CRIMINALITY-ORIENTED TERRORIST LEARNING:

AN INTERACTIVE MODEL

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ABSTRACT

This thesis, focusing on the reasons beyond immediate terrorist and criminal events, studies ‘how’ and ‘why’ terrorist organizations (TOs) and organized crime groups (OCGs) act, react and evolve. It adopts a ‘criminality oriented approach’ that puts discrete pieces of terrorism under a microscopic examination and explains terrorist learning of criminality: how tacit knowledge required for terror tactics and organized crime is processed and saved in the secret domains of TOs and OCGs and how the knowledge is accessed and learned by other illegal organizations. Using Akers’ social learning theory, it explains that TOs and OCGs influence each other through a hybrid network structure and they learn non-traditional activities that require knowledge, skills and techniques (organized crime for TOs and terrorism for OCGs) through associations. It also argues that the associations among them result in the appropriation of tactics and *modus operandi*, and that the closer association of the two groups may cause the mutation of both organizations. It develops a dynamic model that explains the relationship between terrorism and organized crime and the mutative behaviours of TOs and OCGs. Depicting the present and future capabilities of TOs and OCGs and possible future forms of both terrorism and organized crime threats, it offers pathways to prevent TOs from learning and to strengthen counterterrorism measures.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Organization	Abbreviation	Country
14K Triad	Triad	China
19th of April Movement	M-19	Colombia
Abdurajak Janjalani Brigade	AJB	Philippines
Abu Nidal Organization	ANO	Philippines
Abu Sayyaf Group	ASG	Philippines
Abu Sofia	AS	Philippines
Action Directe	AD	France
Al Khobar (Jerusalem Squadron)	AK	Saudi Arabia
Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department	KOM	Turkey
Anti-Terrorism Department of the Turkish National Police	TEM	Turkey
Apo's Revenge Hawks	ARH	Turkey
Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades	AYRB	Turkey
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria	GIA	Algeria
Aum Shinrikyo	AUM	Japan
Basque Fatherland and Liberty	ETA	Spain
Black P Stone Nation (El Rukn)	BPSN	United States of America
Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia	EMBNC	Colombia
Charles Martel Group	CMG	France
Communist Party of India	CPI	India
Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe	KON-KURD	Belgium

D-Company	D-Company	India
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	EIJ	Egypt
Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas Army of the People in Arms	EPA	Venezuela
German Revolutionary Cells	RZ	Germany
Group of Popular Combatants	GPC	Ecuador
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen	HuM	Pakistan
International Kurdish Businessmen Union	KAR-SAZ	the Netherlands
Irish Republican Army	IRA	Ireland
Islamic Army of Aden	IAA	Yemen
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front	IBDA-C	Turkey
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan	KIM	Iraq
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	IMU	Uzbekistan
Islamic Resistance Movement	HAMAS	Gaza
Islamyya al Gama'at	IG	Egypt
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	IFJK	Pakistan, India
Japanese Red Army	JRA	Japan
Jemaah Islamiyah	JI	Indonesia, Philippines
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia	KMM	Malaysia
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	KIUP	Turkey
Kurdish National Liberation Front	ERNK	Turkey
Kurdish Patriotic Union	KPU	Turkey
Kurdish Patriotic Women's Union	YJWK	Turkey
Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Union	YDGH	Turkey
Kurdistan Democratic Party	KDP	Iraq

Kurdistan Freedom Hawks	TAK	Turkey
Kurdistan Imams Union	UIK	Turkey
Kurdistan Mullahs Union	UMK	Turkey
Kurdistan Religious Union	URK	Turkey
Kurdistan Workers' Party	PKK	Turkey
Lashkar-e-Taiba	LeT	Pakistan
Laskar Jihad	LJ	Indonesia
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction	LARF	Lebanon
Lebanese Christian Phalange (Kataeb Party)	KAL	Lebanon
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers)	LTTE	Sri Lanka
Misuari Breakaway Group	MBG	Philippines
Montoneros (Movimiento Peronista Montonero)	MPM	Argentina
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	MILF	Philippines
Moro National Liberation Front	MNLF	Philippines
Muttahida Qaumi Movement	MQM	Pakistan
National Liberation Army (Colombia)	ELN	Colombia
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters	EOKA	Cyprus
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams	NKRT	Turkey
Organization of the Armed Arab Struggle	OAAS	Lebanon
Palestine Liberation Organization	PLO	Palestine
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	PIJ	Palestine
Party of God	Hezbollah	Lebanon
Patriotic Kurdish Workers Party	PUK	Turkey
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	PUK	Iraq

People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan	ARGK	Turkey
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	PFLP	Palestine
Popular Liberation Army	EPL	Colombia
Provisional Irish Republican Army	PIRA	Ireland
Rajah Solaiman Movement	RSM	Philippines
Red Army Faction	RAF	Germany
Red Brigades	BR	Italy
Revolutionary Armed Forces	FAR	Cuba
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	FARC	Colombia
Revolutionary Army of the People	ERP	Argentina
Revolutionary United Front	RUF	Sierra Leone
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (Orly Group, 3rd October Organization)	ASALA	Lebanon, Armenia
Sendero Luminoso	SL	Peru
Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board	CGSB	Colombia
The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front	DHKP/C	Turkey
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement	MRTA	Peru
Tupamaros National Liberation Movement	MLN-T	Uruguay
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist	TKP/ML-TIKKO	Turkey
United Red Army	URA	Japan
United Self-Defense Group of Colombia	AUC	Colombia
Zapatista Army of National Liberation	EZLN	Mexico

CHAPTER 1

TERRORISM, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST LEARNING OF ORGANIZED CRIME

The World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks – the so-called 9/11 attacks– on September 11, 2001, followed by bombings in Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and in London and Delhi in 2005, along with recent terrorist attacks in many other cities in Europe confirmed that no state was immune from terrorism. The then President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, in his address to a joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, said the following: "Our nation has been put on notice: we are not immune from attack" (Bush, 2001a). These attacks triggered the opening of a new period in the history of states: the priorities of states and the concerns of their people were shifted more towards security (Silke, 2007, p.76; Nacos, 2007, p.33; Kongar, 2009, p.151; Rothenberger, Müller & Elmezeny, 2016).

Statistics of terrorist attacks demonstrate the seriousness of the terrorism problem and explain this shift. The Bureau of Counterterrorism of the United States of America (U.S.A.) (U.S. Department of State, 2015), for instance, reports that, in 2014, a total of 13,463 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide. In 2014, the number of terrorist attacks increased 35% and total fatalities increased 81% compared to 2013. The number of countries that terrorist attacks took place

in and the number of organizations identified as perpetrators also increased.

Terrorist attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014. 60% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria) and 78% of all fatalities took place in almost the same countries (Iraq, Nigeria Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria). More than 250 organizations were named as perpetrators of terrorist attacks, including 33 organizations that had not previously been identified. Terrorist attacks in 2014, on the other hand, resulted in more than 32,700 deaths and more than 34,700 injuries. This means that, on average, every month 2,727 people were killed and 2,899 people injured in 1,122 terrorist attacks worldwide. These statistics indicate that people have become more vulnerable to terrorism. As a result, terrorism has become a top priority.

Responding to the threat of terrorism, many democratic states increased their security alert levels, adopted tougher legislation and implemented new counterterrorism measures (Jackson, Baker, Cragin, Parachini, Trujillo & Chalk, 2005, p.13; Sinai, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007, p.319; Maogoto, 2016, p.4). These changes shifted security policies towards a 'war model' (Bobic, 2014, p.253). Member states of the United Nations (U.N.), following the lead of the U.S.A., have declared a 'global war' on terror (Barnett, 2004; Napoleoni, 2007, p.183; Graham, 2008, p.42; Morales-Dupont & Asthappan, 2008; Welch, 2009; Comas, Shrivastava. & Martin, 2014, p.1; Maogoto, 2016, p.5; Hunt & Rygiel, 2016, p.1; Maira, 2016, p.19). Even states, once declared as sponsors of terror, condemned the 9/11 attacks and joined the international community to fight against terrorism (Schmemann, 2001). The then President of Iran Mohammad Khatami, for example, expressed his sympathy for the American nation and said

that “terrorism is doomed and the international community should stem it and take effective measures in a bid to eradicate it" (Press, 2002).

“Starving terrorists of funding” has become one of the pillars of the war model (Bush, 2001b). States have started to target terrorist financing and the international community has begun increasingly scrutinizing state sponsorship of terrorism (Passas, 2007, p.23; Hufbauer & Moll, 2007, p.189; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.15; Kaunert & Giovanna, 2010, p.280; Napoleoni, 2013, p.14; Ryder, 2016, p.1). Concomitantly, researchers and scholars have begun to study terrorism extensively to find out why ‘others (them)’ were attacking the ‘modern society (us)’ and killing innocent people (Jackson, R., 2005, p.5). As a result, academic literature and sources have abounded (Makarenko, 2004; Ganor, 2008, 269; Blomberg, Engel & Sawyer, 2010, p.303; Schmid, 2016, p.26; Freilich & LaFree, 2016, p.569).

Identifying the Problems

Researchers take different incidents as the beginning of modern terrorism. The French Revolution in 1789 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p.92), the emergence of Anarchists in Russia in the 1880s (Rapoport, 2004, p.47), the beginning of European expansion in the early 1900s (Weinberg & Eubank, 2004, p.96), the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 from Rome to Tel Aviv by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) for the release of comrades-in-arms on July 22, 1968 (Pollard, 2007, p.237) are all argued to be the beginning of modern terrorism. Therefore, it is not clear when modern terrorism started, but it is clear when it ended. George W. Bush announced the beginning of a new era in his press conference on October 11th, 2001:

> And the world has come together to fight a new and different war, the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century…there are new threats that we face; and no better example of that new threat than the attack on America on September 11th. (Bush, 2001c)

This declaration of 'war' on a 'new' form of terrorism has led many researchers to argue that 'new terrorism' is fundamentally different from the pre - 9/11 period (Kennedy-Pipe & Welch, 2008, p.262). They argue that new terrorists have transformed terrorism into a war of tactics: they resort to new tactics; they are fanatic, deadly and pervasive internationalized entities; they are religiously motivated; they are decentralized, independent, and more importantly self-funding (Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2004a, p.xvi; De Vries, 2005, p.3; Horgan, 2005, p.vii; Naim, 2006; Comras, 2007; Ranstorp & Wilkinson, 2008, p. xvii; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008; Forst, 2009, p.71; Gofas, 2012). However, a closer examination of these arguments reveals that contemporary terrorism and terrorist organizations (TOs) are *not* new. Terrorism and TOs have evolved over centuries under the changing milieu (Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeld, Zanini & Jenkins, 1999, p.41; Raufer, 2000, p.30; Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p.77; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.7; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Santifort, 2012; Manwaring & Corr, 2014, p.96). Contemporary terrorism continues this pattern of evolution.

An historical perspective on terrorism provides a better understanding of its changes, the characteristics of tactics used and the way it is today. Researchers of the history of terrorism have delineated distinct periods. These periods are the key to understand the changes in tactics, goals and motivations of terrorism in different eras. Forst (2009, p.43), for example, refers to three

periods of terrorism; from its origins to the mid-twentieth century, the latter half of the twentieth century, and the emerging post—9/11 era. Rapoport (2004), on the other hand, prefers to use the term 'wave' to explain periodic changes in terrorism. He defines wave as, "a cycle of activity in a given time period—a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases" (p.47).

Rapoport identifies four waves in terrorism. The first wave, referred to as the Anarchist wave, began in 1878 when a Russian police commander was wounded by Vera Zasulich who later threw her revolver and shouted that she was a terrorist, not a killer. The primary strategy of anarchists was assassination campaigns against prominent officials. Bank robberies were frequently used for financing. The second wave, the anti-colonial wave, began in the 1920s and ended in the 1960s. The self-identified terrorist groups changed their financing methods; bank robberies were less common because of the money they received from diaspora sources. The third wave, the new left wave, was dominant until the end of the twentieth century, but there are still TOs active from that period such as the PKK. Kidnappings, hijackings, and bank robberies were characteristics of the new left wave. The last wave, the religious wave, emerged after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Sikhs seeking a religious state in Punjab, Jews killing Muslims in sacred Islamic places in Jerusalem in 1994 and the assassination of Palestinian mayors, the murder of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the emergence of the American "Christian Identity" movement fuelled the last wave. TOs in the last wave favoured bombings and financed themselves through alternative resources.

TOs changed their tactics rapidly during these terrorism waves. Examination of conventions held between interested states to discuss how to

respond to terrorist activities provides a clear picture of these changes, as counterterrorism policies and conventions are reactive and generally enacted after terrorists employ new tactics (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p.183). The 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s were the eras of aeroplane hijacking and hostage taking by TOs (Nacos, 2007, p.80). The 1963 Tokyo Convention, 1970 Hague Convention, 1971 Montreal Convention and 1988 Montreal Convention all focused on hijackings and airport safety. The increased use of kidnappings and hostage takings by TOs dominated discussions in the 1970s and 1973 New York Convention and 1979 New York Convention covered kidnappings and hostage takings. TOs increasingly used bombings in the 1990s and the 1988 Rome Convention, 1991 Montreal Convention and 1997 New York Convention consequently emphasized terrorist bombings. These conventions point out that TOs use different tactics with varying frequencies in different periods. Contemporary TOs continue to resort to the same tactics (Merari, 1999, p.54; Dolnik, 2007).

Another point of the new terrorism discussion is that contemporary TOs have started to operate internationally. However, TOs have been operating internationally since the 1960s (Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.62; Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p.175; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Santifort, 2012, p.5). The number of international terrorist incidents that occurred between 1968 and 1974 was 503 (Midlarsky et al., 1980, p.266). Since 1968, transnational terrorism has claimed at least 15,000 victims (Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p. 246). The Armenian terrorists, for instance, prepared attacks in more than 20 countries, including the USA, Australia, France, Switzerland and others (Pluchinsky, 1982, p.51). The Rand Corporation notes that “the breadth of their geographical reach was

equalled by no other group" (as cited in Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p.243). The Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany also perpetrated international terrorism; it was involved in attacks outside of the Federal Republic of Germany (Pluchinsky, 1982, p.51). The RAF seized the West German Embassy in Stockholm in 1975. One year later, the RAF robbed a bank in Vienna and another in Zurich in 1979. In 1977, they were planning to kidnap the former Swedish minister of immigration. The RAF also attempted to assassinate the then NATO commander in Belgium in 1979. However, support from wealthy individuals, states, diaspora groups, transnational criminal activities and charitable organizations have given an impetus to the internationalization of TOs (Von Hippel, 2007). Consequently, contemporary TOs have increased their international operations and networks, although many TOs already operated at international levels.

Contemporary TOs continue to use the same weapons such as pistols, rifles, and improvised explosive devices (Merari, 1999, p.54; Dolnik, 2007, p.25). However, TOs have learned ways to improve materials and tactics. For example, TOs have tried to use aeroplanes in attacks many times. Yevno Azev, foreseeing aeroplanes' potential in 1906, bought one to use in a terrorist attack (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p.179). The Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) was planning to crash a hijacked aeroplane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1994 (Gunaratna, 2006, p.175; Shapiro, 2007, p.143). It was Al Qaeda that managed to turn aeroplanes into missiles in the 9/11 attacks. Contemporary TOs have successfully learned ways to convert different materials into weapons. Additionally, it has become easy to carry and conceal weapons because of miniaturization (Dolnik, 2007, p.25).

Contemporary TOs have become deadly because of their increased ability to obtain deadly weapons, especially under the new financial infrastructure (Veness, 2000, p.9; Zimmerman, 2011, p.8). They have managed to change their funding portfolio (Berry, Curtis, Hudson, & Kollars, 2002, p.3; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.7; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.12; Freeman, 2011). They have begun to use alternative financial resources that have helped them survive (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.14; Clunan, 2007, p.264; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.1; Bobic, 2014, p.245). Criminal enterprise has become one of their alternative means to gain material assets (Copeland, 2001, p.96; Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.18; Comras, 2007, p.126; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.27; Hayden, 2007, p.294; Napoleoni, 2007, p.14; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208; Freeman, 2011, p. 466; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014). Earlier groups were using bank robberies, extortion and kidnapping for funding, but contemporary TOs have become more dependent on organized crime. They are now capable of perpetrating a variety of organized crime (Renner, 2002, p.7; Rapoport, 2002; Higgings & Kilpatrick, 2005, p.340; Crelinsten, 2007, p.217; Passas, 2007; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007; Zarate, 2009a; Freedman & Levitt, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.167; Levitt, 2012; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.11; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.73).

The evidence provided by a study of the history of terrorism demonstrates that contemporary TOs are not very different from those of the past (Merari, 2000, p.54; Cronin, 2003, p.38; Dulnik, 2007, p.56): they continue to use the same tactics in varying frequencies, but they have synchronized attacks and have combined various tactics into single operations; they continue to operate at transnational levels, but have increased their transnational

operations and networks; they continue to use the same weapons, but their access to deadly weapons has become easier; they continue to be motivated by the same reasons, including religion. However, contrary to Merari's (1999) argument that organizational features of terrorism cannot change because of the organizational rigidness that stems from clandestinity, and that terrorism has not changed "at all" since the 1970s (p.54), contemporary TOs have successfully learned new ways to survive and have evolved. They have changed their structure and their communication modes. They have acquired new materials to prepare attacks. They have learned new techniques and methods and new ways of improving existing tactics. As a result, TOs have become "smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture and eliminate" (Hoffman, 1999, p.25)

Even though many studies on terrorism acknowledge the importance of learning for TOs, how they learn has attracted little attention from researchers (Jackson, 2004; Hamm, 2005; Jackson et al, 2005; Forest, 2006a; Jones, 2006). Few researchers who have studied terrorist learning have had a limited focus; diminishing 'learning' to 'adaptation' or 'innovation', they examined the technological adaptations, creativity and innovations of TOs (Forest, 2008; Kenney, 2008; Ackerman, 2010, p. 51; Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.130; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013; Stenersen, 2013; Revill, 2016). Consequently, how TOs learn and the implications of their learning mechanisms have not been studied extensively (Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.128). In the Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect Workshop in 2012, for example, experts stated that there was a better understanding of terrorist innovation, however, they

emphasized the need to know how terrorists learned (Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.35).

Learning organized crime, on the other hand, was a part of their evolution. TOs have learned to use organized crime as a tool of survival. For example, while over 90% of the terrorist groups disappear within the first few years of their existence, only TOs with secure sources of funding have survived (Rapoport, as cited in Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.72). TOs involved in criminal activities survive longer than those that do not (Tupman, 1988; Fearon, 2004, p.275; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.4). A study conducted by Stanford University after 9/11 supports the fact that crime is important for survival of TOs (Kaplan, 2005).

TOs and organized crime groups (OCGs) have come together around the 'business of crime' even though their motives are dissimilar: that of OCGs' is profit while TOs want political change (Naylor, 2004; Frisch, 2011, p.2; Nath, 2012; Jones, 2012; Pryce, 2012, p.106). However, the business of organized crime is highly sophisticated and requires knowledge, skills and techniques. TOs need to learn how to perpetrate these activities; they need to associate with the source (teacher), acquire and operationalize the knowledge, experience the activity, and improve their skills and techniques. For example, TOs need to learn how to cultivate drug plants, how to process the harvest, how to obtain and use precursors, how to produce drugs with high quality, how to transport them and how to prepare them for street use. How TOs acquire criminal knowledge, skills and techniques has not been studied at an academic level. Studies focus on the criminal activities of TOs in the context of learning (Hamm, 2005; Hamm & Voorde, 2005). Hamm (2005), for example, analyses distinguishing features of

terrorist-oriented crimes of American right-wing and international jihad groups by using aircraft and motor vehicle violations, explosives, firearms, machine guns and destructive devices, racketeering, robbery and burglary. However, his study remains limited to terrorist learning of crimes in training programmes. Other researchers, on the other hand, present evidence of organized crime activities of TOs, but they do not explain how they learned those crimes. Consequently, the literature still lacks studies that examine how TOs learn organized crime.

On the other hand, only a few researchers have focused on the relationship between terrorism and crime. They have formed models to explain different types of relationships that are emerging (Williams, 1998; Dishman, 2001; Shelley & Picarelli, 2002; Thompson & Turlej, 2003; Makarenko, 2004; Metz & Millen, 2004; Naylor, 2004; Picarelli et al., 2005; Mincheva & Gurr, 2006; Rollins & Wyler, 2013; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014). However, existing models do not provide a complete understanding of the relationship; how and why such a relationship is formed is not examined extensively. Moreover, some of these theories have conceptualized terms, such as nexus, alliance, etc., with different meanings or these terms are used interchangeably, therefore, analyses provided are diverse and questionable.

In sum, academic interest in the learning mechanism of TOs has remained limited. In spite of studies that have examined the criminal activities of TOs and the relationship between TOs and OCGs, implications of an interactive learning that occurs between TOs and OCGs have not received substantial attention from researchers.

Aims of the Thesis

Terrorism and counterterrorism have been subjected to different studies in the discipline of political science. A plethora of these studies focus on the causes of the phenomenon and reactions of countries to terrorism. Because of the traditional security approach of political science that does not consider organized crime a national or international security issue, but a law enforcement problem (Makarenko, 2005), the number of researchers that examine the relation of terrorism with other phenomena remains limited. For example, there is abundant information on terrorism in political science and organized crime in criminology separately, but few studies across various disciplines that investigate the relationship between the two (Bandura, 1990; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996, Akers & Silverman, 2004; Hamm, 2005; Ryan, Vanderlick & Matthews, 2007, Kule & Gul, 2015). The absence of amalgam studies on the relationship creates a lacuna in the literature. This thesis intends to contribute to the literature by combining the principles of various disciplines to explain two different but related phenomena.

Organizations that fail to learn cease their evolution; therefore the ability to learn is vital for their survival. TOs, similar to other organizations, are living organisms; they learn and evolve (Raufer, 2000, p.30; Sageman, 2004, p.139; Forest, 2006b, p.4; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.53; Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p.77; Longmire & Longmire, 2008; Makarenko, 2010, p.185; Comas, Shrivastava & Martin, 2014, p.2; Tutun, Wang, Liu, Yıldırım & Khanmohammadi, 2016). They have learned alternative ways to survive and organized crime has become one of the primary factors conducive to TOs' survival and evolution. This thesis aims to study how TOs learn organized crime

that requires knowledge, skill and techniques. The thesis, to achieve this aim, investigates the learning mechanisms of TOs. The association between TOs and OCGs within the context of criminal involvement is examined as a *cause* of the learning.

Research Design and Methods

This thesis uses exploratory research design, a method used to provide insight to a research problem when there are few or no earlier studies to refer to. The thesis, therefore, extensively reviews the literature and scrutinizes various theoretical approaches to create a baseline of knowledge that can be used to shed light on terrorist learning, particularly of organized crime.

The thesis primarily uses qualitative methods to explore and understand the learning mechanisms and the nature of the association between TOs and OCGs as a cause of the learning. It undertakes semi-structured interviews to investigate two aspects: 'how' and 'why' TOs learn organized crime. These questions require a special focus on "operational links, rather than mere frequencies or incidences" (Yin, 1994, p.6). Therefore, the thesis focuses on the operational aspects of terrorism and organized crime, the actors (TOs and OCGs) and what they do. It conducts interviews with law enforcement officers who are actively working at an operational level (responsible for surveillance, interception, raids, etc.). The majority of these officers are selected from the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) (n= 13) and the Anti-Terrorism Department (TEM) (n=9) of the Turkish National Police. Officers from Turkey have been chosen because Turkey, countering different types of TOs for the last forty years, has valuable experience on both terrorism and organized crime (Kule & Gul, 2015, p.16). Moreover, Turkey is the first

country that realized the relationship between terrorism and organized crime and collected data on the issue (United Nations, 1996). In addition, the researcher, as a member of the Turkish National Police Force, has privileged access to people and data. Officers from international agencies such as Interpol (n=1), U.N. (n=1), European Union (n=2) and Europol (n=1) are also interviewed.

The thesis extensively reviews archival materials. It examines the drug seizure files of the KOM Department of Turkish National Police. These files consist of official documents of drug seizure operations and statements of arrestees. The majority of these operations were held in Turkey, but many of them had ties to other countries, particularly to European countries. Investigating these national and international operations enables the research to have a broad perspective on the issue.

Examination of the literature is the best way to identify trends and patterns in terrorism (Silke, 2004d, p.187). This thesis, therefore, systematically examines the existing literature to understand how the terror–crime relationship is perceived by academics. It uses quantitative methods for two purposes: to achieve a 'workable' definition of terrorism and to present and evaluate the existing approaches on the relationship. As a part of the quantitative work, it constructs two different datasets by using academic materials. Descriptive statistics are applied to those datasets.

The first dataset is derived from the terrorism definitions proposed and used in the literature. The thesis formulates existing definitions into variables and proposes a workable definition of its own. The extant studies on the relationship between terrorism and organized crime are converted into another

dataset. The second dataset has different layers. The first layer demonstrates the characteristics of the relationship in a time-line format. The second layer is designed to explore terrorist criminality. It consists of data about reasons for terrorist criminality, types of criminal activities, etc.

The thesis uses seven different variables, rather than selecting a number of TOs as cases. This method is similar to the work performed by Hamm (2005). Hamm (2005) uses terrorist-oriented crimes as cases, rather than examining TOs, because of the heterogeneity of TOs (2005, p.13). He uses one TO for each one of the cases (a Jihadi plot for aircraft and motor vehicle violations, a domestic right-wing terrorist for racketeering, etc.). This thesis, on the same grounds, uses various variables identified to affect the level of association between TOs and OCGs, and consequently the learning. This approach helps the research to achieve more generalizable conclusions.

The thesis identifies *motivational change, leader, setting* and *association nodes (size, network, identity, structure)* to have an effect on the level of association that facilitates learning and criminality. It analyses these variables by using multiple comparative examples to demonstrate the effect of association. For that purpose, it uses terrorist organization profiles from open-source terrorism databases such as the TRAC database of the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (www.trackingterrorism.org), Big, the Allied and Dangerous Database (BAAD) of Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York (www.start.umd.edu), the Mapping Militant Organizations Database of Stanford University (www.stanford.edu) and the Violent Extremism and

Transnational Crime Database of the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (www.isvg.org).

Significance of the Thesis

Terrorism studies are interdisciplinary (Silke, 2004d, p.188; Sinai, 2007, p.32; Forst, 2009, p.xx; Sageman, 2014, p.569; LaFree & Dugan, 2015, p.54). An interdisciplinary approach is a developmental tool for terrorism literature (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004, p.139; Crelinsten, 2007, p.211). This thesis, using an interdisciplinary approach, and combining issues that are of interest to various disciplines, namely business administration, international relations, economics and criminology, provides a much needed cross-fertilization between disciplines, as recommended by Huber (1991, p.107) and LaFree and Dugan (2015, p.53).

Researchers remark on the importance of 'how' and 'why' questions and encourage other researchers to use these questions in their studies, rather than answering who, when and where of terrorist activity (Silke, 2004b, p.10; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.53; Horgan, 2007, p.114). Inspired by remarks of Silke (2004b) that define "a good research" as the one that, "can reveal vital information on how terrorists plan and prepare for operations and how they react to different circumstances and events both during and after incidents" (p.11), this thesis studies how TOs learn and reveals vital information on how TOs act, react and evolve by using a combined method that helps to achieve a better equilibrium between theory and practice: a cross-fertilization of tactical and strategic domains (Ranstorp, 2007b, p.11). It focuses on the actors and their actions to verify theoretical arguments throughout the research. Therefore, it

provides information on both tactical and strategic spheres and creates a balance between theory and practice.

This thesis, focusing on learning as one of the most important aspect of organizations, illuminates learning mechanisms of TOs and OCGs. It investigates the interactive learning process between TOs and OCGs and provides detailed analyses on the learning mechanisms and the internal dynamics of TOs. It, therefore, provides a new way of thinking about terrorist learning and contributes to the literature on both terrorism and organized crime.

Terrorism and crime have been subject to various studies. These studies have contributed to the understanding of each phenomenon, but there is still a need to better understand the relationship between terrorism and crime (Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.8). The relationship is now much more complex than in the pre-9/11 era and it is becoming more difficult to draw a line of separation between the two phenomena (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.15; Lal, 2005, p.302; Chepesiuk, 2007; Bobic, 2014, p.241; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014). This thesis, modelling the relationship by modes of association between TOs and OCGs, provides insight into both phenomena. The model indicates mutative modes of behaviours that result from association, and consequently from learning. Therefore, the thesis provides a key to understanding as to how TOs and OCGs learn, evolve and survive. Thus, the model has implications for a proactive counterterrorism policy that may focus on weakening the learning mechanisms of TOs and decreasing the appropriation among TOs and OCGs.

Limitations

Terrorism researchers face persistent problems; the scarcity of primary data, extensive use of secondary sources, limited access to the primary sources

such as terrorists, transient researchers – one-time contributors, etc. (Jongman, 1993, p.26; Crenshaw, 2000, p.405; Schulze, 2004, p.163; Horgan, 2005, p.37; Bier, 2006, p.23; Ranstorp, 2007b, p.6; Silke, 2007, p.77; Schuurman& Eijkman, 2013, p.4; Sageman, 2014). Some of the problems encountered by other terrorism researchers are also expected to be present in this thesis.

One of the significant barriers to terrorism and organized crime research is the secret nature of TOs and OCGs (Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p.285). Researchers do not have direct access to TOs (Horgan, 2005, p.37). In very rare cases when access is granted, researchers confront dangerous situations that might jeopardize their safety (Silke, 2004c, p.58; 2004d, p.189). For example, between 2002 and 2015, a total of 932 journalists were killed by terrorists (Lopez, 2016, p.64). One prominent example is the kidnapping and killing of Daniel Pearl from the Wall Street Journal (Lal, 2005, p.296; Combs, 2006, p.135). Therefore, the field study in both realms mostly relies on one side of the conflict: the state authorities. This thesis uses information that is obtained from government officers and official documents that may be considered to be one sided. Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, may raise concerns such as the interviewer's weak skills, an abundance of irrelevant information, difficulty of analysing the depth of qualitative information and questions of validity (Whiting, 2008; Diefenbach, 2009). To overcome these potential weaknesses, the structure of the interviews is designed to achieve operational information that was gathered during the investigations in order to leave little room for personal interpretations and to minimize the risk of personal biases.

There are some attributes attached to different types of organizations, however, the heterogeneity of TOs and OCGs hampers researchers from

drawing conclusions that are valid for all (Dror, 1983, p.68; Altes, 1993, p.237; Townshend, 1995, p.316; Cesoni, 1999, p.159; Den Boer, 1999, p.14; Vilks & Bergmanis, 1999, p.65; Garrison, 2004, p.272; Silke, 2004b, p.4; Hamm, 2005). Therefore, this thesis accepts the fact that there might be organizations that would challenge the findings of the thesis.

Terrorism literature may be dominated by the views of some leading researchers that are often cited by other researchers. Such dominance may affect the datasets used in the thesis because they are extracted from the existing literature. Therefore, datasets may be skewed towards those frequently cited views. This may affect the objectivity of the datasets.

Definitions

Defining concepts is the first step of research (Merari, 2007, p.13). It is necessary to formulate definitions not only to present the boundaries of the researches, but also to enable the research world to develop shared methods and approaches (Silke, 2004b, p.3). For example, there are certain differences between guerrilla warfare, insurgency, anarchism and terrorism (Steinitz, 1985, p.151; Corrado & Evans, 1988, p.374; Goolsby, 2006, p.9; Art & Richardson, 2007, p.8; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.9; Merari, 2007, p.24; Sinai, 2007, p.32; Frisch, 2011, p.2; Combs, 2015, p. 23; Martin, 2015, p.27). Referring to all these forms of violence as terrorism and building up research propositions on this conceptual mistake would cause misleading analyses and conclusions. The focus of terrorism research would also be scattered (Silke, 2004b, p.3). This thesis, therefore, searches for clear definitions of research concepts (terrorism and organized crime) that would help the researcher sustain a clear focus throughout the research.

One of the biggest obstacles in this definitional search is that terrorism and organized crime are essentially contested concepts (Schmid, 2004, p.378; Wight, 2009, p.100; Nesser & Stenersen, 2014, p.2). Gallie (1955) explains the notion of the essentially contested concept: "…there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users" (p.169). According to Gallie, neither of the explanations of the contested concepts needs to be correct or wrong. Therefore, it should be emphasized that this thesis does not argue that definitions used in the thesis are the best or better than existing definitions in the literature.

The thesis starts its definitional search by examining the terrorism and organized crime definitions provided by the U.N. on the ground that an international organization with 193 member states would provide internationally agreed definitions of both concepts. Therefore, this thesis considers the UN definition of organized crime as an agreed upon one, at least agreed upon by the majority of member states, and adopts it. However, the UN has not succeeded in achieving a definition of terrorism (LaFree & Dugan, 2015, p.58). It has eliminated this predicament by listing terrorist acts. Therefore, the thesis continues its search for a terrorism definition in the following section.

Organized Crime

Organized crime, within the framework of this thesis, refers to the definition adopted by the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime:

> a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. (United Nations, 2003)

According to this definition, an organized crime organization refers to an organized group that consists of three or more people who come together to plan and perpetrate acts of organized crime defined in the thesis.

Terrorism

A definition of terrorism draws a line between who qualifies as a terrorist and those who pursue their political goals peacefully. Jenkins, in his foreword to *Countering the New Terrorism* (1999), points out the role of terrorism's definition to "clear out confusion on who terrorists are, what means are used, what ends are justified" (p.v). A definition does not only clarify Jenkins' remarks, but also clearly establishes what terrorism is not (Schmid, 2004, p.408) and distinguishes innocent actors in political conflicts from terrorists (Hartung & Berrigan, 2007, p.80).

In addition, the political character of an offense, in the absence of a definition, could not be determined and, eventually, the law might give rise to abuse (Dartnell, 2000, p.203). For example, it is the legal definition of terrorism that limits the capacity and the power of states to infringe upon civil liberties (Golder & Williams, 2004, p.271). Thus, a definition is needed for international politics in order to facilitate discussion about the way in which terrorism should be tackled internationally (Altes, 1993, p.237), to formulate or enforce international agreements (Ganor, 2002, p.300), to develop international cooperation and to create a regime of global governance in the area of

counterterrorism (Crelinsten, 2007, p.220). A definition also hampers TOs from gaining public legitimacy and stops them from receiving support from the population (Ganor, 2002, p.302).

Terrorism, however, has different meanings for different people (McIntosh, 1975, p.18; Gordon, 2004, p.112; Wilkinson, 2006, p.1; Merari, 2007, p.13). How one defines terrorism is, in fact, an indication of how close one perceives himself or herself to be to terrorism or to terrorist groups and how he or she expects the problem to be solved (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.9; Crelinsten, 2000, p.179; Schmid, 2004, p.384; Hayden, 2007, p.296; Forst, 2009, p.20).

Definitions of terrorism vary from person to person, society to society and from government to government (Schmid, 1993a, p.7; Bruce, 2013; Martin, 2015, p.32). Terrorism, on the one hand, is a path that must be taken by the oppressed minority or the only method left for the weak to obtain freedom from the oppressor or for groups calling themselves 'freedom fighters'. 'Freedom fighters' propose that fulfilling their demands for freedom or political changes would solve the conflict. According to the majority, on the other hand, terrorism is a method of violence and a rejection of democratic paths in pursuit of political changes or the denial of peace and democracy by the "freedom's enemies" (Jackson, R, 2005), or the "evil" ones (Bush, 2006). US Senator Henry Jackson makes the point well: "terrorism is what our enemies do and never what we do" (Jackson, 1979, cited in Stohl, 1988, p.14). It is obvious from both approaches that a definition reflects the proposed solutions (Altes, 1993, p.237; Crenshaw, 1995b, p.9; Crelinsten, 2000, p.179; Hayden, 2007, p.296; Forst, 2009, p.20; Abadinsky, 2010, p.7; Martin, 2015.). This is why how terrorism is defined is important.

The general meaning of terrorism has changed over time (Makarenko, 2005; Combs, 2015, p.2). Fine (2010), in his study on the origins of the term, demonstrates changes in the meaning of terrorism. During the Assyrian era after 1100 BCE, terrorism was the use of political and military means to inspire fear and terror in their Kingdom's enemies, but later it was used to refer to the "terror from below" by the Sicarii sect of Jewish zealots (Fine, 2010, p.271). It was the tool of religious extremist movements (Makarenko, 2005, p.60). Beginning in the 1400s, it was again used to mean 'terror from above': "a prestige of cruelty" (Fine, 2010, p.277). Terrorism had the same meaning in the 1700s. Maximilien Robespierre, who was guillotined as a victim of terror five months after he prepared his "Report on the Principles of Political Morality" in 1794, for instance, said that:

> terrorism is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible, it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs. (Robespierre, 1794)

Terrorism, later in the 1800s, had positive connotations such as revolution by non-state actors (Hoffman, 1999). In the beginning of the 1900s terrorism lost its revolutionary appeal and began to mean "the abuse of governmental power against its citizens and potential opponents" (Fine, 2010, p.281). After the Second World War, the meaning of terrorism changed again to mean struggles for national liberation. This definition referred to the nationalistic and ethnic separatism after the 1960s (Makarenko, 2005, p.61). In spite of the fact that nationalistic and ethnic separatism persists, terrorism has

been associated with religiously motivated groups in recent years (Rapoport, 2004; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013; Nesser & Stenersen, 2014).

Discrepancies among approaches towards terrorism and the changing meaning of it lead researchers to one agreed upon conclusion that there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism (Dror, 1983, p.68; Schmid, 1993a, p.7; Taylor & Horgan, 2000, p.6, Silke, 2004d, p.208; Ranstorp, 2007a; Hartung & Berrigan, 2007, p.81; Graham, 2008, p.30; Forst, 2009, p.4; Freilich & LaFree, 2016, p.570). Therefore, terrorism experts have been trying to achieve a workable definition of terrorism by using different methods. Determining common elements of terrorism definitions is one of these methods (Schmid, 2004; Combs, 2015, p.5).

Schmid and Jongman (1988, cited in Schmid, 2004, p.381), in their examination of definitional elements, found 16 characteristics. Crenshaw (2002, cited in Schmid, 2004, p.403), later, prepared a list of 13 key characteristics of terrorism definitions. However, they created a definition that is too broad. Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004, p.777), following the footsteps of Schmid and Jongman, examined a total of 73 definitions from 55 articles in the major journals in the field. They found 8 elements frequently included in terrorism definitions. However, terrorism evolves and changes, as does the definition of terrorism. This thesis, therefore, examined 171 definitions provided in the literature, beginning from 1963. Each definition is divided into different variables. Based on these variables, a dataset is created. Analysis of the dataset revealed that six different elements are common in all definitions: perpetrators/terrorists, psychological effect /psychological nature, means, acts, targets and purpose of terrorism. After selecting the most common words used

in these elements, this thesis has succeeded in achieving a workable definition of terrorism.

Terrorism within the context of this thesis explicitly refers to a phenomenon that is defined as:

> the conduct of systematic violent acts or the threat of violence that is aimed to create a climate of fear and employed by individuals, groups or state actors against the immediate victims and overall population as a means of achieving political purposes.

According to the BAAD database of State University of New York (2016), TOs have at the very least 11 members. Therefore, a terrorist organization refers to an organized group that consists of 11 or more people who come together to plan and perpetrate acts of terrorism defined in the thesis. This definition excludes self-starter cells and gives more emphasis to the organizational aspect of the learning, which is much needed in terrorism studies (Shapiro, 2013, p.1).

Outline of the Thesis

The structure of the thesis is designed to explore the learning mechanisms of TOs in order to create a baseline of knowledge that can be used to shed light on the research question. The first chapter outlines the thesis. It addresses the gaps in the literature and calls for a closer examination of terrorist learning, organized crime activities of TOs and the relationship between TOs and OCGs. The second chapter examines terrorist financing, suicide attacks and hostage seizure missions to find evidence of terrorist learning and to extract principle methods used for learning by TOs.

The literature lacks theoretical studies on the learning of TOs, therefore, the third chapter searches for theoretical grounds that explain terrorist learning. It reviews Contagion Theory, Organizational Learning Theory, Alliance Learning Theory and Social Learning Theory for that purpose. The weaknesses and strengths of each theory in relation to terrorist learning are discussed. The thesis, after reviewing those theories, concludes that Akers' Social Learning Theory that stems from Sutherland's Differential Association Theory provides better explanations for the learning mechanism of TOs and the involvement of TOs in organized crime businesses. The fourth chapter applies the principles of Social Learning Theory to terrorist learning of organized crime.

The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters study the concept of 'association', a point emphasized by theories examined in the thesis and by studies that explain terrorist learning in the context of adaptation and innovation. The thesis argues that association facilitates learning, therefore, these three chapters review the literature on the relationship between TOs and OCGs, present reasons for the association between them, conceptualize the learning process around an association model, investigate factors that affect the association, and eventually the appropriation and learning. And, finally, the conclusion outlines the findings of the thesis and presents implications for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS

How people become terrorists is one part of the terrorism research focus. When people become terrorists, how they learn to fight is another (Shapiro, 2012). TOs need to develop their capabilities, improve the skills of members, and increase their intelligence gathering abilities to become capable of using new tactics, to attack with more success, and to become apt to counter the counterterrorism measures. They need to learn how to use weapons, how to successfully attack, how to launder money, how to transport personnel from one location to another, how to identify and conduct attacks on their targets, how to do surveillance and how to make secret communications (Jackson, 2004, p. 8). They need to alter and improve their learning capabilities to perform all these tasks. Moreover, they need to learn secretly, without attracting law enforcement agencies' attention (Forest, 2006b, p. 4), and successfully because failing to learn has devastating consequences for them (Shapiro, 2013, p.4). Many TOs that failed to learn how to successfully explode bombs faced human resource losses (Pluchinsky, 1982, p.58; Forest, 2006, p.3; Laciner, 2005b). The PIRA, for instance, is estimated to have lost approximately 120 members due to accidental shooting incidents or premature explosions (Jackson, 2001, p.17; Revill, 2016, p.81). In addition, they need to learn ways to increase their

production rates (the number of attacks) because the learning is estimated to affect the production rates of TOs at a factor of two or so, and in special circumstances at a factor of ten (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2009). Learning, therefore, is vital for TOs. It draws a line between failure and success that grants survival.

Many studies demonstrate that TOs are adaptive and members of TOs learn new techniques, particularly in technological developments and bombings (Forest, 2008, p.270; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012; Ranstorp & Brun, 2013). However, activities of TOs are not limited to those areas. They operate in a broad range of areas, such as financing, the criminal world, intelligence gathering, etc. These activities require additional skills, techniques and knowledge to be learned. TOs need to be *learning organizations* in all activity areas and to be able to alter and improve their organizational routines (Jackson, 2004, p. 8). Therefore, this chapter investigates terrorist financing, suicide attacks and hostage seizures in search of evidence that TOs are learning organizations before examining how TOs learn. Thus, such a search may also enable the researcher to extract principal methods used for learning by TOs. While performing this task, the chapter focuses on sources of knowledge (states, other TOs and OCGs) because the thesis considers OCGs as one of the elements of the terrorist learning chart and states that TOs learn organized crime activities from OCGs.

A Continuous Competitive Learning Process

Terrorists, in order to achieve their goals, use various tactics. Terrorism itself, in fact, is a tactic. Suicide attacks, kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, shootings and assassinations are prevalent among TOs' repertoire (Rosie, 1987,

p.163; Wilkinson, 2006, p.16). Even though TOs have been using these tactics for a long time, some of the methods used in these tactics are new. They are either developed by TOs' innovative units or learned from other organizations.

Midlarsky et al. (1980, p.279) refer to new terrorist methods as 'innovations'. These innovations occur at three levels; tactical, strategic and organizational (Crenshaw, 2010, p.36; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.8). Problem solving, competition and status, invention and discovery are drivers of these innovations (Ackerman, 2010, p.58; Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010, p.2; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.129). For example, counterterrorism barriers, as one of these drivers, shifted TOs towards malevolent creativity (Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley, 2008, p.107) or innovations (Jackson, 2004, p.10; Forest, 2008, p.270; Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012, p.9; Moghadam, 2013, p.467). While counterterrorism agencies try to detect these innovations and block access to them, TOs learn other ways to bid these measures (Dolnik, 2007, p.152; Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010, p.33). Many TOs learned new methods in bombings every time a method was obviated by government agencies (Forest, 2008, p.270; Ranstorp & Brun, 2013). These efforts indicate a continuous competitive learning process between counterterrorism agencies (states) and TOs in which both parties learn from each other. Yet, the learning process is not limited to these two groups. TOs also learn from other TOs and criminals/OCGs.

Learning from States

TOs have managed to 'counter' counterterrorism measures by learning new methods and increasing their learning abilities and capabilities (Enders & Sandler, 1993; Jackson et al., 2005, p.2; Forest, 2008, p270; Kenney, 2008,

p.97; Bobic, 2014, p.245; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016, p. 22). Whenever a new counterterrorism policy is implemented, TOs learn new ways of bypassing and weakening the measures in said policy (Sandler & Enders, 2004; Faria, 2006, p.47; Ranstorp & Brun, 2013, p.11; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Santifort, 2012, p.3; Hsu & Apel, 2015, p.30; Revill, 2016, p.80).

Researchers have demonstrated interest in the competitive learning mechanism between TOs and states. Some explain these changes as "compliments and substitutes": modes of attack that fulfil similar purposes, when the relative price of one type of terrorist tactic is increased by passive and active responses of governments designed to reduce that type of tactic (Enders & Sandler, 1993, p.831). Others, borrowing from arms races in evolutionary biology, call it the "red queen effect" (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012, p.9). For example, when metal detectors were installed in airports and embassies, TOs started to increasingly use kidnapping and assassinations. When embassies and government installations were fortified, TOs started to use assassinations and car bombs sequentially.

Crenshaw (2001, p.15604) and Moghadam (2013, p.467), on the other hand, provide an additional explanation to these changes. They argue that such tactical changes are due to the loss of the 'surprise' factor that is critical to success because when tactics of terrorists become familiar to governments, they cease to surprise.

Whether it is because of the substitution, red queen effect or the loss of the surprise factor, TOs need to learn new methods and tactics to survive (Goolsby, 2006, p.8). Changes in organizational structure are one of these tactics (Comas, Shrivastava & Martin, 2014, p.9). TOs, learning that it is easier

for state agencies to detect and dismantle centralized hierarchical organizations, changed their organizational structures to flexible networks (Braun, 2008; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013, p.774; Al Raffie &Huehn, 2016, 226; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016).

Some TOs started to use cell structures. The PIRA, for example, started to use cell based structures in its operational components in the 1970s because of a desire for increased secrecy and discipline (Jackson et al, 2005, p.129; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 139). Some switched to decentralized structure (Moghadam, 2013; Shapiro, 2013, p.16; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016). For example, Al Qaeda commander Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri's called for self-sufficient cells in a meeting in Yemen in 1995 because the organization was having financial difficulties (Sageman, 2004, p.43). After this call, Al Qaeda and its affiliates changed their organizational structures to a decentralized model with compartmentalized units that became financially self-sufficient. This helped Al Qaeda to maximize the level of terrorist activities and minimize the risk of detection by law enforcement agencies (Jackson, 2004, p.23; Forest, 2008, p.273). Other TOs became leaderless to decrease vulnerability when they learned that counterterrorism agencies used decapitation against leaders of TOs (Jackson, 2004, p.24; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.9). All these changes helped TOs survive.

In addition to defensive changes, TOs search for vulnerabilities of counterterrorism agencies and change their operation modes accordingly. They investigate state agencies' methods, tactics, techniques, successes and failures, and they learn from them (Forest, 2006d, p.262; Gunaratna, 2006, p.172). Al Qaeda members, for example, learn to survive in extreme circumstances from

army sources using a tactical training manual, the *Al-Baqaa Fi al-Zuruf al-Saba*. The manual is a translation of a U.S. Army manual (Forest, 2006b, p.6). Moreover, TOs routinely gather information about counterterrorism agencies' efforts to identify their own and state agencies' vulnerabilities (Kenney, 2006, p.42). Al Qaeda members, for example, allegedly faked themselves as informants providing information about a possible attack at the embassy by unidentified terrorists before the USA embassy bombing in Kenya in 1998 (Kenney, 2006, p.44). They then had access to the embassy building for the next days. They gathered information on security procedures and sent it to an Al Qaeda leader for review. The PKK uses a less risky method to gather information on state agencies. The PKK established CCTV units in the cities. They use them for surveillance, operations and security (Personal communication (P.C.) 21, 2014). They observe state agencies' reactions to attacks and ameliorate their tactics accordingly (P.C. 22, 2014).

