Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

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Matros, Alexander and Possajennikov, Alex (2016) Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142 . pp. 74-77. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/782355
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
Depositing User: Possajennikov, Dr Alex
Date Deposited: 24 Mar 2016 15:09
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:43
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/32514

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