

**MINARETS AND GOLDEN ARCHES:
STATE, CAPITAL AND RESISTANCE IN NEOLIBERAL TURKEY**

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A. Synopsis

The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse the convergence of political Islam and neoliberalism in Turkey. By doing so, the research aims to construct a Gramscian historical materialist account as opposed to the mainstream centre-periphery relations approach. The mainstream centre-periphery relations approach takes the state and civil society as antagonistic autonomous entities. This consideration brings us where the Turkish politics are perceived as a terrain of conflict between Islamists and secularists. The centre-periphery relations approach has four shortcomings. First, the state and society are considered separately. Second, the market and the state; and the economy and the politics are considered separately. Third, as considered separately, the theory takes civil society as automatically progressive. Fourth, the social relations of productions are neglected. This thesis argues that the Islamists versus secularists dichotomy is not sufficient enough to explain the complexity of contradictions in Turkish politics because of the given four shortcomings. Therefore, a more complex theory where the antagonism is considered within the class struggle is needed. Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, passive revolution and most importantly the integral state provides a new window in this respect. The Gramscian historical materialism offers a holistic understanding for the relationship between the state and society, the market and the state, and the economy and the political. As part of the hegemonic struggle, civil society can be on either side of the struggle therefore it is not considered as automatically progressive in Gramscian historical materialism. As a historical materialist approach, Gramscianism considers the social relations of production as the crucial element of the analysis. The pre-2002 periods (before the Justice and Development Party came into power) were already researched by Gramscian scholars. Therefore, the neoliberal restructuring in Turkey during the Justice and Development Party era is the focal period of this thesis. There will be a specific focus on the cases of urbanisation, education, and the mass media. The conceptual framework of state-society relations is the analytical basis of

this study. Overall, this thesis offers an alternative reading of the rise of political Islam in Turkey.

B. Dedication

To the memory of those who lost their lives in the political violence in Turkey since 2002.

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D. Declaration

Parts of chapter 5 were published on adamdavidmorton.com as a blogpost – *Misunderstanding the Gezi Movement: Secularism Strikes Back?* – in 2013. Ideas and arguments that were developed in this thesis were also used in numerous book reviews that I authored for *Political Science Review* and presented as papers at conferences of IIPPE, EISA, AAG, PSA and UoN SPIR Postgraduate Conferences.

E. Abbreviations

AA: Anatolian Agency

AKP: Justice and Development Party

AKSİYON-İŞ: Confederation of Action Trade Unions

AKTİF EĞİTİM-SEN: Active Educators' Union

ANAP: Motherland Party

AP: Justice Party

BHH: United June Movement

CİHAN-SEN: Cihan Confederation of Trade Unions

CHP: Republican People's Party

CUP: Committee of Union and Progress

ÇŞB: Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning

DİSK: Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey

DP: Democrat Party

DPT: State Planning Organisation

DYP: True Path Party

EĞİTİM BİR-SEN: United Educators' Union

EĞİTİM-İŞ: Union of Education and Science Wage Earners

EĞİTİM-SEN: Education and Science Workers' Union

EU: European Union

FAP: Freedom and Alliance Party

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FP: Virtue Party

GHM: Gramscian Historical Materialism

IHS: Imam-Hatip Schools

ILO: International Labour Organization

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISI: Import Substitution Industrialisation

HAK-İŞ: Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions

HDP: Peoples' Democratic Party

KAMU-SEN: Confederation of Public Workers' Unions of Turkey

KESK: Confederation of Public Workers' Unions

MEB: Ministry of National Education

MEMUR-SEN: Confederation of Civil Servants' Unions
MGK: National Security Council
MİSK: Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions
MHP: Nationalist Movement Party
MNP: National Order Party
MO: Chamber of Architects
MSP: National Salvation Party
MÜSİAD: Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
OECD: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RP: Welfare Party
RTÜK: Radio and Television Supreme Council
SCF: Liberal Republican Party
SHD: Association of Social Rights
SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SP: Felicity Party
ŞPO: Chamber of Urban Planners
TGS: Journalists' Union of Turkey
TİB: Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication
TİP: Workers Party of Turkey
TMMOB: Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TMSF: Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey
TOKİ: Housing Development Administration
TÖB-DER: Association of Union and Solidarity of All Teachers
TÖS: Teachers' Union of Turkey
TpCF: Progressive Republican Party
TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TSE: Turkish Standards Institution
TUSKON: Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TÜRK EĞİTİM-SEN: The Union of Public Workers at Education, Teaching and Science Services' Branch in Turkey
TÜRK-İŞ: Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TÜSİAD: Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
WB: World Bank
YÖK: Council of Higher Education

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Ubi dubium ibi libertas (where there is doubt, there is liberty) – Anonymous proverb.

1. Introduction

“...[A]ll [humans] are ‘philosophers’” (Gramsci, 1971, p.323).

“Science needs the person who has not obeyed it” (Adorno, 1998 [1969], p.132).

In March 2013, a 13-year-old worker died while he was working on an injection moulding machine. Although the owner of the factory was found to be ‘fully culpable’ by the legal experts of the court, the worker’s father did not sue the owner. The father later made a statement: “My son is given and taken by Allah; this is my son’s destiny. What can be said against the will of Allah?” (Radikal, 2013a). Perhaps this example represents only a micro case for the study of the relations of production and the role of religion, yet it is strong enough to provoke a reconsideration of the political economy of political Islam in Turkey.

The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse the convergence of political Islam and neoliberalism in Turkey. To do so, the thesis aims to construct a Gramscian historical materialist (henceforth GHM) account for the neoliberal restructuring in Turkey during the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, henceforth AKP¹) era (from 2002 to present), with a specific focus on the cases of urbanisation, education, and the mass media, and within the conceptual framework of state-society relations. The uniqueness of this research lies in the selection of those three cases and their analysis as a whole within the convergence of neoliberal restructuring and rise of Islamism. By doing so, this research challenges the

¹ The abbreviated version of the party’s name is controversial because of the party staff’s persistence in using the term *AK Parti*. In Turkish ‘*ak*’ means ‘white and/or clean’. Party abbreviations usually consist of three initials in Turkish but, in 2009, Erdoğan stated that using *AKP* instead of *AK Parti* is impertinent and unethical (Milliyet, 2009). In English, *JDP* is often used but it is possible to come across *AK* in the media. In Turkish, *AKP* is broadly used; however, *AK Parti* is still used by party staff, state agents, and pro-government and mainstream media, therefore the choice of abbreviation has become an indicator of being for or against the government in Turkey. In this thesis, the abbreviation *AKP* is used as this is the internationally and broadly accepted version.

oft-referred mainstream approaches that claim there is a conflict between secularists and Islamists.

As a social construct, Islam has been an active element of politics in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Political Islam, as Olivier Roy defines, is a “Third World movement” (1994, p.1) that is distinct from the traditional understanding of Islam because Islamism considers that the society will be Islamised only through social and political action (1994, p.36). To do so, the Islamists no longer perceive the economy and social relationships as subordinate activities (1994, p.36) therefore there is a transformation of small Islamic marginal organisations into a new class of modern-educated but Islamically oriented elite which is defined as a movement “from the periphery to the centre” through Islamic banks, schools and religious publishing/broadcasting by John L. Esposito (1999, p.20-21). In this thesis, political Islam or Islamism is comprehended as an ideological phenomenon that involves the application of Islam to politics for the establishment of the Islamic state (Voll, 2013, p.57). In fact, political Islam has been on the rise in Turkey since the early 1990s, a point that will be discussed in detail later in this thesis. With the emergence of the AKP, it took on a new form, named *conservative democracy* by one of the senior members of the party, Yalçın Akdoğan (AK Parti, 2004; Akdoğan, 2004; Kalin, 2013; Özbudun, 2006). However, the term political Islam will be used in this thesis because of its globally accepted reference. The chief advisor of president Erdoğan, Ibrahim Kalin defines that the success of conservative democracy heralded a movement “from the periphery to the centre” through emphasising society over the state (2013, p.427). In this thesis the validity of this argument will be questioned.

The term neoliberalism is over-used among social sciences, even in partly overlapping and partly contradictory ways (Ferguson, 2010, p.166; Venugopal, 2015, pp.165-166). However, neoliberalism is used in its very strict sense in this research. It is understood, as the political geographer David Harvey defines it, as the phase of capitalism in which the deregulation,

privatisation, deunionisation, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision are accelerated (Harvey, 2005, pp.2-3). At the discursive level (Springer, 2012), neoliberalism is understood as a class-based ideological hegemonic project applied by the transnational class (Cox, 2002, p.33). As analysed in detail later in this thesis, neoliberal restructuring has been introduced to Turkey in the early 1980s.

The study construes the restructuring of Islamic neoliberalism as a passive revolution, which could be explained very briefly as a slow social transformation process realised by an alliance of different social classes. The role of consent and coercion in reconstructing the state-society relations is evaluated in this context. The transition from consent to coercion represents a transition from hegemony to authoritarianism, with special reference to the Gramscian term, *the integral state*; that is to say: “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci, 1971, p.263). Consent is understood as a broad consensual acceptance of the ruling system by the masses. Although it includes the members of society who did not vote for the current government, it is predominantly based on the ones who voted for them especially in such polarised societies like Turkey. Coercion, on the other hand, represents the force of the state, such as law, police and armed forces. State-society relations are considered in relation to this understanding of the integral state in this thesis, thus the emphasis is placed on state-society symbiosis, rather than the frequently referred to state-society antagonism. This holistic approach to the base-superstructure model is termed the GHM in this study. The AKP era is the focus of this research because the party’s victory in 2002 has been considered by mainstream approaches as a rupture, as the “second Republic” (Teazis, 2011), and the start of a new phase for “normalising democracy” (Heper, 2003; İnsel, 2003; Mardin, 2005; Öniş & Keyman, 2003); and the pre-AKP period has already been analysed by numerous Gramscian scholars (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2002; Ahmet Öncü, 2003; Tünay, 1993; Üşenmez, 2007; Yalman, 2009). This thesis argues that the AKP’s victory in 2002 did not indicate a rupture in the history of the

political economy of Turkey, but continuity in the restructuring of neoliberalism. The consecutive victories of the AKP represent a new form of hegemony based on urbanisation, education and the mass media. The analysis is therefore limited to the period between the General Election of 3rd November 2002 and the General Election of 1st November 2015.

In this chapter the main purpose of the thesis is introduced briefly at the beginning. This section presents the aim of the research and what is going to be learnt from this project that is not known yet by the reader. This is followed by the elaboration of the research questions. The conceptual approach is then discussed. The conceptual framework is based on the study of state-society relations, which provides an integrative understanding of the social phenomena. This research's theoretical standpoint, the GHM, which is based on the Gramscian notion of the integral state, is explained in this section. Then the justification and elaboration of cases is discussed. The reader will find answers to the question of why it is worth knowing the results of this thesis in this section. The case study selection is followed by the study's methodology. This section aims to assure the reader that the conclusions of this research are valid. The scientific contribution of this thesis is illustrated in the next section, disclosing the uniqueness of this research. Finally, the structure of this thesis is revealed at the end of this chapter.

1.1. Research Questions

This thesis seeks an answer to a main research question: which social forces have been supportive and non-supportive of political Islam and neoliberal restructuring in Turkey. In order to analyse this research question extensively, the thesis also focusses on two sub-questions: (1) how the AKP has articulated discourses around neoliberal restructuring; and (2) to what extent neoliberalism is hegemonic in Turkey.

The research question focuses on the social forces that have been supportive and non-supportive of political Islam and neoliberal

restructuring in Turkey. This question focuses on the issue of whether the presumption of the 'secularist versus Islamist' conflict is valid for every segment of society, and whether the conflict between those two groups is the only major socio-economic phenomenon in Turkey. Investigating the support and non-support for both political and economic developments of the country at major levels of society would provide an answer for the validity of this presumption. Therefore, this question targets two segments of society: political society and civil society. Political society denotes the state in its strict sense or, in other words, government; civil society, on the other hand, symbolises the state in its *integral*² sense (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p.91). To unpack this, civil society is divided into two parts, each of which receives antagonistic benefits from the same polity: the bourgeoisie, who own the means of production, and the proletariat, who do not, and thus have to sell their labour (Marx & Engels, 2004 [1848], p.3). In addition, there are dissident movements, which can be categorised in two ways: organised and unorganised. Therefore, civil society has three components in the analysis: the capitalist class, trade unions, and resistance groups. This thesis adopts a political economy perspective, in which the relations of production are at the centre of the analysis. The social relations of production will be taken into account in order to highlight the social aspects of the issue.

The first sub-question examines how the AKP has articulated discourses around neoliberal restructuring in Turkey. This question primarily focuses on political society and its role in the consolidation of neoliberalism in Turkey since 2002. In this context, the AKP's role as political society includes the production of consent through discourses around neoliberal restructuring. The production of consent is essential for the hegemonic establishment because no system would survive by relying solely on the coercive power of the state. This question also helps to provide an overview

² My emphasis.

of whether the Islamic narrative has played any part in this consent production.

This leads to the second sub-question, which involves analysis of the extent to which neoliberalism is hegemonic in Turkey. This question's purpose is to explore the magnitude and limits of consent-based politics of neoliberal restructuring. The double-edged transitions between hegemony and authoritarianism will be understood by answering this question.

1.2. Conceptual Approach

The rise of political Islam in Turkey and the rise of the AKP have been studied by numerous approaches in academia. In this research, the approaches are divided into two groups: state-centric approaches and society-centric approaches. It is safe to argue that there is no clear line between these approaches and the distinction may be rather ambiguous. Therefore, this grouping is further classified within four sub-themes: (1) the strong state thesis approach, (2) the modernity and secularism approach, (3) the political economy approach, and (4) the hegemony approach. The reason for starting with the state-centric and society-centric approaches distinction is that this labelling helps the reader to understand the focal point of terrain in those analyses. The state-society relations are crucial to explain the social change phenomena. The shared understanding in the existing literature on state-society relations leads to a number of shortcomings that can be identified in the existing literature.

It can be argued that, regardless of its labelling or classification, the existing literature reviewed for this research on the rise of the AKP and the rise of Turkish political Islam in general shares the same meta-theoretical approach: centre-periphery relations. This approach also leads the literature to share the same four interconnected shortcomings. First, the literature considers the state and civil society in an antagonistic way. Second, separatism is expanded to other sectors, such as the political and the economic (Wood, 1981), or, in other words, the state and the market (Bruff,

2011). These splits are used not only used for methodological purposes but also to define them as separate ontological entities in practical terms. The exteriority leads to an understanding in which these sectors are considered as independent, with an assumed conflict between them. Third, as a result of the conflict between the state and civil society the literature considers the latter as automatically progressive and favours it. Finally, the literature neglects the social relations of production in its analyses. Those four shortcomings limit the arguments to a dualist reading of state-society relations. However, this thesis proposes that a dualist reading prevents a holistic understanding of such social phenomena; therefore, an approach that provides an indivisible reading of society is required.

The dualist understanding of state-society relations that is embedded in the centre-periphery relations approach brings the major ontological reading of Turkish politics: the secularist versus Islamist conflict. As this reading is regarded as problematic because of the shortcomings outlined above, an alternative reading of state-society relations is offered; which takes account of urbanisation, education and mass media in Turkey. The Gramscian concept of the integral state could overcome the shortcomings.

First, Gramsci's theory of the integral state methodologically overcomes the dualism as it does not consider the state and society antagonistically; rather it positions the antagonism between/within classes. Second, methodological separation of the economic and political spheres, or through agents of the market and the state, may also be overcome by the holistic approach. These separatist appearances are linked to the capitalist mode of production, in which production is organised around wage labour and the private ownership of the means of production.

“...[T]he rigid conceptual separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ which has served *bourgeois* ideology so well ever since the classical economists discovered the ‘economy’ in the abstract and began emptying capitalism of its social and political content” (Wood, 1981, p.66).

It is argued that such separations prevent a clear understanding of the internal relations between the dualisms and bring an *ahistorical* analysis of social changes. In order to avoid such obstacles, a *historical* materialist approach is required. Marxist state theory brings a base-superstructure model to the reading of the economic and the political. In this model, the base that contains the means of production and the relations of production determines and shapes the superstructure that consists of religion, culture, mass media, politics, education, architecture, etc. Orthodox Marxism considers this relationship unilaterally; thus, the same determination and shaping does not apply the other way around. Therefore, in this one-way relationship, the economic determines the political. The Greek Marxist Nicos Poulantzas' concept of 'relative autonomy of the state' (Poulantzas, 1973) expands this diagram and proposes that the superstructure also maintains and sometimes even determines the base. Perhaps, what Poulantzas was inspired by is the Gramscian notion of the integral state, in which the economic and the political are conceptualised bilaterally. It is crucial to understand the dynamics of the integral state within its two superstructural components, political society and civil society, and their relationship with the base.

"Gramsci offers two basic concepts for the analysis of modern societies: first, political society, or the repressive apparatus of the state; and second, civil society or the '*private* apparatus of hegemony'. The latter includes all types of private organizations, such as cultural clubs, churches, newspapers and political parties. These two basic elements of a superstructure have a definite function and two distinct ways to carry it out. Political society, no less than civil society, is the institutional embodiment of the power of a class whose unity is realized in the state. However, whereas the supremacy of the class is preserved by political society through the use of force, civil society accomplishes the same end by means that can be called ethical, that is, by means of hegemony or organized consensus. In short, political society organizes force, civil society is the organizer of consensus" (Morera, 1990b, pp.27-28).

Third, instead of considering civil society as an automatically progressive terrain and as a sphere of freedom (Buttigieg, 1995, pp.6-7), this thesis proposes that civil society is not necessarily progressive. The integral state consisting of civil society and political society is the terrain on which

hegemonic struggles are carried out and the components of civil society (the capitalist class, working class and resistance groups) could be on either side in these struggles; progressive or reactionary. Finally, fourth, it is argued that the class struggle and social relations of production are disregarded in most of the literature and identity-based antagonisms have been portrayed as the actual conflicts. As a Marxist historical materialist theory, the GHM account is used in this thesis to overcome this shortcoming in explaining the rise of the AKP, as it starts by analysing the social relations of production.

“Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of life, including polity” (Cox, 1987, p.1).

The distinction between the economic and the political realms in this quotation is not articulated in an ahistorical way; “[r]ather, it promotes a precise conceptualization of the historical and social constitution of particular social relations of production and the emergence of related political and economic institutions” (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p.116).

The concept of hegemony is useful not only to point out the supremacy of ruling class, but also to understand the development of consent and coercion. As Bieler and Morton illustrate here, in Gramscian terms, hegemony

“appears as an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state...” (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p.87).

As mentioned above, this thesis construes the transformation process as a passive revolution, described as “revolution without a revolution” by Antonio Gramsci (1971, p.59). Passive revolution represents a slow social transformation in which reorganisation of the state power and class relations could be found. The reconstitution of political forms is also involved in the passive revolution process in order to adjust it to the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production (Morton, 2010a, p.316).

As a qualitative researcher, reading Gramsci’s *The Prison Notebooks* inspired me to develop an alternative approach to the mainstream

understanding on state-society relations. His dialectical method within his theoretical conceptualisation of capitalist society, which also emphasises the tensions along with bilateral relationships, rather than categorising spheres as cultural/economic/political or state/society (Jubas, 2010, p.237) was thought provoking and facilitated an understanding of society as 'integral state = political society + civil society', as already discussed above. Therefore, in order to understand each empirical case (urbanisation, education, and the mass media), the thesis first analyses the policy and discourse changes that were created by political society. It then focuses on civil society and analyses the discourses of the capitalist class, and the trade unions and unorganised resistance groups. This analysis also features the fractions within those fragments. Thus, a holistic analysis of the integral state is conducted. Due to the fact that this research starts the analyses with the social relations of production, the method is defined as political economy analysis. As the study of production, political economy focuses on both the economy and politics. As mentioned earlier, as a method, the Marxist political economy does not conceptualise the economic and the political as conflicting spheres; rather it conceptualises them as constituting each other (Chandhoke, 1994, p.22).

As a final note on this section, the limitations of the GHM is given. John M. Hobson once defined the Gramscian approach as a scholarship that is acutely ironic with the fact that it reproduces Eurocentrism (2007, p.91). Eurocentrism can be conceptualised as the theorising of history with European/Western eyes. Often, mainstream IR theories fall into the Eurocentrism however what surprised Hobson was that Gramscian scholars who research former colony countries with subaltern studies fall into the same notion too. In my opinion, Gramsci himself indeed produced Eurocentrism as his work exclusively focusses on the Italian politics and the *Risorgimento*. The historical specificity and spatio-temporality are embedded in Gramscian scholarship therefore this thesis too are based on a methodological understanding in which a particular time-space is the focal point. Despite the fact that Gramsci himself wrote about the European

context, his concepts such as the integral state, passive revolution and hegemony transcend time-space and they are applicable to non-European contexts.

1.3. Case Study Selection

As a student of Marxist theory, my readings of Gramsci have helped me to comprehend the dialectical relationship between the base and superstructure. Davison reported that Stuart Hall once described Gramsci as ‘our foremost theorist of defeat’ (2011). If Karl Marx is the theorist of revolution³, Gramsci would be the theorist of defeat⁴. Therefore, as Turkey never experienced a revolution led by the working class, and the 1980 coup could safely be described as the defeat of the working class, Gramsci’s theory of *defeat* within his conceptualisation of hegemony and passive revolution is very applicable to the Turkish case. As superstructural spheres, education (Entwistle, 1979; Freire, 2000; Giroux, 1981, 1999; DJ Hill, 2007; Mayo, 1999, 2005, 2014, 2015; Torres, 2013), language (Ives, 2004, 2008; Ives & Lacorte, 2010; Sassoon, 2000a), the mass media (Hall, 1980a; Landy, 2008), culture (Hall, 1997), religion (Gramsci, 2000), and the spatial relations of capitalism (Ekers, Hart, Kipfer, & Loftus, 2013; Kipfer, 2002, 2013; Morton, 2013c) are crucial for the system to maintain its dominance over the relations of production. My understanding of Turkish politics is based on my long-term intellectual journey. As an undergraduate student, I studied Public Administration⁵ from a liberal perspective; whereas during my postgraduate studies, I focused more on critical approaches, particularly Marxist voices around politics. As a student of Turkish politics, I identified urbanisation, education and mass media sectors as highly contested and critical in Turkey;

³ Marx and Engels published *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848.

⁴ He wrote *The Prison Notebooks* while he was imprisoned by Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime.

⁵ In Turkey, Public Administration departments are often considered as Politics departments. Notwithstanding that my department changed its name to *Politics and Public Administration* following my graduation.

not only in terms of sustaining the particular relations of production, but also in terms of consolidating political support. On the other hand, sectors like manufacturing, garments etc. are not specifically crucial to maintaining superstructural spheres. Therefore, by combining both the reading of Gramscian theory and Turkish politics, those three sectors arise as the most critical ones for the analysis. Additionally, religion also arises from Gramsci's work as an important component of superstructure. The role of religion in maintaining and sustaining particular social relations of production is the focal point of the research because of the configuration of political Islam as an accompaniment to neoliberalism.

Turkey is geographically placed between Europe and the Middle East⁶ and, as a consequence of this location, the Ottomans laid claim to both the Caliphate and the Roman Empire. Historically, Turkey has the strongest secular tradition among Islamic countries and experienced an earlier industrialisation and capitalist accumulation process compared to other countries in the region. This reality also highlights the uniqueness of Turkey's own political Islam. Political Islam refers to a political ideology, based on Islamic conservatism, seeking the moral implementation of Islamic rules in every part of life. Political Islam has different forms in different countries and also globally. Neofundamentalism (Roy, 1994, p.194), post-Islamism (Bayat, 2013; Dağı, 2013; Tuğal, 2013a), and globalised Islam (Roy, 2004) could be given as examples. Pan-Islamism is probably the most global version of political Islam that has been articulated throughout history. More recently, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 9/11 in the US, 7/7 in the UK, the war on terror, Al-Qaeda's activities, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and a broader territory later on, the Arab Spring, and, finally, the emergence and the rise of ISIS have brought political Islam under close scrutiny in the study of politics. However, this thesis only focuses on Turkish political Islam because of its historical

⁶ For instance, the Gezi uprising could be seen as part of both the Arab Spring (Islamic) and Occupy Movement (Western).

specificity. Turkey represents a unique case as the capitalist development in Turkey took place earlier than in other Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, what Savran calls Turkish exceptionalism (2015, p.48). Hereby, it is argued that Turkish political Islam's *sui generis* features, arising from the country's comparatively early and high levels of industrialisation, which have led to profound class contradictions and conflicts, complicate comparisons. Therefore, Turkish political Islam is distinct from the experience of political Islam elsewhere and is defined as a movement that is limited within its spatio-temporality.

Urbanisation refers to the process whereby more people leave the countryside to live in cities, whereas *urbanism* is the study of urbanisation. The difference between urbanism and urbanisation is actually beyond semantics in this study because urbanisation embodies a crucial element for the survival of capitalism: *hegemony*. The production of space and, further, its commodification have come under close scrutiny since the industrial revolution changed the course of society. Unceasing population flows from the countryside to urban space have not only been determined by the mode of production, but also shaped the trajectory of the capitalist system. This bilateral and dialectical relationship also drew the attention of philosophers in the last century. Jessop argues that "Gramsci's philosophy of praxis involves not only the historicisation but also the spatialisation of its analytical categories" (Jessop, 2006, p.29), and that Gramsci approaches space like history (2006, p.31). He continues by summarising Gramsci's understanding of space.

"(a) the spatial division of labour between town and countryside, between north and south, between different regional, national, and even continental economies; (b) the territorialisation of political power, processes of state formation and the dialectic of domestic and external influences on political life; and (c) different spatial and scalar imaginaries and different representations of space. Gramsci did not believe that space exists in itself, independently of the specific social relations that constructs it, reproduce it and occur within it" (2006, pp.30-31).

Gramsci's theory, which not only focuses on the economic base, but also draws attention to the superstructure, allows us to conceptualise architecture as the material structure of ideology.

“Everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly, belongs to [ideological structure]: libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various kinds, even architecture and the layout and names of streets. It would be impossible to explain the position retained by the Church in modern society if one were unaware of the constant and patient efforts it makes to develop continuously its particular section of this material structure of ideology” (Gramsci, 2000, pp.380-381).

Urbanisation in Turkey could be read as a hegemonic process in which state-class relations have been reproduced through spatial policies based on coercion and consent (Çavuşoğlu, 2011, p.50). The redistribution of space and the development of urbanisation have been utilised for consent-making in different forms at different times. The ideological differences coincide with the differences in accumulation regimes. Under the AKP rule, spatial politics were shaped by urban regeneration projects, gentrification, spatial separation of classes in cities, re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics, and the allocation of incentives for pro-government capital. It is plausible to argue that urbanisation and the accumulation regimes are correlated and urbanisation is an active agent of the production of consent. As a highly active sector, urbanisation (or the construction sector) is also important for the labour relations within it, as most of the occupational-work accidents in Turkey take place on construction sites (Müngen, 2011, p.32).

Education is also an important component of hegemonic processes. It helps the reproduction of ideas, ideologies and doctrines, and this is a dialectical relationship because hegemony is also a learning process. As Gramsci noted:

“[e]very relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship...” (Gramsci, 1971, p.350).

Educational processes targeting the children of society aim not only to train them professionally, but also to *educate* them in the norms of the system.

Therefore, it is safe to argue that schools are spaces where the reproduction of social relations of production is realised both *through* and *within* education.

“In the primary school, there were two elements in the educational formation of the children. They were taught the rudiments of natural science, and the idea of civic rights and duties. Scientific ideas were intended to insert the child into the *societas rerum*, the world of things, while lessons in rights and duties were intended to insert [them] into the state and into civil society” (Gramsci, 2000, p.311).

Education’s relationship with the mode of production is not unilateral. Needless to say, education is a superstructural element and it is shaped by the capitalist mode of production. However, education has also the capability of differentiating other superstructural factors, and it maintains the mode of production. As a result of its importance in the reproduction of the social relations of production, education is also a terrain where labour relations are highly contested. The history of education in Turkey has witnessed the correlation between the transformation of modes of production and shifts in educational processes. The education policies are shaped through the Islamicisation⁷ of K-12 education and the marketisation of higher education in Turkey under AKP rule.

The mass media are also important for gaining consent and assist hegemony by moderating interclass relations through consent. The means of communication are active elements of the reproduction of consent to the ideological structure. Gramsci defines the press as:

“the most dynamic part of this ideological structure” (Gramsci, 2000, p.380).

This is because the mass media are fast and efficient in creating the common sense⁸. Education is a long term ‘investment’ for the creation of common

⁷ It is intentionally spelled as *Islamicisation* rather than *Islamisation* because herewith it is referring to the process of a sector *being Islamic* or *more Islamic*; rather than an individual or society *converting to Islam*.

⁸ Common sense is used in its specific Gramscian meaning that defines the perceptions, judgements, values and beliefs that is shared by *common* people (Patnaik, 1988).

sense; on the other hand, the mass media represent a short term investment for the same purpose. There is no doubt that the culture industry is also a long term hegemonic project; however, the short term impacts of the mass media are undeniably crucial for the system. As a superstructural node, the mass media are shaped by the mode of production and maintain the survival of capitalism.

“The great bourgeois press, the so-called independent newspapers, these ‘ideological mercenaries’ in the service of capital, functioned as part of the class struggle, an anything but negligible part. The bourgeois newspaper functioned like a great commercial firm, all intent on ‘distilling political profit’” (Pozzolini, 1970, p.137).

The mass media, as Pozzolini unearths Gramsci’s whole range of works and allows him to speak for himself, are so-called independent; however, they are an important part of the class struggle. The social relations of production are reproduced *through* and *within* the mass media. As *through*, the mass media functions as a hegemonic apparatus; whereas as *within*, the mass media is a terrain where the class struggle takes place. Labour relations in the mass media sector are heavily contested in Turkey and the history of mass media relations in Turkey exemplifies the interconnectedness of the mode of production and the mode of mass media. Since the AKP came into power, the mass media sector has witnessed the creation of the pro-Government media and the disciplining of the mainstream media.

Some scholars focus on Foucauldian governance/governmentality to explain the rise of AKP and neoliberalism (M Erol, Ozbay, Turem, & Terzioglu, 2016; Unalan, 2016). The literature on hegemony and the rise of the AKP/Islamism covers a wide range of areas, such as social policy (Bozkurt, 2013; Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Dorlach, 2015; A Kaya, 2015; Özden, 2014; Seckinelgin, 2015; Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012), anti-corruption (Bedirhanoğlu, 2007), privatisation (Dölek, 2015; Şahin, 2010), central bank independence (Şahin, 2012), foreign policy (Bank & Karadağ, 2012; Yalvaç, 2012), public policy (Bayırbağ, 2013), gender issues (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Dedeoğlu & Elveren, 2012; E Öztan, 2014), populism (Akça, 2014; D Yıldırım, 2010), electoral hegemony (Çınar, 2015; Özbudun, 2013), and

nationalism/the Kurdish issue (GG Öztan, 2014; Taşpınar, 2005; Yeğen, 1999; Yörük, 2014). However, only three areas are analysed in this thesis: urbanisation, education and the mass media. The reasons for this selection are as follows. First, three of these areas are compositely interconnected to each other; therefore, the reproduction of hegemony in one may cause a chain reaction in the others. For instance, the owners of pro-government media outlets also carry out urban renewal projects which, in some cases, dispossess public schools, yet these developments are portrayed as ‘the best urban renewal projects’ by these media outlets. This complex and symbiotic relationship between those three areas evidences their vitality for the reproduction of hegemony. Second, these areas are not only terrains of hegemony *through* which the social relations of production are reproduced, but they are also sectors *within* which these relations are reproduced. Three of the sectors are under the influence of neoliberal restructuring *per se* and the industrial relations within them are heavily contested. Therefore, studying the reproduction of hegemony *through* and *within* urbanisation, education and the mass media is unique, sensible and timely.

The rise and rule of AKP and its policies on urbanisation, education and mass media overlap with especially gender issues, Kurdish problem, and Islamic finance. However, the latter three represent sub-themes under the first three. For instance, gender issues are mainly categorised under education through headscarf dispute in schools; Kurdish problem is mainly categorised under mass media through the reproduction of Turkish nationalism; and Islamic finance is mainly categories under urbanisation through the financing of the Islamic urbanisation. As explained in the previous paragraph, in order to reproduce hegemony, the first three areas are crucial, and the latter three are sub-categories. The reason this thesis does not focus on exclusively on the latter three is that the major aim of this thesis is to reveal the hegemonic relations on the major areas. Considering the time limitations, this thesis takes the latter three as sub-themes which could be major themes for a further research.

1.4. Methodology

The study will apply qualitative research methods and analyse case studies. A linear model of the research process will be pursued. Therefore first theory specification and the development of the hypothesis will be completed. Then, this will be followed by data specification, data collection, data analysis and publication (Burnham, Gilland, Grant, & Layton-Henry, 2004, p.46) with a post-positivist approach (Bieler & Morton, 2003b). In this research, resources are separated into three different categories, as follows: interviews, primary resources and secondary resources. Semi-structured elite interviews were used in order to complete triangulation (Yin, 1994, p.97). In the early stages of the research, elite interviews with representatives of the capitalist class were planned, specifically with experts or spokespersons of the TÜSİAD⁹, MÜSİAD¹⁰ and TUSKON¹¹, and experts at relevant state institutions (TOKİ¹², ÇŞB¹³, MEB¹⁴, YÖK¹⁵, RTÜK¹⁶, TİB¹⁷ and the Prime Ministry). However, during two field trips to Turkey no positive responses to emails or phone calls were received from any of the above-mentioned institutions, except one expert at the TOKİ, who wanted to remain anonymous. On the other hand, most of the resistance groups (unorganised groups and trade unions) responded positively to interview

⁹ Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, Turkish: *Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*.

¹⁰ Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, Turkish: *Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*.

¹¹ The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, Turkish: *Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu*.

¹² The Housing Development Administration, Turkish: *Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*.

¹³ The Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, Turkish: *Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı*.

¹⁴ The Ministry of National Education, Turkish: *Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*.

¹⁵ The Council of Higher Education, Turkish: *Yükseköğretim Kurulu*.

¹⁶ The Radio and Television Supreme Council, Turkish: *Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*.

¹⁷ The Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication, Turkish: *Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı*.

requests, apart from two trade unions (the TÜRK EĞİTİM-SEN¹⁸ and the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN¹⁹).

The clear division between groups who accepted interview requests and those who did not accept, brings us to a position where methodological difficulties of elite interviewing and power/political issues (KE Smith, 2006) within the method need to be addressed. In order to access potential interviewees, I first emailed them and, if I did not receive any replies, I contacted them by telephone. In the case of TÜSİAD, my email was ignored and I was told that my “research topic is too sensitive” during the phone call²⁰. My request was initially accepted by an expert at the MÜSİAD. However, a few hours later, I received a phone call from the person and he said that he no longer wished to give an interview, without giving any reason. Similarly, in the case of TUSKON, an expert accepted the request but subsequently cancelled our appointment following a police raid on their headquarters in Ankara (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015b). In all three cases of capitalist groups, the sensitivity of the research topic proved an obstacle, preventing the pursuit of interviews with them. In the case of state institutions, emails were not responded to, and requests by phone were refused either because of time limitations, or individuals not being interested in giving interviews. Therefore, in this research, elite interviewing was used only as a method for resistance groups. For the rest of the agents, primary resources (material available on their websites and printed materials in some cases) were used to collect data. Interviews with the experts or spokespersons of those groups available on news portals were also used as primary resources.

¹⁸ The Union of Public Workers at Education, Teaching and Science Services’ Branch in Turkey, Turkish: *Türkiye Eğitim, Öğretim ve Bilim Hizmetleri Kolu Kamu Çalışanları Sendikası*.

¹⁹ The Union of United Educators, Turkish: *Eğitimciler Birliği Sendikası*.

²⁰ The relationship between the TÜSİAD and the AKP government, as discussed further in this research, has not been perfectly stable.

Eleven semi-structured interviews were used in this research. Only the interview with an expert at the TOKİ is used anonymously and, in accordance with the interviewee's wishes, this interview was not recorded but rather based on notes taken during the interview. The other ten interviews were going to be used with interviewees' names and their affiliations in regards to their consent. However, following the arrest of four academics (three on 15th March 2016; one on 31st March 2016) on charges of "terrorist propaganda" after they publicly read out a declaration, and the deportation of a British academic who supported them (Reuters, 2016), regardless of their consent, the interviewees' names were withdrawn from the thesis. Their affiliations have been used only in order to define who they are.

For each sector, urbanisation, education and mass media, one set of questions was prepared. In only three interviews were questions from all three sets asked: the United June Movement (Turkish: *Birleşik Haziran Hareketi*, henceforth: the BHH), Anti-capitalist Muslims, and Association of Social Rights (Turkish: *Sosyal Haklar Derneği*, henceforth the SHD). The other seven interviews were carried out with only one question set. For urbanisation questions, interviews were carried out with individuals from The Association of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Turkish: *Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği*, henceforth the TMMOB) on behalf of Taksim Solidarity, The Chamber of Architects (Turkish: *Mimarlar Odası*, henceforth the MO), The Chamber of Urban Planners (Turkish: *Şehir Plancıları Odası*, henceforth: the ŞPO), and TOKİ. For education questions, interviews were conducted with representatives of the EĞİTİM-SEN Istanbul Universities' Branch, and EĞİTİM-SEN Istanbul Teachers' Branch; and mass media questions were used with the Journalists' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası*, henceforth: the TGS) and an academic/expert on media relations in Turkey²¹.

²¹ A former journalist, who is now an academic at Galatasaray University.

Secondary resources were used in this study in order to construct the theoretical framework, historical background and to support the empirical chapters. Journal articles, academic books, documentaries, and some online videos were used. In addition, descriptive statistical data from the Turkish Statistical Institute, the World Bank (henceforth the WB), the International Labour Organization (henceforth the ILO), the International Monetary Fund (henceforth the IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth the OECD) were used as secondary resources. EndNote was used for organising citations and bibliography, and NVivo was used to analyse the interviews.

1.5. Scientific Contribution

The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First of all, this research stands upon critical theory as opposed to problem-solving theory. As Robert W. Cox states in his article, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, “The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble” (1981, pp.128-129). On the other hand, critical theory “is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters” and it “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (1981, p.129 cited in Göl, 2013). As a critique of problem-solving theories, this thesis seeks to contribute to the ‘critical’ literature concerning the rise of the AKP.

Second, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature of class-based analyses of the rise of the AKP. Political Islam in Turkey has often been evaluated by identity-based analyses, with an assumed conflict between secularists and Islamists. On the contrary, this thesis proposes that the secularist versus Islamist antagonism is limited because it is a

superstructural conflict. However, the antagonism between those who own the means of production and those who do not and, therefore, sell their labour is rather a basic conflict. This thesis will seek to answer the question of the rise of the AKP by providing an understanding of the relations of production, unlike mainstream approaches.

Third, as mentioned before, the Gramscian notion of hegemony is used to explain both pre-2002 and post-2002 periods. The production of consent plays a key role in those studies. However, this study seeks to contribute to the literature of hegemony within three sectors: urbanisation, education and mass media, which are also components of passive revolution. None of these on its own can provide a meaningful overview of the hegemonic transformation in post-2002 Turkey. However, together, with a multi-disciplinary approach, they offer a multi-causal analysis of hegemonic processes. The rise of political Islam cannot be explained in a one-dimensional way, therefore urbanisation, education and mass media are taken into account, as they are not mutually-exclusive to capitalism and represent hegemony as a whole. Those three sectors represent the three pillars of the AKP's hegemony in Turkey as all three have been used to produce consent since the establishment of the republic. Therefore, in this research, it is argued that hegemonic projects can be seen within a continuity framework.

1.6. Overview of Thesis

The structure of this research thesis will be as follows. In the second chapter, where the literature review is given, different approaches to political Islam in Turkey will be critically evaluated within the context of state-civil society relations. The centre-periphery relations approach will be the general framework to understand the relationship between religion and politics as the literature mostly shares this approach. The literature is divided into two main categories, as follows: state-centric approaches and society-centric approaches. However, as this division helps only to distinguish the literature

according to its major focal point, it is further divided into four sub-themes for each of the two categories. These themes are hegemony, strong state, political economy, and modernity-secularism. Following categorisation, a general critique is provided, which identifies four key shortcomings commonly shared in the literature. First, the literature considers the state and civil society as autonomous entities, often with an assumed conflict between them. Second, the economic and the political, or in other words the market and the state, are considered separately. Third, as a result of the antagonism between the state and civil society, civil society is considered as a progressive element that is favoured. Fourth, as the antagonism is sought between the state and civil society by the literature, in other words between identities such as 'secularists and Islamists'; the class struggle and the social relations of production are neglected in the literature.

The third chapter presents the integral state as an alternative to the centre-periphery relations approach. An overall critique of this approach is given first. Four shortcomings and their limitations with regard to the analyses of the rise of political Islam in Turkey are addressed in this section. Later, the GHM approach is introduced as an alternative which is constructed around the notions of hegemony, passive revolution and the integral state. Each of these notions will be introduced extensively with the current meta-theoretical discussions and debates around them. This is followed by the proposal of the GHM as an alternative approach to explaining the rise of Turkish Political Islam. Then, there is a brief discussion around the limitations of the Gramscian approach, in particular related to this research. The final section represents a transition to the empirical chapters. This section not only provides the reasons why those three sectors were selected as case studies for this research, it also transcends the justification and explains the connections between the literature review and the theoretical approach. It also presents the conceptual approach that is adopted in the second and third chapters and the empirical approaches that are given in the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters.

An overview of the political economy and hegemony in pre-2002 Turkey is supplied in the fourth chapter with a theoretical engagement. The historical development of capitalism in Turkey prior to the AKP government is provided chronologically, with a particular focus on urbanisation, education and the mass media sectors. To do so, the discussion focuses on the changes in economic policies and shifts in ideologies. The first part of the chapter features the historical engagement with the social relations of production in Turkey thus as well as the macroeconomic policies, their costs on the labour are also given. The second part of the chapter provides a dialectical reading of the ideology as a superstructural node and demonstrates how it accompanied the changes in accumulation regimes. As an ideology, the rise of political Islam is discussed within the context of so-called ‘secularists versus Islamists’ conflict. This reading also shows the establishments of key actors. This historical process will be given under four periods: the late Ottoman Empire era (1808-1922), the Kemalist era (1922-1950), the multi-party era (1950-1980), and the post-coup era (1980-2002). This section will be followed by three sections on the history of consent-production processes related to urbanisation, education and the mass media within those periods. As every consent-production process creates its own discontent and faces contestation as a response, these sections also provide the history of organised and unorganised resistance movements in those sectors.

The purpose of the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters is to demonstrate how the AKP conducted the political economy of urbanisation, education and mass media between 2002 and 2015. In doing so, these chapters will examine whether these sectors are the terrains where the assumed conflict between secularists and Islamists takes place, as proposed by the centre-periphery relations approach. Class conflict is sought in order to transcend the secularists-Islamists conflict and these sectors are conceptualised as the terrains of hegemony through which consent is produced and reproduced. The social forces that have been supportive of Islamic neoliberalism in

Turkey, along with the discourses around the neoliberal restructuring that have been articulated by the AKP, are questioned in the empirical chapters. Thus, the extent of Islamic neoliberalism's hegemony could be understood.

The fifth chapter focuses on the reproduction of social relations of production *within* and *through* urbanisation. First, the contribution to the literature of urban/space theory by the Gramscian scholars is presented in order to establish a conceptual framework for hegemony through urbanisation. The spatiality of Gramsci's theory, accumulation by dispossession, neoliberalism in urban space, and the material structures of ideology will be discussed in this manner. The importance of urbanisation for the development of Turkish capitalism is discussed in the next section, where the key actors of urbanisation in Turkey are also introduced. The re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics and the allocation of incentives for pro-government capital are introduced in the next section. Under those two developments, the urbanisation in Turkey between 2002 and 2015 is analysed as a hegemonic project. This analysis supports discussion around the coexistence of neoliberalism and urbanisation, and their engagement with political Islam; the urban regeneration projects in the slums and the transformation of TOKİ from an agent of social housing to a profit-making housing giant; and the role that pro-government capital plays in the regeneration projects and what they do in exchange. Finally, the growing discontent among the masses at the proposed projects is analysed and the role of this discontent in the Gezi uprising is discussed.

The reproduction of social relations of production *within* and *through* education will be the focal point of the sixth chapter. This chapter will start with the conceptualisation of education as a hegemonic apparatus. Education's role in the reproduction of common sense, schools as material structures of ideology, neoliberal education, and employability agenda are included in this section. The next section examines the vitality of education for the capitalist system in Turkey. The agents discussed in the chapter are also introduced in this section. This section will be followed by the analysis

section, where it is proposed that there are two major processes in the education sector in Turkey under AKP rule: the Islamicisation of K-12 education and the marketisation of higher education. This section provides an extensive examination of the new K-12 schooling system; the rise of religious schools; the business of 'exam preparation' schools; the privatisation of higher education system; and the neoliberalisation of education and responses from the capital. The unrest among the citizens is articulated dialectically and the impact of the education sector on the Gezi uprising will be discussed at the end.

The seventh chapter draws attention mainly to the reproduction of social relations of production *within* and *through* the mass media. The first section of the mass media chapter features the theorisation of mass media as a hegemonic tool through which the reproduction of consent is processed. The concepts that Gramsci coined in his *Prison Notebooks* are introduced; such as ideological structure and ideological material, organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals, and integral journalism. The value of the mass media in Turkey for the survival of the mode of production and the key actors in the mass media sector in Turkey are presented in the next section. Two arguments are asserted in the analytical section: the first concerns the creation of pro-government media; the second focuses on the disciplining of mainstream media. Under these arguments, the analysis is carried out within the discussions of: the transformation of mass media ownership and the role of mass media owners in the urban regeneration projects, the case of a 'left-liberal' newspaper that was previously pro-government and is currently an anti-government media outlet, and the conditions of public broadcasting and its engagement with the rising Islamic mass media and religious broadcasting. Finally, the fast-diminishing trust in the mass media is analysed as part of the discontent, and the rise of social media and digital journalism after the Gezi uprising are examined.

The eighth chapter presents the conclusion of this thesis and provides the empirical findings. First, the key concepts constructed in chapters two and

three, which have driven the narrative and analyses in chapters four to seven, are explained. This section also features the justification and rationale of the thesis. Then, the overall analysis of the trajectory of urbanisation, education and the mass media sectors in Turkey under the AKP rule between 2002 and 2015 is presented. This section addresses the main research questions proposed in the thesis. The extent of hegemonic togetherness of neoliberalism and political Islam, or, *Minarets and Golden Arches*²² as it was already chosen as the title of this thesis, under AKP rule is discussed. This section is followed by a discussion of the limitations of this thesis's epistemological standpoint. Finally, the thesis concludes with a discussion of the recent developments in Turkey and suggests how this study could be further developed in terms of future research.

²² The title of this thesis is inspired by the image on the cover of Zülküf Aydın's book, *The Political Economy of Turkey* (2005), where the minarets of Ortaköy Mosque are harmonised with the golden arches of a McDonald's restaurant under the Turkish flag. The same picture was used on the cover of the first edition of the Turkish translation of Cihan Tuğal's *Passive Revolution* (2010). However, the publisher used another image for the second edition.

2. The Centre-Periphery Relations Approach and its Shortcomings: Towards a Gramscian Challenge

“Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p.128).

2.1. Introduction

One of the vice presidents of AKP, Ömer Çelik, attended a conference in London in December 2012 and he made an analogy between the AKP and Antonio Gramsci during the Q&A. According to Çelik, the AKP represents “the cultural government” therefore it is Gramscian, whereas the Kemalist period (1923-1950) was Hegelian because of their statist policies, and the DP²³ government era (1950-1960) was Marxian because of the importance of economic development (Kasapoğlu, 2012). Regardless of the overall grotesqueness of this conceptualisation, Çelik’s analogy is suggestive in demonstrating the uses and abuses of Gramscian concepts amongst Turkish politics and academia in order to praise civil society against the state.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on state-society relations and political Islam in Turkey. The civil-military relations approach (Demirel, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Huntington, 1957) is also applied to the same context in Turkey, as parliamentary rule had been interrupted several times by the army. However, this approach has a limited view on political Islam and its rise in Turkey, because it reduces the relationship between the state and society into a bureaucratic mechanism; whereas an understanding on state-society relations provides an overarching phenomenology. Centre-periphery relations approach is the overarching meta-theory of the literature. Notwithstanding the focal point of their analyses are state-centric or society-centric, the literature shares the commonalities of centre-periphery relations approach. These commonalities could be defined as dualist reading. As I discussed earlier, although the split between state-

²³ The Democrat Party (Turkish: *Demokrat Parti*).

centrism and society-centrism is helpful to understand the subject of the analysis, it is an ambiguous split. Therefore, I divided them into subthemes: the hegemony approach, the strong-state approach, the political economy approach, and the modernity-secularism approach. Following the reviewing of literature, an overall critique of centre-periphery relations approach will be inserted where shortcomings of the approach will be discussed.

The quadruple victory of AKP brought about the revival of debates about the state and its relation with civil society in Turkey. Although those debates had been vibrant before the AKP, the clear victory of a pro-Islamic party for the first time in the history of Turkish political life raised the importance of discussions. Moreover, the increasing significance of political Islam in the Middle East in recent years drew the attention of the Gramscian scholars (Amin, 2007; Bayat, 2009; Kandil, 2011; Roccu, 2012, 2013; Smet, 2015, 2016), and their studies were also accompanied by numerous comparative studies between Turkey and other Islam-dominated countries, especially Iran and Egypt (RS Ahmad, 2014; Atabaki, 2007; Gümüşçü, 2010; Tezcür, 2010; Tuğal, 2012; Zubaida, 2000). In this study, political Islam is considered as an ideology which guides the social and political as well as personal life (Berman, 2003). Briefly, political Islam refers to a way of political life where Islamist thought and norms, deriving from Quran's, influence individuals' lives entirely; though there are different levels in each country. In the literature there are several studies engaging with Gramsci and Islam (Boothman, 2012; Butko, 2004; Pasha, 2005; Simms, 2002), and also Gramsci and Turkey (Ahmet Öncü, 2003; Üşenmez, 2007; Yalman, 2009). The first one considers Islam as a whole rather than focussing on specific cases and the latter focusses on the pre-AKP period in Turkey. In this study, the Turkish case will be seen in its historical specificity because of its own *sui generis* features, especially its early and relatively high level of industrialisation; and the early but profound class contradictions and conflicts within it. Especially, the rise of so-called 'Islamic' capital and assumed conflict between secular and Islamic capital will be highlighted in

this context. Therefore, this chapter will be primarily focused on the Turkish case and discussions regarding political Islam will be limited within the literature on Turkey. Thus, no comparison will be carried out throughout the research.

The Weberian notion of patrimonial state and its reflexions on Turkish politics will be critically assessed within the centre-periphery relations approach in this section in order to give the general context before the discussions under sub-themes. Centre-periphery relations approach could be accepted as the most influential and prominent meta-theory among social sciences in explaining the Ottoman-Turkish context (İnalçık, 1977). It has been used as “a key to Turkish politics” (Mardin, 1973) for the last quarter of the 20th century. Edward Shils starts his work with a certain claim: “Society has a centre” (1961, p.117). He also points out that the central zone is a phenomenon of the realm of values, beliefs and action in society. Şerif Mardin adapted the concept to the Turkish context. According to Mardin, there has been a sharp division between centre and periphery in both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey; and this phenomenon can be accepted as the most crucial feature of the Turkish political environment (1973, p.169). He gives two major reasons for this separation: firstly, the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the large number of nomads in Anatolia, and secondly, the suspicion of the Ottoman dynasty towards the remaining pre-Ottoman nobility of powerful families in the provinces (1973, pp.170-171). He considers the modernisation process of the Ottoman Empire as the Westernisation of the bureaucracy (1973, p.179). Basically, he asserts that the state which represents the centre imposed Westernisation processes towards the society that represents periphery. He applies the same analogy to the Republic as well. For instance, he claims that the coup on 27th May 1960²⁴ deepened the split between centre and periphery (1973, p.186). He eventually points out that the resistance in Turkey is not rooted in organised

²⁴ He calls it a revolution, rather than a coup d'état.

labour movements, since they are not the part of the periphery; but the periphery itself is the core of counter-official culture (1973, p.187) because of patrimonialism and the absence of civil society (1969, pp.254-264). Those claims appear from not only the dualist understanding of the state-society relations, but also from the consideration of statesmen as a social class. The state and civil society appears to be, on behalf of centre and periphery, autonomous entities. The material conditions of production through capitalist development in the Ottoman Empire are replaced by an antagonism between bureaucracy and the rest.

In relation to the centre-periphery relations approach, Migdal's the state-in-society approach should be highlighted. He aims to present a new definition of the state in place of the Weberian understanding of the state. In Weberian theory, the modern state is seen as a compulsory association which organises domination. In other words, the state is a relation of people dominating people; a relation supported by means of legitimate violence and which claims the monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory (Migdal, 2001, p.13). He provides a new definition within *image* and *practices* of the state (2001, p.16). The image represents the centre. Migdal derives the definition of image from Shils: "the image amalgamates the numerous institutions of which the performers are members and on behalf of which they exercise authority, into an image of a dominant and single centre of society" (Shils, 1975, p.74). Practices can be denoted as "the routine of performance of state actors and agencies, their practices, may reinforce the image of the state or weaken it; they may bolster the notion of the territorial and public-private boundaries or neutralize them" (Migdal, 2001, p.18). Apart from a new definition of the state, Migdal explains the state-in-society perspective as going beyond "bringing the state back in"²⁵. Four points are highlighted in this context: re-situating the study of states in their social setting, disaggregate states as objects of study, rethinking the

²⁵ "Bringing the state back in" refers to the book of Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985).

categories used to conceptualise the evolving nature of social forces, and being continued to the mutually transforming quality of state–society relations (Migdal, 1994, p.1). In sum, the argument is that states are parts of society. Additionally, four claims were discussed: states vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society, states must be disaggregated, social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions and, states and other social forces may be mutually empowering (1994, pp.2-4). Such analyses bring a problematic antagonism: *the strong state versus weak society*. Migdal's book²⁶ describes the definition of state from the perception of bureaucratic authoritarianism and corporatism theories as it is characterised by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures (1988, p.6). He points out that the dual nature of the state in the Third World is at the heart of this understanding (1988, p.8). He continues in a more metaphorical way.

“States are like big rocks thrown into small ponds: they make waves from end to end, but they rarely catch any fish” (Migdal, 1988, p.9).

Migdal's central concern in the book is the duality of states, which he describes as the strengths of states in penetrating societies and their weaknesses in effecting goal-oriented social changes (1988, p.9). He mentions that we accept the rightness of a state's having high capabilities to extract, penetrate, regulate, and appropriate; simply, the strong state (1988, p.15). He uses an “ideal-type definition” which he derived from Max Weber to conceptualise the state. The state is an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership, that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way (1988, p.19). Before he starts defining his model, he criticises Lerner's traditional-modern, Rostow's stages of growth, and Shils's centre-periphery modelling of state-civil society relations for composing their models dichotomically (1988,

²⁶ The book's name derives from the other way around; “Strong Societies and Weak States”.

p.24). Therefore, he seeks a sort of model which would interpret society as a melange of social organisations, rather than the dichotomous structure that practically all past models of macro level change have used (1988, p.28). In the book, there is a table in which he asserts that strong state and weak society refers to a pyramidal model which could be observed in France and Israel, whereas weak state and strong society models a diffused one such as Sierra Leone; and finally both weak states and societies represents anarchical situations and he gives China between 1939-45 and Mexico between 1910-20 as two examples (1988, p.35). The dualist characteristic of the state-civil society relations appears as the major feature of his study. Moreover, the disregard of class relations appears as another shortcoming of his study. In order to understand the state and its relations with civil society, the nature of production and its social relations should be considered as the major factors.

