Chapter 10 Conclusion

This concluding chapter has two sections – a review of the main hypotheses together with a summary of the key findings, and its theoretical contributions to the field and the suggested policy implications for policy makers.

10.1 The Support of Miller's Theory and Findings

By exploring the changing Sino-Indian relations from cold war to cold peace, this thesis has focused on a principal question – “What factors have contributed to this transformation?” The outcome of this research has generally borne out Miller's theory – that the interconnection between his arguments and the empirical evidence corroborates the effects of the two principal independent variables, firstly, the international systemic factor – i.e. the great power involvement – which accounted for the initiation and maintenance of cold peace, and secondly, the domestic factor – the state-to-nation imbalance – which contributed to the 1962 Sino-Indian hot war and the dismantling of the barriers that led to a further transition to warm peace between 1988 and 2015. These two factors have played important roles to define the nature of Sino-Indian relations, which is not characterized by all the elements of rivalry as defined in most of the literature, but as a cold peace with deep engagement diplomatically and economically, cooperation in global issues, and also competition in security arenas.

These two variables also offer competing explanations for regional transformations. The domestic variable, the acute state-to-nation imbalance in regard to the Tibet issue, exacerbated Sino-Indian territorial disputes and increased the intensity of the security dilemma between China and India, thereby leading to the 1962 border war. During the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation, the superpowers supported their regional client states, thereby intensifying regional conflicts and prolonging Sino-Indian cold war. By contrast, the end of the Cold War and superpower competition created both space and incentives for China and India to initiate reconciliation.

Moreover, between 1993 and 1999, a benign great power, Russia encouraged Sino-Indian reconciliation, offering incentives to China and India by way of the growing dependence on Russia's arms transfer, the coordination of common geo-strategy, and the appeal for multipolarity. Furthermore, two occurrences, India's nuclear tests in 1998 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, brought the US back to reengagement with South Asia, and led a cooperative operation on counterterrorism, thereby maintaining a Sino-Indian cold peace. However, China and India were unable to move towards a warm peace because both countries were characterized by the unresolved territorial disputes Arunachal Pradesh after 2006, the competition over infrastructure construction and the deployment of forces along the borders, the 2008 Tibet revolts and the Tibetan refugees' problems, and the unresolved

territorial disputes. Those constraints intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma, making successful conflict resolution less likely.

However, Miller's theory was unable to explain why two such rising economic powers proved to be willing to subscribe to a weakening of a hegemon, Russia, in the 1990s, but left limited leverage by the US in the 2000s. Domestic politics and ideational factors were added to explain the rationales of Chinese and Indian determination of pursuing a stable international environment along with maintaining their strategic autonomy and domestic legitimacy in order to, firstly, focus on their respective economic growth, secondly, manage their various domestic challenges, and thirdly, suit their national interests.

Therefore, the four hypotheses, listed in Chapter 1, together with the findings for each one, are:

Hypothesis 1: weak states, or the failure of nation building resulting from problems of created by secessionism, irredentism, and pan-unification movements, caused state-to-nation imbalances, lead to an intensified security dilemma and create incentives for either expansionist or diversionary hot war.

Findings: when seen from different theoretical approaches, wars have multiple causes. Section 7.1.2 demonstrates that some competing interpretations of the causes of the Sino-Indian border war have derived from the following five theoretical constructs: (i) Vasquez's paradigm, as it relates to the border conflicts (Liu, 1994:171). (ii) Psychological theory, which was used to account for Nehru's "forward policy" (Liao&Whiting, 1973;Maxwell, 1970). (iii) Defensive realism, which has been used to explain China's justification for its claim based on territorial sovereignty (Garver, 2006). (iv) Fearon's bargaining model, which was used to explain India's misjudgment of China's intentions and capabilities (Hoffmann, 1989; 2006;Vertzberger, 1982). (v) Constructivism, which is used to explain historical legacy.

These theoretical constructs offer insights to test Miller's variable – that an acute state-to-nation imbalance was the underlying cause of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. For instance, China, arguing on the grounds of national identity and that ruling legitimacy and domestic security had been endangered, refused to accommodate Tibet's demand for self-determination and independence. This together with the 1959 Tibet revolts, according to Miller's variable, resulted in a state of internal incongruence. These circumstances exacerbated Sino-Indian territorial disagreements, making it difficult for the Chinese leadership to forge a compromise, as it had done in border negotiations with Burma and Pakistan. Moreover, because the Dalai Lama had fled to India at the climax of the 1959 revolts and established a government-in-exile in India, an external state-to-nation incongruence had developed, which was perceived by India as weakness. Emboldened, India adopted a forward policy, thus becoming a revisionist state.

