The Teaching of History in Post-Genocide Rwanda: A Case-Study of a Post-Genocide Secondary School History Curriculum.

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Abstract

The focus of this thesis is an investigation of secondary school history in post-genocide Rwanda. The thesis addresses a knowledge gap by examining the 2008 O-level Rwandan history curriculum as a case of a post-genocide secondary school history curriculum. The issues surrounding the construction of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and the wider opportunities and challenges of teaching and learning history in Rwandan schools are addressed. The research is located in the field of literature that investigates school history in different post-genocide and post-conflict countries and the connections between history education, conflict, peace and reconciliation. Research involved two periods of fieldwork in Rwanda of 11 weeks and 16 weeks respectively. During this time curriculum documents were collected and field-notes taken. Also, interviews were conducted with Rwandan policy-makers (3), secondary history teacher-educators (5) and secondary history student-teachers (10). Informal discussions were held with four additional policy-makers. The empirical research was related to the research question: What opportunities and challenges does teaching history face in post-genocide Rwanda - perceptions of what, why and how history is taught to secondary school pupils? A thematic analysis of the data resulted in three key inter-related findings.

Firstly, there are competing policy visions and curriculum processes at the heart of the 2008 O-level secondary school history curriculum. Secondly, the memory of the 1994 genocide is central to the 2008 O-level history curriculum construction (policy), mediation (teacher-educators) and implementation (student-teachers). Finally, and related to finding two above, limited learner-centeredness in student-teachers' classroom practice demonstrates how the legacy of the Rwandan 1994 genocide impacts on the delivery of the 2008 O-level history curriculum. Based on these findings the thesis makes three original contributions to knowledge. The legacy of the genocide in terms of post-genocide fears of future violence and aspirations for unity and reconciliation needs to be at the centre of our understanding of school history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda. Also, over 20 years after the 1994 genocide the on-going emotional legacy of the genocide in the classroom shapes the classroom practice of a new and university trained generation of history teachers. Yet, student-teacher classroom practice also challenges the uniform depiction of teacher-

led history teaching by writers, suggesting a more complex history classroom reality. Finally, this is the first empirical study to use the theoretical framework of ‘unity in homogeneity’, ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘diversity’ approaches to frame and investigate the opportunities and challenges the teaching of history faces in post-genocide Rwanda.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

Signed: Earl Kehoe

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BERA: British Educational Research Association
CoE: Council of Europe
DFID: Department for International Development
Euroclio: European Association of History Educators
FHAO: Facing History and Ourselves
INGO: International Non-Government Organisation
IRDP: Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
MINECOFIN: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning - Republic of Rwanda
MoE: Ministry of Education
NCDC: National Curriculum and Development Centre
NURC: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PM: Policy-Maker
PRI: Penal Reform International
PRIME: Peace Research Institute in the Middle East
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
GNU: Government of National Unity
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RoG: Government of Rwanda
ST: Student-Teacher
TE: Teacher-Educator
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation
UK: United Kingdom
UNAR: Rwanda National Union
UNECA: United Nations Economic Comission for Africa
USA: United States of America
WSJ: Wall Street Journal
WWII: World War Two

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Chapter 1 Introduction

April 7th 2014 marked the 20th anniversary of 1994 Rwandan genocide. In 100 days, beginning April 1994, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi men, women and children and politically moderate Hutu were murdered (Taylor, 1999). It has been established that the 1994 genocide was organised in advance by a clique of elite-extremist Hutu Power[1] politicians (Keane, 1995; Straus, 2006). It was a state-driven and systematic attempt to eliminate the Tutsi group, plus any politically moderate Hutu (Keane, 1995; Straus, 2006). Hutu ethno-nationalist historical themes focusing on ethnic and racial differences were part of an ideology that played an important role in motivating perpetrators at macro (state) and micro (individual) levels to commit genocide (see Keane, 1995; Des Forges, 1999). During the genocide, journalists in Rwanda reported how killers incessantly repeated that the Tutsis considered the Hutus to be sub-human (Keane, 1995). Furthermore, killers repeated that the Tutsi were a different race and claimed there was a Tutsi plot to colonise Rwanda, restore feudalism and turn the Hutu into slaves (Keane, 1995). These themes had been taught at school in post-colonial Hutu-led Rwanda:

> The propagandists built upon the lessons Rwandans had learned at school. It was hardly necessary even to repeat the basic assumption that Hutu and Tutsi were different peoples by nature. […] The radicals rejected the idea that Rwandans were a single people, charging that this concept was a Tutsi trick to divide and weaken the Hutu by destroying their sense of ethnic identity. As [the propaganda magazine] Kangura assured the Hutu, 'You are an important ethnic group of the Bantu […]. The nation is artificial but the ethnic group is natural'. […] The propagandists stressed that Tutsi were foreign to the area and had stolen Rwanda from its rightful inhabitants. The ruthless conquerors had ground the Hutu under their heel in a repressive and bloody regime […] epitomized by [the queen-mother Kanjogera, [who] to get up from her seat, leaned on two swords planted between the shoulders of two Hutu children (Des Forges, 1999, p.86).

There is no empirical evidence of a direct link between what Rwandans learned at school and the 1994 genocide. Nonetheless, the post-genocide government of Rwanda (RoG) believes that pre-1994 school history education contributed to the genocide by dividing Rwandans along ethnic lines as described by Des Forges (1999) above.

[1] Hutu Power was an ideology propounded by Hutu extremists in post-colonial Rwanda

Therefore, school history education is considered by the RoG to be an important medium for transmitting a single and officially true narrative of Rwandan history for national unity and reconciliation (King, 2008). Within a Social Studies curriculum that all primary-level pupils follow, Rwandan history is addressed (MoE, n/a[2]). Rwandan history is also taught to all O-level secondary pupils aged 13-16 through the 2008 O-level history curriculum.

The Research Problem

The research problem is secondary school history in post-genocide Rwanda. No study to date focuses specifically on the most recent (2008) O-level secondary school history curriculum. Nor does any examine the history curriculum through the multiple perspectives of policy-makers (curriculum developers), teacher-educators (curriculum mediators) and student history teachers (curriculum practitioners). By exploring the perceptions of these different groups of participants the thesis addresses a gap in the literature on school history in post-genocide Rwanda. That is the gap between history curriculum policy, mediation and implementation.

The principle research question is: What opportunities and challenges does teaching history face in post-genocide Rwanda - perceptions of what, why and how history is taught to secondary school pupils? In order to answer this question, I developed three subsidiary research questions related to the 2008 O-level history curriculum. The curriculum provides a point of entry into the teaching of history in Rwandan secondary schools. The afore-mentioned subsidiary research questions explore why, what and how O-level history is taught in post-genocide Rwanda and implications for the theory and practice of school history in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies:

1) What are Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student-teachers perceptions of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what do these perceptions tell us about what history is valued and why?

2) What do Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student teachers discussions of the practice of the 2008 O-level history curriculum tell us about how history is taught to O-level pupils?

[2] Not Available (N/A).

3) What are the present and possible future implications of these findings for the theorisation and practice of history education in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies?

The Research Methods

The research involved two separate periods of fieldwork in Rwanda of 11 weeks (10th September - 28th November 2012) and 16 weeks (28th May - 28th September 2013). During the fieldwork documentary data was gathered and analysed. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were conducted with three policy-makers, five history teacher-educators and ten secondary school history student-teachers. Four informal discussions with policy-makers were also conducted. The interviews and informal discussions were related to the principal research question. They explored the purposes and processes of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and the opportunities and challenges in implementing this curriculum in the classroom.

The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The introduction has outlined the locus and focus of the study, the research problem and methods and it outlines the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2, the 'National Context', provides an overview of Rwandan history and the 1994 genocide ending with a discussion of the socio-economic and political context of post-genocide Rwanda. Chapter 3 reviews the literatures on genocide historiography, school history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict, and school history in post-genocide Rwanda. Chapter 4 begins with the ontology and epistemology and why a qualitative methodology and a case study design are appropriate for this study. I move on to describe the fieldwork case-study research in Rwanda, the data collection methods, data analysis, and the trustworthiness of the findings. I finish with the methodological limitations and a chapter summary.

Chapters 5 to 7 present the findings in terms of: 1) an analysis of the 2008 O-level Rwandan history curriculum and accompanying documents (Chapter 5, 'Curriculum Analysis'); 2) research participants' perceptions of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what these perceptions tell us about what history is valued and why (Chapter 6, 'Curriculum as Discourse'); 3) how research participants discuss the practice of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what these discussions tell us

about how history is taught to O-level pupils (Chapter 7, the ‘Curriculum in Action’). Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by considering the principal research question and the present and possible future implications of the findings.

Chapter 2 National Context

Introduction

In April 1994, in the midst of the civil war with the mainly Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and after the presidential assassination, a hard-liner Hutu Power group within Rwanda's ruling political party took power (Straus, 2006). They assassinated political opposition, formed an interim government and declared "war on the Tutsi enemy" (Straus, 2006, p.1). By early July, the hard-liners had lost the civil war and unleashed genocide (Prunier, 1995). Despite great personal risk, many ordinary Hutus intervened to save Tutsi lives (see Melvern, 2006; Straus, 2006). However, over 100 days, an estimated 800,000 ordinary Tutsi men, women and children and politically moderate Hutus were murdered[3] (see Melvern, 2006; also Deguine, 2010; Straus, 2006; Prunier 1995).

The genocide was planned and state-led and included the mobilization and the active participation of the masses[4] (Prunier, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Melvern, 2006; Pottier, 2002). Government administration at the national and local levels, loyal military units and militias and an estimated 350,000 - 600,000 or ten per cent of the Hutu population[5] heard and responded to calls to exterminate the Tutsi enemy (Straus, 2006; also Prunier, 1995; Taylor, 1999; Mamdani, 2002). Once the killing began, it spread quickly throughout the country (Des Forges, 1999). The perpetrators were the old and young, mostly Hutu male subsistence farmers, but sometimes included women and children with no prior involvement in violence (Keane, 1995; also Maser, 1995; Melvern, 2006; Prunier, 1995; Straus, 2006; Taylor, 1999). Nonetheless, social class and educational attainment were not determining factors in who participated. Teachers, surgeons, doctors, priests, nuns, community police officers and human rights activists all participated in the genocide (African Rights, 1995; Mamdani,

[3] Estimates vary between 500,000 and up to 100,000,000 (see Melvern, 2006, p.252; Deguine, 2010, p.8; Straus, 2006, p.1; Prunier, 1995, p.261, p.265). It's estimated that up to 80 per cent of the pre-genocide Tutsi population in Rwanda was annihilated in the genocide (Chretien, 1997; Taylor, 1999).

[4]Researchers debate the extent to which the genocide was planned in advance by Hutu Power political elites (see Straus, 2006; Prunier, 1995; Taylor, 1999; Mamdani, 2002).

[5] The highest academic estimates put the number of the Hutu population who actively participated in the genocide at ten per cent or 350,000 - 600,000 people (see Eltringham, 2004, p.64; also Hintjens, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2005).

2002). A Hutu teacher told a French journalist: “We had eighty kids in the first year. There are twenty-five left. All the others, we killed them or they have run away” (Saint-Exupery, 1994 in Mamdani, 2002, p.228).

Much of the killing was done with machetes and hammers, screwdrivers and nailed clubs were also used (Mamdani, 2002). Some victims paid their killers for the quick death of a bullet to escape the machete (Taylor, 1999, p.131; Prunier, 1995, p.256). Boutros-Gahli (1996) documents Tutsi families being forced to commit acts of incest before death and rape was common place (see Melvern, 2006). A perpetrator testified: “I no longer had a conscience to be able to love someone […]. I did not even think about the fact that my older brothers had Tutsi wives or that my mother-in law was Tutsi” (Straus, 2006, p.74).

This chapter provides background information on Rwandan history, the 1994 Rwandan genocide and post-genocide Rwanda. This background is necessary to understand school history in pre and post-genocide Rwanda and policy-maker, teacher-educator and student-teacher perceptions of school history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda. The following section provides a brief outline of the physical and human geographical context of Rwanda. Then I explore Rwandan history and why the genocide happened and present the socio-economic and political context of post-genocide Rwanda.

Geographical and human geography context

Figure 2-1 : Map of Rwanda: Source: http://www.google.co.uk/imgres

Rwanda borders Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (see Map 1). It is a small country with a population of 8.1 million (Keane, 1995). This population can broadly be divided into three groups (Walker-Keleher, 2006). The largest group, the Hutu, comprise approximately 85 per cent of the Rwandan population, the Tutsi roughly 15 per cent and the Twa one per cent (Walker-Keleher, 2006). To speak of these identities in post-genocide Rwanda is controversial. People lived and died on the basis of being identified as Hutu or Tutsi in 1994 and such identities imbue many Rwandans with traumatic memories. Furthermore, identifying an individual as a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa in public in Rwanda risks being perceived as perpetrating the crime of 'genocide ideology' and/or 'divisionism'.

The illegality of promoting genocide ideology is an imprecise law brought into being in June 2008. A January 18th 2009 report from the National University of Rwanda explains: "genocide ideology is a term used to describe the notion genocide

perpetrators used to instil a hate campaign that creates divisions among two distinctive groups, usually ethnic groups" (Freedman, 2009, p.16). Similarly, the 2006 parliamentary report 'Rwanda Genocide Ideology and Strategies for its Eradication' defined genocide ideology as: "a set of ideas or representations whose major role is to stir up hatred and create a pernicious atmosphere favouring the implementation and legitimisation of the persecution and elimination of a category of the population" (Freedman et al., 2008, p.679). Genocide ideology is thus given a broad definition and there is a variation in how it is applied. The law is closely related to the 2002 Rwandan law against divisionism or sectarianism:

> Any person who makes public any speech, writing, pictures or images or any symbols over radio airwaves, television, in a meeting or public space, with the aim of discriminating [against] people or sowing sectarianism [divisionism] among them is sentenced to between one year and five years of imprisonment (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.46).

These laws were put in place by the post-genocide Rwandan government to deter and to punish the promotion of the ethnic division that had resulted in the genocide of 1994 (Freedman et al., 2008).

Genocide: Why Rwanda?

Initially, leading newspapers (Schmidt, 1994) and television news media (Keane, 1995) framed the 1994 genocide as a tribal war rooted in ancient hatred between Hutu and Tutsi (Power, 2003; Straus, 2006). In June 1998, American President, Bill Clinton, reiterated this view speaking of 'tribal resentment' as a source of the problems in Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999). However, Hutu and Tutsi have never been tribal groups and the defining history between these groups is not a history of ancient hatred (Straus, 2006). Hutu and Tutsi have shared the same language (Kinyarwanda), clans, cultural practices, diet, religions and inter-married for centuries (Keane, 1995; Des Forges, 1999). Many Rwandans are of mixed Hutu and Tutsi parentage and Hutu and Tutsi have historically lived in the same regions and are neighbours today (Keane, 1995; Des Forges, 1999). Nonetheless, Hutu and Tutsi identities are not ahistorical; they have not been stable across time. The pre-colonial (n/a-1890), colonial (1890-1962) and post-colonial (1962-1994) history below explores how these identities have changed over time. It illustrates the contested nature of this history and the relationship between history, identity and the 1994 genocide.

Pre-colonial Rwanda (n/a-1890)

The origins of the Hutu and Tutsi is a controversial aspect of Rwandan history. This much is stated in the History of Rwanda - a participatory approach: Teachers Guide for Secondary Schools published by the Rwandan Ministry of Education in 2010:

> The settling of people in Rwanda is one of the most controversial topic[s] in the History of Rwanda. The controversy is linked to the fact that the data at our disposal has always come from theories, hypothesis [for example the Hamitic hypothesis] invented by Western authors who have written about Rwanda. These theories and hypothesis have been taken as gospel truth. […] What can be said about these theories, however, is that they are only simple and imaginary constructions that are not based on any scientific findings. It is simply erroneous to establish such a relationship as to the first and last arrivals of these so-called ethnic groups found in Rwanda. […] [F]rom the first millennium there is evidence of economic production in agriculture, animal rearing, metallurgy, pottery, hunting and gathering in Rwanda. All this testifies to the fact that human settlement in Rwanda is much older than thought (MoE, 2010, p.26).

Keane (1995) and Destexhe (1995) state that no-one knows the exact origin of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa people. However, many historians agree that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were not Hutu or Tutsi but hunter-gatherers known today as Twa (Vansina, 1962; de-Heusch, 1966). Writers argue that successive migrations brought first farmers (Hutu) and later cattle herders or pastoralists (Tutsi) into Rwanda (Willoughby-Mellors, 2002). There is consensus amongst many researchers that Tutsis formed part of a larger pastoral migration southwards into the Great Lakes region. However, as noted by Willoughby-Mellors (2002), the nature of the migration, whether sudden or gradual, is contested. A pre-colonial history of peaceful migration and assimilation is oft repeated in RoG official history. However, a number of historians argue that while Tutsi migration and settlement into Rwanda largely came through peaceful assimilation, it also involved conquest (Kagame, 1972; also Vansina, 1962; Ogot, 1984; Reyntjens, 1985).

In pre-colonial times, cattle meant wealth, and so pastoralists - the Tutsi - enjoyed a higher social status than tillers of the soil - the Hutu (Keane, 1995). Nevertheless, not all Tutsi were rich and not all Hutu were poor (Straus, 2006). Furthermore, Hutu and Tutsi were not fixed identities for life. If a Tutsi fell on hard times and lost his cattle he was assimilated into the Hutu ranks and if a Hutu bought a herd of cattle he

became a Tutsi (Gakunzi, 1996; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002). This supports the RoG official history of Hutu and Tutsi being fluid socio-economic identities in pre-colonial times and not fixed tribal or ethnic identities. However, some historians argue that Hutu and Tutsi existed as ethnic and socially divisive identities in late pre-colonial times (Newbury, 1988; also Vansina, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Hintjens, 2008). Based on this account, Hutu and Tutsi were not, therefore, ethnic and divisive identities created solely as a result of colonialism (Newbury, 1988; also Vansina, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Hintjens, 2008). This contradicts the RoG official narrative.

As a cattle and land owning aristocracy, the Tutsi could raise armies and exercise control over much of the centre of modern day Rwanda (Keane, 1995; Vassall-Adams, 1994). This power expanded with time and expansion spread the socio-economic identities of Hutu and Tutsi to other parts of modern day Rwanda (Straus, 2006). The Tutsi aristocracy drew Hutu farmers into a web of clientelism. Hutu would exchange labour and/or goods and services in return for the use of land and cattle on a leasehold basis and for the protection of their Tutsi overlords (Keane, 1995; Vassall-Adams, 1994). Not all Tutsi patrons exploited this relationship (Keane, 1995). Nonetheless, the patron-client system tied Hutu and Tutsi into a close-knit socio-economic hierarchy.

The wealth the Tutsi class secured through cattle enabled them to establish feudal kingdoms and a monarchy. Therefore, the three predominant sources of power in Rwanda at this time were a cattle economy, the monarchy and religious life and Tutsi led. Consequently, to be Tutsi was "to be in power, near power […] or identified with power [while] to be Hutu was more and more to be a subject" (Mamdani, 2002, p.75). However, African Rights Watch (1992) argues that Tutsi did not have a monopoly on power in pre-colonial Rwanda. Hutus headed large lineages and this autonomy was respected by the Tutsi (Ibid.). Gakunzi (1996) discusses how Tutsi kings' power was balanced by the 'Wise Hutus'. Newbury (1988) argues that on the margins or outside the central Rwandan state many Rwandese were not involved in the patron-client or 'ubuhake' system. This shows how the origin, formation and relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial times is a vast, complex and at times contested history (Eltringham, 2004; also Straus, 2006; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002). As seen in chapter

five, the 2008 Rwandan history curriculum does not adequately reflect the contested nature of these contradictions.

Colonial Rwanda (1890-1962)

The German (1890 - 1916) and later Belgian (1918 - 62) colonialists were impressed with the hierarchal and sophisticated system of governance they found in Rwanda (Keane, 1995; Prunier, 1995). They observed an elite of predominantly pastoralists or Tutsi at the apex of this order (Prunier, 1995). The colonialists observed the Tutsi to be "tall, light skinned, thin nosed [and intelligent]" (Prunier, 1995, p.21). Based on these observations, the colonialists concluded that the Tutsi hailed from a superior Hamitic (Caucasoid) race contrasting the indigenous "short, stocky, dark skinned and wide nosed" Bantu Hutu (Prunier, 1995, p.21). This Hamitic hypothesis ultimately cast the Tutsi as proto-Europeans or black Aryans who, originating from Europe had migrated to Africa (Ibid.). Then, having migrated south to Rwanda from the north, possibly Ethiopia, imposed civilisation in the "dark and savage lands" of Rwanda (Keane, 1995; Prunier, 1995).

This view supported the pre-colonial oral mythology of Tutsi superiority and the reality of Tutsi political and socio-economic power (for further discussion see Straus, 2006, p.21). Nevertheless, the Hamitic hypothesis is a flawed history. While no consensus exists amongst writers about where the Tutsi came from, it was most definitely not Europe and probably not Ethiopia (Keane, 1995; also Destexhe, 1995; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002). Furthermore, as noted above, far from imposing civilisation, history records Tutsi conquest but also peaceful migration and assimilation into Rwanda. Moreover, the supposed physical, cognitive and racial distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi ignore the socio-economic origin and fluid history of Hutu and Tutsi identities (Keane, 1995). It also ignores the inter-marriage that had taken place between Hutu and Tutsi for centuries (Keane, 1995). The Hamitic hypothesis underpinned the propaganda depicting the Tutsi as historical foreign oppressors of the Hutu in the lead up to the 1994 genocide (see below). President Paul Kagame stated in a recent Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1994 genocide:

> The most devastating legacy of European control of Rwanda was the transformation of social distinctions into 'races'. We were classified and

> dissected, and whatever differences existed were magnified according to a framework invented elsewhere. Rwanda's 2000 years of history were reduced to a series of caricatures based on bible passages and on myths told to credulous explorers. Atavistic hostility between something called 'Tutsi' and something called 'Hutu' was deemed inherent to our nature. The purpose was neither scientific nor benign, but ideological: to justify colonial claims to rule over and 'civilise' supposedly lesser peoples. With the full participation of Belgian officials and Catholic institutions, ethnicity was made the only basis of political organisation, as if there was no other way to govern and develop society (Kagame, 7th April, 2014, p.1).

The Hamitic hypothesis was the ideological basis of German indirect rule and Belgian distribution of power, the idea being that the proto-European Tutsi could be trusted to carry out colonial orders (Keane, 1995). As such, race "overshadowed the organisation of society, [and became colonial Rwanda's] central political idiom" (Straus, 2006, p.22). Hutu were cast as dumb serfs and were discriminated against by the Belgian education, political and socio-economic systems (Ibid.). Conversely, the Tutsi were cast as superior beings and given access to education and put into positions of power (Ibid.). This history was used to present the Tutsi as oppressors in the propaganda promulgated by the Hutu power regime in the lead up to the 1994 genocide (see below). This propaganda ignored the fact that only a minority elite of the Tutsi population benefited from colonialism (Taylor, 1999). Prunier (1995) argues that by 1959, the year of the Hutu Social Revolution "the average financial situation of the Tutsi and Hutu groups […] was similar" (p.52). In colonial Rwanda not all Tutsi were rich and/or in positions of power and not all Hutu were poor and oppressed.

The institutionalisation of Hutu and Tutsi as racialised ethnic identities was cemented in 1933 with the introduction of a mandatory identity card system by the Belgian colonial authorities. Every Rwandan citizen had to carry an identity card with his/her name and ethnic identity - Hutu, Tutsi or Twa - stated clearly. Consequently, for the first time in Rwandan history, Hutu and Tutsi identities were fixed and legally binding. Except by bribing bureaucratic officials, a Hutu could no longer become a Tutsi:

> [T]he possibility of elevating oneself from the peasant classes to the aristocracy was removed [...] a Hutu was a Hutu for life [which in effect

> meant] that their mission in life was to toil (forced labour on the lands of Tutsi nobles was common place) and serve in perpetuity (Keane, 1995 p.17).

Slowly, many Hutu and Tutsi began to see themselves as distinct peoples (Freedman et al., 2008; also Newbury, 1988; Vansina, 1998). The narrative of distinct difference fuelled a Hutu ethno-nationalist grab for power in the lead-up to post-colonial Rwanda. By the mid to late 1950s, in a post WWII and United Nations (UN) context, the mood for self-determination was sweeping across Africa (Keane, 1995). Rwanda was no exception and the vying for the control of post-colonial Rwanda had begun in earnest. The Tutsi-dominated Rwanda National Union political party (UNAR) became increasingly confrontational with their Belgian rulers (Keane, 1995). The Tutsi monarch - King Mwami Rudahigwa - openly called for Rwandan independence (Taylor, 1999). Realising the Tutsi dominated UNAR would never survive a free and fair democratic election within a Hutu majority Rwanda, Belgium changed sides and backed 'The Party for the (exclusive) Emancipation of the Hutu' (Parme Hutu) (Keane, 1995).

> [T]he shifts in the meaning of ethnic identity had now come full circle; race thinking that had once hardened identity categories and benefited the Tutsi minority now gave rise to ethnic nationalism. Rwanda's new Hutu leaders claimed independence in the name of the previously oppressed Hutu majority. Democracy meant Hutu rule (Straus, 2006, p.21-22).

Identity politics became the order of the day. For many Hutus, colonial rule was synonymous with Tutsi rule. The Bahutu Manifesto (March 24th, 1957) stated that even if "white-black colonialism [ended, the] worst colonialism of Hamite [Tutsi] over the Muhutu" would remain (Nkundabagenzi, 1962, p.24-29). The Parme Hutu call for the 'great Hutu majority' to rise up for a democratic and 'Hutu nation' resulted in the transfer of power from an elite made up mostly of Tutsis to an elite constituted mostly of Hutus (Prunier, 1995). In the new 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) of Rwanda "the Hutu were not just the majority, they were the nation" (Mamdani, 2002, p.189).

The Belgian colonialists hoping neo-colonialism would dominate an independent Rwanda, watched from the side-lines as an elite of Tutsi rulers were chased from

power during the Hutu Social Revolution (1959-1961) (Prunier, 1995). In the upheaval of 1959, thousands of ordinary Tutsi were killed, with estimates varying between 10,000 and 100,000 (Keane, 1995, p.18). As if a prelude to the 1994 genocide, the Tutsi were caste as resident aliens, Tutsi houses were razed and "the rivers filled with bodies" (Keane, 1995, p.18). Thousands of Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries, for example, Uganda (Straus, 2006).

The descendants of Rwandan refugees in Uganda desiring to return to Rwanda, primarily made up the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that started the Rwandan civil war in the 1990s and brought an end to the 1994 genocide. In 1962, Rwanda was declared a Republic with Gregoire Kayibanda, the founder of Parme Hutu, elected as President. This first Rwandan Republic (1962-1973) continued to cast the Tutsi as an alien race in the official discourse. The second Rwandan Republic (1973-1994) led by President Habyarimana, recognised the Tutsi as an indigenous ethnic group but discrimination against the Tutsi continued. After President Habyarimana's death in April 1994, and in the lead-up to genocide, Hutu Power hardliners recast the Tutsi as an alien race. This echoed the colonial racial ideology that underpinned the 1959 Hutu revolution (Mamdani, 2002).

In sum, while the colonial powers did not create Hutu and Tutsi as separate identities, Belgian colonial rule changed what these "categories meant and how they mattered" with tragic consequences (Straus, 2006, p.20). President Paul Kagame stated in a recent Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1994 genocide that: "all genocides begin with an ideology - a system of ideas that says: This group of people here, they are less human and they deserve to be exterminated" (Kagame, 7th April, 2014, p.1). The following sub-section looks more closely at Rwanda's dominant post-colonial ideology prior to the RPF takeover in July 1994. That is Hutu ethno-nationalism, a driving mechanism of the 1994 genocide.

Post-colonial Rwanda and the ideology of Hutu ethno-nationalism (1962-July 1994)

The corner-stone ideology of Hutu ethno-nationalism was distinct difference from the Tutsi oppressor and Hutu rule of a Hutu nation (Straus, 2006; also Taylor, 1999; Mamdani, 2002). This ethno-nationalist framework determined how power was

distributed by successive post-independent Hutu-led government's between1962-1994. Strict limits were placed on Tutsi participation in political life and on their access to education and the military (see Keane, 1995; Straus, 2006). Incited by the Hutu ethno-nationalist themes of the Tutsi enemy and metaphorical (Hutu) kinship, numerous massacres of Tutsi civilians took place in post-colonial Rwanda by mobs (Keane, 1995; also Straus, 2006; Eriksen, 1993). As such, in post-colonial Rwanda killing the Tutsi became a way to protect and reaffirm the idea of a Hutu nation and to escape from a vision of themselves as victims of Tutsi oppression (Prunier, 1995).

Michael Mann (2004) and Eric Weitz (2003) emphasise how utopian ideologies of race and nation can play an important role in mass ethnic violence and genocide. These writers implicate ethnic nationalism in genocide and mass ethnic violence. For example, the Holocaust (Straus, 2006), the Cambodian genocide (Kiernan, 1996), and mass ethnic killing and genocide under Slobodan Milosevic and Serb hardliners in the former Yugoslavia (Silber and Little, 1997). Likewise, writers and historians implicate Hutu ethno-nationalism in the Rwandan genocide (Freedman et al., 2008; also Vansina, 1998; Newbury and Newbury 2000; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Eltringham and van Hoyweghen, 2000; Prunier, 1995; Des Forges, 1999). Hutu ethno-nationalism as the driving mechanism of the 1994 genocide is evident through the repetition of Hutu ethno-nationalist themes in propaganda in the lead up to the 1994 genocide.

Hutu Power media outlets like Kangura, a weekly magazine, proclaimed: "You [the Hutu] are an important ethnic group of the Bantu [race]" (Chrétien et al, 1995 in Des Forges, 1999, p.86). The Hutu Power radio station RTLM, which called itself the voice of 'the majority', broadcast: "the reason we will exterminate them [Tutsi] is that they belong to one ethnic group" (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.39) and "…one can identify them because they are of one race" (Melvern, 2006, p.210). Furthermore, Hutu Power media outlets and political speeches linked the Tutsi within Rwanda not only with the RPF but with the subjugation and exploitation of the Hutu in pre-colonial and colonial times (Straus, 2006; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). In this way, a link between the Tutsi of "different times and places" was created (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.62). Hutu Power politicians exhorted their followers to "send the Tutsi [infiltrators] back to Ethiopia via the nearest river" (Keane, 1995, p.15).

Evident in this propaganda are deeply historical Hutu ethno-nationalist themes. These are Hutu racial and ethnic difference and Hutu victimisation by a foreign Tutsi enemy. Furthermore, a hard won Hutu liberation threatened by the Tutsi who work, plot and scheme day and night to bring back Tutsi rule in Rwanda. In 1991, the magazine Kangura stated that as many as 85 per cent of all Tutsi were "accomplices [who never put down their arms], [and] who were working night and day" to establish Tutsi feudal rule (Taylor, 1999, p.63), the subtext being Tutsis wanted to turn Hutus into slaves. The magazine warned "if this [historical] disease [Tutsi] is not treated immediately, it will destroy all the Hutu" (Taylor, 1999, p.63). Therefore, clearly, the Rwandan state deployed the Hutu ethno-nationalist narrative to identify the:

> [P]rincipal enemy [as the] Tutsi inside or outside the country, who are extremist and nostalgic for power and who have never recognised and still do not recognise the realities of the 1959 Social Revolution and who want to take power by any means necessary, including arms (Rwandan Military Commission Memo circulated to senior officers December 1991 in Des Forges, 1999, p.62).

Consequently, Hutu ethno-nationalism can be implicated as inciting the violence that culminated in the 1994 genocide. However, Straus (2006) argues otherwise. That is the Hutu ethno-nationalist account of history exploited as propaganda by Hutu Power hardliners was not the primary mechanism motivating individual Hutus to kill during 1994 (Ibid.). Straus (2006) believes that while important at the macro (political) level, "history [...] over-determines the genocide" at the individual micro-level (p.18). Straus (2006) points to (1) "war time uncertainty and fear", (2) "social pressure" and (3) "opportunity" (p.10). Underpinning this analysis is the security dilemma theory that argues that people become aggressors in the context of war out of fear that if they don't kill, they too will become victims (for different versions of this argument see Posen, 1993; Snyder and Jervis, 1999; Wilson, 2010). Having considered the above arguments, they all have some validity insofar as genocide is a complex event. Theories are not mutually exclusive and individual perpetrators can be motivated by a variety of factors at any one time (Des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006). Nonetheless, the 1994 genocide could not have taken place without the active involvement of the Hutu masses (Mamdani, 2002). The masses, which came to fear, hate and kill the Tutsi

because of a common Hutu-ethno-nationalist view of the Tutsi namely, as the enemy within (Ibid.).

However, Hutu ethno-nationalism did not work in a vacuum. Tutsi massacres incited at the macro level (by the state) and conducted at the micro level (by individual Hutu perpetrators) over previous decades illustrate this. Between independence in 1962 and the 1994 genocide violence occurred principally during periods of contested power, political instability and imminent change and/or in the aftermath of rebel (Tutsi of the exterior) attacks. For example, from 1962-1964, there were military attacks by Tutsi exiles and internal dissent within the Kayibanda regime; in 1973 an internal military coup was in preparation; and from 1990-1994 there was civil war with the RPF, the real possibility of democratic reform and the assassination of the president (Straus, 2006). So the civil war with the RPF was fundamental to the logic of genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002) because it created war time uncertainty and fear (Straus, 2006). As such, Lemarchand (2006) argues that the RPF bears a large degree of responsibility for the genocide because they invaded Rwanda in 1990. Nontheless, during each of the afore-mentioned periods of instability, Hutu ethno-nationalist themes were used by Hutu power administrations to incite violence against the Tutsi at the micro (individual) level and this violence occurred (see Prunier, 1995). The above shows how 'political instability', 'war' and 'nationalism' are a potent mix combining to legitimise killing (see Straus, 2006; Eriksen, 1993) and within this context, ordinary people will kill (Straus, 2006; Taylor, 1999).

Overall, Straus (2006) points out that genocide is ultimately about how ordinary citizens come to view other citizens, family, friends, neighbours and colleagues as enemies that must be killed and then act on this belief (p.2). Individual motivations driving participation in the Rwandan genocide were heterogeneous: "Hutu who killed Tutsi did so for many reasons" (Des Forges, 1999, p.31). However, underpinning individual motivations was the common fear of the 'Tutsi devils' (Prunier, 1995). Once ignited, Hutu ethno-nationalism changed the dynamics of the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi and made killing imaginable (Prunier, 1995). Melvern (2006) states:

> ..1959 was the first of several alleged genocides. The number of victims would vary widely but […] in each case, the role of propaganda and a distortion of history were paramount. In the years between 1959 and 1994 the idea of genocide, although never officially recognised, became a part of life (Melvern, 2006, p.7-8).

All this points to a partial, but important explanation for the 1994 genocide pivoting on: (a) the colonial manipulation of history along racialised ethnic lines out of which (b) arose the post-colonial ideology of Hutu ethno-nationalism that was exploited (c) by Hutu Power extremists in the context of a civil war, as propaganda up to and during the genocide. Hutu-ethno-nationalism and civil war were an explosive mix. This supports the view of some academics of the important role Hutu-ethno nationalism played in the 1994 genocide for example, Freedman et al., (2008) and Buckley-Zistel (2009a). In turn, the view of Hutu ethno-nationalism implicit in the Rwandan genocide supports those who claim ethno-nationalism, history, memory and war are important factors in genocide and mass violence generally (for example, Mann, 2004; also Horowitz, 1985, 2001; Eller, 1999; Valentino et al., 2004). Below examines the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the current socio-economic and political Rwandan context.

The Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide

By the genocide's end, in early July 1994, an estimated 800,000 ordinary Tutsi men, women and children and politically moderate Hutus had been murdered (see Melvern, 2006; also Deguine, 2010; Straus, 2006; Prunier 1995). There were orphans, wounded and numerous victims of rape who were now HIV positive and/or pregnant (Melvern, 2006; also Kagame, 2004a, b; Des Forges, 1999). Survivors reportedly spoke of being condemned to live (McGreal, 2014). They were called the 'Bapfuye Buhagazi' translated as the 'walking dead' being physically intact but severely traumatised, terrified souls who were not quite able to believe that they had lost family and homes often at the hands of people they knew (Keane, 1995; Prunier, 1995). A survivor recounts: "…we knew the men who attacked us in the beginning. They used to be our neighbors" (African Rights, no date-post 1994/pre May 1998, p.22).

Bodies lay strewn, scattered across Rwanda's rural hills, back roads and urban streets. Corpses were piled high in churches and classrooms; the smell of decomposition was reported as gut-wrenching (Melvern, 2006; also Kagame, 2004a, b; Des Forges,

1999). The small, tight knit communities of Rwanda were in chaos. Of a population in excess of seven million about half were internally or externally displaced, many of whom suffering from deprivation and disease (Prunier, 1995; also Melvern, 2006; Mamdani, 2002; Reyntjens, 2004). Tens and later hundreds of thousands of the Tutsi diaspora, 'returnees' from 1959 and subsequent exiles and massacres, flowed into Rwanda from Uganda, the Congo, Tanzania and Burundi (Prunier, 1995). What they found was a country whose infrastructure was destroyed and intelligentsia (Hutu and Tutsi) dead or in exile (Taylor, 1999).

By the time the new (multi-party) government was inaugurated on 19th July 1994, the old Hutu Power genocide regime had fled. It escaped to the Congo with what was left of the army, civil administration and over 1,000,000 Hutu refugees whom the extremist Hutu regime hoped to use for political advantage and/or to reconstruct its genocidal war machine (Prunier, 1995; also Straus, 2006; Taylor, 1999). Infiltrations into post-genocide Rwanda began as early as September 1994 (Prunier, 1995). The departing regime had implemented a scorched earth policy leaving nothing for the incoming RPF to use to rebuild the country (Prunier, 1995). Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, stated in a State of the Nation address 14th February 2011: "in rebuilding Rwanda after the 1994 genocide we started from scratch […]. [E]very aspect of reconstruction was a priority" (p.1).

Post-genocide Rwanda: The social, economic and political context

It is now over 20 years since July 1994. Post-genocide Rwanda is a tale of rapid economic growth, development and authoritarianism. For Western liberal democracies who provide aid to Rwanda, for example the UK and USA, this is a puzzling mix. This is because economic success is much admired, but authoritarian control conflicts with Western democratic values. Disquiet with the RoG has begun to surface in London and Washington. This was demonstrated in 2012 when the UK Department for International Development (Dfid) stopped aid to Rwanda following UN allegations that the RoG was financing rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (McGreal, 2014, p.4).

In a WSJ article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the genocide, President Paul Kagame (2014) outlined three choices made early on by the RoG which continue to

guide the government today, as quoted below. This develops a picture of the socio-economic and political post-genocide Rwandan context. It also brings into sharp relief where Kagame's rhetoric does and does not reflect reality as depicted by international researchers. Kagame (7th April 2014) stated:

> First we chose to stay together. We brought millions of refugees home. We allowed low level genocide suspects to return home to await our form of community justice known as Gacaca. We passed a new constitution that transcends politics based on division and, for the first time, made women full partners in nation-building. We extended comprehensive health and education benefits to all our children (p.1-2).

These claims are evidenced in the literature (see Aghion, 2002, 2005; also Hintjens, 2008; Khaleeli, 2010). For example, advances in health and educational provision and gender equality since July 1994 have been reportedly remarkable (Reyntjens, 2004). A Dfid (2014) report states: "Rwanda is making significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goal targets and is lifting people out of poverty" (p.1). In 2008 Rwanda introduced a free and compulsory nine years of basic education policy. This includes six years of primary school and three years of junior secondary school (O-level) raised in 2012 to aim to include twelve years of basic education (UNECA, 2014).

In 2012[6], 96.5 per cent of Rwandan children were reportedly enrolled in primary school with universal access to primary school likely by 2015 (UNICEF, 2014). However, the net enrolment for secondary school in 2012 was much lower at 28 per cent. I was unable to find data to clarify if 28 per cent represented net enrolment for junior and upper secondary or junior secondary only. As such, the data suggests that at least 28 per cent of Rwandan children follow O-level or junior secondary history education in Rwanda - the focus of this thesis (UNICEF, 2014). 42.1 per cent of Rwandans are under the age of 14 years. Therefore, a young population coupled with growing net enrolment in primary and secondary school, means the education system is likely to have an increasing influence on the general population in the future (King, 2006). So, as part of the widening of access of compulsory education, O-level history is an important area of educational research.

[6] These were the latest figures available.

For fast-tracking strategies for nine years basic education, in 2012, Rwanda won the prestigious Commonwealth Education Good Practice Award (UNICEF, 30th August 2012). This policy has seen a rapid increase in pupil enrolment, retention and completion at primary and at O-level secondary levels (UNICEF, 30th August 2012). Nonetheless, over-crowded classrooms, a lack of resources and untrained teachers mean that good quality education remains an issue. Moreover, linguistic reforms in 2008 saw English emerge as the language of instruction in Rwandan schools. Previously, children were taught in Kinyarwanda for the first three years of primary school and choose to learn in either French or English for the remaining years (McGreal, 2008). This raises the question of genuine access insofar as many of Rwanda's rural poor speak neither French nor English, but Kinyarwanda (Hintjens, 2008)[7]. Nonetheless, Pells et al (2014) note that widening access to primary and O-level secondary education has led to promising opportunities for young Rwandans.

There are critical points to make about Kagame's claims above. The Rwandan constitution is visionary as Kagame (2014) claims. However, while the language of peace runs throughout the Rwandan constitution, peace is fragile in contemporary Rwandan society. Critics of the RoG point to the concentration of power in the hands of a few urban elite English speaking Tutsi returnees and the Tutsi-led RPF (see Mamdani, 2002; Freedman et al., 2008). Researchers who have spent time outside this narrow Kigali elite with subsistence farmers (see Ansoms, 2011; also Ingelaere, 2011; Huggins, 2011; and Thomson, 2011), prisoners in jail from a Hutu background (see Tertsakian, 2011), Tutsi genocide survivors (see Rettig, 2011), or young people (see Pells, 2011; McLean-Hilker, 2011) tell how participants refer to issues of exclusion and marginalisation, often accompanied by fear and alienation (see Straus and Waldorf, 2011, p.11). Based on an analysis of 350 life histories of rural Rwandans collected in 2011, Ingelaere (2014) talks of the often authoritarian nature and, at times, overreach of underlying government practice in the lives of rural Rwandans.

So there is a disconnection between the RoG constitution that talks of democracy and equality and the grassroots reality of RoG authoritarianism. This is where opposing viewpoints are reportedly excluded from political debate and often demonised as

[7]Approximately 90 percent of Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda only (Le Clerc, 2008).

genocide ideology (Gready, 2011; also Longman, 2011; Waldorf, 2011); tension between top-down and coercive high-modernity plans for rural Rwanda and rural realities (see Ansoms, 2011; Newbury, 2011); and fear amongst Hutu of being falsely accused of genocide or genocide ideology and imprisoned (Prunier, 1995; also Straus, 2006; Webster, 2011; Rettig, 2011; Tertsakian, 2011). There are also reports of distrust by some of *gacaca* or community courts where low-level Rwandan perpetrators of genocide are tried (Rettig, 2011) and of increasing economic inequality between a minority elite and the poor majority. However, while Chemouni (2014) notes strong central control over decentralised processes in Rwanda, he also observes that local government "enjoys an unprecedented range of competencies and resources" (p.246).

Nevertheless, research by Ansoms (2011), Newbury (2011) and Hintjens (2008) referenced above questions Kagame's (2014) claim in the WSJ. That is the claim of genuine accountability and decentralised power being the defining characteristics of RoG decision-making:

> Second, we choose to be accountable. We decentralised power and decision making around the country. We work closely with aid donors to ensure that their funds reach the poor. We award scholarships and appoint public servants based on merit, without discrimination. We sanction officials, no matter how high-ranking, who abuse power or engage in corruption (p.2).

Ingelaere (2011) argues that decentralisation is a front masking a parallel command and control structure put in place by the RoG to maintain centralised control of the rural population. Nonetheless, based on an analysis of 350 life histories of rural Rwandans collected in 2011, Ingelaere (2014) also reports, "an overall perceived improvement in basic service delivery" (p.214). Perhaps as a result of authoritarian control, Kagame's claims of little corruption and effective aid distribution are supported by Taylor, (1999) and Reyntjens (2004). A recent Dfid (2014) report stated:

> We have seen for ourselves the tremendous improvements that Rwanda has made since 1994 and consider that general budget support has proved effective in reducing poverty in Rwanda. For this reason, we think that UK aid should continue to benefit the people of Rwanda (p.1).

Nevertheless, there are instances of cronyism discussed in the literature. Huggins (2011) characterises land redistribution in the eastern province as lacking transparency and equity, arguing that Rwandan elites are able to ignore laws to benefit themselves and their allies (see p.253, p.260). These actions confirm Des Forge's (2006) concern that "the policy and laws appear to offer more security for the prosperous and powerful, eagerly solicited for their capacity to invest, than for the majority of Rwandans who make a bare living from their plots" (Huggins, 2011, p.260). Therefore, while ethnic and regional discrimination no longer determine academic or work opportunities in the way they did in pre-genocide Rwanda, relationships vis-à-vis the ruling elite might determine access to opportunities and wealth. This supports Hintjens (2008) belief that "the social distance between the minority urban elites and majority small-scale peasant producers [in Rwanda] is probably greater than before the genocide" (p.21). Doom (2000) warns that such disparity of wealth and opportunity might lead Rwanda's rural poor to return to the identity politics of the past.

Kagame (2014) claims:

> Third, we chose to think big. We made the country an attractive place to do business. We extended broadband to all 30 districts. We are regular contributors to the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping forces, including Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, because our experience has taught us how to recognise the warning signs of genocide, and it has given us the determination to stop it when we have the means to do so (p.2).

In earlier speeches, Kagame (2011 and 2004b) similarly pointed to progress made in key areas of reconstruction including law and order, economic growth and infrastructure development. The Dfid (2014) report quoted above supports these claims. Moreover, law and order, infrastructure development and a clear plan for economic growth are attractive qualities for business investors wanting to capitalise on Rwanda's eight per cent annual growth rate (see Smith, 2nd April 2014). This, coupled with a reputation for little government corruption, has resulted in much donor and business investment in Rwanda (Reyntjens, 2004; Taylor, 1999). By 2020 the RoG wants Rwanda to be the East African hub for 'knowledge industries' such as commercial banking and ICT (see Vision 2020; Hayman, 2007). However, critics

indicate that improvements to the infrastructure are Kigali-centered and are yet to be replicated in rural areas, which exemplifies the urban - rural divide discussed above.

Kagame's (2014) claim that Rwanda participates in UN missions is true and Rwanda has much to offer the world in terms of how to prevent genocide and how to rebuild a country in the aftermath of violence. The latter is particularly important for other societies recovering from genocide and/or conflict, for example South Africa, Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see chapter 3). Finally, in the 7th April WSJ article Kagame (2014) recounts:

> A few years ago I met a young man who was one of 12 people pulled alive from under 3,000 corpses in a mass grave at Murambi. He still lived nearby, totally alone. When the perpetrators he recognised came home from prison, terror surged again through his body. I asked him how he managed and he told me, 'I could not do it unless I was convinced that these impossible choices are leading us somewhere'. To prevent genocide, it is not enough to remember the past. We must also remember the future (p.2).

Many Rwandans are working to build the better future Kagame (2014) alludes to above. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa work together to manage and, where possible, to heal the on-going legacies of genocide: orphans, widows, rape survivors, refugees, physical wounds and psychological trauma (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000). Perpetrators and survivors work together in co-operatives (Sentama, 2009) and many live as neighbours. None of this has been easy, nor is it working perfectly, as might be expected. However, it is substantial and real progress against claims that in the aftermath of genocide, Rwanda would never work as a country again. Kagame spoke above of focusing on the future. Section three of chapter three shows how history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda has been shaped by a top-down vision of the future.

Post-genocide Rwanda is a complex society. The values and aims of peace, unity and reconciliation and development espoused by the RoG and articulated in the Rwandan constitution are fragile at a deep level across Rwandan society. Academics point to a flawed democratisation process, the repression of civil liberties and the media, and human rights abuses in Rwanda and abroad (see above). However, there are clearly

areas of success. Ordinary Rwandans not only have an investment in peace, unity and reconciliation and development through economic growth and education and health care, but also many Rwandans are active in making Rwandan society more peaceful and economically prosperous. Kagame (2014) emphasises the successes of post-genocide Rwanda but ignores much of the fragility of the peace as discussed in the literature. This raises serious concerns about the breadth, depth and sustainability of social repair in the country (Straus and Waldorf, 2011).

Chapter Summary

The chapter has explored Rwandan history, the genocide and the socio-political and economic context of post-genocide Rwanda. This provides background information necessary to understand history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda as explored in chapters three, five, six, seven, and eight. In brief, Hutu and Tutsi identities are not ahistorical. Evidence suggests that Hutu and Tutsi were, fluid, socio-economic identities in pre-colonial Rwanda, becoming fixed racialised ethnic categories under colonial rule, but this history is contested (see Newbury, 1988; also Vansina, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Hintjens, 2008). While Hutu and Tutsi categories pre-existed colonialism, colonialism played a significant role in changing what these identities meant and how they mattered (Straus, 2006). Key to this transformation was the Hamitic hypothesis. This hypothesis imported into Rwanda by the colonialists, depicted the Tutsi as proto-European and a separate and superior race to the indigenous Bantu Hutu. Power and opportunity in colonial Rwanda were distributed accordingly. The marriage between race and power in colonial Rwanda laid the basis for the emergence of Hutu ethno-nationalism. The Tutsi came to be associated with colonial power and became a symbol of oppression amongst Hutus.

Hutu ethno-nationalism dominated the political, historical and identity discourses in post-independent Rwanda up to July 1994. It called for a Hutu nation for the Hutu people; to be Rwandan was to be Hutu and to be Hutu was to be Rwandan and Tutsi were the enemy within. This politics of division was so often unleashed by Hutu power elements through propaganda that it became a language understood by all, believed by many and tragically acted on in April 1994. Before reviewing the literature on school history in post-genocide Rwanda (section 3 of chapter 3), chapter three addresses genocide historiography (section 1) and considers implications for

educational (school history) approaches after genocide and conflict (section 2). This frames and helps us to understand school history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapter 3 The Challenges of Teaching History in Post-Conflict and Post-Genocide Societies

Introduction

The research problem of this thesis is secondary school history in post-genocide Rwanda. To address the research problem I review the historiographic issues of developing history after genocide and conflict (section 1). Secondly, I consider history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict, derive approaches and address historiographical issues (section 2). Finally, I review the literature on school history in post-genocide Rwanda. I identify the Rwandan approach to history curriculum reform and historiographical implications and derive research questions from knowledge gaps identified (section 3).

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to give a comparative and analytical account of others' research in the relevant fields. I consider scholarly commentary and critically evaluate empirical research in terms of findings, methodology and/or methods to this end. The aim is to reveal knowledge gaps, which have allowed me to generate research questions.

Historiographical Issues of Developing History after Genocide and Conflict

A number of works in historiography have helped me to understand the issues for curriculum reform in the specific contexts of, in particular, post-genocide and, more broadly, post-conflict societies (see below). I first deal with contestations about the nature and purpose of history generally; following this, the themes I identify and deal with focus on history in post-genocide contexts. They are the nature of genocide history and the purpose of history of and after genocide. I conclude that truth in history is subjective and partial and becomes highly complex after genocide. This raises questions about how to deal with the complexities of history in history school curricula after genocide and conflict, which is the focus of the second section.

Contestations about the nature and purposes of history

This theme provides background context necessary for conceptualising school history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies (section 2) and in post-genocide Rwanda (section 3). Western historiography is defined by competing ideas about what history is and for. Some writers organise the contestation into what are

called ‘old’ and ‘new’ history, but clarifying old versus new history is not a contemporary debate (Black and MacRaild, 2000; Southgate, 2000, 2005; Tosh, 2000; Slater, 1992). Old history, dominant in the West up to the 1960s, suggests a grand narrative of objective facts or truth underpinned by the historian’s objectivity; new history, dominant today, emphasises the subjectivity of the historian, historical interpretation and multi-perspectivity.

It is argued that academic concept(s) of historical truth and purpose in old history often aligned with power interests. For example, Whig[8] history dominant in Britain in the 18th and early to mid-19th centuries is characterised as having served British political interests (Black and MacRaild, 2000; Southgate, 2000, 2005). That is by presenting British history as a single narrative truth of human progress with the British system and Empire at the apex of human political development (Ibid.; Ibid., Ibid.). In ‘*The Uses and Abuses of History’*, Margaret MacMillan (2010) analyses how and why old history is employed by contemporary governments. She observes that government control of official history through grand narratives cultivates state loyalty and legitimises state policies, expansionism, war, ethnic cleansing and even genocide (Ibid.).

Contemporary Western historians largely accept that history cannot offer definitive explanations, but rather a range of interpretations (Evans, 1997; MacMillan, 2010; Black and MacRaild, 2000; Slater, 1989, 1995; Southgate, 2000, 2005; Tosh, 2000; von Borries, 2003). Moreover, there is a plethora of approaches, theories and methodologies at work in new history today. Historians use Marxist, post-colonial, nationalism, post-modernism and gender studies theories and philosophies to study the past in particular ways for particular purposes (Black and MacRaild, 2000; Southgate, 2000, 2005; Tosh, 2000). At the same time, as new ways of defining history have emerged, so have new challenges. The trap of relativism that holds that all historical interpretations are of equal validity and no ‘facts’ exist is a consideration (Black and MacRaild, 2000; Southgate, 2000). Yet, most historians agree some perspectives are “more informed by the weight of empirical evidence and the historical record than others” (Bérubé, 2006, p.291).

[8] The past is presented as a progressive story of ever greater liberty and enlightenment.

Although new history puts limits on history's power to narrate a single story about the nation in the service of power interests, as I show below history is still used to this end. There is conflict between the complexities of new history and modern politics in which politicians can perceive a need to tell simple stories of the nation to promote social cohesion. This perception is aptly exemplified in the debate over former UK Conservative Party Education Secretary (2010 - 2014), Michael Gove's plans to turn English school history into a positive narrative of 'our islands story'. This recalls the British history textbook '*Our Island Story*' published in 1905 and written by Henrietta Marshall (Evans, 2012). The textbook is replete with accounts of a glorious British Empire, allowing the argument that Gove's reforms are a return to old history or a single and overly positive national story transmitted to promote a homogenous identity, pride and patriotism (Evans 2011, 2012, 2013; Haydn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b). Yet, Gove's reforms are advocated by some leading historians on this basis, for example Niall Ferguson (see Ferguson, 2011; Evans, 2011, 2013).

This UK example illustrates contemporary historians' debate about the nature and purpose of history and how, on the one hand, historians and politicians forge alliances to promote shared visions of a 'good' society; on the other, awareness of historical complexity, intellectual autonomy and critical thinking skills are sacrificed (Evans, 2011, 2013; Haydn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b). I will show old and new history approaches play out in history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict in section two. In summary, there are different views and interests when it comes to defining truth and purpose in history. Old history's claims to scientific truth and objective purpose have been criticised for being methodologically flawed and for being used by authoritarian governments to control society (MacMillan, 2010). Conversely, new history is largely acknowledged by historians as enriching historiography with new practices, methodologies and knowledge (Black and MacRaild, 2000); less discussed is how the complexity of new history might undermine the traditional cohesive role history has arguably played in society. We see how this apparently straightforward dilemma becomes complex and nuanced as it plays out in the context of history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict in section two.

The nature of genocide history

This theme provides an in-depth understanding of issues around genocide historiography. This is necessary background to tease out and to understand issues arising around history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies (section 2) and in post-genocide Rwanda (section 3). Most genocide scholars' work theorises the concept of genocide and/or identify, describe and explain instances of genocide rather than addressing historiographical issues (Mann, 2004; also Horowitz, 1985, 2001; Eller, 1999; Valentino et al., 2004; Weitz, 2003). Nevertheless, historiography is always present in it because genocide does not emerge in a vacuum. The context is usually one of war/conflict (De Swaan, 2015; Straus, 2006). So the assumption is made here that historiographical issues in post-genocide societies, also broadly apply to post-conflict societies. In this discussion, I draw heavily on Yehuda Bauer and Daniel Stone's work. I also refer to relevant ideas in the work of other genocide scholars and in scholarly work on violence and the past including: De Swaan (2015), Hamber (1998a, b), Minow (1998, 1999), Shriver (1995, 2005) and Straus (2001, 2006).