Morton raises several problems with this theorising of the state. First, the state is considered as a discrete institutional category and its relationship with society is external. Second, even though there is an emphasis on their mutual interaction, the state and society are taken as two separate entities. Within this type of state theorising, the separation of political (the state) and economic (society) obstructs the problematising and critical understanding of capitalism. There is an apparent failure to perceive “the state as a form of capitalist social relations, as an aspect of the social relations of production, predicated upon the reproduction of antagonisms and exploitation” (Morton, 2004, pp.135-136) in those analyses. To go back to the Turkish context as given by Mardin, conceptualising bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire or Turkish Republic as a surplus receiving class directly from labour or peasantry would be problematic. Now, let me review the literature related to the Turkish context and thus I will finalise my critique on the literature.

2.2. The State-centric Approaches

2.2.1. The Strong State Thesis Approach

Heper and Keyman highlight that Migdal realised the close link between the degree of social control a state exercises and the strength of that state (1998, p.272). This 'social control' role of the state brings us to the strong state thesis approach. Heper appears as the most dominant figure of this approach where he seeks answers to the antagonism of the *strong state versus weak society* in Turkey (1992b). He points out the difficulties of democracy in Turkey which are manifested in two interconnected ways. First, the state elites are sensitive to the crisis of integration, and thus they are not sympathetic towards the periphery (1985, p.98).

“In the Ottoman-Turkish context, the State was distinctly separated from society” (Heper, 1991b, p.46).

The centre means those groups or persons who tried to uphold the state's autonomy or supremacy in the polity (Heper, 1980, p.85). He claims that political parties in Turkey have emerged from an environment where there was the absence of an aristocracy and entrepreneurial middle class with political influence; therefore there is a gap of institutions linking political and social structures (1985, p.98). The reason here is that it brings the absence of a middle-class ethic by itself. Eventually, political parties in Turkey developed as a means of elite conflict (1985, p.99). He continues by asserting that the state initially helped the middle class, then arose as an arbitrator state, and finally became a positive state – additionally no 'bourgeois politics' flourished due to the absence of a politically influential civil society (1985, pp.100-101). The private sector is considered as a non-influential and ineffective pressure group in the Turkish context in his writings, (1985, p.102) but interest group politics still constitutes a critical link between the state and civil society (Heper, 1991a, p.3). In the context of patrimonialism, the centre smothered the periphery (1985, p.107). Elsewhere he makes a

division between the army and democracy (Heper, 1992a, p.160) as the bureaucracy appears as an autonomous entity (Heper, 1976, p.497).

“It was thought that when groups had aggregate wills of their own they would have autonomy both against an over-arching State and a 'repressive' civil society, and that the pursuance of political activity by those groups would have a legitimacy of its own. The latter situation was encountered particularly in those polities where the State and civil society were differentiated from each other; both had autonomy vis-a-vis the other, and neither was in a position to smother or 'absorb' the other” (Heper, 1991b, p.42).

Pluralism also appears as another dimension of the strong state thesis approach (Hermann, 2003). For instance, Heper claims that the development of pluralism as a significant dimension of democracy is embedded in the relationship between the state and religion (1991b, p.38). Elsewhere Islam is also taken as an independent variable in their analysis (Heper & Israeli, 1984, p.5).

“The legacy of the 1980s in Turkey may well be the eventual consolidation of pluralism, reinforced by a less conflictual relationship between the State and religion. In other Middle Eastern regimes, which could not effect a separation between religion and the State, even a glimmer of pluralism is still not in sight” (Heper, 1991b, p.51).

Yavuz points out, “the Turkish secular reforms not only hyphenated state and society but defined the Republican state against traditional society” (MH Yavuz, 2003, p.7). He accepts a separatist understanding of state and society, and he asserts that there has been a historical interference between Kemalist state elites and traditional Islamic society. Conceptually, this framework can be found on centre-periphery dichotomy. He claims that Westernisation policy represents a state-controlled and top-down process against Islamic bottom-up emancipation process, and the history of Turkish republic can be accepted as the history of this dichotomy (2003, p.5). Within this Weberian reading of the bureaucracy, it is also argued that during the Kemalist period the bureaucratic elite considered themselves as the guardians of the Republican norms (Heper & Sancar, 1998, p.148; Özbudun, 2000, pp.5-7). The AKP's role and its victory demonstrate to us a new social contract over this antagonism (MH Yavuz, 2003, p.256). He claims that as a result of the

vernacularisation of modernity (2003, p.5) and the interaction between the state and society within the context of politics and the market, the Islamic movements developed four strategies: spiritual/ethical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic (2003, p.9). According to Yavuz, the Islamist movement in Turkey challenges not only the state ideology (Kemalism) which is protected by the secular bloc consisting of military, bureaucracy and capitalists, but also traditional Islamic ways of doing and thinking. He points out that the Islamic movement in Turkey has been engaged with capitalism and it is entrepreneurial. The rise of an Islamic capitalist class can be seen as a challenge to the Orientalist thesis that Islam and capitalism are incompatible and antagonistic, which could be found in the Weberian reading of Islam and capitalism (2006, p.4). In this context, he asserts the prime agent of the AKP's *silent revolution* is the new emerging bourgeoisie rooted in Anatolia (2006, p.1). Also, he claims the dominant reading of Kemalist state versus Islamic society ignores the symbiotic relationship between them (2006, p.8). However, he neglects social relations of production in this analysis and he focusses on identity based issues. For instance, he points out "there is still a high likelihood that Turkish voters will return to the identity-based parties they have voted for in the past" (2006, pp.3-4) because the main goal of Kemalism was the externalisation of Islamic identity in the public domain (1997, p.80). On the other hand, this understanding of Turkish politics ignores the class-based relations of the system. Putting an end to class-based politics as a strategy is not employed as a means to eliminate class politics rather, as Yalman points out, "it is employed to marginalise class-based political opposition" (Yalman, 2012, p.23). Elsewhere he focusses on the AKP's identity, ideology and institutional features. Firstly he questions whether the AKP is an Islamic party or not (2009, p.1) and then he compiles its historical and ideological background (2009, p.14). Thereafter, he makes an analysis of the AKP's ideology, leadership and party organisation (2009, p.79). In this analysis it is important to highlight one point; the Islamic political movement in Turkey has evolved to a position where it has ceased to be Islamic due to three

factors as follows: political participation, neoliberal economic policies and expansion of market (2009, p.xii). As he points out, Islamic parties in Turkey have been constrained by systemic restrictions such as constitution, laws regulating political parties, the military establishment and the requirements of international organisations (2009, p.11). On the other hand, this assumption does not explain why the AKP is not in favour of making amendments on these restrictions (such as 10% nation-wide election threshold). It should be noted that these restrictions have started to play a contributing role in the AKP's mobilisation to politics since these restrictions are regulated for the protection of stability (Boyras, 2011, p.156).

The strong state thesis approach is also used in the literature of assertive secularism versus passive secularism (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p.33; Kuru, 2009; Tank, 2005), political sociology (Sunar, 1974, 2004), and electoral politics too (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, p.145; Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007). Keyman argues that the synthesis of liberalism and conservatism, or in other words economic Islam and conservative modernity, in the AKP challenges the assertive secularism of the state (2010a, pp.149-152). Institutionalism is another aspect too. It is argued that the AKP faced problems of autonomy because of the impact of the bureaucratic veto players (the Presidency, the Armed Forces, National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, the civil service, the mass media and so on) which are very important in determining the structural development of the party system and decision-making process (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009, p.17). Democratisation is blocked by military tutelary (Taş, 2015).

2.2.2. The Modernity and Secularism Approach

This approach is constructed on the idea that, in line with the Kemalist goal for classless society, the secularist versus Islamist dichotomy became a substitute for the conflict of the left and the right throughout the early republican period (Toprak, 1981, p.123; 1987b, pp.218-219). Çarkoğlu and Toprak claim that since the reform period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish

society has faced a separation of two wings; and this polarisation is defined as secularists versus Islamists (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p.32). Their claim further continues as people of Turkey are gradually becoming more religious; and growing religiosity in any society will cause the state to wither away from secular principles (2007, p.101). Elsewhere, where Toprak questions the thesis of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, she also argues that the division along the Islamist versus secular axis can only be resolved through the internal mechanisms and logic of democratic rule; and secularisation is the precondition of democracy in the Turkish model (2005, pp.168-169). Another dualism also appears in Turkey at the cultural level as a result of Westernisation processes (Toprak, 1987a, p.9) and Islamism can be seen as a rejection of Westernisation (Dağı, 2005, p.23). For instance, the headscarf issue is considered as a phenomenon where religious conservatism meets modernity (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, p.99). Heper argues that, since 1923, Turkey has made significant progress towards a reconciliation of Islam with modernity and democracy (Heper, 1997, p.33; 2003, p.133).

Another approach argues that Islamism and nationalism synthesised in post-1980 Turkey, and the best example of this Turkish Muslimhood is the Gülen movement (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2011, pp.146-149). Another approach also focusses on the Islamic enlightenment within the “Islamic ethics and the spirit of capitalism” concept where the Gülen movement is seen as Muslim Calvinism and the executor of enterprising Islam (MH Yavuz, 2013, pp.117-125). Kadioğlu, however, (2005) also seeks synthesis between civil society, Islam and democracy. White (2013) calls this synthesis Muslim nationalism. It is argued that there is a shift from secularisation to sacralisation in the context of Turkish modernity, which indicates a crisis of secularism. The growing Anatolian bourgeoisie in cities like Gaziantep Konya, Kayseri, Denizli, and Çorum; the rise of economic Islam and the emergence of MÜSİAD are given as examples for this claim (Keyman, 2007, pp.217-227). The emergence of a significant middle class or ‘counter-elite’ within Islamist

movements assisted them in engaging with modernity (Öniş, 2006a, p.123), yet some scholars argue that the rise of Anatolian cities marked the failure of the modernisation paradigm (Kosebalaban, 2007). A discussion on Turkey's democratisation and its possibilities of being a model country is also carried out in the literature (Altunisik, 2005; S Aydın & Çakır, 2007; Grigoriadis, 2009). Cagaptay analyses the impact of Kemalist citizenship-making on the minorities (2006) and some scholars emphasise the role of the military as the *guardian* of secularism in Turkey in the construction of the authoritarian nature of secularism (Kuru & Stepan, 2012, p.6). Karpas points out that it is safe to argue that the rise of AKP and its victory in 2002 represents a momentous reconciliation between Turkish modernism and Islam, based on the interaction between faith and rationality – or *iman* and *akıl* (2004, p.2).

Modern theories of nationalism, as Göl argues, can be useful in explaining the emergence of Turkish nationalism for three reasons. First, the erosion of the traditional Ottoman 'Islamic' identity through the collapse of the Empire; second, the needs for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century; and third, that Turkish nationalism was not purely based on primordialist ties and ethno-symbols (2013, p.57). Her analysis critically assesses Turkey's historical engagement with European modernity as the transformation of an Islamic, Ottoman state structure into a modern state through specific reference to the foreign policy towards the East (2013, p.184). She argues that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the Kurdish dispute, and gender issues are the results of the problematic nature of democratisation, and a reaction to the uneven development of secularism and modernity in society. She interprets Turkey's transition to modernity as 'an incomplete project' and thus the rise of the AKP denotes that it is 'still questioning its present' in the Habermasian way. Turkey's unique modernisation process, which is also shaped by its relations with the Soviet Union and the European Union, is helpful in reaching its final destination; an alternative modernity of a Muslim society (2013, p.194). Elsewhere she further develops her analyses on the complexity of this process while she

thought-provokingly criticises the superficiality of Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis (1996). In the light of the rise of AKP, her aim is to answer the issue of whether Turkey is in transition from a secular to an Islamic state. She questions the validity of Huntington's thesis through the argument of the incompatibility of Islam and secularism/democracy and the clash of Muslim versus secular identities. This argument states that the rise of political Islam is a reaction to the failed modernisation based on Kemalist secularism (2009, p.796). By doing so, she firstly questions Turkey's status as a 'bridge' or 'torn' country. She argues that the AKP represents a more complex form than suggested by Huntington's thesis. For instance, the AKP came into power by not only playing the democracy card, but also with the support of Muslim bourgeoisie, mass media and reformist nationalist discourse (2009, pp.802-803). Second, she discusses the AKP's ambivalent policies towards religious and identity issues in relation to increased public visibility of Islam and a performative reflexivity of Muslim-selves at four levels.

“...[F]irst, the control of religion by the state led to the repression of Islam and suppression of Muslim identity that emphasised 'Muslim-selves'. On the second level, the focus on Muslim 'public selves' was regarded as 'reactionary' for its potential subversion of the secular system by a holy trinity of Republicans – the army, the CHP²⁷ and the Kemalists. On the third level, secular Turks were politically constructed as the new social reactionaries against the increased public visibility of Islam. Lastly, religious conservatives reflected this secularist reaction back upon themselves by increasing their support for the AKP as the true representative of 'Muslimselves'” (Göl, 2009, p.804).

She highlights that ambivalence in the AKP's policies allowed a crossover between Islam and modernity, and between secular and religious practices (2009, p.804). She concludes that Turkey is neither a bridge nor a torn country. Rather than a conflict between Muslim and secular identities, there is a complex interdependence between Islam, secularism and democratisation in Turkey. “The fundamental problem that underlies the conflict is the power struggle between the AKP and the secular

²⁷ The Republican People's Party, Turkish: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*.

establishment during the consolidation of democracy in Turkey” (2009, p.807).

2.2.3. The Political Economy Approach

It is argued that the political economy of Turkey is shaped by the struggle over strong state and weak society (Heper, 1984, 1991c; Keyman & Koyuncu, 2005, p.109). The Islamist versus secularist dichotomy is also a subject in the political economy approach (Öniş, 2006a, p.107). Öniş and Keyman argue that the rise of AKP includes three principles. It is based on first, the post-developmental state that is not afraid to play a role in overseeing the economy; second, the governance of the market that is regulated closely enough to keep it honest and free for enterprise; and third, social justice that is fair on the distribution of goods and services. These principles are ideal for, as what they call it, democratically regulated state-society relations (2003, pp.100-101).

“...[T]he AKP claims that in its governing, ... [it will] change the existing state structure which is detached from society, blind to societal needs and demands, and therefore functions as a closed, ineffective and undemocratic system of rule...” (Öniş & Keyman, 2003, p.100).

It is argued that, the rise of “green capital”, or in other words, the Islamic bourgeoisie, or *homo Islamicus* (Öniş, 1997, p.748; Özel, 2010, p.156), represented by MÜSİAD, and its rivalry with secular TÜSİAD (Öniş, 2001, pp.287-290; 2006b, p.220) is crucial in understanding the rise of political Islam. The rise of alternative forms of capitalism (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003) corresponds to the decline of Islamic radicalism (Demiralp, 2009; Madi, 2014) that led to an Islamic-capitalist variety of modernity (İ Kaya, 2014). “Islamic Calvinists versus the guardian state” (K Öktem, 2011, p.122) is another dichotomy mentioned in the literature.

“The transformation of the [RP²⁸] from a marginal force to a significant political movement is a parallel phenomenon to and a reflection of the

²⁸ The Welfare Party, Turkish: *Refah Partisi*.

growing power of Islamic business in the Turkish economy and society in the context of the 1990s. More specifically, the rise of the [RP] reflects, in part, the growing aspirations of the rising Islamic bourgeoisie to consolidate their positions in society, to achieve elite status also and, in purely economic terms, to obtain a greater share of public resources, both at the central and local levels, in competition with other segments of private business in Turkey. Considering the importance of the state as a key allocator of rents in major areas of the economy, it is not surprising that businessmen with an Islamic orientation are cooperating with activities being organised at both the associational level [MÜSİAD] and the political level [RP] to obtain a large share of the public pie” (Öniş, 1997, p.760).

Sufism and its *tarikats*²⁹, and their connections with market-oriented economy, have created the Anatolian bourgeoisie, or in other words the Anatolian Tigers (Demir, Acar, & Toprak, 2004; Öniş, 1997, pp.758-759) and their Islamist business or what Atasoy classes as the Islamist political economy (2003, pp.150-152). Elsewhere, she argues that this economic engagement of *tarikats* requires a rethinking of the political economy of Islamist politics in its relations with the market and the state (2005, p.176). She points out that Islamic social relations are incorporated in the neoliberal global market (2009c, p.182). As an appealing political project, Islamism

“...helps to resist both Kemalist developmentalism, with its class bias in favour of large Istanbul-based industrialists, and secularism, as embodied in the authoritarian homogenizing culture of civil-military state bureaucrats. Islam appeals to those over whom Kemalist bureaucrats have cast shadows, questioning their cultural suitability for ‘western’ modernity” (2008, p.49).

Atasoy questions how the AKP’s attempt to construct an Islamic culture leans on Turkey’s accession to the EU; which is connected to the neoliberal restructuring of the state and its economy (2009b, p.11) and the transnationalisation process (2009b, p.12). She connects the structural and discursive factors which assist us to comprehend how a neoliberal market economy model and liberal principles of democracy are embraced in the reshaping of the Islamic political agenda in Turkey within the transformation of the state (2009b, p.27). According to Atasoy, the lack of a strong leftist

²⁹ Schools in Sufism.

movement in Turkey has brought about a situation in which the intersection between material and cultural tension has made Islam a raising political project (2009b, p.108). In this context, the AKP has appeared to be the leading organisation that incorporates broad fragments of society (2009b, p.109). She describes the AKP as a cross-class coalition and a third way party, in the Blairian way (2008, p.49). Öniş also emphasised the AKP's conceptualisation as a cross-class alliance (Öniş, 1997, p.748; 2006a, p.106). He claims that the AKP "moved beyond class-based politics to forge a broad cross-class coalition that incorporates both the winners and the losers of neoliberal globalisation" (2006b, p.229).

Atasoy asserts that, while considering the entire history of Turkey from the late Ottoman Empire to the present, Islam's marriage with neoliberalism *today* undermines the state's power (against civil society) (2009b, p.240). She claims that the Islamic movement in Turkey continues to articulate a horizontal integration of the social and the cultural as a bottom-up state-making project (2009b, p.251) and connected with that, there is a challenge coming from the fact that Islamic politics is embedded in liberal-democratic and neoliberal capitalist ideas emanating from the IMF, the WB, and the EU (2009b, p.250). Her assumptions can be summarised as different agendas of political orientations, normative standards and cultural practices are penetrated under the supervision of the neoliberal form of capitalism and the AKP attempts to reshape society via the neoliberal discursive synthesis between Islamic cultural orientation and European Union norms (Boyras, 2011, p.158). Briefly, the AKP's success can be found in three major developments: neoliberalism, globalisation and transformation of Turkey's social structure (such as the emergence of Anatolian capital). AKP adopted the EU discourse (liberal democracy, human rights) and Islamic discourse in order to embrace a wider range of people. Therefore, the AKP's structure can be seen as an inter-class coalition. Moreover, the AKP's attempt to reshape the state can be considered as a transformation of the Kemalist republic within the EU perspective with the hands of Anatolian middle-class, religious

groups, intellectuals and Kurds. Basically, it is safe to argue that, in this context, the periphery is reshaping the centre. Class relations are considered within an identity-based perspective in the analysis. Düzgün argues that her analysis fails for three reasons. First, her conception of capitalism is ahistorical. Second, she considers the historical differentiation of economic-political spaces as given. Third, her assumption accepts that capitalism appears from the political struggle (2012b, p.181). For instance, elsewhere Atasoy explores the connections and rivalries between the economy, the state, society, and the citizens (2009a, p.1).

2.2.4. The Hegemony Approach

In this approach, the hegemonic strategies are used in explaining the rise of Islamic movements. In their book, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony through Transformation*, Keyman and Gümüşçü argue that the measures that were implemented under the state policy and ideology of national developmentalism in pre-AKP Turkey, paved the way for the hegemony of the strong state (2014, p.21). They divide the history of modern Turkey into four hegemonic episodes: first, 1923-the present: the process of modernisation and the centre-periphery split; second, 1950-the present: the process of democratisation and the left-right split; third, 1980-the present: the process of globalisation and the global-national split; and fourth, 2000-the present: the process of Europeanisation and the identity-citizenship split (2014, pp.16-18). The strong-state tradition, similar to that approach too, appears to be the most dominant determinant of Turkish politics. For instance they claim that “the strong-state tradition meant a state-centric way of governing society from above by assuming a unity between state and nation, as well as between national and state interests” (2014, p.18). Therefore state-centric Turkish modernity is established as an institutional foundation through the togetherness of strong state and national developmentalism (2014, p.19).

“This state-centric mode defined the early republican period, consolidated itself as hegemonic, and stamped its print on every aspect of state-society interactions. In consolidating its hegemony, it brought about the ‘center-periphery cleavage’ as the organizing principle of Turkish politics, giving rise to the distinction between state and society on the one hand, and between the modern, secular, Western-center and the underdeveloped, uneducated, traditional-periphery that needs to be transformed and developed by the state on the other” (Keyman & Gümüşçü, 2014, p.20).

They further argue that the emergence of Islamic bourgeoisie and the MÜSİAD has constituted a strong alternative to Turkish assertive secular modernity framed by the strong-state tradition. The centre-periphery split is reinforced by the emergence of a new economic power in society, embodied by MÜSİAD, which increased the pressure of the periphery on the centre (2014, p.32). For the AKP rule they argue that, despite the initial democratic reforms the party implemented in its first period, the implications of AKP’s hegemony for democratic consolidation in Turkey demonstrated that “the power of the AKP, stemming from its transformative role in Turkey’s modernisation and globalisation, has not paved the way to consolidation of democracy” (2014, p.45). Understanding hegemony as solely the hegemony of the AKP is problematic. Yalman highlighted in an interview that it is problematic to use the AKP’s hegemony, because the hegemony is produced and reproduced by the class (Gökdemir, 2015). Tansel argues that Keyman and Gümüşçü

“not only fail to account for the existing configuration of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey, but also camouflage the fundamentally interdependent relationship between the erosion of the party’s hegemonic project and its increasing disassociation from democratic principles and procedures” (2015, p.582).

Birtek and Toprak asserted that the uniqueness of Turkish culture in its synthesis of Islam and the historical heritage of Turkish people created a synthesis of the family, the mosque, and the barracks (2011, pp.17-18). This view can be seen as an example of the hegemony approach. However, their quest in the essay as seeking ‘conflictual agendas’ of neoliberalism and political Islam does not engage with the social relations of production and is limited to a discursive analysis. Therefore, the essay fails in demonstrating

the 'convergent agendas' of those two. On the other hand, it is argued that the RP's *Adil Ekonomik Düzen* (Just Economic Order) is not fundamentally different from a social democratic discourse of the left and, as a combination of tradition and modernity, political Islam is a potential force as opposed to the decline of nation-state and left (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-753). Another hegemony approach claims that 'Islamic liberalism' is quite distinct from the 'reformist fundamentalism' in Turkey; with an emphasis on 'co-existence' as opposed to hegemony. The first one may be compatible with pluralism and secular political order. Political Islam is a form of counter-hegemonic discourse that represents the voices and interests of the losers, who are excluded from the material benefits of globalisation; and it is a response to the failure of modern nation-states to overcome poverty and inequality problems. Thus, Islamism is an ideology of the excluded, whether they are entrepreneurs, intellectuals, or unskilled labour (Öniş, 2001, pp.281-283). Some authors define Islamism as a post-hegemonic discourse (Bahi, 2016, p.443) too. The hegemony of conservative democracy (Taşkın, 2013) is also discussed – however in this analysis, hegemony is used in its first meaning as dominance and the article does not engage with the consensual politics.

2.3. Society-centric Approaches

2.3.1. The Strong State Thesis Approach

Turam investigates how the state and Turkish Islamic actors have transformed each other within the concept of state as a multi-layered social organisation (Turam, 2007, p.11). She argues that, within their relationship, a drastic shift is observed from confrontation to cooperation. As she points out, even though it demonstrates a sharp contrast to their historically confrontational relationship, an emergent engagement has been seen between Islam and the state since the 1980s. This engagement represents a continual and mutual interaction between Turkish Islamic actors and the state; ranging from contestation and negotiation to accommodation, cooperation and alliance (2007, p.13). Turkish Islamic actors refers to not

only political actors such as parties, but also religious groups in her analysis. There is a massive emphasis on informal religious groups/fellowships in the book. She asserts that the AKP is not only a transformative power in terms of reshaping the secular state to an Islamic state; it is also a result of the interaction between the state and Islamic actors which has been engaged since the 1980s. She points out two factors behind this engagement: nationalism and shared international agendas (2007, p.146). Nationalism played a key role in this manner. Nationalism and secularism are engaged concepts in Turkey – and this phenomenon assisted people who are not secularist to interiorise the republic. Briefly, nationalism brought a broad consent to the republic. By saying *shared international agendas*, she refers to the mutual interests of the state and the Islamic actors from liberalisation of the state and neoliberalisation of the economy. She underlines the importance of the understanding that the interaction between the state and Islamic actors had started before the AKP was established. The military intervention of 1980 can be accepted as the starting point of this interaction. Over this analysis, two critiques would be asserted. Firstly, her reading on the relationship/interaction between the state and Islamic movement in Turkey has been considered externally. In the book's narrative, the state has been seen as an autonomous actor and it has the ability to act independently from society. Internality of the state and society has been ignored in the analysis; therefore her external explanation on the interaction cannot be applied to the AKP's last period when it has an organic integrity with the state. Elsewhere she argues that "[t]he taken-for-granted opposition or permeation between the state and religion not only obscures the multifaceted nature of the interaction between them, but also undermines further research on emerging channels of contestation and cooperation" (2012, p.3).

"Three main arguments emerge ... on the issue of state-religion interaction. First... there is a specific chemistry between the types of secularisms and pieties in a nation-state, but that the secular state and the devout are neither enemies nor friends. ... Through ongoing interactions between the state and pious actors, state secularism and

religious society mutually inform and shape each other. ... Second... the affinities between the secular state and the pious as a sociological fact. ... Third... the accord between religious groups and the state or secular large businesses, and ... this accord may be reinforced by market forces and/or globalization” (Turam, 2012, p.5).

Another account also suggests such engagement between the state and Islam, where the post-1980 politics of Turkey are considered as Islamicisation of secularism (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996, p.242). It is suggested that the Islamist movement in the 1980s and 1990s developed in a context in which the state-society relationship was dominated by the state (1996, p.245). For instance, the contradictions and inconsistencies in Islamic identity and its interactive formation with the secular establishment as the major sources of the AKP’s creativity and strength in the Europeanisation process (Cizre, 2008a, p.3). However, this engagement repeated the historical collision between the secular establishment and Islamic politics within the civil-military relations after the first three years of the AKP (Cizre, 2008b).

All in all, the strong state thesis approach to state-civil society relations in Turkey claims that there has traditionally been a strong state which has been antagonising civil society. Bureaucracy appears as a social class in the absence of civil society’s actors. As a result of this dualism, civil society appears as the sphere of liberty. Especially in society centric approaches, this dualism is considered as an interaction.

2.3.2. The Modernity and Secularism Approach

Some approaches underline the importance of avoiding reductionist definitions of both modernity and postmodernity while embarking upon a rigorous and critical rethinking of Turkish modernisation (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997, p.6). Arat examines the conflictual relationship between secularism and Islam in a liberal democracy as antithetical to the Islam versus liberalism dichotomy, where she claims that liberalism and Islam do not need to be mutually exclusive (Arat, 2005, p.113). Some approaches

consider political Islamism as a post-modern project. As the Islamist pillars were demolished by Kemalists for the sake of the shift in identity from Islamist to national, Islamism is a frustration and a response to the failure of the nationalist promises of Westernisation, and represents a post-nationalist ideology as a critique of modernism. This cynical critique of post-modernism does not originate from Islamism's pre-modernist position; rather it stands upon the ideological decline of Western rationalism (Gülalp, 1995, pp.177-180; 1999, p.24). Gülalp elsewhere argues that this Islamist critique could be expanded to Kemalist developmentalism (1997, p.420). He claims that the class basis of Islamism primarily includes, in addition to the petty bourgeoisie, young middle class professionals, students and those who were marginalised and dispossessed in the metropolitan cities. Islamists oppose the centralised model of economic and political organisation of the nation-state, and this opposition is together with other contemporary movements that champion 'civil society' (1997, pp.427-430). On the other hand, another account asserts that Islamism was a form of 'alternative capitalism' in Turkey (Tuğal, 2002, p.99). Axiarlis defines Islamism as a societal reaction to secularism (2014). Navaro-Yashin's eye-opening analysis on the reflexion's secularism in public life focuses on the secularity and the piety of consumption (2002, p.78). There is also an emphasis on the spatiality of these ways of consumption as analysed within the new marketplaces (2002, p.90). Göle also highlights the Islamism versus secularism dichotomy (Göle, 1997, 2003, 2010).

To sum up, the modernity-secularism approach focusses on the historical dichotomy between secularists and Islamists. The claim asserts that the dichotomy is the main engine of the democratic development in Turkey. Islamism is situated as a response to the modernisation/Westernisation process. The compatibility/incompatibility of Islam with democracy and the synthesis of nationalism with Islamism are finally discussed.

2.3.3. The Political Economy Approach

Keyder argues that the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic is a class struggle between two classes, which are the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie (1987b, p.2). In the bureaucracy-led new nation-state, there was growing bourgeoisie and it was increasingly challenging the statist economic policies and authoritarian regime of the bureaucratic elite. The main problem of the book emerges from the lack of anatomy of social classes and, connected with this fact, the consideration of *bureaucracy as a dominant class* (Boratav, 1993, p.130). Keyder claims that bureaucracy's manoeuvres tended to favour a model of capitalist integration, promising to uphold the claims of state functionaries as a *surplus-receiving class*³⁰ (1987b, p.29). Historical underdevelopment of the working class both as an economic and political force brought about a privileged interaction between the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy (1987b, p.148). It is safe to argue that Keyder ascribes too much agency to the bureaucracy. On the other hand, as Boratav asserts, "[n]obody can dispute the fact that the 20th century bureaucracy is a salaried group within a modernized state structure. As public finance becomes less and less dependent upon the taxes imposed on agriculture during the century, one can hardly speak of the bureaucracy as a *social class* directly extracting a surplus from the peasantry within primary relations of production" (1993, p.132). Keyder's reading on the history of classes in Turkey, which can be summarised as an antagonism between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie, brings us to the consideration of history throughout ruptures. For instance, he considers the electoral victory of DP in 1950 as a fundamental break in Turkish history and a victory against the several centuries old state tradition (1987b, p.124). This reading of history can also be observed in considerations on the AKP. Mainstream academia and liberal leftist assumptions accept 2002 as a break in history in terms of the state-civil society relations and a victory of civil society against the state.

³⁰ My emphasis.

Therefore, as well as the dualist reading of state-society relations, the progressiveness of civil society automatically appears hereby. He further questions the social base of political Islam where he argues that despite the AKP's genuine commitment to the neoliberal orthodoxy, the party also receives votes from the poor (2004, p.71). A similar account also raises the same dilemma. The political economy of conservative democracy demonstrated that the failure of organised labour movements occurred because the AKP's vote in major working class towns increased (Akan, 2012, pp.243-246).

State-business relations appear to be another important dimension of the political economy approach. Yavuz focusses on the intra-class struggles within state-business relations (DA Yavuz, 2012b, pp.157-159). In this analysis the conflicts between secular and Muslim actors are highlighted (DA Yavuz, 2010, p.73). Democratisation and business (Başkan, 2010; DA Yavuz, 2012a) is another important factor of this relationship in order to understand the business associations' behaviour towards the democratic system. Buğra analyses the historical development of state-business relations where she focusses on the state intervention and the role of bureaucracy in this relationship (1994, pp.23-24) –and elsewhere she compares the TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD within the strong state tradition in the first place. She points out that they are both considered as mechanisms of interest representation and as agents of two different class strategies (1998, p.521; 2002b). According to Buğra, TÜSİAD represents a European model whereas MÜSİAD belongs to an East Asian model since, in her words, “a rival strategy in which a certain interpretation of Islam is used as a resource to bind the businessmen whom it represents into a coherent community and to represent their economic interests as an integral component of an ideological mission” (1998, p.522). She asserts that TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD have emerged in an environment where the state has a very significant

*economy and society shaping role*³¹; and due to the fact that this role of the state has not only been more significant than in the West, but also more crucial than in many other industrialising countries in the context of private-sector development (1998, p.523; 2002a, p.188). Similarly Keyder also emphasises the 'regulatory' role of the state in the redistribution of income and the extension of the market (Keyder, 1987a, p.299). On the other hand, Buğra also highlights that MÜSİAD's position is a challenge against traditional political authority (1998, p.528). Elsewhere, she argues similar points in terms of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. She claims that the most important contribution of contemporary political studies on Turkey is the analysis of the role of the state and the state-society split throughout the secularist imposition of the Republic (2002a, p.187). She compiles four points on the evaluation of the comparative strategies pursued by TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD as a conclusion. First, capitalist class and bourgeois culture do not designate universal categories. Second, forms of interest representation involve different definitions of national interest and national culture. Third, the balance of power between the state and the business class manifests itself in highly different ways in different societies. And finally, fourth, political developments might be in full conformity with the short-term economic interests of a particular segment of the business class (Buğra, 1998, pp.535-536). "The traditional characteristic of the relationship between the state and established big business in Turkey" (1998, p.526) the so-called *strong state tradition*, manifests itself in her analysis as an external reading of the recent history of Turkey. The interpenetrating position of the state and society is neglected in this analysis. The externality of a *centre-periphery relations* approach can be observed as well. The reason for this externality occurs from the dualist reading of state-society relations. The consideration of market members as independent from the state and a dichotomical perception of market and the state would obstruct our understanding on how capital is influential on state policies. This reading of

³¹ Original emphasis.

society excludes the dialectical relations of social classes. The class conflict is posited between capital groups and the state, whereas the class conflict between capitalists and labour is neglected. The separation of market and state can also be seen in Karl Polanyi's studies; for instance he claims that nineteenth-century civilisation rested on four institutions as follows: balance-of-power system, international gold standard, self-regulating market, and the liberal state (Polanyi, 2001, p.3); notwithstanding, she defines her analysis as Polanyian (1998, p.12).

Overall, the political economy approach argues that the rise of political Islam and the AKP is rooted in the emergence of Islamic bourgeoisie. This emergence helped Islamism to challenge not only the pro-developmental economy of the Kemalist bureaucracy, but also the secularist capitalist establishment. In society-centric approaches, the bureaucracy as a social class and state-business relations are the crucial factors of the approach.

2.3.4. The Hegemony Approach

Emrence analyses the rising market hegemony (2008, p.52) and political economy of the new middle classes (2008, p.61) in Turkey. However, the analysis uses hegemony in its literal meaning and it does not attempt to make a review of consensus-based politics. The word hegemony is also used in similar ways in İnsel's work. The hegemony of statist and secularist forces in Turkey caused a switch in the role of AKP, as it is given a progressive role in exiting from the military regime. The realisation of state-society relations on the 'abnormal' democratic basis prevented the AKP from playing its right-wing establishment role (İnsel, 2003, p.300). Some scholars focus on the discursive level and analyse how the AKP staff abused their past victimisations as a discourse. This discourse allowed them to carry out an Islamisation agenda (A Kaya, 2015, pp.52-54) especially in passing educational reforms in the third term of the AKP (2015, pp.56-57). Some scholars focus on the hegemony of identity issues (İ Kaya, 2007). Hendrick argues that the Gülen movement represents a passive revolutionary moment

with its Islamic activism in Turkey (Hendrick, 2009). However, I argue that applying concepts like passive revolution to small scale movements rather than state formations or re-formations would lead to the meaninglessness of concepts.

This section will provide an extensive critique of this approach, particularly on Tuğal's book *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. The reason that Tuğal's book occupies a major place in the literature review of this thesis derives from its importance. The importance of the book stems from not only its attempt to apply Gramscian concepts but also its failure to do so. Although his book provides an excellent comparative historical (one pre-AKP period in 2000-2001, and one AKP period in 2006) ethnographical survey of a conservative district (Sultanbeyli) in Istanbul, his approach hardly develops a Gramscian analysis. Tuğal analyses the engagement of rising political Islam and neoliberalism, where he explains the transition with Gramscian terminology. He attempts to give a 'better conceptualisation' of hegemony (Morton, 2013a, p.133). His main argument is that the shift from radical Islamism to market-oriented Islamism is a passive revolution in which hegemony is constituted and radicalism is absorbed (2009, p.3). Elsewhere, he defined Islamism as an intra-hegemonic struggle in Turkey (2002, p.97). Hegemony is established on the interface between civil society and political society and the AKP

“...learned innovative ways of linking civil society and political society from past Islamist experience” (2009, p.8).

For Tuğal, hegemony operates by (1) organising consent, (2) articulation of everyday life, space, the economy and authority, (3) leadership, and (4) forging the unity of disparity; and he defines Islamic mobilisation as “the reconstitution of hegemony as a response to organic crises” in which “hegemony operates by linking society and state” and the domain that links civil society and state is called “political society” (2009, p.24). Political society is the sphere where the state policies are shaped and the nature of the state and political unity is defined; that is to say people are integrated

into the state, thus they become citizens. He further argues that “without political society, the state is an abstract entity, a body of armed men (and occasionally women) accompanied by some people in robes (judges, professors, bureaucrats)” (2009, p.25). According to Tuğal, there are three mechanisms in both political and civil societies. Political society works through political leadership, authority, and political unity; whereas civil society operates through everyday life, space, and relations to the economy (2009, pp.26-32). The intermediation between the economy and the state is carried out by both civil and political societies within the hegemonic project. Political society, as a fundamental bridge, is situated between civil society and state, and “it constructs and propagates the project that binds them” (2009, p.270); whereas civil society organises people’s relations to political society. The incorporation of revolutionary movements in existing systems, or in other words the ‘passive revolution’, is carried out in the exercising of hegemony by linking economy, society, and the state (2009, pp.32-33).

“As civil society regulates everyday life, uses of space, and relations to the economy, and political society regulates the relation between civil society and state, we can posit that political society has a role of ‘super-regulation,’ that is, the regulation *of* the regulation of these spheres of life” (2009, p.33).

Tuğal applies his ‘better conceptualisation’ to the pre-AKP and the AKP periods of Islamist politics. He argues that Islamism is a response to the organic crisis of secularist hegemony (2009, pp.36-42). He defines the pre-AKP period as the time that integral civil society and integral political society are uncoupled (2009, p.57); thus hegemonic political society was no longer able to link society and the state, (2009, p.101) whereas Islamists were only partly successful in building an integral Islamist society (2009, p.143).

“Islamic civil society was thoroughly uncoupled from Islamic political society and alienated from religious utopianism. The AKP would then transform this historical irony into a passive revolution” (2009, p.144).

Therefore, as a rupture, in 2002 the AKP changed the course of uncoupling to recoupling (2009, p.145). The emergence (2009, p.147) and triumph (2009, p.192) of modern (and neoliberal) Islamic civil society assisted the AKP in

first absorbing Islamist strategies, and then pacifying Islamic resistance to neoliberalism. That process brought about the naturalisation of capitalism (2009, p.217). He argues that, unlike the pre-AKP period, there is a link between political parties and teahouses, unions, Sufi communities, and mosques. The AKP's absorption of Islamic strategies in political society led to a passive revolution in integral Islamic civil society where the intermingling of Islamisation and de-Islamisation, and the naturalisation of neoliberal marketisation were carried out (2009, p.233).

"Islamic civil society and political society were disarticulated after the military intervention of 1997; their incomplete rearticulation culminated in a passive revolution after 2002" (2009, p.233).

Elsewhere, he defines passive revolution as the absorption of (possible or actual) popular demand by counter-revolutionary regimes as a typical response to revolutions abroad (2007, p.11). He finally makes a comparison of passive revolutions in the Middle East; where Turkey experienced a successful passive revolution, Iran on the other hand had a failed passive revolution, and Egypt a blocked passive revolution (2009, pp.236-255; 2012, p.23). Turkey's success derived from the constitution of political society in the process of passive revolution that played an essential role in reconstituting civil society (2009, p.243). His final argument is that

"...situating the possibility of a passive revolution in the context of an analysis of interactions between political society, civil society, the economy, and the state can inform us about routes of change" (2009, p.263).

Morton criticises Tuğal on the basis of taking the interaction of political society, civil society, the economy and the state separately and treating them as always-already separate spheres in theorising hegemonic politics in Turkey. He defines this redefinition of hegemony problematic and he terms this redefinition "ontological exteriority". He argues that

"any account of the reordering of hegemony and the restructuring of spatial-temporal contexts of capital accumulation through conditions of passive revolution also needs to draw from a more sophisticated state theory, a direct reading of Gramsci, and broader scalar analysis of

spatial relations and uneven development under capitalism" (Morton, 2013a, p.129).

He points out that the absence of any direct engagement with Gramsci has important political consequences. For instance, Tuğal missed examining Gramsci's theory of the 'integral state' and the richness this brings to discussions on state theory, hegemony and passive revolution (2013a, p.133). The dualism in Tuğal's analysis is rooted in the central postulates of Sociological Marxism – that civil society exists alongside but distinct from the state and the economy (2013a, p.134). He gives examples from Gramsci's own works to demonstrate the understanding of 'civil society' not as a separate sphere in opposition to the 'state' but as an element in dialectical unity with 'political society' (Morton, 2013a, p.138).

"State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971, p.263).

Morton continues that the state and society are taken as autonomous entities that are mutually interacting, and that results in their juxtaposition and obscures their complex character in Tuğal's analysis. Most significantly, the inner connection between state (politics) and civil society (economics) is rent asunder by this state theorising, which demonstrates the problem of ontological exteriority (Morton, 2013a, p.142). Therefore, the relational and internal link between modern state formation and capitalism is missing.

"The separations drawn by Tuğal between political society + civil society + state + economy within his study of the establishment of secularist hegemony in Turkey cannot therefore reveal the locus of class-driven power relations in production – a core trait of Sociological Marxism – that would provide coherence to its explanations" (Morton, 2013a, p.143).

Although Tuğal acknowledges the inseparability of the state and society in a review article (2004, p.133), he falls into the pitfalls of dualism in the narrative of his book. Morton demonstrates that, throughout the book, the reader is told about different strategies of hegemonies by different actors, such as secularist hegemony and the Islamist challenge, the constitution of state-led hegemony and Islamisation in Turkey, the role of MÜSİAD's

hegemony in integrating state and civil society, and a focus on the naturalisation of market relations through the incompleteness of capitalist hegemony and neoliberal hegemony. However this kind of theorisation of hegemony makes the differences between consensual and coercive politics ambiguous, and obscures the different practices constituting state-led and popular struggles over the construction, renewal, and contestation of hegemony and passive revolution (Morton, 2013a, p.145). Also making an ideological distinction between 'secular' and 'Islamic' bourgeoisie would be very schematic. As Erol claims in his critique of Tuğal's book, "the main source of the fractioning of capital at the time – between highly globalised large capital, represented by the TÜSİAD, and medium-sized and small capital, mainly concentrated on the domestic market and represented by the MÜSİAD ... was *more material than ideological*³²" (E Erol, 2010, p.538). Therefore, it is safer to claim that the AKP's articulation of neoliberalism represents the latest phase in the Turkish experience of passive revolution. "Through the AKP, authoritarianism is articulated and reproduced as part of neoliberal restructuring, due to the Turkish bourgeoisie being far from integrally hegemonic, ensuring continuities in terms of state-class relations" (Morton, 2013a, p.147; Yalman, 2009). Then, it is safe to argue that limiting passive revolution to the absorption of radical movements would be too narrow and micro. As Erol points out "it is impossible to give a meaningful account of passive revolution and hegemony in Turkey – a peripheral capitalist social formation – without addressing the transformation of the capitalist mode of production after the 1980s" and "in order to achieve this aim, one could start on the basis of appreciating the peripheral character of capitalist development in Turkey and its position shaped by national and transnational forces of capital and labour in the global economy" (E Erol, 2010, p.539). In order to understand the class dynamics, the Gramscian notion of the 'integral state' is a more fruitful approach (Morton, 2013a, p.149). "As Gramsci reminds us, the distinction between political society and

³² My emphasis.

civil society can only be merely methodological, ‘since in actual reality civil society and state are one and the same’” (Gramsci, 1971, p.160 cited in Morton, 2013a).

Furthermore, because the AKP is recognised as the follower of neoliberal paradigm, the pre-AKP Islamic movements are considered as homogeneously anti-neoliberal in Tuğal’s work (Tuğal, 2009, pp.42-51). However, the engagement of Islamic groups and capitalism in Turkey can be traced back to the early 1990s. For instance, the 1994 booklet of the RP could be given as an example in which essays in favour of market economy could be found. Although the discourse of party was established upon the anti-Western/anti-capitalist narrative, this booklet shows us the party was actually engaged with capitalism (Refah Partisi, 1994). Reducing the image of Turkish bourgeoisie in the pre-1980 period to a homogeneous secular characteristic would be another mistake. One of the significant outcomes of the 1980 coup can be accepted as the increasing religious emphasis of the state, and undoubtedly it was the ideological strategy of the state controlled by the bourgeoisie. Additionally, considering the 2002 elections as a rupture in Islamic politics in terms of a shift from anti-capitalist to market-oriented policies would be very reductionist. Islamist movements’ considerations on the economy cannot be accepted as anti-capitalist in Turkey. However, as a popular mass party, Refah Party’s rhetoric includes anti-capitalist discourse – this can be accepted as an objection against the Western system. Therefore, an engagement between capitalism and Islamic actions could be observed in the pre-AKP Islamic parties. Although Tuğal claims Islamic rhetoric or religion is not the cement of the broader coalition of the AKP, but neoliberal principles; those principles could be accepted as the main norms of the Turkish politics since the 1980s (E Erol, 2010, p.538).

Briefly, the hegemony approach seeks to locate the Islamists and secularist dichotomy within the hegemonic struggle. It is mainly argued that Islamism is a counter-hegemonic movement/discourse against the secularist establishment’s hegemony.

2.4. The Overall Critique of Centre-Periphery Approaches

Having outlined different approaches to state-society relations, and in particular to the rise of political Islam, let me now provide an overall critique of the literature above. The literature above is famously described as “dissident but hegemonic” (2002b, p.23) approaches by Galip Yalman. They are dissident because they construct an image of civil society and strong state which are against each other, and the strong state is conceived as an autonomous entity which should be weakened. They are also hegemonic because their analyses assert that neoliberal values such as market and individual freedom should be strengthened and civil society should create an independent space against state (2002a, pp.7-8). There are several studies (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009; Dinler, 2003; Güngen & Erten, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 1998; Ozan & Doğangün, 2009; Yalman, 2002a, 2002b) highlighting the shortcomings of a centre-periphery relations approach to state-civil society relations in Turkey. However, I identified four shortcomings that are common in the literature discussed in this chapter. Some approaches embody four of the shortcomings; on the other hand, some embody only one of them. First, the state and civil society are considered ontologically autonomous and antagonistic entities. The dualist understanding of the state-society relations approach does not consider the split between those concepts methodologically but ontologically. Those two spheres appear as two independent entities without symbiotic relationship or with very limited interconnectedness. This understanding, based on a non-symbiotic relationship, is called ‘ontological exteriority’. This feature is problematic because it obstructs the ability of the analysis to comprehend internal dynamic between the state and civil society, as it neglects their interdependent relationship or downgrades their relationship into a limited dependence.

Second, as a result of the dualism of state-society, the economic and the political (or in other words, the market and the state) are considered separately and antagonistically. The pitfalls of ‘ontological exteriority’, such

as the negligence of interdependence and interconnectedness between spheres, apply in these dualisms too. Similar to the first problem, this feature causes an ahistorical understanding of the relationship of those spheres and prevents us from understanding the internal relations between them.

Third, there is a clear favouritism for civil society in those analyses. The antagonistic reading of the state-society relationship concluded with an understanding that the state is considered as a heavy-handed entity and civil society is seen as a progressive social force against the so-called 'evil' state. In the literature of Turkish politics, this conceptualisation manifests itself in the rivalry between the 'secular' state and the 'religious' civil society. The society as a 'civilian' social force is attributed progressiveness against the state's 'military' reactionism. However, both the state and civil society are understood as homogenous social forces in this understanding as if they are able to act as single actors, and I argue that this point is problematic. Also, an understanding based on an always-progressive civil society is equally problematic because civil society is symbiotically connected to the state; and as the integral state, they produce hegemony together. Civil society is neither a necessarily progressive entity nor the sphere of 'freedom'; it is rather the sphere of 'hegemony'.

Fourth, there is a negligence of the social relations of production in the literature. The social relations of production are used in order to describe the class structure – that is to say the social aspect of the relations of production. The relations of production approach is based on the Marxist understanding of classes; in which the bourgeoisie represents those who own the means of production and the proletariat represents those who are compelled to sell their labour because they do not own the means of production. The social aspect of this relationship model is defined as the class structure. In the literature that I reviewed, the class structure is either neglected and the antagonism is made between identities (such as secular vs. religious) or used as a sociological term in which it is utilised to discuss class conflict disconnectedly from the relations of production (such as

bureaucracy as a class). I argue that the lack of the social relations of production in an analysis is problematic, because the material conditions of societal relations are the bases that determine superstructural spheres such as culture, politics etc. Ignoring the material conditions and attributing the identities as the main source of the conflict would lead us to ahistorical analyses. In the next chapter, I will provide my alternative approach which will overcome those shortcomings.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed the literature explaining the rise of political Islam and, specifically, the AKP within the literature of the state-society relations in Turkey. I argued that one should start with understanding the state-society relations in order to grasp the relations between religion and the state, and thus the rise of political Islam. I accepted religion as a social institution and its engagement with politics reflects on the state-society relations literature. The literature was divided into two halves: the state-centric approaches and the society-centric approaches. However, as I discussed earlier, this division requires further categorisation; therefore, four sub-approaches are identified under each one: The strong state approach, the modernity and secularism approach, the political economy approach, and the hegemony approach. Following the insightful outlining of the literature, I identified four shortcomings in the literature: first, the dualism of the state-civil society; second, the dualisms of the state-market and the economy-politics; the given progressiveness of civil society; and finally, the negligence of the social relations of production. Now, let me provide the notion of integral state, an alternative to the centre-periphery relations approach designed by Antonio Gramsci, in the third chapter.

3. The Integral State: A Key to Turkish Politics?³³

“[The] guiding thread that organises all of Gramsci’s carceral research can be succinctly characterised as *the search for an adequate theory of proletarian hegemony in the epoch of the ‘organic crisis’ or the ‘passive revolution’ of the bourgeois ‘integral State’*”³⁴ (PD Thomas, 2009, p.136).

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an alternative approach to the rise and persistence of AKP’s tenure in Turkey since 2002. In the previous chapter, approaches rooted in the centre-periphery relations understanding were critically assessed and four shortcomings that make these approaches problematic were given: the dualist reading of state-society relations; the separatism of state-market and politics-economy; the acceptance of civil society as an automatically progressive sphere; and the disregard of the social relations of production. In this chapter, I will offer the GHM as an alternative approach by challenging those four shortcomings. By doing so, first I will address the question of how the GHM will overcome the problems of dualism in respect to the shortcomings of a centre-periphery relations approach. Following this, I will provide three key concepts from the works of Antonio Gramsci: the integral state, hegemony, and passive revolution. The section will then provide a critical discussion on the limitations of Gramscian theory. Finally, I will demonstrate how these concepts work in overcoming the problems of dualist understanding; with a specific reference to urbanisation, education and the mass media. Following this elaboration, the chapter will be concluded.

³³ The title of this chapter is inspired by the title of Şerif Mardin’s oft-referenced article *Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?* (1973).

³⁴ Original emphasis.

3.2. Bringing Gramsci Back In

Before his death in 1937, at the age of 46, Antonio Gramsci spent 11 years in prison. As Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (the editors and translators of the oft-referenced *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*) report, the public prosecutor stated at Gramsci's trial "[f]or twenty years we must stop this brain from functioning" (Gramsci, 1971, p.lxxxix). His brain did not stop from functioning; ironically, concepts that he developed in his *Prison Notebooks* became some of the most influential ideas in the history of political thought. However, as we rely on the English translations of selections from unsystematically written notebooks under the prison's censorship, it is unrealistic to "reveal a 'true' or 'real' Gramsci and thus no 'correct' reading or 'authentic' version can be produced" (Morton, 1999, p.3). Therefore, this chapter will provide a personal interpretation of Gramsci and his concepts.

The problematic nature of 'dissident but hegemonic' discourses (Yalman, 2002a, p.7) is embedded in the ultimate poverty of the problem-solving³⁵ process in Turkish politics: the dualist reading of the state-society, the state-market, and the politics-economics. This dualism leads the process to read the electoral victory of AKP as the triumph of civil society against the state (Dinler, 2003, p.46). The negation of the state as opposed to the ratification of civil society is the main pillar of this dualism. The first one represents the realm of coercion and force, whereas the latter represents the realm of freedom and liberty. Wood argues that the left learnt the externally related, distinct from each other and separatist conceptualisation of such spheres from liberalism; and the totalising and coercive side of capitalism is ignored in this theorising (1995, pp.242-254). Such dualisms are also problematic

³⁵ However, the dualism could also be seen in critical studies too. For instance, Polanyi argues that the self-regulated market and the liberal state are two components of nineteenth-century civilisation; along with the balance of power system and the gold standard system (2001, p.3).

because they lead to ahistorical readings of capitalism (Ozan & Doğangün, 2009, p.60).

“Since dualist conceptualisation neglects the historical aspects and complex relations of phenomena and, conceives the state and civil society as isolated from their constitutive relations and portrays them as static, and precisely definable; it can be argued that dualist conceptualisation of the relation between the state and civil society will be inadequate to explain and understand the social reality” (Ozan, 2000, pp.3-4).

Separation between the political and the economic limits the understanding on state activity, because it puts constraints in that the state must remain essentially external to the process of capital accumulation. However the purpose of state action is to promote the accumulation of capital (Holloway & Picciotto, 1977 p.96). Bieler argues that, as the political and the economic are considered separately and externally related, the social relations of production are ultimately disregarded as a result of this separatism (2011, p.166). It is safe to maintain that production is established upon private property of the means of production and free wage labour; therefore the accumulation and extraction of surplus is not directly-politically enforced, but indirectly-economically. As it is asserted by the liberal doctrine, workers are ‘free’ to choose selling or not selling their labour power. In capitalism there is this ‘given’ arrangement that the economic appears to be separate from the political, the market from the state and civil society from the state – thus the selling of labour power because of the absence of the ownership of the means of production is assumed to be happening in one of those spheres, separately.

“...[T]he very separation of economics and politics, the very autonomisation of the state form is part of the struggle of the ruling class to maintain its domination” (Holloway & Picciotto, 1977 p.80).

On the other hand, the basis of class structure in society is given by the structure of production and its relations (Cox, 1987, p.6). Gramsci's theoretical concepts such as hegemony, historical bloc, or integral state indicate the totality, historicity and relationality of the social reality. To understand the underpinnings of social change, one should start with the

social relations of production and should consider the state and civil society holistically. The notion of historical bloc aids this endeavour by directing attention to those social forces which may have been crucial in the formation of a historical bloc or particular state; what contradictions may be contained within a historical bloc upon which a form of state is founded; and what potential might exist for the formation of a rival historical bloc that may transform a particular form of state (Cox, 1987, p.419 cited in Bieler & Morton, 2004). Social relations of production arose in three distinct analytical ways: first, the social context determines what kind of things are going to be produced and how they are going to be produced; second, the roles in production are determined with a strict division of labour; and third the distribution of rewards that come out of this production process are determined within surplus value and exploitation (Cox, 1987, pp.11-12).