This finding is in line with Benjamin Miller's theory (Miller, 2005:234; 2007a:109-110), that, due to internal insecurity and trans-border instability, a state-to-nation imbalance provides targets for external intervention. Moreover, Miller states that the causes for a regional war in a region may be divided into, firstly, an underlying cause – e.g. a state-to-nation imbalance, and secondly, an immediate cause – i.e. a security dilemma or diversionary tactics. This thesis, which argues that the Sino-Indian border war was neither a diversionary nor an expansionist war, challenges the established view that the war was due to Chinese aggression (Sinha&Athale, 1962;Fisher et al., 1963:135;Noorani, 2011). The underlying cause of the border war confirms Miller's hypothesis – that it was due to an acute state-to-nation imbalance, including internal state-to-nation incongruence – i.e. the Tibetan resistance movements – and an external incongruence created by the Dalai Lama fleeing to India and the establishment of a Government-in-exile.

Such destabilizing effects created a security dilemma which, together with Nehru's forward policy, challenged the territorial *status quo*, leading to China's offensive attack in the 1962 border war. Thus, Miller's theory offers a nuanced approach to the differences between the underlying cause and the immediate cause of the border war. This study has made a systemic analysis in order to pinpoint an alternative perspective for understanding the causes of the Sino-Indian border war, in that it was a result of a security dilemma rather than either state's expansionism.

Hypothesis 2 : under the condition of a state-to-nation imbalance, the effect of great power competition and disengagement from the region may intensify the regional conflict, leading to cold war.

Findings: Chapter 4 established the systemic variable – the involvement of competing superpowers – in particular, in the global context of the Cold War, which prolonged the Sino-Indian cold war. However, both Miller's theory and structural realism were limited to explaining the Chinese and Indian resistance to align with both superpowers in the 1960s. Section 4.1 argues that both states were resistant to alliance, since they were driven by ideological factors – Mao Zedong's worldview about revolutionary world order and Nehru's belief in non-alignment.

The two findings on superpower competition were:

Firstly, the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars exemplified the different great power strategies in terms of influencing regional outcomes, and confirmed Miller's hypothesis that great powers establish strong patron- client relationships by exerting their influence through combinations of the following four strategies: (i) military and financial support, (ii) diplomatic mediation, (iii) reassurance and security guarantees, and (iv) the deterrence and coercion of revisionist powers. Such strategies, which were used in both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, had the following effects:

1. The great powers' arms supplies triggered a regional arms race. By acquiring weaponry from the contesting superpowers, the USSR and the US, India and Pakistan respectively strengthened their capabilities, thus, raising their leaders' aspirations to recover Kashmir and wage the 1965 war. Following the 1971 Indo-USSR treaty, the USSR offered military and economic aid, and diplomatic support, which, in turn, emboldened India to pursue military action in intervening in the Pakistani civil war, thereby causing a third Indo-Pakistani war.
2. While great power assurances may contain regional adversaries, they risk aggravating conflicts by competing with each other. India interpreted the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty as a public assurance against both Chinese intervention and US involvement; therefore, it thought it was shielded by a superpower's protection against US economic sanctions, whereas China saw it as a Soviet deterrent aimed at itself and the US.

Secondly, both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars conformed with Miller's theory, inasmuch as great power competition may have exacerbated the 1971 war and sustained the Sino-Indian hostilities, whereas great power cooperation exerted effective pressure on those local states who were engaged in the settlement of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Miller holds that shifting regional realignments and the superpowers' fluctuating interests alter the types of great power involvement, thereby leading to different regional outcomes (Miller, 2005:236-237; Miller&Kagan, 1997:59). In the 1965 war, both the US and the USSR had a common interest in maintaining the regional *status-quo* and they cooperated in order to compel India and Pakistan to accept an UN-sponsored cease-fire. By contrast, in the 1971 war, the Nixon administration wanted to use Pakistan in order to create a channel for communications with China, thereby weakening its efforts to prevent a local war for fear of losing its client. The emergent Chinese-Pakistani-US nexus pushed India into aligning with the Soviet Union, regardless of its non-alignment policy. Hence, during the 1971 war, due to the support of the competing rivals, client states were encouraged to undertake adventurous actions, since the protection superpowers offered discouraged diplomatic compromises.

Even though China was unwilling to offer military support to Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, it sought to maintain a supportive relationship verbally and diplomatically in order to contain the Indo-Soviet bloc. Hence without China needing to fire any bullets, India's perception of a "Chinese threat" with a psychological "two-front" effect reinforced their mutual hostility. After the 1971 war in particular, China continued to support Pakistan militarily and this included assistance in the development of its nuclear and missile programmes, thereby intensifying Sino-Indian hostility even further. In summary, the cold war episodes between India and China, and India and Pakistan markedly support Miller's

theory in that superpower competition exacerbated Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting in the prolongation of the Sino-Indian cold war.