Writers' discussions about the nature of genocide usually involve contestations about how the term should be defined, which itself raises historiographical problems. It was coined by the polish jurist Raphael Lemkin (1944) to differentiate between deaths caused by war and the deliberate destruction of a nation or ethnic group (see Bauer, 2002). After Lemkin (1944), article two of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) defines genocide as the planned attempt to destroy, in part or wholly, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group (UN, 1951). Nevertheless, genocide scholar Scott Straus (2001) counted 21 different definitions of genocide in the literature. This means that claims of genocide in history are often disputed (Moses, 2004; Hayden, 2008), for example, with a change in definition, mass atrocity becomes genocide and vice-versa (Hayden, 2008). So, while mass killing is a numerical and quantifiable fact, genocide is a constructed and contested concept and therefore, claims can be difficult to establish and maintain (Stone, 2008).

Furthermore, because genocide involves establishing intent it is more difficult to prove than mass killing (Stone, 2008). By disputing intent, Hayden (2008) challenges the common view amongst scholars that the killing of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim

men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica in July 1995 was genocide. Moreover, he argues that the accusation of genocide is politically motivated (Ibid.). So disputes over intent can involve schisms in scholarship. Stone (2008) observes a tension between genocide as a legal concept that requires the proof of intent and the demands of writing history. Historians are often faced with perpetrator interviewees unclear about "how and when they […] moved from discrimination to violence to genocide" (Stone, 2008, p.5). Motivations are seldom simple (Straus, 2006); perpetrators lie (De Swaan, 2015); primary witnesses are by definition often dead; evidence is often destroyed; and surviving witnesses exiled, silenced or killed in cover-up operations (Bauer, 1976; De Swaan, 2015). Of course, this is not always the case: Nazi Germany left much incriminating evidence (Friedlander, 2012), which Evans (2001) used to rebut Holocaust denial theories.

Other historiographic issues might arise once the term 'genocide' is applied. Firstly, Stone (2008) observes that it can stifle deeper historiographical investigation into what lay behind events. Yet, the vast Holocaust literature as described by Bauer (1976) and Stone (2004a, b) coupled with the growing field of genocide studies (Stone, 2008), are examples of where and how the label of genocide has encouraged historical investigation. Secondly, as Straus (2001) claims of Rwanda, the label of genocide can frame national history too narrowly. Thirdly, the legal and moral implications of the genocide label can result in genocide denial and in the repression of history research by governments. For example, Bloxham and Gocek (2008) discuss how consecutive Turkish governments have denied and repressed the argument of an Armenian genocide in Turkey and abroad for the afore-mentioned reasons (see below, p.41-42). Conversely, we will see in section three how state legislation banning genocide denial and division in post-genocide Rwanda also works to repress free speech in history.

Even if genocide can be clearly established and accepted by the perpetrators as Israeli Holocaust historian, Yehuda Bauer's work on the Holocaust shows, there are inherent limitations of the historical perspective (see Bauer 1976, 1978, 2002; Bauer and Rotenstreich, 1981). Bauer's insights are largely derived from his impressive body of accumulated experiences as Holocaust historian, author, researcher and teacher. He observes that the historical perspective alone is insufficient to answer the big questions genocide poses. For example: "How important are stereotypes? When do

they break down? What exactly makes a stereotype"? Bauer (1976) fears a reliance on history alone could lead to "a narrowing of vision and distortion of perspective" (p.340). To answer the big questions, Bauer (1976) argues, historians need new tools from other fields such as politics, sociology and social psychology (p.341).

Despite the rise of new history with new methodologies and insights for genocide historiography, Bauer (1976, 2002) discusses how intangible causal factors make a definitive explanation of genocide impossible. Genocide, it is argued, is too complex to capture, involving more than our capacity to explain (Bauer, 1976, 2002; De Swaan, 2015; Stone 2004a, b, 2008; Straus, 2006). The theme 'nature of genocide history' has so far highlighted some important historiographical issues discussed in the literature(s) that relate to the concept of genocide and the limits of the historical perspective. I now turn in more detail to historiographical issues historians face of and after genocide in sub-themes: bearing witness, role of the historian and politics.

Bearing Witness

In '*The Holocaust in Historical Persp*ective', Bauer (1978) remarks on the limits of the historian in bearing witness to human suffering. Later Bauer and Rotenstreich (1981) remark:

> "Even when the facts are seemingly placed before us, there is the problem of comprehension […].We are seared in our very being by the testimony of survivors, who are trying to make us understand things that are almost impossible to grasp" (p.vii).

However, in 2002 Bauer argues a more nuanced position that, while historians may reach an understanding of human suffering, they will fail to convey the victims' true terror, fear and suffering (Bauer, 2002). Bearing witness of genocide is recognised by writers as complex and messy (Stone, 2007; De Swaan, 2015) and reasons for this as Bauer (1978, 2002) details are: human desire to avoid the unpleasant and/or to reduce it to what's manageable; the challenge of being accurate, conscientious, but also human, in research and writing; remembering the dead as living beings; avoiding lies, false over-emotionalism and mystification, while not destroying the mysterious quality of the event; and overcoming a natural rejection of the common humanity of perpetrators (Bauer, 1978, 2002). For Bauer (1978) and Bauer and Rotenstreich (1981) historians must bear witness to the humanity of the perpetrator as well as to the

inhumanity of the perpetrator's deeds. In addition to recognising our common humanity, such an approach allows for investigation of the complexities of genocide situations: perpetrators are sometimes also victims of violence and/or rescuers (De Swaan, 2015).

An important aspect of bearing witness is the role of witnesses. Bauer (2002) states: "[a]bove all, we need the witnesses. There is no Holocaust history without witnesses" (p.23). *Inter alia*, witnesses can corroborate, correct and/or create documentation, which is important when documents were destroyed as part of a cover-up (Bauer, 1976). Post-genocide societies often pass from the chaos of aftermath to a more stable reality and so some historiographical issues can lessen or pass. For example, witnesses may return from exile. However, interviewing witnesses of genocide poses methodological and ethical issues in the short and long term. On the one hand, interviewing witnesses too quickly after the events risks trauma, on the other, witness memories often fade over time (Bauer, 1976). This illustrates the time sensitive nature of some historiographical issues after genocide and the potential conflict between ethical considerations and the demands of historical research.

Whatever the time of witness statements, there is the related issue of the trustworthiness of witness memory, which leads both Bauer (2002) and De Swaan (2015) to the view that reconstructing violent past is a partial endeavour. Victims and perpetrators memories are often affected by trauma that can give rise to amnesia, repression and/or cognitive dissonance (Bauer, 2002; Smyth and Robinson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2013; Mazurana et al., 2013). Other issues writers discuss include: false memories (Minow, 1999); self-serving justifications from perpetrators; bias; and lies (Bauer, 1976, 2002; De Swaan, 2015). However, these problems can be viewed as part of the history of genocide itself, as some writers argue, rather than just barriers to writing history (Smith, 2005; King, 2009).

The afore-mentioned issues require a consideration of the nature of truth in history after genocide. The new history perspective points to second order concepts of historical interpretation and historical significance that rule out objective truth in history (Black and MacRaild, 2000; Southgate, 2000, 2005). The question: What is truth in history?, is even more complex after genocide. Legal genocide scholar Minow

(1998) distinguishes between psychological truth associated with truth-telling and historical truth. Minow (1998) argues that individual witness testimonies say something important about a person's grasp of the violent past - there is psychological truth, even if there are factual (historical truth) inaccuracies. Theologian Shriver (2005) clarifies psychological truth: "[p]ersonal stories encompass wider ranges and shades of truth" than facts and must not be ignored by historians (p.120). For Minow (1998) and Shriver (2005) psychological truth is an essential part of the history of genocide.

Minow (1998) and Shriver (2005) argue that the subjective and multi-faceted nature of truth in witness testimony means historians must uphold the critical standard of the history disciplinary process and avoid relativism. So, on the one hand, historians must acknowledge psychological truth as characterised by Minow (1998) as subjective, traumatic, cathartic, stories genuinely told, but fragments of the past and partial truth. On the other hand, historians must maintain the critical standard of the history discipline (Minow, 1998; Shriver, 2005). This seems a contradiction. However, psychological truth can be processed into historical truth by organising and synthesising personal stories into collections or what Shriver (2005) calls social or dialogical truth, and submitting them to the critical lens (Minow, 1998; McCully, 2014). So Minow (1998) and Shriver (2005) conceptualise historical truth as dialogical, empathetic, critical, and as providing a synthesis or overview. It also involves facts, for example how many chimneys were blown up in Auschwitz in October 1944 (see Minow, 1998, p.126).

However, Minow (1998) does not address the contingent and the often contested nature of historical facts of and after genocide (De Swaan, 2015). So called objective or forensic facts: who was killed, how many, when, where and by whom (Shriver, 2005) are observed by De Swaan (2015) to change over time as new sites of killing are uncovered and/or other evidence emerges. Also, over time historians produce competing interpretations that confirm, question and/or refute existing facts in line with new evidence and/or offer new interpretations/reading of existing facts. The vast literature around the Holocaust Bauer (1976) refers to exemplifies this. Furthermore, De Swaan (2015) observes that facts are often disputed by the parties involved in genocide. For example, Bloxham and Gocek (2008) report consecutive Turkish

governments denied the Armenian genocide by disputing facts, carefully selecting facts and/or presenting facts in a certain way. They did this so as to maintain the preferred counter Armenian genocide narrative (also see Bloxham, 2003, 2005; Gocek, 2014).

Even when facts are agreed by historians they can be interpreted differently by different groups of people in post-genocide societies. A study on community relations in 2000 in Vukovar (Croatia) and Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina) by Corkalo et al (2004) report the ethnicisation of memories in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina. This refers to how memory and the interpretation of the past have become ethnically exclusive and so the same events or historical facts are interpreted differently by different ethnic groups (Ibid.). So the subjective and interpretative aspects of history of and after genocide and conflict means different truths can develop around the same set of 'facts'. Nevertheless, as previously noted historical facts do exist (Evans, 1997).

In sum, the point British Marxist historian E. H. Carr (2001) made about how a happening in the past becomes a historical fact that in turn becomes historically significant, points to an argument made by Black and MacRaild (2000) that facts don't speak for themselves. This is particularly so after genocide. Carr (2001) advises a study of the historian before studying the history. This resonates in post-genocide societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina where facts are reported as often interpreted and re-interpreted through an ethnic lens (Corkalo et al., 2004). All this suggests an old history approach of a single and factually true grand narrative is an insufficient response to history of and after genocide. Yet, we see in section two that an old history grand narrative is still used by governments after genocide and conflict.

The Role of the Historian

After Minow (1998), psychological truth demands a good listener capable of empathetic understanding[9]. This is quite different to the historian's traditional role of approaching witness testimonies with a critical eye from the start (Ibid.). Moreover, psychological truth raises the ethical issue of doing no harm - addressed in a growing body of literature on methodological issues social scientists face of and after genocide

[9] Barton and Levstik (2004) theorise different dimensions of historical understanding: cognitive (perspective recognition) and affective (caring).

and conflict (Smyth and Robinson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2013; Mazurana et al., 2013). Historians like other researchers need formal training to interview traumatised witnesses and to elicit rich data, while doing no harm (Thomson et al., 2013; Mazurana et al., 2013). However, harm can work both ways. Bauer (1976, 2002) and De Swaan (2015) observe that listening to victims recount their suffering and/or perpetrators their crimes can be hard (see below). Historians have to deal with difficult feelings generated by the stories they hear and account for how these feeling informed data analysis (Bauer, 1976, 2002; De Swaan, 2015).

So connected to dealing with witnesses of and after genocide is historian subjectivity. Reflecting the new history approach, for Bauer (1976) historian subjectivity is inherent in making history. Historians' choices about what and how history is written are shaped by personal value judgements and underlying social and personal morality particularly when dealing with genocide (Bauer, 1976, 2002). Along these lines De Swaan (2015) specifies two issues that he argues could affect insider historians more than outsider historians: engagement bias, in which the historian over-identifies with the suffering of victims; and revulsion bias where the historian recoils from perpetrators and their crimes (De Swaan, 2015). The afore-mentioned historians' subjectivity raises serious questions about how history is written. It emphasises the challenge to be conscious of the lens oneself and/or historians brings to bear when conducting research and analysing witness testimonies (Bauer, 1976, 2002).

Politics

Other historiographical issues discussed in the literature relate to politics and are often time sensitive and contextual. For example, historian Herf (1997) and Moeller (2001) agree that 1950s West Germany would not have voted for political leaders who demanded that the population face the Nazi past. The absence of Nazi crimes and/or focusing of blame on the Nazi criminal elite in public discourse throughout the 1950s in West Germany illustrates how history was repressed from below. This means repressed by what Moeller (2001) has identified through empirical work as the need/desire of the population at large to remember the Nazi past selectively in ways that exculpated the ordinary citizen from Nazi crimes. This is not to say politicians did not manipulate representations of the past to down play German culpability in Nazi crimes and displace collective guilt. Rather that in doing so they played to a

domestic audience to win the popular vote (Herf, 1997; Moeller, 2001). How the Holocaust is dealt with in schools in contemporary Germany as discussed in section two, shows how silence, denial and selective remembering can dissipate over time subject to complex factors.

Historiographical repression can also come from above. As I will show, much is written about an authoritarian post-genocide Rwandan government that represses a contested history of ethnic identity and Hutu suffering in 1994 caused by the invading RPF (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). However, democracy is no guarantor of historiographical freedom when genocide is denied by the state. Smith (2015) claims that the Turkish government funds historians to discredit scholarship on the Armenian genocide and that this is part of an organised state-led campaign. Dixon (2010a, b) reports that the officially sanctioned terminology in Turkey is the euphemism 'the Armenian question'. The political stakes are high for Turkey. MacMillan (2010) observes that while Turkey seeks admission into the European Union, the Armenian diaspora argues this should not happen until the Turkish government admits the Armenian genocide.

In sum, historiographical repression can be politically motivated and come from above and/or below. So post-genocide states enduring and/or changing political realities set limits as well as possibilities for genocide historiography, which is an important driver of history curriculum reform as discussed in sections two and three. Below, deals with the historiographical issue of the purpose of history of and after genocide.

Purpose of history of and after genocide

Despite all the limitations and difficulties set out above, Bauer (2002) argues that historical analysis is always better than "lamentation, [.] liturgy [and/or mystification]" (p.16). This is because to decry genocide as inexplicable is to give up our moral responsibility to bear witness, to try to describe and explain, and to try to prevent other instances (Bauer, 2002; Stone, 2004a, b; 2008). A major historiographic issue for post-genocide history is the methodological, ethical and political question of what to remember and why. Bauer (1978), Bauer and Rotenstreich (1981) and Shriver

(2005) emphasise prevention and the importance of trying to understand perpetrator motivations to this end.

Shriver (2005) states: "[f]or the sake of putting teeth into the commitment 'Never again!' we must try to understand the perpetrators - a task more difficult than understanding the victims" (Shriver 2005, p.34). Attached here is an ethical consideration of whether understanding perpetrators' motivations might lead to moral ambiguity (see section 2). However, there are limitations. Straus (2006) found in post-genocide Rwanda that perpetrator motivations were difficult ascertain. Like victims, perpetrators' memories can be affected by trauma and subject to amnesia, selective remembering, cognitive dissonance and/or false memories (De Swaan, 2015). Furthermore, can researchers who never experienced genocide be able to unpick perpetrator motivations (De Swaan, 2015)?

How historians should bear witness and to what end is debated in the literature. For Stone (2004a, b) historians are debating whether to represent the Holocaust to heal or to maintain a sense of the horror of genocide. Scholars from different disciplinary perspectives shed different light on the problem. Legal genocide expert Minow (1998) advocates a path between vengeance and forgiveness, which she characterises as between "too much memory and too much forgetting" (p.118). South African psychologist and academic Hamber (1998a, b) recognises that remembering too much too soon risks re-igniting conflict; while theologian Shriver (1995; 2005) argues for remembering and forgiving because forgetting is impossible. However, Chaynes and Minow (2003) theorise that forgiveness is impossible for many victims after genocide.

Central questions emerge here about what historians and societies are morally obliged to remember or bear witness to over generations and why and at what benefit to cost ratio (see Schlink, 1998). More precisely, whether and how extrinsic purposes should/should not shape what and how history is written. This is also an issue in school history, which is addressed in section two. We will see in section three that national history is used to promote national unity and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.

Section 1 Summary

The review of the literature has contextualised a discussion of genocide history in the context of debates about the nature and purposes of history. By two themes related to genocide history - the nature of genocide history; and the purpose of history of and after genocide - I have addressed the main historiographical difficulties of and after genocide as characterised in literature. The literature on historiographical issues of and after genocide is small and largely theoretical and would benefit from large-scale empirical studies on historians' experiences of researching and writing history of and after genocide.

In sum, the historical complexity inherent in history of and after genocide is unlikely to be served by an old history type grand narrative. However, there remains a conflict between the need (from the point of view of scholars and commentators) to represent the historical complexity of and after genocide and the desire of politicians to use an old history type single narrative of the past to achieve political and social goals (Cole, 2007). In the next section, I will discuss different approaches to resolving this tension in school history curriculum reform efforts in post-genocide and post-conflict societies.

Comparative Review of Approaches to School History Curriculum after Genocide and Conflict

To offer context for the comparative review of approaches to history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies that follows, I begin by identifying the theoretical debates about the nature and purposes of school history generally. The scholarship on history curriculum reform is largely empirical and country specific, but common issues are evident. Post-genocide and post-conflict societies face the questions of what to teach young people about the past and why and how to teach it and why. In reference to these key questions the literature throws up two themes: power and politics (for example Korostelina, 2009a, b, 2010, 2011, 2013a, b; Torsti, 2003, 2003, 2007, 2008), and a reconciliation approach (for example Cole, 2007, 2012; Lassig, 2013). A consideration of these themes reveals three approaches to school history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies and related historiographical issues. The approaches are 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches, which are in distilled in the section (two) summary (see below, p.55-56).

Debates about the nature and purposes of the school history curriculum

Studies in school history such as Williams (2014), Cole (2007), Barton and Levstick (2004), Kinloch (2001) and Slater (1995) illuminate the theoretical debates about what school history is and what it is for. I deal briefly below with three areas that have relevance for my research: nation and state versus citizenship and the common good; Holocaust/genocide prevention; and conflict and/or peace and reconciliation.

Linking with my discussion of the purposes of history above, nation and state scholars define school history as a tool of governments to transmit an official narrative of the national past to new generations (Williams, 2014; Schlesinger, 1992). Some scholars argue this is state indoctrination and dumbs down academic history (Evans, 2011, 2013; Haydn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b). Others see potential for promoting social cohesion (Schama, 2010; Ferguson, 2011). By contrast, writers on citizenship and the common good argue that school history should be for democratic citizenship (CoE, 2005; Barton and Levstik, 2004). Others see history as playing a complementary role in citizen formation because disciplinary rigour means it cannot take on the mantel itself (Lee and Shemilt, 2007).

A central idea in Holocaust education is genocide prevention (Bauer, 2002; Short, 2003a, b). In this respect, some writers observe conflict between the disciplinary rigour of school history and conveying clear moral lessons to young people (Haydn, 2000; Kinloch, 2001). Others doubt Holocaust education can ever achieve genocide prevention aims (Novick, 1999; Kinloch, 2001). Finally, a key issue in the history education, conflict, peace and reconciliation literature is the point at which disciplinary rigour limits history's capacity to overtly contribute to social and political change (see Cole, 2007; McCully, 2014, 2012, 2010b, 2009). That is the distinction between the intrinsic (or history for its own sake) academic aims of school history and extrinsic, socio-political aims (see Slater, 1995); and the place and playing out of these aims in school history.

Power and Politics

Power and politics as it emerges in relation to history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies throws up the sub-themes of genocide denial and nationalism. I deal with these sub-themes in the following post-genocide and post-conflict societies: Turkey (genocide denial), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia and Ukraine (nationalism). I have been guided in my selection by focusing on empirical

studies that deal with contemporary examples of genocide denial and nationalism in the school history curriculum.

Genocide Denial

There are two empirical studies (history textbook analysis) in English exploring how the Armenian question is dealt with in school history in Turkey (Akcam, 2014; Dixon, 2010a). Through an analysis of 23 senior secondary school history textbooks published between 1951 and 2007, Dixon (2010a) identifies four historical phases in which narrative content on the Armenian genocide (spoken of officially in Turkey as 'The Armenian question') has changed. Phase one textbooks (1951 - 1980[10]) are silent on the Armenian question. Phase two textbooks (1981 - 1991[11]) discuss Armenian violence against the Ottoman government during World War I and of the consequent necessity of the deportation of Armenians. Phase three textbooks (1994 - 2000[12]) present Armenians as traitors who tried to stab the Ottoman government in the back during World War I. Phase four textbooks (2005 - 2007) make a claim of genocide perpetrated by Armenians against the Turks after the end of World War I.

So Dixon (2010a) observes some of the basic facts of Armenian deaths and deportations are now acknowledged in textbooks. She explains this is part of a political strategy to manage increasing domestic awareness of the Armenian question and growing international criticism of Turkey's genocide denial[13] (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the power and politics construct of the history curriculum is not all pervasive. In Turkey, civil society tries to raise public awareness of the Armenian question in media debates (Dixon 2010b). Furthermore, some Turkish scholars call for the recognition of the Armenian genocide (see Akcam, 2014, 2012, 2004; Akcam and Dadrian, 2011, 2006; Bloxham, 2003, 2005; Bloxham and Gocek, 2008; Gocek, 2014).

Dixon (2010a) acknowledges that her analysis does not take account of if and how school history textbooks developed post-2005 school curriculum reform, deal with the

[10] 11 history textbooks.
[11] Seven history textbooks.
[12] Three history textbooks.
[13] Genocide scholars including Yehuda Bauer argue the killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians by the Young Turk government between 1915 and 1918 was genocide (see International Association of Genocide Scholars, 2005).

Armenian question[14]. The gap is addressed by Akcam's analysis (2014) of one primary school and two junior secondary history textbooks published in 2014. Akcam (2014) focuses his analysis on 1915 and reports a narrative of Armenians incited by foreigners, murdered Turks to break-up the country. The Armenian genocide is called 'The Armenian Matter', which is described as a lie perpetrated to harm Turkey and a threat to national security (Akcam, 2014). Ackman (2014) does not explain why the Armenian genocide is now directly referred to in school history textbooks. One assumes genocide denial in an era of mass communication requires the Turkish government deal with the accusation of an Armenian genocide directly. So the relationship between history, power and politics noted in section one, directly extends into school history curriculum reform in Turkey.

The textbook analysis above sheds no light on the curriculum in action. Turkish scholars Demircioglu (2010, 2009, 2008) and Yildirim's (2006, 2004) qualitative and mixed methods research report history teachers' often teach by rote. So, indications are the Armenian matter is taught by rote. However, classroom-based research reported in English is needed to verify this. It is also needed to consider if and how the history curriculum is (re)interpreted, mastered, appropriated and/or resisted (see Wertsch, 1997, 2002) by Turkish history teachers and students, in particular, those of ethnic Armenian heritage.

In sum, together Akcam (2014) and Dixon's (2010a) work charts the ideologically articulated shifts in the treatment of the Armenian genocide in history textbooks over six decades, but only Dixon (2010a) locates shifts in education policy within the changing political context. As an historian, Akcam (2014) focuses on academic rigour in the textbooks he analyses, which he describes as 'shocking' (p.1). Over a long career Akcam has made the case for an Armenian genocide (see Akcam, 2014, 2012, 2004; Akcam and Dadrian, 2011, 2006). So Bauer (1978, 2002) and Stone's (2007) argument of a moral obligation to bear witness to genocide becomes problematic applied to the history curriculum where and when genocide is disputed by the state and amongst scholars.

[14] Post-2005 curriculum reform senior secondary history textbooks were not developed until after 2007.

Nationalism

As a post-genocide society the focus is on Bosnia and Herzegovina below. I refer to the analysis of school history textbooks used in schools in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1996 and 2001 (Baranovicé, 2001; Torsti, 2003, 2007) and between 2005 and 2012 (OSI, 2007a; Karge, 2008). I refer to other empirical research also conducted between 1996 and 2001 (Freedman et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2007) and 2005 and 2012 (OSI, 2007b; Karge and Batarile, 2008). This work reports on the views of students' and/or parents', history teachers' and administrators' on school history. Collectively, the afore-mentioned studies are the key empirical works on history curriculum reform in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina available in the English language. Below, I review work dealing with the period 1996 - 2001 and then 2005 - 2012.

Baranovicé (2001) examines national history in a combined total of 24 Bosniack, Serb and Croat primary and secondary school history textbooks for the 1996/97 school year. The textbooks are reported as ethno-centric, differing only in degree (Ibid.). Torsti (2003) analyses how war, peace and nation are represented in one Bosniack, one Croat and one Serb eighth grade[15] primary school history textbook published between 1994 and 1997. She finds three (ethnic) versions of national history in each textbook, and stereotypes: positive auto-stereotypes (about us) and negative hetero-stereotypes (about them) (Ibid.). Torsti (2007) looks in-depth at hetero-stereotypes (about them) in the school history textbooks analysed by Torsti (2003). Torsti (2007) includes in her analysis one additional Serb and one additional Bosnaick eight grade history textbook published in 2000 and 2001 respectively. The findings point to the central role 'they' or 'other' play in nationalist histories in Bosnaick, Croat and Serb school history textbooks (Torsti, 2007). The findings also indicate how the ruling of the Council of Europe (1999) that potentially offensive material be removed from school textbooks has played out[16]. Of the textbooks Torsti (2007) deals with (see above), the Serb and Croat history textbooks reportedly had parts removed by blackening text and/or marking text as questionable (Torsti, 2007). Blackened text was annotated: "The following passage contains material of which the truth has not

[15] Eighth grade is the final year of compulsory schooling.

[16] In 1999, a requirement for Bosnian and Herzegovinian accession to the Council of Europe was the removal of potentially offensive material from school textbooks.

been established, or that may be offensive or misleading; the material is currently under review" (Torsti, 2007, p.80). This annotation illustrates the contested and complex nature of history after genocide and conflict and implications for school history in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also raises a historiographical issue of whose truth is being referred to and the political question of who gets to decide.

Torsti (2007) does not address the afore-mentioned and related historiographical and political issues or discuss their implications for school history curriculum reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Freedman et al (2004) and Weinstein et al's (2007) large-scale qualitative study in Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2000 of the views of education stake-holders on the school curriculum address this gap. Freedman et al (2004) report two principle fears associated with the teaching of history: one's own group's history being forgotten; and that the three competing ethnic 'truths' of the past cannot be harmonised in a school history curriculum and any attempt to do so will cause more problems. Weinstein et al (2007) report history teachers are interested in multi-perspectives, critical thinking and debate. However, they fear this might provoke violence if brought to bear on contentious issues in the classroom (Ibid.).

The Open Society Institute (OSI) (2007a) quantitative and qualitative content analysis of religion and national subject (history, geography, language and literature) school textbooks is the next key school history textbook analysis in the literature. This involved 145 textbooks approved by the respective authorities for the school year 2005/06 and used in grades five to eight of primary school and all secondary school grades (OSI, 2007a). The focus of the content analysis was compliance with the 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Schools (Ibid.); in particular the promotion of social cohesion and positive attitudes towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.). The number of primary and secondary school history textbooks analysed is not stated, but the history textbook findings are specified. OSI (2007a) report some positive representations of ethnic diversity and abusive language directed at the 'other' is infrequent. However, history textbooks are still reportedly infused with political interpretations of historical-political events that promote 'us' (auto) and 'them' (hetero) stereotypes (OSI, 2007a). OSI (2007a) conclude school history textbooks fail to cultivate a shared sense of Bosnian and Herzegovinian historical heritage as legislated in the 2003 law. This shows a unifying history curriculum

cannot be commanded through legislation when the education system is de-centralised along partisan ethnic lines (see Freedman et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2007).

As a follow up to OSI (2007a), in 2006-2007 OSI (2007b) conducted a large-scale survey with pupils and parents from across Bosnia and Herzegovina on attitudes to school curricula and textbooks. This was followed-up with interviews with eight focus groups. The majority (over 60 %) of respondents oppose the mono-national focus of school history as reported in OSI (2007a) and call for a more inclusive approach (OSI, 2007b). Most respondents also wanted school history textbooks to encourage solidarity, tolerance and mutual understanding among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina (OIS, 2007b). So OSI highlights conflict between the educational reality (see OSI, 2007a), and the aspirations of students and parents (OSI, 2007b). However, a desire for a more inclusive history curriculum was not reflected in similar levels of support for a common history or multi-perspectivity in school history textbooks (OSI, 2007b). This contradiction is not addressed by OSI (2007b), but suggests bringing about a unitary history curriculum in a society where three histories clash and compete is very difficult.

Since OSI (2007a, b), '*Guidelines for the writing and evaluation of history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina*' were agreed by all ministries of education (2006) and implemented in the school year 2007/8. The Guidelines stipulate multi-perspective and comparative approaches to historical events and the development of critical thinking. Karge (2008) investigates compliance in seven final year primary school history textbooks approved for the school year 2007/8. Karge (2008) reports a good balance between local and global history and a new focus on women, minorities and daily life. However, Croat history textbooks still had Croatia as the point of departure for national history and Serb textbooks Serbian national history (Karge, 2008). Furthermore, the (post-Guideline) new editions of older textbooks reportedly contain negative language about the 'other' (Karge, 2008). Karge (2008) concludes only three of the seven textbooks come close to meeting the guidelines. The others do not comply (Ibid.).

Following Karge (2008), in early 2008 Karge and Batarile (2008) conducted a survey with 184 primary and secondary school history teachers from across Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The authors observe an acceptance of the guidelines by many of the teachers surveyed, but classroom observations were not conducted to compare stated values with actual classroom practice (Ibid.). In sum, together Baranovicé (2001), Torsti (2003, 2007), OSI (2007a) and Karge's (2008) school history textbook analysis show how over time and under political pressure from the Council of Europe history textbooks have becomes less divisive. However, history textbooks still present three different and often ethno-centric versions of the past. The afore-mentioned scholars explain this as serving the ethno-nationalist agendas of the political elites. Yet, the empirical work on student and/or teacher, parent and administrator perceptions of school history suggests a more complex reality.

Together Torsti (2003), Freedman et al (2004), Weinstein et al (2007), OSI (2007b) and Karge and Batarile (2008) indicate public support for school history textbooks to promote mutual-understanding. However, Freedman et al (2004) and Weinstein et al (2007) also identify a fear of losing one's own group's ethno-national history and identity in the process. So divided public memory, history and identity seem to shape public attitudes towards history curriculum reform in complex ways, which might impact on politicians' decisions on the nature of reform. The studies referenced above do not address if and how such public fears (and representing power from below) have influenced political decisions (power from above) about history curriculum reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor, do they address whether and how the 1995 Bosnian genocide (Srebrenica) is presented in history textbooks. How to move Bosnia and Herzegovina towards multi-perspectives and a common history curriculum without violating group rights resulting from the political settlement that keeps the peace is an on-going dilemma (Stober, 2013).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is both a post-genocide, post-conflict and post-communist country. I briefly turn to history curriculum reform in post-conflict and post-communist: Estonia and Ukraine. Empirical studies in English on school history in Estonia and Ukraine mostly deal with school history textbook reform. There are few empirical studies analysing Estonian school history textbooks and a comprehensive and up to date analysis is needed. Collectively Ahonen (2001), Jurgens (2009) and Kurilla (2012) analyse ten school history textbooks published between 1992 and 2006. They collectively report a lack of multi-perspectivity and single narrative

representations of a Russian 'threat' or alien 'other' and/or Estonian victimhood (Ibid., Ibid.; Ibid.). However, Viktorova (2006) referring to four school history textbooks published between 2001 and 2004, reports representations of the Russian 'threat' have been toned down. Furthermore, a more balanced account of the Soviet past is reportedly present (Ibid.). Empirical research is needed to investigate this discrepancy in reported findings. However, commentary indicates under the influence of the Council of Europe Estonian nationalism has been toned down in the history curriculum (Kelleo and Wagner, 2014).

Like Estonia, post-Soviet Ukraine (1990) used the history curriculum to define the new post-Soviet nation in nationalistic and oppositional terms to Russia and Russians - the Ukraine's main ethnic 'other'. I refer to key empirical studies on school history in Ukraine: Janmaat (2005, 2006, 2007) and Korostelina (2010, 2011). Janmaat (2005, 2006) analyses representations of the Ukrainian nation in four school history textbooks published between 1985 and 1995. Janmaat (2005) reports on a further five history textbooks published between 2001 and 2003. Both papers report textbooks strongly associated the Ukrainian language with Ukrainian nationhood, excluding the Russian speaking minority (Janmaat, 2005, 2006).

Janmaat (2007) analyses the Russian ethnic 'other' in five secondary school history textbooks published between 1994 and 1996 (1st generation) and five secondary school history textbooks published between 2002 and 2004 (2nd generation). Janmaat (2007) reports negative representations of Russia and Russians as the historic foreign ruler of dubious and malicious intent, but some positive appreciation of Russian policies in first generation textbooks. In contrast, Janmaat (2007) reports more balanced representations of Russia and Russians in second generation textbooks. However, the lessening of nationalism in school history textbooks over time is not reflected in Korostelina's (2010, 2011) research. Korostelina (2010) analyses eight secondary school history textbooks published between 1995 and 2003. Korostelina (2011) analyses an unspecified number of school history textbooks approved for use in schools between 1991 and 2009. Both studies focus on representations of nation and report Ukrainian victimhood is represented as a core aspect of Ukrainian identity and Russia is portrayed as the historic enemy oppressor (Korostelina, 2010, 2011). There are indications that this ethnic-Ukrainian nationalist historiography in school

history conflicts with the historical complexity history teacher's bring to and likely face in the classroom (Korostelina, 2013a, b). How the on-going conflict with Russia has impacted on history curriculum reform in Ukraine is yet to be seen.

In sum, scholars discuss how ethnic-nationalism in post-communist societies is related to its communist prototype (see Janmaat and Vickers, 2007; Stabback, 2004; 2007). The empirical studies reviewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia and Ukraine show ethnic-nationalism in the post-genocide/conflict and post-communist era continuing the communist approach of suppressing pluralism in historiography and history textbooks. Yet, under political pressure from the Council of Europe ethnic-nationalist bias in school history textbooks in these new democracies has been toned down over time. However, an ethno-nationalist historiography of 'us' (victims) versus 'them' (aggressor) continues. This indicates political anxieties about group cohesion after genocide, conflict and communism have outweighed concerns of developing an inclusive democratic national unity and international pressure for history curriculum reform.

A Reconciliation Approach

Concern over school history's contribution to past and/or future conflict and the belief that school history can positively contribute to social change has attracted scholars, policy-makers and international organisations to multiple-perspectives (Cole, 2007). The term originates in literature produced on school history by the Council of Europe (see Stradling, 2003; CoE, 2005) and the German-based Georg Eckert Institute (see McCully, 2012). Multiple-perspectives is a pedagogical approach to school history that exposes students to the different interpretations of historians and to the different perspectives of historical actors (McCully, 2012; Cole, 2007). In the literature multiple-perspectives is associated with: transitional justice (Cole, 2012; McCully, 2010a); peace (Freedman et al., 2004); peace-building (McCully, 2009); reconciliation (Cole, 2007; Cole and Murphy, 2011); understanding and/or caring about the 'other' (McCully, 2012, 2010a); co-existence (Chaynes and Minow, 2003); genocide and conflict prevention (Hamber, 1998a, b; Minow, 1998; Shriver, 2005; Strom, 1994, 2013); and/or democratic values and democracy (CoE, 2005; McCully, 2012).

School history scholars Cole (2012), McCully (2012) and Lassig (2013) argue multiple-perspective's contribution to the above has not been empirically proven. Below I explore a central theme in the literature of multiple-perspectives as an approach to facing the violent past in school history curriculum reform. I do so in the following post-genocide and post-conflict societies: Germany, South Africa and Northern Ireland. I have been guided in my selection by focusing on empirical studies that deal with contemporary examples of multiple-perspectives as an approach to facing the violent past in the school history curriculum. As a post-genocide society the focus is on Germany.

Multiple-perspectives and facing the violent past

Scholarship on the treatment of Nazi crimes and the Holocaust in school history in Germany pertains to post-war (1945) West Germany and East Germany and post-unification (1990) Germany. By far most empirical studies in English focus on school history textbooks in post-war West Germany and post-unification Germany. So I refer to Bun (1962), Kolinsky and Kolinsky (1974), von Borries (2003), Rathenow (2000), Dierkes (2000, 2004, 2007), Dierkes and Levy (2002), and Wenzeler (2003).

Bun (1962) analyses the treatment of Hitler's rise to power and public support for Hitler in eight school history textbooks published between 1955 and 1961. Bun (1962) reports ordinary German responsibility for National Socialism is ignored. Kolinsky and Kolinsky (1974) examine the Holocaust in 13 school history textbooks published between 1951 and 1957 and in 12 history textbooks published from the early 1960s and up to 1972. They report a focus on German suffering and the blaming of Nazi crimes on Hitler and the Nazi elite in the 1950s textbooks, with no significant change in the later textbooks (Ibid.). So the question of who carried out the orders of the Nazi elite during the Holocaust and the responsibility of ordinary Germans is not addressed in the school history textbooks analysed (Ibid.).

Von Borries (2003) analyses the Third Reich in four secondary school history textbooks published over four decades: 1956, 1961, 1971 and 1996. In the 1956 textbook von Borries (2003) reports the Holocaust is mentioned briefly, but focuses on German soldiers' suffering with Hitler presented as the sole cause of defeat. A revised edition in 1961 provides more information about the Holocaust, but

emphasises internal resistance to Hitler exculpating the German nation from Nazi crimes (Ibid.). Von Borries (2003) reports the 1971 textbook deals briefly with the Holocaust and plays down public knowledge of Nazi crimes. Conversely, the 1996 textbook deals with the Holocaust comprehensively. Reflecting on the above, von Borries (2003) observes how difficult it can be for a population to face its dark national past and its own culpability in past atrocities. However, he does not locate shifts in curriculum reform within the context of historiographical change in Western historiography (Ibid.). This gap is addressed in the work of school history scholar Julian Dierkes.

Dierkes (2000, 2004) and Dierkes and Levy (2002) analyse 30 junior secondary school history textbooks published in three states (Bavaria, Hessia and Northrhine-Westphalia) in West Germany over four decades between 1950 and 1995. Dierkes (2000) and Dierkes and Levy (2002) observe increased attention to the Nazi period in textbooks published after the 1970s. Dierkes (2004) explains this was part of a broader process of historiographical change throughout the 1970s and 1980s with the emphasising of historical interpretation and inter-connectness over facts and memorisation. This process culminated in multiple-perspectives in school history in the 1990s in unified Germany (Dierkes, 2004). Dierkes (2007) examines multiple-perspectives in three secondary school history textbooks published in 1996, 1999 and 2001. He observes multiple-perspectives involve a loss of moral clarity, diminishing the "reconciliatory potential in portrayals of past atrocities" (p.32). So moral clarity advocated by Holocaust historian Bauer (2002), can conflict with the historical complexity of a multiple-perspectives approach to genocide. The issue is balancing analytical history important for facing the past in its complexity, with moral clarity arguably important for reconciliation and genocide prevention.

Wenzeler (2003) analyses the question of culpability for the Holocaust in ten secondary school history textbooks published between 1998 and 2003. Wenzeler (2003) reports the textbooks encourage pupils to accept responsibility for the Holocaust and the consequences for the German nation. Wenzeler (2003) does not consider whether collective responsibility can or should apply to the afore-mentioned fourth post-Holocaust generation of Germans. Indications from empirical research (interviews) with 40 German families are that pupils learn one history at school and

another family history at home (see Welzer, 2005, 2008). This raises questions about how German pupils mediate conflict between home and school histories and/or appropriate, master or resist what they learn at school. Empirical work in English is required to comment.

Together, Bun (1962), Kolinsky and Kolinsky (1974), von Borries (2003), Dierkes (2000, 2004, 2007), Dierkes and Levy (2002) and Wenzeler (2003) provide an overview of continuity and change in German history textbooks since 1945. The overview illustrates how difficult it can be for a population to face its dark national past and culpability in past atrocities. '*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*' (to struggle to come to terms with the past) in history curriculum reform in Germany reveals conflict between the moral imperative to remember and the need or desire to forget and focus on rebuilding the nation. Forgetting for a time was possible in post-war Germany where victims were either dead or exiled. In contrast, victims and perpetrators live together in post-apartheid South Africa and in post-conflict Northern Ireland.

A review of the literature has thrown up empirical studies that shed light on multiple-perspectives in the South African history curriculum (Weldon, 2009); history textbooks (Chisholm, 2008; Morgan, 2012, 2015; van Eeden, 2008, 2010; Engelbrecht, 2008); curriculum in action (Hues, 2011; Dryden-Peterson and Sieborger, 2006); and teacher-training (Tibbits, 2006; Weldon 2005a, b, 2009, 2010; Harland and Kinder, 1997; Jansen, 2001). I summarise findings from these studies below.

A review of post-apartheid school history curricula and policy-documents and interviews with curriculum policy-makers were conducted by Weldon (2009). She reports South African history curriculum developers hope no narrative of the past will again become hegemonic, frame and exclude other narratives (Ibid.). In the new history curriculum racial diversity is celebrated and presented as central to a shared post-apartheid South African national identity (Ibid.). Despite indications that school history textbooks conform to post-apartheid curriculum standards (see Chisholm, 2008), evidence suggests they vary vastly in this regard (see Morgan, 2010). Analysis of primary and secondary school history textbooks reveal: over-simplified conceptualisations of racism (Morgan, 2012); stereotypes and prescriptive moralising

(Morgan, 2015, 2014); intellectually thin and prescriptive content (van Eeden, 2008, 2010); and Engelbrecht (2008) reports white history is marginalised. Research by Hues (2011) suggests the latter issue has negative implications for how Afrikaans history teachers implement the curriculum (see below).

Classroom observations and interviews with history teachers and pupils in two Afrikaans speaking schools were conducted by Hues (2011). Hues (2011) found history teachers ignored aspects of the curriculum and some classes were teacher-centred. Hues (2011) explains this as a reaction by teachers against the perceived marginalisation of Afrikaner history. The important role teachers' play in mediating the curriculum emerges again in Dryden-Peterson and Sieborger's (2006) ethnographic research in 16 schools conducted between 1998 and 2001. Their research reveals a hidden curriculum with teacher-testimony of the violent past occurring in the history classroom on a daily basis (Ibid.). The authors recognise the potentially positive contribution of teachers' personal testimony in challenging stereotypes, but consider pupils need a range of perspectives (Ibid.). Indications are this occurs through extracts of personal testimony from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see Cole and Barsalou, 2006). However, empirical research is required to investigate how extensive this resource is used in history classes across South Africa, teacher mediation of personal testimony and impact on students.

Tibbits (2006) and Weldon (2005a, b, 2010) evaluate the training of small cohorts of South African history teachers on teaching of the violent past. Of particular note is Weldon's (2005a, b, 2010) finding that history teachers' personal experiences of the violent past shapes how they mediate the history curriculum in class. This echoes the earlier work of Harland and Kinder (1997) and Jansen (2001). Weldon (2005a, b, 2010) calls for opportunities for history teachers to explore how their biographies inform their classroom practice. So South African history teachers are expected to deliver on the history curriculum's promise of multiple-perspectives, but policy-makers have not engaged with what this means for teachers conditioned by past conflict (Weldon, 2009). Together, the empirical studies above indicate a gap between the actual history curriculum on one hand and, school history textbooks, teacher-training and classroom practice on the other. So the contested and violent past cannot be addressed through an inclusive history curriculum of multiple-perspectives alone.

South African history textbook writers and history teachers need opportunities to reflect on how their identities and experiences of the violent past shape how they mediate the history curriculum. I turn to Northern Ireland below.

Multi-perspectives is not a common term in school history in Northern Ireland. The term enquiry-based approach is used. Like multiple-perspectives the enquiry-based approach conceptualises history as a process of interpretation involving the critical examination of sources and different perspectives (McCully, 2012; Reilly and McCully, 2011). In a theoretical piece McCully (2012) notes its emergence from the Schools Council History Project in England in the 1960s - the era of the new history movement (see section 1). It has since become standard in history curriculum reform (1991, 1995 and 2007) in Northern Ireland. It is reportedly imbued with aspirations of improving inter-community relations between Catholics and Protestants (see McCully, 2012).

Contrasting Germany and South Africa much empirical research has been conducted on the impact of enquiry-based, multiple-perspectives on student's sense of history and identity in Northern Ireland. So I set aside studies focusing history curriculum reform (see Smith, 2005), history textbook analysis (see Kitson, 2007; Terra, 2014) and teacher-training (McCully and Montgomery, 2009). I refer to a body of empirical work by Alan McCully and Keith Barton (McCully et al., 2003; McCully and Barton, 2005, 2010; Barton and McCully, 2005, 2012). These articles report on an observed visual task and paired interviews with 253 Catholic and Protestant students drawn from twelve secondary schools. The research was conducted between 1999 and 2003.There is only space to synthesise and summarise the authors' main conclusions.

Students' value learning a balanced history and the 'others' perspective, but they do not always value school history above partisan community history. Students' neither appropriate nor resist school or community history, concepts Wertsch (1998, 2002) uses to conceptualise ethnic-Estonian pupils' response to Soviet history. Instead, students often engage in an internally persuasive discourse (also see McCully and Barton, 2009). That is drawing on multiple sources of information to develop their own understanding of the past. However, dealing with different perspectives was challenging for students. Moreover, as students got older they tended to pick and

choose aspects of the curriculum that supported their pre-conceptions. Indeed, many students assimilated school history into their dominant Nationalist or Unionist community narratives.

Many of the afore-mentioned findings are supported by other empirical work. Large and small scale studies report school is just one place pupils learn about the violent past (Bell et al., 2010; Kitson, 2007). Based on interviews with students in other work, McCully and Barton (2009) show students' attachment to partisan community history can be a barrier to genuine engagement with multiple-perspectives in school. This questions the cogitative aspect of multiple-perspectives as sufficiently able to challenge such emotional ties (Ibid.; also see McCully et al., 2002; McCully, 2006; Reilly and McCully, 2011). As such, in theoretical work Reilly and McCully (2011) argue history teachers need to pay more attention to the affective (emotional) dimension of learning history and adapt teaching and learning practices to this end (also see McCully, 2006; McCully and Barton, 2007).

After reviewing empirical work on the enquiry-based approach in Northern Ireland McCully (2012) maintains it can contribute (intrinsically) to peace-building in Northern Ireland and other divided societies. Its strengths lay in fostering: critical analysis; an understanding of the constructive nature of history; empathetic understanding or caring; and democratic values. Evidence outlined above suggests an enquiry-based approach is necessary, but insufficiently able to challenge students' emotional ties to partisan community histories. This would require students to feel as well as to think their way through the contested histories of the violent past. Indications are not all Northern Irish history teachers are committed to this type of engagement with pupils (see Smith, 2005; McCully and Kitson, 2005; Kitson, 2007).

In aggregate, multiple-perspectives in history teaching is the recognised position of the international community in seeking to promote educational reform for social change in post-genocide and post-conflict societies (see Cole, 2007; Cole and Barsalou, 2006; McCully, 2012). In Germany multiple-perspectives is employed to contribute to external reconciliation and genocide prevention (Dierkes, 2007). Research indicates a conflict between looking at Nazi crimes from multiple-perspectives and moral clarity for genocide prevention and external reconciliation (see

above). In South Africa multiple-perspectives is hoped to contribute to internal reconciliation by promoting a shared national identity made of multiple histories and identities (Weldon, 2009). Research suggests a gap between history curriculum aspirations for multiple-perspectives on one hand and school history textbooks, teacher training and classroom practice on the other hand (see above). In post-conflict Northern Ireland where an Irish or British national identity and history has been violently contested, reconciliation through unity in a common national identity is not possible. Evidence indicates an enquiry, multiple-perspectives approach is necessary, but insufficiently able to engage Northern Irish pupils' emotional ties to partisan histories learnt in the community and home (see above). Below summarises this section by identifying approaches to school history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict and raising historiographical issues posed.

Section 2 Summary

This section explored what tends to happen to the history curriculum in post-genocide and post-conflict societies and why. 'Unity in homogeneity' and 'unity in diversity' is a model first put forward in theoretical work by Torsti (2008) and King (2008) to characterise history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. So their model is derived from two societies and empirically weak, but holds in light of the empirical literature reviewed above. The theme power and politics identified genocide denial and nationalism as approaches to school history curriculum reform of and after genocide and/or conflict. Common to history curriculum reform in Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia and Ukraine is an old history, single narrative approach of 'us' (victims) versus 'them' (aggressors) or 'unity in homogeneity'. So 'unity in homogeneity' sacrifices reconciliation for the unity of 'us', defined in opposition to 'them'. This approach is also reported in empirical work on school history curriculum reform in India and Pakistan (see Dorschner and Sherlock, 2007), North and South Korea (see Bleiker and Young-Ju, 2007) and in Russia (see Korostelina, 2009a, b; Sherlock, 2007; Zajda, 2002, 2003, 2007). For Wertsch (1998, 2002) 'unity in homogeneity' is not academic history, but the promotion of a usable past - the hallmark of collective memory (Seixas, 2000, 2006). It overlays the historiographical complexities post-genocide/conflict societies give rise to.

‘A reconciliation approach’ is a new history, multiple-perspectives approach illustrated by the German school history curriculum that has employed multiple-perspectives to contribute to (external) reconciliation between Germany and victims of Nazi crimes and genocide prevention. However, multiple-perspectives in the South African history curriculum is a (internal) reconciliation strategy aimed at ‘unity in diversity’. That is reconciling South Africans living in South Africa through a shared national identity and national story of multiple-perspectives. In Northern Ireland, where national identity is contested, the enquiry, multiple-perspectives approach is employed in school history to promote a recognition of diversity without the overt promotion of unity and reconciliation. This ‘diversity approach’ is not represented in Torsti (2008) and Kings’ (2008) ‘unity in homogeneity’ and ‘unity in diversity’ model.

So Torsti (2008) and Kings’ (2008) model plays out in some societies, but not others. ‘Unity in homogeneity’, ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘diversity’ approaches are not the only possible approaches to history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies. For example, one could conduct a socio-economic or gender analysis of history curriculum reform and derive other approaches. Moreover, none of the afore-mentioned approaches to history curriculum reform are unproblematic in practice. ‘Unity in homogeneity’ tends to suppress historical complexity and to vilify the historical ‘other’ to achieve the unity of ‘us’ and so compromises disciplinary rigour for extrinsic aims. Conversely, ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘diversity’ approaches risk sacrificing moral clarity and commonality by over-privileging historical complexity and difference. Below reviews the literature on school history in post-genocide Rwanda.

Post-Genocide History Curriculum Reform in Post-Genocide Rwanda

The scholarship on school history in post-genocide Rwanda is formed of scholarly commentary, theoretical work and empirical studies. Three themes emerge from an examination of this scholarly work: moratorium, narrative closure and narrative control, which structure this section. Consideration of these themes reveal the Rwandan approach to history curriculum reform post 1994 genocide, implications of historiographical issues and the research gap and mandate for the research questions that emerge.

The Moratorium

In July 1994 the RoG placed a moratorium on teaching Rwandan history in schools. Commentators report that the moratorium was enacted because of a belief that pre-1994 school history had contributed to the 1994 genocide (Rutayisire et al., 2004; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Evidence suggests the RoG had a legitimate concern. Here I discuss the analysis of pre-genocide school history curricula and/or school history textbooks by Gasanabo (2004), Tabete (2011), King (2014) and Weldon (2009). I also refer to empirical studies that shed light on pre-1994 genocide school history teachers' classroom experiences and practices: IRDP (2006), African Rights (2001) and King (2014).

Gasanabo's (2004) doctoral study reports Hutu ethno-nationalist discourse in primary and secondary school history textbooks published between 1962 and 1994. That is a discourse of ethnic and racial difference between Hutu and Tutsi and of past Tutsi hegemony. Rwandan genocide scholars identify this as in genocide propaganda in 1994 (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002). To understand the impact school history had on Rwandans, Gasanabo (2004) interviewed a cross-section of the Rwandan population. His research shows how school history taught between 1962 and 1994 influenced even those who did not attend namely, by shaping their knowledge of Rwandan history and identity along Hutu ethno-nationalist lines. However, the older the participants were, the less inclined they were to accept school history without question.

In a small-scale qualitative study of school history, Tabete (2011) analyses two pre-1994 genocide secondary school history textbooks published in 1987 and 1989 respectively (Part I and Part II). He reports a Hutu ethno-nationalist narrative of the distinct origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa; Tutsi rule in pre-colonial and colonial times; and, Tutsi rebel attacks in post-independent Rwanda. Similarly, King (2014) analyses ethnic difference and division in aspects of history curriculum documents published in the early 1980s (see p.101-109). So overall, 'difference' is evident.

In qualitative research (interviews) on school history conducted by the Rwandan NGO, the 'Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace' (IRDP, 2006) and the NGO 'African Rights' (2001), some history teachers spoke of pre-1994 teaching material as

being dangerous. The teachers' reported ethnic division in history textbooks and a classroom practice of rote learning (African Rights, 2001; IRDP, 2006). So these interviewees linked pre-1994 school history education policy to the genocide (Ibid.; Ibid.). The teaching of ethnic difference and division is further evidenced in King's (2014) Hutu and Tutsi interviewees' memories of actual pre-1994 history lessons (see below, p.62). Moreover, Des Forges (1999) conducted a seminal study on the Rwandan genocide incorporating large-scale document analysis and qualitative interviews with victims and perpetrators. She observes in the lead up to the genocide: "the propagandists built upon the lessons Rwandans had learned at school" (Ibid., p.86). Beyond this, some scholars hypothesise a link between rote learning in pre-genocide school history and the obedient masses obeying commands to kill (Walker-Keleher, 2006; also see McLean-Hilker, 2010). However, for Straus (2006) the idea of unquestioning, conformist masses is insufficient because it obscures how perpetrator motivations are seldom simple (also see Stone, 2008).

None of the afore-mentioned research empirically proves a direct link between pre-1994 school history and the 1994 genocide. However, based on the afore-mentioned research, commentators conclude history classrooms were an important public space where the Hutu regime's top-down narrative of ethnic division was propagated and reinforced (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; McLean-Hilker, 2010). The moratorium on Rwandan history in school history education post-1994 and the search for the true history of Rwanda was proposed by the RoG and reportedly accepted by Rwandans on this basis (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Narrative closure

Section two of this chapter demonstrated how in the aftermath of genocide and conflict, governments often use the history curriculum to try to unite the nation by projecting a collective identity formed through the power of the state. The idea of ethnic difference was central to the recent genocide in Rwanda. So the objective of official history in post-genocide Rwanda is to unite the nation through a de-ethnicised construction of Rwandan history and national identity. The RoG insists this single narrative is the true Rwandan history and basis for the true Rwandan national identity. This has emerged from a comprehensive review of post-genocide RoG education policy documents below.

As early as July 1994, the RoG was reportedly developing new objectives for the education system and planning a new school curriculum (Weldon, 2009; Obura, 2003). To establish the true history of Rwanda and to unite Rwandans are aims repeated in a number of policy documents that discuss education reform (see Office of the President, 1999; Vision 2020). Beyond this, the 2003 Education Sector Policy states that "future populations will learn the true history of Rwanda" (p.4). The 2003 Primary and Secondary School Curriculum Development Policy promises to provide "an objective and truthful account of Rwandan […] history" (MINEDUC, 2003, p.5). The historiographical issues raised by a truthful account of Rwandan history in the school history curriculum are addressed below.

I discuss analysis in English of post-genocide history curricula and/or school history textbooks by Weldon (2009), Tabete (2011), Sjoberg (2011) and Druez (2012). These post-graduate and small-scale qualitative studies focus on school history in post-genocide Rwanda. Weldon (2009) sheds light on how post-genocide history education policy has shaped history curriculum reform. She identifies in education policy documents the aims of the first post-genocide Rwandan (1998) O-level history curriculum: pupils should be able to discern truth from lies in history (Ibid.). In the latest (2008) O-Level history curriculum she identifies an emphasis on clans, lineages and chiefdoms of pre-colonial Rwanda and the organisation of traditional Rwandan society (Ibid.). We will see in chapter five that this emphasis reflects the post-genocide RoG official history of pre-colonial unity and harmony, which is contested by some historians and in society (Ibid.; see below).

