The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control

Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2015) The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control. CESifo Economic Studies, 61 (3-4). pp. 701-721. ISSN 1612-7501

Full text not available from this repository.


We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploy- ing inadequate resources on cost–effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one in- strument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re–election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in CESifo Economic Studies following peer review. The version of record Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control CESifo Economic Studies 2015 61: 701-721 is available online at: This article is part of the CEPR project ‘Temporary Migration, Integration and the role of Policies’ (TEMPO) funded by the NORFACE Research Programme: ‘Migration in Europe—Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics’.
Keywords: illegal immigration, immigration policy
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Thakrar, Anandi
Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2015 11:46
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:04

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View