Hypothesis 3: under the condition of a state-to-nation imbalance, great power cooperation may mitigate regional conflicts and moderate the problems of state-to-nation imbalance, thus leading to cold peace.

Findings: Chapter 4, toward the end of the 1965 war, shows that great power cooperation deterred aggressive local states from going to war, thereby mitigating regional conflict. When China issued an ultimatum to India in order to help Pakistan confront it with a 'two-front' threat, consequently, the USSR and the US sent China a joint warning not to intervene. Such tactical cooperation limited the scope and duration of the war and it also deterred China from triggering a second Sino-Indian war. Moreover, in 1965, after the US had suspended military aid to India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union served as a 'neutral moderator' at the Indo-Pakistani negotiations, which resulted in the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and preserved Indo-Pakistani cold peace for seven years.

Chapter 5, which discussed structural change and how the ending of superpower competition had a profound impact on the transformations of Sino-Indian relations, examined two cases, (i) the 1986-1987 Sino-Indian border standoff, and (ii) the 1990 Kashmir Crisis. The findings support Miller's hypothesis as follows:

Firstly, The US-USSR thaw after 1986 and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, which ended superpower competition in the region, were the main contributory factors to (i) a shift in the regional balance of power, and (ii) the initiation of Sino-Indian reconciliation. This transformation of the international system resulted in the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the USSR's estrangement from India, and China's adjustment of its South Asian policy. All of these factors created both space and incentives for Sino-Indian reconciliation.

The structural changes that resulted from the reconciliation were:

1. *The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations:* this began during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, just prior to the end of the Cold War. Chapter 5 described how the Soviet Union's neutrality in the 1986 border standoff and the emergent Sino-Soviet *entente* led to a de-escalation of the crisis and an Indian policy change to one of normalization. This finding supports Miller's theory by showing that a change of great power interests led to Soviet neutrality, thereby leaving no space for India in its confrontation with China to exploit Soviet support. Therefore, India's leadership adjusted to the Soviet change of policy by exercising restraint in order to de-escalate the crisis. Hence, Sino-Soviet normalization changed the regional balance of power to such an extent that it led to the transformations of Sino-Indian relations.

2. *Russia's estrangement from India*: the collapse of the Soviet Union had a significant effect on India. Having lost its superpower patron, India had to recalculate its traditional non-alignment policy and to adjust its strategic options at the international level. One of the adjustments was to mend its fences with China and the US. Thus, the external uncertainty offered a motivation for Rajiv Gandhi to change his approach towards China.
3. *The decline in Pakistan's importance*: because of the US-USSR thaw and the 1990 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan became less strategically important to the US and China for containing the Soviet Union; the consequent structural change led to two regional outcomes – US disengagement from South Asia, and a change in China's South Asian policy as it sought a more balanced policy over Pakistan and India (Tang et al., 2005:230). This led to the dilution of Sino-Pakistani relations, as demonstrated by China's neutral position in the 1999 Kargil crisis, its concessionary posture over the Kashmir issue, and its low-key response to India's 1998 nuclear tests, all of which showed its benign will towards India and its contribution to the post-1988 Sino-Indian thaw; nevertheless, it did not dissipate the doubts regarding its intention of using Pakistan to contain India.

Secondly, between 1993 and 1999, Russia, a benign great power, played a key role in sustaining the Sino-Indian rapprochement. According to Miller's theory, the types of great power involvement are determined by the balances of their capabilities and of their regional interests. Section 5.2 argued that, during the 1990s, Russia was superior both in the military domain and in international status to both China and India. Russia's regional Sino-Indian interests were bilateral trade, arms sales, military cooperation, and presenting a united front in international forums in order to encounter its rival – the US – for regional hegemony. In particular, throughout the 1990s supplying arms to both China and India was a critical foreign policy tool that it used to exert influence over both countries. The evidence shows that between 1995 and 2000 China and India together accounted for approximately 70% of Russian arms sales and this constituted the core of Russia's strategic regional partnership during President Yeltsin's term (Galeotti, 2001).

Section 5.2 of this thesis, therefore, concluded that Russia, as the dominant power in the region, influenced the regional balance of power by (i) providing arms, (ii) creating a political discourse of converging interests, (iii) promoting a common geo-strategy, and (iv) advocating multi-polarity, in order to counter the potential threat posed by the US, and to serve its interests by cooperating militarily with China and India. Moreover, China and India have been engaged in building CBMs and border negotiations under the political cover of Sino-Russian border negotiations, arms reductions, and the growing Indo-Russian defence cooperation. Russia's role during this period bears out Miller's theory that "great power assurance and common geo-strategy are conducive to on-going cold peace".

