Displacement and Totalisation: A Messianic History of International Theory

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Abstract

The phenomenon of displacement is a fundamental source of social, political and economic tensions in the contemporary world. Despite this centrality there has been relatively little sustained theoretical engagement with this phenomenon within the discipline of International Relations (IR). In this thesis I will therefore develop a phenomenological approach, drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, in order to explore ways in which the placed experience of ethical proximity is disrupted through logics of spatial mediation. I will then apply this phenomenological approach to a reading of four fundamental narratives of displacement in the western philosophical tradition: Exodus, Odyssey, Crusade and Conquest. Through these narratives, I will argue, that we find a process of the subsumption of place within spatial totalities in which inter-personal relations are mediated in relation to the projects of the totality. Ultimately, I will suggest this process of totalisation has shaped the fundamental structure of modern international theory. I will also suggest, however, that the placidness of everyday life constantly disrupts this totalisation.

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Introduction: Displacement and Indifference in the Contemporary World

"Adam, where are you?" This is the first question which God asks man after his sin. "Adam, where are you?" Adam lost his bearings, his place in creation, because he thought he could be powerful, able to control everything, to be God. Harmony was lost; man erred and this error occurs over and over again also in relationships with others. "The Other" is no longer a brother or sister to be loved, but simply someone who disturbs my life and my comfort. God asks a second question: "Cain, where is your brother?" The illusion of being powerful, of being as great as God, even of being God himself, leads to a whole series of errors, a chain of death, even to the spilling of a brother's blood!... Has any one of us wept for these persons who were on the boat? For the young mothers carrying their babies? For these men who were looking for a means of supporting their families? We are a society which has forgotten how to weep, how to experience compassion – "suffering with" others: the globalization of indifference has taken from us the ability to weep! Let us ask the Lord for the grace to weep over our indifference, to weep over the cruelty of our world, of our own hearts, and of all those who in anonymity make social and economic decisions which open the door to tragic situations like this. "Has any one wept?" Today has anyone wept in our world?

(Homily of Pope Francis on the island of Lampedusa, July 2013[1])

The idea of a globalisation of indifference[2] as described above by Pope Francis may sound initially paradoxical, for we are accustomed to thinking of the globalisation of communication, travel, diaspora, culture, politics and economics as making our world smaller and therefore bringing us ever closer together, developing an ever larger moral community. In this cosmopolitan view it is held that in the past the sufferings of others beyond our own familial, tribal, community or national circles of responsibility were rendered invisible to us by spatial distances, however as globalisation makes us more connected in various ways the moral community expands and moral responsibility is globalised[3]. Yet in this thesis I will argue that being brought together spatially and ontologically as parts within a whole through mediations of a single system does not necessarily bring us closer together ethically. On the contrary, I will argue that historically the integration of the self and the Other into systemic relations has created ever more ethical distance as inter-subjective places are displaced within objective spatialities which introduce mediations of status, nationality, religion, class, etc. In this context I define the ethical as a phenomenological experience of the Other as that which is not only beyond the self but is also irreducible to any projection of meaning, the experience described in the language of Emmanuel Levinas as both facing and being faced, the original experience of being responsible before an Other.

To be placed I will argue is first of all to be formed through interactions between the lived body and the world which that body inhabits. Such interactions give form and identity to the self as a meaningful being. The most profound interactions are, however, always with the other people who constitute that place, the parents, siblings, friends and neighbours who tease and play, teach and care for the self. It is through engaging with Others that the self is formed not only as a meaningful being but as an ethical being. This placedness I will also refer to as the spatiality of life, the spatiality filled with everyday meaning and responsibility by which the human being is nurtured in her Otherness as a being capable of responsibility for the Other. I will therefore propose an analysis of the phenomenon of displacement by which places of the spatiality of life are subordinated and in the most radical cases destroyed by the projects of the powerful, projects of Pharaohs and philosopher kings, crusaders and conquistadors, projects of the gr*eat men*

of history. To develop this analysis I will draw on Emmanuel Levinas' concept of *totality* or totalisation to describe that phenomenon by which ethical encounters of the face to face between self and Other are displaced from the inter-subjective to the objective side-by-side, the relation of two particular elements within a greater whole. In this thesis I shall then refer to Displacement as those processes of totalisation which disrupt, distort and estrange people from the experience of placedness, the process by which the inter-subjective face-to-face is transformed into the objective side-by-side, no longer direct relations of responsibility, but indirect relations mediated by the project of the totality[4]. To analyse this phenomenon of totalisation as displacement as it has developed in the western philosophical tradition I will therefore develop what Walter Benjamin has referred to as a "Messianic History" covering four historical episodes of physical displacement. Such a history is by definition discontinuous and fragmentary; it is opposed to any idea of progress or teleology. It is far from anything resembling a universal history but is instead something closer to a bricolage approach to history drawing together various disparate and disconnected historical fragments in order to make an intervention in the present. In this history I will thus argue through four distinct narratives of physical displacement, we can perceive a phenomenal structure of displacement by which the relation of self and Other is mediated, but also a deep structure in the development of the western philosophical tradition which affirms this very displacement as the foundation of the political.

In this introduction I will then begin by first setting out the social context which motivated the present research, the various processes of political, social, economic, cultural displacement in the contemporary world. I refer to these processes as physical displacement, each is unique and distinct and there is no intention here to conflate these processes or experiences. However, I will suggest that as these processes are increasingly linked politically in contemporary Europe it is necessary to ask whether there are fundamental logics within the global system which produce these various processes, to do this I will suggest requires the development of a critical international theory of displacement. In the second section of this introduction I will then refer to some of the highly sophisticated and nuanced studies developed in disciplines such as sociology, and cultural studies to understand the experience of displacement, yet I will suggest international political theory has largely avoided the phenomenon. Instead International

Relations scholarship has largely focused on the consequences of processes of movement for the system itself and how these might bring about instability and change. In particular I discuss how two traditions of critique have engaged with the emancipatory potentials of these processes of movement, the Frankfurt tradition which has perceived a new cosmopolitan structure of community developing, while postmodern theorists have celebrated the migrant and refugee as transgressive and disruptive subjectivities. These analyses offer important insights, yet the experience of displacement is largely absent. Thus in the final section of the introduction I intend to address this absence through the course of the dissertation. I begin by outlining the phenomenological-ethical theory of displacement I intend to develop in chapter 2, then briefly set out the four historical narratives of displacement I will analyse in chapters 3,4,5 and 6 before finally in chapter 7 describing how these narratives relate to the development of modern moral philosophy in the age of enlightenment. In this dissertation I thus seek to argue that various processes of displacement are not merely unrelated problems at the margins of the international system, to be solved through ameliorative measures, or championed as representing historical progress in the breakdown of national boundaries. Instead I argue displacement represents a fundamental logic of the totalisation of the political by which the ethical foundations of the political are negated. I thus argue for a critical international theory which begins from the experience of displacement to develop a systemic critique of the global production of displacement. This, I will conclude at the end of this thesis, is crucial in order to challenge the political appropriation of displacement in the age of globalisation for projects of nationalistic, ethnic and civilisational totalisation which give rise to the everyday tragedies of indifference in our shared world.

1.1 Social Context of the Thesis: The Multiple Forms of Displacement:

By any criteria the twentieth century was a century of displacement, a century in which hundreds of millions of people experienced their places of life swept through, torn apart and bludgeoned by the projects of the powerful. This was a century of war and war is the ultimate negation of place, the reduction of places to territory to be conquered, occupied and demolished. From the fields of Flanders to the Persian desert, the jungles of Malaya to the paddy fields of Vietnam, through the many cities which read like a catalogue of a

century of destruction: Guernica, Warsaw, Stalingrad, Nanjing, Nagasaki, Algiers, San Salvador, Baghdad, Sarajevo. And already in only fourteen years of our new century new names, new places of life, have been added; New York, Kabul, Fallujah, Gaza, Kilinochchi, Aleppo, Donetsk; natural and human geographies disfigured by conflicts over power. The figure of the refugee who for cause of fear or actual threat to life has come to seek refuge outside of their country of origin[5] due to war is perhaps the most radical form of displacement. According to the UNHCR in 2012 15.4 million people were displaced in this way[6]. In the course of writing this introduction the same organisation has declared the civil war in Syria as the largest refugee crisis confronting the world in over a generation. By May of 2013 1.5 million people had fled Syria, while 4.5 million were internally displaced (BBC 2013b), a further 6.8 million were in need of humanitarian assistance (CSM 2013), with the UNHCR (2013) estimating that by the end of 2014 half of all Syrians would be displaced in some form. The Syrian War has all the hallmarks of a refugee crisis with vast numbers of men, women and children, often exhausted and traumatised, fleeing into the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq[7]. The refugee camp is a notoriously lawless space, a space of little dignity, often a space of extreme violence[8], sometimes carried out by paramilitary groups[9], sometimes, as recent scandals have shown, by the very military personnel assigned by the UN to protect the inhabitants (Washington Post 2004, Aljazeera 2012). The vast majority (80%) of refugees around the world are found in the global south, with the greatest numbers being concentrated in the Middle East, Pakistan (1.6 million), Iran (800,000) and Kenya (500,000) (UNHCR 2012b). By comparison, in 2012 the world`s richest countries hosted less than 1 in 5 of global refugees. This means that the 1.5 million people living as refugees in the whole of Europe is less than the 1.6 million living in Pakistan alone[10] (UNHCR 2012b). In Britain in 2011 there were less than 25,000 asylum applications, of which just over 1 in 4 were granted temporary or permanent right to remain[11], yet a climate of public hostility remains. For those caught in the application process life is highly precarious with applicants unable to work and forced to live on a basic grant of £36.62 a week (paid in vouchers)[12], often subject to media vilification (Kundnani 2001, Red Cross 2012)[13], public hostility, detention, including of children (Fekete 2007) and sexual exploitation (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman Report 2004, theguardian 2013c)[14].

The geography of international forced displacement is thus overwhelmingly intra-regional rather than inter-regional, yet still more it is primarily contained within the borders of the nation state itself. Of the 45 million displaced peoples in 2012 an estimated 29 million were classified as internally displaced. In such cases the experience of being forced to flee homes and communities is just as traumatic yet does not constitute any disruption of the existent structures of the international system[15]. In some of these cases there is on-going civil war between the forces of the state and armed rebel groups (such as in Nigeria, Colombia, Syria, Sudan and Afghanistan), while in other cases there is inter-ethnic conflict between communities (such as Myanmar, South Sudan, Central African Republic[16]). In other cases the violence is criminal rather than political in nature, particularly in Central America and Mexico, with some estimates putting the numbers dead during 10 years of the drug war in Mexico alone at over 70,000 (Albuja 2014). Finally, it should be noted that just as the numbers of inter-regional refugees are small in comparison to intra-regional flows, and those regional flows are themselves relatively small compared to intra-national displacement, even in those societies most impacted by conflict the majority of the population do not experience displacement as physical relocation. As of 2010 in those countries with the largest IDP populations in Somalia 13% of the population were classified as internally displaced, Sudan 12%, Iraq 10%, Colombia between 6 and 9% (Gibney 2010: 6)[17]. Quite clearly in these countries displacement is thus being experienced by many people without any movement at all, but instead through catastrophic disruption of everyday life, the destruction of social and economic activity and the constant fear of violence (See Krippner 2003).

In the forms of forced displacement related to war described thus far there is always the presence (threatened or actual) of some form of physical violence in the estrangement from place. However there are also many more forms of estrangement from place associated perhaps less with physical violence and more with the many structural violences of poverty and global economic inequality (Therborn 2013). Here the geographical pattern of movement is much more complicated with around half of the world`s 230 million economic migrants[18] moving from the south towards the north (UNDESA 2013)[19]. As such while the largest recipients of refugees are concentrated amongst the poorest countries in the world, the countries which receive the largest numbers of economic migrants are almost exclusively in the rich world: the United States

43m, Russia 12m, Germany 11m, Saudi Arabia 7m, Canada 7m, United Kingdom 7m, Spain 6.5m, France 6.5m, Australia 5.5m[20]. By contrast the largest emigration countries are located predominantly (though not exclusively) in the global south: Mexico (12m), India (11m), Russia (11m), China (8m), Ukraine (6.5m), Bangladesh (5m), Pakistan (4.5m), the United Kingdom (4.5m), Philippines (4m) Turkey (4m) (UNDESA 2013). The analytical separation between forced migration and economic migration is however often highly ambiguous with the structural violences of poverty and the physical violences of conflict and repression nearly always closely connected phenomena (Beith 2011, Bowden 2011). This can be seen with the case of migrants from Central America and Mexico travelling to the United States from countries ravaged by US intervention and civil conflict during the 1980s and the impact of NAFTA and CAFTA economic liberalisation during the 1990s (Cruttenden 2014). Moreover the process of making the journey into the global north is notoriously dangerous. The US Border Agency figures show that over 5,500 people have died on the US-Mexican border since 1998 (Anderson 2013) while Amnesty International estimate that 70,000 migrants from Central and South America have gone missing en route through Mexico in recent years (LatinoUSA.org 2013, Albuja 2014). Such violences are largely invisible, only reaching national and international attention when they escalate to the level of massacre such as the mass murder by the Zetas cartel of 72 predominantly Honduran migrants travelling through the state of Tamaulipas in 2010 (CNN 2010). The terrors of the land route of the Americas are paralleled by those experienced on the sea-routes from Africa into Europe and Asia into Australia. During 2012 at least 500 people are estimated to have drowned attempting to cross the Mediterranean while it is estimated that over 1000 people died attempting to reach Australia during the period from 2001 to 2012 (The Age 2012). The conditions for those who survive these journeys but are not legally registered are marked by a life in the shadows, lacking the basic protections afforded to formal migrants, undocumented migrants are subject to ultra-exploitative regimes of labour, harassment, intimidation and in many cases conditions of debt bondage (See Shelley 2007, Lindio-McGovern & Wallimann 2009)[21]. The best available estimates of undocumented people in the United States put the figure at around 11 million (80% of whom are from Mexico and Central America) though some estimate the numbers to be considerably higher[22]. Despite much smaller numbers of undocumented migrants in Europe the public discourse surrounding “illegal immigration” is arguably even

more aggressive. The public mood of antagonism encouraged by this discourse has created an increasingly hostile climate for people perceived to be non-European (Bleich 2011, Strabac 2011, Strabac & Listhaug 2008, Semyonov et al 2006, Pettigrew 1998)[23].

Yet here again the numbers of those able to migrate for economic reasons is relatively small compared to those who experience economic displacement without international migration. This experience of *displacement* has been particularly pronounced with the increase in vulnerability due to neoliberal re-structuring since the 1970s (Harvey 2005, Hall 2011, Peck 2013). For the many tens of millions who have fled poverty in Asia, Africa and Latin America since the introduction of liberalisation policies many hundreds of millions more have remained. The destruction of livelihoods in the countryside has been particularly dramatic during this period of liberalisation as evidenced by the tragic phenomenon of suicides amongst indebted farmers in eastern India (See Le Mons Walker 2005, Mohanty 2005, Mohanakumar & Sharma 2006, Shah 2012, for similar processes of rural dispossession in China see Sargeson 2013). The largest migration in the world today is in fact the migration from countryside to the urban periphery within the countries of the global south (See Saunders 2011, Neuwirth 2012). During the twentieth century between two and three billion people made this transition; in China alone 40 million people make this move every year (Saunders 2011: 7). For those who move from the countryside the urban peripheries of the new mega-cities such as Mumbai, Sao Paulo, Lagos and Manila are often deeply unstable without social services and often subject to problems of crime and the constant threat of state violence. For others the move has been to the new unregulated and highly exploitative free spaces of the special economic zones in India (Levein 2012), Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Maquiladoras of northern Mexico and Central America (Cooney 2001)[24]. These new unregulated, liberalised and highly-exploitative spatialities of structural precariousness and vulnerability are far from secure places of life and represent perhaps the most distinctively neoliberal manifestation of displacement in the contemporary world.

Finally, these processes of displacement related to global economic liberalisation are not confined to the global south the same free movement of capital which dismantles social infrastructure for the under-protected and poorly paid workers of the south has also dismantled welfare provisions and social safety nets in the industrial heartlands of the

global north. Here there has been a process of what could be called the displacement of place by which long established communities have been hollowed out through de-industrialisation particularly and the managed decline of vast swathes of the American mid west, the north of England, Scotland and Wales, northern and eastern France, east Germany and much of the former Soviet Union. Here the economic decline combined with the dismantling of social infrastructure has given rise to any number of social problems such as crime, domestic violence, alcoholism, narcotics abuse and communal tensions (Garbarino 1995, Sibley 1995, 2001, Massey & Denton 2001, Standing 2014). These communities have largely been ignored as the focus of the economy has shifted to financial services, aside from the occasional explosions of resentment and anger as for example with the riots across urban France in 2005 (See Muccihelli 2008, Duprez 2009), England in 2011 and Sweden in 2013. Since the economic crisis of 2008 a new wave of displacement has swept through the United States and Europe, beginning with the foreclosures and dispossessions of poor people across the United States and continuing through the crisis of mass unemployment and the dismantling of the welfare state in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Great Britain and Cyprus which have particularly targeted the most vulnerable sectors of society.

Displacement can, then, take many forms in a globalised world criss-crossed with multiple logics of power, yet today in contemporary Europe many of these forms of displacement are rubbing up against each other, generating frictions over identity, conflicts over social resources and increasingly bitter disputes over belonging. These tensions have been particularly associated with a new Right politics which has sought to re-articulate popular dissent through the politics of disciplinary inclusion and exclusion in communities abandoned by the disarticulation of popular moral economies associated with the socialist project and tradition of the Left (Mansell & Motta 2013). In particular this new Right affirms an idealist communitarian narrative of displacement which is linked to the arrival of Others, Asylum-Seekers, Muslims, Gypsies, Immigrants as well as those categorised as the "undeserving" poor, those claiming state benefits, anti-social elements, teenage mothers and many more[25]. This logic of inclusion and exclusion involves a nostalgic critique of globalisation as displacement in the long tradition of the conservative counter-enlightenment and the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century, a tradition which reached its apogee in the greatest orgy of displacement of the twentieth

century. The new Right communitarian discourse is thus no more a defence of the placed than the neoliberal globalism which it opposes, both are discourses of the political totalisation of space which give rise to projects of displacement. Yet what the communitarian critique of displacement appeals to is quite real, the feelings of loss and disillusion with contemporary neoliberal globalisation which are widespread across Europe and have only been heightened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The aim of this thesis is then to offer an alternative critique of displacement which is developed from the very phenomenal experience of the placed, a critique which seeks to explore how the structure of our thinking about the political is related to the totalisation of space and the destruction of place. Rather than engaging with the contemporary phenomena and dynamics I thus propose a historical account of the way in which our thinking of the international political has developed away from the placed and towards the totalisation of space through four paradigmatic historical narratives of displacement. However before outlining in more detail how I intend to develop this critique, I will first briefly reflect on the contemporary scholarly literature surrounding questions of displacement.

1.2 Contribution to Knowledge of the Thesis: The Absence of Displacement in International Political Theory

There are, then, many different and distinct processes and experiences of displacement in the contemporary global political economy and this diversity has been reflected in the diversity of responses across academic fields and disciplines. Particularly in relation to the processes of displacement associated with migration there has developed in the past thirty years a sophisticated multi-disciplinary field of migration studies which embraces a spectrum of approaches and perspectives on the subject matter[26]. Amongst the issues this young field has explored have been the proliferation of new hybrid social identities (Garcia-Canclini 1990, Huq 1995, Kalra et al 2005), diasporic politics (Bauback 2003) and trans-nationalism[27] and new forms of urban governance and the rise of global cities (Sassen 2001, Massey 1984, 2007). Equally, in recent years there has developed an increasingly strong critical literature within this broad field, particularly notable here is B. S. Chimni`s (1998) analysis of the shifting discourse of international refugee law from the political manipulation of the Cold War wherein the Refugee was represented as the

middle class, white, male, anti-communist dissident to the securitisation of the "new asylum seekers" predominantly from the global south beginning in the 1980s, which Chimni contends marks the "repatriation turn" within mainstream refugee studies. Another important critical contribution has been the move towards a more nuanced analysis of the role of place in migratory processes. As Steven Gregory (2007) has suggested, the focus on mobility and the trans-national in migration studies can distract us from the reality that the vast majority of lives are more-or-less spatially fixed due to economic, political and cultural limitations, particularly for the poorest, yet this does not of course mean that these lives are not affected by processes of mobility. In this context of complex and nuanced dynamics an important contribution within the field of migration studies has come from Bonisch-Brendich and Trundle`s (2010) co-edited volume *Local Lives: Migration and the Politics of Place* which explicitly attempts to "go against the grain" of a field shaped by ideas of transnationalism, not as an attempt to "re-essentialise the local" but to "focus on those migrants who experience place and its boundaries as powerful and real, despite often active mobility and flow" (2010: 3). An example of the work carried out in the volume is Erin Taylor`s (2010) description of the strategies of the production of place in *La Cienaga*, a squatter camp for rural migrants on the outskirts of Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, in which the residents both "depend upon locality to resist their marginalisation" at the same time as many experience feelings of "primary belonging (place of origin, family, Dominican culture, mainstream society) as being disconnected or disconnectable from their locality" (2010:102).

Equally the various phenomena of the displacement of place have led to a large literature exploring the intersection between lived places and globalised space particularly amongst human geographers and social theorists[28]. Notable here is Maaria Seppanen's (1998) highly sophisticated analysis of the strategies of resistance by local street vendors against the globalist re-development of Lima as a UN approved World Heritage Site, a "museum city" for European and North American tourists. In a different context Pierre Bourdieu (et all 1999) and a team of sociologists and ethnographers have developed a collection of short ethnographic accounts of experiences of place and displacement in contemporary France. The volume subtly traces the various experiences of displacement, from a desperate young woman deeply in debt and unable to find a home to the loneliness of the

elderly, the chronic insecurity of a sub proletariat “which almost totally lacks a hold on either the present or the future” (Bourdieu 1999: 429) and the industrial workers subjected to new management techniques which have “divided workers against other workers” (Pialoux 1999: 324). Amongst the most poignant reflections on place in the volume is Abdelmalek Sayad`s piece entitled “A displaced family”, a brilliant insight into the tensions over the "trivialities" of sharing space, yet framed by the context of French colonial history in a formerly exclusive but now declining neighbourhood of Paris. As Sayad`s interviews draw out for an Arab family this place is unwelcoming and closed, yet “we will never leave here…. Because we have nowhere to go” (30). While their French neighbour feels lost in a community which has changed dramatically in ways she can't understand, “we don’t talk anymore, we no longer have neighbours, we cant count on anyone, nobody gives a hand, and that`s what`s falling apart” (32). Similar feelings of despair are revealed by Valerie Walkerdine and Luiz Jimenez in their analysis of the traumatic impacts of de-industrialisation on a small town in South Wales. Here again the authors use extensive interviews to draw out the feelings of loss of community and place, for example one resident in her 60s describing the announcement of the closure of the local steelworks as breaking the chain of life in the community. Such experiences constitute what the authors describe as a collective trauma, understood following Erik Erikson as "a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality… a gradual realisation that the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an important part of the self has disappeared" (Erikson 1994: 233).

Place and displacement are thus complex human experiential phenomena that criss-cross the contemporary world and have elicited responses from across multiple academic disciplines and beyond. Multiple disciplines have found meaning in these experiences using their own unique methodological resources and forms of expression. But what of international theory?[29] We might expect this field to have been particularly well positioned to explore processes of displacement associated with conflict, economic disparities, transformations in global production, perhaps even if this is only by providing bridges and connections for other disciplines. Yet as Alexander Betts (2008) has demonstrated with specific reference to forced migration, there has been relatively little direct engagement from IR scholarship, a situation is perhaps even more true for some of

the other forms of displacement suggested in this introduction. For those in the Machiavellian tradition of Realism the primary focus of global politics is on the nation state as an actor seeking to impose its will on the world, while for Neo-Realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1992) and Robert Gilpin (2011) the primary focus is on how the anarchic structure of the states system constitutes the state as an actor. Yet in both traditions this binary between the sovereign political spatiality of the nation state and the anarchic inter-state system in which there is no sovereign power is rigidly enforced, allowing for a total politicisation of global space as the contest over power. To the extent that displacement is of interest to Realists it is thus as a potential threat to the internal integrity of the nation state and thus a question of national security[30], particularly where displacement may be seen as breaking down the strict boundary between internal and external in the context of debates over terrorism and the role of minorities in influencing foreign policy[31]. By contrast, liberal theorists reject the anarchic model of the states system, instead focusing on the myriad structures of governance, treaties, networks, alliances, markets, norms of behaviour, etc., through which global politics are regulated (Keohane & Nye 2011, Milner 1991). For these liberal theorists displacement is thus a potential de-stabilising problem to be contained through international organisations such as the UNHCR and the Schengen Agreement within the European Union. In more recent years a new generation of liberals have extended this commitment to the maintenance of international order and stability to include active intervention in weak or "failed states" either to protect minorities (as with Kosovo), advance democracy (as with Iraq and Libya), or promote markets (as with IMF interventions in various countries since the early 1980s) (Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 1986).

Both Realism and Liberalism can then be described as system maintenance theories in which the experience of displacement is understood as a potential problem for the smooth functioning of the existent system, to be solved within the structures of the existent system, either through the securitisation of the nation state or the co-operation in global governance and liberal intervention. By contrast, critical international theorists are concerned not with solving problems within the global system, but rather with problematising the system with an explicit normative preference for the experiences of marginalised groups and the possibility of emancipation[32]. Almost by definition there are multiple critical theories associated with multiple projects of emancipation. In particular Feminist theorists have challenged ideas of power in global politics (Tickner 1988), the

engendering of migration[33] and the performative masculinity of violence (Butler 2013, 2006, Hutchings 2008) while Post-colonial critics have demonstrated the continuing significance of race in global politics (Grovogui 1996) and development (Escobar 2011). In this introduction I will however focus on two particular traditions of critique which have had an influence across the various approaches, the first associated with the tradition of the Frankfurt School and the latter with the broad label of Postmodernism.

The tradition of Frankfurt critique can broadly be described as the defence of emancipatory reason against instrumental or technical rationality (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002). For Jürgen Habermas the interaction of these forms of reason constitutes a "dialectic of progress" in human history by which through "the acquisition of problem solving abilities", "new problem situations come to consciousness" (Habermas 1975: 294). For Habermas, contemporary globalisation, the migration of peoples, the mobility of capital and the weakening of the nation state can be described as a process of "accelerated modernization" with "some disquieting features" (2001b:9) yet which involves a broadening of responsibilities towards a "post-national constellation" based upon a multicultural "pluralisation of life forms" (2001: 73)[34]. Drawing on Habermasian theory Andrew Linklater (1992, 2007) suggests contemporary globalisation thus constitutes a new post-national order of mechanisms of harm prevention, manifested in institutions such as the global human rights culture, International Criminal Court, and NGOs such as Save the Children or *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Here however there are deep echoes of liberal interventionism, as Linklater affords a privileged role to (implicitly western) states which “seem to have abandoned the totalising project (and thus)…. are more universalistic and more sensitive to cultural difference… (2007: 81), a role (indeed a responsibility) in protecting and even "liberating" the inhabitants of those nations which “remain committed to the totalising project” (81)[35]. Alternatively Seyla Benhabib (2004, 2006) has deployed the Habermasian theory of discourse ethics to suggest new regimes for thinking about inclusion and exclusion, as she suggests such a regime would prohibit any logic of exclusion "that would bar groups of individuals… because of the kind of human beings they were”. However, Benhabib acknowledges criteria which are individual in nature, for example language, qualifications, skills "and resources to become a member are permissible because they do not deny your communicative freedom” (2004: 139). Such an approach, Benhabib argues, would establish the ethical foundations within the

system of nation states, secured by post-national human rights to defend against processes of displacement. Yet here again the approach is essentially liberal in affirming global political equality amongst individuals yet without addressing the fundamental economic structures which constitute logics of inclusion and exclusion along broadly post-colonial lines[36].

For the Frankfurt theorists, then, the aim is to challenge those pre-modern forms of displacement through the Enlightenment tradition of critical rationality. Yet for the more radical postmodern[37] critics the very project of Enlightenment is constitutive of processes of displacement. Here the foundational influence is Michel Foucault, for whom the project of Enlightenment involves the disciplining of the irrational (2002), the insane (1965), the unruly (1991), the sexual (1998), and the body (1990, 1998b). For those who followed Foucault the question was then to overcome the straitjacket of reason. For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983, 1984) the answer was an embrace of the productive force of desire which they understood as the ontological foundation of all activity. When applied to the international system this ontology was described with the evocative image of the *nomadic war machine* or the desire towards de-territorialisation which is constantly ordered through the apparatuses of the state system. As such for Deleuze and Guattari this nomadic spirit amounted to the foundation of global politics in which displacement is the constant force for the de-composition and re-composition of peoples (1983: 417). This theme has been taken up by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000) for whom the economic migrant constitutes "a new spectre haunting the world" (2000: 214), while struggles in defence of place are dismissed as ”totally reactive” (44), “reterritorialising boundaries and barriers” (2000:45), clinging to “regressive…. even fascistic” (362) models of politics, which are to be rejected in favour of the de-territorialising impulse which creates "the new place of the non-place" (2000: 214). Finally, Giorgio Agamben has drawn on Foucault`s early analyses of spatial segregation to describe the contemporary "spaces, of exception," particularly Refugee Camps, Detention Centres, off-shore holding facilities etc., in which human life is reduced to bare life. For Agamben the logic of sovereign spatialities is inherently linked to the production of non-sovereignty in these spaces of exception. As such he proposes the Refugee “who has lost all rights, yet stops wanting to be assimilated” as a new ethical subject of critique, as he affirms "the refugee is the only category in which it is possible to perceive the limits and possibilities of a political

community to come!" (1994: 118)[38]. Here, then, while the Frankfurt tradition looks to a post-national global governance to overcome processes of displacement, the postmodern critics see in displacements the possibility of challenging governance as such from those subjects who are outside of sovereign spatiality.

The two mainstream traditions thus reduce displacement to a problem to be resolved within the existent states system, while the two critical traditions discussed here see processes of displacement as giving rise to a new structure of global politics. Yet what both lack is any identification with the experience of the placedness of life, nor with the feelings of loss and estrangement from place described by sociologists and geographers. There is thus in neither the dominant mainstream approaches or the major criticial theories a sufficient engagement with the experience of displacement as displacement, nor a critique of the production of displacement by the global system. In the final section of this chapter I will then outline how I intend to develop a phenomenological account of the placed in order build a critique of displacement as the political totalisation of space.

1.3 Structure of Thesis: Towards a Messianic History of Displacement in International Political Theory

This thesis begins from the presence of an absence in international political theory, the absence of the fundamental human experience of displacement which I suggest constitutes the absent centre of the global political. The first question I will ask in the following chapter is thus what is meant by *the experience of displacement*? As has been suggested in this introduction, many of the most powerful engagements with displacement have come from ethnographers, geographers, cultural theorists, psychologists and artists capable of exploring the rich affective and symbolic meanings of the loss of place. International theorists, by contrast, are more comfortable with the "big picture" perspective of global historical processes and structural analyses. In this thesis I want to attempt to bring these perspectives together first by developing a phenomenological account of displacement, drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir and Fanon, to discuss the way in which our sense of self is formed through the experience of the lived body in place, the invitations to meaning by which we are formed as subjects. Following Emmanuel Levinas I will argue that the highest expression of this placedness is the encounter in the face to face with the Other which gives rise to ethical

subjectivity. Yet I will argue this experience of placedness as face to face is fundamentally disrupted by projects of spatial totalisation by which inter-subjective relations are objectified as relations of parts within a whole, no longer face to face but side by side, no longer related through ethical proximity but through mediations of the totality. It is this process of the political totalisation of space, from the most mundane to the most radical, which I will argue constitutes the phenomenal experience of displacement.

In the remainder of the thesis I then seek to identify four paradigmatic episodes or narratives of this displacement by which western political philosophy has developed as a philosophy of totalisation opposed to the placedness of everyday life: Exodus, Odyssey, Crusade and Conquest. In Chapter 3 I describe the story of Exodus as the going out of the mediations of the Egyptian totality into the wilderness. I suggest this narrative as the model for understanding the Messianic Christian ethics which goes out of the Roman system of status and honour into the wilderness of the ethical proximity of the neighbour. In Chapter 4 I turn to the narrative of displacement found in the Homeric epic accounts of the siege of Troy. I argue that this narrative structure of departure - overcoming - return has a deep influence in Platonic epistemology as the idea of overcoming the worldly, which ultimately shapes the foundational political philosophy of the Republic as a model of social totalisation. In chapter 5 I discuss how these apparently opposed narratives became synthesised in the post-Messianic theology of Augustine of Hippo and the binary of the earthly city of man and the heavenly city of God. This theology, I argue, allows the idea of "going out" to be delayed while the worldly totality of sin is to be overcome. In the narrative of Crusade I thus argue this overcoming is achieved through the projection of sin onto the Other as "enemy of God" in order to constitute the self as "friend of God". In chapter 6 I describe how this idea of warrior Christianity is articulated in the evangelical conquest of the Americas by which the Amerindian Other is projected as lacking to the extent that she is different from the self, and thus is to be saved by being brought within the totality of the self. I also suggest however that this evangelical project of totalisation re-opens the fundamental tensions between city of God and city of man and thus leads to the ascendency of a natural law of nations as the totalising mediation between self and Other in global politics. Finally in chapter 7 I analyse the three modern ethical systems which complete this secularisation of global politics: moral sentimentalism, which I argue lays the foundations for the totality of world market; moral rationalism, which I argue lays

the foundations for the totality of international law, and a post-moral aesthetic, which I suggest sets a model for the totality of war. I thus suggest that while each of these philosophies involves Messianic fragments, each involves a totalisation of moral activity which negates any true encounter with the Other in place.

Through these particular historical narratives which are each unique and specific to their own context in time and space I will argue we can find a broader process by which the philosophical tradition moves away from the proximity to the Other as suggested in the Messianic love of the neighbour, to the totalisation of the political in which self and Other are related only through the mediation of the totality. I thus refer to this history as Messianic, following the model set out by Walter Benjamin. This then is clearly not a conventional history of political thought which follows a continuous thread in order to develop a coherent narrative of development but instead a model of what Benjamin has referred to as a "Messianic History". Such a model is in not designed to offer a systematic or linear historical account of displacement, or the progress of international theory. On the contrary, it challenges ideas of historical progress by drawing out particular episodes and disruptions, bringing these together in order to intervene in the present. This bricolage approach to history is thus a work of selection and as such I have chosen these particular episodes as reflecting certain paradigmatic modes of the totalisation of space and the mediation of the relation between self and Other which I believe have significant contemporary resonance that I will draw out in the conclusion of the thesis. In the conclusion I will thus suggest that while the totalisation of space may appear absolute as viewed from the perspective from above, from below it is clear that most of life remains lived in place, full of ambiguities and resistances to the mediations which the projects of the powerful seek to impose. As such I conclude by arguing that it is in the spatialities of the places of life that we might find the resources for the Messianic disruption of history, the disrupting of the ever increasing distance. It is in place and in the proximity of Others that we might discover what Benjamin calls "the weak Messianic threads" which interrupt space and time, not the heroic act, but the everyday tenderness of human kindness and responsibility for the Other which are largely invisible to international theory and yet fundamental to our meaningful human experience.

2

Proximity and Totality: A Phenomenological Ethics against Displacement

Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world… hence it is necessary to think that destiny in the history of Being (Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism)

In the introduction to this thesis I have associated the word *displacement* with multiple forms of the social, political and economic disruption of place which criss-cross the contemporary world, from the most radical forms of the refugee to the more ambiguous processes of economic re-structuring, urban re-generation and community breakdown. In this chapter however I want to go beneath these concrete processes and experiences in order to think at a more elemental level about what is the phenomenal meaning of displacement. To state the obvious, displacement is a negation of place and as such before we can think about displacement we must begin by thinking about place. The appeal of the placed is a constant theme in political and media discourses, from the conservative morality of *back to basics*, to the nostalgic charm of period dramas. The placed has a unique pull on our emotions because of its power to evoke comforting and reassuring imagery: the warmth of home, the family dinner table, the community pub, nostalgia for the streets we played football on as children. Such benign images of the placed however should be approached with a good deal of caution, for beneath them all is the idea of belonging, and wherever there is the explicit claim to belonging there is the implicit idea of non-belonging, the logics of inclusion and exclusion, the hostility to difference, the oppression of those who do not conform. The language of place can then very quickly become the language of displacement. As Edward Said has suggested, "nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place… it affirms the home created by language, culture and customs" (2012: 176). Yet of course nationalism is itself a

politicisation of place and it is for precisely this reason that in this chapter I want to go beneath the multiple discourses of place in order to attempt to return to the phenomenal experience of place as lived.

In order to achieve this return to the fundamental experience of the placed and displacement I will adopt a phenomenological approach in this chapter. The basic starting point for this phenomenological analysis is that our primary access to understanding the world is achieved not through an abstraction from the world as with much of modern science, but through our very insertion into the world. The world we seek to understand is the world as it is given to us in experience and as such if we are to understand the world we must engage in what Maurice Merleau-Ponty has referred to as a radical reflection on the intentional structure of experience by which we overcome the competing paradigms of objectification and subjectification through which our experiences are ordinarily understood. In the first section of this chapter I will draw on Merleau-Ponty`s account of how we are formed as meaningful subjects through the perceptual body. In the second section I draw on the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Franz Fanon to describe how the materiality of the body is also the condition in which we are established as objects of meaning. In the third section of the chapter I explore Emmanuel Levina's concept of the face to face encounter with the Other in proximity as the basis by which we might overcome both subjectification and objectication through the affirmation of ethical subjectivity but also how this experience is lost in the philosophy of totalisation which dominates the western philosophical tradition. Finally in section four I set how I intend to use the model of "Messianic History" as developed by Walter Benjamin in order to critically analyse the way in which western political philosophy has moved from the proximity to the Other to the totalisation of the political.

2.1 The Body as Lived in Place

To begin to think about place is immediately to think in relation to space. When we first think of placing an object we imagine situating that object spatially in relation to other objects, for example the knife to the right and the fork to the left of a dinner plate. To describe an object in space, Descartes suggests in his second *Meditation,* is to speak of a body "that can be comprised in a certain place, and so fill a certain space as there from to

exclude every other body" (2:5). To be placed in this Cartesian sense is then to be situated, it is to occupy a certain segment of space and time exclusively of all other bodies. This principle of the situation of material bodies has profound implications for human beings, for we are ourselves materially embodied, as Descartes acknowledges: "I possess a countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I call by the name of body" (2:5). We ourselves are then also like any other object, it would seem, situated in our bodies. Such a conclusion is however clearly problematic for those philosophers concerned with transcending space and time through the establishment of universal truths and eternal laws. To overcome this problem philosophers have proposed a fundamental distinction in the human, between the situatedness of our material bodies and the transcendence of the mind which can be de-situated through the employment of reason. For Descartes this capacity for rational transcendence is much closer to our human essence than the materiality of our bodies. In making this argument in the second *Meditation*[39] Descartes asks what activity could be considered essential to the existence of the self, Physical activities such as eating and walking are not essential, for it is possible to withdraw from any particular physical activity, even breathing (albeit for a short period), and yet still acknowledge the existence of the self, Perceptual activity is equally inessential, for perceptions can be misleading, in dreams I may perceive something which when awake I acknowledge to be non-existent. Finally, mental activity - the activity of thinking, of conscious reflection - Descartes concludes it is not possible to cease, nor to be misled by, as such thought it is concluded "properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am--I exist" (2:6). The very act of self contemplation affirms the existence of the being that contemplates. As such Descartes concludes "it is plain I am not the assemblage of members called the human body" (2:7) but instead a thinking thing, "a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills" (2:7). Distinct from and non-dependent upon the material thing of the body, "my mind, by which I am what I am] is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it" (6:9). It is then through the rational capacities of the mind that Descartes claims we are able to transcend the situatedness of the material body. To give an example, Descartes suggests when looking out of a window onto a busy street I may perceive a vision of floating hats and cloaks "whose motions might be determined by springs" yet through the faculty of rational judgement the

presence of people is hypothesised "by the faculty of judgment alone which is in the mind" (2:13); the perspectival chaos of perception is made meaningful through rational reflection. The de-situated rational mind thus becomes capable of abstract universal reason, of knowing things, which it has never seen. It is even able to objectify the perceptual body itself and thus intellectually transcend its own perspective. Maurice Merleau-Ponty characterises this rationalisation of perception thus; “since I know where I am and see myself amongst things… I am a consciousness… which resides nowhere and can be everywhere… the thing is in a place, but perception is nowhere… Perception is thus thought about perceiving” (2002: 43-44). While the substance dualism[40] of Descartes has largely been abandoned in modern psychology, the basic structural dualism remains in psychological views of the body as a mechanistic object, something like a machine directed in action by the conscious mind[41]. The body in this view is understood as a mere receiver of primary perceptual data which is then made meaningful by a rational consciousness which transcends the body to operate on the plane of abstract laws and concepts. The body is viewed objectively from the perspective of a detached observer, for whom it is merely an object, incapable of transcendence, is an object condemned to meaninglessness. The task Merleau-Ponty sets himself is to challenge this view by developing a phenomenology of the body, not from the perspective of an outside observer, but from inside the experience itself as lived meaningfully in meaningful engagements with the world.

In developing this approach Merleau-Ponty offers an extended discussion on the case of Schneider as analysed by the neuropsychologists Goldstein & Gelb (1918)[42], conducted in the wake of World War One on a patient who had suffered significant brain injuries due to flying shrapnel[43]. Schneider`s symptoms were highly complex. For example when asked to bend or straighten a finger he was unable to perform the task on request, yet when preparing to sneeze he was able quite naturally to retrieve a handkerchief from his pocket and lift it to his mouth (2002: 118). When touched on a part of his body by a doctor he was unable to name which part was being touched without looking, yet when stung by a mosquito he could quite naturally locate and rub the bite without looking. When leaving a room he was quite able to proceed, open the door and leave, yet when asked to walk over to the door but not leave he was unable. Schneider quite normally could return home from work, but when walking past his home while heading somewhere else he would be

unable to recognise which house was his own (155). When asked to point at his nose Schneider could not perform the task without visually isolating his arm, following it through the air and then grasping the nose; if asked to touch his nose with a ruler he was unable to do so (119). Finally despite all these paralysing symptoms Schneider remained quite capable of performing multiple complex tasks in his job working in a wallet making factory (118)[44]. Schneider`s symptoms would then suggest three points. First, that there is a distinction between two types of activity – The first can be described as concrete-habitual, that which is performed in a broader meaningful context, from the very simple (rubbing a sting) to the highly complex (making wallets in a wallet factory), with a goal which is meaningful (soothing pain, or making wallets). The second, abstract-conceptual, are those activities which occur at a step removed from the concrete, for example the difference between being a soldier and playing the role of a soldier in a play, or the difference between rubbing a mosquito sting and pointing to a part of the body Abstract actions have no direct connection to a meaningful goal, they are in some sense abstracted from the context or situation[45]. Second, there is a connection between habitual activity and the feel for the body: Merleau-Ponty claims that the response to the mosquito sting suggests that the patient is able to understand his own body from the inside "but not as an objective setting", for example as an object to be pointed at (119). Yet this analysis can be extended to the situation in which the patient is involved. Merleau-Ponty reports that, when asked about how he felt when performing such concrete activities as making wallets, the patient responded "I experience the movements as being a result of the situation… I am scarcely aware of any voluntary initiative… it all happens independently of me" (120). In such concrete situations Merleau-Ponty thus concludes the patient is not only in his body (as demonstrated with the rubbing of the sting) but also in the situation: “the body is no more than an element in a system of the subject and his work” (122). As such in the activities “needed for living his life” (118) the patient forms a meaningful synthesis in which the lived body and lived context are fused together to form a single lived system of meaning in which "there is a knowledge of place which is reducible to a sort of co-existence with that place" (121). Finally, activities such as wallet-making, walking home and grasping an object are not performed by the abstract consciousness (as for example with pointing at an object) but rather part of a thorough synthesis of the body with the environment which it inhabits. When a ball is thrown for a footballer, she will

respond without conceptual mediation. Her complex physical movements will be performed purely through the body in response to a situation which is saturated with meaning. Here Merleau-Ponty offers various examples such as dancing, driving, typing and sporting activities in which the body intuitively responds to the opportunities, possibilities and limits of action in particular phenomenal contexts: "having a body is for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and maintain a commitment to them" (94). Such contexts in which the body is engaged with a certain set of opportunities, possibilities and limits to action Merleau-Ponty calls the phenomenal field: the meaningful context into which I am integrated through experience; habit is formed through habitat. This integration is first of all an integration in which the subject relates to her own bodily consciousness. "I am not in front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it" (173). Yet this cannot be reduced purely to the biological or physical body, for to be conscious of my being as embodied is also to be conscious of my capacity to engage within particular contexts in the world. This is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the *Phenomenal Body.* Schneider is then confined to the concrete in the sense that he is able to be in his phenomenal body when his body is itself in the contexts the body inhabits, but when the body is removed from context in abstract activity the patient must objectify his body. He lacks the ability to re-translate the abstract into the concrete and thus performs the abstract in precisely the way the rationalist account would suggest, but quite clearly not the way ordinary people perform abstract actions.

The rationalist view of the body as simply a material object situated *in space* and directed by the consciousness is thus only possible because this view approaches the body from the perspective of the outside observer, the body understood as an object no more meaningful than any other object such as a chair or table which occupies a segment of space. Once we enter the phenomenal experience of the body from inside of that experience we come to a different understanding according to which "our body is not primarily *in space*, it is of it" (171) (my italics). The phenomenal body is not *in space* in the way any other object is, but rather *inhabits* space in a way which endows space with meaning. This process occurs first of all because of the spatial and temporal unity of the body - In order to clap I do not need to identify where each hand is in objective space, I am conscious of each hand through the embodied sense of the oneness that pervades the

lived body. The formation of what Merleau-Ponty calls this *bodily schema* can be traced to the earliest stages of infant development. From the primordial shared embodiment of the womb within the first moments of life the infant is able to separate her bodily self from the world. Within the first three days of life she has developed a sense of her own body, as can be seen in the imitation of sticking out the tongue in response to a parent performing the same action (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983). In the first months of life the infant goes on to further explore her own body, by sucking her fist, thence to exploring intimate non-corporeal objects, for example sucking a blanket or soft toy By the age of four months she is grasping at objects which are out of her reach[46]. In this process the infant can be said to be gradually reaching out into the world, pulling the world towards her, first by the most intimate exploration of her own body, then by integrating intimate objects, then reaching out, grasping at toys[47]. At this stage the infant cannot be said to perceive things, but only presences, yet what can be said is the very fact that the infant reaches out into the world tells us that she perceives exteriority. Already she perceives the perceptual presences as not simply interior to consciousness, but part of a world beyond to which she is called to respond in the material capabilities of her body. For Merleau-Ponty this is the primordial phenomenal experience of space, the experience of being pulled beyond consciousness out toward the world, reaching out towards that blurry presence which is beyond me, which beckons me forward, the presence exerting a pull towards meaning and yet it is prior to meaning; it is only presence, not yet thing. This pull is not rational, but purely perceptual, the perception of a presence pulling the senses to exert perceptual grip, the focusing of the eyes, the grasping of the fingers. Gradually the object is brought closer to me, it is brought from the hazy distance of presence to the detailed closeness of meaning, my perceptual grip becoming ever tighter as I perceive more and more detail until the presence becomes a meaningful thing - the presence pulls the perceptual faculties to envelop it and yet always it is beyond full grip, ever beckoning. The presence which is beyond me then draws me to transcend my own interiority of consciousness towards the meaningful engagement with the exteriority of the world. In this way we can say the perceptual body is itself directed toward meaning When standing before a painting or reading a book, for example, we move forward, or backwards, nearer or farther. There is an existential distance "which distinguishes the loose approximate grip… from the complete grip which is proximity" (2002: 305). But also the world itself is

directed toward meaning, the presences which in all their hazy indeterminacy beckon the infant to grasp, beckon the eye to focus, are full of meaning waiting to be revealed; the world is pregnant with the opportunities and possibilities for the body to engage. The ball is pregnant with kickability, the fruit is pregnant with deliciousness, the glass of water is pregnant with quenching refreshment. As such Merleau-Ponty describes the thing as that "Which fulfils more than it promises, which constantly outruns its promises… sight is fulfilled and achieves itself in the thing seen" (438). This mutual constitution of meaning can be illustrated with the example of binocular vision, a process which is prior to reflection, immanent to the body, yet according to Merleau-Ponty directed towards meaning. Each eye receives a distinct image, yet the eyes pre-reflectively unify those images. Through the spatial synthesis of the body, the sense of the oneness of the embodied, the two images come together to form a unified *it - the thing*. However, in the very process of pulling this presence towards meaning as thing, the body is synthesised, for it is not possible to focus in the absence of the object upon which to focus, but rather through the perceptual enveloping of the object (the pulling of the object towards meaning) the body is itself pulled towards meaning as a unified subject. From the initial synthesis of vision, the infant grasps, tastes, smells the object. The object is the gift which gives rise to subjectivity in the mutual pull of meaning through which both subject and object are constituted as meaningful unities. As such just as the object beckons the senses toward the unification of bodily subjectivity Merleau-Ponty suggests, so also this bodily unity unifies the object: "one sees the hardness and brittleness of glass… one sees the springiness of steel" (266). Even more, just as the primary senses bleed into each other, so also they bleed into the secondary senses of balance and fatigue and still further into the affective domain of the emotions - we can see the sharpness of the guillotine as though it were slicing our own flesh, we hear the gentle caress of a soft voice, the peril of the scream. Each experience becomes rich with the synthesis of meaning, synthesised through the oneness of our own meaningful bodies.