As Thomas argues “Gramsci attempted to explain the transition between civil society and the state by introducing the concept of ‘political society or State’ as a superstructural ‘level’ *alongside* that of civil society *within* the integral state”³⁶ (2009, p.186). Gramsci went beyond Marx by putting more emphasis on superstructure. In his analysis, the state appears as much more than the coercive apparatus of the bourgeoisie; it also includes the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure. Hegemony is very beneficial and encompassing for us for a critical reading of the state, not only to point out the supremacy of the ruling class but also to understand the development of consent and coercion. As Gramsci states, “[t]he State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (1971, p.244). Such determinism is conceptualised with much more complexity in the structure-superstructure model on Gramsci’s works (Dimitrakos, 1986, p.466; Joll, 1977, p.82). Gramsci’s materialism and his realism is a more comprehensive

³⁶ Original emphasis.

conceptualisation of social reality, which does not exclude material and ideal dimensions of it (Morera, 1990a, p.61 cited in Ozan, 2000).

Dialectical understanding (Jakubowski, 1976; Ollman, 2003) of absolute historicism (Gramsci, 1971, p.380) is important in overcoming the pitfalls of economism, regarding ideas merely as a reflection of a material structure, and, second, the problems of constructivism, regarding ideas as an equal explanatory factor alongside material social conditions (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p.122). The dialectical relationship between the state and civil society is considered with a holistic perspective in respect to their integrity in order to make the connection between hegemony and passive revolution within conditions of uneven development in the global political economy (Morton, 2007b, p.201). One of the greatest thinkers of the last century, Henri Lefebvre, states in his masterpiece *The Critique of Everyday Life* that, instead of reasoning through induction or deduction, dialectical reasoning helps to grasp the moments and the stages, the contradictions and the movements of the economic and social reality (2014 [1947], p.199).

“There is a dialectical interaction between the economy, which is to say economic growth, and the development of the political element. It is this dialectical interaction that determines the nature, the internal structure, the role, and above all the weight of the State; the structure of the State therefore depends, in the long run of course, and considered over vast historical periods, on the movement of the conjuncture, which is to say on this interaction... This dialectical interaction between the economic and the political is not exercised directly. It exerts itself through the intermediary of mobilized social forces. Social forces are the mediation, the intermediary element between the economic and the political” (Lefebvre, 2009, pp.59-60).

A holistic-relational approach that dialectically constructs the structure and superstructure offers a much more complex foundation in analysing social reality. The centre-periphery relations approach fails in connecting these links. On the other hand, Gramsci’s concept of the integral state provides adequate complexity to construct causal links between spheres, and in particular between the rise of political Islam and neoliberal structuring in the sectors of urbanisation, education and the mass media in

Turkey. In the following sections, the integral state, hegemony, and passive revolution will be elaborated in detail.

3.2.1. The Integral State

In the beginning of this thesis, I conceptualised the integral state as the meta-theoretical understanding of the state and society as a whole, as opposed to the separatist understanding of the centre-periphery relations approach. State theory has always been essential to the conceptualisations of social change (Jessop, 1991b; Marx, 1996; Miliband, 1969). For instance, it was highlighted in the report of the Gulbenkian Commission that the state should not be assumed as a natural boundary of social action (1996, p.85). Marxist state theory is established as a critique of the state (Heinrich, 2012, p.199), therefore it is crucial to highlight that “...[t]he purpose of the Marxist theory of the state is not just to understand but to aid in its deconstruction” (Wolfe, 1974, p.131). Additionally, it is safe to claim that the modern state is centred on the process of reproduction of capital (Hay, 2006, p.65). Engels claims that the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check (1985 [1884], p.104). The state is also conceptualised as a bourgeois relationship (Sayer, 1985, p.240) and as a form of the capital relation (Holloway & Picciotto, 1977 p.77). However, the role of state in the reproduction of capital is much too complex to be reduced to simply a passive role. Gramsci’s aim was to reveal links between classes, political parties, the leadership, civil society and political society etc.

“Classes produce parties, and parties form the personnel of state and government, the leaders of civil and political society. There must be a useful and fruitful relation in these manifestations and functions” (Gramsci, 1971, p.227).

Sotiris reports that, although Althusser appreciated Gramsci’s historicist conception of philosophy, he criticised him harshly by accusing him of lacking theoretical rigour (Althusser & Balibar, 2009), of over-generalising the notion of hegemony, of underestimating the economic infrastructure, of downplaying the role of force, and of tending towards an idealist conception

of the state as educator (Sotiris, 2014, pp.136-137). Althusser divides the role of state into two distinctive apparatuses: repressive and ideological state apparatuses. On the other hand, Poulantzas insisted on the complex political, ideological and economic role of the state that, as Sotiris argues³⁷, could be found in Gramsci's novel contribution to the Marxist political theory: the concept of the *integral state* (2014, p.149). Mouffe also argues that compared to Althusser's theory of the state, the integral state is more dialectical and complex (Mouffe, 1981, p.176).

"With this concept, Gramsci attempted to analyse the mutual interpenetration and reinforcement of 'political society' and 'civil society' (to be distinguished from each other methodologically, not organically) within a unified (and indivisible) state-form. According to this concept, the state (in its integral form) was not to be limited to the machinery of government and legal institutions (the 'state' understood in a limited sense). Rather, the concept of the integral state was intended as a dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society. Civil society is the terrain upon which social classes compete for social and political leadership or hegemony over other social classes" (PD Thomas, 2009, p.139).

Wood highlights that the understanding of civil society has three milestones: Hegel, Marx, and Gramsci (1990, p.62). For Hegel, the distinction between private and public leads to the interaction of the state and civil society, however between two autonomous spheres (1985 [1830], pp.94-97). Marx, then, turned Hegel's philosophy upside-down and conceptualised the relationship between those two dialectically (1970 [1843]). Lefebvre argues that the problem with Hegel's analysis is that he did not cover alienation in the relationship of the state and society (2009 [1940], p.50).

"I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state could neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life, which are summed up

³⁷ Specifically, in the way Poulantzas presents the '*historicity of a territory and the territorialisation of a history*' (Poulantzas, 2000, p.114), his approach is analogous to Gramsci's spatial-temporality and historical specificity (Sotiris, 2014, p.152). "Gramsci's highly complex and original conception of hegemony and the integral state and his reformulation of historical materialism away from both idealism and naturalistic materialism, offer the possibility of picking up this dialogue from where it was stopped by Poulantzas's death" (Sotiris, 2014, p.156).

by Hegel after the fashion of the English and French of the eighteenth century, under the name 'civil society'; the anatomy of that civil society is to be sought in political economy" (Marx, 1904 [1859], p.11).

Whilst in Marx the moment of civil society coincides with the material base (as opposed to the superstructure of ideologies and institutions), for Gramsci the moment of civil society is itself superstructural (Bobbio, 1989, p.25). Morton argues that Gramsci's integral state has engagements with Marx's conceptualisation of state and civil society, Lenin's concept of the withering away of the state and even Trotsky's the permanent revolution (Lenin, 1985 [1917]; Marx, 1904 [1859]; Trotsky, 2010) and comparable through 'incorporating comparison' (McMichael, 1990) method (Morton, 2010a, p.329). A recent debate between Miliband and Poulantzas on the relative autonomy of the state is also an important sequence of Gramsci's concept.

Gramsci transformed the antithesis of the 'Church and the state' into 'civil society and political society' (Bobbio, 1979, p.43; 1988, p.95). His critique of civil society (Patnaik, 2012) is perhaps rooted in Marx's own works, but goes beyond them. For instance, Marx and Engels conceptualised civil society as the true source and theatre of history that transcends the state inwardly to organise itself as the state (1998 [1932], p.57). Gramsci's extended theory of the state is based on the discovery of the 'private apparatuses of hegemony', which led him to distinguish two essential spheres within superstructures; (Coutinho, 2013, p.81) that is to say civil society + political society = the integral state (Bocock, 1986, p.28). This analytically useful concept of Gramsci's is based on the dialectical relation between the state and society (Gramsci, 1971, pp.257-264). On the one hand, the integral state consists of 'political society'; that is, the coercive apparatus of the state more narrowly understood including ministries and other state institutions. On the other, it includes 'civil society', made up of political parties, unions, employers' associations, churches and so on, which 'represents the realm of cultural institutions and practices in which the hegemony of a class may be constructed or challenged' (Rupert, 1995, p.27 cited in Bieler & Morton, 2001b).

“Within this extended or integral conception of the state there is a fusion between political and civil society within which ruling classes organise the political and cultural struggle for hegemony, to the extent that distinctions between them become ‘merely methodological’ ... Once again, the notion of integral state was developed in opposition to the separation of powers embedded in a liberal conception of politics, hence a rejection of the notion of the state as a ‘nightwatchman’, only intervening in the course of safeguarding public order, because ‘laissez-faire too is a form of state ‘regulation’, introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means’ ... Thus it can be argued that the state in this conception is understood as a social relation” (Bieler & Morton, 2003a, pp.482-483).

This methodological separation (Buttigieg, 2005, p.39) or the methodological abstraction of the state apparatus (Maglaras, 2013, p.2) needs to be understood dialectically. For instance, the understanding on civil society that conceptualises the sphere as merely a bourgeois society is problematic because it ignores the embeddedness of bourgeoisie in the state apparatus (Wood, 1990, p.67). On the other hand, the tendency to view the state as both a perpetual entity and to concentrate solely on direct governmental responsibilities within political society was also criticised as *statolatry*; that is to say viewing the state as a perpetual entity limited to actions within political society (Morton, 2007b, p.89). This view is equally problematic as it ignores the role of the state in the making of the social relations of production. The realms of political and civil society within modern states are inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of the integral state (Gramsci, 1971, p.12 cited in Bieler & Morton, 2003a). For example the emergent bourgeoisie was able to present itself as an integral state after the French Revolution in 1789 (Bieler, Bruff, & Morton, 2015, p.142) with all the intellectual and moral forces that were necessary and adequate to the task of organising a complete and perfect society (Gramsci, 2007, p.9 cited in Morton, 2013a). The integral state and its focus on social forces do not exclude the analysis of state institutions as it focusses on ‘political society’ too (Bieler & Morton, 2001b, p.19). The integral state accounts for both the hegemonic and dictatorial aspects of political rule (Howarth, 2015).

“There is no social system where consensus serves as the sole basis of hegemony, nor a state where the same social group can maintain durably its domination on the basis of pure coercion” (Portelli, 1973, p.30 quoted in Morton, 2013a).

Additional aspects of the state is referred to as civil society. The realms of political and civil society, within modern states, are inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of the integral state (Bieler & Morton, 2014, p.38). Bosteels highlights that civil society and the state must be understood according to a dialectic of moments. They can be seen as methodologically or analytically separate but, in the historical era marked by passive revolution, they are also organically linked (2014, p.50). There is the equilibrium between the force and consensus as the political effect of state power, and at the same time power as a ‘condensation’ of the organisation of the social forces in civil society: in sum, the integral state (Frosini, 2014, p.122). Under the integral state, political society and civil society are within a unified and indivisible state-form (McKay, 2014, p.69).

Buci-Glucksmann also uses a new term: *the expanded state* (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p.281). As Guido Liguori notes, Gramsci himself writes of *lo stato integrale*, the state in its inclusive sense, rather than of *lo stato allargato* (or expanded state) (Liguori, 2004, p.208 cited in Jessop, 2014). According to Jessop, however, while it would be wrong to conflate Gramsci’s account of *lo stato integrale* with the idea of *lo stato allargato*, the latter is useful in understanding the historical specificity of the state in a particular period. In other words, while the concept of *stato integrale* (the state in its inclusive sense) has a general methodological value in treating the state as an ensemble of social relations that is always, albeit differentially, embedded within a wider set of social relations; the concept of *stato allargato* has a specific historical value linked to specific stages of capitalist development and/or varieties of capitalism (Jessop, 2014).

Hereby it is worth mentioning that the agency-structure model would also be useful to understand the integral state. As Bieler and Morton suggest, the contributions of a historical critical theory approach to analysing world

order, conspicuous in the work of Robert Cox and the GHM literature, have been overlooked in the discussion of agency-structure in IR (Bieler & Morton, 2001a, p.6). In this historical critical approach, Cox offers that three elements mutually interact: *ideas* (shared notions of social relations and collective images of social order), *material capabilities* (more tangible resources), and *institutions* (amalgams of the first two elements). These three elements represent a complex reality but all, in turn, are viewed as operating within three spheres of activity: *the social relations of production* (encompassing the totality of social relations in material, institutional and discursive forms), *forms of state* (consisting of historically contingent state-civil society complexes), *world orders* (representing persistent patterns of stability and conflict) (Cox, 1981, pp.135-138 cited in Bieler & Morton, 2001a). Elsewhere, Bieler and Morton emphasise that an understanding of the state as a *social relations of production* is overlooked even in other historical materialist approaches such as Open Marxism. Also, a Gramscian 'Critical Economy' perspective or GHM affords insight into a broader range of class-relevant social forces linked to contemporary processes of capitalist development (Bieler & Morton, 2003a, p.467). As they highlight, patterns of production relations should be taken as the starting point, but should not be taken as a move that reduces everything to production in an economic sense (2003a, p.475).

"Production ... is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods" (Cox, 1989, p.39 quoted in Bieler & Morton, 2003a).

Femia highlights that all organs of civil society coerce those non-conformists and rebels who come under their particular jurisdictions (1981, p.28). On the other hand, Buttigieg argues that civil society appears as a sphere of hegemony from Gramsci's reading of it (Buttigieg, 1995, pp.6-7). What is called 'public opinion' is tightly connected to political hegemony; in other words, it is the point of contact between 'civil society' and 'political

society', between consent and force (Gramsci, 2007, p.213 cited in Morton, 2013a). There are two major levels in the analysis of the integral state:

"[T]he one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government" (Gramsci, 1971, p.12 quoted in Bieler & Morton, 2001b).

Civil society is pre-eminently the locus of hegemony (Fontana, 2006, p.55). It is not one and harmonious, but plural, multiple and overlapping (Fontana, 2010, p.345). The enlargement of the state works on two levels: first, it involves the enlarging of the social base of the state and the complex relations established between the state, the hegemonic class and its mass base; second, it also involves the enlarging of the state's functions, since the notion of the integral state implies the incorporation of the apparatuses of hegemony, of civil society, to the state (Mouffe, 1979, p.182). Gramsci rejects any organic distinction between civil society and the state, hegemony and dictatorship (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p.93).

"[The ideas of free trade movement] are based on a distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological. Thus, it is asserted that economic activity belongs to the civil society, and that the state must not intervene to regulate it. But, since in actual reality, civil society and state are one and the same, it must be clear that laissez-faire too is a form of state 'regulation'" (Gramsci, 1971, p.160 quoted in Buci-Glucksmann, 1980).

The homogeneity between structure and superstructure is highlighted in the notion of integral state; therefore, the historical bloc becomes a reality, actually in power. Gramsci rejects the separation between superstructure and structure and he thinks in new terms of a historical bloc; the complex and conflicting set of superstructures is the reflection of the set of social relations of production. Gramsci's concept of hegemony also shows a dialectical relation between the structure and superstructure. Hegemonic apparatus does not belong just to the field of ideological reproduction nor is

reducible simply to the superstructure (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, pp.74-91 cited in Ozan, 2000).

“It is superstructure that represents the active and positive factor in the historical development; it is the complex of ideological and cultural relations, the spiritual and intellectual life, and the political expression of those relations that become the focus of analysis rather than structure” (Carnoy, 1984, p.68).

The difference between how Gramsci and Marx perceive civil society is that, for the latter civil society is a combination of base and superstructure however for the former civil society is superstructure itself. Therefore, civil society is the sphere where hegemony is exercised (Bobbio, 1989, p.29 cited in Ozan, 2000). On the other hand, Texier argues that the notion of civil society in Gramscian theory is established upon the economic base (Texier, 1979, pp.62-64 cited in Ozan, 2000). As the base-superstructure model is dialectically articulated in Gramsci, the latter reading of Gramsci provides a less problematic understanding.




Figure 1: The Integral State.
(Source: Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p.91)

Hereby it is worth noting that the opposition of state and civil society does not represent a distinction, and this opposition is methodological rather

than ideological. Therefore, it is safe to argue that Gramsci does distinguish between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, as two constitutive moments of the *integral state*³⁸ (PD Thomas, 2009, p.170).

“‘Civil society’ and ‘political society’ ... are conceived as ‘two major superstructural ‘levels’ in [the] more complex three-dimensional spatial sense, or two major ‘ideological forms’ in which [people] become conscious of their conflicts in the ‘world of production’” (PD Thomas, 2009, p.172).

Thomas’s main argument is that Gramsci’s key political concept is neither ‘civil’ nor ‘political’ societies; rather it is that of the ‘integral state’ (PD Thomas, 2009, p.174). As can be seen in Figure 1, two internally related spheres – political and civil societies – are the pillars of the integral state. Their difference does not derive from their ontological distinctions; rather it is based on their strategies.

3.2.2. Hegemony

In the first chapter of this thesis, I defined hegemony as the system of ruling based on the consent of the masses. Undoubtedly, no government can live without a broad acceptance by the people. However, in hegemonic rule, government does not need to suppress the opposition because in an hegemonic rule, government does not have an opposition that questions its fundamental principles. Unlike authoritarian regimes, hegemonic governments rule countries with the people and their acceptance.

One of Gramsci’s central aims was to understand the reasons that the working class revolution occurred in the agrarian Russia, rather than in the industrial Britain, as predicted by the Marxists. This quest led him to develop his theory around the spatiality and temporality of social change.

“In the East, the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was immediately revealed” (Gramsci, 2007, p.169)

³⁸ My emphasis.

According to Gramsci, the proper relation between state and society absorbed the unrest in the West; therefore, a revolutionary moment was transformed into a restoration. The key to this process is hegemony. The production and reproduction of the class leadership in capitalism extends the life of the mode of production in the West. Whereas, the coercive state rule in the East brought a rapturous social change. It would be inconsistent and ahistorical to argue that this is necessarily the case, always-everywhere; besides Gramsci highlighted that these processes are dialectical within their spatio-temporality and historical specificity as they are not mutually exclusive.

Thomas compiles four distinguished features of the Gramscian notion of hegemony: first, it represents a way of maintaining the production of consent as opposed to coercion; second, the main terrain is civil society, rather than the state; third, the major activity of operation in the West is 'war of position' whereas in the East it is 'war of movement', and finally, the hegemony can be applied to both bourgeois and proletarian leadership strategies. Thomas conceptualises coercion and consent as antagonistic entities and he claims that in Gramscian theory hegemony-consent is conceived as the opposite of direct domination-coercion (2009, pp.160-161), and he continues that "civil society is the *patria* of consent and hegemony, while the state is the locus of coercion and domination" (2009, pp.167-168).

Within the Gramscian idea of hegemony, two main strands can be found. The first one is from the debates within the Third International and the second is from the writings of Machiavelli. Gramsci applied the idea to his theory from the Third International. The idea that was debated in the Third International is that the workers exercised hegemony over the allied classes and dictatorship over enemy classes. He started to apply this idea to the bourgeoisie. Bourgeoisie was thought by him to be the apparatus of hegemony of the dominant class. When hegemony meets the bourgeoisie, this phenomenon brings us to a new definition of the state. The effect of the hegemony of leading class over the administrative, executive and coercive

mechanisms of government makes the limited definition of the state meaningless. Beyond the limited explanation of the state there are also underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. As Cox points out, deriving from Gramsci's *The Prison Notebooks*, the church, the educational system, the press and all those institutions are embedded in the society and they help the hegemonic social order in order to affect individual's behaviour and thought (1983, pp.163-164). The second strand takes its source from the writings of Machiavelli. In his masterpiece *The Prince* (2005 [1532]), Machiavelli was focused on the question of founding a new state. Machiavelli was concerned with the supporting social basis for a united Italy, on the other hand Gramsci's concern was about the supportive social basis (a Modern Prince) against fascism. Gramsci referred to Machiavelli for the composition of the power as a necessary synthesis of consent and coercion (1971, p.170). Hegemony rises from this wider definition of power.

Gramsci (1971, p.365) also drew attention to such state-impelled practices and designations, which he regarded as linked to the wider class 'realisation of a hegemonic apparatus' in four main ways. First, he referred to the overarching importance of the 'material structure of ideology' which included issues such as architecture alongside street lay-outs (as well as street names), and the social function performed by libraries, schools, publishing houses, newspapers, and journals, down to the local parish newsletter. Second, these social condensations of hegemony are the means by which a 'diffused' and capillary form of indirect pressure becomes mediated through various organizations – or 'capillary intellectual meatuses' – to exercise hegemonic class relations (1971, p.110). Third, according to Gramsci, 'ideology' was neither artificial nor something mechanically superimposed. Rather, ideologies were viewed as historically produced through ceaseless struggle, taking on substance through practical activity bound up with systems of meaning embedded in the economy (1996, p.56). Fourth, it is here, in the struggle over hegemony between different class

fractions, that Gramsci attributed an important role to intellectuals (Bieler & Morton, 2008, pp.118-120).

Hegemony is interpreted in different ways among scholars such as global hegemony (Gill & Law, 1989), and hegemony and the radical democracy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). The relative importance of ideological and material forces in producing and resisting social change (Ransome, 1992, p.113) is a dialectical understanding. Hegemony represents the ideological forces in this formula. Gramsci assumed that no regime, regardless of how authoritarian it was, could sustain itself primarily through organised state power. In the long run, it needs hegemony, that is to say permeation throughout civil society – including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family – of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it (Boggs, 1976, pp.38-39). As already mentioned in the previous section, in the Coxian perspectives there is hegemony within a historical structure that is constituted through three spheres of activity: the social relations of production, forms of state, world orders (Cox, 1981, pp.138-141) and hegemony represents the inter-subjectivity of spheres (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p.105). It is also argued that there are two different types of consent production in Gramsci's theory: the *passive consent* production (indirect, through statist domination, repressive, bourgeois domination, passive revolution, statist), and the *active consent* production (direct, through hegemonic leadership, expansive, working-class domination, popular-democratic revolution, anti-statist) (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982, p.122). This differentiation reflects on the dialectical conceptualisation of hegemony in Gramscianism.

Hegemony is not a pole of consent in contrast to another of coercion, but as a synthesis of consent and coercion (Carnoy, 1984, p.73) and the state is the synthesis of consent and coercion (Vincent, 1987, p.169). Bockock argues that (1986, p.22) the concept of hegemony was never an explicit concept in

Marx and it had not been a central one in Marxist social theory. However there is latently some relevance of hegemony in Marx's work on the conceptualisation of the state, especially in the France trilogy: *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1919 [1852]), *The Civil War in France* (1968 [1872]), and *The Class Struggles in France (1848-1850)* (1964 [1850]). Although there are similarities between Gramsci's notion of hegemony and the works of Rosa Luxemburg, she did not consistently conceptualise it in terms of the integral state (Rehmann, 2014, p.109).

"Gramsci used the term 'hegemony' to refer to the moment when a ruling class is able, not only to *coerce* a subordinate class to conform to its interests, but to exert a 'hegemony' or 'total social authority' over subordinate classes" (Clarke, Hall, Jefferson, & Roberts, 2006, p.28).

Morton distinguishes three intersecting gradations in the dynamics of historical development of hegemonic situations. First, *integral hegemony* which is based on an organic relationship between rulers and ruled; second, *decadent hegemony* indicating the ideological decay of a ruling power bloc with fragile cultural and political integration; and third, *minimal hegemony* based on 'hegemonic activity' but where state power 'became merely an aspect of the function of domination', indicative of the condition of passive revolution. The first one refers to the ordinary exercise of hegemony that is now the terrain of the parliamentary regime. The integral hegemony is categorised by the amalgamation of force and consent, without emphasising the predominance of force over consent. The second one is situated between coercion and consent; however, it is characterised by the situation when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function and when the use of force is too risky. Finally, the third one denotes the moment when the state-coercion element superintends the hegemonic activity (Morton, 2013b, p.21).

"[T]he normal exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterised by the combination of force and consent ... without force predominating excessively over consent" (Gramsci, 1971, p.80).

It is also important to highlight the supplements of hegemonic processes. For instance Morera highlights the organisational basis of hegemony with a

specific reference to the concept of democracy (1990b, p.32). Civilian hegemony could be discussed within this conceptualisation. There is also an emphasis on the importance of working class hegemony as well as the revolutionary working class political party in Gramsci's writings (M Thomas, 2014, p.158). Finance capital is also another important dimension of hegemony in Gramsci's attempt to analyse the relationship between the state and civil society (Sassoon, 1982a, p.100). Gramsci defines hegemony as a phenomenon in which its function is exercised via society by the dominant group (Gramsci, 1971, p.12). This dominant group's ideological justification is determined by its organic intellectuals. Gramsci emphasises the importance of intellectuals' role among the hegemonic struggles between different class fractions, in terms of *capillary power* (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p.120). The dominant group's class composition in Gramsci's theory is heterogeneous, not only in terms of a variety based on the economic base, but also in terms of ideological variety based on the superstructure. Gramsci argues that base and superstructure form a *historical bloc* (JS Davies, 2013, p.16) which was interpreted in a different way by Poulantzas as *power bloc* (1973, p.206).

Religion is also another subject of the social theory as it is a highly crucial element of hegemony. Turner conceptualises religion as a political legitimacy (1991, p.178). Elsewhere he argues that Marx and Durkheim said almost nothing about Islam, and Weber's analysis on Islam is primarily focussed "on the political, military and economic nature of Islamic society as a patrimonial form of domination" (Turner, 1974, pp.20-21). More recently, he argues that Weber's theses on Islam are either theoretically weak or false because he asked the wrong questions about Islam (Turner, 2010, p.230). On the other hand, it is plausible to argue that neither of Turner's works on Islam show any attempt to construct a systematic analysis of Islam within the relations of production.

Max Weber makes a distinction between privileged and non-privileged classes when he looks for a causal relationship between rational religious

ethics and commercial rationalism (Weber, 1965 [1922]). This distinction also gains geographical aspects such as the cultural and institutional differences between the Occident and the Orient in his masterpiece *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 2001 [1905]) where he asserts that the rise of capitalism is related to the rise of Protestantism. However, this reading of capitalism and religion does not analyse the relations of production intensively. In this research, religion is conceptualised as a social construct or social institution therefore as a superstructure in the Marxist sense. As Karl Marx himself coined it in the *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, religion is a superstructural sphere that is determined by the relations of production.

The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness (Marx, 1904 [1859], pp.11-12).

Although this thesis does not aim to contribute exclusively to the literature of 'Marxism and religion', it is crucial to highlight that I do not consider religion as an automatically reactionary social phenomenon, as famously coined "the opium of the people" (Marx, 1970 [1843], p.131). I rather understand religion as a socially constructed institution where the 'cultural' or the 'ideological' form of it could be used on the either side of the class struggles in the Gramscian sense of 'hegemony' (RH Williams, 1996, pp.373-374). Labour struggles in Gastonia and in Appalachia in the US (Billings, 1990), Catholic workers' movement as a counter-hegemonic movement (Robson, 2000, p.169) and the emergence of Liberation Theology and its church in Latin America (C Smith, 1991) could be given as examples of the contribution of religion to progressive movements. I will also provide insights from the anti-capitalist Muslims' movement in Turkey later in this thesis. In a Gramscian sociology of religion, the definition of religion is not limited to 'belief in the supernatural', although it includes it (Fulton, 1987, p.214). The role of religion in politics has been studied by many Gramscian scholars (Adamson, 2013; Simms, 2010).

[Gramsci] extended the definition of religion to include two basically important sociological aspects: the primary element in religion is that it is *an active mode of experiencing nature and human relationships* in the midst of its orientation to the supernatural; and religion is to be differentiated in respect to power. That is, there are different religious forms according to the degree and kind of power religion exercises in society. Most important here is the distinction between religion of the people and religion of the intellectuals. In addition, Gramsci's concept of religion is socio-historically grounded and is shaped by his concrete analysis of past and present events, power struggles, and the development of cultures and power alliances. He also laid stress on the analysis of religious institutions in order to comprehend the relationship between active conceptions of the world and their real impact on social relationships. Finally, ... with regard to Weber, Gramsci took a major step forward in respect to Engels and the Marxian tradition as a whole by taking seriously, *as a source of power*, the self-understanding of religious groups and the interpretations of the world in which those groups actualize their existence (Fulton, 1987, p.214).

For Gramsci, religion provides a relatively incoherent, but nevertheless an operative, world-view to millions of people who are socialised into it (Bocock, 1986, p.95). This socialisation is “the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and unify” (Gramsci, 1971, p.328).

“...[T]he Church itself may become State, and the conflict may occur between on the one hand secular (and secularising) civil society, and on the other State/Church (when the Church has become an integral part of the State, of political society monopolised by a specific privileged group, which absorbs the Church in order the better to preserve its monopoly with the support of that zone of ‘civil society’ which the Church represents)” (Gramsci, 1971, p.245).

Gramsci focussed on particularly the Catholic Church and the secularisation of Italian society.

“The strength of religions, and of the Catholic Church in particular, has lain, and still lies, in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful and strive to ensure that the higher intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower” (Gramsci, 2000, p.330).

According to Gramsci, religion is absorbed by the state in order to preserve its monopoly over civil society because the need for the doctrinal unity is an essential part of the integral state.

3.2.3. Passive Revolution

As it was given in the introduction of this thesis, I define passive revolution as a slow social transformation process realised by an alliance of different social classes. Unlike revolutions, a passive revolution does not happen overnight. Contrary, a passive revolution could take decades such as Meiji restoration in Japan and Kemalist revolution in Turkey. Passive revolution is defined as the reorganisation of state power and class relations, as well as the constitutions of political forms to suit the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production (Morton, 2010a, p.316) and as a blocked dialectic and a rupture (Buci-Glucksmann, 1979; 1980, p.315). The term is highly crucial in understanding social change.

“The concept of ‘passive revolution’ must be rigorously derived from the two fundamental principles of political science: 1. that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward movement; 2. that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc.” (Gramsci, 1971, p.106).

The ‘passive’ aspect refers to the attempt at ‘revolution’ through state intervention or the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of a political order, but without an expansion of mass control over politics. Whilst this might be progressive, it is more likely to result in a dialectical combination of progressive and reactionary elements described (Morton, 2003c, pp.634-635) as ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘revolution without revolution’ (Morton, 2005a, p.511). The *concept* of passive revolution seeks to understand the processes of uneven and combined development by analysing the class strategies within state forms that combine ‘revolutionary’ rupture in transitions to capitalism with a ‘restoration’ of the old political order by new means. Two different but linked understandings of passive revolution can be found: Revolution without mass participation, revolution from above; and a revolutionary form of political transformation is pressed into a conservative project of restoration but is linked to insurrectionary mass mobilisation from below (Bieler et al., 2015, pp.141-142). Similarly,

Hall distinguishes between a *passive revolution from above* committed to the confiscation of the state as an instrument of transformation across ideological, religious, philosophical, and juridical fields and a *passive revolution from below* as a technique of statecraft which an emergent bourgeois class may deploy by drawing in subaltern social classes while establishing a new state on the basis of the institution of capitalism (Hall, 1980b, p.182 cited in Morton, 2013a).

“...[t]he passive revolution, by cutting off the leadership of the allied and opposing classes, deprives them of their own political instrument and creates an obstacle to their constitution as autonomous classes” (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p.57).

Passive revolution is a technique which the bourgeoisie attempts to adopt when its hegemony is weakened (Sassoon, 1982b, p.133). Elsewhere, Sassoon defines hegemony as an exchange whereas passive revolution is a danger (Sassoon, 2000b, p.74). It is based on state intervention and mass mobilisation from below that shaped capital accumulation and political modernisation, resulting in a form of capitalism consisted with authoritarian and hegemonic influence (Morton, 2010b, p.7). Inside the concept, one crucial point should be clarified. Aspects of the social relations of capitalist development could be constituted as either a revolutionary break or a restoration (Morton, 2010a, p.316). Uneven and combined development within the modern state (Morton, 2007c), the modern state formation through social property relations (Morton, 2005a, p.495) are important elements of passive revolution. Morton further analyses the possibilities of a permanent passive revolution (2013b, p.242) referring to the notion of permanent revolution (Trotsky, 2010), where he questions whether there is a restoration-revolution that is permanently consolidated.

Gramsci associates passive revolution with the *Risorgimento*, the unification of Italy, as a ‘revolution without revolution’ (1971, p.56) and he formulates it within two principles: Caesarism and *trasformismo*.

Caesarism can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner; that is to say, they

balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction (Gramsci, 1971, p.219).

The root of Caesarism is found in the Marxist term, Bonapartism. Actually, Marx himself describes Caesarism in the preface to the second edition of *the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* as a “superficial historical analogy” because ancient Rome and Bonaparte’s France cannot be compared due to their different social dynamics. In ancient Rome, class struggles could be found only within a privileged group (Marx, 1919 [1852], p.6). Bonapartism is frequently used in Marxist literature, and it refers to authoritative characteristics of the capitalist state under the rule of bourgeoisie. The second accompaniment of the passive revolution is *trasformismo*. *Trasformismo* is an Italian term which references a broader coalition of groups and interests that dominated the political arena in Italy before fascist rule. From a macro perspective, trasformismo refers to a dominant coalition which embraces more classes and their interests.

As Bedirhanoglu and Yalman point out, neoliberal transformation processes in different countries have been assumed as ‘passive revolutions’ by several Gramscian studies. A passive revolution represents a slow and top-down social transformation within the hands of a cooperation of different classes over the political scene in the name of trasformismo, which attempts to assimilate or dissolve the opposition via policies that applied without suppression of organised working class (2010, p.109).

All in all, in this section the Gramscian theory was elaborated with a particular focus on the concepts of the integral state, hegemony and passive revolution. Now, let me explain how these concepts are related to the shortcomings of the literature that were given in 2.4. *The Overall Critique* and the research in general.

3.3. The GHM as an Alternative Approach

In this section, it is intended to make sense of the GHM as an alternative epistemology to the rise of political Islam in Turkey, as opposed to the

centre-periphery relations approach. Gramsci's historicism is absolute because; first, it eats up any metaphysical 'residue' and destabilises any attempt to suspend the historicity inherent to any human activity; second, it is able to offer a *rational* account of the process by which it is itself constituted (Cesarale, 2014, p.38). In respect to the historical specificity (Bieler, 2005, p.515) it is safe to argue that historical materialism cannot exist without solid appreciation of the dialectics of spatio-temporality. Therefore one may rename it as historical-geographical materialism (Hesketh & Morton, 2014, p.150). The state had to be analysed theoretically and addressed politically in terms of its embedding in the wider ensemble of social relations in all their spatio-temporal specificity. This in turn implies the spatiality as well as the historicity of the state as a social relation (Jessop, 2008, p.113). As Morton reports, "[a]ccording to Gramsci, the conception of the state developed by dominant classes within capitalism itself derives from a separation of economics and politics" (2005b, p.446).

Gramscian ways of thinking within IPE could be established on three research clusters: the relations between different fractions of capital and labour; the spatial awareness of conditions of uneven development; in an endeavour to further social action and engage with aspects of resistance (Morton, 2003a, pp.134-136). Class can be identified by relating social forces to their place in the production process. The capitalist mode of production is organised around wage labour and private property, leading to the opposition between capital and labour. An emphasis on class struggle and a rejection of economism implies the possibility for agency to make a difference within certain constraining structural limits (Bieler, 2005, pp.516-517). The state should be understood, not just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, political parties, military), but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions (Bilgin & Morton, 2002, p.71; Morton, 2003b, p.159). In Gramsci's method (Buttigieg, 1990) the epistemological philosophy of internal relations marks a historical

materialist theory of history (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p.124) through challenging centre-periphery. Wood argues that, given the specificity of material production and productive relations, the base and superstructure cannot be seen as compartments or 'regionally' separated spheres; but rather as a continuous structure of social relations and forms with varying degrees of distance from the immediate processes of production and appropriation, beginning with those relations and forms that constitute the system of production itself. It would obscure not only the historical processes by which modes of production are constituted but also the structural definition of productive systems as living social phenomena (Wood, 1981, p.78).

All in all, within the light of Gramscian considerations above, in this thesis the state is going to be considered within the integral state. Hegemony will play a crucial role. Therefore, the state and civil society are not going to be considered as separate entities. The same position will be taken for the state, market, economy and politics distinction. Civil society is not going to be taken for granted in terms of progressiveness, it will be seen within the hegemony (Buttigieg, 1995, pp.6-7). And finally, in order to carry out a class-based analysis of the AKP's rise, the social relations of production will be put in first place.

The limitations of the GHM need to be addressed too. Hobson highlights what he calls "the acute irony of Gramscian scholarship" that it reproduces the Eurocentrism that mainstream IR scholars all too frequently slip into (2007, p.91). He points out three main arguments. First, world hegemony is an exclusively Western phenomenon, second globalisation is a Western provincialism, and third Gramscian historicism is ahistorical Eurocentrism written backwards (2007, pp.95-98). Similarly, Gramsci's theory is found problematic from a post-colonial perspective (Arnold, 2000). However, this criticism actually highlights and promotes the spatio-temporality of Gramsci's theory. In the literature there are criticisms around anarchism

(Day, 2005), post-hegemony (Beasley-Murray, 2010), critical realism (Joseph, 2002, 2008) and gender issues (Steans & Tepe, 2008) too.

Burnham claims that neo-Gramscian analyses repeats the Weberian pluralism (1991, p.77). Similarly, Urry claims that Gramsci neglects economy in his analysis (1981, pp.21-25). However, this criticism either misreads Gramsci's base-superstructure model or ignores the integral state. According to Anderson, neither the definitions of the terms of civil society and the state, nor the relationship between them is coherent in Gramscianism. There are three models of state-civil society relations in Gramsci, as Anderson argues: first the state and civil society are contrasting; second the state determines civil society; and third the state and civil society are one and the same (Anderson, 1976, pp.26-33 cited in Ozan, 2000). He argues that Gramsci is inconsistent in his theorising of the state-society relations. However, by putting Gramsci's reading of the relationship in such method, Anderson misses out the dialectical dynamics that underpin the relationship. Second, Anderson reproduces the Weberian problematic in his way of conceptualising the state (PD Thomas, 2009, p.187).

Some scholars argue that detaching Gramsci from its original context (ME Erol, 2015a, p.125) is problematic, because it then becomes analogously applicable to every case and eventually it leads to over-using of the concept (Callinicos, 2010; Holloway & Picciotto, 1978, p.9). Holloway and Picciotto also criticise the Gramscian analyses as being restricted to a 'class-theoretical determination of state' which has two consequences: First, such conceptualisation is unable to understand and analyse the development of political forms; and second it is also unable to analyse systematically the limitations imposed on state by the relation of the state to the process of capital accumulation (1978, p.10). However, extracting the social relations of production from the analysis will eventually lead to an ahistorical reading.

Finally, the transition to the empirical chapters will be discussed here. As already discussed, this thesis aims to incorporate three cases into the hegemonic togetherness of the rise of political Islam and neoliberal

restructuring. The purpose in here is to make a causal link between state-society relations, centre-periphery relations approach, and the integral state and urbanisation, education, and the mass media sectors. The fundamental aim of the selection of these three sectors is that those three sectors are at crucial positions in consolidating hegemony. As it was given in the conceptualisation above, the state was understood not just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions. Accordingly, civil society operates without 'sanctions' or compulsory 'obligations' but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality etc. (Gramsci, 1971, pp.242-261 cited in Bieler & Morton, 2003a). Therefore it is argued that those three sectors are mainly used for the production of consent via civil society, thus hegemony and failure of the production brings a coercive form of the state as it is going to be conceptualised as authoritarian neoliberalism (Bieler et al., 2015; Bruff, 2013; Howarth, 2015). It is essential to highlight that hegemony filters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p.87) and failed hegemonic processes may lead to authoritarian populisms and parliamentary dictatorships (Hall, 1980b, p.158).

As already discussed in *1.3. Case Study Selection*, this research develops a Gramscian approach to the analysis of urbanisation, education and mass media sectors. In order to understand the transition from 'absolute space' to the 'abstraction of space', one should comprehend the transcendently articulated social space as organic (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974], p.229) to the integral state. The spatial grasping of history is rooted in social relations and geographies of complexly uneven development (Morton, 2007a, p.600). Establishing such links is essential not only to develop an urban analysis of hegemony, but also to understand more fully the role of difference in counter-hegemonic projects (Kipfer, 2002, p.149). As Jessop highlighted,

Gramscian theory helps not only in historicising but also in spatialising (2006, p.29). Mayo indicates that “every relationship of hegemony is essentially an educational relationship” (1999, p.36). Education is an essential pillar of hegemonic processes. As Gramsci coins it, schools do not only teach natural sciences, but also the rights and duties that make children part of the integral state (2000, p.311). Neoliberalisation of education is not merely an ideological agenda but a new civilisation design; what Gramsci termed a new historical bloc (Torres, 2013, p.80). According to Gramsci, the mass media is “the most dynamic part of this ideological structure” (2000, p.380). There are several studies engaging hegemony and media (Carrageea, 1993; Landy, 2008) and neoliberal media hegemony in Turkey (Aladağ, 2013; Çoban, 2013).

Jessop highlights the distinction between ‘accumulation strategy’ and ‘hegemonic project’ (1991a, p.181). Although urbanisation, education and mass media are embedded in the accumulation process within a totality; in order to highlight their roles in the shaping of the class hegemony, I described them in this research as hegemonic projects.

“A class’s hegemonic apparatus is the wide-ranging series of articulated institutions (understood in the broadest sense) and practices – from newspapers to educational organisations to political parties – by means of which a class and its allies engage their opponents in a struggle for political power” (PD Thomas, 2009, p.226).

Therefore, it is defined in this thesis that newspapers, schools, construction sites are hegemonic apparatuses, whereas the mass media, education and urbanisation as sectors are hegemonic projects for a long term process. One may criticise this thesis on the basis of being superficial on three empirical areas, but it is essential to see the connection between three of them.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter provided the GHM, which is based on the notion of integral state, and introduced an alternative for each shortcoming point. First, the relations between the state and civil society are understood dialectically in

GHM. Second, the state – civil society relations and also relations between the market-the state and the economic-the political are conceptualised symbiotically in GHM. Therefore, rather than dualism, a monolithic and holistic understanding is developed in this study. Third, as it is already highlighted by Gramsci, civil society is the hegemonic sphere, rather than sphere of freedom, thus it is argued that civil society is not necessarily progressive. Fourth, the social relations of production which refers to class struggle, is the main dynamic of the superstructural conflicts, therefore in order to comprehend the social base of political Islam in Turkey, this study starts with the social relations of production. At the end of the chapter, a transition to the empirical chapters is provided.

In the next chapter, a concise historical background of capitalist development in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic will be given. There will be more emphasis on the post-1980s era, since the neoliberal restructuring and the rise of political Islam has become more relevant within the last three decades. The early articulation of the Turkish economic system to the world order will be explained in this context. The production of hegemony through urbanisation, education and media will be given historically.

4. The Historical Background of Pre-AKP Turkey

“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx & Engels, 2004 [1848], p.3).

4.1. Introduction

In Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk’s famous book *Snow*³⁹ (O Pamuk, 2002), the protagonist Ka poetically delivers the so-called contention between secularism and Islamism in Turkey. This chapter aims to provide a historical background of this contention, along with the development of capitalist hegemony through urbanisation, education and the media. In respect to Gramsci’s spatio-temporality and historical specificity, this chapter will offer a reading of historical developments in a particular territory and in particular periods, in order to highlight the peculiarity of the case and cases. As well as the sectors mentioned above, developments around the political economy of Turkey, secularism and the rise of political Islam, Islamic finance and Islamic capital, and the emergence of social forces in pre-AKP Turkey will be provided in this chapter.

The first section of this chapter will highlight the crucial developments during the late Ottoman period (1789-1923), the Kemalist period (1923-1950), the multi-party period (1950-1980), and the post-coup period (1980-2002). These developments will mark the foundational bases of the integration of Turkey into the Western capitalist system. To do so, the chapter will provide the chronological differentiations in the mode of production, ideology, and the contestation around those two. This overview will help to understand, in response to the first research question, which social forces supported what at which period. Following Gramsci’s concepts that were introduced in 3.2. *Bringing Gramsci Back In*, I divided social forces into two halves: political society and civil society. Hereby, political society

³⁹ Turkish: *Kar*.

denotes the state in a strict sense. Civil society consists of two poles: capital and labour; however as all unorganised movements are not necessarily labour movements, I considered unorganised resistance movements and labour movements separately, merely for methodological purposes as they are not mutually exclusive spheres. As for the third research question, the concept of passive revolution will be helpful in this chapter to understand whether the process is continuous or rapturous, and hegemonic or authoritarian. The politico-economic developments throughout the history of modern Turkey will also make sense of the discourse that the AKP articulated (which will be analysed in chapters 5, 6, and 7), which will establish a base for the second research question.

Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this chapter will develop the historical backgrounds of the *hegemonic projects* of urbanisation, education and mass media in Turkey within the periods that were given above. These sections will demonstrate how those three sectors are used as consent making tools throughout modern history, and how they become fields of contestation. For urbanisation, the distribution of different spaces in different times will be evaluated in making sense of the re-commodification of space. For the Islamic characteristics, a reading of the architectural history of modern Turkey will be provided. The pro-government capital issue will be highlighted in the historical development of the fractionation of capital. The Islamic resurgence in education and the struggle for it will be understood in the historical secularisation of education in Turkey that is rooted in the early stages of the Republic. The marketisation aspect in education will be given historically. Finally, the mass media, the progression of press, the emergence of television, and the privatisation of television will be evaluated chronologically. The methods and ways that the pre-AKP governments used state power to create pro-government media and to discipline the mainstream media will also be introduced within the oligopolisation of mass media in Turkey.

4.2. Capitalist Development in Modern Turkey

4.2.1. The Late Ottoman Period (1789-1923)

In this section, capitalist development in Turkey will be explained within four periods that are represented in subsections. The aim of this subsection is to present the background of the Turkish integration into the capitalist system between 1789 and 1923. Following Gülp's periodisation, I divided this period into three conceptual stages: reorganisation (1789-1839); restoration (1839-1908); and revolution (1908-1923) (Gülp, 1994, p.166 cited in Göl, 2013).

The first stage involved the reorganisation of the military structure, as the Ottoman elite considered that the decline of Ottoman power was related to Europe's military superiority – therefore a modernisation of the military was needed. In order to abolish Janissaries, Selim III (reign 1789-1807) carried out a series of reforms that were called *Nizam-ı Cedid* (new order) and resulted in his assassination during the coup led by Janissaries to dethrone him. Mustafa IV, who started to reign with the help of Janissaries, abolished the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. After the 14-month-long reign of Mustafa IV, Mahmut II started to reign in 1808 with the help of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha⁴⁰. The first thing he did was to regulate *derebeys'*⁴¹ relationships with the throne with a charter called the *Sened-i İttifak* (the Charter of Alliance). Some historians start the democratisation process in Turkey by pointing out the importance of the Charter that was signed in 1808. The charter restricts *derebeys'* power and *constitutionally* regulates their relations with the Grand Vizier⁴² (Özbudun, 2011, p.2). It is also arguable that various aspects of the charter were very similar to the Magna Carta of 1215 (F Ahmad, 1996, p.6; Akşin, 2007, p.23; Zürcher, 2004, p.28). However, the charter was not

⁴⁰ Consequently, he became the Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) of Mahmut II.

⁴¹ Feudal lords in Anatolia.

⁴² Prime Minister.

subsequently used in further constitutionalism in the Empire (Göl, 2013, p.59).

Mahmut II carried out reforms throughout his reign, and in 1826 he abolished the Janissary corps who were against the reforms. Following his death in 1839, his son and the new sultan Abdülmecid I (reign 1839-1861) immediately constitutionally regulated his reforms. The Edict of *Gülhane*⁴³ of 1839 was the first substantial constitutional act that restored civic rights in the Empire. The Edict introduced (1) security of life, honour, and property; (2) abolition of the tax-farming system; and (3) recognition of military service as a constitutional duty, limiting it to periods of four or five years (Akşin, 2007, p.28). Especially for the fact that it introduced the protection of private property, it is crucial to highlight that the Edict is the first legal document that secures private property in the Empire. It is arguable that this aspect, the Edict, is the starting point of the adaptation of Western capitalism in the Empire. As it will also be given in the next chapter 5. *Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project*; the distribution of urban and rural lands played a vital role in the development of Turkish capitalism.

Abdülmecid I also carried out the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856 (İnalçık, 1969). The edict strengthened the reforms of 1839 and added further regulations around freedom of religion (especially for non-Muslim citizens), civic rights and duties, education, and judicial system. However, these two series of reforms did not satisfy a group of intellectuals and statesmen who established a secret society called the Young Ottomans in 1865. Mithat Pasha, a prominent member of the group, played an active role in the staging of the military coup against sultan Abdülaziz (reign 1861-1876), and the proclamation of the first constitution, the *Kanûn-ı Esâsî* (the basic law) by the new sultan Abdülhamid II (reign 1876-1909) in 1876 (Zürcher, 2004, pp.71-73). Gülalp defines the Young Ottomans' involvement in the Turkish politics as Islamist modernisation (2002, p.23). Ironically, Abdülhamid II, who came

⁴³ The edict was named after the park where it was publically read.

into power with the help of the Young Ottomans and by opening up the constitutional era, suspended the constitution and the parliament following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) and ruled the country with a heavy-handed authoritarian Islamism until 1908. His Islamism could be accepted as pragmatic because he was the first sultan who actually turned into Islam and fought against the nationalist movements of the non-Muslim elements (Delibaş, 2014, p.73) with an Islamic discourse and as a state ideology (Gülalp, 2002, p.26). During the Hamidian absolutism, another secret society called Young Turks emerged amongst intellectuals and army officers; defending Turkish nationalism as opposed to Young Ottomans' Ottomanism and Abdülhamid II's Islamism. This group's nationalism could be seen as a 'modern' response to the separatist-nationalist movements in the Empire. With the emergence of Turkish nationalism, the modern Turkish nation's past was Ottomanist and Islamic, but its future was secular and European. Turkish nationalism successfully cut its ties with the Ottoman past but it was not easy to change the Islamic character of the Empire (Göl, 2005, p.126).

In 1908, this group forcibly restored the Constitution and introduced parliamentary multi-party politics in the Empire (Karpat, 2004, p.15). Besides the revolutionary moment, the group did not dethrone Abdülhamid II, but he became a non-functional head of state under the Young Turks-led CUP⁴⁴ rule. This era also witnessed the emergence of organised working class movements. In 1909, a pro-sultan counter-revolution was initiated; however the CUP-related 3rd Army from Thessaloniki and its commander Mahmud Şevket Pasha came to Istanbul and suppressed the rebellion (F Ahmad, 2010, p.13). In 1911, the liberal FAP⁴⁵, rival to the CUP, won the elections in Istanbul. In 1913 the CUP won the elections again, but allegedly through tricks. Therefore, an armed group from the FAP started a rebellion and the press in Istanbul supported the FAP. The CUP-related Vizier resigned and a pro-FAP Vizier, Kamil Pasha started his duty in office. Shortly

⁴⁴ The Committee of Union and Progress, Turkish: *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*.

⁴⁵ The Freedom and Accord Party, Turkish: *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası*.

afterwards, the CUP led another coup and Mahmud Şevket Pasha became the Vizier but was assassinated four months after. The turmoil under the CUP rule continued throughout WWI, the Armenian Genocide, the defeat and collapse of the Empire, the Turkish War of Independence, and the establishment of the Republic in 1923 following the victory of Kemalists over the Allied forces and the CUP.

Coups and rebellions in the Ottoman Empire are often used by the AKP staff to demonstrate the source of state-civil society conflict (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 2015). This narrative argues that the state tends to overthrow the democratically elected governments that represent the Islamic demands of society (Karpas, 2001, p.327). The centre-periphery relations approach also reproduces this narrative by defining these developments as state interventions by Turkish elite occupied top positions in the bureaucracy (Öniş, 1998, p.458). However, this understanding is ahistorical because it accepts social forces as static. These developments need to be understood within historical specificity and spatio-temporality. The modernisation in the Ottoman Empire and its discontents are the superstructural reflexions of the Turkish integration to the capitalist world. Neither Ottomanism nor Islamism nor nationalism are enough to explain the social change in Ottoman Empire on their own. The social change was embedded in the need to shift the mode of production from highly agrarian feudalism to increasingly industrial capitalism.

4.2.2. The Kemalist Period (1923-1950)

The Kemalists were mostly former CUP-related army officers and MPs from the Ottoman parliament who were unionised around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; who started a rebellion against the Allied Forces' occupation following the defeat of Ottomans in the WWI in 1918. The Turkish War of Independence concluded successfully in 1922. By this time, the Kemalists had already established a rebel parliament in Ankara following the closure of the parliament by occupied forces in Istanbul in 1920. The victory in 1922

allowed Kemalists to abolish the Sultanate a few months later, and establish the Republic in Ankara⁴⁶ in 1923. The CHP, established as a resistance movement in 1919, became the first political party of the Republic. The entire period was ruled by the CHP within a mono-party system.

As opposed to the three rival ideologies of the Ottoman Empire (Ottomanism, Islamism and nationalism), Kemalists defended westernism. However, Kemalist westernism was heavily influenced by nationalism. Another crucial element of Kemalist westernism was secularism. In 1924 Kemalists abolished the offices of Caliphate and the Şeyhülislam⁴⁷, and the religious courts and schools which marked the end of religious rule by the state, or the separation of state and religious affairs; and this principle was further amplified and enshrined by the inclusion of secularism in the constitution in 1937. In the same year, Kemalists also replaced the Ministry of Religious Affairs⁴⁸ with the Directorate of Religious Affairs⁴⁹ (Ayata, 1996, p.47) under the Prime Ministry. The *tarikats*⁵⁰ were banned; the Islamic lunar calendar was replaced by a Gregorian one (Toprak, 2012, p.218); the fez was outlawed in favour of the western hat and the veil was discouraged in 1925. In 1926, the CHP adopted the Swiss civil code that gives equal rights to men and women. Adoption of the new Turkish alphabet and numerals based on Latin script in 1928 signified a drastic shift from 'old fashion, dogmatic, traditional' past to 'new, Western, modern' future. The same year also witnessed another revolutionary change through the deletion of the second article of the 1924 Constitution that stated Islam as the official religion of Turkish Republic. The law of family names was introduced and traditional titles and bynames were abolished in 1934. 1934 also witnessed the result of the first wave of feminist struggle in Turkey; that is, the constitutional securing of women's suffrage, which overlapped with the

⁴⁶ Just sixteen days before the proclamation of republic, Ankara officially replaced Istanbul (its name was Constantinople back then) as the capital of the Turkish state.

⁴⁷ The head of Muslim cleric.

⁴⁸ Turkish: *Şer'îye ve Evkaf Vekâleti*.

⁴⁹ Turkish: *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, henceforth: DİB.

⁵⁰ It is the term for a school or order of Sufism.

Kemalist desires of modernisation or, in other words, Westernisation (Diner & Toktaş, 2010, p.41). In 1935, the weekly holiday was changed from Friday to Sunday (Toprak, 1987b, p.223). Ayata defines this process as the secularisation of religion (1996, p.56).

By 1939, Turkey was arguably the second successful independent developing nation-state outside of Europe and North America after Japan (Findley, 2010, p.247) as a result of the revolution from above (along with Meiji Restoration in Japan) (Trimberger, 1978). However, Kemalists mono-party rule, shaped by westernisation, nation-making by homogenisation, and the emergence of secularism as an official ideology, inevitably faced contestation. Two democratic attempts by establishing opposition parties (TpCF⁵¹ in 1924-25 and SCF⁵² in 1930) were closed down by Atatürk. There were also Islamist (1930, Menemen) and Kurdish (1925, *Şeyh Said* and 1938-39, Dersim) rebellions. The CHP had become increasingly authoritarian in its political rule as it confronted the unrest. The authoritarian character of the CHP could be seen within the Bonapartism framework (Gevgilili, 2009).