However, Miller's theory was unable to explain why two such rising economic powers proved to be willing to subscribe to a weakening of a hegemon's power, since they were Russia's largest and second largest arms recipients, and to accept Russia's proposal of multi-polarity, which contradicts both Miller's theory and that of the structural realists. In Section 5.2, three factors were considered to have contributed to Russia's dominant role in the Sino-Indian cold peace.

1. Domestic politics: China's post-Tiananmen international isolation and its essentially inward-looking foreign policy created space for both Russian arms sales to China and its increasing influence in international affairs. India's historical partnership with Russia was the main reason for its dependence on it for arms sales and also for its convergence in certain Russia-led international affairs initiatives. Moreover, both states' strived to maintain a stable international environment by focusing on their respective economic developments in order to manage their various domestic challenges. Eventually, this convergence led to an agreement to a reduction in both China's and India's military forces and the enhancement of CBMs in the border area.
2. International institutions: since the mid-1990s, China and India have both modified their assessment of regional multilateral institutions in order for them to become more compatible in their respective foreign policies, and to serve their particular national economic interests. Therefore, the cooperative security approach adopted by the SCO and, later, the RIC (Russia, India and China Foreign Ministers' meeting) in the 2000s, not only became a well coordinated platform, but it also had an expanding normative influence on maintaining a state of cold peace.
3. Ideational factor: both China and India welcomed Russia's multi-polarity proposal because it indicated not only a recognition of their rising statuses due to their economic resurgence, it also confirmed them in their aspirations to become great powers in their own right, which had long been desired by both states.

Thirdly, Chapter 6 examined the reengagement of the US in the region following the 1998 India's nuclear tests and the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks. As a consequence, the US became the regional hegemon by providing the common goods, such as regional stability, liberal economic order and an anti-terrorist campaign, thereby sustaining a regional cold peace. There no doubt that the US has dominated the post-Cold War international system and that its changing interests in South Asia were due to (i) India's growing economic attractions, (ii) its own non-proliferation goals, and (iii) its counter-terrorism agenda. Similar to Russia's strategy, which was to offer arms sales and create a common geopolitical agenda, the US encouraged both China and India to benefit from the US-led liberal international order. Also, its strategy led to both China and India joining the coalition in "war" against terrorism, thereby further strengthening the political dialogues and achieving a cooperative regional

outcome. Russia also joined the US-led anti-terror coalition in order to vindicate its anti-terrorist actions against the rebels in Chechnya. Moreover, Russia's arms sales to China and India have declined since the 1990s due to China's growing self-sufficiency and the US increase in sales to India, with Russian hegemony giving way to American.

Section 6.3 described the US role in the Indo-Pakistani cold peace after 1998, in the 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani border standoffs by offering reassurances, arms sales and financial assistance. The Indo-Pakistani cold peace supports Miller's theory that the presence of a hegemon leaves no space for its client states to manoeuvre; hence they are compelled to exercise restraint, thereby leading to a peaceful order. Also, the subsequent easing of Indo-Pakistani relations eased Indian fears of a "Sino-Pakistani nexus".

Section 6.4 demonstrated that the 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal emphasised the change in US interests, which has, in fact, created a more complex regional outcome that goes beyond Miller's theoretical expectation, which is that a hegemon might leave its client states only limited room to manoeuvre. In order to complement this theory, I offered the following four factors to explain why the local states were allowed to exercise strategic autonomy: (i) the shrinking commitment of the hegemon, (ii), the changing distribution of local states' capabilities, (iii) increasing economic interdependence between the hegemon and the local states, and (iv) the determination of local states to pursue strategic autonomy. I concluded, therefore, that, due to their desire to be autonomous, and the limited leverage that could be applied by the US, China and India pursued policies that better suited their national interests.

In summary, Sino-Indian cold peace has been maintained for more than two decades due, firstly, to the Russian hegemon between 1993 and 1999, and, secondly, the US hegemon from 2000 to date. This finding, I believe, challenges the traditional views that only the US dominated the regional balance of power (Pant, 2008:11). It makes a considerable difference under the global uni-polarity that the great power hegemony, Russia and the US, have exerted different influences on Sino-Indian relations due to their interests and capabilities in different periods.

Hypothesis 4 : no matter whether states are democratic or not, and which types of great power are involved, successful state-building and nation-building are conducive to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts as a prerequisite to warm peace.

Findings: the arguments formulated in Chapter 8 and 9 suggested that Sino-Indian relations cannot be transformed into a state of warm peace, due to the state-to-nation imbalance problems not having been resolved.

Chapter 8 explored that both China and India may be labeled as strong states in terms of their capability to exercise powers over political institutions, control domestic violence, and show their effectiveness in suppressing armed conflicts, thereby proving their domestic

legitimacy. In the case of India's north-eastern secession-prone states, democratic governance and the growth of state strength have proved its state-building policy to have been successful. The 1989 Tibet revolts, due to the Soviet neutrality, and a moderation in the state-to-nation imbalance, including China's effective control of domestic violence, India's restraint on the Tibet revolts and its assurance of respect for China's sovereignty over Tibet, led to a de-escalation of rivalries, thereby initiating a Sino-Indian cold peace.