While Weldon (2009) does not review post-genocide school history textbooks, Tatebe (2011), Sjoberg (2011) and Druez (2012) address this gap. Collectively, the authors review one primary school (2006) and two secondary school history textbooks (2009, 2010) and one primary (2006) and one secondary school history teachers' guide (2010). All of the authors identify in the curriculum documents they analyse the official single narrative of Rwandan history and identity. That is a narrative of: pre-colonial unity and harmony; and/or pre-colonial unity disturbed by colonialists by introducing artificial ethnic identities and divisions, continued by post-independent Hutu elite governments and resulting in genocide in 1994 (Tatebe, 2011; Sjoberg, 2011; Druez, 2012). This contrasts with the 'distinct difference' Hutu ethno-

nationalist narrative of racial and ethnic difference and Tutsi colonial oppression of Hutu in pre-1994 genocide school history documents reported by Gasanabo (2004), Tabete (2011) and King (2014).

Together Weldon (2009), Tabete (2011), Sjoberg (2011) and Druez's (2012) analysis suggests that the RoG's single and officially true narrative of Rwandan history and identity dominates school history curriculum reform. A number of historiographical issues are evident. The idea of historical truth conflicts with a broad consensus amongst Western historians that history cannot constitute the truth about the past, but is rather an interpretation of the available evidence (Carr, 2001; also Bauer, 1976, 2002; Southgate, 2000, 2005). Secondly, aspects of this officially true narrative are contested by some historians (see chapter 2, p.9-11; also see Newbury, 1988; Vansina, 2004). It also neglects the responsibility of ordinary Hutu genocide perpetrators for their crimes and, with it, an understanding of their motivations by focusing the blame instead on elites. In section one of this chapter I showed how Bauer (1978) and Shriver (2005) argue that understanding perpetrators' motivations is key to prevention, albeit that motivations are often complex and hard to pin down (see Straus, 2006). Finally, while Rwanda may have one past, genocide scholars report that it has multiple histories that are contested in society (Eltringham, 2004; Mamdani, 2002) and this is not evident in school history. So school history curriculum reform overlays some of the complexities of genocide historiography generally and of Rwandan history of and after genocide specifically.

Commentators report that the official RoG narrative has been widely disseminated since July 1994 through the media, genocide memorials, *gacaca* courts and ingando or solidarity camps[17] as well as in schools (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; McLean-Hilker, 2010). However, as Wertsch's (1998, 2002) research into ethnic-Estonian pupils' responses to Soviet history illustrates, dissemination does not guarantee appropriation. Below in relation to this point, I discuss large-scale (Freedman et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2007), medium-sized (Mills and Wiesemes 2012; King, 2014, 2011, 2010; IRDP, 2006; African Rights, 2001) and small-scale qualitative studies (Druez, 2012;

[17] Local political and community leaders, pre-entry university students, lecturers and administrative staff, former militia members and released prisoners and genocide survivors pass through ingando camps for two weeks to four months. They are educated on issues pertaining to post-genocide Rwanda including Rwandan history (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Tabete, 2011; Sjoberg, 2011) that address the views of education stakeholders about school history in post-genocide Rwanda.

Freedman et al (2004)[18] and Weinstein et al (2007)[19] report on the same empirical research. That is of focus groups and one-to-one interviews with 376 Rwandan education stakeholders conducted between 2000 and 2002 (Ibid.; Ibid.). Both papers analyse Rwandan school teachers' and administrators' and students' and parents' views on the role of education in teaching history, ethnicity and reconciliation. Support is revealed amongst participants for unity and reconciliation, but there is division over curriculum content, in particular on the question of the inclusion of ethnicity. Yet, the authors also report broad support for examining the origins of ethnic identity in school history so students can learn from past mistakes. So education stakeholders want school history to promote unity and reconciliation, but some differ in their views about how the curriculum might best deal with ethnic identity to achieve this end.

The majority of participants reportedly support a democratic approach to teaching school history, but others see discussion and debate as a threat to government control and official truth (Freedman et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2007). So the relationship between history, power and politics identified in sections one and two of the chapter, extends into participants' views on how to teach school history and the nature of truth in Rwandan history. Freedman et al (2004) and Weinstein et al (2007) also report a fear amongst participants that critically exploring the 1994 genocide might cause conflict. So classroom debate and discussion, supported by many, also evokes fears of future violence. Likewise, Mills and Wiesemes (2012)[20] report that beginning Rwandan school history teachers state that some pupils are of the view that learning about the Rwandan genocide is irrelevant for today. By way of explanation these

[18]Authors: Freedman, S.W., Kambanda, D., Samuelson, B., Mugisha, I., Mukashema, I., Mukama, E., Mutabaruke, J., Weinstein, H., and Longman, T.

[19] Authors: Weinstein, H., Freedman, S. W., and Hughson, H.

[20]Mills and Wiesemes (2012) findings are drawn from data generated by the DelPHE project funded by the British Council (see www.edcoco.org). The project explored the promotion of community cohesion through the teaching of the violent past in schools in the UK and in post-genocide Rwanda. It included online activities, which involved beginning school history teachers and academics in the UK and Rwanda. It also facilitated dialogue between beginning school history teachers in the UK (Nottingham) and in Rwanda (Kigali) through an online forum.

beginning history teachers reported a fear amongst some pupils that discussing the Rwandan genocide in class could re-ignite ethnic conflict (Ibid.). All this correlates with findings of chosen amnesia in Buckley-Zistel's (2006, 2009b, 2011) large-scale qualitative research amongst ordinary Rwandans. She reports on the strategic forgetting of past divisions by ordinary Rwandans to cope with living in proximity to killers (Ibid.). This context illustrates how Bauer (1978, 2002) and Stone's (2007) proposal of a moral obligation to bear witness to genocide (see section 1) becomes morally complex and difficult to achieve in practice in the post-genocide Rwandan history classroom.

So a key issue also raised in the work of Hamber (1998a, b) is the role (if any) of history education in the process of remembering and forgetting if and when remembering risks reigniting conflict (see section 1). This is exemplified in Rwanda as tension, common in societies after genocide, between the moral imperative to remember the past (see Bauer, 1978, 2002; Stone, 2007), and the need to forget to focus on rebuilding society (see section 2). King (2014) identifies complex attitudes amongst past and present pupils and teachers to questions of what and how to remember the past in school history. Over four months in 2006, King conducted 70 one to one semi-structured interviews with past and current primary school pupils and teachers. King (2014) identifies a paradox in participants' views, which she does not explain. Some interviewees' simultaneously called for historical complexity and a single true history of Rwanda, which are incompatible (Ibid.).

King's interviewees schooled in the post-genocide period generally considered ethnicity as artificial in line with official history, but some also readily pointed out Hutu or Tutsi in the classroom (Ibid., 2014). These contradictions in opinions about the nature of truth in history and about ethnicity makes stake-holder attitudes to school history in Rwanda hard to pin down. However, in King (2014) and in earlier publications (King, 2011, 2010) also based on the afore-mentioned fieldwork in 2006, King reports that several Hutu interviewees expressed alienation from the history curriculum. This was because it was perceived to ignore Hutu suffering at the hands of the invading Tutsi-led RPF in 1994 (King, 2014, 2011, 2010); war crimes alleged in scholarship (see Gersony Report, 1994), but denied by the RPF-led RoG. This indicates official history in the history curriculum suppresses the psychological truth

of Hutu suffering. It also indicates that official history in the history curriculum limits the possibility of developing in the history classroom dialogical truth and historical truth - as defined by Minow (1998) and Shriver (2005) in section one, on the afore-mentioned issue.

Nevertheless, the power and politics construct of the history curriculum in Rwanda is not all pervasive. Longman and Rutagengwa's (2004, 2006) large-scale qualitative research reports distrust of official history as an instrument of government power amongst the population (Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004, 2006). Furthermore, ethnographic research indicates ethnicity is still salient amongst Rwandan youth aged between 15 and 30 and living in Kigali (Mclean-Hilker, 2009, 2011, 2014). Indeed, based on qualitative interviews with history teachers, IRDP (2006) and African Rights (2001) report that history teachers claim that some students react to Rwandan history along ethnic lines. Hutu pupils reportedly ask why the Rwandan monarchy was Tutsi, while Tutsi pupils want to know why the Tutsi King went into exile in 1959 during the Hutu revolution (Ibid.; Ibid.). Likewise, Mills and Wiesemes (2012) report beginning school history teachers in Rwanda spoke of pupils' trying to find out the ethnic identity of teachers.

Beyond the above, based on 67 qualitative one-to-one interviews with secondary school students Druez (2012) reports that: students' were disappointed with a school history that they view as abstract, partial and flawed in part; and that only a substantial minority of pupils responded positively to school history. Nevertheless, Sjoberg's (2011) seven junior secondary history teacher interviewees reportedly supported the official RoG narrative. Similarly, Tatebe's (2011) five government official interviewees saw no problem with the new official Rwandan history. However, of the other seven (non-government) participants Tatebe (2011) interviewed six considered the new history to be a political history rather than Rwandan history itself. So while government employees publically support official history, indications are this plays out in more complex ways in wider society.

In sum, together Weldon (2009), Tabete (2011), Sjoberg (2011) and Druez's (2012) curriculum analysis suggest that a single and closed narrative of Rwandan history and identity dominates post-genocide school history curriculum reform. However, a more

comprehensive analysis of school history curricula and textbooks is required. This is because empirical research to date does not include an analysis of all of the most recently published school history textbooks (see chapter 5). Finally, collectively, a growing body of research reveals that education stakeholders have mixed opinions on school history content and pedagogy. Research is needed to explore similarities and differences within and between education stakeholders views on what and how to teach Rwandan history and why.

Narrative control

The founding ideology of the post-genocide Rwandan state is 'never again' in reference to the 1994 genocide. This commitment has led to the development of a legal framework to deal with genocide ideology and divisionism in society. The Rwandan Constitution (2003) commits the RoG to the principles of "fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; and the eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity" (p.4). In the 2011 State of the Nation address, President Kagame simultaneously spoke of fighting genocide ideology and promoting national unity (Kagame, 2011). Critics argue that the genocide ideology and divisionism laws criminalise discussion of ethnicity in public discourse (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Hintjens, 2008). Beyond this, commentators report that genocide ideology laws underpin official history repressing free speech on Rwandan history and identity (McLean-Hilker, 2010; Begley, 2011). What emerges from the empirical literature and commentary on school history are problems posed by the fight against genocide ideology to history curriculum reform.

I principally discuss the work of Freedman et al (2008) and Freedman (2009). The authors were involved in a five year (2003 - 2008) project with the RoG to develop materials for school history content and teaching (pedagogy). Freedman et al (2008) analyse qualitative data collected from two workshops and three teacher seminars and related planning meetings. Freedman (2009) analyses interviews, evaluation materials and field-notes connected to curriculum writing and teacher-education workshops. Collectively, the authors identify tensions within school history education policy and contradictions between policy and practice.

For Freedman et al (2008) the RoG desire to use school history to promote national unity through a single history is incompatible with the government's rhetoric of pupils developing an understanding of historical evidence and critical thinking (also see Druez, 2012). Freedman (2009) reports Rwandan history teachers want to employ democratic teaching methods including critical thinking and debate in the classroom. However, as the political context grew more repressive between 2003 and 2008 with the enactment of the genocide ideology laws, Freedman (2009) observed history teachers became more reticent. Evident in Freedman et al (2008) and Freedman (2009) is a conflict between extrinsic (political) and intrinsic (academic) aims of school history in post-genocide Rwanda. Few studies report on the post-genocide history curriculum in action. Based on classroom observations in three primary schools and two secondary schools, Walker-Keleher (2006) reports history classes are teacher-led. Students reportedly play a scripted role within the bounds set by the teacher (Ibid.). Over three months in three secondary schools, Druez (2012) conducted classroom observations of history lessons. Druez (2012) also reports teacher-led lessons and observes the history taught in schools is incomplete and selective, which I interpret to mean official history.

Large-scale research in schools throughout Rwanda is required to understand whether, how and why Walker-Keleher (2006) and Druez's (2012) findings play out in urban and rural settings. However, other studies more directly illustrate how the conflict in education policy (see Freedman et al., 2008) and between policy and practice (see Freedman, 2009) plays out in the classroom. Two qualitative studies on school history in Rwanda report self-censorship by history teachers (Bijlsma, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011). For example, history teachers avoiding politically sensitive aspects of Rwandan history such as ethnicity, for fear of causing offence and/or being accused of being divisive (Bijlsma, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011). So post-genocide Rwanda's political realities have set limits for discussion and debate in the classroom and genocide historiography more generally.

Nevertheless, political repression alone does not fully explain the teacher-led instruction in history classes implied by Freedman et al (2008) and Freedman (2009) and evidenced in Walker-Keleher (2006) and Druez (2012) above. Collectively, large and small scale qualitative studies on school history in Rwanda conducted since 2001

reveal issues non-specific to the politics of school history. These are: a lack of trained-teachers; large class sizes; students' and teachers' fear of offending others and of re-igniting conflict; few learner-centred teaching and learning resources; and/or instruction in English (see African Rights, 2001; Walker-Keleher, 2006; Freedman et al., 2008; Freedman, 2009; Bijlsma, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011; Mills and Wiesemes, 2012; Druez, 2012; King, 2014). So, wider aspects of educational policy and practice not specific to history teaching, are likely to shape Rwandan history teachers' classroom practice (see chapter 7).

Overall, Freedman et al (2008) and Freedman (2009) highlight a contradiction between history education policy about discussion, debate and critical thinking and about promoting a single and official narrative protected by genocide ideology laws. While research on how Rwandan history teachers teach and why is small-scale, sparse and so more research is required, existing studies indicate that at least some history teachers fear discussion and debate beyond the legislated bounds of the official narrative (Bijlsma, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011). So despite references in post-genocide history curricula to discussion and debate (Weldon, 2009; Druez, 2012), research suggests debate beyond the legislated bounds of the official narrative is unlikely to occur. This indicates political anxieties about group cohesion after genocide and conflict or extrinsic aims have outweighed concerns with the intrinsic aims of academic history or disciplinary rigour in post-genocide Rwanda. It also means bearing witness in the history classroom to contested histories and identities and memories of the 1994 civil war and genocide, is unlikely.

Section 3 Summary

Based on the themes moratorium, narrative closure and narrative control above I summarise below the Rwandan approach to history curriculum reform post 1994 genocide, implications of historiographical issues for this approach and I identify the research gap and research questions. To this end I consider empirical research in terms of findings, methodology and/or methods.

In theoretical works King (2008) and Torsti (2008) characterise the Rwandan approach to school history curriculum reform as 'unity in homogeneity'. The empirical evidence reviewed supports this hypothesis because it points to history

curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda as being dominated by an old history, single narrative approach that projects everyone as the same; that is as Rwandan, and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa and to achieve extrinsic aims of national unity and reconciliation. Rwandan genocide scholars (see Eltringham, 2004; Mamdani, 2002), Rwandan school history scholars (see King, 2014; Weldon, 2009; Freedman, 2009) and commentators (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; McLean-Hilker, 2010) fear the afore-mentioned approach will be divisive. This is because research suggests it suppresses historiographical complexity of and after the 1994 genocide, for example ethnic identification, contested histories, Hutu suffering and ordinary Hutu responsibility for killing in 1994 focusing instead on blaming elites (see above). So attached to the 'unity in homogeneity' approach are potentially serious historiographical issues or implications.

Empirical research on school history in post-genocide Rwanda is largely qualitative and small-scale. This raises the methodological issue of how representative research findings are. More studies on school history are needed. Reports of political repression, contested histories, chosen amnesia and selective telling in post-genocide Rwanda (see King, 2009), raise questions about the trustworthiness of the research findings of studies on school history. Few school history scholars directly address these issues (see King, 2014, 2009), that are also issues in genocide historiography (see Bauer, 2002, 1976). In chapter four I consider the data issues the post-genocide Rwandan context poses for empirical research with reference to my own study.

Some empirical studies deal with the processes of history curriculum development in post-genocide Rwanda (see Weldon, 2009), while others focus on the school history curriculum in action (Walker-Keleher, 2006; Druez, 2012). Most focus on reporting the views of policy-makers (Tatebe, 2011), current and/or past history teachers (IRDP, 2006; Bijlsma, 2009; Freedman et al., 2008; Freedman, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011; Mills and Wiesemes, 2012) and/or pupils (African Rights, 2001; Gasanbo, 2004; Druez, 2012; King, 2014, 2010, 2011). Few studies deal collectively with the views of policy-makers, history teachers, pupils and parents (Freedman et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2007). To date and to my knowledge no study in English deals systematically with teacher-educators' perspectives, and except Mills and Wiesemes (2012), with the perspectives of student-teachers who are the new generation of history teachers.

This PhD thesis addresses a methodological gap in empirical research by exploring school history in post-genocide Rwanda from the perspectives of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers (see above). By doing so it bridges a knowledge gap in the literature between post-genocide Rwandan school history curriculum policy (policy-makers), mediation (teacher-educators) and implementation (student-teachers) (see above). Previously, no study has focused specifically on the latest 2008 O-level history curriculum taught to all O-level pupils aged 13-16 years and explored this curriculum with Rwandan policy-makers, teacher-educators and student history teachers.

Therefore, I used the afore-mentioned curriculum to explore the wider opportunities and challenges of teaching history in post-genocide Rwanda from the perspectives of policy, mediation and practice. So the principle research question is: What opportunities and challenges does teaching history face in post-genocide Rwanda - perceptions of what, why and how history is taught to secondary school pupils? In order to answer this question, I developed three subsidiary research questions:

1) What are Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student-teachers perceptions of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what do these perceptions tell us about what history is valued and why?

2) What do Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student teachers discussions of the practice of the 2008 O-level history curriculum tell us about how history is taught to O-level pupils?

3) What are the present and possible future implications of these findings for the theorisation and practice of history education in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies?

Chapter Summary

The research problem of this thesis is school history in post-genocide Rwanda. The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a comparative and analytical account of others' research in the relevant fields and derive research questions. Section one outlined the main historiographical issues of developing history of and after genocide. This provided a basis to critically review approaches to history curriculum reform after genocide and conflict in section two. Section two provided a theoretical framework for identifying the Rwandan approach to school history curriculum reform

in section three. By opting for a 'unity in homogeneity' approach to school history curriculum reform to promote national unity and reconciliation the RoG challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of multi-perspectivity advocated largely by the international community. Clearly, teaching 'unity in homogeneity' after ethnic violence and genocide in post-genocide Rwanda is a complex challenge that raises serious historiographical issues. So Rwanda is an appropriate context to explore a contested area of school history education; namely, the role of school history education in contributing to re-building society after genocide and conflict.

Chapter 4 Methodology and Methods

Introduction

The research involved two periods of fieldwork in Rwanda of 11 weeks (10th September - 28th November 2012) and 16 weeks (28th May - 28th September 2013). During the fieldwork field-notes were taken, documents collected, semi-structured interviews conducted with three policy-makers, five teacher-educators and ten student-teachers involved in O-level history education in Rwanda. Additionly informal discussions were conducted with four policy-makers who worked within the field of humanities education. Research with participants was conducted in English. Below I discuss the methodology and methods that structured this study. I begin with the ontology and epistemology and why a qualitative methodology and a case study design are appropriate for this study. I then describe the fieldwork case-study research in Rwanda, the data collection methods, data analysis, and trustworthiness of the findings. I finish with the methodological limitations and the chapter summary.

Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology

Beliefs about the nature of reality (ontology) feed into considerations about the nature of knowledge (epistemology) and vice-versa (Pring, 2000). Objectivism is an ontological position asserting a single, tangible and objective social reality exists 'out there' independent of social actors (Bryman, 2008). Objectivism underpins a view of knowledge called positivism. Positivism asserts that facts about the social world can be established and the truth known, providing the principles, procedures and ethos of the natural sciences are applied (Pring, 2000). Conversely, social constructivism is an ontological position asserting that social reality is continually in the process of being constructed by social actors (Bryman, 2008). Social constructivism underpins anti-positivist epistemologies that perceive knowledge of social phenomena to be in constant flux. Consequently, knowledge of social phenomena can only ever be partial. This study is located in the anti-positivist interpretive paradigm. This choice reflects the aims of this study. That is to understand how the 2008 O-level history curriculum is playing out from the perspectives of Rwandan policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers.

Epistemological considerations "give rise to methodological considerations" (Cohen et al., 2007, p.5). A qualitative research strategy emphasises the exploration of the partial and ever changing multiple realities that constitute an aspect of social life (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 1998). Qualitative research is "concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted" (Mason 2002, p. 4). The qualitative researcher attaches significance to meaning, to knowledge grounded in individual experiences, perspectives and positions. Thereby the qualitative researcher seeks to construct a holistic picture of an aspect of society, demonstrating complexity (Powel, 1997; also Griffiths, 1998; Creswell, 1998; Wellington, 2000). This sits comfortably within my social constructivist ontological and interpretive epistemological positioning(s) and fits within my aim to develop "rich, nuanced and detailed data" (Mason, 2002, p.4). As this chapter will show, rich, nuanced and detailed data is critical for addressing secondary school history in post-genocide Rwanda.

I did not rule out quantitative or mixed methods research strategies out of hand. The nature of my research questions and holistic approach to the analysis made a qualitative research strategy the most appropriate choice. In this sense, it was a choice based on context as well as philosophy (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, the knowledge I aimed to generate by asking the research questions was not knowledge making universal claims as positivism aspires to. Rather, I aimed to develop knowledge bound up in context and time, temporal and open to new points of view (Schwandt, 2001, p.139). As such, and because the investigation had a specific focus tied to a particular place (Kigali - Rwanda) and time (see above) and a small purposive sample of research participants, this study is a case-study. It is a case-study of a post-genocide secondary school history curriculum - the 2008 Rwandan O-level history curriculum. This curriculum is a conduit for exploring the wider opportunities and challenges of teaching history in post-genocide Rwanda, which are addressed in chapters five, six, seven and eight. The case-study is constituted of documentary analysis, field-notes and the perceptions of Rwandan education policy-makers (7), secondary school history teacher-educators (5) and student-teachers (10). Associated methodological issues are addressed throughout this chapter.

The term ‘case’ has several meanings in the literature (Durrani, 2008). This study understands ‘cases’ to be the products of basic research operations. Through continual emersion in the data and literature, the researcher arrives at an understanding of the case at the end of the research process (Durrani, 2008; also Ragin, 1992a, b). The thesis began as a case-study of promoting a Culture of Peace through the history curriculum in post-conflict societies. Over time and through continuous engagement with the literature and data, the thesis evolved into a case-study of a post-genocide secondary school history curriculum.

Undertaking fieldwork case-study research in Rwanda: Research Design

This section details the experience of fieldwork in Rwanda focusing on ethical issues and how they were managed. Social research involves gathering information from people about people (Punch, 2005). This brings to the fore ethical considerations (Silverman, 2005). I received ethical approval for this study from the ethics board of the School of Education at the University of Nottingham, and the Rwandan Ethics Committee in Kigali. In addition, I followed the ethical guidelines for research in education set down by the ‘British Educational Research Association’ (BERA). The efforts to conduct culturally and contextually appropriate and ethical fieldwork in Rwanda began with deskwork. This involved a review of 128 empirical studies based in post-genocide, post-conflict and conflict affected societies in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, South America and Africa. Twenty-seven of these studies were Rwandan based. How to conduct ethical research on controversial issues in sensitive contexts and, at the same time, elicit rich data, was a tension apparent in most studies. This tension shaped the methodological choices I made prior to and during the fieldwork. These choices are discussed below.

Participant Safety: Trust, Confidentiality and Anonymity

No definitive ‘how to’ guide emerged from my reading of the literature about how to build trust between the researcher and participants. Nevertheless, researchers explained why building up trust is important and offered insights into how to go about it. In a personal communication (2010) Rosemary Kilpatrick, a professor of social work in Northern Ireland, explained that one-to-one interviews were essential if respondents were to be open about politically and emotionally sensitive issues. In Gaza, Gross (2006) found questionnaires distributed to Zionist settlers were viewed suspiciously as part of a covert Israeli government conspiracy. So, one-to-one

interviews with Zionist settlers were essential for establishing trust and hence obtaining information (Ibid.).

In Rwanda, establishing trust is linked to participant safety, a particular concern in a number of Rwandan studies researching topics similar to my own - history, identity, conflict, peace and/or reconciliation (see Staub et al., 2010; also Weldon, 2009; Tatebe, 2011; Freedman et al., 2011; King, 2009; Thomson, 2009; Mclean-Hilker, 2009; Sentama, 2009; Rettig, 2011; and Begley, 2011). Concerns across these studies revolve around the political and potentially legal sensitivities of engaging participants in discussions about ethnicity. For example, Sentama (2009) cautions:

> In Rwanda, nowadays, it appears politically unacceptable to publicly use ethnic labels in reference to people, such as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, with the risk of being treated as 'divisionist' - sowing division in the Rwandan community. But this seems controversial, given that while the Rwandan constitution emphasizes Rwandans (instead of 'ethnic' labels), the 1994 genocide is described as the genocide against Tutsi people. There is, thus, still confusion about whether the use of these terms is officially proscribed or not (p.19).

Along these lines, a number of researchers discuss the limitations on free speech and reticence amongst participants to discuss certain issues (King, 2009). For example, Freedman et al (2011) report:

> [I]n Rwanda, issues of safety for free speech are serious, and in some cases free speech may be impossible to guarantee […] our interviewees and participants were wary of possible negative consequences that might accompany speaking freely about ethnicity " (p.305 - p.308). […] [I]n the seminars, we saw increasing resistance to discussing ethnicity or identity or to deviating from the government line of unity and reconciliation (p.308).

Begley (2011) notes participants from a Hutu background often speaking of "the RoG accusing anyone who disagreed with the government of genocide ideology". Similarly, several of Rettig's (2011) interviewees expressed fear of being punished for expressing opinions contrary to government policies. One woman said, "Do not show my answers to the authorities. They would condemn me" (Interview in May 2007, p.199). My field notes record two-three people in Rwanda stating that it is impossible

to strongly criticise or oppose the RoG without reprisal. In such an environment, gaining the trust of participants is dependent on giving convincing assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. For example, Staub et al (2010) stressed the confidentiality of their responses to Rwandan participants to encourage them to be open. In ethnographic research in rural Rwanda, Thomson (2009) found that assurances of confidentiality increased the trust and rapport between her and Rwandan participants. To mitigate the risks of participation and build trust, I conducted one-to-one (recorded) interviews and informal discussions (where I took notes) in private - discussed in data collection methods. I also tried to ensure I had informed consent (see below).

Access, selection of participants and informed consent

Access to my host institution where I accessed teacher-educators and student-teachers was granted by the host institution prior to departing Nottingham for phase one of data collection. On arrival, I made a further application to the MoE for research approval, which was referred to the Rwandan Ethics Committee before being subsequently approved. I applied to conduct research in Kigali and therefore, research was approved in Kigali only. The application process with the MoE took six weeks during which time I sought out potential participants and visited important memorials and centres of research (see below).

Table 4-1 Participants from phase one and two of data collection

Policy-Maker (PM) Pseudonym and Method	**Teacher-Educator (TE)** Pseudonym and Method	**Student-Teacher (ST)** Pseudonym and Method
Conchobhar: Interview	Abracham: Interview	Jules: Interview
Turlach: Interview	Shyaka: Interview	Emmanuel: Interview
Michael: Interview	Tadhg: Interview	Anastase: Interview
Elie: Informal Discussion	Martin: Interview	Eric: Interview
Gael: Informal Discussion	Fidele: Interview	Gilbert: Interview
Abernethy: Informal Discussion		Danielle: Interview
Jado: Informal Discussion		Accalon: Interview
		Pacifique: Interview
		Ultan: Interview
		Albert: Interview

Table 4.1., lists a pseudonym for each participant in this study. The pseudonyms are used in the text and in footnotes in analysis chapter's six and seven. For the purposes of confidentiality and anonymity I have not included in Table 4.1, the dates or time of any interview or informal discussion. In addition, participants are not listed in order of participation. Furthermore, the three female participants have been given male names so as to protect the anonymity of a minority group in the sample. No gender differences were apparent in the data. Moreover, I omitted detailing specific jobs participants had or the type of school individual student-teachers taught in - public or private - to ensure anonymity. The implications of these measures for data analysis are discussed in methodological limitations below.

The seven policy makers, five teacher-educators and ten student-teachers in Table 4.1., were purposively drawn and selected according to the criteria of accessibility and representativeness, which is common in qualitative research (Durrani, 2008). Purposive sampling involves sampling "on the basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research questions" (Bryman, 2008, p.458). I sought out policy-makers familiar with the 2008 history curriculum and/or who work within humanities education more broadly, secondary history teacher-educators and secondary history student-teachers. By targeting people in these specific roles I did not have to go through a process of filtering potential respondents.

All participants spoke English - the language of instruction in Rwanda. Most student-teachers were under 30 years of age and all the teacher-educators and policy-makers were over 35 years old. I had an initial meeting with each participant to take them through the participant consent forms, explaining the study to ensure informed consent. To this end**,** I stressed the voluntary, confidential and anonymous nature of participating. This was important because I accessed the sample by identifying individuals through internet searches on government websites, but also gatekeepers at the host institution and snowballing - asking participants to recommend other potential participants.

Access and consent do not necessarily converge when gatekeepers are involved and consequently, I emphasised to participants that their decision about participating or not would not be revealed to anyone - including the gatekeeper. I left participants with

a copy of the consent form and summary of the study in English (Appendix 1) approved by my supervisors and Ethics boards noted above. During my second visit, consent forms were provided in English and French because French was some participants' second language, after Kinyarwanda. I later rang at an agreed date and time to confirm participation or otherwise. This was a few days after the initial meeting to allow participants time to decide whether they wanted to participate. In this way, I hoped to build up trust and shift power to them to mitigate the risk of oppressing the researched (Sapsford and Abbot, 1996). Moreover, I always emphasised to participants that they could withdraw from the research at any time and that the host teacher-training institute and the MoE would review an anonymous version of their transcripts. This was a requirement of the MoE of researchers taking data out of the country, however, the MoE ultimately choose not review the transcripts (see below, p.77). I found that being straightforward and open with participants helped to build a sense of trust between us in a short space of time.

New experiences, new perceptions

'Parachuting' in, to conduct research in an unfamiliar culture is highly problematic (Dore, 1994; Crossley and Tikly, 2004). This is especially so in post-genocide Rwanda, where the danger of trauma and limits to free speech need consideration before asking questions (King, 2009). One aspect of the ethical methodology was the length of time I spent in Rwanda. As noted above, I spent nearly seven months in Rwanda, split into two phases. This allowed me to trial the interview guides in Appendix 2 (phase one) and become gradually immersed into the research context. On reflection, this pattern was central to developing cultural and contextual sensitivity as well as awareness of my own presumptions. During both periods of fieldwork, I took time to soak up daily life through numerous impromptu conversations with ordinary Rwandans on buses, in shops and in the market place. These every-day conversations and experiences were recorded in the field-notes from memory most evenings. The fieldnotes helped me to think about Rwanda and history education in Rwanda outside the pronouncements of the literature.

Sometimes conversations with Rwandans confirmed what I had previously read. For example, the literature refers to an authoritarian government. This was evident when some Rwandans and expatriates spoke of not going against the government unless one

wanted trouble in return. Conversely, I also found Kigali to be an ordered and safe city where people moved freely. I got no sense of people living their day-to-day lives in fear of the RoG. Having read Begley's (2011) and Thomson's (2009) experiences of interference from the RoG in their fieldwork, I was surprised at how happy participants seemed to be to participate in the study. They expressed no apparent concerns whether their anonymous transcripts would be reviewed by the MoE and the host institution[21]. Nevertheless, three policy-makers and one teacher-educator asked to read their transcripts to ensure that they had said what they had meant to say. Three of these participants seemed relaxed about their transcripts being submitted to the MoE. However, one policy-maker seemed concerned, but went ahead with the informal discussion.

During both phases of fieldwork I visited important memorials and centres of research. These included: Kigali Memorial Centre, the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace. Here, I accessed research by Rwandans on issues of history education, conflict, peace and reconciliation not available on the internet. In a similar way as talking to ordinary Rwandans was important, accessing Rwandan based research provided a source of locally produced knowledge about Rwanda that I had no previous access to.

What I discovered was that Rwandan society is largely viewed differently by Rwandans and non-Rwandans; no Rwandan literature I read wrote of limited freedom of speech or authoritarianism. Conversations with the international community in Rwanda lead me to think that that this was probably self-censorship by Rwandan writers because the RoG does not tolerate a free press. My field notes record that over seven months in Rwanda, the Rwandan daily newspaper 'The New Times', was never - to my knowledge - critical of the government. Nevertheless, President Kagame's RPF party won 76 per cent of the democratic vote in 2013 and therefore, perhaps Rwandan writers genuinely have a different perspective of Rwanda from international

[21] A major ethical issue I faced was the requirement of the Rwandan Ministry of Education to submit anonymous transcripts to the host institution and the Ministry of Education for review before they could be taken out of the country. As such, I made sure all transcripts were anonymised, deleting anything that might have indicated who a participant was, for example a reference to a particular job. Ultimately, the Ministry of Education did not review the transcripts.

writers. This was an important insight, highlighting the assumptions I brought to the field "based on existing research" and the true complexity of Rwandan society (Crossely and Watson, 2003, p.36).

Being an outsider and making the most of it

Like King (2009), I was conscious of timing and did not conduct research on April 6th, the eve of the beginning of an annual three-month period commemorating the 1994 genocide. On the advice of Rwandans that some people might prefer not to talk with me during the early to middle parts of the commemoration period, I returned to Rwanda at the end of May 2013. As Buckley-Zistel (2006, 2007) experienced, some interviewees spoke of appreciating an opportunity to share their views with me and others were more outspoken than I had expected. For example, some Rwandans spoke of how the genocide had impacted on their lives, for example, losing loved ones. In addition, one student-teacher spoke of the RoG as repressive, restricting what Rwandans can say about history and identity in public. While I suspected that this might be the case, I had not expected any such explicit comments. I often felt that being an 'outsider' helped. Having grown up in Northern Ireland, I am aware of how, in divided societies, people often customise their comments on sensitive issues according to their listener. As an 'outsider', Irish, culturally and historically rooted in a distant land, there was no checking process to submit me to - Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. So participants were perhaps open with me as described above, because of this (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Furthermore, in some ways, I felt that coming from a post-conflict society made me more credible as a researcher in the eyes of the interviewees. I was often able to relate discussions about the conflict in Rwanda to the Catholic and Protestant divide in Northern Ireland. One policy-maker introduced me to a colleague with the words 'Earl is from Northern Ireland' meaning a researcher with experience of conflict. The colleague however, seemed unimpressed. This highlighted for me, the uniqueness of the experience of genocide. Despite coming from a post-conflict society, Rwandans may have felt that I could never understand what they had been through. One student-teacher jokingly asked if I thought everyone was a killer. I responded immediately 'not at all'. This made me reflect on what some Rwandans, especially those of a Hutu

background who might have relatives in prison for participating in the genocide, might have assumed I thought about Rwanda.

Moreover, social research involves entering into "a politics of knowing and being known where power is never absent" (Scott and Usher, 1996, p.180). One interviewee startled me by asking why Africans thought all Westerners were intelligent. I had the impression the comment meant why some Africans thought that Westerners were more advanced than Africans. This gave me insight into how I might be perceived in an African context, where Westerners are often viewed as wealthy and where higher education is the privilege of the few, being a PhD student carries high status (King, 2009). Indeed, one participant asked if I could buy an electronic device for him/her after an interview. This only happened once and the participant accepted my explanation that I was on a budget and could not. I tried to mitigate the above conceptions by living and dressing modestly. I always articulated my gratitude to participants for participating in the study and, when appropriate, discussed how and why the West is not the 'promised land' some might think. For example, there is poverty in Europe.

Cultural and contextual sensitivity, awareness of one's own presumptions and trust and rapport are important tools for accessing the lives of others. They underpin "the increasingly successful application of qualitative research strategies in the field" (Crossley and Watson, 2003, p.48). The personality and personal conduct of the researcher throughout fieldwork are central here (Lewis, 1976). While this is not an ethnographic study, the experience of conducting fieldwork in Rwanda made me realise that the personal attributes I brought to the field as an 'outsider' likely shaped how participants saw me and what they were or were not willing to discuss with me. Ronald Dore (1994) in 'Why Visiting Sociologists Fail' reflects on the personal conduct of the researcher as a reason for the failure of sociological research: "[i]ncompetence in personal relations [and] lacking the acuity to know whom not to be observed drinking with […]" (p.1430). I kept a low profile in Rwanda and avoided socialising in bars frequented by UN staff and high-level Rwandan policy-makers to avoid drawing too much attention to myself (see Obura, 2003). I feared that socialising with the powerful risked drawing unnecessary government attention to my research and undermining my being perceived as a trustworthy 'outsider' by the

people I hoped would confide in me in interviews. Furthermore, I was discrete and did not openly criticise the government, which would have been both rude as an outsider and insensitive to the political context (see King, 2009). Moreover, I made efforts to greet respondents in Kinyarwanda and like Thomson (2009) I carried a language book with me at all times. This was a small but important practice, demonstrating respect and providing a source of fun with participants. Being discrete, gentle and friendly was important to avoid being seen as an unwelcome and uninvited intruder (see Shah, 2004; Dimmock, 2007) and for building trust with participants, which was important for eliciting rich data.

Overall, this section has given an account of my experiences of undertaking fieldwork in Rwanda and how ethical considerations shaped methodological choices including my own personal conduct. No social research is without ethical concerns and ultimately the researcher must decide if the research is worth doing and how best to go about it; ethical research in an absolute sense is not possible (Daphne, 1991). Discovering and facing that I could not conduct research in Rwanda with absolute assurance of participant safety was a shock and took time to come to terms with. The decision to go to Rwanda was made over time. It came about after in-depth discussions with my supervisors, in particular, Associate Professor Mills who has conducted research in Rwanda, and reference to the literature on research in Rwanda and other post-conflict societies. My worst fears, to my knowledge, were not realised. Rather, the Rwandan authorities were very helpful, kind and friendly, which, as noted by Begley (2011) reflects the experience of many other researchers but not Begley (2011) and Thomson's (2009) experiences, noted above. The following sub-section details the data collection methods: one-to-one semi-structured interviews and informal discussions, documentary data and field notes.

Data Collection Methods

Semi-structured Interviews and Informal Discussions

This is a qualitative study concerned with conducting an emic enquiry from the inside. Therefore, I needed to probe participants' "thoughts", "values", "prejudices", "perceptions", "views", "feelings" and "perspectives" on the issues under investigation (Wellington, 2000, p.71). Semi-structured interviews are a good format for such "considerable in-depth probing of issues, attitudes and experiences"

(Kilpatrick and Leitch, 2004, p.569). The semi-structured interview method along with four informal discussions with four policy-makers was used to explore participants' views on the 2008 history curriculum. A criticism of the semi-structured interview, which can also be levied at informal discussions, is that semi-structured interviews often take place in private rooms. That is outside the natural setting or habitat where daily life unfolds, so they are artificial constructs (see Bryman, 2008; Cicourel, 1982).

However, Silverman (2007) questions whether there is a natural/unnatural divide here and Douglas (1975) argues it is an irrelevant construct. Bryman (2008) states that to explore some research questions through empirical research you have to ask questions, which Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004) argue are better asked in 'private'. Like King (2009) and Scott (1990) I view one-to-one interviews and informal discussions in private as "the most protected format of spoken communication" (Scott, 1990, p.162). I decided to use one-to-one semi-structured interviews and informal discussions as the sole methods of empirical data collection. This is because they provided a basis for me to assure participants what they said would be confidential, to build trust and reduce the risk of participant safety. Therefore, like King (2009), I happily sacrificed ecological validity in Rwanda for private space. Moreover, like King (2009), I did not use a translator to ensure what participants said remained private. This meant not interviewing participants in their native Kinyarwanda. The implications of this for data analysis are discussed below.

The analysis of the first set of data led me to re-think the interview guides and therefore, there are differences between the first and second phase interview guides (see Appendices 2 and 3). In addition, policy-maker, teacher-educator and student-teacher interview guides had differences in both phases (Ibid., Ibid.). However, I asked all participants in both phases a standard set of questions to reduce variation and create common ground for comparison. Interviews were recorded and times varied from 1 hour - 1 hour 30 minutes with policy-makers and teacher - educators and from 1hour 20 minutes to 2 hours 30 minutes with student-teachers. Informal discussions were not recorded - I took written notes – and lasted no more than 30 minutes, as planned. Like King (2009), before an interview, I showed participants the stop button on the recorder and explained that they could stop the interview at any

time and for any reason and/or ask me to delete the recording. No participant did this, but it helped develop 'trust' and I hope reduced any power imbalance between the researcher and participants. In addition, interviews and informal discussions took place at a time and place convenient to individual participants - an office, a café or a participants' home. I never pressed participants to discuss something in an interview or informal discussion that they did not want to.

I approached each interview and informal discussion not as a neutral exchange of questions and answers, but as an interaction between an interviewer and interviewee (Ribbins, 2007). This involved me being: "a sponge; a sounding board; a prober; a listener; a counsellor; a challenger; a sharer" and any combination of the above (Ribbins, 2007, p.208). The flexible and perceived 'unscientific' nature of such research has been criticised as unpredictable and likely to illicit "misleading" and "inaccurate" information (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 25). However, I consider partial knowledge as inherent in researching a complex and constructed social world (Creswell, 1998). Furthermore, partial knowledge, gaps and silences are useful data points, illuminating the complexity and nuances of the research milieu (King, 2009). This latter point is addressed in the methodological limitations section below.

An interview or informal discussion is only successful when the interviewee and interviewer share a common understanding of the questions asked and answers given (Broadfoot, 2000). Interviewing in English did not restrict candidates for the study, but limited the range and depth of some participant responses. This was because English was a good number of participants' second or third language after Kinyarwanda and French. To mediate the danger of slippage in language used, I spoke clearly and in a friendly and conversational way to encourage participants to be open about what they did not understand (Mason, 2002). Buckley-Zistel (2008) talks of an open and unstructured approach to interviews to build trust with her Rwandan respondents. Similarly, I asked more open-ended questions than closed questions - with a limited range of responses mainly at the beginning of an interview to get basic background information (for example, type of school, length of internship in school, etc.). This was designed to ease participants into the interview and therefore, like Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004) in Northern Ireland, I left more sensitive questions to the middle and later parts of the interview and informal discussion (personal

communication, Kilpatrick, 2010). This schedule, delivered in a relaxed, friendly and conversational way, was designed to help me to build rapport with participants, encourage the free flow of information and elicit the information needed to respond to research questions.

To aid the above, I memorised interview/informal discussion questions in advance, gently guiding interviews and informal discussions back to the topic when required (Bryman, 2008; Durrani, 2008). However, I left plenty of scope for participants to diverge onto topics they wanted to discuss. Moreover, at the end of an interview and informal discussion I asked participants if there was anything they would like to add. Interviews were stored on a password protected memory stick and instantly deleted from the recorder for security purposes. I transcribed interviews in Rwanda and Nottingham word for word, checking accuracy by listening to each interview while reading each transcript. This helped me to spot any errors I had made because of mishearing and/or fatigue (Poland, 1995). Transcription resulted in hundreds of pages of interview data. Throughout the informal discussions with four policy-makers (see Table 4.1.), because of the brief (30 minutes) and relaxed nature of these discussions, I took notes instead of using a digital recorder as in interviews. This resulted in a page of data per policy-maker.

Documentary data

According to Durrani (2008) and Prior (2003), documentary data is a good starting point for qualitative research. Bryman (2004) explains that written documents can provide important contextual information illuminating underlying themes of the case. Brown (2013) warns of the potential partial nature of documents including bias and distortion. I attempted to mitigate bias and distortion by mining documents from a range of government (formal), non-government organisations (NGO/INGO's) and academic sources. These documents provided contextual information about history education in Rwanda and are recorded in the bibliography.

Documentary data constituted the first phase of the research process because it provided background to the case. Understanding the context helped me decide the most appropriate empirical data collection methods to use (interviews and informal discussions) and the question content and type (open or closed) to ask. I was also

enabled to recognise official discourse in an interview so as to make informed decisions about how to probe beneath it (Bryman, 2008). In this sense, one phase of the research process - analysing documents and reviewing the literature - informed subsequent phases of the empirical research. While I had a copy of the 2008 Rwandan O-level history curriculum prior to the field work, I only located the accompanying O-level history textbooks and teacher guides at the end of the second data collection phase. Consequently, the curriculum analysis in chapter six did not inform the collection of the empirical data, but situated it for critical analysis.

Field notes

During the first phase of fieldwork field-notes recording personal observations of daily life in Kigali and snippets of conversation with Rwandans and expatriates were written up most evenings from memory: during the second phase they were written when I learned something new or revealing about Rwanda. Although my study is not ethnographic, field notes are an ethnographic aspect of the empirical research. This is because they record seven months of observations and planned and unplanned day to day interactions with ordinary Rwandans. In addition to discussions with insiders or Rwandans, the field notes also record conversations with outsiders. Outsiders included people living in Kigali from other African countries and people from all over the world like international teachers, UN staff, INGO staff and people working for private enterprises.

The field-notes constitute a body of informal data that has contributed to the interpretation of the spoken data by helping me compare what was said in an interview or informal discussion with my personal experience of living in Kigali. They also reminded me what happened during each interview - silences, changes in tone, lowering of the voice, discussions with participants before and after the recorded interviews and informal discussions. For example, a few days before an interview, one participant wondered how to promote peace through a single Rwandan history when Rwandans are divided about that history. This was not referred to in the interview. In sum, field notes are a tapestry of observations made, experiences had, people I met, and what they told me.

Data Analysis

Philosophical underpinnings of my approach to the analysis

Trying to see social phenomena through the eyes of the research participants is at the heart of what qualitative research is about (see Bryman, 2008, 1988; also Hammersley, 1992, 2004; Morrison, 2007; Silverman, 2005, 2007). I emphasise *trying* because taking a social constructivist stance means it is impossible to get a true fix on reality or that a singular reality exists. Furthermore, the interpretive epistemology (or approach to knowledge) I adhere to considers knowledge as value-laden, partial and perspective bound (Bryman, 2008; also Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005; Silverman, 2005). The research findings of this study are not independent of the researcher (Wellington, 2000). Rather, "[t]o prepare an interpretation is to offer the inquirer's construction of the constructions of the actors being studied" (the 'double hermeneutic' see Racher and Robinson, 2003, p. 469). The social identity and values of the researcher influence the research process (Troyna, 1995). Hence, what the Rwandan participants said about the 2008 Rwandan history curriculum have been interpreted by a 33 year old, Irish, male, qualitative researcher.

Two Phases of Data Analysis

Rather than marking the final phase of research, data analysis is on-going in qualitative research (Wellington, 1996; Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). I experienced a "repetitive interplay between the collection and analysis of data" and so the two data collection phases informed each other (Bryman, 2008, p.539). This process was particularly evident when the first tranche of data was analysed in-depth after the first phase of fieldwork. While this was collected as pilot data, the quality of the data evident on analysis resulted in it becoming the first tranche of data. During this period of analysis, I decided which interview questions would be scrapped or added to the interview guides for the second phase. The analysis chapters were written after two phases of data collection and subsequent analysis of the data as a whole. Writing was a method of enquiry as during the writing process I moved between the raw data, data analysis and interpretation, and the literature. Therefore, on reflection, the collection of raw data, analysis, interpretation and writing were not mutually exclusive phases of knowledge production, but mutually informing processes producing the culmination of knowledge (Richardson, 2003). How I handled raw data is discussed below.

Raw data: Thematic Analysis

There is a consensus amongst writers that the principal goal of qualitative analysis is to draw out important themes from raw qualitative data and identify structures of meaning that underlie and connect these themes (Bryman, 2008; also Miles and Huberman, 1994; Tesch, 1990). There is no distinct cluster of techniques for conducting a thematic analysis and I drew on a range of academic perspectives to guide this process (see Bloor and Wood, 2006; Bryman, 2008; also Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Mason, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005; Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003; Tesch, 1990; Wellington, 2000). The thematic analysis of the first phase of raw data collection involved five distinct steps:

- I read the policy-maker (2), teacher-educator (1) and student-teacher (5) interview transcripts without making any notes several times. By immersing myself in the data, I became familiar with the similarities and differences within and between the groups of participants (Bloor and Wood, 2006, p.101; Wellington, 2000, p.135). A good understanding of the data as a whole was essential background knowledge for coding (step two), as it gave me a sense of the range and the comparative importance of the topics covered in the interview data.

- 2) I coded two student-teacher transcripts with keywords/phrases and made general notes highlighting patterns or recurring topics, silences and important areas of contrast, contradiction and irregularity (see Bryman, 2008; also Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Wellington, 2000). I chose student-teacher transcripts rather than policy-maker or teacher-educator transcripts because they best illuminated the curriculum as actions. The coding process was exhaustive and almost entirely inductive, with codes emerging from the data. However, *a priori* categories in interview guides, like a 'Culture of Peace', were used deductively - the data was analysed with a 'Culture of Peace' in mind (Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003).

- 3) I constructed themes from coded groups that I felt were "most revealing about the data" (Bryman, 2008, p.552; p.553). These thematic headings were not participants' actual words but my interpretation of what the two student-

teachers had said. The themes were compared and seven meta-themes emerged: curriculum, content and pedagogy; the nature of history; the past, present and future; teaching practice; the history teacher; curriculum development; and other.

- 4) The meta-themes were applied across all eight transcripts and I cut segments of data (or quotations) from each interview transcript and pasted them under the relevant theme. As this can lead to the fragmentation of data (see Coffey and Atkinson, 1996), I endeavoured to strip the data down to its "bare bones" while keeping "its wholeness intact" (Durrani, 2008, p.98). For example, for each segment of data (or quotation) I selected using Microsoft Word, I added the four lines above and below. This was done so that during the writing-up process I would be sensitive to each segment's immediate context in the transcript and (helped by immersion in the data in step one) to the narrative as a whole (Bryman, 2008). Each segment was reviewed to ensure it was under the appropriate theme. Where data did not fit within any theme it was coded under 'other' - which did not lead to rethinking the themes or to the emergence of new themes.

- 5) Within each theme, what individual and groups of participants said was summarised in comparison tables (Appendix 4). These tables characterised the data and noted key analytical points for discussion with my supervisors about what was emerging from within and between groups of participants in relation to the seven themes. Burnet (2005) speaks of "amplified silences" in Rwanda (p.155-174) and King (2009) reports she was often told in Rwanda that silences speak louder than words. Consequently gaps and silences in individual transcripts, within groups and across groups were paid particular attention to illuminate the complexity and nuances of the research milieu (King, 2009). Steps four and five were applied to the second set of data collected (28th May - 28 September 2013).

Bringing two phases of data analysis together

The summaries of the thematic analysis of both sets of data were compared to see what would emerge from the data as a whole. This involved, reading and re-reading

the thematic summaries, referring back to the raw data, the literature and drawing diagrams to characterise the data as a whole. Two key themes emerged: the curriculum as discourse and as actions, which are the titles of empirical data analysis chapters six and seven. Through the process of writing and rewriting the analysis chapters, I wove the data together to present (from my interpretive reading of the transcripts) important themes and sub-themes in the data (Mason, 2002). As a process of enquiry, writing the analysis chapters led to a refocusing of sub-themes, research questions and a re-writing of the literature review. As clarity in English was an issue in some transcripts, participant quotations in chapters six and seven have been modified for clarity. I added missing or additional words - in brackets - and I deleted repetition and unnecessary words marked by a single full stop in brackets - [.] - for one word, two for two words - [..] - and three for three or more deleted words - […]. I have been careful to ensure modified quotations reflect what participants said and are comprehensible to the reader.

Establishing the Trustworthiness of the Findings

What standard of truth can be attributed to knowledge that is qualified as partial? Kellehear (1993) notes that interpretative research "is a 'reading' of the world, and the task is always [one of] persuasion rather than proving" (p.25). Therefore, I aim to convince the reader of the logical coherence of the argument advanced in this thesis and of the cogency of the supporting evidence (Thomson, 2009). Dunne, Pryor and Yates (2000) argue that qualitative research is ultimately judged on how far it tells a convincing story. Lincoln and Guba (1985) developed criteria to assess this through the measure of trustworthiness. The criteria of trustworthiness are: credibility (parallels internal validity in quantitative research, see Bryman, 2008, p.377); transferability (parallels external validity in quantitative research, ibid.); dependability (parallels reliability in quantitative research, ibid.); and confirmability (parallels objectivity in quantitative research, ibid.). The credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of this qualitative study are addressed below.

Credibility (internal validity)

The credibility of this study is underpinned by the triangulation of methods and perspectives. The findings from the interviews were cross-referenced with those from informal discussions, the documentary data and field notes (Cohen et al., 2000; also Janesick, 2003; Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). The triangulation of perspective was

achieved by comparing individual participant data from interviews and informal discussions with their sub-group's data and data across the groups of participants. Like Silverman (2005), I do not expect the triangulation of data to add up to the whole story of history education in Rwanda. Rather, I believe that the triangulation of methods and perspectives - as discussed above - has helped me to develop a more detailed, nuanced, layered, complex and balanced picture of a situation and from a variety of vantage points than might have been otherwise possible (Altrichter et al., 1996, p.174; also Cohen et al., 2000; Stake, 2003). As such, the research demonstrates complexity, which Bryman (2008) states is a key aim of qualitative research (Bryman, 2008).

An aspect of credibility missing from this study is participant validation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). Two participants reviewed their individual interview transcripts and three of four policy-makers reviewed their informal discussions. However, participant validation of all the transcripts and informal discussion notes and the interpretation of the data was not possible for practical and ethical reasons. Many student-teachers had left Kigali by the time the interviews had been transcribed, and the interpretation of data was made in Nottingham. I could have contacted participants by e-mail. However, in light of rumours I heard in Rwanda of e-mails being hacked by the RoG and discussed by Begley (2011), I decided against this to protect participant anonymity and confidentiality.

Transferability (external validity)

Subjectivity is the major criticism of interpretivism by positivists because interpretive results cannot be generalised as they are subjective and partial knowledge. Similarly, Scott and Usher (1996) and Greenwood and Levin (2005) argue that while a case study might offer a tapestry of different points of view that illuminate the context, case study findings are not generalisable because samples are small. However, Pring (2000) points out "there remains room for […] generalisations, however tentative, and causal explanations even within the interpretive traditions" (p. 95). Moreover, Bassey (1998) retorts that case studies can offer fuzzy generalisations beyond the sample. This is because tentative generalisations are possible where thick description demonstrates instances "of a broader set of recognisable features" in other cases (Williams, 2000, p.215; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). In this way, thick

description in this study provides a basis for judging the transferability (external validity) of the research findings beyond the sample of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers (Bryman, 2008). Moreover, Bryman (1988) and Kyburz-Graber (2004) state that the aim of case study research is not to generalise findings to larger populations but to link findings to theory. The findings of this case study are used to comment on approaches to history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies.

Dependability (reliability)

Establishing dependability required me to be careful, honest and thorough throughout the research process and to demonstrate this to others (Williams, 2003). This study has dependability as I have included an audit trail of all phases of the research process so readers can see proper procedures have been followed and that the research findings can be justified (Bryman, 2008; see Appendices). Furthermore, I provided a full account of how the respondents were selected; how entry to the field was gained; how data was collected and analysed; how many people were interviewed; how long I was in the field; and what might have affected the results (see methodological limitations below). This was done so informed judgements can be made about the quality of the research and to live up to the qualitative ideal of being open to criticism (Wellington, 2000).

Confirmability (objectivity)

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) note that because detachment is impossible, the influence a researcher has on the research process has to be accounted for. I reflected above on the effect my presence might have had on the research participants and what they did/did not tell me. Durrani (2008) defines this process as reflexivity and argues that reflexivity increases the confirmability of qualitative research. Nonetheless, the confirmability of a thesis of which I am the sole 'author' with authority to decide whose voice to copy, paste and/or cut requires further consideration. As such, reflexivity has been supplemented by asking myself if any other interpretations could be drawn from the research data than the interpretations I have made and presented in the analysis chapters (Durrani, 2008). This process of critical reflexion and revision has been on-going throughout the data analysis and writing phases. I constantly moved back and forth between the raw data, data analysis, interpretation and literature.

