Against strong pluralism

Noonan, Harold W. (2015) Against strong pluralism. Philosophia, 43 (4). pp. 1081-1087. ISSN 1574-9274

Full text not available from this repository.


Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional, relational and non-relational, past, present and future, at the microphysical level, but differing in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional repscts at the macrophysical level. It is objectionable because it thus deprives us of the explanatory resources to explain why evident absurdities are absurd. A second objection is to the suggestion that cases involving artefacts can illustrate strong pluralism. This offends against the principle that gien a complex intrinsic microphysical property instantiated in some regiion, the number of material things possessing it in that region cannot depend on the existence and nature of intentional activity taking place outside it.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via
Keywords: Pluralism, Coincidence, Goliath and Lumplde, re modality
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2016 12:23
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:15

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View