On the economic side, the era is split into two. Bayar defines the economy of CHP in 1923-50 as a transition from laissez-faire to statism (1996, p.774). Kemalists established a relatively liberal economic policy based on a development model for private accumulation between 1923 and 1929. The principles of this model were determined at the Izmir Economic Congress in 1923. The 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry was passed in this economic climate (F Ahmad, 1993, p.96); however, this did not work out because of the approaching global financial crisis. The effects of the Great Depression were very hazardous for the new-born Republic. The crisis provided an opportunity for the CHP to implement state-led inward-looking development strategies, or, in other words, the *statism*. Protectionist economic policies were applied until 1946. The state emerged as the

⁵¹ Progressive Republican Party, Turkish: *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. Pro-CUP.

⁵² The Liberal Republican Party Turkish: *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. Liberal.

principal entrepreneur under statism, and five-year development plans were introduced (Öniş, 1998, pp.458-461). In this model, industrialisation is undertaken by the introduction of state enterprise and private capitalist enterprise too; however the first one aimed to encourage the latter one (Rodinson, 1974, p.127). This 'statist' era is called 'state capitalism' by some scholars (Berberoğlu, 1982, p.34; Savran, 2010, p.154). Despite the fact that the economic policies in 1923-29 and 29-46 have two distinct characters, they aimed for the same result: the creation of a national bourgeoisie. Indeed, a national capitalist group had started to emerge. However the burgeoning bourgeoisie did not become a dominant force within the state between 1923 and 1950 (Z Aydın, 2005, p.27). Yerasimos argues that a statist agenda had been already held since the Congress (1987, p.88). Yalman defines statism as a hegemonic project (2009, p.155). However, the bourgeoisie were not happy with the *statist* economic policies of the CHP, as the more they grew, the more they aspired to integrate with global capitalism. Meanwhile, Turkey became a frontline between the West and the USSR after the reshaping of borders in the post-WWII world. As a result of those international and domestic conditions, the CHP and its statism could not hold any longer, and in 1950 the DP (a party that split from the CHP in 1946) won the elections and started to rule the country (Karpas, 1959, p.151).

Some historians argue that it is also crucial to highlight the deportation and dispossession of Armenian and Greek communities in order to demonstrate the nationalist aspect of the capital accumulation regime of both the Young Turk (Üngör & Polatel, 2011) and Kemalist Turkey. Starting from 1915, one and a half million Armenians were deported from their places and most of them were systematically killed. The Armenian Genocide was followed by the confiscation of their properties by Turkish authorities. The Greek population was also a target of deportation in 1923; however, this time it was a reciprocal popular exchange with Greece accordingly with the Lausanne Treaty. Over one million Greeks were sent to Greece and their

possessions were either given to the Turkish population, exchanged with Greece or confiscated by Turkish authorities. It is worth mentioning that, because of the Ottoman population policies, Armenian and Greek peoples were the industrial and commercial capitalist class in Ottoman Empire. The confiscation of their possessions gave the young republic the opportunity of distributing these possessions according to their ideal – in other words the creation of a national bourgeoisie. According to Onaran, Armenian and Greek possessions constituted the material basis of the creation of a national (ethnically Turkish) bourgeoisie (2010).

Some historians acknowledge the anti-imperialist character of the Turkish War of Independence (Savran, 2010, p.111) and consider the rise of the new republic as a rupture in the history of Turkey because “[Atatürk] put an end to the archaic Ottoman Empire and erected in its place a modern Turkish Republic...” (Akşin, 2007, p.226). This account accepts the Turkish Revolution as a fresh start and proposes that the young Republic broke all ties with the Ottoman past. On the other hand, some other historians, such as Akşin, further elaborate that the sources of anti-Kemalist discourse derive from the “pro-Sharia, civil society and second republican” groups (2007, p.226), and consider the rise as a continuity. For instance Lewis asserts that “[t]he Turkish Revolution began, in the formal sense, with the forcible overthrow of an old political order and the establishment of a new one in 1908. In another sense, however, it has been going on for nearly two centuries” (1968, p.480 quoted in Güllalp, 1994). This account accepts the persistence of revolutions and acknowledges the Ottoman reforms as the predecessors of the Kemalist revolution. Güllalp disagrees with the reading of the Republic as a fundamental break from the Ottoman Empire; he rather deploys it as the culmination of the capitalist transformation of the Empire, in the process of its peripheral integration into the capitalist world economy (Güllalp, 1994, p.172). The latter also does not perceive the Independence War as an anti-imperialist struggle and considers it as a fight between Muslims and non-Muslims. Hereby, I argue that neither of these theories is

capable of providing an in-depth analysis of the social relations of production. Following Gülp's argument, it is safe to maintain that they share the same ahistorical framework and "the creation of the Turkish Republic could not be captured within a rupture vs. continuity framework" (1994, p.156). The emergence of young Republic could be seen as a 'restoration-revolution' within the framework of passive revolution. However, the cost of this passive revolution on the workers and peasantry had become heavier throughout the period (Işıklı, 1987, p.313).

4.2.3. The Multi-party Period (1950-1980)

This era demonstrated not only gradual ascendancies in capitalist relations, increasing domination of bourgeoisie and emergence of a capitalist state (Keyder, 1987b, p.1); but also the emergence of class with consciousness and the first mass working class movement in Turkey, which ended up with the hegemonic crisis and led to the military intervention in 1980.

Turkey joined NATO in 1952, but it is worth mentioning that Turkey had already joined the IMF and the WB in 1947 under the CHP rule. Therefore, it is safe to say that as well as initiating a multi-party system, the CHP under İnönü in the post-war period started the transition to integration into the Western capitalist world as opposed to the Socialist Bloc. The DP represented conservatism and economic liberalism as opposed to the CHP's secularism and statism. It is often argued that the DP represented the emerging bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1987b, p.1) and its electoral victory was the first successful counter-attack against the 'secular establishment' (Karpas, 2004, p.15). For example, in 1950, right after their electoral victory, the DP removed the ban on the Arabic call for prayer which was introduced by the Kemalists in the early 1930s in order to support the Turkish call for prayer. However, an analysis omitting the economic regime change regarding the accumulation of capital would be inaccurate. Therefore, what I argue is that the DP's victory forges an economic regime change, from demising statism to liberalism with an expanding capitalism (Öniş, 1998, p.458) in which anti-

secularist movements were utilised to consolidate masses. However, the macroeconomic crisis in 1958 (Schick & Tonak, 1987, p.340) merged with the political turmoil and the DP's increasing authoritarianism towards the end of the decade; therefore, the liberal decade of the DP came to an end on 27th May 1960 with a coup initiated by Colonel Cemal Madanoğlu.

The junta executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and two Ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan in the aftermath of the coup. Ironically after such a bloody coup, the junta passed the 1961 Constitution, probably the most libertarian constitution Turkey had ever had. The Constitution provided a liberal environment for the development of Western-like social institutions. First of all, the principle of separation of legislature, executive, and judiciary powers took place whereas its predecessor the 1924 Constitution was based on the union of legislature and executive powers with judicial independence⁵³. The pluralist democracy model was accepted as the main principle. The Grand National Assembly was divided into two: the Parliament and the Senate. The Constitutional Court was established to control legislature power and the Council of State was charged to check government's actions. Fundamental rights and freedoms were constitutionally protected. Workers and public servants were entitled to the right to establish trade unions, right to strike and collective bargaining. The State Planning Organisation (Turkish: *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, henceforth DPT) was established (Keyder, 1979, p.27). The autonomy of universities and the TRT was provided. De-centralisation partly took place. Right to form association and freedom of assembly were guaranteed. The social state was included in the constitution (Keyder, 1987b, p.148). The dismissal of top bureaucrats was conditional to prior court decision.

The first political Islamic party in Turkey was established in 1970. It was called the National Order Party (Turkish: *Milli Nizam Partisi*, henceforth MNP) and its ideology was identified as *Milli Görüş* (literally English:

⁵³ The 1921 Constitution was based on the union of three of those powers.

National Vision). The party was banned by the Constitutional Court one year after its establishment in the aftermath of the 1971 military coup (Eligür, 2010, p.68). Necmettin Erbakan, the founder and the leader of MNP, was forced to flee to Switzerland to avoid prosecution and he stayed there until 1972 (MH Yavuz, 2003, p.209). In 1972 the National Salvation Party (Turkish: *Milli Selamet Partisi*, henceforth MSP) was founded by the previous members of the MNP and Erbakan was elected as the leader in 1973. In the General Elections of 14th October 1973, 48 MSP MPs out of 450 joined parliament and the party formed a coalition with the left-leaning pro-secular CHP, who won the elections as the leading party. However, this coalition of the left and the right, or the secular and the religious, did not last longer than a year and PM Bülent Ecevit resigned in November 1974. Three months later, the MSP joined another coalition with three other right-wing parties in the parliament: the Justice Party (Turkish: *Adalet Partisi*, henceforth AP), the Republican Reliance Party (Turkish: *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*, henceforth CGP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish: *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, henceforth MHP). This coalition was called the (first) 'Nationalist Front' and it ruled the country until the new elections were held in 1977. On 5th June 1977 the general elections were held and the MSP's vote share was 8.57% and it obtained 24 seats in the parliament. The second Nationalist Front was formed by AP, MSP, and MHP in July 1977 (Turan, 1986). However, this time the 'Front' did not live as long as its predecessor and dissolved in January 1978. Between February 1978 and September 1980, the MSP was an opposition party in parliament and finally, along with all other political parties, it was closed down by the military junta which came into power on 12th September 1980.

Especially with the establishment of the DPT, the new era indicated a shift from 'planless industrialisation' to 'development planning' (Yalman, 2009, p.198) via successive five-year development plans in which import-subsidised, protectionist, inward-oriented industrialisation based on heavy protectionism, restrictive on FDI, and acute balance of payments (henceforth

ISI) was applied. The change in the mode of production aimed for rapid growth. Indeed between 1960 and 1977 the GDP increased 6.35% per annum (Öniş, 1998, pp.458-461). Under the planning and ISI (Bayar, 1996, pp.776-777) the state functioned as a guarantor of the mechanisms of income distribution (Keyder, 1987b, p.156). However through the state economic enterprises (Milor, 1990, p.4) the bourgeoisification of Anatolia was aimed at too. Ergil argues that the Islamist MSP's emergence indicated the rise of Anatolian bourgeoisie and Islamic puritanism; therein the secularisation became a form of class conflict (1975, pp.69-79). The 1960s was progressive for labour as real wages increased 5-7% every year between 1963 and 1971 (Işıklı, 1987, p.324) and also in 1965, the TİP (Workers Party of Turkey) obtained 14⁵⁴ seats in parliament (F Ahmad, 1993, p.145).

However, the debt crisis in 1970 and the 1971 military memorandum as the state's response to the crisis reversed working class gains as the class struggle became more violent. After the memorandum, the government resigned and a technocratic government was formed. Three of the arrested student leaders, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnönü were hanged. The constitutional amendments of 1971 in the aftermath of the 1971 memorandum restricted the liberal constitutional rights that were given by the 1961 Constitution. In order to guarantee stability the statutory decree was introduced. The authority of the council of ministers on taxation was increased. The autonomy of universities was diminished, whereas the autonomy of TRT was completely abolished and the TRT was turned into a state-enterprise. The union rights of public servants were removed. The Council of State's supervisory on the Armed Forces was removed and the Supreme Military Administrative Court (Turkish: *Askeri Yüksek İdare Mahkemesi*) was established. Some restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, and application to the Constitutional Court were initiated.

⁵⁴ Actually 15 MPs were elected from the list of TİP but one of them was elected as independent (TÜİK, 2008, p.12).

The situation immediately affected the conditions of the working class. Real wages decreased 10% in 1972-1973 when strikes were outlawed and union leaders jailed (Keyder, 1987b, p.160).




Figure 2: Number of Strikes between 1963 and 1980.

Source: (Işıkılı, 1987, pp.324-325)

As it can be seen in Figure 2, the memorandum interrupted the workers' struggle. However, as the struggle carried on after 1973, real wages increased after 1974; they leapt up by 21% in 1975, by 5% in 1976 and by 22% between 1976 and 1978, to then stagnate until the military takeover in 1980. Between 1964 and 1978 average wages had more than doubled (Keyder, 1987b, p.160).

The class struggle was also taking place at an institutional level (Taylan, 1984). The TİSK, the union of employers, was established in 1961 (Çakmakçı & Oba, 2007, p.712) but the real representative of the industrial capitalist class, the TÜSİAD, was established in 1971. TÜSİAD maintains strong links to the state and enjoys easy access to government support, aided by joint ventures with the military in areas ranging from iron and steel, cement, automotive, pulp and paper and food, as well as artillery ammunition, small arms, military vehicles and rocket systems (Atasoy, 2008, pp.52-53). TÜSİAD even succeeded in making the Ecevit government resign in 1979 (Boratav, 2005, p.73). Turkey also witnessed the emergence and growth of a proper

working class in this phase of capitalist development which resulted in class conflict coming to the public stage. Socialism, nationalism, and Islamism burgeoned as ideologies of the working class masses. As a result, labour unions were established accordingly with ideologies as follows: TÜRK-İŞ as centre-right in 1952, DİSK as revolutionary left in 1967, MİSK as nationalist in 1970, and HAK-İŞ as Islamist in 1976.

The crisis between 1977 and 1980 was not only economic stagnation as trade regime towards FDI and state interventionism changed in the end (Öniş, 1998, pp.458-461); it was also a political crisis in which class struggle was at its most violent form in the history of modern Turkey as thousands of people were killed in the streets in three years. These crises of both accumulation and political regimes were embedded in the hegemonic crisis (Ozan, 2011, p.22) which ended in the neoliberal 24th January 1980 structural adjustment programme⁵⁵, and 12th September 1980 coup d'état.

4.2.4. The Post-coup Period (1980-2002)

The structural adjustment programme on 24th January 1980 was prepared by Özal, the undersecretary of the PM (Heper, 2013). The programme introduced the free market economy that brought privatisation of state-owned enterprises, flexible working conditions (Öngel, 2014) (to the detriment of the working class) and outsourced and privatisation of public services and so on. The programme was supported by the IMF and the WB with financial allocations (Öniş, 2004, p.118). Yalman defined the economic development by the state between 1923 to 1980 as a hegemonic project (2009, p.113). Perhaps it is safe to argue that the hegemonic crisis in 1977-1980 put an end to consent production through inward-oriented economic development; and in 1980, the hegemonic project became export-oriented

⁵⁵ The programme was prepared by the undersecretary of the PM, Turgut Özal who was a former consultant of the World Bank. Those decisions introduced neoliberal policies such as devaluation of the Turkish Lira, major public spending cuts, liberalisation of foreign trade, and encouragement of foreign direct investment.

neoliberalisation (Öniş, 1998, p.461). Ironically, the new consent production project was implemented by force, as the military took over power under the leadership of the Chief General Staff, General Kenan Evren, on 12th September 1980 to finish the political crisis too. Evren and other generals formed the National Security Council, and appointed Bülent Ulusu as PM. Özal was the deputy PM in the technocratic government. In 1981, Evren became the president through the referendum that enacted the undemocratic and authoritarian 1981 Constitution – which closed the senate that was opened in the aftermath of the 1960 coup.

“The military coup of 1980 signified not only a change in the political regime but also a change in the form of the state which maintains itself despite the return to civilian government within the confines of an authoritarian constitution put into effect by the referendum in 1982” (Yalman, 2009, p.289).

Return to the parliamentary regime was dated as 1983, and Özal’s new party ANAP (Öniş, 2004, p.116) won the elections in 1983 by landslide. Between 1983 and 1987 there was an acceleration of growth led by the public sector (Öniş, 1998, p.184). This was an example of the very first encounters of Washington consensus (Öniş & Şenses, 2005, p.270). As a previous member of the MSP, Özal was an Islamist; however, he adopted his new party to the combination of hard neoliberalism and mild Islamism.

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis arose in this period (Coşar, 2012). Islamism represented a deviation from the Kemalists in the 1980s, because it was not only the second ideological component of the ANAP after neoliberalism, it was also an element of the discourse and policies of Evren and the junta⁵⁶. This new ideology was formed in Turkey which is a synthesis of Ottoman Islam, Turkish popular culture and an emphasis on the dangers of ideological fragmentation; and in a Gramscian way of thinking, it can be assumed that family, mosque and military barracks have become the privileged institutions as a new historic bloc (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, pp.113-

⁵⁶ For instance, the compulsory religious classes in K-12 education were introduced by the technocratic government.

114). The decline of traditional working-class politics as a result of the coup and rise of indigenous (Ş Pamuk, 2008, p.271) petty entrepreneurship created a fertile ground for political Islam (Gülalp, 2001, p.437). This quiet return of Ottomanism (Roy, 2005, p.20) by the authoritarian and homogenised culture of civil-military state bureaucrats (Atasoy, 2009b, p.108) created an environment for a rise of another capitalist class within the new mode of production; and it can be defined as 'fractionation of capitalist class' (Tanyılmaz, 2015) in a Poulantzasian way (Poulantzas, 1974, p.77). It is often argued that this newly emerged authentic bourgeoisie (İnsel, 2011; Laçiner, 2007) or devout bourgeoisie (Gümüşçü, 2010, p.835; Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009, p.955) or the 'Anatolian tigers' (Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman, 2009, p.259) differentiated from the members of TÜSİAD with a distinct feature; they are pro-Islamic as opposed to the secular establishment. As a result of the emergence of Islamic capital, the MÜSİAD was established in 1990 by a group of businessmen, mainly owners of SMEs. For the labour movements, the Great Miners' March in 1989 could be counted as a crucial event (MG Doğan, 2010, p.11)

Düzgün claims that the 20th Century in Turkey may be a modernist one but it was not a capitalist one; therefore there was no capitalist mode of production in Turkey until the 2000s (Düzgün, 2012a, 2013b). However, he continues, the bourgeoisie emerged as first the commercial bourgeoisie (Düzgün, 2013a, p.895), then the industrial bourgeoisie (Düzgün, 2013a, p.897). Perhaps the new bourgeoisie may be called an Islamic one, but most importantly with capitalist property relations for the first time in Turkey (Düzgün, 2013a, pp.899-901). Karadağ criticised this analysis and argued that a capitalist mode of production developed during the 1960s (Karadağ, 2012) and he defines the mode of production in the post-1980 period as 'oligarchic capitalism' (Karadağ, 2010).

On the working class side, apart from the MİSK, three main labour union confederations re-opened after the coup. Furthermore, workers in the public sector were allowed to establish unions in the 1990s: KAMU-SEN as centre-

right in 1992, KESK as left in 1995, and MEMUR-SEN as religious in 1995. However, considering that the highest level of union density in the history of Turkey was realised in 1979 (Cam, 2002, p.97), the 1980s and 1990s were not positive for labour as throughout the period union density constantly declined from 20.83% in 1986 to 9.48% in 2002 (Source: <https://stats.oecd.org>); although as Blind argues they helped the democratisation process in the 1990s (Blind, 2007, p.305). The 1980s represented a fundamental deterioration in the relative economic position of labour in general against capital in general (Boratav, 1990, p.224), as the transition to neoliberalism was a passive revolution (Yalman, 2009, p.311).

On the other hand, the 1990s represented the 'lost decade' (K Öktem, 2011, p.84) with civil war against Kurds, weak coalitions as ANAP lost its majority in 1991 after Özal was elected as the president in 1989 (he died in 1993 whilst he was incumbent), and economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001 because of increased instability and uncertainty (Bayar, 1996, p.782). Turkey joined a customs union with the EU in 1995 and became a candidate state in 1999. Historically, Turkey was the first example of the transition of an Islamic empire to a modern secular nation-state outside Europe. It is also the first and only Muslim country to have achieved candidature for EU membership (Göl, 2009, p.796).

The pro-Islamist RP came into power⁵⁷ in 1996. During his period in office, Erbakan's first official visit was controversially to Iran. There was

⁵⁷ The Welfare Party (Turkish: *Refah Partisi*, henceforth RP) was founded in 1983 as the heir of *Milli Görüş* after the military regime allowed the establishment of political parties for the upcoming General Elections of 6th November 1983. However, its founders were vetoed by the junta – therefore the RP did not join the elections in 1983. In the General Elections of 29th October 1987, Erbakan was already elected as the leader of the RP and the party received 7.16% of votes although was represented by no MPs in the parliament as a result of the 10% nationwide threshold, which was introduced by the new constitution in 1982. It is worth mentioning that the RP's social base was established on the urban poor (Delibaş, 2014). In the General Elections of 20th October 1991 the RP's vote share increased to 16.9% and 69 MPs joined parliament as RP members. The RP's first significant success was in 27th March 1994 local elections when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the Mayor of Istanbul and Melih Gökçek as the Mayor of Ankara. One year later, in the General Elections of 24th December 1995, the RP received 21.38% of the votes with 158 MPs out of 550 (The total

further controversy on his later visit to Libya where Gaddafi's comments about Turkey's domestic and foreign policies in front of cameras, whilst Erbakan was present, were heavily criticised in Turkey. Furthermore, Erbakan's attendance at a dinner with *tarikat* leaders, radical Islamists' rally in Ankara Kocatepe Mosque, and some RP members' criticisms about secularism in Turkey also triggered negative secularist reaction. A jihad themed play, organised by the Major of Sincan⁵⁸, on 30th January 1997 was the last straw for high ranking officers in the army. In response to the event, tanks moved into the streets of Sincan on 4th February 1997. On 28th February 1997, at the National Security Council⁵⁹ (Turkish: *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, henceforth MGK) meeting, generals stated their concerns about secularism and increasing Islamism. After the meeting, generals forced PM Erbakan to sign the memorandum (AE Doğan, 2010, p.295) they had drafted, which include the abolition or confiscation of religious schools opened under the RP government, the abolition of the *tarikats*, the increase of primary schooling to an 8-year system which aimed to prevent pupils joining Imam-Hatip⁶⁰ (henceforth IH) schools after the 5th grade, the controlling of the pro-Islamic media which depicted army as an enemy of religion, strict application of dress code in public space, limitation on the growing Islamic capital and the prosecution of crimes against Atatürk. This military memorandum was

number of MPs in parliament increased from 450 to 550 in 1995) and became the first party. Keyder reports that only 6-7% of the population supports a fundamental changing of the modern state and western law with Islamic ones, and the rest of the RP voters favoured an opening, a widening of the base that the system acknowledges (Keyder, 2004, p.70). As the first party, the RP was authorised to seek coalition. However, negotiations failed. In the second round, Mesut Yılmaz's the Motherland Party (Turkish: *Anavatan Partisi*, henceforth ANAP) formed a coalition with Tansu Çiller's the True Path Party (Turkish: *Doğru Yol Partisi*, henceforth DYP) which lasted only three months. Erbakan was authorised to form the government for the second time and he managed to form a coalition with Çiller in June 1996 and he became the Prime Minister. This was the first time in Turkish political history that a so-called political Islamist leader became Prime Minister (Gürel, 2015).

⁵⁸ Sincan is a district in Ankara.

⁵⁹ Members: the President, the Prime Minister, the National Defence Minister, the Internal Affairs Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Land Force Commander, the Naval Force Commander, the Air Force Commander, the Gendarmerie General Commander.

⁶⁰ The IH schools are public vocational schools to train imams and preachers. These schools will be explained historically in section 4.4. *The History of Education as a Hegemonic Project*.

later called a 'post-modern coup'. Erbakan refused to sign it. On 21st May, the chief-prosecutor Vural Savaş decided to bring a case to close down the RP. Erbakan resigned on 18th June. The constitutional court verdict closed down the RP in January 1998 and banned some of its politicians (including Erbakan) from politics for 5 years.

After the closure of RP, the Virtue Party (Turkish: *Fazilet Partisi*, henceforth FP) was established and previous MPs of the RP joined the FP (Mecham, 2004). Recai Kutan was elected as the leader, but he was a proxy of Erbakan. In the 1999 General Elections the FP received 15.41% of votes and 111 MPs joined parliament. However, during the opening ceremony of parliament, an MP of the FP, Merve Kavakçı, entered the chamber wearing a headscarf and the speaker suspended her from swearing the oath (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p.60). Five days after the crisis, Vural Savaş opened a case to close down the FP. After the case opening, some MPs called the 'reformist fraction' and led by Abdullah Gül rebelled against Kutan's old traditional understanding⁶¹ of *Milli Görüş*, but they lost the inner-party elections in May 2000. The FP was closed down by the constitutional court in June 2001. Straight after the closure, Recai Kutan established the Felicity Party (Turkish: *Saadet Partisi*, henceforth SP). The SP joined all general elections since its establishment in July 2001 but it never received more than 2.5% of the votes until today. However, and most importantly for this research, Gül and his fellow 'reformists' did not join the SP after the closure of FP; instead they established the AKP. The former Major of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was banned from politics for five years after the closure of RP and was in prison for four months in 1999 because of a poem that he recited in public (Heper & Toktaş, 2003, p.170) which prevented him from parliamentary election forever, also joined that new party.

⁶¹ This split was rooted in the mid-1990s (Heper, 1997, p.37).

• Elections	• The AKP's Vote-share	• Number of MPs from the AKP's List
• General Elections of 3rd November 2002	• 34.28%	• 363/550 (First Party)
• General Elections of 22nd July 2007	• 46.58%	• 341/550 (First Party)
• General Elections of 12th June 2011	• 49.83%	• 327/550 (First Party)
• General Elections of 7th June 2015	• 40.87%	• 258/550 (First Party)
• General Elections of 1st November 2015	• 49.50%	• 317/550 (First Party)

Figure 3: The AKP's Performance in General Elections between 2002 and 2015.

(Source: TÜİK, 2008 and <https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr>).

All in all, that split changed the course of history in Turkey, and the AKP was formed by those who were called the 'reformist fraction'. Perhaps as a backlash, the AKP has won all elections by landslide since its establishment and has ruled Turkey with its single party majority since 2002⁶². The economic crises of 2000 and 2001, the catastrophic double-earthquakes of 1999, the intolerance of people to former politicians (those who were active in the 1990s) and the transformation of political Islam into a pro-EU, liberal and neoliberal conservatism brought a one-year old party into government and tore apart the rest of the political parties.

⁶² Apart from the 2015 elections in June when the AKP lost its majority in parliament. However, no coalition attempt was successful therefore early elections were held in November and the AKP re-established its majority in parliament and re-formed its single-party government after a 5-months-long interim election government.

4.3. The History of Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project

The aim of this section is to provide an outline of historical developments around urbanisation. Karpas reports that roughly 6 million people, Turks and Muslims, were forcibly relocated inwards within the shrinking Ottoman Empire from 1783 to 1913. This relocation had profound demographic impacts on the port cities along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts. Later, the popular exchange with Greece in 1923 also brought 1.5 million Muslims into the new-born republic (1976, pp.48-51; 1985). By also taking the Armenian Genocide into account, towards the end of the first quarter of the 20th Century, the population of Turkey was pretty much homogenised in terms of religion.

The history of urbanisation in the Turkish republic features four⁶³ phases of consent-production through redistribution of different spaces. Those hegemonic phases are based on a reading of the relations of production within the construction sector and the commodification of space. These phases coincide with the periods that were given above. In the first phase (1923-1950) the consent was produced via redistribution of rural land. The country was then predominantly rural, given the fact that approximately 80% of the population lived in villages. 10 million Decare rural lands were distributed between 1923 and 1938. Furthermore in 1945 the Land Reform Act⁶⁴ was enacted; however it failed because of the transition to ISI model. The historical bloc was constructed around the CHP (Çavuşoğlu, 2014, pp.108-141). The architecture of Kemalist revolution was based on 'contemporary', 'modern', and 'national' architecture in order to designate a new and desirable look in the cities, as opposed to the traditional Ottoman look (Tekeli, 2010b, p.202). In the 1930s, the republic embraced rationalism and functionalism in urbanism with the trend of 'new architecture' in Le Corbusier's style. Ankara was the symbolic city in this era as it was recently

⁶³ The fourth phase will be explained in chapter 5. *Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project*.

⁶⁴ The act was literally called 'the act to make farmers land owners', Turkish: *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*.

established as the capital and was starting to grow fast; the Ulus Train Station was an important example of the architecture (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.18-19). As modernist avant-garde architecture emerged in Europe in the 1940s, Turkey remained 'national' in its architecture. Ankara was still the symbolic city, as the notable buildings of the decade, the State Opera and Anıtkabir (the mausoleum of Atatürk), and the government district by Clemens Holzmeister were constructed in Ankara (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.40-46).

In the second phase (1950-1980), as a result of industrialisation and infrastructure investments, the rural population started to migrate to cities en masse. The mechanisation of agriculture as part of the Marshall Plan played a key role in this process. For instance, 75% of all investment in machinery in the 1950s was tractors (Margulies & Yıldızoğlu, 1987, p.280). The ISI model as the new capitalist strategy within development planning caused a massive flux of migration to the cities. Cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir grew rapidly, and those who moved to the cities started to occupy public lands on the peripheries of city centres and built their *gecekondu*⁶⁵. The emergence of slum cities on the outskirts of major cities changed property relations entirely as the illegal settlements (Keyder, 1999, p.146) on the occupied lands were legalised and given to the occupiers as election bribes via amnesty laws⁶⁶. Therefore, the redistribution of urban land in this second era featured the consent-making apparatus around urbanisation. The historical bloc was constructed around the emerging bourgeoisie, land owners, urban and rural poor, the army, and capital (Çavuşoğlu, 2014, pp.146-147). The establishment of the TSE⁶⁷ as a controller of the construction material was an important development. The organic architecture emerged as a response to the architecture of revolution. Organic

⁶⁵ *Gecekondu* is a term used to describe a squatter's house that is constructed in the urban land without building permits. It literally means 'set up overnight' referring to the endless struggle between squatters and authorities in building/rebuilding and demolishing/re-demolishing houses every night and morning.

⁶⁶ Turkish: *İmar affı*.

⁶⁷ Turkish Standards Institute, Turkish: *Türk Standardları Enstitüsü*.

architecture was also a consequence of the intensive housing shortage that led to the informal housing; the *gecekondu*⁶⁸ and small contractor⁶⁹. The socio-economic constraints of underdevelopment led Turkey's speculative apartment boom to be carried out by small contractors; apartments and *gecekondus* that resulted in not only illegal, self-built, squatter housing on the periphery, but also brought self-public transportation, the *dolmuş*⁷⁰ (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.136-164). The state's unwillingness to get involved in the housing sector, and the ambiguity of its policies towards *gecekondu* as between demolition and legalisation, can be explained in two folds. *Gecekondu* not only provided and harboured cheap labour for the emerging industry in the cities; but it also reduced the state's resources allocated to urbanisation which could now be transferred to industrialisation (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, p.167). This dialectical inter-class consensus did not change until the neoliberal era.

Urban planning also inevitably changed in the second phase. Under the DP rule in the 1950s, Istanbul started to catch up as the symbolic city. Henri Prost's⁷¹ 1939 master plan for Istanbul was put in action in the 1950s. His plan was based on an urban renewal in historical peninsular (deploying wide boulevards, large squares, public parks etc. and indeed Atatürk Boulevard, Vatan and Millet Avenues that plough through the historical peninsular were constructed then), and demolishing military barracks in Taksim Square and deploying a public park there (Gezi Park). In this phase some suburbs

⁶⁸ It was reported in the early 1960s that 64% of the dwellings in Ankara, 48% in Adana, about 40% in Istanbul, Iskenderun, and Erzurum, and 24% in Izmir qualified were *gecekondu* areas. Of the total city population, *gecekondu* inhabitants constituted 59.22% in Ankara, 45% in Istanbul, 44.95% in Adana, and 33.42% in Izmir (İmar ve İskân Bakanlığı Mesken Genel Müdürlüğü Arastırma Dairesi, 1964, pp.5-6).

⁶⁹ Small contractor (Turkish: *yap-satçı*) is a person who builds apartments and sells them to the customers at small scale. These people are usually not trained in any technical or architectural sciences.

⁷⁰ Self-owned minibuses run as share taxis between *gecekondu* neighbourhoods at the periphery and the city centre.

⁷¹ It is reported that in 1933, Le Corbusier penned a letter to Atatürk asking for permission to lead the urban planning in Istanbul on two bases: first to protect the historical peninsular as it is and second to plan the new city on modern urban principles. However, Atatürk either ignored his proposal or was not even informed about it; therefore his opponent-colleague Henri Prost was invited to Turkey to lead urban planning in 1936 (Karahan, 2011).

(Florya, Yeşilköy) emerged, and the Atatürk Airport was constructed. The opening of Barbaros Boulevard in Beşiktaş revealed that Istanbul would expand northwards⁷² (as opposed to the historical peninsular that was the centre of Ottoman Empire). A central business district emerged in the Levent-Maslak axis where the first bridge's European leg was constructed in the early 1970s. The urban sprawl became significant in the 1970s. This phase can be defined as the internationalisation of Turkish modernist architecture, and the Istanbul Hilton, the Istanbul City Hall, Abdi İpekçi Sports Complex, and the AKM⁷³ were the most iconic structures (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.108-127). As a proletarian initiative, the Mayday district as an autonomous model of autogestion can be given as an example of resistance movements.

In the third phase (1980-2002) the urban population surpassed the rural population, and neoliberalism was introduced. Neoliberal economic policies through export-led rapid growth with free market regime caused two major urbanisation issues: capital accumulation and faster migration. As a result of these developments, housing demand increased rapidly and adding extra floors to *gecekondus* and constructing new neighbourhoods around current neighbourhoods provided the supply. This hybridisation of the *gecekondu* and apartment building transformed the city fabric from low-rise, irregular, ad-hoc *gecekondus* to large anonymous apartment blocks worked through amnesty law and resulted in a new type of residential segregation. However, this was not for the public benefit any longer because it aimed to demolish self-built shelters as part of the new urban development programme, known as rehabilitative master plan, and to open *gecekondu* zones to real estate investment with minimal city service and improper infrastructure (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.236-239). Therefore the consent-production process was realised by the redistribution of construction rights (Çavuşoğlu,

⁷² Even today, although this part of Istanbul is now the city centre, this north part of European side of Istanbul is still predominantly pro-Kemalist.

⁷³ Atatürk Cultural Centre, Turkish: *Atatürk Kültür Merkezi*.

2014, pp.213-221). The TOKI was established in 1984 in order to supply social housing needs and regulate the market. Until 1991, the TOKI initiated four times more cooperative housing projects for the poor than the state had run since 1923. However, as a result of the free market economy, the TOKI turned into a state agent that privatised the housing sector since 1991 (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, p.252). This phase also witnessed the rise of satellite cities of gated-communities around metropolitan cities.

The neoliberal urbanism did not manifest only in the relations of production, but also in the consumption. Shopping centres, as spaces of global consumption, emerged as the new consumption complexes. This mixed-use development model is a recombination of work, dwelling, and recreation in a single project. Atakule was the first shopping centre in Turkey, opened in 1989 in Ankara, and Akmerkez was the first in Istanbul opened in 1993. Shopping centres represented the decline of public space and privatisation of social and cultural functions, which were no longer provided by public authorities and city councils. *Milli Reasürans* (National Re-insurance) Complex in 1992, Ankara Sheraton Hotel, Istanbul Büyükdere Avenue along the Levent-Maslak axis can be given examples of symbolic constructions that not only provided a new skyline and new urban image with skyscrapers, but also heralded the unprecedented prominence of the global cities discourse via neoliberal urbanism (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.207-209).

These hybrid *gecekondu*-like-apartments or *apartkondus*⁷⁴ (Tuğal, 2008, p.69) created, what Bozdoğan and Akcan call ‘Turkey’s modern vernacular’, and they give Sultanbeyli in Istanbul as an example (2012, pp.236-239). The rising tide of Islamism was the most crucial component of these vernaculars. Gülalp defined Islam at *gecekondu* areas as a class (Gülalp, 2003a; 2003b, p.384) whereas Toprak defined it as a response to the metropolitanisation of cities (1989, p.1). The success of RP in the local elections in the early 1990s

⁷⁴ *Apartkondu* is a portmanteau, blending *apartman* (apartment) and *gecekondu*.

brought the Town Hall Islamism (Tuğal, 2007, p.14) but it is safe to maintain that *tarikats* became highly active in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in this period (Delibaş, 2009, p.90). Political Islam was also influential on architecture and urbanism. Ankara Kocatepe Mosque, completed in 1987 (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, p.196) on a hill across the Anıtkabir, was probably the most provocative challenge not only to secular republican identity, but also to Turkish architecture with its neoclassical revivalism – that is to say the contemporary imitation of classical Ottoman architecture. Other examples can be given as the Parliament’s new mosque complex, completed in 1989 and from the southern city Adana with its Sabancı Central Mosque, completed in 1998. Turgut Cansever was the most popular architect with his revivalist approach. The mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek, changed the city logo from the Hittite symbol that was attributed to Kemalism into the minarets of Kocatepe Mosque and the dome of Atakule. The mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s plan to build a mosque in front of the AKM in Taksim was another Islamist challenge to secularism (Öniş, 2001, p.286). On the Mediterranean coast there was also a rise of Islamic hotels (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.217-222). As opposed to the republic’s capital Ankara; Istanbul, the Ottoman city, became the symbol of a global city (B Öktem, 2011) within political Islam’s view of ‘city of the Conqueror⁷⁵’ (Bora, 1999, p.35). Sabiha Gökçen Airport in 2001, and a second bridge (Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Mehmet the Conqueror) in 1988 are the most iconic mega projects of the phase.

4.4. The History of Education as a Hegemonic Project

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how capitalism is integrated into education in Turkey whilst education became a frontline of secularism and Islamism. Kazamias points out that education was assigned a major role in the ‘defensive modernisation’ under Selim III and Mahmut II (1789-1839)

⁷⁵ Turkish: *Fatih*.

(1966, p.50). *Islahat Fermanı* (Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856) was another historical document that marked many important educational reforms. The edict ‘confirmed and consolidated’ the principles and guarantees of its predecessor, the *Tanzimat*, and educational change was an integral part of the overall reforms. In 1846, the Ministry of Public Education (*Maarif Umumiye Nezaretı*) replaced the previous ministry and new responsibilities were given to the new one. Also, the edict issued a new set of regulations for a thorough overhauling of the structure of the school system and two epoch-making institutions: *Mülkiye* (the school of civil service, now the Faculty of Politics at Ankara University) and *Mekteb-i Sultani* (the Imperial school, now Galatasaray High School) (Kazamias, 1966, pp.60-61).

After the proclamation of republic, the unification of education⁷⁶ in 1924 was the most ground-breaking activity of the Kemalists. At the beginning of the 20th century the Ottoman education system was dualist, most of the centuries old *medreses*⁷⁷ were under the control of *vakıfs*⁷⁸ therefore the influence of the state was very weak. Under the modernisation process, Western-style *mekteps*⁷⁹ were opened and under state’s absolute control⁸⁰, which strengthened the state’s power over education. The outcome of this dualist education system was the production of two different types of generations (traditional and modern). In the eyes of Kemalists, the traditional and religious education system urgently needed to be removed in order to create secular citizens, as they blamed the empire’s underdevelopment on the influence of religion. Therefore, the unification took place in 1924, only one year after the establishment of the Republic and it merged the entire education system under the MEB. All *medreses* were

⁷⁶ In Turkish: *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*.

⁷⁷ Religious schools.

⁷⁸ Foundations, mostly religion based.

⁷⁹ Literally in English: school. In this context it means Western style modern primary schools (*ibtidai*), secondary schools (*rüştiye*), high schools (*idadi* and *sultani*), teacher training colleges for men and women, and a university in Istanbul (The *Darülfünun*).

⁸⁰ Minority (Greek, Armenian and Jewish) schools, missionary schools and foreign colleges (American, French, Italian, German and Austrian) represent the third kind of schooling in the Ottoman education system.

closed down and instead a Faculty of Theology within Darülfünun⁸¹ and the first 29 Imam-Hatip Schools across the country were opened (Tanilli, 1994). These schools were opened as vocational schools and aimed to raise modern 'enlightened' preachers loyal to the Kemalist regime. However, the number of Imam-Hatip Schools went down to two by 1929 and they were closed down entirely due to lack of interest in the 1930s. Therefore, there were neither compulsory nor optional religious subjects in the basic education curriculum under Kemalist rule after 1939. Between 1927 and 1950, literacy increased from 10.6% to 34.6% (Frey, 1964, p.218).

The unification changed the basic education curriculum. Compulsory religious subjects were first changed to optional ones and later, because of the lack of interest, they were removed from the system. The change of the Turkish alphabet from the Arabic script to the Latin one was also a very important factor of modernising education in this period. Education is almost entirely public and secular throughout this era, and the MEB was the only actor in education until 1950. Higher education was very weak with only three universities. After 1950, the MEB remained as the main actor but Islamic schooling was used as a consent-making tool during this era. The DP government had opened 19 Imam-Hatip Schools by the end of 1959 and, importantly, the duration of study at those schools extended to seven years⁸². The DP also liberated the schools to use Arabic script; however they did not receive much interest. The Imam-Hatip Schools were used as political arguments by Demirel Governments too and (especially when the MSP was part of the coalition) the number of those schools increased rapidly⁸³, and by the end of 1979 the total number of Imam-Hatip Schools reached 374. In the 1960s, the Imam-Hatip graduates were able to pursue higher education in any subject at universities if they passed some exams; because Imam-Hatip

⁸¹ The *Darülfünun* transformed into Istanbul University in 1933 as part of the modernisation process.

⁸² Previously IH Schools were 4 years at secondary level. The DP extended it by including 3 years of high school education.

⁸³ 233 new IH Schools opened in between 1975-1978.

schools were accepted as vocational schools. The 1971 regime closed down the secondary school section of Imam-Hatips and prevented its graduates from pursuing higher education apart from in theology faculties at universities. However, the secondary school sections were reopened in 1974 and they were called Imam-Hatip High Schools (*Lise* in Turkish) in the new education law in 1973 and their aim was determined as ‘to prepare students for higher education’. In 1976, with a decision of the Council of State⁸⁴, female students were starting to enrol in Imam-Hatip High Schools. An optional religious subject was included in the curriculum from the 1950s.

The junta in 1960 suspended 147 academics after the coup; however, they were reinstated after 1962. The universities became a battlefield of class conflict between the 1960s and 1980 as university autonomy was exercised by the liberal 1961 constitution. The number of universities reached 19 by the end of this period. However, privatisation of HE did not take place in this sector until 1980. The first foundation university, Bilkent, was established in 1984 by İhsan Doğramacı – who also established the YÖK in 1981 after the coup. It is worth mentioning that the term ‘foundation university’ is used because those universities are legally established by foundations and are not-for-profit organisations. However, they have turned into *de facto* profit-making enterprises and they effectively work as private companies. Subsequently the privatisation of higher education took place and 23 private universities opened by 2002.

⁸⁴ Turkish: *Danıştay*.




Figure 4: Number of Universities by year until 2003.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)

Nevertheless, it is safe to maintain that the major part of higher education was still managed by public universities, as their number also increased by two waves of openings in 1982 and 1992. The YÖK was established in order to control universities as the junta thought university autonomy was one of the reasons for ‘anarchy’ and therefore an academic centralisation needed to be exercised. This also had an impact on academic freedom as, according to Tekeli, more than 1890 academics were dismissed because of their ‘inconvenient political activism’ against the public order (2010a, p.230).

Student activism in Turkey burgeoned and matured in the 1960s. The relatively liberal environment that was provided by the 1961 Constitution allowed left-wing activism to accelerate and spread widely amongst both universities and high schools. Global unrest erupted in the late 1960s after the May 1968 protests in France escalated the prevalence of left-wing activism in Turkey (Şenocak, 2009, p.175). However, the coup of 12th March 1971 severely undermined left-wing student activism, as it was done as a response to the unsuccessful socialist coup attempt on 9th March 1971. In the aftermath of the coup, left-wing student activism became silent until the mid-1970s, as most of the student leaders were either arrested or killed in a clash

or executed⁸⁵ (Erken, 2014, p.71). The silence of left-wing student movements after 1971 also caused the ascendancy of religious and nationalist student movements in parallel to the emergence of Nationalist-Front governments in the 1970s until the 12th September 1980 (Erken, 2014, p.70). Left-wing and right-wing students had fought severely throughout the mid-late-1970s (Mardin, 2006, p.207; Salah, 1984, pp.97-109). Erken argues that the 1980 coup is a crackdown on student activism thus designed to restore the hegemony of secular establishments (2014, p.82). However, this reading of state-society relations includes the shortcomings of centre-periphery relations; as he already referred to the centre-periphery relations approach in the very beginning of his article, therefore could not explain the neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s and its engagement with Islamism in the 2000s. Since 1980, student activism has never become as strong as it was in the 1960s and the 1970s. One could argue that the depoliticisation of youth in post-1980 Turkey caused the decline of student movements.

Ironically, a compulsory religious subject was included in the basic education curriculum, and this fact was enshrined in the constitution⁸⁶ by the junta in 1982. This point is ironic because the same constitution⁸⁷ also protects ‘Kemalist Revolution Laws’, including the Unification of Education which banned compulsory religious teaching in order to protect the freedom of belief of those non-Muslim Turks. In 1983, graduates from all kinds of vocational high schools, including Imam-Hatips, were allowed to pursue any subjects in the higher education system; therefore, the difference between high schools and vocational high schools was diminished. In 1985, the first Anatolian Imam-Hatip high school was opened. By 1997, 107 schools,

⁸⁵ The execution of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan in 1973; the imprisonment of Harun Karadeniz who died in jail in 1975 and İbrahim Kaypakkaya who was killed in jail in 1973; and the killing of Sinan Cemgil in 1971 and Mahir Çayan in 1972 could be given as examples. Mahir Çayan and nine friends of his were killed in Kızıldere and the only survivor of this massacre, Ertuğrul Kürkçü is a prominent MP and the honorary president of the HDP (previously the BDP) since 2011.

⁸⁶ Article 24.

⁸⁷ Article 174.

including their branches, were opened. In 1991 there were 392 Imam-Hatip high schools with almost 310k students, whereas after the RP government in 1997 the number of schools increased to 601 with almost 512k students. The situation of female students with headscarves was a hot topic in the 1990s as they had to remove their scarves or wear a wig before entering universities and high schools. The 'postmodern coup' obviously targeted Imam-Hatip high schools and by the acceptance of 8 years of compulsory basic schooling, the secondary school sections of those schools were closed down again. Furthermore, the YÖK prevented Imam-Hatip graduates from being able to enrol into departments apart from Theology by some changes in the university exam system. Quranic courses run by the Presidency of Religious Affairs were also affected by those changes, as a new prerequisite of being a graduate of at least basic education was applied for joining those courses. This triggered an increase in the number of illegal Quranic courses in the late 1990s.

This period also witnessed the rise of *dershanes*, as admission to the higher education institutions had become very competitive and the university exams had become more sophisticated. *Dershanes* are private courses for preparation for university admission exams. They became legal in 1965 (Ural, 2012, p.152). Their significance increased since the 1980s not only in big cities, but also in Anatolian cities. The *dershane* business also featured the rise of Gülen movement as it owned a considerable amount of *dershanes* in the 1990s.

The teachers' struggle was the social base of the left in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. The Village Institute Teachers' movement⁸⁸ in the 1940s and 1950s was the first spark. After the establishment of the Federation of Village Teachers' Foundation of Turkey⁸⁹ by the state in the early 1960s, those dissident teachers from the Village Institute Teachers' movement took

⁸⁸ Turkish: *Köy Enstitülü Öğretmenler Hareketi*.

⁸⁹ Turkish: *Türkiye Köy Öğretmen Dernekleri Federasyonu*.

it over. They then established the TÖS⁹⁰, which was closed down by the 1971 junta. Public workers' rights to unionise were removed; therefore they established the TÖB-DER⁹¹. University autonomy was very strong in the 1961 Constitution; however, it was reduced by the 1971 junta. In Turkey, the struggle for university autonomy and democratic education has been one of the main axes of the class struggle. The industrial actions and strikes of the TÖS and the TÖB-DER and their struggles have shaped the course of left movements in the country (Interview 11). After 12th September, they established the KESK and EĞİTİM-SEN in the 1990s. The EĞİTİM-SEN is still the largest left union in Turkey. Anti-YÖK movements in the 1990s, in the aftermath of 12th September, were the engine of resistance movements around education (interview 10).

4.5. The History of Mass Media as a Hegemonic Project

Finally, this section will provide an outlining of the historical media and press relations in Turkey. The significance of press emerged during the late Ottoman Empire. Following the developments since the *Tanzimat*, the press became the hub of intellectuals and political groups (Karpas, 1964, p.263). The first Ottoman newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekai* was published in 1831; however, it was more an official gazette than a newspaper. The involvement of the non-Muslim components of the Empire is crucial in this sense as the first official gazette had a section in Armenian language (Göçek, 2002, p.42). The first privately owned newspaper, *Ceride-i Havadis*, was published in 1840. One of the leaders of the Young Ottomans, İbrahim Şinasi started to publish his influential *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* and *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in the early 1860s, where he supported the European enlightenment movements in Ottoman society. The importance of mobilising the Ottomans as a conscious group was emphasised for the first time by the Young Ottomans and they used the

⁹⁰ The Union of Teachers of Turkey, Turkish: *Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası*.

⁹¹ The Foundation of Solidary and Unity of All Teachers, Turkish: *Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği*.

print media as a means of spreading their ideology (Mardin, 1991, p.89). *Basiret* was the first newspaper with large readership, which became the voice of Islamism. It is safe to argue that the development of print media (newspapers and books) became increasingly popular and influential in the late Ottoman empire (Karpas, 2001, pp.119-133; Zürcher, 2004, p.67). Turkish was accepted as the official language of the state for the first time in Ottoman history in the 1876 Constitution (Deringil, 1993, p.167). The Hamidian absolutism affected the Ottoman journalism and the number of newspapers declined (Göçek, 1996, p.129). In the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution, the press enjoyed the very liberal environment until the counter-revolution attempt in 1909. The CUP also realised the importance of print capitalism and standardised language. In 1911, the CUP decided to employ the Turkish language in all the schools of the Empire, with the aim to denationalise all the non-Turkish communities and instil patriotism among the Turks (Göçek, 2002, p.43 cited in Göl, 2005).

“The reformation of the state schooling system and of language by the compulsory use of demotic Turkish aimed for the linguistic homogenisation of society. Similarly, the importance of language to produce new meanings and visions of a modern nation would be recognised by the Kemalist nationalism later in 1928 through the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin” (Göl, 2005, pp.128-129).

Göl argues that the modernisation policies in the Ottoman Empire led to the development of ‘print capitalism’. This print capitalism contributed to the rise of nationalism within both Muslim and non-Muslim *millets* towards the end of the nineteenth century (2012, p.267).

The importance of press media did not diminish in the republican era. Bilgiç divides the Kemalist period into four episodes: 1919-1923, 1923-1925, 1925-1930, and 1930-1950. In the first one, the press in Istanbul supported the Kemalists in their independence fight almost unanimously. The second period witnessed the power struggle between the Kemalists who were holding the government with a small majority and their rivals who represented the rest of parliament. The era finished with *Takrir-i Sükun*

*Kanunu*⁹², which gave extraordinary powers to the Kemalist government. 15 newspapers were closed down; moreover, the owners and reporters of these newspapers were sent to exile accordingly with this law. In the third episode, the press faced financial troubles amid state control and alphabet adoption. Therefore, the state started to support loyal press financially. Those who were not in this close circle started to work in non-media works; for instance, Ahmet Emin Yalman of *Vatan* started his business in the car tyres trade. The episode ended with the establishment of the opposition party, SCF. The establishment of the SCF brought back critical voices to the press, and the circulation of critical newspapers increased. However, the Kemalists were not ready to hand over power, therefore the SCF experience did not last long. In 1931, the Press Law was enacted and with this law the CHP was able to close down any form of media outlet with any criticism (Bilgiç, 2014).

“Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to spread the Kemalist message” (Zürcher, 2004, p.181).

By saying ‘the Kemalist message’, hereby it refers to the ‘six arrows’ that were included in the CHP’s party programme in 1931⁹³, which later became part of the Constitution in 1937: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism/reformism (Bilgiç, 2014, p.62). The last episode remained an era of Kemalist absolutism until the DP came into power in 1950. Between 1925 and 1950 the press was strictly state-controlled. After that, only the ones who supported the law and Kemalist policies resumed publishing. The means of communication were used to create a culture where westernisation could manifest itself. The adoption of the Latin alphabet could be seen in this sense, however, the cost of this reform was very high for the press and publishers (Kejanhoglu, 2000, p.114). The AA was established as the official news agency of the Independence Movement in April 1920. When it was converted into a corporation, its

⁹² The ‘Law on the Maintenance of Order’ was enacted on 4th March 1925.

⁹³ The ‘six arrows’ were also accepted as the logo of the party at the same time, and the CHP is still using the same logo today.

shares distributed to the agency employees in 1925. The Treasury collected 47.75% of these shares later; therefore the corporation became a state venture. Courts, censorship, and suspension of publications were common practices of the period (Kaynardag, 1985, pp.2824-2836). It is also argued that Kemalists instrumentally used journalism for establishing their hegemony (Burak & Yilmaz, 2011). The media contributed to producing a national discourse and representing the 'secular face' of the new Turkish state and nation as a part of Turkish modernisation (Navaro-Yashin, 2002 cited in Göl, 2012, pp.266-267). As a consequence, the media became an agent to create and distribute 'secularism' after the transition from an Islamic empire to a secular nation-state. In this model, the media "was set up as part of the new state ideology to serve as a medium of 'disenchantment' with religion and sacred authority" (Göl, 2012, p.267).

In the 1950 and 1980 period, the DP years started as relatively liberal; however, after 1953 the DP's attitude towards the press became rather authoritarian. Although the liberal 1961 Constitution brought some press freedom, press revenues were still highly dependent on the government, as 56% of revenues came from official advertisements and notices in 1969 (Kejanlıoglu, 2000, pp.115-116). The last decade of this period witnessed the rise of television and the industrialisation of the media as a sector. The entertainment industry and television media started to emerge. Establishment of the TRT was also crucial as it was the only TV channel of the decade and it was state-controlled.

The post-coup era is the era where the media met neoliberalism. As protectionism was abandoned, media ownership started to gain importance. In the press, the number of printed materials increased, and foreign magazines started to enter the market as protections were removed. There were 11 newspapers with an average daily circulation of over 10,000 in 1983, 14 in 1990 and 32 in 1997 (Kejanlıoglu, 2000, p.120). Newspapers started to use marketing techniques in order to increase their circulation. In 1989 the first private television channel, the Star 1, started broadcasting. It is

worth mentioning that President Özal's son Ahmet Özal was a shareholder. This ground-breaking event was followed by the enacting of a new broadcasting law written accordingly with the conditions of the Council of Europe; and by this law the RTÜK⁹⁴ was established in 1994 in order to maintain the state control on broadcasting. In 2000, the RTÜK ordered more than 4,500 days of suspension on media organisations for violations of the country's broadcast principles (Göl, 2012, p.268).

“[RTÜK's] main duties were to allocate channels, frequencies and bands; to control the transmitting facilities of radio stations and television networks; to set up regulations concerning related audio-visual issues; to monitor all broadcasting, and also to issue warnings and assess punishments when broadcasting laws are violated” (Göl, 2012, p.268).

Throughout the 1990s dozens of television channels opened. In 2001, there were 261 registered commercial television channels in Turkey; 16 of which were national, 15 regional and 230 local (Kejanlıoğlu, 2000, p.126).