What we can conclude then from this discussion is that we are not situated in space as objects, but rather we constitute space through our embodied inhabitation of the world. This inhabitation is immediate, not abstracted through consciousness or concepts, but is there in the very fabric of perception - meaning is constituted in the very phenomenon of perception prior to any conscious reflection. We are thus not objectively in space, but

rather constitutive of space through what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the immediacy of the "face to face of subject and world" (311). It is the thing which provides the invitation to meaning, it calls from its blurry presence on the horizon of perception, it invites us to transcend the interiority of consciousness and to explore the exteriority of the world, it provides us with opportunities to reach, to focus, to touch, and through reaching and focusing and touching we become conscious of the unity of perception, the unity of our bodies, ultimately the unity of our subjectivity. Yet in this process of the unification of perception so also we come to unify the object: just as the presence invites us to meaning, so we are able then to nurture the meaning of the thing, uniting its appearance, its smell, its texture into a meaningful thing. As Merleau-Ponty describes this process, "the world is inseparable from the subject, but the subject is a project of the world and the subject is inseparable from the world, but a world which the subject itself projects. The Subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains subjective" (499-500). Through the placed contexts which we meaningfully inhabit we are brought into meaningful existence. Through our embodied activity in these contexts we are constituted as meaningful beings forever invited by the world to find meaning to the world. It is for Merleau-Ponty precisely "because we are in the world (that) we are *condemned to meaning* and we cannot do or say anything without it acquiring a name in history" (xxii, italics in original).

2.2 The Body as Object in the World

Rather than the Cartesian *Ego Cogito* by which the thinking being as subjective consciousness is separated from the world of objects, Merleau-Ponty offers a model of subjectivity[48] which is much more fluid, never in full possession of itself, but instead constituted through the pre-reflective interaction of the body and the world. This is particularly true in early infancy, when we are anything but fixed subjective identities. Initially in the womb there is a shared embodiment between mother and child, while in the first months of life the newborn`s sense of self is highly ambiguous, with aspects of selfhood but also significant flows of anonymous experiential phenomena which are not channelled into self / other, internal / external binaries. This ambiguity can be seen in the post-natal act of imitation. When the parent playfully pretends to bite the finger of the child of 15 months, the baby will respond by opening its own mouth "it perceives its intentions in its own body, and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its

own body" (2002: 405). This act of imitation in one respect suggests a proto-subjective body schema, but at the same time also suggests the absence of fixed boundaries between self and other. There is then not yet a sense of subject identity, but there is already a sense of collective indemnification of shared humanity (the infant will not imitate a bird tweeting for example until she is much older). This hazy sense of inter-subjectivity continues into early childhood, as Merleau-Ponty illustrates with the story of a young child who upon the birth of a baby sister, took upon herself the name and dress of her own older sister, suggesting the blurry ambiguity of identity constituted more by familial context than a fully fixed sense of subjective self-identity: "the personality is somehow immersed in the situation" (1964a: 146). Equally, while this phenomenon is most pronounced in childhood it can be seen throughout life, for example as the spectator at a football match moves as if to head the ball (1964a: 145) or more profoundly in our capacities for empathy in which we experience the pain of the other as our own (1964a: 146). This original experience of "syncretic sociability" or “anonymous inter-subjectivity…. undifferentiated group life” (1964: 137) is fundamental for Merleau-Ponty, for it suggests we are only formed in our subjectivity through the pre-personal inter-subjectivity of being in the world.

It is then, according to Merleau-Ponty, only with the mirror stage of ego formation at around the age of 24 months that we come for the first time to fully perceive our selves not as fluidly intervolved with the contexts which we inhabit, but as a being with fixed boundaries, a definite outline (1964a: 120). For the first time the reflection of the mirror introduces us to the objective view of the body as being in space, rather than the inhabitation of space. From here the experience of the world shifts from the sense of the body lived as an opening out onto the world (as described in the previous section) to the body lived as a closure, a set of fixed boundaries, which divide subject from object, a boundary upon which consciousness ultimately will fall into the former category and the body will fall into the latter, a thing like other things. This experience of the wrenching separation of conscious subjectivity from embodied object is profoundly alienating. It is the moment “Whereupon I leave the reality of my lived me in order to refer myself constantly to the ideal, fictitious, or imaginary me… I am torn from myself, and the image in the mirror prepares me for another still more serious alienation, which will be the alienation by others” (1964a: 136)[49]. For Merleau-Ponty the possibilities for overcoming

this alienation rely on re-constituting the original anonymous inter-subjectivity of nature through the collective inter-subjectivity of culture, in particular language. As previously suggested ,just as the object draws together the eyes into the synthesis of binocular vision (embodied subjectivity) so also the object draws together the self and the other inter-subjectively. The object is named inter-subjectively: when two people experience an object, the object draws them together, as such in dialogue "My body and the other`s are one whole, two sides of the same phenomenon" (2002: 412)[50]. In order to share the world we name the object, name its qualities, and in the formation of language the distinctions between self and other disappears, replaced with a unified system of signification in which "my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric… inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator.. our perspectives merge… we co-exist through a common world. We have a dual being…. I am freed from myself" (2002: 413)[51].

There are, however, problems with this understanding of language and culture as providing the collective basis for over-coming the alienating objectification of the mirror-stage as suggested by Merleau-Ponty. One potential line of critique is suggested by Dorothea Olokowski in her essay *Only Nature is Mother to the Child* (2006) in which the idea of early infancy as anonymous collectivity is claimed to negate the fundamental relation of nurture in the mother-child relation. According to Olokowski, Merleau-Ponty constructs infancy as the anonymous chaotic sensual experience of an undifferentiated nature

> *"Although the natural world of the child is a beautiful, fascinating place, human beings are largely absent... The mother who carries... in her body, who gives birth, who nurses, cares... holds in her arms, comforting, soothing, calming this tiny, not yet fully human being is either absent or supplanted by the natural, physical world... devoid of mothers and mothering" (2006: 54)*

For Olokowski, Merleau-Ponty`s understanding of the role of culture as the foundation of inter-subjectivity signals a move away from the corporeal. The child develops its selfhood by breaking with the world of proximal touch (associated with the mother) through the anonymous role-play (associated with the father)[52] in order to enter the world of culture, the "community of men... endowed with speech, with gesture, with perception" (2006:

55). This world of language and culture is assumed by Merleau-Ponty to be anonymous and inter-subjective - by which we overcome our objectified selves in the inter-subjectivity of language, in art, in poetry, in philosophy, in all the ways which we share the world. Yet for others the relationship of the world of culture to the lived body ~~is~~is much more complex.

Simone de Beauvoir[53] shares the view of Merleau-Ponty that the discovery of "finitude, solitude and abandonment" (2009: 294) originates in the reflection of the mirror. However for Beauvoir this objectification is not easily overcome through submerging oneself into the world of culture. On the contrary, for Beauvoir the world of culture is not so much a collective anonymity but a profoundly structuring world in which the female body is radically objectified through mythical, anthropological, philosophical, scientific and literary representations. Rather then than simply the encounter with the spectral image, Beauvoir affirms "it is the whole of civilisation that creates this product (woman)... (through which) her vocation is imperiously imposed upon her". As with the mirror`s reflection, the process of gendered objectification occurs from early childhood, in the games that small children play, in which boys are encouraged to grasp their own active bodies as "a means by which to dominate nature" (305), climbing trees and fighting. By contrast, the female child is to be kept clean, to be passive. She is taught "that to please, she must try to please" (280). It is not only in the mirror that she is to be an object, she is continuously encouraged to play the role of a "living doll" (305)[54]. The process continues in the earliest stories that patriarchal civilisations tell in which the female is the "Sleeping Beauty", the "Snow White", the "Cinderella", "the one who receives and endures" whilst awaiting the young man – the knight, the prince charming – who again is the active protagonist fighting dragons, combating giants, conquering enemy barbarians in order to save the damsel in distress (316). This civilizational construction of the feminine object does not of course end with childhood, but is analysed by Beauvoir in many of the great names of the literary canon including Montherlant, Lawrence and Stendhal. In Beauvoir's analysis of Montherlant`s tetralogy *Les jeunes filles* (The Young Girls) we see various constructions of the feminine as Other, for example as a corrupting weakness against which the male hero must rise up, or conquer: "he must take, without being taken" (225). In an alternative construction the female is again defined by her relation to masculine action, but here as the supportive wife who according to Lawrence "ought to believe in

you, and in the deep purpose you stand for… submit to your purpose that is beyond her" (quoted in Beauvoir 241). Despite the divergences in characterisation, the structural parallel is clear: the feminine is the object while the masculine is subject. What is more, this objectification is fundamentally associated with the corporeality of the female body, as when Montherlant suggests feelings of contempt with the "cloying, almost disgusting smell of this body, without muscles, without nerves, like a white slug" (quoted in Beauvoir 225), while Lawrence explains that in the female her "deepest consciousness is in her loins and her belly" (240). In both accounts the female is thus reduced to the objectivity of the body, "bathed in sweat and body odour", which serves as a contrast to transcendent masculinity, which is "pure spirit served by muscles and a sex organ of steel" (229), as Beauvoir cites Montherlant: "what is most irritating in women is their claim to reason" (225). The feminine is thus defined above all by embodiment which "imprison(s) her in her subjectivity, circumscribe(s) her within the limits of her own nature" (5), the embodied passive object counter-posed to the spirited active masculine subject. Such representations take many forms, reflecting many dominant culturally and historically specific discourses, imageries and metaphors, to the extent that it is not only humanity which is gendered, but even the non-human: the natural, the mountains and oceans, the serpent, the moon. Yet all these diverse representations are structurally homologous in constructing the female body through imageries of "femininity" as the object through which masculine subjectivity achieves his transcendence, to "provide man with the same passive and unexpected resistance that allows him to accomplish himself" (180).

A parallel analysis is offered by Fanon (2008) with a particular focus on language. Fanon agrees with Merleau-Ponty that to speak a language is to engage in a creative relationship with a whole cultural reservoir of meaning "bearing the weight of a civilisation" (2) and which structures our own consciousness; as he affirms "an idiom is a way of thinking" (9). However, for precisely this reason Fanon believes speech and language are powerful tools by which oppressive social relations can be constituted with an appearance of anonymity. To illustrate this argument Fanon, as did Beauvoir, turns to discussions of cultural representation, particularly comics, films and children's stories. Fanon focuses on the representation of the "native", showing how even in films dubbed from English into French - the speech remains stunted and broken - "me work hard, me never lie, me never steal" (17) - suggesting intellectual incapacity, while the white adventurer speaks with

fluency and poise. The native is thus primarily not a speaker, which would allow the expression of subjectivity, but is described overwhelmingly in his bodily appearance as an object: as dark-skinned, semi-naked, quick-to-anger. As Nigel Gibson (2003: 22), argues in reflection on Fanon`s analysis, it is not simply that the Black is his body, but that he is purely the exteriority of his body as an object, an assemblage of external organs and carnal desires, the "uneducated sexual instinct" (Fanon 2008: 154),"an object amongst other objects" (2008: 89). Again, the distinction in the narrative is the distinction between the white man as active subject, the eloquent speaker, the explorer, the adventurer, "the civilising coloniser who brings truth to the savages, a lilly-white truth" and the passive object, the native, dark-skinned, the unclothed, "the wolf, the devil, the wicked Genie, Evil, the Savage" (124). The opposition structures the narrative, subject and object, speech and body, civilisation and barbarism, white and black. Such stories perform a double function. In the colony they inspire a desire "to be on the side of good" by learning the language, dressing as the hero dresses, while in the Metropole they reinforce the sense of innate superiority, the view that the native can never enter the metropolitan linguistic-cultural civilisation, precisely because he is marked in his body as pure body, incapable of speaking *the French of the French*. Fanon refers to the experience of the educated black man in Martinique who is taught that he is part of French civilisation, a part of the universal culture of letters, the global Francophone cultural-linguistic civilisation, the civilisation of Descartes and Zola, Rousseau and Baudelaire. However, Fanon demonstrates that this is an illusion which is quickly dispelled the moment the Antillean enters the Metropole, at which point it becomes clear that it is not enough to speak the French language, but one must speak *the French of the French*. Fanon thus describes how the new arrival will spend hours paying close attention to his diction, excessively rolling his Rs in the way of the metropolitan Parisian. Yet this is never enough. When he is spoken to it is in a child-like pidgin, precisely because Fanon suggests it is not in his speech that he is deemed to be *not French*, it is in his body. As with the feminine the black man is objectified in his body, "attacked in his corporeality" (142). Despite Merleau-Ponty`s meticulous analysis of how we come to inhabit our bodies, this process of racialisation is entirely absent. As such it is left for Fanon to explain how in the "white world" the man of colour encounters profound obstacles in elaborating his body schema (90-91). Here Fanon recounts the experience of entering the gaze of a small child. "Look,

a Negro…. The Negro`s going to eat me" (92/93). In such a moment Fanon describes a deeply traumatic experience of being imprisoned in the objectivity of his body by an entire linguistic-cultural civilisation. Such experiences demand not only an understanding of the individual body-schema but also of a historic-racial schema built up through the centuries of cultural narratives, discourses and representations exerting an overwhelming reification, whereby the body becomes the object interchangeably of fascination, of fear, of contempt, but above all a body as object, never as subject.

There are clear parallels in the analyses developed by Beauvoir and Fanon, for both reflect on experiences of being constituted in their bodies as objects through which active subjects achieve their own transcendence, the production of a "crushing objecthood" (109) achieved not simply in the mirror, but by an entire cultural-linguistic civilisation. While it may be possible for some to transcend the objectification of the spectral image through the collectivity of culture, for others this is not possible. Indeed it might even be suggested this transcendence is achieved through the objectification of others in the world of culture. Equally for both thinkers it is the apparent universality of culture which allows these structures of objectification to function, by subsuming the relation of self to Other. This is most obvious for Fanon who frequently insists that while on his own territory of the Antillean "is unaware of his inferiority being determined by the Other" (89). In order for this realisation to occur it is necessary not only for him to be black, but "to be black in relation to the white man" (89). As Beauvoir analyses the situation, the patriarchal separation of private and public and the confinement of the female to the former assures that women "live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social standing to certain men – fathers or husbands – more firmly than they are to other women" (2009: 15). The world of culture is then not anonymous but reflective of the material structures of the production of knowledge in colonial and patriarchal contexts, which subsume the difference of Self and Other in representations of universality, representations which are deeply structured by the interests of those empowered to speak. For both Beauvoir and Fanon the relationships between man and woman, white and black, are profoundly distorted by their cultural representation into the binaries of subject and object, mind and body. Both then propose a response which restores the interaction of Self and Other in the lived world. For Beauvoir the primary model by which the self is related to the Other is through a

domination model as inherited from Hegel. Yet as Debra Bergoffen (1997) has suggested, it is also possible to read Beauvoir as developing a different model of the relation between self and Other, built around the "erotic generosities" of intimacy in which "The ethical question concern the ways in which we negotiate these differences" (1997: 174). In this reading the ethical is built on precisely the affirmation *of ambiguity (1948)*[55], a way of being with the Other which involves the mutual struggle for liberation from the logic of subject and object, a struggle for freedom from the logic of possession, "since the moment one releases his hold, he again finds his hands free and ready to stretch out toward a new future" (1948: 130). For Beauvoir such reciprocity in the struggle for freedom involves dismantling the rigid distinctions between subject and object, yet such reciprocity is not easily won. On the contrary it is to be considered "humanity's highest achievement". While the domination model of the struggle of life and death between self and Other, master and slave, ultimately involves negation, the possibility of reciprocity suggested by Beauvoir involves an acknowledgement of the preservation of alterity by which "each will yet remain for the other an other"[56]

Fanon is even more explicitly concerned with the problematic of love in the context of racialisation[57], referring extensively to the case of the Martiniquan author Mayotte Capecia, whose attraction to white men Fanon considers to be a form of self-hatred, a desire to socially and culturally whiten the skin of the next generation. Equally problematic is the white woman whose fantasies about the black man reflect deeply ingrained discourses of danger and animalistic sexuality (136-7)[58]. What Fanon addresses in these chapters is the distortion of the intimate by the entire linguistic-cultural civilisation of representations, power relations and pathologies. It is this distortion which Fanon finds most tragic precisely because it is in bodily intimacy that the self and the Other are most able to engage in mutual disclosure. As such Fanon affirms that it is ultimately in the cause of love, which the struggle against colonial racialisation is ultimately fought

> "*Superiority? Inferiority? Why not the simple trying to touch the Other, to feel the Other, discover each Other. Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the You, Man?.. the open dimension of every consciousness. My final Prayer: Oh my body, make of me always a man who questions*" (2008: 232)

Here for Fanon as with Beauvoir, the possibility of transcendence is imagined not as escaping the body into the world of language and culture as suggested by Merleau-Ponty, but something much more intimate, the ability to explore the body of the Other, and have the Other explore the body of the self, to love through our bodies and thus develop relations of subject-object, object-subject through the embrace of mutual embodiment as separate and distinct beings[59].

2.3 The Proximity of the Other and the Spatiality of Totality

At this point, then,it can be said that taking a phenomenological perspective the body is not simply in space, but rather inhabits space. It Is intervolved in the constitution of meaning in lived contexts or places, the interaction of which gives rise both to the meaning of the self and the meaning of the world[60]. Yet just as we are subjectified (in the creation of meaning) in our bodies, we are also objectified, first in the reflection of the mirror but also in the social and cultural representations of the body which reflect broader social relations of power. The body is thus a deeply ambiguous experience of both subjectivity and objectivity. The question of the body is thus of central importance to political theory, Indeed, in an early essay entitled *Reflection on the Philosophy of Hitlerism* (1990)[61], Emmanuel Levinas asks quite directly “what does it mean to have a body?” (67). In this essay Levinas claims that western thought,particularly since the Enlightenment, has viewed the body as subordinate to the rational mind, as an obstacle to universalisation particularly in the age of Enlightenment. Levinas argues, "The whole philosophical and political thought of modern times tends to place the human spirit on a plane that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between man and the world" (66). The ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy associated with the Enlightenment reflect this very detachment from the materiality of the body. This detachment of abstract concepts from material realities such as the bodily pleasures, necessities and desires put the Enlightenment at a certain distance from the materiality of life, what Levinas refers to as the "unique warmth of our bodies” (68), the feeling of danger when our lives are at risk, the feelings of pain and joy which are felt in the body. For Levinas the Philosophy of Hitlerism is thus a rebellion against this detachment of modern thought from the materiality of life, a philosophy that awakens "the secret nostalgia within the German soul" (64) for the determination of nature, expressed in the language of the community of

blood, the sweat of labour and the groundedness of the soil, upon which is built the dwelling, the homeland. For Levinas this identification of the body with nature, with a certain *at-homeness*, is the very expansionary project of Being by which the world is inhabited. The body must consume, it must eat the fruit of the world, it must build its dwelling out of the products of nature and thus it expands out, it claiming a part of the world for itself, a part which gradually is enlarged, an "expansion… (of) an ideal that simultaneously brings with it its own form of universalization: war and conquest." (1990: 70-71). The philosophy of Hitlerism is thus for Levinas closely linked with the expansion of the self out into the world, the building of the home through the sweat of the body upon the soil of nature, giving rise to an identification of belonging which is deeply embodied but also totalising, for once blood, sweat and soil are combined, the project of the self affirms a spatiality as its own. This spatiality which begins with the dwelling can expand out throughout whole countries and continents.

The experience of Nazism, the catastrophe of the Holocaust and the total war that destroyed Europe in the first half of the twentieth century haunts Levinas` mature work[62]. For Levinas, however, the fascistic naturalism of Nazi Germany cannot be neatly opposed to the liberal rationalism of the Enlightenment tradition. On the contrary, as the Hitlerism essay suggests, it is precisely the detachment from the materiality of life in the Enlightenment tradition which gives rise to the romantic counter-Enlightenment that culminates in the Third Reich. The philosophical project of modernity is not opposed to the naturalist philosophy of Hitlerism but rather gave birth to the philosophy of Hitlerism. The philosophy of totalitarianism in politics was born out of the philosophy of *totality* or *totalisation*. Just as the philosophy of Hitlerism involved the expansion of Being through the sweat of the body out into the world, to take a grip of the world, to build a dwelling in the world, establish a home in the world, conquer the world, build an empire in the world, the whole history of philosophy is the history of the philosophical expansion of Being through the intellect out into the world. In Fascism Being overcomes the world through blood and sweat; in the philosophical tradition Being overcomes the world through contemplation and reflection. The reason philosophy proved so unable to resist the violence into which Europe descended was because philosophy has itself been complicit with violent domination by which the desire to live in proximity to the truth of Being overwhelmed any desire to live in proximity to the Other. This obsession with the truth of

Being leads Levinas to claim that “Philosophy is an egology” (1994: 44), an obsession of the self in relation to Being in which there is no exteriority, only the charade of Socratic dialogue which “Receive(s) nothing of the Other but what is in me ...” (43). Thus the very word 'philosophy' suggests the fundamental problem of philosophy, *philo-sophia*: the love of wisdom elevated above all other concern. The whole world is to be known, to be interiorised into knowledge in much the same way that the fruits of the world are consumed by the body, the places of life subsumed into the logic of war. This love of wisdom, much like the violence of war, has at its heart the drive towards submission of all that is beyond itself. All that is Other is to be understood and brought under the command of knowing. As Adriaan Peperzak describes eloquently, “The deepest motivation for this project was the wish to be free... a freedom engrossing to itself all that resists its powers... Thought`s ideal is the integration of everything into the immanence of a total knowing... the reduction of all alterity… is the ideal of autonomy, the legislation of the same” (1993: 45).

The very freedom which the philosopher seeks is the power to take possession of the world, to name and categorise and classify, and in doing so all things come under the power of the self and, what is more, all things become defined in relation to the projects of the self. The hammer and the nail, the tree and the axe are related to the project of building the home, but the good and the bad, the hot and the cold, the day and the night are all meanings related to the project of the self in knowing the world, planning, predicting and controlling the world. Yet in this process the philosopher also comes to view people as objects related to the totality of Being. Not only is the hammer there for hammering, the axe for felling trees, but human beings have a particular purpose “individuals are bearers of forces that command them unbeknownst to themselves... the meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality” (21/2). This totalisation is expressed perhaps most elegantly in the Heideggerian image of *Dwelling*, by which man is described as "the shephard of Being… whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being`s truth… in his dwelling in the nearness of Being" (1993: 245). For Heidegger what is then most meaningful about human being is to dwell in nearness to Being, lived as a certain at-homeness in the world, to live off the land in closeness to the temporal rhythms of nature. Yet for Levinas this ideal of *at-homeness* in the world involves the very same logic by which the self expands

out into nature. In building, in becoming lost in nature the blood and flesh of the self and the soil of the world become inter-twined in the taking a grip of the world as the home, as that which belongs to me (Levinas 1993: 37)[63]. The home is thus for Levinas fundamentally in the tradition of philosophical *egology* by which the self establishes its domain of interiority within the world, "the utopia in which the "I" recollects itself in dwelling at home with itself" (156). From here the home establishes the first "possessions" brought about through labour by which nature is manipulated and distorted towards the self, towards my egoist ends (159). Levinas's critique is certainly not directed primarily at Merleau-Ponty, yet the same critique of possession which can be made of Heidegger can also be directed against Merleau-Ponty`s concept of the grasp as the embodied performance of intentionality towards the world. To grasp is also to bring towards the self. The phenomenal grasp is for Levinas the origin of property, by which we become lost again in the Being of the world, a world in which relations between persons are mediated as relations of "merchandise, to be bought and sold… and accordingly convertible to money… dispersing in the anonymity of money" (162). To grasp is to bring towards the self, to bring under control, to compare and contrast, to measure the one against the other, the whole world becoming possible as possession, and ultimately the grasp which is confronted by resistance is directed toward violence, directed towards murder (162). For Levinas this idea of grasp as the bodily expression of intentionality is deeply troubling precisely because it involves “the enveloping of the exterior by the inward which is the very structure of the cogito” (1978: 48). To grasp either physically or intellectually involves a violence which culminates in murder.

The structure of intentionality so central to the phenomenological tradition since Husserl is thus condemned by Levinas to the extent that it involves the taking possession, the bringing within the totality of that which is exterior. Such intentionality is for Levinas associated with the violent imperialism of the self which overcomes the world. It is for precisely this reason that Levinas describes Being as evil "not because it is finite, but because it is without limits" (51). The desire for freedom from danger which builds the security of the home out of nature sets aside that spatiality in which there is the absolute freedom of the self, a spatiality in which the self is free from limits. What Levinas thus proposes is a phenomenology of the experience of limits, the experience of the limits of the freedom of the self, the experience of the limits of that which can be known, the

experience of the limits of that which can be grasped, and the experience of the limits of that which can be possessed. The fundamental question which Levinas asks of phenomenology is thus “Do particular beings yield their truth as a whole in which their exteriority vanishes? Or on the contrary is the ultimate event of being enacted in the outburst of this exteriority” (1993: 26). This question is raised in the encounter which is the experience of the ethical, the experience of the face of the Other, the experience of being faced by the Other, of being accountable before the Other, the experience of the face of the Other,

> "which is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched, for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object which becomes precisely a content” (1993: 194).

There is a notable influence here of Martin Buber (2002, 2004) whose description of the relation of the I and the Thou in many respects pre-figures Levinas' work[64]. For Buber the foundation of all language is the opening up of the I to the Thou. While language can be thought of as the totality of meaning (the totality of what can be meaningfully said) the foundation of that totality of meaning is the relation of I and Thou which is built in dialogue - the attempt to reach out to the Other meaningfully. For Levinas in much the same way, all our social, economic, cultural and political relations may constitute an ontological totality of meaning by which each subject has a certain identity - the foundation of that totality is in the appearance of an Other outside of that totality. The Other does not appear yonder as pure presence to be grasped, nor to be named, nor to be thematised, nor politicised, but is in her Otherness the call to ethics. The face, for the very reason that it expresses this ethical recognition prior to language, even prior to dialogue, is by definition resistant to capture within the totality of language[65], and as such Levinas' descriptions are highly impressionistic, almost Prophetic in tone. The face is thus described variously as erupting, disrupting, shattering: it is "infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign" (194). “The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me.... It expresses itself. (50-51). It is beyond any effort of domination, it “resists possession, resists my powers” (197). It is "total resistance to the grasp" (197) or representation. It “overflows images” (297) ", overflows the thought that thinks it" (25).

It is defined by its absolute alterity, its Otherness, “its refusal to be contained” (194). It is the fact which always confronts and disrupts my conscious image of the Other, "the calling into question of the I" (171)[66].

The difficulties of language in this context are the difficulties of describing a concept which represents the beyond the limits of that which can be represented, even beyond the limits of that which can be thought. In this challenge Levinas finds solace in Descartes' similarly tortured attempts to ground the existence of his own being in the prior existence of a benevolent God as outlined in the Third Meditation. What Levinas takes from this meditation is the foundational significance in Descartes of a separation between God and the self, and more significantly that Descartes affirms the absolute Otherness of God as both beyond and prior to the thinking subject. The idea of God for Descartes is that which is beyond thought. That God is infinite and I am finite establishes a relation of deep respect for that which cannot be known, for "it is of the nature of the infinite that it should not be comprehended by the finite; and it is enough that I rightly understand this… “in order to come to any contact with God it is necessary to abandon the effort to know God, for God must be recognised as "an infinity of properties of which I am ignorant… in order that the idea I have of him may become the most true, clear, and distinct of all the ideas in my mind" (III 26). While philosophy (the love of wisdom) affirms that all Being is that which can be known, Descartes suggests that the infinite is beyond finite mind, beyond the knowing of the self, beyond consciousness and thus must be prior to consciousness. The idea of the infinite must therefore be a gift of divine love. For Levinas this concept of infinity is the closest philosophical analogy for the experience of the face. That which is beyond thought takes on a fundamental significance as an escape route from all ontological attempts at totalisation, finessing Descartes with his own ethical project. “What remains ever exterior to thought is thought in the idea of infinity” (1999:25) and as such “if totality cannot be constituted it is because infinity does not permit itself to be integrated” (1961 80). For Levinas this trace of God is found in the human face, the face of the Other which is itself beyond and prior to consciousness[67]. It is thus in the face that there is a “gleam of exteriority” which escapes the totality, escapes the meaning ascribed to it by totality as the love of wisdom and the nearness to Being[68].

What then does it mean to be in nearness to the Other, rather than nearness to Being? For Levinas this nearness to the Other is described with the word *Proximity*. Again there is a parallel with Merleau-Ponty. Clearly Levinas wants to escape the connotations of objectivism by which self and other are situated in a relation of objective space. Proximity cannot describe the nearness of any two points in a universal homogenous space which derives from "Being`s non-subjective essence" but rather its "absolute and proper meaning presupposes humanity" (1998: 81). Yet the idea of proximity goes even further than this human spatiality as suggested by Merleau-Ponty. Proximity is the "closer and closer" which "forgets reciprocity" (82). No site is ever sufficiently called proximity - to be in proximity is to be called by the presence of the Other to ethics in a form analogous to the way in which the presence of the object calls the I towards perception with a pull that is non-voluntary, non-subjective. The analogy with perception is only partial however, for while it is true that the sense of proximity is first of all an embodied sense, much like balance or fatigue, and in this it is prior to consciousness, yet while fatigue and balance are internal to the body, the sense of proximity refers to the loss of the self in the presence of an unthematisable Other. As such while in perception the object pulls the subject towards perceptual grip, Levinas suggests that in the attempt to grip the Other ethical proximity is lost. To become conscious of the approaching Other is to have "already lost proximity properly so called" (83). It is to have become at ease with the presence, to have achieved a certain security of the self in the presence of the Other. While Merleau-Ponty had described the loss of the self in the spectral image, the loss of the self through the relation to the reflected image of the self, Levinas affirms a different understanding of the loss of self through the experience of proximity. Here there is a certain parallel with Sartre, for whom the experience of being with others provokes a profound sense of unease[69], even nausea. As such Sartre describes in *Being and Nothingness* (1989: 347-354) a peeping Tom so lost in the act of looking through the keyhole at a woman undressing that he has lost his sense of self. He is lost in the being of the object, yet when he hears the creek of a floorboard behind him, he is immediately re-entombed in his selfhood, persecuted by a crushing sense of being watched himself, of himself being an object. The proximity of the Other in this case is not graspable, not present yonder, but simply present as an Other who calls in a way unique to the human Other. No object invokes the same feelings of guilt, anguish, nausea, shame, self-loathing.

What can be said from the Levinasian perspective, however, is that these feelings merely represent the surface phenomena, the egology of Sartre`s philosophy of subjective freedom. What is deeper is the experience of radical responsibility towards the Other, the feeling of accountability before the Other, “the one-for-the-Other, a one-way relationship” (84)[70]. The image of proximity is thus quite distinct from the nearness to Being. It is in fact "older than the abstractness of nature" (86), nor is it to be thought of as subsumed within the inter-corporeality of the flesh. It is not a fusion of subjectivities but a contact with the Other which "neither annuls his alterity nor suppresses myself in the Other" (86). It is the touching and the touched as separate which defines the experience[71]. To be for the Other is to be placed in relation to the Other. The experience of being situated by the Other in a condition of responsibility is the experience of the ethical limit upon the freedom of the self. Sartre feels a shame in his freedom only because his freedom is questioned by the Other.

To live in the nearness of Being as proposed by Heidegger is thus for Levinas to live in farness from the Other, to live within the totality but to live without infinity, to live with all that which can be known and possessed, and yet to live without the Other who captivates and beguiles and brings the self to meaning as responsibility: Levinas thus rejects the idea of mere “inhabitation (which) belongs to the essence – to the egoism of the I” in favour of the proximity to the mystery of the Other, for whom “to have the idea of infinity it is necessary to exist as separated” (1961: 79). As will be remembered from section 1 of this chapter, for Merleau-Ponty the idea of proximity developed through the grasp which brought the thing from the farness of presence to the nearness of knowing, as such "distance is what distinguishes that loose and approximate grip from the complete grip which is proximity" (2002: 305). Yet for Levinas this model of the grasp which brings near to proximity is the movement of the love of wisdom to capture, to thematise, to perceive and ultimately to know, the love of wisdom, the pathos of the wisdom of love is found in the caress, the gentility of touch, the nurture of difference, the coaxing of the infant in her first words, the pedagogical relation, the dialogue. This is suggested in Levinas' insistence that "the caress does not seek to dominate a hostile freedom"[72]. What is sought in the caress is not the graspable, it is not the attempt to pull towards or bring under consciousness, "not an intentionality of disclosure but of search" (258). In this sense the joy of the caress is found in its very lack of grasp. It is "fed by its own hunger" (257) or

"the desire that animates it is reborn in its satisfaction" (258)[73]. The very pathos of the caress is found in its delights in the impossibility of grasp, the joy of that which cannot be interiorised, the joy of that which is Other and must remain so. “It anticipates the joy of satisfaction … This is the love of life, a pre-established harmony with what is yet to come to us” (1961: 144/5). The concept of love is itself of course highly complex, drawing on multiple traditions, most significantly Agape (Semitic, neighbourly love, gift) and Eros (Greek, sexual desire, need). For Levinas however, even in Eros it is Agape which is fundamental because in order to erotically desire the Other, the Other`s Otherness must be preserved. “Love remains a relation with the Other that turns into need, and this need still presupposes the total, transcendent exteriority of the other, of the beloved” (254). Yet here we find a problem. For Levinas the ethical is absolutely asymmetrical, yet in the caress there is both the caressing and the caressed, and in the giving I experience as pleasure the gift, the giving and the gift are brought together. The danger of an absolute asymmetry might be to affirm the passivity of the Other, an Other who is merely in receipt of ethical obligation. Yet the caress itself pre-supposes the giving of the vulnerability of the skin, the Other as the active agent who approaches, just as the phenomenal presence on the horizon of perception invites the body to meaning, so also the Other invites the self to responsibility. It is the Other who approaches proximity and gives the gift of vulnerability by which I am able to achieve my own goodness in giving, to whom I am indebted. Rather than pure responsibility, my responsibility to the Other is always a response to this gift of approach which has been given in presence. I am always indebted to the Other for this gift by which I achieve my own meaning as goodness, my response can only be the gift by which the Other may achieve her own goodness, my own vulnerability in the flesh of the body.

2.4 For a Messianic History of Distance from the Other

In the previous three sections of this chapter I have argued that our primary experience of space is not as empty and objective as would be perceived by an outside observer, but inhabited through our bodies in the embodiment of our subjectivity which is formed through our meaningful engagements with the world, the most significant of which is the encounter with the Other through which meaning is constituted as responsibility. This immediacy in relation to the world by which we are formed as meaningful subjects I have

called the placed in contrast to the spatiality of the totality in which there is no place, only space by which all parts derive their meaning in relation to the totalising whole. At this point these two understandings of space may be considered as parallel understandings suitable for different purposes. In the chapters to come, however, I will suggest that western political philosophy has developed through four paradigm narratives of displacement towards the understanding of the political as the spatial which overcomes and subordinates the places of life. In order to develop this analysis, however, it is necessary to briefly suggest the temporality of these two spatial structures, in order in the chapters to come to see how they have historically come into tension in the phenomenon of displacement.

To think about the temporality of totality it will be useful to briefly introduce the cosmology which exerts such a powerful influence on Levinas' thought, the tradition of Jewish mysticism known as Kabbala which developed in early medieval Europe as a deeply metaphysical set of interpretations of the Torah and the Talmud. The fundamental text in this tradition is known as the Zohar or Book of Splendour, in which the narrative of creation is read as a process of the self-revelation of God, by which the unknowable infinitude of the hidden mystery of divinity (En-sof) is constituted as the appearance of God by which He may be known to finite minds. In his account of this process of self-revelation, the leading expert of Jewish mysticism in the twentieth century, Gershom Scholem, suggests this En-sof can be thought of as the deepest being of the divine analogous to the soul of God, that which is always most hidden, but which is also most essential (1995: 215). In this analogy the body of the Divine, constitutes the faces of God (*sefiroth),* or the manifestations by which God might be revealed, the qualities and attributes of the Divinity. In the account of Issac Luria, developed during the sixteenth century, the process of revelation is described as involving prior to the act of creation, an act of retraction (Tsimsum), as Scholem suggests in order for the Divine to be revealed there must be first a self-limiting act of love in order to make room for the Other by abandoning a region from within the divine Self (261). As the Lurianic account describes, following the creation of this space of exteriority within the Divine God creates ten vessels into which divine light floods, yet the power of the divine light is so overwhelming that the lower six vessels shatter into an infinite number of shards scattered throughout the void. This shattering of the vessels (Shevirat Ha-Kelin) represents for Scholem "the defining

turning point in the cosmological order" (266), the moment in which humanity is thrown into distance, yet this distance is also in a deeper sense part of the very project of divine self-revelation by which humanity must complete the purpose of creation by fixing what has been broken, the restoration of what was destroyed called the *Tikkum Olam* - the fixing of the world, the restoration of that which was destroyed. As Scholem suggests in this sense "salvation means nothing but restitution" (268). The Messianic dimension is thus closely tied to the trauma of primordial disruption[74], the dream “to return home to paradise where all things will again be in their true place” (1974: 23).

For Walter Benjamin this cosmological catastrophe is captured most poignantly in a painting by the German artist Paul Klee, Angelus Novus:

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In his description of the image in Thesis 9 of his 20 *Theses on the Concept of History* (1999: 249-256) Benjamin refers to an angel, "his face turned towards the past", his mouth open, his eyes staring as if in horror. This past is described as "one single catastrophe" upon which more and more wreckage is being piled. The angel, it is suggested, wants to intervene, "to awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed". However this desire *to mend the world* is frustrated due to a powerful wind blowing from paradise which is caught in the angel`s wings. Despite the angel`s overwhelming wish to repair the catastrophe of history, he is propelled helplessly ever forward towards the future as more and more the wreckage and debris of death and despair piles towards the sky. This storm of unrelenting destruction blowing from paradise, Benjamin concludes, "is what we call progress".

Like his close friend Scholem**,** Benjamin is clearly influenced by the mystical tradition in Judaism. Yet much more than for Scholem there is an attempt to connect this mystical tradition with the tradition of the oppressed. The idea of redemption is combined with the idea of liberation, the idea of the Messianic combined with the idea of History. Clearly these theses, written months before his death amidst the ongoing catastrophe of European destruction, reflect Benjamin`s commitment that the dead cannot simply be forgotten, the deaths of so many millions cannot be without meaning, cannot but exert a powerful obligation upon the living - the obligation is above all to remember, to never forget, to struggle against forgetting. The temporality of totality is however

fundamentally opposed to remembering. It is the telos, the ever forward march of progress towards the goal, casting aside those who fall by the way on the ever-forward march of time, of progress, of development, of universal history. This is the history of the winners, the victorious armies and imperial powers, only ever looking forward to the next conquest, instantly disregarding the victims, history lived as an ever progressive singularity. The Being of the totality is the Spirit of the totality, the subjective, the active, the names recorded by historians, the great men of history, the kings and queens, the generals, their poets, philosophers, artists, explorers who live in nearness to the Being of the totality. In this view official history is the history of the totality, the history of battles won, enemies slain, projects completed towards the ever future, history as "the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate" (7). Just as Levinas suggests the totalisation of the Other involves murder, while the face of the Other is the prohibition *Thou shall not kill*, so also the temporality of the totality is the act not only of murder, but the forgetting of murder, the victim rendered ever more distant, ever more nameless in history, ever more meaningless, ever more necessary sacrifices in the achievement of the project. The temporality of totality assures that "not even the dead will be safe from the enemy if he is victorious. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious" (6). As the totalisation of Being involves the meaning of each body being mediated through the totality, the temporality of that totality is progress, every body being reduced in its meaning to the achievement of the totality towards the telos, the goal of transcendence.

Yet if progress is the temporality of the spirit of totality, what of the body, the objects, the passive, the peasants and workers, the soldiers, the housewives, the poor, those who produce the material necessities of life, those who re-produce life, those whose names are not recorded, whose biographies are never written down and taught to school children. The body, or rather to be embodied, is not lived on the grand stage of history in proximity to the being of the totality, nor in the temporality towards progress, for it is the bodies which are precisely sacrificed in the name of progress. The body which is lived in place must then have a different temporality, a temporality which, just as Levinas suggests with *the caress,* collapses the totality, by which meaning is no longer related to the ultimate goal, but is experienced in the flood of meaning and responsibility which emanates through the proximity of self and Other. As *the caress* is lived space for Levinas, for

Benjamin lived time is the *Jetztzeit*, the time of the here and now which is not causally determined by the flow of empty homogenous time, but is experienced in the phenomenal sense as lived time, the temporality of possibility, the possibility to engage with the world, the possibility to encounter the Other without certainty, without a goal as such, in which past present and future are fused in the elongated now. This now-time has several structural analogies. It has an intentional structure as suggested in the first section of this chapter, perception-engagement-meaning by which I respond in my body to the invitation to meaning from the world. It has an ethical structure encounter-commitment-responsibility. For example in the utterance *I love you* there is a commitment to redeem that which has been promised, a statement which commits the self to responsibility for the words uttered. In these placed moments of *the now* all empty-homogenous time stops, there is a "cessation of happening" in which temporality is humanised as a beginning saturated with significance for those who live it (17). The spatio-temporality of the placed now is fundamentally human, it cannot exist without the human and as such it fundamentally disrupts the spatio-temporality of the totality in which there is no place, no now, only space, only progress ever forward.

For Benjamin, however, there is a third structural manifestation of *Jetztzeit*, the structure of Messianic history, for just as in the subject there is a structure of responsibility which is temporal in nature, so also history has a temporal structure of redemptio. The dreams and hopes of redemption of the "now silenced ones" endow the living with a "weak Messianic power" to redemption (2). In Benjamin this redemption begins from the power of remembering against forgetting, in order to redeem the past against the greatest violation of all, greater even than death, the violation of forgetting. "For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably" (5). The now involves the explosion of the continuum of history. It does not conform to the teleological goal of history, but is the temporality of the mystery of the presence of the Other which exerts responsibility. This point is also recognised by Levinas, for whom our responsibility cannot be merely responsibility to those who are before us in the face, but also those whose absence is felt as an overwhelming presence, those whose very distance exerts a profound proximity, particularly those who have been effaced by time and history, an absence which places impossible ethical demands on the living[75]. To hold as progressive time would suggest

that the past has no claim on the present. Such a view would constitute the "most profound limitation on our responsibility… the fundamental limitation… a condition that is irreparable" (1990: 65) but instead full of human meaning and responsibility. For Levinas just as for Benjamin then human history contains within it a cosmic Messianic dimension which is referred to redemption by which "Time loses its very irreversibility" (1990: 65). Time in this sense is a process of looking back, not looking forward, and as such it allows the "reopen(ing of) the finality brought about by the flow of moments… to go beyond the absolute contradiction of a past that is subordinate to the present". To remember is in this sense to rebel against the inevitability of the future, a rebellion against the ever-forward movement of forgetting. To be responsible for the Other is the most radical disruption of empty homogenous space, as Levinas suggests, "If totality cannot be constituted it is because infinity does not permit itself to be integrated" (1961: 80). Equally to remember is to bring the temporally distant into the proximity of responsibility and as such is to disrupt homogenous empty time, just as proximity to the Other disrupts empty homogenous space, and this proximity similarly establishes a profound responsibility. The task of Messianic history is thus to restore proximity with the past by recording "the constellation in which the present epoch comes into contact with that of an earlier one… in which splinters of messianic time are shot through" (18a).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have drawn on the phenomenological tradition of the early twentieth century to argue that the way we inhabit the world is full of meaning, indeed it is our very inhabitation of the world which endows meaning. To inhabit the world is however not an anonymous experience, it is to be invited towards meaning in our bodies. The world beckons, pulls us beyond the interiority of consciousness. It calls on us to explore, to see and touch and smell and listen and give meaning, and in responding to these invitations we ourselves are formed in our perceptual bodies as meaningful beings. In responding to the invitation to give form to the world, so also we form our selves. From the infant who grasps to the full inhabitation of work and play we are formed as subjects in our bodies in the world, in the contexts we inhabit, the everyday rituals, the rhythms of labour, the emotional and affective attachments. Yet just as we are subjectified in our bodies in place, so also we are also objectified in our bodies in the world, in the first encounter with

the spectral image, but also in the cultural discourses by which we are alienated from our placed bodies and situated in a global context of social, economic, political, and cultural relations which objectify the body in terms of gender, race, class, disability, and poverty and by which consciousness is active and transcendent while embodiment is passive and imminent. In this chapter I have suggested the overcoming of this objectification is achieved in the activity of love, the giving to the Other, the nurture of Otherness, the caress, the *I love you*, the places and moments of proximity in which we are revealed as profoundly meaningful precisely because we are responsible for Others. This is the gift the Other offers - the revelation of our own meaning as subjects capable of love, not objects. It is in this placement in responsibility to Others that I suggest we are fundamentally placed in the immediacy of the now. This placement is rarely heroic, but most often found in the everyday acts of kindness, generosity, compassion, the encouragement of a teacher to a nervous student, the solidarity of friendship in a moment of need, the kiss on the cheek, the shoulder to cry on. In these everyday acts we are most revealed to ourselves as most meaningful. We become conscious of our capacity to give. In the following four chapters I will explore how western political thought has largely ignored the significance of the placed now in favour of the progressive totalisation of space in which the relations between self and Other are mediated through the project of the totality. In this history I begin from the Messianic interruption of Exodus, before moving onto the ways in which this Messianic spatio-temporality has been totalised in medieval Christendom and early modernity,

3

Displacement as Exodus in Messianic Christianity

Who is my Neighbour? (Luke 10:29)

In the previous chapter I have suggested a phenomenological approach to the understanding of place as the engagement of the lived body with the world, whereby the world provides invitations to meaning to which the body responds and through this engagement the body is itself formed meaningfully as the self as a meaningful being. The most profound of these meaningful engagements with the world around us is that offered by the Other person in which the self is invited towards her own ethical being, the achievement of her own goodness and responsibility for the Other. I have also suggested an understanding of displacement as the process of totalisation by which the experience of the Other in place is transformed into an spatial relation between parts within a broader system, the relation of which is determined by the project of the totality and as such in which there is no responsibility of self to Other. In the following four chapters of this thesis I will now discuss four historical episodes of physical displacement: the Exodus of the Hebrews out of Egypt, the Odyssey surrounding the siege and destruction of Troy, the First Crusade to the Holy Land and the Conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century. While each chapter will describe the narratives of these physical displacements the focus will be predominantly on the philosophical responses to these experiences, the ways in which western philosophy has engaged with, contributed to and occasionally challenged the metaphysical totalisation of the relation of self to Other which undergirds all processes of physical displacement. In the first of these four chapters I will then begin by describing the experience of physical displacement described as the Exodus of the Hebrews out of the Pharaonic state into the wilderness, which I argue amounts to a foundational narrative of going out of totality in order to achieve ethical proximity. In the second section of the chapter I will analyse how the memory of Exodus infuses the teachings of the Messianic Christ as the spiritual going out of the Roman totality of honour and status, in order to establish the community of love. The purpose of this chapter is thus to suggest the Semitic narrative of displacement as Exodus serves as a foundation for thinking about the placed as the going out of the mediations of totality, into the wilderness of proximity, or in the Messianic language the love of the neighbour.

3.1 The Exodus out of Egypt

The story of Exodus is the foundation narrative of Israel. There were of course many foundation myths in the ancient Mediterranean[76], yet what is remarkable about the foundation story of Israel is that it is explicitly told from the perspective of the lowly and oppressed and it is in this context that it has become much more than just another national foundation story, but rather a paradigm of liberation for oppressed peoples throughout history[77]. The book of Exodus[78] follows on from the book of Genesis, which describes the creation of humanity in the likeness of God (Gen 1:26) with dominion over the earth and sea and all that dwells within (Gen 1:27-28) in order that humanity shall thrive and "replenish the earth" (1:28). The narrative of Genesis then moves through the various stages of the alienation of created humanity from this original divine plan, in the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden (Gen 3:1-24), the cursing of the earth following the murder of Abel by his brother Cain (Gen 4:2-16), the corruption of the flesh (6:12) which gave rise to the flood of Noah (7:17-24), and ultimately the revelation of God`s Covenant with Abraham (Gen 12-17). The narrative of the Book of Exodus continues this pattern of alienation and redemption into human history: the oppression of Pharaonic Egypt into which the Hebrews had fallen and the restoration of the Covenant of Abraham with Moses in Sinai. Egypt in this narrative thus represents the imperial state, for it was at this time the greatest state in the Mediterranean built around the idea of a contiguous territory, a continuous cultural history and a hierarchical social order all of which coalesced around the figure of the imperial Pharaoh (Kemp 1989: 20) whose role was to maintain the balance between the earthly and the divine (Freeman 2004: 57). The narrative of Exodus thus begins with this Pharaonic emperor[79] delivering an address to his people declaring the presence of an enemy within, a "foreign people[80] (Exod 1:9) whose very presence threatened to destroy the hierarchical social balance of Egyptian civilisation and thus the cosmic purpose to which it was directed. Here then is the first declaration of displacement in the narrative of Exodus based on a political mediation of the relation of self to Other. The people living in this land who had been neighbours are now mediated in their relation to the Pharaonic state as Egyptians and Hebrews; the latter must be expelled for they are a threat to the political ordering of the natural space. At first Pharaoh announces a system of slavery in order to subjugate the Hebrews[81]. When this fails (1:11-14) a policy of systematic genocide is proclaimed by which the Hebrew Midwives are ordered to kill all sons at birth. The first characters introduced by name in this narrative

are thus not great men or powerful warriors, but two simple Hebrew midwives, *Shiprah* and *Puah,* whose faith in the God of life leads them to refuse to comply with the imperial command to murder (Exod 1:17) and thus sets Israel on the path of resistance which will ultimately lead to liberation. Here is the first suggestion of ethical proximity in the narrative of Exodus. The midwives in proximity with the infants defy the powerful pharaoh. This is the first suggestion that placed proximity stands in opposition to political totalisation. Having failed to turn Hebrew against Hebrew, Pharaoh attempts to incite communal genocide by calling on the Egyptians to cast the Hebrew male infants into the waters of the Nile (1:22). Yet here again Pharaoh is thwarted, as the mother of Moses casts her son into the Nile in an Ark of bushels (Exod 2:3), and then by Pharaoh`s own daughter[82], who discovers the child and upon hearing his cries is overcome by compassion and adopts the child as her own (2:6)[83]. Here again proximity is suggested as being in opposition to totality. The princess hears the cries of Moses and is overcome with a sense of responsibility which is more powerful than the totalising political mediation of Egyptian-Hebrew. These acts of human compassion signal the shift from the pattern of alienation to the pattern of redemption, for just as the princess heard the cries of the infant and took pity upon him, so God hears the groans of Israel and remembers the covenant with Abraham, a covenant which will be redeemed through Moses (2:23-25).