However, Miller's variable of state-to-nation imbalance does not exhaust the range of domestic factors that were responsible for the maintenance of cold peace and which covered all dimensions of their relations. In Section 8.5, two factors, the importance of economic growth and pragmatic leadership, complement Miller's variable relating to state strength, in that the states' new generation of leaders pursue pragmatic policies in order to engage with each other; hence, they are willing to set aside territorial disputes in order to maintain their economic growth, thereby consolidating their domestic legitimacy and coherence.

Section 9.1 illustrates that multi-dimensional explanations derived from existing IR theoretical approaches help to understand the puzzle of why Sino-Indian territorial disputes have been so unsettled. The problems with the border disputes were due to the lack of threat, the salience of territory, nationalism and national identity. However, because some factors, such as nationalism and the value of the territory involved, were constant; however, in the post-Cold War period, although there were no longer barriers in the China-Russia, China-Vietnam and India-Bangladesh territorial disputes. Such factors does not explain why it did not work in the Sino-Indian case.

Section 9.2 and 9.3 have drawn on Miller's theory in order to explain why Sino-Indian territorial disputes cannot be resolved and why China has revised its territorial claims after 2006. Benjamin Miller's theory suggests that the degree of state-to-nation balance conditions the effectiveness of conflict resolution, which, in turn, can result in warm peace. The intractable state-to-nation problems experienced by China and India – i.e. the territorial disputes in Arunachal Pradesh, the internal state-to-nation incongruence for China caused by the recurrent Tibetan revolts and the external incongruence due to the Tibetan refugees in India – have led to long-term mutual distrust and China's revisionist territorial claims.

The territorial disputes in Arunachal Pradesh has created a state-to-nation imbalance that has resulted in both countries strengthening their defensive infrastructures and increasing their border forces, which have intensified their security dilemma, making it difficult to resolve the border disputes in order to establish warm peace. This finding accords with the views of distinguished scholars (Garver, 2002b; 2010b; Scott, 2011b:221; Pant, 2013), even though this thesis postulates that – the explanation for the Sino-Indian security dilemma – is their state-to-nation imbalance, which is a different perspective from the geopolitical competition and realist perspectives adopted by those scholars.

It is important to emphasise that the security dilemma the countries faced during the post-1988 Sino-Indian cold peace was less severe than during the Sino-Indian cold war with heavy militarization along the border and the pre-1962 war with several military skirmishes, which accords with Miller's theory and Hypothesis 3 that the presence of a hegemon imposes regional cold peace. Besides the systemic factor, I add two nuanced aspects of regional context to explain that the moderation of the security dilemma has been a result of establishment of CBMs over the last two decades and the fact that the posture of border force deployments and military patrols appeared to be defensive rather than offensive.

In summary, this thesis has tested the empirical validity of the propositions derived from Miller's theoretical framework in order to explain empirical variations of Sino-Indian relations over different periods and whether his theory might assist in answering the research questions that the transformation from cold war to cold peace.

10.2 Theoretical contributions and the policy implications of this thesis

This thesis has tested Benjamin Miller's theory and found it to be able to offer coherent explanations on a dyadic transition pattern, which is a main contribution to the existing literature. Moreover, this research might be useful to predict the possible trajectory of Sino-Indian relations and also offer some fresh suggestions for policy makers. The following reviews the theoretical contributions of this thesis and makes some policy suggestions.

Firstly, testing the theories: as Stephen Van Evera (1997:35) suggests, for theories to be tested successfully, the researcher should test as many predictions as possible that flow from the hypotheses. In this thesis, therefore, I tested the following independent and dependent variables (see Table 10.1): (i) great power competition in both the Sino-Indian cold war between 1963 and 1987 and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani hot war, (ii) great power cooperation during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, (iii) Russian hegemony in the post-1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the Sino-Indian cold peace between 1991 and 1999, (iv) the US hegemony during the 1991 Kargil crisis, the Indo-Pakistani cold peace between 2004 and 2008, and the post-2000 Sino-Indian cold peace, (v) state-to-nation imbalance in the 1962 Sino-Indian hot war, (vi) the moderation of state-to-nation imbalance in the post 1988 Sino-Indian cold peace.

If the outcomes of the dependent variables are shown to have been consistent with Miller's theories, then the causal relationship is strengthened. Therefore, as they pertain to the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani dyadic cases, this thesis has shown that Miller's theories possess great explanatory powers in that the independent variables explain the cause of the wars and also the transformations of both Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani relations during various periods of time. I believe, therefore, that his theories are coherent and consistent with the Sino-Indian case.