The inflation of media in this period changed the structure of media ownership. The oligopoly started to emerge in the late 1980s and in the 1990s the number of media groups declined and by the end of the decade only three big and two medium sized holdings survived. Aydın Doğan (Kanal D, Milliyet, Hürriyet, and Posta), Dinç Bilgin (ATV, Sabah), and Cem Uzan (Star TV) owned the three big holdings and they represented the mainstream media. During the 'postmodern coup' the role of the mainstream media in fostering public opinion against the Islamic government was crucial. In terms of the distribution of advertisement spending among media, television caught up with the press, as in 1997 both took 41% of the spending. The four big television channels' share of advertisement spending ranges from 15% to 25%, which means more than 80% of all in the same year (Kejanlıoğlu, 2000, p.128). The emergence of conservative and Islamist broadcasting (TGRT) is another crucial factor of the period. The engagement of media owners with other sectors (such as banking, finance, marketing,

⁹⁴ Radio and Television Supreme Council, Turkish: *Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*.

energy and so on) brought another dynamic to the media industry. This engagement derived from the privatisation of state enterprises, as a significant amount of those privatised were channelled to the holdings that also owned media outlets because they manipulated the privatisation process. In 1999, the Doğan Group purchased the Petrol Ofisi A.Ş. (POAŞ), and during the tender process the Doğan and the other media groups assaulted each other, revealing their relationship with government (Çam & Yüksel, 2015, p.68). The oligopoly in media by the end of the 1990s was based on five major groups, though their share was uneven:

- (1) Aydın Doğan – media outlets: Kanal D, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Radikal, Meydan, Posta, and Fanatik; other investments: Automotive, banking, health, insurance, marketing, and travel;
- (2) Dinç Bilgin – media outlets: ATV, Sabah, Yeni Yüzyıl, Takvim, Bugün, Fotomaç, and Yeni Asır; other investments: Banking, finance, insurance, and steel works;
- (3) Cem Uzan – media outlets: Star, and Kral; other investments: Banking, cement, construction, energy, finance, football (until 1998), and telecoms;
- (4) Erol Aksoy – media outlets: Show TV, Cine5, Akşam, and Güneş; other investments: Banking, finance, insurance, marketing, and manufacturing;
- (5) İhlas Holding – media outlets: TGRT, and Türkiye; other investments: Automotive, banking, finance, home appliances, insurance, marketing, and travel (Kejanlıoğlu, 2000, pp.129-130).

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter chronologically provided a historical overview of the development of a capitalist system in Turkey prior to the AKP government; with a particular focus on urbanisation, education and media sectors. The first section in this chapter compiled the critical developments during the late Ottoman Empire era (1808-1922) and modern Turkey (1922-2002). This section featured the transition from one mode of production to another

with capitalist development. A change in ideology also accompanied the change in mode of production, and social unrest was also an important part of this development. The positions of social forces as provided with the integral state were given too. By doing so, the chapter overall provides an opportunity to understand continuity and change in modern Turkey. The last three sections are dedicated to pointing out the historical backgrounds of the hegemonic projects of urbanisation, education and media. These sections indicated how those three sectors are utilised as consent making tools throughout modern history. The following chapter will provide the first empirical chapter, in which urbanisation is analysed as a hegemonic project in the AKP era.

5. Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project

“The true founder of civil society was the first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying, ‘This is mine’, and came across people simple enough to believe him” (Rousseau, 1994 [1755], p.55).

5.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the social relations of production are reproduced *within* and *through* urbanisation. To elaborate on this, the reproduction of the social relations of production *within* urbanisation refers to the labour relation in the given area; specifically in the construction sector. The reproduction of the social relations of production *through* urbanisation, on the other hand, embodies the research of how social forces in Turkey have positioned themselves whilst the AKP accelerated urban renewal projects and to what extent the social forces have been supportive of those policies. The position of capital *vis-à-vis* urbanisation since 2002 will be examined and fractionation of capital will be argued in this chapter. Along with capital, the AKP’s attempt to reproduce the hegemony by utilising discourses around urban planning, relations of possession and dispossession, a strategy of postponing economic crisis via construction-based growth and finally resistance against AKP’s policies will be examined. Accumulation by dispossession will be another dimension of the chapter. Especially within the urban renewal projects, some certain groups are being dispossessed and their possessions are transferred to certain big capitalist groups. In this chapter it is argued that urbanisation constitutes one of three main pillars of the AKP’s neoliberal hegemony, along with education and media.

This chapter starts with a theoretical framework of urbanisation and hegemony through urbanisation. After this conceptualisation, the importance of urbanisation for Turkish capitalism will be given. Justification will be followed by a periodisation of urban developments in Turkey. This

historical section will be followed by the introduction of agents. After this presentation of urbanisation in Turkey, the analytical section of the chapter will be provided. The analytical section will include the re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics and allocation of incentives for pro-government capital. These two processes will allow us to elaborate on the coexistence of neoliberal urbanisation and Islamism, the urban regeneration projects in the *gecekondu* areas, and the role of TOKİ and pro-government capital in these projects. The discontent around the urbanisation project will be given at the end of the analytical section, where the Gezi uprising will be analysed intensively. Finally, the conclusion will be given.

5.2. Gramsci on Urbanisation

“Urban space is structured, that is to say, it is not organized randomly, and the social processes at work in it express, in specifying them, the determinisms of each type and of each period of social organization” (Castells, 1977, p.115).

In this chapter the ‘city’ is considered as the space where capitalism is reproduced. Urbanisation is chosen for a case study because of its crucial role in the reproduction of the social relations of production. There is always a distinct togetherness between urbanism and the capitalist mode of production.

“The contradiction between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilisation, from tribe to state, from locality to nation, and runs through the whole history of civilisation to the present day” (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1932], p.72)

Moreover, Gramsci argues that the relation between the city and the countryside is the necessary starting-point for the study of the fundamental engines of Italian history (Gramsci, 1971, p.98); therefore the spatiality is not a metaphor but “the actuality of spatial social relations and practices of state power in Italy” (Morton, 2013c, p.48). Jessop argues that “Gramsci not only emphasised the *historical specificity* of all social relations but was also less explicitly attuned to their distinctive *location in place, space and scale*” (2006,

p.40). Therefore, it is safe to argue that “the spatial aspects of Gramsci’s work do not contradict his historicism”; rather they help

“to (1) understand the relationship between city and countryside in its historical and social specificity, (2) transform the relationship between both in communist hegemonic projects, and (3) grasp claims to urbanity and rurality as moments of hegemonic struggle” (Kipfer, 2013, p.83).

Elsewhere, Kipfer aims to establish a lineage between Gramsci’s and Lefebvre’s understandings on space and hegemony in order to propose a meta-theoretical and meta-political intellectual *orientation*, although he does not aim to develop a full-fledged *Gramscian-Lefebvrian* approach to urban theory. He argues that both thinkers “may help develop an understanding of the reorganisation of capitalism by extending middle-range analyses of *urban hegemony* from state theory and urban political economy to everyday life” (Kipfer, 2002, p.119). A sense of *integrality* can be seen in both thinkers’ works (2002, p.124). *Production of space* or, in other words, *reproduction of social relations of production* is essential for Lefebvre; by which he means not only consumption and labour reproduction, but also all aspects of everyday life. Daily life survives capitalism – therefore it can be said that everyday life is vital for hegemony and reproduction of capitalism (2002, p.131). Gramsci considers urbanisation as a key to bourgeois hegemony and architecture; the layout and names of streets are possibly organic components of bourgeois culture (2002, p.135). Smith also emphasises the importance of reproduction of social relations of production as a key to spatial relations to understand uneven development (1984, p.123). All in all, the social relations of production and its reproduction are fundamental in comprehending the articulation of hegemonic discourses. As already given in 2.4. *The Overall Critique*, the social relations of production are neglected in the literature of state-society relations in Turkey. For a theory of resistance, it is crucial to highlight the Lefebvrian notion of ‘right to the city’ (Ö Çelik & Gough, 2014; Harvey, 2003, 2008; Kuymulu, 2015; Purcell, 2014) which was developed as a theory of the Paris 1968 Uprising within an understanding of an urban revolution (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]).

As the relations between production and social reproduction come under close scrutiny, cities are variously studied because they are the locus of production, of realisation (effective demand through consumption, sometimes conspicuous), of the reproduction of labour power (in which the family and community institutions, supported by physical and social infrastructures such as housing, health-care, education, cultural life – play a key role, backed by the local state) and they are built as an environment to facilitate production, exchange and consumption, as a form of social organisation of space (for production and reproduction), and as a specific manifestation of the division of labour and function under capitalism (finance capital versus production, etc.) (Harvey, 1991, p.560). In other words, it is plausible to maintain that cities are spaces where capitalism is reproduced. Capitalism commodifies space and extracts ground rent; it also turns space into one of the means of production. Hereby the ground-rent appears as the most vital component of this reproduction, not only because it is limited therefore valuable, but also its limitlessness assists in the reproduction of capital through the construction sector.

The integral state is already used as a theory in critical geography studies to explain urban forestry (Perkins, 2011) and political ecology (D'Alisa & Kallis, 2016). As already discussed in 3.2.1. *The Integral State*, this Gramscian notion is the main theoretical pillar of this thesis. Therefore this chapter intends to provide a basis for a holistic approach to state-society relations in Turkey through analysing the AKP's hegemonic neoliberal discourse on urbanisation (Türkün, 2011).

5.3. Urbanisation in Turkey

As it can be seen in Figure 5, the population of Turkey increased almost six times since 1927. However, and most importantly, the percentage of the population in urban and rural land switched drastically in almost nine decades.

Figure 6 demonstrates that urban population increased from less than a quarter to over 90% in this period. Between 1927 and 1950 there was almost no difference in the distribution of urban and rural populations, although total population increased more than 7 million. Periodically, the ratio of urban population increased to almost 44% in the first 53 years whereas between 1980, the long year includes 24th January structural adjustment programme and 12th September coup, and 2015 the ratio of urban population reached 92.1%. In only 15 years, during the AKP rule⁹⁵, the ratio increased from 65% to 92%. In the light of this data, it is safe to argue that the population of Turkey has been moving to urban land from rural land *en masse* since the 1950s.




Figure 5: Total Population in Turkey by Critical Years.

(Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr)




Figure 6: The Distribution of Urban and Rural Population in Turkey.

(Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr)

⁹⁵ The AKP came into government in 2002.

Erman argues that Turkish urbanisation is different from Western ones, and she defines urbanisation in Turkey as 'urbanisation without industrialisation' (Erman, 2012, p.293). As discussed earlier in *4.1.The History of Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project*, the consent was produced through the redistribution of rural land as the population predominantly lived in the country until 1950. The ideology was based on Kemalist developmentalism. Ankara was established as the new capital representing the new republic, new secular way of life and new national elites, whereas Istanbul was the Ottoman past with its mosques and minarets. Additionally, new educational institutions such as People's House⁹⁶ and Village Institutes⁹⁷ were constructed in new town centres of new provinces in Anatolia and they assisted the young republic in reproducing its ideology through education. Construction of state-owned factories in Anatolian cities is also crucial in the manner of hegemony production (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, p.144).

Between 1950 and 1980 the country started to become more urban. The consent production in the second period was based on redistribution of urban land. NATO membership heralded Turkey becoming a part of the Western Bloc and crowned Western capitalism as the only way; as opposed to socialism under the Soviet Union. The mechanisation of agriculture through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine caused a massive migration flux from rural areas to urban ones. The ISI model required more labour force in the cities, therefore those migrating from their villages to the outskirts of big cities became the new working class. The new working class habitants were accommodated in self-made squat-houses (Keyder, 2008, p.511) on 'illegally' occupied lands on the periphery of cities; therefore the *gecekondu* phenomenon emerged at this stage. The *gecekondu* created a key consent-making process. By allowing those newcomers to occupy and squat on land, the state was providing cheap labour for the newly growing

⁹⁶ Turkish: *Halkevleri*.

⁹⁷ Turkish: *Köy Enstitüleri*. These institutes were established based on John Dewey's recommendations (Uygun, 2008).

industry, which was welcomed by the capital because this assisted the establishment of ISI model. This also reduced the cost of urbanisation for the state. For the newcomers, the *de facto* situation was also welcomed because it provided them with jobs, free accommodation and the opportunity to live in cities. This inter-class alliance determined almost the entire period. However, discontent among the working class in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods arose towards the end of this period (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, pp.144-145).

The third period came after the hegemonic crisis of 1977-1980 and started with the response to it: the coup in 1980. The coup consolidated the hegemonic crisis of the late 1970s with its iron-fist and assisted the establishment of a new accumulation model: neoliberalism. In this period, the economy started to leave industrialisation and established a service-based economy following the World Bank's directives. Ideologically, Istanbul arose as the image of the global city rather than Ankara. Global city discourse became significant. Also, *gecekondus* remained as vital actors of consent-making through not only allowance of their settlement, but also the allowance of additional storeys. First and second generation *gecekondu* settlers became half of Istanbul's population (Tuğal, 2008, p.65). The foundation of TOKİ occurred at this stage, and a forceful state-led urban transformation appeared. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Islamic political parties, the RP and the FP, became the voice of masses left out of this urban transformation and ironically these parties are the predecessors of the AKP. The contestation over urban transformation in the 1990s consolidated political Islam's position in Turkish politics (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, p.146). Balaban defines two periods of boom in construction sector, one in the 1980s and one in the 2000s (2013, p.60).

5.3.1. Agents in Turkish Urbanisation

Referring to Gramsci's notion of the integral state, this analysis is based on two symbiotically connected sub-terrains: political society and civil society.

As for political society, this chapter will analyse the discourses and policies of the AKP around neoliberal urbanisation. The ÇŞB and TOKİ will be the main state agents in the analysis. In civil society, the bourgeoisie is represented by three major groups: TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON. The first one represents transnational big capital with secular characteristics; on the other hand, the second one represents domestic and relatively smaller capital with Islamic characteristics, which has organic connections with the AKP. TUSKON was established in 2005 and represents the capital who are close to the Gülen movement (K Öktem, 2011, p.129); a transnational Islamist movement led by Islamic leader Fethullah Gülen (MH Yavuz & Esposito, 2003). The movement and the AKP were hand-in-hand until December 2013, when the movement started to attack AKP staff by revealing the corruption scandal with their prosecutors and security forces that infiltrated into the state agencies.

Trade unions are very weak in the construction sector as the entire sector's unionisation rate is less than 3%, which represents the lowest participation rate among all sectors (A Çelik, 2013a). There is only one trade union, the YOL-İŞ⁹⁸ affiliated with the centre-right TÜRK-İŞ, above the 1% threshold⁹⁹ with 2.60% rate¹⁰⁰ in 2016. The left-wing DİSK's DEV YAPI-İŞ, pro-Gülen AKSİYON's PAK İNŞAAT-İŞ¹⁰¹, and independent İNSAN-İŞ and İNŞAAT-İŞ's rates are lower than 0.1%. The Islamist HAK-İŞ has no union organised around construction. Public workers' unions are in better condition: Pro-government MEMUR-SEN's BAYINDIR MEMUR-SEN's rate is 34.66% (was 4.19% in 2004); right-wing KAMU-SEN's TÜRK İMAR-SEN's is 16.42% (was 30.48% in 2004); left-wing KESK's YAPI-YOL-SEN's is 8.99%

⁹⁸ The Union of Road, Building, Construction Workers of Turkey, *Turkish: Türkiye Yol, Yapı, İnşaat İşçileri Sendikası*.

⁹⁹ According to the new Law of Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements passed in 2012, unions have to contain more members than 1% of the whole sector in order to be a part of collective bargaining. This threshold will be 2% in 2016 and 3% in 2018.

¹⁰⁰ (Source: <http://www.csgb.gov.tr/>).

¹⁰¹ Established in 2014.

(was 26.51% in 2004); and Gülenist CİHAN-SEN's¹⁰² UFUK BAYINDIR-SEN's is 0.35% in 2015 (established in 2014)¹⁰³. It is safe to argue that among trade unions, there has been deunionisation and a shift to pro-government and right-wing unions.

Apart from the labour movements, unorganised social movements were the real engine of the resistance movements around urbanisation in Turkey in the AKP era. The Gezi uprising was the pinnacle of the resistance movements which was organised by the TMMOB and the Taksim Solidarity. They will both be analysed in this chapter.

5.4. The Re-commodification of Space with Islamic Characteristics and the Allocation of Incentives for Pro-Government Capital

This section intends to provide empirical data and analysis within three interrelated subthemes around the re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics and the allocation of incentives for pro-government capital: the *gecekondu* (Balaban, 2011) and urban transformation, the TOKİ's role in this transformation, and the role of ideology in this transformation. Finally, the Gezi uprising will be as the backlash of these three processes. The purpose of this analytical section is to evaluate the validity of the 'Islamists versus secularists' dichotomy.

5.4.1. The *Gecekondu* and the Urban Regeneration Projects

“[T]he question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what relations to nature we cherish, what style of life we desire, what aesthetic values we hold” (Harvey, 2012, p.4).

¹⁰² Full name: *Cihan Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*.

¹⁰³ (Source: <http://www.csgb.gov.tr/>).

The Nobel Laureate, Orhan Pamuk's 2014 book *A Strangeness in My Mind*¹⁰⁴ explores the 'epic' life of protagonist Mevlut, the street vendor who sells *boza*¹⁰⁵, cooked rice and yogurt in Istanbul. Mevlut was born in the Anatolian city of Konya and when he was 12, he left Konya with his father and migrated to Istanbul in 1971. His strangely amusing but ultimately conservative life in the fictional *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, Duttepe and Kültepe, allows us to discover in the background how urban land has become a commodity within the development of urban capitalism in Istanbul throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century (O Pamuk, 2014). In this section, the last period of this urban transformation will be analysed.

In the historical background of urbanisation, it was argued that the re-distribution of rural land (1923-1950), urban land (1950-1980), and construction rights (1980-2000) (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b) were the hegemonic processes around urbanisations which correspondingly matched with the mode of production and ideology of the periods. The fourth period covers the AKP period when Islamism and neoliberalism merged. The 1999 Marmara earthquake created fear and consequently a discourse for urban regeneration. The limits of urban space led the AKP not only to expand the cities towards natural resources therefore to distribute non-commodified land, for instance forest areas around the cities (Y Çağlar, 2010, p.781); but also to re-commodify the land that is already in use, that is to say the space below and above in-use buildings, former industrial sites, state-owned land, historic and *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. In 2005, the AKP enacted Law no: 5366 'Preservation by Renovation and Utilisation by Revitalisation of Deteriorated Immovable Historical and Cultural Properties' which enabled municipalities to 'urgently expropriate' the property owner of a historic or heritage-listed building, on the pretext of preservation (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, pp.143-148). Interviewee 9 mentioned that there were four types of regeneration projects in this period: first, strengthening buildings against

¹⁰⁴ Turkish: *Kafamda Bir Tuhafılık*.

¹⁰⁵ A semi-fermented wheat drink.

earthquake (such as Fikirtepe); second, mixed-use development projects and gated-communities type of ghettoisation projects on the outskirts of the city; third, the mega-projects such as the Third Airport, the Third Bridge, Kanal İstanbul, the New Istanbul, the Izmit Bay Bridge (Osman Gazi Bridge), Çanakkale Suspension Bridge (Çanakkale 1915), and the Istanbul's bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics¹⁰⁶; finally, the renewal projects at public and historical areas (Turkish: *kupon arazi*) (Aksoy, 2012; Dinçer, 2011).

Bozdoğan and Akcan defined this urban model as a global trend called transnational urbanism, in which transnational capital's investments started to shape the cities as global consumption zones with shopping centres, supermarkets, international cafes, fast-food restaurants, office and residential towers, and gated suburbia. "Since 2000 Turkey too has built its 'brandsapes' and theme parks' and continues to offer provocative material for discussions of 'transnational urbanism'" (2012, p.205). The construction firms that emerged in the 1980s such as MESA, ENKA, TEPE, and MAYA, started to undertake large scale housing ensembles and as an outcome of neoliberal housing, gated communities (Geniş, 2007; Tanulku, 2013) arose as one of two major urban phenomena of the period. Gated communities targeted the high income groups, especially in Istanbul. They created a segregated and sterilised neighbourhood only for people from the same income group. These gated communities are private and in some cases car-access only. They are either inner city sites (along the Bosphorus) or on the periphery to enjoy the natural resources. They are mixed-use sites as they include gyms, sports centres, shopping centres and so on (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.252-260). The benefits of this urbanisation model for the poor are questionable (Başlevent & Dayıoğlu, 2005) because the displacement of the urban poor (Lovering & Türkmen, 2011) does not result in any sustainable ways of improving their conditions.

¹⁰⁶ Istanbul lost the bid to Tokyo.

Squatting often becomes a prolonged test of will and endurance against the repressive apparatus of the state (Davis, 2006, p.38). However in the case of *gecekondu*, the state also produced consent out of *gecekondu*. As the cities kept growing, the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods became parts of the city centres. The technological developments in transportation also helped this fact. Therefore, the value of land in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods increased rapidly and in order to sustain the construction-led growth those re-valued neighbourhoods needed to be re-commodified and this was realised through urban renewal/regeneration projects. Those who used to live in those *gecekondu*-like-apartments or *apartkondus*¹⁰⁷ (Tuğal, 2008, p.69) at those neighbourhoods were pushed to the new peripheries of the cities constructed by TOKİ; whilst relatively wealthier habitants moved to the new luxury multi-storey apartments constructed by the large and transnational construction companies in those ex-*gecekondu* neighbourhoods. The TOKİ's role in this gentrification – that is to say a state-led property transfer (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010) process – is crucial as its activity increased dramatically under legal changes, making it one of the most important actors of the production of space in this period within force and consent production (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014a). Metropolitan cities like Istanbul have reached their ecological limits. Therefore, the natural resources around cities have become a target for construction sector investments such as the construction of an airport and bridge in the northern forests of Istanbul. This development features the redistribution of non-commodified space. The growth of Anatolian cities is also an important factor of this period; notwithstanding the fact that cities like Kayseri, Gaziantep, Denizli, and Konya have become clusters of factories and production. Also, there was a boom on the south and west coast with holiday houses and resorts.

Urbanisation has been coupled with neoliberalism since 1980. However, as Karaman points out, neoliberalism is almost-always found in combination

¹⁰⁷ *Apartkondu* is a portmanteau, blending *apartman* (apartment) and *gecekondu*.

with other political rationalities and he asserts that urban neoliberalism¹⁰⁸ in Turkey contains Islamic characteristics and Islamic charities have a role to create consent over urban renewal projects, the regeneration of *gecekondu* areas as he gives an example from Başbüyük, Istanbul (Karaman, 2013, p.3). Tuğal argues that one of the goals of the republic was the creation of ideal urban citizens in what he calls the “civilizing project of urbanist elitism” as a hegemony (2009, pp.40-41). The AKP’s conservative democracy or, in other words, ‘neoliberalism with a Muslim face’ (Coşar & Özman, 2004, p.69) is also considered within the concept of hegemony by Moudouros; where he analysed how the ‘conservative democracy’ programme of the AKP is ‘harmonising’ Islam with neoliberal transformation of the country and how this transformation is presented with ‘local colours’, being more acceptable and creating the new hegemony in Turkey (2014a, p.1). Bozdoğan and Akcan also report other urban renewal projects from Istanbul, such as Golden Horn, Galataport, Galata and Beyoğlu, Tarlabası and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Projects. They emphasise gentrification as the consequence of urban renewal and how the AKP articulates discourses and public rhetoric in order to justify projects. The residents’ poverty and lack of resources are the pivotal justifications as well as social, technical and aesthetic arguments. In the first one, security reasons can be counted, such as gentrified neighbourhoods will be safer, cleaner and more diverse than the current concentration of poverty and ethnic ghettoisation. For the second one, the earthquake-phobia of the public is used as a tool, such as rehabilitation of badly aged buildings. Third, beautifying of the city and aesthetic concerns¹⁰⁹ can be counted. They also highlight that the AKP passed laws that give local municipalities¹¹⁰ special permissions to designate historical but derelict neighbourhoods (2012, pp.289-290).

¹⁰⁸ For neoliberal urbanism, please see (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ However, this discourse has been never used for skyscraper areas where the historical view of Istanbul was damaged.

¹¹⁰ Additionally, 14 more cities became metropolitan municipalities (MMs) with extraordinary authorities in 2012. Previously there were 3 MMs in 1984, 5 more in 1986-1988, 7 more in 1993.




Figure 7: The performance of the Construction Sector in 2002-2012.
(Source: Uzunkaya, 2013, p.3)

As it can be seen in Figure 7, the reactivity of the construction sector towards economic fluctuations is stronger than the reactivity of the GDP. When there is an increase/decrease in the GDP, the sector grows/shrinks more than that. This relationship indicates that the sector is one of the leading ones in the country as the construction boom/slump pushes up/down the GDP (Karatepe, 2015). This dependence even strengthened during the AKP time as the number of people employed in the sector increased more than 50% in 2002-2012 (please see Figure 8).



Figure 8: Number of People Employed in the Construction Sector (thousands).
(Source: Uzunkaya, 2013, p.3)

Figure 9 shows the constant increase in building construction cost between 2005 and 2015 (apart from the slowdown in 2009) as a consequence of the global financial crisis in 2008 that started after the bursting of the housing market in the US. The constant increase indicates the high demand in building construction as a result of the construction-led growth and crisis-dilatory strategy of the AKP. In the mind-set of the AKP's Board of Economy Coordination¹¹¹, the construction sector plays a crucial role in sustaining economic growth. The construction-led economy does not manifest itself as opposed to the export-oriented one, it is rather articulated as a complimentary one.




Figure 9: Annual Change in Building Cost (%).

(Source: <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>)

Similarly, as it is shown in Figure 10, the increase in the number of building permits demonstrates the popularity of the sector.

¹¹¹ This board was established in 2009 in order to sustain coordination between the economy-related ministries. The Vice-PM (in charge of supervising and coordinating reforms and investments), the Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, the Minister of Labour and Social Security, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Customs and Trade, the Minister of Development, and the Minister of Finance were board members.




Figure 10: Building Permits Changes in Number of Dwelling Units.
(Source: <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>)




Figure 11: House sales in detail of mortgaged and other houses by years.
(Source: <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>)

The introduction of the mortgage system to the sector brought another dimension into the case: indebtedness. Along within creased household debt (Karaçimen, 2014, p.177), mortgage loans gradually increased. Turkey had the highest index of change in house prices with 16.1% among the selected countries in the Credit Suisse's report in 2015 (Credit Suisse, 2015). This

could also be seen in the number of house sales in Figure 11 as housing demand increased. The introduction of the mortgage system in 2008 also brought finance capital's interest to the market. Figure 11 demonstrates that finance capital is gradually taking over the market, whilst the market is booming rapidly. An interviewee highlighted the crucial point that this situation based on construction-led neoliberal restructuring through the commodification and financialisation of space, along with the rise of automotive sector, started to take place since the 1980s but the AKP merged it with stability discourse (Interview 9). It is worth mentioning that the financialisation of the housing market in Turkey was already in progress before the introduction of a mortgage system. The share of housing loans in total consumer loans increased from 14.8% in 2004 to 43.8% in 2005 and since then has remained above 40% (FESSUD, 2014, p.316). The role of Islamic finance capital is also crucial in this process (Başkan, 2004; Demiralp, 2009; Hoşgör, 2011, 2015a).

The AKP's pro-activeness in the sector was based on two discourses: *gecekondu* and earthquake. The ÇŞB stated on the official web-site of urban renewal that "the major aim of this transformation of areas under disaster risk is to prevent loss of life and property" (Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı, 2013a) and "*gecekondus* and conurbation are the major obstacles to 'accurate' urbanisation" (Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı, 2013b). In the periodical of the ÇŞB, *Çevre ve Şehir*, the minister Erdoğan Bayraktar expresses that "I do not understand why opposition parties are against urban renewal because we carry them out with consent" and he continues, "even if it is rent, it is still *helal*¹¹² to our people" (Çevre ve Şehir, 2013, p.37).

Now let us focus on the capital. Before the 1980s, the construction sector was locally based, with many small and middle-sized, often family, enterprises and only a very small number of international actors like Koç and Zorlu based in Istanbul (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, p.151). After

¹¹² Allowed by Islam.

neoliberalisation, this changed and Anatolian firms started to grow. MÜSİAD can be seen within this perspective. MÜSİAD has close relations with the AKP. For instance the president of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, İbrahim Çağlar (one of the founders of both the AKP and MÜSİAD), said that if the Gezi Uprising and 17th December Operation¹¹³ had not happened, Turkey would have been the 15th biggest economy by the end of 2014, but that is no longer possible (Munyar, 2014). The discourse on keeping stability and economic growth that both the AKP and MÜSİAD often highlight becomes significant in this manner. MÜSİAD also reacted similarly to AKP during the Gezi uprising. Parallel to AKP staff' discourse, Nail Olpak¹¹⁴ made a distinction between 'real environmentalists' and 'provocateurs' (T24, 2013). MÜSİAD's periodical *Çerçeve* discussed urban regeneration in September 2012 (Issue No: 59). In the epilogue, Nail Olpak started to draw our attention to the importance of developing a common perspective of public and private sector attitudes to urban renewal projects. It is important to mention that this issue of *Çerçeve* came out after the Van earthquake¹¹⁵. After the earthquake, the AKP passed Law no: 6306 *Law on Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk* on 16th May 2012 (Angell, 2014). This law gives the Ministry of Urbanisation broad authority to proclaim neighbourhoods as disaster areas and regenerate them. Therefore, this issue of *Çerçeve* focusses mainly on this law and its applications. The appropriation of this earthquake in order to create consent for urban renewal projects is very significant throughout the periodical. Pages 58-61 document an interview with a manager of urban renewals in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, where he points out that urban renewal is not an arbitrary process; rather it is an obligatory process. On pages 66-71, the CEO of Akyapı Construction Firm, and head of the construction sector committee of MÜSİAD, gives an

¹¹³ It is worth mentioning that the CEOs of Yorum, Ağaoğlu and Taşyapı were detained as part of the investigation (Hürriyet, 2013a). TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD (Today's Zaman, 2013) and TUSKON (Radikal, 2013b) called for thorough investigation for the accusations.

¹¹⁴ President of MÜSİAD.

¹¹⁵ 23rd October 2011.

interview where he says “I think everybody must support this law”. He continues by radicalising grassroots resistance of *gecekondu* habitants.

“Some marginal groups are propagandising unrealistically, by saying ‘our *gecekondus*, houses will be demolished’. In fact, *gecekondu* owners will be given houses. Houses will not be demolished until the plot of lands’ money is paid. However, and conversely, marginal groups are agitating the situation and opposing our plans on this basis. The reason is that these neighbourhoods are the biggest hubs of criminal and terrorist organisations. They always pick up criminals from those neighbourhoods. These areas are harbouring these kinds of terrorist and illegal organisations. They do not want to lose it” (Dönmez, 2012).

He also advises that the TRT should broadcast 90 minutes of film and city councils should open information kiosks for advertising urban renewal because no doubt must be in people’s mind about projects, therefore informing people is crucial. From an Islamic point of view, on page 56 there are suggestions to MÜSİAD members for obtaining *helal*¹¹⁶ finance for urban renewal projects. Almost every interview and essay mentions the Van earthquake.

The criminalisation of habitants of the targeted neighbourhoods was also used by the AKP and the capital. Çalık Holding also owns Turkuvaz Media Group that incorporates Sabah newspaper and local resistance groups and residents of Tarlabası were marginalised and Çalık’s regeneration project was portrayed as ‘the best renewal project in Europe’ (Sabah, 2013). After being sold to Kalyon, Sabah also organised a congress on the urban regeneration projects. In the final declaration, it is noted that Islamic financial regulations should be incorporated in the construction sector (Sendika.org, 2016). Those neighbourhoods have been portrayed as the hub of crime and terrorism in the mainstream media. Sulukule’s predominantly Romani (Lelandais, 2014; Tok & Oğuz, 2013; van Dobben Schoon, 2014) communities and Tarlabası’s Kurdish (Goral, 2016), Romani and African black migrant communities (and Syrian refugees after the civil war began in 2011) have been illustrated as criminals and thieves. The criminalisation of

¹¹⁶ Basically Islamic banking which operated without interest.

Okmeydanı's Alevi communities embodies rather a direct benefit to the AKP per se. Okmeydanı has hosted the DHKP-C¹¹⁷, a Marxist-Leninist organisation that has severely clashed with the police since the Gezi uprising. The neighbourhood has been subjected to many accusations of being supportive of the 'terrorists' by the mainstream media and the government. The neighbourhood was declared as an 'earthquake risk zone' on the 4th June 2014 (VICE News, 2014). The Chamber of Urban Planners stated that by using their constitutional duties they already asked the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning about the reasons Okmeydanı was declared as an earthquake risk zone under Law no. 6306 and how they collected the scientific data for the decision-making process. The interviewee said that "unfortunately we have not heard back for 1.5 years" (Interview 5).

Head of TÜSİAD in 2012, Ümit Boyner, declared her support for urban renewal projects but also highlighted the importance of environmentally-friendly houses. TÜSİAD is supportive of individual-centric urban regeneration (Milliyet, 2012). Also, Secretary General of TÜSİAD, Muharrem Yılmaz, made the opening speech of the 5th International Summit of Quality in Construction organised by İMSAD¹¹⁸, where he highlighted how urban renewal has become a lifesaver for the construction sector and saved it from low productivity. As well as mentioning environmentally friendly buildings, he also emphasised the earthquake risk and issues of sustainable development (TÜSİAD, 2013).

TUSKON is also supportive of urban renewal projects. In 2013, TUSKON organised a conference on urban renewal and earthquake risk, and a construction, building materials, caterpillar equipment, and furniture fair in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Turkish Exporters Assembly, and Exporters' Union (TUSKON, 2013). There was a clear emphasis on the appropriation of earthquake as a discourse.

¹¹⁷ The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (Turkish: *Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*).

¹¹⁸ Association of Turkish Building Material Producers.

5.4.2. From Social Housing to Profit Seeking: The Case of TOKİ

Uneven Growth, an exhibition that I visited at MoMA¹¹⁹ in New York City on 2nd May 2015 was based on six cities¹²⁰ around the world and their ‘future’ experiences of tactical urbanisms (guerrilla, pop-up, or D.I.Y. urbanism). The exhibition’s Istanbul section was curated by Superpool, Istanbul and Atelier d’Architecture Autogérée, Paris. The section was structured around a proposal on the establishment of a citizen-driven initiative, the KİTO¹²¹ at fictional Kayabaşı TOKİ site. The KİTO is a “post-urban development agency, which proposes an alternative positive scenario for the future of TOKİ complexes” which suffer from “isolation, reduced social relations, long work journeys, hours spent in traffic jams or shopping in massive malls, high service and maintenance fees, and long-term debt” (Gadanhö, 2014, pp.82-95).

“A house is a machine for living in” stated Le Corbusier almost a century ago (1931 [1923], p.95). Housing is intensively embedded in the relations of production. As mentioned earlier, the TOKİ is the agent of the state in the housing market for not only controlling the market, but also creating consent.

“We have already given an example of how in cities that are experiencing rapid growth, particularly where building is carried on factory-style, as in London, it is ground-rent and not the houses themselves that forms the real basic object of speculative building...” (Marx, 1990 [1867], p.909).

A historical analogy could be made with Istanbul as it grows rapidly. After the AKP took over power, many lands and resources were transferred to the TOKİ (Emlak Konut GYO, 2016). The TOKİ’s role in *gecekondu* cleansing, urban renewal, and housing production for middle and upper-middle income groups exceeded demand; which indicates not only reversing the previous situation when demand was far above production, but also the rise of

¹¹⁹ The Museum of Modern Art.

¹²⁰ Hong Kong, Istanbul, Lagos, Mumbai, New York, Rio de Janeiro.

¹²¹ Turkish: *Kolektif İşbirlikçi Toplum Oluşumu*, the Collective and Collaborative Agency.

demand creation by marketing and advertisement. As mentioned earlier, through a series of laws in 2003-2005 unprecedented rights were given to municipalities to designate *gecekondu* areas as renewal zones, and relocate settlers by usually buying their properties under-price and selling these state-building mass-housing units with unduly high mortgage prices. Numerous *gecekondu* projects are carried out by real-estate investors and large-scale developments, and displacement of settlers' process overlooks the right of residents, which creates clashes with police and resistance. *Gecekondu* transformation projects in the 2000s are state-led gentrification processes rather than public housing that preserves the rights of the underprivileged. Post-earthquake and pre-earthquake transformations are also led by TOKİ (Bozdoğan & Akcan, 2012, pp.242-250). Accumulation by dispossession (Özar, 2007) applies in this process and, by the corporate urban neoliberalism, small enterprises are dispossessed as well.

Apart from the period between 2002 and 2004 when it was under the Ministry of Public Works and Housing¹²² (Turkish: *Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlığı*), TOKİ has been always organised under the Prime Ministry. In 2004, just two years after the AKP came into power, TOKİ was strengthened by absorption of the State Housing Bank¹²³ and the State Land Office¹²⁴ (Geray, 2010, p.748) along with amendments to TOKİ law. TOKİ meets 5-10% of the housing needs of Turkey (TOKİ, 2013, p.19). According to a report that TOKİ published on its website¹²⁵, in between 1984 and 2002 TOKİ built 43,145 houses whereas since the AKP came into power TOKİ built 660,387 new buildings at the last update. It is claimed that 84.58% of those buildings were social housing (TOKİ, 2016). There are major TOKİ-led gentrification and urban regeneration projects in Başibüyük, Gülsuyu, Güleusu, Derbent, Kazım Karabekir (İslam, 2010, p.61), and Ayazma (Azem, 2012) in Istanbul, Mamak, Dikmen in Ankara (Güzey, 2009, pp.32-33),

¹²² Today this ministry has turned into the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning.

¹²³ In Turkish: *Türkiye Emlak Bankası*.

¹²⁴ In Turkish: *Arsa Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü*.

¹²⁵ Last update: 16th February 2016 17:00.

Kadifekale in Izmir (Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014, p.178) and many other Anatolian cities as well. TOKİ plans to evict six million households across the nation (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, p.141). The role of TOKİ and construction firms becomes a part of the system here because the law also allows local governments to follow the process through TOKİ, and TOKİ achieves this regeneration via subcontracting construction firms such as Yorum, Albayrak, Çalık, İhlas, Ağaoğlu and Taşyapı (Sönmez, 2013, pp.148-149). Hereby, it is important to mention that TOKİ creates unfair competition in the market as a state institution by creating a monopoly and protecting ‘TOKİ princes’ such as firms named above. For instance, TOKİ intervened when the Tarlabası Renewal Project was heavily criticised by local residents and TOKİ started to use force to evict householders. The bid for the rebuilding process then was won by Çalık Holding, owned by Erdoğan’s son-in-law (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014b, pp.143-148).

By pushing the poor to the periphery of cities, the city is practically divided along class lines. The class division of cities is led by TOKİ. In this regard, a sentence from Erdoğan Bayraktar’s¹²⁶ speech in 2006 demonstrates the duty of TOKİ in the class struggle: “We should find a way to keep poor people from the city of Istanbul” (Gündoğdu & Gough, 2009, p.16). Also, as a discourse strategy, the AKP renamed the ministry as the ‘Ministry of Environment and Urbanism’, whereas it used to be the ‘Ministry of Public Works and Settlement’. From the employer-employee perspective, TOKİ cannot be accepted as a labour-friendly enterprise. According to the Istanbul Worker’s Health and Safety Assembly, in July 2013 alone, 41 workers died at TOKİ construction sites (Etkin, 2013) across the country.

Financialisation brought indebtedness to the urban renewal projects. In the TOKİ system people have to accept very long periods of indebtedness. Financially, those who signed contracts with TOKİ become poorer because

¹²⁶ In 2006 he was the chairman of TOKİ. He served as the minister of Environment and Urbanism in the third period of AKP until the 17th December corruption scandal erupted.

after a while they start paying their instalments without any change in their income. Therefore, first, they cannot pay their instalments back, and second they cannot earn the same amount of money because they have been already moved to a very far side of the city so that they have to save some money for commuting. As the interviewee from the Chamber of Urban Planners highlighted, this is what happened in Sulukule. “All previous residents of Sulukule who were sent to almost outside of Istanbul, are now back in Istanbul again, with a huge debt and without a house” (Interview 5). It is not surprising that the TOKİ specialist also stated that “Sulukule is not an unsuccessful project, what happened is they are very greedy and wanted more than they deserve” (Interview 3). The spokesperson of Taksim Solidarity, who also represents the Chamber of Architects, indicated the impossibility of the TOKİ model solving the housing problem in Turkey.

“First of all there is no point in trying to solve the housing problem through property-based solutions; even if you try, it cannot be socially just. The indebting TOKİ model cannot solve the housing problem. For instance, there was not any homelessness during the 1970s in Turkey whilst there was the *gecekondu* problem, if it was a ‘problem’. However, after the 1980s and especially since the 2000s, homelessness has increased rapidly, and this was before the Syrian refugee crisis. The right to shelter or the right to housing cannot be seen as a problem. This ‘problem’ cannot be solved by selling houses to the poor while they are in exile in the outskirts of the city. Sulukule and Tarlabası were the poorest parts of the old Istanbul so those people sell flowers in the city, polish your shoes, collect paper for recycling etc. When those people are sent to 3 hours away it is the end of their engagement with the city. Also this prevents them earning money and they cannot pay their debts. So they become bankrupt. The housing problem can be solved in Turkey only by squatting, not by a property-based indebting TOKİ model which only means the re-distribution of urban land in favour of capital” (Interview 9).

The founding member of anti-capitalist Muslims also stated that

“Urban renewal is a class project where only one certain class benefits from the blessings of city whereas the poor are being imprisoned in ghettos, I know because I live in a ghetto¹²⁷” (Interview 2).

¹²⁷ The interview was conducted in the interviewee’s neighbourhood, Kayaşehir, a TOKİ site in Istanbul.

There were debates and initiatives about a new constitution during the AKP period. The Constitutional Reconciliation Commission was working on a new constitution in 2013 and in the draft there was no substantial amendment for the right to housing for the poor (Sütlaş, 2013).

5.4.3. The Material Structure of Ideology

As already mentioned in 3.2.2. *Hegemony*, the material structure of ideology is determined by the mode of production and manifests itself in many areas of superstructure, including architecture and urban design. The aim in this subsection is to demonstrate the level and extent of Islamism in urbanisation under AKP rule¹²⁸. Bozdoğan and Akcan highlighted the rise of the traditional Ottoman *mahalle* (neighbourhood) concept in the new upper-middle-income group gated-community sites, and naming the houses, or sites, as *konak* (house in Ottoman Turkish) which indicates the Ottoman revivalism in urban design (2012, pp.252-260). The AKP's headquarters and the new Presidential Palace with their neo-Seljuk architecture, the Kanyon shopping centre, the Sapphire tower¹²⁹, the Third Bridge which was later called Yavuz Sultan Selim¹³⁰, the Çamlıca Mosque Complex¹³¹, and the Third Airport¹³² could be accepted as notable buildings of the era.

As the European capital of culture in 2010 (Aksoy, 2012), Istanbul became the pivotal city under the AKP. As already being the largest economy of Turkey, Istanbul received more investment in this era. Within the global city discourse (B Öktem, 2011), the Istanbul Financial Centre project, Erdoğan's 'crazy project' aka the *Kanal İstanbul*¹³³, the Third Airport and the Third Bridge started in the north of Istanbul. These developments meant that

¹²⁸ Hammond analyses the materiality of space and the practicality of piety in the assemblage of Eyüp, Istanbul (2014) in this manner.

¹²⁹ The tallest building in Turkey.

¹³⁰ Yavuz is the 9th Ottoman sultan who brought Caliphate to the Empire in 1517.

¹³¹ The biggest mosque in Turkey.

¹³² The Third Airport is projected to be the largest airport in the world with a 200 million passenger annual capacity (The Telegraph, 2013).

¹³³ A new waterway to bypass the heavily congested Bosphorus Strait (BBC, 2011).

north of Istanbul was opened for urbanisation, which is heavily criticised by town planners (Uyar, 2013). Tuğal defines this strategy as a market-oriented Islamicisation of the city, in which consumer-oriented religious activities take place; for instance fast-breaking feasts in Ramadan, Ottomanisation of architecture, calling the AKP era the ‘Tulip Era’, and the proposed Dubai Towers project¹³⁴ (Tuğal, 2008, pp.76-77). The rise of Islamic capital (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p.57) can be seen within this composition and the AKP’s attacks on Taksim Square and the AKM (Moudouros, 2014b, p.8) are part of the Islamicisation process of urban transformation as a source of Islamic hegemony (Moudouros, 2014b, p.3). These attempts are often called the second conquest of Istanbul (Tuğal, 2008, p.72) by Muslims.

From a political aspect, the rise of Islamism has been a component of urban transformations. Interviewee 1 argued that the AKP utilised Islam in order to consolidate its votes in the regenerated areas. He gave the example of Erdoğan’s proposal to construct a mosque – as opposed to the AKM in Taksim – to support this argument. While new mosques have been constructed, there are still numerous historical mosques that have been idle. District favouritism is another aspect of this issue. For instance, the AKP indicates Üsküdar (predominantly conservative) as an alternative to its neighbour Kadıköy (predominantly secular) (Interview 1). It is plausible to argue that the currently under construction Çamlıca Mosque Complex (Turkish: *Çamlıca Camii Külliyesi*), which will be the largest shrine ever built in Turkey, also embodies the same Islamic aspect of spatial politics. The Chamber of Urban Planners defined the project as a ‘bad joke’, because such a construction on one of the last remaining natural hills in Istanbul cannot be accepted within the science of urban planning (Biçer, 2012). It is also noteworthy that the architects of the mosque are two pious women with headscarves. The Turkish word *külliye* is crucial in this context. *Külliye* is an Ottoman architecture form in which the mosque is located in the centre, and

¹³⁴ This project was cancelled in 2012.

the rest of the social facilities are lined up around the mosque. Following Erdoğan's 'suggestion' to emphasise Seljuk architecture and to call *küllîye* instead of a *campus* or a *complex*, the new place started to be known as *küllîyes*. University campuses, the new gigantic presidential palace, and the Çamlıca Mosque Complex were called *küllîye* by then. Perhaps one of the most iconic engagements of neoliberal urbanisation and political Islam was the residential site in Gaziantep, which is read as *Allah* in Arabic from a certain angle (BirGün, 2015). Another example for the AKP's urban transformation and its engagement with Islamic way of life is that the Minister of Family and Social Policy, Ayşenur İslam, stated that they do not allow the TOKİ to construct 1+1 houses anymore because those houses do not fit in the traditional family structure of Turkey (A Yılmaz, 2015).

All in all, it is safe to argue that there is an acceleration of Islamic influence and reference in the architecture and urbanisation under AKP rule. However, it is problematic to consider this engagement as a reflexion of the secularist versus Islamist conflict. The involvement of so-called secular TÜSİAD's in the sector indicates that the rise of Islamism is not an obstacle for neoliberal urbanisation; on the contrary it is the accordance between them as structural and superstructural spheres.

5.5. The Discontent and Resistance around Urbanisation

As a dialectical relationship, the hegemonic project of urbanisation was confronted with unrest after a while. The first mass protest against the AKP's economic policies was in July 2006 when 80,000 hazelnut producers in the Black Sea Region blocked the highway to protest government cuts in agricultural subsidies (Bozkurt, 2008, p.256). The TEKEK resistance in 2010 was a milestone as it was the most participated strike and protest after the coup in 1980 (MG Doğan, 2014; Özügür, 2011) and during the protests the public space appeared as an important issue as the architecture of resistance (Batuman, 2013b). There were also protests against privatisation (Öniş, 2011) and grassroots resistance to displacement (Karaman, 2014) during

the AKP rule. Now, let me elaborate on the Gezi uprising which occurred in 2013, in the eleventh year of AKP rule.

5.5.1. Urbanisation and the Gezi Uprising

The greatest civil uprising in recent Turkish history erupted in Istanbul on 31 May 2013. It started with a peaceful sit-in protest in order to protect a few trees in the city centre (TMMOB ŞPO İstanbul Şubesi, 2014, p.50). The excessive usage of force by police against activists assisted protests in spreading first across Istanbul and then to almost all cities throughout Turkey, as well as major cities around the world. Demonstrations took an inspiring, widely participated, and multi-located form which created its own humour via graffiti and social media (Öztürkmen, 2014). According to government sources (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013a) 2.5 million people joined rallies across Turkey. The TTB (Turkish Medical Association, 2013) declared 4 deaths and over 8,000 injuries (60 with serious conditions). More than 70 people were detained (out of 4,900 arrests) within the first 20 days (Bohn & Bayraslı, 2013). It is often argued that the Gezi uprising was part of the global social movements, including “Occupy, Arab Spring, Athens, Tahrir, Seattle, London Riots, 2011-2013 Russia Protests, Bolotnaya Square, Virginia and so on” (Interview 7). It is also noteworthy that there were also protests in Brazil at the same time with the Gezi uprising (Özden & Bekmen, 2015).

“The reason that the Gezi uprising erupted was right to the city, right to education, right to health, freedom of information were at stake and the tension between those axes was extremely high. Also previously labour movements, especially the Mayday rally just a month ago was banned from Taksim. There was an occupation protest against the demolition of Istanbul’s historic Emek Movie Theatre and replacement of it with a shopping centre in April, which is in walking distance to Gezi Park. The Turkish Airlines strike was on at the same time. The rally against the internet censorship in 2011, the protest against the law draft that offers the extermination of street animals in 2012, the accumulated anger towards urban regeneration projects, Erdoğan’s statement about the ‘breeding of religious generation’, the bombings in Reyhanlı on 11th May 2013 that killed 52 people were also part of this anger” (Interview 7).

Gürcan and Peker contributes to David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession, over-accumulation argument where he outlined the spatio-temporal fix (Harvey, 2004), by proposing political-cultural fix (Gürcan & Peker, 2014, 2015a) and arguing the Gezi was neither middle-class nor secularism-centred (Gürcan & Peker, 2015b). Some authors argue that the Gezi uprising was the limit of Turkey's neoliberal success (Tuğal, 2013b) and of Islamic urban governance/politics (Batuman, 2013a; Bayırbağ, 2015), in which the AKP's hardening hegemony (Yörük & Yüksel, 2014, p.108) confronted with collective action (Farro & Demirhisar, 2014) of mature class movement (Sendika.org, 2013) in the absence of collective class interest of the bourgeoisie (Boratav, 2015, p.9), and the Islamic middle class (Balkan & Öncü, 2015; Ahmet Öncü & Balkan, 2016). The protests have been portrayed as middle class (Keyder, 2014), petty-bourgeois, and a 'white Turks' uprising (Bohn & Bayraslı, 2013; Fishman, 2013) based on an assumed conflict between secularist people and an Islamist government. Gezi was the result of the secular/Islamic dual opposition became a decisive factor in the politics of Turkish capitalist modernity (Ahmet Öncü, 2014). This understanding of the unrest brings us to a position where the underlying economic aspects of the issue are overlooked; for a 'secularist versus Islamist' dichotomy would prevent us from comprehending the heterogeneous (Örs & Turan, 2015) composition of demonstrators.

First, this type of labelling of the phenomenon as a middle class revolution (Fukuyama, 2013) would be a superficial one. According to a survey carried out by Istanbul Bilgi University Press (Bilgiç & Kafkaslı, 2013), 67.1% of protestors were aged 30 and below. Turkey's youth unemployment rate (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013c) increased to 20.1% in 2013, and employed youngsters are compelled to accept the conditions of precarious work (Civelekoğlu, 2015, p.106). Those who were murdered on the streets during the uprising illustrate the profile of demonstrators. Ethem Sarısülük (aged 26, Ankara) was a metalworker at OSTİM (Ankara industrial region); Abdullah Cömert (aged 22, Antakya) was a worker at a citrus fruit factory;

and Mehmet Ayvaltaş (aged 20, Istanbul) who was also a factory worker. Also, the two labour union confederations, DİSK and KESK¹³⁵ declared a general strike and joined the rally during the demonstrations¹³⁶. Therefore, it is quite unfair to ignore the working class aspect of the uprising in light of these facts. Additionally, as the main opposition party, the pro-secular CHP's strike-breaking activities, after the declaration of general strike, showed us how secular politicians are deeply involved in the uprising, notwithstanding the fact that the mayor of Izmir, Aziz Kocaoğlu from the CHP, declared that whoever joined the general strike from the municipality would receive serious punishment. Moreover, the CHP's proposed project for the 2015 elections, *Merkez Türkiye* (*Centre Turkey* or *Hub Turkey*) to create a megacity in central Anatolia (The Guardian, 2015a) also demonstrated the level of CHP's engagement with neoliberal urbanisation. Although the AKP's merit is its ability to merge Islamism and neoliberalism (Blad & Koçer, 2012), the neoliberal environmental policies (Duru, 2010) and CHP's commitment to such policies indicated that Islamic capitalism and secular capitalism are not mutually exclusive (Moudouros, 2014a, p.854).

Second, regardless of the class composition of the protests, the very central aim of the uprising was to prevent one of the last parks in the city centre of Istanbul from being demolished and replaced by a shopping centre. Shopping centres in Turkey have become spatial incarnations of neoliberal order. The construction sector has become a pivotal one since the 1980s, when Turkey left the import substituting industrialisation model and became integrated into the neoliberal system. Discourses of urban renewal have assisted the sector to diffuse the economic system more and more

¹³⁵ DİSK and KESK also released separate press statements (DİSK, 2013; KESK, 2013) in order to point out the rising authoritarianism of the AKP which is sharpened on Mayday 2013 due to the fact that disproportionate usage of police force on Maydays has become rule rather than exception over years (Sezer, 2013) and Taksim was closed to Mayday rallies because of the construction of Taksim pedestrianisation project. Taksim is highly important as a space for the labour movements in Turkey as it embodies the ideology of place (Gül, Dee, & Cünük, 2014).

¹³⁶ TÜRK-İŞ only declared call for sobriety between the protestors and the AKP (TÜRK-İŞ, 2013).

while the size of cities has boomed. Shopping centres have become the symbol of this urban transformation and gentrification. Today Istanbul and Ankara are the first and second cities in Europe and the Middle East with the highest number of shopping centres (Port Turkey, 2012). Therefore, it would not be too unrealistic to claim that those who do not want a shopping centre in Taksim Square represent a growing opposition to the neoliberal restructuring of the city. Opposition to the neoliberal assault on living space is at the very heart of the movement.

Labelling the entire body of demonstrators as ‘secular’ is an over-generalisation too. The movement was initially organised by Taksim Solidarity which consists of 118 constituents from different backgrounds. Apart from Taksim Solidarity, the profile of individual protestors is quite heterogeneous (Senses & Ozcan, 2016) and includes Kurds, Alevis, LGBT communities, feminists, nationalists, liberals, socialists, anarchists, communists, social democrats, ultras of football clubs (Irak, 2015), students, Kemalists and Muslims. Muslims’ involvement in the movement cannot be ignored. Especially, Anticapitalist Muslims, Revolutionary Muslims and Mazlumder have appeared as leading Muslim communities. For instance, the spokesman of Anticapitalist Muslims, İhsan Eliaçık, led the Friday salah two times on 7th and 14th July in front of the tent mosque in Gezi Park and participation levels were high. Those who were not praying at that moment formed a human chain to protect praying protestors. The *iftars*¹³⁷ on the İstiklal Avenue organised by Anticapitalist Muslims were much more popular than the official *iftars* organised by the Istanbul’s AKP municipality in the square (Akça, Bekmen, & Özden, 2014, p.255). One of the Anticapitalist Muslims’ slogans was self-explanatory in understanding their presence there: “Property is Allah’s, capital get out of Taksim”. A Revolutionary Muslims’ banner was more detailed: “Trees worship Allah, the AKP worships capital”. Interviewee 2, one of the founding members of Anticapitalist

¹³⁷ The fast breaking dinner during Ramadan.