The first phase of the book thus describes the opposition of the totalising state which sets person against person in a system of oppression to the proximity of responsibility which nurtures life and is experienced in places. The second phase of the book thus describes the going out of oppression in order to create a new community built on the law of life. This phase begins with the appearance of God to Moses in the form of the burning bush (3:2-4:22). What is most striking about this encounter is that Moses is not over-whelmed by God. Quite the contrary, Moses questions God`s judgement in choosing him to lead Israel (3:11, 4:1, 4:10)[84]. Again we see here the continuities between Genesis and Exodus. The gift of creation which was the gift of life was also the gift by which man was put at a distance from God. This gift allows the sin of Adam. It surely brings great pain both to God and humanity, but also without this distance there could be no revelation, there could be no love. The very structure of redemption is built into the dialogue between Moses and God. Having convinced Moses of his own abilities the following chapters recount the long and painful struggle for the freedom between the Hebrews and

the intransigent Pharaoh (5:5-20), the many plagues with which Egypt was afflicted, the ongoing persecution and turmoil until the eventual liberatio, whereby the Hebrew`s depart from Egypt through the parted waves of the Red Sea.

The third phase of the narrative of liberation recounts the long years of wandering in the wilderness which follow the escape from bondage. Here the refugees face the simple challenges of life: exhaustion, thirst and hunger. It is quite clear that the liberation is not brought about only in order to achieve freedom and bread. Indeed, the murmurings of the Hebrews in the wilderness suggest amongst some at least a nostalgia for the certainties of Egyptian servitude. Indeed, one murmur goes as far as to lamen, "Would by God we had died by the hand of the LORD in the land of Egypt… when we did eat bread to the full , for ye have brought us forth into this wilderness to kill this whole assembly with hunger" (Exod 16:3). While in Egypt the Hebrews had been cruelly oppressed as a people, and in this oppression had been formed as a people through a solidarity against the external enemy, now in the wilderness they are responsible for each other and without an external enemy come increasingly to question each other and even challenge God who has delivered them from Pharaoh. The time in the wilderness is the time in between, a time when Israel exists free from the oppression of Pharaonic law and yet prior to the revelation of divine law. This is the last period where God must constantly intervene in history, for the culmination of the wanderings is the revelation of the divine law to Moses on Mount Sinai expressing the rules by which the community of life shall be maintained. Here we learn the true redemptive purpose of the liberation from Egypt: not simply the liberation of a particular nation, but rather the liberation of a nation which shall play a guiding role in universal liberation. Israel shall be a "kingdom of priests… a holy nation" (Exod 19: 6), which will work through the project of redemption amongst all peoples and nations. The story of Exodus, the story of departure out of the Egyptian totality thus culminates in the formation of a new community with a divine mission in the world, as was revealed to Isaiah (42:6) "a light unto nations" to teach the world the laws by which to worship God and to live in a community of life rather than a totalising system of death. Within this redemptive project the remembering of the oppression in Egypt has a fundamental significance for the responsibility placed upon Israel, as God proclaims "thou shalt not oppress a stranger, for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt" (23:9). For Israel and those who follow in the path of the Prophets

are commanded not to form the totality which oppresses the Other, but rather to live outside of totality "as strangers and aliens in the world" (1 Peter 2:11). The story thus constitutes for Gustavo Guttierrez a radical assertion that “the salvific action of God underlies all human existence... (that) the historical destiny of humanity must be placed definitively in this salvific horizon” (1996: 131). The foundational narrative of displacement in the Semitic tradition thus begins from the foundational experience of political totalisation of space by which the relation of self to Other in place is mediated as the relation of Egyptian-Hebrew within the state. Yet this narrative also suggests the resistance of placed proximity to the process of totalisation. Ultimately the going out of Egypt is the going out of totalisation, the establishment of a new community which will not totalise, but will instead remember "the heart of the stranger".

4.2 The Memory of Exodus in the Gospels

The memory of the delivery of the Hebrews "out of the land of Bondage" (Exod 20:2, Deut 5:6) is thus absolutely central to the various Abrahamic traditions. Indeed Ronald Hendal goes as far as to suggest that "Virtually every kind of religious literature in the Hebrew Bible: - prose narrative, liturgical poetry, didactic prose, and prophecy - celebrates the exodus as a foundational event" (2001: 601). Similarly, Jan Assman has argued that this remembering within the living traditions of faith constitutes not an historical memory as such but a "mnemohistory" in which the text "acquires its world changing momentum only in its reception history… its real importance is a question of memory not of history" (2013)[85]. Rather than talking of the history of Exodus we are then concerned with the memory of Exodus, memory being always a synthesis of present and past, always a process of bringing the past into proximity with the present. This is certainly true in the Christian Gospels where the motifs of Exodus are constantly referred to as indicators of the Messianic nature of the ministry of Jesus as a successor of Moses. This can be seen, as Jacob Enz (1957: 209) has suggested, in the Gospel of John, or as Jindrich Manek suggests (1957) in his analysis of the Jesus phenomenon as a "new Exodus" in the book of. As Frederick Green suggests in his commentary on the gospel of Matthew the motivation for this paralleling of Moses and Jesus is quite clear: "to surround the promulgation of the New Law and Covenant of God in Christ with the same majesty as accompanied the giving

of the Law on Sinai… when he delivered His people from the Land of Egypt and out of the house of bondage" (1936: 5).

The parallel between Moses and Jesus reflects a deeper parallel, whereby the Roman Empire emerges as a new system of the political totalisation of space resonant of the old Pharaonic totality. Yet this is a new model of totality. While the Egyptian state was built around the transcendent project of Pharaoh, through whom the relation of self and Other was mediated through the binary of Egyptian-Hebrew, in the Roman totality the project of the state was the constant territorial expansion which integrated ever more peoples, nations and communities into the imperial whole. The Roman state was thus built upon the most powerful war machine ever built, an entire society built upon a war machine, what Saskia Hin has called a "conquest society" (2013) constantly expanding in order to enrich the metropolis through plunder and pillage, as described by Livy (25:1) in his account of the sack of Syracuse, or as Polybius` (10:15) describes in his account of the slaughter of Carthage carried out "in accordance with the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they met". With each new conquest new contracts were signed with the subjugated peoples, new slaves were taken, new riches won, new legends made. The dynamic of war meant Roman society was never rigid, but always fluid, as the soldier grew rich through the capture of booty in war, powerful through the building of his legend, his clients could gain privilege by pleasing their patron, slaves could win their freedom, tribal elites of subjugated and colonised provinces could retain their privileges and power by promising loyalty and tribute to Rome. The fundamental mechanism of inter-personal mediation of this conquest society was thus the idea of status derived from Spartan ideals[86] of prestige, honour and glory *won* through heroic conduct on the battlefield and passed down through the blood. In this sense status was a legalised manifestation of physical violence and as such the logic of violence structured every social relation: the patrician and the plebeian, the master and the slave, the rich and the poor, the husband and wife, the patron and the client, all legally codified positions in society mediated by the totality of the state[87]. There could thus be no place outside the Roman system of status, as all relations were mediated through the structures of status built upon constant expansion, the constant interiorisation of territory outside of the totality. For its advocates this expansion represented a universal cosmopolitanism in which all could become Roman regardless of race, religion or nationality. Status was not national or

ethnic but a social and legal relation between citizens. As Cicero suggests, each citizen could claim to have "two fatherlands" within the Roman system, the one of national culture and tradition, the other of legal status, and yet it was also quite clear that "that fatherland must stand first in our affections in which the name of Republic signifies the common citizenship of us all" (Legibius 2:25). The result of this duality between natural and civic fatherlands was a fundamental tension between a "highly differentiated (society) composed of many classes, groups, associations each marked by linguistic, legal, cultural, racial and most commonly religious identities beneath the formal respectable institutions of the City" (Riesenberg 1994: 88). Moreover, as this entire system of status was built on the dynamism of war, so Rome was in a constant state of war with itself, particularly during the decline of the Republic which began with the slave revolt of the Servile Wars of 135BC[88] and continued through the rebellions of the Italian allies in the social wars of 91--88BC, the ongoing conflict between Patrician and Plebeian giving rise to civil war in Rome in 83BC. The militarisation of politics culminated in the final collapse of the Republic and the formation of the Empire in 27BC.

Perhaps the most radically subversive movement during this period of instability, however, came not in the form of an armed rebellion or mass uprising but a small movement of impoverished and marginalised Jewish peasants gathered around a charismatic preacher in the restless province of Judea. The region had long been characterised by a rebellious defiance from the time of the sack of Jerusalem in 63BC, since which time it had been governed by the dynasty of Herod the Great, the client "king of the Jews" who according to the Jewish historian Josephus kept his people "obedient" through fear while remaining submissive before Roman power (book 15 9:5), spending huge amounts of money on monuments in the Greco-Romanic style "in order to please Caesar and the Romans, as though he had not the Jewish customs so much in his eye as he had the honour of those Romans"(15 9:5)[89]. Josephus recounts that during this period there were ten thousand disorders in Judea (17 10:4), the most significant of which was the Passover uprising of 4BC against the idolatry and decadence of Herod Archelaus[90], culminating in a siege of Jerusalem and the eventual massacre of around 3000 rebels (17, 9:3). During the same period in Galilee a related rebellion also culminated in Jerusalem, with the Roman general Varius ordering the crucifixion of 2000 dissidents (17 10:1) a violent attack on the royal palace at Jericho led by Simon of Perea (17, 10:6), and the first

revolt of the Zealots led by Judas of Galilee[91] against the Roman census. This was, then, a region thrown into turmoil by the Roman conquest, marked by insurrection, famine, sectarian divisions amongst various Jewish groups, amongst them the upper class Sadducees, who sought to achieve religious and cultural autonomy through collaboration with Roman rule, while others such as the Pharisees, Essenes and Zealots sought revolution and independence (Antiqs 18, 1:2-6). This was the region into which Jesus was born, a region which Josephus describes as "full of murders and robberies" (17 10:8), where "one war followed upon another" (18 1:1, see also Mark 15:7), Jesus was born in a region as far from the centre of Roman power as can be imagined, not in a palace, but in a stable to a poor Aramaic - speaking family and raised in the small town of Nazareth in the region of Galilee. Even within Galilee the area around Nazareth was particularly marked by poverty and lawlessness. As the Brazilian theologian Leonardo Boff writes, it was “a worthless place (John 1,45-46; 6,42) a land where there lived, according to the preconceived ideas of the time, ignorant people who did not know the law (John 7,4)” (2007: 30). The fact that Jesus "shall be called a Nazarene" (Matt 2:23) is thus crucial to the identity and life of the historical Jesus, shaped by the world of the poor at the absolute margins of the Roman totality[92].

The experience of subjugation and repression by Rome, particularly the massacre on the night of Passover, would inevitably have recalled the experience of Egyptian bondage described in the book of Exodus. Indeed Josephus suggests that Judas of Galilee had explicitly drawn the connection between Roman tribute and Egyptian slavery (18, 1:1). This is particularly striking in the second chapter of Matthew`s Gospel, where Herod is situated as a contemporary Pharaoh pursuing another round of the slaughter of innocent Hebrew infants (1:21, 2:2, 2:3, 2:16) while Jesus is placed in a manger of hay (Luke 2:7) in parallel to the basket of reeds into which the infant Moses had been placed. As Moses fled into exile so Jesus goes into exile, this time into Egypt, and again upon the death of Herod there are again echoes of Exodus: "out of Egypt I have called my Son" (2:15). The very name given to Jesus by the Angel Gabriel, a Hellenised form of Joshua who completed the Exodus into Canaan, suggests that Jesus fulfils the liberation which began with Moses, "for he shall free his people from their sins" (1:21). Yet as can be seen from this mission statement, while the Gospels constantly re-affirm the parallels between Egyptian and Roman totalities, and between Moses and Jesus, so also it is clear that the

nature of the liberation shall be different from that described in Exodus. While the Hebrews in Egypt had been united in physical bondage as slaves, the Jews in 1st century Judea were divided amongst themselves by the Roman imperial system of status, honour, violence and idolatry which created collaboration, jealousy, violence, greed, etc. This liberation will not be a physical Exodus, a going out of the spatial territory of Rome, but a more profound liberation, a spiritual and ethical liberation, a going out of the totality of status and war which subjugates places of life and by which the relations of all persons are mediated through the primary relation to the totality of the Roman system. The Christian Exodus will, then, involve the re-establishment of relations of placed proximity, or what will be called neighbourly love, from within the spatiality of the totality, achieved through a going out of the logic of the totality, the logic of the mediation of status. Yet just as the physical Exodus of Moses, Aaron and Miriam involved the cruelties of the plagues, the long hard sufferings of the wilderness, so also the ethical Exodus out of the Roman totality of status and honour shall also be a long and painful struggle involving humiliations and hardships for many centuries. Christ thus makes it clear that to speak of love is not a simple matter. The love of which Christ speaks is not an accommodation to power but a revolutionary love, as is made quite clear in Matthew`s Gospel: "think not that I come to send peace on earth, I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt 10: 34)[93].

This revolutionary love is spelled out most clearly in the Sermon on the Mount. Again, the location of the Sermon has obvious resonances of Exodus, the ascension of Moses on Mount Sinai signalling that this will not be a destruction of the old law, but a fulfilment of law (5:17). While the liberation from Egypt involved the liberation of slaves as Hebrews, the chosen people of God who were to become a nation of the priests of God in the world (Exod 19:6), a light unto nations (Isi 42:6) which is explicitly echoed in Matthew (5:14), the audience addressed are not chosen for their national heritage, but rather purely as the oppressed and their allies, as signalled in the Beatitudes with which the sermon begins.

> "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven (5:3)… Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth (5:5)… Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy (5:7)… Blessed are the peace-makers (5:9)…. Blessed are the persecuted for righteousness' sake" (5:10).

As Warren Carter suggests, the primary audience to whom Jesus is speaking are those furthest from Roman status, "those oppressed by the powerful, despised by the elite" (2005: 131) alongside a secondary audience of those who take the side of the oppressed, the merciful, the peacemakers, those persecuted for righteousness sake, those who struggle for justice against the oppressors. There is thus here an echo of God hearing the groans of Israel in bondage (Exod 2:24) as Jesus affirms that God will redeem again, shall again deliver the oppressed out of the oppressive totality. The remainder of the Sermon will then set out the process by which the oppressed shall be liberated from Roman bondage through the formation of a new community, a community of the love of neighbour (Bailey 1993, Lapide 1986).

The poetic rhythm of the Sermon revolves around the repetition of two key phrases, a call and response rhythm which opens with the call pattern “ye hath heard that it was said by them of old time” (5:21, 27, 31, 33, 38, 43). Here there is a certain ambiguity. There is a clear reference to the old law as set out in the books of Exodus and Deuteronomy: this composes the "old time" that is referred to. However the opening of the phrase is not "it was said", which would affirm the authority of the tradition, but rather "ye hath heard", which puts a certain distance between what is being said and what was said. This distance allows Jesus to develop a critique of the contemporary interpreters of the law who it will be suggested confuse its divine spirit for its most banal formalities. In the response pattern of the Sermon, Jesus will then offer his Messianic re-interpretation of the law by revealing the fundamental essence beneath the formal requirements. This Messianic intervention is built around the phrase “but I say unto you” 5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44), introducing a series of extensions which radicalise the law and place even more profound demands of love. The first reference is to the old commandment “thou shalt not kill” (Exod 20:13, Deut 5:17), to which Jesus adds “I say unto you whosoever shall be angry with his brother… shall be in danger of the judgement” (Matt 5:21-22)[94]. Here, it should be noted Jesus, is not condemning anger as such. Anger is an emotion much like frustration to which we are all subject. There are instances in the Gospels where Jesus himself shows signs of frustration with those around him, particularly in the Temple at Jerusalem where he would appear to be angry. What is meant here then are two clear extensions. On the first level there is an extension from the physical act of murder to the spiritual act of anger: to be angry, it is suggested, is already to be entering upon the path

of murder in the sense of reducing the Other to an object in relation to the self. The moment this reduction of the Other occurs violence is a possibility, for if the Other is an obstacle to the project of the self, then it becomes possible to imagine how that obstacle may be removed. Yet, as Anna Wierzbicka (2001) suggests, there is also a second extension here, for there is precedent for the commandment against hating the brother in Leviticus (19:17), "Thou shall not hate thy brother". For Wierznicka there is then a subtle shift which is of crucial importance, for while Leviticus explicitly defines the word brother as a fellow Israelite, "the children of your people" (Lev 19:18), the parallel which Jesus suggests with the Exodus is universal prohibition against murder. There is then for Wierznicka "a semantic expansion of "brother" from "fellow Israelite" to "any other human being" (Chap 5 p8), which expands the community from the purely national towards universal humanity. This same double movement of extension is re-inforced when Jesus turns from the prohibition against murder to the prohibition against lust. Here again the call pattern refers to the old teaching, "Thou shall not commit adultery" (Matt 5:27), referring back to Exodus (20:14) and Deuteronomy (5:18), which explicitly speak against adultery. Again the same pattern of extension from sin of action to sin of the heart is apparent in the response pattern, "who so ever look at a woman to lust after hath committed adultery" (5:28). Here again, however, the response pattern seems to be referring to a different law to the one suggested in the call pattern involving a transformation rather than simply an extension. The call refers to Exodus 20:14 but the response refers more closely to Exodus 20:17 (also Deut 5:21), which prohibits coveting not only the neighbour`s wife, but also his house, his manservant, his maidservant, his ox, his ass, or anything belonging to him. The structural parallel of the prohibition in Christ`s teaching again thus involves a subtle shift but one of radical consequence. The offence which Jesus calls sinful is not the violation of the property rights of the brother (akin to all other property rights) but rather the violation of the dignity of the sister[95]. What is prohibited is the objectification of the sister`s body as a thing to be possessed or to be lusted over, rather than as a sister in the community (Carter 2005: 147)[96]. The paralleling of these two interpretations of law against murder and lust thus enrich each other and reveal the deep structure of Christian teaching, the first prohibiting the objectification of the Other in anger, the second prohibiting the objectification of the Other in lust. In both cases Jesus wants us to love our brothers and sisters as children of the father in their

Otherness beyond the project of the self, not to reduce them to objects to be hated or lusted after, killed or owned, but as possessing a dignity in their very Otherness. This is the Messianic understanding of proximity in the face to face beyond mediations, the Other who is associated with all manner of metaphors of place, the neighbour, the brother, the sister, yet who is defined above all not by her sameness, but by her Otherness to the self. Indeed, it is the respect for her Otherness which defines the meaning of love.

The community of love is, then, not only the national community, but the universal community, not only the community of male property holders, but the community of persons - brothers and sisters possessing unique human dignity as children of the Father which defines them as possessing a meaning which cannot be subsumed within any totality, including the totality of status. At this point the Sermon becomes yet more radical, moving from the manifestations of the negation of the Other in lust and anger, to the fundamental cause of these manifestations: the principle of honour. As has been suggested above, the code of honour was the absolutely central pillar of the Roman system of status. Indeed status was little more than a legalisation of honour. John Lendon (1997) describes this Roman system as an *Empire of Honour* in which all social relations were mediated by power. Any affront to honour must be met with crushing violence. This logic of honour was written in blood throughout the Roman world, not least the brutal sack of Carthage, the mass crucifixion of 6000 rebel slaves led by Spartacus in 71BC through to the mass crucifixion of 2000 Galilean rebels following the rebellion of 4BC. This idea of a symmetrical ethics of honour is of course not uniquely Roman, but also has its place in the very tradition to which Christ refers: “ye hath heard it said… an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (Matt 5:38, referring back to Exod. 21:24, Deut 19:21, Lev. 24:20). Yet here the Nazarene is more clear than before in affirming his absolute purpose. There can be no mere extension of a symmetry of violence in the cause of restoring lost honour, but instead a radical break with that very logic of honour in favour of an asymetrical ethics in which “ye whosoever shalt spite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (5:39). This then is the true meaning of the going out of the Roman totality: it is the going out of love of status and honour which gives rise to the constant violence of Rome by which relations between Roman subjects are mediated in the logic of violence in order to enter the proximity of love of the Other as neighbour. The Christian message in the tradition of radical Mosaic teaching is that “No man can serve two masters… ye cannot

serve God and mammon (the love of money, power, status, etc.)" (6:24), it is not possible to love the neighbour and also love status. As the first prohibition spoke against the objectification of the Other in anger, the second prohibition against the objectification of the Other in lust, so this asymmetrical ethics speaks against the objectification of the Self, as a thing to be honoured, to be determined in our relation to Others by the logic of honour as codified through the imperial system of status. Instead, we are to come face to face with the Other as brother and sister and as neighbour in the proximity of place, outside of the totality. As Paul interprets this in his letters to the Galatians, all social divisions are broken down in the community of love. "In flesh, if we are born again in Christ we are no longer Greek and barbarian, slave and free, male and female but are all in Jesus, and if ye be Christ`s then ye be of Abraham`s seed" (Gal 3:28-29).

The sermon thus teaches a relationship to the Other which is not subsumed within the totality, but is lived in the face to face in the community of neighbourly love. However there is another extension which goes still further. Again the poetic pattern opens with the call, "ye hath heard it said…. Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemies" (5:43-44). The second clause here is well established in the tradition (see for example Lev 19:18). However, there is no explicit endorsement of hating the enemy in the old law. On the contrary there are various commitments to show compassion for enemies, for example in Deuteronomy (23:17): "Do not despise an Edomite, for the Edomites are related to you. Do not despise an Egyptian, because you resided as foreigners in their country"; and in Proverbs (25:21): "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat: if he thirst, give him water to drink". It would seem, then, that Jesus is not referring to the tradition as such, but rather against the interpreters of the tradition who have distorted the commandment to love the neighbour as a justification for hating the enemy. The response pattern thus offers the challenge "I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, pray for them which despitefully persecute you" (5:44). Again, it is useful to situate this teaching in the historical context of insurrection and sectarian conflict amongst the various Judean factions. Jesus is clearly in everything he has said just as opposed to Roman domination as the radical Zealots and Pharisees. Throughout his life he teaches against the idolatry, love of wealth and power, violence and oppression of Roman imperial rule. Yet for Jesus escaping the Roman totality cannot be achieved through a mere nationalistic war of independence which divides the

world between neighbours and enemies. Such a division, Jesus is suggesting, remains trapped within the imperial logic of honour and gives rise to the myriad violences which have wracked the region over the past century since the siege of Jerusalem. Such a division between neighbour and enemy in fact introduces simply another mediation of the relation of self and Other which gives rise to the objectification of the Other and the ultimate violation of the Other. Such logics replace the mediation of the totality of status for the mediation of the totality of war. The Christian model of going out of the totality is to go out of the logic of mediation altogether, to embrace our ability to love the Other as Other in a way which is not mediated by either status or war. This is the true going out of the logic of Rome. As Paul describes in his letters to the Romans, “do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good” (Rom 12:21). To rebel against the Roman imperial system of violence, which Jesus undeniably affirms upon his arrival in Jerusalem, is never to deny the Roman as a fellow child of God. On the contrary this rebellion in its profoundest sense is to go out of the very logic of Rome by affirming the Romans as fellow children of God and thus to be loved as brothers and sisters, "that ye may be the children of your Father in heaven" (5:45). The message of the Sermon can then be characterised as a radical expansion of the concept of neighbour to create a universal community of love to include not only the children of the nation, but all children of the Father.

The primary spatial metaphor in the Christian discourse used to describe this experience of proximity to the Other outside of totality is, then, that of the neighbour. The crucial question is thus asked of Jesus (perhaps unsurprisingly by a lawyer) in the Gospel of Luke (10:29), “who is thy neighbour?”. This is perhaps the most important single question in the Gospels - for as the Sermon suggested, the neighbour or the brother can have resonances of nation or community in a way which limits responsibility. Jesus' response is thus striking, for his parable does not describe a homely space but rather a lawless and ungoverned space in the wilderness, the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, an area we know from Josephus as beset by criminality and insecurity during this period. Along this road Jesus describes a certain man who has been subject to a violent attack by a gang of thieves, stripped him of his clothes, beaten him and left battered and dying by the side of the road. In the minutes following the attack the victim is passed first by a priest, then a Levite[97], two highly respected members of the religious establishment, possessed of all the formalities of holiness and piety, yet both of whom continue along the road without

stopping, because, we can assume' they have somewhere to go, something to do. Finally a Samaritan[98] passes. Here the Galilean audience would have been in some degree of suspense, as this was a time during which tensions between the Galileans and Samaritans were growing rapidly, as Josephus suggests (20 6 1), resulting in violent clashes and communal hatreds, which Crown (1991: 27) describes as amounting to an "endemic prejudice" between the two groups. The very word Samaritan for the Galileans would have had connotations of criminality, untrustworthy, ungodliness[99]. Yet it is the Samaritan who saw the bloodied body by the side of the road, and took compassion upon him (10:33) and went to him, and took care of him (10:34). While the religious establishment was possessed of the formalities of holiness, the Samaritan is possessed of the true essence of holiness. The Priest and the Levite conform with the pattern of "ye hath heard"; the Samaritan represents the pattern "But I say unto you", the essence of the law. The message of the parable thus suggests that true holiness, true proximity to God, is not found through formal rules and regulations, but rather through obeying the rules of love for the Other, love expressed, according to Jesus, most comonly on the margins of the totality, amongst those despised by the powerful: the slaves, the hungry, the excluded, the homeless, the disabled and the diseased (Mark 7:32, John 5:3-9, Mark 1:40, 2:5, Luke 22:16, Matt 20:25, 25, Mark 15:27). While the Roman totality of status mediates all relations through the logic of honour which ultimately leads to the violation of the Other, the places of life on the margins of totality allow for nurture of the Other as Other, the acts of kindness and compassion. It is in such places that we are in true proximity to God. As Matthew (25:34-40) proclaims, "For I was hungry, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in, naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me, I was in prison, and ye came unto me… Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done *it* unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done *it* unto me". The fundamental message of Christian ethics is thus the un-mediated responsibility for the Other which is achieved in proximity, as can be seen in any number of scandalising activities of Jesus - healing the sick on the Sabbath (Mark 1:21-23), touching the impure (Mark 1:3-31), befriending Prostitutes (Luke 7:36-50). This praxis is central to the whole teaching of Christ. As Leonardo Boff explains, “it is not the Law that saves, but Love. Law merely possesses a human function... one of creating harmony and comprehension amongst peoples” (1980: 68) - Love is the essence of the law of life

outside of any totality - the coming into nearness with the Other, the tendering to her wounds, setting her again upon her feet.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the foundational story of displacement in the Semitic tradition as the going out of the Pharaonic totalisation of natural space through the political mediation of the relation between self and Other into a relation of Egyptian - Hebrew. This going out was foreshadowed by the acts of compassion within Egypt which defied the reduction of the Other to an object, but instead nurtured the life of the Other in proximity. The story of Exodus thus establishes a narrative of displacement whereby relations between people (Egyptians and Hebrews) are mediated by the project of the totality (the Pharaonic system), but also suggests the placed resistance against this totalisation. This narrative fundamentally shapes the teachings of the Nazarene Christ in the context of another totalisation of natural space, the political totalisation of the Roman state by which all inter-personal relations across the Mediterranean were mediated by the totality of status and the violence of constant war. As I have suggested in this context the going out could not involve a physical going into the wilderness, but instead an ethical and spiritual going out of the totality based on the commitment "to love one another" (John 13:34)[100], a love which is not mediated and which is thus deeply unreasonable, deeply asymmetrical, the love of the prodigal Son, the love which asks no questions? the love of the poor, the meek, the peaceful, the socially marginal. Yet in moving into this spiritual wilderness it becomes possible to relate to the Other as Other, not as patron-client, rich-poor, patrician-plebeian, but as brothers and sisters, in which the person is revealed in the fullest sense not merely as a status position within a totality, nor as an object in relation to the projects of the self, but as an Other outside of any system. As the parable of the Samaritan suggests this is a placed experience. It is not mediated or determined by an entire system of status relations, but is rather direct and inescapable. It is also in the possibility of love in proximity to the Otherness of the Other that there exists the possibility of faith and proximity to the Otherness of God. From the displacement of Exodus thus emerges the foundational idea of place in the Semitic tradition, the inescapable proximity of responsibility to the Other as experienced by the Hebrew Midwives, the daughter of Pharaoh, the Samaritan on the side of the road to Jericho. In

the following chapters I will now explore how this Messianic idea of placed proximity outside of the mediations of totality is gradually lost through the totalisation of the political in western thought, the process of going ever further into distance from the Messianic interruption which gives rise to ever greater distance from the worldly Other.

4

Displacement as Odyssey in Platonic Philosophy

"Far from hot baths he was indeed, poor man, and not he alone. Nearly all the Iliad takes place far from hot baths. Nearly all of human life, then and now, takes place far from hot baths" (Simone Weil, The Iliad as a Poem of Force)

In the previous chapter I have described the Exodus of the Hebrews out of the Pharaonic totality as a fundamental narrative of displacement, the memory of which shapes the ethical imaginary of Messianic Christianity. The perspective of the Exodus is that of a displaced people, slaves, peasants, workers, the subjugated underside of an oppressive Egyptian and later Roman Imperial system in which human life was reduced to labour and games. The going out of these totalising systems was the attempt to re-found a community in which the sanctity of life and the love of the neighbour would be the foundation of law. There is, however, an equally significant narrative of displacement which shapes the ethical and political thought of the ancient Mediterranean: the Homeric account of events surrounding the siege and ultimate destruction of Troy as set out in the two great epics of early Greek civilisation, *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*[101]. Both the Exodus and Odyssey narratives are stories combining elements of history and myth, yet what is so different is the perspective from which these stories are told. The Exodus account discussed above is the story of the displaced, the lowly and the subjugated, while the Homeric story is told from the perspective of the displacers, the aristocratic warriors who laid siege to Troy and would ultimately sack the city and enslave its inhabitants before returning home to Greece victorious. This is also then a narrative of going out into the world, but in distinction to the narrative of Exodus this going out involves an overcoming of the world. It is in this sense a heroic narrative by which the heroic self overcomes the many challenges of the world with which he is confronted in order to achieve his legend. In this chapter I will, then, begin by describing the narrative of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, focusing in particular on the construction of the heroic self through three archetypes of masculinity in Homer: *Paris,* the hedonistic charmer: *Achilles,* the greatest warrior and *Odysseus,* the wily navigator. In the second section of the chapter I analyse how this mythic structure of heroism as the overcoming of the world serves as a deep metaphysical structure for Platonic epistemology, whereby the intellect overcomes the earthly temptations and corruptions of the body in order to return home to the paradise of the

proximity of the truth of Being. In the final section of the chapter I will then argue that this metaphysic of overcoming the world shapes the Platonic political philosophy of the *Republic* as a totality in which all elements are constituted in relation to the project of the whole, the project of the transcendence of the Philosopher. As such I conclude by suggesting that while the Exodus narrative involves a going out of totality into the wilderness of the proximity of the Other, the Odyssean narrative in Plato involves the going out into the world in order to overcome the world through totalisation, the submitting of the world to the project of the self through which all proximity to the Other is lost in favour of the project of the self to achieve proximity to the truth of Being. I thus suggest these two Mediterranean narratives of displacement establish two radically different models of politics, the former in Exodus directed towards the love of the Other in place, the latter in Odyssey directed towards the overcoming of the Other and the transcendence of the earthly world.

4.1 The Judgement of Paris, the Wrath of Achilles and the Homecoming of Odysseus

The Iliad and *The Odyssey* compose two epic poems related to events surrounding a great war between the allied forces of the Greeks and the City of Troy. The war referred to is believed to have some historical grounding in a conflict of the late Mycenaean age around 1250BC[102]. However, the Homeric account[103] is mythic rather than historical, operating at two levels, the one of the human conflicts over honour amongst mortals which inevitably give rise to tragic consequences, the second that of the Olympian gods whose vanities and rivalries are played out through the human conflict with a mixture of detached amusement and withering contempt. The primary moral theme of the two epics is that of honour amongst men (*timē,* τιμή), the recognition of one`s position in the social hierarchy of the aristocratic elite. This code of honour underpins the whole ethos of masculinity in the Homeric value system within the context of the heroic age[104]. The tragic arc of the two poems is thus built around a series of disputes over honour, and in particular disputes amongst aristocratic men over the possession of women, disputes which give rise to heroic acts of vanity, violence and vengeance (van Wees 1992). The first of these disputes is the earthly cause of the whole Trojan conflict, where during a visit to the house of the king of Sparta, Menelaus, the Trojan Prince Paris takes possession of Menelaus's wife Helen. All characters seem to agree that the war relates to the

possession of Helen[105]. There is, however, some dispute about the precise circumstances by which she has come to leave Menelaus for Paris. According to certain accounts of the Greeks Helen was forcefully abducted[106], while according to the Trojan accounts Helen was seduced by Paris and followed voluntarily[107]. While there are suggestions of resentment against Helen amongst the Trojans, there are also suggestions of sympathy from amongst the family of Paris (3:159-167)) and from regular citizens (3:154-7) who seem to see the Spartan Queen more as a fellow victim of the whole cosmic tragedy rather than a malign influence. This cosmic cause of the war is only alluded to in *The Iliad*, in an enigmatic passage at 24:28-31 but is described in other sources as the Judgement of Paris, in which the Trojan Prince was asked to judge a beauty contest amongst the goddesses[108]. In seeking to tempt Paris, Athena had offered the gift of wisdom and skill in warfare, while Hera (the wife of Zeus) offered the gift of earthly political power, and finally Aphrodite, the goddess of beauty, offered Helen, the most beautiful woman in the world. Paris's choice of Aphrodite gave rise to the possession of Helen, but also alienated both Athena and Hera, creating powerful enemies committed to support the cause of Menelaus in the total destruction of Troy. Most characters in *The Iliad* thus blame the "dangerous lusts" (24:30) of Paris for the devastation of the siege. The character of Paris is thus established as the lowest level of aristocratic masculinity, a seducer and charmer of women, but also a hedonist more concerned with the pleasures of the flesh than the virtues of war. This characterisation is repeatedly emphasised by Paris's own brother Hector, the great hero of the Trojans who describes his errant sibling as "good for nothing but looks, a woman-crazed seducer" (3:38), concerned more with the boyish challenges of chasing women rather than the manly challenges of war, "a champion only for your good lucks" (3:43), empty of strength or courage" (3:44). Even having agreed to face Menelaus in a dual Paris is quickly whisked away by his patron Aphrodite who "sets him down in his sweetly scented bedroom", saying of him, in decidedly un-heroic terms, "you would not think he had come from fighting a man, you would say he was going to the dance" (393-4). Homer thus situates Paris most comfortably in the domestic space of the bedroom in the company of women, rather than on the battlefield in the honourable company of fighting men, more a charmer with sweet words than a warrior with sword in hand; even when engaged in combat it is lamented that Paris is more worried about "fussing over his exquisite armour" (6:320) than engaging in the slaughter of the enemy.

The contrast between Paris and heroic Hector, the pride of the Trojans who is evidently adored and admired even by his enemies, is clearly deliberate. However, the most powerful model of the heroic in the Iliad is the greatest of the Greek warriors, Achilles. Here again, however, there is a tragic conflict of honour over the rightful possession of a woman which shapes the dramatic arc of the narrative. During the sack of the Trojan ally Moesia, the Mycenaen King Agamemnon (the brother of Menelaus) had captured a young girl named Chryseis whom he had taken as a war prize[109]. Chrysei, however, was a daughter of Chryses, a priest of Apollo, who having failed in his appeals for her release requests his patron to impose a devastating plague on the Achaean forces. As a result of the plague Achilles appeals to Agamemnon to release Chryseis. The request is, however, taken as a dishonour by Agamemnon who threatens Achilles that if Chryseis is returned so he will take Achilles's own war prize, the Trojan girl Briseis (whose family Achilles had slaughtered during the sack of Lyrnessus) in order "that you know how much more powerful than you I am" (1:186). When the capture is carried out (1:320-325) Achilles goes into a deep rage withdrawing from the fight for Troy having been assured (via his divine mother Thetis) by Zeus that during his absence the Trojans shall achieve ever greater victories and impose ever greater suffering on the Greek forces, until Agamemnon will eventually have to "recognise his folly" (1:409) and thus restore the honour of Achilles (1:239-250). In the absence of Achilles the war slowly turns in favour of the Trojans. In desperation one of the Achaean generals Patroclus begs Achilles to lend him his armour. Achilles agrees to the request of his beloved friend[110] and comrade. However, upon entering the battle Patroclus is killed by Hector, and his body is stripped of the armour and desecrated (117:125-127)[111]. The death of Patroclus sends Achilles into a new and even deeper rage, leading him to return to battle and confront the Trojan hero.

The encounter between Hector and Achilles marks the dramatic climax of the poem. As the two heroes come face to face there begins a remarkable dialogue in which Hector, who had previously stripped naked the body of Patroclus and threatened to feed it to the dogs of Troy, makes an appeal to Achilles for a pledge of honour that whoever shall be victorious will not desecrate the body of the vanquished and shall return it to his family. The response of Achilles is, however, possessed by the rage of war. "Fool, do not speak to me of agreements, there are no treaties of trust between lions and men, wolves and lambs share no unity of heart but are fixed in hatred of each other for all time" (22:262-

264). As the final blows are struck Achilles further glories in his desire to defile the corpse of the vanquished Hector in a tragic embrace of the brutal laws of war. "You fool… Now the dogs and birds will maul you hideously (22:334-336)… make me no appeals… I wish I could eat you myself, that the fury in my heart would drive me to cut you into pieces and eat your flesh raw. So no man is going to keep the dogs away from your head" (22:345-352). At this point Achilles sets about "putting glorious Hector to shameful treatment" (22:396), tying his feet to the back of a chariot and dragging the body through the dirt and dust as the grieving parents of Hector look on in horror. The chapter ends with a shift of scene to the home of Hector`s wife Andromache, who sits weaving a web of flowers on a purple cloth, while warming water over the fire for a soothing bath for her husband when he returns from battle, unaware that on this day her husband will not return from battle. As Simone Weil suggests in her brilliant analysis of the Iliad as a *poem of force* 1965, the tragic pathos of the murder of Hector is all the more heightened through the contrast between the brutal logic of de-humanisation on the battlefield, a spatiality where the Other is reduced to the enemy, an object, a body to be defiled, "a thing dragged behind a chariot in the dust", and the domesticity of home in which earlier in the poem Hector had played with his infant son, the place of proximity where life is gently nurtured with caring affection and tenderness. The poem thus reads, "Foolish woman! Already he lay, far from hot baths, slain by grey-eyed Athena, who guided Achilles' arm". As Weil analyses this passage, "Far from hot baths he was indeed, poor man. And not he alone… Nearly all the Iliad takes place far from hot baths. Nearly all of human life, then and now, takes place far from hot baths" (1965: 7). The structure of the Iliad can be read as a continuous reflection upon the way in which the honour of great men rides through and destroys these places of life and in the process transforms mothers, sisters, daughters and wives into trophies of honour or war prizes, as with the taking of Helen by Paris, the seizure of Chryseis by Agamemnon, the capture of Briseis by Achilles, just as much as the transformation of fathers, brothers, sons and husbands into corpses in the dust, to be fed to the Trojan dogs, or the Achaean dogs, far from the hot baths prepared by their beloveds. In Weil`s account the climax of the *Iliad* describes the force of war, a force which possesses heroic Hector in the destruction and desecration of Patroclus and which possesses heroic Achilles in the destruction and desecration of Hector and which will ultimately destroy Achilles himself (9:410-416). These acts of heroic violence serve as poetic metaphors for the broader

destruction of places of life, cities and nations, including Troy, which will be ultimately transformed from a place of life to a desecrated corpse in the dust. The heroic narrative of the *Iliad* is in this sense a narrative of displacement, a story of how persons are swept away from their places of life by forces beyond their control, forces of honour, war, revenge, rage. For Weil none of the characters of the *Iliad*, not even Hector or Achilles, possesses the destructive force which the poem describes, but rather they abandon themselves to the force and as such are possessed by it. All relations in the *Iliad* are mediated by this force of the totality of war: it is this very possession by the desire to overcome the world which is called the heroic.

Throughout the battle for Troy Odysseus played the role of a leading general for the Achaean cause, a mediator between Achilles and Agamemnon and ultimately the man who secures the capture of Troy through his famous infiltration into the city by means of a wooden horse. The real story of Odysseus is, however, only told in the second poem, the *Odyssey* which recounts the travails encountered on the return from Troy, a return which like the war itself takes 10 years. As with the *Iliad* the drama revolves around a threat to honour centred on the possession of a woman, this time Odysseus's faithful wife Penelope[112], whose house has been occupied by many dozens of suitors[113] who believing Odysseus to be dead seek to claim Penelope and by extension the crown of Attica. There are important parallels with the *Iliad* here, most notable the parallel of the dishonouring of the house by the suitors just as Paris had dishonoured the house of Menelaus when he captured Helen. Yet the structure is now reversed. While the *Iliad* described the going out into the world in order to restore the honour of the household, the Odyssey describes the returning home to restore the honour. In both cases the household is thus politicised not as a place of life but rather as a manifestation of honour. As Suzanne Said suggests, "the house has a honour which is indistinguishable from that of its master" (2011: 360)[114]. Odysseus` homecoming involves a series of encounters which emphasise the overcoming of the world, and even more Odysseus overcoming his own tragic flaws of inquisitiveness and hubris (ὕβρις). These flaws are the fundamental cause of the travails of the Odyssey after the hero is captured exploring the cave of a giant one-eyed Cyclops named Polyphemos. When Polyphemos returns and sets about eating the sailors (two at each sitting), Odysseus rebukes the Cyclops for an affront to all good manners of hospitality and civilised norms of friendship and honour towards travellers (9:265-270, a charge to which

the Cyclops responds with disdain. Wily Odysseus is, however, able to honourably overcome his captor by getting him drunk and then stabbing him in the eye with a heated metal spear while he sleeps (9:380-400). So proud of his ruse, Odysseus cannot help but taunt the blinded Cyclops: "if anyone asks, tell them your eye was put out by Odysseus sacker of cities" (9:502-505). Unfortunately, unbeknownst to the Achaeans the Cyclops happens to be the son of Poseidon, the god of the sea, who commits to avenge the crime against his son, giving rise to the many disasters of the journey home. The remainder of the journey thus consistently reaffirms the themes of inquisitiveness and guile. When passing the island of the sirens, whose magic song seduces all those who hear it to their death, Odysseus insists his men plug their ears with wax, while he is tied to the mast of the ship and is thus able to listen to the song without being tempted to his death. On the island of the nymph Circe, whose potion turns men into pigs, Odysseus, with the help of Hermes, takes a drink which renders the potion ineffective. Having overcome these and many other challenges[115], the final phase of the Odyssey describes the return to Attica, where with the help of a few loyal servants and his son Telemachus, Odysseus, hardened by his experiences, is able to single-handedly slaughter the decadent suitors, hang the treacherous maid-servants, reclaim his wife and restore familial, political and cosmic order. The slaughter of the suitors (and the maid-servants who had entertained them) thus symbolises the completion of the twenty-year journey of going out into the world - overcoming the world - returning home victorious. The war which began with the dishonourable capture of Helen by Paris is completed with the honour restoring reclamation of Penelope by Odysseus. In the process of going out into the world in order to overcome the world, the heroic self is constituted. The totalisation by which the world is brought under the power of the self and as such even the return home of Odysseus is not a return to a place of life, but rather a restoration of honour, Even the home is a politicised space within the heroic narrative.

4.2 The Heroic Philosopher in Platonic Epistemology

The Homeric epics represent the earliest recorded attempts in the Greek world to give meaning to the world, to provide moral and cosmic explanations for life and death amidst the catastrophic absurdity of existence in a time of war. Within 200 years of these foundational texts, however, there were very different attempts to explain the world, no

longer through stories of gods and goddesses, heroes and monsters, but through fundamental forces of nature. This new approach to explaining the world was called philosophy, for its exponents claimed to love (*philia,* φιλία) wisdom (*sophia,* σοφία)[116]. Yet while many of these first philosophers explicitly saw their own project in opposition to the old myths (See Plato, Republic 607b), it is also true that the boundary between myth and early philosophy was highly porous, the metaphors, allegories, literary conventions and cosmic systems inherited from the mythic age continuing to structure thinking and writing well into the philosophical age[117]. There is, for example, a powerful echo of *The Iliad*, and in particular Achilles's merciless response to Hector, a fragment from Heraclitus, wherein "War is the father of all and the king of all and some he has made gods and some men, some bond and some free" (F23). For Heraclitus war represented a social manifestation of the fundamental substance of existence which is fire (F36, F38, F40)[118], by which all things are created and destroyed in the eternal flux of conflict and tension between opposed forces (F44, see Finley 2011: 12). The Heraclitean philosophy of flux and force clearly has powerful Homeric resonances, as notably with the description in book 6 of the *Iliad*": Like the generations of leaves, the lives of mortal men. Now the wind scatters the old leaves across the earth, now the living timber bursts with the new buds and spring comes round again. And so with men: as one generation comes to life, another dies away." (6:144). In this philosophy of flux, life and death are in a constant state of tension. Indeed the very essence of the hero is to embrace this tension in the abandonment of fate. The greatest life for both Homer and Heraclitus is the Achillean life fought in constant tension with death. It is for this reason that Heraclitus affirms that "Gods and men honour those who are slain in battle" (F24)[119]. The first philosophers thus introduce a new model of heroism, the heroism which abandons the self to achieve the proximity of truth, as Heraclitus suggests his readers should not accept what he says but rather should seek to understand the authoritative force of the *logos* (λόγος) (F10) (Robinson 1991: 481), the logic of the cosmos which the author only attempts to express. In Heraclitean terms there is no truth in assertion, but only in negation, the constant flux of fire which brings truth into and out of existence. What Heraclitus suggests, then, is an overcoming of the authorial self through the establishment of a new relationship to knowledge in which self and Other are related to each other through the tension of the logos, much like the relationship of Hector and Achilles developed through the tension of

war. The most elegant expression of this new approach to explaining the world is found in the dialogues of Plato, whereby the character of Socrates represents the highest expression of the philosophical hero, the man who is so committed to truth that he is prepared ultimately to die for it. In the dialogues, then, Socrates serves not as an oracle, not a prophet, but a guide who seldom if ever offers his companions definitive answers to questions, but only new questions of his own. His role is not to provide positive affirmation of truth, but rather the constant negation of error, challenging the premises and assumptions and thus opening new ways to thinking. Most of the early dialogues are thus aporetic in nature[120]. They do not conclude with statements of established truth, rather they remain open and unresolved. Knowledge in the dialogues is therefore in a constant state of becoming through the process of assertion and negation. The Platonic dialogue is thus a Heraclitean-Achillean structure of flux and tension in the encounter of self and Other, representing the opposed forces by which the stronger argument negates the weaker. It is the war of ideas in intellectual dialogue which is the father of all mortal wisdom[121]. While the myth-maker free from the challenge of debate is content like the charmer Paris to lull his audience into submission through the beauty of the verse and the drama of his stories of monsters and temptresses (See Plato Ion 535b)[122], the philosophers, like the warriors of the *Iliad*, abandon themselves to the battlefield of dialogue in order to achieve their legend (*Kleios*, κλεος). What is striking about the new model of the heroic, however, is that this coming together in dialogue is not committed to the physical destruction of the Other, as with Achilles and Hector, but instead the mutual co-operation in the destruction of error, to overcome the self through proximity to the Other. This new model of heroism in the commitment to truth though dialogue of self and Other thus signals a radical shift in the history of thought. There are, however, also for Plato fundamental problems in the Heraclitean approach to knowledge, particularly radical interpretation of Heraclitean flux which would serve the negation rather than the promotion of dialogue. For if "all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light… all things are becoming relatively to one another" (Theat 152d). As Heraclitus had claimed it is not possible "to step in the same river twice, for always new waters flow" (F12), so also it must be the case that the river cannot be named and thus cannot be expressed in dialogue. If as Heraclitus claims, the road upwards and the road

downwards are the same (F14), the sea water which gives life to the fish brings death to the person (F15), donkeys prefer refuse to gold (F17), then there cannot be any objective truth, only subjective perspective. As Plato suggests, all knowledge is formed in the imminent conjuncture of perceiving subject and perceived object, "there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abolished" (Theat 157b). If being must be abolished so also knowledge must be abolished. The Achillean warrior model of the heroic philosopher who goes out into the world thus serves the purpose of overcoming the errors of the self which is encaged within the limitations of the senses, but much like Achilles it is uncontrollable, and when misdirected can wreak catastrophic damage on the very search for truth to which it was initially committed, not only destroying the authoritative voice of the author but the very authority of knowledge itself[123]. The result of this misdirected warrior philosophy is ultimately to reaffirm the domination of opinion, in which "no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false… and everything that he judges is true and right" (Theat 161d).