Methodological Limitations

On reflection, there were often grey areas, no clear ethical boundaries of what I should or should not do and say in Rwanda. I was constantly working out how to balance my desire to gather rich data with ethical considerations that might or might not become actual at any time. For example, when one participant spoke of government control over history education, I was torn between the desire to probe this issue and not put the participant in an awkward position vis-a-vis the political situation. Being cautious I did not probe the participant for further information and perhaps I should have. Recalling Lewis' (1976) statement that the researcher's personality inevitably influences the research process, perhaps, my cautious nature was a methodological limitation in this study.

Furthermore, I was cognisant of the dichotomy between being an 'outsider' in an African post-genocide society and the ultimate 'insider'. That is in trying to discover who participants "think they are, what they think they are doing, and to what end they think they are doing it" (Geertz, 1999, p.vii). "[U]ltimately we are all outsiders in the lives of others", there is no perfect medium of access, which in part explains why this study is located within the interpretative paradigm (Pryluck, 1976, p.22). I usually felt what participants told me in interviews was what they genuinely thought. However, what participants did not say needs to be considered (King, 2009). Sometimes a participant seemed purposely obscure, bringing attention to, yet skirting around a sensitive issue. Due to cultural differences and language issues, I could not always interpret what silences meant during interviews and data analysis and might have missed some points.

Moreover, a number of biases exist in the sample. Only three of the sample was female. Furthermore, the participants as English speakers, represent a small educated minority (King, 2009), an educated elite. In addition, like King (2009) and Thomson (2009), I did not ask respondents if they identified themselves as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa due to the legal context of the genocide ideology and divisionism laws. Unlike King (2009), participants did not self-identify, for which I have no explanation. Not knowing the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa backgrounds of participants is an omission in a society where ethnic identity is often a marker of how Rwandans' view the past. Consequently, I have been unable to consider if and how participants' ethnic identity

shaped what they told me. Moreover, to preserve participant anonymity I have not included the specific jobs of policy-makers and the type of school - public or private - student-teachers taught in. This has limited analysis insofar as I have been unable to link similarities and differences between what policy-makers' said about the 2008 history curriculum with how closely they might have/have not been involved in its construction. Also, I have been unable to consider any similarities and differences in student-teachers classroom experiences in different types of schools. Potential future research is considered in chapter eight.

Chapter Summary

The methodology and methods chapter has provided an account of how I grappled with trying to gather rich data while being ethical. This tension is not unique to post-genocide and post-conflict societies. However, as the account of field work in Rwanda has demonstrated, this tension can be particularly acute when researching sensitive and/or controversial issues in societies recovering from genocide and with increasingly authoritarian governments. Overall, this chapter has related the big and small methodological decisions made prior to and during fieldwork with ethics, philosophy, research questions and practicalities. The following three analysis chapters: 'curriculum analysis', 'curriculum as discourse' and 'curriculum as actions' present and discuss the research findings.

Chapter 5 Curriculum Analysis: The 2008 O-Level History Curriculum as a case of 'Unity in Homogeneity'

Introduction

Section three of chapter three looked at history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda. This chapter focuses on the 2008 O-level history curriculum taught to all O-level pupils aged 13-16 years in Rwanda today (2015). King's (2014) brief overview of it concludes that there is "no detailed historical narrative [in the curriculum], and thus teachers are given significant responsibility and leeway" (p.135). However, by exploring the 2008 history curriculum in-depth and with reference to the accompanying history textbooks (see Table 5.2) and broader literature on history education in Rwanda, this section challenges this conclusion. It demonstrates that there is a historical narrative in the O-level history curriculum and that it is the RoG official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative.

This analysis of the 2008 history curriculum brought out three analytical themes: the curriculum as discourse, actions and outcomes. They are presented and discussed below focusing on opportunities, issues and challenges of these aspects of history curriculum reform. I conclude that the 2008 history curriculum has been identifiably reformed along 'unity in homogeneity' lines and represents a unique case of 'unity in homogeneity'. However, the curriculum analysis sheds no light on how the 2008 history curriculum is perceived by Rwandan history educationalists or how it is implemented at classroom level. This provides the mandate for the subsequent empirical analysis in chapters six and seven. It is important to note that most student-teachers I interviewed had access to the 2008 history curriculum during their school internships; however, no one spoke of having access to the accompanying history textbooks referred to below[22] (see Table 5.2). I gained access to these history textbooks after much searching.

In the final days of the second phase of data collection, a member of staff at the Department of Curricula and Pedagogical Materials in Kigali revealed there were history textbooks for the 2008 history curriculum in use in secondary schools across

[22] I did not ask participants directly about access to history textbooks.

Rwanda[23]. The extent to which history teachers and O-level history pupils have access to these textbooks is unclear. For example, a teacher-educator was unsure whether these textbooks were used in secondary schools and student-teachers indicated that they generally lacked resources in class (chapter 7). Indeed, resource issues in Rwandan history classrooms were discussed by Freedman et al (2008) and Rwandan writers Rutayisire et al (2004), Buhigiro (2012) and Gahama (2012). This is important insofar as the 2008 history curriculum on its own is potentially more open to personal interpretation than when used in conjunction with the accompanying history textbooks. This, further mandates exploring policy-makers', teacher-educators' and student-teachers' perceptions of the 2008 history curriculum (chapter 6) and how they discuss the curriculum as actions (chapter 7).

Curriculum as discourse

The section demonstrates how the RoG official discourse of 'unity in homogeneity' is identifiable in Rwandan history covered in Years 1, 2 and 3 of the 2008 O-level history curriculum (see Table 5.1., below) and history textbooks (see Table 5.2., below). This shows how the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative, as a political strategy for Rwandan national unity, has shaped the 2008 O-level history curriculum reform. It illuminates the relationship between actual history curriculum reform along 'unity in homogeneity' lines, identity, power and politics in post-genocide Rwanda. To reduce the repetition of words through-out this chapter, the 2008 O-level history curriculum is referred to as 'the curriculum' except when discussing pre and post-genocide history curricula in the same paragraph.

Curriculum structure - the primacy of Rwandan history

Table 5.1., divides the curriculum into three yearly sections - one, two and three. Each yearly section is sub-divided into parts. Every part contains two or more chapters of content to be covered and every chapter is allocated a number of class periods[24]. An analysis of Table 5.1., reveals the primacy of Rwandan history in the curriculum in terms of being allocated more class time (periods) and covering more of the expanse of the curriculum than African or World history. Thus, this signals an end to the

[23] I bought history textbooks 1 and 2 for O-level years 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 5.2., below) from the commercial MK Publishers LTD in Kigali as advised by the Rwandan Department of Curricula and Pedagogical Materials. I was given history textbook 3 for O-level years 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 5.2., below) by the Department of Curricula and Pedagogical Materials. Like the 2008 O level history curriculum, all textbooks are published in English.

[24] The curriculum does not allocate a specific amount of time per class period. However, participants often spoke of a period being approximately one hour in length.

moratorium on Rwandan history in history education since July 1994 that is disputed in the literature (see over-leaf for Table 5.1.).

Table 5-1 The 2008 Rwandan O level History Curriculum (MoE, 2008)

Section 1: Year One (General Introduction to History (4 Periods)	Section 2: Year Two	Section 3: Year Three
Part 1: History of Ancient Rwanda Chapter 1 The sources of history of Rwanda (2 periods Chapter 2 The pre-history and the population of Rwanda (3 periods) Chapter 3 Origin, formation and expansion of the Kingdom of Rwanda until C19th (8 periods) Chapter 4 The Civilisation of Ancient Rwanda (10 periods)	**Part 1 History of Africa** Chapter 1 Exploration of Africa in the C15th and its consequences (4 periods) Chapter 2 Africa in the C19th and C20th (8 periods)	**Part 1: Asia in the 2nd middle period of the C19th** Chapter 1 Japan (3 periods) Chapter 2 China (3 periods)
Part 1: Total Periods: 23	**Part 1: Total Periods: 12**	**Part 1: Total Periods: 6**
Part 2: History of Africa Chapter 1 Africa, cradle land of humanity (4 periods) Chapter 2 The Egyptian civilisation (6 periods) Chapter 3 Other major important civilisations (6 periods) Chapter 4 Africa of the C7th and C18th (12 periods)	**Part 2: History of colonial Rwanda** Chapter 1 Rwandan during German colonisation (1897-1916) (14 periods) Chapter 2 Rwanda under Belgium colonisation (1916-1962) (16 periods)	**Part 2: The World Wars and their consequences** Chapter 1 The first World War (8 periods) Chapter 2 Between two wars (6 periods) Chapter 3 The second World War (8 periods) Chapter 4 The decolonisation *(8 periods)*
Part 2: Total Periods: 28	**Part 2: Total Periods 30**	**Part 2: Total Periods: 22**
	Part 3: History of North America and Europe in C19th Chapter 1 The century of enlightenment (15 periods) Chapter 2 North America in the 2nd half of the C19th (6 periods)	**Part 3: The independent Rwanda** Chapter 1 The first Republic (1962 – 1973) (6 periods) Chapter 2 The second Republic (1973-1994) (8 periods) Chapter 3 The war of 1990-1994 and the Genocide of Tutsi (10 periods)
N/A	**Part 3: Total Periods: 21**	**Part 3: Total Periods: 24**

As demonstrated in Table 5.1., Rwandan history is given 27 more periods than African history and 16 more periods than World history in the curriculum. Moreover, unlike African and World History, Rwandan history is included in each of the three years of the curriculum. This signals the importance curriculum developers placed on Rwandan history in comparison with African and World history when designing the curriculum. The primacy of Rwandan history is significant as writers record Rwandan policy-makers and RoG official documents talking of Rwandan history returning to schools when the truth about the past had been established and guidelines on how to teach Rwandan history had been developed (Obura, 2003; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). The inclusion of Rwandan history in the curriculum and history textbooks (see Table 5.2., below) therefore signals that, from the RoG perspective, historical truth and guidelines have been established. The sub-section below identifies the 'unity in homogeneity' official history in Year 1 of the curriculum (see Table 5.1) and history textbooks (see Table 5.2.). For ease of reading, each history textbook in Table 5.2., is abbreviated in the text. For example, History Textbook 1 for Year 1 of the curriculum (see over-leaf for Table 5.2.) is abbreviated to Year 1 Book 1.

Table 5-2: History Textbooks for Each Year of the 2008 History Curriculum (Sources in Table)

History Textbooks for Year One of the 2008 History Curriculum	History Textbooks for Year Two of the 2008 History Curriculum	History Textbooks for Year Three of the 2008 History Curriculum
History Textbook 1[25]. Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (n/a) *New Junior Secondary History Book 1*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala **History Textbook 2.** Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (2010) *New Junior Secondary History Teacher's Guide Book 1*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala Uganda **History Textbook 3.** Rwandan National Curriculum and Development Centre (NCDC) (2010) *The History of Rwanda, A Participatory Approach: Teachers Guide for Secondary Schools*, published by Rwandan Ministry of Education, Kigali	**History Textbook 1.** Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (n/a) *New Junior Secondary History Book 2*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala **History Textbook 2.** Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (2013) *New Junior Secondary History Teacher's Guide Book 2 Revised Edition*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala Uganda **History Textbook 3.** Rwandan National Curriculum and Development Centre (NCDC) (2010) *The History of Rwanda, A Participatory Approach: Teachers Guide for Secondary Schools*, published by Rwandan Ministry of Education, Kigali	**History Textbook 1.** Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (2011) *New Junior Secondary History Book 3*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala **History Textbook 2.** Emmanuel Bamusananire and Dorethy Ntege (2013) *New Junior Secondary History Teacher's Guide Book 3 Revised Edition*, published by NetMedia Publishers LTD, Kampala Uganda **History Textbook 3.** Rwandan National Curriculum and Development Centre (NCDC) (2010) *The History of Rwanda, A Participatory Approach: Teachers Guide for Secondary Schools*, published by Rwandan Ministry of Education, Kigali

Pre-colonial Rwandan history, Year 1 of the 2008 history curriculum

This sub-section identifies that the language of ethnicity in the old pre-1994 genocide curriculum has been removed and replaced by the 'unity in homogeneity' language of Rwandan national identity in the new (2008) curriculum. Furthermore, there is a harmonious account of social relationships between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in pre-colonial Rwanda. This demonstrates the ways in which 'unity in homogeneity' as an official RoG narrative and political strategy for national unity has shaped Year 1 of the 2008 history curriculum reform.

[25] Some history textbooks have no date of publication.

Changes in ethnic language

With reference to Gasanabo's (2004) analysis of pre-genocide history education in Rwanda, differences between the pre-genocide history curriculum and the 2008 history curriculum are evident. The former asked pupils to define: clan, lineage, ethnicity and tribe (Gasanabo, 2004). Part 1, Year 1 of the 2008 history curriculum (see Table 5.1) asks pupils to define lineage, clan and nation without talking about ethnicity or tribe (MoE, 2008a p.11). The removal of 'ethnicity' from pre-colonial history in the 2008 history curriculum reflects the RoG's unification policy of de-ethnicising Rwanda through a non-ethnic, unified and harmonious imagining of the pre-colonial past (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Indeed, the words 'ethnic' or 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' or 'Twa' are not used in the history of pre-colonial Rwanda in the 2008 history curriculum. They appear only in the colonial and post-independence parts of the curriculum, including the 1994 Genocide, to reflect how Rwandans were divided along ethnic lines.

The above does not mirror the contested nature of the origins of ethnic identity in Rwanda (Vansina, 2004; also Newbury, 1988; King, 2014). For example, Newbury, (1988) states that in pre-colonial Rwanda "Tutsis and Hutus became political labels; 'ethnicity' was considered so significant that it became politically important, defining not only a person's social opportunities but also their relations with the authorities" (p.52). The changes between the pre-genocide history curriculum and the 2008 history curriculum - as noted above - are politically symbolic insofar as they reflect a change in regime. That is from a pre-genocide Hutu-led RoG, whose claim to power and legitimacy was based on ethnic difference, to the current Tutsi-led RoG, whose claim to power and legitimacy is based on the idea of being Rwandan and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. In short, the changes in terminology noted above indicate the RoG 'unity in homogeneity' narrative at work in history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda and thereby, history curriculum reform as an expression of RoG power.

Replacing Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities with a national identity

There is additional evidence for the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in p.p.18-19, of the curriculum (MoE, 2008), Year 1 Book 1 (Bamusananire and Ntege, n/a, p.50-53) and Year 1 Book 3 (MoE, 2010, p.53-54) dealing with the History of Ancient Rwanda. This is where the traditional occupations of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are discussed - agriculture, pastoralists and artisans - without mentioning Hutu, Tutsi or

Twa identities (see MoE, 2008, p.p.18-19). Year 1 Book 1 talks of Rwandans (not Hutu) "[c]ultivating land, [this] was the main activity of Rwandans" and of Rwandans not Tutsi "[c]attle rearing, [which] is one of the main sources of income for Rwandans" (Bamusananire and Ntege, n/a, p.50 and p.51). The economic organisation of ancient Rwanda is similarly discussed in Year 1 Book 3. Agriculture, animal production and handicrafts are spoken of as Rwandan activities in general and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa occupations (see, MoE, 2010, p.53-54). The absence of the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa might reflect the RoG's attempts to eliminate these reference terms leading authors to remove them from pre-colonial history altogether.

Positive Pre-colonial Social Relationships

Despite the contested history of the social relations between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in pre-colonial Rwanda, the curriculum is silent on the question of ethnic division and Year 1 Book's 1 and 3 depict a pre-colonial era of harmony. Year 1 Book 1 reports:

> Social relations in ancient Rwanda were very important. The Banyarwanda were keen on good relations with neighbours and relatives. These good relations were exemplified by visits; assistance when one lost a relative or was robbed; contributions towards one's marriage; marriage alliances; visiting a mother; exchanging cattle, goats, sheep, bananas, hoes, clothes, and even people – e.g. children, servants and brides (DPES, 1987 p. n.a. in Bamusananire and Ntege, n/a, p.39).

As noted above, no mention is made in the curriculum and Year 1 Book 1 (or Year 1 Book 3) of some writers' views that Hutu and Tutsi existed as ethnic and socially divisive identities in late pre-colonial times (see Newbury, 1988; also Vansina, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Hintjens, 2008). For example, Ubuhake[26] or clientism has a controversial history, but it is only listed as a term in the curriculum with a suggested activity and no mention of the contested nature of this aspect of history is made (see MoE, 2008, p.20). Ubuhake is referred to in detail in Year 1 Book 3, but it depicts Ubuhake or clientism as having been generally beneficial for both parties:

[26]Explanation of Ubuhake: Scholars note that Hutu would exchange labour and/or goods and services in return for the use of land and cattle on a leasehold basis and for the protection of their Tutsi overlords (Keane, 1995; Vassall-Adams, 1994). Not all Tutsi patrons exploited this relationship (Keane, 1995). Nonetheless, the patron-client system tied Hutu and Tutsi into a close-knit socio-economic hierarchy. However, Newbury (1988) argues that on the margins or outside the central Rwandan state many Rwandese were not involved in the patron-client or 'ubuhake' system.

> Ubuhake was based on the principle of individual liberty. One entered into it freely and went out of it freely. […] Ubuhake quite often generated special relations and sentiment of affection, faithfulness and respect between the patron and client. Finally, Ubuhake was considered as a school where clients used to learn culture and history and heroic and pastoral poems from the patron's homes during the night duty (MoE, 2010, p.55).

However, Year 1 Book 3 does acknowledge:

> But all was not roses. Ubuhake had its own inconveniences because once the patron-client contract was broken the client could be a victim of injustice and violence from the patron. If the patron could suspect that a client had hidden some cows he would seek to recover them by all means (MoE, 2010, p.55).

Notably, conflict between patron and client is acknowledged, but as existing between an undefined patron-client, not a Tutsi cattle owning patron and a Hutu client. This is a distinction made in the Hutu ethno-nationalist narrative and by some writers (Keane, 1995; Vassall-Adams, 1994). From a Hutu ethno-nationalist perspective, Hutu and Tutsi divisions pre-dated colonialism - Hutu were oppressed by Tutsi through social institutions like Ubuhake. The origins, formation and relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial times is a vast, complex and contested history (Eltringham, 2004; also Straus, 2006; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002) whereby there can "never be one definitive history of Rwanda" (Hodgkin, 2006, p.204). Yet, the afore-mentioned complexity is missing from the curriculum. Moreover, Year 1 Book 1 presents pre-colonial history in unitary terms in a post-genocide society with divisions over history and identity (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014). Similarly, Year 1 Book 3 emphasises the unity of pre-colonial Rwandans: "At the royal court, there was a military training 'itorero' composed of young men […]. What is important to note is that all Rwandan social classes participated in this 'itorero', be [they] 'Tutsi', 'Hutu' or 'Twa'. It was not a monopoly of any single social class" (NCDC, 2010, p.51).

Noticeably, Year 1 Book 1 and Book 3 seem to be promoting the official RoG 'unity in homogeneity' narrative by: depicting a united pre-colonial Rwanda (Book 1); and discussing Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as social classes not ethnic identities and presenting

these social classes as existing harmoniously in pre-colonial times (Book 3). This might be problematic because IRDP (2006) and African Rights (2001) report Rwandan history teachers claiming pupils react to Rwandan history along ethnic lines. Some Rwandan history teachers reportedly felt that an elite wanted to turn pre-colonial Rwanda into a paradise and so had difficulty making certain observations about this period (Buhigiro, 2012). A non-ethnic and harmonious presentation of relationships between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in pre-colonial times illuminates the exercise of RoG power in the curriculum. This power is exercised through controlling substantive concepts which is, in effect, an attempt to control dialogue, expression and ultimately, thought itself, along 'unity in homogeneity' lines. Below explores 'unity in homogeneity' in Year 2 of the curriculum.

Colonial Rwandan history, Year 2 of the 2008 history curriculum

'Unity in homogeneity' is evident in the depiction of an external enemy in the colonial past to achieve internal unity in post-genocide Rwanda, thereby illustrating how 'unity in homogeneity' is an official RoG narrative and political strategy for national unity shaping Year 2 of the 2008 history curriculum reform.

External Enemy, Internal Unity

Central to the official RoG 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of pre-colonial unity is its destruction by Belgium colonialists. This narrative is recounted in Year 2 Book 1 that covers Year 2 of the curriculum:

> In 1935, the Belgium colonial administration introduced a discriminatory national identification on the basis of ethnicity. […] Initially, the Rwandan identity reference was the clan first. Then, depending on their social status and their proximity to the monarchy and ruling clan, they could be identified as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. It is true to say, therefore, that the twisted views of the West on Rwanda distorted the realities and relations of the people of Rwanda. […] This false racial classification put the Tutsi in the position of being invaders in their own country and exposed them to an eventual ethnic backlash from the Hutu who were negatively classified as the aboriginal population of Rwanda (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2010, p.92).

There are two points to make about the above passage. Firstly, the importance of clans in pre-colonial Rwanda is emphasised. Some argue that the RoG's stress on clans vis-a-vis lineage and region is inconsistent with available historical records (Freedman et al., 2008). Secondly, blaming the West for the 1994 genocide ignores Vansina's

(2004) argument that the seeds of the 1994 genocide were sown in pre-colonial times. Also, Lemarchand (2006) and Straus (2006) argue that the RPF bears some responsibility for the 1994 genocide because the genocide would not have happened if the RPF had not started a civil war in the 1990s. So blaming the West is politically useful for the RoG as it absolves ordinary Rwandans and the current RPF-led RoG from responsibility for the 1994 genocide. In addition, it provides a narrative around which perpetrators and survivors can unite.

Year 2 Book 3 elaborates the negative impact colonial manipulation had on Rwandan society. It does this by explaining how the distribution of power through administrative reforms implemented by the Belgium colonialists divided Rwandans:

> However, the distribution of administrative responsibilities in the new structure was discriminatory because it excluded the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa of modest background in favour of the Tutsi from well to do families. […] The Morteham reform brought about some prejudice without prudence. Some quarters interpreted it as a Tutsi monopoly of power. This was erroneous because through this reform the traditional chiefs lost their power because they now performed their duties under the duress of being dismissed if they performed poorly (MoE, 2010, p.86).

The negative aspects of colonial rule are not disputed in the literature and the curriculum also points out positive aspects of colonial rule. The teaching/learning activities in Chapter 2, Year 2 of the curriculum (see Table 5.1), ask teachers to "discuss in groups on the politics of dividing people so that they can rule them easily showing some of the good things that were done by the colonialists but favouring some groups more than the others; this laid the basis for Genocide in Rwanda" (MoE, 2008a, p.41).The focus on positive contributions Germany and Belgium made to Rwanda demonstrates that while the colonialist policy of ethnic division is presented as the cause of genocide, the curriculum refrains from presenting Germany and Belgium as the 'other' of Rwandan national unity in Rwanda today. However, Belgium is portrayed as the 'other' of Rwandan national unity in colonial times in the curriculum. That is insofar as Belgian colonialists are identified as creating the ethnic divisions that continued into post-colonial times, which is expanded on in Year 2 Book 1:

> It is due to this background that Rwanda has had an unfair share of politics of ethnicity for quite a long period of time. The Belgian classification of the people of Rwanda made them (Rwandans) look at themselves as belonging to their different ethnic groups and not to one nation. This led to the break-up of an alliance that was as old as Rwanda's hills and history, and explains the development of ethnic conflicts and lack of true Rwandan nationalism which characterised Rwanda's politics for decades" (Bamusananire and Ntege, n/a, p.92). […] Thus from 1950 to 1994, Rwanda was ruled by the politics of ethnicity and the international community closed its eyes to this. This ethnic problem resulted in the world's worst tragedy of the 20th century, in which a million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed (Bamusananire and Ntege, n/a, p.107).

Notably, unity in pre-colonial Rwanda is depicted as "old as Rwanda's hills and history". This echoes the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative, obliterating the complexity and contested nature of pre-colonial history discussed in chapter two of this thesis. Furthermore, as previously noted, ordinary Hutu are not held accountable for continuing the politics of ethnic division in post-independent Rwanda. This suggests the RoG may fear alienating the Hutu majority population in post-genocide Rwanda. Blaming the Belgian colonialists for the 1994 genocide and casting all Rwandans as victims of colonialism might be a political strategy to unite all Rwandans - whether survivors or perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. The International NGO Penal Reform International (PRI), which contributes to modules in ingando in Rwanda, discusses the negative implications of the above for reconciliation:

> The version relayed in the ingando errs with regard to a number of aspects, either because of its interpretation or because of its omissions. In fact, it is about the role of Rwandans in their own history that the courses in the ingando appear to be most questionable. Yet it is essential nowadays that the work of memory and reconciliation is subject to the recognition of three things: recognition of Rwandan responsibility in the genocide, which is often blamed on the role of the white colonizer; recognition of the individual responsibility of the genocide, which cannot be entirely diluted within that of a monstrous machination; [and] recognition of persistent ethnic divides in present day Rwanda (PRI, 2004, p.24).

This reference illustrates in Rwanda the broader claim that simplistic images of historic national victimhood are often deployed by post-colonial governments through the history curriculum (MacMillan, 2010). That is to consolidate a post-colonial national identity and the authority, legitimacy and power of the newly formed

independent state (Ibid.). This is not to suggest that ethnic division entrenched in the Rwandan psyche by the Belgian colonial regime and continued in post-independent times by Hutu political elites does not bear a large degree of responsibility for the 1994 genocide (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). It is the lack of discussion of the responsibility of ordinary Rwandans for killing, as indicated by PRI above, and the potential role the RPF-led RoG played in the 1994 Genocide by starting a civil war in the 1990s that is considered problematic (Straus, 2006). Below explores 'unity in homogeneity' in Year 3 of the curriculum.

Post-colonial Rwandan history, Year 3 of the 2008 history curriculum

'Unity in homogeneity' is identified in Year 3 of the curriculum and is characterised in this sub-section as: The 1st and 2nd Republics: recognising Hutu suffering, emphasising Tutsi suffering; The illusion of balance and debate; Targeting blame, common victimhood and remembering and forgetting; RPF-RoG as liberator; and RoG achievements and silences. This demonstrates how 'unity in homogeneity' as the official RoG narrative and political strategy for national unity has shaped Year 3 of the curriculum.

The 1st and 2nd Republics: Recognising Hutu Suffering, Emphasising Tutsi Suffering

Chapter 1, Part 3, Year 3 of the curriculum asks teachers to get pupils to "make a comparative table of the achievements and failures of the first [Rwandan] Republic [1962-1973]" (MoE, 2008, Chapter 1, p.66). Similarly, Chapter 2, Part 3, Year 3 of the curriculum asks teachers to get pupils to make a list of "the achievements and failures of the 2nd Rwandan Republic [- 1973-1994]" (MoE, 2008a, Chapter 2, p.69). Year 3 Book 3 discusses both positive and negative aspects of the 1st and 2nd Republics. However, Year 3 Book 1 makes no mention of the positive achievements of either post-independent government: "The period of the first republic was that of stagnation and failure - a time of crisis, ineptitude and factional government, and mounting social and economic problems" (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.86). The 2nd Republic is summed up as follows:

> For years, the MRND[27] government fed the people of Rwanda with nothing but untold death and suffering. It was a period in which innocent civilians succumbed to unjustified torture. The second republican

[27] MRND: National Revolutionary Movement for Development - pre-1994 Genocide Hutu-led government.

> administration will above all, go down in the annals of Rwanda's history for having drawn up the master plan of the 1994 [Genocide] (Bamusananire and Ntege , 2011, p.96).

This questions the extent to which Hutu can relate to the curriculum if everything about the pre-1994 Hutu-led RoG is taught in negative terms in class, as in Year 3 Book 1. This one-sided view is not the whole story. Moreover, it contradicts the teaching activity in the curriculum quoted above. Also, in field notes I note that in conversation with me a Rwandan educationalist stated that history teachers should not teach only the bad aspects of 1st and 2nd Republics, but also the good aspects and vice-versa. Hutu suffering is mentioned during the 1st and 2nd Republics in Year 3 Book 1 and the curriculum makes specific mention, as learning content, of the extermination of Hutu who opposed the genocide ideology in 1994 (see MoE, 2008a, p.71). However, Year 3 Book 1 almost eulogises Tutsi suffering under the 1st and 2nd Hutu-led Republics:

> Again and again, the [Tutsi] refugees in the diaspora appealed to the Habyarimana regime to allow them [to] return to their motherland, Rwanda. But time and again, he said that Rwanda was like a glass full of water. The refugees wondered as they wandered whether they would ever have a chance of returning home - a home that now seemed very strange indeed. To them, Rwanda was becoming a place that was remote and vague in their memories. Their return home [.] [became] for them a physical agony devoid of promise. Despite their horrible experiences those in the diaspora did not lose courage in the slightest. They always believed that Rwanda would eventually return to sanity and that they would then be able to go back home (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.91).

The eulogising of Tutsi suffering and the uplifting narrative of perseverance above recalls critiques of the official RoG narrative glorifying Tutsi suffering, while ignoring Hutu suffering (King, 2014). In 2006 Hutu are recorded in interviews with King (2014) arguing that Hutu were targeted by the RPF during the RPF invasion in 1994 in the context of the 2nd Republic and subsequent genocide. The title of the relevant section in the curriculum is 'The War of 1990-1994 and The Genocide of Tutsi'. This ignores how Hutu moderates were also targeted by the genocidaires, though, as noted above, it is mentioned in curriculum content. Moreover, no mention is made in the curriculum of allegations of RPF crimes against Hutu in 1994 (see the

Gersony Report in Des Forges, 1999, p.17). Perhaps this helps to explain Druez's (2012) finding that young Rwandans express disappointment with a history that they view as abstract, partial and flawed (p.200). Writers talk of how the term 'Tutsi Genocide' over 'Rwandan Genocide' implicitly creates a sense of collective guilt amongst the Hutu population (Waldorf, 2011). This suggests how guilt might be used as a tool to achieve broad acceptance of the RoG official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of the post-genocide nation.

The illusion of balance and debate

Year 3, Part 3, Chapter 1 of the curriculum dealing with the 1st Republic requires teachers: "Through exchange of ideas with learners define regionalism and ethnicism and show how they were conducted up to Genocide" (MoE, 2008a, Chapter 1, p.65). Chapter 2, dealing with the 2nd Republic, similarly requires teachers to: "Organise a debate on the policy of ethnic and regional balance and criticise with learners to show that the base of policy was erroneous with incompetence and it led to failure" (MoE, 2008a, Chapter 2, p.68-69). While both activities suggest exchanging ideas and/or debate, Chapter 2 directs teachers and pupils to pre-determined conclusions. Concluding that ethnic and regional discrimination during the 1st and 2nd Republics was bad is not an unfair assessment. However, leading pupils to pre-determined conclusions, however fair-minded, echoes King's (2014) view that critical thinking in history education in Rwanda is rhetorical; real critical thinking is subservient to an official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative that cannot be challenged in public.

At the centre of this tension between drawing predefined lessons from the past and allowing debate is the view in the curriculum and history textbooks, of the function of history to help pupils to learn from the past, to understand the present and to prepare for a better future (MoE, 2008, p.7; also MoE, 2010, p.6; Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.1). This reflects the argument that if we do not learn from the past, we are often prone to repeat it (Giroux, 1988). However, directing pupils to arrive at the same conclusions about the past to achieve a better future risks history teachers preaching (Haydn, 2000). This contradicts the learner-centered and critical thinking pedagogy stipulated in the curriculum and discussed below (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, I recorded in field-notes a Rwandan educationalist stating the history of the 1st and 2nd Republics is to be taught using evidence and not through rote learning. The question arising in Rwanda is the extent to which teachers and pupils feel they can critically engage with the evidence, which is different from denying the reality of ethnic and regional discrimination in the 1st and 2nd Republics. Scholars suggest that in the context of the genocide ideology and divisionism laws, history teachers cannot critically engage with the official history (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; also Freedman et al., 2004; King, 2014; Weldon, 2009). This barrier might distort pupils' capacity to access evidence on its own merits and to evaluate which version of events is more likely. That is the official version taught in school or the unofficial history taught at home, which, in Rwanda can conflict.

Moreover, the past is complicated as Rwandan society is divided about it (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). This then questions whose history the curriculum represents and whether a single view of history can help new generations of Rwandans achieve the better future the curriculum was designed to help bring about. As one educationalist in Rwanda wondered in an impromptu discussion recorded in field notes, how can you promote peace through history if people are divided about that history?

Targeting Blame, Common Victimhood and Remembering and Forgetting

In Year 3, Part 3, Chapter 2 of the curriculum and Year 3 Book's 1 and 3 a direct link between the post-independent policies of ethnic and regional exclusion and the 1994 genocide are made. This connection is made only once and in relation to the 2nd Republic in Year 3 Book 3:

> The system saw Tutsi children excluded from Secondary and Tertiary education. This policy also tended to discriminate against the Hutu from the South […]. […] [R]eserving the best and numerous positions in all fields to the Hutu from the North […]. This policy was in fact applied in all sectors of National life and it constituted a serious violation of human rights. It went a long way into preparing for the culmination into genocide in 1994 (MoE, 2010, p.134).

However, Year 3 Book 1 makes stronger connections between the 1st and 2nd Republics and the 1994 genocide. For example:

> A small number of educated Rwandans were able to plan and perpetuate Tutsi genocide by exploiting the ignorance of the uneducated masses. As it was, Rwandans were told many very nasty lies by the hate radios and hate newspapers which were controlled by the 'genocidaires', as the perpetrators and planners of the Tutsi genocide were know. There was nothing to counter these lies. Habyarimana's ideology of ethnic hatred was epitomised in the 6th issue of the Kangura newspaper/magazine of October 2010, 1990 which was sponsored by high-ranking government officials (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.90).

As noted previously, above, a Hutu elite are held accountable for the 1994 genocide, while ordinary Rwandans are cast as hapless victims of government lies. Moreover, underlying the violence against the Tutsi in the 1st Republic was colonialism in Year 3 Book 1:

> Meanwhile the elimination of the Tutsi continued and Batutsi refugees left Rwanda in three different waves: 1959-1961, 1963-1964, and 1974. During the years 1968-1972, many Tutsi students were murdered in cold blood […]. […] Underlying these waves of political murders was the belief in the earlier colonial teaching that the Hutu and Tutsi were different races and the Hutu were justified in eliminating the Tutsi. Many Hutu fell victim to this great lie and treated it as a Biblical truth (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.84).

Emerging from the above quotation is a narrative that the violence against the Tutsi was caused by colonialist teaching and a Hutu political elite, not individual Rwandans. The "responsibilisation" of the pre-genocide Rwandan state and the "de-responsilisation" and submissiveness of the Rwandan people (see Muhimpundu, 2002, p.154-155), obfuscates the role of what Straus (2006) called (1) "wartime uncertainty and fear", (2) "social pressure" and (3) "opportunity" (p.10) in motivating individuals to kill in 1994. Focusing blame for the 1994 genocide on colonialists no longer alive and Hutu-led governments that no longer exist, provides the Tutsi-led RoG with a politically convenient narrative of the 1994 genocide. That is, as it exculpates ordinary Hutu Rwandans from personal responsibility and the RPF-led government (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). This obfuscates the complex issues of how and why genocide began, the broad alignment of social forces, deep social and political cleavages and diverse forms of social mobilisation.

Those who killed in 1994 have been and continue to be punished for committing murder through prison sentences. However, the potential of a narrative to unite Rwandans that seems to exculpate individuals from personal responsibility, as they too are cast as victims of pre-genocide government lies, is debatable. Eltringham (2011) notes that ordinary Rwandans do tend to blame the 1994 genocide on the Hutu political elite. However, in 2003 a civil society activist explained to Buckley-Zistel (2009a) that: "If a survivor is told that someone killed their husband they know that it was a Hutu and not just a Rwandan"[28] (p.48). Ethnic identity is tied into the memory of who killed who in the 1994 genocide and perhaps means more to ordinary Rwandans than ever before. By ignoring the issue of individual and RPF responsibility in the curriculum, the RoG is practising nationally in the curriculum, what Buckley-Zistel (2006) recorded as 'chosen amnesia' in operation at the local level in Rwanda. Buckley-Zistel (2006) reports that "while the event of the genocide was constantly evoked by my interviewees, the causes of the genocide and the decades of tension between Hutu and Tutsi were ignored" (p.131). Emerging here is how the politics of remembering and forgetting in post-genocide Rwanda has shaped history curriculum reform. That is directing it towards the politically and emotionally safer territory of 'unity in homogeneity' (see Vandeginste, 2014).

In this sense, the curriculum highlights the conflict between using the past to promote a united nation in the aftermath of genocide and acknowledging negative, complex and contested aspects of history (Cole, 2007). In July 1994, the newly formed RoG faced a criminal population of genocidaires. So perhaps avoiding individual responsibility has been deemed necessary to manage a post-genocide society where victims and perpetrators have to find a way to live together, and work together to rebuild society (Weldon, 2009). However, arguably, only by looking at the complex reasons behind the 1994 genocide can new generations understand why the genocide happened, acknowledge that it could happen again and recognise the danger signs for prevention (see Bauer, 1978; Shriver, 2005). The act of remembering "is premised on the aspiration that [we] can gain a brutally harsh knowledge of [our] capabilities and tendencies [.] [A] self-knowledge that is a necessary condition for the prevention of the actualisation of [our] worst possibilities" (Magurshak, 1989, p. 430).

[28]Interview with civil society activist, Kigali, April 2nd, 2003.

Nonetheless, such self-knowledge risks dividing Rwandans by emphasising the role ordinary Hutu and arguably the RPF played in the 1994 genocide. Moreover, looking at the 1994 genocide through multiple perspectives could result in a loss of moral clarity about the genocide. Dierkes (2007) argues that this has occurred in modern Germany (chapter 3). So using the past to understand the present and to prepare a better future in a post-genocide context is a complex issue. There is a paradox here; history was used selectively to promote conflict in pre-genocide Rwanda and is being used selectively to promote national unity and peace in post-genocide Rwanda. A better future is a political ambition demanding a certain version of Rwandan history that responds to deeper existential questions about 'who we are' and 'who we will be' as a nation (Burn, 2014). Overall, the burden on the curriculum to unite Rwandans in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide has required decisions to be made about what to remember and what to forget with implications for academic rigour. This brings to the fore whether the sacrificing academic of rigour for a single narrative account of the 1994 genocide can help pupils avoid violence in the future and achieve national unity.

RPF-RoG as Liberator

Casting all Rwandans as victims, as noted above, is politically useful as it enables the current RPF-led RoG to depict itself as the liberator of not just the Tutsi population in 1994, but all Rwandans. While the civil war in the 1990s between the RPF and the 2nd Republic is referred to in a nonpartisan way in Chapter 3, Part 3, Year 3 of the curriculum, "The War of 1990-1994…." (MoE, 2008a, p.70), in Year 3 Book 1 it is called "The 1990-1994 Liberation War…." (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.97) as in Year 3 Book 3 (MoE, 2010, p.139). The word *liberation* begs the question of liberation of whom and from whom? The textbooks make clear that liberation was from a tyrannical 2nd Republic and liberation was for the benefit of all Rwandans. This is clearly a Tutsi-led RPF view. An estimated 350,000 - 600,000 or ten per cent of the Hutu population[29] heard and responded to calls to exterminate the Tutsi in 1994 (Straus, 2006; also Prunier, 1995; Taylor, 1999). These Hutu and their families probably did not see the RPF as a liberator, but as the enemy. This highlights the partisan nature of the official narrative and the reality of multiple histories in Rwandan society at large not evident in the curriculum (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). However, RPF victory in 1994 as liberation for all Rwandans strategically obviates

[29] The highest estimates put the number of the Hutu population who actively participated in the genocide at ten per cent or 350,000 - 600,000 people (see Eltringham, 2004, p.64).

the potential humiliation Hutu might have felt. That is if the RPF victory over the 2nd Republic Hutu-led regime in 1994 was cast as a Tutsi victory over the Hutu in the curriculum. This would have continued what Weldon (2009) identified as a conflict narrative in operation in pre-1994 history curricula by reversing curriculum depictions of Hutu victory over Tutsi in the 1959 Hutu revolution with Tutsi victory over Hutu in 1994.

RoG Achievements and Silences

In contrast to the chapters of the curriculum dealing with post-independent Hutu-led governments, the final chapter addressing post-genocide Rwanda does not require teachers and pupils to consider the positive and negative aspects of the post-genocide RoG, only the successes. For example, curriculum content is "Efforts of the Government of National Unity" and content headings include: "The Unity and Reconciliation; and The Economic, Political and Socio-Cultural Realisations (Successes)" (MoE, 2008a, p.72). A teaching/learning activity suggested in the history curriculum is: "The teacher will help learners to make groups and discuss efforts of the Government of National Unity" (MoE, 2008a, p.73). Such discussions might be intended to involve critical debate of RoG efforts, but this is not made explicit, as it was in relation to the 1st and 2nd Republics (see above).

Pages 147-154 of Year 3 Book 3 reads as a list of RoG achievements, with no discussion of government failings (MoE, 2010). This partiality is stark in Year 3 Book 1, which devotes ten pages to enunciating the achievements of the RPF-led RoG: "Today, under the dynamic leadership of the RPF, Rwanda has miraculously recovered from the trauma of genocide and has gained high economic performance" (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.134). Clearly, Rwanda is still recovering from the trauma of genocide and will do for years to come (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Nevertheless, as claimed in Year 3 Book 1 above, Rwanda has achieved remarkable economic development since 1994 (Smith, 2nd April 2014). Important advances in health and educational provision and gender equality since July 1994 have also been made by the RoG (Reyntjens, 2004). Year 3 Book 1 continues:

> Under the dynamic leadership of the government of national unity, the entire world is witnessing the unfolding of a very strong democratisation process in Rwanda, with the Rwandans clearly taking charge of their own

> destiny, under the clear ideology of empowering the people and allowing them to exercise their full sovereignty. […] The Government of National Unity has registered a number of achievements that had eluded the governments before 1994. They, among others, include: regular elections of leaders at all levels; freedom of speech, expression, press, promotion of marginalised groups and independence of the Judiciary, Parliament and the Executive (Bamusananire and Ntege, 2011, p.134).

Yet, claims of democracy, freedom of speech, inclusion and decentralization in Year 3 Book 1 contrast with claims in the literature of power in the hands of a few urban elite English speaking Tutsi returnees and the Tutsi-led RPF (Mamdani, 2002; Freedman et al., 2008). They also contrast with reports of a grassroots reality of RoG authoritarian control where opposing viewpoints are excluded from political debate and often demonised as genocide ideology (Gready, 2011; also Longman, 2011; Waldorf, 2011); and top-down and coercive high-modernity plans for rural Rwanda and rural realities (see Ansoms, 2011; Newbury, 2011). None of this invalidates the achievements of the RoG, but highlights the partial and contested nature of focusing on achievements in the curriculum and textbooks. This false positive narrative is indicative of insecurity on the part of the Tutsi-led RoG in the context of a Hutu majority population in post-genocide Rwanda.

The above exemplifies in the curriculum, my assertion in chapter two of the thesis that President Kagame (2014) emphasises the successes of post-genocide Rwanda, while much of the fragility of peace is ignored. In Year 3 Book 3, a learning objective is "Showing the achievements of the Government of National Unity" (MoE, 2010, p.139). A methodological note states: "The teacher gives students homework to list down all the achievements of the Government of National Unity" (MoE, 2010, p.139). If what pupils are learning about RoG achievements does not reflect their lived realities and the contested nature of RoG achievements, how can they reconcile the two? For example, researchers found feelings of exclusion and alienation from the RoG amongst subsistence farmers (see Ansoms, 2011; also Ingelaere, 2011; Huggins, 2011; and Thomson, 2011), prisoners from a Hutu background (see Tertsakian, 2011), Tutsi genocide survivors (see Rettig, 2011) and young people (see Pells, 2011; McLean-Hilker, 2011). So a partisan listing of RoG achievements might lead to feelings of exclusion from the official narrative. This is a sentiment King (2014) records interviewees expressing in relation to the official narrative ignoring Hutu

suffering at the hands of the Tutsi-led RPF in 1994. This highlights the point that history is not seen in the same way by all Rwandans, and the curriculum does not reflect this diversity of viewpoints. Rather it emphasises instead, the relationship between the curriculum and RoG power. Stober (2013) writes:

> When the groups have been subject to oppression by the majority and where recognition was the result of a struggle which involved a high cost. A common curriculum and common textbooks, […] might be unacceptable to them and even a reason for further strife (Stober, 2013, p.42).

The Tutsi were oppressed by Hutu-led governments during the 1st and 2nd Republics. Perhaps a history curriculum of multiple-perspectives is unacceptable to the Tutsi-led RoG because recognition came at such a high cost, namely civil war and the 1994 genocide. This might explain the focus on Tutsi suffering in Year 3 Book 1, noted above and the silence in the curriculum and textbooks on alleged RPF crimes against the Hutu population in 1994. All this reflects the broader point of what is remembered and forgotten in the history curriculum in post-genocide and post-conflict societies is often subject to a politics of memory. This shapes the national narrative of the past, and, in turn, history curricula reform, which brings to the fore silences in the 2008 history curriculum. For example, silence about the individual responsibility of ordinary Hutu who killed in 1994 (Straus, 2006), alleged RPF crimes against the Hutu population in 1994 (see the Gersony Report in Des Forges, 1999, p.17), and negative aspects of post-genocide RoG policies and practices (Reyntjens, 2004; Hintjens, 2008; Pells, 2011; King, 2014).

Overall, evidence suggests that Rwandans believe that history is a tool of political elites (Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004). So remembering the past selectively might sow the seeds of "antagonisms and resentments in the present that can grow into possible retaliation and violence in the future" (Hintjens, 2008, p.25; Des Forges, 1999). Harland and Kinder (1997) argue curriculum change becomes possible only "when policy intentions and teachers' beliefs about good practice or values coincide" (Weldon, 2009, p.280). The curriculum analysis above cannot indicate the extent to which the beliefs and values of those charged with delivering the 2008 history curriculum coincide with the single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008

history curriculum and/or if and how this shapes teachers' delivery of the curriculum. Nor does it indicate how far the curriculum responds to the different wants, needs, beliefs and values of pupils and/or whether the curriculum conflicts with non-school influences on pupils historical thinking, for example the family (see IRDP, 2006). These issues are addressed in chapters six and seven. The next section moves from 'curriculum as discourse' to 'curriculum as actions' focusing on pedagogy in the 2008 history curriculum and in the history textbook teacher guides in Table 5.2.

Curriculum as actions

A learner-centered pedagogy in history education in post-conflict contexts is often imbued with extrinsic expectations. For example, developing mutual-understanding, empathy, tolerance, democratic citizenship and an ability to question assumptions and to disagree without resorting to violence, amongst students (see Cole, 2007; also Weldon, 2009; Sexias and Peck, 2004). The Teachers' Guide Books 1, 2 and 3 that accompany the New Junior Secondary History Textbooks 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 5.2) all discuss a participatory approach to teaching and learning. It is described as the "modern learner-centered approach" (Bamusasanire and Ntege, 2010, Teachers Guide Book 1, p.4). The 2010 Rwandan Ministry of Education teacher guide for secondary schools is entitled: 'The History of Rwanda - A Participatory Approach: Teachers Guide for Secondary Schools' indicating the preferred participatory pedagogy (see Table 5.2). Similarly, the curriculum stipulates a learner-centered methodology involving critical thinking:

> The History Program will involve much Active Participation of learners in the teaching and learning process. […] In the process of teaching, the teacher will develop into his learners the spirit of critical thinking and to arouse learners' need for continuous perfection. The approach to be used in history teaching is to consider the teacher as a co-ordinator, organiser, experienced adviser and a guide when learners are the first actors of pedagogic, that is to say, principal agents in the process of teaching-learning. To conclude, close collaboration should be established between the learners and the teacher since history is not an evangelical speech. The student is capable of making some comments and criticism on a given historical event (MoE, 2008, p.73).

The above describes a very different relationship between history teachers and pupils from that in the pre-1994 history classroom, when rote learning, as part of a banking approach to history teaching and learning, dominated (Rutayisire et al., 2004). History

teachers performed as the 'knower' and pupils were 'empty vessels' to be filled with the right knowledge. The teacher could not be questioned and history was essentially a set of facts to be acquired and repeated in exams (Rutayisire et al., 2004). Writers and the RoG view this way of teaching as having helped to indoctrinate pupils into a Hutu ethno-nationalist ideology, which contributed to making genocide possible in 1994 (Rutayisire et al., 2004). To avoid this type of indoctrination happening again and with such devastating consequences, the RoG has included a learner-centered pedagogy in history education (Freedman, 2009). The new relationship that should characterise history teachers' and pupils' interactions is defined in the curriculum above as one of collaboration, where the teacher is a guide. The role of the history teacher has thus changed in post-genocide Rwanda; what is not evident here is how this is working out and why (see chapter 7).

In a learner-centered context, writers talk of students questioning, debating and dissenting; and, of critical thinking, enquiry, interpretation and dialogue (Educational Initiative Centre (EIC)[30], 2004). Similarly, the curriculum advocates critical thinking and stipulates that history is not to be an evangelical speech:

> In the process of teaching, the teacher will develop into his learners the spirit of critical thinking and to arouse learners' need for continuous perfection. […] [H]istory is not an evangelical speech. The student is capable of making some comments and critics on a given historical event (MoE, 2008a, p.73).

In the literature, critical thinking is identified as hinging "on our ability to enter into dialogue [with other viewpoints] and to question our own underlying assumptions" (Brown, 2013, p.44). This requires being open-minded, thinking for oneself and changing one's point of view in line with experience or evidence (Brown, 2013; also Brookfield, 1987; Paul, 1990). Critical thinking embodies 'thinking eachother's histories'[31] (Weldon, 2009) or border crossing (Giroux, 1991, 1997) into the alien territory of inclusive or multiple narratives (FHAO, 2013). 'Thinking each-other's

[30] Educational Initiative Centre, University of Westminster.

[31] 'Thinking each-others histories' was a phrase that was used by Edward Said at the Saamtrek Values in Education conference in Cape Town, South Africa in 2001 and later referenced by Weldon (2009, p.248).

histories' is considered important because it is believed to help guard against the dominion of one narrative to the exclusion of others (Weldon, 2009). In this way it can promote mutual-understanding in post-genocide and post-conflict societies (Weldon, 2009). In Rwanda, one official narrative of Rwandan history is tolerated by the RoG and it is presented as the truth (King, 2014). This narrative closure suppresses multiple-perspectives. Furthermore, the narrative closure inherent in a single true history negates the need to engage seriously with multiple-perspectives because, by definition, they are not true (King, 2014). This does little to help students "question deeply [.] [their] own framework of thought" whether personal (egocentric) and/or socio-cultural (ethnocentric) or enable them to engage with the boundaries between themselves and the 'other' (Paul, 1990, p.110). Rather, narrative closure contradicts the learner-centered approach the curriculum stipulates.

Finally, accompanying a learner-centered approach is often a view of historical knowledge as "constructed - and therefore contingent, contested and provisional" (Rogers and Horrocks, 2010, p.128). Herein lays a crucial aspect of historiography - interpretation (Carr, 2001; also MacMillan, 2010; Southgate, 2000, 2005). In the learner-centered classroom, historical learning should be a process of interpretation, not acquisition (EIC, 2004). This implies the constructivist approach to historical knowledge the curriculum alludes to in stating history is not to be taught as an evangelical speech. However, a constructivist approach to knowledge conflicts with narrative closure, which characterises the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative identified in the curriculum and history textbooks above.

Overall, governments have to decide whether "the goal of history instruction is to promote critical thought and reflection on texts - that is to engage in analytical history - [or] to inculcate collective memory in state approved civic truth" (Wertsch, 2002, p.71). Both are goals of the curriculum (see 'curriculum as outcomes' below). Therefore, at the heart of history curriculum reform in post-genocide is a conflict between a learner-centered pedagogy and the idea of a single and true 'unity in homogeneity' narrative. O-level history education in Rwanda swings between encouraging history teachers to promote 'unity in homogeneity' through a single story of an ideal community while developing ideal citizens - critical thinkers (see 'curriculum objectives' below) and this is discussed further in chapter seven. The

evidence suggests that history teaching remains largely teacher-centered in Rwanda with little critical thinking (Walker-Keleher, 2006; Druez, 2012), as expected from a single and 'true' account of the past. Nonetheless, Buhigiro (2012) also found some student history teachers used the Socratic Method. This suggests that narrative closure has not led to a total absence of critical thinking in student-teachers' classroom practice (see chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of student-teachers' classroom practice). Below, focuses on 'curriculum as outcomes' or the objectives of the 2008 O-level history curriculum.

Curriculum as outcomes

Governments cannot legislate their way to peace as an outcome in a post-genocide and post-conflict society (Bilant, 2001). Minow (1998) and Cole (2007) argue that the idea of peace, often articulated in peace agreements, needs to penetrate beyond the level of the political elite and become grounded in the lives of ordinary people if it is to become a living reality. In the education, conflict, peace and reconciliation literature, education is seen as a tool to help to bridge the gap between policy aspirations and ordinary citizens (Cole, 2007; Minow, 1998). How far education can achieve positive change for peace in the lives of ordinary citizens is open to debate. Outcomes will differ at different times in different post-genocide and post-conflict contexts depending on a range of factors. These include the nature of the conflict, political settlement and regime in power (Weldon, 2009). Furthermore, socio-economic realities, the quality of teacher-training and access to teaching and learning resources are also factors (Ibid.). However, the idea that education can make a positive difference for peace has been taken to heart by the post-genocide RoG. The Rwandan Education Sector Strategic Plan 2006 - 2010 discusses education in general as an important medium for addressing the issues of peace and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda (see MoE, 2006, p.19).

It is argued that history education has the potential to contribute to peace-building after genocide and conflict (see McCully, 2009, 2012; also Buckland, 2005; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Cole and Barsalou, 2006; Cole, 2007; Weldon, 2009). Correspondingly, post-genocide and post-conflict governments often imbue Humanities curriculum reform and specifically history and civics (citizenship) curriculum reform with special peace aims. For example, the Curriculum 2005 in

South Africa (Weldon, 2009) aims to develop citizens who reject the culture of apartheid and to promote social cohesion. The civics curriculum in post-conflict Lebanon aims to develop citizens who reject sectarianism and promote national unity (Frayha, 2004). Similarly, the RoG has concluded that school history education can make a positive difference to post-genocide Rwandan society. The Rwandan Education Sector Strategic Plan 2006 - 2010 discusses how the normative values of peace, harmony and reconciliation will infuse a revision of school history (MoE, 2006, p.19). This policy-level aspiration is evident in the 2008 O-level history curriculum. The curriculum stipulates four general objectives to develop pupils who can: a) work with a critical spirit; b) have knowledge of diverse human experiences; c) live without ethnic and religious distinctions or other forms of discrimination and exclusion, which led to the 1994 Genocide of the Tutsi; d) and promote the Culture of Peace, tolerance, reconciliation and love of the homeland (MoE, 2008a, p.6). These objectives are discussed in turn below, beginning with objective d.

Objective d (above) is premised on the idea that a closed 'unity in homogeneity' narrative devoid of ethnic identity and subject to narrative control (through the genocide ideology and divisionism laws) can achieve peace, which is widely challenged (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014). For example, Buckley-Zistel (2009a) argues that narrating the Rwandan nation as founded on ethnic harmony is unlikely to lead to national unity. That is because it is top-down, exclusive of alternative narratives and the scars of the genocide persist (Ibid.). Cole (2007) identified a trend in post-genocide and post-conflict contexts of moving away from the top-down transmission of one-sided historical narratives. Rather towards inclusive and/or multiple-perspectives of the past and a learner-centered approach of critical thinking, interpretation, enquiry and dialogue when peace is a desired outcome (Cole, 2007; also Cole and Murphy, 2009; Cole and Barsalou, 2006; Freedman et al., 2008; McCully, 2009; Stober, 2013).

While the 2008 history curriculum stipulates a learner-centered approach to teaching and learning and critical thinking, this has not been complemented with a multiple-perspectives approach. Rather, the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative aims to achieve peace through a single and homogenising identity narrative of 'we are all Rwandans'. So the old ethnic 'other' of pre-genocide Rwanda no longer officially exists. The

'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches above are yet to be conclusively proven to result in reconciliation by empirical data (Lassig, 2013). However, the prevailing view of scholars is history curriculum reform of multiple-perspectives has greater potential than 'unity in homogeneity' to contribute to post-genocide and post conflict peace and reconciliation (Weldon, 2009; see chapter 3, section 2).