Muslims who defines themselves as an ‘anticapitalist Muslim worker’, clarified their existence in Gezi as follows:

“The emergence of cities and classes are parallel and the dominant class imposes its lifestyle on us. This is like production of consent. The project (demolition of park and establishment of shopping centre) will help the dominant classes make masses in metropolitan cities serve them. Because shopping centre means hotel, it means fast food, so it means consumption. However, a park is public; nobody needs to pay to go there. That’s why we said ‘property belongs to Allah, capital get gone’ on our banner. I think it was the most meaningful banner in Gezi. ... Also we were representing the closest group (ideologically) to the AKP. That’s why it is very crucial in terms of class. For instance, some groups made a security chain while we were praying, and they offered to celebrate *kandil*¹³⁸ at Gezi, and we forgot it was *kandil*. This convergence of different ideological groups was really important in class terms. ... For instance, LGBT groups built the mosque there, it wasn’t us.... Because it was so crucial to be there to resist against someone monopolising means of production and blessings of earth such as land, water, and air” (Interview 2).

It is important to highlight the usage of Islamic and Marxist terminology in the same sentence. Notwithstanding that, Interviewee 9, who comes from a secular background, shares the same understanding.

“Public sphere should be understood as a ‘World’s property’, I mean ‘property belongs to Allah’. We have to say that these properties like water, air, land, and the planet are everyone’s property; no state, no person should claim any of them exclusively” (interview 9).

Also, some prominent Muslim authors and scholars penned a declaration under the name of the Labour and Justice Coalition. They point out how capitalism is not in accord with Islam and how neoliberalism has damaged Islamic society. As noted in the following statement, this group has also highlighted that the current government’s rise to power was marked by a struggle against a heavy-handed Kemalism, but eventually they ended up replacing their former foes’ practice.

“In every location undergoing gentrification, attempts are being made to clear the path for a new and elite style of life – partly modern and partly conservative... People who fought for trees harbouring the poor and homeless were faced with the harshest form of the State’s hubris

¹³⁸ One of the five Islamic holy nights.

for protesting the top-down decision to transfer this park into capital... Our neighbourhood is dying out. We almost turned into a society whose poor and rich are praying in different mosques. Don't you want our kids to neighbour the poor, and befriend them? A consumption culture that finds its expression in malls is leading us all into a future from which we cannot return" (Emek ve Adalet Platformu, 2013).

On the other hand, the president of HAK-İŞ, the labour union, notorious for its Islamic background, declared on 4 June 2013 that "Gezi started with environmental concerns but by some sinister people and groups, it changed into a harmful movement which is targeting our country's peace and the *strong* Turkey will get over these days with unity and togetherness" (HAK-İŞ, 2013). 2 days later, when Gezi protestors occupied Taksim and police forces stepped back, TÜRK-İŞ, TESK¹³⁹, TZOB¹⁴⁰, HAK-İŞ, MEMUR-SEN and TOBB¹⁴¹ released a joint statement. In this statement, they share the same discourse with the AKP.

"It is incontestably right that our people assert their demands within law. We support our people using their democratic rights for their environmental concerns within the right to demonstrate. However, these days we are observing that marginal groups are leading demonstrations to a wrong place that our country's enemies benefit from it" (HAK-İŞ et al., 2013).

MÜSİAD's reaction was similar: "in the end, Gezi was a demonstration of terrorism" (Haber7, 2013).

Bozkurt argues that the AKP's previously expansive hegemony turned into a 'limited hegemony' after Gezi (2015, p.87). To sum up, rather than an exclusively secular and middle class activism, the Gezi movement should be understood as a counter-hegemonic uprising based on different class fractions and ideological groups against the AKP's authoritarian neoliberal hegemony which, in the words of Antonio Gramsci, is fast losing the unstable equilibrium between coercion and consent.

¹³⁹ The Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (Turkish: *Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu*).

¹⁴⁰ The Union of Turkish Agricultural Chambers (Turkish: *Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği*).

¹⁴¹ The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Turkish: *Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*).

5.6. Conclusion

The reproduction of social relations of production *within* and *through* urbanisation in 2002 and 2015 was analysed in this chapter. The chapter explored how social classes have been positioned whilst the AKP carried out urban regeneration projects and to what extent they have been supportive of those projects. Furthermore, how the AKP has produced discourse around urban regeneration is also explored. Urbanisation represents one of the three main pillars of AKP's hegemony. This chapter analysed the dynamics behind this pillar. Two processes appeared from the hegemonic process of urbanisation: the re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics, and the allocation of incentives for pro-government capital. Inside these processes the regeneration of *gecekondu* zones, the role of TOKİ as a state entrepreneur in the market, material structures of ideology, and the Gezi uprising are analysed. It is safe to argue that the export-oriented growth model of the 1980s and 1990s turned into the construction-oriented growth model in the 2000s and 2010s (Saraçoğlu & Yeşilbağ, 2015, p.881).

As discussed previously in 2. *The Centre-Periphery Relations Approach* and 3. *The Integral State*, the dualist understanding on the state-society relations obscures the internal dynamics; therefore, it is problematic and in order to overcome the problems of dualism a holistic and dialectical approach is required. In this chapter, urbanisation in Turkey is analysed to provide evidence for this claim. The involvement of Muslims in the Gezi uprising and the so-called secular TÜSİAD members' involvement in urban regeneration projects that are tendered by the AKP demonstrated that the seculars versus Islamists dichotomy is limited and an understanding within the social relations of production needs to be applied. Gramsci's framework within the conceptualisation of consent/hegemony and coercion/authoritarianism which are embedded in the relations of production is useful in explaining the symbiotic relationship of the state and society. Urbanisation was a hegemonic pillar that the AKP benefitted from, especially in its first and

second period in office. However as social unrest increased, the hegemony was slowly replaced by authoritarianism.

6. Education as a Hegemonic Project

“How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation?” (Freire, 2000, p.48).

6.1. Introduction

The aim in this chapter is to analyse the reproduction of the social relations of production *within* and *through* education in Turkey. Labour relations, especially in the private sector, will be analysed in the reproduction of the social relations of production *within* education. The production of consent and coercion via hegemonic processes will be analysed in the reproduction of the social relations of production *through* education. This chapter aims to demonstrate how education is used by the AKP in order to create consent and how social forces have had a position while the consent is produced. This chapter will make a critical appraisal of the political economy of education in Turkey since 2002. The neoliberal transformation of education and the AKP's discourse around the privatisation of education will be investigated in this chapter. The position of capital *vis-à-vis* education since 2002 will be analysed in this chapter and the fractionation of capital will be assessed. From the rival side, trade unions and organised/unorganised dissident social forces will be studied too.

This chapter opens with a theoretical framework of hegemony through education. Conceptualisation will be followed by a short summary of the importance of education for capitalism in Turkey. After this justification, a periodisation of educational developments in Turkey will be given. Introduction of actors will be outlined after the historical background. The analytical section will be provided after this presentation of education in Turkey. The analysis will include evidence from the AKP, capital groups (TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, and TUSKON), trade unions, and dissident social groups. The AKP produces consent through two ways: the neoliberal transformation of education and utilising political Islamist discourse around education.

Discussions around the 4+4+4 system, the Imam-Hatip Schools, the *dershanes* and the foundation universities will be elaborated in this chapter. This juxtaposition, therefore, creates a perfect environment for the consolidation of hegemony.

6.2. Gramsci on Education

Education is considered as the source of consent in this chapter because as an 'ideological state apparatus', education is the sphere in which ideology is being reproduced throughout generations. Apart from this Althusserian/Gramscian reading of education, the discipline of education is also bejewelled with discussions around the critical pedagogy, in particular Freirian/Gramscian (Cohen, 1998; Fischman & McLaren, 2005) reading of it. However these debates are beyond the scope of this research.

"Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations" (Gramsci, 1971, p.350). Briefly, it is safe to argue that an analysis would overlook the central core of hegemonic processes, and therefore a crucial aspect of Gramsci's conception of power and the quest for social and political transformation, if it misses the educational element embedded in relations of hegemony (Mayo, 2014, p.386). Education is very central to hegemonic processes. In this chapter, education is viewed in its broader context, incorporating activities across the whole spectrum of 'civil society' (Mayo, 2015, p.2). The intellectual and moral leadership exercised by the dominant class does not consist of the imposition of its own ideology upon allied groups; instead it represents a pedagogic and politically transformative process whereby the dominant class articulates a hegemonic principle that brings together common elements drawn from the world views and interests of allied groups (Giroux, 1981, p.17). Giroux argues that social and cultural reproduction is very crucial in understanding the role of state in educational

theory and practice (1981, p.3). Hegemony entails the education of individuals and groups in order to secure consent to the dominant group's agenda (Borg, Buttigieg, & Mayo, 2002; Buttigieg, 2002).

Neoliberalism and its educational dimension (B Davies & Bansel, 2007) also corresponded with the rise of global hegemony (Hartmann, 2015). Neoliberalism could be conceptualised as a capitalist assault on public education (D Hill, 2013) in which knowledge capitalism took form at the higher education level (Olssen & Peters, 2005). In this neoliberalisation of education process, the state is central to the production of consent (Mayo, 2011).

Torres argues that the emergence of neoliberalism has dramatically altered the notion of common sense in education. He calls neoliberalism's common sense in education a 'new historical bloc' and he compiles sixteen theses for the theory and analysis of this argument: (1) neoliberalism is the new paradigm or logic-in-use that has replaced progressivism; (2) neoliberalism has deeply impacted higher education worldwide; (3) neoliberal globalisation has galvanised the model of neoliberal common sense in education; (4) neoliberal public managerialism is supposed to solve the crises of higher education; (5) neoliberal common sense is predicated on the power of possessive individualism; (6) neoliberalism's common sense in education undermines the public responsibility of the state in promoting the 'common good'; (7) if there is no solidarity built on the premise of the attainment of the 'common good', then cut-throat competition and not citizenship collaboration is the key to capitalist development; (8) neoliberalism not only reproduces existing inequalities but also creates new ones. The paradigmatic shift towards neoliberalism may be responsible for and/or has deepened larger civilisation crises than could have previously been imagined; (9) deregulation is the cornerstone of the political economy of neoliberalism; (10) neoliberal globalisation simultaneously produces fragmentation and homogenisation in the polity; (11) privatisation is the key to neoliberalism's new common sense; (12) neoliberalism sees students as

consumers not citizens; (13) is lifelong learning for a knowledge society a creature of neoliberalism?; (14) neoliberalism promotes and benefits from the culture of science in education; (15) a fundamental myth of neoliberalism common sense is that the nation-state has or will wither away; and (16) there is an elective affinity between bi-national, multinational and international organisations and neoliberal governments (Torres, 2013).

One important feature of hegemonic rule is that it refers to more than the institutionalisation and framing of specific modes of discourse; it also includes the messages inscribed in material practices. In other words, hegemony is rooted in both the meanings and symbols that legitimate dominant interests as well as in the practices that structure daily experience (Giroux, 1981, p.17).

“Refusing to separate culture from systemic relations of power, or politics from the production of knowledge and identities, Gramsci redefined how politics bore upon everyday life through the force of its pedagogical practices, relations, and discourses” (Giroux, 1999, p.1).

As well as discourse, the privatisation of education also assists hegemony. For example, in recent years, through employability, higher education has become a target for marketisation and these policies have turned into consent making tools (Arora, 2013). Sotiris theorises higher educational institutions as hegemonic apparatuses rather than simply, in Althusserian way of thinking, ideological apparatuses (Sotiris, 2012, p.128).

“The multiplication of types of vocational school thus tends to perpetuate traditional social differences; but since, within these differences, it tends to encourage internal diversification, it gives the impression of being democratic in tendency. The labourer can become a skilled worker, for instance, the peasant a surveyor or petty agronomist. But democracy, by definition, cannot mean merely that an unskilled worker can become skilled” (Gramsci, 2000, p.318).

Although education is an indispensable element of the hegemony of dominant classes, it may open some routes to resistance as well. For instance, Mayo focuses on the way a state-funded university, as an important institution of civil society, consolidates existing hegemonic arrangements

and, at the same time, offers spaces wherein these arrangements can be contested (Mayo, 2005, p.65).

“It is undoubtedly the fact that hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci, 1971, p.161).

6.3. Education in Turkey

Education in Turkey is chosen as a case study in this research because of the importance of education in not only the shaping of society, but also in the production of consent. Some authors argue that education reproduces the gender relations within the military-based nationhood in Turkey (Altınay, 2004; Kaplan, 2006). Modernisation was the major direction in education during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The republic was established on the ruins of the Empire and it continued the modernisation process. However, secularisation was included in the process by Kemalists and the unification of education brought an absolute state control in education. Although the Imam-Hatip Schools were opened by the CHP, they were closed down due to lack of interest. The DP government revived the IH Schools in the 1950s which was followed by further revivalism in the 1970s by the coalition governments that the MSP took part in. The liberal constitution of 1961 brought the university autonomy, but it was interrupted by the 1971 memorandum. The students' movement and teachers' movement also burgeoned in the liberal environment (Şimşek, 2004). The 1980 coup and neoliberalisation process brought the marketisation of education. The *dershanes* and private schools at the K-12 level and foundation universities at the higher education level started to become more operative in the education sector. The ANAP paid attention to the IH Schools too; and finally during the RP-DYP coalition the number of IH Schools came to a peak point.

The 1997 memorandum's assault on the IH Schools was the last development until the AKP took power which made the IHSs a frontline of the secular Islamist conflict (Özgür, 2012). The establishment of the YÖK, the headscarf ban at universities and schools (Özdalga, 1998), and the compulsory religious subject at the K-12 level were crucial developments of the post-coup period in Turkey. Rutz and Balkan defines education in 1950-1983 as 'selective education'; and education in 1983-2000 as 'elite' education (2009, pp.43-46). It is also argued that the social policy regime change under AKP is fundamentally embedded in education.

"[I]t is safe to say that the changes in Turkey's educational apparatus have become traceable with reference to the political economy of Turkey and the social policy regime of Turkey" (Yücesan-Özdemir & Özdemir, 2012, p.15).

Gök argues that the state has been trying its best to convert the educational and maintenance activities of public schools to paid services accordingly with the IMF and WB's directives since the 1980s (Gök, 2002, p.103).

6.3.1. Agents in Turkish Education

It is worth compiling actors of education in Turkey. As carried out in the previous chapter, this chapter mainly focusses on bourgeoisie. TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON are considered as the major representatives of different fractions of capital. From the government's side, the MEB¹⁴² and the YÖK¹⁴³ are the main state agents in K-12 education and higher education respectively. The Non-appointed Teachers' Platform, the Research Assistants' Initiative, the Don't Touch My School, and the SHD are examples of unorganised resistance groups in the sector.

Although the AKP has always claimed that the investment in education has increased since 2002, it is evident that the share of investment in education has continuously decreased since 2002. The share of investment

¹⁴² The Ministry of National Education, Turkish: *Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*.

¹⁴³ The Council of Higher Education, Turkish: *Yükseköğretim Kurulu*.

in the MEB's budget decreased from 17.18% in 2002 to 5.85% in 2011 which indicates the decline of public education (İnal, 2012). It is crucial to introduce the history and functions of YÖK. Higher education in Turkey was restructured in 1981 after the military intervention. The unification of higher education was processed by the Higher Education Law (no: 2547) and since then, according to that law, the entire higher education system has been regulated by the YÖK. It has become the only regulating body in higher education. The YÖK is not only responsible for public universities, it also regulates foundation universities. The YÖK consists of 21 members selected equally (7 each) by the President, the Council of Ministers, and Inter-universities' Board. The president of YÖK is appointed by the President.

Trade unions are fragmented in respect to ideological differences. As given in the previous chapters, there are four labour confederations in Turkey organised in private sector, and according to the Trade Union Law, unions are allowed to organise around the branch of industrial activity of Commerce, Office Works, Education and Fine Arts. The DİSK is the only left-leaning confederation and there are two unions organised in the branch: SOSYAL-İŞ¹⁴⁴ and SİNE-SEN¹⁴⁵. Right-wing TÜRK-İŞ too contains two unions organised in the branch: TÜRK KOOP-İŞ¹⁴⁶ and TEZKOOP-İŞ¹⁴⁷. ÖZ BÜRO-İŞ¹⁴⁸ is the only union affiliated with the Islamic-oriented HAK-İŞ. The pro-Gülen¹⁴⁹ PAK EĞİTİM-İŞ¹⁵⁰ under AKSİYON-İŞ was established in 2013 as an outcome of the fight between the AKP and the movement. Its main purpose is

¹⁴⁴ Full name: *Türkiye Sosyal Sigortalar, Eğitim, Büro, Ticaret, Kooperatif ve Güzel Sanatlar İşçileri Sendikası.*

¹⁴⁵ Full name: *Sinema Emekçileri Sendikası.*

¹⁴⁶ Full name: *Türkiye Kooperatif, Ticaret ve Büro İşçileri Sendikası.*

¹⁴⁷ Full name: *Türkiye Ticaret, Kooperatif, Eğitim, Büro ve Güzel Sanatlar İşçileri Sendikası.*

¹⁴⁸ Full name: *Büro, Eğitim, Güzel Sanatlar, Ticaret ve Kooperatif İşçileri Sendikası.*

¹⁴⁹ The movement has a proactive role in education – it retains private schools and has substantial investments in media and finance. Estimates of the number of schools and educational institutions vary widely, from about 300 schools in Turkey to over 1,000 schools in over 140 countries (Reuters, 2008) – The AKP and the Gülen movement have been embedded and cohesive since the establishment of the AKP but a statement declared by the movement on 13th August 2013 revealed the power struggle between the Gülenists and the AKP (Gürsel, 2013).

¹⁵⁰ Full name: *Pak Eğitim İşçileri Sendikası.*

to protect rights of *dershane* teachers. However the unionisation rate of those unions varies between 0.01% and 2% (with only TRK-İŞ unions being above the 1% threshold – data from: <http://www.csqb.gov.tr/>). Moreover, apart from the PAK EĖİTİM-İŞ, none of them are exclusively organised in the education sector. Therefore, it is safe to argue that labour unions in the education sector are weak and non-influential. On the other hand the picture is different for the public workers' unions.

As public sector still occupies the major part of education in Turkey, organised unions are stronger among public servants. In 2015, there were 34 public servants' union in education sector, officially called 'education, teaching and science service'. 13 of them are organised within confederations and the rest of them are independent. Only five of them are above the 1% unionisation rate: EĖİTİM-BİR-SEN¹⁵¹ under Islamist MEMUR-SEN; TRK EĖİTİM-SEN¹⁵² under right-wing TRKİYE KAMU-SEN; EĖİTİM-SEN¹⁵³ under left-wing KESK; EĖİTİM-İŞ¹⁵⁴ under Kemalist BİRLEŞİK KAMU-İŞ¹⁵⁵; and AKTİF EĖİTİM-SEN¹⁵⁶ under pro-Glen CİHAN-SEN. The emergence of EĖİTİM-İŞ in 2005 and the emergence of AKTİF EĖİTİM-SEN in 2014 could be seen as splits in the left and Islamist politics respectively.

¹⁵¹ Full name: *EĖitimciler Birlięi Sendikası*.

¹⁵² Full name: *Trkiye EĖitim ve Öğretim Bilim Hizmetleri Kolu Kamu Çalışanları Sendikası*.

¹⁵³ Full name: *EĖitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası*.

¹⁵⁴ Full name: *EĖitim ve Bilim İşgörenleri Sendikası*.

¹⁵⁵ Full name: *Birleşik Kamu İşgörenleri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*.

¹⁵⁶ Full name: *Aktif EĖitimciler Sendikası*.




Figure 12: The Number of Public Servants' Union Members since 2002.
(Source: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/>)




Figure 13: The Unionisation Rate of Public Servants' Unions since 2002.
(Source: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/>)

As it can be seen in Figure 12 and Figure 13, there was a massive increase in the numbers of members of the pro-government trade union the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN from 2002 to 2015. Membership increased 19 times and the number rocketed from 18,082 to 340,365 in 13 years. Its unionisation rate correspondingly increased from 2.76% to 30.51% in the same period. The same period witnessed the decline of the left-wing EĞİTİM-SEN which was the leading union in 2003 with 166,515 members and a 27.9% unionisation rate, whereas by 2015 it had become the third most popular union with 127,214 members and an 11.4% unionisation rate, in which its figures are

almost half of the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN's. This fact clearly indicates not only the government's favouritism over the trade unions, but also a clientelist/political employment strategy in the public education system. Also the emergence of a Kemalist trade union in 2005 and a pro-Gülen union in 2013 demonstrates the fractionation of labour movement in education in both pro-government and anti-government sides.

6.4. The Islamicisation of K-12 Education and the Marketisation of Higher Education

In this section, there are two processes that are going to be analysed: First the Islamicisation, and second the marketisation of education. Although they are not mutually exclusive processes, the first one is focussed at the K-12 education level and the latter is at the higher education level. The 4+4+4 system in 2012 and the rise of Imam-Hatip Schools are in the process of Islamicisation. The *dershanes* and the foundation universities on the other hand are in the process of marketisation. Islamicisation in Turkey differs from the other examples around the world.

“The Islamicisation of Turkey’s social and education systems may be described, in relation to jihadi Islamicisation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, Egypt, for example, as ‘soft Islamicisation’. There are no beheadings, amputation of limbs, widespread killings of religious minorities” (D Hill, 2013, p.8).

Towards the end of this chapter, there will be a section on the resistance movements and the role of education in the making of the Gezi uprising. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the validity of Islamist versus secularist dichotomy.

6.4.1. The 4+4+4 System and the Revival of Imam-Hatip Schools

The AKP did not do much to transform K-12 education towards an Islamic direction in the first two periods. However following its third electoral victory with almost half of the votes, the party started to restructure the education system in the country.

As it was already highlighted in chapter 4, the Memorandum in the aftermath of the ‘post-modern coup’ of 28th February 1997 aimed to hinder students joining Imam-Hatips following their graduation from compulsory primary schools after the 5th grade. To do so, compulsory education was increased to eight years and the middle-school branches (the 6th, 7th and 8th grades) of the Imam-Hatips were closed by the Memorandum. Therefore the Imam-Hatips were limited to secondary education (grades between the 9th and 12th) and, furthermore, by changing the scoring system of the admission tests to colleges and universities, the Imam-Hatip graduates were limited to entering Theology faculties only.

First, the scoring disadvantage of Imam-Hatips was removed and their rights to enrol in any faculties at any universities were reinstated in 2009. Three years later, the AKP enacted education reform in 2012 that has changed the 8-year compulsory schooling system completely. The new reform introduced the 4+4+4 system. The new system replaced the 8-year uninterrupted compulsory schooling with 12-year fractional compulsory schooling. In this system, pupils must start the 1st grade at the age of 5.5 (66 months old) whereas the previous system ruled the schooling age as 7 years. The pupils must complete 12 years in order to graduate but the fractional system allows pupils to continue to open junior high schools and/or high schools after completing the first and/or the second 4-year periods.

“The 4+4+4 system is a regression in basic education; at least the previous system secured enrolment in the first eight grades. In the new one, after the first, the 4th grade parents can send their children to open schools, and it is being encouraged by the local authorities. This causes a decrease in the schooling ratio and an increase in both child labour and child marriage” (Interview 10).




Figure 14: Net schooling ratio (%).

(Source: <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>)

As it can be seen in Figure 14, the net schooling ratio decreased at primary school and junior high school levels, respectively from 99.57% to 96.30% and from 64.52% to 94.35%.

In this change, the eight-year uninterrupted compulsory basic education has transformed into a 12-year compulsory basic education with optional gap years in between every four years. The system is criticised because in reality the optional gap years might potentially turn into permanent leavers, as the system might facilitate child labour and child marriage. The schooling age changed to 5.5 years or 66 months old with the same system. In the interviews that I conducted with the trade unions organised around education, it was argued that the reason the schooling age was changed to 5.5 is that when the female students finish the first 4 years at the age of almost 10, they could wear the headscarf and marry if their parents wish (Interview 10 & 11). The system allows parents to register their children to the open-secondary schools after the first four years and open-high schools after the second four years. These open schools are based on distance learning. In 2014, 36,401 female students did not register to any high schools, including distance learning ones, following their graduations from

secondary schools; and in the meantime there has been an increase in child marriage (Cansu, 2015).

Another major change introduced with 4+4+4 is the transformation of schools into Imam-Hatips in which the boys and girls¹⁵⁷ are enrolled to school from the age of 11 instead of 15 (Reuters, 2012). Moreover, the number of IHSs increased very sharply in the early 2010s (73% in 2013) (Radikal, 2014c) and pupils are obliged to go to IHSs because all regular high schools are changed into either Anatolian High Schools¹⁵⁸ (henceforth AHSs) or IHSs. Therefore those who cannot obtain a place at Anatolian High Schools must go to IHSs (Radikal, 2014d). In 2006, during the 17th Education Council meeting, the MEB revealed plans to restructure the education system in which the IH Schools are organised as a parallel education system (Günlü, 2010, p.738); which was thought of as a deepening of the secularist-Islamist divide (Pak, 2004). There was a remarkable increase in numbers of Imam-Hatip Schools under AKP rule (Coşkun & Şentürk, 2012, p.165). As well as most of the AKP officials, as an Imam-Hatip graduate, Erdoğan said the Imam-Hatips are going to be the most favourite schools (Sabah, 2012b).

It is important to highlight that the graduates of Imam-Hatips represent ‘organic intellectuals’ for the political Islamic movements in the Gramscian sense. After the ‘postmodern coup’ in 1997, the secondary school sections of Imam-Hatips were closed down and the YÖK prevented Imam-Hatip graduates from enrolling in subjects at higher education institutions apart from Theology departments by changing the scoring system for the university admission tests. First, in 2009, the YÖK cancelled the current coefficient system and all students including vocational high school and Imam-Hatip graduates were allowed to enrol in any department at higher education institutions based on their marks in the exam. This equalised

¹⁵⁷ Allowing girls in these schools are also a contested issue because they are considered as vocational high schools in order to train imams (priest in a mosque) and hatips (preacher) who must be male according to Islamic rules.

¹⁵⁸Anatolian High School refers to public high schools in Turkey that admit their students according to high nation-wide standardized test (TEOG) scores.

vocational high schools and Imam-Hatips with other high schools, such as ordinary high schools, science high schools and Anatolian high schools (NTV, 2009b). Furthermore the MEB reopened the secondary school sections of Imam-Hatips in 2012 with the 4+4+4 system. In the circular for the 4+4+4 system, the MEB also mentioned that the opening of secondary school sections is to be prioritised (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2012). This triggered a massive transformation of ordinary high schools into Imam-Hatip Schools, marginalising those who do not wish to pursue an education at an Imam-Hatip school. They were compelled to register to private K-12 schools because in some neighbourhoods the only school was turned into an Imam-Hatip School. Another consequence of 4+4+4 is the additional Islamic subjects in the curriculum. In addition to the compulsory religious subject enshrined in the 1982 Constitution, the 2012 reform featured optional subjects for secondary/high schools. These optional subjects are almost always limited to ‘the Life of Mohammad’ and ‘the Quran’, but because of the high demand from students they have become *de facto* compulsory subjects¹⁵⁹. Additionally, it should be noted that religious education is limited to Sunni Islam in Turkey; other sections such as Alawism are ignored. Furthermore, private institutions which are based on religious education were rewarded with tax reduction in 2012.

¹⁵⁹ Hereby, it is worth to mention that Erdoğan’s persistence on making the Ottoman Turkish as a compulsory course at K-12 level (Hürriyet, 2014) could be seen as a counter-hegemonic attack against the Kemalist language reform that Turkified the Turkish language – that is to say replaced Arabic and Persian words in Ottoman Turkish with proto-Turkish words.




Figure 15: Number of Imam-Hatip Schools by year.

(Source: Hürriyet, 2015a; T24, 2014)

Coşkun and Şentürk argue that under the AKP government, the function of IHSs was redesigned as an instrument to create new modern, conservative intellectuals by articulating the AKP's discourse and contributing to the dispersion of its ideology, and that IHS students are inspired by the AKP's political discourse (Coşkun & Şentürk, 2012, p.165).

"The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise: (1) The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. (2) The apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed" (Gramsci, 2000, pp.306-307).

They further argue that the AKP considers the IHSs as an instrument for educating what Gramsci calls *organic intellectuals*; whereas previous right-wing populist parties perceived the IHSs as a tool for populist policies (Coşkun & Şentürk, 2012, pp.170-172). It could be also argued that, at the discursive level, the AKP benefitted from a discourse of victimisation through the IHSs and the AKP articulated that discourse to legitimise the 4+4+4 system (A Kaya, 2015). The headscarf ban at universities and the

obstacles faced by Imam-Hatip school students to get into universities were removed eventually during AKP rule.

Capitalist groups seem divided over the 4+4+4 issue. The TÜSİAD declared that this is not the reform that was needed, but is rather going backwards (Hürriyet, 2012). MÜSİAD, on the other hand, stated that the counter-reaction to the reform is ideological and political because in the past secularists prevented veiled students pursuing education, therefore their concern about child marriage is not genuine (Zaman, 2012). Trade unions are fragmented too: EĞİTİM-SEN is against, EĞİTİM BİR-SEN is in favour and TÜRK EĞİTİM-SEN is neutral. The illegal Quran courses that were introduced in the aftermath of the ‘postmodern coup’ were also legalised in 2005 (Yurt, 2013). The interviewee from the EĞİTİM-SEN argued that the CHP constructed its own bases on the transformation of education system in the 1920s; today the AKP pursues the same approach because the aim is to regenerate a new type of citizen. In this sense the AKP represents both rupture and continuity (Interview 10). The interviewee from the SHD defined the process as *shariafication*.

“Today there is gradually increasing religion-based education in Turkey, which indicates a process of *shariafication*¹⁶⁰. I use this term on purpose because this is beyond conservatism and this is not the paranoia of secular masses. It is actually happening, right now. The 4+4+4 has two folds, first the content of curriculum has become Islamic and second the IH Schools has become the central education institutes. Even mixed-sex education is being questioned these days. EĞİTİM BİR-SEN supports this. The 4+4+4 is the greatest backwardness in the education history. And it is completed. We will face the consequences now. It is a transformation first religious fold, the IH Schools and curriculum, second gender fold, mixed-sex education, third marketisation, as a consequence of the IH Schools’ boom, people want to send their children to private schools and *dershanes*” (Interview 7).

6.4.2. The *Dershanes*

The impact of political Islam in education (Güven, 2005) manifested itself through the rise of IHSs (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p.63), the Islamicisation

¹⁶⁰ Turkish: *Şerileşme*.

of education (Güven, 2008), the headscarf issue (Güven, 2010), religious education (Shively, 2008) and so on. Besides the Islamicisation, marketisation at K-12 level¹⁶¹ was also observed through the restructuring of the teachers' labour (Buyruk, 2015), and the restructuring of the labour markets within the 4+4+4 system (Müftüoğlu, 2012) along with the curriculum changes in favour of neoliberalism in primary school education (İnal, 2006).

The privatisation of basic education is also supported and encouraged by the AKP. The *dershane* dispute could also be seen within the privatisation of basic education as, in the aftermath of the quarrel of the AKP and the Gülen movement, in 2015 the AKP decided to shut down *dershanes* as the Gülen movement is very strong in the *dershane* business. However the Constitutional Court decided to annul this change (AA Kılıç, 2015). The resistance against the closure of *dershanes* by the *Cemaat* created the birth of a new trade union: AKTİF EĞİTİM-SEN.

The increasing encouragement to students to pursue their educations in private K-12 schools could be seen within the marketisation of K-12 education. In 2014-2015 the government subsidised 250,000 students amounts of 2500-3500 Turkish Liras for their annual fees at private K-12 schools. The amount increased to 5500 Liras if the school is a private vocational school in the industrial estates. However, this substitution was not paid in cash to the parents, instead it was paid to private schools hence they reduced the annual fee for the beneficiary pupil (Al Jazeera, 2014c). The government anticipated the number of private K-12 schools to double after these subsidiaries (Özay, 2012). This policy cannot be seen as arranging benefits for the poor; it is rather the marketisation of basic education with public budget. This issue also has another dimension, which is the

¹⁶¹ Free distribution of textbooks since 2003 is positive in principle, however what AKP did was actually to outsource the printing, thus privatisation of public resources (İnal, 2010, pp.702-703).

transformation of *dershanes*. The *dershanes* are privately-owned cram schools for preparation for the highly competitive admission tests to Anatolian and Science High Schools (before the 4+4+4), universities and colleges, and the Public Personnel Selection Examination (Turkish: *Kamu Personeli Seçme Sınavı*, KPSS)¹⁶². These cram schools are not an alternative or parallel schooling system; they are rather supplementary ‘preparation courses’ for exclusive preparation for the exams at non-school times (especially evenings and weekends). There were 1,220,000 students registered to one of the total number of 3550 *dershanes* in 2014 across the country. The Gülen movement controlled 25% of those *dershanes* (Al Jazeera, 2014a). Following the fight between the movement and the AKP, government enacted a law in 2014 in order to forbid cram schools. Arguably this law was a response to the movement’s 17th December corruption scandal attack at the end of 2013. The *dershanes* were given three options until 1st September 2015: to transform into private K-12 schools under the authority of the Ministry, to transform into private courses for social, artistic, sporting, cultural and vocational development without preparing students for any tests, or to disband. The transformed *dershanes* would be subsidised by the state. The Gülen movement stated that this law aimed to close down their *dershanes* and reduce their influence in K-12 education.




Figure 16: The Number of *Dershanes* since 1965.

(Source: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr>; Radikal, 2014b; Ural, 2012, p.153)

¹⁶² The high competitiveness in the admission test also created another informal economy – personal tutoring.

Figure 16, 17, and 18 shows that the number of *dershanes*, *dershane* students, and *dershane* teachers increased rapidly after the AKP came into power, arguably when the movement and the government were collaborating hand in hand. However the alleged breakdown in their relationship following the incident of Gaza flotilla raid in 2010¹⁶³ has also changed government's policies towards *dershanes*. It is also crucial to highlight that most of the *dershane* teachers are often university students working off-record with zero-hour contracts (Balkız, 2014). Unionisation among *dershane* teachers is very low because of their flexible contracts (Ulutaş, 2014, p.197).




Figure 17: The Number of *Dershane* Students since 1975.

(Source: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr>; Radikal, 2014b; Ural, 2012, p.153)




Figure 18: The Number of *Dershane* Teachers since 1975.

(Source: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr>; Radikal, 2014b; Ural, 2012, p.153)

¹⁶³ The leader of the movement criticised the action publicly.

The law could be seen as a coercive action towards the AKP's rival movement in order to reduce their influence and as an action to take these private institutions under the supervision of the MEB. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court cancelled the law in July 2015 when 400 *dershanes* were already closed and 850 *dershanes* were already transformed into private schools and accepted students (Radikal, 2015a). In 2016, the ambiguity of the *dershane* business still remains. All in all, the transformation of *dershanes* could be seen as a marketisation of the K-12 education system. However the marketisation was observed pre-eminently at the higher education level.

6.4.3. From Foundation Universities to Private Universities?

The privatisation of higher education is understood as a rising trend, which has accelerated since 2002. The shift from an understanding based on the acceptance of education as a common good to the reconfiguration of this understanding within market ethics is the major element of this section. It is argued that foundation universities are the Trojan Horses on the way to private universities (Altıntaş, 2015).

First, the marketisation of higher education has accelerated during the AKP era and this can be observed throughout its three parliamentary periods. The marketisation of higher education was introduced after the coup and has accelerated as neoliberal restructuring has settled. However, there is a significant rise in the AKP period including private vocational training courses. Therefore, it is safe to maintain that the AKP adopted the process and encouraged the establishment of profit-seeking universities. Apart from the privatisation, the marketisation process also features the introduction of market rules to the public sphere such as competitiveness, adding items to the promotion criteria, temporary contracting such as research assistants contacted by the article 50/d on the Higher Education Law¹⁶⁴, favouritism towards market-friendly sciences and the slighting of the

¹⁶⁴ Law no: 2547.

others, the Bologna process, open adherence to the labour needs of the bourgeoisie, the proletarianisation and precariatization of academic staff (Önal, 2012). On a positive side in 2012, fees¹⁶⁵ for public universities were removed. However, this did not apply to the more expensive evening education¹⁶⁶. It is also worth mentioning that foundation universities are highly expensive and may cost US\$30,000 (Sönmez, 2014) per year. Political pressure and influence on universities and academics are very high as, although they were supposed to be impartial, both President Gül and President Erdoğan favoured pro-AKP people when they were appointing the rectors. The AKP's influence on higher education increased gradually from 2002 to 2015 as rectors who were YÖK and UAK members were appointed by the AKP governments, or the presidents originated from the AKP. The secular president Ahmet Necdet Sezer's term in office between 2000 and 2007 caused a delay in this dominance. This fact also affected academic freedom. There has been political pressure on EĞİTİM-SEN members in academia. Since the fight between the Gülen movement and the AKP sparked, there has been pressure on the pro-Gülen universities and academics. The construction of mosques on university campuses has accelerated since 2012. Erdoğan's suggestion of using 'külliye', instead of campuses heralded the influence of Sunni Islam on higher education and represented a perfect example of the 'material structure of ideology' in the Gramscian sense. From a similar point, the allowing of the headscarf at universities (Tanış, 2011) is undoubtedly a 'freedom of belief issue', but it also shows the increase of Islamic influence on higher education. The allowing of the headscarf also took place at the basic education level (after the fifth grade, that is, at the age of 10) in 2014 and this brings us to the second trend: the Islamicisation of basic education.

¹⁶⁵ Approximately 80 to 250 Turkish Liras per semester.

¹⁶⁶ Turkish: *İkinci Öğretim*.

As can be seen in Figure 19, the number of students in higher education gradually increased until 2007. However, since the second electoral victory of the AKP, the number rocketed rapidly.




Figure 19: Number of Students in Higher Education (millions).

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)

This fact indicates the growing importance of higher education during the AKP period. This importance is also reflected within the rise of foundation universities.




Figure 20: Number of increase in private universities by years.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)




Figure 21: Number of Universities by year after 2003.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)

Figure 20 and Figure 21 demonstrate that the number of foundation universities increased unprecedentedly under AKP rule. The number of public universities doubled between 2003 and 2015; on the other hand, the number of foundation universities tripled in the same period.

Privatisation of higher education in Turkey has become a phenomenon since the establishment of Bilkent University, the first foundation university, in 1984 (Birler, 2012, p.142). As can be seen, apart from a spike in the mid-1990s, the major increase starts after 2006. It is safe to say that foundation universities found a convenient environment to grow under the AKP rule. At the end of the AKP's first ruling year in 2003, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underlined the importance of the private sector in education. In his speech¹⁶⁷ he pointed out that education is not an issue that can be left just within the consolidated budget; private sector and NGOs should budget funds for education (Hürriyet, 2003). It is worth mentioning that constitutionally the private sector can open universities only under the name of a foundation and cannot seek profit-making;¹⁶⁸ but in practice it does make profit out of it. Therefore, PM Erdoğan continued highlighting the importance of private education. In 2013, he spoke at an opening ceremony of a private hospital

¹⁶⁷ Officially called "Address to the nation" in Turkish: *Ulusa Sesleniş*.

¹⁶⁸ The Constitution of Turkey, Article 130.

and medical school complex, and pointed out that the private sector should run educational institutes for commercial purposes. As private sector runs primary/secondary schools already for commercial purposes, he clarifies that it can run universities without foundations because in fact foundations are by-passed and the system works through collusion. In order to adjust this situation, he calls for a unity among political parties because it requires constitutional amendments.




Figure 22: Number of Students in State Universities, total (as of 2015): 5,615,293.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)




Figure 23: Number of Students in Foundation Universities, total (as of 2015): 434,430.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)

The number of students in higher education in Turkey as of 2015 is 6,062,886, including open education faculty members. 7% of those students are registered to a foundation university, whereas 93% of them are at public universities. The numbers of open education¹⁶⁹ students at Anadolu, Atatürk,

¹⁶⁹ Open education in Turkey is run exclusively by public universities.

and Istanbul Universities are 2,803,064. Therefore, it changes the proportion heavily. Without open education students, the total number is 3,259,822 and with 447,593 students at foundation universities the proportion becomes 14% and 86%. This ratio also reflects on the proportion of academics at foundation and public universities, which is 15% and 85% in 2015. On the other hand, Figure 24 demonstrates the increase in the number of academics at foundation universities under AKP rule.




Figure 24: Number of Academic Staff in State and Foundation Universities since 1984.

(Source: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>)

Interviewee 10 highlighted the fact that during the AKP period, the increase in the foundation universities did not only occur in three big cities, but also happened in Anatolian cities such as Gaziantep, Kayseri, and Konya which indicates the capital accumulation thus the bourgeoisification of these cities. The government also allocated free land for those who wanted to establish a foundation university (Interview 10).

In June 2012, the AKP¹⁷⁰ published a brief document on their activities in the past 9.5 years. In this report, it is mentioned that the increase in the

¹⁷⁰ According to an online database called *Higher Education Industrial Complex: Private universities and their boards of trustees connected to a network of corporations and*

number of private universities and the 4+4+4 reform are signs of development in education (AK Parti, 2012). Also in the party manifesto, it is clearly given that the private sector will be encouraged and supported to invest in education both in higher education and K-12 education; and for religious education, it is accepted that as it is a duty of the state, religious education will be supported by the state (AK Parti, 2016).

It is argued that the neoliberalisation of higher education brought about precariatization of academics and the transformation of academics to unskilled labour (Önen, 2015; Vatansever & Yalçın, 2015) at private company-like run universities, such as competitiveness among colleagues (Interview 9). Under these conditions academics are more like to be organic intellectuals for the neoliberal Islamism (Hoşgör, 2015c). Interviewee 10 gave examples of precariatization from foundation universities. There is enforcement of research students with scholarships to work without contracts – that is to say without pay and insurance. For instance, “in some cases research students are forced to mark exam papers and to invigilate exams without payment which are subject to the definition of ‘work of research assistants’. One student won a court-case against Bilkent University” (Interview 10). Also, the quality of higher education became a concerning issue as the number of students per academic staff has increased from 45 in 2000 to 51 in 2014 (Salman, 2014).

On the spatial relations side of higher education, Islam and ideology, the AKP has accelerated construction of mosques on campuses since 2012. It is worth mentioning that those prayer houses exclusively serve the Sunni Islam sect that was supported by the AKP; and other sects of Islam (such as

institutions in Turkey, the AKP has 24 board members at 14 foundation universities and four of them are construction firms, two of them are MÜSİAD members, one of them is TÜSİAD and one of them is TUSKON member (accessed on: 21/05/2016, source: http://burak-arikan.com/ozeluniversiteler/index_en.html). İbrahim Çağlar is very central for AKP's relations with the capital in Istanbul. He is a founding member of the MÜSİAD and the AKP, the head of the board of trustees of Istanbul Commerce University, the head of managers' board of İTO, deputy president of TOBB, and a member of DEİK (İ Çağlar, 2016).

Alevism) or other religions were completely ignored in the construction process. In 2012, Bekir Bozdağ, the deputy Prime Minister, stated that the existence of a mosque on a university campus is equally important to the existence of faculty buildings on campus (Karaca, 2012). Two years after, Mehmet Görmez, the president of Religious Affairs, declared that the *Diyanet* was currently leading 80 constructions of mosque on university campuses across the country in order to meet the youths' religious needs (Bianet, 2014). Finally, in 2015, president Erdoğan suggested that instead of a campus it would be 'nicer' if it was called a *küllüye* which is an Islamic-Ottoman social complex centred on a mosque (Bianet, 2015b). This attempt can be understood within the importance of the 'material structure of ideology' in the Gramscian sense¹⁷¹. As Bieler and Morton cite, the 'material structure of ideology' includes "issues such as architecture alongside street lay-outs (as well as street names), and the social function performed by libraries, schools, publishing houses, newspapers, and journals, down to the local parish newsletter" (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p.118). Clearly the AKP aimed to increase the influence of Sunni Islam in the higher education system by locating mosques on campuses. I argue that constructing prayer houses serving only Sunni Islam cannot be seen within freedom of belief; rather it can be seen as an ideological assault on the higher education.

YÖK published a report on the evaluation of foundation universities in 2007. Okçabol argues that the report which praises foundation universities demonstrates fundamental problems such as lack of research and academic seriousness (2015, pp.58-60). TÜSİAD¹⁷² published 4 reports on higher education in 1995, 2000, 2003 and 2008. This chapter will start with the most recent one. TÜSİAD starts its reports with an opening: "TÜSİAD tries to act within the establishment of legal and institutional infrastructure of

¹⁷¹ The new Presidential Palace in Ankara is also called the 'Presidential *Küllüye*' by AKP officials and Erdoğan as.

¹⁷² According to *Higher Education Industrial Complex* database, the TÜSİAD has 15 board members at 10 universities (accessed on: 21/05/2016, source: http://burak-arikan.com/ozeluniversiteler/index_en.html).

market economy and universal work ethics of the business world” (TÜSİAD, 2008, p.3). The report concludes that the major obstacle for universities’ development is the absence of autonomy. There is no doubt that YÖK is a very crucial actor but its regulating system should change because whilst it supports an increase in universities’ autonomy. Ironically its intervention in their internal administration became more significant. Subsidiarity is very important, which means a principle that allows a bottom-up approach to the administration of higher education. This will also assist a proper understanding of autonomy (TÜSİAD, 2008, pp.145-146). Although TÜSİAD demands progressive steps, as given above, it articulates those demands with neoliberal inducements. The report compares EU and Turkish cases, and evaluates the application of Bologna process¹⁷³ in Turkey.

“Universities in Turkey and the perception on their roles in society encounter a transformation as well as society itself in Turkey as a response to the new ideas accompanied by globalisation and the stream of market forces. In west Europe as well, there has been a transformation for the last 30 years in the paradigm which affects universities’ role and functions that resulted in an increase in accountability and autonomy” (TÜSİAD, 2008, pp.17-18).

¹⁷³ The Bologna Process is a series of agreements between European countries to create the European Higher Education Area that allows comparability in the standards and quality of higher education qualifications. EĞİTİM-SEN points out that there are three main aims of the Bologna Process. First, the universities are subject to re-organisation in order to support Europe in global competition of science and technology. This point aims to create the *European Research Area*. It is expected that higher education has an engine role in developing the social forces and means of production within demands from the capital accumulation regime. This process reinforces a situation which increases the level of absolute and relative exploitation. Second, there is a purpose to create the *European Higher Education Area* (henceforth EHEA) which assists in the transformation of higher education into a global market. EHEA is the application of an understanding in the EU shaped within a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which considers education, and particularly higher education, a service can be commoditised internationally. In this context, the EHEA aims for ‘the removal of obstacles against the freedom of the movement of services through acceptance of diplomas and accreditation mechanisms’, ‘the increase in mobility of students and creature of a mutual *European* culture’ and ‘the development of competition power in science and technology through collaboration between universities’. Third, privatisation of higher education which is a collective service in order to help shrink the state for the creation of new public finance; therefore the removal of the meaning of higher education as a social right that was for labour within secondary distribution relations (Gümüş & Kurul, 2011, pp.6-7).

The report suggests lifelong learning should be more market-oriented (TÜSİAD, 2008, p.34) and claims that the organisational profile of higher education is more advanced in Europe because it responds to market demand (TÜSİAD, 2008, pp.72-73). Market-oriented higher education is promoted in the report as one of the principles of democratic societies. A study which is carried out with content analysis indicates that there is more emphasis on private universities than public universities. In the report the frequency of *the universities funded by the foundations* is 68 whereas *public universities* is used 42 times (Aslan, 2011, pp.91-92).

In TÜSİAD's other reports the same neoliberal paradigm could be seen as well. For instance in a 2003 report, under the 'what to do' section, it is suggested that professional training should be redesigned and be more flexible for market demands, and the private sector should be allowed to establish vocational schools of higher education¹⁷⁴ (TÜSİAD, 2003, pp.24-25).

MÜSİAD's¹⁷⁵ position on religious education and IHSs is very clear. They were against compulsory eight-year-education, which they regarded as an attempt to restrict the freedom of religion and belief and furthermore to abolish the religious life under the name of westernisation. They contended that this law was a violation of democracy and human rights (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010, p.115). Under AKP rule, the MÜSİAD supported the 4+4+4 system and the rise of IHSs. For the neoliberalisation of education, they are very pro-government as well. For instance, the MÜSİAD suggested in its 2006 economy report that the Ministry of National Education should be restructured and renamed as "Ministry of Education and Human Resources" (Ercan & Uzunyayla, 2009, p.114).

¹⁷⁴ Students in Turkey may choose vocational high schools after completing the 8-year-long compulsory primary education. Vocational high school graduates may pursue 2 year-long polytechnics or may continue with a related tertiary degree.

¹⁷⁵ According to *Higher Education Industrial Complex* database, the MÜSİAD has 18 board members at 9 universities (accessed on: 21/05/2016, source: http://burak-arikan.com/ozeluniversiteler/index_en.html).

“As our industry grows rapidly, many sub-sectors have an increasing need for technical personnel. Therefore, renewing the image and content of vocational schools to attract more students is an issue that must be addressed urgently. ... However, given that economy development and sectoral growth is directly related to productivity, the meaning and importance of the concept of ‘productivity’ should be taught from the earliest stages of education. ... The role of the public sector in the development and direction of vocational education policies and practices, and the sharing of authority and responsibilities, should be revised to establish specific mechanisms that will allow the parties to participate effectively in the decision-making processes. ... Social control mechanisms should be established and strategies should be determined to improve the quality of managers and educators of vocational schools. Vocational education institution models and practices are mainly adopted from other countries and institutionalized based on their regulations. However, a national and unique model for vocational education should be developed, based on Turkey’s contemporary and local needs. ... Life-long education counselling and guidance services in elementary, secondary and vocational education should be reinforced. All training tools and materials used in secondary and high schools should be diversified and to assist students in understanding business life and vocational education, and adapting to life” (MÜSİAD, 2013, pp.64-65).

TUSKON¹⁷⁶ is a recently-established association; therefore there is insufficient material available from their publication or reports. Interviews were carried out for that reason. Rizanur Meral (the president of TUSKON since 2010) emphasised the importance of Gülen schools outside of Turkey and claimed that education is one of the most important outward investment instruments of Turkey (Ensari & Öztürk, 2014). The Gülen movement is very well-organised in the education sector. Estimates of the number of schools and educational institutions vary widely; from about 300 schools in Turkey to over 1,000 schools worldwide (Reuters, 2008). The *dershane* dispute between the AKP and the Gülen movement has become the breaking point of the recent disintegration of those two. The Turkish parliament's recent passing of a bill to shut down *dershanes* by 1 September 2015 is the last front in the all-out domestic war between the AKP and the Gülen community.

¹⁷⁶ According to *Higher Education Industrial Complex* database, the TUSKON has 8 board members at 5 universities (accessed on: 21/05/2016, source: http://burak-arikan.com/ozeluniversiteler/index_en.html). Ömer Dengiz is a member of TUSKON and he was the AKP’s Kayseri provincial head. However he resigned (Ensari & Zengin, 2014) after the Gülen movement and government started to fight.

Initially announced by the Turkish prime minister on 9 September 2012, the law's first draft was published by the movement's daily *Zaman* last November. This re-ignited a heated debate amongst intellectuals, politicians, and the broader public across the country, and drastically increased the tension that has characterised AKP and Gülen movement relations since 2011 (Vicini, 2014). The Gülen movement's schools in Azerbaijan were closed in 2014 (Radikal, 2014a).

6.5. The Discontent and Resistance around Education

Apart from organised trade unions, there are unorganised civil organisations too. The *Okuluma Dokunma*¹⁷⁷ features an unorganised parents' movement against the closure and dispossession of schools in Istanbul. Later some unorganised parents also resisted against the transformation of secondary/high schools into Imam-Hatips (Radikal, 2015b). The Non-Appointed Teachers' Platform¹⁷⁸ represents another resistance movement in the education sector. They organised protests against the employment strategies of AKP, as in 2012 there were approximately 300,000 non-appointed teachers and 30 of them committed suicide between 2007 and 2012 (Vatan, 2012).

Interviewee 10 highlighted the resistance movements against the transformation of secondary schools into IHSs. Some of them were successful as they stopped the transformation; however in most cases they did not succeed (Interview 10). A high school in Çamlık, Ümraniye (Istanbul) was a victory in which Interviewee 7 took part. As they underlined, they resisted for an "education that is public, secular, mother tongue-based, and within walking distance" (Interview 7).

¹⁷⁷ Literally in English: Do not touch my school.

¹⁷⁸ Most of the non-appointed teachers work at *dershanes* with zero-hour contracts (Gümüş & Çetin, 2014).

6.5.1. Education and the Gezi Uprising

Besides the fact that the Gezi uprising was a social movement within the dynamics of spatial politics, especially in urbanisation, the discontent against the transformation of education played a key role in the making of the uprising. Interviewee 11 highlighted that there was a mass participation from high school pupils such as Dev-Lis¹⁷⁹ and Genç-Sen¹⁸⁰ (Interview 11). Bilgiç and Kafkaslı reports that 43.1% of the participants in the Gezi uprising were aged 25 and below (2013, p.13). Youth unemployment is also related to education. The massive expansion of tertiary education has so far yielded little in terms of employment returns: in 2009, nearly 20% of graduates between the ages of 20 and 30 were unemployed (Yörük & Yüksel, 2014, p.108).

It is noteworthy that the 4+4+4 system passed one year before Gezi so Gezi also harboured resistance against the new education system.

“The 4+4+4 law passed just before Gezi. In the new system, age categories are arranged to create gender discrimination, especially through supporting child marriage. Gezi was a reaction to that” (Interview 7).

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to demonstrate how education is used by the AKP in order to create consent and how social forces have had position whilst the consent is produced within a critical appraisal of the political economy of education in Turkey since 2002. The neoliberal transformation of education and the AKP’s discourse around the privatisation of education were the subjects of this chapter. Capitalist groups, trade unions, and the resistance groups’ position vis-à-vis education since 2002 were analysed. In this chapter firstly a theoretical discussion was carried out to conceptualise education as the source of consent and its articulation with neoliberalism.

¹⁷⁹ Revolutionary high School Students, Turkish: *Devrimci Liseliler*.

¹⁸⁰ Students’ and Youngsters’ Union, Turkish: *Öğrenci Gençlik Sendikası*.

Second, a brief overview of education in Turkey was given where the agents were introduced. The empirical section was divided into two parts: the marketisation of higher education and Islamicisation of K-12 education. The new 4+4+4 system, the rise of IHSs, the *dershanes*, and the foundation universities were elaborated on in the discussion. Finally, the resistance movements in education and education's role in the making of Gezi was discussed. Following the discussion in 3. *The Integral State*, I covered the capitalist groups, labour unions and unorganised resistance movements in the analysis.

The AKP's education policies demonstrate both rupture and continuity (Interview 10). As it was mentioned before, two processes, the marketisation of higher education and the Islamicisation of K-12 education assisted the AKP in creating and consolidating consent through education policies and around neoliberalism with Islamic characteristics. The rupture showed itself especially on the K-12 level by the Islamicisation process. This process is exclusively an AKP-made drastic shift, therefore it is a break from the pre-AKP education policies, although the junta in the 1980s introduced the compulsory religious subjects at the K-12 level (Coşar, 2011, p.166). The continuity, on the other hand, was realised at the higher education level and articulated around the marketisation. The 24th January 1980 structural adjustment programme and the follow up 12th September 1980 coup opened the door to the encouragement of private schools, establishment of foundation universities, and the rise of *dershanes*. The AKP continued the encouragement of private schools by subsidising parents, and by transforming the *dershanes* into private schools, and realising the boom in foundation universities. Islamicisation and marketisation do not mutually exclude each other; rather they represent the combination of both. Indeed, it is possible to observe the Islamicisation of higher education and the marketisation of K-12 education in the AKP period as well. However what I argued is that the key determinants in the education policy of the AKP are first the drastic U-turn from secular-schooling to Islamic-schooling and

second the continuation and acceleration of the marketisation of higher education.