Conventionally opposed to the Ionian Heraclitus is the Eleatic[124] Parmenides (see for example Minar 1949 42, Mourelatos 1981 650), whose fragments describe a mysterious chariot journey into the underworld dwelling of an unspecified goddess[125] who offers to guide the traveller home along the path of immortal truth (*Aletheia,* ἀλήθεια) (1:29), away from the path of seeming, “the opinions of mortals” (*Doxa,* δόξα) (1:30)[126]. Here there are very notable resonances of *Odysseus* As Eric Havelock (1958) suggests, the goddess who offers to guide the traveller along the path of wisdom resembles Athena. Moreover, Parmenides's journey, like that of Odysseus, will involve navigating away from the temptations of error by applying wisdom in order to return to truth[127]. These resonances establish Parmenides' philosophy as also proposing a "new form of intellectual heroism" (Havelock 1958 155) but rather a heroism of the Odyssean rather than the Heraclitean-Achillean[128]. The path of truth described by the goddess is the path of immortal logic, that which shall be true always and everywhere - the path of Being, *for it is (esti,* ἐστί[129]) *and it is impossible for it not to be* (2:3) while the path of error and confusion is the path of non-Being *for it is not and it is impossible for it to be:* “neither may you know that which is not (2:7)…. Nor may you declare it” (2:8), for what is and what can be thought are the same (3). To think the absence of Being is an impossibility. In this moment Parmenides

established the discipline of metaphysics (Kahn 1969: 700[130]) as the transcendence of mortal knowledge confined within the limits of the senses. Instead by following the path of logic the mind could depart from the world of mortal knowledge and move towards the immortal truths of Being. Amongst these immortal truths, contra the Heraclitean mortal philosophy of flux amongst oppositions always in becoming, Parmenides claims Being must be always and everywhere one, it must be without beginning or end (8:9, 8:28), for it is impossible for Being to emerge from non-Being. Moreover there can be no outside of Being (8:32), for what could be beyond Being but non-Being, and non-Being is not and thus there can be no change in Being. As such, while Heraclitean fire affirms the Achillean mortality of all things in the world which pass into and out of existence in the constant flux of becoming, for Parmenides we find more resonance of the Odyssean journey home by which the infinite truths of Being can be conquered, mastered as knowing in the form of logic**.** For Plato, this Parmenidean philosophy of immortal truths allows a movement away from the problems of Heraclitean mortal flux[131]. While the Socratic dialogue involves the Heraclitean-Achillean abandonment to the world by which self and Other engaged in debate can serve the negation of mortal error, the Platonic model of the heroic philosopher in the Odyssean tradition affirms the overcoming of the world of error by entering upon the path of truth. Here there is a decisive shift from Heraclitus to Parmenides, Achilles to Odysseus[132]. For Plato, what Heraclitus had identified was the mortality of human knowledge: we are trapped not only in our own bodies, but more profoundly in the partiality of our experience, the temporality of life, the situatedness of space. These limitations give rise to the perception of constant change. Summer becomes winter, hot becomes cold, great warriors become weak and old. Through dialogue we may be able to overcome some of the more extreme distortions these limitations impose upon us, yet we may be able to discover what is not, but never what is. Yet in the immortal world which is absent of the mortal limitations of space and time, the deeper conceptual structures of reality are radically unchanging: “the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small…nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite” (*Phaedo*, 102e). These *ideas*, or *forms* (*eidos, εἶδος*), constitute for Plato the very essence (*ousia, οὐσία*) upon which each earthly thing is modelled. Every thing which is hot participates in the form of heat, so while any hot thing can become cold by ceasing to participate in the form of heat, - the form of heat itself can

never become cold, nor can the form of cold ever become hot. The forms are always and everywhere fixed. Plato thus claims to establish a division between two dimensions of reality, the seen and the unseen, in which “the seen (thing) is the changing, the unseen (form) is the unchanging" (79a). The seen is the worldly, the perceptual, the Heraclitean imminent and mortal becoming: the unseen is the otherworldly, the logical, the Parmenidean always and everywhere and immortal Being. The key epistemological problem in this metaphysical construct, however, is if we are situated in this mortal world and thus only ever encounter change and flux in things, the heat of a summer day, the strength of the warrior, how is it that we might ever know the forms of heat and strength?

For Plato the answer to this question is a highly speculative and highly Odyssean narrative of journey. We are not at home in the world, the world of the body and the world of things, but rather we only travel through this world. The home from we departed at birth was the paradise of the forms, a world of perfections in which all things were experienced “as they truly are” (*Phaed* 110a). As Plato affirms "Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth" (75c). In the paradise of the forms all Being is experienced in its essential forms. The strength of the strong, the beauty of the beautiful, the heat of the hot, all are encountered not in the perceptual senses of the body, but through the very essence of our own being, the intellect. For Plato, then, all knowledge in the mortal world is merely recollection (75e, also Meno 81c) of forms experienced prior to birth. The process of Socratic questioning is thus designed to draw away the confusions and distortions of the mortal world, in order to allow the pure memory to be recalled. This argument is demonstrated most clearly in the *Meno* dialogue (82b-85d) in which Socrates uses a series of negative questions to tease out abstract geometric principles from an uneducated slave. The questions asked by Socrates are designed (and as always with Socrates, they are successful) to stimulate dormant memories of the pure geometric principles which are claimed to have been forgotten at birth, along with the pure principles of all other forms. The encounter thus serves as an exemplar of the whole Socratic approach, by which the student is able through wisdom to overcome the confusion and error of worldy being by gradually finding the path of otherworldly logic towards truth (Fine 1992: 208, see also Franklin 2001). The heroic model of the philosopher in Platonic epistemology thus involves both Achillean and Odyssean elements. In the mortal world it is the process of assertion and negation in

debate, the Achillean self-abandonment of the participants to the dialogue by which the stronger argument emerges through the negation of error, the overcoming of the self through the proximity (in dialogue) of the Other. Much like Achilles this form of knowledge is thus half human, half godlike; it proceeds through error in order to move towards truth. However, the more profound heroic influence in Platonic epistemology is the Odyssean narrative by which the mortal world of the body and things is subordinated to the immortal world of the true forms. The heroic philosopher in this narrative is he who overcomes the earthly world in order to return to the proximity of the truth. While the Heraclitean-Achillean method of Socratic dialogue relates to mortal knowledge through the Other in the process of the negation of the self, the Odyssean theory of knowledge as recollection relates to truth purely through the self and as such amounts to the overcoming of the worldly, and ultimately the overcoming of the Other. This heroic epistemology thus shapes Platonic political philosophy as a fundamental philosophy of totalisation and displacement, as will become clear in the final section of this chapter.

4.3 The Platonic Republic and the Return Home of the Philosopher

The structure of Platonic epistemology in the mortal world of things is, then, a process of assertion and negation by which the philosopher overcomes the world of things, in order to enter upon the path of return to the immortal paradise of the forms in which the intellect restores proximity to the truth of Being. The heroic philosopher must therefore overcome the world in order to reach the paradise of the truth of Being, but how is this overcoming of the world to be achieved? This is the fundamental political question which Plato seeks to answer in the most important work of his middle period, *the Republic*. Initially the discussion amongst Socrates and a series of interlocutors concerns the question of what it means for a person to be just and why it is good to live a just life. However, having failed to reach a satisfactory answer to these questions, Socrates proposes that the inquiry shift focus from what is just in the individual person to what is a just society. In order to answer this question we must begin from the original purpose of social relations, namely the meeting of basic physical needs: the needs of the body for food, shelter and clothing, which require a certain set of activities, such as farming, weaving, house-building and shoe-making (369d). Rather than one individual performing all these diverse tasks, Plato affirms that it will be better if each activity is performed by

that individual "for which he is naturally fitted". As such there will be a division of labour as the very foundation of society, allowing the farmer or weaver to concentrate on farming and weaving while craftsmen will specialise in crafting the tools required for these activities (370c). For those goods which cannot be produced naturally within the community there will be required traders who will establish links with other communities (370e). Having secured the basic needs of the body[133], the community will from there develop more civilised needs: the need for entertainment will be fulfilled by poets, artists and actors (373b), and as people come to live older there will be the need for doctors to cure illnesses and disease (373d)[134]. At this point there will be then a primordial political economy within the community whereby each person is defined in some sense by their role in the production for the needs of the community. Yet, as Plato suggests at this point, the community which began from only a handful of persons will now encompass several hundred; maybe even thousands. It will be called a successful and flourishing community but the problem with this success will be that other less successful neighbours will likely attempt to plunder or conquer the successful community[135] and therefore there will be the need for a new class of citizens, not producers for the needs and pleasures of the community itself, but soldiers trained to fight off outsiders. This new class of citizens Plato refers to as the guardians. Again, as with all other activities, the soldier guardians should be chosen from amongst those most suited to the tasks of warfare (374e), those possessed of physical strength, bravery, courage and above all a warrior spirit (375a). This warrior caste of guardians are then, in the tradition of Achilles, fearless in battle, merciless when confronted with the enemy. Yet also, as with Achilles, Plato notes that such a spirit, if not properly directed, can become self-destructive. The warriors may well turn against the community itself, in which case "they will destroy each other before they can destroy the enemy" (375c). To avoid this fate Plato concludes that the warrior caste must be properly directed through education not only in the physical arts of war but in the moral values of the republic. Therefore it will be required to develop a third and final social caste of educators particularly suited to the training in the moral values of the Republic. This third caste will thus be drawn not from those suited to the activities of the body, nor those suited to the activity of the spirit, but those suited to the activity of the mind - lovers of knowledge, philosophers (376b)[136]. The foundational text of western political philosophy thus proposes the formation of a political community through the subsuming

of natural space into a system of social relations mediated by the project of the totality of those relations. What had begun as placed acts of co-operation in the sharing of tasks (for example hunting and gathering) has quickly become for Plato a totality in which each person is identified with his task; each person within the totality has been reduced to their task, defined by the task to which they are best suited and thus defined as a part within a whole. The face-to-face relations of the original acts of sharing and co-operation are no longer present in Plato`s Republic, there are only relations between parts of the whole. The fundamental question, then, is what is the purpose of this totalisation of social relations within the Republic? Initially Plato has suggested humans form social relations for the purpose of fulfilling physical needs. However, as will become clear, this is only the most basic purpose of the Republic.

If the most important task in the Republic is, then, the education of the citizenry in the moral values of the Republic, then the most important practical question is that of the education of the educators. The fundamental challenge is to de-personalise the philosophers, to assure that the philosophers place the good of the Republic above their own personal good. At one level Plato suggests this can be achieved through an austere regimen of socialisation by which the family will be abolished and all men and women shall live in common, while all infants which women bear "for the state" (460e) shall be removed from their biological parents at birth (460b-c) to be placed under the supervision of state-appointed officers to then be raised by nurses prior to beginning the long formal process of education for rulership[137]. There shall be no distinctions of personal or familial rank or wealth amongst the philosophical caste. They "shall live and feed together and have no private property or home" (458d). These social arrangements involve the displacement of natural relations of pre-social attachment in favour of the political relations of the totality. There are amongst the philosophical caste no relations outside the totality of relations of the Republic. There are thus no places outside totality, no face to face outside the totality, no engagement of self and Other in proximity. The philosopher is thus established as a child of the Republic whose first loyalty is to the Republic. However, it is also necessary, according to Plato, that the child should be educated to subordinate even the self to the higher good of the Republic, which can only be achieved through a rigorous education in philosophy.

In order to illustrate this metaphysical path of the education of the philosopher guardians Plato offers the image of a divided line (509d-513e) separating two distinct paths or "orders of things, the visible and the intelligible" (509d), the path of non-Being and the path of Being. Here again there is a deep echo of Parmenides` distinction between the mortal path of opinion and the immortal path of truth. Yet while for Parmenides the path of non-Being was the path of error, Plato recognises these paths are inter-woven. The path of non-Being (as associated with the process of negation in the Socratic dialogue) must be travelled through the mortal world of things in order to reach the destination of the immortal truths of the world of the forms. At the lowest point of the divided line Plato thus separates out mirror reflections and the things themselves reflected. Pure pre-critical perception might suggest that the two phenomena (the thing reflected and the reflection itself) are entirely independent of each other and possess equal reality. However, upon critical investigation, it will become clear to the observer that this is not the case. The reflection is in fact dependent upon, and thus possesses less reality than, the reflected object. The relationship of reflection and thing reflected is thus suggested as equivalent to that between opinion and knowledge (510b). This move from bare perception to intellectual contemplation sets the ground for mathematical education[138]. The mathematician may perceive in the world three bottles on a wall and say there are an odd number of bottles on the wall, as Plato suggests the student of maths here "argue about visible figures… though they are not really thinking of them" (510d). The bottles merely reflect the oddness of 3 which is the thing reflected; should a bottle fall and smash the reality of the oddness of 3 will be unaffected. The invisible number thus possesses more reality than the visible manifestation of that number. In each step the student moves to a higher level of reality. There is, however, a final step, the step which can only be achieved by philosophy: the step that recognises, just as the reflections reflect original things, just as things reflect original concepts, so also original concepts themselves reflect a fundamental principle: the principle of Being *the form of the good*. To imagine the number 3 as odd is also to imagine the number 4 as even, to imagine all numbers as odd and even. The whole totality of Being determines each particular manifestation in a form in its perfection, the perfection of any particular form being related to the ultimate perfection of the goodness of Being in its totality, which is eternal, universal, absolute, without beginning and without end. As Plato suggests in the simile of the Cave which

immediately follows the divided line discussion, the earthly world in which we live is merely the world of shadows and reflections. The philosopher is that person who is able to escape the chains of the worldly through education in order to see not only the forms which give rise to the shadows and reflections, but also the very light of the truth of Being which illuminates all forms. The philosopher thus finds the highest good not in relation to the worldly, nor in the faces of the Others, but by going out of the worldliness of the cave into the light of the eternal good. The highest achievement for Plato is not life lived in the world with Others, but life lived towards the transcendence of the worldly, the transcendence of the bodily, a transcendence achieved by going out of proximity to the Other.

The world of the seen, the world of the body, is thus a lesser form of reality than the world of the unseen, the world of the mind. As Plato described at length, the earthly body is merely the manifestation of the eternal soul and as such is akin to "a cage.. in which it wallows in every kind of ignorance" (Phaedo 82e). While inhabiting the body the soul is constantly distracted and tempted by the needs and pleasures of the body, "if they are to be called pleasures" (64d)[139], such as eating and drinking, the acquisition of sandals or ornaments of the body, the gaining of wealth. Indeed even the love of another person is a pleasure of the lowest order (64d) by which the soul shall become polluted and impure when it leaves the body (81b); it will become heavy and unable to separate. Each pleasure and pain experienced in the body is to be understood as "a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body" (83b). The purpose of the Republic cannot, then, be the satisfaction of basic human needs for food and shelter, for these needs and pleasures can only ever be of a lower order of existence in the world of shadows and reflections. Such pleasures of the world of shadows, Plato suggests, the rewards and prizes of justice in the mortal world, are "nothing in number and magnitude when compared to those which await the just man after death" (614a). The highest achievement of the Republic, its ultimate purpose is not, then, to achieve bread and wine in this world, but rather to secure the transcendence of the soul to the paradise of the forms. The philosopher, to the extent that his soul is connected to his body, is constantly hindered by "the mere requirement of food… diseases which overtake and impede us… loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery… and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy" (66b-d). It is only possible

to acquire true knowledge when the philosopher "has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth" (65e-66a). The ultimate purpose of the Republic is then to establish the social and political infrastructure by which the Philosopher shall be able to detach the soul from the body in order to achieve the return home to that "region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, in communion with the unchanging is unchanging" (79d). The social division between bodily workers, spirited fighters and intellectual guardians thus allows the third category the ability to escape the mortal world by escaping the turmoil and travails of the body. As Plato affirms "no one may lawfully join the company of the gods who has not practised philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, only the lover of wisdom" (82b-c). The Platonic Republic is thus just to the extent that it approximates the form of its purpose as a totality in which each part plays its role in relation to the purpose of the whole: the farmer farms, the soldier fights, each individual performs the role for which they are best suited in order to maximise the success of the Republic. In this totality each part (each person performing a role) is directed not towards each other, but towards the objective purpose of the whole; the relations between each part are thus mediated by the whole. Yet the highest purpose of the Republic is not merely worldly success, but the transcendence of the worldly by that social caste which is capable of achieving transcendence, the philosophical caste. The organisation of society in such a way as producers produce and soldiers fight allows the social and economic preconditions for the philosophers to achieve the detachment of the intellect from the needs and pleasures of the body in order that they might return to the paradise of the forms through the knowledge of immortal truths. It is towards this purpose that every member of the Republic is faced. The Republic is thus turned away from the earthly life towards the otherworldly "knowledge of true being". This turning away from the mortal world thus involves the ultimate turning away from the Other. The Other is dispensible, an object to be put to work in the project of the transcendence of the self. For as Plato suggests, “if a man has greatness of mind… to contemplate all of time and all of reality, can he think of human life as any great consequence?” (Rep 486b) The proximity of the soul to the immortal truth of Being is higher and more profound than proximity of the body of the Other in the mortal world of things. The mortal world of

things, including the Other, is to be overcome in the journey of return of the intellect to the paradise of the forms. The Republic provides the economic, military and political infrastructure by which this journey of return is to be achieved.

Conclusion

In beginning this chapter I described the narrative of the great Homeric epics as a heroic narrative of displacement, a journey of going out into the world in order to overcome the world and return home victorious. In this narrative I suggested all the world is totalised as the project of the heroic self. The Other is the enemy fought on the battlefield, laid siege to, destroyed and enslaved, the oceans to be navigated, the monsters and temptresses to be outwitted. Even the home itself to which the heroic Odysseus returns is not a place of proximity but a symbolic spatiality of honour to be overcome and cleansed with blood. Throughout the narrative, places of life are thus swept through and destroyed: the sacking of cities, the capturing of war-prizes, the desecration of bodies all occurring, as Simone Weil describes, far from hot baths, far from the caress of the beloved, far from the play of children. The spatiality of life, the places of life, are subordinate in the Homeric epic to the projects of the hero, and this is the fundamental logic of displacement. The shift from Homeric Greece to Platonic Greece is certainly a significant one. Yet, as I have suggested in this chapter, the motif of the heroic remains, albeit rearticulated as the philosopher rather than the great warrior. In Platonic epistemology the philosopher is again the figure who seeks to overcome the world of life, the shadows and reflections of everyday life. What is revolutionary about Plato is his suggestion that this overcoming can be achieved not through the subordination of the Other to the self, but through proximity to the Other in the co-operation of dialogue. Yet ultimately Plato rejects this view as only achieving a type of mortal knowledge, the negation of error, but not the certainty of truth. The pursuit of immortal truths involves an overcoming of the mortal world, in order to return home to the immortal truth of Being, the paradise of the forms from which the soul departed upon birth. Like heroic Odysseus, the Platonic philosopher thus struggles to overcome the world of the body, the rough seas of the temptations to error, the violent waves of the distortions of truth. This subordination of the world of life to the project of transcendence of the self is quite clearly a paradigm for displacement, for in overcoming the world the self becomes a

destroyer of worlds. As the philosopher turns towards the immortal truth of Being, so also he turns away from the mortal Other, he departs from proximity to the Other. The political expression of this metaphysical overcoming of the world of life is the Platonic Republic, the social totality in which each person is related to every other person through the tasks he or she performs for the totality of the Republic. Each person relates to each other person as parts related through a whole. In such a totality there can be no places of life, only the spatiality of the totality. The Platonic Republic thus represents a radical totality in which all places of life are subordinated to the project of the overcoming of life. There is no face to face engagement between self and Other in such a totality, because there can be no true self or Other, only parts of the whole turned not towards each other but towards the philosophical ruler and the truth of Being. The displacement of any proximity between self and Other in places of life is thus absolutely central to the establishment of the Republic as a totality in Plato, and absolutely central to the Platonic project of philosophy.

5

Displacement as Crusade for the City of God

"All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am invested." (Pope Urban II, Declaration of Crusade at Clermont Auvergne, November 27, 1095 as recorded in the account of Fulcher de Chartres).

In the previous two chapters I have described two foundational narratives of displacement in the ancient Mediterranean, beginning in chapter 3 with the story of the Exodus of the Hebrews out of the Pharaonic totality into the wilderness of the proximity of the Other. I then suggested this narrative was re-articulated in Messianic Christianity as the spiritual and ethical going out of the Roman totality of status and the establishment of the community of love in the proximity of the neighbour. In chapter 4, by contrast, I described the narratives of displacement surrounding the siege of Troy by which the heroic Greeks went out into the world in order to overcome the world and ultimately return home victorious. I then suggested this narrative was re-articulated in Platonic philosophy as the overcoming of the bodily and the worldly by the intellect which led ultimately to the idealised totality of the Platonic Republic, in which all social relations were mediated towards the intellectual transcendence of the philosopher. The former narrative was told from below, from the perspective of a displaced people who through their experience of displacement came to think about the ethics of responsibility of self for Other in place outside the mediation of totality, while the latter narrative was told from above, from the perspective of the displacers who through their experience came to think of the Other as the object through which the transcendence of the self could be achieved. a

At this point these narratives are, then fundamentally, opposed, the one the narrative of place and proximity, the other the narrative of displacement and totalisation. Yet in this chapter I will demonstrate how these two narratives became deeply inter-twined in the emergence of a post-Messianic Christian theology which subordinated the earthly world to the project of transcendence to the heavenly hereafter. In the first section of the chapter I will begin by suggesting what Edward Said has called a "Canaanite reading" of the story of Exodus. This reading, I will then suggest, has profound implications for our understanding of Christianity as a narrative of going out of totality, particularly in the post-

Messianic theology developed in the letters of Paul and the writings of Saint Augustine. In this section I will suggest two readings of Augustinian political theology, the first as a new Messianic theology affirming the city of God as an ethical community of love against the empire of earthly totality, the second as a mystical abandonment of the earthly Messianic to the totalisation of the imperial city of man. In the second section of the chapter I then discuss how this post-Messianic theology was articulated in the imperial Christendom of medieval Europe through a new narrative of displacement, the narrative of the first Crusade surrounding the siege and destruction of Antioch. In this new narrative, I argue we find a new metaphysical totalisation of the relationship of self to Other, by which the Other is reduced again to the projection of the self as an enemy of God, the overcoming of whom allows for the transcendence of the self to heavenly paradise. In this post-Messianic process I argue, violent displacement, destruction and massacre thus becomes not only heroic, but indeed sacred, beloved of God.

5.1 Post-Messianic Theology of the City of Man and the City of God

In chapter 3 of this thesis I have dealt with the story of Exodus in its Semitic context as a narrative of liberation from oppression, the going out of the enslaved Hebrews from the mediation of the Pharaonic imperial totality into the wilderness of the desert. Yet the story of Exodus does not end there. From the wilderness the Hebrews moved into the land of Canaan and from there the image of Exodus as a universal narrative of liberation becomes much more problematic. As Edward Said has argued[140] (1986), if we attempt a Canaanite reading of Exodus we are left with a very different narrative, not of going out into the wilderness, but rather of going into the lands of another. In this Canaanite reading Exodus is not a narrative of liberation but one of invasion and genocide[141]. Amongst the most problematic passages can be found in the book of Deuteronomy, in which the God of Israel speaks not as the God of life described in Exodus but as a tribal and warrior God with the commandment to "utterly destroy them… make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them… destroy their altars… for thou art an holy people… above all people that art upon the earth" (Deut 7 2:6). Later the message is expressed in even starker terms: "thou shalt save alive nothing that breathes" (Deut 20:16)[142]. These commandments are put into practice at the city of Jericho in which the army of Joshua "utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young

and old… with the edge of the sword" (Josh 6:21), before finally "burn(ing) the city with fire and all that was therein" (6:24). The same fate befell the city of Ai with a slaughter of 12,000 men and women (Josh 8:24-28), leaving the city "a heap forever" (8:28), and was ultimately carried out throughout all the cities of Canaan (11:16-23). Displacement in the biblical account of the Canaan campaign thus becomes sacred: God casts the Canaanites out of their homes and divides the land amongst Israel (Psalms 78:55, Acts 13:19). As Geoffrey de Ste. Croix observes, this narrative of sacred violence is almost unique in the religious imagination of the ancient Mediterranean, in which “only one people felt able to assert that it had a divine command to exterminate whole populations among those it conquered; namely, Israel” (1981: 331). What is more this militaristic logic of a chosen people is not confined to the cities of Canaan but rather extends to "all the cities *which are* very far off from thee, which *are* not of the cities of these nations" (Deut 20:12-15). This divine endorsement to displacement leads Said to read the story of Exodus not as a book of liberation, but as “a tragic book in that it teaches that you cannot both "belong" and concern yourself with Canaanites who do not belong” (106); the achievement of a place in the world for one people cannot be achieved without the displacement of another. The displacement of Canaan indeed can be read as a process of totalisation which mirrors that of the totalisation of Pharaonic Egypt whereby once Egyptian and Hebrew were divided by Pharaoh now Hebrew and Canaanite are divided by divine commandment. The going out of the Pharaonic totality into the ethical proximity of the wilderness gives way to the going into the totality of Israel by which the Other is not only to be put into bondage, but to be destroyed absolutely.

If thus far I have suggested an Exodus reading of the Christian Gospels in the Semitic context of going out of totality, what implications does this Canaanite reading then have for our interpretation of Christian Messianism? Certainly it is clear that the Messianic Christ was not a warrior-prophet, he was not a conqueror of territory, nor did he advocate the conquest of territory. Indeed, the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount explicitly reject the more tribal and militaristic teachings of "old times". Yet the fact that Christ himself died on the Cross as a rebel, humiliated and persecuted by the princes of this world (1 Cor 2:8, Schussler-Fiorenza 1983: 135) should not obscure the fact that the Christian Church following the Crucifixion did shift from the margins to the centres of social and political power and did become a religion of the princes and emperors of the

world. This process began as early as the first century in the letters of the apostle Paul[143]. The social position of Paul was quite distinct from that of Christ. While Christ had been most likely an illiterate Aramaic speaker raised in a rural village to working parents, associated with fisherman, insurgents, prostitutes and lepers, Paul was raised and educated in the metropolitan city of Taurus to a Romanised Jewish family. Moreover, Paul was highly literate, fluent in Hebrew, Greek and Latin and most likely familiar not only with the traditions of his fathers (Gal 1:14) but also with Greek and Roman philosophy. Following his conversion from persecutor to follower Paul certainly embraced much of the Christian doctrine and in particular the rejection of the Roman love of power[144] yet Paul was much more cautious about challenging the institutional structures which derived from that love of power. In part this can be explained by the very audience to whom Paul was speaking. While the Messianic Jesus was talking on the radical margins of the Roman system, Paul`s letters were addressed across the empire and in particular to the centre of the empire, to the social elites of Rome itself. As Jacob Taubes (2004: 16) observes, Paul "is not writing to any old congregation, but to the congregation in Rome, the seat of the world empire. He had a sense for where to find power and where to establish a counter-power"[145].

The critique of Roman power found in the letters of Paul is then primarily a spiritual rather than a political critique and as such often appears conciliatory, even complicit with existent structures of earthly social power. This can be seen with the advice to the Romans (13:1-7): "let every soul be subject unto the highest powers… the powers that be are ordained of God, whosoever therefore resists the powers, resists the ordinance of God… For Rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil". This message of conservative political passivity is re-enforced in the letters to the Corinthians, in which Paul denies that a slave who converts to Christianity should be freed as a fellow brother, but rather insists "let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Are thou called being a servant (slave)? Care not for it… (7:21)… Let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God" (7:24). Equally Paul is particularly significant in advancing the patriarchal submission of women in the early church, declaring to the Christians of Corinth that women "are commanded to be under obedience as also saith the law" (14:34) and to Timothy, "I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent" (1 Tim 2:11–15). In such advice there is a clear shift from the Messianic radicalism

of the Nazarene to a social conservatism moderated only by what Gerd Theissen suggests I a “primitive Christian love-partriarchalism” whereby "obligation is placed on those who are socially strong, while from the weaker is required subordination, fidelity and esteem” (1982:107). While Christ had scandalised the religious establishment by his healing activity for those who suffered in the body in defiance of the law and tradition, Paul in the post-Messianic context affirms the endurance of the suffering of the body, "for the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the glories which shall be revealed" (Rom 8:18). While for Christ the transgression of law had been embodied in the physical proximity of place, the proximity to those considered unclean by the Jewish law,- lepers, prostitutes, Samaritans, criminals - Paul`s letters do not call for transgressions of the law in the body, but rather in the soul. Here there are recognisably Platonic influences in Pauline theology, wherein the earthly is established as the profane and sensual while the heavenly is the sacred and spiritual, persecution and suffering in this world are not to be challenged in this world, but rather to be transcended by the spirit which will be liberated in the afterlife. This Platonic influence is particularly evident in the advice to the Corinthians: “look not at the things which are seen but at things which are not seen, for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal” (2 Cor 4:18). Indeed, Paul also shares the Platonic view that the distinction between the body and soul constitutes a psychological conflict whereby the law of the body is constantly "warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity of the law of sin; Oh wretched man that I am who shall deliver me of the body of this death…. with the mind I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin" (7:23-25). The Platonic hierarchy between earthly body and heavenly spirit thus allows Pauline theology to move from a radical Messianism which proclaimed a going out of the Roman totality of status through the creation of an earthly community of love built through proximity to the world of the poor and the suffering. Instead Paul suggests a much more conservative spiritual going out of totality, achieved not in the earthly proximity of places of life, but rather in the heavenly afterlife, whereby "the righteousness of the law must be fulfilled in us that walk not in the flesh but in the spirit (Rom 8:4)… for to be carnally minded is death, to be spiritually minded is life" (8:6). As such the earthly is retained for the existent structures of social and political power in the mediation of social relationships, while the transcendence of those relationships is delayed for the kingdom of heaven after death

(see Jipp 2008, Keener 2008). The distortions of the face to face brought about by the mediations of status which Christ had overcome in practice are thus for Paul broadly to be accepted in the political structures of the world, even as they are rejected in the spiritual world of the soul. This is the deep ambiguity in Paul`s letters. The political totality is to be gone out of in the soul, even as he advises his readers that it must remain within in the body.

The process of the evangelisation of Rome which began with Paul`s letters was completed three centuries later with the conversion of Emperor Constantine and the declaration of Christianity as the state religion of the Roman Empire in 380AD. During this period the Messianic teachings of the Nazarene Christ were ever more integrated into Roman tribal traditions, Greek philosophical influences and even Gnostic cosmology. The greatest of the early Church fathers in weaving together these disparate elements into a coherent theological doctrine was Augustine of Hippo. Like Paul, Augustine`s intellectual development came at the inter-section of various currents. He born to a lower middle class[146] family of a pagan father and a pious Christian mother[147] in Roman north Africa at the end of the fourth century. This was a region heavily influenced by the Gnostic doctrine of Manichaeism[148], which was attracting a large number of converts to a highly mystical reading of Christian doctrine as developed by the Persian prophet-philosopher Mani. Like other forms of Gnosticism, the doctrine of Mani described a cosmos radically divided between an empire of light associated with the world of the spirit and an empire of darkness associated with the world of matter and the body. The doctrines of Manichaeism exerted a formative influence on Augustine`s thought, as can be seen in various passages of *The City of God Against the Pagans* (1998). Referring to the account of Genesis in which God created light "and God saw the light and saw that it was good" (Gen 1:4), Augustine pointed out (XI 20 474), that when separating darkness from light it is not called good, "only the light was pleasing to God….darkness…. was not approved by Him". The creation of light which then gave rise to darkness also serves as a metaphor for the creation of the angels (XI 9 461), from whom emerged the darkness of the evil angels who sinned against God by putting the will above God and were thus cast down into hell for eternity. The two worlds, the one of heaven, the other of hell, are thus characterised in terms of the binary of lightness and darkness: "the one is tranquil in the light of Godliness, the other turbulent with dark desires" (XI 33 493). There is, however, a fundamental

philosophical and theological problem here: if God is good in the Platonic sense of being a perfection how is it possible that His creation should give rise to evil which is an imperfection? It is for Augustine and the whole Christian tradition impossible that God, who is all knowing, could not have foreseen that Satan should become wicked. As such Augustine suggests the creation of evil was necessary as part of the divine plan. "God caused the temptations of the devil to bring good to the saints". The creation of evil thus brought forth good (XI 17 471). Augustine thus suggests that in the process of the separation of darkness from light, evil from good, there are created two orders of love. The one is the love of God for His creation, the love by which the angels are turned towards God in proximity. The other order is constituted by the love of self, that which is turned towards the self and away from God, "and what else is this fault called than pride" (XII 6 506), for it is "the turning away from that which has supreme being towards that which has less" (XII 8 508). Augustine thus proclaims that “pride is the beginning of all sin” (XII 6 505), which in the love of self seeks “to become, as it were, one`s own foundation” (XIV 13 608). These two orders thus represent the metaphysical foundations of two cities both formed by the nature of their love, the heavenly city of God formed by "love of God extending to contempt of self", and the earthly city of man, "by love of self extending even to contempt of God… the one glories in itself, the other glories in the Lord" (XIV 28 632)

The formation of the city of man begins with Cain, the first son of Adam and Eve who it is asserted in scripture was the founder of the first city (Gen 4:17), while Abel, his younger brother, sought not to found a city but lived from the land as a pilgrim. While Cain sought to establish himself in the world, Abel, it is suggested was in the world but not of the world (XV 1, Gen 4:2). The two brothers initially lived in peace in the world. However, when Cain perceived that Abel was favoured by God he grew jealous and turned against his brother,. The relationship of self and Other became mediated by this jealousy and as such Cain came to see his brother as an obstacle to his own glorification in the eyes of God. The earthly city was thus built from the beginning on the sinful foundation stone of murder as the turning away of Cain from his brother Abel (XV 1), the reduction of the brother to an object of the self. In this moment, the love of self overcame the love of the Other, creating disarray and ultimately the evil of murder. All civilisations are marked by the sin of Cain. Yet Augustine devotes the majority of critical analysis to his own civilisation, the Roman Empire, an empire itself born out of a foundational act of fratricide,

the murder of Remus by his brother Romulus (XV 5 640). Accordingly, Augustine argues that the Roman imperial system is absolutely built upon pride as the love of self over and above the Other: the love of possessions and money, the love of mastery (V, 19, 223), the love of power and status (I, 31, 45) and the love of domination over other peoples (III, 14, 109). Such sinful foundations led to the descent into decadence of Roman power, examples of which include the brutal rape of the Sabine women (II, 17, 69), the corruption of Roman political institutions (II, 19), the rebellions of the Gracchi brothers (III, 25), the servile wars (III, 26), civil wars (III, 27), rebellion of the Gladiators led by Spartacus (IV, 5). We can then read Augustine, in profound continuity with the Messianic tradition of Jesus, as a radical critic of the love of mastery in Rome built on the sin of pride, which inspires the urge to dominate and subjugate the Other in order to glorify the self. This violence is for Augustine as for Jesus the "greatest evil" (III, 14) of the earthly city. What is more, the greatest earthly cities, those which are most victorious and powerful, are also those which are most marked by sin, "for when it triumphs it is lifted up in its pride" (XV 4 638), subduing and subordinating other peoples simply in order to glorify the self. As such, Augustine offers a radical rejection of the city of man as it had been expressed in the Pagan Roman system of imperial domination, concluding that "the Romans lived in dark fear and cruel lust, surrounded by the disasters of war and the shedding of blood, which whether that of fellow citizens or enemies, was human nonetheless" (IV, 3, 146). By contrast to the city of man, which glorifies the self in the subjugation of the Other and ultimately in the murder of the Other, the city of God glorifies God in the love of the Other, the compassion of the Hebrew Midwives, the Egyptian Princesses, the Samaritan on the road to Jericho. Here the grace of God is manifested in the community of love that brought Israel out of Egypt and brought Christ to Golgotha. Here the city of God can be read as in profound continuity with Jesus' words in his farewell Prayer on the eve of his crucifixion and the final commandment to love one another, the love for the neighbour, the love for the enemy, "those who draw near and with one another, a Holy fellowship…. Which is His living sacrifice and His living temple" (XII, 9, 511.). In this Messianic reading of Augustine the two cosmic cities or orders of being are deeply intertwined in the struggle between the community which is founded on the love of Other (the city of God) and the community founded on the love of self (the city of man). Indeed, this metaphysical structure can even be read as running through each individual, in the temptations we all

experience to put the love of self over the love of Other, the temptations to pride and glory against compassion and humility. The city of God can then be viewed in this reading as the earthly going out of political power in order to form the community of love of the Other, which inhabits human history as the struggle against earthly domination and pride as manifested in totalising political systems of the murder of the brother and sister.

The dominant reading of Augustine which has come to shape western Christendom, however, has been a decidedly post-Messianic doctrine heavily influenced by Platonic philosophy and which offers a very different model of going out of the totality of the city of man. In this interpretation, the city of God is not achieved through the establishment on earth of the community of love as expressed in charitable proximity to the lives of those who are most despised by the totality of the city of man, but rather is an invisible community of those chosen by God to be saved not in the world, but in the heavenly paradise hereafter. Here the crucial concept introduced to western Christianity by Augustine is that of Original Sin, by which it is held that the temptation of Adam in the Garden of Eden is passed from each generation to the other. For we are all born of sexual desire, "the concupiscence of the flesh", with the exception of Christ who was conceived immaculately. It is then from the original sin of Adam that "the whole mass of the human race is condemned" (XXI 12 1070). Drawing on the letter of Paul to the Romans (5:19) which asserts that "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners", Augustine asserts that the only way by which humans may escape this "deserved punishment" of "just damnation" is through the mercy of "undeserved grace". Yet while this grace is bestowed upon a few, "many more are left under punishment than are redeemed from it" (XXI 12 1070). In this post-Messianic reading of Augustinian theology, the city of God can thus be read as that invisible community which has been chosen by God not through any deserving, not due to any good acts of love for the poor or suffering, but through pure grace. This invisible community is turned towards God in Heaven away from the world. By contrast, the city of man is not the imperial state as such, but the earthly world marked by original sin, and its citizens are those who are turned towards the works of the flesh. Here Augustine cites Paul extensively, for example the letter to the Romans (7:18-25), in which it is claimed that in the flesh "dwelleth no good thing" (7:18) but in the mind "I delight in the law of God" (7:22). Even more powerfully Augustine cites at length (XIV, 2, 583) the epistle to the Galatians in which Paul describes the “works of

the flesh" which are "adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, sedition, heresies, envying, murders, drunkenness, revelings and such like… such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (5:17-22), while the "fruit of the spirit" are "love, peace, joy, longsuffering, gentleness…"(5:22). Augustine thus shares with Paul the Platonic dualism which divides the world of the body from the world of the soul. Yet through the doctrine of original sin Augustine arrives at an even more conservative political theology. While Paul had tacitly endorsed the institution of slavery, with the advice to the Corinthians to "let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called" (1:21), for Augustine the institution of slavery was inaugurated in the sinfulness of Ham (XVI 1 694), the middle son of Noah and the father of Canaan, who looked upon the nakedness of his father and did not seek to cover it (Gen 9: 20-27). For this crime, Noah imposed a curse upon the descendents of Canaan that they should always be servants to their brothers. As such, slavery was not only a man-made institution, but a Prophetic punishment for the sinfulness of the father to be carried down through the generations. This shift from a Messianic to a post-Messianic view of politics is even more evident in Augustine`s approach to war. Here, while the Messianic Christ had proposed a radical pacifism in rejecting the logic of violence to the extent of turning the other cheek to an aggressor, Augustine argues that in a world marked by original sin human relations are corrupted by violence and as such in certain circumstances violence can be justified. While Augustine acknowledges the Messianic teaching he thus argues that true peace is impossible in a world marked by original sin (XVII 13 801), and therefore war can be necessary in order to protect the faithful lambs of the city of God from the barbarian wolves (XV 4 639). What is prohibited by Christ is war motivated by pride, "the desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge… the lust for dominating" (Contra Faustum XXII 74 *Augustine Political Writings*). Yet Augustine suggests there can be violence motivated by the love of the enemy, the desire to bring imperial peace where there is barbarian anarchy.

The influence of Platonic metaphysics in the post-Messianic theology of Paul and Augustine is thus of immense significance. Indeed Augustine declares that "no philosophers are nearer to us Christians than the Platonists" (VIII 5). Plato himself is granted the highest complement of being the first pagan philosopher to understand the distinction between heavenly and earthly on the basis that he "preferred the intelligible

form to the sensible… which can be perceived by the body`s sight and touch… (while the intelligible) can be understood by the vision of the mind" (VIII, 6, 322). For Augustine this philosophical insight pre-figures the Christian revelation and as such he bestows unique praise on Plato as the classical Philosopher who came closest to describing the city of God prior to the revelation of Christ[149]. What is most influential for Paul and Augustine in the Platonic approach is then the division between an immortal and invisible world of heavenly paradise to which the souls of the citizens of God are destined to enter after their worldly death and a mortal and visible world of earthly suffering in which the body is marked by the original sin of Adam to suffer in servitude and violence. While the Platonic philosopher navigated through the earthly life like Odysseus, Augustine applies the image of the pilgrimage (XIV 13 609) following the tradition of Abel (XV, 1, 635) who lives through the earthly life without establishing a city. While for Plato this journey was ultimately directed towards the paradise of the forms in proximity to the truth of Being, for Augustine it is a pilgrimage directed towards the heavenly paradise and proximity to the truth of God. While the Messianic Sermon of the Mount had thus proposed a worldly going out of the political totality of the mediations of Roman status through the active establishment of a community of love in which each person was encountered as a neighbour, the post-Messianic Augustinian going out of totality is the Platonic going out of the worldly, or rather with the help of divine grace the overcoming of the sinful temptations of the worldly. The going out of political totality in the Sermon had been an act of the subversion of the totality. The going out of earthly totality in the post-Messianic reading of Augustine, by contrast, is an act of the legitimisation of the totality by which "Christ`s servants… be they rich men or poor, free or slaves, of which ever sex are commanded to endure this earthy commonwealth, however depraved and wholly vile it may be… by their endurance they will win for themselves a place… in that heavenly place where God`s will is law" (II 19 74-75). The earthly city of man is thus to be condemned as wicked, but it is not to be challenged. The mediations of human relations, be they of status, of wealth, of slavery, of patriarchy, are not only to be accepted, but to be endured, for they are ordained of God. There are no places in the world outside of the earthly totality: the only going out of this totality is delayed to the afterlife. There is thus no possibility of proximity outside totality in this dominant reading of Augustine. Relations between people in the world are marked by original sin and thus mediated by pride,

anger, greed, envy, etc. While the Messianic Christ had spoken of overcoming sin in the self through the love of the Other, Augustine seems to suggest that the only way to be delivered from sin is through the undeserved love of God as grace. The love of the community of neighbours, brothers and sisters, can have no political significance in the worldly totality of sin.

5.2 Heroic Christianity and Crusade

The theological foundations of western Christendom established by this reading of Augustine grounded the geo-politics of western Europe for more than a thousand years in the form of the Gelasian[150] doctrine. Here the two cities achieved a certain compromise. The church as the institutional form of the city of God was capable of achieving the salvation of souls through the baptism of infants, the prayer of monks, the performing of the sacraments, etc. Such activities, however, required the security which only the earthly state as the institutionalisation of the city of man could provide. As such, the two cities were inter-dependent, the church providing legitimisation for the state, the state providing security for the church. This dualistic power structure also, however, established fundamental tensions. These tensions came ever more to the fore following the collapse of the western Roman Empire under the pressure of the invasions of the Germanic tribes during the fifth century. During this period Europe was marked by chaotic instability amongst various kingdoms, tribes, mercenaries, warlords, elements of the old Roman nobility, barbarian raiders from Scandinavia and the advance of Islamic armies into Iberia[151]. In this chaos the institution of the Church became increasingly involved in the tribal politics of central Europe, sanctifying tribal wars as just in the name of evangelisation, most notoriously with the brutal campaigns conducted by Charlemagne across Saxony in the latter part of the eighth century[152]. In this Germanic warrior culture the Augustinian theory of just war became a central pillar of the Church`s ideological power, to the extent that Pope John VII was able to draw a sacred equivalence between those fighting in defence of the church of God and those fighting in defence of the state (See Thatcher & Mcneil 1905: 512). Yet as the ideological power of the church increased so inevitably the church itself became politicised, with powerful kings seeking influence in the church while rival factions of the nobility sought endorsement for positions in the church hierarchy[153]. This pattern became institutionalised in the appointment of church

positions by secular rulers, all the way from local clerks and abbots up to and including the selection of the Bishop of Rome[154]. When during the eleventh century a series of reforming Popes sought to regain power over the allocation of church appointments the fundamental tension between the city of man and the city of God was torn open with the declaration of the 27 principles of the primacy of Papal power, affirmed by Pope Gregory VII, including the power to depose Kings and Emperors (in Thatcher & Mcneil 136-138). The resulting crisis, known as the contest of the investiture, saw the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV deposed and ex-communicated by Pope Gregory VII[155], to be replaced by the anti-Emperor Rudolf of Rheinfelden. In response Henry ex-communicated Pope Gregory and declared the establishment of the anti-papacy of Clement III, ultimately capturing Rome and forcing Gregory into exile in 1084 **(**Blumenthal 1988: 113-125). Gregory`s successor, Urban II, was still in exile 11 years later when he received an urgent request from the Byzantine emperor Alexius I for assistance to the eastern Church in a war against the Muslims to reclaim the Holy Land and in particular the holy cities of Antioch, Alexandria and above all Jerusalem, the spiritual capital of Christian civilisation[156].

The Crusade against the Islamic east which would come to dominate the following centuries and would ultimately divide the old Mediterranean world was thus born out of the division of the Christian west, the division between empire and the papacy, state and church. The discourse of the Crusade is thus from the beginning an attempt to construct the self through a projection of the Other which is in the most profound sense a reduction of the Otherness of the Other to that which is opposed to the project of the self, the most profound mediation of the relationship between self and Other. This discourse is established in the epochal declaration of Crusade by Pope Urban at an open air sermon in Clermont Auvergne in November of 1095[157] describing the bloody behaviour of those called variously Saracens, Persians, Arabs, Heretics, Pagans, Turks, etc. against the pious pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem and the benighted Christians living in the Holy Land. The process of the "invention of the Crusades" (Tyerman 1995, 1998) thus began with an appeal to the long divided tribes, peoples, kings, princes, warlords and even criminal bands of Europe, who had spent much of the last century in various wars against each other, now to join together in the cause of a war against an Other which will unite all of Christendom.

> "Let those who have been accustomed unjustly to wage private warfare against the faithful now go against the Infidel... Let those who for a long time, have been robbers, now become knights. Let those who have been fighting against their brothers and relatives now fight in a proper way against the barbarians" (Fulcher de Chartres cited in Thatcher & Mcneil 1905: 514-5)

In this discourse Urban addresses his audience as the supreme leader of Christendom, the inheritor of the throne of Saint Peter, and thus speaking "by the permission of God chief bishop and prelate over the whole world… an ambassador with a divine admonition to you, the servants of God" (Fulcher de Chartres in Thatcher & Mcneil 1905: 515). Yet Urban is also able to out-flank the secular authorities by skillfully combining this religious authority with a notably secular appeal to the "race of Franks" (Robert the Monk in Sweetenham 2005: 79), inheritors of the "worth and greatness of Charlemaigne… who have destroyed the kingdoms of the pagans, and brought them within the bounds of Christendom" (Robert the Monk in Sweetenham 2005:80**).** Indeed, Urban even goes as far as endorsing the Franks in the tradition of Israel as "a people loved and chosen by God!". Here Christian Messianism combines with the rhetoric of Germanic tribal ancestor worship: "let your minds be stirred to bravery by the deeds of your forefathers….oh bravest knights, descendents of unconquered ancestors, do not be weaker than they but remember their courage" (ibid). Urban`s appeal thus builds a powerful sense of the unity of Christendom under his own leadership. Petty squabbles of the past are to be forgotten in favour of the new cosmic battle which is explicitly situated in the tradition of the campaigns of Israel in Canaan.