Table 10-1: Summary of the findings in two dyadic relations over four time periods

| <i>Different Periods</i> | <i>Great Power Factors</i> | <i>The State-to-nation Imbalance</i> | <i>Regional Outcomes</i> |
|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1959-1962 | The US and the USSR arms aid to India | Acute state-to-nation imbalance | The 1962 Sino-Indian hot war |
| 1965 | The US and the USSR cooperation on cease-fire | Acute state-to-nation imbalance | The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war |
| 1965-1970 | Russia hegemon | Acute state-to-nation imbalance | Indo-Pakistan cold peace |
| 1963-1987 | Great power competition | Moderated but unresolved | Sino-Indian cold war |
| 1971 | Great power competition | Acute state-to-nation imbalance | Indo-Pakistan hot war |
| 1987-1999 | The US disengagement The Russian hegemon | Moderated but unresolved | Sino-Indian cold peace |
| 1991-present | The US hegemon | Acute state-to-nation imbalance | Indo-Pakistani cold peace |
| 2000- the present | The US hegemon | Moderated but unresolved | Sino-Indian cold peace |

Source : The author

Secondly, the theoretical contributions: the findings of this thesis contribute to the wider scholarly literature concerning the transformation of regional order and they enrich area studies by testing Miller's theory. The theoretical contributions may be summarised as follows:

1. They offer new insights into the transformations of Sino-Indian relations in terms of Miller's theoretical framework; in particular, the change in the post-1989 international structure, which led to Sino-Indian cold peace, and galvanized China and India into rapprochement. The stabilizing effect of a single great power hegemon allowed them to focus on economic development and to strengthen their states, thereby maintaining cold peace. It can be predicted, therefore, that as long as the US remains the hegemon, China and India will adhere to a liberal international order, since the resulting economic growth accords with both their national interests and their domestic legitimacy. However, should China outreach the US and exercise its vast military and economic power aggressively, and should the great powers fall

into competition again, new cold war could be the result.

2. They show the destabilising effect of a state-to-nation imbalance, which not only made it difficult to resolve the Sino-Indian border disputes and achieve the warm peace, but also led China to challenge the status quo, thus deepening the perception of it as a threat. Hence both countries are still concerned about relative gains and strive to build traditional military power, which could be why economic interdependence does not neutralize mistrust and the perception of threat (Rapkin&Thompson, 2006;Holslag, 2010) .
3. They offer an alternative perspective from which to view Sino-Indian relations by bridging the neglected gap that lies between the level of analysis. Though a great power hegemon imposed peaceful regional order, the state-to-nation imbalance made China and India being unable to resolve their outstanding territorial disputes and ascend to warm peace.
4. They, however, do not consider the characteristics of rising powers, in which domestic political factors and the aspirations to gain great power status may change the interactions between existing great powers and local states. For example, in order to achieve national greatness and international prestige by pursuing their national interests though their domestic economic and military modernization programs, China and India have both pursued a policy of mixing cooperation with competition, by, maintaining peaceful borders and the focusing on economic development.

It is necessary to take internal factors into account to understand both states' intransigence to the US-led uni-polarity and their determination to maintain social stability and regime legitimacy, such as Indian tradition of pursuing its strategic autonomy, and China's steadfast emphasis on territorial integrity and continued economic development. Hence, the adherence to such internal factors explains the transformation of state behaviour, which accords with the neoclassic realist argument that domestic political factors matter.

Thirdly, this thesis suggests policy changes for both countries: firstly, how could China and India resolve their state-to-nation imbalance? According to Miller's theory, when states are strong and their political boundaries and national identities are congruent, they are likely to resolve territorial disputes and create warm peace. The first requirement is for China and India to address their problems of state-to-nation imbalance. As described in chapter 9, China and India are strong states with both experiencing state-to-nation incongruence, which encourages revisionist claims.

As a top priority, therefore, China needs to improve its nation-building in Tibet. In spite of an immense financial investment in Tibet, its policy, which is based on coercive assimilation and patriotic education, has failed; indeed, it has simply created more resentment and resistance. Therefore, although democratization is an unlikely outcome in the next decade, China needs to build an effective Tibet strategy based on nation-building by, firstly, acknowledging the Dalai Lama as Tibet's spiritual leader, secondly, protecting its cultural identity, and thirdly, granting it genuine autonomy. As long as Tibetans accept "China" as their state, exiles will be able to return to their homeland. This would discourage revisionism and secessionism, there would no longer be an issue between China and India. However, if China does not resolve the Tibetan grievance, it risks further domestic turmoil, especially when the next Dalai Lama is reincarnated in Indian controlled territory. As Smith (2013:221) states, if India assists the Tibetan exiles against China after the present Dalai Lama passes away, the possibility of another Sino-Indian hot war is high.