This continuity and change framework indicates that in the education sector, Islamicisation is accompanied by marketisation within the neoliberal hegemony. Contra to the mainstream understanding, I argue that rather than a sphere of struggle between secularists and Islamists, education is a sphere of class struggle in which the AKP has been utilising Islamicisation in order to absorb the discontent against the marketisation. So, comparing the integral state with centre-periphery, the latter is limited to the secularist versus Islamist antagonism as a result of the assumed state-society dichotomy, whereas the integral state provides a holistic understanding in which the state and the fragments of civil society (the capitalist groups, trade unions and un-organised resistance groups) are conceptualised symbiotically which gives us a reading with social relations of production.

7. The Mass Media as a Hegemonic Project

“Whoever funds the media, funds the parliament too” (Interview 2).

“Are we to assume perhaps that the television organisations are outside the normal social structure? But in all the countries ... the control and ownership of television systems is centrally characteristic of general social control and ownership and (in part) authority” (R Williams, 2003 [1975], p.126).

7.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to provide an insightful understanding of media relations in Turkey and how the AKP used media as a hegemonic apparatus from 2002-2015. The reproduction of the social relations of production *within* and *through* the media will be analysed in this chapter. The labour relations in media will be the main focus of the reproduction of the social relations of production *within* the media. The intervention to the media sector in order to convert it to a pro-government side will be explained in the reproduction of the social relations of production *through* the media. The political economy of media in Turkey since 2002 will be explored by focussing on the neoliberal Islamist transformation of media relations. AKP’s policies and discourse, and as social forces the positions of capitalist groups, trade unions and other organised/unorganised resistance movements will be investigated in this chapter.

Theoretical framework of hegemony through media will be the starting point of this chapter. Media will be conceptualised as a perception controller and one of the main components of a consent making process. This section will be followed by a brief overview of media relations in Turkey. In this section the importance of media for capitalism in Turkey will be described historically and labour relations in Turkish media will be evaluated. Then, the introduction of actors in the media sector will be provided. An analytical section where the political economy of media relations is investigated will be

given later. In the analytical section two main arguments will be elaborated: the creation of pro-government media and the disciplining of mainstream media. These two arguments are not mutually exclusive; instead, many of the government's actions resulted in the reproduction of both of the arguments. Therefore they will be evaluated together under subtopics of the transformation of media ownership, the media owners' role on urban transformation projects, the case of Taraf as a hegemonic tool, the conditions of public broadcasting, and religious broadcasting and the rise of Islamic media. This section will be followed by the analysis of resistance movements in the media sector through the media's role during the Gezi uprising and the emergence of online journalism and social media. Finally, I will give the concluding remarks.

7.2. Gramsci on the Mass Media

The politics and mass media have always been embedded in each other – what Block calls the mediatisation of politics in the age of media hegemony (2013). First of all, the media is a means of production. By utilising this means of production, the owner receives surplus value out of the cultural production. Second, the media is also a hegemonic project in which the media outlets are used as hegemonic tools. Therefore the cultural production is associated with the production of consent.

“The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1932], p.64).

Arguably, according to Marx and Engels, the means of mental production is used to create false consciousness. However, Gramsci's notion of hegemony provides a more complex understanding on the issue.

In the Gramscian sense, media is a crucial component of hegemony (Çoban, 2014, p.27). Media outlets are important tools for creating consent. Forgacs mentions that in the introduction to Gramsci's *Cultural Writings* “[i]t

is significant that the emerging forms of radio and cinema receive minimal attention in the notebooks” (Forgacs, 1985, p.13). Gramsci was aware of the *new media* and recognised them as a *source of linguistic innovation* inherent to forms of cultural hegemony (Landy, 2008, p.105; 2009, p.111). In seeking the sources of this innovation, Gramsci lists, as Landy reports:

“1) the school; 2) newspapers; 3) popular and artistic writers; 4) theatre and sound cinema; 5) radio; 6) public and religious congregations of every type; 7) connections in ‘conversation’ among the most and least cultivated of the population (a question which perhaps is not accorded the importance it deserves in relation to the ‘word’ as verse that is learned through memory in the form of songs, fragments of lyric opera, etc.)” (Landy, 2009, p.111).

Pozzolini mentions that the importance of the daily press on education, the formation of the personality, and on the ‘freedom’ of the decisive choices of the individual should not be forgotten (1970, p.137).

“The bourgeoisie possessed thousands and thousands of newspapers and printing presses. Could one really speak of liberty in a bourgeois State? Could one really say that a parliament, elected in these conditions, represented the ‘free’ will of the nation? ‘The press, together with the political parties, is an integral part of a well-organised democratic parliamentary regime. If the press is failing in its duty as a disinterested organ of control of public opinion, who could stem the arbitrariness of the officials?’” (Pozzolini, 1970, p.137).

The gutter press and the radio became two elements that menaced the pre-established plans of the traditional parties for the monopoly of public opinion in Gramsci’s times. Given their popularity and simultaneity, these two elements had the ability to provoke impromptu outbreaks of panic or of fictitious enthusiasm, which permitted the attainment of determined goals, in the elections for example, in order to obtain and sustain the ideological supremacy of the ruling class (Pozzolini, 1970, p.138).

“The type of journalism considered in these notes is one that could be called ‘integral’ (the meaning of this term will become increasingly clear in the course of the notes themselves), in other words one that seeks not only to satisfy all the needs (of a given category) of its public, but also to create and develop these needs, to arouse its public and progressively enlarge it” (Gramsci, 1985, p.408).

Herman and Chomsky explain the broad sweep of the mainstream media's behaviour and performance by their corporate character and integration into the political economy of the dominant economic system; what they call the propaganda model (1988, p.xii). As already mentioned in *1.3. Case Study Selection* the press is “the most dynamic part of this ideological structure” (Gramsci, 2000, p.380). Therefore, it is plausible to maintain that the mass media is an important component of the material structure of ideology.

7.3. The Mass Media in Turkey

The purpose of this section is to analyse the relations of production in media as an industry under the AKP rule within labour relations. An academic and expert on the political economy of media in Turkey highlighted in an interview that the labour relations in Turkish media have not worked in the ‘labour relations’ way ever since the ‘Industrial Law of Press’ was passed in 1952. Only a few people have been employed within this law. Although employment within this law has increased since the AKP came into power, it increased in the Doğan group and the Gülen movement’s media as the AKP is using auditing as a punishment tool against those non-pro-government media. It is unlikely that a pro-government media would employ a reporter within this law, as the main employment strategy is based on ‘copyright’. Deunionisation in the media sector has increased since the 1980 coup and it worsened after the AKP. Reporters do not want to join the unions because first they know joining a union would put their position at stake, and second they do not believe in the beneficence of unions. S/he gave an example from the recently established PAK MEDYA İŞ as they once mentioned that ‘unions are not that important’. Reporters are employed with low-paid contracts and working hours are too long. Also promotion in the media is not merit-based; it is rather based on your capability in understanding the relations between ‘the boss’ and government (Interview 6). The importance of official-ads declined for national media in this period; however they remained as

important revenues of local and small-scale media. For instance, the historical newspaper of Greeks of Turkey *Apoyevmatini* was at risk of bankruptcy in 2014 (Kurban & Sözeri, 2012, p.32). On another important note, as Sönmez argues, the mass media is almost entirely Istanbul-based (Sönmez, 2010).

7.3.1. Agents in the Turkish Mass Media

Some scholars accept the media as a part of civil society that is prominent in democratic consolidation (Heper & Demirel, 1996), thus a progressive force. However, drawing on chapter 3. *The Integral State*, I argue that the media is not necessarily progressive. As part of civil society, the media can be either side of the hegemonic struggles which can be progressive or reactionary.

There are 96 journalism related organisations in Turkey and they constitute the 'Freedom to Journalists Platform'¹⁸¹. The main constituents are Press Council¹⁸², The Federation of Journalists of Turkey¹⁸³, Society of Turkish Journalists¹⁸⁴, and Progressive Journalists Association¹⁸⁵. This platform is mainly interested in jailed journalists and it is worth mentioning that Turkey has the worst record in the world with 49 journalists in jail (Beiser, 2013). As opposed to the Press Council and the TGC, pro-government associations the *Medya Derneği* and the *Online Medya Derneği* were established in order to challenge their authority. (Çam & Yüksel, 2015, p.92).

There are five trade unions organised within the media sector in Turkey. Under TÜRK-İŞ there are two trade unions: Journalists Union of Turkey¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Turkish: *Gazetecilere Özgürlük Platformu*.

¹⁸² Turkish: *Basın Konseyi*.

¹⁸³ Turkish: *Türkiye Gazeteciler Federasyonu*.

¹⁸⁴ Turkish: *Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti*.

¹⁸⁵ Turkish: *Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği*.

¹⁸⁶ Turkish: *Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası*.

(henceforth TGS) and BASIN-İŞ¹⁸⁷. BASIN-İŞ mainly organised within workers at printing houses and print shops, whereas TGS is the trade union for media workers and journalists/correspondents. The general secretary of TGS highlighted in their interview that the main aim of the union is to deal with basic work-based problems of media workers (such as the quality of food provided for them, 5% increase at their salary, non-flexible working hours etc.), and to protect the social and economic rights of journalists in order to provide them with an environment where they can sustain their journalism freely. TGS is the only growing union in the media sector, with a 25% increase in the number of members in 2014 (Interview 4). DİSK BASIN-İŞ under the DİSK, similarly focuses mainly on printing house workers. MEDYA-İŞ under HAK-İŞ is organised only at the AA¹⁸⁸. PAK MEDYA-İŞ is the newest one, and it is organised under the recently established confederation AKSİYON-İŞ.

As already provided in 4.5. *The History of Mass Media*, there is an oligopoly in the mass media sector in Turkey. Towards the end of the second millennium there were five major groups: *Doğan Media Group* owned by media mogul Aydın Doğan; *Medya Holding* owned by Dinç Bilgin; *Rumeli Holding* owned by Cem Uzan; *Avrupa ve Amerika Holding* owned by Erol Aksoy; and *İhlas Holding* owned by Enver Ören. New actors emerged by the time some of them diminished. Uzan, Bilgin and Aksoy disappeared from the media sector because of various reasons, which will be elaborated in the following sections. Acun, Albayrak, Ciner, Doğuş, Sancak, Fox International, Koza-İpek, Turkuvaz, Yeni Dünya, Demirören, Çukurova, Multi Channel Developers, and Gülen (Feza, Samanyolu, and Kaynak Kültür) are the current media groups in 2016. However, considering the size of these groups, only Doğan, Doğuş, and Turkuvaz could be counted as the major groups. Although positions have changed throughout the AKP rule, the media groups' positions

¹⁸⁷ Turkish: *Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Gazetecilik, Grafik-Tasarım, Baskı ve Ambalaj Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası*.

¹⁸⁸ Anadolu Agency (Turkish: *Anadolu Ajansı*) is a state-run press agency in Turkey.

towards the AKP could be divided into four categories: pro-AKP, somewhat pro-AKP mainstream, somewhat anti-AKP mainstream, and anti-AKP.

7.4. The Creation of Pro-Government Mass Media and the Disciplining of Mainstream Mass Media

7.4.1. The Transformation of Mass Media Ownership

The major source of revenue for media outlets in Turkey is advertisements. The size of the advertisement economy in Turkish media is very small. According to the Advertisers' Association US\$1,616,050,000 was spent on advertisements in 2015 (Reklamcılar Derneği, 2015) which makes only approximately 0.2% of the GDP (\$798.4 billion in 2014, source: <http://data.worldbank.org/>). Television receives more than half of the investments, whereas press and internet are respectively 17% and 21%. As it can be seen in Figure 25, there is a clear dominance of television in the industry.




Figure 25: Advertisement Economy in Turkey (as of 2015).

Source: (Reklamcılar Derneği, 2015)

Apart from the distribution within the means of communication, there is also an unfair distribution of advertisement investments within media ownership. In 2010 Doğan Holding's ad-share among all means of communication (newspaper, television, magazine, radio, and internet) was 54%; whereas Çalık Holding's was 23%, Çukurova Holding's was 10%, Doğuş

Holding's was 10% and Ciner Holding's was 3% (Sözeri & Güney, 2011, p.46). Interviewee 6 stated that conditions in the advertisement industry have changed since 2010. They highlighted that, first of all, media proprietor Doğan's ad-share must have shrunk although it has become impossible to find reliable ad-share data for the last couple of years due to misinformation in the industry. Also, the clients in the advertisement industry started to fear the government's approach to the non-pro-government media; therefore they have stopped giving advertisements to those groups, especially Gülen movement media (Interview 6).

The deregulation of media ownership (Tunç, 2015) or transformation in media ownership is the most ground-breaking outcome of state-media relations under the AKP rule and it is the primary disciplining method in media by the AKP (Interview 6). Although the oligopoly-based structure of media ownership has sustained, the member structure of the oligopoly has witnessed the rises and demises of several holdings. For instance, in 2007 the TMSF confiscated ATV and Sabah from Ciner Holding. The channel and the newspaper were previously purchased by Ciner from Bilgin. Çalık Holding bought ATV & Sabah from the TMSF for \$1.1 billion in 2008 and for the purchase the holding borrowed \$750 million from two public banks; VakıfBank and Halkbank. It was asserted by a CHP MP that the loans were given with very long-term instalments and very low interest, and with political pressure on the banks' management. However the banks refused to reveal any information due to confidentiality (Günday, 2008). In 2013, Çalık sold the media group (Turkuvaz Media Group) to Zirve Holding in December 2013, just three days after the '17th December events'. Zirve Holding was established in the same year in August, and the Kalyon Construction Firm seemed to be part of this holding (Hürriyet, 2013b). Meanwhile, illegally recorded tapes revealed that a group of businessmen were encouraged by Erdoğan to buy the Turkuvaz Group that includes ATV and Sabah from Çalık Group. According to the recordings, the owners of Kalyon were convinced by Erdoğan on 21st June 2013; however Kalyon's budget could not afford a

US\$1.1 billion worth media group. Therefore a ‘pool’ was created for the construction firms that already received tenders from government and will receive in the future. Cemal Kalyoncu, the owner of Kalyon, established the Zirve Holding with US\$170 million in August 2013. Cengiz Construction Firm and Kalyon Construction Firm started to raise funds for the ‘pool’, as Cengiz itself already invested US\$100 million. Kolin Holding, Limak Holding and IC Holding invested US\$100 million each, and Makyol Holding and Özaltın Holding contributed respectively US\$30 and US\$20 million (Diken, 2014a). Indeed, the tender for the Third Bridge was received by the IC Holding and Astaldi Consortium, and the tender of the Third Airport was received by the Consortium of Limak, Cengiz, Kolin, Kalyon and MAPA (Hürriyet, 2013c; Sabah, 2012a). The phrase ‘pool media’ started to be used in order to define pro-government media after that case.

The mainstream media did not oppose the AKP’s rise and seizing power in their first parliamentary term. Kemalist and left-wing Cumhuriyet’s headline on 23rd May 2003 ‘young military officers are displeased’¹⁸⁹, which clearly ‘warns’ the AKP against another 1960-like coup, could be an exception in this term. On the other hand, Cumhuriyet cannot be accepted as mainstream media in the first place. However, by the end of this term in 2007 the mainstream media started to play the dated role that it played during the ‘post-modern coup’ period back in the 1990s. For instance, Hürriyet covered the news about the freeing of headscarves at universities by a law passed by

¹⁸⁹ Turkish: *Genç Subaylar Tedirgin*. A famous pro-AKP NGO, the ‘Young Civilians’ (Turkish: *Genç Siviller*) derived its name from this headline: *Genç Siviller Rahatsız*, Young Civilians are Displeased (K Öktem, 2011, p.162). This NGO assisted the AKP to consolidate and absorb liberal concerns in their political movement, especially in the first and second period (2002-2011). In the 2010 Constitutional Referendum, they supported the campaign called ‘Not Enough but Yes!’ (Turkish: *Yetmez ama Evet!*) launched by the DSİP (the Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party; ironically enough this party is Trotskyist in theory but liberal left in practice). Erdoğan congratulated and thanked the DSİP in his victory speech after the Referendum resulted in 57.88% in favour of yes. Another note on this referendum is about the TUSİAD. During the 2010 referendum campaigns the TUSİAD wanted to remain neutral however Erdoğan threatened them by saying “those who remain neutral will be eliminated” (Turkish: *Bitaraf olan bertaraf olur*) (DA Yavuz, 2012b, p.144).

411 MPs of the AKP and MHP on 10th February 2008: “411 hands rose for chaos”¹⁹⁰.

A month after that, the chief-prosecutor opened the closure case against the AKP based on the charge that the party violated the principle of secularism in Turkey and the party had become “a centre for anti-secular activities” on 18th March 2008. On 28th July 2008, the closure request failed as six judges’ verdict were in favour of closure (seven votes needed) and five ruled against the closure. On the other hand, 10 judges were in favour of the “AKP had become a centre for anti-secular activities”, which led the party to be excluded from state funding. In order to understand the series of events that ended up in the closure trial of the AKP (in which the party survived by only one vote), one should start with the bombings of Cumhuriyet’s media centre in Istanbul and the Turkish Council of State¹⁹¹ shooting in May 2006. 2007 witnessed the assassination of an Armenian-descent journalist, Hrant Dink, in Istanbul in January and the massacre of the Zirve Publishing House¹⁹² in Malatya in April. The AKP interpreted these events as an attempt to create a chaotic environment for initiating a coup plot against their government¹⁹³. Meanwhile, in 2007, the next president of Turkey needed to be elected by May. On 13th April the Chief of the Turkish General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that he hoped the next

¹⁹⁰ Turkish: *411 El Kaosa Kalktı*.

¹⁹¹ Turkish: *Danıştay*.

¹⁹² Three employees of the Bible publishing house were attacked, tortured and murdered.

¹⁹³ This was later called the ‘Ergenekon coup plot’. In 2010 the ‘Balyoz coup plot’, a plot conspired in 2003, was also revealed. Ironically enough the prosecutor of those two ‘coup plot’ cases, Zekeriya Öz, who later started investigating the case against the AKP staff on 17th December 2013, was dismissed from his duties by the HSYK and a warrant was issued for his arrest on charges of ‘plotting the 17th December 2013 coup against government’. He is still a fugitive in 2016. There are some points that need to be addressed in this context. First of all, his dismissal by the HSYK indicated how the top judicial system is under the AKP’s influence which occurred after the ‘civilianisation’ of the HSYK in the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. Second, his dismissal also heralded the fight between the Gülen movement and government in the 2010s, whereas they were hand in hand in the 2000s. Third, charging him with ‘plotting coup’ is also a perfect indicator of how the AKP has articulated discourses around civilianisation and being a civilian and democratically-elected government against coups. Notwithstanding the fact that the Gezi uprising was also defined a ‘coup plot’ by the AKP staff. Regarding the responses to the Ergenekon case, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet are on the Kemalist side (Keyman, 2010b, p.550).

president was loyal to the basic principles of the Republic, including secularism (NTV, 2007). The next day, the first rally of the 'Republic protests'¹⁹⁴ took place at Atatürk's tomb in Ankara (Turam, 2012, p.6) with hundreds of thousands of people (Armutçu, 2007). On 24th April, Abdullah Gül¹⁹⁵ was nominated as the candidate of AKP by Prime Minister Erdoğan. The opposition party CHP did not vote as a block and no CHP MP was present in the chamber; therefore 361 votes were used and Gül received 357 votes on 27th April 2007.

The CHP brought a case to the constitutional court straightaway as constitutionally there had to be at least 367 MPs in the chamber in order to hold the elections. On the same day at 23:20, the General Staff of the Armed Forces released a statement on the web-site of the Armed Forces.

"It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently... The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary..." (BBC, 2007).

This statement was later called the 'e-memorandum' (Turkish: *e-muhtıra*). On 1st May, the Constitutional Court ruled that the first round of elections held on 27th were invalid because of the insufficient number of MPs (less than 367) in the chamber during the meeting, which resulted in a deadlock in the presidential elections. Under these conditions the AKP decided to hold the general elections in July 2007, in which it received 46.7% of the votes (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010). The backlash of the 'e-memorandum' was the

¹⁹⁴ The second rally was organised on 29th April in Istanbul, the third and fourth were organised on 5th May in Manisa and Çanakkale, and finally the fifth rally was organised on 13th May 2007 in Izmir with 2.5 million protestors according to the organising committee.

¹⁹⁵ He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007. The fact that his wife is veiled was the main issue that was discussed, as a headscarf was considered as the symbol of political Islam and back then wearing the headscarf was banned in public institutions, including the presidential palace (Göl, 2009, p.797).

strengthening of the AKP's social support. On 28th August 2007, Abdullah Gül was elected as the president of Turkey. The TÜSİAD congratulated Gül and denounced the military action (DA Yavuz, 2010, p.86). However, this series of events and the closure case in 2008 were perceived as a counter attack by the AKP. Throughout the process, the mainstream media was not supportive of the AKP. As the media also played an active role in the 'post-modern coup' in 1997 against the RP, the AKP's response to the situation was an attempt to transform the ownership structure of media in its favour. Interviewee 6 stated that

“[t]o do so the AKP followed two paths: first to struggle against the current mainstream media owners and second to create a mainstream media that is loyal to it” (Interview 6).

It is clear that the series of events in 2007 and 2008 changed the AKP's approach to the mainstream media. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the first parliamentary period of the AKP in between 2002 and 2007 represents a relatively liberal period in which a hegemonic broad-based approach and discourse were applied. The AKP did not attempt to change the structure of the political economy of media in Turkey in this period. However, in 2009, the owner of *Hürriyet*, Aydın Doğan was charged a \$2.5 billion tax fine by auditors from the Ministry of Finance. The AKP denied that this was an political act (Reuters, 2009). This was also about the fact that *Hürriyet* covered the news about the corruption scandal in the AKP-related *Deniz Feneri e.V* in Germany (Silverman, 2014) (Interview 6). Later in 2012, Doğan paid \$0.5 billion after negotiations in the case were resolved. Perhaps one should understand the apathy of Doğan's media during the Gezi uprising by starting with this re-settlement. For instance, CNN Türk broadcasted a documentary about penguins on the first night of the clashes between protestors and the police, whereas CNN International broadcasted it live for nine hours. The Gezi movement and media will be investigated later in this chapter. Especially after 2009, Doğan's publishing policy has changed; however it was late because Çalık bought ATV and Sabah in 2008 (Interview 6). As it was mentioned earlier in chapter 5, the CEO of Çalık Holding was

Erdoğan's son-in-law back in the day¹⁹⁶. Therefore the second largest media group was transferred to a holding that had organic connections with government. Doğan sold Milliyet and Vatan newspapers to Yıldırım Demirören, and STAR TV which he bought from the TMSF in 2005 to Doğu Holding in 2011, therefore his media group shrunk in 2011. The pressure on non-pro-government media worked and the leader of industry, the tycoon Doğan's group, was shrunk and disciplined.

The liquidation of mainstream media (UU Aydın, 2014, p.133) perhaps manifested more severely for Cem Uzan. The Uzan family owned Rumeli Holding, the owner of the STAR TV and Star newspaper. Through cross-ownership, the holding also has investments in telecommunication, energy, construction, cement, and finance. In 2002, Cem Uzan established the GP¹⁹⁷ three months before the General Elections of 3rd November 2002 and entered politics in the aftermath of the political and economic turmoil of 2000-2001. His right-wing vulgar-populist party pursued a populist strategy and the GP received 7.5% of votes. The AKP entered parliament for the first time in the same elections. The GP's increasing popularity motivated the AKP to take action against the Uzan family. In mid-2003 more than 200 companies of the Uzan group were confiscated due to alleged fraud claims in the Motorola case. The confiscation caused an entire erasure of the group from the economic, political and media fields. Cem Uzan fled to France in 2009, after losing the court case in the US against Motorola and Nokia, and applied for political asylum. He is still in France under the protection of granted asylum (UU Aydın, 2014, pp.133-134). The general secretary of TGS mentioned in their interview that what happened to Cem Uzan represents what has just happened to the Gülen Group¹⁹⁸ and also what will happen to Doğan one day, because "the Cem Uzan case showed us if government wants

¹⁹⁶ He was elected as an MP from the AKP in November 2015 and he is the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in 2016.

¹⁹⁷ The Young Party, Turkish: *Genç Parti*.

¹⁹⁸ Bank Asya, the Gülen movement's major bank was confiscated by the TMSF shortly before the interview (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015c).

to demolish a media owner, it can do it, no matter whether it is lawful or not” (Interview 4).

According to the general secretary of TGS, the media could be divided into three groups in Turkey during the AKP rule. First, the so called the *pool media*¹⁹⁹ which is organically connected to the AKP and therefore pro-government, such as Sabah, ATV, Yeni Şafak. Second the *dissident media*; this represents a wide range of media outlets from Kemalist Sözcü, Cumhuriyet, Halk TV to Socialist Evrensel, BirGün – they do not share the same world view but they are all against the AKP’s policies. The third group represents most of the mainstream media, the media under government pressure, such as Milliyet, Vatan, Hürriyet, CNN TÜRK, and NTV. They are neither pro-government nor anti-government; however they are under political pressure thus cannot pursue free journalism. They do not have solid opposition tendencies; their aim is to sustain proper journalism but there is pressure on them. This pressure usually comes through economic oppression and tax penalties. The main political struggle happens at the third group of media (Interview 4). Furthermore, I divide the third group into two parts: somewhat pro-government and somewhat anti-government.

It is safe to maintain that there is a transformation in favour of government within media ownership in Turkey and the main struggle happens around this issue. For instance, somewhat anti-government Doğan Group used to own 65% of media in Turkey before the AKP rule. According to 2008 data, it was still the biggest group, controlling 34% of total daily newspaper circulation (62% ad-share), 23% of TV ratings (41% ad-share), and 43% of total advertising revenues (Adaklı, 2010, p.56 cited in UU Aydın, 2014). It shrank during the AKP period. STAR TV was bought by Doğuş Group and Milliyet & Vatan was bought by Demirören Group in 2011; Radikal was closed and turned into an internet newspaper in 2014, and the website was closed in 2016, so Doğan Group shrank and its media outlets

¹⁹⁹ Turkish: *havuz medyası*.

were transferred to the somewhat pro-government media. Doğan decided to shrink by itself; however this was through intimidation – as Sönmez’s harsher expression puts it a ‘hostage-taking’ operation, not only towards other media groups but also towards the big bourgeoisie as well (Sönmez, 2012 cited in UU Aydın, 2014). Doğuş and Demirören are already in an economic relationship with the AKP. TV8 was bought by Acun Media which is pro-government too. Also, the TMSF²⁰⁰ confiscated some of the media outlets such as Show TV, Digitürk and those media outlets publishing and broadcasting in favour of the AKP while they were waiting to put in tenders. Either way the TMSF transferred those media outlets to ‘pool media’; for example ATV & Sabah Group was given to Çalık Holding which is run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law. There are only a few new media outlets that are not pro-government. Gülen movement owns Zaman and STV, and pro-Gülen Koza-İpek Group owns Millet, KANALTÜRK and Bugün. Those media outlets were pro-AKP until 2013 but after the clash between the group and the party they started to publish and broadcast from the anti-government side. All of them were confiscated and trustees were appointed in 2015 and 2016, and their policy became pro-government again under the trustees’ management. The Gülen group established Yarına Bakış newspaper in 2016. Yurt and Karşı newspapers were recently established by MPs from the CHP. Özgür Gündem and İMC TV were the pro-Kurdish, and Yeniçağ and Ortadoğu were the pro-MHP newspapers in 2016.

In order to understand the shift in ownership structure, one should start with analysing the media owners’ role on urban regeneration projects that were discussed in *5. Urbanisation as a Hegemonic Project*. It is important to control some media outlets in order to build up a relationship with government and to sustain or start other businesses such as construction, energy, real estate where the government is the key actor within market economy rules (Interview 6). According to an online database called

²⁰⁰ The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey, Turkish: *Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu*.

*Networks of Dispossession: Collective data compiling and mapping on the relations of capital and power in Turkey*²⁰¹, there are nine media groups that also pursue construction-related business and urban renewal projects. Pro-AKP Turkuvaz Group (ATV, Sabah, Takvim, and Yeni Asır) was owned by Çalık Holding (member of TÜSİAD) and the CEO was Erdoğan's son-in-law. Çalık runs projects such as controversial Tarlabası Regeneration Project, Fener-Balat Regeneration Project, Şehrizar and Metropol Housing Projects, Çankırı and Çatalağzı Thermal Power Plants, Adacami Hydroelectric Power Plant, Aydem, Yeşilirmak, and Aras Energy Distribution, and Çöpler Gold Mine. As stated earlier, Çalık sold Turkuvaz to the *pool* led by Kalyon Holding (member of MÜSİAD). Kalyon's investments are given as follows: controversial Third Airport Project, Taksim Pedestrianisation Project that triggered Gezi Park Protests, Şile-Ağva Motorway, Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey Metro, and Gelirler İdaresi Building. Kalyon also constructed the Başakşehir Stadium (£37 millions) and during the opening ceremony Erdoğan played football and he scored 3 goals in 15 minutes (Er & Oktay, 2014). Owners of Kalyon were also detained during the 17th December corruption scandal (Al Jazeera, 2014b). Another pro-AKP media group, Albayrak (member of MÜSİAD), owns Yeni Şafak and TVNET, also its construction firm runs the 3rd Mavişehir Housing Project and Taksim-4th Levent Metro Project. Sembol Group (member of TUSKON) is another pro-AKP one (Star Newspaper and 24TV) and received tenders from the state for Halic Marina and Istanbul Harbiye Congress Centre. The construction of this centre was heavily criticised by urban planners and theatre players (Bay, 2010) because in order to construct this centre the historical Harbiye Muhsin Ertuğrul Stage was partially demolished. Today a new Harbiye Muhsin Ertuğrul Stage is located in the centre. It is also worth mentioning that in 2009 the Congress Centre hosted the IMF and WB Group Annual Meeting (NTV, 2009a). Pro-AKP İhlas Holding (owns TGRT, İHA, and Türkiye Newspaper) also constructs Bizim Evler 2 Housing Project. Somewhat pro-AKP Ciner Holding

²⁰¹ (Source: <http://mulksuzlestirme.org/index.en.html>).

(SHOW TV, HABERTÜRK, and Bloomberg HD) owns Silopi, Çayırhan, Konya Ilgın, and Kazan Soda Thermal Power Plants. Somewhat pro-AKP Demirören Group, (member of TÜSİAD) who bought Milliyet and Vatan from Doğan in 2011, constructed Demirören Shopping Centre in Beyoğlu. The building of the shopping centre was also much contested because it was not constructed in accordance with the urban plan (A Kılıç, 2011). It is notably higher than the rest of historical İstiklal Avenue.

The cross-ownership issue is really crucial in understanding Doğuş's (member of TÜSİAD) transformation. Doğuş Group (NTV, NTV Spor, Kral TV, STAR TV²⁰², CNBC-e²⁰³, e2, and TV8²⁰⁴) had changed over time from somewhat anti-AKP to somewhat pro-AKP. In the beginning of the AKP rule, NTV²⁰⁵ was slightly sceptical of the government. However it became pro-government gradually as dissident journalists were dismissed one by one: Banu Güven, Can Dündar and Mirgün Cabas can be given as examples. This shift represents a causality with the increase in Doğuş Holding's tenders from the state. During the Gezi uprising NTV was heavily criticised by the public because of the lack of coverage. NTV apologised for failing to cover the initial protests one week after the start of protests and faced a protest in front of NTV headquarters. The CEO of Doğuş Media Group, Cem Aydın, conceded that the criticisms were "fair to a large extent", and that "[o]ur audience feels like they were betrayed" (BBC, 2013b). Shortly after his comments, Aydın resigned from Doğuş Media (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013b). Shortly after that, NTV refused to air a BBC World News package on press freedom in Turkey, breaking its partnership agreement with the BBC. The BBC suspended the agreement in response (BBC, 2013a). Some examples of Doğuş Holding's non-media investments based on state tenders are given as follows: 2003 Turgutreis Marina (60 Million TL), 2006 Otogar-Başakşehir

²⁰² Bought from Doğan in 2011.

²⁰³ CNBC-e was sold to Discovery Communications and replaced with TLC in 2015.

²⁰⁴ 30% shareholder only, Acun Medya (pro-government) owns 70% of shares since 2015.

²⁰⁵ NTV was bought by Doğuş from Nergis Group since 1999. NTV has been one of the most important and respected thematic (news) TV channels in Turkey.

Metro (2,865 Million TL), 2007 Artvin and Aslancık Hydroelectric Power Plants (1,080+400 Million TL), 2012 Üsküdar-Altunizade-Ümraniye-Dudullu Metro (2,147 Million TL), 2013 Galataport Project, 2013 (1,404 Million TL), Konya Mavi Tünel Water Purification Project (48 Million TL), 2014 Ankara-Sivas High Speed Train Project (298.8 Million TL).

The AKP's intervention on NTV is also mentioned in the interview that I conducted with the general secretary of the TGS, who worked for ntvmsnbc.com²⁰⁶ in 2011-2012. They stated that the change in NTV started to happen after the June 2011 elections because "everybody in NTV was convinced that the AKP government is not leaving its ruling position and the more strength they gain, the more authoritarian they become".

"Almost every day we used to receive phone calls from consultants and undersecretaries of ministers, and MPs saying that 'well, you published this news but the Mister²⁰⁷ might be annoyed with that, you better remove it'. First we started to discuss among us whether we should remove, or re-edit or keep the news, but then when we kept them, they started calling our senior managers [Nermin Yurteri²⁰⁸ was mentioned], and then we had to remove them anyway. So that we started to remove them as soon as we received a phone call in order to save time, because we knew that the world would not be changed with this news ... It was the same at every media institution, even at very pro-government ones²⁰⁹, because they wanted an absolute allegiance, this would lead to a single party hegemony... And now, with the new law, they do not need to ring us, because without any court decision, the TİB (The Presidency of Telecommunication, a new institution under Prime Ministry) can remove any content from the internet within 4 hours. Even tweets from Twitter are being removed from the internet, it is like Orwell's 1984" (Interview 4).

Doğan Group (member of TÜSİAD) is another example of change from somewhat anti-AKP to somewhat pro-AKP case. Doğan group used to have a monopoly on media, but during the AKP period its power on the media has

²⁰⁶ NTV's website. It used to be a joint venture consisting of NTV, MS (Microsoft) and NBC. In 2013 the partnership came to an end.

²⁰⁷ Referring to PM Erdoğan.

²⁰⁸ Her phone-call tape with Yalçın Akdoğan (at that time he was the head consultant of PM Erdoğan) during the 17th December crisis revealed this relationship between the NTV and the AKP.

²⁰⁹ The interviewee was reminded of the *Alo Fatih* incident that was revealed by a phone-call tape between Erdoğan and Ciner Media's CEO Fatih Saraç about removing content from HABERTÜRK's website during the Gezi.

declined. For instance, Doğan Media sold Milliyet and Vatan newspapers to Demirören Group and STAR TV to Doğuş. At the moment Doğan Media owns Posta, Hürriyet, Fanatik and Radikal newspapers²¹⁰, Kanal D and CNN Türk television channels, and the Doğan News Agency. Doğan Group also received tenders from state institutions: Boyabat and Aslancık Hydroelectric Plants (partner with Doğuş), and Şah and Mersin Wind Power Plants. The general secretary of TGS also mentioned the oppression on Aydın Doğan.

“Today, the most sold newspapers are Posta, Hürriyet and Sözcü. The first two belong to Doğan and the third is distributed by Doğan. They are anti-government newspapers. Therefore, it is safe to say that there is no 100% allegiance to government by the media, but it is very obvious that government aims for it. For instance there have been rumours about Doğan being willing to sell Hürriyet. What happens to Doğan is a clear intimidation to all media owners” (Interview 4).

Doğan Holding was banned from government tenders in 2015. The Energy Ministry ordered Doğan and Petrol Ofisi (a fuel retailer it owned until 2010) to serve the 237 days remaining on a one-year ban imposed in 2009, according to the Official Gazette. The ban had previously been annulled by a court order. It applies to government tenders in all sectors (Meric, 2015).

During the marathon of four elections in 2014-2015 (local, presidential and 2 general), Doğan was on the side of anti-AKP groups. Hürriyet’s coverage of the given death sentence of former president of Egypt, Morsi, was heavily criticised by Erdoğan. Hürriyet later published an editorial declaration to ask the president to be more respectful to the freedom of press. Erdoğan did not refrain from criticising Doğan in public. Although as the president, he is supposedly impartial, he ran rallies for the AKP in 2015. On 5th June 2015, just two days prior to the General Elections, at his Eskişehir rally he criticised Doğan over plotting a coup against him.

“The parallel state [the Gülen movement] with the terrorist organisation [the PKK], and the main opposition party [the CHP] with the so-called nationalist party [the MHP] are all on the same side, fighting together shoulder to shoulder [in order to support the HDP against the AKP]. The coup-lover Doğan media and the international

²¹⁰ Closed down in 2016.

press that thinks [the Turkish] nation is their colony are trying to polish this dirty alliance. Let me give you an indicator. Who is assaulting your brother [Erdoğan]? If they were the ones that love this country, they are right but if they were the enemy of the nation, they are wrong. Well, given that the New York Times also assaulted Abdülhamid, Özal, and Menderes, and now they are assaulting your brother, then our way is right. [The NYT] did not assault the ones who have done nothing for the country's sake but it assaulted the one who serves this country..." (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 2015).

During the interim government rule between June and November 2015, Hürriyet was attacked by approximately 100 people with fire arms and stones led by the former head of youth organisation of the AKP, and an AKP MP, Abdurrahim Boynukalın. The MP later stated that by attacking Hürriyet, he removed the immunity of anti-AKP media. A few weeks later, a columnist from Hürriyet, Ahmet Hakan (pro-HDP) was attacked by a group of people and was hit severely. After the victory of AKP in November, Hürriyet became less critical about the AKP. Radikal, an anti-AKP outlet, was closed down, critical journalists were dismissed and the narrative of Hürriyet became pro-AKP. Ahmet Hakan changed too, and he became critical of the HDP. Another key issue that happened during the interim government was the removal of Gülen movement's television channels (STV, Bugün) from the digital platform Digitürk and the satellite Turksat.

Press censorship (Yeşil, 2014) and the neoliberal media autocracy (Akser & Baybars-Hawks, 2012) is rooted in the post-Ergenekon period. For instance in one of the CHP's booklet in 2010 about the media under the AKP, it is stated that Erdoğan once told media bosses that "columnists are your wage labour, they should do whatever you tell them" (CHP, 2010). Aydın argues that the Ergenekon case fulfilled a significant ideological role in authoritarianisation of the regime, which is one of the main foundations of the AKP's neoliberal-conservative hegemony project (UU Aydın, 2014, p.137).

"Although the AKP was now bringing all state apparatuses under its own control, and high-ranking military officers, including the ex-Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, politicians, academics, mafia leaders and journalists were being arrested, the new mainstream media managed to hegemonise the discourse of threatening 'pro-coup,

totalitarian, terrorist' forces *versus* civil politics and democratic forces, by means of bringing into the discussion on every occasion the allegation that, deep down in the state's basement tunnels, the Ergenekon organisation was staying on alert to overthrow the government" (UU Aydın, 2014, p.138).

In 2002, 2005 and 2008, the RTÜK introduced legal changes to include monetary fines for violations of broadcast laws in the country. Its critics claim that these closures of TV and radio channels by the RTÜK create excessive self-censorship of broadcasting in Turkey (Göl, 2012, p.268).

7.4.2. The Conditions of Public Broadcasting

According to Algan the privatisation of public broadcasting and the commercialisation of cultural industry was processed in Turkey through hegemony (Algan, 2003). Irak argues that while the conditions of journalism have been suffering from frequent and severe press freedom violations, the situation in state-run media differed from the private sector. The TRT and the AA received heavy financing and employed hundreds of pro-government journalists. Programmes on TRT often feature Yiğit Bulut and Yasin Aktay, chief advisors of Erdoğan, as regular guests, or even paid programme hosts (Irak, 2016, p.7). Now let me elaborate on this issue.

The 1961 Constitution created a relatively liberal environment and article 121 in the constitution ruled the monopoly of the state in radio and television broadcasting with strong autonomy and impartiality. Public television broadcasting started in Turkey with the establishment of the TRT in 1964. However, since it lost its autonomous status with the constitutional amendments of 1971 in the aftermath of the 12th March 1971 coup, the TRT has turned into a state broadcasting channel. The 1982 Constitution (article 133) and the TRT law in 1983 resumed the state-monopoly over broadcasting with much less autonomy under the 1980 regime. In 1983 the TRT started coloured broadcasting. The TRT's monopoly was interrupted by the establishment of STAR 1 in 1989, but the constitutional amendments to the article 133 about the allowing of privately-owned broadcasting took in

place in 1993. However, the state's control over the media and broadcasting has continued since the establishment of the RTÜK in 1994 through the financial and 'content' regulations of the private television and radio channels. It is worth mentioning that this 'content' monitoring includes also 'issuing warnings and assessing punishments when the broadcasting rules are violated'. Basically, the RTÜK's role over broadcasting was extended to apply censorship or shut them down for issues concerning 'sensitive' political topics such as national security, secularism, political Islam, the military, the Kurdish question, and the Armenian genocide. When the AKP came into power in 2002, no 'religious broadcasting' could take place in Turkey. (Göl, 2012, p.268). The AKP appointed Şenol Demiröz as the general director of the TRT in 2004 but one year later in 2005 he resigned. After his resignation the AKP wanted to appoint İbrahim Şahin but the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed his appointment two times and he was only finally appointed in 2007 after Abdullah Gül became the president. After the AKP-led appointments, criticisms by seculars were expressed as allegedly there was an increase in the number of 'religious programmes' on TRT. The TRT responded with an official statement highlighting that there is no such increase in the numbers and lengths of the 'religious programmes' as the number (four) of programmes had remained the same in between 2004-2006. However, as of August 2010, a content analysis of TRT programmes carried out by Göl indicates that the numbers of programmes with 'religious' themes had continuously increased (Göl, 2012, pp.270-271). In 2012, the TRT and the Directorate of Religious Affairs signed a collaboration agreement which was followed by the establishment of TRT Diyanet in 2014. The channel aims to provide religious broadcasting controlled by the state.

The accusations about the TRT were not limited to the increase in religious content in its programme. The opposition party leaders continuously complained about the non-objective broadcasting policy of the TRT. The questioning of the TRT's impartiality increased, especially during the 2014-2015 triple (later quadruple) elections marathon. Throughout the

Presidential Elections in 2014, it was reported that TRT News broadcast material about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (the AKP's candidate) for 8 hours and 2 minutes, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (the CHP and the MHP's joint candidate) for 2 hours and 53 minutes and Selahattin Demirtaş (the HDP's candidate) only for 1 hour and 24 minutes. The situation was criticised by Demirtaş later on and Şahin stated that the TRT would completely stop broadcasting about Demirtaş if he continued criticising it. The Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey (Turkish: *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*, YSK) fined the TRT more than 25 times throughout the elections. Similarly, in between two elections in 2015 the TRT was criticised by one of the members of RTÜK Ersin Öngel for favouritism. Öngel stated that the TRT broadcasted material for 30 hours about the AKP, 29 hours about the 'impartial' president Erdoğan, 5 hours about the CHP, 1 hour and 10 minutes about the MHP and only 18 minutes about the HDP (Hürriyet, 2015b). Furthermore the TRT broadcasted a documentary about the 17th December corruption scandal with a title of 'the 17th and 25th December Coup Plot'. The documentary included only pro-government journalists and the AKP MPs. Before the General Election of 7th June, the TRT refused to broadcast the opposition CHP's advertisement on the basis that 'the advert was criticising government'. In our interview it also came up, and the interviewee stated that the TRT has always been a state broadcaster rather than a public one since 1971 but the AKP used this method disproportionately without accountability and transparency in its budget and so on (Interview 6).

The AA is also being used in similar ways. As it was mentioned earlier the AA was established as the official news agency of the Independence Movement in April 1920. When it was converted into a corporation its shares were distributed to the agency employees in 1925. The Treasury collected 47.75% of these shares later; therefore the corporation became a state venture. In 2013, after the agency went into capital augmentation the agency's CEO Kemal Öztürk, former consultant of both Vice-PM Arınç and PM Erdoğan, personally took over 25.65% of the shares. Following his

resignation in 2014 it was revealed that the AA board did not allow the agency to be audited by the Court of Auditors (Turkish: *Sayıştay*) because they claimed that the agency legally has a private company status. On the other hand the state budget allocated to the agency had increased 540% in 2004-2012 (Irak, 2016, pp.10-11). In his study Irak revealed that 91.1% of the entire AA content in the first 20 days of February 2015 was related to Erdoğan or government and the agency's 'live commentary' did not feature any opposition politician while it covered the AKP's rallies even in small towns (Irak, 2016, p.7). Two former editors of the AA, who were hired to edit English-language news, later resigned from the agency and wrote a piece, titled "We Quit Working for Erdoğan's Propaganda Mouthpiece" on the VICE News site.

"Established in 1920, [the AA] was once a point of national pride. Today, it's just at the end of another set of strings in the ruling AK Party's puppet parade. ... As outsiders we take freedom of speech for granted" (O'Sullivan & Benitez, 2014).

The AKP's 'nepotism' has also occurred in the employment strategy of the TRT and the AA. Before the clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement started, dozens of journalist from Samanyolu, Zaman and CHA were employed at TRT, however those journalists were fired after the 17th December corruption scandal was revealed. The AA's high ranking staff on the board were rather chosen from the 'pool media' and close circles of Erdoğan and Arınç (Irak, 2016, pp.9-10).

7.4.3. Religious Broadcasting and the Rise of Islamic Mass Media

The media in pre-AKP Turkey and its role in society differed from other Islamic countries in the region, mostly because of established secularism. For instance, the media were not allowed to pursue any sorts of religious broadcasting that would clash with secular principles. Furthermore, the representation of religion and secularism have been under the state's control and been systematically reproduced by the state-controlled media. Although the latter has showed no drastic changes since the AKP came into power,

there has been a significant increase in the number and quality of religious programmes on both state-controlled and privately-owned media in the same period. This is called 'mediatisation of religion' by Göl and she further explains how and to what extent it challenged the secular media under AKP rule (Göl, 2012, pp.261-262). She emphasises that the centre-right (mainstream) media, even the liberal and secular ones, supported the rise of AKP in 2002 by considering it as the only political agent that would manage to integrate Turkey into the Western liberal democratic system. The mainstream media seemed mesmerised by the new ideological label of the party, generated by Yalçın Akdoğan, the 'conservative democrats'. However, the rise of AKP caused two results in the media. First the visibility of Islam has increased in the media and second the boundaries of secular establishment in media (and elsewhere) have been challenged (Göl, 2012, pp.264-265). The AKP's policies towards multi-media groups resulted in abandoning the 'no religious broadcasting' tradition and the increase of religious content in television programmes. This 'mediatisation of religion' trend has been observed in both the TRT and private channels (Göl, 2012, p.268). The media's role in social change has shifted from reproduction of secularism to reproduction of Islamism. According to UU Aydın, the Islamic and conservative media became a hegemonic media bloc consisting of Sabah, ATV, TRT, AA, Zaman, Star, Kanal 24, Yeni Şafak and Taraf founded specifically with a mission to struggle against military tutelage (2014, p.136) because in the aftermath of the 28th February 1997 memorandum and the 2001 economic crisis, the Islamist media became a refuge (Kentmen, 2010, p.635).

The strange case of Taraf as a hegemonic assistant is noteworthy to elaborate. Taraf is a liberal newspaper in Turkey and it has been being published since 2007 (Polat, 2014, p.208). Following its establishment, the paper has started to publish documents about the omissions of the Armed Forces during the PKK attacks and the Ergenekon coup plot. These documents were used as evidence in the trials. Also the newspaper has

played a key role in shaping public opinion with its controversial style. For instance, the paper was the first partner of WikiLeaks in Turkey and was later described as ‘the bravest newspaper in Turkey’ by Julian Assange (Hürriyet Daily News, 2011). Although they did not use it with a positive connotation, Interviewee 6 stated that “[t]here was a need for Taraf in those days” (Interview 6). Aladağ describes Taraf and its ideology ‘left liberalism’ as a project whilst the hegemony was being reconstructed.

“Taraf has created a discourse based on the concepts around ‘civil society’, ‘globalisation’, and ‘democratisation’ within the market economy; instead of concepts like ‘class’, ‘state’ and ‘imperialism’ that have been used by the left in order to explain the relations” (Aladağ, 2013, p.285).

The rise of the liberal left could be seen as the continuation of the split in the Turkish left since the 1980s; however, what Taraf did was to add concepts like ‘military tutelage’, ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘normalising’ to the discourse and to meld them with its overall critique on the ‘traditional’ left in Turkey (2013, p. 285). By doing so Taraf also supported the ‘Not Enough but Yes!’ bloc during the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. Undoubtedly, its position in the second term of AKP could be described as pro-government. In 2012 its founding editors-in-chief Ahmet Altan and the assistant to the editor-in-chief Yasemin Çongar, and columnists Murat Belge, Neşe Düzel and Hadi Uluengin resigned from the newspaper and since then it has turned into a pro-Gülen newspaper; therefore it joined the anti-government side along with other Gülenist institutions.

7.5. The Discontent and Resistance around the Mass Media

Interviewee 9 highlighted the complex relationship between the space and culture industry and defined shopping centres as the manifestation of this relationship.

“If you want to watch a film, you have to go a shopping centre, in a consumption cathedral, you have to walk through hundreds of shops with international brands and have to watch dozens of adverts and have to watch a film that is made exclusively for profit” (Interview 9).

Interviewee 4 mentioned a few industrial actions within the mass media sector. ATV-Sabah workers unionised under the TGS went on strike in 2009, and this was the first industrial action in the sector for 29 years (Keten, 2015, p.239). However, the crucial point is that there has been a growing discontent over the mass media as a hegemonic project. Anti-capitalist Muslims reflected on media ownership from a fundamental point of view. The founding member, whom I interviewed, stated that media is a business of capital. They gave the example of Çapul TV²¹¹ which disappeared after a while. Therefore media imposes on us their bourgeois ethics. On the transformation of media ownership they mentioned that it only transfers from one side of capital to another, actors are changing but the story is the same (Interview 2). The BHH reflects on the transformation of media ownership in a similar way, a shift from one capital group to another – especially from pre-AKP period’s dominant media powers (mainly Doğan) to pro-AKP capital groups now. Interviewee 1 finalised their comments on media as “to be able to pursue a *neutral* journalism is a means of resistance at the moment” (Interview 1).

7.5.1. The Mass Media and the Gezi Uprising

“Journalists lost their jobs just for applying the minimum journalistic ethics” (Interview 8).

The mainstream media in Turkey remained silent throughout the Gezi protests, leading the demonstrators to use social media to inform the rest of the world. Videos from the streets of Istanbul revealing the images of police brutality quickly garnered the focus of the international press. For instance, CNN televised the entire night of demonstrations on 2 June for nine hours. Interviewee 4 mentioned that their colleagues from mainstream media outlets told him that “we record, we write but editors do not publish them”.

²¹¹ An online TV channel that was established by Gezi Park protestors.

“After a while they stopped coming during the day time, they worked elsewhere and then in the evening they joined the Gezi protests” (Interview 4).

Interviewee 4 used to work for İMC TV at that time and they stated that, probably because of the ‘flirtation’ between the AKP and Kurdish groups, even İMC TV declined to broadcast Gezi in the first few days. As a trade union, they also worked in order to protect journalists at the same time. As they pointed out, for the most intense 10-15 days as a trade unionist Interviewee 4 often went to hospitals to help the members who were injured by police attacks (especially by tear gas canisters) and to police stations to help the members who were taken under police custody. He also told a story that he experienced at a park forum after Gezi.

“After Gezi, journalists started to question themselves, they started to come to our union; they wanted to be a member, so Gezi was our milestone. After Gezi, our membership increased 25% and we changed. We removed Turkish flags and Atatürk pictures from the union, then we removed the emphasis on Turkishness from our constitution, Gezi was not just Gezi, it was an upheaval for the media. We understood that we cannot wait for our bosses, Doğan, Ciner or Şahenk, to break up with the government, we need to defend our rights by ourselves” (Interview 4).

Anti-capitalist Muslims also reflected on media and Gezi. Interviewee 2 mentioned that the government did not decide what to do in the beginning of Gezi; we can understand it from the lack of coverage by media. After 15 days, government waited for the media to demonstrate protestors as elitist people. So it was not surprising that poor masses who live dependent on television responded to that. Therefore the police attacks became legitimate in the eyes of poor people (Interview 2). Also Gezi caused further narrowing down in the journalism ethics of pro-AKP newspapers, such as Yeni Şafak dismissing ‘neutral’ columnists during the Gezi uprising (Saymaz, 2014, p.197). It was also argued that Gezi caused further ‘schism’ in the secularist and Islamist divide (Oğurlu & Öncü, 2015).

“Gezi was a rupture in media relations” says Interviewee 1 in the interview. They gave an example of the rise of Halk TV or BirGün newspaper. Also Gülen movement joined the anti-government side. That is a breakup in

'pool media'. "There were some papers that cannot join government's meetings²¹² such as Cumhuriyet, BirGün, and Evrensel – now Zaman and Bugün are included into that list (Interview 1). Interviewee 7 mentioned that they were working as the press and information officer of the 'Gezi commune' and was simply repeating "what the square was saying" (Interview 7).

In its third parliamentary period in between 2011 and 2015 the AKP has become harsher on the media and this even intensified after the Gezi uprising. Interviewee 6 defined Gezi as a rupture in media relations in Turkey.

"Gezi helped people to understand how the media works. It was the moment that government's hegemony broke. Even apolitical people went on the streets. For media, it is very crucial that people went to a media centre and protested against their broadcasting policy; also they smashed their vans in the Square. Somebody took the microphone of Habertürk (Ciner Holding) on a live show and asked them 'will Habertürk broadcast us if we pay for it'. A protest against Güner Ümit's racist comments took place in the 1990s but Gezi was different. People were angry because their protests were not being covered. Cem Aydın, the CEO of Doğu Media had to resign and the channel apologised later on for their negligence during the Gezi uprising. This was very drastic in terms of the media as an ideological state apparatus" (Interview 6).

In terms of the relations between media and government, the AKP did not leave the media any space to be impartial in this period. Pro-government media was being rewarded with tenders from state institutions and anti-government media was being punished with tax and other fines. For instance Ulusal TV, Halk TV, Cem TV and EM TV were being fined by the RTÜK due to their coverage during the Gezi uprising. Taraf newspaper was fined for \$1.5 million due to violating paper-recycling issues. However, the newspaper has become anti-government since 2013. Pro-Gülen movement television channels' (Bugün TV, STV, Samanyolu Haber, Mehtap TV and KANALTÜRK) licences were unlawfully cancelled and they were removed from digital

²¹² Referring to the fact that the AKP does not provide accreditation to anti-government newspapers for accessing their buildings, therefore they cannot cover news from government.

platforms in 2015. Constitutionally the RTÜK should have taken action as it was a violation of a contract valid until 2024; however it remained quiet. Although it was in the AKP's fourth period, the confiscation of Bugün TV and Bugün newspaper in November 2015 also could be given an example. On the other hand, pro-government media kept receiving tenders from the state institutions.




Figure 26: Turkey's Position in the Reporters without Borders' Press Freedom Index.