In order to achieve this unification of the Christian self the Other has to be constructed as transcending all existing rivalries and conflicts amongst the Christians. As such Urban describes at length the Muslims of the east as "a foreign people, rejected by God" (Robert the Monk in Sweetenham 2005 79), or alternatively as a "despised and base race which worships demons" (Fulcher de Chartres in Ant & Allen 2010: 40). This is an Other which rejects all standards of human decency, as Urban describes the torture of Christians by "pulling out their intestines, tying them to a pole and then whipping them around it until all their bowels are pulled out" (Robert Monk in Sweetenham 2005: 80), while of the treatment of women, "it is better to pass over in silence than to spell out in detail". The

persecution of the eastern Christians is explicitly situated in the messianic context: "the blood redeemed by the blood of Christ has been shed" (Baldric of Dol in Allen & Ant 2010 43). Yet even more incendiary are the accusations of the defiling of holy sites and relics, "befoul(ing) them with their uncleanness" (Robert the Monk in Sweetenham 2005:80), or even "us(ing) them as stables for their animals" (Baldric of Dol in Allen & Ant 2010: 43)[158]. The discourse of Urban at Clermont thus constructs an idea of the Christian self through a projection of an Islamic Other. In the process, he is able to synthesise motifs and symbolism from the Christian tradition such as the suffering of Christ on the Cross and the sacrifices of the martyrs with powerful narratives of Germanic tribal tradition, the warrior ethic and the legacy of Charlemagne. Yet the most powerful idea which Urban is able to offer is the idea that through engaging in crusade those who have been sinners shall be redeemed. As the account of Fulcher de Chartres describes it, "All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am invested"[159]. Here the projection of the Islamic Other as not only an enemy but a cosmic enemy of God, allows the Pope to construct a powerful binary based on the distinction between the earthly city of man and the heavenly city of God. While the earthly city is marked by sin and suffering and thus war is necessary, the transcendence of this earthly world can be achieved through obedience to God. By conducting war against the "the enemies of the Lord" the crusaders will be assured to be on the side of "his friends" (Fulcher de Chartres). The going out of the earthly totality of the city of man in the afterlife of the heavenly city of God allows earthly war against the Other as enemy of God to be not only just, but sacred, a penitential act of devotion commanded by Christ (Fulcher de Chartres). This going out which had been achieved in the Messianic Christ through the proximity to the Other outside any totality including the totalising mediation of friend and enemy on the side of the road to Jericho is now achieved through the totalising projection of an Other who exists purely in order to allow the achievement of the project of the self, to overcome the Other as enemy of God in order that the self may be beloved of God[160].

The discourse of the crusade then established a totalisation of the Mediterranean, a region which had long been marked by various religions, empires, traditions, cultures, communities as now divided radically between sacred Christian self (the friends of God) and profane Muslim Other (the enemies of God). Within this totality there could be no

relations between self and Other in place: all relations from this point were mediated by the totality of the cosmic conflict. This totalisation from the beginning then drew in all communities, for none could be outside. The first chaotic mobilisation was the notorious People's Crusade led by the enigmatic Peter the Hermit, composed of a poorly equipped and underfed army of peasants, which upon entering the eastern empire bedraggled and exhausted from their journey, confused the local Orthodox Bulgarian Christians for the despised Muslim enemies of God, leading to a massacre of 4000 people according to the account of Albert of Aachen (in Peters 2011: 106). Perhaps even more significant was the almost immediate outbreak of anti-Jewish pogroms which swept across central Europe in 1096, first in Cologne and then in Mainz, where Aachen records upwards of 7000 civilians being slaughtered, including women and children "of whatever age and sex" (Peters 2011:110). As one anonymous Jewish chronicler describes the attitude of the Crusaders, "(if) we are to travel to a distant land… to kill and subjugate all those kingdoms who do not believe in the crucified. How much more so (we should kill and subjugate) the Jews, who killed and crucified Him" (113). The massacres were condemned by the Church[161], yet the rhetoric of division between the Christian fiends of God and the infidel enemies of God had already been established in the popular mind as a divine mandate from God to "destroy the excrable race wherever they found them" (Peters 2011: 112), a view which is shared by the Jewish Chronicler Solomon Ben Simson, describing the attitude of the Crusaders towards the Jews to "wipe them out as a nation" (126) on the basis that "anyone who kills a single Jew shall have all his sins absolved" (114).

The ominous bloodletting of 1096 set the tone for the better organised campaigns which were to come and the bloody slaughter which was to occur in the sacred cities of the holy land. Throughout the accounts of the campaign the theme of penitential suffering is absolutely central. Stephen of Blois, for example, describes how "we suffered for our Lord Jesus Christ" (in Allen &Amt 2010 64), while according to Fulcher de Chartres the hunger and disease suffered by the besieging Crusader forces at Antioch recalls the sufferings of the prophet Job who had "purified his soul by the torments of his body" (in Peters 2011:73). Suffering is part of the worldly city of man, but through overcoming this suffering the crusaders affirm theirs will be the heavenly city of God. The binary of an earthly world marked by sin and a heavenly afterlife thus allows worldly violence to be legitimised in the project of heavenly transcendence. The violence described in the

various accounts of the siege of Antioch therefore do not adopt a Christian lament for the violent destruction of the city and the slaughter of the enemy, but are much closer to the heroic accounts of siege warfare described in the *Iliad*. In precisely this spirit the Gesta account describes how "all the squares were full of corpses of the dead, so that no one could endure it there because of the stench. No one could go anywhere in the city except over the bodies of the dead" (Gesta version in Peters 2011: 205). Equally, there are resonances of the stories of the campaigns of Joshua in Canaan, particularly the echo in the account of Fulcher de Chartres of God on the side of his chosen people miraculously appearing to convert a Muslim citizen who then clandestinely opens the city gates to the besieging armies (in Peters 2011:75) just as he had appeared to convert the Canaanite Rahab who then opened the gates to allow the Israelite capture of Jericho (Josh 2). There are also, however, for example in the Chanson de Antioch, re-imagining of the Messianic Christ who now appears to his followers not as a prince of peace but as a warrior dressed in the armour of the Franksh Knights. The Chanson thus describes an imagined conversation between Christ and a disciple following the crucifixion, in which the follower laments that "you should be avenged for the treatment you have suffered at the hands of these cowardly Jews" (v8, 106). To this the warrior Christ responds in Messianic tones, "the race is not yet born who will come to revenge me.. they will come on my behalf and kill these wicked pagans" (v9, 106). Asked who this race might be, Christ replies enigmatically only that they shall come "from over the sea" (v11, 106), an allusion to the crusading Franks. Here Christ clearly speaks not in the voice of the Gospels but as a contemporary of the crusaders, demanding "Our Lord God asks you to go to Jerusalem to kill and confound the wicked pagans… (to) save your souls by becoming savages…for God, Jesus king of Glory" (Chanson de Antioch v6, 105). The combination of warrior tradition with Christian imagery thus constitutes a new paradigm for thinking about displacement, in which the destruction of place is a sacred violence in the tradition of Joshua. The accounts of the siege of Antioch thus glory in the violence of the campaign, with lurid descriptions of the beheading of Saracen soldiers and the catapulting of those same heads into the City in order to inspire terror amongst the inhabitants (v187, 209). Indeed, the celebration of violence is consistent throughout the narrative, reaching spectacular pitch with the gruesome description of the slicing in half of an enemy soldier, "so far into the vital organs that the two halves hung right down to ground level" (v162, 192). The account

continues enthusiasticall, “just listen to what happened next!... one half of the Turk fell to the ground while the other half stayed in the saddle… the Turk`s horse galloped off at speed… The race of the devil was terrified at the sight” (v162, 193). The crusade thus amounted to the spatial totalisation of the Mediterranean world, the mediation of all placed self-Other relations through the totality of the opposition friends of God and enemies of God The Other was reduced to that which was rejected in the self, the embodiment of the sinfulness of the world, the overcoming of which would allow the heavenly transcendence of the heroic Christian warrior. This new synthesis of the heroic and the Messianic was not without precedent in the Christian tradition. It had been foreshadowed in certain metaphors of Paul, for example, encouraging the Ephesians to "put on the whole armour of God: For we wrestle against... the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness" (Ephesians 6:11-12). However, the association of Christian piety with Germanic warrior ethics which crystalised during the crusades in the chivalric code amounted to a new paradigm of the overcoming of earthly life, a subordination of earthly life to heavenly paradise encapsulated in the Chivalric motto described by Kaeuper: "vita est militia, hominis super terram", human life on earth is a battle (Kaeuper 2009 2).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have suggested the emergence of a post-Messianic theology built around the synthesis of Christian motifs and Platonic categories. The Messianic model of Christianity discussed in chapter 3 had been the narrative of going out of the social mediations of status within the Roman totality in order to establish placed un-mediated proximity with the neighbour as Other in the world. The Platonic model of philosophy discussed in chapter 4 had been the narrative of going out of the earthly world by overcoming the world of the body and as such subordinating the worldly Other to the project of the transcendence of the self, in particular through the social totalisation of the Republic. In this chapter I have suggested the possibility of retaining a Messianic reading of Augustine which emphasises the continuity with the critique of the mediation of status within a Roman totality built on imperial pride and the glorification of the self through the subjugation of the Other. However, I have also suggested that from the letters of Paul there is developed a notably Platonic distinction between the body, which is represented

as marked by sinful desires and temptations, and the soul, which is marked by restraint and piety. In Augustine, I have suggested, this distinction is schematised as a division between an earthly city of man comprising the social and political structures of earthly existence and a heavenly city of God composed of those chosen by divine grace to transcend the earthly towards heavenly paradise. The result of this radical distinction is that the earthly totality is re-imagined not as merely the political mediation of inter-personal relations through a totality of status and power, but the earthly itself, the totality of sin inherited from the crimes of the father. The going out of totality proposed in Messianic Christianity as the creation of a community of love is thus impossible for Augustine in the world. There is not earthly outside of the totality of sin; the only going out is the overcoming of the earthly in Platonic terms achieved by the detachment of the pure soul from the sinful body. Even as Augustine condemns Roman status and imperialism as the sinful pride of the love of self, he also legitimises these structures as in accord with the fallen nature of man, as such relations of status, power, honour, even war are accepted as necessary in a world marked by original sin. The inter-subjective relation of the face to face in the world is thus situated within the city of man as a lower order. The relation between neighbours, brothers and sisters, occur within the totality of sin. The truly divine relation is that directed towards the transcendence of the worldly, the moving out of proximity to the worldly Others into the proximity of the absolute Other through divine grace. The Citizen of God is thus not expected to go out of the political totality in the world but rather overcome the worldly.

This subordination of the worldly Other to the absolute Other thus sets the ground for the discourse of Crusade outlined by Pope Urban, whereby the struggle to overcome sin in this world is articulated through a struggle against the Other. The relation of self to Other is thus mediated by the project of the self in the most radical way. All that is sinful in the world is projected onto the Other; all that the self seeks to overcome in the self is projected onto the Other and can thus be overcome in the Other. Through projecting the Other as the enemy of God, the self affirms the self as the friend of God, the defender of the honour of Christ, Self and Other are no longer encountered in the face to face but in the radical mediation of friends and enemies of God. This cosmic totalisation which played out through many places of the ancient Mediterranean, from the towns and villages of the Rhineland through to the cities of Antioch and Jerusalem, became

subsumed within the totalising decision between the self as friends of God and the Other as enemies of God. What is more, in the years to come this same logic of radical mediation would become the matrix by which campaigns of annihilation could be sacralised in northern France in the 13th century, with the Albigensian Crusade against the accused Cathar Heretics, in Iberia through the Reconquest and the persecution of Spanish Jews which gave way to the Inquisition of the 16th century. In each case the logic of the crusade could be understood as the projection of the sinfulness of the self onto the Other by which the destruction of the Other could allow the cleansing of the self. The assurance that the self was indeed a friend of God destined to overcome the worldly totality of sin and ascend to the Heavenly city of God. The relation of self and Other is thus fully totalised in the discourse of crusade. The Other is again not the experience of that which overwhelms the self as with Messianic Christianity, but that which is to be overcome as with the Homeric narrative of Achilles and Odysseus.

6

Displacement as Conquest of the Americas

We ask and require you that you acknowledge the Church as the Ruler and Superior of the whole world....But, if you do not do this, and maliciously make delay in it, I certify to you that, with the help of God, we shall powerfully enter into your country, and we shall make

war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can (El Requerimiento, 1513)

Thus far I have suggested three narratives of displacement which have shaped the political philosophy of the ancient Mediterranean from antiquity through to the Medieval period. The first of these was the Messianic Exodus narrative of the going out of totality into the wilderness of the proximity of the neighbour, the second was the Platonic heroic narrative of the going out into the world in order to overcome the world and return home to the paradise of the truth of Being. The third post-Messianic narrative synthesises the previous two as the pilgrimage of the citizen of God through the earthly city of man which in the narrative of crusade involves the overcoming of the Other as the enemy of God in order to secure the transcendence of the self to heavenly paradise. In the process we have moved from the placed proximity of the Other in her Otherness as experienced by the Samaritan on the road to Jericho, through the political totalisation of self-Other relations in the Platonic Republic through to the sacralisation of that totalisation in the narrative of Crusade, the radical mediation of placed proximity as the cosmic struggle between the friends and enemies of God. In this chapter I will describe a final historical narrative of displacement in which we can find the reduction of the Other to the project of the self, the narrative of the conquest of the Americas during the sixteenth century. What I will suggest is distinct to this narrative, however, is that while in the narrative of crusade the Other was projected as Other in her Otherness, in her difference from the self by which the sinfulness of the self could be projected on to that difference, in the conquest of the Amerindian world(s) the Amerindian Other is negated in her Otherness, subsumed within the categories of the self. Drawing on the work of Edmundo O`Gorman and Enrique Dussel I thus describe in the first section of the chapter the "invention of the Americas" by which the Amerindian world(s) were covered over in order to invent the American through the existent categories of the European totality. This negation of the Otherness of the Other, I will thus suggest, involves an even more radical process of the

mediation of self-Other relations by which the Other is no longer reduced to her Otherness, but rather negated in her Otherness and reduced to a projection of the same. In the second section of the chapter I will then turn to the great debates in Spanish Scholasticism regarding the legitimacy of the conquest; the Aristotelian argument for the Indian as natural slave of the European master proposed by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda; the evangelical Christian argument for the Indian as Christian brothers and sisters proposed by Bartolomé de Las Casas, and finally the argument for international law proposed by Francisco de Vitoria. In these debates, I argue, we find complex ambiguities, with suggestions of Messianic tradition in Las Casas, but also the foundations of universal human rights in de Vitoria. Yet I conclude ultimately these debates affirm the negation of the Amerindian as Other, the integration of the Other into a totality of the same which serves as the foundation of international law. This I conclude thus amounts to the final shift away from the Messianic understanding of the encounter of self and Other in the place outside of totality, for from here all the international self-Other relations will be integrated within the mediations of the totality of international law.

6.1 The integration of the Amerindian into the European Totality

In his first hand account of the campaign of Hernán Cortés` conquest of the Aztec Empire, Bernal Diaz Del Castillo recalls the first sighting in 1521 of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan with a sense of awe as a floating city of unparalleled beauty and sophistication, "the great towers and temples and other edifices of lime which seemed to rise from the water… I express myself to be wondered at… for never yet did man see, hear or dream of anything equal to the spectacle which appeared… this was the garden of the world" (1963: 160-1). Having described the wonders of the city Del Castilo immediately refers to the fate of this garden of the world, "which is now a tract of fields of Indian corn", so utterly destroyed by the battle to occupy it "that the natives themselves could hardly recognise it" (161). The destruction of Tenochtitlan could serve as a metaphor for the broader destruction of the Amerindian world(s) during the sixteenth century. While previous narratives of displacement discussed in this thesis involved systematic persecutions, brutal sieges and campaigns of violence, the conquest of the Americas involved the total annihilation of multiple civilisations and the subjugation and decapitation of many others, from the islands of the Caribbean to the cities of Mexico and

Peru, the jungles of the Amazon to the grasslands of the north American plains. In the course of the sixteenth century not only did many tens of millions of indigenous Amerindians die due to the brutal treatment and conditions imposed upon them combined with the diseases brought by Europeans, millions more Africans died in the slave ships crossing the middle passage of the Atlantic and on the plantations to which they were delivered for labour. The processes of physical displacement endured throughout the Atlantic world in the sixteenth century were at the time and remain to the present unparalleled in human history in their absolute dimensions.

The origins of the journey which brought the Europeans across the Atlantic can be found in the conflicts which had divided the Mediterranean during the era of the crusades. In 1453 the Byzantine capital Constantinople had been captured by the Ottoman Turks, effectively closing off to the Europeans the last remaining route to the eastern centres of the global economy in India and China[162]. In Spain, the era of Crusade known as the Reconquest had lasted much longer and penetrated much deeper into the national psyche than in the rest of Europe. Yet here also the culmination came during the final years of the fifteenth century in the momentous events of 1492, the *Annus Mirabilis* (year of miracles), which began on the first of January with the capture of Granada from the Muslims followed at the end of March by the Alhambra Decree declaring the expulsion of all practising Jews from Spanish territory and climaxing with the landing on the 12th of October of Christopher Columbus[163] on the beaches of a small island across the Atlantic known by its inhabitants as *Guanahani*. The spirit of the Reconquest of Spain and in particular the climate of triumphalism surrounding the fall of Granada fundamentally shaped the early years of the Conquest of the Americas. In his account of the first journey Columbus refers to his Spanish patrons Ferdinand and Isabela as “enemies of the sect of Mohammed, all heresies and idolatries”, and celebrates the achievements of the Catholic monarchs in conquering the Moorish rulers and expelling the Jews (Columbus 2010: 16). It is even suggested that all the profits from Columbus` expedition be put towards the recapture of Jerusalem (2010: 139). Yet from the beginning the discourse of the conquest is also different from that of the crusades and reconquest. While the Muslims had long been described in the most bloodthirsty language (as devil worshipers, idolaters, pagans, etc.) - rhetoric befitting existential enemies of God - the inhabitants of the Atlantic islands were constructed as timid and gentle. As Columbus describes the inhabitants of *Haiti*

(which he had re-named as *Española),* "there is no better nor gentler people (131)…. (they are) a loving people without covetousness and fit for anything,… there is not better land nor people. They love their neighbours as themselves" (135). Rather than enemies of God, the natives were thus initially regarded as fellows who would “easily be made Christians” (Columbus 2010: 38)[164] under the banner of the universal church. As with the declaration of crusade 400 years earlier, the official announcement of the legitimacy of the conquest came from the Pope Alexander IV in the form of the Papal Bull of Donation known as *Inter Caetera* and by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 granting sovereignty over the new found lands to the Spaniards. Yet here again while Pope Urban's sermon at Clermont had been full of the atrocities of the enemies of God, the violence inflicted upon the peaceful Christians of the east and the need for vengeance, a declaration of war against the Islamic Other, the Bull of 1493 is not a declaration of war but a call for peaceful evangelisation to peoples who already "believe in one God, the Creator in heaven, and seem sufficiently disposed to embrace the Catholic faith and be trained in good morals". The conquest is thus to be an evangelical mission "to lead the peoples dwelling in those islands and countries to embrace the Christian religion", carried out primarily by the holy orders of the Catholic Church, a fleet of "worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled, and experienced men, in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals" (Papal Bull 1493). The Amerindian Other is thus constructed in these first moments of engagement not as an existential Other, but as potential fellow Christians, not to be destroyed, but to be converted to Christianity, to be brought to the true faith and good morals through the instruction of the religion provided by the holy orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans who would set out across the Atlantic in ever increasing numbers in the following years.

From the very beginning, then, the conquest was understood as a process of the Europeanisation of the Amerindian. This process was expressed even before the Europeans ever set foot on the first beach in the Caribbean but rather at the very first moment Columbus sighted land and took possession of the island known by its inhabitants as *Guanahani,* by renaming that island as *San Salvador*. Subsequently, the island known by its inhabitants as *Haiti* would be renamed as *Española* and later other islands claimed as sovereign territories of the Spanish crown through acts of de-naming and re-naming into Spanish: *Santa Maria de Concepción, Fernandina, Isabela, Juana*[165]*,* Venezuela,

Colombia, Nueva España, Nuevo Granada, all complex Amerindian territories with various names and meanings integrated into a new imperial geography through the symbolic act of re-naming as an assertion of sovereignty. Ultimately the continent itself would be given a new name as América, in honour of the Portuguese navigator Amerigo Vespucci who first reached the conclusion that these lands were not the eastern extremity of Asia, but rather a continent previously unknown to the Europeans[166]. For Edmundo O`Gorman (1961), this process of de-naming and re-naming cannot be described in any sense as a discovery. To discover implies a degree of revelation, it implies a degree of dialogue whereby the Other reveals something of her essence. Rather, O`Gorman argues that in the process of colonisation the "lump of Cosmic matter" which we now call America had its meaning written in the language and cosmology of the Spanish colonisers, with little input from the inhabitants of the continent (1961: 42). As such, O`Gorman claims what came to be America was not discovered, but rather invented through European categories. Enrique Dussel goes still further in a brilliant Levinasian inspired analysis of the invasion[167]. He argues that the structure of the conquest was marked from the beginning by the negation of the Amerindian Other, the negation of language, the negation of sovereignty, the negation of humanity. In the process of the conquest, then, Amerindian forms of knowledge, cosmologies, traditions and ways of being were systematically destroyed. "As a result the Other, the American Indian disappeared. The Indian was not discovered (des-cubierto) as Other, but subsumed under categories of the Same... denied as Other, covered over (en-cubierto)" (1995: 32). The narrative of the crusade had then constructed the Islamic Other as enemy of God. While this construction was a projection of European imagination, it was also built around the very Otherness of the Other and as such preserved the ontological status of the Other even as this served as the basis for the distinction. The narrative of the conquest, by contrast, from the beginning was marked by a negation of the Otherness of the Other by which the Amerindian world was brought within European categories of the same. The Amerindian was to be made Christian, the Amerindian world was to be re-named, the various cultures of the region - the Aztecs and Inca, Mapuche, Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, Arawak, Navaho, Miskito - were to be subsumed under the category of Indian.

While the discourse of the conquest had always, then, affirmed the humanity of the Amerindian and thus a part of the universal brotherhood to be loved as neighbours, this

universalism was built on the sameness of the Amerindian as human, but not in any sense on an affirmation of her Otherness. As such the view amongst the Europeans became established that the Amerindian, while human in her sameness, was defined as a lesser humanity to the extent of her difference from the European**.** This perception is articulated perhaps most frequently in the image of nudity. The account of Columbus in particular describes the Taino as "a naked people" (Columbus 2010: 37), lacking in clothes, lacking in religion, lacking in laws of property or obvious social hierarchies. The metaphor of nudity continued to be used as a standard motif of the narratives of the conquest for centuries, as O`Gorman`s analysis of the discourses of discovery demonstrates, with an image of the "new world" as a succumbing femininity giving way to masculine exploration, as with the example of Samuel Morrison`s twentieth century description of "The delight of those October days in 1492 when the New World gracefully yielded her virginity to the conquering Castilians" (O`Gorman 1961: 44). The imagery of nudity as denoting lack of morality is also echoed in the account of Jose de Anchieta, describing how "the Indian women go about naked and do not their deny themselves anything.. they are troublesome to the men, throwing themselves and ensnaring them for the honour of sleeping with a Christian" (in Benjamin 2009c: 97). The most sinister appearance of the idea of nudity, however, is found in the account of Michel de Cunho, a companion of Columbus on the third journey, an unusually candid description of an act of brutal violence.

> *"I captured a very beautiful Carib woman... whom the Lord Admiral (Columbus) gave to me... she being naked as is their custom, I conceived the desire to take my pleasure of her... but she was unwilling... I took a rope end and thrashed her well (producing) such screaming as you would not believe your ears... finally we reached an agreement (following which) she seemed to have been raised by a whole school of whores" (in Columbus 1969: 139)*[168].

This account of a single act of brutal violation captures the full horror of the early years of the conquest during which the Amerindian was afforded no Otherness, but only the status of being for the self, a source of slave labour, objects of sexual exploitation, beasts of burden. The conquest which had been legitimised as a conquest of Christian evangelisation and the love of the neighbour had within months become the marked by the most sadistic and genocidal forms of de-humanisation. The fundamental problem

here was that from the beginning the Amerindian Other had been framed as an object in relation to the European subject, an object of evangelisation, an object of civilisation. In this context the brutal exploitation of Amerindian bodies was entirely consistent with the logic of the 1493 Bull of Donation, the construction of the Amerindian as object in relation to the European subject. For many of the Priests who had embarked on the journey across the Atlantic with stories of gentle natives who loved each other as neighbours the stories of massacre, torture, exploitation and subjugation were deeply shocking. The first to protest against the atrocities being carried out in the Indies was the Dominican Friar Antonio de Montesinos, who in 1511 delivered an extraordinary Christmas sermon to the Colonists of Española, denouncing their brutality and raising for the first time the fundamental questions which would dominate the sixteenth century: if the legitimacy of the conquest was based on Christian evangelisation, how could it be legitimate to work Indians to death, to enslave and murder…

> "I who am a voice of Christ crying in the wilderness of this island…This voice says that you are in mortal sin, that you live and die in it, for the cruelty and tyranny you use in dealing with these innocent people… by what right or justice do you keep these Indians in such cruel servitude. On what authority have you waged such a detestable war on them… For with the excessive work you demand of them they fall ill and die, or rather you kill them with your desire to extract and acquire gold every day… Are these not men?... Are you not bound to love them as you love yourselves" (Montesinos, cited in Hanke 2002: 17)

The voices of protest raised by Montesinos reflects the tension at the heart of the conquest. It affirms the Amerindians as fellow brothers and sisters whom the Spaniards are bound to love, to treat with human dignity, without "cruel servitude" or "tyranny". Moreover, it denounces the military form of the conquest as a "detestable war" which lacks in any legitimate "authority". Yet the appeal to the legitimacy of the conquest as the Christianisation of the Amerindians is still accepted. The protests made by Montesinos and various others in the early years of the sixteenth century thus served to condemn the violent conquest of the body associated with the city of man, while appealing to the legitimacy of the evangelical conquest of the soul associated with the city of God. These appeals led to a series of reforms being introduced which sought to re-affirm the

evangelical legitimacy of the conquest. The first of these new reforms was the introduction of t*he Requirement* (see epigraph of this chapter). A speech was to be read by the Conquistadors to all communities on their first encounter with the Europeans. The Requirement in many respects continues in the tradition of the Papal Bull in asserting the universal family of humankind to include both Europeans and Amerindians, descendents of "one man and one woman, of whom you and we, all the men of the world at the time, were and are descendants", the only distinction being that early in history some went one way and others another and as a result the original human brotherhood became "divided into many kingdoms and provinces". In relation to these many communities of the universal human family the "God our Lord gave charge to one man, called St. Peter… that he should be the head of the whole Human Race, wherever men should live, and under whatever law, sect, or belief they should be". This universal sovereignty has henceforth succeeded to all those who took "his seat in Rome, as the spot most fitting to rule the world from…. This man was called Pope". The Requirement thus proposes the common humanity of Amerindian and European, their fundamental human equality at the very same moment that it affirms the sovereignty of Europe over the various Amerindian worlds. The Requirement thus proceeds to explain that the Pope as ruler of the world has donated the rights of sovereignty over all islands and territories discovered “with everything there that is in them” to the Spanish monarchs. This donation the Indians were assured was in compliance with all fair legal procedure “set forth in certain documents which were drawn up regarding this donation in the manner described, which you may see if you so desire”. The Requirement thus retains the deep paradox at the heart of the conquest. This is not a war against an enemy, but rather a benevolent conquest designed to save souls, an act of Christian love towards the pagan brothers and sisters. This discourse is described by Diaz del Castillo in his account of Cortes` address to Montezuma, in which it is asserted that "Our emperor laments the loss of souls in such numbers as were brought, by his (Montezuma`s) Idols, into everlasting flames" (1928 168). However, underpinning this conquest of Christian love is an implicit threat of annihilation, if on being rightfully informed of the cosmic history of the world, the lordship of the Pope over their territories, and the sinfulness of their customs and traditions, the natives did not accept the sovereignty of their new rulers, they would face the wrath of God, by which "we will enter your land against you with force and will make war in every place.. We will

take you and your wives and children and make them slaves, and as such we will sell them…And we will take your property and will do to you all the harm and evil we can…". The Requirement thus continues to maintain the dual project of conquest, which draws its legitimacy from the language of Christian love amongst the European and Amerindian brothers and sisters of universal humanity, but is practised through the methods of the most extreme forms of violence and domination by one branch of that family over another.

Alongside the Requirement, the other major reform introduced by the Spanish Crown in 1512 were the Laws of Burgos which attempted to formalise and codify the *Encomienda* as the basic structure both of exploitation and Christianisation. Here the starting point was the belief that the failure of evangelisation in the previous two decades had resulted not from the oppressive violence of exploitation, but rather from the excessive degree of freedom and autonomy enjoyed by the Indians, particularly the lack of contact with the civilising influence of the Christians. This degree of freedom, it was suggested, encouraged a sense of separation amongst the natives, who were "by nature inclined to idleness and vice, and have no manner of virtue or doctrine". As such the new laws affirmed that all *encomenderos* would be required to provide housing for the Indians held in *encomienda*, and as a result all existing Indian villages should be burnt to the ground (1). Aside from this spatial re-structuring the Encomenderos would be required to provide adequate food (15) and clothing (20) as well as a hammock (19). Moreover it was decreed pregnant women should not be employed in the gold mines, but should only be "utilised in household tasks" (16) until the infant was three years of age (violation of this prohibition would result in a fine of 6 pesos). Amongst the labour rights described in the laws were included a break of 40 days following a working period of 5 months (13), and the right to perform dances (including on work days, unless this should interfere with their work) (14). Finally, "no person or persons shall dare to beat any Indians with sticks, or whip him, or call him dog, or address him by any name other than his proper name alone" (24), the violation of which would again result in a fine of 5 pesos. Again, the logic of the reforms combine suggestions of respect for basic human rights amongst the indigenous communities, including basic labour rights. Yet again the underpinning rationale for these rights is the Europeanisation of the Amerindian, the establishment of labour discipline and what Enrique Dussel refers to as the "colonisation of everyday life… (whereby) the

European process of civilisation subsumed the Other under the same….this Other no longer served as an object to be brutalised by the warlike project of a Cortes or a Pizarro… (but rather) the conqueror colonised the manner by which those conquered lived and reproduced their lives" (1991: 45). As always the Amerindian was to be granted rights according to her humanity, to the extent that she could be understood as the same as the European, but was to be disciplined and subjugated to the extent that she was different from the European. In her dress, her home life, her religion, her customs and tradition, her language she was to be negated, reduced to her sameness, her bare humanity. The totality of colonisation through the dual discourses of Christian evangelisation and Conquistador discipline thus constituted a relationship between self and Other which was radically mediated by the project of the conquest, the Europeanisation of the Amerindian, the making the same of the Other through the negation of her Otherness.

The laws of Burgos, then, established the mediation of relations between Spaniards and Amerindians for several decades. However, the basic tension between those advocating the primacy of Christian evangelisation and those advocating the primacy of the exploitation of the natural resources, in simple terms those concerned with capturing souls and those concerned with earning gold, grew ever more polemical. In this febrile atmosphere the most passionate and the most brilliant of those advocating the primacy of the city of God in the evangelical conquest was the Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, whose *Brief Account* of the Destruction of the Indies (1992) amounted to a literary declaration of war against the Encomenderos, with vivid descriptions of the most heinous atrocities and sadistic cruelties inflicted upon the Indians by the Spaniards. Las Casas's account has served as the standard for the descriptions of the total de-humanisation of the Amerindian by the Spaniards. In one example an incident is described on the island of Espanola in which men placed wagers on whether they could behead an Indian with one sword swing, in another of men laughing and joking as they murdered infants, “running through a mother and her baby with a single sword thrust” (15). Like his mentor Montesinos, Las Casas critique is developed not outside the conquest, but rather from within, from the evangelical language of the 1493 Bull, yet it is a critique which is radical in its affirmation of Amerindian human dignity, a radicalism which enraged many of the Encomenderos and their advocates, amongst them the Franciscan Friar Torbio de Benavente Motolinia, who described him as "a man so vexatious, unquiet, importunate,

argumentative and litigious…. going about with his tumult and unrest" (in Lockhart & u 1976: 225). In the same letter, Motolinia claims that the massive depopulation of the Indies was despite the excellent treatment provided for the Indians by the Spaniards, concluding "God alone knows the cause; his judgments are many and hidden from us. Whether or not the great sins and idolatries that took place in this land cause it, I do not know". Increasingly the Encomenderos were, however, tiring of the rhetoric of evangelical love of neighbour, moving ever more towards a view of the Amerindian as a mere body to be exploited and disposed of once it had served its purpose. In 1537 the Church again sought to assert its supreme authority over the conquest with the Papal Bull Sublimis Deus, describing explicitly as "the enemy of the human race" those who claimed that the Indians "should be treated as dumb brutes created for our service… pretending that they are incapable of receiving the Catholic Faith". In response to this Bull, the Spanish authorities introduced the New Laws of 1542, designed to establish much more stringent requirements on the *Encomenderos*, ending the hereditary principle with the aim of the eventual abolition of the *Encomienda* system altogether. The resentment amongst the Encomenderos was, however, now at such a point that the attempt to introduce the laws in Peru led to a full scale rebellion culminating in the assassination of the Viceroy Blasco Nunez Vela leading the Crown to moderate the laws in 1544, to the dismay of Las Casas and his supporters. In a last attempt to restore some kind of balance between the project of evangelisation and exploitation the Spanish Crown thus announced there would be an official debate on all matters concerning the legitimacy and conduct of the Conquest to be convened in Valladolid in 1550 before a panel of scholars and chaired by Francisco de Molina. The debate would be conducted between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, representing the position of the *Encomenderos,* and drawing on Aristotelian philosophy to argue that the Indians should be taken possession of as natural slaves. On the other side would be Las Casas as the representative of the Indians[169], advocating a Christian critique of the conquest and calling for a suspension of all military campaigns and exploitation in favour of an exclusive focus on peaceful evangelisation. Aside from the participants at Valladolid, however, a third and equally significant contribution to the debate would be made by Francisco de Vitoria, who despite not being associated directly with either faction in the Indies published a scholarly essay *On the Indies* (*De Indis*) in

1537, arguing for a move away from the evangelical legitimisation of the conquest towards a natural law argument.

6.2 The Philosophical Debate on the Justness of the Conquest

The argument set out by Sepúlveda at Valladolid[170] was largely based on his earlier treaties *Democrates secundus sive de justis belli causis apud Indios*[171], a fictionalised philosophical dialogue in the Socratic style between *Democrates,* representing the arguments of the author, and *Leopoldo*, a suitably naïve Lutheran whose chief role (in the Socratic fashion) was to be thoroughly disabused of his erroneous naiveté by *Democrates*. For Sepúlveda, who had never travelled across the Atlantic, the empirical evidence relating to the Indians was largely based on the prior research of Gonzalo Fernandes de Oviedo, whose multi-volume *La historia general y natural de las Indias* had caused considerable controversy for challenging the official position of the Church that the Indian was rational and thus capable of being Christianised. Rather, Oviedo claimed that careful study of the thickness of Indian skulls, which he claimed to be four times as thick as those of European Christians, made the natives irrational and course (Bk 5). Oviedo thus concluded this intellectual lack was closely connected to the multiple failings of moral character which he had observed and listed extensively: "lazy and vicious, melancholic and cowardly... in general a lying shiftless people... they are idolatrous, libidinous and sodomites... their chief desire to eat, drink and worship idols... what else could one expect from people whose skulls are so thick?" (quoted in Hanke 2002: 11). The descriptions of Indian nature provided by Oviedo were crucial elements of empirical evidence in support of the scriptural, theological and philosophical sources which composed the majority of Sepúlveda`s argument for the legitimacy of the Spanish claim in the Indies and the justness of war to secure that claim. There are various strands to the argument proposed by Sepúlveda, drawing on both classical philosophy and scriptural tradition. In the latter account there is a clear continuity with the tradition of the Crusades, in defining the conquest as a sacred violence in parallel to the campaigns of Joshua against the idolatrous and sinful Canaanites, Amorites and Perizites. Here Sepulveda particularly focuses on the notorious passages from Deuteronomy 1 and 20 describing the command of God to the Hebrews to kill all males and enslave all women and children in the promised land (Deut 20: 13-14) as a blueprint for action in "all the cities which are very far off from thee" (Deut

20:15). On this basis, Sepúlveda concludes, “God has made great and very clear indications regarding the extermination of these barbarians” (317). Alongside the Old Testament suggestions of divine punishment there are, however, also passages where the New Testament language of neighbourly love and the universal mission of Christ are invoked. Here the discourse is clearly more consistent with the official position of the Church since the Bull of 1493 according to which God wants all men to be brought to the true religion, and there is therefore a universal responsibility on the church not only to shepherd the sheep within the flock, but also those who have strayed (327). This is according to Sepúlveda, the foundation of Christian charity as described in the parable of the Good Samaritan. The Indians are to be regarded as neighbours who have strayed, and the Christian is enjoined to love by putting the Amerindian back on the correct path to salvation. For Sepúlveda, however, this neighbourly love is to be expressed through a war to exterminate satanic practices in order to rescue the “innocents” (by which is meant children, possibly even infants) from the “impious worship of idols” and the “prodigious sacrifice of human victims”, “the banquet of human bodies” (331) which Oviedo has described in his *History*. By this humanistic standard Sepúlveda concludes the conquest should be judged, "provided it can be achieved without great loss of life amongst the Christians", as an act of “gentleness and mercy, and not so much as a punishment but as an amendment of the wicked” (331). The principle of common humanity, as has been suggested throughout this chapter, is thus deeply ambiguous, Oviedo`s denial of the Amerindian as fully human followed in the tradition of the most brutal exploitation of the early conquest. Yet again this affirmation of Amerindian humanity also served to subsume her within the universal project of European spiritual conquest, by which she could be condemned and disciplined in her Otherness, to the extent in Sepulveda`s argument that neighbourly love could be used to justify military genocide.

Sepúlveda thus accepts the basic position of the 1493 and 1537 Papal Bulls that the Amerindian should be considered human and thus should be treated as a neighbour for whom we are responsible; the key question, then, is the nature of that responsibility. Here again Oviedo`s *History* is drawn upon extensively by Sepúlveda for its copious descriptions of Indian incapacity. Amongst the indicators of this barbarism, aside from the evidence of the thickness of their skulls, are the claims that they do not retain any monument of their history (309), that they have no laws only “barbarous institutions and

customs" (309), including idolatry, sodomy, laziness and cannibalism. As such it is concluded that the Indians had, before the arrival of the Christians, lived in a state of constant war in which the only victory was the "quenching of their insatiable lust for human flesh" (309). This is contrasted by Sepúlveda to the virtues of the Spaniards, their prudence, wit, virtue and humanity, in comparison to whom the Indians are judged as inferior "as children to parents, wives to husbands.. and even I say as monkeys to men" (305). From this it is concluded that the Indians are thus to be understood in Aristotelian terms as natural slaves in relation to the Spaniards who are their natural masters. Here again we find the old Platonic binary between reason and passions, soul and body, by which humanity is divided between the Spaniards who are clothed, speak Latin, read scripture, are possessed of Christian morality and restraint, while the Indians are naked, speak non-Latin languages (without formal writing), do not know scripture and are held to be incapable of moral restraint. The Amerindian is thus defined by the rule of the body over the mind, while the Spaniard is defined by the rule of the mind over the body. This later condition is for Sepúlveda profoundly unnatural, quoting from Aristotle in book 1 of his *Politics*, "it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient". For Aristotle, this binary distinction between the intellect, which was suited to rule, and the body, which could only be ruled, reflected the biological foundation of political order. As such, those whose business was concerned primarily with the body were to be considered as "the lower sort… as nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master" (Bk 1 pt V), while those capable of sophisticated thought were by nature masters who must direct the slaves in their endeavours in much the same way that the mind directs the body in order to achieve a task[172]. As such Sepúlveda concludes that the responsibility of the Christians for the Amerindians takes the form of the relation of natural master and natural slave as a fundamental law of nature by which "the soul dominates the body, the reason presides over appetite, man prevails over woman, the father over his children, ie, the more powerful over the weak, the perfect over the imperfect" (293). The conclusion of this philosophical analysis of natural law thus holds that the Indian serves as pure body to the pure mind of their Spanish Christian masters, "and it will always be fair and in accordance with natural law that such people submit to the rule of princes and more cultured and humane nations" (293). Moreover, Sepúlveda

follows in the Scholastic tradition by arguing that this natural law is itself only a manifestation of divine law, “the will of God, who wishes to keep the natural order and forbids disturbance… because although man's appetite is inclined to evil, reason is likely good” (277). For Sepulveda, then, the Amerindian shares in common humanity with the European. Yet to the extent of her difference from the European, she is subordinate to the European and in need of mentorship, in need of civilisation by her natural European masters. The relationship of self and Other is thus mediated by this project of colonial civilisation. Self and Other become natural master and natural slave through the institution of the *Encomienda,* which was thus not only profitable but a universal law of nature and but also the divine law of neighbourly charity.

In setting out their own responses to the problem of the conquest, Las Casas in his *In Defense of the Indians* (1992b) and de Vitoria in his *On the Indies* (*De Indis*) (1991) differ considerably in style. Las Casas was responding directly to Sepúlveda. His prose fizzes with a mixture of righteous rage and withering contempt for his opponents, the latter particularly directed against his long time rival Oviedo, whose *History* is dismissed as the self-regarding apologia of "a despotic master who kept Indians oppressed by slavery like cattle" (45-6)[173]. De Vitoria, by contrast, whose contribution was written in 1537, prior to the Bull Sublimis and New Laws and the heated polemics of the 1540s, adopts a more detached scholarly tone. Despite these stylistic differences, both Las Casas and de Vitoria share many important positions. Both for example reject the simplistic popular arguments for the legitimacy of an imperial conquest based on the Papal Bull of 1493. What is striking, however, is that the two adopt subtly different reasons for their opposition. Las Casas reflects on the spiritual focus of the Bull to argue that this is not a document designed to condone subjugation by force of arms, which would go against the explicit teaching of Christ who had insisted that the gospel should be preached only with "gentleness and meekness… not by armed force but by holy example" (1992b 350). De Vitoria, by contrast, adopts an arguably more radical position by suggesting that the Papal Bull could not grant earthly dominion because in order to grant dominion to another entity one must be in possession of the granted dominion. For de Vitoria it might be true that the Church has spiritual dominion over the whole world, but not earthly dominion, which is rightly divided amongst kings and emperors, including non-Christians; citing scripture, the Pope`s role is thus described as that of a shepherd to the flock rather than a

lord (De Vitoria 1991 260, Pet 1 5:3) and thus the Indies are not in his possession to grant politically. Similarly, both de Vitoria and Las Casas are in agreement in rejecting the method of the Requirement introduced in 1513 as a legitimising process for possession. De Vitoria declares that the only way such a method could be considered legitimate were if it provided explicit and reasonable evidence for the truthfulness of its claims. Instead the Requirement was a plain and simple declaration, an “announcement, unaccompanied by any kind of miracles, proof or persuasion that the true religion is Christian” (269). To accept such an announcement would be quite contrary to natural law of reason which requires reflection and rational consideration in order to make a decision. Declaration allows no room for distinction between true and false faith. As de Vitoria concludes, Islamic preachers could also announce a similar declaration, and “it is clear that the Indians would not be obliged to believe the Saracens” (270). The exact same point is made by Las Casas in his *History of the Indies* (1971: 194). With regard to the argument proposed by Sepúlveda in relation to the precedent of Joshua in Canaan, Las Casas points out that this instance of divine law was applied only to the Promised Land, not to all lands in which idolatry was practised, which would have included Egypt and indeed the entire Mediterranean in the period of the Exodus (1992b: 104). What is more, even if this violent judgement on the enemies of God had been the law in the time of Moses, it has been made redundant with the coming of Christ and the renewal of the law, since "the Lord has distributed his treasures and mercy throughout the entire earth and every nation". To disregard this radical shift from old law (which Las Casas describes as "rigid and severe") to the new law of love and grace is, according to Las Casas, to open the way for "tyrants and plunderers, to cruel invasion, oppression and enslavement" (1992b: 110). De Vitoria broadly avoids even demeaning to engage with such arguments which he clearly views as preposterous, simply describing the attempt to elevate the Conquistadors to the status of Old Testament prophets as "dangerous" (276).

With regard to the argument proposed by Sepúlveda concerning the universal neighbourly responsibility to protect those who are subject to sacrifice and save the souls of the idolatrous, Las Casas shares with de Vitoria the view that while the Pope has spiritual dominion over the whole world and should be considered the ultimate protector of natural law, he does not have political dominion and thus is not in a position to interfere in those states which have disagreeable laws and customs, even if such customs

should transgress natural law. Yet here it becomes clear that Las Casas's position is more radical than the official church position. He cites the letter of Paul to the Christians of Corinth "Of those who are inside you can surely judge, but of those who are outside (the Church) God is the only judge" (1992b: 63, 1 Cor 5 12-13). This reference to "the outside" is significant, because it suggests the possibility of Amerindian difference even as they are still to be considered neighbours. What Las Casas is suggesting is that while any person who accepts Christ becomes subject to Christian law, to the extent that that person has not yet accepted Christ she is not subject to Christian law, outside the political jurisdiction of Christendom and yet she is still to be considered a neighbour, a fellow of universal humanity. The radicalism of this position is illustrated by the examples given by Las Casas which touch on the most controversial and challenging subjects, including idolatry and human sacrifice. For Sepúlveda, Oviedo and many other of the chroniclers of the Amerindian world(s), these practices marked the very extremity of Indian sinfulness and lack of civilisation, such stories were highly influential in representing the Indian as lacking in reason and deeply barbarous and thus requiring the most severe forms of moral re-education and discipline in the norms of civilisation. Las Casas accepts the Christian view that idolatry is sinful, yet he asks, why is such a practise sinful? All sin derives from the original sin of pride, the putting of the self over God, and idolatry is thus a manifestation of this sin, a putting of idols above God. The sinfulness of idolatry is thus not the mere worship of idols, but rather the purposeful pride in rejecting God, whereas in the Americas idolatry derives only from ignorance (77) and thus should not be considered as sinful. Again, if the Amerindian accepts Christian revelation and then worships idols such activity may then be considered sinful, but while she remains outside of Christendom her activity is not sinful and thus not a justification for war or enslavement.

Perhaps even more provocative, however, for the Spanish audience of the sixteenth century was Las Casas's argument regarding human sacrifice. Firstly, Las Casas accepts Sepúlveda`s propositions that all Christians have a universal responsibility for neighbours who are suffering, including the innocent infants subjected to human sacrifice. However, he questions how this might best be achieved. For Las Casas, putting an end to practices such as human sacrifice cannot be achieved through violent imposition, but only through the preaching of Christian doctrine which will inspire a radical change of cultural values and attitudes. As such if the Christian is to intervene militarily in the name of neighbourly

love then he must also "carefully consider the tumult, sedition, killings, arson, davastation and furor of the goddess of war" (1992b: 188). Such tumult is likely only to lead to an entrenchment of positions, as "when they hear how many people, women and children and aged people of their nations have been killed by Christians in the fury of war", such bloody sacrifices to the goddess of war will result in a "perpetual barrier to their salvation" (191). As such, Las Casas concluded anyone who should seek to free those who suffer evils by means of war is committing mortal sin (192). Furthermore Las Casas offers an even more provocative argument, on the basis that all nations are said to have some conception of God, but that each nation shall differ according to their own ways and customs in the forms in which they worship this God (226-228). Las Casas claims "there is no better way to worship God than by sacrifice" (218). Indeed, it is noted that God had commanded Abraham to sacrifice his only son Isaac (Gen 22:1-19) and even God the Father sacrificed Christ the son for the salvation of mankind and it is thus "not altogether detestable to sacrifice human beings to God" (1992b: 239). Las Casas thus concludes that rather than evidence of absolute sinfulness and opposition to Christianity, the practice of human sacrifice may suggest a basis for Christianisation. Here again, Las Casas acknowledges the Otherness of the Other. Surely he accepts as a Christian that sacrifice of the innocent is a sinful practice, yet he suggests the only way to end such practices is not through domination of the Other, either in the discipline of slavery, of military conquest, but rather through dialogue and rational argument by which the Other may be persuaded to abandon such practices. Again, the common humanity of the Other thus serves as a foundation for some recognition of the Otherness of the Other and thus a prohibition against the violation of her sovereignty. The Other is sovereign for Las Casas not simply because she is a part of universal humanity, but because she is Other than the self and thus not subject to the self.

Finally, in addressing Sepúlveda`s Aristotelian argument for the natural slavishness of the Amerindian peoples, de Vitoria argues that the crucial question was whether the Indians could be described as being so close to brute animals as to have no ability to take possession of their own bodies and thus require possession and direction by others, i.e. the Spaniards, their natural masters. De Vitoria does theoretically accept this formula in the somewhat unlikely case that “some mischance should carry off all the adult barbarians, leaving only the children” (1991: 291) or if the entire population were deemed

incurably insane (248). Yet such absurd hypotheticals notwithstanding, de Vitoria shares the view of the Church that the Indians are not mentally insufficient but are rational like all men (250), as evidenced by the fact they have maintained a certain order, including proper marriages, organised cities, laws, magistrates, industries and commerce (250). From this de Vitoria asserts that there is no evidence to justify the claim that the Indians are naturally slavish in the Aristotelian sense, instead concluding in humanistic terms that “if they seem to be insensate and slow-witted… I put it down mainly to their evil and barbarous education”, adding “even amongst ourselves (in Spain) we see many peasants who are little different from brute animals” (250). Las Casas again develops a broadly similar critique of the claim of natural slavishness, pointing out that long before the arrival of the Spaniards the Indians had successful "political states founded on beneficial laws" (1992b 44). If it is true that the Indians are so incapable, Las Casas asks with his typical vituperative wit, "they say without tutors Indians would not work and would die of starvation, let us ask then, if Spain sent food to the Indians for all those thousands of years people have lived there?" (1971: 82). In contrast to the disreputable and unreliable account of Oviedo, Las Casas offers his own experience against the accusation that the Indians possess neither language nor history (1971: 279-280) by pointing to the rich oral tradition by which the Indians pass on their history over many generations (1971: 279-280). Against the accusation that the Indians are incapable of reason, it is stated that, on the contrary, "they have intelligence… something Gonzalo Fernandez Oviedo lacked entirely" (1971: 280). Having set out his empirical evidence for the rationality of the Amerindian, Las Casas engages in a final attack on the authority of Aristotle himself, "who was ignorant of Christian truth and love". Denouncing this pagan philosopher as anti-Christian, the critique thus concludes "Goodbye Aristotle… Christ seeks souls, not property… he who following Aristotle`s teachings may act like a ferocious executioner… is a despotic master, not a Christian, (but) a son of Satan" (1992b: 39-40).