The competitive learning is obvious in technological developments. When counterterrorism agents detect techniques and technological equipment used by terrorists, TOs start to use new techniques and materials. For instance, every time a new technological tool was used by the British agencies, the PIRA found and learned new methods to bypass it (Jackson, 2004, p.10; Ranstorp & Brun, 2013; Revill, 2016). When police stations and military bases were strengthened, the PIRA began to use mortars. Learning from military reference books, they manufactured mortar units in local machine shops and safe houses (Jackson et al., 2005, p.1). They later modified mortar designs and added timers (Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 145). The PIRA used crude timers, then radio control, radar detectors, and remote photographic flash units

and time delay switches in their bomb attacks as detonator mechanisms. When radio signals were blocked, they switched to radar detectors and when radar detectors became useless, they used photographic flash units. Each time a new method was interfered by the British counterterrorism agencies, a new method was learned and implemented by the PIRA.

The PKK, on the other hand, used mines on roads frequently used by government forces. However, after realizing that government forces had started to use mine detectors and strengthened transportation vehicles, the PKK changed its method and started to use remote controlled explosives with radio controlled equipment and cellular phones. The Turkish government forces started to use radio frequency blockers and jammers to block cell phones and once again the PKK changed its tactic. The PKK, similar to methods used in Afghanistan and Iraq, used sensors (Celik, 2011).

Surprisingly, the PKK uses one of the most primitive methods to detonate explosives in its recent attacks: cables. The PKK used cables that are kilometres' length to detonate explosives on roads frequently used by the military or the police (Sancar, 2011; "15 asker kirpi", 2012). In those attacks, a good calculation is needed for success. The PKK uses road traffic sings to calculate the speed of the vehicles targeted, distance between vehicles and the bomb, and timing of the blast (P.C. 21, 2014). The military and the police forces became vigilant about road signs and started to drive in the middle of the road to decrease the effect of the bombings because the PKK sets explosives on the sides of the road. The PKK has demonstrated its innovative character in other attacks. The PKK, for instance, used wet black umbrellas to make themselves invisible to thermal cameras. In one of the raids against Turkish Military Forces,

they used wet black umbrellas and killed 9 soldiers and wounded 19 ("PKK siyah şemsiye", 2012).

Similar to the PKK, TOs in Iraq also have used radio signals to trigger explosives. However, as soon as American forces started to block signals, TOs in Iraq, in contrast to the PKK, learned to develop their equipment. They started to send a continuous radio signal. When the signal is stopped, the bomb explodes (Forest, 2006b, p.22; Forest, 2008, p.270). They also used infrared lasers to bypass electronic jammers. The American forces managed to track the signals and assured the continuing signals, however, TOs came up with a new innovation; encrypted signals (Forest, 2006b, p.22). Recently, they have used another tactic. They make one of the bombs visible and bury a secondary bomb that explodes when the visible bomb is disarmed (Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.16).

The LTTE is another organization that managed to remain ahead of the learning curve. They invented speedboat suicide attacks and developed underwater bombs with RDX, a powerful explosive, and time detonators (Forest, 2006b, p. 21). The FARC also learned how to develop its military equipment. The FARC developed a series of mortars with a quality close to that of industrially manufactured ones (Ortiz, 2006, p.211). They also learned how to recharge and reuse cartridges fired by heavy weapons. The most important development came from the FARC's efforts to combat the Air Forces in Colombia; they designed and produced an anti-aircraft rocket with instructions and manuals (Ortiz, 2006, p.212).

Terrorist financing is another area in which competitive learning occurs. States examine the financial activities of TOs and learn ways to block their

access to resources. However, TOs scrutinize those measures and learn other ways to acquire much needed resources.

The amount of money that is available to TOs is "as important as fighters, weaponry and extremist ideology" (Cohen, 2010). The failure of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, to reach his ultimate goal of toppling one of the towers into the other because of his limited resources proves its importance (Dishman, 2005; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008). Another example comes from the ASG in the Philippines. The ASG planned to bomb a chemical plant in 2006 but never managed to execute the plan because of a lack of funds (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p. 41).

Al Qaeda is one of the TOs that is aware of the importance of funding. Osama Bin Laden, in his fatwa urging Jihad against Americans in 1998, emphasized this fact and called on "every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to *kill* the Americans and *plunder their money* wherever and whenever they find it" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2004, p.58, emphasize added). His followers obeyed the fatwa. The 9/11 attackers even returned their unused funds to Al Qaeda to finance other operative units, a total of $36,000 before committing suicide (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.4).

States, being aware of the importance of finance for TOs, made counter terrorist financing an important pillar. (Passas, 2007, p.23; Hufbauer & Moll, 2007, p.189; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.15; 2008b, p.68). In his remarks on September 24, 2001, George W. Bush emphasized the importance of such an approach and made this statement:

> Today, we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network…We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places and bring them to justice…I don't know the full amount of their cash flows, but *one dime of money into a terrorist activity is one dime too much*… And we know that these organizations *cannot function if we're able to … chop off their monies*. (Bush, 2001b, emphasis added)

The primary aim of countering terrorist financing is to prevent future terrorist attacks by limiting the resources of terrorists (Luna, 2008a; 2008b). The second is to enable law enforcement agencies to predict and interdict future terrorist operations. Gordon Brown, a former prime minister of the United Kingdom, emphasizes that "financial information" is one of the most powerful "investigative and intelligence tools" available in the fight against crime and terrorism ("Meeting the terrorist", 2006). By gaining financial information, it is possible to penetrate TOs and pre-empt terrorist attacks because financial activities may indicate forthcoming terrorist attacks (De Vries, 2005, p.4; Kaplan, 2005; Wilkinson, 2006, p.205; Williams, 2007, p.72; Costigan & Gold, 2007, p.ix; Phillips, 2009). In addition, financial information may sometimes help investigators to make the link between terrorists and attacks.

Several cases highlight the importance of financial information for state agencies. In a terrorism-related financial investigation in Turkey, it was found that 69 individuals had received money transfers, 150 Euros for each, between 2005 and 2006. Examination of the individuals revealed that 30 of them had criminal records for terrorism. The most important finding of the investigation

was that 2 individuals received money transfers before and after terrorist attacks (Yucebas, 2011, p.201).

In another case, the link between Riduan Isamuddin, head of the JI operations, and the Bali bombings in 2002 was detected only after a successful financial investigation (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.41). There are others. The liquid explosive aviation plot in 2006 in the UK was detected and disrupted through financial investigations (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.41). The first link between the 9/11 hijackers and the planners of the attacks was also established through the financial information discovered during the investigations that followed (Pollard, 2007, p.240).

Policies of countering terrorist financing have changed over time. They focused on the direct financial methods of TOs in the 1960s. Counterterrorism policy in Burma in the 1960s, for example, implemented the "Four Cuts" programme to cut terrorists off from resources: limiting access to food, funding, recruits and intelligence (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.167). Later, terrorist financing was handled in the context of state sponsorship (Clunan, 2007).

After the terrorist bombings of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the focus shifted back to TOs' direct financial sources. The New York Convention on terrorist financing was signed in the following year (Crelinsten, 2007, p.217). The U.N. adopted Resolution 1267 in 1999 to call on all member states to freeze funds and other financial resources that may be used by terrorists. They also established a Sanctions Committee, which was later named 'the Security Council Committee', to monitor the implementation of sanctions on the Taliban, Al Qaeda and associated entities and individuals. The Committee later created a "Consolidated List of Asset Freeze Targets",

containing approximately 500 names. Other resolutions such as Resolution 1373 followed, but they did not contain any listing procedure. In 2005, the act of financing terrorism was criminalized in 123 U.N. member states (Dalyan, 2008).

The European Union followed a parallel strategy to the UN. It formed a comprehensive plan for combating terrorist financing. It defined its objectives in the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2004:

> to impede terrorists' planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorists' funding and access to attack materials, and bring them to justice, while continuing to respect human rights and international law. (European Union, 2004, p.12)

The international community has consequently begun to use "smart financial power" to counter terrorist financing (Zarate, 2009a). Legislative, regulatory, and financial enforcement tools have been deployed to prevent terrorist financing. Three developments occurred as a consequence of the use of smart financial power: an expansion of the international anti-money laundering regime; the development and application of financial tools to national security issues; and centralisation of the international financial community and private sector (Zarate, 2009b). However, these developments also had unintended consequences: TOs shifted towards new financing methods and tactics.

Countering terrorist financing is a complex process; "the government's effort to reduce one type of activity causes the terrorists to shift into another" (Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983, p.51). TOs, pressured by the new challenging milieu, have learned to surpass the terrorist financing policies of states (Berry et al., 2002, p.3; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.14; Hamm &

Voorde, 2005, p.18; Comras, 2007, p.126; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.12; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.1). Measures taken to block the access of terrorists to financial assets have shifted terrorists towards other resources. TOs have learned new methods of financing. These methods have helped them to change their funding portfolio; they have become self-funding (Veness, 2000, p.9).

Financial measures have had a limited impact on the capacity of TOs because TOs, learning tactics used by OCGs, appropriated their methods (Schaefer, 2003; Williams, 2007; Hayden. 2007, p.294; Roberts, 2016, p.10). When counterterrorism efforts started to focus on charities exploited by TOs for money transfers TOs started to use the methods of OCGs to transfer money (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.9). They shifted towards informal value transfer systems (Luna, 2008a). Money obtained from sources, particularly illegitimate sources, has been transferred illegally by actors such as travel agencies, gold and diamond dealers, bureaux de change, cheque cashers and money remitters through informal value transfers, like hawala, hundi and cash couriers (Greenberg, Wechsler & Wolosky, 2002, p.11; "Meeting the terrorist", 2006; Hess, 2007, p.57; Passas, 2007, p.30; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.72, Helmy, Zaki, Salah & Badran, 2016).

In addition, terror financiers have moved their assets into less regulated financial markets, particularly European markets (Napoleoni, 2007). Thus, TOs have started to operate in areas that counterterrorist financing policies do not cover. The SL, for example, exchanges US dollars of Colombian drug traffickers for Peruvian currency and garners a great deal of money while the FARC charges a facilitation fee for assuring jobs to individuals in the local bureaucracy (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.43). The LTTE, on the other hand, charges

an “exit visa”, around a thousand dollars, for people who want to leave controlled areas of the LTTE in Sri Lanka (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.97). Aum Shinrikyo is another. It used meditation classes, books, copy shops, noodle shops, computer assembly and sales, real estates, initiation fees, sales of religious items and training courses as source of revenue (Parachini, 2005, p.28).

In sum, states try to design better counterterrorism policies and implement measures that deny means to terrorism whereas TOs endeavour to bypass those measures. The competitive learning process is cyclical: whenever a new policy is implemented, TOs shift their focus to other areas that are not covered in the new policy and whenever counterterrorism agencies pressure and block new methods, TOs learn others. Thus, the learning is continuous. For example, Al Qaeda changed its structure to a decentralized cell structure, however, it has recently started to move back to its original centralized structure due to the difficulties in the control and coordination of cells (Jackson & Loidolt, 2013). This change confirms Shapiro’s (2013, p.17) argument that TOs opt to hierarchy whenever they can because of its advantages such as resource sharing, specialization, economies of scale, reduced contracting costs, screening potential operatives and minimizing internal disciplinary problems. Moreover, some affiliates in Europe are becoming more discriminate in targeting to win broader sympathy while weapons and tactics are becoming more diverse (Nesser & Stenersen, 2014, p.19). Eventually, TOs and counterterrorism agencies represent two different but related inputs of the learning chart: TOs and states learn from their enemies to compete with each other.

Learning from Terrorist Organizations

TOs learn some of their tactics from other TOs. When a TO resorts to a tactic with success, others start to demonstrate interest in that tactic. When they learn the tactic, they implement it, with modifications if necessary. The suicide attack is one of the tactics TOs learned from other TOs.

Suicide attacks are frequently used by TOs (Baker, 2005, p.87; Hafez, 2006, p.57; Araj, 2008, p.284; Forst, 2009, p.58; Horowitz, 2010; Acosta, 2016, p.180). There are two conditions in suicide attacks: "a willingness to kill and a willingness to die" (Merari, 1998, p.196, cited in Moghadam, 2006, p. 17). The terrorist committing suicide is an "*a priori* objective" of a suicide attack (Mintz, Chatagnier & Brule, 2006, p.152).

Suicide attacks, like many other terrorist tactics, are not new (Dolnik, 2007, p.43). The Narodnaya Volya Group in Russia, for instance, used suicide attacks in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 (Rosie, 1987, p.209; Moghadam, 2006, p.93). However, the contemporary form of suicide attacks developed in the 1980s. In 1981, a suicide car bombing against the Iraqi embassy in Beirut killed 61 people, including Ambassador Abdul Razzak Lafta, and injured over a 100 others (Moghadam, 2006, p.81). Two years later, the US Embassy was attacked by a suicide car bombing, and six months later, the US Marine and French Paratroops Barracks in Lebanon were attacked simultaneously with the same tactic (Rosie, 1987, p.49; Forst, 2009, p.57). These attacks marked the beginning of modern suicide attacks and a sharp increase occurred in the following years (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.156; Pape, 2006, p.27; Nacos, 2007, p.24). Until the 2000s, 32 different groups in 28 countries resorted to suicide attacks (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.1). A dataset from the

University of Chicago (2014) indicates that suicide attacks have become prevalent among TOs: the number of organizations has increased to 92 and the number of countries to 40.

According to Pedahzur (2006, p.xv), the main reason for the prevalent use of suicide attacks is the failure of other tactics used by some TOs. Moreover, suicide attacks are the most efficient and least expensive tactic (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.1; Dolnik, 2007, p.44; Weitz & Neal, 2007, p.135; Forst, 2009, p.58). There are other advantages. TOs have the control to direct their attacks to the selected target (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.1; Gere, 2007, p.363). Thus, government authorities cannot obtain any critical information about the organization after the attack because attackers rarely survive. Attacks, moreover, capture media attention and generate publicity (Thackhar, 2005, p.170; Hafez, 2006, p.57; Moghadam, 2006, p.95).

In spite of the prevalent use of suicide attack by TOs and its benefits, some TOs have had concerns such as angering the local population and losing political capital in deadly attacks (Claridge, 2000, p.143; Horowitz, 2010, p.60). The PIRA, for instance, never used the tactics. Some other TOs, on the other hand, have not resorted to the tactic because they have not learned it successfully. The FARC, for example, has attempted to learn and use the tactic but have failed. According to Horowitz (2010), organizational factors play a significant role in this failure. Organizational capacity, duration of organizations (organizational age) and organizational structure affect the level of learning. The FARC's strong intention to keep the status quo of the illegal war economy and the political culture also furthered its failure (Waldman, 2012, p.111).

Hezbollah was the first to employ suicide attacks successfully and systematically in their present form (Cragin, 2005, p.41; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 132). After Hezbollah's suicide attacks in Lebanon in 1983, American and French forces withdrew from Lebanon (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.156; Forst, 2009, p.57). The withdrawal confirmed the success of suicide attacks. Impressed by the success, other TOs learned to apply them in their operations (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.8; Horowitz, 2010; Acosta, 2016). The LTTE in Sri Lanka, for example, learned suicide attacks from Hezbollah (Forest, 2008, p.276); the LTTE was "so impressed by the achievement in Lebanon that they used the tactic in Sri Lanka to give their movement new life" (Rapoport, 2004, p.62). Many other TOs learned from the LTTE (Pape, 2006, p.27). Hamas and PIJ also learned suicide attacks from Hezbollah (Horowitz, 2010, p.54; Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.205). In 1992, Israel deported some Hamas and PIJ members to Lebanon. Those deported members associated with Hezbollah members and learned the tactic (Dolnik, 2007, p.43; Acosta, 2016, p.191).

Al Qaeda exhibited a special interest in suicide attacks. Bin Laden sent some of his senior members to Hezbollah to learn suicide attacks. Those members, by taking careful notes, specifically studied Hezbollah's attack in Lebanon in 1983 (9/11 Commission Report, as cited in Horowitz, 2010, p.34). They learned details of the tactics, went back and disseminated their findings to others (Horowitz, 2010, p.34). Later, Al Qaeda members successfully completed the East African embassy bombings in 1998.

TOs do not immediately adopt new tactics. They wait until they obtain sufficient knowledge about the operation of the tactics (Attawell, 1992, p.1).

Therefore, there is a time interval between the first and following uses of a tactic. Success of a tactic is one of the factors that determines the length of this period because “best practices” can proliferate across different groups when there is a success (Weitz and Neal, 2007, p.140). Weitz and Neal (2007) apply the “Technology Adoption Life Cycle” to terrorism, particularly to suicide attacks, to understand how network based TOs share knowledge across their constituent nodes. When a new terrorist tactic is used by one TO, it takes time for that organization to turn the experience into its best practice. In the beginning, only the early adopters learn and enforce the tactic, however, after a certain time, the tactic extends to the mass terrorism market. Rogers (as cited in Ackerman, 2010, p.61) divides this process into five stages; innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Suicide attacks follow the same stages. The LTTE was an early adopter, however it took nearly 4 years for the LTTE to learn suicide attacks after Hezbollah’s attack in 1983: the LTTE started to use suicide attacks in 1987. Again after a time lag, other TOs started to use them.

There are methodological differences among suicide attacks by different TOs. Pedahzur and Perlinger (2006) note that, “suicide attacks are varied and change from region to region and during different time periods” (p.11). Some TOs use cars and trucks while others use explosive belts (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.8; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 134). These changes depend on the learning capabilities of TOs. Successful learners suit suicide attacks to the nature of the target. They modify and improve the methods used. Ackerman (2010, p.61) calls this process “reinvention”; optional modification and adaptation of an innovation by the learner to fit the tactic to suit the unique

needs of the learner. The LTTE, for example, became one of the most effective groups to employ suicide attacks (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.116; Dolnik, 2007, p.43). Until 2003, the LTTE executed more suicide attacks than those by all other organizations combined (Weitz & Neal, 2007, p.136). The LTTE even had an elite suicide squad named the Black Tigers (Forest, 2006b, p.21; Gere, 2007, p.380). The LTTE managed to develop two tactics in suicide attacks; exploding boats and sending bombers to navy ships and suicide vests (Pedahzur & Perlinger, 2006, p.8; Dolnik, 2007, p.43; Comas, Shrivastava & Martin, 2014, p. 6). They used speedboats for suicide attacks. The LTTE also developed underwater bombs with RDX and time detonators (Forest, 2006b, p.21). In the suicide attack that killed the Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1991, the LTTE perpetrator was the first to use a suicide vest.

Learning among TOs is a continuous process. The LTTE learned suicide attacks from Hezbollah, but later on, learning suicide vests from the LTTE, Palestinian TOs started to use them (Pape, 2006, p.27). They used suicide belts around 70 % of the time (as cited in Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 134). Moreover, learning associated with suicide attacks continues to occur after the attack. Most TOs endeavour to learn from their mistakes during these operations. They make martyr videos in which they record the preparations and the attacks. The LTTE, for example, record every moment of suicide attacks. They use these films for training and recruitment (Pape, 2006, p.27).

In sum, suicide attacks contribute to the understanding of terrorist learning and indicate that TOs are learning organizations. TOs learned suicide attacks from other TOs. Learners modified suicide attacks according to their targets. Later, these modifications are learned and used by others.

Learning from Criminals/Organized Crime Groups

TOs, in addition to states and other TOs, learn from criminals/OCGs. Hostage seizure is one of the tactics learned from criminals/OCGs. Criminals/OCGs have resorted to hostage seizures, and learning from them, TOs have started to use hostage seizures as well.

Hostage seizure incidents can be grouped into four categories: aeroplane hijacking, unlawfully seizing or exercising control of an aircraft in flight by the use or threat of force; hijacking (capture) of transportation vehicles, unlawfully seizing or exercising control of a vehicle by the use or threat of force; hostage taking missions, unlawfully seizing people in a place as a means of negotiation and unlawfully seizing control of a place such as buildings, compounds, etc.; and kidnapping, unlawfully seizing and carrying away a person by force (Brandt & Sandler, 2009, p.759; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.740; De kock, 2014, p.168).

Each hostage seizure type is correlated. Aeroplane hijacking and kidnappings, for example, are negatively correlated while aeroplane hijacking and other hostage seizures are positively correlated (Brandt & Sandler, 2009, p.777). When kidnappings increase, aeroplane hijackings start to decline and when hijackings increase, hostage taking missions increase at the same time. Moreover, each hostage seizure type has different risks. While kidnapping is the least risky, hostage taking missions are more dangerous than aeroplane hijackings. The risks, of course, do not stop terrorists; they resort to hostage seizures because they are an effective means to gain ransom and publicity, to disseminate their causes and goals and to recruit more (Midlarsky et al. 1980,

p.291; Clutterbuck, 1994, p.153; Wilkinson, 2006, p.103; Brandt & Sandler, 2009, p.759).

Aeroplane hijacking is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence in an aeroplane to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005, p.346). It typically starts in the air and government agencies are not able to approach an aeroplane unseen. This makes the chance of a successful counterstrike minimal. Therefore, aeroplane hijacking is one of the most frequently used hostage seizures (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.740).

Aeroplane hijackings can be grouped into two types. The first type is hijacking for transportation, mostly done by escaping refugees, criminals, etc. This type of hijacking was the first to occur. It may be traced back to 1930 (Holden, 1986, p.874; Merari, 1999, p. 54; Dugan, et al. 2005, p.346) when Peruvian bandits hijacked an aeroplane and flew it to a jungle airstrip (Rosie, 1987, p.31; Thackrah, 2005, p.113). According to a time-line in Holden's (1986) data of aeroplane hijackings, hijacking for transportation reached a peak in 1969. The majority of the 177 worldwide hijacking attempts between 1958 and 1969 were hijackings for transportation. Escaping refugees were responsible for the first peak.

The second type is hijacking for extortion, often for money and political concessions (Holden, 1986, p.878; Merari, 1999, p.54; Wilkinson, 2006, p.126). Criminals learned that they could use aeroplane hijackings for ransom. The first well-publicized hijacking for extortion occurred in the USA in 1970 when Arthur Barkley demanded $100 million. In the following year, D.B. Cooper hijacked the Northwest Orient flight from Portland to Seattle. He extorted

$200,000 and used a parachute to escape. This hijacking and all details of the incident were covered on the media. After this successful hijacking and extortion, many other criminals attempted to use the same tactic for personal gain (Holden, 1986, p.885; Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p.249; Dulnik, 2007, p.31; Nacos, 2009). In the following months, Garrett Brock Trapnell, Richard McCoy, Frederick Hahneman, and 12 other people attempted to hijack aeroplanes and tried to escape with parachutes, but none of them succeeded.

TOs, learning that they could gain massive publicity (Schweitzer, 2011, p.19) and income through aeroplane hijackings, started to hijack aeroplanes. As a result, hijacking for extortion reached a peak in 1972 (Holden, 1986). One well-known case is that of three Black Panther Party members. They successfully hijacked an aeroplane to Cuba in 1972 and demanded $2 million ransom (Dugan et al, 2005, p.351). Turkish terrorists also became aware of the use of this tactic; 2 aeroplanes were hijacked in Turkey in the same year (Mango, 2005, p.17). Consequently, the 1970s became the apex of aeroplane hijackings (Holden, 1986, p.880; Rosie, 1987, p.142; Wilkinson, 2006, p.128).

Following the boom in aeroplane hijackings by TOs, airline security was increased (Clutterbuck, 1993, p.274; Thackrah, 2005, p.21; Dugan et al., 2005, p.343; Nacos, 2009; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.144). The competitive learning process among TOs and government agencies resulted in nine major policy changes from 1947 to 1986 (Dugan et al, 2005). Eventually, these policy changes, improved international cooperation and the deterrent effect of successful rescue operations, discouraged hijackings (Wilkinson, 2006, p.124; Crenshaw, 2010, p.39). TOs, learning that aeroplane hijackings

were becoming riskier and success was difficult to achieve, started to resort to kidnappings.

Terrorists have not confined themselves to aeroplanes. They have hijacked transportation vehicles such as trains, cruise ships, buses, etc. (Thorson, 1985). Like aeroplane hijackings, there are 2 types in hijackings of transportation vehicles: hijacking for transportation and hijacking for extortion.

The hijacking of transportation vehicles, excluding aeroplanes, goes back to the 1960s. The capture of transportation vehicles, similar to aeroplane hijackings, was initially used for means of transportation, mostly by refugees. Portuguese refugees, for example, captured the liner Santa Maria and sailed it to Brazil in 1961. In 1972, the US freighter Columbia Eagle was hijacked by a Vietnam War protestor.

TOs, learning from refugees, started to use hijackings of transportation vehicles for political concessions. The Greek ship Vori, for example, was hijacked in Karachi in 1974 by three Pakistanis who demanded the release of two Palestinians facing death sentences (Thorson, 1985). In the following year, a Japanese ship was successfully hijacked by the Moro National Liberation Front (Rosie, 1987, p.144). The Netherlands witnessed a train hijacking in the same year and another in 1977. In both incidents, trains were held for weeks by the South Moluccans demanding a free South Moluccan Republic (Rosie, 1987, p.144; Thackrah, 2005, p.113). They reportedly admitted that they were inspired by other similar attacks (Nacos, 2009).

Hostage taking is another hostage seizure tactic that TOs learned. It is different from other hostage seizure missions in terms of the learning source. Innovative TOs implemented this tactic and other TOs learned from them.

The most prominent and early hostage taking was the seizure of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by Black September, a Palestinian TO, on the 5th of September 1972 (Merari, 2012, p.45). The Black September members succeeded in gaining publicity and disseminating their cause because the incident was broadcasted live on television (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.739). It was a live training course of hostage taking for other TOs; not only about the benefits of hostage taking, but also how to carry it out, what mistakes to avoid, how government authorities respond, etc. Other TOs learned the tactic and used it to disseminate their cause.

At first, TOs started to take foreign diplomats hostages, particularly in Latin America. When this failed to have the desired effect, they turned to embassy seizures (Wilkinson, 2006, p.104). It peaked between 1979 and 1981 (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.154). TOs, particularly after 1990s when hostage taking missions started to fail (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.154), have started to use mass kidnappings (Wilkinson, 2006, p.115). One of the most well-known cases is the seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence during a reception and the taking of 500 people as hostages by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Lima (Wilkinson, 2006, p.115).

Kidnapping is the most used hostage seizure type by TOs (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.740). There has been a significant increase in kidnappings over the last decade (Forest, 2012b, p.781). It is different from other hostage seizures because kidnapping occurs in an unknown location while others occur in a known location (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.176; Dolnik, 2007, p.29). Kidnapping, like hijacking, secures a place on headlines. For example, the Chibok kidnapping and other attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria and

kidnappings by the ASG have been in the headlines of world news for months (AbuBakr. & Brumfield, 2014; Schillinger, 2016, 338).

Jenkins (1974a, p.6) identifies three types of kidnappers: criminals whose only motive is profit; the psycho kidnapper whose motive is revenge; and the motivated kidnapper who is pursuing a political or ideological cause. Briggs (2001, p.2), on the other hand, mentions two types: political and economic kidnappings. However, he notes that there is grey area between both types. In 1970, the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T) in Uruguay, also known as Tupamaros of Uruguay, kidnapped a US advisor in Uruguay and demanded the release of 150 prisoners. All the prisoners demanded were convicted of common crimes but none for political crimes (Stechel, 1972, p.204). Their demands were refused and the hostage was killed. In another case, the ASG carried out the mass kidnapping of westerners in the Philippines in 2000. Initially, political concessions were demanded, but later, a ransom payment ended the kidnappings (Briggs, 2001, p.14). Therefore, the MLN-T, the FARC and the ASG stay in the grey area as TOs that are involved in kidnapping for economic purposes.

Kidnapping, in addition to the publicity and political concessions, provides income for TOs (Forest, 2012b; O'Brien, 2012). It is estimated that kidnappers globally take in over $500 million each year (Briggs, 2001, p.1). Prominent business executives are the most lucrative targets for TOs, particularly in Argentina where a record $14.2 million is known to have been paid for the release of an executive of the EXXON Corporation (Jenkins, 1974a, p.6; Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p.249). There were 54 political kidnappings from 1968 to 1974 (Peterson, 1978, p.47). During this period, a total amount of

$7,962,500 was collected in ransom money and 305 political prisoners were released.

OCGs were the early adopters of the kidnapping business. The majority of kidnappings were carried out by OCGs to gain ransom money (Wilkinson, 2006, p.103). Later, TOs learned the tactic and entered into the business (Briggs, 2001, p.2; Nacos, 2007, p.80). The early leader in the political kidnapping industry was MLN-T. They accounted for the majority of the early kidnappings prior to 1972. In 1971, for instance, they succeeded in gaining the release of 106 political prisoners (Peterson, 1978, p.48). The People's Revolutionary Army in Argentina was another TO that used kidnapping frequently (Peterson, 1978, p.48). The FARC and The National Liberation Army (ELN) learned urban kidnapping of foreigners (diplomats and CEOs) from groups, such as Tupamaros in Uruguay and Montoneros in Argentina (Rubio, 2004, p.1) and carried out an estimated 80 percent of all kidnappings (Briggs, 2001, p.14).

Distinct from other hostage seizures, it is possible to observe direct associations between TOs and OCGs in kidnapping. These two groups associate with each other for strategic and tactical purposes in kidnappings. OCGs in Iraq, for example, kidnap foreigners and sell them to terrorist groups (Wilkinson, 2006, 117; Forest, 2012b, p.781). A similar association was observed in Lebanon years ago when Philip Padfield and Leigh Douglas were kidnapped by a "freelance" terrorist group and sold to the pro-Libyan terrorists (Rosie, 1987, p.164). OCGs in Colombia also act together with TOs in kidnappings: OCGs kidnap victims and TOs hide the victims in rural areas where it is almost impossible to find and rescue them (Rubio, 2004, p.11). These associations facilitate learning and help both organizations learn each other's methods.

When all these hostage seizures are evaluated, it is possible to extract a learning pattern. For example, refugees were responsible for early incidents of aeroplane hijacking and hijacking (capture) of transportation vehicles. They used these tactics for transportation. A period of stability or inactivity followed the early incidents. Criminals/OCGs learned the tactic during this period and started to resort to aeroplane hijacking and hijacking (capture) of transportation vehicles for extortion. A series of incidents occurred. After a shorter period of stability, a sharp increase occurred. TOs were responsible for the last peak.

TOs do not immediately adopt a new tactic (Attawell, 1992, p.1). They wait until they learn the tactic to ensure the success. Brandt and Sandler (2009, p.777) call this time interval the "arrival rate". The period of stability between early incidents by criminals/OCGs and the following incidents by TOs is the time required for learning.

In addition, the time gap of aeroplane hijacking for extortion is shorter than aeroplane hijacking for transportation. According to Holden's data, it took years for hijacking for transportation to reach its peak, but only a few years for hijacking for extortion. Moreover, each successful hijacking for transportation in the USA generated an average of 0.758 additional hijacking, with a median delay of 60.6 days while each successful hijacking for extortion in the USA generated an average of 2.014 additional hijacking with a median delay of 44.8 days (Holden, 1986, p.902). The difference occurs because hijacking for extortion is mostly perpetrated by TOs that have learning advantages compared to individuals. When TOs learn the tactic, they use the tactic frequently.

Another reason for this difference among the number of generated hijackings and shortened delay is the associations between TOs that enable them

to learn faster. For example, there have been joint hostage seizure operations by different TOs (Rapoport, 2002; 2004, p.58). Members of different TOs come together in joint operations and pass their knowledge on to others (Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.204; Ackerman, Zhuang & Weerasuriya, 2016, p. 27). Strategic and tactical knowledge is disseminated during the planning and operation. Later, both organizations disseminate their experimental knowledge to other cooperative TOs. Consequently, TOs in those joint operations learned faster and the number of hostage seizures increased after TOs got involved. An Air France flight was hijacked by a joint group of German, Palestinian and Japanese terrorists on the 27th of June 1976 (Clutterbuck, 1993, p.270; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.742). In another case, on the 21st of December 1975, it was a joint team of RAF and PFLP that captured 70 hostages including 11 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers in Vienna (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.46; Richardson, 2000, p.3; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.739). Palestinian and Japanese terrorists came together in another operation when they captured a ferry in 1974 (Clutterbuck, 1993, p.267). In an interesting case, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an aeroplane and demanded the release of the RAF's leaders and Arab prisoners in 1977 (Clutterbuck, 1993, p.271).

Kidnapping exhibits a similar pattern. OCGs used kidnapping for economic purposes. TOs followed OCGs and started to use kidnapping for both economic and political purposes. Moreover, kidnapping, similar to suicide attacks, often changes its original form when it is learned and used by other organizations (Briggs, 2001, p.10). Italian kidnappers and the families of victims try to solve cases before law enforcement agencies are informed because of the law that freezes the assets of a hostage's family. In Mexico, kidnapping

involves higher levels of violence that encourages a speedy payment of ransom. In Colombia, kidnappings take longer to be solved and sometimes kidnappers demand a second payment. These organizational modifications indicate varying learning capacities of the organizations.

The most important trigger for the learning of terrorist tactics is the level of success. Success creates incentives for TOs to proceed in favour of one specific tactic. Successful hijackings increase the likelihood of future hijackings (Holden, 1986, p.902). For example, on June 14th 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked by Hezbollah members. Hijackers demanded the release of political prisoners in Israel and eventually Israel released 766 prisoners (Cragin, 2005, p.43; Wilkinson, 2006, p.106). This result was likely to excite terrorists in other parts of the world. In fact, perpetration of a hostage seizure itself is a success, whether TOs' demands are fulfilled or not. TOs gain publicity and disseminate their cause by these missions because it attracts media attention.

In addition, success affects the intensity of the media coverage. Successful incidents are covered in detail for longer periods. Each time an attack is covered in the media, it transfers operational knowledge of attacks to a degree (Forest, 2006b, p.9). Such learning through the media in "real time" serves as a "showcase"; "terrorist actions … become an effective and essentially cost-free teaching technique for terrorists" (Combs, 2006, p.139). The more terrorist tactics occupy news, the more likely it is that they will be learned and implemented in another part of the world (Midlarsky et al., 1980, p.279).

"Trialability" and "observability" are other factors prevalent in terrorist tactics (Revill, 2016, p.86). Becoming aware of a tactic is not enough for that tactic to be used. It should be doable and visible to others, as well. That depends

on the degree of tacitness of the knowledge needed. TOs use bombings, kidnappings and hijackings more than other tactics because of these factors (Midlarsky, Crenshaw & Yoshida, 1980, p.279). The more a tactic is executable, the more it will be chosen among learned tactics by TOs.

All these hostage seizure types point to a learning process. Aeroplane hijacking, hijacking (capture) of transportation vehicles and kidnapping indicate that TOs learned these tactics (excluding hostage taking) from criminals/OCGs. TOs learned that hostage seizures were useful to disseminate their cause and to attract media attention. They also learned these tactics could be used for both political and economic concessions. Hostage taking, on the other hand, is learned from innovative TOs.

Conclusion

An examination of terrorist financing, suicide attacks and hostage seizures indicates that TOs are learning organizations. They are capable of learning different tactics resorted to by other organizations. They learn from their predecessors, their enemies (states) and their friends (other TOs and OCGs).

The relationship between TOs and their sources of learning (states, TOs and OCGs) causes a continuous learning. TOs anticipate relatively greater rewards for learned tactics, such as media attention, publicity, ransom, political concessions and recruitment. The learning process includes techniques of terrorist tactics and all means of communication, particularly the media. In addition, the relationship between Al Qaeda, Palestinian TOs and Hezbollah, joint operations between TOs and OCGs in suicide attacks and hostage seizure

missions point out that associations and vicarious learning are important factors in the process.

This chapter successfully demonstrated that TOs are learning organizations, however, how they learn still remains only partially answered. The following chapter explores the literature to better understand terrorist learning.

CHAPTER 3

EXPLORING TERRORIST LEARNING

The continuity of organizations depends on, *inter alia*, their learning capabilities (Acosta, 2016). Through learning, organizations become aware of the use of new tactics. This awareness helps them achieve success in their future activities (Kenney, 2010a, p.18; Gerdes, Ringler, Autin, 2014, p.279). Therefore, learning is important for the future of organizations.

Learning in organizations and its effects on organizational behaviours have been subject to many studies. Units of analysis in those studies have mostly been legal organizations and an interest in the learning undergone by illegal organizations has remained minimal (Jackson et al., 2005, p.iii). The following areas have all been studied to understand learning in organizations: contemporary military strategic thinking (Mani, 2003, p.2), armies as learning organizations (Mumford, 2011, p.2), the use of learning in improving the process of training in militaries (Gagne, 1962, p.84), the early identification of best practices, adaptation and learning at tactical and strategic levels in militaries (Rotmann, Tohn & Wharton, 2009, p.15), the roles of low level and high level officers in organizational learning and modernization in militaries (Demchak, 1995, 348), learning from unconventional warfare conducted by special units such as Special Operations Forces in militaries (Jones, 2003), the effects of information and its associated technologies on problem solving in the

public sector, particularly in police organizations (Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.35), the role of learning in sub-cultural groups, particularly in law enforcement agencies (Chappel & Piquerro, 2004, p.95), the influences of organizational cultures on learning in public agencies (Mahler, 1997, p.525), knowledge management and learning in police work (Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001, p.318), learning through benchmarking in local governments (Ammons & Roenigk, 2014, p.23), and the effects of increased political involvement on the learning capacity of public organizations (Dekker & Hansen, 2004, p.212).

Illegal organizations are reminiscent of legal organizations (Cordes et al., 1984, p.50; Crenshaw, 1985; 1987, p.22; Jackson, 2001, p.6; Jackson et al., 2005, p.4; Ackerman, 2010, p. 84; Frisch, 2011; Revill, 2016). TOs, similar to legal organizations, learn and evolve (Forest, 2006b, p.4; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.53; Longmire & Longmire, 2008; De kock, 2014; Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016, p.13). Structures, organizational characteristics, and internal functioning mechanisms are quite similar but there are certain differences between them of which legality is the most obvious: TOs are illegal structures whereas business organizations are legal. This distinction may be blurred because TOs, through legal front organizations, also act in legal areas (Cressey, 1967, p.104; Albini et al., 1999, p.7; UK Treasury, 2007, p.3). TOs, for example, may control legitimate enterprises and own companies for money laundering, financing and recruitment. Legal organizations, on the other hand, are sometimes involved in illegal activities such as the smuggling of goods, and tax and trade law violations.

In contrast to legal organizations, illegal organizations pay utmost attention to the security and secrecy of their relations (Jackson & Frelinger,

2009, p.10). The complexity of operations also distinguishes them from legal organizations (Ackerman, 2010, p.84). Illegal organizations act like multi-firm companies that are active in different businesses at the same time. TOs are multi-functional; they conduct surveillance, acquire resources, gather intelligence, communicate, and at the same time, launder money, move goods and people from one location to another, and establish legal businesses (Forest, 2008, p.270). Like some organizations in high-risk industries, such as the nuclear industry, the operations of illegal organizations may cause catastrophic consequences for themselves due to the hostile learning environment (Shapiro, 2013, p.4). They learn under non-ideal conditions, exclusively by trial-and-error (Carroll, 1998, p.699; Aase & Nybo, 2002, p.1; Jackson, 2004, p.13; De kock, 2014, p.66).

The scarce studies on the learning process of illegal organizations, particularly TOs and OCGs, have had a limited focus. They have mostly deemed learning as a process of adaptation (Jackson, 2004), creativity (Bucic & Gudergan, 2004), malevolent creativity (Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley, 2008; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013) or innovation (Faria, 2006; Crenshaw, 2010; Horowitz, 2010; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012; Waldman, 2012; English, 2013; Hayden, 2013; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013). Some of them regarded all as equal notions (Jackson, 2004; Cragin, 2006, p.202; Kenney, 2008; Forest, 2008; Revill, 2016). Dolnik (2007, p.6), for example, accounts all changes in *modus operandi* of TOs as innovation.

However, they are different concepts (De kock, 2014, p.66); learning is "the development of insights, knowledge and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions" while adaptation is "the

ability to make incremental adjustments as a result of environmental changes, goal structure changes, or other changes" (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.811). On the other hand, creativity is the "generation of new ideas and novel concepts" while innovation is the implementation of these ideas (Amabile, as cited in Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013. p. 126). For example, evolutionary adaptation and the use of earlier methods and technologies are not counted as innovations (Crenshaw, 2010; Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010, p. 30).

Learning involves all these concepts. It is the understanding of reasons beyond the immediate event. It includes new technologies and methods, as well as already used and improved ones. While adaptation and innovation always require a learning process, learning is not limited to adaptation or innovation. Limiting learning to defensive adjustments or adoption of an entirely new tactic, mostly by innovation of materials used in terrorist attacks, oversimplifies the organizations' learning abilities and palliates the learning.

On the other hand, studies that concentrate on learning only focus on training camps or the role of veterans (Forest, 2006a). They have not examined the internal processes of organizational learning, particularly the variety of internal dynamics of different TOs (Kenney, 2008, p.24). Thus, they do not consider the effects of external factors such as economic conditions, social changes, etc. As a result, the literature on terrorist learning has a limited perspective and the question on how TOs learn is only partially answered.

The absence of prior theoretical studies that explain terrorist learning extensively necessitates a search in the literature. This thesis performs this task in this chapter. It reviews various learning theories to provide an explanation to

terrorist learning of criminality. To reiterate, this thesis studies how TOs learn organized crime.

Knowledge

What is learned, knowledge, is the core of learning in organizations. It is "justified true belief" that relates to humans' actions (Nonaka, 1994, p.15). There are two dimensions in the analysis of the knowledge in organizations: *ontological* and *epistemological* (Nonaka, 1994, p.15; Lam, 2000, p.489). The ontological dimension refers to knowledge at individual and collective levels and the epistemological dimension refers to modes of expression of knowledge. The epistemological dimension divides the knowledge into two types: *tacit knowledge* and *explicit knowledge* (Collins, 1993, p.116; Nonaka, 1994, p.16; Inkpen, 1998b, p.74; Lam, 2000, p.489; Ghosh, 2004, p.305; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p.296; De kock, 2014, p.65).

It is possible to distinguish tacit and explicit knowledge in three aspects; *codifiability and mechanisms for transferring knowledge*, *acquisition and aggregation methods*, and *modes of appropriation* (Lam, 2000, p.490). First, tacit knowledge is mostly invisible and hard to formalize (Inkpen, 1998b, p.74). The contents of tacit knowledge cannot be explicitly stated either (Polanyi, 1966a, p.1). While tacit knowledge is difficult to communicate or share with others, explicit knowledge is "systematic and easily communicated in the form of hard data or codified procedures" (Inkpen, 1998b, p.74). Tacit knowledge is difficult to be transmitted while explicit knowledge is transmittable (Nonaka, 1994, p.16; Ackerman, 2010, p.72; Venkitachalam & Busch, 2012, p.357; Panahi, Watson & Partridge, 2013, p.380).

Second, tacit knowledge can be acquired only through experience that includes close observation and interaction (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.135; Nonaka, 1994, p.21; Tsang, 1999, p.218; Lam, 2000, p.490; Song, Almeide & Wu, 2003, p.352; Jackson, 2004, p.10; Kenney, 2010b, p.188). It can be acquired through experiencing a man's mind and dwelling (interiorization) of his actions from outside, referred to as "indwelling", (Polanyi, 1966a, p.14; 1966b, p.17). Explicit knowledge, on the contrary, can easily be generated through logical deduction (Lam, 2000, p.490).

Third, tacit knowledge has a "personal quality" that makes it hard to acquire (Nonaka, 1994, p.16). The acquisition requires close involvement and cooperation of the knowledge subject (Lam, 2000, p.490). Explicit knowledge, in contrast, can be aggregated at a single location and can be appropriated without interaction with the knowledge subject (Lam, 2000, p.490).

Tacit and explicit knowledge interact with each other; "all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge" (Polanyi, 1966a, p.7). Explicit knowledge must rely on tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966a; Inkpen, 1998b, p.74) and creation of new knowledge, regardless of whether it is explicit or tacit, necessarily requires the use of tacit knowledge (Lam, 2000, p.491). Nonaka (1994) calls the interaction between both knowledge types a "continuous dialog" that facilitates organizational knowledge creation (p.14). The high degree of tacitness of the knowledge makes it difficult to be learned. The more explicit the knowledge is, the easier the acquisition, consequently, the value of the knowledge is less likely to be high (Inkpen, 1998b, p.74).

Examples of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge from terrorism and organized crime are numerous. A residential address of a prominent political

actor that can be obtained from open sources is a type of explicit knowledge. The map of a police station that will be attacked is another. The IRA's instruction manuals that describe how to leave a scene without any forensic evidence, for example, are used by the Earth Liberation Front in the U.S.A. as explicit knowledge (Forest, 2008, p.272).

Illegal drug production, on the other hand, is a relevant example of tacit knowledge that can only be acquired by experience. All officers from KOM Department remark that, even though drug production techniques can be obtained from open sources, it is almost impossible to produce market quality heroin without tacit knowledge because it is illegally produced in different settings rather than laboratories. Thus, the ingredients and materials are not standard. Ingredients and materials used by one 'doctor', a term used to define a person who converts a morphine base into heroin, is not the same as that of another. Therefore, tacit knowledge is required for activities such as drug production.

Some actions of TOs require both knowledge types. Operating an attack in a foreign country, for example, is challenging; it has disparate learning requirements than attacks in the primary land (Jackson et al, 2005, p.117). Moreover, "the tradecraft required to succeed at urban terrorism" in cities is not easily learned (Kenney, 2008, p. 18), therefore learning to live in cities, particularly in the West, requires explicit and tacit knowledge (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.117; Kenney, 2009, p.19; Hsu &Apel, 2015, p.33). Al Qaeda members, for instance, made various mistakes until they got used to living in the USA (Hamm, 2005).

Bomb making also requires skills with both tacit and explicit knowledge. Basic information about bomb materials can be obtained from open sources, however, for manufacturing a bomb safely and ensuring a successful blast with maximum destruction, tacit knowledge is required (Kenney, 2010b, p.188; Revill, 2016, p.83). Terrorists, for instance, attempted to explode three underground trains and a bus two weeks after the 2005 bombings in London. They did not possess the tacit knowledge; the bombs failed to detonate properly (Forest, 2006b, p.2). Moreover, an organization can cause a few deaths without substantial damage by using certain explosives, but another organization with greater knowledge on how to use explosives effectively, can cause numerous deaths and damage by using the same materials. It is the tacit knowledge that makes this kind of difference.

Knowledge can be obtained from various sources, ranging from the Internet to memos. These sources can be classified into two groups: closed circuit sources and open sources. Closed circuit sources are associated with tacit knowledge and they can only be accessed by a specific audience. Closed circuit sources consist of human sources, experiences, etc. Open sources, on the contrary, are easily accessible and generally associated with explicit knowledge. Examples of open sources of TOs involve the Internet, books, diaries, memos, written documents, videos, and other open materials can be accessed by everyone that has interest.

Manuals of TOs are examples of open sources. They cover a variety of knowledge for TOs; explosives, bombs, household poisons, counterfeit currency and forged documents, member safety, prisons and detention centres, means of communications and transportation, etc. (Kenney, 2006, p.37). The

Al-Baqaa fi al-Zuruf al-Sa'ba (Survival in Difficult Circumstances) manual of Al Qaeda explains how to survive in difficult conditions (Forest, 2006b, p.6). The *Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad*, distributed on digital and hard copies, is another manual that contains topics such as recruitment, weapons, bombs and attacks (Forest, 2006b, p.7). The British Police, for example, arrested a suspected terrorist in Manchester in 2000 and they found a manual in one of the computers seized. The manual, known as the Al Qaeda training manual, had instructions on "counterfeiting and forgery, security measures for undercover activities and strategies in the case of arrest and indictment" (Flynn, 2007, p.201; Roberts, 2016, p.10). Different versions of the manual were also found in Afghanistan.

Court documents are another example of open sources. TOs examine them and learn ways to decrease their vulnerability. RAF members, for example, consistently examined court documents and transcripts. After learning that law enforcement officers could obtain their fingerprints, they started to use special ointment on their fingers that would prevent them from leaving fingerprints (Hoffman, 1999, p.25). Allekama Lamari, a participant in the Madrid bombing, on the other hand, used open sources for his security. He refused to use a cell phone after learning from a court case that cell phone communication could be tracked (Kenney, 2008, p.90). Jamal Ahmidan, one of the Madrid bombing suspects, also used open sources. He followed several online periodicals to find some information about the police investigations (Kenney, 2008, p.39). After reading reports in the periodicals on the investigation, he realized that the police were close to catching him.

Learning theories focus on the knowledge and explain how individuals and organizations process it. The following section examines relevant theories that would create a baseline of knowledge on learning in illegal organizations.