Consequently, the capacity of the 2008 history curriculum and textbooks to achieve objective d - develop pupils who can promote a Culture of Peace, reconciliation, tolerance and love of the homeland, is questionable. "If it is admitted that [Rwandan] history - however painful it may have been - always provides lessons for the future, then in-depth thought about its content must not be omitted" (PNI, 2004, p.23). Nevertheless, Druez (2012) tentatively suggests that a master narrative might be working to shape the new generations' sense of history and identity along de-ethnicised lines. This finding tentatively challenges the view that 'unity in homogeneity' does not work as a vector for promoting unity, peace and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda amongst new generations of Rwandans (King, 2014; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Where core values are promoted in curricula as part of broader socio-political change, as is often the case in post-genocide/conflict societies, the issue of indoctrination needs careful attention (Brown, 2013). Peace can be a form of indoctrination, "where the learner is manipulated to thinking in a particular way" about the violent past (Brown, 2013, p.48). Related here are the afore-mentioned silences of the curriculum and history textbooks. These include the personal responsibility of ordinary Hutu for the 1994 killings, the alleged crimes committed by the RPF in 1994, and negative aspects of RoG policies in post-genocide Rwanda. Moreover, "what right do adult educators have to tamper with the worldview […] of the learner" anyway (Merriam and Caffarella, 1999, p.337)? A planned outcome like a Culture of Peace, reconciliation, tolerance and love of the homeland, requires "the learner to share the convictions of the educator's own view of social reality [which] would be tantamount to indoctrination" (Mezirow, 1995, p.59). What is critical thinking if not "dominance-free forms of human interaction" (Hart, 1990, p.136).

The above suggests a potential clash between the peace aims of objective d) and objective a), critical thinking. There is a tension between promoting through the curriculum the values Rwandan policy-makers feel are important for pupils and society as a whole, which Druez (2012) reports do seem open to questioning, and critical thinking. Specifically, the freedom that is implicit in critical thinking to reject what one it taught. Moreover, the question of teacher biography arises with a curriculum that requires teachers to deliver on policy aims of peace when history teachers have likely been affected directly or indirectly by the hate and violence of the 1994 genocide (Weldon, 2009).

Finally, there are tensions between the individual objectives of the curriculum. Objectives a (critical spirit) and b (knowledge of human diversity) are in conflict with a single homogenising narrative of being Rwandan in the curriculum and history textbooks (see above). This is because singular accounts of the past give students only one side of a story and leave little room for debate, dissent and alternative perspectives. Furthermore, achieving objective b would involve critically examining all RoG policy impacts on the lives of ordinary Rwandans, not just the effects of RoG achievements. The listing of achievements limits the options available for public discourse and suppresses the complexities of the past, present and future vis-a-vis government policies. Objective c (to live without ethnic and religious distinctions) is in tension with objective d, to develop pupils who can promote: "the Culture of Peace, tolerance, reconciliation and love of the homeland" (MoE, 2008a, p.6). By trying to eliminate ethnic difference by removing the language of ethnic identity from parts of the 2008 history curriculum, the RoG has removed the language of difference and division that is a pre-requisite for the language of reconciliation. If ethnic differences and divisions don't officially exist, then one must ask reconciliation of what and for what? While ethnic distinction is viewed by the RoG as a threat to peace and hence is suppressed through a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative, acknowledging ethnic difference and division is arguably a pre-condition for reconciliation.

Objective c is to develop pupils who can "live without ethnic and religious distinctions or other forms of discrimination and exclusion, which led to the 1994 Genocide of the Tutsi" (MoE, 2008a, p.6). This echoes broader objectives for the new education system and the planning of a new curriculum in post-genocide 1994

Rwanda. That is "correcting the errors of the past" and developing "people free of ethnic, regional, national and religious prejudices, conscious of human rights and responsibilities" (MoE, 1994, p.25)[32]. Unlike this broad aim, objective c conflates ethnic and religious distinction with the ethnic discrimination and exclusion that led to genocide in 1994. Conflating ethnic distinction with ethnic discrimination and genocide is at the heart of the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative because it characterises ethnicity as the 'other' of Rwandan national unity. The conflation puts objective c in tension with objectives a and b. That is because critical thinking (a) and having an understanding of diverse human experiences (b) can involve understanding why and how ethnic identity means different things to different Rwandans. Furthermore, fulfilling objective b - knowledge of diverse human experiences - would involve an examination of the different views of ethnic identity that exist in Rwanda, which the 2008 history curriculum does not do.

Chapter Summary

Post-genocide Rwanda faced the questions of what to do with the knowledge of the violent and contested past, and how to relate it to new generations (Weldon, 2009). The curriculum analysis above shows the choices made by the RoG. What is remembered and forgotten in the 2008 history curriculum and history textbooks illustrates how history curriculum reform has been shaped by a single and official vision of national unity; a vision based on a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of being Rwandan and not being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. 'Unity in homogeneity' is both an approach to the interpretation of Rwandan history and a political strategy to achieve national unity through a single closed and controlled narrative of Rwandan history. Official RoG discourse narrates present-day national unity through a pre-colonial history of nationhood, unity and harmony between Hutu and Tutsi. Harmony that was disturbed by the colonial experience resulting in the creation of artificial ethnic divisions, that led to genocide in 1994 (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). The language used in the curriculum and history textbooks reflect this.

Chapter three established that the history curriculum in post-genocide Rwanda has been reformed along 'unity in homogeneity' lines. Together chapter three and this

[32] Ministry of Education (1994) quoted in Obura (2003, p.66): Also: Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research (2003) *National Curriculum Development Centre 6 Year Plan: 2003 to 2008*, Kigali: NCDC

chapter uncover the 2008 O-level history curriculum as a unique case as 'unity in homogeneity'. The 'other' of national unity is not directed at a group of people, but the idea of ethnic identity, creating a de-facto 'other' of those for whom ethnic identity is important. In history curriculum reform in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina and post-conflict Estonia and Ukraine the 'other' is a defined group of people (see chapter 3, section 2). Finally, 'unity in homogeneity' is implemented in a post-genocide context, where the children of survivors and perpetrators learn in the history classroom side by side. This is largely not the case in post-genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina and post-conflict Estonia and Ukraine where the ethnic 'other' is often schooled separately (see chapter 3, section's 1 and 2).

This chapter has highlighted tensions within the curriculum and textbooks which mirror issues and challenges highlighted by research into history education in Rwanda more broadly (King, 2014; also Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman, 2009). Firstly, 'unity in homogeneity' as a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform is problematic. This is because while Rwanda has one past, it has multiple histories (Eltringham, 2004) and evidence suggests that at least some Rwandans tend to interpret history along ethnic lines (King, 2014). Secondly, and following the first point, casting all Rwandans as victims of lies taught by the 1st and 2nd Republics ignores: the question of RPF responsibility for a civil war that culminated in genocide; and individual Hutu responsibility for the killing in 1994. It also fails to address the traumatic memories of survivors. That is memories of individual Hutu friends, neighbours and family members who killed in 1994, not Rwandans who were simply victims of government lies (King, 2014; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Thirdly, central to the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the curriculum is the false conflation of ethnic difference with ethnic division and genocide. The notion of the 'other' is an inherent part of ethnic and national identity formation. So the existence of an 'other' does not necessarily lead to contention or conflict between separate groups. It is when the 'other' is vilified, like the Tutsi by the Hutu power elites before the Rwandan genocide that conflict might occur. In the aftermath of genocide and conflict, acknowledging the 'other' rather than suppressing the idea of the 'other'

through ‘unity in homogeneity’ can be a strategy for reconciliation (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; McLean-Hilker, 2010).

Finally, the officially true, closed and controlled ‘unity in homogeneity’ narrative in the curriculum and textbooks conflicts with the curriculum’s aim of developing pupils who are critical thinkers (Freedman, 2009). A pre-requisite for critical thinking is freedom of thought and speech; narrative closure and control integral to the ‘unity in homogeneity’ narrative restricts this. This conflict between narrative and pedagogy is at the heart of the 2008 history curriculum. So the key curriculum objectives - peace through a ‘unity in homogeneity’ narrative and pupils who can work with a critical spirit - are contradictory.

Overall, after establishing how the 2008 history curriculum was reformed along ‘unity in homogeneity’ lines and presenting opportunities, issues and challenges therein, this chapter leaves us with questions. That is how the curriculum is perceived by history educationalists in Rwanda and the curriculum as actions in the Rwandan history classroom. The following empirical chapters six and seven address these issues. They do so by presenting and critically discussing how policy-makers’, teacher-educators’ and student-teachers’ perceive the 2008 history curriculum (chapter 6); and their accounts of the curriculum as actions (chapter 7). These empirical chapters complement this chapter’s curriculum analysis by engaging with the curriculum as a living document.

Chapter 6 Curriculum as Discourse: An identity narrative of being Rwandan

Introduction

This chapter addresses research sub-question one: What are Rwandan a) policy-makers', b) teacher-educators' and c) student-teachers' perceptions of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what do these perceptions tell us about what history is valued and why? Chapter five illustrated the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008 history curriculum. However, the curriculum analysis could not reveal how the 2008 history curriculum was perceived by Rwandan educationalists. This chapter gives insights into the thinking behind the 2008 history curriculum reform along 'unity in homogeneity' lines at policy-level. Also, it provides insights into the degree(s) of agreement between the 2008 history curriculum as policy and those charged with its mediation (teacher-educators) and implementation (student-teachers). Thus this chapter addresses what history is valued and why by participants. The findings are spread across four sub-themes all related to 'curriculum as discourse: an identity narrative of being Rwandan'. They will structure the chapter and are: a legacy of the genocide; a political strategy for a new society; national security; and, ethnic identity as the problem, 'unity in homogeneity' as the solution. So, as previously discussed in chapter four (see p.71), the 2008 O-level history curriculum is a conduit for wider issues around school history in post-genocide Rwanda to emerge.

The theme 'curriculum as discourse' and sub-themes (see above) that characterise and structure this chapter derive from four of seven initial themes that emerged from the data analysis detailed in chapter four. These four initial themes are: curriculum, content and pedagogy; the nature of history; past, present and future; and the history teacher. To reflect the analytical process detailed in chapter four in the analysis of the findings from interviews, I refer to these four initial themes throughout.

As noted in chapter four, I do not include dates and times of interviews to protect participant anonymity; therefore, this information is not included in participant quotations referenced in this chapter and in chapter seven. However, pseudonyms in text and in footnotes are included to indicate who said what. Line numbers are used to

indicate where quotations came from within individual transcripts. When a quotation is used and then a part of it is referred to later in the chapter, this part is *italicised* and single quotation marks are used to avoid repeating line numbers. The opportunities and challenges of 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative of and a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda are discussed throughout. The chapter concludes with a summary of findings raising questions about 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative of and political strategy for national unity through the 2008 history curriculum.

A legacy of the 1994 genocide

A legacy of the 1994 genocide emerged from the initial themes: curriculum, content and pedagogy; past, present and future; and the nature of history. Together these initial themes express how the experience of genocide has been instrumental in shaping history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda. The legacy of the 1994 genocide is often ignored in research into history education in Rwanda (Weldon, 2009). Some policy-makers (see below) gave insight into how the experience of genocide shaped history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda. Policy-maker Jado explained:

> [There was] a common view that history played a big role in the genocide […]. […] In the history of the country you see how the population was presented or divided in races […] out of these developed stereotypes. I remember a fear [after 1994] of repeating the kind of thinking that led to the genocide [Jado, Line 1].

The kind of thinking Jado refers to was ethnic thinking and policy-makers Jado, Conchobhar, Michael and Elie agreed that the emphasis on ethnic differences in pre-1994 history education was based on a distorted view of history. Conchobhar, Michael and Elie stated that distorted history contributed to the 1994 genocide by dividing people along ethnic lines. Elie reported:

> Before 1994 history in school was ethnically orientated - division based on ethnic[ity]. So the new curriculum try/tried to show the history of Rwanda is not ethnic. [.] [H]istory ed[ucation] pre-94 promoted ethnicism and regionalism. The teaching of that history is among the causes of that genocide [Elie, Line 1].

The understanding that the history taught in schools pre-1994 that emphasised ethnic difference was bad history and contributed to the genocide is the view of the RoG. This view is shared across the groups of participants in this study (see below). Policy-maker Michael explained in detail how the history taught in schools pre-1994 was distorted and how this was implicated in the 1994 genocide:

> When you come to [the] post 1994 Tutsi genocide, [.]the first question you ask is what were the causes of this genocide in the first place? [.] When you go back again you find [that] when the colonialists were teaching history they were emphasising difference rather than similarity. They were teaching how different Rwandans are, teaching how different the Hutu, Tutsi, Twa are and we know very well that in Rwanda the idea of Hutu, Tutsi, Twa was about who kept cattle and who tilled the land and who didn't. In Rwanda, if you had, according to records, if you had less than ten cows you were classified as a Hutu, if you had more than ten cows you were classified as a Tutsi and so the economic mobility, the social-economic mobility would determine your Hutuness or Tutsiness. But when the Belgians came they wanted to model their own divisions alongside that socio-economic dichotomy and turned that into tribes and they did that deliberately. So that created hatred [.], that created divisionism and after 1994, the 2008 curriculum reform you are referring to was meant to correct those errors if you like [PM Michael, Line 49 - 50].

Michael's account of Rwandan history above was a history of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as socio-economic identities in pre-colonial times. This account suggests that Belgian colonialists changed what these identities meant and how they mattered; and this left a legacy of hatred and division culminating in the 1994 genocide. In discussions of the 2008 history curriculum, this historical narrative was re-iterated by policy-makers Turlach, Conchobhar, Jade and Elie, teacher educator Martin, and student-teachers Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules and Pacifique, in the following terms. Pre-colonial Rwanda was united through shared clans, culture and language. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were socio-economic not ethnic identities. The colonialists created and/or divided Rwandans along artificial ethnic lines. Ethnic division was continued by post-independent governments, which led to the 1994 genocide. Consequently, most participants in this research shared a vision that O-level history aims to uncover 'who we were' before the colonialists divided us along artificial ethnic lines. Furthermore, that this knowledge will help pupils to know

'who we really are' namely, Rwandans, and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. For example policy-maker Jado stated:

> The point here is that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were related to social, economic and political positions in pre-colonial [Rwanda], they were very limited in space and not so important. Other identities: family, lineage, clans were more important. As the beginning of the C20th if you asked a Rwandan 'who are you', he would say I am Paul of X Mother and X Father into grandfather etc - lineage, we are from this region and we come from this clan, then I am cow or land owner, which would signify Hutu or [Tutsi]. Yes Hutu, Tutsi can be mentioned but not always, they are not the most important. […] The radical change during the colonial time - naming those fluid realities, putting them as race, had a big impact on how Rwandans saw themselves and how they were seen by others - colonialists, writers etc. The col[onialists] and missionaries, they selected one identity and gave it another meaning. The[y] administered the country according to those categories, which were continued in 1st and 2nd Republic[s] [PM Jado, Line 8].

Jado above presents Hutu and Tutsi as unimportant socio-economic identities in pre-colonial Rwanda. These socio-economic identities were transformed into divisive ethnic categories by the colonialists and perpetuated by consecutive Hutu-led post-independent regimes. This view of history is central to how the RoG narrates national unity through 'unity in homogeneity' (see chapter 3). The view that ethnic identities did not exist prior to colonialism, but were invented by the "white men, [..] forms a substantial part of the government's effort to un-make ethnic differences and to unify the nation" (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.47). Therefore, O-level history is about connecting pupils to a pre-colonial ideal community in order to shape who they think they are today. That is Rwandans, not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa:

> The student which finish[es] this curriculum is able to explain to others how white people disturbed our society. Before the arrival of Europeans, the King had soldiers [and] among those soldiers were Tutsi, Twa and Hutu, [but] they were called Rwandan soldiers in general. But since the arrival of foreigners in Rwanda it changed [ST Gilbert, Line 875-877].

From this perspective, the history curriculum is a healing narrative because it sets the record straight, namely before colonialism Rwandans were united. Subsequent division and the genocide was a direct result of colonial divide and rule policies based on artificial ethnic identities. Therefore, Rwandans can be united again:

> People use[d] to be taught a spirit of patriotism, which was based on discrimination. Now people are taught their real origin, which incites them to live together, to love one another, to work together in unit[y]. So that student[s] throughout the whole country will share the same understanding of peace and reconciliation [ST Anastase, Line 1513 - 1526].

Student-teacher Anastase's comment: '*So that student[s] throughout the whole country will share the same understanding of peace and reconciliation',* perhaps explains a finding from chapter four. That is the "increased emphasises on the clans, lineages and chiefdoms of pre-colonial Rwanda and organisation of traditional Rwandan society" in the 2008 history curriculum compared to the 1998 curriculum (Weldon, 2009, p.238). Writers argue that the RoG's emphasis on clans in terms of lineages and regions is inconsistent with the available historical records (Freedman et al., 2008). However, the focus on pre-colonial history in the 2008 curriculum is because pre-colonial peace and harmony and no ethnic identity is the corner-stone of the RoG's 'unity in homogeneity' narrative. This narrative serves as a reference point "for today's unification policy and signifies a state to which the government wants to return" (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.35). For example, policy-maker Elie explained:

> [The aim is] to build national unity by teaching [the] history of ancient Rwanda, which was united, not ethnically and regionally divided. Pre-colonial history shows unity, which promotes unity in Rwanda today. […] Unity is very important, without unity you cannot develop, it is a basic political concept for develop[ment] [PM Elie, Line 2].

Sjoberg (2011) reported how the socio-economic origins of Hutu and Tutsi identities was often repeated by history teachers in interviews, and likewise, participants who gave views on the issue in this study[33]. However, student-teacher Gilbert disagreed with the official RoG non-ethnic view of the origin of Hutu and Tutsi identities presented across the groups of participants. Gilbert stated:

[33] PM: Turlach, Michael, Conchobhar, Jado, Elie; TE: Martin; ST: Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules, Pacifique.

> [T]his curriculum is containing lies. We know that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are ethnic groups. This curriculum teaches us that we must teach learners that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were socio-economic identities. But the historians Jan Vansina and Alexis Kagame said that Hutu were from Chad, Tutsi were from Ethiopia and Twa were natives of Rwanda. Imagine now this curriculum is saying that it was based on economic categories, that is why it is containing lies [ST Gilbert, Line 445 - 467].

Some historians do argue that Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic identities existed in late pre-colonial Rwanda (see Newbury, 1988; also Vansina, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Hintjens, 2008). Indeed, Vansina (2004) dates the emergence of ethnic identities to the 17th Century. I cannot speculate on what motivated Gilbert's dissent, other than the stated fact of him having knowledge of the literature noted above. However, Gilbert's counter-discourse reflects the contested nature of what Hutu and Tutsi meant in pre-colonial Rwanda according to historians and in Rwandan society today (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Nonetheless, policy-makers Turlach, Conchobhar, Jade and Elie, teacher educator Martin, and student-teachers Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules and Pacifique expressed the opposite view to Gilbert on the origins of ethnic identity:

> [B]efore [the] 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi, the education system divided Rwandans. This is why Rwandans killed their neighbour[s]. [...] Before [the] 1994 genocide our history education [told] us that there [are] three ethnic group[s] [in Rwanda]. But when we analyse the defin[ition] of ethnic there [are] no ethnic [groups] in our country. This is why, in order to correct those mistakes, the history must be taught in our society [ST Ultan, Line 120 - 134].

The lack of dissent evidenced by the apparent agreement across the groups of participants on ethnic origins does not reflect the contested nature of Rwandan history in society at large claimed by scholars (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014). This is discussed further below. Of particular note is the strong language Gilbert used, '*this curriculum is containing lies',* correlating with Gilbert's understanding of history as a tool used and misused by governments all over the world for political purposes. This response contrasts with student-teacher Ultan's view that post-genocide history corrects past mistakes about the concept of ethnic identity. Neither view took account of how the origin, formation and relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial

times is a vast, complex and contested history (Eltringham, 2004; also Straus, 2006; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002). Historians' debate aspects of Rwandan history, and recognise that there can "never be one definitive history of Rwanda" (Hodgkin, 2006, p.204). However, the political manipulation of history Gilbert refers to above echoes Longman and Rutagengwa's (2004) finding of distrust amongst Rwandans of current and/or any future government efforts to narrate the past. The lack of dissent amongst participants other than Gilbert might suggest that they were not open with me and this is discussed further below.

The interview with student-teacher Gilbert provided an important insight. Gilbert's stated belief in ethnic origins contradicts the RoG narrative of socio-economic origins. Nevertheless, he advocated the official narrative of being Rwandan and against ethnic identities and ethnic division throughout the interview (see below). Erasing ethnic identity through a closed and controlled 'unity in homogeneity' narrative does not allow Rwandans to embrace being Rwandan inclusive of ethnic identity. Yet, clearly Gilbert exemplifies that an ethnic view of the origin of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities does not automatically lead to viewing Hutu or Tutsi identities as important today; nor as a legitimate cause of division in contemporary Rwanda. Indeed Gilbert stated: "if we continue dealing with ethnic groups we will not develop our society" [Line, 945], a view repeated across the groups of participants (see below). So the unity aim of the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative will not necessarily collapse if diversity is included.

The contention of policy-makers Michael, Conchobhar and Elie above that the bad history taught in schools is directly and causally implicated in the 1994 genocide has little empirical basis (McLean-Hilker, 2010). Moreover, the emphasis placed on the role history played in the genocide by the policy-makers named above without discussing other potential factors is arguably politically convenient. That is, that it diverts attention away from politically inconvenient drivers of genocide: individual Hutu responsibility and alleged RPF responsibility (see chapter 3 and 5). The paradox is that only by looking at the complex reasons behind the 1994 genocide can new generations learn from the past and develop strategies for prevention in the future (see Bauer, 1978; Shriver, 2005). This aim was articulated by policy-maker Abernethy:

> For learners he/she knows the history of the country from the beginning to present day. This is important because if you don't know your history you can't prepare your future. In history we have good and bad times. History helps us to connect or to avoid some facts. For example, if you learn about genocide, they know what it is, how it was planned, executed and the consequences of genocide. This is important to avoid other genocide[s] and other conflicts. By doing this you introduce [a] Culture of Peace to learners. If you see the cause, plan and execution of genocide, learners understand that it is not good to make conflict between each other or in society [PM Abernethy, Line 2]

Political convenience seems to have trumped genuine use of the past to help to prevent future violence. Nevertheless, there is a basis in the literature for Michael, Conchobhar and Elies' view that pre-1994 history education contributed to an 'us' and 'them' mentality along Hutu and Tutsi lines that can be implicated in the 1994 genocide (Des Forges, 1999). Gasanabo's doctoral research (2004) found that pre-genocide school history had shaped the historical memory of Rwandans who had not attended school, thus evidencing its impact beyond the classroom and on Rwandan society at large. Weldon (2009) spoke of the pre-1994 history curriculum having promoted a conflict narrative. Des Forges (1999) explained how pre-1994 history education was implicated in the 1994 genocide, "[t]he propagandists built upon the lessons Rwandans had learned at school. It was hardly necessary even to repeat the basic assumption that Hutu and Tutsi were different peoples by nature" (Des Forges, 1999, p.86). This seemed to be the point policy-maker Michael was arguing (see above) when discussing how the colonialists *'emphasised [ethnic] difference rather than similarity'* and the artificial ethnic division Michael felt this had caused:

> But what is written is that the Tutsi came with [.] steamrollers because it was [the] ice-age and they came rolling on ice all the way from Iceland to Kigali or to Rwanda if you like. Ridiculous as this might sound, the children believed it. What's the impact of this? The impact is [that]: [1] history is portraying Tutsi as foreigners, like UFO, strange people; 2) it is portraying Tutsi as some superior race, which appeared from no-where and landed in Rwanda where you cannot trace; [and] 3) that we don't really know the origin of these people because it can be Tibet, it can be Iceland, it can be Abyssinia, it can be - nobody knows. Whereas the Hutu, according to [the] colonial teaching, they said they came from the forests of Chad and the Congo and all that. So in other words they are telling the children that the Hutu are from near here. They are not [shown] [as coming from] as far [away] as the Tutsi. And then they said the Twa as the original people of Rwanda [PM Michael, Line 117-130].

Emerging from the above is that understanding history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda requires taking account of the genocide. Also, taking account of the perceived role of colonial and pre-1994 history education therein and the moral obligation felt by policy-makers to ensure that genocide never happens again. Achieving national unity and the moral imperative of 'never again' are central aims of the RoG (see Kagame, 2011; also Musoni, 2003; Hayman, 2007; Freedman et al., 2008; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Mamdani, 2002; Rafti, 2004; Hintjens, 2008). Policy-maker Jado spoke of a fear in Rwanda of repeating the same thinking in the post-genocide history curriculum that led to the genocide. Jado remarked: *'I remember a fear [after 1994] of repeating the kind of thinking that led to the genocide'* (see above).

The 1994 genocide was explained across all groups of participants[34] with reference to the manipulation of history in the past. Somehow the post-genocide history curriculum had to be different. Policy-maker Jado implied and policy-makers Michael, Conchobhar and Elie explained that content revision was essential to ensure that the kind of thinking that led to genocide would not be repeated in history education in schools in post-genocide Rwanda (see above). However, rather than taking a multiple-perspective approach to the past, chapter five demonstrated how one single official 'bad' narrative of Rwandan history in the pre-1994 history curriculum has been replaced with another single 'good' 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008 history curriculum. The impact this approach to history curriculum reform had on student-teachers' thinking about history was evident in some interviews. That is in how student-teachers Danielle, Anastase and Gilbert conflated historical manipulation with interpretation and bad history on the one hand and historical truth with good history on the other. Gilbert stated:

> A good historian or [a] true history must be based on true facts. [F]alse historians or poor historians are those who try to change the facts because of their own interest or political interest. [I]nterpretation is [to] change good history, [to] change facts [ST Gilbert, Line 295 - 329].

[34]PM Michael, Conchobhar, Jado, Elie; TE Martin; ST Emmanuel, Danielle and Ultan

Student-teacher Danielle stated: "History it is history. When something happened, it happened. We should not change it to suit our interpretation. We want to teach history as history, without such interpretation. It is better to teach history as history" [Line 1046 - 1055]. There seemed to be a category error at work here; that good history promotes goodness and truth and bad history promotes badness and lies. What might actually promote peace is an understanding of different people's points of view. However, this would mean giving space to ethnic identity, which requires legitimising ethnicity as an identity category in Rwanda. The association between historical interpretation and manipulation leading to genocide, and true history with good history is a likely stumbling block to 'unity in diversity' or 'diversity' approaches. This is because a distrust of interpretation perpetuates a desire for a single 'correct' narrative of the past in the minds of history educationalists in Rwanda (see below). For example, policy-maker Elie stated:

> My concern is when we see [how the] history of Rwanda has been manipulated, there are and always have been some historical writers who try to manipulate history, the most important thing is to find the historical truth. [That] means in conformity with the reality of [the] facts, to decolonise the history of Rwanda [and to] struggle for truth in different periods of [the] history of Rwanda. As historians it is possible to find truth. [M]any remote periods are not well known, but in contemporary history there [is a] clear history. When [a] historian is making research he is requested to be objective, impartial and transparent [PM Elie, Line 10].

Elie's statement above contrasts with the assertion of Opondo (2012) that, "the historian in Rwanda must pursue the rules of criticism and challenge fixed memories" (p.64). True official history leaves no room for such critical engagement. Overall, central to the development of the 2008 history curriculum was the idea that 'bad' history pre-1994 promoted ethnic division, which culminated in genocide**.** Conversely, 'good' history in the 2008 history curriculum promotes 'truth', which is the basis of national unity and ensuring genocide never happens again. Historical 'truth' ignores how the origin, formation and the relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial times is a contested history (Eltringham, 2004) and how Rwandan history is contested in society at large (King, 2014). However, in the aftermath of genocide national unity and ensuring genocide never happens again are RoG priorities (Kagame, 2011). Writers advocating history curriculum reform along

'unity in diversity' lines in Rwanda tend to ignore how the experience of genocide has been instrumental in shaping history curriculum reform in Rwanda. That is away from diversity and firmly within 'unity in homogeneity' lines to achieve a united post-genocide society where genocide is unimaginable to new generations. Below explores 'unity in homogeneity' as a political strategy to achieve the afore-mentioned goals.

A political strategy for a new society

A political strategy for a new society emerged from the initial themes: curriculum, content and pedagogy; past, present and future; and the history teacher. Together these initial themes illustrate how history curriculum reform is a political strategy for a new society. As early as July 1994, the RoG was developing new objectives for the education system and planning a new curriculum. The broad aim was: "correcting the errors of the past" and developing "people free of ethnic, regional, national and religious prejudices, conscious of human rights and responsibilities" (MoE, 1994, p.25)[35]. Similarly, policy-maker Michael spoke above of correcting errors evident in the pre-1994 history curriculum: *'the 2008 curriculum reform you are referring to was meant to correct those errors if you like'*. For example, correcting how Hutu and Tutsi were presented as ethnic or tribal identities in the history curriculum (see above). Policy-maker Elie agreed, *'So the new curriculum try/tried to show the history of Rwanda is not ethnic'* (see above). Policy-maker Conchobhar explained, "[f]or the sake of unity and for the sake of reconciliation, those aspects of the former curriculum, in terms of content, [had] to be removed" [Line 10].

The correction and/or removal of ideologically bad ethnic history from the post-genocide history curriculum corresponds with actual differences between the pre-1994 history curriculum and the 2008 history curriculum (chapter 5). While the pre-1994 history curriculum asked pupils to define clan, lineage, ethnicity and tribe (Gasanabo, 2004), the 2008 history curriculum asks pupils to define lineage, clan and nation without reference to ethnicity or tribe (MoE, 2008a p.11). This change in language reflects the change in political regime. That is from a pre-1994 Hutu ethno-nationalist regime that promoted a Hutu nation for a Hutu people, to the current RoG that promotes a non-ethnic imagining of the Rwandan nation (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

[35] Ministry of Education (1994) quoted in Obura (2003, p.66). Also: Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research (2003) *National Curriculum Development Centre 6 Year Plan: 2003 to 2008 (Current Year Plus 5 Years)*, Kigali: NCDC

The change in language in the curriculum noted above was a tangible example of policy-maker Conchobhar's description of how the 2008 history curriculum was developed as part of a political process, a process that aimed to change what Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities meant and how they mattered to Rwandans:

> I will give you an example. For example, [.] we looked at the curriculum of the previous years and there were certain aspects in terms of content, for example, that were completely divisive and they seemed to differentiate the different ethnic groups of Rwanda. Those were particularly emphasised in the content and we have cases of people telling us that at times, actually, history teachers would stand up and ask the different ethnic groups to stand up in class: 'can the Tutsi's stand up, can the Hutus' stand up, can the Twa's stand up' and it was quite frustrating to certain students and you see if we had now decided that no longer would we identify our society in terms of those ethnic groups. [E]verybody was now [a] Rwandese. For the sake of unity and for the sake of reconciliation those aspects of the former curriculum, in terms of content, [had] to be removed [PM Conchobhar, Lines 6 - 10].

There are two points to make about Conchobhar's comment. First, he located the de-ethnicising of the 2008 history curriculum (evidenced in chapter 5 and policy-maker statements above) within a political process. Conchobhar did this by linking the policy of de-ethnicising the content of the history curriculum with the political decision to no longer *'identify our society in terms of those ethnic groups. [E]verybody was now [a] Rwandese'*. Thereby, marking 'unity in homogeneity' as a political strategy for national unity delivered through history curriculum reform. This RoG mantra is constantly repeated in RoG policy documents and has been promoted with vigour by the RoG since coming to power in July 1994 (see chapters 3 and 5).

The notion of citizenship had been employed by the first post-independent government to divide the polis along ethnic lines. It did this by excluding all Tutsi from a Hutu ethno-nationalist brand of citizenship. Conversely, today, citizenship is based on Rwandaness (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). In this sense, the new citizenry of the post-genocide state promoted in the 2008 history curriculum is inclusive. It does not exclude any group - Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. However, by defining national identity in essentialist terms, the 2008 history curriculum and policy-makers have arguably closed down space for more complex, but inclusive conceptions of national identity and citizenship to emerge from engagement with the curriculum in school.

Consequently, the new imagining of national identity and citizenship in the curriculum might alienate those for whom ethnicity is important. According to scholars and somewhat evidenced in chapter seven, this is not an insignificant part of the Rwandan population (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; also Freedman et al., 2004, 2011; Mamdani, 2002; Mclean-Hilker, 2009; King, 2009). This paradox is important insofar as the RoG hopes that the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative will unite the country and thereby help develop Rwanda into a middle income country by 2020 (Vision, 2020).

The above demonstrates that understanding history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda requires considering reform from within and as part of the political ambitions of the post-genocide government. Interpretations of the past in Rwanda are hence power struggles, and "are profoundly political since they determine the form of the state and its social relations" (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.48). This resonates with Korostelina's (2010) and Weldon's (2009) view that power is never absent from history curriculum reform. This is because whoever narrates the past controls the form and content of the new collective memory, national identity and vision of the future (Ibid.; Ibid.). Therefore, the 2008 history curriculum can be understood as a politicised message system for the promotion of government sanctioned (historical) knowledge, identities and political aims (Apple 1982, 1993; Bernstein, 2000).

When the past is closed to debate, so is the present and the future imagining of the nation and vice-versa. Policy-maker Jado gave further insights into the relationship between history and politics in post-genocide Rwanda and how people's politics and desire for historical truth have shaped their approach to history. All this further illuminates the politicised context out of which the 2008 history curriculum has emerged:

> So I emphasise, so we as teachers, parents and political leaders, how do we talk? For example, my friends fit history with their political sympathies but I am open, I don't mind what view people take but let's use evidence. Personally, I want intellectual honesty - how far have I identified appropriate sources. We cannot be 100% objective but we can strive. To understand this moment you have to understand it from many points of view. This complexity is not accepted very well, **[**people in Rwanda] want things to be clear. In our debates people don't like to [hear] words [such as] 'I don't know' or 'complexity'. […] Between A and B

> you can have different situations. People want the truth but some aspects are vague, for example around ethnic identities [PM Jado, Line 5 - 6].

There are two points to make about Jado's quotation above: firstly, Jado was the only participant to refer to the history of ethnic identity as being vague, *'People want the truth but some aspects are vague, for example around ethnic identities'*. While in the literature, the origins of ethnic identities in Rwanda are vast, complex and contested (Eltringham, 2004; also Newbury, 1988; Straus, 2006; Vansina, 2004; Willoughby-Mellors, 2002), other participants simply repeated the official narrative of socio-economic origins and ethnicity as a colonial invention. Or, in the case of student-teacher Gilbert, that ethnic identities existed in pre-colonial times. Nonetheless, while Jado spoke of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as moving realities throughout history, he re-iterated a view in line with the official narrative. That is the socio-economic origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and the colonial distortion of these identities (see sub-theme 'A legacy of the 1994 genocide' above).

However, the above is significant as it suggests awareness by at least one policy-maker of complexities around the history of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities not evident in 'unity in homogeneity'. It also suggests a lack of awareness amongst other research participants. This might be explained by the desire Jado refers to for singular answers, *'In our debates people don't like to [hear] words [such as] 'I don't know' or 'complexity'*, reflecting the RoG approach to Rwandan history, of finding the true history of Rwanda. Teacher-educator Tadhg seems to agree with Jado's perception:

> I think it is both - [history is about facts and interpretation]. And that is why it would be interesting that we emphasise that aspect of interpreting the facts which is not, I think done very much. [P]eople try to emphasise on facts, they teach facts, they teach issues as they happened and they hardly, I think, let people discuss on what these/this situation mean to us and to our future, what can we do about it. I think both are important - facts and interpretation. [Interpretation]: drawing meaning, drawing conclusions and also thinking about solutions [TE Tadhg, Line 444-460].

Teacher-educator Abracham explained that the role of the 2008 history curriculum is to give pupils historical facts:

> I think that at Ordinary level they don't go deeply [in]to analysis and intellectual interpretation. What is given at that level, considering also the number of periods, which are limited, are historical facts. [T]he role of this curriculum is to prepare learners at secondary level to have a certain background [knowledge] of historical facts [TE Abracham, Line 14-22].

A history as facts approach noted by Abracham correlates with teacher-educator Tadgh's experience of watching A-Level history lessons:

> They think they are teachers or technician[s] of history and they give the knowledge and that is why one of the greatest challenge[s] I realised was that they use [the] lecture method, they teach just facts, just knowledge and don't develop skills and values as lessons drawn from that knowledge they teach [TE Tadgh, Line, 222; TE Tadgh viewed A-level classes not O-level].

The above illustrates both constructivist and positivist approaches to knowledge at work in Rwanda. It suggests different views in Rwanda on how history should be taught to O-level pupils. In contrast to how Jado reported he approached history, Jado claimed, *'my friends fit history with their political sympathies*'. Jado did not say that the content of the 2008 history curriculum was developed to fit the politics of the RoG. However, Jado's description of the general politicised environment from which the 2008 history curriculum emerged casts a shadow in that direction. There is a strong official public script in operation in Rwanda which, coupled with limited freedom of speech, sheds light on whose knowledge counts and who decides, namely the RoG (Weldon, 2009). Nevertheless, an experience of multiple perspectives and historical complexity in the German history curriculum was the diminishing moral clarity of past Nazi crimes (chapter 3). Perhaps this explains, in part, why Jado spoke of historical complexity not being well accepted in Rwanda and that people wanted the truth despite some aspects of history being vague, for example ethnic identities.

The utility of a single uncomplicated view of the past was evident in the major economic policy document, Vision 2020, referenced in chapter three, where President Kagame linked a single view of the past to present national unity, the basis of future socio-economic development. Teacher-educator Fidele stated that, "Normally the role of history is to know the past as we say if you don't know from where you come from you don't know where you are going to" [Line 24]. This conceptualisation of history

was repeated by policy-makers Turlach and Conchobhar and student-teachers Emmanuel, Ultan, Jules and Pacifique. Pacifique stated: "History is the study of the past, a study of the past which allow[s] us or permits us to understand the present so that you can fight for the good future" [Line 48].

Using the 2008 history curriculum to develop a better future was evident in policy-maker Conchobhar's discussion of how that the 2008 history curriculum was shaped by government policies, for example Vision 2020:

> [T]here were a number of government policies that shaped the designing and the development of this particular curriculum because we had Vision 2020, which had been initiated by the government. There was a commission that had been put in place for unit[y] and reconciliation, actually quite a number of their members help[ed] in the development and designing of this particular curriculum. Then there were other strategic policy papers of the government including the poverty reduction [strategy]. [Furthermore], we had good governance policies [and] decentralisation policies. [A]ll [of] these policies had to be taken into account before we could come up with a history curriculum that we thought would be suitable for our pupils and our students of that particular time. [These policies] shape[d] quite a number of aspects of our curriculum because if, for example, we thought that the reconciliation of the Rwandan society was a priority for the social and economic development of this country, it was [.] very important that we looked really into the aspects of that particular strategy [PM Conchobhar, Line 4-6].

Conchobhar, above, spoke of government policies directly shaping the 2008 history curriculum and of members of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission being involved in designing the 2008 history curriculum. Similarly, policy-maker Turlach explained:

> [W]e have the Parliamenter's ask[ing] us when we will teach the history of Rwanda because when you refuse to teach that history, they create[s] [.][.] a conflict because the learner get[s] the information [from] different person and he doesn't get the information in our formal education and can create in his hand/head some problem. Why the school refuse to teach history and [.] the student can get the information from the bad, let me say bad [.] information and [.] the role of school is to give [..] the good information [PM Turlach, Line 167 - 187]?

The above reflects the notion of 'good' history replacing 'bad' history discussed previously, and the central role the 2008 history curriculum was understood at government level to play in developing a new society also discussed above. Policy-maker Turlach later directly linked history curriculum reform with a broader political agenda: "[When] we develop history [we] go there. Even if we develop other subject[s] we try to converge on that [idea of the] Rwanda we need" [Line 391-397]. Developing the 2008 history curriculum in line with a government view of the *'Rwanda we need'* links history curriculum reform to power and politics and raises questions about who gets to decide the *'Rwanda we need'*. How the 2008 history curriculum should shape pupils' was explained by student-teacher Emmanuel:

> First is [..], they [.] will come out with [..] a relative understanding of who they are. Yea, in what sense? Who they are means who Rwandans they are. [..] Where they came from, [..] where they are and [.] where they want to reach. You see, and know that Rwanda is their country, which has to [.] remain there existing forever that's one you know it, yes. […] Important, yes, because this is one of the reason of learning and teaching history. We are living today but we have our […] forefathers who lived before us they left [.] our national identity. So, we have to know it, to know why should we behave in a way which promotes a national pride [..]. Yes, national pride. Not regional or [..] ethnic or no but [..] as a nation [..] which has same links, which has roots, [..] which will keep on growing. So students need to know that yes, and they can't know that from any other lesson apart from history [ST Emmanuel, Line 718-749].

Student-teacher Emmanuel above noted the special role of history in building a better future by teaching pupils about their national identity and not ethnic or regional identities. Emmanuel stated: '*We are living today but we have our […] forefathers who lived before us they left [.] our national identity. So, we have to know it, to know why should we behave in a way which promotes a national pride [..]. […] Not regional or [..] ethnic or no but [..] as a nation [..] which has same links, which has roots, [..] which will keep on growing. So students need to know that yes, and they can't know that from any other lesson apart from history'*. Similarly, policy-maker Turlach spoke of the 2008 history curriculum promoting a Culture of Peace by bringing pupils to the same understanding of history:

> Also help to develop the Culture of Peace because when you know your history and [.] we have the same understanding of our history is the way

> [.] to look forward how to change that bad, let me say/said it, bad history and we need together to look forward together not as individual[s] [but] as a group, as a student together. And even […] our father have [.] the bad thinking, the children must brought the good thinking in class and participate in the Culture of Peace in society [PM Turlach, Line 764 - 787].

Directing pupils towards a single conception of national identity, pride and unity in the way Emmanuel advocates above and the same understanding of history noted by Turlach, contrasts with policy-maker Jado's view that: *'to understand this moment you have to understand it from many points of view'* (see above). Jado was alone amongst the participants in the view that multiple - perspectives are required to understand any given event in the past (see above), and spoke of a strenuous push for consensus in history in Rwanda:

> When we discuss, debate, the question is around common history, which means everything is put down [and] is agreed, we have to agree on every point. This means each person that has a different view or interpretation - for many it is not history because it causes differences, people are very emotionally attached to views. But we know such debates are normal [PM Jado, Line 2].

Emerging here is how a history inclusive of differences in a context where people are emotionally tied to their own views of the past is difficult to achieve. This may be one reason why the RoG has taken a homogeneity approach. Respecting differences requires permitting multiple views of the past to emerge and co-exist in the classroom:

> How you present things as a teacher is crucial. For example, 1959 and 1962, there is a debate - was it a revolution or something else? Those linked to the Kayibanda and Hybarimana regime will call it a revolution, which means a qualitative change, yet the refugees would see it as a negative change. So now you have two groups in your public, how do you proceed as a teacher? In my experience, if you take one view or the other, you are missing something. The best thing is to ask what happened - look at the evidence. We can do discussions, debates - [this] helps, even if they remain with the interpretation from their parents, no problem, because you are creating awareness and capacity [PM Jado, Line 3 and 4].

Jado discussed the importance of multiple perspectives in operation in the history classroom to manage different points of view: '*now you have two groups in your public, how do you proceed as a teacher. In my experience, if you take one view or the other, you are missing something*'. Freedman (2009) speaks of Rwandan history teachers understanding that an inclusive society requires multiple points of view but no participant affirmed this. Multiple-perspectives contrasts with teacher-educator Fidele who viewed multiple-perspectives to have been the source of Rwanda's problems:

> The problem is that when an event happen[ed] it is explained differently according to people'[s] background[s], according to their interest, according to many things. This is why Rwandans don't agree on their history, particularly on their political history. They can agree on economic history, they have no difference[s]. [B]ut when it comes to politics, it is sensitive and they explain their past according to their interest, according to their parents, according to their life [T]he society is divided in two. [There] are people who are thinking this [and] there are people who are thinking other thing[s] according to the past because of ethnic differences and because, for a long time, history emphasised on the differences between the two groups instead of showing them [what] [.] they had in common. [For example,] they had the same country, the same language, the same God but they emphasised [.] small differences [TE Fidele, Line 8-12, Line 22].

Fidele's quotation above concurs with the literature arguing that Rwandans are divided about history along ethnic lines (Freedman et al., 2004, 2011; also Mamdani, 2002; Mclean-Hilker, 2009; King, 2009). Moreover, Fidele sheds light on why there was no reference to multiple perspectives in the presentation of Rwandan history in Vision 2020 or in the 2008 history curriculum. That is multiple-perspectives are viewed as a source of division, '*The problem is that when an event happen[ed] it is explained differently according to people'[s] background[s], according to their interest, according to many things'*. Interviewees from all the groups of participants echoed the 2008 history curriculum's desire for pupils to contribute their own views about the past in class discussions (see chapter 7). However, no-one, apart from Jado, suggested facilitating this by approaching history from multiple-perspectives.

While Fidele above, notes the partial nature of history in Rwanda as being a source of division, he proposes showing Rwandans what they had in common as a possible

solution. This echoes student-teacher Emmanuel's view that a common history was the basis for future prosperity:

> [A]t the end of the curriculum, at the end of the lesson, at the end of the scheme of work, students are equipped with a thorough understanding of who really they are; where they came from; and the cultural values which help young generations to live in peace and keep on developing our country hand in hand. Yes, and lastly, to feel proud of their country, their nation. [W]e have [a] common history, we also [have] a common path to walk in towards prosperity [ST Emmanuel, Line 1063-1094].

While Emmanuel claims, '*we have common history, we also [have] a common path to walk in towards prosperity',* student-teacher Accalon recalls how the on-going legacy of genocide divides Rwandans:

> For example, here in Rwanda people are shy. [T]hey have in their mind different thoughts. [M]aybe you heard the situation about Hutu and Tutsi. [S]ome [people] condemn others saying that they killed us, others saying that [it was] not us but them [ST Accalon, Line 791-799]

Similarly, student-teacher Pacifique explained:

> There are some people who were killed and others who were killing [in 1994]. [T]hose who were outside [of] the country, [when they returned, they] found [out that their] colleagues or relatives [had been] killed. [S]o you feel somehow [that] you don't like those who [partook in the killings] [ST Pacifique, Line, 351].

Accalon and Pacifique's words exemplify how ethnic identity is tied into the memory of the 1994 genocide and perhaps means more to ordinary Rwandans today than ever before. The contrast between the aspirations of unity and prosperity through a single and homogeneous common history noted by Emmanuel and the reality of a legacy of the genocide dividing Rwandans discussed by Accalon and Pacifique, questions whether a singular common history can unite Rwandans. Therein lays the danger of the single story. It gives a single impression of who Rwandans were, are and will be. There is no room for individuals to shape this narrative: you are Rwandan and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa and that's it. The complexities of real life are missing.

However, as noted by policy-maker Jado and teacher-educator Fidele above, Rwandans are emotionally tied to their own views of the past. This suggests that diversity in history might presently - 20 years after the 1994 genocide - be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, Jado noted the on-going debate in Rwanda between multiple histories and a single history approach. This debate is supported in the field-notes recording a Rwandan educationalist's claim of an on-going debate over the objective or subjective nature of historical knowledge. The sense I got from the field-note conversation was that the RoG had commissioned a committee to decide on the nature of historical knowledge and the truth would be found. This reflects the view of some Rwandan historians and intellectuals that a scientific review of Rwandan history, which implies truth, is imperative (Rutembesa, 2002; Ntaganda, 2002). Teacher-educator Martin spoke of the positive impact the truth would have on pupils: "[S]tereotyping [about Hutu and Tutsi social groups] is going to decrease because [pupils] are in face of the truth. I think [that] is a big opportunity of this curriculum. [T]o have the real picture of what happened in the country" [Line 351-358]. Similarly, student-teacher Ultan explained: "[T]he key message in this curriculum for us is to educate our children to know our history, which will help us to unite our society; unity and reconciliation of our divided society" [Line 162-172].

Yet, whose history can achieve such healing, given the contested nature of history in post-genocide Rwanda (King, 2014)? Only one participant seemed to recognise this dilemma, as noted above, who, before an interview, wondered aloud how peace could be promoted through a single history when people are divided about that history. As evidenced above, the groups of participants saw pre-colonial history as a positive example for Rwandans today, which teacher-educator Martin saw as helping to achieve the ends student-teacher Ultan discussed above:

> I think that [student-teachers] should show [pupils the] different steps of [the] evolution of the history of this country. [F]irst of all, by [focusing] on the ancient Rwandan civilisation because it has a lot of messages [that] it can give to [pupils]. […] [Student-teachers] should show [pupils the] different aspect[s] of Rwandan culture: how politically the country [was] organised; how economically it was organised; socially in terms of religion; and so on, so that [pupils] can understand how our ancestors were living and then to get what they can learn from them. I think the most important thing to learn from them was that Culture of Peace, of tolerance and also [the] innovation they [had] during their time, the

> traditional way of living because it can show them that also they can be innovative in their [lives] [TE Martin, Line 202-218].

In sum, 'unity in homogeneity' in the 2008 history curriculum is a political strategy to achieve a new post-genocide society based on being Rwandan and not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Directing pupils to a single conception of national identity for national unity seems problematic in a context where Rwandans are emotionally tied to competing views of history and identity and the genocide is understood in ethnic terms. Yet, multiple-perspectives are equally difficult to achieve in a society where people are emotionally tied to opposing views of the past and where multiple-perspectives are viewed as dangerous by the RoG and some history educationalists. Allowing different perspectives is viewed as dangerous because one - Hutu ethno-nationalist - version of history is perceived to have divided Rwandans in the past. Below, discusses 'unity in homogeneity' in the 2008 history curriculum as a national security measure in post-genocide Rwanda.

National security

National security emerged from the initial themes: the history teacher; past, present and future; and curriculum, content and pedagogy. Together these initial themes show history curriculum reform along 'unity in homogeneity' lines to be a national security measure. Writers view the single non-ethnic narrative of history and identity promoted in history education and society at large in Rwanda as a potential cause of future conflict (King, 2014; Weldon, 2009). Conversely, policy-maker Conchobhar pointed to the relationship between de-ethnicising the post-genocide history curriculum and maintaining national security in contemporary Rwanda:

> [P]robably you have heard of the children of a school during the insurgence of 2007. [Rebels] invaded the school by [.] night and said 'okay now Tutsis here, Hutus there', right, because they wanted to kill the Tutsis. The children, they said 'no, we are all Rwandans' and very many were killed simply because they refused to separate. So these are the kind of heroes and heroines that we want to probably produce through the different curricula that we design and develop history inclusive [PM Conchobhar, Line 54-60].

While Conchobhar got the dates wrong, stating the incident took place in 2007, this incident is verified by a New York Times article published the 30th April 1997:

> The attack, which took place on Monday, occurred at a school in Gisenyi prefecture, which borders Zaire, after the girls refused the gunmen's order to separate into groups of ethnic Hutu or Tutsi, the Rwandan News Agency said. 'The students refused to comply, and the killers then started shooting indiscriminately,' the agency quoted a survivor as saying (N/A, 1997, p.1).

The incident referred to above took place in 1997. However, there continues to be a security threat from rebel insurgents left over from the genocidal Hutu militia who fled Rwanda in 1994 and continue to make violent incursions into Rwanda. During my time in Kigali I noted that armed soldiers patrol the streets every evening and security checks are at the entrances to shopping centres and banks. A grenade attack by rebels took place in a busy Kigali market while I was in Kigali in the summer of 2013, and a number of shoppers died. The heroes and heroines Conchobhar said that the 2008 history curriculum should produce, are individuals who strongly identify with the identity narrative of being Rwandan to the exclusion of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa identities and who refuse to be divided along ethnic lines, even unto death. Being patriotic was also explicit in the type of history teacher, teacher-educator Abracham said the teacher-training institute aimed to produce:

> I think that the history teacher developed by [this institution] is the one that the government want[s] to develop. [This] public institution is going to produce teachers who respect government guidelines [Line 347- 349]. […] We [have] cultural values which are emphasised, like patriotism - someone who is not an enemy of the country [or] an enemy of the government, no, it is not [going to be a teacher trained by this institute] [TE Abracham, Line 361-363].

Attached to national security is the development of patriotic history teachers and pupils. The 2008 history curriculum aims to promote patriotism, pupils who can promote love of the homeland (chapter 5). From across the groups of participants emerged a new post-genocide type of patriotism based on national identity (Rwandan), contrasting the ethnic Hutu ethno-nationalist identity promoted pre-1994. Policy-maker Elie stated:

> In other words to build Rwandan patriotism - love of country. A Rwandan patriot is someone who would like unity, power of [the] nation of Rwanda - he would like Rwanda [to be] the most possible powerful [PM Elie, Line 2].

Similarly, teacher-educator Fidele believes being patriotic is about loving ones country and being a good citizen: "A good citizen means: a Rwandan who is aware of the values of the society; [who] are patriotic people who will love [their] country and who will do all things so that Rwanda [will] be a great country in the world [TE Fidele, Line 84]. Notice how Elie and Fidele emphasise national and not ethnic identity when discussing patriotism. Teacher-educator Abracham expanded on the idea of the good citizen discussed by Fidele above. The good citizen embodies the cultural values of: "social cohesion, patriotism [and] hospitality. [T]hese cultural values are necessary to make a good citizen today. Why [is] a husband killing his wife? Because there is lack of these cultural values" [TE Abracham, Line 587-595]. Such patriotic individuals are unlikely to commit the violent acts motivated by ethnic identity and division described by Conchobhar above.

Being patriotic was tied into the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of pre-colonial history. Abracham discussed above promoting patriotism through teaching pupils about the positive relationships existing between Rwandans in pre-colonial times, which is contested in the literature and in Rwandan society (Eltringham, 2004; King, 2014). Indeed, participants across the groups often spoke of the patriotic ideal of Rwandaness with reference to a pre-colonial ideal community[36]. For example, student-teacher Eric stated: "[I]n the ancient Rwanda they [.] tried to demonstrate [..] how the society was. […] [T]hey state how the organisation was, […] they explain how the unity of Rwandans was before. [.] So they want[..] [.] Rwandans today to imitate how [ancient] Rwandans [..] [were]" [Line 364 - 370]. There is a danger with the patriotic ideal constructed on the basis of a single narrative of Rwandan history. That is that it is no big leap to call those who adhere to unofficial narratives of patriotism enemies of the nation or security threats. Researchers fear that the single

[36]PM Turlach, Michael, Elie; TE Fidele; ST Emmanuel, Anastase, Eric, Jules, Pacifique.

narrative will fuel ethnic tensions that run beneath the surface in Rwandan society (Freedman et al., 2011; also Mclean-Hilker, 2009, 2011; Tatebe, 2011). They fear serious implications for national unity (Eltringham, 2004; Freedman, 2009) and as such, national security.

Overall, King (2006) explores the post-genocide Rwandan education system from a human security perspective and King (2014) discusses the risks Rwandan history education poses for inter-group relations. This sub-section has identified the de-ethicising of the 2008 history curriculum as a national security measure from a Rwandan policy-maker perspective. This indicates how differently 'unity in homogeneity' is perceived at the Rwandan policy level and by writers (King, 2014). Conchobhar's statement suggests that national security was an important motivating factor behind history curriculum reform and the policy of de-ethnicising Rwandan society at large, from the Rwandan perspective. Below elaborates on how ethnic identity was viewed as Rwanda's big problem and 'unity in homogeneity' (being Rwanda) as the solution to past division and the basis for future prosperity.

Ethic identity as the problem, 'unity in homogeneity' as the solution

This sub-theme emerged from initial themes: the history teacher; curriculum, content and pedagogy; and past, present and future. Together these initial themes bring into focus participants' attitudes to ethnic identity and to the official narrative of 'unity in homogeneity' (see below).

Attitudes to ethnic identity

The major RoG policy-document, Vision 2020, asks: "How do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to become? How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity" (MINECOFIN, n/a, p.4)? Corresponding to the views of the policy-makers referred to above, Hutu and Tutsi identities were discussed by teacher-educators Martin, Abracham and Fidele and student-teachers Emmanuel, Ultan, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules, Gilbert and Pacifique as divisive and at odds with building a new post-genocide society. No respondent directly challenged this view (see below). In line with the policy view outlined above, these teacher-educators and student-teachers presented ethnic identities as the defining problem of contemporary society, while being Rwandan was presented as the defining solution. This indicates that the policy-level narrative of ethnic division leading to genocide

promoted through bad 'ethnicised' history pre-1994 (see above) had filtered down to how teacher-educators and student-teachers professed to understand ethnicity. That is as inimical to building a new unified and developed post-genocide society. For example, in response to important attitudes and values pupils should leave with after studying the 2008 history curriculum for three years, student-teacher Gilbert stated:

> [T]hey must know that ethnic/ethnie groups are not the reason why Rwandan society should be disturbed by these. [T]hey must know that ethni[c] groups [are] [.] not necessary for us because even in different categories or [.] in different domains in Rwanda, Hutu, Twa and Tutsi now are working together. They must know that even in [the] Rwandese army we have all of these categories. In our army […] they don't ask you your ethni[c] group, no, they recruit you as Rwandese only. As Rwandese we should put away, we should take away and prevent all and we must fight against ethnie groups, ethnisation. So, we have to work together in order to contribute, to develop our country, our society. It is necessary. […] [I]f we continue dealing with ethnic groups, we will not develop our society" [ST Gilbert, Line 931 - 945].