A further strategy should be to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes, either by delimiting the line of actual control (LAC) according to the watershed principles or transforming the current LAC into an international boundary (Singh, 2006; Pan, 2009:215; Liu, 1994:181). To apply lessons learned from this research, the "package deal", which had been proposed by China twice and been rejected twice by India, is the easiest way to reach the final solution based on mutual respect and reciprocal concessions (Li, 2015). As shown in chapter 9, the two countries have to deal with domestic pressure, such as that imposed by nationalists in both countries, who accuse their government of losing territory and leadership weakness. However, the benefits of resolving territorial disputes peaceably will outweigh the costs, since they will reduce strategic rivalry, mutual distrust and uncertainty, military costs of deploying troops along the borders, and the tensions on two fronts for China, its offshore territorial disputes, and for India, its Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. The relief of such pressures will allow both countries to concentrate on their economic development programs, and also fits in the US's interests.

Another suggested strategy is that India should continue to improve peace prospects with Pakistan. Even though the acute state-to-nation imbalance brought about by the Kashmir issue is unlikely to resolve in the next decade, if Indo-Pakistani cold peace can be maintained, Pakistan would cease to become an issue between India and China, as described in chapter 6, because their economic development interests are best served by the maintenance of regional stability. This research shows that the Indo-Pakistani peace is an additional reason that India would likely improve its relations with China, and this is also an additional reason for the US having stake on it.

Finally, an examination of the Sino-Indian case accords with Miller's theory, which holds that warm peace cannot be established if a resolution is not found for both countries' state-to-nation imbalance. However, by the 2050s, if they can resolve their territorial disputes, and if they become the top two largest economic powers in the world in terms of PPP (Purchasing

Power Parity),as have been predicted (PwC, 2015), they will have fulfilled the prediction of Deng Xiaoping when he was talking to Rajiv Gandhi at the 1988 Sino-Indian rapprochement meeting – that the twenty-first century would be the “Asian century”⁹⁶.

⁹⁶ In December 1988, the late Chinese senior leader Deng Xiaoping told the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, during the meeting in Beijing that ‘there could be no Asia-Pacific century without China and India forming crucial elements of such architecture’. See Xinhua. December 21 1988.

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Appendix 1 The lists of interviewees

| <i>Names</i> | <i>Affiliations/ Position</i> | <i>date</i> | <i>The mains topics of interviews</i> |
|--------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|
| Benjamin Miller | Professor of the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa | 2015. 5.12 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The effects of great power involvement on the rising powers 2. the state-to-nation imbalance regarding China and India |
| Alistair Currie & Sonam Choden | Campaigns and Media Manager of Free Tibet | 2015. 6.30 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tibet's claim on autonomy 2. What's the future of the TGIE after the 13th Dalai Lama's pass away 3. Chinese Government's Tibet policy 4. Tibet current situation regarding their religious life and the relations with the Dalai Lama |
| Anil Raman | A Lieutenant in Indian Army | 2012. 2.18 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sino-Indian relations 2. Sino-Indian war 3. The Kargil crisis |
| Jin Wei | Professor of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC | 2015. 5.18 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. how Chinese government resolve the Tibet problem? 2. The future of Tibet and the government-in-exile after the Dalai Lama's pass away? 3. The relations between Tibetans in China and Chinese government? 4 . The Tibetan autonomy and identity |
| Youkang Do | Director of Center for South Asian Studies, | 2014. 7.10 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sino-Indian war 2. Sino-Indian relations 3. Pakistan factor |

| | | | |
|--|---------------------|--|--|
| | Fudan University | | |
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Appendix 2

The document analysis of high level exchanges between China and India, which covered the key issues in their relations, constituted an important source of information regarding the influence the respective leaders had on foreign policy. A pilot study was conducted to explore the key issues in the Sino-Indian relations. The data was collected from joint communique, statements, lectures, declarations, and agreements between Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to China, and 2013, the end of the time frame of this research.

During this period there were fourteen state visits during this period⁹⁷, not including visits by vice-presidents, parliamentarians, and high level attendances at international forums and other regional events. The unit of documents pertaining to each state summit has been coded as one visit per unit of analysis, even though some visits resulted in more than one signed agreement and key issues were dealt with more than once, the analysis only counted as one unit.

| The coding number of State visits | Date | State Visits and Documents/ Agreements/ Memoranda etc. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|--|
| 1. | 1988.12.19-23 | Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rajiv's Gandhi's Speech at Qinghua University, Beijing, 21 December. 2. China-India Joint Press communiqué, 23 December. 3. Three intergovernmental cooperation agreements signed: (i) science and technology, (ii) civil aviation, and (iii) cultural changes |
| 2. | 1991.12 | Premier Li Peng's visit India <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Three agreements signed: (i) resumption of border trade, (ii) reopening of consulates in Bombay and Shanghai, (iii) cooperation in peaceful applications of outer space sciences and technology. |
| 3. | 1992.5.18-23 | President R. Venkataraman a state visit to China, May 1992 |
| 4. | 1993.9.6-10 | Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to China <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas |

⁹⁷ The boxes show sixteen visits because there were two visits fall outside the time frame of this research.

| | | |
|-----|---------------|---|
| | | 2. Agreement of cooperation signed in environment and broadcasting and television, protocol agreed on adding points on border trade |
| 5. | 1996.11.29 | President Jiang Zemin visited India 1. Announcing to build a constructive and cooperative partnership 2. Signing four agreements, including maritime transport, and “Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border” |
| 6. | 2000.5.28-6.3 | President Shri K. R. Narayanan’s visit to China 1. Three cooperation memoranda signed on (i) steel, (ii) information technology, and (iii) labour |
| 7. | 2002.1.13-19 | Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India 1. One agreement signed: to establish a bilateral dialogue mechanism against terrorism, cooperation on tourism and agriculture |
| 8. | 2003.6.22-27 | Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China 1. Joint declaration on principles for relations and comprehensive cooperation. 2. Nine memoranda signed of issues, including a ‘memorandum on expanding border trade’ |
| 9. | 2005.4.9-12 | Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India 1. Joint statement issued regarding a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. 2. Twelve agreements and MoUs signed, including the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question’ |
| 10. | 2006.11.20-23 | President Hu Jintao’s visit to India 1. Joint declaration 2. Thirteen agreements and protocols signed, including open two new Consulate General’s offices |
| 11. | 2008.1 | Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China 1. ‘A shared Vision for the 21 st Century’ |

| | | |
|-----|---------------|---|
| | | 2. Ten agreements signed |
| 12. | 2010.12.15-17 | Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India 1. Joint communiqué 2. Six MoUs and agreements signed |
| 13. | 2013.5.19-22 | Premier Li Keqiang's visit to India 1. Eight MoUs and agreements signed |
| 14. | 2013.10.22-24 | Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China 1. Nine MoU and agreements signed, including 'Border Defence Cooperation Agreement' |
| 15. | 2014.9. 17-19 | President Xi Jinping's visit to India 1. Joint statements on building a closer developmental partnership 2. Sixteen agreements signed, including \$20 billion investment to India in the next 5 years |
| 16. | 2015.5.14 | Prime Minister Modi's visit to China 1. Twenty-four agreements signed |

Appendix 3

The document analysis of high level exchanges between China and India, which was collected from communique, statements, lectures, declarations, and agreements, covered the key issues in their relations. The definitions of key issues were explained as follows:

1. Cooperation in many fields: refers to cooperation in economic, defence, energy, agriculture, and technical fields.
2. The resolution of border disputes: resolving border disputes include setting up joint working groups (JWGs), appointing a special representative, strengthening border trade, facilitating pilgrims, and the resolving border issue through peaceful negotiations.
3. Crisis management regimes: crisis management regime includes CBMs, arms reductions, joint military and training exercises, and recognition of and respect for the LAC, promising neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other.
4. *Panch Sheel*: the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, synonym of ‘*Panch Sheel*’ in India, regarded as the foundation of Sino-Indian friendship, it was in the preamble to the agreement and appeared in a joint-statement regarding Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in June 1954.
5. Tibet issue: the Tibet issue refers to the recognition of PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet. The Indian government does not allow Tibetan anti-China activity on Indian soil, and it recognizes the ‘One China’ policy.
6. Kashmir issue: referring to China’s respect for India’s sovereignty over Kashmir, peaceful settlement for Kashmir disputes.
7. Pakistan: referring to both states’ relations with Pakistan.
8. Equality: equality refers to the countries’ equal partnership.
9. Anti-imperialism: refers to both states’ against imperialism.
10. As a developing countries: as developing countries, both states wish to narrow the gap between North and South.
11. The convergence on global issues : the convergence on international issues includes, strengthening cooperation in the WTO , the reform of the United Nations Security Council, the need for opposing "uni-polarity" and hegemony, the appeal for "multi-polarity", addressing the climate change, anti-terrorism, the Afghanistan issue, supporting each other for the multilateral mechanisms, tackling piracy, support for the Doha Development Round of WTO, energy and food security, reform of the international

financial institutions and global governance, support for the BCIM Forum between Kolkata and Kunming via Bangladesh and Myanmar.

12. Common outweighs difference: referring to common interests outweigh differences.
13. Disagreements: referring to outstanding boundary differences and sensitive concerns about their friendship.
14. Left over history: left over history' refers to unresolved border disputes and present hesitancy in resolving them.