Contagion Theory

Contagion theory focuses on imitative behaviours and posits that people learn from other people by implementing their experiences in an imitative manner. Studies in social science advisedly use the term 'behavioural contagion' to explain the change in human behaviour as a result of imitation (Polansky, Lippitt & Redl, 1950, p.321; Wheeler, 1966, p.179; Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966, p.1). The behavioural contagion is "an event which a recipient's behaviour has changed to become 'more like' that of the actor or initiator" that has occurred "in a social interaction in which the actor has not communicated intent to evoke such a change" (Polansky, Lippitt & Redl, 1950, p.322).

In addition to behaviours, contagion theory has been applied to a variety of social phenomena: urban disorders (Midlarsky, 1978, p.996), the contagion of aggression (Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966, p.1), collective violence (Pitcher, Hamblin & Miller, 1978, p.23), suicide (Stack, 1987, p.401), and the spread of war (Most & Starr, 1980, p.932), the spread of terrorist tactics, methods and experiences within and across national boundaries (Midlarsky et al., 1980, p.263; Holden, 1987, p.1019; Weitz & Neal, 2007, p.130; Nacos, 2009).

Various researchers have focused on the contagiousness of terrorism with different angles. Temporal contagion, for example, looks at the time factor: "past terrorism bears new terrorism within one country" (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p.9). Spatial contagion, on the other hand, states that, "if one country suffers from terrorism, it is also likely to infect neighbouring countries"

(Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p.9). A study by Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980), as one of the first such studies on contagion, analysed terrorist incidents by region. They defined contagion as "the increase from m to n incidents" (p268). In their analysis of 503 terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1974, Midlarsky et al. (1980) found a diffusion of terrorism in the first segment of the time period (1968-1971) and contagion in the second period (1973-1974). Holden (1987) also examined the contagious effect of terrorism. Analysing 326 attempts of aircraft hijacking between 1968 and 1972, Holden found an effect of generating new hijacking at a rate of 0.5 for each successful hijackings in the U.S.A. Johnson et al. (2011, p.82), on the other hand, by examining the coalition military fatality data in Iraq and Afghanistan, observed a similar acceleration in deadly events in both countries.

Contagion theory posits a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and the spread of terrorism. The theory postulates that terrorist tactics become available to other terrorists through "indirect diffusion" (Horowitz, 2010, p.37): by imitation or vicarious learning through the media (Pitcher, Hamblin & Miller, 1978, p.24; Midlarsky et al., 1980, p.282; Holden, 1987, p.1019; Pech, 2003, p.61; Forest, 2008, p.276; Nacos, 2009; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p.4;).

The media serves terrorists in three ways: "by providing exposure to a public, by conferring legitimacy on the terrorists' cause and by supplying information about tactics and strategies to other terrorists" (Dobkin, 2005, p.128). The media also facilitates the spread of terrorist script through labels such as heroes, gunman, fighter, etc. (Pech & Slade, 2005, p.47). While it is difficult to distribute tacit knowledge through the media, explicit knowledge is

easily distributed. For example, details of a terrorist attack, as in hostage seizure missions examined in Chapter 2, are learned through the media and the tactic is imitated successfully by other TOs.

In addition to imitation, the transmission of "meme" also facilitates the process of learning (Pech, 2003, p.61; Coker, 2008, p.904). Memes are units of information, ideas or mental representations, culturally transmitted instructions (Levitt & March, 1988, p.329; Pech, 2003, p.61; Pech & Slade, 2005, p.47; Pech & Slade, 2006.p.13; Coker, 2008, p.904). They are contagious, self-replicating, and can be effectively communicated.

Pech and Slade (2005, p.50; 2006, p.14) mention a toxic meme, known as the terrorism meme, that runs counter to the values and norms of society. When a terrorist attack occurs, the portrayal of terrorist attacks with labels such as gunman, fighter, or sniper in the media "confers a communicable mantle upon the act of violence". The labels later become 'memes' that are transmitted to a wide range of receivers. However, the interpretation of the receiver plays a significant role in the transmission. A terrorist attack can be interpreted with anguish and fear by the victims' families, but, on the contrary, it can also be interpreted as a victory by the individuals that associate themselves with the perceived cause of the terrorists. The latter group receives the terrorist meme and imitates the behaviour through memetic engineering (Pech, 2003, p.62).

Contagion theory finds a broad range of application areas in terrorism. Researchers that agree on the contagiousness of terrorism mostly focus on innovations and diffusion of terrorist tactics (Klingman, 1980; Nacos, 2009; Horowitz, 2010; Cliff & First, 2013; Nesser & Stenersen, 2014, p.13; Revill, 2016). They argue that the mass-mediated contagion of terrorism provides an

“inspiration” to others (Nacos, 2009; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.3). Nacos calls this process “inspirational contagion”. They explain that TOs learn innovations and techniques used in bombings from other TOs through a contagious process. However, they do not provide information on how TOs get over the predicaments of learning tacit knowledge, how they learn skills and techniques, nor how they operationalize what is learned.

The media permits the spread of terrorism and the publicity of the terrorist cause, however, the media coverage alone would not affect the spread of terrorism (Dobkin, 2005, p.130). The media is a catalyser, not simply through the coverage of incidents but through the facilitation of learning. For example, direct associations between members of TOs have an effect on the level of diffusion. TOs are interested in tactic established associations with innovator TOs and are engaged in vicarious learning (Horowitz, 2010). Therefore, addressing the media for the contagion of terrorist attacks is simplistic, particularly for tactics that require tacit knowledge.

On the other hand, the whole learning process of TOs is not explained by the theory completely. For example, there is a degree of freedom of choice in the adoption of certain tactics by learning organizations (Polansky, Lippitt & Redl, 1950, p.346), termed as “selective adoption” by Klingman (1980, p.127). Organizations do not identically imitate or interpret tactics (Polansky, Lippitt & Redl, 1950, p.346). Kidnapping, for example, differs from organization to organization (Briggs, 2001, p.10). Contagion theory does not elucidate the factors that affect the choice of terrorist tactics (Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983, p.36). Only recently have researchers looked at other factors in the contagiousness of terrorism. Horowitz (2010), as one of them, scrutinizes the

role of organizational factors and concludes that organizational capacities define the diffusion of tactics. For example, suicide attacks did not diffuse to some organizations because of a lack of organizational capabilities. Shapiro (2012), commenting on Horowitz's findings, even questions the validity of earlier studies of contagiousness of suicide attacks in the form of diffusion. Therefore, the learning capacities of organizations determine whether the same tactic will be used successfully or whether the same tactic has rationale for other TOs. Consequently, the theory has not provided answers as to why some TOs do not embrace some terrorist tactics, what makes some TOs refrain from applying those tactics or why a successful tactic becomes unsuccessful when it is used by another organization.

There are several gaps in contagion literature, such as pro-innovation bias, and the motivations of actors and receptors (Ackerman, 2010, p.59). According to the theory, unsuccessful terrorist tactics have no contagious effect. Why do only successful tactics spread? How do terrorists learn from experiences, more importantly from mistakes, then? Experiences are built on both successes and failures. Organizations also learn from mistakes and improve themselves. What about "noncontagious diffusion mechanisms", such as victim mobilization? The spread of terrorism may in fact be corollary to the mobilization of targets of TOs and terrorists to other regions; a non-contagious diffusion rather than contagion (Heyman & Mickolus, 1980, p.303). The theory explains the spread of successful tactics but the whole process of terrorist learning remains partly explained.

The contagion theory adopts an event-oriented approach. This approach, in fact, is one of the persistent problems of terrorism research (Crenshaw, 2000,

p.405; Ranstorp, 2007b, p.4). As a result of this approach, researchers have focused on "why" terrorism, more specifically terrorist tactics, occurs in one location and "why" the same tactics start to be used in another part of the world, but have not shown interest in understanding "how". Therefore, this thesis continues its search.

Organizational Learning Theory

Organizational learning is the process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.803). It is the process of "homogenization in organizational changes, including changes in structure, organizational culture, goals, programme or mission" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149). It occurs when the organizational knowledge base is developed and shaped (Shrivastava, 1981, p.15, cited in Tsang, 1999, p.213), change in behaviour or in routines is observed (Das & Kumar, 2007, p.685), and knowledge is transformed from an individual to a "collective state" (Spender, 1996, cited in Inkpen, 2000, p.1022).

Theorists have formulated various processes of organizational learning. Nonaka (1994, p.21), for instance, considers there to be five stages in organizational knowledge creation: *the enlargement of an individual's knowledge*, *sharing tacit knowledge and conceptualization*, *crystallization*, *justification* and *networking of knowledge*. Individuals initially accumulate new knowledge and absorb it as individual knowledge. During the process of absorption, the new knowledge is enlarged through an interaction between personal experience and rationality. Individual beliefs and value systems play a significant role in the enlargement of individual knowledge. Through social interactions in the "field" (a place in which individual perspectives are

articulated and conflicts are resolved) or "self-organizing team" (a team in which individual members collaborate), this individualized knowledge is shared and becomes conceptualized among the individual members. Then, the new knowledge is crystallized into concrete 'form' such as a product or a system. During the crystallization, various groups within the organization test the reality and applicability of the concept created. As a fourth stage, the truthfulness of the concept and the quality of the knowledge are determined: whether it has value for the organization or not. In the last stage, the concept that has been created, crystallized and justified is integrated into the organizational knowledge and becomes visible in the organization's knowledge networks.

Lane and Lubatkin (1998) provide a simplistic learning model to knowledge acquisition: *passive*, *active* and *interactive* learning (p.462). In each method of learning, a different type of knowledge is acquired. Passive learning occurs when knowledge is acquired from open sources such as newspapers. Active learning can provide broader knowledge compared to the passive learning method. Active learning occurs at arm's length and only the observable portion of another organization's experience can be acquired. The interactive method brings the parties of learning together. The 'how' and 'why' knowledge, as well as unique, less imitable knowledge that is embedded in the social context of an organization, is learned through this method (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998, p.462).

Other researchers provide different processes. For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.147) identify three "isomorphic processes": coercive, mimetic and normative. While coercive isomorphism stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, mimetic isomorphism emanates from

standard responses to uncertainty. Normative isomorphism, on the other hand, is associated with professionalism. Researchers from other disciplines, on the other hand, focus on operational activities. Jackson (2004, p.10), for example, proposes four learning processes: learning by doing, learning through training, learning through organizational research activity and learning from others.

Despite the diversity of thoughts on the classification of learning processes, most research, including this thesis, agree on Huber's (1991, p.90) model that posits four steps. *Knowledge acquisition*, also referred to as knowledge diffusion, is the first step by which knowledge is obtained. *Knowledge distribution*, also referred to as knowledge transmission, is the second step by which information from different sources is shared and new information or understanding occurs. *Knowledge interpretation*, also referred to as knowledge transformation, is the third step by which distributed information is given one or more commonly understood interpretations. *Organizational memory* is the last step by which knowledge becomes accessible to members and is stored for future use.

Knowledge Acquisition

Knowledge acquisition is the first step of learning by organizations through which knowledge is obtained. Huber (1991, p.91) identifies five different learning processes through which organizations become aware of new knowledge and acquire it: *congenital learning*, *experiential learning*, *vicarious learning*, *searching* and *grafting*. The knowledge that an organization knows at its birth is referred to as congenital knowledge. It is formed by the founders of the organization who deeply affect the nature of organization.

In the aftermath of the foundation of an organization, it garners some knowledge through direct experience (experimental learning). Vicarious learning refers to the inter-organizational imitation. Searching, on the other hand, occurs in three forms: scanning (sensing of external environment), focused search (search in response to problems or opportunities) and performance monitoring (sensing of effectiveness). Grafting new members with knowledge that was not previously known to the organization is another process of acquiring knowledge.

These knowledge acquisition processes have characteristics that favour their use in certain situations. In some circumstances, experience would have a very poor effect, but in others, it would confirm the validity of an external knowledge. Acquisition through grafting, for example, is often "faster than experimental acquisition and more complete than acquisition through imitation" (Huber, 1991, p.97).

Absorptive capacity is one of the core factors that influences knowledge acquisition (Inkpen, 1998a, p.227; Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.358; Simonin, 2004, p.410; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p.294). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined absorptive capacity as "the ability to recognize the value of external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to… ends" (p.128). The greater the absorptive capacity, the more an organization can absorb knowledge (Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.358).

The absorptive capacity is influenced by various factors: knowledge connections between interacting parties, the relatedness of the knowledge, the cultural alignment between members, the quality of human resources, the resources at disposal and the management systems (Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Kumar

& Nti, 1998, p.358). Another factor that affects the absorptive capacity is prior knowledge about the new knowledge. Prior knowledge enhances the learning process. Through prior knowledge, a link between the new learning subject and pre-existing concepts can be established and ultimately, the new knowledge can be absorbed (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.129).

Knowledge Distribution (Transmission)

Once knowledge is obtained, it is distributed throughout an organization. Knowledge distribution results in "more broadly based organizational learning" (Huber, 1991, p.101). While DiMaggio and Powell's (1983, p.147) isomorphic processes originally refer to organizational learning, Levitt and March (1988, p.329) use the same coercive, mimetic and normative processes in the explanation of the knowledge distribution processes. Coercive transmission involves a single source of knowledge such as rules promulgated by professional associations, unions and governments. Mimetic transmission involves the diffusion of knowledge through contacts between members of an organization that has the knowledge and an organization that encounters the new knowledge by the movement of personnel or by consultants. Normative transmission is a two-staged process: the diffusion of knowledge by a small group in the organization and then transmission of the knowledge to the remaining groups (Levitt & March, 1988, p.329).

"Knowledge connections" are responsible for knowledge transmission (Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Inkpen, 2000, p.1021; Ball, 2013, p.9; De kock, 2014; Mellon, Yoder & Evans, 2016). Knowledge connections "facilitate the sharing and communicating of new knowledge and provide a basis for transforming individual knowledge" (Inkpen, 1998a, p.226). Jackson (2006), in a similar way

to Inkpen's understanding of 'knowledge connection', emphasizes the importance of the 'connections' that exist among organizations' constituent units. He argues that organizations are held together by connections between individuals at the lowest level and among components of the organization at higher levels. The connections "provide the ability to communicate, to exchange information, and to convey authority to shape the behaviours of others in the organizations" (p.243).

While knowledge connections are actors of the knowledge transmission, their existence is not enough for the transmission of knowledge among units of the organizations. The knowledge connections should be able to 'interact' to transmit the knowledge acquired. The knowledge is transmitted by "socialization, education, imitation, professionalization, personnel movement, mergers, and acquisitions" (Levitt & March, 1988, p.320). The "communities of interaction" contribute to the development of new knowledge, mainly to the transmission process.

Knowledge Interpretation (Transformation)

Following acquisition and transmission, knowledge needs to be transformed into a meaningful term that can be absorbed by internal members. Knowledge that is difficult to be assimilated by internal members needs to be interpreted. Knowledge interpretation is "the process through which information is given meaning" and "the process of translating events and developing shared understanding and conceptual schemes" (Daft & Weick, 1984, p. 286, cited in Huber, 1991, p.102). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) use the term "gatekeeping" to refer this interpretation (p.132). Gatekeepers both

monitor the environment and translate complex knowledge into a more understandable form.

This is the phase of organizational learning in which knowledge is transformed from individual level to organizational level in an understandable form. Once the knowledge is encoded into routines (structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge, the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate), the transformation process is achieved (Levitt & March, 1988, p.320).

Organizational Memory

Knowledge is maintained and accumulated within routines (Levitt & March, 1988, p.320; March, 1991, p.73). In the last phase of organizational learning, the routines are passed from individuals to collective organizational memory through socialization and control.

The acquired knowledge, particularly experiential knowledge, whether in tacit or explicit form, is recoded in the organizational memory (Levitt & March, 1988, p.326). After determining the truthfulness of the concept and the quality of the knowledge, only worthwhile knowledge becomes visible in the organization's knowledge networks (Nonaka, 1994, p.21). After it becomes visible in the knowledge networks, the knowledge is saved in the memory of the organization and becomes 'organizational'.

This organizational memory is independent of individual actors. Once the knowledge is acquired, transmitted, transformed and lastly stored in the organizational memory, the knowledge becomes independent of the original source. The individuals that initially played a role in the organizational learning

may later leave the organization, but the organizational knowledge persists in the organizational memory (Crosssan & Inkpen, 1994, p.278; Jackson, 2004, p.3).

There are various types of organizational learning theories, but none of them are widely accepted (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.803; Jackson, 2004, p.3). The *level of analysis* has been an important distinguishing point in organizational learning theories (Easterby-Smith, Crossan & Nicolini, 2000, p.785). The idea that learning takes place in the heads of individuals has been mostly rejected and it has been argued that learning occurs "mainly through conversations and interactions *between* people" (Easterby-Smith, Crossan & Nicolini, 2000, p.787). They postulate that organizational learning goes beyond the individuals and characterizes continuity; unlike individuals, organizations "develop and maintain learning systems that not only influence their immediate members, but are then transmitted to others by ways of organization histories and norms" (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.804). Eventually, organizational learning is agreed to be more than the cumulative results of the members' learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.804; Crossan & Inkpen 1994, p.281; Tsang, 1999, p.213).

Organizational learning theories argue that individual learning is likely to cause problems. Levitt and March (1988, pp.323-325), for example, argue that individuals make systematic errors in recoding the events of history and that they possess systematic biases in their interpretation of the knowledge. Moreover, March (1991) mentions "mutual learning"; while organizations learn from individuals, individuals also learn from organizations (p.73). As a result of mutual learning, the individual and organizational beliefs converge and

individuals adjust to an organizational code *before* the code can be learned from individuals; therefore, the effectiveness of learning diminishes.

In contrast to the stance of most organizational learning studies on the overlooked role of the individual, individuals are the "agents of organizational learning" (Tsang, 1999, p.213). Individual knowledge is the first step to learning (Jackson, 2004, p.3). The quality of learning is determined by the skills of the individual. The new knowledge is developed and transmitted by the individual (Nonaka, 1994, p.p.14; Revill, 2016, p.82), therefore, organizations are dependent on individuals for knowledge. Individuals are organizational assets that contribute to both ideology and operations (Forest, 2006b, p.18). For example, Mustafa Setmarim Nasar, an Al Qaeda leader, was one of the principal architects of Al Qaeda's recently transformed structure to a decentralized network (Forest, 2008, p.273). Gabriel Cleary, the PIRA director of engineering, was responsible for homemade mortars and timing devices used by the PIRA while Richard Clark Johnson, an electrical engineer, helped the PIRA develop radio and radar-controlled initiation systems (Jackson et al., 2005, p.25; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.139). As individuals, Nasar, Cleary and Johnson contributed effectively to their organizations.

Individual knowledge has an "epistemological dimension" (Nonaka, 1994, p.15). It is the "part of the knowledge which resides in the brains and bodily skills of the individuals" (Lam, 2000, p.491). Some part of the knowledge is "in the heads of people", not "in manuals, blueprints or handbooks" (Powell, 1987, p.81). This is particularly true for secret organizations such as TOs and OCGs. Knowledge transmission, thus, occurs

through networks of individuals (Powell, 1987, p.81). Therefore, individuals are an important factor in organizational learning (Nonaka, 1994, p.15).

Knowledge acquisition, particularly of tacit knowledge, is a complex process. Some types of knowledge are difficult to be realized, observed, acquired and assimilated (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.139). The level of tacitness of the knowledge may cause unsuccessful learning. For example, Levitt and March (1988) point out the "superstitious learning" problem that stems from a misunderstanding in learning from experience: superstitious learning occurs when the experience of learning is compelling, but the connections between actions and outcomes are mis-specified (p.325).

In addition to 'superstitious learning', the paucity, the redundancy and the complexity of experience are among other problems in organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988, p.333). Organizations may not obtain adequate experience, especially in a rapidly changing environment or through ordinary learning which can create stability in routines that would prevent the organization from experiencing. Nevertheless, the experience itself is very complicated because of the organizational environments, causal systems and interactions.

Learning generally increases the learner's effectiveness, however, it is possible that ineffective learning may also occur: "entities can incorrectly learn, and they can correctly learn that which is incorrect" (Huber, 1991, p.89). Nonetheless, learning does not always result in observable changes in behaviour (Huber, 1991, p.89) or change does not necessarily imply learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p.803).

While obtaining adequate experiences is one problem, not being aware of what is known is another. Division of labour may hamper organizations from realizing the importance of the knowledge they possess: “as a result of specialization, differentiation and departmentalization, organizations frequently do not know what they know” (Huber, 1991, p.106).

Despite the increasing interest in organizational learning in research (De kock, 2014), the organizational learning theories have still not provided a full explanation of the dynamic of organizational learning. The lack of literature, the lack of empirical data and insufficient knowledge still persist in organizational learning theories (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011; Jiménez-Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 2011; Thistlethwaite, 2012). Organizational learning theories only partially explain the learning process because they focus on the organization itself. They neither consider the roles of individuals, nor the effects of interactions between organizations. Therefore, learning in TOs requires further analysis.

Alliance Learning Theory

Alliances, by bringing organizations together with different knowledge bases (Inkpen, 1998b, p.69), create unique learning opportunities (Crossan & Inkpen, 1994, p.263; Inkpen, 1998a, p. 223: Ghosh, 2004, p.303; Lin, 2012, p.341; Love, Roper & Vahter, 2014, p.1705). Alliance learning is “the acquisition and development of information and skills within the alliance team” (Bucic & Gudergan, 2004, p.260). Alliance learning theory concentrates on the organizational learning that occurs among two or more organizations.

Alliance learning is a multidisciplinary subject and consequently, there are various conceptualizations and classifications of alliance learning (Iyer,

2002, p.2). One classification focuses on the involvement of various actors at individual, group and organizational levels: the individual level involves interpreting the knowledge learned; the group level involves integrating; and the organizational level involves integrating and institutionalizing (Crossan & Inkpen, 1994, p.265; Inkpen, 1998a, p.226).

According to another classification, alliance learning consists of three different learning types: content learning, partner-specific learning, and alliance management learning (Das & Kumar, 2007, p.686). While content learning refers to the acquisition and internalization abilities of an allied organization, partner-specific learning refers to learning from a partner and learning about a partner. Alliance management learning refers to the organization's ability to manage alliances effectively. In spite of the diversity of thoughts on alliances, most researchers agree that alliance learning postulates the same learning processes as organizational learning: *knowledge acquisition*, *knowledge distribution*, *knowledge interpretation*, and *organizational memory*. Through these processes, knowledge permeates into the organization.

Organizations may have various motives to enter into alliances (Iyer, 2002, p.1). These motives may change in time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.147; Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.356; Iyer, 2002, p.9), but, in general, alliances are formed for mutual benefits. Even though organizational learning is not the primary purpose of most alliances (Grant & Baden Fuller, 2004, p.77; Das & Kumar, 2007, p.686), the knowledge exchange inside of the alliances is one of the benefits (Teece, 1992, p.4; Konrad, 2011, p.16; Lin, 2012, p.341). Allying parties intend to access and acquire knowledge from one another (Gulati, 1999, p.401; Grant & Baden Fuller, 2004, p.65; Albers, Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013,

p.4). The openness of allying parties is important for the exchange of knowledge. It thus helps boost innovation for both parties (Love, Roper & Vahter, 2014, p.1705). The knowledge obtained through exchange may be applied to operations related to alliance activities (common benefits), as well as to the organization's own purposes in areas not related to the alliance's activities (private benefits) (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998, p.194).

There are other benefits to be found in alliances. Alliances help organizations to transform their operations and gain access to new knowledge that would be difficult for them to learn alone (Lei, 1993, p.32). Thus, they provide opportunities to leverage organizational strengths with allied partners that may empower them to deal with the problem of self-sufficiency (Inkpen, 1998a, p.224).

The success or failure of strategic alliances is based on the collective learning process (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson & Sparks, 1998, p.285). According to Larsson and et al. (1998), inter-organizational learning is a joint outcome of the interacting organizations' choices and abilities of receptivity and transparency, and it "can be achieved by transferring existing knowledge from one organization to another organization, as well as by creating completely new knowledge through interaction among the organizations" (p.289).

There are factors that affect learning in alliances. Absorptive capacity, an effective factor in organizational learning, is also an important factor in alliance learning (Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.356). Its level determines the level of knowledge that can be acquired and absorbed. The accessibility of alliance knowledge and the effectiveness at learning also affect the learning process in alliances (Inkpen, 1998b, p. 74). For alliances to be successful, partners should

both be able to access the organizational knowledge (Inkpen, 1998b, p.74; Inkpen, 2000, p.1021).

The absorptive capacity is affected by the "learning alliance partner" (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998, p.462). Learning from another firm is "jointly determined by the relative characteristics of the student… and the teacher" (p.462), more specifically, by the similarities of student and teacher organizations on knowledge basis, organizational structures, compensation policies and dominant logics.

Simonin (2004) remarks the importance of "learning capacity," which is different from absorptive capacity (p.410). Simonin argues that learning capacity is a fundamental determinant of absorptive capacity. In addition to learning capacity, learning intent, organizational culture, size of the knowledge seekers, knowledge connections, relatedness of alliance knowledge, partner protectiveness, alliance forms, tacitness and ambiguity of knowledge there are other determinants of learning in the process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances (Hamel, 1991, p.90; Lei, 1993, p.32; Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Simonin, 2004, p.409).

Alliance learning theory has theoretical and practical problems. One of the problems in alliances is 'instability'. Since learning is considered to be a strong motive for forming and sustaining alliances (Mody, 1993, p.152; Lei, 1993, p.37; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998, p.198; Inkpen, 1998a, p.228), achieving learning may cause instability: "the more a partner in an alliance learns, the less it may need to remain in an alliance" (Inkpen, 1998a, p.228). However, this instability argument is limited to alliances for the sole purpose of learning; not all alliances are formed just to learn from the partner (Tsang, 1999,

p.220). In most cases, learning is an opportunity that occurs with alliances. Moreover, accessibility of alliance knowledge, partner protectiveness, and ambiguity, tacitness of knowledge, environmental factors, task types, processes, skills, goals and cooperativeness of behaviour affect the quality or even the occurrence of alliance learning (Doz, 1996, p.74; Inkpen, 1998b, p.74; Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.359; Simonin, 2004, p.412).

Organizations in an alliance may sometimes fail to learn particularly when alliance knowledge is undervalued, knowledge connections are not put into place, knowledge is difficult to learn, or the learning potential is not realized (Inkpen, 1998b, p.70). In addition, the organization may never assimilate and exploit the new knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p.136) refer to this condition as "lockout". If the organization does not develop its absorptive capacity in the initial period, it will not foresee the new opportunities and, as a result, it will not invest in absorptive capacity.

In sum, alliance learning, similar to organizational learning, focuses on the learning process of organizations, yet, the subject is the learning between two or more organizations, not within the organization. Even though alliance learning theory provides important information about how alliances occur and how organizations benefit from alliances, it has limited interest in individuals that form the organizations. Therefore, it is one sided and it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the learning of TOs. Moreover, learning is not the primary purpose of most alliances (Grant & Baden Fuller, 2004, p.77; Das & Kumar, 2007, p.686). What is learned is the primary focus in alliance learning theory, but not how it is learned. Consequently, alliance learning theory does

not present a complete understanding of the learning mechanisms of organizations.

Social Learning Theory

Social learning generally refers to social behaviouristic approaches in psychology, principally to that of Albert Bandura (Akers, 2009, p. xv), yet, in other fields, such as criminology, it refers to Akers' theory, first proposed by Burgess and Akers (1966) and later improved by Akers (Akers & Silverman, 2004, p.30; Akers, 2009, p.xv). The theory has gained significant interest from researchers, particularly from criminologists (Cressey, 1952; Cressey, 1960a; Adams, 1973; Tittle, Burke & Jackson, 1986; McCarthy, 1996; Cullen & Agnew, 1999; Hochstetler, Copes & De Lisi, 2002; Tittle, 2004; Church II, Wharton & Taylor, 2009; Pratt, Cullen, Sellers, Winfree Jr., Madensen, Daigle, Fearn & Gau, 2010). Since the theory posits that behaviours are learned through individual and social mechanisms, criminologists have used it in the explanation of criminality: criminal behaviour, like any other human behaviour, is learned through interactions/associations (Akers, Burgess & Johnson, 1968, p.459; Matsueda, 2006, p.3).

The roots of the theory can be traced to Gabriel De Tarde (1903; 1912). De Tarde (1903) examines the dynamics of various societies and remarks that society is imitation. He describes the "laws of imitation": close contact, imitation of the superiors by inferiors and insertion.

In De Tarde's view, everything in social algebra is derived from imitation (1903, p.150). Every act of imitation is a consequence of a calculation on the part of the individual. The calculation involves a conflict between desires

and beliefs of individuals. The imitation occurs in accordance with the proportion of association between individuals.

The direction of the imitation is also important to his thought. According to De Tarde (1903, p.367; 1912, p.326), imitation marches from top to bottom (the law of superiority): "the subjective model is imitated before the objective" (1903, p.194) and "the example of persons or classes as well as of localities that are thought superior will prevail over the example of inferior persons or classes or localities" (1903, p.194). Lastly, newly imitated acts or behaviours are superimposed on former ones. De Tarde names this superimposition as the law of insertion.

De Tarde (1912), in *Penal Philosophy*, applies the laws of imitation to crime and explains how crime can be learned through the process of imitation. He further applies it to terrorism, arguing that terrorists imitate states:

> …when a band of obscure insurgents terrorizes a capital and holds a government in check, let us recall the fact that there was a time when statesmen were not ashamed to carry out the massacres and annoyances which they suppress in our days. (p.336)

Sutherland undertakes an enhanced application of De Tarde's laws on crime with some revisions and changes. Sutherland (1940; 1941; 1942; 1945), integrating De Tarde's laws, argues that criminal behaviour is learned in interaction with other persons with an emphasis on the learning that occurs within intimate personal groups, but, in contrast to De Tarde, he includes all mechanisms of learning, rather than restricting it to imitation only.

The differential association theory postulates nine principles of criminality:

(1) Criminal behaviour is learned,

(2) Criminal behaviour is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication,

(3) The principal part of the learning occurs within intimate personal groups,

(4) When a criminal behaviour is learned, the learning includes techniques of committing the crime and the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations and attitudes,

(5) The specific direction of the motives and drives is learned from a definition of the legal codes as favourable or unfavourable,

(6) A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favourable to the violation of law over definitions unfavourable to the violation of law,

(7) Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority and intensity,

(8) The process of learning criminal behaviour by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning,

(9) While criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since non-criminal behaviour is an expression of the same needs and values (Sutherland, 1941; Cressey, 1952, p.44; Cressey, 1960a, p.2; Matsueda, 1982, p.489; Matsueda & Heimer, 1987, p.827; Matsueda, 2001, p.126; Akers, 2009, p.23-25; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.323).

Sutherland's differential association theory focuses on the variables in social order (Sutherland, 1940, p.2; Sutherland, 1945, p.433), rather than pathological (Sutherland, 1950, pp.146-147) or biological perspectives (Sutherland, 1951, p.13). Sutherland states that, "the significant factors are definitions of behaviour and conceptions of right and duties" (Sutherland, 1945, p.433). Therefore, the theory focuses on definitions that make a crime justified or unjustified through motives, verbalizations or rationalizations and it asserts that the excess of definitions favourable to criminal behaviour over definitions unfavourable to the violation of law results in deviant behaviour (Sutherland, 1941, p.116).

The process of acquiring definitions is called *differential association* because the content of definitions associated with criminal behaviour patterns differs from the content of definitions associated with anti-criminal behaviour (Sutherland, 1941; Cressey, 1952, p.44; Cressey, 1960a; Matsueda, 1982; Matsueda & Heimer, 1987; Matsueda, 2001; Akers, 2009; Akers & Jennings, 2009). In addition to definition, skills and techniques for committing crime are also important (Matsueda, 2001, p.126; Valier, 2002, p.49; Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.20). The skills and techniques can range from specialized and complicated ones to the simple ones; from fraud, forgery, or cyber-crimes to skills of assault, pickpocketing, or shoplifting. Some crime types, scam related crimes for example, require skills. However, skills may not be adequate in certain crime types. Techniques of crime should also be known. Forgery, for instance, requires skills for a good quality false document, but techniques used are equally important. In the context of terrorist learning of organized crime, the preparation of false identity documents, cyber-crimes, or smuggling may

require high level skills and detailed knowledge while assault, or extortion may not require the same level skills. Particularly crime types in organized forms require both skills and techniques that cannot be obtained or developed without tutelage, and observation, that is, without learning.

Social learning theory builds upon the fundamental principles of differential association theory. Burgess and Akers (1966) developed Sutherland's principles and put forward *differential association-reinforcement theory* which later came to be known as social learning theory (Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Radosevich, 1979, p.637; Akers, 2009, p.xv; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.323. Adding "operant behaviour", "reinforcement" and "imitation" to the theory (Cullen & Agnew, 1999, p.10; Akers, 2009, pp.58-60), they made some revisions to the principles of Sutherland's theory (Burgess & Akers, 1966, p.132; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.324). The theory postulates that:

> the definitions themselves are learned through reinforcement contingencies operating in the socialization process, and they may function less as direct motivators than as facilitative or inhibitory "discriminative stimuli" or cues that signal that certain behaviour is appropriate and likely to be rewarded or inappropriate and likely to be punished in that situation. It is this anticipated reinforcement/punishment (based on direct or vicarious reinforcement in the past) that provides motivation for the behaviour independently of whatever motivation to engage in or refrain from an act comes from the fact that it conforms to or violates one's beliefs or definitions. (Akers, 1996, p.239)

There are four principle learning mechanisms: *differential association* which refers to direct and indirect interaction with others; *differential reinforcement* which refers to instrumental learning through rewards and punishments; *imitation* which refers to observational learning; cognitive *definitions* (attitudes) towards favourable or unfavourable deviant behaviour (Akers & Lee, 1996, p.318; Akers, 1999, p.486; Akers & Silverman, 2004, p.20; Akers, 2009, p.50; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.325). All these learning mechanisms are used in the learning of conforming and deviant behaviours (Akers & Silverman, 2004, 24). Social learning theory, considering the changes in the role of the media since the 1940s, also characterizes the media effect as an important element, contrary to Sutherland's theory that finds it "relatively unimportant" (Akers, 2009, p.60).

Learning stems from various sources and differential definitions are influenced by different groups (Lee, Akers & Borg, 2004, p.17). In addition to differential peer-friendship groups which are one of the most important factors in social learning theory (Akers et al., 1979, p.638), "parents, other family members, neighbours, church and religious groups, schoolteachers, physicians, authority figures and other individuals and groups in the community as well as mass media and other more remote sources of attitudes and modules" also affect individuals' behaviours (Akers & Lee, 1996, p.321). These sources of *associations* (*differential associations*) are divided into two groups (Akers & Silverman, 2004, p.20; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.325): the primary group includes family and the peer groups of early childhood years and spouses; the secondary group includes neighbours, church leaders, teachers, and work groups. Reference groups that comprise of other social groups, including virtual

groups (mass media and the Internet) are also counted as secondary groups. All association groups play an important role in the formation of definitions, but to varying degrees. Naturally, definitions acquired through primary associations are more powerful.

Differential reinforcement is of primary importance. There are three aspects of reinforcement: the amount of reinforcement that positively affects the response rate; the frequency of reinforcement that is negatively affected by the number of reinforcements per given time period; the probability of reinforcement that negatively affects the reciprocity of responses per reinforcement (Burgess & Akers, 1966, p.144). Moreover, social behaviour, after being shaped by operant conditioning, is strengthened through positive reinforcement (reward) and negative reinforcement (avoidance of punishment), or weakened through positive punishment (aversive stimuli) and negative punishment (loss of reward) (Akers et al., 1979, p.637; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.327). In addition, past and present reinforcements determine what type of behaviour is acquired, whether conforming or deviant.

Imitation or *vicarious reinforcement* refers to observational learning. It occurs through modelling others' behaviours. After modelling, the individual engages in the observed behaviour. Imitation can occur as a result of either direct observation or indirect observation (e.g. through the mass media). The process of imitation is affected by the attributes of the model, the behaviour and the consequences of behaviour (Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.327).

Definitions, on the other hand, represent an individual's own "orientations and attitudes toward a given behaviour" (Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.326). They are motives, verbalizations or rationalizations that make crime

justified or unjustified (Matsueda, 2006, p.5). They are “techniques of neutralization” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667).

There are five major types: the denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. All these types of definitions either concern specific offenses or a class of offences. They justify or motivate either criminal or conforming acts. Akers, on the other hand, focuses on individual definitions and divides them into two groups: *general definitions* that emanate from conventional values such as religion, morality, etc. and *specific definitions* that drive individuals towards committing or refraining from certain deviant or criminal acts (Akers, 2009, p.78).

Examples of definitions are numerous. Definitions favourable to embezzlement, for instance, include “I am just borrowing the money, I will pay it back soon”, “The money is really mine”, “It is only fair that I get something more, I’m certainly not getting paid what I’m worth” (Cressey, 1953, p.93, cited in Akers, 2009, p.34). Definitions that include denial of responsibility are “I just blew my top”, “I was drunk”, “I broke down”, and “I didn’t know what I was doing” (Hartung, 1965, p. 52, cited in Akers, 2009, p.40). Definitions unfavourable to violence, on the other hand, include “no need to harm anyone” or “respect the law, don't get behind bars”.

Sutherland’s differential association theory has been one of the most influential theories in criminology (Short Jr. & Meier, 1981, p.471), however, the theory has not escaped criticism. Akers, in his revision, describes the general process of deviant behaviour and avoids the problems in Sutherland’s original formulation, but there are still points criticized in social learning theory.

The criticisms mainly centre on empirical validity, level of operationalization and testability, conceptual integration methods, structural principles and similarity to cultural deviance theory (Short Jr, 1956; Hirschi, 1969. p.12; Jensen, 1972, cited in Adams, 1973, p.467; Kornhauser, 1978, cited in Hirschi, 1996; Matsueda, 1982, p.489; Cullen & Agnew, 1999, p.10; Krohn, 1999; Valier, 2002, p.2; Tittle, 2004).

Both theories are criticized for being versions of 'cultural deviance theory' (Kornhauser, 1978, cited in Hirschi, 1996). According to cultural deviance theory, "cultures and subcultures" transmit the "criminal value" to the individual, therefore, individuals do not have any role in deviance (Akers, 1996, p.231). In contrast, individuals are the main actors in deviance for Sutherland and Akers. Thus, the learning process in deviant behaviour goes beyond the culture and includes all criminal values. Therefore, both theories do not postulate on the main assumptions of cultural deviance theory (Akers, 2009, 92).

Another critique is that both differential association and social learning theories are invalid because not everyone who interacts with criminals becomes a criminal (Akers, 2009, p.30). Police officers and correction officers, for example, associate with criminals but they do not become criminals. Besides, how people who may not have been in contact with other people exhibiting criminal behaviour still become criminals is emphasized as one of the points these theories do not answer.

Cressey (1960b, p.49) and Akers (1996, p.229; 2009, p.30; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.324) consider these critiques misinterpretation and ignorance of the words "differential" and "excess" in the theory. In fact, both

criminologists examine all critiques: Cressey (1960b) finds various principal errors by readers and Akers remarks that most of the critiques stem from "literary errors" or "misinterpretation" (Aker, 1996, p.229). The theories do not posit that learning occurs simply by contact with criminals, but through relative exposure to criminal and noncriminal patterns (Matsueda, 1982, p.491). The theory is concerned with "ratios of associations with patterns of behaviour", rather than "the character of the person presenting them" (Cressey, 1960b, p.49). Moreover, in spite of the learned definitions favourable to committing crimes, a person may anticipate more cost than reward attached to the crime, and therefore, may reject criminal acts (Akers, 1996, p.239).

Sutherland's and Akers' theories are also criticised for their lack of operationalization and testability. However, this critique is not unique to these two theories. It is argued that some of sociological and criminological theories are still untested in spite of their continued usage (Short Jr, 1956, p.233). Contrary to this critique, Akers included operant behaviourism, the most important part of the revision in the social learning theory according to Bursik (1988, p.522), and this inclusion allowed for a way to test the theory because operant behaviourism had already been operationalized in psychology. For example, in one of Aker's studies (Akers, Burgess & Johnson, 1968, p.469) on the drug use-addiction-relapse process, the principles of operant conditioning were used to test the differential association-reinforcement theory. In a study of adolescent drug use and drinking among male and female students, Akers et al. (1979) successfully operationalized the theory (Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Akers, 1984, p.359). In another longitudinal study on adolescent smoking (Akers & Lee, 1996), social learning theory was successfully tested and supported.

It is claimed that both theories disregard the gender factor in crime (Morash, in Akers, 1999, 482). However, gender differences are not overlooked nor disregarded by these theories. Gender variables have been used by many researchers who approve the status of these theories. Perry and Bussey (1979, p.1704), for example, in their study on gender discrepancies in learning through imitation, found that children are far more likely to imitate the response made by same sex models. Mihalic and Elliot (1997, p.42), on the other hand, examined minor and severe marital violence and tested victimization among males and females.

The main critique of social learning theory involves the question of empirical evidence (Short Jr, 1956; Hirschi, 1969. p.12; Krohn, 1999; Tittle, 2004). Social learning theory, however, has been subject to a plethora of studies with empirical positive results (Short Jr., 1956, p.238; Cressey, 1960a, p.4; Matsueda, 1982, p.500; Matsueda, 2001, p.129; Hochstetler et al., 2002; Akers, 2009, p.110; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.325). Social learning theory allows researchers to apply its principles to explain a variety of crimes such as marijuana use (Akers et al., 1979, p.651), elderly drinking behaviour (known as the Florida study) (Akers, 2009, p.234), drug use and drinking (Krohn et al, 1984, p.358), group and individual offending (Hochstetler et al., 2002), the impact of tutelage on attitudes (McCarthy, 1996, p.145), rape and sexual aggression (Akers, 2009, p.254), cheating among university students (Akers, 2009, p.286), delinquent behaviours (Short Jr, 1956, p.238; Andrews, 1980, p.449) and the role of families (Haj-Yahia & Dawud-Noursi, 1998, p.81). Akers et al. (1979, p.651), for example, found that differential association, differential reinforcement, definitions, and imitation combine to account for 68% of the

variance in marijuana use and 55% of the variance in alcohol use after testing social learning theory with primary data collected from the community for the first time.

Some researchers who raise the concern, in fact, admit that they found supporting evidence in their studies (Tittle, Burke & Jackson, 1986, p.425; Tittle, 2004, p.717). Krohn (1999, p.463), for example, expresses three concerns about social learning theory. First, he addresses a conceptual problem on the role of differential association within the theory. Secondly, he mentions conceptual integration, "a process of equating concepts in different theories", and argues that, "while the words and terms are different, the theoretical meanings and operations of measurements are similar" (p.470). According to Krohn (1999), Akers' conceptualizations, such as negative punishment, require more specifications and explanations. In spite of these concerns, he notes that social learning theory has established itself as "one of the more important explanation of deviant behaviour" and the theory is "consistently and strongly supported" (Krohn, 1999, p.474).

Andrews (1980, p.449), on the other hand, collects and analyses studies on social learning theory, and finds evidence of the causal significance of the theory. A recent study, similar to Andrews', was undertaken by Pratt et al. (2010). Pratt et al. (2010, p.771) examined a total of 133 studies that measured social learning principles from the leading criminal justice/criminology journals between 1974 and 2003. They found that all studies are successful in predicting criminal and deviant behaviour.

In sum, differential association theory postulates that criminal behaviour is learned in a process of symbolic differential associations with intimate groups

that change in frequency, duration, priority and intensity. The primary group presents criminal and anti-criminal patterns, techniques, motivations and definitions. Social learning theory, on the other hand, revises the principles of differential association theory and posits that criminal behaviour is learned through all learning mechanisms in association with all reference groups. In contrast to differential association theory, social learning theory includes differential reinforcement and imitation in the learning process. Thus, the role of the media is considered to be an important factor in social learning theory.

Social learning theory is applicable to all types of criminal and deviant behaviours at the organizational and individual levels (Andrews, 1980, p.448; Akers, 2009, p.xx). Moreover, because of Akers' addition of reinforcement that also applies to behaviours within groups, social learning theory provides additional explanations on learning at the group and organizational levels. Reinforcement individuals receive from groups or organizations, for instance, is a significant factor to understand the pressure of groups on individuals' behaviours. Thus, it explains all phases of deviant behaviour, from initiation to persistence and desistance (Akers, 2009, p.xx).

Conclusion

Due to a lack of prior theoretical studies on terrorist learning, this thesis searches for explanations to understand terrorist learning comprehensively. For this purpose, it reviews four theories that have come from different but related disciplines.

Contagion, organizational learning and alliance learning theories are interested in different aspects of learning. Contagion theory explains only why events spread. Organizational learning theories, on the other hand, ignore

individuals' roles in learning, mainly look at organizational level learning and are primarily concerned with the outcome of the learning (Inkpen, 2000, p.1037). Similarly, alliance learning is interested in learning only as an outcome of alliance. Even though these theories are applicable to both phenomena, for the purpose of the thesis, they remain weak in terms of their overall explanations to terrorist learning of criminality.

Social learning theory of criminology, on the other hand, provides a better insight into terrorist learning of criminality. It explains criminality through a learning process. It is interested in both inputs and outcomes of the learning process. In addition, it explains criminal learning at individual, group and organizational levels. This serves the aim of this thesis because the thesis argues that TOs learn criminal activities from OCGs through interactions/associations at inter-personal, intra-group and inter-group levels.

Furthermore, a part of the thesis' focus is criminal activity. Explanations achieved in criminology contribute to this aim. Thus, terrorism is a form of organized crime; a "political-social organized crime" (Albini, Rogers & Anderson, 1999, p.3). It is more appropriate to examine criminality-related issues through the lenses of a criminological theory. As a result, the thesis chooses social learning theory for the theory's broad applicability, explanatory power, and detailed coverage of all aspects of both individual and organizational level learning. The following chapter operationalizes this choice and applies social learning theory to terrorist learning of organized crime.

CHAPTER 4

TERRORIST LEARNING OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Social learning theory is applicable to a broad range of social phenomena. There are researchers who examine terrorism within the context of social learning theory (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 1996; Akers & Silverman, 2004; Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.20; Ryan, Vanderlick & Matthews, 2007). Other researchers explain how people engage in terrorism by the acquisition of definitions favourable to political violence (Pauwels & Schils, 2016), the role of social initiation (Kule & Gul, 2015) and association groups (Yilmaz, 2009).

Bandura (1990), as one of these researchers, explains that, "terrorists invoke moral principles to justify human atrocities" (p.4). Socialized people are converted to "dedicated combatants" by "cognitively restructuring the moral values" towards political violence, rather than by altering "personality structures, aggressive drives or moral standards" (Bandura, 1990, p.3). People acquire moral justifications for their violent deeds through restructured moral values; they start to see themselves as fighters against ruthless oppressors with an evil ideology, protectors of cherished values or preservers of world peace (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 1996, p.364). Once the morality of the action is justified, destructive conduct becomes personally and socially acceptable.

Thus, moral justifications play a central role in the selection of counterterrorism measures; justified on the criterion of "grave threat", states may adopt extreme counterterrorist reactions (Bandura, 1990, p.4).

Bandura's study is constructed on a social behaviouristic perspective. This perspective limits his study to mechanisms of moral justification. Building moral justifications and considering a conduct acceptable does not necessarily mean that people perform the conduct. The FARC, for example, provided a moral justification for suicide attacks and tried to resort to it, however, they failed (Horowitz, 2010, p.37). How people operationalize their justifications, how they learn tactics or what factors affect their decision positively or negatively towards the conduct should also be explained. Thus, the whole learning process, particularly learning within the organization, is not studied.

Yilmaz (2009) scrutinizes terrorism from different angles, including a social learning perspective. He takes a sociological approach to analyse and identify the personal characteristics of terrorists. He uses socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, and education to create a sociological terrorist profile in respect to their involvement levels (Yilmaz, 2009, p.5). However, Yilmaz, rather than looking at how terrorist learning occurs, looks at the discrepancies between two groups of arrested terrorists and factors that may have an effect on the probability of arrest. He also finds family association to have a greater effect on involvement in terrorist activities, yet his study does not go beyond the recruitment.

Akers and Silverman (2004, p.21) provide a more relevant application of social learning theory to terrorism. They argue that ideologies of TOs do not only justify violence but also provide strong positive definitions and

motivations for violence and acts of terrorism. Terrorists adopt the identity and ideology of the organization that justify killing, destruction and injury. Terrorists, sometimes through tutelage and training, learn that violence for political ends is permitted and rewarded by the organization, leaders and other members. Akers and Silverman's study, similar to that of Bandura (1990), explains how people learn political violence and become terrorists. How people learn certain tactics when they become terrorists or the whole learning process of terrorists, particularly organizational perspectives, is not scrutinized.