The depiction by Gilbert of ethnic identity as something to be fought against mirrors the RoG official narrative. Student-teacher Gilbert links the desired curriculum outcome of pupils not being disturbed by ethnic identities with awareness that the Rwandan army recruits Rwandans not ethnic groups. This indicates Gilbert's understanding of how the 2008 history curriculum with its non-ethnic aims fits the officially proscribed non-ethnic society. A society where, as policy-maker Conchobhar put it above, people should no longer: *'identify our society in terms of those ethnic groups. [E]verybody was now [a] Rwandese'*. As a student-teacher, Gilbert reflects King's (2014) finding that students schooled in the post-genocide period often perceived ethnicity as the cause of genocide and tended to equate ethnicity with violent conflict.

As noted above, the respondents saw ethnic identities as divisive and inherently at odds with building a new society. While student-teacher Emmanuel agreed with this view, he also seemed to present ethnic identity in a slightly different way from the policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers named above. He was of the view that ethnic identity while unimportant, could co-exist with Rwandan national identity as long as one was Rwandan first. Being Rwandan first was what mattered,

which is different from saying one was only Rwandan or only Hutu or Tutsi. Emmanuel stated: "So historians or history teachers are there to know [.] which period can [best] help our students understand that they are Rwandans first, who can live together regardless of their differences and keep developing their country" [Line 792 – 799]. Emmanuel continued: "…but also to show them that human beings, despite their so called ethnic groups, despite you know everything, they are able to live in harmony. If they understand that they have a common background" [Line 1352 – 1355].

In contrast, student-teacher Albert's view of the role of the history teacher was: "[I] tell [pupils] how we are Rwandan, we are [the] same society, instead of talking about Hutu, Tutsi and Twa" [ST 7, Line 662 - 665]. For Emmanuel '*Living together regardless of difference*' did not necessarily mean erasing ethnic difference. However, for Albert, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were incompatible with being Rwandan and constituting the same society. Indeed, Albert seemed to plead with pupils*:* "I know […] on this desk […] this one maybe is a Hutu or that one is a Tutsi, but please today, we are Rwandan" [Line 569]. Albert's plea to pupils highlights a dichotomy at the centre of the RoG approach to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities: drawing attention to ethnic identities to explain why Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities are unimportant.

Student-teacher Emmanuel's understanding of Hutu and Tutsi identities as not necessarily inimical to Rwandan national identity, represents a third way. That is between the defining of national identity exclusively in ethnic terms, as either during the 1st post-independent Republic and in propaganda in the lead up to the 1994 genocide, or an essentialist non-ethnic Rwandan national identity promoted by the RoG in post-genocide Rwanda. The former prioritised difference, while the latter prioritises sameness. Emmanuel is not alone in viewing Hutu and Tutsi identities as not necessarily incompatible with Rwandan national identity. As discussed, King (2014) recorded that Rwandans recognise that "people can at the same time embrace Rwandaness and maintain different ethnicities, so long as ethnic groups are not used as bias" (p.144). Ross (2007) and King (2008) argue that in societies recovering from an identity-based conflict like Rwanda, an abstract meta-identity upon which diverse groups can come together and identify as one, while maintaining what makes them unique, might be more productive than promoting a new identity or erasing an old

one. King (2014) argues that such a hybrid identity strategy "would involve positive and simultaneous appreciation of Hutu, Tutsi" and other categories (p.144). This means putting history and identity in the hands of ordinary Rwandans, rather than controlling identity and history from the top-down. Below, critically explores the apparent agreement between participant views on official Rwandan history and identity.

Agreement

"While Rwanda may have one past it has multiple histories [and identities]" and Rwandan history is often contested in Rwanda along ethnic lines (Eltringham, 2004, p. 151; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).Yet, despite the varying ages, gender and the potentially different ethnic backgrounds of participants, all the respondents named in this section - with the exception of student-teacher Emmanuel - seemed to adhere to the identity narrative in the 2008 history curriculum. That is of being Rwandan to the exclusion of being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa in Rwanda today (see above). The afore-mentioned findings resonate with Sjoberg's (2011) finding that history teachers understood ethnic identities in line with the RoG official narrative presented in a history textbook. So Buckley-Zistel's (2009a) assertion that being Rwandan means different things to different Rwandans seems not to apply here (p.48).

Moreover, Mamdani (2002) asserts that reconciling Hutu and Tutsi in post-genocide Rwanda requires a prior reconciliation with history. If participants came from Hutu and Tutsi backgrounds, the findings above seem to suggest this has occurred through 'unity in homogeneity' and across the generations of the sample of history educationalists. However, student-teacher Gilbert gives the impression that ethnic identity was important to older generations of Rwandans. This (de-facto) would include middle-aged history teachers, policy-makers and teacher-educators:

> [A] young man and a girl they fell in love, but one among them was a Hutu and other was Tutsi. Once they wanted [.] to make marriage parents of the girl asked [..] to their child 'To whom are you going to make marriage?' [The] [.] girl explained to them a man with whom […] she was going to make marriage. So parents answered to their girl 'do you know this boy is from that family here [...] family neighbours. Also you are different in [.] ethni[c] groups you don't marry to him'. So the girl was surprised and told them that whatever you do I will marry to him. Parents put effort to prevent that, so it ended by [..] when [the] girl went back to

> the boy and told him […] what her family says they decided [..] to make marriage without inviting their [parents] [ST Gilbert, Line 941-945].

The love story above suggests a generation gap in attitudes to ethnic identity between those who were adults during the events of 1994, and younger generations who were probably children in 1994 or not yet born. Policy-makers Conchobhar, Gael and Michael spoke of teachers discriminating against pupils along ethnic lines in the pre-genocide classroom and this has been documented in the literature (Rutayisire et al., 2004). Michael focused on how teachers mediated the curriculum pre-1994 as being a driver of ethnic discrimination:

> The violence is in the methodology and not in the content. This is because in Rwanda the colonialists were teaching, including the missionaries, the Catholic missionaries who owned the schools, they will teach mathematic/arithmetic. Mathematic[s], you are talking about addition, subtraction, division, multiplication but when they teach, the methodology they used was they will/would say 'come on children you have 20 Tutsi, if you kill 5 how many do you have left'. But the curriculum is talking about subtraction and addition. […] The missionaries they came into class and they say 'Tutsi children stand up' and they stood up and they count them: '1, 2, 3, 4 [and] 5 ok sit down again'. That is dehumanisation, when you are counting them as if they are objects and you are not even telling them why you are counting them. […] When you go to history then they talk about [.] Tibet and Iceland. So the history itself is talking about how people lived together. So you can have a topic like: the origin of man where you can say […] how people lived together. But […] when the teacher approaches that topic, he say[s] all right - economic activity of these people, some people were hunters, others were gatherers but they also have another group which didn't know what to do because they had come from Iceland or Tibet" [PM Michael, Line 258 - 281].

Michael explains how teachers' ethnic prejudices shaped how they mediated the pre-1994 curriculum in an ethnic, divisive and hateful manner. Policy-maker Gael spoke of a concern in July 1994 that history teacher's trained pre-1994 were biased. Furthermore, that many teachers that taught in what is widely recognised to have been an era of widespread discrimination against Tutsi pupils in schools, still teach today: "Many teachers today were there before genocide. It's difficult to change mentality - way of thinking of teachers" [Gael, Line 7]. It was unclear if Gael is referring to pedagogy or content, however student-teacher Danielle spoke of older generations teaching history in line with personal bias:

> Because history, it is the lesson, when you teach history you [..] tried to be comfortable or not make your other things about as you know about, for example, [.] there is some old man teaching history when they teach history [..] they tried to make the history as they want. But it is not good [ST Danielle, Line 1036 -1044].

The field-notes record one educationalist telling me that promoting ethnic division in the history classroom was the big red line that student-teachers should not cross. Teacher-educator Fidele recognised that developing a good - patriotic - citizen, a core aim of the 2008 curriculum "depends [on] the teacher in the class. The value she [or] he is transmitting to the student[s]. [T]he teacher plays a great and important role" [Line 90 - 92]. Weldon (2009) points out: "what goes on in the classroom is notoriously difficult to control" (p.240). She wrote of deep anxiety about genocide ideology in schools in 2008 "with up to 50 school principals and teachers being suspended on suspicion of disseminating the ideology of genocide" (Ibid., p.251).

The above sheds light on why the RoG through the genocide ideology and divisionism laws has worked hard to control what Rwandans say in public (see chapter 5). A history teacher who deviates from the official line would undermine the 2008 history curriculum and the efforts to de-ethnicise Rwandan society at large, for which the 2008 history curriculum was designed. For example, policy-maker Gael explained that the secondary school history curriculum had the potential to bring people together: "Opportunities of history in secondary school - is history that brings students together. For example, pre-94 [in schools people would say] 'Hutu [or] Tutsi stand up'. Now no-one can say that or write [Hutu, Tutsi or Twa] in official documents" [Line 6]. So perhaps a fear of losing control of the master narrative will lead to a resurgence of ethnic politics is behind the genocide ideology and divisionism laws and how these laws have been used to control what history teachers say in the classroom. The impact narrative control had on student-teachers classroom practice is addressed in chapter seven. Suffice it to say that narrative control through the genocide ideology and divisionism laws suggests that the RoG does not seem to trust history teachers to deliver the 2008 history curriculum; in particular, teachers who taught school history under the previous regime. This questions how far participants' identification with the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative is shared amongst history teachers who taught in schools pre-1994.

The love story reported by Gilbert chimes with emerging research that shows no strong ethnic patterning to young Rwandans' narratives of the past (McLean-Hilker, 2011) and of friendships and intimate relationships between young Rwandans of different ethnic backgrounds (McLean-Hilker, 2012). However, African Rights (2001) reported ethnic prejudice amongst teachers. Teacher-educator Tadhg's experience of teaching student-teachers suggests that ethnic prejudice exists amongst young student-teachers and was not therefore, the sole pre-occupation of older generations. Nevertheless, while older generations of Rwandans in student-teacher Gilbert's account above are presented as being explicit in their prejudice - not evident in policy-maker or teacher-educator transcripts, student-teachers were discussed as being more subtle in their prejudice in Tadhg's account below. When asked to give an example of the kind of prejudices that student-teachers talk about having Tadhg stated:

> The prejudices they may have, generally they are not talked about, as you know it's not easy [..]to let out the prejudice. People always think that it's ok, there is no problem but when you allow them to reflect on specific issues, that is, when you, you show them that there is, there may be a prejudice. Like for instance in the case of Rwanda, you see this question of ethnic belonging, Hutu - Tutsi. People give it too much value that it shouldn't have. These are things that were created throughout the time and they are nothing like natural or ontologically related to human being[s]. They are fabrications [and] if you come to show people how they are fabrications [.] they agree but before making them come to discussion they think it is normal that, for instance, it is hard for a Tutsi to marry a Hutu or for a Hutu to marry a Tutsi, […] but when you make them discuss the fact that this issue does not belong to their personal being as a human being, that it is a fabrication, they become aware slowly by slowly that it is a prejudice and that maybe if a Tutsi marries a Hutu, it can work out or if a [.] Hutu marries a Tutsi, it can work out without a problem as they [.] think it [would have]" [TE Tadgh Line 10-24].

There are a number of points to make in relation to Tadhg's statement. Tadhg points to a culture of silence in Rwanda, where ethnic-based prejudices lie beneath the surface. Tadhg stated: '*The prejudices they may have, generally they are not talked about, as you know it's not easy [..] to let out the prejudice*'. The mask of neutrality noted by Tadhg perhaps explains why no interviewee spoke of ethnic identity being important to him/herself and/or of being at odds in any way with 'unity in homogeneity' promoted in the 2008 history curriculum. Genuine neutrality juxtaposes

the saliency of ethnic identity in Rwandan society at large claimed by researchers (Buckley-Zistel, 2011; also Freedman et al., 2004, 2011; Mamdani, 2002; Mclean-Hilker, 2009; King, 2009). This questions how genuine student-teacher views on ethnic identity were, or if genuine, how representative they are of Rwandan society as a whole.

Unlike other teacher-educators and policy-makers, teacher-educator Tadhg demonstrated above awareness that student-teachers, like secondary pupils, have not grown up in a vacuum. Rather, they are likely to have been shaped by Rwanda's violent past. The lack of self-awareness of ethnic prejudice noted by Tadhg amongst student-teachers suggests that prejudice took an unspoken form and perhaps a cloak of common sense. Student-teacher Emmanuel was the only student-teacher to indicate a level of awareness of how the past might impact on history teachers. He illustrated this by reflecting on what it might mean for Rwandan history teachers to deliver the 2008 history curriculum: "we teachers we are also victims of the past. So, we have […] to go beyond our feelings, our past to teach the past [Line 1517 – 1519]. Policy-maker Jado was the only policy-maker to hint at history teachers themselves having a past and a view of history, which might differ from students:

> You, as a teacher, have also a past. For example, some students may see [19]59 as a revolution, the teacher may not. We always have to go back to how to teach the past. All this should show you the delicacy of teaching history. As you have said it is not an easy job" [PM Jado, Line 9].

Emerging here is the emotional delicacy of teaching history in a post-genocide society of contested histories and more broadly, the recognition that history teachers have a past. Arising here is the issue of how a new generation of history teachers - apparently unaware of prejudices they may have - can help O-level pupils recognise and overcome ethnic prejudices they may hold. Attached here is how far student-teachers can be open about their own ethnic prejudices. That is in an authoritarian context, where speaking about such issues might be construed as genocide ideology or divisionism and attract prosecution. So an apparent lack of awareness across the groups of how student-teachers' might be unaware of their own ethnic prejudices or how the genocide ideology and divisionism laws might silence discussions about this, raises serious questions. That is about how student-teachers implement the curriculum

(see chapter 7) and their capacity to genuinely promote a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the classroom.

The above has shown that the degree(s) of agreement between policy-maker, teacher-educator and student-teachers attitudes to ethnic identity and the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008 history curriculum might be more complicated than transcripts suggest. However, there are two possible explanations for the apparent similarity between the 2008 history curriculum and policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers' views. The first is a story of genuine consensus. As noted above, during interviews, all participants seemed to believe a non-ethnic Rwandan national identity was a good thing and ethnic identity was bad and/or that what was important was being Rwandan. However, how participants came to this view is an area for further research. Scholars talk of indoctrination in Rwanda as the official 'unity in homogeneity' Rwandan identity narrative is disseminated throughout Rwanda in the media, genocide memorials, *gacaca* courts, schools and ingando or solidarity camps (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; McLean-Hilker, 2010). All participants would have likely been exposed to the official narrative over a prolonged period and in different settings.

The second possible explanation is conformity. The measure of consensus within and between policy-maker, teacher-educator and student-teacher groups referenced above was remarkable. Its contrasts with Tatebe's (2011) report of grievances amongst a small sample of non-government employees (including teachers) over the official narrative and of feelings of powerlessness to challenge this narrative. While student-teacher Gilbert advocated a Rwandan identity and fighting against ethnic identity, he also spoke of government control over history and identity. Gilbert reported toeing the government line if one wanted to avoid prison, "concerning history and philosophy [..], we must know that once you pronounce a word which is to blame the government where you are, you must think that you will be [put in] prison. That's why you should limit yourself in what you say" [Line 693].The field notes recorded a Rwandan and internationals stating that one does not challenge the RoG without expecting some sort of reprisal. This supports a view of the RoG as an increasingly suppressive and authoritarian regime (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014).

The apparent consensus between the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008 history curriculum and the interviewees could indicate that participants were afraid to stray from what is politically acceptable to say. If so, this suggests some history teachers teach an official version of Rwandan history they don't believe in but cannot publicly dissent from. In a discussion about topics in the 2008 history curriculum important for student-teachers to teach pupils but challenging to teach, teacher-educator Shyaka reported:

> Another thing is they are challenge[d], some events, they are being asked to teach events they do not understand. For example, if [.], the example I can give, the history of Rwanda, let me give you an example, the history of Rwanda. The history of Rwanda was written by people who were not historians. Some events are politicised. Then when [.] you are teaching[.] an event you do not believe in, [.] it's a challenge. […] An example, [..] in many books, let me give you an example [the] settlement of Rwanda. We need to teach the way Rwanda was settled. But according to the written books, they will tell you first came these/this people, secondly this, thirdly this, but [..] you are not, here, you are not allowed to teach those ethnicism [.] things. Yet, in [the] settlement they tell you Batwa came first, after Bahutu, then at the end Batutsi. Then, it will be a challenge because you are not allowed to use those terminologies. Yet, you have to teach the settlement of Rwanda. Without using them. Then it is a challenge, how can you teach the settlement of Rwanda if you are not allowed to use those terminologies [TE Shyaka, Line 276 - 294]?

Student-teacher Gilbert and teacher-educator Shyaka bring to the fore the question of whether history-teachers can deliver the ambitions of the 2008 history curriculum. That is if history teachers don't believe what they are teaching and/or are limited in what they can say in the classroom. Overall, ethnic identity was presented as the defining problem of Rwandan society, while being Rwandan was presented and valued across the groups as the defining solution. The apparent consensus across the groups of participants with 'unity in homogeneity' is questionable. If genuine, it sets an educated elite apart from a Rwandan society of contested histories and identities. In addition, the above raises questions about how such apparent agreement shapes student-teachers' classroom practice. That is, in a post-genocide context where pupils may value ethnic histories and identities and where the curriculum requires teachers' to implement a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking (see chapter 7). A single account of the past does not prepare student-teachers to manage the vague and contested aspects of Rwandan history policy-maker Jado referred to above. This

situation could make it difficult for student-teachers to manage contested histories and identities in the classroom context of children (see chapter 7). Below summarises the chapter.

Chapter Summary

The 2008 O-level history curriculum is a living document that is subject to interpretation. As such, this chapter explored Rwandan policy-makers' (7), teacher-educators' (5) and student-teachers' (10) perceptions of the curriculum and what this tells us about what history is valued and why. The chapter illustrated how all groups of participants conformed to the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the 2008 history curriculum. There was evidence of strong agreement between policy-makers' intentions - the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative - and how teacher-educators and student-teachers interpreted the 2008 history curriculum. This suggests that amongst the professional class of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers the official RoG 'unity in homogeneity' is a shared and valued narrative. However, whether this consensus is genuine in a society where free speech is limited is questionable.

This chapter has also provided insights into the thinking behind 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to history curriculum reform in Rwanda. 'Unity in homogeneity' can be understood as related to the experience of the 1994 genocide, often ignored in research into history education in Rwanda (Weldon, 2009). Policy-makers Conchobhar, Michael and Elie made direct links between the 1994 genocide and what children had learned in history classes' pre-1994. The 2008 history curriculum was developed to set the record straight and thereby work to restore Rwandans to their pre-colonial state of national unity. In this sense 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to history curriculum reform can be understood as a legacy of the 1994 genocide. That is in terms of a particular understanding of why genocide happened and how best to avoid genocide in the future. Tied into this 'never again' agenda was the idea of the curriculum presenting to new generations of Rwandans the 'true' history of Rwanda.

Furthermore, 'unity in homogeneity' can be understood as related to national security. The type of Rwandan that policy-makers Turlach, Conchobhar, Jade, Gael, Michael

and Elie hope the 2008 history curriculum can produce is one who identifies with being Rwandan only. This aspiration reverberated across the other groups. Such a de-ethnicised Rwandan was viewed by Conchobhar to be capable of resisting ethnic division promoted by the Hutu militia who fled Rwanda in 1994 and who commit terrorist acts in Rwanda today. Rwandans who self-identify as being Rwandan are presented by policy-makers named above, teacher-educators Martin, Abracham and Fidele and student-teachers Emmanuel, Ultan, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules, Gilbert and Pacifique as being the solution to Rwanda's ethnic past. This strategy has been employed by the RoG to act as a medicine to treat the legacies of genocide in Rwanda and to bring about national unity.

In sum, the big idea of the post-genocide RoG is national unity delivered through 'unity in homogeneity' via the 2008 history curriculum. This puts history curriculum reform at the centre of a broader process of re-narrating post-genocide Rwanda. History curriculum reform is a delivery system for a political strategy to achieve the idea of a new post-genocide society based only on being Rwandan. This new society is narrated based on a contested idea of an old pre-colonial society where ethnic identities did not exist. Participants hoped this 'true' history would contribute to national unity, reconciliation, security and/or future economic prosperity and 'never again'. Chapter seven explores the curriculum as actions from the perspectives of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers. This gives further insights into the opportunities and challenges of 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative of and a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapter 7 Curriculum as Actions: Aspirations and Classroom Practice

Introduction

Chapters five and six have shown how 'unity in homogeneity' is a political strategy to achieve national unity through the 2008 O-level history curriculum reform - a single closed and controlled narrative of Rwandan history and identity. This chapter explores how policy-makers (7), teacher-educators (5) and student-teachers (10) discussed the practice of the 2008 history curriculum. This addresses research sub-question two: What do Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student teachers discussions of the practice of the 2008 O-level history curriculum tell us about how history is taught to O-level pupils? By discussing the 'practice' of the curriculum from the perspectives of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers this chapter adds to a thin literature base on the 'curriculum as actions' in the Rwandan history classroom. Furthermore, no study has brought together the perspectives of policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers to discuss how history is taught to O-level pupils. The findings are spread across three sub-themes all related to 'curriculum as actions: aspirations and classroom practice'. They will structure the chapter and are: a new approach to teaching and learning - a legacy of the 1994 genocide; a new type of citizen for 'never again'; and, learner-centeredness in practice. So, as discussed in chapter four (see p.71), the 2008 O-level history curriculum is a conduit for wider issues around school history in post-genocide Rwanda to emerge.

The theme 'curriculum as actions' and afore-mentioned sub-themes derive from four of seven initial themes that emerged from the data analysis detailed in chapter four. These are: curriculum, content and pedagogy; the nature of history; past, present and future; and, the history teacher. To reflect the analytical process in the analysis of the findings from interviews, I make reference to these four initial themes throughout. The chapter concludes acknowledging some opportunities, but raises serious doubts about 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative of and a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform.

A new approach to teaching and learning - a legacy of the 1994 genocide

This sub-theme emerged from the initial themes: curriculum, content and pedagogy; and past, present and future. Together these initial themes express how a new learner-centred approach to teaching and learning school history is a legacy of the 1994 genocide. As noted in chapter four, the founding ideology of the post-genocide state is that genocide will 'never again' occur in Rwanda. Chapter six demonstrated how 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to history curriculum reform was a legacy of the 1994 genocide. That is, a political strategy to achieve national unity and to make genocide unthinkable to new generations of Rwandans. Evident in interviews with some policy-makers was how the aim of a learner-centered approach involving critical thinking in the 2008 history curriculum was also a legacy of the genocide. That is insofar as it was designed to develop a new type of citizen as part of a 'never again' agenda. Policy-makers' Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar with whom I conducted interviews and not 30 minute informal discussions (see Table 4.1., chapter 4), discussed how a rote and fact-based approach to teaching history in pre-genocide Rwanda had contributed to the 1994 genocide. For example, Michael explained:

> Others say, 'I just don't know, they s[aid] let's go and kill and we all [.] [went] and [.] killed'. 'We went and we did it'. Why? Because there had never been a culture in the teaching in schools of people questioning authority. Questioning authority in a negative way would mean insubordination, but in this case, I am talking about questioning authority [.] asking [.] how, why and that's very important [PM Michael, Line 723 - 733].

Michael makes the distinction between pupils questioning authority and insubordination seem an easy one. The idea of pupils questioning authority in post-genocide history classrooms pointed out by Michael is discussed below. The view articulated by 3 - Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar - of the seven policy-maker participants, echoes the official RoG explanation for the genocide noted in chapter three. That is the view that the top-down pedagogy of the pre-genocide years had perpetuated uncritical, conformist and passive attitudes in pupils, which led to genocide. However, as noted in chapter three, there is no empirical evidence of a direct link between what and how Rwandans learned in school and the 1994 genocide. Nevertheless, in the lead up to the 1994 genocide, "[t]he propagandists built upon the lessons Rwandans had learned at school" (Des Forges, 1999, p.86). Emerging here is

a policy-maker's view of Rwandans not only being insufficiently able to question authority pre-1994, but also of Rwandans being unable to make independent moral judgements, which pre-1994 education contributed to. Below, focuses on how a learner-centred pedagogy was part of a political strategy to develop a new type of citizen for a 'never again' agenda.

A new type of citizen for 'never again'

A new type of citizen for 'never again' emerged from initial themes: curriculum, content and pedagogy; past, present and future; history teacher; teaching practice; and, the nature of history. Together these initial themes show that a 'never again' genocide prevention aspiration is related to teaching history through a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking. That is to develop pupils' who are capable of making independent and moral choices. We will see how far this policy and pedagogy is replicated in teacher-educator and student-teacher interviews. Also, this sub-theme demonstrates two competing policy visions of an O-level Rwandan pupil at the heart of the 2008 history curriculum - 'unity in homogeneity' and a critical citizen.

Policy-makers Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar (above) connected an education system that taught pupils what to think rather than how to think, with the 1994 genocide. Policy-makers Michael, Gael, Turlach, Abernethy and Conchobhar went on to outline a new pedagogical approach to history education in terms of pupil involvement in class through discussions, debate and/or questions. Conchobhar explained: "The main pedagogy really is now student-centered or participatory [..] way of teaching history, where you involve your learners[.] [S]o that by probably posing certain [..] questions as a teacher you get them to appreciate certain values and certain concepts" [Line 14]. Conchobhar talks of leading pupils to specific outcomes - appreciating certain values through '*posing certain questions*' to pupils. This questions whether the insubordination Michael discussed (above) means being able to dissent from values policy-makers believe are important. However, Michael explained that dissent was the basis of building values in pupils:

> Actually, dissent is the word because the idea of tolerance, the idea of debate, the idea of discussion all this means that you can have an opinion different from mine and we can say to each-other, 'Look you talk to me

> like this, ok, but I think this [is] what I believe in' […] and then at the end of the day […] we are all Rwandans, we have a common destiny, we have a common goal, what can we learn from our dissent? How do we learn from our differences? If we don't agree, what is it we are not agreeing about? Let's go and research more about this thing, which we have not agreed on [PM Michael, Line 529 - 536].

While Michael talks of dissent as the basis for developing tolerance for other people's opinions, he states that '*at the end of the day you all […] we are all Rwandans, we have a common destiny, we have a common goal*'. This indicates that dissent does not involve challenging or rejecting the official non-ethnic 'unity in homogeneity' imagining of Rwandan national identity and this paradox is discussed below. Evident in interviews with Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar was a belief and hope that a learner-centered pedagogy would develop individual responsibility by way of an ability to make independent moral judgements. Conchobhar explained:

> We imagine [.] that kind of approach will produce independent and [..] philosophical [..] individuals who can no longer be influenced by those character[s] that we are talking about in the history, but people who will pause to ask themselves whether what they are being told to do, what they are being, you know given, is it right? There is that idea of now, self-assessing, is it right [PM Conchobhar, Line 32]?

> We could probably be saying, right by the end of this at least we are not going to get a sheep. You are going to get someone who will say 'Ah but is this right, should I do it like he [has] been told, should I'? You know you are more independent, you are more logical, you are more questioning […]. And at the same time, those values of justice, equality and all, that have already been integrated within those topics. So you question things from the point of view of a person who really wants justice to be seen to be done [PM Conchobhar, Line 40 - 42].

This is a vision of a new type of citizen. One who will not follow the genocidal commands of those in power as policy-makers claimed previous generations did in 1994, but who will ask 'why' and make 'good' moral choices. Like Conchobhar above, Michael noted the importance of pupils learning to question authority and make independent moral judgements:

> Before 1994 that history which was distorted was being taught as facts. The difference between that and the post-1994 Tutsi genocide curriculum

> reform is that we designed the curriculum such [.] [as] that it should be participatory in nature in terms of the way it is taught and learnt in school. So it would encourage students to debate with fellow students about their history [Line 68 - 71]. […] That's the key idea because the key idea is a participatory, that's the key idea, as opposed to factual transmission of knowledge [PM Michael, Line 90 - 91].

> We are told that during the 1994 Tutsi Genocide, people were told 'go and kill' and they went and killed. [.] When you ask[ed] them later, when the Human Rights, the NGOs came and they were going around writing books and reports and they were doing their research they would ask people: 'Why did you kill'? [.] People would say 'I don't know, they told me to go and kill'. Now, think about the population of people who would say, 'I don't know I was told to go and kill', you don't want to have another generation of human being[s] like that. You want a generation of people who when somebody tells you 'Go and kill', you will say 'Why, why? Why should I?' Or where they would tell you 'No, it's not good to kill' [PM Michael, Line 372 - 381].

Michael and Conchobhar spoke above of an aspiration of pupils having a moral compass that helps them to say no to killing through developing a questioning and critical attitude. Not killing because one is told to is an important, but narrow definition of challenging authority. Michael and Turlach discussed the importance of critical thinking. However, they do not take account of how far critical thinking can occur within a single closed and controlled official narrative of Rwandan history permitted in the classroom (see sub-theme Narative Control below). Turlach stated:

> If you come as a teacher [and] you teach as [..] a preacher in the church, we'll say 'Yes', even you accept it, even you don't accept it, you say 'Yes!' [.] Even in society when [.] [the] boss say[s] something we'll say 'Yes!' That is [to] obey [..]. But even if you [..] are able to develop this something, [.] I don't know what to call it, in class, we say 'Why, why, why' - a critical spirit [..]. 'Why this, why this?' Now I say the person who grow[s] in that spirit even in the society, when you will say something, he say [will say] 'Why' [Line 570-592]? [..] Even [..] you force me [to say] yes, I say 'No, No', I try to resist, maybe I [...] follow, but I [can] try to resist [..]. That spirit to resist come[s] from [.] the system of education, the way of teaching [PM Turlach, Line 598-609].

Like Michael and Conchobhar above, Turlach spoke of the ability to resist authority being based on pupils learning to ask 'why'. This questions where the line is between asking 'why' and insubordination in a society where 'unity in homogeneity' is

controlled through the genocide ideology and divisionism laws. Turlach further explained: "When you [..] start to say why, that is the beginning of critical thinking" [Line 480-484] and how critical thinking plays across the groups of participants is discussed below. Turlach and Conchobhar did discuss the importance of pupils exploring positive and negative aspects of Rwandan history, which implies genuine critical and independent thinking. Also, policy-maker Jado discussed how history should be taught:

> In my experience if you take one view or the other you are missing something. The best thing is to ask what happened - look at the evidence. We can do discussions, debates - [this] helps, even if they remain with the interpretation from their parents, no problem, because you are creating awareness and capacity [PM Jado, Line 4].

Unlike Conchobhar, Michael and Turlach, Jado noted the nuanced way history should be dealt with. This demonstrates awareness of the historical complexity inherent in a pedagogy involving discussion and debate that was not evident in other informal discussions and interviews with policy-makers. International researchers argue that the aspect of critical thinking in history education in post-conflict societies that exposes pupils to multiple points of view and develops independent thought and a critical, curious and engaged consciousness through active learning - debate and discussion - can be transformative and promote peace (see Cole and Barsalou, 2006; also Mc Lean-Hilker, 2010; Freedman et al., 2008). Rwandan academics outline similar benefits critical thinking has for history education in Rwanda (Opondo, 2012; Rutayisire et al., 2004). However as noted above, questioning authority from a policy-maker perspective does not seem to involve being free to reject the single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative.

The 'never again' policy has clearly informed the thinking behind pedagogical reform in the 2008 history curriculum in post-genocide Rwanda. Like policy-makers, teacher-educators Martin, Shyaka and Tadhg also spoke of a learner-centered approach. Similarly, teacher-educator, Fidele, spoke of a participatory approach that encouraged new generations of pupils to participate in class discussions, debate and/or to ask questions in the history classroom. Student-teachers Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules and

Pacifique spoke of a learner-centered pedagogy[37] or pupil participation (Ultan) and/or all student-teachers discussed a lesson plan. A lesson plan made of an introduction, body and conclusion that involved class discussions and/or pupils asking questions. This demonstrates a shared view of what history teachers should be doing in the classroom by policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers. The above is important insofar as Harland and Kinder (1997) note that such agreement between curriculum change and teachers' beliefs about good practice is essential if curriculum reform is to be successful.

Indeed, student-teachers Ultan and Albert spoke of pupils bringing important knowledge to the classroom. Student-teachers Accalon, Anastase, Eric and Albert saw their role as that of a guide, facilitator or colleague, not the fount of all knowledge, reconfiguring the authority of the teacher along learner-centered lines. For example, in response to what his role as a teacher was, Anastase explained:

> Yes, a facilitator. You visit [.] every group […], you listen [.] [to what] they say [and] you try [.] to [.] guide them if they don't understand" [Line 410 - 413]. […] So if you go for teaching, [it] is for teaching and you cannot impact [.] a learner [through] forc[ing] him to know, no, you lead him, you put him in a situation where he will be [..] interested [ST Anastase, Line 1274 - 1280].

What Anastase describes here is a very different relationship between teacher and pupil to the teacher-centered approach that reportedly dominated pre-genocide history classrooms as described by policy-makers above. A more learner-centered approach is also evidenced in how some student-teachers spoke of how they approached and/or interacted with pupils. Emmanuel discussed a pedagogy of sharing responsibility for learning with pupils. Danielle explained how he liked to share knowledge with others. Pacifique spoke of being patient with pupils. Gilbert spoke of joking with pupils and explained that a good history teacher creates friendships with pupils, supports pupils and allows pupils to express their ideas and opinions. Jules discussed motivating

[37]Emmanuel, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert and Jules spoke of employing a learner-centered pedagogy, which involved discussions, debates and/or pupils asking questions.

pupils by showing affection and Albert and Pacifique encouraged pupils by congratulating them when they did well. Moreover, Albert spoke of developing friendships with pupils and creating a positive learning environment:

> So [it] means when [the] situation of teaching is vice-versa, [it] is very good because learners became comfortable, [.] [they] become comfortable [in] front of you, they see that you are [a] human being like them, so they try to answer willingly and voluntarily, ok, because they don't have fear, they [.] [aren't] afraid of you, right [ST Albert, Line 464].

Evidence of a different type of teacher and a new type of classroom environment from the pre-1994 one is emerging; where the teacher and pupils' relationship is learner-centered rather than teacher-centered meaning pupils' views and contributions are desired and valued. To date, this has not been widely recognised by researchers and there is reference to a mainly teacher-led approach in history classrooms (African Rights, 2001; also Druez, 2012; Walker-Keleher, 2006). This questions how far student-teachers' aspirations and claims above are replicated in their actual classroom practice (see sub-theme 'Rhetoric and Reality' below).

However, while policy-makers Michael and Turlach noted the importance of critical thinking other policy-makers did not. Moreover, only two teacher-educators, Fidele and Tadhg, claimed that student-teachers were taught critical thinking and three student-teachers - Emmanuel, Danielle and Accalon - mentioned critical thinking. For example, Emmanuel explained: "[C]ritical thinking. The guy does not accept everything for granted, he keeps on reading, searching [and] asking [questions]" [Line 1011-1014]. Emerging here is disconnection between the rhetoric of critical thinking between policy-makers Michael and Turlach and the lack of spontaneous discussion of critical thinking in the majority of policy-maker, teacher-educator and student-teacher interviews. This reflects McLean-Hilker's (2011) findings of little open debate and teaching of critical thinking skills in history education (see Walker-Keleher, 2006; Druez, 2012). One wonders if wider aspects of educational policy and practice non-specific to history teaching might account for the above, for

example a lack of teacher-training and/or a superficial understanding of learner-centred approaches amongst participants (see below).

However, while the eight other student-teachers did not use the term 'critical thinking', there was evidence of critical thinking happening as part of Jule's and Anastase's classroom practice. For example, in response to pupil reaction to learning about ancient Kingdoms and early European explorers Anastase explained:

> But the impact [of] that, when a student [.] comes to study […] he now takes an opportunity to think about himself[.], […] and think where am I? Am I capable of doing this? [Were] [o]ur ancestors good [.] people who prepared our countries or bad ones compared to those of other countries [ST Anastase, Line 366 - 375]?

Yet, no student-teacher or teacher-educator linked a learner-centered pedagogy or critical thinking to the extrinsic purposes of a 'never again' agenda expressed by policy-makers. Participants who mentioned a learner-centered pedagogy were asked why a learner-centered pedagogy was important. So the afore-mentioned omission suggests communication between policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers about the extrinsic aims of critical thinking in O-level history education has been ineffectual. This contrasts how participants across the groups spoke of the extrinsic purposes of the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in chapter six suggesting that narrative takes precedence over pedagogy in history teaching in Rwanda.

While policy-makers advocated a learner-centered pedagogy above, they also spoke of guiding pupils towards a pre-defined outcome of 'being Rwandan, not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa' (see chapter 6). As did, teacher-educator Martin and student-teachers Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules and Pacifique who mentioned a learner-centered pedagogy. Likewise, student-teacher Ultan who spoke of a participatory pedagogy and Gilbert who along with all of the other student-teachers discussed a lesson plan involving pupils asking questions (see chapter 7). Emerging here across the groups of participants is a paradox, a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative and a learner-centered pedagogy that seem incompatible. This might indicate a

superficial understanding of the learner-centred approach and critical thinking across the groups of participants.

The above also reflects the inherent contradiction between curriculum aims. That is to develop pupils who can "live with the world without ethnic, religious distinction or other forms of discrimination and of exclusion that led to genocide of Tutsi in 1994" (MoE, 2008, p.6) on the one hand. On the other hand, to "develop into [.] learners' the spirit of critical thinking" (MoE, 2008 p.72). The first aim - instilling a sense of homogeneity - implies doing away with ethnic difference; while the second aim - critical thinking involves independent thinking about anything, including 'unity in homogeneity'. This resonates with Freedman et als' (2008, 2011) conclusion of a fundamental conflict in history education in Rwanda between a single official narrative and critical thinking thought important by the government for participation in a global economy. Indeed, policy-makers Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar's vision of a critical citizen noted above, is in conflict with the vision of developing O-level pupils who uniformly adhere to 'unity in homogeneity' - 'we are Rwandan, not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa' outlined in chapter seven. No participant seemed aware of this paradox (see chapter 6). The following sub-theme adds to our understanding of learner-centeredness in O-level history education by exploring accounts of learner-centeredness in practice.

Learner-centeredness in Practice

This sub-theme emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; curriculum, content and pedagogy; past, present and future; the history teacher; and curriculum development. Together these initial themes bring into focus accounts of learner-centeredness in classroom practice. That is through the findings of: rhetoric and reality; narrative control; contested history and identity; the classroom context of children; and, practical barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy and 'unity in homogeneity' narrative (see below).

Rhetoric and Reality

Rhetoric and Reality emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; the history teacher; and curriculum, content and pedagogy. Together these initial themes highlight where history curriculum and participant's aspirations of

learner-centeredness do and do not reflect student-teachers' reported classroom practice. While, classroom observations are required to establish whether student-teachers teach as they claim, the learner-centered aspirations evident amongst student-teachers noted above is promising. Policy-maker Michael reminds us: "[T]he teachers traditionally in Rwanda [were] regarded as the power, the source of knowledge[.] [F]or them to think that they can allow children to challenge them, sometimes they don't let go let go [of] that power that easily" [Line 1053 - 1055]. In contrast, student-teachers Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Accalon, Anastase, Eric, Albert, Jules, Gilbert and Pacifique spoke of discussions and/or questions and answers taking place in class. Anastase spoke of group work as part of a learner-centered pedagogy to develop a pupils' sense of responsibility: "also it causes in them a sense of responsibility. To be leader of a group - a sense of responsibility. There are many, many advantages of learning centered method[s]" [Line 493 - 499]. Student-teachers' self-reported classroom practice suggests a new generation of history teachers are engaging in a learner-centered pedagogy in class, but this is not supported by some teacher-educators.

Teacher-educator Shyaka stated that the learner-centered method is difficult to employ: "The learners, according to my experience, the learners are [.] really interested with that method, but still the problem is even our students are not good at learner-centered method[s][.] […] [B]ut it is really an encouraging method with this/these ordinary level [.] learners" [Line 122]. In contrast to student-teacher claims, teacher-educator Tadhg reported student-teachers using the lecture method and teaching facts in A-Level history lessons:

> They think they are teachers or technician[s] of history and they give the knowledge and that is why one of the greatest challenge[s] I realised was that they use [the] lecture method, they teach just facts, just knowledge and don't develop skills and values as lessons drawn from [.] [the] knowledge [that] they teach [TE Tadgh, Line 222].

Emerging here are gaps between policy-makers', teacher-educators' and student-teachers' aspirations of a learner-centered classroom, student-teacher claims of discussions, debates and/or questions in class and teacher-educator Shyaka's and

Tadgh's classroom experience (for further discussion see below). Indeed, while the afore-mentioned student-teachers spoke of a learner-centered or participatory pedagogy in class, Emmanuel, Danielle, Ultan, Anastase, Eric, Jules, Gilbert and Pacifique also seemed to guide pupils to particular messages. Messages that mirrored government priorities of: unity, reconciliation and/or development. For example, in response to how the curriculum can help pupils to learn certain values and attitudes, Pacifique responded:

> By exploration, […] in the colonisation there [.] [were] some heroes who wanted to unite Africans, even though some Europeans wanted to divide them so that they can rule them. [T]here are some heroes who tried to unite [Africans] and who tried again to fight against the influence or the bad consequences of colonisation. Through this, the students and the teacher will discuss together how to develop [.] [these] kind[s] of good values - of patriotism, of tolerance, of peace, of reconciliation [ST Pacifique, Line 682 - 684].

The above illustrates Pacifique's understanding of how a learner-centered pedagogy of discussion can take place in the classroom with student-teachers guiding pupils to a view of the world that matches government priorities. Nonetheless, this approach was consistent with policy-makers' discussion of critical thinking, which did not include critically engaging with the official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative (see above). Moreover, while a teacher-centered approach was not evident in the attitudes and values of a new generation of student-teachers above, Albert, Jules and Emmanuel discussed how pupils often saw the teacher as the font of all knowledge. This suggests a shift from a teacher-centered to a learner-centered classroom requires change in pupils' expectations and that this was an on-going process. For example, when asked how pupils responded to the idea that there are few facts in history and "[T]hat's why you can't say this is true 100% or false 100%" [ST Emmanuel, Line 423], student-teacher Emmanuel stated: "Yeh, they say 'Ah, if it is not true why are you teaching us [that]'" [Line 427 - 429]. Teacher - educator Shyaka noted a cultural dimension to pupils looking to the teacher for answers, which could limit a learner-centered pedagogy:

> Another thing, we Africans we are not used to debate, [.] sometimes you can put a topic on the board, you ask learners to talk, you [wait] [.] 20, 30 minutes without having someone [.] speak, then you end by going back to [the] teacher-centered method. But in schools where learners are used to talk[ing], they talk without problems, but challenges still are there because of [the] language barrier and because of culture. [..] In Rwandan culture, we have been brought up in the culture where a child never talk[s] once [..] their elders [or adults are speaking]. Then it harm[s], [.] that culture harm[s] [.] the learner [TE Shyaka, Line 130].

Taking this at face value, there is the question of whether pupils are able to participate in a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking in a culture where Shyaka seemed to say children are taught not to speak when adults' are talking. Central here is the issue of power, which teacher-educator Fidele related to history more broadly:

> I think it is important to explain more to the student[s], the student, […] even to the community in general, to explain what [.] history [is]. They don't know [.], [they] don't know really what [.] history [is]. [...] The word [for history in] Kinyarwanda [is] amateka, [..] amataka means the […] things [..] which happen[s] to the court [..] of Mwami, the court of [..] the royal [family] [.]. […] [H]istory is related to the King and [.] only to the King. It means that when you are talking about history, it is not only political history, we have to deal with economic history, environmental history, history of architecture, history is more than politics. This confusion should be removed [from the] mind of people, this is important for me [TE Fidele, Line 375 - 397].

Fidele hints at a distance from history amongst Rwandans, that history is viewed as about the powerful and that it is political. In a society where a single version of national history has been used to promote genocide and in Rwanda today - national unity, I wonder if the official history in Rwanda might be viewed by Rwandans as about the powerful. Therefore, people might feel distant from this history. Longman and Rutagengwa (2004) found 49.2 per cent of Rwandan interviewees agreed or strongly agreed that "whoever is in power rewrites Rwandan history to serve their own interests" (p.170), while only 21.7 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. This reflects the relationship between history, identity, power and politics in Rwanda across time and changing political contexts (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). A sense of distance from official history might have important implications for the capacity of the official narrative to unite Rwandans. This is significant because national unity is considered by the RoG to be key to preventing genocide in the future. Below, looks at

a learner-centered pedagogy and 'unity in homogeneity' in the context of the genocide ideology laws.

Narrative control

Narrative control emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; curriculum, content and pedagogy; and the history teacher. Together these initial themes bring into focus relationship(s) in the history classroom between narrative control, 'unity in homogeneity' and a learner-centered pedagogy. Policy-makers Jado, Turlach, Michael and Conchobhar spoke above of wanting pupils to form their own opinions (see sub-theme 'A new type of citizen for 'never again'') . This aspiration contrasts research arguing that narrative closure and the control associated with the single official 'unity in homogeneity' narrative and genocide ideology laws exclude competing interpretations of Rwandan history (Freedman et al., 2008; Freedman, 2009). This questions policy-makers' commitment to a learner-centered pedagogy and/or critical thinking. No policy-maker alluded to limits on freedom of speech in Rwanda and how this might impact on a learner-centered pedagogy or critical thinking in the classroom (Freedman, 2009). No policy-maker and only one teacher-educator (Martin) discussed the limiting impact the genocide ideology laws had on history student-teachers practice, or the fear writers discuss these laws generate amongst history teachers (Ibid.; King, 2014; further discussion see below). In this sense, the vision of a new citizen capable of independent thought and able to resist authority at policy-level conflicts with the reality reported by writers. That is the reality of a top-down official history underpinned by genocide ideology laws curtailing what people feel they can say in public (Ibid.; Ibid.).

However, Michael explained how from his perspective, genocide ideology is an on-going barrier to peace and development that the government is fighting:

> [W]e still have genocide ideology, [.] people living out of Rwanda they write on the internet, they write in newspapers and genocide ideology is something we are still fighting and [.] for as long as you still have genocide ideology, as long as you have violence in places then you cannot talk about promoting a Culture of Peace. Yeh, because it is peace as opposed to violence [Line 953 - 959]. […] Yeh, because we have peace

> and reconciliation as a key pillar [..] for our development [PM Michael, Line 964 - 965].

This shows the conflict between the perceived need to control genocide ideology in Rwandan society for peace on the one hand and freedom of speech necessary for critical thinking and debate in the history classroom important for 'never again' on the other. This is a contradiction insofar as the new citizen capable of making moral judgements and resisting authority envisioned by the policy-makers is premised on a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking, debate and discussion in the history classroom. Michael continues:

> So we hope that the new generation will be able to be more tolerant, be able to respect [.] human right[s], be able to see the values of equality more than it happened before, but this can only be taught through a curriculum that encourages debate, discussion and tolerance [PM Michael, Line 336-340].

Debate and discussion described by Michael above does not occur in a vacuum; it has to be facilitated by wider social arrangements. In a workshop in 2006, history teachers agreed that democracy meant being able to disagree with one's government, but most history teachers reportedly felt unable to do so (Weldon, 2009). Equally, Freedman (2009) notes that history teachers' understand an inclusive society requires multiple-points of view, but African Rights (2001) report history teachers fearing criticising the RoG in class. Sjoberg (2011) concludes that history teachers fear RoG reprisals when discussing ethnic identities in class. As such, Weldon (2009) questions whether debate is possible in Rwandan history classrooms because engaging in different interpretations of Rwandan history might be construed as genocide ideology. This might be so. Asked whether student teachers were anxious about teaching the 1994 genocide, teacher-educator Martin responded:

> If you are not capable to guide clearly students he can have problems with I can say security institutions because you can be promoting divisions in class [Line 279 - 280]. […] Ok, this aspect [- the 1994 genocide] is taught, but I don't know whether they are using discussion or they are using [the] expository approach because I think if they want to avoid problems they can use [the expository approach] [TE Martin, Line 332-333].

Martin suspected that student-teachers wanting to avoid potential problems with the authorities used a teacher-led approach to teach the 1994 Genocide. Corroborating this view, student-teachers Eric and Accalon spoke of history teachers being put in prison in the past for teaching genocide ideology. Accalon spoke of teachers fearing prosecution when teaching aspects of the curriculum, for example: "[S]ome teachers feared to teach [the] genocide because sometime[s] you can be imprisoned. You can make an error and some student can report you badly, so we feared to teach this topic" [Line 807- 812]. The legacy of government anxiety about genocide ideology in schools in 2008 that resulted in "up to 50 school principals being suspended on suspicion of disseminating the ideology of genocide" is on-going (Weldon, 2009, p.251).

While Accalon talks of some teachers avoiding teaching the genocide for fear of prosecution, Martin discussed student-teachers possibly teaching sensitive issues in a didactic manner to avoid the possibility of problems with the security services. Both approaches - avoidance and teacher-centered methods - contradict policy-maker aspirations for a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking in the classroom and this is discussed further below. Nonetheless, Accalon explained that teacher-training meant that teaching the genocide was not a problem nowadays, confirmed by student-teachers Ultan, Eric and Anastase. As such, there is a distinction between some history teachers reportedly not teaching the genocide, others reportedly using a teacher-led approach discussed by Martin above and learner-centeredness in some student-teachers' accounts of classroom practice in sub-theme 'The classroom context of children' below. These differences suggest a continuum of practice and that the genocide ideology laws impact on history teachers in Rwanda differently. Fear of prosecution or government reprisal is perhaps not as pervasive amongst history teachers and as disabling for a learner-centered pedagogy as writers suggest (African Rights, 2001; also Freedman, 2009; Sjoberg, 2011; Weldon, 2009).

However, narrative control through the genocide ideology laws was reflected in student-teacher Gilbert's classroom practice. Gilbert spoke of wanting to teach pupils the truth about ethnic origins, but of not being able to do so: "I wanted to teach them [or pupils] the truth [.] because I am not afraid [.] of saying the truth [.]. Even if they make people take me in judicial [or to court], I may say the truth" [ST Gilbert, Line

495 - 499]. Gilbert's reference to potential prosecution suggests a classroom context where people are not free to express their opinions, as claimed by policy-maker Michael above. Gilbert further stated that you should toe the line:

> [B]ecause I already told you that history is controlled mainly by the government. Other subjects can be taught, but history is strongly controlled and checked by the government" [Line 429]. […] [T]he value for teachers is to teach the content of the curriculum only. But when you are maybe somewhere free you may say whatever you want. But as you are under the control of some force you should respect to those [ST Gilbert, Line 485-489].

Gilbert hints at how the genocide ideology laws can create fear in the classroom, which will limit open discussions. This is evident in writers' findings of Rwandan history teacher concerns about discussing ethnicity in the classroom (King, 2014; also Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman et al., 2004). Writers argue that the genocide ideology laws prevent history teachers from critically engaging with the official history (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; also Freedman et al., 2004; King, 2014; Weldon, 2009). While only Gilbert spoke directly of being under government control, other student-teachers may have avoided this because the genocide ideology laws are highly politically sensitive in Rwanda. This might explain why, faced with contested histories and ethnic identities in the classroom, student-teachers tended to revert to a 'unity in homogeneity' message of being Rwandan (see sub-theme 'Contested history and identity' below). The paradox is that adherence to authority is what policy-makers hoped a learner-centered pedagogy would inhibit so Rwandans would 'never again' kill because they were told to.

Overall, the legacy of the genocide led to competing priorities in the 2008 history curriculum. They are national unity through a single closed and controlled 'unity in homogeneity' narrative and citizenry capable of independent thought through a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking. As noted in chapter six, the legacy of the genocide is often ignored in research into history education in Rwanda (Weldon, 2009). At the heart of the afore-mentioned contradiction are the genocide ideology laws. However, student-teachers' values and discussion(s) of their classroom practice (above) suggest that they did, at least sometimes, employ a learner-centered pedagogy (for further discussion see below). Nevertheless, the genocide ideology

laws could limit discussions when dealing with controversial aspects of Rwandan history. Below details how the on-going legacy of contested history and identity in the classroom are barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy and how a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative plays out.

Contested history and identity

Contested history and identity emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; curriculum, content and pedagogy; and the history teacher. Together these initial themes bring into focus the issue of contested history and identity in the history classroom. Evident in some student-teachers' interviews were contested histories and pupils asking questions about ethnic identity in the classroom. This reveals how it is impossible to avoid these controversial and sensitive issues in the Rwandan history classroom. Some pupils reportedly embrace the idea of a single 'true' or authorative history and/or reject the idea of ethnic identity. Others are reportedly confused and/or reject school history in favour of history learnt at home. These indicate very different pupil relationships vis-à-vis the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative, whether these different pupil attitudes are mutually-exclusive and/or how they might change over time is unexplored. By reverting to a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative when faced with these controversial issues, student-teachers may have reinforced - rather than mitigated - tensions between what pupils learned at home and at school; in doing so undermining both the national 'unity in homogeneity' agenda and the 'never again' aim of a learner-centered pedagogy. Nonetheless, while student-teachers often reverted to 'unity in homogeneity' when faced with controversial issues, there is evidence of student-teachers also engaging with pupils about ethnic identity. In doing so they demonstrated learner-centeredness in their classroom practice.

Teacher-educator Fidele and student-teachers Accalon, Albert and Eric noted how ethnically divided and/or affected by the genocide post-genocide Rwandan society was. Accalon explained: "For example, here in Rwanda people are shy, they have in their mind different [.] thoughts. [..] [M]aybe you heard the situation about Hutu and Tutsi. [..] [S]ome [.] condemn others saying that they killed us, others saying that not us but them" [Line 792 - 798]. Policy-maker Turlach spoke of conflict between what

pupils learnt at school and in society: "When the learner come[s] from the school with an idea and go[es] in[to] society and get[s] other information the[.] learner need[s] to be more strong skilled in order to face [.] what he found in society" [Line 2159 - 2164]. The role of history education according to Turlach is to prepare pupils to manage contested histories in society, which by implication differ from what is taught in school. Turlach did not clarify whether pupils become skilled by developing critical thinking capabilities or by internalising the single 'unity in homogeneity narrative'. However, he did discuss the importance of both critical thinking and 'unity in homogeneity' in the interview (see sub-theme, A new type of citizen for 'never again', above).

Contested histories and identities in society were evident in the classroom experiences of Emmanuel, Pacifique, Albert, Gilbert, Jules and Anastase. Emmanuel, Pacifique and Jules noted parental influence shaped how pupils thought about Rwandan history, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and/or the 1994 genocide. Emmanuel explains how pupils are caught between what they learn at school and at home about Hutu and Tutsi identities:

> I told them when you are sitting in a church […] do you think the guy who sits nearby you is a Hutu or a Tutsi or [.] what is important between you is just praying [to] your God? They said 'God comes first because we went there, we didn't know that we [will] find such […] we don't know, we don't care, but our parents tell us [..] we are this or this' [ST Emmanuel, Line 934 - 940].

Emmanuel describes the conflict between what pupils learn at home and at school, which leaves pupils confused and questions the potential of achieving national unity through a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative contested in wider society. IRDP (2006) confirms that "people check out at home what the teacher said on the history of Rwanda" (p.193). The conflict noted by Emmanuel also resonates with African Rights (2001) discussion of: pupils bringing into the classroom bias learned at home. While Emmanuel experienced pupils' confusion, Pacifique discussed pupils reacting negatively to what they learnt in the classroom because of parental influence:

> Maybe, [.] they cannot tell, as I told you there are some parents maybe who can still have this conception of the background. So, when you speak

> [..] you are observing the learners and their attitude, their gestures can show you if he is interested or not. Yeh, he can even show this attitude. […] Yea, he cannot speak or she cannot speak but through this gestures you understand what, who has at their home. They are still young, they cannot think themselves, but as I, [..] I think it is the parents' influence [ST Pacifique, Line 39 - 401].

