Monism: the islands of plurality

Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (3). pp. 583-606. ISSN 1933-1592

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Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended monism in its current guise, across a range of papers. Each paper looks to add something to the monistic picture of the world. In this paper we argue that monism—as Schaffer describes it—is false. To do so we develop an ‘island universe’ argument against Schaffer’s monistic theory.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Baron, S. and Tallant, J. (2016), Monism: The Islands of Plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12270, which has been published in final form at: This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
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Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2016 17:01
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:41

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