In sum, social learning theory has been used in the explanation of terrorism, but it has only been partially applied to terrorist learning. How terrorists learn certain tactics and methods has not been studied. How they learn organized crime is another. This thesis intends to fill the gap in the literature by applying principles of social learning theory to terrorist learning of organized crime.

There are various ways to achieve this task. Matsueda (1982), for example, points out that it is possible to operationalize the theory by "modelling its measurement error structure": focusing on definitions and measuring the ratio of behaviour patterns, rather than measuring the number of "bad companions" (p.491). Another method is to follow the specific order in which the learning occurs (Akers et al., 1979, p.638). For example, in substance use, differential association occurs first. When an individual associates with different groups, the individual becomes exposed to definitions that are learned through imitation and social reinforcement by these groups. Once definitions are learned, they serve as discriminative stimuli for use or abstinence. Differential reinforcement takes place later and the balance of reinforcement

produces initial use. At this stage, “social or non-social reinforces” (Akers et al., 1979, p.638) and “experience” (Akers & Lee, 1996, p.321) determine the probability of the continuity of substance use.

Terrorist learning of organized crime follows the same order. TOs, differentially associating with different entities (other terrorists/TOs, OCG members or other people) that commit organized crime, become exposed to criminal definitions and learn criminal and anti-criminal patterns, including knowledge, skills, and techniques. When they start justifying organized crime, anticipating relatively greater reward and less punishment, they start committing the crime. The thesis follows this order and explains how terrorists learn organized crime.

Differential Association

There are different modes of association between TOs and the source entities (Lesser et al., 1999; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008; Kenney, 2008). Jackson (2001; 2004) for example, focuses on the structure types of TOs. He remarks that TOs are adopting “leaderless resistance” and becoming network core (leaderless organizations) structures. These studies focus on network types and their benefits against counterterrorism policies, with less of a concern for associations between these networks.

Matsueda’s (2006, p.14) network structure model, originally formed by Coleman (1990) as a concept of social capital and social ties, is specifically concerned with social interactions and ties among networks. According to the model, there are two types of network structures, open and closed (*Figure 1*). In open network structures, there is less social capital and social control. In open network structures, A and B are linked to C, but they are not linked to each

other. Both A and B can independently influence C, but they cannot engage in joint behaviour. Contrary to open network structures, closed network structures enable greater social capital and social control. In closed network structures, A and B are not only linked to each other but also to C, therefore, A and B can independently or jointly influence C.



Figure 1. Matsueda's (2006, p.14) model of open and closed network structures.

Both network structure models need to be revised. Firstly, this model presents only one dimension of influence among entities, namely primary influencers, such as A and B. While establishing influence on C, A and B themselves are influenced by secondary influencers such as D, E, F and G. Therefore, influences of other entities (D, E, F, G) on primary influencers also affect the level of influence on C. Secondly, the model considers only "direct" links and overlooks the "indirect" influences. Even though A and B are not directly linked in open structure, they can influence each other indirectly and it may eventually influence C. Thirdly, even though the model uses the word 'social', it does not include the effects of social factors. A and B are different

entities, however, they may act within the same social environment that eventually influences both under the same or very similar social factors.

This thesis develops and uses a hybrid network structure model to explain associations among entities (*Figure 2*). In this model associations are built among 'association nodes', also described as 'gatekeepers' (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.132; Ball, 2013, p.9), the 'knowledge connection' (Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Jackson, 2006, p.243) or "change agents" (Ackerman, 2010, p.67). Association nodes, in addition to definitions, "share their observations and experiences" (Inkpen, 1998a, p.226; Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Inkpen, 2000, p.1021). They represent entities; individuals and/or groups (organizations). Associations among entities occur at inter-personal, intra-group, inter-group, inter-organizational and intra-organizational levels. There may be a cross-association between entities. For example, an individual may associate with a group or an organization may associate with an individual.



Figure 2. Hybrid Networks: Open network structure (A-B- F-G) and closed network structure (A-B-C-D)

The number of associations that one entity may have is not limited; one entity may have numerous links. All these entities participate in and contribute

to a social mechanism that influences each one in turn. Consequently, the network structure model of social ties and associations developed here represent a continuous learning mechanism.

'Influence' in the hybrid network structure model refers to all phases of learning; acquisition and transition of definitions and the criminal knowledge that the influencer possesses, disseminates and reinforces. It occurs at varying degrees. Definitions acquired through the primary association group that includes family and peer groups, spouses, relatives, members of the same division of the organization, etc., create stronger influence than the secondary group that includes neighbours, religious leaders, teachers, work groups, members of other OCGs and TOs, and reference groups that comprise of other social groups, including virtual groups (mass media and the Internet), etc. (Akers & Silverman, 2004, p.20; Brams, Mutlu & Ramirez, 2006, p.705; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.325). Consequently, there is a 'hierarchy of influence' among association groups.

Individual level associations occur through the primary and secondary association groups. Studies that focus on radicalization confirm the role of association groups. Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann and Feddes (2016), in their study on radicalization, explain that radicalization is likely to depend on association groups because of the strong influence these groups have on individuals. Gill, Lee, Rethemeyer, Horgan & Asal (2014), on the other hand, study the determinants of network connections in the PIRA and focus on the concept of "homophily" in the networks (p.3). They note that individuals prefer relationships with similar others. The PIRA networks, for example, comprise of relationships based on involvement in a PIRA activity

together, friends, blood relatives, and marriage. They find further evidence that "those engaged in kidnapping, robbery, hijacking, and/or drug smuggling are much more likely to share a connection with peers engaged in the same activity" (p.28).

The influence and transition of definitions may occur from different directions and from different sources (Brams, Mutlu & Ramirez, 2006, p.705). A terrorist/TO, in association with a criminal/OCG (primary association), not only acquires and learns from that criminal/OCG directly, but also acquires and learns indirectly from other terrorists/TOs or criminals/OCGs with whom the primarily associated criminal/OCG associates (secondary association). Similarly, definitions and knowledge from a terrorist/TO can be acquired directly, and from other terrorists/TOs or criminals/OCGs indirectly that the primarily associated terrorist/TO associates with.

Applied to TOs, it may be stated that a terrorist or TO (A) is influenced by its direct links with other terrorists/TOs (B) and/or organized crime members/OCGs (C) (*Figure 2*). It can also be expressed that a terrorist or TO (A) is influenced by its indirect links with other terrorists/TOs (X, Y, Z, etc.) and organized crime members/OCGs (D). F and G, on the other hand, influence each other through their direct links (A and B). Through these direct and indirect links, a terrorist/TO becomes exposed to criminal definitions and knowledge.

There are three possible association modes: a TO may associate only with its kind (*autogamic association);* only with the other kind (*allogamous association*) or with both kinds (*multiple associations*). These association modes are not strictly formed. TOs in one type may later be classified in another type in different periods. The PKK, for instance, was in the allogamous

association in its founding stage, but later moved to multiple associations. The German Revolutionary Cells (RZ), on the other hand, was in autogamic association mode when the RZ associated with the PFLP for years. German terrorists realized the differences between their agendas and the association was soon ceased (Rapoport, 2002; 2004, p.59).

Autogamic Association:

TOs prefer to associate with ideologically similar organizations (Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016, p.21). Because of their political purposes and strong dedication to these goals, they may refrain from getting into contact with OCGs. Moreover, fear of decreasing their political capital, recruitment or member distraction may also drive TOs away from OCGs (Higgins & Kilpatrick, 2005, p.334; Makarenko, 2005, p.191; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.391). The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) is one of these. The EZLN has kept itself away from organized crime and OCGs in the fear of eroding the EZLN's foreign support which provides crucial licit financial and political capital (Dishman, 2001; Cornell, 2005, p.755).

OCGs in this association mode, on the other hand, may refrain from establishing contact with TOs. Nationalistic affiliates, risks associated with contacting states' avowed enemies, the risk of deteriorating relationships with officials, politicians, etc., may steer some of the OCGs away from TOs (Picarelli, 2012, p.4). Therefore, they may limit their associations to OCGs only. Some OCGs in Turkey, for instance, possess nationalist affiliates. They have kept themselves away from making business with the PKK (P.C. 1, 2012; P.C. 3, 2012; P.C. 4, 2012). Some of them extorted and even killed members of other OCGs that associated with the PKK.

Allogamous Association:

TOs may refrain from associating with other TOs because of the "potential costs" such as a lack of trust, fear of additional enemies, and increased security risks (Ackerman, Zhuang &Weerasuriya, 2016, p.3). They may also have antagonistic attitudes towards other TOs and they may only associate with OCGs that they feel superior to or that are not a 'threat'. They may see other TOs as competitors and try to eliminate them, or at least refrain from contact with them.

Competition for membership may also cause antagonistic attitudes (Schillinger, 2016, 344; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016, p.12). Aum Shinrikyo, for instance, fought with other religious organizations in Japan and attempted to assassinate members of two rival religious organizations (Parachini, 2005, p.15). The PKK, on the other hand, before beginning its terrorist campaign against the Turkish state, focused on other Kurdish TOs and eliminated every one of them (Cagaptay, 2007). Elimination of other TOs strengthened the PKK's position in the region and gave it a monopoly over political capital. However, Turkish Hezbollah which hopes to influence the same Kurdish population with religious motivations came on the scene later and the PKK, after fighting with the Turkish Hezbollah for years, made an agreement with it to end hostilities under the auspices of the Iranian intelligence organization, SAVAMA (Mango, 2005, p.65).

The PKK, while eliminating other Kurdish TOs, established contacts with OCGs, particularly with heroin and contraband smuggling groups that are active in the region where the PKK possesses a monopoly. The SL, similar to the PKK, also competed with other TOs. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Movement (MRTA) was active in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru where the SL aimed to gain control. The SL, eliminating the MRTA, acquired the control of the valley (Palmer, 2007, p.200).

OCGs, on the other hand, may refrain from associating with other OCGs. They may see other criminal groups as rivals and use 'systemic violence' against other OCGs for market share and territory control (Goldstein, 1986, p.513; Pryce, 2012, p.101). The Tambov and Kazan criminal gangs in Russia, for example, have performed the most severe systemic violence against each other in the 1990s (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.15). D-Company group is another. The Group used violence against other OCGs. D-Company eliminated all other local gangs and leaders (Lal, 2005, p.297).

Multiple Associations:

This type of association is the most prevalent among TOs and OCGs. TOs and OCGs in this mode associate with both their kind and the other simultaneously. Organizations in this mode may still demonstrate characteristics of others in autogamic and/or allogamous modes. They may associate with their kinds and the other or they may refrain from contact with certain groups of their kind or the other. A TO, for example, may refrain from associations with OCGs in certain locations, but may associate with others outside of those locations.

Some TOs, in spite of the secret nature of their activities, made their associations known to the public. The ETA, for example, announced in 1972 that they would cooperate with TOs operating in other countries (Gurses, 2007, p.54; Comas, Shrivastava & Martin, 2014, p.6). The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front (DHKP/C) in Turkey and the PFLP also published joint

statements (Mango, 2005, p.24). The PKK and ASALA are other examples. They announced a declaration of cooperation in Lebanon in 1980. Some ASALA members even joined the PKK when they fought with Turkish Military troops in 1983 and 1984 (Gunter, 1991, p.21). These TOs associated with OCGs at the same time.

The FARC has associated with the ETA, the JRA in Japan and the IRA (Forero, 2001; Engel & Cowan, 2002; Jackson, 2004, p.17; Sanderson, 2004, p.54; Naim, 2006, p.79; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.57; Forest, 2008, p.272; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.4). At the same time, the FARC has had close contacts with OCGs such as Mexican cartels and Russian OCGs (Naim, 2006, p.75). The Ostaiza Brothers, for instance, were the association node of the FARC and Mexican traffickers for tons of cocaine seized by Ecuadoran Police (Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.36). The Russian OCGs are others that the FARC associates with. Russian OCGs have provided arms and technological equipment for the FARC, in exchange for cocaine (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.82).

The FARC did not hesitate to create associations with its enemy, the AUC, for the sake of their drug business. The FARC controlled the cultivation areas while the AUC controlled the rivers and transportation routes of drugs. The Colombian military has interdicted various joint drug transportation operations of the FARC, the AUC and OCGs. In an operation in 2004, the Colombian military captured the chief financial officer of the FARC's southern bloc and they found emails in her laptop asking the AUC to lend a helicopter to transport arms and drugs through the jungle (Isacson, cited in Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.100).

The Red Brigades in Italy are another that associated with TOs and OCGs. Five Red Brigade members, for instance, were arrested with arms and plans to assassinate a senior Italian officer in Paris probably in cooperation with the German RAF in 1989. During the investigation, the ANO's cooperation was also detected. It was not the first disclosure of the association between the Red Brigades and the ANO (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.22). In another case, three members of the Red Brigades and a member of the ANO were arrested with plans to attack Israeli and American diplomats in Rome in 1990 (Jamieson, 1994, p.15). It has been claimed that senior members of the Red Brigades have also had contact with an OCG, headed by Illich Ramirez Sanchez, "Carlos the Jackal" (Weinberg, 2007, p.41).

The IRA has interacted with other TOs such as the ETA, the PLO, the Red Brigades and the RAF (O'Brien, 1983, p.103; Wilkinson, 1983, p.120; Jimenez, 1993, p.112; Shabad & Ramo, 1995, p.444; Forest, 2008, p.272). The IRA, for instance, acquired weapons from the ETA in exchange for technology and training (Jackson et al, 2005, p.120). Associations between the DHKP/C and the ETA (Mango, 2005, p.24), the PLO and the United Red Army of Japan, the German RZ, the AD in France and the ASALA (Jenkins, 1974b p.8; Pluchinsky, 1982, p.58; Clutterbuck, 1990, p.62; Richardson, 2000, p.217; Rapoport, 2002; Rapoport, 2004, p.59; Mango, 2005, p.12; Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p.239), the AD in France and the RAF in Germany (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.62) are other examples of TOs in the multiple associations mode.

Examples are abundant. The Organization of the Armed Arab Struggle and the Lebanese Revolutionary Armed Fractions, for example, associated with each other to achieve the release of a member of the Japanese Red Army from

a French prison (Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, p. 247). The Montoneros (*Movimiento Peronista Montonero*-MPM), the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) in a joint operation staged a major guerrilla breakout from Rawson prison in Argentina in 1972 (Gillespie, 1995, p.230). Association among Argentinean, Basque, Canadian, Chilean, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran and Uruguayan TOs is another. The Nicaraguan Police found explosives, weapons and air missiles after responding to an explosion that occurred in an auto repair shop in 1993. The detailed investigation revealed documents of associations among them (Richardson, 2000, p.217). The JI and Al Qaeda are others. They hosted a meeting that brought two of the 9/11 hijackers, 2000 USS *Cole* attackers and some senior Al Qaeda members together in Kuala Lumpur in 2000 (Baker, 2005, p.65).

OCGs, on the other hand, may associate with OCGs and TOs (Longmire & Longmire, 2008, p.36). There are incentives for them to associate with TOs, such as protecting their monopoly on the market and territory, selling their products, etc. In addition, it is the nature of their business to cooperate. TOs are 'customers' for OCGs; providing arms, counterfeit materials, smuggled goods, etc. to TOs is just business (Lal, 2005, p.296; Luna, 2008a).

Examples are numerous. Albanian, Colombian, West African groups, Galician OCGs in Spain, the Calabrian N'Drangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra groups in Italy, for instance, have had connections with Turkish OCGs (Resa-Nestares, 1999, p.48-p.54; Europol, 2009a, p.28-35). Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia shared transportation to minimize the costs of transportation and seizures (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.237). They also had agreements with Russian and Italian OCGs. It is claimed that they had meetings in Prague,

Warsaw and Moscow between 1991 and 1992 (Jamieson, 1994, p.xiv). Cali cartel also had ties to Italy's Cosa Nostra (Cesoni, 1999, p.162; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.73).

The Russian OCGs, on the other hand, performed money laundering operations for Mexican drug traffickers while the Colombian traffickers acquired technological equipment from the Russian OCGs. They obtained parts of a Russian submarine, and later, learning from the LTTE, they started to build their own homemade semi-submersibles (Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.41). All these OCGs associated with TOs simultaneously.

Iraqi OCGs associate with TOs in Iraq. They seize foreigners and sell them to TOs (Wilkinson, 2006, p.117). OCGs in Colombia act together with TOs in kidnapping: OCGs kidnap victims and TOs hide the victims in rural areas where it is almost impossible to find and rescue them (Rubio, 2004, p.11). Associations exist between Cypriot OCGs in the UK and the PKK for heroin smuggling (Gurses, 2007, p.75), drug and cigarette smuggling OCGs and the PIRA (Horgan, 2005, p.111), D-Company and religious TOs in India, the Neapolitan Camorra in Italy with the ETA and the GIA in Algeria (Horgan, 2005, p.ix) are others.

There are various factors that affect the associations: political, social, economic conditions, strength of law enforcement agencies, size of the networks of organizations, structure, etc. Geographical conditions also affect TOs' modes of association. A number of TOs and OCGs may be active in a region or country at the same time, but sometimes there may be only one type of organization, or at least dominance of one type. All these factors are studied

separately in Chapter 7 where the thesis discusses the role of various variables on the level of association.

Definitions

TOs, by differentially associating with others, become exposed to definitions favourable to certain modes of behaviour (Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016, p.56). The learning, in addition to definitions, includes criminal knowledge, skills and techniques. TOs, associating with different entities (other terrorists, OCG members and/or other people) that commit organized crime, become exposed to criminal definitions and learn criminal and anti-criminal patterns, including knowledge, skills and techniques.

Killing human beings generates publicity and increases the recruitment of TOs (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p.438). It is the apex of violence a TO may reach. TOs justify this type of violence because they consider every possible way 'ethical' if it serves their agendas (Fleming, 1980, p.13; Kaplan, 2005; Gurses, 2007, p.15). Mustafa Karasu, aka Okkes, is one of the PKK leaders who was once arrested for robbery and attempted murder (KOM Archives). He gives clues as to how every kind of action is justified: "Kurds do not have any state or laws that they can obey. We use every method as long as we are slaves" (cited in Gurses, 2007, p.74). Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, a Jihadist leader, on the other hand, justified the killing of Muslims who do not engage in Jihad efforts by defining those as "pseudo-Muslims" that ally with infidels (Matthias & Huehn, 2016, p. 232). ISIS, on the other hand, adopted a similar definition and declared all opponents "unbelievers" (Holbrook, 2015, p.98). Such definitions indicate that TOs may not have barriers to possess definitions favourable to a variety of activities, including organized crime, especially when they can justify killings.

Definitions favourable to terrorism include the denial of the victim, denial of responsibility and/or appeal to higher loyalty (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667). These definitions either concern specific offenses or a class of offences. A definition favourable to suicide attack, for example, may include all these definition types. Mahmoud Ahmed Marmush, a suicide attacker, gave the following statement:

> the Palestinian people are encountering the cruellest times, enduring daily killings, bombardment, displacement, and the most extreme forms of violence. Everyday its suffering increases. A group must rise to sacrifice itself and strive in the path of God to defend its honour and its people. (Hafez, 2006, p.75)

Definitions favourable to organized crime, on the other hand, are numerous. Benson and Decker (2010, p.136) interviewed 35 inmates that were heavily involved in high-level drug smuggling. Respondents stated that they "wanted more money" or they "just really didn't care about anything". An incident in Uludere, Turkey provides a good example of how organized crime may turn into social habits and historical tradition through "social facilitation" that makes activities "justifiable" (Crenshaw, 1981, p.382). On the 28th of December 2011, Turkish military forces mistook smugglers for terrorists and 35 people died in an airstrike. One of the survivors gave the following statement to the press: "Smuggling is my job, our fathers have done it, our grandfathers had done it, and even our ancestors had done it. It is a tradition that continues for centuries. I do not have any other job" ("Uludere olayını anlattı", 2012).

Some OCG members in Turkey possess definitions that make heroin business religiously and morally justifiable. In spite of the fact that Islam clearly

prohibits dealing with addictive substances, they justify selling drugs only to buyers that assure their sale to non-Muslims abroad. One such heroin smuggler even arranged the transportation of heroin when he was in Mecca as a pilgrim who is supposed to stay away from such religiously forbidden activities (P.C. 7, 2013). The definition favourable to heroin smuggling for those 'pious' heroin smugglers is "I am not selling it to Muslims" (P.C. 3, 2012; P.C. 12, 2014).

TOs become exposed to definitions favourable to a variety of criminal activities (Rosato, 2016, p.21). For example, Carlos Marighella, in his *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, justified bank robberies as a means to acquire funds (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.3). His followers and many other terrorists inspired by Marighella became exposed to criminal patterns. The RAF provided similar definitions favourable to criminal activities. They encouraged bank robberies in justification of solving "logistics problems" that could "secure the continuity of the revolutionary organizations" (Jackson, 2001, p.29). Similarly, the PKK encouraged members to find money "by all means" (P.C. 14, 2012; P.C. 15, 2012; P.C. 17, 2013). Members started to engage in smuggling activities to raise money.

Personal motivations may be different from the ideology of TOs (Merari, 1999, p.59). Some individuals that possess definitions in favour of material gains may join TOs. Those members who join TOs may pursue profit, expose other members to their definitions and divert the activities of TOs towards organized crime. One Kenyan al-Shabaab member, for instance, states:

> It was all about the money […] I was jobless. And then when al-Shabaab came with that huge money and they're giving you that for free, you just have to join them. Most of these youths in Kenya, they're joining al-

Shabaab not because of jihad or Islam, it's because of that money. (as cited in Roberts, 2016, p.15)

Other examples of terrorist definitions favourable to organized crime are as follow: Mohammed Rasul Akhundzada, the elder brother of Mullah Nasim, one of the major resistance leaders in Afghanistan during 1980s, said "We must grow and sell opium to fight our holy war against the Russian nonbelievers" (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.116). Years later, Baz Mohammad, a Taliban-linked narco-terrorist extradited to the US from Afghanistan, provided similar definitions for both terrorism and crime. He said that, "selling heroin in the U.S.A. was a Jihad because they were taking the Americans' money at the same time the heroin they were paying for was killing them" (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2005). Linking activities to a sacred purpose is used as a means of justifying organized crime activities and terrorism. Consequently, other members and affiliated TOs become exposed to those definitions.

Definitions in favour of terrorism and organized crime are disseminated by open and closed-circuit knowledge sources, such as videos, books, manuals, etc. For example, the LTTE makes martyr videos in which they record their preparations and attacks. They record every moment of their suicide attacks (Pape, 2006, p.27). Al Qaeda also has similar videos; the "All Religion Will be for Allah" video is Al Qaeda's famous suicide training video (Forest, 2006c, p.97). Terrorists learn how to increase the impact of an explosion, how to prepare suicide vests, etc. from these videos (Forest, 2006c, p.93; Hafez, 2007). More importantly, definitions in favour of suicide attacks are disseminated by the videos.

The media help TOs to gain publicity, legitimacy, recruit new members and disseminate their cause (Dobkin, 2005, p.128), therefore, most TOs have their own TV channels, newspapers, radio broadcasts, etc. In addition, media is used as a tool to disseminate definitions, knowledge and techniques and to provide vicarious reinforcement (Pitcher, Hamblin & Miller, 1978, p.24; Schmid, 1993b, p.22; Pech, 2003, p.61; Pech & Slade, 2005, p.47; Combs, 2006, p.139; Forest, 2006b, p.9; Forest, 2008, p.276; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, Schmid, 2016, p. 29). TOs use their media channels to disseminate definitions in favour of certain types of activities. Their media defines terrorists with positive connotations such as freedom fighters, heroes, gunmen, etc. Some activities are defined with heroic labels. Suicide attacks, for example, are defined as 'sacrificing for the nation' or 'honour' and attackers are defined as 'heroes' or 'symbols of freedom'. Videos of suicide attackers are broadcasted to strengthen the influence of these definitions. Thus, the media is used to disseminate definitions favourable to acts against states. Brutal images of state operations against the political capital of TOs are used to strengthen those definitions.

Some programmes broadcasted through TOs' media draw attention to the alleged alliances between states and OCGs with nationalist views and accuse them of organized crime, particularly drug smuggling. These programmes direct the attention to the income states allegedly generate. Officers from the KOM Department, for example, state that such programmes have a purpose: it is a "secret way of negatively directing people to organized crime" (P.C. 1, 2012; P.C. 3, 2012; P.C. 6, 2013). People acquire definitions such as "States use drug money to kill us, then, we should use it against state".

A similar antagonistic definition favourable to drug smuggling is observed in members of OCGs with nationalistic affiliates. A nationalistic OCG in Turkey engaged in the drug business in order to break the monopoly of the PKK. They believed that becoming a major actor in the business was the only way to cut the PKK's finances and that they were the ones who should take the share from the drug money, not PKK members who use it to break the country into pieces (P.C. 2, 2012; P.C. 9, 2013; P.C. 11, 2013).

In addition to the media, training programmes are used as a tool to disseminate definitions favourable to certain terrorist tactics and the knowledge of those tactics (Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.57; Ryan, Vanderlick & Matthews, 2007, p.5; Forest, 2008, p.273; Combs, 2015, p. 131). There are many examples. The PIRA, for instance, organized cross-training programmes among its cells within groups (Forest, 2006b, p.19). It maintained engineering, training and education departments to perform training programmes (Jackson et al, 2005, p.119). The FARC also arranged standard three-month courses for training on new weapons and techniques (Ortiz, 2006, p.212). The LTTE, on the other hand, provided scuba trainings to its members for naval suicide attacks (Forest, 2006b, 21). These programmes provided definitions, the knowledge, skills, techniques, expertise and vicarious reinforcement. They also strengthened existing definitions.

The role of training programmes may be observed in the FARC's shift towards urban terrorism (Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.207). The FARC members, being exposed to definitions favourable to urban terrorism, started to learn the knowledge required (Ortiz, 2006, p.213). The FARC received training from the IRA (Ranstorp & Brun, 2013). Three IRA members, two most senior

explosives experts and Sinn Fein's political representative in Cuba, were arrested in Colombia for aiding the FARC in designing gas-cylinder bombs (Forero, 2001; Engel & Cowan, 2002; Sanderson, 2004, p.54; Forest, 2006b, p.17; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.57). The chief of the Colombian army, General Fernando Tapias, told that at least four more IRA members came to Colombia to train the FARC members (Engel & Cowan, 2002). The IRA was transmitting its knowledge on bomb-making techniques and urban guerrilla warfare tactics to the FARC (Horgan, 2005, p.112; Forest, 2008, p.272; Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.207). After 1998, the FARC began to use improvised mortars, using gas cylinders filled with explosives, booby traps in houses where searches would be conducted, mortar grenades detonated by remote controls, etc., very similar to the ones used by the IRA. Definitions towards urban terrorism, techniques and materials used are learned from the IRA (Ortiz, 2006, p.213; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.244).

TOs use camps for training purposes. Training camps act as 'centres of association': terrorists do not only meet with other members and learn definitions and the knowledge, but also obtain expertise and vicarious reinforcement (Baker, 2005, p.79; Kenney, 2006, p.33; 2009, p. 19; 2010a, p.184; Forest, 2008, p.279; Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016, p.2). Training subjects and materials in these camps are abounded. Operation Crevice, Britain's largest undercover counterterrorism investigation that began in 2004, disclosed the role and types of training available, ranging from how to use variety of weapons to how to make fertilizer-based explosives (Sciolino & Grey, 2006; Kenney, 2008, p.48). Expertise in criminal activities is also

developed (Hamm, 2005, p.10). In addition, definitions favourable to certain methods and tactics are disseminated to other participants.

Some TOs have their own training camps. Members of the RAF in Germany for example used their training camps in Dresden, East Germany to learn techniques of terrorism and assassination (Wilkinson, 1994b, p.197). Other TOs attend joint programmes in others' camps. For example, the PFLP, the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the PKK and the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) trained in camps in Syria (Cordes et al., 1984, p.vi; Gunter, 1991, p.17; Forest, 2006c, p.86; Gergin, Duru, Cetin, 2015, p.220). The IRA, the Basque separatist ETA, Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Colombia's 19th of April Movement (M-19), the ASALA and many others received training in the Seven April training camp in Libya (Shabad & Ramo, 1995, p.444; Forest, 2008, p.277; Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016). PIRA members also took part in training activities with Palestinian organizations (Horgan, 2005, p.115). Regional militant religious groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) shared training facilities with the JI (Baker, 2005, p.64). During those trainings, members of each organization created associations with others and became exposed to different definitions and knowledge. Some of them even perpetrated joint operations (Clutterbuck, 1993, p.270; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009, p.742). For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Christian Phalange together committed bank robberies and acquired $100 million in Beirut in 1976 (Rapoport, 2004, p.57).

Another purpose of the training camps is to bring veterans and new recruits together. It provides opportunities for vicarious reinforcement. Definitions and knowledge are transferred from veterans to new recruits in camps (Jackson et al, 2005, p.137; Hegghammer; 2006, p.46; Forest, 2008, p.281; Kenney, 2008, p.75; 2009, p.19; 2010a, p.184; Matthias & Huehn, 2016, p. 229). One of the PKK bombing experts, alias "Doctor", for example, was living in Turkey. He was an expert in planting bombs in the fuel tanks of vehicles. After preparing 4 different cars that exploded in different cities throughout Turkey, he went to Kandil camp. He trained at least 5 PKK members in the camp. Those trainees also received training on stealing cars, faking car plate licences, etc. Recently, there have been numerous bomb attacks in Turkey and law enforcement officers believe that those trained members are responsible for the attacks (P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18-19, 2014).

The trends in terrorism signify a shift towards urban terrorism which is a milieu that is not consistent with the training available in regular terrorist training camps (Kenney, 2008, p.18). Moreover, training programmes in camps may create a security loop by attracting the attention of security services (Jackson et al, 2005, p.119). Consequently, TOs have begun to avoid training camps recently and most of them no longer exist (Forest, 2006c, p.86). However, it should be noted here that TOs have not abandoned training camps totally. The PKK, for instance, established training camps in Europe (Cagaptay, 2007). PKK members received training "to prepare for the armed struggle of the PKK in Turkey" in Liempde, the Netherlands, until Dutch police forces shut down the camp and arrested 29 terrorists in 2004 (Jonsson & Cornell, 2008). Moreover, the PKK, while negotiating with the Turkish government for a

peaceful end, moved most of its resources into cities. Most PKK members have started to receive training in camps located in cities and areas close to cities (P.C. 15, 2012; P.C. 17, 2013).

TOs have started to focus on the Internet as an alternative to risky training camps. Although some TOs may have concerns about the Internet because of security and message control concerns (Ramsay, 2016), it has become one of the most important means of training for TOs (Forest, 2006c, p.96; Atran, 2006, p.135; Nacos, 2009; Stenersen, 2013, p.28). It provides "a new vehicle for organizational learning and adaptation and improving the terrorists' ability to achieve strategic objectives" (Forest, 2006b, p.17). The online manual of Al Qaeda, *Al-Battar*, explains the role of the Internet profoundly:

> Oh mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps, you don't have to travel to other lands. Alone, in your home or with a group of your brothers, you too can begin to execute the training program. You can all join the Al-Battar Training Camp. (Weimann, 2006, p.110)

Some researchers argue that the Internet's role in learning is limited (Ackerman, 2010, p.72). Kenney (2009; 2010b), for example, strongly opposes the role of the Internet in learning activities that require tacit knowledge or "*techne*". Building his expertise upon his fieldwork focused on Islamic militancy in Britain and Spain, he provides numerous examples of terrorists that fail to successfully learn from the Internet because of the lack of practical knowledge and misinformation. However, in another study of his (2010c), he mentions numerous basic errors of those terrorists and concludes that the terrorists that he studies are "dumb" yet deadly. Therefore, judging those

terrorists' abilities and concluding that the Internet is not a tool of practical knowledge learning may be misleading. It still stands true that members of TOs need to engage in vicarious learning to achieve practical knowledge, but some exceptional terrorists may be good learners with better research abilities and terrorist skills. Depending on the degree of the tacitness, open source materials may be sufficient for them to learn the tacit knowledge (Chennamaneni & Teng, 2011, Panahi, Watson & Partridge, 2013, p.383), especially if they have prior knowledge and experience on the subject. For example, Adman Osman Khatib in the 2006 transatlantic liquid bomb plot had received training in Pakistan and used Internet resources to learn the properties of hexamine and hydrogen peroxide (Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.144). Stenersen (2013), on the other hand, provides examples of terrorists that managed to acquire tacit knowledge of bomb making from the Internet by their own efforts. Learning from the Internet may limit the quality of learning, but they may still learn. Nesser and Stenersen (2014), for example, find variations of technical sophistication in bombings in Europe; in some cases, methods are becoming simpler because of the recipes available on the Internet.

Many people become exposed to definitions favourable to terrorism through the Internet (Kenney, 2010b; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p.41; Stenersen, 2013, p.27; Nesser & Stenersen, 2014, p.2; Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen, 2016). The exposure is higher when terrorists use an interactive way of communication through the new social media (Pauwels & Schils, 2016, p.21). In addition, Rothenberger, Müller and Elmezeny (2016) examine the role of the Internet in the construction of terrorist group identity and find that TOs disseminate their definitions through the Internet not only by texts but also by

pictures, videos, etc. These materials are used for indoctrination, recruitment and vicarious reinforcement (Holt, 2012, p.341). In addition, by these definitions, TOs aim to discredit their opponents and to create an identity. ISIS, for example, uses the Internet effectively for this purpose (Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen, 2016). They have established a media branch that disseminates and promotes definitions on the Internet (Lopez, 2016, p.69).

Members of TOs also become exposed to definitions favourable to organized crime through the Internet (Matthias & Huehn, 2016, p. 231). TOs prepare web sites, forums, chat rooms, online manuals, videos, etc. Materials are easily accessible and trainings are abundant. Criminal activities, such as forgery, illegal entrance to countries, preparing false IDs, passports, etc. are covered in those materials (P.C. 18-19, 2014).

Those who already possess definitions, on the other hand, use the Internet to develop expertise (Cronin, 2003, p. 48; Stenersen, 2013). For example, David Copeland, a neo-Nazi terrorist who killed 3 people and injured 139 in London in 1999, admitted that he learned techniques of bomb making from the Internet (Weimann, 2006, p.120). Mohammed Momin Khawaja, a computer programmer, disseminated his definitions favourable to bomb attacks on the Internet. He taught bomb making techniques to a group of people that he met online. He was later arrested in Canada in 2004 for participating in a transatlantic plot to bomb targets in Canada and London (Forest, 2006b, p.17).

Correctional institutions, particularly prisons, are settings where members of TOs come together behind walls (Forest, 2008, p.273; Kule & Gul, 2015, p.25). Even though there are discrepancies among findings on the role of prisons in terrorism, particularly recruitment (Cuthbertson, 2004; Lal, 2005;

Cilluffo, Lane, Cardash, Saathoff, Raynor, Magarik, Whitehead, Bogis & Lohr, 2006; Hamm, 2007), the role prisons play in learning is well documented (Kenney, 2008, p.83).

TOs use prisons as training centres; experienced members pass on their definitions favourable to certain tactics and their expertise to others (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.16; P.C. 4, 2012; P.C. 13, 2014; P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 19, 2014). For instance, the IRA members who later formed the core of the PIRA in the 1970s were imprisoned together with members of the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in England in the 1950s. EOKA members passed their expertise on to the IRA in countering counterterrorism; the IRA learned to restructure their organization (Jackson et al, 2005, p.120; English, 2013, p.501). The imprisoned IRA members also transmitted valuable knowledge to other inmates and IRA members outside; they were immediately debriefed by other inmates and useful information on how they were caught, what questions they were asked, what officers were looking for, etc. were transferred out of the prisons (Forest, 2006c, p.75; Kenney, 2006, p.43; Forest, 2008, p.281).

The PKK is another TO that uses prisons as professional training centres. The organization deliberately forces new recruits to participate in activities such as joining violent demonstrations, or throwing stones and Molotov cocktails (Kaymak, 2012). These activities hasten their falling out with the law. It thus decreases the probability of disengagement from the organization (P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 19, 2014; P.C. 21, 2014). These participants confront short-term imprisonment risks. When they are imprisoned, they are immediately taken to ‘prison training’ where they are exposed to definitions favourable to violent

acts. When they are released, they become “real terrorists”: “A rookie terrorist walks out of prison as a pro”. (P.C.17, 2013; P.C. 19, 2014).

Prisons bring members of different organizations together under the same roof. The shared settings facilitate associations among inmates from different backgrounds. In Turkey, for instance, convicted terrorists and criminals mostly stay in the same correctional institutions where they find opportunities for association that lead to learning and recruitment (Picarelli et al, 2005, p.54; P.C. 10, 2013; P.C. 13, 2014; P.C. 19, 2014).

Even though learning in prisons may remain limited to theoretical learning because inmates may not receive vicarious learning opportunities behind walls, prisons provide opportunities for associations. Some OCG members stated that they met with PKK members in the prisons and continued to associate with them after they were released (KOM Archives). They used terrorists’ network to compete with rivalry groups and to reach out to new contacts for the supply and market selling of heroin both in source and consumption countries. For example, some heroin smugglers admitted that they applied to the PKK to solve their disputes with other OCGs (KOM Archives). Moreover, some of them acquired acid anhydride, a precursor used in heroin production, through terrorist channels in Europe and Russia (P.C. 2, 2012; P.C. 5, 2012; P.C. 8, 2013). In some cases, terrorists introduced them to heroin suppliers in Iran. In other cases, some of the terrorists became part-time heroin smugglers who supplied the drugs and arranged for the transportation. (P.C. 1, 2012; P.C. 2, 2012; P.C. 5, 2012).

These explanations also apply to correction facilities in other countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom where terrorists come into contact with

petty criminals (Kenney, 2008, p.83). Aftab Ansari, for example, was an ordinary criminal until he met Sayed Omar Sheikh, one of the financial supporters of 9/11 attacks, in prison. He was exposed to radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs and definitions favourable to both terrorism and crime. After he was released from prison, Ansari kidnapped Partha Roy Burman, an Indian shoe manufacturer, for $830,000 in ransom. Ansari sent $100,000 to the Sheikh who later sent the money to Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 attackers (Lal, 2005, p.298).

Jamal Ahmidan and Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Christian mineworker, are other examples. They were arrested and imprisoned for drug offences (Kenney, 2009, p.20). They were exposed to definitions favourable to radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs and terrorism in prison (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.15). After they were released, they used criminal activities to finance the Madrid bombings. While Suarez Trashorras, Ahmidan, Ansari and others were exposed to definitions favourable to terrorism in prisons, they disseminated their own definitions, including of criminal activities, to their associates.

Some members strictly limit their activities to one organization's goal, but others may feel attached to more than one organization. In such situations, poly-membership, a concomitant involvement of a terrorist in organized crime or an organized crime perpetrator in terrorism, occurs (Forest, 2008, p.281). Poly-membership is common among TOs. For example, Action Directe (AD) in France and the LARF in Lebanon had dual members and both organizations were discovered to be involved in terrorist attacks perpetrated by dual members

(Cordes et al., 1984, p.28). The PKK and ASALA are others that have incorporated poly-members (Gunter, 1991, p.21).

TOs and OCGs also consist of poly-members. Some members of OCGs may feel sympathetic or attached to the political ideologies of TOs. Statements of some arrested drug producers and smugglers indicate that they politically and financially support the PKK (KOM Archives). These members serve as association nodes between two organizations. They become exposed to definitions favourable to both terrorism and organized crime and cross-disseminate them to others.

Exchanged members transmit various definitions from their original organization to their new ones. The migration of terrorists from one area to another performs the most important form of such transmission (Forest, 2006b, p.13). Members of Al Qaeda affiliated organizations, for instance, have gone to Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechenia, Afghanistan, etc. They have transmitted all of their definitions, knowledge, skills and techniques to each organization they have affiliated with.

Differential Reinforcement

TOs, being exposed to definitions favourable to organized crime through association, learn those definitions, knowledge, skills and techniques. The reinforcement they positively or negatively receive determines the outcome: when they are reinforced positively towards organized crime and start to anticipate relatively greater reward or less punishment they start justifying organized crime. Eventually, they model the behaviour and commit organized crime.

Terrorists are exposed to strong organizational reinforcement. Through the reinforcement, the bonds between the organization and its members are strengthened (Hofmann & Dawson, 2014, p.351; Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann & Feddes; 2016, p.8) and a collective identity is created (Vignoles, Schwartz & Luyckx, 2011, p.4; Rothenberger, Müller & Elmezeny, 2016). Members start to subordinate their identity to the collective identity. The collective identity, enforced by the rules, norms and routines, drives members towards certain modes of behaviour (Mayntz, 2004, p.13; Fominaya, 2010, p.398). Recruits and members start to consider those modes acceptable (Ryan, Vanderlick & Matthews, 2007, p.4).

Rewards and punishments are used for organizational reinforcement (Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p.299; Schillinger, 2016, 335). Assassinations are a common form of punishment in TOs. For example, PKK members who do not operationalize organizational definitions, routines or decisions are assassinated (Criss, 1995, p.19; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.9; Mango, 2005, p.34; Cagaptay, 2007). More than 10,000 members of the PKK have been assassinated since 1974 (Soylemez, 2012). Semdin Sakık, a former high ranking member of the PKK, stated that Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, first shot 'the Kurds' and that he was responsible for killing more than 2000 PKK members who are buried in the Bekaa valley. They were labelled as 'moles, and betrayers' by Abdullah Ocalan ("Sakık PKK infazlarını", 2012). Kani Yılmaz who left the organization to solve the Kurdish issues without violence, was also announced as a traitor. Yılmaz states that demonizing members as traitors is "the standard way in which the organization provides the foundations for individuals to be eliminated" (Mango, 2005, p.51). Aum Shinrikyo in Japan is

another organization that reinforced members by establishing the routine of killing its own members (Parachini, 2005, p.33).

Suicide attacks provide a good example of reinforcement in TOs. A suicide attack involves a complicated process. This includes preparation, training, intelligence and the professional knowledge of explosives (Moghadam, 2006, p.85; Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.2). All these processes are supervised within an organizational framework (Moghadam, 2006, p.92; Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006, p.2; Schweitzer, 2006, p.133).

It is easier for TOs to change young members' definitions in favour of suicide (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.116). They can be easily manipulated (Ramakrishna, 2006, p.224). Therefore, attackers are deliberately chosen from young members on whom the organization can more easily reinforce group norms (Bloom, 2006, p.36). The average age of suicide terrorists for the PKK, for example, is 27 (Merari, cited in Bongar et al. 2007, p.105). The "All Religion Will be for Allah" video of Al Qaeda, for instance, shows suicide attacks in Iraq. Terrorists did not want to hide their faces in that video because they were a "corps of suicide bombers in training" (Forest, 2006c, p. 97). They were all chosen among young members. Consequently, definitions in favour of terrorism, particularly of suicide attacks, can be enforced upon young members.

TOs, being exposed to definitions favourable to organized crime, learn that criminal activities for political ends are permissible and rewarding, start to engage in organized crime. PKK members, for example, being exposed to favourable definitions and encouraged by their leaders to find money "by all means" start to engage in smuggling (P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18, 2014). A group of PKK members, headed by Abdullah Ocalan's brother Osman, aka Ferhat,

started to acquire income from heroin production and smuggling from Iran to Turkey (KOM Archives). They became experts in the production and smuggling of heroin (Ocalan, 1999). Huseyin Baybasin provides another example. He was encouraged and rewarded by the PKK for heroin smuggling. He was imprisoned for smuggling tons of heroin. In one case, he was found to be the principle organizer of a 3.100 kg shipment of heroin in 1992 (KOM Archives). He provided enormous income to the PKK. He was allegedly promoted to the rank of general in the PKK for his services (P.C. 7, 2013; P.C. 8, 2013). These examples confirm such reinforcement inside the organization because members would not dare to act against group norms and the leader in such an organization with a strong punishment system (P.C. 21, 2014).

Another source of reinforcement is association groups. The role of association groups has been emphasized in terrorism studies, particularly in terrorist recruitment (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, 81; Hegghammer, 2006, p.49; Yılmaz, 2009; Frisch, 2011, p.5). For example, presence of a member participating in terrorism in a family, among relatives or among friends is likely to result in an increased member participation in terrorism. The primary association groups possess the strongest reinforcement and presents opportunities for observational learning (Kenney, 2010c, p.915). The more individuals associate with terrorists through these association groups, the more they are likely to become involved in terrorism (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, p.81; Frisch, 2011, p.5). Similarly, the more terrorists associate with members of OCGs through these association groups, the more they are likely to engage in organized crime.

Vicarious Reinforcement

Once TOs associate with OCGs, become exposed to definitions, and receive reinforcement, they start to possess an intention towards criminality. However, learning is not completed until they experiment with the behaviour. They need to engage in vicarious reinforcement to complete the process (Gerdes, Ringler, Autin, 2014, p.280).

There is a positive correlation between "hiring" and "learning" (Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003, p.361). TOs outsource experts for activities that they cannot conduct with their own in-house capabilities (Steinitz, 1985, p.143; Homer, 1988, p.205; Clutterbuck, 1990, p.116; Bibes, 2001, p.247; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.52). Hagop Hagopian's fraction of ASALA became contracted killers working closely with Arab terrorists (Mango, 2005, p.12). They sometimes use experts from other TOs and 'shadow facilitators' from OCGs. The facilitators include travel experts, attorneys, corrupt officials, local and regional "fixers", (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.12; P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18, 2014). For example, Victor Bout, an arms trafficker, was caught in Thailand in 2008 and extradited to the USA two years later. He was accused of transporting arms to Al Qaeda and the Taliban and selling surface-to-air missiles, AK-47s, ammunition, C-4 plastic explosives, and unmanned aerial vehicles to agents purporting to be members of the FARC (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.16). He was also involved in contraband smuggling, money laundering and diamond smuggling. Aum Shinrikyo is another organization that outsources experts. They reportedly used a Russian expert to learn how to produce sarin (Parachini, 2005, p.24).

OCGs also outsource. A recent increase in the use of terrorist tactics by OCGs in Colombia is a prime example of such an exchange of knowledge (Dickinson, 2011). Bolivia's cocaine smuggling groups also hired right-wing European terrorists as "enforcers" and "hit men" (Steinitz, 1985, p.143). In all these cases, outsourced individuals worked as association nodes for TOs and helped to distribute definitions and knowledge they possessed throughout the units of TOs. Bout and other facilitators served as association nodes between different organizations and exposed their contacts to vicarious reinforcement.

Individual members of TOs that are assigned to specific tasks, such as supplying weapons, 'taxing' smugglers, or arranging transportation of personnel from one point to another with false passports/identity documents, establish links to members of OCGs (P.C. 19, 2014; P.C. 21, 2014). In these associations, they observe each other's behaviours. If the observed criminal or terrorist behaviour is rewarded by the organization and others, they start to commit the crime.

Moreover, when OCGs pass transfer their contrabands through the territories that TOs control, TOs engage in observational learning by taxing or helping them on the route. Most smugglers in Turkey, for example, pass their 'goods' from the mountainous areas that PKK members regularly control. Thus, most of heroin laboratories in Turkey are detected in the same region. They get permission from the PKK to establish their "factories". During such associations, PKK members learn the 'job' (P.C. 9, 2013; P.C. 10, 2013).

Members coming from the same families have better opportunities for vicarious learning. For example, some members of the PKK and OCGs in Turkey come from the same families. Most members of OCGs arrested with

high quantities of drugs had close family members in the PKK. Some of those arrestees stated that their brothers or uncles were killed in armed conflicts with state forces (KOM Archives). Members of TOs and OCGs that come from the same families disseminated definitions favourable to crime and terrorism and reinforced each other. In such situations, they had a chance to observe each other's behaviour (KOM Archives).

In addition, members of both organizations coming from the same pool establish their associations beginning in their early childhood, particularly in urban ghettos. While one goes down the terrorism path, another chooses the organized crime path. They share the knowledge acquired from both paths (P.C. 3, 2012; P.C. 7, 2013; P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18, 2014).

Observational learning occurs in other ways, as well. Accessing the knowledge through different sources such as videos, the Internet, and manuals, members of TOs learn the methods and tactics of organized crime. They start to experience the knowledge by trial and error. However, it should again be noted that such learning by watching may have limited effectiveness, depending on the experimental knowledge members possess and the degree of tacitness of the knowledge. Such learning, therefore, is limited to less sophisticated crime types such as preparing fake IDs, documents, etc. (P.C. 3, 2012; Gerdes, Ringler, Autin, 2014, p.280).