Las Casas' arguments throughout *the Defense* thus draw a powerful image of the humanity of the Amerindian as both rational and capable of embracing Christian doctrine. In this his position is in continuity with the Papal Bulls of 1493 and 1537. While the official church position had always been that evangelisation could accompany the conquest, Las Casas increasingly comes to a more radical position: evangelisation absolutely cannot happen alongside enslavement and genocide. If the Christian evangelists teach a doctrine

of the love of neighbour and the saviour as a prince of peace who called upon his followers to turn the other cheek, it was not possible that they should sit at dinner with the very same Conquistadors who were growing rich on the exploitation of bodies and the destruction of cities and villages. In part, Las Casas' radicalism developed from his own attempts alongside fellow Dominicans to build alternative utopian communities in which Indian and Spaniard would live as brother and sisters rather than masters and slaves (see Hanke 2002: 72-81). The failure of these experiments led Las Casas to the view that if the original evangelical cause declared in the 1493 Bull was to be achieved, it would require the abandonment of the conquest itself. This radical position signalled the Messianic reading of the city of God suggested in the previous chapter being deployed as a critique of the city of man, a radical affirmation of the community of the love of neighbour in the world being opposed to the love of power and the increasingly racialised system of status which was emerging in the Americas.

The potential of this Messianic use of the Christian tradition to critique the conquest was powerful precisely because it drew on the original legitimacy granted to the conquest from the 1493 and later 1537 Bulls asserting the primacy of the city of God and the evangelical project over and above the city of man and the project of exploitation. What is then significant about the contribution of Francisco de Vitoria was to shift the fundamental source of legitimacy for the conquest from divine law of evangelisation to the natural law of nations. In this shift de Vitoria was thus able to re-contextualise various existent arguments for the conquest onto more secure secular grounds free from the challenges made by Las Casas. As such de Vitoria also begins from a statement of universalism. However, while the Requirement of 1513 had defined universality in Christian terms as the common derivation of humanity from one man and one woman, de Vitoria asserts that prior to the formation of any political community in which manmade laws could be operational there was a single universal human community in which the only law was natural law. Rather then than a foundation in the Christian brotherhood of humanity, de Vitoria`s foundation of all law is the priority of natural law prior to the formation of any distinct political communities. During this pre-political period men were free to sojourn as they so chose across the whole surface of the globe and as such de Vitoria affirms all political communities must incorporate this natural right into their own laws by avoiding any laws which would prevent free sojourn. This, it is claimed, is

recognised by all cultures and societies, for “Amongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and travellers badly” (1991: 278). More radically, de Vitoria affirms “it is an act of war to bar those not considered enemies from entering a city”, and since according to de Vitoria the Indians have no claim to just war against the Spaniards it is not lawful "to bar them from their homeland" (278). Amongst the evidences cited by de Vitoria for this universal principle are various references to Classical narratives of journey, including Virgil`s poetic verse (in De Vitoria 1991: 278):

What men, what monsters, what inhuman race

What laws, what barbarous customs of the place

S*hut up a desert shore to drowning men*

A*nd drive us to the cruel sea again*

The natural right to sojourn is thus established by de Vitoria as the fundamental principle upon which the legitimacy of the conquest is to be grounded. Yet this fundamental principle is also furnished with Christian principles of universal neighbourly love, “which shows that unity between men is part of natural law” (279) prior to geo-political division. As such again de Vitoria affirms “Spaniards are the barbarians neighbours… and the barbarians are obliged to love their neighbours as themselves” (279). The Amerindians are thus on the basis of natural law committed first to allow the Spaniards free sojourn through their territories and moreover to love the Spaniards, to treat them as neighbours. On these foundations certain procedures which had been rejected in their divine law formulation can now be re-habilitated. The Requirement, for example, De Vitoria had concluded it was against natural law of reason to compel someone to accept conversion purely based on assertion, for such compulsion would be to violate the natural law of reason. Yet it would also violate the natural law of reason to refuse to listen and give consideration to what is said (270). As such, while the Amerindians could not be compelled by natural law to accept what was said, they could rightly be compelled to listen and give careful consideration. Additionally the Indians must accept that “the Christians have the right to preach the Gospels in the land of the Barbarians” (284) and allow the conversion of those who wished to be converted. Moreover, while the initial Papal Bulls of donation could not grant political dominion, as the Pope did not possess

political dominion, he did possess spiritual dominion in matters of evangelisation and so could rightfully “entrust the task to them (the Spanish) and deny it to others” (284). For example, Protestants and Muslims could rightfully be barred from entering the Americas for the purposes of evangelisation. Finally and most significant, the natural laws of free sojourn throughout the world and neighbourliness, according to de Vitoria, meant that the Amerindians must accept the rights of Spaniards to engage in trade, "importing the things the Indians lack and may benefit from, and exporting the gold, silver and other commodities which they possess in abundance". Freedom of trade is an absolute law of nature as long as it remains consistent with the equally absolute natural laws of property. As such, de Vitoria claims any good that is held in common (i.e. not private property) should also be shared with strangers. The Indians can therefore not deny the Spaniards rights to hunt, cultivate land, build houses or dig for Gold and Silver, etc. Finally, any good which is newly discovered (i.e. neither private nor public property) shall be distributed in accordance with the natural law that "a thing which does not belong to anyone becomes the property of the first taker" (280). As such, any gold or silver discovered through such activities shall belong to those in control of the discovery (i.e. the owners of the mines, not the miners themselves). De Vitoria thus proceeds to outline the laws of nations, as the right to sojourn freely throughout the whole world, the right to freely proselytise and evangelise, the right to trade and the right to exploit natural resources. To the extent that the Indians attempt to infringe on these natural rights which are prior to and thus superior to any laws of particular nations, they will be violating the natural law of nations and it is for de Vitoria this violation of nature which makes legitimate the waging of war in the Indies. As Anthony Anghie concludes, “Once this framework is established ... the Indians are in violation of universal natural law, ultimately Indians are included in the system only to be disciplined” (1996: 331).

The natural law of nations suggested by de Vitoria thus establishes both European and Amerindian as subject peoples within a totality of natural law which is universal and applied equally, always and everywhere. Just as the Papal Bull of 1493 had called all humanity children of God and thus allowed the Pope authority to grant legitimacy to one branch of the human family (the Spaniards) to embark on a process of evangelical conquest over another branch of the human family (the Amerindians), so also natural law allows those who comply with natural law legitimacy to bring those who do not comply

with natural law back into the law of civilisation. Just as the Requirement demanded the Amerindian accept the sovereignty of the universal church or face physical destruction, so also de Vitoria implies the Amerindian must choose either to accept the sovereignty of universal natural law (including the rights of Spaniards to sojourn through their territories, proselytise, trade and extract their resources) or face physical destruction. The natural law thus takes on the appearance of asserting equality between European and Amerindian, yet its fundamental tenets are absolutely written within the European philosophical and theological tradition. It is a totality into which European and Amerindian appear as partners in dialogue, but in which the terms of the debate are entirely determined through European monologue. The monologue which began with the de-naming of Guanahani and its re-naming as San Salvador thus continues. The Amerindian is invited to enter as an equal within universal humanity to the extent that she accepts her sameness within the totality of European natural law. To the extent that she affirms her difference, to the extent that she goes out of the European totality, she is in violation of universal natural law and thus to be disciplined and ultimately negated in her Otherness.

Conclusion

In the previous chapter I had discussed how the narrative of crusade developed at the end of the eleventh century had established a pattern of mediations across the old Mediterranean world whereby the self projected onto the Other that which was to be overcome in the self, the sinfulness of the world. In this process the placed encounter of self and Other as neighbours was radically negated. Instead of neighbours the relation of self and Other became mediated by the totality of the crusade, the division between friends and enemies of God, by which the self could overcome sinfulness of the worldly not in the self, but through the destruction of the Other. This logic of mediation established a paradigm of displacement throughout the Mediterranean for several centuries by which communities were divided between friends and enemies of God, from the massacres of the Rhineland Jews through the brutal campaigns in the Holy Land and back to Europe in several centuries of religious persecution and inquisition. In this chapter it is then striking that we find a quite different paradigm of displacement, in which the Other is no longer projected as that which the self rejects in the self, no longer negated as

neighbour, but instead is now affirmed as neighbour, fellow member of the universal church, and yet it is upon this very affirmation of sameness that the Other is negated in her Otherness. This is clearly a different paradigm of mediation, yet it is no less violent or destructive of place. To negate the Other as Other is to deny any difference from the self, to affirm the making the Other the same as the self. Thus from the beginning the conquest was a project of the destruction of the Amerindian through the invention of the American, the de-naming and re-naming of islands, the enslavement of bodies, the burning of villages, the clothing and the teaching of the Spanish language. That this logic of mediation in which the Other had no exteriority outside of the project of the self led to the most sadistic and genocidal violences was inevitable, yet also these violences awakened the protests from those who sought to retain the distinction between the evangelical project of the city of God and the exploitative project of the city of man which had been inter-twined since Augustine. The contradictions in the conquest born out of the dual project of evangelisation and exploitation allowed figures such as Montesinos and later Las Casas the possibility to condemn the violent project of domination in favour of a more peaceful project of evangelisation. Las Casas can thus be thought of as speaking from the Messianic tradition of the city of God, the attempt to build a Christian community of love outside of the structures of the city of man. However, it is precisely in response to this critique that de Vitoria is able to affirm a move away from divine law as the basis of conquest towards the natural law of nations This new construct thus again affirms the common humanity of all peoples from an original state of nature, from which emerge universal rights to sojourn, to trade, to property and to proselytise - the Amerindian is thus again subsumed within the totality; in order to be negated in her Otherness, her violation of international law allows for her dispossession. The totalisation of the relation of self and Other at the beginning of the sixteenth century had thus been interpreted theologically and asserted in the Requirement as the universal sovereignty of the Pope over all branches of the human family to grant sovereignty of one branch of that family over another. By the end of the sixteenth century the totalisation of the relation was thus interpreted philosophically as the universal sovereignty of the law of nations over all humanity by which those who observed by that law had legitimate cause to impose order upon those who did not. Yet again the Amerindian was thus affirmed to the extent that she could be integrated within the totality of the same, to the extent that her

difference could be overcome, and negated to the extent that she was Other. Just as with the age of Crusade the possibility of ethical encounter between self and Other in the face to face is thus from the beginning negated in the Americas through the establishment of a fundamental mediation by which the totalising project of the conquest is constructed. This system of mediation has been more or less maintained for the following 500 years[174], as the totality of dispossession and displacement by which all that is Amerindian is to be negated and all that is European is to be affirmed. Self and Other are reduced to a formal equality in their humanity as defined through the categories of European thought and as such in relation to which the Other is always defined as lacking, inferior.

7

The Displacement of Ethics and the Thinking of Global Totalities in Modern Secular Moral Philosophy

Morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself.

(Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals)

There is no ought anymore. Morality to the extent that it was an ought has been destroyed.

(Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human All to Human*)

In the preceding four chapters I have outlined four historical narratives of displacement which I have argued have shaped the development of western international political theory. In chapter 3 I suggested the Messianic going out of the Roman totality of status and honour shaped the ethics of the love of the neighbour in early Christianity. In chapter 4 I argued that the Platonic idealisation of the heroic philosopher involved an overcoming of the worldly achieved through the totalisation of the political in the Republic. In chapter 5 I described how the Platonisation of post-Messianic theology allowed the going out of totality to be thought of in terms of the overcoming of the sinful and how in the discourse of Crusade this was achieved through the projection of the sinfulness of the world onto the Other as enemy of God in opposition to the self as the friend of God. In chapter 6 I described how the idea of self as friends of God mediated the encounter between European and Amerindian as the negation of the Other in her Otherness, the subsumption of the Other under categories of the same and how this ultimately grounded a new natural law totality of the law of nations. In these chapters I have thus suggested a movement away from the original Messianic proximity to the Other, through the totalisation of the Republic, the totalisation of the worldly as sinful and ultimately the shift from divine law to natural law as the basis of international law. In this final chapter I will thus conclude by suggesting that in the eighteenth and nineteenth century this process of secularising distance from the Other was completed in an age of secular doubt through three attempts to re-ground moral action in a fully post-Messianic world. The first of these traditions I refer to as moral sentimentalism[175] for it seeks to understand morality in terms of our emotions and passions. This tradition, I suggest, serves as moral foundation of totalisation as the world market. The second tradition I refer to as moral rationalism for it understands morality in terms of our rational freedom to overcome natural determination and which I will suggest serves as the moral foundation of the totality of international law. The third tradition I refer to as anti-morality which seeks to question the very value of morality in favour of an aesthetic of the beautiful life lived as the

embrace of the will to power and which I suggest serves as moral foundation of the totality of war. In each of these traditions I suggest we find moments of Messianic Proximity to the Other, yet I also suggest these traditions ultimately amount to a final negation of the Other, the subsumption of the Other within a totalising project of the self, and politically the subsumption of places of life into the projects of global totalisation. I thus conclude in modern philosophy we find the completion of the journey away from placed proximity of the face to face with the Other and into the mediations of totality and the side by side.

7.1 Moral Sentimentalism and the Global Market

The move away from divine law as the foundation of political legitimacy, in international law and in the nation state, suggested by the Iberian Scholastic philosophers of the sixteenth century spread rapidly to the northern European Protestants of the seventeenth century. Most important amongst these being the Dutch Scholastic Hugo Grotius whose work systematised and elaborated the principles of the laws of nations set out by de Vitoria. Less acknowledge though perhaps equally significant was the subtle influence this tradition had on the emergent school of British empiricism which developed in the work of Hobbes, Locke and David Hume during the seventeenth and early eighteeenth centuries[176]. Where the Empiricists and particularly Hume were much more radical than the Scholastics, however, was in developing a systemic critique of the metaphysical foundations of divine law. In his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) Hume thus condemns metaphysics as an airy science (1:12) and easy philosophy (1:3) engaged in the suppression of scientific enquiry in favour of popular superstition (1:6), with poetic banalities designed to appeal to the "The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passion" and which therefore "reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian" (3). Yet still more radical he proposes not only an attack on metaphysics, but "carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy" (1:12) by attacking the very epistemological structures by which such theories could be thought. For Hume then, as for Locke before him, all human knowledge comes from experience: there is nothing in consciousness which is prior to experience of it in the world. Hot, cold, wet, dry, light, dark, all simple sensual impressions which Hume suggests can be associated to form more complex impressions or ideas - the idea of water, for example, combines the visual transparency,

the tactile fluidity, a sound when poured on metal. For Hume there are only three fundamental principles of association: 1) contiguity / continuity in space and time, 2) resemblance, and 3) causality. All legitimate knowledge must come from these three principles, which are empirically observable through the senses. To say heating water causes steam is empirically verifiable through the principle of causality; to say the bite of a particular cobra is poisonous through the principle of resemblance; to say the ball will role down hill relies on the principle of continuity. From these most simple principles Hume is thus able to challenge the whole tradition of metaphysics which relies on processes of logical association, for example the ontological argument for the existence of God, which defines God as an infinitely wise and good beyond the limited nature of consciousness. Hume suggests such a construction can be explained purely through the principle of resemblance: "the operation of our own mind and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom" which we have observed in fellow humans (14). Such arguments demonstrate the ability to develop ideas through the association of simple impressions in the empirical world, but they do not demonstrate the existence of anything beyond the idea, any more than the association of the idea of gold and the idea of mountain gives rise to the reality of golden mountains beyond the imagination (13). Even more radical than the questioning of the Scholastic proof of the existence of God is the empiricist questioning of the Cartesian proof for the existence of the self: "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception" (Treatise B1 P4 S6 299). For Hume the self is thus merely a manifestation of the principle of association, whereby "a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (B1 P4 S6 299). What is more, the world of things can also be reduced to precisely these principles of association: "objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are suppos'd to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation" (B1 P4 S6 300). All that can be said to exist with certainty are simple impressions of the world received through the senses which are then associated as ideas in the brain. There is thus for Hume no outside of the empirical world; the earthly world

of experience is all there is. If it cannot be observed sensually it cannot be said to exist other than as an idea drawn from mental associations.

What implications does this empiricist epistemology have then for moral philosophy? Clearly morality cannot be the gift of the creator carved in stone; still more it cannot be a law of nature which can be objectively known through rational calculation. Rather, Hume affirms that morality is "felt rather than judged" (B3 P1 S2 522). Rather than the traditional view of moral philosophers since Socrates that morality involves the restraining influence of reason over the passions, Hume affirms that in matters of morality the passions are the active master, while reason is the passive slave (B2 P3 S3 462). It is the passions which dictate our actions. The role of reason is only ever to obey and serve, by calculating how such dictates are best to be carried out in order to achieve the desired ends. But where, then, do our moral feelings come from? Here again Hume begins from simple sense impressions of pleasure and pain; we pursue the former and avoid the latter. At this point the actor is purely egoisticly motivated by self-love, for as Hume suggests "every person loves himself above any other single person" (B3 P2 S2 539). Yet from this self love emerges the love of others, for "we love company in general", even if this love of others "proceeds only from the relation to ourselves" (B3 P2 S1). It is in this move towards the company of others that there develops the capacity of sympathy by which we experience the association of pain and pleasure in others with our own pain and pleasure. "The sighs of sorrow and mourning… tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuse compassion and uneasiness…. the effects of misery touch us in so lively a manner.. to the extent that we cannot remain indifferent to its causes" (*Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals 1751* C5 P2). To perceive another person of independent wealth and success displaying "an easy and unconstrained postures.. An air of health and vigour is (always) agreeable" (*Enquiry*, C5 P2). To perceive someone in poverty give rise to "disagreeable images of want, penury, hard labour, dirty furniture, coarse or ragged clothes, nauseous meat and distasteful liquor" (*Enquiry* C6, P2). Such impressions give rise to moral feelings. It is good to give help to the poor and the destitute to the extent that such actions ease the disagreeable feelings in favour of the agreeable feelings of benevolence and generosity in the patron. In his description of sympathy, Hume, then, affirms a certain Messianic proximity. It is in coming into company with the Other that the self comes to experience his pleasures and pains as though they were his own. Like the Samaritan who

encounters the battered traveller, the self cannot ignore these feelings, cannot turn away, but is rather overwhelmed. The joy and grief of the Other in proximity persecute the self, demand an ethical response. This sympathy, however, is not for the Other as Other, but rather derived from the principle of association by which the Other`s pains and pleasures are associated with the pains and pleasures of the self. The Other is thus reduced in some sense to the sameness to the self. There is in a certain sense an interiorisation of the Other, while to the extent that the Other is Other than the self, experiences pleasures and pains differently from the self, we might say Hume`s sympathy does not allow for proximity.

If feelings of pain and pleasure, then, explain where moral sentiments come from, what is to explain the nature of moral behaviour? How do we explain the rational servant who obeys the sentimental master? Here Hume moves from the sentimental feelings of sympathy to the more social customary principles of justice. The initial love of self which gave rise to love of others brought together individuals into families and small villages, the cultivation of the land, the establishment of property, the raising of children. The first communities thus formed through the recognition that "by the conjouncture of forces our power is augmented… by mutual succour we are less exposed to fortune and accidents" (*Treaties* B3 P2 S2 537). In coming together the individuals thus recognise the need for the community to establish certain norms of behaviour, for example against murder, or theft, or adultery, norms which will allow the proper functioning of the community and the pleasure of the individuals in that community (B3 P2 S2 544). From this moment the natural morality associated with feelings of pleasure and pain become over-written with civil moral feelings of pride and shame. To be esteemed by one`s fellows is the greatest source of pride, while to be held in contempt is the greatest shame. The artificial civilised forms of pleasure and pain, pride and shame, thus come to overwhelm the natural forms, to the extent that an individual shall even consider it more pleasurable to sacrifice his own life for the good of the community than be considered a coward. Morality thus moves from the senses of pleasures and pains in the individual, to the sympathy for another person, the socialisation of pleasure and pain as pride and shame in a community and ultimately, it is suggested, to universal ideas of moral behaviour. As Hume suggests, we admire qualities of bravery in a warrior even if that be a long dead historical character, or even an enemy soldier who displays bravery and aptitude in battle, where these qualities

are quite evidently contrary to our own individual or collective interest (B3 P2 S1 524). Here again is the significance of the associative principle of resemblance: just as we can perceive a brave soldier as being good for our own society, so also we can sympathetically perceive that a brave soldier is good for another society, even a rival. Moral behaviour is thus for Hume socially determined despite being generated from sentimental feelings within the individual. Ultimately, "everything which contributes to the happiness of society recommends itself directly to our approbation and good will" (*Enquiry* C5 P2).

For Hume, then, our moral activity is entirely mediated through the interiority of the self, through the feelings of pleasure and pain which touch us most deeply. Yet these very feelings are themselves mediated through the totality of the social. We perceive what is good as what is socially approved and what is bad as what is socially disapproved. There is thus no face to face in the proximity of place; all encounters are mediated by the entire social totality. The act of generosity is entirely set within limits of social approbation: to be too generous is scorned as much if not more than not being generous at all. This social abstraction of the moral encounter is illustrated even more clearly by Adam Smith (1759) with his image of the impartial spectator as the psychological mechanism by which the civilised love of social esteem comes to dominate the uncivilised love of personal pleasure. Here Smith affirms that naturally we pursue what is pleasurable and avoid what is painful, however once in a society we come to detach ourselves from our personal desires by abstractly judging all our moral behaviours through the perspective of an impartial observer "who will consider our conduct with the same indifference with which we regard that of other people" (*Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759* 3 1 2-6). Through the perspective of the Spectator we thus regard gratuitous eating as displaying greed, which is socially disapproved of, and as such restrain our appetite. We regard excessive anger as disrupting the peace, and thus restrain our temper. In all activities we socially objectify our own activity through the judgement of an anonymous social abstraction with the question? "what would an impartial spectator consider the correct response in this scenario?" Smith thus, even more explicitly than Hume, affirms that moral activity is not related to any face to face proximity to the Other in place but is the result of the mediation of the entire social totality: ″It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind… It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and

dignity, and superiority of our own characters (*TMS* 3 4 4). Morality is thus profoundly self-referential, always related in the final instance to the socialised pleasure and pain of the individual; it is a manifestation of pride, the honour afforded by an act of generosity or bravery.

What is striking is that it is precisely these thought experiments in moral psychology which lay the groundwork for Smith`s later development of political economy. Here the idea of self-love, which in the form of the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain had been the foundation of moral activity, is now re-conceptualised as self-interest as the foundation of all economic activity. Just as the love of self had given rise through the love of company and the formation of the first basic social relations, so also self-interest gives rise to the first economic relations by which labour is divided within the community (*Wealth* 1 1 2). As with the Platonic Republic, Smith thus suggests that a division of labour develops by which each member of the community is specialised in that activity to which they are best suited. "In every improved society, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing but a manufacturer" (*Wealth* 1 1 4). While Smith shares the ideal of a division of labour with Plato, he perceives no necessity for a philosophical ruler to allocate each task to each member of the community. Rather, the very psychology of socialised self-love will co-ordinate action on the basis of trade, whereby "You give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want… We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love". As such Smith famously affirms that there is no inherent collective rationality in production but merely socialised love of gain. "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interests."(*Wealth* 1 2 2). The pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain understood as self-interest thus serves as the fundamental basis for the formation of nations, bringing together the agrarian production of the countryside with the manufacture of the towns and cities through "the exchange of rude for manufactured produce" (*Wealth* 3 1 1), which allows societies to move from the production of necessities of food and shelter to the civilised products of garments and jewelries as signs of status and honour. Still more, the desire for luxury expands even beyond the established national territories. As trade develops between different nations, each producing those goods to which it is most naturally suited and trading the surplus in exchange for those products which others are most naturally suited.

As such, Smith affirms, there develops a division of labour which is potentially universal in nature and which is "advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into which it is subdivided" (*Wealth* 3 1 1), leading to the maximisation of efficiency and thus "universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people… a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of the society" (*Wealth* 1 1 10).

The logic of self love is thus in Smith`s political economy constantly expanding, bringing together individuals into groups, into communities, bringing together city and countryside, bringing together nations and ultimately subsuming ever more that is outside into itself. What is distinct about Smith, however, is that unlike Plato, the division of labour has no purpose outside of itself. While Plato saw the division of labour as the social mechanism by which the philosopher king could transcend the world towards the truth of Being, for Smith there is no transcendence, no going out in this world or the next. The global market is thus a totality without any beyond. There is no neighbour, no Other; all Others are reduced to their function in relation to the self. The butcher is that function which prepares my meat, the street cleaner is that function which cleans streets, all functions related to the proper functioning of the totality which is the social production of the satisfaction of the desires of the self. While the Christian moral tradition had claimed that pride as the love of self achieved through the subordination of the Other was the father of all sin, for the sentimental moralists pride is the father of all virtue. Morality is thus the self relating to the self through the social abstraction of honour and status. The critique of metaphysics thus gives rise to the radical displacement of a globalised market as totality in which there is no outside, no places of life and no possibility of encounter with the Other. All relations are between parts of the whole: the nurse, the builder, the weaver, the farmer, the call centre operative all related to each other not through the proximity of the face to face, but through the distance of mediation, side by side within the totality of the global totality of the love of self, the totality of pride.

7.2 Moral Rationalism and International Law

The critique of metaphysics launched by David Hume famously awakened Immanuel Kant from his pre-critical "dogmatic slumbers". In the opening pages of the second edition of Kant`s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) he thus affirms with Hume that western philosophy

had fallen into error almost from the beginning, in the moment when "Plato left the world of the senses as setting too narrow limits to the understanding and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas" (B9). For Kant this taking of flight involved a privileging of metaphysics over epistemology out of an all too hasty desire "to complete its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire if the foundations were stable" (B9). Kant thus shares much of Hume`s critique of speculative philosophy which he dismisses as "sophistical art of giving to ignorance…. the appearance of truth" (B86). Yet where Kant differs from Hume is in his conviction that while metaphysics has long been detached from stable foundations, this does not imply a rejection of metaphysics in itself. On the contrary, Kant claims such a rejection is impossible precisely because metaphysical questions are part of our intrinsic existential need to explore that which is beyond us (B21). Rather than attacking metaphysics, Kant thus seeks to set metaphysics within its proper limits, the structures of possible human knowledge. This is the essence of Kant`s proposition of a Copernican revolution in philosophy described in the preface to the 1st Critique. Where hitherto all philosophy from the Platonists to the Empiricists had considered that our understanding must conform to the structure of things in the world, Kant argues we might instead investigate whether it is on the contrary the world of experience which must conform to our own structures of understanding.

The fundamental question of epistemology is then: how can we claim to legitimately know something? For Hume there were two distinct ways of making such claims: 1) through *relations of ideas* where the veracity of the claim is "discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe", (**Enq** 20) for example statements such as *all bachelors are unmarried* require no enquiry or investigation, only definitions of the terms involved. Such claims are absolute, always and everywhere true or false, but for Hume they are largely banal and do not add anything novel to knowledge. For Hume, then, new knowledge can only come from experience, 2) *Matters of fact,* which involve active empirical observation through the senses of *the world out there,* such as the statement *The President Is married* (*Enquiry* 22-*24*), which can be verified for example by observing the President`s marriage certificate. Kant takes these two forms of knowledge and modifies them slightly, *Relations of ideas* he defines as *analytic judgements,* whereby the predicate is internal to the definition of the subject (not being married is internal to the definition of bachelor) and are thus verifiable *a priori* or

prior to experience. Where Hume speaks of *matters of facts*, Kant refers to *Synthetic judgements* whereby the two or more elements are entirely logically independent of each other, there is not "one concept contained in the other" (B12) (for example being married is not a condition of being President). To verify the truth of such a statement thus requires the two or more elements to be *synthesised* together and this is achieved through the common ground of the third element of the empirical observer. Such claims are thus only verifiable *a posteriori* or after experience. What Kant points out, however, is that not all claims fit into these categories as so defined. Indeed, many of the fundamental statements of mathematics and geometry do not fit, for example *"no number is so large that a further unit cannot be added to it"* or "*two parallel lines shall never intersect*". Both of these statements, Kant argues, are knowable to be true a priori to observation. We are never able to empirically verify that there exists no number so large that we cannot add a further unit, or that two parallel lines never intersect, yet they are equally not analytic in the sense of being logically structured as one concept contained within the other. Kant thus claims we must recognise a third category of knowledge a *synthetic a priori*. The crucial question of the entire Kantian epistemological project is then, what, is the common ground upon which elements can be synthesised prior to experience of the world? The answer Kant suggests can only be the very structures of the understanding which allow humans to make sense of the world. The most important of these structures are for Kant the principles of time and space.

Rather than space and time being understood as things out there in the world of experience they are rather the very conditions of experience, "belong(ing) only to the form of the intuitions and therefore to the subjective constitution of our minds, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever" (B38). Kant thus rejects the view of the empiricists that all knowledge comes from experience, because all experience of things requires first of all the intuitions of space and time. We can well imagine space absent of things, but we certainly cannot imagine things in the absence of space (B39). We can imagine time absent of events, but we certainly cannot imagine events in the absence of time. It is then the intuition of space and time as infinite by which we are able to synthesise the two elements in the geometrical statement "two parallel lines shall never intersect" and the mathematical statement "no number is so large that a further unit cannot be added". These types of structure of the understanding

do not determine in any sense the world in itself, but only the possible ways in which we humans are able to know the world within the limits of the "human standpoint" (B42) constituted by the categories of the understanding. The *noumenal* world beyond these categories is the realm of speculative metaphysics. It should thus not be the concern of natural philosophy (the sciences). All that natural philosophy should concern itself with is the world of appearances, with which we humans are meaningfully familiar.

This distinction between a world which is knowable within the structures of the understanding and the world which exists in itself beyond the structures of the understanding is thus crucial for Kant. This can be seen in the critique of the Cartesian self whereby Descartes had claimed that the very activity of subjective reflection allowed immediate access to the objective existence of the self. As Kant acknowledges, if this were indeed the case it would constitute "an unanswerable objection" to the whole 1st Critique (B409), by providing an access point to the *noumenal* world beyond the structures of the understanding. Yet for Kant this claim to move from subjective thought to the objective existence of the self is not proven by Descartes. For example, while it is true that the "I that thinks can be regarded always as subject… it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-subsistent being or substance" (B407). What is more, as Hume had suggested, to have a series of experiences in continuity does not imply the existence of a subject-consciousness "(That) I can be conscious in all my representations does not concern any intuition of the subject, whereby it is given as object, and therefore cannot signify the identity of the person" (B408). Instead, Kant claims that when we reflect on our selfhood we are engaged in a reflection on the very structures of the understanding, what Kant calls the synthetic unity of apperception, by which each person synthesises all the distinct elements of knowledge through the common ground of the I. It is this synthesising principle which is referred to as the transcendental ego - the I which "must accompany all my representations" (B131), *I think, I see a dog, I left the house,* etc. Knowledge of the *noumenal* self beyond the structures of the understanding thus remains in Kant`s terms "undemonstrated and indemonstrable" (B415). Yet this very inability to know the self is for Kant something of a liberation, for were the self knowable as a thing in itself it would be in some sense confined to the world of nature, where the only questions are *what is? what has been* or *what will be*?: "we cannot say in nature that anything ought to be… in nature alone ought has no meaning whatsoever" (B575). Instead Kant affirms

the study of the human must instead situated beyond the limits of natural determination in the sphere of freedom, which is practical philosophy where the question of the ought can be asked. This is then the highest achievement of the 1st Critique: the establishment of the correct sphere of philosophy in which the fundamental questions of morality might be asked - the sphere of human freedom "not bound down to natural conditions" (425) but instead the sphere of the human in which "we should have to regard man, who alone can contain in himself the ultimate end of all this order, as the only creature that is excerpted from it" (B425). The epistemological project of the 1st Critique thus opens again the possibility after the Empiricists to think about our relation in terms of freedom, the freedom of the self and the freedom of the Other outside of the totality of the natural determination by the passions. Our moral reason is thus liberated from its enslavement to the masterly passions.

For Kant, then, while natural philosophy is concerned with the laws of rigid necessity such as those of mathematics or geometry which are by definition unbreakable, the philosophy of moral and political laws is concerned with the law of human freedom which are thus by definition breakable by any individual. Accordingly, the sentimental moralists made a fundamental mistake by reducing moral philosophy to laws of necessity by subordinating reason to the determination of the passions whereby the only moral questions became "in order to be…. (happy, admired, etc.) I ought to… (act generously, etc.)". Such calculations are classified by Kant as *hypothetical imperatives*, where the *ought* describes only the means by which the desired ends shall best be achieved. This is certainly a form of rationality, yet it is much impoverished, concerned only with the achievement of the passions, and to the extent that it interferes with these passions it shall be viewed as a burden upon their satisfaction (Kant 1988 20). As such Kant concludes that this form of moral sentimentalism amounts to a *misology*, a hatred of reason and a love of the irrational passions, which will ultimately negate moral reasoning altogether in favour of a pure self-interest whereby "men… keep closer to the guidance of instinct and do not allow reason much influence at all on their conduct" (20)[177]. By contrast, Kant claims that if we are to understand an action as possessing any moral content we must understand ourselves as un-determined by necessity, un-determined by our passions: we must believe ourselves to be free and autonomous in our rational capacity to make moral decisions. Freedom of moral choice must therefore be the

foundational principle of any moral law, for without freedom of moral choice there can be no morality. This freedom relates not only to the subordinate calculation of means to ends, but to the rational decision about the ends itself, not simply *what we ought to do in order that* but rather more profoundly *what we ought to do*. These fundamental moral questions of ought Kant refers to as *categorical imperatives*, in which the *ought* is not subordinate to some desired ends, but is concerned with the rational reflection on the nature of the good itself. Certainly there are many types of good. We might say charm is a good quality, but charm in a deceiver would be considered bad. We might say strength of conviction is good, but strength of convection in a mistaken endeavour would be considered bad. The only thing which can then be absolutely good for Kant, the only thing to which all other goods must be in some sense directed, is the good will, that human spirit which "simply by virtue of the volition" (18) is committed to the good. The good will is, then, not a thing which can be empirically observed. As Kant suggests, we may well observe a beneficent action (for example an act of generosity) and consider it morally good, yet if the beneficent individual "take(s) delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work…. (such action), however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth" (22-23). Morality for Kant, rather than being understood empirically, must be understood metaphysically as a commitment to "pure duty", to a "nobler purpose" by which the passions are subjected to the rule of the reason (20). While traditional religious metaphysics described this nobler purpose in terms of divine will, Kant as a man of the Enlightenment frames the duty in secular terms - our nobler purpose is our rational capacity to achieve freedom to which we must subordinate our naturally determined passions. It is in making this choice that we enter into the moral law.

This idea of freedom is thus both the starting point and the highest principle of the Categorical Imperative, for it affirms our belief that we as humans are capable of transcending natural and social determination by our ability to make decisions regarding the good. It is this ability for autonomous moral reasoning which distinguishes humanity as possessing unique dignity distinct from all other things in the world. As such Kant affirms the highest principle of the Categorical Imperative. Human beings understood as a species uniquely capable of transcending natural or social determination possess a dignity within their very rational humanity which is to be regarded only ever as an end, the freedom of the will which defines humanity must never be considered only as a means to

an end, but always as an end in itself. This principle of our rational capacities as the foundation of human dignity is thus for Kant an inviolable principle, the "supreme limiting condition" (59) on every person`s freedom of action that we "treat humanity, whether in (our) own person or in that of any other in every case as an end withal, and never as means only" (58). Here Kant approaches something like the Levinasian face-to-face or as it has been in chapter 3 of this thesis the Messianic idea of the encounter with the Other in her Otherness, the Other whose freedom can never be reduced to a means by which to satisfy the project of the self. That the Other is defined by her dignity in the context of her radical freedom would certainly suggest that for Kant this is a fundamental experience which reveals the possibility of goodness in the self. To the extent that the Other commands the self to limitation of its own projects there is a certain commandment with profound resonances of the traveller fallen by the side of the road to Jericho. Yet, Kant does not speak merely of the Other as commanding the discipline of the passions, but also the self. It is equally morally impermissible to treat the self as merely a means to an end and as such the self must affirm the burden of moral responsibility for her own choices. She must not simply accept her moral determinations by her passions, her pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, but must acknowledge that the autonomy of moral action is an end in itself. How then are we to avoid determination by our passions? Here Kant proposes a process of a priori universalisation by which each actor is able to assure the mastery of reason over the passions by asking herself a simple question: *would I be able to will without contradiction that the maxim upon which I intend to proceed be established as a universal law*? (49). Kant offers three examples to illustrate this argument (50-51). In the first scenario a person promises to repay a debt in order to receive a loan while knowing she will be unable to repay; Kant concludes such action is immoral for if all people motivated by such "self-love" made promises they intended not to keep the social convention "of the promise would become impossible". In another example it is asked if a person "reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes" would be permitted to commit suicide in order to relieve that suffering; Kant again affirms such a course of action would be motivated by "self-love" in the pursuit of reducing pain, and that if we all took such drastic measures to avoid discomfort society would collapse. In a final example a person in possession of certain talents which with sufficient cultivation "might make of him a useful man in many respects" opts out of self-love to content himself with playful

pleasures rather than develop his capacities. Kant concludes again that if such activity were universalised and all persons chose to "devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement and the propagation of the species" society would decline into decadence and none should enjoy a life of "comfortable circumstances". What becomes clear from these examples is that Kant does not envision the encounter with the Other as occurring in a place outside of the totality, but on the contrary the encounter with the Other is absolutely mediated by the totality. The responsibility is not as much to the Other in her Otherness but to the universal human community in its totality, the commitment to maintain those universal laws of reason which mediate successful social relations. In this sense there is less proximity to the Other even than suggested by Hume, where at least the proximity of the Other exerted a powerful and irresistible emotional pull in the form of sympathy, even as this was interiorised through the self. By contrast, Kant`s proposal for the mastery of the emotions by reason affirms a profound distance from the Other. The responsibility is a responsibility to the universal community and perhaps even more so a responsibility to reason itself, to which the responsibility to the Other is only ever a subordinate manifestation.

This criticism might be levelled at Kant thus: that the structure of the categorical imperative which begins from the affirmation that all persons (both self and Other) should be treated as ends and never merely as means to ends, gives way to a procedure by which we are all reduced to means to the ends in relation to the wellbeing of society as a totality. Kant, however, seeks to argue that the two formulations 1) the respect for human dignity, and 2) the universalisability of any moral maxim, are brought together within a third formulation referred to as the Kingdom of Ends. This kingdom can be thought of as the Kantian moral utopia, as he suggests "it is certainly only an ideal" in which a community is constituted through a "union of different rational beings in a system of common law" (1988: 62) in which each rational being shall will themselves to be free from determination (either by others or by their own passions) and as they will their own freedom so also they will the freedom of all others. The kingdom of ends thus amounts to the totality of rational beings acting in accordance with the moral laws of reason which they have chosen to obey in order to maintain their own moral freedom. This freedom of each individual is thus always the end goal of the rational social formation and as such there is a harmony between the two previous formulations There are, then, two possible

readings of the Kingdom of Ends. In one reading, we can see a certain parallel with the Messianic interpretation of the city of God, in which the ethical is the invisible community of love which inhabits and potentially subverts the existing structures of pride and the love of honour and status which are all manifestations of self-love. Here the idea of love is re-articulated in Kantian language through the affirmation of the dignity of the Other as an end in herself and as the inviolable limitation on the action of the self. In this reading, the dignity of the Other is defined by her capacity to freedom. That she is understood as free beyond any totality which would reduce her to a means, or any action which when universalised would contradict the will to freedom of the self. In this Messianic reading the Other is the basis of moral critique, by which we might challenge the distortions of reason which reduce Others to means to ends of the self. There is, however, a second reading of the Kingdom of Ends which is much more in continuity with the post-Messianic reading of the city of God. As will be remembered, in this reading Augustine suggested that the going out of the earthly city of man as a totality of sin could only be achieved in the afterlife, at which point the soul would be detached from the sinful body in accordance with the Platonic metaphysics which so influenced Augustine`s Christian cosmology. Clearly, Kant the enlightenment rationalist could not imagine going out into any heavenly paradise. Instead, in this reading, the Kingdom of Ends is read historically as the end point of history, the final achievement of human rationalisation by which human rationality overcomes the distortions and passions associated with the body. In this teleological understanding of the Kingdom of Ends, what is good is the rational overcoming of nature, the overcoming of the passions and needs of the body. Such a going out as overcoming includes the overcoming of the irrational demands of sympathy and compassion, and all the many irrationalities of place. Even the irrationality of love is to be overcome by the self-legislating rational being in relation to her fellow self-legislating rational beings in the universal kingdom of ends.

Each of these readings can find textual support in Kant, but the latter reading has particularly powerful connections with his thinking on teleology as set out in the 3rd Critique, which focuses primarily on aesthetic judgement but also in certain essays on international political theory. The basic idea of teleology is set out in a short essay from 1784 entitled *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent*[178] *in which Kant proposes a fundamental thesis* "All natural capacities of a creature are destined to evolve

completely to their natural end" (1983a: 30). As such for Kant it is a fundamental law of nature and thus a fundamental natural law undergirding human history that humanity has capacities which must be fully developed in order to achieve its final purpose. For Kant the definitive capacity of the human is rationality and as such Kant claims *that the* ascendency of human rationality is not merely an end of humanity but is embedded in the very structure of nature by which there is a teleological directionality towards rational thought. As Kant suggests, it is "willed by nature that man… produces everything that goes beyond the mechanical organisation of his animal existence" (1983a: 31). As such there is "a general progression of freedom" which develops through the ascendency of the reason in the mastery of the passions and the determination of natural necessity. As with Smith before him, in order to illustrate this process Kant turns to the origins of society in another short essay from the 1780s entitled *Speculative Beginnings of Human History* (1786, reproduced in 1983b). Here Kant offers his own story of primordial man and woman, in which there is nothing but instinct, nothing but the passions and the desire for their satisfaction. The desire for hunger, for example, requires the cultivation of basic forms of rational judgement, such as judgement between edible and inedible, and at a more sophisticated level a distinction between what will be nutritious and what will be poisonous, a distinction between good fruit and bad fruit. In making these judgements, Kant suggests, humanity takes its first step towards civilisation by establishing the "ability to choose his own way in life and not be bound like animals" (51). From these primordial judgements unfurls the whole telos of rational civilisation, by which humanity moves from the judgement of simple objects (good fruit and bad fruit) to conceptual judgements: good and bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong. From this point develops "the first hint of man`s formation as a moral creature" (51), a creature capable of choice regarding good and bad. In coming to make these judgements humanity became ever more aware of itself as not merely a part of the natural world of the animals, "which he now no longer regarded as his fellows" (52), but rather as transcending the eternal present of necessity in which all animals are entombed. Instead, humanity now is capable of the management of time, planning for the future, the cultivation of the land, the establishment of agricultural villages, and in these villages developed the first forms of culture, art, entertainment, as well as security and industriousness (56). These achievements of settled life attracted more and more of the nomads to join the nascent villages, not least according to Kant due

to the (slightly less than rational) attraction of the village women who were much more skilled in "the art of giving pleasure… than the filthy desert girls". This, Kant suggests, with uncharacteristic colour, "must have been a powerful temptation" for the desert boys (57). In this original phase, then, natural spaces become political spaces, marked no longer by relations of nature, but by civil agreements of inclusion and exclusion, reciprocity and basic rights. The politicisation of space is thus from the beginning associated with the ascendency of reason over the passions, civilisation over nature.

While humanity initially enters society out of what Kant refers to as an unsocial sociability (1983a), in the very act of entering society he is in some sense making a very conscious decision to "abandon his wild lawless freedom wholly, in order to find all his proper freedom again entire and undiminished, but in the form of a regulated order of dependence, that is, in a civil state regulated by laws of right" (*Science of Right* 1790: 47). The formation of the state as the politicisation of space is not designed, then, merely to protect life, but to achieve freedom, to achieve the overcoming of nature through the civilisation of social behaviour that socialisation brings. There are thus empirically many social constitutions which involve the moving from some form of nature to some form of political community. Yet for Kant there is ultimately only one standard by which each particular constitution must be measured, a universal law which protects each individual's "birthright of freedom". This is thus a fundamental universal human right: "in so far as it can co-exist with the Freedom of all according to a universal Law, it is the one sole original, inborn Right belonging to every man in virtue of his Humanity" (Section C). From the universal human Right to freedom must then develop several further civil Rights and which all correct constitutions must assure: 1) the right of citizens to participate in the formation of the laws by which they shall be governed, 2) the right of citizens to be formally equal before the law, and 3) the right to political independence from the arbitrary will of another. This republican model thus constitutes for Kant the "perfect constitution" (1983a: 36), whereby each member accepts the law by which her freedom of action is constrained by respect for the right to freedom of every other member of the Republic: the animal passions are thus civilised by reason. The formation of the republic does not yet, however, represent the absolute completion of the human telos towards rational freedom from irrational determination, because while the republic assures against the war within, it does not assure against war amongst the various social

formations. As Kant suggests, a world divided amongst different sovereigns, even where these are republics, will not have established rational governance. Still, the law of war will be the law of nations. This is a crucial point as for Kant war represents the most terrifying regression to primordial brutality, "the greatest evil which can oppress civilised peoples" (1988b: 58), not necessarily because of the destruction of life and the imposition of suffering, but more for the fact that war is inherently linked to primordial urges and natural passions and thus opposed to the mastery of reason. On this basis, Kant affirms, "reason absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the right" (1983c: 116) and as "nature irresistibly wills that right should eventually triumph" (1988c: 124), it is the fundamental purpose of human reason to overcome war, to find rational structures by which perpetual peace shall be established through universal international law. To achieve the full universalisation of the ascendency of reason over the passions Kant thus proposes a "union of states" through which will be born "a permanent congress of nations" by which a system of international law should be developed on the foundations of international trade. The same basic unsocial sociability which brought together the barbarians out of the war of all against all into the law of civil freedom within the republic shall thus bring all republics into the civil freedom of international law, for as Kant suggests "the spirit of trade cannot coexist with that of war" and as such "financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble aim of peace" (1988c: 125). While, then, for Smith the relations which emanate from trade are inherently amoral, based on the instrumental rationality of self-interest in the market, for Kant the very relations which develop from trade require all actors to establish rational laws of non-coercion, legal equality, honesty, respect for the property of others, etc. and thus submit self-love to a duty to the nobler purpose of the rational freedom of each individual. The basic natural logic of antagonism establishes norms of reciprocity by which peoples and nations overcome nature and thus "entered into peaceful relations with each other and from this common understanding a community of interest… arose with the most distant peoples" (1988c: 122). Here Kant is in clear continuity with the laws of nations set out by de Vitoria in the sixteenth century. Indeed he recognises the foundational principle of "the common ownership of the earth`s surface" (1988c: 118), for it is in this very common ownership that "the right to the earth`s surface belongs in common to the totality of men (which) makes commerce possible" (118). This common ownership in the

state of nature is thus to be transcended, for Kant as for the imperial scholastics, in the private ownership of rational men who have overcome nature. The process of dispossession of communal property in favour of private property is thus inherent to the civilisation of nature by reason which Kant proposes as the foundational principle of individual freedom to which the whole structure of international law shall be ultimately directed.

In this teleology of rationalisation as the foundation of international law Kant is thus very much in the tradition of Plato whereby the inter-personal places of life are associated with the realm of nature and necessity to be overcome through their subsumption and subordination to the civil spatiality of the political, in which all persons become in Kant`s view universal citizens possessed of fundamental rights to freedom. In his Essay *What is Enlightenment* Kant thus describes again the origins of civilisation whereby having been "freed from nature`s womb" (1988d: 52) early in her development, humanity fell into a long "condition of self-imposed immaturity". In this condition the masses, by which is meant the "greater portion of mankind" including the "entire fairer sex" and the "lowest levels of the races" (1988c: 41) were either too cowardly or lazy to fully embrace their destiny as fully rational beings, content instead to live in nature like small children requiring the guidance of benevolent guardians who set out the commandments of a disciplinarian father. Kant, however, affirms that in this new age of enlightenment a few philosophical heroes, having thrown off the yoke of their own tutelage, are coming to "disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation… (in) every man's vocation for thinking for himself" (1988d: 53). Through this process the higher echelons of humanity are finally coming to overthrow their childish fears and are beginning to take the steps towards a true embrace of their own reason in relation to the full overcoming of nature. The kingdom of ends in this sense is thus the end point of human history, the telos of human rationalisation by which throughout the whole of global space reason overcomes nature, the whole of global space is brought within the totality of international law and the relations of rights between sovereign individuals this process entails. In such a totality there is no placed proximity, because every Other is not related to in her Otherness, but in her sameness as a fellow rational being whose rationality defines her as a citizen of the world, possessing the same rights and responsibilities as the self. To the extent that any Other is beyond the totality, outside of rationalisation in part or in whole, she is to be

brought within the totality, to be rationalised. To the extent that any place exists beyond the totality it is to brought within the spatiality of the totality. Much like the law of nations proposed by de Vitoria in the sixteenth century, the Other is affirmed as human to the extent that she is to be understood as the same as the self, rational, civilised, capable of accepting the natural laws of property, trade, industriousness and above all freedom which reason has revealed as self-evident. To the extent that the Other is not fully rationalised she is outside of the totality and potentially a threat to that totality, a threat which Kant as much as de Vitoria reluctantly acknowledges may justify violence in the cause of civilisation.