My interpretation of '*I told you there are some parents maybe who can still have this conception of the background*', is parents who identify themselves and/or others in ethnic terms. I did not probe what Pacifique meant by gestures - '*through this gestures you understand what, who has at their home*'. Emmanuel's and Pacifique's experiences confirm the family influence, noted in the literature, over how pupils view the past in Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Pacifique's experiences points to Druez's (2012) finding of young Rwandans expressing disappointment with a history they view as abstract, partial and flawed in part. Nevertheless, Emmanuel, Pacifique and Anastase's classroom experiences also indicate that some pupils had moved beyond the ethnic identification and division characterising Rwanda in the 1994 genocide.

> So, when you teach[…], you talk [.] about those problems of ethni[c] [identity] and race to learners [.] they wonder themselves, 'Why that happened. Today we don't talk about [ethnicity and] race in Rwanda [..] and people are friends. Why did they use this system now, [.] why did they apply this [.] [system] of racism, ethnicism in this period? Today we don't talk about it and people are [.] together, no problem' [ST Anastase, Line 793 - 807].

There are three points to make in relation to Anastase's comment. Firstly, like Emmanuel, Anastase engaged pupils in a discussion about ethnic identity. This contrasts the avoidance and/or self-censoring tactics employed by Gilbert in relation to the role of the Catholic Church in the genocide (see sub-theme 'The classroom context of children'., below). Secondly, if Anastase actually heard pupils say the above rather than assuming what they think, the pupils' reaction to ethnic identity suggests for some, ethnic identity is unimportant. This perhaps reflects they have grown up in a very different political context from pre-1994, when ethnic identity was used to divide Rwandans. It also resonates with an African Rights (2001) report of good relations between pupils despite differences and McLean-Hilker's (2012)

discussion of friendships and intimate relationships between young Rwandans from different ethnic backgrounds. Finally, a lack of ethnic identification by pupils suggests that the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative is working, to some extent, as tentatively suggested by Druez (2012) in schools and/or - given the reported parental influence on pupils discussed above - in wider society. This resonates with King's (2014) finding of interviewees schooled in the post-genocide period generally viewing ethnicity as bad. However, it contrasts with King's (2014) interviewees who also readily pointed to Hutu or Tutsi in the classroom and how some viewed ethnicity as a fact.

While for some pupils, ethnic identity might have genuinely meant little, for others, it defined who killed who and why in 1994 and how this affected their current lives. African Rights (2001) reported pupil trauma, mirroring Tatebe's (2011) and Buckley-Zistel's (2009a) discussions of on-going scars of genocide and distrust amongst Rwandans. Buckley-Zistel (2011) talks of ethnic identity being more significant in post-genocide times because the experience and repercussions of the 1994 genocide are experienced differently by different population groups, emphasising their dissimilarity. This was evident in student-teachers classroom experiences discussed in the sub-theme immediately below. Suffice it to say here that how the legacy of the 1994 genocide could impact on pupils was discussed by Pacifique. Pacifique explained some pupils were scared of Hutu because their parents taught them that Hutu killed Tutsi in 1994:

> [T]here are some parents who are not skilful, who did [not] have the chance to reac[h] the school so they speak whatever at home. [..] [T]heir children […] asks them [.] some questions - 'Who are this, this Hutu what does this mean, our relative[s] who lived here, where are [.] [they]'? […] [Parents can respond 'They] killed them' [..]. So in the mind of children, there is the image of those neighbour[s] who killed their relatives. So if he saw somebody who seems to have some, what can I say, originality, the same origin [or ethnic identity] of [.] those who killed their relatives, he somehow can [.] [keep] some distance [from them] [ST Pacifique, Line 351].

Given reported parental influence and how Hutu ethnic identity is linked in pupils' minds to who killed their relatives in 1994 with the effect of one pupil keeping his/her distance from Hutu, one wonders how the curriculum aim of reconciliation, noted in

chapter five, is achievable. Indeed, Emmanuel explained that teaching reconciliation was challenging: "Now, if you explain everything [.] to students who have parents who at home [who] may or may not tell them something different to what you taught them in the morning, you see its hard, [..], its challenging, very controversial" [Line 1482 - 1484]. This conflicts with Weldon's (2009) argument that the official narrative had hegemonic status among young people by 2004. It also illustrates the difficulties of achieving the aspiration repeated in interviews by policy-maker Turlach and student-teachers Albert, Ultan, Jules, Gilbert and Anastase. That is that pupils could become agents of change by re-educating their parents, family and/or friends in line with the history learned in the classroom; this would change society.

Gilbert spoke of the 2008 history curriculum playing such a social purpose thereby articulating an understanding of the extrinsic purposes of history education, namely: "Now for this curriculum, it will contribute to change our minds like [.] of that family, because if we continue dealing with […] ethni[c] groups we will not develop our society" [Line 941 - 945]. Student-teacher, Ultan stated:

> "[T]he children learn our history and their parents must [learn] from their children. [However,] it is a big task to educate children and older students [and] their parents [and] their friends. [B]ut when they beg[i]n on our children, so our history will be spread among Rwandans [ST Ultan, Line 143-152].

While Ultan acknowledged how big a task it is to educate pupils and society at large into an orthodoxy of 'unity in homogeneity', which as evidenced above is often contested in the family, Anastase was more optimistic, stating:

> [T]he child when he has a chance to learn this, [..] about his history [.] the real history he goes [.] home [and] he talks to the parents so that they also understand, his friends, his fellows at home they also know really what is now [.] Rwandan history [Line 822- 825]. […] When you want to unite people you start by [.] the youth. The youth, it's a future, a future generation and [.] when they understand first, you [do] not take a long time to meet the adults [ST Anastase, Line 886 - 891].

Re-educating the nation along non-ethnic lines through a post-genocide orthodoxy of 'unity in homogeneity' with the youth playing a key role is problematic. In addition to

contested histories in the family discussed above, far from ethnic identity being unimportant to pupils, Gilbert, Anastase and Albert spoke of pupils asking for signs of ethnic identity and/or asking student-teachers what their ethnic identity was.

> But learners ask you as the teacher, 'Please can you explain who you are? If you teach us, you come to teach us that Germans, Belgians used Tutsification to promote Tutsi, now can you tell us, give us an example of Tutsi in this class? Imagine. […] They used to ask this question. As a teacher I told them that in this class we are Hutu, Twa and Tutsi but combining all of this makes Rwandese society. Is that I teach them. Yeh, but they were not satisfied. They also asked 'Please teacher who are you, what are you'? Asking me, […] I told them that I am Rwandese. Yeh, because I told them that imagine Tutsi is Rwandese, Hutu is Rwandese, Twa is Rwandese, what do you want to mean [..] to know about it. Beyond this I don't have [.] [an] answer. Because they were not satisfied, they also asked me 'Please are you [a] survivor of genocide'? Imagine, they are philosophers because they asked this question to know if your family has been [killed] [..] [ST Gilbert, Line 399 - 409].

Pupils are responding to a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative that they seem to feel is inauthentic and they are willing to address the ethnic 'elephant in the room'. Gilbert was impressed '*they are philosophers*', but also limited in how he responded to pupils '*Beyond this I don't have [.][an] answer*'. Gilbert explains '*they were not satisfied*' demonstrating pupil interest in ethnic identity and the limits of a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of being Rwandan insofar as pupils were not satisfied with his response. Gilbert's reaction to pupil interest in his ethnic identity demonstrates not a lack of engagement with ethnic identity. Rather it demonstrates Gilbert's uncertainty as to how to deal with ethnic identity in the classroom in any other way than stating 'unity in homogeneity' - we are all Rwandans. This resonates with Freedman et al's (2004) suggestion that teachers fear the subject of history, which Buckley-Zistel (2009a) relates to the prevailing issue of how to manage the question of ethnicity in the classroom.

By repeating the official narrative Gilbert did not engage with pupils as to why they were interested in his ethnic identity, but closed down the conversation. Conversely, while student-teacher Emmanuel emphasised to pupils that they

were Rwandans (see chapter 6), he engaged pupils in some critical reflection on their attitudes to ethnic identity:

> They sat down and I asked them 'Why [.] didn't this guy tell us that he is a Hutu or a Tutsi? Why did he choose to call himself a Mutwa'? Some they say [..] 'It's because if you say we are, I'm a Hutu, there is someone who can feel uncomfortable'. I said 'Why do think the guy feels uncomfortable with you being a Hutu'? He said 'Because mom told me Hutu killed Tutsi [Emmanuel, Line 881 - 889].

This illustrates the difficulty of engaging pupils in discussions on their attitudes to ethnic identity. That is ethnic identity is tied into the oral memory of who killed whom in the 1994 genocide, and not historically important to pupils per se. Student-teacher Anastase explained that pupils can sometimes ask what their own ethnic identity is: "sometimes one can ask you 'What is my ethni[c] [identity], what is my race'? You say 'I don't know'" [Line 1977 - 1983]? Anastase's response, *'I don't know'*, also exemplifies how the issue of ethnic identity can be avoided.

Pupils tried to find out Gilbert's ethnic identity by asking if he was a survivor of the genocide, this is why Gilbert said above '*Imagine, they are philosophers because they asked this question to know if your family has been [killed]*'. By knowing if Gilbert was a survivor they could make a good guess as to if he was a Tutsi or Hutu. This suggests that despite the RoG replacing ethnic vocabulary with that of 'perpetrators' and 'survivors' in official discourse, survivor and perpetrator have become *de-facto* terms for ethnic identity in society at large. Student-teacher Jules told me a pupil stood up and stated I am a Hutu:

> So also another time when I [.] was [.] teaching, one learner […] [stood-up] and […] [said] I am [a] Umuhutu. [.] [Hutu] was a […] social clan, but it was called during the past event, was called the tribe. […] I asked him, […] 'Why'? Then he bec[a]me quiet. So, I tried also to handle this because I explained to him what I am really teaching is differently from this [ST Jules, Line 184 - 186].

Clearly, ethnic identification is important for some pupils. Gilbert explained: "Even if they ask us questions like Tutsi and Hutu, they know their ethnic groups. Even if it is

forbidden to be pronounced publicly, but everyone knows his ethnic group" [Line 659 - 661]. Similarly, Albert stated: "Remember, that back there are students, they have some information[.] about their background - [whether] they were Hutu or Tutsi" [Line 344]. Indeed, Albert discussed how teaching about the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities could create conflict between pupils in class:

> So learners among themselves, [.] start[.] to look at colleagues […] [to work out if they are Hutu, Tutsi or Twa through physical appearance]. So myself why they say Hutu [.] have a big nose [because] now student[s] try - 'Ow maybe that one is a Hutu' you see. Also it can create a conflict, that's on myself, ok, yeh is not all, it's my critical thinking [ST Albert, Line 641 - 645].

Albert's experience indicates that pupils try to by-pass obstacles to find out what they want to know about ethnic identity, as they did by asking Gilbert if he was a survivor of the 1994 genocide. Pupils have a sense of the importance of ethnic identity in society, but ethnicity is effectively outlawed. The genocide ideology and divisionism laws practically criminalise any discussion of ethnicity in public discourse. They drive into private spaces history that deviates from the official doctrine of, "we are all one Rwanda, there are no Hutu, Tutsi or Twa" (Freedman, 2009, p. 4; also Freedman et al., 2008; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Hintjens, 2008). So ethnicity is present in society and yet, paradoxically absent from pupils lives - a defining feature of the 1994 genocide that no-one can fully openly discuss.

While there was student-teacher engagement with ethnic identity in the classroom, Pacifique spoke of wanting to de-ethnicise Rwandan history. That is by replacing the language of Hutu and Tutsi with the language of being Rwandan, which Pacifique felt was appropriate for new generations: "This complex is finishing but tomorrow the next generation will understand the words, we are all Rwandese" [Line 292]. This suggests that some student-teachers may not share pupil interest in ethnic identity and perhaps given pupil interest in ethnic identity, the view that '*this complex is finishing*' is over-optimistic.

Student-teachers' face a conflict in the classroom; delivering a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative, while pupils are interested in ethnic identity. Furthermore, any mention of

the origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities risks pupils differentiating one another along ethnic lines, which is outlawed by the RoG. Like Gilbert and Anastase, Jules' reaction to the issue of ethnic identity in class: *'[O]ne learner […] [stood-up] and […] [said] 'I am [a] Umuhutu' [.]. […] I asked him, […] 'Why'? Then he bec[a]me quiet. So, I tried also to handle this because I explained to him what I am really teaching is differently from this' (see above),* illustrates engagement with the pupils' ethnic thinking. However, it also illustrates an objective to bring pupils to a non-ethnic understanding of history and identity - Jules spoke of teaching Rwandaness in the interview and I interpret '*I explained to him what I am really teaching is differently from this'* in this way (see chapter 6). Reverting to 'unity in homogeneity' not only undermines learner-centeredness in the face of sensitive issues, but the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative could put pupils and teachers into conflict with each other. Jules discussed pupils not completing homework on clans because their parents had told them that it was bad knowledge:

> Yeh, from my own experience, [..] one time I [.] taught about [.] clans. First of all I [...] taught[..] learners [.] to ask their families to tell them their clans. Then I [.] explained the clans is very different[..] from tribes. So then the learners, some learners don't [.] came with [.] information, don't got information[.]. So then when others are taught about what they have, what they knew about their clans, so others were ashamed and were very angry because their families told them it is very, very bad to know those information. So they [- or families] told them [- or pupils] to come and tell me they don't have the clan [ST Jules, Line 182].

Jules explained clans (ancient socio-political structures) were different to tribes (Hutu, Tutsi or Twa), but pupils' negative reactions suggests some pupils or parents conflated clans with ethnic identity. Telling pupils that is bad information and to tell the teacher they don't have a clan perhaps reflects the sensitive legal and political nature of ethnicity in Rwanda and how this limits classroom discussions. It also exemplifies how a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in a society of contested histories can create tensions between parents, on the one hand, and teachers on the other. Policy-maker Turlach explained: "Even […] the learner come[s] with a good idea to the family, but there is a conflict between school, from school and society" [Line 2149 - 2153]. Student-teacher Jules recounted: "Yeh. It is not really easy to teach learners with different information from their families. For example, one learner can raise his

or her hand and tell you that I [.] [do] not agree with you in this" [Line 168]. This again points to IRDP (2006) and African Rights (2001) findings of pupils reacting to Rwandan history along ethnic lines. So despite RoG attempts to erase ethnic identity, ethnic identity remains salient in Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2011; Mclean-Hilker, 2009).

The findings show that pupils want to know about ethnic identity, but ethnic identity remains a point of sensitivity limiting what one pupil and one student-teacher (Gilbert) would or would not reveal about themselves in the accounts I heard. This relates to McLean-Hilker's (2009) finding that young Rwandans don't talk about their ethnicity and while Kigali teenagers did not want to disclose their own Hutu or Tutsi background, they were keen to know that of their friends (Mclean-Hilker, 2012). Knowing the ethnic identity of others was important to most of her participants "so that the boundaries of behaviour and dialogue could be determined" (Mclean-Hilker, 2012, p.255). This reveals how the history classroom can be viewed as a microcosm of society at large and how the tensions in society are replicated in the history classroom. A lack of open discussion about ethnicity in society, amongst friends and in the classroom, limits opportunities for pupils to subject ethnic stereotypes critical scrutiny (McLean-Hilker, 2009). It also might perpetuate a desire to reveal the ethnicity of others and to conceal one's own identity reinforcing a sense of difference and division beneath the surface (Mclean-Hilker, 2009).

Perhaps because pupils were confused by the different versions of history learnt at school, home and in the community, Jules spoke in broad terms of pupils being happy to learn an authoritative single version of history. So replacing one narrative with another without critical engagement with either:

> So if, when they get the well [or good] information[.], so they become somehow very happy because it is written, it is taught by [the] teacher, […] and the government also they prepare writers of curriculum and [.] that show[s] them that it is really very important for them to know [..]. […] Yes. I let[.] them ask me different questions, [.] any questions that they want. So then I respond correctly [.] what is really important for them, what is really truth [ST Jules, Line 70 - 72].

Obura (2004) asserted that Rwandan children felt that "school can and should give unbiased and objective explanations on social relations and the history of Rwanda" (p.16). Jules spoke of pupils being happy to learn a version of history which was authorative, which links with pupils wanting historical truth discussed in sub-theme 'Rhetoric and Reality' above. So some pupils reportedly embrace the single official history as authorative, while others are reportedly confused and/or reject school history in favour of history learnt at home. These suggest the existence of very different pupil relationships vis-à-vis the 'unity in homogeneity narrative, but this proposition needs to be substantiated through large-scale empirical research with pupils.

Overall, there is evidence of student-teachers engaging with ethnic identity in the classroom. This contrasts with research findings of predominantly teacher-centeredness in the classroom and of a fear of teaching history because of uncertainty as to how to deal with ethnic identity - though this was also evident (Walker-Keleher, 2006; Freedman, 2009; Druez, 2012). Indeed, student-teachers often reverted to a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative at the cost of deeper engagement with pupils' questions about ethnic identity. This reflects Bijlsma (2009) argument that the politics of history in Rwanda is a constraint on history teaching, with history teachers often being reluctant to broach sensitive issues in the classroom.

Ethnic identity is a politically and legally sensitive issue in Rwanda, but it was reportedly important to pupils. Perhaps the suppression of ethnic identity through a single official non-ethnic history of Rwanda fuels pupil interest in ethnicity because a major event in Rwandan history - the 1994 genocide - occurred along ethnic lines. Parental influence on what pupils believed about history and identity was reported by student-teachers as significant. While research notes Rwandan children learn interpretations of the past at home (African Rights, 2001) and check out at home what they learn at school (IRDP, 2006), direct causation between what pupils' learn at home and the ideas they express at school has not to my knowledge been established in existing research. Depending on who pupils believe - home or school - a single history taught at school might lead to tensions between parents and pupils on the one hand, and history teachers on the other or between

history teachers and pupils on one hand, and parents on the other. Alternatively, pupils might be confused, caught between official and unofficial histories. All this can negate the purpose of the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative - national unity. Nonetheless, there is also evidence of pupils also being happy to learn an official version of history in school, which they could accept as authorative or even true and of pupils rejecting the idea of ethnic identity. Whether these different pupil attitudes are mutually-exclusive and/or how they might interact and change over time is unexplored. However, they reflect mixed findings in research of the importance of knowing the ethnic identity of 'others (McLean-Hilker, 2009, 2012) and of no strong ethnic patterning to young peoples (aged between 15 - 35) narratives of the past (McLean-Hilker, 2011).

Student-teachers hoped that pupils would enlighten their parents about the roots of the antagonisms between different ethnic groups, so parents would see themselves and others as Rwandans and not be divided along ethnic lines. The challenge is balancing this desire with a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking that implicitly allows pupils to come to their own views about the past. No student-teacher, teacher-educator or policy-maker - with the exception of Jado - suggested a multiple histories approach. This approach could help student-teachers to better manage contested histories and pupil interest in ethnic identity and to facilitate a learner-centered pedagogy. A lack of spontaneous discussion implies that policy-makers are not committed to a learner-centered approach in the classroom when it challenges the official history.

However, it might not be as simple as this. Policy-makers are mostly government employees. While they may genuinely want to see a learner-centered approach in history classes, they might not be empowered by politicians to get history teachers to engage pupils in deep and critical discussions of the official narrative and unofficial histories. Moreover, issues of a classroom context of children of survivors and perpetrators (see sub-theme immediately below) and large class sizes, limited resources and English as the medium of instruction (see sub-theme 'Practical barriers…', below) are barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy in the history classroom. The classroom context of the children of survivors and perpetrators is

outlined and the challenges to 'unity in homogeneity' - a strategy for national unity - and a learner-centered pedagogy - a strategy for never again - are discussed below.

The classroom context of children

This sub-theme emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; curriculum, content and pedagogy; and the history teacher. Together these initial themes bring into focus the impossibility of avoiding the violent past in the Rwandan history classroom. The previous sub-theme identified a lack of deep engagement with ethnic identity in the classroom and perhaps this was a result of a fear of political reprisal discussed in sub-theme narrative control. The literature focuses on how the politics of history constrains history teaching in Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, 2011), with scant attention given to the on-going emotional legacy of the genocide in the classroom recorded by African Rights (2001). The classroom context of children of perpetrators (mostly Hutu) and survivors (mostly Tutsi) of the 1994 genocide where some pupils have Hutu and Tutsi parents and the issue of trauma is on-going, limits a learner-centered pedagogy and pose challenges for the 'unity in homogeneity' message. Nevertheless, the picture is mixed and hard to pin down. The genocide has impacted differently on different pupils, who also have different levels of understanding as to how the genocide has shaped their lives. Moreover, student-teachers appear to find the classroom context difficult to manage with some pupils being angry or distracted by the effect the genocide had on their lives. However, some also or alternatively felt that they were adequately trained and ultimately able to manage these issues. This sub-theme shows the impossibility of avoiding the violent past in the Rwandan history classroom - it has to be engaged with.

In any classroom in Rwanda there are the children/relatives of people who killed, were killed, survivors of rape, and returnees arriving back in Rwanda in 1994 to discover their relatives had been killed (Weldon, 2009). Teacher-educator, Tadhg, explained that because Rwandans do not want to offend others, sensitive issues were often not broached in society or in the classroom. In response to specific fears student-teachers might have about open classroom discussions and when asked if he meant that student-teachers feared hurting pupils' feelings, Tadhg replied: "[Y]eh, [.] that can happen. [..] [T]hat is from my experience of the

Rwandan society, people fear to hurt others feelings especially [.] as, [.] if you consider the ethnic situation [.] people fear to hurt others [and] they seem to be neutral on [.] those issues" [Line 146 - 153]. Student-teachers, Anastase, Gilbert and Albert, contextualised this by explaining the sensitive nature of the Rwandan classroom.

> Maybe some [.] among learners, there are some category of learners [..] whose [.] parents are in prison, while others were challenged or were survival of [the] genocide. [.] How can you pronounce whatever you want? Maybe […] you may speak or pronounce some word [.] [that] disturb[s] one among those categories [ST Gilbert, Line 661].

Clearly, from Gilbert's account of classroom dynamics above, student-teachers have to be highly sensitive in discussing the genocide and ethnic identity. Anastase explained how the dynamics of the classroom created a sensitive environment in which to teach unity and reconciliation, a central aim of the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative (chapter 6):

> Let's say for example about unity and reconciliation. [.] About unity and reconciliation, when there is a student for example whose parents are in [a] cell in prison sometimes he cannot tell you many things. He sit, he stays quiet, he stays quiet because he doesn't want to think about his problem. But that is not a problem or [..] a real challenge in class because a teacher knows how to handle it [ST Anastase, Line 1346 - 1351].

Anastase handles such situations by being careful in who he asks sensitive questions to and how he asks them. Anastase imagined a pupil who was disengaged in class because a family member was in prison for what I interpret to be genocide related crimes, reflecting African Rights (2001) reports of pupil trauma. Similarly, Albert discussed how the legacy of the genocide led to some pupils being distracted during lessons:

> So to teach them history, it's like a burden. [It's] [.] a problem. So some [pupils] [.] don't hear you well because they have some problems about their backgrounds. They [.] think about how my Daddy in prison, when I will escape this [.] [classroom] and then go there to send him or her food [ST Albert, Line 198 - 200].

This highlights how the 1994 genocide has shaped pupils' lives and trauma in the Rwandan history classroom is on-going with pupils being distracted by the fact that 'Daddy is in prison'. Emmanuel explained that teaching reconciliation entailed explaining what divided people, which led to pupils asking difficult questions:

> I was saying, when you are teaching about reconciliation, it's hard because you have to explain why that reconciliation and I was telling you that you have to mention some issues like you know killings, genocide [of the] Tutsi, Hutu killing Tutsi, you know and when you say greed, political greed, who was greed[y]? Yeh, and what made […] him [greedy] [..]?All [.] [these] issues are very sensitive [.] [for] a teacher to explain in a way that students understand what you mean and what can be done [..]. Now, if you explain everything [.] to students who have parents who at home may or may not tell them something different to what you taught them in the morning, you see its hard, [..], its challenging, very controversial [..] [ST Emmanuel, Line 1470 - 1486].

After 20 years the 1994 genocide is still highly traumatic and affects pupils' lives. Gilbert, Anastase and Emmanuel highlighted a dilemma history teachers' face in the post-genocide classroom. That is of not hurting pupils' feelings, but of a need to go into depth to explain sensitive aspects of Rwandan history. Gilbert wondered how one could teach unity and reconciliation in a post-genocide context:

> How can you teach, I use your examples, how can you teach unity and reconciliation, while among those learners you are teaching some of them [.] [who have] parents in prison, others every day see […] where […] their parents and brothers [were burnt]. How can you teach them unity and reconciliation? It is difficult for you to teach them, for them to understand [.]. Imagine, maybe we are neighbours. I know that your parents killed [.] mine, how can we unify and reconciliate? It cannot be understandable for us [ST Gilbert, Line 745 - 747].

Gilbert summed up a post-genocide society and classroom context where the memory of genocide is acute, *'I know that your parents killed [.] mine, how can we unify and reconciliate? It cannot be understandable for us'*. This highlights the on-going cruel intimacy of the 1994 genocide that history teachers face in the classroom, which student-teacher Jules also discussed. Jules explained pupils know who killed their relatives and some pupils want revenge; some student-teachers discussed how

explaining the genocide to pupils was emotionally challenging for pupils and/or teachers (see below):

> For example, in Rwanda[..] as a post-conflict country those conflict were in the families. So a learner can tell you that [.] they are [.] [the] famil[y] who committed a sin, evil or wrong things to my family so I want to revenge or he can't, he can't tell you that he will [take] revenge but [he] show[s] me that he is very angry because of that. So it is very important to know how to counsel this [.] learner [ST Jules, Line 218].

This raises questions about how a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative can shape the thinking of pupils who lost loved ones during the genocide along 'unity in homogeneity' lines. It also raises questions about how 'unity in homogeneity' can lead to reconciliation between the children/relatives of perpetrators and survivors. Pacifique explained how talking to pupils about the 1994 genocide could be sensitive because one parent could come from a Hutu, the other from a Tutsi background:

> They [or pupils] can ask you 'When there was the genocide in Rwanda they told us there is Tutsi and Hutu and Twa, what do you speak about this teacher'? You know [.] this is somehow hard for us to tell the learners in Ordinary Level. So if you tell them [..] [and] at home [.] [they say], 'The teacher told me this and this' and maybe there is a Tutsi who married a Hutu. So he can ask his father or his mum, so you know somehow there are some, yeh, it can be a problem, especially for the Rwandan history but others, no problem, but Rwandan history has some challenges [ST Pacifique, Line 244 - 254].

Pacifique articulates concern for the sensitivities of Rwandan history, specifically teaching the genocide when pupils' parents have both Hutu and Tutsi backgrounds. This highlights the historical and emotional complexity of the classroom where some pupils may have relatives who participated in the genocide (Hutu) and relatives who were killed (Tutsi). Policy-makers Turlach, Jado and Gael acknowledged classroom complexities. Jado spoke of the responsibility of teachers to do no harm:

> [G]enocide made people choose. 94 forced people into one category or [an]other: you are you, I am me. Teaching history is delicate. How you present the past must be delicate. Some students [.] are suffering, so doing no harm is very important when teaching [PM Jado, Line 9].

Clearly, 20 years after the genocide the sensitivities around teaching the 1994 genocide and the risk of traumatising pupils persist. The fear of doing harm when engaging pupils in discussions about the genocide was real for student-teachers. Jules discussed how some pupils were born as a result of rape and the difficulties this created in the family and at school:

> [T]he challenge[.] is to explain [to] learners how Rwandans killed each-another. […] [L]earners [have a] broken heart because of those information's. [O]ther learners also have information from their families; for example [a] woman [was] raped by a killer and [consequently she] [had] a child. Then [for] a woman to explain to [the] learners [that] your father was a killer is very difficult. So you can also meet with those challenges in school [..] when teaching this curriculum. So the 1994 genocide is very difficult topic to teach [ST Jules, Line 432, Line, 442-447, Line 452].

Pacifique added people had experienced the genocide differently:

> It is the background of Rwanda, [.] there are some people who [.] were killed and others who was killing, even [.] those who were outside the country, [.] came, [.] [and] found others, your colleagues or your relatives were killed, so you feel somehow you don't like those who are in [.] the parts who was killing [ST Pacifique, Line 351].

Pacifique and Jules describe the different ways in which the genocide impacts on Rwandans today - those who killed and their children, lost relatives, survivors of rape and their children, and returnees arriving back in Rwanda in 1994 to discover their relatives had been killed. Perhaps this complexity, in addition to the fear of political reprisal discussed in the sub-theme Narrative Control., explains why teacher-educator Tadhg spoke of a limited openness in class and a fact-based lecture approach to teaching and learning. Tadhg stated: "I don't know really but I guess they may fear what may come out if they discuss things as they are. […] Yeh, [.] or what may shock them yeh, there is a kind of limitedness of openness" [Line 104 - 110]. While the previous sub-theme discussed a degree of student-teacher engagement with ethnic identity in the classroom, student-teacher Gilbert discusses avoiding the sensitive issue of the Catholic Churches culpability in the 1994 genocide in class. The Catholic Church was involved in colonialism and some Priests and Nuns took part in killing in 1994:

> How they organised separation in Rwandese society. Imagine you are teaching in the school of Catholics, then you are teaching to learners that Catholic Church was or is guilty to provocate or to provoke separation or discrimination among Rwandese, while you are teaching in this school. It was also a challenge. That is why instead of speaking or telling to learners all of the facts concerning Catholic Church you limited yourself in [.] words. So this topic was jumped [ST Gilbert, Line 665 - 667].

Emerging here is the gap between the classroom pedagogy of open discussion and debate envisioned by policy-makers Gael, Turlach, Michael and Conchobhar and teacher-educators' Martin, Fidele, Shyaka and Tadhg, and limiting classroom discussion in practice because of classroom dynamics. The latter point, in Gilberts' case, refers to a Catholic classroom and school illustrating how the sensitivities of the genocide are not only related to Hutu and Tutsi identities, but to religious identity as well. Policy-makers Gael and Jado recognised that dealing with the genocide was difficult for some teachers:

> For some periods [its] better not to talk because the teacher is not ready. I remember one secondary teacher saying I am not comfortable to teach about [genocide], so better to stop. I know that our teachers are not yet prepared for that, or maybe some are […]. So [history] teachers need to be prepared. So we have good curricula/documents [but] are teachers prepared? However, I am not informed on how teachers are trained to teach [PM Jado, Line 3].

Yet, not addressing sensitive issues is problematic because teacher-educators Shyaka and Tadhg felt that such discussions could help to develop a good society in the future, a key curriculum aim (chapter 6):

> Like if we are talking about the situation which led [..] to [the] Rwandan genocide, for instance, there is a background behind that and people may try [.] to talk about it with sensitive, sensitive vocabulary but if you are honest and we talk of it as it is, whatever happened is discussed and whatever consequence is displayed, not just trying to keep temporal harmony, but try [.] to see the hard issues which were there and discuss them honestly. It can lead students [.] to be part of peace builders of this nation who can create a good society in the future and now [TE Tadhg, Line 94 - 100]

Tadhg argues that the desire to keep what he calls '*temporal harmony*' or to avoid conflict in the classroom limits discussion - a barrier to developing a good society.

Writers warn that failure to face up to and to learn from the violent past can lead to renewed cycles of violence (Weldon, 2009). There is a tension between needing to teach the violent past and how far history teachers are ready to do this. As noted by African Rights (2001) there needs to be more engagement with history teachers about how to teach the violent past and the issue of teacher-training is discussed below. Pupils of different backgrounds were interested in understanding ethnic identity and how the genocide had shaped their lives. Anastase and Gilbert explained pupils wanted to know the causes of the genocide and/or the origin of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: "I teach this because every children, every learner, they need to know really the causes of genocide we had in Rwanda. They also need to know [.] the origin of Tutsi, Hutu and origin of Twa. They have this ambition, they want to know its origin" [ST Gilbert, Line 443].

Pupils looked to student-teachers for answers about the past and their present lives and this links up with children asking student-teachers questions about ethnic identity in sub-theme 'Contested history and identity', above. This contrasts with African Rights' (2001) finding of a mistrust of teachers and history by children, which is not surprising given how history was mis-used to promote genocide and how teachers participated in the 1994 genocide (chapter 2). The question of such a generational divide between pupils and teachers has not been addressed in more recent research (African Rights, 2001), but the findings referred to immediately above point to a possible diminishing generational divide.

While some pupils knew how the genocide had shaped their lives, others did not. Albert points out pupils' desire to understand why their parents were in prison without being able to connect this reality to the genocide:

> But when I was in [my school practice] internship, […] during a break, students tried to make [.] groups [and said to each-other], 'Have you seen [or understood] what [the] teacher ha[s] said, [.] do you know why my father is in prison, do you know why' [ST Albert, Line 674 - 676]?

Policy-maker Gael asserted "some young people don't know about [the] genocide" [Line 8]. The problem of how to bring such diverse groups of pupils together was acknowledged by policy-maker Turlach:

> Now consider [..] our country, our problem come[s] from how to teach in that system where [..] the person come from different countr[ies], when there is children […] [of survivors], there is other person where [..] his parent is in prison, there is the person who [.] the parent was [..] outside [the country during the genocide]. How to [.] manage to bring together that children [PM Turlach, Line 1823 - 1848]?

The quotation above illustrates the legacy of the genocide continues in the history classroom. Nevertheless, despite challenging classroom dynamics, student-teachers Emmanuel, Ultan, Anastase, Eric and Pacifique claimed pupils' demonstrated positive attitudes when learning aspects of Rwandan, African or World history. Anastase explained that pupils were emotional when learning about the genocide, revolted by what happened in 1994: "They are all ashamed to mean they have a feeling in them wondering why [.] someone can kill another? So [they] ask many questions to know really [.] the causes of that. Yes, the origin" [Line 125 - 131]. This illustrates, again, how pupils are trying to understand the genocide, why it occurred, but also how pupils feel ashamed learning that genocide happened in Rwanda. Eric, demonstrating engagement with pupils about the genocide, describes when pupils were asked if they would go and kill, they responded "No!":

> So I am in front of children, I am teaching for them, but the only question that I ask them is, 'Really as you, as children, you understand what happened? So you go and do it'? They tell [me], 'No, what kind of human being who [does that]. So through those [..] aspects that she or he remembers [.] about [.] the past, so this in [a] normal sense, a child may acquire another spirit which will help him to prevent the past [ST Eric, Line 172 - 174].

The fact that genocide was unimaginable for pupils may indicate some success for the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in that pupils cannot imagine how Hutu could kill Tutsi. This was further exemplified by Ultan's experience of pupils' learning how their ancestors founded Rwanda, which gave them the sense of a common identity: "The students know they're [.] the origin of Rwanda. […][T]hey say […] we are a founder because [of] our ancestors, our ancestors, are the founder, [..] of this [.] country" [ST Ultan, Line 1203 - 1211]. This suggests that O-level history has shaped

how some pupils' understand the past, present and future along 'unity in homogeneity' lines. However, this might also be due to parental influence.

Conversely, in an informal discussion recorded in my field notes, an international humanities (not history) secondary school teacher in Rwanda spoke of classroom debates being almost script-like. This teacher talked of pupils repeating the official narrative - a negative view of pre-genocide Rwanda and a positive view of post-genocide Rwanda - and using slogans of unity and no division. If this is an example of public transcripts in operation in the classroom, it suggests a gap between pupils participating in the official narrative and genuine belief. This questions the positive attitudes detailed above and conflicts with the vision of the learner-centered or participatory pedagogy articulated by policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers. However, a gap between pupils participating in the official narrative and genuine belief is difficult to ascertain because I did not conduct classroom observations or interviews with pupils. Moreover, as an 'outsider', pupils may not have opened up to me, especially in a context where free speech is lacking.

While student-teachers appear to find classroom dynamics difficult to manage with pupils being angry or distracted by the effect the genocide had on their lives, some student-teachers also or alternatively felt that they were adequately trained and able to manage these issues. Accalon, Ultan, Eric and Anastase claimed their training enabled them to manage sensitive aspects of history - the genocide. Anastase explained how he managed such difficulties: "[I]f there is a problem which is going to happen I try to cool, [..] to take the class in hand. […] [Y]ou have [..] to master the class. [...] When he starts arguing you try to guide him, to show him [..] the good language to use in a class" [Line 1355 - 1361].

There seem to be two types of student-teacher, those who felt able to handle emotionally difficult topics related to the 1994 genocide in the classroom and those who felt that such issues remain challenging. Whether the former confident student-teachers are also effective in their classroom requires classroom observations. Policy-maker Abernethy, Conchobhar and student-teacher Emmanuel referred to a need for more continuous on-the-job training and Jules of a need for information about counselling: "Also because as history teacher we need also [.] [more] information

about counselling. About counselling in classroom" [ST Emmanuel, Line 675, 679]. Teacher-educator Tadhg spoke of a need for more training if history teachers are to discuss difficult aspects of history in the classroom: "Maybe if they have external visitors, external experts in history and in peace education who can discuss with them issues and see how they can work out in class. Yeh, [..] to help them remove the fear of discussing hard issues" [Line 308 - 312]. Ultan spoke of trained and non-trained history teachers not going deeply into the genocide in class. Ultan also spoke of history teachers generally and non-trained history teachers in particular relying on educational centres like Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre to teach the genocide to pupils. Ultan further reported many history teachers, especially untrained ones lack pupil management skills necessary for dealing with traumatised pupils when teaching the genocide:

> But the teacher, many[.] teacher[s] have not knowledge about how they manage [..] the student who could be traum[atised], [.] who [.] [could be] traumatise[d] by those [.] events. So they have, teaching history is one elements which is difficult for many teacher[s], especially the teacher who [.] did not train[..], who [.] [were] not qualified [ST Ultan, Line 1426 - 1430].

African Rights (2001) spoke of a need for a system offering specialist help to traumatised pupils and how all teachers need to know how to identify trauma. The above reaffirms this need and highlights the risk of untrained teachers traumatising pupils. This raises questions about whether untrained teachers should employ a learner-centered pedagogy that could bring sensitive issues to the fore in class. It also demonstrates how teaching history in a post-genocide context, where the children of survivors and perpetrators are in the same classroom, is qualitatively different from teaching history in post-genocide/conflict societies where the 'other' is another country, not a neighbour and/or a classmate. Critical thinking requires distance from events that may have been and continue to be the cause of great personal suffering (Weldon, 2009). Achieving such intellectual distance may be difficult for pupils and teachers to achieve only 20 years after the 1994 genocide. This may explain the lack of in-depth learner-centeredness in the post-genocide history classroom when sensitive issues arise. With the exception of Jado, policy-makers did not discuss the issue of trauma when talking about a learner-centered pedagogy. This absence

questions the extent to which policy-makers engage with the implications of a learner-centered pedagogy in the post-genocide history classroom.

In sum, the children of survivors and perpetrators in the same classroom challenges 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative for national unity and a learner-centered pedagogy for 'never again'. Whether pupils from Hutu, Tutsi and Taw backgrounds with diverse experiences of the 1994 genocide and differing levels of understanding as to how the genocide has shaped their lives, can identify with a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of Rwandan history is unclear. Furthermore, the capacity and willingness of trained and non-trained history teachers to teach the genocide in the classroom and/or through a learner-centered pedagogy is unclear. African Rights (2001) reported a lack of teacher-training and teacher inability to deal with pupil trauma and resultant behaviour issues and of difficulty discussing the genocide with pupils.

Thirteen years on from the African Rights (2001) study some student-teachers were afraid to discuss and critically engage with the genocide and/or ethnicity with pupils for fear of causing harm or upsetting parents. These fears perhaps make the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative a convenient school history text for student-teachers. They can avoid engaging deeply with what Hutu and Tutsi identities mean to individual pupils and the relationship between these identities and the genocide because 'we are all Rwandans' now. A closed narrative of Rwandan history is arguably easier to teach than multiple histories for inexperienced student-teachers, and where every individual pupil has his/her own view and perhaps related trauma.

However, a closed narrative and/or avoiding sensitive issues in the classroom obviates a learner-centered pedagogy of discussion and debate for a 'never again' agenda. Furthermore, closing down discussion and debate leaves little room for pupils to develop an understanding of other points of view. This was valued by policy-makers so pupils develop tolerance and it is described by Buckley-Zittel (2011) as key to future peace. Moreover, a closed narrative can create insiders - who adopt the official narrative - and outsiders - who hold to unofficial histories taught at home. National unity as envisaged depends on everyone believing the same account of history in a society of contested histories and identities that are linked to the oral memory of

genocide. As such, national unity is problematic through 'unity in homogeneity', which is also a barrier to a learner-centered pedagogy for 'never again'. Below adds to our understanding of learner-centeredness and 'unity in homogeneity'. It highlights practical barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy and a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the history classroom.

Practical barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy and 'unity in homogeneity' narrative

This sub-theme emerged from the initial themes: teaching practice; curriculum, content and pedagogy; the history teacher; and curriculum development. Together these initial themes bring into focus practical barriers to a learner-centered pedagogy and a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in the history classroom. In doing so they illustrate how wider aspects of educational policy and practice non-specific to the history teaching context impact on classroom practice and curriculum aims.

Attached to the challenges of teaching history to the children of perpetrators and survivors and/or of employing a learner-centered pedagogy therein were a number of issues. They are: limited resources - books and/or maps[38], insufficient class-time[39], a content heavy curriculum[40], over-crowded classrooms[41] and teaching in English[42] (Freedman et al., 2008; also Druez, 2012; Buhigiro, 2012; Gahama, 2012; Rutayisire et al., 2004). These educational issues are common in schools in Rwanda and non-history specific, but have implications for history curriculum implementation (see Rutayisire et al., 2004; Gahama, 2012). For example, student-teacher Gilbert spoke of being pressurised by the class teacher to skip curriculum content because of limited class time to deliver a content heavy curriculum and to prepare for exams. These wider educational issues could help to account for student-teachers' attitudes to critical thinking discussed above (see, p. 166). Instruction in English was the most significant barrier to curriculum implementation, so this wider educational policy is now considered.

[38] PM Michael; TE Martin and Fidele; ST Ultan and Accalon.
[39] PM Abernety; ST Jules, Ultan, Eric and Gilbert.
[40] PM Abernety; ST Gilbert and Ultan.
[41] TE Martin and Tadhg; ST Anastase, Eric, Emmanuel and Ultan.
[42] TE Martin and Shyaka; ST Emmanuel, Anastase, Albert, Gilbert and Jules.

Student-teachers Ultan, Anastase, Eric, Albert and Pacifique spoke of the curriculum as an important guide for what to teach pupils and Anastase felt that the curriculum was concise and clear. However, Albert explains how some teachers could not access the 2008 history curriculum because it is written in English: "When we take this one [it] is written in English, so other challenge is language barrier. I know because some teachers where I have been last time, they don't know to read English" [Line 350, 352]. Moreover, teacher-educators Martin and Shyaka and student-teachers Emmanuel, Anastase, Albert and Jules mentioned how difficult teaching and/or learning history in English could be. Shyaka explained: "Yes, [the] learner-centered method [.] asks learners to talk […], for instance the [..]medium of instruction is English. You see our Rwandan learners, most of them, they are poor in English. Then they fear to talk, language barrier" [Line 128]. Student-teacher Gilbert reflected on teaching history through English:

> Imagine [.] to attend secondary schools and teaching them [..] in English is [.] difficult for them. Even for the teachers […]. If I think in this way because [the] curriculum, every subject to be taught in secondary schools should be related to the language because language is the one [.] to facilitate communication and collaboration between teachers and learners. So imagine, they plan[ed] this curriculum to be followed by teachers, teachers will meet the problem of language [ST Gilbert, Line 51 - 59].

Gilbert raises an important point about how English limits pupils and, as Albert also noted above, teachers' opportunities to access the 2008 history curriculum. Gilbert highlights the tension between English as the language of instruction in secondary schools and a learner-centered pedagogy. That is of English being a barrier to the collaboration integral to a learner-centered pedagogy, '*language is the one [.] to facilitate communication and collaboration between teachers and learners*'. So instruction in English might also help to explain instances of teacher-led teaching reported above. Student-teacher Emmanuel linked learning outcomes with history teachers' level of English: "Yes, but in general if [..]the teacher was good, [..] qualified, master of the content, a very fluent in English speaking skills [..] the students also finishes [..] his studies [.] having a [..] positive package" [Line 1019 - 1021].

However, Anastase spoke of how the learner-centered pedagogy provided pupils with opportunities to talk in class and thereby practice English. In response to why the learner-centered method was important Anastase stated: "It also improve the [.] it fights the fear[.] of learners, they [..] fear talking [in English], […] [so] they hide themselves [..], but when they talk also they practice […] English" [Line 476]. This demonstrates that while instruction in English may impede a learner-centered pedagogy, a learner-centered pedagogy may facilitate pupils' development of English language skills.

Nonetheless, questions of genuine curriculum access and the potential of a learner-centered pedagogy remain because approximately 90 per cent of Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda only (Le Clerc, 2008). Despite this, no policy-maker mentioned teaching history in English as a barrier to accessing the curriculum or a learner-centered pedagogy in the classroom. This illustrates the disconnection between policy-maker learner-centered rhetoric and classroom realities, raising serious questions of whether a national unity and never again agenda through the 2008 history curriculum is realistic. If pupils cannot access a curriculum taught through English, neither 'unity in homogeneity' nor a learner-centered pedagogy are likely to be promoted in the classroom.

Chapter Summary

This chapter explored how policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers discussed the 2008 history curriculum in practice. It has illuminated opportunities if not of 'unity in homogeneity' but, certainly for 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to history curriculum reform and a political strategy to achieve national unity. For example, there is evidence of pupils being horrified by the genocide and rejecting ethnic identity as a reason for future division and violence, which is different from pupils rejecting the idea of ethnic identity - though some pupils did. Moreover, some pupils identified with pre-colonial ancestors, who are depicted in the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in terms of being Rwandan.

However, the chapter has also brought out numerous challenges to 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to history curriculum reform and political strategy to achieve national unity. The 'unity in homogeneity' and learner-centered pedagogy

aspects of history curriculum reform are legacies of the genocide as they were developed to respond to the needs of a post-genocide society - national unity and 'never again'. Yet, there is a conflict between a single official history of 'unity in homogeneity' and a learner-centered pedagogy involving critical thinking. Central here are competing visions of the type of 16 year-old Rwandan that the 2008 history curriculum should develop. Namely, one who embraces 'unity in homogeneity' and identifies as being Rwandan only and a critical thinker capable of independent thought; "[e]mbracing the rhetoric of critical thinking will do little if only a singular narrative is taught" (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, p.148). A single history appears - to me - to negate the 2008 history curriculum proclamation that "history is not an evangelical speech" (p.73). Little is known about how the conflict between narrative and pedagogy works out in the classroom, which this chapter has attempted to address albeit second hand (see below).

At the heart of the tension between narrative and pedagogy are the genocide ideology laws that controlled what student-teacher Gilbert was willing to say about ethnic identity in the classroom. This adds to findings of history teachers not feeling able to disagree with the RoG (Weldon, 2009, p.243). Freedman et al's (2004) research suggests that teachers fear the subject of history, which is related by Buckley-Zistel (2009a) to the question of how to manage ethnicity in the classroom in the prevailing context of the genocide ideology laws. This reflects Bijlsma's (2009) statement that the politics of history in Rwanda is a major constraint on history teaching. Without the legal freedom allowing open, public debate, how can a democratic learner-centered approach to teaching and learning history in the classroom be genuinely achieved?

When teachers feel they have to manage discussions within the rule of law that excludes ethnic identification, deep discussions about ethnic identity and the genocide are unlikely because teachers fear prosecution (see Weldon, 2009; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman et al., 2008; Mc Lean-Hilker, 2010; Sjoberg, 2011). This was evidenced by Gilbert's self-censoring noted above. The dilemma mirrors a broader contradiction between the RoG constitution that talks of democracy and equality (chapter 2) and the grassroots reality of authoritarian government control in Rwanda**.** That is where opposing viewpoints are reportedly excluded from political debate and

often demonised through genocide ideology laws (Gready, 2011; also Longman, 2011; Waldorf, 2011). The RoG argues that the genocide ideology laws protect Rwandans from future ethnic division and violence. Yet, they also limit opportunities to engage with any divisions that exist in Rwanda today, which 'unity in homogeneity' obscures.

The genocide ideology laws also shaped how far some history teachers more broadly were willing to engage with the genocide in the classroom, thereby limiting learner-centeredness when teaching the violent past. Weldon (2009) notes: "[i]t would be a brave teacher who persisted in trying new approaches [for example critical thinking and debate]" (p.252). Yet, it was impossible for student-teachers to avoid questions and discussions about ethnic identity and the genocide because pupils were interested in the violent past, sometimes to understand how it has shaped their lives. The conflict between narrative control and pedagogy noted above, was illustrated by some student-teachers reverting to a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative when discussions of ethnic identity and genocide emerged in class, thereby limiting engagement. Nevertheless, there was evidence of student-teachers engaging with pupils' questions about ethnic identity and the genocide. Reverting to 'unity in homogeneity' and/or in some cases avoiding sensitive issues was mostly reportedly related to student-teachers' fear of emotionally harming pupils.

There are two points to make in relation to the above. Firstly, narrative control and closure around teaching about ethnic identity and the genocide limited opportunities for pupils to critically engage with aspects of Rwandan history that they were interested in. This could drive ethnicity underground and add to feelings of marginalisation, fear and exclusion in relation to the official history that Waldorf and Straus (2011) argue exists amongst the population at large in relation to the RoG. This questions 'unity in homogeneity' as a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform. However, the fact of engagement with ethnic identity and the genocide by student-teachers suggests that history teachers' fear of prosecution and the disabling effect of the genocide ideology laws for a learner-centered pedagogy, might not be as pervasive as writers suggest (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman, 2009).

Secondly, history education in a post-genocide context where the children of perpetrators and survivors learn together is qualitatively different from history education in stable societies or post-genocide/conflict societies where there is separate schooling or the 'other' is another country. This is because school history in post-genocide Rwanda means engaging with recent traumatic events, which affect pupils in the same classroom differently. As this chapter has discussed, teachers need more training on how to manage the unique classroom dynamics in Rwanda and the risk of traumatising pupils. Student-teachers' fear of harming pupils limited discussions on sensitive issues and a learner-centered pedagogy.

However, discussing sensitive issues is complicated by the fact that some pupils fear speaking in English or can't speak English. Moreover, if pupils and teachers cannot access the 2008 history curriculum in English, pupils are unlikely to access the 'unity in homogeneity' message for national unity. Nor are they likely to engage in a learner-centered pedagogy of discussion, debate and critical thinking for never again. This highlights conflict between a policy of educating pupils in English and the 2008 history curriculum's aims. So wider aspects of educational policy and practice non-specific to history teaching impact on school history classroom practice and curriculum aims. Nonetheless, despite the evident challenges, no participant said that history education in Rwanda should drop the extrinsic purposes - national unity, reconciliation and peace - of history education and focus on the intrinsic or academic purposes of history only (for further discussion see chapter 8).

Pupils demonstrated different attitudes to ethnicity and the genocide. There was evidence of ethnic identity being unimportant to some pupils. This suggests that the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative is working to some extent, as noted by Druez (2012). However, other pupils were interested in ethnic identity with one student-teacher describing one pupil openly identifying him/herself in ethnic terms. This suggests parental influence might be significant in shaping pupils' attitudes to ethnic identity. Such influence highlights the potential for conflict between home and unofficial histories on the one hand, and school and official history on the other.

However, the impact family has over what pupils think about history and identity in Rwanda needs to be researched. What is clearer is the risk that denying ethnic identity is a barrier to pupils integrating their own sense of identity and history into a post-genocide Rwandan national identity (see Buckley-Zistel, 2011). Homogenising society into a single conception of Rwandan national identity is also a barrier to facing existing divisions in a constructive manner and developing mutual-understanding (Buckley-Zistel, 2011). Student-teachers' suppression of ethnic identity through 'unity in homogeneity' and limiting discussions might lead to a resurgence of the ethnic identities central to the genocide in the future (see Buckley-Zistel, 2009a, 2011). Buckley-Zistel (2011) argues the question of ethnicity lies at the heart of past violence and future peace - it should not be avoided (Eltringham, 2011), a view the findings support.

Indeed, the pupil interest in ethnic identity noted in this chapter suggests that suppressing ethnic identity has made ethnic identity intriguing to at least some Rwandan youth (King, 2014). Overall, the 'unity in homogeneity' approach to national unity depends on everyone believing the same account of history in a society of contested histories and identities. This paradox questions 'unity in homogeneity' as a political strategy for national unity through history curriculum reform and the potential for a deep commitment by history teachers to learner-centeredness in the classroom.

Despite broad international recognition of the contradiction between a closed and controlled narrative and pedagogy in Rwandan history education (Freedman, 2009; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014), this tension has to date neither been discussed in official RoG documents nor by policy-makers. This suggests policy-makers have not engaged with what it means for Rwandan history student-teachers to deliver the history curriculum in the context of the genocide ideology laws. What is worrying is that with one exception the largely middle-class cohort of policy-makers and teacher-educators interviewed did not seem aware of this or the dangers therein. Narrative control in the classroom might result in a division between a professional class of educationalists speaking an official 'truth' and ordinary Rwandans, most of whom

live in rural areas as subsistence farmers (chapter 2). Chapter eight concludes the thesis.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Introduction

Rwanda provides a case-study of a post-genocide secondary school history curriculum. By opting for a 'unity in homogeneity' approach to school history curriculum reform to promote national unity and reconciliation the RoG challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of multi-perspectivity advocated largely by the international community. As such, and 20 years on from the 1994 genocide, Rwanda is a unique context to explore school history education. The principal research question of the thesis is: What opportunities and challenges does teaching history face in post-genocide Rwanda - perceptions of what, why and how history is taught to secondary school pupils? In order to answer this question, I developed three subsidiary research questions related to the 2008 O-level history curriculum:

1) What are Rwandan a) policy-makers, b) teacher-educators and c) student teachers perceptions of the 2008 O-level history curriculum and what do these perceptions tell us about what history is valued and why?

2) What do Rwandan a) policy-makers', b) teacher-educators' and c) student teachers' discussions of the practice of the 2008 O-level history curriculum tell us about how history is taught to O-level pupils?

3) What are the present and possible future implications of these findings for the theorisation and practice of history education in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies?

Unlike previous research into history education in Rwanda, this thesis has focused on the 2008 O-level history curriculum. As a unique case of 'unity in homogeneity' taught to Rwandans aged 13-16 years (see chapter 5, p.123), the 2008 O-level Rwandan history curriculum is an important vehicle to explore the wider opportunities and challenges facing the teaching of history to secondary pupils in Rwanda today. By exploring it from the perspectives of Rwandan policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers, the thesis adds new perspectives to the literature, bridging the gap between O-level history curriculum policy, mediation and implementation. This chapter considers the key findings, the implications of the

findings and the limitations of the study. This is followed by possible future research and personal reflections.

Key Findings

This section summarises the opportunities and challenges facing history teaching in Rwanda today. It does so with reference to Rwandan policy-makers', teacher-educators' and student-teachers' perceptions of what, why and how history is taught to Rwandan secondary school pupils.

What and why - opportunities and challenges

The origins, formation and relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial times are a contested history (Eltringham, 2004). Despite this, and the contested nature of Rwandan history in society (King, 2014), the single and officially 'true' 'unity in homogeneity' narrative in RoG discourse (chapter 3) and in the 2008 O-level history curriculum (chapter 5) was reiterated across the groups of participants. Participants seemed to me, as I spoke to them, genuine in their stated beliefs. However, as reported in chapter seven, in addition to contested histories and identities in society writers report limitations to freedom of speech in terms of the genocide ideology laws (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014). So the almost uniform congruence between the stated beliefs of participants and the official RoG 'unity in homogeneity' narrative seems questionable.