In sum, social learning theory explains that TOs learn organized crime through association with OCGs. In light of the principles of social learning theory, the thesis provides a statement that explicitly explains the arguments of the theory; how and why terrorist learning of organized crime occurs (Wacker, 1998, p.364; Corley and Gioia, 2011, p.12):

When a terrorist/TO differentially associates directly or indirectly with criminals and/or OCGs and/or other people who espouse favourable definitions of organized crime, when a terrorist/TO is relatively more exposed to salient models of criminal acts, when a terrorist/TO defines it as desirable or justified in a situation discriminative for criminal behaviour, and when a terrorist/TO anticipates relatively greater reward and less punishment for criminal behaviour, that terrorist/TO is more likely to exhibit criminal behaviours.

Conclusion

Social learning theory posits that people learn in association with others. As an application of the principles of the theory to terrorist criminality, the thesis demonstrates that TOs learn criminal activities in association with OCGs. The hybrid network model developed in this thesis demonstrates the modes of associations between TOs and OCGs. It takes learning into consideration and presents how individuals' definitions and behaviours are influenced by these association structures.

Previous chapters explored the learning process that occurs in TOs and demonstrated that TOs, as learning organizations, learn organized crime by association with OCGs: they differentially associate with OCGs, become exposed to definitions in favour of organized crime, anticipate reward for organized crime activities and, eventually, start to commit organized crime.

The principle factor in terrorist learning is association among individual members, units and organizations. Its role has been emphasized by theories and

studies examined in the thesis. The following chapters, therefore, focus on this important point.

CHAPTER 5

TERRORIST CRIMINALITY

This thesis investigates terrorist learning of criminality. Previous chapters explored the learning process that occurs in TOs and demonstrated that TOs, as learning organizations, learn organized crime by association with OCGs: they differentially associate with OCGs, become exposed to definitions in favour of organized crime, anticipate rewards for organized crime activities, and start to commit organized crime. This learning process indicates two important points: associations between organizations and appropriation.

Appropriation, as an outcome of learning, leads to similarity. TOs, learning techniques and tactics of OCGs, start to appropriate OCGs and eventually become similar to OCGs. Focusing on the operational aspects of both phenomena, this chapter first examines actors (TOs and OCGs) by discussing the similarities and differences between them in theory and practice to better understand the appropriation.

In order to provide a better insight into this association, this chapter investigates the organized crime activities of TOs as an outcome of learning in the following sections. It discusses reasons for the use of organized crime by TOs, presents evidence of the terrorist criminality of organized crime and explains reasons for negligence of the relationship by academics and states in spite of its importance and existence for a long time.

Appropriation

TOs and OCGs are effective learners (Martin, 1999, p.25; Berry et al, 2002, p.69; Sanderson, 2004, p.56; Braun, 2008; Longmire & Longmire, 2008, p.40; Dickinson, 2011; Benson & Decker, 2010, p.136). Learning among them depends on similarities and differences, homophily as in the word of Ackerman (2010, p.65) because learning is "jointly determined by the relative characteristics" of teaching and learning organizations (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998, p.462). Similarities between them lead to rapid learning. In addition, similarities ease the appropriation because it is easier for similar organizations to appropriate each other. When appropriation occurs, organizations enter into a mutation period, and depending on the level of appropriation, they become alike. As a result of appropriation, organizations may morph into new organizations. Therefore, examining the level of appropriation among TOs and OCGs by investigating similarities and differences is a crucial step to understand the outcome of terrorist learning and future implications of the learning process.

TOs and OCGs are heterogeneous; there are structural and operational differences between them (Dror, 1983, p.68; Altes, 1993, p.237; Townshend, 1995, p.316; Cesoni, 1999, p.159; Den Boer, 1999, p.14; Vilks & Bergmanis, 1999, p.65; Garrison, 2004, p.272; Silke, 2004b, p.4; Horgan, 2005, p.24; UK Treasury, 2007, p.8). The threat associated with both organizations against states and societies, moreover, changes daily (Sanderson, 2004, p.56). Therefore, it is very difficult to extract generalizations about these groups. In spite of these difficulties, researchers have looked at both organizations and identified similarities and differences between them. Flanigan (2012), for

example, studies Mexican OCGs such as the Fe´lix Organization, the Beltra´n Leyva Organization, the Gulf Cartel, La Familia, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa Cartel, and Middle Eastern TOs such as Hamas. Flanigan finds "striking" similarities between them. These cartels fit into the definition of terrorism except for one difference, motivation, which is blurred in some cases (Flanigan, 2012, p.291).

Others provide more conceptual approaches. Forst (2009, p.14), for example, distinguishes TOs and OCGs in three important aspects; crime type, agenda type and media exposure. Sanderson (2004, p.55), on the other hand, points to three types of differences between them: cultural, operational and practical. This thesis, on the other hand, compares TOs and OCGs at two levels: strategic and tactical. Strategic level comparison looks at structural and organizational features while tactical level comparisons focus on activities and functions of organizations.

Motivation is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the two organizations (Jenkins, 1974b, p.2; Jenkins, 1974c, p.2; Braun, 2008; Forst, 2009, p.14; De Danieli, 2014, p.1). TOs undermine political authorities in order to achieve political ends whereas OCGs have motives for 'pure profit' (Jenkins, 1974b, p.2; Viano, 1999b, p.189; Berry et al., 2002, p.1; Bjornehed, 2004, p.312; Sanderson, 2004, p.55; Picarelli et al.2005, p.34; Kaplan, 2005; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.148). TOs want a change in the *status quo*. Therefore, they may receive support from states ideologically and materially. OCGs, on the contrary, are in support of the *status quo*: they are interested in a stable state with a prosperous economy rather than overthrowing the government and weakening society (Jamieson, 1994, p.10; Laqueur, 1996, p.25; Sanderson, 2004, p.55;

Passas, 2007, p.302; Cockayne, 2013; De Danieli, 2014, p.1). OCGs almost never receive support from other states due to a lack of political objectives that could be exploited by other states (Sanderson, 2004, p.50; Yayla, 2008, p.421). In addition, profit-oriented goals diminish the longevity of OCGs. Contrary to OCGs, TOs are long standing (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.13). They sometimes divide into splinter groups, but the mother organizations usually continue to exist.

TOs, as a strategy, use indiscriminate violence against civilian and government targets (Sanderson, 2004, p.55; Horgan, 2007, p.111; Merari, 2007). Citizens, government officers, properties, and political figures are all on the target list of TOs. Strategically, OCGs are very careful about target selection (Yucebas, 2011, p.180). The use of violence is mostly "concealed" and "generally focused on tactical goals such as intimidating witnesses, eliminating competitors or obstructing investigators" (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.34).

The size of the organizations is another distinguishing characteristic. TOs, even though most of the operations are perpetrated by a very small group of members, are often large in size (Merari, 2007, p.25). According to the BAAD Database, most TOs have more than 100 members. Those members are deeply isolated and separated from the general population (Horowitz, 1983, p.43; Crenshaw, 1995b, p.13). The number of supporters may reach to the tens of thousands (Cragin, 2005, p.38). TOs do not have territorial bases in urban areas (Steinitz, 1985, p.142) and they do not directly associate with general population in urban areas in which they hide themselves (Merari, 2007, p.25). They act publicly only in "friendly" territories (Sanderson, 2004, p.53). OCGs, in contrast with TOs, generally have fewer members who interact with the population. They act on territorial bases (Goldstein, 1986, p.513) and their bases

are generally known not only by the general public, but also by government agencies.

Leaders of TOs and OCGs are usually well known to the police (Shabad & Ramo, 1995, p.438). They play important roles in both organizations, however, leaders of TOs, compared to that of OCGs, cannot be "easily and quickly replaced" (Berry et al, 2002, p.69).

Media exposure is another difference between both groups. TOs try to garner maximum media attention (Forst, 2009, p.14; LaFree & Dugan, 2015, p.59). OCGs, on the contrary, "loathe attracting unwanted attention" (Sanderson, 2004, p.55).

TOs and OCGs, in addition to the strategic differences stated above, exhibit differences at tactical levels. TOs and OCGs resort to violence with different approaches and degrees (Sanderson, 2004, p.55; Picarelli et al. 2005, p.34; Merari, 2007; Yucebas, 2011, p.180). While most terrorist operations involve violence, operations of OCGs do not always necessitate violence. They both use guns, automatic rifles, grenades and explosives, but TOs use more sophisticated weapons such as rockets, and shoulder-launched anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades. As a result, TOs perpetrate more serious crimes (Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.20; Forst, 2009, p.14).

On the other hand, there are numerous strategic and tactical similarities between TOs and OCGs. The most obvious similarity is that they are secret organizations operating both in illegal and legal areas (Bjornehed, 2004, p.308; Sanderson, 2004, p.53). TOs, for example, may build legal front organizations and companies in the "upper world" in order to facilitate money laundering, financing and recruitment while OCGs set up legal entities and through them,

get involved in illegal activities such as the smuggling of goods, as well as tax and trade law violations (Williams, 1995, cited in Albini et al.,1999, p.7). They have similar logistical needs and they share the same resources (Beers & Taylor, 2002; Williams, 2007, p.83; Picarelli, 2012, p.6; Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014, p.213). Activity types and methods are also similar: both organizations operate globally and get involved in similar criminal activities such as theft, forgery, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, drug smuggling, human trafficking, intimidation, extortion, bribery, money laundering, intellectual property crimes, etc. (Berry et al., 2002, p.69; Sanderson, 2004, p.54; Picarelli et al, 2005, p.10; Kaplan, 2005; Shelley, 2006, p.203; UK Treasury, 2007, p.8; Forst, 2009, p.24). While performing these criminal activities, they use cryptic codes and slang to secure their communications (McIntosh, 1975, p.38; Porta, 1995, p.158; Vilks & Bergmanis, 1999, p.66; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.14).

They also have similar organizational characteristics (Sanderson, 2004, p.49; Benson & Decker, 2010, p.136). Upper levels in both organizations are generally structured vertically whereas mid and lower levels are structured horizontally (Bjornehed, 2004, p.309). Some of them utilize decentralized transnational network structures (Tupman, 1998; Viano, 1999b, p.3; Albini, Rogers & Anderson, 1999, p.3; Beers & Taylor, 2002; Picarelli et al. 2005, p.34; Naim, 2006, p.35; Williams, 2007, p.77).

TOs and OCGs are often connected to a “class, race, ethnic or other institutionalized form of human association” (Horowitz, 1983, p.43). They use the same “interchangeable recruitment pools” (Sanderson, 2004, p.53). Therefore, members have similar profiles (Picarelli et al, 2005, p.10). They exercise discipline and internal punishments (Cressey, 1967, p. 105; Horgan,

2005, p.111; Wilkinson, 2006, p.72). The IRA, for example, immediately punishes carelessness or negligent actions, and traitors. Such punishments help them to create more professionalized units (Heger, Jung & Wong, 2012, p.748). Discipline mechanisms, particularly punishment, are also used to enforce organizational rules, therefore, 'freelancing' rarely occurs in either organization. Disengagement is possible but when members leave, it may have fatal consequences (Sanderson, 2004, p.53). Many PKK members who wanted to leave the organization were killed by the organization (P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18-19, 2014).

There is a division of labour in both organizations. Operational tasks are compartmentalized and members are assigned to specific tasks (Cressey, 1967, p.104; Crenshaw, 1995c, p.80; P.C. 12, 2014; P.C. 19, 2014; P.C. 21, 2014) They use the same 'shadow facilitators' such as travel experts, attorneys, corrupt officials, local and regional "fixers", for activities that they cannot conduct with their own in-house capabilities (Braun, 2008; Picarelli, 2012, p.7; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.12). They also use the same networks, routes and methods of transportation for illegal goods and humans (Tupman, 1998; Lesser et al., 1999, p.107; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.48; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208; Hartung & Berrigan, 2007, p.84; Stohl, 2007, p.103; Braun, 2008; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.11; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.29; Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.3). For example, in some drug seizure cases, police officers seized high quantities of heroin destined for Europe in trucks found in car parks. Ongoing investigations have revealed weapon seizures, bombs, ammunitions, and radios brought to Turkey for the PKK by the same organization (KOM Archives).

TOs and OCGs both provide social services to their target population (Sanderson, 2004, p.53; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.9; Flanigan, 2012, p. 284; Pryce, 2012, p.107; Cockayne, 2013, p.14.). Giving a service that is not provided by the government is used as a tool to humiliate governments, to delegitimize their goals and to create loyalty and sympathy for the organizations. The FARC in Colombia and the SL in Peru, for example, have provided social and medical services to the local population (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.18). Pablo Escobar, on the other hand, built hospitals, churches and schools (Bowden, 2001). Similarly, Urfi Çetinkaya, one of the most notorious drug traffickers in Europe, built 8 schools, and 1 surgery clinic. He also has donated a significant amount of money to charities ("Çetinkaya, 'okul' savaşını", 2004). These services pay back as recruitment channels (P.C. 3, 2012).

Some of the fundamental strategic differences between TOs and OCGs are blurred at the tactical level. The strategic differences in motivations and aims, for example, may disappear at the tactical level. OCGs, even if they do not have political motives, may develop political goals and deploy political violence against governments (Beers & Taylor, 2002; Sanderson, 2004, p.56; Picarelli, 2012, p.1; Cockayne, 2013, p. 15). Many OCGs in Colombia such as the Medellin's "Extraditables", a group of drug traffickers in Colombia who declared total war on Colombia and its citizens to change the behaviour of the government, are actively engaged in politics (Chepesiuk, 1999, p.71; Dishman, 2001, p.50; Dickinson, 2011; Bobic, 2014, p.251). They try to acquire political capital. La Familia, for example, refers to drug smuggling groups as "beasts of evil" (Ballina, 2011, p.125) and prevents local drugs sales for that purpose (Flanigan, 2012, p.287). They, in a similar way to TOs, pursue power to

influence and control people (Nakamura, 1999, p.103; Veness, 2000, p.8). The pursuit of power by OCGs, in exceptional cases, may eventually topple governments (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.8). Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, one of the former presidents of Bolivia, blamed "narco-syndicalists, terrorist groups, and cartels" for his government's fall (Naim, 2006, p.83). Eventually, OCGs may seek financial gain to acquire power and influence (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.25).

Thus, both organizations operate against governments and the rule of law (Nakamura, 1999, p.103; Sanderson, 2004, p.53; Braun, 2008; White House & USA, 2011, p.5). TOs act "overtly" to oppose governments whereas OCGs oppose "quietly" (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.25; Townshend, 1995, p.340; Braun, 2008). OCGs, by violating the laws that governments use to enforce their power, are also breaking the "monopoly of legitimate coercive power" (Townshend, 1995, p.340).

Even though the control of territory is common for TOs and uncommon for OCGs, some OCGs have started to exhibit an interest in controlling specific areas for their businesses (Flanigan, 2012, p.280). Mexican OCGs are some of them. Both groups' activities are concentrated in controlled areas.

OCGs' strategy to refrain from violent acts against states changes at the tactical level. The Mafia in Italy, for example, bombed and killed many government agents, particularly prosecutors and judges. Recent violent methods used by various OCGs, moreover, indicate that they have also started to use indiscriminative violence (Palmer-Fernandez, 2000, p.165; Bibes, 2001, p.256; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.8). Some OCGs such as the *Los Zetas*, the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico, for instance, conducted

indiscriminate violent attacks to intimidate the populace and to change the behaviour of government (Luna, 2008a; Longmire & Longmire, 2008, p.46). For example, 177 bodies of bus passengers, some raped or burned alive, were found in 2011 in Mexico. It is believed that Mexican cartels were responsible for this indiscriminate killing (Flanigan, 2012, p.290). Such indiscriminate attacks against civilians by OCGs have caused the death of hundreds.

Media exposure is another point. OCGs use the media to portray an image of 'good fellas' in the minds of the society. Media coverage of OCGs creates a powerful image: it helps them to expand their networks, recruit more and scare rival groups. The main difference in regards to media is that OCGs want to steer away from media attention at the tactical level, but seek it at the strategic level while TOs seek it at both levels.

In sum, an examination of the differences and similarities of both organizations demonstrates that they have more similar characteristics than distinguishing ones. The characteristics of TOs and OCGs at a strategic level exhibit significant differences, but tactical similarities overlap (Jenkins, 1974b, p.2; Steinitz, 1985, p.150; Picarelli et al, 2005, p.9; Flanigan, 2012, p.286; Bobic, 2014, p.246.). Clear lines between strategic level characteristics, therefore, become obscure at tactical levels. The most significant reason for the domination of similarities over discrepancies is the tactical level commonalities between the two organizations; what they do is similar to each other and their operational interests are the same (Naim, 2006, p.138). Antonio Maria Costa (2004), former head of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, confirms this situation: "it has become more and more difficult to distinguish clearly between

terrorist groups and organized crime units, since their tactics increasingly overlap".

These facts indicate that TOs and OCGs have appropriated the techniques and tactics of each other (Sanderson, 2004, p.49; UK Treasury, 2007, p.8; Roberts, 2016, p.10). For example, TOs, appropriating organizational structures used by OCGs, changed their organizational structures and transformed into organizations with decentralized flexible networks (Tupman, 1998; Albini, Rogers & Anderson, 1999, p.3; Viano, 1999b, p.3; Jackson, 2006, p.246; Naim, 2006, p.35; Williams, 2007, p.77). Consequently, TOs have become akin to OCGs.

Another outcome of the terrorist learning process is the terrorist criminality of organized crime: when they learn how to commit organized crime, they operationalize their learning. The remainder of this chapter investigates the organized crime activities of TOs, discusses reasons for the use of organized crime by TOs and presents evidence of terrorist criminality of organized crime.

Terrorist Criminality

TOs of the nineteenth century were poor (Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.62). Their criminal engagements were limited to low-income generating crime types (Findlay, 2008, p.76). Indian terrorists, Bonnot Gang in France and Belgium, Bolshevik revolutionaries, Narodnaya Volya group in Russia, American and West German leftist TOs, and many others resorted to burglary and bank robbery to finance themselves (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p.182; Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.63; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p. 3). These criminal activities were "self–limiting" as a source of finance: "terrorists could only rob so many banks

or extort a limited number of individuals" (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.14). SL members, for instance, perpetrated around fifty bank robberies in Lima in 1981 but gained very limited funds (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.37). Contemporary TOs, unlike TOs of the nineteenth century, have been dealing with millions of dollars (Cilluffo, 2000; Makarenko, 2004; Dishman, 2005; Richardson, 2007; Laciner, 2008). How did this happen; how did terrorism become a multimillion-dollar business? The credit should be given, *inter alia*, to their innovative practices that learned and conquered the organized crime business.

Contemporary TOs have started to increasingly operate in the organized crime business (Merkl, 1995, p.182; Wallace, 1995, p.400; Rapoport, 2004, p.57; Hamm, 2005, p.1; Giraldo &Trinkunas, 2007b, 14; Clunan, 2007, p.264; Costigan, 2007, p.3; Marks, 2007, p.504; Cohen, 2010; Jones, 2012, Nath, 2012; P.C. 23, 2012; P.C. 25; 2013; P.C: 24, 2014). They have become rich on the proceedings of organized crime (Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.62). The Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, for example, had $400 when it was founded in 1858 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p.182). By the mid-1990s, when the group moved towards organized crime, its annual budget was $15 million per year (Richardson, 2007).

There are others. Two Hezbollah operatives in Paraguay, for example, moved $50 million to Hezbollah from 1995 until their arrest in 2001 (Dishman, 2005). The money was obtained from counterfeiting, money laundering, and extortion. Another Hezbollah cell in North Carolina acquired $7.9 million by taking advantage of tax differences in states of the USA (Dishman, 2005).

Al Qaeda's financial network in Europe, on the other hand, raises nearly $1 million a month from credit card fraud (Makarenko, 2004). The FARC also

became rich on organized crime proceedings. It is believed that the FARC receives $500 to $700 million annually from illicit drugs (Cilluffo, 2000; Makarenko, 2004).

The PKK is another. It obtained enormous income from organized crime (Nath, 2012; Jones, 2012). It was estimated to collect only $200-500 million from the drug trade during the 1990s, however, after a decline in support from sponsoring states, the income from the drug trade has increased; it was estimated that the PKK garnered around $500 million in 2008 alone (Laciner, 2008). Eventually, TOs have begun to increase their share of the criminal enterprise and terrorism became a multimillion-dollar business.

There are many reasons for the use of organized crime by TOs. TOs use organized crime to "function" (Shelley, 2006, p.209). Organized crime, particularly arms smuggling and drug trafficking, are used to keep a conflict going (Jongman, 2007, p.258). For example, there are at least 30 ongoing conflicts fostered by the finances generated from organized crime (Calvani, 2001). Thus, TOs resort to organized crime as a tactic to generate terror and put pressure on states; extortion, murder, kidnapping, ransom, robbery, and forgery have been used frequently. They use it as a predication for future attacks; before attacking their targets, they have used false documents to hide their identities, to mobilize their members or to have easy access to their targets' environment. Some terrorists, as individuals or sub-units, also use organized crimes for their own purposes to obtain wealth, authority and power in their organizations (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.18). Additionally, some TOs consider it as a means of destroying the economic and social norms of the societies that they target (Berry et al, 2002, p.2; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.30).

This thesis, to better understand terrorist criminality, examined the literature and formed a dataset (n=148). The dataset focuses on academic approaches to terrorist criminality. According to the dataset, there are six reasons for the criminal activities of TOs: financial needs (92 %), improving capacities (7 %), sustainability (2.6 %), opportunity (2.6 %), undermining the legitimacy (1.7 %) and inactivity periods (0.8 %).

Some researchers argue that TOs would steer away from criminal activities because of the risks associated with organized crime. High entry cost, for example, may keep TOs away from organized crime, especially when the cost of terrorist attacks is cheap, because entry into organized crime is a competitive action (McIntosh, 1975, p.69, Williams, 2007, p.77; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.45). In addition, criminal activities and contact with OCGs may attract the attention of government agencies and perpetrating crimes may create areas of vulnerability for TOs (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.14; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.2). Can criminal activities really create areas of vulnerability for TOs? How risky is engaging in crime for terrorists? Or, more precisely, how successful have law enforcement agencies been in detecting terrorist activities by investigating criminal activities? Law enforcement agencies have not successfully followed the traces of TOs' crime business and linked their criminal activities to terrorism. Detected criminal activities are either regarded as individual engagements or perpetrators are apprehended as petty criminals (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.19; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.52; LaFree & Dugan, 2015, p.58).

A study by Smith and his colleagues (as cited in Hamm, 2005, p.220) remarks that organized crime is not a risky business for TOs. They examined

2,748 U.S. federal court cases against 430 terrorists from over 50 groups between 1980 and 1998. They found that most of the terrorists were indicted on criminal charges; only 15 % of them were indicted on terrorism charges. The link between their criminal and terror activities was not detected in those cases. Their criminal activities also did not reveal risky information.

Other examples indicate a similar point. For example, the 9/11 attackers used false identities to obtain credit cards in order to finance their attack ("Meeting the terrorist", 2006), however, neither government agencies detected their criminal activities nor did this risk stop attackers from perpetrating the crime. The Madrid bombings provide another example; the attackers of the Madrid bombings used drug money to finance the attack. The attackers were previously identified as regular drug dealers by the Spanish police before the bombings (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.19), but Spanish law enforcement agencies neither detected attackers' terrorist activities, nor did the attackers find it too risky to finance their operations through drug dealing (Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.41). They were, on the contrary, thought to be petty criminals and their terrorist activities remained unknown until they attacked. In another case, the Kouachi brothers in the Charlie Hebdo attack in France were under the surveillance of the French Terror Police. However, the surveillance was stopped because the brothers were setting up a counterfeiting business. They were thought to be petty criminals, but killed many (Schneider, 2016, p.221)

Moreover, the probability of arrest and prosecution for terrorism and criminal activities in some countries, particularly in less develop countries or weak states, is low (Sanderson, 2004, p.50; Napoleoni, 2007, p.171; Pollard, 2007, p.236; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1). In weak or failed states–so called

black hole states (Makarenko, 2004, p.138), safe havens, ineffective policies and corruption make arrest and prosecution almost impossible. Consequently, criminal engagement may not constitute an additional risk for some TOs.

Entry cost into organized crime, on the other hand, is low for TOs. TOs hold the advantage in this competition: they impose their power over OCGs (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.90). Tactics, weapons, and size, among other things, make TOs superior to OCGs (Yayla, 2008, p.420). TOs, therefore, do not face significant barriers to enter into the organized crime business (Williams, 2007, p.77).

Researchers point to other factors that may create disincentives for criminal engagement. The cost of terrorist attacks, for instance, is relatively cheap (Hess, 2007, p.61; Napoleoni, 2007, p.184). TOs need very little money to accomplish an attack. The Bali bombings in 2002 were estimated to cost between $20,000 and $35,000 while the cost of the Istanbul bombings in Turkey in 2003 was estimated to be around $40,000 (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.6; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.9). Moreover, technological advances are creating highly destructive, portable and cheap weapons that reduce the costs of attacks significantly. However, there are hidden costs to terrorist operations; maintenance costs for perpetrators, the cost of special training and the development of expertise, the purchase of attack materials, the cost of travel and the cost of communications and the cross-border movements of people, money, and materials (Williams, 2007, p.80; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014, p. 1).

New trends in terrorism increase the operational costs. Urban terrorism, for instance, leads to additional costs. Some TOs known to operate in rural areas have started to move into urban areas (Bibes, 2001, p.250; Jackson, 2004, p.17;

Felbab-Brown, 2010, pp.53-56) because these areas provide a variety of opportunities for TOs, such as a multitude of targets, anonymity, potential recruits, financial resources, methods, concealment and security, etc. (McIntosh, 1975, p.20; Crenshaw, 1981, p.382; Grabosky, 1988, p.62; Naim, 2006, p.36; Sormani, Soldatos, Vassilaras, Kioumourtzis, Leventakis, Giordani & Tisato, 2016, p.30). The FARC, for example, had always been active in rural areas, but it has started to increasingly operate in cities (Jackson, 2004, p.17; Ortiz, 2006, p.213; Naim, 2006, p.79). The PKK has also changed its primary operation field. It has moved its operatives to cities and started to carry out attacks there (Laciner, 2008; P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 18-19, 2014). This field change affected TOs financially because urban life, in spite of the advantages mentioned above, increases costs. Accommodation, transportation, surveillance and counter surveillance cause high expenditures. For example, planning and executing an attack in cities may take months. When well-protected government officers are targeted, it may sometimes take more than a year (P.C. 16, 2013; P.C. 19, 2014). Expenses then increase substantially. Organized crime is used to cover these expenses.

In addition to operational costs, there is a high cost of sustaining infrastructure (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.98; Wilkinson, 1994c, p.216; Horgan, 2005, p.111; Jones, 2012). This constitutes the largest proportion of TOs' costs (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.9; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.8; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008b, p.80; Makarenko, 2010, p.193; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.62). The majority of Al Qaeda's income (90 %) goes to the cost of administering and maintaining the organization, including operating training camps and maintaining an international network of cells while only 10 % of its income is

spent on operational costs (Damian Bugg, cited in Biersteker & Eckert, 2008). It is estimated that it spends € 200,000 per week to maintain its organization in Iraq alone (De Vries, 2005, cited in Roth & Sever, 2010, p.62).

Logistics is another factor that forces TOs towards organized crime. Although the cost of logistics is high, it is important for the continuity of TOs. . TOs need to sustain members, buy weapons, military technology, arms and explosives, technological equipment, such as satellite phones and radios, undertake surveillance, promote political ideology, train new recruits, move money and people from one location to another, bribe government officials, hire experts for needs such as false passports and false identity documents, maintain conditions for members in prison, pay court fees, etc. (Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983, p.37; Tupman, 1988; Wilkinson, 1994c, p.216; Palmer, 1995, p.278; Hamm and Voorde, 2005, p.19; Wilkinson, 2006, p.35; Carish, 2007, p.166; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.27; Williams, 2007; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.39; UK Treasury, 2007, p.8; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.8; Forest, 2008, p.270; Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2; Cohen, 2010). Some TOs, for instance, pay a significant amount of money to their members monthly (Palmer, 1995, p.278). When the number of members is considered, money spent on salaries is substantial. The Taliban, as one of the largest TOs, pays $200 monthly to its cadres while police salaries in Afghanistan average $70 a month (Piazza, 2012, p.216). Salaries of SL members, on the other hand, range from $20 up to $1000 per month. Felbab-Brown (2010, p.44) estimates that the SL spends as much as $5 million a year on salaries for an estimated 10,000 members.

Moreover, money for members' families accounts for a high percentage of the families' income (Palmer, 1995, p.278; UK Treasury, 2007; Ehrenfeld,

2007, p.27; Cohen, 2010). The IRA's budget solely spent on prisoners' families is estimated to be around £2 million (Tupman, 1998).

There are also maintenance costs of imprisoned members and costs for court trials (Palmer, 1995, p.278). Thus, TOs have to pay for investments in their own legitimate and illegitimate business enterprises (Wilkinson, 1994c, p. 216). They also have to bear the costs of "sleepers", members of TOs that remain inactive until they receive orders to act (Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.28; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.8). Organized crime is one of the resources used by TOs to cover all these expenses.

TOs' participation in organized crime sometimes results from opportunities (Cornell, 2005, p.757; Hamm, 2005, p.220; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.45). Globalization, prevalence of illegal activities in the geographical locations in which they operate, ineffective counter policies, inadequate law enforcement, absence of the rule of law, legal and jurisdictional boundaries and safe havens provide various opportunities to be exploited (Sanderson, 2004, p.50; Napoleoni, 2007, p.171; Pollard, 2007, p.236; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1; Bobic, 2014, p.241; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014, p. 1).

The geographical location provides different opportunities; therefore, it has a significant effect on TOs' choice of activity (Crenshaw, 1981, p.380; Jackson, 2001, p.19; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1; Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2011, p.448). TOs in regions where drugs are cultivated and produced, such as Afghanistan and Burma, find opportunities for drug dealing (Felbab-Brown, 2010). Moreover, TOs that operate in regions that are located near smuggling routes between developed and less developed countries engage in smuggling activities. In addition, low legal livelihood, prevalence of crime and

size of the illicit economy in those countries also strengthen terrorists' hands. TOs take these opportunities to sustain their activities with new areas of activity, including organized crime.

Mincheva and Gurr (2008, p.22) examine how TOs exploit these opportunities. They mention three factors that create opportunities for criminal engagement by TOs: existence of trans-state identity networks and movements; occurrence of armed conflict; and illicit market opportunities. Felbab-Brown (2010, p.6) further scrutinizes the role of illicit economies and she identifies four factors that determine TOs' involvement in illicit economy: the state of the overall economy, the character of the illicit economy, the presence or absence of thuggish traffickers and the government response to the illicit economy. While a poor economy limits the availability of alternative sources of income, a labour intensive illicit economy provides employment opportunities to the local population. Thuggish traffickers and aggressive government responses also increase the dependency of the local population on TOs. The more pressure the local population receives from thuggish traffickers for cheaper products and from governments for interdiction, the more dependent they become on TOs for higher prices and protection (Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.546). Concomitant to the illicit economy, the enlarging black market also provides opportunities for TOs. In order to supply black market products, they engage in a broad range of criminal activities (Europol, 2009b, p.59).

Some of the factors mentioned above by Mincheva and Gurr (2008) and Felbab-Brown (2010) may, in fact, be listed under the rubric of globalization. Globalization has various definitions (Mittelman, 2000; Weinberg & Eubank, 2004; Pollard, 2007; Zimmerman, 2011). It is the closer integration of the

countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of the artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge and people across borders (Stiglits, cited in Weinberg & Eubank, 2004, p.93).

The internationalization of crimes, such as smuggling and drug trafficking, entails the 'dark side of globalization' (Mittelman, 2000, p.218; Calvani, 2001). Mittelman (2000, p.218) argues that states' immune systems break down during the restructuring of the state and the recomposition of civil society during the process of globalization. When the immune systems of states are broken, resistance against terrorism and organized crime is weakened. Then, both terrorism and organized crime are empowered and the criminal engagement of TOs and the terrorist activities of OCGs become prevalent.

In addition, modernization has created sophisticated transportation and communication systems that have not only enabled the mobility of people and goods, but also the means of publicity for terrorists (Crenshaw, 1981, p.381; Cesoni, 1999, p.163; Sanderson, 2004, p.50). Terrorists and criminals have started to move easily from one place to another where they have created their own networks, such as immigration and diaspora groups (Arva & Piazza, 2016, p.5). Free trade opportunities have increased the transportation of capital, goods and people that TOs and OCGs have abused principally for criminal activities (Cesoni, 1999, p.163; Copeland, 2001, p.96; Napoleoni, 2007, p.171; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.10; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208). Consequently, the dynamics of globalization are exploited by TOs and OCGs (Viano, 1999a, p.xi; Vilks & Bergmanis, 1999, p.68; Picarelli et al, 2005, p.17; Giraldo &

Trinkunas, 2007b, p.7; Chepesiuk, 2007; Picarelli, 2012, p.1; Bobic, 2014, p.241).

Decline in the state sponsorship of terrorism is another reason for an increased reliance of TOs on organized crime. "Rogue Nations", in pursuit of geopolitical motives, have used TOs in rival countries as proxy agents to prompt political change without wars (Copeland, 2001, p.95; Rapoport, 2002; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.4; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.12; Bapat, 2011, p. 1; Bobic, 2014, p.242; Combs, 2015, p. 94; Schillinger, 2016, 342). This may occur to varying degrees: direct involvement of states in the killing of dissidents, such as the murder of Iranians overseas by Iranian officials; the recruitment and training of terrorists for overseas missions, such as the training of an Iranian and four Lebanese for the murder of Kurdish dissidents in Germany; controlling and directing TOs, as in the case of Palestinian groups and Syria; providing training, financing and safe havens for autonomous terrorist groups such as the PKK in Iran, Iraq and Syria; and support of states for their own interests to foreign TOs, Gaddafi's support of the IRA in order to punish Britain for the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986 (Richardson, 2000, p.212).

The concept of state sponsorship, which became the focus of the counterterrorism policies in the 1980s, originated from explanations of Iran's policies after the Islamic Revolution (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.10; 2001, p.15605; Hufbauer & Moll, 2007, p.180). Iran was not the only state in focus; in 1985, Ronald Reagan named four other countries as members of a "confederation of terrorist states": Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Nicaragua (Reagen cited in Blin, 2007, p.410). Libya, for example, provided over a ton of Semtex, AK47

assault rifles, RPG-7 and SAM-7 missiles to the IRA (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.76; Wilkinson, 1994c, p.214).

Increasing pressure from the international community on sponsoring states, the gradual rapprochement of sponsoring states to reduce international isolation, states' agreement on counterterrorism, the end of the Cold War, the demise of specific geographical interests of some contemporary TOs, especially religiously motivated ones, and negative experiences with sponsoring states that made some TOs sceptical with state support led to the decline in state sponsorship (Jamieson, 1994, p.viii; Laqueur, 1996, p.26; Albini, Rogers & Anderson, 1999, p.5; Berry et al., 2002, p.2; Kaplan, 2005; Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.18; Wilkinson, 2006, p.37; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.11; Clunan, 2007, p.264; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208; Picarelli et al., 2007, p.40; Braun, 2008; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.16; Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.542). It should be noted that state sponsorship, in spite of the decline, continues to be a major global security problem. The U.S.A. still denounces Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as "state sponsors of terrorism" (U.S. Department of State, 2014, p. 283).

The decline in state sponsorship has forced TOs to evolve (Goolsby, 2006, p.10). Many TOs have shifted to self-financing, particularly through organized crime (Gheordunascu, 2000, p.26; Sanderson, 2004, p.49; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008; Aydin, 2008, p.xi; Braun, 2008; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p. 73; Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.542). The PKK, for instance, has received support from numerous countries: Syria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Armenia and Greece (Gunter, 1991; Mango, 2005, p.8; Cagaptay, 2007; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.18). Syria

has supported the PKK to obtain concessions from Turkey while Greece has provided facilities to the PKK to gain leverage in its conflicts with Turkey (Mango, 2005, p.8). For example, Abdullah Ocalan was carrying a Greek Cypriot passport when he was apprehended on his way out of the Greek embassy in Nairobi (Cagaptay, 2007). After the decline in the number of supporting states, the PKK has increasingly become dependent upon support from diaspora and organized crime, particularly drugs, arms and human smuggling and extortion (Jonnson & Cornell, 2008; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.19).

The cease-fire period is another factor that forces TOs to maintain their existence through organized crime. When TOs decide to agree to a ceasefire, their members walk into a period of inactivity. During such periods, members of TOs turn to other activities that will sustain the continuity of the organizational mechanisms. Engaging in organized crime helps terrorist members not only to stay active, but also to keep the organizational solidarity by enabling the organization function. Therefore, TOs start to increasingly engage in criminal activities during cease fire periods (Debray, 1967, cited by Horgan, 2005, p.151). The PKK, for example, uses ceasefire agreements as a tactic to gain time and power (P.C. 17, 2013; P.C. 19, 2014; P.C. 21, 2014). It has ceased fire when it has confronted a substantial loss of members, mostly in armed conflicts, or when it has lost support from state sponsors (Ganor, 2008, p.278). During these periods, the amount of smuggled goods seized by law enforcement officers such as heroin, hashish, cigarettes, etc. increased. Some officers interviewed blame members of the PKK for the increase. They remark

that PKK members increasingly turn to smuggling activities in these periods (P.C. 1-4, 2012).

Organized crime is used as a means to obtain popular support, a term used in the context of terrorism by Dishman (2001, p.47) and Felbab-Brown (2010, p.17) to describe the support TOs acquire from local populations, because it breaks the monopoly of OCGs. TOs in the drug business, for example, may provide better prices for the local population for drugs than OCGs, or TOs may force OCGs to offer higher prices to the farmers, as in the cases of the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru and the FARC in Colombia (Felbab-Brown, 2010). In addition, TOs often provide social services to their target population, such as health and justice services, food, and other supplies to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Sanderson, 2004, p.53; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.18; Flanigan, 2012, p.284; Forest, 2012a, p.175; Cockayne, 2013, p.14). Profits generated from organized crime are used to cover these highly expensive services.

Counterterrorism and counterdrug policies, on the other hand, may have negative consequences. Tough counterterrorism policies, for example, may aggravate the conflict and result in more violence in the long run (P.C. 20, 2014). As discussed in Chapter 2, some counter policies force TOs and OCGs to evolve and defeat those policies. For example, TOs, partly because of counterterrorism policies, have adopted flexible network structures and acquired freedom of action and self-sufficiency (European Union, 2004, p.6; Kaplan, 2005; Braun, 2008; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016). Thus, the policies for countering terrorist finance put pressure on the extant sources such as charities, legal companies, etc. and TOs were driven towards alternative

methods of funding (Sanderson, 2004, p.50; Kaplan, 2005; Passas, 2007, p.26; Braun, 2008). In order to overcome the financial pressure, TOs have shifted towards illegitimate sources that are kept in the 'shadow economy' that does not enter the formal banking system controlled by governments (De Vries, 2005, p.4; Hess, 2007, p.57). Consequently, the money needed for terrorist cells has started to come from organized crime (Berry et al., 2002, p.3; Hamm & Voorde, 2005, p.18; Hayden, 2007, p.294; Comras, 2007, p.126; Napoleoni, 2007, p.14; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.27; Williams, 2007, p.74; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208).

Counterdrug policies, on the other hand, may have an indirect effect on terrorism, particularly in drug cultivation areas. Counterdrug policies affect the availability of drugs. When there is a substantial demand for drugs, eradication programmes and the decreased supply of drugs increase the prices of drugs (Bjornehed, 2004, p.315). This attracts the attention of TOs because the fluctuation of drug prices generates enormous revenues. Eradication policies in Peru, for example, reduced the efficacy of counterterrorism policies (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.50). Operation Condor, which aimed to destroy the illegal drug business in Peru, resulted in an overabundance of cocaine in the country because traffickers could not transport drugs. Prices fell dramatically and *cocaleros* (coca growers) encouraged the SL's involvement to defend growers against government interdiction and to provide protection for the transportation of drugs against government forces (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.57). Another consequence of the eradication programs has been the diversification of drugs; marihuana cultivation is increasing in Afghanistan where opium poppy cultivation is common, heroin production is increasing in Colombia where cocaine

production is common and synthetic drug production is increasing in Burma where heroin production is common (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.169). As a result, TOs have become interested in a variety of drugs to expand their income channels.

The demise of prominent OCGs in one country may create a gap in the illicit economy. This gap creates opportunities for TOs to engage in criminal activities. The FARC, for instance, emerged as the premiere drug producing organization after the elimination of the Medellin and Cali Cartels and the fragmentation of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia (Chepesiuk, 2007; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.30; Makarenko, 2010, p.187; Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.546).

Organized crime is sometimes perpetrated as a predicate crime to terrorist attacks (Hamm, 2005, p. 220). Identity fraud, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, forgery, and auto vehicle theft are commonly used as precursors of terrorist attacks. For example, TOs mostly use false passports in aeroplane hijacking (Wilkinson, 1994a, p.176). Perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks also used 30 false identities to obtain credit cards and passports ("Meeting the terrorist", 2006). Additionally, the PKK organizes the transportation of its members to European countries as refugees. In order to support their refugee status, the PKK provides false arrest warrants to them. Some PKK members have been caught with false empty arrest warrants (KOM Archives).

In addition, TOs may engage in organized crime to obtain materials that are illegal such as arms, weapons, explosives and chemicals. The Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), arms dealer branch of the LTTE, for instance, used false documents and companies to steal 32,400 rounds of mortar ammunition

purchased from Tanzania for the Sri Lankan Army. They loaded the ammunition into their vessels and took them to a territory controlled by the LTTE (Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.45).

In addition to the use of organized crime as a means of acquiring financial resources, organized crime is also used to undermine and weaken countries politically, economically and socially (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.99; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.15; Picarelli et al., 2005, p.50; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.30). Some TOs even engage in organized crime, chiefly in drug trafficking, to weaken their enemies by "flooding their societies with addictive drugs" (Berry et al, 2002, p.2).

The range of criminal activities that TOs engage in is as extensive as the OCGs' repertoire (Forest, 2012a, p.171). Examples of TOs' criminal activities, particularly of drug related crimes, are abundant. The drug trade is the most common crime type perpetrated by TOs mainly due to the high income potential and low entry costs, in spite of the high risk of confiscation of assets and the high level of information sharing and cooperation among law enforcement agencies (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.23; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.52). Moreover, drugs are cultivated and processed mostly in rural areas, particularly where TOs are active. Stepanova (cited in Picarelli et al, 2005, p.17), for example, observes the link between the illegal narcotics trade and TOs in three different regions where drug business mostly occurs in rural areas: Latin America, Central Asia, and the Golden Triangle. The same settings make it easy to detect TOs' drug related activities.

According to the crime dataset of the thesis, drug related crimes (70 %) are mentioned as the crimes most committed by TOs. The remainder of the

distribution is as follows: smuggling of humans and goods (20 %), robbery (19 %), kidnapping (19 %), fraud (17 %), arms smuggling (14 %), money laundering (14 %), extortion (10 %), counterfeiting (8 %), revolutionary taxes (8 %), racketeering (6 %), ransom (6 %), corruption (5 %), identity theft (5 %), protection rackets (3.6 %), intellectual property crimes (2 %), white collar crime (2 %) (*Figure 3*).



Figure 3. Distribution of crimes committed by TOs.

When these crime types are categorized, they are listed as follows:

- Production, transportation and selling of illegal drugs (Viano, 1999b, p.199; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.93; Higgings & Kilpatrick, 2005, p.340; Horgan, 2005, p.111; Cagaptay, 2007; Onay, 2008; Laciner, 2008; Freedman & Levitt, 2009; Levitt, 2012; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1),
- Diamond and special minerals smuggling (Renner, 2002, p.7; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.88),

- Illicit tobacco trade (Horgan, 2005, p.111; Shelley & Melzer, 2008; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.11),
- Human trafficking (Viano, 1999b, p.199; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.94; Cagaptay, 2007),
- Prostitution (Cagaptay, 2007; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1),
- Fake documents and counterfeiting (Lowe, 2006; Freedman & Levitt, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1; Schneider, 2016),
- Illegal foreign currency exchanges (Freedman & Levitt, 2009),
- Tax evasion (Horgan, 2005, p.111; Freedman & Levitt, 2009),
- Smuggling of contrabands (Renner, 2002, p.7; Fearon, 2004, p.284; Yayla, 2008, p.428; Freedman & Levitt, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.64),
- Piracy related crimes (Sanderson, 2004, pp.51-52; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1; Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.1),
- Cybercrime (Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.1),
- Credit card fraud (Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.1),
- Money laundering (Cluttrerbuck, 1990, p.116; Jamieson, 1994, p.127; Horgan, 2005, p.111; Williams, p. 2007, p.85; Passas, 2007, p.34),
- Benefit frauds (Horgan, 2005, p.111),
- Maritime fraud (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1),
- Toxic and industrial waste trade (Viano, 1999b, p.199; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1),
- Armed robberies (Rapoport, 2002; 2004, p.51; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.37; Taylor, 2010, p.127).

- Smuggling of wildlife, human organs, cattle and meat, hardwood such as cedar, oak, fake insurance claims, unlicensed commercial materials, cell phone cloning, counterfeit computer software and videos (Tupman, 1998; Renner, 2002, p.7; Kaplan, 2005; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.1; Yucebas, 2011, p.218).

In sum, TOs are involved in organized crime for various reasons. Globalization, prevalence of illegal activities in the geographical locations where TOs and OCGs operate, proliferation of new inefficient states, ineffective counter policies, inadequate law enforcement, absence of the rule of law, legal and jurisdictional boundaries, safe haven, gaps in the illicit economy, negative consequences of counterterrorism and counterdrug policies, and settings where TOs and OCGs converge create opportunities and incentives for TOs to participate in organized crime. TOs, encouraged by these incentives, added organized crime perpetration to their *modus operandi*.

A Neglected Research Area

In spite of the fact that changes in the *modus operandi* of TOs indicate an increasing trend of organized crime involvement, the connection between terrorism and organized crime has neither been a primary concern nor documented sufficiently. Consequently, important warnings that stem from the criminal activities of TOs have been overlooked (Jamieson, 1994, p.10; Naim, 2006; Shelley, 2006, p.204; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.54; Clunan, 2007, p.264; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208).

The dataset formed by the thesis points out that only 4 studies mentioned TOs' engagement of organized crimes before the 1990s. There were studies in

the early 1990s that remarked a possible connection, but there was a boom of interest only after the mid-1990s (*Figure 4*). Why have the researchers neglected the connection between terrorism and organized crime until very recently?

The most salient factor for the overlook is the lack of an agreed upon definition of both terrorism and organized crime (Calvani, 2001; Clunan, 2007, p.264; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.264; Freilich & LaFree, 2016, p.570). An organization regarded as a political organization in one country may be considered a TO in another. Parallel to this, the same organization may also be considered as an OCG in another country. Therefore, the activities of both organizations fall into different categories of crime records in different states and the connection between the two phenomena eventually becomes undetectable.

Another problem associated with a definition is the discrepancies between national terrorism laws. The Turkish government, for example, regards the assassination of Ozdemir Sabanci, a well-known businessman, and two of his employees on January, 9, 1996 in Turkey, as an operation of a TO. One of the killers, Fehriye Erdal, fled abroad. Later, she was detained in Belgium while holding a false passport. She was put under house arrest after serving a year in prison for various crimes she committed (being a member of a TO, possession of an unregistered weapon and using a false identification) in Belgium. Later, she managed to escape from house arrest despite being under surveillance by 32 agents of the Belgian state security (Bellen, 2006). The Belgium court, however, ruled that she could not be charged in Belgium for the assassination of three people in Turkey because the type of the weapon used in the assassination was

a semi-automatic weapon and semi-automatic weapons were not covered in Belgium counterterrorism act (Laciner, 2005a).

Data formation methods and concerns over the trustworthiness of empirical studies hamper the efforts to realize the connection (Calvani, 2001). Members of TOs that engage in organized crime in countries other than the homeland are recorded as citizens of the home country and their political affiliations have been undiscovered. The PKK members in European countries, for instance, are recorded as Turkish citizens in crime statistics (P.C. 7, 2013; P.C. 9, 2013; P.C. 13, 2014). Moreover, their activities have been recorded as individual crime perpetrations and the link between TOs and organized crime has been overlooked. Therefore, existing data analyses do not demonstrate the extent of organized crime engagement by TOs.

Institutions that collect and analyse terrorism and organized crime data at regional and global levels have not demonstrated an interest in the relationship between terrorism and organized crime until recent years. Europol, one of the most important strategic analysts in European Union's security policies, for example, analyses terrorism and organized crime separately (P.C. 25, 2013). While Europol emphasizes that its annual European Union Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment Reports (SOCTA, earlier known as OCTA) focus on serious and organized crime only, Europol's annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) examine terrorism solely. The examination of all of Europol's terrorism and organized crime reports reveals that Europol has only recently started to realize the connection between TOs and OCGs, but with an approach limited to the financing of terrorism. The link

between TOs and OCGs has found no place in SOCTA reports until 2009 whereas Europol's TE-SAT first expressed its concern after 2007.