7.3 Anti-Morality and War

The two traditions of moral philosophy discussed above represent two distinct attempts in the age of scepticism to shift existent codes of moral behaviour from the religious metaphysical foundations upon which they had been based in the west for fifteen hundred years towards secular humanist foundations. For the most radical exponent of scepticism however, Friedrich Nietzsche, the question was not to re-ground existent moral codes, but to radically re-value all values. As with both Hume and Kant, so also Nietzsche develops his critique of moral philosophy through the lens of epistemology. However, while Hume and Kant both began from the question - *what can we know?* Nietzsche characteristically begins from a very different question - *why do we need to know*? or as he describes it, *where in the world could the drive for truth have come from?* This question was first formulated in an early and unpublished essay entitled *Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,* in which the foundational epistemological moment, the first moment in which "which clever beasts invented knowing", is described as "the most arrogant and mendacious minute of world history". From this moment certain people began to focus less on living and more on knowing. Those who lived life were the strong, the happy, the confident: those who focused on knowing were "weaker, less robust individuals", solemn, reflective and withdrawn, skilled in the arts of "Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back". While the strong focused on living, the weak focused on the invention of words, poetries and metaphors by which to describe, classify and categorise life; their "eyes merely glide over the surface of things and see *forms*". In this process however, the idea of truth was born. What became true was not the things as they were

experienced, the tree which was climbed or the apple which was eaten but the classifications under words within a system of meaning, "a uniformly valid and binding designation" by which the truth was associated with the word while the thing was associated with falsity. In an act of epic forgetfulness humanity came to forget the world as it is, as it was experienced by the happy beasts, and came only to see the world as it had been constructed through language. Indeed, the world as it was lived came to be dismissed as "something not in the least worth striving for". What was valued was the world which could be known, the world of the concepts and metaphors and classifications and categories by which the world had been constructed through the totality of language. In this act of deviousness the weak thus were able to entrap the strong, by luring them from their joyful life of the world into the grey artifice of knowledge, a subjugation of the love of life to the sterile science of knowing, a world of invisible and invented truths which cannot be found and which do not exist in the world of appearances.

In a parallel study from the same period Nietzsche develops this argument though a critical analysis of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872, reproduced 1956a), which shifts from speculative stories of primordial man to a critical discussion of pre-Socratic Greek aesthetics. Nietzsche`s disdain for the esteemed philosophical field of epistemology is thus expressed in his admiration for the marginal field of aesthetics, in which there is less of an obsession with the deep and hidden truths of existence and more of a delight in the profoundly superficial (1974 *Preface* 4), the "beauty of mere appearances" (1956a VI). In this analysis, Nietzsche argues Greek tragedy in its golden age developed through the creative tension between two cosmic-psychological forces, associated with two Greek gods, Dionysius and Apollo. In this construction *Dionysius* is then a representative of the strong and happy barbarians. He is the god of the direct experience of life: the sensual, the natural, the overflowing of boundaries, the god of music, of spontaneity, of drunken intoxication. In the Dionysian spirit there is no distinction between subject and object, self and world, but instead "the individual forgets himself completely" in the experience of primordial oneness with the whole universe: "the animals speak and the earth renders up milk and honey" (1956a: 1). By contrast, the Apollonian force reflects the weak with their desire to give order and form, to categorise. Apollo is thus the god of reflection upon life, the intellectual, the civilised, the theatrical performance, the sculptor, the poet concerned with "the perfection of conditions, in contrast to our imperfect reality" (I). As such Apollo

is associated with individuation and the establishment of a rigid separation between self and world. On Nietzsche`s account it is in the antagonistic relationship of these two cosmic-psychological forces that the tragic emerges as the highest aesthetic form. The *Dionysiac* spirit by which the self is lost in the "ghastly absurdity of existence" (1956a 7) is provided with the structural conditions for the artistic expression of this absurdity through the Apollonian pantheon of gods and goddesses, heroes and villains. While the strong barbarians simply lived life, what elevates the tragic Greeks in Nietzsche`s view is that the inter-twining of Apollonian and Dionysian allowed for an aestheticisation of lived life, an "Apollonian embodiment of Dionysiac insights and powers" by which the "truth of nature" could be formed and intelligibly expressed through the "pretentious lie of civilisation" (8).

The decline of the tragic was, however, signalled when this delicate balance was upset by the appearance of Socrates, whom Nietzsche characterises as "solitary, arrogantly superior", whose claim to be fearless before death captivated the youth of the Hellenic elite with the idea that through a love of knowledge man could overcome fate. In this moment the Apollonian drive towards classification and categorisation became absolutely dominant, violently repressing the Dionysian love of life, play, danger, risk, abandon, in favour of an austere scholarly detachment from life of the "man of theory… (who) no longer dare commit himself to the icy flood of existence… he remains eternally hungry, the critic without strength or joy… who is at bottom a librarian… blinding himself miserably over dusty books and typographical errors" (1956a: 13). The Socratic moment rather than fearlessness before death, is in fact, according to Nietzsche, motivated by a profound fear of the absurdity of death, a fear which is itself expressed in an even more profound fear of life and living. This Socratic influence is captured particularly in the plays of Euripides, which are marked by a shift of focus away from the great and the powerful aristocratic heroes such as Achilles and Odysseus and towards the lives of ordinary people, indeed, even towards women, away from the cool detachment of the tragic hero and towards the complexities of character, psychologically tormented and contradictory yet recognisably human. Above all, however, Euripides's plays suggest a move from self-forgetfulness towards scrutinising self-critique. This is for Nietzsche the greatest distortion and corruption of the tragic form under the influence of Socratic reason, for "whereas in all truly productive men instinct is the strong, affirmative force and reason the dissuader and critic, in Socrates the roles are reversed… truly a monstrosity" (13).

The critique of philosophy suggested by Nietzsche is thus a critique of the totality of knowledge by which the original experience of life as lived is made sterile and rigidified through the detached abstraction and reflective architecture of concepts and words. The process by which the original vivid colours of nature are imprisoned within fixed conceptual and categorical boundaries of language, reduced to a "regular and rigid new world as its prison from its own ephemeral products, the concepts" (*On Truth & Lies*, Sec 1). In this sense Nietzsche proposes a move beyond the philosophical totalisation of knowing the world and a return to the world of experience, against the objectification and classification of the world in favour of the living of the tragic absurdity of existence. Here we might read Nietzsche as proposing some type of Messianic return to place, a return to the immediacy of the experience of the Other outside of the totality of categories and classifications which mediate our relationship to the Other. Indeed, Nietzsche affirms clearly that the philosophical will to knowing is only ever a manifestation of a deeper will to power. As he suggests, though, disguised by the detached philosophical and scientific affectations of the scholar the sole criterion of truth is the feeling of power which derives from its activity (*Will to Power* 1968: 534). The will to knowledge is simply the will "to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require" (1968 515), a will motivated at bottom by a fear of the absurdity of existence. The key question is, then, what does this critique of philosophical detachment from the world as lived mean for how we should live?, in particular how we ought to live in relation to the Other?

Here again, however, Nietzsche characteristically refuses to ask the standard philosophical questions. Rather than the moral question what ought we do?, Nietzsche in his two major works on moral philosophy, *On The Genealogy of Morals* (1887 reproduced 1956b) and *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886 reproduced 1989), begins from the questions, *"Under what circumstances did man construct the value judgements Good and Evil?* and more over "have they thus far benefited or retarded mankind?" (1956b *Preface* III). Here, then, Nietzsche offers a fundamental statement of intent. It is mistaken to view the concepts of good and bad through the lens of the Other, i.e. through the lens of the person to whom the good or bad is done, but instead should be understood through the self. It was for Nietzsche not an affirmation of Others which gave to individuals the status of being good, but rather a self-affirmation by those who considered themselves good. In this period goodness was thus not defined in moral terms of altrusitic deeds i.e. as acts of

beneficence or generosity to the Other, but purely in descriptive terms of self-affirmation by which those of the higher social rank, "the noble, might, highly placed and highly minded… decreed themselves and their actions to be good" (1956b *1st essay* II). For Nietzsche, then, the origin of the distinction between good and bad was a primordial social distinction between those of a noble "dominant temper" the healthy, physically strong, aristocratic, noble, lordly, who sought to assert their distance from those of a the lowly classes whom they called the bad, the poor, the uneducated, the coarse and crude, "all that was base, low-minded and plebeian" (1956b *1st Essay* II). The original concept of good is thus "always noble in the hierarchical class sense" (4), born of an aristocratic class that seeks to separate itself from the lowly. In this earliest stage of morality the good have no sense of obligation to the bad. On the contrary, this is a morality of a masterly caste in which the only duties are to others of the same caste, for the master "honours only whatever he recognises in himself" (260). Yet in this process there emerges amongst some of the aristocrats the fear that contact with the bad might pollute the good. There thus develop certain rituals and laws of cleanliness by which the good hopes to maintain his purity, washing himself, who refused to eat certain foods, prohibiting "sleep(ing) with the unwashed Plebeian women" (*1st essay* VI). In this process there develops a priestly caste within the aristocratic caste which no longer affirms life, but develops a paranoid "anti-sensual metaphysics" by which it puts itself at a distance from life as lived through all manner of laws, rituals, prohibitions and procedures of self-cleansing. The original aristocratic morality affirmed nature, the joy of strength and domination. They harboured no particular hatred toward the weak and diseased any more than the soaring eagle resents the stumbling lamb. On the contrary, the strong delighted in the weak: "we have nothing against these good lambs, in fact we love them, nothing tastes better than a tender lamb" (*1956b 1st Essay* XIII). By contrast, the idea took hold amongst the Priestly caste that to be in contact with the world was to be polluted by the world. As such all worldly practices which were good and natural were to be condemned as impure and thus no longer good, but on the contrary bad, even more, evil. For Nietzsche this priestly mindset is fundamentally associated with the Jews as a "priestly people". As he describes, it is "from the tree trunk of Jewish hatred and vengeance - the deepest and sublimest hatred in human history", that there emerges the fundamental perversion of the good of the nobility, to the extent that "whatever else has been done to damage the powerful and

great seems trivial compared with what the Jews have done" (1956b VII). As such while Socratic philosophy is to be condemned it is clear that the greatest enemies of humanity are the children of Israel, for it is they,

> "the Jews who with frightening consistency dared to invert the Aristocratic value-equation that Good/noble/powerful/ beautiful/happy/favoured of the gods, with the furious vindictiveness of the underprivileged and impotent that only the poor, the powerless are good… the suffering, the sick, the ugly are truly blessed *and you the powerful are on the contrary… the evil… the cursed and the damned*" (*1st essay* VII)

While the aristocratic class of the strong and confident had happily embrace the beautiful absurdity of life, the priestly caste are thus condemned as despisers of life. While the strong had affirmed the natural order, the priestly caste call nature evil and call artificial laws of justice and humanity good. This artifice which grew out of priestly self-loathing and resentment of aristocratic strength, however, took hold amongst the masses: "everything is becoming Judeisised", as Nietzsche describes "the progress of this poison throughout the body of mankind cannot be stayed" (*1st Essay* IX), the Priestly morality has been adopted as the morality of the slave masses. This slave revolt in morals, Nietzsche associates particularly with the emergence of Christianity, whereby "out of the tree trunk of Jewish vengeance grew a branch that was equally unique: a new love… grew out of hatred as the tree`s crown" (*1st essay* VIII). In Christianity the priestly morality of weakness took hold amongst the masses, the "cowardly…weaklings" (XIV), the "oppressed", the "vermin full of hatred" (XIII). While masterly morality had been a self-affirmation of strength and action, the morality of the slaves is an affirmation of impotence and incapacity: "we weak ones are in fact weak, it is a good thing that we do nothing for which we are not strong enough". Therefore "Let us unlike the evil ones, let us be good… do no violence, not attack or retaliate" (XIII). In Christianity, weakness became holy, impotence is made sacred, all absurdity in the world is denied thorough promises of divine justice by which the meek shall inherit the earth, the peace-makers shall be blessed, while the rich and the powerful shall be punished for their pride and arrogance. Such a narrative feeds directly into the bitter resentment of the masses: "men incapable of wielding weapons (sword or pen)… (for them) servility assumes the appearance of a virtue

and astonishingly even becomes beautified" (1989: 115). As such Nietzsche refers to Christianity, above all other traditions, as "the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct for revenge…. I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind" (1968b: 62)

In Christianity, then, morality shifts from the affirmation of the good character of the self, to a focus on the Other to whom good deeds are done. Morality to be defined by acts of goodness to Others, rather than assertions of the goodness of the self. Yet while this shift is perfected in Christianity, it survives the death of Christian metaphysics in various forms. As Nietzsche declares, even after God has been declared dead in the age of scepticism, "his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave - a tremendous, gruesome shadow…. - And we- we still have to vanquish his shadow also" (1974). Amongst these shadows Nietzsche includes almost all political traditions emanating from the Enlightenment: democracy, liberalism, socialism, science are all dismissed as merely secularised echoes of the same "Theologian`s instinct" (1968b: 9), which seeks to implement ideas of justice and equality against the grain of natural absurdity and hierarchy. It is precisely because modern philosophers continue to philosophise in "traditional religious habits" (1968: 110) that they arrive at moral philosophies which closely resemble or mimic the fundamental "metaphysical needs" of traditional Christian dogma. This is certainly true of Kant`s categorical imperative, which Nietzsche characterises as a rationalised Christian ethics with its talk of duty and human dignity. Such moral systems may appear benign, as "a nice naïve idea… assum(ing) a general harmony… according to innate laws of melioration" (1989: 25). Yet for Nietzche this spirit of melioration is yet another form of self-loathing, self-disciplining, self-denying, life-despising slave morality which "reeks of blood and torture…. even in Kant, whose categorical imperative smacks of cruelty" (1956b *2nd Essay* VI). Nietzsche is even more contemptuous of the British utilitarians whom he dismisses as a tribe of "ponderous conscience stricken herd animals", the product of "a mediocre species of men", whose fascination with the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to be considered little more than mere "comfort and fashion" (1989: 228, 1956b *2nd Essay* III). Against those sentimentalists such as Hume and Smith, who had argued that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain gives rise to feelings of sympathy and compassion for the sufferings of others, Nietzsche contends that on the contrary "to behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater

pleasure… there is no feast without cruelty… punishment too has its festive features" (1956b *2nd essay* VI).

What then is clear from Nietzsche`s critique of existent moral systems is that all moralities which impose limitations on the activity of the self through some appeal to a responsibility to the Other are derivations of slave morality, a morality which is artificial and opposed to nature. These limitations are thus anti-vital - the feeling of strength enjoyed in the self when overcoming another, slave morality suppresses this joy of strength. In the name of hidden moral laws, the Commandments of Moses, the love of the Christians, the "nobler purpose" of Kant or the "civilised pleasures" of Hume all serve to deny what is most remarkable in the human spirit, for Nietzsche the experience of power. Here again is the distinction between appearance and hidden truth, Dionysian and Apollonian, for what is most natural to we humans, Nietzsche affirms, is the superficial, "the pleasure in his own superiority (which) can be discovered only in the suffering of another" (1996: 103), while what is most artificial is the "moralistic drivel (which) has alienated man from his natural instincts" in favour of some hidden moral laws. As Nietzsche describes, "in the days when people were unashamed of their cruelty life was a good deal more enjoyable" (1956b VII). As such Nietzsche does not propose a deep, fundamental morality by which the good life is to be lived, but rather an aesthetic outline. Clearly the life of the old aristocratic masters is no longer achievable, the civilisation of the world has denied us of the joys of savagery forever. Yet that Dionysiac savage impulse remains latent, the joy in power remains within. What Nietzsche thus proposes is something akin to the tragic aesthetic, to civilise the barbarian by providing it with form, just as the Apollonian plastic arts allowed for the expression of Dionysiac experiences. In this sense life becomes a work of self-creation. To live is to be an artist engaged in the creation of her life as a work of art. In order to "make things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us" we become "the poets of our life" (1974: 229). We become simultaneously the artist, the medium and the spectator by which the art of nature is expressed in the living of a beautiful life. To live the beautiful life is thus profoundly superficial, performed neither for our betterment nor for our education, and it is in this very superficiality that "we derive such dignity as we possess from our status as art works, only as an aesthetic can the world be justified to all eternity" (1956a V). The post-moral self-creation of the life of the self performed for the self is however in Nietzsche`s view an

act of radical self-forgetting. It is an act of the abandonment of self to fate in order "To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion *who* one is" (Ecce Homo, *Clever* 7). In the life lived beautifully, Dionyaian self-affirmation is thus civilised through Apollonian reflection as tragic self-creation. The self is thus dissipated in multiple relations of the self to the self through the medium of the self: "he is at once subject and object, poet, actor and audience" (1956a V). All that is lacking in the living of the beautiful life, all that is radically absent, is any trace of responsibility to the Other. If Nietzsche`s critique of morality thus gives rise to the post-moral aesthetic affirmation of the good life as a beautiful life, by which the self relates to the self through the medium of the self within a cosmic forgetfulness of the self, the final question then must be what does this post-moral aesthetic mean for international politics?

Here there is a good deal of ambiguity, as Nietzsche never wrote a sustained work of political philosophy: his political comments are scattered throughout works on other areas of philosophy and are never systematic in nature. What is more, the political uses and misues of Nietzsche`s thought in the years after his death have served to complicate any political reading of his thought. Perhaps unsurprisingly for the radically anti-Christian Nietzsche, the great model of the political is the Pagan Roman Empire, which he claims composed "the strongest and the most noble people who ever lived", built upon "the absolute supremacy of aristocratic values" (1956b *1st essay* XVI). What is to be particularly admired about the Roman aristocracy is their unapologetic embrace of what Nietzsche refers to as the *will to power*, the will to strength, the will to subjugate and dominate, the will to overcome. The concept of the will to power has a foundational status in Nietzschean thought, composing both a psychological drive or instinct by which "a living thing seeks above all to discharge itself" (1989: 13), an intrinsic desire of "striv(ing) after a maximal feeling of power" (1968: 689). Yet the concept also expresses something much deeper, the very self-forgetting by which Nietzsche described the abandonment to fate, the abandonment of both heroic Hector and heroic Achilles to the force of war, the Heraclitean fire of antagonism and tension by which life flickers and is blown out like a flame in the night. This Heraclitean resonance is particularly strong in Nietzsche`s description of the will to power as "a monster of energy, without beginning, without end", constituted by a complex "play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of

forces" (1968: 1067). Another Heraclitean resonance is the Dionysian focus on superficiality and appearance over hidden fundamental laws. The will to power is not a hidden law, but the very experience of existence on the surface: "my Dionysian world of the eternally self- creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world…. “beyond good and evil,” without goal". In this Dionysian sense the entire cosmos is will to power "and nothing besides". Even more "you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides" (*1968:* 1067). It is not then that we humans possess a psychological will to power, but that we express psychologically the will to power of the cosmos. The will to power is the cosmic constellation of becoming which brings all into and out of existence. From the intimate ideas of the mind to the movements of oceans and planets the only question is the balance of superiority and inferiority between power and resistance (1968: 634).

To live the beautiful life is thus above all for Nietzsche to embrace the tragic absurdity of the will to power, to abandon the self to the will to power, to express the will to power without artifice of reason or claims to truth or justice, simply to live the tragedy in its profound superficiality. Here, then, Nietzsche finally affirms his view of what is good and bad. "What is good?-All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad?-All that proceeds from weakness" (1968b: L2). The person living the will to power as an act of tragic self creation Nietzsche designates with the German word *Übermensch,* variously translated as *beyond man*, *superman* or *Overman*. Whatever the translation, the word has recognisable connotations of Nietzschean themes of Dionysian excess, tragic self-forgetfulness, aristocratic indifference and heroic strength of character, the "overcoming of man" (1969 *prologue* 3), a being which transcends humanity as the highest and ultimate "meaning of existence" (*prologue* 7). The life of the *Übermensch* is his masterpiece - "The man in this condition transforms things until they mirror his power until they are reflections of his perfection. This compulsion to transform into the perfect is art" (1968a, *Expeditions* 9). What, then, is opposed to the expression of the radical life will to power of the *Ubermensch* are the sterile laws and norms of civilisation which negate his freedom of self creation. All such laws are for Nietzsche laws of artifice against nature, laws of the weak against the strong. As he affirms in *The Will to Power*,

> "No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise…. from the biological point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power…. which is to create greater power constellations" (1956b *2nd Essay* XI)

The only way to escape the sterile laws and constrictive norms of civilisation which bind the Übermensch from the affirmation of his radical life will to power is, then, in war. Here again is the influence of Heraclitus, for whom war is the father of all. So also for Nietzsche it is in war that the strong separate themselves from the weak. Here Nietzsche engages in some of his most romanticised imagery to describe "war as a training in freedom… that will to self-responsibility…. that one is ready to sacrifice men to one`s cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means the manly instincts that delight in war have gained mastery" (1968a *Expeditions* 38). Such *manly* instincts are radically opposed to the simple delights of the placed life, the hot baths described by Simone Weil, enjoyed according to Nietzsche "by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and democrats". "The free man is a warrior", a destroyer of places of life (1968a *Expeditions* 38). War for Nietzsche is thus understood in a tragic fashion as a beautiful celebration of the will to power, "a festival for the Gods… a festival for the Poets" (1956b *2nd Essay* VII), an aesthetic spectacle of heroic action, destruction, chaotic slaughter, rape, enslavement, the full human drama viewed with disinterested amusement. It is then, above all in war, that the old barbarian Dionysian birds of prey which lurk within the hearts of all the noble races (the Germans, Japanese, Romans, Arabians, Homeric heroes and Scandinavian Vikings), in their "headstrong, incalculable, absurd, sudden… utter indifference to safety, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty" (1956b *1st Essay* XI) are provided with Apollonian form, by which the barbarity of violence can give rise to self-creation of heroic legends. This process thus allows the "spiritualising and intensifying of cruelty" (1989: 229), the making of war into an aesthetic spectacle of the heroes. Nietzsche thus calls for war as a rebellion against the morality of servility, against the tepid liberalism, socialism, democracy and conservatism of modern Europe, in favour of an affirmation of nature, of tragedy, the self-creation of great men through the will to power which subordinates whole worlds to the projects of the self. Here Nietzsche takes the political exemplar of the *Übermensch* to be Napoleon, as the very "embodiment of the noble idea" (1956b *1st*

Essay XVI), a man who forged his image upon the continent of Europe in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche affirms that in the century to come Europe must again

> *"acquire one will, by means of a new caste to rule over the continent, a persistent dreadful will of its own, that can see its aims thousands of years ahead… (that) its petty-statism and its dyanstic as well as its democratic many-willed-ness might finally be brought to a close. The time for petty politics is past; the next century will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world, the compulsion to great politics" (1989: 208).*

The Nietzschean post-moral aesthetic of the self creation of the self performed for the pleasure of the self is thus manifested in Nietzschean politics as the subjugation of the entire world to these projects of self-creation by which the world is compelled to mirror the will. In the Nietzschean post-moral aesthetic there is no moral responsibility before the Other and this is expressed in the Nietzschean political imaginary in the affirmation of the singular persistent and dreadful will of great men, compelled to great politics in the overcoming of "democratic many-willed-ness". This is then the most radical totalisation we have encountered thus far, for it affirms no role for the Other in the construction of the good. On the contrary, it is a rebellion against any morality which derives an idea of the good in relation to the good of the Other. The good life as an aesthetic beautiful life is not defined for Nietzsche in relation to the Other but in the relation of the self as artist through the self as medium to the self as audience. The logic of displacement for Hume and Smith was brought about by the expansionary logic of the market which came to mediate all relations through self interest. For Kant it was in the logic of the telos of rationalisation which mediated all relations through the sovereign individual. For Nietzsche the logic of displacement is the logic of war, or perhaps more accurately the expansionary logic of power which seeks always to prove itself through the overcoming of that which resists. The totality of war is for Nietzsche the "training in freedom", by which the strong may be liberated from the morality of the weak and come to embrace their own vitality. Yet this same activity is also of course that which subjugates and destroys life on an unimaginable scale. The beautiful life of the heroic warrior is created through ugly, cruel violence suffered overwhelmingly by the weak and vulnerable. For Nietzsche the post-moral aesthetic assures that the only perspective on the self is the perspective from

the self. It is the world as the mirror of his power which thus reflects the image of the self back to the self as the self wills it - the great heroic warrior, the man of action, the *Ubermensch*. When we move beyond the mirror and look at this figure from the perspective of the Other, the victims, we will however see this reflection only as an illusion. We perceive instead the true figure as indeed tragic, but still more pathetic, not a beautiful life but a life of self-delusion, a life lived in the cruel solitude of narcissism, the life lived without Others.

Conclusion

The age of enlightenment, which is also known sometimes as the age of disenchantment, is then marked by the crisis of religious metaphysics which had grounded the philosophy of morality for fifteen hundred years. The fundamental questions for the thinkers of this age were thus how to engage with morality without the metaphysical foundations of a divine judge, or without any idea of an eternal soul. If these foundations could no longer be relied on to ground moral behaviour, what could? Or indeed, should morality be abandoned altogether? In discussing the responses to this crisis I have suggested three broad strategies: moral sentimentalism, moral rationalism and the post-moral aesthetic. In each section I have sought to draw out both fragments of Messianic disruption, but also the broader political projects of totalisation which I have argued these new philosophies have laid the ground for. In the first section I thus described how the empiricist critique of rationalism came to foreground the emotions as the basis of morality and how these emotions became civilised in community as pride and shame. In this tradition, then, I argued there is a Messianic fragment in the feelings of sympathy the self feels when brought into the proximal presence of the Other, feelings which are overwhelming and irresistible, commanding a response. However, in the social mediation of the sentiments I argued, Hume ultimately affirms that moral action is determined in relation to the self, through the objective calculation of social approbation by which the pursuit of esteem and the avoidance of disdain shall be achieved, most elegantly described in Smith`s account of the "impartial spectator in the breast". Morality thus became a socially mediated form of self-love which set the ground for the self-interest of the world market, whereby all relations were mediated through the totality of the market mechanism and thus there could be no places of proximity in which the self could truly encounter the Other. Kant in

his rationalist critique of empiricism, by contrast, affirmed that in order to speak of morality it was necessary to move from the laws of nature and determination to the law of freedom and autonomy. Here again the foundation could be called in some sense Messianic. The affirmation of the unique dignity of humanity which must be treated always as an end and never as a means. Yet again, as this moral system develops it becomes clear that the relation with the Other is not direct but mediated by the rational abstraction of the universalisability of any moral maxim and thus the negation of any possibility of an un-mediated face to face encounter with the Other. I therefore suggested this affirmation of civilisation over nature allowed for a historical teleology of rationalisation by which the all relations between self and Other became mediated by the idea of the sovereign individual as the cornerstone of international law. In this teleology of totalisation we find displacement as the negation of collective rights and communal property regimes, etc. and ultimately the negation of the Otherness of the Other to the extent that she fails to conform to the model of rational subjectivity within the totality. Finally, I turned to Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom the critique of epistemology involved a radical rejection of the privileging of abstract truths, including moral truths beyond the world of appearances. Even here, I suggested, we can find Messianic fragments in Nietzsche, in the affirmation of the worldly rather than the abstract truth beyond. However, as I argued, for Nietzsche this is not an affirmation of the worldly Other. On the contrary, Nietzsche rejects the "slave morality" which relates the good life to the Other to whom the good is done. Instead Nietzsche proposes a post-moral aesthetic by which the good life is the beautiful life, the life lived as a work of art, in which the self is simultaneously artist, medium and spectator. The foundations of the good life is thus the relation of the self through the self to the self. I thus concluded this aesthetic amounts to the most profound totalisation of the world, the negation of the Other through the projects of great men expressing the will to power of war, the total destruction of places of life and the destruction of life itself, the ultimate totalisation of murder.

In analysing these three post-metaphysical traditions I have thus concluded that in the age of secularisation loss of the absolute Other also heralds the loss of any relationship to the Other in the world as the foundation of moral behaviour. While religious metaphysics had been built upon the conception of the absolute Other as that which was beyond being, beyond knowing, secular thought is incapable of thinking that which is beyond. As

such the worldly Other is almost as far from the self as the absolute Other. For Hume and Smith morality thus becomes founded in the social mediation of the sentiments of the self, the self love of self interest and the world market; for Kant morality becomes founded in the rational abstraction of the sovereign individual and the structures of international law; and for Nietzsche morality is abandoned in favour of the aesthetic self-creation of the beautiful life and the project of war. In these traditions there can thus be no encounter with the Other in proximity of place, because all that is beyond the totality is incomprehensible, all encounters must be within the totality. The totality of mediations of the market, of international law, of the logic of the will to power in war - moral activity for the philosopher of enlightenment takes place very far from hot baths, at a distance from place and at a terrible distance from the Other.

Conclusions

In beginning this dissertation I suggested there are many forms of physical displacement in our contemporary world, from the refugee fleeing war and the migrant escaping poverty to the economic decline of great cities and the social breakdown of local community solidarities. As I suggested, each of these experiences is unique and singular in their causes and dynamics, each requires specific forms of analysis. However, what is clear is that these experiences of loss and estrangement from place in their many forms are no longer phenomena only at the margins of the political, no longer an exceptional experience but more and more a permanent feature of the global system. Moreover, today these dynamics of physical displacement are increasingly coming into contact, creating new tensions as political projects seek to articulate feelings of precariousness and uncertainty in ways which generate fear and suspicion of others, giving rise to new logics

of displacement. In the introduction to thie thesis I thus suggested that alongside the contemporary social, political and economic crises engulfing Europe we might also speak of an ethical crisis of indifference to the sufferings of Others, a turning away from the Other, particularly the most vulnerable. The experience of displacement is thus of profound significance for international politics and yet there has been relatively little engagement with this experience in mainstream and even critical international theory scholarship. For the mainstream realists displacement has been dealt with predominantly through the lens of security, for mainstream liberals it has been addressed primarily through the lens of global governance. For the mainstream theories displacement is thus a problem to be solved. For critical theory it is instead a potential source of political transformation beyond the old boundaries of the nation state. For those such as Linklater and Benhabib, following in the Frankfurt tradition of Habermas, this involves the establishment of universalistic moral communities. For those following in the postmodern tradition, such as Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri and Agamben, this involves the transgression of modern disciplinary subjectivities in favour of nomadic flows. Each of these critical analyses suggest important political possibilities for emancipation, yet I have suggested they do not sufficiently engage with the experience of displacement as loss and estrangement. Perhaps because of this there is no real critical appraisal of displacement as a fundamental phenomenon of global politics, not an emancipatory dynamic of transformation but a systemic logic of disruption and disarticulation. The aim of this thesis was then to explore what is meant by this word displacement by developing a Levinasian - inspired phenomenological and ethical account of the experience of displacement by which I suggested we are drawn out of meaningful proximity to the Other. In the following chapters I have thus deployed this ethical understanding of displacement to analyse four paradigmatic narratives of displacement within the western philosophical tradition. Here I have described two broad patterns. In the dominant tradition the political is constituted through the going out of proximity to the Other via various logics of mediation within various totalities in order to achieve the transcendence of simple life. Throughout I have also attempted to suggest a fragmentary and discontinuous tradition from below of Messianic politics in which proximity to the Other is the condition for the transcendence or going out of the totality. In this conclusion I will first summarise the dissertation chapter by chapter and the argument as it has been

developed. Following this, I will outline how the four paradigmatic narratives of displacement are manifested in contemporary processes and dynamics of physical displacement and how these are related to the systemic production of displacement in global politics. I then discuss how the dominant tradition of western political philosophy has involved the subordination of the placed encounter with the Other to the spatial totalisation of the political and how this is relevant for contemporary international political theory. Finally, I intimate towards the possibility of thinking the international political differently by grounding a systemic critique of displacement on the ethical foundations of the encounter with the Other as it is lived in the placed and the everyday.

In order to begin to understand the phenomenon of displacement I began by seeking to understand what it means to be placed, drawing on the phenomenological tradition and in particular the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here I argued that first of all we are placed in the materiality of our bodies through which we are invited towards meaning by the world, the eyes invited to focus, the hands invited to grasp, the feet invited to kick. Through these invitations the body is gradually unified, formed as subjectivity, as self, as I. Yet drawing on the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Franz Fanon, I suggested it is also in the materiality of our bodies that we are made objects in the world, gendered and racialised as meanings defined by social structures beyond us. Following suggestions in both Beauvoir and Fanon, I argued it is only in our capacity to love that we are able to escape this objectification, to affirm our subjectivity as committing to love the Other. In developing this argument I followed Emmanuel Levinas, for whom the most profound invitation to meaning is that offered by the Other: the invitation not to focus or grasp or kick, but the invitation to moral goodness, the invitation to generosity, to kindness, to compassion, to charity. I thus concluded we become truly placed in ethical proximity before the Other. This ethical placedness Levinas describes as the face to face. However, opposed to this placedness is the logic of totality which brings all persons into relations of mediation within the project of the totality, relations no longer in the inter-subjectivity of the face to face but in the objectivity of the side by side. The phenomenon of description of displacement I have proposed can thus be described as the experience by which the meaningful inter-subjective encounter with the Other as Other gives way to the imposition of objective meanings on self and Other as parts within a whole, the relation between people/selves is mediated by the project of the totality itself. In order to explore

this phenomenon of displacement I thus proposed a "Messianic History", following the model set out by Walter Benjamin, of four paradigmatic historical narratives of displacement which have played a fundamental role in the development of the western political philosophical tradition. This historical method, rather than the traditional linear or progressive account, is by definition fragmentary and episodic, not a history as such but a construction by which we are able to engage critically in the present. These four narratives I have chosen thus allowed for a schematic analysis of certain fundamental logics of displacement within global politics, but also in combination allowed an analysis of the way in which the dominant western tradition has legitimised displacement through the philosophical totalisation of the political.

The first narrative of displacement I discussed was then that of the Exodus of the Hebrews out of Egypt. Here I suggested we found the first mediation of self and Other as the distinction between Egyptian and Hebrew with the Pharaonic totality and the first experience of displacement by which the Hebrews were subjugated and eventually went out into the wilderness. Yet we also find in this narrative the first examples of the proximity of the placed giving rise to resistances to the mediations of totality within politicised space, first in the defiance of the Hebrew Midwives Puah and Shiprah and then in the Daughters of Pharaoh who heard the cries of infant Moses and responded with compassion. I then argued this foundational narrative of displacement as Exodus shaped Messianic Christianity as a new age of going out of totality, no longer a physical going out, but a revolutionary going out of the Romanic imperial totality of status which mediated all social relations. This Messianic moment thus involved the going out of totality into the proximity of the Other, the poor, the disabled, the socially despised. This proximity was described both in the Sermon on the Mount and the Parable of the Good Samaritan as the love of the neighbour. This proximity to the Other was thus of a transcendent nature, as it was suggested to be in proximity to the Other was akin to being in proximity to God: "as ye have done it onto one of the least of these my brethren, so ye have done it onto me" (Matt 25:40).

Having outlined the foundational Semitic narrative of displacement in chapter three, in chapter four I turned to the foundational Hellenic narrative surrounding the long siege of Troy as outlined in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Here I suggested we have a very different

perspective, no longer from the lowly displaced slaves, but the aristocratic displacers, not a going out into the wilderness, but a going out into the world, across the sea to overcome the Other and restore the honour of the self. This is a narrative which, as Simone Weil suggests, takes place *far from hot baths,* on the field of war in which husbands and sons become lifeless bodies dragged in the dirt; women become war prizes looted as booty. This narrative of overcoming the simple life of the worldly, I argued, can be found also in Hellenic philosophy, particularly in Platonic epistemology where the ideal of the heroic philosopher involves the overcoming of the worldly temptations and corruptions of the bodily in order to return home to the paradise of the pure forms. For Plato, transcendence is thus to be achieved not through proximity to the Other (particularly not the lowly) but through turning away from the worldly. In the Republic this involves the social totalisation of the political whereby all social relations are mediated towards the project of transcendence of the philosopher kings. Displacement is thus inherent in this Hellenic narrative whereby to achieve transcendence it is necessary to turn away from the worldly Other in order to turn towards the eternal truth of Being.

At this point there are thus two narratives, the Messianic whereby transcendence is achieved through proximity to the Other as the going out of totality, and the Heroic whereby transcendence is achieved by going out of worldly proximity to the Other through totalisation in order to achieve proximity to the truth of Being. In chapter five, however, I argued that in the development of post-Messianic theology these two narratives become synthesised. This synthesis can be seen initially in the letters of Paul in which the Christians are advised to endure earthly social mediations in the body and the world, for they shall be overcome in the soul and in the heavenly. In developing this analysis, I suggested two readings of Augustinian theology, the first Messianic, the second post-Messianic. In the Messianic reading, in continuity with the teaching of the Messianic Christ, we find the radical critique of the love of power born of the murder of Abel by his brother Cain which constitutes the Roman Empire as a totality of sin. The city of God, by contrast, is the love of the neighbour, the community of love outside of political power which might serve as the basis for a new type of worldly community. In the post-Messianic reading, however, the totality of sin is not merely the political, but the worldly. The sinfulness of Adam is passed down through the generations to the extent that there is no going out of the totality in the worldly, but only through divine grace. As such earthly

political structures have a legitimacy as a punishment for our sinful nature. I thus suggested this post-Messianic model of transcendence as going out of the worldly totality of sin through the patronage of God allowed for a new narrative of displacement as Crusade. Focusing on the discourse of Pope Urban, I argued that the logic of the Crusade involved a transference by which the Other was constructed no longer as neighbour, but as the enemy of God who had defiled the honour of Christ. The self thus projected all that was to be rejected into the self in order that the sinfulness of the world could be overcome not in the self, but through the overcoming of the Other. This logic of mediation between friends and enemies of God swept through the Mediterranean world for several centuries, tearing apart communities from the first pogroms against the Jews of the Rhineland in 1096 through the waves of persecution against Christian heretics and ultimately on to the Inquisition and beyond.

The age of Crusade thus involved the negation of the Other as neighbour, the projection of Other as purely Other, all that the self rejected in the self. By contrast, the final narrative of displacement I discussed involved the negation of the Amerindian Other in her Otherness. The Other was not to be destroyed as Other but rather to be made the servant of the same, brought within the totality of European colonial project. In the early days of the Conquest, this project was brought about by the dual project of subjugation and evangelisation as laid out in the Requirement, whereby the Amerindians were informed if they did not accept the rule of Rome and Castile "(we) shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can… and we protest that the deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault". The negation of the Other in her Otherness allowed for the most systemic displacement in history, the destruction of all that was outside of the colonial project: multiple civilisations, cultures, communities, peoples, traditions of learning, languages destroyed. Here also we see the tension between the Messianic and post-Messianic, particularly in the protests of Montesinos and Las Casas, for whom the colonial project of the city of Man must be subordinate to the evangelical project of the city of God. These criticisms, however, ultimately led to the abandonment of the evangelical legitimisation of the conquest in favour of the natural law model of the laws of nations as developed by Francisco de Vitoria. Yet, here again, the Amerindian Other was only brought into the totality of the human family in order to be disciplined and subjugated for her Otherness in relation to the universal laws of nature. As Enrique Dussel

has suggested, much like the Requirement, if the Amerindian accepted the affirmation of universal law she would be afforded some protection; to the extent that she refused the rules of universal natural law as proclaimed by the European she would be in violation and thus responsible for her own misfortunes.

Here then we have moved from post-Messianic theology to natural law philosophy as the basis of thinking about global politics in the sixteenth century. This shift was part of a broader crisis of religious metaphysics which culminated in the age of Enlightenment. In chapter seven I thus discussed three attempts to respond to this crisis of metaphysics through models of international politics built on non-Christian understandings of the good life. In the tradition of moral sentimentalism I described the attempt to ground morality in the human passions. Here I suggested a potential Messianic opening to the Other in the experience of sympathy by which the Other confronts the self in ways which are irresistible and overwhelming. However, I argued that ultimately for Hume and Smith the moral passions are ultimately civilised by becoming related to the social status of the self as pride and shame. In Smith`s powerful image we thus come to objectify our own moral decisions through the lens of the impartial spectator who calculates social approbation or disapprobation. The moral self is thus no longer subjective but objectified within a totality of status by which the moral relation to the Other is mediated. In Smith I argued this morality of self-love becomes the foundation of self interest and the world market by which each individual comes to view themselves objectively through the totality of the market as a rational interest maximiser whose actions are determined by the logics of the market. As such, there can be no face to face or proximity with the Other within the global market. If sentimentalism reduces morality to instrumental reason, Kantian moral rationalism affirms that morality by definition involves rational contemplation of the good. Here again we find a Messianic echo in Kant`s affirmation of the freedom of the Other as the ultimate limitation on the actions of the self, a freedom which must be regarded as an end in itself. Yet, again, this moral relation is not conducted at the level of the face to face in proximity to the Other as Other, but rather to an objectified rational abstraction of the Other arrived at through the principle of universalisation, by which all Others are reduce to their sameness as rational creatures. The rational overcoming of nature is thus part of a universal telos which Kant sees as the foundation of international law, in which all of humanity is brought within a totality built around the construction of the sovereign

individual. To the extent that the Other does not conform to this construct she is in violation of the law of nature and thus can be rightfully negated in her Otherness, brought within the project of rational civilisation. Finally, while Hume and Kant sought to re-ground a broadly Christian morality on post-Christian foundations, I described how Nietzsche proposed an abandonment of morality altogether in favour of an aesthetic self-creation of the beautiful life. Even here, I suggested, there is a certain Messianic appeal in the affirmation of our worldly accountability. Yet in Nietzsche this is never an accountability before the Other, but an aesthetic accountability to the self related through the self to the self, the artist, medium and audience. This aesthetic self-creation thus amounted to a radical self-affirmation of the will to power by which great men separate themselves from the herd morality of the masses. The ultimate expression of this separation is war, which fully captures the tragic absurdity of the human drama in the beauty of self-affirmative destruction, the absolute overcoming of life.

These historical narratives of displacement brought about by the mediation of relations between self and Other illustrate fundamental logics of displacement which remain relevant to contemporary processes. Certainly, in the contemporary world all too many communities are divided between Egyptians and Hebrews by the projects of the powerful, all too many people are divided by the powerful between those who are said to belong and those who are said not to belong, all too often casting those who do not belong out into the wilderness of the desert. This traumatic experience of displacement has been present throughout the twentieth century, where natural spatialities of life have been divided politically through various forms of nationalism in which certain groups, for cause of their ethnic or religious identity, their culture or their lack of formal citizenship, have been deemed a threat to the integrity of the national homeland. This mediation of belonging and non-belonging is arguably fundamental to the very concept of the nation state upon which the modern international system of states is built, and as such many people fall between the cracks into the spaces of non-belonging within the global system. Stateless people, refugees, and undocumented workers all exist permanently outside the spatiality of the totality of the states system. While the states system continues to operate on logics of mediation built around belonging and non-belonging, the global economy today functions as a totality much like that of Rome, a vast and complex system of status relations which encompasses the entire globe. Much like imperial Rome, there

exists a cosmopolitan elite at the top of this status system which has no grounding in national territorialities, but rather moves freely through a global network of post-national spaces in various globalised cities from London and New York to Hong Kong and Abu Dhabi. In the time of Rome, the dynamic of the status system was the imperial war machine; in the contemporary era it is the creative destruction of global capitalism, the constant creative destruction of capital through space without any grounding or responsibility to the places through which it flows. The new global status system can be seen in any of the major cities of Europe, with a cosmopolitan elite floating above in a post-national bubble, a national working class facing declining conditions and wages, a migrant working class particularly within the EU, with formal documentation but viewed with suspicion and hostility, an unskilled national precariat on the margins of the formal economy, and ultimately the non-European undocumented migrant workers of the shadow economy with no rights and no security. Beyond the cities of Europe the system continues through the global network of production to the very lowest reaches of the economy. In this global status system advancement is always possible for any individual but conversely so is decline. There is thus a permanent insecurity which mediates all social relations by the fear of those from below.

In the contemporary world there are many places of life like the city of Troy which have been destroyed due to conflicts over honour. The logic of power in global politics assures that an affront to the honour of the powerful can still result in merciless displays of heroic masculinity rained down from the skies on the places of life where children sleep at night, mothers shop for bread, families go to pray. Still today the heroic glory of the powerful is overwhelmingly achieved at the expense of the weak and vulnerable. While in the time of Troy the great heroes Achilles and Hector met on the battlefield face to face, today rarely do armies meet in such a way, but much more often destroy and desecrate bodies through military technology which does not even require any acknowledgment of the victim's existence. Today more than ever Simone Weil`s observation is affirmed that war is a force of de-humanisation both for those who suffer from it and those who perpetrate it. As the heroic model of war continues in many scenarios in the twenty-first century so also the crusader narrative is also sadly familiar. The projection onto the Other all that the self rejects in the self has been articulated by proponents of the clash of civilisations, whereby the Other is not merely an enemy on the battlefield, but a cosmic enemy of

civilisation itself, an "evil empire", an "axis of evil". In projecting all that is evil onto the Other the self projects onto the self all that is good. Torture becomes good, war becomes good, arbitrary detention becomes good, any evil becomes good in the cause of freedom, or civilisation. The good is achieved not through the actions of the self as such, but in opposition to the evil of the Other which must be overcome. Still today this projection of all that is rejected in the self onto the Other amounts to the cleansing of the self, the "enemy within", the dissident, the alien, the Guerrilla who must be identified and expelled through all manner of inquisitions and witch trials. Yet also in the contemporary world the cause of civilisation is not merely a claim by which the Others of civilisation are defined in their Otherness, but also a cause by which the Otherness of Others is negated. 500 years after the evangelisation of the Amerindian world(s) was achieved through genocidal violence, exploitation and subjugation, still today the "civilisation" of those on the margins of the global system continues. Today, this "civilisation" is to be found in the projects of development by which forests are destroyed and rivers polluted, the discourses of economic reform and austerity projected by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the rhetoric of modernisation by which workers' rights are eroded and commons privatised. In these processes ever more of the spatiality of life is brought within the totality of global capitalism, ever more communal spaces, from parks and forests to streets and youth clubs, ever more local traditions are lost, ever more community resources are reduced to property, the dispossession of places of life brought within the spatiality of the totality. All are equal as sovereign individuals within the totality of universal human rights, yet what is not permissable within this totality is to be otherwise than sovereign individuals.

These paradigms of displacement are clearly not exhaustive and in the real world they are often criss-crossed one over another, yet what they each suggest is a particular process by which the relation between self and Other shifts from the proximity of place to some form of mediated relation within a spatial totality. The phenomenon of displacement can thus be described as the experience of the loss of the encounter with the Otherness of the Other in the generosity of her vulnerability, which invites the self to move beyond the self towards the achievement of ethical subjectivity as goodness, but also the loss of the ability to invite the Other to goodness in our own vulnerability. Rather than encountering the Other in her Otherness we perceive the Other through the totality

as a certain classification, and indeed we perceive our own selves through the totality as a certain classification. The relation is thus no longer inter-subjective but objective, the relation between Egyptian and Hebrew, Patrician and Plebeian, citizen and immigrant, rich and poor, friend and enemy. As we no longer face the face of the Other so we are no longer invited by the Other to goodness as ethical subjectivity. We are no longer responsible directly to the Other but to the totality. It is thus to the totality that we look to achieve our goodness, yet not as ethical subjects but as ethical objects, objects of the totality classified as good in relation to those classified as bad within the project of the totality. We are thus defined not as ethical subjects in relation to the Other, but as ethical objects in relation to the totality: deserving and undeserving poor, hard-working families and scroungers, moderate trade unionists and the "enemy within", law abiding citizens and anti-social elements, those who play by the rules and those who are looking to "play the system", those who uphold "British values" and those who are different, strange, foreign. It is in this sense that the displacement brought about by the totalisation of the political gives rise to the contemporary crisis of indifference with which I began this thesis, as we come to put responsibility to the totality over and above responsibility to the Other. This is the process by which a young family thrown out of their home for defaulting on their loans are responsible for their own misfortune due to financial mismanagement, workers made unemployed by de-industrialisation are subjects of the iron laws of the market required to re-train for the demands of the service economy. A student unable to visit his dying mother in the Philippines because of his undocumented status in Europe is a law breaker, a 17 year old girl unable to complete her A-levels because her asylum application has been rejected must accept that the law apply "fairly" to all. The migrants dying at sea in the Mediterranean, or the children crossing the border into the United States, are not "our" responsibility. Indeed the Other is not "our" responsibility, precisely the attitude of the Priest and the Levite, the turning away from the Other. The self relates only to the law of the totality by which the self will be defined as good.