(Source: <https://en.rsf.org>)

As it can be seen in Figure 26, the pressure on media has started to increase after 2007. This could be seen within the decline in the EU relations, and the AKP's second victory, which strengthened their position.

Digital journalism, social media and citizen journalism gained importance after the Gezi uprising.

"We realised that the mainstream media is not only partisan, it is also unnecessary, so that social media and citizen journalism were the main means of communications during the Gezi uprising" (Interview 7).

As the conventional media tools (television, newspaper, magazines, and radio) have become a battlefield for the struggle over hegemony, social media and digital journalism has started to gain importance and has been increasingly popular among internet users. Bianet (Turkish: *Bağımsız İletişim Ağı*, Independent Communication Network, established in 2000), T24 (established in 2009) and Diken (established in 2014) could be given as examples of independent internet-based journalism in Turkey. Doğan's Radikal was transformed to an online-only newspaper in 2014, but however

closed down in 2016. As a space for resistance, citizen journalism has risen as an alternative after the Gezi uprising, and 'Çapul TV', 'dokuz8' and '140 journos' could be examples of those initiatives. However, as these types of journalism do not include any editorial process, it is controversial to argue that they could represent an alternative. Furthermore, sustainability becomes an issue for this type of initiative as they have to compete with mainstream media tools' websites (Interview 6). It is also crucial to highlight that social media (especially Facebook and Twitter) has become increasingly popular and a means of communication among dissident groups. Therefore there have been several censorships applied to social media (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and so on) since 2007. The internet censorship took to an official form in 2011 through the BTK (Turkish: *Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu*, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority) draft regulations on internet filtering. It caused an outcry across the country and "Don't touch my Internet!" (Turkish: *İnternetime Dokunma!*) protests were organised in various cities across Turkey. In 2014, a new law was passed and according to the law the TİB (Turkish: *Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı*, the Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication) that was organised under the Prime Ministry was given the authority to remove any content in four hours without any judicial process if the content is related to the secrecy of private life or if it is a non-delayable case. However it is criticised that the definition of 'secrecy of private life is' too ambiguous in the law. As of 27th February 2016, 108,660 websites were blocked in Turkey and 94.3% of those websites were blocked by the TİB (source: <https://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/>).




Figure 27: Number of Websites Blocked, excluding 1436 websites that were blocked at unknown times.

(Source: <https://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/>)




Figure 28: Turkey's points in Freedom of Social Media

(Source: <https://freedomhouse.org>)

In Freedom House's 'Freedom on the Net' reports, Turkey's status has worsened since the report started to be published in 2009. Although the status has remained as 'partly free', Turkey's points on internet freedom have declined since 2009. From the government's side, there are initiatives that praise the AKP's activities on the internet. They are called in social media AK-trolls (Turkish: *AK-troller*), and arguably they are web-bots controlled from one centre.

7.6. Conclusion

In chapter 7, I analysed the political economy of media in Turkey between 2002 and 2015. The main focus of the chapter was concentrated on the relations of media ownership as the transformation of media manifested itself around the property relations in Turkey in that period. In the chapter I investigated the positions of social forces while the AKP was transforming the media relations. This transformation was led by the AKP's neoliberal Islamism and the chapter presented how the AKP articulated discourse around the neoliberal restructuring of media relations. This presented the influence of AKP on media with direct or indirect pressures, censorship, and self-censorship. The emergence of social media as a means of communication and its effect on social movements were also analysed in the chapter. Theoretically I borrowed the Gramscian understanding of the media as one of the components of passive revolution. I conceptualised media as a perception controller. After compiling the actors in media, I analysed the transformation of media in Turkey in two trends around media ownership: first the creation of pro-government 'partisan/pool', media and second the disciplining/intimidation of mainstream media. The first one features three paths. The first is the transformation of TRT and AA into a pro-government television channel and news agency. Second, the purchase of the ATV-Sabah group by Çalık Group (where the son-in-law of Erdoğan was the CEO) (Ayşe Öncü, 2012, p.130) started a new trend of manipulating media ownership in 2007. Some media companies were confiscated by TMSF and they were sold to holdings that had close ties with the AKP. Third, there were also already pro-AKP media tools. In 2015 there were five media holdings which could be seen in this category: Turkuvaz Media (Sabah and ATV), Esmedya (Kanal 24 and Star), Albayrak Holding (Yeni Şafak), İhlas Holding (TGRT and Türkiye) and Yeni Dünya Media (Kanal 7 and Ülke TV). Seven newspapers (Bugün, Sabah, Star, Habertürk, Türkiye, Yeni Şafak and Zaman) from this category published the same headline on 7th June 2013 during the Gezi uprising. The headline was Prime Minister Erdoğan's response to the protestors. Zaman

and Bugün newspapers and the STV are embedded in the Gülen movement so, although they were in that category until the end of 2013, they cannot be accepted as pro-government since then. After the split, the pro-Gülen media changed their editorial contents into anti-government ones. The disciplining and intimidation of mainstream media manifest itself in three ways: tax policies, distributing public resources and direct pressure. The tax policies have been utilised on especially the Doğan Media Group, the leader of the sector. Doğan's major newspaper Hürriyet was critical on the AKP government until 2011. For instance in 2008, the newspaper criticised the amendments to the constitution in their headline. However the decline of its tone has been observed throughout the three periods of AKP rule. Distributing public resources has been utilised to discipline the mainstream media whilst the urban regeneration projects accelerated. Especially Doğu Holding (the NTV and Star TV) and Ciner Holding (Habertürk and Show TV) could be included in this group as the more they benefited from tenders, the less critical they have become. Their silence during the Gezi uprising was heavily criticised. Coercion has been active as well among the media and press sector. According to the TGS, 94 journalists were imprisoned (in 2012) for doing their jobs. Islamic emphasis could be highlighted as well. There has been an increase in the number of pro-Islamic channels and newspapers since 2002. Also, censorship within Islamic moral criteria has become a rule in the media. Therefore, the media and press sector will be the third and final empirical section of the thesis. The direct pressure cannot be limited to mainstream media; it is also applied to critical and radical media on press and television and social and internet media. In this category, I have given the press freedom violations such as direct intervention from government to editors, imprisonment of journalists (Ahmet Şık, Nedim Şener, Ekrem Dumanlı, Can Dündar, Erdem Gül, Oda TV case, KCK Press Committee case), assassination of journalists (Hrant Dink), mass firings by suggestions from government, media blackouts after critical events, physical assaults against journalists and media centres by AKP officials (Ahmet Hakan and Hürriyet), blocking of social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), and removal of anti-

government content from the internet by the BTK. Direct pressure has accelerated in the last parliamentary period of the AKP as the resistance created counter-hegemony. I have also analysed the industrial relations within media sector in this chapter as well.

According to centre-periphery relations approach, the media in Turkey is divided within religious and secularism issues (Somer, 2010) but can come together on the issues regarding the Sèvres Syndrome (Guida, 2008). In this chapter I argued that secularist versus Islamist dichotomy does not provide sufficient background to analyse the political economy of mass media in Turkey under the AKP rule. The togetherness of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON in their involvement in urban regeneration projects and mass media sector simultaneously invalidates the dichotomy. Similarly the liquidation of Gülen group demonstrates that the conflict is beyond Islamist versus secularist dichotomy. Also the “archaic meta-theoretical disease” of Turkish political science (Göker, 2010) that is based on the understanding that 2002 was a rupture in Turkey is also problematic because such reading of 2002 as an *epistemological rupture*²¹³ cannot explain the rising *authoritarian populism* (Hall, 1980b, p.157) and authoritarian characteristics (Letsch, 2011; The Economist, 2011) of the AKP over the media through press-party parallelism (Çarkoğlu & Yavuz, 2010, p.615). This authoritarianism will perhaps lead from parliamentarism to presidentialism (Arato, 2010). Despite its hegemonic discourse on merging liberalism and Islamism, the AKP actually represents the authoritarian Islamism within neoliberal restructuring (Bedirhanoğlu, 2010, p.64).

²¹³ I owe this term to Althusser and Balibar (2009, p.49).

8. Concluding Remarks

“I’m a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will” (Gramsci, 2011, p.299).

8.1. Introduction

This research analysed the political economy of urbanisation, education and the mass media in Turkey under the AKP rule between 2002 and 2015 within the conceptual framework of hegemony. It argues that, according to the centre-periphery relations approach, the rise of the AKP is a response by the religious society to the secular state. In this approach, the centre is represented by the state and its antagonistic relationship with the periphery, which is represented by society, is the dynamic behind the rise of the AKP. However, the thesis argues that the rise of the AKP is not a response to secularism; rather, it is a result of the convergence of political Islam with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism was introduced by the military regime and the ANAP governments in the 1980s, and changed the capital accumulation regime entirely. The ISI model was replaced by the export-oriented rapid growth model. Moreover, both the military regime and the ANAP used Islam as a unifying element for the polarised society. The AKP succeeded in merging those political and economic qualities and presented itself as an alternative after the subsequent economic crises of 2000 and 2001. This thesis particularly focuses on how the AKP managed to create consent from the masses for its rule. Three key sectors that the AKP has used as consent-making projects have been identified: urbanisation, education and mass media. The position of social forces vis-à-vis economic-political transformation of those three areas has been analysed.

The conclusion is structured as follows. First, the key concepts that have been used to drive the narrative and analyses in this thesis are described. Within this context, the justification and rationale of this thesis are also presented. Second, an overall analysis of the three empirical chapters that

cover urbanisation, education and the mass media sectors in Turkey in 2002-2015 with their crossing points is given. This overall analysis consists of the empirical findings and demonstrates how these findings answer the research question and sub-questions. Finally, along with discussion of recent developments in 2015, the thesis will speculate about probable future coordinates of hegemony/authoritarianism and the class struggle in Turkey. This assessment will offer, as Morgan reports quoting the words of Antonio Gramsci, “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” (Morgan, 1987).

In the introduction, one main research question and two sub-questions were posed to investigate the rise of the AKP. The main question was designed to reveal one main point: the social forces that have been supportive and non-supportive of political Islam, neoliberalism, and their convergence. Furthermore two sub-questions were designed to reveal two sub-points: first, the way that the AKP articulated discourses around neoliberal restructuring; and, second, the extent to which neoliberalism is consent-based in Turkey. The main objective of this thesis is to provide an alternative reading to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. The dominant narrative to explain this rise is based on the centre-periphery model, in which the state (centre) and society (periphery) are conceptualised separately. This conceptual separatism is also applied to the state-market and political-economic relations. This understanding of state-society relations that is based on dichotomies, limits us to perceive societies within identity-based dualisms. The secularist versus Islamist conflict is rooted in this dualist understanding. In this dichotomy the secularists represent the state and the political as the centre, whereas the Islamists represent society and the economic as the periphery. In the centre-periphery literature, civil society is also assigned a progressive role, often against the backwardness of the state. The AKP’s victory in 2002 can be understood within this conceptualisation by the centre-periphery relations approach. The negligence of social classes in this approach causes the construction of societal dichotomies within identity-based dualisms. Although the secularist

versus Islamist conflict and the class conflict are not completely mutually exclusive, it is plausible to argue that an analysis without the social relations of production is partial and problematic. The capitalist mode of production and, in particular, neoliberalism is based on private property and private ownership of the means of production. Thus, the social relations of production are being shaped by two facts. First, those who do not own any means of production have to sell their labour to survive and, second, those who own the means of production can extract surplus value and accumulate more capital from the first one. This dialectical relationship reproduces itself through time and it represents the class struggle; in Marxist terms, the engine of the historical development. Therefore, it is argued that the conflict between classes transcends the conflict between identities, such as secularist versus Islamist. In addition, in the case of the rise of the AKP, one should start one's analysis by taking the struggle *between* and *within* social classes into account. To do so, one should avoid the dualist understanding of the state-society, state-market, and economic-political relations. In the third chapter, the GHM approach is proposed in this respect.

The third chapter provides an introduction to the GHM account which is based on the integral state as an alternative theoretical framework. This chapter is founded on the theoretical discussions around the Gramscian terms 'the integral state', 'hegemony', and 'passive revolution'. A holistic approach needs to be applied in order to overcome the shortcomings of dualist understanding. Gramsci's notion of the integral state provides this holistic approach to state-society relations. Gramsci defines the integral state as "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion", formulated as "political society + civil society" (1971, pp.262-263), or in other words the state as hegemony fortified by coercion (Sassoon, 1987, p.109). In this formula, Gramsci methodologically conceives political society or the state as the realm of force or coercion and civil society as the realm of consent or hegemony. Their symbiotic togetherness forms the integral state, which represents the capitalist state in Gramsci's works. Therefore, hegemony is

understood as a process in which the consent of the masses is produced. Finally, passive revolution refers to a non-ruptured and gradual significant change, supported by the production of consent, protected by coercion, and realised by the ruling class. The GHM account's holistic epistemology considers the capitalist system as a whole. In the Turkish case, this would mean not seeking antagonism between the 'secular' and 'military' state, and the 'religious' and 'civilian' society. Rather, the antagonism is sought between or within classes. The GHM account offers a reading of civil society that does not consider it in an automatically progressive state. Civil society is part of the integral state and it is the sphere in which consent is produced. Therefore, according to the GHM approach, the integral state is the terrain on which hegemonic struggles are carried out and civil society can be on either the progressive or reactionary side of those struggles. A conceptualisation that considers civil society as necessarily progressive would be unrealistic. Moreover, as Yalman coins it, juxtaposing the state and civil society within a 'false dichotomy' is a hegemonic strategy itself which was carried out by Erdoğanism (2012, pp.24-32). Finally, the GHM account seeks the antagonism between or within classes and class struggle is central to the analysis. The relations of production and its social aspects are at the core of the GHM approach. In historical materialist terms, the base determines the superstructure, and the GHM approach focusses on the relationship between the base and superstructure. As superstructural nodes, urbanisation, education and the mass media are determined by the capitalist mode of production and in return they maintain it. These three sectors are interconnected to each other and together they indicate a unique form of hegemonic project. They are also not only the sectors that reproduce hegemony; they are also the sectors where capitalist social relations take place.

8.2. The Trajectory of Urbanisation, Education and Mass Media Sectors in Turkey under the AKP

“The mass media, education, the space... they are all restructured as capital wants” (Interview 9).

“Turkey’s years under the AKP governments can be read as the articulation of brute, violent neoliberalism with the silence of Islamist politics. ... All social and political *discoveries* under the AKP’s rule have been made to conform to a neoliberal economic rationality, which is fixed on the goals of marketisation and commodification without regard to the real lives of real people suffering from exploitation, suppression, and oppression” (Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012, pp.295-296).

The complex relationship between the state, capital, labour, and unorganised resistance movements indicated a hegemonic process under the AKP rule between 2002 and 2015. This process manifested itself for the persistence of neoliberal relations of production. The sustainability of these particular social relations of production was promoted via the production of ideology through the reproduction of religious and secular identities. The sectors of urbanisation, education, and the media were utilised in order to create and sustain the hegemonic relationship, as they are the spheres where the ideology is being reproduced. The hegemonic relationship was not reproduced merely through the production of consent process; rather, it was shaped within the complexity of consensual politics for some, and coercion-based politics for others. The consensual process created its own discontent and therefore faced contestation. By the time the AKP’s social base had lost its plurality, its responses to the unrest became more severe and coercive. The Islamic neoliberalism in Turkey has created an environment where the one half of the citizens consented and the other half contested.




Figure 29: Urbanisation, Education and the Mass Media under the AKP rule.

Urbanisation in Turkey between 2002 and 2015 demonstrated two major non-mutually-exclusive processes: first, the re-commodification of space with Islamic characteristics and, second, the allocation of incentives for pro-government capital. The re-commodification of space is divided into two categories: urban and rural space. In urban space, the process was concentrated on the commodification of already commodified city land through urban regeneration projects, especially in the slum neighbourhoods, public areas, and historical sites. It also covered the expansion of cities which led to the commodification of peripheral natural resources, such as Istanbul's northern forests, and the commodification of rural land through mega projects, such as *Kanal İstanbul*, the Third Bridge, the Third Airport in Istanbul, and mine and dam projects elsewhere in Turkey. The commodification processes in both urban and rural areas were neoliberal projects and served to promote the class conflict in favour of the capitalist class by reproducing the social relations of production *within* and *through*

urbanisation. Relations were reproduced *within* urbanisation since this was the terrain where the conditions of the working class in the construction sector worsened throughout the AKP rule. For example in 2015, the construction sector again suffered the highest number of fatalities in Turkey, with 418 workers' deaths out of a total of 1,703 (İş Cinayetlerini Unutma, 2016). Moreover, the social relations of production are maintained *through* urbanisation, as this is the terrain of hegemonic production and reproduction. For example, urban regeneration projects dispossessed the working class masses by dislocating them from their shanty towns to new houses outside of the cities with indebtedness. The process caused class division in the city, and created debt for the working class. In response to the first sub-research question, it is safe to conclude that, by using the stability discourse, the AKP created consent for its single party rule. The capitalist class benefitted from the urban regeneration project by accumulating more capital from this dispossession. Therefore the capitalist class was supportive of the convergence of neoliberalism and Islamism.

This accumulation regime also helped the AKP to create a capitalist class that is more loyal to it because the tenders were being distributed via state agents such as the TOKİ, the related ministries, and municipalities; thus the tenders were distributed to pro-government capital. In return, this pro-government capital mainly helped the AKP to be portrayed as successful and justified by the media outlets owned by those capitalist groups. Moreover, such groups formed a pool to buy media outlets confiscated by the TMSF. The urban regeneration projects run by those groups were portrayed positively in their media outlets and resistance movements against those projects were either ignored or demonised. This allocation also included traditionally 'secular' capital, such as Doğu Holding. This circle continued in the first and second periods of the AKP but it encountered opposition in the third period, as the discontent grew stronger and more wide-spread. Thus, the coercion-based politics of the AKP started to challenge the consent-based politics.

Islamic characteristics were incorporated into the commodification processes, in order to perpetuate the hegemonic reproduction through material structures of ideology, such as naming the Third Bridge after the first Turkish caliph, Yavuz Sultan Selim, and encouraging the revival of neo-Ottoman architecture in public construction projects. The construction of a new mosque on Çamlıca Hill, which is going to be the largest mosque in Turkey, could also be seen as an example of the material structure of ideology, as it is being constructed for symbolic purposes rather than material needs. The opposition that the AKP encountered regarding its urbanisation politics exemplified united resistance, consisting also of Islamic groups. In sum, as proposed by the literature reviewed in the second chapter, the dichotomy of secularists versus Islamists does not explain the social dynamics in Turkey. However, the alternative approach based on the 'consent + coercion' model, introduced in the third chapter, provides a dialectical reading of social dynamics. Instead of putting the dichotomy between identities, a class-based dichotomy is more helpful in comprehending the antagonisms in society because the involvement of Islamic groups in the Gezi uprising and the involvement of secular capital in the urban regeneration projects cannot be explained by secularist versus Islamist conflict.

There are also two non-mutually-exclusive processes in Turkish education between 2002 and 2015: the Islamicisation of K-12 education, and the marketisation of higher education. The Islamicisation of education was concentrated at the primary and secondary education levels, and the process was observed only in the third period (2011-2015). By passing the 4+4+4 system, the AKP entirely transformed the K-12 schooling system in Turkey. In this system, compulsory education becomes twelve years non-continuously, whereas it used to be eight years continuously. The non-continuity refers to the gap years that pupils could take after the 4th and 8th grades. The gap years aim to encourage distance education, especially for girls. Indeed, between 2013 and 2015, approximately 260,000 female

students did not continue to the 5th and 9th grades at formal education institutions (Diken, 2014b) and 36,401 female students did not continue even to open high schools (Diken, 2015). As a result, the net schooling ratio has decreased from 99.57% to 96.30% since 2012. This situation arguably aimed at providing an environment for child marriage; indeed, there has been an increase in the number of child marriages since 2012, and a recent study indicated that one third of all marriages in Turkey are actually child marriages (Hürriyet, 2015c). There was also an increase in the Islamic content in the curriculum. The Quran and the life of Mohammad were introduced as optional courses to the secondary schools; however, because of their 'popularity', they have become *de-facto* compulsory subjects along with the other compulsory religious class for every level, introduced after the coup in 1980. Finally, abolishing mixed-sex education was being discussed publicly. The rise of Imam-Hatip schools was another aspect of Islamicisation. These vocational schools are normally for training imams and preachers. However, they have become a frontline for the so-called secularist versus Islamist struggle. In the military intervention of 1997, the army forced the government to close down secondary sections of Imam-Hatip schools and, by changing the scoring system for access to university exams, the Imam-Hatip graduates were limited to going only to theology departments at the universities. However, the AKP lifted this restriction with the new 4+4+4 system, and the secondary school branches of the Imam-Hatips were re-opened. Furthermore, the regular high schools started being transformed into Imam-Hatip institutions, whose number doubled between 2012 and 2015. This had two outcomes. First, there was an increase in private schooling because those who did not want to send their children to Imam-Hatip schools and could afford it sent their children to private schools. Second, there was the *de-facto* end of mixed-sex education because Imam-Hatips started to separate schools on a gender basis. The increase in private schooling, the increase in the number of *dershanes* and their transformation into private schools, and an increase in child labour as a result of the 4+4+4 system can be seen within the marketisation of K-12 education.

The marketisation of education was a process concentrated on the higher education level throughout the three periods of the AKP rule. For example, the number of foundation universities tripled between 2002 and 2015. Although it did not happen in the period that this research focussed on, the AKP supported the transformation of foundation universities into profit-seeking private universities. The marketisation of higher education brought deunionisation and the precariatization of academic staff to the foundation universities. The process also had an impact on the public universities as it brought market rules, such as competitiveness, outsourcing the non-academic work, and temporary contracts for researchers in the public universities. Islamicisation was also another process in higher education. This could be seen within the material structures of ideology. For instance, there are currently 80 mosques being constructed on campuses across the country. Also Erdoğan suggested the term campus should not be used, but it should be called a *küllüye*, an Ottoman complex in which the mosque is in the centre and all other facilities are surrounding it. The lifting of the ban on headscarves at both K-12 and higher education levels could also be seen as elements of Islamicisation. The reproduction of the social relations of production *within* education could be seen especially in the precariatization of teachers and academics. The reproduction of social relations of production *through* education was a hegemonic process and the creation of consent was a long-term aim.

All in all, the findings indicate that there is not only Islamicisation; there is also neoliberalisation of education, which means that Islamicisation actually articulated with neoliberalism. The latter demonstrates continuity with the pre-AKP governments whereas the former demonstrates rupture. The centre-periphery relations approach, and its assertion of secularist versus Islamist conflict, does not provide an adequate basis to analyse the transformation of education in Turkey under AKP rule. Contrary to the centre-periphery relations approach's reading of education in Turkey, it is argued that, rather than a sphere of struggle between secularists and

Islamists, education is a sphere of class struggle, in which the AKP has been utilising Islamicisation in order to absorb the discontent against marketisation. In response to the first sub-research question, we can conclude that this process also helps the AKP to reproduce hegemony at the very beginning of everyday life, at school. Consequently, comparing the integral state with the centre-periphery model, the latter is limited to the secularist versus Islamist antagonism as a result of the assumed state-society dichotomy whereas the integral state provides a more holistic understanding, in which the state and various sections of civil society (capitalist groups, trade unions and un-organised resistance groups) are conceptualised symbiotically which provides a reading that takes account of social relations of production.

Media relations in Turkey between 2002 and 2015 also demonstrated two processes. First, the creation of pro-government mass media, and second the disciplining of the mainstream mass media. Moreover, these developments were not mutually exclusive. The creation of pro-government media included two main sub-processes: the transformation of mass media ownership, and the abuse of public broadcasting. The transformation of the structure of oligopoly in the media, through the manipulation of media ownership, was the major phenomenon in the mass media sector under AKP rule. The process was driven by a state agent, the TMSF. There were four major cases of the confiscation of media outlets in 2002 and 2015. In 2004, the STAR group (newspaper and television channel) was confiscated from (anti-AKP) Cem Uzan, who had been a political rival of the AKP back in 2002. The channel was sold to (somewhat anti-AKP mainstream) Doğan Media in 2005 but as Doğan decided to shrink the business, as a result of the disciplining, which is another process, STAR TV was purchased by (somewhat pro-AKP mainstream) Doğuş Holding in 2011. The newspaper was then sold to (pro-AKP) Ethem Sancak's Esmedy in 2008. In 2007, the second largest media group in the country, Sabah-ATV group, was confiscated from (somewhat pro-AKP mainstream in 2007) Turgay Ciner by

the TMSF and sold to (pro-AKP) Çalık Holding, in which the CEO was Berat Albayrak, the son-in-law of Erdoğan. Later, in 2013, the group was purchased by, as it was later called, the (pro-AKP) 'pool media'. The 'pool' was created by the construction companies that won or were interested in winning the tenders of mega projects, such as the Third Airport, the Third Bridge, and so on. In 2013, the assets of (somewhat anti-AKP mainstream) Çukurova Holding, SHOW TV, Digiturk (satellite television platform), and Akşam (newspaper), were confiscated from its owner Mehmet Emin Karamehmet. SHOW TV was bought by (pro-AKP) Ciner; Digiturk was purchased by (somewhat pro-AKP) Al Jazeera; and Akşam was sold to (pro-AKP) Esmedy. Finally, in 2015 and 2016, Bugün and Zaman, two major newspapers of the Gülen movement, were confiscated and trustees were appointed to those media assets. These newspapers were transformed from pro-AKP to anti-AKP following the fight between the Gülen group and the AKP. From 2002 to 2015, the media ownership in Turkey witnessed an overall shift towards the pro-AKP side of the scale. As can be seen above, some groups also changed their political allegiance throughout the periods of AKP rule. For example, Doğu had been somewhat anti-AKP but, following the party's victory in 2011, it became somewhat pro-AKP. Ciner also became pro-AKP at that time. Doğan first shrunk in 2011 by selling one television channel and two newspapers, and later its position changed after the 1st November general elections in 2015, as it became somewhat pro-AKP in 2016. The Gülen movement's media outlets represent the only reverse shift. The disciplining of mainstream media manifested itself through selective tax penalties, direct threats and attacks by the AKP staff, imprisoning journalists, and rewarding them with state tenders of urbanisation projects.

The abuse of public broadcasting was another dimension of the creation of pro-government media. The AA and the TRT became pro-AKP media outlets throughout the AKP rule. Therefore, it is safe to argue that public broadcasting was abused by the AKP in order to expand the pro-government media group. The creation of pro-government media also brought an

increase in religious content in the broadcasting of both public and private channels. Hegemonic reproduction manifested itself not only with the rise of Islamic media, but also within the absorption of liberal left ideas via Taraf especially in the second period of AKP rule. However, with the rise of coercion-based politics in the third period, the AKP did not need to consolidate such broader social coalition.

“The initial attempt of AKP government to create an ‘expansive type of hegemony’ has failed” (R Kaya & Çakmur, 2010, p.534).

The analysis of the political economy of the mass media in Turkey indicates a shift in the structure of the media oligopoly. The reproduction of the social relations of production through the mass media resulted in short-term impacts. Furthermore, the mass media as a hegemonic project manifested itself either in sanctifying the AKP and demonising the anti-AKP bloc or in turning a blind eye to the developments that would harm the AKP’s hegemony. The lack of media coverage during the Gezi uprising and the corruption scandal in December 2015 could be seen as examples of turning a blind eye.

As offered by the centre-periphery relations approach, the secularist versus Islamist dichotomy does not provide sufficient theoretical basis to analyse the transformation of media in Turkey. One cannot explain the transformation of ‘secular’ capital, such as that of Doğan and Doğuş, into somewhat pro-AKP mainstream media groups by utilising the centre-periphery relations approach. In order to answer the main and the first sub-research questions, it is plausible to argue that, as part of civil society, Doğan and Doğuş’s involvements in the urbanisation projects that were being put out to tender by the AKP government demonstrate an engagement which transcends the Islamist versus secularist dichotomy. In other words, political society requires a dialectical approach, which is provided by Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the integral state.

In response to the main research question, it can be concluded that the state-capital relations under the AKP rule have demonstrated the

fractionation of capital (Poulantzas, 1973, 1975). However, this class struggle within capitalist groups has not been severely antagonistic; rather, it has manifested itself in the expansion of the bourgeoisie class. The already-burgeoning Islamic capital has found a fertile environment in which it could bloom. SMEs in Anatolian cities have grown quickly and successfully as a result of rapid export-oriented growth. In 2009, the head of MÜSİAD proudly stated that the association represented the 'real' bourgeoisie of Turkey rather than the 'new' because, unlike TÜSİAD, they were not created by the state; instead the Anatolian capital emerged naturally as had happened in the West. Therefore, TÜSİAD represents the past and MÜSİAD means the future (Yankaya, 2014, p.18). Aydın argues that the AKP pushed MÜSİAD to be a dominant actor in this period (Z Aydın, 2013, p.105). Ümit Boyner, the head of TÜSİAD visited Nail Olpak, the head of MÜSİAD in 2012 and together they announced "there is no colour difference in the capital" (Sol Portal, 2012). The emergence of TUSKON in 2005 unravelled that the Gülen movement had also been growing as a capitalist class. The birth of TUSKON indicated the unwillingness of the movement in fully merging with the AKP because instead of joining MÜSİAD, the group formed its own capitalist organisation. The relationship between government and the movement evolved from one of cooperation to conflict in the third parliamentary period of the AKP. In addition, the movement's exiled leader, Fethullah Gülen, was accused of establishing a terrorist organisation or parallel state in order to overthrow the government, and he was included in the red category of most wanted terrorists (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015e). Obviously this reversed the entire nature of the relationship between the government and TUSKON. Boydak Holding, one of the major members of TUSKON, left the organisation (Habertürk, 2015b) and another major member, İpek-Koza Holding, had its assets confiscated and a trustee was appointed. It is crucial to highlight that İpek-Koza has been an important actor in the construction, education and media sectors, as it founded a university in Ankara and owned a newspaper, two television channels, and a gold mine. The content of the newspaper and television channels changed from anti-government to pro-government

following the appointment of the trustee. The government's relationship with TÜSİAD has been turbulent. Bekmen gives the disagreement on renewing the stand-by agreement with the IMF in which TÜSİAD insisted on renewing whereas the AKP did not renew (Bekmen, 2014, p.65). Although they generally agreed on the economic policies carried out by the AKP, TÜSİAD has been somewhat critical about the rising tendencies of Islamism and conservatism. For instance, TÜSİAD criticised the 4+4+4 system as backward. However, Buğra and Savaşkan give the example of the transformation of NTV²¹⁴ from a critical-liberal media to a non-critical mainstream one in order to explain the fact that "it is highly possible that TÜSİAD could abandon its critical position toward the AKP government if a sufficiently large group among the association's members believe that their interests would be better served by acquiescence rather than confrontation" (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p.174). Therefore, it is safe to argue that "the rise of political Islam did not create an obstacle to the development of capitalism in Turkey" (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p.172) and the pious entrepreneurs did not struggle to adapt to the neoliberal restructuring.

The labour movement has been severely fragmented and weakened. Although there was some space for resistance (such as TEKEL Resistance, Kazova Resistance, Greif Resistance, the general strike during the Gezi uprising), the labour unions were mostly quiet during AKP rule. The ideological fragmentation of labour movements played a key role in this silence. The labour union confederations were divided into four, as follows: the TÜRK-İŞ (centre-right), the DİSK (progressive, left-wing), the HAK-İŞ (Islamist and pro-government), and the AKSİYON-İŞ (Gülenist). The public employees' union confederations were similarly divided: the MEMUR-SEN (Islamist and pro-government), TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN (centre-right), KESK (left-wing), BİRLEŞİK KAMU-İŞ (Kemalist), and CİHAN-SEN (Gülenist). It is important to highlight that public employees' unions do not have any right to

²¹⁴ The owner of NTV, Doğuş Holding is a member of TÜSİAD.

strike in Turkey. The TİSK represents the only employers' union confederation. The emergence of Gülenist trade unions in 2014 indicates that the movement's quarrel with the AKP government was also taking place at the trade union level. In general, trade unionism in Turkey under AKP rule tended towards deunionisation rather than unionisation; and the rise of symbiotic trade unionism with pro-AKP unions (A Çelik, 2013b, p.48) which created a 'fragile and aggressive class relations' (Gündoğdu, 2014, p.363).




Figure 30: Union Density in Turkey since 2000.

(Source: <https://stats.oecd.org>)

In the construction sector, there has been a lack of trade unionism throughout AKP rule as no construction workers' union is strong enough to resist the heavy conditions of the sector. The education sector demonstrates a different picture in terms of the size and influence of unions, yet it is also fragmented. There are three major unions organised in the education sector: the EĞİTİM-SEN (progressive and left-leaning), TÜRK EĞİTİM-SEN (centre-right) and EĞİTİM BİR-SEN (religious and pro-government). In the beginning of the AKP rule, the EĞİTİM-SEN was the leader of the sector and the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN was very small, whereas in 2015 the EĞİTİM-SEN was the third largest and the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN was the leader by far. As the EĞİTİM BİR-

SEN has very close ties with the government and supports the AKP's policies, it would be unrealistic to expect them to stand up for labour. Thus, the rise of the EĞİTİM BİR-SEN is a rather backward trend in terms of labour relations in the education sector. There were also two further fragmentations as the Kemalists' split created the EĞİTİM-İŞ in 2005 and the Gülenists' split created the AKTİF EĞİTİM-SEN in 2012.

In the media sector, the rise of the TGS as a progressive actor was witnessed after the Gezi uprising. However, the fragmentation of labour movements applied here too, and, opposed to the TGS, the MEDYA-İŞ was established under the pro-government HAK- İŞ (Çam & Yüksel, 2015, p.92). However, the unionisation rate in the sector is still low. As for the unorganised resistance and social movements, the Gezi uprising in 2013 heralded a counter-hegemonic movement against the neoliberal Islamism of the AKP. Arguably, it is plausible to maintain that there was precariatization among all sectors of the working class (Ercan & Oğuz, 2015, p.129). In 2006, it was argued in an edited volume on the politics of the AKP, to which Erdoğan and Gül also contributed, that "Islam is a happy marriage between [labour] and capital" because Islam is the "moral bent" in which "the relationship between the worker and the employer involves a mutuality of duties and rights in the spirit of brother/sisterhood, not class antagonism"; therefore as a party with "Islamic roots", the AKP's "approach to [labour] can be seen as an indicator of the degree to which the party has genuinely adopted democratic standards" (E Yıldırım, 2006, pp.235-236). The findings of this thesis indicate that the last quotation in the previous sentence is actually valid; however, with an irony.

In response to the second sub-research question, it can now be concluded that the last period of AKP leadership witnessed a shift from consent-based rule to coercion-based rule, or, in other words, from hegemony to authoritarianism; because hegemony is not a static moment (Hoşgör, 2015b, p.219). However, the results of the 1st November 2015 elections, and the success of the AKP in bringing security concerns into the consent production,

indicated the end of the short-term effects of the Gezi movement. Urbanisation, education and the mass media have constantly remained as the hegemonic pillars of the AKP. All three were exploited in order to create consent in various forms and also impacted on the class struggle. The relations of production in those sectors also served capital accumulation and the cost to labour increased. All three pillars represent long-term republican hegemonic projects in different forms, and the AKP has adopted them into its political Islamic agenda. Therefore, it is plausible to maintain that, rather than representing rupture, the AKP represents continuity in modern Turkish political history. However, in contrast to the previous ruling parties, the AKP has accommodated political Islam into the mode of production and this change upholds the passive revolution. The urbanisation sector had strong connections with the media sector as the owners of newspapers and television channels were also active in the construction sector. Those who own the means of communication used it to portray their accumulation by dispossession process as they wanted. This helped the AKP to dominate the media. The position of the media was heavily criticised during the Gezi Park Protests, as they remained silent. Their silence was arguably rooted in the media owners' connections with the urban regeneration projects. In the first parliamentary period of the AKP, the system was mainly based on hegemony as the AKP was established on a broader social coalition or historical bloc in the Gramscian sense. In the second period, with the coup plots of *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz*, the closure case of the AKP at the Constitutional Court, and the resistance against Abdullah Gül's presidency, the AKP started to narrow its social coalition. However, this caused an increase in their popular support. In the last period, society was divided into two halves, and the AKP faced strong resistance from one half while it gained the support of the other. This polarisation put an end to consent-based politics for one half, therefore the AKP's authoritarianism started to appear. At the end of the third term, the regime was demonstrating neoliberal authoritarian tendencies. The neoliberal restructuring in Turkey is hegemonic as it has been a consent-based project since the early 1980s, and the AKP succeeded in adopting

political Islam to the neoliberal restructuring as its predecessor the RP excluded neoliberalism at discourse level. As a *longue durée* overview, it is safe to claim that secularism has been replaced, with political Islam as the political component of capitalism in Turkey.

8.3. Reflections on a Future Research: Towards a Neoliberal Authoritarian Regime?

By winning the elections on 1st November 2015, the AKP has become the first party successfully winning a fourth consecutive election as a single party government in the multi-party era of Turkey. The AKP will potentially have been in power for seventeen years by the end of its fourth parliamentary period in 2019²¹⁵. This will be the second longest continuous governing period after the founder CHP's twenty-seven years²¹⁶ of rule between 1923 and 1950. Arguably, as passive revolutions, those two longest periods of rule have changed the country gradually but fundamentally. However, in contrast to the centre-periphery relations approach to Turkish politics which considers these two periods as conflictual, this thesis argues that the AKP is not antagonistic to the fundamental principles of the Republic. Both of the periods exemplified the consolidation of capitalism, one for the sake of the creation of a national bourgeoisie, and the other for the sake of the creation of an Islamic bourgeoisie (AE Doğan & Durak, 2014; Öztürk, 2015; B Yılmaz, 2012). The AKP embodies the fundamental hegemonic features of Turkish politics and benefits from them. Therefore, it is argued that 2002 can be interpreted not as a rupture but rather a continuation through hegemonic projects. Urbanisation, education and the mass media have been utilised as long-term hegemonic tools, from which the AKP has continuously benefitted, along with its predecessors.

²¹⁵ The elections have to be held by 25th October 2019.

²¹⁶ The CHP was founded as a resistance organisation in 1919, during the Turkish War of Independence, but took the form of a political party in 1923.

The AKP's 13-year rule consists of three parliamentary periods, as follows: 2002-2007, 2007-2011, and 2011-2015. In 2015, the first elections were held on 7th June and the AKP lost its majority in the parliament. The HDP's victory played a key role in this defeat. The pro-Kurdish and left-wing HDP decided to join the elections as a party²¹⁷ and they highlighted the fact that the HDP's existence in the parliament was crucial, not only for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue, but also to make the AKP lose its majority in the parliament. There are two reasons for this. First, if the AKP lost its majority (fewer than 276 MPs), there would be negotiations for coalition, which would halt the authoritarian rise of the AKP. Second, if the AKP kept its majority, but gained fewer than 330 MPs, it would not be able to amend the constitution with its majority²¹⁸. Amending the constitution is related to President Erdoğan's desire to change the country's parliamentary system towards a presidential one. The authoritarian tendencies of the AKP have already alarmed the people and, furthermore, there is the fear of dystopian one-man rule, especially since Erdoğan's regime has become more heavy-handed which caused the radical left and Kurds to unite under the HDP. The chairman of the HDP²¹⁹, Selahattin Demirtaş, benefitted from this fear to raise the party's vote, and the party's election campaign was based on it. Demirtaş's historic speech at the party's group meeting²²⁰, which was one-sentence long but clear enough, stressed that anti-Erdoğanism was going to be the key campaign element of the elections: "Mr Erdoğan, as long as the HDP exists, as long as the HDP members breathe, you won't be the president". After this sentence, he chanted three times: "We won't let you be

²¹⁷ In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the MPs from pro-Kurdish parties (BDP and DTP) joined and won the elections as independent candidates; they then re-united under the party in parliament in order to by-pass the 10% threshold.

²¹⁸ Between 330 and 367 MPs is enough to change the constitution; however, it also requires a referendum. More than 367 MPs is enough to change the constitution without any referendum.

²¹⁹ The party operates a co-presidential system of leadership, with one chairman and one chairwoman. Its current chairwoman is Figen Yüksekdağ.

²²⁰ Political parties in Turkey hold group meetings every Tuesday and the leaders of each party deliver a speech, usually approximately 20-30 minutes long. On 17th March 2015 Demirtaş delivered the shortest speech, which took under 2 minutes (Habertürk, 2015a).

elected as the President!”²²¹. Immediately after the speech, his words went viral on social media and hashtag *#SeniBaşkanYaptırmayacağız* (translation: we won’t let you be elected as the President) became Twitter’s second highest top trend worldwide, as of 2 p.m. local time (Bianet, 2015a). The HDP’s popularity increased after that speech and it received 13.12% of the votes, with 80 MPs entering parliament on 7th June 2015.

AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40.87% • 258 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24.95% • 132 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16.29% • 80 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13.12% • 80 MPs

Figure 31: Results of 7th June 2015 General Elections.

(Source: <https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr>)

As the AKP lost the majority, the idea of a CHP+MHP+HDP coalition was mooted. However, it was refused by the leader of the MHP because he did not want to be in coalition with the HDP. Therefore the AKP started to meet with the CHP’s staff for coalition negotiations that did not succeed. As the leader of MHP refused any coalition possibilities, an interim government was formed and repeat elections were agreed to be held on 7th November 2015. In the meanwhile, the political atmosphere in Turkey was being shaped by ISIS attacks. The first bombing attack hit an HDP rally in Diyarbakir on the 5th June 2015, just 2 days before the first elections. Four people were killed and more than 100 were injured (Today’s Zaman, 2015). On the 20th July 2015 the second attack hit Suruç²²² where university-aged members of the ESP²²³ and SGDF²²⁴ were organising a press meeting about their trip to help in the reconstruction of Kobani. The ISIS-related suicide bomber killed 33

²²¹ Erdoğan is already the president. By saying ‘being elected as president’ Demirtaş implies the regime change to the presidential model that Erdoğan wants.

²²² A border town next to the Northern Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, where the YGP militias (the People’s Protection Units, in Kurdish: *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*) and ISIS have been in conflict during and after the siege of the town.

²²³ The Socialist Party of the Oppressed (Turkish: *Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi*).

²²⁴ The Socialist Youth Associations Federation (Turkish: *Sosyalist Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonu*).

and injured 104 (BBC, 2015). The final bombing attack hit the capital, outside Ankara central railway station, where the 'Labour, Peace and Democracy' rally was being organised by the DİSK, TMMOB, HDP, TTB and KESK. The general aim of the rally was to protest against the conflict between the PKK and the Army. Two synchronised ISIS-related suicide bombers blew themselves up at the beginning of the rally, killing 102 and injuring more than 400, marking the deadliest attack on civilians in the history of modern Turkey (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015a). These bombing attacks increased concerns about security. It is also worth mentioning that on 12th July the PKK announced the end of the ceasefire, as the resolution process, involving bilateral peace talks aimed at ending the conflict, had slowed down. Consequently, Erdoğan declared his rejection of the 'Dolmabahçe Agreement' (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015d), a document outlining a 10-item list of priorities for the resolution of the conflict. A few days after the Suruç bombing, the PKK killed two policemen as a response. Four days after the bombing, the Turkish Air Force started to hit ISIS in Syria and the PKK on Qandil Mountains (The Guardian, 2015b). Those airstrikes indicated that the AKP decided to abandon the resolution process and take part in the conflict. In September, the conflict took a new turn, as it spread to urban areas, and months-long curfews were announced in some Kurdish cities, such as Cizre and Sur. This drastic change in the AKP's policies towards the Kurdish issue is arguably related to the rise of the HDP and its success in the parliamentary elections on 7th June, which prevented the AKP from regaining a majority. Therefore, the AKP shaped its strategy around security concerns within a nationalist agenda. For instance, after the PKK killed 16 soldiers in Dağlica on 6th September 2015, President Erdoğan²²⁵ stated that "If 400 MPs were elected from the AKP list in the last elections, that incident would not have happened" (T24, 2015). This 400 MP demand

²²⁵ Constitutionally the President of Turkey is impartial and has no political affiliations. However, Erdoğan announced that he would not be impartial as President because he is the first elected President. In both election campaigns in 2015, Erdoğan joined the election rallies of the AKP.

of the President is related to his aspirations for the presidential system. In the end, the AKP's attempt to consolidate nationalism and win the reactionary votes was successful.

AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 49.50% • 317 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25,32% • 134 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11,90% • 40 MPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10,76% • 59 MPs

Figure 32: Results of 1st November 2015 General Elections.
(Source: <https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr>)

In the 2015 General Elections, the turnout increased only a little from June (83.92%) to November (85.23%). Clearly, abandoning the resolution process and engaging in the conflicts with the PKK helped the AKP to transfer votes from the nationalist MHP, the pro-Kurdish HDP²²⁶, and also small nationalist-conservative parties, such as the BBP²²⁷ and SP.

“It is safe to say that 1st November Elections were the end of Gezi's short term effects as a counter-hegemonic movement” (Interview 8).

In five months, the AKP gained almost 9% more votes and its number of MPs reached 317²²⁸. However, this is still below the number of MPs that the AKP would need to amend the constitution on its own. It is reported that the victory of the AKP was interpreted by the liberal intelligentsia, mainstream media, and the big bourgeoisie as a good opportunity to return to the so called ‘reformist’ period of the AKP. By ‘reformist’ period, they mean the first period of the party's rule (2002-2007)²²⁹, when the pro-EU ‘democratic’ reforms, structural reforms on economy, and rapid growth were observed and 2002 was accepted as the rupture from the anti-democratic status-quo and the AKP was the engine of those reforms (ME Erol, 2015b). Dualist

²²⁶ It is arguable that conservative and religious HDP voters transferred allegiance to the AKP.

²²⁷ The Great Unity Party (Turkish: *Büyük Birlik Partisi*).

²²⁸ It is important to highlight that if the HDP received 0.77% less of the vote-share, it would have won no seats in the parliament, and the AKP would have had enough MPs to amend the constitution on its own.

²²⁹ It can also be partly extended to the second period (2007-2011).

understanding is clearly applicable in this context. First of all, the separation between the state and society appears via the centre-periphery approach, as the AKP is considered as the periphery and the state is the centre. That approach neglects the fact that the AKP is not a homogenous representative of society as a whole nor is it completely excluded from the state. Most of the members of the AKP took part in the previous governments or local governments and bureaucracy. Therefore, it is problematic to argue that there is a split between the state and society, and that the AKP represents society. Second, the claim stands on an assumed progressiveness of civil society. Viewing society as opposed to the state attributes a progressive role to civil society in that context. In the arguments of democratisation and Europeanisation, this concept is argued and a 'civilianisation' of politics (especially moving away from the army's influence) is promoted. However, an antagonistic juxtaposition of the state and civil society is problematic as their relationship is rather symbiotic and together they are the sphere in which hegemony is produced and reproduced. Therefore, it is safe to argue that civil society is not necessarily progressive. The AKP's rising authoritarianism after 2011 can be given as an example to a civilian reactionary movement. Finally, the neglect of the social relations of production with respect to the promotion of structural reforms and rapid growth is also problematic. The "class-blinded nature of these arguments" (ME Erol, 2015b) overlooks the fact that the neoliberal economic policies actually widened the gap between labour productivity and real wages (Yeldan, 2007), and created jobless growth (Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman, 2010, p.120) between 2002 and 2007. Increased deunionisation is also another important factor of this period (Spiegelaere, 2012). Furthermore, Güney reports from the dataset of Credit Suisse's 'Global Wealth Report' that the richest 1% in Turkey has increased its share of the aggregate total wealth from 39.4% to 54.3% since the AKP came into power (Güney, 2015). Therefore, assessing the 2002-2007 periods as simply just a period of rapid growth would ignore its cost to the working class. Also, in the light of the

data given below, it is plausible to argue that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened throughout the AKP rule.




Figure 33: The Wealth-share of the Richest 1% and Other 99%.
(Source: Güney, 2015)

The rise of political Islam has been the most crucial determinant of Turkish politics since the early 1990s. However, the Kurdish dispute that has become deadlocked with the Syrian crisis has been the most effective determinant of Turkish politics since 2015. As for the developments in 2015, it is argued that the AKP's hegemonic neoliberalism based on urbanisation, education and mass media has gained another dimension, which is security. The three pillars are retained as hegemonic pillars after the November 2015 elections. As for urbanisation, after the months-long conflicts in the Sur district of Kurdish-dominated Diyarbakir, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, the city has been severely ruined and 30,000 of its population have fled. Prime Minister Davutoğlu claimed that:

"These cities have faced unplanned and uncontrolled growth since the 1990s, and would need urban renewal even if these events hadn't

happened. We'll rebuild Sur so that it's like Toledo: everyone will want to come and appreciate its architectural texture" (Lapeska, 2016a)²³⁰.

Later on the Minister of the Environment and Urban Planning gave details of the urban renewal plans (Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı, 2016). The gentrification and urban regeneration plans for Sur indicated that the AKP will benefit from its past experiences of urbanisation for its new approach to the Kurdish question. On the education side, this situation is similar. On Monday, 11th January 2016, 1128 academics from 89 universities in Turkey, and over 355 academics and researchers from abroad, called Academics for Peace²³¹, signed a declaration entitled: 'We will not be part of this crime', calling on the Turkish state to end state violence and prepare negotiation conditions in Kurdish regions of Turkey. Two days after the declaration, President Erdoğan denounced academics as being 'so-called non-enlightened, fifth-column intellectuals' and he called on the authorities to do 'what is necessary'. He also criticised academics that signed the declaration around the world (including Noam Chomsky, Gayatri Spivak, David Harvey, Etienne Balibar, Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Butler) for being ignorant about the issue and fooled by those 'fifth-pillar' academics from Turkey. Absurdly enough, he even invited Chomsky to show him 'the true picture'. After his speech, the YÖK published a statement saying that it is a crime to sign that declaration and 'what is necessary' will be done. Subsequently, universities started investigations within themselves and some of the academics were suspended or dismissed on the very first day. Finally, prosecutors initiated investigations and police started to detain some of those academics (Weaver, 2016). Four of the signatories were arrested and imprisoned in March 2016 (Reuters, 2016). This thesis argues that this attack on academia cannot be

²³⁰ On a different note, the reporter of this article, David Lapeska of *The Guardian* was denied entry to Turkey in April 2016. On 2nd May 2016, he published an article on *Foreign Policy* where he reported that since September 2015, two British journalists from *Vice News* were arrested and deported, one Dutch freelance journalist was deported, and the correspondents of *Aftenposten*, *Der Spiegel*, *ARD*, *Bild*, and *Sputnik* were denied entry to the country (Lapeska, 2016b).

²³¹ Turkish: *Barış İçin Akademisyenler*.

seen as a coincidence. Rather, it is a strategic move, as academia (or part of it) still harbours critical voices, whereas the dissent in the media has significantly weakened with the consolidation of mainstream media after the elections in November. This timely attack aimed to annihilate critical voices, as the YÖK declared after the meeting with the Prime Minister that there would be 1000 additional positions at universities in 2016 (Radikal, 2016). Finally, for the media the situation is even darker. Two journalists from Cumhuriyet, Can Dündar (editor-in-chief) and Erdem Gül, were arrested and imprisoned in pre-trial detentions, and accused of spying and divulging state secrets. The newspaper revealed that a convoy of trucks linked to the MİT²³² was intercepted by security forces and some weapons, which were being sent to rebels fighting against the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, were discovered in those trucks. The revelations caused a political storm and President Erdoğan said Dündar would pay a heavy price (The Guardian, 2015c). After his arrest, Dündar wrote a letter to The Guardian entitled: “I revealed the truth about President Erdoğan and Syria. For that, he had me jailed” (Dündar, 2015). Also, the major newspaper of the Gülen movement, Zaman, was confiscated by the state and trustees were appointed (Mason, 2016). All in all, it is safe to argue that these three examples demonstrate that security has appeared as the new dominant factor of hegemony in 2015 (UU Aydın, 2015, p.61). Sözeri highlights the role of anti-terror law in this manner (Sözeri, 2014, p.78; 2015, p.24). Undoubtedly, an increase in the security dimension is indicative of the rise of coercion-based politics, thus the rise of authoritarianism. Furthermore, the rise of security-based politics is like a double-edged sword and is not a sustainable way of maintaining the economic base. In the long term, it also has the dangerous potential to jeopardise capital accumulation. However, it should also be noted that, like the state and civil society, consent and coercion are not mutually exclusive. An increase in authoritarianism does not exclude the production of consent through coercive politics. Furthermore, it is problematic to understand the

²³² National Intelligence Organisation, Turkish: *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*.

rise of authoritarianism as “authoritarianism with Islamic characteristics” against a secular tradition that is rooted in a lack of democratic tradition, weak judicial independence, and, once again, a gap between the centre and periphery (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016; Özbudun, 2014, p.155) or in the party structure (Musil, 2011). Rather, the rise of authoritarianism is rooted in the crisis of a neoliberal accumulation regime and pluralist hegemony. Therefore, neoliberal authoritarianism is a response to the growing discontent over Islamic neoliberalism. By the time the AKP speculatively moves from authoritarian neoliberalism (Bieler et al., 2015; Bruff, 2013; Oğuz, 2009) to totalitarianism (Tuğal, 2016) in the Poulantzasian sense (Poulantzas, 2000), consent would be produced through security within the coercion-based politics of authoritarian neoliberalism.

“[I]t is imperative to understand that the AKP represents more continuity than radical change in terms of the authoritarian form of the state that has been the defining feature of the Turkish political economy in the neoliberal era, in that its policies and practices can be best summed up with Gramsci's notion of *transformismo*” (Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman, 2010, p.122).

9. Appendix – Index of Interviews

Interview 1 – [Name withheld], lawyer, coordinator of the BHH in Istanbul; on behalf of the United June Movement (Turkish: *Birleşik Haziran Hareketi*, BHH) – interview info: 12th February 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 2 – [Name withheld], worker and spokesperson of the Anti-capitalist Muslims; on behalf of the Anti-capitalist Muslims (Turkish: *Antikapitalist Müslümanlar*) – interview info: 14th February 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 3 – TOKİ (anonymous expert) – interview info: 17th February 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 4 – [Name withheld], the general secretary of TGS; on behalf of the Journalists' Union in Turkey (Turkish: *Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası*, TGS) – interview info: 17th February 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 5 – [Name withheld], the secretary of the board of directors at the ŞPO Istanbul branch; on behalf of the Chamber of Urban Planners (Turkish: *Şehir Plancıları Odası*, ŞPO) – interview info: 19th February 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 6 – [Name withheld], associate professor at Galatasaray University, former reporter at Hürriyet – interview info: 17th November 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 7 – [Name withheld], assistant professor at Istanbul University, former general secretary of the SDH, activist; on behalf of the Association of Social Rights (Turkish: *Sosyal Haklar Derneği*, SDH) – interview info: 24th November 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 8 – [Name withheld], lawyer of the TMMOB and Taksim Solidarity, general secretary of the SDH, urban activist; on behalf of the Taksim Solidarity (Turkish: *Taksim Dayanışması*) – interview info: 25th November 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 9 – [Name withheld], former general secretary of Chamber of Architects and Secretary of Taksim Solidarity, socialist feminist; on behalf of the Chamber of Architects and the Taksim Solidarity (Turkish: *Mimarlar Odası* and *Taksim Dayanışması*) – interview info: 26th November 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 10 – [Name withheld], assistant professor at Istanbul University; on behalf of the EĞİTİM-SEN Universities' Branch (Turkish: *EĞİTİM-SEN İstanbul 6 Nolu Üniversiteler Şubesi*) – interview info: 26th November 2015, Istanbul.

Interview 11 – [Name withheld], teacher; on behalf of the EĞİTİM-SEN Teachers' Branch (Turkish: *EĞİTİM-SEN İstanbul 8 Nolu Öğretmenler Şubesi*) – interview info: 27th November 2015, Istanbul.

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