TOs are well camouflaged organizations (Horgan, 2004, p.49; Naim, 2006, p.138). The clandestine nature and irregular activities of TOs make them difficult to analyse and investigate, and therefore to detect and find evidence of involvement (Richardson, 2000, p.216; Sageman, 2004, p.165; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.37). Maintenance of ethnic, racial or family-based composition by TOs and OCGs exacerbates this problem (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.11).

The characteristics of organized crime also affect this situation. Criminal funding, for example, is very difficult to trace (Copeland, 2001, p.98; Horgan, 2005, p.122). The link between the source, launderer and the receiver may not be discovered easily. Describing the activities of Al Qaeda, Gordon Brown, for example, notes that "money is invariably raised in one country, used for training in the second, for procurement in a third and terrorist acts in a fourth - and the results broadcast in propaganda across the world" ("Meeting the terrorist", 2006). In addition, TOs and OCGs sometimes use disassociated fronts and criminal experts (Homer, 1988, p.205; Clutterbuck, 1990, p.116; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.57; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.52; Picarelli, 2012, p.7). Then, it becomes very difficult to relate TOs with activities of contracted criminals and OCGs with activities of contracted terrorists and, eventually, to make the link. Thus, the transnational characteristic of these activities prevents the observation of a systemic link between terrorism and organized crime and of TOs' organized crime activities.

There is a lack of sufficient information sharing among law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities of various countries outside of the illegal drugs

area (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.23; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.52; P.C. 18-20, 2014). The lack of cooperation even exists among agencies that are responsible for similar tasks within the same country. For example, investigations after the 9/11 attacks revealed that law enforcement agencies made numerous mistakes (Shapiro, 2013, p.15) and important information that might have helped prevent the attacks was not shared amongst agencies in the USA.

Moreover, information gathered from criminal investigations is not disseminated to other agencies simultaneously. Drug enforcement and anti-terrorism officers interviewed (2012; 2013; 2014), for example, stated that they would share information with officers from other departments *only if* the investigation reveals that their targets are not involved in crimes that fall in their responsibility. In such cases, it takes time to completely hand over all the information gathered and sometimes information becomes useless because the target group might have already completed their illegal operations. In other cases, where information between counterterrorism and counter organized crime agencies is shared, the intelligence community is disappointed by their information or by the fact that their informants end up in court (Kaplan, 2005). As a result of one-sided investigations, inefficient cooperation among departments, and multi-subjected investigations, conjunctions of activities of TOs and OCGs have not been explored sufficiently.

Law enforcement officers in some countries do not have direct access to the economic data, such as suspected transactions, that would demonstrate the relationship. The Turkish Police Force, for instance, does not have access to

financial transactions that would enable them to analyse the financial aspect of their investigations simultaneously (Yavuz, 2008, p.448; P.C. 8-9, 2013).

When a terrorist engages in organized crime, it is a difficult task to differentiate whether the crime is committed for organizational or individual purposes. When a terrorist is arrested as a heroin courier, for instance, law enforcement officers may not discern whether it is for financing the organization, or a breakaway act. Therefore, detecting the link between the organization and the crime can become a challenging task.

TOs and OCGs use secret communication methods. They use cryptic codes and slangs to secure their communications (McIntosh, 1975, p.38; Vilks & Bergmanis, 1999, p.66; Tucker, 2001, p.9; Baker, 2005, p.76; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.14). Terrorism and organized crime investigations are conducted by separate agencies and responsibility is not given to a single agency (Lesser et al., 1999, p.54; P.C. 1-2, 2012; P.C. 18-19, 2014). Law enforcement officers are trained in one area and can only encrypt code words that are used in their fields of expertise; either terrorism or organized crime (Carisch, 2007, p.165; P.C. 3-.4, 2012; P.C. 6-7, 2013). The majority of law enforcement officers interviewed, for example, claim that officers from other departments may not properly understand the contents of their target groups' communications (2012; 2013; 2014). Consequently, the link between TOs and OCGs remains undetected in investigations.

Many other reasons explain the neglect:

- Evolving and heterogeneous nature of both terrorism and organized crime (Calvani, 2001; Hamm, 2005, p.20; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1) and difficulty extracting a general notion of relationship between them,

- Reallocation of state resources from other areas such as organized crime to terrorism and weakened law enforcement agencies with limited resources (Jenkins, 1974b, p.6; Bjornehed, 2004, p.320; Kaplan, 2005; Picarelli et al, 2005, p.7; Shelley, 2006, p.203; P.C. 1-2, 2012),
- Difficulty of linking the criminal activities of compartmentalized units of TOs to terrorism (P.C. 19, 2014).
- Difficulty of tracking inactive cells (P.C.19-20, 2014).

In sum, terrorism research has only recently noted the relationship between terrorism and organized crime. Political, geographical and constitutional situations of states, perspectives of national and international institutions, characteristics of TOs and OCGs, types of activities engaged, methods that states employ to combat these organizations, the functioning mechanisms of law enforcement agencies, and error of data formation, among other intertwining factors, have hampered the development of literature on this relationship.

A shift Towards 'Recognition'

An increasing number of studies focusing on the relationship have emerged since the mid-1990s (*Figure 4*). Concomitant to academic interest, states and international institutions have begun to express their concerns about the link between the terrorism and organized crime. The European Union, for example, began to question the link between the two, beginning with the La Gomela Declaration in 1995, but it was the U.N. that first explicitly mentioned the link between terrorism and organized crime at the global level.



Figure 4. Graph of distribution of studies on relationship between terrorism and crime by years (n=148).

The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice of the UN, after 16 meetings and a number of informal meetings, recommended to the Economic and Social Council of U.N. in 1994 to consider crimes of terrorism and their interrelationship with organized crime. Pursuant to Council resolution 1995/27, the Secretariat requested the views of states on the issue. Only 8 states expressed their support and commented on the links between terrorism and transnational organized crime. Turkey, noting that "not all terrorist acts constituted transnational organized crime since some might be sporadic, individual and not organized", expressed that "transnational organized criminal groups and terrorist groups were becoming more and more similar in terms of their methods, strategies and scope of activities" (United Nations, 1996). Turkey also provided extensive information on the criminal activities of a TO. Austria, in contrast, reported that "it had never detected links but concerned that links might emerge with regard to financing of terrorist crimes". Other

countries, including Japan and France, emphasized significant differences between terrorism and transnational organized crime.

The U.S.A., on the other hand, stated that it was unaware "of well-established or systematic links between terrorist crimes and transnational organized crimes". The U.S.A. even expressed the opinion that evidence of a link was not "substantial enough to justify either allocation of the time and resources of the Commission or the drafting of a code of conduct or other international legal instrument even partially devoted to the subject". As a result, on its fifth session in Vienna on 16.05.1996, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice presented its report concluding that, "while links between transnational organized crime and terrorist crimes are more circumstantial than institutional, both forms of crime present formidable challenges to the international community and require improved international cooperation" (United Nations, 1996).

The U.S.A., however, changed its former position and recognized a link between terrorism and transnational organized crime, particularly the use of organized crime for financing right after the 9/11 attacks (Passas, 2007). The George W. Bush administration, as a part of its War on Terror, attempted to link the war on terrorism with its domestic equivalent, the war on drugs which is the most prominent area in which OCGs operate (Drug Policy Alliance, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Jones, 2002; Nadelman, 2003).

George W. Bush, while talking about the Drug-Free Communities Act Reauthorization Bill on December 14, 2001, stated: "the terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder. If you quit drugs, you join the fight against terror in America" (Bush, 2001d). The U.S.A. Office of

National Drug Control Policy began a campaign in 2002 to tell Americans that they might be supporting terrorism by buying drugs. Advertisements were linking drugs to terrorism: “Where do terrorists get their money? If you buy drugs, some of it might come from you” and “drug money helps support terror. Buy drugs and you could be supporting it, too.” (Dougherty, 2002).

Since then, the U.S.A has been emphasizing this relationship; the National Intelligence Strategy (U.S. Department of National Intelligence, 2009), National Security Strategy (White House & United States of America, 2010), Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011), National Strategy for Counterterrorism (White House & United States of America, 2011) and Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (Obama, 2011) reports state the threat of a relationship. Gradually, the U.S.A. has started to focus more on the link (Pellerin, 2012).

Numerous states and international organizations have followed the U.S.A. and started to regard the relationship between terrorism and organized crime as a grave threat that should be tackled seriously (Dandurand & Chin, 2004). In Europe, special units were established and programs were initiated to counter both threats. The South-eastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which later became the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC) in 2011, for example, has an Anti-Terrorism Task Force that helps member states counter the link between organized crime and terrorism (Sanderson, 2004, p.57). Moreover, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, founded the Fusion Task Force to address linkages between organized crime and terrorism.

In sum, the literature, especially after the acknowledgment of a relationship at global level by academics in the mid-1990s and by states in the 2000s, has started to progress. The existence of a relationship is no longer in question, but the attributes of this relationship are. The following chapter, examining various approaches towards the relationship between terrorism and organized crime, presents attributes of the relationship. It thus scrutinizes prior models used to explain the relationship. Building upon the literature, it forms a dynamic model that explains the relationship and implications of terrorist learning of organized crime.

CHAPTER 6

AN INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVE

This chapter continues to investigate terrorist learning of organized crime. It examines implications of the association between TOs and OCGs comprehensively to understand the appropriation among TOs and OCGs as an outcome of the interactive learning process. It analyses the association between two groups that leads to learning, consequently appropriation, through a dynamic model called 'association model'.

The thesis looks at the association between TOs and OCGs with a special focus because theories examined in Chapter 3 and studies on learning, adaptation and innovation devote an utmost importance to the association among teaching and learning parties (Midlarsky et al, 1980, 282; Attawell, 1992, p.1; Baptista, 1999, p.109; Inkpen, 2000, p.1021; Jackson, 2006, p.243; Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 2006, p.3; Dolnik, 2007, p.160; Nacos, 2009, Akers, 2009, p.23-25; Akers & Jennings, 2009, p.323; Horowitz, 2010, p.42-43; Lee, 2011; Albers, Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.126; Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013; Love, Roper & Vahter, 2014, p.1703; Pauwels & Schils, 2016). Therefore, the model, in the explanation of the relationship between TOs and OCGs, concentrates on the association as an effective factor on mutative modes of behaviour in both organizations.

The Relationship

Studies examined by this thesis indicate that findings on the relationship between terrorism and organized crime are diverse. A very high percentage of those studies (97%) accepts that there is a relationship, but a very small number of studies (3 %) argues that there is no relationship. In spite of this agreement, there is no consensus on the attributes of the relationship (*Figure 5*). Almost half of the studies remarking a relationship presents a form of relationship (44 %): short-term (21 %), alliance (35 %) and transformation (78 %). A small percentage (4.6 %), on the other hand, rejects a relationship in the form of alliance due to the differences between terrorism and organized crime. They argue that transformation of terrorism and crime might occur directly developing from a simple relationship, rather than as a result of alliance. Because of these different thoughts, the relationship is not clear and requires an additional scrutiny.



Figure 5. Attributes of relationship with multiple choices (n=65).

Researchers have provided different analytic models to explain attributes of the relationship. For instance, Dishman (2001, p.43) argues that transformation of a TO may occur while he objects any cooperative relationship between TOs and OCGs. Noting that limited, episodic and impermanent examples of cooperation are possible, he remarks that two groups remain non-cooperative due to different ends and means; the concern of TOs over political capital, and the fear of the government's reprisal towards a criminal group in cooperation with TOs.

There are different degrees in Dishman's linear spectrum. TOs and OCGs that continue to be purely criminal or political remain on the left side while organizations that lose their *raison d'etre* are located on the right end side. Pure groups such as the Russian Mafia and the EZLN might exceptionally engage in non-traditional activities only to further their ultimate purposes. The ultimate aims and motivations of organizations on the right side of the spectrum may change and they may no longer retain their initial goals or motivations. These organizations may still claim their rhetoric and maintain "public façade". TOs in Burma are typical of these organizations. Organizations that participate in crime or politics to a significant degree are located on the middle-right end of the spectrum. On the other hand, mutated TOs that invest significant energies into profit-driven criminal acts are placed in the middle of the spectrum. IRA is one of them. It had been involved in micro criminal activities, but later invested so much of its resources in committing criminal acts.

Dishman's objection to cooperation is questionable. TOs and OCGs may forgo creating alliances (Makarenko, 2005, p.191), but tendency is skewed towards cooperation. Details of this subject are presented in Chapter 4. Other

reasons that create obstacles to cooperation are questionable as well. Dishman argues that 'in house' capabilities of TOs obviate the need for TOs to cooperate with OCGs, but learning is prerequisite for developing in house capabilities and it requires association between two groups. Knowledge on highly sophisticated criminal activities such as illicit drug production, money laundering or counterfeiting may not be learned without the assistance of experts from the criminal world (Makarenko, 2004, p.131). For example, TOs in Burma, without the cooperation of OCGs, could not learn to produce chemical drugs, reach out criminal contacts abroad, or transport or sell their products abroad.

There are other points that raise concerns in Dishman's model. It is not clear where each type of organization stands on the linear spectrum. He argues that the purely criminal or political organizations, about which he gives examples, which are strictly loyal to their *raison d'etre* are, in fact, known to be involved in non-traditional activities regularly, not exceptionally. The Russian Mafia, for instance, regularly cooperated with the FARC to exchange drugs for arms and to launder money (Bibes, 2001, p.246; Makarenko, 2005, p.174; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.80). Russian OCGs, on the other hand, regularly engage in non-traditional activities. They exploded trolley-buses in Moscow in 1996 right after the Russian government passed the 'Decree on Combatting Organized Crime'. Additionally, they bombed a block of flats that government officers live in 1996 (Makarenko, 2005, p.275).

Thompson & Turlej's (2003, p.88) propose an operational model formed according to the level of criminality for financial purposes. In the first stage (Exclusively Terrorist), there are TOs that are involved in minor criminal fundraising activities such as robbing and kidnapping for ransom. The second

stage (Mainly Terrorist) consists of TOs that increasingly use crime to support their activities. Military causes are paramount over criminality in this stage. The third stage (Increasingly Criminal) includes TOs that expend their resources to protect and expand criminal activities. The criminal activities in this stage are seen increasingly vital. TOs in the fourth stage (Criminal Side Dominates) use their original cause to validate criminal activities. The criminal activities become the main focus of the organizations. The last stage consists of TOs that expend all efforts on criminal activities. Ideology is forsaken in this stage. Their model, however, ignores OCGs and focuses only on TOs of the 'terror-crime partnership'. Nevertheless, it is conceptualized by only criminal operations of TOs. Organizational characters, such as the size of the organization and the member types are disregarded. Factors that affect motivational changes and role of non-financial crimes such as producing false passports for transportation purposes or arms smuggling, whether the model follows a certain order or whether TOs may switch backwards in the model remain unanswered. Therefore, their model does not provide the whole aspects of the relationship.

Metz and Millen (2004), on the other hand, consider the course of insurgency as the basis of their analysis. They debate that the relationship between TOs and OCGs is a natural phase of the development that TOs experience. They note seven stages in the course of insurgency: (1) the emergence of serious insurgency in the first place, (2) the development of military capacities by the insurgents, (3) the expansion of public support, (4) the creation of linkages between the insurgency and organized crime, (5) the sustainment of chronic instability, (6) the perception of success by insurgents and (7) the coalescence of a coherent insurgent political organization (p.27). It

is the fourth phase that TOs form linkages with OCGs and enter into organized crime. According to them, TOs step into coalitions with OCGs and they may become "purely criminal organizations with only the thinnest veneer of politics" (p.14). However, their argument does not provide an explanatory model on the interaction in the sense that not only do not they explain how TOs enter into organized crime and how TOs form the linkages, but also they also overlook the fact that not all TOs experience these developmental phases. Some TOs, for example, distance themselves from organized crime and remain purely political.

Picarelli et al (2005, p.34) define five different stages in their linear "terror-crime interaction spectrum": *activity appropriation* in which organizations begin to "borrow each other's methods"; *nexus* that refers to a short-term process in which groups form "business relationships" and start to "buy" and "sell" services and goods from each other; *symbiotic relationship* that refers to a stage in which "two groups begin working together more regularly, and begin to share each other's goals as well as working methods"; *hybrid* that refers to a stage in which "two groups become one"; and *transformation* that refers to a last stage in which hybrid group's proclivity towards one of the groups starts to dominate and "drops the other altogether" (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.5).

Picarelli et al (2005)'s classification of terror-crime interaction requires an additional examination. The activity appropriation process requires more than just interaction because for an activity to be appropriated, sufficient knowledge on it should be learned. This learning, depending on the activity type, requires long-term associations, longer than what Picarelli et al. consider. "Nexus", on the other hand, means more than just "link" between the two

(Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.5). It refers to more advanced associations between two groups. Thus, an organization may become hybrid without converging with another organization but changing itself to a point where it adds a secondary characteristic. Moreover, hybrid is the beginning of a convergence process (Makarenko, 2004, p.135). Even though hybrid and transformation stages may be distinguished, they both are part of a convergence process because in each phase, the end organization becomes different from the original.

Mincheva and Gurr (2006) also study the attributes of the relationship. They look at the motivations and circumstances that extend the agendas of TOs. They argue that three factors condition the terrorism-crime connection. The first factor is the "existence of trans-state nationalistic, ethnic and religious movements that provide settings conductive to collaboration between terrorists and criminals based on shared values and mutual trust" (p.1). The second factor is the occurrence of armed conflict and the third is the constraints such as complex transnational exchanges of illegal goods, other parties involved in exchanges and corruptible internal security forces.

Mincheva and Gurr (2006, p.3) state four different patterns in their interaction model: ideological, pragmatic, predatory and opportunistic. Giving the example of the Provisional IRA, they argue that some TOs give primacy to their ideological objectives while they engage in illicit economic activities for funds in the ideological pattern. The pragmatic pattern represents the "pragmatic shift" in a TO's agenda; material objectives become priority whilst political objectives still exist, as in the case of the FARC. A complete shift from political agenda towards material gain is the predatory pattern. The fourth pattern is the opportunistic interdependence in which "political goals and

material gain co-exist on an equal footing" (p.5). The Balkan region, according to them, provides examples of political-criminal hybrids; Ethnic Serbian groups that are responsible for the Bosnian ethnic cleansing and mass murder and Albanian terrorists are some of them (p.5).

Mincheva and Gurr's (2006) analysis, however, does not involve both parties of the interaction. The model does not explain how these associations occur, how organizations fit into specific patterns or if they may shift from one pattern to another. Nevertheless, the model conditions the relationship on three factors. The model does not explain conditions that do not meet those criteria. Therefore, their model does not explain the whole aspects of the interaction.

Rollins and Wyler (2013) provide a model with three stages; partnership motivation and disincentives, appropriation of tactics, and organizational evolution and variation. The first phase refers to partnerships that include demands for skill, greed, opportunity, joint ventures and changes in ideological motivations. The second phase refers to appropriation of tactics by both organizations. Ideologies and motivations remain consistent in this phase. The last phase refers to the transformation of both organizations over time. In this stage, TOs transform to adopt criminal motivations whereas criminal organizations shift towards political goals. Original motivations, profit or politics remain secondary for organizations in this phase. The ASG, Al Qaeda's affiliates, D-Company, the PKK, the FARC, Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah are listed as TOs that are frequently cited as being involved in criminal activities.

However, Rollins and Wyler (2013) provide a general model that overlooks details in those three stages. The first stage, for example, consists of

various relationship types, but the model considers them all as partnerships. On the other hand, when a TO forms a partnership with an OCG and acts on joint ventures, it means an activity appropriation already occurs in the first stage, not in the second stage, as Rollins and Wyler (2013) argue. Nevertheless, level of interaction in the first stage is not enough to cause a change in ideological motivations. For such changes, interaction should reach a sustained level.



Figure 6. Makarenko's Crime Terror Continuum (2004, p.131).

Tamara Makarenko's (2003, p.6; 2004, p.130; 2005, p.187) model (*Figure 6*) is the most insightful terror-crime model so far. It has been adopted by different researchers (Smith, Rush & Burton, 2013). In her terror-crime continuum, the first level of relationship is alliance that includes one-off, short-term and long-term relationships. The international drug trade is one of the crime businesses that alliances mostly occur. The Medellin cartel and the ELN, D-Company and Al Qaeda, the LTTE and Lashkar e-Tayyaba, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Albanian criminal groups are some examples of alliances in this business. The second level of relationship is operational motivations. TOs, at this level, increasingly engage in criminal activities whereas OCGs increasingly focus on political activities. The primary motivations of both organizations persist in this level. The ETA, the FARC and

the PKK are examples of this level relationship. Convergence is the third level in which both organizations start to lose their primary aims and motivations. Makarenko (2004) describes this level as:

> the idea that criminal and TOs could converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously; but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began. (p.135)

Makarenko, similar to Metz's (1993, p.5) classification of terrorism as spiritual and commercial, divides this level into two groups; political crime and commercial terrorism. Political crime includes groups, such as Albanian criminal groups, who use terror tactics to gain political leverage and terrorism to establish a monopoly over an economic sector. Commercial terrorism, on the other hand, includes groups who engage in criminal activities extensively and maintain their political rhetoric as a façade to keep government focused on political issues and to maintain superiority against rivalry criminal groups (Makarenko, 2004, p.136). The ASG, the FARC and the IMU are examples of commercial terrorism. Later, probably taking into account the evolving nature of terrorism and organized crime, Makarenko (2005, p.186) argues that convergence phase includes the second level in which tactical convergence of organizations occurs and the third level in which convergence of all related group factors occurs.

The last level of continuum is called "the black hole syndrome" that refers to the environment that is created when the convergences happen. According to Makarenko (2003, p.11; 2004, p.138), black hole syndrome occurs when either the black hole states emerge after a state is taken over by a hybrid

groups or the primary motivations of TOs evolve from political aims to criminal aims. The product may be two different black hole states; a failed state that displays characteristics of anarchy without a central authority such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Somalia, or a criminal state controlled by government elites that use terror tactics to retain their power for lucrative illicit activities, such as North Korea, Myanmar (Makarenko, 2005, p.202).

In a recently published study, Makarenko and Mesquite (Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014, p. 1) revise Makarenko's model and propose a new, but a very general model. Beginning from alliances, they argue that organizations move to organizational convergence stage where they become the same, and then evolutionary stage where they transform into the other.

There are some conceptual problems in both models. The models consider one-off, short-term and long-term relationships as part of alliances, but alliances are strategic formations and one-off and even short-term relationships may not be considered as alliances because alliances require more advanced relationships and strong pre-existing ties (Teece, 1992, p.6; Larsson et al., 1998, p.292; Inkpen, 1998a, p.226; Tsang, 1999, p.212; Rees & Aldrich, 2005, p.907; Mitsuhashi & Greeve, 2009, p.975).

The models do not consider possible confrontations between TOs and OCGs in spite of the fact that organized crime is a competitive world and contestation in the same activity area is likely to occur. When TOs transform into hybrid organizations, or "commercial TOs" as in the words of Makarenko, they compete with OCGs for territorial issues and rivalry becomes an inevitable outcome due to the monopolist nature of organized crime business. The issue of contestation is more important when black hole states occur. According to the

black hole thesis, “the most complex relationships between organized crime and terrorism are allowed to persist and eventually take over territorial control” (2005, p.186). In a business full of rivalry and violence, who will take over the territorial control? The new ruling power and OCGs will then dispute with each other (Cockayne, 2013, p.14). The FARC, for example, aims to implement pervasive land reform in Colombia which acts against the interests of OCGs such as Medellin and Cali groups, who purchased over one-twelfth of Colombia’s land (Dishman, 2001, p.50). Makarenko presents no argument on the future of the black hole states nor the organizations in the black hole syndrome. Her focus, nonetheless, is limited to the black hole states in terms of the milieu TOs and OCGs operate. Nonetheless, she does not present any information about the direct involvement of TOs or OCGs in crime.

In sum, researchers have proposed models purporting to explain the relationship even though concepts such as nexus and alliance refer to different association types in each one of these models. Consequently, models built on these concepts exhibit disparity, and this inconsistency perplexes the literature. The following section presents an association model that describes how TOs and OCGs associate with each other and explains the implications of these associations. The model focuses on the degree of the association, and is developed over the argument that increased associations between TOs and OCGs cause a learning process that leads to appropriation to a level where organizations become alike, and in some extreme cases, the same.

The Association Model

After an extensive exploration of the literature, this chapter proposes a new dynamic model to explain the relationship between TOs and OCGs. The

frequency of association, non-traditional activity engagements, and changes in motivations and aims are the cores of the model. The gradual increase in association brings both organizations closer to each other: the more they associate, the more they learn non-traditional activities. The more they engage in those activities, the more they appropriate each other and become alike.

Mutative behaviour modes of organizations are presented gradually in different phases of the model. It is posited here that the initial relationships between organizations are mostly formed at the individual levels, but it escalates to organizational levels as the frequency of the association increases. Thus, the decreasing range of difference between both organizations also represents an escalation of association from tactical level to strategic level (Lal, 2005, p.302).

The model exemplifies non-traditional activities of TOs by using the crime types perpetrated by TOs. However, the literature on criminal activities of TOs has mostly remained limited to illegal drug activities of TOs because TOs' involvement in drug business, compared to other criminal activity types, is documented to a greater extent. Therefore, this model uses illegal drug activities extensively, yet other types of criminal activities are also evaluated when substantial evidence of involvement is found.

The association model, represented in a graphic using X (mutation) and Y (association) axis, demonstrates mutative modes of behaviour that occur in TOs and OCGs depending on the level of association (*Figure 7*). The model defines seven points in four different groups: *authentic, link (ephemeral* and *non-symptomatic), nexus (alliance* and *contestation),* and *convergence (hybrid* and *transformation).*



Figure 7. Dynamic Model of Association.

TOs and OCGs, in this model, pass through the same phases. The dynamic model neither posits that every organization passes through all phases nor suggests that the association process follows a certain order. An organization may skip some phases and move from one point to another at any given time. A hybrid organization may dissolve later and move back to alliance, or an alliance may be ended and both organizations may go back to the first phase. The LTTE, for example, had been associated with OCGs and started to smuggle narcotics in the 1980s which would place it in the nexus phase for that period. However, later, the LTTE started to distance itself from the narcotic activities of the 1980s (Dishman, 2001, p.49) and this puts it on the earlier phases of the model. The model, conceptualizing its structure according to the non-traditional activities of the organizations, tolerates changes and provides flexibility to the analysts who study the relationship between TOs and OCGs.

An organization may be positioned at different stages of the model simultaneously. This argument is especially valid for large-sized (n > 100) or cell-structured decentralized organizations. For example, while large-sized TOs associate with OCGs for taxes from drugs, and some of their sections may evolve into drug trafficking organizations themselves (Bovenkerk & Chakra, 2004, p.11). The PKK represents a good example (P.C. 3-5, 2012) as its sub-units located in urban areas associate with OCGs at an ephemeral level while its rural units maintain alliances with smuggling groups. Some of the PKK's units abroad, on the other hand, do not engage in organized crime and forgo relationships with OCGs, particularly with drug smuggling groups in fear of pressure from law enforcement agencies (P.C. 1-2, 2012).

The PIRA, a splinter group of the IRA, on the other hand, lost its political capital during the late 1970s when it became involved in drugs and other organized crime activities that were condemned by Catholic clergy and community leaders (Felbab-Brown; 2010, p.164; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.61). Later, they ceased association with drug smuggling organizations and began to antagonize them. They killed 13 alleged drug dealers between 1994 and 1996 (Horgan, 2005, p.28). However, they continued to associate with other OCGs that deal with money laundering, smuggling, etc. This puts the PIRA in the contestation and alliances phases at the same time.

It should be emphasized that the association model is built on the hybrid network structure model of association that explains modes of association between TOs and OCGs in Chapter 4. To reiterate, the hybrid network structure model works on three association forms; *autogamic association*, *allogamous association* and *multiple associations*. TOs in the authentic phase fall into the

category of autogamic association form because they do not associate with OCGs. TOs in the contestation phase, on the other hand, may fall into all association forms. They may contest with some OCGs and remain in the autogamic form, but at the same time they may continue to associate with other OCGs and refrain from contacts with TOs, or alternatively they may associate with other OCGs and TOs simultaneously. Depending on the characteristics of the association, they fall into different forms.

Authentic Phase

The authentic phase is the starting point of the graphical model. In this part, TOs and OCGs maintain their authenticity; they strictly pursue their original aims. The main distinction between them, one being political and the other criminal, is clearly observed in this phase. TOs in this phase are connected to ideologies. Horowitz (1983) calls them "purely ideological" (p.43). These purely ideological organizations strictly follow their primary motivations (Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.72). They do not interact with OCGs because association may be risky for the political capital, security and loyalty of members (Hamm, 2005, p.5; O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p.5; Otis, 2014, p.13). In addition, they mostly have steady channels of funding that would not necessitate alternative funding methods (Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.72). OCGs in this phase, on the other hand, focus on the profit only. They do not engage in non-traditional activities and refrain from associating with TOs because such association may deteriorate their business (Kaplan, 2005).

TOs and OCGs in this phase may engage in non-traditional activities exceptionally. Their exceptional involvements do not require associations with the other organization. They employ each other's methods without association

because of the simplicity of their non-traditional activities that can be operationalized with their own capabilities. Crimes committed by TOs at this phase are mostly limited to low sophisticated crime types such as robbery, extortion, taxation or street selling of illegal goods. Thus, they commit predicate crimes in preparation for another crime.

The EZLN in Mexico may be evaluated in authentic phase because it has kept itself away from organized crime and OCGs for fear of erosion of the EZLN's foreign support which provides crucial illicit financial and political capital (Cornell, 2005, p.755). The EZLN receives most of its donations from foreign sympathizers through its web site, music concerts and other means (Dishman, 2001, p.47).

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement in Pakistan is another organization that distanced itself from drugs trade (Cornell, 2005, p.756). However, parts of the organization were involved in other criminal activities, but not at significant levels.

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq are other examples of authentic TOs. Mango (2005), for instance, states that "no matter how poor were Masud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan at their nadir, neither cultivated nor smuggled drugs" (p.48).

Harkatul Jihad-E-Islami in Pakistan, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in Indonesia, Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let) in Pakistan, Loyalist Volunteer Forces (Lvf) in Northern Ireland, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Philippines, Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance, Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs in Russian Federation,

and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in India represent other examples of authentic TOs. (State University of New York, 2016).

OCGs in this phase, on the other hand, employ non-traditional activities exceptionally. The Yakuza in Japan and some Chinese triads are two illustrative examples of other authentic organizations that fall into this phase of association (Makarenko, 2005, p.203).

It is difficult to remain authentic for both organizations. The evolving nature of both terrorism and crime, the emergence of transnational organized crime and the changing international security as well as globalization put pressure on both organizations to move along the other phases in the model. For example, the ELN, established in 1964 in Colombia, remained authentic between the 1960s and 1990s. Nicolas Rodriguez, its leader, continuously tried to distinguish ELN's financing from drug funding (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.4; Otis, 2014, p.4). Most of the funding was coming from kidnappings that generated around $200 million annually until the ELN leadership decided to change its policy by the late 1990s (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.92). Money started to come from drugs that generated 20 % of the ELN's income in the 2000s (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.93).

The M-19 in Colombia is another representative example. M-19 was an intellectually based movement operating in urban areas (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.119). It was a peasant self-defence organization targeting OCGs for extortion (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.77). Later, it allied with OCGs. It remained authentic until it formed an alliance with drug cartels in Colombia.

Link Phase

The association between TOs and OCGs occurs in its simplest form for short periods of time in the link phase (Laqueur, 1996, p.25). TOs and OCGs, in this phase, are clearly distinguished by their traditional aims and motivations (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.37; Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.4). They are characterized by their one-off, single or episodic engagements in non-traditional activities (O'Malley & Hutchison, 2006, p.13). These activities remain at tactical levels.

The role of the members of both organizations is very significant in this level of association; non-traditional activities are most often facilitated at an individual level through "trusted handshakes" formed by shared ethnic, tribal, religious bonds (Forest, 2012a, p.175). The level of association increases when both organizations benefit from the relationship over a period of time (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.37). Then, tactical level associations upgrade to strategic level associations in other phases.

Ephemeral (Opportunistic)

This phase refers to associations that result from opportunities (Horgan & Taylor, 1999, p.9; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.41; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.5). It includes exceptional, incidental associations. It consists of isolated organizations that plan one-off, single engagements in non-traditional activities. TOs and OCGs in this phase do not associate with each other regularly.

TOs and OCGs that engage in one-off, small scale operations with low entry costs are located in this stage (O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p.5). Types of crimes in which TOs engage are non-sophisticated crimes which do not require special knowledge or expertise. TOs in this phase may be involved in

crime only when it is needed financially for forthcoming attacks. When the needed amount of money is accumulated, they embark their operations, without committing further crime. They become involved in crime again if they are short of money for another operation. Such involvements are neither "symptomatic" of a continuous association nor "indicative" of future associations between the two groups (Merari, 2000, p.59). However, political conditions may change in one region and new conditions may provide opportunities for association.

OCGs in this phase, on the other hand, use killings and assassinations. These tactics are used to establish a monopoly and to solve disputes with other OCGs. The violence remains discriminate in this phase.

Non-symptomatic (Expedient)

Non-symptomatic phase is the stage in which association increases in frequency and starts to become complicated; however, it still does not reach to a symptomatic level. The frequency of non-traditional activity engagement still remains non-symptomatic at low levels and types of crimes committed are unsophisticated. It consists of organizations that engage in non-traditional activities episodically (O'Malley & Hutchison, 2006, p.13).

Not only do TOs begin to engage in crimes when they need immediate financial support, but also when they want to guarantee resources and hoard for their future operations. OCGs in this phase continue to use discriminate violence. They use terror tactics to further their profit-oriented goals (O'Malley & Hutchison, 2006, p.13). Killings and assassinations against their rival groups and corrupted officers are used as a means to sustain the monopoly. The rising criminal activities of TOs and terror tactics of OCGs become cause for concern;

however, TOs' political motives and OCGs' financial motives still distinguish them.

The PIRA is an organization that represents an example of this level of association. Researchers, based on cases in the U.S.A., remark the PIRA is associated with OCGs, particularly the Mafia and Colombian drug dealers (Maguire, 1993, p.286). However, later, the PIRA started to give primacy to their ideological objectives. They ceased associations with drug dealers, but continued their organized crime activities. Their association with drug smuggling OCGs became limited to the non-symptomatic level (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.3).

Nexus Phase

In the nexus phase, the association between two organizations becomes systematic and continuous. Tactical level associations reach strategic levels in the nexus phase. Both the frequency of criminal engagements and association and the variety of crime types in which TOs become involved increase in this stage. OCGs at this stage, on the other hand, are increasingly involved in terrorist activities; they establish their own assassination squads to eliminate, as well as terrorize, people who harm their business (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.111).

There is strong "intertwining" between TOs and OCGs in this stage (Den Boer, 1999, p.7; Radu, 2002, p.278; Wilkinson, 2006, p.194; Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.63; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.4). The relationship between both groups is characterized as "pragmatic, arms-length relationship" (Berry, 2002, p.1). At this level of association, the demarcation between terrorism and organized crime becomes difficult to discern; nevertheless, the fundamental difference of

motivation still exists (Laqueur, 1996, p.25; Lesser et al., 1999, p.98; Berry et al., 2002, p.1).

Alliance (symbiotic)

Alliances between TOs and OCGs are one of the most referred association types in the literature (Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014, p. 5), unfortunately, they are also the most mistaken types; researchers tend to consider almost all association types as alliance. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify 'alliances' before explaining this association phase.

Alliance is a "mutual commitment to contribute …assistance" (Reiter, 1994, p.495). It is "a long term cooperative arrangement" (Tsang, 1999, p.212). An alliance is established when "two or more organizations are mutually useful to each other" (Mitsuhashi & Greeve, 2009, p.992).

The literature on alliances is extensive (Albers, Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013) and alliances are very common in many situations, ranging from alliances between legal business firms, military organizations to international organizations and states (Walt, 1987; 1988; Teece, 1992; Reiter, 1994, p.490; Tsang, 1999, p.211; Morgan & Palmer, 2003, p.180; Grant & Baden Fuller, 2004, p.62; Bloch, 2009, p.2; Konrad & Kovenock, 2009, p.84; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009, p.975; Kimball, 2010, p.407; Konrad, 2011, p.2). These studies, and many others, indicate that alliance formation is a selective process (Medcof, 1997, p.718; Mitsuhashi & Greeve, 2009, p.975; Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.200).

Understanding each other's strategic reasons for forming the alliance, coined as "strategic business fit" by Medcof (1997, p.720), familiarity with organizations through historical association, named as the "shadow of the past"

by Larsson et al. (1998, p.292), pre-existing ties and resource endowment are the main factors in formation of alliances (Teece, 1992, p.6; Inkpen, 1998a, p.226; Rees & Aldrich, 2005, p.907; Mitsuhashi & Greeve, 2009, p.975, Albers, Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013). While pre-existing ties enable organizations to have useful information about potential partners and make it easier to initiate new collaborations, high resource endowment makes organizations more attractive as alliance partners. TOs and OCGs have clear understanding of their strategic business fit. TOs and OCGs, for instance, operate within the same environment (Steinitz, 1985, p.147; Beers & Taylor, 2002; Picarell et al, 2005, p.34; Braun, 2008; Bergeron, 2013, p.7; Bobic, 2014, p.246; Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014, p.214) and by sharing the same geography, TOs and OCGs obtain prior knowledge about each other. Gradually, they grow connections for valuable resources. Purposes of each organization are clearly known to the other. Moreover, poly-members of both organizations contribute to the formation of alliances between organizations. Consequently, they form alliances in which both groups understand each other.

A change in circumstances (Kimball, 2010, p.410) or a confrontation by a significant external threat (Walt, 1988, p.278; Lin, 2012, p.336) gives impetus to alliance formation. Reiter (1994, p.504) labels this experience as a "formative event" and argues that preferences for alliances are based on the formative events and their results; in dealing with threats, learning a lesson in favour of the utility of alliance results in continuity. TOs, as demonstrated earlier, have faced with the new global counterterrorism challenges. The changing circumstances have also forced them towards alliances with OCGs not only to save resources by relying on other organizations but also to benefit from access

of OCGs to different strata of society and governmental organizations that are deemed to be a threat to the security of TOs. Since OCGs corrupt officials and law enforcement agencies and receive information about possible intervention efforts beforehand, TOs also benefit from these connections.

The success in alliances promotes continuity (Reiter, 1994, p.526). Alliances for primary level benefits, such as protection of OCGs by TOs against rivalry and shares of profits of drug business given to TOs by OCGs in exchange of protection, is likely to promote advanced alliances between two organizations. The advanced alliances may result in more associations between both organizations. In tandem, the learning process among both groups reaches high levels. In addition to learning, advanced alliances provide opportunities to reach out the primary sources directly. For example, by accessing and acquiring the knowledge of arms smuggling through alliances with OCGs, not only do TOs obtain weapons but also acquire direct access to the primary sources of the weapons (Bibes, 2001, p.246; Makarenko, 2004, p.132; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.80). This helps TOs expand their networks and increase the number of association nodes.

Alliance (symbiotic) phase of the model refers to mutually beneficial relationships between TOs and OCGs (Cilluffo, 2000; Berry, 2002, p.1; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.87; Aufhauser, 2004, p.4; Ehrenfeld, 2007, p.29; Waldman, 2007, p.232; Ackerman, Zhuang &Weerasuriya, 2016). The relationship occurs in the form of “marriages of convenience” (Passas, 2007, p.26; Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1; Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.1). In fact, it stems from both opportunity and need (Albini et al., 1999, p.7; Gheordunescu, 2000, p.26; Hamm, 2005, p.221; Wilkinson,

2006, p.35; Duyvesteyn, 2007, p.63; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.10; Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.200). The urgency of obtaining financial resources and arms forces TOs into dependence on organized crime (Porta, 1995, p.158). While TOs provide protection to OCGs, the latter provide finance (Calvani, 2001; Berry, 2002, p.58; Björnehed, 2004, p.309). Some TOs may even give up the political capital and compel the local population for cooperation with OCGs (Van de Velde, cited in Berry et al, 2002, p.58). In other cases, both organizations use each other's networks and nodes for their own purposes (Greenberg, Wechsler & Wolosky, 2002, p.11; Lal, 2005, p.294; Chepesiuk, 2007; Levitt, 2012; Byman, 2014, p.439).

Alliances create incentives to TOs and OCGs because alliances provide various benefits to allying parties, such as generating additional profits and improving market share. (Simonin, 1997, p.1154). They are beneficial for obtaining and sharing resources (Lei, 1993, p.32; Inkpen, 1998b, p.69; Goolsby, 2006, p.16; Das & Kumar, 2007, p.684; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p.440; Mitsuhasi & Greeve, 2009, p.975; Kimball, 2010, p.407; Ackerman, Zhuang &Weerasuriya, 2016, p.3; Schillinger, 2016, 342). In addition, they increase the efficiency of their operations by providing the same level activity with fewer resources (Kimball, 2010, p.407). They also increase payoffs by joint actions (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p.9). Thus, they present better propaganda opportunities that help allying partners increase recruitment (Bymani 2014, p.449).

Alliances present additional benefits for TOs and OCGs. Allying TOs become more likely to use violence (Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016, p.5) and increase their production rates (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008,

p.440). Felbab-Brown (2010, p.22), on the other hand, points out the benefits that TOs and drug traffickers provide to each other. TOs benefit from financial payoffs, denial and provision of intelligence on terrorists to government agencies or to other TOs, whereas drug trafficking groups benefit from protection against governments, TOs and other trafficking organizations as well protection of transport systems and routes and guarantee of reliable production from peasants.

TOs and OCGs are not the only parties that benefit from alliances. The symbiotic relationships between TOs and OCGs may include more than two actors. Money generated from illegal activities creates its own system that consists of other actors such as military forces, politicians, businessmen and government officers (Waldman, 2007, p.243). These actors have an interest in preserving the symbiotic relationship because they would receive additional payments, equipment, weaponry or power.

There are numerous examples of alliances between TOs and OCGs. Peru's SL, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Colombian leftist group the April 19th Movement (M19) allied with various OCGs. They provided protection for the drug trade to OCGs in exchange for money (Makarenko, 2005, p.175; O'Malley & Hutchinson, 2006, p.10). The PKK, for instance, established strong relationships with OCGs such as the Italian Pugliese mafia; the so-called Holy United Crown. The alliance of the PKK and the Albanian Mafia, on the other hand, is based on smuggling activities; they do not only smuggle drugs but also immigrants into Western Europe through the Balkan route (Brewda, 1999, p.53; P.C. 6-7, 2013).

The PKK is not the only organization that Albanian criminal groups ally with. The Albanian OCGs also ally with the KLA (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.37). The KLA and its political wing, Kosovo National Front (KNF), developed relationships with Albanian OCGs to smuggle heroin to Europe in exchange of arms (Makarenko, 2004, p.132; 2005, p.189; Makarenko & Mesquite, 2014, p. 3). The LTTE followed a similar way to reach weapons. The LTTE developed alliances with Indian OCGs; the LTTE members, using their networks abroad, sold the Indian OCGs' drugs in exchange of weapons (Makarenko, 2005, p.188).

The alliance between the Italian Red Brigades and the Naples Camorra in the 1980s demonstrates how advanced alliances may be formed. The Red Brigades handed out a five-page statement that praised criminal activities of the Naples Camorra in 1982 (Dishman, 2001, p.53), and offered help to the Camorra in their organized crime activities (Steinitz, 1985, p.146). The Red Brigades killed a Naples police chief who arrested friends and relatives of a jailed Camorra godfather. They even attempted to free Camorra members from prison.

Similarly, ASALA cooperated with OCGs, particularly of Armenian origins (Steinitz, 1985, p.145). Members of OCGs were involved in bombings with ASALA members. Noubar Sofoyan, an Armenian drug smuggler who was arrested in Greece on drug charges, was involved in bombing in Switzerland. In return to those OCGs, ASALA issued several threats against Swedish authorities on behalf of drug dealers in prisons (Steinitz, 1985, p.145).

The FARC is another TO that allied with OCGs. They developed relationships with Mexican drug trafficking groups, Russian OCGs and the

Italian Mafia (Bibes, 2001, p.246; Makarenko, 2004, p.132; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.80). They also jointly involved in document fraud and counterfeiting activities (Makarenko, 2003, p.7). The FARC sends cocaine to Mexico and Russia in return for arms (Makarenko, 2004, p.132). The FARC's relation with the Russian Mafia also includes money laundering (Makarenko, 2005, p.174). The FARC also acted on behalf of OCGs. It exploded a car with bombs in 1999, killing 7 people and injuring 42, to influence the extradition requests for drug traffickers to the USA (Bibes, 2001, p.250).

The Medellin Cartel is an example of an OCG that allied with TOs; it is alleged that a member of ETA exploded 1,100 pounds of dynamite in front of the Department of Administrative Security Building in Bogota for the Medellin Cartel (Dishman, 2001, p.53). A similar agreement was done between La Terraza, an urban-based OCG, and Peasant Self-Defence Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU), the largest paramilitary group in Colombia. La Terraza agreed to kill human right activists on the request of Carlos Castano, the leader of the ACCU (Dishman, 2001, p.53).

Drug lord Pablo Escobar's OCG, on the other hand, allied with the ELN and hired ELN members to plant car bombs in 1993 because neither Escobar nor anyone in his organization possessed knowledge of bombs (Björnehed, 2004, p.310; Makarenko, 2004, p.131; Picarelli et al., 2005, p.36). Escobar's OCG also allied with the M-19 in the mid-1980s. Escobar's OCG produced cocaine in Colombia and the M-19 arranged transportation as well as protection against government raids (Hamm, 2005, p.5). M-19 also allied with other OCGs. For example, Jaime Guillot-Lara, a leading Colombian drug trafficker, supplied weapons for M-19 in exchange of assistance for drug smuggling

(Steinitz, 1985, p.143). The M-19 members raided the Colombian Supreme Court on behalf of the drug traffickers before the court gave its verdict on extradition of drug traffickers. They killed over 100 people, including Supreme Court judges (Jamieson, 1994, p.84; Bibes, 2001, p.249; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.91).

Afghanistan provides another example. Taliban members walk hand in hand with drug smuggling groups (Taylor, 2006, p.7). Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, outlines this alliance: "terrorism and narcotic drugs are involved and cooperate in the destruction of Afghanistan, the region and the world" (Karzai, 2004). Iraq is another country where TOs and OCGs ally (Looney, 2005, p.3). Insurgent attacks on oil reserves provide huge profits to OCGs. OCGs purchase oil from corrupted government officers at the official price, and then sell it on the black market for higher prices. Kidnapping is another realm of alliance in Iraq. OCGs kidnap foreigners and sell them to TOs.

Contestation

Contestation refers to the antagonistic relationships between TOs and OCGs. It may occur in other phases of the interaction; however, the inherent problems in the alliances fuel the possibility of contestation, and it is more likely to occur when a certain level of association occurs between two groups, especially at a level when TOs and OCGs may find the alliance less beneficial and start to challenge each other either for their shares in the market or for strategic reasons such as political capital or territorial control. On the other hand, there may be other problems in alliances which drive both organizations towards contestation.

Forming alliances is a difficult process (Konrad and Kovenock, 2009, p.84). Alliances may fail to produce intended outcomes (Lei, 1993, p.32; Esteban & Ray, 2001, p.663; Bloch, 2009, p.2; Konrad, 2011, p.5; Albers, Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013, p.6; Byman, 2014, p.444). Konrad (2011, p.5) calls this situation as "the paradox": both sides of the alliance have to share the "the prize" (Esteban & Ray, 2001, p.663), but one side may fail to garner its share and effort in alliances becomes "suboptimal" (Bloch, 2009, p.2)". Consequently, alliances may be decimated.

The alliance between TOs and OCGs is not different. The relationship may be an "uneasy alliance" (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.8). TOs and OCGs in alliances may not always preserve their mutual benefits and they may become more self-interested (Ackerman, Zhuang &Weerasuriya, 2016, p.4). In such situations, conflict arises and TOs and OCGs become rivals. Contestation among the PKK members and OCGs in London provides an example. Baybaşin family members who gained control over the drug market in Haringey area of London were known to finance the PKK (KOM Archives). Abdullah Baybaşin, the leader of the family in London and one of the targets of the Serious Organized Crime Agency of the UK (UK Treasury, 2007, p.22), established a gang named Bombacılar (Bombers) who spread fear throughout the Turkish and Kurdish community in London (Summers, 2006). Establishment of the Bombacılar was not welcomed by the PKK and they began to dispute over the drug business (P.C. 1-3, 2012). This resulted in "a mass brawl" broke out in Haringey, and a man was killed by Bombacılar (Summers, 2006). Consequently, the PKK and Baybaşin Group became competitors in the UK after long years of alliance.