If, then, we can call displacement a phenomenon of the totalisation of the political by which the proximity to the Other in place is disrupted by the mediation of relations between parts within the project of a totality, how can it be that international political theory has largely avoided this phenomenon? The answer I have argued in this thesis is that the western philosophical tradition has itself overwhelmingly understood the

meaning of the political as a process of totalisation by which the projects of the powerful are achieved through the transcendence of life. This can be seen from the foundation of political philosophy in Plato`s Republic, whereby the placed familial and friendly relations are perceived as threatening and dangerous to the unity of the state. Instead, for Plato citizens must give their primary allegiance not to family or friends, but to the republic as totality. A similar point is re-affirmed by Cicero in relation to the Roman imperial totality of status, whereby "that fatherland must stand first in our affections in which the name of Republic signifies the common citizenship of us all" (Legibius 2:25). The role of this totalisation of the political for Plato is to achieve the transcendence of thought, to turn away from the impermanence of the worldly Other and towards the eternal truths of Being. In the political totality we therefore transcend nature, we overcome nature, we overcome our imprisonment within the body and we overcome the world, we turn away from proximity to the Other in order to achieve proximity to the truths of Being beyond life. In Platonised post-Messianic theology this amounted to a retreat from the worldly, a divine legitimisation of the political totality as a punishment for original sin which can only be gone out of in transcendence to heavenly paradise. In this post-Messianic theology the neighbour becomes the enemy, not an enemy to be loved, but an enemy of God, an embodiment of the sinfulness of the worldly. Transcendence could be thus achieved by overcoming the sinfulness of the world through the destruction of the Other. The post-Messianic foundations of the legitimisation of the state laid by Augustine ultimately crumbled with the crisis of religious metaphysics from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, yet the fundamental understanding of the political as the totalisation by which transcendence is to be achieved remains. In Hume, we transcend the natural passions through the civilisation of the passions; we objectify the self as a member of a community whose moral behaviour is mediated by pride and shame. In Kant, we transcend the determination of nature through the rational universalisation of our moral maxims. In Nietzsche, we transcend the simple life through the self-creation of life as a work of tragic art. In each case we find a model of the moral (or post-moral) foundations of the political which involves the going out of proximity to the Other through an objectification of the self within a totalisation which involves the transcendence of nature. Just as the heroic lives of Achilles and Hector were lived far from places of life, far from hot baths, far from proximity to the Other, so the dominant tradition of western political philosophy has

understood the fundamental meaning of the political as going far from hot baths, out of proximity to the Other, the transcendence of life. Such going out of proximity to places of life inevitably leads to the displacement of places of life, the destruction of life in order to achieve the projects of transcendence, for as Plato suggests “if a man has greatness of mind… to contemplate all of time and all of reality, can he think of human life as any great consequence?” (Rep 486b). For the great anti-Platonist Nietzsche, writing over 2000 years later, the metaphysical idea of transcendence is to be rejected, but the same basic idea of the transcendence of life, the contempt for the life lived in place remains. The beautiful lives of the noble races are lives of displacement, with "their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure for destruction, their taste for cruelty" (1956a 1st Essay, XI). For the western philosophical tradition the political involves the transcendence of life through the totalisation of nature, the displacement of place. As Benjamin described a wind blowing from paradise blowing us temporally ever further from proximity to the Creator, so also we might speak of that same wind blowing us spatially ever further from proximity to each Other. As Benjamin calls this wind progress, we may call it the idea of transcendence, the idea that humanity can transcend nature by overcoming, by establishing its own foundations in the artificial totalising structures of the political. It is this idea of transcendence as the overcoming of mere life through the totalisation of the political which gives rise to the legitimisation of displacement in the western philosophical tradition.

Throughout this thesis I have, however, suggested there are other ways to think the political. In particular, I have sought to draw out the Messianic threads which run through the dominant tradition in which the placed is the foundation of the universal community. In this tradition the metaphors of place, the familial brother and sister, the children of the Father, but above all as the love of the neighbour are of central significance for building a community of love. Yet these metaphors of place are not to be mistaken for tribal or familial belonging. The neighbour is not to be loved in her sameness, not as "children of your people" as had been the case in the old law, but in her very Otherness. As the Messianic Christ taught, to love those who are like us is no effort at all (Matt 5:46-7), to love the Other in her Otherness is what is truly sacred. Messianic Christian love is the love for those like the Prodigal Son who turn away (Luke 15 11;32), those who are of a different tribe or ethnicity (10:29-37), those like the workers of the vineyard who are perhaps least

deserving (Matt 20:1-16); even the enemy is to be loved as a neighbour. While in the philosophical tradition transcendence had been achieved by turning away from the worldly Other through the totalisation of the political in order to turn towards the truth of Being, in the Messianic Christian tradition to turn away from the worldly Other is to turn away from God, to turn towards the worldly Other is to turn towards God (Matt 25: 21-46). Transcendence is achieved in the going out of totality into the proximity of the Other.

The idea that the placed is the foundation of the political community is indeed recognised by the dominant tradition of political philosophy. For Plato, it is in original co-operation that the social relations are born which give rise to the republic. For Hume, these original proximities find their echo in irresistible feelings of sympathy towards others. For Kant, it is the urge of nature itself that we come together in harmonious social relations which grounds the idea of human dignity. Even Nietzsche accepts that the recognition of the Other is the foundation of civil morality, albeit a morality which he condemns as self-hatred. The placed is thus the foundation of the political, but it is not a part of the political totality itself. The political totality is only ever spatial, for the dominant philosophical tradition place disappears once the social relations of the political totality have been established. Yet this is only the perspective which has sought to overcome life: outside of this philosophical perspective the vast majority of life is lived in place, lived in the pre-political, in the places of hot baths, the streets and playgrounds, workplaces, public houses, churches and mosques. As such, while the philosopher views space from the outside as objective, in our embodied inhabitation of place we subjectively engage with space, the hidden pathways, the openings and possibilities which inhabitation invites. It is thus in place that we go out of totality. It is in placed proximity that we found the political community in the multiplicity of encounters between self and Other; the placed is possessed of utopian energies for the going out of the political. It is in place that we go out of totality when we go out into the streets in protest, when we go out of the workplace onto the picket line, when we go out and occupy public space, organise, mobilise, protest, challenge - still today the mediations of social relations within the totality are disrupted in the proximity of place. The fundamental political logic of displacement is thus always the disruption of place, the attempt at the disruption of proximity which threatens to disrupt the totality, the attempt to mediate relations

through logics which regulate the placed through the project of the totality. Yet these attempts are never wholly successful: life in place is too messy, too ambiguous, it is lived and thus it can never be fully closed. There is always the possibility that new relations will form in proximity which challenge the mediated relations of the totality.

It is in the placed encounter with the Other as Other in all its messy ambiguity that we might find the ethical foundations for critique of the totality. It is in such encounters that the possibilities of a new political community can be found. A critical international theory born of the placed must be capable of critically analysing the theoretical logics which mediate social relations in space: the belonging/non-belonging mediation which grounds the realist tradition, the sovereign individual mediation which grounds the liberal tradition. This critique must be able to demonstrate that displacement is not merely an unfortunate symptom of the way the international system works, but a fundamental logic of the international system which generates immense human suffering. Yet critical international theory of displacement must also be capable of affirming the infinite everyday placed resistances to the mediations of the totality. In this sense, international political theory must be capable of connecting the minutiae of the placed with the global. The insights into displacement suggested in this introduction by sociologists, artists, anthropologists have sought to understand life from the inside; so also international political theory must seek to understand the global totality from the perspective of everyday life. In recent years the entrance into critical international theory of new critical traditions coming from Feminism, Post colonialism and various forms of Marxism have seen the beginnings of such a new perspective. The project of critical international theory against displacement might therefore be built upon the ethical foundations of the placed encounter with the Other, the going out of the international totality of mediations. Such a critique will resonate with Messianic hope. Let us be not Priests and Levites; let us be Samaritans; let us be like Shiprah and Puah in defiance of the law of Pharaoh; let us be citizens of God who fulfil the law in the love of the Other in resistance to the law of the city of man, let us go out of totality. Let us achieve our meaningful goodness as ethical subjects in the messy proximity of the places of everyday life.

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End Notes

[1] The visit was the first of Pope Francis outside Rome, following a series of tragedies in the Mediterranean in recent years, see for examples The Guardian Online (2011), BBC Online (2009), several months later, in October 2013, another tragedy off the island of Lampedusa claimed the lives of over 350 African migrants in the Mediterranean.

[2] This term has been further developed by Francis in the Papal Encyclical (2013) concerning the social dimension of evangelisation in the contemporary world.

[3] This position is broadly associated with the label Cosmopolitanism. I will discusss a particular tradition of Cosmopolitanism within critical international theory in section 2 of this chapter, but for an excellent statement of the cosmopolitan argument see Nussbaum (1996) and for a series of critical rejoinders see Cohen & Nussbaum (1996). For a more general overview of the subsequent debates see Brown & Held (2010).

[4] Darko Suvin (2005) offers his own typology of displacement in relation to various categories, including exiles, emigres, expatriates, etc. While this is a useful starting point, I suggest in this thesis a much broader phenomenological definition of the term. The reasons for this should become clear in the course of the introduction.

[5] The official definition of Refugee comes from the 1951 Convention on the Status of Reugees as any "person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". For a useful introduction to issues related to forced displacement see Gibney (2010) and Loescher (1993, 2008).

[6] All statistics collated by the UNHCR do not include Palestinian Refugees which come under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

[7] It is worthy of note that in the first decade of the twenty-first century Syria had itself been the second largest recipient of Refugees in the world. The conflict has thus led to a displacement of the displaced, particularly the large Palestinian Refugee Camp of Yarmouk in Damascus has become a battleground between government and rebel forces UNRWA (2014).

[8] In particular sexual violence; see for example The Guardian (2013b) with regard to the situation of Syrian women in the Zaatari Camp. For a more general picture of the causes of sexual violence against Refugees see UNHCR (1994) and Hynes & Lopes Cardoso (2000).

[9] Perhaps the most notorious example of this phenomenon is the massacres carried out in the Sabra and Shatila Camps in Southern Lebanon by the Christian Militia with support from Israeli military occupation forces: see Hut (2004).

[10] Of these there are 589,000 in Germany, 254,000 in France, 150,000 in Britain, 74,000 in the Netherlands and 64,000 in Italy with another 250,000 in the United States and 163,00 in Canada.

[11] Below the European per capita average) 17,545 (72%) were refusals, 4190 (17%) were granted asylum, while 2460 (10%) were granted temporary discretionary Leave to remain (Refugee Welcome Trust, 2013).

[12] For an insightful account of the situation of Children in the Asylum Process see Pinter (2012) and Children`s Society (2013). For testimonies regarding the experience of detention during the application process in Australia see Philips ( ) including the account of one applicant *"You couldn't raise your voice, you couldn't [express]your rights... If you complained, they would isolate you. So… you kept quiet."*

[13] The Red Cross Report finds 72% of the UK view the word "Refugee" to have negative connotations. Amongst examples of headlines concerning Asylum Seekers in the UK are "Soft-touch Britain: the asylum capital of Europe" (Daily Mail); "Refugees made our lives hell too, say neighbours" (Daily Express); and "DNA test for bogus refugees scrapped as expensive flop" (The Times).

[14] For useful resources on the connection between media portrayals of migration and negative public perceptions see Strabac (2011), Semionov et al (2006), Petigrew (1998).

[15] The largest numbers of IDPs are found in countries where longstanding conflicts have divided the national territory including Colombia (5 million), Syria (4.25m), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2.6 million), Sudan

(1.46m), Iraq (1.1 million), Somalia (1.1m), Pakistan (758,000), Afghanistan (500,000) and the Central African Republic (206,000) (IDMC 2011.

[16] It should be noted that in many such cases including Syria and Iraq there is considerable overlap between political conflict and inter-communal conflict.

[17] These figures are for 2008.

[18] The UNDESA definition of migrant here is a person living in a country in which they were not born.

[19] The point here is not to characterise all economic migration as "displacement" but as should be clear from the discussion to recognise the economic inequalities which constitute major structural pressures towards migration and the connections between these pressures and forms of violence and coercion.

[20] The criteria for this definition of migrant is a person born outside of the country of residence.

[21] In Britain these conditions were highlighted in 2004 with the deaths of 23 Chinese cocklepickers at Morecombe Bay, employed by so-called "Gangmasters" operating with minimal labour standards and at times high levels of coercion, including debt bondage. For a full report on the attempts to regulate this sector see Oxfam (2009).

[22] The numbers are considerably lower in Europe, with estimates of between 1.8 and 3.8 million people believed to be living and working without formal documentation, though this is somewhat misleading given the precarious and temporary conditions experienced by many formally documented migrants.

[23] The situation has been particularly severe in Greece where in the wake of the financial crisis African migrants have been forced into perilous conditions, systematically targeted for arbitrary arrest and deportation by police (Hope 2014, See also MSF 2014) and violent attacks by organised fascist street gangs while similar phenomena have been on the rise in various other countries.

[24] These new spaces are particularly related to female labour, most notably the garment industries. For an excellent analysis see Collins (2003) and in relation to the intersection of exploitation and patriarchy see Fernandes-Kelly (1997) and Tiano (1994) and for the associated nexus of gendered violence in Ciudad Juarez, Bowden (2010).

[25] For excellent analyses of the "narrativisation" by which poverty has been demonised see Lubiano (1992) for the United States and Jones (2012) for the United Kingdom.

[26] For example, see the number of excellent journals related to issues of migration and politics, amongst them *Race and Class, Journal of Race and Ethnicity Studies, Journal of Refugee Studies, International Migration Review, and Social Identities.*

[27] See for examples Glick-Schiller et al 1995, Glick-Schiller & Faist 2010, Glick-Schiller 2008, Balibar 2004, Vertovec 2009.

[28] These disciplines have perhaps been particularly responsive to the question of the way in which migration impacts upon the lived spatiality of place and the practices of everyday life due to the long tradition of engagement with these concepts during the twentieth century. To give only a few of the most seminal contribution in this field see for example Auge (2009) de Certeau (1984, 1998), Lefebvre (1991), Buttimer & Seamon (1980), Tuan (1977, 2010).

[29] Here I offer a deliberately broad definition of international theory designed to capture not only the discipline of International Relations and its sister-discipline International Political Economy but the broader range of political theories which have developed since the early 1990s in response to globalisation.

[30] Since the collapse of the bipolar world order at the beginning of the 1990s and particularly since the attacks of September 11 2001, the area of security studies has become increasingly prominent as a sub-field of IR concerned with the so-called "new threats", including migration. Particularly influential has been the

concept of securitisation as developed by the Copenhagen School , for example, (including critical responses) Boswell (2007), Buzan et al (1998) Weaver et all 1993), Teitelbaum (2010) , Curley & Wong (2008) Huysmans (2006), Guillame & Huysmans (2013) Geddes (2008), Doty (2009), Weiner (1993, 1993b, 1995), Adamson (2006), Loescher (1993), Guild (2009, 2010a, 2010b).

[31] In this International Realism is closely connected with political communiatianism which shares the essentially nationalistic view of identity as opposed to political liberalism. This can be seen in the words of Michael Walzer for whom "I am not a citizen of the world… no one has ever offered me (world) citizenship… or shown me the world`s calendar, or common celebrations and commemorations of its citizens" (REF).

[32] Just to give a few examples of the work carried out in this spirit see Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992, Phoenix & Pattynama 2006, Phizacklea 1998, Indra 1999, Mahler & Pesar 2006, Koffman 1999, Koffman et al 2001, Lutz 1997).

[33] Just to give a few examples of the work carried out in this spirit see Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992, Phoenix & Pattynama 2006, Phizacklea 1998, Indra 1999, Mahler & Pesar 2006, Koffman 1999, Koffman et al 2001, Lutz 1997).

[34] Particularly in recent years there has been an explosion of interest in the spatial re-structuring of citizenship, from broadly liberal positions giving rise to various novel terminologies including "global citizenship" (Falk 1994), "Post national citizenship" (Soysal 1994), "World Citizenship" (Heater 2002), "Universal Citizenship" (Young 1989), "Nested Citizenship" (Faist 2006), "Trans-national citizenship" (Balibar 2004, Glick-Schiller 2009), "Global Civil Society" (Keane 2003), "Multi-layered Citizenship" (Yural-Davis 1999), etc.

[35] For Habermas, who also supported the Kosovo intervention, it was important to recognise a distinction between the Cosmopolitan European motivations which involved a "transition from a soft international law toward a fully implemented human rights regime, whereas both US and British advocates remained in their tradition of liberal nationalism. They did not appeal to "principles" of a future cosmopolitan order but were satisfied to enforce their demand for international recognition of what they perceived to be the universalistic force of their own national "values" (2002).

[36] Benhabib acknowledges this discourse ethics approach may well be abused in practise. However, she contends it would still establish important standards for justification which could then be challenged. The question of abuse in practice, however, is perhaps more problematic than Benhabib suggests. As Anderson et al (2013b) have demonstrated, the official language of migration control has since the 19th century been formally liberal and apparantly neutral with regards to race and class, yet these social and economic factors undergrid the very structures of migration control, precisely because they are unspoken.

[37] The term 'postmodernism' has a broad range of meanings and has been applied to various different theories. For the classic statement of the "postmodern condition" see Lyotard (1984) and for its critique Jameson (1992) and Harvey (1991). Here then I take postmodernism to be a critique of the Enlightenment claim that knowledge can be autonomous from power and thus an emancipatory force in society. This tradition I will later situate in the heritage of Friedrich Nietzsche`s critique of modernity, but here I will refer to those influenced by the work of Michel Foucault; see (1994, 1994b) for his classic statement of postmodernism.

[38] For Agamben`s fuller elaborations on the issues of sovereign and bare life (1998), the state of exception (2005) and for his formulation of the "coming community" (1993) and for an excellent collection demonstrating the relevance of these ideas to the contemporary "deportation regime" in Western Europe and beyond see Genova & Peutz (2010).

[39] This mind-body problem can be traced back to the origins of Socratic philosophy. The historical development of this problem will be of central importance to the discussion in subsequent chapters, but here in introducing the problem I will focus specifically on the Cartesian description.

[40] The view that both the mind and body are distinct substances.

[41] This view that the body simply responds to consciousness in much the same way that a robot might respond to programmed commands remains highly influential particularly in the development of thinking about artificial intelligence. For an excellent critique influenced by Merleau-Ponty`s ideas see Dreyfus (1979), (1992), Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), and in particular relation to the Internet Dreyfus (2001).

[42] For a useful overview of the original case study see Goldenberg (2002 282-301) and Marotta & Behrmann (2004).

[43] The patient is diagnosed by Goldstein and Gelb as suffering from visual agnosia, a disorder whereby the patient is able to see objects quite normally (for example being able to read) but is unable to associate the thing seen with the associated concept such as table, box, wheel etc. There have been suggestions that some of Shneider`s symptoms may have been exaggerated or even faked. However, Goldenberg rejects this view while acknowledging there may be certain errors in the recording of some symptoms (2002 292-3).

[44] Though it is noted his production rate is only "at three quarters to that of a normal workman" (118).

[45] For a fuller discussion of the distinction between concrete and abstract in Goldstein and Gelb`s study see Gurwitsch (1949).

[46] Merleau-Ponty`s work on developmental stages can be read in dialogue with both Lacan`s discussion of the stages of psycho-sexual development and Jean Piaget`s analysis of child cognitive development. For a useful reassessment of Merleau-Ponty`s analysis of the formation of body schema in light of subsequent developments in developmental psychology see Gallagher & Meltzoff (1996).

[47] For more contemporary analysis of the formation of the body schema in early infancy see Maravita et al (1996) Rizzolatti et al (1997) and Holmes & Spence (2001).

[49] There are clear resonances with the understanding of the Mirror Stage in the work of Jacques Lacan. For a full comparison of the spectral image in these two thinkers see O`Neill (1986).

[50] These ideas are much more fully developed in Merleau-Ponty`s later work *The Visible and the Invisible* (1969), in which the relationship between the subjective self and the objective world is characterised in terms of a unified ecology of the flesh - a particularly powerful image of two hands washing each other in which there is no fixed distinction between subject and object, but only the activity of mutual washing. This later writing has had a significant influence on ecological theories of the relationship of humanity to the earthly environment, see Cataldi & Hamric (2007) for a collection of essays dealing with this dimension of Merleau-Ponty`s philosophy.

[52] It is important to stress that the sensual faculties are often themselves gendered, with sight being the masculine while touch constitutes the feminine. In his later work Merleau-Ponty becomes ever more sceptical about the model set out in the Phenomenology, even claiming that the fundamental problematic which motivated the project was insoluble due to the maintenance of the consciousness / object distinction (*1968:*200). Quite clearly this self-critique signals a move away from a Husserlian model of intentionality, claiming that the approach developed in the Phenomenology retains the basic distinction between consciousness and object. As such the later work, particulary *The Visible and the Invisible* moves increasingly away from phenomenology and towards ontology and indeed much closer to a Heideggerian understanding of Being. With the description of an "ontology of the flesh" takes the lived body as developed in the Phenomenology as a metaphor for the whole natural world. While in his early work Merleau-Ponty had described the experience of the embodied subject in the reversibility of one had washing over the other, in his later work this description serves to illustrate the relation of body and world, for example in a handshake in which there is no subject and object, but only the perceptual relation of the touching and the being

touched (1968:133, 142) whereby the corporeal bdoy becomes the inter-corporeal flesh. While there are certainly elements of this analysis in relation to inter-subjectivity and the dialectical relation of body and world in the Phenomenology, this radicalisation undoubtedly marks a significant shift, not least in relation to the negation of alterity for reflections on this question see (Irigaray 2002:127-154, Fielding 2010, Lefort 2006).

[53] Beauvoir`s work is clearly influenced by Merleau-Ponty and it is clear she greatly admired the Phenomenology of Perception as can be seen with her review of that work (2006). However, the relationship between the two was complicated in later years by Merleau-Ponty`s break with Sartre as can be seen with Beauvoir's polemical attack on Merleau-Ponty`s philosophy as "Pseudo-Sartreanism" (1989).

[54] This theme is particularly developed in Beauvoir`s philosophical-literary writings, most notably her own autobiographical work *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (2005) see Tidd (1999).

[55] On the centrality of ambiguity to Beauvoir`s ethical thought there is a particularly significant influence from Merleau-Ponty. For an excellent discussion of the concept in both thinkers see Langer (2003). For an analysis of the relevance of Beauvoir`s ethics of ambiguities for thinking about political violence see Hutchings.

[56] For a useful discussion of relations of friendship amongst women in precisely this context see Ward (1999).

[57] For Nelson Maldonado-Torres this is the fundamental dimension of Fanon`s thought, "the question of racial identity emerges out of a deep interest in the construction of a world of love" (2008:238).

[58] The gender politics of *Black Skin, White Mask* have in recent years generated a substantial critical literature; see for example Bergner (1995) Kalisa (2002) and Lane & Mahdi (2013) and in particular for a more nuanced discussion of Mayote Cacepia, which challenges the pejorative representation offered by Fanon see Parasivini-Gebert (1992), Moore-Gilbert (1996). Harpley-Whiting (1999) and Nya (2010), who points out that Fanon`s reading relies on a blurring of the distinction between author and character.

[59] The question of difference has been raised in relation to both Beauvoir and Fanon`s thought. For critical analyses on this theme in Beauvoir see Kaufman (1986), Kristeva (1986). Notably Iris Marion Young concludes that Beauvoir`s humanist feminism “consists in a revolt against femininity” which in effect rehashes masculinist logics by presenting femininity itself as “the primary vehicle of women’s oppression” (1985:173) while for a defence see Zakin 2000).

[60] Certainly this humanist orientation in Merleau-Ponty can be associated with a distinctive phenomenological reading of the Marxist tradition in which Historical Materialism is described as "trying to extract from beneath the juridical abstraction called “the citizen”... the economic subject, man as a factor of production, but in more general terms the living subject, man as creativity, as a person trying to endow his life with form” (2002:199 fn 18), which can quite clearly be contrasted with the existentialist humanism offered by Sartre (2007).

[61] The article was first published in the Catholic journal *L`esprit* in 1934 shortly after Hitler came to power.

[62] Levinas own mother, father, brothers, mother-in-law and father-in-law were killed during the Holocaust, which Levinas links not only to the anti-Semitism of the violent mob and the Nazi bureucrat, but the deeper anti-Semitism of thought, as can be seen in the dedication of *Otherwise than Being* “to those who were closest amongst the six million... and the millions upon millions of all confessions and all nations who were victims of the same hatred, the same anti-Semitism".

[63] Clearly for Heidegger the home represents an attachment to the land, while Levinas's thought can be firmly situated within the cosmology of exilic thought, or in Sarah Hammerschlag`s (2010:119) characterisation “a philosophy of uprootedness".

[64] For an excellent collection dealing with the relationship between Levinas and Buber, see Alterton et al (2004). It should however be noted that there are crucial differences in the understanding of the Other between Buber and Levinas. As Robert Bernasconi notes, the apparent "proximity" between the two which is perceived by many readers was not largely recognised by the thinkers themselves (1988:100).

[65] Here again Levinas can be seen as distancing himself from Heidegger for whom language is the house of Being.

[66] It is worthy of note here that while Levinas is keen to affirm the physical materiality of the face, this is not only the face as such (i.e. the eyes, mouth nose) which may be called only the most high expression of the face. The face Levinas suggests "the whole body", including a hand, or the curve of a should can express the face (1961:262). In Bernard Waldentell`s elegant formulatin it is "the emblem of the Other`s Otherness" (2002:63).

[67] At certain points Levinas refers to the face as a "thin place" of encounter with God, the religious significance of the face is clearly profound as can be seen with the explicit of the face as a "commandment" - “The first word of the face is the “Thou shalt not kill.” It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all" (1985:89).

[68] The difficulty for thinking politically with the concept of the face is that Levinas often oscilates between the face as worldly and the face as transcendent, at one point for example suggesting when consciousness encounters the face of the Other it “(can)not even take notice of the colour of his eyes. When one observes the colour of his eyes one is not in social relation with the Other” (1985:85). This is clearly problematic for, as John Drabinski has suggested, the experience of the Other is inseparable from her physical characteristics, in particular those characteristics which take on profound political significance such as the pigmentation of the skin, the cracked hands of the labourer, the injustices of poverty and disability inscribed into the body. For Drabinski a potential route to overcoming this overly transcendental reading of the face is through dialogue with Gayatri Spivak`s conception of the Subaltern by which “The Other comes to me not only as a singular face who signifies without context, but as an embodied being whose appearance to me is saturated with historical meaning. The traffic of the world is neither a compromise nor a betrayal of the Other`s Otherness” (2011: 42-3).

[69] This is expressed most famously in the play *No Exit* in which three strangers are concemned for their early sins to inhabit a 19th century living room in each other`s company giving rise to the legend "Hell is Other People".

[70] Despite the obvious differences between the approaches to proximity in Sartre and Levinas there are strong resonances. Levinas notably associates the idea of proximity with that of obsession, or elsewhere of being held hostage by the Other. This is a common theme in Sartre`s work, perhaps most sustained in his Play *No Exit* in which the three characters obsess over the way in which they are seen by the other two. Both Sartre and Levinas see this obsession with the Other as a foundation of ethics, yet for Sartre it is in some sense to be escaped while for Levinas it is inescapable and indeed to escape obsession with the Other is to open the door to violence and murder for a useful discussion of the relation between Sartre and Levinas see.

[71] Here Levinas is quite clearly opposed to the later Merleau-Pontian view of the flesh which he suggests as promoting an anti-humanist tendency, "to link the human to an ontology of anonymity" in which "the human is only an articulation, or a moment of an event of intelligibility, the heart of which is no longer enveloped or situated within the human being" (Levinas 2006b:203).

[72] This point is re-asserted by Luce Irigaray in her duscussion of the Caress as a form of communion in which "the feeling and felt go so far as vertigo… every subject loses its mastery and method" (2001:122).

[73] It should be noted here that Levinas's work has inspired an extensive feminist literature, beginning from Beauvoir for whom Levinas re-enscribes traditional gender roles and the status of "Other" to woman

(though it is clear this category plays a radically different role for the two thinkers) through to those such as Tina Chantier (1988) who see in Levinas the possibility of thinking sexual difference against the philosophical tradition. For a useful summary of this literature see Sandford (2000, 2002) and Chanter (2007).

[74] Scholem grants great significance to the context of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 in the development of Isaac Luria`s distinctively Messianic Kabala.

[75] As William Faulkner suggests in his novel *Requiem for a Nun* "the past is never dead, it`s not even past" (1951:92).

[76] There are around this time other examples of popular religion emerging which reflect popular hopes and struggles for salvation, such as Osiris devotion in Egypt and the *Epic of Gigamesh* in Mesopotamia which chronicles humanity`s epic (and ultimately failed) uprising against the Gods who oppress them (Dalley 1989, Moran 1970, 1971); and for a discussion of the relation of this story to Noah`s flood in the Book of Genesis see Fryner-Kensky 1977).

[77] Perhaps most famously the motif of Exodus is central to the discourse of liberation in the speeches of Martin Luther King, famously on April 3rd 1968, the day before his death, King proclaimed in a speech in support of the Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike at Maison Temple, "we as a people will get to the promised land". For an excellent study of the motif of Exodus in King`s speeches and sermons see Selby (2008). For another example of the liberation narrative Archbishop Desmond Tutu affirms in a speech in 1973 "our God is the God of the exodus, the liberation God who is encountered in the Bible". A similar theme he maintains in opposition to the Israelic blockade of Gaza in 2008."God of the Exodus… The God who sided with the slaves against the Pharaoh… who knew their suffering, is the same yesterday, today and forever! (2008).

[78] There is of course a large literature dealing with the historical archaeology of the Exodus story, for good scholarly studies see Hoffmeier (1997) Finkelstein & Silberman (2002) and for example is primarily a hermeneutical engagmement rather than a historical one, yet a hermeneutics which is historically situated, as Paul Ricoeur suggests, "to understand the relationship between the text and historic communities of reading and interpretation. It is (necessarily to) be willing to enter sympathetically the hermeneutic circle in which, *it is in interpreting the Scriptures in question that the community in question interprets itself" (Lacoque & Ricoeur 1998 xvi).*

[79] The exact Pharaohs mentioned in the book are never named and thus it is difficult to know which historical period is being refered to. One suggestion is the 13th century BC (Sarna 1986), though such claims rely heavily on circumstantial evidence.

[80] It is worthy of note that this is the first time that the descendents of Abraham have been referred to as a people, rather than the direct familial relations. This signals both a shift from cosmic history to human history but also is notable for the fact that Israel is formed as a people out of oppression, rather than divine election which only follows subsequently.

[81] The word Hebrew has connotations of lowliness, slave, marginals, outcasts, bandits and thus likely originates as a pejorative term of derision given the lowly status of the ancestors of Abraham in Egypt.

[82] In the Quranic account it is the wife of Pharaoh who saves Moses.

[83] It is worth noting the rich symbolism in this section which affirms its significance. The ark into which Moses is cast in the Nile recalls the ark of Noah which preseved the Chosen ones from the waters of the flood, while the cries of the infant Moses which are heard by the Princess foreshadow God hearing the cries of the Hebrews in bondage and the re-establishment of covenant at the end of the chapter (Exod 2:22-23).

[84] It is even suggested here that Moses may suffer from some form of disability, or at least be of little education as he claims "I am slow of speech and of a slow tongue" (Exod 4:10), while God replies rhetorically "who maketh the dumb or the deaf, the blind or the seeing" (4:11).

[85] For a fuller exposition of Assman`s description of "memohistory" as an approach to the interpretation of the role of memory in interpreting the Exodus narrative see Assman (1998),

[86] Polybius 6:50 affirms that the Roman constitution was superior to that of Sparta and thus moves beyond the defects which eventually destroyed the internal coherence of the Spartan state.

[87] Jon Lendon (1997) in his excellent analysis of later Rome describes this aristocratic ethic of honour and prestige as the cultural foundation underpinning the whole legal foundation of the Empire.

[88] This rebellion was centred on Sicily. A second rebellion followed in the same region in 104BC before the most famous of these rebellions led by Spartacus in 71BC. For a good general history of slave revolt in this period see Bradley (1989).

[89] Upon the death of Herod the Great in 4BC the province was divided between his two sons, Herod Archelaus in Judea and Herod Antipas in Galilee.

[90] Eventually Herod Archelaus was remobed from his client position in 6AD due to accusations of corruption and decadence (Antiqs 17:13:3). From this point the province came under direct Roman control through the governor.

[91] This group Josephus describes as possessing an "inviolable attachment to liberty, and say that God is to be their only Ruler and Lord" (18 1:6).

[92] For more on the zealot movement see Donaldson (1990). On the relationship of this movement to the Jesus movement see Brandon (1967) and for the broader state of rebellion in the 1st century see Horseley (1999).

[93] For a full study of the centrality of the mountain motif in Matthean theology see Donaldson (1985).

[94] In the King James version the prohibition against anger includes the modifier "without a cause", though this is absent from other versions and does not seem to convey the essence of what Christ is teaching given that all anger would have some cause.

[95] Wierznicka illustrates this point even more clearly by citing Eduard Schweizer (1975:121) who comments, “The common Greek term [*emoicheusenautēn*] actually means ‘injuring her adulterously’ which reflects the idea of violation which is absent from the English translation, while the Greek word Gyne is ambiguous regarding the marital status of the woman again suggesting it is the dignity of the person, rather than the social status which is being violated in the act of lust".

[96] Quite clearly Jesus is speaking against lust regardless of gender. His focus on male lust is a reflection of the patriarchal structures of the time in which women were perceived as property of their husbands, fathers, brothers etc.

[97] A prestigious Jewish tribe to which Moses and Aaron had belonged,

[98] The Samaritans were a Jewish sect originating from Samaria.

[99] For a fuller discussion on the relationship of Jews and Samaritans in 1st century Palestine see Crown (1991).

[100] This is the final commandment as given by Christ to his disciples on the eve of his crucifixion: "love one another, as I have loved you". The commandment is suggested alongside the love of God as composing the fundamental principle of Christian ethical conduct. This love between father, son and holy spirit composes the essential trinitarian structure of the Cross as developed in the final prayer

[101] In this chapter I will be referring to the Penguin Classics translations both by E. V. Rieu of the Iliad and the Odyssey.

[102] The historicity of Homer`s account is clearly open to dispute. For example, Dickinson (1986) suggests Homer`s history refers more closely to the late dark ages (800bc) than the Mycenaean Age (1200bc). For an introduction to the many issues surrounding the so-called "Homeric question" see Sherratt (1990) Fowler (2004) and Nagy (1996).

[103] The question of authorship known as the "Homeric question" is almost as mythical as the history described by Homer. What can be said is that it is believed the poems were composed between 750 and 700BC at the end of the long tradition of oral poetry, drawing on multiple sources, myths and legends which would have been well known to the audience. For a fuller discussion of the oral tradition of Greek poetry and its relation to Homer see Darby (2007) and Jensen (1980).

[104] The meaning of heroism in the Homeric sense describes the idea of reaching beyond mortality, establishing a legend (*Kleos* κλέος) which will live forever after the physical body has been destroyed. For an excellent study of the concept see Nagy (1999).

[105] See for example 3:126 and also 3:158 where Helen is referred to as as a "curse to us and our children". In 7:349-350 it is suggested the returning of Helen would end the conflict, a suggestion which Paris acknowledges but refuses (7:359-60).

[106] For example in the speech of Hector in which the Aechean leader appears to incite his followers towards a campaign of sexual violence against the women of Troy, which will not end “until after (every man) has lain in bed with the wife of a Trojan to avenge Helen’s struggles and her groans” (2:355–56).

[107] Helen`s expressions of deep regret and references to her "following" (3:174) Paris to Troy would appear to suggest a seduction rather than a violent seizure (3:173-6). As such, Roisman argues Helen`s tragedy is one of her possession rather than her violation, she "depicts her coming to Troy as moreof an elopement than an abduction. Nonetheless, the description of her suffering implies that, even if she had once wanted to be in Troy, she no longer does". For a fuller discussion of Helen`s self-blame in the Iliad see Blondell (2010).

[108] This is clearly a crucial episode in the story of the Trojan War yet is only alluded to by Homer. For a fuller discussion of the significance of this event see Walcott (1977) and in particular the account of the great tragedian Euripides see Stinton (1965)

[109] Sometimes translated as "gift of honour". As Jonathan Ready suggests, the acquisition of war booty and in particular slaves is a key sign of status in the moral economy of warfare, granted to the "best men" as a marker of their honour and "determining his status relative to that of his peers" (2007:3).

[110] It is suggested by Plato in the *Symposium* that the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus may have been a romantic one, though this isn't referred to in the text.

[111] Hector threatens to behead Patroclus and feed him to the dogs of Troy. Here there is a clear foreshadowing of Hector`s own fate, which Patroclus prophecies shortly before his own death (18:844-867).

[112] While the focus of the Iliad and Odyssey, it should also be noted that Penelope serves as an idealised of the feminine, the dutiful wife, contrasted explicitly against Helen, "she has a patient heart, though her eyes are never free from tears as the slow days and nights pass by so slowly" (16:33-36).

[113] 108 according to Telemachus (16:245-250).

[114] As can be seen with the brutal punishments for the maid servants accused of disloyalty to the house for their infidelity with the suitors.

[115] It should be noted that the vast majority of Odysseus is ten years at sea is not spent overcoming challenges, but rather in the company of the beautiful nymph Circe who falls hopelessly in love with him, requiring nightly sex, before ultimately being ordered (against her bitter objections) to release the hero by Hermes the messenger of Zeus.

[116] This movement of philosophy broadly emerged in the middle of the 6th century BC around the Ionian city of Miletus (See Gorman 2001 for an excellent history of these origins). According to Aristotle (*Metapysics* 983b18) the first of these philosophers was Thales who founded the Ionian School from which Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus would emerge in later generations. For a good introduction to Pre-Socratic thought see Stamatellos (2012) and on the relation of pre-Socratic thought to modern science Boschiero (2010).

[117] In her excellent study of the relationship of myth to early Greek thought Katherine Morgan (2000:3) argues that in this period philosophy develops out of myth through a powerful negation, "mythos becomes the "Other" and the opposition that we know as mythos versus logos, myth versus science is born". This negation however "risks blinding us to the important role played by myth in Greek philosophy".

[118] Numbering convention for Heraclitus` fragments varies with translation. Here all references are taken from Kahn (1981).

[119] For a fuller of discussion on Heraclitus and death in battle see Kirk (1949).

[120] This is particularly true of the early and middle period dialogues on which I focus in this chapter. For a useful discussion of the debate over the periodiesation of the Platonic dialogues see Brandwood (1990), Howard (1991) and Kahn (2002).

[121] As Christopher Rowe (2006 10) suggests, the dialogue is "as much a dialogue of positions than a dialogue of persons". It is a literary form which develops a philosophical method of dialetical thinking. For more on the Platonic method see Kahn (1998).

[122] This critique of the mythic poets is articulated at length by Socrates n the Apology in which it is suggested "not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them" (Apol 21d).

[124]Relating to the School of Philosophy established in the Greek town of Elea.

[125] Kingsley (1999 92) suggests the goddess as the daughter of Zeus and queen of the underworld Persephone.

[126] There is also suggested a third path which confuses being and non-being and thus is also a path of error and confusion.

[127] The underworld to which Parmenides refers is, however, not Homer`s Hades, but according to Pamer (2009 54) the world of Tartarus (*Τάρταρος*) as described in the cosmogony of Hesiod.

[128] Crucially Havestock affirms that these allusions are thus not merely "conflined to the proem but effect also the general structure of Parmenides philosophical argument" (1958 156). For a parallel discussion of the relation of Parmeindes thought to the cosmogony of Hesiod see Dolin (1962).

[129] The Greek verb does not require a subject and so can also be translated as being. See Sedley (1999 114), for a fuller discussion see Furth (1968 111-116).

[130] Kahn also claims ontology to be founded in the very same moment.

[131] For a useful discussion of Plato`s ambiguous relationship to Heracliteanism see Resothko (1994) and Zovko (2002).

[132] In his extensive study of the relationship of the Odyssey to political theory Patrick Deneen discusses the ambiguous relationship to Achilles in Plato, both in the apology where Socrates explicitly compares his own philosophical courage to the heroic courage of Achilles, but also in the Republic where there is a notable sympathy for Odysseus as the proto-philosopher while Achilles is condemned as a lover of money and rebel

against the gods (2000 94-100). See also Euben (1990) for a fuller discussion of the comparison to Achilles in the Apology.

[133] Glaucon characterises such a city as a "community of pigs" (372d).

[134] For a useful discussion of the parallels between the Smithian model of the division of labour and Plato`s theory of specialisation see Foley (1974) and for a critical response McNulty (1975).

[135] Julia Annas suggests a third possible danger would be the rise of corruption in a city purely motivated by appetitive desires (1981 76).

[136] It should be noted that by philosophers Plato is suggesting an ideal form of philosophers rather than actual philosophers as they existed in ancient Greece (474b-475d).

[137] Somewhat sinisterly, it is suggested any "defective offspring… will be quietly and secretly disposed of, they must be if we are to keep the guardian stock pure" (460c).

[138] Mathematics was a crucial part of education in the Platonic academy (see Fowler 1987). For Burnyeat (2003:74) this is because it teaches the higher unity of the good of the whole over and above the parts. For a critical response to this view see Tenen (2011).

[139] Plato`s critique of earthly pleasures is developed at length in the Georgias and Philebus Dialogues, suggesting for example in the latter that the life of the gods is a life without pleasure at all (Phil 33b). For Moss (2006 503-53) this distrust of pleasure as leading us away from the true good towards false goods is key to the whole Platonic project.

[140] Said is responding to Michael Walzer`s *Exodus and Revolution.* Both authors reflect the "memory" of Exodus as suggested in the previous chapter, reading that narrative through contemporary politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Boyarin (1992, 1996). For Walzer`s response see (1986) and for a good summary of the exchange see Walkout (1991).

[141] The use of the term genocide in relation to the Canaan campaigns has become particularly contentious in recent years. For a useful summary of the distinct positions see Rauser (2009), Earl (2011), Copan (2011), Selbert (2012).

[142] The 7 tribes of Canaan referred to were the Amorites, Hittites, Perrizites, Canaanites, Gergashites, Hevites and Jebusites (Deut 7:1, Josh 3:10).

[143] The complexities of Paul identity are addressed in an excellent collection edited by Stanley Porter (2008) as composing three elements. Certainly he was of Jewish heritage and religiously zealous in his persecution of Christians (Rom 11:1, Gal 2:15), yet he wrote his letters in Greek and was born in Tarsus (Acts 22:3) a centre of Greek learning. Finally he was a Roman citizen (Acts 16:37) from a relatively wealthy background (Nock 1938 21) who travelled widely throughout the Mediterranean world.

[144] See for example 1 Cor 1:1, 1 Cor 1:26-28, Gal 3:28-29, 2 Cor 12:8, 1 Cor 2:8, 1 Cor 4:8-21.

[145] Particularly amongst the elite women of Rome (Harnack 1905 227) who were key in the establishment of house churches in the early Jesus movement. As Gillian Clarke suggests, women of the comfortably off and merchant classes of the empire were well-attested in the Christian movement from early on in its spread... (as) patronesses to the apostles and their successors"(2000:427 cited in Stark 2009: 10).

[146] Shaw (1987:12) suggests Augustine likely came from the lower end of the Curial class, the "lower ranks of the regional upper class" albeit on the extreme margins of the empire, rather than a background of rural poverty as sometimes suggested in the *Confessions*

[147] The *Confessions* suggest Augustine`s father was from a pagan background. It is rather his mother who is painted as intellectually brilliant and particularly devout, her influence on the young Augustine`s development is clearly immensely significant (Confess IX 9, See also Shaw 1987).

[148]The tradition originating in 3rd century writings of the Persian prophet Mani combine elements of Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastronism and Buddhism into a dualistic cosmology which divided existence into the two fundamental substances of good and evil. For a fuller discussion on Augustine`s embrace of this tradition see Hollingworth (2013:127-142).

[149] As such Augustine`s theology involves both a Platonisation of Messianic Christianity, but also a Christianisation of Platonsim as he describes *"in the Platonists there is the view that In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God: the Same was in the beginning with God: all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made: But, that He came unto His own, and His own received Him not… this I read not there" (Confessions 7).*

[150] Sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the two swords, established by Pope Gelasius in 494AD whereby the Empire was granted earthly legitimacy in political matters on the basis of its acceptance of the soverignty of the Church in spiritual matters (See Tierney & Painter 1999 76).

[151] At its height in the 720s the Umayyad Caliphate had reached across the Pyrenees into southern Gaul before being pushed back in the 750s.

[152]As Leo IV affirmed to the armies of the Franks, to fight against Heathens would assure a special recognition from God: “For the Omnipotent knows that they lost their lives fighting for the truth of the faith, for the preservation of their country” (Medieval Sourcebook 1905 511-12).

[153] In particular the practice of Simony was widespread by which these positions and the lucrative estates they controlled were often sold by kings in order to raise funds and assure the loyalty of the local nobility, particularly in hostile regions such as Saxony (see Blumenthal 1988 110-113).

[154] The Church took the opportunity to win back this privilege in 1059 following the accession of Henry VI as a 6 year old child.

[155]First in 1076 and then again in 1080.

[156] Jerusalem had been the very definition of the "city of God" for Augustine, the centre of the world in Medieval Christianity.

[157]There are several different versions of the Clermont sermon which in some aspects differ considerably, here I refer to the accounts collected in Allen & Ant (2010).

[158] The reality seems to be much less dramatic. For many centuries Christians and Jews had made pilgrimage to Jerusalem during which time there had been no official opposition. To the extent that pilgrims suffered it was largely due to criminality and local resentment against the presence of large numbers of foreigners rather than organised opposition. The only notable outbreak of perseuction against Christians came at the beginning of the 11th century during the Caliphate of Al Hakim culminating in the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. However, upon the disappearance of Hakim in 1021 the persecution ended and by 1048 the Church had been rebuilt see Falk (2010:74-98), Claster (2009:17-18).

[159] The Church retained a certain spiritual dimension with the condition that remission shall only be achieved if the Crusader is motivated purely by piety, rather than pursuit of glory and honour (Flori 2006:20) yet this subtlety was likely lost on most participants and certainly was absent from all accounts of Urban`s sermon at Clermont.

[160] For more on the ideology of Crusading see Riley-Smith (2003), Erdman (1977) and Flori (2006).

[161] In the period prior to 1096 Canon law affirmed the toleration of Jews in Christian territories on the basis that they accept subordination to Christian rule (Gilchrist 1988:10-11).

[162] The victories of the Muslims in the east combined with the rise of the Mongols and the devastation of the Plague effectively served to close off all eastward routes to the great centres of wealth in India and China. This closure set in motion the desperate efforts to find an alternative route to the east which would

ultimately find success in the Southern rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Vasco de Garma in 1497 but also in the event led to the western journey of Columbus which led to the Americas.

[163] Cristoforo Colombo in the original Italian, Cristóbal Colón in Spanish, I will use the standard English translation throughout this chapter for purposes of clarity.

[164] In addition, Columbus affirms, somewhat more sinisterly, the Indians passivity shall also make them "good servants" (2010:38), noting that with only a small number of men it will be easy to subjugate the entire population (which he estimates as twice that of Portugal), "for they are naked and without arms, and hopelessly timid" (2010:138).

[165] Named for the Spanish Princess.

[166] For more on the original cartography of the Americas see Mignolo (1995) (2005).

[167] Dussel pointedly refuses to use the standard term "encounter", which he suggests implies a meeting of equals rather than a violent subjugation of one people by another.

[168] For more on the role of sexual violence in the conquest see Wood (1998) and Trexler (1995).

[169] In particular the Indians of Chiapas, who officially endorsed Las Casas as their representative in the debate.

[170] The actual proceedings of the debate were not formally recorded. However, both Sepúlveda and Las Casas drew their arguments from already published work which was submitted before the judges.

[171] The original document was publish in Latin, here I will translate from the Spanish translation provided by M. Menendes-Pelayo and available online at http://jorgecaceresr.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/democrates-segundo-o-de-las-justas-causas-de-la-guerra-contra-los-indios.pdf.

[172] For an excellent study on the use of Aristotle in the debates concerning the American Indian see Hanke (1959).

[173] The polemical tone against Oviedo is a constant theme throughout the Defense, amongst the more colourful characterisations of "that wretched man" (1992b:345) are his description as a "looter" (346), a "wicked plunderer" (346), a "sycophant" (346), and moreover an "ignorant" (345), and "unhappy man who reviles almost all of humanity" (345), a man who "is not ashamed to write lies… from which he stupidly promises himself immortality" (344). For these lies and the multiple crimes Las Casas accuses Oviedo of during his time in Hispaniola and Nicaragua, he will surely be judged "and Christ has a whip in his hand" (345).

[174] Certainly it should be noted that this has not been without resistance. From the very first months of the conquest there have been active resistance from the various Amerindian peoples to the domination fo Europeans, from the first rebellion of the Taino through the uprisings of Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari through to the present mobilisations of indigenous peoples from southern Mexico to Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.

[175] Sometimes referred to elsewhere as moral sense theory.

[176] Quentin Skinner has argued Locke in particular shared much with the model of natural law proposed by the Iberian Scholastics and further "agreed with their sense of the pivotal role which ought to be assigned to this natural law in any legitimate political society" (1978:174).

[177] Here Kant could be referring directly to the amorality of the market described by Smith in *The Wealth of Nation*s.

[178] Alternatively *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, or *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View.*