Propositions as truthmaker conditions

Jago, Mark (2016) Propositions as truthmaker conditions. Argumenta . ISSN 2465-2334 (In Press)

Full text not available from this repository.


Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Special issue on Thinking the (Im)possible.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2016 08:44
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 18:21

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View