Contestation may sometimes occur before an alliance is formed. The M-19, for instance, was an authentic organization when it was founded. Later, it started to brutally extort drug cartels and kidnap their family members. Then, drug cartels established the Death to Kidnappers (MAS) to protect themselves from M-19. The MAS started to kill M-19 members and supporters systematically. After being killed by the MAS, the M-19 changed its strategy and allied with drug cartels (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.91). The relationship between M-19 and OCGs was a contestation before an alliance.

The relationship between TOs and OCGs is sometimes considered to be antagonistic (Björnehed, 2004, p.311; Makarenko, 2005, p.191; O'Malley and Hutchinson, 2006; Passas, 2007, p.302; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.391). TOs and OCGs may use systematic violence against each other (Higgins & Kilpatrick, 2005, p.334; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.391; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.91; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.6). For instance, the PIRA is known to use violence against drug dealers (Horgan, 2005, p.28). Similarly, the ETA announced that it would kill narcotic dealers in the Basque region (Steinitz, 1985, p.147).

The FARC, on the other hand, demanded more money for protection and higher prices for *cocaleros* (coca growers) from drug traffickers. It raided the ranches and kidnapped family members of Colombia's richest traffickers (Dishman, 2001, p.50). It blocked the drug smugglers attempt to gain power and respect by acquiring large landholdings. As a result, nearly 100 Colombian cocaine traffickers issued a manifesto declaring open war with the FARC in 1984 (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.80). Colombia's drug traffickers hired private security forces, and founded their own paramilitary armies (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.4; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.80). They used these armies not only to fight

with the guerrillas for local control, but also to provide an order to their territories (Holmes, De Pineres & Curtin, 2007, p.252).

A similar contestation occurred in Peru. The interests of SL and OCGs conflicted over "the price of their services" with the SL intending to extract more fees and OCGs wanting to pay as little as possible (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.20). The SL, in an effort to gain popular support, forced OCGs to pay higher prices for drugs, managed to "prohibit traffickers from killing farmers who fail to produce promised quantities of coca", and prevented OCGs from "establishing a monopoly in a region" (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.23). The SL, in favour of coca growers against traffickers, agreed with coca growers for a guaranteed minimum selling price for coca (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.87; Jamieson, 1994, p.86; Palmer, 2007, p.200). The SL also killed OCGs members who prevented the farmers from organizing themselves against the traffickers. Consequently, the SL reduced traffickers' ability to cheat and abuse coca cultivators. In response, Colombian OCGs sent 300 heavily armed members to the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru to "protect their Peruvian intermediaries and cocaine shipments from Sendero's attacks and extortion" (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.48).

In sum, TOs and OCGs may have antagonistic relationships because of their disparate motivations. On the other hand, they may ally with each other for mutual benefits, but it is also possible that their relationship deteriorates, and, by extension, they may clash. Goals of both organizations still persist in this stage; however, it becomes difficult to discern because organizations separately continue to engage in non-traditional activities. One interesting point about contestation among TOs and OCGs after alliances is that TOs, using

OCGs' contacts, learn the business and establish their own international contacts with foreign OCGs (Bibes, 2001, p.246; Makarenko, 2004, p.132; 2005, p.174; Naim, 2006, p.75; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.30; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.64). Consequently, TOs that contest with OCGs in the homeland may continue to ally with foreign OCGs.

Convergence Phase

The last phase refers to metamorphosis of both organizations. Metamorphosis may occur in two ways: TO and OCGs may become hybrids or may transform themselves into the other. When political motivations are interwoven with criminal motivations and financial need and political motive exhibit equilibrium, organizations become 'hybrid'; half political half criminal. It occurs in two ways: an organization may mutate into an organization that embraces criminal and political aims and motivations simultaneously, or conflate with another organization into a single organization that exhibit characteristics of both organizations. On the other hand, when financial needs override political motives, or vice versa, organizations shift to the "transformation" phase. In the transformation phase, organizations' original aims and motivations evaporate as are replaced by new ones. Then, a TO becomes an OCG or *vice versa.*

Hybrid

Hybrid organizations are organizational managements in which "two or more sovereign organizations combine to pursue common interests" (Borys & Jemison, 1989, p.234). Organizations in the hybrid phase convergence into "a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously" (Makarenko, 2004, p.135). Organizations do not necessarily

need to combine with one another. A single organization may also start to exhibit characteristics of a hybrid organization.

Strategic alliance formation is a very dynamic and interactive process; alliances evolve over time (Powell, 1987). As a part of the evolution, organizations become hybrids. Accordingly, they redefine their goals (Iyer, 2002, p.9), and reconcile their purposes into a common purpose (Borys & Jemison, 1989, p.237). Similarly, TOs and OCGs in successful alliances may transform into hybrid organizations (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Bovenkerk & Chakra, 2004, p.13; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p.564; Kaplan, 2005; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a; p.10; Levitt, 2009; Hoffman, 2010, p.443). When TOs and OCGs become one in hybrids (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.6), they start to preserve political and criminal motivations simultaneously and become part 'criminal', part 'political' (Horgan & Taylor, 1999, p.84; Schmid, 2000, p.114; Manwaring, 2002, p.72; Makarenko, 2003, p.6; 2004, p.135; 2005, p.17; Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.5; Braun, 2008; Bergeron, 2013, p.7; Rosato, 2016, p.2).

Hybrid TOs and OCGs are referred to as "degenerates" because they are no longer their original kinds (Veness, 2000, p.10; Sageman, 2004, p.44; Horgan, 2005, p.ix; Wilkinson, 2006, p.18). They become "terrorist by day, criminals by night", or terrorists who have turned into "traders" (Naim, 2006, p.28). Mincheva and Gurr (2008) call such organizations "political-criminal syndicates" that are characterized by "opportunistic interdependence" (p.34). These degenerates possess an ultra-rapid mutation capability (Horgan, 2005, p.ix). Michael Braun (2008), the DEA's chief of operations, states that they are "meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced". They may even attain enough power to bring down weak or

uncooperative states (Sanderson, 2004, p.56). Therefore, their motives become very difficult to discern (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Taylor & Horgan, 2000, p.5; Boer, 2001, p.214).

Benefiting from resources of more than one organization is one of the primary advantages of hybrid organizations. This also reduces market constraints (Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2). Thus, through hybrids, organizations avoid the disadvantages of conventional organizations, such as inadequate personnel, limited access to resources and lack of knowledge on other specializations (Borys & Jemison, 1989, p.235). A hybrid TO, for instance, "simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain their political objectives" (Hoffman, 2010, p.443).

The identity networks, existence of intra or inter-state armed conflict, and market opportunities and constraints can lead to the occurrence of hybrid organizations. Mincheva and Gurr (2008, p.2) argue that shared nationality, ethnicity or religious beliefs help individuals and groups feel attached to each other. The shared identity, instability and financial opportunities bring TOs and OCGs together in hybrid forms (Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2). The FARC in Colombia, TOs in tri-border area in Latin America, Aum Sect in Japan, groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the SL in Peru, the KLA in Kosovo and the PKK in Turkey are mostly cited as hybrid groups (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.3; Schmid, 2000, p.114; Sanderson, 2004, p.44; Horgan, 2005, p.ix; Parachini, 2005, p.12; Braun, 2008; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.41; Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.22; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.6).

The IRA, which is regarded as hybrid TOs (Bergeron, 2013, p.7), experienced a change of motivation initiated by Gerry Adams, a senior member of the IRA as well as the leader of the Sinn Fein. The new IRA leaders pursued a revolutionary change by means of armed struggle and economic subversion at once (Adams, 1992, cited in Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.4). Consequently, members moved away from terrorism to organized crime projects (Makarenko, 2005, p.197). The IRA operatives began to pretend to be "normal criminals" and "infiltrated the criminal infrastructure" (Tupman, 1988). Tupman also considers the possibility that OCGs might have infiltrated the IRA. Consequently, the IRA invested most of its energies to organized crime activities such as smuggling livestock and cars, running protection, extortion rackets, underground brothels and contractor fraud (Dishman, 2001, p.48; English, 2013, p.502). Thomas Murphy, IRA chief of staff, for example, had run a lucrative smuggling operation until 2006 (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.4). According to the aforementioned examples, the IRA may also be counted as a hybrid organization.

TOs, particularly in Latin America, have started to focus on "material greed" (Veness, 2000, p.10). To take an illustrative example, the FARC prohibited drugs as "anti-Marxist" between the 1960s and 1970s. It changed its position starting from 1978 as it embraced the drug economy with effect from 1982 (Otis, 2014, p.3). The FARC's initial involvement in drugs was limited to revolutionary taxes from coca farmers and OCGs, and through keeping government forces away from interfering with the cultivation and coca production, rather than actually producing the drugs (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.111; Clutterbuck, 1994, pp.90-111; Sanderson, 2004, p.51; Felbab-Brown, 2010).

Later, FARC members gradually engaged in drug business (Steinitz, 1985, p.142; Sanderson, 2004, p.51; Naim, 2006, p.28; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.40; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.378; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.19; Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.543). The FARC directly involved itself in drug production by acquiring coca plots and producing cocaine in the beginning of the 1990s (Felbab-Brown, 2010, 80). Moreover, the demise of the main Colombian cartels, the Medellin and Cali, and the fragmentation of other OCGs helped the FARC in this shift (Chepesiuk, 2007; Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.30; Otis, 2014, p.4).

Today, the FARC is involved in all phases of drug trafficking and controls approximately 70 % of the opium poppy producing regions under the responsibility of its six fronts and the vast majority of coca growing territory with its 23fronts (Farah & Simpson, 2010, p.9; Felbab-Brown, 2010, 80). The FARC has reportedly become the world's largest cocaine supplier (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.19). It has transformed itself into purely criminal organization with only "the thinnest veneer of politics" (Metz & Millen, 2004, p.14). However, it is more appropriate to consider the FARC a hybrid organization because the FARC still pursues its political motives (Otis, 2014, p.20).

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also known as Islamic State (IS), has increasingly attracted researchers' interest (Roberts, 2016). The ISIS acts as a "massive organized crime group" (Levitt, cited in Bronstein & Griffin, 2014). ISIS garners enormous income from kidnapping, arms-smuggling, widespread looting, oil smuggling, bank robberies and extortion (Dettmer, 2013; Bronstein & Griffin, 2014; Salman & Bayoumy, 2014; Roberts, 2016, p.4). These operations make ISIS one of the wealthiest TOs in history (Pape &

Morell, 2015). Although Roberts (2016, p.17) defines ISIS a third generation OCG, ISIS still pursues its ideology (Schillinger, 2016, 339). Therefore, ISIS may be considered a hybrid TO.

Hybrid OCGs, on the other hand, employ terrorist tactics against their rivals and states systematically (Cockayne, 2013, p.17). They employ terrorism to "force the government to negotiate terms beneficial to criminal leaders" or when the survival of the organizations is threatened (Dishman, 2001, p.50). For example, the Medellin's *Extraditables*, a group of drug traffickers in Colombia who declared total war on Colombia and its citizens, threatened Colombian government to set off 5.5 tons of dynamite in residential areas of Bogota for every drug trafficker extradited to the U.S.A. (Chepesiuk, 1999, p.71; Dishman, 2001, p.50). *Extraditables* used some traditional terrorist attacks: they exploded over four hundred bombs between 1989 and 1990, and killed over one thousand Colombians (Dishman, 2001, p.51). They also blew up an aeroplane killing 119 people.

An OCG led by Ibrahim Davood, known as D-Company in India, is also involved in both organized crime and terrorism (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Kaplan, 2005; Picarelli, 2012, p.8; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.18; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.59). Ibrahim Davood, provoked by the destruction of Babri Masjid in Uttar Pradesh in 1992, assumed the "role of protector of the Muslim minority in India against the perceived oppressive Hindu majority" (Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.385), and added political ideology into his organization's *modus operandi* (Lal, 2005, p.302). D-Company killed 320 people and injured 1200 in different car, motorcycle and suitcase bombings in Bombay in 1993 (Raufer, 2000, p.34). The targets were the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Air India building, the Shiv

Sena (Hindu nationalist group) headquarters, the gold market, and the Plaza Cinema. Following the attacks, 3,400 kg of RDX and 459 grenades and 63 AK-56 rifles were seized, an amount of weaponry more than regular TOs possess (Lal, 2005, p.297).

La Familia, an OCG in Mexico, is another OCGs that started to pursue ideology. Born as a splinter group of Gulf Cartel, La Familia, uses religious ideology, and resorts to terrorism increasingly (Ballina, 2011; Flanigan, 2012). The group pursues both profit and ideology.

Another example is the Italian Mafia. The Italian Mafia attacked the Uffizi gallery in Florence and St. John Lateran Church in Rome when the Mafia leaders faced a wave of arrests (Cowell, 1993). Bombing the Pisa campanile was another plan of the Italian mafia which was uncovered later (Makarenko, 2003, p.7).

The Commando Vermelho Gang of Brazil blew up 16 buses and three cars. The gang also attacked commercial and residential targets (Makarenko, 2003, p.7). *Amigos dos Amigos* (Friends of Friends) and *Tercerio Comando* (Third Command) groups in Brazil also bombed buses, attacked government buildings, and killed law enforcement officers in a campaign of political violence (Makarenko, 2004, p.134).

The *Los Zetas*, the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico, is another example of hybrid OCGs. Some members of the *Los Zetas* are former Mexican Special Forces soldiers trained and armed by the U.S.A. They frequently employ terroristic attacks (Longmire & Longmire, 2008, p.41; Flanigan, 2012, p.286).

Transformation

The last phase of association model is the transformation of TOs and OCGs into the other. Non-traditional activities become the primary activity type of TOs and OCGs. The phase consists of TOs that are solely interested in lucrative criminal revenues using their political rhetoric as a 'façade' at the same time and of OCGs that act on political motivations (Tupman, 1998; Dishman, 2001, p.48; Gordon, 2004, p.112; Makarenko, 2004, p.135; Metz & Millen, 2004, p.13; Bobic, 2014, p.246; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.61).

It is possible to observe changes of priorities in terrorism (Dishman, 2001, p.52; Horgan, 2007, p.117). TOs may lose direction and prioritize financial gain as an end when their activities increase on certain types of crimes (Horgan, 2005, p.151). Consequently, political objectives may be displaced by material objectives (Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.33). Algeria's Islamist TOs, for example, had started to finance themselves through raids and armed robberies beginning from 1992. Later, they became interested in other types of crimes such as extortion, taxing and illicit trading in hashish, vehicles and food products. They are primarily involved in organized crime activities. They have still not abandoned their political rhetoric because it provided them a cover for corruption and contraband (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.5).

In addition, TOs may transform their networks into OCGs when they realize that their political goal is not attainable, or when they decide to disarm themselves (Wallace, 1995, p.360). When TOs cease to have a political objective, they turn to things they do well (Regis Debray, 1967, cited by Horgan, 2005, p.151). Most of the TOs in the Golden Triangle area, for example, gave up their expectations of political change, and transformed into OCGs in the

business of heroin and methamphetamine (Dishman, 2001, p.48; Hamm, 2005, p.6; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.167). The United Wa State Army, for example, produces and transports heroin out of the Golden Triangle (Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.546). The Shan United Army, the Kokang Shan and remnants of the Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army are other transformed organizations in the region (Steinitz, 1985, p.144; Cornell, 2005, p.756).

The AUC, on the other hand, provides an example of disarmed TOs. The AUC demobilized after the 2000s. Many commanders of the AUC refused to disarm and formed their own criminal organizations, called *bandas criminals* (criminal bands), BACRIM. They are primarily involved in organized crime activities such as drug trafficking, extortion, illegal gold mining and other criminal activities (Otis, 2014, p.6). Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador, the RUF in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor Group in Liberia are other organizations that transformed into OCGs after demobilization (Otis, 2014, 17).

Transformation may occur when splinter groups emerge, or when some units begin to act independently. Some units of the FARC, for example, are also argued to be independently involved in cocaine laboratory operations (Berry et al., 2002, p.53). Splinter groups, on the other hand, may depart or be omitted from the mother TOs due to their material objectives that undermine the mother organizations' political objectives (Wilkinson, 2006, p.28). Those splinters may start to see material gain as an end. The PIRA, for example, have claimed that the Irish People's Liberation Organization, a splinter group, has undermined the intended political goal because it was involved in drug trafficking (Wilkinson, 1994b, p.216).

The IMU is another representative example as it was established to change the secular regime in Uzbekistan, but later aimed at creating an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia (Berry et al., 2002, p. 89; Omelicheva, 2011, p.2). It is one of the widely cited organizations that lost its direction as a result of involvement in crime (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.18; Makarenko, 2005, p.174). It became primarily interested in drug business. It has various heroin laboratories in the region, and transports heroin (Berry et al., 2002, p.92).

Another example is the ASG whose initial political aim was to establish an independent Islamic Republic in Mindanao, surrounding islands, and the Sulu Archipelago. However, since 2000, the ASG has gradually become involved in crimes (Ballina, 2011, p.125). Organized crime has become its primary engagement (Sageman, 2004, p.44; Picarelli et al., 2005, p.36), including marijuana plantations in Philippines and kidnapping operations that generated $20 million for the organization alone in 2000 (Makarenko, 2004, p.137).

The Sicilian Mafia, on the other hand, was established as a political resistant group to foreign rule of Arabs in Sicily, but it shifted away from political aims and motivations towards criminality (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006, p.5; Makarenko, 2005, p.95). Even though it acts as an OCG, it still resorts to terrorist tactics and possesses weapons used by TOs. For instance, after an operation in Sicily, Law Enforcement Officers discovered safe houses and arms deposits full of bombs (Jamieson, 1994, p.40).

OCGs also have the potential for transformation. They can easily transform into other types of armed groups and turn back again (Ayling, 2009, p.186); however, this happens less frequently (Anderson & Bowers, 2009,

p.18). Black P Stone Nation (BPSN) in Chicago, USA, for example, had been a gang involved in crimes such as drugs, extortion and robbery, but they later became a TO and many of its members were later arrested for domestic terrorism (Ayling, 2009, p.191).

The milieu that OCGs operate have significant effect on OCGs. OCGs operating in conflict areas systematically associate with TOs. They can quickly transform into ethnic militias or paramilitary groups (Hagedorn, 2008, p.22). Thus, long armed conflict periods speed up the transformation process (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.18). Serb Volunteer Guard (SDG), also known as Arkan's Tigers, for instance, transformed into a paramilitary organization whilst the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Another form of transformation occurs when OCGs create armed groups to help them fight against governments' counter policies, particularly eradication policies, against TOs or other OCGs. Nakamura (1999), for instance, argues that both the SL and the MRTA were "original, full-fledged creations of the local lords, who set the movements up as "armed insurrection" organizations to help them fight against the 1982 plant-eradication and anti-drug policies of the then President Fernando Belaunde Terry" (p.100). E. Calvo gang transformed into the SL, whereas a group of new drug trafficking groups transformed into the MRTA (Nakamura, 1999, p.107). Thus, creation of armed groups was also aimed to help drug lords protect their organizations against each other. Two rival gangs, for example, had an open fight that resulted in victory of the SL in Uchiza in 1986.

t (Time) Factor

The external milieu and internal conditions strongly affect TOs and OCGs. Therefore, it is very difficult to achieve a clear notion of time periods of the phases in the association model. However, it is possible to extract a general understanding of the periods of metamorphosis of both organizations by examining time series of strategic changes of TOs and OCGs in the literature.

Beginning from its foundation, the FARC was an authentic organization for almost 20 years. During the following 10 years, the FARC moved to the nexus phase. Lastly, the FARC became a hybrid organisation. On the other hand, it took almost 10 years for the PKK to move from the authentic phase to the nexus, and another 10 years to the convergence (hybrid) phase.

D-Company, established in the 1970s, started to assassinate members of other OCGs in the 1980s, and had eliminated hundreds of rival gang members by the end 1980s (Treverton, Matthies, Cunningham, Goulka, Ridgeway & Wong, 2009, p.118). After around five years, their first terrorist attack occurred in Mumbai in 1993. Compared to TOs, it took less for D-Company to morph into a hybrid OCG.

Calculation of the time intervals of these changes shows that indirect involvement in non-traditional activities (t1) took 10 to 20 years, whereas direct involvement (t2) took around 10 years. Convergence phase (t3) takes longer than other phases. Many TOs that entered the nexus phase have not transformed themselves yet. However, these calculations may exhibit changes when other crime types or organizations are examined. For example, it took around 10 years for the ASG to reach the convergence phase.

Conclusion

There is a complex relationship between terrorism and organized crime and consequently between TOs and OCGs (Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.40). This thesis, looking at actors, their acts and associations between actors, rather than looking at what actors claim they are, forms a dynamic association model that explains the relationship.

The model defines seven points in four different groups: *authentic, link; ephemeral* and *non-symptomatic*, *nexus; alliance* and *contestation,* and *convergence; hybrid* and *transformation*. TOs and OCGs that maintain their 'authentic' aims and motivations are located at the zero point of the graphical model. Both organizations located at this point may exceptionally engage in low-sophisticated non-traditional activities without contacting with the other organization.

TOs and OCGs in the link phase maintain their original motivations. They contact with each other in this phase, but their interaction does not indicate a systematic relation for the future. TOs in this phase start to engage in non-traditional activities for their immediate operational needs (ephemeral), or when TOs want to guarantee resources and hoard for their future operations (non-symptomatic). OCGs, on the other hand, engage in non-traditional activities when they either want to enter into a new business area or enforce their monopoly. The use of violence remains discriminate. They use simple terrorist tactics such as killings and assassinations against their rival groups and corrupted officers.

TOs and OCGs start to contact each other regularly in the nexus phase. They provide services to each other (alliance) in this phase. However, their

relationship may deteriorate, and they may clash as strategic reasons may drive both groups to rivalry (contestation). Goals of both organizations still persist in the nexus stage, but it becomes difficult to distinguish the two groups. Non-traditional activity engagement increases in this phase. The use of terrorist tactics by OCGs becomes systematic and indiscriminate. OCGs establish their assassination squads to bring order to territories under their control, and to eliminate and terrorize people who harm their business.

The association between TOs and OCGs starts to be problematic in the convergence phase. Their motivations become blurred. Both organizations start to act like the other without abandoning their primary motivations (hybrid). When these hybrid organizations forsake their primary motives and their new motivations dominate initial ones, they metamorphose into the other (transformation). OCGs in the convergence phase use indiscriminative violence. They resort to bombings, and use heavy weapons against states and citizens.

The rate of association, the frequency of criminal engagement and the changes in the motivations and aims of organizations are the cores of the model. They are presented gradually in different phases of the model. Effects of these factors are presented in a table (Table 1).

Table 1. *Table of appropriation.*

	Authentic	Link		Nexus		Convergence	
		Ephemeral	Non-Symptomatic	Alliance	Contestation	Hybrid	Transformation
Association	No	Exceptional (Tactical)	Low (Tactical)	Middle (Strategic)	No	High (Strategic)	√
Non-Traditional Activity	Exceptional	Low	Low	Middle / High	Middle / High	High	√
Motivational Change	No	No	No	No	No	Blurred	√

TOs and OCGs in association learn tactics and methods from each other. They start to engage in learned non-traditional activities. The more TOs and OCGs associate with each other, the more they learn each other's tactics and methods; and the more they learn, the more they engage in non-traditional activities. Consequently, they appropriate each other more to such an extent they become alike.

There are various factors that affect the model such as: the political, social and economic conditions, the strength of law enforcement agencies, the size of the networks of organizations, the structure, and the group duration as well as geographical conditions. (Horowitz, 2010; Revill, 2016). The following chapter continues to investigate the dynamics of terrorist learning of organized crime. It focuses on variables that affect the level of association, and by extension, the learning.

CHAPTER 7

DETERMINANTS OF ASSOCIATION

This thesis studies terrorist learning of criminality. It particularly focuses on how TOs learn organized crime, and investigates the role of association between TOs and OCGs within the context of terrorist learning of criminality. Therefore, this chapter exhibits a specific interest on the association.

This chapter examines the factors that affect the level of association. It identifies *motivational changes, leadership, setting* and *association nodes* as having an effect on the level of association that facilitates learning and criminality of TOs. It analyses those variables by using multiple comparative examples to demonstrate the effect of association. For that purpose, it uses open-source terrorism databases such as TRAC database of Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (www.trackingterrorism.org), Big, Allied and Dangerous Database (BAAD) of Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York (www.start.umd.edu), Mapping Militant Organizations Database of Stanford University (www.stanford.edu) and Violent Extremism and Transnational Crime Database of the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (www.isvg.org).

The thesis gathered 119 terrorist organization profiles from BAAD database. Cross-checking those organizations with other databases, it achieved

a list of nine TOs (Group 1) that are known not to have organized crime activities (drug smuggling) and of seven TOs (Group 2) that are obviously known for their involvement.

Group 1 includes Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) in Ireland, Harkatul Jihad-E-Islami in Pakistan, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in Indonesia, Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let) in Pakistan, Loyalist Volunteer Forces (Lvf) in Northern Ireland, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Philippines, Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) in Northern Ireland, Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs in Russian Federation, and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in India.

Group 2 includes Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Philippines, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Pakistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN), Popular Liberation Army (EPL), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and United Self Defence Units of Colombia (AUC) in Colombia. In addition, this chapter examines D- Company as a hybrid OCG to provide a better perspective. The Following section discusses these variables by providing comparative analysis.

Change of Motivation

The political aspect is one of the obvious differences between TOs and OCGs. As TOs and OCGs change and evolve, their ideologies and political motivations may also change over time (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.18; Laqueur, 1996, p.25; Gordon, 2004, p.112; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.3; O'Brien, 2012; Bobic, 2014). Ideological and motivational changes may drive organizations towards different ideas and motivations. As a result of these changes, TOs may pursue profit while OCGs may begin to operate as terrorists.

TOs may experience ideological changes. The PKK, for instance, declared its aim to have a separate Kurdish state with Marxist-Leninist ideologies in the eastern part of Turkey (Freedman & Levitt, 2009; Casier, 2010, p.3; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012; Unal, 2014, p.420). However, they later announced abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology and demanded federation (Criss, 1995, p.17), moving on Islamic influences more recently which contradicts their first Marxist-Leninist ideology (Bruno, 2007; Cagaptay, 2007; Casier, 2010, p.3; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.96). While negotiating with the Turkish government, they have recently demanded an autonomous government in the region and a confederalized Turkey (Casier, 2010, 395).

The FARC, compared to the PKK, slightly changed its ideology. The FARC was established as a Marxist organization primarily aiming to replace the Colombian government with a communist government. The FARC had been committed to following its ideology until the 1980s. They strongly opposed drugs (Monteleone, 2016, p. 41). They even banned alcohol, drugs and prostitution because they were against Marxist principles (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.48). However, beginning from the 1980s, the FARC has abandoned some of its Marxist principles, and started to systematically engage in various activities once considered anti-Marxist, such as drug production and smuggling (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.111; 1994, p.90-111; Sanderson, 2004, p.51; Naim, 2006, p.28; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.40; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.378; Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.546). While having peace talks with the Colombian government (Otis, 2014), the FARC tried to expand its territorial control (Stanford University, 2016). Eventually, peace talks have become fruitful; the

FARC and the Colombian government agreed on a peace accord (The Washington Office on Latin America, 2016).

The ASG also changed its ideology. The group's initial political aim was to establish an independent Islamic Republic in the Bangsamoro homeland, Mindanao, the Philippines (Snakenberg, 2011, Isvg, 2013; University of Maryland, 2014; U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 2014). The ASG, however, has gradually shifted away from ideology to crimes since the death of its founding leader, Abdurajik Janjalani, in 1998 (O'Brien, 2012, p.328; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.17).

D-Company, on the other hand, experienced a radical change. Ibrahim Dawood, the leader of the D-Company, was provoked by the destruction of Babri Masjid in Uttar Pradesh in 1992. Assuming the "role of protector of the Muslim minority in India against the perceived oppressive Hindu majority" (Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.385), Dawood added political ideology into the organization's *modus operandi* (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Lal, 2005, p.302; Kaplan, 2005; Picarelli, 2012, p.8; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.18). La Familia in Mexico is an example of other OCGs that started to pursue ideology. It has become one of the most feared Mexican OCGs. Born as a splinter group of Gulf Cartel, La Familia, uses religious ideologies and resorts to terrorism increasingly (Ballina, 2011; Flanigan, 2012). After the demise of its long standing leader, Nazario Moreno, the group has started to pursue both profit and ideology of bringing a "divine justice" (Ballina, 2011, p.125).

In addition to ideological changes, TOs and OCGs may experience motivational changes (Lal, 2005, p.294; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.60). Meierrieks & Schneider (2016) studied the relationship between the drug

business and terrorism in 58 countries from 1984 to 2007 and found out that TOs change their motivation towards profit by shifting their activities to attractive drug business. Moreover, TOs may change their motivations during periods of inactivity because they turn to the best things they can do during inactivity periods (Debray, cited in Horgan, 2007, p.151).

Motivational changes may occur at three levels; individual, organizational or both. Organizational level changes mostly occur when organizations realize that their goals are unachievable (Wallace, 1995, p.360). Laqueur (1996) explains such changes by looking at organizations' ultimate aims. He argues that separatist TOs such as the PKK, the IRA, the ETA and the Tamil Tigers have limited their aims due to the fact that they cannot realistically hope to destroy their enemies (Laqueur, 1996, p.35). In addition, affected by external and internal factors, the whole organization may change its priority (Horgan, 2007, p.117; Ganor, 2008, p. 278). Strongly dedicated members, for instance, may be killed in conflicts with state forces, and their successors may not be strongly attached to the political motivation. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is often cited as a TO that changed its political motivation to profit, particularly after the death of its strongly dedicated members (Bobic, 2014, p.246).

Individual level changes, on the other hand, occur when members' priorities change (Dishman, 2001, p.52; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.61). When members feel unattached to the cause or the organization, when they are disappointed with the organization or the leader, or when other motivations over ride their prior motivations, motivational changes may be observed. Then, members either deradicalize (Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann

and Feddes; 2016, p. 10; Tobor & Shajkovci, 2016) or fall back on alternatives, such as material motivations (Wallace, 1995, p.360).

Horgan (2007, p.117) examines this issue and looks at the consequence of motivational changes, that is, disengagement from terrorism. He mentions two types of disengagement: physical and psychological. Physical disengagement occurs when members are apprehended, forced into another role as a result of disobeying orders, or ejected from the movement as they increasingly engage in other role activities, such as increased political activities. Personal circumstances such as marriage, children may also cause physical disengagement. Negative influences as a result of sustained, focused membership, a sense of changing priorities, and a sense of growing disillusionment with the avenues pursued result in psychological disengagement.

Horgan, Altier, Shortland & Taylor (2016) mention similar points. They focus on "pull" and "push" factors in terrorism. Push factors are conditions that cause disillusionment with the organization's strategy, leadership, membership, or actions. Pull factors, on the other hand, are conditions that attract people towards a different lifestyle or identity such as a desire for an intimate relationship, having a family, taking advantage of amnesty offers, or taking up conventional employment. These factors may cause a change of priority. Increased engagement in criminal activities, for instance, may cause a sense of change in priority that may divert members to pursue profit (Berry et al., 2002, p.2; Cornell, 2005, p.754; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.5; Picarelli, 2012, p.5). Then, members may "define personal meaning by material possessions" (Metz, 1993, p.15). Consequently, the financial gain may become an end for TOs:

“their political objectives are subordinated to, or displaced by, material objectives” (Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.33).

Tupman (1988) sees this change a principal fact and explains that the more TOs devote manpower resources to crime, mainly for fund-raising activities, the greater the likelihood TOs become OCGs. Hamm’s (2005, p.221) study supports Tupman’s argument. He examines crimes committed by TOs and finds conditions that affect TOs’ priorities: “opportunities to commit crimes and criminal skills are more important …than their motivation and ideology; more important, in fact, than their character, morality, and personal history” (p.221). Eventually, members of TOs become tempted by profits (Jonsson, Brennan & O'Hara, 2016, p.542); “when it comes to exposure to temptation, in the long run greed tends to be stronger than ideology” (Bovenkerk & Chakra, 2004, p.13).

However, disengagement from terrorist activities does not mean that these members disengage from terrorism-related activities in the sense they may still continue to support the organization (Horgan, 2007, p.117), or part of the organizations may resist the temptation and remain ideological while others shift towards disengagement (Cornell, 2005, p.757).

The PKK was committed to its political motivations in its founding stage. Its motivation changed over time, and the group increasingly started to deal with drug smuggling from the 1980s onwards. The Turkish National Police reports indicate that the PKK had been very active in the drug trade until the mid-1990s when the international community turned its focus on its terrorist and criminal activities (KOM Reports, 1993-2013). The PKK separated drug trafficking members from the organization because of the concerns over the

support it received from European countries; however, it never ended its ties to them but moved them underground (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012).

Most FARC members, on the other hand, have become motivated by material gain after the FARC's increased engagement in drug production and smuggling (Clutterbuck, 1990, p.111; 1994, p.90-111; Sanderson, 2004, p.51; Naim, 2006, p.28; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007, p.40; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.378; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012). The ASG represents another example as its members have been motivated by profit, and, accordingly, organized crime has become their primary motivation (Briggs, 2001, p.14; Makarenko, 2004, p.137; Sageman, 2004, p.44; Picarelli et al., 2005, 36; Rollins & Wyler, 2013). D-Company is an example to OCGs. Even though D-Company was an OCG when it was founded, the group has focused on terrorist activities, in addition to organized crime, since the 1990s (Makarenko, 2010, p.189).

Similar to the PKK, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the biggest TO in Group 1, has changed its ideology slightly. MILF initially demanded an independent state; however, it has begun to demand an autonomous state. Members of MILF, contrary to the PKK, did not experience a motivational change because highly radical members and senior commanders who are religious clerks controlled and reinforced others to be loyal to the ideology.

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in Group 1, continues to sustain its original motivation. It fragmented over internal disagreements about the way to achieve organization' goals. This caused a decrease in size. In 2007, it had 900 members. It lost 400 members in the following year. In 2013, it had around 500 members. Members still continue to follow their original motivation without any distraction.

In sum, ideology and motivation determines the modes of actions of TOs and OCGs. TOs and OCGs may abandon or change their primary motivations, and they may become motivated with other goals such as profit or politics. When change of motivation towards profit is observed, TOs and OCGs start to increasingly engage in non-traditional activities that drive these organizations towards associations. Motivational changes, therefore, bring members of two organizations closer to each other.

Leader

Survival of the organization is one of the first goals of TOs (Frisch, 2011, p.6). Leaders play a crucial role in this goal because their role is one of the determinant of the growth and development of the organization (Parachini, 2005, p.12; Wilkinson, 2006, p.19; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.4; Moghadam, 2013, p. 482; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016, p.12; Price, 2016, p.284). They define cultural and social identity messages of the groups (Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009, p.550; Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p.290). Their messages create consensus around values (Al Raffie & Huehn, 2016, p.209), and like-minded followers gather around the leaders (Mullins, 2009, p.819). When the messages and the values become institutionalized (Jordan, 2014, p.15), a "charismatic bond" between the leadership and members is created (Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff & Weine, 2009, p.24; Price, 2016, p.266). This bond makes the leadership the main actor in control of the organization as well as the decision-making that shapes TOs' *modus operandi* (Ganor, 2008, p.273; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009, p.24; Moghadam, 2013, p.469). Therefore, examining terrorist leaders' role enables one to correctly understand how

behaviours of others in TOs may become favourable to non-traditional activities, and how *modus operandi* of organizations change.

Researchers argue that the charisma of the leaders is an important factor for TOs (Frisch, 2011, p.4). Hofman and Dawson (2014), in their study on the role of charismatic authority in radicalization, focus on the "charismatic bond"; the relationship between the charismatic leader and his or her followers (p.351). They explain that new members start to characterize the leader as someone to emulate when they are exposed to an esoteric body of knowledge about the charismatic aspects of the leader. Then, the leaders become role models (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1961; Bandura, 1965). This process is a key to the creation of a strong charismatic authority. Leaders use the authority to shape the behaviours of the members (Jackson, 2006). Using the authority, sometimes with cruel methods, they ensure that their organizations are on the right track to the ultimate goals.

The authority is exercised at three levels; strategic, operational, and tactical. In each one of them, the leaders have the ability to shape the group activities. The strongest leaders can influence at all three levels (Jackson, 2006, p. 244). However, the level of control depends on the structure of the organizations (Dishman, 2005). In a hierarchical organization, the leaders have a direct role in using the authority, controlling almost all organizational activities, including recruitment, promotion, planning of attacks, and criminal activities. Decentralized organizations do not have a single leader or command elements. Cell leaders control the activities of individual cells. In leaderless resistance movements, on the other hand, because of the lack of a leader, there

is no control over the units of the movements. Leaders of affiliated groups provide inspiration.

In addition, the leadership type affects the organizational characteristics of TOs (Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.140). For example, Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald, and Freilich (2016, p.14) examined the organizational-level characteristics in right-wing extremist groups in the United States and found differences among the type of the leadership and the level of violence. Groups with weak or decentralized leadership, on the one hand, or strong ruling councils, on the other hand, were more likely to use violence. By contrast, groups with strong or factionalized leadership were less likely to be involved in violence. Post, Ruby, and Shaw (2002) found a similar relationship: the more violent a group's leader is, the more likely the group is to commit terrorist acts.

Leaders may affect operandi of TOs and OCGs in different ways. Changes in leaders' perceptions or motives, for example, may cause waves of changes, both at individual and organizational levels (Ayling, 2009, p.191; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p. 73). When leaders tolerate or create incentives for non-traditional activities, others start to engage in those activities increasingly. D-Company, for example, was originally an OCG established during the 1970s by Ibrahim Dawood (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.18). Dawood was Muslim, but his organization consisted of different groups, including Indian Hindus. Hindus demolished Babri Masjid in Uttar Pradesh, India in 1992 ("Timeline: Ayodhya holy", 2003). Nationwide riots between Hindus and Muslims followed the destruction of the Masjid. The riots caused the death of at least 2000 people. Dawood was one of the Muslims provoked by this event. He later acted with

political ideology against the Hindu majority (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Lal, 2005, p.302; Clarke & Lee, 2008, p.385).

After D-Company's attacks against the Indian community, Hindu members of the organization condemned the attacks, and some of the influential members such as Chhota Rajan left the organization. However, still, there is support among Hindu criminals for the organization (Lal, 2005, p.297). Eventually, D-Company, influenced by its leader, has started to pursue political goals (Raufer, 2000, p.34; Kaplan, 2005; Picarelli, 2012, p.8; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.16).

The JI, on the other hand, has a group of important figures: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who is believed to be the group's spiritual and operational leader, Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin (aka Hambali), and Mohamad Iqbal Abdurrahman (aka Abu Jibril). These members are known to strictly pursue their ideologies. Therefore, the group had always acted under the control of a leader until 2007. However, there is no known leader at the moment, and the group has splinters. Before 2007, the group leaders had established various channels of funding; mainly from member donations and charities. They also received funding from other groups, such as Al Qaeda. The criminal activity in which the group known to engage remained limited to robberies. The known group leaders had strong influence and control over members even though the group changed its structure from hierarchy to network of cells. The group leadership strictly focused on religious outreach to increase its popular support and refrained from organized crime.

Similar to the JI, the MILF, headed by a main leader, has senior and local commanders. Founder of the organization, Hashim Salamat, died in 2003 and

Ebrahim Murad became the leader. The organization has not faced financial difficulties. It received financial support from Al Qaeda; therefore, neither the leadership nor the death of its strong leader created incentives for criminal activity engagements.

Leader change is another factor that causes changes in *modus operandi* of TOs. The leaders of TOs and OCGs are well respected and valued by most members. This makes the leaders hard to replace, particularly of TOs (Berry et al, 2002, p.69; Jackson, 2004, p.24; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.9). However, it is possible that organizations may lose or change their leaders. In the absence of an entrepreneurial leader that innovates and finds ways to bid counterterrorism measures, organizations may become vulnerable to those measures (Oots, 1989, 141; Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010, p. 25; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.137; Al Raffie & Huehn, 2016, p.209). Therefore, decapitation of leaders by killing, capturing, or capturing then killing has been used as a tool to decrease or end operations of TOs (Oots, 1989, p.141; Cronin, 2009, p.16; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013, p.774; Johnston as cited in Gill, Piazza & Horgan, 2016, p.475; Price, 2012; Price, 2016, p.261; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016, p.14).

However, decapitation may not be an effective tool against some TOs such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Shapiro, 2012; 2013, p.9), or may have negative consequences such as escalation of violence or change of organizational structure to a more flexible one (Gutfraind, 2009, p.54; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016, p. 23; Zech, 2016). Nevertheless, when leaders of TOs and OCGs are decapitated, members of TOs and OCGs may divert their efforts to non-traditional activities increasingly. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, for

instance, has exercised absolute control and discipline over the organization by assassinations. As a result, the organization has rarely allowed freelancing. In spite of this, Osman Ocalan and his group produced and sold drugs which indicates the leader`s decision about such engagement in the drug business. Ocalan's capture and the following peace negotiations that moved the organization to inactivity period, have given an impetus to the PKK`s drug business (Laciner, 2008; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.73). In the absence of a strong control from Ocalan, many groups in the organization have increasingly started to focus on profit-gathering activities, and the organization has engaged in non-traditional activities increasingly.

The FARC experienced a similar change. In addition to the death of Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes, one of the two founding leaders, in 1990, having numerous leaders also caused this change. The FARC, unlike many other TOs, has a number of leaders. The leadership is given to the Secretariat that consists of seven hardline members (Ortiz, 2006, p.217; Stanford University, 2016). After the death of Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes, the FARC units shifted from protecting and taxing drug businessmen to "middlemen" between farmers and drug trafficking organizations (Makarenko, 2004, p.137).

Four members of the Secretariat are responsible for drug policies and drug trade related activities. Luciano Marín Arango, the advisor to the Northwestern and Caribbean Blocs, set many of the drug policies of the organization. Felix Antonio Muñoz Lascarro, the representative of the Magdalena Medio Bloc, controls drug production and distribution in the region. Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera Pineda, the commander of the Caribbean Bloc, is another leader involved in drugs. Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, a hard-line

member of the FARC and advisor to the Magdalena Medio Bloc, also designed the organization's drug policies. Consequently, after the death of its founding leader, the FARC, influenced by these top members, gave an impetus to the drug business (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.250). Its drug policy, influenced by the leaders, started from banning the drugs, serving as a middlemen, and later producing and selling them.

The ASG case is a good example that demonstrates how the absence of a dedicated leader affects organizations. The leader of ASG, Abdurajik Janjalani, emphasized the religious orientation and focused on Jihad to establish an independent Muslim state in the southern Philippines (Filler, 2002, p. 131; O'Brien, 2012, p.321). However, after he was killed in 1998, Aldam Tilao (aka Abu Subaya) and Ghalib Andang (aka Commander Robot), known as "bandits" who focus on financial gains rather than ideology, became leading members (O'Brien, 2012, p.328). New leaders primarily focused on criminal activities. The group established a "kidnapping unit" that brought wealth to the group (O'Brien, 2012, p.321). Consequently, the ASG's terrorist activities reduced and its criminal activities increased.

After the death of Aldam Tilao and Ghalib Andang, Khadafi Janjalani, brother of Abdurajik Janjalani, became the leader (Lum, 2012, p.19). During his leadership, ASG shifted back to ideology. The death of Khadafi Janjalani in 2006 has eradicated ideological barriers against criminal activities. A group of profit-oriented members, such as Alba- der Parad, Furuji Indama, Nurhassan Jamiri, Puwi Ambali, and Sulaiman Pattah gained power in the organization. This has given a momentum to the move towards profit again (O'Brien, 2012, p.328; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.17).

OCGs, on the other hand, shift towards indiscriminate violence when their leaders are decapitated. The Commando Vermelho Gang of Brazil, after incarceration of its leader, Fernandinho Beira-Mar, blew up 16 buses and three cars. The gang also attacked commercial and residential targets (Makarenko, 2003, p.7). Provoked by the similar reasons, *Amigos dos Amigos* (Friends of Friends) and *Tercerio Comando* (Third Command) groups in Brazil also bombed buses, attacked government buildings, and killed law enforcement officers in a campaign of political violence (Makarenko, 2004, p.134).

In sum, the attitude of the leaders strongly affects the organizations' tendencies towards certain activity types. Therefore, changes in leaders' perceptions or motives can cause a wave of changes. When leaders tolerate, encourage, or shift towards non-traditional activities, TOs and OCGs start to associate with each other and learn these activities. In addition, in the absence of a dedicated leader or direct control of the leader, some members may focus on non-traditional activities and associate with other organizations.

Setting

The setting in which TOs and OCGs operate is an important factor for terrorism and organized crime (Crenshaw, 1981, p.380; Horgan, 2005, p.107; Makarenko, 2010, p.185; Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016). It is, in fact, one of the key determinants of the overall success of these organizations mainly due to the resources available (Frisch, 2011, p.5; Bloomberg, Engel, Sawyer, 2010, p.327). Thus, it affects the level of association between them: *macro setting*s, such as countries, geographies, and regions, and *micro setting*s, such as prisons and ghettos in cities and suburbs, provide TOs and OCGs the permissive milieu in which they associate with each other.

Forest (2012) argues that access to weapons, illicit economies, and safe haven are "enablers" that influence activities of TOs and OCGs (p.176). Geography, as one of these "enablers", has a significant effect on TOs and OCGs (Crenshaw, 1981, p.380; Resa-Nestares, 1999, p.57; Jackson, 2001, p.19; Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.1; Cockayne, 2013, p.14; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013, p.779). It is one of the determinants of TOs' survival. Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler's study (2011) on 367 terrorist organizations finds out that terrorist groups based in the Middle East and North Africa (henceforth, Middle East), for example, survive longer than others. The indigenous support and infrastructure have been contributive to their survival.

In addition, terrorism and organized crime intersect in macro settings where TOs and OCGs utilize the same techniques (Renner, 2002, p.65; Croissant & Barlow, 2007, p.208; Waldmann, 2007, p.226; Makarenko, 2010, p.180; Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.2; Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014, p.214; Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.3). Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Tri Border area are examples of these settings (Cilluffo, 2000; Makarenko, 2004, p.138; Picarelli, 2006, p.20; Braun, 2008; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.10). For example, TOs and OCGs are present in regions where drugs are cultivated and produced (Cornell, 2005, p.751; Meierrieks & Schneider, 2016, p.3; Monteleone, 2016, p.45).

The breakdown of central authorities, an increase in corruption, and a decline in legitimacy, power, and authority, allow TOs and OCGs to fill the gap of authority (Cilluffo, 2000; Copeland, 2001, p.97; Forest, 2008, p.281; Luna, 2008a, 2008b; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.1; Bobic, 2014, p.248). Consequently, less developed, weak, and destabilized states and conflict zones provides a

permissive environment for operations and associations (Picarelli, 2012, p.2; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.88; Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014, p.215; Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016, p.24).

The control of a territory by TOs offers a variety of advantages to TOs and OCGs. It allows TOs to establish military infrastructure, safe haven, training, and arms depots. (Forest, 2008, p.275; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p.441). Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman (2016), for example, found a direct link between permissive environments and terrorist alliances: TOs in permissive environments are more likely to associate with others (p.22). The majority of TOs in Group 2 control a territory while none of the TOs in Group 1 controls a specific territory where they may find opportunities to associate with OCGs.

Different geographies offer different crime opportunities (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). The circumstances in different areas determine the choice of criminal activities (Picarelli et al, 2005, p.45; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008a, p.50). Geographies with intra or inter-state armed conflicts, for instance, are ideal settings for weapons smuggling (Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2). On the other hand, geographies where there are limited organized crime activities do not present opportunities for association. The ASG operates in a very limited area in the southern Philippine islands (Gershman, 2002, p.61). Therefore, the Group has mostly engaged in kidnappings and ransom, even though it attempted to commit other crimes such as drug trade (Makarenko, 2004, p.137). The JI in Indonesia also operates in an area where only available criminal activities that the group engage systematically remains limited to robberies and kidnappings. Similarly, areas that Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs in Russia and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

in India operate are the same. These TOs do not operate in drug supplying or consuming parts of the countries or on the smuggling routes. Therefore, they are less likely to associate with OCGs.