Were the above genuine, it could be an opportunity of/for 'unity in homogeneity'. That is insofar as Harland and Kinder (1997) argue that curriculum change is possible only if policy intentions coincide with the beliefs of those charged with curriculum implementation. Yet, Harland and Kinder (1997) overlook the implied effect society - the object of curriculum change - has on curriculum change. There was some evidence that universal adherence to 'unity in homogeneity' in the classroom - genuine or not - by student-teachers risked conflict between some student-teachers and some pupils and their parents (chapter 7). Such classroom conflicts are a microcosm reflecting the concerns raised by writers about 'unity in homogeneity' as strategy for national unity in post-genocide Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014). If participants' stated beliefs were not genuine, there are gaps between genuine belief or appropriation and what - under the authority of the RoG - policy-makers

have constructed, teacher-educators mediate and student-teachers implement in the classroom.

The value of 'unity in homogeneity' articulated across the groups was that it was a 'good' and/or 'true' history. It explained 'who we were' before the colonialists divided us along artificial ethnic lines, which enables new generations to know 'who we really are' namely, Rwandans, not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa (chapter 7). Valuing being Rwandan and not valuing being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa was connected by participants to the memory of genocide and/or aspirations of national unity, reconciliation and/or socio-economic development. Ethnic identity was viewed as inimical to building the new post-genocide society and the defining problem of earlier society. Conversely, being Rwandan was presented as the solution to Rwanda's ethnically violent past (chapter 7). Given the Tutsi-led RPF (RoG) power basis in Rwanda, some would argue that this is a largely Tutsi elite construction of history, identity and the future of the nation (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a); a narrative employed to mask a Tutsi elite monopoly over the military and political power (Ibid.).

The type of 16 year old Rwandan pupil that policy-makers, teacher-educators and student-teachers hoped would be produced through the 2008 O-level history curriculum is one who self-identifies as being Rwandan rather than Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. For participants, attached to developing the afore-mentioned 16 year old was the oral memory of ethnic based genocide in 1994 and/or hopes for national unity, reconciliation, development and/or national security (chapter 7). Writers often advocate reform in history education in Rwanda along 'unity in diversity' lines (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman et al., 2009) and much attention has been given to the politics of 'unity in homogeneity' at RoG level (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). Less discussed are the deep-seated fears and hopes rooted in the experience of the 1994 genocide that seem to underpin and perpetuate 'unity in homogeneity' in history education at the levels of policy, mediation and implementation.

'Unity in homogeneity' is not just an approach to interpreting Rwandan history, nor is it only about RoG power, as often reported (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a). It was perceived by participants across the groups to be a panacea for the primary cause and legacy of the genocide - ethnic division based on a distorted Hutu ethno-nationalist version of

Rwandan history. This places ‘unity in homogeneity’ at the centre of a broader understanding across the groups of participants of how to reconstruct post-genocide Rwanda into a new, united and prosperous society. This signifies that ‘unity in homogeneity’ may be a staging post, part of a broader process of working out how to reconstruct the nation post-genocide.

The fears and hopes noted above mirror how the RoG positions ‘unity in homogeneity’ in government discourse. This questions how far participants' re-iteration of RoG hopes and fears are genuine or reflect RoG power (chapter 2 and 3). Nevertheless, apart from why history educationalists might support ‘unity in homogeneity’, it is still problematic. Contested histories and identities reported in society (King 2014), were evident in student-teachers classroom experiences. Student-teachers reported: some pupils were confused by the conflict between home and school histories; some asked for signs of ethnic identity, for example, asking one student-teacher what his ethnic identity was; and pupils often knew their ethnic identity, with one pupil self-identifying as a Hutu.

The above demonstrates some of the complexities of history classroom dynamics, how some pupils seemed to feel that ‘unity in homogeneity’ was not authentic. Their questions about ethnic identity and the genocide demonstrates a willingness to address the ethnic ‘elephant in the room’, which ‘unity in homogeneity’ seeks to suppress (chapter 7). Ethnic identity was real for pupils because some ‘Hutu killed my Tutsi relatives’, for others, because ‘Daddy is in prison for killing Tutsi’, as reported by student-teachers in chapter seven. Ethnicity has personal significance for some pupils that a ‘unity in homogeneity’ narrative of pre-colonial unity devoid of ethnic identity struggles to counter. So ethnicity is present in society and yet, paradoxically, the ‘unity in homogeneity’ narrative attempts to remove it from pupils' lives at school. Ethnicity is a defining feature of the 1994 genocide that no-one can fully and/or openly discuss.

‘We are all Rwandans’ or ‘unity in homogeneity’ pushes aside pupils' interest in their ethnic identity, on-going social divisions and suppresses genocide-related trauma in the history classroom (chapter 7). How far it is possible to bind together the children/relatives of perpetrators, victims and survivors - which in Rwanda are de-

facto terms for Hutu (perpetrator) and Tutsi (victim or survivor) - through a contested single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative of history and identity is unclear (chapter 7). However, in addition to confusion, pupils' interest in ethnic identity and/or trauma, there were also student-teacher reports of pupils:

- being happy to learn an official and perceived authoritative account of Rwandan history;
- rejecting ethnic identity - indicating pupils are moving beyond the divisions of the past;
- being ashamed of the genocide;
- or celebrating common historical roots (chapter 7).

Taken together, these reported responses echo the findings of other researchers, indicating a continuum of pupil attitudes to the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative - rejection, confusion or acceptance - which requires further research (Hodgkin, 2006; IRDP, 2006; Druez, 2012). Nonetheless, the continuum signifies a need for a political settlement that moves beyond RPF victory in 1994 and RPF dominance of the RoG. It calls for movement towards genuine inclusion of political opposition parties, which writers argue are suppressed in Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a).

Overall, it is impossible to avoid the related issues of ethnic identity and the genocide in the history classroom and in the context of contested histories. Some pupils seem to want historical complexity and others a single true history, reflecting King's (2014) findings in society at large. 'Unity in homogeneity' cannot respond to both a desire for a single 'true' Rwandan history and historical complexity, illustrating how 'unity in homogeneity' cannot embody the collective memories of the nation. The implications of this for national unity in the long-term are unclear. Most argue that 'unity in homogeneity' is highly problematic for national unity (Buckley-Zistel, 2008; King, 2014). However, Druez (2012) tentatively suggests it might be shaping Rwandan pupils' sense of history and identity along de-ethnicised lines. Some of the research findings suggest there are some opportunities of/for 'unity in homogeneity' as a unifying social principle, but mostly highlight the complexities and challenges involved.

How - opportunities and challenges

There is a shared vision across the levels of curriculum policy, mediation and implementation, of developing O-level pupils who uniformly adhere to 'unity in homogeneity' - 'we are Rwandan, not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa' for national unity. This conflicts with policy-makers Michael, Turlach and Conchobhar's and the 2008 O-level history curriculum's vision of a critical citizen and independent thinker for a 'never again' agenda. There was evidence of a paradox across the groups of participants: a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative and a learner-centered pedagogy that seem incompatible. This paradox is documented in the literature on school history generally (Freedman, 2009; Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014), but was not discussed by participants. This absence could indicate a superficial understanding of learner-centred approaches amongst participants, in particular student-teachers' who are at the beginning their careers.

Moreover, policy-makers stressed the importance of pupils becoming independent critical thinkers. However, no mention was made of how narrative closure and the control associated with the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative exclude competing interpretations of Rwandan history (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Freedman, 2009). At the centre of this conflict between narrative and pedagogy are the genocide ideology laws. That is between the perceived need to control genocide ideology in Rwandan society for peace, on the one hand - as expressed by one policy-maker - and the freedom of speech necessary for critical thinking and debate in the history classroom, on the other. The RoG argues that the genocide ideology laws protect Rwandans from future ethnic division and violence. However, the findings indicate that they also limit opportunities to openly engage with different interpretations of history, identity and any divisions that exist in Rwanda today (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014).

Little is known about how the seemingly conflicting nature of a closed and controlled narrative through the genocide ideology laws and a learner-centered pedagogy works out in the history classroom in practice. How the genocide ideology laws shaped student-teacher practice was hard to pin down and the findings are mixed. There was evidence of a fear of government control limiting what one student teacher would say about the origins of ethnic identity in the classroom. Other student-teachers noted that some history teachers used to be afraid of teaching the 1994 genocide in case they

were accused of what I interpreted to be genocide ideology. A teacher-educator claimed that fear of problems with the security services had led some history teachers to teach about the genocide in a non-discursive fashion.

However, there was evidence of student-teachers engaging with pupils' questions about ethnic identity and the genocide, but also of reverting to 'unity in homogeneity' and in one case avoidance of discussing the role of the Catholic Church in the 1994 genocide. The practice of reverting to a 'unity in homogeneity' narrative when discussions of ethnic identity and genocide came up limited engagement with the topic and pupils. Furthermore, no student-teacher strayed from the 'unity in homogeneity' narrative. However, limited engagement with sensitive issues for most student-teachers seemed more related to their fears of emotionally harming pupils than the genocide ideology laws (for further discussion see below).

The student-teachers' professed values and their accounts of classroom practice indicate that despite the inherent conflict between narrative and pedagogy, they did, at least sometimes, employ a learner-centered pedagogy. As such, there is a distinction between those history teachers who reportedly: did not teach the genocide or avoided sensitive issues; employed a teacher-led approach to teach the genocide; and a learner-centered approach in general, as evidenced in some student-teachers' reports of their classroom practice in chapter seven. These differences suggest a continuum of practice and that the genocide ideology laws impact on history teachers in Rwanda differently. This indicates a classroom reality far more complex than policy-maker aspirations of learner-centeredness. This also indicates a classroom reality more complex than writers' depictions of an almost universal fear amongst history teachers of engaging with ethnicity and the genocide in the classroom because of the genocide ideology laws (Weldon, 2009; Freedman et al., 2004, 2008; Freedman, 2009). It also suggests a more complex classroom reality than the depiction of a largely teacher-centered approach to history teaching in Rwanda in previous research (Druez, 2012; Walker-Keleher, 2006). At the very least, student-teachers are familiar with a learner-centered rhetoric and at least sometimes, employ a limited learner-centered pedagogy even, sometimes, when ethnicity and genocide have come up in class discussions.

One of the key findings of this study is how teaching school history in Rwanda means engaging with a recent genocide where neighbour killed neighbour, and which affects pupils in the same classroom in different ways. Student-teachers' fear of harming pupils limited discussions on sensitive issues and employing a learner-centered pedagogy and this has not - to my knowledge - been focused on in the existing research; it is a challenge facing the teaching of the violent past in Rwanda. Clearly, 20 years after the genocide, the sensitivities around teaching the 1994 genocide and the related issues of ethnicity and traumatising pupils persist, raising the issue of second and third generation trauma.

The reality of second or third generation trauma in the history classroom questions how ready the Rwandan history classroom is for a learner-centered pedagogy. Learner-centeredness, and critical thinking in particular, requires engaging with and distancing oneself from violent events that were and may continue to be the cause of great personal suffering to teachers and pupils. This might partially explain the lack of critical thinking in most student-teachers' classroom practice (chapter 7). Failure to face up to and learn from the violent past can lead to renewed cycles of violence (Weldon, 2009). Two teacher-educators felt that building a better Rwandan society required dealing with hard issues in the history classroom, which one teacher-educator felt was seriously lacking in student-teacher classroom practice (chapter 7).

Emerging from chapter seven were two types of student-teacher: those who ultimately felt able to handle emotionally difficult topics related to the 1994 genocide in the classroom and those who felt that such issues remain challenging. An evident need was revealed for more and on-going engagement through, for example local, national and international workshops about how to teach the violent past and deal with pupil trauma (chapter 7). So the findings highlight the tension between a requirement to teach the violent past and how far Rwandan history teachers are ready to do this using a learner-centered pedagogy. This has not, to my knowledge, been addressed in the existing research, but has emerged in the thesis as a central issue facing the teaching of history in Rwanda.

Finally, employing a learner-centered pedagogy and discussing sensitive issues in the classroom is complicated by student-teacher reports of limited resources - books

and/or maps, insufficient class-time, a content heavy curriculum, over-crowded classrooms and the issue of English as the medium of instruction. This illustrates how wider aspects of educational policy and practice non-specific to history teaching impact on history classroom practice and the delivering of history curriculum aims (see chapter 7). Some pupils reportedly fear speaking in English or can't speak English and one student-teacher reported history teachers not being able to access the 2008 O-level history curriculum because it is written in English. Learning through English raises questions about equality of access to the 2008 history curriculum in a society where approximately 90 per cent of Rwandans speak only Kinyarwanda (Le Clerc, 2008). This has serious potential implications for 'unity in homogeneity' and a learner-centered pedagogy. That is because if pupils and history teachers cannot access a curriculum written in English, neither the narrative nor the required pedagogy can be adequately implemented in schools across Rwanda. How English as the medium of instruction and other afore-mentioned non-history specific educational policy and practice issues shapes the delivery of narrative and pedagogy in the O-level history classroom is an important, but under-researched area. The implications of these findings for the theory and practice of history education in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies are discussed next.

Implications of Findings

This section draws on the key findings above to respond to the third sub-research question: What are the present and possible future implications of these findings for the theorisation and practice of history education in Rwanda and other post-genocide and post-conflict societies?

Rwanda

Weldon (2009) notes that the legacy of genocide is often ignored in research on Rwandan history education. This thesis has uncovered that the legacy of the 1994 genocide is at the heart of a more complex understanding of the theory and practice of history education in Rwanda. Post-genocide Rwanda faced the issue of what to do with the knowledge of the violent and contested past, and how to relate it to new generations (Weldon, 2009). The findings have indicated that the desire to raise a 16 year old Rwandan who self-identifies as a Rwandan and not a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa through a single 'unity in homogeneity' narrative is at the centre of the 2008 O-level history curriculum's construction, mediation and implementation.

The basis of the afore-mentioned aim is first the fear of genocide happening again and the perceived necessary steps to avoid such a catastrophe; and second, aspirations for national unity, reconciliation, development, security and a prosperous future. This is the what and why of O-level history, demonstrating that 'unity in homogeneity' is not simply about securing the RoG power base, as emphasised by for example, Buckley-Zistel (2009a). Rather for history educationalists 'unity in homogeneity' symbolises breaking with the violent past and constitutes a basis from which to develop a much hoped for united and developed society. So the legacy of the genocide needs to be at the centre of our conceptualisation of history curriculum construction, mediation and implementation in Rwanda.

Moreover, limited learner-centeredness in student-teacher practice seemed less a result of the genocide ideology laws, than student-teacher' fears of distressing pupils. This points to the important role the emotional legacy of the genocide plays in the history classroom. How far and in what ways the theory and practice of teaching history in post-genocide Rwandan is qualitatively different from history education in stable societies or post-conflict societies where the 'other' is taught separately or another country and not a neighbour is a further consideration. That is, the children of perpetrators and victims inhabit the same classroom space. Teaching the violent past in this unique context a mere 20 years after the genocide requires in-depth psychological understanding and professional capabilities from teachers as much as sensitivity and academic skills. This has not been sufficiently addressed in the Rwandan-based literature. There is a need for more training for Rwandan history teachers on how to teach the violent past and how to face hard and controversial issues in the classroom.

Overall, the findings have shown the impossibility of avoiding the violent past in the Rwandan history classroom - it has to be engaged with. 'Unity in homogeneity' depends on everyone accepting the same account of history in a society of contested histories and identities. The findings suggest that a single account of Rwandan history or 'unity in homogeneity' cannot constitute the collective memories of the classroom - a microcosm of the nation, and a single closed and controlled narrative conflicts with a learner-centered pedagogy (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; Weldon, 2009). The lack of in-depth discussion of ethnicity in the classroom mirrors the avoidance of openly

discussing ethnicity in society more broadly, as noted by McLean-Hilker (2012). This limits opportunities for pupils to face and challenge any ethnic stereotypical attitudes they may have.

Open discussion requires a classroom environment where history teachers and pupils are able to think and act free from the fear of prosecution and imbued with the confidence that pupil trauma can be identified and managed. This suggests a different vision of and approach to national unity in Rwanda is required. Namely, one that is bottom-up and rooted in the multiplicity of voices that exist in Rwanda, rather than the current approach of commanding a belief in an orthodoxy of 'unity in homogeneity' from the top-down (Buckley-Zistel, 2011). Finally, competing visions of a Rwandan O-level pupil linked to a conflicting narrative and pedagogy seem in perpetual conflict and 'unity in diversity' offers a possible way out. Rwandan pupils are exposed to multiple histories in society that clash with 'unity in homogeneity' in the classroom, limiting learner-centeredness and making genuine critical thinking impossible.

Conversely, in South Africa, a school history curriculum of multiple-perspectives - at least theoretically - helps pupils to understand competing histories, thus facilitating an understanding of a shared South African identity through critical thinking and debate (Weldon, 2009). Yet, for this to happen in Rwanda, freedom of speech around the topic of ethnicity is required. However, from a Rwandan perspective, this risks perpetrating genocide ideology. This is because it means affording the right to individuals to express a Hutu ethno-nationalist narrative that is viewed by the RoG and across the groups to have been instrumental in making the past genocide possible. This is a fair concern. More engagement with this vicious circle or paradox is required to better understand 'unity in homogeneity' from the perspectives of Rwandan history educationalists. That is before a convincing case for the 'unity in diversity' advocated by this thesis and others (Buckley-Zistel, 2009a; King, 2014; Weldon, 2009) can be made.

Post-genocide and post-conflict societies

Three broad approaches to history curriculum reform in post-genocide and post-conflict societies were identified in chapter three - 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches. This framework proved useful for illustrating the relationship between the history curriculum, identity, power and politics in post-genocide and post-conflict societies generally, and in post-genocide Rwanda specifically. It offers a useful theoretical framework to explore these issues further in future research.

An unexpected, but key finding emerges from exploring O-level history education in Rwanda that resonates with history education in other post-genocide/conflict societies. That is, to understand the choices post-genocide/conflict governments make about the direction of history curriculum reform requires taking account of the legacy of a violent past. In particular, taking account of how this legacy shapes choices and attitudes to reform at government level, and at the levels of curriculum construction, mediation and implementation (Weldon, 2009). This is crucial to develop an empathetic understanding of the choices made.

In addition, the findings suggest that pupils in Rwanda want to understand the violent past, with some looking to history teachers to help them do this. While no-one can say when the right time is, post-genocide and post-conflict governments have a responsibility to teach the violent past to new generations. However, Rwanda has shown that this is no easy task. History teachers may need specialist psychological training to manage complex classroom dynamics. They may need personal support to come to terms with their own experiences of the violent past and opportunities to explore their own prejudices, as discussed in chapter six and adequate resources as noted in chapter seven. This is not unique to Rwanda and these issues were noted by Weldon in South Africa (2009). Moreover, as post-war Germany demonstrates, facing a violent past to achieve reconciliation with the 'other' can be the work of generations. It can involve generations of politicians, civil society, universities, history teachers, parents and pupils (chapter 3) and this seems to be the case in Rwanda.

Neither the 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' or 'diversity' approaches is a panacea for a violent past (chapter 3), which questions if political goals should be laid at the door of school history. As one policy-maker and teacher-educator discussed in chapter six, Rwandans are emotionally attached to opposing views of the past. This would make it difficult to bring about unity through diversity, highlighting the potential concerns the RoG and similarly divided societies may have with regards 'unity in diversity'. Perhaps an approach focusing on diversity without the overt promotion of unity as identified in Northern Ireland could be an alternative (chapter 3). However, this too has limits in post-genocide Rwanda where politicians feel national unity through a common national history and identity is necessary for peace and stability. However, the over-riding issue with 'unity in homogeneity' in societies like Rwanda, where the past is contested, is that it cannot respond to the diverse experiences and backgrounds of pupils. It cannot embody the collective memories of the nation, but only impose a top-down official view of the past that resonates with some, but not others.

Whether 'unity in homogeneity' will, over time, become the accepted narrative, as I imagine the RoG hopes it will, is uncertain. Re-educating the nation into a single orthodoxy is a substantial task that carries a real risk of failure. By contrast, 'unity in diversity' despite the afore-mentioned risks, seems the better option for post-genocide/conflict societies where, as in Rwanda, the past is contested, but a common national identity exists. This is because in theory at least, it provides a basis for divided societies to face differences and divisions as part of a shared whole, which 'unity in homogeneity' does not (Weldon, 2009). King (2008) argues such an abstract meta-identity upon which diverse groups can identify as one, while maintaining what makes them unique, might be more productive than promoting a new identity or erasing an old one in divided societies.

Finally, curriculum reform and implementation do not take place in a vacuum. For example, issues of unequally resourced schools and wider socio-economic inequalities along racial lines in South Africa are reported as barriers to 'unity in diversity' (Weldon, 2009). As noted in chapter seven, resources are also lacking in Rwandan schools, history teachers need more training and English as the medium of instruction is a barrier to implementing any future reform. So wider aspects of educational policy

and practice non-specific to school history have implications for history curriculum implementation in post-genocide/conflict societies.

Theoretical and Methodological Limitations

Theoretical limitations

As noted above, 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches have provided a useful theoretical framework for this study, but by focusing on the curriculum vis-à-vis identity, power and politics, it has overlooked other issues. For example, how the 2008 O-level history curriculum deals with gender or historical and on-going socio-economic inequalities in Rwanda. A gender analysis of the 2008 O-level history curriculum would offer important insights into how far history promotes gender equality in a society where there is a majority female parliament. A gender analysis would shed further light on 'unity in homogeneity' as a narrative of and political strategy for national unity. Similarly, an analysis of how far the 2008 O-level history curriculum addresses historical and current socio-economic inequalities in Rwanda would offer important insights into 'unity in homogeneity' as a proposed narrative of and political strategy for national unity.

Methodological limitations

Methodological limitations were discussed in-depth in chapter four, but the important limitations are summarised below. Conducting research in a post-genocide society as an outsider and where freedom of speech is reportedly limited has potential implications for the quality of the data and the trustworthiness of the findings (King, 2009). My impression was participants said what they thought. However, given the constraints noted above, I have to consider the possibility that this was not always the case, and also reflect on what was not said in interviews and informal discussions. I have not taken what participants said for granted, but critically engaged with the data through the literature and highlighted and commented on suspicious silences. Chapter four illustrated how some or all of the afore-mentioned factors in Rwanda are also data issues in other post-conflict societies. The aim of this study is not to establish the 'truth' about history education in Rwanda; rather, through the findings to add to an understanding of the complexities of history education in Rwanda and the research milieu. In this way, recognising as a qualitative researcher, the temporal, partial and subjective nature of knowledge and concomitantly, the findings and conclusions of this thesis (Bryman, 2008).

Every attempt has been made to ground the findings in the literature and relate the findings to theory about history education in Rwanda and post-genocide/conflict societies more broadly. However, given the small sample of policy-makers (7), teacher-educators (5) and student-teachers (10), the results are not generalisable across Rwanda or to other post-genocide/conflict societies. Nevertheless, by linking findings to the broader theoretical framework of 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches, I demonstrate instances of "a broader set of recognisable features" (Williams, 2000, p.215). This allows for what Bassey (1998) calls 'fuzzy generalisations' across Rwanda and to other post-genocide/conflict societies (Williams, 2000).

Future Research and Personal Reflections

Future research

To develop a fuller picture of how 'unity in homogeneity' plays out in the history classroom in Rwanda and why, a longitudinal study is required. This could involve following year one classes of O-level history pupils in urban and rural schools through to the completion of the 2008 O-level history curriculum in year three. Classroom observations and periodic interviews with pupils, parents and teachers would help give a fuller understanding of how pupils respond to 'unity in homogeneity' and why, if, and how pupil attitudes change over time. From this, more substantial and generalisable findings on 'unity in homogeneity' as an approach to national unity through history education in Rwanda could be achieved. However, given the authoritarian political context and the issue of trauma in a society recovering from recent genocide, research methods require careful consideration.

This thesis is the first empirical-based study to use the theoretical framework of 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches in-depth on school history education in post-genocide Rwanda[43]. More research on using this theoretical framework is required to establish how effective it is in addressing the relationship between the history curriculum, identity, power and politics in post-genocide and post-conflict societies. Such future research could be a comparative study between school history in Rwanda as an extreme case of 'unity in homogeneity' and school

[43] In a theoretical paper King (2008) employs the 'unity in homogeneity' and 'unity in diversity' framework to characterise and compare school history in Bosnia and Herzegovina - a case of 'unity in diversity' with school history in post-genocide Rwanda - a case of 'unity in homogeneity'.

history in Northern Ireland representing an extreme case of the 'diversity approach' (chapter 3). This might enhance our understanding of why different post-genocide/conflict societies take different approaches to the history curriculum and result in an interesting dialogue between the 'unity and homogeneity' and 'diversity' approaches. Moreover, 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches are also evident in school history reform in stable societies (see chapter 1). Using 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches to compare history curricula between stable and post-genocide/conflict societies could lead to dialogue between different and often separate literatures. This might establish 'unity in homogeneity', 'unity in diversity' and 'diversity' approaches as a theoretical framework to explore the history curriculum, identity, power and politics within and between stable and post-conflict societies.

Personal reflections

Four years of extensive reading, thinking, writing, discussions with my supervisors and seven months of empirical research in Rwanda have deeply challenged my assumptions about what history education should look like in post-genocide and post-conflict societies. I still tend to believe 'unity in diversity' and/or 'diversity' approaches offers the best hope for school history education in the service of unity and peace in divided and post-genocide/conflict societies, including my own - Northern Ireland - as well as in Rwanda. However, this is now coupled with an appreciation of the complex factors that shape history education in the aftermath of genocide and violence and of the limits of any approach for national unity or peace. Nevertheless, I believe history education has an important extrinsic role to play in post-genocide/conflict societies. Extrinsic purposes are best met when pupils learn to critically examine the past to develop an understanding of the 'other' and of themselves through the 'other's' eyes.

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Appendices

1. Consent form and Information sheet
2. Interview Guides: Phase 1
3. Interview Guides: Phase 2
4. Thematic Analysis

Appendix 1: Participant Consent Form and Information Sheet

Project Title: History education and the promotion of a Culture of Peace in post-conflict societies: a case study of Rwanda

Research Aim: If and what are the opportunities and challenges of promoting a Culture of Peace through the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum?

Researcher's name: Earl Kehoe, University of Nottingham, UK
Supervisor's name: Professor Monica McLean and Mr. Gary Mills, University of Nottingham, UK. NB:

- I have read and fully understand the Participant Information Sheet below.
- The purpose of the research project has been clearly explained to me and I understand that this interview will last between 1 – 2 hours.
- I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it, and that I will not be identified in the research.
- I understand that participation in this study is completely voluntary and that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and for any reason and that this will not affect me in any way now or in the future.
- I further understand and agree that there are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to me as a result of my participation in this research. Furthermore, I understand that I will not incur any financial costs as a result of my participation in this study.
- I understand that while a transcript of my interview will be shared along with other interviewee transcripts with the teacher-training institution and the relevant Rwandan Research Authority and that information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified by name.
- I understand that I will be audiotaped during the interview, but that I can ask for the recorder to be switched off at any time.
- I understand that data will be securely stored by the researcher in transcript form.
- I understand that I may contact the researcher Earl Kehoe and Mr. Kehoe's supervisor(s) if I require further information about the research, and that I may contact the Research Ethics Coordinator of the School of Education, University of Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint relating to my involvement in the research. For contact details of the above persons please see below.

- I understand that if I have any questions relating to my rights as a participant in this study, I may contact the Chair Person of the Rwandan Ethics Committee in Kigali, Dr. Justin Wane at 0788500499 and/or the Secretary of the Committee, Dr. Emmanuel Nkeranihigo at 0788557273.

- I understand and agree to partake in the research.

Signed By the Participant…… **Date:**…….

Contact details
Researcher: *{earlkehoe@hotmail.com}* Mobile *in Rwanda* (_____) Mobile *in UK* (00447900087480); Supervisors: *monica.mclean@nottingham.ac.uk Tele:* 0044115 951 3704 *; gary.mills@nottingham.ac.uk Tele:* 0044115 951 4497*;* School of Education Research Ethics Coordinator: educationresearchethics@nottingham.ac.uk

Participant Information Sheet

Dear Sir/Madam,

The 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum aims to promote a Culture of Peace (CoP). The purpose of this study is to explore if/what are the opportunities and challenges of/for promoting a Culture of Peace through the 2008 Rwandan secondary (junior) history curriculum in history classrooms in Rwanda? This question is important because the promotion and the development of a CoP in a post-conflict society, for example Rwanda, is likely to play a role in peace and reconciliation and the future social and economic development of that society. Therefore, by contributing to this research, you are contributing to a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges of promoting a CoP through the 2008 Rwandan secondary (junior) history curriculum in Rwandan history classrooms and as such history education as a medium for promoting a CoP in Rwanda and other post-conflict societies. Consequently, this study has potential to inform debates about promoting/developing a CoP through history curricula not only in Rwanda but in other post-conflict societies in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, N and S America and other African countries.

In this study I employ the research methods: documentary analysis and one to one semi-structured interviews. The data is collected in 2 phases. During the first phase of

data collection conducted between September and November 2012, I conducted 1-1 semi-structured interviews in private with 5 fourth year secondary history student-teachers, 1 teacher – trainer and I had informal discussions with 2 policy-makers in education. During this present 2013 phase of data collection, I aim to conduct 1-1 semi-structured interviews in private with 5 more final year secondary history student-teachers, 4 more teacher – trainers and to have an informal discussion with 1 policy-maker in education. I may also have very informal discussions with 1 education specialist in 1-3 (I)NGOs in Kigali.

Please note that you are **under absolutely no obligation** to participate in this study, participation is on a voluntary basis only. If you do decide to participate in this study I would like to restate that you will not be identified by name in the transcript of the interview, in my PhD or any future publications. Furthermore, I can meet to conduct an interview at any time and place of your convenience within Kigali. I would like to take the opportunity to thank-you very much for taking the time to consider this study and your potential participation in it. If you have any questions that you would like answered before making a decision about participating in this study please don't hesitate to contact me, my supervisors and/or the Rwandan Ethics Committee and/or the University of Nottingham Ethics Co-ordinator; please see above for contact details.

Murakoze Cyane, Thank-you, Merci!
Earl Kehoe (Doctoral Candidate, University of Nottingham)

Appendix 2: Interview Guide: Policy Makers, Teacher-Educators and Student-Teachers for Phase 1 of data collection (10th September 2012 - 28th November 2012)

A. Policy-Makers

1. **Broadly is secondary junior history education important in Rwanda and why?** Supporting Questions: Could you tell me a little about the different sections of the curriculum in terms of content and pedagogy (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial sections). What key messages and pedagogies run through these different sections that are important for student-teachers to know (be specific –what message, what skills, what part of the curriculum)? Why? What are the most important message(s) and skills that student-teachers should take away after studying here and put in practice in the classroom? Why – how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum/what are the core aims of the curriculum?

2. **Can you talk me through the type of lesson you would like to see student teachers teaching when using the 2008 curriculum and why?** Supporting Questions: What would be important aims/objectives –content(s)/messages and skills - of the lesson, what part(s) of the curriculum should they use and why? How should they begin the lesson, what specific teaching strategies should they use? Why? What specific activities should they get pupils to do? Why? How should the lesson end and why? What impact should all this have on pupils and how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum? How can student teachers know what pupils have learnt in any given lesson and if core curriculum aims have been achieved?

3. **Finally, based on your experiences in schools do you think the core aims of the history curriculum are being achieved in secondary history classrooms? Which, How and Why? Note to self**: *If a CoP is mentioned focus on opportunities and challenges of promoting a CoP through the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum in classrooms?* Is there anything at all that we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add? If you want to get in touch with me about the study at any time now or in the future, please don't hesitate to get in touch – I am here until x and will be back x and you have my details on the information sheet. Murakoze (merci, thankyou)

B. Teacher -Educators

Introduce self and background, purpose of the study and my personal motivation for conducting it, confirm confidentiality and anonymity, ask for oral consent.

Background Information Teacher-Trainers: Can you tell me a little bit about yourself, why you decided to become a teacher-trainer? Why a history teacher-trainer? What type of schools have you taught in?

1**. Broadly is secondary junior history education important in Rwanda and why?** Supporting Questions: Could you tell me a little about the different sections of the curriculum in terms of content and pedagogy (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial sections). What key messages and pedagogies run through these different sections that are important for student-teachers to know (be specific –what message, what skills, what part of the curriculum)? Why? What are the most important message(s) and skills that student-teachers should take away after studying here and put in practice in

the classroom? Why – how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum/what are the core aims of the curriculum?

2. **Can you talk me through the type of lesson you would like to see student teachers teaching when using the 2008 curriculum and why?** Supporting Questions: What would be important aims/objectives – content(s)/messages and skills - of the lesson, what part(s) of the curriculum should they use and why? How should they begin the lesson, what specific teaching strategies should they use? Why? What specific activities should they get pupils to do? Why? How should the lesson end and why? What impact should all this have on pupils and how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum? How can student teachers know what pupils have learnt in any given lesson and if core curriculum aims have been achieved?

3. **Given your experience what core advice do you give to students teaching this type of lesson for the first time and why?** Supporting Questions: What sort of challenges might they face and how do you advise students to manage these challenges? Thinking about your experience(s) teaching the secondary (junior) history curriculum to student teachers are there any aspects - topics and pedagogy - of the curriculum that are important but particularly challenging to teach in a classroom? What and Why – specific examples from classroom experiences? How do you advise student teachers to manage this – specific examples from classroom experiences? How and how well do student teachers manage these aspects of the curriculum in classrooms? Is there anything you might change and/or add to the curriculum? Why? Is there anything that you think the curriculum should do more and/or less of? Why? How would you like to implement these ideas in classroom situations – what opportunities, issues and challenges might this pose? Why?

4. **Finally, based on your experiences in schools do you think the core aims of the history curriculum are being achieved in secondary history classrooms? Which, How and Why? Note to self**: *If a CoP is mentioned focus on opportunities and challenges of promoting a CoP through the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum in classrooms?* Is there anything at all that we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add? If you want to get in touch with me about the study at any time now or in the future, please don't hesitate to get in touch – I am here until x and will be back x and you have my details on the information sheet. Murakoze (thankyou).

C. Student Teachers

1**. Broadly is secondary junior history education important in Rwanda and why?** Supporting Questions: Could you tell me a little about the different sections of the 2008 curriculum in terms of content and pedagogy (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial sections).What key messages and skills run through these different sections that are important for students to know (be specific –what messages, what skills, what part of the curriculum)? Why? What are the most important message(s) and skill (s) that students should take away after 3 years of studying this curriculum? Why – how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum/what are the core aims of the curriculum?

2. **Can you talk me through your last lesson teaching secondary junior history students? What type of school were you in (private/public)? What year were the**

students in (1, 2 or 3)? Supporting Questions: What were the aims/objectives of the lesson, what part of the curriculum did you use and why? How did you begin the lesson? Why? How did students respond to the topic – why and how did you manage this? What specific teaching strategies did you use? Why? What specific activities did you get students to do and why? How did students respond to the activities – why and how did you manage this? How did the lesson end? Why? How did all this help to get across a particular message/aim? How does all this relate to core aims of the curriculum and how do you know if core aims have been achieved?

3. A) **Thinking about the lesson overall what went well and why? What impact did it have on pupils and how do you know? What might you change or do differently next time? Why?** Supporting Questions: Thinking about your experience(s) teaching this lesson, is there any advice you would give to someone teaching it for the first time?

B) **Thinking about your experience(s) teaching the secondary (junior) history curriculum throughout this year are there any aspects - topics and pedagogy - of the curriculum that are important but particularly challenging to teach in a classroom? What and Why – specific examples from classroom experiences?** Supporting Questions: How do you manage this – specific examples from classroom experiences? Thinking again about your experiences teaching the curriculum this year is there any advice you would give to new student teachers starting out? Why – specific examples from classroom experiences?

4. **Is there anything you might change and/or add to the curriculum? Why?** Supporting Questions: Is there anything that you think the curriculum should do more and/or less of? Why? How would you like to implement these ideas in classroom situations – what opportunities, issues and challenges might this pose? Why?

5. **Finally, based on your experiences and those of your colleagues do you think the core aims of the history curriculum are being achieved in secondary history classrooms? Why and how – specific classroom examples? Note to self**: *If a CoP is mentioned focus on opportunities and challenges of promoting a CoP through the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum in classrooms?* Is there anything at all that we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add? If you want to get in touch with me about the study at any time now or in the future, please don't hesitate to get in touch – I am here until x and will be back x and you have my details on the information sheet. Murakoze (merci, thankyou)

Appendix 3: Interview Guide: Policy Makers, Teacher-Educators and Student-Teachers for Phase 2 of data collection (28th May - 28th September 2013)

A. Policy-Makers

1. Can you talk me through what has happened to secondary history education in Rwanda since 1994? What is its place in national priorities? Why? What type of history teacher do you want to be produced– who do you want them to be when they leave and teach in secondary schools? Why? How does this relate to national priorities?

2. Broadly is secondary junior history education important in Rwanda and why? What is the 2008 curriculum broadly about? What are the big opportunities of teaching this curriculum – secondary classroom experiences? What are the big challenges of teaching this curriculum – classroom experiences? Supporting Questions: What key messages and pedagogies run through the different sections of the curriculum that are important for student-teachers to know (be specific –what message, what skills, what part of the curriculum)? Why? What are the most important message(s) and skills that student-teachers should be teaching through the 2008 history curriculum to secondary (junior) pupils? Why – how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum/what are the core aims of the curriculum?

3. How do you define a CoP? Supporting Questions: Is this the UNESCO definition? When did this concept first appear in Rwanda, where, by whom and why? What is the history of a CoP in education in Rwanda – who introduced it, when, why, whats its evolution been and where does it fit with national priorities? Why and **how** (**content/pedagogy**) has a CoP found its way into the curriculum? Is it in other subjects - what and why – and education as a whole? **What are the opportunities and challenges of promoting a CoP through the 2008 history curriculum in secondary secondary (junior) history classes?** Supporting Questions: Are there any other challenges facing student history teachers? Are there resources to help student-teachers to manage these challenges (**sensitive/controversial** issues) – specific classroom examples?

4. Can you talk me through the evolution of secondary (junior) history curricula since 1994 up to the emergence of the 2008 history curriculum and the present day? What has happened and why? Supporting Questions: What were the main considerations when developing the 2008 history curriculum – what guided the development team in terms of making choices about the content, structure and pedagogy of the 2008 curriculum – specific examples? Why? **What is the nature of history/historical knowledge (Facts/Interpretation) from the perspective of the 2008 curriculum and why? How should student-teachers demonstrate this in their teaching of important messages in the curriculum – concrete examples of important messages and pedagogy teachers should use to teach these messages.**

5. Can you talk me through the type of lesson you would like to see student teachers teaching when using the 2008 curriculum and why? Supporting Questions: What should be at the fore-front of student-teachers minds when they are teaching? Why? What is it they should be trying to do? Why? How should they begin the lesson? Why? During the lesson what specific teaching strategies should they use?

Why? What specific activities should they get pupils to do? Why? How should the lesson end and why? What impact should all this have on pupils and how does this relate to core aims of the curriculum i.e. a CoP if a core aim? To what extent do you think all this is really happening in classes – concrete examples? Why? What are the opportunities and challenges of doing this through the 2008 curriculum in class – concrete classroom experiences? Why? What might this mean for promoting a CoP/new society/citizen - **the only way to learn a CoP, tolerance, mutual – understanding is to practice it? What opportunities does the curriculum give student-teachers to do this with secondary pupils - concrete classroom examples, any issues and challenges –concrete classroom examples?** How can student teachers know what pupils have learnt in any given lesson and if core curriculum aims have been achieved?

6. Does the curriculum help student-teachers to manage different ideas that secondary pupils may learn about the past outside the classroom? What other ideas? How? Why? Supporting Questions: How should student-teachers manage these unofficial histories and teaching controversial and/or sensitive issues? Are student – teachers given any special resources/training? How effective is this – secondary classroom experiences? What might this mean for promoting a CoP through the 2008 curriculum? Why? Broadly speaking how does the 2008 secondary junior history curriculum help student-teachers help secondary (junior) pupils to make sense of unofficial histories they hear outside the classroom – concrete classroom examples?

7. **Finally, if you can sum up, what is it student-teachers should be trying to do when teaching this history curriculum? Why? How are things going with the 2008 curriculum generally? How do you know and why? What are the big opportunities/challenges of being a history teacher in secondary (junior) school teaching this 2008 curriculum? Why? Based on your experiences in schools do you think the core aims of the history curriculum are being achieved in secondary history classrooms? Which, How and Why?** Is there anything at all that we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add? If you want to get in touch with me about the study at any time now or in the future, please don't hesitate to get in touch – I am here until x and will be back x and you have my details on the information sheet. Murakoze (thankyou).

B. Teacher-Educators

1. **What is history as a subject/discipline about? How does the 2008 curriculum define the subject/discipline of history?** *If there is a difference explore if and how this impacts on how the teacher-educators train student-teachers to deliver the curriculum and how student teachers deliver the 2008 history curriculum – concrete examples?*

2. **What is the role of the 2008 history curriculum in secondary (junior) history education in Rwanda? Why is it important? What are the core aims of this curriculum? Why?** *(If a CoP is mentioned ask for a definition and where this came from and ask if and how they teach student-teachers to promote a CoP through the 2008 curriculum and why– if not mentioned ask if these aims are part of a broader aim – see original interview guide).* **What are the most important (historical) knowledge, skills and attitudes does this training institute want student history**

teachers delivering this 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum to have by the time they graduate? Why? What impact should this type of teacher teaching the 2008 history curriculum have on secondary (junior) history learners? Why? *(If critical thinking is mentioned ask as to how student –teachers should teach* critical thinking *– example from secondary classroom teacher using the 2008 curriculum)?* **To what extent does the 2008 curriculum facilitates student-teachers in bringing this historical knowledge, skills and attitudes to bear in the history classroom – why and how – specific examples from curriculum and classroom and implications for STs promoting core aims of the 2008 curricula?**

3. **What should a standard lesson student-teachers teaching the 2008 curriculum to secondary (junior) history learners look like – classroom examples? Why - important? To what extent does the 2008 curriculum help student-teachers practice this type of lesson in the secondary (junior) history classroom – how curriculum and classroom examples and why and implications for STs promoting core aims of the 2008 curricula?**

4. **In summary: From your observations, are student-teachers challenged in delivering this curriculum to learners – classroom examples? Why? What type of secondary history teacher do you want to develop here? How (training, books and resources) and Why? To what extent does the 2008 history curriculum help student teachers to develop in this way – how curriculum and classroom examples and why and implications for STs being able to promote the core aims of the curriculum in class?**

5. **<u>To finish</u>: Thinking about your experiences observing student-teachers teaching the secondary (junior) history curriculum are there any aspects – topics and pedagogy – that are important and particularly challenging for student-teachers to teach? What - examples from curriculum and classroom and why and implications for student-teachers delivering core aims of the curriculum?**
6. What are the real opportunities of this curriculum? Why – specific curriculum classroom examples and implications for student-teachers delivering core aims of the curriculum?

7. **What type of teacher does the 2008 curriculum need student-teachers to be? What is the most important knowledge, skills and attitudes a learner should take away after three years of studying this curriculum – specific curriculum examples? Why – specific classroom examples and implications for delivering core aims of the curriculum? Explore any differences here?**

8. **Finally, if in five years you were part of a curriculum development team charged with developing the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum, what would you do and why? Is there anything at all we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add?**

C. Student-Teachers

1. **What is history as a subject/discipline about? How does the 2008 curriculum define the subject/discipline of history?** *If there is a difference explore if and how this impacts on how the student-teacher delivers the curriculum?*

2. **What is the role of the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum in secondary (junior) history education in Rwanda? Why is it important? What are the core aims of this curriculum? Why?**

3. **What important historical knowledge and skills and attitudes is important to teach learners when delivering the 2008 curriculum? Why and where and how did you learn this? Did the curriculum help you in getting this knowledge and skills and attitudes across to students – specific examples from curriculum and classroom?** *(If critical thinking is mentioned ask as to how student –teachers should teach critical thinking – example from secondary classroom teacher using the 2008 curriculum)?* **What did this mean in terms of being able to deliver the core aims of the curriculum during your internship?**

4. **Can you talk me through a standard lesson plan that you would use when teaching this 2008 curriculum? Why? How and where did you learn this? Did the curriculum help you to conduct such lessons –how - specific examples from the curriculum and classroom? What did this mean in terms of being able to deliver the core aims of the curriculum during your internship? What was an important lesson you taught and to what year group? What part of the curriculum did you use and why? Why was it an important lesson? What were the aims of the lesson? Why? How did you teach it?** How did you begin the lesson? Why? How did it continue? What teaching strategies did you use? Why? What activities did you get students to do, why and how did this go? How did students respond to the activities (questions, opportunities, issues/challenges) – why and how did you manage this - why? How did the lesson end? Why? How does all this relate to core aims of the curriculum?

5. **In summary what makes a good teacher? Where and how did you learn this? Did the 2008 curriculum help you to be this type of teacher during the internship period –how - specific examples from the curriculum and classroom and what did this mean in terms of being able to deliver the core aims of the curriculum during your internship – which core aims? Why?**

6. **To Finish: How would you say you have developed as a history teacher over the course of the internship delivering this 2008 curriculum? Has delivering this curriculum challenged you as a teacher? Why and how – specific curriculum and classroom examples? More broadly, thinking about your experiences teaching the secondary (junior) history curriculum to secondary (junior) learners are there any aspects – topics and pedagogy – that are important and particularly challenging to teach? What and why? How did you manage this? Why – where did you learn this? Implications for delivering core aims of the curriculum?**

7. **What are the real opportunities of this curriculum? Why – specific curriculum and classroom examples and implications for delivering core aims of the curriculum?**

8. **What is the most important knowledge, skills and attitudes a learner should take away after studying this curriculum for three years? Why? Where and how did you learn this? What are the opportunities and challenges of delivering this to learners – specific curriculum and classroom examples and implications for**

delivering core aims of the curriculum? Finally, if in five years you were part of a curriculum development team charged with developing the 2008 secondary (junior) history curriculum, what would you do and why?
9. Is there anything at all we have not discussed that you would like to discuss or add?

Appendix 4. Map of Thematic Analysis of 1st Phase of Data collected between 10th September 2012 - 28th November 2012 (Example: Theme A)

Themes from 1st Phase of Data Analysis

Theme A: Curriculum, Content and Pedagogy

Theme B: The nature of History

Theme C: History is not about the past, it's about the future

Theme D: Teaching Practice

Theme E: The History Teacher

Theme F: Curriculum Development

Theme G: Theme: Other

Example Comparative Table: Theme (A)

Characterisation of the Data: Headline News!!!! Theme A: Curriculum, Content and Pedagogy		
Overall Characterisation: **The Story of US! Who we were, are and want to be. (Insiders/Outsiders)**	Overall Characterisation: **The Story of US! Who we were, are and want to be. (Insiders/Outsiders)**	Overall Characterisation: **The Story of US! Who we were, are and want to be. (Insiders/Outsiders)**
Students x 5	Teacher Educator x 1	Policy Maker x2
Aims: **Vision of a New Citizen and Society**. *Linked to:* -something about being Rwandan	Aims: **Vision of a New (old) Citizen and Society**. *Linked to:* -traditional values, how Rwandans lived, learn from past: unity, collaboration and mutual respect, CoP, innovation, to build a better future - development.	Aims: **Vision of a New Citizen and Society**. *Linked to:* -a new type of curriculum: For PM A and B the curriculum is an attempt to address past mistakes – so Rwanda can be a different place. **Emerging here is a theme of Never Again - a pedagogy for genocide prevention.**
Content: Above underpinned by **a Story of Restoration** -an emphasis on pre-colonial history (unity) -colonial distortions (genocide) **Note**: Only one ST discussed showing positive and negative aspects of colonial and post-independent history.	Content: Above underpinned by **a Story of Restoration** and **learning from the past to build a better future.** -an emphasis on pre-colonial history as it has important messages for Rwandans today (traditional values - unity) -positive and negative aspects of colonial and post-colonial history (no link made btw colonial experience and the genocide) - Post-1994 history of unity and reconciliation	Content: Above underpinned by **a knowledge of the past (PM A)/ a Story of Restoration (PM B)** and **learning from the past to build a better future.** -PM A emphasises acknowledging the good and bad in Rwandan history, but take from the good and put it into practice today. Also show the two sides of Rwandan history - all this builds a CoP. Yet also says when we have the same understanding of history - this helps develop a CoP. PM B: emphasises on pre-colonial history – Rwandan values of oneness, togetherness, working together, co-cooperativeness. You can build on that Rwandanness today – national pride/identity. PM B: Colonialism distorted the past, the curriculum is meant correct these errors.
Opportunities: **Generational Divide: Youth First Agenda – Children will change society** (children will teach their parents and be protected from oral history).	Opportunities: **Looking to the past to build the future** -Pre-colonial practices of collaboration, living in harmony and positive aspects of colonial history as ways to promote a CoP. -Post-1994 history of unity and reconciliation. -Stereotyping will decrease because students are in face of the truth, the real picture of what happened in the country.	Opportunities: **Generational Divide: Youth First Agenda – Children will change society** (children will teach their parents- telling parents the truth(?) promotes a CoP - and pupils will be be protected from oral history, their understanding of history will be based on scientific content not rumours PM A). PM A: A good citizen must know the history of Rwanda – where it came from. - when we know and have the same understanding of history – helps develop a CoP – Single Narrative?? -Show positive and negative sides of Rwandan history to avoid conflict. However, focus on the positive and apply it today. All this linked with a CoP. -Kids are learning the ideas of their political makers and they can fight against other ideas coming from different persons. The children won't be confused. Scientific content not rumours. -'we know even [....] [if] [.] grandmother or grandfather was participat[ing] in conflict but as children we need to build a new society that is why we say the way of teaching history can create the [..] Culture of Peace'. Children participate in a CoP by': If we learn the good thing and I come home and I discuss with my father and my father is telling me something which [.] [is] wrong and I say no, that is not true, let me tell you true [...] even I am [a] child but I can change [.] views of my father and that is why you say [.] if you give a good education the children will change society'. [Could work other way around!!!!]. PM B: **Setting the Record Straight:** the curriculum corrects the distortions made by colonialists – pre-colonial history was distorted and taught as facts. -**National Identity**: students should know their history and culture so they must go back to pre-colonial days of traditional culture and values – curriculum covers pre-colonial history – which shows oneness, you can build on that today. Rwanda is teaching Rwandanness in the curriculum, which is a basis for a sense of a future: -**A CoP:** In pre-colonial tradition i.e. Ubukhe – sharing and protection. Reflecting on what caused the conflict – colonial history. (Does not say the 2008 directly)
Challenges: **Teaching the Violent Past: Issues and Challenges** (range of views including issues of sensitivity, trauma – student and teacher, teacher training and genocide ideology laws - penury). **Curriculum organisation** (range of views including disorganisation of the curriculum, overcrowded curriculum, lack of content – post-1994 and gender) **Important issue**: Home vrs School histories – mentioned by one participant here but a lot in Theme D – Teaching Practice	Challenges: **Teaching the Violent Past: Issues and Challenges** (issues of : sensitivity- emotional, political - genocide ideology laws and social; teacher-training, resources) **Curriculum organisation** (The curriculum is wide in comparison with the time available to teach it).	Challenges: **Teaching the Past: Issues and Challenges** PM A: It is not easy to teach the chapter on the history of Rwanda, your view might be different from students and this might create conflict{FYI: Recheck} PM B: While the content of the history curriculum is the same as pre-1994, the new curriculum has to be different in terms of how history is taught.
Pedagogy: **Learner Centred Approach (LCA): A Scale of Understandings from Thin to Thick!**	Pedagogy: **Implied LCA**: pedagogy of student participation and discussion, dialogue btw students, reading and debate.	Pedagogy: **LCA**: **Critical Thinking (PM A) and Participation (PM B) are Key**

LCA Opportunities: - Discussions for a CoP - Variety of Benefits **LCA Challenges**: - Teacher-Training - School/Home Environment (variety: resources, classroom size, student participation, distance from home to school, chores at home)	**LCA Opportunities**: -Pedagogy of discussion is central to building a CoP -Dialogue helps people to build mutual-understanding, share ideas and have an open mind. **LCA Challenges**: -Teacher Training (emotional, social and political - genocide ideology law - sensitivities)	**LCA Opportunities**: **Genocide Prevention – Never Again and a New Citizen and Society** PM A – that promotes a new type of Rwandan -spirit to resist - capable of critical thinking, a person who asks why - is it true (oral histories) and is responsible for his/her decisions. Critical thinking, a critical pedagogy is key to a new society. The curriculum developed in line with the vision of the type of Rwandan/Rwanda we need: a critical citizen, able to develop him/herself and who has a spirit of patriotism. PM B: 'the violence is in the methodology it is not in the content – pre-1994 examples […]. Post -1994 the curriculum, the emphasis is on children and teachers being able to discuss, to debate, ask questions why rather than taking it as facts'. Participation (discuss, debate, ask questions – why, dissent) as opposed to pre-genocide factual transmission – in order to promote tolerance/respect different views, human rights, equality, where they value themselves and no longer take info as gospel (check). Values of listening to and tolerating others shows everyone is valued and respected. Critical thinking is important for problem solving, decision making – people killed because they were told too, 'we want a generation of human beings, of Rwandans who will grow up to value their own selves'. **LCA Challenges**: PM A and B Teacher-Training – LCA require training; traditionally a culture of teacher as boss in Rwanda. PM A or B: Variety of challenges including (School vrs community/home influences; Exams; Resources; and classroom climate; Change takes time)
A Culture of Peace: **A Scale of Understandings from Thin to Thick!**	**A Culture of Peace**: No specific definition. Ideas drawn from scholars associated with a Culture of War, a period of harmony. [Note to Self A Culture of War is embedded with the UNESCO idea of a CoP]. **A CoP in the Curriculum:** **-**Emphasis on pre-colonial Rwanda**:** they can learn that CoP and tolerance. **-**Positive aspects of colonial history are ways to promote a CoP. -Discussion as a way to promote a CoP and dialogue as a way to promote mutual-understanding.	**A Culture of Peace: A Scale of Understanding from Concrete to Abstract!** -Both discuss a CoP in terms of marking a move away from conflict. -Both root the origins of the CoP in the legacy of the genocide and articulate it as a response to the violent past – a solution. -However, PM A defines a CoP in concrete terms; PM B defines a CoP more abstractly. **Note:** Only PMB discusses the future of a CoP in Rwanda – it will have no place as the job will be done. **A CoP in the Curriculum:** **PMA:** Positive and negative aspects of Rwandan history – focus on good and put good into practice. We talk about our history now. LCA. '..the way of teaching history can create the [..] CoP. **PM 2B:** Pre-colonial practices – Ubukhe (sharing and protection but through discussion and debate); getting people to talk to each-other. LCA. **Challenges for promoting a CoP** -Both mention issues related to teacher training. -PM A: Difficulty teaching Cpt on Rwandan History; Broad definition of a CoP; school vrs home influences -PM B: Resources; Classroom Climate; Exams.
Areas of Dissonance Between Students: Nothing substantial	N/A Just one Teacher Ed	**Areas of Dissonance Between PM A and B**: Nothing substantial
Anomalies: Only 1 ST mentions that teachers also have a past, this might link to Weldon's (2009) personal and professional argument – TE or PMs don't mention this – yet personal and professional values are critical.	Anomalies:	**Anomalies:** Unlike STs and TEs the explicit focus is on pedagogical change above that of content.
Interesting Notes: ST 5 History to' recover our peace we lost' 'but here people are [.] now taught how to [.] how they, they're origin, **real origin** 1521P: inciting them to [.] live together, to love one another, to work together in unit[y] so 1522that the student[s] will learn this in this province in the other province, the whole 1523country will be on **the same level of understanding to mean that the peace**, the [.] theory 1524the notion of peace in him one of Kigali for example will be the same [.] as one of 1525Gizayne [**Words? at 1h 22mins 56secs**] another province so that they may be on the 1526same level of understanding in terms of peace and reconciliation'. [FYI: Will students 1527have the same idea of peace]	**Interesting Notes:**	**Interesting Notes:** Both offer confusing accounts of the nature of history: fact or interpretation, single narrative – truth vrs applying LCA and critical thinking. Having different views vrs having the same view. This is less so in PM B. There is a big debate in Rwanda along the lines of history fact or interpretation. PM A: Expectation that evidence will change peoples' views and students as carriers of important knowledge will change society. Does PM B make too much of a link btw authoritative teaching style and the genocide and too much of an expectation that LCA will bring societal change? PM B: 'Now, after 1994, how do you turn that around? You cannot turn that around by telling people you are no longer in prison, no. You encourage debate, talk, discuss. So now, competitions in schools on story writing, mobile libraries in communities – that will shape people to think beyond the stomach, to think beyond their own community, [.] broaden their horizons, that's the new thinking'.