The PKK, emerged from a location with rich criminal resources, engages in a variety of crimes including drugs, smuggling, and fraud. It operates in a region that is a key point for a variety of criminal activities (Jamieson, 1994, p.80; Schmid, 2000, p.114; Makarenko, 2004, p. 134; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.69; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.246; Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.7). Smuggling of drugs, precursors, weapons, human, and contrabands occur frequently in the region. Turkey, for instance, is at the beginning of the Balkan route that the majority of heroin destined for Europe passes through (Roth & Sever, 2010, p.69). The same route is used for smuggling of synthetic drugs, precursors, and arms originated from Europe (Jamieson, 1994, p.80; P.C. 1-3, 2012). The mountainous region, particularly the borders, on the other hand, deteriorates the efforts of security forces to control the region. In addition, the PKK has bases in most of the adjacent countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. Increasing instability in neighbouring countries makes the region more profitable for the PKK (Laciner, 2008; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008; Beren, 2012, p.96; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.241).

The FARC, on the other hand, operates in Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Panama. The areas under the FARC's control are the main cocaine and heroin producing places (Jamieson, 1994, p.116; Lesser et al., 1999, p.105; Naim, 2006, p.70). These areas provide other criminal opportunities to the FARC (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.245). For example, the FARC, in addition to the drugs trade, commits crimes such as illegal gold

mining in the region (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Otis, 2014, p.10; Renwick & Hanson, 2014).

Micro settings, referred to as "thick crime habitat" by Ayling (2009, p.187), provide multitude of targets, anonymity, market opportunities, recruitment resources, financial resources, security, and new criminal opportunities (McIntosh, 1975, p.20; Crenshaw, 1981, p.382; Grabosky, 1988, p.62; Naim, 2006, p.36; Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2; Ayling, 2009, p.187). A thick crime habitat is an "offender convergence setting" where offenders such as TOs and OCGs associate with each other and share their knowledge and experiences (Raufer, 2000, p.32; Europol, 2009a, p.20). Urban areas, for instance, are convergence points for TOs and OCGs. Parts of urban areas are filled with ethnic minority groups; a primary human source of ethno-nationalist TOs (Picarelli et al., 2005, p.11). These locations are also the hotbeds of organized crimes. TOs and OCGs meet in these places. Moreover, TOs have begun to operate in cities increasingly (Bibes, 2001, p.250; Jackson, 2004, p.17; Laciner, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010, pp.53-56). FARC, for example, had always been active in rural areas, but recently the FARC has started to operate in cities. Similarly, the PKK has been carrying out attacks in cities (Laciner, 2008). Urban terrorism, consequently, increases the level of association among the two groups.

Other micro settings, such as prisons, facilitate associations between organizations (Forest, 2008, p.281). When terrorists and criminals are kept in the same correctional institutions either because of the lack of administrative concern, or because terrorists are treated as petty criminals, members of each organization associate with each other in correctional institutions and develop

connections (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.14; Cuthbertson, 2004, p.15; Picarelli et al., 2005, p.40; Luna, 2008a; Europol, 2009a, p.20; Perri & Brody, 2011, p.48; Roberts, 2016, p.12). They perpetrate joint ventures after they are released (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007b, p.15).

TOs in resource-rich environments, moreover, attract more "opportunistic joiners" interested in "payoffs" (Weinstein, 2005, p.599). They demonstrate little commitment to the long-term goals of the organization, and become more interested in financial wealth (Frisch, 2011, p.7; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.17). Roberts (2016), for example, provides statements of some opportunistic terrorists who joined Al Shabaab only for the sake of money. These opportunists pursue profit and associate with OCGs in these areas.

In sum, setting serves as a convergence centre for TOs and OCGs. TOs and OCGs that operate in the same macro and micro settings associate with each other frequently. Consequently, they learn from each other and start to increasingly engage in non-traditional activities.

Association Nodes

TOs and OCGs access the external milieu by using knowledge connections (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.132; Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Jackson, 2006, p.243). Knowledge connections are association nodes of an organization that link members within the units, with another organization, or with the outside environment (Ball, 2013, p.9). Organizations use these association nodes for learning (Mellon, Yoder & Evans, 2016). The nodes determine the level of the organizational absorptive capacities (Inkpen, 1998b, p.75; Kumar & Nti, 1998, p.358). Therefore, the number of association nodes of an

organization has a significant effect on the level of association, and by extension, the learning.

The number of association nodes depends on various variables. The size of the organization, the size of the network, the identity of members, and the structure type of the organization affect the number of the association nodes. The remainder of this chapter investigates these factors.

Size

The size of an organization may affect the strength of the members' attachment to its ideology negatively even though the growth of size promotes innovation and survival (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2011, p.441; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.2; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013, p.774; Hausken, 2016). Members of small-sized TOs (n < 100) are strongly bonded to their ideological goals. Therefore, compared to large-sized TOs (n > 101), they have a significantly higher proportion of ideologues. These members focus on their ideologies and are less likely to be distracted by other motivations. Organizational experiences of small groups, moreover, tend to be low (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2009, p.14); therefore, they deeply focus on their primary activities without associating with outsiders such as OCGs.

TOs in Group 1 have variety of size. While Moro Islamic Liberation Front has 12.000 members, other TOs have less than 2.000 members. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, for example, have around 50 members while Loyalist Volunteer Forces (Lvf) has 300. Excluding the MILF, the average member number is around 1.000. The MILF, on the other hand, has around 12.000 members that are located on the mountainous region of the

country where OCGs find weak links to establish their businesses. Therefore, even though the MIRL has a high number of association nodes, they do not find opportunities to associate with OCGs.

TOs in Group 2 have an average of 4.000 members. Therefore, these large groups are more likely to have more association nodes and opportunities to associate with OCGs. The activities of organizations become diverse, and the members start to associate with other organizations (Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.212). Moreover, large organizations are more attractive for associations because of their resources (Asal, Park, Rethemeyer & Ackerman, 2016, p.8). This makes them vulnerable to outsiders and distractions.

The internal control over members, furthermore, weakens when TOs become large in size. Organizational solidarity may also become problematic. Some members and sub-groups may act in contradiction with the principles of the organization and may associate with criminals (O'Brien, 2012, p.330; Otis, 2014).

TOs in their initial stage mostly consist of small dedicated numbers. When these ideologues implement successful activities, the number of members increases (Gleditsch, 2012, p. 8). Some members become skilled at terrorism, finance, and materials, and the organization becomes more likely to use violence (Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016). Then, they become capable and deathly (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p.439; Horowitz & Potter, 2014, p.212). These changes make TOs attractive for recruitment. Consequently, TOs start to recruit and grow more (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2009, p.14).

The growth in size makes the organization more accessible to a broad range of participants (Crenshaw, 1995b, p.13); the diversity of participants

affects organizational dedication to the original motivations. Therefore, organizations with a high number of members have more 'less-dedicated' members (Copeland, 2001, p.99; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.17). These less-dedicated members may pursue other goals such as profit, and may associate with OCGs to achieve these goals. The FARC, for example, is the largest TO in Latin America (Anderson & Bowers, 2009, p.9; Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.19). Compared to its current size, it had been a very small organization until the 1980s. In 1979, it consisted of only nine fronts. After its decision to engage in the drug trade directly, the size of the FARC has grown gradually. It had 3,600 fighters in 32 fronts in 1986. It had around 7,000 members by 1995. In 2001, the number of members increased to 16,000 and to 18,000 in 2002. It doubled its fronts in the 2000s to 70 (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.81). Beginning from 2008, however, the number of members was estimated to be decreasing; it was 9,000 in 2008 and 8,000 in 2011 (Isvg, 2013). The decline might occur due to the isolation of many front leaders from the secretariat during the peace talks that also aims at curtailing the drug activities of the FARC (Otis, 2014, p.19).

The PKK is a large organization that has similar growth pattern with the FARC. It had had a very small number of members until the 1980s. Later, the PKK has grown gradually in size, particularly after the 1990s when the PKK started to acquire financial power from drug smuggling (KOM Reports, 1993-2013; P.C. 2, 2012). The PKK was estimated to have around 5,000 members and only 2,700-3,200 of them operated in Turkey ("Government draws road", 2014). The majority were located in Iraq. However, after the political changes and peace talks, the PKK increased its size by promising jobs to people (P.C. 18, 2014).

In addition, larger groups have separate elements that are responsible for different activities (Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016, p. 5). As their need of finance increases, units responsible for financing start to engage in a variety of activities increasingly. Then, those members direct their activities to organized crime (O'Brien, 2012, p. 330). Moreover, as the groups survive longer, members become experienced and expose others to their motivations (Ranstorp & Brun, 2013, p.40). This increases the number of members that engage in criminal activities.

The number of members of TOs may decrease significantly when organizations confront financial difficulties or lose significant number of members because of armed conflicts or disengagement. The ASG, for instance, had been successful in implementing terrorist tactics until the early 2000s (Lum, 2012, p.18). The number of members decreased to 200 when the organization had financial difficulties. The organization garnered finance through kidnappings, and the number increased to 3000. It became "the single biggest employer" for poor people in the Philippines (Koh, 2006, p.12). Consequently, the organization developed its capabilities and attracted many new recruits who were motivated by profit rather than ideology (Rollins & Wyler, 2013, p.17). Later, the ASG transformed itself into an OCG when organized crime became its primary activity. Eventually, due to the killing of two operational leaders and 13 influential members in 2012, the organization has started to lose members (Ridley, 2012, p.152). The number of members decreased to 380 in 2013 (Stanford University, 2016).

D-Company, contrary to regular OCGs, is estimated to be large having around 5,000 members (Isvg.2013) It lost a significant number of Hindu

members after the Mumbai attacks (Lal, 2005, p.297), but later, new members with radical religious ideologies joined the organization. These new members act as association nodes between D-Company and TOs.

In sum, the growth in number positively increases the number of association nodes of TOs and OCGs. Moreover, when organizations grow in size, new members with different motivations join the organizations, and they facilitate further associations between TOs and OCGs.

Network

A network is a collection of nodes of trust (Sageman, 2004, p.137). It is "a group of individual agents who share informal norms or values" (Cozzens, 207, p.135). In a broader term, network refers to all links of an organization. The network of a TO is not limited to the web of the operational group; it includes affiliated fronts, sympathizer organizations, and migrant groups settled in foreign countries (Onay, 2008; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008). The growth of size of an organization positively affects the extent of the network. When the network of an organization grows, the organization increases its access to human, material, and knowledge resources (Crenshaw, 1983, p.26). Consequently, the number of association nodes increases, and the organization starts to associate more with other organizations.

Small TOs in Group 1 do not have large networks. Even when they establish links outside their home country, the number of those links are very limited. The JI in Indonesia, for instance, has cells in Malaysia and the Philippines as well as very limited number of cells in Australia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand. Consequently, association nodes remain limited. On the contrary to other TOs

in Group 1, the MILF is one of the biggest TOs. Despite its large size, the members are accumulated in one region. This restricts its network growth.

Large groups, on the other hand, have a large web of networks. The PKK, the FARC, the IRA, Al Qaeda, and many others have established networks in countries other than their homeland (Byman, 1998, p.161; Casier, 2010, p.399; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.237; Leong, 2005, p.32; Arva & Piazza, 2016, p.2). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for example, has established cells in as many as thirty-eight countries in Europe, North America, and the Middle-East. The organization uses these networks to gain finance through various organized crime activities (Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012, p.6). They acquire heroin and arms from Thailand and sell them in countries where its network reaches (Hutchinson & O'malley, 2007, p.1102; Comas, Shrivastava & Martin, 2014, p.6).

Internalization of TOs and OCGs is one of the factors in the network growth. For example, Arva and Piazza (2016, p.1), examining the role of minority community members in mobilising financial and political resources to support terrorist activities, find out two predictors of terrorist attacks: transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries. Networks of kin minority communities increase the success of TOs which in return increases its growth. Diaspora communities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah in Europe, North and South America, Albanian diaspora networks of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Europe, and Kurdish diaspora networks of the PKK in Iraq, Iran, and Europe, for example, provided significant political and financial support to these organizations.

Diaspora groups help lobby, pressure, and launch public relations campaigns on behalf of TOs (Oots, 1989, p.145; Casier, 2012, p.399; Arva & Piazza, 2016, p.2). TOs may even receive crucial intelligence from foreign governments through these networks (Byman, 1998, p.161). In addition to political support, TOs use their networks for financial and logistical purposes (Clutterbuck, 1994, p.117; Thompson & Turlej, 2003, p.45; UK Treasury, 2007; Europol, 2012, p.13; Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.8; Monteleone, 2016, p.37).

Diaspora groups provide assistance to the mobilization of terrorists in laundering and transferring money. TOs mostly rely on their diaspora groups for acquiring weapons, safe houses, legal or illegal entry into foreign countries, and recruitment (Mayntz, 2004, p.9; Goolsby, 2006; Arva & Piazza, 2016, p.2). These groups associate with OCGs for those activities. While the networks of TOs receive materials from OCGs, OCGs penetrate terrorist networks to benefit from their resources such as local business and transportation. (Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.8).

TOs exploit charities and NGOs in countries where they establish their networks ("Meeting the terrorist", 2006; Naim, 2006, p.203; Crelinstein, 2007, p.219; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.9). The support from these exploited sources sometimes comes in the form of materials and weapons. An NGO associated with the German Lutheran Church, for example, sent 40 trucks of humanitarian aid to Iraq destined for the PKK in 1992; however, trucks were full of rockets, camouflage and bombs (Yucebas, 2011, p.199).

The PKK's network reaches out many European and Arab countries. The PKK uses these countries as safe houses. For example, various PKK leaders

live in Europe (Gunter, 1991, p.16; Cagaptay, 2007; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.69). It acquires income from the Kurdish community through various crimes such as extortion and the drugs trade. (Ocalan, 1999; Curtis & Karacan, 2002, p.20; Avci, 2012; Roth & Sever, 2010, p.909; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.241). Most of the PKK' activities occur in the Balkan Smuggling Route (Leong, 2005, p.32). For example, it has established criminal networks in Romania not only for drug smuggling but also for human smuggling (Ocalan, 1999; Gheordunescu, 2000, p.25). The PKK and the Kurdistan Communities Union are the main actors in drug smuggling in the Balkan Route (Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014, p.8). They associate different organizations for the drug trade, such as Moroccan OCGs.

The PKK exploits asylum seekers in foreign countries. It forces asylum seekers to act as heroin couriers and sellers (Laciner, 2008; Kom Reports, 1993-2013; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.90). One of the officers interviewed (P.C. 3, 2012), for example, expressed that the PKK members take people to Europe, help them apply as refugees, and force them sell drugs on the streets. Statements of arrested OCG members confirm this (KOM Archives). The PKK even smuggled a group of Kurdish children to Europe for street distribution of drugs (Laciner, 2008; Roth & Sever, 2010). They used children in drug sells as a strategy because they would be given shorter prison terms (P.C. 3, 2012; KOM Archives). These sellers have to give most of the money to the PKK. People who do not want to sell drugs can get regular jobs, but they still have to pay to the organizations.

European countries, particularly the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Holland, and Romania, have a significant number of Kurdish migrants (Gheordunescu, 2000, p.25; Laciner, 2008; Jonsson & Cornell, 2008;

Casier, 2010, p.8; Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.86). According to data in 1991, over 400,000 Kurds live in Germany, 60,000 in France, 10,000 in Sweden, 5,000 in Belgium, and others in Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy (Gunter, 1991, p.12). The current number is expected to be higher. However, it should be emphasized that the Kurdish population in these countries does not mean that the PKK receives support from all of them.

The PKK has 17 main business and cultural organizations (Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.94). The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD), the International Kurdish Businessmen Union (KAR-SAZ), the Kurdish National Liberation Front (ERNK), the Patriotic Kurdish Workers Party, Kurdish Patriotic Women's Union, and Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Union are some of the PKK's organizations (Gunter, 1991, p.15).

The PKK has a relationship with Apo's Revenge Hawks, Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades, DHKP/C, Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front, Kurdish Islamic Unity Party, Kurdish Patriotic Union, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams, People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK), and TKP/ML-TIKKO (Stanford University, 2016). After adding the Islamic values to its new goal, the PKK founded the Kurdistan Imams Union, Kurdistan Mullahs Union, and Kurdistan Religious Union. Later, it combined all of them under the umbrella of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan that was formerly founded in 1993 (Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.96). All these associations in different countries help the PKK increase their network.

The FARC's international network is smaller than the PKK. Still, the FARC has networks in various countries, including European countries and Russia. The FARC, for example, sent its representatives to Europe to open

offices (Europol, 2010, p.32). Moreover, the FARC has relations with other organizations that are located in different countries such as Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas (EPA), Group of Popular Combatants (GPC), Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board (CGSB), the ETA, Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia, HAMAS, Hezbollah, the IRA, Islamyya al Gama'at (IG), the ELN, Popular Liberation Army (ELP), and Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinator (Stanford University, 2016; Isvg, 2013; University of Maryland, 2016; U.S: National Counterterrorism Center, 2014).

The ASG's own network is limited; however, it has connections with TOs in different countries such as the MILF, the JI, the Al Qaeda, Abdurajak Janjalani Brigade, Laskar Jihad and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Abu Sofia, Al Khobar, Al Qaeda, the GIA, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Islamic Army of Aden, the IMU, the JI, the KMM, the LTTE, Misuari Breakaway Group, the MILF, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Rajah Solaiman Movement, and 14K Triad (Hong Kong) (Ugarte, 2008; Lum, 2012, p.18; Stanford University, 2016; Isvg, 2013). Many of these organizations are active in different countries. However, Al Qaeda later distanced itself from the ASG due to group's motivational change towards organized crime that creates a security concern for Al-Qaeda (Snakenberg, 2011; Lum, 2012, p.18; Hausken & Gupta, 2015, p.72).

D-Company has links with organizations with different political motivations. Al Qaeda and the Communist Party of India are some of them. D-Company is also in connection with Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other OCGs in Pakistan, Persian Gulf, and United Arab Emirates (Isvg, 2013).

In sum, TOs and OCGs with larger networks are advantageous to acquire material and non-material support. TOs and OCGs use their networks to access human, material, and knowledge resources. They associate with each other through their networks to access those resources.

Identity

Identity attaches individuals to each other (Horowitz, 1983, p.43; Mincheva & Gurr, 2008, p.2; Price, 2012). Kinship, friendship, and ethnicity play a particular role in organizational network formation because they provide stronger and well-linked networks (Porta, 1995, p.121; Martin, 1999, p.25; Copeland, 2001, p.94; Sageman, 2004, p.131; Turk, 2004, p.279; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p.11). Consequently, members of TOs and OCGs that share the same identity build more associations naturally (Ozdemir & Pekgozlu, 2012, p.89).

Identity at personal level refers to "the aspects of self-definition at the level of the individual person" (Vignoles, Schwartz & Luyckx, 2011, p.4). It thus refers to relational/social level that represents "one's roles vis-à-vis other people" (Vignoles, Schwartz & Luyckx, 2011, p.4) and collective/cultural level that represents individual's "identification" (Vignoles, Schwartz & Luyckx, 2011, p.3) or "membership" (Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009, p.537) in social groups and categories.

Ethnicity is the confluence of individual, social, and collective identities. Ethnic identity provides solidarity and trust among members (Mincheva & Gurr, 2006; Price, 2012; Rothenberger, Müller & Elmezeny, 2016, p.13). It is "the most powerful of the factors capable of determining men's actions" (Le Bon, 1897, p.91). It delivers "a far more durable and powerful influence on

human behaviour" (Wilkinson, 2006, p.11). It encourages "initial social affiliation" that leads to take part in organizations (Mullins, 2009, p.820).

Moreover, ethnicity eases the creation of collective identity in which members start to consider themselves as group members. In return, organizations create stronger bonds with members in very early stages (Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff & Weine, 2009). Thus, ethnic identity is one of the determinants of overall success of TOs (Gates, cited in Frisch, 2011). Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald, and Freilich (2016), for example, discover that ethnicity in its superiority constitues a factor that increases the likelihood of the use of violence. Therefore, ethnic TOs endeavour to strengthen the ethnic identity (Byman, 1998, p.154).

TOs and OCGs exploit human association forms for recruitment purposes (Makarenko, 2004, p.136; Weinstein, 2005, p.599; Hegghammer, 2006, p.49; Sinai, 2007, p.40; Frisch, 2011, p.5; Stohl & Stohl, 2016, p.3). They use the same "interchangeable recruitment pools" that consist of individuals within the same association groups (Sanderson, 2004, p.53). Therefore, they have similar member profiles (Picarelli et al, 2005, p.10). Poly-members that come from the same pools, mostly ethnically-formed pools, connect TOs and OCGs (Sloan & Cockayne, 2011, p.2). These members create trust among organizations; a factor that affects associations (Hutchinson & O'malley, 2007, p.1101; Albers, Wohlgezogen & Zajac, 2013, p.7; Ackerman, Zhuang & Weerasuriya, 2016). Forest (2012, p.175) names these associations as "trusted handshakes" established through shared ethnicity. Associations between Albanian OCGs and the Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, are built on the

trusted handshakes. These trusted handshakes cause the convergence of crimes and politics in Albania (Makarenko, 2004, p.136).

These recruitment pools are also filled with individuals from the same tribes and families. Those recruits provide more reliability and stronger ties. Magouirk, Atran, & Sageman (2008, p.12) remark that such recruitment (kinship network) acts as the glue that holds terrorist networks within and across organizations. Members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, established one of its strategy on this fact. They deliberately married with members of influential local tribes to benefit from recruitment, protection, and funding (Rosato, 2016, p.18). The PKK also benefits from such ties. The PKK and OCGs in the region where the PKK is active share the same identity because they recruit from the same tribes and families. One member of a family is recruited by the PKK while another one is recruited by OCGs (P.C. 2, 2012; P.C. 6-8, 2013). Some members of OCGs arrested with huge quantities of drugs had close family members in the PKK. Some of those arrestees stated that their brothers or uncles are killed in armed conflicts with state forces (KOM Archives).

An analysis of the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime of Turkish National Police (KOM) emphasizes the same fact. In 1996, KOM launched an operational project called 'Asena Project' to investigate and analyse criminal groups in Turkey (P.C. 1-4, 2012). It endorsed the findings of the Wolfgang Project which found out that the majority of the crimes in the U.S.A. were perpetrated by a small group of career criminals (Wolfgang, Figlio & Sellin, 1972). The Asena Project concluded that criminal groups formed by family relations were responsible for the majority of the smuggling, particularly

of illegal drugs, and these families had the same ethnic identity. Most of the criminal organizations examined in the project were found to have connection with the PKK mostly through a family relationship. Similar projects in other countries were also initiated later; Germany started 'Anadolu Project' in the end of the 1990s, and the UK launched 'Big Tree Project' in the beginning of the 2000s. All these projects disclosed the role of kinship and ethnicity in the associations between drug smuggling families and the PKK (P.C. 1-4, 2012).

The ethnic identity of the PKK, moreover, reaches beyond the national borders of Turkey (Jamieson, 1994, p.79); members of the same tribes are divided by the national borders between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria because no attention was given to ethnic or tribal homogeneity when drawing the borders of countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Wilkinson, 2006, p.11). Access to relatives across the borders makes the ethnic identity more important for the PKK and OCGs. Consequently, associations between the PKK and OCGs easily occur. Kurds, for instance, are located in North West Iran and South East Iran, particularly in Baluchistan. Kurds in Turkey easily associate with Kurds in Iran to organize drug smuggling.

Ideology brings individuals with specific identities together. Asal, Park, Rethmeyer, and Ackerman (2016), studying associations between TOs find out that ideology provides strong basis for association. Most of TOs in Group 2 have similar ideologies which increases the likelihood of association. The FARC, for example, has ideological identity. The left-wing revolutionary ideology has a considerable influence on FARC members' behaviour; the political identity of Marxism connects the members of the FARC (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.236). On the other hand, most of TOs in Group 1 have religious

ideologies while only three of them have ethnic ideologies. Those religious groups recruit from religious study groups; therefore, members do not come from the same recruitment pools with OCGs. The JI, for example, uses a network of Islamic boarding schools as a recruitment pool. This decreases the number of criminal association nodes of the organizations.

The ASG members also share ideological identity. Their ideological identity is formed by religious norms. Members identify themselves as Muslims. They use social identity not only for recruitment but also for forming teams and groups within the organization. Family ties and friendship bonds play a strong role in determining those teams, particularly attack teams (Gerdes, Ringler, Autin, 2014, p.287). The group benefits from those ties in its criminal activities. A similar network formation occurs in the PIRA. In their study on the determinants of network connections, Gill, Lee, Rethemeyer, Horgan, and Asal (2014) discovered that the PIRA networks comprise of relationships based on involvement in a PIRA activity together such as friends, blood relatives, or marriage.

D-Company, distinct from other groups, consists of members with ideological and ethnic identities. It has members from both Muslim and Hindu communities in India. However, it has started to attract more Muslims after the organization enunciated its political stance towards Islam, whereas some Hindu groups condemned the Mumbai attacks and separated from the organization (Lal, 2005, p.297). The identity of the members of the organization moved towards ideology.

In sum, identity plays an important role in formation of organizations. Institutionalized forms of human associations such as religion, race, ethnicity,

and ideology connect members together. TOs and OCGs formed around the same association forms, particularly the ethnic and social identities (kinship), consist of similar members that share the same norms and values. These members facilitate associations between the two organizations.

Structure

The structures of TOs exhibit discrepancies. There are three types of structures in TOs: classic hierarchical "management trees"; "hub-and-spoke networks" where a leader controls individual units; and "leaderless resistance" (Dishman, 2005, p.237; Jackson et al, 2005, p.37). Some TOs have changed their organizational structures; they are more decentralized network structures (Dishman, 2005, p.237; Jackson, 2006, p.246; Kenney, Coulthart & Wright, 2016). The Provisional IRA is one of them. The PIRA changed from a military structure to a tighter cellular-based network (Gill, Piazza & Horgan, 2016).

Organizations sometimes use mixed structures (Jackson, 2001, p.27; Baker, 2005, p.63; Mayntz, 2004), referred to as polymorphic organizational structures by Comas, Shrivastava, and Martin (2014, p.9). Operational units, administrative units, and compartmentalized units may have different structures within the same organization. The D-Company, for example, uses a mix structure. It consists of various sub-OCGs. Its structure is hierarchically formed; however, there are sub-units that use mixed structures (Clark & Lee, 2008).

Hierarchical organizations have a clear division of authority. The authority consists of the leadership, officials with specific responsibilities, activists, and supporters (Ganor, 2008, p.276). The Tamil Tigers, the PKK and, the FARC are some of them. Network groups, on the other hand, are composed of cells connected weakly. They do not have a single leader or a central

command, but may still have hierarchical components (Dishman, 2005, p.239). Al Qaeda and many contemporary religious TOs are examples of network organizations (Jones, 2006, p. 557; Frisch, 2011, p.14; Moghadam, 2013, p.469; Al Raffie & Huehn, 2016).

Each organizational structure has both advantages and disadvantages. For example, hierarchical TOs, compared to others with networks structures, are slower to adapt and learn (Bucic & Gudergan, 2004, p.258; Ortiz, 2006, p.219; Tucker, 2008: Horowitz, 2010, p.45). Moreover, they learn less effectively because of a loss of information during the learning processes (Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.60). Organizational cultures, on the other hand, may not tolerate risk-taking; therefore, organizations may block interest in learning. Few individuals are responsible for decision making (Frisch, 2011, p.4). Lessons learned by low level members who are in the 'field' may be disregarded or accepted late by the top level members (Ortiz, 2006, p219; Tucker, 2008). This is not unique to TOs: the same problem persists in other hierarchical organizations such as military forces (Demchak, 1995, 348; Jones, 2003; Rotmann, Tohn & Wharton, 2009, p.15).

The rigid structure in hierarchical organizations prevents individuals from taking the initiative, particularly to engage in crime and to associate with OCGs. They do not act without a group decision. Moreover, hierarchical organizations are more vulnerable to counterterrorism measures (Al Raffie & Huehn, 2016, p.228; De Danieli, 2014, p.2). However, as an advantage of 'division of labour' in large hierarchical organizations, units responsible for certain tasks become more specialized (Heger, Jung & Wong, 2012, p.747).

While they perform their special tasks, they associate with other organizations, generally at strategic levels.

Network structures, on the other hand, are more resilient because they act on loose coordination with other units (Tucker, 2001, p.1; Trijullo & Jackson, 2006, p.60; Heger, Jung & Wong, 2012, p.746). Learning occurs faster in this structure type (Jones, 2006, p. 557; Hayden, 2013; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013, p.138). The structure allows bottom-up learning, particularly in the form of innovations and adaptations (Moghadam, 2013, p.494). Actions of units are not continuously supervised by the organizations; therefore, their associations with OCGs are not interrupted. Thus, network structures provide flexibility of action, and members may take initiatives to engage in non-traditional activities and to associate with others (Dishman, 2005, p.245; Asal, Chermak, Fitzgerald & Freilich, 2016, p.4). As a result, associations between networked TOs and members of other organizations occur frequently.

Network structures, moreover, are self-funding, and they use criminal activities as one source of their funding (Dishman, 2005, p. 246; O'Brien, 2012, p.330). Therefore, they associate with OCGs, more at tactical levels. The ASG, for example, had a military structure; however, after the decline in support from the Al Qaeda, it changed its hierarchical structure to decentralised loose network one with splinter groups emerging (Filler, 2002, p.140; O'Brien, 2012, 329; Gerdes, Ringler & Autin, 2014, p. 287). Decentralised cells rely on their own funding mechanism that focuses on kidnapping (O'Brien, 2012, p.330). However, the level of loyalty to the cause, environmental factors, and opportunities may affect operations of cells.

Most of TOs in Group 1 have network structures. The JI, for example, operated as a hierarchical organization. It had four “Mantiqis” that each had a geography and specific tasks. Later, it changed its structure to a network of cells with a degree of autonomy. Cells of the JI work as association nodes; however, members in those cells are highly ideological and receive support from the organization and other supporting groups. Therefore, they do not need to associate with OCGs.

The PKK is a centralized hierarchical organization. Its organizational activities are carried out by committees: a central, support, and military committee. The PKK does not have a special unit to control and organize its criminal activities. Its structure is often described as “hydra-headed” or “octopus” like, extending its networks in neighbouring countries (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.235). The PKK, concerned with loss of political support from European countries where it established its network, uses this structure as “a tactic to obscure and camouflage the PKK’s hierarchical structure of its criminal and guerrilla tentacles” (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, p.238).

The FARC is hierarchically organized (Ortiz, 2006, p.217; Felbab-Brown, 2010, p.78; Frisch, 2011, p.3). However, it has been changing its structure towards a system of multiple decision-making nodes since 2008 (Eccarius-Kelly; 2012). Nevertheless, with its shift to urban terrorism, it is using network structures in urban areas. Consequently, a growing number of FARC commanders, particularly of large fronts, and members in those cells have shifted from ideology to drugs in the absence of strong organizational control (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012, Otis, 2014).

In sum, TOs and OCGs have various organizational structures. There are advantages and disadvantages of these structures. Large hierarchical TOs, particularly through financial and operational units, are the most likely groups to associate with OCGs. Small hierarchical organizations lack the division of labour and specialization. Therefore, they are the less likely groups to associate with OCGs. On the other hand, TOs with network or leaderless resistance structure types, compared to small hierarchical ones, are more likely to associate with OCGs. Consequently, each structure type facilitates association, but at varying degrees.

Conclusion

This chapter examined seven variables that affect the intensity of associations between TOs and OCGs; the motivational changes, the leader, the setting, the size of the organizations, the network, the identity and, the organizational structure. Each one of these variables affects the level of association to varying degrees (*Table 2*). It should be reiterated that TOs and OCGs are heterogeneous, and there may be other cases that would challenge these conclusions.

TOs that experience motivational changes towards profit tend to engage in non-traditional activities. These changes increase the likelihood of association between the two organizations. Therefore, the motivational changes positively affect the level of association.

There is a negative relationship between the dedication of the leader to the organizational cause and the association level. Negative attitudes of the dedicated leaders of organizations in which the leader imposes strong influence on the members against non-traditional activities affect the association level

negatively. The leaders in the networked structures, on the contrary, do not have control over networks; therefore, the influence weakens and network units may take the initiative for operations and associate with other organizations. Organizations with less dedicated leaders, on the other hand, may accept non-traditional activities with tolerance and associate with OCGs. Decapitation of the leader in both organizational types also affects the level of association positively. When the leaders are arrested or killed, both organizations tend to associate with each other increasingly.

Table 2. *Relationship between variables and the level of association.*

Variables	Attributes	Effect
Motivational Change	Profit	Positive
Leader	Ideologue	Negative
	Tolerant	Positive
	Decapitation	Positive
Setting	Permissive	Positive
	Control of Territory	Positive
Size	Large (n>100)	Positive
	Small (n<100)	Negative
Network	Large	Positive
	Small	Negative
Identity	Ethnic	Positive
	Social(kinship)	Positive
Structure	Hierarchical and Large	Positive
	Hierarchical and small	Negative
	Decentralized/Leaderless	Positive

The setting affects the level of association significantly. Permissive settings provide the milieu that TOs and OCGs may associate frequently. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the setting and the level of association. When TOs control a territory in those settings, the effect is higher.

The organizational size positively affects the level of association. When organizations grow in size, member types start to be diverse, and connection nodes to augment. The association, therefore, increases in larger organizations.

The network, similar to the size of the organizations, affects the number of association nodes. When the networks of TOs and OCGs grow, the possibility of association with other organizations increases.

The identity of the members positively affects the level of association because both TOs and OCGs generally recruit members with similar identities. The effect is high when it is related to the ethnic and social identities.

Different organizational structures provide different advantages for organizations in terms of their relationship with the external milieu. Large hierarchical organizations, for instance, have special units responsible for certain tasks. Financial and operational units associate with OCGs when they perform their tasks. TOs with network or leaderless resistance structure types are more independent in decision-making and self-funding. They associate with OCGs without organizational restrictions. Small hierarchical organizations do not have special units; therefore, association level remains low. Consequently, each structure type facilitates associations, but network, leaderless resistance, or large hierarchical structures associate with other organizations more than small hierarchical organizations.

In conclusion, TOs and OCGs associate with each other at varying degrees. Variables examined in this chapter affect the level of association. Excluding the effect of the dedicated leaders and the hierarchical structure of small sized organizations, there is a positive relationship between these variables and the level of association.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Researchers remark on the importance of 'how' and 'why' questions and encourage other researchers to use these questions in their studies, rather than answering who, when and, where questions of terrorist activities (Silke, 2004b, p.10; Trujillo & Jackson, 2006, p.53; Horgan, 2007, p.114). This thesis, encouraged by these researchers, focused on the reasons beyond the immediate terrorist and criminal events, and studied 'how' and 'why' TOs and OCGs act, react, and evolve.

Adopting a 'criminality oriented approach' that puts terrorist learning of criminality under a microscopic examination, it set out to explore the 'interactive learning process' among TOs and OCGs to understand how both organizations learn non-traditional activities (organized crime for TOs and terrorism for OCGs). It concluded that TOs and OCGs learn from each other; associations among them cause appropriation of tactics and *modus operandi*, and the increasing associations between the two groups may cause mutation of both organizations.

The introduction briefly explained the aim of the thesis. It explored the literature, studied the problems associated with terrorism and organized crime, and noted the need for research about how TOs and OCGs learn. In order to help the researcher to decide what constitutes terrorism or organized crime, it

examined definitional studies. After adopting UN's definition of organized crime, it formed a database to analyse existing definitions of terrorism. Not only did it succeed in achieving a workable definition of terrorism, but also provided a pathway of analysis for researchers interested in definitional studies.

Chapter 2 began to investigate terrorist learning by examining counterterrorism policies with a focus on terrorist financing, suicide attacks, and hostage seizures. It confirmed that TOs are learning organizations and concluded that states, TOs, and OCGs are 'sources of knowledge'. TOs learn from their enemies (states) to compete with counterterrorism policies, from other TOs to successfully resort to suicide attacks, and from OCGs to employ hostage seizure missions.

There is no integrative and cumulative theory that explains terrorism or terrorist learning completely. Therefore, Chapter 3 explored terrorist learning through the windows of various learning theories. It provided the much needed cross-fertilization between different disciplines particularly of business administration, international relations, economics, criminology, and security studies by combining subjects that are the interest of various disciplines, such as education, knowledge management, terrorism, and organized crime. After an extensive review of contagion, organizational learning, and alliance learning theories, the thesis concluded that there are weaknesses in their theoretical explanations, and that they are interested in different aspects of learning with limited perspective to terrorist criminality. Consequently, they do not provide a complete understanding of how terrorists learn.

To address those weaknesses, Chapter 3 reviewed the social learning theory of criminology. It concluded that the social learning theory explains how

TOs learn; particularly how they learn highly sophisticated types of organized crime that require knowledge, skills, and techniques both at individual and organizational levels.

Chapter 4 provided theoretical explanations for the way in which TOs and OCGs learn. Following the specific order of learning that social learning theory posits, the chapter applied the theory's principles to organized crime activities of TOs. It explained that TOs, by differentially associating with OCGs, become exposed to definitions in favour of organized crime, anticipate reward for organized crime activities, engage in vicarious learning, and eventually, start to commit organized crime. It thus provided a new perspective to the modes of association between numerous entities; individuals, networks, groups, and organizations. It utilized the 'hybrid network structure model' of association that could be beneficial to future researchers. It found out that entities (TOs and OCGs) influence each other through both their direct and indirect contacts in three forms: *autogamic, allogamous, and multiple*.

Chapter 5 examined the outcome of the learning process, which is appropriation. As a result of appropriation, organizations enter into a mutation period. Therefore, examining the level of appropriation among TOs and OCGs by investigating similarities and differences is a crucial step to understand the outcome of terrorist learning and future implications of the learning process. The chapter focused on operational aspects of both phenomena, actors (TOs and OCGs), their strategic and tactical similarities and discrepancies in theory and practice, to better understand the appropriation. Such an approach provided an equilibrium between theory and practice, namely a cross-fertilization of tactical and strategic domains (Ranstorp, 2007b, p. 11). It concluded that actors, in spite

of the distinctiveness of terrorism and organized crime, have numerous strategic and tactical similarities that facilitate a successful and faster learning.

Chapter 5 devoted the rest of the study to the terrorist criminality to create a baseline of knowledge for understanding the relationship between associations and appropriation. After providing information on the trends in terrorism and organized crime, it discussed reasons for the use of organized crime by TOs. It investigated factors that have given an impetus to the evolution of the contemporary TOs, including the changes in their funding portfolio. It explained factors that have been conducive to the criminality of TOs, including reasons that affected TOs' choice of criminal activities. This chapter confirmed that TOs engage in variety types of organized crime, and provided a comprehensive list of crimes that TOs perpetrate.

Chapter 6 continued to examine the interactive learning process between TOs and OCGs. In order to understand the relationship further, prior models explaining terror crime relationship were scrutinized. The thesis found out conceptual and analytical problems with prior models, and concluded that the literature needs to be revisited. After an extensive investigation of various organizations, it proposed a 'dynamic model of association that explains mutative behaviours of TOs and OCGs. According to this model, associations between TOs and OCGs has various phases: an 'authentic phase' in which organizations remain true to their original purpose; a 'link phase' in which organizations engage in non-traditional activities that are opportunistic and non-symptomatic; a 'nexus phase' in which organizations ally or contest; and a 'convergence phase' in which organizations become hybrids or transform into a new organization. It concluded that TOs and OCGs learn non-traditional

activities from each other through associations. Interacting groups, depending on the level of association, start to appropriate tactics and approximate each other. This change may reach a point where organizations mutate into the other.

Chapter 7 identified factors that affect the level of appropriation as a result of association between TOs and OGCs. The thesis used various variables (motivational change, leader, setting, and interaction nodes) to test the association model of the thesis. It concluded that the motivational change, the setting, the size, the network, the identity, and the structure type (excluding small-sized hierarchical structure) positively affect the level of interaction. Small hierarchical organizations that lack specialized units and dedication of the leader to the cause, on the contrary, have negative effect on the association.

In sum, the thesis provided a new way of thinking about terrorist learning by investigating the interactive learning processes of TOs and OCGs. It reached various conclusions that marked TOs and OCGs as learning organizations. According to these conclusions, TOs learn to perpetrate highly sophisticated types of organized crime from OCGs, whereas OCGs learn terror tactics from TOs through such associations. The level of association, moreover, determines the level of appropriation and the likelihood of one type of organization mutating into the other. The thesis depicted possible future forms of both terrorism and organized crime threats. Consequently, it contributed to the knowledge of how terrorism and organized crime threats might evolve.

There are some attributes attached to different types of organizations. However, the heterogeneity of TOs and OCGs hamper researchers to make concrete conclusions that are valid for all TOs and OCGs (Horgan, 2005; p.24).

An attribute attached to one organization may not be observed in another organization, even when both organizations are under the same conditions. Therefore, this thesis reiterates and accounts the fact that there will always be exceptional organizations that will challenge its findings.

Findings of this thesis indicate possible pathways to improve counterterrorism policies. Preventing TOs from learning is one of the ways to achieve a proactive counterterrorism policy. Various factors affect learning: the availability and the type of the knowledge, the technological awareness, the openness to new ideas, the attitudes toward risks, the nature of the environment, the characteristics of group leadership and structure, the absorptive capacity of organizations and individuals, the availability of financial and human resources, the stability of membership, the level of association among organizations, individuals, and units, the connections within the organizations, and group longevity. All these factors give clues about how capable and efficient an organization can be in learning, but they also indicate on what points these organizations may be vulnerable to inference. A focus on each one of these factors may weaken learning capabilities of TOs.

Learning includes both tacit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge needed by TOs may be made difficult to learn. Such a change in knowledge may also cause 'unsuccessful learning'. Thus, restructuring the knowledge may cause misinterpretation of the knowledge. Members may be forced to codify misinterpreted knowledge in their routines that would cause them to fail repeatedly.

Knowledge sources may also be targeted. Training programs, for instance, provide terrorists with useful information, mostly tacit knowledge

such as how to use weapons, how to make bombs, and how to do counter surveillances. Preventing training programs or putting barriers to limit participation of terrorists may decrease the value of their knowledge, weaken their activities, and decrease their success. Other sources, such as training manuals, emails, and videos may also be intervened or blocked.

In addition, terrorists face a dilemma: they need to learn, but the tools used to learn may create vulnerabilities (Shapiro, 2013, p.4). For example, learning materials such as papers, handbooks, manuals, videotapes, communication tools, address books, phone lists, and activity lists reveal significant information on the organization's members, operations, and plans. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, was planning to destroy multiple aeroplanes years before 9/11, and his plans were simply discovered from his laptop computer where they were stored (Jackson, 2004, p.17; Wilkinson, 2006, p.123). Such knowledge should be the aim of investigative and intelligence agencies.

Learning from past experiences is important for TOs. By learning lessons from their unfinished attempts, TOs may ameliorate their methods and apply developed tactics on similar attacks. Oplan Bojinka, the genesis of 9/11 attacks, for example, was developed by Ramzi Yousef and his uncle Khalid Sheik Mohammed (Gunaratna, 2006, p.171). They planned to destroy twelve U.S. airliners simultaneously over the pacific in 1995. Both planners travelled and tested airport security. Yousef even carried 14 contact lens solution bottles filled with concentrated nitromethane, an inexpensive explosive. Later, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Al Qaeda modified the plans and completed the mission on September 11, 2001. Therefore, unfinished attempts may help

counterterrorism agencies predict future attacks. In addition, TOs' failures may have implications for better counterterrorism tactics (Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010, p.4). Dahl' study (2011) on 176 unsuccessful terrorist plots and attacks points out that there are many lessons to extract from those failures. Counterterrorism agencies may focus on them to prevent future attacks.

Focusing on the learning capabilities and putting multi-level pressure on TOs can speed up the timetable of the TOs which may result in premature attacks or not well-planned attacks with less casualties or damage. Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, for example, pressured by the law enforcement agencies, hurried to accomplish sarin gas attack plans, and the casualties remained few (Jackson, 2001, p.27). Counterterrorism agencies may concentrate on TOs' learning methods and pressure them which may limit their learning efforts, and by extension, lead to an incomplete-learning.

Moreover, associations between members, groups, and organizations are the primary factors in learning. Identifying and isolating key nodes that possess definitions, facilitate associations, and reinforce others towards terrorist activities may make associations and learning harder (Horowitz, 2010; Ball, 2013, p.9; Mellon, Yoder and Evans, 2016). Therefore, counterterrorism policies should focus on factors that affect the level of association. Innovative, skilled, and experienced members and association nodes should be given priority.

In addition, ways people become exposed to terrorist and criminal definitions should be targeted. The access to propaganda materials and narratives should be restricted and changed. Clubb (2016), for example, shows that returning former combatants present an opportunity for counterterrorism,

offering a means to challenge the ideologies and definitions that motivate violence. Members that possess the strongest reinforcement in the organizations should be put in the list as well. These efforts can provide a way of countering activities of organizations by frustrating their association in their search for skills and know-how. Moreover, it is possible to decrease rewards and increase punishments that TOs and OCGs anticipate by engaging certain modes of behaviours (Hsu & Apel, 2015, p.43). Counterterrorism policies should focus on reinforcement methods used by TOs and OCGs.

TOs and OCGs are dynamic: they change their tactics and *modus operandi* depending on the problems they confront. Through these changes, they survive and evolve. There are predictive indicators of those changes (Rasmussen & Hafez, 2010). For example, 20 biological and chemical attacks prior to the Tokyo attack are a case in point. The statements of the group about the value of sarin, the complaints about unusual odours, the anonymous letters about Aum Shinrikyo's activities, and the group's research and experimentations with chemicals were indicators of the Tokyo attack (Dolnik, 2010). Therefore, counterterrorism agencies should be vigilant about changes in TOs' *modus operandi*. They should focus on those methods, tactics, and techniques and identify predictive indicators. Such awareness, moreover, enables counterterrorism agencies to invest in the right policies. A clear understanding of the dynamics of TOs' learning methods, therefore, may shift counterterrorism measures from being reactive to proactive.

On the other hand, the analyses of this thesis point to a complex situation. It found out that the associations between TOs and OCGs, in spite of its existence for decades, has been neglected, mostly because of the narrowly

managed criminal investigations and the predominantly military-centric approach. To achieve proactive counterterrorism policies, it calls for a change in the existing policies that overlook the catalysing effect of organized crime on terrorist activity by demonstrating the relationship between two factors: the importance of organized crime for TOs and the importance of countering organized crime.

This thesis offers suggestions for further areas of research. First, there is still inadequate knowledge on the relationship between terrorism and crime. Recent developments in terrorism and counterterrorism have heightened the need for closer examination of the relationship. This includes learning capabilities and characteristics of TOs, the evolution of terrorism in response to the counterterrorism measures, the reliance of TOs on organized crime, and the consequences of such a strategy.

Second, terrorism research needs to be enriched by inputs of other disciplines. Researchers from other disciplines could be encouraged to undertake terrorism research, and terrorism researchers should be encouraged to apply principles of other disciplines to terrorism.

Third, equilibrium between counterterrorism and counterorganized crime policies needs to be created. Such a balanced approach has numerous advantages. It may discourage TOs from engaging in organized crime and help convince them to negotiate for peace in the absence of financial resources (Otis, 2014, p.2). It may also increase the quality of criminal investigations and help law enforcement agencies to detect future attacks. Thus, it may encourage national law enforcement agencies to work cooperatively in joint investigations, and organs of counterterrorism and counterorganized crime policies may work

side-by-side. This may increase international cooperation and provide more resources to the countercrime which needs these resources because of the allocation of state resources from the countercrime to the counterterrorism arena (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002; Bobic, 2014, p.253). Therefore, researchers should study ways to create the equilibrium between counterterrorism and counterorganized crime measures.

Finally, when for whatever reasons terrorism ends, some organizational units, particularly of TOs engaged in non-traditional activities, may reject disarmament: the ossified structures of the terrorist networks may continue to rely on the knowledge, skills, and techniques. More importantly, the collective identity may not disappear (Fominaya, 2010, p.401). Consequently, members of these structures may continue their business in organized crime, and the terrorism problem may be transformed into an organized crime problem. The BACRIM, Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor Group in Liberia are alarming examples. Researchers should focus on the vulnerabilities of TOs and identify pathways to force them end their organized crime business before they transform into a more dangerous form.

This thesis has contributed to the understanding of how TOs and OCGs learn, and provided a way to counter terrorism and organized crime by undermining their capabilities for future attacks. Trujillo and Jackson (2006), two of the few researchers that examined terrorist learning, have emphasized the importance of studying terrorist learning: “to truly prepare ourselves to combat terrorism threat we must also understand how these groups learn and change” (p.53). The association between TOs and OCGs is self-evident.

Investigatıng the criminal aspect of terrorism offers an opportunity for improving counterterrorism policy and creating a safer future.

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